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tatra yadi pareṇa vaktṛtvānugamena tat praṇītatvam āgamasyeṣṭaṃ syāt tadā bhaved vaktṛtvābhāvād āgamasyātat praṇītatvaprasaṅgaḥ yāvatādhipatyamātreṇāsau tasyāgamasya praṇetābhyupagato na vaktṛtvopagamāt / | Now, if the other party (Buddhist) had held the fact of the Scripture being composed by the Person on the ground of His speakership, then there could be some point in urging that “if He is not the speaker, then the Scripture could not have been composed by Him”. As a matter of fact, however, when Buddha is regarded as the composer (Author) of the Scripture, it is only as a Supervisor, an over-lord, not as the actual speaker. |
ato yat tatpraṇītāgamopagamena vaktṛtvāpādanaṃ tat prasaṅgārthānabhijñena bhavatābhyadhāyi // | Consequently, the argument that you have urged in the form of the Reductio ad Absurdum, that “if He is the composer of the Scripture, He must be the speaker”, is one that has been urged by you without knowing what is meant by ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’. |
yaccedam uktaṃ kuṭyādiniḥsṛtānām ityādi / | It has been argued, under Text 3244, that “Teachings issuing from walls could not be accepted as taught by a Reliable Person”. |
tatrāha kuṭyādītyādi / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3611 above] |
yadi hi tadādhipatyena tāsāṃ deśanānāṃ na syāt pravṛttis tadāptopadiṣṭatā na bhavet / | If the teachings had not been prompted by the over-lordship of the Omniscient Person, then they might not be accepted as those of a Reliable Person. |
[p.927] yadā tu tadādhipatyena tāḥ pravartanta ityupagataṃ tadā kimiti tadupadiṣṭatvam āsāṃ na bhavet // | When, however, it has been admitted that they do proceed under His supervision, then why should not they be regarded as taught by Him? (3611) |
sambhinnālāpahiṃsādikutsitārthavivarjitāḥ / krīḍāśīlapiśācādipraṇītāḥ syuḥ kathaṃ ca tāḥ // | Being devoid of teachings of mixed character and those of slaughter and such other evil things, how could these teachings be the work of sportive goblins and others? in them, there is no teaching of mixed character; |
krīḍāśīlapiśācādikāryaṃ tāsu na vidyate // | nor of slaughter and other evil things, which alone could be the work of sportive goblins and others. |
pramāṇadvayasaṃvādi mataṃ tadviṣaye 'khile / | All that lies within the purview of the two means or forms of right cognition is in strict accord with these; |
yasya bādhā pramāṇābhyām aṇīyasyāpi nekṣyate // yaccātyantaparokṣepi pūrvāparavibādhitam / | and nothing of the slightest thing contrary to them is vouched for by the two means of cognition. Even in regard to absolutely supersensuous things, the said teaching is not annulled by anything past or future; |
karuṇādiguṇotpattau sarvapuṃsāṃ prayujakam // sarvākāradharopetaṃ sadvṛttapratipādakam / | it prompts the manifestations of such qualities as compassion and the like; it is endowed with all forms, expounds right behaviour; |
ihāmutra ca bhavyānāṃ vividhābhyudayāvaham // | it is conducive to various forms of welfare here and elsewhere; |
sarvānuśayasandohapratipakṣābhidhāyakam / | it teaches the antidote to all kinds of love, hatred and the rest; |
nirvāṇanagaradvārakapāṭapurabhedi ca // | it opens the gate to the city of nirvāṇa. |
taccetkrīḍanaśīlānāṃ rakṣasāṃ vā vaco bhavet / ta eva santu sambuddhāḥ sarvatallakṣaṇasthiteḥ // | If such teaching could be the work of playful persons or demons, then these same may be the ‘enlightened beings’, as fulfilling all the conditions of ‘enlightenment’! |
nahi nāmāntaraklṛptau vasturūpaṃ nivartate / | Merely by giving a different name to a thing, its real form does not become altered. |
viśiṣṭe 'śiṣṭasaṃjñāṃ tu kurvannindyaḥ satāṃ bhavet // | In fact, if a man were to call the cultured ‘uncultured’, he himself would be subject to the derision of all good people. |
yadi hi nṛtyagītahiṃsāgamyagamanādeḥ tat kartavyatayā tatropadeśaḥ syāt tadā krīḍādyabhiratapiśācādikāryopalambhāt tāsāṃ tat praṇītatvaṃ sambhāvanāpathamavataret / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3612-3619 above] If there were teaching of dancing, music, slaughter, incest and such things as to be done, then, in as much there would be found the work of playful goblins and such persons, it might come within the range of possibility to think of it as the work of these persons; |
yāvatā pramāṇaviruddhamaparasparaparāhatamāryajanocitam karuṇādiguṇeṣu niyojayitṛ svargāpavargaphalavāhakam etad bhagavato vacanam ityupapāditam etat / | as a matter of fact, however, the words of the Blessed Lord are found to be not incompatible with any forms of right cognition, free from self-contradictions, fit for noble people, prompting men to Compassion and other such qualities, conducive to the attainment of Heaven and Final Liberation; |
tadīdṛśaṃ kathaṃ krīḍanaśīlasya piśādeḥ sambhāvyate / yadi nṛṇām api bhavatā piśāca iti nāma kriyate / | How could such teaching be the work of playful goblins? If you apply the name ‘goblin’ to men also, you may do so; |
kāmaṃ kriyatāṃ nahi nāmakaraṇe vastusvabhāvahāniḥ / | but mere naming does not deprive the thing of its nature. |
kintu bhavāneva viśiṣṭe bhagavatyaśiṣṭavyavahāraṃ kurvan satāṃ nindya āpadyeteti samāsārthaḥ / | On the contrary, you yourself, by behaving like an uncultured person towards the highly cultured Blessed Lord, would be open to the derision of good men. Such in brief is what is meant by the Text as a whole. |
avayavārthastūcyete sambhinnālāpo gītādyupadeśaḥ / | The meaning of the words is as follows ‘Teachings of mixed character’ e.g. those of singing, etc; |
hiṃsā prāṇivadhaḥ / kutsitārthaḥ kāmamithyācārādiḥ / | ‘slaughter’ killing of animalsevil things’ like sensuality, dishonesty and the like. |
[p.928] pramāṇadvayasaṃvādīti / pramāṇadvayam pratyakṣānumāne tābhyāṃ saṃvādas tadaviruddhārthā so 'syāstīti tat tathoktam / | ‘In accord with the two means or forms of right cognition’; the two means are Perception and Inference; ‘accordance with these’ is saying nothing contrary to these; |
matam iti / | ‘matam’ found to be; |
tadviṣaye 'khila iti pramāṇadvayaviṣaye / pramāṇadvayasaṃvādīti sambandhaḥ / | in all matters contained therein’ matters within the purview of the two Means of Right Cognition, it is in strict accord with these latter; such is the construction of the sentence. |
tallakṣaṇasthitetr iti sambuddhalakṣaṇasthiteḥ //3612- | ‘Right behaviour’ which is excellent, in the beginning, middle and end; |
"abhijñātam abhijñeyaṃ bhāvanīyaṃ ca bhāvitam / prahātavyaṃ ca prahīṇaṃ ca tena buddho nirudhyata //" iti vedasyaiva krīḍāśīlapiśācādipraṇītatvaṃ yuktaṃ sambhāvayitum / yena gosavādiṣvagamyagamanādayo 'samācārāḥ samprakāśitā ityetad darśayann āha kāmetyāha / | such as Continence and the like. ‘Sarvānuśayasandoha’ the entire mass of perception, thoughts and ‘Afflictions’, ‘Fulfilling all the conditions’ Having all the characteristics of the ‘enlightened Person’, This has been thus described ‘When all that had to be known becomes known, all that had to be reflected upon has become reflected upon, all that had to be abandoned has become abandoned, then the Person is said to have become Buddha, Enlightened’. |
kāmamithyāsamācāraprāṇihiṃsādilakṣaṇāḥ / asabhyāstu kriyā yena vacasā samprakāśitāḥ // tadbhujaṅgapiśācādipraṇītam iti śaṅkyate / | In fact, it is in the case of words that are marked by the mention of sexuality, dishonest behaviour, animal-slaughter and so forth, and which speak of many barbarous acts, that there is room for suspicion regarding their being the work of rogues, demons and the like. |
tacceṣṭābhiratānāṃ hi tādṛksambhāvyate vacaḥ // | Such words are likely to proceed only from persons who are addicted to such practices. |
bhujaṅgo dhūrtaḥ //3620- | ‘Bhujaṅga’ is Bogus. |
yaccoktam yugapacchucyaśucyādītyādi tatrāha yugapad ityādi / yugapacchucyaśucyādisvabhāvānāṃ virodhinām / | The simultaneous apprehension by one and the same cognition of mutually contradictory things, like the pure and the impure and so forth, has actually been found. |
jñānamekadhiyā dṛṣṭaṃ na viruddhā vidā hi te // | because they are not incompatible with cognition. |
yadyapi bhāvāḥ kecit parasparaṃ virodhinaḥ tathāpi te vidā jñānena sahāviruddhā eva / yugapad ekenāpi jñānena viruddhānekārthagrahaṇopalambhāt // | Even though there are some things that are mutually incompatible, yet, they are quite compatible with the Cognition; as is clear from the fact that several mutually incompatible things are actually perceived at one and the same time. |
etad eva spaṣṭayann āha anyonyaparihāretyādi / | The same idea is further clarified: [see verses 3623-3624 next] |
anyonyaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇato 'thavā / ekasmin na saha sthānaṃ virodhas teṣu sambhavet // | In the case of things that are mutually exclusive by their nature, or in those that can never coexist, there may be incompatibility; |
ekajñānāvabhāsitvaṃ natu teṣāṃ virodhitā / | but there is no incompatibility in both figuring in the one and the same cognition; |
śucyaśucyāhiśikhyādeś cakṣuṣā sakṛdīkṣaṇāt // | because there is perception through the eye of such contraries as (a) the pure and the impure things, (b) the serpent and the peacock and so forth. |
dvividha eva hi bhāvānāṃ virodhaḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā sahānavasthānatā ca / | Incompatibility among things is of two kinds (1) mutual exclusiveness, and (2) non-coexistence. Those things that are mutually exclusive, their unification is clearly incompatible; |
tatra ye parasparaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇās teṣām aikyaṃ viruddham / | those again that are non-coexistent, their coexistence is incompatible. |
na caikavijñānabhāsanādoṣām aikyamekadeśatvaṃ vā prasajyeta / | But by figuring in the same cognition, things do not become either unified or coexistent. |
tena naikavijñānabhāsitvenaiṣāṃ virodhaḥ / | Hence there is no incompatibility in their figuring in the same cognition. |
dṛṣṭaṃ ca viruddhānām api satāmekajñānabhāsanam / | In fact, it is actually seen that even incompatible things figure in the same cognition; |
yathā śucyaśucinoścakṣurjñānena parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayor ahermayūrasya ca sahānavasthāyinor yugapad grahaṇam / | for instance, the Pure and the Impure things, which are mutually exclusive, and the Serpent and the Peacock, which can never live together, are perceived, through the Eye, at one and the same time. |
ādiśabdena chāyātapādīnāṃ grahaṇam / | ‘And so forth’ includes such pair of opposites as Light and Shade and the rest. |
sukhaduḥkhādibhede tu yat sakṛnnāsti vedanam / hetvabhāvād asānnidhyāt tajjñeyaṃ na virudhyate // | That there is no simultaneous cognition in the case of pleasure and pain, that should be understood to be due to the requisite cause being absent; there is nothing incompatible in it. |
tajjñeyam iti / | ‘Should be understood’; |
yat sukhādīnāṃ sakṛdavedanaṃ tat kāraṇābhāvenānutpatter asannihitatvāt tat{natu---} viruddhatvād ityevaṃ jñeyam boddhavyam ity arthaḥ / | That Pleasure and Pain are not cognised at one and the same time is due to the fact that they do not appear at one and the same time, on account of the causes of both not being present, not on account of any incompatibility. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati kāraṇavaikalyād asānnidhyaṃ tatra kāraṇaṃ na parasparavirodha iti // | This is what should be understood to be the case. What is meant is that the cause of the non-cognition of both lies in the absence of their causes, not in their mutual incompatibility. |
yeṣāṃ ca vāstavo virodho natu śucyaśucyādivat kalpanākṛtas teṣām apyekajñāne bhāsanam astīti darśayati nīlapītetyādi / | (3625) In the case of those things also where the Incompatibility is real, and not merely conceptual, as in the case of Pure and Impure, there is figuring in the same cognition. This is what is shown in the following [see verse 3626 above] |
deśaprakṛtibhedepi{na---} vīkṣyante yugapadyataḥ // deśaprakṛtibhedena virodhina iti sambandhaḥ / | [verse 3626]: The construction is ‘incompatible, on account of the differences of place, origin, etc.’ ‘Difference of place’ consists in both not occupying the same point in space; |
prakṛtibhedo nīlapītādisvabhāvatvam / yadvā nīlādyupādānakāraṇatvam // | ‘difference of origin or nature’ ‘nature’ in the shape of the Blue, etc. and ‘origin’ in the shape of the blue components. |
yaccoktam bhūtaṃ bhavadbhaviṣyatītyādi tatrāha ekajñānetyādi / ekajñānakṣaṇavyāptaniḥśeṣajñeyamaṇḍalaḥ / | The omniscient person whose existence we have established is one who comprehends within a single cognitive moment the entire round of all that is to be known; |
prasādhito hi sarvajñaḥ kramo nāśrīyate tataḥ // | it is for this reason that no succession is admitted in this case. |
atra kecit svayūthyā eva vijñānavādimatam upodbalayantaś codayanti yadi yugapad ekajñānakṣaṇena {a} viśeṣaṃ jñeyamaṇḍalaṃ vyāghā{pya---}te, tadā bhāvanāni yatnā{bhāvānāmiyattā---}paricchedādānantyamabhyupetaṃ bādhyeta / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3627 above] In this connection some people belonging to our own party, while supporting the opinion of the Idealist, argue as follows: If the entire round of cognisable things is embraced within a single cognitive moment, then that would imply a limit on the number and extent of things; |
tathā hyekajñānārūḍhād bhāvād anyo bhāvo nāstītyevaṃ paricchidyamānāḥ katham antavanto na bhaveyuḥ / | Because when all things would be embraced within the orbit of a single cognition, how could they be saved from the contingency of not being endless? This has been asserted thus ‘Being embraced within a single cognition, there is nothing outside that limit; |
ekajñānasamārūḍhānnānyo bhāvo 'sti kaścana / iyanta iti vijñānādantavanta <kathaṃ na te> iti / tataś ca kramapakṣe yo doṣaḥ sa yugapajjñānapakṣe 'pīti. | and thus the idea being that things are only so many, they cannot be endless, they become limited’, Under the circumstances, the idea of the simultaneous cognition of all things would be open to the same objection that has been urged against the idea of their successive cognition. |
tadetad asāram. | There is no force, however, in this argument. |
yadi tāvan nirākāravijñānavādimatam āśritya codyate, tadā sarvamasaṅgatam. | If this argument is put up on the basis of the opinion that Cognitions are formless, then it is all irrelevant. |
tathā hi yāvat kiñcid [p.930] vastujñānaṃ{taṃ} sattām anubhavati / tasya sarvasya sattāmātreṇa sarvajñacetasā parichedāt tena tadvyāptam iti vyapadiśyate, natu paṭeneva ghaṭānāṃ deśaparyantatayā vyāpteḥ / | Because, whenever a thing, on becoming cognised, thereby acquires existence, all that is comprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person is that it is existent, and is, therefore, said to be embraced by it; and it is not meant by this that it covers the place occupied by the thing, in the way that the cloth covers a number of jars. |
na caikena jñānena paricchinnānītyetāvatā vastūnām ātmasvabhāvahāniḥ / | The mere fact that certain things are apprehended by a single cognition does not deprive the things of their own nature or character; |
yena tānyekajñānaparicchedavaśād anantatvamātmasvabhāvaṃ jahyuḥ / | whereby, by reason of being apprehended by a single cognition, they would renounce their endless character. |
nahi nīlapītādayo bhāvā bahavo yugapaccitrās taraṇādiṣvekajñānakṣaṇāvasīyamānatanavo 'nekatvaṃ jahati / | When various things, like the Blue, the Yellow and so forth, appearing in a single picture, become apprehended by a single cognition, they do not cease to be many; |
nāpi parasparamanvāviśanti / | nor do they become merged into one another; |
apitu yathaiva santi tathaiva jñānena paricchidyante / nānyena rūpeṇa / | in fact, they are apprehended by the cognition exactly as they are, not in any other form. |
tadvat sattvabaloko 'pi yathaiva sattāmanubhavati tathaiva sarvajñacetasā gṛhyate / | In the same manner, the World which has existence is apprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person exactly as it exists. |
aparyantaś ca dikṣu vidikṣu sattvādiloko 'vasthita ityaparyantayā tasya grahaṇaṃ natu paryantavartitayeti kuto 'ntavattvaprasaṅgaḥ / | As a matter of fact, there is no end to the extent of the worldly region in any direction; hence it is apprehended as limitless, not as limited. How then could it be regarded as having an end? |
syād etat sakalagrahaṇābhyupagame kathaṃ paryantagrahaṇaṃ na syād iti / | It might be urged that “If the apprehension of the entire world is admitted, then, how could there be no apprehension of the limits?” |
naitad asti / | It is not so, we reply. |
kohyatra pratibandho yatra sākalyagrahaṇaṃ tatrāvaśyaṃ paryantagrahaṇam iti / tathā hi yāvantas te santi bhāvās teṣāṃ madhye naiko 'pi sarvajñajñānāviditasvarūpaḥ sattāmanubhavati / | Where is there any such universal Proposition that ‘wherever there is apprehension of the entirety of things, there must be apprehension of the limits also’? As a matter of fact, of all the things that exist, there is not one which has existence and has its form unapprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person; in fact all things appear and disappear only as having their forms apprehended by the consciousness of the Omniscient Person; |
apitu sarva eva sarvajñacetasā viditasvarūpā evodayante vyayante ca naiko 'piparityakta ityayaṃ sakalagrahaṇasyārthaḥ / iyam eva ca teṣām ekajñānena vyāptiḥ / | This is what is meant by His apprehending ‘all things in their entirety’. This also is what is meant by all things being ‘embraced in a single cognition’, otherwise, the fact of all things being spoken of as ‘all’ may also be not admitted, in order to avoid their having limits. |
yaccoktamekajñānārūḍhād bhāvād anyo nāstītyevaṃ paricchedāt katham antavanto na bhaveyur iti tadapyasamyak / | It has been argued that “on account of the things being all included under a single cognition, there would follow the corollary that there is nothing apart from all these; how then would it be denied that the said things have their limit?” |
nahi nirākārajñānavādipakṣe jñānātmani bhāvānām ārohaṇam asti / | Under the view of people who regard Cognition as formless, there can be no actual ‘inclusion’ of things within the Cognition; |
api tu sattāmātreṇa tena nivedyante / | all that happens is that they become indicated by the Cognition merely as |
nāpi bhāvānāṃ jñānāparicchedyasvabhāvatayānantatvam abhyupetam yena jñāyamānatayā teṣām antavattvaṃ prasajyeta / | existing, Nor has the ‘endlessness’ of things been accepted on the ground of their not being comprehended under Cognition; by virtue of which, if they became apprehended, they would come to have limits. |
kintu deśavitānāparyantatayānanto bhājanalokaḥ / | All that has been held is that the extension of space being limitless, the Region ‘containing’ the things is ‘limitless’, ‘endless’; |
sattvalokas tu saṅkhyānāparyantatayāpi / | as the Region of pure ‘Existence’ is ‘endless’, also because there can be no limits to the enumeration (of things). |
na ca deśāvatiṣṭhambhāya paryantatve sati grāhyavirodhaḥ kaścid yenāgrāhyatā bhavet / | Nor is there any incompatibility between‘being apprehended’ and the ‘absence of limits’ for the filling up of space; |
yadi paryantatayā na saṃgṛhṇāti kathaṃ sarvajñaḥ syād iti cedata eva / yata evāsau paryantatayā na gṛhṇāti tata eva sarvajño bhavati / | on account of which ‘incompatibility’, things would have to be regarded as ‘not apprehended’, If it is asked “If He does not comprehend all things within His Cognition, how can He be omniscient?”, the answer is that, it would be so, for that very reason; |
anyathānantaṃ vastvantavattvena gṛhṇan bhrānto bhavet / | otherwise, if He had apprehended the limitless things as limited, He would be clearly mistaken. |
tathā hi yadasti tadastitvena yannāsti tannāstitvena gṛhṇan sarvaviducyate / | Because one is called “omniscient’ only when He apprehends existing things as existent, and non-existing things as non-existent; |
na ca sattvabhājanalokasya paryanto 'sti / | and to the Region of existence, there is no limit at all. |
tasmāt paryantaṃ gamanakṛtamavidyamānatayā gṛhṇan sarvajñajñānaparicchedakṛtaṃ tu paryantaṃ vidyamānaṃ vidyamānatayā paśyan katham asarvajño nāma / | Hence if one apprehends as non-existent, the limit, which does not exist in the form of movement, and if he apprehends as existent, the Limit, which does exist in the form of being cognised by the Omniscient Person, why should He be regarded as ‘Not-Omniscient’? |
syād etat nirākārajñānapakṣe viṣayagrahaṇamanupapannaṃ sarvatrāviśiṣṭatvāt tasya / | The following might be urged “Under the view that Cognition is formless, there can be no apprehension of objects; because such Cognition would be indistinguishable. |
tena pratikarma{panna---}vibhāgānupapatter ato nirākārapakṣo 'nupanyasanīya eva / | Consequently, no differentiation of particular things and functions being possible, this view of Cognition being formless should not be put forward at all; |
sarvadā tasya dra{du---}ṣṭatvād iti / | as it would be always open to objection”. |
tadetad asamyak / | This is not right. |
[p.931] nahi sarvajñajñānasya pratikarma{panna---}vibhāga iṣyate tasya, sarvavastuviṣayatvāt yato na tannīlasyaiva saṃvedanaṃ pītasyaivā vā api tu sarvasyaivetīṣṭam / | In regard to the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, no differentiation of things and their functions is admitted; because the said Cognition envisages all things: because the idea is that the said Cognition (of the Omniscient Person) envisages, not the Blue only, nor the yellow only, but all things. |
tathahi nīlasyedaṃ saṃvedanaṃ na pītasyeti niyamābhāvāt sarvasya pṛthagjanasya sarvajñatvaprasaṅgāpādanaṃ kriyate / | hence as in his case, under the view that ‘Cognitions are formless’, all things would stand on the same footing, the impossibility of well-known distinctions is declared to be open to objection, Because, as there could he no such distinction as ‘this is the Cognition of Blue’, ‘that is the Cognition of Yellow’ even common people would be equally omniscient; |
sarvajñasya tu tadiṣṭam eveti kasya kimaniṣṭamāpadyatām / tena sarvajñāvasthāyāṃ nirākāraṃ yogabalenotpadyamānam aviruddhameva / | as regards the Omniscient Person himself, such non-distinction would be only right; hence how could the said contingency be urged as an undesirable one? Thus in the state of Omniscience, it is only right and proper that the Cognition should be formless and brought about by the powers of mysticism. |
vibhāgena heyopādeyavastuparijñānaṃ na syād iti cet / | It might be argued that “In that case things could not be distinguished as (1) those to be acquired, and (2) those to be abandoned”. |
na / | Not so, we reply. |
yadi hi yugapad anante vastuni pratibhāsamāne heyopādeyavastunaḥ pratibhāsavirodhaḥ syāt avirodhe cānyaiḥ pratibhāsamānasya tasya heyopādeyavastunaḥ tattvapracyutiḥ syāt, pracyutattvasyāpi vibhāgenāvabhāsam eva vā na syāt, viraktāvabhāsanasyāpi yadi paricchedakaḥ śuddhalaukiko vimarśapratyayaḥ pṛṣṭhabhāvī notpadyate tadaitat sarvaṃ syād vaktum / | If in the event of the limitless number of things appearing in consciousness at one and the same time, there were incompatibility with the things being cognised as (1) to be acquired and (2) to be abandoned, and if there were no such incompatibility with other things, and there were some loss of character on the part of the things to be acquired and things to be abandoned as they appear in consciousness, or even thi lost character were not distinguished, , or even when they appeared in consciousness, if there came about no ordinary Cognition envisaging them, then, under these contingencies, there might be room for asserting what has been asserted. |
yāvatā viśvasmin jagatyavabhāsamāne tadapi heyopādeyaṃ vastvaviruddhapratibhāsamapracyutātmatattvaṃ niruktamevāvabhāsate / | As a matter of fact, however, when the entire world appears in consciousness, even the thing to be acquired and to be abandoned appear in consciousness without any incongruity, and without losing any of their essential character; |
paścāc ca sarvajñajñānabalotpannaśuddhalaukikapratyavamarśapratyayena paricchidyata eveti kathaṃ vibhāgena tadaparijñānaṃ nāma / | and subsequently, it all becomes apprehended by the pure ordinary Cognition brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person. Why then, can there be no Cognition of things as distinguished from one another? |
tadevaṃ nirākārajñānapakṣe tāvad acodyametad iti pratipāditam / | Thus it has been proved that there is no room for the objection as against the view that Cognitions are formless. |
atha sākārajñānavādapakṣe codyate / | If then, the objection is meant to be urged against the view that Cognitions have forms, then, also there is no such incompatibility as has been urged. |
tatrāpyavirodha eva / | and there is no incongruity in this; |
ekasya jñānasyānekavastvākāropagraheṇoptattyavirodhāt / | as there is nothing incompatible in a single Cognition envisaging the forms of several things. |