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tadanyavad iti / | [see verse 3578 above] |
kṛtrimābhimatabrāhmaṇeṣviva / | ‘Among others’ i.e. among the artificial Brāhmaṇas. |
nāmakaraṇādivat sāṃvyavahārikāḥ / | ‘Illusory’ purely artificial, like the Naming-rite. |
tṛtīye 'pi pakṣe na yukto madaḥ nahi brāhmaṇabrāhmaṇīśarīrāṇāṃ śūdrādiśarīrataḥ śukraśoṇitādyaśucimayatvena kaścid viśeṣo 'stītyuktam etat // | Under the third alternative also (that of superiority being due to birth from Brāhmaṇa parents), no pride is proper; because, as has been pointed out before, there is no difference between the body of the Brāhmaṇa male and female and that of the Śūdra male and female, both consisting of the same unclean ingredients of Semen, Blood and so forth. |
atītaś ca mahān kālo yoṣitāṃ cāticāpalam / | A very long time has elapsed and women are very unsteady; |
tadbhavatyapi niścetuṃ brāhmaṇatvaṃ na śakyate // | hence it cannot be certain if there is Brāhmaṇa-hood in you. |
atīndriyapadārthajño nahi kaścit samasti vaḥ / | For you, there is no one who is cognisant of supersensuous things; |
tvadanvayaviśuddhiṃ ca nityo vedo 'pi noktavān // | nor has even the Veda declared the purity of your genealogy. |
kālāntareṇa kadācidabrāhmaṇagotrake 'pi sambhavān brāhmaṇaḥ sāṃvṛta ityapi sambhāvyate / | After the lapse of a long time, it is just possible that though not belonging to a Brāhmaṇa family, you may have become a Brāhmaṇa. |
satyapi brāhmaṇapūrvatve bhavato mātṛcāritradoṣeṇa jārajātatvam api sambhāvyata eva / | Or even if your ancestors were Brāhmaṇas, your.....; so that it is possible that your birth may be defective. Because, as a rule..... |
na cātīndriyārthadarśī bhavadbhiḥ kaścinnaro 'byupeyate yato niścayaḥ syāt / | You do not admit that there is any man capable of perceiving supersensuous things, through whom certainty on this point could be obtained. |
nāpi vedo nivedayati bhavato 'nvayaśuddhim // | Nor lastly, does the Veda declare the purity of your genealogy. |
kiñca na kevalaṃ bhavatāmātmanyapariniścitabrāhmaṇyānāṃ jātimadāvilepo na yujyate api ca manvādīnām apyaviditad vijātīnāṃ dvijātibhya evopadeśo mohāditi darśayati ata ityādi / ato manvādayo 'pyeṣām avijñātadvijātayaḥ / nopadeśaṃ prayaccheyur dvijebhyastadaniścayāt // | Thus, Manu and other teachers, not knowing who were real Brāhmaṇas, could not have imparted the teachings to Brāhmaṇas alone: because they could not be sure of it. Then again, it is not only for yourselves that it is not right to indulge in arrogance due to your Brāhmaṇa-hood, which is open to doubt; as regards Manu and other teachers also, as they could not know who were real Brāhmaṇas, the Teachings, if imparted to Brāhmaṇas alone, must have been imparted under a delusion. |
avijñātā aniścitā dvijātayo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | ‘Avijñāta’ Those who could not bo sure of the Brāhmaṇa-hood of any one. |
tadaniścayād iti / | ‘Tadaniścayāt’ Because they could not be sure of people being Brāhmaṇas. |
teṣāṃ dvijātīnām aniścayāt // | and it was for this reason that they expounded their teachings to the Brāhmaṇas alone. |
api ca manvādibhir asmabhyamevopadeśaṃ kṛtam iti naitad bhavatāṃ mahattvakāraṇam api tu jaḍatvam eva sūcayatīti darśayann āha niryuktikatvam ityādi / | Then again, the fact that Manu and others imparted their teachings to you alone does not redound to your credit; in fact, it only indicates the dullness of your intelligence. This is pointed out in the following; |
[p.922] | [see verses 3582-3583 above] |
niryuktikatvaṃ vedārthe jñāpanāśaktatātmani / vedādhītijaḍā viprā na parīkṣākṣamā iti // | ‘Vedādhītijaḍa’ Those who have become ‘jaḍa’ dull-witted by the ‘adhiti’ reading of the Veda; i.e. those whose powers of discriminating things had been set aside by the reading of the Veda. |
kutaścid iti / | ‘For some reason’. Somehow. |
ata eva vedādīnām ayuktikatvam avetya manvādibhir ājñāsiddhatvam ātmavacaneṣūktam iti darśayati / | It was for this reason that Manu and others, realising the irrationality of the Veda, etc., declared, in reference to their own words, that they were to be regarded as so many ‘commandments’ (to be obeyed without question). |
purāṇam ityādi / | This is what is shown in the following: [see verses 3584-3585 next] |
purāṇaṃ mānavo dharmaḥ sāṅgo vedaścikitsitam / ājñāsiddhāni catvāri na hantavyāni hetubhiḥ // manye tenaiva datteyaṃ jaḍebhyastair vibhīṣikā / | [They have declared that] “The Purāṇa, the dharmaśāstra propounded by Manu, the Veda with its subsidiaries, and the science of medicine, these four are self-sufficient commandments, and should never be attacked with reasonings”, this threat, in regard to the self-sufficiency of their authority, we think, was pronounced by them to the dull-witted people for the same reason. |
ājñāsiddhatvam anyatra vāṅmātrāt kiṃ nu vā bhavet // | Or else, how could a mere verbal statement make anything self-sufficient in its authority? (3584-3585) |
purāṇaṃ nāma śāstram / | ‘Purāṇa’ the literary works known under that name; |
mānavo dharma iti / manunā viracitaḥ / | ‘mānavo dharmaḥ’ the code composed by Manu; |
sāṅgo veda iti / saha vyākaraṇādibhiḥ ṣaḍbhir aṅgair vartata iti sāṅgaḥ / | ‘the Veda with its subsidiaries’ i.e. with its six subsidiaries, Grammar and the rest. |
cikitsitam iti / cikitsāśāstraṃ / | ‘Cikitsitam’ the science of Medicine. |
niryuktikatvam eṣāṃ purāṇādīnāṃ bhavatāṃ ca jāḍyamavadhāryeti yāvat // | ‘For the same reason’, i.e. on account of having found that the teaching of the Purāṇa, etc. was irrational and that your Brāhmaṇas were dull-witted. |
yaiḥ punaḥ svoktiṣu spaṣṭaṃ yuktārthatvaṃ viniścitam / tat pratyāyanasāmarthyam ātmanaś ca mahātmabhiḥ // | Those who are Brāhmaṇas in reality, by reason of having removed all their sins, and who have practised the teaching of ‘no-soul’, are all within the purview of the great sage himself; |
kutīrthyamattamātaṅgamadaglānividhāyinam / | it is for this reason that it has been declared that ‘herein is the śramaṇa’ who has been described under four classes; |
evam astākhilatrāsāḥ siṃhanādaṃ nadanti te // | and the teachings of others are entirely devoid of the śramaṇa-brāhmaṇas. |
kutīrthyā eva mattamātaṅgās teṣāṃ madaglāniṃ vidhātuṃ śīlaṃ yasya siṃhanādasya sa tathoktaḥ / | The ‘false Philosophers’ are likened to the ‘maddened elephants’; and the Roaring has the capacity to bring about the lowering of the arrogance of these elephants. |
evam iti vakṣyamāṇam // | ‘Thus’ i.e. as described below. |
kaḥ punar asay siṃhanāda ity āha tāpādityādi / | Question: “What is that lion-like roar?” Answer: [see verse 3588 above] |
api ca bhagavadbhir eva paramārthabrāhmaṇebhyaḥ kṛtam upadeśanaṃ na manvādibhir ityetad āha ye cetyādi / | Further, even the Blessed Lords have imparted their teachings to real Brāhmaṇas; this was not done by Manu and others. This is pointed out in the following: [see verses 3589-3590 above] |
[p.923] | [verses 3589-3590]: |
vāhitapāpadharmatvād brāhmaṇa iti niruktiḥ / | The connotation of the term. ‘Brāhrmṇa’ is ‘one who has removed all sins’; |
te cehaiva nairātmyābhyāsopadeśān muner bhagavataḥ śāsane yuktāḥ nānyatrapāpakṣayopāyavikalatvāt / | and such Brāhmaṇas are possible only under the teaching of the Great Sage, where they are taught the practice of ‘Soul-less-ness’, this is not possible under any other teachings, as these latter do not provide any means for the destroying of sins. |
ata eva bhagavatoktam ihaiva śramaṇaḥ ihaiva brāhmaṇaḥ śūnyāḥ parapravādāḥ śramaṇair brāhmaṇairEEE iti / | It is for this reason that the Blessed Lord has declared that ‘It is here that there is Śramaṇa’, the Brāhmaṇa and the teachings of others are devoid of real Brāhmaṇas in the shape of Śramaṇas. |
tatra catvāraḥ śramaṇāḥ phalasthā śrota āpannādayaḥ / | Of these Śramaṇas, there are four classes ‘Srotāpanna’ (joined the stream) and the rest; |
brāhmaṇā api tat pratipālakāścatvāra eva //3580- | and Brāhmaṇas also, with the same characteristics, are of the same four kinds. |
naraḥ ko 'py astītyādāv āha nara ityādi --- nara kopyasti sarvajña ityādyapi na sādhanam / | It has been explained that the proving of the proposition that ‘there is some man who is omniscient’ is not vitiated by the defect of falling short of our proposition. |
pratijñānyūnatādoṣadṛṣṭamityupapāditam // | It has been argued under Text 3230 that “If proofs were adduced to prove that there is someone who is omniscient, then this would fall short of your Proposition”. |
kena granthenopapāditam ity āha niḥśeṣārthetyādi / | Question: “By what part of your work has this been explained?”. Answer: [see verses 3592-3593 above] |
kiñca nāsmābhiḥ sarvajñoktatvam avagamya tadanuṣṭhānāya sarvajñaḥ prasādhyate / | Then again, we are not proving the existence of the Omniscient Person with a view to ascertain that a certain teaching has been propounded by the Omniscient Person, and then and therefore to follow that teaching in practice. |
kiṃ tarhi ye sārvajñapadaprāptīcchavas tadarthaṃ doṣakṣayo guṇotkarṣāya prasādhyate / | In fact, we ourselves seek to attain the position of the Omniscient Person and to that end we seek to prove that it is possible to get rid of the Defects and attain the excellent qualities (that mark the Omniscient Person). |
yato vastubalapravṛttānumānata eva saugatāḥ puruṣārtheṣu ghaṭante na pravādamātreṇa / | And the reason for this lies in the fact that the Buddhists have recourse to activities tending to the fulfilment of the several aims of man, not on the strength of mere words, but on the basis of Inferences from the capacity of things. |
prameyatvādīnāṃ ca yathā sādhanatvaṃ bhavati tathā pratipāditameva / | It has already been explained in what way such reasons as ‘cognisability’ and the rest can lead to conclusions. |
yaccoktam daśabhūmigata iti tadapi siddhāntānabhijñena bhavatoktam / | It has been argued under Text 3238, that “When He has passed through the Ten Stages, and Love and other Defects have become destroyed, then rapt in meditation..... |
nahi daśabhūmigato bhagavāniṣyate / | The Blessed Lord is not held by us to be standing upon the Ten Stages; |
kiṃ tarhi bodhisattvāvasthāṃ yāvad daśabhūmis tata ūrdhvaṃ buddhabhūmir iṣyate // | what we hold is that the Ten Stages are occupied during the Bodhisattva-Stage, and beyond and above that lies the Buddha-Stage, the state of Perfect Enlightenment, Buddha-hood. |
yaccoktam ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam iti tadapi prativihitam eveti darśayann āha ekadeśetyādi / | As regards the argument that “what is asserted by one who knows only a part cannot be regarded as the assertion of the omniscient person”, the answer to this has already been given, that it would be due to the actual presence of the knowledge of all things. |
ekadeśajñagītaṃ tu na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam / | and yet it is not that his words do not proceed from his knowledge of those things; |
ityatrāpi purā proktaṃ sarvajñānānvayād iti // | the same would be the case with the assertion of the omniscient person; |
etad eva punar api pratipādayann āha yathaivetyādi / | the difference would lie in the difference between the basis of the two assertions. |
yathaiveṣṭādikānarthān anubhūyālpadarśanaḥ / | What forms the source of the words (of Buddha) is the knowledge of all things; |
cetasyāropya tān paścāt pravaktyanubhavāśrayān // | while the source of the words of the other person consists in the knowledge of only a few things. |
[p.924] | [verse 3593]: |
na ca tadvacanaṃ tasya tadvastujñānajanma na / evaṃ sarvajñavākyaṃ syāddhetubhedāt tu bhidyate // | It has been argued under Text 3240, that “What has been asserted by one who knows only a part cannot be the assertion of the Omniscient Person”. |
alpadarśana iti / | [verses 3594-3595]: |
arvāgdarśanaḥ asarvajña, iti yāvat / | ‘The man of limited vision’ i.e. one who is not omniscient. |
tadvastujñānajanmeti / tasyoṣṇāder vastuno jñānamanubhavas tadvastujñānaṃ tato janmotpattir yasya vacanasya tat tathoktam / | ‘Proceed from his knowledge, etc. etc.’ the knowledge of those things Heart, etc. from which proceeds the assertion. |
na neti pratiṣedhadvayena tadvastujñānajanmaiva bhavatīti darśayati / | The two negatives ‘na-na’ indicate that the words do proceed from the said knowledge of the things. |
evam iti tadapi tadvastu jñānajanmatayā pramāṇam / | ‘The same, etc. etc.’ That also would be reliable as proceeding from the said actual knowledge. |
yadyevaṃ ko viśeṣo 'lpadarśanavacanād buddhavacanasyetyāha hetubhedāt tu bhidyata iti // | Question: “If this is so, then what would be the difference between the words of the man who knows little and the words of Buddha, the Omniscient?” Answer: ‘The difference would lie, etc. etc.’ (3594-3595) |
etad eva spaṣṭayati samastetyādi / | The same idea is further clarified: [see verse 3596 above] |
asyeti / buddhavacanasya / | ‘Asya’ of the words of Buddha. |
tasya tviti / ekadeśajñavacanasya // | ‘Tasya’ of the words of the man who knows only a part of things. |
vikalpetyādinā paraścodayati / | The opponents urge the following objection: [see verse 3597 above] |
prahīṇācaraṇatvāddhi vikalpo nāsya vartate // | There can be no ‘desire to speak’ on the part of a person in whom no Conceptual Content is possible; |
nahyasambhavadvikalpasya vivakṣā sambhavati tasyā vikalpaviśeṣatvāt / | because the said desire is only a form of Conceptual Content. |
ato 'sau vikalpatvena vyāptā satī tadbhāve katham avasthāṃ labheta / nahi vṛkṣābhāve śiṃśapāyāḥ sambhavo 'sti / | The Desire thus being invariably concomitant with ‘Conceptual Content’, how could it exist in the absence of this latter? Certainly when the ‘tree’ is absent, the ‘Śiṃśapā’ cannot be there. |
naca sarvajñasya vikalpasambhavaḥ tasya prahīṇāśeṣakleśaviśeṣādyāvaraṇatvāt / kalpasya ca prakṛtya bhrāntatvāt / | For the Omniscient Person, any Conceptual Content is impossible; because all obstacles in the shape of the Afflictions, etc. have disappeared, and Conceptual Content is, by its nature, wrong, mistaken. |
tat samudācāre bhrāntaḥ prāpnoti sarvaviditi // | Consequently if He had 'the Conceptual Content, the Omniscient Person would have to be regarded as ‘mistaken’, (3597) |
naivam ityādinā pratividhatte / | The Author answers this objection in the following [see verse 3598 next] It cannot be so; |
naivaṃ kliṣṭo hi saṃkalpas tasya nāstyāvṛtikṣayāt / | because, as regards the conception that is beset with afflictions, no such is possible in his case, as all ‘obscuration’ has disappeared from him. |
jagaddhitānukūlas tu kuśalaḥ kena vāryate // | while that conception which is favourable to the world’s welfare and hence ‘healthy’, who would prevent that? (3598) |
dvividho hi vikalpaḥ saṃkleśādyanukūlatayā kliṣṭaḥ / alobhādisamprayogasamutthānatayā kuśalaḥ / tatra yaḥ kliṣṭaḥ sa prahīṇakleśādyāvaraṇānāṃ nāstyeva kāraṇābhāvāt / | Conceptual Content is of two kinds (I) that which is favourable to troubles, and hence ‘beset with Afflictions’, and (2) that which is favourable to the appearance of ‘freedom from greed’ and such qualities, and hence ‘Healthy’, Of these that which is ‘beset with Afflictions’ can never be present in persons who have got rid of all obscurations in the shape of the Afflictions, because the cause of this is not present there; |
yastu kuśalaḥ sa prahīṇāvaraṇasyāpyavirodhīti tena bhagavatāṃ kṛpābhyāsapravartito jagaddhitodayānukūlatayā kuśalo vikalpaḥ saṃmukhībhavana kena vāryate // | while that which is ‘Healthy’, that is not incompatible with the man who has got rid of the obscurations; hence if this ‘healthy’ Conceptual Content does appear, through the mercy of the Blessed Lord, as it would be favourable to the welfare of the world and hence ‘healthy’, why should any one object to its appearance? (3598) |
naca tasya vikalpasya so 'rthavattāmavasyati / | As a matter of fact, he does not recognise the conceptual content as beneficial (useful); |
taṃ hi vetti nirālambaṃ māyākārasamo hyasau // māyākāro yathā kaścin niścitāśvādigocaram / | he knows it to be baseless; he is like the magic-performer. The magic-performer knows that the idea that he has produced envisaging the real horse is really without an objective basis; |
ceto nirviṣayaṃ vetti tena bhrānto na jāyate // | and hence he himself does not become mistaken or misled by it. |
yadi hi tasya vikalpasyāviṣayasya viṣayavattāṃ gṛhṇīyāt tadā bhrānto bhavedyāvatā māyākāravadasau tajjñānaviṣayatayaivāvagacchatīti kathaṃ bhrānto bhavet // | If He had apprehended the Conceptual Content, which is devoid of objective basis, as having an objective basis, then alone He would be regarded as mistaken. As a matter of fact, however, He is like the magic-performer, and regards the Conceptual Content only in the form of the conception itself; how then can He be regarded as ‘mistaken’? (3599-3600) |
ityādi kīrtyamānaṃ tu śraddadaneṣu śobhate / prakṛtārthānurūpeṇa proktaṃ naitaddvijātinā // | When the Brāhmaṇa (opponent) has asserted that “such assertions sound well only when addressed to people imbued with faith”, he has not said anything relevant to the subject under consideration. |
tathā{ '}vyāptaś ca sarvārthaiḥ śakto naivopadarśane / | The subject under consideration was the statement that “the omniscient person, being excluded from all things, could not be able to impart teachings”. |
tasyopadeśane śaktir na syāccet kiṃ tadā bhavet / tato bhavadbhir vaktavyamāgamo na bhaved iti // | To this, the wise men made the answer ‘if he had no power to impart teachings, what would happen?’ The proper rejoinder for you should have been that “in that case there would be no reliable scripture”. |
tatrāpyāhur bhavatvevaṃ kiṃ dṛṣṭo 'sau tvayā vadan / prasaṅgasādhanenedam aniṣṭaṃ codyate yadi // na cedvaktṛtvamiṣyeta nāgamopagamo bhavet / | What you have asserted is “it may be so, but have you seen him actually speaking?” Now if, in this, you are urging a reductio ad absurdum against us, then it should only mean as follows: “If his speakership is not admitted, then there could be no getting at the scripture; |
tat praṇetāgameṣṭau tu tasya vaktṛtvamiṣyatām // | hence if the scripture composed by him is admitted, his speaker ship also will have to be admitted.” (3602-3605) |
etacca prasaṅgasādhanaṃ mayoktaṃ na svātantryeṇetyevaṃ svavācaiva paro 'bhidhāsyatīti manyamānaḥ prasaṅgasādhanatvam eva tāvad asya prakṛtasya samarthayitum āha tatra cāhur ityādi / | It has been argued, under Text 3243, that “such assertions sound well only when addressed to people imbued with faith, we, however, are wanting in that faith, and hence ask for reasons”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3601 above] Question: “Why? What is the subject under consideration, to which our remark is not relevant?” |
tata ityādi / | Answer: [see verses 3602-3605 above] |
tatrāpyabhidhīyate bhavatyevam āgamābhāvaḥ, ko 'tra virodhaḥ nahi bhavatāsau bruvāṇaḥ samupalabdho yena dṛṣṭa iti virodhaḥ syādityevaṃ [p.926] pṛṣṭena tvayā sāmarthyādidam abhidhānīyam na mayā svayam āgamasya tat praṇītatvam upalabhya tasya vaktṛtvaṃ prasādhyate, kiṃ tarhi bhavadbhir evāgamasya tat praṇītatvam iṣṭam tacca bhavatāṃ nopapadyate yadi tasya vaktṛtvaṃ neṣyeta / | in connection with this, you have to be asked He may not have the capacity to teach, what is the harm in that? Being thus asked, what the Opponent would say, the Author himself states ‘The proper rejoinder for you should have been that in that case there would be no reliable Scripture’. The answer to this rejoinder is There may be no reliable Scripture, what is the incongruity in that? He has not been seen speaking, by which there would be incompatibility with a perceived fact. Being thus questioned, you should have said “I am not proving His speakership after having myself seen that the Scripture had been composed by Him; you yourself regard your Scripture as composed by Him; and this is not possible if you do not admit His speaker-ship; |
tasmād avaśyamāgamasya tat praṇītatvam icchadbhir vaktṛtvam api tasyeṣṭavyamityevam aniṣṭāpādanaṃ prasaṅgena kriyata iti // | hence when you must insist upon the fact of the Scripture having been composed by Him, you must admit His speakership also”. This is the undesirable contingency that is presented to the Buddhist by means of the Reductio ad Absurdum. |
evaṃ prasaṅgasādhanatvaṃ samarthya sāmprataṃ prakṛtārthānurūpyānabhidhānaṃ yojayitum āha yadyevam ityādi / | If that is so, then, the principle accepted by all relationalists is that a reductio ad absurdum (in this case) can be urged only on the basis of a character that is accepted on mere faith; |
yuktiprasiddhatāyāṃ ca svatantraṃ sādhanaṃ bhavet / | if it were based upon well-known reasons, there would be independent (direct) arguments in support. |
īdṛśaś ca pareṇeṣṭas tat praṇītaḥ sa āgamaḥ // sambhārāvedhatas tasya puṃsaścintāmaṇeriva / niḥsaranti yathākāmaṃ kuṭyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ // | As a matter of fact, the scripture that is postulated by the other party (the Buddhist) as composed by the omniscient person, is as thus described ‘without any appurtenances, the teachings of that person proceed freely even from the walls, as if they were coming out of the cintāmaṇi gem’. |
ādhipatyaprapattyātaḥ praṇetā so 'bhidhīyate / | Thus then it is purely through supervision that he is regarded as the ‘composer’ of the teachings; |
vikalpānugataṃ tasya na vaktṛtvaṃ prasajyate // | hence his speakership need not be associated with any conceptual content. |
vayamaśraddadhānās tu ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe / itīdaṃ gaditaṃ tasmāt prasaṅgārtham ajānatā // | Thus then, when you assert that “we are wanting in that faith and hence ask for reasons” you do so without knowing what is meant by reductio ad absurdum. |
ya eva hi dharmaḥ pareṇāgamamātrād abhyupetaḥ sa eva prasaṅgasādhane 'bhidhīyata iti nyāyaḥ / | That character which the other party admits on the basis of the Scripture alone, that alone should be urged in the Reductio ad Absurdum; such is the well-recognised principle. |