Fix the required signing bond math
@@ -24,15 +24,15 @@ requiring additional bonded collateral to ensure recompense in case of failure.
Applying this pricing model to tBTC's bonding, it's clear that a signer would
like to make a similar return on the total capital it's responsible for-- its
portion of `Deposit` security. In the full threshold case, that's
-`(n - m - 1) / n` in deposit security and
-`(n - m - 1) / n * OverCollateralizationFactor` in bonds, assuming for a moment
+`1 / min(m, n)` in deposit security and
+`1 / min(m, n) * OverCollateralizationFactor` in bonds, assuming for a moment
a shared value currency.
For a few conservative values,
`n = 20, m = 15, OverCollateralizationFactor = 150%, LotSize = 1 BTC`, a single
-signer can hope to make .0015 TBTC a year per deposit. But for depositors, that
-costs 3% a year. Lowering single-signer returns to 0.25% across the security
-value they provide means total signing revenue is 1.5% of the market cap of TBTC
+signer can make .0005 TBTC a year per deposit. For depositors, that costs 1.5% a
+year. Lowering single-signer returns from 0.75% to 0.25% across the security
+value they provide means total signing revenue is 0.5% of the market cap of TBTC
each year, with a return a year of their locked up capital, denominated in TBTC.
While these returns are reasonable relative to their risk in the cryptocurrency
