At $1.65 billion in operating profit per year it would take nearly 71 years to pay off $117 billion. It's likely that as ridership continued to rise profits would increase as well (just as they are now on the Acela line), but for the sake of simplicity, and to be as conservative as possible, we'll assume that those levels would remain the same indefinitely. And while 71 years may sound like a very long time, rail is a very long-lived piece of infrastructure. For reference, it seems that much of the track in the Northeastern Corridor was built between the 1830s and 1917; most modifications since then have been things like electrification, crossing alterations, and so on. These would of course be provided up front in this case, and the technology is well-proven in markets across the globe. Operating expenses also already take all maintenance, including the tracks, into account.

You can also look at it this way: construction of NextGen HSR would be complete in 2040, which comes out to about $4 billion per year in spending while it's being built. That's about a tenth of the amount the federal government spends on highways every year, and half of what it spends on mass transit, and those recipients aren't expected to pay the money back. It's a sixth of what we spend every year just on the TSA and FAA. The federal government makes these investments not because it expects to make a profit, but because mobility is important. Critically important. NEC HSR would not only drastically improve mobility for tens of millions of people every year, it would also recoup a huge portion of its cost--possibly the entire amount--in ticket sales over the coming decades. How is this a difficult choice?

Some might argue, "if high speed rail can be so popular, why not just let the private sector take care of it?" I'm sympathetic to this view, but based on the experience of places like the U.K., also quite wary of such private sector takeovers.

Tanya Snyder at Streetsblog just addressed this, noting that without an established HSR success in this country, private industry is unlikely to take the chance. For investments of this magnitude, government has to lead the way. Snyder quotes European rail consultant Jim Steer, who made the case before Congress:

[A] rail line needs to prove itself before the private sector steps up. In his testimony, he talked about a 189-mile line currently under construction between Tours and Bordeaux in France, an extension of an existing high-speed line between Paris and Tours.

“The most problematic section of the overall route (access to central Paris) has been built,” Steer said in his written testimony, “the market for services is proven; now it’s a matter of shortening an already improved journey between Paris and Bordeaux. This project (worth $10.3 billion) has been privately funded through a PPP structure. As an extension to what is now a core national network, the perceived risks are much lower.”

If this still seems like too much of a financial and political hurdle to overcome, don't give up yet. We have options.

First, even if the private sector can't build something of this size and complexity on their own, they can certainly still contribute. This could take many forms, but one that really appeals to me is the following: government entities sell off land near HSR stations, along with very generous development rights in terms of height, floor-area-ratio, etc., and then collect a share of the income over the next several decades. Investors profit from increased demand and land values around train stations, new housing and businesses get built (which is good for everyone), and the government offsets some of its construction costs. It also lets us keep all the ticket revenue for ourselves.

Or, in the spirit of "proof of principle," we could start with just phase one of the NextGen HSR project: New York to Washington, D.C. Referring back to the projected costs table above, this section of the NEC corridor would actually be less expensive than the NY-Boston section by about $6.6 billion although they're roughly the same distance. It also stops at larger and more important cities along the way, including Baltimore, Philadelphia, and to a lesser degree Newark (and the airports for each of these cities). NY-DC is also better established as a rail corridor, controlling over 3/4 of the market relative to air, while rail accounts for just over 1/2 of trips between New York and Boston. In terms of federal support, this could be a considerably easier sell.

The inevitable success of HSR in the New York to D.C. corridor would help to galvanize support for expansion of the network, both from politicians in Washington and their constituents throughout the region. The population from New York to D.C. is also greater than that of the NY-Boston corridor, so putting together local funding to cover a share of the investment might be easier there.

Realistically, it will probably take all of the above to get things moving. NY-DC would cost about $60 billion--if the federal government covered half they'd be contributing just $2 billion per year, barely 5% of what's spent every year on highways. The remaining $30 billion might be raised through a combination of private investment and local funding, not an unreasonable prospect for the governments of D.C., Baltimore/MD, Philadelphia/PA, NJ, and New York combined, especially over a 15+ year period.. Under Amtrak's plan, New York to Boston construction would start long after New York to D.C., so the key is to get a commitment on the first step. By the time that first phase is nearing completion the case for expansion will be obvious, and irresistible.