This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-497
entitled 'Coast Guard: Better Logistics Planning Needed to Aid
Operational Decisions Related to the Deployment of the National
Security Cutter and Its Support Assets' which was released on July 17,
2009.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2009:
Coast Guard:
Better Logistics Planning Needed to Aid Operational Decisions Related
to the Deployment of the National Security Cutter and Its Support
Assets:
GAO-09-497:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-497, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
As part of its more than $24 billion Deepwater program to replace aging
vessels and aircraft with new or upgraded assets, the Coast Guard is
preparing the National Security Cutter (NSC) for service. GAO
previously reported on Deepwater assetsí deployment delays and the
Coast Guardís management of the Deepwater program. GAO was
legislatively directed to continue its oversight of the Deepwater
program. As a result, this report addresses: (1) the operational
effects, if any, of delays in the delivery of the NSC and its support
assets of unmanned aircraft and small boats; (2) Coast Guard plans for
mitigating any operational effects and any associated costs of these
plans; and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard has plans, to
include cost estimates, for phasing in logistics support of the NSC
while phasing out support for the High Endurance Cutter (HEC) it is
replacing. GAOís work is based on analyses of the (1) operational
capabilities and maintenance plans of the NSC and its support assets
and (2) data on the HECsí condition; comparison of an NSC and HEC; and,
interviews with Coast Guard officials.
What GAO Found:
Delays in the delivery of the NSC and the support assets of unmanned
aircraft and small boats have created operational gaps for the Coast
Guard that include the projected loss of thousands of days in NSC
availability for conducting missions until 2018. Enhancements to the
NSCís capabilities following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the effects
of Hurricane Katrina were factors that contributed to these delays.
Given the delivery delays, the Coast Guard must continue to rely on
HECs that are becoming increasingly unreliable. Coast Guard officials
said that the first NSCís capabilities will be greater than those of an
HEC; however, the Coast Guard cannot determine the extent to which the
NSCís capabilities will exceed those of the HECs until the NSCís
support assets are operational, which will take several years.
To mitigate these operational gaps, the Coast Guard plans to upgrade
its HECs and use existing aircraft and small boats until unmanned
aircraft and new small boats are operational, but because the
mitigation plans are not yet finalized, the costs are largely unknown.
Also, the Coast Guard has not yet completed operational requirements
for the unmanned aircraft or new small boats. As a result, the Coast
Guard has not determined the cost of the HEC upgrade plan or the
operational gap created by the delay in fielding new support assets for
the NSC.
The Coast Guardís logistics support plans for its transition to the NSC
from the HEC are not finalized, and it has not yet fully determined
transition costs. The contractor developed the initial NSC logistics
plans, but Coast Guard officials said the plans lacked needed details,
such as how the contractor would support the NSC after it becomes fully
operational, and so, in 2007, the Coast Guard took over logistics
planning. Coast Guard acquisition guidance states that an Integrated
Logistics Support Plan should be completed by the time production of an
asset is started. Although the first NSC has already been delivered,
the Coast Guard has not yet finalized this plan, but expects to do so
by October 2009. While the Coast Guard has developed an interim plan,
it did not commit to including required logistics support documents to
be used or time frames for completing them in the Integrated Logistics
Support Plan because it is in the process of determining how to
finalize the plan. Ensuring the plan includes these documents and time
frames would better prepare the Coast Guard to support the NSC and aid
it in making operational decisions given that the Coast Guard has not
yet developed a deployment plan or completed cost estimates of the
logistics transition from the HEC to the NSC.
Figure: National Security Cutter - Bertholf:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that as the Coast Guard finalizes the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan, it should ensure that the plan includes the
required logistics support documents to be used and the time frames for
completing them. The Coast Guard concurred with GAOís recommendation
and is taking action to respond to it.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-497] or key
components. For more information, contact Steve Caldwell at (202) 512-
9610 or caldwells@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Delays in the Delivery of the NSC and Its Support Assets Have Created
an Anticipated Loss of Operational Days and Will Result in the NSC
Being Deployed without Certain Operational Capabilities:
The Coast Guard Plans to Mitigate Identified Operational Gaps by
Upgrading Certain High Endurance Cutters and Using Existing Support
Assets, but the Success and Costs of These Plans Cannot Be Fully
Determined:
The Coast Guard Is Working to Finalize Its Key Logistics Plan by
October 2009, but Complete Logistics Costs Cannot Yet Be Determined:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: National Security Cutter Operations and Logistics
Documents:
Appendix II: Logistics Readiness Review Findings and the Coast Guard's
Efforts to Address Identified Gaps:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: HEC Operational Days Lost During Fiscal Years 2003 through
2008:
Table 2: Description of Key MSAM-required Logistics Plans:
Table 3: Number and Status of the Coast Guard's Progress in Addressing
Navy's Logistics Readiness Review Recommendations, by Total and High
Priority:
Table 4: Coast Guard Logistics Areas:
Table 5: Information on the Coast Guard's Interim Support Plan's
Compliance with MSAM Requirements:
Table 6: List of NSC Operations and Logistics Documents/Analyses and
Expected Completion Dates:
Table 7: The Navy's Logistics Readiness Review Assessment of NSC
Logistics Areas, as of May 2008:
Table 8: NSC Logistics Readiness Review Assessment of Logistics Areas
and the Coast Guard's Reported Progress:
Figures:
Figure 1: Comparison of Capabilities of the High Endurance Cutter and
Its Replacement, the National Security Cutter:
Figure 2: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for High
Endurance Cutters, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2008:
Figure 3: Projected NSC Operational Day Gap Resulting from Delivery
Delays, Calendar Years 2008 through 2018:
Figure 4: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable (PTFMC) for HEC Class,
Fiscal Years 2004 through 2008:
Figure 5: NSC-Bertholf Docked at the Pier, Alameda, California:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
HEC: High Endurance Cutter:
LRR: Logistics Readiness Review:
MSAM: Major Systems Acquisition Manual:
NSC: National Security Cutter:
PTFMC: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 17, 2009:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
The Honorable George Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Deepwater program is the largest acquisition program in Coast Guard
history--estimated at more than $24 billion--and is intended to replace
or modernize the Coast Guard's aging vessels, aircraft, and some
communications systems. The first-in-class National Security Cutter
(NSC) Bertholf is undergoing final trials as the Coast Guard prepares
it for full operational service in 2010.[Footnote 1] We have earlier
reported that the Coast Guard has experienced delays with the delivery
of the NSC,[Footnote 2] and the estimated production costs of the NSC
class have increased from about $3.5 billion in 2007 to about $4.7
billion in 2009.[Footnote 3] The NSC delays and cost increases have
raised questions about whether the Coast Guard will have all the
operational capabilities needed to effectively perform its missions and
the resources necessary for maintaining its aging High Endurance
Cutters (HECs)--the vessels that the NSCs are to replace.
The NSC is the first cutter class delivered to the Coast Guard under
the Deepwater program, and, according to the Coast Guard, is to be the
most technologically advanced class in the Coast Guard, with
capabilities to aid the Coast Guard in performing missions worldwide--
to include drug interdiction and defense readiness,[Footnote 4] among
others. Compared to the HEC, the NSC is to travel at higher sustained
speeds and farther distances from shore for longer time periods and
launch and recover upgraded small boats, helicopters, and unmanned
aircraft in rough seas--all key attributes in enabling the Coast Guard
to implement its increased national security responsibilities resulting
from the events of September 11, 2001.
A House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the Department of
Homeland Security's fiscal year 2007 appropriations act directed us to
continue our oversight of the Deepwater program.[Footnote 5] Based on
this legislative direction, as well as more recent input from House and
Senate Appropriations Committee staff, we assessed the Coast Guard's
management, operation, and deployment of the NSC. Specifically, this
report addresses:
* What operational effects, if any, are anticipated based on delays in
delivery of the NSC class and its accompanying support assets of
unmanned aircraft and small boats?
* What plans does the Coast Guard have for mitigating any identified
operational effects, and what are the costs associated with these
plans?
* To what extent has the Coast Guard planned for phasing in logistics
support of the NSC and phasing out support of the HEC, and what are the
costs associated with this transition?
In conducting our work, we reviewed studies, prior GAO and Department
of Homeland Security Inspector General reports, and other relevant
documents, such as Quarterly Acquisition Reports to Congress and the
HEC 2008 Sustainment Conference Report covering the Deepwater program
in general and the NSC and HEC specifically. To identify any
operational effects from delays in the delivery of the NSC class, we
reviewed the 2007 Deepwater Acquisition Program Baseline and the 2008
NSC Acquisition Plan. We compared the 2007 and 2008 delivery schedules
to measure the effects of delivery delays on the number of NSC
operational days available to the Coast Guard over the next 9 years. We
also analyzed Coast Guard data from fiscal years 2003 through 2008 to
determine the number of HEC operational days available to the Coast
Guard. To assess the reliability of the operational hour and vessel
condition data obtained from the Coast Guard, we reviewed data systems
manuals and directives to ensure that the systems included controls for
maintaining the integrity of the data. We also interviewed officials
knowledgeable about the data and the systems that produced them. On the
basis of our assessments, we determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. We also reviewed Coast Guard
documentation of the acquisition process for the NSC-based unmanned
aircraft and small boats and the anticipated schedule for the
acquisition of those assets. We toured NSC-Bertholf and HEC-Morgenthau
while both were at their home port in Alameda, California, to compare
and contrast the new vessel with one of the legacy vessels it is
replacing. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials about HEC and
planned NSC operational days and capabilities, including the aircraft
and small boats that support these vessels.
To address the Coast Guard's plans for mitigating any identified
operational effects, we reviewed and analyzed the Coast Guard's
mitigation plans contained in the Readiness Management Framework. We
also interviewed Coast Guard officials about the Coast Guard's plans
and their costs for maintaining and upgrading the HECs for use until
the NSCs are delivered, and for using existing aircraft and small boats
until new unmanned aircraft and small boats are acquired and deployed.
To assess the extent to which the Coast Guard has plans for phasing in
maintenance of the NSCs, we reviewed existing maintenance planning
documents, including the Coast Guard's Major Systems Acquisition Manual
(MSAM), and the Deepwater contract. We also reviewed a maintenance and
logistical readiness study conducted for the Coast Guard by the U.S.
Navy.[Footnote 6] Our analysis included reviewing the methodology,
criteria, and assumptions of the study, and discussing the study's
scope, assumptions, and conclusions with the Coast Guard. As a result
of our review and analysis, we determined that the study and its
results were reasonable for use in our report. To supplement our
document reviews and analyses, we interviewed Coast Guard maintenance
and logistics officials regarding the ongoing maintenance planning
process and the estimated costs of this process. We also contacted
officials representing the maintenance contractor that was originally
to perform NSC maintenance for the Coast Guard to solicit their views
on NSC maintenance planning.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to July 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The Coast Guard, an Armed Service of the United States housed within
the Department of Homeland Security, is the principle federal agency
responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental
stewardship through multimission resources, authorities, and
capabilities. According to the Coast Guard, the greatest threat to
mission performance is the deteriorating condition and increasing
technological obsolescence of its legacy assets. According to the Coast
Guard, its assets--such as vessels, aircraft, and shore facilities--are
essential to its homeland security missions, as well as sustaining
other mission areas, such as search and rescue, law enforcement, and
environmental protection. Because many of the Coast Guard's assets were
reaching the end of their expected service lives and were in
deteriorating condition, the Coast Guard began the 25-year, more than
$24 billion Deepwater program in the mid-1990s to upgrade or replace
vessels and aircraft and to acquire other capabilities, such as
improved communications systems.
The Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Acquisition Strategy and Management
Have Evolved:
The Coast Guard has taken more direct responsibility for the Deepwater
program acquisition strategy and management in recent years. At the
start of the Deepwater acquisition, the Coast Guard chose a system-of-
systems strategy that was to replace the legacy assets with an
integrated package of assets,[Footnote 7] rather than using a
traditional acquisition approach of replacing individual classes of
legacy assets through a series of acquisitions. To carry out this
acquisition, the Coast Guard awarded a competitive contract to a
systems integrator, which for the Deepwater program was a contractor
composed of two major companies--Lockheed Martin Corporation and
Northrop Grumman Corporation. Acting as a joint venture called
"Integrated Coast Guard Systems" (the contractor), these companies were
responsible for designing, constructing, deploying, supporting, and
integrating the various assets to meet projected Deepwater operational
requirements. However, after experiencing a number of management
challenges under the system-of-systems approach, the Coast Guard
recognized that it needed to increase government oversight and
transferred Deepwater system integration and program management
responsibilities, including logistics planning, back to the Coast Guard
in April 2007.[Footnote 8] Furthermore, when the Coast Guard assumed
the lead role for Deepwater program management, it decided to consider
future work and potential bids on these assets outside of the existing
Deepwater contract. By taking this action, the Coast Guard in some
cases decided to restart the planning and design of the individual
assets. In addition, the Coast Guard took over logistics planning for
some assets from the contractor. For example, the Coast Guard, rather
than the contractor, is now developing the NSC logistics planning
documents including the key logistics document--the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan.
The Deepwater program represents the largest acquisition in the Coast
Guard's history, and the program has experienced some serious
performance and management problems, such as cost overruns, schedule
slippages, and assets designed and delivered with significant defects.
Since 2001, we have reviewed the Deepwater program and informed
Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard of
the risks and uncertainties inherent with the system-of-systems
approach.[Footnote 9] In March 2004, we made recommendations to the
Coast Guard to address three broad areas of concern: improving program
management and oversight, strengthening contractor accountability, and
promoting cost control through greater competition among potential
subcontractors.[Footnote 10] In April 2006, June 2007, and March 2008,
we issued follow-on reports describing the Coast Guard's efforts to
address these recommendations and provided information on the status of
various Deepwater assets, including that the Coast Guard's increased
management and oversight of the Deepwater acquisition had resulted in
improvements to the program.[Footnote 11] In June 2008, we reported on
additional changes in Deepwater management and oversight that resulted
in improvements to the program and that the Coast Guard's mitigating
strategies for the loss of patrol boats were achieving results in the
near term.[Footnote 12]
Since the Coast Guard took over the acquisition and management
responsibilities for the Deepwater program from the contractor in 2007,
it has realized that its knowledge of how the various proposed assets
would work together to help meet mission needs were limited because the
contractor, in some cases, had developed the plans for these assets
without using all of the input from the Coast Guard. In 2001, the
contractor completed a study documenting the capabilities, types, and
mix of assets the Coast Guard needed to fulfill its Deepwater missions,
referred to as the Fleet Mix Study. The Coast Guard has initiated a
follow-on study to update the work originally completed by the
contractor. The goals of this study include validating mission
performance requirements and revisiting the number and mix of assets to
be procured. The results of this study are expected in the summer of
2009, at which time Coast Guard leadership will assess the results and
plan for future asset procurement decisions. According to Coast Guard
officials, the Coast Guard plans to update the Fleet Mix Study every 4
years and, as a result, the Deepwater program may change in terms of
the numbers and types of specific assets needed.
While the final number may change as a result of the Fleet Mix Study,
the Coast Guard currently is projected to take delivery of a total of
eight NSCs between 2008 and 2017. In May 2008, the contractor delivered
the first-in-class NSC, Bertholf, to the Coast Guard. The Bertholf is
undergoing testing and is planned to be fully operational in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2010. According to the Coast Guard, as of May
2009, the second NSC, Waesche, was 83 percent complete and is scheduled
to be delivered in late 2009, while the third NSC, Stratton, was 11
percent complete and is scheduled for a late 2011 delivery. The Coast
Guard plans to have each NSC fully operational once testing--which
ranges from less than 1 year to 2 years after delivery--is completed.
Coast Guard officials stated that the Coast Guard has awarded the
contract to begin purchasing materials for the fourth NSC, but the
Coast Guard has not awarded a contract for construction of the fourth
NSC. Neither materials purchases nor production has begun on the fifth
through eighth NSCs because funds for these cutters have not yet been
appropriated.
Comparison of National Security Cutter and High Endurance Cutter
Capabilities and Operations:
According to the Coast Guard, the NSC is designed to be capable of
helping it execute the most challenging of maritime security mission
needs and represents a giant leap forward in capability for the Coast
Guard's vessel fleet. The Coast Guard further states that the NSC is to
be the largest and most technologically advanced class of cutter in the
Coast Guard, with robust capabilities for maritime homeland security,
law enforcement, and defense readiness missions. The NSC class is to
replace the Coast Guard's aging HEC class and is to provide several
capabilities that the HECs do not have, such as the ability to collect,
analyze, and transmit classified information; carry, launch, and
recover unmanned aircraft, thereby increasing the cutter's surveillance
capabilities and range; more easily and safely launch small boats from
and return them to the cutter; and travel away from shore for longer
time periods.
In 2007, the Commandant of the Coast Guard stated that the NSC will be
the most sophisticated and capable cutter the Coast Guard has ever
operated, with vastly improved capabilities over legacy HECs. The more
capable NSCs, for example, are designed to enable the Coast Guard to
screen and target vessels faster, and more safely and reliably before
they arrive in U.S. waters. As a result of the increased capabilities
of the NSCs, the Coast Guard plans to replace 12 HECs with 8 NSCs.
Figure 1 provides a comparison of some key operational capabilities
between the HEC and its replacement, the NSC.
Figure 1: Comparison of Capabilities of the High Endurance Cutter and
Its Replacement, the National Security Cutter:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
The table contains 2 photographs:
High Endurance Cutter;
National Security Cutter.
Capability: Number in fleet;
High Endurance Cutter: 12;
National Security Cutter: 8 planned[A].
Capability: Year first-in-class cutter commissioned;
High Endurance Cutter: 1967;
National Security Cutter: 2008;
Capability: Crew size;
High Endurance Cutter: 166 (19 officers, 147 crew);
National Security Cutter: 108 (14 officers; 94 crew).
Capability: Length;
High Endurance Cutter: 378 feet;
National Security Cutter: 418 feet.
Capability: Days away from homeport;
High Endurance Cutter: 185 days per year;
National Security Cutter: 230 days per year[B].
Capability: Maximum time at sea without re-provisioning;
High Endurance Cutter: 45 days;
National Security Cutter: 60 days.
Capability: Range;
High Endurance Cutter: 9,600 nautical miles at an average speed of 15
knots;
National Security Cutter: 12,000 nautical miles at an average speed of
12 knots.
Capability: Maximum speed;
High Endurance Cutter: 29 knots[C];
National Security Cutter: 28 knots.
Capability: Patrol speed;
High Endurance Cutter: 12 knots;
National Security Cutter: 15 knots.
Capability: Draft[D];
High Endurance Cutter: 19 feet;
National Security Cutter: 22 feet.
Capability: Intelligence gathering;
High Endurance Cutter: On-board intelligence gathering facility (cannot
transmit classified data); Helicopter;
National Security Cutter: Secure information system for transmitting
classified data (planned); Unmanned aircraft (planned); Helicopters[E].
Capability: Weapons;
High Endurance Cutter: 76 millimeter weapon system;
National Security Cutter: 57 millimeter weapon system with computer
programmable projectiles and an optical sight.
Capability: Ability to withstand a biological or chemical attack;
High Endurance Cutter: No;
National Security Cutter: Yes.
Capability: Aircraft command capabilities;
High Endurance Cutter: No comprehensive aircraft launch and recovery
control center; 1 aircraft hangar; Partially automated helicopter
recovery system;
National Security Cutter: Comprehensive aircraft launch and recovery
control center; 2 aircraft hangers; Fully automated helicopter recovery
system (planned).
Capability: Small boat capabilities;
High Endurance Cutter: Carries 2 small boats; 2 side-mounted small boat
recovery systems;
National Security Cutter: Carries 3 small boats; 1 side-mounted small
boat recovery system for 1 small boat; 1 stern-mounted small boat
recovery system for 2 small boats.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data; Photographs courtesy of the
Coast Guard.
[A] The Coast Guard is in the process of conducting a fleet mix
analysis--expected to be completed in 2009--that is to reevaluate the
optimal number of each Deepwater asset (including the NSC) the Coast
Guard should acquire.
[B] To achieve 230 days away from homeport, the Coast Guard plans to
use a "crew rotational concept" whereby the Coast Guard plans to have
four crews staff and operate three cutters on a rotating basis.
[C] According to the Coast Guard, the age and condition of the HECs,
coupled with renovation and modernization modifications made to these
vessels over the years, make many HECs unable to achieve a maximum
speed of 29 knots.
[D] Draft is the depth of water needed to float the vessel.
[E] According to the Coast Guard, HEC flight deck is certified to
accommodate a multimission helicopter, while the NSC flight deck is
certified to accommodate a multimission helicopter and the larger
medium-range recovery helicopter.
[End of figure]
In addition to the capabilities described in figure 1, according to the
Coast Guard, the NSC also has the following capabilities that go beyond
those of an HEC:
* NSC's engine and propulsion systems are more efficient than the
HEC's; allowing the NSC to transit faster while burning less fuel;
* the higher transit speed of the NSC allows it to maximize the time
that it operates inside of the mission area;
* the NSC has the ability to conduct missions in rougher seas than the
HEC; and:
* the NSC has more comfortable accommodations for the crew, with larger
sleeping and living areas that include many modern conveniences, such
as computers, entertainment systems, and exercise facilities.
The primary missions the Coast Guard assigns to its HECs include drug
interdiction, fisheries patrols, and defense readiness. Together these
missions account for over 70 percent of HEC mission assignments.
Although the NSC is a multimission cutter that is to help the Coast
Guard conduct its full range of missions, the Coast Guard plans to
assign the NSC the same mission assignments as the HEC. Figure 2 shows
the percentage of time the HEC conducted Coast Guard missions for
fiscal years 1999 through 2008.
Figure 2: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for High
Endurance Cutters, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Drug Interdiction: Deployment of assets to reduce the flow of illegal
drugs: 43%;
Living Marine Resources: Enforcement of domestic fishing laws and
regulations: 20%;
Defense Readiness: Participation with the Department of Defense in
global military operations: 11%;
Support: Training; public affairs; and cooperation with federal, state,
and local agencies: 9%;
Other Law Enforcement: Protection of U.S. fishing grounds from illegal
harvest by foreign fishermen: 7%;
Other: Migrant interdiction; ports, waterways, coastal security; search
and rescue; and marine environmental protection: 10%.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Notes: While this chart shows the percentage of total operational hours
logged by the HECs over a 10-year period, there can be significant year-
to-year variation in operational hour totals because of shifting
mission priorities, the use of other vessels in filling certain
missions, and other factors.
In conducting missions, Coast Guard vessels log the amount of
operational hours deployed by mission while on patrol. However, the
Coast Guard's system for tracking operational hours captures hours
logged in support of the primary mission that a vessel conducts while
on patrol; thus, any secondary missions that may have been performed on
a patrol by these multimission vessels would not necessarily be
reflected in the operational hour data.
Prior to fiscal year 2005, the Other Law Enforcement mission area
contained the Enforcement of Laws and Treaties-Other employment
category which captured those law enforcement activities that did not
fall under drug interdiction, fisheries enforcement, or migration
interdiction operations.
[End of figure]
There are currently 12 HECs in the Coast Guard, with 2 of them based on
the East Coast and another 10 on the West Coast and in Hawaii. To
accomplish its missions, cutters like the HEC typically deploy and
operate with support assets that aid the cutter in performing its
mission requirements. These may include small boats, cutter-based air
assets (such as helicopters), or land-based aircraft (such as fixed-
wing aircraft or helicopters). According to the Coast Guard officials,
pairing support assets with a cutter increases its surveillance and
intelligence gathering range and improves its search and rescue
capabilities.
To maximize the time that the NSC can operate at sea each year without
requiring its crews to be away from their home port more than allowed
with the HEC, the Coast Guard plans to use a "crew rotational concept."
Under this concept, the Coast Guard plans to have four crews staff and
operate three cutters on a rotating basis. By using the crew rotational
concept, the Coast Guard hopes that each NSC will be able to provide
230 days away from home port per year as compared to the 185 days away
from home port per year provided by each HEC. Days away from home port
is a Coast Guard measure that reflects the level of operations for a
cutter. The measure represents the days the cutter is not at the port
where it is based, including days the cutter is en route to and
conducting missions. For purposes of this report, we refer to days away
from home port as operational days.
Delays in the Delivery of the NSC and Its Support Assets Have Created
an Anticipated Loss of Operational Days and Will Result in the NSC
Being Deployed without Certain Operational Capabilities:
Delays in the delivery of the NSC and its associated support assets--
primarily unmanned aircraft and small boats--have created an
anticipated loss of cutter operational days and delays in achieving
certain other operational capabilities. Enhancements to the NSC's
capabilities following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as damage to
the shipyard and the exodus of workers as a result of Hurricane
Katrina, contributed to these delays. These delays will require the
Coast Guard to continue to rely on its aging HECs to provide cutter
operational days and to use existing aircraft and small boats to
support the new NSC. Also, certain systems on NSC-Bertholf are
currently not functioning as planned, but the Coast Guard plans to
resolve these deficiencies before NSC-Bertholf is certified as fully
operational, scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010.
Because the Coast Guard plans to deploy the first NSC without the
planned unmanned aircraft and new small boats, and because on-board
deficiencies still exist, the NSC will not initially operate with the
full complement of its originally-planned capabilities. As a result,
the Coast Guard cannot determine the extent to which the NSC's final
capabilities will exceed those of the HECs at this time and it may take
several years before some of these capabilities are realized.
Comparison of the 2007 and 2008 Delivery Schedules Shows an Anticipated
Loss of Over 3,000 National Security Cutter Operational Days:
Delays in deployment of the NSCs between the 2007 and 2008 delivery
schedules show an anticipated loss of thousands of NSC operational
days. Comparing the 2007 and 2008 delivery schedules shows that the
first NSC will likely be 1 year behind schedule when it is certified as
fully operational, now scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2010[Footnote 13]. Further, the eighth and final NSC was to be fully
operational in 2016, but is currently projected to be fully operational
by the fourth quarter of calendar year 2018.
The first NSC was initially projected for delivery in 2006, but slipped
to August 2007 after the 9/11 requirements changes.[Footnote 14] New
requirements made after 9/11 to enhance the NSC's capabilities also
contributed to these delays and include the following:
* expanded interoperability with the Department of Defense, DHS, and
local first responders;
* increased self-defense and survivability, including chemical,
biological, and radiological measures;
* increased flight capability via a longer and enhanced flight deck;
* upgraded weapon systems; and:
* improved classified communication capabilities.
In addition to the delays brought about by post-9/11 requirements
changes and the associated enhancements to NSC capabilities, delivery
of the NSC was further delayed until May 2008 because of substantial
damage to the shipyard and an exodus of some of the experienced
workforce as a result of Hurricane Katrina.
If the Coast Guard maintains its 2008 acquisition schedule, the most
recent acquisition schedule available to us, it will face a projected
loss of thousands of cutter operational days available from the NSC
class for calendar years 2009 through 2017 from what was originally
planned. Specifically, as shown in figure 3, in comparing the number of
operational days that were expected to be available from the NSC fleet
in the 2007 schedule to what is expected based on the updated 2008
schedule delivery schedule,[Footnote 15] there is a cumulative
projected loss of 3,080 operational days (an "operational gap").
[Footnote 16]
Figure 3: Projected NSC Operational Day Gap Resulting from Delivery
Delays, Calendar Years 2008 through 2018:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined stacked vertical bar and line graph]
Calendar year: 2008;
2007 delivery schedule: 0 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 0 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 0 days.
Calendar year: 2009;
2007 delivery schedule: 185 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 0 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 185 days;.
Calendar year: 2010;
2007 delivery schedule: 460 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 185 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 275 days.
Calendar year: 2011;
2007 delivery schedule: 460 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 370 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 90 days.
Calendar year: 2012;
2007 delivery schedule: 920 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 460 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 460 days.
Calendar year: 2013;
2007 delivery schedule: 1150 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 690 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 460 days.
Calendar year: 2014;
2007 delivery schedule: 1380 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 920 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 460 days.
Calendar year: 2015;
2007 delivery schedule: 1610 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 1150 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 460 days.
Calendar year: 2016;
2007 delivery schedule: 1840 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 1380 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 460 days.
Calendar year: 2017;
2007 delivery schedule: 1840 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 1610 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 230 days.
Calendar year: 2018;
2007 delivery schedule: 1840 days;
2008 delivery schedule: 1840 days;
Projected gaps (total projected gap: 3,080 days): 0 days.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Notes: HEC cutter operational days are not included in this analysis.
The planned number of operational days per year assumes each NSC is
operated 185 days per year with a single crew and 230 days per year
when the crew rotational concept is employed.
NSCs are expected to be fully operational 1 to 2 years after delivery.
[End of figure]
Figure 3 represents the loss of operational capabilities as a result of
delivery delays with the NSC, but does not directly translate into lost
cutter operational days for the Coast Guard as a whole because it does
not take into account any operational days that the Coast Guard
anticipates can be provided through continued use of its HECs. Coast
Guard officials emphasized that it plans for the HECs to continue to
serve until the NSCs become operational. As a result, the Coast Guard
officials state that they do not anticipate a gap in operational days,
even though they acknowledge that the HECs have fewer capabilities than
the NSCs.
While continued operation of the HECs should at least partially
mitigate the operational gap shown in figure 3, we believe that this
analysis is useful to demonstrate the amount of time that the Coast
Guard will be without the enhanced operational capabilities that the
NSCs are expected to provide once they are deployed with their full
complement of support assets. The Coast Guard is unable to quantify the
gap in operational capabilities that it will actually experience,
though, because it has not yet completed the HEC decommissioning
schedule, which, according to Coast Guard officials, is to be completed
in late 2009 at the earliest. The Coast Guard is also not able to
estimate the impact of these lost operational days on specific future
missions. However, given the enhanced capabilities that NSCs have over
the HECs, a loss in NSC operational days could negatively impact the
Coast Guards' ability to more effectively conduct missions, such as
migrant and drug interdiction, enforcement of domestic fishing laws,
and participation in Department of Defense operations.
Delays in Delivery of the National Security Cutters Require the Coast
Guard to Continue to Rely on Its Aging High Endurance Cutters:
Delays in delivery of the NSCs have required the Coast Guard to develop
plans to rely on its aging fleet of HECs to continue to perform
missions that the NSCs were to take over. However, Coast Guard metrics
show that the HECs are becoming increasingly unreliable and, as a
fleet, have not met their target number of cutter operational days in
each of the past 6 fiscal years. Specifically, the fleet of 12 HECs
lost a cumulative total of 118 to 390 operational days each fiscal year
from 2003 through 2008. This accounts for 5 to 18 percent of the Coast
Guard's annual target of 2,220 days for the HEC fleet. According to the
Coast Guard, this loss occurred because of a combination of unscheduled
maintenance and additional planned maintenance beyond the 143
maintenance days allotted for each HEC annually, and averaged about 260
lost operational days per year. Coast Guard officials told us that this
additional maintenance was the result of the HECs' deteriorating
condition. Table 1 shows the actual operational days provided by the
HECs from fiscal years 2003 through 2008, and the gap between the days
provided and the Coast Guard's annual target of 2,220 days.
Table 1: HEC Operational Days Lost During Fiscal Years 2003 through
2008:
Fiscal year: 2003;
HEC actual operational days: 1,956;
HEC operational days lost[A]: 264;
Days lost as a percent of 2,220-day target: 12.
Fiscal year: 2004;
HEC actual operational days: 2,012;
HEC operational days lost[A]: 208;
Days lost as a percent of 2,220-day target: 9.
Fiscal year: 2005;
HEC actual operational days: 2,102;
HEC operational days lost[A]: 118;
Days lost as a percent of 2,220-day target: 5.
Fiscal year: 2006;
HEC actual operational days: 1,830;
HEC operational days lost[A]: 390;
Days lost as a percent of 2,220-day target: 18.
Fiscal year: 2007;
HEC actual operational days: 1,959;
HEC operational days lost[A]: 261;
Days lost as a percent of 2,220-day target: 12.
Fiscal year: 2008;
HEC actual operational days: 1,879;
HEC operational days lost[A]: 341;
Days lost as a percent of 2,220-day target: 15.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[A] The Coast Guard sets an annual target of 185 operational days per
cutter each year for a total of 2,220 operational days (12 cutters x
185 days per cutter) for the HEC fleet.
[End of table]
Another measure of the condition of the HEC fleet is the percent of
time [it is] fully mission capable (PTFMC). This metric reflects the
percentage of time that the cutters operate without a major equipment
failure or loss in mission capabilities. For example, a PTFMC of 50
percent indicates that the cutter had one or more major equipment
failures (or casualties) that degraded or forced the termination of
missions for half of the cutter's operational days in a given year.
From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, the HECs' PTFMC was 59 percent or
less, while the Coast Guard's PTFMC goal for the HEC class was 86
percent. Figure 4 shows the PTFMC for the HECs during that period.
Figure 4: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable (PTFMC) for HEC Class,
Fiscal Years 2004 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked line graph]
Fiscal year: 2004;
Actual: 26.4%;
Goal: 86%;
Operational gap: 59.6%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Actual: 48.2%;
Goal: 86%;
Operational gap: 35.8%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Actual: 41%;
Goal: 86%;
Operational gap: 45%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Actual: 50.8%;
Goal: 86%;
Operational gap: 35.2%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Actual: 58.2%;
Goal: 86%;
Operational gap: 27.8%.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Coast Guard officials said that because of the age and condition of the
HECs, they anticipate that the maintenance needs of the cutters will
continue to increase over time. According to Coast Guard officials, the
loss of cutter operational days and the gap between the actual PTFMC of
the HEC class and the Coast Guard's goal of 86 percent would negatively
impact their drug interdiction, defense readiness, alien migrant
interdiction, and living marine resource missions. The HECs were
commissioned during 1967 to 1972 and have an estimated service life of
about 40 years, affected in part by a rehabilitation and service life
extension program that began in the late 1980s and ended in 1992. As
part of this program, each cutter received an overhaul, costing from
$70 million to $90 million per cutter. Many major propulsion and hull
systems, however, were overhauled but not upgraded or replaced, and
these systems are now at or near the end of their useful service life.
The First National Security Cutter Will be Deployed without Planned
Support Assets:
The Coast Guard plans to deploy the first NSC, scheduled to become
fully operational in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010, without
its planned support assets of unmanned aircraft and new small boats. In
addition, based on our review of a Coast Guard study, future NSCs may
begin missions without the originally-planned unmanned
aircraft.[Footnote 17] The Coast Guard plans to draft operational
specifications for the unmanned aircraft in 2010, and to acquire new
small boats that will be deployed with the first NSC by the end of
calendar year 2010. As a result, because Coast Guard has not determined
the needed specifications, the extent of the operational gap created by
the lack of these assets is not known at this time. In particular, a
Coast Guard acquisition official said that the Coast Guard has not yet
selected the type of unmanned aircraft that is to be deployed with the
NSC, but plans to do so by the third quarter of fiscal year 2012. After
the unmanned aircraft is selected, the Coast Guard must contract for
the acquisition and production of the aircraft, accept delivery of it,
and test its capabilities before deploying it with the NSC--activities
that can take several years.
The NSCs are designed to be deployed with the following combinations of
support aircraft:
* 2 helicopters[Footnote 18] or:
* 1 helicopter and 2 unmanned aircraft or:
* 4 unmanned aircraft.
The helicopter may be used for surveillance, rescue operations, or
airborne use of force, whereas the unmanned aircraft is intended to
increase the NSC's surveillance capabilities. In addition to the
support aircraft, the NSC is intended to be deployed with three new
small boats, rather than the two small boats on the HECs, and,
according to the Coast Guard, will be able to launch and recover small
boats in rougher seas than the HEC. The small boats are designed to
assist the Coast Guard in conducting vessel boardings, pursuing and
interdicting vessels suspected of unlawful behavior, and conducting
search and rescue operations. The Coast Guard currently operates the
helicopters that can be deployed with the NSC, but has restarted the
acquisition of the small boats and is in a pre-acquisition process for
the unmanned aircraft because the operational requirements for the
unmanned aircraft and small boats, as set forth by the contractor, did
not meet the Coast Guard's needs. These support assets are to provide
the NSC with surveillance and other capabilities beyond those of the
HECs. However, until operational requirements are completed and the
unmanned aircraft and small boats are delivered, these increased
capabilities of the NSC will not be realized by the Coast Guard. Coast
Guard officials acknowledged that the lack of unmanned aircraft would
create a gap between the NSC's actual and planned capabilities, but
noted that deployment of existing small boats with the NSC would
mitigate any capability gap created by the absence the new small boats,
as discussed later in this report.
Unmanned Aircraft:
The Coast Guard has not finalized the operational requirements or
acquisition schedule for the unmanned aircraft to be deployed with an
NSC, making it difficult for the Coast Guard to quantify the expected
operational gap. Acquisition of the unmanned aircraft was discontinued
by the Coast Guard in 2007. According to Coast Guard officials, the
Coast Guard discontinued this acquisition because the technology was
unproven and the projected costs were greater than those originally
planned.[Footnote 19] According to a Coast Guard acquisition official,
the Coast Guard will assess alternative aircraft platforms and plans to
select one by the third quarter of fiscal year 2012 for acquisition.
Having assumed responsibility for the acquisition of the unmanned
aircraft from the contractor, the Coast Guard is to follow the
processes set forth in its acquisition guidance. However, because the
acquisition program is in its early stages, the Coast Guard has not yet
determined a date for the deployment of an NSC-based unmanned aircraft.
Small Boats:
The capabilities of the small boats that are to be deployed with the
NSCs are also not currently defined. According to Coast Guard
officials, the original small boat capabilities as planned by the
contractor were not realistic. For example, Coast Guard officials told
us that operational requirements--such as the inclusion of gun mounts,
a top speed of 45 knots, and communication suite requirements--may have
been achievable individually, but were not feasible when taken
together. Coast Guard officials said that they do not yet know what the
new operational requirements will be, but that they plan for the new
small boats to have greater capabilities than the legacy small boats,
which will further enhance the capabilities of the NSC. The Coast Guard
planned to finalize the operational requirements by summer 2009, and
Coast Guard officials anticipate deployment of the small boats by the
end of calendar year 2010. However, until these operational
requirements and a determined delivery schedule are in place, the Coast
Guard is unable to quantify the operational gap that will be created by
the absence of the new small boats that were to have been deployed on
the NSC.
The Coast Guard Is Addressing National Security Cutter Onboard
Deficiencies:
In addition to the gaps created by lost operational days and the
absence of the unmanned aircraft and small boats, the Coast Guard has
identified several operational deficiencies onboard NSC-Bertholf that
it plans to address by the end of calendar year 2010. In particular,
according to Coast Guard officials, three deficiencies are to be
addressed before the cutter is certified as fully operational in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. Details on these three deficiencies
are as follows:
* First, NSC-Bertholf currently lacks a shipboard sensitive
compartmented information facility required for participation in
certain Department of Defense missions and exercises. Coast Guard
officials told us that building such a facility was a post-9/11
requirement the manufacturer did not have time to integrate into NSC-
Bertholf. This facility is to improve communication of sensitive and
classified information with other Coast Guard and Department of Defense
assets and shore facilities. Work on the facility is underway and the
Coast Guard plans to complete the installation and testing in February
2010. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard will also be
responsible for installing similar facilities on the future NSCs, as
they will not be installed by the contractor during construction for
security reasons.
* Second, full installation of technology that aids the movement of
helicopters into the NSC's two hangars is not yet complete, because the
helicopters that are to be deployed with the NSC have not yet been
modified to use this technology. NSC-Bertholf is equipped with a system
designed to automatically secure helicopters after landing and then
move them into a hangar. According to Coast Guard officials, this
system reduces the number of crew members needed to assist in landing
the helicopter and increases the safety of the landing process. The
system has been installed on NSC-Bertholf, but the Coast Guard has not
yet completed the modification of the helicopters to enable them to
integrate with the system. Therefore, the Coast Guard plans to manually
tie down and move the helicopters until the modification is complete,
which, according to Coast Guard officials, is planned for March 2010.
Coast Guard officials stated that the system is to be included during
construction of all future NSCs.
* Third, the functionality of the stern ramp and doors used to launch
small boats on NSC-Bertholf is limited. Coast Guard officials reported
that the doors do not open and close as expected and that the doors are
safe to operate only when the NSC is moving at speeds of 5 knots or
less, because sections of the doors protrude into the water at the edge
of the cutter when they are opened. The stern launch system facilitates
the launch and recovery of small boats and requires fewer crew to
operate than traditional side-launch systems that rely on cranes to
both lower the small boats into the water and then raise them on to the
cutter when their missions are completed. Replacement doors have been
designed that angle up, away from the water, and are equipped with a
mechanism that will better handle their weight to enable them to
operate more reliably and safely. According to the Coast Guard, the new
doors are to be retrofitted to NSC-Bertholf when the cutter goes in for
a maintenance period, planned for March 2010, and are to be installed
on future NSCs during their construction.
Until these onboard deficiencies are addressed and the NSC's unmanned
aircraft and new small boats are delivered, the NSC will be operating
without planned assets that would enhance its capabilities over those
of an HEC. Coast Guard officials stated, though, that even without the
planned unmanned aircraft and new small boats, NSC-Bertholf's
capabilities will be greater than those of an HEC when it is certified
as fully operational at the end of fiscal year 2010. In particular, the
officials stated that, among other things, the NSC will have improved
habitability, increased transit speeds, better fuel efficiency, and a
superior weapons system. However, some of these improvements have not
been fully tested and the NSC will initially not have other key
capabilities, such as the unmanned aircraft, which will require several
years of construction and testing after its initial selection in 2010.
The Coast Guard Plans to Mitigate Identified Operational Gaps by
Upgrading Certain High Endurance Cutters and Using Existing Support
Assets, but the Success and Costs of These Plans Cannot Be Fully
Determined:
To mitigate the operational gaps identified to date that have been
created by delays in deployment of the NSC and its associated support
assets, the Coast Guard plans to keep the HECs operational and to use
existing air assets and small boats until new assets are acquired.
However, the costs of these plans and the extent to which these plans
will successfully mitigate gaps caused by delivery delays cannot be
fully determined at this time.
The Coast Guard Plans to Perform Upgrades and Maintenance on the High
Endurance Cutters to Help Mitigate Lost Cutter Operational Days, but
Complete Costs Cannot Be Determined:
The Coast Guard plans to perform a series of upgrades and maintenance
procedures on its HECs to help mitigate the loss of NSC operational
days, but the complete costs of these improvements cannot be determined
because the Coast Guard has not finalized its plans for completing
these tasks, nor has funding been provided. The Coast Guard has also
begun a management initiative to increase the number of operational
days available from the HECs, given delays in deploying the NSCs.
However, because these plans have not yet been finalized and the Coast
Guard could not provide estimated completion dates, the extent to which
these plans will help mitigate the loss of cutter operational days
faced by the Coast Guard cannot be fully determined at this time. More
specifically, the Coast Guard's mitigation plans include three key
elements, as follows:
* First, the Coast Guard plans to overhaul or replace equipment on
selected HECs through an HEC sustainment program. According to Coast
Guard officials, the purpose of the program is to replace obsolete or
increasingly unsupportable parts and equipment to lower the cost of
future HEC maintenance and increase the number of days that the HECs
are able to operate each year. Depending on the state of each
individual HEC, the sustainment program could include repairs or
upgrades to the hull and propulsion machinery, fire alarm systems, air-
conditioning and refrigeration systems, or other equipment that has
become difficult to maintain. According to Coast Guard officials, they
do not expect that all of the HECs will receive these upgrades; rather,
the selection of the cutters to be upgraded is to be based on an
analysis of their condition. Coast Guard officials stated that the
analysis of the condition of the HECs is expected to begin in 2011, and
that the work to overhaul the selected cutters is to begin in 2015,
with work on the first selected HEC to be completed in 2016. Based on
these time frames, there will be a loss of cutter operational days
resulting from the deteriorating condition of the HECs for at least the
next 7 years, until 2016. During the years in which the Coast Guard
carries out the sustainment program, the operational gap created by
lost cutter operational days could widen because each HEC selected for
upgrade is to be taken out of service for 1 year while the necessary
work is completed. Coast Guard officials noted that this is required in
order for HECs to continue operations until the NSCs are deployed and
that they intend to coordinate the HEC upgrades, the HEC
decommissioning schedule, and the deployment of the NSCs to ensure that
a combination of 12 HECs and NSCs are available for operations while
HECs are removed from service for upgrades. The Coast Guard officials
said that they have drafted the sustainment program proposal, but it
was not finalized at the time of our review and the Coast Guard does
not have an estimated date for when it will be completed. The officials
added that they could not predict whether this program would be funded.
* Second, in 2007, the Coast Guard implemented a management initiative
to (1) clearly define HEC maintenance goals, (2) enumerate tasks to
achieve those goals, (3) assign personnel responsible for each goal,
and (4) provide a means of measuring whether the goal had been
achieved, in order to improve the readiness of the HECs based on the
West Coast and Hawaii.[Footnote 20] For example, the Coast Guard
personnel responsible for the HECs' maintenance were assigned the goal
of improving HEC engineering equipment readiness, including tasks such
as reducing the time taken to address failures in essential equipment
to less than 15 days. Similarly, the commanding officers of each HEC
were assigned the goal of improving scheduled preventive maintenance
completion rates and to keep records to measure how much of this
maintenance was completed. Through regular analysis of the measures
associated with each goal or task, the responsible personnel are to
identify issues that may impact mission readiness, develop and
implement corrective actions, and evaluate the effectiveness of those
actions. While this management initiative is still ongoing, Coast Guard
officials stated that they believe it has been successful. For example,
the officials told us that from 2006--the year before the initiative
began--through 2008, the number of HEC equipment failures that impacted
missions declined by over 50 percent.
* Third, in advance of the HEC sustainment program, the Coast Guard
intended to increase funding for HEC maintenance by $10 million during
fiscal year 2010. However, Coast Guard officials reported that their
request for the funding--intended to enable the Coast Guard to complete
HEC maintenance that had been deferred over time and address the near-
term maintenance needs of the HECs until the sustainment program
begins--was not included in the fiscal year 2010 budget.[Footnote 21]
The Coast Guard Plans to Address Operational Gaps Caused by Delays in
the Delivery of Unmanned Aircraft and Small Boats with Existing Assets,
Thus Costs May Not Increase:
According to the Coast Guard, operational gaps caused by delays in the
delivery of unmanned aircraft and small boats are to be addressed
through the use of existing aircraft and small boats and thus, it
likely would not incur new costs. The unmanned aircraft is intended to
increase the NSC's surveillance capabilities, while the small boats are
designed to assist the Coast Guard in conducting vessel boardings,
pursuing and interdicting other vessels, and conducting search and
rescue operations. The Coast Guard has not yet finalized the
operational requirements of these assets; therefore, it is not yet able
to quantify the gap in aircraft surveillance and small boat missions
created by their absence.
Manned aircraft currently provide surveillance support to the HECs and
other Coast Guard vessels and could be assigned to support NSC
missions, as needed. While existing aircraft would provide the NSCs
with a level of air support comparable to that currently provided to
the HECs, a Coast Guard study found that manned aircraft cannot provide
the same level of surveillance capabilities that would be provided by a
cutter-based unmanned aircraft.[Footnote 22] Because the NSCs are to
replace decommissioned HECs, Coast Guard officials told us that the
level of support provided by the manned aircraft to the NSCs is not
expected to be greater than that currently provided to the HECs.
Therefore, the Coast Guard would, theoretically, not incur new costs in
assigning existing air assets to the NSC as the HECs are decommissioned
and no longer need air support.
According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard plans to deploy the
first NSC with existing small boats until new small boats are acquired.
During its operational testing period, NSC-Bertholf is using a
prototype small boat delivered by the contractor, as well as small
boats used on the HEC class. According to Coast Guard officials, there
is no additional cost to use these small boats beyond the funds already
allocated for small boat operations. Furthermore, Coast Guard officials
told us that the configuration of the small boats on the NSC will
enhance its small boat capabilities relative to the HECs. In
particular, the NSC will be equipped with three small boats, rather
than the two small boats on the HECs, and will be able to launch and
recover small boats in rougher seas than the HEC. Nevertheless, the
lack of operational requirements and a delivery schedule for new small
boats precludes the Coast Guard from quantifying the gap between the
capabilities of the existing small boats and those that it intends to
acquire. As a result, the Coast Guard has not determined the extent to
which existing small boats will help mitigate the operational gap
between the existing small boats that will be initially deployed on the
NSC and the new small boats with which the NSC will deploy in the
future.
The Coast Guard Is Working to Finalize Its Key Logistics Plan by
October 2009, but Complete Logistics Costs Cannot Yet Be Determined:
The Coast Guard has begun planning for the logistics support transition
to the NSC from the HEC, and is working to finalize its key NSC
logistics support plan by October 2009, but the Coast Guard cannot
determine the complete logistics transition costs. While the Coast
Guard is generally following the process established in its acquisition
guide and is developing logistics plans to support the NSC, the key
logistics support plan has not been finalized and approved within
required time frames. In particular, to meet the near term logistics
needs of NSC-Bertholf, the Coast Guard has developed and is using an
interim support plan, but this plan does not include the requisite
descriptions of the detailed documents that the Coast Guard plans to
use to provide logistics support to the NSC or time frames for
completing these documents. Further, according to its acquisition
guide, the Coast Guard's key logistics support plan--the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan--for the NSC should have been finalized prior to
the start of production on the first NSC in June 2004; but the Coast
Guard has not finalized or approved this plan. Further, the Coast Guard
cannot fully estimate the costs of the transition from the HECs to its
NSCs.
The Coast Guard Is Developing Required Logistics Plans for the National
Security Cutter, but the Key Logistics Plan Has Not Been Completed and
Approved, as Required:
The Coast Guard is developing logistics plans to support the NSC as
required by its Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM), but the key
plan has not been finalized and approved in accordance with the time
frames required by the MSAM. The Coast Guard is required to follow the
MSAM when designing and producing new assets. Specifically, the MSAM
requires a management approach that begins with the identification of
deficiencies in overall Coast Guard capabilities and then proceeds
through a series of structured phases and decision points to: (1)
identify requirements for performance, (2) develop and match these
requirements with a proposed solution (e.g., asset needed), (3)
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed asset, and (4) produce the
desired asset. The MSAM process provides a number of benefits that have
the potential to improve acquisition outcomes, such as ensuring that
the new systems and equipment are optimally supportable and the
necessary logistics support resources are in place and acquired at an
optimal cost. Primarily, it requires event-driven decision making by
high-ranking Coast Guard acquisition personnel at a number of key
points in an asset's life cycle. At each decision point, or
"milestone," the MSAM requires the Coast Guard to prepare certain
documents or plans that capture the information needed for decision
making and approval of acquisition activities. The MSAM-required
documents or plans also guide the transition to a new asset (e.g., NSC)
from a legacy asset (e.g., HEC), and the MSAM provides criteria for the
Coast Guard to follow when preparing each of these documents.
Required logistics support documents include the Integrated Logistics
Support Plan, the Logistics Readiness Review, and the NSC Deployment
Plan. The Integrated Logistics Support Plan, which should have been
finalized and approved by the time production of the first NSC was
started in June 2004, is expected to be completed by October 2009.
According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard contracted for the
Logistics Readiness Review and the Coast Guard expects to complete the
Deployment Plan within the time frames required by the MSAM, which is
2012. Table 2 describes and provides the status of these plans for the
NSC acquisition. Appendix I includes a list of the Coast Guard
documents necessary for NSC operations and logistical support, as well
as the status of the documents.
Table 2: Description of Key MSAM-required Logistics Plans:
Logistics plan: Logistics Readiness Review;
Description: Assesses the logistics readiness level of a ship,
identifies gaps in support, and recommends remediation for identified
gaps;
Status: Completed in May 2008. At the time the Coast Guard contracted
for this review, it was not an MSAM requirement.
Logistics plan: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Description: Serves as the final master logistics plan used after the
asset is fully operational that incorporates any changes identified
while the asset undergoes testing with the Interim Support Plan in
place;
Status: In progress and expected to be completed by October 2009.
According to the MSAM, the final plan should have been completed by the
time production was started on the first NSC in June 2004.
Logistics plan: Deployment Plan;
Description: Ensures that all required personnel and facilities are
identified and provided to operate and sustain the new asset when it
arrives at the deployed location;
Status: Not yet started, but expected to be completed by 2012, in
accordance with MSAM requirements.[A]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard documents.
[A] Coast Guard officials stated that some parts of the Deployment Plan
are under development, but the Coast Guard has not begun work on the
Deployment Plan itself.
[End of table]
The Navy's Logistics Readiness Review Found Some Logistics Plans Are
Incomplete:
In 2007, the Coast Guard contracted with the Department of the Navy to
conduct a Logistics Readiness Review of NSC logistics, which identified
gaps in logistics planning and recommended corrective actions that the
Coast Guard has begun to address. The Deepwater contractor developed
the initial NSC logistics plans, but in 2007, the Coast Guard assumed
responsibility for NSC logistical planning because, according to Coast
Guard officials, the contractor's plans were deficient. Coast Guard
officials stated that they were concerned that the contractor was not
completing NSC logistics plans quickly enough and the plans had
insufficient detail. For example, Coast Guard officials said that the
contractor's logistics plans did not include the necessary details,
such as how the contractor would support the NSC after it becomes fully
operational. As part of the logistics shift from the contractor to the
Coast Guard, in 2007, the Coast Guard contracted with the Department of
the Navy to assess the logistics readiness level of NSC-Bertholf. While
not required by the MSAM at the time the review was contracted for,
Coast Guard officials said that the review helped them focus on areas
where logistics planning for the NSC were lacking. Coast Guard
officials added that the review proved to be very useful for logistics
planning and, as a result, they revised the MSAM to now require this
review before new assets transition to fully operational status.
Published in May 2008, the Logistics Readiness Review focused on nine
areas of logistics readiness and identified logistics gaps in those
areas. The areas of logistics readiness included the adequacy of the
spare parts and supplies available to support NSC-Bertholf, the
adequacy of technical support document and plans, and the adequacy of
the NSC logistical support facilities, among others. In total, the Navy
identified 34 gaps within the 9 logistics areas and developed
recommendations on how the Coast Guard could take appropriate action to
address those gaps. The Navy identified 18 of the 34 gaps as "high
priority," which means that the gap introduces significant risk to near-
term supportability and workarounds either do not exist or they
introduce additional risk. For example, the review found that the Coast
Guard had not conducted a sufficient number of analyses to determine
NSC crew training needs. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast
Guard generally agreed with the Logistic Readiness Review's findings
and has made some progress in addressing the recommendations
identified. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard plans
to address 31 of the 34 recommendations. However, according to Coast
Guard officials, the Coast Guard has decided not to address three
recommendations because the costs of addressing these recommendations
outweighed the benefits. For example, the review found that the lifting
capability of the crane used to hoist items from the pier onto the NSC
was insufficient and made a recommendation to address this deficiency.
Coast Guard officials stated the Navy's finding was based on the
projected capability of the crane and countered that its actual lift
capabilities are sufficient to meet the needs of the NSC.
Coast Guard officials stated that the NSC logistics transition from the
contractor to the Coast Guard either created or increased the
significance of several of the gaps identified. For example, under the
contractor-supported model, the Coast Guard would have been responsible
for a limited amount of NSC maintenance. However, because the Coast
Guard now plans to support the NSC with its own staff, it must train
personnel and upgrade facilities. Appendix II provides more detail on
the review's findings and the status of the Coast Guard's progress in
implementing the recommendations made to address the gaps identified.
Coast Guard officials noted that the Navy does not plan to validate the
actions the Coast Guard has taken. Table 3 shows the Coast Guard's
assessment of the status of the 34 gaps identified by the Navy's
review.
Table 3: Number and Status of the Coast Guard's Progress in Addressing
Navy's Logistics Readiness Review Recommendations, by Total and High
Priority:
Status: Work completed/addressed;
Number of recommendations: 6;
Number of recommendations pertaining to high priority gaps: 4.
Status: Work in progress;
Number of recommendations: 22;
Number of recommendations pertaining to high priority gaps: 12.
Status: Work not started;
Number of recommendations: 3;
Number of recommendations pertaining to high priority gaps: 2.
Status: Recommendation will not be addressed;
Number of recommendations: 3;
Number of recommendations pertaining to high priority gaps: 0.
Status: Total;
Number of recommendations: 34;
Number of recommendations pertaining to high priority gaps: 18.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
According to the Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard has completed
work to address six recommendations, such as revising the NSC
Configuration Management Plan, which the Navy found to be inadequate
and considered a high-priority gap.[Footnote 23] Regarding the 25
recommendations in process or not yet started, Coast Guard officials
stated the Coast Guard has made some progress in addressing these
recommendations. For example, one high-priority gap cited the lack of
training for Coast Guard personnel who will be supporting NSC-Bertholf,
so, according to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard is training
these personnel as needs arise. Despite progress, more work needs to be
done. For example, the review concluded that facility budgets are
insufficient and are not aligned with asset deliveries, and that the
Coast Guard has not developed plans for either home ports or facilities
for all NSCs.[Footnote 24] The review recommended developing these
documents to address these high-priority gaps. Coast Guard officials
stated that the Coast Guard is in the process of addressing the home
port recommendation, but has not started to address the facility
recommendation.
The National Security Cutter's Integrated Logistics Support Plan Has
Not Been Completed and Approved, as Required:
The NSC's Integrated Logistics Support Plan--the key logistics planning
document that is to describe the necessary logistics support
activities--has not been completed and approved as required by the
MSAM. The MSAM requires that this plan assign responsibility to a Coast
Guard unit for the planning of each logistics area and establish a
schedule with time frames for completing these activities. According to
the MSAM, each of the 10 logistics areas should have a section in the
Integrated Logistics Support Plan that identifies and describes the
detailed documents the Coast Guard intends to use to support the
project in each logistics area with the details to be provided
separately. Moreover, the plan is to identify what details will be
provided, who will provide them, and when. Table 4 describes the 10
logistics areas.
Table 4: Coast Guard Logistics Areas:
Logistics area: 1; Design interface;
Description: Determines the inherent supportability of a system.
Purpose is to: (1) ensure that logistical support considerations are a
part of the design process; and (2) ensure that changes in a system
design during the various design and construction phases are reviewed
for impact on logistical support.
Logistics area: 2; Maintenance planning;
Description: The analytical methodology used to establish the
maintenance philosophy of a system; answers questions such as: What can
go wrong? Who will fix it? Where will it be fixed? How will it be
fixed? And how often will it need to be fixed?
Logistics area: 3; Manpower and personnel;
Description: The identification and acquisition of personnel (military
and civilian) with skills and grades required to operate, support, and
maintain a system over its life cycle.
Logistics area: 4; Supply support;
Description: All the management actions, procedures, and techniques
necessary to acquire, catalog, receive, store, transfer, issue and
dispose of secondary items (piece and repair parts below the major
system level).
Logistics area: 5; Support equipment;
Description: All equipment required to support the operation and
maintenance of a system.
Logistics area: 6; Technical data;
Description: The information needed to translate system and equipment
design requirements into discrete engineering and logistics
considerations, such as manual and maintenance procedures.
Logistics area: 7; Training and training support;
Description: The processes, procedures, techniques, training devices,
equipment, and materials used by personnel to operate and support a
system throughout its life cycle.
Logistics area: 8; Computer resources support;
Description: The internal and external facilities, hardware, software,
personnel, and other resources needed to support software intensive
systems.
Logistics area: 9; Packaging, handling, storage, and transportation;
Description: The requirements, resources, processes, procedures, design
considerations, and methods necessary to ensure that all systems,
equipment, and support items are preserved, packaged, handled, stored,
and transported properly.
Logistics area: 10; Facilities;
Description: The real property assets required for the support of a
system; includes conducting studies that define facilities and facility
improvement, locations, space needs, equipment, and others.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard documents.
[End of table]
According to the MSAM, the Coast Guard is to prepare and approve the
Integrated Logistics Support Plan before production is started on the
first asset in a class. Although the NSC acquisition passed this phase
in June 2004, as of May 2009, the Coast Guard has not completed and
approved this plan. Coast Guard officials said that the Coast Guard
initially required the contractor to develop the Integrated Logistics
Support Plan, but when the Coast Guard assumed responsibility for NSC
logistics in 2007, it determined that the contractor's plan did not
meet the Coast Guard's needs and began to update it. According to Coast
Guard officials, they expect to complete the plan by October 2009.
To meet the near term logistics needs of the NSC and guide logistics
planning until the Coast Guard completes the Integrated Logistics
Support Plan, it developed an Interim Support Plan. According to the
Coast Guard, the interim plan is to provide information about how the
Coast Guard would sustain NSC-Bertholf and to identify the personnel
responsible for maintaining the NSC. Our review of the Interim Support
Plan, however, found that while the plan assigns responsibility to a
Coast Guard unit for activities in all 10 logistics areas, it does not
provide the level of detail that would be required by the MSAM for an
NSC Integrated Logistics Support Plan. In particular, as shown in table
5, we found that 5 of the 10 areas covered in the Interim Support Plan
do not contain a planning section that describes the detailed documents
the Coast Guard plans to use to support the NSC in each logistics area.
In addition, none of the 10 logistics areas contain detailed time
frames for when the planning information is to be developed and
finalized. For example, while the interim plan makes note of the
"Training" logistics area, the plan does not contain any dates to guide
the Coast Guard's planning of this area. Further, five areas, such as
"Maintenance Planning" and "Supply Support" do not contain a planning
section and, therefore, do not have required time frames for completing
documents.
Table 5: Information on the Coast Guard's Interim Support Plan's
Compliance with MSAM Requirements:
Logistics area: Maintenance planning;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Empty];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Supply support;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Empty];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Training;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Check];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Support and test equipment;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Empty];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Manpower and personnel;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Check];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Packaging, handling, storage, and transportation;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Check];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Facilities;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Check];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Computer resources support;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Empty];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty]
Logistics area: Technical data;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Check];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Design interface;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: [Check];
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: [Empty];
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan:
[Empty].
Logistics area: Totals;
Responsibility assigned to appropriate Coast Guard offices: 10;
Planning section present in the Interim Support Plan: 5;
Documentation of time frames present in the Interim Support Plan: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[End of table]
According to Coast Guard officials, while the Interim Support Plan was
developed using the MSAM-mandated Integrated Logistics Support Plan
structure as a guide, they acknowledged that the interim plan does not
meet MSAM requirements. Further, Coast Guard officials did not commit
to including all the required items, such as details of documents to be
used and time frames for completing these documents, when revising the
final Integrated Logistics Support Plan because they are still in the
process of determining how to proceed with finalizing the plan.
Including these details and time frames for the completion of logistics
planning documents could strengthen the Coast Guard's efforts to
support the NSC in the 10 logistics areas by providing a roadmap to
guide its personnel regarding actions to take and when to take them.
For example, the interim plan lacks MSAM-required details on
maintenance planning and supply support--which are critical in
determining the number of people and supplies for supporting the NSC.
In addition, providing details and time frames for the other logistics
areas, as noted in table 5, would help ensure such actions are
conducted in accordance with management's directives and better
position the Coast Guard to more effectively support the NSCs as they
are deployed.
The Coast Guard Continues to Develop Required Components of the
National Security Cutter Deployment Plan:
The Coast Guard has made some progress in developing a deployment plan
that is to address the logistics transition from the HEC to the NSC and
some of the costs of this transition and expects to complete this plan
by 2012, as required by the MSAM. Specifically, the MSAM requires the
Coast Guard to develop an asset deployment plan that includes items
such as the timing of deliveries, the decommissioning of legacy assets,
and the selection of locations where the new assets will be based. In
addition, the Deployment Plan is to identify any costs that will be
incurred as part of (1) NSC deployment, (2) new or modified facilities
requirements, (3) staffing issues, and (4) plans for disposal of HECs.
For the NSC, the MSAM requires an approved plan be in place by 2012,
prior to full production. The Coast Guard anticipates it will complete
the NSC Deployment Plan to satisfy this requirement within the time
frame established by the MSAM. Some parts of the Deployment Plan
currently under development include the following:
* Delivery schedule: The Coast Guard has developed an NSC delivery
schedule. The first NSC was delivered in 2008 and the final NSC is
expected to be delivered in 2017.
* Home port locations: According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast
Guard plans to base the first three NSCs in Alameda, California and
continues to develop home port plans for the other five cutters and
determine the facilities upgrades needed at these ports. According to
the MSAM, both the home port and facility plans are to be completed by
2012, and Coast Guard officials stated the Coast Guard is on track to
meet this requirement for both plans. Specifically, Coast Guard
officials stated that the Coast Guard expects to decide the home port
locations for the fourth through sixth NSCs by the end of fiscal year
2009, and it plans to decide the home port locations for the seventh
and eighth NSCs by fiscal year 2011. According to Coast Guard
officials, facility planning is to begin after home port locations are
determined.
* Decommissioning Schedule: Coast Guard officials stated that they
continue to work on a decommissioning schedule and have determined that
the Coast Guard will decommission HEC-Hamilton shortly after NSC-
Bertholf becomes fully operational. According to Coast Guard officials,
the order in which the other HECs are to be decommissioned is to be
determined in 2009, although the order may change after the completion
of an analysis of the condition of HECs. A critical component of this
analysis is an assessment of HEC hulls. According to Coast Guard
officials, saltwater corrodes a cutter's hull over time, and the
studies are to determine the extent to which the hulls are degraded on
HECs. Studies of two HEC hulls have been completed, and the Coast Guard
expects to complete five more in 2009, and then complete the remaining
five by 2011. Ultimately, the Coast Guard plans to use these studies to
inform its decision about which HECs to decommission first and which to
sustain longer. According to Coast Guard officials, the time frames the
Coast Guard develops to implement its HEC sustainment plan may also
impact the decommissioning schedule, as the Coast Guard may delay the
decommissioning of an HEC until it completes sustainment upgrades on
another HEC to minimize any operational gaps. To further minimize any
operational gaps, Coast Guard plans to schedule HEC decommissioning
dates to coincide with NSCs becoming operational.
Coast Guard Continues to Develop Logistics Transition Cost Estimates:
The Coast Guard has incurred some costs and developed cost estimates
related to the logistics transition from the HEC to the NSC, such as
NSC maintenance personnel salaries at Alameda, but other costs related
to this transition, such as facilities upgrades for ports other than
Alameda, cannot be fully determined at this time. According to Coast
Guard officials, the primary cost drivers of the logistics transition
are: (1) maintenance planning, (2) maintenance training, (3) facilities
upgrades, and (4) maintenance execution. These officials stated that
the cost drivers they identified contained both transition and life-
cycle logistics costs, and that it was difficult to differentiate
between these costs. For example, Coast Guard officials stated that the
maintenance execution cost driver--the actions taken to maintain an
asset--does not distinguish between transition and life-cycle costs. A
discussion of the transition component of each cost driver, the costs
incurred to date, and any estimated future costs follows.
Maintenance Planning:
Coast Guard officials said that the first cost driver for the logistics
transition from HECs to NSCs is the development of maintenance planning
documents and schedules. According to Coast Guard officials, most
maintenance planning is complete, and as of May 2009, the Coast Guard
has spent an estimated $2.5 million on these efforts. More
specifically, the Coast Guard spent about $1.1 million on contracting,
primarily for maintenance plan development and management, while the
remaining $1.4 million represents the amount paid to Coast Guard
personnel working on maintenance planning. Coast Guard officials
estimated that as of May 2009, the Coast Guard had completed at least
90 percent of the needed NSC maintenance planning.
Maintenance Training:
Coast Guard officials stated that the second cost driver for the
logistics transition from HECs to NSCs is the preparation of the crew
and shore-side maintenance personnel to support the NSC. As of June
2008, the Coast Guard estimated that it needed about $7 million for
training. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard continues
to develop training programs and further work remains to be done. For
example, the Logistics Readiness Review recommended completing
additional training analyses on 30 equipment systems unique to the NSC,
but Coast Guard officials stated that as of February 2009, only 4
analyses of these systems were under way. Additionally, the Coast Guard
has not decided the extent to which it will develop its own training
courses--which require more upfront costs--as opposed to contracting
with equipment manufacturers for the training. The costs incurred for
this driver as well as the overall logistics transition costs may
increase if the Coast Guard decides to develop more training.
Facility Upgrades:
Coast Guard officials told us that the third cost driver for the
logistics transition from HECs to NSCs includes the modifications to
the port and its associated buildings to accommodate the new NSCs. By
June 2008, the Coast Guard had completed about $12.5 million of the
facility upgrades needed at the Alameda, California port where at least
three NSCs are to be based. These modifications included pier upgrades
to accommodate the larger NSC as well as dredging the channel to
accommodate the NSC's deeper draft.[Footnote 25] Because of these
logistics improvements, the Coast Guard port at Alameda can now
accommodate NSC-Bertholf, as shown in figure 5.
Figure 5: NSC-Bertholf Docked at the Pier, Alameda, California:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
While certain facility upgrades have been completed in Alameda, other
upgrades have not been completed. For example, the Coast Guard believes
it will need a building to house those crew members who are part of the
new rotational crewing concept for the NSC, but as of June 2009,
construction of the estimated $22.4 million facility has not started.
According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard also has not begun
facility upgrades at other locations because the Coast Guard has not
finalized the NSC Home Port Plan. Coast Guard officials stated that the
Coast Guard expects to decide the home port locations for the fourth
through sixth NSCs by the end of fiscal year 2009, and it plans to
decide the home port locations for the seventh and eighth NSCs by
fiscal year 2011. Coast Guard officials stated that the Coast Guard may
select home ports for NSCs in locations that could require more
significant upgrades than Alameda, an outcome that would increase
costs.
Maintenance Execution:
Coast Guard officials said that the fourth cost driver for the
logistics transition from HECs to NSCs is maintenance activities to
support the NSCs and include (1) the cost of purchasing agreements and
other commercial contracts to supply and maintain the NSCs and (2)
salaries for Coast Guard shore-side maintenance personnel. According to
Coast Guard officials, as of May 2009, the Coast Guard had spent
$550,000 on purchasing agreements it developed with equipment
manufacturers to help bridge the gap between contractor-supported and
Coast Guard-supported logistics and plans to allocate $5.6 million for
these agreements from 2008 through 2011. Coast Guard officials stated
the Coast Guard has used these agreements to purchase parts and extend
equipment warranties, among other things. Additionally, Coast Guard
officials stated that the Coast Guard plans to enter into other
commercial contracts for NSC maintenance from 2008 through 2011, but
cannot estimate the costs of those contracts because it does not have
historical maintenance data on the NSC's new equipment that are needed
to estimate the frequency of equipment failures and the costs of
repairing them. Coast Guard officials stated that the Coast Guard
currently has a 5-year study underway to develop more accurate
maintenance cost estimates.
Regarding maintenance personnel salaries, Coast Guard officials said
that separating the personnel costs for the logistics transition from
HECs to NSCs is difficult because maintenance execution costs are
determined based on the service life of the cutters and transition
costs are not accounted for separately. As such, these officials could
not estimate the maintenance personnel cost component of the logistics
transition. Although the Coast Guard has estimated shore side
maintenance costs for NSCs that are to use Alameda as a home port,
Coast Guard officials stated that they have not determined how quickly
the support needs for HECs will diminish as NSCs begin conducting
missions and HECs are decommissioned. With this in mind, Coast Guard
officials stated that the Coast Guard plans to phase out personnel
positions currently dedicated to supporting HECs and replace them with
personnel dedicated to support NSCs. According to Coast Guard
officials, the Coast Guard currently has 79 maintenance personnel
positions in Alameda to support four HECs and could not estimate the
cost for these positions. These officials stated the Coast Guard has
added 11 NSC maintenance positions in Alameda, at a cost of $940,000
per year, and estimate that it will need 108 additional maintenance
personnel to support the first three NSCs at a cost of about $9 million
per year for all three combined. Furthermore, Coast Guard officials
stated that they expect the maintenance execution cost estimates to
change after the Coast Guard completes a study to determine the number
of shore-side personnel needed to support the NSC--the lack of that
study was identified in the Logistics Readiness Review as high
priority.
Conclusions:
The NSC, the first cutter class delivered to the Coast Guard under the
Deepwater program, is to be instrumental in carrying out the Coast
Guard's missions as it replaces the aging and increasingly unreliable
HEC class. Although the Coast Guard assumed responsibility for NSC
logistical planning in 2007 because it believed that the contractor's
plans did not contain sufficient details, the Coast Guard has yet to
complete the Integrated Logistics Support Plan, as required by the
MSAM. The Coast Guard has developed an interim support plan to guide
logistics planning for the NSC until the Integrated Logistics Support
Plan is finalized, but the interim plan lacks MSAM-required details,
such as maintenance planning and supply support that are critical in
determining the number of people and supplies the Coast Guard will need
to support the NSC. Further, while the Coast Guard expects to complete
the Integrated Logistics Support Plan by October 2009, the plan may not
include the required details of logistics support documents to be used
and time frames for completing them because the Coast Guard is still
determining how to proceed with finalizing the plan and did not commit
to including these details. Identifying these details and time frames
for the completion of logistics planning documents could strengthen the
Coast Guard's efforts to support the NSC in the 10 logistics areas by
providing a roadmap to guide its personnel of actions to take and when
to take them, better position the Coast Guard to more effectively
transition to the NSC, better ensure that the Coast Guard's cost
estimates are reasonable, and reduce uncertainties for the Coast Guard
(which must budget for such costs in advance) and Congress (which must
appropriate the funds).
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To meet MSAM requirements and aid the Coast Guard in making operational
decisions, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard ensure
that as the Coast Guard finalizes the Integrated Logistics Support Plan
for the NSC, that the plan includes the required logistics support
documents to be used and the time frames for completing them.
Agency Comments:
In June 2009, we requested comments on a draft of this report from the
Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the
report, as appropriate. In addition to the technical comments, the
Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard jointly provided an
official letter for inclusion in this report. In the letter, the
agencies noted that they generally concur with our findings and
recommendation. A copy of this letter can be seen in appendix III.
We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of DHS, the
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and interested congressional
committees. In addition, the report will also be made available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9610, or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: National Security Cutter Operations and Logistics
Documents:
This appendix lists the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter (NSC)
operations and logistics documents that are incomplete or under
development. The Coast Guard uses many documents to guide the
acquisition and logistical support of its assets. The Coast Guard
documents relative to the NSC, their expected completion dates, and
purpose are listed in table 6.
Table 6: List of NSC Operations and Logistics Documents/Analyses and
Expected Completion Dates:
Document/analysis: Small Boats Concept of Operations;
Expected completion date: Spring 2009;
Purpose: Outlines the specific uses and missions of small boats
integrated with the NSC.
Document/analysis: Fleet Mix Analysis;
Expected completion date: Summer 2009;
Purpose: Determines the appropriate number of Deepwater assets,
including NSCs.
Document/analysis: Small Boats Operational Requirements Document;
Expected completion date: Summer 2009;
Purpose: Provides the performance specifications of small boats.
Document/analysis: NSC Test and Evaluation Master Plan;
Expected completion date: July 2009;
Purpose: Serves as the "top-level" planning document for all NSC
testing and evaluation. Guides verification of technical performance
parameters, operational effectiveness, and operational suitability.
Document/analysis: NSC Logistics Support Plan;
Expected completion date: October 2009;
Purpose: Serves as the master logistic support planning document and is
an integral part of the total project planning effort. Describes the
necessary logistics support activities including assigning
responsibility for those activities and establishing the schedule for
completing those activities.
Document/analysis: Project Management Plan;
Expected completion date: October 2009;
Purpose: Establishes procedures for the overall management of the
approved acquisition project. Provides the framework to define the
activities/tasking, responsibilities, and the sequence of events, and
is the Project Manager's blueprint for project management.
Document/analysis: Mission Enhancement Project--Plus Plan;
Expected completion date: 2009;
Purpose: Documents High Endurance Cutter sustainment process that will
replace aging and obsolete systems to reduce maintenance costs and
operational days lost because of unplanned maintenance.
Document/analysis: HEC Decommissioning Schedule;
Expected completion date: Late 2009;
Purpose: Determines the order in which the Coast Guard will
decommission HECs.
Document/analysis: Crew Rotational Concept; Concept of Operations;
Expected completion date: 2010-2011;
Purpose: Provides specifics on how the Coast Guard will implement
rotational crewing. Needed to estimate the number of shore-side NSC
maintenance personnel--a key cost of the maintenance transition.
Document/analysis: Unmanned Aircraft System Study;
Expected completion date: 2010;
Purpose: Document which identifies the most effective unmanned aircraft
system to operate off the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter.
Document/analysis: High Endurance Cutter Hull Inspections;
Expected completion date: 2011;
Purpose: Provides information to support the HEC decommissioning
schedule.
Document/analysis: NSC Home Port Plan;
Expected completion date: 2011[A];
Purpose: Determines home port for each of the eight NSCs.
Document/analysis: Deployment Plan;
Expected completion date: 2012;
Purpose: Addresses all areas of asset deployment related to the
acquisition. Ensures that all required resources (e.g., personnel and
facilities) are identified and provided to operate and sustain the new
asset or capability when it arrives at the deployed location.
Document/analysis: Integrated Training Plan;
Expected completion date: No estimate available;
Purpose: Formalizes both NSC crew and shore-side personnel training
curricula.
Document/analysis: Manpower Requirements Analysis for shore-side
commands;
Expected completion date: No estimate available;
Purpose: Details the shore-side requirements--including billets--needed
for NSC maintenance. Completion is dependent on the crew rotational
concept (CRC) concept of operations (CONOPS).
Document/analysis: Class Facilities Plan;
Expected completion date: No estimate available;
Purpose: Determines what changes are necessary in selected homeports to
accommodate NSCs. Completion is dependent on the NSC Home Port Plan.
Source: GAO Analysis of Coast Guard information.
[A] Coast Guard officials stated that the first three NSCs will be
located in Alameda, California. According to these officials, the Coast
Guard expects to decide the home port locations for the fourth through
sixth NSCs by the end of fiscal year 2009, and it plans to decide the
home port locations for the seventh and eighth NSCs by fiscal year
2011.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Logistics Readiness Review Findings and the Coast Guard's
Efforts to Address Identified Gaps:
This appendix describes the results of the Navy's Logistics Readiness
Review (LRR) and the Coast Guard's efforts to address identified gaps,
as of May 2009. The MSAM requires the completion of a LRR as a part of
the acquisition process. The Coast Guard contracted with the Department
of the Navy to conduct a LRR, which assessed the adequacy of the Coast
Guard's readiness to support the NSC based on logistics plans provided
by the contractor. Specifically, the LRR determined the logistics
readiness level of NSC-Bertholf, identified gaps in support, assessed
potential impacts on mission performance, and recommended remediation
for identified gaps. This appendix provides details on the review's
findings and the status of the recommendations made to address the gaps
identified.
Navy Review of National Security Cutter Logistics Areas Identified
Gaps:
The LRR focused on nine areas of logistics readiness, including supply
support, technical documents, facilities, and aviation, among others.
[Footnote 26] Table 7 provides the review's findings in the nine areas.
Table 7: The Navy's Logistics Readiness Review Assessment of NSC
Logistics Areas, as of May 2008:
Logistics areas: 1; Support equipment;
Assessment of progress made: Inoperative;
Number of gaps: 2;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 1.
Logistics areas: 2; Configuration management;
Assessment of progress made: The working level details in the draft
Configuration Management Plan are inadequate to support the NSC;
Number of gaps: 1;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 1.
Logistics areas: 3; Capstone documentation;
Assessment of progress made: Capstone documents need to be updated, or
in some cases developed;
Number of gaps: 4;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 3.
Logistics areas: 4; Manpower, personnel, and training;
Assessment of progress made: Minor Problems;
Number of gaps: 6;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 3.
Logistics areas: 5; Aviation and small boats;
Assessment of progress made: Minor Problems (aviation)/moderate
problems (small boats);
Number of gaps: 3;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 0.
Logistics areas: 6; Technical documentation;
Assessment of progress made: Moderate problems;
Number of gaps: 6;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 4.
Logistics areas: 7; Supply support;
Assessment of progress made: Moderate problems;
Number of gaps: 5;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 5.
Logistics areas: 8; Facilities;
Assessment of progress made: Moderate problems;
Number of gaps: 6;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 0.
Logistics areas: 9; Maintenance planning;
Assessment of progress made: Not reviewed[B];
Number of gaps: 1;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 1.
Logistics areas: Total;
Number of gaps: 34;
Number of gaps that introduce significant risk[A]: 18.
Source: GAO analysis of data compiled by the U.S. Navy.
[A] The Logistics Readiness Review identified some gaps as "Priority
1," which the Navy defined as the gaps that introduce significant risk
to near-term supportability and workarounds either do not exist or
introduce significant risk.
[B] Prior to the start of the Navy's review, the Coast Guard determined
that the maintenance procedures delivered by the contractor were
deficient. As a result, the Navy did not review this logistics area and
assessed it has a gap that introduced significant risk to logistics
readiness.
[End of table]
The LRR identified 34 gaps within the 9 logistics. Details on the
Navy's assessment for each of these logistics areas are as follows:
Support Equipment:
Support equipment is all the required equipment needed to support the
operation and maintenance of a system, including: tools; ground support
equipment such as generators and service carts; and calibration
equipment, among others. Systems include such areas as propellers,
guns, and the rudder. A review of 197 NSC systems identified incomplete
and inconsistent support equipment documentation. For example, 22
percent of the items needed to support the NSC systems had complete
support equipment data while the remaining 78 percent had either
partial or no data. Additionally, numerous support equipment items were
referenced multiple times for the same systems. For example, a system
that should require only one 2,000 pound chain hoist had documents that
listed a 2,000 pound chain hoist 15 times.
Configuration Management:
Configuration management is the process used to understand the
important components of an asset and to manage any changes to these
components that might be made over the asset's service life. This
process includes identifying components that require management;
controlling changes to these components; and recording changes made to
components. The LRR concluded that there was limited capacity within
the Coast Guard to address near-term configuration management processes
and that the working-level details in the draft configuration
management plan were not adequate to support the NSC. For example, the
Navy identified more than 13,700 NSC equipment and system records from
databases and site inspections, but the contractor's databases included
only 5,600 records.
Capstone Documentation:
The Navy identified NSC Capstone documents, which are the documents
normally required for major milestone decisions. The Navy found that
several logistics documents needed to be updated, such as the
Configuration Management Plan and the Interim Logistics Support Plan.
The Configuration Management Plan provides the process the Coast Guard
uses to control changes to NSC components, while the Logistics Support
Plan serves as the master logistics support document. Other documents-
-including the Home Port Plan and Facilities Plan--need to be
developed. The Home Port Plan is to outline where all eight NSCs are to
be permanently stationed and the Facilities Plan is to describe the
necessary changes to those homeports needed to accommodate NSCs.
Manpower, Personnel, and Training:
Manpower and personnel is the identification and acquisition of
personnel (military and civilian) with skills and grades required to
operate, support, and maintain a system over its life cycle. Training
is the processes, procedures, techniques, training devices, equipment,
and materials used by personnel to operate and support a system
throughout its life cycle. Overall, the Navy found that this area had
minor problems, but identified some areas of concern. For example, the
personnel evaluation identified several administrative findings the
Coast Guard needed to resolve, including filling three vacant NSC-
Bertholf crew positions. Additionally, the training evaluation found
that NSC training requirements are "significantly greater" than for
legacy cutters and determined that 137 systems require additional
formal training. For example, the LRR found that the average number of
training days needed for an HEC crewmember is 23, but NSC crew members
need an average of 61 days of training.
Aviation and Small Boats:
The aviation logistics area was found to have minor problems and the
small boats area was categorized as having moderate problems. The
review identified two aviation Priority 3 gaps and found, for example,
that the wind indicating system pilots use to land helicopters on the
NSC was inadequate. According to the LRR, the NSC does not have a
system certified by the Navy, but Coast Guard officials stated that the
Coast Guard has received interim approval from the Navy to use the
current system. The review also found that the Coast Guard had not made
a final decision regarding the small boat package required for the NSC.
The review recommended conducting a small boat LRR once the Coast Guard
decided on the small boat package.
Technical documentation:
Technical documentation is the information needed to translate system
and equipment design requirements into discrete engineering and
logistics considerations, such as manual and maintenance procedures.
The Navy compared technical documentation data from different Coast
Guard sources and found that there were a number of technical
documentation discrepancies. The baseline documentation lists were
inconsistent and did not provide the desired level of logistics
information as compared with documentation found on other vessel
classes. For example, the review identified about 300 document
duplications and discrepancies in Coast Guard data. Moreover, the
review determined that the Coast Guard was unable to effectively
identify and track these documents.
Supply support:
Supply support is all the management actions, procedures, and
techniques necessary to acquire, catalog, receive, store, transfer,
issue and dispose of secondary items (piece and repair parts below the
major system level). The review found that the contractor did not
include maintenance requirements in the spares determination process;
out of the 316 items the Navy reviewed, 55 items had sufficient spares
ordered, 127 items had insufficient spares, and 134 items had either
incomplete or no data.
Facilities:
The review also examined all planned, ongoing, and completed shoreside
facility projects to gauge the potential impact on the delivery of NSC-
Bertholf to the Coast Guard's Alameda, California location. The review
found numerous logistics gaps--such as an expired certification for a
crane used to maintain NSC small boats--but none introduced significant
risk to the near-term supportability of the NSC.
Maintenance planning:
Maintenance planning is the analytical methodology used to establish
the maintenance philosophy of a system and answers questions such as:
What can go wrong? Who will fix it? Where will be fixed? How will it be
fixed? And how often will it need to be fixed? The LRR for the NSC did
not review the detailed maintenance procedures needed to support the
hull, mechanical, electrical, and communications systems because Coast
Guard officials told the Navy that the procedures in place at the time
of the LRR did not contain the information needed. The review
identified the inadequacy of maintenance procedures as a significant
gap.
The Coast Guard Reports Making Progress in Addressing Gaps Identified
by the Logistics Readiness Review:
The Coast Guard has addressed some of the gaps identified by the
Logistics Readiness Review. The Navy categorized the gaps it identified
in the LRR and developed recommendations to address those gaps. The
Navy ranked the gaps it identified in the LRR as Priority 1, 2, or 3.
Priority 1 gaps are defined as those that introduce significant risk to
near-term supportability, and workarounds either do not exist or
introduce additional risk. Priority 2 gaps do not introduce significant
risk to near-term supportability, and workarounds are likely to
increase the cost or reduce the efficiency of maintenance or
operations. Priority 3 gaps do not introduce significant risk to near-
term supportability, and workarounds exist that do not introduce
additional risk. Of the 34 gaps, the Navy identified 18 as Priority 1,
8 as Priority 2, and 8 as Priority 3. As of May 2009, Coast Guard
officials stated that the Coast Guard had addressed 7 recommendations
(3 of which pertain to priority 1 gaps), was in the process of
addressing 21 (13 of which pertain to priority 1 gaps), had not started
3 (2 of which pertain to priority 1 gaps), and had decided not to
address 3 gaps (none of which pertain to priority 1 gaps). Table 8
provides a list of the 34 gaps the LRR identified and the progress the
Coast Guard has made in addressing these gaps.
Table 8: NSC Logistics Readiness Review Assessment of Logistics Areas
and the Coast Guard's Reported Progress:
Logistics Gaps:
Priority 1 Gap: NSC-Bertholf will not receive Navy standard Engineering
Operational Sequencing System (EOSSS) documents;
Status: Completed.
Priority 1 Gap: Training requirements requested in CG-1 resource
proposals require validation;
Status: Completed.
Priority 1 Gap: Limited capacity to address near-term configuration
management processes and status accounting;
Status: Completed.
Priority 1 Gap: Hull, Maintenance and Electrical and Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) maintenance procedures inadequate;
Status: Completed.
Priority 1 Gap: NSC-Bertholf will not receive Navy standard Combat
Systems Operational Sequencing System (CCOSS) documents;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: No locally prepared combat systems operating
procedures;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: Procurement of recommended C4ISR spares incomplete;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: Minimal deep insurance spares;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: Baseline technical documentation lists are
inconsistent;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: Support equipment documentation is incomplete and
inconsistent;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: No integrated training plan captures non-billet
specific or shore support training requirements;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: There are NSC Class-unique systems that require a front
end analysis;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: Home port requirements continue to evolve; no home port
plan for hulls beyond the first three;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: Transition to Coast Guard support of C4ISR suite;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: Original Source, Maintenance, and Recoverability coding
should be updated;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: No formal Provisioning Technical Documentation for
C4ISR;
Status: In progress.
Priority 1 Gap: Facility requirements are not definitive and continue
to evolve;
Status: Not started.
Priority 1 Gap: Manpower Requirements Analysis for the shore commands
is not complete;
Status: Not started.
Priority 2 Gap: Alameda port security issues;
Status: Completed.
Priority 2 Gap: Support equipment requirements for the LM2500 engine
are unknown;
Status: Completed.
Priority 2 Gap: Naval Engineering Support Unit is scheduled to receive
25 additional billets over next 3 fiscal years and may need office
space;
Status: In progress.
Priority 2 Gap: No facility currently exists to store shore power cable
reels at Alameda;
Status: In progress.
Priority 2 Gap: No plan currently exists to maintain the new shore
power infrastructure;
Status: In progress.
Priority 2 Gap: Certification of overhead crane expired;
Status: Will not be addressed.
Priority 2 Gap: A comprehensive list of Coast Guard-required operations
and tactical documentation is unavailable;
Status: Will not be addressed.
Priority 2 Gap: Alameda pier side crane lifting capability is
insufficient;
Status: Will not be addressed.
Priority 3 Gap: Manpower requirements for crew need to be revised[A];
Status: In progress.
Priority 3 Gap: Level III analysis will need to be revised once a new
Front End Analysis (FEA) is performed[A];
Status: In progress.
Priority 3 Gap: No logistical support for Aircraft/Shipboard Integrated
Secure and Traverse System;
Status: In progress.
Priority 3 Gap: Wind Measuring and Indicating System is not a Naval Air
Systems Command certified system;
Status: In progress.
Priority 3 Gap: Logistics Support Plan is incomplete;
Status: In progress.
Priority 3 Gap: Training and simulation support not aligned with watch
standards qualification system and EOSS/CSOSS;
Status: In progress.
Priority 3 Gap: Damage control repair locker inventory process is
inefficient;
Status: In progress.
Priority 3 Gap: No LRR for the Long Range Interceptor small boat;
Status: Not started.
Source: Coast Guard.
[A] The Navy considered these gaps to be Priority 3, but the Coast
Guard recategorized them as Priority 1.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528
July 10, 2009:
Mr. Stephen Caldwell:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Caldwell:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) Draft Report GAO-09-497, entitled Coast
Guard Better Logistics Planning Needed to Aid Operational Decisions
Related to the Deployment of the National Security Cutter and Its
Support Assets.
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) remains grateful for the work GAO
has done to bring attention to issues within the Coast Guard's
acquisition of the National Security Cutter (NCS) and concurs with the
findings of this report. The commitment, the GAO has towards making the
Deepwater program successful is appreciated and the Coast Guard values
the opinion of the GAO. The Coast Guard benefits from this oversight
and will use it to ensure improvement to our acquisition program in the
future. Thank you for considering the Coast Guard's comments on these
very important issues.
Recommendation: "To meet MSAM requirements and aid the Coast Guard in
making operational decisions, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the
Coast Guard ensure that as the Coast Guard finalizes the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan for the NSC, that the plan includes the required
logistics support documents to be used and the time frames for
completing them."
Response: Concur - the USCG agrees with the Recommendation and is in
the process of finalizing the NSC Integrated Logistics Support Plan.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this Draft Report and
we look forward to working with you on future Homeland Security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Stephen L. Caldwell (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad, Assistant
Director, and Ellen Wolfe, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this review.
Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt and Paul Hobart made significant contributions
to the work. Geoffrey Hamilton provided legal and regulatory support;
Adam Vogt provided assistance in report preparation; Michele Fejfar
assisted with design, methodology, and data analysis; and Karen Burke
helped develop the report's graphics.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Coast Guard: As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is
Reassessing Costs and Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its Disciplined
Acquisition Approach. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-682]. Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2009.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget and Related
Performance and Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-810T]. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 24,
2009.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Genesis and Progress of the Service's
Modernization Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-530R]. Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2009.
Coast Guard: Update on Deepwater Program Management, Cost, and
Acquisition Workforce. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-620T]. Washington, D.C.: April 22,
2009.
Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management and
Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-745]. Washington D.C.: June 24,
2008.
Coast Guard: Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol Boats Are
Achieving Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a Cost and Longer
Term Sustainability Is Unknown. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-660]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008.
Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-270R]. Washington, D.C.:
March 11, 2008.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent
Performance, and Related Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-494T]. Washington, D.C.: March 6,
2008.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Management Initiatives and Key Homeland
Security Missions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-531T]. Washington, D.C.: March 5,
2008.
Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and
Management and Efforts to Address Them. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-874]. Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2007.
Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management
and Address Operational Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-575T]. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2007.
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets and
Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-446T]. Washington, D.C.: February
15, 2007.
Coast Guard: Coast Guard Efforts to Improve Management and Address
Operational Challenges in the Deepwater Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-460T]. Washington, D.C.: February
14, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland
Security's Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's Deepwater
Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-453T].
Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2007.
Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-764]. Washington, D.C.:
June 23, 2006.
Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program
Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring Is Warranted.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-546]. Washington, D.C.:
April 28, 2006.
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset
Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges
Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-757].
Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-651T]. Washington, D.C.: June 21,
2005.
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-307T]. Washington, D.C.: April 20,
2005.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-695]. Washington, D.C.:
June 14, 2004.
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks
Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-564].
Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] A group of ships of similar design is called a class. The Coast
Guard's current plans call for the NSC class to include eight cutters,
although this is under review.
[2] The delivery delay is a result of problems the Coast Guard
experienced during the construction of the first NSC, which caused
delays with the deployment of the first and subsequent NSCs.
[3] See GAO, Coast Guard: Update on Deepwater Program Management, Cost,
and Acquisition Workforce, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-620T] (Washington, D.C.: April 22,
2009) and GAO, Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset
Deployment and Management and Efforts to Address Them, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-874] (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2007).
[4] Defense readiness includes participating with the Department of
Defense in global military operations.
[5] H.R. Rep. No. 109-476 at 64 (2006).
[6] Naval Sea Systems Command, Department of the Navy, Logistics
Readiness Review (LRR): United States Coast Guard Cutter BERTHOLF
(Maritime Security Cutter, Large, WMSL 750): Final Report (May 2,
2008).
[7] The Coast Guard's "system-of-systems" approach integrates vessels,
aircraft, and communication links together as a system to accomplish
mission objectives.
[8] Coast Guard logistics encompasses support activities associated
with developing, acquiring, testing, and sustaining the mission
effectiveness of operating systems throughout their service lives.
[9] Prior GAO reports on the Deepwater program are listed in the
"Related GAO Products" section at the end of this report.
[10] GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs
Increased Attention to
Management and Contractor Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-380] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9,
2004).
[11] GAO, Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and
Program Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring Is Warranted,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-546] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 28, 2006); GAO, Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset
Deployment and Management and Efforts to Address Them, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-874] (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2007); and, GAO, Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's
Deepwater Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-270R]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008).
[12] GAO, Coast Guard: Change In Course Improves Deepwater Management
and Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-745] (Washington D.C.: June 24,
2008) and GAO, Coast Guard: Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of
Patrol Boats Are Achieving Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a
Cost and Longer Term Sustainability Is Unknown, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-660] (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008).
[13] According to the 2007 delivery schedule, the first NSC was to be
certified as fully operational in calendar year 2009.
[14] From 2005 to 2006, the Coast Guard worked to rebaseline the
Deepwater program to reflect its post-9/11 mission. The Deepwater
Acquisition Program Baseline, approved by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in May 2007, reflects those changes.
[15] The actual delivery and certification of NSCs as fully operational
may happen more quickly or more slowly than expected in these plans.
[16] A cutter operational day is generally logged when the vessel
completes at least 4 hours of operations in a given 24 hour period.
[17] Deepwater Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VUAV) Path Forward
Study Group: Phase II Alternatives Analysis Report, United States Coast
Guard Research and Development Center (August, 2007).
[18] The helicopter the Coast Guard plans to deploy with the NSC is its
HH-65 multimission helicopter. The NSC can also launch and recover
medium-range recovery helicopters, but the NSC hangar is not large
enough for this helicopter to be deployed with the NSC for long periods
of time.
[19] As we previously reported in 2008 [Coast Guard: Change In Course
Improves Deepwater Management and Oversight, but Outcome Still
Uncertain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-745]
(Washington D.C.: June 24, 2008)], the Deepwater Implementation Plan
initially included procurement of 45 cutter-based Vertical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (VUAV) and associated control stations. In the fall of
2006, the Coast Guard initiated a multiphase VUAV alternatives
analysis. Phase I, completed in February 2007, recommended against
proceeding with the VUAV effort because of developmental and cost
concerns. Phase II, completed in August 2007, concluded that small,
tactical, cutter-based Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and long-
endurance, land-based UASs might fulfill most of the maritime
surveillance performance gap if a maritime VUAV were not available. The
Coast Guard received $3 million in the fiscal year 2009 budget to
continue to study possible approaches going forward.
[20] Readiness is the ability to execute mission requirements in
keeping with Coast Guard standards.
[21] The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (February 17, 2009) provided funds to the Coast
Guard's acquisition account to help pay for HEC upgrades.
[22] Deepwater Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VUAV) Path Forward
Study Group: Phase II Alternatives Analysis Report, United States Coast
Guard Research and Development Center (August, 2007).
[23] Configuration management is the process used to understand the
important components of an asset and to manage any changes to these
components that might be made over the asset's service life. This
process includes identifying components that require management,
controlling changes to these components, and recording changes made to
components.
[24] A home port is the port at which a vessel is based.
[25] Draft is the depth of water needed to float the vessel. The draft
of the NSC is 22 feet, compared to the 19 foot draft of an HEC.
[26] At the time Coast Guard contracted for the NSC LRR, it was not an
MSAM requirement.
[End of section]
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U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: