Title: Unsupervised Adversarial Anomaly  Detection using One-Class Support Vector Machines. Abstract: Anomaly detection discovers regular patterns in unlabeled data and identifies the non-conforming data points, which in some cases are the result of malicious attacks by adversaries. Learners such as One-Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVMs) have been successfully in anomaly detection, yet their performance may degrade significantly in the presence of sophisticated adversaries, who target the algorithm itself by compromising the integrity of the training data. With the rise in the use of machine learning in mission critical day-to-day activities where errors may have significant consequences, it is imperative that machine learning systems are made secure. To address this, we propose a defense mechanism that is based on a contraction of the data, and we test its effectiveness using OCSVMs. The proposed approach introduces a layer of uncertainty on top of the OCSVM learner, making it infeasible for the adversary to guess the specific configuration of the learner. We theoretically analyze the effects of adversarial perturbations on the separating margin of OCSVMs and provide empirical evidence on several benchmark datasets, which show that by carefully contracting the data in low dimensional spaces, we can successfully identify adversarial samples that would not have been identifiable in the original dimensional space. The numerical results show that the proposed method improves OCSVMs performance significantly (2-7%)