Title: Provably robust classification of adversarial examples with detection. Abstract: Adversarial attacks against deep networks can be defended against either by building robust classifiers or, by creating classifiers that can \emph{detect} the presence of adversarial perturbations.  Although it may intuitively seem easier to simply detect attacks rather than build a robust classifier, this has not bourne out in practice even empirically, as most detection methods have subsequently been broken by adaptive attacks, thus necessitating \emph{verifiable} performance for detection mechanisms.  In this paper, we propose a new method for jointly training a provably robust classifier and detector.  Specifically, we show that by introducing an additional "abstain/detection" into a classifier, we can modify existing certified defense mechanisms to allow the classifier to either robustly classify \emph{or} detect adversarial attacks.  We extend the common interval bound propagation (IBP) method for certified robustness under $\ell_\infty$ perturbations to account for our new robust objective, and show that the method outperforms traditional IBP used in isolation, especially for large perturbation sizes.  Specifically, tests on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets exhibit promising results, for example with provable robust error less than $63.63\%$ and $67.92\%$, for $55.6\%$ and $66.37\%$ natural error, for $\epsilon=8/255$ and $16/255$ on the CIFAR-10 dataset, respectively.
