Title: Towards Certified Defense for Unrestricted Adversarial Attacks. Abstract: Certified defenses against adversarial examples are very important in safety-critical applications of machine learning. However, existing certified defense strategies only safeguard against perturbation-based adversarial attacks, where the attacker is only allowed to modify normal data points by adding small perturbations. In this paper, we provide certified defenses under the more general threat model of unrestricted adversarial attacks. We allow the attacker to generate arbitrary inputs to fool the classifier, and assume the attacker knows everything except the classifiers' parameters and the training dataset used to learn it. Lack of knowledge about the classifiers parameters prevents an attacker from generating adversarial examples successfully. Our defense draws inspiration from differential privacy, and is based on intentionally adding noise to the classifier's outputs to limit the attacker's knowledge about the parameters. We prove concrete bounds on the minimum number of queries required for any attacker to generate a successful adversarial attack. For a simple linear classifiers we prove that the bound is asymptotically optimal up to a constant by exhibiting an attack algorithm that achieves this lower bound. We empirically show the success of our defense strategy against strong black box attack algorithms.