Title: The impacts of known and unknown demonstrator irrationality on reward inference. Abstract: Algorithms inferring rewards from human behavior typically assume that people are (approximately) rational. In reality, people exhibit a wide array of irrationalities. Motivated by understanding the benefits of modeling these irrationalities, we analyze the effects that demonstrator irrationality has on reward inference. We propose operationalizing several forms of irrationality in the language of MDPs, by altering the Bellman optimality equation, and use this framework to study how these alterations affect inference. 

We find that incorrectly assuming noisy-rationality for an irrational demonstrator can lead to remarkably poor reward inference accuracy, even in situations where inference with the correct model leads to good inference. This suggests a need to either model irrationalities or find reward inference algorithms that are more robust to misspecification of the demonstrator model. Surprisingly, we find that if we give the learner access to the correct model of the demonstrator's irrationality, these irrationalities can actually help reward inference. In other words, if we could choose between a world where humans were perfectly rational and the current world where humans have systematic biases, the current world might counter-intuitively be preferable for reward inference. We reproduce this effect in several domains. While this finding is mainly conceptual, it is perhaps actionable as well: we might ask human demonstrators for myopic demonstrations instead of optimal ones, as they are more informative for the learner and might be easier for a human to generate.