Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such
principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having
considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and
having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and
to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of
offence and defence which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his
foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go
to ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or
composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws
where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well
armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion
and shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state
are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds
his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe;
for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful,
valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the
fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so
long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war
by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for
keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient
to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be
your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take
themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble
to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by
resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they
formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet
when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that
Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in
hand;(*) and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the
truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have
related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who
have also suffered the penalty.

     (*) "With chalk in hand," "col gesso." This is one of the
     _bons mots_ of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with
     which Charles VIII seized Italy, implying that it was only
     necessary for him to send his quartermasters to chalk up the
     billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. Cf. "The
     History of Henry VII," by Lord Bacon: "King Charles had
     conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind
     of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of
     Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope
     Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into
     Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings,
     rather than with swords to fight."

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The
mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they
are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own
greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others
contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are
ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,
whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to,
either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in
person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its
citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it
ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so
that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes and
republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries
doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to bring a
republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens
than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood
for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely armed and
quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who
were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the
Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.
After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of
their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their
liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against
the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,(*)
allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father,
Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna(+) of Naples, left her
unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of
the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the Venetians
and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet
their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them,
I reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance,
for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some
have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their
ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,(%) and
since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one
will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have
stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him,
so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy;
Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come
to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines appointed as
their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who from a private
position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken Pisa,
nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to
keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had
no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The
Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have
acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men,
when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was
before they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight
on land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And
in the beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much
territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much
to fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under
Carmignuola,(#) they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him
a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership),
and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they
feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they
were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose
again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to
secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their
captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of
Pitigliano,(&) and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not
gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,($) where in one battle they
lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much
trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed
and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

     (*) Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.

     (+) Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of
     Naples.

     (%) Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir
     John Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and
     was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body
     of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous
     "White Company." He took part in many wars, and died in
     Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham,
     a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo
     Visconti.

     (#) Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about
     1390, executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.

     (&) Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of
     San Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund,
     Duke of Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."--
     Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442,
     died 1510.

     ($) Battle of Vaila in 1509.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,
in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better
prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more
temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states,
for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their
nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them,
whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal
power: in many others their citizens became princes. From this it came
to pass that Italy fell partly into the hands of the Church and of
republics, and, the Church consisting of priests and the republic of
citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,(*) the
Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and
Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came
all the other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy;
and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been overrun
by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the
Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to lower
the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. They did
this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, they were
unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them
any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force
of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to
such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were
not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used
every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers,
not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without
ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the
towns attack encampments at night; they did not surround the camp either
with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these
things were permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to
avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought
Italy to slavery and contempt.

     (*) Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio
     in Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St
     George," composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in
     1409.

Any state--old, new, whatever--needs good laws and good armed forces. Since you can't have good armed forces without good law, let's just say you need a good army. There are four types of armies you could have: a local army, mercenaries, auxiliaries , or some kind of mixture. First things first: mercenaries and auxiliary armies are useless. Just don't do it. Mercenaries are only interested in the money and are not reliable. That's how Italy got into trouble--occupation by France and Spain--in the first place. Plus, if a mercenary leader is good then you have to be afraid that he will turn against you, and if he is bad he will make you lose anyway. So, no good. Good armies? Citizen armies. Look at Rome. Look at Sparta! Carthage used mercenaries, and guess what happened to them? They got owned by Philip of Macedonia, Alexander the Great's dad. Don't be like Carthage. Machiavelli gives us a bunch of examples, but the basic takeaway here is mercenaries = bad. They are lazy. They are expensive. They kill during wartime. And they don't even defend their camps. Machiavelli has a little bit of an axe to grind about this problem, since he has wanted Italy to stop relying on mercenaries forever, but no one would listen to him.

Having discussed the different types of states in Chapters 2 through 11, Machiavelli now turns to how to attack and defend them. Princes must lay good foundations, and those foundations include good laws and good armies. There cannot be good laws without good armies, and where there are good laws, there must be good arms, so Machiavelli declares he will only discuss arms, not laws. Arms to defend the state are the prince's own, mercenaries, auxiliaries, or a mix of the three. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are dangerous and unreliable. If a mercenary is talented, he will always be trying to increase his power at the prince's expense. If he is incompetent, he will ruin the prince. Only princes and republics that can field their own armies can succeed, for mercenaries do nothing but lose. Those who are well armed can live free. Machiavelli sites many examples of mercenaries who have turned on their employers. All this began when the Holy Roman Empire lost power in Italy and the popes gained power. Citizens took up arms against the nobles, and the popes encouraged them. Because neither the citizens nor the popes knew how to fight, they hired mercenaries. Soon mercenaries commanded every army in Italy. These mercenaries adopted strategies that kept them from hard work and danger, and this caused the ruin and humiliation of Italy.

This chapter and the two following concern arms and armies. It is tempting to interpret Machiavelli's quotable line that there cannot be good laws without good arms as just a variation on "might makes right," but this was probably not his intent. Because force is an inseparable part of the state, a well-governed state needs a good army. If the reader interprets "good laws" not in the strict legal sense, but as the conditions that make for orderly life in society, Machiavelli's observation loses some of its radical edge. Even in the modern world, the state that does not rely on police or military force to keep order and protect its citizens is rare indeed. Machiavelli further observes that where there are good arms there must be good laws, meaning that a ruler who is capable enough to raise and command a disciplined army must also be capable enough to keep his state well ordered. Equally important is what Machiavelli chooses not to discuss. Just as in Chapter 1, where he declined to discuss republics, here he declines to discuss laws, confining himself to a prince's command of the military. However, the world he describes is clearly one of cutthroat competition and violence, in which only the well armed can live free. In such a world, the weak will quickly be exploited by the strong unless they can defend themselves. "Good arms," in Machiavelli's view, can be only the state's own troops; that is, its own citizens, rather than outsiders. Keeping with his view that independence and self-sufficiency are the only security, Machiavelli asserts that dependence on foreign troops is the kiss of death to a prince's power. He had good reasons to think so, having observed the widespread use of foreign mercenaries in Italy and what he felt were its disastrous consequences. He blamed the mercenaries for lacking the spirit of soldiers who were defending their own lands and homes. In his opinion, the mercenaries were lazy, looking only for the easiest way to get their money, regardless of whether this benefited the state that employed them. They were also untrustworthy, because if they worked for a prince's money, they were probably just as willing to work for the prince's opponent. Notice also Machiavelli's characteristic assessment of human selfishness: If you hire a talented mercenary who is successful, you will never be safe, because he will want to take over your position. Mercenaries were common in the Renaissance. Ironically, the most famous were the Italian condottieri, sophisticated professional soldiers who spent their lives serving various employers. Criticism of them was commonplace and not necessarily always deserved, because many of them were highly successful and loyal to their employers' interests. Both foreign and Italian mercenaries participated in Italian warfare. Glossary chalk Alexander VI supposedly remarked that Charles VIII of France was able to conquer Italy with a piece of chalk, simply by marking the doors of houses in order to claim them as quarters for his soldiers. sins Savonarola interpreted the foreign invasions as punishment for Italian sinfulness, but Machiavelli says that the only sin involved was that of relying on mercenaries. Carthage ancient city-state in northern Africa, founded by Phonecians near the site of modern Tunis and destroyed by Romans, rebuilt by Romans, and destroyed by Arabs. Epaminondas a famous Theban general. Philip II of Macedon  was not a mercenary but an ally of the Thebans. Duke Filippo Filippo Maria Visconti , Duke of Milan. Francesco Sforza's rise to power in Milan is described in Chapter 2. Queen Giovanna Giovanna II of Naples . The incident referred to involved a dispute between Giovanna and Muzio Attendolo Sforza . Sforza supported Louis III of Anjou as Giovanna's successor, while she favored Alfonso V, King of Aragon. John Hawkwood , also called Giovanni Acuto, an English mercenary who spent his career in Italy. Near the end of his life, he worked for the Florentines. Paolo Vitelli  mercenary leader employed by the Florentines. The Florentine government became suspicious of his conduct in the war against Pisa and had him executed. Carmagnola Francesco Bussone , Count of Caramagnola, was a mercenary originally employed by the Milanese and dismissed by them. He was then employed by the Venetians, for whom he defeated the Milanese army. The Venetians were suspicious of his relationship with the Milanese and had him executed. Vaila the city at which the League of Cambrai, including forces of Julius II and Louis XII, defeated the Venetians in 1509. Empire the Holy Roman Empire, in west-central Europe, comprising the German-speaking peoples and northern Italy. Alberigo da Cunio Alberigo da Barbiano , Count of Cunio. He founded the Company of St. George, the first company of Italian mercenaries.


Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince
is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope
Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise
against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to
auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,(*) for his
assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good
in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their
captive.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish
to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which
cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw
himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune
brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his
rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and
the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all
expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did
not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his
auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople,(*) to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to
the infidels.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,
for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the
ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others;
but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better
opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one
community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you
have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority
to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous;
in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided
these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose
with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real
victory which is gained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke
entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers,
and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces
not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less
danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently,
on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he
destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one
and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers
the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the
French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his
own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever
increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw
that he was complete master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am
unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I
have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the
Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like
our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he
could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut to pieces,
and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament
applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with
Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed
him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them
on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to
meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of
others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind
you fast.

Charles the Seventh,(*) the father of King Louis the Eleventh,(+) having
by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized
the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established
in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry.
Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to
enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now
seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the
reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of
his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his
men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so
accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they
can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot
stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come
off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become
mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together
are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much
inferior to one's own forces. And this example proves it, for the
kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had
been enlarged or maintained.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks
well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have
said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality
cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise;
and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman
Empire(*) should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only
with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of
the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised
it passed away to others.

     (*) "Many speakers to the House the other night in the
     debate on the reduction of armaments seemed to show a most
     lamentable ignorance of the conditions under which the
     British Empire maintains its existence. When Mr Balfour
     replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under
     the weight of its military obligations, he said that this
     was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added that the
     Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen
     acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that
     it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer
     recognized."--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its
own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune,
not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has
always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so
uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength.
And one's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects,
citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And
the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily found if the rules
suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider
how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and
princes have armed and organized themselves, to which rules I entirely
commit myself.

Remember what we said about mercenaries? Well, the same goes for auxiliary forces. Sure, Pope Julius II used them, and he was okay, but he was just lucky that the Swiss army came to bail him out. The problem is, even if you win, the auxiliary army might never leave and will just start occupying you--which is pretty easy since you were stupid enough not to have an army. Actually, auxiliaries are even worse than mercenaries, because auxiliaries always have the interests of their ruler in mind over yours and are probably just waiting to attack you. Dun dun dun. Machiavelli gives us a bunch of examples of guys who wised up and realized that mercenaries were a bum deal. In the end, you should just get your own army. Follow the example of those guys who kicked mercenaries to the curb, and you'll be golden.

Auxiliaries are troops sent by another ruler to help you. Just as with mercenaries, if they lose, you are ruined, and if they win, you are in their power. Auxiliaries come to you as a united body trained to obey others. Mercenaries are less dangerous, because they are not united behind their leaders. A wise prince would rather lose his own troops than win with someone else's, because a victory with borrowed troops is not really a victory. A principality that does not have its own army is not really secure, because it depends on fortune, not its own strength. Nothing is weaker than a reputation for power that is not based on your own strength.

Machiavelli views auxiliaries, troops loaned by another ruler, as even more destructive than mercenaries. While mercenaries are only self-interested, auxiliaries are actually loyal to someone else, namely a rival prince who may use them to conquer you. Using forces that belong to someone else puts you in that person's power. Returning once again to his theme that the only real strength is self-sufficiency, Machiavelli remarks that it is better to lose with one's own troops than to win with the strength of others, because that victory belongs to them. Unless a prince can field an army of his own citizens or subjects, he has no real power. Virtu, a prince's own strength, is always preferable to relying on luck or the favor of others. Glossary Julius Pope Julius II tried to take Ferrara, allied with the French, in 1510. Julius probably allied with Spain more out of fear of French power in Italy than out of specific desire to conquer Ferrara. Constantinople former name for Istanbul. Christian capital of the Byzantine Empire. During a period of civil war, the emperor asked Ottoman Turkish forces to intervene. Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Empire in 1453. David the great king of the Israelites, only a young shepherd boy when he fought for King Saul against the Philistine giant, Goliath. David's refusal of Saul's armor appears in I Samuel 17:38-40. Charles VIII  King of France. His royal ordinances established permanent infantry and cavalry in the French army. His successor Louis XII reversed this policy. Goths Germanic people who invaded and conquered most of the Roman Empire.


A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else
for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the
sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it
not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men
to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is
seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have
lost their states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect
this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of
the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from a private person
became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and
troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. For among other
evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised, and
this is one of those ignominies against which a prince ought to guard
himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing proportionate
between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who
is armed should yield obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that
the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants. Because, there
being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible
for them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does not
understand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already
mentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them.
He ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of
war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in
war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.

As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well
organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he
accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of
localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys
open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and
marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge
is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and
is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the
knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands with ease any
other which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because
the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for
instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other
countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country one can
easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this
skill lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should
possess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters,
to lead armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.

Philopoemen,(*) Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which
writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he
never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in
the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "If
the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here
with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best
advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat,
how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as he went, all
the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion
and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual
discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected
circumstances that he could not deal with.

     (*) Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C.,
     died 183 B.C.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and
study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne
themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat,
so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as
an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised
and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept
in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar
Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written
by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how that
imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and
liberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of
Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and
never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with
industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity,
so that if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows.

War. 24/7. That's what should be on your mind if you want to become King or Queen Shmoopton the Third. Stop thinking about war, and you're as good as done. Oh, and if you don't even have an army, you're just pathetic. There's no sugar-coating it. Think about peace as war prep-time. During this time, a ruler should exercise and train his troops. He should also think about everything possible concerning war and read history to look at examples of other rulers' war strategies, just like football players study playbooks. Basically, make sure you get ready for war before it happens, or you'll be sorry.

The study of war should be a prince's main goal, for war is a ruler's only art. Knowledge of war is so vital that it not only keeps princes in power but can make princes out of private citizens. If princes become too refined to study this art, they lose their states. Being unarmed makes others contemptuous of you. No one can expect an armed man to obey an unarmed one. Therefore a prince who does not understand military matters will not be able to work well with his soldiers. Even in peacetime, a prince must concentrate on war by exercises and by study. Hunting is excellent exercise, because it strengthens the body and makes the prince more familiar with the surrounding terrain. A prince should always be asking himself how to make the best military advantage of the landscape. A prince should also exercise his mind by reading the histories of great men and how they waged war, in order to imitate them. Great leaders have always tried to emulate the qualities of those worthy examples who preceded them. By studying their precepts in good times, the prince will be ready when fortune changes.

Chapter 14 marks the end of Machiavelli's discussion of armies and the beginning of his exploration of the prince's character. Before leaving the topic of armies, Machiavelli has some parting comments for those princes who become too soft to tend to military matters. The Sforzas were uppermost in Machiavelli's mind in this respect, having gone from commoners to dukes in only one generation because of their skills as mercenary soldiers, only to go from dukes to commoners in the next generation. This observation is sometimes interpreted as a warning to the Medici family, who were notable for their lack of military leadership. Unlike most Italian princes of their day, they relied on their wealth and their diplomatic skills, rather than weapons, to secure their power. Military prowess was a very real way to get to the top in Machiavelli's day. In the cutthroat world of Italian politics, an unarmed prince would quickly be undone by his more rapacious neighbors. More importantly, Machiavelli argues for carrying a big stick, because no one can expect an unarmed man to command one who is armed. Machiavelli recommends both physical and mental discipline to keep the prince sharp. Hunting was one of the favorite pastimes of the Middle Ages and Renaissance and was widely recommended as good exercise. Machiavelli also sees it as an opportunity for reconnaissance. While he may be exaggerating somewhat, he makes the point he first made in Chapter 3, that the prince must always be thinking about future events and preparing for potential problems. Mental exercise involved studying history. The humanist scholars of the Renaissance deeply valued the study of history, particularly the histories of classical Greece and Rome, and the imitation of their precepts. In this humanist tradition, Machiavelli draws many of his examples from classical history, blending them with lessons from contemporary events. He closes the chapter with a discussion of personal qualities of the great leaders of history. This leads him into the theme of the next segment of the book, the behavior and character of the prince. Glossary Philopoemen  Greek general and leader of the Achaean League; he defeated Nabis the Spartan on several occasions. Alexander Alexander the Great. Machiavelli proposes that Alexander imitated the example of Achilles, the legendary Greek warrior who appears in Homer's Iliad; Julius Caesar , the great Roman general and emperor, imitated Alexander; and Scipio Africanus , another great Roman general, imitated Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian empire. Xenophon author of the Cyropaedia, purportedly a biography of Cyrus the Great, but actually an exploration of how an ideal ruler should be educated.


It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince
towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on
this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it
again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of
other people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall
be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to
follow up the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for
many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never
been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one
ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to
be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who
wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with
what destroys him among so much that is evil.

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know
how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.
Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and
discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken
of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable
for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and
thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan
term (because an avaricious person in our language is still he who
desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives
himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed generous,
one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another
faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one
affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere,
another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous;
one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that every
one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to
exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but because
they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human
conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently
prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which
would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible,
from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he
may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need
not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without
which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is
considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like
virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which
looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.

Now the controversy begins. Or something. We think the book has been pretty stinkin' controversial already, but Machiavelli tells us that the party has only just started. He makes a pretty underhanded slap at Plato's Republic and a ton of other books that at the time were giving impractical and morally idealistic recommendations to princes. That's dreamy pie-in-the-sky stuff. Machiavelli is all about cold hard reality. In Machiavelli's Real World, princes stop being polite, and start getting real. Princes can't be good all the time. That's real. Sure, Disney Princes can be awesome and perfect, since they spend most of their time rescuing multi-racial princesses, but real princes have to wage war and fight. Those are not nice-guy things. That's why nice guys are probably not going to make good rulers. The important thing is to look like you are a Disney Prince while doing all that not-so-nice guy stuff that you need to do in order to rule.

The proper behavior of princes toward subjects and allies remains to be discussed. Many others have treated this subject, but Machiavelli bases his observations on the real world, not on an imagined ideal. There is so much difference between the way people should act and the way they do act that any prince who tries to do what he should will ruin himself. A prince must know when to act immorally. Everyone agrees that a prince should have all good qualities, but because that is impossible, a wise prince will avoid those vices that would destroy his power and not worry about the rest. Some actions that seem virtuous will ruin a prince, while others that seem like vices will make a prince prosper.

In this chapter, Machiavelli introduces the theme that will occupy much of the rest of the book: how princes should act. He announces his intention to turn the reader's expectations upside down by recommending that princes be bad rather than good. He was consciously going against a long tradition of advice books for rulers, the "Mirror for Princes" genre, which predictably recommended that leaders be models of virtue, always upholding the highest moral standards and being honest, trustworthy, generous, and merciful. Machiavelli declares that this is fine if you are an imaginary model prince living in a perfect world, but in the real world, a prince is surrounded by unscrupulous people and must compete with them if he is to survive. To put it in modern terms, he must learn to swim with the sharks. Therefore, the prince must know how to behave badly and to use this knowledge as a tool to maintain his power. Machiavelli recognizes that princes are always in the public eye. Their behavior will affect their public image, and their reputation will affect their ability to keep power. With this in mind, Machiavelli advises that it is fine to avoid vices, but because no one can avoid them all, the prince should be careful to avoid those that will most severely damage his reputation and, therefore, his power. His consciousness of a prince's need to control his public image would not seem out of place in the media age, where public relations experts carefully groom and prepare politicians for public consumption. Apparently flaunting all conventional moral advice, he says that many things that appear good will damage a prince's power, while those that appear bad will enhance it. The contrast between the imaginary world of virtues and the real world of vices could not be more plain. Now that he has everyone's attention, he proceeds to dissect these so-called virtues in the next three chapters. Glossary Tuscan the variety of Italian spoken in Tuscany, the region of Italy where Florence is located.


Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say
that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality
exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it,
injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be
exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach
of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the
name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so
that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts all his property,
and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name
of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax them, and do
everything he can to get money. This will soon make him odious to his
subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by any one; thus,
with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is
affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the
first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from
it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of
liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if
he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in
time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that
with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself
against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without
burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberality
towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and meanness
towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have
been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was
assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he
did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of
France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on
his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long
thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or
conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A
prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he
can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he
is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account
a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will
enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and
many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,
and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in
fact, or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is
dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal;
and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome;
but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his
expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should
reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies,
who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends
that which is his own or his subjects' or else that of others. In the
first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect
any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes forth with
his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that
which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise he
would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is neither yours
nor your subjects' you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and
Alexander; because it does not take away your reputation if you squander
that of others, but adds to it; it is only squandering your own that
injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst
you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor
or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a
prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised
and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to
have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred,
than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to
incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.

Machiavelli's rule number 670,979,843,101: Don't be generous. It's not worth it. We know you want to seem awesome and have everyone think that you're the best ruler ever, but seriously, don't. You will waste all of your money and your people will hate you because you have to raise taxes. Funnily enough, you can seem generous by not spending any money because everyone will be happy that you didn't tax them. Old Niccolo likes to back up his claims with examples, if you haven't noticed already. This time, he says it worked out for Pope Julius II, The King of France, and the King of Spain, so it can work for you! Anyway, if people are upset with you for not giving them presents, ignore them. Oh, unless it's other people's stuff. If it's other people's stuff then feel free to throw money everywhere. Actually you have to. Otherwise, everyone will hate you, and that means that they might rebel against you.

A reputation for generosity is thought to be desirable, but developing it can be dangerous. Generosity exercised in truly virtuous ways is never seen by others, so if you want to be thought of as a generous ruler, you must keep up a lavish public display. To support this habit, a prince must raise taxes and squeeze money from his subjects. Generosity of this sort benefits few and harms many. The prince's subjects will hate him, and no one will respect him because he is poor. Therefore, a wise prince will not mind being called a miser, because stinginess is a vice that allows him to reign. If a prince is giving away other people's property, he can afford to be generous, but if he is giving away his own resources, he will become grasping and hated or poor and despised.

After teasing the reader with shocking revelations in Chapter 15, Machiavelli comes away sounding thoroughly conservative in this chapter, discussing the supposed virtue of generosity. His focus is on the appearance of generosity and what one must do to develop one's public image. True generosity, he notes, would not get a prince a reputation for being generous, because no one would see it. This is an important distinction. Machiavelli does not say that true generosity is bad. What concerns him is the kind of forced display that a prince must put on to develop a public image as a generous man. Supporting lavish displays eventually makes a prince poor, forcing him to exploit his subjects' resources. This does real harm to everyone, including the prince. Thus the supposed virtue is no virtue at all. He does qualify this observation by saying that new princes who are trying to gain power must be seen to be generous, but after they have power, they should immediately curtail their spending. He offers good examples: Both Louis XII of France and Ferdinand of Spain were noted for their thrifty habits, and both were energetic conquerors. On the subject of conquerors, Machiavelli makes the interesting observation that because armies live off looting and extortion, a leader of armies had better be generous or his soldiers may decide to leave. According to Machiavelli, this is desirable, because the property involved is not the prince's or his subjects', and therefore the integrity of the state is not harmed. Glossary Caesar Julius Caesar had a reputation for generosity that contributed to his popularity. He was assassinated in 44 B.C., only a year after his triumphal return to Rome from a series of military victories.


Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every
prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.
Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare
Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the
Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this
be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more merciful
than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty,
permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.(*) Therefore a prince, so long as he
keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of
cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those
who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow
murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole people,
whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the
individual only.

     (*) During the rioting between the Cancellieri and
     Panciatichi factions in 1502 and 1503.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the
imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence
Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign
owing to its being new, saying:

     "Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
     Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."(*)

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he
himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and
humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and
too much distrust render him intolerable.

     (*) . . . against my will, my fate
     A throne unsettled, and an infant state,
     Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,
     And guard with these severities my shores.

     Christopher Pitt.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than
feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to
be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it
is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be
dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that
they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as
you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood,
property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far
distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that
prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other
precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by
payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be
earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied
upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one
who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which,
owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their
advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never
fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he
does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well
being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he
abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their
women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of
someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause,
but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others,
because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss
of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are
never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always
find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking
life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But
when a prince is with his army, and has under control a multitude of
soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation
of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or
disposed to its duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that
having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men,
to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or
against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This
arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his
boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of
his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not
sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire
his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal
cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been
sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most
excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man,
against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from
nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more
license than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was
upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of
the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio,
yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate
punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in
the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew
much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others.
This disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have
destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the
control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed
itself, but contributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the
conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing
according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself
on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must
endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

So generosity was a no-go. And compassion? Well, you guessed it: compassion isn't really conducive to the sort of warlike ruler Machiavelli advocates and might actually destroy a nation. Just like it's better to be a little mean than nice for the sake of the nation, it's better to be feared than loved because people seem to react better to punishment than love. Again, Machiavelli keeps telling us not to become hated, which is easy enough if you lay off people's families and lands. In Machiavelli's example section, he tells us how Hannibal was super awesome because he was insanely cruel. We mean, there's a reason why that scary dude from Silence of the Lambs was named Hannibal. Guess who almost wasn't awesome? This guy called Scipio who was all mushy touchy feely and didn't want to punish people. Lucky for him, other people covered up his namby-pamby nature. But everyone is not so lucky. Anyway, in the end, since the people choose if they like you or not, don't worry about it. Just make sure that they don't hate you.

Every prince will want to be considered merciful, but mercy should not be mismanaged. Cesare Borgia, by being cruel, restored peace and order to the Romagna. No prince should mind being called cruel for keeping his subjects peaceful and loyal. Punishing a few, and thus averting disorder, is better than allowing troubles to develop that will hurt many. New rulers cannot avoid seeming cruel, because their states are insecure. Still, a prince should not be too rash or too fearful. If you cannot be both loved and feared, then it is better to be feared than loved. Men are generally fickle, afraid of danger, and greedy. When a prince benefits them, they will do anything for the prince, but when trouble comes, they will desert the prince. People will break ties of love if it is to their advantage, but fear of punishment they will never transgress. A prince must be careful not to make himself hated, even though he is feared; to do this, he must keep his hands off his subjects' property and their women. People will sooner forget the death of a father than the loss of an inheritance. However, when a prince commands an army, he must be cruel in order to control his troops. In conclusion, people love at their own wish, but fear at the prince's will, so a wise ruler will rely on what he can best control.

Continuing his discussion of virtues that are not virtues, Machiavelli considers mercy and cruelty. As with generosity and miserliness, he comes down on the side of the supposedly bad quality. He bases his judgment on consideration of what benefits the most people. It is no use to be merciful if by doing so, a prince allows disorder in his state to get out of control. A controlled amount of cruelty, which harms a few, can avert widespread violence and lawlessness, which harms many. Mercy that allows the majority to suffer cannot properly be called mercy. This is an extremely old idea in Western jurisprudence, and one can still hear it cited as a justification for the imposition of punishment for crimes: Failing to punish wrongdoers penalizes the innocent people who would be harmed by the criminal's future actions. As an example, Machiavelli praises Cesare Borgia's policy of subduing the lawless Romagna region, described in Chapter 8. He also criticizes the Florentine government for failing to intervene when civil war broke out in Pistoia, a Florentine possession. Though the Florentines sent Machiavelli to investigate the situation, they did nothing, and as a result, many citizens died in the fighting. Machiavelli is careful not to advocate cruelty for cruelty's sake. As in Chapter 8, he warns the prince not to constantly injure his subjects, because this will make him hated. Instead, he must be cruel only when necessary to avoid greater wrongs. Even his assertion that the leaders of armies must be cruel is based on the maintenance of discipline, for undisciplined armies harm innocent citizens--or even the ruler himself. This philosophy leads him to the logical conclusion that if a prince has to choose between being loved and being feared, being feared is at least safer, for both the ruler and his subjects. Machiavelli's typically dark view of human nature is on display in this chapter, as seen in his warning about those who swear they love you in good times, but then desert you in bad times. The most cynical of Machiavelli's statements in this chapter is his assertion that people are quicker to forgive the death of a loved one than the confiscation of their property--there could be no bleaker assessment of raw human selfishness. Surrounded by people like these, a prince is indeed safer if he can control them by fear, because love is so fleeting and unreliable. Glossary Dido founder and queen of Carthage: in the Aeneid she falls in love with Aeneas and kills herself when he leaves her. Hannibal  Carthaginian general: crossed the Alps to invade Italy in 218. He was defeated by Scipio Africanus in 202 B.C. Fabius Maximus, more conservative in his tactics than Scipio, also fought against Hannibal. Locri a city captured by Scipio and brutally treated by one of his commanders.


Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and
to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience
has been that those princes who have done great things have held good
faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect
of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on
their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,(*) the one
by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the
second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it
is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary
for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the
man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers,
who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were given to
the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline;
which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half
beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make
use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. A
prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought
to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself
against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves.
Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a
lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not
understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought
he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and
when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men
were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are
bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe
it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate
reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples
could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made
void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who
has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.

     (*) "Contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." Mr Burd
     points out that this passage is imitated directly from
     Cicero's "De Officiis": "Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi,
     unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud
     proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum est ad
     posterius, si uti non licet superiore."

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,
and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and
so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will
always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent
example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing
else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he
always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power
in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would
observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to
his wishes,(*) because he well understood this side of mankind.

     (*) "Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad
     votum)." The words "ad votum" are omitted in the Testina
     addition, 1550.

     Alexander never did what he said,
     Cesare never said what he did.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities
I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And
I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe
them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear
merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a
mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and
know how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one,
cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often
forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,(*)
friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to
have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations
of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the
good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to
set about it.

     (*) "Contrary to fidelity" or "faith," "contro alla fede,"
     and "tutto fede," "altogether faithful," in the next
     paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, "contro
     alla fede" and "tutto fede," were omitted in the Testina
     edition, which was published with the sanction of the papal
     authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the word
     "fede" was "the faith," i.e. the Catholic creed, and not as
     rendered here "fidelity" and "faithful." Observe that the
     word "religione" was suffered to stand in the text of the
     Testina, being used to signify indifferently every shade of
     belief, as witness "the religion," a phrase inevitably
     employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. South in his
     Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as
     follows: "That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe,
     Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his
     political scheme: 'That the show of religion was helpful to
     the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and
     pernicious.'"

For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything
slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five
qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether
merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing
more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men
judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to
everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees
what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare
not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty
of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and
especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges
by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding
his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be
praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a
thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are
only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have
no ground to rest on.

One prince(*) of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never
preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is
most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of
reputation and kingdom many a time.

     (*) Ferdinand of Aragon. "When Machiavelli was writing 'The
     Prince' it would have been clearly impossible to mention
     Ferdinand's name here without giving offence." Burd's "Il
     Principe," p. 308.

We would all love to be perfect and be honest, but, hey, you have to break some eggs if you're going to make an omelet. Dear Shmooponauts: if you want to rule, you're going to have to lie. A lot. Maybe all the time. Machiavelli gives us some metaphors about law versus force, and our animal side versus our human side. Basically the idea is this: don't be afraid to go a little wild. You're going to have to be a bit tricky and a bit scary, and that's okay. We think Machiavelli would have liked the phrase "there's a sucker born every minute" because he thinks that most people are just sitting around, waiting to be lied to. He even gives an example of a lying pope: Alexander VI. Here's a guy whose job is to be religious and moral, but how does he succeed in life? By lying! Ta-da. So, Machiavelli gives us the go-ahead to do the nasty stuff. But here's the thing: we have to seem to be innocent. And we need to know when we have to change our tactics. Anyway, as long as you keep your kingdom prosperous and safe, people will say that you were a good guyeven if you say one thing and do another, like the king of Spain.

Everyone knows that princes should keep their word, but we see that the princes who have accomplished the most have been accomplished at deception. A prince may fight with laws, which is the way of human beings, or with force, which is the way of animals. A prince should imitate the fox in cunning as well as the lion in strength. A wise prince should never keep his word when it would go against his interest, because he can expect others to do the same. In order to pull it off, you must be a good liar, but you will always find people willing to be deceived. To sum it up, it is useful to seem to be virtuous, but you must be ready to act the opposite way if the situation requires it. A prince should do good if he can, but be ready to do evil if he must. Yet a prince must be careful to always act in a way that appears virtuous, for many can see you, but few know how you really are. If a ruler conquers and maintains his state, everyone will praise him, judging his actions by their outcome.

This chapter concludes Machiavelli's discussion of the qualities a prince should display. Keeping his feet firmly in the real world, as he promised, he begins by stating that even though everyone assumes princes should keep their word, experience shows that those who do not keep their word get the better of those who do. This is Machiavelli's justification for deceit: Because you can expect other princes not to honor their word to you, you should not feel obligated to honor your word to them. Sebastian de Grazia, writing about this chapter, refers to Machiavelli's precept as the "Un-Golden Rule"--do unto others as you can expect they will do unto you. In this bestial world, princes must act like beasts, imitating the clever fox, instead of relying only on strength, as does the lion. In a world full of deceivers, there must also be someone to deceive, and Machiavelli finds that there are plenty of people willing to overlook all kinds of deceit as long as their state is peaceful and prosperous. The prince's control of his public image gets special attention in this chapter. A prince must always appear to be truthful, merciful, and religious, even if he must sometimes act in the opposite way. Interestingly, these are the very same qualities he condemns Agathocles for lacking in Chapter 8, but here, he advises the prince to dispense with them when necessary. But the great mass of people will never see the prince as he really is; they will see only the image he projects. The few insiders who know the prince's true nature will do nothing to harm him as long as the people support him, and the people will support him as long as he has been successful. Here, Machiavelli sounds remarkably like a modern spin doctor advising a politician on how to get good press. Glossary Chiron the wisest of all centaurs , famous for his knowledge of medicine: he is the teacher of Asclepius, Achilles, and Hercules. prince who is not named the reference is to King Ferdinand of Spain, who had a wide reputation for being deceptive and crafty.