Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities
as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of
state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and
following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to
the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise
man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate
those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal
theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever
archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far
distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow
attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their
strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of
so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is
a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,
accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired
the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station
presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other
of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.
Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the
strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no
other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,
have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus,
and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not
discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet
he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to
speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or
founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular
deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior
to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in
examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything
to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould
into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their
powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers
the opportunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of
Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that
they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of
bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and
that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become
King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus
should find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes,
and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus
could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians
dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate,
and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby
their country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire
a principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The
difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules
and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their
government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there
is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or
more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction
of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies
all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm
defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises
partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and
partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new
things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens
that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they
do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise
that the prince is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter
thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves
or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate
their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the
first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything;
but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely
endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the
unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the
nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade
them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is
necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it
may be possible to make them believe by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not
have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to
Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things
immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means
of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to
believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating
their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with
ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those
who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be
respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured,
and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some
resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind:
it is Hiero the Syracusan.(*) This man rose from a private station to
be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but
opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their
captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their prince. He was
of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one who writes
of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This man
abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances,
made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such
foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had
endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.

     (*) Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

Now on to totally new states with rulers who have never ruled before. In this case, whether things go good or bad is based on whether the new ruler is good at his job. True, there is some luck involved, but those guys who were just lucky didn't last long. Let's talk about those guys who weren't "just lucky." Machiavelli starts talking about the big shots: Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus. These are some high-rolling, nation-building, founding fathers. These are not just lucky guys. Sure they had some luck to get where they are. But why do we remember them? Because they had talent. Just like any new ruler, these guys had a lot of trouble at first. The hardest thing is to establish a new type of government in an area, because everyone hates change at firstjust ask those people starting petitions to bring back the old Facebook. But the real question you have to ask is this: does the new ruler have his own army? If not, well, you're out of luck. None of these mythical greats like Moses relied on other people; they had armies backing them up and they weren't afraid to use them. Once all those people who didn't like you have been "dealt with" , you can rest easy and kick back in your new kingdom. All this time, Machiavelli has been talking about fancy old leaders, but he has a slightly less fancy modern-day example for all the people who will say that the examples are just fairy tales. Hiero, the King of Syracuse followed Machiavelli's recommendations to the letter. He was lucky at first and was made king because people seriously needed a leader. After that, it was all hard work. He got rid of the old army, made a new one, forged alliances, and broke off the old ones, so in the end he was only relying on his own power. No wonder he was able to keep his new lands, even though he was a regular dude.

The difficulty a new prince will have will depend on his ability. Private citizens become princes either through luck or through ability, but it is best not to trust luck. Those who become prince through their own strength have difficulty gaining power, but keep it easily. Establishing new states is always troublesome, because everyone who was happy under the old order will oppose change, and most people will not support new things until they have seen them work. The question is whether innovators must rely on others in order to succeed, or whether they can rely on their own forces. Armed prophets succeed, but unarmed prophets must fail. The people are fickle, and when they no longer believe in you, you must force them to believe.

Chapter 6 elaborates on a theme begun in Chapter 5--that of personal ability. The Italian word Machiavelli uses is virtu, which does not have an exact English equivalent. He uses this word to mean many things, but usually not "virtue," which in English implies goodness and moral behavior. Virtu is closer in meaning to the Latin word for masculine strength, virtus, from which English gets the word "virility." Exactly what Machiavelli means by virtu is a subject of debate among scholars. Virtu can be ability, skill, energy, forcefulness, strength, ingenuity, courage, or determination. Virtu is the quality that distinguishes successful princes--or more accurately, successful innovators and conquerors. The examples Machiavelli provides are all legendary founders of great civilizations. When they found opportunities, they had the virtu to make the most of them. Machiavelli makes a point of observing, however, that virtu without opportunity to use it is wasted, but without virtu, opportunity is wasted. The other theme of this chapter concerns the use of force. Machiavelli assumes that force or violence is an integral part of the state, and a ruler cannot do without it as a tool of government. He observes that after your followers lose faith in your innovative schemes, you must force them to have faith, or at least, to act as if they do by obeying you. His comment about unarmed prophets is based on the meteoric rise and fall of Savonarola, whose career Machiavelli had observed, and whose failure had led to the reestablishment of the Florentine republic in which Machiavelli served. Glossary Moses prophet and lawgiver who led the Israelites out of captivity in Egypt, as recounted in the Biblical book of Exodus. Cyrus "the Great," founder of the Persian Empire, beginning with his conquest of the Medes . Romulus with his brother Remus, the legendary founders of Rome. Theseus legendary hero of Athens who killed the Minotaur, a half-man, half-bull monster, in the Labyrinth of Crete. Savonarola Girolamo Savonarola . Dominican monk, charismatic preacher, and reformer.  Hiero also called Hieron II, King of Syracuse . He was made commander of the Syracusan army and was so successful that he was elected king by the citizens.


Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private
citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they
have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have
many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state
is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it;
as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the
Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might
hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those
emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens
came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the
fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and unstable
things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;
because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not
reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always
lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they
have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature
which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and
correspondencies(*) fixed in such a way that the first storm will
not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become
princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be
prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,
and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they became
princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS.

     (*) "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e.
     foundations) and correspondencies or relations with other
     states--a common meaning of "correspondence" and
     "correspondency" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or
fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and
these are Francesco Sforza(*) and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper
means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be
Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties
he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by
the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of
his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had
taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and
able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and
fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

     (*) Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married
     Bianca Maria Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo
     Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he procured his
     own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited
     agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478-
     1507) during the transactions which led up to the
     assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and
     along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left
     an account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the
     proceedings of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto
     dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,"
     etc., a translation of which is appended to the present
     work.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations
may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will
be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,
therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be
seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not
consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what
better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;
and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but
the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had
many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his
way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church;
and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan
and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were
already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the
arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in
hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini
and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved him, therefore,
to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make
himself securely master of part of their states. This was easy for him
to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined
to bring back the French into Italy; he would not only not oppose this,
but he would render it more easy by dissolving the former marriage of
King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy with the assistance of
the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan
than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna,
which yielded to him on the reputation of the king. The duke, therefore,
having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to
hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things: the one,
his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of
France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which
he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder
him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and
that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning
when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very
unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when
he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the
king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to
depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in
Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,
making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their
rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few
months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely
to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini,
having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came to him
soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length that the
aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a
meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at
Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke,
all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored
his authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French
or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew
so well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor
Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of
attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the Orsini were
reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power
at Sinigalia.(*) Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their
partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good foundations
to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the
people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them
all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be
imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.

     (*) Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak
masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave
them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was
full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing
to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it
necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer
Ramiro d'Orco,(*) a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest
power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the
greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not
advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but
that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the
country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their
advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some
hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people,
and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any
cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in the
natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro,
and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at
Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of
this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.

     (*) Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding
himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate
dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great
measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he
wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for
he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not
support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and to
temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards the
kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It
was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have
quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future
he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church
might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which
Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by
exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as
to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself
all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their
aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to
himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die
that he could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four
things, at the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had
killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and
few had escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the
most numerous party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he
intended to become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia
and Piombino, and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer
to study France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom
of Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy
his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena
yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of
the Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he
continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander died,
for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have
stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces
of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He
left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the
rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto
death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew
so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations
which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those
armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have
overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his foundations were
good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In Rome,
although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni,
the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect
anything against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished,
at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But
if he had been in sound health at the death of Alexander,(*) everything
would have been different to him. On the day that Julius the Second(+)
was elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might
occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all,
except that he had never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he
himself would be on the point to die.

     (*) Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.

     (+) Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San
     Pietro ad Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to
blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to
offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of
others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and
far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise,
and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness
frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to
secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome
either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the
people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those
who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things
for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy
a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings
and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend
with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this
man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he
made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope
to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected
Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any
cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became
pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he
had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San
Giorgio, and Ascanio.(*) The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him,
Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their relationship and
obligations, the former from his influence, the kingdom of France having
relations with him. Therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have
created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to
Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who believes that new benefits
will cause great personages to forget old injuries is deceived.
Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his
ultimate ruin.

     (*) San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio
     Sforza.

For those of you who got your nation by sheer luck, or by buying it: we have good news and bad news. The good news is--yay!--you have some territory now. The bad news is, it won't be like that for long. Unless you've been hard at work figuring out how to fight and defend your new land with your very own army, you will probably soon be known as the ex-ruler of your nation. Oops. Enjoy it while you can. Machiavelli gives us examples of men who got their new kingdoms by luck and by sheer abilities. The first is Francesco Sforza, who got Milan through ability and effort and kept it fairly easily. The second is Machiavelli's historical crush, Cesare Borgia, who got his land because his dad tricked people to get it for him. Now, Machiavelli wants us to know that just because Borgia died and lost his land, doesn't mean he wasn't awesome. You see, he did everything right in Machiavelli's eyes. He was just super unlucky. Here's how it went down. Pope Alexander VI, otherwise known as Borgia's dad, got some land called Romagna for his son. Now it was up to Borgia to stand on his own two feet, and he realized that his army and his ally weren't the most loyal ever. This is a problem. Remember what Machiavelli said about using other people's power? Well, Borgia was fed up with it and decided to free himself by getting some new allies. Then he took it up a notch and decided it was time to get rid of anyone else who might challenge him. He invited them to a party and killed them all. So far, so good. Now, remember how were just talking about how sometimes you have to crush your new land in order to rule it? Well, guess who knew that? That's right, Borgia. He put a crazy ruthless guy named Remirro de Orco in charge of Romagna who whipped the area into shape. No one really liked de Orco or Borgia after all this violence, but that would change. Borgia decided that he didn't need such violent methods anymore and established a court of locals to run everything. Oh, and he killed de Orca and displayed his corpse in the town center to show everyone that he was so angry with him for being mean to them. Hmmm. These shenanigans scared the pee out of anyone trying to mess with Borgia and made everyone think that he was a nice guy. We're not sure if there has ever been another case where killing someone and displaying his rotting body has made people like someone. Don't try this on your next date. Things were going okay for Borgia, until he realized that his buddy France was turning on him. He needed some new buddies, and soon--but then his dad died, throwing a wrench in Borgia's plans. But he'd always been a quick thinker. He made a new, four-part plan to deal with whomever the new pope was going to be. Kill more people who didn't like him Make friends with all the nobles of Rome Control the people who were choosing the new pope Get lots and lots of land before the new pope came so he could defend himself When he died, Borgia was pretty close to checking off all of the to-dos on his list. The only thing left was to become master of Tuscany, which would happen as soon as he completed his collection of regions with Pisa. But, well, he never got Pisa. And he was mortally ill. And the new pope? He hated Borgia. So, yeah. Not so great. Despite all this, Machiavelli says that Borgia is the best role model for any new ruler because he did all the things that a ruler should do, like killing all your enemies ruthlessly and appearing to be a nice dude. The only problem was his horrible bad luck. Machiavelli only has this critique of Borgia: he let Julius II become pope. There were tons of other options that would at least have been afraid of Borgia--if not his best bud--but instead, he let the papacy go to a hater. Not a smooth move.

Citizens who become princes through luck or the favor of others find it easy to acquire their states, but difficult to keep them. They are not used to being in command, and they have no armies of their own. Francesco Sforza became a prince by his own strength and kept his state. Cesare Borgia became a prince by his father's influence, and, despite his best efforts, could not maintain his state after his father's influence failed. This was not his fault, but was caused by extraordinary bad luck. Alexander VI wanted to make his son great, but had no troops he could rely on. Alexander allowed the French into Italy in exchange for the use of their troops to conquer the Romagna region. Borgia succeeded and made more conquests, but worried about the French king and the loyalty of his Roman troops, led by the Orsini family. He lured the Orsini leaders with gifts and promises of friendship, then killed them all. He won the loyalty of the people in Romagna. He had at first found the Romagna to be lawless, so he put Remirro de Orco in charge of restoring order, which he did well. However, Remirro de Orco was so cruel that everyone hated him, so to deflect bad feeling from himself, Borgia had him publicly executed. At this point Borgia had laid good foundations for his power. But abruptly Alexander died, and Borgia himself was extremely ill. Borgia then made a mistake by not preventing the election of a Pope hostile to him. In short, Borgia was a model prince and did all things well, except for his poor judgment about Julius II, which caused his downfall.

Although Machiavelli offers an example of a prince who rose to power through his own ability in Francesco Sforza, he devotes most of this long chapter to the analysis of the career of Cesare Borgia, whose rise depended on the favor of others, namely his powerful father, Pope Alexander VI . Machiavelli's admiration for Borgia shines throughout the description. He sees in Borgia a model for all princely conquerors. Machiavelli had an opportunity to personally observe this dynamic Duke when he was sent by the Florentine council to negotiate with Borgia about relations with Florence. Machiavelli was on this mission when Borgia lured his enemies to the city of Senigallia and had them strangled, and Machiavelli spoke with Borgia about the incident. Borgia was by all accounts ruthless, ambitious, and boundlessly energetic, possessing a forceful personality that impressed those around him. It is no accident that these are the same qualities possessed by Machiavelli's ideal prince. Borgia radiates virtu, but in the end it is not enough to save him, because he remains dependent on the power and influence of his father. Pure bad luck--his father's sudden death and his own unexpected illness--puts him on the path to ruin. The dangers of dependency on others will become a key point in Machiavelli's arguments, one he emphasizes later in his discussion of armies. Machiavelli's endorsement of Borgia's tactics, including deceit, brutality, and betrayal of his own agents, is enthusiastic. One may be more inclined to judge Borgia as a heartless master manipulator, expertly playing factions against one another, using those around him as needed and disposing of them as they become inconvenient. But for a brief period, he was stunningly successful, on the verge of consolidating his hold over Italy--and success in controlling the state is all that matters in Machiavelli's analysis. He will be more explicit in Chapter 18 on how necessary it is for a prince to be deceitful when circumstances call for it, and in Chapter 17 how cruelty is often better than mercy to preserve the peace and order of the state. Glossary Duke Valentino Cesare Borgia was often referred to as Duke Valentino or Duke Valentinois, a title he was granted by Louis XII of France. Orsini and Colonna rival families of the Roman aristocracy, both enormously powerful in Italian politics. The Orsini family, in particular, was a bitter opponent of the Borgias, and Cesare Borgia ordered at least three of the leading Orsini family members to be killed. College of Cardinals an assembly that is responsible for electing a successor when a Pope dies. San Piero Machiavelli refers to a number of cardinals  who were potential candidates for Pope, calling some of them by the names of their churches. "San Piero" was Giuliano della Rovere, who become Pope Julius II. "Rouen," whom Machiavelli thinks Borgia should have contrived to elect, was Georges d'Amboise.


Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither
of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is
manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be
more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are
when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the
principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private
person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first
method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other
modern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider these
two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian,(*) became King of Syracuse not only from
a private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a
potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous
life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of
mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,
he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established
in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself
prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that
which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding
for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was
fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the senate
of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the
Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and
the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held the princedom
of that city without any civil commotion. And although he was twice
routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was
he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defence,
with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the
siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were
compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him,
had to be content with the possession of Africa.

     (*) Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will
see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as
he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any
one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were
gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly
held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent
to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith,
without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but
not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and
extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his
greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be
seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain.
Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite
wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent
men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da
Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up
by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his
youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under
his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military
profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,
and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body
and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing
a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some
citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than
its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So
he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many
years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look
upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire anything
except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he had not
spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would be
accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and he
entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably by
the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to
that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,
and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he
lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having
arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a
solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of
Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual
in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave
discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son
Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others
answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be
discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a chamber,
whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No
sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places and
slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,
mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief
magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey
him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the prince. He
killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened
himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in
the year during which he held the principality, not only was he
secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his
neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that
of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by Cesare
Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was
stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this parricide, he
was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in
valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after
infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in
his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be
conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by means
of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the
state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this
follows from severities(*) being badly or properly used. Those may be
called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are
applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and that are
not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage
of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding
they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than
decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God
or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is
impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.

     (*) Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the
     modern equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of
     "crudelta" than the more obvious "cruelties."

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought
to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him
to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat
them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure
them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either
from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife
in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach
themselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For
injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less,
they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that
the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such
a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall
make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled
times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help
you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be
under any obligation to you for them.

Now let's talk about the two other ways for regular old Joes to become rulers: through crime and by being made king by everyone else. Machiavelli gives us two examples of the first kinds. Here's the ancient example: Agathocles was a bad man. Like, really bad. He somehow became the head of the army even though he was just the son of a potter. Then he decided that he was going to be king. Can you guess what comes next? Yep, more killing. Agathocles invited the senators and richest guys around to a huge bash at his place and, before they knew it, they were dead, Agathocles was king, and everyone was too scared of this crazy guy to even try messing with him. This guy didn't leave much up to luck, and it's easy to see that he worked hard at his kingdom. But no one remembers him as an awesome leader. Why? Because he was insanely horrible and violent, that's why. He might have ruled securely, but you don't get written into the history books as a great ruler by massacring people left and right. Okay, let's move into modern times with Oliverotto. He was raised by his uncle and went into the army, where he rose to the top of the pack. Once he got there, he wanted to be his own boss, which meant ruling Fermo. So the plan was to go back to Fermo and tell his uncle to throw a big shindig for him. Fancy food, fancy clothes, all the highest-ranking people in town, the works. Guess what happened when he got to the party? That's right, it wasn't a party after allit was a massacre. Oliverotto killed all of the people there, including his uncle and scared everyone else so much that they set him up as the new ruler of Fermo. Does this technique sound familiar? So after this bloody coup, Oliverotto did all the good things a new ruler should do, like make a new army and government. He was doing all right for himself. At least until he went to a party thrown by none other than Cesare Borgia. Man, if we were those guys, we would never go to a party again. It seems to be code word for "kill everyone en masse." Okay, but how does a crazy guy like Agathocles keep ruling even though he's horribly violent? Elementary, dear Shmoopton. He used cruelty well. You can use cruelty badly, getting crueler and crueler over time, or you can use it well, getting less cruel pretty quickly. If you use cruelty badly, everyone will hate you. It's better to get that part over with and give people favors over time instead.

Continuing his theme from Chapter 7, Machiavelli discusses two other ways to becoming a prince: by criminal means or when private citizens choose a ruler from their fellow citizens. Machiavelli declines to discuss the first method at length, because it speaks for itself. Agathocles was wicked, but through his great energy became a military commander in Syracuse. In order to become ruler, he called the Senate and the leading citizens together for a meeting, and then massacred them. His ability made him a prince, but such conduct cannot be called virtuous. One can get power this way, but not glory. For example, Oliverotto of Fermo became a military commander and plotted with a few leading citizens to take over the city. His uncle arranged a lavish banquet to welcome him. On a prearranged signal, Oliverotto and his soldiers killed all the guests, including his uncle, and then terrorized the city into obedience. He was only removed from power when Cesare Borgia had him murdered at Senigallia. Cruel acts, though evil, may be justified when they are done all at once to establish a prince's power and turned to the benefit of his subjects. Cruel acts are done badly when they increase over time. A conqueror should decide how many injuries he must inflict up front and do them all at once to keep his subjects from constantly resenting them. But benefits should be handed out gradually, so that people savor them. Above all, a prince should live with his subjects in such a way that no good or bad situation can force him to change his conduct.

Many readers have found evidence in this chapter and the previous one for Machiavelli's approval of vicious behavior. Clearly, Machiavelli admires the energy and ability  of men like Agathocles, but he is careful to qualify his approval. He says that it cannot be called "virtue"  for a prince to be devoid of conscience. Criminal acts may give a prince power, but they cannot place him among the truly great rulers of history, whose acts are to be admired and imitated. However, it is difficult to reconcile Machiavelli's criticism of Agathocles and Oliverotto with his glowing admiration of Cesare Borgia, particularly when all three employed the same tactic of inviting their opponents to a supposedly friendly setting and then murdering them. Oliverotto, in fact, foolishly fell for this ploy after using it himself, having been betrayed by a better betrayer, namely Borgia. At this point in the argument, Machiavelli the moralist steps away, and Machiavelli the coolly rational observer of politics returns. How is it, he asks, that criminals like this stay securely in power when many leaders who have done much less evil cannot keep their positions? He replies that even evil acts may be put to good use if they are handled properly. Evils done in the beginning, to secure the new state and to establish orderly government and not made into a habit may be excusable, even in Agathocles' case--a striking observation, because Machiavelli had previously called him devoid of truth, pity, or religion. This may explain why he can approve of Borgia but nominally condemn Agathocles and Oliverotto: He views Borgia as a bringer of order and unity to a divided and suffering Italy. As long as evils are turned as quickly as possible to benefits for one's subjects, they can be forgiven, because, as Machiavelli has already observed, it is impossible for conquerors to avoid injuring some of their subjects at first. There are other practical reasons to avoid terrorizing one's subjects, for if a prince abuses them constantly, he will never be able to rely on their support, a point to which Machiavelli returns in the next chapter. While Machiavelli does not exactly advocate criminal acts, neither does he oppose them, as long as they achieve the desired goal. If one chooses not to call this stance immoral, it is at least amoral; that is, not concerned with the moral value of an action. The philosophy of "the end justifies the means" has often been associated with Machiavelli and is easily subject to abuses in the name of progress. Glossary Agathocles , King of Syracuse. Exiled from Syracuse because of his power and popularity, he was able to return through the intervention of Hamilcar, leader of the Syracusan's allies, the Carthaginians. A military coup followed in which Agathocles killed or banished the oligarchy that had ruled the city. Machiavelli summarizes Agathocles' long campaigns against the Carthaginians. Oliverotto da Fermo . Machiavelli accurately describes how he seized power. Soon after, he joined a conspiracy of Cesare Borgia's captains to try to limit Borgia's growing power. This group included Vitellozzo Vitelli, the brother of Oliverotto's mentor, Paolo Vitelli. Pretending to be reconciled with them, Borgia lured the conspirators to a meeting at Senigallia, where he had them killed.


But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the
prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,
but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil
principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to
it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality
is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the
nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found,
and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor
oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the
people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one
of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles,
seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation
of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his
shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding
they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of
themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority.
He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains
himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of
the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who
consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule
nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular
favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not
prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,
satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is
more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,
while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also
that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because
of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself,
as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a
hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he
has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against
him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always
come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him
whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live
always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles,
being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away
authority when it pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to
be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their
course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do
not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be
honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt
with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a
natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,
especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in
prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.
But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it
is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,
and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they
were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they
only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to
the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they
receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more
closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted
to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours;
and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary
according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit
them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people
friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.

Nabis,(*) Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,
and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country
and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only
necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would
not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not let any
one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that "He who builds on
the people, builds on the mud," for this is true when a private citizen
makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will
free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates;
wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the
Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali(+) in Florence. But granted
a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is
a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other
qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole
people encouraged--such a one will never find himself deceived in them,
and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.

     (*) Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under
     Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.

     (+) Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in
     Machiavelli's "Florentine History," Book III.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the
civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule
personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government
is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill
of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially
in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either
by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid
tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and
subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of
a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in
doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince
cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have
need of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all
promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him;
but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then
he finds but few. And so much the more is this experiment dangerous,
inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to
adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and
kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will
always find them faithful.

Rulers that come to power because of the support of the people are the total opposite of bloody conquers. Everyone loves 'em. They're not too smart, or even extra lucky, but just enough to get by. Our new ruler has three options for his new place: a monarchy where power goes to the nobles, a republic where power goes to the people, and anarchy. In monarchies, either the nobles or the people decide to concentrate all the power in one person, the king. Seems simple enough, but a king who comes to power because of the nobles will have a hard time. After all, the nobles have lots of power to throw around, too. Remember, you don't want anyone who can compete with you around, and these are the people with the weapons. What are the regular people going to do to you? Poke you with their potatoes? Bottom line: be friends with the people, because the nobles have too many tricks up their sleeves. More on nobles. There are two kinds, those who are totally 100% loyally part of your fan club and those who aren't. Out of those who aren't, there are two kinds. Those who are just scaredy-cats , and those who are planning something. The latter are the ones to watch out for because they will turn on you at the drop of a hat. Okay, back to the people. You need to be on their side. It's pretty easy, actually, because they basically just don't want to be oppressed and tortured. Also, if they thought you were going to be super mean, and you turn out to be okay, they will love you even more than if they loved you from the start. They're easy to please. Some people say that it's a bad idea to depend on the support of the people. Machiavelli just doesn't agree--he says that's only the case if you're stupid and think they'll fight for you or rescue you. That's not going to happen. But they can support you and not turn against you. Problems for the ruler supported by the people? When they want to become an absolute ruler, they need either give direct command or rule though other people who they give power to. The problem is, these people aren't always the most trustworthy--before you know it, everything is up in flames. So, make sure your people always need not only your government , but you specifically, and everything will be okay.

When private citizens become rulers through the favor of their fellow citizens, these may be called civil principalities. One can reach this position through the favor of either the common citizens or the nobles, because the two classes are found in every city. The nobles want only to oppress the people, and the people want only to avoid oppression. From these opposing impulses can come three results: a principality, a republic, or anarchy. When the nobles feel pressure from the people, they try to make one of their own the prince in order to protect their privileges. When the people feel they cannot resist the nobles, they try to make a fellow citizen prince in order to protect their rights. You can never satisfy the nobles by acting honorably, but you can satisfy the people. Regardless of how a prince comes to power, he should make every effort to win the good will of the people, or in times of trouble, he will have no hope. A prince must not delude himself about the reliability of the people, but nonetheless, a prince who makes good preparations and knows how to command will never be betrayed by them. A wise ruler will contrive to keep all his citizens dependent on him and on the state, and then he will be able to trust them.

Machiavelli's theme in this chapter is the relationship between the people  and their opposites, the nobles . Machiavelli portrays these two groups as constantly at odds, but his sympathy is clearly with the people, who only want to live free under the rule of their own laws. Machiavelli himself belonged firmly in this group, having been prevented from holding high office because he was not an aristocrat, and having served his entire career in Florence's civil government. The Medici, to whom he was writing, were members of the nobility, and this makes his advice somewhat more daring than it may sound at first. As in Chapter 5, Machiavelli can be seen reminding the Medici how much free states like Florence value their freedom and how justified they are in doing so. Machiavelli emphasizes how necessary it is for a prince to win over the people, because they are many, while the nobles are few, and a prince can never live safely without being able to trust the people. On this subject, Machiavelli was going against prevailing opinion, which he acknowledges by quoting the proverb "He who builds on the people builds on mud." In fact, he is able to find only one example to support his argument , but two that disprove it . Machiavelli had many opportunities to observe the fickleness of the Florentine people, as they had alternately supported the Medici, Savonarola, the Republic, and then the Medici again. In another pessimistic observation about human nature, Machiavelli says that everyone is ready to die for you when the prospect of death is far off. The key, he maintains, is for the prince to keep his subjects dependent on him for all their benefits, because dependency is the only way to ensure loyalty. Characteristically, Machiavelli advocates a particular behavior not for its moral qualities, but because it accomplishes a specific goal for the prince: A prince should treat his subjects well and do all he can to benefit them, not necessarily because it is right to do so, but because it ultimately consolidates the prince's power. Machiavelli also insists on the importance of self-interest as a motivator throughout the chapter: He notes that all parties, whether princes, nobles, or common people, come into conflict or make alliances primarily to protect their own rights and privileges. Throughout the book, self-interest and a concern for one's own comfort level can be seen as the driving force in human behavior. Glossary Nabis ruler of Sparta . Machiavelli is probably exaggerating Nabis' success, but Nabis did introduce many social reforms. Gracchi brothers Tiberius  and Gaius Gracchus . Roman officials who instituted many social reforms and were killed by aristocratic opponents. Giorgio Scali a leader of the Ciompi  revolt in Florence in 1378. The wool workers' guild briefly held some political power, but its leaders, including Scali, were quickly overthrown and later executed.


It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in
case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether
he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite
clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by
their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise
a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack
them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot
show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to
defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been
discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second
case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision
and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country.
And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the
other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often
repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are
always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it
will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well
fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country
around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits
them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them,
because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the
taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they
have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they
always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating, drinking, and
firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to
the state, they always have the means of giving work to the community
in those labours that are the life and strength of the city, and on
the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold military
exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself
odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only
be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this
world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole
year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever should
reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it burnt,
they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will
make them forget their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and
courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one
time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for long, at another
time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly
from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin
the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and
ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince
to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage
is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any
remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with
their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that
their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his
defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they
confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is
well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the
minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not
fail to support and defend them.

Okay okay, so Machiavelli has taught you everything he knows about how to get a kingdom. What about how to keep one? It's simple, really. The most important question is, if this kingdom were attacked, would the ruler have to use other people's armies, or could they fight themselves? The first kind can defend themselves. Machiavelli already talked about them and he will again. But the second kind of ruler is what we're going to talk about. These guys need all the help they can get. First, fortify your hometown and forget about the rest of the kingdom. People are lazy, and if you've done a good job of protecting yourself, they won't bother. Look at Germany. No one wants to invade themthe cities are so fortified it would be a total pain in the butt to try. So protect your town and store lots of food and you can laugh while armies sit outside of your gates, playing Angry Birds for a year. Won't people be pissed that their houses are being destroyed? Poppycock. They'll support their ruler even more because, well, they have no choice now. Piece o' cake. Next topic!

One other measure of a state's strength is whether a prince can defend himself, or whether he must rely on the help of others. If a ruler can field his own army , he needs no outside help, but if he must hide behind his city walls, he will always need help from others. The first type has already been discussed in Chapter 6, and will be again in Chapters 12 through 14. The second type has no option but to fortify his city and lay in supplies. If he has treated his subjects well and has made preparations, others will hesitate to attack him. The free German cities follow this practice with great success. Therefore, any prince who has a strong city and has not made his people hate him is safe. Some will argue that the stresses of a siege will make the people disloyal, but a wise ruler will know how to keep up their morale, as long as there are enough weapons and supplies.

Winning the people's support is absolutely necessary if a prince faces the possibility of a siege. Sieges were commonplace in medieval and Renaissance warfare, and many medieval cities were surrounded by high walls in anticipation of just such an event. Sieges were often lengthy affairs, with the attacking army camped outside the city walls, hoping to starve out or wear down the residents inside the city's fortifications. As Machiavelli observes, a prince in this position could only wait out the siege or hope for outside help. Machiavelli considers it better for the prince to have an army he can put into the field on the offensive, so that the prince need not be dependent on the favor of others. However, a prince with a strong and loyal city is still in a good position, as long as he has made adequate preparations and keeps his people's spirits up. Finally, he gives some attention to the prince's ability to "spin" political events to his advantage; in this case, to reassure his people that the siege will be short, to remind them of the cruelty of the enemy, and to take measures to deal with anyone who is a little too outspoken in his criticism of the prince's policies. The absolute necessity of maintaining one's own troops is a point Machiavelli revisits throughout the book, and particularly in Chapters 12 through 14, which concern how a prince should behave in military matters. Machiavelli had been active in raising a native militia to defend Florence, and he detested the common practice of hiring foreign mercenaries to fight, a practice he believed had helped to ruin Italy. Here, he praises the independence of the German cities, which had their own armies to fight for them. Glossary German cities the Holy Roman Empire, a loose confederacy of states that comprised most of what is now Germany, as well as parts of Italy and France. In Machiavelli's time, the empire included more than 70 imperial cities, which exercised greater and lesser degrees of obedience to the Emperor, Maximilian I.


It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching
which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they
are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held
without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of
religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the
principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live.
These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have
subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are
not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care,
and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves.
Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by
powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of
them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act
of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the
Church has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from
Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been
called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)
have valued the temporal power very slightly--yet now a king of France
trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and
to ruin the Venetians--although this may be very manifest, it does not
appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,(*) this country was
under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the
Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal
anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; the
other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about
whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To
restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it
was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use
of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and
Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in
their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and
powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope,
such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these
annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness;
for in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope, he can with
difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one people
should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the
Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time
to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the
pope were little esteemed in Italy.

     (*) Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.

Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that
have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to
prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by
reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things
which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although
his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,
nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,
which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all
his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all
the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the
chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found
the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been
practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only followed,
but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the
Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these
enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,
inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any
private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within
the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them
some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the
one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the
other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the
disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their cardinals
they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster the factions
in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to support them, and
thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders and tumults among
the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope Leo(*) found the
pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made it
great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his
goodness and infinite other virtues.

We've arrived at the last type of state. Hurrah! But if the book is only half done, what's the rest of it about? Don't worry: it's coming. Church states are awesome because no matter what you do, you can't lose them. You don't have to defend them, or even govern them. It is totally a sweet deal being pope. Now, Machiavelli is just a little bit sarcastic when he says that, "since Church states depend on forces beyond the reach of human reason, I shall say no more about them," but continues to talk about them for a couple of pages . Recently, the church has been getting more and more earthly power. We're not talking angels here, we're talking war popes. This sounds a bit weird to us, since we can't imagine Pope John Paul or Benedict XVI going all Rambo on someone, but these were hard core biker popes back in Machiavelli's day. Apparently the whole aggro-pope thing snuck up on Europe and no one noticed that they were getting so powerful that they could boss France around. We get it. They are popes. They're supposed to be goody two-shoes; plus, they only rule for like ten years. What can get done in that amount of time? Well, everything changed when Cesare Borgia's dad, Pope Alexander VI, came on the scene. He was darned determined to get his kid some land, and he did. Sure, that land was reabsorbed into the pope's territory, but oh well. So, when Julius, the next pope, took over, the church was stronger than ever. Machiavelli ends this chapter with some pretty blatant flattery to Pope Leo, the pope at the time, and the uncle of the prince Machiavelli was writing to. Tricky.

The final type of principality to be discussed is the ecclesiastical state. Although this type of principality is gained through ability or luck, their princes stay in power no matter how they act. They do not defend their states or govern their people, and the people never think of getting rid of them. No other state could be so successful. Because these states are ordained by God, Machiavelli says he will not be so foolish as to discuss them. Still, some people may ask how these states became so powerful so quickly. Before Charles invaded Italy, it was controlled by five factions whose goals were to keep out foreign invaders and make sure no one faction became too strong. The short reign of most popes kept them from making any headway against these factions. Then Alexander VI appeared, and he showed what a Pope could accomplish with money and weapons. Though he wanted only to promote Cesare Borgia's power, he ended up making the Church more powerful, which Julius II took advantage of. One hopes that the present Pope Leo will make it as great by his goodness as others have made it by force.

In this chapter, Machiavelli completes his discussion of the different kinds of states and how to acquire them, which he laid out in Chapter 1. The ecclesiastical states he refers to were a unique feature of the Italian political landscape, namely the Papal States. As he notes, they followed none of the rules that would have applied to other kinds of principalities. The popes, as head of the Catholic church, which was arguably the most powerful institution in Europe, had always had power and privilege, and had ruled over their own states around Rome. But the popes of the Italian Renaissance added military conquest and aggressive fund-raising to the mix, becoming not only outrageously powerful but outrageously corrupt as well. The abuses of Alexander VI--who had children by several mistresses, lived a decadent lifestyle, and undertook military campaigns to aggrandize his family--played a significant part in bringing about the backlash of the Protestant Reformation. The collecting of indulgences, a practice Martin Luther protested strongly, was one of the chief sources of income for Alexander's military ventures. Machiavelli's comment that he cannot presume to discuss a state ordained by God fairly drips with sarcasm. Machiavelli was well aware of the thoroughly worldly ambitions of the Renaissance popes and bitterly resented their effect on Italian politics. In his Discourses on Livy, he has harsh words for the Church's lack of religious principle and willingness to promote factionalism in Italy, depriving it of a strong, centralized leadership such as existed in France and Spain. Glossary Pope Leo X Giovanni de Medici . A son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and therefore uncle of the man to whom The Prince was dedicated. He became Pope in 1513. It was during the general amnesty celebrating his election that Machiavelli had been released from prison. Leo would later excommunicate Martin Luther, the Protestant reformer.