Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I
have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss
briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has
been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him
hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he
will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other
reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious,
and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from
both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their
honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to
contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many
ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,
effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should
guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his
actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his
private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are
irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can
hope either to deceive him or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,
and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,
provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by
his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason
a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his
subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From
the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,
and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will
always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they
should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should
affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and
has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist
every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has
only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince
can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by
keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary
for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most
efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not
to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against
a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the
conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have
the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront
a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the
conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires
cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he
believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind
to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content
himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that,
seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other
to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a
thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side
of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of
punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the
majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and
the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the
popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to
conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the
execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to
the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and
thus cannot hope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content
with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer
Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the
present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had
conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer
Giovanni,(*) who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination
the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the
popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in
Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after the
death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having
information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence,
who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to
Florence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was
ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government.

     (*) Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan
     1508. He ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli's
     strong condemnation of conspiracies may get its edge from
     his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he had
     been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the
     Boscoli conspiracy.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies
of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it
is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear
everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have
taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the
people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important
objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and
in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty
and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its
authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of
the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths
would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the
hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to
protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care
of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be
liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people
for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who
could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the
king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or
a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can
draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs
of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in
their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish
the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths
of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary
to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great
qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been
killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore,
to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the
emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different
to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for
consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the
affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to
the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were
Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son
Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the
ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be
contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to
put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset
with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing
to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people
loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince,
whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and
rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise
upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to
their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were
always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great
authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the
principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours,
were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about
injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes
cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to
avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they
ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the
most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had
need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to
the people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not,
accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being
all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,
and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died
honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title,
and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards,
being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept
both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor
despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,
who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not
endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus,
having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt
for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his
administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as
much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince
wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that
body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself--it
may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles--you have to
submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do
you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,
that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the
fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by
him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who
allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the
army conspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus
Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men
who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of
iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad
end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers
friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned
successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of
the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished
and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the
actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show
briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which
natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in
Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome
and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian
soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the
throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known
that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear,
elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for
Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two
difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had
caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where
Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it
dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack
Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected
emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and
sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made
Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true.
But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental
affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus,
little recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had
by treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was
compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and
took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully
examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and
a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected by every one,
and not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a
new man, was able to hold the empire so well, because his supreme
renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have
conceived against him for his violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent
qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and
acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring
of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which
caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and
cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single
murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of
Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those
he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst
of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like
deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate
courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear
to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the less because
they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury
to those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the state.
Antoninus had not taken this care, but had contumeliously killed a
brother of that centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained
in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and
proved the emperor's ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to
hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it,
and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his
people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave
himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might
indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining
his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators,
and doing other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he
fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and
despised by the other, he was conspired against and was killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike
man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander,
of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the
throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated
and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought
him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great
indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession
to his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the
imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity
by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire,
practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger
at the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa
rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy
conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter,
besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were
disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so
many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being
thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this
discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this
difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a
far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some
indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that
are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were
the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary
to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more
necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the
people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him
twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend
the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,
putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them
his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the
hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people,
he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the
Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it
is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an
hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old
prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by
those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this
being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because
there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new
ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state is
old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary
lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will
consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been
fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how
it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number
in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to
unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for
Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who
was heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly
destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated
Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread
in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot
imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow
those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which
are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are proper
and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm.

Remember how Machiavelli has said several times that it is super duper important not to be hated? Well, he's saying it again. Yeah, we got it, Niccolo. He kind of summarizes in this chapter: don't be hated, leave people's family and property alone, don't appear weak, appear to be awesome in every way. Sounds good so far. If you do all of that, you're probably safe from both internal and external threats. What are internal threats, you say? Well we've been talking about external threats, which are war and invasions and that kind of stuff. Internal threats are things like conspiracies and revolutions. How do you stop internal threats? Oh yeah, don't be hated. You see, conspiracies need a certain amount of people. A one-person conspiracy is called a crazy person. So if most people like you, no one will ever be able to get together enough people that want to kill you and don't mind taking the risk to try to overthrow you. Actually, if people like you enough, they might rat out the conspiracy to get you to like them. Machiavelli gives us an example of Annibale Bentivogli, Duke of Bologna, who was killed by a conspiracy. The thing is, everyone loved the family so much that it didn't even matter that, after the conspiracy, the only person in the family left was a baby. The city waited for the baby to grow up and rule them. That's serious love right there. The conspiracy didn't even make a dent. Or better yet, look at France. There the king set up a parliamentary system to protect the people from the nobles, at least according to Machiavelli. A bonus was that everything could be blamed on the system, so no one would hate the king. Genius! Okay, okay. Some critics in the back of the room are pointing out that the Roman emperors followed this advice and still failed. First of all, that's like comparing apples to oranges. They needed to deal with the greed and cruelty of the army in addition to not being hated. This was a tough task, because the people wanted a peaceful leader, but the soldiers wanted the craziest, most bloodthirsty guy they could find. Since it was kind of impossible to please both sides, it was most important to please the side that had the weapons. You know, the side that could kill you. The emperors who just wanted to chill and sing kumbaya? Off with their heads. But because they made the people hate them, the ones who let the army run amok in violent frenzies didn't keep their heads on much better than the other guys. Only one dude did that, and that was Severus. He somehow managed not to be hated, but admired. We know, you want to figure out what kind of awesome sauce he was using, so we'll tell you. This guy was so big and bad that when he walked into Rome with his posse, the Senate got so scared that they made him emperor without him even asking. Then, Mr. Emperor realized that he had two problems: a guy in the West who wanted to be emperor, and guy in the East. How to fix this? Attack one outright. The other one? Yep, it's the old make-him-think-you're-a friend-and-then-kill-him-instead trick. Honestly, this is starting to get old. After this feat of cunning, everyone was too scared to mess with Severus. He was never hated by the people, even though he liked to pillage their lands. Now for what not to do. Do not be like Severus's son, who was so overwhelmingly violent that he killed a decent number of the people in Rome. So everyone hates him by now, and you know what happens when everyone hates you. Yep, conspiracy. Off with his head. Still, Machiavelli tells us: you know, assassinations just happen sometimes, and not to worry about it. Right. So, where were we? Oh, right. Roman emperors had a lot more to deal with. Today , he says, rulers don't have to worry about the will of the Military as much, because the people are more powerful than they are. Well, except for Turkish and Egyptian rulers. They are weird. Otherwise, yeah: don't get hated by the people.

A prince must avoid becoming hated or despised. Taking the property or the women of his subjects will make him hated. Being frivolous, indecisive, and effeminate will make him despised. All a prince's actions should show seriousness, strength, and decisiveness. The best defense against internal threats such as conspiracy is to be neither hated nor despised. If a conspirator thinks that killing the prince will enrage the people, he will think twice. Wise princes are careful not to antagonize the nobles and to keep the people happy. In France, the parliament restrains the ambition of the nobles and favors the people, without directly involving the king, so that he cannot be accused of favoritism. Princes should let others do the unpleasant tasks, doing for themselves what will make them look good. Some people may object that the careers of the Roman emperors go against this argument, because many of them were greatly admired, yet were still assassinated. This is because they had to deal with their soldiers, and they could not satisfy both the soldiers, who wanted warlike leaders, and the people, who wanted peace. Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander were all compassionate and just, but only Marcus escaped assassination, because he was a hereditary ruler and did not owe his power to the army. Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, and Maximinus were all cruel and greedy, and only Severus escaped assassination, because he was so cunning and ruthless, and because he kept up a splendid reputation. But in Machiavelli's time, princes do not have the same need to satisfy their armies, because armies are not used to being together for long periods and controlling whole provinces, the way Roman armies were. Instead, princes should satisfy the people, who are more powerful.

Conspiracy and assassination occupy Machiavelli's attention in this chapter. The best way to avoid these dangers is to avoid being hated or despised by one's subjects.  In the state, there are two main groups the prince must court: the nobles and the people, a theme pulled from Chapter 9. Although a prince must not alienate the nobles, he must win over the people, because they are the majority, and their ill will can cost a prince his place and his life. Hated and despised princes are targets for assassination, because assassins conclude that the people will support killing the ruler. Plots such as these were a real concern for Renaissance rulers. Machiavelli offers as an example the 1445 assassination of Annibale Bentivoglio, ruler of Bologna, noting that popular support enabled the family to keep their power despite their desperate situation after the assassination. In Machiavelli's own lifetime, in Florence in 1478, the Pazzi conspiracy against the Medici had resulted in the injury of Lorenzo the Magnificent and the death of Lorenzo's brother. In both cases the assassins were from rival powerful families; they were not disgruntled subjects. As if acknowledging this, Machiavelli observes that there is no real defense against a determined assassin, because anyone who is not afraid to die can kill a ruler. Nonetheless, he maintains that popular support is the best prevention. About balancing the conflicting demands of the people and the nobles, Machiavelli offers the interesting example of France's parliamentary government, which allowed participation by both the aristocracy and the commoners. Rather than presenting it as a democratic innovation, he offers it as a way of increasing the absolute ruler's power, taking pressure off of the prince by putting competing interests into a neutral forum--in effect, giving unpleasant tasks to others so they do not damage the prince's popularity. In the midst of his argument, Machiavelli embarks on a long digression about the many Roman emperors, good and bad, who were assassinated. He concludes that most of them were undone by their powerful and bloodthirsty armies, a problem that the princes of Machiavelli's time need not worry about. His more interesting observation, which is somewhat lost in his analysis, is that nearly all of the rulers were killed regardless of their qualities and actions. Some did one thing and others did the opposite, but all came to basically the same end. The key to their success or failure is whether they adapted their actions to their times and political circumstances. This theme reappears in Chapter 25, where Machiavelli discusses the effect of fortune on human affairs. Glossary Marcus Marcus Aurelius , called "the Philosopher;" one of the most respected of the Roman emperors. Commodus , oldest son of Marcus Aurelius. Noted as an enthusiast for gladiator and wild animal games in the Coliseum. Assassinated by a group of conspirators. Pertinax . After Commodus was assassinated, Pertinax was proclaimed emperor by the praetorian guard, but was assassinated three months later by rebellious soldiers. Julianus  After the assassination of Pertinax, Julianus bought the office of emperor from the praetorian guard, but was assassinated by order of the Senate two months later. Severus Septimius Severus . Proclaimed emperor by the Senate. Overcame claims to the throne by Pescennius Niger and Clodius Albinus. He died while on a military campaign in England. Antoninus Caracalla Marcus Aurelius Antoninus , called Caracalla. Oldest son of Septimius Severus. He was killed by the prefect of the praetorian guard, Macrinus. Macrinus Marcus Opellius Severus  spent all of his brief reign on military campaigns in Asia. He was executed by his opponents. Heliogabalus also called Elagabalus , Heliogabalus was killed by the praetorian guard. Alexander Marcus Aurelius Severus Alexander . Succeeded his cousin Heliogabalus. Killed by rebellious soldiers in Gaul. Maximinus  named emperor by the army after Alexander Severus was killed. Subsequently killed by his own troops.


1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their
subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;
others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid
themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning
of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown
and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all
of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states
in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as
comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by
arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted
become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your
subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be
armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be
handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they
quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,
considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm
them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either
for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions
breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it
follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already
shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to
defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore,
as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always
distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince
acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then
it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have
been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and
opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should
be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be
your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed
to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by
fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their
tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily.
This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way
balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept
for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;
rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided
cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always
assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist.
The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the
Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although
they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these
disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their
differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not
afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one
party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,
therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be
permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the
more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if
war comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore
fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who
has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes
enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have
the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a
ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that
a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster
some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown
may rise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance
in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than
among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince
of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by
others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies
so much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who
at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of
a description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be
gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to
serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very
necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had
formed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from
them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect
his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a
prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he
must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who
did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only
discontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly
with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy
them. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which
can be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is
easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented
under the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of
those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and
encouraged him to seize it.

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states
more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit
to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge
from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use
of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times
has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he
might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to
his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the
foundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that
without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the Bentivogli
returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, therefore,
are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in one
way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus:
the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners
ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners
than from the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan,
built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the
house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason
the best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because,
although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the
people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist
a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our
times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the
Countess of Forli,(*) when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed;
for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait
for assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state; and the posture
of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist
the people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when
Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied
with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then
and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the
fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him
who builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame
whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.

     (*) Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and
     Lucrezia Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the
     Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499.
     A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the
     appointment: "I have been with the signori," wrote
     Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and when. They
     tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine
     noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me
     at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini,
     translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.

People do all kinds of things in order to keep power. They take guns away from people, try to turn them against one another, build fortresses, tear them down. All sorts of things. But let's talk about if they are helpful or not. First, taking away guns. This is a bad idea for most rulers. If you give arms to people, they are excited. If you take them away, they wonder why you don't like them and start to hate you. And we all know where that leads--right, Shmoop rulers of tomorrow? The only people who should be doing this are people who already have vast established kingdoms and are just adding this new one to their collection. Then, go right ahead. You have your army already and taking away arms will keep the state weak. Next, dividing towns into factions and making them fight amongst each other. Now, for some reason, people keep saying this is a good idea. As the president of Panem will tell you, it is not. The weaker faction will turn against you and the stronger one won't be able to defend against a foreign invasion. Just say no. Next, stirring up trouble intentionally. Do it. It will make you seem more awesome if you take care of it like a pro. You'll have a reputation of being a good ruler, and everyone will like you. Machiavelli just leaves us a note here to remember if you take a nation with inside help, you need to be pretty suspicious of those guys that helped you. Hey, they turned on their previous ruler, why shouldn't they turn on you, newbie? Fortresses. Machiavelli approves, but only because everyone has been doing it forever. Mostly they are only helpful if you're afraid of your own people, because they hate you--which, as we all know by now, is the beginning of a downward spiral. The important thing to remember is that fortresses can't help you for long if your people hate you.

Princes have tried various tactics to maintain power: disarming their subjects, dividing their subjects into factions, encouraging their enemies, winning over the suspicious, building new fortresses, and tearing down fortresses. New princes must never disarm their subjects, for if a prince arms his people, their arms become his. If a prince disarms them, the people will hate him, and he will be forced to employ mercenaries. Conventional wisdom says that creating factions is a good way to control a state. This may have been true when Italy was more stable, but not in Machiavelli's time. When factious cities are threatened by invaders, they quickly fall. Because rulers become great by overcoming difficulties, some believe that a prince should secretly encourage his enemies, so that when he overcomes them, his reputation will be greater. Some new princes find that those who were at first suspect prove more useful than others in governing the state. They are anxious to prove themselves to the prince. Those who helped the prince gain power may have done so out of dissatisfaction with the prior state, and the new state may also fail to please them. Princes often build fortresses to protect themselves from plotters and sudden attacks. If a prince fears his subjects more than foreign invaders, he should build fortresses. The best fortress, however, is not to be hated by the people.

In this chapter, Machiavelli briefly discusses a number of potential strategies for maintaining power. Predictably, he opposes disarming one's subjects, having already expressed his support for citizen armies over mercenaries or outside troops. Disarming citizens also sends a message that the prince does not trust them, and Machiavelli highly values a good relationship between the prince and his subjects. Like disarming one's subjects, building fortresses within the city also expresses distrust and shows insecurity. No fortress can substitute for the trust and support of the people. Encouraging rival factions to fight in order to keep them occupied also is the mark of a weak and insecure ruler. Machiavelli alludes to the Florentine policy in Pistoia, which he already condemned as cruel in Chapter 17. He blamed factionalism for some of Italy's problems, pointing out that divided cities fall easily when foreign invaders come, because one side or the other sells out to the invaders in hopes of gaining power. Oddly, Machiavelli expresses no opinion about the practice of secretly encouraging one's enemies in order to gain glory by overcoming them later, merely mentioning it without discussing it. Machiavelli devotes the largest portion of this chapter to making the point that those people who are under suspicion turn out to be the most trustworthy servants of the new prince. This should be no surprise, considering that Machiavelli was distrusted by the new Medici leadership, to whom he dedicated The Prince in the hope of regaining his old position as a diplomat. It is easy to imagine Machiavelli speaking about himself when he points out that those who are insecure in their positions work harder and are more motivated to prove themselves to the prince than those whom the prince trusts. He observes that those who were unhappy under the previous regime  may be just as likely to become unhappy with the new prince, while those who most love the stability of the state  will necessarily prove more loyal. Glossary Guelphs supporters of Papal interests. Their opponents, the Ghibellines, were supporters of the Holy Roman Empire. Pandolfo Petrucci  ruler of Siena. It is not clear to what "suspected men" Machiavelli is referring. Niccolo Vitelli  mercenary leader, father of Paolo and Vitellozo Vitelli. He became leader of Citta de Castello and destroyed several fortresses built there by his opponent, Pope Sixtus IV. Countess of Forli Caterina Sforza Riario . Her husband was Girolamo Riario . Negotiations with Caterina were the subject of Machiavelli's very first diplomatic assignment in July 1499. When her husband was assassinated, she held out against the revolt in one of her fortresses until help arrived from her uncle, Ludovico Sforza of Milan. When Cesare Borgia invaded in late 1499, her subjects welcomed him and again revolted against her, and she was forced to surrender despite the protection of her fortress.


Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting
a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present
King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has
risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the
foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds
you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the
beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the
foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without
any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile
occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;
thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power
and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and
of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the
foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.
Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater
schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and
clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable
example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,
he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his
achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds
of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of
them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other,
that men have never been given time to work steadily against him.

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal
affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano,
who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some
extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of
rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a
prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain
for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a
downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he
declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course
will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two
of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character
that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not.
In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare
yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if
you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to
the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been
conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to
protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want
doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who
loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand,
court his fate.

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive
out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of
the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the
Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in
the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to
stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: "As for that which has
been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not
to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by
not interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the
guerdon of the conqueror." Thus it will always happen that he who is not
your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend
will entreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes,
to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are
generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour
of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although
the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is
indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are
never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing
you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not
show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally
yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he
may aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that
you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it
greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction
of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved
him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your
assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted
that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one
more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless
necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are
at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being
at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against
the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could
have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the
Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then
in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of
the parties.

Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe
courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,
because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid
one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in
knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to
take the lesser evil.

A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour
the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his
citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and
agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be
deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away
from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the
prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and
designs in any way to honour his city or state.

Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles
at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into
guilds or into societies,(*) he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and
associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy
and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his
rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.

     (*) "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were
     craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole
     company of any trade in any city or corporation town." The
     guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr
     Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906).
     Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called
     "artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace's
     "Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were always during the
     working season members of an artel. In some of the larger
     towns there are artels of a much more complex kind--
     permanent associations, possessing large capital, and
     pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the individual
     members." The word "artel," despite its apparent similarity,
     has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with "ars" or
     "arte." Its root is that of the verb "rotisya," to bind
     oneself by an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only
     another form of "rota," which now signifies a "regimental
     company." In both words the underlying idea is that of a
     body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were possibly gentile
     groups, united by common descent, and included individuals
     connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "sects" or "clans"
     would be most appropriate.

How do you get respect as a ruler? By winning wars. Look at the King of Spain. He was once just a wimp, but now he's the most famous king in Europe. War not your thing? Too bad. But you can also handle your nation's domestic affairs awesomely, and that will work, too. Also, you need to be a genuine friend and enemy. What Machiavelli means by that is, if two of your neighbors are fighting, you have to take sides. If you don't, then the winner will come after you and the loser won't help you at all. If win, you get spoils; if you lose, you can plot your revenge together. A ruler should also give prizes to overachievers, lower taxes, promote small businesses, and give people parties. Also, show up from time to time. That way, everyone will remember how awesome and yet authoritative you are. Yep. This part seems just silly to us, like Machiavelli had to fill up the end of the chapter to meet his word count.

Nothing enhances a ruler's reputation more than undertaking great conquests. Ferdinand of Spain's career provides a good example. He had attacked Granada; driven the Moors out of Spain; and attacked Africa, Italy, and France. These activities kept his subjects amazed and preoccupied, so that no one had time to do anything against him. With regard to internal affairs, princes should always find noteworthy ways to reward or punish any extraordinary actions. Rulers must never remain neutral. If neighboring rulers fight, you must take sides, because if you do not, the winner will threaten you, and the loser will not befriend you. Whether or not your ally wins, he will be grateful to you. However, if you can avoid it, you should never ally with someone more powerful than yourself, because if he wins, you may be in his power. A prince should show that he loves talent and rewards it. He should encourage his citizens to prosper in their occupations. He should keep the people entertained with festivals at appropriate times. And he should give attention to the various civic groups, attending some of their activities, but without appearing undignified.

Reputation and public image are the topics of this chapter. Conquests and daring deeds are the first way to enhance one's reputation. King Ferdinand of Spain is Machiavelli's exemplar, but he gets ambiguous treatment. Although Machiavelli calls him the most famous and glorious prince in Christendom, he also has harsh words for Ferdinand's expulsion of the Moors from Spain, calling it a despicable act done under a religious pretext. In Chapter 18, Machiavelli made a not-very-subtle reference to Ferdinand's penchant for trickery and deceit. Clearly he admires Ferdinand's boldness and energy, but deplores his actions. The emphasis on Ferdinand's ability to keep his subjects amazed and preoccupied recalls the description of Cesare Borgia's execution of Remirro de Orco, which left the people stunned and satisfied. Machiavelli specifically mentions public spectacles at the end of this chapter, and there is a suggestion that spectacle, whether in the form of entertaining festivals, dramatic executions, or daring schemes, is one of the prince's most important tools for controlling public opinion. In the same way, rewarding citizens' achievements or punishing their misdeeds should have an element of spectacle. It should make people talk, and when they talk, it should be about how remarkable the prince is. Machiavelli's other recommendation has to do with decisiveness. Not surprisingly, given his preference for bold action, Machiavelli deplores princes who try to remain neutral in disputes. He presents this as a practical consideration: If a prince fails to take sides, he may find himself without friends when the dust settles. In this discussion, Machiavelli makes one of his few positive statements about human behavior, remarking that men are not so dishonorable nor ungrateful that they will immediately turn on their allies. Given Machiavelli's own advice to the prince in Chapter 18 to break his word when it suits his goals, the reader may have difficulty taking seriously Machiavelli's assurances in this case. Returning to his theme of maintaining good relationships with one's subjects, Machiavelli says that a prince should reward merit and encourage prosperity, because achievements by the citizens improve the state. Princes should show themselves to be friendly to their subjects but without compromising the dignity of their office. Maintaining a certain distance keeps an air of grandeur intact. Glossary Moors Islamic residents of Spain, the Moors had invaded from north Africa in the early eighth century and controlled large portions of Spain until Ferdinand drove them out during the Reconquest, completed by 1500. Ferdinand expelled the Jews at the same time, in his desire to make Spain a pure Christian nation. Machiavelli implies that this was a purely political maneuver done under a religious pretext. Bernabo Bernabo Visconti , ruler of Milan, was famous for giving bizarre punishments.


The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they
are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the
first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is
by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and
faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how
to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are
otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error
which he made was in choosing them.

There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to
be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there
are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;
another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which
neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is
the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore,
it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he
was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and
bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the
initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant,
and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot
hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his
own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in
everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever
be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his
hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and
never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned.

On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study
him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with
him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he
cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,
many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him
dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,
are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,
the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.

Choosing ministers is a big deal. If you chose right, everyone will say how smart you are for choosing such a great minister. Machiavelli explains that there are three kinds of people: First, there are those that are just super smart and understand things without any help Second, there are those that can understand what someone else has come up with And third, there are those that just don't get anything Ministers are great because even if you are only the second kind of person, you can pick a minister that is the first kind and seem super smart. There is no hope for the third kind of person. Now how do we choose a good minister? Throw any minister who seems to be thinking only of himself out of the pile. When you get ministers, give them more than they could ever dream of, so that, unless they are completely worthless, they will only think of how to make things more awesome for you, since you gave them all of that stuff. Loyalty guaranteed.


I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it
is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless
they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of
whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own
affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with
difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they
run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way
of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that
to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell
you the truth, respect for you abates.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the
wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking
the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,
and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and
listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions.
With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry
himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more
freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of
these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be
steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown
by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls
into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of
affairs to Maximilian,(*) the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,
said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything.
This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the
above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not communicate his
designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in
carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are
at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being
pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he
does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he
wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.

     (*) Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the
     Holy Roman Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of
     Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus
     became involved in Italian politics.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he
wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one
from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be
a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the
things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any
consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be
felt.

And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression
of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good
advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because
this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise
himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his
affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In
this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long,
because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from
him.

But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more
than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to
unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and
the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And
they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue
to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be
inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of
the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good
counsels.

This is a hard one. There are so many people around who will just want to kiss your butt. Think of paparazzi. Everyone wants a piece of you. So what to do? Here it is: get people, but only some people, i.e. your ministers, to understand that you want them to tell the truth. Only when you ask, though. Also, make sure they get that you are the decider here, not them. One Bishop, Luca Rainaldi, never got advice and he also never got anything done, because he was always changing his mind. Don't be like him. Get your advice and make your decisions. Remember that a good minister and good advice won't help you if you are a bad leader, because they will just take over. You have to be a good leader to begin with to take advantage of a good minister.


The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince
to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed
in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of
a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary
one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind
far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the
present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy
it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a
prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double
glory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and
strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good
example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince,
shall lose his state by want of wisdom.

And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in
Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan,
and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in
regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in
the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the
people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known
how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that
have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who
was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to
the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a
warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he
sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the
end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the
kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their
principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own
sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change
(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm
against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they
thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that
the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall
them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to
have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never
wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to
restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will
not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which
does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and
durable that depend on yourself and your valour.

These rules are a quick-start guide to ruling a kingdom. In just a few short years, you, too, can have all the prestige of a well-established ruler. Plus, people will love you more because they will be extra surprised that you didn't failjust like people are amazed when babies do anything. Enough of that. Let's talk about why Italy has been failing so hard recently. We all know why. What is Machiavelli's number one rule? Have a strong army. What haven't they had? Any kind of decent army at all. Yet they are whining about how they lost their states because of "bad luck." It's not luck, people. You should have been training an army. Mr. Machiavelli gets himself pretty worked up about this.

If a new prince follows all of these principles, he will soon be as secure as a hereditary ruler, because if people find they are doing well in the present, they will not look for changes. But anyone who acquires a new state and then loses it through incompetence is disgraced. The Italian rulers who have lost their states did so because they lacked military power, made their subjects hate them, or were unable to defend against the nobles. They should not blame bad luck but their own laziness for their losses, because they did not make preparations, and when trouble struck, they ran away, hoping the people would restore them. A prince can only rely on defenses that he can personally control.

This chapter brings Machiavelli back to his discussion of Italy's political situation in his time, which he last treated in his discussion of military matters in Chapters 12 through 14. He specifically mentions the King of Naples and the Duke of Milan as rulers who have lost their power, but he is most concerned with Ludovico Sforza, whom Machiavelli regarded with contempt. Sforza provided a perfect example of how not to follow Machiavelli's precepts. He encouraged Charles VIII of France to invade Italy, and when Louis XII returned, the French deprived Sforza of his state and made him their prisoner. Machiavelli blamed him for many of Italy's troubles resulting from the foreign invasions. Frederick of Aragon , the King of Naples, is probably less fair as an example, because he was forced out of power by a secret agreement between Louis XII and Ferdinand II to divide Naples between them. In the face of two major powers, there was very little Frederick could have done to preserve his position. In particular, Machiavelli has harsh words for the laziness and indolence of the Italian princes, because an ideal prince must always be planning and maneuvering to avoid future disasters. Finally, Machiavelli returns to his theme of self-sufficiency: Relying on others is always a mistake, because others are out of your control. Only by controlling your own resources can you be really secure. Machiavelli takes up this theme more fully in Chapter 25. Glossary Philip of Macedon Philip V , king of Macedon. He was defeated in 197 B.C. by Titus Quintus Flaminius, a Roman general, at Cynoscephalae.


It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the
opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by
fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and
that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us
believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let
chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times
because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and
may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes
pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.
Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that
Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,(*) but that she still
leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.

     (*) Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older
     one gets the more convinced one becomes that his Majesty
     King Chance does three-quarters of the business of this
     miserable universe." Sorel's "Eastern Question."

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood
overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away
the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to
its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,
though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when
the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences
and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may
pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so
dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour
has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where
she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain
her.

And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and
which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open
country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been
defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either
this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it
would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning
resistance to fortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be
seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change
of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes
that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who
relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that
he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of
the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will
not be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end
which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there
by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force,
another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one
succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of
two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly,
two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being
cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than
whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times.
This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently
bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains
his object and the other does not.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs
himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a
way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if
times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course
of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know
how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate
from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always
prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well
to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn
adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he
changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed.

Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and
found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action
that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against
Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians
were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the
enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless
he personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness
and energy, a move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute
and passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover
the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drew after him the King of
France, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring
to make the Pope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it
impossible to refuse him. Therefore Julius with his impetuous action
accomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have
done; for if he had waited in Rome until he could get away, with his
plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have
done, he would never have succeeded. Because the King of France would
have made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a
thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they
all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience
the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go
cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have
deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.

I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind
steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are
successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider
that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is
a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and
ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by
the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is,
therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are
less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.

Let's talk about luck. People feel like the world is just a Wheel of Fortune and they might as well give up because they can't do anything to change their luck. Well, Machiavelli says yeah, fortune is a real force, but just like we dam rivers and create earthquake resistant buildings, we can prepare for when bad luck strikes. The only people who get hit by "bad luck" are the ones who aren't prepared. That's how Italy got where it is. If they were prepared, it wouldn't matter if bad luck in the form of an occupation came knocking on their door. They would have been ready to deal with it. Some people might say that luck is what makes some people trying the same technique fail and others succeed. Nope. Machiavelli says that's just the circumstances. Sometimes certain techniques are good for certain circumstances, and sometimes they are not. It's up to a smart ruler to tell the difference, but that almost never happens. Look at Pope Julius II, our warrior pope. He jumped into everything he's ever done, and in his circumstances that was great. But what if circumstances changed? Things might not have turned out so well for him. Machiavelli ends with a weird sexist-style note about dominating fortune. Bottom line: when in doubt, be impulsive.

Many people believe that fortune controls everything, so that there is no use in trying to act, but fortune controls only half of one's actions, leaving free will to control the other half. Fortune can be compared to a river that floods, destroying everything in its way. But when the weather is good, people can prepare dams and dikes to control the flood. If Italy had such preparations, she would not have suffered so much in the present floods. Princes are successful one day and ruined the next, with no change in their natures. Two men may use the same method, but only one succeeds; and two men may use different methods, but reach the same goal, all because the circumstances do or do not suit their actions. If a man is successful by acting one way and the circumstances change, he will fail if he does not change his methods. But men are never flexible enough to change, either because their natures will not let them or because they become accustomed to a certain behavior bringing success. It is better to be bold than timid and cautious, because fortune is a woman, and the man who wants to control her must treat her roughly.

This chapter is perhaps the most pivotal in The Prince, because Machiavelli discusses the relationship of action and fortune in determining the prince's success. Machiavelli uses fortune  in at least two senses. In Chapters 7 and 8, Machiavelli contrasts virtu with fortune in the sense of luck or the favor of powerful people. In those chapters, the contrast is between what the prince can control  and what he cannot control . In this chapter, fortune refers more to prevailing circumstances and events, which are still things that the prince cannot directly control. Rather than taking the fatalistic view that all events are controlled by destiny and that it is useless to work toward a particular outcome, Machiavelli gives fortune control over only half of human actions, letting free will influence the rest. If free will did not operate, all of a prince's virtu would be for nothing. Yet Machiavelli struggles with the problem of why one person succeeds and another fails, even though they have employed the same methods, or why totally different methods can arrive at the same outcome. To explain this, he proposes that success comes when virtu is suited to the particular situation a prince finds himself in. Machiavelli envisions fortune as a set of constantly changing circumstances in which particular actions can bring about success or failure. To describe it, he uses one of his few extended metaphors, making fortune a force of nature, like a river that seems uncontrollable, yet can be tamed and directed by human activity. If the Italian princes had made suitable preparations, the "flood" of foreign invasions would not have swept over the open and unprotected country. Having affirmed the value of free will, Machiavelli limits it by asserting that even though it may be possible to vary one's actions to suit the times, no one ever does. Machiavelli implies that this is because virtu is an inherent, natural quality that the prince cannot change. People act according to their character and cannot change their natures. This line of reasoning brings Machiavelli back to the pessimistic fatalism he rejected at the beginning of the chapter. If a prince cannot change his nature, success depends simply on being lucky enough to have a character suited to the times he lives in. Fortune was frequently personified in Renaissance art and literature as Fortuna, a female figure who held a turning wheel to symbolize her constant state of change. Fortuna's fickleness is her greatest trait; no sooner are you at the top of her wheel than it turns, and you end up at the bottom. Drawing on this symbolism, Machiavelli closes the chapter by saying that a man who wants to subdue fortune must treat her like the woman she is, and approach her with boldness and roughness. While Machiavelli's metaphor may be offensive to some modern readers, it would not have been shocking in its own day. Even in modern times, the saying "fortune favors the bold" can still be heard. Glossary Julius the warlike pope's remarkable career as a military leader was cut short by his sudden death in 1513.


Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and
wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to
a new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an
opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of
things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this
country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new
prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be
captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians
should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the
soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate
the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to
discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy
should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should
be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,
more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,
despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.

Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us
think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was
afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him;
so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal
her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy,
to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse
those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God
to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous
insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a
banner if only someone will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope
than in your illustrious house,(*) with its valour and fortune, favoured
by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and which could
be made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you
will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named.
And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and
each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for
their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was
God more their friend than He is yours.

     (*) Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal
     by Leo X. In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the
     title of Clement VII.

With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is
necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in
them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness
is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those
men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how
extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:
the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured
forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to
your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do
everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory
which belongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians
have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious
house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns,
it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has
happened because the old order of things was not good, and none of us
have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to
establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen.
Such things when they are well founded and dignified will make him
revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to
bring such into use in every form.

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.
Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior
the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes
to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from
the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not
obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there having never been
any one so distinguished above the rest, either by valour or fortune,
that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for so long a time,
and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there
has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a poor account of
itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, afterwards Allesandria,
Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.(*)

     (*) The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua,
     1501; Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable
men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things,
as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your
own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better
soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will
be much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince,
honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is
necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended
against foreigners by Italian valour.

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very
formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which
a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied
upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the
Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close
combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards
are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by
Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot
be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of
Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions,
who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility
of body and with the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the
Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood
helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been
over with them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both
these infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not
be afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but
a variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which
confer reputation and power upon a new prince.

This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting
Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love
with which he would be received in all those provinces which have
suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for
revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears.
What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him?
What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all
of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious
house take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all
just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native
country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that
saying of Petrarch:

     Virtu contro al Furore
     Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:
     Che l'antico valore
     Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.

     Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
     And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight:
     For the old Roman valour is not dead,
     Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished.

     Edward Dacre, 1640.

At the end of it all, Machiavelli has an appeal to Lorenzo de' Medici. Please take over Italy. Pretty please! It goes a little something like this: It's time for a new ruler. If he wants to, Medici can be like Moses, Cyrus, and all the greats. He can rebuild Italy from its broken down state and be part of the history books. Doesn't that sound sweet? There was one guy who might have been Italy's savior, but well, that didn't work out so well and now look where we are. Italy is ready for someone to save her, and who better than the smart, rich, famous, powerful--and did we mention good-smelling?--Lorenzo de' Medici? Now that he's presumably read the book, Medici has all the knowledge he needs to be a first-rate ruler. God wants him to do it. He has sent miracles. Does he want to displease God? Does he want to get smote? Look at Italy. It's down in the dumps, but its peoples are hard workers. Better than any other country. The best. They just need a leader. Whose name begins with an "L." By the way, Lorenzo, if you haven't gotten it already, if you plan to rule Italy, please establish an army. It's only the right thing to do. Italy can take on the Spanish, it can take on the Swiss--just give it a chance. So, Lorenzo, don't pass up this limited-time offer of ruling Italy. Everyone would love you, everyone would be loyal, and you would be the most adored ruler in the history of Italy. Why would you pass that up? Machiavelli leaves de' Medici with a patriotic quote from Petrarch about taking up arms, and his plea is over.

There could not be a more appropriate time to welcome a new ruler to Italy. In order for the greatness of Italian spirit to be shown, Italy had to be humiliated first. Although it appeared a prince was coming to lead her, bad luck struck him down, so that she still waits eagerly for her rescuer. The Medici family can fill this role, if they will imitate the precepts Machiavelli has explained. Even signs from God point to their coming greatness. The other Italian princes never achieved this goal, because their old methods of warfare were unsound. There is no lack of courage or strength among the Italians, but their leaders are weak. For this reason, Italian armies have lost in the field for the last 20 years. If the Medici family want to become great leaders, they will raise their own armies. All the other European armies, despite their successes, have weaknesses that can be exploited with new strategies. Italy has been waiting for a savior to liberate her from oppression by the foreign barbarians. Let the Medici take up the cause, and Italy will be great once more.

The final chapter of The Prince is Machiavelli's exhortation to the Medici family to lead Italy out of foreign domination under a strong, centralized leadership. His tone is passionate and poetic, in contrast to the dry, direct style of the rest of the book. Still, Machiavelli slips back into his more familiar analytical style when discussing the various military techniques employed by the German, Swiss, French, and Spanish. Methods of warfare were another of Machiavelli's great interests. In 1520, he wrote an entire book on the subject in his Art of War . Machiavelli is at his most fervent when describing the bravery and strength of the Italian national spirit, and he rebukes the foolish leaders who have failed to make use of this great raw material. Even here, though, he has room for a small jab: The Italians, he says, fight well individually, but do not take well to authority, because they all think they know best. Another notable break with the rest of the book is the repeated invocation of God, who has been conspicuously absent from Machiavelli's discussion up until this point: Italy beseeches God for a redeemer, God favors the Medici, God wants the people to use free will, and God sends signs to show that the time is near. Machiavelli even refers to the man who was thought to have been ordained by God to save Italy, namely Cesare Borgia, who but for his rotten luck would have unified Italy. Italy still waits for this promised savior. The bitterness of Italy's subjugation to foreign powers runs throughout this final chapter. All of Machiavelli's observations and advice about the state and the prince have been directed toward this goal, to bring forth the leader who will liberate Italy from the barbarians and unify it. Then Italy will be the peaceful, prosperous state Machiavelli envisions, with a prince who works for the security and stability his subjects need. Machiavelli closes the book with a quotation from the patriotic poem "My Italy"  by the great Italian poet Francesco Petrarca. Glossary Moses, Cyrus, Theseus the great leaders Machiavelli cited in Chapter 6, whom he presents here as liberators of oppressed peoples. head of the Church Giovanni de Medici, the newly elected Pope Leo X. Sea, cloud, stone, manna miracles that occurred when Moses led the Israelites out of slavery in Egypt. Machiavelli claims these are signs that point to the Medici's role in liberating Italy. Taro . . . Mestre battles in which Italian forces were defeated.