We address the problem of estimating the state of a differentially flat system from measurements that may be corrupted by an adversarial attack. In cyber-physical systems, malicious attacks can directly compromise the system's sensors or manipulate the communication between sensors and controllers. We consider attacks that only corrupt a subset of sensor measurements. We show that the possibility of reconstructing the state under such attacks is characterized by a suitable generalization of the notion of s-sparse observability, previously introduced by some of the authors in the linear case. We also extend our previous work on the use of Satisfiability Modulo Theory solvers to estimate the state under sensor attacks to the context of differentially flat systems. The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated on the problem of controlling a quadrotor under sensor attacks.
['Yasser Shoukry', 'Pierluigi Nuzzo', 'Nicola Bezzo', 'Alberto L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli', 'Sanjit A. Seshia', 'Paulo Tabuada']
A Satisfiability Modulo Theory Approach to Secure State Reconstruction in Differentially Flat Systems Under Sensor Attacks