Information systems can be targeted by different types of attacks. Some of them are easily detected (like an DDOS targeting the system) while others are more stealthy and consist in successive attacks steps that compromise different parts of the targeted system. The alarm referring to detected attack steps are often hidden in a tremendous amount of notifications that include false alarms. Alert correlators use correlation rules (that can be explicit, implicit or semi-explicit [3]) in order to solve this problem by extracting complex relationships between the different generated events and alerts. On the other hand, providing maintainable, complete and accurate correlation rules specifically adapted to an information system is a very difficult work. We propose an approach that, given proper input information, can build a complete and system dependant set of correlation rules derived from a high level attack scenario. We then evaluate the applicability of this method by applying it to a real system and assessing the fault tolerance in a simulated environment in a second phase.
['Erwan Godefroy', 'Eric Totel', 'Michel Hurfin', 'Frédéric Majorczyk']
Generation and assessment of correlation rules to detect complex attack scenarios