This paper demonstrates targeted cyber-physical attacks on teleoperated surgical robots. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the robot's control system to infer a critical time during surgery to drive injection of malicious control commands to the robot. We show that these attacks can evade the safety checks of the robot, lead to catastrophic consequences in the physical system (e.g., sudden jumps of robotic arms or system's transition to an unwanted halt state), and cause patient injury, robot damage, or system unavailability in the middle of a surgery. We present a model-based analysis framework that can estimate the consequences of control commands through real-time computation of robot's dynamics. Our experiments on the RAVEN II robot demonstrate that this framework can detect and mitigate the malicious commands before they manifest in the physical system with an average accuracy of 90%.
['Homa Alemzadeh', 'Daniel Chen', 'Xiao Li', 'Thenkurussi Kesavadas', 'Zbigniew Kalbarczyk', 'Ravishankar K. Iyer']
Targeted Attacks on Teleoperated Surgical Robots: Dynamic Model-Based Detection and Mitigation