Detection of rapidly evolving malware requires classification techniques that can effectively and efficiently detect zero-day attacks. Such detection is based on a robust model of benign behavior and deviations from that model are used to detect malicious behavior. In this paper we propose a low-complexity host-based technique that uses deviations in static file attributes to detect malicious executables. We first develop simple statistical models of static file attributes derived from the empirical data of thousands of benign executables. Deviations among the attribute models of benign and malware executables are then quantified using information-theoretic (Kullback-Leibler-based) divergence measures. This quantification reveals distinguishing attributes that are considerably divergent between benign and malware executables and therefore can be used for detection. We use the benign models of divergent attributes in cross-correlation and log-likelihood frameworks to classify malicious executables. Our results, using over 4,000 malicious file samples, indicate that the proposed detector provides reasonably high detection accuracy, while having significantly lower complexity than existing detectors.
['Hassan Khan', 'Fauzan Mirza', 'Syed Ali Khayam']
Determining malicious executable distinguishing attributes and low-complexity detection