Key management in wireless sensor networks does not only face typical, but also several new challenges. The scale, resource limitations, and new threats such as node capture and compromise necessitate the use of an on-line key generation, where secret keys are generated by the nodes themselves. However, the cost of such schemes is high since their secrecy is based on computational complexity. Recently, several research contributions justified that the wireless channel itself can be used to generate information-theoretic secure keys between two parties. By exchanging sampling messages during movement, a bit string can be derived that is only known to the involved entities. Yet, movement is not the only possibility to generate randomness. The channel response is also strongly dependent on the frequency of the transmitted signal. In our work, we introduce a protocol for key generation based on the frequency-selectivity of channel fading. The great practical advantage of this approach is that we do not rely on node movement as the source of randomness. Thus, the frequent case of a sensor network with static motes is supported. Furthermore, the error correction property of the proposed protocol mitigates the effects of measurement errors and other temporal effects, giving rise to a key agreement rate of over 97%. We show the applicability of our protocol by implementing it on MICAz motes, and evaluate its robustness and secrecy through experiments and analysis.
['Matthias Wilhelm', 'Ivan Martinovic', 'Jens B. Schmitt']
Secret keys from entangled sensor motes: implementation and analysis