This paper presents a formal framework for verifying distributed embedded systems. An embedded system is described as a. set of concurrent real time functions which communicate through a network of interconnected switches involving messages queues and routing services. In order to allow requirements verification, such a model is then translated into timed automata. However, the complexity inherent in distributed embedded systems often does not allow to apply model checking techniques. Consequently, the paper presents an abstraction-based verification method which consists in abstracting the communication network by end-to-end timed channels. To prove a given safety property φ requires then (1) to prove a set of proof obligations ensuring the correctness of the abstraction step (i.e. the end-to-end channels correctly abstract the network), and (2) to prove (p at the abstract level. The expected advantage of such a method lies in the ability to overcome the combinatorial explosion frequently met when verifying complex systems. This method is illustrated by an avionic case study.
['Francois Carcenac', 'Frédéric Boniol']
A formal framework for verifying distributed embedded systems based on abstraction methods