This paper introduces and analyzes the class of inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions for cooperative bargaining problems. We show that generalized Gini solutions and inequality averse Choquet solutions are particular cases of this new multi-valued solution concept and provide a complete characterization in which an invariance property, consisting of a weakening of both the linear invariance axiom in Blackorby et al. (Econometrica 62:1161–1178, 1994) and the restricted invariance axiom in Ok and Zhou (Games Econ Behav 33:249–264, 2000), plays an important role. Moreover, by relaxing the assumptions involved in the characterization, the class is extended to include inequality loving multi-utilitarian solutions which are also studied in the paper.
['Miguel A. Hinojosa', 'Amparo M. Mármol', 'José Manuel Zarzuelo']
Inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions