We study the envy-free pricing problem in multi-unit markets with budgets, where there is a seller who brings multiple units of an item, while several buyers bring monetary endowments (budgets). Our goal is to compute an envy-free (item) price and allocation---i.e. an outcome where all the demands of the buyers are met given their budget constraints---which additionally achieves a desirable objective. We analyze markets with linear valuations, where the buyers are price takers and price makers, respectively. For the price taking scenario, we provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the welfare maximizing envy-free pricing, followed by an FPTAS and exact algorithm---that is polynomial for a constant number of types of buyers---for computing a revenue maximizing envy-free pricing. #R##N#In the price taking model, where the buyers can strategize, we show a general impossibility of designing strategyproof and efficient mechanisms even with public budgets. On the positive side, we provide an optimal strategyproof mechanism for common budgets that simultaneously approximates the maximal revenue and welfare within a factor of 2 on all markets except monopsonies. #R##N#Finally, for markets with general valuations in the price taking scenario, we provide hardness results for computing envy-free pricing schemes that maximize revenue and welfare, as well as fully polynomial time approximation schemes for both problems.
['Simina Brânzei', 'Aris Filos-Ratsikas', 'Peter Bro Miltersen', 'Yulong Zeng']
Envy-Free Pricing in Multi-unit Markets