Side-channel attacks are an increasingly important concern for the security of cryptographic embedded devices, such as the SIM cards used in mobile phones. Previous works have exhibited such attacks against implementations of the 2G GSM algorithms COMP-128, A5. In this paper, we show that they remain an important issue for USIM cards implementing the AES-based MILENAGE algorithm used in 3G/4G communications. In particular, we analyze instances of cards from a variety of operators and manufacturers, and describe successful Differential Power Analysis attacks that recover encryption keys and other secrets needed to clone the USIM cards within a few minutes. Further, we discuss the impact of the operator-defined secret parameters in MILENAGE on the difficulty to perform Differential Power Analysis, and show that they do not improve implementation security. Our results back up the observation that physical security issues raise long-term challenges that should be solved early in the development of cryptographic implementations, with adequatei¾źcountermeasures.
['Junrong Liu', 'Yu Yu', 'François-Xavier Standaert', 'Zheng Guo', 'Dawu Gu', 'Wei Sun', 'Yijie Ge', 'Xinjun Xie']
Small Tweaks Do Not Help: Differential Power Analysis of MILENAGE Implementations in 3G/4G USIM Cards