This paper presents a novel security architecture for in-vehicle communication. The ratio of electronics to vehicle equipment is steadily increasing. And novel vehicles will also have connectibility to public networks to provide many kinds of services. Therefore, they are expected to suffer from a wide variety of threats and the electronic control units (ECUs) embedded in them may execute execute malicious programs because of tampering. The remote attestation scheme with the trusted platform module (TPM) has been attracting a great deal of attention to cope with such issues. However, it is not feasible for vehicle systems because the conventional attestation process cannot adapt to in-vehicle communication and TPM cannot adapt to time-constrained vehicle systems. We propose an attestation based security architecture that is suitable for novel vehicles.
['Hisashi Oguma', 'Akira Yoshioka', 'Makoto Nishikawa', 'Rie Shigetomi', 'Akira Otsuka', 'Hideki Imai']
New Attestation Based Security Architecture for In-Vehicle Communication