Nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have the potential to be selfish without transmitting packets in routing. This study mainly focuses on the problem of reliable delivery mechanism in WSNs, and the authors’ objective is to ensure stable cooperation among nodes for packets delivery and minimum routing cost at the same time. Based on the performance metrics in terms of the rate of packets forwarding, correctly reporting event, and energy remain, the authors present a coalitional game model with a characteristic function to be shared among coalition members. Then an efficient and fast convergence coalition formation algorithm is proposed to obtain the stable coalition partition in the game. Finally, on the basis of the coalitional game model, the authors design a reliable coalition formation routing (RCFR) protocol, which selects route according to the principle of lowest cost. Simulation experiments are conducted to analyse the performance of RCFR, compared with original ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing and the method proposed by Kazemeyni. The results show that RCFR effectively enhances packet delivery ratio, decreases routing establishing time, balances energy consumption, and reduces average signalling overhead.
['Renjian Feng', 'Tongling Li', 'Yinfeng Wu', 'Ning Yu']
Reliable routing in wireless sensor networks based on coalitional game theory