Recently, the use of formal methods to specify and verify properties of electronic voting (e-voting) systems, with particular interest in security, verifiability, and anonymity, is getting much attention. Formal specification and verification of such systems can greatly help to better understand the system requirements by thoroughly specifying and analyzing the underlying assumptions and security specific properties. Unfortunately, even though these systems have been formally verified to satisfy the desired system security requirements, they are still vulnerable to attack. In this paper we extend a formal specification of the ES&S voting system by specifying attacks that have been shown to successfully compromise the system. We believe that performing such analysis is important for two reasons: first, it allows us to discover some missing critical requirements for the specification and/or assumptions that were not met Second, it allows us to derive mitigation or counter-measure strategies when the system behaves differently than it should. We used the ASTRAL language for the specification, and the verification is performed using the PVS tool.
['Komminist Weldemariam', 'Richard A. Kemmerer', 'Adolfo Villafiorita']
Formal analysis of attacks for e-voting system