In this paper, we develop two mechanisms to detect DoS attacks against CDN-hosted Web sites and CDN infrastructure servers. First, we propose a novel request routing algorithm which allows CDN servers to effectively distinguish attacks from legitimate requests. Our scheme, based on a keyed hash function, significantly improves the resilience of servers to DoS attacks. Second, we introduce several site allocation algorithms based on binary codes which insure that an attack on one hosted Web site has a limited impact on other hosted sites. Our scheme guarantees that a specified minimum number of servers remain available for non-victimized sites. Together, the proposed schemes significantly improve the resilience of CDN-hosted Web sites, and complement other work on countering distributed DoS attacks.
['Kang-Won Lee', 'Suresh Chari', 'Anees Shaikh', 'Sambit Sahu', 'Pau-Chen Cheng']
Protecting content distribution networks from denial of service attacks