The automation of Power Grids by means of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems has led to an improvement of Power Grid operations and functionalities but also to pervasive cyber interde-pendencies between Power Grids and Telecommunication Networks. Many power grid services are increasingly depending upon the adequate functionality of SCADA system which in turn strictly depends on the adequate functionality of its Communication infrastructure. We propose to tackle the SCADA risk analysis by means of different and heterogeneous modeling techniques and software tools. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach through a case study on an actual SCADA system for an electrical power distribution grid. The modeling techniques we discuss aim at providing a probabilistic dependability analysis, followed by a worst case analysis in presence of malicious attacks and a real-time performance evaluation.
['Andrea Bobbio', 'Ester Ciancamerla', 'S. Di Blasi', 'A. Iacomini', 'Federico Mari', 'Igor Melatti', 'Michele Minichino', 'Alessandro Scarlatti', 'Enrico Tronci', 'Roberta Terruggia', 'Emilio Zendri']
Risk analysis via heterogeneous models of SCADA interconnecting Power Grids and Telco networks