Spread spectrum techniques such as Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping (FH) have been commonly used for anti-jamming wireless communication. However, traditional spread spectrum techniques require that sender and receivers share a common secret in order to agree upon, for example, a common hopping sequence (in FH) or a common spreading code sequence (in DSSS). Such a requirement prevents these techniques from being effective for anti-jamming  broadcast  communication, where a jammer may learn the key from a compromised receiver and then disrupt the wireless communication. In this paper, we develop a novel Delayed Seed-Disclosure DSSS (DSD-DSSS) scheme for efficient anti-jamming broadcast communication. DSD-DSSS achieves its anti-jamming capability through randomly generating the spreading code sequence for each message using a random seed and delaying the disclosure of the seed at the end of the message. We also develop an effective protection mechanism for seed disclosure using content-based code subset selection. DSD-DSSS is superior to all previous attempts for anti-jamming spread spectrum broadcast communication without shared keys. In particular, even if a jammer possesses real-time online analysis capability to launch reactive jamming attacks, DSD-DSSS can still defeat the jamming attacks with a very high probability. We evaluate DSD-DSSS through both theoretical analysis and a prototype implementation based on GNU Radio; our evaluation results demonstrate that DSD-DSSS is practical and have superior security properties.
['An Liu', 'Peng Ning', 'Huaiyu Dai', 'Yao Liu', 'Cliff Wang']
Defending DSSS-based broadcast communication against insider jammers via delayed seed-disclosure