In Asiacrypt 2005, Abdalla  et al.  put forward the notion of gateway-based password-authenticated key exchange (GPAKE) protocol, which allows clients and gateways to establish a common session key with the help of an authentication server. In addition to the semantic security of the session key, their solution also provided additional security properties such as password protection with respect to malicious gateways and key privacy with respect to curious authentication servers. In this paper, we further pursue this line of research and present a new and stronger security model for GPAKE schemes, combining all above-mentioned security properties. In addition to allowing a security proof for all these security properties, the new security model has also other advantages over the previous one such as taking into account user corruptions. After describing the new security model, we then present a new variant of the GPAKE scheme of Abdalla  et al.  with similar efficiency. Like the original scheme, the new scheme is also  transparent  in that it does not differ significantly from a classical  2-PAKE  scheme from the point of view of a client. Finally, we also show how to add client anonymity with respect to the server to the basic GPAKE scheme by using private information retrieval protocols.
['Michel Abdalla', 'Malika Izabachène', 'David Pointcheval']
Anonymous and Transparent Gateway-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange