Parking-lot electric vehicle (EV) charging promises reduced on-board battery capacity for commuters, which would decrease the payback time. However, the parking-lot EV charging scenario is rendered complicated by the large number of agents involved and highly dynamic price of electricity during the day. This study solves the parking-lot EV charging scheduling problem through a noncooperative game approach that considers the coupled constraint therein. The total charging amount is restrained by the transformer capacity. Such a coupled constraint makes the parking-lot EV charging game distinct from other EV charging scenarios. The theoretical framework of the Rosen–Nash normalized equilibrium is applied to deal with such a problem. The Nikaido–Isoda relaxation algorithm is used to calculate the equilibrium point. The dynamic game extension is then provided. Numerical simulation validates the proposed framework. Moreover, the impact of major parameters of the EV charging game on the equilibrium point that can be achieved is investigated.
['Lei Zhang', 'Yaoyu Li']
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Optimal Scheduling of Parking-Lot Electric Vehicle Charging