Mandated requirements to share information across different sensitivity domains necessitate the design of distributed architectures to enforce information flow policies while providing protection from malicious code and attacks devised by highly motivated adversaries. The MYSEA architecture uses component security services and mechanisms to extend and inter-operate with commodity PCs, commodity client software, applications, trusted components, and legacy single level networks, providing new capabilities for composing secure, distributed multilevel secure solutions. This results in an architecture that meets two compelling requirements: first, that users have a familiar work environment, and, second, that critical mandatory security policies are enforced.
['Cynthia E. Irvine', 'Thuy D. Nguyen', 'David J. Shifflett', 'Timothy E. Levin', 'Jean Khosalim', 'Charles Prince', 'Paul C. Clark', 'Mark A. Gondree']
MYSEA: the monterey security architecture