For their scalability needs, data-intensive Web applications can use a database scalability service (DBSS), which caches applications' query results and answers queries on their behalf. One way for applications to address their security/privacy concerns when using a DBSS is to encrypt all data that passes through the DBSS. Doing so, however, causes the DBSS to invalidate large regions of its cache when data updates occur. To invalidate more precisely, the DBSS needs help in order to know which results to invalidate; such help inevitably reveals some properties about the data. In this paper, we present invalidation clues, a general technique that enables applications to reveal little data to the DBSS, yet limit the number of unnecessary invalidations. Compared with previous approaches, invalidation clues provide applications significantly improved tradeoffs between security/privacy and scalability. Our experiments using three Web application benchmarks, on a prototype DBSS we have built, confirm that invalidation clues are indeed a low-overhead, effective, and general technique for applications to balance their privacy and scalability needs.
['Amit Manjhi', 'Phillip B. Gibbons', 'Anastassia Ailamaki', 'Charles Garrod', 'Bruce M. Maggs', 'Todd C. Mowry', 'Christopher Olston', 'Anthony Tomasic', 'Haifeng Yu']
Invalidation Clues for Database Scalability Services