There is currently a paucity of literature focusing on the relationship between the actual actions of staff members, who perpetrate some form of computer abuse, and the organisational environment in which such actions take place. A greater understanding of such a relationship may complement existing security practices by possibly highlighting new areas for safeguard implementation. In addition, if insights are afforded into the actions of dishonest staff, prior to the actual perpetration of a crime, then organisations may be able to expand their preventive scope, rather than relying solely on technical safeguards to stop the actual commission of some form of computer abuse. To help facilitate a greater understanding of the offender/environment dynamic, this paper assesses the feasibility of applying criminological theory to the IS security context. More specifically, three theories are advanced, which focus on the offender's behaviour in a criminal setting. After opening with a description of the theories, the paper provides an account of the Barings Bank collapse. Events highlighted in the case study are used to assess whether concepts central to the theories are supported by the data. The paper concludes by summarising the major findings and discussing future research possibilities.
['Robert Willison']
Understanding the offender/environment dynamic for computer crimes: assessing the feasibility of applying criminological theory to the IS security context