Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  conjecture that  PPAD  has a PCP-like complete problem, seeking a near equilibrium in which all but very few players have very little incentive to deviate.  show that, if one assumes that this problem requires exponential time, several open problems in this area are settled. The most important implication, proved via a "birthday repetition" reduction, is that the  n O(log n)   approximation scheme of Lipton et al. [23] for the Nash equilibrium of two-player games  is essentially optimum.  Two other open problems in the area are resolved once one assumes this conjecture, establishing that certain approximate equilibria are  PPAD -complete: Finding a  relative  approximation of two-player Nash equilibria (without the ll-supported restriction of [14]), and an approximate competitive equilibrium with equal incomes [10] with small clearing error and near-optimal Gini coefficient.
['Yakov Babichenko', 'Christos H. Papadimitriou', 'Aviad Rubinstein']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  conjecture that  PPAD  has a PCP-like complete problem, seeking a near equilibrium in which all but very few players have very little incentive to deviate.  show that, if one assumes that this problem requires exponential time, several open problems in this area are settled. The most important implication, proved via a \"birthday repetition\" reduction, is that the  n O(log n)   approximation scheme of Lipton et al. [23] for the Nash equilibrium of two-player games  is essentially optimum.  Two other open problems in the area are resolved once one assumes this conjecture, establishing that certain approximate equilibria are  PPAD -complete: Finding a  relative  approximation of two-player Nash equilibria (without the ll-supported restriction of [14]), and an approximate competitive equilibrium with equal incomes [10] with small clearing error and near-optimal Gini coefficient."}]