Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  analyzes repeated multimarket contact with observation errors where two players operate in multiple markets simultaneously. Multimarket contact has received much attention from the literature of in economics, management, and so on. Despite vast empirical studies that examine whether multimarket contact fosters cooperation or collusion, little is theoretically known as to how players behave in an equilibrium when each player receives a noisy and different observation or signal indicating other firms' actions (private monitoring). To the best of our knowledge,  are the first to construct a strategy designed for multiple markets whose per-market equilibrium payoffs exceed one for a single market, in our setting.  first construct an entirely novel strategy whose behavior is specified by a non-linear function of the signal configurations.  then show that the per-market equilibrium payoff improves when the number of markets is sufficiently large.
['Atsushi Iwasaki', 'Tadashi Sekiguchi', 'Shun Yamamoto', 'Makoto Yokoo']
I am writing a research paper on a idea How is Cooperation/collusion Sustained in Repeated Multimarket Contact with Observation Errors?: (Extended Abstract)
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea How is Cooperation/collusion Sustained in Repeated Multimarket Contact with Observation Errors?: (Extended Abstract)"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  analyzes repeated multimarket contact with observation errors where two players operate in multiple markets simultaneously. Multimarket contact has received much attention from the literature of in economics, management, and so on. Despite vast empirical studies that examine whether multimarket contact fosters cooperation or collusion, little is theoretically known as to how players behave in an equilibrium when each player receives a noisy and different observation or signal indicating other firms' actions (private monitoring). To the best of our knowledge,  are the first to construct a strategy designed for multiple markets whose per-market equilibrium payoffs exceed one for a single market, in our setting.  first construct an entirely novel strategy whose behavior is specified by a non-linear function of the signal configurations.  then show that the per-market equilibrium payoff improves when the number of markets is sufficiently large."}]