Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  addresses the question of multi party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function#R##N#the agents would like to compute and implement. All agents would like to perform a joint computation, which input is their vector#R##N#of secrets. Hover, agents would like to free-ride on others contribution.#R##N##R##N#A mechanism which elicits players secrets and performs the desired computation defines a game. A mechanism is `appropriate if it (akly) implements the social choice function for all#R##N#secret vectors. namely, if there exists an equilibrium in which it is able to elicit (sufficiently many) agents secrets and perform#R##N#the computation, for all possible secret vectors.  show that `appropriate mechanisms approach agents sequentially and that#R##N#they have low communication complexity.
['Rann Smorodinsky', 'Moshe Tennenholtz']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  addresses the question of multi party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function#R##N#the agents would like to compute and implement. All agents would like to perform a joint computation, which input is their vector#R##N#of secrets. Hover, agents would like to free-ride on others contribution.#R##N##R##N#A mechanism which elicits players secrets and performs the desired computation defines a game. A mechanism is `appropriate if it (akly) implements the social choice function for all#R##N#secret vectors. namely, if there exists an equilibrium in which it is able to elicit (sufficiently many) agents secrets and perform#R##N#the computation, for all possible secret vectors.  show that `appropriate mechanisms approach agents sequentially and that#R##N#they have low communication complexity."}]