Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: An approach to define a rule for an airport problem is to associate to each problem a cooperative game, an airport game, and using game theory to come out with a solution. ,  study the rule that is the average of all the core allocations: the core-center (Gonzalez-Diaz and Sanchez-Rodriguez, 2007). The structure of the core is exploited to derive insights on the core-center. First,  provide a decomposition of the core in terms of the cores of the downstream-subtraction reduced games. Then,  analyze the structure of the faces of the core of an airport game that correspond to the no-subsidy constraints to find that the faces of the core can be seen as new airport games, the face games, and that the core can be decomposed through the no-subsidy cones (those whose bases are the cores of the no-subsidy face games). As a consequence,  provide two methods for computing the core-center of an airport problem, both with interesting economic interpretations: one expresses the core-center as a ratio of the volume of the core of an airport game for which a player is cloned over the volume of the original core, the other defines a recursive algorithm to compute the core-center through the no-subsidy cones. Finally,  prove that the core-center is not only an intuitive appealing game-theoretic solution for the airport problem but it has also a good behavior with respect to the basic properties one expects an airport rule to satisfy.  examine some differences beten the core-center and, arguably, the two more popular game theoretic solutions for airport problems: the Shapley value and the nucleolus.
['Julio González-Díaz', 'Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo', 'Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo', 'Estela Sánchez Rodríguez']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Airport games: The core and its center
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Airport games: The core and its center"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: An approach to define a rule for an airport problem is to associate to each problem a cooperative game, an airport game, and using game theory to come out with a solution. ,  study the rule that is the average of all the core allocations: the core-center (Gonzalez-Diaz and Sanchez-Rodriguez, 2007). The structure of the core is exploited to derive insights on the core-center. First,  provide a decomposition of the core in terms of the cores of the downstream-subtraction reduced games. Then,  analyze the structure of the faces of the core of an airport game that correspond to the no-subsidy constraints to find that the faces of the core can be seen as new airport games, the face games, and that the core can be decomposed through the no-subsidy cones (those whose bases are the cores of the no-subsidy face games). As a consequence,  provide two methods for computing the core-center of an airport problem, both with interesting economic interpretations: one expresses the core-center as a ratio of the volume of the core of an airport game for which a player is cloned over the volume of the original core, the other defines a recursive algorithm to compute the core-center through the no-subsidy cones. Finally,  prove that the core-center is not only an intuitive appealing game-theoretic solution for the airport problem but it has also a good behavior with respect to the basic properties one expects an airport rule to satisfy.  examine some differences beten the core-center and, arguably, the two more popular game theoretic solutions for airport problems: the Shapley value and the nucleolus."}]