Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  focuses on the relationship beten the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. In particular, it analyses how both players’ unobservable effort levels affect the equity share that the entrepreneur is willing to cede to the venture capitalist.  solve the entrepreneur’s maximization problem in the presence of double-sided moral hazard. In this scenario,  show that the venture capitalist’s share is binding and, therefore, there is no efficiency wage.  simulate the model and show that the entrepreneur’s effort does not monotonically decrease in the share allocated to the venture capital, while the venture capitalist’s effort does not monotonically increase in his share.  show that as efforts tend to be more complementary, the project cash flows are distributed nearly equally, at approximately 50% for each partner. This theoretical finding is actually observed in real contracts beten entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
['Marcos Vergara', 'Claudio A. Bonilla', 'Jean P. Sepulveda']
I am writing a research paper on a idea The complementarity effect: Effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea The complementarity effect: Effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  focuses on the relationship beten the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. In particular, it analyses how both players\u2019 unobservable effort levels affect the equity share that the entrepreneur is willing to cede to the venture capitalist.  solve the entrepreneur\u2019s maximization problem in the presence of double-sided moral hazard. In this scenario,  show that the venture capitalist\u2019s share is binding and, therefore, there is no efficiency wage.  simulate the model and show that the entrepreneur\u2019s effort does not monotonically decrease in the share allocated to the venture capital, while the venture capitalist\u2019s effort does not monotonically increase in his share.  show that as efforts tend to be more complementary, the project cash flows are distributed nearly equally, at approximately 50% for each partner. This theoretical finding is actually observed in real contracts beten entrepreneurs and venture capitalists."}]