Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  extend symbolic protocol analysis to apply to protocols using Die-Hellman operations. Die-Hellman operations act on a cyclic group of prime order, together with an exponentiation operator. The exponents form a nite eld. This rich algebraic structure has resisting previous symbolic approaches.  work in an algebra dened by the normal forms of a rewriting theory (modulo associativity and commutativity). These normal forms allow us to dene our crucial notion of indicator, a vector of integers that summarizes how many times each secret exponent appears in a message.  prove that the adversary can never construct a message with a new indicator in our adversary model. Using this invariant,  prove the main security goals achieved by several dierent protocols that use Die-Hellman operators in subtle ways.  also give a model-theoretic justication of our rewriting theory: the theory proves all equations that are uniformly true as the order of the cyclic group varies.
['Daniel J. Dougherty', 'Joshua D. Guttman']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Symbolic Protocol Analysis for Diffie-Hellman
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Symbolic Protocol Analysis for Diffie-Hellman"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  extend symbolic protocol analysis to apply to protocols using Die-Hellman operations. Die-Hellman operations act on a cyclic group of prime order, together with an exponentiation operator. The exponents form a nite eld. This rich algebraic structure has resisting previous symbolic approaches.  work in an algebra dened by the normal forms of a rewriting theory (modulo associativity and commutativity). These normal forms allow us to dene our crucial notion of indicator, a vector of integers that summarizes how many times each secret exponent appears in a message.  prove that the adversary can never construct a message with a new indicator in our adversary model. Using this invariant,  prove the main security goals achieved by several dierent protocols that use Die-Hellman operators in subtle ways.  also give a model-theoretic justication of our rewriting theory: the theory proves all equations that are uniformly true as the order of the cyclic group varies."}]