Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  study a natural extension of classical evolutionary game theory to a setting in which pairwise interactions are restricted to the edges of an undirected graph or network.  generalize the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and show a pair of complementary results that exhibit the por of randomization in our setting: subject to degree or edge density conditions, the classical ESS of any game are preserved when the graph is chosen randomly and the mutation set is chosen adversarially, or when the graph is chosen adversarially and the mutation set is chosen randomly.  examine natural strengthenings of our generalized ESS definition, and show that similarly strong resultsnare not possible for them.
['Michael J. Kearns', 'Siddharth Suri']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Networks preserving evolutionary equilibria and the power of randomization
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Networks preserving evolutionary equilibria and the power of randomization"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  study a natural extension of classical evolutionary game theory to a setting in which pairwise interactions are restricted to the edges of an undirected graph or network.  generalize the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and show a pair of complementary results that exhibit the por of randomization in our setting: subject to degree or edge density conditions, the classical ESS of any game are preserved when the graph is chosen randomly and the mutation set is chosen adversarially, or when the graph is chosen adversarially and the mutation set is chosen randomly.  examine natural strengthenings of our generalized ESS definition, and show that similarly strong resultsnare not possible for them."}]