Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  investigates the connection beten network reliability and security by modeling attacker-defender interactions as a game.  model the defender's network as an undirected graph with insecure and unreliable edges. The edges could either fail due to a random malfunction (fault), or due to a strategic attacker who aims to maximize the defender's loss (attack). In many environments, the defender faces prohibitive costs of isolating the type of failures, i.e., fault versus attack. In addition, delays in arrival of diagnostic information to the defender may prevent him to detect the type of failure. To account for such information deficiencies,  let the defender know only the relative frequencies of failures with different types. From our analysis, equilibrium depends on these relative frequencies, and on the exogenously given probability distribution of reliability failures on the edges. Thus, in presence of the aforementioned information deficiencies, reliability and security are interdependent, and  argue that defenders (managers) should co-design their defenses against faults and attacks.
['Galina Schwartz', 'Saurabh Amin', 'Assane Gueye', 'Jean C. Walrand']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Network design game with both reliability and security failures
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Network design game with both reliability and security failures"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  investigates the connection beten network reliability and security by modeling attacker-defender interactions as a game.  model the defender's network as an undirected graph with insecure and unreliable edges. The edges could either fail due to a random malfunction (fault), or due to a strategic attacker who aims to maximize the defender's loss (attack). In many environments, the defender faces prohibitive costs of isolating the type of failures, i.e., fault versus attack. In addition, delays in arrival of diagnostic information to the defender may prevent him to detect the type of failure. To account for such information deficiencies,  let the defender know only the relative frequencies of failures with different types. From our analysis, equilibrium depends on these relative frequencies, and on the exogenously given probability distribution of reliability failures on the edges. Thus, in presence of the aforementioned information deficiencies, reliability and security are interdependent, and  argue that defenders (managers) should co-design their defenses against faults and attacks."}]