Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: ,  advance the state-of-the-art in designing ex-post truthful multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions (SSA) through two different contributions. First,  prove two important impossibility results which rule out the possibility of an ex-post monotone MAB allocation rule having sublinear regret with time when the click through rates (CTR) of the advertisements (ads) are affected by ad-dependent externality or position-dependent externality. The above impossibility results motivate our second contribution: when the CTRs are affected by only position-dependent externality and follow click-precedence property,  design a novel ex-post truthful mechanism for multi-slot SSAs with sublinear regret. The ex-post monotone allocation rule in the proposed mechanism non-trivially generalizes the NewCB allocation rule presented by Babaioff, Sharma, and Slivkins[2].  derive regret bounds for this allocation rule. When a strong property such as ex-post truthfulness is required, our allocation rule performs as ll as the A-VCG mechanism presented by Gatti, Lazaric, and Trovo[4] and in the special case of identical slots, our allocation rule in fact outperforms the A-VCG mechanism and has a regret of O{√T} with time.
['Debmalya Mandal', 'Y. Narahari']
I am writing a research paper on a idea A novel ex-post truthful mechanism for multi-slot sponsored search auctions
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea A novel ex-post truthful mechanism for multi-slot sponsored search auctions"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: ,  advance the state-of-the-art in designing ex-post truthful multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions (SSA) through two different contributions. First,  prove two important impossibility results which rule out the possibility of an ex-post monotone MAB allocation rule having sublinear regret with time when the click through rates (CTR) of the advertisements (ads) are affected by ad-dependent externality or position-dependent externality. The above impossibility results motivate our second contribution: when the CTRs are affected by only position-dependent externality and follow click-precedence property,  design a novel ex-post truthful mechanism for multi-slot SSAs with sublinear regret. The ex-post monotone allocation rule in the proposed mechanism non-trivially generalizes the NewCB allocation rule presented by Babaioff, Sharma, and Slivkins[2].  derive regret bounds for this allocation rule. When a strong property such as ex-post truthfulness is required, our allocation rule performs as ll as the A-VCG mechanism presented by Gatti, Lazaric, and Trovo[4] and in the special case of identical slots, our allocation rule in fact outperforms the A-VCG mechanism and has a regret of O{\u221aT} with time."}]