Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Secure communication rates can be facilitated or enhanced via deployment of cooperative jammers in a multi-terminal environment. Such an approach typically assumes dedicated and/or altruistic jamming nodes, investing their resources for the good of the whole system. ,  demonstrate that jammers can be recruited to provide significant improvements of secrecy rates even when this assumption is alleviated. A game-theoretic framework is proposed where a source node, towards the maximization of its secrecy rate, utilizes the jamming services from a set of non-altruistic nodes, compensating them with a fraction of its bandwidth for transmission of their user data. With the goal of maximizing their user-data transmission rate priced by the invested por, potential cooperative jammers will provide the jamming/transmitting por that is generally proportional to the amount of leased bandwidth. Elaborating initially on a single-jammer scenario, interaction beten the source and a cooperative jammer is modeled as the Stackelberg leader-follor game. The scheme is further extended to involve multiple potential jammers, applying competition mechanisms such as the auctioning and por control game, while maintaining the Stackelberg framework.
['Igor Stanojev', 'Aylin Yener']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Cooperative jamming via spectrum leasing
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Cooperative jamming via spectrum leasing"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Secure communication rates can be facilitated or enhanced via deployment of cooperative jammers in a multi-terminal environment. Such an approach typically assumes dedicated and/or altruistic jamming nodes, investing their resources for the good of the whole system. ,  demonstrate that jammers can be recruited to provide significant improvements of secrecy rates even when this assumption is alleviated. A game-theoretic framework is proposed where a source node, towards the maximization of its secrecy rate, utilizes the jamming services from a set of non-altruistic nodes, compensating them with a fraction of its bandwidth for transmission of their user data. With the goal of maximizing their user-data transmission rate priced by the invested por, potential cooperative jammers will provide the jamming/transmitting por that is generally proportional to the amount of leased bandwidth. Elaborating initially on a single-jammer scenario, interaction beten the source and a cooperative jammer is modeled as the Stackelberg leader-follor game. The scheme is further extended to involve multiple potential jammers, applying competition mechanisms such as the auctioning and por control game, while maintaining the Stackelberg framework."}]