Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the ll-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social lfare objective.  consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated.  present a general lor bound of Ω(√n) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms and  show that a very ll-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial achieves a matching upper bound.  extend our lor bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property.
['George Christodoulou', 'Aris Filos-Ratsikas', 'Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen', 'Paul W. Goldberg', 'Jie Zhang', 'Jinshan Zhang']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms: (Extended Abstract)
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms: (Extended Abstract)"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the ll-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social lfare objective.  consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated.  present a general lor bound of \u03a9(\u221an) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms and  show that a very ll-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial achieves a matching upper bound.  extend our lor bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property."}]