Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  consider situations, in which socially important goods (like transportation capacity or hospital beds) are supplied by independent economic agents. There is also a regulator that believes that constraining the goods delivery is desirable. The regulator can compute a constrained Pareto-efficient solution to establish optimal output levels for each agent.  suggest that a coupled-constraint equilibrium (also called a “generalized” Nash or “normalized” equilibrium a la Rosen) may be more relevant for market economies than a Pareto-efficient solution.  examine under which conditions the latter can equal the former.  illustrate our findings using a coordination problem, in which the agents’ outputs depend on externalities. It becomes evident that the correspondence beten an efficient and equilibrium solutions cannot be complete if the agents’ activities generate both negative and positive externalities at the same time.
['Jacek B. Krawczyk', 'Mabel Tidball']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Economic Problems with Constraints: How Efficiency Relates to Equilibrium
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Economic Problems with Constraints: How Efficiency Relates to Equilibrium"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  consider situations, in which socially important goods (like transportation capacity or hospital beds) are supplied by independent economic agents. There is also a regulator that believes that constraining the goods delivery is desirable. The regulator can compute a constrained Pareto-efficient solution to establish optimal output levels for each agent.  suggest that a coupled-constraint equilibrium (also called a \u201cgeneralized\u201d Nash or \u201cnormalized\u201d equilibrium a la Rosen) may be more relevant for market economies than a Pareto-efficient solution.  examine under which conditions the latter can equal the former.  illustrate our findings using a coordination problem, in which the agents\u2019 outputs depend on externalities. It becomes evident that the correspondence beten an efficient and equilibrium solutions cannot be complete if the agents\u2019 activities generate both negative and positive externalities at the same time."}]