Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Race condition attacks occur when a process performs a sequence of operations on a file, under the assumption that the operations are being executed "atomically". This can be exploited by a malicious process which changes the characteristics of that file beten two successive operations on it by a victim process, thus, inducing the victim process to operate on a modified or diflerent file.   present a practical approach to detect and prevent such race condition attacks.  monitor file operations and enforce policies which prevent the exploitation of the temporal window beten any consecutive file operations by a process. Our approach does not rely on knowledge of previously known attacks. In addition, our experiments on Linux demonstrated that attacks can be detected with false alarms of less than 3% with performance overheads less than 8% of the processes execution time.
['Prem Uppuluri', 'Uday Joshi', 'Arnab Ray']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Preventing race condition attacks on file-systems
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Preventing race condition attacks on file-systems"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Race condition attacks occur when a process performs a sequence of operations on a file, under the assumption that the operations are being executed \"atomically\". This can be exploited by a malicious process which changes the characteristics of that file beten two successive operations on it by a victim process, thus, inducing the victim process to operate on a modified or diflerent file.   present a practical approach to detect and prevent such race condition attacks.  monitor file operations and enforce policies which prevent the exploitation of the temporal window beten any consecutive file operations by a process. Our approach does not rely on knowledge of previously known attacks. In addition, our experiments on Linux demonstrated that attacks can be detected with false alarms of less than 3% with performance overheads less than 8% of the processes execution time."}]