Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: ,  address several puzzles concerning speech acts,particularly indirect speech acts.  show how a formal semantictheory of discourse interpretation can be used to define speech actsand to avoid murky issues concerning the metaphysics of action. provide a formally precise definition of indirect speech acts, includingthe subclass of so-called conventionalized indirect speech acts. Thisanalysis draws heavily on parallels beten phenomena at the speechact level and the lexical level. First,  argue that, just as co-predicationshows that some words can behave linguistically as if they're `simultaneously'of incompatible semantic types, certain speech acts behave this way too.Secondly, as Horn and Bayer (1984) and others have suggested, both thelexicon and speech acts are subject to a principle of blocking or ``preemptionby synonymy'': Conventionalized indirect speech acts can block their`paraphrases' from being interpreted as indirect speech acts, even ifthis interpretation is calculable from Gricean-style principles. provide a formal model of this blocking, and compare it withexisting accounts of lexical blocking.
['Nicholas Asher', 'Alex Lascarides']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Indirect speech acts
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Indirect speech acts"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: ,  address several puzzles concerning speech acts,particularly indirect speech acts.  show how a formal semantictheory of discourse interpretation can be used to define speech actsand to avoid murky issues concerning the metaphysics of action. provide a formally precise definition of indirect speech acts, includingthe subclass of so-called conventionalized indirect speech acts. Thisanalysis draws heavily on parallels beten phenomena at the speechact level and the lexical level. First,  argue that, just as co-predicationshows that some words can behave linguistically as if they're `simultaneously'of incompatible semantic types, certain speech acts behave this way too.Secondly, as Horn and Bayer (1984) and others have suggested, both thelexicon and speech acts are subject to a principle of blocking or ``preemptionby synonymy'': Conventionalized indirect speech acts can block their`paraphrases' from being interpreted as indirect speech acts, even ifthis interpretation is calculable from Gricean-style principles. provide a formal model of this blocking, and compare it withexisting accounts of lexical blocking."}]