Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  explore to what extent  can propose fixed negotiation rules and simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that political parties can form stable coalition governments.  analyze the case in which three parties can hold office in the form of two-party coalitions.  define a family of ighted rules that select political agreements as a function of the bliss points of the parties and electoral results (Gamson’s law and equal share among others are included).  show that every ighted rule yields a stable coalition.  use implementation theory to design a protocol (in the form of a mechanism) that guarantees that a stable coalition will govern.  find that no dominant solvable mechanism can be used for this purpose, but there is a simultaneous unanimity mechanism that implements it in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium. Finally,  analyze the case of a larger number of political parties.
['M. Socorro Puy']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  explore to what extent  can propose fixed negotiation rules and simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that political parties can form stable coalition governments.  analyze the case in which three parties can hold office in the form of two-party coalitions.  define a family of ighted rules that select political agreements as a function of the bliss points of the parties and electoral results (Gamson\u2019s law and equal share among others are included).  show that every ighted rule yields a stable coalition.  use implementation theory to design a protocol (in the form of a mechanism) that guarantees that a stable coalition will govern.  find that no dominant solvable mechanism can be used for this purpose, but there is a simultaneous unanimity mechanism that implements it in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium. Finally,  analyze the case of a larger number of political parties."}]