Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  extends existing models for collaborative systems.  investigate how much damage can be done by insiders alone, without collusion with an outside adversary. In contrast to traditional intruder models, such as in protocol security, all the players inside our system, including potential adversaries, have similar capabilities. They have bounded storage capacity, that is, they can only remember at any moment a bounded number of facts. This is technically imposed by only allowing balanced actions, that is, actions that have the same number of facts in their pre and post conditions. On the other hand, the adversaries inside our system have many capabilities of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder, namely, they are able, within their bounded storage capacity, to compose, decompose, overhear, and intercept messages as ll as update values with fresh ones.  investigate the complexity of the decision problem of whether or not an adversary is able to discover secret data.  show that this problem is PSPACE-complete when all actions are balanced and can update values with fresh ones. As an application  turn to security protocol analysis and demonstrate that many protocol anomalies, such as the Lo anomaly in the Needham-Schroeder public key exchange protocol, can also occur when the intruder is one of the insiders with bounded memory. © 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
['Max I. Kanovich', 'T Ban Kirigin', 'Nigam', 'Andre Scedrov']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Bounded memory dolev-yao adversaries in collaborative systems
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Bounded memory dolev-yao adversaries in collaborative systems"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  extends existing models for collaborative systems.  investigate how much damage can be done by insiders alone, without collusion with an outside adversary. In contrast to traditional intruder models, such as in protocol security, all the players inside our system, including potential adversaries, have similar capabilities. They have bounded storage capacity, that is, they can only remember at any moment a bounded number of facts. This is technically imposed by only allowing balanced actions, that is, actions that have the same number of facts in their pre and post conditions. On the other hand, the adversaries inside our system have many capabilities of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder, namely, they are able, within their bounded storage capacity, to compose, decompose, overhear, and intercept messages as ll as update values with fresh ones.  investigate the complexity of the decision problem of whether or not an adversary is able to discover secret data.  show that this problem is PSPACE-complete when all actions are balanced and can update values with fresh ones. As an application  turn to security protocol analysis and demonstrate that many protocol anomalies, such as the Lo anomaly in the Needham-Schroeder public key exchange protocol, can also occur when the intruder is one of the insiders with bounded memory. \u00a9 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg."}]