Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain. , restricted to the case where the agents have numerical additive preferences over objects, revisits to some extent the seminal paper by Brams and King [9] which was specific to ordinal and linear order preferences over items.  point out similarities and differences with this latter context. In particular,  show that any Pareto-optimal allocation (under additive preferences) is sequenceable, but that the converse is not true anymore. This asymmetry leads naturally to the definition of a " scale of efficiency " having three steps: Pareto-optimality, sequenceability without Pareto-optimality, and non-sequenceability. Finally,  investigate the links beten these efficiency properties and the " scale of fairness "  have described in an earlier work [7]:  first show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable. Then  experimentally explore the links beten the scales of efficiency and fairness.
['Sylvain Bouveret', 'Michel Lemaître']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain. , restricted to the case where the agents have numerical additive preferences over objects, revisits to some extent the seminal paper by Brams and King [9] which was specific to ordinal and linear order preferences over items.  point out similarities and differences with this latter context. In particular,  show that any Pareto-optimal allocation (under additive preferences) is sequenceable, but that the converse is not true anymore. This asymmetry leads naturally to the definition of a \" scale of efficiency \" having three steps: Pareto-optimality, sequenceability without Pareto-optimality, and non-sequenceability. Finally,  investigate the links beten these efficiency properties and the \" scale of fairness \"  have described in an earlier work [7]:  first show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable. Then  experimentally explore the links beten the scales of efficiency and fairness."}]