Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Access control mechanisms are widely used with the intent of enforcing confidentiality and other policies, but few formal connections have been made beten information flow and access control. Java and C# are object-oriented languages that provide fine-grained access control. An access control list specifies local policy by authorizing permissions for principals (code sources) associated with class declarations; a mechanism called stack inspection checks permissions at run time. An example is given to show how this mechanism can be used to achieve confidentiality goals in situations where a single system call serves callers of differing confidentiality levels and dynamic access control prevents release of high information to low callers. A static analysis is given which applies to such examples. The analysis is shown to ensure a noninterference property formalizing confidentiality.
['Anindya Banerjee', 'David A. Naumann']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Using access control for secure information flow in a Java-like language
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Using access control for secure information flow in a Java-like language"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Access control mechanisms are widely used with the intent of enforcing confidentiality and other policies, but few formal connections have been made beten information flow and access control. Java and C# are object-oriented languages that provide fine-grained access control. An access control list specifies local policy by authorizing permissions for principals (code sources) associated with class declarations; a mechanism called stack inspection checks permissions at run time. An example is given to show how this mechanism can be used to achieve confidentiality goals in situations where a single system call serves callers of differing confidentiality levels and dynamic access control prevents release of high information to low callers. A static analysis is given which applies to such examples. The analysis is shown to ensure a noninterference property formalizing confidentiality."}]