Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: In this article,  study the design and characterization of sequential prediction mechanisms in the presence of agents with unknown risk aversion.  formulate a collection of desirable properties for any sequential forecasting mechanism.  present a randomized mechanism that satisfies all of these properties, including a guarantee that it is myopically optimal for each agent to report honestly, regardless of her degree of risk aversion.  observe, hover, that the mechanism has an undesirable side effect: each agent's expected reward, normalized against the inherent value of her private information, decreases exponentially with the number of agents.  prove a negative result showing that this is unavoidable: any mechanism that is myopically strategyproof for agents of all risk types, while also satisfying other natural properties of sequential forecasting mechanisms, must sometimes result in a player getting an exponentially small expected normalized reward.
['Stanko Dimitrov', 'Rahul Sami', 'Marina A. Epelman']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Subsidized Prediction Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Agents
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Subsidized Prediction Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Agents"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: In this article,  study the design and characterization of sequential prediction mechanisms in the presence of agents with unknown risk aversion.  formulate a collection of desirable properties for any sequential forecasting mechanism.  present a randomized mechanism that satisfies all of these properties, including a guarantee that it is myopically optimal for each agent to report honestly, regardless of her degree of risk aversion.  observe, hover, that the mechanism has an undesirable side effect: each agent's expected reward, normalized against the inherent value of her private information, decreases exponentially with the number of agents.  prove a negative result showing that this is unavoidable: any mechanism that is myopically strategyproof for agents of all risk types, while also satisfying other natural properties of sequential forecasting mechanisms, must sometimes result in a player getting an exponentially small expected normalized reward."}]