Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  model an Internet marketplace using a set of servers that choose prices for performing jobs. Each server has a queue of unfinished jobs, and is penalized for delay by the market maker via a holding cost. A server completes jobs with a low or high "quality", and jobs truthfully report the quality with which they re completed. The best estimate of quality based on these reports is the "reputation" of the server. A server bases its pricing decision on the distribution of its competitors offered prices and reputations. An entering job is given a random sample of servers, and chooses the best one based on a linear combination of price and reputation.  seek to understand how prices would be determined in such a marketplace using the theory of Mean Field Games.  show the existence of a Mean Field Equilibrium and show how reputation plays a role in allowing servers to declare larger prices than their competitors.  illustrate our results by a numerical study of the system via simulation with parameters chosen from data gathered from existing Internet marketplaces.
['Vamseedhar Reddyvari Raja', 'Vinod Ramaswamy', 'Srinivas Shakkottai', 'Vijay G. Subramanian']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Mean Field Equilibria of Pricing Games in Internet Marketplaces
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Mean Field Equilibria of Pricing Games in Internet Marketplaces"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  model an Internet marketplace using a set of servers that choose prices for performing jobs. Each server has a queue of unfinished jobs, and is penalized for delay by the market maker via a holding cost. A server completes jobs with a low or high \"quality\", and jobs truthfully report the quality with which they re completed. The best estimate of quality based on these reports is the \"reputation\" of the server. A server bases its pricing decision on the distribution of its competitors offered prices and reputations. An entering job is given a random sample of servers, and chooses the best one based on a linear combination of price and reputation.  seek to understand how prices would be determined in such a marketplace using the theory of Mean Field Games.  show the existence of a Mean Field Equilibrium and show how reputation plays a role in allowing servers to declare larger prices than their competitors.  illustrate our results by a numerical study of the system via simulation with parameters chosen from data gathered from existing Internet marketplaces."}]