Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: In his dissertation of 1950, Nash based his concept of the solution to a game on the assumption that "a rational prediction should be unique, that the play- ers should be able to deduce and make use of it".  study when such definitive solutions exist for strategic games with ordinal payoffs.  offer a new, syntactic approach: instead of reasoning about the specific model of a game,  deduce prop- ertiesofinterestdirectlyfromthedescriptionofthegameitself.ThiscapturesNash's deductiveassumptionsandhelpstobridgeall-knowngapbetensyntacticgame descriptions and specific models which could require unwarranted additional epis- temicassumptions,e.g.,commonknowledgeofamodel.showthatgameswithout Nash equilibria do not have definitive solutions under any notion of rationality, but each Nash equilibrium can be a definitive solution for an appropriate refinement of Aumann rationality. With respect to Aumann rationality itself, games with multiple Nash equilibria cannot have definitive solutions. Some games with a unique Nash equilibrium have definitive solutions, others don't, and the criterion for a definitive solution is provided by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
['Sergei N. Artëmov']
I am writing a research paper on a idea On Definitive Solutions of Strategic Games
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea On Definitive Solutions of Strategic Games"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: In his dissertation of 1950, Nash based his concept of the solution to a game on the assumption that \"a rational prediction should be unique, that the play- ers should be able to deduce and make use of it\".  study when such definitive solutions exist for strategic games with ordinal payoffs.  offer a new, syntactic approach: instead of reasoning about the specific model of a game,  deduce prop- ertiesofinterestdirectlyfromthedescriptionofthegameitself.ThiscapturesNash's deductiveassumptionsandhelpstobridgeall-knowngapbetensyntacticgame descriptions and specific models which could require unwarranted additional epis- temicassumptions,e.g.,commonknowledgeofamodel.showthatgameswithout Nash equilibria do not have definitive solutions under any notion of rationality, but each Nash equilibrium can be a definitive solution for an appropriate refinement of Aumann rationality. With respect to Aumann rationality itself, games with multiple Nash equilibria cannot have definitive solutions. Some games with a unique Nash equilibrium have definitive solutions, others don't, and the criterion for a definitive solution is provided by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies."}]