Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Protected Module Architectures are a new brand of security architectures whose main objective is to support the secure isolated execution of software modules with a minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB) -- several prototypes for embedded systems (and also the Intel Software Guard eXtensions for higher-end systems) ensure isolation with a hardware-only TCB. Hover, while these architectures offer strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees for software modules, they offer no availability (let alone real-time) guarantees.  reports on our work-in-progress towards extending a protected module architecture for small microprocessors with availability and real-time guarantees. Our objective is to maintain the existing security guarantees with a hardware-only TCB, but to also guarantee availability (and even real-time properties) if one can also trust the scheduler. The scheduler, as any software on the platform, remains untrusted for confidentiality and integrity -- but it is sufficient to trust the scheduler module to get availability guarantees even on a partially compromised platform.
['Jo Van Bulck', 'Job Noorman', 'Jan Tobias Mühlberg', 'Frank Piessens']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Towards availability and real-time guarantees for protected module architectures
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Towards availability and real-time guarantees for protected module architectures"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Protected Module Architectures are a new brand of security architectures whose main objective is to support the secure isolated execution of software modules with a minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB) -- several prototypes for embedded systems (and also the Intel Software Guard eXtensions for higher-end systems) ensure isolation with a hardware-only TCB. Hover, while these architectures offer strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees for software modules, they offer no availability (let alone real-time) guarantees.  reports on our work-in-progress towards extending a protected module architecture for small microprocessors with availability and real-time guarantees. Our objective is to maintain the existing security guarantees with a hardware-only TCB, but to also guarantee availability (and even real-time properties) if one can also trust the scheduler. The scheduler, as any software on the platform, remains untrusted for confidentiality and integrity -- but it is sufficient to trust the scheduler module to get availability guarantees even on a partially compromised platform."}]