Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  present a number of enhancements to the voter verifiable election scheme Pret a Voter [CRS05]. Firstly,  propose a mechanism for the distributed construction by a set of independent clerks of the ballot forms. This construction leads to proto-ballot forms with the candidate list encrypted and ensures that only a collusion of all the clerks could determine the cryptographic seeds or the onion/candidate list association. This eliminates the need to trust a single authority to keep this information secret. Furthermore, it allows the on-demand decryption and printing of the ballot forms, so eliminating chain of custody issues and the chain voting style attacks against encrypted receipt schemes identified in [RP05]. The ballot forms proposed here use ElGamal randomised encryption so enabling the use of re-encryption mixes for the anonymising tabulation phase in place of the decryption mixes. This has a number of advantages over the RSA decryption mixes used previously: tolerance against failure of any of the mix tellers, full mixing of terms over the Z *  p  space and enabling the mixes and audits to be fully independently rerun if necessary.
['P. Y. A. Ryan', 'Sascha Schneider']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Prêt à Voter with Re-encryption Mixes
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Pr\u00eat \u00e0 Voter with Re-encryption Mixes"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  present a number of enhancements to the voter verifiable election scheme Pret a Voter [CRS05]. Firstly,  propose a mechanism for the distributed construction by a set of independent clerks of the ballot forms. This construction leads to proto-ballot forms with the candidate list encrypted and ensures that only a collusion of all the clerks could determine the cryptographic seeds or the onion/candidate list association. This eliminates the need to trust a single authority to keep this information secret. Furthermore, it allows the on-demand decryption and printing of the ballot forms, so eliminating chain of custody issues and the chain voting style attacks against encrypted receipt schemes identified in [RP05]. The ballot forms proposed here use ElGamal randomised encryption so enabling the use of re-encryption mixes for the anonymising tabulation phase in place of the decryption mixes. This has a number of advantages over the RSA decryption mixes used previously: tolerance against failure of any of the mix tellers, full mixing of terms over the Z *  p  space and enabling the mixes and audits to be fully independently rerun if necessary."}]