Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract.  introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulatability—and show that when these conditions are satisfied, the cumulative o↵er mechanism is the unique mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (for workers). Moreover, when the choice function of some firm fails any of our three conditions, one can construct unit-demand choice functions for the other firms such that no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. In the final part of the paper,  characterize the class of choice functions for which the cumulative o↵er mechanism is guaranteed to yield a stable outcome.
['John William Hatfield', 'Scott Duke', 'Kominers', 'Alexander Westkamp']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract.  introduce three novel conditions\u2014observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulatability\u2014and show that when these conditions are satisfied, the cumulative o\u21b5er mechanism is the unique mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (for workers). Moreover, when the choice function of some firm fails any of our three conditions, one can construct unit-demand choice functions for the other firms such that no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. In the final part of the paper,  characterize the class of choice functions for which the cumulative o\u21b5er mechanism is guaranteed to yield a stable outcome."}]