Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in non cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and deviations from a prescribed ELE become irrational after polynomial time.  prove the existence of an ELE in the perfect monitoring setting, where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium.  also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Yet, it exists in the special case of common-interest games. Finally,  extend our results to general stochastic games.
['Ronen I. Brafman', 'Moshe Tennenholtz']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Efficient Learning Equilibrium
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Efficient Learning Equilibrium"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in non cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and deviations from a prescribed ELE become irrational after polynomial time.  prove the existence of an ELE in the perfect monitoring setting, where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium.  also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Yet, it exists in the special case of common-interest games. Finally,  extend our results to general stochastic games."}]