Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multiunit auction in which some bidders are better informed than others.  show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly ll: They can win with higher probability than better informed bidders, and sometimes, even with higher expected utility.  also find a positive relationship beten the success of worse informed bidders and the number of units for sale. Finally  argue that the correct intuitive explanation of these results relies on the balance of the winner's curse and the loser's curse effects. (This abstract was borrod from another version of this item.)
['Angel Hernando-Veciana']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Successful uninformed bidding
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Successful uninformed bidding"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multiunit auction in which some bidders are better informed than others.  show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly ll: They can win with higher probability than better informed bidders, and sometimes, even with higher expected utility.  also find a positive relationship beten the success of worse informed bidders and the number of units for sale. Finally  argue that the correct intuitive explanation of these results relies on the balance of the winner's curse and the loser's curse effects. (This abstract was borrod from another version of this item.)"}]