Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  analyze markets in which the price of a traded commodity is such that the supply and the demand are unequal. Under standard assumptions, the agents then have single peaked preferences on their consumption or production choices. For such markets,  propose a class of Uniform trade rules each of which determines the volume of trade as the median of total demand, total supply, and an exogenous constant. Then these rules allocate this volume “uniformly” on either side of the market.  evaluate these “trade rules” on the basis of some standard axioms in the literature.  show that they uniquely satisfy Pareto optimality, strategy proofness, no-envy, and an informational simplicity axiom that  introduce.  also analyze the implications of anonymity, renegotiation proofness, and voluntary trade on this domain.
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I am writing a research paper on a idea Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  analyze markets in which the price of a traded commodity is such that the supply and the demand are unequal. Under standard assumptions, the agents then have single peaked preferences on their consumption or production choices. For such markets,  propose a class of Uniform trade rules each of which determines the volume of trade as the median of total demand, total supply, and an exogenous constant. Then these rules allocate this volume \u201cuniformly\u201d on either side of the market.  evaluate these \u201ctrade rules\u201d on the basis of some standard axioms in the literature.  show that they uniquely satisfy Pareto optimality, strategy proofness, no-envy, and an informational simplicity axiom that  introduce.  also analyze the implications of anonymity, renegotiation proofness, and voluntary trade on this domain."}]