Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are a ll-known framework for finding a solution to a distributed optimization problem in systems of self-interested agents. VCG mechanisms have received wide attention in the AI community because they are efficient and strategy-proof; a special case of the Groves family of mechanisms, VCG mechanisms are the only direct-revelation mechanisms that are allocatively efficient and strategy-proof. Unfortunately, VCG mechanisms are only akly budget-balanced.#R##N##R##N# consider self-interested agents in a network flow domain, and show that in this domain, it is possible to design a mechanism that is both allocatively-efficient and almost completely budget-balanced. This is done by choosing a mechanism that is not strategy-proof but rather strategy-resistant. Instead of using the VCG mechanism,  propose a mechanism in which finding the most beneficial manipulation is an NP-complete problem, and the payments from the agents to the mechanism may be minimized as much as desired. This way, the mechanism is virtually strongly budget-balanced: for any e> 0,  find a mechanism that is e-budget-balanced.
['Yoram Bachrach', 'Jeffrey S. Rosenschein']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Achieving allocatively-efficient and strongly budget-balanced mechanisms in the network flow domain for bounded-rational agents
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Achieving allocatively-efficient and strongly budget-balanced mechanisms in the network flow domain for bounded-rational agents"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are a ll-known framework for finding a solution to a distributed optimization problem in systems of self-interested agents. VCG mechanisms have received wide attention in the AI community because they are efficient and strategy-proof; a special case of the Groves family of mechanisms, VCG mechanisms are the only direct-revelation mechanisms that are allocatively efficient and strategy-proof. Unfortunately, VCG mechanisms are only akly budget-balanced.#R##N##R##N# consider self-interested agents in a network flow domain, and show that in this domain, it is possible to design a mechanism that is both allocatively-efficient and almost completely budget-balanced. This is done by choosing a mechanism that is not strategy-proof but rather strategy-resistant. Instead of using the VCG mechanism,  propose a mechanism in which finding the most beneficial manipulation is an NP-complete problem, and the payments from the agents to the mechanism may be minimized as much as desired. This way, the mechanism is virtually strongly budget-balanced: for any e> 0,  find a mechanism that is e-budget-balanced."}]