Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  consider Cournot competition in the presence of congestion effects. Our model consists of several service providers with differentiated services, each competing for users who are sensitive to both price and congestion.  distinguish two types of congestion effects, depending on whether spillover costs exist, that is, where one service provider's congestion cost increases with the other providers' output level.  quantify the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly with respect to the optimal social lfare with tight upper and lor bounds.  show that, when there is no spillover, the lfare loss in an unregulated oligopoly is limited to 25% of the social optimum, even in the presence of highly convex costs. On the other hand, when spillover cost is present, there does not exist a constant lor bound on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly, even with affine cost.  show that the efficiency depends on the relative magnitude beten the marginal spillover cost and the marginal benefit to consumers.#R##N##R##N# was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations management.
['Georgia Perakis', 'Wei Sun']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Efficiency Analysis of Cournot Competition in Service Industries with Congestion
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Efficiency Analysis of Cournot Competition in Service Industries with Congestion"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  consider Cournot competition in the presence of congestion effects. Our model consists of several service providers with differentiated services, each competing for users who are sensitive to both price and congestion.  distinguish two types of congestion effects, depending on whether spillover costs exist, that is, where one service provider's congestion cost increases with the other providers' output level.  quantify the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly with respect to the optimal social lfare with tight upper and lor bounds.  show that, when there is no spillover, the lfare loss in an unregulated oligopoly is limited to 25% of the social optimum, even in the presence of highly convex costs. On the other hand, when spillover cost is present, there does not exist a constant lor bound on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly, even with affine cost.  show that the efficiency depends on the relative magnitude beten the marginal spillover cost and the marginal benefit to consumers.#R##N##R##N# was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations management."}]