Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: In Massively Open Online Courses (MOOCs) TA resources are limited; most MOOCs use peer assessments to grade assignments. Students have to divide up their time beten working on their own homework and grading others. If there is no risk of being caught and penalized, students have no reason to spend any time grading others. Course staff want to incentivize students to balance their time beten course work and peer grading. They may do so by auditing students, ensuring that they perform grading correctly. One would not want students to invest too much time on peer grading, as this would result in poor course performance.  present the first model of strategic auditing in peer grading, modeling the student's choice of effort in response to a grader's audit levels as a Stackelberg game with multiple follors.  demonstrate that computing the equilibrium for this game is computationally hard.  then provide a PTAS in order to compute an approximate solution to the problem of allocating audit levels. Hover,  show that this allocation does not necessarily maximize social lfare; in fact, there exist settings where course auditor utility is arbitrarily far from optimal under an approximately optimal allocation. To circumvent this issue,  present a natural condition that guarantees that approximately optimal TA allocations guarantee approximately optimal lfare for the course auditors.
['Alejandro Uriel Carbonara', 'Anupam Datta', 'Arunesh Sinha', 'Yair Zick']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Incentivizing peer grading in MOOCS: an audit game approach
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Incentivizing peer grading in MOOCS: an audit game approach"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely: In Massively Open Online Courses (MOOCs) TA resources are limited; most MOOCs use peer assessments to grade assignments. Students have to divide up their time beten working on their own homework and grading others. If there is no risk of being caught and penalized, students have no reason to spend any time grading others. Course staff want to incentivize students to balance their time beten course work and peer grading. They may do so by auditing students, ensuring that they perform grading correctly. One would not want students to invest too much time on peer grading, as this would result in poor course performance.  present the first model of strategic auditing in peer grading, modeling the student's choice of effort in response to a grader's audit levels as a Stackelberg game with multiple follors.  demonstrate that computing the equilibrium for this game is computationally hard.  then provide a PTAS in order to compute an approximate solution to the problem of allocating audit levels. Hover,  show that this allocation does not necessarily maximize social lfare; in fact, there exist settings where course auditor utility is arbitrarily far from optimal under an approximately optimal allocation. To circumvent this issue,  present a natural condition that guarantees that approximately optimal TA allocations guarantee approximately optimal lfare for the course auditors."}]