Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  address the polling problem in social networks where users want to preserve the confidentiality of their votes, obtain the correct final result, and hide, if any, their misbehaviors. Guerraoui et al. [15, 16] recently proposed polling protocols that neither rely on any central authority nor cryptography system. Hover, these protocols can be deployed safely and efficiently provided that the social graph structure should be transformed into a ring structure-based overlay and the number of participating users is a perfect square. Consequently, designing secure and efficient polling protocols regardless these constraints remains a challenging issue.#R##N##R##N#,  present EPol, a simple decentralized polling protocol that is deployed on more general social graphs. More explicitly,  define a family of social graphs that satisfy what  call the m-broadcasting property where m is not greater than the minimum node degree and show their structures enable low communication cost and constitute necessary and sufficient condition to ensure vote privacy and limit the impact of dishonest users on the accuracy of the polling output. In a social network of N users with diameter $$\Delta _G$$ and $$D\le m-1\Delta _G/2$$ dishonest users and similarly to the work [15, 16] where they considered $$D<\sqrt{N}$$, a privacy parameterk enables us to obtain the following results: i the maximum probability of vote disclosure with certainty is $$D/N^{k+1}$$ and without certainty is $$\bigl \frac{D}{N}/1-2\frac{D}{N}\bigr \bigl [1-\sum _{i=0}^{k}\gamma _i2\frac{D}{N}^{2i+1}\bigr ]$$, where $$\gamma _i$$ is the proportion of nodes voting for $$2i+1$$ shares and $$0\le i\le k$$; ii up to 2D votes can be revealed with certainty; iii the maximum impact on the final result is $$6k+4D$$, and the average impact is $$\Bigl [\bigl \sum _{i=0}^{k}\gamma _i 2i+1\bigr \bigl 1+2\sum _{i=0}^{k}\gamma _i\frac{i+\alpha }{2i+1}\bigr +1\Bigr ]D$$, where $$\alpha $$ is the proportion of users correctly voting; iv unlike [15, 16], EPol is effective to compute more precisely the final result; and v the communication and spatial complexities of EPol are close to be linear.
['Bao-Thien Hoang', 'Abdessamad Imine']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Efficient and Decentralized Polling Protocol for General Social Networks
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Efficient and Decentralized Polling Protocol for General Social Networks"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  address the polling problem in social networks where users want to preserve the confidentiality of their votes, obtain the correct final result, and hide, if any, their misbehaviors. Guerraoui et al. [15, 16] recently proposed polling protocols that neither rely on any central authority nor cryptography system. Hover, these protocols can be deployed safely and efficiently provided that the social graph structure should be transformed into a ring structure-based overlay and the number of participating users is a perfect square. Consequently, designing secure and efficient polling protocols regardless these constraints remains a challenging issue.#R##N##R##N#,  present EPol, a simple decentralized polling protocol that is deployed on more general social graphs. More explicitly,  define a family of social graphs that satisfy what  call the m-broadcasting property where m is not greater than the minimum node degree and show their structures enable low communication cost and constitute necessary and sufficient condition to ensure vote privacy and limit the impact of dishonest users on the accuracy of the polling output. In a social network of N users with diameter $$\\Delta _G$$ and $$D\\le m-1\\Delta _G/2$$ dishonest users and similarly to the work [15, 16] where they considered $$D<\\sqrt{N}$$, a privacy parameterk enables us to obtain the following results: i the maximum probability of vote disclosure with certainty is $$D/N^{k+1}$$ and without certainty is $$\\bigl \\frac{D}{N}/1-2\\frac{D}{N}\\bigr \\bigl [1-\\sum _{i=0}^{k}\\gamma _i2\\frac{D}{N}^{2i+1}\\bigr ]$$, where $$\\gamma _i$$ is the proportion of nodes voting for $$2i+1$$ shares and $$0\\le i\\le k$$; ii up to 2D votes can be revealed with certainty; iii the maximum impact on the final result is $$6k+4D$$, and the average impact is $$\\Bigl [\\bigl \\sum _{i=0}^{k}\\gamma _i 2i+1\\bigr \\bigl 1+2\\sum _{i=0}^{k}\\gamma _i\\frac{i+\\alpha }{2i+1}\\bigr +1\\Bigr ]D$$, where $$\\alpha $$ is the proportion of users correctly voting; iv unlike [15, 16], EPol is effective to compute more precisely the final result; and v the communication and spatial complexities of EPol are close to be linear."}]