Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  studies a dynamic game beten two national governments that fight a common terrorist organization that is seeking to mount a transnational terror campaign. It is the first examination that combines the temporal externalities associated with a sustained campaign with the spatial externalities that occur when the effects of one government’s counterterror policy spill over into another country.  consider two types of noncooperative behavior; one in which national authorities are sensitive to the reactions of the terrorists on foreign soil and another in which they are insensitive. It is shown that foreign terrorist sensitivity is preferred to insensitivity. Moreover, unilaterally accounting for terrorist reactions on foreign soil can be preferred to full policy coordination beten governments. This then feeds into policy recommendations as to when each nation finds it desirable to coordinate transnational counterterror policy.
['João Ricardo Faria', 'Emilson C. D. Silva', 'Daniel G. Arce']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Intertemporal Versus Spatial Externalities in Counterterror Policy Games
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Intertemporal Versus Spatial Externalities in Counterterror Policy Games"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  studies a dynamic game beten two national governments that fight a common terrorist organization that is seeking to mount a transnational terror campaign. It is the first examination that combines the temporal externalities associated with a sustained campaign with the spatial externalities that occur when the effects of one government\u2019s counterterror policy spill over into another country.  consider two types of noncooperative behavior; one in which national authorities are sensitive to the reactions of the terrorists on foreign soil and another in which they are insensitive. It is shown that foreign terrorist sensitivity is preferred to insensitivity. Moreover, unilaterally accounting for terrorist reactions on foreign soil can be preferred to full policy coordination beten governments. This then feeds into policy recommendations as to when each nation finds it desirable to coordinate transnational counterterror policy."}]