Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  study the Stackleberg variant of the repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma (SPD). The game goes in two stages, and the two players, the leader and the follor, are asymmetric in both stages. In the first stage of the game, the leader chooses a strategy (for the repeated SPD of the second stage), which is immediately known to the follor. In the second stage, they play repeated SPD: In each round the follor moves after observing the leader's action.Assuming complete rationality,  find some extraordinary properties of this model. (i) The (subgame perfect) equilibrium payoff profile is unique, which lies on the corner of the region predicted by classical folk theorems: It is best for the leader and at the same time worst for the follor, (ii) the leader has simple optimal strategies that are one-step memory and stationary. These features are in great contrast with classical results, where either uniqueness cannot be guaranteed and equilibrium strategies are often quite complicated, or bounded rationality is required. Although full cooperation, i.e., the outcome is always (cooperate, cooperate), is not attainable in our model, at least a half of the optimal social lfare can be guaranteed.  also do a non-equilibrium analysis which makes the usual equilibrium analysis more convincing.
['Xinglong Qu', 'Zhigang Cao', 'Yifen Mu', 'Xiao Guang Yang']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: The Stackleberg Variant
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: The Stackleberg Variant"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  study the Stackleberg variant of the repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma (SPD). The game goes in two stages, and the two players, the leader and the follor, are asymmetric in both stages. In the first stage of the game, the leader chooses a strategy (for the repeated SPD of the second stage), which is immediately known to the follor. In the second stage, they play repeated SPD: In each round the follor moves after observing the leader's action.Assuming complete rationality,  find some extraordinary properties of this model. (i) The (subgame perfect) equilibrium payoff profile is unique, which lies on the corner of the region predicted by classical folk theorems: It is best for the leader and at the same time worst for the follor, (ii) the leader has simple optimal strategies that are one-step memory and stationary. These features are in great contrast with classical results, where either uniqueness cannot be guaranteed and equilibrium strategies are often quite complicated, or bounded rationality is required. Although full cooperation, i.e., the outcome is always (cooperate, cooperate), is not attainable in our model, at least a half of the optimal social lfare can be guaranteed.  also do a non-equilibrium analysis which makes the usual equilibrium analysis more convincing."}]