Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  consider optimal investment policies for irreversible capital investment projects under uncertainty in a monopoly situation and in a Stackelberg leader-follor game.  consider two types of payoffs: lump-sum and cash flows. The decisions are the times to enter into the market. The problems belong to the class of optimal stopping times, for which the right approach is that of variational inequalities (V.I.s). In the case of complete markets, payoffs are expected values with respect to the risk-neutral probability. In the case of incomplete markets, the risk-neutral probability is not defined.  consider an investor maximizing his/her utility function, and  consider the investment in the project as an additional decision, besides portfolio investment and consumption decisions. This decision remains a stopping time, conversely to the portfolio investment and consumption decisions (continuous controls). The game problem raises new difficulties. The leader's V.I. has a nondifferentiable obstacle. The ak formulation of the V.I. handles this difficulty. In some cases, the solution of the V.I. may be continuously differentiable although the obstacle is not. An additional difficulty occurs for lump-sum payoffs in the case of incomplete markets.  cannot compare gains and losses at different times.  propose an alternative approach, using equivalence (indifference) considerations. In the case of payoffs characterized by cash flows, this difficulty does not exist, but an intermediary problem arises which has a nice interpretation as a differential game. The solutions thus obtained for the Stackelberg game are not intuitive. Therefore, competition has important consequences on investment decisions.
['Alain Bensoussan', 'J. David Diltz', 'SingRu Celine Hoe']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Real Options Games in Complete and Incomplete Markets with Several Decision Makers
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Real Options Games in Complete and Incomplete Markets with Several Decision Makers"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  consider optimal investment policies for irreversible capital investment projects under uncertainty in a monopoly situation and in a Stackelberg leader-follor game.  consider two types of payoffs: lump-sum and cash flows. The decisions are the times to enter into the market. The problems belong to the class of optimal stopping times, for which the right approach is that of variational inequalities (V.I.s). In the case of complete markets, payoffs are expected values with respect to the risk-neutral probability. In the case of incomplete markets, the risk-neutral probability is not defined.  consider an investor maximizing his/her utility function, and  consider the investment in the project as an additional decision, besides portfolio investment and consumption decisions. This decision remains a stopping time, conversely to the portfolio investment and consumption decisions (continuous controls). The game problem raises new difficulties. The leader's V.I. has a nondifferentiable obstacle. The ak formulation of the V.I. handles this difficulty. In some cases, the solution of the V.I. may be continuously differentiable although the obstacle is not. An additional difficulty occurs for lump-sum payoffs in the case of incomplete markets.  cannot compare gains and losses at different times.  propose an alternative approach, using equivalence (indifference) considerations. In the case of payoffs characterized by cash flows, this difficulty does not exist, but an intermediary problem arises which has a nice interpretation as a differential game. The solutions thus obtained for the Stackelberg game are not intuitive. Therefore, competition has important consequences on investment decisions."}]