Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  define a newstrategic equilibrium concept - called strong collusion-proof contract - designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, selfenforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions.  then construct a strategic market mechanism which, for quasi-linear economies, is such that its strong collusion-proof contracts generically induce the incentive compatible interim efficent allocations. Moreover, it is such that these allocations can be achieved by strong collusion-proof contracts.  show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficent allocations.
['Gaël Giraud', 'Celine Rochon']
I am writing a research paper on a idea Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
[{"from": "human", "value": "I am writing a research paper on a idea Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies"}, {"from": "gpt", "value": "Thats a unique idea.You should consider the following idea to enhance your idea so that it would impact uniquely:  define a newstrategic equilibrium concept - called strong collusion-proof contract - designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, selfenforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions.  then construct a strategic market mechanism which, for quasi-linear economies, is such that its strong collusion-proof contracts generically induce the incentive compatible interim efficent allocations. Moreover, it is such that these allocations can be achieved by strong collusion-proof contracts.  show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficent allocations."}]