diff --git "a/valid.txt" "b/valid.txt"
new file mode 100644--- /dev/null
+++ "b/valid.txt"
@@ -0,0 +1,20342 @@
+Riltok	B-Malware
+mobile	O
+Trojan	O
+:	O
+A	O
+banker	O
+with	O
+global	O
+reach	O
+25	O
+JUN	O
+2019	O
+Riltok	B-Malware
+is	O
+one	O
+of	O
+numerous	O
+families	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+with	O
+standard	O
+(	O
+for	O
+such	O
+malware	O
+)	O
+functions	O
+and	O
+distribution	O
+methods	O
+.	O
+
+Originally	O
+intended	O
+to	O
+target	O
+the	O
+Russian	O
+audience	O
+,	O
+the	O
+banker	O
+was	O
+later	O
+adapted	O
+,	O
+with	O
+minimal	O
+modifications	O
+,	O
+for	O
+the	O
+European	O
+“	O
+market.	O
+”	O
+The	O
+bulk	O
+of	O
+its	O
+victims	O
+(	O
+more	O
+than	O
+90	O
+%	O
+)	O
+reside	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+,	O
+with	O
+France	O
+in	O
+second	O
+place	O
+(	O
+4	O
+%	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Third	O
+place	O
+is	O
+shared	O
+by	O
+Italy	O
+,	O
+Ukraine	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+United	O
+Kingdom	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+first	O
+detected	O
+members	O
+of	O
+this	O
+family	O
+back	O
+in	O
+March	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+Like	O
+many	O
+other	O
+bankers	O
+,	O
+they	O
+were	O
+disguised	O
+as	O
+apps	O
+for	O
+popular	O
+free	O
+ad	O
+services	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+distributed	O
+from	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+in	O
+the	O
+form	O
+“	O
+%	O
+USERNAME	O
+%	O
+,	O
+I	O
+’	O
+ll	O
+buy	O
+under	O
+a	O
+secure	O
+transaction	O
+.	O
+
+youlabuy	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ru/7	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+3	I-Indicator
+”	O
+or	O
+“	O
+%	O
+USERNAME	O
+%	O
+,	O
+accept	O
+25,000	O
+on	O
+Youla	O
+youla-protect	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ru/4	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+7	I-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+link	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+samples	O
+were	O
+also	O
+noticed	O
+,	O
+posing	O
+as	O
+a	O
+client	O
+of	O
+a	O
+ticket-finding	O
+service	O
+or	O
+as	O
+an	O
+app	O
+store	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+It	O
+was	O
+late	O
+2018	O
+when	O
+Riltok	B-Malware
+climbed	O
+onto	O
+the	O
+international	O
+stage	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+cybercriminals	O
+behind	O
+it	O
+kept	O
+the	O
+same	O
+masking	O
+and	O
+distribution	O
+methods	O
+,	O
+using	O
+names	O
+and	O
+icons	O
+imitating	O
+those	O
+of	O
+popular	O
+free	O
+ad	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+November	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+a	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+for	O
+the	O
+English	O
+market	O
+appeared	O
+in	O
+the	O
+shape	O
+of	O
+Gumtree.apk	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+with	O
+a	O
+link	O
+to	O
+a	O
+banker	O
+looked	O
+as	O
+follows	O
+:	O
+“	O
+%	O
+USERNAME	O
+%	O
+,	O
+i	O
+send	O
+you	O
+prepayment	O
+gumtree	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cc/3	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+1	I-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Italian	O
+(	O
+Subito.apk	B-Indicator
+)	O
+and	O
+French	O
+(	O
+Leboncoin.apk	B-Indicator
+)	O
+versions	O
+appeared	O
+shortly	O
+afterwards	O
+in	O
+January	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+messages	O
+looked	O
+as	O
+follows	O
+:	O
+“	O
+%	O
+USERNAME	O
+%	O
+,	O
+ti	O
+ho	O
+inviato	O
+il	O
+soldi	O
+sul	O
+subito	O
+subito-a	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+pw/6	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+5	I-Indicator
+”	O
+(	O
+It	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+“	O
+%	O
+USERNAME	O
+%	O
+,	O
+ti	O
+ho	O
+inviato	O
+il	O
+pagamento	O
+subitop	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+pw/4	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+7	I-Indicator
+”	O
+(	O
+It	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+“	O
+%	O
+USERNAME	O
+%	O
+,	O
+je	O
+vous	O
+ai	O
+envoyé	O
+un	O
+prepaiement	O
+m-leboncoin	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/7	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+3	I-Indicator
+”	O
+(	O
+Fr	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+“	O
+%	O
+USERNAME	O
+%	O
+,	O
+j	O
+’	O
+ai	O
+fait	O
+l	O
+’	O
+avance	O
+(	O
+suivi	O
+d	O
+’	O
+un	O
+lien	O
+)	O
+:	O
+leboncoin-le	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/8	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+9	I-Indicator
+”	O
+(	O
+Fr	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+Let	O
+’	O
+s	O
+take	O
+a	O
+more	O
+detailed	O
+look	O
+at	O
+how	O
+this	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+works	O
+.	O
+
+Infection	O
+The	O
+user	O
+receives	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+with	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+link	O
+pointing	O
+to	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+website	O
+simulating	O
+a	O
+popular	O
+free	O
+ad	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+,	O
+they	O
+are	O
+prompted	O
+to	O
+download	O
+a	O
+new	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+app	O
+,	O
+under	O
+which	O
+guise	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+is	O
+hidden	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+be	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+it	O
+needs	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+unknown	O
+sources	O
+in	O
+the	O
+device	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+Riltok	B-Malware
+asks	O
+the	O
+user	O
+for	O
+permission	O
+to	O
+use	O
+special	O
+features	O
+in	O
+AccessibilityService	O
+by	O
+displaying	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+warning	O
+:	O
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+ignores	O
+or	O
+declines	O
+the	O
+request	O
+,	O
+the	O
+window	O
+keeps	O
+opening	O
+ad	O
+infinitum	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+obtaining	O
+the	O
+desired	O
+rights	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+sets	O
+itself	O
+as	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+(	O
+by	O
+independently	O
+clicking	O
+Yes	O
+in	O
+AccessibilityService	O
+)	O
+,	O
+before	O
+vanishing	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+screen	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+enabling	O
+AccessibilityService	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+sets	O
+itself	O
+as	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+Now	O
+installed	O
+and	O
+having	O
+obtained	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+permissions	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+,	O
+Riltok	B-Malware
+contacts	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+later	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+when	O
+it	O
+starts	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+additionally	O
+opens	O
+a	O
+phishing	O
+site	O
+in	O
+the	O
+browser	O
+that	O
+simulates	O
+a	O
+free	O
+ad	O
+service	O
+so	O
+as	O
+to	O
+dupe	O
+the	O
+user	O
+into	O
+entering	O
+their	O
+login	O
+credentials	O
+and	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+entered	O
+data	O
+is	O
+forwarded	O
+to	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+.	O
+
+Phishing	O
+page	O
+from	O
+the	O
+French	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+Communication	O
+with	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+Riltok	B-Malware
+actively	O
+communicates	O
+with	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+off	O
+,	O
+it	O
+registers	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+in	O
+the	O
+administrative	O
+panel	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+a	O
+GET	O
+request	O
+to	O
+the	O
+relative	O
+address	O
+gate.php	B-Indicator
+(	O
+in	O
+later	O
+versions	O
+gating.php	B-Indicator
+)	O
+with	O
+the	O
+ID	O
+(	O
+device	O
+identifier	O
+generated	O
+by	O
+the	O
+setPsuedoID	O
+function	O
+in	O
+a	O
+pseudo-random	O
+way	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+IMEI	O
+)	O
+and	O
+screen	O
+(	O
+shows	O
+if	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+active	O
+,	O
+possible	O
+values	O
+are	O
+“	O
+on	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+off	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+none	O
+”	O
+)	O
+parameters	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+,	O
+using	O
+POST	O
+requests	O
+to	O
+the	O
+relative	O
+address	O
+report.php	B-Indicator
+,	O
+it	O
+sends	O
+data	O
+about	O
+the	O
+device	O
+(	O
+IMEI	O
+,	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+,	O
+country	O
+,	O
+mobile	O
+operator	O
+,	O
+phone	O
+model	O
+,	O
+availability	O
+of	O
+root	O
+rights	O
+,	O
+OS	O
+version	O
+)	O
+,	O
+list	O
+of	O
+contacts	O
+,	O
+list	O
+of	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+the	O
+server	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+receives	O
+commands	O
+(	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+to	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+)	O
+and	O
+changes	O
+in	O
+the	O
+configuration	O
+.	O
+
+Trojan	O
+anatomy	O
+The	O
+family	O
+was	O
+named	O
+Riltok	B-Malware
+after	O
+the	O
+librealtalk-jni.so	B-Indicator
+library	O
+contained	O
+in	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+library	O
+includes	O
+such	O
+operations	O
+as	O
+:	O
+Get	O
+address	O
+of	O
+cybercriminal	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+Get	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+with	O
+web	O
+injects	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+default	O
+list	O
+of	O
+injects	O
+Scan	O
+for	O
+app	O
+package	O
+names	O
+that	O
+generated	O
+AccessibilityEvent	O
+events	O
+in	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+known	O
+banking/antivirus/other	O
+popular	O
+apps	O
+Set	O
+malware	O
+as	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+Get	O
+address	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phishing	O
+page	O
+that	O
+opens	O
+when	O
+the	O
+app	O
+runs	O
+,	O
+and	O
+others	O
+getStartWebUrl	O
+function	O
+–	O
+get	O
+address	O
+of	O
+phishing	O
+page	O
+The	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+injects	O
+for	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+–	O
+links	O
+to	O
+phishing	O
+pages	O
+matching	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+
+banking	O
+app	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+most	O
+so-called	O
+Western	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+the	O
+package	O
+names	O
+in	O
+the	O
+default	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+are	O
+erased	O
+.	O
+
+Sample	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+Through	O
+AccessibilityService	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+monitors	O
+AccessibilityEvent	O
+events	O
+.	O
+
+Depending	O
+on	O
+which	O
+app	O
+(	O
+package	O
+name	O
+)	O
+generated	O
+the	O
+event	O
+,	O
+Riltok	B-Malware
+can	O
+:	O
+Open	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+screen	O
+requesting	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+Open	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+screen	O
+or	O
+phishing	O
+page	O
+in	O
+a	O
+browser	O
+(	O
+inject	O
+)	O
+mimicking	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+of	O
+the	O
+relevant	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+app	O
+and	O
+requesting	O
+user/bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+Minimize	O
+the	O
+app	O
+(	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+antivirus	O
+applications	O
+or	O
+device	O
+security	O
+settings	O
+)	O
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+can	O
+hide	O
+notifications	O
+from	O
+certain	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+List	O
+of	O
+package	O
+names	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+events	O
+from	O
+which	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+opens	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+window	O
+(	O
+for	O
+the	O
+Russian	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+)	O
+Example	O
+of	O
+Trojan	O
+screen	O
+overlapping	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+When	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+are	O
+entered	O
+in	O
+the	O
+fake	O
+window	O
+,	O
+Riltok	O
+performs	O
+basic	O
+validation	O
+checks	O
+:	O
+card	O
+validity	O
+period	O
+,	O
+number	O
+checksum	O
+,	O
+CVC	O
+length	O
+,	O
+whether	O
+the	O
+number	O
+is	O
+in	O
+the	O
+denylist	O
+sewn	O
+into	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+code	O
+:	O
+Examples	O
+of	O
+phishing	O
+pages	O
+imitating	O
+mobile	O
+banks	O
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+the	O
+functionality	O
+of	O
+most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Western	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Riltok	O
+
+was	O
+somewhat	O
+pared	O
+down	O
+compared	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Russian	O
+one	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+default	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+with	O
+injects	O
+is	O
+non-operational	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+contains	O
+no	O
+fake	O
+built-in	O
+windows	O
+requesting	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+Threats	O
+are	O
+better	O
+prevented	O
+than	O
+cured	O
+,	O
+so	O
+do	O
+not	O
+follow	O
+suspicious	O
+links	O
+in	O
+SMS	O
+,	O
+and	O
+be	O
+sure	O
+to	O
+install	O
+apps	O
+only	O
+from	O
+official	O
+sources	O
+and	O
+check	O
+what	O
+permissions	O
+you	O
+are	O
+granting	O
+during	O
+installation	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+Riltok	B-Malware
+shows	O
+,	O
+cybercriminals	O
+can	O
+apply	O
+the	O
+same	O
+methods	O
+of	O
+infection	O
+to	O
+victims	O
+in	O
+different	O
+countries	O
+with	O
+more	O
+or	O
+less	O
+the	O
+same	O
+success	O
+.	O
+
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+products	O
+detect	O
+the	O
+above-described	O
+threat	O
+with	O
+the	O
+verdict	O
+Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Riltok	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+IoCs	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+100.51.100.00	B-Indicator
+108.62.118.131	B-Indicator
+172.81.134.165	B-Indicator
+172.86.120.207	B-Indicator
+185.212.128.152	B-Indicator
+185.212.128.192	B-Indicator
+185.61.000.108	B-Indicator
+185.61.138.108	B-Indicator
+185.61.138.37	B-Indicator
+188.209.52.101	B-Indicator
+5.206.225.57	B-Indicator
+alr992.date	B-Indicator
+avito-app.pw	B-Indicator
+backfround2.pw	B-Indicator
+background1.xyz	B-Indicator
+blacksolider93.com	B-Indicator
+blass9g087.com	B-Indicator
+brekelter2.com	B-Indicator
+broplar3hf.xyz	B-Indicator
+buy-youla.ru	B-Indicator
+
+cd78cg210xy0.com	B-Indicator
+copsoiteess.com	B-Indicator
+farmatefc93.org	B-Indicator
+firstclinsop.com	B-Indicator
+holebrhuhh3.com	B-Indicator
+holebrhuhh45.com	B-Indicator
+karambga3j.net	B-Indicator
+le22999a.pw	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-bk.top	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-buy.pw	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-cz.info	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-f.pw	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-jp.info	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-kp.top	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-ny.info	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-ql.top	B-Indicator
+leboncoin-tr.info	B-Indicator
+
+myyoula.ru	B-Indicator
+sell-avito.ru	B-Indicator
+sell-youla.ru	B-Indicator
+sentel8ju67.com	B-Indicator
+subito-li.pw	B-Indicator
+subitop.pw	B-Indicator
+web-gumtree.com	B-Indicator
+whitehousejosh.com	B-Indicator
+whitekalgoy3.com	B-Indicator
+youlaprotect.ru	B-Indicator
+Examples	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+0497b6000a7a23e9e9b97472bc2d3799caf49cbbea1627ad4d87ae6e0b7e2a98	B-Indicator
+417fc112cd0610cc8c402742b0baab0a086b5c4164230009e11d34fdeee7d3fa	B-Indicator
+
+54594edbe9055517da2836199600f682dee07e6b405c6fe4b476627e8d184bfe	B-Indicator
+6e995d68c724f121d43ec2ff59bc4e536192360afa3beaec5646f01094f0b745	B-Indicator
+bbc268ca63eeb27e424fec1b3976bab550da304de18e29faff94d9057b1fa25a	B-Indicator
+dc3dd9d75120934333496d0a4100252b419ee8fcdab5d74cf343bcb0306c9811	B-Indicator
+
+e3f77ff093f322e139940b33994c5a57ae010b66668668dc4945142a81bcc049	B-Indicator
+ebd0a8043434edac261cb25b94f417188a5c0d62b5dd4033f156b890d150a4c5	B-Indicator
+f51a27163cb0ddd08caa29d865b9f238848118ba2589626af711330481b352df	B-Indicator
+Tracking	O
+down	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+adware	O
+affecting	O
+
+millions	O
+of	O
+users	O
+24	O
+Oct	O
+2019	O
+-	O
+11:30AM	O
+We	O
+detected	O
+a	O
+large	O
+adware	O
+campaign	O
+running	O
+for	O
+about	O
+a	O
+year	O
+,	O
+with	O
+the	O
+involved	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+eight	O
+million	O
+times	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+alone	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+identified	O
+42	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+as	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+which	O
+had	O
+been	O
+running	O
+since	O
+July	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+Of	O
+those	O
+,	O
+21	O
+were	O
+still	O
+available	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+discovery	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+reported	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Google	O
+security	O
+team	O
+and	O
+they	O
+were	O
+swiftly	O
+removed	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+still	O
+available	O
+in	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+ESET	B-Organization
+detects	O
+this	O
+adware	O
+,	O
+collectively	O
+,	O
+as	O
+Android/AdDisplay.Ashas	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+1	O
+.	O
+
+Apps	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android/AdDisplay.Ashas	B-Malware
+family	O
+reported	O
+to	O
+Google	O
+by	O
+ESET	B-Organization
+Figure	O
+2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+most	O
+popular	O
+member	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android/AdDisplay.Ashas	B-Malware
+family	I-Malware
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+was	O
+“	O
+Video	O
+downloader	O
+master	O
+”	O
+with	O
+over	O
+five	O
+million	O
+downloads	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+functionality	O
+All	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+provide	O
+the	O
+functionality	O
+they	O
+promise	O
+,	O
+besides	O
+working	O
+as	O
+adware	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+adware	O
+functionality	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+in	O
+all	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+we	O
+analyzed	O
+.	O
+
+[	O
+Note	O
+:	O
+The	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+functionality	O
+below	O
+describes	O
+a	O
+single	O
+app	O
+,	O
+but	O
+applies	O
+to	O
+all	O
+apps	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android/AdDisplay.Ashas	B-Malware
+family	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+]	O
+Once	O
+launched	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+starts	O
+to	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+(	O
+whose	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+is	O
+base64-encoded	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+sends	O
+“	O
+home	O
+”	O
+key	O
+data	O
+about	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+:	O
+device	O
+type	O
+,	O
+OS	O
+version	O
+,	O
+language	O
+,	O
+number	O
+of	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+free	O
+storage	O
+space	O
+,	O
+battery	O
+status	O
+,	O
+whether	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+rooted	O
+and	O
+Developer	O
+mode	O
+enabled	O
+,	O
+and	O
+whether	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+and	O
+FB	O
+Messenger	B-System
+are	O
+installed	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+3	O
+.	O
+
+Sending	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+The	O
+app	O
+receives	O
+configuration	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+needed	O
+for	O
+displaying	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+and	O
+for	O
+stealth	O
+and	O
+resilience	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+4	O
+.	O
+
+Configuration	O
+file	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+As	O
+for	O
+stealth	O
+and	O
+resilience	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+tricks	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+whether	O
+it	O
+is	O
+being	O
+tested	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+security	O
+mechanism	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+this	O
+purpose	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+receives	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+the	O
+isGoogleIp	O
+flag	O
+,	O
+which	O
+indicates	O
+whether	O
+the	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+of	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+falls	O
+within	O
+the	O
+range	O
+of	O
+known	O
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+for	O
+Google	O
+servers	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+server	O
+returns	O
+this	O
+flag	O
+as	O
+positive	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+will	O
+not	O
+trigger	O
+the	O
+adware	O
+payload	O
+.	O
+
+Second	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+can	O
+set	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+delay	O
+between	O
+displaying	O
+ads	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+samples	O
+we	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+had	O
+their	O
+configuration	O
+set	O
+to	O
+delay	O
+displaying	O
+the	O
+first	O
+ad	O
+by	O
+24	O
+minutes	O
+after	O
+the	O
+device	O
+unlocks	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+delay	O
+means	O
+that	O
+a	O
+typical	O
+testing	O
+procedure	O
+,	O
+which	O
+takes	O
+less	O
+than	O
+10	O
+minutes	O
+,	O
+will	O
+not	O
+detect	O
+any	O
+unwanted	O
+behavior	O
+.	O
+
+Also	O
+,	O
+the	O
+longer	O
+the	O
+delay	O
+,	O
+the	O
+lower	O
+the	O
+risk	O
+of	O
+the	O
+user	O
+associating	O
+the	O
+unwanted	O
+ads	O
+with	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Third	O
+,	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+server	O
+response	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+can	O
+also	O
+hide	O
+its	O
+icon	O
+and	O
+create	O
+a	O
+shortcut	O
+instead	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+a	O
+typical	O
+user	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+get	O
+rid	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+,	O
+chances	O
+are	O
+that	O
+only	O
+the	O
+shortcut	O
+ends	O
+up	O
+getting	O
+removed	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+then	O
+continues	O
+to	O
+run	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+without	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+knowledge	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+stealth	O
+technique	O
+has	O
+been	O
+gaining	O
+popularity	O
+among	O
+adware-related	O
+threats	O
+distributed	O
+via	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+5	O
+.	O
+
+Time	O
+delay	O
+to	O
+postpone	O
+displaying	O
+ads	O
+implemented	O
+by	O
+the	O
+adware	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+receives	O
+its	O
+configuration	O
+data	O
+,	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+is	O
+ready	O
+to	O
+display	O
+ads	O
+as	O
+per	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+choice	O
+;	O
+each	O
+ad	O
+is	O
+displayed	O
+as	O
+a	O
+full	O
+screen	O
+activity	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+wants	O
+to	O
+check	O
+which	O
+app	O
+is	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+the	O
+ad	O
+being	O
+displayed	O
+,	O
+by	O
+hitting	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Recent	O
+apps	O
+”	O
+button	O
+,	O
+another	O
+trick	O
+is	O
+used	O
+:	O
+the	O
+app	O
+displays	O
+a	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+or	O
+Google	B-Organization
+icon	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+6	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+adware	O
+mimics	O
+these	O
+two	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+look	O
+legitimate	O
+and	O
+avoid	O
+suspicion	O
+–	O
+and	O
+thus	O
+stay	O
+on	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+for	O
+as	O
+long	O
+as	O
+possible	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+6	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+adware	O
+activity	O
+impersonates	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+(	O
+left	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+long-presses	O
+the	O
+icon	O
+,	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+the	O
+activity	O
+is	O
+revealed	O
+(	O
+right	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Finally	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	O
+family	O
+has	O
+its	O
+code	O
+hidden	O
+under	O
+the	O
+com.google.xxx	O
+package	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+trick	O
+–	O
+posing	O
+as	O
+a	O
+part	O
+of	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+Google	B-Organization
+service	O
+–	O
+may	O
+help	O
+avoid	O
+scrutiny	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+detection	O
+mechanisms	O
+and	O
+sandboxes	O
+may	O
+whitelist	O
+such	O
+package	O
+names	O
+,	O
+in	O
+an	O
+effort	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+wasting	O
+resources	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+7	O
+.	O
+
+Malicious	O
+code	O
+hidden	O
+in	O
+a	O
+package	O
+named	O
+“	O
+com.google	O
+”	O
+Hunting	O
+down	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+Using	O
+open-source	O
+information	O
+,	O
+we	O
+tracked	O
+down	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+of	O
+the	O
+adware	O
+,	O
+who	O
+we	O
+also	O
+identified	O
+as	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+’	O
+s	O
+operator	O
+and	O
+owner	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+following	O
+paragraphs	O
+,	O
+we	O
+outline	O
+our	O
+efforts	O
+to	O
+discover	O
+other	O
+applications	O
+from	O
+the	O
+same	O
+developer	O
+and	O
+protect	O
+our	O
+users	O
+from	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+based	O
+on	O
+information	O
+that	O
+is	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+registered	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+domain	O
+,	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+registrant	O
+,	O
+along	O
+with	O
+further	O
+data	O
+like	O
+country	O
+and	O
+email	O
+address	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+8	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+8	O
+.	O
+
+Information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+domain	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	O
+Knowing	O
+that	O
+the	O
+information	O
+provided	O
+to	O
+a	O
+domain	O
+registrar	O
+might	O
+be	O
+fake	O
+,	O
+we	O
+continued	O
+our	O
+search	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+email	O
+address	O
+and	O
+country	O
+information	O
+drove	O
+us	O
+to	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+students	O
+attending	O
+a	O
+class	O
+at	O
+a	O
+Vietnamese	O
+university	O
+–	O
+corroborating	O
+the	O
+existence	O
+of	O
+the	O
+person	O
+under	O
+whose	O
+name	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+was	O
+registered	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+9	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+university	O
+class	O
+student	O
+list	O
+including	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+domain	O
+registrant	O
+Due	O
+to	O
+poor	O
+privacy	O
+practices	O
+on	O
+the	O
+part	O
+of	O
+our	O
+culprit	O
+’	O
+s	O
+university	O
+,	O
+we	O
+now	O
+know	O
+his	O
+date	O
+of	O
+birth	O
+(	O
+probably	O
+:	O
+he	O
+seemingly	O
+used	O
+his	O
+birth	O
+year	O
+as	O
+part	O
+of	O
+his	O
+Gmail	B-System
+address	O
+,	O
+as	O
+further	O
+partial	O
+confirmation	O
+)	O
+,	O
+we	O
+know	O
+that	O
+he	O
+was	O
+a	O
+student	O
+and	O
+what	O
+university	O
+he	O
+attended	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+were	O
+also	O
+able	O
+to	O
+confirm	O
+that	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+he	O
+provided	O
+to	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+registrar	O
+was	O
+genuine	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+we	O
+retrieved	O
+his	O
+University	O
+ID	O
+;	O
+a	O
+quick	O
+googling	O
+showed	O
+some	O
+of	O
+his	O
+exam	O
+grades	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+his	O
+study	O
+results	O
+are	O
+out	O
+of	O
+the	O
+scope	O
+of	O
+our	O
+research	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+our	O
+culprit	O
+’	O
+s	O
+email	O
+address	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+find	O
+his	O
+GitHub	B-Organization
+repository	O
+.	O
+
+His	O
+repository	O
+proves	O
+that	O
+he	O
+is	O
+indeed	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+developer	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+contained	O
+no	O
+publicly	O
+available	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+of	O
+this	O
+blogpost	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+Google	B-Organization
+search	O
+for	O
+the	O
+adware	O
+package	O
+name	O
+returned	O
+a	O
+“	O
+TestDelete	O
+”	O
+project	O
+that	O
+had	O
+been	O
+available	O
+in	O
+his	O
+repository	O
+at	O
+some	O
+point	O
+The	O
+malicious	O
+developer	O
+also	O
+has	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+App	B-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+them	O
+are	O
+iOS	B-System
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+ones	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+but	O
+none	O
+contain	O
+adware	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+10	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+developer	O
+’	O
+s	O
+apps	O
+published	O
+on	O
+the	O
+App	O
+Store	O
+which	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+contain	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	O
+Searching	O
+further	O
+for	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+developer	O
+’	O
+s	O
+activities	O
+,	O
+we	O
+also	O
+discovered	O
+his	O
+Youtube	B-System
+channel	O
+propagating	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	O
+and	O
+his	O
+other	O
+projects	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+for	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+family	O
+,	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+associated	O
+promotional	O
+videos	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Head	O
+Soccer	O
+World	O
+Champion	O
+2018	O
+–	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+ios	B-System
+”	O
+was	O
+viewed	O
+almost	O
+three	O
+million	O
+times	O
+and	O
+two	O
+others	O
+reached	O
+hundreds	O
+of	O
+thousands	O
+of	O
+views	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+11	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+11	O
+.	O
+
+YouTube	B-System
+channel	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+developer	O
+His	O
+YouTube	B-System
+channel	O
+provided	O
+us	O
+with	O
+another	O
+valuable	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+information	O
+:	O
+he	O
+himself	O
+features	O
+in	O
+a	O
+video	O
+tutorial	O
+for	O
+one	O
+of	O
+his	O
+other	O
+projects	O
+.	O
+
+Thanks	O
+to	O
+that	O
+project	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+extract	O
+his	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+profile	O
+–	O
+which	O
+lists	O
+his	O
+studies	O
+at	O
+the	O
+aforementioned	O
+university	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+12	O
+.	O
+
+Facebook	B-Organization
+profile	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+domain	O
+registrar	O
+(	O
+cover	O
+picture	O
+and	O
+profile	O
+picture	O
+edited	O
+out	O
+)	O
+Linked	O
+on	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+developer	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+profile	O
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+page	O
+,	O
+Minigameshouse	B-Indicator
+,	O
+and	O
+an	O
+associated	O
+domain	O
+,	O
+minigameshouse	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+domain	O
+is	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+the	O
+one	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+author	O
+used	O
+for	O
+his	O
+adware	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+communication	O
+,	O
+minigameshouse	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+us	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Checking	O
+this	O
+Minigameshouse	B-Indicator
+page	O
+further	O
+indicates	O
+that	O
+this	O
+person	O
+is	O
+indeed	O
+the	O
+owner	O
+of	O
+the	O
+minigameshouse	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+us	I-Indicator
+domain	I-Indicator
+:	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+registered	O
+with	O
+this	O
+domain	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+as	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+appearing	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+page	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+13	O
+.	O
+
+Facebook	B-Organization
+page	O
+managed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+domain	O
+registrant	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+same	O
+base	O
+domain	O
+name	O
+(	O
+minigameshouse	O
+)	O
+and	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+as	O
+the	O
+registered	O
+malicious	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	O
+Of	O
+interest	O
+is	O
+that	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Minigameshouse	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+page	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+developer	O
+promotes	O
+a	O
+slew	O
+of	O
+games	O
+beyond	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+family	O
+for	O
+download	O
+on	O
+both	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+and	O
+the	O
+App	B-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+all	O
+of	O
+those	O
+have	O
+been	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+–	O
+despite	O
+the	O
+fact	O
+that	O
+some	O
+of	O
+them	O
+didn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+contain	O
+any	O
+adware	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+top	O
+of	O
+all	O
+this	O
+,	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+developer	O
+’	O
+s	O
+YouTube	B-System
+videos	O
+–	O
+a	O
+tutorial	O
+on	O
+developing	O
+an	O
+“	O
+Instant	O
+Game	O
+”	O
+for	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+–	O
+serves	O
+as	O
+an	O
+example	O
+of	O
+operational	O
+security	O
+completely	O
+ignored	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+see	O
+that	O
+his	O
+recently	O
+visited	O
+web	O
+sites	O
+were	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+pages	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+apps	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+He	O
+also	O
+used	O
+his	O
+email	O
+account	O
+to	O
+log	O
+into	O
+various	O
+services	O
+in	O
+the	O
+video	O
+,	O
+which	O
+identifies	O
+him	O
+as	O
+the	O
+adware	O
+domain	O
+owner	O
+,	O
+beyond	O
+any	O
+doubt	O
+.	O
+
+Thanks	O
+to	O
+the	O
+video	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+even	O
+able	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+three	O
+further	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+contained	O
+adware	O
+functionality	O
+and	O
+were	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+14	O
+.	O
+
+Screenshots	O
+from	O
+this	O
+developer	O
+’	O
+s	O
+YouTube	B-System
+video	O
+shows	O
+history	O
+of	O
+checking	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+ESET	B-Organization
+telemetry	O
+Figure	O
+15	O
+.	O
+
+ESET	B-Organization
+detections	O
+of	O
+Android/AdDisplay.Ashas	B-Malware
+on	O
+Android	O
+devices	O
+by	O
+country	O
+Is	O
+adware	O
+harmful	O
+?	O
+
+Because	O
+the	O
+real	O
+nature	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+containing	O
+adware	O
+is	O
+usually	O
+hidden	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+,	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+their	O
+developers	O
+should	O
+be	O
+considered	O
+untrustworthy	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+,	O
+apps	O
+containing	O
+adware	O
+may	O
+,	O
+among	O
+other	O
+things	O
+:	O
+Annoy	O
+users	O
+with	O
+intrusive	O
+advertisements	O
+,	O
+including	O
+scam	O
+ads	O
+Waste	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+battery	O
+resources	O
+Generate	O
+increased	O
+network	O
+traffic	O
+Gather	O
+users	O
+’	O
+personal	O
+information	O
+Hide	O
+their	O
+presence	O
+on	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+persistence	O
+Generate	O
+revenue	O
+for	O
+their	O
+operator	O
+without	O
+any	O
+user	O
+interaction	O
+Conclusion	O
+Based	O
+solely	O
+on	O
+open	O
+source	O
+intelligence	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+trace	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Ashas	B-Malware
+adware	O
+and	O
+establish	O
+his	O
+identity	O
+and	O
+discover	O
+additional	O
+related	O
+adware-infected	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Seeing	O
+that	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+did	O
+not	O
+take	O
+any	O
+measures	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+his	O
+identity	O
+,	O
+it	O
+seems	O
+likely	O
+that	O
+his	O
+intentions	O
+weren	O
+’	O
+t	O
+dishonest	O
+at	O
+first	O
+–	O
+and	O
+this	O
+is	O
+also	O
+supported	O
+by	O
+the	O
+fact	O
+that	O
+not	O
+all	O
+his	O
+published	O
+apps	O
+contained	O
+unwanted	O
+ads	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+some	O
+point	O
+in	O
+his	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+“	O
+career	O
+”	O
+,	O
+he	O
+apparently	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+increase	O
+his	O
+ad	O
+revenue	O
+by	O
+implementing	O
+adware	O
+functionality	O
+in	O
+his	O
+apps	O
+’	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+various	O
+stealth	O
+and	O
+resilience	O
+techniques	O
+implemented	O
+in	O
+the	O
+adware	O
+show	O
+us	O
+that	O
+the	O
+culprit	O
+was	O
+aware	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+nature	O
+of	O
+the	O
+added	O
+functionality	O
+and	O
+attempted	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+it	O
+hidden	O
+.	O
+
+Sneaking	O
+unwanted	O
+or	O
+harmful	O
+functionality	O
+into	O
+popular	O
+,	O
+benign	O
+apps	O
+is	O
+a	O
+common	O
+practice	O
+among	O
+“	O
+bad	O
+”	O
+developers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+we	O
+are	O
+committed	O
+to	O
+tracking	O
+down	O
+such	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+report	O
+them	O
+to	O
+Google	B-Organization
+and	O
+take	O
+other	O
+steps	O
+to	O
+disrupt	O
+malicious	O
+campaigns	O
+we	O
+discover	O
+.	O
+
+Last	O
+but	O
+not	O
+least	O
+,	O
+we	O
+publish	O
+our	O
+findings	O
+to	O
+help	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+protect	O
+themselves	O
+.	O
+
+MITRE	B-Organization
+ATT	O
+&	O
+CK	O
+techniques	O
+Tactic	O
+ID	O
+Name	O
+Description	O
+Initial	O
+Access	O
+T1475	O
+Deliver	O
+Malicious	O
+App	O
+via	O
+Authorized	O
+App	O
+Store	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+impersonates	O
+legitimate	O
+services	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Persistence	O
+T1402	O
+App	O
+Auto-Start	O
+at	O
+Device	O
+Boot	O
+An	O
+Android	O
+application	O
+can	O
+listen	O
+for	O
+the	O
+BOOT_COMPLETED	O
+broadcast	O
+,	O
+ensuring	O
+that	O
+the	O
+app	O
+'s	O
+functionality	O
+will	O
+be	O
+activated	O
+every	O
+time	O
+the	O
+device	O
+starts	O
+Impact	O
+T1472	O
+Generate	O
+Fraudulent	O
+Advertising	O
+Revenue	O
+Generates	O
+revenue	O
+by	O
+automatically	O
+displaying	O
+ads	O
+The	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+mobile	O
+Trojan	O
+–	O
+banker	O
+and	O
+ransomware	O
+22	O
+NOV	O
+2018	O
+On	O
+
+the	O
+back	O
+of	O
+a	O
+surge	O
+in	O
+Trojan	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+we	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+carry	O
+out	O
+an	O
+in-depth	O
+analysis	O
+and	O
+track	O
+the	O
+evolution	O
+of	O
+some	O
+other	O
+popular	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+besides	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+interesting	O
+and	O
+active	O
+specimens	O
+to	O
+date	O
+was	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+Trojan	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+family	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+a	O
+three-month	O
+period	O
+from	O
+August	O
+to	O
+October	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+it	O
+launched	O
+over	O
+70,000	O
+attacks	O
+against	O
+users	O
+located	O
+primarily	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+interesting	O
+feature	O
+of	O
+this	O
+family	O
+of	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+is	O
+the	O
+simultaneous	O
+use	O
+of	O
+three	O
+command	O
+sources	O
+:	O
+Google	O
+Cloud	O
+Messaging	O
+(	O
+GCM	O
+)	O
+service	O
+–	O
+used	O
+to	O
+send	O
+small	O
+messages	O
+in	O
+JSON	O
+format	O
+to	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+via	O
+Google	O
+servers	O
+;	O
+malicious	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+;	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+‘	O
+versatility	O
+’	O
+was	O
+present	O
+in	O
+the	O
+first	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+and	O
+has	O
+been	O
+a	O
+feature	O
+of	O
+all	O
+the	O
+family	O
+’	O
+s	O
+subsequent	O
+representatives	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+our	O
+research	O
+we	O
+also	O
+arrived	O
+at	O
+the	O
+conclusion	O
+that	O
+this	O
+Trojan	O
+evolved	O
+from	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+spyware	O
+Trojan	O
+that	O
+was	O
+first	O
+spotted	O
+in	O
+October	O
+2014	O
+.	O
+
+Back	O
+then	O
+it	O
+was	O
+detected	O
+as	O
+Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.SmsThief	B-Malware
+,	O
+but	O
+later	O
+versions	O
+were	O
+assigned	O
+to	O
+another	O
+family	O
+–	O
+Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rotexy	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+modern	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+combines	O
+the	O
+functions	O
+of	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+and	O
+ransomware	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+spreads	O
+under	O
+the	O
+name	O
+AvitoPay.apk	B-Indicator
+(	O
+or	O
+similar	O
+)	O
+and	O
+downloads	O
+from	O
+websites	O
+with	O
+names	O
+like	O
+youla9d6h.tk	B-Indicator
+,	O
+prodam8n9.tk	B-Indicator
+,	O
+prodamfkz.ml	B-Indicator
+,	O
+avitoe0ys.tk	B-Indicator
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+website	O
+names	O
+are	O
+generated	O
+according	O
+to	O
+a	O
+clear	O
+algorithm	O
+:	O
+the	O
+first	O
+few	O
+letters	O
+are	O
+suggestive	O
+of	O
+popular	O
+classified	O
+ad	O
+services	O
+,	O
+followed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+random	O
+string	O
+of	O
+characters	O
+,	O
+followed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+two-letter	O
+top-level	O
+domain	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+before	O
+we	O
+go	O
+into	O
+the	O
+details	O
+of	O
+what	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+can	O
+do	O
+and	O
+why	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+distinctive	O
+,	O
+we	O
+would	O
+like	O
+to	O
+give	O
+a	O
+summary	O
+of	O
+the	O
+path	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+has	O
+taken	O
+since	O
+2014	O
+up	O
+to	O
+the	O
+present	O
+day	O
+.	O
+
+Evolution	O
+of	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+2014��2015	O
+Since	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+program	O
+was	O
+detected	O
+in	O
+2014	O
+,	O
+its	O
+main	O
+functions	O
+and	O
+propagation	O
+method	O
+have	O
+not	O
+changed	O
+:	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+spreads	O
+via	O
+links	O
+sent	O
+in	O
+phishing	O
+SMSs	O
+that	O
+prompt	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+install	O
+an	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+it	O
+launches	O
+,	O
+it	O
+requests	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+rights	O
+,	O
+and	O
+then	O
+starts	O
+communicating	O
+with	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Until	O
+mid-2015	O
+,	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+used	O
+a	O
+plain-text	O
+JSON	O
+format	O
+to	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+address	O
+was	O
+specified	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+and	O
+was	O
+also	O
+unencrypted	O
+:	O
+In	O
+some	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+a	O
+dynamically	O
+generated	O
+low-level	O
+domain	O
+was	O
+used	O
+as	O
+an	O
+address	O
+:	O
+In	O
+its	O
+first	O
+communication	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+sent	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+IMEI	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+and	O
+in	O
+return	O
+it	O
+received	O
+a	O
+set	O
+of	O
+rules	O
+for	O
+processing	O
+incoming	O
+SMSs	O
+(	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+,	O
+keywords	O
+and	O
+regular	O
+expressions	O
+)	O
+–	O
+these	O
+applied	O
+mainly	O
+to	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+banks	O
+,	O
+payment	O
+systems	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+network	O
+operators	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+instance	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+could	O
+automatically	O
+reply	O
+to	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+immediately	O
+delete	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+then	O
+sent	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+smartphone	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+model	O
+,	O
+number	O
+,	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+network	O
+operator	O
+,	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+and	O
+IMEI	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+each	O
+subsequent	O
+request	O
+,	O
+a	O
+new	O
+subdomain	O
+was	O
+generated	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+algorithm	O
+for	O
+generating	O
+the	O
+lowest-level	O
+domain	O
+name	O
+was	O
+hardwired	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+also	O
+registered	O
+in	O
+Google	B-System
+Cloud	I-System
+Messaging	I-System
+(	I-System
+GCM	I-System
+)	I-System
+,	O
+meaning	O
+it	O
+could	O
+then	O
+receive	O
+commands	O
+via	O
+that	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+’	O
+s	O
+list	O
+of	O
+possible	O
+commands	O
+has	O
+remained	O
+practically	O
+unchanged	O
+throughout	O
+its	O
+life	O
+,	O
+and	O
+will	O
+be	O
+described	O
+below	O
+in	O
+detail	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+’	O
+s	O
+assets	O
+folder	O
+contained	O
+the	O
+file	O
+data.db	B-Indicator
+with	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+possible	O
+values	O
+for	O
+the	O
+User-Agent	O
+field	O
+for	O
+the	O
+PAGE	O
+command	O
+(	O
+which	O
+downloads	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+webpage	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+value	O
+of	O
+this	O
+field	O
+failed	O
+to	O
+arrive	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+it	O
+was	O
+selected	O
+from	O
+the	O
+file	O
+data.db	B-Indicator
+using	O
+a	O
+pseudo-random	O
+algorithm	O
+.	O
+
+2015–2016	O
+Starting	O
+from	O
+mid-2015	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+began	O
+using	O
+the	O
+AES	O
+algorithm	O
+to	O
+encrypt	O
+data	O
+communicated	O
+between	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+and	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+:	O
+Also	O
+starting	O
+with	O
+the	O
+same	O
+version	O
+,	O
+data	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+in	O
+a	O
+POST	O
+request	O
+to	O
+the	O
+relative	O
+address	O
+with	O
+the	O
+format	O
+“	O
+/	O
+[	O
+number	O
+]	O
+”	O
+(	O
+a	O
+pseudo-randomly	O
+generated	O
+number	O
+in	O
+the	O
+range	O
+0–9999	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+samples	O
+,	O
+starting	O
+from	O
+January	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+an	O
+algorithm	O
+has	O
+been	O
+implemented	O
+for	O
+unpacking	O
+the	O
+encrypted	O
+executable	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+from	O
+the	O
+assets	O
+folder	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+,	O
+dynamic	O
+generation	O
+of	O
+lowest-level	O
+domains	O
+was	O
+not	O
+used	O
+.	O
+
+2016	O
+From	O
+mid-2016	O
+on	O
+,	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+returned	O
+to	O
+dynamic	O
+generation	O
+of	O
+lowest-level	O
+domains	O
+.	O
+
+No	O
+other	O
+significant	O
+changes	O
+were	O
+observed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+’	O
+s	O
+network	O
+behavior	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+late	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+emerged	O
+that	O
+contained	O
+the	O
+card.html	B-Indicator
+phishing	O
+page	O
+in	O
+the	O
+assets/www	B-Indicator
+folder	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+page	O
+was	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+users	O
+’	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+:	O
+2017–2018	O
+From	O
+early	O
+2017	O
+,	O
+the	O
+HTML	O
+phishing	O
+pages	O
+bank.html	B-Indicator
+,	O
+update.html	B-Indicator
+and	O
+extortionist.html	B-Indicator
+started	O
+appearing	O
+in	O
+the	O
+assets	O
+folder	O
+.	O
+
+Also	O
+,	O
+in	O
+some	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+the	O
+file	O
+names	O
+were	O
+random	O
+strings	O
+of	O
+characters	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+emerged	O
+that	O
+contacted	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+using	O
+its	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+‘	O
+One-time	O
+’	O
+domains	O
+also	O
+appeared	O
+with	O
+names	O
+made	O
+up	O
+of	O
+random	O
+strings	O
+of	O
+characters	O
+and	O
+numbers	O
+,	O
+combined	O
+with	O
+the	O
+top-level	O
+domains	O
+.cf	O
+,	O
+.ga	O
+,	O
+.gq	O
+,	O
+.ml	O
+,	O
+or	O
+.tk	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+this	O
+time	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+also	O
+began	O
+actively	O
+using	O
+different	O
+methods	O
+of	O
+obfuscation	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+is	O
+packed	O
+with	O
+garbage	O
+strings	O
+and/or	O
+operations	O
+,	O
+and	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+key	O
+to	O
+decipher	O
+the	O
+main	O
+executable	O
+file	O
+from	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+.	O
+
+Latest	O
+version	O
+(	O
+2018	O
+)	O
+Let	O
+’	O
+s	O
+now	O
+return	O
+to	O
+the	O
+present	O
+day	O
+and	O
+a	O
+detailed	O
+description	O
+of	O
+the	O
+functionality	O
+of	O
+a	O
+current	O
+representative	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+family	O
+(	O
+SHA256	O
+:	O
+ba4beb97f5d4ba33162f769f43ec8e7d1ae501acdade792a4a577cd6449e1a84	B-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Application	O
+launch	O
+When	O
+launching	O
+for	O
+the	O
+first	O
+time	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+checks	O
+if	O
+it	O
+is	O
+being	O
+launched	O
+in	O
+an	O
+emulation	O
+environment	O
+,	O
+and	O
+in	O
+which	O
+country	O
+it	O
+is	O
+being	O
+launched	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+located	O
+outside	O
+Russia	O
+or	O
+is	O
+an	O
+emulator	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+displays	O
+a	O
+stub	O
+page	O
+:	O
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+’	O
+s	O
+logs	O
+contain	O
+records	O
+in	O
+Russian	O
+with	O
+grammatical	O
+errors	O
+and	O
+spelling	O
+mistakes	O
+:	O
+If	O
+the	O
+check	O
+is	O
+successful	O
+,	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+registers	O
+with	O
+GCM	B-System
+and	O
+launches	O
+SuperService	O
+which	O
+tracks	O
+if	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+has	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+SuperService	O
+also	O
+tracks	O
+its	O
+own	O
+status	O
+and	O
+relaunches	O
+if	O
+stopped	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+performs	O
+a	O
+privilege	O
+check	O
+once	O
+every	O
+second	O
+;	O
+if	O
+unavailable	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+starts	O
+requesting	O
+them	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+in	O
+an	O
+infinite	O
+loop	O
+:	O
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+agrees	O
+and	O
+gives	O
+the	O
+application	O
+the	O
+requested	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+another	O
+stub	O
+page	O
+is	O
+displayed	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+app	O
+hides	O
+its	O
+icon	O
+:	O
+If	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+detects	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+revoke	O
+its	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+it	O
+starts	O
+periodically	O
+switching	O
+off	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+screen	O
+,	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+stop	O
+the	O
+user	O
+actions	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+privileges	O
+are	O
+revoked	O
+successfully	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+relaunches	O
+the	O
+cycle	O
+of	O
+requesting	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+,	O
+for	O
+some	O
+reason	O
+,	O
+SuperService	O
+does	O
+not	O
+switch	O
+off	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+when	O
+there	O
+is	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+revoke	O
+the	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+intimidate	O
+the	O
+user	O
+:	O
+While	O
+running	O
+,	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+tracks	O
+the	O
+following	O
+:	O
+switching	O
+on	O
+and	O
+rebooting	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+;	O
+termination	O
+of	O
+its	O
+operation	O
+–	O
+in	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+it	O
+relaunches	O
+;	O
+sending	O
+of	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+by	O
+the	O
+app	O
+–	O
+in	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+is	O
+switched	O
+to	O
+silent	O
+mode	O
+.	O
+
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+communications	O
+The	O
+default	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+address	O
+is	O
+hardwired	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+code	O
+:	O
+The	O
+relative	O
+address	O
+to	O
+which	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+send	O
+information	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+generated	O
+in	O
+a	O
+pseudo-random	O
+manner	O
+.	O
+
+Depending	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+version	O
+,	O
+dynamically	O
+generated	O
+subdomains	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+used	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+stores	O
+information	O
+about	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+servers	O
+and	O
+the	O
+data	O
+harvested	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+in	O
+a	O
+local	O
+SQLite	O
+database	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+off	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+registers	O
+in	O
+the	O
+administration	O
+panel	O
+and	O
+receives	O
+the	O
+information	O
+it	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+operate	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+(	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+interception	O
+templates	O
+and	O
+the	O
+text	O
+that	O
+will	O
+be	O
+displayed	O
+on	O
+HTML	O
+pages	O
+)	O
+:	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+intercepts	O
+all	O
+incoming	O
+SMSs	O
+and	O
+processes	O
+them	O
+according	O
+to	O
+the	O
+templates	O
+it	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+Also	O
+,	O
+when	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+arrives	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+puts	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+into	O
+silent	O
+mode	O
+and	O
+switches	O
+off	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+so	O
+the	O
+user	O
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+notice	O
+that	O
+a	O
+new	O
+SMS	O
+has	O
+arrived	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+required	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+sends	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+to	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+with	O
+the	O
+information	O
+it	O
+has	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+intercepted	O
+message	O
+.	O
+
+(	O
+It	O
+is	O
+specified	O
+in	O
+the	O
+interception	O
+template	O
+whether	O
+a	O
+reply	O
+must	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+,	O
+and	O
+which	O
+text	O
+should	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+which	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+If	O
+the	O
+application	O
+hasn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+received	O
+instructions	O
+about	O
+the	O
+rules	O
+for	O
+processing	O
+incoming	O
+SMSs	O
+,	O
+it	O
+simply	O
+saves	O
+all	O
+SMSs	O
+to	O
+a	O
+local	O
+database	O
+and	O
+uploads	O
+them	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+Apart	O
+from	O
+general	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+sends	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+the	O
+running	O
+processes	O
+and	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+possible	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+use	O
+this	O
+list	O
+to	O
+find	O
+running	O
+antivirus	O
+or	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+will	O
+perform	O
+further	O
+actions	O
+after	O
+it	O
+receives	O
+the	O
+corresponding	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+START	O
+,	O
+STOP	O
+,	O
+RESTART	O
+—	O
+start	O
+,	O
+stop	O
+,	O
+restart	O
+SuperService	O
+.	O
+
+URL	O
+—	O
+update	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+MESSAGE	O
+–	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+containing	O
+specified	O
+text	O
+to	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+UPDATE_PATTERNS	O
+–	O
+reregister	O
+in	O
+the	O
+administration	O
+panel	O
+.	O
+
+UNBLOCK	O
+–	O
+unblock	O
+the	O
+telephone	O
+(	O
+revoke	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+from	O
+the	O
+app	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+UPDATE	O
+–	O
+download	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+and	O
+install	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+command	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+not	O
+just	O
+to	O
+update	O
+the	O
+app	O
+but	O
+to	O
+install	O
+any	O
+other	O
+software	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+CONTACTS	O
+–	O
+send	O
+text	O
+received	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+to	O
+all	O
+user	O
+contacts	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+most	O
+probably	O
+how	O
+the	O
+application	O
+spreads	O
+.	O
+
+CONTACTS_PRO	O
+–	O
+request	O
+unique	O
+message	O
+text	O
+for	O
+contacts	O
+from	O
+the	O
+address	O
+book	O
+.	O
+
+PAGE	O
+–	O
+contact	O
+URL	O
+received	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+using	O
+User-Agent	O
+value	O
+that	O
+was	O
+also	O
+received	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+or	O
+local	O
+database	O
+.	O
+
+ALLMSG	O
+–	O
+send	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+all	O
+SMSs	O
+received	O
+and	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+user	O
+,	O
+as	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+phone	O
+memory	O
+.	O
+
+ALLCONTACTS	O
+–	O
+send	O
+all	O
+contacts	O
+from	O
+phone	O
+memory	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+ONLINE	O
+–	O
+send	O
+information	O
+about	O
+Trojan	O
+’	O
+s	O
+current	O
+status	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+:	O
+whether	O
+it	O
+has	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+which	O
+HTML	O
+page	O
+is	O
+currently	O
+displayed	O
+,	O
+whether	O
+screen	O
+is	O
+on	O
+or	O
+off	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+NEWMSG	O
+–	O
+write	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+to	O
+the	O
+device	O
+memory	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+text	O
+and	O
+sender	O
+number	O
+sent	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+CHANGE_GCM_ID	O
+–	O
+change	O
+GCM	O
+ID	O
+.	O
+
+BLOCKER_BANKING_START	O
+–	O
+display	O
+phishing	O
+HTML	O
+page	O
+for	O
+entry	O
+of	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+.	O
+
+BLOCKER_EXTORTIONIST_START	O
+–	O
+display	O
+HTML	O
+page	O
+of	O
+the	O
+ransomware	O
+.	O
+
+BLOCKER_UPDATE_START	O
+–	O
+display	O
+fake	O
+HTML	O
+page	O
+for	O
+update	O
+.	O
+
+BLOCKER_STOP	O
+–	O
+block	O
+display	O
+of	O
+all	O
+HTML	O
+pages	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+role	O
+for	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+can	O
+be	O
+filled	O
+not	O
+only	O
+by	O
+a	O
+web	O
+server	O
+but	O
+also	O
+by	O
+any	O
+device	O
+that	O
+can	O
+send	O
+SMSs	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+intercepts	O
+incoming	O
+SMSs	O
+and	O
+can	O
+receive	O
+the	O
+following	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+them	O
+:	O
+“	O
+3458	O
+”	O
+—	O
+revoke	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+from	O
+the	O
+app	O
+;	O
+“	O
+hi	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+ask	O
+”	O
+—	O
+enable	O
+and	O
+disable	O
+mobile	O
+internet	O
+;	O
+“	O
+privet	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+ru	O
+”	O
+—	O
+enable	O
+and	O
+disable	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+;	O
+“	O
+check	O
+”	O
+—	O
+send	O
+text	O
+“	O
+install	O
+:	O
+[	O
+device	O
+IMEI	O
+]	O
+”	O
+to	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+from	O
+which	O
+SMS	O
+was	O
+sent	O
+;	O
+“	O
+stop_blocker	O
+”	O
+—	O
+stop	O
+displaying	O
+all	O
+blocking	O
+HTML	O
+pages	O
+;	O
+“	O
+393838	O
+”	O
+—	O
+change	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+address	O
+to	O
+that	O
+specified	O
+in	O
+the	O
+
+SMS	O
+.	O
+
+Information	O
+about	O
+all	O
+actions	O
+performed	O
+by	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+is	O
+logged	O
+in	O
+the	O
+local	O
+database	O
+and	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+server	O
+then	O
+sends	O
+a	O
+reply	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+instructions	O
+on	O
+further	O
+actions	O
+to	O
+be	O
+taken	O
+.	O
+
+Displaying	O
+HTML	O
+pages	O
+We	O
+’	O
+ll	O
+now	O
+look	O
+at	O
+the	O
+HTML	O
+pages	O
+that	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+displays	O
+and	O
+the	O
+actions	O
+performed	O
+with	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+displays	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+HTML	O
+update	O
+page	O
+(	O
+update.html	B-Indicator
+)	O
+that	O
+blocks	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+screen	O
+for	O
+a	O
+long	O
+period	O
+of	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+displays	O
+the	O
+extortion	O
+page	O
+(	O
+extortionist.html	B-Indicator
+)	O
+that	O
+blocks	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+demands	O
+a	O
+ransom	O
+for	O
+unblocking	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+sexually	O
+explicit	O
+images	O
+in	O
+this	O
+screenshot	O
+have	O
+been	O
+covered	O
+with	O
+a	O
+black	O
+box	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+displays	O
+a	O
+phishing	O
+page	O
+(	O
+bank.html	B-Indicator
+)	O
+prompting	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+enter	O
+their	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+page	O
+mimics	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+bank	O
+form	O
+and	O
+blocks	O
+the	O
+device	O
+screen	O
+until	O
+the	O
+user	O
+enters	O
+all	O
+the	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+even	O
+has	O
+its	O
+own	O
+virtual	O
+keyboard	O
+that	O
+supposedly	O
+protects	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+from	O
+keyloggers	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+areas	O
+marked	O
+‘	O
+{	O
+text	O
+}	O
+’	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+displays	O
+the	O
+text	O
+it	O
+receives	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+Typically	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+a	O
+message	O
+saying	O
+that	O
+the	O
+user	O
+has	O
+received	O
+a	O
+money	O
+transfer	O
+,	O
+and	O
+that	O
+they	O
+must	O
+enter	O
+their	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+so	O
+the	O
+money	O
+can	O
+be	O
+transferred	O
+to	O
+their	O
+account	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+entered	O
+data	O
+is	O
+then	O
+checked	O
+and	O
+the	O
+last	O
+four	O
+digits	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+number	O
+are	O
+also	O
+checked	O
+against	O
+the	O
+data	O
+sent	O
+in	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+command	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+scenario	O
+may	O
+play	O
+out	O
+:	O
+according	O
+to	O
+the	O
+templates	O
+for	O
+processing	O
+incoming	O
+SMSs	O
+,	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+intercepts	O
+a	O
+message	O
+from	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+last	O
+four	O
+digits	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+connected	O
+to	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+sends	O
+these	O
+digits	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+which	O
+in	O
+turn	O
+sends	O
+a	O
+command	O
+to	O
+display	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+data	O
+entry	O
+window	O
+to	O
+check	O
+the	O
+four	O
+digits	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+has	O
+provided	O
+the	O
+details	O
+of	O
+another	O
+card	O
+,	O
+then	O
+the	O
+following	O
+window	O
+is	O
+displayed	O
+:	O
+The	O
+application	O
+leaves	O
+the	O
+user	O
+with	O
+almost	O
+no	O
+option	O
+but	O
+to	O
+enter	O
+the	O
+correct	O
+card	O
+number	O
+,	O
+as	O
+it	O
+checks	O
+the	O
+entered	O
+number	O
+against	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+received	O
+earlier	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+all	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+card	O
+details	O
+are	O
+entered	O
+and	O
+have	O
+been	O
+checked	O
+,	O
+all	O
+the	O
+information	O
+is	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+to	O
+unblock	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+Now	O
+for	O
+some	O
+good	O
+news	O
+:	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+have	O
+a	O
+very	O
+well-designed	O
+module	O
+for	O
+processing	O
+commands	O
+that	O
+arrive	O
+in	O
+SMSs	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+means	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+can	O
+be	O
+unblocked	O
+in	O
+some	O
+cases	O
+when	O
+it	O
+has	O
+been	O
+blocked	O
+by	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+above	O
+HTML	O
+pages	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+done	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+“	O
+3458	O
+”	O
+in	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+to	O
+the	O
+blocked	O
+device	O
+–	O
+this	O
+will	O
+revoke	O
+the	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+that	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+necessary	O
+to	O
+send	O
+“	O
+stop_blocker	O
+”	O
+to	O
+the	O
+same	O
+number	O
+–	O
+this	O
+will	O
+disable	O
+the	O
+display	O
+of	O
+HTML	O
+pages	O
+that	O
+extort	O
+money	O
+and	O
+block	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+.	O
+
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+may	O
+start	O
+requesting	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+again	O
+in	O
+an	O
+infinite	O
+loop	O
+;	O
+in	O
+that	O
+case	O
+,	O
+restart	O
+the	O
+device	O
+in	O
+safe	O
+mode	O
+and	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+program	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+this	O
+method	O
+may	O
+not	O
+work	O
+if	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+react	O
+quickly	O
+to	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+that	O
+case	O
+,	O
+you	O
+first	O
+need	O
+to	O
+send	O
+the	O
+text	O
+“	O
+393838	O
+”	O
+in	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+to	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+and	O
+then	O
+repeat	O
+all	O
+the	O
+actions	O
+described	O
+above	O
+;	O
+that	O
+text	O
+message	O
+will	O
+change	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+address	O
+to	O
+“	O
+:	O
+//	O
+”	O
+,	O
+so	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+will	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+receive	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+real	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+Please	O
+note	O
+that	O
+these	O
+unblocking	O
+instructions	O
+are	O
+based	O
+on	O
+an	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+current	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+and	O
+have	O
+been	O
+tested	O
+on	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+possible	O
+the	O
+set	O
+of	O
+commands	O
+may	O
+change	O
+in	O
+future	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Geography	O
+of	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+attacks	O
+According	O
+to	O
+our	O
+data	O
+,	O
+98	O
+%	O
+of	O
+all	O
+Rotexy	B-Malware
+attacks	O
+target	O
+users	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+Indeed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+explicitly	O
+targets	O
+Russian-speaking	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+have	O
+also	O
+been	O
+cases	O
+of	O
+users	O
+in	O
+Ukraine	O
+,	O
+Germany	O
+,	O
+Turkey	O
+and	O
+several	O
+other	O
+countries	O
+being	O
+affected	O
+.	O
+
+Kaspersky	B-System
+Internet	I-System
+Security	I-System
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+the	O
+Sberbank	B-System
+Online	I-System
+app	I-System
+securely	O
+protect	O
+users	O
+against	O
+attacks	O
+by	O
+this	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+IOCs	O
+SHA256	O
+0ca09d4fde9e00c0987de44ae2ad51a01b3c4c2c11606fe8308a083805760ee7	B-Indicator
+4378f3680ff070a1316663880f47eba54510beaeb2d897e7bbb8d6b45de63f96	B-Indicator
+76c9d8226ce558c87c81236a9b95112b83c7b546863e29b88fec4dba5c720c0b	B-Indicator
+7cc2d8d43093c3767c7c73dc2b4daeb96f70a7c455299e0c7824b4210edd6386	B-Indicator
+
+9b2fd7189395b2f34781b499f5cae10ec86aa7ab373fbdc2a14ec4597d4799ba	B-Indicator
+ac216d502233ca0fe51ac2bb64cfaf553d906dc19b7da4c023fec39b000bc0d7	B-Indicator
+b1ccb5618925c8f0dda8d13efe4a1e1a93d1ceed9e26ec4a388229a28d1f8d5b	B-Indicator
+ba4beb97f5d4ba33162f769f43ec8e7d1ae501acdade792a4a577cd6449e1a84	B-Indicator
+
+ba9f4d3f4eba3fa7dce726150fe402e37359a7f36c07f3932a92bd711436f88c	B-Indicator
+e194268bf682d81fc7dc1e437c53c952ffae55a9d15a1fc020f0219527b7c2ec	B-Indicator
+С	O
+&	O
+C	O
+2014–2015	O
+:	O
+secondby.ru	B-Indicator
+darkclub.net	B-Indicator
+holerole.org	B-Indicator
+googleapis.link	B-Indicator
+2015–2016	O
+:	O
+test2016.ru	B-Indicator
+blackstar.pro	B-Indicator
+synchronize.pw	B-Indicator
+lineout.pw	B-Indicator
+sync-weather.pw	B-Indicator
+
+2016	O
+freedns.website	O
+streamout.space	B-Indicator
+2017–2018	O
+:	O
+streamout.space	B-Indicator
+sky-sync.pw	B-Indicator
+gms-service.info	B-Indicator
+EventBot	B-Malware
+:	O
+A	O
+New	O
+Mobile	O
+Banking	O
+Trojan	O
+is	O
+Born	O
+April	O
+30	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+KEY	O
+FINDINGS	O
+The	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+is	O
+investigating	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+,	O
+a	O
+new	O
+type	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+emerged	O
+around	O
+March	O
+2020	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+trojan	O
+and	O
+infostealer	O
+that	O
+abuses	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+accessibility	O
+features	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+user	O
+data	O
+from	O
+financial	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+read	O
+user	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+and	O
+steal	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+targets	O
+users	O
+of	O
+over	O
+200	O
+different	O
+financial	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+including	O
+banking	O
+,	O
+money	O
+transfer	O
+services	O
+,	O
+and	O
+crypto-currency	O
+wallets	O
+.	O
+
+Those	O
+targeted	O
+include	O
+applications	O
+like	O
+Paypal	B-System
+Business	I-System
+,	O
+Revolut	B-System
+,	O
+Barclays	B-System
+,	O
+UniCredit	B-System
+,	O
+CapitalOne	B-System
+UK	I-System
+,	O
+HSBC	B-System
+UK	I-System
+,	O
+Santander	B-System
+UK	I-System
+,	O
+TransferWise	B-System
+,	O
+Coinbase	B-System
+,	O
+paysafecard	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+many	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+specifically	O
+targets	O
+financial	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+across	O
+the	O
+United	O
+States	O
+and	O
+Europe	O
+,	O
+including	O
+Italy	O
+,	O
+the	O
+UK	O
+,	O
+Spain	O
+,	O
+Switzerland	O
+,	O
+France	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Germany	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+full	O
+list	O
+of	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+targeted	O
+is	O
+included	O
+in	O
+the	O
+appendix	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Organization
+is	O
+particularly	O
+interesting	O
+because	O
+it	O
+is	O
+in	O
+such	O
+early	O
+stages	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+brand	O
+new	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+real	O
+potential	O
+to	O
+become	O
+the	O
+next	O
+big	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+as	O
+it	O
+is	O
+under	O
+constant	O
+iterative	O
+improvements	O
+,	O
+abuses	O
+a	O
+critical	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+feature	O
+,	O
+and	O
+targets	O
+financial	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+research	O
+gives	O
+a	O
+rare	O
+look	O
+into	O
+the	O
+process	O
+improvements	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+make	O
+when	O
+optimizing	O
+before	O
+launch	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+going	O
+on	O
+the	O
+offensive	O
+and	O
+hunting	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+,	O
+our	O
+team	O
+was	O
+able	O
+to	O
+unearth	O
+the	O
+early	O
+stages	O
+of	O
+what	O
+may	O
+be	O
+a	O
+very	O
+dangerous	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+TABLE	O
+OF	O
+CONTENTS	O
+Security	O
+Recommendations	O
+Introduction	O
+Threat	O
+Analysis	O
+Common	O
+Features	O
+Unique	O
+Features	O
+by	O
+Version	O
+Malware	O
+Under	O
+Active	O
+Development	O
+Suspected	O
+Detection	O
+Tests	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Threat	O
+Actor	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Infrastructure	O
+Cybereason	O
+Mobile	O
+Conclusion	O
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+Compromise	O
+MITRE	B-Organization
+ATT	O
+&	O
+CK	O
+for	O
+Mobile	O
+Breakdown	O
+SECURITY	O
+RECOMMENDATIONS	O
+Keep	O
+your	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+up-to-date	O
+with	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+software	O
+updates	O
+from	O
+legitimate	O
+sources	O
+.	O
+
+Keep	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+on	O
+.	O
+
+Do	O
+not	O
+download	O
+mobile	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+unofficial	O
+or	O
+unauthorized	O
+sources	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+legitimate	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+are	O
+available	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Always	O
+apply	O
+critical	O
+thinking	O
+and	O
+consider	O
+whether	O
+you	O
+should	O
+give	O
+a	O
+certain	O
+app	O
+the	O
+permissions	O
+it	O
+requests	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+in	O
+doubt	O
+,	O
+check	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+signature	O
+and	O
+hash	O
+in	O
+sources	O
+like	O
+VirusTotal	B-Organization
+before	O
+installing	O
+it	O
+on	O
+your	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Use	O
+mobile	O
+threat	O
+detection	O
+solutions	O
+for	O
+enhanced	O
+security	O
+.	O
+
+INTRODUCTION	O
+For	O
+the	O
+past	O
+few	O
+weeks	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+has	O
+been	O
+investigating	O
+a	O
+new	O
+type	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+dubbed	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+first	O
+identified	O
+in	O
+March	O
+2020	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malware	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+newly	O
+developed	O
+with	O
+code	O
+that	O
+differs	O
+significantly	O
+from	O
+previously	O
+known	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+under	O
+active	O
+development	O
+and	O
+is	O
+evolving	O
+rapidly	O
+;	O
+new	O
+versions	O
+are	O
+released	O
+every	O
+few	O
+days	O
+with	O
+improvements	O
+and	O
+new	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+abuses	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+accessibility	O
+feature	O
+to	O
+access	O
+valuable	O
+user	O
+information	O
+,	O
+system	O
+information	O
+,	O
+and	O
+data	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+other	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+particular	O
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+can	O
+intercept	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+bypass	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+mechanisms	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+has	O
+concluded	O
+that	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+target	O
+over	O
+200	O
+different	O
+banking	O
+and	O
+finance	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+the	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+which	O
+are	O
+European	O
+bank	O
+and	O
+crypto-currency	O
+exchange	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+accessing	O
+and	O
+stealing	O
+this	O
+data	O
+,	O
+Eventbot	B-Malware
+has	O
+the	O
+potential	O
+to	O
+access	O
+key	O
+business	O
+data	O
+,	O
+including	O
+financial	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+60	O
+%	O
+of	O
+devices	O
+containing	O
+or	O
+accessing	O
+enterprise	O
+data	O
+are	O
+mobile	O
+,	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+tend	O
+to	O
+include	O
+a	O
+significant	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+personal	O
+and	O
+business	O
+data	O
+,	O
+assuming	O
+the	O
+organization	O
+has	O
+a	O
+bring-your-own-device	O
+policy	O
+in	O
+place	O
+.	O
+
+Mobile	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+a	O
+significant	O
+risk	O
+for	O
+organizations	O
+and	O
+consumers	O
+alike	O
+,	O
+and	O
+must	O
+be	O
+considered	O
+when	O
+protecting	O
+personal	O
+and	O
+business	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+targetedApplications	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Mobile	I-Organization
+Detecting	O
+EventBotCybereason	O
+Mobile	O
+detecting	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+THREAT	O
+ANALYSIS	O
+Initial	O
+Access	O
+Though	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+not	O
+currently	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+find	O
+several	O
+icons	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+using	O
+to	O
+masquerade	O
+as	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+that	O
+,	O
+when	O
+it	O
+is	O
+officially	O
+released	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+most	O
+likely	O
+be	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+rogue	O
+APK	O
+stores	O
+and	O
+other	O
+shady	O
+websites	O
+,	O
+while	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+real	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Icons	O
+used	O
+for	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+masqueraded	O
+as	O
+legitimate	O
+with	O
+these	O
+icons.application	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+Capabilities	O
+The	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+has	O
+been	O
+following	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+since	O
+the	O
+beginning	O
+of	O
+March	O
+2020	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+team	O
+has	O
+encountered	O
+different	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+over	O
+time	O
+as	O
+it	O
+has	O
+rapidly	O
+evolved	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+this	O
+research	O
+,	O
+four	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+malware	O
+were	O
+observed	O
+:	O
+Version	O
+0.0.0.1	O
+,	O
+0.0.0.2	O
+,	O
+and	O
+0.3.0.1	O
+and	O
+0.4.0.1	O
+.	O
+
+Each	O
+version	O
+expands	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+’	O
+s	O
+functionality	O
+and	O
+works	O
+to	O
+obfuscate	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+against	O
+analysis	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+research	O
+,	O
+we	O
+review	O
+common	O
+features	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+and	O
+examine	O
+the	O
+improvements	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+made	O
+in	O
+each	O
+version	O
+.	O
+
+COMMON	O
+FEATURES	O
+Permissions	O
+When	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+requests	O
+the	O
+following	O
+permissions	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+:	O
+SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW	O
+-	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+app	O
+to	O
+create	O
+windows	O
+that	O
+are	O
+shown	O
+on	O
+top	O
+of	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE	O
+-	O
+read	O
+from	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+.	O
+
+REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES	O
+-	O
+make	O
+a	O
+request	O
+to	O
+install	O
+packages	O
+.	O
+
+INTERNET	O
+-	O
+open	O
+network	O
+sockets	O
+.	O
+
+REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS	O
+-	O
+whitelist	O
+the	O
+app	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+it	O
+to	O
+ignore	O
+battery	O
+optimizations	O
+.	O
+
+WAKE_LOCK	O
+-	O
+prevent	O
+the	O
+processor	O
+from	O
+sleeping	O
+and	O
+dimming	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+.	O
+
+ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE	O
+-	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+app	O
+to	O
+access	O
+information	O
+about	O
+networks	O
+.	O
+
+REQUEST_COMPANION_RUN_IN_BACKGROUND	O
+-	O
+let	O
+the	O
+app	O
+run	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+.	O
+
+REQUEST_COMPANION_USE_DATA_IN_BACKGROUND	O
+-	O
+let	O
+the	O
+app	O
+use	O
+data	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+.	O
+
+RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED	O
+-	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+launch	O
+itself	O
+after	O
+system	O
+boot	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+uses	O
+this	O
+permission	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+persistence	O
+and	O
+run	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+as	O
+a	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+RECEIVE_SMS	O
+-	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+READ_SMS	O
+-	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+read	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+permissions	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+permissions	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+THE	O
+INITIAL	O
+INSTALLATION	O
+PROCESS	O
+Once	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+prompts	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+give	O
+it	O
+access	O
+to	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+Initial	O
+request	O
+by	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Initial	O
+request	O
+by	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+to	O
+run	O
+as	O
+a	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+use	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+,	O
+it	O
+has	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+operate	O
+as	O
+a	O
+keylogger	O
+and	O
+can	O
+retrieve	O
+notifications	O
+about	O
+other	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+and	O
+content	O
+of	O
+open	O
+windows	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	O
+’	O
+s	O
+request	O
+to	O
+use	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+more	O
+up-to-date	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+will	O
+ask	O
+for	O
+permissions	O
+to	O
+run	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+before	O
+deleting	O
+itself	O
+from	O
+the	O
+launcher	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+requests	O
+permissions	O
+to	O
+always	O
+run	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+.	O
+
+DOWNLOAD	O
+AND	O
+UPDATE	O
+THE	O
+TARGET	O
+CONFIGURATION	O
+FILE	O
+By	O
+analyzing	O
+and	O
+decoding	O
+the	O
+HTTP	O
+packets	O
+in	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Version	O
+0.0.0.1	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+that	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+downloads	O
+and	O
+updates	O
+a	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+with	O
+almost	O
+200	O
+different	O
+financial	O
+application	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+Following	O
+is	O
+the	O
+HTTP	O
+response	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+,	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+encrypted	O
+configuration	O
+:	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Encrypted	O
+HTTP	O
+response	O
+returned	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+Encrypted	O
+HTTP	O
+response	O
+returned	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+Version	O
+0.0.0.1	O
+,	O
+the	O
+communication	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+is	O
+encrypted	O
+using	O
+Base64	O
+and	O
+RC4	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+RC4	O
+key	O
+is	O
+hardcoded	O
+in	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+decryption	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+that	O
+the	O
+response	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+is	O
+a	O
+JSON	O
+object	O
+of	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+configuration	O
+,	O
+which	O
+contains	O
+C2	O
+URLs	O
+and	O
+a	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+Decrypted	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+configuration	O
+Decrypted	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+configuration	O
+returned	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+financial	O
+applications	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+This	O
+version	O
+includes	O
+185	O
+different	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+including	O
+official	O
+applications	O
+of	O
+worldwide	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+26	O
+of	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+are	O
+from	O
+Italy	O
+,	O
+25	O
+are	O
+from	O
+the	O
+UK	O
+,	O
+6	O
+are	O
+from	O
+Germany	O
+,	O
+5	O
+are	O
+from	O
+France	O
+,	O
+and	O
+3	O
+are	O
+from	O
+Spain	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+it	O
+also	O
+targets	O
+applications	O
+from	O
+Romania	O
+,	O
+Ireland	O
+,	O
+India	O
+,	O
+Austria	O
+,	O
+Switzerland	O
+,	O
+Australia	O
+,	O
+Poland	O
+and	O
+the	O
+USA	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+official	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+the	O
+target	O
+list	O
+includes	O
+111	O
+other	O
+global	O
+financial	O
+applications	O
+for	O
+banking	O
+and	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+management	O
+,	O
+money	O
+transfers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+cryptocurrency	O
+wallets	O
+and	O
+exchanges	O
+.	O
+
+Those	O
+targeted	O
+include	O
+Paypal	B-System
+Business	I-System
+,	O
+Revolut	B-System
+,	O
+Barclays	B-System
+,	O
+UniCredit	B-System
+,	O
+CapitalOne	B-System
+UK	I-System
+,	O
+HSBC	B-System
+UK	I-System
+,	O
+Santander	B-System
+UK	I-System
+,	O
+TransferWise	B-System
+,	O
+Coinbase	B-System
+,	O
+paysafecard	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+many	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+full	O
+list	O
+of	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+targeted	O
+is	O
+included	O
+in	O
+the	O
+appendix	O
+.	O
+
+ABUSE	O
+OF	O
+ACCESSIBILITY	O
+SERVICES	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+abuses	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+for	O
+the	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+its	O
+activity	O
+.	O
+
+Accessibility	O
+features	O
+are	O
+typically	O
+used	O
+to	O
+help	O
+users	O
+with	O
+disabilities	O
+by	O
+giving	O
+the	O
+device	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+write	O
+into	O
+input	O
+fields	O
+,	O
+auto-generate	O
+permissions	O
+,	O
+perform	O
+gestures	O
+for	O
+the	O
+user	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+when	O
+used	O
+maliciously	O
+,	O
+accessibility	O
+features	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+exploit	O
+legitimate	O
+services	O
+for	O
+malicious	O
+purposes	O
+,	O
+like	O
+with	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+uses	O
+multiple	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+exploit	O
+accessibility	O
+events	O
+for	O
+webinjects	O
+and	O
+other	O
+information	O
+stealing	O
+purposes	O
+.	O
+
+DATA	O
+GATHERING	O
+Getting	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+:	O
+Once	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+target	O
+machine	O
+,	O
+it	O
+lists	O
+all	O
+the	O
+applications	O
+on	O
+the	O
+target	O
+machine	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+them	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+Device	O
+information	O
+:	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+queries	O
+for	O
+device	O
+information	O
+like	O
+OS	O
+,	O
+model	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+,	O
+and	O
+also	O
+sends	O
+that	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+infected	O
+device	O
+to	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+Information	O
+gathered	O
+about	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+to	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+Data	O
+encryption	O
+:	O
+In	O
+the	O
+initial	O
+version	O
+of	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+,	O
+the	O
+data	O
+being	O
+exfiltrated	O
+is	O
+encrypted	O
+using	O
+Base64	O
+and	O
+RC4	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+later	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+another	O
+encryption	O
+layer	O
+is	O
+added	O
+using	O
+Curve25519	O
+encryption	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+contain	O
+a	O
+ChaCha20	B-System
+library	O
+that	O
+can	O
+improve	O
+performance	O
+when	O
+compared	O
+to	O
+other	O
+algorithms	O
+like	O
+RC4	O
+and	O
+AES	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+implies	O
+that	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+are	O
+actively	O
+working	O
+to	O
+optimize	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+over	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+SMS	O
+grabbing	O
+:	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+has	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+parse	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+by	O
+using	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+SDK	O
+version	O
+to	O
+parse	O
+them	O
+correctly	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+parsing	O
+of	O
+grabbed	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+Parsing	O
+of	O
+grabbed	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Webinjects	O
+:	O
+According	O
+to	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+’	O
+s	O
+configuration	O
+,	O
+if	O
+a	O
+webinject	O
+is	O
+set	O
+for	O
+a	O
+given	O
+application	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+web	O
+injects	O
+execution	O
+method	O
+Web	O
+injects	O
+execution	O
+method	O
+by	O
+a	O
+pre-established	O
+configuration	O
+.	O
+
+BOT	O
+UPDATES	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+has	O
+a	O
+long	O
+method	O
+called	O
+parseCommand	O
+that	O
+can	O
+update	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+configuration	O
+XML	O
+files	O
+,	O
+located	O
+in	O
+the	O
+shared	O
+preferences	O
+folder	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Dropped	O
+XML	O
+configuration	O
+files	O
+Dropped	O
+XML	O
+configuration	O
+files	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+uses	O
+this	O
+function	O
+to	O
+update	O
+its	O
+C2s	O
+,	O
+the	O
+configuration	O
+of	O
+webinjects	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+code	O
+shows	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+parsing	O
+instructions	O
+sent	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+Parsing	O
+of	O
+instructions	O
+by	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Parsing	O
+of	O
+instructions	O
+by	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+UNIQUE	O
+FEATURES	O
+BY	O
+VERSION	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Version	O
+0.0.0.1	O
+RC4	O
+and	O
+Base64	O
+Packet	O
+Encryption	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+RC4	O
+and	O
+Base64	O
+data	O
+decryption	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+RC4	O
+and	O
+Base64	O
+data	O
+decryption	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+above	O
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Version	O
+0.0.0.1	O
+sends	O
+a	O
+JSON	O
+object	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+package	O
+names	O
+of	O
+all	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+alongside	O
+additional	O
+metadata	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+version	O
+,	O
+botnetID	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+reason	O
+this	O
+package	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+this	O
+particular	O
+packet	O
+,	O
+the	O
+reason	O
+is	O
+registration	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+fails	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+retry	O
+until	O
+it	O
+is	O
+successful	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Logcat	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+Logcat	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+EVENTBOT	B-Malware
+VERSION	O
+0.0.0.2	O
+Dynamic	O
+Library	O
+Loading	O
+As	O
+of	O
+Version	O
+0.0.0.2	O
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+attempts	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+its	O
+main	O
+functionality	O
+from	O
+static	O
+analysis	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+Version	O
+0.0.0.1	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+dedicated	O
+functions	O
+class	O
+where	O
+all	O
+main	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+happens	O
+and	O
+can	O
+be	O
+observed	O
+.	O
+
+Instead	O
+,	O
+in	O
+Version	O
+0.0.0.2	O
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+dynamically	O
+loads	O
+its	O
+main	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+loaded	O
+library	O
+Loaded	O
+library	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Logcat	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+browsing	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+installation	O
+path	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+the	O
+library	O
+dropped	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app_dex	O
+folder	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+loaded	O
+library	O
+The	O
+loaded	O
+library	O
+dropped	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+to	O
+load	O
+the	O
+main	O
+module	O
+dynamically	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+statically	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+library	O
+is	O
+loaded	O
+from	O
+Eventbot	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+assets	O
+that	O
+contain	O
+a	O
+font	O
+file	O
+called	O
+default.ttf	B-Indicator
+which	O
+is	O
+actually	O
+the	O
+hidden	O
+library	O
+and	O
+then	O
+decoded	O
+using	O
+RC4	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	O
+method	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+the	O
+library	O
+loading	O
+The	O
+method	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+the	O
+library	O
+loading	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+has	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+update	O
+its	O
+library	O
+or	O
+potentially	O
+even	O
+download	O
+a	O
+second	O
+library	O
+when	O
+given	O
+a	O
+command	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+updated	O
+library	O
+name	O
+is	O
+generated	O
+by	O
+calculating	O
+the	O
+md5sum	O
+of	O
+several	O
+device	O
+properties	O
+,	O
+while	O
+concatenating	O
+the	O
+build	O
+model	O
+twice	O
+in	O
+case	O
+of	O
+an	O
+update	O
+to	O
+the	O
+library	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	O
+Updated	O
+library	O
+naming	O
+convention	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+New	O
+library	O
+naming	O
+convention	O
+.	O
+
+Data	O
+Encryption	O
+The	O
+Curve25519	O
+encryption	O
+algorithm	O
+was	O
+implemented	O
+as	O
+of	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Version	O
+0.0.0.2	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+encryption	O
+algorithm	O
+is	O
+an	O
+extra	O
+security	O
+layer	O
+for	O
+communicating	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+,	O
+an	O
+improvement	O
+over	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+version	O
+of	O
+a	O
+plain	O
+RC4	O
+encryption	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+reviewing	O
+the	O
+decrypted	O
+packet	O
+,	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+clear	O
+it	O
+has	O
+the	O
+same	O
+content	O
+as	O
+previous	O
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+decryption	O
+of	O
+packets	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+Decryption	O
+of	O
+packets	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+using	O
+Curve25519	O
+.	O
+
+EVENTBOT	O
+VERSION	O
+0.3.0.1	O
+Additional	O
+Assets	O
+Based	O
+on	O
+Country	O
+/	O
+Region	O
+EventBot-23aEventBot	O
+Spanish	O
+and	O
+Italian	O
+Images	O
+in	O
+Spanish	O
+and	O
+Italian	O
+added	O
+in	O
+version	O
+0.3.0.1	O
+.	O
+
+Version	O
+0.3.0.1	O
+includes	O
+Italian	O
+and	O
+Spanish	O
+language	O
+compatibility	O
+within	O
+the	O
+resources	O
+section	O
+.	O
+
+Presumably	O
+,	O
+this	O
+was	O
+done	O
+to	O
+make	O
+the	O
+app	O
+seem	O
+more	O
+credible	O
+to	O
+targeted	O
+users	O
+in	O
+different	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+Grabbing	O
+the	O
+Screen	O
+PIN	O
+with	O
+Support	O
+for	O
+Samsung	B-Organization
+Devices	O
+Version	O
+0.3.0.1	O
+added	O
+an	O
+~800	O
+line	O
+long	O
+method	O
+called	O
+grabScreenPin	O
+,	O
+which	O
+uses	O
+accessibility	O
+features	O
+to	O
+track	O
+pin	O
+code	O
+changes	O
+in	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+listens	O
+to	O
+events	O
+like	O
+TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+suspect	O
+the	O
+updated	O
+PIN	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+,	O
+most	O
+likely	O
+to	O
+give	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+the	O
+option	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+privileged	O
+activities	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+related	O
+to	O
+payments	O
+,	O
+system	O
+configuration	O
+options	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Listening	O
+to	O
+TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED	O
+accessibility	O
+event	O
+Listening	O
+to	O
+TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED	O
+accessibility	O
+event	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+collecting	O
+the	O
+changed	O
+PIN	O
+code	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Sending	O
+the	O
+pin	O
+code	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+Sending	O
+the	O
+pin	O
+code	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+Eventually	O
+,	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+PIN	O
+preferences	O
+will	O
+be	O
+saved	O
+to	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+XML	O
+file	O
+in	O
+the	O
+shared	O
+preferences	O
+folder	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	O
+screenPinPrefs.xml	B-Indicator
+The	O
+content	O
+of	O
+screenPinPrefs.xml	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+grabScreenPin	O
+method	O
+has	O
+separate	O
+conditioning	O
+to	O
+handle	O
+screen	O
+lock	O
+events	O
+in	O
+Samsung	B-Organization
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+screen	O
+lock	O
+with	O
+support	O
+for	O
+Samsung	B-Organization
+devices	O
+A	O
+new	O
+method	O
+to	O
+handle	O
+screen	O
+lock	O
+with	O
+support	O
+for	O
+Samsung	B-Organization
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+EVENTBOT	O
+VERSION	O
+0.4.0.1	O
+Package	O
+Name	O
+Randomization	O
+In	O
+this	O
+version	O
+,	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+is	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+named	O
+‘	O
+com.example.eventbot	B-Indicator
+’	O
+,	O
+which	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+more	O
+difficult	O
+to	O
+track	O
+down	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Randomized	O
+package	O
+name	O
+Randomized	O
+package	O
+name	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+com.example.eventbot	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+ProGuard	B-System
+Obfuscation	O
+As	O
+with	O
+many	O
+other	O
+Android	B-System
+applications	O
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+now	O
+using	O
+obfuscation	O
+.	O
+
+Both	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+and	O
+dropped	O
+class	O
+are	O
+obfuscated	O
+using	O
+ProGuard	B-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+obfuscates	O
+names	O
+using	O
+alphabet	O
+letters	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+itself	O
+is	O
+not	O
+modified	O
+by	O
+this	O
+type	O
+of	O
+obfuscation	O
+though	O
+,	O
+making	O
+the	O
+analysis	O
+easier	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+Obfuscated	O
+class	O
+names	O
+Obfuscated	O
+class	O
+names	O
+using	O
+letters	O
+of	O
+the	O
+alphabet	O
+.	O
+
+Hidden	O
+Configuration	O
+Data	O
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+above	O
+,	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+begins	O
+using	O
+obfuscation	O
+.	O
+
+Due	O
+to	O
+this	O
+obfuscation	O
+,	O
+a	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+previously	O
+mentioned	O
+cfg	O
+class	O
+is	O
+now	O
+mapped	O
+to	O
+c/b/a/a/a	O
+or	O
+c/a/a/a/a	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	O
+C2	O
+URLs	O
+C2	O
+URLs	O
+and	O
+other	O
+settings	O
+in	O
+a	O
+nested	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+configuration	O
+data	O
+is	O
+located	O
+elsewhere	O
+,	O
+and	O
+some	O
+of	O
+it	O
+can	O
+been	O
+seen	O
+here	O
+:	O
+The	O
+encrypted	O
+library	O
+path	O
+The	O
+output	O
+folder	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+for	O
+the	O
+dropped	O
+library	O
+The	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+library	O
+after	O
+it	O
+is	O
+loaded	O
+eventBot	O
+name	O
+string	O
+Version	O
+number	O
+A	O
+string	O
+used	O
+as	O
+an	O
+RC4	O
+key	O
+,	O
+both	O
+for	O
+decrypting	O
+the	O
+library	O
+and	O
+as	O
+a	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+network	O
+data	O
+encryption	O
+(	O
+hasn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+changed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+version	O
+)	O
+The	O
+C2	O
+URLs	O
+A	O
+randomized	O
+class	O
+name	O
+using	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+extracted	O
+configuration	O
+Part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+extracted	O
+configuration	O
+of	O
+the	O
+new	O
+version	O
+
+.	O
+
+MALWARE	O
+UNDER	O
+ACTIVE	O
+DEVELOPMENT	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+“	O
+cfg	O
+”	O
+class	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+“	O
+cfg	O
+”	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+in	O
+constant	O
+development	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+with	O
+the	O
+botnetID	O
+string	O
+above	O
+,	O
+which	O
+shows	O
+consecutive	O
+numbering	O
+across	O
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+example	O
+is	O
+from	O
+a	O
+later	O
+version	O
+of	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+in	O
+other	O
+versions	O
+the	O
+naming	O
+convention	O
+is	O
+very	O
+similar	O
+,	O
+with	O
+bot	O
+IDs	O
+such	O
+as	O
+word100	O
+,	O
+word101	O
+,	O
+word102	O
+,	O
+and	O
+test2005	O
+,	O
+test2006	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+,	O
+a	O
+layer	O
+of	O
+obfuscation	O
+was	O
+added	O
+,	O
+perhaps	O
+taking	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+one	O
+step	O
+closer	O
+to	O
+being	O
+fully	O
+operational	O
+.	O
+
+SUSPECTED	O
+DETECTION	O
+TESTS	O
+BY	O
+THE	O
+THREAT	O
+ACTOR	O
+In	O
+searching	O
+for	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+identified	O
+multiple	O
+submissions	O
+from	O
+the	O
+same	O
+submitter	O
+hash	O
+,	O
+22b3c7b0	B-Indicator
+:	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+22b3c7b0	B-Indicator
+submitter	O
+hash	O
+The	O
+22b3c7b0	B-Indicator
+submitter	O
+hash	O
+that	O
+submitted	O
+most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+samples	O
+to	O
+VirusTotal	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+submitter	O
+has	O
+thousands	O
+of	O
+other	O
+submissions	O
+in	O
+VirusTotal	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+the	O
+only	O
+one	O
+that	O
+continues	O
+to	O
+submit	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+samples	O
+via	O
+the	O
+VirusTotal	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+Also	O
+,	O
+the	O
+botnet	O
+IDs	O
+increment	O
+over	O
+time	O
+as	O
+they	O
+are	O
+submitted	O
+.	O
+
+Given	O
+this	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+naming	O
+convention	O
+of	O
+the	O
+submissions	O
+(	O
+.virus	O
+)	O
+,	O
+the	O
+submitter	O
+hash	O
+most	O
+likely	O
+belongs	O
+to	O
+an	O
+AV	O
+vendor	O
+or	O
+sandboxing	O
+environment	O
+that	O
+automatically	O
+submits	O
+samples	O
+to	O
+online	O
+malware	O
+databases	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+may	O
+be	O
+that	O
+these	O
+submissions	O
+are	O
+made	O
+from	O
+the	O
+author	O
+’	O
+s	O
+machine	O
+,	O
+or	O
+that	O
+they	O
+submit	O
+it	O
+to	O
+a	O
+detection	O
+service	O
+that	O
+in	O
+turn	O
+submits	O
+to	O
+online	O
+malware	O
+databases	O
+.	O
+
+EVENTBOT	B-Malware
+THREAT	O
+ACTORS	O
+As	O
+a	O
+part	O
+of	O
+this	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+has	O
+attempted	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+development	O
+of	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+evidence	O
+above	O
+suggests	O
+that	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+still	O
+in	O
+the	O
+development	O
+stage	O
+,	O
+and	O
+as	O
+such	O
+,	O
+is	O
+not	O
+likely	O
+to	O
+have	O
+been	O
+used	O
+for	O
+large	O
+attack	O
+campaigns	O
+thus	O
+far	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+is	O
+monitoring	O
+multiple	O
+underground	O
+platforms	O
+in	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+chatter	O
+relating	O
+to	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+New	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+often	O
+introduced	O
+to	O
+underground	O
+communities	O
+by	O
+being	O
+promoted	O
+and	O
+sold	O
+or	O
+offered	O
+as	O
+a	O
+giveaway	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+unable	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+relevant	O
+conversations	O
+about	O
+the	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+strengthens	O
+our	O
+suspicion	O
+that	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+still	O
+undergoing	O
+development	O
+and	O
+has	O
+not	O
+been	O
+officially	O
+marketed	O
+or	O
+released	O
+yet	O
+.	O
+
+EVENTBOT	B-Malware
+INFRASTRUCTURE	O
+By	O
+mapping	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+,	O
+a	O
+clear	O
+,	O
+repeated	O
+pattern	O
+emerges	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+specific	O
+URL	O
+gate_cb8a5aea1ab302f0_c	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+of	O
+this	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+all	O
+the	O
+domains	O
+were	O
+registered	O
+recently	O
+and	O
+some	O
+are	O
+already	O
+offline	O
+.	O
+
+URL	O
+Status	O
+IP	O
+Domain	O
+registration	O
+date	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//ora.studiolegalebasili	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/gate_cb8a5aea1ab302f0_c	I-Indicator
+offline	O
+31.214.157	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+6	I-Indicator
+2020-02-29	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//themoil	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+site/gate_cb8a5aea1ab302f0_c	I-Indicator
+online	O
+208.91.197	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+91	I-Indicator
+2020-03-04	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//ora.carlaarrabitoarchitetto	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/gate_cb8a5aea1ab302f0_c	I-Indicator
+offline	O
+31.214.157	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+6	I-Indicator
+2020-03-26	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//rxc.rxcoordinator	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/gate_cb8a5aea1ab302f0_c	I-Indicator
+online	O
+185.158.248	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+102	I-Indicator
+2020-03-29	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//ora.blindsidefantasy	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/gate_cb8a5aea1ab302f0_c	I-Indicator
+online	O
+185.158.248	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+102	I-Indicator
+2020-04-02	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//marta.martatovaglieri	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it/gate_cb8a5aea1ab302f0_c	I-Indicator
+online	O
+185.158.248	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+102	I-Indicator
+2020-04-14	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//pub.douglasshome	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/gate_cb8a5aea1ab302f0_c	I-Indicator
+online	O
+185.158.249	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+141	I-Indicator
+2020-04-26	O
+In	O
+the	O
+course	O
+of	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+team	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+potential	O
+link	O
+to	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+Android	B-Malware
+infostealer	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+of	O
+both	O
+ora.carlaarrabitoarchitetto	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+and	O
+ora.studiolegalebasili	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+,	O
+31.214.157	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+6	I-Indicator
+,	O
+was	O
+previously	O
+hosting	O
+the	O
+domain	B-Indicator
+next.nextuptravel	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+was	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+for	O
+an	O
+Android	B-Malware
+infostealer	I-Malware
+responsible	O
+for	O
+several	O
+attacks	O
+in	O
+Italy	O
+back	O
+in	O
+late	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+VirusTotal	O
+search	O
+for	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+VirusTotal	O
+search	O
+for	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+IMPACT	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+banking	O
+trojan	O
+that	O
+steals	O
+financial	O
+information	O
+,	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+hijack	O
+transactions	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+successfully	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+collect	O
+personal	O
+data	O
+,	O
+passwords	O
+,	O
+keystrokes	O
+,	O
+banking	O
+information	O
+,	O
+and	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+information	O
+can	O
+give	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+access	O
+to	O
+personal	O
+and	O
+business	O
+bank	O
+accounts	O
+,	O
+personal	O
+and	O
+business	O
+data	O
+,	O
+and	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+Letting	O
+an	O
+attacker	O
+get	O
+access	O
+to	O
+this	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+data	O
+can	O
+have	O
+severe	O
+consequences	O
+.	O
+
+60	O
+%	O
+of	O
+devices	O
+containing	O
+or	O
+accessing	O
+enterprise	O
+data	O
+are	O
+mobile	O
+.	O
+
+Giving	O
+an	O
+attacker	O
+access	O
+to	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+can	O
+have	O
+severe	O
+business	O
+consequences	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+if	O
+the	O
+end	O
+user	O
+is	O
+using	O
+their	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+to	O
+discuss	O
+sensitive	O
+business	O
+topics	O
+or	O
+access	O
+enterprise	O
+financial	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+can	O
+result	O
+in	O
+brand	O
+degradation	O
+,	O
+loss	O
+of	O
+individual	O
+reputation	O
+,	O
+or	O
+loss	O
+of	O
+consumer	O
+trust	O
+.	O
+
+Much	O
+like	O
+we	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+recent	O
+months	O
+,	O
+anyone	O
+can	O
+be	O
+impacted	O
+by	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+attack	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+attacks	O
+are	O
+only	O
+becoming	O
+more	O
+common	O
+,	O
+with	O
+one	O
+third	O
+of	O
+all	O
+malware	O
+now	O
+targeting	O
+mobile	O
+endpoints	O
+.	O
+
+Care	O
+and	O
+concern	O
+both	O
+for	O
+using	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+and	O
+for	O
+securing	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+is	O
+critical	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+for	O
+those	O
+organizations	O
+that	O
+allow	O
+bring-your-own-devices	O
+.	O
+
+CYBEREASON	B-System
+MOBILE	I-System
+Cybereason	B-System
+Mobile	I-System
+detects	I-System
+EventBot	B-Malware
+and	O
+immediately	O
+takes	O
+remediation	O
+actions	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+the	O
+end	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+Cybereason	B-System
+Mobile	I-System
+,	O
+analysts	O
+can	O
+address	O
+mobile	O
+threats	O
+in	O
+the	O
+same	O
+platform	O
+as	O
+traditional	O
+endpoint	O
+threats	O
+,	O
+all	O
+as	O
+part	O
+of	O
+one	O
+incident	O
+.	O
+
+Without	O
+mobile	O
+threat	O
+detection	O
+,	O
+this	O
+attack	O
+would	O
+not	O
+be	O
+detected	O
+,	O
+leaving	O
+end	O
+users	O
+and	O
+organizations	O
+at	O
+risk	O
+.	O
+
+Cybereason	B-System
+Mobile	I-System
+detects	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+and	O
+provides	O
+the	O
+user	O
+with	O
+immediate	O
+actions	O
+.	O
+
+CONCLUSION	O
+In	O
+this	O
+research	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Nocturnus	B-Organization
+team	O
+has	O
+dissected	O
+a	O
+rapidly	O
+evolving	O
+Android	B-Malware
+malware	O
+in	O
+the	O
+making	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malware	O
+abuses	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+accessibility	O
+feature	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+user	O
+information	O
+and	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+update	O
+its	O
+code	O
+and	O
+release	O
+new	O
+features	O
+every	O
+few	O
+days	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+each	O
+new	O
+version	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+adds	O
+new	O
+features	O
+like	O
+dynamic	O
+library	O
+loading	O
+,	O
+encryption	O
+,	O
+and	O
+adjustments	O
+to	O
+different	O
+locales	O
+and	O
+manufacturers	O
+.	O
+
+EventBot	B-Malware
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+a	O
+completely	O
+new	O
+malware	O
+in	O
+the	O
+early	O
+stages	O
+of	O
+development	O
+,	O
+giving	O
+us	O
+an	O
+interesting	O
+view	O
+into	O
+how	O
+attackers	O
+create	O
+and	O
+test	O
+their	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+classifies	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+as	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+trojan	O
+and	O
+infostealer	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+stealing	O
+features	O
+discussed	O
+in	O
+this	O
+research	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+leverages	O
+webinjects	O
+and	O
+SMS	O
+reading	O
+capabilities	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+,	O
+and	O
+is	O
+clearly	O
+targeting	O
+financial	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+the	O
+development	O
+of	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+is	O
+still	O
+unknown	O
+and	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+does	O
+not	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+involved	O
+in	O
+major	O
+attacks	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+interesting	O
+to	O
+follow	O
+the	O
+early	O
+stages	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+development	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+will	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+monitor	O
+EventBot	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+development	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+recent	O
+years	O
+,	O
+online	O
+activity	O
+has	O
+gradually	O
+been	O
+shifting	O
+from	O
+personal	O
+computers	O
+to	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Naturally	O
+,	O
+this	O
+resulted	O
+in	O
+the	O
+introduction	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+for	O
+mobile	O
+platforms	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+,	O
+including	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+,	O
+Xhelper	B-Malware
+and	O
+the	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+Banking	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+many	O
+people	O
+use	O
+their	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+for	O
+online	O
+shopping	O
+and	O
+even	O
+to	O
+manage	O
+their	O
+bank	O
+accounts	O
+,	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+arena	O
+became	O
+increasingly	O
+profitable	O
+for	O
+cyber	O
+criminals	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+why	O
+we	O
+recently	O
+released	O
+Cybereason	B-System
+Mobile	I-System
+,	O
+a	O
+new	O
+offering	O
+that	O
+strengthens	O
+the	O
+Cybereason	B-System
+Defense	I-System
+Platform	I-System
+by	O
+bringing	O
+prevention	O
+,	O
+detection	O
+,	O
+and	O
+response	O
+capabilities	O
+to	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+Cybereason	B-System
+Mobile	I-System
+,	O
+our	O
+customers	O
+can	O
+protect	O
+against	O
+modern	O
+threats	O
+across	O
+traditional	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+endpoints	O
+,	O
+all	O
+within	O
+a	O
+single	O
+console	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Mobile	B-System
+Threat	I-System
+Prevention	I-System
+has	O
+detected	O
+two	O
+instances	O
+of	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+variant	O
+infecting	O
+multiple	O
+devices	O
+within	O
+the	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+customer	O
+base	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+packaged	O
+within	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+game	O
+app	O
+called	O
+BrainTest	B-Malware
+,	O
+had	O
+been	O
+published	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+twice	O
+.	O
+
+Each	O
+instance	O
+had	O
+between	O
+100,000	O
+and	O
+500,000	O
+downloads	O
+according	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+statistics	O
+,	O
+reaching	O
+an	O
+aggregated	O
+infection	O
+rate	O
+of	O
+between	O
+200,000	O
+and	O
+1	O
+million	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+reached	O
+out	O
+to	O
+Google	B-Organization
+on	O
+September	O
+10	O
+,	O
+2015	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+app	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+on	O
+September	O
+15	O
+,	O
+2015	O
+.	O
+
+Overview	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+first	O
+detected	O
+on	O
+a	O
+Nexus	B-System
+5	I-System
+smartphone	O
+,	O
+and	O
+although	O
+the	O
+user	O
+attempted	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+app	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+reappeared	O
+on	O
+the	O
+same	O
+device	O
+shortly	O
+thereafter	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+shows	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+multiple	O
+,	O
+advanced	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+malware	O
+detection	O
+and	O
+to	O
+maintain	O
+persistency	O
+on	O
+target	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+detected	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+,	O
+Mobile	B-System
+Threat	I-System
+Prevention	I-System
+adjusted	O
+security	O
+policies	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Mobile	O
+Device	O
+Management	O
+solution	O
+(	O
+MobileIron	O
+)	O
+managing	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+devices	O
+automatically	O
+,	O
+thereby	O
+blocking	O
+enterprise	O
+access	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+facilitating	O
+various	O
+cyber-criminal	O
+goals	O
+,	O
+our	O
+team	O
+confirmed	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+currently	O
+installing	O
+additional	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Disturbingly	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+establishes	O
+a	O
+rootkit	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+allowing	O
+it	O
+to	O
+download	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+any	O
+code	O
+a	O
+cybercriminal	O
+would	O
+want	O
+to	O
+run	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+it	O
+could	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+display	O
+unwanted	O
+and	O
+annoying	O
+advertisements	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+,	O
+or	O
+potentially	O
+,	O
+to	O
+download	O
+and	O
+deploy	O
+a	O
+payload	O
+that	O
+steals	O
+credentials	O
+from	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Highlights	O
+Samples	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+found	O
+in	O
+BrainTest	B-Malware
+have	O
+been	O
+found	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+and	O
+its	O
+creator	O
+has	O
+used	O
+multiple	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+evade	O
+detection	O
+by	O
+Google	B-Organization
+including	O
+Bypassing	O
+Google	B-System
+Bouncer	I-System
+by	O
+detecting	O
+if	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+being	O
+run	O
+from	O
+an	O
+IP	O
+or	O
+domain	O
+mapped	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Bouncer	I-System
+and	O
+,	O
+if	O
+so	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+not	O
+perform	O
+its	O
+intended	O
+malicious	O
+activities	O
+.	O
+
+Combining	O
+timebombs	O
+,	O
+dynamic	O
+code	O
+loading	O
+,	O
+and	O
+use	O
+of	O
+reflection	O
+to	O
+complicate	O
+reverse	O
+engineering	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Using	O
+off-the-shelf	O
+obfuscation	O
+(	O
+packer	O
+)	O
+from	O
+Baidu	B-Organization
+to	O
+re-introduce	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+after	O
+the	O
+first	O
+instance	O
+was	O
+removed	O
+on	O
+Aug	O
+24th	O
+.	O
+
+BrainTest	B-Malware
+uses	O
+four	O
+privilege	B-Vulnerability
+escalation	I-Vulnerability
+exploits	I-Vulnerability
+to	O
+gain	O
+root	O
+access	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+and	O
+to	O
+install	O
+a	O
+persistent	O
+malware	O
+as	O
+a	O
+system	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+BrainTest	B-Malware
+leverages	O
+an	O
+anti-uninstall	B-Vulnerability
+watchdog	I-Vulnerability
+that	O
+uses	O
+two	O
+system	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+monitor	O
+the	O
+removal	O
+of	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+components	O
+and	O
+reinstall	O
+the	O
+component	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+the	O
+first	O
+instance	O
+of	O
+BrainTest	B-Malware
+was	O
+detected	O
+,	O
+Google	B-Organization
+removed	O
+the	O
+app	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+Within	O
+days	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+research	O
+team	O
+detected	O
+another	O
+instance	O
+with	O
+a	O
+different	O
+package	O
+name	O
+but	O
+which	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+same	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+creators	O
+had	O
+used	O
+obfuscation	O
+to	O
+upload	O
+the	O
+new	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+consists	O
+of	O
+2	O
+applications	O
+:	O
+The	O
+Dropper	O
+:	O
+Brain	O
+Test	O
+(	O
+Unpacked	O
+–	O
+com.mile.brain	B-Indicator
+,	O
+Packed	O
+–	O
+com.zmhitlte.brain	B-Indicator
+)	O
+This	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+and	O
+downloads	O
+an	O
+exploit	O
+pack	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+root	O
+access	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+root	O
+access	O
+is	O
+obtained	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+downloads	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+.apk	O
+file	O
+(	O
+The	O
+Backdoor	O
+)	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+and	O
+installs	O
+it	O
+as	O
+system	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Backdoor	O
+:	O
+System	O
+malware	O
+(	O
+mcpef.apk	B-Indicator
+and	O
+brother.apk	B-Indicator
+)	O
+This	O
+tries	O
+a	O
+few	O
+persistence	O
+methods	O
+by	O
+using	O
+few	O
+anti-uninstall	O
+techniques	O
+(	O
+described	O
+below	O
+)	O
+and	O
+downloads	O
+and	O
+executes	O
+code	O
+from	O
+server	O
+without	O
+user	O
+consent	O
+.	O
+
+Detailed	O
+Malware	O
+Structure	O
+Malware	O
+Strucutre	O
+com.mile.brain	B-Indicator
+(	O
+SHA256	O
+:	O
+135d6acff3ca27e6e7997429e5f8051f88215d12351e4103f8344cd66611e0f3	B-Indicator
+)	O
+:	O
+This	O
+is	O
+the	O
+main	O
+application	O
+found	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+It	O
+contains	O
+encrypted	O
+java	O
+archive	O
+“	O
+start.ogg	B-Indicator
+”	O
+in	O
+the	O
+assets	O
+directory	O
+and	O
+dynamically	O
+loads	O
+code	O
+with	O
+dalvik.system.DexClassLoader	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+do.jar	B-Indicator
+(	O
+SHA256	O
+:	O
+a711e620246d9954510d3f1c8d5c784bacc78069a5c57b9ec09c3e234bc33a8b	B-Indicator
+)	O
+:	O
+The	O
+decrypted	O
+file	O
+that	O
+was	O
+created	O
+by	O
+“	O
+start.ogg.	B-Indicator
+”	O
+It	O
+sends	O
+a	O
+request	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+with	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+configuration	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+server	O
+’	O
+s	O
+response	O
+is	O
+a	O
+json	O
+,	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+link	O
+to	O
+a	O
+.jar	O
+file	O
+,	O
+class	O
+name	O
+and	O
+method	O
+name	O
+to	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+with	O
+reflection	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+application	O
+downloads	O
+the	O
+file	O
+and	O
+dynamically	O
+loads	O
+it	O
+using	O
+dalvik.system.DexClassLoader	O
+and	O
+invokes	O
+class	O
+and	O
+method	O
+specified	O
+in	O
+json	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+jhfrte.jar	I-Indicator
+:	O
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+java	O
+archive	O
+file	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+a	O
+device	O
+isn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+rooted	O
+,	O
+it	O
+downloads	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+an	O
+exploit	O
+pack	O
+and	O
+executes	O
+it	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+root	O
+on	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+root	O
+is	O
+obtained	O
+,	O
+it	O
+downloads	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+(	O
+mcpef.apk	B-Indicator
+)	O
+and	O
+installs	O
+it	O
+as	O
+system	O
+application	O
+(	O
+/system	O
+directory	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+r1-r4	O
+:	O
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+local	O
+privilege	O
+escalation	O
+(	O
+root	O
+)	O
+exploit	O
+,	O
+which	O
+includes	O
+:	O
+CVE-2013-6282	B-Vulnerability
+,	O
+camerageroot	O
+(	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www.77169.org/exploits/2013/20130414031700	I-Indicator
+)	I-Indicator
+,	O
+a	O
+rooting	O
+tool	O
+for	O
+mtk6592	O
+and	O
+addtional	O
+exploit	O
+.	O
+
+nis	O
+:	O
+The	O
+su	O
+application	O
+used	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+shell	O
+commands	O
+with	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+mcpef.apk	B-Indicator
+(	O
+SHA256	O
+:	O
+a8e7dfac00adf661d371ac52bddc03b543bd6b7aa41314b255e53d810931ceac	B-Indicator
+)	O
+:	O
+The	O
+malicious	O
+system	O
+application	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+server	O
+(	O
+package	O
+name	O
+–	O
+com.android.music.helper	B-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+installs	O
+additional	O
+application	O
+from	O
+assets	O
+directory	O
+(	O
+brother.apk	B-System
+)	O
+and	O
+listens	O
+for	O
+PACKAGE_REMOVED	O
+events	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+brother.apk	B-System
+application	O
+is	O
+removed	O
+,	O
+mcpef.apk	B-System
+reinstalls	O
+brother.apk	B-System
+from	O
+assets	O
+.	O
+
+brother.apk	B-System
+(	O
+SHA256	O
+:	O
+422fec2e201600bb2ea3140951563f8c6fbd4f8279a04a164aca5e8e753c40e8	B-Indicator
+)	O
+:	O
+The	O
+package	O
+name	O
+–	O
+com.android.system.certificate	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+System	O
+application	O
+installed	O
+by	O
+mcpef.apk	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+has	O
+the	O
+same	O
+functionality	O
+as	O
+mcpef.apk	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+it	O
+monitors	O
+to	O
+verify	O
+if	O
+com.android.music.helper	B-Indicator
+package	O
+is	O
+removed	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+mcpef.apk	B-Indicator
+is	O
+removed	O
+,	O
+brother.apk	B-Indicator
+reinstalls	O
+it	O
+from	O
+a	O
+META-INF/brother	O
+file	O
+boy	O
+,	O
+post.sh	B-Indicator
+:	O
+The	O
+shell	O
+scripts	O
+u	O
+sed	O
+for	O
+application	O
+persistency	O
+.	O
+
+Application	O
+lifecycle	O
+Application	O
+Lifecycle	O
+Google	B-System
+Bouncer	I-System
+Bypass	O
+On	O
+start	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+checks	O
+if	O
+it	O
+is	O
+executed	O
+on	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Google	O
+servers	O
+:	O
+IP	O
+ranges	O
+209.85.128.0-209.85.255.255	B-Indicator
+,	O
+216.58.192.0-216.58.223.255	B-Indicator
+,	O
+173.194.0.0-173.194.255.255	B-Indicator
+,	O
+74.125.0.0-74.125.255.255	B-Indicator
+or	O
+if	O
+it	O
+is	O
+executed	O
+on	O
+IP	O
+hosted	O
+domain	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+following	O
+strings	O
+:	O
+“	O
+google	O
+”	O
+,	O
+”	O
+android	B-System
+”	O
+,	O
+”	O
+1e100	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+any	O
+of	O
+these	O
+conditions	O
+is	O
+true	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+does	O
+not	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+flow	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+method	O
+is	O
+design	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+the	O
+automatic	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+protection	O
+mechanism	O
+called	O
+Bouncer	B-System
+.	O
+
+Timebombs	O
+,	O
+Dynamic	O
+Code	O
+Loading	O
+and	O
+Reflection	O
+If	O
+Google	B-System
+Bouncer	I-System
+was	O
+not	O
+detected	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+starts	O
+a	O
+time	O
+bomb	O
+which	O
+initiates	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+flow	O
+only	O
+after	O
+20	O
+seconds	O
+and	O
+will	O
+run	O
+every	O
+2	O
+hours	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+time	O
+bomb	O
+triggers	O
+unpacker	O
+thread	O
+.	O
+
+Unpacker	O
+thread	O
+decrypt	O
+java	O
+archive	O
+from	O
+assets	O
+directory	O
+“	O
+start.ogg	B-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+and	O
+dynamically	O
+loads	O
+it	O
+and	O
+calls	O
+the	O
+method	O
+“	O
+a.a.a.b	O
+”	O
+from	O
+this	O
+archive	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+method	O
+checks	O
+if	O
+eight	O
+hours	O
+have	O
+passed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+first	O
+run	O
+of	O
+application	O
+,	O
+and	O
+if	O
+so	O
+,	O
+request	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+data	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+server	O
+sends	O
+back	O
+encoded	O
+json	O
+containing	O
+URL	O
+,	O
+class	O
+name	O
+and	O
+method	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+the	O
+application	O
+downloads	O
+java	O
+archive	O
+from	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+specified	O
+in	O
+json	O
+,	O
+dynamically	O
+loads	O
+it	O
+with	O
+class	O
+loader	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+archive	O
+is	O
+loaded	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+uses	O
+reflection	O
+api	O
+to	O
+call	O
+methods	O
+from	O
+the	O
+class	O
+names	O
+specified	O
+in	O
+the	O
+json	O
+.	O
+
+Rooting	O
+and	O
+Ad	O
+Network	O
+Presentation	O
+The	O
+reflection	O
+loaded	O
+methods	O
+check	O
+if	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+rooted	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+not	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+downloads	O
+a	O
+pack	O
+of	O
+exploits	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+and	O
+runs	O
+them	O
+one-by-one	O
+up	O
+until	O
+root	O
+is	O
+achieved	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+root	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+copies	O
+su	O
+binary	O
+to	O
+/system/bin	O
+directory	O
+and	O
+silently	O
+downloads	O
+apk	O
+file	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+,	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+as	O
+system	O
+application	O
+and	O
+registers	O
+listener	O
+on	O
+USER_PRESENT	O
+event	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+event	O
+triggers	O
+archive	O
+downloading	O
+thread	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+the	O
+event	O
+is	O
+triggered	O
+,	O
+it	O
+registers	O
+a	O
+timer	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+timer	O
+triggers	O
+additional	O
+thread	O
+which	O
+makes	O
+a	O
+request	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+expects	O
+a	O
+json	O
+with	O
+url	O
+,	O
+class	O
+and	O
+method	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+downloads	O
+one	O
+more	O
+archive	O
+and	O
+dynamically	O
+loads	O
+code	O
+from	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+final	O
+APK	O
+is	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+a	O
+different	O
+URL	O
+that	O
+is	O
+currently	O
+down	O
+,	O
+we	O
+assume	O
+that	O
+the	O
+apk	O
+purpose	O
+is	O
+overlaying	O
+ads	O
+on	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+,	O
+we	O
+assume	O
+this	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+research	O
+we	O
+have	O
+done	O
+on	O
+the	O
+API	O
+we	O
+found	O
+which	O
+returns	O
+URL	O
+of	O
+random	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+containing	O
+different	O
+advertising	O
+networks	O
+.	O
+
+Persistency	O
+Watch-Dog	O
+The	O
+application	O
+contains	O
+protection	O
+against	O
+its	O
+own	O
+removal	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+outlined	O
+in	O
+the	O
+diagram	O
+above	O
+,	O
+It	O
+installs	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+application	O
+with	O
+the	O
+same	O
+functionality	O
+and	O
+these	O
+two	O
+applications	O
+monitor	O
+the	O
+removal	O
+of	O
+each	O
+other	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+applications	O
+is	O
+deleted	O
+,	O
+the	O
+second	O
+application	O
+downloads	O
+and	O
+re-installs	O
+the	O
+removed	O
+one	O
+.	O
+
+Network	O
+activity	O
+BrainTest	O
+communicates	O
+with	O
+five	O
+servers	O
+:	O
+APK	O
+files	O
+provider	O
+(	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//psserviceonline	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/	I-Indicator
+)	I-Indicator
+:	O
+This	O
+server	O
+provides	O
+APK	O
+files	O
+with	O
+advertising	O
+network	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+found	O
+two	O
+functions	O
+:	O
+The	O
+first	O
+function	O
+is	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//s.psserviceonline	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/api/s2s/tracks/	I-Indicator
+and	O
+is	O
+used	O
+for	O
+activation	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+function	O
+is	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//s.psserviceonline	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/api/ads/	I-Indicator
+which	O
+is	O
+used	O
+for	O
+obtaining	O
+a	O
+link	O
+to	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+Regardless	O
+of	O
+the	O
+parameters	O
+,	O
+it	O
+returns	O
+a	O
+json	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+link	O
+for	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+File	O
+Server	O
+(	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www.psservicedl	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+)	O
+:	O
+Contains	O
+android	B-System
+packages	O
+,	O
+java	O
+archives	O
+and	O
+zip	O
+archives	O
+with	O
+exploits	O
+Archive	O
+Link	O
+domains	O
+:	O
+Three	O
+domains	O
+with	O
+the	O
+same	O
+functionality	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+application	O
+chooses	O
+one	O
+of	O
+them	O
+to	O
+send	O
+request	O
+for	O
+archive	O
+link	O
+.	O
+
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www.himobilephone	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www.adsuperiorstore	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www.i4vip	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+Counter	O
+Measures	O
+Use	O
+an	O
+up	O
+to	O
+date	O
+anti-malware	O
+software	O
+that	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+identifying	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+reappears	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+after	O
+the	O
+first	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+it	O
+means	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+managed	O
+to	O
+install	O
+the	O
+persistency	O
+module	O
+in	O
+the	O
+System	O
+directory	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+device	O
+should	O
+be	O
+re-flashed	O
+with	O
+an	O
+official	O
+ROM	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+Discovers	O
+Phishing	O
+Sites	O
+Distributing	O
+New	O
+IOS	B-System
+And	O
+Android	B-System
+Surveillanceware	B-Malware
+April	O
+8	O
+,	O
+2019	O
+For	O
+the	O
+past	O
+year	O
+,	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+been	O
+tracking	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+surveillanceware	B-Malware
+,	O
+that	O
+can	O
+exfiltrate	O
+contacts	O
+,	O
+audio	O
+recordings	O
+,	O
+photos	O
+,	O
+location	O
+,	O
+and	O
+more	O
+from	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+has	O
+been	O
+previously	O
+reported	O
+,	O
+some	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+were	O
+present	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+iOS	B-System
+versions	O
+were	O
+available	O
+outside	O
+the	O
+app	B-System
+store	I-System
+,	O
+through	O
+phishing	O
+sites	O
+,	O
+and	O
+abused	O
+the	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+Developer	I-Organization
+Enterprise	I-Organization
+program	O
+.	O
+
+Background	O
+:	O
+Android	B-System
+surveillanceware	O
+Early	O
+last	O
+year	O
+,	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+discovered	O
+a	O
+sophisticated	O
+Android	B-System
+surveillanceware	O
+agent	O
+that	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+have	O
+been	O
+created	O
+for	O
+the	O
+lawful	O
+intercept	O
+market	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+agent	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+have	O
+been	O
+under	O
+development	O
+for	O
+at	O
+least	O
+five	O
+years	O
+and	O
+consists	O
+of	O
+three	O
+stages	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+small	O
+dropper	O
+,	O
+then	O
+a	O
+large	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+payload	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+multiple	O
+binaries	O
+(	O
+where	O
+most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+surveillance	O
+functionality	O
+is	O
+implemented	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+finally	O
+a	O
+third	O
+stage	O
+which	O
+typically	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+DirtyCOW	B-Vulnerability
+exploit	I-Vulnerability
+(	O
+CVE-2016-5195	B-Vulnerability
+)	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+root	O
+.	O
+
+Security	B-Organization
+Without	I-Organization
+Borders	I-Organization
+has	O
+recently	O
+published	O
+an	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+this	O
+family	O
+,	O
+independently	O
+,	O
+through	O
+their	O
+blog	O
+.	O
+
+Several	O
+technical	O
+details	O
+indicated	O
+that	O
+the	O
+software	O
+was	O
+likely	O
+the	O
+product	O
+of	O
+a	O
+well-funded	O
+development	O
+effort	O
+and	O
+aimed	O
+at	O
+the	O
+lawful	O
+intercept	O
+market	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+included	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+certificate	O
+pinning	O
+and	O
+public	O
+key	O
+encryption	O
+for	O
+C2	O
+communications	O
+,	O
+geo-restrictions	O
+imposed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+when	O
+delivering	O
+the	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+comprehensive	O
+and	O
+well	O
+implemented	O
+suite	O
+of	O
+surveillance	O
+features	O
+.	O
+
+Early	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+application	O
+used	O
+infrastructure	O
+which	O
+belonged	O
+to	O
+a	O
+company	O
+named	O
+Connexxa	B-Organization
+S.R.L	I-Organization
+.	I-Organization
+
+and	O
+were	O
+signed	O
+using	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+an	O
+engineer	O
+who	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+hold	O
+equity	O
+in	O
+Connexxa	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+This	O
+engineer	O
+’	O
+s	O
+name	O
+is	O
+also	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+a	O
+company	O
+called	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+S.R.L	I-Organization
+.	I-Organization
+
+eSurv	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+public	O
+marketing	O
+is	O
+centered	O
+around	O
+video	O
+surveillance	O
+software	O
+and	O
+image	O
+recognition	O
+systems	O
+,	O
+but	O
+there	O
+are	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+individuals	O
+claiming	O
+to	O
+be	O
+mobile	O
+security	O
+researchers	O
+working	O
+at	O
+the	O
+company	O
+,	O
+including	O
+one	O
+who	O
+has	O
+publically	O
+made	O
+claims	O
+to	O
+be	O
+developing	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+surveillance	O
+agent	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+was	O
+a	O
+business	O
+unit	O
+of	O
+Connexxa	B-Organization
+and	O
+was	O
+leased	O
+to	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+S.R.L	I-Organization
+in	O
+2014	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+business	O
+unit	O
+and	O
+the	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+software	O
+and	O
+brand	O
+was	O
+sold	O
+from	O
+Connexxa	B-Organization
+S.R.L	I-Organization
+.	I-Organization
+
+to	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+S.R.L	I-Organization
+.	I-Organization
+
+on	O
+Feb	O
+28	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+notified	O
+Google	B-Organization
+of	O
+the	O
+potential	O
+threat	O
+shortly	O
+after	O
+it	O
+was	O
+discovered	O
+.	O
+
+Together	O
+,	O
+during	O
+the	O
+latter	O
+half	O
+of	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+we	O
+worked	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+store	I-System
+while	O
+it	O
+was	O
+being	O
+deployed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+iOS	B-System
+development	O
+Analysis	O
+of	O
+these	O
+Android	B-System
+samples	O
+led	O
+to	O
+the	O
+discovery	O
+of	O
+infrastructure	O
+that	O
+contained	O
+several	O
+samples	O
+of	O
+an	O
+iOS	B-System
+port	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+far	O
+,	O
+this	O
+software	O
+(	O
+along	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+)	O
+has	O
+been	O
+made	O
+available	O
+through	O
+phishing	O
+sites	O
+that	O
+imitated	O
+Italian	O
+and	O
+Turkmenistani	O
+mobile	O
+carriers	O
+.	O
+
+Wind	B-Organization
+Tre	I-Organization
+SpA	I-Organization
+-	O
+an	O
+Italian	O
+telecom	O
+operator	O
+TMCell	B-Organization
+-	O
+the	O
+state	O
+owned	O
+mobile	O
+operator	O
+in	O
+Turkmenistan	O
+Deployment	O
+to	O
+users	O
+outside	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+app	O
+store	O
+was	O
+made	O
+possible	O
+through	O
+abuse	O
+of	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+enterprise	O
+provisioning	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+Developer	I-Organization
+Enterprise	I-Organization
+program	O
+is	O
+intended	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+organizations	O
+to	O
+distribute	O
+proprietary	O
+,	O
+in-house	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+their	O
+employees	O
+without	O
+needing	O
+to	O
+use	O
+the	O
+iOS	B-System
+App	B-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+A	O
+business	O
+can	O
+obtain	O
+access	O
+to	O
+this	O
+program	O
+only	O
+provided	O
+they	O
+meet	O
+requirements	O
+set	O
+out	O
+by	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+not	O
+common	O
+to	O
+use	O
+this	O
+program	O
+to	O
+distribute	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+although	O
+there	O
+have	O
+been	O
+past	O
+cases	O
+where	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+have	O
+done	O
+so	O
+.	O
+
+Each	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phishing	O
+sites	O
+contained	O
+links	O
+to	O
+a	O
+distribution	O
+manifest	O
+,	O
+which	O
+contained	O
+metadata	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+application	O
+name	O
+,	O
+version	O
+,	O
+icon	O
+,	O
+and	O
+a	O
+URL	O
+for	O
+the	O
+IPA	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+be	O
+distributed	O
+outside	O
+the	O
+app	O
+store	O
+,	O
+an	O
+IPA	O
+package	O
+must	O
+contain	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+provisioning	O
+profile	O
+with	O
+an	O
+enterprise	O
+’	O
+s	O
+certificate	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+these	O
+packages	O
+used	O
+provisioning	O
+profiles	O
+with	O
+distribution	O
+certificates	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+company	O
+Connexxa	B-Organization
+S.R.L	I-Organization
+.	I-Organization
+
+Certificate	O
+Used	O
+The	O
+apps	O
+themselves	O
+pretended	O
+to	O
+be	O
+carrier	O
+assistance	O
+apps	O
+which	O
+instructed	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+“	O
+keep	O
+the	O
+app	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+your	O
+device	O
+and	O
+stay	O
+under	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+coverage	O
+to	O
+be	O
+contacted	O
+by	O
+one	O
+of	O
+our	O
+operators	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+packages	O
+after	O
+initial	O
+launch	O
+The	O
+iOS	B-System
+variant	O
+is	O
+not	O
+as	O
+sophisticated	O
+as	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+,	O
+and	O
+contained	O
+a	O
+subset	O
+of	O
+the	O
+functionality	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+releases	O
+offered	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+particular	O
+,	O
+these	O
+packages	O
+have	O
+not	O
+been	O
+observed	O
+to	O
+contain	O
+or	O
+to	O
+download	O
+exploits	O
+which	O
+would	O
+be	O
+required	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+certain	O
+types	O
+of	O
+activities	O
+on	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+without	O
+capabilities	O
+to	O
+exploit	O
+a	O
+device	O
+,	O
+the	O
+packages	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+exfiltrate	O
+the	O
+following	O
+types	O
+of	O
+data	O
+using	O
+documented	O
+APIs	O
+:	O
+Contacts	O
+Audio	O
+recordings	O
+Photos	O
+Videos	O
+GPS	B-System
+location	O
+Device	O
+information	O
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+the	O
+packages	O
+offered	O
+a	O
+feature	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+remote	O
+audio	O
+recording	O
+.	O
+
+Though	O
+different	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+vary	O
+in	O
+structure	O
+,	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+was	O
+initialized	O
+at	O
+application	O
+launch	O
+without	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+knowledge	O
+,	O
+and	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+timers	O
+were	O
+setup	O
+to	O
+gather	O
+and	O
+upload	O
+data	O
+periodically	O
+.	O
+
+Upload	O
+data	O
+was	O
+queued	O
+and	O
+transmitted	O
+via	O
+HTTP	B-Indicator
+PUT	O
+requests	O
+to	O
+an	O
+endpoint	O
+on	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+iOS	B-System
+apps	O
+leverage	O
+the	O
+same	O
+C2	O
+infrastructure	O
+as	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+and	O
+use	O
+similar	O
+communications	O
+protocols	O
+.	O
+
+Push	O
+notifications	O
+were	O
+also	O
+used	O
+to	O
+control	O
+audio	O
+recording	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+has	O
+shared	O
+information	O
+about	O
+this	O
+family	O
+with	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+,	O
+and	O
+they	O
+have	O
+revoked	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+certificates	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+,	O
+no	O
+new	O
+instances	O
+of	O
+this	O
+app	O
+can	O
+be	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+and	O
+existing	O
+installations	O
+can	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+be	O
+run	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+customers	O
+are	O
+also	O
+protected	O
+from	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+on	O
+both	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+Trojan	O
+Found	O
+in	O
+Targeted	O
+Attack	O
+26	O
+MAR	O
+2013	O
+In	O
+the	O
+past	O
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+seen	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+against	O
+Tibetan	O
+and	O
+Uyghur	O
+activists	O
+on	O
+Windows	B-System
+and	O
+Mac	B-System
+OS	I-System
+X	I-System
+platforms	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+documented	O
+several	O
+interesting	O
+attacks	O
+(	O
+A	O
+Gift	O
+for	O
+Dalai	O
+Lamas	O
+Birthday	O
+and	O
+Cyber	O
+Attacks	O
+Against	O
+Uyghur	O
+Mac	B-System
+OS	I-System
+X	I-System
+Users	O
+Intensify	O
+)	O
+which	O
+used	O
+ZIP	O
+files	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+DOC	O
+,	O
+XLS	O
+and	O
+PDF	O
+documents	O
+rigged	O
+with	O
+exploits	O
+.	O
+
+Several	O
+days	O
+ago	O
+,	O
+the	O
+e-mail	O
+account	O
+of	O
+a	O
+high-profile	O
+Tibetan	O
+activist	O
+was	O
+hacked	O
+and	O
+used	O
+to	O
+send	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+to	O
+other	O
+activists	O
+and	O
+human	O
+rights	O
+advocates	O
+.	O
+
+Perhaps	O
+the	O
+most	O
+interesting	O
+part	O
+is	O
+that	O
+the	O
+attack	O
+e-mails	O
+had	O
+an	O
+APK	O
+attachment	O
+–	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+program	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attack	O
+On	O
+March	O
+24th	O
+,	O
+2013	O
+,	O
+the	O
+e-mail	O
+account	O
+of	O
+a	O
+high-profile	O
+Tibetan	O
+activist	O
+was	O
+hacked	O
+and	O
+used	O
+to	O
+send	O
+spear	O
+phishing	O
+e-mails	O
+to	O
+their	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+what	O
+the	O
+spear	O
+phishing	O
+e-mail	O
+looked	O
+like	O
+:	O
+In	O
+regards	O
+to	O
+the	O
+message	O
+text	O
+above	O
+,	O
+multiple	O
+activist	O
+groups	O
+have	O
+recently	O
+organized	O
+a	O
+human	O
+rights	O
+conference	O
+event	O
+in	O
+Geneva	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+noticed	O
+an	O
+increase	O
+in	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+attacks	O
+using	O
+this	O
+event	O
+as	O
+a	O
+lure	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+’	O
+s	O
+another	O
+example	O
+of	O
+such	O
+an	O
+attack	O
+hitting	O
+Windows	B-System
+users	O
+:	O
+Going	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+Package	I-System
+(	O
+APK	O
+)	O
+file	O
+was	O
+attached	O
+to	O
+the	O
+e-mail	O
+,	O
+this	O
+is	O
+pushing	O
+an	O
+Android	O
+application	O
+named	O
+“	O
+WUC	B-Malware
+’	I-Malware
+s	I-Malware
+Conference.apk	I-Malware
+”	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malicious	O
+APK	O
+is	O
+334326	O
+bytes	O
+file	O
+,	O
+MD5	O
+:	O
+0b8806b38b52bebfe39ff585639e2ea2	B-Indicator
+and	O
+is	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+Lab	I-Organization
+products	O
+as	O
+“	O
+Backdoor.AndroidOS.Chuli.a	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+an	O
+application	O
+named	O
+“	O
+Conference	O
+”	O
+appears	O
+on	O
+the	O
+desktop	O
+:	O
+If	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+launches	O
+this	O
+app	O
+,	O
+he	O
+will	O
+see	O
+text	O
+which	O
+“	O
+enlightens	O
+”	O
+the	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+upcoming	O
+event	O
+:	O
+The	O
+full	O
+text	O
+reads	O
+follows	O
+.	O
+
+Notice	O
+notice	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+the	O
+mistaken	O
+“	O
+Word	O
+”	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+“	O
+World	O
+”	O
+:	O
+“	O
+On	O
+behalf	O
+of	O
+all	O
+at	O
+the	O
+Word	B-Organization
+Uyghur	I-Organization
+Congress	I-Organization
+(	I-Organization
+WUC	I-Organization
+)	I-Organization
+,	O
+the	O
+Unrepresented	B-Organization
+Nations	I-Organization
+and	I-Organization
+Peoples	I-Organization
+Organization	I-Organization
+(	I-Organization
+UNPO	I-Organization
+)	I-Organization
+and	O
+the	O
+Society	B-Organization
+for	I-Organization
+Threatened	I-Organization
+Peoples	I-Organization
+(	I-Organization
+STP	I-Organization
+)	I-Organization
+,	O
+Human	O
+Rights	O
+in	O
+China	O
+:	O
+Implications	O
+for	O
+East	O
+Turkestan	O
+,	O
+Tibet	O
+and	O
+Southern	O
+Mongolia	O
+In	O
+what	O
+was	O
+an	O
+unprecedented	O
+coming-together	O
+of	O
+leading	O
+Uyghur	O
+,	O
+Mongolian	O
+,	O
+Tibetan	O
+and	O
+Chinese	O
+activists	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+other	O
+leading	O
+international	O
+experts	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+greatly	O
+humbled	O
+
+by	O
+the	O
+great	O
+enthusiasm	O
+,	O
+contribution	O
+and	O
+desire	O
+from	O
+all	O
+in	O
+attendance	O
+to	O
+make	O
+this	O
+occasion	O
+something	O
+meaningful	O
+,	O
+the	O
+outcome	O
+of	O
+which	O
+produced	O
+some	O
+concrete	O
+,	O
+action-orientated	O
+solutions	O
+to	O
+our	O
+shared	O
+grievances	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+are	O
+especially	O
+delighted	O
+about	O
+the	O
+platform	O
+and	O
+programme	O
+of	O
+work	O
+established	O
+in	O
+the	O
+declaration	O
+of	O
+the	O
+conference	O
+,	O
+upon	O
+which	O
+we	O
+sincerely	O
+hope	O
+will	O
+be	O
+built	O
+a	O
+strong	O
+and	O
+resolute	O
+working	O
+relationship	O
+on	O
+our	O
+shared	O
+goals	O
+for	O
+the	O
+future	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+this	O
+in	O
+mind	O
+,	O
+we	O
+thoroughly	O
+look	O
+forward	O
+to	O
+working	O
+with	O
+you	O
+on	O
+these	O
+matters	O
+.	O
+
+Dolkun	O
+lsa	O
+Chairman	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Executive	B-Organization
+Committee	I-Organization
+Word	I-Organization
+Uyghur	I-Organization
+Congress	I-Organization
+”	O
+While	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+reads	O
+this	O
+fake	O
+message	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+secretly	O
+reports	O
+the	O
+infection	O
+to	O
+a	O
+command-and-control	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+that	O
+,	O
+it	O
+begins	O
+to	O
+harvest	O
+information	O
+stored	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+includes	O
+:	O
+Contacts	O
+(	O
+stored	O
+both	O
+on	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+and	O
+the	O
+SIM	O
+card	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Call	O
+logs	O
+.	O
+
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Geo-location	O
+.	O
+
+Phone	O
+data	O
+(	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+,	O
+OS	O
+version	O
+,	O
+phone	O
+model	O
+,	O
+SDK	O
+version	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+important	O
+to	O
+note	O
+that	O
+the	O
+data	O
+won	O
+’	O
+t	O
+be	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+automatically	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+waits	O
+for	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+(	O
+the	O
+“	O
+alarmReceiver.class	B-Indicator
+”	O
+)	O
+and	O
+checks	O
+whether	O
+these	O
+messages	O
+contain	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+“	O
+sms	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+contact	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+location	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+other	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+one	O
+these	O
+commands	O
+is	O
+found	O
+,	O
+then	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+will	O
+encode	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+with	O
+Base64	O
+and	O
+upload	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C2	O
+URL	O
+is	O
+:	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//64.78.161.133/	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+victims	I-Indicator
+’	I-Indicator
+s_cell_phone_number	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+/process.php	I-Indicator
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+this	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+also	O
+reports	O
+to	O
+another	O
+script	O
+,	O
+“	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//64.78.161.33/android.php	I-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+get	O
+the	O
+“	O
+nativenumber	O
+”	O
+variable	O
+from	O
+the	O
+“	O
+telmark	O
+”	O
+value	O
+of	O
+“	O
+AndroidManifest.xml	B-System
+”	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+hardcoded	O
+and	O
+equals	O
+“	O
+phone	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+add	O
+the	O
+result	O
+of	O
+the	O
+public	O
+method	O
+localDate.getTime	O
+(	O
+)	O
+,	O
+which	O
+simply	O
+gets	O
+the	O
+current	O
+date	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+example	O
+of	O
+the	O
+string	O
+which	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+command-and-control	O
+would	O
+be	O
+“	O
+phone	O
+26.03.2013	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+interesting	O
+that	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+used	O
+Java	O
+Base64	O
+library	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+Sauron	B-Organization
+Software	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+This	O
+software	O
+is	O
+free	O
+and	O
+distributed	O
+under	O
+LGPL	O
+license	O
+.	O
+
+Also	O
+,	O
+command	O
+communications	O
+with	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+are	O
+parsed	O
+with	O
+a	O
+function	O
+named	O
+“	O
+chuli	O
+(	O
+)	O
+”	O
+prior	O
+to	O
+POSTing	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+to	O
+the	O
+command-and-control	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+appears	O
+that	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+are	O
+somewhat	O
+familiar	O
+with	O
+the	O
+language	O
+and	O
+mountain-trekking	O
+culture	O
+of	O
+the	O
+targets	O
+–	O
+the	O
+meaning	O
+of	O
+“	O
+chuli	O
+”	O
+is	O
+“	O
+summit	O
+”	O
+:	O
+The	O
+command-and-control	O
+server	O
+and	O
+parameters	O
+can	O
+be	O
+easily	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+decompiled	O
+source	O
+code	O
+:	O
+Command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+interaction	O
+code	O
+Throughout	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+log	O
+all	O
+important	O
+actions	O
+,	O
+which	O
+include	O
+various	O
+messages	O
+in	O
+Chinese	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+was	O
+probably	O
+done	O
+for	O
+debugging	O
+purposes	O
+,	O
+indicating	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+may	O
+be	O
+an	O
+early	O
+prototype	O
+version	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+actions	O
+include	O
+(	O
+with	O
+rough	O
+translations	O
+)	O
+:	O
+The	O
+command-and-control	O
+server	O
+The	O
+command-and-control	O
+server	O
+is	O
+located	O
+at	O
+IP	O
+64.78.161.133	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+IP	O
+is	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Los	O
+Angeles	O
+,	O
+U.S.A.	O
+,	O
+at	O
+a	O
+hosting	O
+company	O
+named	O
+“	O
+Emagine	B-Organization
+Concept	I-Organization
+Inc	I-Organization
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+domain	O
+which	O
+used	O
+to	O
+point	O
+there	O
+,	O
+“	O
+DlmDocumentsExchange.com	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+domain	O
+was	O
+registered	O
+on	O
+March	O
+8th	O
+,	O
+2013	O
+:	O
+Registration	O
+Service	O
+Provided	O
+By	O
+:	O
+SHANGHAI	B-Organization
+MEICHENG	I-Organization
+TECHNOLOGY	I-Organization
+INFORMATION	I-Organization
+DEVELOPMENT	I-Organization
+CO.	I-Organization
+,	I-Organization
+LTD.	I-Organization
+Domain	O
+Name	O
+:	O
+DLMDOCUMENTSEXCHANGE.COM	B-Indicator
+Registration	O
+Date	O
+:	O
+08-Mar-2013	O
+Expiration	O
+Date	O
+:	O
+08-Mar-2014	O
+Status	O
+:	O
+LOCKED	O
+The	O
+domain	O
+registration	O
+data	O
+indicates	O
+the	O
+following	O
+owner	O
+:	O
+Registrant	O
+Contact	O
+Details	O
+:	O
+peng	O
+jia	O
+peng	O
+jia	O
+(	O
+bdoufwke123010	B-Indicator
+@	I-Indicator
+gmail.com	I-Indicator
+)	O
+beijingshiahiidienquc.d	B-Indicator
+beijingshi	O
+beijing,100000	O
+
+CN	O
+Tel	O
+.	O
+
++86.01078456689	O
+Fax	O
+.	O
+
++86.01078456689	O
+The	O
+command-and-control	O
+server	O
+is	O
+hosting	O
+an	O
+index	O
+page	O
+which	O
+also	O
+serves	O
+an	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+:	O
+The	O
+referenced	O
+“	O
+Document.apk	B-Indicator
+”	O
+is	O
+333583	O
+bytes	O
+in	O
+size	O
+,	O
+MD5	O
+:	O
+c4c4077e9449147d754afd972e247efc	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+the	O
+same	O
+functionality	O
+as	O
+the	O
+one	O
+described	O
+above	O
+but	O
+contains	O
+different	O
+text	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+new	O
+text	O
+(	O
+in	O
+Chinese	O
+,	O
+about	O
+relations	O
+between	O
+China	O
+,	O
+Japan	O
+and	O
+the	O
+disputed	O
+“	O
+Senkaku	O
+Islands	O
+/	O
+Diaoyudao	O
+Islands	O
+/	O
+Diaoyutai	O
+Islands	O
+”	O
+)	O
+is	O
+shown	O
+to	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+and	O
+reads	O
+as	O
+following	O
+:	O
+When	O
+opened	O
+in	O
+a	O
+browser	O
+,	O
+this	O
+is	O
+what	O
+the	O
+command-and-control	O
+index	O
+page	O
+looks	O
+like	O
+:	O
+The	O
+text	O
+on	O
+the	O
+top	O
+means	O
+“	O
+Title	O
+Title	O
+Title	O
+”	O
+in	O
+Chinese	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+other	O
+strings	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+random	O
+characters	O
+typed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+keyboard	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+includes	O
+a	O
+publicly	O
+accessible	O
+interface	O
+to	O
+work	O
+with	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+:	O
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+with	O
+rough	O
+translations	O
+:	O
+The	O
+command-and-control	O
+server	O
+is	O
+running	O
+Windows	B-System
+Server	I-System
+2003	O
+and	O
+has	O
+been	O
+configured	O
+for	O
+Chinese	O
+language	O
+:	O
+This	O
+,	O
+together	O
+with	O
+the	O
+logs	O
+,	O
+is	O
+a	O
+strong	O
+indicator	O
+that	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+are	O
+Chinese-speaking	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusions	O
+Every	O
+day	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+hundreds	O
+if	O
+not	O
+thousands	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+against	O
+Tibetan	O
+and	O
+Uyghur	O
+supporters	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+vast	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+these	O
+target	O
+Windows	B-System
+machines	O
+through	O
+Word	B-System
+documents	O
+exploiting	O
+known	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+such	O
+as	O
+CVE-2012-0158	B-Vulnerability
+,	O
+CVE-2010-3333	B-Vulnerability
+and	O
+CVE-2009-3129	B-Vulnerability
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+hacked	O
+a	O
+Tibetan	O
+activist	O
+’	O
+s	O
+account	O
+and	O
+used	O
+it	O
+to	O
+attack	O
+Uyghur	O
+activists	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+indicates	O
+perhaps	O
+an	O
+interesting	O
+trend	O
+which	O
+is	O
+exploiting	O
+the	O
+trust	O
+relationships	O
+between	O
+the	O
+two	O
+communities	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+technique	O
+reminds	O
+us	O
+of	O
+a	O
+combination	O
+between	O
+ages	O
+old	O
+war	O
+strategies	O
+“	O
+Divide	O
+et	O
+impera	O
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+By	O
+way	O
+of	O
+deception	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Until	O
+now	O
+,	O
+we	O
+haven	O
+’	O
+t	O
+seen	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+against	O
+mobile	O
+phones	O
+,	O
+although	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+seen	O
+indications	O
+that	O
+these	O
+were	O
+in	O
+development	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+current	O
+attack	O
+took	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+the	O
+compromise	O
+of	O
+a	O
+high-profile	O
+Tibetan	O
+activist	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+perhaps	O
+the	O
+first	O
+in	O
+a	O
+new	O
+wave	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+aimed	O
+at	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+far	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+relied	O
+entirely	O
+on	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+the	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+History	O
+has	O
+shown	O
+us	O
+that	O
+,	O
+in	O
+time	O
+,	O
+these	O
+attacks	O
+will	O
+use	O
+zero-day	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+,	O
+exploits	O
+or	O
+a	O
+combination	O
+of	O
+techniques	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+now	O
+,	O
+the	O
+best	O
+protection	O
+is	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+any	O
+APK	O
+attachments	O
+that	O
+arrive	O
+on	O
+mobile	O
+phones	O
+via	O
+e-mail	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+detect	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+used	O
+in	O
+this	O
+attack	O
+as	O
+“	O
+Backdoor.AndroidOS.Chuli.a	B-Malware
+”	O
+.	O
+
+MD5s	O
+:	O
+c4c4077e9449147d754afd972e247efc	B-Indicator
+Document.apk	B-Indicator
+0b8806b38b52bebfe39ff585639e2ea2	B-Indicator
+WUC	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Conference.apk	B-Indicator
+Triada	B-Malware
+:	O
+organized	O
+crime	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+Triada	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+modular	O
+mobile	O
+Trojan	O
+that	O
+actively	O
+uses	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+to	O
+substitute	O
+system	O
+files	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+several	O
+clever	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+become	O
+almost	O
+invisible	O
+March	O
+3	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+You	O
+know	O
+how	O
+armies	O
+typically	O
+move	O
+:	O
+first	O
+come	O
+the	O
+scouts	O
+to	O
+make	O
+sure	O
+everything	O
+is	O
+ok.	O
+Then	O
+the	O
+heavy	O
+troops	O
+
+arrive	O
+;	O
+at	O
+least	O
+that	O
+was	O
+how	O
+it	O
+used	O
+to	O
+be	O
+before	O
+the	O
+age	O
+of	O
+cyber	O
+wars	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+turns	O
+out	O
+,	O
+that	O
+Trojans	O
+behave	O
+quite	O
+the	O
+same	O
+way	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+small	O
+Trojans	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+capable	O
+of	O
+leveraging	O
+access	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+in	O
+other	O
+words	O
+—	O
+gaining	O
+root	O
+access	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+malware	O
+analysts	O
+Nikita	O
+Buchka	O
+and	O
+Mikhail	O
+Kuzin	O
+can	O
+easily	O
+name	O
+11	O
+families	O
+of	O
+such	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+of	O
+them	O
+are	O
+almost	O
+harmless	O
+—	O
+all	O
+they	O
+did	O
+until	O
+recently	O
+was	O
+injecting	O
+tons	O
+of	O
+ads	O
+and	O
+downloading	O
+others	O
+of	O
+their	O
+kind	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+you	O
+want	O
+to	O
+know	O
+more	O
+about	O
+them	O
+—	O
+our	O
+researchers	O
+have	O
+an	O
+article	O
+about	O
+them	O
+on	O
+Securelist	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+If	O
+you	O
+follow	O
+the	O
+military	O
+analogy	O
+—	O
+those	O
+are	O
+the	O
+scouts	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+you	O
+probably	O
+have	O
+noticed	O
+,	O
+gaining	O
+root	O
+access	O
+gives	O
+them	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+download	O
+and	O
+install	O
+applications	O
+—	O
+that	O
+’	O
+s	O
+the	O
+reason	O
+why	O
+once	O
+one	O
+of	O
+them	O
+get	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+,	O
+in	O
+a	O
+few	O
+minutes	O
+there	O
+are	O
+all	O
+the	O
+others	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+our	O
+researchers	O
+have	O
+predicted	O
+that	O
+these	O
+small	O
+Trojans	O
+would	O
+certainly	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+download	O
+some	O
+really	O
+bad	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+can	O
+actually	O
+harm	O
+the	O
+owners	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+And	O
+that	O
+’	O
+s	O
+exactly	O
+what	O
+has	O
+happened	O
+recently	O
+.	O
+
+Small	O
+Trojans	O
+like	O
+Leech	B-Malware
+,	O
+Ztorg	B-Malware
+and	O
+Gopro	B-Malware
+now	O
+download	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+advanced	O
+mobile	O
+Trojans	O
+our	O
+malware	O
+analysts	O
+have	O
+ever	O
+encountered	O
+—	O
+we	O
+call	O
+it	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Triada	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+modular	O
+mobile	O
+Trojan	O
+that	O
+actively	O
+uses	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+to	O
+substitute	O
+system	O
+files	O
+and	O
+exists	O
+mostly	O
+in	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+RAM	O
+,	O
+which	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+extremely	O
+hard	O
+to	O
+detect	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+dark	O
+ways	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+Once	O
+downloaded	O
+and	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+first	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+some	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+system	O
+—	O
+like	O
+the	O
+device	O
+model	O
+,	O
+the	O
+OS	O
+version	O
+,	O
+the	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+the	O
+SD	O
+card	O
+space	O
+,	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+the	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+and	O
+other	O
+things	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+it	O
+sends	O
+all	O
+that	O
+information	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+detected	O
+a	O
+total	O
+of	O
+17	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+servers	O
+on	O
+4	O
+different	O
+domains	O
+,	O
+which	O
+probably	O
+means	O
+the	O
+bad	O
+guys	O
+are	O
+quite	O
+familiar	O
+with	O
+what	O
+redundancy	O
+is	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+then	O
+responds	O
+with	O
+a	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+,	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+personal	O
+identification	O
+number	O
+for	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+some	O
+settings	O
+—	O
+the	O
+time	O
+interval	O
+between	O
+contacting	O
+the	O
+server	O
+,	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+modules	O
+to	O
+be	O
+installed	O
+and	O
+so	O
+on	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+modules	O
+are	O
+installed	O
+they	O
+are	O
+deployed	O
+to	O
+the	O
+short	O
+term	O
+memory	O
+and	O
+deleted	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+storage	O
+,	O
+which	O
+makes	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+harder	O
+to	O
+catch	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+two	O
+more	O
+reasons	O
+why	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+is	O
+so	O
+hard	O
+to	O
+detect	O
+and	O
+why	O
+it	O
+had	O
+impressed	O
+our	O
+researchers	O
+so	O
+much	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+it	O
+modifies	O
+the	O
+Zygote	B-System
+process	O
+.	O
+
+Zygote	B-System
+is	O
+the	O
+core	O
+process	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+OS	O
+that	O
+is	O
+used	O
+as	O
+a	O
+template	O
+for	O
+every	O
+application	O
+,	O
+which	O
+means	O
+that	O
+once	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+gets	O
+into	O
+Zygote	B-System
+,	O
+it	O
+becomes	O
+a	O
+part	O
+of	O
+literally	O
+every	O
+app	O
+that	O
+is	O
+launched	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Triada	B-Malware
+:	O
+organized	O
+crime	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+Second	O
+,	O
+it	O
+substitutes	O
+the	O
+system	O
+functions	O
+and	O
+conceals	O
+its	O
+modules	O
+from	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+the	O
+running	O
+processes	O
+and	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+the	O
+system	O
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+see	O
+any	O
+strange	O
+processes	O
+running	O
+and	O
+thus	O
+does	O
+not	O
+cry	O
+the	O
+alarm	O
+.	O
+
+Those	O
+are	O
+not	O
+the	O
+only	O
+system	O
+functions	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+modifies	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+our	O
+researchers	O
+discovered	O
+,	O
+it	O
+also	O
+lays	O
+its	O
+hands	O
+on	O
+the	O
+outgoing	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+filters	O
+the	O
+incoming	O
+ones	O
+.	O
+
+That	O
+is	O
+actually	O
+how	O
+the	O
+bad	O
+guys	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+monetize	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+applications	O
+rely	O
+on	O
+SMS	O
+when	O
+it	O
+comes	O
+to	O
+in-app	O
+purchases	O
+—	O
+the	O
+transaction	O
+data	O
+is	O
+transferred	O
+via	O
+a	O
+short	O
+text	O
+message	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+main	O
+reason	O
+for	O
+developers	O
+to	O
+choose	O
+SMS	O
+over	O
+traditional	O
+payments	O
+via	O
+Internet	O
+is	O
+that	O
+in	O
+the	O
+case	O
+with	O
+SMS	O
+no	O
+Internet	O
+connection	O
+is	O
+required	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+do	O
+not	O
+see	O
+those	O
+SMS	O
+because	O
+they	O
+are	O
+processed	O
+not	O
+by	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+,	O
+but	O
+by	O
+the	O
+app	O
+that	O
+has	O
+initiated	O
+the	O
+transaction	O
+—	O
+e.g	O
+a	O
+free-to-play	O
+game	O
+.	O
+
+Triada	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+functionality	O
+allows	O
+it	O
+to	O
+modify	O
+those	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+so	O
+the	O
+money	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+not	O
+to	O
+some	O
+app	O
+developer	O
+,	O
+but	O
+to	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+operators	O
+.	O
+
+Triada	B-Malware
+steals	O
+the	O
+money	O
+either	O
+from	O
+the	O
+users	O
+—	O
+if	O
+they	O
+haven	O
+’	O
+t	O
+succeeded	O
+in	O
+purchasing	O
+whatever	O
+they	O
+wanted	O
+,	O
+or	O
+from	O
+the	O
+app	O
+developers	O
+,	O
+in	O
+case	O
+the	O
+user	O
+has	O
+completed	O
+the	O
+purchase	O
+successfully	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+now	O
+,	O
+that	O
+is	O
+the	O
+only	O
+way	O
+how	O
+cybercriminals	O
+can	O
+profit	O
+from	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+,	O
+but	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+forget	O
+that	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+a	O
+modular	O
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+so	O
+it	O
+can	O
+be	O
+turned	O
+into	O
+literally	O
+everything	O
+on	O
+one	O
+command	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Fighting	O
+organized	O
+crime	O
+in	O
+your	O
+phone	O
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+main	O
+problems	O
+with	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+is	O
+that	O
+it	O
+can	O
+potentially	O
+hurt	O
+a	O
+LOT	O
+of	O
+people	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+mentioned	O
+earlier	O
+,	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+is	O
+downloaded	O
+by	O
+smaller	O
+Trojans	O
+that	O
+have	O
+leveraged	O
+the	O
+access	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+And	O
+our	O
+researchers	O
+estimate	O
+that	O
+in	O
+every	O
+10	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+1	O
+was	O
+attacked	O
+by	O
+either	O
+one	O
+or	O
+several	O
+of	O
+those	O
+Trojans	O
+during	O
+the	O
+second	O
+half	O
+of	O
+2015	O
+,	O
+so	O
+there	O
+are	O
+millions	O
+of	O
+devices	O
+with	O
+a	O
+huge	O
+possibility	O
+of	O
+being	O
+infected	O
+with	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+So	O
+,	O
+what	O
+can	O
+you	O
+do	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+yourself	O
+from	O
+this	O
+stealthy	O
+beast	O
+?	O
+
+1	O
+.	O
+
+Never	O
+forget	O
+to	O
+update	O
+your	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+turns	O
+out	O
+that	O
+those	O
+smaller	O
+Trojans	O
+face	O
+serious	O
+problems	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+get	O
+root	O
+access	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+4.4.4	I-System
+and	O
+above	O
+,	O
+because	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+were	O
+patched	O
+in	O
+these	O
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+if	O
+you	O
+have	O
+Android	B-System
+4.4.4	I-System
+or	O
+some	O
+more	O
+recent	O
+version	O
+of	O
+this	O
+OS	O
+on	O
+your	O
+device	O
+,	O
+your	O
+chances	O
+of	O
+getting	O
+infected	O
+with	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+are	O
+significantly	O
+lower	O
+.	O
+
+Yet	O
+our	O
+statistics	O
+says	O
+that	O
+about	O
+60	O
+%	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+are	O
+still	O
+sitting	O
+with	O
+Android	B-System
+4.4.2	I-System
+and	I-System
+below	I-System
+.	O
+
+Triada	B-Malware
+:	O
+organized	O
+crime	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+2	O
+.	O
+
+Better	O
+not	O
+to	O
+take	O
+any	O
+chances	O
+at	O
+all	O
+,	O
+no	O
+matter	O
+which	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+OS	O
+you	O
+use	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+we	O
+recommend	O
+installing	O
+an	O
+anti-virus	O
+solution	O
+on	O
+your	O
+Android	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Kaspersky	B-System
+Internet	I-System
+Security	I-System
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+detects	O
+all	O
+three	O
+of	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+modules	O
+,	O
+so	O
+it	O
+can	O
+save	O
+your	O
+money	O
+from	O
+cybercriminals	O
+that	O
+are	O
+behind	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Just	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+forget	O
+that	O
+the	O
+scan	O
+does	O
+not	O
+run	O
+automatically	O
+in	O
+the	O
+free	O
+version	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+all	O
+in	O
+all	O
+Triada	B-Malware
+is	O
+yet	O
+another	O
+example	O
+of	O
+a	O
+really	O
+bad	O
+trend	O
+:	O
+malware	O
+developers	O
+are	O
+taking	O
+Android	B-System
+seriously	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+samples	O
+are	O
+almost	O
+as	O
+complex	O
+and	O
+hard	O
+to	O
+withstand	O
+,	O
+as	O
+their	O
+Windows-based	B-System
+kin	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+only	O
+good	O
+way	O
+to	O
+fight	O
+all	O
+these	O
+threats	O
+is	O
+to	O
+be	O
+proactive	O
+,	O
+and	O
+so	O
+a	O
+good	O
+security	O
+solution	O
+is	O
+a	O
+must	O
+.	O
+
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+Pushing	O
+a	O
+2FA	O
+Bypass	O
+App	O
+to	O
+Bank	O
+Customers	O
+in	O
+Germany	O
+March	O
+24	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+IBM	B-Organization
+X-Force	I-Organization
+researchers	O
+analyzed	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+app	O
+that	O
+’	O
+s	O
+likely	O
+being	O
+pushed	O
+to	O
+infected	O
+users	O
+by	O
+the	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+app	O
+,	O
+dubbed	O
+“	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+”	O
+by	O
+our	O
+team	O
+,	O
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+second	O
+factor	O
+and	O
+strong	O
+authentication	O
+pushed	O
+to	O
+bank	O
+customers	O
+when	O
+they	O
+need	O
+to	O
+authorize	O
+a	O
+transaction	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+not	O
+the	O
+first	O
+of	O
+its	O
+kind	O
+,	O
+this	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+app	O
+is	O
+more	O
+sophisticated	O
+than	O
+similar	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+possesses	O
+interesting	O
+features	O
+that	O
+enable	O
+its	O
+operators	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+transaction	O
+authorization	O
+codes	O
+from	O
+victims	O
+who	O
+download	O
+the	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+our	O
+research	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+is	O
+still	O
+under	O
+active	O
+development	O
+as	O
+we	O
+expect	O
+to	O
+see	O
+frequent	O
+changes	O
+and	O
+updates	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+it	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+anywhere	O
+and	O
+target	O
+any	O
+bank	O
+or	O
+region	O
+,	O
+at	O
+this	O
+time	O
+,	O
+we	O
+are	O
+seeing	O
+it	O
+deployed	O
+specifically	O
+in	O
+Germany	O
+.	O
+
+Germany	O
+is	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+first	O
+attack	O
+turfs	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+spread	O
+to	O
+when	O
+it	O
+first	O
+emerged	O
+in	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2020	O
+,	O
+it	O
+appears	O
+that	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+vast	O
+bank	O
+fraud	O
+is	O
+an	O
+ongoing	O
+project	O
+that	O
+helps	O
+the	O
+gang	O
+monetize	O
+compromised	O
+accounts	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+Signs	O
+in	O
+September	O
+2019	O
+In	O
+September	O
+2019	O
+,	O
+a	O
+tweet	O
+by	O
+CERT-Bund	B-Organization
+caught	O
+the	O
+attention	O
+of	O
+the	O
+IBM	B-Organization
+Trusteer	I-Organization
+Mobile	I-Organization
+Security	I-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+team	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+tweet	O
+stated	O
+that	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+,	O
+a	O
+well-known	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+owned	O
+by	O
+an	O
+organized	O
+cybercrime	O
+gang	O
+,	O
+uses	O
+man-in-the-browser	O
+(	O
+MITB	O
+)	O
+web	O
+injects	O
+in	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+sessions	O
+to	O
+ask	O
+infected	O
+users	O
+for	O
+their	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+and	O
+device	O
+type	O
+.	O
+
+Machine	O
+translation	O
+of	O
+this	O
+tweet	O
+reads	O
+:	O
+“	O
+Watch	O
+out	O
+for	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+:	O
+Emotet	B-Malware
+reloads	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+On	O
+infected	O
+PCs	O
+,	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+displays	O
+a	O
+query	O
+for	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+and	O
+the	O
+device	O
+type	O
+used	O
+for	O
+banking	O
+and	O
+then	O
+prompts	O
+users	O
+to	O
+install	O
+an	O
+alleged	O
+security	O
+app.	O
+”	O
+When	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+ask	O
+for	O
+this	O
+type	O
+of	O
+information	O
+,	O
+it	O
+usually	O
+means	O
+the	O
+next	O
+step	O
+will	O
+be	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+team	O
+went	O
+ahead	O
+and	O
+hunted	O
+for	O
+samples	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+and	O
+analyzed	O
+it	O
+in	O
+our	O
+labs	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+we	O
+get	O
+into	O
+the	O
+capabilities	O
+of	O
+the	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+and	O
+what	O
+we	O
+found	O
+to	O
+be	O
+a	O
+“	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+”	O
+that	O
+can	O
+eliminate	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+remotely	O
+from	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Desktop	O
+Trojans	O
+and	O
+Their	O
+Mobile	O
+Component	O
+The	O
+process	O
+by	O
+which	O
+Trojans	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+is	O
+at	O
+least	O
+a	O
+decade	O
+old	O
+.	O
+
+Usually	O
+,	O
+when	O
+users	O
+are	O
+already	O
+infected	O
+with	O
+malware	O
+like	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+on	O
+their	O
+desktop	O
+,	O
+they	O
+will	O
+see	O
+a	O
+web	O
+injection	O
+asking	O
+for	O
+their	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+(	O
+OS	O
+)	O
+type	O
+and	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+Next	O
+,	O
+if	O
+they	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+they	O
+use	O
+an	O
+Android-based	B-System
+device	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+impersonating	O
+their	O
+bank	O
+with	O
+web	O
+injections	O
+,	O
+fools	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+into	O
+installing	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+security	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+supposed	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+that	O
+app	O
+is	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+and	O
+use	O
+a	O
+required	O
+“	O
+security	O
+code	O
+”	O
+to	O
+log	O
+in	O
+to	O
+their	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+site	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+research	O
+team	O
+analyzed	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+Android	B-System
+application	O
+that	O
+is	O
+most	O
+likely	O
+being	O
+spread	O
+by	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+and	O
+dubbed	O
+it	O
+“	O
+TrickMo.	B-Malware
+”	O
+Targeting	O
+users	O
+in	O
+Germany	O
+at	O
+this	O
+time	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+is	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+variation	O
+in	O
+the	O
+transaction	O
+authentication	O
+number	O
+(	O
+TAN	O
+)	O
+-stealing	O
+malware	O
+category	O
+.	O
+
+Its	O
+main	O
+capabilities	O
+include	O
+:	O
+Stealing	O
+personal	O
+device	O
+information	O
+Intercepting	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+Recording	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+for	O
+one-time	O
+password	O
+(	O
+TAN	O
+)	O
+Lockdown	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+Stealing	O
+pictures	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+Self-destruction	O
+and	O
+removal	O
+As	O
+banks	O
+release	O
+more	O
+advanced	O
+security	O
+measures	O
+,	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+evolves	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+up	O
+with	O
+the	O
+perpetual	O
+arms	O
+race	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+apparent	O
+that	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+break	O
+the	O
+newest	O
+methods	O
+of	O
+OTP	O
+and	O
+,	O
+specifically	O
+,	O
+TAN	O
+codes	O
+often	O
+used	O
+in	O
+Germany	O
+.	O
+
+Among	O
+the	O
+various	O
+features	O
+we	O
+discuss	O
+in	O
+this	O
+post	O
+,	O
+we	O
+believe	O
+that	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+most	O
+significant	O
+novelty	O
+is	O
+an	O
+app	O
+recording	O
+feature	O
+,	O
+which	O
+gives	O
+it	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+overcome	O
+the	O
+newer	O
+pushTAN	O
+app	O
+validations	O
+used	O
+by	O
+German	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+analysis	O
+that	O
+follows	O
+,	O
+we	O
+describe	O
+in	O
+detail	O
+the	O
+capabilities	O
+of	O
+this	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+and	O
+a	O
+“	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+”	O
+that	O
+can	O
+remotely	O
+eliminate	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+from	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Why	O
+Do	O
+Desktop	O
+Trojans	O
+Use	O
+a	O
+Mobile	O
+Component	O
+?	O
+
+About	O
+a	O
+decade	O
+ago	O
+,	O
+attackers	O
+wielding	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+could	O
+simply	O
+use	O
+stolen	O
+credentials	O
+to	O
+access	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+account	O
+and	O
+perform	O
+money	O
+transfers	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+countermeasure	O
+,	O
+financial	O
+institutions	O
+introduced	O
+various	O
+second	O
+factor	O
+authentication	O
+(	O
+2FA	O
+)	O
+methods	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+method	O
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+popular	O
+in	O
+Germany	O
+,	O
+is	O
+known	O
+as	O
+mobile	O
+TAN	O
+(	O
+mTAN	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+was	O
+implemented	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+one-time	O
+password	O
+(	O
+OTP	O
+)	O
+to	O
+the	O
+client	O
+’	O
+s	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+transaction	O
+would	O
+only	O
+be	O
+authorized	O
+after	O
+the	O
+client	O
+enters	O
+the	O
+TAN	O
+into	O
+the	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+website	O
+in	O
+their	O
+browser	O
+.	O
+
+Keep	O
+in	O
+mind	O
+that	O
+while	O
+this	O
+case	O
+is	O
+about	O
+TANs	O
+,	O
+it	O
+can	O
+be	O
+any	O
+OTP	O
+,	O
+depending	O
+on	O
+which	O
+bank	O
+is	O
+being	O
+targeted	O
+.	O
+
+Meanwhile	O
+,	O
+desktop	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+developed	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+various	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+schemes	O
+by	O
+using	O
+web	O
+injections	O
+,	O
+a	O
+method	O
+that	O
+alters	O
+the	O
+content	O
+presented	O
+to	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+victim	O
+in	O
+their	O
+browser	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+cases	O
+,	O
+sophisticated	O
+web	O
+injects	O
+were	O
+used	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+victims	O
+into	O
+entering	O
+their	O
+2FA	O
+codes	O
+directly	O
+into	O
+the	O
+web	O
+forms	O
+controlled	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+eliminate	O
+the	O
+need	O
+for	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+component	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+attackers	O
+were	O
+still	O
+constantly	O
+looking	O
+for	O
+new	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+TANs	O
+.	O
+
+Around	O
+2011	O
+,	O
+the	O
+infamous	O
+Zeus	B-Malware
+Trojan	I-Malware
+started	O
+using	O
+web	O
+injects	O
+that	O
+tricked	O
+users	O
+into	O
+downloading	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+component	O
+called	O
+“	O
+ZitMo	B-Malware
+”	O
+(	O
+Zeus	B-Malware
+in	O
+the	O
+Mobile	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+was	O
+used	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+2FA	O
+methods	O
+by	O
+intercepting	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+coming	O
+from	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+and	O
+stealing	O
+the	O
+mTANs	O
+without	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+knowledge	O
+.	O
+
+Many	O
+other	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+followed	O
+suit	O
+and	O
+released	O
+their	O
+own	O
+Android	O
+malware	O
+components	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+those	O
+OTPs	O
+and	O
+TANs	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+mTAN	O
+to	O
+pushTAN	O
+In	O
+the	O
+past	O
+few	O
+years	O
+,	O
+some	O
+banks	O
+in	O
+Europe	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+in	O
+Germany	O
+,	O
+stopped	O
+using	O
+SMS-based	O
+authentication	O
+and	O
+switched	O
+to	O
+dedicated	O
+pushTAN	O
+applications	O
+for	O
+2FA	O
+schemes	O
+.	O
+
+Instead	O
+of	O
+relying	O
+on	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+which	O
+can	O
+be	O
+easily	O
+intercepted	O
+by	O
+third-party	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+these	O
+applications	O
+started	O
+using	O
+push	O
+notifications	O
+for	O
+users	O
+,	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+transaction	O
+details	O
+and	O
+the	O
+TAN	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+pushTAN	O
+method	O
+has	O
+a	O
+clear	O
+advantage	O
+:	O
+It	O
+improves	O
+security	O
+by	O
+mitigating	O
+the	O
+risk	O
+of	O
+SIM	O
+swapping	O
+attacks	O
+and	O
+SMS	O
+stealers	O
+.	O
+
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+Calls	O
+pushTAN	O
+The	O
+pushTAN	O
+method	O
+is	O
+a	O
+hurdle	O
+for	O
+malware	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+may	O
+reside	O
+on	O
+the	O
+same	O
+device	O
+,	O
+and	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+particularly	O
+challenging	O
+for	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+due	O
+to	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+application	O
+sandbox	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+feature	O
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+block	O
+one	O
+application	O
+from	O
+accessing	O
+the	O
+data	O
+of	O
+other	O
+applications	O
+without	O
+rooting	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+get	O
+around	O
+this	O
+challenge	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+developers	O
+added	O
+some	O
+new	O
+features	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+TANs	O
+using	O
+screen	O
+video	O
+recording	O
+and	O
+screen	O
+data	O
+scraping	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Root	O
+of	O
+All	O
+(	O
+Android	B-System
+)	O
+Evil	O
+So	O
+how	O
+does	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+get	O
+around	O
+these	O
+security	O
+features	O
+?	O
+
+It	O
+abuses	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+were	O
+originally	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+Google	B-Organization
+for	O
+the	O
+benefit	O
+of	O
+users	O
+with	O
+disabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Any	O
+app	O
+can	O
+ask	O
+for	O
+accessibility	O
+permissions	O
+and	O
+implement	O
+features	O
+such	O
+as	O
+screen	O
+reading	O
+,	O
+changing	O
+sizes	O
+and	O
+colors	O
+of	O
+objects	O
+,	O
+hearing	O
+enhancements	O
+,	O
+replacing	O
+touch	O
+with	O
+other	O
+forms	O
+of	O
+control	O
+and	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+recent	O
+years	O
+,	O
+some	O
+malicious	O
+Android	B-System
+applications	O
+abused	O
+these	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+in	O
+various	O
+attack	O
+scenarios	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+as	O
+installed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+duped	O
+user	O
+,	O
+the	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+component	O
+opens	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+an	O
+intent	O
+to	O
+start	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+settings	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+coercing	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+grant	O
+it	O
+with	O
+accessibility	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+,	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+for	O
+its	O
+malicious	O
+operations	O
+,	O
+some	O
+of	O
+which	O
+include	O
+:	O
+Preventing	O
+the	O
+user	O
+from	O
+uninstalling	O
+the	O
+app	O
+Becoming	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+by	O
+changing	O
+device	O
+settings	O
+Monitoring	O
+the	O
+currently	O
+running	O
+application	O
+(	O
+s	O
+)	O
+Scraping	O
+on-screen	O
+text	O
+Android	B-System
+operating	O
+systems	O
+include	O
+many	O
+dialog	O
+screens	O
+that	O
+require	O
+the	O
+denial	O
+,	O
+or	O
+approval	O
+,	O
+of	O
+app	O
+permissions	O
+and	O
+actions	O
+that	O
+have	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+input	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+by	O
+tapping	O
+a	O
+button	O
+on	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+.	O
+
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+uses	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+and	O
+control	O
+some	O
+of	O
+these	O
+screens	O
+and	O
+make	O
+its	O
+own	O
+choices	O
+before	O
+giving	O
+the	O
+user	O
+a	O
+chance	O
+to	O
+react	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+image	O
+below	O
+,	O
+we	O
+see	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+function	O
+that	O
+detects	O
+such	O
+dialogs	O
+when	O
+they	O
+are	O
+presented	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+,	O
+asking	O
+them	O
+to	O
+tap	O
+an	O
+option	O
+based	O
+on	O
+predefined	O
+choices	O
+.	O
+
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+Persistence	O
+Capabilities	O
+When	O
+it	O
+comes	O
+to	O
+Android-based	B-System
+devices	O
+,	O
+many	O
+applications	O
+must	O
+find	O
+a	O
+way	O
+to	O
+run	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+after	O
+a	O
+system	O
+reboot	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+most	O
+common	O
+way	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+this	O
+is	O
+by	O
+creating	O
+a	O
+broadcast	O
+receiver	O
+that	O
+is	O
+registered	O
+to	O
+the	O
+“	O
+android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED	B-Indicator
+”	O
+broadcast	O
+action	O
+and	O
+adding	O
+code	O
+that	O
+boots	O
+the	O
+application	O
+when	O
+the	O
+broadcast	O
+is	O
+fired	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+instruction	O
+is	O
+especially	O
+important	O
+for	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+user	O
+interaction	O
+by	O
+running	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+as	O
+a	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+does	O
+things	O
+differently	O
+.	O
+
+Instead	O
+of	O
+running	O
+its	O
+service	O
+only	O
+at	O
+boot	O
+time	O
+,	O
+it	O
+registers	O
+a	O
+receiver	O
+that	O
+listens	O
+to	O
+the	O
+“	O
+android.intent.action.SCREEN_ON	B-Indicator
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+android.provider.Telephony.SMS_DELIVER	B-Indicator
+”	O
+broadcast	O
+actions	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+then	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+AlarmManager	B-System
+to	O
+set	O
+a	O
+pending	O
+intent	O
+that	O
+will	O
+run	O
+its	O
+own	O
+service	O
+after	O
+a	O
+predefined	O
+interval	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+other	O
+words	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+service	O
+will	O
+start	O
+either	O
+after	O
+the	O
+device	O
+becomes	O
+interactive	O
+or	O
+after	O
+a	O
+new	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+is	O
+received	O
+.	O
+
+Tricky	O
+Configurations	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+uses	O
+the	O
+shared	O
+preferences	O
+mechanism	O
+to	O
+store	O
+settings	O
+and	O
+data	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+at	O
+runtime	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+settings	O
+are	O
+Boolean	O
+values	O
+that	O
+act	O
+as	O
+switches	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+represent	O
+features	O
+and	O
+can	O
+be	O
+turned	O
+on	O
+and	O
+off	O
+from	O
+the	O
+command-and-control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+or	O
+by	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+,	O
+effectively	O
+instructing	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+certain	O
+tasks	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+settings	O
+include	O
+:	O
+The	O
+URL	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+Service	O
+wake-up	O
+intervals	O
+Important	O
+package	O
+names	O
+Accessibility	O
+permissions	O
+status	O
+Lockdown	O
+screen	O
+status	O
+Recording	O
+status	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+status	O
+Kill	O
+switch	O
+status	O
+Stealth	O
+To	O
+keep	O
+its	O
+resources	O
+safer	O
+and	O
+make	O
+analysis	O
+more	O
+difficult	O
+for	O
+researchers	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+uses	O
+an	O
+obfuscator	O
+to	O
+scramble	O
+the	O
+names	O
+of	O
+its	O
+functions	O
+,	O
+classes	O
+and	O
+variables	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+version	O
+from	O
+January	O
+2020	O
+contained	O
+code	O
+that	O
+checks	O
+if	O
+the	O
+app	O
+is	O
+running	O
+on	O
+a	O
+rooted	O
+device	O
+or	O
+an	O
+emulator	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+analysis	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+an	O
+example	O
+,	O
+in	O
+the	O
+two	O
+images	O
+below	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+the	O
+encrypted	O
+and	O
+decrypted	O
+shared	O
+preferences	O
+file	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+encrypted	O
+using	O
+the	O
+java	O
+“	O
+PBEWithMD5AndDES	O
+”	O
+algorithm	O
+.	O
+
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+Communications	O
+Exfiltrating	O
+Device	O
+Data	O
+To	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+its	O
+master	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+hardcoded	O
+URL	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+it	O
+runs	O
+,	O
+it	O
+periodically	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+its	O
+designated	O
+server	O
+via	O
+an	O
+unencrypted	O
+HTTP	O
+request	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+over	O
+a	O
+JSON	O
+object	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+data	O
+gleaned	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+phone	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+stolen	O
+parameters	O
+follow	O
+:	O
+ID	O
+IMSI	O
+IMEI	O
+Phone	O
+number	O
+Operator	O
+AID	O
+Model	O
+Brand	O
+Version	O
+Build	O
+Battery	O
+percentage	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+connection	O
+state	O
+Wake	O
+time	O
+Are	O
+logs	O
+enabled	O
+?	O
+
+Is	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+already	O
+set	O
+as	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+application	O
+?	O
+
+[	O
+True/False	O
+]	O
+Signal	O
+strength	O
+Screen	O
+active	O
+[	O
+True/False	O
+]	O
+Orientation	O
+Was	O
+accessibility	O
+permission	O
+granted	O
+?	O
+
+[	O
+True/False	O
+]	O
+Screen	O
+size	O
+List	O
+of	O
+the	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+saved	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+It	O
+is	O
+not	O
+uncommon	O
+for	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+harvest	O
+extensive	O
+amounts	O
+of	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+collected	O
+data	O
+can	O
+then	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+generate	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+identifier	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+or	O
+for	O
+monetization	O
+purposes	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+sold	O
+on	O
+the	O
+dark	O
+web	O
+and	O
+used	O
+in	O
+various	O
+spoofing	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+since	O
+some	O
+banks	O
+use	O
+anti-fraud	O
+solutions	O
+that	O
+only	O
+check	O
+device	O
+fingerprinting	O
+,	O
+fraudsters	O
+can	O
+use	O
+the	O
+collected	O
+information	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+fraudulent	O
+transactions	O
+from	O
+a	O
+device	O
+that	O
+mimics	O
+that	O
+same	O
+fingerprint	O
+.	O
+
+Stealing	O
+and	O
+Concealing	O
+SMS	O
+Messages	O
+As	O
+some	O
+banks	O
+still	O
+use	O
+SMS-based	O
+transaction	O
+authorization	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+is	O
+configured	O
+to	O
+automatically	O
+steal	O
+all	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+that	O
+are	O
+stored	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+in	O
+a	O
+while	O
+,	O
+it	O
+sends	O
+a	O
+packet	O
+to	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+collected	O
+device	O
+data	O
+along	O
+with	O
+all	O
+the	O
+saved	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+it	O
+can	O
+use	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+to	O
+become	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+,	O
+it	O
+can	O
+also	O
+delete	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+so	O
+only	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+can	O
+see	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+image	O
+below	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+a	O
+packet	O
+that	O
+was	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+containing	O
+collected	O
+information	O
+along	O
+with	O
+stolen	O
+SMS	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+Communication	O
+Channel	O
+via	O
+Stolen	O
+SMS	O
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+has	O
+an	O
+automatic	O
+mechanism	O
+to	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+cases	O
+,	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+this	O
+mechanism	O
+to	O
+send	O
+log	O
+data	O
+of	O
+important	O
+actions	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+can	O
+save	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+marking	O
+with	O
+“	O
+internal	O
+”	O
+in	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+field	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+will	O
+be	O
+instantly	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+,	O
+informing	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+operator	O
+of	O
+executed	O
+tasks	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+image	O
+below	O
+,	O
+we	O
+see	O
+a	O
+log	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+upon	O
+becoming	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+successfully	O
+became	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+,	O
+it	O
+sends	O
+the	O
+words	O
+“	O
+the	O
+app	O
+has	O
+been	O
+replaced	O
+”	O
+in	O
+Russian	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+original	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+has	O
+been	O
+restored	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+send	O
+“	O
+the	O
+app	O
+returned	O
+to	O
+its	O
+original	O
+place.	O
+”	O
+Controlling	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+operators	O
+can	O
+control	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+via	O
+two	O
+channels	O
+:	O
+Through	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+via	O
+a	O
+plaintext	O
+HTTP	O
+protocol	O
+using	O
+JSON	O
+objects	O
+Through	O
+encrypted	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+There	O
+are	O
+predefined	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+change	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+configuration	O
+and	O
+make	O
+it	O
+execute	O
+certain	O
+tasks	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+more	O
+interesting	O
+commands	O
+include	O
+:	O
+SMS	O
+Control	O
+Update	O
+the	O
+address	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+—	O
+SMS	O
+starting	O
+with	O
+“	O
+http	O
+:	O
+//	O
+”	O
+Send	O
+AES-encrypted	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+back	O
+to	O
+sender	O
+—	O
+SMS	O
+starting	O
+with	O
+“	O
+sms	O
+:	O
+//	O
+”	O
+Update	O
+service	O
+wake-up	O
+interval	O
+—	O
+“	O
+2	O
+”	O
+Kill	O
+switch	O
+—	O
+“	O
+4	O
+”	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+Control	O
+Update	O
+the	O
+address	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+—	O
+“	O
+1	O
+”	O
+Update	O
+service	O
+wake-up	O
+interval	O
+—	O
+“	O
+2	O
+”	O
+Lock	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+—	O
+“	O
+5	O
+”	O
+Display	O
+a	O
+picture	O
+in	O
+a	O
+WebView	O
+from	O
+an	O
+arbitrary	O
+URL	O
+—	O
+“	O
+11	O
+”	O
+Send	O
+an	O
+arbitrary	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+—	O
+“	O
+8	O
+”	O
+Steal	O
+images	O
+
+saved	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+—	O
+“	O
+12	O
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+13	O
+”	O
+Use	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+to	O
+become	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+—	O
+“	O
+6	O
+”	O
+Enable	O
+recording	O
+of	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+—	O
+“	O
+15	O
+”	O
+Kill	O
+switch	O
+—	O
+“	O
+4	O
+”	O
+The	O
+Lockdown	O
+Screen	O
+Most	O
+thieves	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+want	O
+to	O
+be	O
+caught	O
+red-handed	O
+as	O
+they	O
+steal	O
+—	O
+they	O
+want	O
+to	O
+buy	O
+some	O
+time	O
+to	O
+get	O
+away	O
+with	O
+the	O
+loot	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+same	O
+is	O
+true	O
+for	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Desktop	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+often	O
+blocks	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+access	O
+to	O
+their	O
+banking	O
+website	O
+after	O
+a	O
+successful	O
+transaction	O
+by	O
+using	O
+web	O
+injects	O
+that	O
+show	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+“	O
+service	O
+unavailable	O
+”	O
+screens	O
+.	O
+
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+is	O
+no	O
+different	O
+;	O
+the	O
+goal	O
+is	O
+to	O
+complete	O
+the	O
+operation	O
+while	O
+raising	O
+minimal	O
+suspicion	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+performing	O
+a	O
+fraudulent	O
+action	O
+,	O
+stealing	O
+the	O
+OTP/mTAN	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+buys	O
+some	O
+time	O
+by	O
+activating	O
+the	O
+lock	O
+screen	O
+and	O
+preventing	O
+the	O
+user	O
+from	O
+accessing	O
+their	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+lockdown	O
+screen	O
+includes	O
+two	O
+parts	O
+:	O
+A	O
+WebView	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+background	O
+picture	O
+loaded	O
+from	O
+a	O
+predefined	O
+URL	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+background	O
+image	O
+likely	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+“	O
+software	O
+update	O
+”	O
+screen	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+lockdown	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+a	O
+transparent	O
+window	O
+shown	O
+at	O
+the	O
+top	O
+of	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+“	O
+loading	O
+”	O
+cursor	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+screen	O
+persists	O
+on	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+and	O
+prevents	O
+the	O
+user	O
+from	O
+using	O
+the	O
+navigation	O
+buttons	O
+.	O
+
+Due	O
+to	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+persistence	O
+implementation	O
+mentioned	O
+earlier	O
+,	O
+this	O
+lockdown	O
+screen	O
+persists	O
+after	O
+a	O
+restart	O
+and	O
+is	O
+re-initiated	O
+every	O
+time	O
+the	O
+device	O
+becomes	O
+interactive	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+cases	O
+,	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+may	O
+use	O
+this	O
+feature	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+without	O
+the	O
+knowledge	O
+of	O
+the	O
+user	O
+by	O
+activating	O
+the	O
+lockdown	O
+screen	O
+and	O
+intercepting	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+.	O
+
+Application	O
+Recording	O
+—	O
+Stealing	O
+OTPs	O
+and	O
+TANs	O
+The	O
+feature	O
+that	O
+makes	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+different	O
+from	O
+standard	O
+SMS	O
+stealers	O
+is	O
+its	O
+unique	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+record	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+when	O
+targeted	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+running	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+feature	O
+was	O
+enabled	O
+only	O
+in	O
+newer	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+that	O
+were	O
+tailored	O
+specifically	O
+for	O
+German	O
+banks	O
+and	O
+use	O
+a	O
+special	O
+application	O
+for	O
+implementing	O
+TAN-based	O
+2FA	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+application	O
+recording	O
+is	O
+implemented	O
+via	O
+two	O
+methods	O
+:	O
+Using	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+MediaRecorder	O
+class	O
+to	O
+capture	O
+a	O
+video	O
+of	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+when	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+application	O
+is	O
+presented	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+Using	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+to	O
+save	O
+a	O
+text	O
+file	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+data	O
+of	O
+all	O
+the	O
+objects	O
+on	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+Both	O
+files	O
+are	O
+later	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+of	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+following	O
+image	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+how	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+receives	O
+a	O
+JSON	O
+object	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+command	O
+to	O
+start	O
+recording	O
+,	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+the	O
+recorded	O
+video	O
+size	O
+ratio	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+image	O
+below	O
+,	O
+the	O
+function	O
+recursively	O
+collects	O
+all	O
+the	O
+text	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+child	O
+nodes	O
+of	O
+each	O
+accessibility	O
+node	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+other	O
+words	O
+,	O
+it	O
+goes	O
+through	O
+every	O
+object	O
+on	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+and	O
+saves	O
+its	O
+text	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+Kill	O
+Switch	O
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+interesting	O
+features	O
+of	O
+the	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+malware	I-Malware
+is	O
+having	O
+its	O
+own	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+.	O
+
+Kill	O
+switches	O
+are	O
+used	O
+by	O
+many	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+traces	O
+from	O
+a	O
+device	O
+after	O
+a	O
+successful	O
+operation	O
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+TrickMo	O
+’	O
+s	O
+HTTP	B-Indicator
+traffic	O
+with	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+is	O
+not	O
+encrypted	O
+,	O
+it	O
+can	O
+easily	O
+be	O
+tampered	O
+with	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+following	O
+image	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+the	O
+function	O
+that	O
+parses	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+returned	O
+JSON	O
+object	O
+has	O
+the	O
+“	O
+4	O
+”	O
+key	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+turn	O
+on	O
+the	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+and	O
+initiate	O
+its	O
+own	O
+removal	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+an	O
+intent	O
+and	O
+seamlessly	O
+confirming	O
+the	O
+uninstall	O
+using	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+,	O
+all	O
+without	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+ever	O
+noticing	O
+anything	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+turned	O
+on	O
+by	O
+SMS	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+bit	O
+more	O
+complicated	O
+since	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+commands	O
+are	O
+encrypted	O
+and	O
+encoded	O
+with	O
+base64	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+encryption	O
+algorithm	O
+used	O
+is	O
+RSA	O
+,	O
+and	O
+interestingly	O
+,	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+chose	O
+to	O
+use	O
+the	O
+private	O
+key	O
+for	O
+decryption	O
+and	O
+leave	O
+it	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+as	O
+a	O
+hardcoded	O
+string	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+image	O
+below	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+function	O
+that	O
+parses	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+decrypts	O
+them	O
+using	O
+the	O
+hardcoded	O
+RSA	O
+private	O
+key	O
+and	O
+executes	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+Having	O
+analyzed	O
+a	O
+few	O
+variants	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+we	O
+noticed	O
+that	O
+the	O
+private	O
+key	O
+was	O
+exposed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+and	O
+did	O
+not	O
+change	O
+.	O
+
+Therefore	O
+,	O
+our	O
+team	O
+managed	O
+to	O
+generate	O
+the	O
+public	O
+key	O
+and	O
+craft	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+that	O
+activated	O
+the	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+means	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+be	O
+remotely	O
+eliminated	O
+by	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+team	O
+was	O
+also	O
+able	O
+to	O
+test	O
+other	O
+commands	O
+in	O
+the	O
+lab	O
+either	O
+by	O
+tampering	O
+with	O
+the	O
+HTTP	O
+traffic	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+or	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+crafted	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Suspect	O
+You	O
+’	O
+re	O
+Infected	O
+?	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+kill	O
+the	O
+sample	O
+analyzed	O
+in	O
+this	O
+research	O
+and	O
+all	O
+other	O
+variants	O
+that	O
+use	O
+the	O
+same	O
+private	O
+key	O
+:	O
+HrLbpr3x/htAVnAgYepBuH2xmFDb68TYTt7FwGn0ddGlQJv/hqsctL57ocFU0Oz3L+uhLcOGG7GVBAfHKL1TBQ==	O
+Sending	O
+this	O
+SMS	O
+will	O
+trigger	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+the	O
+string	O
+“	O
+4	O
+”	O
+encrypted	O
+with	O
+the	O
+generated	O
+RSA	O
+public	O
+key	O
+and	O
+base64	O
+
+encoded	O
+.	O
+
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+Compromise	O
+(	O
+IoCs	O
+)	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mcsoft365.com/c	I-Indicator
+hxxp	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//pingconnect.net/c	I-Indicator
+Hashes	O
+MD5	O
+:	O
+5c749c9fce8c41bf6bcc9bd8a691621b	B-Indicator
+SHA256	O
+:	O
+284bd2d16092b4d13b6bc85d87950eb4c5e8cbba9af2a04d76d88da2f26c485c	B-Indicator
+MD5	O
+:	O
+b264af5d2f3390e465052ab502b0726d	B-Indicator
+
+SHA256	O
+:	O
+8ab1712ce9ca2d7952ab763d8a4872aa6a278c3f60dc13e0aebe59f50e6e30f6	B-Indicator
+The	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+Factor	O
+The	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+Trojan	I-Malware
+was	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+active	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+strains	O
+in	O
+the	O
+cybercrime	O
+arena	O
+in	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+apparent	O
+that	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+help	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+break	O
+the	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+methods	O
+of	O
+TAN-based	O
+authentication	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+significant	O
+features	O
+TrickMo	B-Malware
+possesses	O
+is	O
+the	O
+app	O
+recording	O
+feature	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+what	O
+gives	O
+TrickBot	B-Malware
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+overcome	O
+the	O
+newer	O
+pushTAN	O
+app	O
+validations	O
+deployed	O
+by	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+SimBad	B-Malware
+:	O
+A	O
+Rogue	O
+Adware	O
+Campaign	O
+On	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+March	O
+13	O
+,	O
+2019	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+researchers	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Mobile	O
+Threat	O
+Team	O
+have	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+new	O
+adware	O
+campaign	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+This	O
+particular	O
+strain	O
+of	O
+Adware	O
+was	O
+found	O
+in	O
+206	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+combined	O
+download	O
+count	O
+has	O
+reached	O
+almost	O
+150	O
+million	O
+.	O
+
+Google	B-Organization
+was	O
+swiftly	O
+notified	O
+and	O
+removed	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+applications	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	O
+.	O
+
+Inside	O
+the	O
+SDK	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+resides	O
+within	O
+the	O
+‘	O
+RXDrioder	O
+’	O
+Software	O
+Development	O
+Kit	O
+(	O
+SDK	O
+)	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+‘	O
+addroider	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+’	O
+as	O
+an	O
+ad-related	O
+SDK	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+the	O
+developers	O
+were	O
+scammed	O
+to	O
+use	O
+this	O
+malicious	O
+SDK	O
+,	O
+unaware	O
+of	O
+its	O
+content	O
+,	O
+leading	O
+to	O
+the	O
+fact	O
+that	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+was	O
+not	O
+targeting	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+county	O
+or	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+same	O
+developer	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+been	O
+dubbed	O
+‘	O
+SimBad	B-Malware
+’	O
+due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+fact	O
+that	O
+a	O
+large	O
+portion	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+applications	O
+are	O
+simulator	O
+games	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Infection	O
+Chain	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+user	O
+downloads	O
+and	O
+installs	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+‘	O
+SimBad	B-Malware
+’	O
+registers	O
+itself	O
+to	O
+the	O
+‘	O
+BOOT_COMPLETE	O
+’	O
+and	O
+‘	O
+USER_PRESENT	O
+’	O
+intents	O
+,	O
+which	O
+lets	O
+‘	O
+SimBad	B-Malware
+’	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+actions	O
+after	O
+the	O
+device	O
+has	O
+finished	O
+booting	O
+and	O
+while	O
+the	O
+user	O
+is	O
+using	O
+his	O
+device	O
+respectively	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+designated	O
+Command	O
+and	O
+Control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+,	O
+and	O
+receives	O
+a	O
+command	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+.	O
+
+‘	O
+SimBad	B-Malware
+’	O
+comes	O
+with	O
+a	O
+respected	O
+list	O
+of	O
+capabilities	O
+on	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+removing	O
+the	O
+icon	O
+from	O
+the	O
+launcher	O
+,	O
+thus	O
+making	O
+it	O
+harder	O
+for	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+uninstall	O
+,	O
+start	O
+to	O
+display	O
+background	O
+ads	O
+and	O
+open	O
+a	O
+browser	O
+with	O
+a	O
+given	O
+URL	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+Does	O
+SimBad	B-Malware
+Do	O
+?	O
+
+‘	O
+SimBad	B-Malware
+’	O
+has	O
+capabilities	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+divided	O
+into	O
+three	O
+groups	O
+–	O
+Show	O
+Ads	O
+,	O
+Phishing	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Exposure	O
+to	O
+other	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+open	O
+a	O
+given	O
+URL	O
+in	O
+a	O
+browser	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+‘	O
+SimBad	B-Malware
+’	O
+can	O
+generate	O
+phishing	O
+pages	O
+for	O
+multiple	O
+platforms	O
+and	O
+open	O
+them	O
+in	O
+a	O
+browser	O
+,	O
+thus	O
+performing	O
+spear-phishing	O
+attacks	O
+on	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+open	O
+market	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+and	O
+9Apps	B-System
+,	O
+with	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+keyword	O
+search	O
+or	O
+even	O
+a	O
+single	O
+application	O
+’	O
+s	O
+page	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+can	O
+gain	O
+exposure	O
+for	O
+other	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+and	O
+increase	O
+his	O
+profits	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+actor	O
+can	O
+even	O
+take	O
+his	O
+malicious	O
+activities	O
+to	O
+the	O
+next	O
+level	O
+by	O
+installing	O
+a	O
+remote	O
+application	O
+from	O
+a	O
+designated	O
+server	O
+,	O
+thus	O
+allowing	O
+him	O
+to	O
+install	O
+new	O
+malware	O
+once	O
+it	O
+is	O
+required	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+observed	O
+in	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+is	O
+‘	O
+www	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+addroider.com	I-Indicator
+’	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+server	O
+runs	O
+an	O
+instance	O
+of	O
+‘	O
+Parse	O
+Server	O
+’	O
+(	O
+source	O
+on	O
+GitHub	B-Organization
+)	O
+,	O
+an	O
+open	O
+source	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Parse	O
+Backend	O
+infrastructure	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+a	O
+model	O
+for	O
+providing	O
+web	O
+app	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+app	O
+developers	O
+with	O
+a	O
+way	O
+to	O
+link	O
+their	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+backend	O
+cloud	O
+storage	O
+and	O
+APIs	O
+exposed	O
+by	O
+back-end	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+while	O
+also	O
+providing	O
+features	O
+such	O
+as	O
+user	O
+management	O
+,	O
+push	O
+notifications	O
+and	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+domain	O
+‘	O
+addroider	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+’	O
+was	O
+registered	O
+via	O
+GoDaddy	B-Organization
+,	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+privacy	O
+protection	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+accessing	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+from	O
+a	O
+browser	O
+you	O
+get	O
+a	O
+login	O
+page	O
+very	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+panels	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+‘	O
+Register	O
+’	O
+and	O
+‘	O
+Sign	O
+Up	O
+’	O
+links	O
+are	O
+broken	O
+and	O
+‘	O
+redirects	O
+’	O
+the	O
+user	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+login	O
+page	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+RiskIQ	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+PassiveTotal	O
+,	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+expired	O
+7	O
+months	O
+ago	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+,	O
+it	O
+may	O
+be	O
+that	O
+are	O
+looking	O
+into	O
+a	O
+compromised	O
+,	O
+parked	O
+domain	O
+that	O
+was	O
+initially	O
+used	O
+legitimately	O
+,	O
+but	O
+is	O
+now	O
+participating	O
+in	O
+malicious	O
+activities	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+the	O
+capabilities	O
+of	O
+showing	O
+out-of-scope	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+exposing	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+other	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+and	O
+opening	O
+a	O
+URL	O
+in	O
+a	O
+browser	O
+,	O
+‘	O
+SimBad	B-Malware
+’	O
+acts	O
+now	O
+as	O
+an	O
+Adware	O
+,	O
+but	O
+already	O
+has	O
+the	O
+infrastructure	O
+to	O
+evolve	O
+into	O
+a	O
+much	O
+larger	O
+threat	O
+.	O