diff --git "a/train.txt" "b/train.txt"
new file mode 100644--- /dev/null
+++ "b/train.txt"
@@ -0,0 +1,71001 @@
+Super	B-Malware
+Mario	I-Malware
+Run	I-Malware
+Malware	I-Malware
+#	O
+2	O
+–	O
+DroidJack	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+Gamers	O
+love	O
+Mario	B-System
+and	O
+Pokemon	B-System
+,	O
+but	O
+so	O
+do	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+few	O
+days	O
+back	O
+,	O
+we	O
+wrote	O
+about	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+Marcher	B-Malware
+trojan	O
+variant	O
+posing	O
+as	O
+the	O
+Super	B-System
+Mario	I-System
+Run	I-System
+game	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+found	O
+another	O
+instance	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+posing	O
+as	O
+the	O
+Super	B-System
+Mario	I-System
+Run	I-System
+Android	B-System
+app	O
+,	O
+and	O
+this	O
+time	O
+it	O
+has	O
+taken	O
+the	O
+form	O
+of	O
+DroidJack	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+(	O
+remote	O
+access	O
+trojan	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Proofpoint	B-Organization
+wrote	O
+about	O
+the	O
+DroidJack	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+side-loaded	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Pokemon	B-System
+GO	I-System
+app	O
+back	O
+in	O
+July	O
+2016	O
+;	O
+the	O
+difference	O
+here	O
+is	O
+that	O
+there	O
+is	O
+no	O
+game	O
+included	O
+in	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+package	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+authors	O
+are	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+latch	O
+onto	O
+the	O
+popularity	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Super	B-System
+Mario	I-System
+Run	I-System
+game	O
+to	O
+target	O
+eagerly	O
+waiting	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Details	O
+:	O
+Name	O
+:	O
+Super	B-System
+Mario	I-System
+Run	I-System
+Package	O
+Name	O
+:	O
+net.droidjack.server	B-Indicator
+MD5	O
+:	O
+69b4b32e4636f1981841cbbe3b927560	B-Indicator
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+:	O
+The	O
+malicious	O
+package	O
+claims	O
+to	O
+be	O
+the	O
+Super	B-System
+Mario	I-System
+Run	I-System
+game	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+permissions	O
+screenshot	O
+below	O
+,	O
+but	O
+in	O
+reality	O
+this	O
+is	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+RAT	O
+called	O
+DroidJack	B-Malware
+(	O
+also	O
+known	O
+as	O
+SandroRAT	B-Malware
+)	O
+that	O
+is	O
+getting	O
+installed	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+registers	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+DroidJack	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+starts	O
+capturing	O
+sensitive	O
+information	O
+like	O
+call	O
+data	O
+,	O
+SMS	O
+data	O
+,	O
+videos	O
+,	O
+photos	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+Observe	O
+below	O
+the	O
+code	O
+routine	O
+for	O
+call	O
+recording	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+RAT	O
+records	O
+all	O
+the	O
+calls	O
+and	O
+stores	O
+the	O
+recording	O
+to	O
+an	O
+“	O
+.amr	B-Indicator
+”	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+is	O
+the	O
+code	O
+routine	O
+for	O
+video	O
+capturing	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+,	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+stores	O
+all	O
+the	O
+captured	O
+videos	O
+in	O
+a	O
+“	O
+video.3gp	B-Indicator
+”	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+also	O
+harvests	O
+call	O
+details	O
+and	O
+SMS	O
+logs	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+further	O
+inspection	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+observed	O
+that	O
+this	O
+RAT	O
+extracts	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+data	O
+too	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+RAT	O
+stores	O
+all	O
+the	O
+data	O
+in	O
+a	O
+database	O
+(	O
+DB	O
+)	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+send	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+are	O
+the	O
+DBs	O
+created	O
+and	O
+maintained	O
+by	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+saw	O
+the	O
+following	O
+hardcoded	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+location	O
+in	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+package	O
+:	O
+Conclusion	O
+:	O
+The	O
+DroidJack	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+is	O
+another	O
+example	O
+of	O
+a	O
+growing	O
+trend	O
+in	O
+which	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+seek	O
+to	O
+exploit	O
+public	O
+interest	O
+as	O
+a	O
+way	O
+to	O
+spread	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+like	O
+others	O
+before	O
+,	O
+the	O
+event	O
+of	O
+a	O
+popular	O
+game	O
+release	O
+became	O
+an	O
+opportunity	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+unsuspecting	O
+users	O
+into	O
+downloading	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+reminder	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+always	O
+a	O
+good	O
+practice	O
+to	O
+download	O
+apps	O
+only	O
+from	O
+trusted	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+This	O
+practice	O
+can	O
+be	O
+enforced	O
+by	O
+unchecking	O
+the	O
+"	O
+Unknown	O
+Sources	O
+''	O
+option	O
+under	O
+the	O
+"	O
+Security	O
+''	O
+settings	O
+of	O
+your	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+Disguises	O
+as	O
+Android	B-System
+Apps	O
+,	O
+Has	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+Links	O
+This	O
+new	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+variant	O
+poses	O
+as	O
+a	O
+security	O
+app	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+,	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+iOS	B-System
+profile	O
+to	O
+affect	O
+iPhone	B-System
+and	O
+iPad	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+:	O
+Hara	O
+Hiroaki	O
+,	O
+Lilang	O
+Wu	O
+,	O
+Lorin	O
+Wu	O
+April	O
+02	O
+,	O
+2019	O
+In	O
+previous	O
+attacks	O
+,	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+posed	O
+as	O
+Facebook	B-System
+,	O
+Chrome	B-System
+and	O
+other	O
+legitimate	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+users	O
+into	O
+downloading	O
+its	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+researchers	O
+found	O
+a	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+that	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+different	O
+way	O
+to	O
+lure	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+new	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+variant	O
+poses	O
+as	O
+a	O
+security	O
+app	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+,	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+iOS	B-System
+profile	O
+to	O
+affect	O
+iPhone	B-System
+and	O
+iPad	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Aside	O
+from	O
+a	O
+change	O
+in	O
+its	O
+deployment	O
+techniques	O
+,	O
+a	O
+few	O
+changes	O
+in	O
+its	O
+code	O
+set	O
+it	O
+apart	O
+from	O
+its	O
+previous	O
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+newest	O
+variant	O
+has	O
+been	O
+labeled	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+version	O
+6.0	O
+(	O
+detected	O
+as	O
+AndroidOS_XLoader.HRXD	B-Indicator
+)	O
+,	O
+following	O
+the	O
+last	O
+version	O
+discussed	O
+in	O
+a	O
+previous	O
+research	O
+on	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+family	O
+.	O
+
+Infection	O
+chain	O
+The	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+this	O
+version	O
+used	O
+several	O
+fake	O
+websites	O
+as	O
+their	O
+host	O
+—	O
+copying	O
+that	O
+of	O
+a	O
+Japanese	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+operator	O
+’	O
+s	O
+website	O
+in	O
+particular	O
+—	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+users	O
+into	O
+downloading	O
+the	O
+fake	O
+security	O
+Android	B-System
+application	O
+package	O
+(	O
+APK	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Monitoring	O
+efforts	O
+on	O
+this	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+revealed	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+websites	O
+are	O
+spread	O
+through	O
+smishing	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+infection	O
+has	O
+not	O
+spread	O
+very	O
+widely	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+but	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+seen	O
+that	O
+many	O
+users	O
+have	O
+already	O
+received	O
+its	O
+SMS	O
+content	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+past	O
+,	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+showed	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+mine	O
+cryptocurrency	O
+on	O
+PCs	O
+and	O
+perform	O
+account	O
+phishing	O
+on	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+new	O
+wave	O
+also	O
+presents	O
+unique	O
+attack	O
+vectors	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+device	O
+it	O
+has	O
+accessed	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+,	O
+accessing	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+website	O
+or	O
+pressing	O
+any	O
+of	O
+the	O
+buttons	O
+will	O
+prompt	O
+the	O
+download	O
+of	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+successfully	O
+installing	O
+this	O
+malicious	O
+APK	O
+requires	O
+that	O
+the	O
+user	O
+has	O
+allowed	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+such	O
+apps	O
+as	O
+controlled	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Unknown	O
+Sources	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+users	O
+allow	O
+such	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+be	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+then	O
+it	O
+can	O
+be	O
+actively	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+infection	O
+chain	O
+is	O
+slightly	O
+more	O
+roundabout	O
+in	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+Apple	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Accessing	O
+the	O
+same	O
+malicious	O
+site	O
+would	O
+redirect	O
+its	O
+user	O
+to	O
+another	O
+malicious	O
+website	O
+(	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//apple-icloud	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+qwq-japan	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+or	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//apple-icloud	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+zqo-japan	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+)	O
+that	O
+prompts	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+install	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+iOS	B-System
+configuration	O
+profile	O
+to	O
+solve	O
+a	O
+network	O
+issue	O
+preventing	O
+the	O
+site	O
+to	O
+load	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+installs	O
+the	O
+profile	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+website	O
+will	O
+open	O
+,	O
+revealing	O
+it	O
+to	O
+be	O
+an	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+phishing	O
+site	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+figure	O
+2	O
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+analysis	O
+Most	O
+of	O
+this	O
+new	O
+attack	O
+’	O
+s	O
+routines	O
+are	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+those	O
+of	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+as	O
+mentioned	O
+earlier	O
+,	O
+an	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+this	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+showed	O
+some	O
+changes	O
+in	O
+its	O
+code	O
+in	O
+line	O
+with	O
+its	O
+new	O
+deployment	O
+method	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+discuss	O
+these	O
+changes	O
+and	O
+its	O
+effect	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+Apple	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Malicious	O
+APK	O
+Like	O
+its	O
+previous	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+6.0	I-Malware
+abuses	O
+social	O
+media	O
+user	O
+profiles	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+its	O
+real	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+addresses	O
+,	O
+but	O
+this	O
+time	O
+its	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+chose	O
+the	O
+social	O
+media	O
+platform	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+never	O
+used	O
+in	O
+previous	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+real	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+address	O
+is	O
+encoded	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+names	O
+,	O
+and	O
+can	O
+only	O
+be	O
+revealed	O
+once	O
+decoded	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+adds	O
+an	O
+extra	O
+layer	O
+against	O
+detection	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+for	O
+this	O
+characteristic	O
+and	O
+the	O
+corresponding	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+figures	O
+3	O
+and	O
+4	O
+respectively	O
+.	O
+
+Version	O
+6.0	O
+also	O
+adds	O
+a	O
+command	O
+called	O
+“	O
+getPhoneState	O
+”	O
+,	O
+which	O
+collects	O
+unique	O
+identifiers	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+such	O
+as	O
+IMSI	O
+,	O
+ICCID	O
+,	O
+Android	B-System
+ID	O
+,	O
+and	O
+device	O
+serial	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+addition	O
+is	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+.	O
+
+Considering	O
+the	O
+other	O
+malicious	O
+behaviors	O
+of	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+,	O
+this	O
+added	O
+operation	O
+could	O
+be	O
+very	O
+dangerous	O
+as	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+can	O
+use	O
+it	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+Malicious	O
+iOS	B-System
+profile	O
+In	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+Apple	B-System
+devices	O
+,	O
+the	O
+downloaded	O
+malicious	O
+iOS	B-System
+profile	O
+gathers	O
+the	O
+following	O
+:	O
+Unique	O
+device	O
+identifier	O
+(	O
+UDID	O
+)	O
+International	O
+Mobile	O
+Equipment	O
+Identity	O
+(	O
+IMEI	O
+)	O
+Integrated	O
+Circuit	O
+Card	O
+ID	O
+(	O
+ICCID	O
+)	O
+Mobile	O
+equipment	O
+identifier	O
+(	O
+MEID	O
+)	O
+Version	O
+number	O
+Product	O
+number	O
+The	O
+profile	O
+installations	O
+differ	O
+depending	O
+on	O
+the	O
+iOS	B-System
+.	O
+
+For	O
+versions	O
+11.0	O
+and	O
+11.4	O
+,	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+is	O
+straightforward	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+a	O
+user	O
+visits	O
+the	O
+profile	O
+host	O
+website	O
+and	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+installer	O
+to	O
+download	O
+,	O
+the	O
+iOS	B-System
+system	O
+will	O
+go	O
+directly	O
+to	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Install	O
+Profile	O
+”	O
+page	O
+(	O
+which	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+verified	O
+safety	O
+certificate	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+then	O
+request	O
+the	O
+users	O
+’	O
+passcode	O
+for	O
+the	O
+last	O
+step	O
+of	O
+installation	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+later	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+specifically	O
+iOS	B-System
+12.1.1	I-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+12.2	I-System
+,	O
+the	O
+process	O
+is	O
+different	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+profile	O
+is	O
+downloaded	O
+,	O
+the	O
+iOS	B-System
+system	O
+will	O
+first	O
+ask	O
+users	O
+to	O
+review	O
+the	O
+profile	O
+in	O
+their	O
+settings	O
+if	O
+they	O
+want	O
+to	O
+install	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+can	O
+see	O
+a	O
+“	O
+Profile	O
+Downloaded	O
+”	O
+added	O
+in	O
+their	O
+settings	O
+(	O
+this	O
+feature	O
+is	O
+in	O
+iOS	B-System
+12.2	I-System
+,	O
+but	O
+not	O
+on	O
+iOS	B-System
+12.1.1	I-System
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+gives	O
+users	O
+a	O
+chance	O
+to	O
+see	O
+details	O
+and	O
+better	O
+understand	O
+any	O
+changes	O
+made	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+review	O
+,	O
+the	O
+process	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+as	O
+above	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+profile	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+user	O
+will	O
+then	O
+be	O
+redirected	O
+to	O
+another	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+phishing	O
+site	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+phishing	O
+site	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+gathered	O
+information	O
+as	O
+its	O
+GET	O
+parameter	O
+,	O
+allowing	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+Ongoing	O
+activity	O
+While	O
+monitoring	O
+this	O
+particular	O
+threat	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+another	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+variant	O
+posing	O
+as	O
+a	O
+pornography	O
+app	O
+aimed	O
+at	O
+South	O
+Korean	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+"	O
+porn	O
+kr	O
+sex	O
+''	O
+APK	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+website	O
+that	O
+runs	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+website	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+different	O
+fixed	O
+twitter	B-Organization
+account	O
+(	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/fdgoer343	I-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+attack	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+seems	O
+exclusive	O
+to	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+,	O
+as	O
+it	O
+does	O
+not	O
+have	O
+the	O
+code	O
+to	O
+attack	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Succeeding	O
+monitoring	O
+efforts	O
+revealed	O
+a	O
+newer	O
+variant	O
+that	O
+exploits	O
+the	O
+social	O
+media	O
+platforms	O
+Instagram	B-Organization
+and	O
+Tumblr	B-Organization
+instead	O
+of	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+to	O
+hide	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+labeled	O
+this	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+version	O
+7.0	O
+,	O
+because	O
+of	O
+the	O
+different	O
+deployment	O
+method	O
+and	O
+its	O
+use	O
+of	O
+the	O
+native	O
+code	O
+to	O
+load	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+and	O
+hide	O
+in	O
+Instagram	B-Organization
+and	O
+Tumblr	B-Organization
+profiles	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+more	O
+recent	O
+developments	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+is	O
+still	O
+evolving	O
+.	O
+
+Adding	O
+connections	O
+to	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+We	O
+have	O
+been	O
+seeing	O
+activity	O
+from	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+since	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+and	O
+have	O
+since	O
+followed	O
+up	O
+our	O
+initial	O
+findings	O
+with	O
+a	O
+detailed	O
+research	O
+revealing	O
+a	O
+wealth	O
+of	O
+activity	O
+dating	O
+back	O
+to	O
+as	O
+early	O
+as	O
+January	O
+2015	O
+,	O
+which	O
+outlined	O
+a	O
+major	O
+discovery—its	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+emergence	O
+of	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+6.0	I-Malware
+does	O
+not	O
+only	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+it	O
+remain	O
+active	O
+;	O
+it	O
+also	O
+holds	O
+fresh	O
+evidence	O
+of	O
+its	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+One	O
+such	O
+immediately	O
+apparent	O
+connection	O
+was	O
+the	O
+similar	O
+deployment	O
+technique	O
+used	O
+by	O
+both	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+6.0	I-Malware
+and	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+It	O
+had	O
+again	O
+cloned	O
+a	O
+different	O
+legitimate	O
+Japanese	O
+website	O
+to	O
+host	O
+its	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+,	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+what	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+had	O
+also	O
+done	O
+before	O
+.	O
+
+Their	O
+similarity	O
+is	O
+made	O
+more	O
+apparent	O
+by	O
+looking	O
+at	O
+their	O
+naming	O
+method	O
+for	O
+downloadable	O
+files	O
+,	O
+domain	O
+structure	O
+of	O
+fake	O
+websites	O
+and	O
+other	O
+details	O
+of	O
+their	O
+deployment	O
+techniques	O
+,	O
+exemplified	O
+in	O
+figure	O
+10	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+6.0	I-Malware
+also	O
+mirrors	O
+the	O
+way	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+hides	O
+its	O
+real	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+before	O
+it	O
+had	O
+used	O
+several	O
+different	O
+social	O
+media	O
+platforms	O
+,	O
+it	O
+now	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+platform	O
+,	O
+something	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+has	O
+done	O
+in	O
+its	O
+past	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+Analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+iOS	B-System
+profile	O
+also	O
+revealed	O
+further	O
+connections	O
+,	O
+as	O
+the	O
+profile	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+a	O
+website	O
+that	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+deployed	O
+early	O
+this	O
+year	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+and	O
+security	O
+recommendations	O
+The	O
+continued	O
+monitoring	O
+of	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+showed	O
+how	O
+its	O
+operators	O
+continuously	O
+changed	O
+its	O
+features	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+its	O
+attack	O
+vector	O
+deployment	O
+infrastructure	O
+and	O
+deployment	O
+techniques	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+newest	O
+entry	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+these	O
+changes	O
+won	O
+’	O
+t	O
+be	O
+stopping	O
+soon	O
+.	O
+
+Being	O
+aware	O
+of	O
+this	O
+fact	O
+can	O
+help	O
+create	O
+defensive	O
+strategies	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+prepare	O
+for	O
+upcoming	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+just	O
+as	O
+uncovering	O
+new	O
+characteristics	O
+is	O
+important	O
+,	O
+finding	O
+ones	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+also	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+a	O
+different	O
+malware	O
+family	O
+like	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+also	O
+provides	O
+valuable	O
+insight	O
+.	O
+
+Links	O
+between	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+and	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+can	O
+give	O
+clues	O
+to	O
+the	O
+much	O
+broader	O
+inner	O
+workings	O
+of	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+Perhaps	O
+more	O
+information	O
+on	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+will	O
+be	O
+known	O
+in	O
+the	O
+future	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+now	O
+,	O
+users	O
+can	O
+make	O
+the	O
+best	O
+of	O
+the	O
+knowledge	O
+they	O
+have	O
+now	O
+to	O
+significantly	O
+reduce	O
+the	O
+effectivity	O
+of	O
+such	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+of	O
+iOS	B-System
+can	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+profile	O
+using	O
+the	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+Configurator	O
+2	O
+,	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+official	O
+iOS	B-System
+helper	O
+app	O
+for	O
+managing	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Following	O
+simple	O
+best	O
+practices	O
+,	O
+like	O
+strictly	O
+downloading	O
+applications	O
+or	O
+any	O
+files	O
+from	O
+trusted	O
+sources	O
+and	O
+being	O
+wary	O
+of	O
+unsolicited	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+can	O
+also	O
+prevent	O
+similar	O
+attacks	O
+from	O
+compromising	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+Compromise	O
+SHA256	O
+Package	O
+App	O
+label	O
+332e68d865009d627343b89a5744843e3fde4ae870193f36b82980363439a425	B-Indicator
+ufD.wykyx.vlhvh	B-Indicator
+SEX	O
+kr	O
+porn	O
+403401aa71df1830d294b78de0e5e867ee3738568369c48ffafe1b15f3145588	B-Indicator
+ufD.wyjyx.vahvh	B-Indicator
+佐川急便	O
+466dafa82a4460dcad722d2ad9b8ca332e9a896fc59f06e16ebe981ad3838a6b	B-Indicator
+
+com.dhp.ozqh	B-Indicator
+Facebook	B-Organization
+5022495104c280286e65184e3164f3f248356d065ad76acef48ee2ce244ffdc8	B-Indicator
+ufD.wyjyx.vahvh	B-Indicator
+Anshin	O
+Scan	O
+a0f3df39d20c4eaa410a61a527507dbc6b17c7f974f76e13181e98225bda0511	B-Indicator
+com.aqyh.xolo	B-Indicator
+佐川急便	O
+cb412b9a26c1e51ece7a0e6f98f085e1c27aa0251172bf0a361eb5d1165307f7	B-Indicator
+
+jp.co.sagawa.SagawaOfficialApp	B-Indicator
+佐川急便	O
+Malicious	O
+URLs	O
+:	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//38	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+27	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+99	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+11/xvideo/	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//apple-icloud	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+qwe-japan	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//apple-icloud	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+qwq-japan	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//apple-icloud	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+zqo-japan	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//files.spamo	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+jp/佐川急便.apk	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-qae	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-qaf	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-qau	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-qaw	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-wqe	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-wqo	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-wqp	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-wqq	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-wqu	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mailsa-wqw	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//nttdocomo-qae	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//nttdocomo-qaq	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//nttdocomo-qaq	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/aa	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//nttdocomo-qar	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//nttdocomo-qat	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//nttdocomo-qaw	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//sagawa-reg	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com/	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+711231	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+759383	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+923525	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+923915	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+975685	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+Malicious	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+:	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/lucky88755	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/lucky98745	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/lucky876543	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/luckyone1232	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/sadwqewqeqw	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/gyugyu87418490	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/fdgoer343	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/sdfghuio342	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/asdqweqweqeqw	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//twitter.com/ukenivor3	I-Indicator
+
+Malicious	O
+Instagram	B-Organization
+account	O
+:	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www.instagram.com/freedomguidepeople1830/	I-Indicator
+Malicious	O
+Tumblr	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+:	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//mainsheetgyam.tumblr.com/	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//hormonaljgrj.tumblr.com/	I-Indicator
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//globalanab.tumblr.com/	I-Indicator
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+addresses	O
+:	O
+104	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+160	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+191	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+190:8822	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+204	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+87:28833	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+204	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+87:28844	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+204	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+87:28855	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+205	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+122:28833	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+205	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+122:28844	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+205	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+122:28855	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+205	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+132:28833	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+205	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+132:28844	I-Indicator
+61	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+230	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+205	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+132:28855	I-Indicator
+GoldenCup	B-Malware
+:	O
+New	O
+Cyber	O
+Threat	O
+Targeting	O
+World	O
+Cup	O
+Fans	O
+As	O
+the	O
+World	O
+Cup	O
+launches	O
+,	O
+so	O
+does	O
+a	O
+new	O
+threat	O
+Officials	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Israeli	B-Organization
+Defense	I-Organization
+Force	I-Organization
+recently	O
+uncovered	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+Spyware	O
+campaign	O
+targeting	O
+Israeli	O
+soldiers	O
+and	O
+orchestrated	O
+by	O
+"	O
+Hamas	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+''	O
+The	O
+latest	O
+samples	O
+attributed	O
+to	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+were	O
+discovered	O
+by	O
+security	O
+researchers	O
+from	O
+ClearSky	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+In	O
+our	O
+research	O
+,	O
+we	O
+focus	O
+on	O
+the	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+sample	O
+,	O
+an	O
+application	O
+dubbed	O
+as	O
+"	O
+Golden	B-Malware
+Cup	I-Malware
+''	O
+,	O
+launched	O
+just	O
+before	O
+the	O
+start	O
+of	O
+World	O
+Cup	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+Distribution	O
+/	O
+Infection	O
+When	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+started	O
+at	O
+the	O
+start	O
+of	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+(	O
+"	O
+GlanceLove	B-Malware
+''	O
+,	O
+"	O
+WinkChat	B-Malware
+''	O
+)	O
+was	O
+distributed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+perpetrators	O
+mainly	O
+via	O
+fake	O
+Facebook	B-System
+profiles	O
+,	O
+attempting	O
+to	O
+seduce	O
+IDF	O
+soldiers	O
+to	O
+socialize	O
+on	O
+a	O
+different	O
+platform	O
+(	O
+their	O
+malware	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+this	O
+approach	O
+was	O
+not	O
+a	O
+great	O
+success	O
+,	O
+their	O
+last	O
+attempt	O
+was	O
+to	O
+quickly	O
+create	O
+a	O
+World	O
+Cup	O
+app	O
+and	O
+this	O
+time	O
+distribute	O
+it	O
+to	O
+Israeli	O
+citizens	O
+,	O
+not	O
+just	O
+soldiers	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+official	O
+“	O
+Golden	B-Malware
+Cup	I-Malware
+”	O
+Facebook	B-System
+page	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+short	O
+URL	O
+redirects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+application	O
+page	O
+at	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+official	O
+“	O
+Golden	B-Malware
+Cup	I-Malware
+”	O
+Facebook	B-System
+page	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+short	O
+URL	O
+redirects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+application	O
+page	O
+at	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+We	O
+assume	O
+it	O
+was	O
+rushed	O
+because	O
+,	O
+unlike	O
+GlanceLove	B-Malware
+,	O
+it	O
+lacked	O
+any	O
+real	O
+obfuscation	O
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+side	O
+was	O
+mostly	O
+exposed	O
+with	O
+the	O
+file	O
+listing	O
+available	O
+for	O
+everyone	O
+to	O
+traverse	O
+through	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+contained	O
+approximately	O
+8GB	O
+of	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+recent	O
+whois	O
+of	O
+“	O
+goldncup.com	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Creation	O
+date	O
+is	O
+a	O
+week	O
+before	O
+the	O
+start	O
+of	O
+the	O
+tournament	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+recent	O
+whois	O
+of	O
+“	O
+goldncup.com	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Creation	O
+date	O
+is	O
+a	O
+week	O
+before	O
+the	O
+start	O
+of	O
+the	O
+tournament	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+it	O
+Works	O
+In	O
+order	O
+to	O
+get	O
+into	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+phased	O
+approach	O
+which	O
+is	O
+quite	O
+a	O
+common	O
+practice	O
+for	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+these	O
+days	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+original	O
+app	O
+looks	O
+innocent	O
+,	O
+with	O
+most	O
+of	O
+its	O
+code	O
+aimed	O
+at	O
+implementing	O
+the	O
+real	O
+features	O
+that	O
+the	O
+app	O
+claims	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+it	O
+collects	O
+identifiers	O
+and	O
+some	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+getting	O
+a	O
+command	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+download	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+in	O
+the	O
+form	O
+of	O
+a	O
+.dex	O
+file	O
+that	O
+is	O
+being	O
+dynamically	O
+loaded	O
+adding	O
+the	O
+additional	O
+malicious	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+way	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+can	O
+submit	O
+their	O
+app	O
+and	O
+add	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+capabilities	O
+only	O
+after	O
+their	O
+app	O
+is	O
+live	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Communication	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+In	O
+order	O
+to	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+MQTT	O
+(	O
+Message	O
+Queuing	O
+Telemetry	O
+Transport	O
+)	O
+protocol	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+transported	O
+over	O
+TCP	B-Indicator
+port	I-Indicator
+1883	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Initiating	O
+the	O
+MQTT	O
+client	O
+.	O
+
+Initiating	O
+the	O
+MQTT	O
+client	O
+.	O
+
+Initiating	O
+the	O
+MQTT	O
+client	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+MQTT	O
+broker	O
+with	O
+hardcoded	O
+username	O
+and	O
+password	O
+and	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+device	O
+identifier	O
+generated	O
+for	O
+each	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+MQTT	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+broker	O
+The	O
+MQTT	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+broker	O
+The	O
+MQTT	O
+communication	O
+is	O
+used	O
+primarily	O
+to	O
+update	O
+the	O
+device	O
+state	O
+and	O
+get	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+uses	O
+different	O
+topics	O
+that	O
+include	O
+the	O
+unique	O
+device	O
+identifier	O
+,	O
+which	O
+side	O
+is	O
+sending	O
+the	O
+message	O
+,	O
+and	O
+whether	O
+it	O
+is	O
+information	O
+message	O
+or	O
+command	O
+.	O
+
+HTTP	O
+Communication	O
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+the	O
+MQTT	O
+communication	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+also	O
+uses	O
+plain	O
+text	O
+HTTP	O
+communication	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+.dex	O
+file	O
+and	O
+upload	O
+collected	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+the	O
+files	O
+that	O
+are	O
+being	O
+uploaded	O
+or	O
+downloaded	O
+are	O
+zip	O
+files	O
+encrypted	O
+by	O
+AES	O
+with	O
+ECB	O
+mode	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+key	O
+for	O
+each	O
+file	O
+is	O
+generated	O
+randomly	O
+and	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+encrypted	O
+file	O
+with	O
+a	O
+fixed	O
+offset	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+order	O
+to	O
+upload	O
+the	O
+file	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+basic	O
+REST	O
+communication	O
+with	O
+the	O
+server	O
+,	O
+checking	O
+if	O
+the	O
+file	O
+exists	O
+and	O
+uploading	O
+it	O
+if	O
+it	O
+isn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+path	O
+that	O
+is	O
+used	O
+for	O
+the	O
+uploads	O
+is	O
+:	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//	I-Indicator
+/apps/d/p/op.php	I-Indicator
+The	O
+communication	O
+looks	O
+like	O
+this	O
+:	O
+First	O
+Phase	O
+The	O
+first	O
+phase	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+attack	O
+flow	O
+collects	O
+device	O
+information	O
+and	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+are	O
+then	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+HTTP	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+collection	O
+of	O
+basic	O
+device	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+collection	O
+of	O
+basic	O
+device	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+at	O
+this	O
+stage	O
+the	O
+app	O
+can	O
+process	O
+one	O
+of	O
+these	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+•	O
+Collect	O
+device	O
+info	O
+•	O
+Install	O
+app	O
+•	O
+Is	O
+online	O
+?	O
+
+•	O
+Change	O
+server	O
+domain	O
+Out	O
+of	O
+these	O
+,	O
+the	O
+most	O
+interesting	O
+command	O
+is	O
+the	O
+“	O
+install	O
+app	O
+”	O
+command	O
+that	O
+downloads	O
+an	O
+encrypted	O
+zip	O
+file	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+second	O
+phase	O
+dex	O
+file	O
+,	O
+unpacks	O
+and	O
+loads	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+Second	O
+Phase	O
+The	O
+second	O
+phase	O
+dex	O
+file	O
+contains	O
+3	O
+main	O
+services	O
+that	O
+are	O
+being	O
+used	O
+:	O
+•	O
+ConnManager	O
+-	O
+handles	O
+connections	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+•	O
+ReceiverManager	O
+-	O
+waits	O
+for	O
+incoming	O
+calls	O
+/	O
+app	O
+installations	O
+•	O
+TaskManager	O
+-	O
+manages	O
+the	O
+data	O
+collection	O
+tasks	O
+The	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+address	O
+is	O
+different	O
+than	O
+the	O
+one	O
+that	O
+is	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+first	O
+phase	O
+,	O
+so	O
+the	O
+app	O
+reconnects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+new	O
+server	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+starts	O
+the	O
+periodic	O
+data	O
+collector	O
+tasks	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+analyzing	O
+the	O
+TaskManager	O
+class	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+the	O
+new	O
+commands	O
+that	O
+are	O
+supported	O
+at	O
+this	O
+stage	O
+:	O
+As	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+above	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+quite	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+data	O
+collection	O
+tasks	O
+that	O
+are	O
+now	O
+available	O
+:	O
+Collect	O
+device	O
+info	O
+Track	O
+location	O
+Upload	O
+contacts	O
+information	O
+Upload	O
+sent	O
+and	O
+received	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+Upload	O
+images	O
+Upload	O
+video	O
+files	O
+Send	O
+recursive	O
+dirlist	O
+of	O
+the	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+Upload	O
+specific	O
+files	O
+Record	O
+audio	O
+using	O
+the	O
+microphone	O
+Record	O
+calls	O
+Use	O
+the	O
+camera	O
+to	O
+capture	O
+bursts	O
+of	O
+snapshots	O
+Those	O
+tasks	O
+can	O
+either	O
+run	O
+periodically	O
+,	O
+on	O
+event	O
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+incoming	O
+call	O
+)	O
+or	O
+when	O
+getting	O
+
+a	O
+command	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Mitigations	O
+Stay	O
+protected	O
+from	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+by	O
+taking	O
+these	O
+precautions	O
+:	O
+Do	O
+not	O
+download	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+unfamiliar	O
+sites	O
+Only	O
+install	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+trusted	O
+sources	O
+Pay	O
+close	O
+attention	O
+to	O
+the	O
+permissions	O
+requested	O
+by	O
+apps	O
+Install	O
+a	O
+suitable	O
+mobile	O
+security	O
+app	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+SEP	O
+Mobile	O
+or	O
+Norton	O
+,	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+your	O
+device	O
+and	O
+data	O
+Keep	O
+your	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+up	O
+to	O
+date	O
+Make	O
+frequent	O
+backups	O
+of	O
+important	O
+data	O
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+Compromise	O
+(	O
+IoCs	O
+)	O
+Package	O
+names	O
+:	O
+anew.football.cup.world.com.worldcup	B-Indicator
+com.coder.glancelove	B-Indicator
+com.winkchat	I-Indicator
+APK	O
+SHA2	O
+:	O
+166f3a863bb2b66bda9c76dccf9529d5237f6394721f46635b053870eb2fcc5a	B-Indicator
+
+b45defca452a640b303288131eb64c485f442aae0682a3c56489d24d59439b47	B-Indicator
+d9601735d674a9e55546fde0bffde235bc5f2546504b31799d874e8c31d5b6e9	B-Indicator
+2ce54d93510126fca83031f9521e40cd8460ae564d3d927e17bd63fb4cb20edc	B-Indicator
+67b1a1e7b505ac510322b9d4f4fc1e8a569d6d644582b588faccfeeaa4922cb7	B-Indicator
+
+1664cb343ee830fa94725fed143b119f7e2351307ed0ce04724b23469b9002f2	B-Indicator
+Loaded	O
+DEX	O
+SHA2	O
+:	O
+afaf446a337bf93301b1d72855ccdd76112595f6e4369d977bea6f9721edf37e	B-Indicator
+Domain/IP	O
+:	O
+goldncup	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+glancelove	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+autoandroidup	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+website	I-Indicator
+mobilestoreupdate	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+website	I-Indicator
+updatemobapp	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+website	I-Indicator
+107	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+175	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+144	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+26	I-Indicator
+192	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+64	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+114	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+147	I-Indicator
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+2.0	I-Malware
+:	O
+Android	B-System
+Trojan	O
+targets	O
+security-seekers	O
+A	O
+malicious	O
+,	O
+counterfeit	O
+version	O
+of	O
+a	O
+VPN	B-System
+client	O
+for	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+targets	O
+security-minded	O
+victims	O
+with	O
+a	O
+RAT	O
+.	O
+
+Written	O
+by	O
+Jagadeesh	O
+Chandraiah	O
+JULY	O
+23	O
+,	O
+2018	O
+SophosLabs	B-Organization
+has	O
+uncovered	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+distribution	O
+campaign	O
+that	O
+uses	O
+advertising	O
+placement	O
+to	O
+distribute	O
+the	O
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+Trojan	I-Malware
+,	O
+linking	O
+counterfeit	O
+branding	O
+of	O
+well-known	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+Web	O
+pages	O
+that	O
+deliver	O
+an	O
+updated	O
+,	O
+2.0	O
+version	O
+of	O
+this	O
+bank	O
+credential	O
+thief	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+group	O
+distributing	O
+this	O
+family	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+decorates	O
+it	O
+in	O
+the	O
+branding	O
+and	O
+logos	O
+of	O
+well-known	O
+social	O
+media	O
+or	O
+media	O
+player	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+system	O
+update	O
+patches	O
+,	O
+or	O
+(	O
+in	O
+its	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+campaign	O
+)	O
+VPN	B-System
+client	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+lure	O
+users	O
+into	O
+downloading	O
+,	O
+installing	O
+,	O
+and	O
+elevating	O
+the	O
+privileges	O
+of	O
+a	O
+Trojanized	O
+app	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+a	O
+site	O
+not	O
+affiliated	O
+with	O
+any	O
+reputable	O
+app	O
+market	O
+or	O
+store	O
+.	O
+
+Aside	O
+from	O
+the	O
+inescapable	O
+irony	O
+of	O
+disguising	O
+a	O
+security-reducing	O
+Trojan	O
+as	O
+an	O
+ostensibly	O
+security-enhancing	O
+app	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+righteous	O
+affront	O
+to	O
+the	O
+whole	O
+concept	O
+of	O
+a	O
+VPN	O
+’	O
+s	O
+purpose	O
+a	O
+Trojan	O
+so	O
+disguised	O
+inspires	O
+,	O
+this	O
+represents	O
+an	O
+escalation	O
+in	O
+the	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+app	O
+types	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+of	O
+bankbots	O
+in	O
+disguise	O
+.	O
+
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+Plays	O
+Dress-Up	O
+In	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+Web	O
+pages	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+(	O
+vaguely	O
+)	O
+resemble	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+market	O
+pages	O
+,	O
+hosting	O
+files	O
+for	O
+download	O
+that	O
+have	O
+been	O
+disguised	O
+as	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+mobile	O
+application	O
+of	O
+moderately	O
+broad	O
+appeal	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+a	O
+media	O
+player	O
+or	O
+social	O
+media	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+the	O
+categories	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+this	O
+group	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+be	O
+broadening	O
+with	O
+the	O
+inclusion	O
+of	O
+VPN	B-System
+software	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Web	O
+page	O
+shown	O
+here	O
+on	O
+the	O
+left	O
+is	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+a	O
+domain	O
+that	O
+seems	O
+apt	O
+:	O
+free-vpn	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+download	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Investigation	O
+of	O
+this	O
+domain	O
+led	O
+to	O
+additional	O
+domains	O
+that	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+have	O
+been	O
+registered	O
+for	O
+use	O
+with	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+but	O
+are	O
+not	O
+in	O
+use	O
+yet	O
+.	O
+
+(	O
+You	O
+can	O
+find	O
+additional	O
+IoCs	O
+at	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+this	O
+article	O
+)	O
+As	O
+you	O
+can	O
+see	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Web	O
+page	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+similar	O
+colour	O
+scheme	O
+as	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+icon	O
+design	O
+from	O
+,	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+VPN	O
+application	O
+(	O
+VPN	O
+Proxy	O
+Master	O
+)	O
+found	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+store	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+fake	O
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+quite	O
+nail	O
+the	O
+app	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+“	O
+Free	B-System
+VPN	I-System
+Master	I-System
+Android	I-System
+,	O
+”	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+observed	O
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+2.0	I-Malware
+Trojans	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+disguising	O
+themselves	O
+using	O
+names	O
+like	O
+:	O
+Flash	B-System
+Player	I-System
+or	O
+Update	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+Player	I-System
+Android	B-System
+Update	I-System
+or	O
+Android	B-System
+Antivirus	I-System
+Chrome	B-System
+Update	I-System
+or	O
+Google	B-System
+Update	I-System
+Update	B-System
+Google	I-System
+Market	I-System
+WhatsApp	B-System
+Viber	B-System
+OneCoin	B-System
+Wallet	B-System
+Pornhub	O
+Tactic	O
+FlashLight	O
+or	O
+PROFlashLight	O
+Finanzonline	O
+The	O
+vast	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+in-the-wild	O
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+2.0	I-Malware
+samples	I-Malware
+falsely	O
+present	O
+themselves	O
+as	O
+Adobe	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+player	I-System
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+a	O
+utility	O
+that	O
+Adobe	B-Organization
+stopped	O
+supporting	O
+years	O
+ago	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+logs	O
+show	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+simultaneous	B-Malware
+Red	I-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+2.0	I-Malware
+campaigns	I-Malware
+in	O
+operation	O
+,	O
+many	O
+(	O
+but	O
+not	O
+all	O
+)	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+dynamic	O
+DNS	O
+domains	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+Payload	I-Malware
+Once	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+requests	O
+Device	O
+Administrator	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+obtains	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+rights	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+lock	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+by	O
+itself	O
+,	O
+expire	O
+the	O
+password	O
+,	O
+and	O
+resist	O
+being	O
+uninstalled	O
+through	O
+normal	O
+methods	O
+.	O
+
+Device	O
+admin	O
+request	O
+from	O
+app	O
+that	O
+says	O
+it	O
+is	O
+WhatsApp	O
+The	O
+app	O
+then	O
+stays	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+listening	O
+to	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+cybercrooks	O
+.	O
+
+Within	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+first	O
+of	O
+those	O
+commands	O
+,	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+typically	O
+receives	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+banks	O
+it	O
+will	O
+target	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+works	O
+by	O
+creating	O
+an	O
+overlay	O
+whenever	O
+the	O
+user	O
+launches	O
+the	O
+banking	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+Currently	O
+Running	O
+Applications	O
+Banking	O
+Trojans	O
+that	O
+rely	O
+on	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+mechanism	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+information	O
+need	O
+to	O
+know	O
+what	O
+application	O
+is	O
+in	O
+the	O
+foreground	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+do	O
+this	O
+not	O
+only	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+whether	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+app	O
+may	O
+permit	O
+them	O
+to	O
+harvest	O
+another	O
+credential	O
+,	O
+but	O
+also	O
+because	O
+each	O
+targeted	O
+app	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+have	O
+an	O
+overlay	O
+mapped	O
+to	O
+its	O
+design	O
+,	O
+so	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+can	O
+intercept	O
+and	O
+steal	O
+user	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+quest	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+the	O
+currently	O
+running	O
+application	O
+is	O
+a	O
+hallmark	O
+of	O
+overlay	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+so	O
+we	O
+thought	O
+we	O
+’	O
+d	O
+take	O
+a	O
+closer	O
+look	O
+at	O
+how	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+done	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+prevent	O
+this	O
+,	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+engineers	O
+regularly	O
+release	O
+updates	O
+that	O
+contain	O
+bug	O
+fixes	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+getting	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+currently	O
+running	O
+apps	O
+without	O
+explicit	O
+permission	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+every	O
+Android	B-System
+update	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+are	O
+forced	O
+to	O
+come	O
+up	O
+with	O
+new	O
+tricks	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+particular	O
+case	O
+is	O
+not	O
+an	O
+exception	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+author	O
+(	O
+s	O
+)	O
+of	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+wrote	O
+separate	O
+subroutines	O
+that	O
+identify	O
+the	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+version	O
+and	O
+fire	O
+off	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+currently	O
+running	O
+applications	O
+known	O
+to	O
+work	O
+on	O
+that	O
+particular	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+they	O
+use	O
+the	O
+built-in	O
+toolbox	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+what	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+running	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+that	O
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+work	O
+,	O
+they	O
+try	O
+to	O
+use	O
+queryUsageStats	O
+:	O
+When	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+invokes	O
+queryUsageStats	O
+,	O
+it	O
+asks	O
+for	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+applications	O
+that	O
+ran	O
+in	O
+the	O
+last	O
+1	O
+million	O
+milliseconds	O
+(	O
+16	O
+minutes	O
+and	O
+40	O
+seconds	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+String	O
+Resources	O
+Used	O
+to	O
+Store	O
+App	O
+Data	O
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+2.0	I-Malware
+stores	O
+its	O
+data	O
+in	O
+an	O
+atypical	O
+location	O
+(	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+Strings.xml	B-Indicator
+file	I-Indicator
+embedded	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app	O
+)	O
+to	O
+fetch	O
+its	O
+critical	O
+data	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+com.dsufabunfzs.dowiflubs	O
+strings	O
+in	O
+the	O
+screenshot	O
+above	O
+refer	O
+to	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+name	O
+this	O
+particular	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+given	O
+,	O
+which	O
+in	O
+this	O
+case	O
+was	O
+randomized	O
+into	O
+alphabet	O
+salad	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+been	O
+SophosLabs	O
+’	O
+observation	O
+that	O
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+Trojans	I-Malware
+usually	O
+have	O
+a	O
+randomized	O
+internal	O
+name	O
+like	O
+this	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+strings	O
+section	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+contains	O
+embedded	O
+command-and-control	O
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+,	O
+ports	O
+,	O
+and	O
+domain	O
+names	O
+in	O
+plaintext	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+an	O
+invaluable	O
+source	O
+of	O
+intelligence	O
+about	O
+a	O
+given	O
+campaign	O
+..	O
+The	O
+following	O
+snippet	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+location	O
+within	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+where	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+SQLite	O
+database	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+store	O
+and	O
+recall	O
+command-and-control	O
+addresses	O
+:	O
+Backdoor	O
+Commands	O
+The	O
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+code	I-Malware
+also	O
+contains	O
+an	O
+embedded	O
+list	O
+of	O
+commands	O
+the	O
+botmaster	O
+can	O
+send	O
+to	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+execute	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+arbitrary	O
+commands	O
+,	O
+including	O
+(	O
+for	O
+example	O
+)	O
+intercepting	O
+or	O
+sending	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+without	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+knowledge	O
+,	O
+obtaining	O
+a	O
+copy	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Address	B-System
+Book	I-System
+,	O
+or	O
+call	O
+or	O
+text	O
+message	O
+logs	O
+,	O
+or	O
+sending	O
+phone	O
+network	O
+feature	O
+codes	O
+(	O
+also	O
+known	O
+as	O
+USSD	O
+codes	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+C2	O
+and	O
+Targeted	O
+Banks	O
+As	O
+described	O
+earlier	O
+,	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+domain	O
+is	O
+kept	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+resources	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+the	O
+app	O
+execution	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+contacts	O
+C2	O
+domain	O
+for	O
+further	O
+instructions	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+network	O
+traffic	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+observed	O
+is	O
+HTTP	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C2	O
+address	O
+,	O
+as	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+samples	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+seen	O
+,	O
+comprise	O
+both	O
+an	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+and	O
+port	O
+number	O
+;	O
+So	O
+far	O
+,	O
+all	O
+the	O
+samples	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+tested	O
+attempted	O
+to	O
+contact	O
+an	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+on	O
+port	B-Indicator
+7878/tcp	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+main	O
+C2	O
+domain	O
+is	O
+not	O
+responsive	O
+,	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+fetches	O
+a	O
+backup	O
+C2	O
+domain	O
+from	O
+a	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+account	O
+.	O
+
+Static	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+code	O
+reveals	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+downloads	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+template	O
+to	O
+use	O
+against	O
+any	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+(	O
+s	O
+)	O
+it	O
+is	O
+targeting	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+also	O
+sends	O
+regular	O
+telemetry	O
+back	O
+to	O
+its	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+about	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+in	O
+the	O
+form	O
+of	O
+an	O
+HTTP	B-Indicator
+POST	O
+to	O
+its	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+base	O
+Dalvik	O
+User-Agent	O
+string	O
+for	O
+the	O
+device	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+running	O
+on	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+content	O
+of	O
+the	O
+HTTP	B-Indicator
+POST	O
+data	O
+is	O
+telemetry	O
+data	O
+in	O
+a	O
+json	O
+format	O
+about	O
+the	O
+device	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+running	O
+on	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+list	O
+of	O
+banks	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+2.0	I-Malware
+includes	O
+NatWest	O
+,	O
+Barclays	B-Organization
+,	O
+Westpac	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Citibank	O
+.	O
+
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+2.0	I-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+bot	O
+that	O
+is	O
+currently	O
+very	O
+active	O
+online	O
+,	O
+and	O
+presents	O
+a	O
+risk	O
+to	O
+Android	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+expect	O
+to	O
+see	O
+more	O
+diversification	O
+in	O
+the	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+lures	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+group	O
+employs	O
+as	O
+time	O
+goes	O
+on	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+far	O
+,	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Achilles	O
+heel	O
+;	O
+disabling	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+third-party	O
+apps	O
+has	O
+been	O
+an	O
+effective	O
+prevention	O
+measure	O
+.	O
+
+Stick	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+and	O
+use	O
+VPN	O
+software	O
+from	O
+reputable	O
+vendors	O
+.	O
+
+Sophos	B-Organization
+detects	O
+all	O
+the	O
+samples	O
+of	O
+this	O
+Trojan	O
+family	O
+as	O
+Andr/Banker-GWC	O
+and	O
+Andr/Spybot-A	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+,	O
+these	O
+are	O
+only	O
+distributed	O
+as	O
+a	O
+direct	O
+download	O
+from	O
+unofficial	O
+Web	O
+pages	O
+(	O
+“	O
+third-party	O
+”	O
+app	O
+)	O
+and	O
+not	O
+through	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+Red	B-Malware
+Alert	I-Malware
+2.0	I-Malware
+IoCs	O
+list	O
+C2	O
+addresses	O
+103.239.30.126:7878	B-Indicator
+146.185.241.29:7878	B-Indicator
+146.185.241.42:7878	B-Indicator
+185.126.200.3:7878	B-Indicator
+185.126.200.12:7878	B-Indicator
+185.126.200.15:7878	B-Indicator
+185.126.200.18:7878	B-Indicator
+185.165.28.15:7878	B-Indicator
+185.243.243.241:7878	B-Indicator
+185.243.243.244:7878	B-Indicator
+185.243.243.245:7878	B-Indicator
+Domains	O
+Malware	O
+source	O
+Web	O
+hosts	O
+
+on	O
+167.99.176.61	B-Indicator
+:	O
+free-androidvpn.date	B-Indicator
+free-androidvpn.download	O
+free-androidvpn.online	O
+free-vpn.date	B-Indicator
+free-vpn.download	O
+free-vpn.online	O
+Hashes	O
+22fcfce096392f085218c3a78dd0fa4be9e67ed725bce42b965a27725f671cf	O
+55292a4dde8727faad1c40c914cf1be9dfdcf4e67b515aa593bcd8d86e824372	B-Indicator
+
+be92a751e5abbcd24151b509dbb4feb98ea46f367a99d6f86ed4a7c162461e31	B-Indicator
+5c4d666cef84abc2a1ffd3b1060ef28fa3c6c3bb4fad1fa26db99350b41bea4c	B-Indicator
+06081ab7faa729e33b9397a0e47548e75cbec3d43c50e6368e81d737552150a5	B-Indicator
+753999cb19a4346042f973e30cf1158c44f2335ab65859d3bfa16bca4098e2ef	B-Indicator
+
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+of	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+hard	O
+work	O
+done	O
+by	O
+our	O
+security	O
+research	O
+teams	O
+,	O
+we	O
+revealed	O
+today	O
+a	O
+new	O
+and	O
+alarming	O
+malware	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attack	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+named	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+,	O
+breached	O
+the	O
+security	O
+of	O
+over	O
+one	O
+million	O
+Google	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+number	O
+continues	O
+to	O
+rise	O
+at	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+13,000	O
+breached	O
+devices	O
+each	O
+day	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+research	O
+exposes	O
+how	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+roots	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+steals	O
+authentication	O
+tokens	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+access	O
+data	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+Gmail	B-System
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Photos	I-System
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Docs	I-System
+,	O
+G	B-System
+Suite	I-System
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Drive	I-System
+,	O
+and	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	O
+malware	O
+campaign	O
+found	O
+by	O
+our	O
+researchers	O
+in	O
+the	O
+SnapPea	B-Malware
+app	O
+last	O
+year	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+reached	O
+out	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Google	B-Organization
+Security	I-Organization
+team	O
+immediately	O
+with	O
+information	O
+on	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+researchers	O
+are	O
+working	O
+closely	O
+with	O
+Google	B-Organization
+to	O
+investigate	O
+the	O
+source	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+campaign	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+“	O
+We	O
+’	O
+re	O
+appreciative	O
+of	O
+both	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+research	O
+and	O
+their	O
+partnership	O
+as	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+worked	O
+together	O
+to	O
+understand	O
+these	O
+issues	O
+,	O
+”	O
+said	O
+Adrian	O
+Ludwig	O
+,	O
+Google	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+director	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+security	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+As	O
+part	O
+of	O
+our	O
+ongoing	O
+efforts	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+users	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Ghost	B-Malware
+Push	I-Malware
+family	I-Malware
+of	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+taken	O
+numerous	O
+steps	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+our	O
+users	O
+and	O
+improve	O
+the	O
+security	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+ecosystem	O
+overall.	O
+”	O
+We	O
+are	O
+very	O
+encouraged	O
+by	O
+the	O
+statement	O
+Google	B-Organization
+shared	O
+with	O
+us	O
+addressing	O
+the	O
+issue	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+chosen	O
+to	O
+join	O
+forces	O
+to	O
+continue	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+around	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Google	B-Organization
+also	O
+stated	O
+that	O
+they	O
+are	O
+taking	O
+numerous	O
+steps	O
+including	O
+proactively	O
+notifying	O
+affected	O
+accounts	O
+,	O
+revoking	O
+affected	O
+tokens	O
+and	O
+deploying	O
+SafetyNet	O
+improvements	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+users	O
+from	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+the	O
+future	O
+.	O
+
+Who	O
+is	O
+affected	O
+?	O
+
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+potentially	O
+affects	O
+devices	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+4	I-System
+(	I-System
+Jelly	I-System
+Bean	I-System
+,	I-System
+KitKat	I-System
+)	I-System
+and	I-System
+5	I-System
+(	I-System
+Lollipop	I-System
+)	I-System
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+over	O
+74	O
+%	O
+of	O
+in-market	O
+devices	O
+today	O
+.	O
+
+About	O
+57	O
+%	O
+of	O
+these	O
+devices	O
+are	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Asia	O
+and	O
+about	O
+9	O
+%	O
+are	O
+in	O
+Europe	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+our	O
+research	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+tens	O
+of	O
+fake	O
+applications	O
+that	O
+were	O
+infected	O
+with	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+you	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+downloaded	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+listed	O
+in	O
+Appendix	O
+A	O
+,	O
+below	O
+,	O
+you	O
+might	O
+be	O
+infected	O
+.	O
+
+You	O
+may	O
+review	O
+your	O
+application	O
+list	O
+in	O
+“	O
+Settings	O
+-	O
+>	O
+Apps	O
+”	O
+,	O
+if	O
+you	O
+find	O
+one	O
+of	O
+this	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+please	O
+consider	O
+downloading	O
+an	O
+antivirus	O
+product	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+ZoneAlarm	B-System
+to	O
+check	O
+if	O
+you	O
+are	O
+indeed	O
+infected	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+noticed	O
+that	O
+hundreds	O
+of	O
+the	O
+email	O
+addresses	O
+are	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+enterprise	O
+accounts	O
+worldwide	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+do	O
+you	O
+know	O
+if	O
+your	O
+Google	B-Organization
+account	O
+is	O
+breached	O
+?	O
+
+You	O
+can	O
+check	O
+if	O
+your	O
+account	O
+is	O
+compromised	O
+by	O
+accessing	O
+the	O
+following	O
+web	O
+site	O
+that	O
+we	O
+created	O
+:	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//gooligan.checkpoint.com/	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+If	O
+your	O
+account	O
+has	O
+been	O
+breached	O
+,	O
+the	O
+following	O
+steps	O
+are	O
+required	O
+:	O
+A	O
+clean	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+an	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+on	O
+your	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+is	O
+required	O
+(	O
+a	O
+process	O
+called	O
+“	O
+flashing	O
+”	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+this	O
+is	O
+a	O
+complex	O
+process	O
+,	O
+we	O
+recommend	O
+powering	O
+off	O
+your	O
+device	O
+and	O
+approaching	O
+a	O
+certified	O
+technician	O
+,	O
+or	O
+your	O
+mobile	O
+service	O
+provider	O
+,	O
+to	O
+request	O
+that	O
+your	O
+device	O
+be	O
+“	O
+re-flashed.	O
+”	O
+Change	O
+your	O
+Google	B-Organization
+account	O
+passwords	O
+immediately	O
+after	O
+this	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+do	O
+Android	O
+devices	O
+become	O
+infected	O
+?	O
+
+We	O
+found	O
+traces	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+malware	O
+code	O
+in	O
+dozens	O
+of	O
+legitimate-looking	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+third-party	O
+Android	B-System
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+stores	O
+are	O
+an	O
+attractive	O
+alternative	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+because	O
+many	O
+of	O
+their	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+free	O
+,	O
+or	O
+offer	O
+free	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+paid	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+security	O
+of	O
+these	O
+stores	O
+and	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+they	O
+sell	O
+aren	O
+’	O
+t	O
+always	O
+verified	O
+.	O
+
+Gooligan-infected	B-Malware
+apps	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+installed	O
+using	O
+phishing	O
+scams	O
+where	O
+attackers	O
+broadcast	O
+links	O
+to	O
+infected	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+unsuspecting	O
+users	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+or	O
+other	O
+messaging	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+did	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+emerge	O
+?	O
+
+Our	O
+researchers	O
+first	O
+encountered	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+in	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+SnapPea	B-Malware
+app	O
+last	O
+year	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+reported	O
+by	O
+several	O
+security	O
+vendors	O
+,	O
+and	O
+attributed	O
+to	O
+different	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+like	O
+Ghostpush	B-Malware
+,	O
+MonkeyTest	B-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+Xinyinhe	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+By	O
+late	O
+2015	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+creators	O
+had	O
+gone	O
+mostly	O
+silent	O
+until	O
+the	O
+summer	O
+of	O
+2016	O
+when	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+reappeared	O
+with	O
+a	O
+more	O
+complex	O
+architecture	O
+that	O
+injects	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+into	O
+Android	B-System
+system	O
+processes	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+change	O
+in	O
+the	O
+way	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+works	O
+today	O
+may	O
+be	O
+to	O
+help	O
+finance	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+through	O
+fraudulent	O
+ad	O
+activity	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+simulates	O
+clicks	O
+on	O
+app	O
+advertisements	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+legitimate	O
+ad	O
+networks	O
+and	O
+forces	O
+the	O
+app	O
+to	O
+install	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+attacker	O
+is	O
+paid	O
+by	O
+the	O
+network	O
+when	O
+one	O
+of	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+successfully	O
+.	O
+
+Logs	O
+collected	O
+by	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+researchers	O
+show	O
+that	O
+every	O
+day	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+installs	O
+at	O
+least	O
+30,000	O
+apps	O
+fraudulently	O
+on	O
+breached	O
+devices	O
+or	O
+over	O
+2	O
+million	O
+apps	O
+since	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+began	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+does	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+work	O
+?	O
+
+The	O
+infection	O
+begins	O
+when	O
+a	O
+user	O
+downloads	O
+and	O
+installs	O
+a	O
+Gooligan-infected	B-Malware
+app	O
+on	O
+a	O
+vulnerable	O
+Android	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+research	O
+team	O
+has	O
+found	O
+infected	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+,	O
+but	O
+they	O
+could	O
+also	O
+be	O
+downloaded	O
+by	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+directly	O
+by	O
+tapping	O
+malicious	O
+links	O
+in	O
+phishing	O
+attack	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+app	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+it	O
+sends	O
+data	O
+about	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Command	O
+and	O
+Control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+then	O
+downloads	O
+a	O
+rootkit	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+that	O
+takes	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+multiple	O
+Android	B-System
+4	I-System
+and	I-System
+5	I-System
+exploits	O
+including	O
+the	O
+well-known	O
+VROOT	B-Vulnerability
+(	O
+CVE-2013-6282	B-Vulnerability
+)	O
+and	O
+Towelroot	B-Vulnerability
+(	O
+CVE-2014-3153	B-Vulnerability
+)	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+exploits	O
+still	O
+plague	O
+many	O
+devices	O
+today	O
+because	O
+security	O
+patches	O
+that	O
+fix	O
+them	O
+may	O
+not	O
+be	O
+available	O
+for	O
+some	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+or	O
+the	O
+patches	O
+were	O
+never	O
+installed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+rooting	O
+is	O
+successful	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+has	O
+full	O
+control	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+can	O
+execute	O
+privileged	O
+commands	O
+remotely	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+achieving	O
+root	O
+access	O
+,	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+downloads	O
+a	O
+new	O
+,	O
+malicious	O
+module	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+and	O
+installs	O
+it	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+module	O
+injects	O
+code	O
+into	O
+running	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+or	O
+GMS	B-System
+(	I-System
+Google	I-System
+Mobile	I-System
+Services	I-System
+)	I-System
+to	O
+mimic	O
+user	O
+behavior	O
+so	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+can	O
+avoid	O
+detection	O
+,	O
+a	O
+technique	O
+first	O
+seen	O
+with	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+module	O
+allows	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+to	O
+:	O
+Steal	O
+a	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Google	B-Organization
+email	O
+account	O
+and	O
+authentication	O
+token	O
+information	O
+Install	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+and	O
+rate	O
+them	O
+to	O
+raise	O
+their	O
+reputation	O
+Install	O
+adware	O
+to	O
+generate	O
+revenue	O
+Ad	O
+servers	O
+,	O
+which	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+know	O
+whether	O
+an	O
+app	O
+using	O
+its	O
+service	O
+is	O
+malicious	O
+or	O
+not	O
+,	O
+send	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+the	O
+names	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+download	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+After	O
+an	O
+app	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+ad	O
+service	O
+pays	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+leaves	O
+a	O
+positive	O
+review	O
+and	O
+a	O
+high	O
+rating	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+using	O
+content	O
+it	O
+receives	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+research	O
+team	O
+was	O
+able	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+several	O
+instances	O
+of	O
+this	O
+activity	O
+by	O
+cross-referencing	O
+data	O
+from	O
+breached	O
+devices	O
+with	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+app	O
+reviews	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+another	O
+reminder	O
+of	O
+why	O
+users	O
+shouldn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+rely	O
+on	O
+ratings	O
+alone	O
+to	O
+decide	O
+whether	O
+to	O
+trust	O
+an	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Similar	O
+to	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+also	O
+fakes	O
+device	O
+identification	O
+information	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+IMEI	O
+and	O
+IMSI	O
+,	O
+to	O
+download	O
+an	O
+app	O
+twice	O
+while	O
+seeming	O
+like	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+is	O
+happening	O
+on	O
+a	O
+different	O
+device	O
+,	O
+thereby	O
+doubling	O
+the	O
+potential	O
+revenue	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+are	O
+Google	B-Organization
+authorization	O
+tokens	O
+?	O
+
+A	O
+Google	B-Organization
+authorization	O
+token	O
+is	O
+a	O
+way	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+Google	B-Organization
+account	O
+and	O
+the	O
+related	O
+services	O
+of	O
+a	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+issued	O
+by	O
+Google	B-Organization
+once	O
+a	O
+user	O
+successfully	O
+logged	O
+into	O
+this	O
+account	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+an	O
+authorization	O
+token	O
+is	O
+stolen	O
+by	O
+a	O
+hacker	O
+,	O
+they	O
+can	O
+use	O
+this	O
+token	O
+to	O
+access	O
+all	O
+the	O
+Google	B-Organization
+services	O
+related	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+,	O
+including	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+Gmail	B-System
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Docs	I-System
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Drive	I-System
+,	O
+and	O
+Google	B-System
+Photos	I-System
+.	O
+
+While	O
+Google	B-Organization
+implemented	O
+multiple	O
+mechanisms	O
+,	O
+like	O
+two-factor-authentication	O
+,	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+hackers	O
+from	O
+compromising	O
+Google	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+,	O
+a	O
+stolen	O
+authorization	O
+token	O
+bypasses	O
+this	O
+mechanism	O
+and	O
+allows	O
+hackers	O
+the	O
+desired	O
+access	O
+as	O
+the	O
+user	O
+is	O
+perceived	O
+as	O
+already	O
+logged	O
+in	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+has	O
+breached	O
+over	O
+a	O
+million	O
+Google	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+that	O
+it	O
+is	O
+the	O
+largest	O
+Google	B-Malware
+account	O
+breach	O
+to	O
+date	O
+,	O
+and	O
+we	O
+are	O
+working	O
+with	O
+Google	B-Organization
+to	O
+continue	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+encourage	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+to	O
+validate	O
+whether	O
+their	O
+accounts	O
+have	O
+been	O
+breached	O
+.	O
+
+Hacking	B-Organization
+Team	I-Organization
+Spying	O
+Tool	O
+Listens	O
+to	O
+Calls	O
+By	O
+:	O
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+July	O
+21	O
+,	O
+2015	O
+Following	O
+news	O
+that	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+are	O
+at	O
+risk	O
+of	O
+spyware	O
+related	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Hacking	B-Organization
+Team	I-Organization
+,	O
+the	O
+saga	O
+continues	O
+into	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+sphere	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+found	O
+that	O
+among	O
+the	O
+leaked	O
+files	O
+is	O
+the	O
+code	O
+for	O
+Hacking	O
+Team	O
+’	O
+s	O
+open-source	O
+malware	O
+suite	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+(	O
+Remote	B-Malware
+Control	I-Malware
+System	I-Malware
+Android	I-Malware
+)	O
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+sold	O
+by	O
+the	O
+company	O
+as	O
+a	O
+tool	O
+for	O
+monitoring	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+(	O
+Researchers	O
+have	O
+been	O
+aware	O
+of	O
+this	O
+suite	O
+as	O
+early	O
+as	O
+2014	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+The	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+code	O
+can	O
+be	O
+considered	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+professionally	O
+developed	O
+and	O
+sophisticated	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+ever	O
+exposed	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+leak	O
+of	O
+its	O
+code	O
+provides	O
+cybercriminals	O
+with	O
+a	O
+new	O
+weaponized	O
+resource	O
+for	O
+enhancing	O
+their	O
+surveillance	O
+operations	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+leaked	O
+code	O
+,	O
+the	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+app	O
+can	O
+do	O
+the	O
+following	O
+intrusive	O
+routines	O
+to	O
+spy	O
+on	O
+targets	O
+:	O
+Capture	O
+screenshots	O
+using	O
+the	O
+“	O
+screencap	O
+”	O
+command	O
+and	O
+framebuffer	O
+direct	O
+reading	O
+Monitor	O
+clipboard	O
+content	O
+Collect	O
+passwords	O
+for	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+networks	O
+and	O
+online	O
+acco	O
+;	O
+.unts	O
+,	O
+including	O
+Skype	B-System
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+,	O
+Twitter	B-System
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+,	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Mail	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+LinkedIn	B-System
+Record	O
+using	O
+the	O
+microphone	O
+Collect	O
+SMS	O
+,	O
+MMS	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Gmail	B-System
+messages	O
+Record	O
+location	O
+Gather	O
+device	O
+information	O
+Capture	O
+photos	O
+using	O
+the	O
+front	O
+and	O
+back	O
+cameras	O
+Collect	O
+contacts	O
+and	O
+decode	O
+
+messages	O
+from	O
+IM	O
+accounts	O
+,	O
+including	O
+Facebook	B-System
+Messenger	I-System
+,	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Skype	B-System
+,	O
+Viber	B-System
+,	O
+Line	B-System
+,	O
+WeChat	B-System
+,	O
+Hangouts	B-System
+,	O
+Telegram	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+BlackBerry	B-System
+Messenger	I-System
+.	O
+
+Capture	O
+real-time	O
+voice	O
+calls	O
+in	O
+any	O
+network	O
+or	O
+app	O
+by	O
+hooking	O
+into	O
+the	O
+“	O
+mediaserver	O
+”	O
+system	O
+service	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+in	O
+the	O
+Wild	O
+Our	O
+analysis	O
+reveals	O
+that	O
+this	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+(	O
+AndroidOS_RCSAgent.HRX	B-Indicator
+)	O
+has	O
+been	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+since	O
+2012	O
+.	O
+
+Traces	O
+of	O
+its	O
+previous	O
+uses	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+were	O
+found	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+:	O
+It	O
+was	O
+configured	O
+to	O
+use	O
+a	O
+Command-and-control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+in	O
+the	O
+United	O
+States	O
+;	O
+however	O
+,	O
+the	O
+server	O
+was	O
+bought	O
+from	O
+a	O
+host	O
+service	O
+provider	O
+and	O
+is	O
+now	O
+unavailable	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+was	O
+configured	O
+to	O
+activate	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+sent	O
+from	O
+a	O
+Czech	O
+Republic	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+Attackers	O
+can	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+with	O
+certain	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+activate	O
+the	O
+agent	O
+and	O
+trigger	O
+corresponding	O
+action	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+can	O
+also	O
+define	O
+what	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+evidences	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+emails	O
+leaked	O
+in	O
+the	O
+dump	O
+,	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+Czech	O
+firms	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+in	O
+business	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Hacking	O
+team	O
+,	O
+including	O
+a	O
+major	O
+IT	O
+partner	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Olympic	O
+Games	O
+.	O
+
+Dropping	O
+Cluster	O
+Bombs	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+threat	O
+that	O
+works	O
+like	O
+a	O
+cluster	O
+bomb	O
+in	O
+that	O
+it	O
+deploys	O
+multiple	O
+dangerous	O
+exploits	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+various	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+easily	O
+infect	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+analyzing	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+that	O
+the	O
+whole	O
+system	O
+consists	O
+of	O
+four	O
+critical	O
+components	O
+,	O
+as	O
+follows	O
+:	O
+penetration	O
+solutions	O
+,	O
+ways	O
+to	O
+get	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+either	O
+via	O
+SMS/email	O
+or	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+low-level	O
+native	O
+code	O
+,	O
+advanced	O
+exploits	O
+and	O
+spy	O
+tools	O
+beyond	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+security	O
+framework	O
+high-level	O
+Java	O
+agent	O
+–	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+malicious	O
+APK	O
+command-and-control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+servers	O
+,	O
+used	O
+to	O
+remotely	O
+send/receive	O
+malicious	O
+commands	O
+Attackers	O
+use	O
+two	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+get	O
+targets	O
+to	O
+download	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+method	O
+is	O
+to	O
+send	O
+a	O
+specially	O
+crafted	O
+URL	O
+to	O
+the	O
+target	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+or	O
+email	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+URL	O
+will	O
+trigger	O
+exploits	O
+for	O
+arbitrary	B-Vulnerability
+memory	I-Vulnerability
+read	I-Vulnerability
+(	I-Vulnerability
+CVE-2012-2825	I-Vulnerability
+)	I-Vulnerability
+and	O
+heap	B-Vulnerability
+buffer	I-Vulnerability
+overflow	I-Vulnerability
+(	I-Vulnerability
+CVE-2012-2871	I-Vulnerability
+)	I-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	O
+in	O
+the	O
+default	O
+browsers	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+versions	I-System
+4.0	I-System
+Ice	I-System
+Cream	I-System
+Sandwich	I-System
+to	O
+4.3	B-System
+Jelly	I-System
+Bean	I-System
+,	O
+allowing	O
+another	O
+local	O
+privilege	O
+escalation	O
+exploit	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+root	O
+privilege	O
+is	O
+gained	O
+,	O
+a	O
+shell	O
+backdoor	O
+and	O
+malicious	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+agent	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+will	O
+be	O
+installed	O
+The	O
+second	O
+method	O
+is	O
+to	O
+use	O
+a	O
+stealthy	O
+backdoor	O
+app	O
+such	O
+as	O
+ANDROIDOS_HTBENEWS.A	B-Malware
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+role	O
+of	O
+ANDROIDOS_HTBENEWS.A	B-Malware
+and	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+APK	O
+mentioned	O
+in	O
+the	O
+first	O
+method	O
+is	O
+to	O
+exploit	O
+a	O
+local	B-Vulnerability
+privilege	I-Vulnerability
+escalation	I-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	I-Vulnerability
+in	O
+Android	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Hacking	O
+Team	O
+has	O
+been	O
+known	O
+to	O
+use	O
+both	O
+CVE-2014-3153	B-Vulnerability
+and	O
+CVE-2013-6282	B-Vulnerability
+in	O
+their	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+said	O
+exploits	O
+will	O
+root	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+install	O
+a	O
+shell	O
+backdoor	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+shell	O
+backdoor	O
+then	O
+installs	O
+the	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+agent	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+agent	O
+has	O
+two	O
+core	O
+modules	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Evidence	O
+Collector	O
+and	O
+the	O
+Event	O
+Action	O
+Trigger	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Evidence	O
+Collector	O
+module	O
+is	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+the	O
+spying	O
+routines	O
+outlined	O
+above	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+its	O
+most	O
+notable	O
+routines	O
+is	O
+capturing	O
+voice	O
+calls	O
+in	O
+real	O
+time	O
+by	O
+hooking	O
+into	O
+the	O
+“	O
+mediaserver	O
+”	O
+system	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+basic	O
+idea	O
+is	O
+to	O
+hook	O
+the	O
+voice	O
+call	O
+process	O
+in	O
+mediaserver	O
+.	O
+
+Take	O
+voice	O
+call	O
+playback	O
+process	O
+for	O
+example	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+mediaserver	O
+will	O
+first	O
+builds	O
+a	O
+new	O
+unique	O
+track	O
+,	O
+start	O
+to	O
+play	O
+the	O
+track	O
+,	O
+loop	O
+play	O
+all	O
+audio	O
+buffer	O
+,	O
+then	O
+finally	O
+stop	O
+the	O
+playback	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+raw	O
+wave	O
+audio	O
+buffer	O
+frame	O
+can	O
+be	O
+dumped	O
+in	O
+the	O
+getNextBuffer	O
+(	O
+)	O
+function	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+the	O
+help	O
+of	O
+the	O
+open-source	O
+Android	B-System
+Dynamic	O
+Binary	O
+Instrumentation	O
+Toolkit	O
+and	O
+root	O
+privilege	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+possible	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+any	O
+function	O
+execution	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Event	O
+Action	O
+Trigger	O
+module	O
+triggers	O
+malicious	O
+actions	O
+based	O
+on	O
+certain	O
+events	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+events	O
+can	O
+be	O
+based	O
+on	O
+time	O
+,	O
+charging	O
+or	O
+battery	O
+status	O
+,	O
+location	O
+,	O
+connectivity	O
+,	O
+running	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+focused	O
+app	O
+,	O
+SIM	O
+card	O
+status	O
+,	O
+SMS	O
+received	O
+with	O
+keywords	O
+,	O
+and	O
+screen	O
+turning	O
+on	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+the	O
+configuration	O
+pattern	O
+,	O
+these	O
+actions	O
+are	O
+registered	O
+to	O
+certain	O
+events	O
+:	O
+Sync	O
+configuration	O
+data	O
+,	O
+upgrade	O
+modules	O
+,	O
+and	O
+download	O
+new	O
+payload	O
+(	O
+This	O
+uses	O
+transport	O
+protocol	O
+ZProtocol	O
+encrypted	O
+by	O
+AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding	O
+algorithm	O
+to	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+Upload	O
+and	O
+purge	O
+collected	O
+evidence	O
+Destroy	O
+device	O
+by	O
+resetting	O
+locking	O
+password	O
+Execute	O
+shell	O
+commands	O
+Send	O
+SMS	O
+with	O
+defined	O
+content	O
+or	O
+location	O
+Disable	O
+network	O
+Disable	O
+root	O
+Uninstall	O
+bot	O
+To	O
+avoid	O
+detection	O
+and	O
+removal	O
+of	O
+the	O
+agent	O
+app	O
+in	O
+the	O
+device	O
+memory	O
+,	O
+the	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+suite	O
+also	O
+detects	O
+emulators	O
+or	O
+sandboxes	O
+,	O
+obfuscates	O
+code	O
+using	O
+DexGuard	B-System
+,	O
+uses	O
+ELF	O
+string	O
+obfuscator	O
+,	O
+and	O
+adjusts	O
+the	O
+OOM	O
+(	O
+out-of-memory	O
+)	O
+value	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+one	O
+unused	O
+feature	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+is	O
+its	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+manipulate	O
+data	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+package	O
+manager	O
+to	O
+add	O
+and	O
+remove	O
+permissions	O
+and	O
+components	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+hide	O
+the	O
+app	O
+icon	O
+.	O
+
+Recommendations	O
+Popular	O
+mobile	O
+platforms	O
+like	O
+Android	B-System
+are	O
+common	O
+targets	O
+for	O
+organized	O
+or	O
+commercialized	O
+monitoring	O
+operations	O
+.	O
+
+Attackers	O
+know	O
+that	O
+rooting	O
+devices	O
+via	O
+malware	O
+exploits	O
+is	O
+an	O
+effective	O
+means	O
+to	O
+control	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+gather	O
+information	O
+from	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+a	O
+root	O
+broken	O
+device	O
+,	O
+security	O
+is	O
+a	O
+fairy	O
+tale	O
+.	O
+
+Take	O
+note	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+best	O
+practices	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+from	O
+getting	O
+in	O
+your	O
+device	O
+:	O
+Disable	O
+app	O
+installations	O
+from	O
+unknown	O
+,	O
+third-party	O
+sources	O
+.	O
+
+Constantly	O
+update	O
+your	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+to	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+to	O
+help	O
+prevent	O
+exploits	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+in	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+which	O
+can	O
+affect	O
+only	O
+up	O
+to	O
+version	O
+4.4.4	B-System
+KitKat	I-System
+.	O
+
+Note	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+that	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+leak	O
+mail	O
+from	O
+a	O
+customer	O
+inquiry	O
+,	O
+Hacking	B-Organization
+Team	I-Organization
+was	O
+in	O
+the	O
+process	O
+of	O
+developing	O
+exploits	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+5.0	I-System
+Lollipop	I-System
+.	O
+
+Install	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+security	O
+solution	O
+to	O
+secure	O
+your	O
+device	O
+from	O
+threats	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+leaked	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+code	I-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+commercial	O
+weapon	O
+now	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+Mobile	O
+users	O
+are	O
+called	O
+on	O
+to	O
+be	O
+on	O
+top	O
+of	O
+this	O
+news	O
+and	O
+be	O
+on	O
+guard	O
+for	O
+signs	O
+of	O
+monitoring	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+indicators	O
+may	O
+come	O
+in	O
+the	O
+form	O
+of	O
+peculiar	O
+behavior	O
+such	O
+as	O
+unexpected	O
+rebooting	O
+,	O
+finding	O
+unfamiliar	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+or	O
+instant	O
+messaging	O
+apps	O
+suddenly	O
+freezing	O
+.	O
+
+Should	O
+a	O
+device	O
+become	O
+infected	O
+,	O
+this	O
+backdoor	O
+can	O
+not	O
+be	O
+removed	O
+without	O
+root	O
+privilege	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+may	O
+be	O
+required	O
+the	O
+help	O
+of	O
+their	O
+device	O
+manufacturer	O
+to	O
+get	O
+support	O
+for	O
+firmware	O
+flashing	O
+.	O
+
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+offers	O
+security	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+through	O
+Mobile	B-System
+Security	I-System
+for	I-System
+Android™	I-System
+to	O
+protect	O
+against	O
+these	O
+types	O
+of	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+Find	O
+out	O
+more	O
+about	O
+the	O
+7	O
+Android	B-System
+Security	O
+Hacks	O
+You	O
+Need	O
+to	O
+Do	O
+Right	O
+Now	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+your	O
+mobile	O
+data	O
+safe	O
+.	O
+
+Update	O
+as	O
+of	O
+July	O
+23	O
+,	O
+2015	O
+1:00	O
+AM	O
+PDT	O
+(	O
+UTC-7	O
+)	O
+We	O
+have	O
+added	O
+a	O
+link	O
+to	O
+a	O
+previous	O
+report	O
+discussing	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+Timeline	O
+of	O
+posts	O
+related	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Hacking	O
+Team	O
+DATE	O
+UPDATE	O
+July	O
+5	O
+The	O
+Italian	O
+company	O
+Hacking	B-Organization
+Team	I-Organization
+was	O
+hacked	O
+,	O
+with	O
+more	O
+than	O
+400GB	O
+of	O
+confidential	O
+company	O
+data	O
+made	O
+available	O
+to	O
+the	O
+public	O
+.	O
+
+July	O
+7	O
+Three	O
+exploits	O
+–	O
+two	O
+for	O
+Flash	B-System
+Player	I-System
+and	O
+one	O
+for	O
+the	O
+Windows	B-System
+kernel—were	O
+initially	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+information	O
+dump	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+these	O
+[	O
+CVE-2015-5119	B-Vulnerability
+]	O
+was	O
+a	O
+Flash	O
+zero-day	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Windows	B-Vulnerability
+kernel	I-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	I-Vulnerability
+(	O
+CVE-2015-2387	B-Vulnerability
+)	O
+existed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+open	O
+type	O
+font	O
+manager	O
+module	O
+(	O
+ATMFD.dll	B-Indicator
+)	O
+and	O
+can	O
+be	O
+exploited	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+the	O
+sandbox	O
+mitigation	O
+mechanism	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Flash	B-System
+zero-day	O
+exploit	O
+(	O
+CVE-2015-5119	B-Vulnerability
+)	O
+was	O
+added	O
+into	O
+the	O
+Angler	B-Malware
+Exploit	I-Malware
+Kit	I-Malware
+and	O
+Nuclear	B-Malware
+Exploit	I-Malware
+Pack	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+It	O
+was	O
+also	O
+used	O
+in	O
+limited	O
+attacks	O
+in	O
+Korea	O
+and	O
+Japan	O
+.	O
+
+July	O
+11	O
+Two	O
+new	O
+Flash	B-Vulnerability
+zero-day	I-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+,	O
+CVE-2015-5122	B-Vulnerability
+and	O
+CVE-2015-5123	B-Vulnerability
+,	O
+were	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+hacking	O
+team	O
+dump	O
+.	O
+
+July	O
+13	O
+Further	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+hacking	O
+team	O
+dump	O
+revealed	O
+that	O
+the	O
+company	O
+used	O
+UEFI	B-Malware
+BIOS	I-Malware
+rootkit	I-Malware
+to	O
+keep	O
+their	O
+Remote	B-Malware
+Control	I-Malware
+System	I-Malware
+(	I-Malware
+RCS	I-Malware
+)	I-Malware
+agent	O
+installed	O
+in	O
+their	O
+targets	O
+’	O
+systems	O
+.	O
+
+July	O
+14	O
+A	O
+new	O
+zero-day	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	I-Vulnerability
+(	O
+CVE-2015-2425	B-Vulnerability
+)	O
+was	O
+found	O
+in	O
+Internet	B-System
+Explorer	I-System
+.	O
+
+July	O
+16	O
+On	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+front	O
+,	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+news	O
+app	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+was	O
+discovered	O
+.	O
+
+July	O
+20	O
+A	O
+new	O
+zero-day	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	I-Vulnerability
+(	O
+CVE-2015-2426	B-Vulnerability
+)	O
+was	O
+found	O
+in	O
+Windows	B-System
+,	O
+which	O
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+fixed	O
+in	O
+an	O
+out-of-band	O
+patch	O
+.	O
+
+July	O
+21	O
+Analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+RCSAndroid	B-Malware
+spying	O
+tool	O
+revealed	O
+that	O
+Hacking	O
+Team	O
+can	O
+listen	O
+to	O
+calls	O
+and	O
+roots	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+get	O
+in	O
+.	O
+
+July	O
+28	O
+A	O
+recent	O
+campaign	O
+compromised	O
+Taiwan	O
+and	O
+Hong	O
+Kong	O
+sites	O
+to	O
+deliver	O
+Flash	B-System
+exploits	O
+related	O
+to	O
+Hacking	B-Organization
+Team	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+warned	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+attack	O
+spreading	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+FEB	O
+16	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+Security	O
+researchers	O
+are	O
+warning	O
+owners	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+smartphones	O
+about	O
+a	O
+new	O
+malware	O
+attack	O
+,	O
+spreading	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+the	O
+team	O
+at	O
+Scandinavian	O
+security	O
+group	O
+CSIS	B-Organization
+describes	O
+,	O
+malware	O
+known	O
+as	O
+MazarBOT	B-Malware
+is	O
+being	O
+distributed	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+in	O
+Denmark	O
+and	O
+is	O
+likely	O
+to	O
+also	O
+be	O
+encountered	O
+in	O
+other	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+Victims	O
+’	O
+first	O
+encounter	O
+with	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+reportedly	O
+comes	O
+via	O
+an	O
+unsolicited	O
+text	O
+message	O
+that	O
+their	O
+Android	B-System
+smartphone	I-System
+receives	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+txt	O
+message	O
+uses	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+to	O
+dupe	O
+unsuspecting	O
+users	O
+into	O
+clicking	O
+on	O
+a	O
+link	O
+to	O
+a	O
+downloadable	O
+Android	B-System
+application	O
+.	O
+
+CSIS	B-Organization
+provided	O
+a	O
+(	O
+sanitised	O
+)	O
+version	O
+of	O
+a	O
+typical	O
+message	O
+to	O
+warn	O
+users	O
+what	O
+to	O
+look	O
+out	O
+for	O
+:	O
+“	O
+You	O
+have	O
+received	O
+a	O
+multimedia	O
+message	O
+from	O
++	O
+[	O
+country	O
+code	O
+]	O
+[	O
+sender	O
+number	O
+]	O
+Follow	O
+the	O
+link	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//www.mmsforyou	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net/mms.apk	I-Indicator
+to	O
+view	O
+the	O
+message	O
+”	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+package	O
+is	O
+downloaded	O
+,	O
+potential	O
+victims	O
+are	O
+urged	O
+to	O
+grant	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+a	O
+wide	O
+range	O
+of	O
+permissions	O
+on	O
+their	O
+Android	O
+device	O
+:	O
+App	O
+permissions	O
+SEND_SMS	O
+RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED	O
+INTERNET	O
+SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW	O
+WRITE_SMS	O
+ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE	O
+WAKE_LOCK	O
+GET_TASKS	O
+CALL_PHONE	O
+RECEIVE_SMS	O
+READ_PHONE_STATE	O
+READ_SMS	O
+ERASE_PHONE	O
+Once	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+MazarBOT	B-Malware
+downloads	O
+a	O
+copy	O
+of	O
+
+Tor	B-System
+onto	O
+users	O
+’	O
+Android	B-System
+smartphones	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+it	O
+to	O
+connect	O
+anonymously	O
+to	O
+the	O
+net	O
+before	O
+sending	O
+a	O
+text	O
+message	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+location	O
+to	O
+an	O
+Iranian	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+now	O
+in	O
+place	O
+,	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+actions	O
+can	O
+be	O
+performed	O
+,	O
+including	O
+allowing	O
+attackers	O
+to	O
+secretly	O
+monitor	O
+and	O
+control	O
+smartphones	O
+via	O
+a	O
+backdoor	O
+,	O
+send	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+premium-rate	O
+numbers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+intercept	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+codes	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+the	O
+like	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+fact	O
+,	O
+with	O
+full	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+compromised	O
+Android	B-System
+smartphone	I-System
+,	O
+the	O
+opportunities	O
+for	O
+criminals	O
+to	O
+wreak	O
+havoc	O
+are	O
+significant	O
+–	O
+such	O
+as	O
+erasing	O
+infected	O
+phones	O
+or	O
+launching	O
+man-in-the-middle	O
+(	O
+MITM	O
+)	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+its	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+CSIS	B-Organization
+notes	O
+that	O
+MazarBOT	B-Malware
+was	O
+reported	O
+by	O
+Recorded	B-Organization
+Future	I-Organization
+last	O
+November	O
+as	O
+being	O
+actively	O
+sold	O
+in	O
+Russian	O
+underground	O
+forums	O
+and	O
+intriguingly	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+will	O
+not	O
+activate	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+configured	O
+with	O
+Russian	O
+language	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+,	O
+in	O
+itself	O
+,	O
+does	O
+not	O
+prove	O
+that	O
+the	O
+perpetrators	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+campaign	O
+are	O
+based	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+certainly	O
+sounds	O
+as	O
+if	O
+that	O
+is	O
+a	O
+strong	O
+possibility	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+authors	O
+in	O
+the	O
+past	O
+have	O
+often	O
+coded	O
+a	O
+“	O
+safety	O
+net	O
+”	O
+into	O
+their	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+them	O
+from	O
+accidentally	O
+infecting	O
+their	O
+own	O
+computers	O
+and	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+more	O
+detailed	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+,	O
+check	O
+out	O
+the	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+from	O
+CSIS	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+And	O
+,	O
+of	O
+course	O
+,	O
+remember	O
+to	O
+always	O
+be	O
+wary	O
+of	O
+unsolicited	O
+,	O
+unusual	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+installing	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+third-party	O
+sources	O
+on	O
+your	O
+Android	B-System
+smartphone	I-System
+.	O
+
+Coronavirus	B-System
+Update	I-System
+App	I-System
+Leads	O
+to	O
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+Spyware	O
+We	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+cyberespionage	O
+campaign	O
+we	O
+have	O
+named	O
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+infecting	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+with	O
+spyware	O
+by	O
+using	O
+the	O
+coronavirus	O
+disease	O
+(	O
+Covid-19	O
+)	O
+as	O
+a	O
+lure	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+:	O
+Tony	O
+Bao	O
+,	O
+Junzhi	O
+Lu	O
+April	O
+14	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+We	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+potential	O
+cyberespionage	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+which	O
+we	O
+have	O
+named	O
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+,	O
+that	O
+infects	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+with	O
+spyware	O
+(	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+as	O
+AndroidOS_ProjectSpy.HRX	B-Indicator
+and	O
+IOS_ProjectSpy.A	B-Indicator
+,	O
+respectively	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+uses	O
+the	O
+ongoing	O
+coronavirus	O
+pandemic	O
+as	O
+a	O
+lure	O
+,	O
+posing	O
+as	O
+an	O
+app	O
+called	O
+Coronavirus	O
+Updates	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+also	O
+found	O
+similarities	O
+in	O
+two	O
+older	O
+samples	O
+disguised	O
+as	O
+a	O
+Google	B-Organization
+service	O
+and	O
+,	O
+subsequently	O
+,	O
+as	O
+a	O
+music	O
+app	O
+after	O
+further	O
+investigation	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+noted	O
+a	O
+significantly	O
+small	O
+number	O
+of	O
+downloads	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+in	O
+Pakistan	O
+,	O
+India	O
+,	O
+Afghanistan	O
+,	O
+Bangladesh	O
+,	O
+Iran	O
+,	O
+Saudi	O
+Arabia	O
+,	O
+Austria	O
+,	O
+Romania	O
+,	O
+Grenada	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+routine	O
+At	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+March	O
+2020	O
+,	O
+we	O
+came	O
+across	O
+an	O
+app	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+a	O
+coronavirus	O
+update	O
+app	O
+,	O
+which	O
+we	O
+named	O
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+login	O
+page	O
+of	O
+its	O
+backend	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+app	O
+carries	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+the	O
+capabilities	O
+:	O
+Upload	O
+GSM	B-System
+,	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Telegram	B-System
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+Threema	B-System
+messages	O
+Upload	O
+voice	O
+notes	O
+,	O
+contacts	O
+stored	O
+,	O
+accounts	O
+,	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+,	O
+location	O
+information	O
+,	O
+and	O
+images	O
+Upload	O
+the	O
+expanded	O
+list	O
+of	O
+collected	O
+device	O
+information	O
+(	O
+e.g.	O
+,	O
+IMEI	O
+,	O
+product	O
+,	O
+board	O
+,	O
+manufacturer	O
+,	O
+tag	O
+,	O
+host	O
+,	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+,	O
+application	O
+version	O
+,	O
+name	O
+,	O
+model	O
+brand	O
+,	O
+user	O
+,	O
+serial	O
+,	O
+hardware	O
+,	O
+bootloader	O
+,	O
+and	O
+device	O
+ID	O
+)	O
+Upload	O
+SIM	O
+information	O
+(	O
+e.g.	O
+
+,	O
+IMSI	O
+,	O
+operator	O
+code	O
+,	O
+country	O
+,	O
+MCC-mobile	O
+country	O
+,	O
+SIM	O
+serial	O
+,	O
+operator	O
+name	O
+,	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+number	O
+)	O
+Upload	O
+wifi	O
+information	O
+(	O
+e.g.	O
+,	O
+SSID	O
+,	O
+wifi	O
+speed	O
+,	O
+and	O
+MAC	O
+address	O
+)	O
+Upload	O
+other	O
+information	O
+(	O
+e.g.	O
+,	O
+display	O
+,	O
+date	O
+,	O
+time	O
+,	O
+fingerprint	O
+,	O
+created	O
+at	O
+,	O
+and	O
+updated	O
+at	O
+)	O
+The	O
+app	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+stealing	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+popular	O
+messaging	O
+apps	O
+by	O
+abusing	O
+the	O
+notification	O
+permissions	O
+to	O
+read	O
+the	O
+notification	O
+content	O
+and	O
+saving	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+database	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+requests	O
+permission	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+additional	O
+storage	O
+.	O
+
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+earlier	O
+versions	O
+Searching	O
+for	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+in	O
+our	O
+sample	O
+database	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+that	O
+the	O
+coronavirus	O
+update	O
+app	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+of	O
+another	O
+sample	O
+that	O
+we	O
+detected	O
+in	O
+May	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+(	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+as	O
+AndroidOS_SpyAgent.HRXB	B-Indicator
+)	O
+had	O
+the	O
+following	O
+capabilities	O
+:	O
+Collect	O
+device	O
+and	O
+system	O
+information	O
+(	O
+i.e.	O
+,	O
+IMEI	O
+,	O
+device	O
+ID	O
+,	O
+manufacturer	O
+,	O
+model	O
+and	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+)	O
+,	O
+location	O
+information	O
+,	O
+contacts	O
+stored	O
+,	O
+and	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+Collect	O
+and	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+Take	O
+pictures	O
+via	O
+the	O
+camera	O
+Upload	O
+recorded	O
+MP4	O
+files	O
+Monitor	O
+calls	O
+Searching	O
+further	O
+,	O
+we	O
+also	O
+found	O
+another	O
+sample	O
+that	O
+could	O
+be	O
+the	O
+second	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Project	O
+Spy	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+version	O
+appeared	O
+as	O
+Wabi	O
+Music	O
+,	O
+and	O
+copied	O
+a	O
+popular	O
+video-sharing	O
+social	O
+networking	O
+service	O
+as	O
+its	O
+backend	O
+login	O
+page	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+second	O
+version	O
+,	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+’	O
+s	O
+name	O
+listed	O
+was	O
+“	O
+concipit1248	O
+”	O
+in	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+and	O
+may	O
+have	O
+been	O
+active	O
+between	O
+May	O
+2019	O
+to	O
+February	O
+2020	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+app	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+have	O
+become	O
+unavailable	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+in	O
+March	O
+2020	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+Project	B-Malware
+Spy	I-Malware
+version	O
+has	O
+similar	O
+capabilities	O
+to	O
+the	O
+first	O
+version	O
+,	O
+with	O
+the	O
+addition	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+:	O
+Stealing	O
+notification	O
+messages	O
+sent	O
+from	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+Telegram	B-System
+Abandoning	O
+the	O
+FTP	O
+mode	O
+of	O
+uploading	O
+the	O
+recorded	O
+images	O
+Aside	O
+from	O
+changing	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+supposed	O
+function	O
+and	O
+look	O
+,	O
+the	O
+second	O
+and	O
+third	O
+versions	O
+’	O
+codes	O
+had	O
+little	O
+differences	O
+.	O
+
+Potentially	O
+malicious	O
+iOS	B-System
+connection	O
+Using	O
+the	O
+codes	O
+and	O
+“	O
+Concipit1248	O
+”	O
+to	O
+check	O
+for	O
+more	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+two	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+the	O
+App	B-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Further	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+iOS	O
+app	O
+“	O
+Concipit1248	O
+”	O
+showed	O
+that	O
+the	O
+server	O
+used	O
+,	O
+spy	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cashnow	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ee	I-Indicator
+,	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+one	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+of	O
+Project	B-System
+Spy	I-System
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+although	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Concipit1248	O
+”	O
+app	O
+requested	O
+permissions	O
+to	O
+open	O
+the	O
+device	O
+camera	O
+and	O
+read	O
+photos	O
+,	O
+the	O
+code	O
+only	O
+can	O
+upload	O
+a	O
+self-contained	O
+PNG	O
+file	O
+to	O
+a	O
+remote	O
+sever	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+may	O
+imply	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Concipit1248	O
+”	O
+app	O
+is	O
+still	O
+incubating	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+other	O
+iOS	B-System
+app	O
+“	O
+Concipit	O
+Shop	O
+”	O
+from	O
+the	O
+same	O
+developer	O
+appeared	O
+normal	O
+and	O
+was	O
+last	O
+updated	O
+on	O
+November	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+Apple	B-Organization
+has	O
+confirmed	O
+that	O
+the	O
+iOS	B-System
+apps	O
+are	O
+not	O
+functioning	O
+based	O
+on	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+codes	O
+,	O
+and	O
+stated	O
+that	O
+the	O
+sandbox	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+detect	O
+and	O
+block	O
+these	O
+malicious	O
+behaviors	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+The	O
+“	O
+Corona	O
+Updates	O
+”	O
+app	O
+had	O
+relatively	O
+low	O
+downloads	O
+in	O
+Pakistan	O
+,	O
+India	O
+,	O
+Afghanistan	O
+,	O
+Bangladesh	O
+,	O
+Iran	O
+,	O
+Saudi	O
+Arabia	O
+,	O
+Austria	O
+,	O
+Romania	O
+,	O
+Grenada	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+Perhaps	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+false	O
+capabilities	O
+also	O
+fueled	O
+the	O
+low	O
+number	O
+of	O
+downloads	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+also	O
+appears	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+may	O
+still	O
+be	O
+in	O
+development	O
+or	O
+incubation	O
+,	O
+maybe	O
+waiting	O
+for	O
+a	O
+“	O
+right	O
+time	O
+”	O
+to	O
+inject	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+codes	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+also	O
+possible	O
+that	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+being	O
+used	O
+to	O
+test	O
+other	O
+possible	O
+techniques	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+possible	O
+indication	O
+for	O
+timing	O
+might	O
+be	O
+when	O
+the	O
+app	O
+reaches	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+number	O
+of	O
+downloads	O
+or	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+coding	O
+style	O
+suggests	O
+that	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+behind	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+are	O
+amateurs	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+incomplete	O
+iOS	B-System
+codes	O
+used	O
+in	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+may	O
+have	O
+been	O
+bought	O
+while	O
+other	O
+capabilities	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+have	O
+been	O
+added	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+may	O
+also	O
+explain	O
+the	O
+timing	O
+in	O
+between	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+becoming	O
+fully	O
+functional	O
+and	O
+“	O
+incubation.	O
+”	O
+As	O
+this	O
+is	O
+a	O
+group	O
+we	O
+have	O
+not	O
+observed	O
+before	O
+,	O
+we	O
+will	O
+continue	O
+monitoring	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+for	O
+further	O
+developments	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+are	O
+cautioned	O
+to	O
+research	O
+and	O
+check	O
+reviews	O
+before	O
+they	O
+download	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Observe	O
+and	O
+look	O
+at	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+display	O
+and	O
+text	O
+,	O
+stated	O
+functions	O
+,	O
+reviews	O
+from	O
+other	O
+users	O
+,	O
+and	O
+requested	O
+permissions	O
+before	O
+downloading	O
+.	O
+
+Make	O
+sure	O
+that	O
+all	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+and	O
+the	O
+device	O
+operating	O
+systems	O
+are	O
+updated	O
+to	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+.	O
+
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+Compromise	O
+(	O
+IoCs	O
+)	O
+SHA256	O
+Detection	O
+e394e53e53cd9047d6cff184ac333ef7698a34b777ae3aac82c2c669ef661dfe	B-Indicator
+AndroidOS_SpyAgent.HRXB	B-Indicator
+e8d4713e43241ab09d40c2ae8814302f77de76650ccf3e7db83b3ac8ad41f9fa	B-Indicator
+AndroidOS_ProjectSpy.HRX	O
+29b0d86ae68d83f9578c3f36041df943195bc55a7f3f1d45a9c23f145d75af9d	B-Indicator
+
+AndroidOS_ProjectSpy.HRX	O
+3a15e7b8f4e35e006329811a6a2bf291d449884a120332f24c7e3ca58d0fbbdb	B-Indicator
+IOS_ProjectSpy.A	B-Indicator
+URLs	O
+cashnow	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ee	I-Indicator
+Backend	O
+server	B-Indicator
+ftp	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+XXXX	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+Backend	O
+server	B-Indicator
+spy	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cashnow	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ee	I-Indicator
+Backend	O
+server	B-Indicator
+xyz	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cashnow	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ee	I-Indicator
+Backend	O
+server	O
+October	O
+8	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+Sophisticated	O
+new	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+marks	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+evolution	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+ransomware	O
+Attackers	O
+are	O
+persistent	O
+and	O
+motivated	O
+to	O
+continuously	O
+evolve	O
+–	O
+and	O
+no	O
+platform	O
+is	O
+immune	O
+.	O
+
+That	O
+is	O
+why	O
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+has	O
+been	O
+working	O
+to	O
+extend	O
+its	O
+industry-leading	O
+endpoint	O
+protection	O
+capabilities	O
+beyond	O
+Windows	B-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+addition	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+threat	O
+defense	O
+into	O
+these	O
+capabilities	O
+means	O
+that	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+for	O
+Endpoint	O
+(	O
+previously	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+Advanced	I-System
+Threat	I-System
+Protection	I-System
+)	O
+now	O
+delivers	O
+protection	O
+on	O
+all	O
+major	O
+platforms	O
+.	O
+
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+mobile	O
+threat	O
+defense	O
+capabilities	O
+further	O
+enrich	O
+the	O
+visibility	O
+that	O
+organizations	O
+have	O
+on	O
+threats	O
+in	O
+their	O
+networks	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+provide	O
+more	O
+tools	O
+to	O
+detect	O
+and	O
+respond	O
+to	O
+threats	O
+across	O
+domains	O
+and	O
+across	O
+platforms	O
+.	O
+
+Like	O
+all	O
+of	O
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+security	O
+solutions	O
+,	O
+these	O
+new	O
+capabilities	O
+are	O
+likewise	O
+backed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+global	O
+network	O
+of	O
+threat	O
+researchers	O
+and	O
+security	O
+experts	O
+whose	O
+deep	O
+understanding	O
+of	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+landscape	O
+guide	O
+the	O
+continuous	O
+innovation	O
+of	O
+security	O
+features	O
+and	O
+ensure	O
+that	O
+customers	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+from	O
+ever-evolving	O
+threats	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+a	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+a	O
+particularly	O
+sophisticated	O
+Android	B-System
+ransomware	O
+with	O
+novel	O
+techniques	O
+and	O
+behavior	O
+,	O
+exemplifying	O
+the	O
+rapid	O
+evolution	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+threats	O
+that	O
+we	O
+have	O
+also	O
+observed	O
+on	O
+other	O
+platforms	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+mobile	O
+ransomware	O
+,	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+for	O
+Endpoint	O
+as	O
+AndroidOS/MalLocker.B	B-Indicator
+,	O
+is	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+a	O
+ransomware	O
+family	O
+that	O
+’	O
+s	O
+been	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+for	O
+a	O
+while	O
+but	O
+has	O
+been	O
+evolving	O
+non-stop	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+ransomware	O
+family	O
+is	O
+known	O
+for	O
+being	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+arbitrary	O
+websites	O
+and	O
+circulated	O
+on	O
+online	O
+forums	O
+using	O
+various	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+lures	O
+,	O
+including	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+popular	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+cracked	O
+games	O
+,	O
+or	O
+video	O
+players	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+caught	O
+our	O
+attention	O
+because	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+an	O
+advanced	O
+malware	O
+with	O
+unmistakable	O
+malicious	O
+characteristic	O
+and	O
+behavior	O
+and	O
+yet	O
+manages	O
+to	O
+evade	O
+many	O
+available	O
+protections	O
+,	O
+registering	O
+a	O
+low	O
+detection	O
+rate	O
+against	O
+security	O
+solutions	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+with	O
+most	O
+Android	B-System
+ransomware	O
+,	O
+this	O
+new	O
+threat	O
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+actually	O
+block	O
+access	O
+to	O
+files	O
+by	O
+encrypting	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+Instead	O
+,	O
+it	O
+blocks	O
+access	O
+to	O
+devices	O
+by	O
+displaying	O
+a	O
+screen	O
+that	O
+appears	O
+over	O
+every	O
+other	O
+window	O
+,	O
+such	O
+that	O
+the	O
+user	O
+can	O
+’	O
+t	O
+do	O
+anything	O
+else	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+said	O
+screen	O
+is	O
+the	O
+ransom	O
+note	O
+,	O
+which	O
+contains	O
+threats	O
+and	O
+instructions	O
+to	O
+pay	O
+the	O
+ransom	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+’	O
+s	O
+innovative	O
+about	O
+this	O
+ransomware	O
+is	O
+how	O
+it	O
+displays	O
+its	O
+ransom	O
+note	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ll	O
+detail	O
+the	O
+innovative	O
+ways	O
+in	O
+which	O
+this	O
+ransomware	O
+surfaces	O
+its	O
+ransom	O
+note	O
+using	O
+Android	B-System
+features	O
+we	O
+haven	O
+’	O
+t	O
+seen	O
+leveraged	O
+by	O
+malware	O
+before	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+incorporating	O
+an	O
+open-source	O
+machine	O
+learning	O
+module	O
+designed	O
+for	O
+context-aware	O
+cropping	O
+of	O
+its	O
+ransom	O
+note	O
+.	O
+
+New	O
+scheme	O
+,	O
+same	O
+goal	O
+In	O
+the	O
+past	O
+,	O
+Android	B-System
+ransomware	O
+used	O
+a	O
+special	O
+permission	O
+called	O
+“	O
+SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW	O
+”	O
+to	O
+display	O
+their	O
+ransom	O
+note	O
+.	O
+
+Apps	O
+that	O
+have	O
+this	O
+permission	O
+can	O
+draw	O
+a	O
+window	O
+that	O
+belongs	O
+to	O
+the	O
+system	O
+group	O
+and	O
+can	O
+’	O
+t	O
+be	O
+dismissed	O
+.	O
+
+No	O
+matter	O
+what	O
+button	O
+is	O
+pressed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+window	O
+stays	O
+on	O
+top	O
+of	O
+all	O
+other	O
+windows	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+notification	O
+was	O
+intended	O
+to	O
+be	O
+used	O
+for	O
+system	O
+alerts	O
+or	O
+errors	O
+,	O
+but	O
+Android	B-System
+threats	O
+misused	O
+it	O
+to	O
+force	O
+the	O
+attacker-controlled	O
+UI	O
+to	O
+fully	O
+occupy	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+,	O
+blocking	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Attackers	O
+create	O
+this	O
+scenario	O
+to	O
+persuade	O
+users	O
+to	O
+pay	O
+the	O
+ransom	O
+so	O
+they	O
+can	O
+gain	O
+back	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+catch	O
+these	O
+threats	O
+,	O
+security	O
+solutions	O
+used	O
+heuristics	O
+that	O
+focused	O
+on	O
+detecting	O
+this	O
+behavior	O
+.	O
+
+Google	B-Organization
+later	O
+implemented	O
+platform-level	O
+changes	O
+that	O
+practically	O
+eliminated	O
+this	O
+attack	O
+surface	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+changes	O
+include	O
+:	O
+Removing	O
+the	O
+SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW	O
+error	O
+and	O
+alert	O
+window	O
+types	O
+,	O
+and	O
+introducing	O
+a	O
+few	O
+other	O
+types	O
+as	O
+replacement	O
+Elevating	O
+the	O
+permission	O
+status	O
+of	O
+SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW	O
+to	O
+special	O
+permission	O
+by	O
+putting	O
+it	O
+into	O
+the	O
+“	O
+above	O
+dangerous	O
+”	O
+category	O
+,	O
+which	O
+means	O
+that	O
+users	O
+have	O
+to	O
+go	O
+through	O
+many	O
+screens	O
+to	O
+approve	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+ask	O
+for	O
+permission	O
+,	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+just	O
+one	O
+click	O
+Introducing	O
+an	O
+overlay	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+8.0	I-System
+and	O
+later	O
+that	O
+users	O
+can	O
+activate	O
+anytime	O
+to	O
+deactivate	O
+a	O
+system	O
+alert	O
+window	O
+To	O
+adapt	O
+,	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+evolved	O
+to	O
+misusing	O
+
+other	O
+features	O
+,	O
+but	O
+these	O
+aren	O
+’	O
+t	O
+as	O
+effective	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+some	O
+strains	O
+of	O
+ransomware	O
+abuse	O
+accessibility	O
+features	O
+,	O
+a	O
+method	O
+that	O
+could	O
+easily	O
+alarm	O
+users	O
+because	O
+accessibility	O
+is	O
+a	O
+special	O
+permission	O
+that	O
+requires	O
+users	O
+to	O
+go	O
+through	O
+several	O
+screens	O
+and	O
+accept	O
+a	O
+warning	O
+that	O
+the	O
+app	O
+will	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+monitor	O
+activity	O
+via	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+ransomware	O
+families	O
+use	O
+infinite	O
+loops	O
+of	O
+drawing	O
+non-system	O
+windows	B-System
+,	O
+but	O
+in	O
+between	O
+drawing	O
+and	O
+redrawing	O
+,	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+possible	O
+for	O
+users	O
+to	O
+go	O
+to	O
+settings	O
+and	O
+uninstall	O
+the	O
+offending	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+new	O
+Android	B-Malware
+ransomware	O
+variant	O
+overcomes	O
+these	O
+barriers	O
+by	O
+evolving	O
+further	O
+than	O
+any	O
+Android	B-Malware
+malware	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+seen	O
+before	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+surface	O
+its	O
+ransom	O
+note	O
+,	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+series	O
+of	O
+techniques	O
+that	O
+take	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+components	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+:	O
+The	O
+“	O
+call	O
+”	O
+notification	O
+,	O
+among	O
+several	O
+categories	O
+of	O
+notifications	O
+that	O
+Android	B-System
+supports	O
+,	O
+which	O
+requires	O
+immediate	O
+user	O
+attention	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+“	O
+onUserLeaveHint	O
+(	O
+)	O
+”	O
+callback	O
+method	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+Activity	I-System
+(	O
+i.e.	O
+,	O
+the	O
+typical	O
+GUI	O
+screen	O
+the	O
+user	O
+sees	O
+)	O
+is	O
+called	O
+as	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+activity	O
+lifecycle	O
+when	O
+the	O
+activity	O
+is	O
+about	O
+to	O
+go	O
+into	O
+the	O
+background	O
+as	O
+a	O
+result	O
+of	O
+user	O
+choice	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+when	O
+the	O
+user	O
+presses	O
+the	O
+Home	O
+key	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+connects	O
+the	O
+dots	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+these	O
+two	O
+components	O
+to	O
+create	O
+a	O
+special	O
+type	O
+of	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+triggers	O
+the	O
+ransom	O
+screen	O
+via	O
+the	O
+callback	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+the	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+shows	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+notification	O
+builder	O
+and	O
+then	O
+does	O
+the	O
+following	O
+:	O
+setCategory	O
+(	O
+“	O
+call	O
+”	O
+)	O
+–	O
+This	O
+means	O
+that	O
+the	O
+notification	O
+is	O
+built	O
+as	O
+a	O
+very	O
+important	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+needs	O
+special	O
+privilege	O
+.	O
+
+setFullScreenIntent	O
+(	O
+)	O
+–	O
+This	O
+API	O
+wires	O
+the	O
+notification	O
+to	O
+a	O
+GUI	O
+so	O
+that	O
+it	O
+pops	O
+up	O
+when	O
+the	O
+user	O
+taps	O
+on	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+this	O
+stage	O
+,	O
+half	O
+the	O
+job	O
+is	O
+done	O
+for	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+wouldn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+want	O
+to	O
+depend	O
+on	O
+user	O
+interaction	O
+to	O
+trigger	O
+the	O
+ransomware	O
+screen	O
+,	O
+so	O
+,	O
+it	O
+adds	O
+another	O
+functionality	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+callback	O
+:	O
+As	O
+the	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+shows	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+overrides	O
+the	O
+onUserLeaveHint	O
+(	O
+)	O
+callback	O
+function	O
+of	O
+Activity	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+function	O
+onUserLeaveHint	O
+(	O
+)	O
+is	O
+called	O
+whenever	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+screen	O
+is	O
+pushed	O
+to	O
+background	O
+,	O
+causing	O
+the	O
+in-call	O
+Activity	O
+to	O
+be	O
+automatically	O
+brought	O
+to	O
+the	O
+foreground	O
+.	O
+
+Recall	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+hooked	O
+the	O
+RansomActivity	O
+intent	O
+with	O
+the	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+was	O
+created	O
+as	O
+a	O
+“	O
+call	O
+”	O
+type	O
+notification	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+chain	O
+of	O
+events	O
+that	O
+triggers	O
+the	O
+automatic	O
+pop-up	O
+of	O
+the	O
+ransomware	O
+screen	O
+without	O
+doing	O
+infinite	O
+redraw	O
+or	O
+posing	O
+as	O
+system	O
+window	O
+.	O
+
+Machine	O
+learning	O
+module	O
+indicates	O
+continuous	O
+evolution	O
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+,	O
+this	O
+ransomware	O
+is	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+a	O
+malware	O
+family	O
+that	O
+has	O
+undergone	O
+several	O
+stages	O
+of	O
+evolution	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+knowledge	O
+graph	O
+below	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+various	O
+techniques	O
+this	O
+ransomware	O
+family	O
+has	O
+been	O
+seen	O
+using	O
+,	O
+including	O
+abusing	O
+the	O
+system	O
+alert	O
+window	O
+,	O
+abusing	O
+accessibility	O
+features	O
+,	O
+and	O
+,	O
+more	O
+recently	O
+,	O
+abusing	O
+notification	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+ransomware	O
+family	O
+’	O
+s	O
+long	O
+history	O
+tells	O
+us	O
+that	O
+its	O
+evolution	O
+is	O
+far	O
+from	O
+over	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+expect	O
+it	O
+to	O
+churn	O
+out	O
+new	O
+variants	O
+with	O
+even	O
+more	O
+sophisticated	O
+techniques	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+fact	O
+,	O
+recent	O
+variants	O
+contain	O
+code	O
+forked	O
+from	O
+an	O
+open-source	O
+machine	O
+learning	O
+module	O
+used	O
+by	O
+developers	O
+to	O
+automatically	O
+resize	O
+and	O
+crop	O
+images	O
+based	O
+on	O
+screen	O
+size	O
+,	O
+a	O
+valuable	O
+function	O
+given	O
+the	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+frozen	O
+TinyML	B-System
+model	O
+is	O
+useful	O
+for	O
+making	O
+sure	O
+images	O
+fit	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+without	O
+distortion	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+this	O
+ransomware	O
+,	O
+using	O
+the	O
+model	O
+would	O
+ensure	O
+that	O
+its	O
+ransom	O
+note—typically	O
+fake	O
+police	O
+notice	O
+or	O
+explicit	O
+images	O
+supposedly	O
+found	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device—would	O
+appear	O
+less	O
+contrived	O
+and	O
+more	O
+believable	O
+,	O
+increasing	O
+the	O
+chances	O
+of	O
+the	O
+user	O
+paying	O
+for	O
+the	O
+ransom	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+library	O
+that	O
+uses	O
+tinyML	B-System
+is	O
+not	O
+yet	O
+wired	O
+to	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+functionalities	O
+,	O
+but	O
+its	O
+presence	O
+in	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+code	O
+indicates	O
+the	O
+intention	O
+to	O
+do	O
+so	O
+in	O
+future	O
+variants	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+will	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+monitor	O
+this	O
+ransomware	O
+family	O
+to	O
+ensure	O
+customers	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+and	O
+to	O
+share	O
+our	O
+findings	O
+and	O
+insights	O
+to	O
+the	O
+community	O
+for	O
+broad	O
+protection	O
+against	O
+these	O
+evolving	O
+mobile	O
+threats	O
+.	O
+
+Protecting	O
+organizations	O
+from	O
+threats	O
+across	O
+domains	O
+and	O
+platforms	O
+Mobile	O
+threats	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+rapidly	O
+evolve	O
+,	O
+with	O
+attackers	O
+continuously	O
+attempting	O
+to	O
+sidestep	O
+technological	O
+barriers	O
+and	O
+creatively	O
+find	O
+ways	O
+to	O
+accomplish	O
+their	O
+goal	O
+,	O
+whether	O
+financial	O
+gain	O
+or	O
+finding	O
+an	O
+entry	O
+point	O
+to	O
+broader	O
+network	O
+compromise	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+new	O
+mobile	O
+ransomware	O
+variant	O
+is	O
+an	O
+important	O
+discovery	O
+because	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+exhibits	O
+behaviors	O
+that	O
+have	O
+not	O
+been	O
+seen	O
+before	O
+and	O
+could	O
+open	O
+doors	O
+for	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+follow	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+reinforces	O
+the	O
+need	O
+for	O
+comprehensive	O
+defense	O
+powered	O
+by	O
+broad	O
+visibility	O
+into	O
+attack	O
+surfaces	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+domain	O
+experts	O
+who	O
+track	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+landscape	O
+and	O
+uncover	O
+notable	O
+threats	O
+that	O
+might	O
+be	O
+hiding	O
+amidst	O
+massive	O
+threat	O
+data	O
+and	O
+signals	O
+.	O
+
+Microsoft	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+for	O
+Endpoint	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+now	O
+generally	O
+available	O
+,	O
+extends	O
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+industry-leading	O
+endpoint	O
+protection	O
+to	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+It	O
+detects	O
+this	O
+ransomware	O
+(	O
+AndroidOS/MalLocker.B	B-Indicator
+)	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+other	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+files	O
+using	O
+cloud-based	O
+protection	O
+powered	O
+by	O
+deep	O
+learning	O
+and	O
+heuristics	O
+,	O
+in	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+content-based	O
+detection	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+also	O
+protects	O
+users	O
+and	O
+organizations	O
+from	O
+other	O
+mobile	O
+threats	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+mobile	O
+phishing	O
+,	O
+unsafe	O
+network	O
+connections	O
+,	O
+and	O
+unauthorized	O
+access	O
+to	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+Learn	O
+more	O
+about	O
+our	O
+mobile	O
+threat	O
+defense	O
+capabilities	O
+in	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+for	O
+Endpoint	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+,	O
+phishing	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+threats	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+for	O
+Endpoint	O
+are	O
+reported	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+Defender	I-Organization
+Security	I-Organization
+Center	I-Organization
+,	O
+allowing	O
+SecOps	O
+to	O
+investigate	O
+mobile	O
+threats	O
+along	O
+with	O
+endpoint	O
+signals	O
+from	O
+Windows	B-System
+and	O
+other	O
+platforms	O
+using	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+for	O
+Endpoint	O
+’	O
+s	O
+rich	O
+set	O
+of	O
+tools	O
+for	O
+detection	O
+,	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+and	O
+response	O
+.	O
+
+Threat	O
+data	O
+from	O
+endpoints	O
+are	O
+combined	O
+with	O
+signals	O
+from	O
+email	O
+and	O
+data	O
+,	O
+identities	O
+,	O
+and	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+365	I-System
+Defender	I-System
+(	O
+previously	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Threat	I-System
+Protection	I-System
+)	O
+,	O
+which	O
+orchestrates	O
+detection	O
+,	O
+prevention	O
+,	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+and	O
+response	O
+across	O
+domains	O
+,	O
+providing	O
+coordinated	O
+defense	O
+.	O
+
+Microsoft	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+for	O
+Endpoint	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+further	O
+enriches	O
+organizations	O
+’	O
+visibility	O
+into	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+empowering	O
+them	O
+to	O
+comprehensively	O
+prevent	O
+,	O
+detect	O
+,	O
+and	O
+respond	O
+to	O
+against	O
+attack	O
+sprawl	O
+and	O
+cross-domain	O
+incidents	O
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+analysis	O
+Obfuscation	O
+On	O
+top	O
+of	O
+recreating	O
+ransomware	O
+behavior	O
+in	O
+ways	O
+we	O
+haven	O
+’	O
+t	O
+seen	O
+before	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+variant	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+new	O
+obfuscation	O
+technique	O
+unique	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+platform	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+tell-tale	O
+signs	O
+of	O
+an	O
+obfuscated	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+the	O
+absence	O
+of	O
+code	O
+that	O
+defines	O
+the	O
+classes	O
+declared	O
+in	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+classes.dex	O
+has	O
+implementation	O
+for	O
+only	O
+two	O
+classes	O
+:	O
+The	O
+main	O
+application	O
+class	O
+gCHotRrgEruDv	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+involved	O
+when	O
+the	O
+application	O
+opens	O
+A	O
+helper	O
+class	O
+that	O
+has	O
+definition	O
+for	O
+custom	O
+encryption	O
+and	O
+decryption	O
+This	O
+means	O
+that	O
+there	O
+’	O
+s	O
+no	O
+code	O
+corresponding	O
+to	O
+the	O
+services	O
+declared	O
+in	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+file	O
+:	O
+Main	O
+Activity	O
+,	O
+Broadcast	O
+Receivers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Background	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+does	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+work	O
+without	O
+code	O
+for	O
+these	O
+key	O
+components	O
+?	O
+
+As	O
+is	O
+characteristic	O
+for	O
+obfuscated	O
+threats	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+encrypted	O
+binary	O
+code	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Assets	O
+folder	O
+:	O
+When	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+runs	O
+for	O
+the	O
+first	O
+time	O
+,	O
+the	O
+static	O
+block	O
+of	O
+the	O
+main	O
+class	O
+is	O
+run	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+is	O
+heavily	O
+obfuscated	O
+and	O
+made	O
+unreadable	O
+through	O
+name	O
+mangling	O
+and	O
+use	O
+of	O
+meaningless	O
+variable	O
+names	O
+:	O
+Decryption	O
+with	O
+a	O
+twist	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+an	O
+interesting	O
+decryption	O
+routine	O
+:	O
+the	O
+string	O
+values	O
+passed	O
+to	O
+the	O
+decryption	O
+function	O
+do	O
+not	O
+correspond	O
+to	O
+the	O
+decrypted	O
+value	O
+,	O
+they	O
+correspond	O
+to	O
+junk	O
+code	O
+to	O
+simply	O
+hinder	O
+analysis	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+an	O
+Intent	O
+is	O
+a	O
+software	O
+mechanism	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+users	O
+to	O
+coordinate	O
+the	O
+functions	O
+of	O
+different	O
+Activities	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+a	O
+task	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+a	O
+messaging	O
+object	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+request	O
+an	O
+action	O
+from	O
+another	O
+app	O
+component	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Intent	O
+object	O
+carries	O
+a	O
+string	O
+value	O
+as	O
+“	O
+action	O
+”	O
+parameter	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+creates	O
+an	O
+Intent	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+decryption	O
+function	O
+using	O
+the	O
+string	O
+value	O
+passed	O
+as	O
+the	O
+name	O
+for	O
+the	O
+Intent	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+then	O
+decrypts	O
+a	O
+hardcoded	O
+encrypted	O
+value	O
+and	O
+sets	O
+the	O
+“	O
+action	O
+”	O
+parameter	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Intent	O
+using	O
+the	O
+setAction	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+this	O
+Intent	O
+object	O
+is	O
+generated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+action	O
+value	O
+pointing	O
+to	O
+the	O
+decrypted	O
+content	O
+,	O
+the	O
+decryption	O
+function	O
+returns	O
+the	O
+Intent	O
+object	O
+to	O
+the	O
+callee	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+callee	O
+then	O
+invokes	O
+the	O
+getAction	O
+method	O
+to	O
+get	O
+the	O
+decrypted	O
+content	O
+.	O
+
+Payload	O
+deployment	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+static	O
+block	O
+execution	O
+is	O
+complete	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+Lifecycle	I-System
+callback	O
+transfers	O
+the	O
+control	O
+to	O
+the	O
+OnCreate	O
+method	O
+of	O
+the	O
+main	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+code	O
+showing	O
+onCreate	O
+method	O
+Figure	O
+9.	O
+onCreate	O
+method	O
+of	O
+the	O
+main	O
+class	O
+decrypting	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+Next	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware-defined	O
+function	O
+decryptAssetToDex	O
+(	O
+a	O
+meaningful	O
+name	O
+we	O
+assigned	O
+during	O
+analysis	O
+)	O
+receives	O
+the	O
+string	O
+“	O
+CuffGmrQRT	B-Indicator
+”	O
+as	O
+the	O
+first	O
+argument	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+encrypted	O
+file	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Assets	O
+folder	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+code	O
+showing	O
+decryption	O
+of	O
+assets	O
+Figure	O
+10	O
+.	O
+
+Decrypting	O
+the	O
+assets	O
+After	O
+being	O
+decrypted	O
+,	O
+the	O
+asset	O
+turns	O
+into	O
+the	O
+.dex	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+notable	O
+behavior	O
+that	O
+is	O
+characteristic	O
+of	O
+this	O
+ransomware	O
+family	O
+.	O
+
+Comparison	O
+of	O
+code	O
+of	O
+Asset	O
+file	O
+before	O
+and	O
+after	O
+decryption	O
+Figure	O
+11	O
+.	O
+
+Asset	O
+file	O
+before	O
+and	O
+after	O
+decryption	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+encrypted	O
+executable	O
+is	O
+decrypted	O
+and	O
+dropped	O
+in	O
+the	O
+storage	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+the	O
+definitions	O
+for	O
+all	O
+the	O
+components	O
+it	O
+declared	O
+in	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+then	O
+starts	O
+the	O
+final	O
+detonator	O
+function	O
+to	O
+load	O
+the	O
+dropped	O
+.dex	O
+file	O
+into	O
+memory	O
+and	O
+triggers	O
+the	O
+main	O
+payload	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+code	O
+showing	O
+loading	O
+of	O
+decrypted	O
+dex	O
+file	O
+Figure	O
+12	O
+.	O
+
+Loading	O
+the	O
+decrypted	O
+.dex	O
+file	O
+into	O
+memory	O
+and	O
+triggering	O
+the	O
+main	O
+payload	O
+Main	O
+payload	O
+When	O
+the	O
+main	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+loaded	O
+into	O
+memory	O
+,	O
+the	O
+initial	O
+detonator	O
+hands	O
+over	O
+the	O
+control	O
+to	O
+the	O
+main	O
+payload	O
+by	O
+invoking	O
+the	O
+method	O
+XoqF	O
+(	O
+which	O
+we	O
+renamed	O
+to	O
+triggerInfection	O
+during	O
+analysis	O
+)	O
+from	O
+the	O
+gvmthHtyN	O
+class	O
+(	O
+renamed	O
+to	O
+PayloadEntry	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+code	O
+showing	O
+handover	O
+from	O
+initial	O
+module	O
+to	O
+main	O
+payload	O
+Figure	O
+13	O
+.	O
+
+Handover	O
+from	O
+initial	O
+module	O
+to	O
+the	O
+main	O
+payload	O
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+,	O
+the	O
+initial	O
+handover	O
+component	O
+called	O
+triggerInfection	O
+with	O
+an	O
+instance	O
+of	O
+appObj	O
+and	O
+a	O
+method	O
+that	O
+returns	O
+the	O
+value	O
+for	O
+the	O
+variable	O
+config	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+code	O
+showing	O
+definition	O
+of	O
+populateConfigMap	O
+Figure	O
+14	O
+.	O
+
+Definition	O
+of	O
+populateConfigMap	O
+,	O
+which	O
+loads	O
+the	O
+map	O
+with	O
+values	O
+Correlating	O
+the	O
+last	O
+two	O
+steps	O
+,	O
+one	O
+can	O
+observe	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+payload	O
+receives	O
+the	O
+configuration	O
+for	O
+the	O
+following	O
+properties	O
+:	O
+number	O
+–	O
+The	O
+default	O
+number	O
+to	O
+be	O
+send	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+(	O
+in	O
+case	O
+the	O
+number	O
+is	O
+not	O
+available	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+)	O
+api	O
+–	O
+The	O
+API	O
+key	O
+url	O
+–	O
+The	O
+URL	O
+to	O
+be	O
+used	O
+in	O
+WebView	O
+to	O
+display	O
+on	O
+the	O
+ransom	O
+note	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+saves	O
+this	O
+configuration	O
+to	O
+the	O
+shared	O
+preferences	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+data	O
+and	O
+then	O
+it	O
+sets	O
+up	O
+all	O
+the	O
+Broadcast	O
+Receivers	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+action	O
+registers	O
+code	O
+components	O
+to	O
+get	O
+notified	O
+when	O
+certain	O
+system	O
+events	O
+happen	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+done	O
+in	O
+the	O
+function	O
+initComponents	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+code	O
+showing	O
+initializing	O
+broadcast	O
+receiver	O
+Figure	O
+15	O
+.	O
+
+Initializing	O
+the	O
+BroadcastReceiver	O
+against	O
+system	O
+events	O
+From	O
+this	O
+point	O
+on	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+execution	O
+is	O
+driven	O
+by	O
+callback	O
+functions	O
+that	O
+are	O
+triggered	O
+on	O
+system	O
+events	O
+like	O
+connectivity	O
+change	O
+,	O
+unlocking	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+,	O
+elapsed	O
+time	O
+interval	O
+,	O
+and	O
+others	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+identified	O
+a	O
+new	O
+,	O
+highly	O
+targeted	O
+surveillanceware	O
+family	O
+known	O
+as	O
+Desert	B-Malware
+Scorpion	I-Malware
+in	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+notified	O
+Google	B-Organization
+of	O
+the	O
+finding	O
+and	O
+Google	B-Organization
+removed	O
+the	O
+app	O
+immediately	O
+while	O
+also	O
+taking	O
+action	O
+on	O
+it	O
+in	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+ties	O
+together	O
+two	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+-	O
+Desert	B-Malware
+Scorpion	I-Malware
+and	O
+another	O
+targeted	O
+surveillanceware	O
+family	O
+named	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+-	O
+that	O
+we	O
+believe	O
+are	O
+being	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+single	O
+,	O
+evolving	O
+surveillanceware	O
+actor	O
+called	O
+APT-C-23	B-Malware
+targeting	O
+individuals	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Middle	O
+East	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+'ve	O
+seen	O
+this	O
+actor	O
+rely	O
+heavily	O
+on	O
+phishing	O
+campaigns	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+victims	O
+into	O
+downloading	O
+their	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+specifically	O
+on	O
+Facebook	B-System
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+sophisticated	O
+actors	O
+are	O
+using	O
+lower	O
+cost	O
+,	O
+less	O
+technologically	O
+impressive	O
+means	O
+like	O
+phishing	O
+to	O
+spread	O
+their	O
+malware	O
+because	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+cheap	O
+and	O
+very	O
+effective	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+on	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+where	O
+there	O
+are	O
+more	O
+ways	O
+to	O
+interact	O
+with	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+(	O
+messaging	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+social	O
+media	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+less	O
+screen	O
+real	O
+estate	O
+for	O
+victims	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+potential	O
+indicators	O
+of	O
+a	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+customers	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+against	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+and	O
+additionally	O
+we	O
+have	O
+included	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+IOCs	O
+at	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+this	O
+report	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+potential	O
+actor	O
+and	O
+who	O
+they	O
+target	O
+Our	O
+current	O
+analysis	O
+strongly	O
+suggests	O
+Desert	B-Malware
+Scorpion	I-Malware
+is	O
+being	O
+deployed	O
+in	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+against	O
+Middle	O
+Eastern	O
+individuals	O
+of	O
+interest	O
+specifically	O
+those	O
+in	O
+Palestine	O
+and	O
+has	O
+also	O
+been	O
+highlighted	O
+by	O
+other	O
+researchers	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+been	O
+able	O
+to	O
+tie	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+a	O
+long-running	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+profile	O
+that	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+promoting	O
+the	O
+first	O
+stage	O
+of	O
+this	O
+family	O
+,	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+chat	O
+application	O
+called	O
+Dardesh	B-Malware
+via	O
+links	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+Threat	I-Organization
+Intelligence	I-Organization
+team	O
+identified	O
+that	O
+this	O
+same	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+profile	O
+has	O
+also	O
+posted	O
+Google	B-System
+Drive	I-System
+links	O
+to	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+the	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+family	O
+attributed	O
+to	O
+APT-C-27	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+These	O
+factors	O
+,	O
+in	O
+combination	O
+with	O
+the	O
+fact	O
+that	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+infrastructure	O
+used	O
+by	O
+Frozen	B-Malware
+Cell	I-Malware
+and	O
+Desert	B-Malware
+Scorpion	I-Malware
+resides	O
+in	O
+similar	O
+IP	O
+blocks	O
+,	O
+supports	O
+the	O
+theory	O
+that	O
+the	O
+same	O
+actor	O
+is	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+operating	O
+,	O
+if	O
+not	O
+developing	O
+,	O
+both	O
+families	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+it	O
+does	O
+The	O
+surveillance	O
+functionality	O
+of	O
+Desert	B-Malware
+Scorpion	I-Malware
+resides	O
+in	O
+a	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+payload	O
+that	O
+can	O
+only	O
+be	O
+downloaded	O
+if	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+has	O
+downloaded	O
+,	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+and	O
+interacted	O
+with	O
+the	O
+first-stage	O
+chat	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+chat	O
+application	O
+acts	O
+as	O
+a	O
+dropper	O
+for	O
+this	O
+second-stage	O
+payload	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+has	O
+observed	O
+two	O
+updates	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Dardesh	B-Malware
+application	O
+,	O
+the	O
+first	O
+on	O
+February	O
+26	O
+and	O
+the	O
+second	O
+on	O
+March	O
+28	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+capabilities	O
+observed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+include	O
+the	O
+following	O
+:	O
+Upload	O
+attacker-specified	O
+files	O
+to	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+Get	O
+list	O
+of	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+Get	O
+device	O
+metadata	O
+Inspect	O
+itself	O
+to	O
+get	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+launchable	O
+activities	O
+Retrieves	O
+PDF	O
+,	O
+txt	O
+,	O
+doc	O
+,	O
+xls	O
+,	O
+xlsx	O
+,	O
+ppt	O
+,	O
+pptx	O
+files	O
+found	O
+on	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+Send	O
+SMS	O
+Retrieve	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+Track	O
+device	O
+location	O
+Handle	O
+limited	O
+attacker	O
+commands	O
+via	O
+out	O
+of	O
+band	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+Record	O
+surrounding	O
+audio	O
+Record	O
+calls	O
+Record	O
+video	O
+Retrieve	O
+account	O
+information	O
+such	O
+as	O
+email	O
+addresses	O
+Retrieve	O
+contacts	O
+Removes	O
+copies	O
+of	O
+itself	O
+if	O
+
+any	O
+additional	O
+APKs	O
+are	O
+downloaded	O
+to	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+.	O
+
+Call	O
+an	O
+attacker-specified	O
+number	O
+Uninstall	O
+apps	O
+Check	O
+if	O
+a	O
+device	O
+is	O
+rooted	O
+Hide	O
+its	O
+icon	O
+Retrieve	O
+list	O
+of	O
+files	O
+on	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+If	O
+running	O
+on	O
+a	O
+Huawei	O
+device	O
+it	O
+will	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+add	O
+itself	O
+to	O
+the	O
+protected	O
+list	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+able	O
+to	O
+run	O
+with	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+off	O
+Encrypts	O
+some	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+Desert	B-Malware
+Scorpion	I-Malware
+'s	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+masquerades	O
+as	O
+a	O
+generic	O
+"	O
+settings	O
+''	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+Curiously	O
+,	O
+several	O
+of	O
+these	O
+have	O
+included	O
+the	O
+world	O
+"	O
+Fateh	O
+''	O
+in	O
+their	O
+package	O
+name	O
+,	O
+which	O
+may	O
+be	O
+referring	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Fatah	B-Organization
+political	O
+party	O
+.	O
+
+Such	O
+references	O
+would	O
+be	O
+in	O
+line	O
+with	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+'s	O
+phishing	O
+tactics	O
+in	O
+which	O
+they	O
+used	O
+file	O
+names	O
+to	O
+lure	O
+people	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+political	O
+party	O
+to	O
+open	O
+malicious	O
+documents	O
+.	O
+
+Desert	B-Malware
+Scorpion	I-Malware
+'s	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+installing	O
+another	O
+non-malicious	O
+application	O
+(	O
+included	O
+in	O
+the	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+)	O
+which	O
+is	O
+highly	O
+specific	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Fatah	B-Organization
+political	O
+party	O
+and	O
+supports	O
+the	O
+targeting	O
+theory	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+Threat	I-Organization
+Intelligence	I-Organization
+team	O
+is	O
+increasingly	O
+seeing	O
+the	O
+same	O
+tradecraft	O
+,	O
+tactics	O
+,	O
+and	O
+procedures	O
+that	O
+APT-C-23	B-Malware
+favors	O
+being	O
+used	O
+by	O
+other	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+approach	O
+of	O
+separating	O
+malicious	O
+functionality	O
+out	O
+into	O
+separate	O
+stages	O
+that	O
+are	O
+later	O
+downloaded	O
+during	O
+execution	O
+and	O
+not	O
+present	O
+in	O
+the	O
+initial	O
+app	O
+published	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+,	O
+combined	O
+with	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+delivered	O
+via	O
+social	O
+media	O
+platforms	O
+like	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+,	O
+requires	O
+minimal	O
+investment	O
+in	O
+comparison	O
+to	O
+premium	O
+tooling	O
+like	O
+Pegasus	B-Malware
+or	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+As	O
+we	O
+'ve	O
+seen	O
+with	O
+actors	O
+like	O
+Dark	B-Malware
+Caracal	I-Malware
+,	O
+this	O
+low	O
+cost	O
+,	O
+low	O
+sophistication	O
+approach	O
+that	O
+relies	O
+heavily	O
+upon	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+has	O
+still	O
+been	O
+shown	O
+to	O
+be	O
+highly	O
+successful	O
+for	O
+those	O
+operating	O
+such	O
+campaigns	O
+.	O
+
+Given	O
+previous	O
+operational	O
+security	O
+errors	O
+from	O
+this	O
+actor	O
+in	O
+the	O
+past	O
+which	O
+resulted	O
+in	O
+exfiltrated	O
+content	O
+being	O
+publicly	O
+accessible	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+Threat	I-Organization
+Intelligence	I-Organization
+is	O
+continuing	O
+to	O
+map	O
+out	O
+infrastructure	O
+and	O
+closely	O
+monitor	O
+their	O
+continued	O
+evolution	O
+.	O
+
+Virulent	B-Malware
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+returns	O
+,	O
+gets	O
+>	O
+2	O
+million	O
+downloads	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+HummingWhale	B-Malware
+is	O
+back	O
+with	O
+new	O
+tricks	O
+,	O
+including	O
+a	O
+way	O
+to	O
+gin	O
+user	O
+ratings	O
+.	O
+
+DAN	O
+GOODIN	O
+-	O
+1/23/2017	O
+,	O
+4:39	O
+PM	O
+A	O
+virulent	B-Malware
+family	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+infected	O
+more	O
+than	O
+10	O
+million	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+last	O
+year	O
+has	O
+made	O
+a	O
+comeback	O
+,	O
+this	O
+time	O
+hiding	O
+inside	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+apps	O
+that	O
+have	O
+been	O
+downloaded	O
+by	O
+as	O
+many	O
+as	O
+12	O
+million	O
+unsuspecting	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+HummingWhale	B-Malware
+,	O
+as	O
+the	O
+professionally	O
+developed	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+been	O
+dubbed	O
+,	O
+is	O
+a	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+,	O
+the	O
+name	O
+given	O
+to	O
+a	O
+family	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+researchers	O
+documented	O
+in	O
+July	O
+invading	O
+non-Google	O
+app	O
+markets	O
+.	O
+
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+attempted	O
+to	O
+override	O
+security	O
+protections	O
+by	O
+exploiting	O
+unpatched	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+that	O
+gave	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+in	O
+older	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+Before	O
+Google	B-Organization
+shut	O
+it	O
+down	O
+,	O
+it	O
+installed	O
+more	O
+than	O
+50,000	O
+fraudulent	O
+apps	O
+each	O
+day	O
+,	O
+displayed	O
+20	O
+million	O
+malicious	O
+advertisements	O
+,	O
+and	O
+generated	O
+more	O
+than	O
+$	O
+300,000	O
+per	O
+month	O
+in	O
+revenue	O
+.	O
+
+Of	O
+the	O
+10	O
+million	O
+people	O
+who	O
+downloaded	O
+HummingBad-contaminated	B-Malware
+apps	O
+,	O
+an	O
+estimated	O
+286,000	O
+of	O
+them	O
+were	O
+located	O
+in	O
+the	O
+US	O
+.	O
+
+HummingWhale	B-Malware
+,	O
+by	O
+contrast	O
+,	O
+managed	O
+to	O
+sneak	O
+its	O
+way	O
+into	O
+about	O
+20	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+apps	O
+that	O
+were	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+2	O
+million	O
+to	O
+12	O
+million	O
+times	O
+,	O
+according	O
+to	O
+researchers	O
+from	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+,	O
+the	O
+security	O
+company	O
+that	O
+has	O
+been	O
+closely	O
+following	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+family	O
+for	O
+almost	O
+a	O
+year	O
+.	O
+
+Rather	O
+than	O
+rooting	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+variant	O
+includes	O
+new	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+techniques	O
+that	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+ad	O
+fraud	O
+better	O
+than	O
+ever	O
+,	O
+company	O
+researchers	O
+said	O
+in	O
+a	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+published	O
+Monday	O
+.	O
+
+"	O
+Users	O
+must	O
+realize	O
+that	O
+they	O
+can	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+trust	O
+in	O
+installing	O
+only	O
+apps	O
+with	O
+a	O
+high	O
+reputation	O
+from	O
+official	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+as	O
+their	O
+sole	O
+defense	O
+,	O
+''	O
+the	O
+researchers	O
+wrote	O
+in	O
+an	O
+e-mail	O
+to	O
+Ars	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+"	O
+This	O
+malware	O
+employs	O
+several	O
+tactics	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+its	O
+activity	O
+hidden	O
+,	O
+meaning	O
+users	O
+might	O
+be	O
+unaware	O
+of	O
+its	O
+existence	O
+on	O
+their	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+As	O
+was	O
+the	O
+case	O
+with	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+,	O
+the	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+HummingWhale	B-Malware
+is	O
+to	O
+generate	O
+revenue	O
+by	O
+displaying	O
+fraudulent	O
+ads	O
+and	O
+automatically	O
+installing	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+users	O
+try	O
+to	O
+close	O
+the	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+the	O
+new	O
+functionality	O
+causes	O
+already	O
+downloaded	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+run	O
+in	O
+a	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+.	O
+
+That	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+ID	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+perpetrators	O
+to	O
+generate	O
+referral	O
+revenues	O
+.	O
+
+Use	O
+of	O
+the	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+brings	O
+many	O
+technical	O
+benefits	O
+to	O
+the	O
+operators	O
+,	O
+chief	O
+among	O
+them	O
+allowing	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+install	O
+apps	O
+without	O
+requiring	O
+users	O
+to	O
+approve	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+elevated	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+Advertisement	O
+The	O
+VM	O
+also	O
+disguises	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+making	O
+it	O
+easier	O
+for	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+infiltrate	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+the	O
+added	O
+benefit	O
+of	O
+installing	O
+a	O
+nearly	O
+unlimited	O
+number	O
+of	O
+fraudulent	O
+apps	O
+without	O
+overloading	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Until	O
+now	O
+,	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+that	O
+wanted	O
+advanced	O
+capabilities	O
+typically	O
+had	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+users	O
+into	O
+approving	O
+sometimes	O
+scary-sounding	O
+permissions	O
+or	O
+exploit	O
+rooting	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Ginning	O
+the	O
+ratings	O
+FURTHER	O
+READING	O
+1	O
+million	O
+Google	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+compromised	O
+by	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+called	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+To	O
+implement	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+feature	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+APK	O
+installation	O
+dropper	O
+used	O
+by	O
+HummingWhale	B-Malware
+uses	O
+DroidPlugin	B-Malware
+,	O
+an	O
+extension	O
+originally	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+developers	O
+from	O
+China-based	O
+company	O
+Qihoo	B-Organization
+360	I-Organization
+,	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+said	O
+.	O
+
+HummingWhale	B-Malware
+has	O
+also	O
+been	O
+observed	O
+hiding	O
+the	O
+original	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+once	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+installed	O
+and	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+improve	O
+its	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+reputation	O
+by	O
+automatically	O
+generating	O
+posts	O
+disguised	O
+as	O
+positive	O
+user	O
+comments	O
+and	O
+ratings	O
+.	O
+
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+,	O
+a	O
+family	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+that	O
+came	O
+to	O
+light	O
+in	O
+November	O
+after	O
+it	O
+compromised	O
+more	O
+than	O
+1	O
+million	O
+Google	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+,	O
+contained	O
+similar	O
+abilities	O
+to	O
+tamper	O
+with	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+ratings	O
+.	O
+
+People	O
+who	O
+want	O
+to	O
+know	O
+if	O
+their	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+are	O
+infected	O
+can	O
+download	O
+the	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+app	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+separate	O
+app	O
+from	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+competitor	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+also	O
+detects	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+as	O
+a	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Shedun	B-Malware
+malware	O
+family	O
+.	O
+
+More	O
+technically	O
+inclined	O
+people	O
+can	O
+detect	O
+infections	O
+by	O
+seeing	O
+if	O
+a	O
+device	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+a	O
+control	O
+server	O
+located	O
+at	O
+app.blinkingcamera.com	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Package	O
+names	O
+for	O
+infected	O
+apps	O
+typically	O
+contain	O
+a	O
+common	O
+naming	O
+structure	O
+that	O
+includes	O
+com.XXXXXXXXX.camera	B-Indicator
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+com.bird.sky.whale.camera	B-Indicator
+(	O
+app	O
+name	O
+:	O
+Whale	B-System
+Camera	I-System
+)	O
+,	O
+com.color.rainbow.camera	B-Indicator
+(	O
+Rainbow	B-System
+Camera	I-System
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+com.fishing.when.orangecamera	B-Indicator
+(	O
+Orange	B-System
+Camera	I-System
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Google	B-Organization
+officials	O
+removed	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+market	I-System
+after	O
+receiving	O
+a	O
+private	O
+report	O
+of	O
+their	O
+existence	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+company	O
+representative	O
+declined	O
+to	O
+comment	O
+for	O
+this	O
+post	O
+.	O
+
+BusyGasper	B-Malware
+–	O
+the	O
+unfriendly	O
+spy	O
+29	O
+AUG	O
+2018	O
+In	O
+early	O
+2018	O
+our	O
+mobile	O
+intruder-detection	O
+technology	O
+was	O
+triggered	O
+by	O
+a	O
+suspicious	O
+Android	B-System
+sample	O
+that	O
+,	O
+as	O
+it	O
+turned	O
+out	O
+,	O
+belonged	O
+to	O
+an	O
+unknown	O
+spyware	O
+family	O
+.	O
+
+Further	O
+investigation	O
+showed	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+which	O
+we	O
+named	O
+BusyGasper	B-Malware
+,	O
+is	O
+not	O
+all	O
+that	O
+sophisticated	O
+,	O
+but	O
+demonstrates	O
+some	O
+unusual	O
+features	O
+for	O
+this	O
+type	O
+of	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+a	O
+technical	O
+point	O
+of	O
+view	O
+,	O
+the	O
+sample	O
+is	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+spy	O
+implant	O
+with	O
+stand-out	O
+features	O
+such	O
+as	O
+device	O
+sensors	O
+listeners	O
+,	O
+including	O
+motion	O
+detectors	O
+that	O
+have	O
+been	O
+implemented	O
+with	O
+a	O
+degree	O
+of	O
+originality	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+an	O
+incredibly	O
+wide-ranging	O
+protocol	O
+–	O
+about	O
+100	O
+commands	O
+–	O
+and	O
+an	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+the	O
+Doze	O
+battery	O
+saver	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+modern	O
+Android	O
+spyware	O
+it	O
+is	O
+also	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+exfiltrating	O
+data	O
+from	O
+messaging	O
+applications	O
+(	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Viber	B-System
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+BusyGasper	B-Malware
+boasts	O
+some	O
+keylogging	O
+tools	O
+–	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+processes	O
+every	O
+user	O
+tap	O
+,	O
+gathering	O
+its	O
+coordinates	O
+and	O
+calculating	O
+characters	O
+by	O
+matching	O
+given	O
+values	O
+with	O
+hardcoded	O
+ones	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+sample	O
+has	O
+a	O
+multicomponent	O
+structure	O
+and	O
+can	O
+download	O
+a	O
+payload	O
+or	O
+updates	O
+from	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+which	O
+happens	O
+to	O
+be	O
+an	O
+FTP	O
+server	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+the	O
+free	O
+Russian	O
+web	O
+hosting	O
+service	O
+Ucoz	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+noteworthy	O
+that	O
+BusyGasper	B-Malware
+supports	O
+the	O
+IRC	O
+protocol	O
+which	O
+is	O
+rarely	O
+seen	O
+among	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+log	O
+in	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+email	O
+inbox	O
+,	O
+parse	O
+emails	O
+in	O
+a	O
+special	O
+folder	O
+for	O
+commands	O
+and	O
+save	O
+any	O
+payloads	O
+to	O
+a	O
+device	O
+from	O
+email	O
+attachments	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+particular	O
+operation	O
+has	O
+been	O
+active	O
+since	O
+approximately	O
+May	O
+2016	O
+up	O
+to	O
+the	O
+present	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+Infection	O
+vector	O
+and	O
+victims	O
+While	O
+looking	O
+for	O
+the	O
+infection	O
+vector	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+no	O
+evidence	O
+of	O
+spear	O
+phishing	O
+or	O
+any	O
+of	O
+the	O
+other	O
+common	O
+vectors	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+some	O
+clues	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+existence	O
+of	O
+a	O
+hidden	O
+menu	O
+for	O
+operator	O
+control	O
+,	O
+point	O
+to	O
+a	O
+manual	O
+installation	O
+method	O
+–	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+used	O
+physical	O
+access	O
+to	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+to	O
+install	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+would	O
+explain	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+victims	O
+–	O
+there	O
+are	O
+less	O
+than	O
+10	O
+of	O
+them	O
+and	O
+according	O
+to	O
+our	O
+detection	O
+statistics	O
+,	O
+they	O
+are	O
+all	O
+located	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+Intrigued	O
+,	O
+we	O
+continued	O
+our	O
+search	O
+and	O
+found	O
+more	O
+interesting	O
+clues	O
+that	O
+could	O
+reveal	O
+some	O
+detailed	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+owners	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Several	O
+TXT	O
+files	O
+with	O
+commands	O
+on	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+FTP	O
+server	O
+contain	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+identifier	O
+in	O
+the	O
+names	O
+that	O
+was	O
+probably	O
+added	O
+by	O
+the	O
+criminals	O
+:	O
+CMDS10114-Sun1.txt	B-Indicator
+CMDS10134-Ju_ASUS.txt	B-Indicator
+CMDS10134-Tad.txt	B-Indicator
+CMDS10166-Jana.txt	B-Indicator
+CMDS10187-Sun2.txt	B-Indicator
+CMDS10194-SlavaAl.txt	B-Indicator
+CMDS10209-Nikusha.txt	B-Indicator
+Some	O
+of	O
+them	O
+sound	O
+like	O
+Russian	O
+names	O
+:	O
+Jana	O
+,	O
+SlavaAl	O
+,	O
+Nikusha	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+we	O
+know	O
+from	O
+the	O
+FTP	O
+dump	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+there	O
+was	O
+a	O
+firmware	O
+component	O
+from	O
+ASUS	B-Organization
+firmware	O
+,	O
+indicating	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+interest	O
+in	O
+ASUS	B-Organization
+devices	O
+,	O
+which	O
+explains	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+file	O
+name	O
+that	O
+mentions	O
+“	O
+ASUS	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Information	O
+gathered	O
+from	O
+the	O
+email	O
+account	O
+provides	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+’	O
+personal	O
+data	O
+,	O
+including	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+IM	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Gathered	O
+file	O
+Type	O
+Description	O
+lock	O
+Text	O
+Implant	O
+log	O
+ldata	O
+sqlite3	O
+Location	O
+data	O
+based	O
+on	O
+network	O
+(	O
+cell_id	O
+)	O
+gdata	O
+sqlite3	O
+Location	O
+data	O
+based	O
+on	O
+GPS	O
+coordinates	O
+sdata	B-Indicator
+sqlite3	I-Indicator
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+f.db	B-Indicator
+sqlite3	I-Indicator
+Facebook	B-System
+messages	O
+v.db	B-Indicator
+sqlite3	I-Indicator
+Viber	B-System
+messages	O
+w.db	B-Indicator
+sqlite3	I-Indicator
+WhatsApp	B-System
+messages	O
+Among	O
+the	O
+other	O
+data	O
+gathered	O
+were	O
+SMS	O
+banking	O
+messages	O
+that	O
+revealed	O
+an	O
+account	O
+with	O
+a	O
+balance	O
+of	O
+more	O
+than	O
+US	O
+$	O
+10,000.But	O
+as	O
+far	O
+as	O
+we	O
+know	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+behind	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+is	O
+not	O
+interested	O
+in	O
+stealing	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+’	O
+money	O
+
+.	O
+
+We	O
+found	O
+no	O
+similarities	O
+to	O
+commercial	O
+spyware	O
+products	O
+or	O
+to	O
+other	O
+known	O
+spyware	O
+variants	O
+,	O
+which	O
+suggests	O
+BusyGasper	B-Malware
+is	O
+self-developed	O
+and	O
+used	O
+by	O
+a	O
+single	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+same	O
+time	O
+,	O
+the	O
+lack	O
+of	O
+encryption	O
+,	O
+use	O
+of	O
+a	O
+public	O
+FTP	O
+server	O
+and	O
+the	O
+low	O
+opsec	O
+level	O
+could	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+less	O
+skilled	O
+attackers	O
+are	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+details	O
+Here	O
+is	O
+the	O
+meta	O
+information	O
+for	O
+the	O
+observed	O
+samples	O
+,	O
+certificates	O
+and	O
+hardcoded	O
+version	O
+stamps	O
+:	O
+Certificate	O
+MD5	O
+Module	O
+Version	O
+Serial	O
+Number	O
+:	O
+0x76607c02	B-Indicator
+Issuer	O
+:	O
+CN=Ron	O
+Validity	O
+:	O
+from	O
+=	O
+Tue	O
+Aug	O
+30	O
+13:01:30	O
+MSK	O
+2016	O
+to	O
+=	O
+Sat	O
+Aug	O
+24	O
+13:01:30	O
+MSK	O
+2041	O
+Subject	O
+:	O
+CN=Ron	O
+9e005144ea1a583531f86663a5f14607	B-Indicator
+1	O
+–	O
+18abe28730c53de6d9e4786c7765c3d8	B-Indicator
+2	O
+2.0	O
+
+Serial	O
+Number	O
+:	O
+0x6a0d1fec	B-Indicator
+Issuer	O
+:	O
+CN=Sun	O
+Validity	O
+:	O
+from	O
+=	O
+Mon	O
+May	O
+16	O
+17:42:40	O
+MSK	O
+2016	O
+to	O
+=	O
+Fri	O
+May	O
+10	O
+17:42:40	O
+MSK	O
+2041	O
+Subject	O
+:	O
+CN=Sun	O
+9ffc350ef94ef840728564846f2802b0	B-Indicator
+2	O
+v2.51sun	O
+6c246bbb40b7c6e75c60a55c0da9e2f2	B-Indicator
+2	O
+v2.96s	O
+7c8a12e56e3e03938788b26b84b80bd6	B-Indicator
+2	O
+v3.09s	O
+
+bde7847487125084f9e03f2b6b05adc3	B-Indicator
+2	O
+v3.12s	O
+2560942bb50ee6e6f55afc495d238a12	B-Indicator
+2	O
+v3.18s	O
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+interesting	O
+that	O
+the	O
+issuer	O
+“	O
+Sun	O
+”	O
+matches	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Sun1	O
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+Sun2	O
+”	O
+identifiers	O
+of	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+from	O
+the	O
+FTP	O
+server	O
+,	O
+suggesting	O
+they	O
+may	O
+be	O
+test	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+analyzed	O
+implant	O
+has	O
+a	O
+complex	O
+structure	O
+,	O
+and	O
+for	O
+now	O
+we	O
+have	O
+observed	O
+two	O
+modules	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+(	O
+start	O
+)	O
+module	O
+The	O
+first	O
+module	O
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+device	O
+,	O
+could	O
+be	O
+controlled	O
+over	O
+the	O
+IRC	O
+protocol	O
+and	O
+enable	O
+deployment	O
+of	O
+other	O
+components	O
+by	O
+downloading	O
+a	O
+payload	O
+from	O
+the	O
+FTP	O
+server	O
+:	O
+@	O
+install	O
+command	O
+As	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+from	O
+the	O
+screenshot	O
+above	O
+,	O
+a	O
+new	O
+component	O
+was	O
+copied	O
+in	O
+the	O
+system	O
+path	O
+,	O
+though	O
+that	O
+sort	O
+of	O
+operation	O
+is	O
+impossible	O
+without	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+we	O
+had	O
+no	O
+evidence	O
+of	O
+an	O
+exploit	O
+being	O
+used	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+though	O
+it	O
+is	O
+possible	O
+that	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+used	O
+some	O
+unseen	O
+component	O
+to	O
+implement	O
+this	O
+feature	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+is	O
+a	O
+full	O
+list	O
+of	O
+possible	O
+commands	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+first	O
+module	O
+:	O
+Command	O
+name	O
+Description	O
+@	O
+stop	O
+Stop	O
+IRC	O
+@	O
+quit	O
+System.exit	B-Indicator
+(	I-Indicator
+0	I-Indicator
+)	I-Indicator
+@	O
+start	O
+Start	O
+IRC	O
+@	O
+server	O
+Set	O
+IRC	O
+server	O
+(	O
+default	O
+value	O
+is	O
+“	O
+irc.freenode.net	B-Indicator
+”	O
+)	O
+,	O
+port	O
+is	O
+always	O
+6667	O
+@	O
+boss	O
+Set	O
+IRC	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+nickname	O
+(	O
+default	O
+value	O
+is	O
+“	O
+ISeency	O
+”	O
+)	O
+@	O
+nick	O
+Set	O
+IRC	O
+client	O
+nickname	O
+@	O
+screen	O
+Report	O
+every	O
+time	O
+when	O
+screen	O
+is	O
+on	O
+(	O
+enable/disable	O
+)	O
+@	O
+root	O
+Use	O
+root	O
+features	O
+(	O
+enable/disable	O
+)	O
+@	O
+timer	O
+Set	O
+
+period	O
+of	O
+IRCService	O
+start	O
+@	O
+hide	O
+Hide	O
+implant	O
+icon	O
+@	O
+unhide	O
+Unhide	O
+implant	O
+icon	O
+@	O
+run	O
+Execute	O
+specified	O
+shell	O
+@	O
+broadcast	O
+Send	O
+command	O
+to	O
+the	O
+second	O
+module	O
+@	O
+echo	O
+Write	O
+specified	O
+message	O
+to	O
+log	O
+@	O
+install	O
+Download	O
+and	O
+copy	O
+specified	O
+component	O
+to	O
+the	O
+system	O
+path	O
+The	O
+implant	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+complex	O
+intent-based	O
+communication	O
+mechanism	O
+between	O
+its	O
+components	O
+to	O
+broadcast	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+Approximate	O
+graph	O
+of	O
+relationships	O
+between	O
+BusyGasper	O
+components	O
+Second	O
+(	O
+main	O
+)	O
+module	O
+This	O
+module	O
+writes	O
+a	O
+log	O
+of	O
+the	O
+command	O
+execution	O
+history	O
+to	O
+the	O
+file	O
+named	O
+“	O
+lock	O
+”	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+later	O
+exfiltrated	O
+
+.	O
+
+Below	O
+is	O
+a	O
+fragment	O
+of	O
+such	O
+a	O
+log	O
+:	O
+Log	O
+with	O
+specified	O
+command	O
+Log	O
+files	O
+can	O
+be	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+the	O
+FTP	O
+server	O
+and	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+email	O
+inbox	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+even	O
+possible	O
+to	O
+send	O
+log	O
+messages	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+the	O
+screenshot	O
+above	O
+shows	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+its	O
+own	O
+command	O
+syntax	O
+that	O
+represents	O
+a	O
+combination	O
+of	O
+characters	O
+while	O
+the	O
+“	O
+#	O
+”	O
+symbol	O
+is	O
+a	O
+delimiter	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+full	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+possible	O
+commands	O
+with	O
+descriptions	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+in	O
+Appendix	O
+II	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+all	O
+the	O
+popular	O
+capabilities	O
+of	O
+modern	O
+spyware	O
+.	O
+
+Below	O
+is	O
+a	O
+description	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+noteworthy	O
+:	O
+The	O
+implant	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+spy	O
+on	O
+all	O
+available	O
+device	O
+sensors	O
+and	O
+to	O
+log	O
+registered	O
+events	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+special	O
+handler	O
+for	O
+the	O
+accelerometer	O
+that	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+calculate	O
+and	O
+log	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+speed	O
+:	O
+This	O
+feature	O
+is	O
+used	O
+in	O
+particular	O
+by	O
+the	O
+command	O
+“	O
+tk0	O
+”	O
+that	O
+mutes	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+disables	O
+keyguard	O
+,	O
+turns	O
+off	O
+the	O
+brightness	O
+,	O
+uses	O
+wakelock	O
+and	O
+listens	O
+to	O
+device	O
+sensors	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+allows	O
+it	O
+to	O
+silently	O
+execute	O
+any	O
+backdoor	O
+activity	O
+without	O
+the	O
+user	O
+knowing	O
+that	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+in	O
+an	O
+active	O
+state	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+soon	O
+as	O
+the	O
+user	O
+picks	O
+up	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+will	O
+detect	O
+a	O
+motion	O
+event	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+“	O
+tk1	O
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+input	O
+keyevent	O
+3	O
+”	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+tk1	O
+”	O
+will	O
+disable	O
+all	O
+the	O
+effects	O
+of	O
+the	O
+“	O
+tk0	O
+”	O
+command	O
+,	O
+while	O
+“	O
+input	O
+keyevent	O
+3	O
+”	O
+is	O
+the	O
+shell	O
+command	O
+that	O
+simulates	O
+the	O
+pressing	O
+of	O
+the	O
+‘	O
+home	O
+’	O
+button	O
+so	O
+all	O
+the	O
+current	O
+activities	O
+will	O
+be	O
+minimized	O
+and	O
+the	O
+user	O
+won	O
+’	O
+t	O
+suspect	O
+anything	O
+.	O
+
+Location	O
+services	O
+to	O
+enable	O
+(	O
+GPS/network	O
+)	O
+tracking	O
+:	O
+The	O
+email	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+protocol	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+implant	O
+can	O
+log	O
+in	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+email	O
+inbox	O
+,	O
+parse	O
+emails	O
+for	O
+commands	O
+in	O
+a	O
+special	O
+“	O
+Cmd	O
+”	O
+folder	O
+and	O
+save	O
+any	O
+payloads	O
+to	O
+a	O
+device	O
+from	O
+email	O
+attachments	O
+.	O
+
+Accessing	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Cmd	O
+”	O
+folder	O
+in	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+email	O
+box	O
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+it	O
+can	O
+send	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+file	O
+or	O
+all	O
+the	O
+gathered	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+device	O
+via	O
+email	O
+.	O
+
+Emergency	O
+SMS	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+an	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+contains	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+magic	O
+strings	O
+:	O
+”	O
+2736428734″	B-Indicator
+or	O
+”	O
+7238742800″	B-Indicator
+the	O
+malware	O
+will	O
+execute	O
+multiple	O
+initial	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+Keylogger	O
+implementation	O
+Keylogging	O
+is	O
+implemented	O
+in	O
+an	O
+original	O
+manner	O
+.	O
+
+Immediately	O
+after	O
+activation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+textView	O
+element	O
+in	O
+a	O
+new	O
+window	O
+with	O
+the	O
+following	O
+layout	O
+parameters	O
+:	O
+All	O
+these	O
+parameters	O
+ensure	O
+the	O
+element	O
+is	O
+hidden	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+it	O
+adds	O
+onTouchListener	O
+to	O
+this	O
+textView	O
+and	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+process	O
+every	O
+user	O
+tap	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+an	O
+allowlist	O
+of	O
+tapped	O
+activities	O
+:	O
+ui.ConversationActivity	O
+ui.ConversationListActivity	O
+SemcInCallScreen	O
+Quadrapop	O
+SocialPhonebookActivity	O
+The	O
+listener	O
+can	O
+operate	O
+with	O
+only	O
+coordinates	O
+,	O
+so	O
+it	O
+calculates	O
+pressed	O
+characters	O
+by	O
+matching	O
+given	O
+values	O
+with	O
+hardcoded	O
+ones	O
+:	O
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+if	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+predefined	O
+command	O
+,	O
+the	O
+keylogger	O
+can	O
+make	O
+a	O
+screenshot	O
+of	O
+the	O
+tapped	O
+display	O
+area	O
+:	O
+Manual	O
+access	O
+and	O
+operator	O
+menu	O
+There	O
+is	O
+a	O
+hidden	O
+menu	O
+(	O
+Activity	O
+)	O
+for	O
+controlling	O
+implant	O
+features	O
+that	O
+
+looks	O
+like	O
+it	O
+was	O
+created	O
+for	O
+manual	O
+operator	O
+control	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+activate	O
+this	O
+menu	O
+the	O
+operator	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+call	O
+the	O
+hardcoded	O
+number	O
+“	O
+9909	O
+”	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+:	O
+A	O
+hidden	O
+menu	O
+then	O
+instantly	O
+appears	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+display	O
+:	O
+The	O
+operator	O
+can	O
+use	O
+this	O
+interface	O
+to	O
+type	O
+any	O
+command	O
+for	O
+execution	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+also	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+current	O
+malware	O
+log	O
+.	O
+
+Infrastructure	O
+FTP	O
+server	O
+The	O
+attackers	O
+used	O
+ftp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//213.174.157	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+151/	I-Indicator
+as	O
+a	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+IP	O
+belongs	O
+to	O
+the	O
+free	O
+Russian	O
+web	O
+hosting	O
+service	O
+Ucoz	O
+.	O
+
+Files	O
+Description	O
+CMDS	O
+*	O
+.txt	O
+Text	O
+files	O
+with	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+supersu.apk	B-Indicator
+SuperSU	O
+(	O
+eu.chainfire.supersu	B-Indicator
+,	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//play.google.com/store/apps/details	I-Indicator
+?	I-Indicator
+
+id=eu.chainfire.supersu	I-Indicator
+)	O
+tool	O
+246.us	B-Indicator
+us.x	B-Indicator
+SuperSU	O
+ELF	O
+binaries	O
+supersu.cfg	B-Indicator
+supersu.cfg.ju	B-Indicator
+supersu.cfg.old	B-Indicator
+SuperSU	O
+configs	O
+with	O
+spyware	O
+implant	O
+mention	O
+bb.txt	B-Indicator
+BusyBox	O
+v1.26.2	O
+ELF	O
+file	O
+bdata.xml	B-Indicator
+Config	O
+file	O
+for	O
+excluding	O
+malware	O
+components	O
+from	O
+Android	B-System
+battery	O
+saver	O
+feature	O
+Doze	O
+bdatas.apk	B-Indicator
+Main	O
+implant	O
+module	O
+com.android.network.irc.apk	B-Indicator
+Start	O
+implant	O
+module	O
+MobileManagerService.apk	B-Indicator
+ASUS	B-Organization
+firmware	O
+system	O
+component	O
+(	O
+clean	O
+)	O
+mobilemanager.apk	B-Indicator
+
+Corrupted	O
+archive	O
+privapp.txt	B-Indicator
+Looks	O
+like	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+system	O
+applications	O
+(	O
+including	O
+spyware	O
+components	O
+)	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+run-as.x	B-Indicator
+run-as.y	B-Indicator
+Run-as	O
+tool	O
+ELF	O
+file	O
+SuperSU	O
+config	O
+fragment	O
+for	O
+implant	O
+components	O
+and	O
+the	O
+busybox	O
+tool	O
+supersu.cfg	B-Indicator
+:	O
+This	O
+config	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+to	O
+use	O
+all	O
+root	O
+features	O
+silently	O
+.	O
+
+Content	O
+of	O
+bdata.xml	O
+file	O
+:	O
+It	O
+can	O
+be	O
+added	O
+to	O
+the	O
+/system/etc/sysconfig/	B-Indicator
+path	O
+to	O
+allowlist	O
+specified	O
+implant	O
+components	O
+from	O
+the	O
+battery	O
+saving	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+Email	O
+account	O
+A	O
+Gmail	B-System
+account	O
+with	O
+password	O
+is	O
+mentioned	O
+in	O
+the	O
+sample	O
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+:	O
+It	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+and	O
+“	O
+cmd	O
+”	O
+directory	O
+with	O
+commands	O
+for	O
+victim	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+10	O
+million	O
+Android	B-System
+phones	O
+infected	O
+by	O
+all-powerful	O
+auto-rooting	O
+apps	O
+First	O
+detected	O
+in	O
+November	O
+,	O
+Shedun/HummingBad	B-Malware
+infections	O
+are	O
+surging	O
+.	O
+
+7/7/2016	O
+,	O
+1:50	O
+PM	O
+Security	O
+experts	O
+have	O
+documented	O
+a	O
+disturbing	O
+spike	O
+in	O
+a	O
+particularly	O
+virulent	O
+family	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+,	O
+with	O
+more	O
+than	O
+10	O
+million	O
+handsets	O
+infected	O
+and	O
+more	O
+than	O
+286,000	O
+of	O
+them	O
+in	O
+the	O
+US	O
+.	O
+
+FURTHER	O
+READING	O
+New	O
+type	O
+of	O
+auto-rooting	O
+Android	B-System
+adware	O
+is	O
+nearly	O
+impossible	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+Researchers	O
+from	O
+security	O
+firm	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Software	I-Organization
+said	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+installs	O
+more	O
+than	O
+50,000	O
+fraudulent	O
+apps	O
+each	O
+day	O
+,	O
+displays	O
+20	O
+million	O
+malicious	O
+advertisements	O
+,	O
+and	O
+generates	O
+more	O
+than	O
+$	O
+300,000	O
+per	O
+month	O
+in	O
+revenue	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+success	O
+is	O
+largely	O
+the	O
+result	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+'s	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+silently	O
+root	O
+a	O
+large	O
+percentage	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phones	O
+it	O
+infects	O
+by	O
+exploiting	O
+vulnerabilities	B-Vulnerability
+that	I-Vulnerability
+remain	I-Vulnerability
+unfixed	I-Vulnerability
+in	I-Vulnerability
+older	I-Vulnerability
+versions	I-Vulnerability
+of	I-Vulnerability
+Android	I-Vulnerability
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+dubbed	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+family	O
+"	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+,	O
+''	O
+but	O
+researchers	O
+from	O
+mobile	O
+security	O
+company	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+say	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+is	O
+in	O
+fact	O
+Shedun	B-Malware
+,	O
+a	O
+family	O
+of	O
+auto-rooting	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+came	O
+to	O
+light	O
+last	O
+November	O
+and	O
+had	O
+already	O
+infected	O
+a	O
+large	O
+number	O
+of	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Update	O
+Jul	O
+11	O
+2016	O
+8:32	O
+:	O
+On	O
+Monday	O
+,	O
+a	O
+Checkpoint	B-Organization
+representative	O
+disputed	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+'s	O
+contention	O
+and	O
+pointed	O
+to	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+from	O
+security	O
+firm	O
+Eleven	B-Organization
+Paths	I-Organization
+as	O
+support	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+said	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+"	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+completely	O
+different	O
+infrastructure	O
+with	O
+little	O
+in	O
+common	O
+''	O
+with	O
+Shedun	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+In	O
+an	O
+e-mail	O
+,	O
+a	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+representative	O
+stood	O
+by	O
+its	O
+analysis	O
+and	O
+said	O
+company	O
+researchers	O
+planned	O
+to	O
+publish	O
+an	O
+in-depth	O
+response	O
+in	O
+the	O
+coming	O
+days	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+the	O
+past	O
+five	O
+months	O
+,	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+quietly	O
+observed	O
+the	O
+China-based	O
+advertising	O
+company	O
+behind	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+in	O
+several	O
+ways	O
+,	O
+including	O
+by	O
+infiltrating	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+servers	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+researchers	O
+say	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+unusually	O
+tight	O
+control	O
+it	O
+gains	O
+over	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+create	O
+windfall	O
+profits	O
+and	O
+steadily	O
+increase	O
+its	O
+numbers	O
+.	O
+
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+does	O
+this	O
+by	O
+silently	O
+installing	O
+promoted	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+infected	O
+phones	O
+,	O
+defrauding	O
+legitimate	O
+mobile	O
+advertisers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+creating	O
+fraudulent	O
+statistics	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+official	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+"	O
+Accessing	O
+these	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+their	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+new	O
+and	O
+steady	O
+stream	O
+of	O
+revenue	O
+for	O
+cybercriminals	O
+,	O
+''	O
+Check	I-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+researchers	O
+wrote	O
+in	O
+a	O
+recently	O
+published	O
+report	O
+.	O
+
+"	O
+Emboldened	O
+by	O
+financial	O
+and	O
+technological	O
+independence	O
+,	O
+their	O
+skillsets	O
+will	O
+advance–putting	O
+end	O
+users	O
+,	O
+enterprises	O
+,	O
+and	O
+government	O
+agencies	O
+at	O
+risk	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+The	O
+report	O
+said	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+apps	O
+are	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+Yingmob	B-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+Chinese	O
+mobile	O
+ad	O
+server	O
+company	O
+that	O
+other	O
+researchers	O
+claim	O
+is	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+Yinspector	B-Malware
+iOS	B-System
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+sends	O
+notifications	O
+to	O
+Umeng	O
+,	O
+a	O
+tracking	O
+and	O
+analytics	O
+service	O
+attackers	O
+use	O
+to	O
+manage	O
+their	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+analyzed	O
+Yingmob	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+Umeng	O
+account	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+further	O
+insights	O
+into	O
+the	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+campaign	O
+and	O
+found	O
+that	O
+beyond	O
+the	O
+10	O
+million	O
+devices	O
+under	O
+the	O
+control	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+Yingmob	B-Organization
+has	O
+non-malicious	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+another	O
+75	O
+million	O
+or	O
+so	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+researchers	O
+wrote	O
+:	O
+While	O
+profit	O
+is	O
+powerful	O
+motivation	O
+for	O
+any	O
+attacker	O
+,	O
+Yingmob	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+apparent	O
+self-sufficiency	O
+and	O
+organizational	O
+structure	O
+make	O
+it	O
+well-positioned	O
+to	O
+expand	O
+into	O
+new	O
+business	O
+ventures	O
+,	O
+including	O
+productizing	O
+the	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+85	O
+million	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+it	O
+controls	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+alone	O
+would	O
+attract	O
+a	O
+whole	O
+new	O
+audience–and	O
+a	O
+new	O
+stream	O
+of	O
+revenue–for	O
+Yingmob	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+Quick	O
+,	O
+easy	O
+access	O
+to	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+on	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+connected	O
+to	O
+enterprises	O
+and	O
+government	O
+agencies	O
+around	O
+the	O
+globe	O
+is	O
+extremely	O
+attractive	O
+to	O
+cybercriminals	O
+and	O
+hacktivists	O
+.	O
+
+Drive-by	O
+downloads	O
+and	O
+multiple	O
+rooting	O
+exploits	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+involves	O
+drive-by	O
+downloads	O
+,	O
+possibly	O
+on	O
+booby-trapped	O
+porn	O
+sites	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attacks	O
+use	O
+multiple	O
+exploits	O
+in	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+root	O
+access	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+rooting	O
+fails	O
+,	O
+a	O
+second	O
+component	O
+delivers	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+system	O
+update	O
+notification	O
+in	O
+hopes	O
+of	O
+tricking	O
+users	O
+into	O
+granting	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+system-level	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+Whether	O
+or	O
+not	O
+rooting	O
+succeeds	O
+,	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+downloads	O
+a	O
+large	O
+number	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+cases	O
+,	O
+malicious	O
+components	O
+are	O
+dynamically	O
+downloaded	O
+onto	O
+a	O
+device	O
+after	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+app	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+there	O
+,	O
+infected	O
+phones	O
+display	O
+illegitimate	O
+ads	O
+and	O
+install	O
+fraudulent	O
+apps	O
+after	O
+certain	O
+events	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+rebooting	O
+,	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+turning	O
+on	O
+or	O
+off	O
+,	O
+a	O
+detection	O
+that	O
+the	O
+user	O
+is	O
+present	O
+,	O
+or	O
+a	O
+change	O
+in	O
+Internet	O
+connectivity	O
+.	O
+
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+also	O
+has	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+inject	O
+code	O
+into	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+to	O
+tamper	O
+with	O
+its	O
+ratings	O
+and	O
+statistics	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+does	O
+this	O
+by	O
+using	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+imitate	O
+clicks	O
+on	O
+the	O
+install	O
+,	O
+buy	O
+,	O
+and	O
+accept	O
+buttons	O
+.	O
+
+Many	O
+of	O
+the	O
+10	O
+million	O
+infected	O
+phones	O
+are	O
+running	O
+old	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+reside	O
+in	O
+China	O
+(	O
+1.6	O
+million	O
+)	O
+and	O
+India	O
+(	O
+1.35	O
+million	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Still	O
+,	O
+US-based	O
+infected	O
+phones	O
+total	O
+almost	O
+287,000	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+most	O
+widely	O
+infected	O
+major	O
+Android	B-System
+versions	O
+are	O
+KitKat	B-System
+with	O
+50	O
+percent	O
+,	O
+followed	O
+by	O
+Jelly	B-System
+Bean	I-System
+with	O
+40	O
+percent	O
+.	O
+
+Lollipop	B-System
+has	O
+7	O
+percent	O
+,	O
+Ice	B-System
+Cream	I-System
+Sandwich	I-System
+has	O
+2	O
+percent	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Marshmallow	B-System
+has	O
+1	O
+percent	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+'s	O
+often	O
+hard	O
+for	O
+average	O
+users	O
+to	O
+know	O
+if	O
+their	O
+phones	O
+have	O
+been	O
+rooted	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Shedun	B-Malware
+apps	O
+often	O
+wait	O
+some	O
+period	O
+of	O
+time	O
+before	O
+displaying	O
+obtrusive	O
+ads	O
+or	O
+installing	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+best	O
+bet	O
+for	O
+Readers	O
+who	O
+want	O
+to	O
+make	O
+sure	O
+their	O
+phone	O
+is	O
+n't	O
+infected	O
+is	O
+to	O
+scan	O
+their	O
+phones	O
+using	O
+the	O
+free	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+Security	O
+and	O
+Antivirus	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+has	O
+drastically	O
+lower	O
+rates	O
+of	O
+success	O
+when	O
+app	O
+installations	O
+outside	O
+of	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+are	O
+barred	O
+.	O
+
+Readers	O
+should	O
+carefully	O
+think	O
+through	O
+the	O
+risks	O
+before	O
+changing	O
+this	O
+default	O
+setting	O
+.	O
+
+Top	O
+20	O
+countries	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+Hummingbad/Shedun	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Enlarge	O
+/	O
+Top	O
+20	O
+countries	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+Hummingbad/Shedun	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Software	I-Organization
+Hummingbad/Shedun	B-Malware
+infections	O
+by	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+.	O
+
+Enlarge	O
+/	O
+Hummingbad/Shedun	B-Malware
+infections	O
+by	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Software	I-Organization
+So	O
+far	O
+,	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+has	O
+been	O
+observed	O
+using	O
+its	O
+highly	O
+privileged	O
+status	O
+only	O
+to	O
+engage	O
+in	O
+click	O
+fraud	O
+,	O
+display	O
+pop-up	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+tamper	O
+with	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+and	O
+install	O
+additional	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+do	O
+more	O
+of	O
+the	O
+same	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+there	O
+'s	O
+little	O
+stopping	O
+it	O
+from	O
+doing	O
+much	O
+worse	O
+.	O
+
+That	O
+'s	O
+because	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+roots	O
+most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phones	O
+it	O
+infects	O
+,	O
+a	O
+process	O
+that	O
+subverts	O
+key	O
+security	O
+mechanisms	O
+built	O
+into	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+Under	O
+a	O
+model	O
+known	O
+as	O
+sandboxing	O
+,	O
+most	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+are	O
+n't	O
+permitted	O
+to	O
+access	O
+passwords	O
+or	O
+other	O
+data	O
+available	O
+to	O
+most	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+System	O
+applications	O
+with	O
+root	O
+,	O
+by	O
+contrast	O
+,	O
+have	O
+super-user	O
+permissions	O
+that	O
+allow	O
+them	O
+to	O
+break	O
+out	O
+of	O
+such	O
+sandboxes	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+there	O
+,	O
+root-level	O
+apps	O
+can	O
+read	O
+or	O
+modify	O
+data	O
+and	O
+resources	O
+that	O
+would	O
+be	O
+off-limits	O
+to	O
+normal	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+first	O
+reported	O
+more	O
+than	O
+eight	O
+months	O
+ago	O
+,	O
+the	O
+problem	O
+with	O
+Shedun/HummingBad	B-Malware
+and	O
+similar	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+families	O
+that	O
+silently	O
+exploit	O
+Android	B-Vulnerability
+rooting	I-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+is	O
+that	O
+the	O
+infections	O
+can	O
+survive	O
+normal	O
+factory	O
+resets	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+said	O
+in	O
+its	O
+own	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+published	O
+Wednesday	O
+that	O
+its	O
+threat	O
+detection	O
+network	O
+has	O
+recently	O
+observed	O
+a	O
+surge	O
+of	O
+Shedun	B-Malware
+attacks	O
+,	O
+indicating	O
+the	O
+scourge	O
+wo	O
+n't	O
+be	O
+going	O
+away	O
+any	O
+time	O
+soon	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+investigation	O
+of	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+Malware	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+03	O
+April	O
+2017	O
+Google	B-Organization
+is	O
+constantly	O
+working	O
+to	O
+improve	O
+our	O
+systems	O
+that	O
+protect	O
+users	O
+from	O
+Potentially	O
+Harmful	O
+Applications	O
+(	O
+PHAs	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Usually	O
+,	O
+PHA	O
+authors	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+install	O
+their	O
+harmful	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+as	O
+many	O
+devices	O
+as	O
+possible	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+a	O
+few	O
+PHA	O
+authors	O
+spend	O
+substantial	O
+effort	O
+,	O
+time	O
+,	O
+and	O
+money	O
+to	O
+create	O
+and	O
+install	O
+their	O
+harmful	O
+app	O
+on	O
+one	O
+or	O
+a	O
+very	O
+small	O
+number	O
+of	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+known	O
+as	O
+a	O
+targeted	O
+attack	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+,	O
+we	O
+describe	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+,	O
+a	O
+newly	O
+discovered	O
+family	O
+of	O
+spyware	O
+that	O
+was	O
+used	O
+in	O
+a	O
+targeted	O
+attack	O
+on	O
+a	O
+small	O
+number	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+,	O
+and	O
+how	O
+investigations	O
+like	O
+this	O
+help	O
+Google	B-Organization
+protect	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+from	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+threats	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+is	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+?	O
+
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+is	O
+spyware	O
+believed	O
+to	O
+be	O
+created	O
+by	O
+NSO	B-Organization
+Group	I-Organization
+Technologies	I-Organization
+,	O
+specializing	O
+in	O
+the	O
+creation	O
+and	O
+sale	O
+of	O
+software	O
+and	O
+infrastructure	O
+for	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+is	O
+believed	O
+to	O
+be	O
+related	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Pegasus	B-Malware
+spyware	O
+that	O
+was	O
+first	O
+identified	O
+on	O
+iOS	B-System
+and	O
+analyzed	O
+by	O
+Citizen	B-Organization
+Lab	I-Organization
+and	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+Late	O
+last	O
+year	O
+,	O
+after	O
+receiving	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+suspicious	O
+package	O
+names	O
+from	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+that	O
+a	O
+few	O
+dozen	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+may	O
+have	O
+installed	O
+an	O
+application	O
+related	O
+to	O
+Pegasus	B-Malware
+,	O
+which	O
+we	O
+named	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+the	O
+applications	O
+were	O
+never	O
+available	O
+in	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+we	O
+immediately	O
+identified	O
+the	O
+scope	O
+of	O
+the	O
+problem	O
+by	O
+using	O
+Verify	B-System
+Apps	I-System
+.	O
+
+We	O
+gathered	O
+information	O
+from	O
+affected	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+and	O
+concurrently	O
+,	O
+attempted	O
+to	O
+acquire	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+apps	O
+to	O
+better	O
+understand	O
+its	O
+impact	O
+on	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+'ve	O
+contacted	O
+the	O
+potentially	O
+affected	O
+users	O
+,	O
+disabled	O
+the	O
+applications	O
+on	O
+affected	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+and	O
+implemented	O
+changes	O
+in	O
+Verify	B-System
+Apps	I-System
+to	O
+protect	O
+all	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+is	O
+the	O
+scope	O
+of	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+?	O
+
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+was	O
+never	O
+available	O
+in	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+and	O
+had	O
+a	O
+very	O
+low	O
+volume	O
+of	O
+installs	O
+outside	O
+of	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+Among	O
+the	O
+over	O
+1.4	O
+billion	O
+devices	O
+protected	O
+by	O
+Verify	B-System
+Apps	I-System
+,	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+fewer	O
+than	O
+3	O
+dozen	O
+installs	O
+of	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+on	O
+victim	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+devices	O
+were	O
+located	O
+in	O
+the	O
+following	O
+countries	O
+:	O
+How	O
+we	O
+protect	O
+you	O
+To	O
+protect	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+and	O
+users	O
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+provides	O
+a	O
+complete	O
+set	O
+of	O
+security	O
+services	O
+that	O
+update	O
+outside	O
+of	O
+platform	O
+releases	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+do	O
+n't	O
+have	O
+to	O
+install	O
+any	O
+additional	O
+security	O
+services	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+safe	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+these	O
+services	O
+protected	O
+over	O
+1.4	O
+billion	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+making	O
+Google	B-Organization
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+largest	O
+providers	O
+of	O
+on-device	O
+security	O
+services	O
+in	O
+the	O
+world	O
+:	O
+Identify	O
+PHAs	O
+using	O
+people	O
+,	O
+systems	O
+in	O
+the	O
+cloud	O
+,	O
+and	O
+data	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+us	O
+from	O
+devices	O
+Warn	O
+users	O
+about	O
+or	O
+blocking	O
+users	O
+from	O
+installing	O
+PHAs	O
+Continually	O
+scan	O
+devices	O
+for	O
+PHAs	O
+and	O
+other	O
+harmful	O
+threats	O
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+we	O
+are	O
+providing	O
+detailed	O
+technical	O
+information	O
+to	O
+help	O
+the	O
+security	O
+industry	O
+in	O
+our	O
+collective	O
+work	O
+against	O
+PHAs	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+do	O
+I	O
+need	O
+to	O
+do	O
+?	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+extremely	O
+unlikely	O
+you	O
+or	O
+someone	O
+you	O
+know	O
+was	O
+affected	O
+by	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Through	O
+our	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+less	O
+than	O
+3	O
+dozen	O
+devices	O
+affected	O
+by	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+disabled	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+on	O
+those	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+and	O
+we	O
+have	O
+notified	O
+users	O
+of	O
+all	O
+known	O
+affected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+the	O
+improvements	O
+we	O
+made	O
+to	O
+our	O
+protections	O
+have	O
+been	O
+enabled	O
+for	O
+all	O
+users	O
+of	O
+our	O
+security	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+ensure	O
+you	O
+are	O
+fully	O
+protected	O
+against	O
+PHAs	O
+and	O
+other	O
+threats	O
+,	O
+we	O
+recommend	O
+these	O
+5	O
+basic	O
+steps	O
+:	O
+Install	O
+apps	O
+only	O
+from	O
+reputable	O
+sources	O
+:	O
+Install	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+a	O
+reputable	O
+source	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+No	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+apps	O
+were	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+Enable	O
+a	O
+secure	O
+lock	O
+screen	O
+:	O
+Pick	O
+a	O
+PIN	O
+,	O
+pattern	O
+,	O
+or	O
+password	O
+that	O
+is	O
+easy	O
+for	O
+you	O
+to	O
+remember	O
+and	O
+hard	O
+for	O
+others	O
+to	O
+guess	O
+.	O
+
+Update	O
+your	O
+device	O
+:	O
+Keep	O
+your	O
+device	O
+up-to-date	O
+with	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+security	O
+patches	O
+.	O
+
+Verify	O
+Apps	O
+:	O
+Ensure	O
+Verify	O
+Apps	O
+is	O
+enabled	O
+.	O
+
+Locate	O
+your	O
+device	O
+:	O
+Practice	O
+finding	O
+your	O
+device	O
+with	O
+Android	B-System
+Device	I-System
+Manager	I-System
+because	O
+you	O
+are	O
+far	O
+more	O
+likely	O
+to	O
+lose	O
+your	O
+device	O
+than	O
+install	O
+a	O
+PHA	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+does	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+work	O
+?	O
+
+To	O
+install	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+,	O
+we	O
+believe	O
+an	O
+attacker	O
+coaxed	O
+specifically	O
+targeted	O
+individuals	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+software	O
+onto	O
+their	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+is	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+a	O
+remote	O
+operator	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+surveil	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+activities	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+within	O
+the	O
+vicinity	O
+,	O
+leveraging	O
+microphone	O
+,	O
+camera	O
+,	O
+data	O
+collection	O
+,	O
+and	O
+logging	O
+and	O
+tracking	O
+application	O
+activities	O
+on	O
+communication	O
+apps	O
+such	O
+as	O
+phone	O
+and	O
+SMS	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+representative	O
+sample	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+app	O
+that	O
+we	O
+analyzed	O
+was	O
+tailored	O
+to	O
+devices	O
+running	O
+Jellybean	B-System
+(	I-System
+4.3	I-System
+)	I-System
+or	O
+earlier	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+is	O
+a	O
+review	O
+of	O
+scope	O
+and	O
+impact	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+app	O
+named	O
+com.network.android	B-Indicator
+tailored	O
+for	O
+a	O
+Samsung	B-Organization
+device	O
+target	O
+,	O
+with	O
+SHA256	O
+digest	O
+:	O
+ade8bef0ac29fa363fc9afd958af0074478aef650adeb0318517b48bd996d5d5Upon	B-Indicator
+installation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+uses	O
+known	O
+framaroot	O
+exploits	O
+to	O
+escalate	O
+privileges	O
+and	O
+break	O
+Android	B-System
+'s	O
+application	O
+sandbox	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+device	O
+is	O
+not	O
+vulnerable	O
+to	O
+these	O
+exploits	O
+,	O
+then	O
+the	O
+app	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+use	O
+a	O
+superuser	O
+binary	O
+pre-positioned	O
+at	O
+/system/csk	B-Indicator
+to	O
+elevate	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+escalating	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+immediately	O
+protects	O
+itself	O
+and	O
+starts	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+data	O
+,	O
+by	O
+:	O
+Installing	O
+itself	O
+on	O
+the	O
+/system	O
+partition	O
+to	O
+persist	O
+across	O
+factory	O
+resets	O
+Removing	O
+Samsung	B-Organization
+'s	O
+system	O
+update	O
+app	O
+(	O
+com.sec.android.fotaclient	B-Indicator
+)	O
+and	O
+disabling	O
+auto-updates	O
+to	O
+maintain	O
+persistence	O
+(	O
+sets	O
+Settings.System.SOFTWARE_UPDATE_AUTO_UPDATE	B-Indicator
+to	I-Indicator
+0	I-Indicator
+)	O
+Deleting	O
+WAP	O
+push	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+changing	O
+WAP	O
+message	O
+settings	O
+,	O
+possibly	O
+for	O
+anti-forensic	O
+purpose	O
+.	O
+
+Starting	O
+content	O
+observers	O
+and	O
+the	O
+main	O
+task	O
+loop	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+remote	O
+commands	O
+and	O
+exfiltrate	O
+data	O
+The	O
+app	O
+uses	O
+six	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+user	O
+data	O
+:	O
+Repeated	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+use	O
+alarms	O
+to	O
+periodically	O
+repeat	O
+actions	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+expose	O
+data	O
+,	O
+including	O
+gathering	O
+location	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+Data	O
+collectors	O
+:	O
+dump	O
+all	O
+existing	O
+content	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+into	O
+a	O
+queue	O
+.	O
+
+Data	O
+collectors	O
+are	O
+used	O
+in	O
+conjunction	O
+with	O
+repeated	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+user	O
+data	O
+including	O
+,	O
+SMS	O
+settings	O
+,	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+Call	O
+logs	O
+,	O
+Browser	O
+History	O
+,	O
+Calendar	O
+,	O
+Contacts	O
+,	O
+Emails	O
+,	O
+and	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+selected	O
+messaging	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+including	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Twitter	B-System
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+,	O
+Kakoa	B-System
+,	O
+Viber	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+Skype	B-System
+by	O
+making	O
+/data/data	O
+directories	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+world	O
+readable	O
+.	O
+
+Content	O
+observers	O
+:	O
+use	O
+Android	B-System
+'s	O
+ContentObserver	O
+framework	O
+to	O
+gather	O
+changes	O
+in	O
+SMS	B-System
+,	O
+Calendar	B-System
+,	O
+Contacts	B-System
+,	O
+Cell	B-System
+info	I-System
+,	O
+Email	B-System
+,	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+,	O
+Twitter	B-System
+,	O
+Kakao	B-System
+,	O
+Viber	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+Skype	B-System
+.	O
+
+Screenshots	O
+:	O
+captures	O
+an	O
+image	O
+of	O
+the	O
+current	O
+screen	O
+via	O
+the	O
+raw	O
+frame	O
+buffer	O
+.	O
+
+Keylogging	O
+:	O
+record	O
+input	O
+events	O
+by	O
+hooking	O
+IPCThreadState	O
+:	O
+:Transact	O
+from	O
+/system/lib/libbinder.so	B-Indicator
+,	O
+and	O
+intercepting	O
+android	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+:parcel	I-Indicator
+with	O
+the	O
+interface	O
+com.android.internal.view.IInputContext	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+RoomTap	O
+:	O
+silently	O
+answers	O
+a	O
+telephone	O
+call	O
+and	O
+stays	O
+connected	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+,	O
+allowing	O
+the	O
+caller	O
+to	O
+hear	O
+conversations	O
+within	O
+the	O
+range	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+'s	O
+microphone	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+unlocks	O
+their	O
+device	O
+,	O
+they	O
+will	O
+see	O
+a	O
+black	O
+screen	O
+while	O
+the	O
+app	O
+drops	O
+the	O
+call	O
+,	O
+resets	O
+call	O
+settings	O
+and	O
+prepares	O
+for	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+interact	O
+with	O
+the	O
+device	O
+normally	O
+.	O
+
+Finally	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+can	O
+remove	O
+itself	O
+through	O
+three	O
+ways	O
+:	O
+Via	O
+a	O
+command	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+Autoremove	O
+if	O
+the	O
+device	O
+has	O
+not	O
+been	O
+able	O
+to	O
+check	O
+in	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+after	O
+60	O
+days	O
+Via	O
+an	O
+antidote	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+/sdcard/MemosForNotes	B-Indicator
+was	O
+present	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+app	O
+removes	O
+itself	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Samples	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+VirusTotal	B-Organization
+To	O
+encourage	O
+further	O
+research	O
+in	O
+the	O
+security	O
+community	O
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+uploaded	O
+these	O
+sample	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+apps	O
+to	O
+Virus	B-Organization
+Total	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+Package	O
+Name	O
+SHA256	O
+digest	O
+SHA1	O
+certificate	O
+com.network.android	B-Indicator
+ade8bef0ac29fa363fc9afd958af0074478aef650adeb0318517b48bd996d5d5	B-Indicator
+44f6d1caa257799e57f0ecaf4e2e216178f4cb3d	B-Indicator
+com.network.android	B-Indicator
+3474625e63d0893fc8f83034e835472d95195254e1e4bdf99153b7c74eb44d86	B-Indicator
+516f8f516cc0fd8db53785a48c0a86554f75c3ba	B-Indicator
+
+Additional	O
+digests	O
+with	O
+links	O
+to	O
+Chrysaor	B-Malware
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+of	O
+our	O
+investigation	O
+we	O
+have	O
+identified	O
+these	O
+additional	O
+Chrysaor-related	B-Malware
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Package	O
+Name	O
+SHA256	O
+digest	O
+SHA1	O
+certificate	O
+com.network.android	B-Indicator
+98ca5f94638768e7b58889bb5df4584bf5b6af56b188da48c10a02648791b30c	B-Indicator
+516f8f516cc0fd8db53785a48c0a86554f75c3ba	B-Indicator
+com.network.android	B-Indicator
+5353212b70aa096d918e4eb6b49eb5ad8f59d9bec02d089e88802c01e707c3a1	B-Indicator
+
+44f6d1caa257799e57f0ecaf4e2e216178f4cb3d	B-Indicator
+com.binary.sms.receiver	B-Indicator
+9fae5d148b89001555132c896879652fe1ca633d35271db34622248e048c78ae	B-Indicator
+7771af1ad3a3d9c0b4d9b55260bb47c2692722cf	B-Indicator
+com.android.copy	B-Indicator
+e384694d3d17cd88ec3a66c740c6398e07b8ee401320ca61e26bdf96c20485b4	B-Indicator
+
+7771af1ad3a3d9c0b4d9b55260bb47c2692722cf	B-Indicator
+com.android.copy	B-Indicator
+12e085ab85db887438655feebd249127d813e31df766f8c7b009f9519916e389	B-Indicator
+7771af1ad3a3d9c0b4d9b55260bb47c2692722cf	B-Indicator
+com.android.copy	B-Indicator
+6348104f8ef22eba5ac8ee737b192887629de987badbb1642e347d0dd01420f8	B-Indicator
+
+31a8633c2cd67ae965524d0b2192e9f14d04d016	B-Indicator
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+exposed	O
+:	O
+A	O
+researcher	O
+’	O
+s	O
+tale	O
+of	O
+defeating	O
+traps	O
+,	O
+tricks	O
+,	O
+and	O
+complex	O
+virtual	O
+machines	O
+March	O
+1	O
+,	O
+2018	O
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+Advanced	I-System
+Threat	I-System
+Protection	I-System
+(	O
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+)	O
+blocked	O
+many	O
+notable	O
+zero-day	O
+exploits	O
+in	O
+2017	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+one	O
+activity	O
+group	O
+stood	O
+out	O
+:	O
+NEODYMIUM	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+This	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+is	O
+remarkable	O
+for	O
+two	O
+reasons	O
+:	O
+Its	O
+access	O
+to	O
+sophisticated	O
+zero-day	O
+exploits	O
+for	O
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+and	O
+Adobe	B-Organization
+software	O
+Its	O
+use	O
+of	O
+an	O
+advanced	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+government-grade	O
+surveillance	O
+spyware	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+,	O
+also	O
+known	O
+as	O
+FinSpy	B-Malware
+and	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+security	O
+products	O
+as	O
+Wingbird	B-Malware
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+is	O
+such	O
+a	O
+complex	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+,	O
+like	O
+other	O
+researchers	O
+,	O
+we	O
+had	O
+to	O
+devise	O
+special	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+crack	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+needed	O
+to	O
+do	O
+this	O
+to	O
+understand	O
+the	O
+techniques	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+uses	O
+to	O
+compromise	O
+and	O
+persist	O
+on	O
+a	O
+machine	O
+,	O
+and	O
+to	O
+validate	O
+the	O
+effectiveness	O
+of	O
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+detonation	O
+sandbox	O
+,	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+Advanced	I-System
+Threat	I-System
+Protection	I-System
+(	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+)	O
+generic	O
+detections	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+Microsoft	B-Organization
+security	O
+solutions	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+task	O
+proved	O
+to	O
+be	O
+nontrivial	O
+.	O
+
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+is	O
+not	O
+afraid	O
+of	O
+using	O
+all	O
+kinds	O
+of	O
+tricks	O
+,	O
+ranging	O
+from	O
+junk	O
+instructions	O
+and	O
+“	O
+spaghetti	O
+code	O
+”	O
+to	O
+multiple	O
+layers	O
+of	O
+virtual	O
+machines	O
+and	O
+several	O
+known	O
+and	O
+lesser-known	O
+anti-debug	O
+and	O
+defensive	O
+measures	O
+.	O
+
+Security	O
+analysts	O
+are	O
+typically	O
+equipped	O
+with	O
+the	O
+tools	O
+to	O
+defeat	O
+a	O
+good	O
+number	O
+of	O
+similar	O
+tricks	O
+during	O
+malware	O
+investigations	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+is	O
+in	O
+a	O
+different	O
+category	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+for	O
+the	O
+level	O
+of	O
+its	O
+anti-analysis	O
+protection	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+a	O
+complicated	O
+puzzle	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+solved	O
+by	O
+skilled	O
+reverse	O
+engineers	O
+only	O
+with	O
+good	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+time	O
+,	O
+code	O
+,	O
+automation	O
+,	O
+and	O
+creativity	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+intricate	O
+anti-analysis	O
+methods	O
+reveal	O
+how	O
+much	O
+effort	O
+the	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+authors	O
+exerted	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+hidden	O
+and	O
+difficult	O
+to	O
+analyze	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+exercise	O
+revealed	O
+tons	O
+of	O
+information	O
+about	O
+techniques	O
+used	O
+by	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+that	O
+we	O
+used	O
+to	O
+make	O
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+more	O
+resistant	O
+to	O
+sandbox	O
+detection	O
+and	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+to	O
+catch	O
+similar	O
+techniques	O
+and	O
+generic	O
+behaviors	O
+.	O
+
+Using	O
+intelligence	O
+from	O
+our	O
+in-depth	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+can	O
+raise	O
+alerts	O
+for	O
+malicious	O
+behavior	O
+employed	O
+by	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+memory	O
+injection	O
+in	O
+persistence	O
+)	O
+in	O
+different	O
+stages	O
+of	O
+the	O
+attack	O
+kill	O
+chain	O
+.	O
+
+Machine	O
+learning	O
+in	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+further	O
+flags	O
+suspicious	O
+behaviors	O
+observed	O
+related	O
+to	O
+the	O
+manipulation	O
+of	O
+legitimate	O
+Windows	B-System
+binaries	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+1	O
+.	O
+
+Generic	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+detections	O
+trigger	O
+alerts	O
+on	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+behavior	O
+While	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+has	O
+allowed	O
+us	O
+to	O
+immediately	O
+protect	O
+our	O
+customers	O
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+d	O
+like	O
+to	O
+share	O
+our	O
+insights	O
+and	O
+add	O
+to	O
+the	O
+growing	O
+number	O
+of	O
+published	O
+analyses	O
+by	O
+other	O
+talented	O
+researchers	O
+(	O
+listed	O
+below	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+hope	O
+that	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+helps	O
+other	O
+researchers	O
+to	O
+understand	O
+and	O
+analyze	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+samples	O
+and	O
+that	O
+this	O
+industry-wide	O
+information-sharing	O
+translate	O
+to	O
+the	O
+protection	O
+of	O
+as	O
+many	O
+customers	O
+as	O
+possible	O
+.	O
+
+Spaghetti	O
+and	O
+junk	O
+codes	O
+make	O
+common	O
+analyst	O
+tools	O
+ineffective	O
+In	O
+analyzing	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+,	O
+the	O
+first	O
+obfuscation	O
+problem	O
+that	O
+requires	O
+a	O
+solution	O
+is	O
+the	O
+removal	O
+of	O
+junk	O
+instructions	O
+and	O
+“	O
+spaghetti	O
+code	O
+”	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+a	O
+technique	O
+that	O
+aims	O
+to	O
+confuse	O
+disassembly	O
+programs	O
+.	O
+
+Spaghetti	O
+code	O
+makes	O
+the	O
+program	O
+flow	O
+hard	O
+to	O
+read	O
+by	O
+adding	O
+continuous	O
+code	O
+jumps	O
+,	O
+hence	O
+the	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+example	O
+of	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+spaghetti	O
+code	O
+is	O
+shown	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+spaghetti	O
+code	O
+in	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+dropper	O
+This	O
+problem	O
+is	O
+not	O
+novel	O
+,	O
+and	O
+in	O
+common	O
+situations	O
+there	O
+are	O
+known	O
+reversing	O
+plugins	O
+that	O
+may	O
+help	O
+for	O
+this	O
+task	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+we	O
+could	O
+not	O
+find	O
+a	O
+good	O
+existing	O
+interactive	O
+disassembler	O
+(	O
+IDA	O
+)	O
+plugin	O
+that	O
+can	O
+normalize	O
+the	O
+code	O
+flow	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+we	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+write	O
+our	O
+own	O
+plugin	O
+code	O
+using	O
+IDA	O
+Python	B-System
+.	O
+
+Armed	O
+with	O
+this	O
+code	O
+,	O
+we	O
+removed	O
+this	O
+first	O
+layer	O
+of	O
+anti-analysis	O
+protection	O
+.	O
+
+Removing	O
+the	O
+junk	O
+instructions	O
+revealed	O
+a	O
+readable	O
+block	O
+of	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+code	O
+starts	O
+by	O
+allocating	O
+two	O
+chunks	O
+of	O
+memory	O
+:	O
+a	O
+global	O
+1	O
+MB	O
+buffer	O
+and	O
+one	O
+64	O
+KB	O
+buffer	O
+per	O
+thread	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+big	O
+first	O
+buffer	O
+is	O
+used	O
+as	O
+index	O
+for	O
+multiple	O
+concurrent	O
+threads	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+big	O
+chunk	O
+of	O
+data	O
+is	O
+extracted	O
+from	O
+the	O
+portable	O
+executable	O
+(	O
+PE	O
+)	O
+file	O
+itself	O
+and	O
+decrypted	O
+two	O
+times	O
+using	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+XOR	O
+algorithm	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+determined	O
+that	O
+this	O
+chunk	O
+of	O
+data	O
+contains	O
+an	O
+array	O
+of	O
+opcode	O
+instructions	O
+ready	O
+to	O
+be	O
+interpreted	O
+by	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+program	O
+(	O
+from	O
+this	O
+point	O
+on	O
+referenced	O
+generically	O
+as	O
+“	O
+VM	O
+”	O
+)	O
+implemented	O
+by	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+authors	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+3	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+stages	O
+of	O
+the	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+multi-layered	O
+protection	O
+mechanisms	O
+Stage	O
+0	O
+:	O
+Dropper	O
+with	O
+custom	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+The	O
+main	O
+dropper	O
+implements	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+dispatcher	O
+loop	O
+and	O
+can	O
+use	O
+32	O
+different	O
+opcodes	O
+handlers	O
+.	O
+
+Th	O
+64KB	O
+buffer	O
+is	O
+used	O
+as	O
+a	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+data	O
+structure	O
+to	O
+store	O
+data	O
+and	O
+the	O
+just-in-time	O
+(	O
+JIT	O
+)	O
+generated	O
+code	O
+to	O
+run	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+VM	O
+dispatcher	O
+loop	O
+routine	O
+ends	O
+with	O
+a	O
+JMP	O
+to	O
+another	O
+routine	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+total	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+32	O
+different	O
+routines	O
+,	O
+each	O
+of	O
+them	O
+implementing	O
+a	O
+different	O
+opcode	O
+and	O
+some	O
+basic	O
+functionality	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+program	O
+may	O
+execute	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+4	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+snapshot	B-Malware
+of	O
+the	O
+code	O
+that	O
+processes	O
+each	O
+VM	O
+opcode	O
+and	O
+the	O
+associate	O
+interpreter	O
+The	O
+presence	O
+of	O
+a	O
+VM	O
+and	O
+virtualized	O
+instruction	O
+blocks	O
+can	O
+be	O
+described	O
+in	O
+simpler	O
+terms	O
+:	O
+Essentially	O
+,	O
+the	O
+creators	O
+of	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+interposed	O
+a	O
+layer	O
+of	O
+dynamic	O
+code	O
+translation	O
+(	O
+the	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+)	O
+that	O
+makes	O
+analysis	O
+using	O
+regular	O
+tools	O
+practically	O
+impossible	O
+.	O
+
+Static	O
+analysis	O
+tools	O
+like	O
+IDA	O
+may	O
+not	O
+be	O
+useful	O
+in	O
+analyzing	O
+custom	O
+code	O
+that	O
+is	O
+interpreted	O
+and	O
+executed	O
+through	O
+a	O
+VM	O
+and	O
+a	O
+new	O
+set	O
+of	O
+instructions	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+the	O
+other	O
+hand	O
+,	O
+dynamic	O
+analysis	O
+tools	O
+(	O
+like	O
+debuggers	O
+or	O
+sandbox	O
+)	O
+face	O
+the	O
+anti-debug	O
+and	O
+anti-analysis	O
+tricks	O
+hidden	O
+in	O
+the	O
+virtualized	O
+code	O
+itself	O
+that	O
+detects	O
+sandbox	O
+environments	O
+and	O
+alters	O
+the	O
+behavior	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+this	O
+stage	O
+,	O
+the	O
+analysis	O
+can	O
+only	O
+continue	O
+by	O
+manually	O
+investigating	O
+the	O
+individual	O
+code	O
+blocks	O
+and	O
+opcode	O
+handlers	O
+,	O
+which	O
+are	O
+highly	O
+obfuscated	O
+(	O
+also	O
+using	O
+spaghetti	O
+code	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Reusing	O
+our	O
+deobfuscation	O
+tool	O
+and	O
+some	O
+other	O
+tricks	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+been	O
+able	O
+to	O
+reverse	O
+and	O
+analyze	O
+these	O
+opcodes	O
+and	O
+map	O
+them	O
+to	O
+a	O
+finite	O
+list	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+later	O
+to	O
+automate	O
+the	O
+analysis	O
+process	O
+with	O
+some	O
+scripting	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+opcode	O
+instructions	O
+generated	O
+by	O
+this	O
+custom	O
+VM	O
+are	O
+divided	O
+into	O
+different	O
+categories	O
+:	O
+Logical	O
+opcodes	O
+,	O
+which	O
+implement	O
+bit-logic	O
+operators	O
+(	O
+OR	O
+,	O
+AND	O
+,	O
+NOT	O
+,	O
+XOR	O
+)	O
+and	O
+mathematical	O
+operators	O
+Conditional	O
+branching	O
+opcodes	O
+,	O
+which	O
+implement	O
+a	O
+code	O
+branch	O
+based	O
+on	O
+conditions	O
+(	O
+equals	O
+to	O
+JC	O
+,	O
+JE	O
+,	O
+JZ	O
+,	O
+other	O
+similar	O
+branching	O
+opcodes	O
+)	O
+Load/Store	O
+opcodes	O
+,	O
+which	O
+write	O
+to	O
+or	O
+read	O
+from	O
+particular	O
+addresses	O
+of	O
+the	O
+virtual	O
+address	O
+space	O
+of	O
+the	O
+process	O
+Specialized	O
+opcodes	O
+for	O
+various	O
+purposes	O
+,	O
+
+like	O
+execute	O
+specialized	O
+machine	O
+instruction	O
+that	O
+are	O
+not	O
+virtualized	O
+We	O
+are	O
+publishing	O
+below	O
+the	O
+(	O
+hopefully	O
+)	O
+complete	O
+list	O
+of	O
+opcodes	O
+used	O
+by	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+VM	O
+that	O
+we	O
+found	O
+during	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+and	O
+integrated	O
+into	O
+our	O
+de-virtualization	O
+script	O
+:	O
+INDEX	O
+MNEMONIC	O
+DESCRIPTION	O
+0x0	O
+EXEC	O
+Execute	O
+machine	O
+code	O
+0x1	O
+JG	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+greater/Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+less	O
+or	O
+equal	O
+0x2	O
+WRITE	O
+Write	O
+a	O
+value	O
+into	O
+the	O
+dereferenced	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+value	O
+(	O
+treated	O
+as	O
+a	O
+pointer	O
+)	O
+0x3	O
+JNO	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+overflow	O
+0x4	O
+JLE	O
+Jump	O
+
+if	O
+less	O
+or	O
+equal	O
+(	O
+signed	O
+)	O
+0x5	O
+MOV	O
+Move	O
+the	O
+value	O
+of	O
+a	O
+register	O
+into	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+(	O
+same	O
+as	O
+opcode	O
+0x1F	O
+)	O
+0x6	O
+JO	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+overflow	O
+0x7	O
+PUSH	O
+Push	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+value	O
+to	O
+the	O
+stack	O
+0x8	O
+ZERO	O
+Reset	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+value	O
+to	O
+0	O
+(	O
+zero	O
+)	O
+0x9	O
+JP	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+parity	O
+even	O
+0xA	O
+WRITE	O
+Write	O
+into	O
+an	O
+address	O
+0xB	O
+ADD	O
+Add	O
+the	O
+value	O
+of	O
+a	O
+register	O
+to	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+value	O
+0xC	O
+JNS	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+signed	O
+0xD	O
+JL	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+less	O
+(	O
+signed	O
+)	O
+0xE	O
+
+EXEC	O
+Execute	O
+machine	O
+code	O
+and	O
+branch	O
+0xF	O
+JBE	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+below	O
+or	O
+equal	O
+or	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+above	O
+0x10	O
+SHL	O
+Shift	O
+left	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+value	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+times	O
+specified	O
+into	O
+the	O
+opcodes	O
+0x11	O
+JA	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+above/Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+below	O
+or	O
+equal	O
+0x12	O
+MOV	O
+Move	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+value	O
+into	O
+a	O
+register	O
+0x13	O
+JZ	O
+JMP	O
+if	O
+zero	O
+0x14	O
+ADD	O
+Add	O
+an	O
+immediate	O
+value	O
+to	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+Vm	O
+descriptor	O
+0x15	O
+JB	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+below	O
+(	O
+unsigned	O
+)	O
+0x16	O
+JS	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+signed	O
+0x17	O
+EXEC	O
+Execute	O
+
+machine	O
+code	O
+(	O
+same	O
+as	O
+opcode	O
+0x0	O
+)	O
+0x18	O
+JGE	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+greater	O
+or	O
+equal/Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+less	O
+0x19	O
+DEREF	O
+Write	O
+a	O
+register	O
+value	O
+into	O
+a	O
+dereferenced	O
+pointer	O
+0x1A	O
+JMP	O
+Special	O
+obfuscated	O
+“	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+below	O
+”	O
+opcode	O
+0x1B	O
+*	O
+Resolve	O
+a	O
+pointer	O
+0x1C	O
+LOAD	O
+Load	O
+a	O
+value	O
+into	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+0x1D	O
+JNE	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+equal/Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+zero	O
+0x1E	O
+CALL	O
+Call	O
+an	O
+external	O
+function	O
+or	O
+a	O
+function	O
+located	O
+in	O
+the	O
+dropper	O
+0x1F	O
+MOV	O
+
+Move	O
+the	O
+value	O
+of	O
+a	O
+register	O
+into	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+0x20	O
+JNB	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+below/Jump	O
+if	O
+above	O
+or	O
+equal/Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+carry	O
+0x21	O
+JNP	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+not	O
+parity/Jump	O
+if	O
+parity	O
+odd	O
+Each	O
+virtual	O
+instruction	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+a	O
+special	O
+data	O
+structure	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+all	O
+the	O
+information	O
+needed	O
+to	O
+be	O
+properly	O
+read	O
+and	O
+executed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+data	O
+structure	O
+is	O
+24	O
+bytes	O
+and	O
+is	O
+composed	O
+of	O
+some	O
+fixed	O
+fields	O
+and	O
+a	O
+variable	O
+portion	O
+that	O
+depends	O
+on	O
+the	O
+opcode	O
+.	O
+
+Before	O
+interpreting	O
+the	O
+opcode	O
+,	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+decrypts	O
+the	O
+opcode	O
+’	O
+s	O
+content	O
+(	O
+through	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+XOR	O
+algorithm	O
+)	O
+,	O
+which	O
+it	O
+then	O
+relocates	O
+(	O
+if	O
+needed	O
+)	O
+,	O
+using	O
+the	O
+relocation	O
+fields	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+is	O
+an	O
+approximate	O
+diagram	O
+of	O
+the	O
+opcode	O
+data	O
+structure	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+graphical	O
+representation	O
+of	O
+the	O
+data	O
+structure	O
+used	O
+to	O
+store	O
+each	O
+VM	O
+opcode	O
+The	O
+VM	O
+handler	O
+is	O
+completely	O
+able	O
+to	O
+generate	O
+different	O
+code	O
+blocks	O
+and	O
+deal	O
+with	O
+relocated	O
+code	O
+due	O
+to	O
+address	O
+space	O
+layout	O
+randomization	O
+(	O
+ASLR	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+also	O
+able	O
+to	O
+move	O
+code	O
+execution	O
+into	O
+different	O
+locations	O
+if	O
+needed	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+instance	O
+,	O
+in	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Execute	O
+”	O
+opcode	O
+(	O
+0x17	O
+)	O
+,	O
+the	O
+32-bit	O
+code	O
+to	O
+run	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+entirely	O
+into	O
+the	O
+variable	O
+section	O
+with	O
+the	O
+value	O
+at	O
+offset	O
+5	O
+specifying	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+bytes	O
+to	O
+be	O
+copied	O
+and	O
+executed	O
+.	O
+
+Otherwise	O
+,	O
+in	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+conditional	O
+opcodes	O
+,	O
+the	O
+variable	O
+part	O
+can	O
+contain	O
+the	O
+next	O
+JIT	O
+packet	O
+ID	O
+or	O
+the	O
+next	O
+relative	O
+virtual	O
+address	O
+(	O
+RVA	O
+)	O
+where	O
+code	O
+execution	O
+should	O
+continue	O
+.	O
+
+Of	O
+course	O
+,	O
+not	O
+all	O
+the	O
+opcodes	O
+are	O
+can	O
+be	O
+easily	O
+read	O
+and	O
+understood	O
+due	O
+to	O
+additional	O
+steps	O
+that	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+have	O
+taken	O
+to	O
+make	O
+analysis	O
+extremely	O
+complicated	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+this	O
+is	O
+how	O
+opcode	O
+0x1A	O
+is	O
+implemented	O
+:	O
+The	O
+opcode	O
+should	O
+represent	O
+a	O
+JB	O
+(	O
+Jump	O
+if	O
+below	O
+)	O
+function	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+implemented	O
+through	O
+set	O
+carry	O
+(	O
+STC	O
+)	O
+instruction	O
+followed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+JMP	O
+into	O
+the	O
+dispatcher	O
+code	O
+that	O
+will	O
+verify	O
+the	O
+carry	O
+flag	O
+condition	O
+set	O
+by	O
+STC	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+6	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+obfuscation	O
+tricks	O
+included	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+in	O
+a	O
+VM	O
+opcode	O
+dispatcher	O
+Even	O
+armed	O
+with	O
+the	O
+knowledge	O
+we	O
+have	O
+described	O
+so	O
+far	O
+,	O
+it	O
+still	O
+took	O
+us	O
+many	O
+hours	O
+to	O
+write	O
+a	O
+full-fledged	O
+opcode	O
+interpreter	O
+that	O
+’	O
+s	O
+able	O
+to	O
+reconstruct	O
+the	O
+real	O
+code	O
+executed	O
+by	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Stage	O
+1	O
+:	O
+Loader	O
+malware	O
+keeps	O
+sandbox	O
+and	O
+debuggers	O
+away	O
+The	O
+first	O
+stage	O
+of	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+running	O
+through	O
+this	O
+complicated	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+is	O
+a	O
+loader	O
+malware	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+probe	O
+the	O
+system	O
+and	O
+determine	O
+whether	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+running	O
+in	O
+a	O
+sandbox	O
+environment	O
+(	O
+typical	O
+for	O
+cloud-based	O
+detonation	O
+solution	O
+like	O
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+loader	O
+first	O
+dynamically	O
+rebuilds	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+import	O
+address	O
+table	O
+(	O
+IAT	O
+)	O
+,	O
+resolving	O
+all	O
+the	O
+API	O
+needed	O
+from	O
+Kernel32	O
+and	O
+NtDll	O
+libraries	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+then	O
+continues	O
+executing	O
+in	O
+a	O
+spawned	O
+new	O
+thread	O
+that	O
+checks	O
+if	O
+there	O
+are	O
+additional	O
+undesired	O
+modules	O
+inside	O
+its	O
+own	O
+virtual	O
+address	O
+space	O
+(	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+modules	O
+injected	O
+by	O
+certain	O
+security	O
+solutions	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+eventually	O
+kills	O
+all	O
+threads	O
+that	O
+belong	O
+to	O
+these	O
+undesired	O
+modules	O
+(	O
+using	O
+ZwQueryInformationThread	O
+native	O
+API	O
+with	O
+ThreadQuerySetWin32StartAddress	O
+information	O
+class	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+anti-sandbox	O
+technique	O
+is	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+checking	O
+the	O
+code	O
+segment	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+not	O
+0x1B	O
+(	O
+for	O
+32-bit	O
+systems	O
+)	O
+or	O
+0x23	O
+(	O
+for	O
+32-bit	O
+system	O
+under	O
+Wow64	O
+)	O
+,	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+exits	O
+.	O
+
+Next	O
+,	O
+the	O
+dropper	O
+checks	O
+its	O
+own	O
+parent	O
+process	O
+for	O
+indications	O
+that	O
+it	O
+is	O
+running	O
+in	O
+a	O
+sandbox	O
+setup	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+calculates	O
+the	O
+MD5	O
+hash	O
+of	O
+the	O
+lower-case	O
+process	O
+image	O
+name	O
+and	O
+terminates	O
+if	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+conditions	O
+are	O
+met	O
+:	O
+The	O
+MD5	O
+hash	O
+of	O
+the	O
+parent	O
+process	O
+image	O
+name	O
+is	O
+either	O
+D0C4DBFA1F3962AED583F6FCE666F8BC	B-Indicator
+or	O
+3CE30F5FED4C67053379518EACFCF879	B-Indicator
+The	O
+parent	O
+process	O
+’	O
+s	O
+full	O
+image	O
+path	O
+is	O
+equal	O
+to	O
+its	O
+own	O
+process	O
+path	O
+If	O
+these	O
+initial	O
+checks	O
+are	O
+passed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+builds	O
+a	O
+complete	O
+IAT	O
+by	O
+reading	O
+four	O
+imported	O
+libraries	O
+from	O
+disk	O
+(	O
+ntdll.dll	B-Indicator
+
+,	O
+kernel32.dll	B-Indicator
+,	O
+advapi32.dll	B-Indicator
+,	O
+and	O
+version.dll	B-Indicator
+)	O
+and	O
+remapping	O
+them	O
+in	O
+memory	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+technique	O
+makes	O
+use	O
+of	O
+debuggers	O
+and	O
+software	O
+breakpoints	O
+useless	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+this	O
+stage	O
+,	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+may	O
+also	O
+call	O
+a	O
+certain	O
+API	O
+using	O
+native	O
+system	O
+calls	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+another	O
+way	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+breakpoints	O
+on	O
+API	O
+and	O
+security	O
+solutions	O
+using	O
+hooks	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+7	O
+.	O
+
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+loader	O
+calling	O
+native	O
+Windows	B-System
+API	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+anti-debugging	O
+tricks	O
+At	O
+this	O
+point	O
+,	O
+the	O
+fun	O
+in	O
+analysis	O
+is	O
+not	O
+over	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+additional	O
+anti-sandbox	O
+checks	O
+are	O
+performed	O
+in	O
+this	O
+exact	O
+order	O
+:	O
+Check	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+not	O
+executed	O
+under	O
+the	O
+root	O
+folder	O
+of	O
+a	O
+drive	O
+Check	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+file	O
+is	O
+readable	O
+from	O
+an	O
+external	O
+source	O
+Check	O
+that	O
+the	O
+hash	O
+of	O
+base	O
+path	O
+is	O
+not	O
+3D6D62AF1A7C8053DBC8E110A530C679	B-Indicator
+Check	O
+that	O
+the	O
+full	O
+malware	O
+path	O
+contains	O
+only	O
+human	O
+readable	O
+characters	O
+(	O
+“	O
+a-z	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+A-Z	O
+”	O
+,	O
+and	O
+“	O
+0-9	O
+”	O
+)	O
+Check	O
+that	O
+no	O
+node	O
+in	O
+the	O
+full	O
+path	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+MD5	O
+string	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+
+file	O
+Fingerprint	O
+the	O
+system	O
+and	O
+check	O
+the	O
+following	O
+registry	O
+values	O
+:	O
+HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid	B-Indicator
+should	O
+not	O
+be	O
+“	O
+6ba1d002-21ed-4dbe-afb5-08cf8b81ca32	B-Indicator
+”	O
+HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows	B-Indicator
+NT\CurrentVersion\DigitalProductId	I-Indicator
+should	O
+not	O
+be	O
+“	O
+55274-649-6478953-23109	B-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+A22-00001	B-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+or	O
+“	O
+47220	B-Indicator
+”	O
+HARDWARE\Description\System\SystemBiosDate	B-Indicator
+should	O
+not	O
+contain	O
+“	O
+01/02/03	O
+”	O
+
+Check	O
+that	O
+the	O
+mutex	O
+WininetStartupMutex0	O
+does	O
+not	O
+already	O
+exist	O
+Check	O
+that	O
+no	O
+DLL	O
+whose	O
+base	O
+name	O
+has	O
+hash	O
+value	O
+of	O
+0xC9CEF3E4	B-Indicator
+is	O
+mapped	O
+into	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+address	O
+space	O
+The	O
+hashes	O
+in	O
+these	O
+checks	O
+are	O
+most	O
+likely	O
+correspond	O
+to	O
+sandbox	O
+or	O
+security	O
+products	O
+that	O
+the	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+authors	O
+want	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+.	O
+
+Next	O
+,	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+checks	O
+that	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+not	O
+running	O
+in	O
+a	O
+virtualized	O
+environment	O
+(	O
+VMWare	B-System
+or	O
+Hyper-V	B-System
+)	O
+or	O
+under	O
+a	O
+debugger	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+the	O
+hardware	O
+virtualization	O
+check	O
+,	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+obtains	O
+the	O
+hardware	O
+device	O
+list	O
+and	O
+checks	O
+if	O
+the	O
+MD5	O
+of	O
+the	O
+vendor	O
+ID	O
+is	O
+equal	O
+to	O
+a	O
+predefined	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+our	O
+tests	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+sample	O
+was	O
+able	O
+to	O
+easily	O
+detect	O
+both	O
+VMWare	B-System
+and	O
+Hyper-V	B-System
+environments	O
+through	O
+the	O
+detection	O
+of	O
+the	O
+virtualized	O
+peripherals	O
+(	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+Vmware	B-Organization
+has	O
+VEN_15AD	O
+as	O
+vendor	O
+ID	O
+,	O
+HyperV	O
+has	O
+VMBus	O
+as	O
+bus	O
+name	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+sandbox	O
+employs	O
+special	O
+mechanisms	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+being	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+similar	O
+checks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+loader	O
+’	O
+s	O
+anti-debugger	O
+code	O
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+following	O
+three	O
+methods	O
+:	O
+The	O
+first	O
+call	O
+aims	O
+to	O
+destroy	O
+the	O
+debugger	O
+connection	O
+:	O
+NOTE	O
+:	O
+This	O
+call	O
+completely	O
+stops	O
+the	O
+execution	O
+of	O
+WinDbg	O
+and	O
+other	O
+debuggers	O
+The	O
+second	O
+call	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+detect	O
+the	O
+presence	O
+of	O
+a	O
+debugger	O
+:	O
+The	O
+final	O
+call	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+destroy	O
+the	O
+possibility	O
+of	O
+adding	O
+software	O
+breakpoint	O
+:	O
+Finally	O
+,	O
+if	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+is	O
+happy	O
+with	O
+all	O
+the	O
+checks	O
+done	O
+so	O
+far	O
+,	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+(	O
+32	O
+or	O
+64-bit	O
+)	O
+it	O
+proceeds	O
+to	O
+decrypt	O
+a	O
+set	O
+of	O
+fake	O
+bitmap	O
+resources	O
+(	O
+stage	O
+2	O
+
+)	O
+embedded	O
+in	O
+the	O
+executable	O
+and	O
+prepares	O
+the	O
+execution	O
+of	O
+a	O
+new	O
+layer	O
+of	O
+VM	O
+decoding	O
+.	O
+
+Each	O
+bitmap	O
+resource	O
+is	O
+extracted	O
+,	O
+stripped	O
+of	O
+the	O
+first	O
+0x428	O
+bytes	O
+(	O
+BMP	O
+headers	O
+and	O
+garbage	O
+data	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+combined	O
+into	O
+one	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+block	O
+is	O
+decrypted	O
+using	O
+a	O
+customized	O
+algorithm	O
+that	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+key	O
+derived	O
+from	O
+the	O
+original	O
+malware	O
+dropper	O
+’	O
+s	O
+TimeDateStamp	O
+field	O
+multiplied	O
+by	O
+5	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+8	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+fake	O
+bitmap	O
+image	O
+embedded	O
+as	O
+resource	O
+The	O
+32-bit	O
+stage	O
+2	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+customized	O
+loading	O
+mechanism	O
+(	O
+i.e.	O
+,	O
+the	O
+PE	O
+file	O
+has	O
+a	O
+scrambled	O
+IAT	O
+and	O
+relocation	O
+table	O
+)	O
+and	O
+exports	O
+only	O
+one	O
+function	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+the	O
+64-bit	O
+stage	O
+2	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+the	O
+code	O
+execution	O
+is	O
+transferred	O
+from	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+using	O
+a	O
+well-known	O
+technique	O
+called	O
+Heaven	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Gate	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+next	O
+sections	O
+,	O
+for	O
+simplicity	O
+,	O
+we	O
+will	O
+continue	O
+the	O
+analysis	O
+only	O
+on	O
+the	O
+64-bit	O
+payload	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+9	O
+.	O
+
+Heaven	O
+’	O
+s	O
+gate	O
+is	O
+still	O
+in	O
+use	O
+in	O
+2017	O
+Stage	O
+2	O
+:	O
+A	O
+second	O
+multi-platform	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+The	O
+64-bit	O
+stage	O
+2	O
+malware	O
+implements	O
+another	O
+loader	O
+combined	O
+with	O
+another	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+architecture	O
+is	O
+quite	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+the	O
+one	O
+described	O
+previously	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+opcodes	O
+are	O
+slightly	O
+different	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+reversing	O
+these	O
+opcodes	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+update	O
+our	O
+interpreter	O
+script	O
+to	O
+support	O
+both	O
+32-bit	O
+and	O
+64-bit	O
+virtual	O
+machines	O
+used	O
+by	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+INDEX	O
+MNEMONIC	O
+DESCRIPTION	O
+0x0	O
+JMP	O
+Special	O
+obfuscated	O
+conditional	O
+Jump	O
+(	O
+always	O
+taken	O
+or	O
+always	O
+ignored	O
+)	O
+0x1	O
+JMP	O
+Jump	O
+to	O
+a	O
+function	O
+(	O
+same	O
+as	O
+opcode	O
+0x10	O
+)	O
+0x2	O
+CALL	O
+Call	O
+to	O
+the	O
+function	O
+pointed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+value	O
+0x3	O
+CALL	O
+Optimized	O
+CALL	O
+function	O
+(	O
+like	O
+the	O
+0x1E	O
+opcode	O
+of	O
+the	O
+32-bit	O
+VM	O
+)	O
+0x4	O
+EXEC	O
+Execute	O
+code	O
+and	O
+move	O
+to	O
+the	O
+next	O
+packet	O
+0x5	O
+JMP	O
+Jump	O
+to	O
+an	O
+internal	O
+function	O
+0x6	O
+NOP	O
+No	O
+operation	O
+,	O
+move	O
+to	O
+the	O
+
+next	O
+packet	O
+0x7	O
+CALL	O
+Call	O
+an	O
+imported	O
+API	O
+(	O
+whose	O
+address	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+value	O
+)	O
+0x8	O
+LOAD	O
+Load	O
+a	O
+value	O
+into	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+structure	O
+*	O
+0x9	O
+STORE	O
+Store	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+value	O
+inside	O
+a	O
+register	O
+0xA	O
+WRITE	O
+Resolve	O
+a	O
+pointer	O
+and	O
+store	O
+the	O
+value	O
+of	O
+a	O
+register	O
+in	O
+its	O
+content	O
+0xB	O
+READ	O
+Move	O
+the	O
+value	O
+pointed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+internal	O
+value	O
+into	O
+a	O
+register	O
+0xC	O
+LOAD	O
+Load	O
+a	O
+value	O
+into	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+structure	O
+(	O
+not	O
+optimized	O
+)	O
+0xD	O
+CMP	O
+Compare	O
+the	O
+value	O
+pointed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+
+with	O
+a	O
+register	O
+0xE	O
+CMP	O
+Compare	O
+the	O
+value	O
+pointed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+with	O
+an	O
+immediate	O
+value	O
+0xF	O
+XCHG	O
+Exchange	O
+the	O
+value	O
+pointed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+internal	O
+VM	O
+descriptor	O
+with	O
+a	O
+register	O
+0x10	O
+SHL	O
+Jump	O
+to	O
+a	O
+function	O
+(	O
+same	O
+as	O
+opcode	O
+0x1	O
+)	O
+This	O
+additional	O
+virtual	O
+machine	O
+performs	O
+the	O
+same	O
+duties	O
+as	O
+the	O
+one	O
+already	O
+described	O
+but	O
+in	O
+a	O
+64-bit	O
+environment	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+extracts	O
+and	O
+decrypts	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+3	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+encrypted	O
+resources	O
+such	O
+as	O
+fake	O
+dialog	O
+boxes	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+extraction	O
+method	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+encryption	O
+algorithm	O
+(	O
+also	O
+XOR	O
+)	O
+is	O
+much	O
+simpler	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+new	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+decrypted	O
+,	O
+remapped	O
+,	O
+and	O
+executed	O
+in	O
+memory	O
+,	O
+and	O
+represents	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+and	O
+persistence	O
+stage	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Stage	O
+3	O
+:	O
+Installer	O
+that	O
+takes	O
+DLL	O
+side-loading	O
+to	O
+a	O
+new	O
+level	O
+Stage	O
+3	O
+represents	O
+the	O
+setup	O
+program	O
+for	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+the	O
+first	O
+plain	O
+stage	O
+that	O
+does	O
+not	O
+employ	O
+a	O
+VM	O
+or	O
+obfuscation	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+supports	O
+two	O
+different	O
+installation	O
+methods	O
+:	O
+setup	O
+in	O
+a	O
+UAC-enforced	B-System
+environment	I-System
+(	O
+with	O
+limited	O
+privileges	O
+)	O
+,	O
+or	O
+an	O
+installation	O
+with	O
+full-administrative	O
+privileges	O
+enabled	O
+(	O
+in	O
+cases	O
+where	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+gains	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+run	O
+with	O
+elevated	O
+permissions	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+were	O
+a	O
+bit	O
+disappointed	O
+that	O
+we	O
+did	O
+not	O
+see	O
+traces	O
+of	O
+a	O
+true	O
+privilege	B-Vulnerability
+escalation	I-Vulnerability
+exploit	I-Vulnerability
+after	O
+all	O
+this	O
+deobfuscation	O
+work	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+seems	O
+these	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+samples	O
+were	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+work	O
+just	O
+using	O
+UAC	O
+bypasses	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+setup	O
+code	O
+receives	O
+an	O
+installation	O
+command	O
+from	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+stage	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+our	O
+test	O
+,	O
+this	O
+command	O
+was	O
+the	O
+value	O
+3	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+global	O
+event	O
+named	O
+0x0A7F1FFAB12BB2	B-Indicator
+and	O
+drops	O
+some	O
+files	O
+under	O
+a	O
+folder	O
+located	O
+in	O
+C	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+\ProgramData	I-Indicator
+or	O
+in	O
+the	O
+user	O
+application	O
+data	O
+folder	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+folder	O
+and	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+configuration	O
+are	O
+read	O
+from	O
+a	O
+customized	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+resource	O
+section	O
+of	O
+the	O
+setup	O
+program	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+the	O
+files	O
+potentially	O
+dropped	O
+during	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+stage	O
+:	O
+FILE	O
+NAME	O
+STAGE	O
+DESCRIPTION	O
+d3d9.dll	B-Indicator
+Stage	O
+4	O
+Malware	O
+loader	O
+used	O
+for	O
+UAC	O
+environments	O
+with	O
+limited	O
+privileges	O
+;	O
+also	O
+protected	O
+by	O
+VM	O
+obfuscation	O
+aepic.dll	B-Indicator
+,	O
+sspisrv.dll	B-Indicator
+,	O
+userenv.dll	B-Indicator
+Stage	O
+4	O
+Malware	O
+loader	O
+used	O
+in	O
+presence	O
+of	O
+administrative	O
+privileges	O
+;	O
+executed	O
+from	O
+(	O
+and	O
+injected	O
+into	O
+)	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+service	O
+;	O
+also	O
+protected	O
+by	O
+VM	O
+obfuscation	O
+msvcr90.dll	B-Indicator
+Stage	O
+5	O
+Malware	O
+payload	O
+injected	O
+into	O
+
+the	O
+explorer.exe	B-Indicator
+or	O
+winlogon.exe	B-Indicator
+process	O
+;	O
+also	O
+protected	O
+by	O
+VM	O
+obfuscation	O
+.cab	O
+Config	O
+Main	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+;	O
+encrypted	O
+setup.cab	B-Indicator
+Unknown	O
+Last	O
+section	O
+of	O
+the	O
+setup	O
+executable	O
+;	O
+content	O
+still	O
+unknown	O
+.7z	O
+Plugin	O
+Malware	O
+plugin	O
+used	O
+to	O
+spy	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+network	O
+communications	O
+wsecedit.rar	B-Indicator
+Stage	O
+6	O
+Main	O
+malware	O
+executable	O
+After	O
+writing	O
+some	O
+of	O
+these	O
+files	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+decides	O
+which	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+installation	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+current	O
+privilege	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+the	O
+hosting	O
+process	O
+(	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+if	O
+a	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Office	I-System
+process	O
+was	O
+used	O
+as	O
+exploit	O
+vector	O
+)	O
+:	O
+Installation	O
+process	O
+under	O
+
+UAC	O
+When	O
+running	O
+under	O
+a	O
+limited	O
+UAC	O
+account	O
+,	O
+the	O
+installer	O
+extracts	O
+d3d9.dll	B-Indicator
+and	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+persistence	O
+key	O
+under	O
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+sets	O
+a	O
+registry	O
+value	O
+(	O
+whose	O
+name	O
+is	O
+read	O
+from	O
+the	O
+configuration	O
+file	O
+)	O
+to	O
+“	O
+C	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe	I-Indicator
+c	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+\ProgramData\AuditApp\d3d9.dll	I-Indicator
+,	I-Indicator
+Control_Run	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Before	O
+doing	O
+this	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+makes	O
+a	O
+screenshot	O
+of	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+and	O
+displays	O
+it	O
+on	O
+top	O
+of	O
+all	O
+other	O
+windows	B-System
+for	O
+few	O
+seconds	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+indicates	O
+that	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+are	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+some	O
+messages	O
+showed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+system	O
+during	O
+the	O
+setup	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+loaded	O
+with	O
+startup	O
+command	O
+2	O
+,	O
+the	O
+installer	O
+can	O
+copy	O
+the	O
+original	O
+explorer.exe	B-Indicator
+file	I-Indicator
+inside	O
+its	O
+current	O
+running	O
+directory	O
+and	O
+rename	O
+d3d9.dll	B-Indicator
+to	O
+uxtheme.dll	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+the	O
+persistence	O
+is	O
+achieved	O
+by	O
+loading	O
+the	O
+original	O
+explorer.exe	B-Indicator
+from	O
+its	O
+startup	O
+location	O
+and	O
+,	O
+using	O
+DLL	O
+side-loading	O
+,	O
+passing	O
+the	O
+execution	O
+control	O
+to	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+4	O
+malware	O
+(	O
+discussed	O
+in	O
+next	O
+section	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Finally	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+spawns	O
+a	O
+thread	O
+that	O
+has	O
+the	O
+goal	O
+to	O
+load	O
+,	O
+remap	O
+,	O
+and	O
+relocate	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+5	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+context	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+indeed	O
+no	O
+need	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+4	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+msvcr90.dll	B-Indicator
+file	I-Indicator
+is	O
+opened	O
+,	O
+read	O
+,	O
+and	O
+decrypted	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+code	O
+execution	O
+control	O
+is	O
+transferred	O
+to	O
+the	O
+RunDll	O
+exported	O
+routine	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+32-bit	O
+systems	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+may	O
+attempt	O
+a	O
+known	O
+UAC	O
+bypass	O
+by	O
+launching	O
+printui.exe	B-Indicator
+system	O
+process	O
+and	O
+using	O
+token	O
+manipulation	O
+with	O
+NtFilterToken	O
+as	O
+described	O
+in	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+.	O
+
+Installation	O
+process	O
+with	O
+administrative	O
+privilege	O
+This	O
+installation	O
+method	O
+is	O
+more	O
+interesting	O
+because	O
+it	O
+reveals	O
+how	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+stealthier	O
+persistence	O
+on	O
+the	O
+machine	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+method	O
+is	O
+a	O
+well-known	O
+trick	O
+used	O
+by	O
+penetration	O
+testers	O
+that	O
+was	O
+automated	O
+and	O
+generalized	O
+by	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+The	O
+procedure	O
+starts	O
+by	O
+enumerating	O
+the	O
+KnownDlls	O
+object	O
+directory	O
+and	O
+then	O
+scanning	O
+for	O
+section	O
+objects	O
+of	O
+the	O
+cached	O
+system	O
+DLLs	O
+.	O
+
+Next	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+enumerates	O
+all	O
+.exe	O
+programs	O
+in	O
+the	O
+%	O
+System	O
+%	O
+folder	O
+and	O
+looks	O
+for	O
+an	O
+original	O
+signed	O
+Windows	B-System
+binary	O
+that	O
+imports	O
+from	O
+at	O
+least	O
+one	O
+KnownDll	O
+and	O
+from	O
+a	O
+library	O
+that	O
+is	O
+not	O
+in	O
+the	O
+KnownDll	O
+directory	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+a	O
+suitable	O
+.exe	O
+file	O
+candidate	O
+is	O
+found	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+copied	O
+into	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+installation	O
+folder	O
+(	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+C	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+\ProgramData	I-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+this	O
+point	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+extracts	O
+and	O
+decrypts	O
+a	O
+stub	O
+DLL	O
+from	O
+its	O
+own	O
+resources	O
+(	O
+ID	O
+101	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+then	O
+calls	O
+a	O
+routine	O
+that	O
+adds	O
+a	O
+code	O
+section	O
+to	O
+a	O
+target	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+section	O
+will	O
+contain	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+export	O
+table	O
+mimicking	O
+the	O
+same	O
+export	O
+table	O
+of	O
+the	O
+original	O
+system	O
+DLL	O
+chosen	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+the	O
+dropper	O
+supports	O
+aepic.dll	B-Indicator
+,	O
+sspisrv.dll	B-Indicator
+,	O
+ftllib.dll	B-Indicator
+,	O
+and	O
+userenv.dll	B-Indicator
+to	O
+host	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+payload	O
+.	O
+
+Finally	O
+,	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Windows	B-System
+service	O
+is	O
+created	O
+with	O
+the	O
+service	O
+path	O
+pointing	O
+to	O
+the	O
+candidate	O
+.exe	O
+located	O
+in	O
+this	O
+new	O
+directory	O
+together	O
+with	O
+the	O
+freshly	O
+created	O
+,	O
+benign-looking	O
+DLL	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+way	O
+,	O
+when	O
+the	O
+service	O
+runs	O
+during	O
+boot	O
+,	O
+the	O
+original	O
+Windows	B-System
+executable	O
+is	O
+executed	O
+from	O
+a	O
+different	O
+location	O
+and	O
+it	O
+will	O
+automatically	O
+load	O
+and	O
+map	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+DLL	O
+inside	O
+its	O
+address	O
+space	O
+,	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+using	O
+the	O
+genuine	O
+system	O
+library	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+routine	O
+is	O
+a	O
+form	O
+of	O
+generic	O
+and	O
+variable	O
+generator	O
+of	O
+DLL	O
+side-loading	O
+combinations	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+10	O
+.	O
+
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+timeline	O
+can	O
+pinpoint	O
+the	O
+service	O
+DLL	O
+side-loading	O
+trick	O
+(	O
+in	O
+this	O
+example	O
+,	O
+using	O
+fltlib.dll	B-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+past	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+other	O
+activity	O
+groups	O
+like	O
+LEAD	O
+employ	O
+a	O
+similar	O
+attacker	O
+technique	O
+named	O
+“	O
+proxy-library	O
+”	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+persistence	O
+,	O
+but	O
+not	O
+with	O
+this	O
+professionalism	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+said	O
+technique	O
+brings	O
+the	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+avoiding	O
+auto-start	O
+extensibility	O
+points	O
+(	O
+ASEP	O
+)	O
+scanners	O
+and	O
+programs	O
+that	O
+checks	O
+for	O
+binaries	O
+installed	O
+as	O
+service	O
+(	O
+for	O
+the	O
+latter	O
+,	O
+the	O
+service	O
+chosen	O
+by	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+will	O
+show	O
+up	O
+as	O
+a	O
+clean	O
+Windows	B-System
+signed	O
+binary	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+cleans	O
+the	O
+system	O
+event	O
+logs	O
+using	O
+OpenEventLog/ClearEventLog	O
+APIs	O
+,	O
+and	O
+then	O
+terminates	O
+the	O
+setup	O
+procedure	O
+with	O
+a	O
+call	O
+to	O
+StartService	O
+to	O
+run	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+4	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+11	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+DLL	O
+side-loaded	O
+stage	O
+4	O
+malware	O
+mimicking	O
+a	O
+real	O
+export	O
+table	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+detection	O
+Stage	O
+4	O
+:	O
+The	O
+memory	O
+loader	O
+–	O
+Fun	O
+injection	O
+with	O
+GDI	O
+function	O
+hijacking	O
+Depending	O
+on	O
+how	O
+stage	O
+4	O
+was	O
+launched	O
+,	O
+two	O
+different	O
+things	O
+may	O
+happen	O
+:	O
+In	O
+the	O
+low-integrity	O
+case	O
+(	O
+under	O
+UAC	O
+)	O
+the	O
+installer	O
+simply	O
+injects	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+5	O
+malware	O
+into	O
+the	O
+bogus	O
+explorer.exe	B-Indicator
+process	O
+started	O
+earlier	O
+and	O
+terminates	O
+In	O
+the	O
+high-integrity	O
+case	O
+(	O
+with	O
+administrative	O
+privileges	O
+or	O
+after	O
+UAC	O
+bypass	O
+)	O
+,	O
+the	O
+code	O
+searches	O
+for	O
+the	O
+process	O
+hosting	O
+the	O
+Plug	O
+and	O
+Play	O
+service	O
+(	O
+usually	O
+svchost.exe	B-Indicator
+
+)	O
+loaded	O
+in	O
+memory	O
+and	O
+injects	O
+itself	O
+into	O
+it	O
+For	O
+the	O
+second	O
+scenario	O
+,	O
+the	O
+injection	O
+process	O
+works	O
+like	O
+this	O
+:	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+opens	O
+the	O
+target	O
+service	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+allocates	O
+and	O
+fills	O
+four	O
+chunks	O
+of	O
+memory	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+service	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+chunk	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+entire	O
+malware	O
+DLL	O
+code	O
+(	O
+without	O
+PE	O
+headers	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Another	O
+chunk	O
+is	O
+used	O
+to	O
+copy	O
+a	O
+basic	O
+Ntdll	O
+and	O
+Kernel32	O
+import	O
+address	O
+table	O
+.	O
+
+Two	O
+chunks	O
+are	O
+filled	O
+with	O
+an	O
+asynchronous	O
+procedure	O
+call	O
+(	O
+APC	O
+)	O
+routine	O
+code	O
+and	O
+a	O
+stub	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+opens	O
+the	O
+service	O
+thread	O
+of	O
+the	O
+service	O
+process	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+ZwQueueApcThread	B-Indicator
+native	O
+API	O
+to	O
+inject	O
+an	O
+APC	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+APC	O
+routine	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+thread	O
+in	O
+the	O
+context	O
+of	O
+the	O
+svchost.exe	B-Indicator
+process	O
+that	O
+will	O
+map	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+5	O
+malware	O
+into	O
+the	O
+winlogon.exe	B-Indicator
+process	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+injection	O
+method	O
+used	O
+for	O
+winlogon.exe	B-Indicator
+is	O
+also	O
+interesting	O
+and	O
+quite	O
+unusual	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+that	O
+this	O
+method	O
+is	O
+engineered	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+trivial	O
+detection	O
+of	O
+process	O
+injection	O
+using	O
+the	O
+well-detected	O
+CreateRemoteThread	B-Indicator
+or	O
+ZwQueueApcThread	B-Indicator
+API	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+takes	O
+these	O
+steps	O
+:	O
+Check	O
+if	O
+the	O
+system	O
+master	O
+boot	O
+record	O
+(	O
+MBR	O
+)	O
+contains	O
+an	O
+infection	O
+marker	O
+(	O
+0xD289C989C089	B-Indicator
+8-bytes	O
+value	O
+at	O
+offset	O
+0x2C	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+,	O
+if	O
+so	O
+,	O
+terminate	O
+itself	O
+Check	O
+again	O
+if	O
+the	O
+process	O
+is	O
+attached	O
+to	O
+a	O
+debugger	O
+(	O
+using	O
+the	O
+techniques	O
+described	O
+previously	O
+)	O
+Read	O
+,	O
+decrypt	O
+,	O
+and	O
+map	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+5	O
+malware	O
+(	O
+written	O
+in	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+stage	O
+in	O
+msvcr90.dll	B-Indicator
+)	O
+Open	O
+winlogon.exe	B-Indicator
+process	O
+Load	O
+user32.dll	B-Indicator
+system	O
+library	O
+and	O
+read	O
+the	O
+KernelCallbackTable	B-Indicator
+
+pointer	O
+from	O
+its	O
+own	O
+process	O
+environment	O
+block	O
+(	O
+PEB	O
+)	O
+(	O
+Note	O
+:	O
+The	O
+KernelCallbackTable	O
+points	O
+to	O
+an	O
+array	O
+of	O
+graphic	O
+functions	O
+used	O
+by	O
+Win32	O
+kernel	O
+subsystem	O
+module	O
+win32k.sys	B-Indicator
+as	O
+call-back	O
+into	O
+user-mode	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+Calculate	O
+the	O
+difference	O
+between	O
+this	O
+pointer	O
+and	O
+the	O
+User32	O
+base	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+Copy	O
+the	O
+stage	O
+5	O
+DLL	O
+into	O
+winlogon.exe	B-Indicator
+Allocate	O
+a	O
+chunk	O
+of	O
+memory	O
+in	O
+winlogon.exe	B-Indicator
+process	O
+and	O
+copy	O
+the	O
+same	O
+APC	O
+routine	O
+seen	O
+previously	O
+Read	O
+and	O
+save	O
+the	O
+original	O
+pointer	O
+of	O
+the	O
+__fnDWORD	O
+internal	O
+User32	O
+routine	O
+(	O
+located	O
+at	O
+offset	O
++0x10	O
+of	O
+the	O
+KernelCallbackTable	O
+)	O
+and	O
+replace	O
+this	O
+pointer	O
+with	O
+the	O
+address	O
+of	O
+the	O
+APC	O
+stub	O
+routine	O
+After	O
+this	O
+function	O
+pointer	O
+hijacking	O
+,	O
+when	O
+winlogon.exe	B-Indicator
+makes	O
+any	O
+graphical	O
+call	O
+(	O
+GDI	O
+)	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+can	O
+execute	O
+without	O
+using	O
+CreateRemoteThread	O
+or	O
+
+similar	O
+triggers	O
+that	O
+are	O
+easily	O
+detectable	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+execution	O
+it	O
+takes	O
+care	O
+of	O
+restoring	O
+the	O
+original	O
+KernelCallbackTable	O
+.	O
+
+Stage	O
+5	O
+:	O
+The	O
+final	O
+loader	O
+takes	O
+control	O
+The	O
+stage	O
+5	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+needed	O
+only	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+one	O
+more	O
+layer	O
+of	O
+obfuscation	O
+,	O
+through	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+,	O
+of	O
+the	O
+final	O
+malware	O
+payload	O
+and	O
+to	O
+set	O
+up	O
+a	O
+special	O
+Structured	O
+Exception	O
+Hander	O
+routine	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+inserted	O
+as	O
+Wow64PrepareForException	O
+in	O
+Ntdll	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+special	O
+exception	O
+handler	O
+is	O
+needed	O
+to	O
+manage	O
+some	O
+memory	O
+buffers	O
+protection	O
+and	O
+special	O
+exceptions	O
+that	O
+are	O
+used	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+more	O
+stealthy	O
+execution	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+VM	O
+code	O
+has	O
+checked	O
+again	O
+the	O
+user	O
+environment	O
+,	O
+it	O
+proceeds	O
+to	O
+extract	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+final	O
+un-obfuscated	O
+payload	O
+sample	O
+directly	O
+into	O
+winlogon.exe	B-Indicator
+(	O
+alternatively	O
+,	O
+into	O
+explorer.exe	B-Indicator
+)	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+extracted	O
+,	O
+decrypted	O
+,	O
+and	O
+mapped	O
+in	O
+the	O
+process	O
+memory	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+calls	O
+the	O
+new	O
+DLL	O
+entry	O
+point	O
+,	O
+and	O
+then	O
+the	O
+RunDll	O
+exported	O
+function	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+latter	O
+implements	O
+the	O
+entire	O
+spyware	O
+program	O
+.	O
+
+Stage	O
+6	O
+:	O
+The	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+a	O
+modular	O
+spyware	O
+framework	O
+for	O
+further	O
+analysis	O
+Our	O
+journey	O
+to	O
+deobfuscating	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+has	O
+allowed	O
+us	O
+to	O
+uncover	O
+the	O
+complex	O
+anti-analysis	O
+techniques	O
+used	O
+by	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+to	O
+use	O
+this	O
+intel	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+our	O
+customers	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+our	O
+top	O
+priority	O
+.	O
+
+Analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+additional	O
+spyware	O
+modules	O
+is	O
+future	O
+work	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+evident	O
+that	O
+the	O
+ultimate	O
+goal	O
+of	O
+this	O
+program	O
+is	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+architecture	O
+is	O
+modular	O
+,	O
+which	O
+means	O
+that	O
+it	O
+can	O
+execute	O
+plugins	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+plugins	O
+are	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+its	O
+resource	O
+section	O
+and	O
+can	O
+be	O
+protected	O
+by	O
+the	O
+same	O
+VM	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+sample	O
+we	O
+analyzed	O
+in	O
+October	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+plugin	O
+that	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+spy	O
+on	O
+internet	O
+connections	O
+,	O
+and	O
+can	O
+even	O
+divert	O
+some	O
+SSL	O
+connections	O
+and	O
+steal	O
+data	O
+from	O
+encrypted	O
+traffic	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+variants	O
+incorporate	O
+an	O
+MBR	B-Indicator
+rootkit	I-Indicator
+,	O
+the	O
+exact	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+which	O
+is	O
+not	O
+clear	O
+.	O
+
+Quite	O
+possibly	O
+,	O
+this	O
+routine	O
+targets	O
+older	O
+platforms	O
+like	O
+Windows	B-System
+7	I-System
+and	O
+machines	O
+not	O
+taking	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+hardware	O
+protections	O
+like	O
+UEFI	O
+and	O
+SecureBoot	O
+,	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Windows	B-System
+10	I-System
+.	O
+
+Describing	O
+this	O
+additional	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+code	O
+in	O
+detail	O
+is	O
+outside	O
+the	O
+scope	B-System
+of	O
+this	O
+analysis	O
+and	O
+may	O
+require	O
+a	O
+new	O
+dedicated	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+.	O
+
+Defense	O
+against	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+Exposing	O
+as	O
+much	O
+of	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+riddles	O
+as	O
+possible	O
+during	O
+this	O
+painstaking	O
+analysis	O
+has	O
+allowed	O
+us	O
+to	O
+ensure	O
+our	O
+customers	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+against	O
+this	O
+advanced	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Windows	B-System
+10	I-System
+S	O
+devices	O
+are	O
+naturally	O
+protected	O
+against	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+and	O
+other	O
+threats	O
+thanks	O
+to	O
+the	O
+strong	O
+code	O
+integrity	O
+policies	O
+that	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+allow	O
+unknown	O
+unsigned	O
+binaries	O
+to	O
+run	O
+(	O
+thus	O
+stopping	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+PE	O
+installer	O
+)	O
+or	O
+loaded	O
+(	O
+blocking	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+DLL	O
+persistence	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+Windows	B-System
+10	I-System
+,	O
+similar	O
+code	O
+integrity	O
+policies	O
+can	O
+be	O
+configured	O
+using	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+Application	I-System
+Control	I-System
+.	O
+
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+Advanced	I-System
+Threat	I-System
+Protection	I-System
+secures	O
+mailboxes	O
+from	O
+email	O
+campaigns	O
+that	O
+use	O
+zero-day	B-Vulnerability
+exploits	I-Vulnerability
+to	O
+deliver	O
+threats	O
+like	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+blocks	O
+unsafe	O
+attachments	O
+,	O
+malicious	O
+links	O
+,	O
+and	O
+linked-to	O
+files	O
+using	O
+time-of-click	O
+protection	O
+.	O
+
+Using	O
+intel	O
+from	O
+this	O
+research	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+made	O
+Office	B-System
+365	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+more	O
+resistant	O
+to	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+anti-sandbox	O
+checks	O
+.	O
+
+Generic	O
+detections	O
+,	O
+advanced	O
+behavioral	O
+analytics	O
+,	O
+and	O
+machine	O
+learning	O
+technologies	O
+in	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+Advanced	I-System
+Threat	I-System
+Protection	I-System
+detect	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+malicious	O
+behavior	O
+throughout	O
+the	O
+attack	O
+kill	O
+chain	O
+and	O
+alert	O
+SecOps	O
+personnel	O
+.	O
+
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+also	O
+integrates	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Windows	B-System
+protection	O
+stack	O
+so	O
+that	O
+protections	O
+from	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+AV	I-System
+and	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+Exploit	I-System
+Guard	I-System
+are	O
+reported	O
+in	O
+Windows	B-System
+Defender	I-System
+ATP	I-System
+portal	O
+,	O
+enabling	O
+SecOps	O
+personnel	O
+to	O
+centrally	O
+manage	O
+security	O
+,	O
+and	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+promptly	O
+investigate	O
+and	O
+respond	O
+to	O
+hostile	O
+activity	O
+in	O
+the	O
+network	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+hope	O
+that	O
+this	O
+writeup	O
+of	O
+our	O
+journey	O
+through	O
+all	O
+the	O
+multiple	O
+layers	O
+of	O
+protection	O
+,	O
+obfuscation	O
+,	O
+and	O
+anti-analysis	O
+techniques	O
+of	O
+FinFisher	B-Malware
+will	O
+be	O
+useful	O
+to	O
+other	O
+researchers	O
+studying	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+that	O
+an	O
+industry-wide	O
+collaboration	O
+and	O
+information-sharing	O
+is	O
+important	O
+in	O
+defending	O
+customers	O
+against	O
+this	O
+complex	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+TUESDAY	O
+,	O
+APRIL	O
+9	O
+,	O
+2019	O
+Gustuff	B-Malware
+banking	O
+botnet	O
+targets	O
+Australia	O
+EXECUTIVE	O
+SUMMARY	O
+Cisco	B-Organization
+Talos	I-Organization
+has	O
+uncovered	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Android-based	B-System
+campaign	O
+targeting	O
+Australian	O
+financial	O
+institutions	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+progressed	O
+,	O
+Talos	B-Organization
+came	O
+to	O
+understand	O
+that	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+was	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+"	O
+ChristinaMorrow	O
+''	O
+text	O
+message	O
+spam	O
+scam	O
+previously	O
+spotted	O
+in	O
+Australia	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+'s	O
+credential-harvest	O
+mechanism	O
+is	O
+not	O
+particularly	O
+sophisticated	O
+,	O
+it	O
+does	O
+have	O
+an	O
+advanced	O
+self-preservation	O
+mechanism	O
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+though	O
+this	O
+is	O
+not	O
+a	O
+traditional	O
+remote	O
+access	O
+tool	O
+(	O
+RAT	O
+)	O
+,	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+target	O
+mainly	O
+private	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Aside	O
+from	O
+the	O
+credential	O
+stealing	O
+,	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+also	O
+includes	O
+features	O
+like	O
+the	O
+theft	O
+of	O
+users	O
+'	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+,	O
+collecting	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+associated	O
+names	O
+,	O
+and	O
+files	O
+and	O
+photos	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+that	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+mean	O
+companies	O
+and	O
+organizations	O
+are	O
+out	O
+of	O
+the	O
+woods	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+should	O
+still	O
+be	O
+on	O
+the	O
+lookout	O
+for	O
+these	O
+kinds	O
+of	O
+trojans	O
+,	O
+as	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+could	O
+target	O
+corporate	O
+accounts	O
+that	O
+contain	O
+large	O
+amounts	O
+of	O
+money	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+information	O
+collected	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+and	O
+the	O
+control	O
+over	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+allows	O
+their	O
+operators	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+more	O
+complex	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+motivated	O
+attacker	O
+can	O
+use	O
+this	O
+trojan	O
+to	O
+harvest	O
+usernames	O
+and	O
+passwords	O
+and	O
+then	O
+reuse	O
+them	O
+to	O
+login	O
+into	O
+the	O
+organization	O
+'s	O
+system	O
+where	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+works	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+good	O
+example	O
+where	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+based	O
+on	O
+SMS	O
+would	O
+fail	O
+since	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+can	O
+read	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+.	O
+
+Corporations	O
+can	O
+protect	O
+themselves	O
+from	O
+these	O
+side-channel	O
+attacks	O
+by	O
+deploying	O
+client-based	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Duo	B-System
+Security	I-System
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+impressive	O
+features	O
+of	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+its	O
+resilience	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+(	O
+C2	O
+)	O
+server	O
+is	O
+taken	O
+down	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+operator	O
+can	O
+still	O
+recover	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+control	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+directly	O
+to	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+makes	O
+the	O
+taking	O
+down	O
+and	O
+recovery	O
+of	O
+the	O
+network	O
+much	O
+harder	O
+and	O
+poses	O
+a	O
+considerable	O
+challenge	O
+for	O
+defenders	O
+.	O
+
+THE	O
+CAMPAIGN	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+'s	O
+primary	O
+infection	O
+vector	O
+is	O
+SMS	O
+.	O
+
+Just	O
+like	O
+the	O
+old-school	O
+mail	O
+worms	O
+that	O
+used	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+address	B-System
+book	I-System
+to	O
+select	O
+the	O
+next	O
+victims	O
+,	O
+this	O
+banking	O
+trojan	O
+'s	O
+activation	O
+cycle	O
+includes	O
+the	O
+exfiltration	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+address	O
+book	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+trojan	O
+will	O
+receive	O
+instructions	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+to	O
+spread	O
+.	O
+
+Spread	O
+command	O
+from	O
+C2	O
+The	O
+victim	O
+receives	O
+the	O
+command	O
+sendSMSMass	O
+.	O
+
+Usually	O
+,	O
+this	O
+message	O
+targets	O
+four	O
+or	O
+five	O
+people	O
+at	O
+a	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+body	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+message	O
+and	O
+URL	O
+.	O
+
+Again	O
+,	O
+the	O
+concept	O
+is	O
+that	O
+new	O
+victims	O
+are	O
+more	O
+likely	O
+to	O
+install	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+if	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+comes	O
+from	O
+someone	O
+they	O
+know	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+in	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+body	O
+,	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+will	O
+check	O
+if	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+meets	O
+the	O
+criteria	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+(	O
+see	O
+infrastructure	O
+section	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+device	O
+does	O
+not	O
+meet	O
+the	O
+criteria	O
+,	O
+it	O
+wo	O
+n't	O
+receive	O
+any	O
+data	O
+,	O
+otherwise	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+be	O
+redirected	O
+to	O
+a	O
+second	O
+server	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+a	O
+copy	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+install	O
+on	O
+their	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+domain	O
+on	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+was	O
+registered	O
+on	O
+Jan.	O
+19	O
+,	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+Talos	B-Organization
+has	O
+identified	O
+that	O
+was	O
+used	O
+at	O
+least	O
+since	O
+November	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+Talos	B-Organization
+was	O
+also	O
+able	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+that	O
+the	O
+same	O
+infrastructure	O
+has	O
+been	O
+used	O
+to	O
+deploy	O
+similar	O
+campaigns	O
+using	O
+different	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Distribution	O
+of	O
+victims	O
+.	O
+
+Talos	B-Organization
+assess	O
+with	O
+high	O
+confidence	O
+that	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+is	O
+targeting	O
+Australian	O
+financial	O
+institutions	O
+based	O
+on	O
+several	O
+factors	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+Umbrella	O
+telemetry	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+the	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+the	O
+request	O
+comes	O
+from	O
+Australia	O
+and	O
+the	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+infected	O
+have	O
+the	O
+international	O
+indicative	O
+for	O
+Australia	O
+.	O
+
+Finally	O
+,	O
+the	O
+specific	O
+overlays	O
+are	O
+designed	O
+for	O
+Australian	O
+financial	O
+institutions	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Australia	O
+is	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+geographic	O
+regions	O
+that	O
+is	O
+accepted	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+DNS	O
+queries	O
+distribution	O
+over	O
+time	O
+The	O
+campaign	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+be	O
+growing	O
+at	O
+a	O
+fast	O
+pace	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+data	O
+shows	O
+,	O
+on	O
+average	O
+,	O
+about	O
+three	O
+requests	O
+per	O
+hour	O
+to	O
+the	O
+drop	O
+host	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+request	O
+is	O
+only	O
+made	O
+upon	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+but	O
+there	O
+is	O
+no	O
+guarantee	O
+that	O
+it	O
+will	O
+be	O
+installed	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+data	O
+,	O
+when	O
+analyzed	O
+with	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+send	O
+SMSs	O
+that	O
+Talos	O
+received	O
+during	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+lead	O
+us	O
+to	O
+conclude	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+operator	O
+is	O
+aggressively	O
+spreading	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+but	O
+that	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+result	O
+in	O
+the	O
+same	O
+number	O
+of	O
+new	O
+infections	O
+.	O
+
+Examples	O
+of	O
+the	O
+overlays	O
+available	O
+to	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+Above	O
+,	O
+you	O
+can	O
+see	O
+examples	O
+of	O
+the	O
+injections	O
+that	O
+distributed	O
+to	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+as	O
+part	O
+of	O
+this	O
+specific	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+doing	O
+our	O
+investigation	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+packages	O
+with	O
+different	O
+names	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+these	O
+might	O
+have	O
+been	O
+used	O
+on	O
+old	O
+campaigns	O
+or	O
+were	O
+already	O
+prepared	O
+for	O
+new	O
+campaigns	O
+.	O
+
+MALWARE	O
+TECHNICAL	O
+DETAILS	O
+During	O
+our	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+researchers	O
+uncovered	O
+a	O
+malware	O
+known	O
+as	O
+"	O
+Gustuff.	B-Malware
+''	O
+.	O
+
+Given	O
+the	O
+lack	O
+of	O
+indicators	O
+of	O
+compromise	O
+,	O
+we	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+check	O
+to	O
+see	O
+if	O
+this	O
+was	O
+the	O
+same	O
+malware	O
+we	O
+had	O
+been	O
+researching	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+Threat	O
+Intelligence	O
+and	O
+Interdiction	O
+team	O
+found	O
+the	O
+Gustuff	B-Malware
+malware	O
+being	O
+advertised	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Exploit.in	B-Indicator
+forum	O
+as	O
+a	O
+botnet	O
+for	O
+rent	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+seller	O
+,	O
+known	O
+as	O
+"	O
+bestoffer	O
+,	O
+''	O
+was	O
+,	O
+at	O
+some	O
+point	O
+,	O
+expelled	O
+from	O
+the	O
+forum	O
+.	O
+
+Gustuff	B-Malware
+advertising	O
+screenshot	O
+The	O
+companies	O
+advertised	O
+in	O
+the	O
+image	O
+above	O
+were	O
+from	O
+Australia	O
+,	O
+which	O
+matches	O
+up	O
+with	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+we	O
+researched	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+screenshots	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+the	O
+author	O
+align	O
+with	O
+the	O
+advertised	O
+features	O
+and	O
+the	O
+features	O
+that	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+while	O
+doing	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+.	O
+
+Admin	O
+panel	O
+The	O
+administration	O
+panel	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+configuration	O
+,	O
+which	O
+matches	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+Country	O
+selection	O
+The	O
+administration	O
+console	O
+screenshots	O
+also	O
+show	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+filter	O
+the	O
+results	O
+by	O
+country	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+"	O
+AU	O
+''	O
+is	I-Organization
+the	O
+code	O
+shown	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+Australia	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+this	O
+information	O
+,	O
+Talos	B-Organization
+assesses	O
+with	O
+high	O
+confidence	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+and	O
+this	O
+is	O
+,	O
+in	O
+fact	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Gustuff	B-Malware
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Design	O
+In	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+requests	O
+a	O
+large	O
+number	O
+of	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+it	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+request	O
+permissions	O
+like	O
+BIND_ADMIN	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+perform	O
+some	O
+of	O
+its	O
+activities	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+does	O
+not	O
+need	O
+high	O
+privileges	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+as	O
+we	O
+will	O
+explain	O
+ahead	O
+.	O
+
+Permissions	O
+in	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+This	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+detection	O
+and	O
+analysis	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+several	O
+protections	O
+in	O
+place	O
+,	O
+both	O
+in	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+and	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+'s	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+is	O
+not	O
+only	O
+obfuscated	O
+but	O
+also	O
+packed	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+packer	O
+,	O
+besides	O
+making	O
+the	O
+static	O
+analysis	O
+more	O
+complex	O
+,	O
+will	O
+break	O
+the	O
+standard	O
+debugger	O
+.	O
+
+Manifest	O
+activity	O
+declaration	O
+Class	O
+list	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+dex	O
+file	O
+The	O
+main	O
+malware	O
+classes	O
+are	O
+packed	O
+,	O
+to	O
+a	O
+point	O
+where	O
+the	O
+class	O
+defined	O
+in	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+has	O
+a	O
+handler	O
+for	O
+the	O
+MAIN	O
+category	O
+that	O
+does	O
+not	O
+exist	O
+in	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+Error	O
+when	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+debug	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+using	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+Studio	I-System
+IDE	I-System
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+side	O
+effects	O
+of	O
+this	O
+packer	O
+is	O
+the	O
+inability	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+Studio	I-System
+IDE	I-System
+to	O
+debug	O
+the	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+happens	O
+because	O
+the	O
+IDE	O
+executes	O
+the	O
+code	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+debug	I-System
+bridge	I-System
+(	O
+ADB	O
+)	O
+by	O
+calling	O
+the	O
+activity	O
+declared	O
+in	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+by	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+the	O
+class	O
+does	O
+not	O
+exist	O
+at	O
+startup	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+does	O
+not	O
+run	O
+on	O
+the	O
+debugger	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+Talos	B-Malware
+analyzed	O
+the	O
+unpacked	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+the	O
+packer	O
+analysis	O
+is	O
+beyond	O
+the	O
+scope	O
+of	O
+this	O
+post	O
+.	O
+
+Check	O
+code	O
+for	O
+emulators	O
+As	O
+part	O
+of	O
+its	O
+defense	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+payload	O
+first	O
+checks	O
+for	O
+emulators	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+analysis	O
+on	O
+sandboxes	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+checks	O
+for	O
+different	O
+kinds	O
+of	O
+emulators	O
+,	O
+including	O
+QEMU	B-System
+,	O
+Genymotion	B-System
+,	O
+BlueStacks	B-System
+and	O
+Bignox	B-System
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+determines	O
+that	O
+is	O
+not	O
+running	O
+on	O
+an	O
+emulator	O
+,	O
+it	O
+then	O
+performs	O
+additional	O
+checks	O
+to	O
+ensure	O
+that	O
+it	O
+wo	O
+n't	O
+be	O
+detected	O
+.	O
+
+Code	O
+to	O
+check	O
+the	O
+existence	O
+of	O
+SafetyNet	O
+Google	B-System
+API	I-System
+It	O
+also	O
+checks	O
+if	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+SafetyNet	O
+is	O
+active	O
+and	O
+reporting	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+helps	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+define	O
+what	O
+actions	O
+it	O
+can	O
+do	O
+before	O
+being	O
+detected	O
+on	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+List	O
+of	O
+anti-virus	O
+packages	O
+that	O
+are	O
+checked	O
+The	O
+payload	O
+goes	O
+a	O
+long	O
+way	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+itself	O
+and	O
+checks	O
+for	O
+anti-virus	O
+software	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+trojan	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+Accessibility	I-System
+API	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+all	O
+interactions	O
+between	O
+the	O
+user	O
+and	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Android	B-System
+developer	O
+documentation	O
+describes	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+event	O
+class	O
+as	O
+a	O
+class	O
+that	O
+"	O
+represents	O
+accessibility	O
+events	O
+that	O
+are	O
+seen	O
+by	O
+the	O
+system	O
+when	O
+something	O
+notable	O
+happens	O
+in	O
+the	O
+user	O
+interface	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+when	O
+a	O
+button	O
+is	O
+clicked	O
+,	O
+a	O
+view	O
+is	O
+focused	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+For	O
+each	O
+interaction	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+will	O
+check	O
+if	O
+the	O
+generator	O
+is	O
+a	O
+package	O
+that	O
+belongs	O
+to	O
+the	O
+anti-virus	O
+list	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+will	O
+abuse	O
+another	O
+feature	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Accessibility	B-System
+API	I-System
+.	O
+
+There	O
+is	O
+a	O
+function	O
+called	O
+"	O
+performGlobalAction	O
+''	O
+with	O
+the	O
+description	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+documentation	O
+describes	O
+that	O
+function	O
+as	O
+"	O
+a	O
+global	O
+action	O
+.	O
+
+Such	O
+an	O
+action	O
+can	O
+be	O
+performed	O
+at	O
+any	O
+moment	O
+,	O
+regardless	O
+of	O
+the	O
+current	O
+application	O
+or	O
+user	O
+location	O
+in	O
+that	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+going	O
+back	O
+,	O
+going	O
+home	O
+,	O
+opening	O
+recents	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+The	O
+trojan	O
+calls	O
+this	O
+function	O
+with	O
+the	O
+action	O
+GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK	O
+,	O
+which	O
+equals	O
+the	O
+pressing	O
+of	O
+the	O
+back	O
+button	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+thus	O
+canceling	O
+the	O
+opening	O
+of	O
+the	O
+anti-virus	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+same	O
+event	O
+interception	O
+is	O
+used	O
+to	O
+place	O
+the	O
+webview	O
+overlay	O
+when	O
+the	O
+user	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+allowing	O
+it	O
+to	O
+display	O
+its	O
+overlay	O
+,	O
+thus	O
+intercepting	O
+the	O
+credentials	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+beaconing	O
+only	O
+starts	O
+after	O
+the	O
+application	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+and	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+running	O
+tasks	O
+.	O
+
+Beaconing	O
+information	O
+The	O
+ID	O
+is	O
+generated	O
+for	O
+each	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+token	O
+remains	O
+unique	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+checks	O
+performed	O
+previously	O
+are	O
+immediately	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+,	O
+like	O
+the	O
+safetyNet	O
+,	O
+admin	O
+and	O
+defaultSMSApp	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+beaconing	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//	I-Indicator
+/api/v2/get.php	I-Indicator
+with	O
+an	O
+interval	O
+of	O
+60	O
+seconds	O
+.	O
+
+Answer	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+The	O
+C2	O
+will	O
+check	O
+the	O
+country	O
+field	O
+,	O
+if	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+empty	O
+or	O
+if	O
+the	O
+country	O
+is	O
+not	O
+targeted	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+reply	O
+with	O
+a	O
+"	O
+Unauthorized	O
+''	O
+answer	O
+.	O
+
+Otherwise	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+return	O
+a	O
+JSON	O
+encoded	O
+"	O
+OK	O
+,	O
+''	O
+and	O
+if	O
+that	O
+is	O
+the	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+command	O
+to	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+.	O
+
+List	O
+of	O
+available	O
+commands	O
+The	O
+command	O
+names	O
+are	O
+self-explanatory	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+command	O
+will	O
+be	O
+issued	O
+as	O
+an	O
+answer	O
+to	O
+the	O
+beaconing	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+result	O
+will	O
+be	O
+returned	O
+to	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//	I-Indicator
+/api/v2/set_state.php	I-Indicator
+Example	O
+of	O
+the	O
+command	O
+"	O
+changeServer	O
+''	O
+The	O
+commands	O
+are	O
+issued	O
+in	O
+a	O
+JSON	O
+format	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+obfuscation	O
+is	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+code	O
+and	O
+not	O
+added	O
+by	O
+the	O
+packer	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+obfuscation	O
+partly	O
+based	O
+on	O
+base85	B-Indicator
+encoding	I-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+in	O
+itself	O
+unusual	O
+,	O
+in	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Base85	B-Indicator
+encoding	I-Indicator
+is	O
+usually	O
+used	O
+on	O
+pdf	O
+and	O
+postscript	O
+documentsThe	O
+configuration	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+custom	O
+preferences	O
+files	O
+,	O
+using	O
+the	O
+same	O
+obfuscation	O
+scheme	O
+.	O
+
+Activation	O
+cycle	O
+As	O
+we	O
+have	O
+explained	O
+above	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+several	O
+defence	O
+mechanisms	O
+.	O
+
+Beside	O
+the	O
+obfuscation	O
+and	O
+the	O
+environment	O
+checks	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+also	O
+has	O
+some	O
+interesting	O
+anti-sandbox	O
+mechanisms	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+user	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+run	O
+the	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+user	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+press	O
+the	O
+"	O
+close	O
+''	O
+button	O
+to	O
+finish	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+this	O
+wo	O
+n't	O
+close	O
+the	O
+application	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+send	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+background	O
+,	O
+instead	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+the	O
+application	O
+is	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+,	O
+although	O
+the	O
+service	O
+is	O
+already	O
+running	O
+,	O
+the	O
+beaconing	O
+will	O
+not	O
+start	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+beaconing	O
+will	O
+only	O
+start	O
+after	O
+the	O
+application	O
+is	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+background	O
+,	O
+ultimately	O
+stopping	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+will	O
+be	O
+the	O
+trigger	O
+for	O
+the	O
+service	O
+to	O
+start	O
+the	O
+beaconing	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+previously	O
+,	O
+the	O
+beaconing	O
+is	O
+done	O
+every	O
+60	O
+seconds	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+no	O
+command	O
+is	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+until	O
+the	O
+inactiveTime	O
+field	O
+(	O
+see	O
+beaconing	O
+information	O
+image	O
+above	O
+)	O
+has	O
+at	O
+least	O
+the	O
+value	O
+of	O
+2000000	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+time	O
+resets	O
+every	O
+time	O
+the	O
+user	O
+performs	O
+some	O
+activity	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+checks	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+becomes	O
+active	O
+,	O
+but	O
+first	O
+,	O
+it	O
+goes	O
+through	O
+seven	O
+steps	O
+,	O
+each	O
+one	O
+calling	O
+a	O
+different	O
+command	O
+:	O
+uploadPhoneNumbers	O
+:	O
+Exfiltrates	O
+all	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+that	O
+are	O
+in	O
+the	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+Aside	O
+from	O
+the	O
+natural	O
+value	O
+of	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+names	O
+of	O
+their	O
+owners	O
+.	O
+
+Using	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+has	O
+an	O
+initial	O
+infection	O
+vector	O
+is	O
+another	O
+possibility	O
+for	O
+the	O
+exfiltration	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+purposes	O
+of	O
+the	O
+exfiltration	O
+of	O
+the	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+is	O
+to	O
+use	O
+them	O
+to	O
+attack	O
+other	O
+victims	O
+using	O
+SMS	O
+as	O
+an	O
+initial	O
+vector	O
+.	O
+
+checkApps	O
+:	O
+Asks	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+see	O
+if	O
+the	O
+packages	O
+sent	O
+as	O
+parameters	O
+are	O
+installed	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+209	O
+packages	O
+hardcoded	O
+in	O
+its	O
+source	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+can	O
+send	O
+an	O
+updated	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+List	O
+of	O
+packages	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+adminNumber	O
+:	O
+Setup	O
+of	O
+the	O
+admin	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+our	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+administrator	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+belongs	O
+to	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+network	O
+in	O
+Australia	O
+.	O
+
+Phone	O
+number	O
+for	O
+administration	O
+changeServer	O
+:	O
+At	O
+this	O
+point	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+changes	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+to	O
+a	O
+new	O
+host	O
+,	O
+even	O
+though	O
+the	O
+API	O
+and	O
+communication	O
+protocol	O
+continues	O
+to	O
+be	O
+the	O
+same	O
+.	O
+
+Change	O
+server	O
+request	O
+The	O
+URL	O
+'s	O
+for	O
+the	O
+new	O
+server	O
+is	O
+obfuscated	O
+,	O
+preventing	O
+easy	O
+network	O
+identification	O
+.	O
+
+changeActivity	O
+:	O
+This	O
+command	O
+will	O
+set	O
+up	O
+the	O
+webview	O
+to	O
+overlay	O
+any	O
+of	O
+the	O
+target	O
+activities	O
+.	O
+
+changeActivity	O
+command	O
+The	O
+webview	O
+injects	O
+are	O
+not	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+,	O
+they	O
+are	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+a	O
+completely	O
+different	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+params	O
+:	O
+This	O
+command	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+operator	O
+to	O
+change	O
+configuration	O
+parameters	O
+in	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+this	O
+stage	O
+of	O
+the	O
+activation	O
+cycle	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+increases	O
+the	O
+beaconing	O
+time	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+detection	O
+.	O
+
+Command	O
+to	O
+change	O
+the	O
+beaconing	O
+changeArchive	O
+:	O
+The	O
+final	O
+command	O
+of	O
+the	O
+activation	O
+cycle	O
+is	O
+the	O
+download	O
+of	O
+an	O
+archive	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+archive	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+same	O
+host	O
+has	O
+the	O
+webviews	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+archive	O
+is	O
+a	O
+ZIP	O
+containing	O
+several	O
+files	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+protected	O
+with	O
+a	O
+password	O
+.	O
+
+Change	O
+archive	O
+command	O
+After	O
+this	O
+activation	O
+cycle	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+will	O
+start	O
+the	O
+collection	O
+of	O
+information	O
+activities	O
+and	O
+dissemination	O
+.	O
+
+Malicious	O
+activity	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+activation	O
+cycle	O
+ends	O
+,	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+will	O
+start	O
+its	O
+malicious	O
+activities	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+activities	O
+depend	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+configuration	O
+.	O
+
+Depending	O
+if	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+has	O
+any	O
+of	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+the	O
+anti-virus	O
+installed	O
+or	O
+geographic	O
+location	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+harvest	O
+credentials	O
+from	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+exfiltrate	O
+all	O
+personal	O
+information	O
+or	O
+simply	O
+use	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+device	O
+to	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+to	O
+spread	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+deploys	O
+overlaying	O
+webviews	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+the	O
+user	O
+and	O
+eventually	O
+steal	O
+their	O
+login	O
+credentials	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+are	O
+adapted	O
+to	O
+the	O
+information	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+operator	O
+wants	O
+to	O
+retrieve	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+webview	O
+overlay	O
+is	O
+created	O
+on	O
+step	O
+6	O
+of	O
+the	O
+activation	O
+cycle	O
+.	O
+
+Pin	O
+request	O
+overlay	O
+This	O
+overlay	O
+asks	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+their	O
+PIN	O
+to	O
+unlock	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+immediately	O
+exfiltrated	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+last	O
+step	O
+of	O
+the	O
+activation	O
+cycle	O
+is	O
+the	O
+download	O
+of	O
+a	O
+password-protected	O
+ZIP	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+file	O
+contains	O
+all	O
+HTML	O
+,	O
+CSS	O
+and	O
+PNG	O
+files	O
+necessary	O
+to	O
+create	O
+overlays	O
+.	O
+
+Talos	O
+found	O
+189	O
+logos	O
+from	O
+banks	O
+to	O
+cryptocurrency	O
+exchanges	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+archive	O
+,	O
+all	O
+of	O
+which	O
+could	O
+be	O
+targeted	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+archive	O
+also	O
+contained	O
+all	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+codes	O
+to	O
+target	O
+Australian	O
+financial	O
+institutions	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+overlays	O
+are	O
+activated	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+operator	O
+using	O
+the	O
+command	O
+changeActivity	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+on	O
+step	O
+5	O
+of	O
+the	O
+activation	O
+cycle	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+that	O
+the	O
+HTML	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+infrastructure	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+since	O
+the	O
+archive	O
+that	O
+is	O
+downloaded	O
+into	O
+the	O
+device	O
+has	O
+all	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+information	O
+and	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+actor	O
+has	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+device	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+operator	O
+can	O
+keep	O
+its	O
+activity	O
+even	O
+without	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+infrastructure	O
+.	O
+
+Infrastructure	O
+The	O
+infrastructure	O
+supporting	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+rather	O
+complex	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+clear	O
+that	O
+on	O
+all	O
+stages	O
+there	O
+are	O
+at	O
+least	O
+two	O
+layers	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+infrastructure	O
+has	O
+several	O
+layers	O
+,	O
+although	O
+not	O
+being	O
+very	O
+dynamic	O
+,	O
+still	O
+has	O
+several	O
+layers	O
+each	O
+one	O
+providing	O
+some	O
+level	O
+of	O
+protection	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+the	O
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+belong	O
+to	O
+the	O
+same	O
+company	O
+Hetzner	B-Organization
+,	O
+an	O
+IP-hosting	O
+firm	O
+in	O
+Germany	O
+.	O
+
+COVERAGE	O
+Cisco	B-Organization
+Cloud	B-System
+Web	I-System
+Security	I-System
+(	O
+CWS	O
+)	O
+or	O
+Web	B-System
+Security	I-System
+Appliance	I-System
+(	O
+WSA	O
+)	O
+web	O
+scanning	O
+prevents	O
+access	O
+to	O
+malicious	O
+websites	O
+and	O
+detects	O
+malware	O
+used	O
+in	O
+these	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+Email	O
+Security	O
+can	O
+block	O
+malicious	O
+emails	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+as	O
+part	O
+of	O
+their	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+Network	O
+Security	O
+appliances	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Next-Generation	B-System
+Firewall	I-System
+(	O
+NGFW	O
+)	O
+,	O
+Next-Generation	B-System
+Intrusion	I-System
+Prevention	I-System
+System	I-System
+(	O
+NGIPS	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Meraki	B-System
+MX	I-System
+can	O
+detect	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+AMP	O
+Threat	O
+Grid	O
+helps	O
+identify	O
+malicious	O
+binaries	O
+and	O
+build	O
+protection	O
+into	O
+all	O
+Cisco	B-Organization
+Security	O
+products	O
+.	O
+
+Umbrella	O
+,	O
+our	O
+secure	O
+internet	O
+gateway	O
+(	O
+SIG	O
+)	O
+,	O
+blocks	O
+users	O
+from	O
+connecting	O
+to	O
+malicious	O
+domains	O
+,	O
+IPs	O
+,	O
+and	O
+URLs	O
+,	O
+whether	O
+users	O
+are	O
+on	O
+or	O
+off	O
+the	O
+corporate	O
+network	O
+.	O
+
+Open	O
+Source	O
+SNORTⓇ	O
+Subscriber	O
+Rule	O
+Set	O
+customers	O
+can	O
+stay	O
+up	O
+to	O
+date	O
+by	O
+downloading	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+rule	O
+pack	O
+available	O
+for	O
+purchase	O
+on	O
+Snort.org	O
+.	O
+
+INDICATORS	O
+OF	O
+COMPROMISE	O
+(	O
+IOCS	O
+)	O
+Domains	O
+Facebook-photos-au.su	O
+Homevideo2-12l.ml	B-Indicator
+videohosting1-5j.gq	B-Indicator
+URLs	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//88.99.227	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+26/html2/2018/GrafKey/new-inj-135-3-dark.html	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//88.99.227	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+26/html2/arc92/au483x.zip	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//94.130.106	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+117:8080/api/v1/report/records.php	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//88.99.227	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+26/html2/new-inj-135-3-white.html	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//facebook-photos-au	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+su/ChristinaMorrow	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//homevideo2-12l	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ml/mms3/download_3.php	I-Indicator
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+78.46.201.36	B-Indicator
+88.99.170.84	B-Indicator
+88.99.227.26	B-Indicator
+94.130.106.117	B-Indicator
+88.99.174.200	B-Indicator
+88.99.189.31	B-Indicator
+Hash	O
+369fcf48c1eb982088c22f86672add10cae967af82613bee6fb8a3669603dc48	B-Indicator
+b2d4fcf03c7a8bf135fbd3073bea450e2e6661ad8ef2ab2058a3c04f81fc3f3e	B-Indicator
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+8f5d5d8419a4832d175a6028c9e7d445f1e99fdc12170db257df79831c69ae4e	B-Indicator
+a5ebcdaf5fd10ec9de85d62e48cc97a4e08c699a7ebdeab0351b86ab1370557d	B-Indicator
+84578b9b2c3cc1c7bbfcf4038a6c76ae91dfc82eef5e4c6815627eaf6b4ae6f6	B-Indicator
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+89eecd91dff4bf42bebbf3aa85aa512ddf661d3e9de4c91196c98f4fc325a018	B-Indicator
+9edee3f3d539e3ade61ac2956a6900d93ba3b535b6a76b3a9ee81e2251e25c61	B-Indicator
+0e48e5dbc3a60910c1460b382d28e087a580f38f57d3f82d4564309346069bd1	B-Indicator
+c113cdd2a5e164dcba157fc4e6026495a1cfbcb0b1a8bf3e38e7eddbb316e01f	B-Indicator
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+1819d2546d9c9580193827c0d2f5aad7e7f2856f7d5e6d40fd739b6cecdb1e9e	B-Indicator
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+0246dd4acd9f64ff1508131c57a7b29e995e102c74477d5624e1271700ecb0e2	B-Indicator
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+88034e0eddfdb6297670d28ed810aef87679e9492e9b3e782cc14d9d1a55db84	B-Indicator
+e08f08f4fa75609731c6dd597dc55c8f95dbdd5725a6a90a9f80134832a07f2e	B-Indicator
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+6bdfb79f813448b7f1b4f4dbe6a45d1938f3039c93ecf80318cedd1090f7e341	B-Indicator
+ADDITIONAL	O
+INFORMATION	O
+Packages	O
+monitored	O
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+com.morganstanley.clientmobile.prod	B-Indicator
+com.wf.wellsfargomobile	B-Indicator
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+
+com.schwab.mobile	B-Indicator
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+com.grppl.android.shell.BOS	B-Indicator
+com.tdbank	B-Indicator
+com.huntington.m	B-Indicator
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+com.usbank.mobilebanking	B-Indicator
+com.ally.MobileBanking	B-Indicator
+com.key.android	B-Indicator
+com.unionbank.ecommerce.mobile.android	B-Indicator
+com.mfoundry.mb.android.mb_BMOH071025661	B-Indicator
+
+com.bbt.cmol	B-Indicator
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+com.mtb.mbanking.sc.retail.prod	B-Indicator
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+org.westpac.bank	B-Indicator
+org.stgeorge.bank	B-Indicator
+au.com.nab.mobile	B-Indicator
+au.com.bankwest.mobile	B-Indicator
+au.com.ingdirect.android	B-Indicator
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+com.anz.android	B-Indicator
+com.anz.android.gomoney	B-Indicator
+com.citibank.mobile.au	B-Indicator
+org.bom.bank	B-Indicator
+com.latuabancaperandroid	B-Indicator
+
+com.comarch.mobile	B-Indicator
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+pl.eurobank2	B-Indicator
+pl.noblebank.mobile	B-Indicator
+com.getingroup.mobilebanking	B-Indicator
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+eu.eleader.mobilebanking.pekao	B-Indicator
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+dk.jyskebank.mobilbank	B-Indicator
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+com.mbmobile	B-Indicator
+
+com.db.mobilebanking	B-Indicator
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+cy.com.netinfo.netteller.boc	B-Indicator
+ge.mobility.basisbank	B-Indicator
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+
+com.lcode.apgvb	B-Indicator
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+com.bmm.mobilebankingapp	B-Indicator
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+
+de.dkb.portalapp	B-Indicator
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+pl.com.suntech.mobileconnect	B-Indicator
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+com.advantage.RaiffeisenBank	B-Indicator
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+
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+
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+com.hashengineering.bitcoincash.wallet	B-Indicator
+bcc.org.freewallet.app	B-Indicator
+com.coinspace.app	B-Indicator
+btg.org.freewallet.app	B-Indicator
+net.bither	B-Indicator
+
+co.edgesecure.app	B-Indicator
+com.arcbit.arcbit	B-Indicator
+distributedlab.wallet	B-Indicator
+de.schildbach.wallet_test	B-Indicator
+com.aegiswallet	B-Indicator
+com.plutus.wallet	B-Indicator
+com.coincorner.app.crypt	B-Indicator
+eth.org.freewallet.app	B-Indicator
+secret.access	B-Indicator
+secret.pattern	B-Indicator
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+:	O
+The	O
+Latest	O
+Family	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+Malware	O
+Attacking	O
+Users	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+Via	O
+SMS	O
+Phishing	O
+April	O
+26	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+Introduction	O
+Recently	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+an	O
+Android	B-Malware
+malware	O
+family	O
+being	O
+used	O
+to	O
+attack	O
+users	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+samples	O
+were	O
+mainly	O
+distributed	O
+through	O
+a	O
+series	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+subdomains	O
+registered	O
+under	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+domain	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+a	O
+well-known	O
+shared	O
+hosting	O
+service	O
+provider	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+Because	O
+all	O
+the	O
+URLs	O
+used	O
+in	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+have	O
+the	O
+form	O
+of	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//yyyyyyyy	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+XXXX.ru/mms.apk	I-Indicator
+(	O
+where	O
+XXXX.ru	B-Indicator
+represents	O
+the	O
+hosting	O
+provider	O
+’	O
+s	O
+domain	O
+)	O
+,	O
+we	O
+named	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+family	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+To	O
+lure	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+use	O
+SMS	O
+phishing	O
+–	O
+sending	O
+a	O
+short	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+URL	O
+to	O
+the	O
+potential	O
+victims	O
+.	O
+
+Unwary	O
+users	O
+who	O
+click	O
+the	O
+seemingly	O
+innocuous	O
+link	O
+will	O
+have	O
+their	O
+device	O
+infected	O
+with	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+1	O
+describes	O
+this	O
+infection	O
+process	O
+and	O
+the	O
+main	O
+behaviors	O
+of	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+On	O
+April	O
+3	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+we	O
+still	O
+observed	O
+new	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+emerging	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+earliest	O
+identified	O
+sample	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+can	O
+be	O
+traced	O
+back	O
+to	O
+Jan.	O
+18	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+Within	O
+this	O
+time	O
+period	O
+,	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+close	O
+to	O
+300	O
+samples	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+this	O
+family	O
+(	O
+all	O
+sample	O
+hashes	O
+are	O
+listed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Appendix	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+landing	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+phone	O
+,	O
+the	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+apps	O
+will	O
+request	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+remove	O
+their	O
+icons	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+themselves	O
+from	O
+users	O
+,	O
+and	O
+remain	O
+running	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+a	O
+series	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+behaviors	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+far	O
+we	O
+have	O
+identified	O
+the	O
+following	O
+behaviors	O
+:	O
+Sending	O
+device	O
+information	O
+to	O
+a	O
+remote	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+(	O
+C2	O
+)	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Contacting	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+for	O
+instructions	O
+.	O
+
+Sending	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+financial	O
+institutions	O
+to	O
+query	O
+account	O
+balances	O
+.	O
+
+Uploading	O
+any	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+(	O
+including	O
+the	O
+balance	O
+inquiry	O
+results	O
+)	O
+to	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Sending	O
+C2-specified	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+in	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+contacts	O
+.	O
+
+Forward	O
+incoming	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+voice-based	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+.	O
+
+Each	O
+of	O
+these	O
+behaviors	O
+is	O
+under	O
+the	O
+control	O
+of	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+other	O
+words	O
+,	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+can	O
+specify	O
+the	O
+message	O
+contents	O
+to	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+,	O
+the	O
+time	O
+period	O
+in	O
+which	O
+to	O
+forward	O
+the	O
+voice	O
+call	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+recipients	O
+of	O
+outgoing	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+part	O
+of	O
+our	O
+investigation	O
+into	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+we	O
+emulated	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+the	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+one	O
+session	O
+,	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+commanded	O
+our	O
+emulated	O
+device	O
+to	O
+send	O
+four	O
+different	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+four	O
+different	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+,	O
+all	O
+of	O
+which	O
+were	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+Russian	O
+financial	O
+institutions	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+least	O
+three	O
+of	O
+the	O
+messages	O
+were	O
+intended	O
+to	O
+check	O
+a	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+account	O
+balance	O
+at	O
+the	O
+institution	O
+(	O
+we	O
+could	O
+not	O
+confirm	O
+the	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+the	O
+fourth	O
+)	O
+.Through	O
+additional	O
+research	O
+,	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+several	O
+forum	O
+posts	O
+where	O
+victims	O
+complained	O
+of	O
+funds	O
+(	O
+up	O
+to	O
+600	O
+rubles	O
+)	O
+were	O
+transferred	O
+out	O
+of	O
+their	O
+accounts	O
+after	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+infected	O
+their	O
+phones	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+do	O
+not	O
+know	O
+exactly	O
+how	O
+many	O
+people	O
+have	O
+been	O
+infected	O
+with	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+our	O
+data	O
+suggests	O
+that	O
+there	O
+have	O
+been	O
+at	O
+least	O
+2,729	O
+infections	O
+between	O
+January	O
+2016	O
+and	O
+early	O
+April	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+with	O
+a	O
+peak	O
+in	O
+March	O
+of	O
+more	O
+than	O
+1,100	O
+infections	O
+.	O
+
+Smishing	O
+:	O
+The	O
+Major	O
+Way	O
+To	O
+Distribute	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+We	O
+have	O
+not	O
+observed	O
+any	O
+instances	O
+of	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+or	O
+other	O
+online	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+Smishing	O
+(	O
+SMS	O
+phishing	O
+)	O
+is	O
+currently	O
+the	O
+primary	O
+way	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+are	O
+distributing	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+process	O
+starts	O
+when	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+phishing	O
+message	O
+arrives	O
+at	O
+a	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+phone	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+example	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+is	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+1	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+message	O
+translates	O
+roughly	O
+to	O
+“	O
+You	O
+got	O
+a	O
+photo	O
+in	O
+MMS	O
+format	O
+:	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//yyyyyyyy.XXXX.ru/mms.apk.	I-Indicator
+”	O
+So	O
+far	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+seven	O
+different	O
+URLs	O
+being	O
+used	O
+to	O
+spread	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+the	O
+URLs	O
+reference	O
+the	O
+file	O
+“	O
+mms.apk	B-Indicator
+”	O
+and	O
+all	O
+use	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+“	O
+XXXX.ru	B-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+which	O
+belongs	O
+to	O
+a	O
+top	O
+five	O
+shared	O
+hosting	O
+platform	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+(	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+itself	O
+has	O
+been	O
+obfuscated	O
+to	O
+anonymize	O
+the	O
+provider	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+registered	O
+at	O
+least	O
+seven	O
+subdomains	O
+through	O
+the	O
+hosting	O
+provider	O
+,	O
+each	O
+consisting	O
+of	O
+eight	O
+random-looking	O
+characters	O
+(	O
+asdfgjcr	B-Indicator
+,	O
+cacama18	B-Indicator
+,	O
+cacamadf	B-Indicator
+,	O
+konkonq2	B-Indicator
+,	O
+mmsmtsh5	B-Indicator
+,	O
+riveroer	B-Indicator
+,	O
+and	O
+sdfkjhl2	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+)	O
+As	O
+of	O
+this	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+no	O
+files	O
+were	O
+hosted	O
+at	O
+any	O
+of	O
+the	O
+links	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+have	O
+abandoned	O
+these	O
+URLs	O
+and	O
+might	O
+be	O
+looking	O
+into	O
+other	O
+ways	O
+to	O
+reach	O
+more	O
+victims	O
+.	O
+
+Use	O
+of	O
+a	O
+shared	O
+hosting	O
+service	O
+to	O
+distribute	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+highly	O
+flexible	O
+and	O
+low	O
+cost	O
+for	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+also	O
+much	O
+harder	O
+for	O
+network	O
+defenders	O
+or	O
+researchers	O
+to	O
+track	O
+a	O
+campaign	O
+where	O
+the	O
+infrastructure	O
+is	O
+a	O
+moving	O
+target	O
+.	O
+
+Many	O
+top	O
+providers	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+offer	O
+cheap	O
+prices	O
+for	O
+their	O
+shared	O
+hosting	O
+services	O
+,	O
+and	O
+some	O
+even	O
+provide	O
+free	O
+30-day	O
+trial	O
+periods	O
+.	O
+
+Threat	O
+actors	O
+can	O
+register	O
+subdomains	O
+through	O
+the	O
+hosting	O
+provider	O
+and	O
+use	O
+the	O
+provider	O
+’	O
+s	O
+services	O
+for	O
+a	O
+short-period	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+few	O
+days	O
+later	O
+they	O
+can	O
+cancel	O
+the	O
+trial	O
+and	O
+do	O
+not	O
+need	O
+to	O
+pay	O
+a	O
+penny	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+these	O
+out-of-the-box	O
+hosting	O
+services	O
+usually	O
+provide	O
+better	O
+infrastructure	O
+than	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+could	O
+manage	O
+to	O
+construct	O
+(	O
+or	O
+compromise	O
+)	O
+themselves	O
+.	O
+
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+Code	O
+Analysis	O
+All	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+share	O
+the	O
+same	O
+behaviors	O
+,	O
+major	O
+parts	O
+of	O
+which	O
+are	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+1	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+underlying	O
+code	O
+can	O
+be	O
+quite	O
+different	O
+in	O
+that	O
+various	O
+obfuscation	O
+mechanisms	O
+were	O
+adopted	O
+to	O
+evade	O
+detection	O
+by	O
+anti-virus	O
+tools	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+used	O
+a	O
+sample	O
+app	O
+named	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew	B-Indicator
+”	O
+with	O
+an	O
+MD5	O
+of	O
+d8caad151e07025fdbf5f3c26e3ceaff	B-Indicator
+to	O
+analyze	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Several	O
+of	O
+the	O
+main	O
+components	O
+of	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+are	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+activity	O
+class	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.MainActivity	B-Indicator
+”	O
+executes	O
+when	O
+the	O
+app	O
+is	O
+started	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+first	O
+starts	O
+another	O
+activity	O
+defined	O
+in	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.Aa	B-Indicator
+”	O
+to	O
+request	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+and	O
+then	O
+calls	O
+the	O
+following	O
+API	O
+of	O
+“	O
+android.content.pm.PackageManager	B-Indicator
+”	O
+(	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+package	O
+manager	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+its	O
+own	O
+icon	O
+on	O
+the	O
+home	O
+screen	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+conceal	O
+the	O
+existence	O
+of	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+:	O
+At	O
+the	O
+same	O
+time	O
+,	O
+”	O
+org.starsizew.MainActivity	B-Indicator
+”	O
+will	O
+start	O
+the	O
+main	O
+service	O
+as	O
+defined	O
+in	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.Tb	B-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+and	O
+use	O
+a	O
+few	O
+mechanisms	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+the	O
+main	O
+service	O
+running	O
+continuously	O
+
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+class	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.Ac	B-Indicator
+”	O
+is	O
+designed	O
+for	O
+this	O
+purpose	O
+;	O
+its	O
+only	O
+task	O
+is	O
+to	O
+check	O
+if	O
+the	O
+main	O
+service	O
+is	O
+running	O
+,	O
+and	O
+restart	O
+the	O
+main	O
+service	O
+if	O
+the	O
+answer	O
+is	O
+no	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+class	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.Tb	B-Indicator
+”	O
+also	O
+has	O
+a	O
+self-monitoring	O
+mechanism	O
+to	O
+restart	O
+itself	O
+when	O
+its	O
+own	O
+onDestroy	O
+API	O
+is	O
+triggered	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+than	O
+that	O
+,	O
+its	O
+major	O
+functionality	O
+is	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+private	O
+device	O
+information	O
+,	O
+upload	O
+it	O
+to	O
+a	O
+remote	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+,	O
+and	O
+handle	O
+any	O
+commands	O
+as	O
+requested	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+those	O
+functions	O
+are	O
+implemented	O
+in	O
+asynchronous	O
+tasks	O
+by	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.i	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+class	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.Ma	B-Indicator
+”	O
+is	O
+registered	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+the	O
+arrival	O
+of	O
+which	O
+will	O
+trigger	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+system	O
+to	O
+call	O
+its	O
+“	O
+onReceive	O
+”	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+Its	O
+major	O
+functionality	O
+is	O
+also	O
+implemented	O
+through	O
+the	O
+call	O
+of	O
+the	O
+asynchronous	O
+task	O
+(	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.i	B-Indicator
+”	O
+)	O
+,	O
+including	O
+uploading	O
+the	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+and	O
+executing	O
+any	O
+commands	O
+as	O
+instructed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+attacker	O
+.	O
+
+C2	O
+Communication	O
+The	O
+C2	O
+communication	O
+includes	O
+two	O
+parts	O
+:	O
+sending	O
+information	O
+to	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+HTTP	O
+server	O
+and	O
+parsing	O
+the	O
+server	O
+’	O
+s	O
+response	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+any	O
+commands	O
+as	O
+instructed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+attackers	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+functionality	O
+for	O
+these	O
+two	O
+parts	O
+is	O
+implemented	O
+by	O
+doInBackground	O
+and	O
+onPostExecute	O
+respectively	O
+,	O
+two	O
+API	O
+methods	O
+of	O
+“	O
+android.os.AsyncTask	B-Indicator
+”	O
+as	O
+extended	O
+by	O
+class	O
+“	O
+org.starsizew.i	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+3	O
+.	O
+
+Method	O
+doInBackground	O
+:	O
+to	O
+send	O
+information	O
+to	O
+remote	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+As	O
+seen	O
+from	O
+the	O
+major	O
+code	O
+body	O
+of	O
+method	O
+doInBackground	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+3	O
+(	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+original	O
+classes	O
+and	O
+methods	O
+are	O
+renamed	O
+for	O
+easier	O
+understanding	O
+)	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+three	O
+calls	O
+to	O
+HttpPost	O
+with	O
+different	O
+contents	O
+as	O
+parameters	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+line	O
+5	O
+,	O
+local	O
+variable	O
+v4	O
+specifies	O
+the	O
+first	O
+parameter	O
+url	O
+,	O
+which	O
+can	O
+be	O
+changed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+later	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+URLs	O
+are	O
+all	O
+in	O
+the	O
+form	O
+of	O
+“	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//	I-Indicator
+$	I-Indicator
+C2.	I-Indicator
+$	I-Indicator
+SERVER.	I-Indicator
+$	I-Indicator
+IP/api/	I-Indicator
+?	I-Indicator
+
+id=	I-Indicator
+$	I-Indicator
+NUM	I-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+parameter	O
+is	O
+a	O
+constant	O
+string	O
+“	O
+POST	O
+”	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+third	O
+parameter	O
+is	O
+a	O
+series	O
+of	O
+key-value	O
+pairs	O
+to	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+,	O
+assembled	O
+at	O
+runtime	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+value	O
+of	O
+the	O
+first	O
+item	O
+,	O
+whose	O
+key	O
+is	O
+“	O
+method	O
+”	O
+(	O
+line	O
+7	O
+)	O
+,	O
+indicates	O
+the	O
+type	O
+of	O
+the	O
+contents	O
+:	O
+install	O
+,	O
+info	O
+and	O
+sms	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+type	O
+of	O
+content	O
+,	O
+starting	O
+with	O
+“	O
+method=install	O
+”	O
+,	O
+will	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+when	O
+the	O
+app	O
+is	O
+started	O
+for	O
+the	O
+first	O
+time	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+following	O
+device	O
+private	O
+information	O
+:	O
+Victim	O
+identifier	O
+Network	O
+operator	O
+Device	O
+model	O
+Device	O
+OS	O
+version	O
+Phone	O
+number	O
+Device	O
+identifier	O
+App	O
+version	O
+Country	O
+The	O
+second	O
+type	O
+of	O
+information	O
+will	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+periodically	O
+to	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+alive	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+only	O
+has	O
+two	O
+parts	O
+,	O
+the	O
+method	O
+indicated	O
+by	O
+word	O
+“	O
+info	O
+”	O
+and	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+identifier	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+third	O
+type	O
+of	O
+information	O
+will	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+when	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+intercepts	O
+any	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+balance	O
+inquiry	O
+results	O
+when	O
+it	O
+contacts	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+code	O
+of	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+financial	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Method	O
+onPostExecute	O
+parses	O
+the	O
+response	O
+from	O
+the	O
+above	O
+HTTP	O
+session	O
+and	O
+executes	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+attacker	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+seen	O
+from	O
+the	O
+code	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+,	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+supports	O
+right	O
+now	O
+include	O
+:	O
+install_true	O
+:	O
+to	O
+modify	O
+app	O
+preference	O
+to	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+received	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+status	O
+.	O
+
+sms_send	O
+:	O
+to	O
+send	O
+C2-specified	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+C2-specified	O
+recipients	O
+.	O
+
+sms_grab	O
+:	O
+to	O
+upload	O
+periodically	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+in	O
+the	O
+inbox	O
+to	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+delivery	O
+:	O
+to	O
+deliver	O
+specified	O
+text	O
+to	O
+all	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+contacts	O
+(	O
+SMS	O
+worming	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+call_number	O
+:	O
+to	O
+forward	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+voice	O
+based	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+.	O
+
+new_url	O
+:	O
+to	O
+change	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app	O
+preference	O
+.	O
+
+ussd	O
+:	O
+to	O
+call	O
+a	O
+C2-specified	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+5	O
+.	O
+
+Method	O
+onPostExecute	O
+:	O
+to	O
+handle	O
+instructions	O
+from	O
+remote	O
+C2	O
+Figure	O
+6	O
+shows	O
+an	O
+example	O
+response	O
+sent	O
+back	O
+from	O
+one	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Note	O
+that	O
+inside	O
+this	O
+single	O
+response	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+one	O
+“	O
+install_true	O
+”	O
+command	O
+,	O
+one	O
+“	O
+sms_grab	O
+”	O
+command	O
+and	O
+four	O
+“	O
+sms_send	O
+”	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+the	O
+four	O
+“	O
+sms_send	O
+”	O
+commands	O
+,	O
+the	O
+messages	O
+as	O
+specified	O
+in	O
+the	O
+key	O
+“	O
+text	O
+”	O
+will	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+immediately	O
+to	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+short	O
+numbers	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+analysis	O
+suggests	O
+that	O
+the	O
+four	O
+short	O
+numbers	O
+are	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+Russian	O
+financial	O
+institutions	O
+,	O
+presumably	O
+where	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+would	O
+be	O
+likely	O
+to	O
+have	O
+accounts	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+6	O
+.	O
+
+Example	O
+Response	O
+in	O
+JSON	O
+format	O
+In	O
+particular	O
+,	O
+short	O
+number	O
+“	O
++7494	O
+”	O
+is	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+a	O
+payment	O
+service	O
+provider	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+provider	O
+’	O
+s	O
+website	O
+described	O
+how	O
+the	O
+code	O
+7494	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+a	O
+series	O
+of	O
+payment-related	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+sending	O
+text	O
+“	O
+Balance	O
+”	O
+will	O
+trigger	O
+a	O
+response	O
+with	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+wallet	O
+balance	O
+.	O
+
+Sending	O
+text	O
+“	O
+confirm	O
+1	O
+”	O
+will	O
+include	O
+proof	O
+of	O
+payment	O
+.	O
+
+Sending	O
+text	O
+“	O
+call	O
+on	O
+”	O
+will	O
+activate	O
+the	O
+USSD	O
+payment	O
+confirmation	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+our	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+sending	O
+multiple	O
+“	O
+balance	O
+”	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+different	O
+institutions	O
+,	O
+presumably	O
+to	O
+query	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+financial	O
+account	O
+balances	O
+.	O
+
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+can	O
+upload	O
+responses	O
+to	O
+the	O
+balance	O
+inquiries	O
+(	O
+received	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+)	O
+to	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+,	O
+which	O
+can	O
+send	O
+back	O
+additional	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+to	O
+the	O
+provider	O
+’	O
+s	O
+payment	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+could	O
+include	O
+resetting	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+PIN	O
+,	O
+enabling	O
+or	O
+disabling	O
+various	O
+alerts	O
+and	O
+confirmations	O
+,	O
+and	O
+confirming	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+identity	O
+.	O
+
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+Samples	O
+,	O
+C2	O
+,	O
+Hosting	O
+Sites	O
+,	O
+Infections	O
+and	O
+Timeline	O
+In	O
+total	O
+we	O
+captured	O
+297	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+,	O
+all	O
+of	O
+which	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+contact	O
+an	O
+initial	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+that	O
+we	O
+extracted	O
+from	O
+the	O
+app	O
+package	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+7	O
+lists	O
+the	O
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+of	O
+these	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+,	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+apps	O
+that	O
+connect	O
+to	O
+each	O
+of	O
+them	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+example	O
+URL	O
+used	O
+as	O
+the	O
+first	O
+parameter	O
+of	O
+the	O
+HttpPost	O
+operation	O
+(	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+of	O
+Figure	O
+3	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+indicates	O
+that	O
+multiple	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+were	O
+used	O
+in	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+but	O
+one	O
+(	O
+37.1.207.31	B-Indicator
+)	O
+was	O
+the	O
+most	O
+heavily	O
+used	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+7	O
+.	O
+
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+and	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+Figure	O
+8	O
+shows	O
+how	O
+these	O
+samples	O
+,	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+and	O
+hosting	O
+websites	O
+are	O
+related	O
+to	O
+each	O
+other	O
+,	O
+including	O
+when	O
+they	O
+were	O
+compiled	O
+or	O
+observed	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+quadrant	O
+,	O
+the	O
+smaller	O
+boxes	O
+in	O
+blue-gray	O
+represent	O
+particular	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+the	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+family	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+bigger	O
+boxes	O
+in	O
+deep-blue	O
+represent	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+used	O
+by	O
+some	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+dotted	O
+arrows	O
+represent	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+by	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+app	O
+to	O
+send	O
+information	O
+and	O
+fetch	O
+instructions	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+figure	O
+we	O
+have	O
+11	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+,	O
+all	O
+of	O
+which	O
+were	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+the	O
+website	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+“	O
+y	O
+”	O
+axis	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+dates	O
+on	O
+the	O
+“	O
+x	O
+”	O
+axis	O
+show	O
+the	O
+dates	O
+when	O
+we	O
+first	O
+saw	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+figure	O
+demonstrates	O
+the	O
+following	O
+interesting	O
+information	O
+:	O
+The	O
+time	O
+range	O
+when	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+distributed	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+on	O
+those	O
+shared-hosting	O
+websites	O
+is	O
+from	O
+January	O
+2016	O
+to	O
+March	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+Threat	O
+actors	O
+used	O
+different	O
+websites	O
+to	O
+host	O
+different	O
+payloads	O
+at	O
+different	O
+times	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+“	O
+moving	O
+target	O
+”	O
+behavior	O
+made	O
+it	O
+harder	O
+to	O
+track	O
+their	O
+actions	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+same	O
+websites	O
+have	O
+hosted	O
+different	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+at	O
+different	O
+dates	O
+.	O
+
+C2	O
+servers	O
+are	O
+shared	O
+by	O
+multiple	O
+samples	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+matches	O
+our	O
+observations	O
+of	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+7	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+8	O
+.	O
+
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+,	O
+hosting	O
+sites	O
+,	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+from	O
+Jan.	O
+2016	O
+to	O
+Mar	O
+.	O
+
+2016	O
+We	O
+do	O
+not	O
+know	O
+exactly	O
+how	O
+many	O
+people	O
+have	O
+been	O
+infected	O
+with	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+malware	O
+;	O
+however	O
+,	O
+our	O
+data	O
+suggests	O
+that	O
+there	O
+are	O
+at	O
+least	O
+2,729	O
+infections	O
+with	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+from	O
+January	O
+2016	O
+to	O
+early	O
+April	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+9	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+infections	O
+recorded	O
+in	O
+the	O
+last	O
+four	O
+months	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+we	O
+first	O
+observed	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+in	O
+January	O
+,	O
+we	O
+recorded	O
+380	O
+infections	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+February	O
+,	O
+we	O
+recorded	O
+767	O
+infections	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+March	O
+,	O
+it	O
+peaked	O
+at	O
+1,169	O
+infections	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+April	O
+,	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+this	O
+post	O
+,	O
+we	O
+recorded	O
+413	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+infections	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+the	O
+propagation	O
+trend	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+be	O
+slowing	O
+down	O
+a	O
+bit	O
+,	O
+the	O
+figure	O
+tells	O
+us	O
+that	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+malware	O
+is	O
+still	O
+alive	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+monitor	O
+its	O
+progress	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+Smishing	O
+(	O
+SMS	O
+phishing	O
+)	O
+offers	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+vector	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+mobile	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+recent	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+campaign	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+Smishing	O
+is	O
+still	O
+a	O
+popular	O
+means	O
+for	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+to	O
+distribute	O
+their	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+shared-hosting	O
+providers	O
+adds	O
+flexibility	O
+to	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+’	O
+s	O
+campaign	O
+and	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+harder	O
+for	O
+defending	O
+parties	O
+to	O
+track	O
+these	O
+moving	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+Fortunately	O
+,	O
+FireEye	B-System
+Mobile	I-System
+Threat	I-System
+Prevention	I-System
+platform	O
+can	O
+recognize	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+networking	O
+behaviors	O
+used	O
+by	O
+these	O
+RuMMS	B-Malware
+samples	O
+,	O
+and	O
+help	O
+us	O
+quickly	O
+identify	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+protect	O
+yourself	O
+from	O
+these	O
+threats	O
+,	O
+FireEye	B-Organization
+suggests	O
+that	O
+users	O
+:	O
+Take	O
+caution	O
+before	O
+clicking	O
+any	O
+links	O
+where	O
+you	O
+are	O
+not	O
+sure	O
+about	O
+the	O
+origin	O
+.	O
+
+Don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+install	O
+apps	O
+outside	O
+the	O
+official	O
+app	O
+store	O
+.	O
+
+Exodus	B-Malware
+:	O
+New	O
+Android	B-System
+Spyware	O
+Made	O
+in	O
+Italy	O
+Mar	O
+29	O
+Summary	O
+We	O
+identified	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Android	B-System
+spyware	O
+platform	O
+we	O
+named	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+composed	O
+of	O
+two	O
+stages	O
+we	O
+call	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+and	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+Two	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+collected	O
+numerous	O
+samples	O
+spanning	O
+from	O
+2016	O
+to	O
+early	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+Instances	O
+of	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+were	O
+found	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+,	O
+disguised	O
+as	O
+service	O
+applications	O
+from	O
+mobile	O
+operators	O
+.	O
+
+Both	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+pages	O
+and	O
+the	O
+decoys	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+in	O
+Italian	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+publicly	O
+available	O
+statistics	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+confirmation	O
+from	O
+Google	B-Organization
+,	O
+most	O
+of	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+collected	O
+a	O
+few	O
+dozens	O
+installations	O
+each	O
+,	O
+with	O
+one	O
+case	O
+reaching	O
+over	O
+350	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+are	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Italy	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+these	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+pages	O
+have	O
+been	O
+taken	O
+down	O
+by	O
+Google	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+platform	O
+is	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+an	O
+Italian	O
+company	O
+called	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+,	O
+which	O
+primarily	O
+operates	O
+in	O
+the	O
+business	O
+of	O
+video	O
+surveillance	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+public	O
+records	O
+it	O
+appears	O
+that	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+began	O
+to	O
+also	O
+develop	O
+intrusion	O
+software	O
+in	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+Exodus	B-Malware
+is	O
+equipped	O
+with	O
+extensive	O
+collection	O
+and	O
+interception	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Worryingly	O
+,	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+modifications	O
+enforced	O
+by	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+might	O
+expose	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+further	O
+compromise	O
+or	O
+data	O
+tampering	O
+.	O
+
+Disguised	O
+Spyware	O
+Uploaded	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+We	O
+identified	O
+previously	O
+unknown	O
+spyware	O
+apps	O
+being	O
+successfully	O
+uploaded	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+multiple	O
+times	O
+over	O
+the	O
+course	O
+of	O
+over	O
+two	O
+years	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+apps	O
+would	O
+remain	O
+available	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+for	O
+months	O
+and	O
+would	O
+eventually	O
+be	O
+re-uploaded	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+details	O
+would	O
+vary	O
+,	O
+all	O
+of	O
+the	O
+identified	O
+copies	O
+of	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+shared	O
+a	O
+similar	O
+disguise	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+most	O
+cases	O
+they	O
+would	O
+be	O
+crafted	O
+to	O
+appear	O
+as	O
+applications	O
+distributed	O
+by	O
+unspecified	O
+mobile	O
+operators	O
+in	O
+Italy	O
+.	O
+
+Often	O
+the	O
+app	O
+description	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+would	O
+reference	O
+some	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+the	O
+targets	O
+would	O
+supposedly	O
+receive	O
+leading	O
+them	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+page	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+pages	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+and	O
+all	O
+of	O
+the	O
+decoys	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+themselves	O
+are	O
+written	O
+in	O
+Italian	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+Google	B-Organization
+,	O
+whom	O
+we	O
+have	O
+contacted	O
+to	O
+alert	O
+about	O
+our	O
+discoveries	O
+,	O
+nearly	O
+25	O
+variants	O
+of	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+were	O
+uploaded	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+has	O
+removed	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+they	O
+stated	O
+that	O
+"	O
+thanks	O
+to	O
+enhanced	O
+detection	O
+models	O
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+will	O
+now	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+better	O
+detect	O
+future	O
+variants	O
+of	O
+these	O
+applications	O
+''	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+Google	I-Organization
+did	O
+not	O
+share	O
+with	O
+us	O
+the	O
+total	O
+number	O
+of	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+they	O
+confirmed	O
+that	O
+one	O
+of	O
+these	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+collected	O
+over	O
+350	O
+installations	O
+through	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+,	O
+while	O
+other	O
+variants	O
+collected	O
+few	O
+dozens	O
+each	O
+,	O
+and	O
+that	O
+all	O
+infections	O
+were	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Italy	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+directly	O
+observed	O
+multiple	O
+copies	O
+of	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+with	O
+more	O
+than	O
+50	O
+installs	O
+and	O
+we	O
+can	O
+estimate	O
+the	O
+total	O
+number	O
+of	O
+infections	O
+to	O
+amount	O
+in	O
+the	O
+several	O
+hundreds	O
+,	O
+if	O
+not	O
+a	O
+thousand	O
+or	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+Stage	O
+1	O
+:	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+The	O
+first	O
+stage	O
+installed	O
+by	O
+downloading	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+uploaded	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+only	O
+acts	O
+as	O
+a	O
+dropper	O
+.	O
+
+Following	O
+are	O
+some	O
+examples	O
+of	O
+the	O
+decoys	O
+used	O
+by	O
+these	O
+droppers	O
+:	O
+The	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+seems	O
+to	O
+be	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+some	O
+basic	O
+identifying	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+device	O
+(	O
+namely	O
+the	O
+IMEI	O
+code	O
+and	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+)	O
+and	O
+send	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+usually	O
+done	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+validate	O
+the	O
+target	O
+of	O
+a	O
+new	O
+infection	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+further	O
+corroborated	O
+by	O
+some	O
+older	O
+and	O
+unobfuscated	O
+samples	O
+from	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+whose	O
+primary	O
+classes	O
+are	O
+named	O
+CheckValidTarget	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+our	O
+tests	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+was	O
+upgraded	O
+to	O
+the	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+on	O
+our	O
+test	O
+device	O
+immediately	O
+after	O
+the	O
+first	O
+check-ins	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+suggests	O
+that	O
+the	O
+operators	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+are	O
+not	O
+enforcing	O
+a	O
+validation	O
+of	O
+the	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+during	O
+a	O
+period	O
+of	O
+several	O
+days	O
+,	O
+our	O
+infected	O
+test	O
+device	O
+was	O
+never	O
+remotely	O
+disinfected	O
+by	O
+the	O
+operators	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+the	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+this	O
+report	O
+we	O
+analyze	O
+here	O
+the	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+sample	O
+with	O
+hash	O
+8453ce501fee1ca8a321f16b09969c517f92a24b058ac5b54549eabd58bf1884	B-Indicator
+which	O
+communicated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+at	O
+54.71.249.137	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+samples	O
+communicated	O
+with	O
+other	O
+servers	O
+listed	O
+at	O
+the	O
+bottom	O
+of	O
+this	O
+report	O
+.	O
+
+Exodus	O
+One	O
+checks-in	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+a	O
+POST	O
+request	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+app	O
+package	O
+name	O
+,	O
+the	O
+device	O
+IMEI	O
+and	O
+an	O
+encrypted	O
+body	O
+containing	O
+additional	O
+device	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+encrypted	O
+body	O
+is	O
+composed	O
+of	O
+various	O
+identifiers	O
+which	O
+are	O
+joined	O
+together	O
+:	O
+doFinal	O
+(	O
+)	O
+is	O
+called	O
+to	O
+encrypt	O
+the	O
+device	O
+information	O
+string	O
+:	O
+The	O
+user	O
+agent	O
+string	O
+is	O
+built	O
+from	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+and	O
+IMEI	O
+number	O
+:	O
+Finally	O
+the	O
+HTTP	O
+request	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+at	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//54.71.249.137/eddd0317-2bdc-4140-86cb-0e8d7047b874	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Many	O
+of	O
+the	O
+strings	O
+in	O
+the	O
+application	O
+are	O
+XOR	O
+'d	O
+with	O
+the	O
+key	O
+Kjk1MmphFG	O
+:	O
+After	O
+some	O
+additional	O
+requests	O
+,	O
+the	O
+dropper	O
+made	O
+a	O
+POST	O
+request	O
+to	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//54.71.249.137/56e087c9-fc56-49bb-bbd0-4fafc4acd6e1	I-Indicator
+which	O
+returned	O
+a	O
+zip	O
+file	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+binaries	O
+.	O
+
+Stage	O
+2	O
+:	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+Two	I-Malware
+The	O
+Zip	O
+archive	O
+returned	O
+by	O
+the	O
+check-in	O
+performed	O
+by	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+collection	O
+of	O
+files	O
+including	O
+the	O
+primary	O
+payload	O
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+and	O
+several	O
+compiled	O
+utilities	O
+that	O
+serve	O
+different	O
+functions	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+least	O
+in	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+as	O
+of	O
+January	O
+2019	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Zip	O
+archive	O
+would	O
+actually	O
+contain	O
+the	O
+i686	O
+,	O
+arm	O
+and	O
+arm64	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+all	O
+deployed	O
+binaries	O
+.	O
+
+File	O
+Name	O
+Modified	O
+Date	O
+SHA256	O
+null_arm	O
+2018-02-27	O
+06:44:00	O
+48a7dd672931e408662d2b5e1abcd6ef00097b8ffe3814f0d2799dd6fd74bd88	B-Indicator
+null_i686	O
+2018-02-27	O
+06:44:00	O
+c228a534535b22a316a97908595a2d793d0fecabadc32846c6d1bfb08ca9a658	B-Indicator
+null_arm64	O
+2018-02-27	O
+06:43:00	O
+48a7dd672931e408662d2b5e1abcd6ef00097b8ffe3814f0d2799dd6fd74bd88	B-Indicator
+
+sepolicy-inject_arm	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+47449a612697ad99a6fbd6e02a84e957557371151f2b034a411ebb10496648c8	B-Indicator
+sepolicy-inject_arm64	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+824ad333320cbb7873dc49e61c14f749b0e0d88723635524463f2e6f56ea133a	B-Indicator
+sepolicy-inject_i686	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+13ec6cec511297ac3137cf7d6e4a7c4f5dd2b24478a06262a44f13a3d61070b6	B-Indicator
+
+rootdaemon_arm	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+00c787c0c0bc26caf623e66373a5aaa1b913b9caee1f34580bdfdd21954b7cc4	B-Indicator
+rootdaemon_arm64	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+3ee3a973c62ba5bd9eab595a7c94b7a26827c5fa5b21964d511ab58903929ec5	B-Indicator
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+2018-12-06	O
+05:50:00	O
+a42a05bf9b412cd84ea92b166d790e8e72f1d01764f93b05ace62237fbabe40e	B-Indicator
+
+rootdaemon_i686	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+b46f282f9a1bce3798faee3212e28924730a657eb93cda3824c449868b6ee2e7	B-Indicator
+zygotedaemonarm	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+e3f65f84dd6c2c3a5a653a3788d78920c0321526062a6b53daaf23fa57778a5f	B-Indicator
+zygotedaemonarm64	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+11499ff2418f4523344de81a447f6786fdba4982057d4114f64db929990b4b59	B-Indicator
+
+zygotedaemoni686	O
+2019-01-08	O
+04:55:00	O
+3c9f08b3280851f54414dfa5a57f40d3b7be7b73736fa0ba21b078e75ce54d33	B-Indicator
+sapp.apk	B-Indicator
+2019-01-08	O
+04:53:00	O
+4bf1446c412dd5c552539490d03e999a6ceb96ae60a9e7846427612bec316619	B-Indicator
+placeholder	O
+2018-03-29	O
+16:31:00	O
+e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855	B-Indicator
+
+After	O
+download	O
+,	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+would	O
+dynamically	O
+load	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+primary	O
+stage	O
+2	O
+payload	O
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+using	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+API	I-System
+DexClassLoader	O
+(	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+implements	O
+most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+data	O
+collection	O
+and	O
+exfiltration	O
+capabilities	O
+of	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+.	O
+
+Of	O
+the	O
+various	O
+binaries	O
+downloaded	O
+,	O
+the	O
+most	O
+interesting	O
+are	O
+null	O
+,	O
+which	O
+serves	O
+as	O
+a	O
+local	O
+and	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+,	O
+and	O
+rootdaemon	O
+,	O
+which	O
+takes	O
+care	O
+of	O
+privilege	O
+escalation	O
+and	O
+data	O
+acquisition	O
+.	O
+
+rootdaemon	O
+will	O
+first	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+jailbreak	O
+the	O
+device	O
+using	O
+a	O
+modified	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DirtyCow	B-Vulnerability
+exploit	I-Vulnerability
+.	O
+
+Similarly	O
+to	O
+another	O
+Android	B-System
+spyware	O
+made	O
+in	O
+Italy	O
+,	O
+originally	O
+discovered	O
+by	O
+Lukas	O
+Stefanko	O
+and	O
+later	O
+named	O
+Skygofree	B-Malware
+and	O
+analyzed	O
+in	O
+depth	O
+by	O
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+Labs	I-Organization
+,	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+also	O
+takes	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+"	O
+protectedapps	O
+''	O
+,	O
+a	O
+feature	O
+in	O
+Huawei	B-Organization
+phones	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+to	O
+configure	O
+power-saving	O
+options	O
+for	O
+running	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+manipulating	O
+a	O
+SQLite	O
+database	O
+,	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+itself	O
+running	O
+even	O
+when	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+goes	O
+off	O
+and	O
+the	O
+application	O
+would	O
+otherwise	O
+be	O
+suspended	O
+to	O
+reduce	O
+battery	O
+consumption	O
+.	O
+
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+rootdaemon	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+its	O
+own	O
+power	O
+usage	O
+statistics	O
+from	O
+Huawei	B-Organization
+phones	O
+'	O
+SystemManager	O
+:	O
+Similarly	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+application	O
+probably	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+minimize	O
+traces	O
+on	O
+Samsung	B-Organization
+phones	O
+by	O
+adding	O
+to	O
+the	O
+file	O
+/data/data/com.samsung.android.securitylogagent/shared_prefs/apm_sp_status_of_apps.xml	B-Indicator
+the	O
+following	O
+lines	O
+:	O
+And	O
+adding	O
+to	O
+the	O
+file	O
+/data/data/com.samsung.android.securitylogagent/shared_prefs/com.samsung.android.securitylogagent_preferences.xml	B-Indicator
+
+these	O
+lines	O
+instead	O
+:	O
+Data	O
+Collection	O
+and	O
+Exfiltration	O
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+,	O
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+equips	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+with	O
+extensive	O
+collection	O
+capabilities	O
+,	O
+including	O
+:	O
+Retrieve	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Record	O
+surroundings	O
+using	O
+the	O
+built-in	O
+microphone	O
+in	O
+3gp	O
+format	O
+.	O
+
+Retrieve	O
+the	O
+browsing	O
+history	O
+and	O
+bookmarks	O
+from	O
+Chrome	B-System
+and	O
+SBrowser	B-System
+(	O
+the	O
+browser	O
+shipped	O
+with	O
+Samsung	B-Organization
+phones	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+events	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Calendar	B-System
+app	I-System
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+the	O
+calls	O
+log	O
+.	O
+
+Record	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+audio	O
+in	O
+3gp	O
+format	O
+.	O
+
+Take	O
+pictures	O
+with	O
+the	O
+embedded	O
+camera	O
+.	O
+
+Collect	O
+information	O
+on	O
+surrounding	O
+cellular	O
+towers	O
+(	O
+BTS	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+the	O
+address	B-System
+book	I-System
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+the	O
+contacts	O
+list	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Facebook	B-System
+app	I-System
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+logs	O
+from	O
+Facebook	B-System
+Messenger	I-System
+conversations	O
+.	O
+
+Take	O
+a	O
+screenshot	O
+of	O
+any	O
+app	O
+in	O
+foreground	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+information	O
+on	O
+pictures	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Gallery	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+information	O
+from	O
+th	O
+GMail	B-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Dump	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+IMO	O
+messenger	B-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+,	O
+contacts	O
+and	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Skype	B-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Retrieve	O
+all	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+the	O
+encryption	O
+key	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Telegram	B-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Dump	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Viber	B-System
+messenger	I-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+logs	O
+from	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+.	O
+
+Retrieve	O
+media	O
+exchanged	O
+through	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+the	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+network	O
+'s	O
+password	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+data	O
+from	O
+WeChat	B-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Extract	O
+current	O
+GPS	O
+coordinates	O
+of	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+some	O
+of	O
+these	O
+acquisition	O
+are	O
+performed	O
+purely	O
+through	O
+code	O
+in	O
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+,	O
+some	O
+others	O
+that	O
+require	O
+access	O
+to	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+SQLite	O
+databases	O
+or	O
+other	O
+files	O
+in	O
+the	O
+application	O
+'s	O
+storage	O
+are	O
+performed	O
+through	O
+rootdaemon	O
+instead	O
+,	O
+which	O
+should	O
+be	O
+running	O
+with	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+order	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+this	O
+,	O
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+connects	O
+to	O
+rootdaemon	O
+through	O
+various	O
+TCP	O
+ports	O
+that	O
+the	O
+daemon	O
+binds	O
+on	O
+some	O
+extraction	O
+routines	O
+for	O
+supported	O
+applications	O
+:	O
+Port	B-Indicator
+6202	I-Indicator
+:	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Ports	B-Indicator
+6203	I-Indicator
+and	I-Indicator
+6204	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Port	B-Indicator
+6205	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Gmail	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Port	B-Indicator
+6206	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Skype	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Port	B-Indicator
+6207	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Viber	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Port	B-Indicator
+6208	I-Indicator
+:	O
+IMO	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Port	B-Indicator
+6209	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Telegram	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Port	B-Indicator
+6210	I-Indicator
+:	O
+SBrowser	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Port	B-Indicator
+6211	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Calendar	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Port	B-Indicator
+6212	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Chrome	B-System
+extraction	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+services	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+running	O
+on	O
+all	O
+network	O
+interfaces	O
+and	O
+are	O
+therefore	O
+accessible	O
+to	O
+anyone	O
+sharing	O
+a	O
+local	O
+network	O
+with	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Following	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+an	O
+example	O
+of	O
+a	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+port	B-Indicator
+6209	I-Indicator
+which	O
+is	O
+used	O
+to	O
+extract	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Telegram	B-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+are	O
+able	O
+to	O
+send	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+the	O
+service	O
+such	O
+as	O
+dumpmsgdb	O
+or	O
+getkey	O
+(	O
+which	O
+dumps	O
+the	O
+tgnet.dat	B-Indicator
+file	I-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Data	O
+acquired	O
+from	O
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+'s	O
+extraction	O
+modules	O
+is	O
+normally	O
+XORed	O
+and	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+a	O
+folder	O
+named	O
+.lost+found	O
+on	O
+the	O
+SD	O
+card	O
+.	O
+
+Data	O
+is	O
+eventually	O
+exfiltrated	O
+over	O
+a	O
+TLS	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	B-Indicator
+ws.my-local-weather	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+through	O
+an	O
+upload	O
+queue	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+before	O
+,	O
+our	O
+test	O
+device	O
+was	O
+automatically	O
+from	O
+stage	O
+one	O
+to	O
+stage	O
+two	O
+,	O
+which	O
+started	O
+collecting	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+password	O
+of	O
+the	O
+WiFi	O
+network	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+was	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+folder	O
+/storage/emulated/0/.lost+found/0BBDA068-9D27-4B55-B226-299FCF2B4242/	B-Indicator
+using	O
+the	O
+following	O
+file	O
+name	O
+format	O
+DD_MM_2019_HH_mm_ss_XXXXXXXXXXXXX.txt.crypt	B-Indicator
+(	O
+the	O
+datetime	O
+followed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+IMEI	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Eventually	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+the	O
+agent	O
+exfiltrate	O
+the	O
+WiFi	O
+password	O
+from	O
+our	O
+test	O
+phone	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+:	O
+Similarly	O
+,	O
+the	O
+agent	O
+also	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+:	O
+This	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+have	O
+been	O
+active	O
+since	O
+at	O
+least	O
+April	O
+2017	O
+and	O
+was	O
+registered	O
+impersonating	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+service	O
+AccuWeather	B-System
+.	O
+
+Local	O
+and	O
+Remote	O
+Shells	O
+In	O
+order	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+commands	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+a	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+operators	O
+,	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+Two	I-Malware
+immediately	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+a	O
+payload	O
+it	O
+downloads	O
+with	O
+the	O
+name	O
+null	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+launched	O
+,	O
+null	O
+will	O
+first	O
+verify	O
+whether	O
+it	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+fork	O
+on	O
+the	O
+system	O
+and	O
+that	O
+there	O
+is	O
+no	O
+other	O
+instance	O
+of	O
+itself	O
+currently	O
+running	O
+by	O
+checking	O
+whether	O
+the	O
+local	O
+port	B-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+6842	I-Indicator
+is	O
+available	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+payload	O
+will	O
+then	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+instantiate	O
+a	O
+remote	O
+reverse	O
+/system/bin/sh	B-Indicator
+shell	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+ws.my-local-weather	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+on	O
+port	B-Indicator
+22011	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+worth	O
+noticing	O
+that	O
+this	O
+remote	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+does	O
+not	O
+employ	O
+any	O
+transport	O
+cryptography	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+traffic	O
+transits	O
+in	O
+clear	O
+and	O
+is	O
+therefore	O
+potentially	O
+exposed	O
+to	O
+man-in-the-middle	O
+attacks	O
+:	O
+At	O
+the	O
+same	O
+time	O
+,	O
+null	O
+will	O
+also	O
+bind	O
+a	O
+local	O
+shell	O
+on	O
+0.0.0.0:6842	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+local	O
+port	O
+is	O
+used	O
+by	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+Two	I-Malware
+to	O
+execute	O
+various	O
+commands	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+enabling	O
+or	O
+disabling	O
+certain	O
+services	O
+,	O
+or	O
+parsing	O
+app	O
+databases	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+binding	O
+a	O
+shell	O
+on	O
+all	O
+available	O
+interfaces	O
+will	O
+obviously	O
+make	O
+it	O
+accessible	O
+to	O
+anyone	O
+who	O
+is	O
+sharing	O
+at	O
+least	O
+a	O
+local	O
+network	O
+with	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+if	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+is	O
+connected	O
+to	O
+a	O
+public	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+network	O
+any	O
+other	O
+host	O
+will	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+a	O
+terminal	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+without	O
+any	O
+form	O
+of	O
+authentication	O
+or	O
+verification	O
+by	O
+simply	O
+connecting	O
+to	O
+the	O
+port	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+operator	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+enforce	O
+proper	O
+client	O
+isolation	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+possible	O
+that	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+are	O
+also	O
+exposed	O
+to	O
+the	O
+rest	O
+of	O
+the	O
+cellular	O
+network	O
+.	O
+
+Obviously	O
+,	O
+this	O
+inevitably	O
+leaves	O
+the	O
+device	O
+open	O
+not	O
+only	O
+to	O
+further	O
+compromise	O
+but	O
+to	O
+data	O
+tampering	O
+as	O
+well	O
+.	O
+
+null	O
+is	O
+not	O
+the	O
+only	O
+payload	O
+opening	O
+a	O
+shell	O
+on	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+rootdaemon	O
+binary	O
+in	O
+fact	O
+offers	O
+several	O
+other	O
+possibilities	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+commands	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+just	O
+by	O
+connecting	O
+to	O
+TCP	O
+port	B-Indicator
+6200	I-Indicator
+and	O
+issuing	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+Sending	O
+the	O
+command	O
+sh	O
+to	O
+TCP	O
+port	B-Indicator
+6200	I-Indicator
+results	O
+in	O
+a	O
+full	O
+terminal	O
+being	O
+dropped	O
+:	O
+Sending	O
+the	O
+command	O
+cmd	O
+followed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+proper	O
+terminal	O
+command	O
+will	O
+execute	O
+it	O
+and	O
+print	O
+the	O
+output	O
+(	O
+in	O
+the	O
+example	O
+we	O
+use	O
+id	O
+which	O
+displays	O
+the	O
+identity	O
+of	O
+the	O
+system	O
+user	O
+running	O
+the	O
+issued	O
+commands	O
+)	O
+:	O
+Doing	O
+the	O
+same	O
+as	O
+above	O
+but	O
+with	O
+command	O
+sucmd	O
+will	O
+run	O
+the	O
+terminal	O
+command	O
+as	O
+root	O
+:	O
+Other	O
+commands	O
+supported	O
+by	O
+rootdaemon	O
+on	O
+TCP	O
+port	B-Indicator
+6200	I-Indicator
+are	O
+su	O
+(	O
+which	O
+in	O
+our	O
+tests	O
+did	O
+n't	O
+properly	O
+work	O
+)	O
+,	O
+loadsocketpolicy	O
+,	O
+loadfilepolicy	O
+,	O
+remount	O
+and	O
+removeroot	O
+
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+cost	O
+of	O
+possibly	O
+being	O
+overly	O
+verbose	O
+,	O
+following	O
+is	O
+the	O
+output	O
+of	O
+an	O
+nmap	O
+scan	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+Android	O
+device	O
+from	O
+a	O
+laptop	O
+in	O
+the	O
+same	O
+local	O
+network	O
+,	O
+which	O
+further	O
+demonstrantes	O
+the	O
+availability	O
+of	O
+the	O
+same	O
+open	O
+TCP	O
+ports	O
+that	O
+we	O
+have	O
+mentioned	O
+thus	O
+far	O
+:	O
+Identification	O
+of	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+Presence	O
+of	O
+Italian	O
+language	O
+At	O
+a	O
+first	O
+look	O
+,	O
+the	O
+first	O
+samples	O
+of	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+we	O
+obtained	O
+did	O
+not	O
+show	O
+immediately	O
+evident	O
+connections	O
+to	O
+any	O
+company	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+persistent	O
+presence	O
+of	O
+Italian	O
+language	O
+both	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	O
+pages	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+code	O
+was	O
+a	O
+clear	O
+sign	O
+that	O
+an	O
+Italian	O
+actor	O
+was	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+creation	O
+of	O
+this	O
+platform	O
+.	O
+
+Initially	O
+some	O
+particular	O
+words	O
+from	O
+the	O
+decompiled	O
+classes.dex	B-Indicator
+of	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+Two	O
+sent	O
+us	O
+in	O
+the	O
+right	O
+direction	O
+.	O
+
+"	O
+Mundizza	O
+''	O
+is	O
+a	O
+dialectal	O
+word	O
+,	O
+a	O
+derivative	O
+of	O
+the	O
+proper	O
+Italian	O
+word	O
+"	O
+immondizia	O
+''	O
+that	O
+translates	O
+to	O
+"	O
+trash	O
+''	O
+or	O
+"	O
+garbage	O
+''	O
+in	O
+English	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+"	O
+mundizza	O
+''	O
+is	O
+typical	O
+of	O
+Calabria	O
+,	O
+a	O
+region	O
+in	O
+the	O
+south	O
+of	O
+Italy	O
+,	O
+and	O
+more	O
+specifically	O
+it	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+language	O
+native	O
+of	O
+the	O
+city	O
+of	O
+Catanzaro	O
+.	O
+
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+some	O
+copies	O
+of	O
+Exodus	O
+One	O
+use	O
+the	O
+following	O
+XOR	O
+key	O
+:	O
+Rino	O
+Gattuso	O
+is	O
+a	O
+famous	O
+retired	O
+Italian	O
+footballer	O
+,	O
+originally	O
+from	O
+Calabria	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+not	O
+too	O
+seriously	O
+,	O
+these	O
+elements	O
+made	O
+us	O
+restrict	O
+our	O
+research	O
+into	O
+surveillance	O
+companies	O
+from	O
+the	O
+region	O
+.	O
+
+Overlapping	O
+Infrastructure	O
+with	O
+eSurv	O
+Surveillance	O
+Cameras	O
+The	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+domain	O
+configured	O
+in	O
+several	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+applications	O
+found	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+,	O
+ws.my-local-weather	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+,	O
+points	O
+to	O
+the	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+54.69.156.31	B-Indicator
+which	O
+serves	O
+a	O
+self-signed	O
+TLS	O
+certificate	O
+with	O
+the	O
+certificate	O
+common	O
+name	O
+MyCert	O
+and	O
+fingerprint	O
+11:41:45:2F	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+A7:07:23:54	I-Indicator
+:	O
+AE:9A	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+CE	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+F4	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+FE:56	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+AE	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+AC	I-Indicator
+:	O
+B1	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+C2:15:9F:6A	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+FC:1E	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+CC:7D	I-Indicator
+:	B-Indicator
+F8:61	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+E3:25:26:73:6A	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+A	O
+search	O
+for	O
+this	O
+certificate	O
+fingerprint	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Internet	O
+scanning	O
+service	O
+Censys	O
+returns	O
+8	O
+additional	O
+servers	O
+:	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+34.208.71.9	B-Indicator
+34.212.92.0	B-Indicator
+34.216.43.114	B-Indicator
+52.34.144.229	B-Indicator
+54.69.156.31	B-Indicator
+54.71.249.137	B-Indicator
+54.189.5.198	B-Indicator
+78.5.0.195	B-Indicator
+207.180.245.74	B-Indicator
+Opening	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+web	O
+page	O
+in	O
+a	O
+browser	O
+presents	O
+a	O
+Basic	O
+Authentication	O
+prompt	O
+:	O
+Closing	O
+this	O
+prompt	O
+causes	O
+the	O
+server	O
+to	O
+send	O
+a	O
+"	O
+401	O
+Unauthorized	O
+Response	O
+''	O
+with	O
+an	O
+"	O
+Access	O
+Denied	O
+''	O
+message	O
+in	O
+Italian	O
+
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+the	O
+other	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+sharing	O
+the	O
+same	O
+TLS	O
+certificate	O
+behave	O
+in	O
+the	O
+same	O
+way	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+also	O
+displays	O
+a	O
+favicon	O
+image	O
+which	O
+looks	O
+like	O
+a	O
+small	O
+orange	O
+ball	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+a	O
+reverse	O
+image	O
+search	O
+for	O
+the	O
+favicon	O
+on	O
+Shodan	O
+using	O
+the	O
+query	O
+http.favicon.hash:990643579	B-Indicator
+returned	O
+around	O
+40	O
+web	O
+servers	O
+which	O
+use	O
+the	O
+same	O
+favicon	O
+.	O
+
+Many	O
+of	O
+these	O
+servers	O
+are	O
+control	O
+panels	O
+for	O
+video	O
+surveillance	O
+systems	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Italian	O
+company	O
+eSurv	O
+,	O
+based	O
+in	O
+Catanzaro	O
+,	O
+in	O
+Calabria	O
+,	O
+Italy	O
+.	O
+
+Their	O
+publicly	O
+advertised	O
+products	O
+include	O
+CCTV	O
+management	O
+systems	O
+,	O
+surveillance	O
+drones	O
+,	O
+face	O
+and	O
+license	O
+plate	O
+recognition	O
+systems	O
+.	O
+
+eSurv	B-Organization
+'s	O
+logo	O
+is	O
+identical	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+favicon	O
+.	O
+
+Older	O
+samples	O
+connecting	O
+to	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+Finally	O
+,	O
+Google	B-Organization
+shared	O
+with	O
+us	O
+some	O
+older	O
+samples	O
+of	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+(	O
+with	O
+hashes	O
+2055584625d24687bd027a63bc0b8faa7d1a854a535de74afba24840a52b1d2f	B-Indicator
+and	O
+a37f5d2418c5f2f64d06ba28fe62edee1293a56158ddfa9f04020e316054363f	B-Indicator
+)	O
+which	O
+are	O
+not	O
+obfuscated	O
+and	O
+use	O
+the	O
+following	O
+disguise	O
+:	O
+The	O
+configuration	O
+of	O
+these	O
+older	O
+samples	O
+
+is	O
+very	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+newer	O
+ones	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+provides	O
+additional	O
+insights	O
+being	O
+not	O
+obfuscated	O
+:	O
+Firstly	O
+we	O
+can	O
+notice	O
+that	O
+,	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+generic	O
+domain	O
+names	O
+or	O
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+,	O
+these	O
+samples	O
+communicated	O
+with	O
+a	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+located	O
+at	O
+attiva.exodus.esurv	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+(	O
+"	O
+attiva	O
+''	O
+is	O
+the	O
+Italian	O
+for	O
+"	O
+activate	O
+''	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+(	O
+We	I-System
+named	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+"	O
+Exodus	O
+''	O
+after	O
+this	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+domain	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+Following	O
+is	O
+the	O
+snippet	O
+of	O
+code	O
+in	O
+these	O
+older	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+samples	O
+showing	O
+the	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+:	O
+Below	O
+is	O
+the	O
+almost	O
+identical	O
+composition	O
+of	O
+the	O
+request	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+in	O
+mike.jar	B-Indicator
+(	O
+also	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+path	O
+7e661733-e332-429a-a7e2-23649f27690f	O
+)	O
+:	O
+To	O
+further	O
+corroborate	O
+the	O
+connection	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+spyware	I-Malware
+with	O
+eSurv	O
+,	O
+the	O
+domain	B-Indicator
+attiva.exodus.esurv.it	I-Indicator
+resolves	O
+to	O
+the	O
+IP	O
+212.47.242.236	B-Indicator
+which	O
+,	O
+according	O
+to	O
+
+public	O
+passive	O
+DNS	O
+data	O
+,	O
+in	O
+2017	O
+was	O
+used	O
+to	O
+host	O
+the	O
+domain	B-Indicator
+server1cs.exodus.connexxa.it	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Connexxa	O
+was	O
+a	O
+company	O
+also	O
+from	O
+Catanzaro	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+publicly	O
+available	O
+information	O
+,	O
+the	O
+founder	O
+of	O
+Connexxa	B-Organization
+seems	O
+to	O
+also	O
+be	O
+the	O
+CEO	O
+of	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+other	O
+DNS	O
+records	O
+mostly	O
+from	O
+2017	O
+that	O
+follow	O
+a	O
+similar	O
+pattern	O
+and	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+contain	O
+two-letters	O
+codes	O
+for	O
+districts	O
+in	O
+Italy	O
+:	O
+Server	O
+City	O
+server1bo.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Bologna	O
+server1bs.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Brescia	O
+server1cs.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Cosenza	O
+server1ct.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Catania	O
+server1fermo.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+server1fi.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Firenze	O
+server1gioiat.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+server1na.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Napoli	O
+server1rc.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Reggio	O
+Calabria	O
+server2ct.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Catania	O
+server2cz.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Catanzaro	O
+server2fi.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Firenze	O
+server2mi.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Milano	O
+server2rc.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Reggio	O
+Calabria	O
+server3bo.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Bologna	O
+server3ct.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Catania	O
+server3.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+server3fi.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Firenze	O
+server4fi.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Firenze	O
+serverrt.exodus.connexxa	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+Public	O
+Resume	O
+Confirms	O
+Development	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+Agent	O
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+an	O
+employee	O
+of	O
+eSurv	B-Organization
+quite	O
+precisely	O
+described	O
+their	O
+work	O
+in	O
+developing	O
+an	O
+"	O
+agent	O
+to	O
+gather	O
+data	O
+from	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+and	O
+send	O
+it	O
+to	O
+a	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+''	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+researching	O
+"	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+in	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+(	O
+mainly	O
+Android	B-System
+)	O
+''	O
+in	O
+a	O
+publicly	O
+available	O
+resume	O
+.	O
+
+Further	O
+details	O
+in	O
+it	O
+reflect	O
+characteristics	O
+of	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+bypass	O
+of	O
+power	O
+managers	O
+we	O
+described	O
+from	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+more	O
+)	O
+:	O
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+Compromise	O
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+011b6bcebd543d4eb227e840f04e188fb01f2335b0b81684b60e6b45388d3820	B-Indicator
+0f5f1409b1ebbee4aa837d20479732e11399d37f05b47b5359dc53a4001314e5	B-Indicator
+2055584625d24687bd027a63bc0b8faa7d1a854a535de74afba24840a52b1d2f	B-Indicator
+
+26fef238028ee4b5b8da631c77bfb44ada3d5db8129c45dea5df6a51c9ea5f55	B-Indicator
+33a9da16d096426c82f150e39fc4f9172677885cfeaedcff10c86414e88be802	B-Indicator
+34d000ee1e36efd10eb37e2b79d69249d5a85682a61390a89a1b9391c46bf2ba	B-Indicator
+4f6146956b50ae3a6e80a1c1f771dba848ba677064eb0e166df5804ac2766898	B-Indicator
+
+5db49122d866967295874ab2c1ce23a7cde50212ff044bbea1da9b49bb9bc149	B-Indicator
+70e2eea5609c6954c61f2e5e0a3aea832d0643df93d18d7d78b6f9444dcceef0	B-Indicator
+80810a8ec9624f317f832ac2e212dba033212258285344661e5da11b0d9f0b62	B-Indicator
+8453ce501fee1ca8a321f16b09969c517f92a24b058ac5b54549eabd58bf1884	B-Indicator
+
+a37f5d2418c5f2f64d06ba28fe62edee1293a56158ddfa9f04020e316054363f	B-Indicator
+db59407f72666526fca23d31e3b4c5df86f25eff178e17221219216c6975c63f	B-Indicator
+e0acbb0d7e55fb67e550a6bf5cf5c499a9960eaf5f037b785f9004585202593b	B-Indicator
+Exodus	B-Malware
+One	I-Malware
+Package	O
+Names	O
+com.phonecarrier.linecheck	B-Indicator
+
+rm.rf	I-Indicator
+operatore.italia	B-Indicator
+it.offertetelefonicheperte	I-Indicator
+it.servizipremium	B-Indicator
+assistenza.sim	B-Indicator
+assistenza.linea.riattiva	B-Indicator
+assistenza.linea	B-Indicator
+it.promofferte	B-Indicator
+Exodus	B-Malware
+Two	I-Malware
+64c11fdb317d6b7c9930e639f55863df592f23f3c7c861ddd97048891a90c64b	B-Indicator
+a42a05bf9b412cd84ea92b166d790e8e72f1d01764f93b05ace62237fbabe40e	B-Indicator
+Exodus	B-Malware
+Two	I-Malware
+
+ELF	O
+Utilities	O
+00c787c0c0bc26caf623e66373a5aaa1b913b9caee1f34580bdfdd21954b7cc4	B-Indicator
+11499ff2418f4523344de81a447f6786fdba4982057d4114f64db929990b4b59	B-Indicator
+13ec6cec511297ac3137cf7d6e4a7c4f5dd2b24478a06262a44f13a3d61070b6	B-Indicator
+3c9f08b3280851f54414dfa5a57f40d3b7be7b73736fa0ba21b078e75ce54d33	B-Indicator
+
+3ee3a973c62ba5bd9eab595a7c94b7a26827c5fa5b21964d511ab58903929ec5	B-Indicator
+47449a612697ad99a6fbd6e02a84e957557371151f2b034a411ebb10496648c8	B-Indicator
+48a7dd672931e408662d2b5e1abcd6ef00097b8ffe3814f0d2799dd6fd74bd88	B-Indicator
+824ad333320cbb7873dc49e61c14f749b0e0d88723635524463f2e6f56ea133a	B-Indicator
+
+b46f282f9a1bce3798faee3212e28924730a657eb93cda3824c449868b6ee2e7	B-Indicator
+c228a534535b22a316a97908595a2d793d0fecabadc32846c6d1bfb08ca9a658	B-Indicator
+e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855	B-Indicator
+e3f65f84dd6c2c3a5a653a3788d78920c0321526062a6b53daaf23fa57778a5f	B-Indicator
+
+Command	O
+&	O
+Controls	O
+ad1.fbsba	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+ws.my-local-weather	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+54.71.249	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+137	I-Indicator
+54.69.156	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+31	I-Indicator
+162.243.172	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+208	I-Indicator
+attiva.exodus.esurv	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+it	I-Indicator
+The	O
+rise	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+banker	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+28	O
+AUG	O
+2018	O
+We	O
+encountered	O
+the	O
+Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub	B-Malware
+family	O
+for	O
+the	O
+first	O
+time	O
+in	O
+2015	O
+,	O
+when	O
+the	O
+first	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+were	O
+detected	O
+,	O
+analyzed	O
+,	O
+and	O
+found	O
+to	O
+be	O
+more	O
+adept	O
+at	O
+spying	O
+than	O
+stealing	O
+funds	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+has	O
+evolved	O
+since	O
+then	O
+,	O
+aided	O
+by	O
+a	O
+large-scale	O
+distribution	O
+campaign	O
+by	O
+its	O
+creators	O
+(	O
+in	O
+spring-summer	O
+2017	O
+)	O
+,	O
+helping	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+to	O
+claim	O
+top	O
+spots	O
+in	O
+last	O
+year	O
+’	O
+s	O
+ranking	O
+by	O
+number	O
+of	O
+attacks	O
+among	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+,	O
+outperforming	O
+other	O
+families	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+and	O
+Faketoken	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+We	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+take	O
+a	O
+peek	O
+under	O
+the	O
+hood	O
+of	O
+a	O
+modern	O
+member	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+family	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+eyes	O
+fell	O
+on	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+money	O
+from	O
+owners	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+connected	O
+to	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+service	O
+of	O
+one	O
+of	O
+Russia	O
+’	O
+s	O
+largest	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+Asacub	B-Malware
+versions	O
+Sewn	O
+into	O
+the	O
+body	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+is	O
+the	O
+version	O
+number	O
+,	O
+consisting	O
+of	O
+two	O
+or	O
+three	O
+digits	O
+separated	O
+by	O
+periods	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+numbering	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+have	O
+started	O
+anew	O
+after	O
+the	O
+version	O
+9	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+name	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+appeared	O
+with	O
+version	O
+4	O
+in	O
+late	O
+2015	O
+;	O
+previous	O
+versions	O
+were	O
+known	O
+as	O
+Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Smaps	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Versions	O
+5.X.X-8.X.X	O
+were	O
+active	O
+in	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+and	O
+versions	O
+9.X.X-1.X.X	O
+in	O
+2017	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+the	O
+most	O
+actively	O
+distributed	O
+versions	O
+were	O
+5.0.0	O
+and	O
+5.0.3	O
+.	O
+
+Communication	O
+with	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+Although	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+capabilities	O
+gradually	O
+evolved	O
+,	O
+its	O
+network	O
+behavior	O
+and	O
+method	O
+of	O
+communication	O
+with	O
+the	O
+command-and-control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+changed	O
+little	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+strongly	O
+suggested	O
+that	O
+the	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+,	O
+despite	O
+differing	O
+in	O
+terms	O
+of	O
+capability	O
+,	O
+belong	O
+to	O
+the	O
+same	O
+family	O
+.	O
+
+Data	O
+was	O
+always	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+via	O
+HTTP	O
+in	O
+the	O
+body	O
+of	O
+a	O
+POST	O
+request	O
+in	O
+encrypted	O
+form	O
+to	O
+the	O
+relative	O
+address	O
+/something/index.php	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+In	O
+earlier	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+the	O
+something	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+relative	O
+path	O
+was	O
+a	O
+partially	O
+intelligible	O
+,	O
+yet	O
+random	O
+mix	O
+of	O
+words	O
+and	O
+short	O
+combinations	O
+of	O
+letters	O
+and	O
+numbers	O
+separated	O
+by	O
+an	O
+underscore	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+“	O
+bee_bomb	O
+”	O
+or	O
+“	O
+my_te2_mms	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Example	O
+of	O
+traffic	O
+from	O
+an	O
+early	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+(	O
+2015	O
+)	O
+The	O
+data	O
+transmitted	O
+and	O
+received	O
+is	O
+encrypted	O
+with	O
+the	O
+RC4	O
+algorithm	O
+and	O
+encoded	O
+using	O
+the	O
+base64	O
+standard	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+address	O
+and	O
+the	O
+encryption	O
+key	O
+(	O
+one	O
+for	O
+different	O
+modifications	O
+in	O
+versions	O
+4.x	O
+and	O
+5.x	O
+,	O
+and	O
+distinct	O
+for	O
+different	O
+C	O
+&	O
+Cs	O
+in	O
+later	O
+versions	O
+)	O
+are	O
+stitched	O
+into	O
+the	O
+body	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+early	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+,	O
+.com	O
+,	O
+.biz	O
+,	O
+.info	O
+,	O
+.in	O
+,	O
+.pw	O
+were	O
+used	O
+as	O
+top-level	O
+domains	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+2016	O
+version	O
+,	O
+the	O
+value	O
+of	O
+the	O
+User-Agent	O
+header	O
+changed	O
+,	O
+as	O
+did	O
+the	O
+method	O
+of	O
+generating	O
+the	O
+relative	O
+path	O
+in	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+:	O
+now	O
+the	O
+part	O
+before	O
+/index.php	O
+is	O
+a	O
+mix	O
+of	O
+a	O
+pronounceable	O
+(	O
+if	O
+not	O
+entirely	O
+meaningful	O
+)	O
+word	O
+and	O
+random	O
+letters	O
+and	O
+numbers	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+“	O
+muromec280j9tqeyjy5sm1qy71	B-Indicator
+”	O
+or	O
+“	O
+parabbelumf8jgybdd6w0qa0	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+incoming	O
+traffic	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+began	O
+to	O
+use	O
+gzip	O
+compression	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+top-level	O
+domain	O
+for	O
+all	O
+C	O
+&	O
+Cs	O
+was	O
+.com	O
+:	O
+Since	O
+December	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+the	O
+changes	O
+in	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+communication	O
+methods	O
+have	O
+affected	O
+only	O
+how	O
+the	O
+relative	O
+path	O
+in	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+is	O
+generated	O
+:	O
+the	O
+pronounceable	O
+word	O
+was	O
+replaced	O
+by	O
+a	O
+rather	O
+long	O
+random	O
+combination	O
+of	O
+letters	O
+and	O
+numbers	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+“	O
+ozvi4malen7dwdh	B-Indicator
+”	O
+or	O
+“	O
+f29u8oi77024clufhw1u5ws62	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+this	O
+article	O
+,	O
+no	O
+other	O
+significant	O
+changes	O
+in	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+network	O
+behavior	O
+had	O
+been	O
+observed	O
+:	O
+The	O
+origin	O
+of	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+It	O
+is	O
+fairly	O
+safe	O
+to	O
+say	O
+that	O
+the	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+family	O
+evolved	O
+from	O
+Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Smaps	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Communication	O
+between	O
+both	O
+Trojans	O
+and	O
+their	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+servers	O
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+same	O
+principle	O
+,	O
+the	O
+relative	O
+addresses	O
+to	O
+which	O
+Trojans	O
+send	O
+network	O
+requests	O
+are	O
+generated	O
+in	O
+a	O
+similar	O
+manner	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+set	O
+of	O
+possible	O
+commands	O
+that	O
+the	O
+two	O
+Trojans	O
+can	O
+perform	O
+also	O
+overlaps	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+’	O
+s	O
+more	O
+,	O
+the	O
+numbering	O
+of	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+versions	O
+is	O
+a	O
+continuation	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Smaps	B-Malware
+system	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+main	O
+difference	O
+is	O
+that	O
+Smaps	B-Malware
+transmits	O
+data	O
+as	O
+plain	O
+text	O
+,	O
+while	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+encrypts	O
+data	O
+with	O
+the	O
+RC4	O
+algorithm	O
+and	O
+then	O
+encodes	O
+it	O
+into	O
+base64	O
+format	O
+.	O
+
+Let	O
+’	O
+s	O
+compare	O
+examples	O
+of	O
+traffic	O
+from	O
+Smaps	B-Malware
+and	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+—	O
+an	O
+initializing	O
+request	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+with	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+and	O
+a	O
+response	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+with	O
+a	O
+command	O
+for	O
+execution	O
+:	O
+Smaps	B-Malware
+request	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+request	O
+Decrypted	O
+data	O
+from	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+traffic	O
+:	O
+{	O
+“	O
+id	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+532bf15a-b784-47e5-92fa-72198a2929f5″	B-Indicator
+,	O
+”	O
+type	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+get	O
+”	O
+,	O
+”	O
+info	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+imei:365548770159066	O
+,	O
+country	O
+:	O
+PL	O
+,	O
+cell	O
+:	O
+Tele2	O
+
+,	O
+android:4.2.2	O
+,	O
+model	O
+:	O
+GT-N5100	O
+,	O
+phonenumber	O
+:	O
++486679225120	O
+,	O
+sim:6337076348906359089f	O
+,	O
+app	O
+:	O
+null	O
+,	O
+ver:5.0.2″	O
+}	O
+Data	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+[	O
+{	O
+“	O
+command	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+sent	O
+&	O
+&	O
+&	O
+”	O
+,	O
+”	O
+params	O
+”	O
+:	O
+{	O
+“	O
+to	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
++79262000900″	O
+,	O
+”	O
+body	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+\u0410\u0412\u0422\u041e\u041f\u041b\u0410\u0422\u0415\u0416	O
+
+1000	O
+50″	O
+,	O
+”	O
+timestamp	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+1452272572″	O
+}	O
+}	O
+,	O
+{	O
+“	O
+command	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+sent	O
+&	O
+&	O
+&	O
+”	O
+,	O
+”	O
+params	O
+”	O
+:	O
+{	O
+“	O
+to	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
++79262000900″	O
+,	O
+”	O
+body	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+BALANCE	O
+”	O
+,	O
+”	O
+timestamp	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+1452272573″	O
+}	O
+}	O
+]	O
+Instructions	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+A	O
+comparison	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+made	O
+of	O
+the	O
+format	O
+in	O
+which	O
+Asacub	O
+and	O
+Smaps	O
+forward	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+(	O
+encoded	O
+with	O
+the	O
+base64	O
+algorithm	O
+)	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+:	O
+Smaps	O
+
+format	O
+Asacub	O
+format	O
+Decrypted	O
+data	O
+from	O
+Asacub	O
+traffic	O
+:	O
+{	O
+“	O
+data	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+2015:10:14_02:41:15″	O
+,	O
+”	O
+id	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+532bf15a-b784-47e5-92fa-72198a2929f5″	B-Indicator
+,	O
+”	O
+text	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+SSB0aG91Z2h0IHdlIGdvdCBwYXN0IHRoaXMhISBJJ20gbm90IGh1bmdyeSBhbmQgbmU=	O
+”	O
+,	O
+”	O
+number	O
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+1790″	O
+,	O
+”	O
+type	O
+
+”	O
+:	O
+”	O
+load	O
+”	O
+}	O
+Propagation	O
+The	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+is	O
+propagated	O
+via	O
+phishing	O
+SMS	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+link	O
+and	O
+an	O
+offer	O
+to	O
+view	O
+a	O
+photo	O
+or	O
+MMS	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+link	O
+points	O
+to	O
+a	O
+web	O
+page	O
+with	O
+a	O
+similar	O
+sentence	O
+and	O
+a	O
+button	O
+for	O
+downloading	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+to	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+download	O
+window	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+masquerades	O
+under	O
+the	O
+guise	O
+of	O
+an	O
+MMS	O
+app	O
+or	O
+a	O
+client	O
+of	O
+a	O
+popular	O
+free	O
+ads	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+came	O
+across	O
+the	O
+names	O
+Photo	O
+,	O
+Message	O
+,	O
+Avito	O
+Offer	O
+,	O
+and	O
+MMS	O
+Message	O
+.	O
+
+App	O
+icons	O
+under	O
+which	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+masks	O
+itself	O
+The	O
+APK	O
+files	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+are	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+sites	O
+such	O
+as	O
+mmsprivate	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+site	I-Indicator
+,	O
+photolike	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+fun	I-Indicator
+,	O
+you-foto	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+site	I-Indicator
+,	O
+and	O
+mms4you	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+me	I-Indicator
+under	O
+names	O
+in	O
+the	O
+format	O
+:	O
+photo_	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+_img.apk	I-Indicator
+,	O
+mms_	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+_img.apk	I-Indicator
+avito_	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+.apk	I-Indicator
+,	O
+mms.img_	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+_photo.apk	I-Indicator
+,	O
+mms	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+_photo.image.apk	I-Indicator
+,	O
+mms	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+_photo.img.apk	I-Indicator
+,	O
+mms.img.photo_	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+.apk	I-Indicator
+,	O
+photo_	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+_obmen.img.apk	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+For	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+to	O
+install	O
+,	O
+the	O
+user	O
+must	O
+allow	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+unknown	O
+sources	O
+in	O
+the	O
+device	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+Infection	O
+During	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+depending	O
+on	O
+the	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+prompts	O
+the	O
+user	O
+either	O
+for	O
+Device	O
+Administrator	O
+rights	O
+or	O
+for	O
+permission	O
+to	O
+use	O
+AccessibilityService	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+receiving	O
+the	O
+rights	O
+,	O
+it	O
+sets	O
+itself	O
+as	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+and	O
+disappears	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+screen	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+ignores	O
+or	O
+rejects	O
+the	O
+request	O
+,	O
+the	O
+window	O
+reopens	O
+every	O
+few	O
+seconds	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+requests	O
+Device	O
+Administrator	O
+rights	O
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+requests	O
+permission	O
+to	O
+use	O
+AccessibilityService	O
+After	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+starts	O
+communicating	O
+with	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+’	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+data	O
+is	O
+transmitted	O
+in	O
+JSON	O
+format	O
+(	O
+after	O
+decryption	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+includes	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+smartphone	O
+model	O
+,	O
+the	O
+OS	O
+version	O
+,	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+operator	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+version	O
+.	O
+
+Let	O
+’	O
+s	O
+take	O
+an	O
+in-depth	O
+look	O
+at	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+5.0.3	O
+,	O
+the	O
+most	O
+widespread	O
+version	O
+in	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+Structure	O
+of	O
+data	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+:	O
+To	O
+begin	O
+with	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+sends	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+:	O
+In	O
+response	O
+,	O
+the	O
+server	O
+sends	O
+the	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+command	O
+for	O
+execution	O
+(	O
+“	O
+command	O
+”	O
+)	O
+,	O
+its	O
+parameters	O
+(	O
+“	O
+params	O
+”	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+time	O
+delay	O
+before	O
+execution	O
+(	O
+“	O
+waitrun	O
+”	O
+in	O
+milliseconds	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+List	O
+of	O
+commands	O
+sewn	O
+into	O
+the	O
+body	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+:	O
+Command	O
+code	O
+Parameters	O
+Actions	O
+2	O
+–	O
+Sending	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+contacts	O
+from	O
+the	O
+address	B-System
+book	I-System
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+7	O
+“	O
+to	O
+”	O
+:	O
+int	O
+Calling	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+number	O
+11	O
+“	O
+to	O
+”	O
+:	O
+int	O
+,	O
+“	O
+body	O
+”	O
+:	O
+string	O
+Sending	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+with	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+text	O
+to	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+number	O
+19	O
+“	O
+text	O
+”	O
+:	O
+string	O
+,	O
+“	O
+n	O
+”	O
+:	O
+string	O
+Sending	O
+SMS	O
+with	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+text	O
+to	O
+numbers	O
+from	O
+the	O
+address	B-System
+book	I-System
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+,	O
+with	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+addressee	O
+from	O
+the	O
+
+address	B-System
+book	I-System
+substituted	O
+into	O
+the	O
+message	O
+text	O
+40	O
+“	O
+text	O
+”	O
+:	O
+string	O
+Shutting	O
+down	O
+applications	O
+with	O
+specific	O
+names	O
+(	O
+antivirus	O
+and	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+)	O
+The	O
+set	O
+of	O
+possible	O
+commands	O
+is	O
+the	O
+most	O
+significant	O
+difference	O
+between	O
+the	O
+various	O
+flavors	O
+of	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+2015-early	O
+2016	O
+versions	O
+examined	O
+in	O
+this	O
+article	O
+,	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+instructions	O
+in	O
+JSON	O
+format	O
+contained	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+command	O
+in	O
+text	O
+form	O
+(	O
+“	O
+get_sms	O
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+block_phone	O
+”	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+later	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+command	O
+,	O
+its	O
+numerical	O
+code	O
+was	O
+transmitted	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+same	O
+numerical	O
+code	O
+corresponded	O
+to	O
+one	O
+command	O
+in	O
+different	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+set	O
+of	O
+supported	O
+commands	O
+varied	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+version	O
+9.0.7	O
+(	O
+2017	O
+)	O
+featured	O
+the	O
+following	O
+set	O
+of	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+2	O
+,	O
+4	O
+,	O
+8	O
+,	O
+11	O
+,	O
+12	O
+,	O
+15	O
+,	O
+16	O
+,	O
+17	O
+,	O
+18	O
+,	O
+19	O
+,	O
+20	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+receiving	O
+the	O
+command	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+it	O
+,	O
+before	O
+informing	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+of	O
+the	O
+execution	O
+status	O
+and	O
+any	O
+data	O
+received	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+“	O
+id	O
+”	O
+value	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+“	O
+data	O
+”	O
+block	O
+is	O
+equal	O
+to	O
+the	O
+“	O
+timestamp	O
+”	O
+value	O
+of	O
+the	O
+relevant	O
+command	O
+:	O
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+sets	O
+itself	O
+as	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+application	O
+and	O
+,	O
+on	O
+receiving	O
+a	O
+new	O
+SMS	O
+,	O
+forwards	O
+the	O
+sender	O
+’	O
+s	O
+number	O
+and	O
+the	O
+message	O
+text	O
+in	O
+base64	O
+format	O
+to	O
+the	O
+cybercriminal	O
+:	O
+Thus	O
+,	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+can	O
+withdraw	O
+funds	O
+from	O
+a	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+linked	O
+to	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+SMS	O
+for	O
+the	O
+transfer	O
+of	O
+funds	O
+to	O
+another	O
+account	O
+using	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+the	O
+card	O
+or	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+intercepts	O
+SMS	O
+from	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+that	O
+contain	O
+one-time	O
+passwords	O
+and	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+balance	O
+of	O
+the	O
+linked	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+can	O
+autonomously	O
+retrieve	O
+confirmation	O
+codes	O
+from	O
+such	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+send	O
+them	O
+to	O
+the	O
+required	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+’	O
+s	O
+more	O
+,	O
+the	O
+user	O
+can	O
+not	O
+check	O
+the	O
+balance	O
+via	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+or	O
+change	O
+any	O
+settings	O
+there	O
+,	O
+because	O
+after	O
+receiving	O
+the	O
+command	O
+with	O
+code	O
+40	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+prevents	O
+the	O
+banking	O
+app	O
+from	O
+running	O
+on	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+.	O
+
+User	O
+messages	O
+created	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+during	O
+installation	O
+typically	O
+contain	O
+grammatical	O
+and	O
+spelling	O
+errors	O
+,	O
+and	O
+use	O
+a	O
+mixture	O
+of	O
+Cyrillic	O
+and	O
+Latin	O
+characters	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+also	O
+employs	O
+various	O
+obfuscation	O
+methods	O
+:	O
+from	O
+the	O
+simplest	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+string	O
+concatenation	O
+and	O
+renaming	O
+of	O
+classes	O
+and	O
+methods	O
+,	O
+to	O
+implementing	O
+functions	O
+in	O
+native	O
+code	O
+and	O
+embedding	O
+SO	O
+libraries	O
+in	O
+C/C++	O
+in	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+,	O
+which	O
+requires	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+additional	O
+tools	O
+or	O
+dynamic	O
+analysis	O
+for	O
+deobfuscation	O
+,	O
+since	O
+most	O
+tools	O
+for	O
+static	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+Android	O
+apps	O
+support	O
+only	O
+Dalvik	O
+bytecode	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+,	O
+strings	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app	O
+are	O
+encrypted	O
+using	O
+the	O
+same	O
+algorithm	O
+as	O
+data	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+but	O
+with	O
+different	O
+keys	O
+.	O
+
+Example	O
+of	O
+using	O
+native	O
+code	O
+for	O
+obfuscation	O
+Examples	O
+of	O
+using	O
+string	O
+concatenation	O
+for	O
+obfuscation	O
+Example	O
+of	O
+encrypting	O
+strings	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+distribution	O
+geography	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+is	O
+primarily	O
+aimed	O
+at	O
+Russian	O
+users	O
+:	O
+98	O
+%	O
+of	O
+infections	O
+(	O
+225,000	O
+)	O
+occur	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+,	O
+since	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+specifically	O
+target	O
+clients	O
+of	O
+a	O
+major	O
+Russian	O
+bank	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+also	O
+hit	O
+users	O
+from	O
+Ukraine	O
+,	O
+Turkey	O
+,	O
+Germany	O
+,	O
+Belarus	O
+,	O
+Poland	O
+,	O
+Armenia	O
+,	O
+Kazakhstan	O
+,	O
+the	O
+US	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+The	O
+case	O
+of	O
+Asacub	B-Malware
+shows	O
+that	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+function	O
+for	O
+several	O
+years	O
+with	O
+minimal	O
+changes	O
+to	O
+the	O
+distribution	O
+scheme	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+basically	O
+SMS	O
+spam	O
+:	O
+many	O
+people	O
+still	O
+follow	O
+suspicious	O
+links	O
+,	O
+install	O
+software	O
+from	O
+third-party	O
+sources	O
+,	O
+and	O
+give	O
+permissions	O
+to	O
+apps	O
+without	O
+a	O
+second	O
+thought	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+same	O
+time	O
+,	O
+cybercriminals	O
+are	O
+reluctant	O
+to	O
+change	O
+the	O
+method	O
+of	O
+communication	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+since	O
+this	O
+would	O
+require	O
+more	O
+effort	O
+and	O
+reap	O
+less	O
+benefit	O
+than	O
+modifying	O
+the	O
+executable	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+most	O
+significant	O
+change	O
+in	O
+this	O
+particular	O
+Trojan	O
+’	O
+s	O
+history	O
+was	O
+the	O
+encryption	O
+of	O
+data	O
+sent	O
+between	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+That	O
+said	O
+,	O
+so	O
+as	O
+to	O
+hinder	O
+detection	O
+of	O
+new	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+’	O
+s	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+and	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+domains	O
+are	O
+changed	O
+regularly	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+download	O
+links	O
+are	O
+often	O
+one-time-use	O
+.	O
+
+IOCs	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+:	O
+155.133.82.181	B-Indicator
+155.133.82.240	B-Indicator
+155.133.82.244	B-Indicator
+185.234.218.59	B-Indicator
+195.22.126.160	B-Indicator
+195.22.126.163	B-Indicator
+195.22.126.80	B-Indicator
+195.22.126.81	B-Indicator
+5.45.73.24	B-Indicator
+5.45.74.130	B-Indicator
+IP	I-Indicator
+addresses	I-Indicator
+from	O
+which	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+was	O
+downloaded	O
+:	O
+185.174.173.31	B-Indicator
+185.234.218.59	B-Indicator
+188.166.156.110	B-Indicator
+195.22.126.160	B-Indicator
+195.22.126.80	B-Indicator
+195.22.126.81	B-Indicator
+
+195.22.126.82	B-Indicator
+195.22.126.83	B-Indicator
+SHA256	O
+:	O
+158c7688877853ffedb572ccaa8aa9eff47fa379338151f486e46d8983ce1b67	B-Indicator
+3aedbe7057130cf359b9b57fa533c2b85bab9612c34697585497734530e7457d	B-Indicator
+f3ae6762df3f2c56b3fe598a9e3ff96ddf878c553be95bacbd192bd14debd637	B-Indicator
+df61a75b7cfa128d4912e5cb648cfc504a8e7b25f6c83ed19194905fef8624c8	B-Indicator
+
+c0cfd462ab21f6798e962515ac0c15a92036edd3e2e63639263bf2fd2a10c184	B-Indicator
+d791e0ce494104e2ae0092bb4adc398ce740fef28fa2280840ae7f61d4734514	B-Indicator
+38dcec47e2f4471b032a8872ca695044ddf0c61b9e8d37274147158f689d65b9	B-Indicator
+27cea60e23b0f62b4b131da29fdda916bc4539c34bb142fb6d3f8bb82380fe4c	B-Indicator
+
+31edacd064debdae892ab0bc788091c58a03808997e11b6c46a6a5de493ed25d	B-Indicator
+87ffec0fe0e7a83e6433694d7f24cfde2f70fc45800aa2acb8e816ceba428951	B-Indicator
+eabc604fe6b5943187c12b8635755c303c450f718cc0c8e561df22a27264f101	B-Indicator
+Kernel	O
+Backdoor	O
+found	O
+in	O
+Gadgets	O
+Powered	O
+by	O
+Popular	O
+Chinese	O
+ARM	B-System
+
+Maker	O
+May	O
+12	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+Mohit	O
+Kumar	O
+How	O
+to	O
+Hack	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+?	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+possibly	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+frequently	O
+asked	O
+questions	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Internet	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+not	O
+pretty	O
+simple	O
+to	O
+hack	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+and	O
+gadgets	O
+,	O
+sometimes	O
+you	O
+just	O
+get	O
+lucky	O
+to	O
+find	O
+a	O
+backdoor	O
+access	O
+.	O
+
+Thanks	O
+to	O
+Allwinner	B-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+Chinese	O
+ARM	B-System
+system-on-a-chip	O
+maker	O
+,	O
+which	O
+has	O
+recently	O
+been	O
+caught	O
+shipping	O
+a	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Linux	B-System
+Kernel	O
+with	O
+an	O
+incredibly	O
+simple	O
+and	O
+easy-to-use	O
+built-in	O
+backdoor	O
+.	O
+
+Chinese	O
+fabless	O
+semiconductor	O
+company	O
+Allwinner	B-Organization
+is	O
+a	O
+leading	O
+supplier	O
+of	O
+application	O
+processors	O
+that	O
+are	O
+used	O
+in	O
+many	O
+low-cost	O
+Android	B-System
+tablets	O
+,	O
+ARM-based	B-Organization
+PCs	O
+,	O
+set-top	O
+boxes	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+electronic	O
+devices	O
+worldwide	O
+.	O
+
+Simple	O
+Backdoor	O
+Exploit	O
+to	O
+Hack	O
+Android	B-System
+Devices	O
+All	O
+you	O
+need	O
+to	O
+do	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+root	O
+access	O
+of	O
+an	O
+affected	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+is…	O
+Send	O
+the	O
+text	O
+"	O
+rootmydevice	O
+''	O
+to	O
+any	O
+undocumented	O
+debugging	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+local	O
+privileges	O
+escalation	O
+backdoor	O
+code	O
+for	O
+debugging	O
+ARM-powered	B-System
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+managed	O
+to	O
+make	O
+its	O
+way	O
+in	O
+shipped	O
+firmware	O
+after	O
+firmware	O
+makers	O
+wrote	O
+their	O
+own	O
+kernel	O
+code	O
+underneath	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+Android	B-System
+build	O
+for	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+though	O
+the	O
+mainstream	O
+kernel	O
+source	O
+is	O
+unaffected	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+backdoor	O
+code	O
+is	O
+believed	O
+to	O
+have	O
+been	O
+left	O
+by	O
+mistake	O
+by	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+after	O
+completing	O
+the	O
+debugging	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+exploiting	O
+this	O
+issue	O
+,	O
+any	O
+process	O
+running	O
+with	O
+any	O
+UID	O
+can	O
+be	O
+converted	O
+into	O
+root	O
+easily	O
+by	O
+simply	O
+using	O
+the	O
+following	O
+command	O
+:	O
+echo	O
+"	O
+rootmydevice	B-Indicator
+''	O
+>	I-Indicator
+/proc/sunxi_debug/sunxi_debug	I-Indicator
+The	O
+Linux	B-Indicator
+3.4-sunxi	I-Indicator
+kernel	O
+was	O
+originally	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+support	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+operating	O
+system	O
+on	O
+Allwinner	B-Organization
+ARM	B-System
+for	O
+tablets	O
+,	O
+but	O
+later	O
+it	O
+was	O
+used	O
+to	O
+port	O
+Linux	B-System
+to	O
+many	O
+Allwinner	B-Organization
+processors	O
+on	O
+boards	O
+like	O
+Banana	B-System
+Pi	I-System
+micro-PCs	I-System
+,	O
+Orange	B-System
+Pi	I-System
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+forum	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Armbian	B-System
+operating	O
+system	O
+,	O
+a	O
+moderator	O
+who	O
+goes	O
+by	O
+the	O
+name	O
+Tkaiser	O
+noted	O
+that	O
+the	O
+backdoor	O
+code	O
+could	O
+remotely	O
+be	O
+exploitable	O
+"	O
+if	O
+combined	O
+with	O
+networked	O
+services	O
+that	O
+might	O
+allow	O
+access	O
+to	O
+/proc	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+''	O
+This	O
+security	O
+hole	O
+is	O
+currently	O
+present	O
+in	O
+every	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+image	O
+for	O
+A83T	B-System
+,	O
+H3	B-System
+or	O
+H8	B-System
+devices	O
+that	O
+rely	O
+on	O
+kernel	B-System
+3.4	I-System
+,	O
+he	O
+added	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+blunder	O
+made	O
+by	O
+the	O
+company	O
+has	O
+been	O
+frustrating	O
+to	O
+many	O
+developers	O
+.	O
+
+Allwinner	B-Organization
+has	O
+also	O
+been	O
+less	O
+transparent	O
+about	O
+the	O
+backdoor	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+David	O
+Manouchehri	O
+released	O
+the	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+backdoor	O
+through	O
+its	O
+own	O
+Github	B-Organization
+account	O
+(	O
+Pastebin	B-Organization
+)	O
+and	O
+then	O
+apparently	O
+deleted	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+Mobile	O
+Malware	O
+Evolution	O
+:	O
+2013	O
+24	O
+FEB	O
+2014	O
+The	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+sector	O
+is	O
+growing	O
+rapidly	O
+both	O
+technologically	O
+and	O
+structurally	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+safe	O
+to	O
+say	O
+that	O
+today	O
+’	O
+s	O
+cybercriminal	O
+is	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+a	O
+lone	O
+hacker	O
+but	O
+part	O
+of	O
+a	O
+serious	O
+business	O
+operation	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+various	O
+types	O
+of	O
+actors	O
+involved	O
+in	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+industry	O
+:	O
+virus	O
+writers	O
+,	O
+testers	O
+,	O
+interface	O
+designers	O
+of	O
+both	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+the	O
+web	O
+pages	O
+they	O
+are	O
+distributed	O
+from	O
+,	O
+owners	O
+of	O
+the	O
+partner	O
+programs	O
+that	O
+spread	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+botnet	O
+owners	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+division	O
+of	O
+labor	O
+among	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+behavior	O
+of	O
+their	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2013	O
+,	O
+there	O
+was	O
+evidence	O
+of	O
+cooperation	O
+(	O
+most	O
+probably	O
+on	O
+a	O
+commercial	O
+basis	O
+)	O
+between	O
+different	O
+groups	O
+of	O
+virus	O
+writers	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+botnet	O
+Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Opfake.a	B-Malware
+,	O
+in	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+its	O
+own	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+also	O
+spread	O
+Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.a	B-Malware
+by	O
+sending	O
+spam	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+link	O
+to	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+list	O
+of	O
+contacts	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+now	O
+clear	O
+that	O
+a	O
+distinct	O
+industry	O
+has	O
+developed	O
+and	O
+is	O
+becoming	O
+more	O
+focused	O
+on	O
+extracting	O
+profits	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+clearly	O
+evident	O
+from	O
+the	O
+functionality	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+2013	O
+in	O
+figures	O
+A	O
+total	O
+of	O
+143,211	O
+new	O
+modifications	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+programs	O
+targeting	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+were	O
+detected	O
+in	O
+all	O
+of	O
+2013	O
+(	O
+as	O
+of	O
+January	O
+1	O
+,	O
+2014	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2013	O
+,	O
+3,905,502	O
+installation	O
+packages	O
+were	O
+used	O
+by	O
+cybercriminals	O
+to	O
+distribute	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Overall	O
+in	O
+2012-2013	O
+we	O
+detected	O
+approximately	O
+10,000,000	O
+unique	O
+malicious	O
+installation	O
+packages	O
+:	O
+Different	O
+installation	O
+packages	O
+can	O
+install	O
+programs	O
+with	O
+the	O
+same	O
+functionality	O
+that	O
+differ	O
+only	O
+in	O
+terms	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+interface	O
+and	O
+,	O
+for	O
+instance	O
+,	O
+the	O
+content	O
+of	O
+the	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+it	O
+spreads	O
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+remains	O
+a	O
+prime	O
+target	O
+for	O
+malicious	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+98.05	O
+%	O
+of	O
+all	O
+malware	O
+detected	O
+in	O
+2013	O
+targeted	O
+this	O
+platform	O
+,	O
+confirming	O
+both	O
+the	O
+popularity	O
+of	O
+this	O
+mobile	O
+OS	O
+and	O
+the	O
+vulnerability	O
+of	O
+its	O
+architecture	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+users	O
+’	O
+money	O
+,	O
+including	O
+SMS-Trojans	O
+,	O
+and	O
+lots	O
+of	O
+backdoors	O
+and	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+Over	O
+the	O
+year	O
+,	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+modifications	O
+designed	O
+for	O
+phishing	O
+,	O
+the	O
+theft	O
+of	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+information	O
+and	O
+money	O
+increased	O
+by	O
+a	O
+factor	O
+of	O
+19.7	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2013	O
+,	O
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+Lab	I-Organization
+mobile	O
+products	O
+prevented	O
+2,500	O
+infections	O
+by	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+Methods	O
+and	O
+techniques	O
+2013	O
+not	O
+only	O
+saw	O
+a	O
+radical	O
+increase	O
+in	O
+output	O
+from	O
+mobile	O
+virus	O
+writers	O
+but	O
+also	O
+saw	O
+them	O
+actively	O
+applying	O
+methods	O
+and	O
+technologies	O
+that	O
+allowed	O
+cybercriminals	O
+to	O
+use	O
+their	O
+malware	O
+more	O
+effectively	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+were	O
+several	O
+distinct	O
+areas	O
+where	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+underwent	O
+advances	O
+.	O
+
+Distribution	O
+Cybercriminals	O
+made	O
+use	O
+of	O
+some	O
+exceptionally	O
+sophisticated	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Infecting	O
+legal	O
+web	O
+resources	O
+help	O
+spread	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+via	O
+popular	O
+websites	O
+.	O
+
+More	O
+and	O
+more	O
+smartphone	O
+and	O
+tablet	O
+owners	O
+use	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+access	O
+websites	O
+,	O
+unaware	O
+that	O
+even	O
+the	O
+most	O
+reputable	O
+resources	O
+can	O
+be	O
+hacked	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+our	O
+data	O
+,	O
+0.4	O
+%	O
+of	O
+the	O
+websites	O
+visited	O
+by	O
+users	O
+of	O
+our	O
+products	O
+were	O
+compromised	O
+sites	O
+.	O
+
+Distribution	O
+via	O
+alternative	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+Asia	O
+there	O
+are	O
+numerous	O
+companies	O
+producing	O
+Android-based	B-System
+devices	O
+and	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+,	O
+and	O
+many	O
+of	O
+them	O
+offer	O
+users	O
+their	O
+own	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+containing	O
+programs	O
+that	O
+can	O
+not	O
+be	O
+found	O
+in	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+purely	O
+nominal	O
+control	O
+over	O
+the	O
+applications	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+these	O
+stores	O
+means	O
+attackers	O
+can	O
+conceal	O
+Trojans	O
+in	O
+apps	O
+made	O
+to	O
+look	O
+like	O
+innocent	O
+games	O
+or	O
+utilities	O
+.	O
+
+Distribution	O
+via	O
+botnets	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+rule	O
+,	O
+bots	O
+self-proliferate	O
+by	O
+sending	O
+out	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+with	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+link	O
+to	O
+addresses	O
+in	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+address	O
+book	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+also	O
+registered	O
+one	O
+episode	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+spreading	O
+via	O
+a	O
+third-party	O
+botnet	O
+.	O
+
+Resistance	O
+to	O
+anti-malware	O
+protection	O
+The	O
+ability	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+software	O
+to	O
+operate	O
+continuously	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+is	O
+an	O
+important	O
+aspect	O
+of	O
+its	O
+development	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+longer	O
+a	O
+Trojan	O
+“	O
+lives	O
+”	O
+on	O
+a	O
+smartphone	O
+,	O
+the	O
+more	O
+money	O
+it	O
+will	O
+make	O
+for	O
+the	O
+owner	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+an	O
+area	O
+where	O
+virus	O
+writers	O
+are	O
+actively	O
+working	O
+,	O
+resulting	O
+in	O
+a	O
+large	O
+number	O
+of	O
+technological	O
+innovations	O
+.	O
+
+Criminals	O
+are	O
+increasingly	O
+using	O
+obfuscation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+deliberate	O
+act	O
+of	O
+creating	O
+complex	O
+code	O
+to	O
+make	O
+it	O
+difficult	O
+to	O
+analyze	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+more	O
+complex	O
+the	O
+obfuscation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+longer	O
+it	O
+will	O
+take	O
+an	O
+antivirus	O
+solution	O
+to	O
+neutralize	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Tellingly	O
+,	O
+current	O
+virus	O
+writers	O
+have	O
+mastered	O
+commercial	O
+obfuscators	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+implies	O
+they	O
+have	O
+made	O
+considerable	O
+investments	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+one	O
+commercial	O
+obfuscator	O
+,	O
+which	O
+cost	O
+€350	O
+,	O
+was	O
+used	O
+for	O
+Trojans	O
+and	O
+Opfak.bo	B-Malware
+Obad.a	I-Malware
+Android	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+are	O
+used	O
+by	O
+criminals	O
+for	O
+three	O
+reasons	O
+:	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+the	O
+code	O
+integrity	O
+check	O
+when	O
+installing	O
+an	O
+application	O
+(	O
+vulnerability	O
+Master	O
+Key	O
+)	O
+;	O
+to	O
+enhance	O
+the	O
+rights	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+considerably	O
+extending	O
+their	O
+capabilities	O
+;	O
+and	O
+to	O
+make	O
+it	O
+more	O
+difficult	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+uses	O
+a	O
+previously	O
+unknown	O
+vulnerability	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+itself	O
+from	O
+being	O
+removed	O
+manually	O
+or	O
+by	O
+the	O
+antivirus	O
+program	O
+.	O
+
+Cybercriminals	O
+also	O
+exploit	O
+the	O
+Master	B-Vulnerability
+Key	I-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	I-Vulnerability
+and	O
+have	O
+learned	O
+to	O
+embed	O
+unsigned	O
+executable	O
+files	O
+in	O
+Android	B-System
+installation	O
+packages	O
+.	O
+
+Digital	O
+signature	O
+verification	O
+can	O
+be	O
+bypassed	O
+by	O
+giving	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+file	O
+exactly	O
+the	O
+same	O
+name	O
+as	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+file	O
+and	O
+placing	O
+it	O
+on	O
+the	O
+same	O
+level	O
+in	O
+the	O
+archive	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+system	O
+verifies	O
+the	O
+signature	O
+of	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+file	O
+while	O
+installing	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+Unfortunately	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+feature	O
+of	O
+Android	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+that	O
+means	O
+it	O
+is	O
+only	O
+possible	O
+to	O
+get	O
+rid	O
+of	O
+them	O
+by	O
+receiving	O
+an	O
+update	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+manufacturers	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+many	O
+users	O
+are	O
+in	O
+no	O
+hurry	O
+to	O
+update	O
+the	O
+operating	O
+systems	O
+of	O
+their	O
+products	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+a	O
+smartphone	O
+or	O
+tablet	O
+was	O
+released	O
+more	O
+than	O
+a	O
+year	O
+ago	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+probably	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+supported	O
+by	O
+the	O
+manufacturer	O
+and	O
+patching	O
+of	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+is	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+provided	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+that	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+only	O
+help	O
+comes	O
+from	O
+an	O
+antivirus	O
+solution	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+Kaspersky	B-System
+Internet	I-System
+Security	I-System
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+Embedding	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+in	O
+legitimate	O
+programs	O
+helps	O
+conceal	O
+infections	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+.	O
+
+Of	O
+course	O
+,	O
+this	O
+does	O
+not	O
+mean	O
+the	O
+digital	O
+signature	O
+of	O
+the	O
+software	O
+developer	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+absence	O
+of	O
+certification	O
+centers	O
+verifying	O
+the	O
+digital	O
+signatures	O
+of	O
+Android	O
+programs	O
+,	O
+nothing	O
+prevents	O
+criminals	O
+from	O
+adding	O
+their	O
+own	O
+signature	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+,	O
+a	O
+copy	O
+of	O
+Angry	B-System
+Birds	I-System
+installed	O
+from	O
+an	O
+unofficial	O
+app	O
+store	O
+or	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+a	O
+forum	O
+could	O
+easily	O
+contain	O
+malicious	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+Capabilities	O
+and	O
+functionality	O
+In	O
+2013	O
+,	O
+we	O
+detected	O
+several	O
+technological	O
+innovations	O
+developed	O
+and	O
+used	O
+by	O
+criminals	O
+in	O
+their	O
+malicious	O
+software	O
+.	O
+
+Below	O
+are	O
+descriptions	O
+of	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+interesting	O
+.	O
+
+Control	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+from	O
+a	O
+single	O
+center	O
+provides	O
+maximum	O
+flexibility	O
+.	O
+
+Botnets	O
+can	O
+make	O
+considerably	O
+more	O
+money	O
+than	O
+autonomous	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+comes	O
+as	O
+no	O
+surprise	O
+then	O
+that	O
+many	O
+SMS-Trojans	O
+include	O
+bot	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+our	O
+estimates	O
+,	O
+about	O
+60	O
+%	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+are	O
+elements	O
+of	O
+both	O
+large	O
+and	O
+small	O
+mobile	O
+botnets	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+using	O
+Google	B-System
+Cloud	I-System
+Messaging	I-System
+botnet	O
+owners	O
+can	O
+operate	O
+without	O
+a	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+thus	O
+eliminating	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+of	O
+the	O
+botnet	O
+being	O
+detected	O
+and	O
+blocked	O
+by	O
+law	O
+enforcement	O
+authorities	O
+.	O
+
+Google	B-System
+Cloud	I-System
+Messaging	I-System
+is	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+send	O
+short	O
+message	O
+(	O
+up	O
+to	O
+4	O
+KB	O
+)	O
+to	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+via	O
+Google	B-Organization
+services	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+developer	O
+simply	O
+has	O
+to	O
+register	O
+and	O
+receive	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+ID	O
+for	O
+his	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+commands	O
+received	O
+via	O
+GCM	B-System
+can	O
+not	O
+be	O
+blocked	O
+immediately	O
+on	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+detected	O
+several	O
+malicious	O
+programs	O
+using	O
+GCM	B-System
+for	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+–	O
+the	O
+widespread	O
+Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a	B-Malware
+,	O
+Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao	B-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a	B-Malware
+among	O
+others	O
+.	O
+
+Google	B-Organization
+is	O
+actively	O
+combating	O
+this	O
+use	O
+of	O
+the	O
+service	O
+,	O
+responding	O
+quickly	O
+to	O
+reports	O
+from	O
+antivirus	O
+companies	O
+and	O
+blocking	O
+the	O
+IDs	O
+of	O
+cybercriminals	O
+.	O
+
+Attacks	O
+on	O
+Windows	B-System
+XP	I-System
+allows	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+a	O
+PC	O
+after	O
+connecting	O
+a	O
+smartphone	O
+or	O
+tablet	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+early	O
+2013	O
+we	O
+detected	O
+two	O
+identical	O
+applications	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+that	O
+were	O
+allegedly	O
+designed	O
+for	O
+cleaning	O
+the	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+of	O
+Android-based	B-System
+devices	O
+from	O
+unnecessary	O
+processes	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+fact	O
+,	O
+the	O
+applications	O
+are	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+autorun.inf	B-Indicator
+file	I-Indicator
+,	O
+an	O
+icon	O
+file	O
+and	O
+the	O
+win32-Trojan	B-System
+file	O
+,	O
+which	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+malicious	O
+program	O
+locates	O
+in	O
+the	O
+root	O
+directory	O
+of	O
+an	O
+SD	B-System
+card	I-System
+.	O
+
+On	O
+connecting	O
+a	O
+smartphone	O
+in	O
+the	O
+USB	B-System
+drive	I-System
+emulation	O
+mode	O
+to	O
+a	O
+computer	O
+running	O
+Windows	B-System
+XP	I-System
+,	O
+the	O
+system	O
+automatically	O
+starts	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+(	O
+if	O
+AutoPlay	O
+on	O
+the	O
+external	O
+media	O
+is	O
+not	O
+disabled	O
+)	O
+and	O
+is	O
+infected	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+criminals	O
+to	O
+remotely	O
+control	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+computer	O
+and	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+recording	O
+sound	O
+from	O
+a	O
+microphone	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+would	O
+like	O
+to	O
+emphasize	O
+that	O
+this	O
+method	O
+of	O
+attack	O
+only	O
+works	O
+on	O
+Windows	B-System
+XP	I-System
+and	O
+Android	B-System
+versions	O
+prior	O
+to	O
+2.2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+most	O
+advanced	O
+mobile	O
+malicious	O
+programs	O
+today	O
+are	O
+Trojans	O
+targeting	O
+users	O
+’	O
+bank	O
+accounts	O
+–	O
+the	O
+most	O
+attractive	O
+source	O
+of	O
+criminal	O
+earnings	O
+.	O
+
+Trend	O
+of	O
+the	O
+year	O
+:	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+2013	O
+was	O
+marked	O
+by	O
+a	O
+rapid	O
+rise	O
+in	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+cyber	O
+industry	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+becoming	O
+more	O
+focused	O
+on	O
+making	O
+profits	O
+more	O
+effectively	O
+,	O
+i.e.	O
+,	O
+mobile	O
+phishing	O
+,	O
+theft	O
+of	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+information	O
+,	O
+money	O
+transfers	O
+from	O
+bank	O
+cards	O
+to	O
+mobile	O
+phones	O
+and	O
+from	O
+phones	O
+to	O
+the	O
+criminalas	O
+’	O
+e-wallets	O
+.	O
+
+Cybercriminals	O
+have	O
+become	O
+obsessed	O
+by	O
+this	O
+method	O
+of	O
+illegal	O
+earnings	O
+:	O
+at	O
+the	O
+beginning	O
+of	O
+the	O
+year	O
+we	O
+knew	O
+only	O
+67	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+,	O
+but	O
+by	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+the	O
+year	O
+there	O
+were	O
+already	O
+1321	O
+unique	O
+samples	O
+.	O
+
+Kaspersky	B-System
+Lab	I-System
+mobile	O
+products	O
+prevented	O
+2,500	O
+infections	O
+by	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+mobile_treats_2013_04s	O
+The	O
+number	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+in	O
+our	O
+collection	O
+Mobile	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+can	O
+run	O
+together	O
+with	O
+Win-32	B-System
+Trojans	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+the	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+–	O
+mTAN	O
+theft	O
+(	O
+the	O
+theft	O
+of	O
+banking	O
+verification	O
+codes	O
+that	O
+banks	O
+send	O
+their	O
+customers	O
+in	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+in	O
+2013	O
+,	O
+autonomous	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+developed	O
+further	O
+.	O
+
+Currently	O
+,	O
+such	O
+Trojans	O
+attack	O
+a	O
+limited	O
+number	O
+of	O
+bank	O
+customers	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+is	O
+expected	O
+that	O
+cybercriminals	O
+will	O
+invent	O
+new	O
+techniques	O
+that	O
+will	O
+allow	O
+them	O
+to	O
+expand	O
+the	O
+number	O
+and	O
+the	O
+geography	O
+of	O
+potential	O
+victims	O
+.	O
+
+mobile_treats_2013_05s	O
+Infections	O
+caused	O
+by	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+programs	O
+Today	O
+,	O
+the	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+attacks	O
+affect	O
+users	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+and	O
+the	O
+CIS	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+this	O
+situation	O
+will	O
+not	O
+last	O
+long	O
+:	O
+given	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+’	O
+interest	O
+in	O
+user	O
+bank	O
+accounts	O
+,	O
+the	O
+activity	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+is	O
+expected	O
+to	O
+grow	O
+in	O
+other	O
+countries	O
+in	O
+2014	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+above	O
+,	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+are	O
+perhaps	O
+the	O
+most	O
+complex	O
+of	O
+all	O
+mobile	O
+threats	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+is	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+striking	O
+examples	O
+.	O
+
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+In	O
+mid-July	O
+,	O
+we	O
+detected	O
+Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Svpeng.a	B-Malware
+which	O
+,	O
+unlike	O
+its	O
+SMS	O
+Trojan	O
+counterparts	O
+,	O
+is	O
+focused	O
+on	O
+stealing	O
+money	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victiim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+bank	O
+account	O
+rather	O
+than	O
+from	O
+his	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+can	O
+not	O
+act	O
+independently	O
+and	O
+operates	O
+strictly	O
+in	O
+accordance	O
+with	O
+commands	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malicious	O
+program	O
+spreads	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+spam	O
+and	O
+from	O
+compromised	O
+legitimate	O
+sites	O
+that	O
+redirect	O
+mobile	O
+users	O
+to	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+resource	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+the	O
+user	O
+is	O
+prompted	O
+to	O
+download	O
+and	O
+install	O
+a	O
+Trojan	O
+imitating	O
+an	O
+Adobe	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+Player	I-System
+update	O
+.	O
+
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+doing	O
+lots	O
+of	O
+things	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+collects	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+smartphone	O
+(	O
+IMEI	O
+,	O
+country	O
+,	O
+service	O
+provider	O
+,	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+language	O
+)	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+host	O
+via	O
+the	O
+HTTP	O
+POST	O
+request	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+necessary	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+banks	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+may	O
+use	O
+.	O
+
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+is	O
+only	O
+currently	O
+attacking	O
+clients	O
+of	O
+Russian	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+Typically	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+cybercriminals	O
+first	O
+test-run	O
+a	O
+technology	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Russian	O
+sector	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Internet	O
+and	O
+then	O
+roll	O
+it	O
+out	O
+globally	O
+,	O
+attacking	O
+users	O
+in	O
+other	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+steals	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+information	O
+about	O
+voice	O
+calls	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+helps	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+find	O
+out	O
+which	O
+banks	O
+the	O
+owner	O
+of	O
+the	O
+smartphone	O
+calls	O
+–	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+receives	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+bank	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+from	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+steals	O
+money	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+bank	O
+account	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+Russia	O
+,	O
+some	O
+major	O
+banks	O
+offer	O
+their	O
+clients	O
+a	O
+special	O
+service	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+them	O
+to	O
+transfer	O
+money	O
+from	O
+their	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+to	O
+their	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+account	O
+.	O
+
+Customers	O
+have	O
+to	O
+send	O
+a	O
+set	O
+text	O
+message	O
+from	O
+their	O
+phone	O
+to	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+bank	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+sends	O
+the	O
+corresponding	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+services	O
+of	O
+two	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+does	O
+this	O
+to	O
+check	O
+if	O
+the	O
+cards	O
+from	O
+these	O
+banks	O
+are	O
+attached	O
+to	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+phone	O
+and	O
+to	O
+find	O
+out	O
+the	O
+account	O
+balance	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+is	O
+attached	O
+to	O
+a	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+,	O
+commands	O
+are	O
+sent	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+with	O
+instructions	O
+to	O
+transfer	O
+money	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+bank	O
+account	O
+to	O
+his/her	O
+mobile	O
+account	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+cybercriminals	O
+then	O
+send	O
+this	O
+money	O
+to	O
+a	O
+digital	O
+wallet	O
+or	O
+to	O
+a	O
+premium	O
+number	O
+and	O
+cash	O
+it	O
+in	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+steals	O
+logins	O
+and	O
+passwords	O
+to	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+accounts	O
+by	O
+substituting	O
+he	O
+window	O
+displayed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+Currently	O
+,	O
+this	O
+only	O
+affects	O
+Russian	O
+banks	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+technology	O
+behind	O
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+could	O
+easily	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+target	O
+other	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+steals	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+information	O
+(	O
+the	O
+number	O
+,	O
+the	O
+expiry	O
+date	O
+,	O
+CVC2/CVV2	O
+)	O
+imitating	O
+the	O
+process	O
+of	O
+registering	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+with	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+has	O
+launched	O
+Play	B-System
+Market	I-System
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+intercepts	O
+the	O
+event	O
+and	O
+displays	O
+a	O
+window	O
+on	O
+top	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+window	O
+,	O
+prompting	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+enter	O
+his/her	O
+bank	O
+card	O
+details	O
+in	O
+the	O
+fake	O
+window	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+data	O
+entered	O
+by	O
+the	O
+user	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+.	O
+
+mobile_treats_2013_06s	O
+It	O
+extorts	O
+money	O
+from	O
+users	O
+by	O
+threatening	O
+to	O
+block	O
+the	O
+smartphone	O
+:	O
+it	O
+displays	O
+a	O
+message	O
+demanding	O
+$	O
+500	O
+to	O
+unblock	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+actual	O
+fact	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+does	O
+not	O
+block	O
+anything	O
+and	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+without	O
+any	O
+problems	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+hides	O
+traces	O
+of	O
+its	O
+activity	O
+by	O
+masking	O
+the	O
+outgoing	O
+and	O
+incoming	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+blocking	O
+calls	O
+and	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+numbers	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+gets	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+bank	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+from	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+protects	O
+itself	O
+from	O
+deletion	O
+by	O
+requesting	O
+Device	O
+Administrator	O
+rights	O
+during	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+delete	O
+button	O
+in	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+applications	O
+becomes	O
+inactive	O
+,	O
+which	O
+may	O
+cause	O
+problems	O
+for	O
+inexperienced	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+impossible	O
+to	O
+deprive	O
+it	O
+of	O
+these	O
+rights	O
+without	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+specialized	O
+tools	O
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Kaspersky	B-System
+Internet	I-System
+Security	I-System
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+)	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+protect	O
+itself	O
+from	O
+being	O
+removed	O
+,	O
+Svpeng	B-Malware
+uses	O
+a	O
+previously	O
+unknown	O
+vulnerability	O
+in	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+It	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+same	O
+trick	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+the	O
+smartphone	O
+from	O
+being	O
+returned	O
+to	O
+its	O
+factory	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+is	O
+distributed	O
+in	O
+Russia	O
+and	O
+CIS	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+,	O
+as	O
+we	O
+have	O
+already	O
+mentioned	O
+,	O
+the	O
+criminals	O
+could	O
+easily	O
+turn	O
+their	O
+attention	O
+to	O
+users	O
+in	O
+other	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+Perkele	B-Malware
+and	O
+Wroba	B-Malware
+Foreign	O
+users	O
+have	O
+also	O
+been	O
+on	O
+the	O
+receiving	O
+end	O
+of	O
+several	O
+malicious	O
+innovations	O
+targeting	O
+bank	O
+accounts	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Perkele	B-Malware
+Android	O
+Trojan	O
+not	O
+only	O
+attacks	O
+Russian	O
+users	O
+but	O
+also	O
+clients	O
+of	O
+several	O
+European	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+of	O
+interest	O
+primarily	O
+because	O
+it	O
+operates	O
+in	O
+conjunction	O
+with	O
+various	O
+banking	O
+win32-Trojans	B-System
+.	O
+
+Its	O
+main	O
+task	O
+is	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+the	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+of	O
+the	O
+client	O
+in	O
+the	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+Due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+specific	O
+nature	O
+of	O
+its	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+Perkele	B-Malware
+is	O
+distributed	O
+in	O
+a	O
+rather	O
+unusual	O
+way	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+a	O
+user	O
+enters	O
+an	O
+Internet	O
+banking	O
+site	O
+on	O
+a	O
+computer	O
+infected	O
+by	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+(	O
+ZeuS	B-Malware
+,	O
+Citadel	B-Malware
+)	O
+,	O
+a	O
+request	O
+about	O
+the	O
+smartphone	O
+number	O
+and	O
+type	O
+of	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+is	O
+injected	O
+into	O
+the	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+authentication	O
+page	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+data	O
+is	O
+immediately	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+and	O
+the	O
+computer	O
+displays	O
+the	O
+QR	O
+code	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+link	O
+to	O
+the	O
+alleged	O
+certificate	O
+of	O
+the	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+scanning	O
+the	O
+QR	O
+code	O
+and	O
+installing	O
+a	O
+component	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+the	O
+link	O
+,	O
+the	O
+user	O
+infects	O
+his	O
+smartphone	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+program	O
+that	O
+boasts	O
+functionality	O
+that	O
+is	O
+of	O
+great	O
+interest	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+.	O
+
+Perkele	B-Malware
+intercepts	O
+mTANs	O
+(	O
+confirmation	O
+codes	O
+for	O
+banking	O
+operations	O
+)	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+via	O
+text	O
+message	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+using	O
+the	O
+login	O
+and	O
+password	O
+stolen	O
+from	O
+the	O
+browser	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Windows	O
+Trojan	O
+initiates	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+transaction	O
+while	O
+Perkele	B-Malware
+intercepts	O
+(	O
+via	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+)	O
+the	O
+mTAN	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+Money	O
+then	O
+disappears	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+account	O
+and	O
+is	O
+cashed	O
+in	O
+without	O
+the	O
+owner	O
+’	O
+s	O
+knowledge	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Korean	O
+malware	O
+Wroba	B-Malware
+,	O
+in	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+the	O
+traditional	O
+vector	O
+of	O
+infection	O
+via	O
+file-sharing	O
+services	O
+,	O
+spreads	O
+via	O
+alternative	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+it	O
+infects	O
+a	O
+device	O
+,	O
+Wroba	B-Malware
+behaves	O
+very	O
+aggressively	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+searches	O
+for	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+removes	O
+them	O
+and	O
+uploads	O
+counterfeit	O
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+the	O
+outside	O
+,	O
+they	O
+are	O
+indistinguishable	O
+from	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+they	O
+possess	O
+no	O
+banking	O
+functions	O
+,	O
+and	O
+merely	O
+steal	O
+the	O
+logins	O
+and	O
+passwords	O
+entered	O
+by	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+:	O
+The	O
+Mobile	O
+APT	O
+Targeting	O
+The	O
+Israeli	B-Organization
+Defense	I-Organization
+Force	I-Organization
+That	O
+Should	O
+Be	O
+On	O
+Your	O
+Radar	O
+February	O
+16	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+is	O
+an	O
+active	O
+,	O
+advanced	O
+persistent	O
+threat	O
+(	O
+APT	O
+)	O
+that	O
+sophisticated	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+are	O
+actively	O
+using	O
+to	O
+target	O
+and	O
+spy	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Israeli	B-Organization
+Defense	I-Organization
+Force.The	I-Organization
+threat	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+surveillanceware	O
+collect	O
+a	O
+significant	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+sensitive	O
+information	O
+off	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+and	O
+seem	O
+most	O
+interested	O
+in	O
+exfiltrating	O
+images	O
+and	O
+audio	O
+content	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attackers	O
+are	O
+also	O
+hijacking	O
+the	O
+device	O
+camera	O
+to	O
+take	O
+pictures	O
+.	O
+
+Using	O
+data	O
+collected	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+global	O
+sensor	O
+network	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Lookout	O
+research	O
+team	O
+was	O
+able	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+unique	O
+visibility	O
+into	O
+the	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+malware	O
+,	O
+including	O
+11	O
+new	O
+,	O
+unreported	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+also	O
+discovered	O
+and	O
+analyzed	O
+live	O
+,	O
+misconfigured	O
+malicious	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+servers	O
+(	O
+C2	O
+)	O
+,	O
+from	O
+which	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+how	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+gets	O
+new	O
+,	O
+infected	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+secretly	O
+install	O
+and	O
+the	O
+types	O
+of	O
+activities	O
+they	O
+are	O
+monitoring	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+we	O
+uncovered	O
+the	O
+IMEIs	O
+of	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+individuals	O
+(	O
+IMEIs	O
+will	O
+not	O
+be	O
+shared	O
+publicly	O
+for	O
+the	O
+privacy	O
+and	O
+safety	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+)	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+the	O
+types	O
+of	O
+exfiltrated	O
+content	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+aggregate	O
+,	O
+the	O
+type	O
+of	O
+information	O
+stolen	O
+could	O
+let	O
+an	O
+attacker	O
+know	O
+where	O
+a	O
+person	O
+is	O
+,	O
+with	O
+whom	O
+they	O
+are	O
+associated	O
+(	O
+including	O
+contacts	O
+’	O
+profile	O
+photos	O
+)	O
+,	O
+the	O
+messages	O
+they	O
+are	O
+sending	O
+,	O
+the	O
+websites	O
+they	O
+visit	O
+and	O
+search	O
+history	O
+,	O
+screenshots	O
+that	O
+reveal	O
+data	O
+from	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+the	O
+conversations	O
+they	O
+have	O
+in	O
+the	O
+presence	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+and	O
+a	O
+myriad	O
+of	O
+images	O
+including	O
+anything	O
+at	O
+which	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+camera	O
+is	O
+pointed	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+has	O
+determined	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+very	O
+sophisticated	O
+threat	O
+that	O
+adds	O
+to	O
+the	O
+mounting	O
+evidence	O
+that	O
+targeted	O
+mobile	O
+attacks	O
+against	O
+governments	O
+and	O
+business	O
+is	O
+a	O
+real	O
+problem	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+been	O
+tracking	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+for	O
+the	O
+last	O
+month	O
+.	O
+
+Given	O
+that	O
+this	O
+is	O
+an	O
+active	O
+threat	O
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+been	O
+working	O
+behind-the-scenes	O
+with	O
+our	O
+customers	O
+to	O
+ensure	O
+both	O
+personal	O
+and	O
+enterprise	O
+customers	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+from	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+and	O
+only	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+come	O
+forward	O
+with	O
+this	O
+information	O
+after	O
+the	O
+research	O
+team	O
+at	O
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+released	O
+a	O
+report	O
+earlier	O
+today	O
+.	O
+
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+determined	O
+that	O
+though	O
+original	O
+reports	O
+of	O
+this	O
+story	O
+attribute	O
+this	O
+surveillanceware	O
+tool	O
+to	O
+Hamas	B-Organization
+,	O
+this	O
+may	O
+not	O
+be	O
+the	O
+case	O
+,	O
+as	O
+we	O
+demonstrate	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+increasing	O
+sophistication	O
+of	O
+surveillanceware	O
+The	O
+structure	O
+of	O
+the	O
+surveillanceware	O
+indicates	O
+it	O
+is	O
+very	O
+sophisticated	O
+.	O
+
+Analysis	O
+indicates	O
+there	O
+are	O
+currently	O
+two	O
+distinct	O
+variants	O
+of	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+variant	O
+is	O
+a	O
+“	O
+first	O
+stage	O
+application	O
+,	O
+”	O
+that	O
+performs	O
+basic	O
+profiling	O
+of	O
+a	O
+device	O
+,	O
+and	O
+under	O
+certain	O
+conditions	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+download	O
+and	O
+install	O
+a	O
+much	O
+more	O
+comprehensive	O
+surveillanceware	O
+component	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+the	O
+second	O
+variant	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+variant	O
+involves	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+the	O
+target	O
+into	O
+downloading	O
+a	O
+trojanized	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Previous	O
+reports	O
+alleged	O
+this	O
+surveillanceware	O
+tool	O
+was	O
+deployed	O
+using	O
+‘	O
+honey	O
+traps	O
+’	O
+where	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+it	O
+would	O
+reach	O
+out	O
+to	O
+targets	O
+via	O
+fake	O
+social	O
+media	O
+profiles	O
+of	O
+young	O
+women	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+building	O
+an	O
+initial	O
+rapport	O
+with	O
+targets	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+these	O
+social	O
+media	O
+accounts	O
+would	O
+instruct	O
+victims	O
+to	O
+install	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+app	O
+for	O
+easier	O
+communication	O
+.	O
+
+Specifically	O
+,	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+determined	O
+these	O
+were	O
+trojanized	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+SR	B-System
+Chat	I-System
+and	O
+YeeCall	B-System
+Pro	I-System
+.	O
+
+We	O
+also	O
+uncovered	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+in	O
+a	O
+billiards	O
+game	O
+,	O
+an	O
+Israeli	O
+Love	O
+Songs	O
+player	O
+,	O
+and	O
+a	O
+Move	O
+To	O
+iOS	B-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+The	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+apps	O
+contain	O
+the	O
+surveillanceware	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+uncovered	O
+nine	O
+secondary	O
+payload	O
+applications	O
+:	O
+*	O
+These	O
+apps	O
+have	O
+not	O
+been	O
+previously	O
+reported	O
+and	O
+were	O
+discovered	O
+using	O
+data	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+global	O
+sensor	O
+network	O
+,	O
+which	O
+collects	O
+app	O
+and	O
+device	O
+information	O
+from	O
+over	O
+100	O
+million	O
+sensors	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+researchers	O
+and	O
+customers	O
+with	O
+a	O
+holistic	O
+look	O
+at	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+threat	O
+ecosystem	O
+today	O
+.	O
+
+Naming	O
+additional	O
+payload	O
+applications	O
+as	O
+system	O
+updates	O
+is	O
+a	O
+clever	O
+technique	O
+used	O
+by	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+victims	O
+into	O
+believing	O
+a	O
+threat	O
+isn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+present	O
+on	O
+their	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+takes	O
+this	O
+one	O
+step	O
+further	O
+by	O
+using	O
+its	O
+dropper	O
+app	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+an	O
+appropriate	O
+second	O
+stage	O
+‘	O
+update	O
+’	O
+that	O
+may	O
+go	O
+unnoticed	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+if	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+has	O
+Viber	B-System
+on	O
+their	O
+device	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+choose	O
+to	O
+retrieve	O
+the	O
+Viber	B-System
+Update	I-System
+second	O
+stage	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+he	O
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+have	O
+Viber	O
+,	O
+the	O
+generically-named	O
+System	O
+Updates	O
+app	O
+gets	O
+downloaded	O
+and	O
+installed	O
+instead	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+was	O
+taken	O
+The	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+seem	O
+to	O
+be	O
+particularly	O
+interested	O
+in	O
+image	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+that	O
+8,929	O
+files	O
+had	O
+been	O
+exfiltrated	O
+from	O
+compromised	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+that	O
+the	O
+overwhelming	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+these	O
+,	O
+97	O
+percent	O
+,	O
+were	O
+highly	O
+likely	O
+encrypted	O
+images	O
+taken	O
+using	O
+the	O
+device	O
+camera	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+also	O
+observed	O
+automatically	O
+generated	O
+files	O
+on	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+,	O
+indicating	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+also	O
+issues	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+search	O
+for	O
+and	O
+exfiltrate	O
+PDF	O
+and	O
+Office	O
+documents	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+should	O
+be	O
+highly	O
+alarming	O
+to	O
+any	O
+government	O
+agency	O
+or	O
+enterprise	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+observed	O
+legitimate	O
+exfiltrated	O
+files	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+types	O
+of	O
+data	O
+:	O
+Contact	O
+information	O
+Compressed	O
+recorded	O
+audio	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Adaptive	O
+Multi-Rate	O
+(	O
+amr	O
+)	O
+file	O
+format	O
+Images	O
+captured	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+camera	O
+Images	O
+stored	O
+on	O
+both	O
+internal	O
+device	O
+and	O
+SDCard	O
+storage	O
+that	O
+are	O
+listed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+MediaStore	O
+Device	O
+geolocation	O
+information	O
+SMS	O
+content	O
+Chrome	O
+browser	O
+search	O
+history	O
+and	O
+bookmarks	O
+Call	O
+log	O
+information	O
+Cell	O
+tower	O
+information	O
+Device	O
+network	O
+metadata	O
+;	O
+such	O
+as	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+,	O
+device	O
+software	O
+version	O
+,	O
+network	O
+country	O
+,	O
+network	O
+operator	O
+,	O
+SIM	O
+country	O
+,	O
+SIM	O
+operator	O
+,	O
+SIM	O
+serial	O
+,	O
+IMSI	O
+,	O
+voice	O
+mail	O
+number	O
+,	O
+phone	O
+
+type	O
+,	O
+network	O
+type	O
+,	O
+data	O
+state	O
+,	O
+data	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+call	O
+state	O
+,	O
+SIM	O
+state	O
+,	O
+whether	O
+device	O
+is	O
+roaming	O
+,	O
+and	O
+if	O
+SMS	O
+is	O
+supported	O
+.	O
+
+Standard	O
+browser	O
+search	O
+history	O
+Standard	O
+browser	O
+bookmarks	O
+Device	O
+handset	O
+metadata	O
+;	O
+such	O
+as	O
+brand	O
+,	O
+display	O
+,	O
+hardware	O
+,	O
+manufacturer	O
+,	O
+product	O
+,	O
+serial	O
+,	O
+radio	O
+version	O
+,	O
+and	O
+SDK	O
+.	O
+
+Command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+API	O
+calls	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+samples	O
+are	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+communicating	O
+to	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+through	O
+an	O
+exposed	O
+API	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+websockets	O
+.	O
+
+Below	O
+is	O
+a	O
+collection	O
+of	O
+API	O
+methods	O
+and	O
+a	O
+brief	O
+description	O
+around	O
+their	O
+purpose	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+attribution	O
+Media	O
+reporting	O
+on	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+thus	O
+far	O
+attributes	O
+this	O
+surveillanceware	O
+tool	O
+to	O
+Hamas	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+Israeli	O
+media	O
+published	O
+the	O
+first	O
+reports	O
+about	O
+the	O
+social	O
+networking	O
+and	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+aspects	O
+of	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+unclear	O
+whether	O
+organizations	O
+that	O
+later	O
+reported	O
+on	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+performed	O
+their	O
+own	O
+independent	O
+research	O
+or	O
+simply	O
+based	O
+their	O
+content	O
+on	O
+the	O
+original	O
+Israeli	O
+report	O
+.	O
+
+Hamas	B-Organization
+is	O
+not	O
+widely	O
+known	O
+for	O
+having	O
+a	O
+sophisticated	O
+mobile	O
+capability	O
+,	O
+which	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+unlikely	O
+they	O
+are	O
+directly	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+has	O
+been	O
+operational	O
+for	O
+quite	O
+some	O
+time	O
+,	O
+with	O
+what	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+a	O
+test	O
+application	O
+that	O
+surfaced	O
+in	O
+late	O
+2015	O
+.	O
+
+Many	O
+of	O
+the	O
+default	O
+strings	O
+in	O
+this	O
+application	O
+are	O
+in	O
+Arabic	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+unclear	O
+whether	O
+this	O
+means	O
+early	O
+samples	O
+were	O
+targeting	O
+Arabic	O
+speakers	O
+or	O
+if	O
+the	O
+developers	O
+behind	O
+it	O
+are	O
+fluent	O
+in	O
+Arabic	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+leads	O
+us	O
+to	O
+believe	O
+this	O
+is	O
+another	O
+actor	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+this	O
+means	O
+for	O
+you	O
+All	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+customers	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+from	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+existence	O
+of	O
+threats	O
+like	O
+ViperRAT	B-Malware
+and	O
+Pegasus	B-Malware
+,	O
+the	O
+most	O
+sophisticated	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+surveillanceware	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+seen	O
+to	O
+date	O
+,	O
+are	O
+evidence	O
+that	O
+attackers	O
+are	O
+targeting	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Mobile	O
+devices	O
+are	O
+at	O
+the	O
+frontier	O
+of	O
+cyber	O
+espionage	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+criminal	O
+motives	O
+.	O
+
+Enterprise	O
+and	O
+government	O
+employees	O
+all	O
+use	O
+these	O
+devices	O
+in	O
+their	O
+day-to-day	O
+work	O
+,	O
+which	O
+means	O
+IT	O
+and	O
+security	O
+leaders	O
+within	O
+these	O
+organizations	O
+must	O
+prioritize	O
+mobile	O
+in	O
+their	O
+security	O
+strategies	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+researchers	O
+discovered	O
+another	O
+widespread	O
+malware	O
+campaign	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+Google	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+official	O
+app	O
+store	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+dubbed	O
+“	O
+Judy	B-Malware
+”	O
+,	O
+is	O
+an	O
+auto-clicking	O
+adware	O
+which	O
+was	O
+found	O
+on	O
+41	O
+apps	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+Korean	O
+company	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+generate	O
+large	O
+amounts	O
+of	O
+fraudulent	O
+clicks	O
+on	O
+advertisements	O
+,	O
+generating	O
+revenues	O
+for	O
+the	O
+perpetrators	O
+behind	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+reached	O
+an	O
+astonishing	O
+spread	O
+between	O
+4.5	O
+million	O
+and	O
+18.5	O
+million	O
+downloads	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+resided	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+for	O
+several	O
+years	O
+,	O
+but	O
+all	O
+were	O
+recently	O
+updated	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+unclear	O
+how	O
+long	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+existed	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+hence	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+spread	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+remains	O
+unknown	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+also	O
+found	O
+several	O
+apps	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+which	O
+were	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+other	O
+developers	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+connection	O
+between	O
+the	O
+two	O
+campaigns	O
+remains	O
+unclear	O
+,	O
+and	O
+it	O
+is	O
+possible	O
+that	O
+one	O
+borrowed	O
+code	O
+from	O
+the	O
+other	O
+,	O
+knowingly	O
+or	O
+unknowingly	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+oldest	O
+app	O
+of	O
+the	O
+second	O
+campaign	O
+was	O
+last	O
+updated	O
+in	O
+April	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+meaning	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+hid	O
+for	O
+a	O
+long	O
+time	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+store	I-System
+undetected	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+apps	O
+also	O
+had	O
+a	O
+large	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+downloads	O
+between	O
+4	O
+and	O
+18	O
+million	O
+,	O
+meaning	O
+the	O
+total	O
+spread	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+may	O
+have	O
+reached	O
+between	O
+8.5	O
+and	O
+36.5	O
+million	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Similar	O
+to	O
+previous	O
+malware	O
+which	O
+infiltrated	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+FalseGuide	B-Malware
+and	O
+Skinner	B-Malware
+,	O
+Judy	O
+relies	O
+on	O
+the	O
+communication	O
+with	O
+its	O
+Command	O
+and	O
+Control	O
+server	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+for	O
+its	O
+operation	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+notified	O
+Google	B-Organization
+about	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+,	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+were	O
+swiftly	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+store	I-System
+.	O
+
+How	O
+Judy	B-Malware
+operates	O
+:	O
+To	O
+bypass	O
+Bouncer	B-System
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+’	O
+s	O
+protection	O
+,	O
+the	O
+hackers	O
+create	O
+a	O
+seemingly	O
+benign	O
+bridgehead	O
+app	O
+,	O
+meant	O
+to	O
+establish	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+,	O
+and	O
+insert	O
+it	O
+into	O
+the	O
+app	O
+store	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+a	O
+user	O
+downloads	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+,	O
+it	O
+silently	O
+registers	O
+receivers	O
+which	O
+establish	O
+a	O
+connection	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+server	O
+replies	O
+with	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+,	O
+which	O
+includes	O
+JavaScript	O
+code	O
+,	O
+a	O
+user-agent	O
+string	O
+and	O
+URLs	O
+controlled	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+author	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+opens	O
+the	O
+URLs	O
+using	O
+the	O
+user	O
+agent	O
+that	O
+imitates	O
+a	O
+PC	O
+browser	O
+in	O
+a	O
+hidden	O
+webpage	O
+and	O
+receives	O
+a	O
+redirection	O
+to	O
+another	O
+website	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+website	O
+is	O
+launched	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+JavaScript	O
+code	O
+to	O
+locate	O
+and	O
+click	O
+on	O
+banners	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+ads	I-System
+infrastructure	O
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+clicking	O
+the	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+author	O
+receives	O
+payment	O
+from	O
+the	O
+website	O
+developer	O
+,	O
+which	O
+pays	O
+for	O
+the	O
+illegitimate	O
+clicks	O
+and	O
+traffic	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+JavaScript	O
+code	O
+locates	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+ads	O
+by	O
+searching	O
+for	O
+iframes	O
+which	O
+contain	O
+ads	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+ads	I-System
+infrastructure	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+image	O
+below	O
+:	O
+The	O
+fraudulent	O
+clicks	O
+generate	O
+a	O
+large	O
+revenue	O
+for	O
+the	O
+perpetrators	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+since	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+reached	O
+a	O
+presumably	O
+wide	O
+spread	O
+.	O
+
+Who	O
+is	O
+behind	O
+Judy	B-Malware
+?	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+all	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+Korean	O
+company	O
+named	O
+Kiniwini	B-Organization
+,	O
+registered	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+as	O
+ENISTUDIO	B-Organization
+corp	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+The	O
+company	O
+develops	O
+mobile	O
+apps	O
+for	O
+both	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+platforms	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+quite	O
+unusual	O
+to	O
+find	O
+an	O
+actual	O
+organization	O
+behind	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+as	O
+most	O
+of	O
+them	O
+are	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+purely	O
+malicious	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+important	O
+to	O
+note	O
+that	O
+the	O
+activity	O
+conducted	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+not	O
+borderline	O
+advertising	O
+,	O
+but	O
+definitely	O
+an	O
+illegitimate	O
+use	O
+of	O
+the	O
+users	O
+’	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+for	O
+generating	O
+fraudulent	O
+clicks	O
+,	O
+benefiting	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+the	O
+clicking	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+Judy	B-Malware
+displays	O
+a	O
+large	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+advertisements	O
+,	O
+which	O
+in	O
+some	O
+cases	O
+leave	O
+users	O
+with	O
+no	O
+option	O
+but	O
+clicking	O
+on	O
+the	O
+ad	O
+itself	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+most	O
+apps	O
+have	O
+positive	O
+ratings	O
+,	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+users	O
+have	O
+noticed	O
+and	O
+reported	O
+Judy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+suspicious	O
+activities	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+images	O
+below	O
+:	O
+As	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+previous	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+DressCode	B-Malware
+,	O
+a	O
+high	O
+reputation	O
+does	O
+not	O
+necessarily	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+the	O
+app	O
+is	O
+safe	O
+for	O
+use	O
+.	O
+
+Hackers	O
+can	O
+hide	O
+their	O
+apps	O
+’	O
+real	O
+intentions	O
+or	O
+even	O
+manipulate	O
+users	O
+into	O
+leaving	O
+positive	O
+ratings	O
+,	O
+in	O
+some	O
+cases	O
+unknowingly	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+can	O
+not	O
+rely	O
+on	O
+the	O
+official	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+for	O
+their	O
+safety	O
+,	O
+and	O
+should	O
+implement	O
+advanced	O
+security	O
+protections	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+detecting	O
+and	O
+blocking	O
+zero-day	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+PHA	O
+Family	O
+Highlights	O
+:	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+(	O
+and	O
+Friends	O
+)	O
+January	O
+9	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+In	O
+this	O
+edition	O
+of	O
+our	O
+PHA	O
+Family	O
+Highlights	O
+series	O
+we	O
+introduce	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+,	O
+a	O
+large-scale	O
+billing	O
+fraud	O
+family	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+first	O
+started	O
+tracking	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+(	O
+also	O
+known	O
+as	O
+Joker	B-Malware
+)	O
+in	O
+early	O
+2017	O
+,	O
+identifying	O
+apps	O
+designed	O
+solely	O
+for	O
+SMS	O
+fraud	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+has	O
+introduced	O
+new	O
+policies	O
+and	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+has	O
+scaled	O
+defenses	O
+,	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+apps	O
+were	O
+forced	O
+to	O
+continually	O
+iterate	O
+to	O
+search	O
+for	O
+gaps	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+have	O
+at	O
+some	O
+point	O
+used	O
+just	O
+about	O
+every	O
+cloaking	O
+and	O
+obfuscation	O
+technique	O
+under	O
+the	O
+sun	O
+in	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+go	O
+undetected	O
+.	O
+
+Many	O
+of	O
+these	O
+samples	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+designed	O
+specifically	O
+to	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+slip	O
+into	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+undetected	O
+and	O
+are	O
+not	O
+seen	O
+elsewhere	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+post	O
+,	O
+we	O
+show	O
+how	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+has	O
+defended	O
+against	O
+a	O
+well	O
+organized	O
+,	O
+persistent	O
+attacker	O
+and	O
+share	O
+examples	O
+of	O
+their	O
+techniques	O
+.	O
+
+TL	O
+;	O
+DR	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+detected	O
+and	O
+removed	O
+1.7k	O
+unique	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+apps	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+before	O
+ever	O
+being	O
+downloaded	O
+by	O
+users	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+apps	O
+originally	O
+performed	O
+SMS	O
+fraud	O
+,	O
+but	O
+have	O
+largely	O
+abandoned	O
+this	O
+for	O
+WAP	O
+billing	O
+following	O
+the	O
+introduction	O
+of	O
+new	O
+Play	B-System
+policies	O
+restricting	O
+use	O
+of	O
+the	O
+SEND_SMS	O
+permission	O
+and	O
+increased	O
+coverage	O
+by	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+More	O
+information	O
+on	O
+stats	O
+and	O
+relative	O
+impact	O
+is	O
+available	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+Security	O
+2018	O
+Year	O
+in	O
+Review	O
+report	O
+BILLING	O
+FRAUD	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+apps	O
+typically	O
+fall	O
+into	O
+two	O
+categories	O
+:	O
+SMS	O
+fraud	O
+(	O
+older	O
+versions	O
+)	O
+and	O
+toll	O
+fraud	O
+(	O
+newer	O
+versions	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Both	O
+of	O
+these	O
+types	O
+of	O
+fraud	O
+take	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+billing	O
+techniques	O
+involving	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+carrier	O
+.	O
+
+SMS	O
+Billing	O
+Carriers	O
+may	O
+partner	O
+with	O
+vendors	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+users	O
+to	O
+pay	O
+for	O
+services	O
+by	O
+SMS	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+user	O
+simply	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+text	O
+a	O
+prescribed	O
+keyword	O
+to	O
+a	O
+prescribed	O
+number	O
+(	O
+shortcode	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+charge	O
+is	O
+then	O
+added	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+bill	O
+with	O
+their	O
+mobile	O
+service	O
+provider	O
+.	O
+
+Toll	O
+Billing	O
+Carriers	O
+may	O
+also	O
+provide	O
+payment	O
+endpoints	O
+over	O
+a	O
+web	O
+page	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+user	O
+visits	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+to	O
+complete	O
+the	O
+payment	O
+and	O
+enters	O
+their	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+Verification	O
+that	O
+the	O
+request	O
+is	O
+coming	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+is	O
+completed	O
+using	O
+two	O
+possible	O
+methods	O
+:	O
+The	O
+user	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+site	O
+over	O
+mobile	O
+data	O
+,	O
+not	O
+WiFi	O
+(	O
+so	O
+the	O
+service	O
+provider	O
+directly	O
+handles	O
+the	O
+connection	O
+and	O
+can	O
+validate	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+)	O
+;	O
+or	O
+The	O
+user	O
+must	O
+retrieve	O
+a	O
+code	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+them	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+enter	O
+it	O
+into	O
+the	O
+web	O
+page	O
+(	O
+thereby	O
+proving	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+provided	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Fraud	O
+Both	O
+of	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+methods	O
+detailed	O
+above	O
+provide	O
+device	O
+verification	O
+,	O
+but	O
+not	O
+user	O
+verification	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+carrier	O
+can	O
+determine	O
+that	O
+the	O
+request	O
+originates	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+,	O
+but	O
+does	O
+not	O
+require	O
+any	O
+interaction	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+that	O
+can	O
+not	O
+be	O
+automated	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+authors	O
+use	O
+injected	O
+clicks	O
+,	O
+custom	O
+HTML	O
+parsers	O
+and	O
+SMS	O
+receivers	O
+to	O
+automate	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+without	O
+requiring	O
+any	O
+interaction	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+STRING	O
+&	O
+DATA	O
+OBFUSCATION	O
+Bread	O
+apps	O
+have	O
+used	O
+many	O
+innovative	O
+and	O
+classic	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+strings	O
+from	O
+analysis	O
+engines	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+are	O
+some	O
+highlights	O
+.	O
+
+Standard	O
+Encryption	O
+Frequently	O
+,	O
+Bread	O
+apps	O
+take	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+standard	O
+crypto	O
+libraries	O
+in	O
+`	O
+java.util.crypto	B-Indicator
+`	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+discovered	O
+apps	O
+using	O
+AES	O
+,	O
+Blowfish	O
+,	O
+and	O
+DES	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+combinations	O
+of	O
+these	O
+to	O
+encrypt	O
+their	O
+strings	O
+.	O
+
+Custom	O
+Encryption	O
+Other	O
+variants	O
+have	O
+used	O
+custom-implemented	O
+encryption	O
+algorithms	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+common	O
+techniques	O
+include	O
+:	O
+basic	O
+XOR	O
+encryption	O
+,	O
+nested	O
+XOR	O
+and	O
+custom	O
+key-derivation	O
+methods	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+variants	O
+have	O
+gone	O
+so	O
+far	O
+as	O
+to	O
+use	O
+a	O
+different	O
+key	O
+for	O
+the	O
+strings	O
+of	O
+each	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+Split	O
+Strings	O
+Encrypted	O
+strings	O
+can	O
+be	O
+a	O
+signal	O
+that	O
+the	O
+code	O
+is	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+something	O
+.	O
+
+Bread	B-Malware
+has	O
+used	O
+a	O
+few	O
+tricks	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+strings	O
+in	O
+plaintext	O
+while	O
+preventing	O
+basic	O
+string	O
+matching	O
+.	O
+
+Going	O
+one	O
+step	O
+further	O
+,	O
+these	O
+substrings	O
+are	O
+sometimes	O
+scattered	O
+throughout	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+retrieved	O
+from	O
+static	O
+variables	O
+and	O
+method	O
+calls	O
+.	O
+
+Various	O
+versions	O
+may	O
+also	O
+change	O
+the	O
+index	O
+of	O
+the	O
+split	O
+(	O
+e.g	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+.clic	O
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+k	O
+(	O
+)	O
+;	O
+”	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Delimiters	O
+Another	O
+technique	O
+to	O
+obfuscate	O
+unencrypted	O
+strings	O
+uses	O
+repeated	O
+delimiters	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+short	O
+,	O
+constant	O
+string	O
+of	O
+characters	O
+is	O
+inserted	O
+at	O
+strategic	O
+points	O
+to	O
+break	O
+up	O
+keywords	O
+:	O
+At	O
+runtime	O
+,	O
+the	O
+delimiter	O
+is	O
+removed	O
+before	O
+using	O
+the	O
+string	O
+:	O
+API	O
+OBFUSCATION	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+toll	O
+fraud	O
+generally	O
+requires	O
+a	O
+few	O
+basic	O
+behaviors	O
+(	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+disabling	O
+WiFi	O
+or	O
+accessing	O
+SMS	O
+)	O
+,	O
+which	O
+are	O
+accessible	O
+by	O
+a	O
+handful	O
+of	O
+APIs	O
+.	O
+
+Given	O
+that	O
+there	O
+are	O
+a	O
+limited	O
+number	O
+of	O
+behaviors	O
+required	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+billing	O
+fraud	O
+,	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+apps	O
+have	O
+had	O
+to	O
+try	O
+a	O
+wide	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+mask	O
+usage	O
+of	O
+these	O
+APIs	O
+.	O
+
+Reflection	O
+Most	O
+methods	O
+for	O
+hiding	O
+API	O
+usage	O
+tend	O
+to	O
+use	O
+Java	O
+reflection	O
+in	O
+some	O
+way	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+samples	O
+,	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+has	O
+simply	O
+directly	O
+called	O
+the	O
+Reflect	O
+API	O
+on	O
+strings	O
+decrypted	O
+at	O
+runtime	O
+.	O
+
+JNI	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+has	O
+also	O
+tested	O
+our	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+analyze	O
+native	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+one	O
+sample	O
+,	O
+no	O
+SMS-related	O
+code	O
+appears	O
+in	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+,	O
+but	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+native	O
+method	O
+registered	O
+.	O
+
+Two	O
+strings	O
+are	O
+passed	O
+into	O
+the	O
+call	O
+,	O
+the	O
+shortcode	O
+and	O
+keyword	O
+used	O
+for	O
+SMS	O
+billing	O
+(	O
+getter	O
+methods	O
+renamed	O
+here	O
+for	O
+clarity	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+native	O
+library	O
+,	O
+it	O
+stores	O
+the	O
+strings	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+nativesend	O
+method	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+Java	O
+Native	O
+Interface	O
+(	O
+JNI	O
+)	O
+to	O
+fetch	O
+and	O
+call	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+SMS	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+is	O
+a	O
+screenshot	O
+from	O
+IDA	O
+with	O
+comments	O
+showing	O
+the	O
+strings	O
+and	O
+JNI	O
+functions	O
+.	O
+
+WebView	O
+JavaScript	O
+Interface	O
+Continuing	O
+on	O
+the	O
+theme	O
+of	O
+cross-language	O
+bridges	O
+,	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+has	O
+also	O
+tried	O
+out	O
+some	O
+obfuscation	O
+methods	O
+utilizing	O
+JavaScript	O
+in	O
+WebViews	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+method	O
+is	O
+declared	O
+in	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+.	O
+
+Without	O
+context	O
+,	O
+this	O
+method	O
+does	O
+not	O
+reveal	O
+much	O
+about	O
+its	O
+intended	O
+behavior	O
+,	O
+and	O
+there	O
+are	O
+no	O
+calls	O
+made	O
+to	O
+it	O
+anywhere	O
+in	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+does	O
+create	O
+a	O
+WebView	O
+and	O
+registers	O
+a	O
+JavaScript	O
+interface	O
+to	O
+this	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+gives	O
+JavaScript	O
+run	O
+in	O
+the	O
+WebView	O
+access	O
+to	O
+this	O
+method	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+loads	O
+a	O
+URL	O
+pointing	O
+to	O
+a	O
+Bread-controlled	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+response	O
+contains	O
+some	O
+basic	O
+HTML	O
+and	O
+JavaScript	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+green	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+the	O
+references	O
+to	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+red	O
+,	O
+we	O
+see	O
+those	O
+values	O
+being	O
+passed	O
+into	O
+the	O
+suspicious	O
+Java	O
+method	O
+through	O
+the	O
+registered	O
+interface	O
+.	O
+
+Now	O
+,	O
+using	O
+these	O
+strings	O
+method1	O
+can	O
+use	O
+reflection	O
+to	O
+call	O
+sendTextMessage	O
+and	O
+process	O
+the	O
+payment	O
+.	O
+
+PACKING	O
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+implementing	O
+custom	O
+obfuscation	O
+techniques	O
+,	O
+apps	O
+have	O
+used	O
+several	O
+commercially	O
+available	O
+packers	O
+including	O
+:	O
+Qihoo360	B-System
+,	O
+AliProtect	B-System
+and	O
+SecShell	B-System
+.	O
+
+More	O
+recently	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+Bread-related	B-Malware
+apps	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+in	O
+a	O
+native	O
+library	O
+shipped	O
+with	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+.	O
+
+Earlier	O
+this	O
+year	O
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+apps	O
+hiding	O
+a	O
+JAR	O
+in	O
+the	O
+data	O
+section	O
+of	O
+an	O
+ELF	O
+file	O
+which	O
+it	O
+then	O
+dynamically	O
+loads	O
+using	O
+DexClassLoader	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+figure	O
+below	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+fragment	O
+of	O
+encrypted	O
+JAR	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+.rodata	O
+section	O
+of	O
+a	O
+shared	O
+object	O
+shipped	O
+with	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+the	O
+XOR	O
+key	O
+used	O
+for	O
+decryption	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+we	O
+blocked	O
+those	O
+samples	O
+,	O
+they	O
+moved	O
+a	O
+significant	O
+portion	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+functionality	O
+into	O
+the	O
+native	O
+library	O
+,	O
+which	O
+resulted	O
+in	O
+a	O
+rather	O
+peculiar	O
+back	O
+and	O
+forth	O
+between	O
+Dalvik	O
+and	O
+native	O
+code	O
+:	O
+COMMAND	O
+&	O
+CONTROL	O
+Dynamic	O
+Shortcodes	O
+&	O
+Content	O
+Early	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Bread	O
+utilized	O
+a	O
+basic	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+infrastructure	O
+to	O
+dynamically	O
+deliver	O
+content	O
+and	O
+retrieve	O
+billing	O
+details	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+example	O
+server	O
+response	O
+below	O
+,	O
+the	O
+green	O
+fields	O
+show	O
+text	O
+to	O
+be	O
+shown	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+red	O
+fields	O
+are	O
+used	O
+as	O
+the	O
+shortcode	O
+and	O
+keyword	O
+for	O
+SMS	O
+billing	O
+.	O
+
+State	O
+Machines	O
+Since	O
+various	O
+carriers	O
+implement	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+differently	O
+,	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+has	O
+developed	O
+several	O
+variants	O
+containing	O
+generalized	O
+state	O
+machines	O
+implementing	O
+all	O
+possible	O
+steps	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+runtime	O
+,	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+can	O
+check	O
+which	O
+carrier	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+connected	O
+to	O
+and	O
+fetch	O
+a	O
+configuration	O
+object	O
+from	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+configuration	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+steps	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+with	O
+URLs	O
+and	O
+JavaScript	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+steps	O
+implemented	O
+include	O
+:	O
+Load	O
+a	O
+URL	O
+in	O
+a	O
+WebView	O
+Run	O
+JavaScript	O
+in	O
+WebView	O
+Toggle	O
+WiFi	O
+state	O
+Toggle	O
+mobile	O
+data	O
+state	O
+Read/modify	O
+SMS	O
+inbox	O
+Solve	O
+captchas	O
+Captchas	O
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+more	O
+interesting	O
+states	O
+implements	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+solve	O
+basic	O
+captchas	O
+(	O
+obscured	O
+letters	O
+and	O
+numbers	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+JavaScript	O
+function	O
+to	O
+call	O
+a	O
+Java	O
+method	O
+,	O
+getImageBase64	O
+,	O
+exposed	O
+to	O
+WebView	O
+using	O
+addJavascriptInterface	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+value	O
+used	O
+to	O
+replace	O
+GET_IMG_OBJECT	O
+comes	O
+from	O
+the	O
+JSON	O
+configuration	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+then	O
+uses	O
+JavaScript	O
+injection	O
+to	O
+create	O
+a	O
+new	O
+script	O
+in	O
+the	O
+carrier	O
+’	O
+s	O
+web	O
+page	O
+to	O
+run	O
+the	O
+new	O
+function	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+base64-encoded	O
+image	O
+is	O
+then	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+an	O
+image	O
+recognition	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+text	O
+is	O
+retrieved	O
+successfully	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+uses	O
+JavaScript	O
+injection	O
+again	O
+to	O
+submit	O
+the	O
+HTML	O
+form	O
+with	O
+the	O
+captcha	O
+answer	O
+.	O
+
+CLOAKING	O
+Client-side	O
+Carrier	O
+Checks	O
+In	O
+our	O
+basic	O
+command	O
+&	O
+control	O
+example	O
+above	O
+,	O
+we	O
+didn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+address	O
+the	O
+(	O
+incorrectly	O
+labeled	O
+)	O
+“	O
+imei	O
+”	O
+field	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+Mobile	O
+Country	O
+Code	O
+(	O
+MCC	O
+)	O
+and	O
+Mobile	O
+Network	O
+Code	O
+(	O
+MNC	O
+)	O
+values	O
+that	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+will	O
+work	O
+for	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+server	O
+response	O
+contains	O
+several	O
+values	O
+for	O
+Thai	O
+carriers	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+checks	O
+if	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+network	O
+matches	O
+one	O
+of	O
+those	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+the	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+it	O
+does	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+commence	O
+with	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+value	O
+does	O
+not	O
+match	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+skips	O
+the	O
+“	O
+disclosure	O
+”	O
+page	O
+and	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+and	O
+brings	O
+the	O
+user	O
+straight	O
+to	O
+the	O
+app	O
+content	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+the	O
+server	O
+would	O
+only	O
+return	O
+valid	O
+responses	O
+several	O
+days	O
+after	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+were	O
+submitted	O
+.	O
+
+Server-side	O
+Carrier	O
+Checks	O
+In	O
+the	O
+JavaScript	O
+bridge	O
+API	O
+obfuscation	O
+example	O
+covered	O
+above	O
+,	O
+the	O
+server	O
+supplied	O
+the	O
+app	O
+with	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+strings	O
+to	O
+complete	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+analysts	O
+may	O
+not	O
+always	O
+see	O
+the	O
+indicators	O
+of	O
+compromise	O
+in	O
+the	O
+server	O
+’	O
+s	O
+response	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+requests	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+take	O
+the	O
+following	O
+form	O
+:	O
+Here	O
+,	O
+the	O
+“	O
+operator	O
+”	O
+query	O
+parameter	O
+is	O
+the	O
+Mobile	O
+Country	O
+Code	O
+and	O
+Mobile	O
+Network	O
+Code	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+server	O
+can	O
+use	O
+this	O
+information	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+if	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+carrier	O
+is	O
+one	O
+of	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+not	O
+,	O
+the	O
+response	O
+is	O
+scrubbed	O
+of	O
+the	O
+strings	O
+used	O
+to	O
+complete	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+fraud	O
+.	O
+
+MISLEADING	O
+USERS	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+apps	O
+sometimes	O
+display	O
+a	O
+pop-up	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+that	O
+implies	O
+some	O
+form	O
+of	O
+compliance	O
+or	O
+disclosure	O
+,	O
+showing	O
+terms	O
+and	O
+conditions	O
+or	O
+a	O
+confirm	O
+button	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+text	O
+would	O
+often	O
+only	O
+display	O
+a	O
+basic	O
+welcome	O
+message	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+versions	O
+included	O
+all	O
+the	O
+pieces	O
+needed	O
+for	O
+a	O
+valid	O
+disclosure	O
+message	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+still	O
+two	O
+issues	O
+here	O
+:	O
+The	O
+numbers	O
+to	O
+contact	O
+for	O
+cancelling	O
+the	O
+subscription	O
+are	O
+not	O
+real	O
+The	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+commences	O
+even	O
+if	O
+you	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+hit	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Confirm	O
+”	O
+button	O
+Even	O
+if	O
+the	O
+disclosure	O
+here	O
+displayed	O
+accurate	O
+information	O
+,	O
+the	O
+user	O
+would	O
+often	O
+find	O
+that	O
+the	O
+advertised	O
+functionality	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+did	O
+not	O
+match	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+content	O
+.	O
+
+Bread	B-Malware
+apps	O
+frequently	O
+contain	O
+no	O
+functionality	O
+beyond	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+or	O
+simply	O
+clone	O
+content	O
+from	O
+other	O
+popular	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+VERSIONING	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+has	O
+also	O
+leveraged	O
+an	O
+abuse	O
+tactic	O
+unique	O
+to	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+:	O
+versioning	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+apps	O
+have	O
+started	O
+with	O
+clean	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+in	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+grow	O
+user	O
+bases	O
+and	O
+build	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+accounts	O
+’	O
+reputations	O
+.	O
+
+Only	O
+later	O
+is	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+introduced	O
+,	O
+through	O
+an	O
+update	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+early	O
+“	O
+clean	O
+”	O
+versions	O
+contain	O
+varying	O
+levels	O
+of	O
+signals	O
+that	O
+the	O
+updates	O
+will	O
+include	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+later	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+are	O
+first	O
+uploaded	O
+with	O
+all	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+code	O
+except	O
+the	O
+one	O
+line	O
+that	O
+actually	O
+initializes	O
+the	O
+billing	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+Others	O
+may	O
+have	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+permissions	O
+,	O
+but	O
+are	O
+missing	O
+the	O
+classes	O
+containing	O
+the	O
+fraud	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+And	O
+others	O
+have	O
+all	O
+malicious	O
+content	O
+removed	O
+,	O
+except	O
+for	O
+log	O
+comments	O
+referencing	O
+the	O
+payment	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+these	O
+methods	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+space	O
+out	O
+the	O
+introduction	O
+of	O
+possible	O
+signals	O
+in	O
+various	O
+stages	O
+,	O
+testing	O
+for	O
+gaps	O
+in	O
+the	O
+publication	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+GPP	O
+does	O
+not	O
+treat	O
+new	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+updates	O
+any	O
+differently	O
+from	O
+an	O
+analysis	O
+perspective	O
+.	O
+
+FAKE	O
+REVIEWS	O
+When	O
+early	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+first	O
+published	O
+,	O
+many	O
+five	O
+star	O
+reviews	O
+appear	O
+with	O
+comments	O
+like	O
+:	O
+“	O
+So	O
+..	O
+good	O
+..	O
+”	O
+“	O
+very	O
+beautiful	O
+”	O
+Later	O
+,	O
+1	O
+star	O
+reviews	O
+from	O
+real	O
+users	O
+start	O
+appearing	O
+with	O
+comments	O
+like	O
+:	O
+“	O
+Deception	O
+”	O
+“	O
+The	O
+app	O
+is	O
+not	O
+honest	O
+…	O
+”	O
+SUMMARY	O
+Sheer	O
+volume	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+the	O
+preferred	O
+approach	O
+for	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+developers	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+different	O
+times	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+three	O
+or	O
+more	O
+active	O
+variants	O
+using	O
+different	O
+approaches	O
+or	O
+targeting	O
+different	O
+carriers	O
+.	O
+
+Within	O
+each	O
+variant	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+present	O
+in	O
+each	O
+sample	O
+may	O
+look	O
+nearly	O
+identical	O
+with	O
+only	O
+one	O
+evasion	O
+technique	O
+changed	O
+.	O
+
+Sample	O
+1	O
+may	O
+use	O
+AES-encrypted	B-Organization
+strings	O
+with	O
+reflection	O
+,	O
+while	O
+Sample	O
+2	O
+(	O
+submitted	O
+on	O
+the	O
+same	O
+day	O
+)	O
+will	O
+use	O
+the	O
+same	O
+code	O
+but	O
+with	O
+plaintext	O
+strings	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+peak	O
+times	O
+of	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+up	O
+to	O
+23	O
+different	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+this	O
+family	O
+submitted	O
+to	O
+Play	B-System
+in	O
+one	O
+day	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+other	O
+times	O
+,	O
+Bread	B-Malware
+appears	O
+to	O
+abandon	O
+hope	O
+of	O
+making	O
+a	O
+variant	O
+successful	O
+and	O
+we	O
+see	O
+a	O
+gap	O
+of	O
+a	O
+week	O
+or	O
+longer	O
+before	O
+the	O
+next	O
+variant	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+family	O
+showcases	O
+the	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+resources	O
+that	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+now	O
+have	O
+to	O
+expend	O
+.	O
+
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+is	O
+constantly	O
+updating	O
+detection	O
+engines	O
+and	O
+warning	O
+users	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+their	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+SELECTED	O
+SAMPLES	O
+Package	O
+Name	O
+SHA-256	O
+Digest	O
+com.rabbit.artcamera	B-Indicator
+18c277c7953983f45f2fe6ab4c7d872b2794c256604e43500045cb2b2084103f	B-Indicator
+org.horoscope.astrology.predict	B-Indicator
+6f1a1dbeb5b28c80ddc51b77a83c7a27b045309c4f1bff48aaff7d79dfd4eb26	B-Indicator
+com.theforest.rotatemarswallpaper	B-Indicator
+4e78a26832a0d471922eb61231bc498463337fed8874db5f70b17dd06dcb9f09	B-Indicator
+
+com.jspany.temp	B-Indicator
+0ce78efa764ce1e7fb92c4de351ec1113f3e2ca4b2932feef46d7d62d6ae87f5	B-Indicator
+com.hua.ru.quan	B-Indicator
+780936deb27be5dceea20a5489014236796a74cc967a12e36cb56d9b8df9bc86	B-Indicator
+com.rongnea.udonood	B-Indicator
+8b2271938c524dd1064e74717b82e48b778e49e26b5ac2dae8856555b5489131	B-Indicator
+
+com.mbv.a.wp	B-Indicator
+01611e16f573da2c9dbc7acdd445d84bae71fecf2927753e341d8a5652b89a68	B-Indicator
+com.pho.nec.sg	B-Indicator
+b4822eeb71c83e4aab5ddfecfb58459e5c5e10d382a2364da1c42621f58e119b	B-Indicator
+Exobot	B-Malware
+(	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+)	O
+-	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+on	O
+the	O
+rise	O
+February	O
+2017	O
+Introduction	O
+The	O
+past	O
+months	O
+many	O
+different	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+for	O
+
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+platform	O
+have	O
+received	O
+media	O
+attention	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+these	O
+,	O
+called	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+(	O
+aka	O
+Exobot	B-Malware
+)	O
+,	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+be	O
+especially	O
+active	O
+with	O
+different	O
+samples	O
+appearing	O
+on	O
+a	O
+daily	O
+basis	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malware	O
+variant	O
+also	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+technically	O
+superior	O
+to	O
+many	O
+other	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+being	O
+able	O
+to	O
+use	O
+its	O
+overlay	O
+attack	O
+even	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+6	I-System
+,	O
+which	O
+has	O
+technical	O
+improvements	O
+compared	O
+to	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+Android	B-System
+versions	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+such	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+main	O
+infection	O
+vector	O
+is	O
+a	O
+phishing	O
+attack	O
+using	O
+SMS/MMS	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+message	O
+includes	O
+a	O
+link	O
+that	O
+leads	O
+to	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+version	O
+of	O
+a	O
+popular	O
+app	O
+,	O
+using	O
+names	O
+like	O
+Runtastic	B-System
+,	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+or	O
+Netflix	B-System
+.	O
+
+On	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+requests	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+SMS	O
+storage	O
+access	O
+and	O
+high	O
+Android	B-System
+privileges	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Device	O
+Admin	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+infection	O
+vectors	O
+include	O
+pornographic	O
+websites	O
+serving	O
+apps	O
+called	O
+Adobe	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+or	O
+YouPorn	B-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+banking	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+two	O
+main	O
+attack	O
+vectors	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+attack	O
+vector	O
+is	O
+to	O
+compromise	O
+the	O
+out	O
+of	O
+band	O
+authentication	O
+for	O
+online	O
+banks	O
+that	O
+rely	O
+on	O
+SMS	O
+using	O
+SMS	O
+forwarding	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+attack	O
+vector	O
+,	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+attack	O
+,	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+customized	O
+phishing	O
+window	O
+whenever	O
+a	O
+targeted	O
+application	O
+is	O
+started	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+overlay	O
+window	O
+is	O
+often	O
+indistinguishable	O
+from	O
+the	O
+expected	O
+screen	O
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+a	O
+login	O
+screen	O
+for	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+app	O
+)	O
+and	O
+is	O
+used	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+banking	O
+credentials	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+target	O
+list	O
+and	O
+bank	O
+specific	O
+fake	O
+login	O
+pages	O
+can	O
+be	O
+dynamically	O
+updated	O
+via	O
+their	O
+C2	O
+panel	O
+(	O
+dashboard	O
+back-end	O
+)	O
+which	O
+significantly	O
+increases	O
+the	O
+adaptability	O
+and	O
+scalability	O
+of	O
+this	O
+attack	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+this	O
+type	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+malware	O
+does	O
+not	O
+require	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+be	O
+rooted	O
+or	O
+the	O
+app	O
+to	O
+have	O
+any	O
+specific	O
+Android	B-System
+permission	O
+(	O
+besides	O
+android.permission.INTERNET	B-Indicator
+to	O
+retrieve	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+contents	O
+and	O
+send	O
+its	O
+captured	O
+data	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+many	O
+changes	O
+we	O
+see	O
+in	O
+the	O
+way	O
+the	O
+attacks	O
+are	O
+performed	O
+show	O
+that	O
+attackers	O
+are	O
+heavily	O
+experimenting	O
+to	O
+find	O
+the	O
+best	O
+way	O
+of	O
+infecting	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+and	O
+abusing	O
+existing	O
+functionality	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+successful	O
+phishing	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+next	O
+stage	O
+in	O
+device	O
+infection	O
+could	O
+be	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+exploit	O
+kits	O
+and	O
+malvertising	O
+,	O
+which	O
+would	O
+be	O
+quite	O
+effective	O
+due	O
+the	O
+many	O
+Android	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+and	O
+consumers	O
+with	O
+unpatched	B-Vulnerability
+devices	I-Vulnerability
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+future	O
+Trojans	O
+could	O
+leverage	O
+root	O
+exploits	O
+to	O
+make	O
+them	O
+almost	O
+impossible	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+and	O
+give	O
+malicious	O
+actors	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+hook	O
+generic	O
+low	O
+level	O
+API	O
+’	O
+s	O
+that	O
+are	O
+used	O
+by	O
+all	O
+(	O
+banking	O
+)	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+just	O
+like	O
+the	O
+attack	O
+vector	O
+as	O
+has	O
+been	O
+used	O
+on	O
+the	O
+desktop	O
+platform	O
+for	O
+years	O
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+Permissions	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+APK	O
+size	O
+is	O
+fairly	O
+small	O
+(	O
+only	O
+683KB	O
+for	O
+sample	O
+eb8f02fc30ec49e4af1560e54b53d1a7	B-Indicator
+)	O
+,	O
+much	O
+smaller	O
+than	O
+most	O
+legitimate	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+other	O
+popular	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+samples	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+sample	O
+only	O
+includes	O
+Dalvik	O
+bytecode	O
+and	O
+resources	O
+without	O
+any	O
+native	O
+libraries	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+package	O
+name	O
+(	O
+vyn.hhsdzgvoexobmkygffzwuewrbikzud	B-Indicator
+)	O
+and	O
+its	O
+many	O
+activities	O
+and	O
+services	O
+have	O
+randomized	O
+names	O
+,	O
+probably	O
+to	O
+make	O
+it	O
+a	O
+bit	O
+more	O
+difficult	O
+to	O
+detect	O
+the	O
+package	O
+using	O
+blacklisting	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+set	O
+of	O
+permissions	O
+required	O
+by	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+according	O
+to	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+is	O
+as	O
+follows	O
+:	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE	B-Indicator
+(	O
+change	O
+network	O
+connectivity	O
+state	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.SEND_SMS	B-Indicator
+(	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.USES_POLICY_FORCE_LOCK	B-Indicator
+(	O
+lock	O
+the	O
+device	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED	B-Indicator
+(	O
+start	O
+malware	O
+when	O
+device	O
+boots	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.INTERNET	B-Indicator
+(	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+the	O
+internet	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.VIBRATE	B-Indicator
+
+(	O
+control	O
+the	O
+vibrator	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE	B-Indicator
+(	O
+view	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+status	O
+of	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.WRITE_SMS	B-Indicator
+(	O
+edit/delete	O
+SMS	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE	B-Indicator
+(	O
+view	O
+the	O
+status	O
+of	O
+all	O
+networks	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.WAKE_LOCK	B-Indicator
+(	O
+prevent	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+from	O
+going	O
+to	O
+sleep	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.GET_TASKS	B-Indicator
+(	O
+retrieve	O
+running	O
+applications	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.CALL_PHONE	B-Indicator
+(	O
+call	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+)	O
+
+∗	O
+android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS	B-Indicator
+(	O
+read/write	O
+global	O
+system	O
+settings	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS	B-Indicator
+(	O
+intercept	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE	B-Indicator
+(	O
+read	O
+phone	O
+details	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+such	O
+as	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+and	O
+serial	O
+number	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE	B-Indicator
+(	O
+connect	O
+to	O
+and	O
+disconnect	O
+from	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+networks	O
+and	O
+make	O
+changes	O
+to	O
+configured	O
+networks	O
+)	O
+∗	O
+android.permission.READ_CONTACTS	B-Indicator
+(	O
+read	O
+all	O
+contact	O
+data	O
+)	O
+*	O
+android.permission.READ_SMS	B-Indicator
+
+(	O
+read	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+)	O
+Obviously	O
+a	O
+fairly	O
+significant	O
+list	O
+of	O
+permissions	O
+of	O
+which	O
+many	O
+are	O
+suspicious	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+when	O
+combined	O
+.	O
+
+Runtastic	B-System
+sample	O
+permission	O
+prompt	O
+Runtastic	B-System
+sample	O
+permission	O
+prompt	O
+Checking	O
+foreground	O
+app	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+is	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+few	O
+Android	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+to	O
+use	O
+the	O
+AndroidProcesses	O
+library	O
+,	O
+which	O
+enables	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+package	O
+that	O
+is	O
+currently	O
+running	O
+in	O
+the	O
+foreground	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+library	O
+is	O
+used	O
+because	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+only	O
+(	O
+publicly	O
+known	O
+)	O
+way	O
+to	O
+retrieve	O
+this	O
+information	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+6	I-System
+(	O
+using	O
+the	O
+process	O
+OOM	O
+score	O
+read	O
+from	O
+the	O
+/proc	O
+directory	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+the	O
+current	O
+app	O
+on	O
+the	O
+foreground	O
+matches	O
+with	O
+an	O
+app	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+show	O
+the	O
+corresponding	O
+phishing	O
+overlay	O
+,	O
+making	O
+the	O
+user	O
+think	O
+it	O
+is	O
+the	O
+app	O
+that	O
+was	O
+just	O
+started	O
+.	O
+
+Dynamic	O
+overlays	O
+When	O
+victims	O
+open	O
+up	O
+a	O
+targeted	O
+app	O
+,	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+smoothly	O
+displays	O
+an	O
+overlay	O
+,	O
+a	O
+customized	O
+WebView	O
+,	O
+looks	O
+in	O
+its	O
+application	O
+preferences	O
+(	O
+main_prefs.xml	O
+)	O
+and	O
+decides	O
+which	O
+specified	O
+URL	O
+is	O
+needed	O
+for	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+complete	O
+list	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+phishing	O
+pages	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+use	O
+Ajax	O
+calls	O
+to	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+a	O
+PHP	O
+back-end	O
+which	O
+stores	O
+all	O
+user	O
+input	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C2	O
+backend	O
+url	O
+looks	O
+like	O
+this	O
+:	O
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//evilhost/c2folder/njs2/	I-Indicator
+?	I-Indicator
+
+fields	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+There	O
+is	O
+no	O
+way	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+original	O
+app	O
+again	O
+even	O
+if	O
+victims	O
+terminate	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+process	O
+and	O
+reopen	O
+app	O
+,	O
+until	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+(	O
+name	O
+,	O
+number	O
+,	O
+expiry	O
+date	O
+,	O
+security	O
+code	O
+)	O
+and/or	O
+bank	O
+information	O
+(	O
+PIN	O
+,	O
+VBV	O
+passcode	O
+,	O
+date	O
+of	O
+birth	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+are	O
+filled	O
+in	O
+and	O
+verified	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+information	O
+is	O
+then	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+local	O
+app	O
+database	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+backend	O
+.	O
+
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+:	O
+A	O
+New	O
+Species	O
+of	O
+Mobile	O
+Malware	O
+July	O
+10	O
+,	O
+2019	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Researchers	O
+recently	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+quietly	O
+infected	O
+around	O
+25	O
+million	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+user	O
+remains	O
+completely	O
+unaware	O
+.	O
+
+Disguised	O
+as	O
+Google	B-Organization
+related	O
+app	O
+,	O
+the	O
+core	O
+part	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+exploits	O
+various	O
+known	O
+Android	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+and	O
+automatically	O
+replaces	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+with	O
+malicious	O
+versions	O
+without	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+interaction	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+unique	O
+on-device	O
+,	O
+just-in-time	O
+(	O
+JIT	O
+)	O
+approach	O
+inspired	O
+researchers	O
+to	O
+dub	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+as	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+currently	O
+uses	O
+its	O
+broad	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+resources	O
+to	O
+show	O
+fraudulent	O
+ads	O
+for	O
+financial	O
+gain	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+activity	O
+resembles	O
+previous	O
+campaigns	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Gooligan	B-Malware
+,	O
+HummingBad	B-Malware
+and	O
+CopyCat	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+primary	O
+targets	O
+,	O
+so	O
+far	O
+,	O
+are	O
+based	O
+in	O
+India	O
+though	O
+other	O
+Asian	O
+countries	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Pakistan	O
+and	O
+Bangladesh	O
+are	O
+also	O
+affected	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+a	O
+much-improved	O
+Android	B-System
+security	O
+environment	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+seem	O
+to	O
+have	O
+moved	O
+into	O
+the	O
+more	O
+complex	O
+world	O
+of	O
+constantly	O
+searching	O
+for	O
+new	O
+loopholes	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+,	O
+Bundle	B-Vulnerability
+and	O
+Man-in-the-Disk	B-Vulnerability
+,	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+a	O
+3-stage	O
+infection	O
+chain	O
+,	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+build	O
+a	O
+botnet	O
+of	O
+controlled	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+earn	O
+profit	O
+for	O
+the	O
+perpetrator	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+is	O
+possibly	O
+the	O
+first	O
+campaign	O
+seen	O
+that	O
+ingrates	O
+and	O
+weaponized	O
+all	O
+these	O
+loopholes	O
+and	O
+are	O
+described	O
+in	O
+detail	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+is	O
+being	O
+used	O
+to	O
+for	O
+financial	O
+gain	O
+through	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+advertisements	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+it	O
+could	O
+easily	O
+be	O
+used	O
+for	O
+far	O
+more	O
+intrusive	O
+and	O
+harmful	O
+purposes	O
+such	O
+as	O
+banking	O
+credential	O
+theft	O
+.	O
+
+Indeed	O
+,	O
+due	O
+to	O
+its	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+icon	O
+from	O
+the	O
+launcher	O
+and	O
+impersonates	O
+any	O
+popular	O
+existing	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+endless	O
+possibilities	O
+for	O
+this	O
+sort	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+harm	O
+a	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Research	O
+has	O
+submitted	O
+data	O
+to	O
+Google	B-Organization
+and	O
+law	O
+enforcement	O
+units	O
+to	O
+facilitate	O
+further	O
+investigation	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+,	O
+information	O
+related	O
+to	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+actor	O
+is	O
+tentatively	O
+redacted	O
+in	O
+this	O
+publication	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+has	O
+worked	O
+closely	O
+with	O
+Google	B-Organization
+and	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+publishing	O
+,	O
+no	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+remain	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Encounter	O
+In	O
+early	O
+2019	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Research	O
+team	O
+observed	O
+a	O
+surge	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+attack	O
+attempts	O
+against	O
+users	O
+in	O
+India	O
+which	O
+had	O
+strong	O
+characteristics	O
+of	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	O
+abuse	O
+;	O
+All	O
+samples	O
+our	O
+team	O
+collected	O
+during	O
+preliminary	O
+investigation	O
+had	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+their	O
+app	O
+icons	O
+and	O
+claim	O
+to	O
+be	O
+Google	B-Organization
+related	O
+updaters	O
+or	O
+vending	O
+modules	O
+(	O
+a	O
+key	O
+component	O
+of	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+framework	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+further	O
+analysis	O
+it	O
+became	O
+clear	O
+this	O
+application	O
+was	O
+as	O
+malicious	O
+as	O
+they	O
+come	O
+and	O
+initially	O
+resembled	O
+the	O
+CopyCat	B-Malware
+malware	O
+,	O
+discovered	O
+by	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Research	O
+back	O
+in	O
+April	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+the	O
+research	O
+progressed	O
+,	O
+it	O
+started	O
+to	O
+reveal	O
+unique	O
+characteristics	O
+which	O
+made	O
+us	O
+believe	O
+we	O
+were	O
+looking	O
+at	O
+an	O
+all-new	O
+malware	O
+campaign	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+a	O
+series	O
+of	O
+technical	O
+analysis	O
+(	O
+which	O
+is	O
+covered	O
+in	O
+detail	O
+below	O
+)	O
+and	O
+heuristic	O
+threat	O
+hunting	O
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+that	O
+a	O
+complete	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+infection	O
+has	O
+three	O
+main	O
+phases	O
+:	O
+A	O
+dropper	O
+app	O
+lures	O
+victim	O
+to	O
+install	O
+itself	O
+voluntarily	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+initial	O
+dropper	O
+has	O
+a	O
+weaponized	O
+Feng	O
+Shui	O
+Bundle	O
+as	O
+encrypted	O
+asset	O
+files	O
+.	O
+
+Dropper	O
+variants	O
+are	O
+usually	O
+barely	O
+functioning	O
+photo	O
+utility	O
+,	O
+games	O
+,	O
+or	O
+sex	O
+related	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+dropper	O
+automatically	O
+decrypts	O
+and	O
+installs	O
+its	O
+core	O
+malware	O
+APK	O
+which	O
+later	O
+conducts	O
+malicious	O
+patching	O
+and	O
+app	O
+updates	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+core	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+usually	O
+disguised	O
+as	O
+Google	B-Organization
+Updater	O
+,	O
+Google	B-Organization
+Update	O
+for	O
+U	O
+or	O
+“	O
+com.google.vending	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+core	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+icon	O
+is	O
+hidden	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+core	O
+malware	O
+extracts	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+installed	O
+app	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+it	O
+finds	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+its	O
+prey	O
+list	O
+(	O
+hard-coded	O
+or	O
+sent	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+)	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+extract	O
+the	O
+base	O
+APK	O
+of	O
+the	O
+target	O
+innocent	O
+app	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+patch	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+with	O
+malicious	O
+ads	O
+modules	O
+,	O
+install	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+back	O
+and	O
+replace	O
+the	O
+original	O
+one	O
+as	O
+if	O
+it	O
+is	O
+an	O
+update	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+repacks	O
+its	O
+prey	O
+apps	O
+at	O
+smali/baksmali	O
+code	O
+level	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+the	O
+final	O
+update	O
+installation	O
+process	O
+,	O
+it	O
+relies	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	O
+to	O
+bypass	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+APK	O
+integrity	O
+checks	O
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+kill	O
+chain	O
+completion	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+will	O
+then	O
+hijack	O
+compromised	O
+user	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+show	O
+ads	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+certain	O
+situations	O
+,	O
+variants	O
+intercept	O
+compromised	O
+apps	O
+’	O
+original	O
+legitimate	O
+ads	O
+display	O
+events	O
+and	O
+report	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+intended	O
+ad-exchange	O
+with	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+hacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+ad	O
+IDs	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+intelligence	O
+shows	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+droppers	O
+proliferate	O
+through	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+store	O
+“	O
+9Apps	B-System
+”	O
+,	O
+a	O
+UC	O
+team	O
+backed	O
+store	O
+,	O
+targeted	O
+mostly	O
+at	O
+Indian	O
+(	O
+Hindi	O
+)	O
+,	O
+Arabic	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Indonesian	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+itself	O
+,	O
+though	O
+,	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+target	O
+mainly	O
+India	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Unlike	O
+previously	O
+discovered	O
+non	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+centric	O
+campaigns	O
+whose	O
+victims	O
+almost	O
+exclusively	O
+come	O
+from	O
+less	O
+developed	O
+countries	O
+and	O
+regions	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+successfully	O
+penetrated	O
+into	O
+noticeable	O
+number	O
+of	O
+devices	O
+in	O
+developed	O
+countries	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Saudi	O
+Arabia	O
+,	O
+UK	O
+and	O
+US	O
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+has	O
+a	O
+modular	O
+structure	O
+and	O
+consists	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+modules	O
+:	O
+Loader	O
+Core	O
+Boot	O
+Patch	O
+AdSDK	O
+Updater	O
+As	O
+stated	O
+above	O
+,	O
+the	O
+first	O
+step	O
+of	O
+this	O
+infection	O
+chain	O
+is	O
+the	O
+dropper	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+dropper	O
+is	O
+a	O
+repacked	O
+legitimate	O
+application	O
+which	O
+contains	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+code	O
+–	O
+“	O
+loader	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+loader	O
+has	O
+a	O
+very	O
+simple	O
+purpose	O
+,	O
+extract	O
+and	O
+run	O
+the	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+of	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+communicates	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+receiving	O
+the	O
+predetermined	O
+list	O
+of	O
+popular	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+scan	O
+the	O
+device	O
+for	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+any	O
+application	O
+from	O
+that	O
+list	O
+was	O
+found	O
+,	O
+it	O
+utilizes	O
+the	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	O
+to	O
+inject	O
+the	O
+“	O
+boot	O
+”	O
+module	O
+into	O
+the	O
+repacked	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+next	O
+run	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+application	O
+,	O
+the	O
+“	O
+boot	O
+”	O
+module	O
+will	O
+run	O
+the	O
+“	O
+patch	O
+”	O
+module	O
+,	O
+which	O
+hooks	O
+the	O
+methods	O
+from	O
+known	O
+ad	O
+SDKs	O
+to	O
+its	O
+own	O
+implementation	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+1	O
+:	O
+‘	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+modular	O
+structure	O
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+–	O
+Loader	O
+Module	O
+The	O
+“	O
+loader	O
+”	O
+module	O
+,	O
+as	O
+stated	O
+above	O
+,	O
+extracts	O
+and	O
+runs	O
+the	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+the	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+resides	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+encrypted	O
+and	O
+disguised	O
+as	O
+a	O
+JPG	O
+file	O
+–	O
+the	O
+first	O
+two	O
+bytes	O
+are	O
+actually	O
+the	O
+magic	O
+header	O
+of	O
+JPG	O
+files	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+rest	O
+of	O
+the	O
+data	O
+is	O
+encoded	O
+with	O
+an	O
+XOR	O
+cipher	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+2	O
+:	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+jpg	O
+file	O
+structure	O
+After	O
+the	O
+extraction	O
+,	O
+the	O
+“	O
+loader	O
+”	O
+module	O
+adds	O
+the	O
+code	O
+to	O
+the	O
+application	O
+while	O
+using	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+mechanism	O
+by	O
+Android	B-System
+to	O
+handle	O
+large	O
+DEX	O
+files	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+3	O
+:	O
+Loading	O
+core	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+into	O
+the	O
+benign	O
+application	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+is	O
+extracted	O
+and	O
+loaded	O
+,	O
+the	O
+“	O
+loader	O
+”	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+reflection	O
+technique	O
+to	O
+initialize	O
+and	O
+start	O
+the	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+4	O
+:	O
+Loader	O
+calls	O
+initialization	O
+method	O
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+–	O
+Core	O
+Module	O
+With	O
+the	O
+main	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+spreading	O
+the	O
+infection	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+implements	O
+in	O
+the	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+:	O
+A	O
+series	O
+of	O
+‘	O
+Bundle	B-Vulnerability
+’	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+used	O
+to	O
+install	O
+applications	O
+without	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+awareness	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	O
+,	O
+which	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+to	O
+replace	O
+any	O
+application	O
+with	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+version	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+contacts	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+get	O
+a	O
+fresh	O
+list	O
+of	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+search	O
+for	O
+,	O
+or	O
+if	O
+that	O
+fails	O
+,	O
+use	O
+a	O
+default	O
+app	O
+list	O
+:	O
+whatsapp	B-System
+lenovo.anyshare.gps	B-Indicator
+mxtech.videoplayer.ad	B-Indicator
+jio.jioplay.tv	B-Indicator
+jio.media.jiobeats	B-Indicator
+jiochat.jiochatapp	B-Indicator
+jio.join	B-Indicator
+good.gamecollection	B-Indicator
+opera.mini.native	B-Indicator
+startv.hotstar	B-Indicator
+meitu.beautyplusme	B-Indicator
+domobile.applock	B-Indicator
+touchtype.swiftkey	B-Indicator
+flipkart.android	B-Indicator
+cn.xender	B-Indicator
+
+eterno	O
+truecaller	O
+For	O
+each	O
+application	O
+on	O
+the	O
+list	O
+,	O
+the	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+checks	O
+for	O
+a	O
+matching	O
+version	O
+and	O
+MD5	O
+hash	O
+of	O
+the	O
+installed	O
+application	O
+,	O
+and	O
+also	O
+checks	O
+for	O
+the	O
+application	O
+running	O
+in	O
+the	O
+user-space	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+all	O
+conditions	O
+are	O
+met	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+the	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+“	O
+core	O
+”	O
+module	O
+will	O
+use	O
+one	O
+of	O
+two	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+the	O
+application	O
+–	O
+Decompile	O
+and	O
+Binary	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+decompile	O
+method	O
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+fact	O
+that	O
+Android	B-System
+applications	O
+are	O
+Java-based	O
+,	O
+meaning	O
+it	O
+is	O
+possible	O
+to	O
+recompile	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+Therefore	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+decompiles	O
+both	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+and	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+and	O
+fuses	O
+them	O
+together	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+5	O
+:	O
+core	O
+module	O
+mixes	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+with	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+While	O
+decompiling	O
+the	O
+original	O
+app	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+has	O
+the	O
+opportunity	O
+to	O
+modify	O
+the	O
+methods	O
+inside	O
+,	O
+replace	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+methods	O
+in	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+that	O
+handles	O
+advertisement	O
+with	O
+its	O
+own	O
+code	O
+and	O
+focus	O
+on	O
+methods	O
+communicating	O
+with	O
+‘	O
+AdMob	B-System
+’	O
+,	O
+‘	O
+Facebook	B-System
+’	O
+,	O
+‘	O
+MoPub	B-System
+’	O
+and	O
+‘	O
+Unity	B-System
+Ads	I-System
+’	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+6	O
+:	O
+Targeted	O
+ad	O
+network	O
+Figure	O
+7	O
+:	O
+Injection	O
+example	O
+After	O
+all	O
+of	O
+the	O
+required	O
+changes	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+compiles	O
+the	O
+application	O
+and	O
+builds	O
+a	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+containing	O
+both	O
+the	O
+original	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+and	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+some	O
+cases	O
+,	O
+the	O
+decompilation	O
+process	O
+will	O
+fail	O
+,	O
+and	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+will	O
+try	O
+another	O
+method	O
+for	O
+infecting	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+–	O
+A	O
+binary	O
+patch	O
+,	O
+which	O
+simply	O
+provides	O
+a	O
+binary	O
+file	O
+of	O
+the	O
+“	O
+boot	O
+”	O
+module	O
+of	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+prepared	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+uses	O
+it	O
+to	O
+build	O
+another	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+,	O
+exploiting	O
+the	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+8	O
+:	O
+The	O
+new	O
+infected	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+structure	O
+Solely	O
+injecting	O
+the	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+loader	O
+is	O
+not	O
+enough	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+modular	O
+approach	O
+,	O
+and	O
+as	O
+stated	O
+earlier	O
+,	O
+the	O
+original	O
+loader	O
+extracts	O
+everything	O
+from	O
+the	O
+assets	O
+,	O
+the	O
+usage	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	O
+can	O
+only	O
+change	O
+the	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+,	O
+not	O
+the	O
+resources	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+means	O
+that	O
+the	O
+only	O
+thing	O
+possible	O
+in	O
+this	O
+case	O
+is	O
+to	O
+replace	O
+its	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+overcome	O
+this	O
+issue	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+found	O
+another	O
+solution	O
+.	O
+
+Seeing	O
+as	O
+the	O
+system	O
+loader	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+files	O
+(	O
+ART	O
+)	O
+fully	O
+ignores	O
+everything	O
+that	O
+goes	O
+after	O
+the	O
+data	O
+section	O
+,	O
+the	O
+patcher	O
+writes	O
+all	O
+of	O
+its	O
+resources	O
+right	O
+there	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+action	O
+changes	O
+the	O
+original	O
+file	O
+size	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+,	O
+which	O
+makes	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+resources	O
+a	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+,	O
+a	O
+section	O
+that	O
+is	O
+ignored	O
+by	O
+the	O
+signature	O
+validation	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+9	O
+:	O
+Malware	O
+secretly	O
+adds	O
+malicious	O
+resources	O
+to	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+Now	O
+,	O
+after	O
+the	O
+alteration	O
+of	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+,	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+package	O
+manager	O
+will	O
+think	O
+that	O
+this	O
+is	O
+an	O
+update	O
+for	O
+the	O
+application	O
+signed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+same	O
+certificate	O
+,	O
+but	O
+in	O
+reality	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+now	O
+,	O
+this	O
+is	O
+still	O
+not	O
+enough	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+be	O
+updated/installed	O
+without	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+consent	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+achieve	O
+this	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+utilizes	O
+a	O
+series	O
+of	O
+1-day	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+,	O
+which	O
+allows	O
+any	O
+application	O
+to	O
+run	O
+an	O
+activity	O
+inside	O
+a	O
+system	O
+application	O
+,	O
+even	O
+if	O
+this	O
+activity	O
+is	O
+not	O
+exported	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+application	O
+sends	O
+a	O
+request	O
+to	O
+choose	O
+a	O
+network	O
+account	O
+,	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+account	O
+that	O
+can	O
+only	O
+be	O
+processed	O
+by	O
+authentication	O
+services	O
+exported	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+system	O
+service	O
+‘	O
+AccountManagerService	O
+’	O
+looks	O
+for	O
+the	O
+application	O
+that	O
+can	O
+process	O
+this	O
+request	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+doing	O
+so	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+reach	O
+a	O
+service	O
+exported	O
+by	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+,	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+out	O
+an	O
+authentication	O
+request	O
+that	O
+would	O
+lead	O
+to	O
+a	O
+call	O
+to	O
+the	O
+‘	O
+addAccount	O
+’	O
+method	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+,	O
+a	O
+request	O
+is	O
+formed	O
+in	O
+such	O
+a	O
+way	O
+that	O
+an	O
+activity	O
+that	O
+installs	O
+the	O
+application	O
+is	O
+called	O
+,	O
+bypassing	O
+all	O
+security	O
+checks	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+10	O
+:	O
+The	O
+algorithm	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+update	O
+,	O
+while	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+updates	O
+application	O
+If	O
+all	O
+that	O
+has	O
+failed	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+turns	O
+to	O
+Man-in-the-Disk	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	O
+for	O
+‘	O
+SHAREit	B-System
+’	O
+or	O
+‘	O
+Xender	B-System
+’	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+very	O
+simple	O
+process	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+replacing	O
+their	O
+update	O
+file	O
+on	O
+SD	O
+card	O
+with	O
+its	O
+own	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+11	O
+:	O
+‘	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+’	O
+uses	O
+man-in-disk	B-Vulnerability
+to	O
+install	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+update	O
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+–	O
+Boot	O
+Module	O
+The	O
+“	O
+boot	O
+”	O
+module	O
+is	O
+basically	O
+another	O
+“	O
+loader	O
+”	O
+module	O
+,	O
+but	O
+this	O
+time	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+executed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+this	O
+module	O
+is	O
+to	O
+extract	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+–	O
+the	O
+“	O
+patch	O
+”	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+infected	O
+application	O
+contains	O
+its	O
+payload	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+that	O
+is	O
+needed	O
+is	O
+to	O
+get	O
+the	O
+original	O
+size	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DEX	O
+file	O
+and	O
+read	O
+everything	O
+that	O
+comes	O
+after	O
+this	O
+offset	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+12	O
+:	O
+Boot	O
+module	O
+After	O
+the	O
+patch	O
+module	O
+is	O
+extracted	O
+,	O
+the	O
+“	O
+boot	O
+”	O
+module	O
+executes	O
+it	O
+,	O
+using	O
+the	O
+same	O
+method	O
+described	O
+in	O
+the	O
+“	O
+loader	O
+”	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+“	O
+boot	O
+”	O
+module	O
+has	O
+placeholder	O
+classes	O
+for	O
+the	O
+entry	O
+points	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+“	O
+boot	O
+”	O
+module	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+payloads	O
+when	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+application	O
+is	O
+started	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+13	O
+:	O
+placeholder	O
+classes	O
+in	O
+Boot	O
+module	O
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+–	O
+Patch	O
+Module	O
+When	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+has	O
+reached	O
+its	O
+goal	O
+–	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+running	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+,	O
+with	O
+hooks	O
+on	O
+various	O
+methods	O
+–	O
+at	O
+this	O
+point	O
+,	O
+everything	O
+lies	O
+with	O
+maintaining	O
+the	O
+required	O
+code	O
+in	O
+case	O
+of	O
+an	O
+update	O
+for	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+investing	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+resources	O
+in	O
+the	O
+development	O
+of	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+does	O
+not	O
+want	O
+a	O
+real	O
+update	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+all	O
+of	O
+the	O
+changes	O
+made	O
+,	O
+so	O
+here	O
+is	O
+where	O
+the	O
+“	O
+patch	O
+”	O
+module	O
+comes	O
+in	O
+to	O
+play	O
+With	O
+the	O
+sole	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+disabling	O
+automatic	O
+updates	O
+for	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+application	O
+,	O
+this	O
+module	O
+observes	O
+the	O
+update	O
+directory	O
+for	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+and	O
+removes	O
+the	O
+file	O
+once	O
+it	O
+appears	O
+.	O
+
+Another	O
+trick	O
+in	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+arsenal	O
+is	O
+to	O
+change	O
+the	O
+settings	O
+of	O
+the	O
+update	O
+timeout	O
+,	O
+making	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+wait	O
+endlessly	O
+for	O
+the	O
+update	O
+check	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+14	O
+:	O
+disabling	O
+infected	O
+apps	O
+auto-update	O
+Figure	O
+15	O
+:	O
+changing	O
+the	O
+settings	O
+of	O
+the	O
+update	O
+timeout	O
+The	O
+Ad	O
+Displaying	O
+Payload	O
+Following	O
+all	O
+of	O
+the	O
+above	O
+,	O
+now	O
+is	O
+the	O
+time	O
+to	O
+take	O
+a	O
+look	O
+into	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+payload	O
+that	O
+displays	O
+ads	O
+to	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+injected	O
+payload	O
+,	O
+the	O
+module	O
+implements	O
+the	O
+method	O
+‘	O
+callActivityOnCreate	O
+’	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+any	O
+time	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+application	O
+will	O
+create	O
+an	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+this	O
+method	O
+will	O
+be	O
+called	O
+,	O
+and	O
+call	O
+‘	O
+requestAd	O
+’	O
+from	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+will	O
+replace	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+’	O
+s	O
+activities	O
+with	O
+an	O
+in-house	O
+SDK	O
+’	O
+s	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+which	O
+will	O
+show	O
+the	O
+banner	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+application	O
+not	O
+specified	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+will	O
+simply	O
+show	O
+ads	O
+on	O
+the	O
+activity	O
+being	O
+loaded	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+16	O
+:	O
+integrating	O
+an	O
+in-house	O
+ad	O
+SDK	O
+Figure	O
+17	O
+:	O
+replacing	O
+original	O
+app	O
+activities	O
+with	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+ad	O
+SDK	O
+activity	O
+Figure	O
+18	O
+:	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+showing	O
+ads	O
+on	O
+any	O
+activity	O
+being	O
+loaded	O
+Connecting	O
+the	O
+Dots	O
+As	O
+our	O
+malware	O
+sample	O
+analysis	O
+took	O
+the	O
+team	O
+closer	O
+to	O
+reveal	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Agent	O
+Smith	O
+”	O
+campaign	O
+in	O
+its	O
+entirety	O
+and	O
+it	O
+is	O
+here	O
+that	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+investigation	O
+enters	O
+the	O
+center	O
+stage	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+started	O
+with	O
+most	O
+frequently	O
+used	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+domains	O
+“	O
+a	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+d.com	I-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+a	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+d.net	I-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+and	O
+“	O
+a	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+d.org	I-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Among	O
+multiple	O
+sub-domains	O
+,	O
+“	O
+ad.a	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+d.org	I-Indicator
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+gd.a	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+d.org	I-Indicator
+”	O
+both	O
+historically	O
+resolved	O
+to	O
+the	O
+same	O
+suspicious	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+reverse	O
+DNS	O
+history	O
+of	O
+this	O
+IP	O
+brought	O
+“	O
+ads.i	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+e.com	I-Indicator
+”	O
+into	O
+our	O
+attention	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+extended	O
+malware	O
+hunting	O
+process	O
+returned	O
+to	O
+us	O
+a	O
+large	O
+set	O
+of	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+dropper	O
+variants	O
+which	O
+helped	O
+us	O
+further	O
+deduce	O
+a	O
+relation	O
+among	O
+multiple	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+infrastructures	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+a	O
+different	O
+period	O
+of	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+droppers	O
+and	O
+core	O
+modules	O
+used	O
+various	O
+combinations	O
+of	O
+the	O
+“	O
+a	O
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+d	O
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+i	O
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+e	O
+”	O
+domains	O
+for	O
+malicious	O
+operations	O
+such	O
+as	O
+prey	O
+list	O
+query	O
+,	O
+patch	O
+request	O
+and	O
+ads	O
+request	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+a	O
+bit	O
+of	O
+luck	O
+,	O
+we	O
+managed	O
+to	O
+find	O
+logs	O
+in	O
+which	O
+the	O
+evidence	O
+showed	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+front	O
+end	O
+routinely	O
+distributes	O
+a	O
+workload	O
+between	O
+“	O
+w.h	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+g.com	I-Indicator
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+tt.a	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+d.net	I-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+An	O
+in-depth	O
+understanding	O
+of	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+campaign	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+infrastructure	O
+enabled	O
+us	O
+to	O
+reach	O
+the	O
+conclusion	O
+that	O
+the	O
+owner	O
+of	O
+“	B-Indicator
+i	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+e.com	I-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+“	O
+h	B-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+*	I-Indicator
+g.com	I-Indicator
+”	O
+is	O
+the	O
+group	O
+of	O
+hackers	O
+behind	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+19	O
+:	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+infrastructure	O
+diagram	O
+The	O
+Infection	O
+Landscape	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+droppers	O
+show	O
+a	O
+very	O
+greedy	O
+infection	O
+tactic	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+not	O
+enough	O
+for	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+family	O
+to	O
+swap	O
+just	O
+one	O
+innocent	O
+application	O
+with	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+double	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+does	O
+so	O
+for	O
+each	O
+and	O
+every	O
+app	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+as	O
+long	O
+as	O
+the	O
+package	O
+names	O
+are	O
+on	O
+its	O
+prey	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+Over	O
+time	O
+,	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+will	O
+also	O
+infect	O
+the	O
+same	O
+device	O
+,	O
+repeatedly	O
+,	O
+with	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+malicious	O
+patches	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+lead	O
+us	O
+to	O
+estimate	O
+there	O
+to	O
+be	O
+over	O
+2.8	O
+billion	O
+infections	O
+in	O
+total	O
+,	O
+on	O
+around	O
+25	O
+Million	O
+unique	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+meaning	O
+that	O
+on	O
+average	O
+,	O
+each	O
+victim	O
+would	O
+have	O
+suffered	O
+roughly	O
+112	O
+swaps	O
+of	O
+innocent	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+an	O
+initial	O
+attack	O
+vector	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+abuses	O
+the	O
+9Apps	B-System
+market	O
+–	O
+with	O
+over	O
+360	O
+different	O
+dropper	O
+variants	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+maximize	O
+profit	O
+,	O
+variants	O
+with	O
+“	O
+MinSDK	O
+”	O
+or	O
+“	O
+OTA	O
+”	O
+SDK	O
+are	O
+present	O
+to	O
+further	O
+infect	O
+victims	O
+with	O
+other	O
+adware	O
+families	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+majority	O
+of	O
+droppers	O
+in	O
+9Apps	B-System
+are	O
+games	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+rest	O
+fall	O
+into	O
+categories	O
+of	O
+adult	O
+entertainment	O
+,	O
+media	O
+player	O
+,	O
+photo	O
+utilities	O
+,	O
+and	O
+system	O
+utilities	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+20	O
+:	O
+dropper	O
+app	O
+category	O
+distribution	O
+Among	O
+the	O
+vast	O
+number	O
+of	O
+variants	O
+,	O
+the	O
+top	O
+5	O
+most	O
+infectious	O
+droppers	O
+alone	O
+have	O
+been	O
+downloaded	O
+more	O
+than	O
+7.8	O
+million	O
+times	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infection	O
+operations	O
+against	O
+innocent	O
+applications	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+21	O
+:	O
+Top	O
+5	O
+most	O
+infectious	O
+droppers	O
+The	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+is	O
+primarily	O
+targeted	O
+at	O
+Indian	O
+users	O
+,	O
+who	O
+represent	O
+59	O
+%	O
+of	O
+the	O
+impacted	O
+population	O
+.	O
+
+Unlike	O
+previously	O
+seen	O
+non-GP	O
+(	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+)	O
+centric	O
+malware	O
+campaigns	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+has	O
+a	O
+significant	O
+impact	O
+upon	O
+not	O
+only	O
+developing	O
+countries	O
+but	O
+also	O
+some	O
+developed	O
+countries	O
+where	O
+GP	O
+is	O
+readily	O
+available	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+US	O
+(	O
+with	O
+around	O
+303k	O
+infections	O
+)	O
+,	O
+Saudi	O
+Arabia	O
+(	O
+245k	O
+)	O
+,	O
+Australia	O
+(	O
+141k	O
+)	O
+and	O
+the	O
+UK	O
+(	O
+137k	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+22	O
+:	O
+world	O
+infection	O
+heat	O
+map	O
+Considering	O
+that	O
+India	O
+is	O
+by	O
+far	O
+the	O
+most	O
+infected	O
+county	O
+by	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+,	O
+overall	O
+compromised	O
+device	O
+brand	O
+distribution	O
+is	O
+heavily	O
+influenced	O
+by	O
+brand	O
+popularity	O
+among	O
+Indian	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+23	O
+:	O
+infected	O
+brand	O
+distribution	O
+While	O
+most	O
+infections	O
+occurred	O
+on	O
+devices	O
+running	O
+Android	B-System
+5	I-System
+and	I-System
+6	I-System
+,	O
+we	O
+also	O
+see	O
+a	O
+considerable	O
+number	O
+of	O
+successful	O
+attacks	O
+against	O
+newer	O
+Android	B-System
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+a	O
+worrying	O
+observation	O
+.	O
+
+AOSP	O
+patched	O
+the	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerability	O
+since	O
+version	O
+7	O
+by	O
+introducing	O
+APK	O
+Signature	O
+Scheme	O
+V2	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+block	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+abuse	O
+,	O
+app	O
+developers	O
+need	O
+to	O
+sign	O
+their	O
+apps	O
+with	O
+the	O
+new	O
+scheme	O
+so	O
+that	O
+Android	B-System
+framework	O
+security	O
+component	O
+could	O
+conduct	O
+integrity	O
+checks	O
+with	O
+enhanced	O
+features	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+25	O
+:	O
+infected	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+distribution	O
+To	O
+further	O
+analyze	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+’	O
+s	O
+infection	O
+landscape	O
+,	O
+we	O
+dived	O
+into	O
+the	O
+top	O
+10	O
+infected	O
+countries	O
+:	O
+Country	O
+Total	O
+Devices	O
+Total	O
+Infection	O
+Event	O
+Count	O
+Avg	O
+.	O
+
+App	O
+Swap	O
+Per	O
+Device	O
+Avg	O
+.	O
+
+Droppers	O
+Per	O
+Device	O
+Avg	O
+.	O
+
+Months	O
+Device	O
+Remained	O
+Infected	O
+India	O
+15,230,123	O
+2,017,873,249	O
+2.6	O
+1.7	O
+2.1	O
+Bangladesh	O
+2,539,913	O
+208,026,886	O
+2.4	O
+1.5	O
+2.2	O
+Pakistan	O
+1,686,216	O
+94,296,907	O
+2.4	O
+1.6	O
+2	O
+Indonesia	O
+572,025	O
+67,685,983	O
+2	O
+1.5	O
+2.2	O
+Nepal	O
+469,274	O
+44,961,341	O
+2.4	O
+1.6	O
+2.4	O
+US	O
+302,852	O
+19,327,093	O
+1.7	O
+1.4	O
+1.8	O
+Nigeria	O
+287,167	O
+21,278,498	O
+2.4	O
+1.3	O
+2.3	O
+Hungary	O
+282,826	O
+7,856,064	O
+1.7	O
+1.3	O
+1.7	O
+Saudi	O
+Arabia	O
+245,698	O
+18,616,259	O
+2.3	O
+
+1.6	O
+1.9	O
+Myanmar	O
+234,338	O
+9,729,572	O
+1.5	O
+1.4	O
+1.9	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+Timeline	O
+Early	O
+signs	O
+of	O
+activity	O
+from	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+“	O
+Agent	O
+Smith	O
+”	O
+can	O
+be	O
+traced	O
+back	O
+to	O
+January	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+classify	O
+this	O
+40-month	O
+period	O
+into	O
+three	O
+main	O
+stages	O
+.	O
+
+January	O
+2016	O
+–	O
+May	O
+2018	O
+:	O
+In	O
+this	O
+stage	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+hackers	O
+started	O
+to	O
+try	O
+out	O
+9Apps	O
+as	O
+a	O
+distribution	O
+channel	O
+for	O
+their	O
+adware	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+this	O
+period	O
+,	O
+malware	O
+samples	O
+display	O
+some	O
+typical	O
+adware	O
+characteristics	O
+such	O
+as	O
+unnecessary	O
+permission	O
+requirements	O
+and	O
+pop-up	O
+windows	B-System
+.	O
+
+During	O
+this	O
+time	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+hackers	O
+eventually	O
+built	O
+up	O
+a	O
+vast	O
+number	O
+of	O
+app	O
+presence	O
+on	O
+9Apps	B-System
+,	O
+which	O
+later	O
+would	O
+serve	O
+as	O
+publication	O
+channels	O
+for	O
+evolved	O
+droppers	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+samples	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+have	O
+key	O
+capabilities	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+innocent	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+victim	O
+devices	O
+yet	O
+.	O
+
+May	O
+2018	O
+to	O
+April	O
+2019	O
+:	O
+This	O
+is	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+mature	O
+stage	O
+of	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+early	O
+2018	O
+prior	O
+to	O
+May	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+hackers	O
+started	O
+to	O
+experiment	O
+with	O
+Bundle	O
+Feng	O
+Shui	O
+,	O
+the	O
+key	O
+tool	O
+which	O
+gives	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+malware	O
+family	O
+capabilities	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+innocent	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+series	O
+of	O
+pilot	O
+runs	O
+were	O
+executed	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+some	O
+major	O
+upgrade	O
+,	O
+by	O
+mid-June	O
+,	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+reached	O
+its	O
+peak	O
+.	O
+
+Its	O
+dropper	O
+family	O
+finished	O
+integration	O
+with	O
+Bundle	O
+Feng	O
+Shui	O
+and	O
+campaign	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+infrastructure	O
+was	O
+shifted	O
+to	O
+AWS	B-System
+cloud	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Campaign	O
+achieved	O
+exponential	O
+growth	O
+from	O
+June	O
+to	O
+December	O
+2018	O
+with	O
+the	O
+infection	O
+number	O
+staying	O
+stable	O
+into	O
+early	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+Post-April	O
+2019	O
+:	O
+Starting	O
+from	O
+early	O
+2019	O
+,	O
+the	O
+new	O
+infection	O
+rate	O
+of	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+dropped	O
+significantly	O
+.	O
+
+From	O
+early	O
+April	O
+,	O
+hackers	O
+started	O
+to	O
+build	O
+a	O
+new	O
+major	O
+update	O
+to	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+under	O
+the	O
+name	O
+“	O
+leechsdk	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+26	O
+:	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+Campaign	O
+timeline	O
+Greater	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+Campaign	O
+Discovery	O
+Orchestrating	O
+a	O
+successful	O
+9Apps	B-System
+centric	O
+malware	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+established	O
+solid	O
+strategies	O
+in	O
+malware	O
+proliferation	O
+and	O
+payload	O
+delivery	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+actor	O
+also	O
+built	O
+solid	O
+backend	O
+infrastructures	O
+which	O
+can	O
+handle	O
+high	O
+volume	O
+concurrent	O
+requests	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+our	O
+extended	O
+threat	O
+hunting	O
+,	O
+we	O
+uncovered	O
+11	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+store	I-System
+that	O
+contain	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+yet	O
+dormant	O
+SDK	O
+related	O
+to	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+actor	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+discovery	O
+indicates	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+’	O
+s	O
+ambition	O
+in	O
+expanding	O
+operations	O
+into	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+store	O
+with	O
+previous	O
+success	O
+experience	O
+from	O
+the	O
+main	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+Instead	O
+of	O
+embedding	O
+core	O
+malware	O
+payload	O
+in	O
+droppers	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+switches	O
+to	O
+a	O
+more	O
+low-key	O
+SDK	O
+approach	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+dangerous	O
+module	O
+lies	O
+a	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+logic	O
+which	O
+looks	O
+for	O
+the	O
+keyword	O
+“	O
+infect	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+the	O
+keyword	O
+is	O
+present	O
+,	O
+the	O
+SDK	O
+will	O
+switch	O
+from	O
+innocent	O
+ads	O
+server	O
+to	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+delivery	O
+ones	O
+.	O
+
+Hence	O
+,	O
+we	O
+name	O
+this	O
+new	O
+spin-off	O
+campaign	O
+as	O
+Jaguar	O
+Kill	O
+Switch	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+below	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+is	O
+currently	O
+isolated	O
+and	O
+dormant	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+future	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+be	O
+invoked	O
+by	O
+malicious	O
+SDK	O
+during	O
+banner	O
+ads	O
+display	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+26	O
+:	O
+the	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+Evidence	O
+implies	O
+that	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+actor	O
+is	O
+currently	O
+laying	O
+the	O
+groundwork	O
+,	O
+increasing	O
+its	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+penetration	O
+rate	O
+and	O
+waiting	O
+for	O
+the	O
+right	O
+timing	O
+to	O
+kick	O
+off	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+this	O
+publication	O
+,	O
+two	O
+Jaguar	O
+Kill	O
+Switch	O
+infected	O
+app	O
+has	O
+reached	O
+10	O
+million	O
+downloads	O
+while	O
+others	O
+are	O
+still	O
+in	O
+their	O
+early	O
+stages	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Research	O
+reported	O
+these	O
+dangerous	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+Google	B-Organization
+upon	O
+discovery	O
+.	O
+
+Currently	O
+,	O
+all	O
+bespoke	O
+apps	O
+have	O
+been	O
+taken	O
+down	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+store	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+28	O
+:	O
+Jaguar	O
+Kill	O
+Switch	O
+infected	O
+GP	O
+apps	O
+Peek	O
+Into	O
+the	O
+Actor	O
+Based	O
+on	O
+all	O
+of	O
+the	O
+above	O
+,	O
+we	O
+connected	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+to	O
+a	O
+Chinese	O
+internet	O
+company	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Guangzhou	O
+whose	O
+front	O
+end	O
+legitimate	O
+business	O
+is	O
+to	O
+help	O
+Chinese	O
+Android	B-System
+developers	O
+publish	O
+and	O
+promote	O
+their	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+overseas	O
+platforms	O
+.	O
+
+Various	O
+recruitment	O
+posts	O
+on	O
+Chinese	O
+job	O
+sites	O
+and	O
+Chinese	B-System
+National	I-System
+Enterprise	I-System
+Credit	I-System
+Information	I-System
+Public	I-System
+System	I-System
+(	I-System
+NECIPS	I-System
+)	I-System
+data	O
+led	O
+us	O
+one	O
+step	O
+further	O
+,	O
+linking	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+to	O
+its	O
+legal	O
+entity	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+we	O
+uncovered	O
+several	O
+expired	O
+job	O
+posting	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+reverse	O
+engineer	O
+from	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+’	O
+s	O
+front	O
+business	O
+published	O
+in	O
+2018	O
+and	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+seems	O
+that	O
+the	O
+people	O
+who	O
+filled	O
+these	O
+roles	O
+are	O
+key	O
+to	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+success	O
+,	O
+yet	O
+not	O
+quite	O
+necessary	O
+for	O
+actor	O
+’	O
+s	O
+legitimate	O
+side	O
+of	O
+business	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+a	O
+better	O
+understanding	O
+of	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+actor	O
+than	O
+we	O
+had	O
+in	O
+the	O
+initial	O
+phase	O
+of	O
+campaign	O
+hunting	O
+,	O
+we	O
+examined	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+target	O
+innocent	O
+apps	O
+once	O
+again	O
+and	O
+discovered	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+’	O
+s	O
+unusual	O
+practices	O
+in	O
+choosing	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+seems	O
+,	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+prey	O
+list	O
+does	O
+not	O
+only	O
+have	O
+popular	O
+yet	O
+Janus	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerable	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+ensure	O
+high	O
+proliferation	O
+,	O
+but	O
+also	O
+contain	O
+competitor	O
+apps	O
+of	O
+actor	O
+’	O
+s	O
+legitimate	O
+business	O
+arm	O
+to	O
+suppress	O
+competition	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+Although	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+make	O
+their	O
+illegally	O
+acquired	O
+profit	O
+by	O
+exploiting	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+another	O
+actor	O
+could	O
+easily	O
+take	O
+a	O
+more	O
+intrusive	O
+and	O
+harmful	O
+route	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+its	O
+icon	O
+from	O
+the	O
+launcher	O
+and	O
+hijack	O
+popular	O
+existing	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+endless	O
+possibilities	O
+to	O
+harm	O
+a	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+digital	O
+even	O
+physical	O
+security	O
+.	O
+
+Today	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+shows	O
+unwanted	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+tomorrow	O
+it	O
+could	O
+steal	O
+sensitive	O
+information	O
+;	O
+from	O
+private	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+banking	O
+credentials	O
+and	O
+much	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+“	O
+Agent	B-Malware
+Smith	I-Malware
+”	O
+campaign	O
+serves	O
+as	O
+a	O
+sharp	O
+reminder	O
+that	O
+effort	O
+from	O
+system	O
+developers	O
+alone	O
+is	O
+not	O
+enough	O
+to	O
+build	O
+a	O
+secure	O
+Android	B-System
+eco-system	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+requires	O
+attention	O
+and	O
+action	O
+from	O
+system	O
+developers	O
+,	O
+device	O
+manufacturers	O
+,	O
+app	O
+developers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+users	O
+,	O
+so	O
+that	O
+vulnerability	O
+fixes	O
+are	O
+patched	O
+,	O
+distributed	O
+,	O
+adopted	O
+and	O
+installed	O
+in	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+also	O
+another	O
+example	O
+for	O
+why	O
+organizations	O
+and	O
+consumers	O
+alike	O
+should	O
+have	O
+an	O
+advanced	O
+mobile	O
+threat	O
+prevention	O
+solution	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+themselves	O
+against	O
+the	O
+possibility	O
+of	O
+unknowingly	O
+installing	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+even	O
+from	O
+trusted	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+Dvmap	B-Malware
+:	O
+the	O
+first	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+with	O
+code	O
+injection	O
+08	O
+JUN	O
+2017	O
+In	O
+April	O
+2017	O
+we	O
+started	O
+observing	O
+new	O
+rooting	O
+malware	O
+being	O
+distributed	O
+through	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Unlike	O
+other	O
+rooting	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+this	O
+Trojan	O
+not	O
+only	O
+installs	O
+its	O
+modules	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+,	O
+it	O
+also	O
+injects	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+runtime	O
+libraries	O
+.	O
+
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+Lab	I-Organization
+products	O
+detect	O
+it	O
+as	O
+Trojan.AndroidOS.Dvmap.a	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+distribution	O
+of	O
+rooting	O
+malware	O
+through	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+is	O
+not	O
+a	O
+new	O
+thing	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Ztorg	B-Malware
+Trojan	I-Malware
+has	O
+been	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+almost	O
+100	O
+times	O
+since	O
+September	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+Dvmap	B-Malware
+is	O
+very	O
+special	O
+rooting	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+new	O
+techniques	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+most	O
+interesting	O
+thing	O
+is	O
+that	O
+it	O
+injects	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+libraries	O
+–	O
+libdmv.so	B-Indicator
+or	O
+libandroid_runtime.so	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+makes	O
+Dvmap	B-Malware
+the	O
+first	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+that	O
+injects	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+libraries	O
+in	O
+runtime	O
+,	O
+and	O
+it	O
+has	O
+been	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+more	O
+than	O
+50,000	O
+times	O
+.	O
+
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+Lab	I-Organization
+reported	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+to	O
+Google	B-Organization
+,	O
+and	O
+it	O
+has	O
+now	O
+been	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+store	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+bypass	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+security	O
+checks	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+creators	O
+used	O
+a	O
+very	O
+interesting	O
+method	O
+:	O
+they	O
+uploaded	O
+a	O
+clean	O
+app	O
+to	O
+the	O
+store	O
+at	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+March	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+,	O
+and	O
+would	O
+then	O
+update	O
+it	O
+with	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+version	O
+for	O
+short	O
+period	O
+of	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+Usually	O
+they	O
+would	O
+upload	O
+a	O
+clean	O
+version	O
+back	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+the	O
+very	O
+same	O
+day	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+did	O
+this	O
+at	O
+least	O
+5	O
+times	O
+between	O
+18	O
+April	O
+and	O
+15	O
+May	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+Dvmap	B-Malware
+apps	O
+had	O
+the	O
+same	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+decrypt	O
+several	O
+archive	O
+files	O
+from	O
+the	O
+assets	O
+folder	O
+of	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+package	O
+,	O
+and	O
+launch	O
+an	O
+executable	O
+file	O
+from	O
+them	O
+with	O
+the	O
+name	O
+“	O
+start.	O
+”	O
+The	O
+interesting	O
+thing	O
+is	O
+that	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+supports	O
+even	O
+the	O
+64-bit	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+very	O
+rare	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+encrypted	O
+archives	O
+can	O
+be	O
+divided	O
+into	O
+two	O
+groups	O
+:	O
+the	O
+first	O
+comprises	O
+Game321.res	B-Indicator
+,	O
+Game322.res	B-Indicator
+,	O
+Game323.res	B-Indicator
+and	O
+Game642.res	B-Indicator
+–	O
+and	O
+these	O
+are	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+initial	O
+phase	O
+of	O
+infection	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+second	O
+group	O
+:	O
+Game324.res	B-Indicator
+and	O
+Game644.res	B-Indicator
+,	O
+are	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+main	O
+phase	O
+.	O
+
+Initial	O
+phase	O
+During	O
+this	O
+phase	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+root	O
+rights	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+to	O
+install	O
+some	O
+modules	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+archives	O
+from	O
+this	O
+phase	O
+contain	O
+the	O
+same	O
+files	O
+except	O
+for	O
+one	O
+called	O
+“	O
+common	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+local	O
+root	O
+exploit	O
+pack	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+uses	O
+4	O
+different	O
+exploit	O
+pack	O
+files	O
+,	O
+3	O
+for	O
+32-bit	O
+systems	O
+and	O
+1	O
+for	O
+64-bit-systems	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+these	O
+files	O
+successfully	O
+gain	O
+root	O
+rights	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+install	O
+several	O
+tools	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+will	O
+also	O
+install	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+“	O
+com.qualcmm.timeservices.	B-Indicator
+”	O
+These	O
+archives	O
+contain	O
+the	O
+file	O
+“	O
+.root.sh	B-Indicator
+”	O
+which	O
+has	O
+some	O
+comments	O
+in	O
+Chinese	O
+:	O
+Main	O
+phase	O
+In	O
+this	O
+phase	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+launches	O
+the	O
+“	O
+start	O
+”	O
+file	O
+from	O
+Game324.res	B-Indicator
+or	O
+Game644.res	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+It	O
+will	O
+check	O
+the	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+installed	O
+and	O
+decide	O
+which	O
+library	O
+should	O
+be	O
+patched	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+Android	B-System
+4.4.4	I-System
+and	O
+older	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+patch	O
+method	O
+_Z30dvmHeapSourceStartupBeforeForkv	O
+from	O
+libdvm.so	B-Indicator
+,	O
+and	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+5	O
+and	O
+newer	O
+it	O
+will	O
+patch	O
+method	O
+nativeForkAndSpecialize	O
+from	O
+libandroid_runtime.so	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Both	O
+of	O
+these	O
+libraries	O
+are	O
+runtime	O
+libraries	O
+related	O
+to	O
+Dalvik	B-System
+and	O
+ART	B-System
+runtime	O
+environments	O
+.	O
+
+Before	O
+patching	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+backup	O
+the	O
+original	O
+library	O
+with	O
+a	O
+name	O
+bak_	O
+{	O
+original	O
+name	O
+}	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+patching	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+overwrite	O
+the	O
+existing	O
+code	O
+with	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+so	O
+that	O
+all	O
+it	O
+can	O
+do	O
+is	O
+execute	O
+/system/bin/ip	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+could	O
+be	O
+very	O
+dangerous	O
+and	O
+cause	O
+some	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+crash	O
+following	O
+the	O
+overwrite	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+put	O
+the	O
+patched	O
+library	O
+back	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+directory	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+that	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+replace	O
+the	O
+original	O
+/system/bin/ip	B-Indicator
+with	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+one	O
+from	O
+the	O
+archive	O
+(	O
+Game324.res	B-Indicator
+or	O
+Game644.res	B-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+doing	O
+so	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+can	O
+be	O
+sure	O
+that	O
+its	O
+malicious	O
+module	O
+will	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+with	O
+system	O
+rights	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+ip	O
+file	O
+does	O
+not	O
+contain	O
+any	O
+methods	O
+from	O
+the	O
+original	O
+ip	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+means	O
+that	O
+all	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+were	O
+using	O
+this	O
+file	O
+will	O
+lose	O
+some	O
+functionality	O
+or	O
+even	O
+start	O
+crashing	O
+.	O
+
+Malicious	O
+module	O
+“	O
+ip	O
+”	O
+This	O
+file	O
+will	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+patched	O
+system	O
+library	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+can	O
+turn	O
+off	O
+“	O
+VerifyApps	O
+”	O
+and	O
+enable	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+3rd	O
+party	O
+stores	O
+by	O
+changing	O
+system	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+Furthermore	O
+,	O
+it	O
+can	O
+grant	O
+the	O
+“	O
+com.qualcmm.timeservices	B-Indicator
+”	O
+app	O
+Device	O
+Administrator	O
+rights	O
+without	O
+any	O
+interaction	O
+with	O
+the	O
+user	O
+,	O
+just	O
+by	O
+running	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+a	O
+very	O
+unusual	O
+way	O
+to	O
+get	O
+Device	O
+Administrator	O
+rights	O
+.	O
+
+Malicious	O
+app	O
+com.qualcmm.timeservices	B-Indicator
+As	O
+I	O
+mentioned	O
+before	O
+,	O
+in	O
+the	O
+“	O
+initial	O
+phase	O
+”	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+will	O
+install	O
+the	O
+“	O
+com.qualcmm.timeservices	B-Indicator
+”	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Its	O
+main	O
+purpose	O
+is	O
+to	O
+download	O
+archives	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+“	O
+start	O
+”	O
+binary	O
+from	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+this	O
+app	O
+was	O
+able	O
+to	O
+successfully	O
+connect	O
+to	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+received	O
+no	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+I	O
+don	O
+’	O
+t	O
+know	O
+what	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+files	O
+will	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+,	O
+but	O
+they	O
+could	O
+be	O
+malicious	O
+or	O
+advertising	O
+files	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusions	O
+This	O
+Trojan	O
+was	O
+distributed	O
+through	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+and	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+very	O
+dangerous	O
+techniques	O
+,	O
+including	O
+patching	O
+system	O
+libraries	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+installs	O
+malicious	O
+modules	O
+with	O
+different	O
+functionality	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+looks	O
+like	O
+its	O
+main	O
+purpose	O
+is	O
+to	O
+get	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+downloaded	O
+files	O
+with	O
+root	O
+rights	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+I	O
+never	O
+received	O
+such	O
+files	O
+from	O
+their	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+malicious	O
+modules	O
+report	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+about	O
+every	O
+step	O
+they	O
+are	O
+going	O
+to	O
+make	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+I	O
+think	O
+that	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+are	O
+still	O
+testing	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+because	O
+they	O
+use	O
+some	O
+techniques	O
+which	O
+can	O
+break	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+they	O
+already	O
+have	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+infected	O
+users	O
+on	O
+whom	O
+to	O
+test	O
+their	O
+methods	O
+.	O
+
+I	O
+hope	O
+that	O
+by	O
+uncovering	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+at	O
+such	O
+an	O
+early	O
+stage	O
+,	O
+we	O
+will	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+a	O
+massive	O
+and	O
+dangerous	O
+attack	O
+when	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+are	O
+ready	O
+to	O
+actively	O
+use	O
+their	O
+methods	O
+.	O
+
+MD5	O
+43680D1914F28E14C90436E1D42984E2	B-Indicator
+20D4B9EB9377C499917C4D69BF4CCEBE	B-Indicator
+First	O
+widely	O
+distributed	O
+Android	B-System
+bootkit	O
+Malware	O
+infects	O
+more	O
+than	O
+350,000	O
+Devices	O
+January	O
+29	O
+,	O
+2014	O
+In	O
+the	O
+last	O
+quarter	O
+of	O
+2013	O
+,	O
+sale	O
+of	O
+a	O
+Smartphone	O
+with	O
+ANDROID	B-System
+operating	O
+system	O
+has	O
+increased	O
+and	O
+every	O
+second	O
+person	O
+you	O
+see	O
+is	O
+a	O
+DROID	B-System
+user	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+Russian	O
+security	O
+firm	O
+'Doctor	O
+Web	B-Organization
+'	O
+identified	O
+the	O
+first	O
+mass	O
+distributed	O
+Android	B-System
+bootkit	O
+malware	O
+called	O
+'Android.Oldboot	O
+'	O
+,	O
+a	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+'s	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+re-infect	O
+devices	O
+after	O
+reboot	O
+,	O
+even	O
+if	O
+you	O
+delete	O
+all	O
+working	O
+components	O
+of	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+bootkit	O
+Android.Oldboot	B-Malware
+has	O
+infected	O
+more	O
+than	O
+350,000	O
+android	B-System
+users	O
+in	O
+China	O
+,	O
+Spain	O
+,	O
+Italy	O
+,	O
+Germany	O
+,	O
+Russia	O
+,	O
+Brazil	O
+,	O
+the	O
+USA	O
+and	O
+some	O
+Southeast	O
+Asian	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+China	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+a	O
+mass	O
+victim	O
+of	O
+this	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+having	O
+a	O
+92	O
+%	O
+share	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+Bootkit	O
+is	O
+a	O
+rootkit	O
+malware	O
+variant	O
+which	O
+infects	O
+the	O
+device	O
+at	O
+start-up	O
+and	O
+may	O
+encrypt	O
+disk	O
+or	O
+steal	O
+data	O
+,	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+application	O
+,	O
+open	O
+connection	O
+for	O
+Command	O
+and	O
+controller	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+very	O
+unique	O
+technique	O
+is	O
+being	O
+used	O
+to	O
+inject	O
+this	O
+Trojan	O
+into	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+system	O
+where	O
+an	O
+attacker	O
+places	O
+a	O
+component	O
+of	O
+it	O
+into	O
+the	O
+boot	O
+partition	O
+of	O
+the	O
+file	O
+system	O
+and	O
+modify	O
+the	O
+'init	O
+'	O
+script	O
+(	O
+initialize	O
+the	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+)	O
+to	O
+re-load	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+as	O
+you	O
+switch	O
+on	O
+your	O
+android	B-System
+.	O
+
+When	O
+you	O
+start	O
+your	O
+device	O
+,	O
+this	O
+script	O
+loads	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+'imei_chk	O
+'	O
+(	O
+detects	O
+it	O
+as	O
+Android.Oldboot.1	B-Indicator
+)	O
+which	O
+extract	O
+two	O
+files	O
+libgooglekernel.so	B-Indicator
+(	O
+Android.Oldboot.2	B-Indicator
+)	O
+and	O
+GoogleKernel.apk	B-Indicator
+(	O
+Android.Oldboot.1.origin	B-Indicator
+)	O
+,	O
+copy	O
+them	O
+respectively	O
+in	O
+/system/lib	B-Indicator
+and	I-Indicator
+/system/app	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Android.Oldboot	B-Malware
+acts	O
+as	O
+a	O
+system	O
+service	O
+and	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+command-and-controller	O
+server	O
+using	O
+libgooglekernel.so	B-Indicator
+library	O
+and	O
+receives	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+download	O
+,	O
+remove	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+and	O
+install	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+it	O
+becomes	O
+a	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+boot	O
+partition	O
+,	O
+formatting	O
+the	O
+device	O
+will	O
+not	O
+solve	O
+the	O
+problem	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+researchers	O
+believe	O
+that	O
+the	O
+devices	O
+somehow	O
+had	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+pre-loaded	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+shipping	O
+from	O
+the	O
+manufacturer	O
+,	O
+or	O
+was	O
+likely	O
+distributed	O
+inside	O
+modified	O
+Android	B-System
+firmware	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+,	O
+users	O
+should	O
+beware	O
+of	O
+certain	O
+modified	O
+Android	B-System
+firmware	O
+.	O
+
+Two	O
+weeks	O
+ago	O
+,	O
+Some	O
+Chinese	O
+Security	O
+Researchers	O
+have	O
+also	O
+detected	O
+a	O
+bootkit	O
+called	O
+'Oldboot	O
+'	O
+,	O
+possibly	O
+the	O
+same	O
+malware	O
+or	O
+another	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+"	O
+Due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+special	O
+RAM	O
+disk	O
+feature	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+'	O
+boot	O
+partition	O
+,	O
+all	O
+current	O
+mobile	O
+antivirus	O
+products	O
+in	O
+the	O
+world	O
+ca	O
+n't	O
+completely	O
+remove	O
+this	O
+Trojan	O
+or	O
+effectively	O
+repair	O
+the	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+"	O
+According	O
+to	O
+our	O
+statistics	O
+,	O
+as	O
+of	O
+today	O
+,	O
+there	O
+'re	O
+more	O
+than	O
+500	O
+,	O
+000	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+infected	O
+by	O
+this	O
+bootkit	O
+in	O
+China	O
+in	O
+last	O
+six	O
+months	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+Android.Oldboot	B-Malware
+is	O
+almost	O
+impossible	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+,	O
+not	O
+even	O
+with	O
+formatting	O
+your	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+if	O
+your	O
+device	O
+is	O
+not	O
+from	O
+a	O
+Chinese	O
+manufacturer	O
+,	O
+then	O
+chances	O
+that	O
+you	O
+are	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+of	O
+it	O
+,	O
+are	O
+very	O
+less	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+bootkit	O
+is	O
+not	O
+the	O
+first	O
+of	O
+this	O
+kind	O
+.	O
+
+Two	O
+years	O
+back	O
+,	O
+in	O
+the	O
+month	O
+of	O
+March	O
+we	O
+reported	O
+,	O
+NQ	B-Organization
+Mobile	I-Organization
+Security	I-Organization
+Research	O
+Center	O
+uncovered	O
+the	O
+world	O
+'s	O
+first	O
+Android	B-System
+bootkit	O
+malware	O
+called	O
+'DKFBootKit	O
+'	O
+,	O
+that	O
+replaces	O
+certain	O
+boot	O
+processes	O
+and	O
+can	O
+begin	O
+running	O
+even	O
+before	O
+the	O
+system	O
+is	O
+completely	O
+booted	O
+up	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+Android.Oldboot	B-Malware
+malware	O
+is	O
+a	O
+bit	O
+more	O
+dangerous	O
+because	O
+even	O
+if	O
+you	O
+remove	O
+all	O
+working	O
+components	O
+of	O
+it	O
+from	O
+your	O
+android	B-System
+successfully	O
+,	O
+the	O
+component	O
+imei_chk	B-Indicator
+will	O
+persist	O
+in	O
+a	O
+protected	O
+boot	O
+memory	O
+area	O
+and	O
+hence	O
+will	O
+reinstall	O
+itself	O
+on	O
+next	O
+boot	O
+and	O
+continuously	O
+infect	O
+the	O
+Smartphone	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+are	O
+recommended	O
+to	O
+install	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+authorized	O
+stores	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+disable	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+'Unknown	O
+Sources	O
+'	O
+and	O
+for	O
+a	O
+better	O
+security	O
+install	O
+a	O
+reputed	O
+security	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+You	O
+can	O
+also	O
+try	O
+to	O
+re-flash	O
+your	O
+device	O
+with	O
+its	O
+original	O
+ROM	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+flashing	O
+,	O
+the	O
+bootkit	O
+will	O
+be	O
+removed	O
+.	O
+
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+:	O
+Multi-Platform	O
+Surveillance	O
+Campaign	O
+Against	O
+Palestinians	O
+October	O
+5	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+has	O
+been	O
+seen	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+various	O
+well	O
+known	O
+social	O
+media	O
+and	O
+chat	O
+applications	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+an	O
+app	O
+likely	O
+only	O
+used	O
+by	O
+Palestinian	O
+or	O
+Jordanian	O
+students	O
+sitting	O
+their	O
+2016	O
+general	O
+exams	O
+.	O
+
+Lookout	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+new	O
+mobile	O
+surveillanceware	O
+family	O
+,	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+threat	O
+is	O
+likely	O
+targeting	O
+employees	O
+of	O
+various	O
+Palestinian	O
+government	O
+agencies	O
+,	O
+security	O
+services	O
+,	O
+Palestinian	O
+students	O
+,	O
+and	O
+those	O
+affiliated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Fatah	B-Organization
+political	O
+party	O
+.	O
+
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+is	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+component	O
+of	O
+a	O
+multi-platform	O
+attack	O
+we	O
+'ve	O
+seen	O
+a	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+known	O
+as	O
+"	O
+Two-tailed	B-Malware
+Scorpion/APT-C-23	I-Malware
+,	O
+''	O
+use	O
+to	O
+spy	O
+on	O
+victims	O
+through	O
+compromised	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+desktops	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+desktop	O
+components	O
+of	O
+this	O
+attack	O
+,	O
+previously	O
+discovered	O
+by	O
+Palo	B-Organization
+Alto	I-Organization
+Network	I-Organization
+,	O
+are	O
+known	O
+as	O
+KasperAgent	B-Malware
+and	O
+Micropsia	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+We	O
+discovered	O
+561MB	O
+of	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+from	O
+24	O
+compromised	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+while	O
+investigating	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+More	O
+data	O
+is	O
+appearing	O
+daily	O
+,	O
+leading	O
+us	O
+to	O
+believe	O
+the	O
+actors	O
+are	O
+still	O
+highly	O
+active	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+are	O
+continuing	O
+to	O
+watch	O
+it	O
+closely	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+threat	O
+is	O
+another	O
+proof	O
+point	O
+that	O
+attackers	O
+are	O
+clearly	O
+incorporating	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+into	O
+their	O
+surveillance	O
+campaigns	O
+as	O
+a	O
+primary	O
+attack	O
+vector	O
+.	O
+
+Government	O
+agencies	O
+and	O
+enterprises	O
+should	O
+look	O
+at	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+as	O
+an	O
+example	O
+of	O
+the	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+spying	O
+that	O
+is	O
+now	O
+possible	O
+given	O
+how	O
+ubiquitous	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+are	O
+in	O
+the	O
+workplace	O
+.	O
+
+Attackers	O
+are	O
+keenly	O
+aware	O
+of	O
+the	O
+information	O
+they	O
+can	O
+derive	O
+from	O
+these	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+are	O
+using	O
+multi-stage	O
+(	O
+phishing	O
++	O
+an	O
+executable	O
+)	O
+,	O
+multi-platform	O
+(	O
+Android	B-System
++	O
+desktop	O
+)	O
+attacks	O
+to	O
+accomplish	O
+their	O
+spying	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+Lookout	B-Organization
+customers	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+from	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+it	O
+does	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+masquerades	O
+as	O
+fake	O
+updates	O
+to	O
+chat	O
+applications	O
+like	O
+Facebook	B-System
+,	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Messenger	B-System
+,	O
+LINE	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+LoveChat	B-System
+.	O
+
+We	O
+also	O
+detected	O
+it	O
+in	O
+apps	O
+targeted	O
+toward	O
+specific	O
+Middle	O
+Eastern	O
+demographics	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+used	O
+a	O
+spoofed	O
+app	O
+called	O
+Tawjihi	B-Indicator
+2016	I-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+Jordanian	O
+or	O
+Palestinian	O
+students	O
+would	O
+ordinarily	O
+use	O
+during	O
+their	O
+general	O
+secondary	O
+examination	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+:	O
+Recording	O
+calls	O
+Retrieving	O
+generic	O
+phone	O
+metadata	O
+(	O
+e.g.	O
+,	O
+cell	O
+location	O
+,	O
+mobile	O
+country	O
+code	O
+,	O
+mobile	O
+network	O
+code	O
+)	O
+Geolocating	O
+a	O
+device	O
+Extracting	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+Retrieving	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+accounts	O
+Exfiltrating	O
+images	O
+Downloading	O
+and	O
+installing	O
+additional	O
+applications	O
+Searching	O
+for	O
+and	O
+exfiltrating	O
+pdf	O
+,	O
+doc	O
+,	O
+docx	O
+,	O
+ppt	O
+,	O
+pptx	O
+,	O
+xls	O
+,	O
+and	O
+xlsx	O
+file	O
+types	O
+Retrieving	O
+contacts	O
+The	O
+graph	O
+below	O
+represents	O
+a	O
+split	O
+of	O
+the	O
+types	O
+of	O
+data	O
+
+from	O
+only	O
+one	O
+misconfigured	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+(	O
+out	O
+of	O
+over	O
+37	O
+servers	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+only	O
+a	O
+small	O
+picture	O
+of	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+'s	O
+operations	O
+.	O
+
+Split	O
+of	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+Some	O
+noteworthy	O
+files	O
+identified	O
+in	O
+content	O
+taken	O
+from	O
+compromised	O
+devices	O
+include	O
+passport	O
+photos	O
+,	O
+audio	O
+recordings	O
+of	O
+calls	O
+,	O
+other	O
+images	O
+,	O
+and	O
+a	O
+PDF	O
+document	O
+with	O
+data	O
+on	O
+484	O
+individuals	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+PDF	O
+lists	O
+dates	O
+of	O
+birth	O
+,	O
+gender	O
+,	O
+passport	O
+numbers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+names	O
+.	O
+
+Potential	O
+targets	O
+The	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+used	O
+an	O
+online	O
+service	O
+that	O
+geolocates	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+based	O
+on	O
+nearby	O
+cell	O
+towers	O
+to	O
+track	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+data	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+distinct	O
+concentration	O
+of	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+beaconing	O
+from	O
+Gaza	O
+,	O
+Palestine	O
+.	O
+
+Map	O
+of	O
+potential	O
+targets	O
+Early	O
+samples	O
+of	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+used	O
+an	O
+online	O
+service	O
+for	O
+storing	O
+geolocation	O
+information	O
+of	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Analysis	O
+of	O
+this	O
+telemetry	O
+shows	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+are	O
+completely	O
+based	O
+in	O
+Gaza	O
+,	O
+Palestine	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+not	O
+been	O
+confirmed	O
+whether	O
+these	O
+are	O
+from	O
+test	O
+devices	O
+or	O
+the	O
+devices	O
+of	O
+victims	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+were	O
+also	O
+able	O
+to	O
+link	O
+the	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+'s	O
+Android	B-System
+infrastructure	O
+to	O
+numerous	O
+desktop	O
+samples	O
+that	O
+are	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+larger	O
+multi-platform	O
+attack	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+appears	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+sent	O
+malicious	O
+executables	O
+though	O
+phishing	O
+campaigns	O
+impersonating	O
+individuals	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Palestinian	B-Organization
+Security	I-Organization
+Services	I-Organization
+,	O
+the	O
+General	B-Organization
+Directorate	I-Organization
+of	I-Organization
+Civil	I-Organization
+Defence	I-Organization
+-	O
+Ministry	B-Organization
+of	I-Organization
+the	I-Organization
+Interior	I-Organization
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+7th	O
+Fateh	O
+Conference	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Palestinian	B-Organization
+National	I-Organization
+Liberation	I-Organization
+Front	I-Organization
+(	O
+held	O
+in	O
+late	O
+2016	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+titles	O
+and	O
+contents	O
+of	O
+these	O
+files	O
+suggest	O
+that	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+targeted	O
+individuals	O
+affiliated	O
+with	O
+these	O
+government	O
+agencies	O
+and	O
+the	O
+Fatah	B-Organization
+political	O
+party	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+malicious	O
+files	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+these	O
+samples	O
+were	O
+titled	O
+the	O
+following	O
+:	O
+Council_of_ministres_decision	O
+Minutes	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Geneva	O
+Meeting	O
+on	O
+Troops	O
+Summary	O
+of	O
+today	O
+'s	O
+meetings.doc.exe	B-Indicator
+The	O
+most	O
+important	O
+points	O
+of	O
+meeting	O
+the	O
+memory	O
+of	O
+the	O
+late	O
+President	O
+Abu	O
+Omar	O
+may	O
+Allah	O
+have	O
+mercy	O
+on	O
+him	O
+-	O
+Paper	O
+No	O
+.	O
+
+1	O
+Fadi	O
+Alsalamin	O
+scandal	O
+with	O
+an	O
+Israeli	O
+officer	O
+-	O
+exclusive	O
+-	O
+watched	O
+before	O
+the	O
+deletion	O
+-	O
+Fadi	O
+Elsalameen	O
+The	O
+details	O
+of	O
+the	O
+assassination	O
+of	O
+President	O
+Arafat_06-12-2016_docx	O
+Quds.rar	B-Indicator
+Many	O
+of	O
+these	O
+executables	O
+are	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+various	O
+short	O
+links	O
+created	O
+using	O
+Bit.ly	B-System
+,	O
+a	O
+URL	O
+shortening	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+analyzing	O
+the	O
+traffic	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+these	O
+short	O
+links	O
+,	O
+we	O
+determined	O
+that	O
+each	O
+one	O
+was	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+a	O
+referral	O
+path	O
+from	O
+mail.mosa.pna.ps	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+MOSA	B-Organization
+is	O
+the	O
+Palestinian	O
+Directorate	O
+of	O
+Social	O
+Development	O
+whose	O
+mandate	O
+is	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+comprehensive	O
+development	O
+,	O
+social	O
+security	O
+,	O
+and	O
+economic	O
+growth	O
+for	O
+Palestinian	O
+families	O
+,	O
+according	O
+to	O
+publicly	O
+available	O
+information	O
+on	O
+this	O
+ministry	O
+.	O
+
+Infrastructure	O
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+the	O
+following	O
+domains	O
+have	O
+either	O
+been	O
+used	O
+by	O
+this	O
+family	O
+or	O
+are	O
+currently	O
+active	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+expect	O
+this	O
+list	O
+to	O
+grow	O
+given	O
+that	O
+this	O
+actor	O
+has	O
+changed	O
+its	O
+infrastructure	O
+numerous	O
+times	O
+in	O
+2017	O
+.	O
+
+cecilia-gilbert	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+comgooogel	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+orgmary-crawley	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+commydriveweb	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+comrose-sturat	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+infokalisi	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+xyzdebra-morgan	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+comarnani	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+infoacount-manager	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+infogooogel-drive	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+commediauploader	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+meacount-manager	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+netupload404	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+clubupload999	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+infoal-amalhumandevelopment	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+commargaery	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+coupload202	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+comgo-mail-accounts	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+comupload101	I-Indicator
+[	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+netsybil-parks	I-Indicator
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+infodavos-seaworth	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+infoupload999	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+orgacount-manager	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+comlila-tournai	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+comaccount-manager	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+orgmediauploader	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+infokalisi	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+orgaryastark	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+infomavis-dracula	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+comkalisi	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+infogoogle-support-team	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+com9oo91e	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+comuseraccount	O
+[	O
+.	O
+
+]	O
+websiteaccounts-fb	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+comakashipro	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+comfeteh-asefa	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+comlagertha-lothbrok	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+info	I-Indicator
+OpSec	O
+fails	O
+and	O
+use	O
+of	O
+cryptography	O
+While	O
+looking	O
+at	O
+this	O
+infrastructure	O
+,	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+that	O
+one	O
+of	O
+these	O
+domains	O
+has	O
+directory	O
+indexing	O
+enabled	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+mistake	O
+in	O
+operational	O
+security	O
+allowed	O
+us	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+visibility	O
+into	O
+exfiltrated	O
+content	O
+for	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Continued	O
+mirroring	O
+suggests	O
+it	O
+is	O
+likely	O
+a	O
+regularly	O
+cleaned	O
+staging	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+sourced	O
+the	O
+over	O
+561MB	O
+of	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+from	O
+this	O
+domain	O
+alone	O
+,	O
+all	O
+of	O
+which	O
+we	O
+found	O
+to	O
+be	O
+7z	O
+compressed	O
+and	O
+password	O
+protected	O
+.	O
+
+Password	O
+generation	O
+for	O
+compressed	O
+files	O
+takes	O
+place	O
+client-side	O
+with	O
+each	O
+device	O
+using	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+key	O
+in	O
+most	O
+scenarios	O
+.	O
+
+Key	O
+information	O
+consists	O
+of	O
+an	O
+MD5	O
+hash	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+Android	B-System
+ID	O
+,	O
+the	O
+device	O
+manufacturer	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+device	O
+model	O
+with	O
+each	O
+separated	O
+by	O
+an	O
+underscore	O
+.	O
+
+Visually	O
+,	O
+this	O
+can	O
+be	O
+represented	O
+as	O
+follows	O
+:	O
+Android	B-System
+ID	O
+When	O
+combined	O
+with	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+indexed	O
+directories	O
+on	O
+C2	O
+infrastructure	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+easily	O
+automate	O
+the	O
+generation	O
+of	O
+the	O
+password	O
+used	O
+by	O
+each	O
+device	O
+and	O
+,	O
+in	O
+turn	O
+,	O
+successfully	O
+decompress	O
+all	O
+exfiltrated	O
+content	O
+from	O
+compromised	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Indexed	O
+directories	O
+on	O
+C2	O
+infrastructure	O
+While	O
+exfiltrated	O
+content	O
+is	O
+encrypted	O
+,	O
+information	O
+used	O
+to	O
+generate	O
+the	O
+password	O
+is	O
+plainly	O
+visible	O
+in	O
+the	O
+top	O
+level	O
+directories	O
+for	O
+each	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Taking	O
+this	O
+information	O
+from	O
+directory	O
+listings	O
+,	O
+like	O
+the	O
+one	O
+shown	O
+above	O
+,	O
+allowed	O
+for	O
+the	O
+decryption	O
+of	O
+all	O
+content	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+has	O
+primarily	O
+netted	O
+the	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+it	O
+with	O
+recorded	O
+outbound	O
+calls	O
+followed	O
+closely	O
+by	O
+images	O
+and	O
+recorded	O
+incoming	O
+calls	O
+.	O
+
+FrozenCell	B-Malware
+is	O
+part	O
+of	O
+a	O
+very	O
+successful	O
+,	O
+multi-platform	O
+surveillance	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+Attackers	O
+are	O
+growing	O
+smarter	O
+,	O
+targeting	O
+individuals	O
+through	O
+the	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+the	O
+services	O
+they	O
+use	O
+most	O
+.	O
+
+Government	O
+agencies	O
+and	O
+enterprises	O
+should	O
+plan	O
+to	O
+be	O
+hit	O
+from	O
+all	O
+angles	O
+-	O
+cloud	O
+services	O
+,	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+laptops	O
+-	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+build	O
+comprehensive	O
+security	O
+strategies	O
+that	O
+work	O
+.	O
+
+TUESDAY	O
+,	O
+MAY	O
+19	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+The	O
+wolf	O
+is	O
+back	O
+...	O
+NEWS	O
+SUMMARY	O
+Thai	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+and	O
+users	O
+are	O
+being	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+a	O
+modified	O
+version	O
+of	O
+DenDroid	B-Malware
+we	O
+are	O
+calling	O
+"	O
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+,	O
+''	O
+now	O
+targeting	O
+messaging	O
+apps	O
+like	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+Messenger	I-System
+and	O
+Line	B-System
+.	O
+
+We	O
+assess	O
+with	O
+high	O
+confidence	O
+that	O
+this	O
+modified	O
+version	O
+is	O
+operated	O
+by	O
+the	O
+infamous	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+This	O
+actor	O
+has	O
+shown	O
+a	O
+surprising	O
+level	O
+of	O
+amateur	O
+actions	O
+,	O
+including	O
+code	O
+overlaps	O
+,	O
+open-source	O
+project	O
+copy/paste	O
+,	O
+classes	O
+never	O
+being	O
+instanced	O
+,	O
+unstable	O
+packages	O
+and	O
+unsecured	O
+panels	O
+.	O
+
+EXECUTIVE	O
+SUMMARY	O
+Cisco	B-Organization
+Talos	I-Organization
+has	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Android	O
+malware	O
+based	O
+on	O
+a	O
+leak	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DenDroid	B-Malware
+malware	O
+family	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+named	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+"	O
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+''	O
+due	O
+to	O
+strong	O
+links	O
+between	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+(	O
+and	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+(	O
+C2	O
+)	O
+infrastructure	O
+)	O
+and	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+,	O
+an	O
+infamous	O
+organization	O
+that	O
+developed	O
+interception	O
+and	O
+espionage-based	O
+malware	O
+and	O
+was	O
+publicly	O
+described	O
+by	O
+CSIS	O
+during	O
+Virus	O
+Bulletin	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+identified	O
+infrastructure	O
+overlaps	O
+and	O
+string	O
+references	O
+to	O
+previous	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+work	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+organization	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+shut	O
+down	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+are	O
+still	O
+very	O
+active	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+identified	O
+campaigns	O
+targeting	O
+Thai	O
+users	O
+and	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+servers	O
+are	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Thailand	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+panels	O
+also	O
+contain	O
+Thai	O
+JavaScript	O
+comments	O
+and	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+names	O
+also	O
+contain	O
+references	O
+to	O
+Thai	O
+food	O
+,	O
+a	O
+tactic	O
+commonly	O
+employed	O
+to	O
+entice	O
+users	O
+to	O
+click/visit	O
+these	O
+C2	O
+panels	O
+without	O
+much	O
+disruption	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+identified	O
+a	O
+notable	O
+lack	O
+of	O
+sophistication	O
+in	O
+this	O
+investigation	O
+such	O
+as	O
+copy/paste	O
+,	O
+unstable	O
+code	O
+,	O
+dead	O
+code	O
+and	O
+panels	O
+that	O
+are	O
+freely	O
+open	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+'s	O
+new	O
+?	O
+
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+a	O
+previously	O
+leaked	O
+malware	O
+named	O
+DenDroid	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+new	O
+malware	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+linked	O
+to	O
+the	O
+infamous	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+organization	O
+and	O
+targets	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Thailand	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+did	O
+it	O
+work	O
+?	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+mimics	O
+legit	O
+services	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Google	B-Organization
+service	O
+,	O
+GooglePlay	B-System
+or	O
+Flash	B-System
+update	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+not	O
+really	O
+advanced	O
+and	O
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+copy/paste	O
+from	O
+public	O
+sources	O
+available	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Internet	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C2	O
+infrastructure	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+lack	O
+of	O
+sophistication	O
+such	O
+as	O
+open	O
+panels	O
+,	O
+reuse	O
+of	O
+old	O
+servers	O
+publicly	O
+tagged	O
+as	O
+malicious…	O
+So	O
+what	O
+?	O
+
+After	O
+being	O
+publicly	O
+denounced	O
+by	O
+CSIS	B-Organization
+Group	I-Organization
+—	O
+a	O
+threat	O
+intelligence	O
+company	O
+in	O
+Denmark	O
+—	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+was	O
+closed	O
+and	O
+a	O
+new	O
+organization	O
+named	O
+LokD	B-Organization
+was	O
+created	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+new	O
+organization	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+work	O
+on	O
+securing	O
+Android	B-Organization
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+thanks	O
+to	O
+the	O
+infrastructure	O
+sharing	O
+and	O
+forgotten	O
+panel	O
+names	O
+,	O
+we	O
+assess	O
+with	O
+high	O
+confidence	O
+that	O
+this	O
+actor	O
+is	O
+still	O
+active	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+still	O
+developing	O
+malware	O
+and	O
+has	O
+been	O
+using	O
+it	O
+from	O
+mid-June	O
+to	O
+today	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+panel	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+a	O
+potential	O
+link	O
+between	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+and	O
+another	O
+Cyprus	O
+organization	O
+named	O
+Coralco	B-Organization
+Tech	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+This	O
+organization	O
+is	O
+also	O
+working	O
+on	O
+interception	O
+technology	O
+.	O
+
+LINKS	O
+TO	O
+WOLF	O
+INTELLIGENCE	O
+During	O
+the	O
+Virus	O
+Bulletin	O
+conference	O
+in	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+CSIS	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+Benoît	O
+Ancel	O
+and	O
+Aleksejs	O
+Kuprins	O
+did	O
+a	O
+presentation	O
+on	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+and	O
+the	O
+offensive	O
+arsenal	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+organization	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+mentioned	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+iOS	B-System
+and	O
+Windows	B-System
+remote	O
+access	O
+tool	O
+(	O
+RAT	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Their	O
+findings	O
+showed	O
+that	O
+Wolf	O
+is	O
+headquartered	O
+in	O
+Germany	O
+with	O
+offices	O
+in	O
+Cyprus	O
+,	O
+Bulgaria	O
+,	O
+Romania	O
+,	O
+India	O
+and	O
+(	O
+possibly	O
+)	O
+the	O
+U.S	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+organization	O
+was	O
+closed	O
+after	O
+the	O
+CSIS	B-Organization
+presentation	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+director	O
+created	O
+a	O
+new	O
+organization	O
+in	O
+Cyprus	O
+named	O
+LokD	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+This	O
+new	O
+organization	O
+proposed	O
+the	O
+creation	O
+of	O
+a	O
+more	O
+secure	O
+Android	B-System
+phone	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+organization	O
+website	O
+,	O
+it	O
+also	O
+proposes	O
+services	O
+and	O
+developed	O
+zero-day	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+to	O
+test	O
+their	O
+own	O
+products	O
+:	O
+Zero-day	O
+research	O
+from	O
+lokd.com	B-Organization
+We	O
+can	O
+see	O
+that	O
+the	O
+organization	O
+owner	O
+still	O
+has	O
+an	O
+interest	O
+in	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+infrastructure	O
+overlaps	O
+and	O
+leaked	O
+information	O
+,	O
+we	O
+assess	O
+with	O
+high	O
+confidence	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+and	O
+present	O
+in	O
+this	O
+paper	O
+is	O
+linked	O
+to	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+samples	O
+(	O
+e19823a1ba4a0e40cf459f4a0489fc257720cc0d71ecfb7ad94b3ca86fbd85d1	B-Indicator
+)	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+svcws	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ponethus	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+our	O
+research	O
+and	O
+Benoît	O
+Ancel	O
+'s	O
+tracker	O
+,	O
+this	O
+C2	O
+was	O
+used	O
+by	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Intelligence	I-Organization
+:	O
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+two	O
+empty	O
+panels	O
+on	O
+a	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+new	O
+one	O
+with	O
+the	O
+title	O
+"	O
+Coralco	O
+Archimedes	O
+,	O
+''	O
+and	O
+an	O
+older	O
+version	O
+with	O
+the	O
+title	O
+"	O
+Wolf	O
+Intelligence	O
+:	O
+''	O
+New	O
+panel	O
+Old	O
+panel	O
+The	O
+new	O
+panel	O
+name	O
+contains	O
+"	O
+Coralco	O
+''	O
+in	O
+its	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+Coralco	B-Organization
+Tech	I-Organization
+is	O
+an	O
+organization	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Cyprus	O
+and	O
+providing	O
+interception	O
+tools	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+can	O
+not	O
+say	O
+for	O
+sure	O
+if	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+and	O
+Coralco	B-Organization
+Tech	I-Organization
+are	O
+linked	O
+,	O
+but	O
+this	O
+panel	O
+name	O
+,	O
+their	O
+offerings	O
+and	O
+the	O
+panel	O
+layout	O
+would	O
+suggest	O
+it	O
+should	O
+be	O
+considered	O
+suspiciously	O
+linked	O
+.	O
+
+Coralco	O
+Tech	O
+'s	O
+services	O
+description	O
+.	O
+
+VICTIMOLOGY	O
+ON	O
+THE	O
+IDENTIFIED	O
+CAMPAIGNS	O
+The	O
+campaigns	O
+we	O
+analyzed	O
+targeted	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+in	O
+Thailand	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+domain	O
+is	O
+linked	O
+to	O
+Thai	O
+food	O
+:	O
+Nampriknum	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Nam	O
+Phrik	O
+Num	O
+Somtum	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+:	O
+Som	O
+Tum	O
+We	O
+also	O
+identified	O
+comments	O
+in	O
+Thai	O
+on	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+infrastructure	O
+mentioned	O
+in	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+chapter	O
+:	O
+MALWARE	O
+DenDroid	B-Malware
+The	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+DenDroid	B-Malware
+Android	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Several	O
+analysis	O
+reports	O
+were	O
+published	O
+on	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+in	O
+2014	O
+and	O
+,	O
+finally	O
+,	O
+the	O
+source	O
+code	O
+was	O
+leaked	O
+in	O
+2015	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+original	O
+leak	O
+is	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+available	O
+on	O
+github.com	O
+,	O
+but	O
+a	O
+copy	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+table	O
+below	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+available	O
+to	O
+the	O
+operator	O
+for	O
+tasking	O
+on	O
+infected	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+simplistic	O
+in	O
+comparison	O
+to	O
+some	O
+modern-day	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+best	O
+example	O
+of	O
+that	O
+is	O
+that	O
+it	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+take	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+framework	O
+,	O
+collecting	O
+information	O
+on	O
+non-rooted	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+commands	O
+are	O
+self-explanatory	O
+and	O
+show	O
+the	O
+features	O
+included	O
+in	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+them	O
+like	O
+takephoto	O
+,	O
+takevideo	O
+,	O
+recordaudio	O
+,	O
+getsentsms	O
+and	O
+uploadpictures	O
+are	O
+focused	O
+on	O
+espionage	O
+activities	O
+.	O
+
+Others	O
+like	O
+transferbot	O
+,	O
+promptupdate	O
+and	O
+promptuninstall	O
+are	O
+meant	O
+to	O
+help	O
+the	O
+operator	O
+manage	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Version	O
+#	O
+1	O
+:	O
+June	O
+2019	O
+—	O
+Domain	O
+:	O
+databit	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+During	O
+our	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+we	O
+identified	O
+at	O
+least	O
+four	O
+major	O
+releases	O
+of	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+permissions	O
+on	O
+the	O
+first	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+lay	O
+out	O
+the	O
+foundations	O
+of	O
+a	O
+spying	O
+trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Permissions	O
+The	O
+package	O
+name	O
+follows	O
+the	O
+original	O
+style	O
+name	O
+used	O
+on	O
+DenDroid	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+is	O
+obfuscated	O
+but	O
+not	O
+packed	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malware	O
+also	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+screen	O
+recorder	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+feature	O
+is	O
+implemented	O
+using	O
+another	O
+open-source	O
+software	O
+package	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+service	O
+is	O
+implemented	O
+in	O
+the	O
+class	O
+com.serenegiant.service.ScreenRecorderService	B-Indicator
+which	O
+is	O
+declared	O
+in	O
+the	O
+package	O
+manifest	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+this	O
+sample	O
+,	O
+we	O
+did	O
+notice	O
+that	O
+the	O
+class	O
+itself	O
+is	O
+never	O
+called	O
+or	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+remains	O
+available	O
+within	O
+the	O
+source	O
+code	O
+but	O
+no	O
+method	O
+of	O
+use	O
+takes	O
+place	O
+.	O
+
+Version	O
+#	O
+2	O
+:	O
+June	O
+-	O
+Aug.	O
+2019	O
+—	O
+Domain	O
+:	O
+somtum	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+This	O
+is	O
+the	O
+first	O
+version	O
+that	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+code	O
+organization	O
+evolution	O
+that	O
+will	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+be	O
+used	O
+on	O
+all	O
+other	O
+functions	O
+throughout	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Code	O
+structure	O
+Obviously	O
+,	O
+this	O
+code	O
+is	O
+not	O
+obfuscated	O
+when	O
+compared	O
+with	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+version	O
+it	O
+becomes	O
+clear	O
+that	O
+this	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+code	O
+base	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+first	O
+changes	O
+that	O
+stands	O
+out	O
+is	O
+that	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+recording	O
+feature	O
+mentioned	O
+in	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+sample	O
+has	O
+been	O
+removed	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+new	O
+class	O
+was	O
+added	O
+called	O
+com.utils.RestClient	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+class	O
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+public	O
+code	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+the	O
+package	O
+praeda.muzikmekan	B-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+here	O
+among	O
+other	O
+places	O
+.	O
+
+Just	O
+like	O
+in	O
+previous	O
+examples	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+author	O
+does	O
+not	O
+use	O
+this	O
+package	O
+.	O
+
+Missing	O
+permissions	O
+The	O
+lack	O
+of	O
+the	O
+READ_FRAME_BUFFER	O
+permission	O
+can	O
+be	O
+justified	O
+by	O
+the	O
+removal	O
+of	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+record	O
+feature	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+ACCESS_SUPERUSER	O
+may	O
+have	O
+been	O
+removed	O
+because	O
+it	O
+was	O
+deprecated	O
+upon	O
+the	O
+release	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+5.0	I-System
+Lollipop	B-System
+which	O
+happened	O
+in	O
+2014	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+reality	O
+is	O
+that	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+permissions	O
+can	O
+be	O
+implemented	O
+just	O
+with	O
+the	O
+permissions	O
+declared	O
+on	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+,	O
+thus	O
+there	O
+is	O
+no	O
+need	O
+for	O
+higher	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+Version	O
+#	O
+3	O
+:	O
+Sept.	O
+-	O
+Dec.	O
+2019	O
+—	O
+Domain	O
+:	O
+ponethus	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+Given	O
+that	O
+there	O
+is	O
+some	O
+overlap	O
+in	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+two	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+it	O
+came	O
+as	O
+no	O
+surprise	O
+to	O
+us	O
+that	O
+we	O
+finally	O
+identified	O
+a	O
+sample	O
+which	O
+is	O
+an	O
+evolution	O
+based	O
+on	O
+both	O
+previous	O
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+sample	O
+is	O
+clearly	O
+a	O
+mix	O
+between	O
+the	O
+two	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+also	O
+the	O
+first	O
+version	O
+where	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+changes	O
+into	O
+something	O
+that	O
+a	O
+less	O
+aware	O
+user	O
+may	O
+be	O
+tricked	O
+by	O
+,	O
+com.android.playup	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+This	O
+version	O
+brings	O
+back	O
+the	O
+ACCESS_SUPERUSER	O
+and	O
+READ_FRAME_BUFFER	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+this	O
+time	O
+,	O
+the	O
+permission	O
+is	O
+actually	O
+used	O
+.	O
+
+WhatsApp	B-System
+message	O
+capture	O
+The	O
+service	O
+com.serenegiant.service.ScreenRecorderService	B-Indicator
+,	O
+is	O
+invoked	O
+by	O
+the	O
+ScreenRecorderActivity	O
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+creation	O
+,	O
+this	O
+activity	O
+launches	O
+a	O
+thread	O
+that	O
+will	O
+loop	O
+on	O
+a	O
+50-second	O
+interval	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+first	O
+iteration	O
+,	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+recording	O
+is	O
+started	O
+and	O
+will	O
+only	O
+stop	O
+when	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+determines	O
+that	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+is	O
+not	O
+running	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+'s	O
+restarted	O
+in	O
+the	O
+next	O
+cycle	O
+independently	O
+based	O
+on	O
+if	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+is	O
+running	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+version	O
+,	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+added	O
+more	O
+classes	O
+from	O
+the	O
+same	O
+package	O
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+though	O
+we	O
+could	O
+not	O
+find	O
+indications	O
+of	O
+being	O
+in	O
+use	O
+,	O
+two	O
+stand	O
+out	O
+.	O
+
+Bluetooth	O
+—	O
+which	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+interaction	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Bluetooth	O
+interface	O
+,	O
+and	O
+net/deacon	O
+—	O
+which	O
+implements	O
+a	O
+beaconing	O
+system	O
+based	O
+on	O
+UDP	O
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+shell	O
+A	O
+new	O
+package	O
+was	O
+added	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+execution	O
+of	O
+commands	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+shell	O
+.	O
+
+Again	O
+,	O
+this	O
+package	O
+source	O
+code	O
+is	O
+publicly	O
+available	O
+and	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+gives	O
+to	O
+this	O
+package	O
+is	O
+the	O
+execution	O
+of	O
+the	O
+command	O
+"	O
+dumpsys	O
+''	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+if	O
+certain	O
+activities	O
+are	O
+running	O
+.	O
+
+Check	O
+if	O
+chat	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+running	O
+In	O
+the	O
+above	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+searching	O
+for	O
+Line	O
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+Messenger	I-System
+and	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+activities	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+part	O
+of	O
+a	O
+class	O
+called	O
+CaptureService	O
+,	O
+which	O
+already	O
+existed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+version	O
+but	O
+it	O
+was	O
+not	O
+duly	O
+implemented	O
+.	O
+
+Previous	O
+version	O
+The	O
+capture	O
+service	O
+class	O
+implements	O
+the	O
+chat	O
+applications	O
+interception	O
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+creation	O
+the	O
+class	O
+will	O
+start	O
+to	O
+take	O
+screenshots	O
+that	O
+will	O
+be	O
+stopped	O
+and	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+once	O
+the	O
+service	O
+ca	O
+n't	O
+find	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+running	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+core	O
+of	O
+this	O
+functionality	O
+is	O
+also	O
+based	O
+on	O
+an	O
+open-source	O
+project	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+Another	O
+novelty	O
+is	O
+a	O
+VPN-related	O
+package	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+OrbotVPN	B-System
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+again	O
+,	O
+it	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+actually	O
+be	O
+in	O
+use	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+same	O
+happens	O
+with	O
+the	O
+package	O
+squareup.otto	B-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+an	O
+open-source	O
+bus	O
+implementation	O
+focused	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+implementation	O
+.	O
+
+Both	O
+sources	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+here	O
+and	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+Version	O
+#	O
+4	O
+:	O
+April	O
+2020	O
+—	O
+Domain	O
+:	O
+nampriknum.net	B-Indicator
+Following	O
+the	O
+same	O
+pattern	O
+,	O
+this	O
+version	O
+has	O
+some	O
+added	O
+features	O
+and	O
+others	O
+,	O
+which	O
+were	O
+not	O
+in	O
+use	O
+,	O
+removed	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+of	O
+all	O
+the	O
+new	O
+package	O
+name	O
+is	O
+com.google.services	B-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+can	O
+easily	O
+be	O
+confused	O
+with	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+Google	B-Organization
+service	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+VPN	O
+package	O
+is	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+present	O
+,	O
+further	O
+reinforcing	O
+our	O
+conclusion	O
+that	O
+it	O
+was	O
+not	O
+in	O
+use	O
+.	O
+
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+application	O
+screen	O
+The	O
+Google	B-System
+GMS	I-System
+and	O
+Firebase	B-System
+service	O
+has	O
+been	O
+added	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+no	O
+configuration	O
+has	O
+been	O
+found	O
+,	O
+even	O
+though	O
+services	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+be	O
+referenced	O
+in	O
+the	O
+of	O
+a	O
+new	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+new	O
+class	O
+is	O
+called	O
+NotificationListener	O
+and	O
+extends	O
+the	O
+NotificationListenerService	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+would	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+RAT	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+system	O
+notifications	O
+.	O
+
+Notification	O
+handling	O
+method	O
+The	O
+class	O
+is	O
+only	O
+implemented	O
+in	O
+debug	O
+mode	O
+,	O
+pushing	O
+all	O
+captured	O
+information	O
+into	O
+the	O
+log	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+usage	O
+of	O
+the	O
+PlusShare	B-System
+API	O
+in	O
+2020	O
+denotes	O
+some	O
+unprofessional	O
+development	O
+,	O
+since	O
+this	O
+is	O
+the	O
+API	O
+to	O
+access	O
+Google+	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+This	O
+service	O
+,	O
+along	O
+with	O
+the	O
+API	O
+,	O
+was	O
+fully	O
+decommissioned	O
+in	O
+March	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+version	O
+adds	O
+one	O
+significant	O
+class	O
+—	O
+it	O
+requests	O
+DEVICE_ADMIN	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+Device	O
+admin	O
+policies	O
+Looking	O
+at	O
+the	O
+policy	O
+'s	O
+definition	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+that	O
+it	O
+lists	O
+all	O
+the	O
+available	O
+policies	O
+even	O
+if	O
+most	O
+of	O
+them	O
+are	O
+deprecated	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+10.0	I-System
+and	O
+their	O
+usage	O
+results	O
+in	O
+a	O
+security	O
+exception	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+implementation	O
+again	O
+seems	O
+that	O
+it	O
+has	O
+been	O
+added	O
+for	O
+testing	O
+purposes	O
+only	O
+.	O
+
+Versions	O
+overview	O
+The	O
+DenDroid	B-Malware
+code	O
+base	O
+was	O
+kept	O
+to	O
+such	O
+an	O
+extent	O
+that	O
+even	O
+the	O
+original	O
+base64-encoded	O
+password	O
+was	O
+kept	O
+.	O
+
+Original	O
+password	O
+The	O
+main	O
+service	O
+follows	O
+the	O
+same	O
+structure	O
+as	O
+the	O
+first	O
+version	O
+,	O
+the	O
+anti-analysis	O
+features	O
+are	O
+primitive	O
+,	O
+only	O
+checking	O
+the	O
+emulator	O
+environment	O
+without	O
+any	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+packing	O
+or	O
+obfuscation	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+will	O
+start	O
+the	O
+main	O
+service	O
+if	O
+all	O
+the	O
+requested	O
+permissions	O
+and	O
+the	O
+device	O
+admin	O
+privileges	O
+are	O
+granted	O
+.	O
+
+Otherwise	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+launch	O
+an	O
+ACTION_APPLICATION_SETTINGS	O
+intent	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+grant	O
+the	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+Each	O
+sample	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+userId	O
+hardcoded	O
+,	O
+meaning	O
+that	O
+each	O
+sample	O
+can	O
+only	O
+be	O
+used	O
+in	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+seems	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+if	O
+the	O
+same	O
+victim	O
+has	O
+more	O
+than	O
+one	O
+device	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+be	O
+reused	O
+since	O
+the	O
+IMEI	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+along	O
+with	O
+each	O
+data	O
+exfiltration	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+clear	O
+that	O
+this	O
+RAT	O
+is	O
+under	O
+intense	O
+development	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+the	O
+addition	O
+and	O
+removal	O
+of	O
+packages	O
+,	O
+along	O
+with	O
+the	O
+huge	O
+quantity	O
+of	O
+unused	O
+code	O
+and	O
+usage	O
+of	O
+deprecated	O
+and	O
+old	O
+techniques	O
+denotes	O
+an	O
+amateur	O
+development	O
+methodology	O
+.	O
+
+CONCLUSION	O
+We	O
+witness	O
+actors	O
+continually	O
+using	O
+open-source	O
+platforms	O
+,	O
+code	O
+and	O
+packages	O
+to	O
+create	O
+their	O
+own	O
+software	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+are	O
+carried	O
+out	O
+well	O
+,	O
+others	O
+,	O
+like	O
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+,	O
+are	O
+designed	O
+with	O
+an	O
+overload	O
+of	O
+functionality	O
+in	O
+mind	O
+as	O
+opposed	O
+to	O
+factoring	O
+any	O
+sensible	O
+approach	O
+to	O
+the	O
+development	O
+aspect	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+all	O
+,	O
+a	O
+working	O
+product	O
+is	O
+often	O
+more	O
+important	O
+than	O
+a	O
+stable	O
+product	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+watched	O
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+evolve	O
+through	O
+various	O
+iterations	O
+which	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+wanted	O
+to	O
+ensure	O
+functional	O
+improvements	O
+—	O
+perhaps	O
+they	O
+had	O
+deadlines	O
+to	O
+meet	O
+for	O
+their	O
+customers	O
+,	O
+but	O
+with	O
+no	O
+thought	O
+given	O
+to	O
+removing	O
+old	O
+code	O
+blocks	O
+,	O
+classes	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+throughout	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+package	O
+.	O
+
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+specifically	O
+targeted	O
+RAT	O
+which	O
+we	O
+assess	O
+to	O
+be	O
+aimed	O
+at	O
+Thai	O
+individuals	O
+and	O
+,	O
+based	O
+on	O
+previous	O
+work	O
+from	O
+Wolf	B-Organization
+Research	I-Organization
+,	I-Organization
+most	O
+likely	O
+used	O
+as	O
+an	O
+intelligence-gathering	O
+tool	O
+or	O
+interception	O
+tool	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+can	O
+be	O
+packaged	O
+and	O
+"	O
+sold	O
+''	O
+in	O
+many	O
+different	O
+ways	O
+to	O
+customers	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+"	O
+Tracking	O
+tool	O
+''	O
+or	O
+an	O
+"	O
+Admin	O
+tool	O
+''	O
+are	O
+often	O
+cited	O
+for	O
+these	O
+kinds	O
+of	O
+tools	O
+for	O
+"	O
+commercial	O
+''	O
+or	O
+"	O
+enterprise	O
+''	O
+usage	O
+.	O
+
+Wolf	I-Malware
+Research	I-Organization
+claimed	O
+to	O
+shut	O
+down	O
+their	O
+operations	O
+but	O
+we	O
+clearly	O
+see	O
+that	O
+their	O
+previous	O
+work	O
+continues	O
+under	O
+another	O
+guise	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+carry	O
+out	O
+these	O
+types	O
+of	O
+intelligence-gathering	O
+activities	O
+on	O
+phones	O
+represents	O
+a	O
+huge	O
+score	O
+for	O
+the	O
+operator	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+chat	O
+details	O
+,	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+records	O
+,	O
+messengers	O
+and	O
+SMSs	O
+of	O
+the	O
+world	O
+carry	O
+some	O
+sensitive	O
+information	O
+which	O
+people	O
+often	O
+forget	O
+when	O
+communicating	O
+with	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+see	O
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+specifically	O
+targeting	O
+a	O
+highly	O
+popular	O
+encrypted	O
+chat	O
+app	O
+in	O
+Asia	O
+,	O
+Line	B-System
+,	O
+which	O
+suggests	O
+that	O
+even	O
+a	O
+careful	O
+user	O
+with	O
+some	O
+awareness	O
+around	O
+end-to-end	O
+encryption	O
+chats	O
+would	O
+still	O
+be	O
+at	O
+the	O
+mercy	O
+of	O
+WolfRAT	B-Malware
+and	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+prying	O
+eyes	O
+.	O
+
+IOCS	O
+Hashes	O
+139edb1bc033725539b117f50786f3d3362ed45845c57fe1f82e7ed72b044367	B-Indicator
+e19823a1ba4a0e40cf459f4a0489fc257720cc0d71ecfb7ad94b3ca86fbd85d1	B-Indicator
+e19823a1ba4a0e40cf459f4a0489fc257720cc0d71ecfb7ad94b3ca86fbd85d1	B-Indicator
+e5f346d8f312cc1f93c2c6af611e2f50805c528934786ea173cabc6a39b14cda	B-Indicator
+
+1849a50a6ac9b3eec51492745eeb14765fe2e78488d476b0336d8e41c2c581d4	B-Indicator
+d328fca14c4340fcd4a15e47562a436085e6b1bb5376b5ebd83d3e7218db64e7	B-Indicator
+59b9809dba857c5969f23f460a2bf0a337a71622a79671066675ec0acf89c810	B-Indicator
+120474682ea439eb0b28274c495d9610a73d892a4b8feeff268c670570db97e2	B-Indicator
+
+ed234e61849dcb95223676abe2312e1378d6130c0b00851d82cda545b946ec83	B-Indicator
+27410d4019251a70d38f0635277f931fb73f67ac9f2e1f3b475ce680ebfde12a	B-Indicator
+6e6c210535b414c5aa2dd9e67f5153feeb43a8ac8126d8e249e768f501323a3e	B-Indicator
+4a32ced20df7001da7d29edc31ca76e13eef0c9b355f62c44888853435e9794f	B-Indicator
+
+ac5abaebd9f516b8b389450f7d27649801d746fb14963b848f9d6dad0a505e66	B-Indicator
+3a45d7a16937d4108b5b48f44d72bb319be645cbe15f003dc9e77fd52f45c065	B-Indicator
+Domains	O
+cvcws	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ponethus	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+svc	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ponethus	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+www	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ponethus	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+webmail	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ponethus	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+nampriknum	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+www	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+nampriknum	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+svc	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+nampriknum	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+svcws	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+nampriknum	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+svc	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+somtum	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+svcws	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+somtum	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+www	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+somtum	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+somtum	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+shop	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+databit	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+svc	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+databit	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+test	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+databit	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+www	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+databit	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+admin	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.databit	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.today	I-Indicator
+cendata	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+svc	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cendata	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+svcws	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cendata	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+www	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cendata	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+today	I-Indicator
+PHA	O
+Family	O
+Highlights	O
+:	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+and	O
+its	O
+cousins	O
+January	O
+11	O
+,	O
+2019	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+detects	O
+Potentially	O
+Harmful	O
+Applications	O
+(	O
+PHAs	O
+)	O
+which	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+defines	O
+as	O
+any	O
+mobile	O
+app	O
+that	O
+poses	O
+a	O
+potential	O
+security	O
+risk	O
+to	O
+users	O
+or	O
+to	O
+user	O
+data—commonly	O
+referred	O
+to	O
+as	O
+"	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+in	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+ways	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+static	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+dynamic	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+and	O
+machine	O
+learning	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+our	O
+systems	O
+are	O
+great	O
+at	O
+automatically	O
+detecting	O
+and	O
+protecting	O
+against	O
+PHAs	O
+,	O
+we	O
+believe	O
+the	O
+best	O
+security	O
+comes	O
+from	O
+the	O
+combination	O
+of	O
+automated	O
+scanning	O
+and	O
+skilled	O
+human	O
+review	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+series	O
+we	O
+will	O
+be	O
+sharing	O
+our	O
+research	O
+analysis	O
+with	O
+the	O
+research	O
+and	O
+broader	O
+security	O
+community	O
+,	O
+starting	O
+with	O
+the	O
+PHA	O
+family	O
+,	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Zen	B-Malware
+uses	O
+root	O
+permissions	O
+on	O
+a	O
+device	O
+to	O
+automatically	O
+enable	O
+a	O
+service	O
+that	O
+creates	O
+fake	O
+Google	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+accounts	O
+are	O
+created	O
+by	O
+abusing	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+Zen	B-Malware
+apps	O
+gain	O
+access	O
+to	O
+root	O
+permissions	O
+from	O
+a	O
+rooting	O
+trojan	O
+in	O
+its	O
+infection	O
+chain	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+,	O
+we	O
+do	O
+not	O
+differentiate	O
+between	O
+the	O
+rooting	O
+component	O
+and	O
+the	O
+component	O
+that	O
+abuses	O
+root	O
+:	O
+we	O
+refer	O
+to	O
+them	O
+interchangeably	O
+as	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+We	O
+also	O
+describe	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+we	O
+think	O
+are	O
+coming	O
+from	O
+the	O
+same	O
+author	O
+or	O
+a	O
+group	O
+of	O
+authors	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+the	O
+PHAs	O
+that	O
+are	O
+mentioned	O
+in	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+post	O
+were	O
+detected	O
+and	O
+removed	O
+by	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+.	O
+
+Background	O
+Uncovering	O
+PHAs	O
+takes	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+detective	O
+work	O
+and	O
+unraveling	O
+the	O
+mystery	O
+of	O
+how	O
+they	O
+'re	O
+possibly	O
+connected	O
+to	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+takes	O
+even	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+PHA	O
+authors	O
+usually	O
+try	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+their	O
+tracks	O
+,	O
+so	O
+attribution	O
+is	O
+difficult	O
+.	O
+
+Sometimes	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+attribute	O
+different	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+the	O
+same	O
+author	O
+based	O
+on	O
+a	O
+small	O
+,	O
+unique	O
+pieces	O
+of	O
+evidence	O
+that	O
+suggest	O
+similarity	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+a	O
+repetition	O
+of	O
+an	O
+exceptionally	O
+rare	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+,	O
+asset	O
+,	O
+or	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+string	O
+in	O
+the	O
+debug	O
+logs	O
+.	O
+
+Every	O
+once	O
+in	O
+a	O
+while	O
+,	O
+authors	O
+leave	O
+behind	O
+a	O
+trace	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+us	O
+to	O
+attribute	O
+not	O
+only	O
+similar	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+but	O
+also	O
+multiple	O
+different	O
+PHA	O
+families	O
+to	O
+the	O
+same	O
+group	O
+or	O
+person	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+timeline	O
+of	O
+the	O
+creation	O
+of	O
+different	O
+variants	O
+is	O
+unclear	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+April	O
+2013	O
+,	O
+we	O
+saw	O
+the	O
+first	O
+sample	O
+,	O
+which	O
+made	O
+heavy	O
+use	O
+of	O
+dynamic	O
+code	O
+loading	O
+(	O
+i.e.	O
+,	O
+fetching	O
+executable	O
+code	O
+from	O
+remote	O
+sources	O
+after	O
+the	O
+initial	O
+app	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Dynamic	O
+code	O
+loading	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+impossible	O
+to	O
+state	O
+what	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+PHA	O
+it	O
+was	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+sample	O
+displayed	O
+ads	O
+from	O
+various	O
+sources	O
+.	O
+
+More	O
+recent	O
+variants	O
+blend	O
+rooting	O
+capabilities	O
+and	O
+click	O
+fraud	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+rooting	O
+exploits	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+become	O
+less	O
+prevalent	O
+and	O
+lucrative	O
+,	O
+PHA	O
+authors	O
+adapt	O
+their	O
+abuse	O
+or	O
+monetization	O
+strategy	O
+to	O
+focus	O
+on	O
+tactics	O
+like	O
+click	O
+fraud	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+post	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+follow	O
+the	O
+chronological	O
+evolution	O
+of	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+,	O
+but	O
+instead	O
+covers	O
+relevant	O
+samples	O
+from	O
+least	O
+to	O
+most	O
+complex	O
+.	O
+
+Apps	O
+with	O
+a	O
+custom-made	O
+advertisement	O
+SDK	O
+The	O
+simplest	O
+PHA	O
+from	O
+the	O
+author	O
+'s	O
+portfolio	O
+used	O
+a	O
+specially	O
+crafted	O
+advertisement	O
+SDK	O
+to	O
+create	O
+a	O
+proxy	O
+for	O
+all	O
+ads-related	O
+network	O
+traffic	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+proxying	O
+all	O
+requests	O
+through	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+server	O
+,	O
+the	O
+real	O
+source	O
+of	O
+ads	O
+is	O
+opaque	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+example	O
+shows	O
+one	O
+possible	O
+implementation	O
+of	O
+this	O
+technique	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+approach	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+to	O
+combine	O
+ads	O
+from	O
+third-party	O
+advertising	O
+networks	O
+with	O
+ads	O
+they	O
+created	O
+for	O
+their	O
+own	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+may	O
+even	O
+allow	O
+them	O
+to	O
+sell	O
+ad	O
+space	O
+directly	O
+to	O
+application	O
+developers	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+advertisement	O
+SDK	O
+also	O
+collects	O
+statistics	O
+about	O
+clicks	O
+and	O
+impressions	O
+to	O
+make	O
+it	O
+easier	O
+to	O
+track	O
+revenue	O
+.	O
+
+Selling	O
+the	O
+ad	O
+traffic	O
+directly	O
+or	O
+displaying	O
+ads	O
+from	O
+other	O
+sources	O
+in	O
+a	O
+very	O
+large	O
+volume	O
+can	O
+provide	O
+direct	O
+profit	O
+to	O
+the	O
+app	O
+author	O
+from	O
+the	O
+advertisers	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+two	O
+types	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+use	O
+this	O
+custom-made	O
+SDK	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+are	O
+games	O
+of	O
+very	O
+low	O
+quality	O
+that	O
+mimic	O
+the	O
+experience	O
+of	O
+popular	O
+mobile	O
+games	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+the	O
+counterfeit	O
+games	O
+claim	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+similar	O
+functionality	O
+to	O
+the	O
+popular	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+they	O
+are	O
+simply	O
+used	O
+to	O
+display	O
+ads	O
+through	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+advertisement	O
+SDK	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+type	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+reveals	O
+an	O
+evolution	O
+in	O
+the	O
+author	O
+'s	O
+tactics	O
+.	O
+
+Instead	O
+of	O
+implementing	O
+very	O
+basic	O
+gameplay	O
+,	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+pirated	O
+and	O
+repackaged	O
+the	O
+original	O
+game	O
+in	O
+their	O
+app	O
+and	O
+bundled	O
+with	O
+it	O
+their	O
+advertisement	O
+SDK	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+only	O
+noticeable	O
+difference	O
+is	O
+the	O
+game	O
+has	O
+more	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+including	O
+ads	O
+on	O
+the	O
+very	O
+first	O
+screen	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+all	O
+cases	O
+,	O
+the	O
+ads	O
+are	O
+used	O
+to	O
+convince	O
+users	O
+to	O
+install	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+different	O
+developer	O
+accounts	O
+,	O
+but	O
+written	O
+by	O
+the	O
+same	O
+group	O
+.	O
+
+Those	O
+apps	O
+use	O
+the	O
+same	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+monetize	O
+their	O
+actions	O
+.	O
+
+Click	O
+fraud	O
+apps	O
+The	O
+authors	O
+'	O
+tactics	O
+evolved	O
+from	O
+advertisement	O
+spam	O
+to	O
+real	O
+PHA	O
+(	O
+Click	O
+Fraud	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Click	O
+fraud	O
+PHAs	O
+simulate	O
+user	O
+clicks	O
+on	O
+ads	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+simply	O
+displaying	O
+ads	O
+and	O
+waiting	O
+for	O
+users	O
+to	O
+click	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+PHA	O
+authors	O
+to	O
+monetize	O
+their	O
+apps	O
+more	O
+effectively	O
+than	O
+through	O
+regular	O
+advertising	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+behavior	O
+negatively	O
+impacts	O
+advertisement	O
+networks	O
+and	O
+their	O
+clients	O
+because	O
+advertising	O
+budget	O
+is	O
+spent	O
+without	O
+acquiring	O
+real	O
+customers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+impacts	O
+user	O
+experience	O
+by	O
+consuming	O
+their	O
+data	O
+plan	O
+resources	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+click	O
+fraud	O
+PHA	O
+requests	O
+a	O
+URL	O
+to	O
+the	O
+advertising	O
+network	O
+directly	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+proxying	O
+it	O
+through	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+SDK	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+command	O
+&	O
+control	O
+server	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+)	O
+returns	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+to	O
+click	O
+along	O
+with	O
+a	O
+very	O
+long	O
+list	O
+of	O
+additional	O
+parameters	O
+in	O
+JSON	O
+format	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+rendering	O
+the	O
+ad	O
+on	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+the	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+advertisement	O
+website	O
+to	O
+click	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+that	O
+part	O
+is	O
+found	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+loads	O
+Javascript	O
+snippets	O
+from	O
+the	O
+JSON	O
+parameters	O
+to	O
+click	O
+a	O
+button	O
+or	O
+other	O
+HTML	O
+element	O
+,	O
+simulating	O
+a	O
+real	O
+user	O
+click	O
+.	O
+
+Because	O
+a	O
+user	O
+interacting	O
+with	O
+an	O
+ad	O
+often	O
+leads	O
+to	O
+a	O
+higher	O
+chance	O
+of	O
+the	O
+user	O
+purchasing	O
+something	O
+,	O
+ad	O
+networks	O
+often	O
+"	O
+pay	O
+per	O
+click	O
+''	O
+to	O
+developers	O
+who	O
+host	O
+their	O
+ads	O
+.	O
+
+Therefore	O
+,	O
+by	O
+simulating	O
+fraudulent	O
+clicks	O
+,	O
+these	O
+developers	O
+are	O
+making	O
+money	O
+without	O
+requiring	O
+a	O
+user	O
+to	O
+click	O
+on	O
+an	O
+advertisement	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+example	O
+code	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+JSON	O
+reply	O
+returned	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+been	O
+shortened	O
+for	O
+brevity	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+this	O
+JSON	O
+reply	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+looks	O
+for	O
+an	O
+HTML	O
+snippet	O
+that	O
+corresponds	O
+to	O
+the	O
+active	O
+element	O
+(	O
+show_hide	O
+btnnext	O
+)	O
+and	O
+,	O
+if	O
+found	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Javascript	O
+snippet	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+a	O
+click	O
+(	O
+)	O
+method	O
+on	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+Rooting	O
+trojans	O
+The	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+authors	O
+have	O
+also	O
+created	O
+a	O
+rooting	O
+trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Using	O
+a	O
+publicly	O
+available	O
+rooting	O
+framework	O
+,	O
+the	O
+PHA	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+root	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+gain	O
+persistence	O
+on	O
+them	O
+by	O
+reinstalling	O
+itself	O
+on	O
+the	O
+system	O
+partition	O
+of	O
+rooted	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Installing	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+the	O
+system	O
+partition	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+harder	O
+for	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+technique	O
+only	O
+works	O
+for	O
+unpatched	O
+devices	O
+running	O
+Android	B-System
+4.3	I-System
+or	O
+lower	O
+.	O
+
+Devices	O
+running	O
+Android	B-System
+4.4	I-System
+and	O
+higher	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+by	O
+Verified	O
+Boot	O
+.	O
+
+Zen	B-Malware
+'s	O
+rooting	O
+trojan	O
+apps	O
+target	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+device	O
+model	O
+with	O
+a	O
+very	O
+specific	O
+system	O
+image	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+achieving	O
+root	O
+access	O
+the	O
+app	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+replace	O
+the	O
+framework.jar	B-Indicator
+file	O
+on	O
+the	O
+system	O
+partition	O
+.	O
+
+Replicating	O
+framework.jar	B-Indicator
+allows	O
+the	O
+app	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+and	O
+modify	O
+the	O
+behavior	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+standard	O
+API	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+particular	O
+,	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+try	O
+to	O
+add	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+method	O
+called	O
+statistics	O
+(	O
+)	O
+into	O
+the	O
+Activity	O
+class	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+inserted	O
+,	O
+this	O
+method	O
+runs	O
+every	O
+time	O
+any	O
+Activity	O
+object	O
+in	O
+any	O
+Android	O
+app	O
+is	O
+created	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+happens	O
+all	O
+the	O
+time	O
+in	O
+regular	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+,	O
+as	O
+Activity	O
+is	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+fundamental	O
+Android	B-System
+UI	O
+elements	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+only	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+this	O
+method	O
+is	O
+to	O
+connect	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+trojan	O
+After	O
+achieving	O
+persistence	O
+,	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+downloads	O
+additional	O
+payloads	O
+,	O
+including	O
+another	O
+trojan	O
+called	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Zen	B-Malware
+requires	O
+root	O
+to	O
+work	O
+correctly	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+operating	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+trojan	O
+uses	O
+its	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+to	O
+turn	O
+on	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+(	O
+a	O
+service	O
+used	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+with	O
+disabilities	O
+to	O
+use	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+)	O
+for	O
+itself	O
+by	O
+writing	O
+to	O
+a	O
+system-wide	O
+setting	O
+value	O
+enabled_accessibility_services	O
+.	O
+
+Zen	B-Malware
+does	O
+n't	O
+even	O
+check	O
+for	O
+the	O
+root	O
+privilege	O
+:	O
+it	O
+just	O
+assumes	O
+it	O
+has	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+leads	O
+us	O
+to	O
+believe	O
+that	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+is	O
+just	O
+part	O
+of	O
+a	O
+larger	O
+infection	O
+chain	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+trojan	O
+implements	O
+three	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+directed	O
+at	O
+different	O
+Android	B-System
+API	I-System
+levels	O
+and	O
+uses	O
+these	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+,	O
+chosen	O
+by	O
+checking	O
+the	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+version	O
+,	O
+to	O
+create	O
+new	O
+Google	B-Organization
+accounts	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+done	O
+by	O
+opening	O
+the	O
+Google	B-Organization
+account	O
+creation	O
+process	O
+and	O
+parsing	O
+the	O
+current	O
+view	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+then	O
+clicks	O
+the	O
+appropriate	O
+buttons	O
+,	O
+scrollbars	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+UI	O
+elements	O
+to	O
+go	O
+through	O
+account	O
+sign-up	O
+without	O
+user	O
+intervention	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+the	O
+account	O
+sign-up	O
+process	O
+,	O
+Google	B-Organization
+may	O
+flag	O
+the	O
+account	O
+creation	O
+attempt	O
+as	O
+suspicious	O
+and	O
+prompt	O
+the	O
+app	O
+to	O
+solve	O
+a	O
+CAPTCHA	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+get	O
+around	O
+this	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+then	O
+uses	O
+its	O
+root	O
+privilege	O
+to	O
+inject	O
+code	O
+into	O
+the	O
+Setup	O
+Wizard	O
+,	O
+extract	O
+the	O
+CAPTCHA	O
+image	O
+,	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+it	O
+to	O
+a	O
+remote	O
+server	O
+to	O
+try	O
+to	O
+solve	O
+the	O
+CAPTCHA	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+unclear	O
+if	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+server	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+solving	O
+the	O
+CAPTCHA	O
+image	O
+automatically	O
+or	O
+if	O
+this	O
+is	O
+done	O
+manually	O
+by	O
+a	O
+human	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+server	O
+returns	O
+the	O
+solution	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+enters	O
+it	O
+into	O
+the	O
+appropriate	O
+text	O
+field	O
+to	O
+complete	O
+the	O
+CAPTCHA	O
+challenge	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+trojan	O
+does	O
+not	O
+implement	O
+any	O
+kind	O
+of	O
+obfuscation	O
+except	O
+for	O
+one	O
+string	O
+that	O
+is	O
+encoded	O
+using	O
+Base64	O
+encoding	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+'s	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+strings	O
+-	O
+"	O
+How	O
+you	O
+'ll	O
+sign	O
+in	O
+''	O
+-	O
+that	O
+it	O
+looks	O
+for	O
+during	O
+the	O
+account	O
+creation	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+below	O
+shows	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+parsing	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+Apart	O
+from	O
+injecting	O
+code	O
+to	O
+read	O
+the	O
+CAPTCHA	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+also	O
+injects	O
+its	O
+own	O
+code	O
+into	O
+the	O
+system_server	O
+process	O
+,	O
+which	O
+requires	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+indicates	O
+that	O
+the	O
+app	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+itself	O
+from	O
+any	O
+anti-PHA	O
+systems	O
+that	O
+look	O
+for	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+app	O
+process	O
+name	O
+or	O
+does	O
+not	O
+have	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+scan	O
+the	O
+memory	O
+of	O
+the	O
+system_server	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+also	O
+creates	O
+hooks	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+from	O
+rebooting	O
+,	O
+going	O
+to	O
+sleep	O
+or	O
+allowing	O
+the	O
+user	O
+from	O
+pressing	O
+hardware	O
+buttons	O
+during	O
+the	O
+account	O
+creation	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+hooks	O
+are	O
+created	O
+using	O
+the	O
+root	O
+access	O
+and	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+native	O
+code	O
+called	O
+Lmt_INJECT	O
+,	O
+although	O
+the	O
+algorithm	O
+for	O
+this	O
+is	O
+well	O
+known	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+has	O
+to	O
+turn	O
+off	O
+SELinux	B-System
+protection	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+the	O
+app	O
+finds	O
+a	O
+process	O
+id	O
+value	O
+for	O
+the	O
+process	O
+it	O
+wants	O
+to	O
+inject	O
+with	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+done	O
+using	O
+a	O
+series	O
+of	O
+syscalls	O
+as	O
+outlined	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+"	O
+source	O
+process	O
+''	O
+refers	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Zen	B-Malware
+trojan	O
+running	O
+as	O
+root	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+"	O
+target	O
+process	O
+''	O
+refers	O
+to	O
+the	O
+process	O
+to	O
+which	O
+the	O
+code	O
+is	O
+injected	O
+and	O
+[	O
+pid	O
+]	O
+refers	O
+to	O
+the	O
+target	O
+process	O
+pid	O
+value	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+source	O
+process	O
+checks	O
+the	O
+mapping	O
+between	O
+a	O
+process	O
+id	O
+and	O
+a	O
+process	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+done	O
+by	O
+reading	O
+the	O
+/proc/	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+pid	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+/cmdline	I-Indicator
+file	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+very	O
+first	O
+step	O
+fails	O
+in	O
+Android	B-System
+7.0	I-System
+and	O
+higher	O
+,	O
+even	O
+with	O
+a	O
+root	O
+permission	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+/proc	B-Indicator
+filesystem	O
+is	O
+now	O
+mounted	O
+with	O
+a	O
+hidepid=2	O
+parameter	O
+,	O
+which	O
+means	O
+that	O
+the	O
+process	O
+can	O
+not	O
+access	O
+other	O
+process	O
+/proc/	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+pid	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+directory	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+ptrace_attach	O
+syscall	O
+is	O
+called	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+source	O
+process	O
+to	O
+trace	O
+the	O
+target	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+source	O
+process	O
+looks	O
+at	O
+its	O
+own	O
+memory	O
+to	O
+calculate	O
+the	O
+offset	O
+between	O
+the	O
+beginning	O
+of	O
+the	O
+libc	O
+library	O
+and	O
+the	O
+mmap	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+source	O
+process	O
+reads	O
+/proc/	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+pid	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+/maps	I-Indicator
+to	O
+find	O
+where	O
+libc	O
+is	O
+located	O
+in	O
+the	O
+target	O
+process	O
+memory	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+adding	O
+the	O
+previously	O
+calculated	O
+offset	O
+,	O
+it	O
+can	O
+get	O
+the	O
+address	O
+of	O
+the	O
+mmap	O
+function	O
+in	O
+the	O
+target	O
+process	O
+memory	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+source	O
+process	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+the	O
+location	O
+of	O
+dlopen	O
+,	O
+dlsym	O
+,	O
+and	O
+dlclose	O
+functions	O
+in	O
+the	O
+target	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+same	O
+technique	O
+as	O
+it	O
+used	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+the	O
+offset	O
+to	O
+the	O
+mmap	O
+function	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+source	O
+process	O
+writes	O
+the	O
+native	O
+shellcode	O
+into	O
+the	O
+memory	O
+region	O
+allocated	O
+by	O
+mmap	O
+.	O
+
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+it	O
+also	O
+writes	O
+addresses	O
+of	O
+dlopen	O
+,	O
+dlsym	O
+,	O
+and	O
+dlclose	O
+into	O
+the	O
+same	O
+region	O
+,	O
+so	O
+that	O
+they	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+shellcode	O
+.	O
+
+Shellcode	O
+simply	O
+uses	O
+dlopen	O
+to	O
+open	O
+a	O
+.so	O
+file	O
+within	O
+the	O
+target	O
+process	O
+and	O
+then	O
+dlsym	O
+to	O
+find	O
+a	O
+symbol	B-Organization
+in	O
+that	O
+file	O
+and	O
+run	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+source	O
+process	O
+changes	O
+the	O
+registers	O
+in	O
+the	O
+target	O
+process	O
+so	O
+that	O
+PC	O
+register	O
+points	O
+directly	O
+to	O
+the	O
+shellcode	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+done	O
+using	O
+the	O
+ptrace	O
+syscall	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+diagram	O
+illustrates	O
+the	O
+whole	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+Summary	O
+PHA	O
+authors	O
+go	O
+to	O
+great	O
+lengths	O
+to	O
+come	O
+up	O
+with	O
+increasingly	O
+clever	O
+ways	O
+to	O
+monetize	O
+their	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Zen	B-Malware
+family	O
+PHA	O
+authors	O
+exhibit	O
+a	O
+wide	O
+range	O
+of	O
+techniques	O
+,	O
+from	O
+simply	O
+inserting	O
+an	O
+advertising	O
+SDK	O
+to	O
+a	O
+sophisticated	O
+trojan	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+that	O
+resulted	O
+in	O
+the	O
+largest	O
+number	O
+of	O
+affected	O
+users	O
+was	O
+the	O
+click	O
+fraud	O
+version	O
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+installed	O
+over	O
+170,000	O
+times	O
+at	O
+its	O
+peak	O
+in	O
+February	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+most	O
+affected	O
+countries	O
+were	O
+India	O
+,	O
+Brazil	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Indonesia	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+most	O
+cases	O
+,	O
+these	O
+click	O
+fraud	O
+apps	O
+were	O
+uninstalled	O
+by	O
+the	O
+users	O
+,	O
+probably	O
+due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+low	O
+quality	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+detects	O
+one	O
+of	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+will	O
+show	O
+a	O
+warning	O
+to	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+are	O
+constantly	O
+on	O
+the	O
+lookout	O
+for	O
+new	O
+threats	O
+and	O
+we	O
+are	O
+expanding	O
+our	O
+protections	O
+.	O
+
+Every	O
+device	O
+with	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+includes	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+and	O
+all	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+are	O
+automatically	O
+and	O
+periodically	O
+scanned	O
+by	O
+our	O
+solutions	O
+.	O
+
+You	O
+can	O
+check	O
+the	O
+status	O
+of	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+on	O
+your	O
+device	O
+:	O
+Open	O
+your	O
+Android	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Tap	O
+Menu	O
+>	O
+Play	O
+Protect	O
+.	O
+
+Look	O
+for	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+status	O
+of	O
+your	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Hashes	O
+of	O
+samples	O
+Type	O
+Package	O
+name	O
+SHA256	O
+digest	O
+Custom	O
+ads	O
+com.targetshoot.zombieapocalypse.sniper.zombieshootinggame	B-Indicator
+5d98d8a7a012a858f0fa4cf8d2ed3d5a82937b1a98ea2703d440307c63c6c928	B-Indicator
+Click	O
+fraud	O
+com.counterterrorist.cs.elite.combat.shootinggame	B-Indicator
+84672fb2f228ec749d3c3c1cb168a1c31f544970fd29136bea2a5b2cefac6d04	B-Indicator
+
+Rooting	O
+trojan	O
+com.android.world.news	O
+bd233c1f5c477b0cc15d7f84392dab3a7a598243efa3154304327ff4580ae213	B-Indicator
+Zen	B-Malware
+trojan	O
+com.lmt.register	B-Indicator
+eb12cd65589cbc6f9d3563576c304273cb6a78072b0c20a155a0951370476d8d	B-Indicator
+Mobile	O
+Campaign	O
+‘	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+’	O
+Affects	O
+Middle	O
+East	O
+We	O
+uncovered	O
+a	O
+cyberespionage	O
+campaign	O
+targeting	O
+Middle	O
+
+Eastern	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+named	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+“	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+”	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+in	O
+the	O
+package	O
+named	O
+“	O
+golf.	O
+”	O
+June	O
+18	O
+,	O
+2019	O
+We	O
+uncovered	O
+a	O
+cyberespionage	O
+campaign	O
+targeting	O
+Middle	O
+Eastern	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+named	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+“	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+”	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+in	O
+the	O
+package	O
+named	O
+“	O
+golf.	O
+”	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+involved	O
+,	O
+which	O
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+detects	O
+as	O
+AndroidOS_GolfSpy.HRX	B-Malware
+,	O
+is	O
+notable	O
+for	O
+its	O
+wide	O
+range	O
+of	O
+cyberespionage	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Malicious	O
+codes	O
+are	O
+embedded	O
+in	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+the	O
+operators	O
+repackaged	O
+from	O
+legitimate	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Monitoring	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+servers	O
+used	O
+by	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+so	O
+far	O
+observed	O
+more	O
+than	O
+660	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+infected	O
+with	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Much	O
+of	O
+the	O
+information	O
+being	O
+stolen	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+military-related	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+campaign	O
+’	O
+s	O
+attack	O
+vector	O
+is	O
+also	O
+interesting	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+repackaged	O
+,	O
+malware-laden	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+neither	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+nor	O
+popular	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+marketplaces	O
+,	O
+and	O
+we	O
+only	O
+saw	O
+the	O
+website	O
+hosting	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+being	O
+promoted	O
+on	O
+social	O
+media	O
+when	O
+we	O
+followed	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+trail	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+were	O
+also	O
+able	O
+to	O
+analyze	O
+some	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+samples	O
+sourced	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+mobile	O
+app	O
+reputation	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Also	O
+of	O
+note	O
+is	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+possible	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+a	O
+previously	O
+reported	O
+mobile	O
+cyberespionage	O
+campaign	O
+that	O
+researchers	O
+named	O
+Domestic	B-Malware
+Kitten	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+strings	O
+of	O
+code	O
+,	O
+for	O
+one	O
+,	O
+are	O
+similarly	O
+structured	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+data	O
+targeted	O
+for	O
+theft	O
+also	O
+have	O
+similar	O
+formats	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+1	O
+.	O
+
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+infection	O
+chain	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+'s	O
+Potential	O
+Impact	O
+Given	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+information-stealing	O
+capabilities	O
+,	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+effectively	O
+hijack	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+is	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+information	O
+that	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+steals	O
+:	O
+Device	O
+accounts	O
+List	O
+of	O
+applications	O
+installed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+device	O
+Device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+current	O
+running	O
+processes	O
+Battery	O
+status	O
+Bookmarks/Histories	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+default	O
+browser	O
+Call	O
+logs	O
+and	O
+records	O
+Clipboard	O
+contents	O
+Contacts	O
+,	O
+including	O
+those	O
+in	O
+VCard	O
+format	O
+Mobile	O
+operator	O
+information	O
+Files	O
+stored	O
+on	O
+SDcard	O
+Device	O
+location	O
+List	O
+of	O
+image	O
+,	O
+audio	O
+,	O
+and	O
+video	O
+files	O
+stored	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+Storage	O
+and	O
+memory	O
+information	O
+Connection	O
+information	O
+Sensor	O
+information	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+Pictures	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+also	O
+has	O
+a	O
+function	O
+that	O
+lets	O
+it	O
+connect	O
+to	O
+a	O
+remote	O
+server	O
+to	O
+fetch	O
+and	O
+perform	O
+commands	O
+
+,	O
+including	O
+:	O
+searching	O
+for	O
+,	O
+listing	O
+,	O
+deleting	O
+,	O
+and	O
+renaming	O
+files	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+downloading	O
+a	O
+file	O
+into	O
+and	O
+retrieving	O
+a	O
+file	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+;	O
+taking	O
+screenshots	O
+;	O
+installing	O
+other	O
+application	O
+packages	O
+(	O
+APK	O
+)	O
+;	O
+recording	O
+audio	O
+and	O
+video	O
+;	O
+and	O
+updating	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+The	O
+repackaged	O
+applications	O
+are	O
+embedded	O
+with	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+,	O
+which	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+com.golf	B-Indicator
+package	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+repackaged	O
+apps	O
+pose	O
+as	O
+communication	O
+,	O
+news	O
+,	O
+lifestyle	O
+,	O
+book	O
+,	O
+and	O
+reference	O
+apps	O
+popularly	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Middle	O
+East	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+malware	O
+embedded	O
+in	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+is	O
+hardcoded	O
+with	O
+an	O
+internal	O
+name	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+2	O
+.	O
+
+Icons	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+operators	O
+repackaged	O
+(	O
+top	O
+)	O
+and	O
+a	O
+comparison	O
+of	O
+packages	O
+between	O
+the	O
+original	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+(	O
+bottom	O
+left	O
+)	O
+and	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+(	O
+bottom	O
+right	O
+)	O
+Figure	O
+3	O
+.	O
+
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+configurations	O
+encoded	O
+by	O
+a	O
+custom	O
+algorithm	O
+(	O
+right	O
+)	O
+and	O
+its	O
+decoded	O
+version	O
+(	O
+left	O
+)	O
+As	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+3	O
+,	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+configurations	O
+(	O
+e.g.	O
+,	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+secret	O
+keys	O
+)	O
+are	O
+encoded	O
+by	O
+a	O
+customized	O
+algorithm	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+it	O
+is	O
+launched	O
+,	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+will	O
+generate	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+ID	O
+for	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+and	O
+then	O
+collect	O
+its	O
+data	O
+such	O
+as	O
+SMS	O
+,	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+,	O
+location	O
+,	O
+and	O
+accounts	O
+in	O
+this	O
+format	O
+:	O
+“	O
+%	O
+,	O
+[	O
+]	O
+,	O
+time	O
+”	O
+(	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+4	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+information	O
+is	O
+written	O
+into	O
+a	O
+file	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attacker	O
+can	O
+choose	O
+the	O
+data	O
+types	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+,	O
+which	O
+are	O
+written	O
+in	O
+a	O
+certain	O
+format	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+4	O
+.	O
+
+Code	O
+snippet	O
+showing	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+generating	O
+UUID	O
+The	O
+value	O
+of	O
+%	O
+is	O
+in	O
+the	O
+range	O
+of	O
+1-9	O
+or	O
+a-j	O
+.	O
+
+Each	O
+value	O
+represents	O
+a	O
+different	O
+type	O
+of	O
+data	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+:	O
+Value	O
+Data	O
+Type	O
+1	O
+Accounts	O
+2	O
+Installed	O
+APP	O
+list	O
+3	O
+Running	O
+processes	O
+list	O
+4	O
+Battery	O
+status	O
+5	O
+Browser	O
+bookmarks	O
+and	O
+histories	O
+6	O
+Call	O
+logs	O
+7	O
+Clipboard	O
+8	O
+Contacts	O
+9	O
+Mobile	O
+operator	O
+information	O
+a	O
+File	O
+list	O
+on	O
+SD	O
+card	O
+b	O
+Location	O
+c	O
+Image	O
+list	O
+d	O
+Audio	O
+list	O
+e	O
+Video	O
+list	O
+f	O
+Storage	O
+and	O
+memory	O
+information	O
+g	O
+Connection	O
+information	O
+h	O
+Sensors	O
+information	O
+i	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+j	O
+VCard	O
+format	O
+contacts	O
+Table	O
+1	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+type	O
+of	O
+data	O
+corresponding	O
+to	O
+the	O
+value	O
+coded	O
+in	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+Figure	O
+5	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+code	O
+snippets	O
+that	O
+are	O
+involved	O
+in	O
+monitoring	O
+and	O
+recording	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+phone	O
+call	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+will	O
+also	O
+take	O
+a	O
+photo	O
+using	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+front	O
+camera	O
+when	O
+the	O
+user	O
+wakes	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Apart	O
+from	O
+collecting	O
+the	O
+above	O
+data	O
+,	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+monitors	O
+users	O
+’	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+,	O
+records	O
+them	O
+,	O
+and	O
+saves	O
+the	O
+recorded	O
+file	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+encrypts	O
+all	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+using	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+XOR	O
+operation	O
+with	O
+a	O
+pre-configured	O
+key	O
+before	O
+sending	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+using	O
+the	O
+HTTP	O
+POST	O
+method	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+5	O
+.	O
+
+Code	O
+snippets	O
+showing	O
+how	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+monitors	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+via	O
+register	O
+receiver	O
+(	O
+top	O
+left	O
+)	O
+,	O
+its	O
+actions	O
+when	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+woken	O
+up	O
+(	O
+top	O
+right	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+how	O
+it	O
+encrypts	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+(	O
+bottom	O
+)	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+retrieves	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+via	O
+HTTP	O
+,	O
+and	O
+attackers	O
+can	O
+steal	O
+specific	O
+files	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+command	O
+is	O
+a	O
+constructed	O
+string	O
+split	O
+into	O
+three	O
+parts	O
+using	O
+"	O
+"	O
+as	O
+a	O
+separator	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+part	O
+is	O
+the	O
+target	O
+directory	O
+,	O
+the	O
+second	O
+is	O
+a	O
+regular	O
+expression	O
+used	O
+to	O
+match	O
+specific	O
+files	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+last	O
+part	O
+is	O
+an	O
+ID	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+6	O
+.	O
+
+Example	O
+of	O
+a	O
+command	O
+that	O
+steals	O
+specific	O
+files	O
+from	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+application	O
+(	O
+top	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+parse-and-perform	O
+command	O
+(	O
+bottom	O
+)	O
+Apart	O
+from	O
+the	O
+HTTP	O
+POST	O
+method	O
+,	O
+GolfSpy	B-Malware
+also	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+socket	O
+connection	O
+to	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+and	O
+perform	O
+additional	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+Stolen	O
+data	O
+will	O
+also	O
+be	O
+encrypted	O
+and	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+via	O
+the	O
+socket	O
+connection	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+encryption	O
+key	O
+is	O
+different	O
+from	O
+the	O
+one	O
+used	O
+for	O
+sending	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+via	O
+HTTP	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+7	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+additional	O
+commands	O
+that	O
+attackers	O
+can	O
+carry	O
+out	O
+via	O
+a	O
+socket	O
+connection	O
+(	O
+top	O
+)	O
+and	O
+the	O
+key	O
+used	O
+to	O
+encrypt	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+(	O
+bottom	O
+)	O
+Correlating	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+'s	O
+Activities	O
+We	O
+monitored	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C-related	O
+activities	O
+and	O
+saw	O
+that	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+has	O
+affected	O
+more	O
+than	O
+660	O
+devices	O
+as	O
+of	O
+this	O
+writing	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+small	O
+or	O
+limited	O
+number	O
+is	O
+understandable	O
+given	O
+the	O
+nature	O
+of	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+but	O
+we	O
+also	O
+expect	O
+it	O
+to	O
+increase	O
+or	O
+even	O
+diversify	O
+in	O
+terms	O
+of	O
+distribution	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+devices	O
+were	O
+located	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Middle	O
+East	O
+,	O
+and	O
+many	O
+of	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+we	O
+saw	O
+is	O
+military-related	O
+(	O
+e.g.	O
+,	O
+images	O
+,	O
+documents	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+operators	O
+also	O
+try	O
+to	O
+cover	O
+their	O
+tracks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+registrant	O
+contact	O
+details	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+domains	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+,	O
+for	O
+instance	O
+,	O
+were	O
+masked	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+used	O
+also	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+disparate	O
+,	O
+as	O
+they	O
+were	O
+located	O
+in	O
+many	O
+European	O
+countries	O
+like	O
+Russia	O
+,	O
+France	O
+,	O
+Holland	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Germany	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+not	O
+a	O
+definite	O
+correlation	O
+,	O
+but	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+also	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+have	O
+a	O
+connection	O
+with	O
+Domestic	B-Malware
+Kitten	I-Malware
+due	O
+to	O
+similarities	O
+we	O
+found	O
+in	O
+their	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+that	O
+both	O
+deploy	O
+share	O
+the	O
+same	O
+strings	O
+of	O
+code	O
+for	O
+their	O
+decoding	O
+algorithm	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+data	O
+that	O
+Domestic	B-Malware
+Kitten	I-Malware
+steals	O
+follows	O
+a	O
+similar	O
+format	O
+with	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+,	O
+with	O
+each	O
+type	O
+of	O
+data	O
+having	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+identifying	O
+character	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+also	O
+worth	O
+noting	O
+that	O
+both	O
+campaigns	O
+repackage	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+are	O
+commonly	O
+used	O
+in	O
+their	O
+target	O
+’	O
+s	O
+countries	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Telegram	B-System
+,	O
+Kik	B-System
+,	O
+and	O
+Plus	B-System
+messaging	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+8	O
+.	O
+
+Code	O
+snippets	O
+showing	O
+:	O
+the	O
+decoding	O
+algorithm	O
+shared	O
+by	O
+both	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+and	O
+Domestic	B-Malware
+Kitten	I-Malware
+(	O
+top	O
+)	O
+,	O
+the	O
+format	O
+of	O
+data	O
+that	O
+Domestic	B-Malware
+Kitten	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+malware	O
+targets	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+(	O
+center	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+how	O
+both	O
+Bouncing	B-Malware
+Golf	I-Malware
+(	O
+bottom	O
+left	O
+)	O
+and	O
+Domestic	B-Malware
+Kitten	I-Malware
+(	O
+bottom	O
+right	O
+)	O
+use	O
+"	O
+"	O
+as	O
+a	O
+separator	O
+in	O
+their	O
+command	O
+strings	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+last	O
+year	O
+’	O
+s	O
+mobile	O
+threat	O
+landscape	O
+,	O
+we	O
+expect	O
+more	O
+cyberespionage	O
+campaigns	O
+targeting	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+platform	O
+given	O
+its	O
+ubiquity	O
+,	O
+employing	O
+tried-and-tested	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+lure	O
+unwitting	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+extent	O
+of	O
+information	O
+that	O
+these	O
+kinds	O
+of	O
+threats	O
+can	O
+steal	O
+is	O
+also	O
+significant	O
+,	O
+as	O
+it	O
+lets	O
+attackers	O
+virtually	O
+take	O
+over	O
+a	O
+compromised	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+should	O
+adopt	O
+best	O
+practices	O
+,	O
+while	O
+organizations	O
+should	O
+ensure	O
+that	O
+they	O
+balance	O
+the	O
+need	O
+for	O
+mobility	O
+and	O
+the	O
+importance	O
+of	O
+security	O
+.	O
+
+End	O
+users	O
+and	O
+enterprises	O
+can	O
+also	O
+benefit	O
+from	O
+multilayered	O
+mobile	O
+security	O
+solutions	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro™	I-Organization
+Mobile	O
+Security™	O
+.	O
+
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro™	I-Organization
+Mobile	B-System
+Security	I-System
+for	I-System
+Enterprise	I-System
+provides	O
+device	O
+,	O
+compliance	O
+and	O
+application	O
+management	O
+,	O
+data	O
+protection	O
+,	O
+and	O
+configuration	O
+provisioning	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+protects	O
+devices	O
+from	O
+attacks	O
+that	O
+exploit	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+,	O
+preventing	O
+unauthorized	O
+access	O
+to	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+and	O
+detecting	O
+and	O
+blocking	O
+malware	O
+and	O
+fraudulent	O
+websites	O
+.	O
+
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+Mobile	B-System
+App	I-System
+Reputation	I-System
+Service	I-System
+(	O
+MARS	O
+)	O
+covers	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+threats	O
+using	O
+leading	O
+sandbox	O
+and	O
+machine	O
+learning	O
+technologies	O
+,	O
+protecting	O
+devices	O
+against	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+zero-day	O
+and	O
+known	O
+exploits	O
+,	O
+privacy	O
+leaks	O
+,	O
+and	O
+application	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Several	O
+weeks	O
+ago	O
+,	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Mobile	O
+Threat	O
+Prevention	O
+detected	O
+and	O
+quarantined	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+of	O
+an	O
+unsuspecting	O
+customer	O
+employee	O
+who	O
+downloaded	O
+and	O
+installed	O
+a	O
+0day	O
+mobile	O
+ransomware	O
+from	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+dubbed	O
+“	O
+Charger.	B-Malware
+”	O
+This	O
+incident	O
+demonstrates	O
+how	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+be	O
+a	O
+dangerous	O
+threat	O
+to	O
+your	O
+business	O
+,	O
+and	O
+how	O
+advanced	O
+behavioral	O
+detection	O
+fills	O
+mobile	O
+security	O
+gaps	O
+attackers	O
+use	O
+to	O
+penetrate	O
+entire	O
+networks	O
+.	O
+
+Charger	B-Malware
+was	O
+found	O
+embedded	O
+in	O
+an	O
+app	O
+called	O
+EnergyRescue	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+infected	O
+app	O
+steals	O
+contacts	O
+and	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+and	O
+asks	O
+for	O
+admin	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+granted	O
+,	O
+the	O
+ransomware	O
+locks	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+displays	O
+a	O
+message	O
+demanding	O
+payment	O
+:	O
+You	O
+need	O
+to	O
+pay	O
+for	O
+us	O
+,	O
+otherwise	O
+we	O
+will	O
+sell	O
+portion	O
+of	O
+your	O
+personal	O
+information	O
+on	O
+black	O
+market	O
+every	O
+30	O
+minutes	O
+.	O
+
+WE	O
+GIVE	O
+100	O
+%	O
+GUARANTEE	O
+THAT	O
+ALL	O
+FILES	O
+WILL	O
+RESTORE	O
+AFTER	O
+WE	O
+RECEIVE	O
+PAYMENT	O
+.	O
+
+WE	O
+WILL	O
+UNLOCK	O
+THE	O
+MOBILE	O
+DEVICE	O
+AND	O
+DELETE	O
+ALL	O
+YOUR	O
+DATA	O
+FROM	O
+OUR	O
+SERVER	O
+!	O
+
+TURNING	O
+OFF	O
+YOUR	O
+PHONE	O
+IS	O
+MEANINGLESS	O
+,	O
+ALL	O
+YOUR	O
+DATA	O
+IS	O
+ALREADY	O
+STORED	O
+ON	O
+OUR	O
+SERVERS	O
+!	O
+
+WE	O
+STILL	O
+CAN	O
+SELLING	O
+IT	O
+FOR	O
+SPAM	O
+,	O
+FAKE	O
+,	O
+BANK	O
+CRIME	O
+etc…	O
+We	O
+collect	O
+and	O
+download	O
+all	O
+of	O
+your	O
+personal	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+information	O
+about	O
+your	O
+social	O
+networks	O
+,	O
+Bank	O
+accounts	O
+,	O
+Credit	O
+Cards	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+collect	O
+all	O
+data	O
+about	O
+your	O
+friends	O
+and	O
+family	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+ransom	O
+demand	O
+for	O
+0.2	O
+Bitcoins	O
+(	O
+roughly	O
+$	O
+180	O
+)	O
+is	O
+a	O
+much	O
+higher	O
+ransom	O
+demand	O
+than	O
+has	O
+been	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+mobile	O
+ransomware	O
+so	O
+far	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+comparison	O
+,	O
+the	O
+DataLust	B-Malware
+ransomware	O
+demanded	O
+merely	O
+$	O
+15	O
+.	O
+
+Payments	O
+are	O
+made	O
+to	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+Bitcoin	B-System
+account	O
+,	O
+but	O
+we	O
+haven	O
+’	O
+t	O
+identified	O
+any	O
+payments	O
+so	O
+far	O
+.	O
+
+Adware	O
+commonly	O
+found	O
+on	O
+Play	O
+collects	O
+profits	O
+from	O
+ad	O
+networks	O
+,	O
+but	O
+mobile	O
+ransomware	O
+inflicts	O
+direct	O
+harm	O
+to	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Like	O
+FakeDefender	B-Malware
+and	O
+DataLust	B-Malware
+,	O
+Charger	B-Malware
+could	O
+be	O
+an	O
+indicator	O
+of	O
+a	O
+wider	O
+effort	O
+by	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+developers	O
+to	O
+catch	O
+up	O
+with	O
+their	O
+PC	O
+ransomware	O
+cousins	O
+.	O
+
+Similar	O
+to	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+past	O
+,	O
+Charger	B-Malware
+checks	O
+the	O
+local	O
+settings	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+does	O
+not	O
+run	O
+its	O
+malicious	O
+logic	O
+if	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+located	O
+in	O
+Ukraine	O
+,	O
+Russia	O
+,	O
+or	O
+Belarus	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+likely	O
+done	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+the	O
+developers	O
+from	O
+being	O
+prosecuted	O
+in	O
+their	O
+own	O
+countries	O
+or	O
+being	O
+extradited	O
+between	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+malware	O
+found	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+contains	O
+only	O
+a	O
+dropper	O
+that	O
+later	O
+downloads	O
+the	O
+real	O
+malicious	O
+components	O
+to	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Charger	B-Malware
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+heavy	O
+packing	O
+approach	O
+which	O
+it	O
+harder	O
+for	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+stay	O
+hidden	O
+,	O
+so	O
+it	O
+must	O
+compensate	O
+with	O
+other	O
+means	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+developers	O
+of	O
+Charger	B-Malware
+gave	O
+it	O
+everything	O
+they	O
+had	O
+to	O
+boost	O
+its	O
+evasion	O
+capabilities	O
+and	O
+so	O
+it	O
+could	O
+stay	O
+hidden	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+for	O
+as	O
+long	O
+as	O
+possible	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+several	O
+advanced	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+its	O
+real	O
+intentions	O
+and	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+harder	O
+to	O
+detect	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+encodes	O
+strings	O
+into	O
+binary	O
+arrays	O
+,	O
+making	O
+it	O
+hard	O
+to	O
+inspect	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+loads	O
+code	O
+from	O
+encrypted	O
+resources	O
+dynamically	O
+,	O
+which	O
+most	O
+detection	O
+engines	O
+can	O
+not	O
+penetrate	O
+and	O
+inspect	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+dynamically-loaded	O
+code	O
+is	O
+also	O
+flooded	O
+with	O
+meaningless	O
+commands	O
+that	O
+mask	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+commands	O
+passing	O
+through	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+checks	O
+whether	O
+it	O
+is	O
+being	O
+run	O
+in	O
+an	O
+emulator	O
+before	O
+it	O
+starts	O
+its	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+.	O
+
+PC	O
+malware	O
+first	O
+introduced	O
+this	O
+technique	O
+which	O
+is	O
+becoming	O
+a	O
+trend	O
+in	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+having	O
+been	O
+adopted	O
+by	O
+several	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+including	O
+Dendroid	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Emulator	O
+and	O
+location	O
+conditions	O
+for	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+activity	O
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+Mobile	O
+Threat	O
+Prevention	O
+customers	O
+are	O
+protected	O
+from	O
+Charger	B-Malware
+and	O
+similar	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Check	B-Organization
+Point	I-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+Analysis	O
+and	O
+Response	O
+Team	O
+(	O
+ART	O
+)	O
+disclosed	O
+the	O
+finding	O
+to	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+Security	O
+team	O
+who	O
+took	O
+the	O
+appropriate	O
+security	O
+steps	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+app	O
+and	O
+added	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+built-in	O
+protection	O
+mechanisms	O
+.	O
+
+Charger	O
+SHA256	O
+hash	O
+:	O
+58eb6c368e129b17559bdeacb3aed4d9a5d3596f774cf5ed3fdcf51775232ba0	B-Indicator
+Infostealer	O
+,	O
+Keylogger	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Ransomware	O
+in	O
+One	O
+:	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+Targets	O
+More	O
+than	O
+250	O
+Android	B-System
+Applications	O
+October	O
+29	O
+,	O
+2021	O
+The	O
+Cofense	B-Organization
+Phishing	I-Organization
+Defense	I-Organization
+Center	I-Organization
+uncovered	O
+a	O
+phishing	O
+campaign	O
+that	O
+specifically	O
+targets	O
+users	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+that	O
+could	O
+result	O
+in	O
+compromise	O
+if	O
+unsigned	O
+Android	B-System
+applications	O
+are	O
+permitted	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+campaign	O
+seeks	O
+to	O
+deliver	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+,	O
+a	O
+particularly	O
+nasty	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+was	O
+originally	O
+used	O
+for	O
+cyber	O
+espionage	O
+and	O
+retooled	O
+as	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Anubis	B-Malware
+can	O
+completely	O
+hijack	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+mobile	O
+device	O
+,	O
+steal	O
+data	O
+,	O
+record	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+,	O
+and	O
+even	O
+hold	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+ransom	O
+by	O
+encrypting	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+personal	O
+files	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+increasingly	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+corporate	O
+environment	O
+,	O
+thanks	O
+to	O
+the	O
+popularity	O
+of	O
+BYOD	O
+policies	O
+,	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+the	O
+potential	O
+to	O
+cause	O
+serious	O
+harm	O
+,	O
+mostly	O
+to	O
+consumers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+businesses	O
+that	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+unsigned	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+’	O
+s	O
+how	O
+it	O
+works	O
+:	O
+At	O
+first	O
+glance	O
+,	O
+the	O
+email	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+1	O
+looks	O
+like	O
+any	O
+other	O
+phishing	O
+email	O
+that	O
+asks	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+download	O
+an	O
+invoice	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+this	O
+particular	O
+email	O
+downloads	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+Package	I-System
+Kit	I-System
+(	O
+APK	O
+)	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+the	O
+common	O
+format	O
+used	O
+by	O
+Android	B-System
+to	O
+distribute	O
+and	O
+install	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Let	O
+’	O
+s	O
+take	O
+a	O
+closer	O
+look	O
+at	O
+the	O
+suspicious	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+1	O
+–	O
+Phishing	O
+Email	O
+When	O
+the	O
+email	O
+link	O
+is	O
+opened	O
+from	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+,	O
+an	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+(	O
+Fattura002873.apk	B-Indicator
+)	O
+,	O
+is	O
+downloaded	O
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+opening	O
+the	O
+file	O
+,	O
+the	O
+user	O
+is	O
+asked	O
+to	O
+enable	O
+“	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	O
+”	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+2	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+this	O
+is	O
+not	O
+a	O
+genuine	O
+“	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	O
+”	O
+screen	O
+;	O
+instead	O
+it	O
+gives	O
+the	O
+app	O
+all	O
+the	O
+permissions	O
+it	O
+needs	O
+while	O
+simultaneously	O
+disabling	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+2	O
+–	O
+Granting	O
+Permissions	O
+The	O
+following	O
+permissions	O
+are	O
+granted	O
+to	O
+the	O
+app	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+3	O
+–	O
+Permissions	O
+Granted	O
+to	O
+App	O
+A	O
+closer	O
+look	O
+at	O
+the	O
+code	O
+reveals	O
+the	O
+application	O
+gathers	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+compare	O
+the	O
+results	O
+against	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+(	O
+Figure	O
+4	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+mainly	O
+targets	O
+banking	O
+and	O
+financial	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+but	O
+also	O
+looks	O
+for	O
+popular	O
+shopping	O
+apps	O
+such	O
+as	O
+eBay	B-Organization
+or	O
+Amazon	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+A	O
+full	O
+list	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+is	O
+included	O
+in	O
+the	O
+IOC	O
+section	O
+at	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+this	O
+post	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+an	O
+application	O
+has	O
+been	O
+identified	O
+,	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+overlays	O
+the	O
+original	O
+application	O
+with	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+login	O
+page	O
+to	O
+capture	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+credentials	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+4	O
+–	O
+Checking	O
+for	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+Based	O
+on	O
+a	O
+thorough	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+the	O
+most	O
+interesting	O
+technical	O
+capabilities	O
+include	O
+:	O
+Capturing	O
+screenshots	O
+Enabling	O
+or	O
+changing	O
+administration	O
+settings	O
+Opening	O
+and	O
+visiting	O
+any	O
+URL	O
+Disabling	O
+Play	O
+Protect	O
+Recording	O
+audio	O
+Making	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+Stealing	O
+the	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+Controlling	O
+the	O
+device	O
+via	O
+VNC	O
+Sending	O
+,	O
+receiving	O
+and	O
+deleting	O
+SMS	O
+Locking	O
+the	O
+device	O
+Encrypting	O
+files	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+external	O
+drives	O
+Searching	O
+for	O
+files	O
+Retrieving	O
+the	O
+GPS	O
+location	O
+Capturing	O
+remote	O
+control	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+Twitter	B-System
+and	O
+Telegram	B-System
+Pushing	O
+overlays	O
+Reading	O
+the	O
+device	O
+ID	O
+The	O
+malware	O
+includes	O
+
+a	O
+keylogger	O
+that	O
+works	O
+in	O
+every	O
+app	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+keylogger	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+be	O
+specifically	O
+enabled	O
+by	O
+a	O
+command	O
+sent	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+keylogger	O
+can	O
+track	O
+three	O
+different	O
+events	O
+(	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+)	O
+:	O
+TYPE_VIEW_CLICKED	O
+Represents	O
+the	O
+event	O
+of	O
+clicking	O
+on	O
+a	O
+View-like	O
+Button	O
+,	O
+CompoundButton	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+TYPE_VIEW_FOCUSED	O
+Represents	O
+the	O
+event	O
+of	O
+setting	O
+input	O
+focus	O
+of	O
+a	O
+View	O
+.	O
+
+TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED	O
+Represents	O
+the	O
+event	O
+of	O
+changing	O
+the	O
+text	O
+of	O
+an	O
+EditText	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+5	O
+–	O
+Keylogger	O
+component	O
+Figure	O
+6	O
+shows	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+noteworthy	O
+functions	O
+of	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+:	O
+its	O
+ransomware	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+searches	O
+both	O
+internal	O
+and	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+and	O
+encrypts	O
+them	O
+using	O
+RC4	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+adds	O
+the	O
+file	O
+extension	O
+.AnubisCrypt	B-Indicator
+to	O
+each	O
+encrypted	O
+file	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+6	O
+–	O
+Ransomware	O
+component	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+has	O
+been	O
+known	O
+to	O
+utilize	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+or	O
+Telegram	B-Organization
+to	O
+retrieve	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+address	O
+and	O
+this	O
+sample	O
+is	O
+no	O
+exception	O
+(	O
+Figure	O
+7	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+7	O
+–	O
+C2	O
+As	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+8	O
+,	O
+this	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+is	O
+built	O
+to	O
+run	O
+on	O
+several	O
+iterations	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+operating	O
+system	O
+,	O
+dating	O
+back	O
+to	O
+version	O
+4.0.3	O
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+released	O
+in	O
+2012	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+8	O
+–	O
+Android	B-System
+requirements	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+has	O
+been	O
+around	O
+for	O
+many	O
+years	O
+and	O
+will	O
+be	O
+with	O
+us	O
+for	O
+the	O
+foreseeable	O
+future	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+who	O
+have	O
+configured	O
+their	O
+Android	B-System
+mobile	O
+device	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+work-related	O
+emails	O
+and	O
+allow	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+unsigned	O
+applications	O
+face	O
+the	O
+most	O
+risk	O
+of	O
+compromise	O
+.	O
+
+APK	O
+files	O
+will	O
+not	O
+natively	O
+open	O
+in	O
+an	O
+environment	O
+other	O
+than	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+.	O
+
+With	O
+the	O
+increased	O
+use	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+phones	O
+in	O
+business	O
+environments	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+important	O
+to	O
+defend	O
+against	O
+these	O
+threats	O
+by	O
+ensuring	O
+devices	O
+are	O
+kept	O
+current	O
+with	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+updates	O
+.	O
+
+Limiting	O
+app	O
+installations	O
+on	O
+corporate	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+ensuring	O
+that	O
+applications	O
+are	O
+created	O
+by	O
+trusted	O
+developers	O
+on	O
+official	O
+marketplaces	O
+,	O
+can	O
+help	O
+in	O
+reducing	O
+the	O
+risk	O
+of	O
+infection	O
+as	O
+well	O
+.	O
+
+ViceLeaker	B-Malware
+Operation	O
+:	O
+mobile	O
+espionage	O
+targeting	O
+Middle	O
+East	O
+26	O
+JUN	O
+2019	O
+In	O
+May	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+campaign	O
+targeting	O
+dozens	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+Israeli	O
+citizens	O
+.	O
+
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+spyware	O
+sensors	O
+caught	O
+the	O
+signal	O
+of	O
+an	O
+attack	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+of	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+;	O
+and	O
+a	O
+hash	O
+of	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+involved	O
+(	O
+Android	B-System
+application	O
+)	O
+was	O
+tagged	O
+in	O
+our	O
+sample	O
+feed	O
+for	O
+inspection	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+we	O
+looked	O
+into	O
+the	O
+file	O
+,	O
+we	O
+quickly	O
+found	O
+out	O
+that	O
+the	O
+inner-workings	O
+of	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+included	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+payload	O
+,	O
+embedded	O
+in	O
+the	O
+original	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+was	O
+an	O
+original	O
+spyware	O
+program	O
+,	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+exfiltrate	O
+almost	O
+all	O
+accessible	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+the	O
+course	O
+of	O
+our	O
+research	O
+,	O
+we	O
+noticed	O
+that	O
+we	O
+were	O
+not	O
+the	O
+only	O
+ones	O
+to	O
+have	O
+found	O
+the	O
+operation	O
+.	O
+
+Researchers	O
+from	O
+Bitdefender	B-System
+also	O
+released	O
+an	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+samples	O
+in	O
+a	O
+blogpost	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+something	O
+had	O
+already	O
+been	O
+published	O
+,	O
+we	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+do	O
+something	O
+different	O
+with	O
+the	O
+data	O
+we	O
+acquired	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+month	O
+,	O
+we	O
+released	O
+a	O
+private	O
+report	O
+on	O
+our	O
+Threat	O
+Intelligence	O
+Portal	O
+to	O
+alert	O
+our	O
+clients	O
+about	O
+this	O
+newly	O
+discovered	O
+operation	O
+and	O
+began	O
+writing	O
+YARA	O
+rules	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+catch	O
+more	O
+samples	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+call	O
+the	O
+operation	O
+“	O
+ViceLeaker	B-Malware
+”	O
+,	O
+because	O
+of	O
+strings	O
+and	O
+variables	O
+in	O
+its	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Mobile	O
+ViceLeaker	B-Malware
+The	O
+following	O
+table	O
+shows	O
+meta	O
+information	O
+on	O
+the	O
+observed	O
+samples	O
+,	O
+including	O
+compiler	O
+timestamps	O
+:	O
+MD5	O
+Package	O
+Compiler	O
+C2	O
+51df2597faa3fce38a4c5ae024f97b1c	B-Indicator
+com.xapps.SexGameForAdults	B-Indicator
+dexlib	O
+2.x	O
+188.165.28	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+251	I-Indicator
+2d108ff3a735dea1d1fdfa430f37fab2	B-Indicator
+com.psiphon3	B-Indicator
+dexlib	O
+2.x	O
+188.165.49	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+205	I-Indicator
+7ed754a802f0b6a1740a99683173db73	B-Indicator
+com.psiphon3	B-Indicator
+dexlib	O
+2.x	O
+188.165.49	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+205	I-Indicator
+3b89e5cd49c05ce6dc681589e6c368d9	B-Indicator
+ir.abed.dastan	B-Indicator
+dexlib	O
+2.x	O
+185.141.60	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+213	I-Indicator
+To	O
+backdoor	O
+legitimate	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+attackers	O
+used	O
+a	O
+Smali	O
+injection	O
+technique	O
+–	O
+a	O
+type	O
+of	O
+injection	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+attackers	O
+to	O
+disassemble	O
+the	O
+code	O
+of	O
+original	O
+app	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Baksmali	O
+tool	O
+,	O
+add	O
+their	O
+malicious	O
+code	O
+,	O
+and	O
+assemble	O
+it	O
+with	O
+Smali	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+,	O
+due	O
+to	O
+such	O
+an	O
+unusual	O
+compilation	O
+process	O
+,	O
+there	O
+were	O
+signs	O
+in	O
+the	O
+dex	O
+file	O
+that	O
+point	O
+to	O
+dexlib	O
+,	O
+a	O
+library	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Smali	O
+tool	O
+to	O
+assemble	O
+dex	O
+files	O
+.	O
+
+Original	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+on	O
+the	O
+left	O
+,	O
+versus	O
+injected	O
+APK	O
+on	O
+the	O
+right	O
+The	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+was	O
+rather	O
+interesting	O
+,	O
+because	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+actions	O
+were	O
+very	O
+common	O
+spyware	O
+features	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+exfiltration	O
+of	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+and	O
+other	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+in	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+the	O
+traditional	O
+functionality	O
+,	O
+there	O
+were	O
+also	O
+backdoor	O
+capabilities	O
+such	O
+as	O
+upload	O
+,	O
+download	O
+,	O
+delete	O
+files	O
+,	O
+camera	O
+takeover	O
+and	O
+record	O
+surrounding	O
+audio	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+HTTP	O
+for	O
+communication	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+for	O
+command	O
+handling	O
+and	O
+data	O
+exfiltration	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+is	O
+a	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+protocol	O
+fragment	O
+:	O
+Commands	O
+from	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+parsing	O
+In	O
+total	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+APK	O
+handles	O
+16	O
+different	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+Command	O
+Endpoint	O
+Description	O
+1	O
+reqsmscal.php	B-Indicator
+Send	O
+specified	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+2	O
+reqsmscal.php	B-Indicator
+Call	O
+specified	O
+number	O
+3	O
+reqsmscal.php	B-Indicator
+Exfiltrate	O
+device	O
+info	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+phone	O
+model	O
+and	O
+OS	O
+version	O
+4	O
+reqsmscal.php	B-Indicator
+Exfiltrate	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+5	O
+reqsmscal.php	B-Indicator
+Exfiltrate	O
+default	O
+browser	O
+history	O
+(	O
+limited	O
+to	O
+a	O
+given	O
+date	O
+)	O
+6	O
+reqsmscal.php	B-Indicator
+
+Exfiltrate	O
+Chrome	O
+browser	O
+history	O
+(	O
+limited	O
+to	O
+a	O
+given	O
+date	O
+)	O
+7	O
+reqsmscal.php	B-Indicator
+Exfiltrate	O
+memory	O
+card	O
+file	O
+structure	O
+8	O
+reqsmscal.php	B-Indicator
+Record	O
+surrounding	O
+sound	O
+for	O
+80	O
+seconds	O
+1	O
+reqcalllog.php	B-Indicator
+Exfiltrate	O
+all	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+2	O
+reqcalllog.php	B-Indicator
+Exfiltrate	O
+all	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+3	O
+reqcalllog.php	B-Indicator
+Upload	O
+specified	O
+file	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+4	O
+reqcalllog.php	B-Indicator
+Download	O
+file	O
+from	O
+specified	O
+URL	O
+and	O
+save	O
+on	O
+device	O
+5	O
+reqcalllog.php	B-Indicator
+Delete	O
+specified	O
+file	O
+6,7,8	O
+reqcalllog.php	B-Indicator
+Commands	O
+not	O
+yet	O
+
+implemented	O
+9	O
+reqcalllog.php	B-Indicator
+Take	O
+photo	O
+(	O
+muted	O
+audio	O
+)	O
+with	O
+rear	O
+camera	O
+,	O
+send	O
+to	O
+C2	O
+10	O
+reqcalllog.php	B-Indicator
+Take	O
+photo	O
+(	O
+muted	O
+audio	O
+)	O
+with	O
+front	O
+camera	O
+,	O
+send	O
+to	O
+C2	O
+All	O
+observed	O
+samples	O
+with	O
+Smali	O
+injections	O
+were	O
+signed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+same	O
+debug	O
+certificate	O
+(	O
+0x936eacbe07f201df	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+we	O
+know	O
+from	O
+our	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+traces	O
+of	O
+the	O
+first	O
+development	O
+activities	O
+were	O
+found	O
+at	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+main	O
+distribution	O
+campaign	O
+began	O
+in	O
+2018	O
+(	O
+end	O
+of	O
+2017	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+our	O
+detection	O
+statistics	O
+,	O
+the	O
+main	O
+infection	O
+vector	O
+is	O
+the	O
+spread	O
+of	O
+Trojanized	O
+applications	O
+directly	O
+to	O
+victims	O
+via	O
+Telegram	O
+and	O
+WhatsApp	O
+messengers	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+the	O
+following	O
+relevant	O
+detection	O
+paths	O
+(	O
+the	O
+last	O
+one	O
+is	O
+an	O
+alternative	O
+Telegram	O
+client	O
+–	O
+“	O
+Telegram	O
+X	O
+“	O
+)	O
+:	O
+Name	O
+Detection	O
+path	O
+Sex	O
+Game	O
+For	O
+Adults	O
+18.apk	B-Indicator
+/storage/emulated/0/WhatsApp/Media/WhatsApp	B-Indicator
+Documents/	I-Indicator
+4_6032967490689041387.apk	I-Indicator
+/storage/emulated/0/Telegram/Telegram	I-Indicator
+Documents/	I-Indicator
+Psiphon-v91.apk	B-Indicator
+/storage/emulated/0/Android/data/org.thunderdog.challegram/files/documents/	B-Indicator
+Backdoored	O
+Open	O
+Source	O
+During	O
+the	O
+course	O
+
+of	O
+our	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+we	O
+also	O
+found	O
+samples	O
+sharing	O
+code	O
+with	O
+the	O
+ViceLeaker	B-Malware
+malware	O
+,	O
+in	O
+particular	O
+they	O
+shared	O
+a	O
+delimiter	O
+that	O
+was	O
+used	O
+in	O
+both	O
+cases	O
+to	O
+parse	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+would	O
+be	O
+a	O
+very	O
+unusual	O
+coincidence	O
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+when	O
+a	O
+false	O
+flag	O
+might	O
+also	O
+be	O
+a	O
+possibility	O
+,	O
+we	O
+consider	O
+this	O
+to	O
+be	O
+unlikely	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+samples	O
+sharing	O
+this	O
+overlap	O
+are	O
+modified	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+an	O
+open	O
+source	O
+Jabber/XMPP	B-System
+client	O
+called	O
+“	O
+Conversations	O
+”	O
+with	O
+some	O
+code	O
+additions	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+legitimate	O
+version	O
+of	O
+this	O
+app	O
+is	O
+also	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Conversations	O
+modified	O
+samples	O
+differ	O
+from	O
+the	O
+original	O
+one	O
+in	O
+the	O
+getKnownHosts	O
+method	O
+that	O
+was	O
+modified	O
+to	O
+replace	O
+the	O
+main	O
+XMPP	B-System
+host	O
+with	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+’	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+:	O
+It	O
+appears	O
+that	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+were	O
+using	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+C2	O
+for	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+that	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Another	O
+important	O
+modification	O
+is	O
+in	O
+the	O
+message	O
+transfer	O
+process	O
+:	O
+With	O
+this	O
+modification	O
+,	O
+an	O
+application	O
+sends	O
+device	O
+location	O
+coordinates	O
+with	O
+every	O
+message	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+also	O
+many	O
+other	O
+modifications	O
+,	O
+fully	O
+described	O
+in	O
+our	O
+private	O
+report	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+we	O
+did	O
+not	O
+see	O
+traces	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Smali	O
+injection	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+we	O
+found	O
+traces	O
+of	O
+dx/dexmerge	O
+compilers	O
+,	O
+which	O
+means	O
+that	O
+,	O
+this	O
+time	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+just	O
+imported	O
+the	O
+original	O
+source	O
+code	O
+into	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+IDE	O
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Android	B-System
+Studio	I-System
+,	O
+for	O
+instance	O
+)	O
+and	O
+compiled	O
+it	O
+with	O
+their	O
+own	O
+modifications	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+adding	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+also	O
+changed	O
+the	O
+icon	O
+and	O
+package	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+do	O
+not	O
+know	O
+why	O
+,	O
+but	O
+we	O
+suspect	O
+that	O
+it	O
+was	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+the	O
+origin	O
+of	O
+the	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+Conversations-based	O
+app	O
+mimics	O
+Telegram	B-System
+messenger	I-System
+Even	O
+when	O
+we	O
+originally	O
+thought	O
+this	O
+was	O
+a	O
+backdoored	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Conversations	O
+app	O
+,	O
+used	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+victims	O
+,	O
+we	O
+didn´t	O
+discovered	O
+anything	O
+malicious	O
+in	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+brought	O
+to	O
+us	O
+the	O
+hypothesis	O
+that	O
+this	O
+might	O
+be	O
+a	O
+version	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+group	O
+behind	O
+ViceLeaker	B-Malware
+for	O
+internal	O
+communication	O
+or	O
+for	O
+other	O
+,	O
+unclear	O
+purposes	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+the	O
+detections	O
+of	O
+this	O
+backdoored	O
+app	O
+were	O
+geolocated	O
+in	O
+Iran	O
+.	O
+
+Backdoored	O
+Conversations	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+analysis	O
+During	O
+the	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Smali	O
+injected	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+their	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+infrastructure	O
+we	O
+hadn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+found	O
+any	O
+interesting	O
+clues	O
+,	O
+but	O
+things	O
+changed	O
+when	O
+we	O
+looked	O
+at	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+of	O
+the	O
+linked	O
+Conversations	O
+messenger	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+uses	O
+“	O
+185.51.201	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+133	I-Indicator
+”	O
+as	O
+a	O
+main	O
+C2	O
+address	O
+,	O
+and	O
+there	O
+is	O
+only	O
+one	O
+domain	O
+that	O
+is	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+this	O
+dedicated	O
+server	O
+–	O
+iliageram	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+ir	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Note	O
+that	O
+we	O
+later	O
+found	O
+versions	O
+that	O
+used	O
+the	O
+domain	O
+as	O
+a	O
+C2	O
+directly	O
+instead	O
+of	O
+the	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+record	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+personal	O
+email	O
+address	O
+:	O
+WHOIS	O
+records	O
+of	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+exposing	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+email	O
+address	O
+We	O
+were	O
+aware	O
+of	O
+the	O
+possibility	O
+that	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+might	O
+be	O
+using	O
+a	O
+compromised	O
+email	O
+account	O
+,	O
+so	O
+we	O
+dug	O
+deeper	O
+to	O
+find	O
+more	O
+information	O
+related	O
+to	O
+this	O
+email	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+quick	O
+search	O
+produced	O
+results	O
+about	O
+a	O
+personal	O
+page	O
+and	O
+,	O
+what	O
+is	O
+more	O
+interesting	O
+,	O
+a	O
+GitHub	B-Organization
+account	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+forked	O
+Conversation	O
+repository	O
+.	O
+
+Related	O
+Github	B-Organization
+account	O
+contains	O
+forked	O
+Conversations	O
+repository	O
+Summarizing	O
+all	O
+the	O
+found	O
+clues	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+the	O
+following	O
+attribution	O
+flow	O
+:	O
+Conclusion	O
+The	O
+operation	O
+of	O
+ViceLeaker	B-Malware
+is	O
+still	O
+ongoing	O
+,	O
+as	O
+is	O
+our	O
+research	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attackers	O
+have	O
+taken	O
+down	O
+their	O
+communication	O
+channels	O
+and	O
+are	O
+probably	O
+looking	O
+for	O
+ways	O
+to	O
+assemble	O
+their	O
+tools	O
+in	O
+a	O
+different	O
+manner	O
+.	O
+
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+detects	O
+and	O
+blocks	O
+samples	O
+of	O
+the	O
+ViceLeaker	B-Malware
+operation	O
+using	O
+the	O
+following	O
+verdict	O
+:	O
+Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.ViceLeaker	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+*	I-Indicator
+Actually	O
+,	O
+we	O
+are	O
+currently	O
+investigating	O
+whether	O
+this	O
+group	O
+might	O
+also	O
+be	O
+behind	O
+a	O
+large-scale	O
+web-oriented	O
+attack	O
+at	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+2018	O
+using	O
+code	O
+injection	O
+and	O
+exploiting	O
+SQL	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+when	O
+this	O
+would	O
+not	O
+be	O
+directly	O
+related	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+described	O
+in	O
+this	O
+blogpost	O
+,	O
+it	O
+would	O
+be	O
+an	O
+indicator	O
+of	O
+wider	O
+capabilities	O
+and	O
+objectives	O
+of	O
+this	O
+actor	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+Android	B-System
+Spyware	O
+and	O
+Banking	O
+Trojan	O
+Distributed	O
+via	O
+DNS	O
+Spoofing	O
+We	O
+have	O
+been	O
+detecting	O
+a	O
+new	O
+wave	O
+of	O
+network	O
+attacks	O
+since	O
+early	O
+March	O
+,	O
+which	O
+,	O
+for	O
+now	O
+,	O
+are	O
+targeting	O
+Japan	O
+,	O
+Korea	O
+,	O
+China	O
+,	O
+Taiwan	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Hong	O
+Kong	O
+.	O
+
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+detects	O
+these	O
+as	O
+ANDROIDOS_XLOADER.HRX	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+By	O
+:	O
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+April	O
+20	O
+,	O
+2018	O
+We	O
+have	O
+been	O
+detecting	O
+a	O
+new	O
+wave	O
+of	O
+network	O
+attacks	O
+since	O
+early	O
+March	O
+,	O
+which	O
+,	O
+for	O
+now	O
+,	O
+are	O
+targeting	O
+Japan	O
+,	O
+Korea	O
+,	O
+China	O
+,	O
+Taiwan	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Hong	O
+Kong	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attacks	O
+use	O
+Domain	O
+Name	O
+System	O
+(	O
+DNS	O
+)	O
+cache	O
+poisoning/DNS	O
+spoofing	O
+,	O
+possibly	O
+through	O
+infringement	O
+techniques	O
+such	O
+as	O
+brute-force	O
+or	O
+dictionary	O
+attacks	O
+,	O
+to	O
+distribute	O
+and	O
+install	O
+malicious	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Trend	B-Organization
+Micro	I-Organization
+detects	O
+these	O
+as	O
+ANDROIDOS_XLOADER.HRX	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+These	O
+malware	O
+pose	O
+as	O
+legitimate	O
+Facebook	B-System
+or	O
+Chrome	B-System
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+are	O
+distributed	O
+from	O
+polluted	O
+DNS	O
+domains	O
+that	O
+send	O
+a	O
+notification	O
+to	O
+an	O
+unknowing	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+can	O
+steal	O
+personally	O
+identifiable	O
+and	O
+financial	O
+data	O
+and	O
+install	O
+additional	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+can	O
+also	O
+hijack	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+(	O
+i.e.	O
+,	O
+send	O
+SMSs	O
+)	O
+and	O
+sports	O
+self-protection/persistence	O
+mechanisms	O
+through	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+Infection	O
+Chain	O
+As	O
+with	O
+our	O
+earlier	O
+reports	O
+in	O
+late	O
+March	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attack	O
+chain	O
+involves	O
+diverting	O
+internet	O
+traffic	O
+to	O
+attacker-specified	O
+domains	O
+by	O
+compromising	O
+and	O
+overwriting	O
+the	O
+router	O
+’	O
+s	O
+DNS	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+fake	O
+alert	O
+will	O
+notify	O
+and	O
+urge	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+domain	O
+and	O
+download	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+first	O
+loads	O
+the	O
+encrypted	O
+payload	O
+from	O
+Assets/db	B-Indicator
+as	O
+test.dex	B-Indicator
+to	O
+drop	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+modules	O
+then	O
+requests	O
+for	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+granted	O
+permission	O
+,	O
+it	O
+hides	O
+its	O
+icon	O
+from	O
+the	O
+launcher	O
+application	O
+list	O
+then	O
+starts	O
+a	O
+service	O
+that	O
+it	O
+keeps	O
+running	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+background	O
+service	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+reflection	O
+technique	O
+(	O
+a	O
+feature	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+inspection	O
+and	O
+modification	O
+of	O
+Java-based	O
+programs	O
+’	O
+internal	O
+properties	O
+)	O
+to	O
+invoke	O
+the	O
+method	O
+com.Loader.start	B-Indicator
+in	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+.	O
+
+Monitoring	O
+Broadcast	O
+Events	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+registers	O
+many	O
+broadcast	O
+receivers	O
+in	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+dynamically	O
+(	O
+to	O
+monitor	O
+broadcast	O
+events	O
+sent	O
+between	O
+system	O
+and	O
+applications	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Registering	O
+broadcast	O
+receivers	O
+enable	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+to	O
+trigger	O
+its	O
+malicious	O
+routines	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+is	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+broadcast	O
+actions	O
+:	O
+android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED	B-Indicator
+android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE	B-Indicator
+android.intent.action.BATTERY_CHANGED	B-Indicator
+android.intent.action.USER_PRESENT	B-Indicator
+android.intent.action.PHONE_STATE	B-Indicator
+android.net.wifi.SCAN_RESULTS	B-Indicator
+android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED	B-Indicator
+android.intent.action.PACKAGE_REMOVED	B-Indicator
+android.intent.action.SCREEN_OFF	B-Indicator
+android.intent.action.SCREEN_ON	B-Indicator
+
+android.media.RINGER_MODE_CHANGED	B-Indicator
+android.sms.msg.action.SMS_SEND	B-Indicator
+android.sms.msg.action.SMS_DELIVERED	B-Indicator
+Creating	O
+a	O
+Web	O
+Server	O
+to	O
+Phish	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+creates	O
+a	O
+provisional	O
+web	O
+server	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+the	O
+broadcast	O
+events	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+can	O
+also	O
+create	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+HTTP	O
+server	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+to	O
+deceive	O
+victims	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+web	O
+phishing	O
+page	O
+whenever	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+receives	O
+a	O
+broadcast	O
+event	O
+(	O
+i.e.	O
+,	O
+if	O
+a	O
+new	O
+package	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+or	O
+if	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+screen	O
+is	O
+on	O
+)	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+personal	O
+data	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+those	O
+keyed	O
+in	O
+for	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+phishing	O
+page	O
+is	O
+translated	O
+in	O
+Korean	O
+,	O
+Japanese	O
+,	O
+Chinese	O
+,	O
+and	O
+English	O
+,	O
+which	O
+are	O
+hardcoded	O
+in	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+will	O
+appear	O
+differently	O
+to	O
+users	O
+depending	O
+on	O
+the	O
+language	O
+set	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+as	O
+Spyware	O
+and	O
+Banking	O
+Trojan	O
+XLoader	B-Indicator
+can	O
+also	O
+collect	O
+information	O
+related	O
+to	O
+usage	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Its	O
+data-stealing	O
+capabilities	O
+include	O
+collecting	O
+SMSs	O
+after	O
+receiving	O
+an	O
+SMS-related	O
+broadcast	O
+event	O
+and	O
+covertly	O
+recording	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+can	O
+also	O
+hijack	O
+accounts	O
+linked	O
+to	O
+financial	O
+or	O
+game-related	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+can	O
+also	O
+start	O
+other	O
+attacker-specified	O
+packages	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+possible	O
+attack	O
+scenario	O
+involves	O
+replacing	O
+legitimate	O
+apps	O
+with	O
+repackaged	O
+or	O
+malicious	O
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+monitoring	O
+the	O
+package	O
+installation	O
+broadcast	O
+event	O
+,	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+can	O
+start	O
+their	O
+packages	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+enables	O
+it	O
+to	O
+launch	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+without	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+awareness	O
+and	O
+explicit	O
+consent	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+reverse	O
+engineered	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+and	O
+found	O
+that	O
+it	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+target	O
+South	O
+Korea-based	O
+banks	O
+and	O
+game	O
+development	O
+companies	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+also	O
+prevents	O
+victims	O
+from	O
+accessing	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+settings	O
+or	O
+using	O
+a	O
+known	O
+antivirus	O
+(	O
+AV	O
+)	O
+app	O
+in	O
+the	O
+country	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+can	O
+also	O
+load	O
+multiple	O
+malicious	O
+modules	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+and	O
+execute	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+its	O
+remote	O
+command-and-control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+below	O
+:	O
+Here	O
+’	O
+s	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+the	O
+modules	O
+and	O
+their	O
+functions	O
+:	O
+sendSms	O
+—	O
+send	O
+SMS/MMS	O
+to	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+address	O
+setWifi	O
+—	O
+enable	O
+or	O
+disable	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+connection	O
+gcont	O
+—	O
+collect	O
+all	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+contacts	O
+lock	O
+—	O
+currently	O
+just	O
+an	O
+input	O
+lock	O
+status	O
+in	O
+the	O
+settings	O
+(	O
+pref	O
+)	O
+file	O
+,	O
+but	O
+may	O
+be	O
+used	O
+as	O
+a	O
+screenlocking	O
+ransomware	O
+bc	O
+—	O
+collect	O
+all	O
+contacts	O
+
+from	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+and	O
+SIM	O
+card	O
+setForward	O
+—	O
+currently	O
+not	O
+implemented	O
+,	O
+but	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+hijack	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+getForward	O
+—	O
+currently	O
+not	O
+implemented	O
+,	O
+but	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+hijack	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+hasPkg	O
+—	O
+check	O
+the	O
+device	O
+whether	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+app	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+or	O
+not	O
+setRingerMode	O
+—	O
+set	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+ringer	O
+mode	O
+setRecEnable	O
+—	O
+set	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+ringer	O
+mode	O
+as	O
+silent	O
+reqState	O
+—	O
+get	O
+a	O
+detailed	O
+phone	O
+connection	O
+status	O
+,	O
+which	O
+includes	O
+activated	O
+network	O
+and	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+(	O
+with	O
+or	O
+without	O
+password	O
+)	O
+showHome	O
+—	O
+
+force	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+home	O
+screen	O
+getnpki	O
+:	O
+get	O
+files/content	O
+from	O
+the	O
+folder	O
+named	O
+NPKI	O
+(	O
+contains	O
+certificates	O
+related	O
+to	O
+financial	O
+transactions	O
+)	O
+http	O
+—	O
+access	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+network	O
+using	O
+HttpURLConnection	O
+onRecordAction	O
+—	O
+simulate	O
+a	O
+number-dialed	O
+tone	O
+call	O
+—	O
+call	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+number	O
+get_apps	O
+—	O
+get	O
+all	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+show_fs_float_window	O
+—	O
+show	O
+a	O
+full-screen	O
+window	O
+for	O
+phishing	O
+Of	O
+note	O
+is	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+abuse	O
+of	O
+the	O
+WebSocket	O
+protocol	O
+(	O
+supported	O
+in	O
+many	O
+browsers	O
+
+and	O
+web	O
+applications	O
+)	O
+via	O
+ws	O
+(	O
+WebSockets	O
+)	O
+or	O
+wss	O
+(	O
+WebSockets	O
+over	O
+SSL/TLS	O
+)	O
+to	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+its	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+servers	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+URLs	O
+—	O
+abused	O
+as	O
+part	O
+of	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+—	O
+are	O
+hidden	O
+in	O
+three	O
+webpages	O
+,	O
+and	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+that	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+connects	O
+to	O
+differ	O
+per	O
+region	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+abuse	O
+of	O
+the	O
+WebSocket	O
+protocol	O
+provides	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+with	O
+a	O
+persistent	O
+connection	O
+between	O
+clients	O
+and	O
+servers	O
+where	O
+data	O
+can	O
+be	O
+transported	O
+any	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+XLoader	B-Malware
+abuses	O
+the	O
+MessagePack	O
+(	O
+a	O
+data	O
+interchange	O
+format	O
+)	O
+to	O
+package	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+and	O
+exfiltrate	O
+it	O
+via	O
+the	O
+WebSocket	O
+protocol	O
+for	O
+faster	O
+and	O
+more	O
+efficient	O
+transmission	O
+.	O
+
+Mitigations	O
+XLoader	B-Malware
+will	O
+not	O
+download	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+if	O
+the	O
+Android	O
+device	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+data	O
+connection	O
+.	O
+
+Nevertheless	O
+,	O
+users	O
+should	O
+practice	O
+proper	O
+security	O
+hygiene	O
+to	O
+mitigate	O
+threats	O
+that	O
+may	O
+take	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+a	O
+home	O
+or	O
+business	O
+router	O
+’	O
+s	O
+security	O
+gaps	O
+.	O
+
+Employ	O
+stronger	O
+credentials	O
+,	O
+for	O
+instance	O
+,	O
+to	O
+make	O
+them	O
+less	O
+susceptible	O
+to	O
+unauthorized	O
+access	O
+.	O
+
+Regularly	O
+update	O
+and	O
+patch	O
+the	O
+router	O
+’	O
+s	O
+software	O
+and	O
+firmware	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+exploits	O
+,	O
+and	O
+enable	O
+its	O
+built-in	O
+firewall	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+system	O
+administrators	O
+and	O
+information	O
+security	O
+professionals	O
+,	O
+configuring	O
+the	O
+router	O
+to	O
+be	O
+more	O
+resistant	O
+to	O
+attacks	O
+like	O
+DNS	O
+cache	O
+poisoning	O
+can	O
+help	O
+mitigate	O
+similar	O
+threats	O
+.	O
+
+Everyday	O
+users	O
+can	O
+do	O
+the	O
+same	O
+by	O
+checking	O
+the	O
+router	O
+’	O
+s	O
+DNS	O
+settings	O
+if	O
+they	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+been	O
+modified	O
+.	O
+
+Even	O
+threats	O
+like	O
+DNS	O
+cache	O
+poisoning	O
+employ	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+,	O
+so	O
+users	O
+should	O
+also	O
+be	O
+more	O
+prudent	O
+against	O
+suspicious	O
+or	O
+unknown	O
+messages	O
+that	O
+have	O
+telltale	O
+signs	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+worked	O
+with	O
+Google	B-Organization
+and	O
+they	O
+ensure	O
+that	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Protect	I-System
+proactively	O
+catches	O
+apps	O
+of	O
+this	O
+nature	O
+.	O
+
+No	O
+instances	O
+of	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+were	O
+found	O
+in	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+September	O
+08	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+TikTok	B-System
+Spyware	O
+A	O
+detailed	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+spyware	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+TikTok	B-System
+A	O
+recent	O
+threat	O
+to	O
+ban	O
+TikTok	B-System
+in	O
+the	O
+United	O
+States	O
+has	O
+taken	O
+the	O
+internet	O
+by	O
+storm	O
+and	O
+received	O
+mixed	O
+reactions	O
+from	O
+social	O
+media	O
+and	O
+internet	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+U.S.	O
+President	O
+Donald	O
+Trump	O
+has	O
+ordered	O
+ByteDance	B-Organization
+,	O
+the	O
+parent	O
+company	O
+of	O
+TikTok	B-System
+,	O
+to	O
+sell	O
+its	O
+U.S.	O
+TikTok	B-System
+assets	O
+and	O
+also	O
+issued	O
+executive	O
+orders	O
+that	O
+would	O
+ban	O
+the	O
+social	O
+media	O
+apps	O
+TikTok	B-System
+and	O
+WeChat	B-System
+from	O
+operating	O
+in	O
+the	O
+U.S.	O
+if	O
+the	O
+sale	O
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+happen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+next	O
+few	O
+weeks	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+the	O
+other	O
+side	O
+,	O
+ByteDance	B-Organization
+has	O
+filed	O
+a	O
+lawsuit	O
+suing	O
+the	O
+Trump	O
+administration	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+popular	O
+applications	O
+come	O
+under	O
+fire	O
+and	O
+are	O
+featured	O
+prominently	O
+in	O
+the	O
+news	O
+,	O
+hackers	O
+get	O
+excited	O
+as	O
+these	O
+newsworthy	O
+apps	O
+can	O
+become	O
+their	O
+latest	O
+target	O
+.	O
+
+And	O
+TikTok	B-System
+is	O
+no	O
+exception	O
+.	O
+
+Generally	O
+,	O
+after	O
+an	O
+application	O
+gets	O
+banned	O
+from	O
+an	O
+official	O
+app	O
+store	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+users	O
+try	O
+to	O
+find	O
+alternative	O
+ways	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+doing	O
+so	O
+,	O
+users	O
+can	O
+become	O
+victims	O
+to	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+portraying	O
+themselves	O
+as	O
+the	O
+original	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Recently	O
+there	O
+was	O
+a	O
+huge	O
+wave	O
+of	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+Whatsapp	B-System
+messages	O
+,	O
+making	O
+the	O
+rounds	O
+asking	O
+users	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+of	O
+TikTok	B-System
+at	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//tiny	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cc/TiktokPro	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+In	O
+reality	O
+,	O
+this	O
+downloaded	O
+app	O
+is	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+app	O
+that	O
+asks	O
+for	O
+credentials	O
+and	O
+Android	B-System
+permissions	O
+(	O
+including	O
+camera	O
+and	O
+phone	O
+permissions	O
+)	O
+,	O
+resulting	O
+in	O
+the	O
+user	O
+being	O
+bombarded	O
+with	O
+advertisements	O
+.	O
+
+Recently	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+come	O
+across	O
+another	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+this	O
+app	O
+portraying	O
+itself	O
+as	O
+TikTok	B-System
+Pro	I-System
+,	O
+but	O
+this	O
+is	O
+a	O
+full-fledged	O
+spyware	O
+with	O
+premium	O
+features	O
+to	O
+spy	O
+on	O
+victim	O
+with	O
+ease	O
+.	O
+
+(	O
+Please	O
+note	O
+this	O
+is	O
+a	O
+different	O
+app	O
+and	O
+not	O
+the	O
+same	O
+as	O
+the	O
+one	O
+being	O
+spread	O
+by	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//tiny	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+cc/TiktokPro	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+)	I-Indicator
+Technical	O
+Analysis	O
+App	O
+Name	O
+:	O
+TikTok	B-System
+Pro	I-System
+Hash	O
+:	O
+9fed52ee7312e217bd10d6a156c8b988	B-Indicator
+Package	O
+Name	O
+:	O
+com.example.dat.a8andoserverx	B-Indicator
+Upon	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+portrays	O
+itself	O
+as	O
+TikTok	B-System
+using	O
+the	O
+name	O
+TikTok	B-System
+Pro	I-System
+.	O
+
+As	O
+soon	O
+as	O
+a	O
+user	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+open	O
+the	O
+app	O
+,	O
+it	O
+launches	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+notification	O
+and	O
+soon	O
+the	O
+notification	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+the	O
+app	O
+icon	O
+disappears	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+fake	O
+notification	O
+tactic	O
+is	O
+used	O
+to	O
+redirect	O
+the	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+attention	O
+,	O
+meanwhile	O
+the	O
+app	O
+hides	O
+itself	O
+,	O
+making	O
+the	O
+user	O
+believe	O
+the	O
+app	O
+to	O
+be	O
+faulty	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+functionality	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+1	O
+.	O
+
+App	O
+Icon	O
+Figure	O
+1	O
+:	O
+App	O
+icon	O
+and	O
+fake	O
+notification	O
+.	O
+
+Behind	O
+the	O
+scenes	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+number	O
+of	O
+process	O
+occurring	O
+simultaneously	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+an	O
+activity	O
+named	O
+MainActivity	O
+fires	O
+up	O
+,	O
+taking	O
+care	O
+of	O
+hiding	O
+the	O
+icon	O
+and	O
+showing	O
+the	O
+fake	O
+notification	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+also	O
+starts	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+service	O
+named	O
+MainService	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+spyware	O
+also	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+have	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+payload	O
+stored	O
+under	O
+the	O
+/res/raw/	O
+directory	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+common	O
+technique	O
+used	O
+by	O
+malware	O
+developers	O
+to	O
+bundle	O
+the	O
+main	O
+payload	O
+inside	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+package	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+easy	O
+detection	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+2	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+open	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+from	O
+the	O
+/res/raw/	O
+directory	O
+and	O
+generate	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+Android	B-System
+Package	I-System
+Kit	I-System
+(	O
+APK	O
+)	O
+named	O
+.app.apk	B-Indicator
+:	O
+Decoy	O
+Code	O
+Figure	O
+2	O
+:	O
+The	O
+decoy	O
+code	O
+for	O
+the	O
+fake	O
+TikTok	B-System
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+that	O
+this	O
+is	O
+a	O
+decoy	O
+functionality	O
+and	O
+no	O
+new	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+generated	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+conditions	O
+to	O
+build	O
+an	O
+additional	O
+payload	O
+are	O
+never	O
+met	O
+.	O
+
+Going	O
+one	O
+step	O
+further	O
+,	O
+we	O
+rebuilt	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+apparent	O
+functionality	O
+of	O
+generating	O
+a	O
+payload	O
+,	O
+but	O
+discovered	O
+that	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+/res/raw/	O
+directory	O
+is	O
+empty	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+placement	O
+of	O
+the	O
+decoy	O
+functionality	O
+is	O
+likely	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+confuse	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+researchers	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+also	O
+possible	O
+that	O
+this	O
+functionality	O
+is	O
+under	O
+development	O
+,	O
+making	O
+this	O
+placeholder	O
+code	O
+incomplete	O
+.	O
+
+Coming	O
+back	O
+to	O
+the	O
+execution	O
+flow	O
+,	O
+once	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+hides	O
+itself	O
+,	O
+it	O
+starts	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+service	O
+named	O
+MainService	O
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+services	O
+are	O
+components	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+made	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+independently	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+without	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+knowledge	O
+.	O
+
+MainService	O
+is	O
+the	O
+brain	O
+of	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+and	O
+controls	O
+almost	O
+everything—from	O
+stealing	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+data	O
+to	O
+deleting	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+its	O
+capabilities	O
+are	O
+discussed	O
+later	O
+in	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+.	O
+
+Hide	O
+Icon	O
+Figure	O
+3	O
+:	O
+Code	O
+showing	O
+the	O
+hiding	O
+icon	O
+and	O
+starting	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+MainService	O
+is	O
+the	O
+main	O
+controller	O
+,	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+has	O
+taken	O
+the	O
+appropriate	O
+actions	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+it	O
+functional	O
+and	O
+running	O
+at	O
+all	O
+times	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+developer	O
+uses	O
+various	O
+tactics	O
+to	O
+do	O
+so	O
+,	O
+and	O
+one	O
+of	O
+them	O
+is	O
+using	O
+Android	B-System
+'s	O
+broadcast	O
+receivers	O
+.	O
+
+Broadcast	O
+receivers	O
+are	O
+components	O
+that	O
+allow	O
+you	O
+to	O
+register	O
+for	O
+various	O
+Android	B-System
+events	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+it	O
+registers	O
+three	O
+broadcast	O
+receivers	O
+:	O
+MyReceiver	O
+-	O
+Triggers	O
+when	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+booted	O
+.	O
+
+Intercept	O
+Call	O
+-	O
+Triggers	O
+on	O
+incoming	O
+and	O
+outgoing	O
+calls	O
+.	O
+
+AlarmReceiver	O
+-	O
+Triggers	O
+every	O
+three	O
+minutes	O
+.	O
+
+MyReceiver	O
+and	O
+AlarmReceiver	O
+start	O
+the	O
+MainService	O
+whenever	O
+appropriate	O
+events	O
+occur	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+tactic	O
+is	O
+very	O
+common	O
+among	O
+malware	O
+developers	O
+to	O
+ensure	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+not	O
+killed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+OS	O
+or	O
+by	O
+any	O
+other	O
+means	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+4	O
+shows	O
+MyReceiver	O
+in	O
+action	O
+where	O
+it	O
+eventually	O
+calls	O
+the	O
+MainService	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Broadcast	O
+Receiver	O
+Figure	O
+4	O
+:	O
+MyReceiver	O
+broadcast	O
+receiver	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+InterceptCall	O
+receiver	O
+is	O
+triggered	O
+whenever	O
+there	O
+is	O
+an	O
+incoming	O
+or	O
+outgoing	O
+call	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+sets	O
+particular	O
+parameters	O
+in	O
+relation	O
+to	O
+call	O
+details	O
+and	O
+a	O
+further	O
+service	O
+named	O
+calls	O
+takes	O
+the	O
+control	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+.	O
+
+Call	O
+Service	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+:	O
+Code	O
+for	O
+the	O
+calls	O
+service	O
+As	O
+seen	O
+above	O
+,	O
+the	O
+calls	O
+service	O
+stores	O
+incoming	O
+call	O
+details	O
+in	O
+.mp3	O
+format	O
+in	O
+the	O
+/sdcard/DCIM/.dat/	O
+directory	O
+with	O
+file	O
+name	O
+appended	O
+with	O
+"	O
+In_	O
+''	O
+for	O
+incoming	O
+calls	O
+and	O
+"	O
+Out_	O
+''	O
+for	O
+outgoing	O
+calls	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+these	O
+recorded	O
+calls	O
+are	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+server	O
+(	O
+CnC	O
+)	O
+is	O
+taken	O
+care	O
+of	O
+by	O
+MainService	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+discussed	O
+next	O
+.	O
+
+MainService	O
+is	O
+the	O
+central	O
+controller	O
+of	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+controls	O
+each	O
+and	O
+every	O
+functionality	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+soon	O
+as	O
+this	O
+service	O
+is	O
+started	O
+,	O
+it	O
+creates	O
+two	O
+processes	O
+that	O
+take	O
+care	O
+of	O
+connection	O
+and	O
+disconnection	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+functionality	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+6	O
+.	O
+
+TimerTask	O
+Figure	O
+6	O
+:	O
+The	O
+timer	O
+task	O
+.	O
+
+MainService	O
+has	O
+the	O
+following	O
+capabilities	O
+:	O
+Steal	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+Send	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+Steal	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+location	O
+Capture	O
+photos	O
+Execute	O
+commands	O
+Capture	O
+screenshots	O
+Call	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+Initiate	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+Steal	O
+Facebook	B-System
+credentials	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+All	O
+of	O
+the	O
+above	O
+functionalities	O
+take	O
+place	O
+on	O
+the	O
+basis	O
+of	O
+commands	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+.	O
+
+Stolen	O
+data	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+under	O
+the	O
+/DCIM/	O
+directory	O
+with	O
+a	O
+hidden	O
+sub-directory	O
+named	O
+"	O
+.dat	O
+''	O
+.	O
+
+Below	O
+is	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+catered	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Command	O
+Action	O
+Unistxcr	O
+Restart	O
+the	O
+app	O
+dowsizetr	O
+Send	O
+the	O
+file	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+/sdcard/DCIM/.dat/	O
+directory	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+Caspylistx	O
+Get	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+hidden	O
+files	O
+in	O
+the	O
+/DCIM/.dat/	O
+directory	O
+spxcheck	O
+Check	O
+whether	O
+call	O
+details	O
+are	O
+collected	O
+by	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+S8p8y0	O
+Delete	O
+call	O
+details	O
+stored	O
+by	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+screXmex	O
+Take	O
+screenshots	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+screen	O
+Batrxiops	O
+Check	O
+battery	O
+status	O
+L4oclOCMAWS	O
+Fetch	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+location	O
+GUIFXB	O
+Launch	O
+
+the	O
+fake	O
+Facebook	B-System
+login	O
+page	O
+IODBSSUEEZ	O
+Send	O
+a	O
+file	O
+containing	O
+stolen	O
+Facebook	B-System
+credentials	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+FdelSRRT	O
+Delete	O
+files	O
+containing	O
+stolen	O
+Facebook	B-System
+credentials	O
+chkstzeaw	O
+Launch	O
+Facebook	B-System
+LUNAPXER	O
+Launch	O
+apps	O
+according	O
+to	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+Gapxplister	O
+Get	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+DOTRall8xxe	O
+Zip	O
+all	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+files	O
+and	O
+store	O
+in	O
+the	O
+/DCIM/.dat/	O
+directory	O
+Acouxacour	O
+Get	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+accounts	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+device	O
+Fimxmiisx	O
+Open	O
+the	O
+camera	O
+
+Scxreexcv4	O
+Capture	O
+an	O
+image	O
+micmokmi8x	O
+Capture	O
+audio	O
+Yufsssp	O
+Get	O
+latitude	O
+and	O
+longitude	O
+GExCaalsss7	O
+Get	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+PHOCAs7	O
+Call	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+Gxextsxms	O
+Get	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+inbox	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+Msppossag	O
+Send	O
+SMS	O
+with	O
+message	O
+body	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+Getconstactx	O
+Get	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+contacts	O
+Rinxgosa	O
+Play	O
+a	O
+ringtone	O
+bithsssp64	O
+Execute	O
+commands	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+DOWdeletx	O
+Deletes	O
+
+the	O
+file	O
+specified	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+Deldatall8	O
+Delete	O
+all	O
+files	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+the	O
+/sdcard/DCIM/.dat/	O
+directory	O
+We	O
+do	O
+n't	O
+have	O
+the	O
+space	O
+to	O
+cover	O
+all	O
+of	O
+the	O
+commands	O
+,	O
+but	O
+let	O
+'s	O
+take	O
+a	O
+look	O
+at	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+major	O
+ones	O
+.	O
+
+Facebook	B-System
+phishing	O
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+interesting	O
+features	O
+of	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+is	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+Facebook	B-System
+credentials	O
+using	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+login	O
+page	O
+,	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+phishing	O
+.	O
+
+Upon	O
+receiving	O
+the	O
+command	O
+GUIFXB	O
+,	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+launches	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+Facebook	B-System
+login	O
+page	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+soon	O
+as	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+log	O
+in	O
+,	O
+it	O
+stores	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+credentials	O
+in	O
+/storage/0/DCIM/.fdat	O
+Facebook	B-System
+Login	O
+Figure	O
+7	O
+:	O
+Fake	O
+Facebook	B-System
+login	O
+The	O
+second	O
+command	O
+is	O
+IODBSSUEEZ	O
+,	O
+which	O
+further	O
+sends	O
+stolen	O
+credentials	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+8	O
+.	O
+
+Stolen	O
+Data	O
+Figure	O
+8	O
+:	O
+Sending	O
+data	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+functionality	O
+can	O
+be	O
+easily	O
+further	O
+extended	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+other	O
+information	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+bank	O
+credentials	O
+,	O
+although	O
+we	O
+did	O
+not	O
+see	O
+any	O
+banks	O
+being	O
+targeted	O
+in	O
+this	O
+attack	O
+.	O
+
+Calling	O
+functionality	O
+Command	O
+PHOCAs7	O
+initiates	O
+calling	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+number	O
+to	O
+call	O
+is	O
+received	O
+along	O
+with	O
+the	O
+command	O
+,	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+9	O
+.	O
+
+Call	O
+Command	O
+Figure	O
+9	O
+:	O
+The	O
+calling	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+is	O
+fetched	O
+from	O
+a	O
+response	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+and	O
+is	O
+stored	O
+in	O
+str3	O
+variable	O
+,	O
+which	O
+further	O
+is	O
+utilized	O
+using	O
+the	O
+tel	O
+:	O
+function	O
+.	O
+
+Stealing	O
+SMS	O
+The	O
+Gxextsxms	O
+command	O
+is	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+fetching	O
+all	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+device	O
+and	O
+sending	O
+it	O
+over	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Stealing	O
+SMS	O
+Figure	O
+10	O
+:	O
+Stealing	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Similarly	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+many	O
+crucial	O
+commands	O
+that	O
+further	O
+allow	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+additional	O
+functionality	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+executing	O
+commands	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+clicking	O
+photos	O
+,	O
+capturing	O
+screenshots	O
+,	O
+stealing	O
+location	O
+information	O
+,	O
+and	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+Further	O
+analysis	O
+Upon	O
+further	O
+research	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+to	O
+be	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+framework	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+Spynote	B-Malware
+and	O
+Spymax	B-Malware
+,	O
+meaning	O
+this	O
+could	O
+be	O
+an	O
+updated	O
+version	O
+of	O
+these	O
+Trojan	O
+builders	O
+,	O
+which	O
+allow	O
+anyone	O
+,	O
+even	O
+with	O
+limited	O
+knowledge	O
+,	O
+to	O
+develop	O
+full-fledged	O
+spyware	O
+.	O
+
+Many	O
+of	O
+the	O
+functionalities	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+are	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+Spynote	B-Malware
+and	O
+Spymax	B-Malware
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+samples	O
+we	O
+analyzed	O
+with	O
+some	O
+modifications	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+spyware	O
+sample	O
+communicates	O
+over	O
+dynamic	O
+DNS	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+doing	O
+so	O
+,	O
+attackers	O
+can	O
+easily	O
+set	O
+up	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+to	O
+communicate	O
+back	O
+to	O
+them	O
+without	O
+any	O
+need	O
+for	O
+high-end	O
+servers	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+common	O
+functionalities	O
+include	O
+executing	O
+commands	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+,	O
+taking	O
+screenshots	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+'s	O
+device	O
+,	O
+fetching	O
+locations	O
+,	O
+stealing	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+most	O
+common	O
+features	O
+that	O
+every	O
+spyware	O
+may	O
+poses	O
+.	O
+
+Stealing	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+credentials	O
+using	O
+fake	O
+Facebook	B-Organization
+activity	O
+is	O
+something	O
+we	O
+did	O
+n't	O
+observe	O
+in	O
+Spynote/Spymax	B-Malware
+versions	O
+but	O
+was	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+framework	O
+allows	O
+anyone	O
+to	O
+develop	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+with	O
+the	O
+desired	O
+icon	O
+and	O
+communication	O
+address	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+icons	O
+used	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+found	O
+280	O
+such	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+the	O
+past	O
+three	O
+months	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+complete	O
+list	O
+of	O
+hashes	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+icons	O
+Figure	O
+11	O
+:	O
+Icons	O
+used	O
+to	O
+pose	O
+as	O
+famous	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+same	O
+framework	O
+and	O
+hence	O
+have	O
+the	O
+same	O
+package	O
+name	O
+and	O
+certificate	O
+information	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+12.	O
+certificate	O
+Figure	O
+12	O
+:	O
+Package	O
+name	O
+and	O
+certificate	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+Due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+ubiquitous	O
+nature	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+the	O
+widespread	O
+use	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+very	O
+easy	O
+for	O
+attackers	O
+to	O
+victimize	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+such	O
+situations	O
+,	O
+mobile	O
+users	O
+should	O
+always	O
+take	O
+the	O
+utmost	O
+precautions	O
+while	O
+downloading	O
+any	O
+applications	O
+from	O
+the	O
+internet	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+very	O
+easy	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+victims	O
+to	O
+fall	O
+for	O
+such	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+Users	O
+looking	O
+forward	O
+to	O
+using	O
+the	O
+TikTok	B-System
+app	O
+amidst	O
+the	O
+ban	O
+might	O
+look	O
+for	O
+alternative	O
+methods	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+doing	O
+so	O
+,	O
+users	O
+can	O
+mistakenly	O
+install	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+mentioned	O
+in	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+precautions	O
+you	O
+take	O
+online	O
+have	O
+been	O
+covered	O
+extensively	O
+in	O
+almost	O
+all	O
+of	O
+our	O
+blogs	O
+;	O
+even	O
+so	O
+,	O
+we	O
+believe	O
+this	O
+information	O
+bears	O
+repeating	O
+.	O
+
+Please	O
+follow	O
+these	O
+basic	O
+precautions	O
+during	O
+the	O
+current	O
+crisis—and	O
+at	O
+all	O
+times	O
+:	O
+Install	O
+apps	O
+only	O
+from	O
+official	O
+stores	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+Never	O
+click	O
+on	O
+unknown	O
+links	O
+received	O
+through	O
+ads	O
+,	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+emails	O
+,	O
+or	O
+the	O
+like	O
+.	O
+
+Always	O
+keep	O
+the	O
+"	O
+Unknown	O
+Sources	O
+''	O
+option	O
+disabled	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+disallows	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+be	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+your	O
+device	O
+from	O
+unknown	O
+sources	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+would	O
+also	O
+like	O
+to	O
+mention	O
+that	O
+if	O
+you	O
+come	O
+across	O
+an	O
+app	O
+hiding	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+icon	O
+,	O
+always	O
+try	O
+to	O
+search	O
+for	O
+the	O
+app	O
+in	O
+your	O
+device	O
+settings	O
+(	O
+by	O
+going	O
+to	O
+Settings	O
+-	O
+>	O
+Apps	O
+-	O
+>	O
+Search	O
+for	O
+icon	O
+that	O
+was	O
+hidden	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+case	O
+of	O
+this	O
+spyware	O
+,	O
+search	O
+for	O
+app	O
+named	O
+TikTok	B-System
+Pro	I-System
+.	O
+
+MITRE	B-Organization
+TAGS	O
+Action	O
+Tag	O
+ID	O
+App	O
+auto-start	O
+at	O
+device	O
+boot	O
+T1402	O
+Input	O
+prompt	O
+T1411	O
+Capture	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+T1412	O
+Application	O
+discovery	O
+T1418	O
+Capture	O
+audio	O
+T1429	O
+Location	O
+tracking	O
+T1430	O
+Access	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+T1432	O
+Access	O
+call	O
+log	O
+T1433	O
+Commonly	O
+used	O
+port	O
+T1436	O
+Standard	O
+application	O
+layer	O
+protocol	O
+T1437	O
+Masquerage	O
+as	O
+legitimate	O
+application	O
+T1444	O
+Suppress	O
+application	O
+icon	O
+T1508	O
+Capture	O
+camera	O
+T1512	O
+Screen	O
+capture	O
+T1513	O
+Foreground	O
+persistence	O
+T1541	O
+DualToy	B-Malware
+:	O
+New	O
+Windows	B-System
+Trojan	O
+Sideloads	O
+Risky	O
+Apps	O
+to	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+Devices	O
+
+By	O
+Claud	O
+Xiao	O
+September	O
+13	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+at	O
+5:00	O
+AM	O
+Over	O
+the	O
+past	O
+two	O
+years	O
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+observed	O
+many	O
+cases	O
+of	O
+Microsoft	B-System
+Windows	I-System
+and	O
+Apple	B-System
+iOS	I-System
+malware	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+attack	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+attack	O
+vector	O
+is	O
+increasingly	O
+popular	O
+with	O
+malicious	O
+actors	O
+as	O
+almost	O
+everyone	O
+on	O
+the	O
+planet	O
+carries	O
+at	O
+least	O
+one	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+they	O
+interact	O
+with	O
+throughout	O
+any	O
+given	O
+day	O
+.	O
+
+Thanks	O
+to	O
+a	O
+relative	O
+lack	O
+of	O
+security	O
+controls	O
+applied	O
+to	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+these	O
+devices	O
+have	O
+become	O
+very	O
+attractive	O
+targets	O
+for	O
+a	O
+broad	O
+range	O
+of	O
+malicious	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+:	O
+WireLurker	B-Malware
+installed	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+non-jailbroken	O
+iPhones	O
+Six	O
+different	O
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+Adware	O
+and	O
+HackTool	B-Malware
+families	I-Malware
+launched	O
+“	O
+BackStab	O
+”	O
+attacks	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+backup	O
+archives	O
+of	O
+iOS	B-System
+and	O
+BlackBerry	B-System
+devices	O
+The	O
+HackingTeam	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+RCS	B-Malware
+delivered	O
+its	O
+Spyware	O
+from	O
+infected	O
+PCs	O
+and	O
+Macs	O
+to	O
+jailbroken	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+and	O
+BlackBerry	B-System
+phones	O
+Recently	O
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+another	O
+Windows	B-System
+Trojan	O
+we	O
+named	O
+“	O
+DualToy	B-Malware
+”	O
+which	O
+side	O
+loads	O
+malicious	O
+or	O
+risky	O
+apps	O
+to	O
+both	O
+Android	B-System
+and	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+via	O
+a	O
+USB	B-System
+connection	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+DualToy	B-Malware
+began	O
+to	O
+spread	O
+in	O
+January	O
+2015	O
+,	O
+it	O
+was	O
+only	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+infecting	O
+Android	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+within	O
+six	O
+months	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+actors	O
+added	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+infect	O
+iOS	B-System
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+DualToy	B-Malware
+is	O
+still	O
+active	O
+and	O
+we	O
+have	O
+detected	O
+over	O
+8,000	O
+unique	O
+samples	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+this	O
+Trojan	O
+family	O
+to	O
+date	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+mainly	O
+targets	O
+Chinese	O
+users	O
+,	O
+but	O
+has	O
+also	O
+successfully	O
+affected	O
+people	O
+and	O
+organizations	O
+in	O
+the	O
+United	O
+States	O
+,	O
+United	O
+Kingdom	O
+,	O
+Thailand	O
+,	O
+Spain	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Ireland	O
+.	O
+
+Credential	O
+phishing	O
+and	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+combine	O
+in	O
+Austrian	O
+mobile	O
+attacks	O
+NOVEMBER	O
+03	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+Overview	O
+Credential	O
+phishing	O
+,	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+,	O
+and	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+phishing	O
+schemes	O
+are	O
+common	O
+threats	O
+that	O
+we	O
+regularly	O
+observe	O
+both	O
+at	O
+scale	O
+and	O
+in	O
+more	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+Proofpoint	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+recently	O
+observed	O
+phishing	O
+attacks	O
+that	O
+incorporate	O
+all	O
+of	O
+these	O
+elements	O
+in	O
+a	O
+single	O
+,	O
+multistep	O
+scheme	O
+involving	O
+the	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+Android	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+targeting	O
+customers	O
+of	O
+large	O
+Austrian	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+Attacks	O
+involving	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+have	O
+become	O
+increasingly	O
+sophisticated	O
+,	O
+with	O
+documented	O
+cases	O
+involving	O
+multiple	O
+attack	O
+vectors	O
+and	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+financial	O
+services	O
+and	O
+communication	O
+platforms	O
+[	O
+1	O
+]	O
+[	O
+2	O
+]	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+a	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+has	O
+been	O
+targeting	O
+customers	O
+of	O
+Bank	O
+Austria	O
+,	O
+Raiffeisen	O
+Meine	O
+Bank	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Sparkasse	O
+since	O
+at	O
+least	O
+January	O
+2017	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attacks	O
+described	O
+here	O
+begin	O
+with	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+credential	O
+phishing	O
+scheme	O
+,	O
+followed	O
+by	O
+an	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+into	O
+installing	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+finally	O
+with	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+information	O
+by	O
+the	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+itself	O
+.	O
+
+Analysis	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+is	O
+frequently	O
+distributed	O
+via	O
+SMS	O
+,	O
+but	O
+in	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+victims	O
+are	O
+presented	O
+with	O
+a	O
+link	O
+in	O
+an	O
+email	O
+.	O
+
+Oftentimes	O
+,	O
+the	O
+emailed	O
+link	O
+is	O
+a	O
+bit.ly	O
+shortened	O
+link	O
+,	O
+used	O
+to	O
+potentially	O
+evade	O
+detection	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+link	O
+leads	O
+to	O
+a	O
+phishing	O
+page	O
+that	O
+asks	O
+for	O
+banking	O
+login	O
+credentials	O
+or	O
+an	O
+account	O
+number	O
+and	O
+PIN	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+1	O
+shows	O
+one	O
+such	O
+landing	O
+page	O
+using	O
+stolen	O
+branding	O
+from	O
+Bank	O
+Austria	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+1	O
+:	O
+Landing	O
+page	O
+for	O
+phishing	O
+scheme	O
+asking	O
+for	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+signatory	O
+number	O
+and	O
+PIN	O
+using	O
+stolen	O
+branding	O
+from	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+Because	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+delivered	O
+phishing	O
+links	O
+using	O
+the	O
+bit.ly	B-Indicator
+URL	O
+shortener	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+access	O
+delivery	O
+statistics	O
+for	O
+this	O
+particular	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+link	O
+resolves	O
+to	O
+a	O
+URL	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+appear	O
+legitimate	O
+,	O
+with	O
+a	O
+canonical	O
+domain	O
+of	O
+sicher97140	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+info	I-Indicator
+including	O
+the	O
+“	O
+bankaustria	O
+”	O
+brand	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+2	O
+:	O
+Bit.ly	B-Indicator
+statistics	O
+for	O
+a	O
+phishing	O
+landing	O
+page	O
+targeting	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+customers	O
+The	O
+actor	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+have	O
+recently	O
+begun	O
+using	O
+“	O
+.top	O
+”	O
+top-level	O
+domains	O
+(	O
+TLDs	O
+)	O
+for	O
+their	O
+phishing	O
+landing	O
+pages	O
+and	O
+have	O
+implemented	O
+a	O
+consistent	O
+naming	O
+structure	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+Earlier	O
+this	O
+year	O
+,	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+used	O
+“	O
+.pw	O
+”	O
+TLDs	O
+while	O
+the	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+scheme	O
+highlighted	O
+above	O
+used	O
+“	O
+.info	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+recent	O
+campaigns	O
+against	O
+other	O
+bank	O
+customers	O
+also	O
+used	O
+“	O
+.gdn	O
+”	O
+TLDs	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+attacks	O
+on	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+customers	O
+that	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+resolved	O
+to	O
+the	O
+following	O
+.top	O
+domains	O
+:	O
+Oct	O
+23	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id8817062	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+23	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id8817461	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+23	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id8817465	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+23	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id8817466	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+23	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id8817469	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+17	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id58712	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+17	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id58717	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+17	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id58729	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+17	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id58729	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+17	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id87721	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+Oct	O
+17	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//online.bankaustria.at.id87726	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+top/	I-Indicator
+These	O
+permutations	O
+of	O
+TLDs	O
+and	O
+canonical	O
+domains	O
+incorporating	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+domain	O
+expected	O
+by	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+banking	O
+customers	O
+exemplifies	O
+recent	O
+trends	O
+in	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+by	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+Just	O
+as	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+may	O
+use	O
+stolen	O
+branding	O
+in	O
+their	O
+email	O
+lures	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+potential	O
+victims	O
+,	O
+they	O
+reproduce	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+domain	O
+name	O
+in	O
+a	O
+fraudulent	O
+domain	O
+that	O
+is	O
+not	O
+controlled	O
+by	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+enters	O
+their	O
+account	O
+information	O
+on	O
+the	O
+landing	O
+page	O
+,	O
+the	O
+phishing	O
+attack	O
+then	O
+requests	O
+that	O
+the	O
+user	O
+log	O
+in	O
+with	O
+their	O
+email	O
+address	O
+and	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+3	O
+:	O
+Step	O
+two	O
+of	O
+the	O
+credential	O
+phish	O
+asking	O
+for	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+email	O
+address	O
+and	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+Having	O
+stolen	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+account	O
+and	O
+personal	O
+information	O
+,	O
+the	O
+scammer	O
+introduces	O
+a	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+scheme	O
+,	O
+informing	O
+users	O
+that	O
+they	O
+currently	O
+do	O
+not	O
+have	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+Security	I-System
+App	I-System
+”	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+their	O
+smartphone	O
+and	O
+must	O
+download	O
+it	O
+to	O
+proceed	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+4	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+download	O
+prompt	O
+for	O
+this	O
+fake	O
+app	O
+;	O
+an	O
+English	O
+translation	O
+follows	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+4	O
+:	O
+Alert	O
+prompting	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+to	O
+download	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	I-System
+app	I-System
+(	O
+English	O
+translation	O
+below	O
+)	O
+,	O
+with	O
+stolen	O
+branding	O
+and	O
+fraudulent	O
+copy	O
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+Translation	O
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+Dear	O
+Customer	O
+,	O
+The	O
+system	O
+has	O
+detected	O
+that	O
+the	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+Security	I-System
+App	I-System
+is	O
+not	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+your	O
+smartphone	O
+.	O
+
+Due	O
+to	O
+new	O
+EU	B-Organization
+money	O
+laundering	O
+guidelines	O
+,	O
+the	O
+new	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+security	I-System
+app	I-System
+is	O
+mandatory	O
+for	O
+all	O
+customers	O
+who	O
+have	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+in	O
+our	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+Please	O
+install	O
+the	O
+app	O
+immediately	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+blocking	O
+your	O
+account	O
+.	O
+
+Follow	O
+the	O
+instructions	O
+at	O
+the	O
+bottom	O
+of	O
+this	O
+page	O
+.	O
+
+Why	O
+you	O
+need	O
+the	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+Security	I-System
+App	I-System
+:	O
+Due	O
+to	O
+outdated	O
+technology	O
+of	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+network	O
+important	O
+data	O
+such	O
+as	O
+mTan	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+connections	O
+are	O
+transmitted	O
+unencrypted	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+security	O
+app	O
+allows	O
+us	O
+to	O
+transmit	O
+this	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+encrypted	O
+to	O
+you	O
+,	O
+thus	O
+increasing	O
+the	O
+security	O
+that	O
+you	O
+will	O
+not	O
+suffer	O
+any	O
+financial	O
+loss	O
+.	O
+
+Step	O
+1	O
+:	O
+Download	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+Security	I-System
+App	I-System
+Download	O
+the	O
+Bank	O
+Austria	O
+security	O
+app	O
+to	O
+your	O
+Android	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+do	O
+this	O
+,	O
+open	O
+the	O
+displayed	O
+link	O
+on	O
+your	O
+mobile	O
+phone	O
+by	O
+typing	O
+in	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+field	O
+of	O
+your	O
+browser	O
+or	O
+scan	O
+the	O
+displayed	O
+QR	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+End	O
+translation	O
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+The	O
+phishing	O
+template	O
+then	O
+presents	O
+additional	O
+instructions	O
+for	O
+installing	O
+the	O
+fake	O
+security	O
+application	O
+(	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+)	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+:	O
+Additional	O
+instructions	O
+telling	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+to	O
+give	O
+the	O
+app	O
+the	O
+requested	O
+permissions	O
+(	O
+English	O
+translation	O
+below	O
+)	O
+,	O
+with	O
+stolen	O
+branding	O
+and	O
+fraudulent	O
+copy	O
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+Translation	O
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+Step	O
+2	O
+:	O
+Allow	O
+installation	O
+Open	O
+your	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+settings	O
+,	O
+select	O
+Security	O
+or	O
+Applications	O
+(	O
+depending	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+)	O
+,	O
+and	O
+check	O
+Unknown	O
+sources	O
+.	O
+
+Step	O
+3	O
+:	O
+Run	O
+installation	O
+Start	O
+the	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+security	I-System
+app	I-System
+from	O
+the	O
+notifications	O
+or	O
+your	O
+download	O
+folder	O
+,	O
+tap	O
+Install	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+successful	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+tap	O
+Open	O
+and	O
+enable	O
+the	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+.	O
+
+Finished	O
+!	O
+
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+End	O
+translation	O
+*	O
+*	O
+*	O
+Referring	O
+again	O
+to	O
+bit.ly	B-Indicator
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+see	O
+click	O
+statistics	O
+for	O
+this	O
+campaign	O
+(	O
+Figure	O
+6	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+6	O
+:	O
+bit.ly	B-Indicator
+statistics	O
+for	O
+the	O
+fake	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+Android	I-System
+app	I-System
+download	O
+link	O
+From	O
+this	O
+small	O
+sample	O
+,	O
+we	O
+see	O
+that	O
+7	O
+%	O
+of	O
+visitors	O
+clicked	O
+through	O
+to	O
+download	O
+the	O
+application	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+actually	O
+a	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+banking	I-Malware
+Trojan	I-Malware
+named	O
+“	O
+BankAustria.apk	B-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+continuing	O
+the	O
+fraudulent	O
+use	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+’	O
+s	O
+branding	O
+to	O
+fool	O
+potential	O
+victims	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+sample	O
+is	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+those	O
+presented	O
+in	O
+other	O
+recent	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+analyses	O
+[	O
+1	O
+]	O
+[	O
+2	O
+]	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+particular	O
+application	O
+is	O
+signed	O
+with	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+certificate	O
+:	O
+Owner	O
+:	O
+CN=Unknown	O
+,	O
+OU=Unknown	O
+,	O
+O=Unknown	O
+,	O
+L=Unknown	O
+,	O
+ST=Unknown	O
+,	O
+C=Unknown	O
+Issuer	O
+CN=Unknown	O
+,	O
+OU=Unknown	O
+,	O
+O=Unknown	O
+,	O
+L=Unknown	O
+,	O
+ST=Unknown	O
+,	O
+C=Unknown	O
+Serial	O
+:	O
+1c9157d7	O
+Validity	O
+:	O
+11/02/2017	O
+00:16:46	O
+03/20/2045	O
+00:16:46	O
+MD5	O
+Hash	O
+:	O
+A8:55:46:32:15	B-Indicator
+
+:	I-Indicator
+A9	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+D5:95	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+A9:91	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+C2:91:77:5D:30	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+F6	I-Indicator
+SHA1	O
+Hash	O
+:	O
+32:17	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+E9:7E:06	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+FE:5D:84	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+BE:7C:14:0C	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+C6:2B:12:85	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+E7:03:9A:5F	I-Indicator
+The	O
+app	O
+requests	O
+extensive	O
+permissions	O
+during	O
+installation	O
+that	O
+enable	O
+a	O
+range	O
+of	O
+activities	O
+supported	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Those	O
+permission	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+bold	O
+below	O
+are	O
+the	O
+most	O
+problematic	O
+:	O
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+write	O
+to	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+read	O
+from	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+use	O
+SIP	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+collect	O
+battery	O
+statistics	O
+Allows	O
+an	O
+app	O
+to	O
+access	O
+precise	O
+location	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+read	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+write	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+initiate	O
+a	O
+phone	O
+call	O
+without	O
+going	O
+through	O
+the	O
+Dialer	O
+user	O
+interface	O
+for	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+confirm	O
+the	O
+call	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+access	O
+information	O
+about	O
+networks	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+open	O
+network	O
+sockets	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+read	O
+the	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+contacts	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+read	O
+or	O
+write	O
+the	O
+system	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+an	O
+application	O
+to	O
+force	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+lock	O
+Allows	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+access	O
+information	O
+about	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+networks	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+change	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+connectivity	O
+state	O
+.	O
+
+Allows	O
+applications	O
+to	O
+change	O
+network	O
+connectivity	O
+state	O
+.	O
+
+Analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+common	O
+string	O
+obfuscation	O
+of	O
+character	O
+replacement	O
+(	O
+Figure	O
+7	O
+)	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+7	O
+:	O
+Encoded	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+Strings	O
+Figure	O
+8	O
+:	O
+Decoded	O
+Marcher	B-Malware
+Strings	O
+As	O
+noted	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+requests	O
+extensive	O
+permissions	O
+during	O
+installation	O
+;	O
+Figure	O
+9	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+request	O
+to	O
+act	O
+as	O
+device	O
+administrator	O
+,	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+permission	O
+that	O
+should	O
+very	O
+rarely	O
+be	O
+granted	O
+to	O
+an	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+9	O
+:	O
+Prompt	O
+for	O
+application	O
+permissions	O
+upon	O
+installation	O
+Figures	O
+10	O
+and	O
+11	O
+show	O
+the	O
+other	O
+permission	O
+screens	O
+for	O
+the	O
+app	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+10	O
+Figure	O
+10	O
+:	O
+Part	O
+1	O
+of	O
+the	O
+permission	O
+screen	O
+for	O
+the	O
+app	O
+Figure	O
+11	O
+:	O
+Part	O
+2	O
+of	O
+the	O
+permission	O
+screen	O
+for	O
+the	O
+app	O
+Once	O
+installed	O
+the	O
+app	O
+will	O
+place	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+looking	O
+icon	O
+on	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+’	O
+s	O
+home	O
+screen	O
+,	O
+again	O
+using	O
+branding	O
+stolen	O
+from	O
+the	O
+bank	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+12	O
+:	O
+Fake	B-System
+Bank	I-System
+Austria	I-System
+Security	I-System
+application	I-System
+icon	O
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+operating	O
+as	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+overlaying	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+banking	O
+app	O
+with	O
+an	O
+indistinguishable	O
+credential	O
+theft	O
+page	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+also	O
+asks	O
+for	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+information	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+when	O
+they	O
+open	O
+applications	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+store	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+13	O
+:	O
+Popup	O
+asking	O
+for	O
+a	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+number	O
+The	O
+application	O
+also	O
+supports	O
+stealing	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+verification	O
+information	O
+(	O
+Figures	O
+14	O
+and	O
+15	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+14	O
+:	O
+Information	O
+theft	O
+via	O
+fake	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+verification	O
+using	O
+stolen	O
+branding	O
+Figure	O
+15	O
+:	O
+Information	O
+theft	O
+via	O
+fake	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+verification	O
+using	O
+stolen	O
+branding	O
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+campaigns	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+have	O
+a	O
+wider	O
+reach	O
+based	O
+on	O
+bit.ly	B-Indicator
+statistics	O
+like	O
+this	O
+one	O
+from	O
+October	O
+13	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+:	O
+Figure	O
+16	O
+:	O
+bit.ly	B-Indicator
+statistics	O
+for	O
+an	O
+October	O
+13	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+campaign	O
+Over	O
+several	O
+days	O
+during	O
+the	O
+last	O
+three	O
+months	O
+,	O
+Proofpoint	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+observed	O
+campaigns	O
+using	O
+similar	O
+techniques	O
+targeting	O
+the	O
+banking	O
+customers	O
+of	O
+Raffeisen	O
+and	O
+Sparkasse	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+review	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bit.ly	B-Indicator
+statistics	O
+for	O
+these	O
+campaigns	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+they	O
+were	O
+at	O
+least	O
+as	O
+effective	O
+in	O
+driving	O
+end-user	O
+clicks	O
+as	O
+the	O
+Bank	B-System
+Austria	I-System
+campaign	O
+analyzed	O
+above	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+As	O
+our	O
+computing	O
+increasingly	O
+crosses	O
+multiple	O
+screens	O
+,	O
+we	O
+should	O
+expect	O
+to	O
+see	O
+threats	O
+extending	O
+across	O
+mobile	O
+and	O
+desktop	O
+environments	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+as	O
+we	O
+use	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+web	O
+and	O
+phishing	O
+templates	O
+extend	O
+to	O
+mobile	O
+environments	O
+,	O
+we	O
+should	O
+expect	O
+to	O
+see	O
+a	O
+greater	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+integrated	O
+threats	O
+like	O
+the	O
+scheme	O
+we	O
+detail	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+on	O
+the	O
+desktop	O
+,	O
+mobile	O
+users	O
+need	O
+to	O
+be	O
+wary	O
+of	O
+installing	O
+applications	O
+from	O
+outside	O
+of	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+and	O
+sources	O
+and	O
+be	O
+on	O
+the	O
+lookout	O
+for	O
+bogus	O
+banking	O
+sites	O
+that	O
+ask	O
+for	O
+more	O
+information	O
+than	O
+users	O
+would	O
+normally	O
+provide	O
+on	O
+legitimate	O
+sites	O
+.	O
+
+Unusual	O
+domains	O
+,	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+URL	O
+shorteners	O
+,	O
+and	O
+solicitations	O
+that	O
+do	O
+not	O
+come	O
+from	O
+verifiable	O
+sources	O
+are	O
+also	O
+red	O
+flags	O
+for	O
+potential	O
+phishing	O
+and	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Ginp	B-Malware
+-	O
+A	O
+malware	O
+patchwork	O
+borrowing	O
+from	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+November	O
+2019	O
+Intro	O
+ThreatFabric	B-System
+analysts	O
+have	O
+recently	O
+investigated	O
+an	O
+interesting	O
+new	O
+strain	O
+of	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+first	O
+spotted	O
+by	O
+Tatyana	O
+Shishkova	O
+from	O
+Kaspersky	B-Organization
+by	O
+end	O
+October	O
+2019	O
+,	O
+but	O
+actually	O
+dates	O
+back	O
+to	O
+June	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+still	O
+under	O
+active	O
+development	O
+,	O
+with	O
+at	O
+least	O
+5	O
+different	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+released	O
+within	O
+the	O
+last	O
+5	O
+months	O
+(	O
+June	O
+-	O
+November	O
+2019	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+makes	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+stand	O
+out	O
+is	O
+that	O
+it	O
+was	O
+built	O
+from	O
+scratch	O
+being	O
+expanded	O
+through	O
+regular	O
+updates	O
+,	O
+the	O
+last	O
+of	O
+which	O
+including	O
+code	O
+copied	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infamous	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+indicating	O
+that	O
+its	O
+author	O
+is	O
+cherry-picking	O
+the	O
+most	O
+relevant	O
+functionality	O
+for	O
+its	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+its	O
+original	O
+target	O
+list	O
+is	O
+extremely	O
+narrow	O
+and	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+be	O
+focused	O
+on	O
+Spanish	O
+banks	O
+.	O
+
+Last	O
+but	O
+not	O
+least	O
+,	O
+all	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+screens	O
+(	O
+injects	O
+)	O
+for	O
+the	O
+banks	O
+include	O
+two	O
+steps	O
+;	O
+first	O
+stealing	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+login	O
+credentials	O
+,	O
+then	O
+their	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+details	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+multi-step	O
+overlays	O
+are	O
+not	O
+something	O
+new	O
+,	O
+their	O
+usage	O
+is	O
+generally	O
+limited	O
+to	O
+avoid	O
+raising	O
+suspicion	O
+.	O
+
+Evolution	O
+The	O
+initial	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+dates	O
+back	O
+to	O
+early	O
+June	O
+2019	O
+,	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+a	O
+“	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Verificator	I-System
+”	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+that	O
+time	O
+,	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+was	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+SMS	O
+stealer	O
+whose	O
+purpose	O
+was	O
+only	O
+to	O
+send	O
+a	O
+copy	O
+of	O
+incoming	O
+and	O
+outgoing	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+couple	O
+of	O
+months	O
+later	O
+,	O
+in	O
+August	O
+2019	O
+,	O
+a	O
+new	O
+version	O
+was	O
+released	O
+with	O
+additional	O
+banking-specific	O
+features	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+and	O
+following	O
+versions	O
+were	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+fake	O
+“	O
+Adobe	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+Player	I-System
+”	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+able	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+overlay	O
+attacks	O
+and	O
+become	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+through	O
+the	O
+abuse	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+overlay	O
+consisted	O
+of	O
+a	O
+generic	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+grabber	O
+targeting	O
+social	O
+and	O
+utility	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+Facebook	B-System
+,	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+,	O
+Chrome	B-System
+,	O
+Skype	B-System
+,	O
+Instagram	B-System
+and	O
+Twitter	B-System
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+early	O
+versions	O
+had	O
+some	O
+basic	O
+code	O
+and	O
+string	O
+obfuscation	O
+,	O
+protection	O
+of	O
+the	O
+third	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+enhanced	O
+with	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+payload	O
+obfuscation	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+capabilities	O
+remained	O
+unchanged	O
+,	O
+but	O
+a	O
+new	O
+endpoint	O
+was	O
+added	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+C2	O
+allowing	O
+it	O
+to	O
+handle	O
+the	O
+generic	O
+card	O
+grabber	O
+overlay	O
+and	O
+specific	O
+target	O
+overlays	O
+(	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+)	O
+separately	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+the	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+grabber	O
+target	O
+list	O
+was	O
+expanded	O
+with	O
+Snapchat	B-System
+and	O
+Viber	B-System
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+third	O
+version	O
+spotted	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+,	O
+the	O
+author	O
+introduced	O
+parts	O
+of	O
+the	O
+source	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infamous	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+(	O
+which	O
+was	O
+leaked	O
+earlier	O
+in	O
+2019	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+change	O
+came	O
+hand	O
+in	O
+hand	O
+with	O
+a	O
+new	O
+overlay	O
+target	O
+list	O
+,	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+targeting	O
+social	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+but	O
+focusing	O
+on	O
+banking	O
+instead	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+remarkable	O
+fact	O
+is	O
+that	O
+all	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+apps	O
+relate	O
+to	O
+Spanish	O
+banks	O
+,	O
+including	O
+targets	O
+never	O
+seen	O
+before	O
+in	O
+any	O
+other	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+24	O
+target	O
+apps	O
+belong	O
+to	O
+7	O
+different	O
+Spanish	O
+banks	O
+:	O
+Caixa	B-System
+bank	I-System
+,	O
+Bankinter	B-System
+,	O
+Bankia	B-System
+,	O
+BBVA	B-System
+,	O
+EVO	B-System
+Banco	I-System
+,	O
+Kutxabank	B-System
+and	O
+Santander	B-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+specific	O
+apps	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+target	O
+list	O
+in	O
+the	O
+appendix	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+(	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+)	O
+was	O
+detected	O
+at	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+November	O
+2019	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+version	O
+has	O
+some	O
+small	O
+modifications	O
+which	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+be	O
+unused	O
+,	O
+as	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+behaviour	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+as	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+version	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+author	O
+has	O
+introduced	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+grant	O
+the	O
+app	O
+the	O
+device	O
+admin	O
+permission	O
+.	O
+
+Additionally	O
+new	O
+endpoint	O
+was	O
+added	O
+that	O
+seems	O
+related	O
+to	O
+downloading	O
+a	O
+module	O
+for	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+probably	O
+with	O
+new	O
+features	O
+or	O
+configuration	O
+.	O
+
+How	O
+it	O
+works	O
+When	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+first	O
+started	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+it	O
+will	O
+begin	O
+by	O
+removing	O
+its	O
+icon	O
+from	O
+the	O
+app	O
+drawer	O
+,	O
+hiding	O
+from	O
+the	O
+end	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+second	O
+step	O
+it	O
+asks	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+for	O
+the	O
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+privilege	O
+as	O
+visible	O
+in	O
+following	O
+screenshot	O
+:	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+Accessibility	O
+request	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+user	O
+grants	O
+the	O
+requested	O
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+privilege	O
+,	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+starts	O
+by	O
+granting	O
+itself	O
+additional	O
+permissions	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+(	O
+dynamic	O
+)	O
+permissions	O
+required	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+send	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+make	O
+calls	O
+,	O
+without	O
+requiring	O
+any	O
+further	O
+action	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+done	O
+,	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+is	O
+functional	O
+and	O
+ready	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+commands	O
+and	O
+perform	O
+overlay	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+commands	O
+supported	O
+by	O
+the	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+are	O
+listed	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+can	O
+be	O
+observed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+possibilities	O
+offered	O
+by	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+are	O
+pretty	O
+common	O
+.	O
+
+Command	O
+Description	O
+SEND_SMS	O
+Send	O
+an	O
+SMS	O
+from	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+to	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+number	O
+NEW_URL	O
+Update	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+URL	O
+KILL	O
+Disable	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+PING_DELAY	O
+Update	O
+interval	O
+between	O
+each	O
+ping	O
+request	O
+CLEAN_IGNORE_PKG	O
+Empty	O
+list	O
+of	O
+overlayed	O
+apps	O
+WRITE_INJECTS	O
+Update	O
+target	O
+list	O
+READ_INJECTS	O
+Get	O
+current	O
+target	O
+list	O
+START_ADMIN	O
+Request	O
+Device	O
+Admin	O
+privileges	O
+ALL_SMS	O
+Get	O
+all	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+DISABLE_ACCESSIBILITY	O
+Stop	O
+preventing	O
+user	O
+from	O
+disabling	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+ENABLE_ACCESSIBILITY	O
+Prevent	O
+user	O
+from	O
+disabling	O
+
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+ENABLE_HIDDEN_SMS	O
+Set	O
+malware	O
+as	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+DISABLE_HIDDEN_SMS	O
+Remove	O
+malware	O
+as	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+ENABLE_EXTENDED_INJECT	O
+Enable	O
+overlay	O
+attacks	O
+DISABLE_EXTENDED_INJECT	O
+Disable	O
+overlay	O
+attacks	O
+ENABLE_CC_GRABBER	O
+Enable	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+overlay	O
+DISABLE_CC_GRABBER	O
+Disable	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+overlay	O
+START_DEBUG	O
+Enable	O
+debugging	O
+GET_LOGCAT	O
+Get	O
+logs	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+STOP_DEBUG	O
+Disable	O
+debugging	O
+GET_APPS	O
+
+Get	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+GET_CONTACTS	O
+Get	O
+contacts	O
+SEND_BULK_SMS	O
+Send	O
+SMS	O
+to	O
+multiple	O
+numbers	O
+UPDATE_APK	O
+Not	O
+implemented	O
+INJECT_PACKAGE	O
+Add	O
+new	O
+overlay	O
+target	O
+CALL_FORWARD	O
+Enable/disable	O
+call	O
+forwarding	O
+START_PERMISSIONS	O
+Starts	O
+request	O
+for	O
+additional	O
+permissions	O
+(	O
+Accessibility	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+battery	O
+optimizations	O
+bypass	O
+,	O
+dynamic	O
+permissions	O
+)	O
+Features	O
+The	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Ginp	O
+has	O
+the	O
+same	O
+capabilities	O
+as	O
+most	O
+other	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+overlay	O
+attacks	O
+,	O
+SMS	O
+control	O
+and	O
+contact	O
+
+list	O
+harvesting	O
+.	O
+
+Overall	O
+,	O
+it	O
+has	O
+a	O
+fairly	O
+common	O
+feature	O
+list	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+is	O
+expected	O
+to	O
+expand	O
+in	O
+future	O
+updates	O
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+Ginp	O
+is	O
+already	O
+using	O
+some	O
+code	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+quite	O
+likely	O
+that	O
+other	O
+,	O
+more	O
+advanced	O
+features	O
+from	O
+Anubis	B-System
+or	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+a	O
+back-connect	O
+proxy	O
+,	O
+screen-streaming	O
+and	O
+RAT	O
+will	O
+also	O
+be	O
+added	O
+in	O
+the	O
+future	O
+.	O
+
+Ginp	B-Malware
+embeds	O
+the	O
+following	O
+set	O
+of	O
+features	O
+,	O
+allowing	O
+it	O
+to	O
+remain	O
+under	O
+the	O
+radar	O
+and	O
+successfully	O
+perform	O
+attacks	O
+:	O
+Overlaying	O
+:	O
+Dynamic	O
+(	O
+local	O
+overlays	O
+obtained	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+)	O
+SMS	O
+harvesting	O
+:	O
+SMS	O
+listing	O
+SMS	O
+harvesting	O
+:	O
+SMS	O
+forwarding	O
+Contact	O
+list	O
+collection	O
+Application	O
+listing	O
+Overlaying	O
+:	O
+Targets	O
+list	O
+update	O
+SMS	O
+:	O
+Sending	O
+Calls	O
+:	O
+Call	O
+forwarding	O
+C2	O
+Resilience	O
+:	O
+Auxiliary	O
+C2	O
+list	O
+Self-protection	O
+:	O
+Hiding	O
+the	O
+App	O
+icon	O
+Self-protection	O
+:	O
+Preventing	O
+removal	O
+Self-protection	O
+:	O
+Emulation-detection	O
+Update	O
+
+10/03/2020	O
+At	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+February	O
+the	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+added	O
+screen	O
+capture	O
+capabilities	O
+to	O
+their	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Like	O
+previously	O
+added	O
+functionality	O
+,	O
+the	O
+code	O
+is	O
+borrowed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+leaked	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+source	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+enables	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+to	O
+stream	O
+screenshots	O
+and	O
+send	O
+them	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+so	O
+that	O
+actors	O
+can	O
+see	O
+what	O
+is	O
+happening	O
+on	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Overlay	O
+attack	O
+Ginp	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+to	O
+check	O
+which	O
+application	O
+runs	O
+is	O
+the	O
+foreground	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+foreground	O
+app	O
+is	O
+included	O
+in	O
+the	O
+target	O
+list	O
+,	O
+an	O
+overlay	O
+is	O
+shown	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+WebView-based	O
+overlay	O
+is	O
+loading	O
+an	O
+HTML	O
+page	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+in	O
+response	O
+to	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+.	O
+
+Something	O
+that	O
+makes	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+special	O
+is	O
+that	O
+all	O
+of	O
+its	O
+overlay	O
+screens	O
+for	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+consist	O
+of	O
+multiple	O
+steps	O
+,	O
+first	O
+stealing	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+login	O
+credentials	O
+,	O
+then	O
+stealing	O
+the	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+details	O
+(	O
+to	O
+“	O
+validate	O
+”	O
+the	O
+user	O
+identity	O
+)	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+screenshots	O
+hereafter	O
+:	O
+The	O
+following	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+after	O
+the	O
+second	O
+overlay	O
+is	O
+filled-in	O
+and	O
+validated	O
+,	O
+it	O
+disappears	O
+and	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+application	O
+is	O
+added	O
+to	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+packages	O
+names	O
+to	O
+be	O
+ignored	O
+for	O
+future	O
+overlays	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+Targets	O
+The	O
+initial	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+had	O
+a	O
+generic	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+grabber	O
+overlay	O
+screen	O
+used	O
+for	O
+all	O
+targeted	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Still	O
+included	O
+in	O
+the	O
+last	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+this	O
+screen	O
+is	O
+only	O
+used	O
+to	O
+overlay	O
+the	O
+official	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Store	I-System
+app	O
+.	O
+
+More	O
+apps	O
+could	O
+be	O
+added	O
+to	O
+the	O
+grabber	O
+target	O
+list	O
+in	O
+the	O
+future	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+ones	O
+that	O
+were	O
+targeted	O
+in	O
+older	O
+versions	O
+:	O
+Facebook	B-System
+WhatsApp	B-System
+Skype	B-System
+Twitter	B-System
+Chrome	B-System
+Instagram	B-System
+Snapchat	B-System
+Viber	B-System
+The	O
+following	O
+screenshot	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+generic	O
+card	O
+grabber	O
+overlay	O
+screen	O
+:	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+generic	O
+grabber	O
+The	O
+current	O
+active	O
+target	O
+list	O
+is	O
+available	O
+in	O
+the	O
+appendix	O
+,	O
+containing	O
+a	O
+total	O
+of	O
+24	O
+unique	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+screenshots	O
+show	O
+what	O
+type	O
+of	O
+information	O
+is	O
+collected	O
+in	O
+both	O
+steps	O
+of	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+attack	O
+:	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+overlaysGinp	O
+overlaysGinp	O
+overlaysGinp	O
+overlays	O
+Based	O
+on	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+Once	O
+the	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+bot	O
+code	O
+got	O
+leaked	O
+,	O
+it	O
+was	O
+just	O
+a	O
+matter	O
+of	O
+time	O
+before	O
+new	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+based	O
+on	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+would	O
+surface	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+analyzing	O
+the	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+recent	O
+samples	O
+,	O
+ThreatFabric	B-System
+analysts	O
+found	O
+some	O
+similarities	O
+with	O
+the	O
+famous	O
+Android	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+evolution	O
+of	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+it	O
+is	O
+clear	O
+that	O
+it	O
+isn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+based	O
+on	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+,	O
+but	O
+rather	O
+reuses	O
+some	O
+of	O
+its	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Below	O
+are	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+elements	O
+showing	O
+the	O
+relation	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+names	O
+used	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+components	O
+are	O
+similar	O
+:	O
+Similarities	O
+with	O
+AnubisSimilarities	O
+with	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+When	O
+analyzing	O
+these	O
+components	O
+,	O
+similarities	O
+were	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+of	O
+both	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+:	O
+Similarities	O
+with	O
+Anubis	B-System
+Another	O
+major	O
+change	O
+that	O
+indicated	O
+that	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+copied	O
+code	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+is	O
+the	O
+way	O
+of	O
+handling	O
+configuration	O
+values	O
+.	O
+
+Previous	O
+versions	O
+were	O
+storing	O
+config	O
+values	O
+within	O
+the	O
+variables	O
+of	O
+a	O
+class	O
+,	O
+while	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+is	O
+using	O
+SharedPreferences	O
+with	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+keys	O
+being	O
+identical	O
+to	O
+those	O
+used	O
+by	O
+Anubis	B-System
+:	O
+isAccessibility	O
+time_work	O
+time_start_permission	O
+url_inj	O
+Conclusion	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+but	O
+rather	O
+efficient	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+providing	O
+the	O
+basic	O
+functionality	O
+to	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+victims	O
+into	O
+delivering	O
+personal	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+a	O
+5-month	O
+timespan	O
+,	O
+actor	O
+managed	O
+to	O
+create	O
+a	O
+Trojan	O
+from	O
+scratch	O
+which	O
+will	O
+presumably	O
+continue	O
+evolving	O
+offering	O
+new	O
+features	O
+such	O
+as	O
+keylogging	O
+,	O
+back-connect	O
+proxy	O
+or	O
+RAT	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Ginp	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+unusual	O
+target	O
+selection	O
+is	O
+not	O
+just	O
+about	O
+its	O
+focus	O
+on	O
+Spanish	O
+banks	O
+but	O
+also	O
+the	O
+wide	O
+selection	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+apps	O
+per	O
+bank	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+fact	O
+that	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+screens	O
+are	O
+almost	O
+identical	O
+to	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+suggests	O
+that	O
+the	O
+actors	O
+might	O
+be	O
+very	O
+familiar	O
+with	O
+the	O
+Spanish	O
+banking	O
+applications	O
+and	O
+might	O
+even	O
+be	O
+accustomed	O
+to	O
+the	O
+language	O
+.	O
+
+Although	O
+the	O
+current	O
+target	O
+list	O
+is	O
+limited	O
+to	O
+Spanish	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+it	O
+seems	O
+that	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+is	O
+taking	O
+into	O
+account	O
+that	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+should	O
+also	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+target	O
+other	O
+countries	O
+,	O
+seeing	O
+that	O
+the	O
+path	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+inject	O
+requests	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+country	O
+code	O
+of	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+institution	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+could	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+actor	O
+already	O
+has	O
+plans	O
+in	O
+expanding	O
+the	O
+targets	O
+to	O
+applications	O
+from	O
+different	O
+countries	O
+and	O
+regions	O
+.	O
+
+Appendix	O
+Samples	O
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+samples	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+:	O
+App	O
+name	O
+Package	O
+name	O
+SHA-256	O
+hash	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Verificator	I-System
+sing.guide.false	B-Indicator
+0ee075219a2dfde018f17561467272633821d19420c08cba14322cc3b93bb5d5	B-Indicator
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Verificator	I-System
+park.rather.dance	B-System
+087a3beea46f3d45649b7506073ef51c784036629ca78601a4593759b253d1b7	B-Indicator
+Adobe	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+Player	I-System
+ethics.unknown.during	B-Indicator
+
+5ac6901b232c629bc246227b783867a0122f62f9e087ceb86d83d991e92dba2f	B-Indicator
+Adobe	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+Player	I-System
+solution.rail.forward	B-Indicator
+7eb239cc86e80e6e1866e2b3a132b5af94a13d0d24f92068a6d2e66cfe5c2cea	B-Indicator
+Adobe	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+Player	I-System
+com.pubhny.hekzhgjty	B-Indicator
+14a1b1dce69b742f7e258805594f07e0c5148b6963c12a8429d6e15ace3a503c	B-Indicator
+
+Adobe	B-System
+Flash	I-System
+Player	I-System
+sentence.fancy.humble	B-Indicator
+78557094dbabecdc17fb0edb4e3a94bae184e97b1b92801e4f8eb0f0626d6212	B-Indicator
+Target	O
+list	O
+The	O
+current	O
+list	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+observed	O
+to	O
+be	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+Ginp	B-Malware
+contains	O
+a	O
+total	O
+of	O
+24	O
+unique	O
+applications	O
+as	O
+seen	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+list	O
+is	O
+expected	O
+to	O
+grow	O
+in	O
+the	O
+future	O
+.	O