diff --git "a/test.txt" "b/test.txt"
new file mode 100644--- /dev/null
+++ "b/test.txt"
@@ -0,0 +1,20017 @@
+Why	O
+Did	O
+Chinese	O
+Spyware	O
+Linger	O
+in	O
+U.S	O
+.	O
+
+Phones	O
+?	O
+
+November	O
+16	O
+,	O
+2016	O
+In	O
+what	O
+'s	O
+being	O
+chalked	O
+up	O
+as	O
+an	O
+apparent	O
+mistake	O
+,	O
+more	O
+than	O
+120,000	O
+Android	B-System
+phones	O
+sold	O
+in	O
+the	O
+U.S.	O
+were	O
+shipped	O
+with	O
+spying	O
+code	O
+that	O
+sent	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+and	O
+other	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+to	O
+a	O
+server	O
+in	O
+Shanghai	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+New	B-Organization
+York	I-Organization
+Times	I-Organization
+reported	O
+on	O
+Nov.	O
+15	O
+that	O
+Kryptowire	B-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+enterprise	O
+security	O
+company	O
+,	O
+discovered	O
+the	O
+code	O
+on	O
+a	O
+lower-end	O
+smartphone	O
+made	O
+by	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+Products	O
+of	O
+Doral	O
+,	O
+Fla	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+phones	O
+are	O
+sold	O
+at	O
+Best	B-Organization
+Buy	I-Organization
+and	O
+Amazon.com	B-Organization
+,	O
+among	O
+other	O
+retail	O
+outlets	O
+.	O
+
+Kryptowire	B-Organization
+says	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+which	O
+it	O
+found	O
+on	O
+a	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+R1	O
+HD	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+transmitted	O
+fine-grained	O
+location	O
+information	O
+and	O
+allowed	O
+for	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Text	O
+message	O
+and	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+were	O
+transmitted	O
+every	O
+72	O
+hours	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Shanghai	O
+server	O
+,	O
+and	O
+once	O
+a	O
+day	O
+for	O
+other	O
+personally	O
+identifiable	O
+data	O
+,	O
+the	O
+company	O
+says	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+turns	O
+out	O
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+that	O
+other	O
+security	O
+researchers	O
+noticed	O
+suspicious	O
+and	O
+faulty	O
+code	O
+on	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+devices	O
+as	O
+early	O
+as	O
+March	O
+2015	O
+,	O
+and	O
+it	O
+has	O
+taken	O
+nearly	O
+that	O
+long	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+it	O
+from	O
+the	O
+company	O
+'s	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+finding	O
+,	O
+in	O
+part	O
+,	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+risk	O
+that	O
+can	O
+come	O
+in	O
+opting	O
+for	O
+less	O
+expensive	O
+smartphones	O
+,	O
+whose	O
+manufacturers	O
+may	O
+not	O
+diligently	O
+fix	O
+security	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+.	O
+
+It	O
+'s	O
+also	O
+raising	O
+eyebrows	O
+because	O
+of	O
+the	O
+connection	O
+with	O
+China	O
+,	O
+which	O
+has	O
+frequently	O
+sparred	O
+with	O
+the	O
+U.S.	O
+over	O
+cyber	O
+espionage	O
+.	O
+
+BLU	B-Organization
+Products	O
+has	O
+now	O
+updated	O
+its	O
+phones	O
+to	O
+remove	O
+the	O
+spying	O
+code	O
+,	O
+which	O
+most	O
+likely	O
+would	O
+have	O
+never	O
+been	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+regular	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+never	O
+informed	O
+phone	O
+users	O
+that	O
+it	O
+was	O
+collecting	O
+that	O
+data	O
+,	O
+a	O
+behavior	O
+uniformly	O
+viewed	O
+by	O
+many	O
+as	O
+a	O
+serious	O
+security	O
+concern	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+developer	O
+of	O
+the	O
+code	O
+,	O
+Shanghai	B-Organization
+Adups	I-Organization
+Technology	I-Organization
+Co.	I-Organization
+,	O
+has	O
+apologized	O
+,	O
+contending	O
+that	O
+the	O
+code	O
+was	O
+intended	O
+for	O
+another	O
+one	O
+of	O
+its	O
+clients	O
+who	O
+requested	O
+better	O
+blocking	O
+of	O
+junk	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+marketing	O
+calls	O
+.	O
+
+Vulnerabilities	O
+Reported	O
+BLU	O
+Products	O
+,	O
+founded	O
+in	O
+2009	O
+,	O
+makes	O
+lower-end	O
+Android-powered	B-System
+smartphones	O
+that	O
+sell	O
+for	O
+as	O
+little	O
+as	O
+$	O
+50	O
+on	O
+Amazon	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+Like	O
+many	O
+original	O
+equipment	O
+manufacturers	O
+,	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+software	O
+components	O
+from	O
+other	O
+developers	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+company	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+type	O
+of	O
+software	O
+from	O
+Adups	B-Organization
+that	O
+'s	O
+nicknamed	O
+FOTA	B-System
+,	O
+short	O
+for	O
+firmware	O
+over-the-air	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+software	O
+manages	O
+the	O
+delivery	O
+of	O
+firmware	O
+updates	O
+over-the-air	O
+,	O
+the	O
+term	O
+used	O
+for	O
+transmission	O
+via	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+network	O
+.	O
+
+Firmware	O
+is	O
+low-level	O
+code	O
+deep	O
+in	O
+an	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+that	O
+often	O
+has	O
+high	O
+access	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+so	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+critical	O
+that	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+verified	O
+and	O
+contains	O
+no	O
+software	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Long	O
+before	O
+Kryptowire	B-Organization
+'s	O
+announcement	O
+,	O
+Tim	O
+Strazzere	O
+,	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+security	O
+researcher	O
+with	O
+RedNaga	B-Organization
+Security	I-Organization
+,	O
+contacted	O
+BLU	O
+Products	O
+in	O
+March	O
+2015	O
+after	O
+he	O
+found	O
+two	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+that	O
+could	O
+be	O
+traced	O
+to	O
+Adup	B-Organization
+'s	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Those	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+could	O
+have	O
+enabled	O
+someone	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+broad	O
+access	O
+to	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Strazzere	O
+'s	O
+colleague	O
+,	O
+Jon	O
+Sawyer	O
+,	O
+suggested	O
+on	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+that	O
+the	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+might	O
+have	O
+not	O
+been	O
+there	O
+by	O
+mistake	O
+,	O
+but	O
+rather	O
+included	O
+as	O
+intentionally	O
+coded	O
+backdoors	O
+.	O
+
+He	O
+posted	O
+a	O
+tweet	O
+to	O
+The	O
+New	B-Organization
+York	I-Organization
+Times	I-Organization
+report	O
+,	O
+sarcastically	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+"	O
+If	O
+only	O
+two	O
+people	O
+had	O
+called	O
+this	O
+company	O
+out	O
+for	O
+their	O
+backdoors	O
+several	O
+times	O
+over	O
+the	O
+last	O
+few	O
+years	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+Strazzere	O
+'s	O
+experience	O
+in	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+contact	O
+both	O
+vendors	O
+last	O
+year	O
+is	O
+typical	O
+of	O
+the	O
+frustrations	O
+frequently	O
+faced	O
+by	O
+security	O
+researchers	O
+.	O
+
+"	O
+I	O
+tried	O
+reaching	O
+out	O
+to	O
+Adups	B-Organization
+and	O
+never	O
+heard	O
+back	O
+,	O
+''	O
+Strazzere	O
+tells	O
+Information	B-Organization
+Security	I-Organization
+Media	I-Organization
+Group	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+"	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+said	O
+they	O
+had	O
+no	O
+security	O
+department	O
+when	O
+I	O
+emailed	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+Strazzere	O
+says	O
+he	O
+also	O
+failed	O
+to	O
+reach	O
+MediaTek	B-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+Taiwanese	O
+fabless	O
+semiconductor	O
+manufacturer	O
+whose	O
+chipsets	O
+that	O
+powered	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+phones	O
+also	O
+contained	O
+Adups	B-Organization
+software	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+their	O
+credit	O
+,	O
+both	O
+Google	B-Organization
+and	O
+Amazon	B-Organization
+appear	O
+to	O
+have	O
+put	O
+pressure	O
+on	O
+device	O
+manufacturers	O
+to	O
+fix	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+when	O
+flaws	O
+are	O
+found	O
+,	O
+Strazzere	O
+says	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+Google	B-Organization
+,	O
+Android	O
+security	O
+issues	O
+-	O
+even	O
+if	O
+not	O
+in	O
+the	O
+core	O
+operating	O
+code	O
+-	O
+are	O
+a	O
+reputation	O
+threat	O
+,	O
+and	O
+for	O
+Amazon	B-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+product	O
+quality	O
+issue	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+devices	O
+sold	O
+outside	O
+of	O
+Amazon	B-Organization
+"	O
+might	O
+not	O
+have	O
+ever	O
+seen	O
+fixes	O
+,	O
+''	O
+he	O
+says	O
+.	O
+
+Officials	O
+at	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+could	O
+n't	O
+be	O
+immediately	O
+reached	O
+for	O
+comment	O
+.	O
+
+Attitude	O
+Change	O
+The	O
+disinterest	O
+in	O
+the	O
+issues	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+have	O
+changed	O
+with	O
+The	O
+New	B-Organization
+York	I-Organization
+Times	I-Organization
+report	O
+,	O
+which	O
+lit	O
+a	O
+fire	O
+underneath	O
+Adups	B-Organization
+and	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+Adups	B-Organization
+addressed	O
+the	O
+issue	O
+in	O
+a	O
+Nov.	O
+16	O
+news	O
+release	O
+,	O
+writing	O
+that	O
+some	O
+products	O
+made	O
+by	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+were	O
+updated	O
+in	O
+June	O
+with	O
+a	O
+version	O
+of	O
+its	O
+FOTA	B-System
+that	O
+had	O
+actually	O
+been	O
+intended	O
+for	O
+other	O
+clients	O
+who	O
+had	O
+requested	O
+an	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+stop	O
+text	O
+spam	O
+.	O
+
+That	O
+version	O
+flags	O
+messages	O
+"	O
+containing	O
+certain	O
+language	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+junk	O
+texts	O
+and	O
+flags	O
+numbers	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+junk	O
+calls	O
+and	O
+not	O
+in	O
+a	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+contacts	O
+,	O
+''	O
+the	O
+company	O
+says	O
+.	O
+
+Manufacturers	O
+should	O
+be	O
+keeping	O
+close	O
+tabs	O
+on	O
+what	O
+software	O
+ends	O
+up	O
+on	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+it	O
+would	O
+appear	O
+that	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+only	O
+took	O
+action	O
+after	O
+Kryptowire	B-Organization
+notified	O
+it	O
+along	O
+with	O
+Google	B-Organization
+,	O
+Adups	B-Organization
+and	O
+Amazon	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+"	O
+When	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+raised	O
+objections	O
+,	O
+Adups	B-Organization
+took	O
+immediate	O
+measures	O
+to	O
+disable	O
+that	O
+functionality	O
+on	O
+BLU	B-Organization
+phones	O
+,	O
+''	O
+Adups	I-Organization
+says	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+greater	O
+worry	O
+is	O
+that	O
+these	O
+situations	O
+may	O
+sometimes	O
+not	O
+be	O
+simple	O
+mistakes	O
+.	O
+
+Security	O
+experts	O
+have	O
+long	O
+warned	O
+of	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+of	O
+advanced	O
+adversaries	O
+to	O
+subvert	O
+hardware	O
+and	O
+software	O
+supply	O
+chains	O
+.	O
+
+Also	O
+,	O
+the	O
+software	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+pointed	O
+out	O
+in	O
+the	O
+FOTA	B-System
+software	O
+by	O
+Strazzere	O
+in	O
+2015	O
+could	O
+have	O
+been	O
+taken	O
+advantage	O
+of	O
+by	O
+cybercriminals	O
+looking	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+bank	O
+account	O
+details	O
+or	O
+execute	O
+other	O
+frauds	O
+.	O
+
+Strazzere	O
+advises	O
+that	O
+consumers	O
+should	O
+look	O
+at	O
+the	O
+pedigree	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+manufacturers	O
+and	O
+take	O
+a	O
+close	O
+look	O
+at	O
+their	O
+security	O
+track	O
+record	O
+before	O
+making	O
+a	O
+decision	O
+on	O
+what	O
+device	O
+to	O
+buy	O
+.	O
+
+"	O
+In	O
+the	O
+end	O
+,	O
+the	O
+consumer	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+vote	O
+with	O
+their	O
+wallet	O
+,	O
+''	O
+he	O
+says	O
+.	O
+
+Skygofree	B-Malware
+:	O
+Following	O
+in	O
+the	O
+footsteps	O
+of	O
+HackingTeam	B-Organization
+16	O
+JAN	O
+2018	O
+At	O
+the	O
+beginning	O
+of	O
+October	O
+2017	O
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+new	O
+Android	B-System
+spyware	O
+with	O
+several	O
+features	O
+previously	O
+unseen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+course	O
+of	O
+further	O
+research	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+related	O
+samples	O
+that	O
+point	O
+to	O
+a	O
+long-term	O
+development	O
+process	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+the	O
+initial	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+were	O
+created	O
+at	O
+least	O
+three	O
+years	O
+ago	O
+–	O
+at	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+2014	O
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+then	O
+,	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+’	O
+s	O
+functionality	O
+has	O
+been	O
+improving	O
+and	O
+remarkable	O
+new	O
+features	O
+implemented	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+record	O
+audio	O
+surroundings	O
+via	O
+the	O
+microphone	O
+when	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+is	O
+in	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+location	O
+;	O
+the	O
+stealing	O
+of	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+messages	O
+via	O
+Accessibility	O
+Services	O
+;	O
+and	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+connect	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+to	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+networks	O
+controlled	O
+by	O
+cybercriminals	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+observed	O
+many	O
+web	O
+landing	O
+pages	O
+that	O
+mimic	O
+the	O
+sites	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+operators	O
+and	O
+which	O
+are	O
+used	O
+to	O
+spread	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+implants	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+domains	O
+have	O
+been	O
+registered	O
+by	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+since	O
+2015	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+our	O
+telemetry	O
+,	O
+that	O
+was	O
+the	O
+year	O
+the	O
+distribution	O
+campaign	O
+was	O
+at	O
+its	O
+most	O
+active	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+activities	O
+continue	O
+:	O
+the	O
+most	O
+recently	O
+observed	O
+domain	O
+was	O
+registered	O
+on	O
+October	O
+31	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+our	O
+KSN	O
+statistics	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+several	O
+infected	O
+individuals	O
+,	O
+exclusively	O
+in	O
+Italy	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+as	O
+we	O
+dived	O
+deeper	O
+into	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+several	O
+spyware	O
+tools	O
+for	O
+Windows	B-System
+that	O
+form	O
+an	O
+implant	O
+for	O
+exfiltrating	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+on	O
+a	O
+targeted	O
+machine	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+version	O
+we	O
+found	O
+was	O
+built	O
+at	O
+the	O
+beginning	O
+of	O
+2017	O
+,	O
+and	O
+at	O
+the	O
+moment	O
+we	O
+are	O
+not	O
+sure	O
+whether	O
+this	O
+implant	O
+has	O
+been	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+named	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+Skygofree	B-Malware
+,	O
+because	O
+we	O
+found	O
+the	O
+word	O
+in	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+domains	O
+*	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+Features	O
+Android	B-System
+According	O
+to	O
+the	O
+observed	O
+samples	O
+and	O
+their	O
+signatures	O
+,	O
+early	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+this	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+were	O
+developed	O
+by	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+2014	O
+and	O
+the	O
+campaign	O
+has	O
+remained	O
+active	O
+ever	O
+since	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+and	O
+functionality	O
+have	O
+changed	O
+numerous	O
+times	O
+;	O
+from	O
+simple	O
+unobfuscated	O
+malware	O
+at	O
+the	O
+beginning	O
+to	O
+sophisticated	O
+multi-stage	O
+spyware	O
+that	O
+gives	O
+attackers	O
+full	O
+remote	O
+control	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+examined	O
+all	O
+the	O
+detected	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+one	O
+that	O
+is	O
+signed	O
+by	O
+a	O
+certificate	O
+valid	O
+from	O
+September	O
+14	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+implant	O
+provides	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+grab	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+,	O
+like	O
+call	O
+records	O
+,	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+geolocation	O
+,	O
+surrounding	O
+audio	O
+,	O
+calendar	O
+events	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+memory	O
+information	O
+stored	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+manual	O
+launch	O
+,	O
+it	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+welcome	O
+notification	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+:	O
+Dear	O
+Customer	O
+,	O
+we	O
+’	O
+re	O
+updating	O
+your	O
+configuration	O
+and	O
+it	O
+will	O
+be	O
+ready	O
+as	O
+soon	O
+as	O
+possible	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+same	O
+time	O
+,	O
+it	O
+hides	O
+an	O
+icon	O
+and	O
+starts	O
+background	O
+services	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+further	O
+actions	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+Service	O
+Name	O
+Purpose	O
+AndroidAlarmManager	O
+Uploading	O
+last	O
+recorded	O
+.amr	O
+audio	O
+AndroidSystemService	O
+Audio	O
+recording	O
+AndroidSystemQueues	O
+Location	O
+tracking	O
+with	O
+movement	O
+detection	O
+ClearSystems	O
+GSM	B-System
+tracking	O
+(	O
+CID	O
+,	O
+LAC	O
+,	O
+PSC	O
+)	O
+ClipService	O
+Clipboard	O
+stealing	O
+AndroidFileManager	O
+Uploading	O
+all	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+AndroidPush	O
+XMPP	O
+С	O
+&	O
+C	O
+protocol	O
+(	O
+url.plus:5223	B-Indicator
+)	O
+RegistrationService	O
+Registration	O
+on	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+via	O
+HTTP	O
+(	O
+url.plus/app/pro/	B-Indicator
+)	O
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+a	O
+self-protection	O
+feature	O
+was	O
+implemented	O
+in	O
+almost	O
+every	O
+service	O
+
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+in	O
+Android	B-System
+8.0	I-System
+(	O
+SDK	O
+API	O
+26	O
+)	O
+the	O
+system	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+kill	O
+idle	O
+services	O
+,	O
+this	O
+code	O
+raises	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+update	O
+notification	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+it	O
+:	O
+Cybercriminals	O
+have	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+control	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+via	O
+HTTP	O
+,	O
+XMPP	O
+,	O
+binary	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+FirebaseCloudMessaging	O
+(	O
+or	O
+GoogleCloudMessaging	O
+in	O
+older	O
+versions	O
+)	O
+protocols	O
+.	O
+
+Such	O
+a	O
+diversity	O
+of	O
+protocols	O
+gives	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+more	O
+flexible	O
+control	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+implant	O
+versions	O
+there	O
+are	O
+48	O
+different	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+You	O
+can	O
+find	O
+a	O
+full	O
+list	O
+with	O
+short	O
+descriptions	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Appendix	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+are	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+notable	O
+:	O
+‘	O
+geofence	O
+’	O
+–	O
+this	O
+command	O
+adds	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+location	O
+to	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+’	O
+s	O
+internal	O
+database	O
+and	O
+when	O
+it	O
+matches	O
+a	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+current	O
+location	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+triggers	O
+and	O
+begins	O
+to	O
+record	O
+surrounding	O
+audio	O
+.	O
+
+”	O
+social	O
+”	O
+–	O
+this	O
+command	O
+that	O
+starts	O
+the	O
+‘	O
+AndroidMDMSupport	O
+’	O
+service	O
+–	O
+this	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+files	O
+of	O
+any	O
+other	O
+installed	O
+application	O
+to	O
+be	O
+grabbed	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+service	O
+name	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+clear	O
+that	O
+by	O
+applications	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+mean	O
+MDM	O
+solutions	O
+that	O
+are	O
+business-specific	O
+tools	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+operator	O
+can	O
+specify	O
+a	O
+path	O
+with	O
+the	O
+database	O
+of	O
+any	O
+targeted	O
+application	O
+and	O
+server-side	O
+PHP	O
+script	O
+name	O
+for	O
+uploading	O
+.	O
+
+Several	O
+hardcoded	O
+applications	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+the	O
+MDM-grabbing	O
+command	O
+‘	O
+wifi	O
+’	O
+–	O
+this	O
+command	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+connection	O
+with	O
+specified	O
+configurations	O
+from	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+enable	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+if	O
+it	O
+is	O
+disabled	O
+.	O
+
+So	O
+,	O
+when	O
+a	O
+device	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+established	O
+network	O
+,	O
+this	O
+process	O
+will	O
+be	O
+in	O
+silent	O
+and	O
+automatic	O
+mode	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+command	O
+is	O
+used	O
+to	O
+connect	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+to	O
+a	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+network	O
+controlled	O
+by	O
+the	O
+cybercriminals	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+traffic	O
+sniffing	O
+and	O
+man-in-the-middle	O
+(	O
+MitM	O
+)	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+addWifiConfig	O
+method	O
+code	O
+fragments	O
+‘	O
+camera	O
+’	O
+–	O
+this	O
+command	O
+records	O
+a	O
+video/capture	O
+a	O
+photo	O
+using	O
+the	O
+front-facing	O
+camera	O
+when	O
+someone	O
+next	O
+unlocks	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Skygofree	B-Malware
+feature	O
+the	O
+self-protection	O
+ability	O
+exclusively	O
+for	O
+Huawei	B-Organization
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+is	O
+a	O
+‘	O
+protected	O
+apps	O
+’	O
+list	O
+in	O
+this	O
+brand	O
+’	O
+s	O
+smartphones	O
+,	O
+related	O
+to	O
+a	O
+battery-saving	O
+concept	O
+.	O
+
+Apps	O
+not	O
+selected	O
+as	O
+protected	O
+apps	O
+stop	O
+working	O
+once	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+is	O
+off	O
+and	O
+await	O
+re-activation	O
+,	O
+so	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+that	O
+it	O
+is	O
+running	O
+on	O
+a	O
+Huawei	B-Organization
+device	O
+and	O
+add	O
+itself	O
+to	O
+this	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+Due	O
+to	O
+this	O
+feature	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+clear	O
+that	O
+the	O
+developers	O
+paid	O
+special	O
+attention	O
+to	O
+the	O
+work	O
+of	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+on	O
+Huawei	B-Organization
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Also	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+a	O
+debug	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+(	O
+70a937b2504b3ad6c623581424c7e53d	B-Indicator
+)	O
+that	O
+contains	O
+interesting	O
+constants	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+.	O
+
+Debug	O
+BuildConfig	O
+with	O
+the	O
+version	O
+After	O
+a	O
+deep	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+all	O
+discovered	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Skygofree	B-Malware
+,	O
+we	O
+made	O
+an	O
+approximate	O
+timeline	O
+of	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+’	O
+s	O
+evolution	O
+.	O
+
+Mobile	O
+implant	O
+evolution	O
+timeline	O
+However	O
+,	O
+some	O
+facts	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+the	O
+APK	O
+samples	O
+from	O
+stage	O
+two	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+used	O
+separately	O
+as	O
+the	O
+first	O
+step	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infection	O
+.	O
+
+Below	O
+is	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+the	O
+payloads	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Skygofree	B-Malware
+implant	O
+in	O
+the	O
+second	O
+and	O
+third	O
+stages	O
+.	O
+
+Reverse	O
+shell	O
+payload	O
+The	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+module	O
+is	O
+an	O
+external	O
+ELF	O
+file	O
+compiled	O
+by	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+to	O
+run	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+choice	O
+of	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+determined	O
+by	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+’	O
+s	O
+version	O
+,	O
+and	O
+it	O
+can	O
+be	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+server	O
+soon	O
+after	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+starts	O
+,	O
+or	O
+after	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+command	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+choice	O
+of	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+zip	O
+file	O
+depends	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+process	O
+architecture	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+now	O
+,	O
+we	O
+observe	O
+only	O
+one	O
+payload	O
+version	O
+for	O
+following	O
+the	O
+ARM	B-System
+CPUs	O
+:	O
+arm64-v8a	B-System
+,	O
+armeabi	B-System
+,	O
+armeabi-v7a	B-System
+.	O
+
+Note	O
+that	O
+in	O
+almost	O
+all	O
+cases	O
+,	O
+this	O
+payload	O
+file	O
+,	O
+contained	O
+in	O
+zip	O
+archives	O
+,	O
+is	O
+named	O
+‘	O
+setting	B-Indicator
+’	O
+or	O
+‘	O
+setting.o	B-Indicator
+’	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+main	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+this	O
+module	O
+is	O
+providing	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+features	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+by	O
+connecting	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+’	O
+s	O
+socket	O
+.	O
+
+Reverse	O
+shell	O
+payload	O
+The	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+started	O
+by	O
+the	O
+main	O
+module	O
+with	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+host	O
+and	O
+port	O
+as	O
+a	O
+parameter	O
+that	O
+is	O
+hardcoded	O
+to	O
+‘	O
+54.67.109.199	B-Indicator
+’	O
+and	O
+‘	O
+30010	B-Indicator
+’	O
+in	O
+some	O
+versions	O
+:	O
+Alternatively	O
+,	O
+they	O
+could	O
+be	O
+hardcoded	O
+directly	O
+into	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+code	O
+:	O
+We	O
+also	O
+observed	O
+variants	O
+that	O
+were	O
+equipped	O
+with	O
+similar	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+payloads	O
+directly	O
+in	O
+the	O
+main	O
+APK	O
+/lib/	O
+path	O
+.	O
+
+Equipped	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+payload	O
+with	O
+specific	O
+string	O
+After	O
+an	O
+in-depth	O
+look	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+that	O
+some	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+payload	O
+code	O
+share	O
+similarities	O
+with	O
+PRISM	B-Malware
+–	O
+a	O
+stealth	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+backdoor	O
+that	O
+is	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Github	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+Reverse	O
+shell	O
+payload	O
+from	O
+update_dev.zip	B-Indicator
+Exploit	O
+payload	O
+At	O
+the	O
+same	O
+time	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+an	O
+important	O
+payload	O
+binary	O
+that	O
+is	O
+trying	O
+to	O
+exploit	O
+several	O
+known	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+and	O
+escalate	O
+privileges	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+several	O
+timestamps	O
+,	O
+this	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+used	O
+by	O
+implant	O
+versions	O
+created	O
+since	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+can	O
+also	O
+be	O
+downloaded	O
+by	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+command	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+exploit	O
+payload	O
+contains	O
+following	O
+file	O
+components	O
+:	O
+Component	O
+name	O
+Description	O
+run_root_shell/arrs_put_user.o/arrs_put_user/poc	B-Indicator
+Exploit	O
+ELF	O
+db	O
+Sqlite3	O
+tool	O
+ELF	O
+device.db	B-Indicator
+Sqlite3	O
+database	O
+with	O
+supported	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+their	O
+constants	O
+needed	O
+for	O
+privilege	O
+escalation	O
+‘	O
+device.db	B-Indicator
+’	O
+is	O
+a	O
+database	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+exploit	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+contains	O
+two	O
+tables	O
+–	O
+‘	O
+supported_devices	O
+’	O
+and	O
+‘	O
+device_address	O
+’	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+table	O
+contains	O
+205	O
+devices	O
+with	O
+some	O
+Linux	B-System
+properties	O
+;	O
+the	O
+second	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+specific	O
+memory	O
+addresses	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+them	O
+that	O
+are	O
+needed	O
+for	O
+successful	O
+exploitation	O
+.	O
+
+You	O
+can	O
+find	O
+a	O
+full	O
+list	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+models	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Appendix	O
+.	O
+
+Fragment	O
+of	O
+the	O
+database	O
+with	O
+targeted	O
+devices	O
+and	O
+specific	O
+memory	O
+addresses	O
+If	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+is	O
+not	O
+listed	O
+in	O
+this	O
+database	O
+,	O
+the	O
+exploit	O
+tries	O
+to	O
+discover	O
+these	O
+addresses	O
+programmatically	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+downloading	O
+and	O
+unpacking	O
+,	O
+the	O
+main	O
+module	O
+executes	O
+the	O
+exploit	O
+binary	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+executed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+module	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+get	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+by	O
+exploiting	O
+the	O
+following	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+:	O
+CVE-2013-2094	B-Vulnerability
+CVE-2013-2595	B-Vulnerability
+CVE-2013-6282	B-Vulnerability
+CVE-2014-3153	B-Vulnerability
+(	O
+futex	B-Vulnerability
+aka	O
+TowelRoot	B-Vulnerability
+)	O
+CVE-2015-3636	B-Vulnerability
+Exploitation	O
+process	O
+After	O
+an	O
+in-depth	O
+look	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+that	O
+the	O
+exploit	O
+payload	O
+code	O
+shares	O
+several	O
+similarities	O
+with	O
+the	O
+public	O
+project	O
+android-rooting-tools	O
+.	O
+
+Decompiled	O
+exploit	O
+function	O
+code	O
+fragment	O
+run_with_mmap	O
+function	O
+from	O
+the	O
+android-rooting-tools	B-System
+project	O
+As	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+from	O
+the	O
+comparison	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+similar	O
+strings	O
+and	O
+also	O
+a	O
+unique	O
+comment	O
+in	O
+Italian	O
+,	O
+so	O
+it	O
+looks	O
+like	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+created	O
+this	O
+exploit	O
+payload	O
+based	O
+on	O
+android-rooting-tools	B-System
+project	O
+source	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Busybox	O
+payload	O
+Busybox	O
+is	O
+public	O
+software	O
+that	O
+provides	O
+several	O
+Linux	O
+tools	O
+in	O
+a	O
+single	O
+ELF	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+earlier	O
+versions	O
+,	O
+it	O
+operated	O
+with	O
+shell	O
+commands	O
+like	O
+this	O
+:	O
+Stealing	O
+WhatsApp	O
+encryption	O
+key	O
+with	O
+Busybox	B-Malware
+Social	I-Malware
+payload	I-Malware
+Actually	O
+,	O
+this	O
+is	O
+not	O
+a	O
+standalone	O
+payload	O
+file	O
+–	O
+in	O
+all	O
+the	O
+observed	O
+versions	O
+its	O
+code	O
+was	O
+compiled	O
+with	O
+exploit	O
+payload	O
+in	O
+one	O
+file	O
+(	O
+‘	O
+poc_perm	O
+’	O
+,	O
+‘	O
+arrs_put_user	O
+’	O
+,	O
+‘	O
+arrs_put_user.o	O
+’	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+fact	O
+that	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+escalate	O
+privileges	O
+before	O
+performing	O
+social	O
+payload	O
+actions	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+payload	O
+is	O
+also	O
+used	O
+by	O
+the	O
+earlier	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+similar	O
+functionality	O
+to	O
+the	O
+‘	O
+AndroidMDMSupport	O
+’	O
+command	O
+from	O
+the	O
+current	O
+versions	O
+–	O
+stealing	O
+data	O
+belonging	O
+to	O
+other	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+payload	O
+will	O
+execute	O
+shell	O
+code	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+data	O
+from	O
+various	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+example	O
+below	O
+steals	O
+Facebook	B-System
+data	O
+:	O
+All	O
+the	O
+other	O
+hardcoded	O
+applications	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+:	O
+Package	O
+name	O
+Name	O
+jp.naver.line.android	B-Indicator
+LINE	B-System
+:	I-System
+Free	I-System
+Calls	I-System
+&	I-System
+Messages	I-System
+com.facebook.orca	B-Indicator
+Facebook	B-System
+messenger	I-System
+com.facebook.katana	B-Indicator
+Facebook	B-System
+com.whatsapp	B-Indicator
+WhatsApp	B-System
+com.viber.voip	B-Indicator
+Viber	B-System
+Parser	O
+payload	O
+Upon	O
+receiving	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+command	O
+,	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+can	O
+download	O
+a	O
+special	O
+payload	O
+to	O
+grab	O
+sensitive	O
+information	O
+from	O
+external	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+case	O
+where	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+this	O
+involved	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+examined	O
+version	O
+,	O
+it	O
+was	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+:	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//url	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+plus/Updates/tt/parser.apk	I-Indicator
+The	O
+payload	O
+can	O
+be	O
+a	O
+.dex	O
+or	O
+.apk	O
+file	O
+which	O
+is	O
+a	O
+Java-compiled	O
+Android	B-System
+executable	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+downloading	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+be	O
+loaded	O
+by	O
+the	O
+main	O
+module	O
+via	O
+DexClassLoader	O
+api	O
+:	O
+As	O
+mentioned	O
+,	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+a	O
+payload	O
+that	O
+exclusively	O
+targets	O
+the	O
+WhatsApp	B-System
+messenger	I-System
+and	O
+it	O
+does	O
+so	O
+in	O
+an	O
+original	O
+way	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+payload	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+to	O
+get	O
+information	O
+directly	O
+from	O
+the	O
+displayed	O
+elements	O
+on	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+,	O
+so	O
+it	O
+waits	O
+for	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+application	O
+to	O
+be	O
+launched	O
+and	O
+then	O
+parses	O
+all	O
+nodes	O
+to	O
+find	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+:	O
+Note	O
+that	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+needs	O
+special	O
+permission	O
+to	O
+use	O
+the	O
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+API	O
+,	O
+but	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+command	O
+that	O
+performs	O
+a	O
+request	O
+with	O
+a	O
+phishing	O
+text	O
+displayed	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+such	O
+permission	O
+.	O
+
+Windows	B-System
+We	O
+have	O
+found	O
+multiple	O
+components	O
+that	O
+form	O
+an	O
+entire	O
+spyware	O
+system	O
+for	O
+the	O
+Windows	B-System
+platform	O
+.	O
+
+Name	O
+MD5	O
+Purpose	O
+msconf.exe	B-Indicator
+55fb01048b6287eadcbd9a0f86d21adf	B-Indicator
+Main	O
+module	O
+,	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+network.exe	B-Indicator
+f673bb1d519138ced7659484c0b66c5b	B-Indicator
+Sending	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+system.exe	B-Indicator
+d3baa45ed342fbc5a56d974d36d5f73f	B-Indicator
+Surrounding	O
+sound	O
+recording	O
+by	O
+mic	O
+update.exe	B-Indicator
+395f9f87df728134b5e3c1ca4d48e9fa	B-Indicator
+Keylogging	O
+wow.exe	B-Indicator
+
+16311b16fd48c1c87c6476a455093e7a	B-Indicator
+Screenshot	O
+capturing	O
+skype_sync2.exe	B-Indicator
+6bcc3559d7405f25ea403317353d905f	B-Indicator
+Skype	B-System
+call	O
+recording	O
+to	O
+MP3	O
+All	O
+modules	O
+,	O
+except	O
+skype_sync2.exe	B-Indicator
+,	O
+are	O
+written	O
+in	O
+Python	B-System
+and	O
+packed	O
+to	O
+binary	O
+files	O
+via	O
+the	O
+Py2exe	B-System
+tool	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+sort	O
+of	O
+conversion	O
+allows	O
+Python	B-System
+code	O
+to	O
+be	O
+run	O
+in	O
+a	O
+Windows	B-System
+environment	O
+without	O
+pre-installed	O
+Python	B-System
+binaries	O
+.	O
+
+msconf.exe	B-Indicator
+is	O
+the	O
+main	O
+module	O
+that	O
+provides	O
+control	O
+of	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+and	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+feature	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+opens	O
+a	O
+socket	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+machine	O
+and	O
+connects	O
+with	O
+a	O
+server-side	O
+component	O
+of	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+located	O
+at	O
+54.67.109.199:6500	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Before	O
+connecting	O
+with	O
+the	O
+socket	O
+,	O
+it	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+malware	O
+environment	O
+in	O
+‘	O
+APPDATA/myupd	B-Indicator
+’	O
+and	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+sqlite3	O
+database	O
+there	O
+–	O
+‘	O
+myupd_tmp\\mng.db	B-Indicator
+’	O
+:	O
+CREATE	O
+TABLE	O
+MANAGE	O
+(	O
+ID	O
+INT	O
+PRIMARY	O
+KEY	O
+NOT	O
+NULL	O
+,	O
+Send	O
+INT	O
+NOT	O
+NULL	O
+,	O
+Keylogg	O
+INT	O
+NOT	O
+NULL	O
+,	O
+Screenshot	O
+INT	O
+NOT	O
+NULL	O
+,	O
+Audio	O
+INT	O
+NOT	O
+NULL	O
+)	O
+;	O
+INSERT	O
+INTO	O
+MANAGE	O
+(	O
+ID	O
+,	O
+Send	O
+,	O
+Keylogg	O
+,	O
+Screenshot	O
+,	O
+Audio	O
+
+)	O
+VALUES	O
+(	O
+1	O
+,	O
+1	O
+,	O
+1	O
+,	O
+1	O
+,	O
+0	O
+)	O
+Finally	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+modifies	O
+the	O
+‘	O
+Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	B-Indicator
+’	O
+registry	O
+key	O
+to	O
+enable	O
+autostart	O
+of	O
+the	O
+main	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+contains	O
+multiple	O
+comments	O
+in	O
+Italian	O
+,	O
+here	O
+is	O
+the	O
+most	O
+noteworthy	O
+example	O
+:	O
+“	O
+Receive	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+server	O
+,	O
+here	O
+you	O
+can	O
+set	O
+the	O
+key	O
+commands	O
+to	O
+command	O
+the	O
+virus	O
+”	O
+Here	O
+are	O
+the	O
+available	O
+commands	O
+:	O
+Name	O
+Description	O
+cd	O
+Change	O
+current	O
+directory	O
+to	O
+specified	O
+quit	O
+Close	O
+the	O
+socket	O
+nggexe	O
+Execute	O
+received	O
+command	O
+via	O
+Python	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+subprocess.Popen	O
+(	O
+)	O
+without	O
+outputs	O
+ngguploads	O
+Upload	O
+specified	O
+file	O
+to	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+URL	O
+nggdownloads	O
+Download	O
+content	O
+from	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+URLs	O
+and	O
+save	O
+to	O
+specified	O
+file	O
+nggfilesystem	O
+Dump	O
+file	O
+structure	O
+of	O
+
+the	O
+C	O
+:	O
+path	O
+,	O
+save	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+file	O
+in	O
+json	O
+format	O
+and	O
+zip	O
+it	O
+nggstart_screen	O
+nggstop_screen	O
+Enable/disable	O
+screenshot	O
+module	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+enabled	O
+,	O
+it	O
+makes	O
+a	O
+screenshot	O
+every	O
+25	O
+seconds	O
+nggstart_key	O
+nggstop_key	O
+Enable/disable	O
+keylogging	O
+module	O
+nggstart_rec	O
+nggstop_rec	O
+Enable/disable	O
+surrounding	O
+sounds	O
+recording	O
+module	O
+ngg_status	O
+Send	O
+components	O
+status	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+socket	O
+*	O
+any	O
+other	O
+*	O
+Execute	O
+received	O
+command	O
+via	O
+Python	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+subprocess.Popen	O
+(	O
+)	O
+,	O
+output	O
+result	O
+will	O
+be	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+socket	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+modules	O
+set	O
+hidden	O
+attributes	O
+to	O
+their	O
+files	O
+:	O
+Module	O
+Paths	O
+Exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+format	O
+msconf.exe	B-Indicator
+%	B-Indicator
+APPDATA	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+/myupd/gen/	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+Y	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+m	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+d-	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+H	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+M	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+S_filesystem.zip	I-Indicator
+(	I-Indicator
+file	I-Indicator
+structure	I-Indicator
+dump	I-Indicator
+)	I-Indicator
+system.exe	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+APPDATA	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+/myupd/aud/	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+d	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+m	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+Y	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+H	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+M	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+S.wav	I-Indicator
+(	I-Indicator
+surrounding	I-Indicator
+sounds	I-Indicator
+)	I-Indicator
+update.exe	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+APPDATA	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+/myupd_tmp/txt/	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+APPDATA	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+/myupd/txt/	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+Y	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+m	I-Indicator
+
+%	I-Indicator
+d-	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+H	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+M	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+S.txt	I-Indicator
+(	I-Indicator
+keylogging	I-Indicator
+)	I-Indicator
+wow.exe	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+APPDATA	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+/myupd/scr/	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+Y	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+m	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+d-	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+H	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+M	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+S.jpg	I-Indicator
+(	I-Indicator
+screenshots	I-Indicator
+)	I-Indicator
+skype_sync2.exe	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+APPDATA	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+/myupd_tmp/skype/	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+APPDATA	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+/myupd/skype/	I-Indicator
+yyyyMMddHHmmss_in.mp3	I-Indicator
+yyyyMMddHHmmss_out.mp3	B-Indicator
+(	O
+skype	O
+calls	O
+records	O
+)	O
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+one	O
+module	O
+written	O
+
+in	O
+.Net	B-System
+–	O
+skype_sync2.exe	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+main	O
+purpose	O
+of	O
+this	O
+module	O
+is	O
+to	O
+exfiltrate	O
+Skype	B-System
+call	O
+recordings	O
+.	O
+
+Just	O
+like	O
+the	O
+previous	O
+modules	O
+,	O
+it	O
+contains	O
+multiple	O
+strings	O
+in	O
+Italian	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+launch	O
+,	O
+it	O
+downloads	O
+a	O
+codec	O
+for	O
+MP3	O
+encoding	O
+directly	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+:	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//54.67.109.199/skype_resource/libmp3lame.dll	I-Indicator
+The	O
+skype_sync2.exe	B-Indicator
+module	O
+has	O
+a	O
+compilation	O
+timestamp	O
+–	O
+Feb	O
+06	O
+2017	O
+and	O
+the	O
+following	O
+PDB	O
+string	O
+:	O
+\\vmware-host\Shared	B-Indicator
+Folders\dati\Backup\Projects\REcodin_2\REcodin_2\obj\x86\Release\REcodin_2.pdb	B-Indicator
+network.exe	B-Indicator
+is	O
+a	O
+
+module	O
+for	O
+submitting	O
+all	O
+exfiltrated	O
+data	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+observed	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+it	O
+doesn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+have	O
+an	O
+interface	O
+to	O
+work	O
+with	O
+the	O
+skype_sync2.exe	B-Indicator
+module	O
+.	O
+
+network.exe	B-Indicator
+submitting	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+Code	O
+similarities	O
+We	O
+found	O
+some	O
+code	O
+similarities	O
+between	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+for	O
+Windows	B-System
+and	O
+other	O
+public	O
+accessible	O
+projects	O
+.	O
+
+https	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//github.com/El3ct71k/Keylogger/	I-Indicator
+It	O
+appears	O
+the	O
+developers	O
+have	O
+copied	O
+the	O
+functional	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+keylogger	O
+module	O
+from	O
+this	O
+project	O
+.	O
+
+update.exe	B-Indicator
+module	O
+and	O
+Keylogger	O
+by	O
+‘	O
+El3ct71k	O
+’	O
+code	O
+comparison	O
+Xenotix	B-System
+Python	I-System
+Keylogger	I-System
+including	O
+specified	O
+mutex	O
+‘	O
+mutex_var_xboz	O
+’	O
+.	O
+
+update.exe	B-Indicator
+module	O
+and	O
+Xenotix	B-System
+Python	I-System
+Keylogger	I-System
+code	O
+comparison	O
+‘	O
+addStartup	O
+’	O
+method	O
+from	O
+msconf.exe	B-Indicator
+module	O
+‘	O
+addStartup	O
+’	O
+method	O
+from	O
+Xenotix	B-System
+Python	I-System
+Keylogger	I-System
+Distribution	O
+We	O
+found	O
+several	O
+landing	O
+pages	O
+that	O
+spread	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+implants	O
+.	O
+
+Malicious	O
+URL	O
+Referrer	O
+Dates	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//217.194.13.133/tre/internet/Configuratore_3.apk	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//217.194.13.133/tre/internet/	I-Indicator
+2015-02-04	O
+to	O
+present	O
+time	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//217.194.13.133/appPro_AC.apk	I-Indicator
+–	O
+2015-07-01	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//217.194.13.133/190/configurazione/vodafone/smartphone/VODAFONE	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+20Configuratore	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+20v5_4_2.apk	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//217.194.13.133/190/configurazione/vodafone/smartphone/index.html	I-Indicator
+
+2015-01-20	O
+to	O
+present	O
+time	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//217.194.13.133/190/configurazione/vodafone/smartphone/Vodafone	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+20Configuratore.apk	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//217.194.13.133/190/configurazione/vodafone/smartphone/index.html	I-Indicator
+currently	O
+active	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//vodafoneinfinity.sytes.net/tim/internet/Configuratore_TIM.apk	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//vodafoneinfinity.sytes.net/tim/internet/	I-Indicator
+2015-03-04	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//vodafoneinfinity.sytes.net/190/configurazione/vodafone/smartphone/VODAFONE	I-Indicator
+
+%	I-Indicator
+20Configuratore	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+20v5_4_2.apk	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//vodafoneinfinity.sytes.net/190/configurazione/vodafone/smartphone/	I-Indicator
+2015-01-14	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//windupdate.serveftp.com/wind/LTE/WIND	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+20Configuratore	I-Indicator
+%	I-Indicator
+20v5_4_2.apk	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//windupdate.serveftp.com/wind/LTE/	I-Indicator
+2015-03-31	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//119.network/lte/Internet-TIM-4G-LTE.apk	I-Indicator
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//119.network/lte/download.html	I-Indicator
+
+2015-02-04	O
+2015-07-20	O
+http	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//119.network/lte/Configuratore_TIM.apk	I-Indicator
+2015-07-08	O
+Many	O
+of	O
+these	O
+domains	O
+are	O
+outdated	O
+,	O
+but	O
+almost	O
+all	O
+(	O
+except	O
+one	O
+–	O
+appPro_AC.apk	B-Indicator
+)	O
+samples	O
+located	O
+on	O
+the	O
+217.194.13.133	B-Indicator
+server	O
+are	O
+still	O
+accessible	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+the	O
+observed	O
+landing	O
+pages	O
+mimic	O
+the	O
+mobile	O
+operators	O
+’	O
+web	O
+pages	O
+through	O
+their	O
+domain	O
+name	O
+and	O
+web	O
+page	O
+content	O
+as	O
+well	O
+.	O
+
+Further	O
+research	O
+of	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+infrastructure	O
+revealed	O
+more	O
+related	O
+mimicking	O
+domains	O
+.	O
+
+Unfortunately	O
+,	O
+for	O
+now	O
+we	O
+can	O
+’	O
+t	O
+say	O
+in	O
+what	O
+environment	O
+these	O
+landing	O
+pages	O
+were	O
+used	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+,	O
+but	O
+according	O
+to	O
+all	O
+the	O
+information	O
+at	O
+our	O
+dsiposal	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+assume	O
+that	O
+they	O
+are	O
+perfect	O
+for	O
+exploitation	O
+using	O
+malicious	O
+redirects	O
+or	O
+man-in-the-middle	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+this	O
+could	O
+be	O
+when	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+connects	O
+to	O
+a	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+access	O
+point	O
+that	O
+is	O
+infected	O
+or	O
+controlled	O
+by	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+.	O
+
+Artifacts	O
+During	O
+the	O
+research	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+plenty	O
+of	O
+traces	O
+of	O
+the	O
+developers	O
+and	O
+those	O
+doing	O
+the	O
+maintaining	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+already	O
+stated	O
+in	O
+the	O
+‘	O
+malware	O
+features	O
+’	O
+part	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+multiple	O
+giveaways	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Here	O
+are	O
+just	O
+some	O
+of	O
+them	O
+:	O
+ngglobal	O
+–	O
+FirebaseCloudMessaging	O
+topic	O
+name	O
+Issuer	O
+:	O
+CN	O
+=	O
+negg	O
+–	O
+from	O
+several	O
+certificates	O
+negg.ddns	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+,	O
+negg1.ddns	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+,	O
+negg2.ddns	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+–	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+servers	O
+NG	O
+SuperShell	O
+–	O
+string	O
+from	O
+the	O
+reverse	O
+shell	O
+payload	O
+ngg	O
+–	O
+prefix	O
+in	O
+commands	O
+names	O
+of	O
+the	O
+implant	O
+for	O
+Windows	B-System
+Signature	O
+with	O
+specific	O
+issuer	O
+Whois	O
+records	O
+and	O
+IP	O
+relationships	O
+provide	O
+many	O
+interesting	O
+insights	O
+as	O
+well	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+other	O
+‘	O
+Negg	O
+’	O
+mentions	O
+in	O
+Whois	O
+records	O
+and	O
+references	O
+to	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+:	O
+Conclusions	O
+The	O
+Skygofree	B-Malware
+Android	B-System
+implant	O
+is	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+powerful	O
+spyware	O
+tools	O
+that	O
+we	O
+have	O
+ever	O
+seen	O
+for	O
+this	O
+platform	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+a	O
+result	O
+of	O
+the	O
+long-term	O
+development	O
+process	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+multiple	O
+,	O
+exceptional	O
+capabilities	O
+:	O
+usage	O
+of	O
+multiple	O
+exploits	O
+for	O
+gaining	O
+root	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+a	O
+complex	O
+payload	O
+structure	O
+,	O
+never-before-seen	O
+surveillance	O
+features	O
+such	O
+as	O
+recording	O
+surrounding	O
+audio	O
+in	O
+specified	O
+locations	O
+.	O
+
+Given	O
+the	O
+many	O
+artifacts	O
+we	O
+discovered	O
+in	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+code	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+infrastructure	O
+analysis	O
+,	O
+we	O
+are	O
+pretty	O
+confident	O
+that	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Skygofree	B-Malware
+implants	O
+is	O
+an	O
+Italian	O
+IT	O
+company	O
+that	O
+works	O
+on	O
+surveillance	O
+solutions	O
+,	O
+just	O
+like	O
+HackingTeam	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+:	O
+The	O
+Chickens	O
+Come	O
+Home	O
+to	O
+Roost	O
+March	O
+13	O
+,	O
+2018	O
+at	O
+5:00	O
+AM	O
+Unit	O
+42	O
+recently	O
+discovered	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+family	O
+we	O
+named	O
+“	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+”	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+legitimate	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+chose	O
+the	O
+name	O
+“	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+”	O
+based	O
+on	O
+metadata	O
+found	O
+in	O
+most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+such	O
+as	O
+package	O
+names	O
+and	O
+signer	O
+detail	O
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+masquerades	O
+as	O
+apps	O
+such	O
+as	O
+VPN	O
+and	O
+Android	B-System
+system	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+often	O
+installs	O
+legitimate	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+along	O
+with	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+to	O
+trick	O
+users	O
+into	O
+thinking	O
+they	O
+downloaded	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+apps	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+use	O
+as	O
+decoys	O
+can	O
+be	O
+found	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+apps	O
+themselves	O
+have	O
+only	O
+been	O
+found	O
+on	O
+third-party	O
+(	O
+non-Google	O
+Play	B-System
+)	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+appears	O
+to	O
+primarily	O
+target	O
+the	O
+Uyghurs	O
+–	O
+a	O
+minority	O
+Turkic	O
+ethnic	O
+group	O
+that	O
+is	O
+primarily	O
+Muslim	O
+and	O
+lives	O
+mainly	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Xinjiang	O
+Uyghur	O
+Autonomous	O
+Region	O
+in	O
+North	O
+West	O
+China	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+also	O
+targets	O
+devices	O
+made	O
+by	O
+Chinese	O
+manufacturer	O
+Xiaomi	B-Organization
+and	O
+those	O
+running	O
+MIUI	B-System
+,	O
+an	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+based	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Android	I-System
+made	O
+by	O
+Xiaomi	B-Organization
+.	O
+
+Smartphones	O
+are	O
+the	O
+dominant	O
+form	O
+of	O
+internet	O
+access	O
+in	O
+the	O
+region	O
+and	O
+Xinjiang	O
+was	O
+recently	O
+above	O
+the	O
+national	O
+average	O
+of	O
+internet	O
+users	O
+in	O
+China	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+result	O
+is	O
+a	O
+large	O
+online	O
+population	O
+who	O
+have	O
+been	O
+the	O
+subject	O
+of	O
+numerous	O
+cyber-attacks	O
+in	O
+the	O
+past	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+steals	O
+information	O
+from	O
+the	O
+devices	O
+from	O
+a	O
+myriad	O
+of	O
+sources	O
+,	O
+including	O
+many	O
+mainstream	O
+chat	O
+,	O
+communication	O
+,	O
+and	O
+social	O
+media	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+stolen	O
+information	O
+includes	O
+personal	O
+and	O
+device	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+Of	O
+note	O
+,	O
+in	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+tracking	O
+the	O
+compromised	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+location	O
+,	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+also	O
+harvests	O
+all	O
+outgoing	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+with	O
+an	O
+“	O
+86	O
+”	O
+prefix	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+the	O
+country	O
+code	O
+for	O
+the	O
+People	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Republic	O
+of	O
+China	O
+(	O
+PRC	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+can	O
+also	O
+access	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+’	O
+s	O
+cameras	O
+and	O
+microphone	O
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+has	O
+ties	O
+to	O
+infrastructure	O
+used	O
+in	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+with	O
+a	O
+focus	O
+on	O
+politics	O
+in	O
+South	O
+East	O
+Asia	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+attackers	O
+have	O
+used	O
+additional	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+in	O
+previous	O
+activity	O
+dating	O
+to	O
+at	O
+least	O
+2015	O
+that	O
+include	O
+PlugX	B-Malware
+,	O
+Zupdax	B-Malware
+,	O
+9002	B-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+This	O
+also	O
+aligns	O
+with	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+timeline	O
+,	O
+as	O
+in	O
+total	O
+we	O
+have	O
+identified	O
+almost	O
+200	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+samples	O
+,	O
+with	O
+the	O
+oldest	O
+dating	O
+to	O
+2015	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+samples	O
+we	O
+found	O
+date	O
+from	O
+the	O
+last	O
+half	O
+of	O
+2017	O
+,	O
+fewer	O
+samples	O
+date	O
+from	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+and	O
+a	O
+handful	O
+date	O
+back	O
+to	O
+2015	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+already	O
+observed	O
+a	O
+small	O
+but	O
+consistent	O
+number	O
+of	O
+samples	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+this	O
+indicates	O
+a	O
+fairly	O
+sustained	O
+campaign	O
+that	O
+has	O
+gained	O
+momentum	O
+over	O
+recent	O
+months	O
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+Enters	O
+the	O
+Uyghur	B-System
+App	I-System
+Store	I-System
+In	O
+May	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+a	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+app	O
+was	O
+downloaded	O
+from	O
+uyghurapps	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+Specifically	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+was	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+Package	I-System
+(	O
+APK	O
+)	O
+file	O
+that	O
+will	O
+be	O
+discussed	O
+in	O
+more	O
+detail	O
+shortly	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+domain	O
+name	O
+,	O
+language	O
+of	O
+the	O
+site	O
+and	O
+app	O
+content	O
+hosted	O
+suggest	O
+this	O
+site	O
+is	O
+a	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+store	O
+for	O
+whom	O
+the	O
+intended	O
+users	O
+are	O
+the	O
+Uyghurs	O
+.	O
+
+Such	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+are	O
+so-called	O
+because	O
+they	O
+are	O
+not	O
+officially	O
+supported	O
+by	O
+Android	B-System
+,	O
+nor	O
+are	O
+they	O
+provided	O
+by	O
+Google	B-Organization
+,	O
+unlike	O
+the	O
+Play	B-System
+Store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Third-party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+are	O
+ubiquitous	O
+in	O
+China	O
+for	O
+a	O
+number	O
+of	O
+reasons	O
+including	O
+:	O
+evermore	O
+powerful	O
+Chinese	B-Organization
+Original	I-Organization
+Equipment	I-Organization
+Manufacturers	I-Organization
+(	I-Organization
+OEM	I-Organization
+)	I-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+lack	O
+of	O
+an	O
+official	O
+Chinese	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+app	O
+store	O
+,	O
+and	O
+a	O
+growing	O
+smartphone	O
+market	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+app	O
+downloaded	O
+in	O
+May	O
+2016	O
+was	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+the	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+app	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+the	O
+content	O
+served	O
+at	O
+the	O
+given	O
+URL	O
+on	O
+uyghurapps	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+,	O
+is	O
+now	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+app	O
+,	O
+and	O
+looks	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+1	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+henbox_2	O
+Figure	O
+1	O
+Uyghurapps	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+app	O
+store	O
+showing	O
+the	O
+current	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+app	O
+Virtual	O
+Private	O
+Network	O
+(	O
+VPN	O
+)	O
+tools	O
+allow	O
+connections	O
+to	O
+remote	O
+private	O
+networks	O
+,	O
+increasing	O
+the	O
+security	O
+and	O
+privacy	O
+of	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+communications	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+the	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+app	O
+description	O
+,	O
+it	O
+“	O
+helps	O
+bypass	O
+regional	O
+internet	O
+restrictions	O
+,	O
+web	O
+filtering	O
+and	O
+firewalls	O
+by	O
+tunneling	O
+traffic	O
+over	O
+ICMP.	O
+”	O
+Some	O
+features	O
+may	O
+require	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+be	O
+rooted	O
+to	O
+function	O
+and	O
+according	O
+to	O
+some	O
+3rd	O
+party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+,	O
+unconditional	O
+rooting	O
+is	O
+required	O
+,	O
+which	O
+has	O
+additional	O
+security	O
+implications	O
+for	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+not	O
+been	O
+able	O
+to	O
+ascertain	O
+how	O
+the	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+app	O
+on	O
+the	O
+uyghurapps	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+app	O
+store	O
+was	O
+replaced	O
+with	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+app	O
+;	O
+however	O
+,	O
+some	O
+indicators	O
+point	O
+to	O
+the	O
+server	O
+running	O
+an	O
+outdated	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Apache	O
+Web	O
+Server	O
+on	O
+a	O
+Windows	B-System
+32-Bit	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+light	O
+of	O
+this	O
+,	O
+we	O
+believe	O
+an	O
+attack	O
+against	O
+unpatched	B-Vulnerability
+vulnerabilities	I-Vulnerability
+is	O
+a	O
+reasonable	O
+conjecture	O
+for	O
+how	O
+the	O
+server	O
+was	O
+compromised	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+HenBox	O
+app	O
+downloaded	O
+in	O
+May	O
+2016	O
+,	O
+as	O
+described	O
+in	O
+Table	O
+1	O
+below	O
+,	O
+masquerades	O
+as	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+app	O
+by	O
+using	O
+the	O
+same	O
+app	O
+name	O
+“	O
+DroidVPN	B-System
+”	O
+and	O
+the	O
+same	O
+iconography	O
+used	O
+when	O
+displaying	O
+the	O
+app	O
+in	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+launcher	O
+view	O
+,	O
+as	O
+highlighted	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+2	O
+below	O
+Table	O
+1	O
+.	O
+
+APK	O
+SHA256	O
+Size	O
+(	O
+bytes	O
+)	O
+First	O
+Seen	O
+App	O
+Package	O
+name	O
+App	O
+name	O
+0589bed1e3b3d6234c30061be3be1cc6685d786ab3a892a8d4dae8e2d7ed92f7	B-Indicator
+2,740,860	O
+May	O
+2016	O
+com.android.henbox	B-Indicator
+DroidVPN	B-System
+Table	O
+1	O
+Details	O
+of	O
+the	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+DroidVPN	B-System
+app	O
+on	O
+the	O
+uyghurapps	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+app	O
+store	O
+henbox_3	O
+Figure	O
+2	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+app	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+purporting	O
+to	O
+be	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+Depending	O
+on	O
+the	O
+language	O
+setting	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+and	O
+for	O
+this	O
+particular	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+,	O
+the	O
+installed	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+app	O
+may	O
+have	O
+the	O
+name	O
+“	O
+Backup	O
+”	O
+but	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+same	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+logo	O
+.	O
+
+Other	O
+variants	O
+use	O
+other	O
+names	O
+and	O
+logos	O
+,	O
+as	O
+described	O
+later	O
+.	O
+
+Given	O
+the	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+look	O
+and	O
+feel	O
+being	O
+used	O
+by	O
+this	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+,	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+highly	O
+likely	O
+the	O
+uyghurapps	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+page	O
+for	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+remained	O
+identical	O
+when	O
+serving	O
+either	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+or	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+apps	O
+,	O
+just	O
+that	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+APK	O
+file	O
+had	O
+been	O
+replaced	O
+with	O
+HenBox	O
+for	O
+an	O
+unknown	O
+period	O
+of	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+the	O
+look	O
+and	O
+feel	O
+of	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+,	O
+this	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+variant	O
+also	O
+contained	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+app	O
+within	O
+its	O
+APK	O
+package	O
+as	O
+an	O
+asset	O
+,	O
+which	O
+could	O
+be	O
+compared	O
+to	O
+a	O
+resource	O
+item	O
+within	O
+a	O
+Windows	B-System
+Portable	I-System
+Executable	I-System
+(	O
+PE	O
+)	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+the	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+app	O
+is	O
+installed	O
+and	O
+launched	O
+,	O
+it	O
+launches	O
+an	O
+install	O
+process	O
+for	O
+the	O
+embedded	O
+app	O
+as	O
+a	O
+decoy	O
+to	O
+other	O
+malicious	O
+behaviors	O
+occurring	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+,	O
+and	O
+to	O
+satisfy	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+with	O
+the	O
+app	O
+they	O
+were	O
+requesting	O
+,	O
+assuming	O
+they	O
+requested	O
+to	O
+download	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+app	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+DroidVPN	B-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+embedded	O
+inside	O
+this	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+variant	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+version	O
+of	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+available	O
+for	O
+download	O
+from	O
+uyghurapps	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+,	O
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+worth	O
+noting	O
+,	O
+newer	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DroidVPN	B-System
+app	O
+are	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+in	O
+some	O
+other	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+,	O
+which	O
+could	O
+indicate	O
+uyghurapps	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+is	O
+not	O
+awfully	O
+well	O
+maintained	O
+or	O
+updated	O
+to	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+apps	O
+available	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+to	O
+our	O
+knowledge	O
+no	O
+other	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+,	O
+nor	O
+the	O
+official	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+store	O
+,	O
+were	O
+or	O
+are	O
+hosting	O
+this	O
+malicious	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+variant	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Right	O
+App	O
+at	O
+the	O
+Right	O
+Time	O
+The	O
+malicious	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+and	O
+embedded	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+app	O
+combination	O
+is	O
+one	O
+instance	O
+of	O
+the	O
+type	O
+of	O
+legitimate	O
+apps	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+choose	O
+to	O
+mimic	O
+to	O
+compromise	O
+their	O
+victims	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+frequently	O
+offer	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+purporting	O
+to	O
+be	O
+legitimate	O
+apps	O
+that	O
+are	O
+broadly	O
+used	O
+or	O
+important	O
+to	O
+a	O
+targeted	O
+population	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+worth	O
+noting	O
+however	O
+,	O
+about	O
+one-third	O
+of	O
+the	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+apps	O
+contained	O
+embedded	O
+APK	O
+objects	O
+that	O
+did	O
+not	O
+refer	O
+to	O
+legitimate	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+were	O
+only	O
+3	O
+bytes	O
+long	O
+,	O
+containing	O
+strings	O
+such	O
+as	O
+“	O
+ddd	O
+”	O
+and	O
+“	O
+333	O
+”	O
+,	O
+or	O
+were	O
+otherwise	O
+corrupted	O
+.	O
+
+Beyond	O
+the	O
+previously	O
+mentioned	O
+DroidVPN	B-Indicator
+example	O
+,	O
+other	O
+viable	O
+embedded	O
+apps	O
+we	O
+found	O
+include	O
+apps	O
+currently	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+many	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+Table	O
+2	O
+below	O
+lists	O
+some	O
+of	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+with	O
+their	O
+respective	O
+metadata	O
+.	O
+
+Sample	O
+1	O
+marks	O
+the	O
+first	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+sample	O
+we	O
+saw	O
+embedding	O
+a	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+within	O
+its	O
+assets	O
+to	O
+be	O
+dropped	O
+and	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+device	O
+as	O
+a	O
+decoy	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+in	O
+question	O
+was	O
+a	O
+Uyghur	O
+language	O
+keyboard	O
+app	O
+targeted	O
+at	O
+native	O
+speakers	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Uyghur	O
+language	O
+and	O
+their	O
+smartphones	O
+.	O
+
+Sample	O
+2	O
+,	O
+has	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+cn.android.setting	B-Indicator
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+Android	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Settings	B-System
+app	I-System
+,	O
+which	O
+has	O
+a	O
+similar	O
+package	O
+name	O
+(	O
+com.android.settings	B-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+also	O
+used	O
+the	O
+common	O
+green	O
+Android	B-System
+figure	O
+as	O
+the	O
+app	O
+logo	O
+and	O
+was	O
+named	O
+设置	O
+(	O
+“	O
+Backup	O
+”	O
+in	O
+English	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+variant	O
+’	O
+s	O
+app	O
+name	O
+,	O
+along	O
+with	O
+many	O
+others	O
+,	O
+is	O
+written	O
+in	O
+Chinese	O
+and	O
+describes	O
+the	O
+app	O
+as	O
+a	O
+backup	O
+tool	O
+.	O
+
+Please	O
+see	O
+the	O
+IOCs	O
+section	O
+for	O
+all	O
+app	O
+and	O
+package	O
+name	O
+combinations	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+the	O
+embedded	O
+app	O
+in	O
+sample	O
+2	O
+is	O
+not	O
+a	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+Settings	I-System
+app	O
+but	O
+instead	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Amaq	B-System
+Agency	I-System
+”	O
+app	O
+,	O
+which	O
+reports	O
+on	O
+ISIS	O
+related	O
+news	O
+.	O
+
+Reports	O
+indicate	O
+fake	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Amaq	B-System
+app	O
+exist	O
+,	O
+likely	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+spy	O
+on	O
+those	O
+that	O
+use	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+month	O
+after	O
+observing	O
+sample	O
+2	O
+,	O
+we	O
+obtained	O
+another	O
+which	O
+used	O
+the	O
+same	O
+package	O
+name	O
+as	O
+sample	O
+2	O
+(	O
+cn.android.setting	B-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+this	O
+time	O
+the	O
+app	O
+name	O
+for	O
+both	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+and	O
+the	O
+embedded	O
+app	O
+were	O
+identical	O
+:	O
+Islamawazi	B-System
+.	O
+
+Islamawazi	B-System
+is	O
+also	O
+known	O
+as	O
+the	O
+Turkistan	B-Organization
+Islamic	I-Organization
+Party	I-Organization
+or	O
+“	O
+TIP	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+organization	O
+was	O
+formerly	O
+known	O
+as	O
+the	O
+East	B-Organization
+Turkestan	I-Organization
+Islamic	I-Organization
+Party	I-Organization
+and	O
+is	O
+purported	O
+to	O
+be	O
+an	O
+Islamic	O
+extremist	O
+separatist	O
+organization	O
+founded	O
+by	O
+Uyghur	O
+jihadists	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+embedded	O
+app	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+a	O
+media	O
+player	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+examples	O
+,	O
+together	O
+with	O
+the	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+app	O
+placed	O
+on	O
+a	O
+very	O
+specific	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+store	O
+,	O
+point	O
+clearly	O
+to	O
+at	O
+least	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+intended	O
+targets	O
+of	O
+these	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+being	O
+Uyghurs	O
+,	O
+specifically	O
+those	O
+with	O
+interest	O
+in	O
+or	O
+association	O
+with	O
+terrorist	O
+groups	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+choosing	O
+the	O
+right	O
+apps	O
+–	O
+those	O
+that	O
+could	O
+be	O
+popular	O
+with	O
+locals	O
+in	O
+the	O
+region	O
+,	O
+at	O
+the	O
+right	O
+time	O
+–	O
+while	O
+tensions	O
+grow	O
+in	O
+this	O
+region	O
+of	O
+China	O
+,	O
+to	O
+ensure	O
+a	O
+good	O
+victim	O
+install-base	O
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+Roosts	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+has	O
+evolved	O
+over	O
+the	O
+past	O
+three	O
+years	O
+,	O
+and	O
+of	O
+the	O
+almost	O
+two	O
+hundred	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+apps	O
+in	O
+AutoFocus	O
+,	O
+the	O
+vast	O
+majority	O
+contain	O
+several	O
+native	O
+libraries	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+other	O
+components	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+their	O
+objective	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+components	O
+are	O
+obfuscated	O
+in	O
+some	O
+way	O
+,	O
+whether	O
+it	O
+be	O
+simple	O
+XOR	O
+with	O
+a	O
+single-byte	O
+key	O
+,	O
+or	O
+through	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+ZIP	B-System
+or	O
+Zlib	B-System
+compression	O
+wrapped	O
+with	O
+RC4	O
+encryption	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+components	O
+are	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+a	O
+myriad	O
+of	O
+functions	O
+including	O
+handling	O
+decryption	O
+,	O
+network	O
+communications	O
+,	O
+gaining	O
+super-user	O
+privileges	O
+,	O
+monitoring	O
+system	O
+logs	O
+,	O
+loading	O
+additional	O
+Dalvik	O
+code	O
+files	O
+,	O
+tracking	O
+the	O
+device	O
+location	O
+and	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+remainder	O
+of	O
+this	O
+section	O
+describes	O
+at	O
+a	O
+high-level	O
+what	O
+HenBox	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+,	O
+and	O
+how	O
+it	O
+operates	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+description	O
+is	O
+based	O
+on	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+sample	O
+described	O
+in	O
+Table	O
+3	O
+below	O
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+of	O
+interest	O
+given	O
+its	O
+C2	O
+domain	B-Indicator
+mefound	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+overlaps	O
+with	O
+PlugX	B-Malware
+,	O
+Zupdax	B-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+malware	O
+families	O
+discussed	O
+in	O
+more	O
+detail	O
+later	O
+.	O
+
+SHA256	O
+Package	O
+Name	O
+App	O
+Name	O
+a6c7351b09a733a1b3ff8a0901c5bde	B-Indicator
+fdc3b566bfcedcdf5a338c3a97c9f249b	O
+com.android.henbox	B-Indicator
+备份	O
+(	O
+Backup	O
+)	O
+Table	O
+3	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+variant	O
+used	O
+in	O
+description	O
+Once	O
+this	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+is	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+can	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+in	O
+two	O
+different	O
+ways	O
+:	O
+One	O
+method	O
+for	O
+executing	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+is	O
+for	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+to	O
+launch	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+(	O
+named	O
+“	O
+Backup	O
+”	O
+,	O
+in	O
+
+this	O
+instance	O
+)	O
+from	O
+the	O
+launcher	O
+view	O
+on	O
+their	O
+device	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+3	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+runs	O
+code	O
+in	O
+the	O
+onCreate	O
+(	O
+)	O
+method	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+MainActivity	O
+class	O
+,	O
+which	O
+in	O
+effect	O
+is	O
+the	O
+program	O
+’	O
+s	O
+entry	O
+point	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+process	O
+is	O
+defined	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+AndroidManifest.xml	O
+config	O
+file	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+following	O
+snippet	O
+.	O
+
+Doing	O
+so	O
+executes	O
+code	O
+checking	O
+if	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+manufactured	O
+by	O
+Xiaomi	B-Organization
+,	O
+or	O
+if	O
+Xiaomi	B-Organization
+’	I-Organization
+s	I-Organization
+fork	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+is	O
+running	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Under	O
+these	O
+conditions	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+continues	O
+executing	O
+and	O
+the	O
+intent	O
+of	O
+targeting	O
+Xiaomi	B-Organization
+devices	O
+and	O
+users	O
+could	O
+be	O
+inferred	O
+,	O
+however	O
+poorly	O
+written	O
+code	O
+results	O
+in	O
+execution	O
+in	O
+more	O
+environments	O
+than	O
+perhaps	O
+intended	O
+;	O
+further	O
+checks	O
+are	O
+made	O
+to	O
+ascertain	O
+whether	O
+the	O
+app	O
+is	O
+running	O
+on	O
+an	O
+emulator	O
+,	O
+perhaps	O
+to	O
+evade	O
+researcher	O
+analysis	O
+environments	O
+.	O
+
+Assuming	O
+these	O
+checks	O
+pass	O
+,	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+main	O
+ELF	O
+libraries	O
+is	O
+loaded	O
+that	O
+orchestrates	O
+other	O
+components	O
+and	O
+provides	O
+functionality	O
+to	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Dalvik	O
+code	O
+through	O
+the	O
+Java	O
+Native	O
+Interface	O
+(	O
+JNI	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+checks	O
+whether	O
+this	O
+execution	O
+is	O
+its	O
+first	O
+by	O
+using	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+shared	O
+preferences	O
+feature	O
+to	O
+persist	O
+XML	O
+key-value	O
+pair	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+it	O
+is	O
+the	O
+first	O
+execution	O
+,	O
+and	O
+if	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+path	O
+does	O
+not	O
+contain	O
+“	O
+/system/app	B-Indicator
+”	O
+(	O
+i.e	O
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+is	O
+not	O
+running	O
+as	O
+a	O
+system	O
+app	O
+)	O
+,	O
+another	O
+ELF	O
+library	O
+is	O
+loaded	O
+to	O
+aid	O
+with	O
+executing	O
+super-user	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+method	O
+uses	O
+intents	O
+,	O
+broadcasts	O
+,	O
+and	O
+receivers	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+HenBox	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Providing	O
+the	O
+app	O
+has	O
+registered	O
+an	O
+intent	O
+to	O
+process	O
+particular	O
+events	O
+from	O
+the	O
+system	O
+,	O
+and	O
+one	O
+of	O
+said	O
+events	O
+occurs	O
+,	O
+HenBox	O
+is	O
+effectively	O
+brought	O
+to	O
+life	O
+through	O
+external	O
+stimulus	O
+from	O
+another	O
+app	O
+on	O
+the	O
+system	O
+broadcasting	O
+a	O
+request	O
+,	O
+or	O
+the	O
+system	O
+itself	O
+broadcasting	O
+a	O
+particular	O
+event	O
+has	O
+occurred	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+intents	O
+are	O
+typically	O
+defined	O
+statically	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+AndroidManifest.xml	O
+config	O
+file	O
+;	O
+some	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+variants	O
+register	O
+further	O
+intents	O
+from	O
+their	O
+code	O
+at	O
+run-time	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+a	O
+matching	O
+intent	O
+is	O
+triggered	O
+,	O
+the	O
+respective	O
+Receiver	O
+code	O
+will	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+,	O
+leading	O
+to	O
+other	O
+HenBox	O
+behaviors	O
+being	O
+launched	O
+,	O
+which	O
+are	O
+described	O
+later	O
+.	O
+
+Table	O
+4	O
+below	O
+lists	O
+the	O
+intents	O
+that	O
+are	O
+statically	O
+registered	O
+in	O
+this	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+variant	O
+’	O
+s	O
+AndroidManifest.xml	O
+config	O
+file	O
+,	O
+together	O
+with	O
+a	O
+description	O
+of	O
+what	O
+that	O
+intent	O
+does	O
+,	O
+and	O
+when	O
+it	O
+would	O
+be	O
+used	O
+.	O
+
+Depending	O
+on	O
+the	O
+intent	O
+triggered	O
+,	O
+one	O
+of	O
+two	O
+Receivers	O
+would	O
+be	O
+called	O
+,	O
+in	O
+this	O
+instance	O
+they	O
+are	O
+called	O
+Boot	O
+or	O
+Time	O
+but	O
+the	O
+name	O
+is	O
+somewhat	O
+immaterial	O
+.	O
+
+Receiver	O
+Intent	O
+Name	O
+Description	O
+BootReceiver	O
+android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED	B-Indicator
+System	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+the	O
+device	O
+has	O
+finished	O
+booting	O
+.	O
+
+android.intent.action.restart	B-Indicator
+A	O
+legacy	O
+intent	O
+used	O
+to	O
+indicate	O
+a	O
+system	O
+restart	O
+.	O
+
+android.intent.action.SIM_STATE_CHANGED	B-Indicator
+System	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+the	O
+SIM	O
+card	O
+has	O
+changed	O
+or	O
+been	O
+removed	O
+.	O
+
+android.intent.action.PACKAGE_INSTALL	B-Indicator
+System	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+the	O
+download	O
+and	O
+eventual	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+an	O
+app	O
+package	O
+is	O
+happening	O
+(	O
+this	O
+is	O
+deprecated	O
+)	O
+android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED	B-Indicator
+System	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+a	O
+new	O
+app	O
+package	O
+has	O
+been	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+said	O
+package	O
+.	O
+
+com.xiaomi.smarthome.receive_alarm	B-Indicator
+Received	O
+notifications	O
+from	O
+Xiaomi	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+smart	O
+home	O
+IoT	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+TimeReceiver	O
+android.intent.action.ACTION_TIME_CHANGED	B-Indicator
+System	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+the	O
+time	O
+was	O
+set	O
+.	O
+
+android.intent.action.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE	B-Indicator
+System	O
+notification	O
+that	O
+a	O
+change	O
+in	O
+network	O
+connectivity	O
+has	O
+occurred	O
+,	O
+either	O
+lost	O
+or	O
+established	O
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+Android	B-System
+version	O
+7	O
+(	O
+Nougat	B-System
+)	O
+this	O
+information	O
+is	O
+gathered	O
+using	O
+other	O
+means	O
+,	O
+perhaps	O
+inferring	O
+the	O
+devices	O
+used	O
+by	O
+potential	O
+victim	O
+run	O
+older	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+Table	O
+4	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+variant	O
+'s	O
+Intents	O
+and	O
+Receivers	O
+Most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+intents	O
+registered	O
+in	O
+the	O
+AndroidManifest.xml	O
+file	O
+,	O
+or	O
+loaded	O
+during	O
+run-time	O
+,	O
+are	O
+commonly	O
+found	O
+in	O
+malicious	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+’	O
+s	O
+more	O
+interesting	O
+,	O
+and	O
+much	O
+less	O
+common	O
+,	O
+is	O
+the	O
+inclusion	O
+of	O
+the	O
+com.xiaomi.smarthome.receive_alarm	B-Indicator
+intent	O
+filter	O
+.	O
+
+Xiaomi	B-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+privately	O
+owned	O
+Chinese	O
+electronics	O
+and	O
+software	O
+company	O
+,	O
+is	O
+the	O
+5th	O
+largest	O
+smart	O
+phone	O
+manufacturer	O
+in	O
+the	O
+world	O
+and	O
+also	O
+manufactures	O
+IoT	O
+devices	O
+for	O
+the	O
+home	O
+.	O
+
+Most	O
+devices	O
+can	O
+be	O
+controlled	O
+by	O
+Xiaomi	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+“	O
+MiHome	B-System
+”	O
+Android	B-System
+app	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+with	O
+between	O
+1,000,000	O
+and	O
+5,000,000	O
+downloads	O
+.	O
+
+Given	O
+the	O
+nature	O
+of	O
+connected	O
+devices	O
+in	O
+smart	O
+homes	O
+,	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+highly	O
+likely	O
+many	O
+of	O
+these	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+and	O
+indeed	O
+the	O
+controller	O
+app	O
+itself	O
+,	O
+communicate	O
+with	O
+one	O
+another	O
+sending	O
+status	O
+notifications	O
+,	O
+alerts	O
+and	O
+so	O
+on	O
+.	O
+
+Such	O
+notifications	O
+would	O
+be	O
+received	O
+by	O
+the	O
+MiHome	B-System
+app	O
+or	O
+any	O
+other	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+,	O
+so	O
+long	O
+as	O
+they	O
+register	O
+their	O
+intent	O
+to	O
+do	O
+so	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+could	O
+essentially	O
+allow	O
+for	O
+external	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+act	O
+as	O
+a	O
+trigger	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+code	O
+,	O
+or	O
+perhaps	O
+afford	O
+additional	O
+data	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+can	O
+collect	O
+and	O
+exfiltrate	O
+.	O
+
+Either	O
+method	O
+to	O
+load	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+ultimately	O
+results	O
+in	O
+an	O
+instance	O
+of	O
+a	O
+service	O
+being	O
+launched	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+service	O
+hides	O
+the	O
+app	O
+from	O
+plain	O
+sight	O
+and	O
+loads	O
+another	O
+ELF	O
+library	O
+to	O
+gather	O
+environmental	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+running	O
+processes	O
+and	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+and	O
+details	O
+about	O
+device	O
+hardware	O
+,	O
+primarily	O
+through	O
+parsing	O
+system	O
+logs	O
+and	O
+querying	O
+running	O
+processes	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+service	O
+continues	O
+by	O
+loading	O
+an	O
+ELF	O
+,	O
+created	O
+by	O
+Baidu	B-Organization
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+tracking	O
+the	O
+device	O
+location	O
+before	O
+setting	O
+up	O
+a	O
+monitor	O
+to	O
+harvest	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+outgoing	O
+calls	O
+for	O
+those	O
+numbers	O
+with	O
+a	O
+country	O
+code	O
+“	O
++86	O
+”	O
+prefix	O
+,	O
+which	O
+relates	O
+to	O
+the	O
+People	O
+’	O
+s	O
+Republic	O
+of	O
+China	O
+.	O
+
+Further	O
+assets	O
+are	O
+decrypted	O
+and	O
+deployed	O
+,	O
+including	O
+another	O
+Dalvik	O
+DEX	O
+code	O
+file	O
+,	O
+which	O
+has	O
+various	O
+capabilities	O
+including	O
+registering	O
+itself	O
+as	O
+the	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+handler	O
+for	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+loading	O
+another	O
+ELF	O
+library	O
+that	O
+includes	O
+a	O
+version	O
+of	O
+BusyBox	B-System
+-	O
+a	O
+package	O
+containing	O
+various	O
+stripped-down	O
+Unix	O
+tools	O
+useful	O
+for	O
+administering	O
+such	O
+systems	O
+–	O
+and	O
+,	O
+interestingly	O
+,	O
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+turning	O
+off	O
+the	O
+sound	O
+played	O
+when	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+cameras	O
+take	O
+pictures	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Android	B-System
+permissions	O
+requested	O
+by	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+,	O
+as	O
+defined	O
+in	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+’	O
+AndroidManifest.xml	O
+files	O
+,	O
+range	O
+from	O
+accessing	O
+location	O
+and	O
+network	O
+settings	O
+to	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+call	O
+,	O
+and	O
+contact	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+HenBox	B-Malware
+can	O
+also	O
+access	O
+sensors	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+device	O
+camera	O
+(	O
+s	O
+)	O
+and	O
+the	O
+microphone	O
+.	O
+
+Beyond	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+app	O
+itself	O
+,	O
+other	O
+components	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+aforementioned	O
+ELF	O
+libraries	O
+have	O
+additional	O
+data-stealing	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+ELF	O
+library	O
+,	O
+libloc4d.so	B-Indicator
+,	O
+handles	O
+amongst	O
+other	O
+things	O
+the	O
+loading	O
+of	O
+the	O
+app-decoded	O
+ELF	O
+library	O
+file	O
+“	O
+sux	O
+”	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+handling	O
+connectivity	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+sux	O
+library	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+a	O
+customized	O
+super	O
+user	O
+(	O
+su	O
+)	O
+tool	O
+that	O
+includes	O
+code	O
+from	O
+the	O
+com.koushikdutta.superuser	B-Indicator
+app	O
+and	O
+carries	O
+the	O
+equivalent	O
+of	O
+a	O
+super	O
+user	O
+(	O
+su	O
+)	O
+binary	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+run	O
+privileged	O
+commands	O
+on	O
+the	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+primary	O
+goal	O
+of	O
+sux	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+steal	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+other	O
+data	O
+from	O
+popular	O
+messaging	O
+and	O
+social	O
+media	O
+apps	O
+specified	O
+within	O
+the	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+sample	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+similar	O
+tool	O
+,	O
+with	O
+the	O
+same	O
+filename	O
+,	O
+has	O
+been	O
+discussed	O
+in	O
+previous	O
+research	O
+but	O
+the	O
+SpyDealer	B-Malware
+malware	O
+appears	O
+unrelated	O
+to	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+More	O
+likely	O
+,	O
+this	O
+is	O
+a	O
+case	O
+of	O
+common	O
+attack	O
+tools	O
+being	O
+re-used	O
+between	O
+different	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+groups	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+particular	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+variant	O
+,	O
+as	O
+listed	O
+in	O
+Table	O
+3	O
+above	O
+,	O
+harvests	O
+data	O
+from	O
+two	O
+popular	O
+messaging	O
+and	O
+social	O
+media	O
+apps	O
+:	O
+Voxer	B-System
+Walkie	B-System
+Talkie	I-System
+Messenger	B-System
+(	O
+com.rebelvox.voxer	B-Indicator
+)	O
+and	O
+Tencent	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+WeChat	B-System
+(	O
+com.tencent.mm	B-Indicator
+)	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+types	O
+of	O
+apps	O
+tend	O
+to	O
+store	O
+their	O
+data	O
+in	O
+databases	O
+and	O
+,	O
+as	O
+an	O
+example	O
+,	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+accesses	O
+Voxer	O
+’	O
+s	O
+database	O
+from	O
+the	O
+file	O
+“	O
+/data/data/com.rebelvox.voxer/databases/rv.db	B-Indicator
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+opened	O
+,	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+runs	O
+the	O
+following	O
+query	O
+to	O
+gather	O
+message	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+Not	O
+long	O
+after	O
+this	O
+variant	O
+was	O
+public	O
+,	O
+newer	O
+variants	O
+of	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+were	O
+seen	O
+,	O
+and	O
+some	O
+had	O
+significant	O
+increases	O
+in	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Table	O
+5	O
+describes	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+variant	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+AutoFocus	O
+.	O
+
+SHA256	O
+Package	O
+Name	O
+App	O
+Name	O
+First	O
+Seen	O
+07994c9f2eeeede199dd6b4e760fce3	B-Indicator
+71f03f3cc4307e6551c18d2fbd024a24f	B-Indicator
+com.android.henbox	B-Indicator
+备份	O
+(	O
+Backup	O
+)	O
+January	O
+3rd	O
+2018	O
+Table	O
+6	O
+contains	O
+an	O
+updated	O
+list	O
+of	O
+targeted	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+which	O
+this	O
+newer	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+harvesting	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+Interestingly	O
+,	O
+the	O
+two	O
+communication	O
+apps	O
+described	O
+above	O
+as	O
+being	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+the	O
+HenBox	O
+variant	O
+listed	O
+in	O
+Table	O
+3	O
+do	O
+not	O
+appear	O
+in	O
+this	O
+updated	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+Package	O
+Name	O
+App	O
+Name	O
+com.whatsapp	B-Indicator
+WhatsApp	B-System
+Messenger	B-System
+com.pugna.magiccall	B-Indicator
+n/a	O
+org.telegram.messenger	B-Indicator
+Telegram	B-System
+com.facebook.katana	B-Indicator
+Facebook	B-System
+com.twitter.android	B-Indicator
+Twitter	B-System
+jp.naver.line.android	B-Indicator
+LINE	B-System
+:	O
+Free	O
+Calls	O
+&	O
+Messages	O
+com.instanza.cocovoice	B-Indicator
+Coco	O
+com.beetalk	B-Indicator
+BeeTalk	B-System
+com.gtomato.talkbox	B-Indicator
+TalkBox	B-System
+Voice	O
+Messenger	B-System
+-	O
+PTT	O
+com.viber.voip	B-Indicator
+Viber	B-System
+Messenger	B-System
+com.immomo.momo	B-Indicator
+MOMO陌陌	B-System
+com.facebook.orca	B-Indicator
+Messenger	B-System
+–	O
+Text	O
+and	O
+Video	O
+Chat	O
+for	O
+Free	O
+com.skype.rover	B-Indicator
+
+Skype	B-System
+;	O
+3rd	O
+party	O
+stores	O
+only	O
+Most	O
+of	O
+these	O
+apps	O
+are	O
+well	O
+established	O
+and	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+,	O
+however	O
+,	O
+com.skype.rover	B-Indicator
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+available	O
+only	O
+on	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+same	O
+is	O
+likely	O
+to	O
+be	O
+the	O
+case	O
+for	O
+com.pugna.magiccall	B-Indicator
+but	O
+this	O
+is	O
+unknown	O
+currently	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+clear	O
+to	O
+see	O
+that	O
+the	O
+capabilities	O
+of	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+are	O
+very	O
+comprehensive	O
+,	O
+both	O
+in	O
+terms	O
+of	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+app	O
+with	O
+its	O
+native	O
+libraries	O
+and	O
+given	O
+the	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+data	O
+it	O
+can	O
+glean	O
+from	O
+a	O
+victim	O
+.	O
+
+Such	O
+data	O
+includes	O
+contact	O
+and	O
+location	O
+information	O
+,	O
+phone	O
+and	O
+message	O
+activity	O
+,	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+record	O
+from	O
+the	O
+microphone	O
+,	O
+camera	O
+,	O
+and	O
+other	O
+sensors	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+access	O
+data	O
+from	O
+many	O
+popular	O
+messaging	O
+and	O
+social	O
+media	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Infrastructure	O
+While	O
+investigating	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+we	O
+discovered	O
+infrastructure	O
+ties	O
+to	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+targeted	O
+attacks	O
+against	O
+Windows	B-System
+users	O
+–	O
+notable	O
+overlaps	O
+included	O
+PlugX	B-Malware
+,	O
+Zupdax	B-Malware
+,	O
+9002	B-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+overall	O
+image	O
+of	O
+these	O
+ties	O
+is	O
+below	O
+in	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+and	O
+paints	O
+a	O
+picture	O
+of	O
+an	O
+adversary	O
+with	O
+at	O
+least	O
+5	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+in	O
+their	O
+toolbox	O
+dating	O
+back	O
+to	O
+at	O
+least	O
+2015	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+overlap	O
+between	O
+the	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+and	O
+9002	B-Malware
+malware	O
+families	O
+Unit	O
+42	O
+has	O
+seen	O
+involves	O
+three	O
+shared	O
+C2s	O
+between	O
+several	O
+samples	O
+;	O
+the	O
+first	O
+IP	O
+below	O
+is	O
+used	O
+for	O
+more	O
+than	O
+half	O
+of	O
+the	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+samples	O
+we	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+to	O
+date	O
+:	O
+47.90.81	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+23	I-Indicator
+222.139.212	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+16	I-Indicator
+lala513.gicp	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+The	O
+overlaps	O
+between	O
+the	O
+Henbox	B-Malware
+,	O
+PlugX	B-Malware
+,	O
+Zupdax	B-Malware
+,	O
+and	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+malware	O
+families	O
+involves	O
+a	O
+web	O
+of	O
+shared	O
+C2s	O
+and	O
+IP	O
+resolutions	O
+centered	O
+around	O
+the	O
+below	O
+:	O
+59.188.196	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+172	I-Indicator
+cdncool	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+(	O
+and	O
+third-levels	O
+of	O
+this	O
+domain	O
+)	O
+www3.mefound	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+www5.zyns	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+w3.changeip	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+org	I-Indicator
+Ties	O
+to	O
+previous	O
+activity	O
+The	O
+registrant	O
+of	O
+cdncool	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+also	O
+registered	O
+six	O
+other	O
+domains	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+date	O
+,	O
+Unit	O
+42	O
+has	O
+seen	O
+four	O
+of	O
+the	O
+seven	O
+(	O
+the	O
+first	O
+three	O
+in	O
+the	O
+list	O
+below	O
+,	O
+along	O
+with	O
+cdncool	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+)	O
+used	O
+in	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+and	O
+it	O
+is	O
+reasonable	O
+to	O
+assume	O
+the	O
+remaining	O
+three	O
+are	O
+or	O
+were	O
+intended	O
+to	O
+serve	O
+the	O
+same	O
+purpose	B-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+tcpdo	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+adminsysteminfo	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+md5c	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+linkdatax	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+csip6	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+biz	I-Indicator
+adminloader	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+Unit	O
+42	O
+published	O
+a	O
+blog	O
+in	O
+July	O
+2016	O
+about	O
+9002	B-Malware
+malware	O
+being	O
+delivered	O
+using	O
+a	O
+combination	O
+of	O
+shortened	O
+links	O
+and	O
+a	O
+file	O
+hosted	O
+on	O
+Google	O
+Drive	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+spear	O
+phishing	O
+emails	O
+had	O
+Myanmar	O
+political-themed	O
+lures	O
+and	O
+,	O
+if	O
+the	O
+9002	B-Malware
+C2	O
+server	O
+responded	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+sent	O
+system	O
+specific	O
+information	O
+along	O
+with	O
+the	O
+string	O
+“	O
+jackhex	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+jackhex	O
+”	O
+has	O
+also	O
+been	O
+part	O
+of	O
+a	O
+C2	O
+for	O
+what	O
+is	O
+likely	O
+related	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+activity	O
+detailed	O
+below	O
+,	O
+along	O
+with	O
+additional	O
+infrastructure	O
+ties	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C2	O
+for	O
+the	O
+aforementioned	O
+9002	B-Malware
+sample	O
+was	O
+logitechwkgame	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+resolved	O
+to	O
+the	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+222.239.91	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+30	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+same	O
+time	O
+,	O
+the	O
+domain	B-Indicator
+admin.nslookupdns	I-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+also	O
+resolved	O
+to	O
+the	O
+same	O
+IP	O
+address	O
+,	O
+suggesting	O
+that	O
+these	O
+two	O
+domains	O
+are	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+the	O
+same	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+,	O
+admin.nslookupdns	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+was	O
+a	O
+C2	O
+for	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+samples	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+attacks	O
+on	O
+Myanmar	O
+and	O
+other	O
+Asian	O
+countries	O
+discussed	O
+in	O
+a	O
+blog	O
+published	O
+by	O
+Arbor	B-Organization
+Networks	I-Organization
+in	O
+April	O
+2016	O
+.	O
+
+Another	O
+tie	O
+between	O
+the	O
+activity	O
+is	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+jackhex.md5c	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+net	I-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+also	O
+used	O
+as	O
+a	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+C2	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Arbor	B-Organization
+Networks	I-Organization
+blog	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+jackhex	O
+”	O
+is	O
+not	O
+a	O
+common	O
+word	O
+or	O
+phrase	O
+and	O
+,	O
+as	O
+noted	O
+above	O
+,	O
+was	O
+also	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+the	O
+beacon	O
+activity	O
+with	O
+the	O
+previously	O
+discussed	O
+9002	B-Malware
+sample	O
+.	O
+
+Finally	O
+,	O
+since	O
+publishing	O
+the	O
+9002	B-Malware
+blog	O
+,	O
+Unit	O
+42	O
+has	O
+also	O
+seen	O
+the	O
+aforementioned	O
+9002	B-Malware
+C2	O
+used	O
+as	O
+a	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+C2	O
+with	O
+a	O
+Myanmar	O
+political-themed	O
+lure	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+our	O
+9002	B-Malware
+blog	O
+we	O
+noted	O
+some	O
+additional	O
+infrastructure	O
+used	O
+either	O
+as	O
+C2s	O
+for	O
+related	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+samples	O
+,	O
+or	O
+domain	O
+registrant	O
+overlap	O
+with	O
+those	O
+C2	O
+domains	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+we	O
+published	O
+that	O
+blog	O
+Unit	O
+42	O
+hadn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+seen	O
+any	O
+of	O
+the	O
+three	O
+registrants	O
+overlap	O
+domains	O
+used	O
+in	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+.	O
+
+Since	O
+then	O
+,	O
+we	O
+have	O
+seen	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+samples	O
+using	O
+third-levels	O
+of	O
+querlyurl	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+,	O
+lending	O
+further	O
+credence	O
+the	O
+remaining	O
+two	O
+domains	O
+,	O
+gooledriveservice	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+and	O
+appupdatemoremagic	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+.	I-Indicator
+
+]	I-Indicator
+com	I-Indicator
+are	O
+or	O
+were	O
+intended	O
+for	O
+malicious	O
+use	O
+.	O
+
+While	O
+we	O
+do	O
+not	O
+have	O
+complete	O
+targeting	O
+,	O
+information	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+these	O
+Poison	B-Malware
+Ivy	I-Malware
+samples	O
+,	O
+several	O
+of	O
+the	O
+decoy	O
+files	O
+were	O
+in	O
+Chinese	O
+and	O
+appear	O
+to	O
+be	O
+part	O
+of	O
+a	O
+2016	O
+campaign	O
+targeting	O
+organizations	O
+in	O
+Taiwan	O
+with	O
+political-themed	O
+lures	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+Typically	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+legitimate	O
+Android	B-Malware
+system	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+and	O
+sometimes	O
+embedding	O
+legitimate	O
+apps	O
+within	O
+them	O
+,	O
+the	O
+primary	O
+goal	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+to	O
+spy	O
+on	O
+those	O
+who	O
+install	O
+them	O
+.	O
+
+Using	O
+similar	O
+traits	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+copycat	O
+iconography	O
+and	O
+app	O
+or	O
+package	O
+names	O
+,	O
+victims	O
+are	O
+likely	O
+socially	O
+engineered	O
+into	O
+installing	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+when	O
+available	O
+on	O
+so-called	O
+third-party	O
+(	O
+i.e	O
+.	O
+
+non-Google	O
+Play	B-System
+)	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+which	O
+often	O
+have	O
+fewer	O
+security	O
+and	O
+vetting	O
+procedures	O
+for	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+they	O
+host	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+possible	O
+,	O
+as	O
+with	O
+other	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+,	O
+that	O
+some	O
+apps	O
+may	O
+also	O
+be	O
+available	O
+on	O
+forums	O
+,	O
+file-sharing	O
+sites	O
+or	O
+even	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+victims	O
+as	O
+email	O
+attachments	O
+,	O
+and	O
+we	O
+were	O
+only	O
+able	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+the	O
+delivery	O
+mechanism	O
+for	O
+a	O
+handful	O
+of	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+we	O
+have	O
+been	O
+able	O
+to	O
+find	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+hosting	O
+locations	O
+seen	O
+for	O
+some	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+samples	O
+,	O
+together	O
+with	O
+the	O
+nature	O
+of	O
+some	O
+embedded	O
+apps	O
+including	O
+:	O
+those	O
+targeted	O
+at	O
+extremist	O
+groups	O
+,	O
+those	O
+who	O
+use	O
+VPN	O
+or	O
+other	O
+privacy-enabling	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+and	O
+those	O
+who	O
+speak	O
+the	O
+Uyghur	O
+language	O
+,	O
+highlights	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+profile	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+were	O
+seeking	O
+to	O
+attack	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+targets	O
+and	O
+capabilities	O
+of	O
+HenBox	B-Malware
+,	O
+in	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+the	O
+ties	O
+to	O
+previous	O
+activity	O
+using	O
+four	O
+different	O
+Windows	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+with	O
+political-themed	O
+lures	O
+against	O
+several	O
+different	O
+South	O
+East	O
+Asian	O
+countries	O
+,	O
+indicates	O
+this	O
+activity	O
+likely	O
+represents	O
+an	O
+at	O
+least	O
+three-year-old	O
+espionage	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+THURSDAY	O
+,	O
+OCTOBER	O
+11	O
+,	O
+2018	O
+GPlayed	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+-	O
+.Net	O
+playing	O
+with	O
+Google	B-Organization
+Market	O
+Introduction	O
+In	O
+a	O
+world	O
+where	O
+everything	O
+is	O
+always	O
+connected	O
+,	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+are	O
+involved	O
+in	O
+individuals	O
+'	O
+day-to-day	O
+lives	O
+more	O
+and	O
+more	O
+often	O
+,	O
+malicious	O
+actors	O
+are	O
+seeing	O
+increased	O
+opportunities	O
+to	O
+attack	O
+these	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+Cisco	B-Organization
+Talos	I-Organization
+has	O
+identified	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+penetrate	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+—	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Android	B-System
+trojan	O
+that	O
+we	O
+have	O
+dubbed	O
+"	O
+GPlayed	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+''	O
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+trojan	O
+with	O
+many	O
+built-in	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+At	O
+the	O
+same	O
+time	O
+,	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+extremely	O
+flexible	O
+,	O
+making	O
+it	O
+a	O
+very	O
+effective	O
+tool	O
+for	O
+malicious	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+sample	O
+we	O
+analyzed	O
+uses	O
+an	O
+icon	O
+very	O
+similar	O
+to	O
+Google	B-System
+Apps	I-System
+,	O
+with	O
+the	O
+label	O
+"	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+Marketplace	I-System
+''	O
+to	O
+disguise	O
+itself	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+application	O
+is	O
+on	O
+the	O
+left-hand	O
+side	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+makes	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+extremely	O
+powerful	O
+is	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+adapt	O
+after	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+deployed	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+order	O
+to	O
+achieve	O
+this	O
+adaptability	O
+,	O
+the	O
+operator	O
+has	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+remotely	O
+load	O
+plugins	O
+,	O
+inject	O
+scripts	O
+and	O
+even	O
+compile	O
+new	O
+.NET	B-System
+code	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+analysis	O
+indicates	O
+that	O
+this	O
+trojan	O
+is	O
+in	O
+its	O
+testing	O
+stage	O
+but	O
+given	O
+its	O
+potential	O
+,	O
+every	O
+mobile	O
+user	O
+should	O
+be	O
+aware	O
+of	O
+GPlayed	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Mobile	O
+developers	O
+have	O
+recently	O
+begun	O
+eschewing	O
+traditional	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+and	O
+instead	O
+want	O
+to	O
+deliver	O
+their	O
+software	O
+directly	O
+through	O
+their	O
+own	O
+means	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+GPlayed	B-Malware
+is	O
+an	O
+example	O
+of	O
+where	O
+this	O
+can	O
+go	O
+wrong	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+if	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+user	O
+is	O
+not	O
+aware	O
+of	O
+how	O
+to	O
+distinguish	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+app	O
+versus	O
+a	O
+real	O
+one	O
+.	O
+
+Trojan	O
+architecture	O
+and	O
+capabilities	O
+This	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+written	O
+in	O
+.NET	B-System
+using	O
+the	O
+Xamarin	B-System
+environment	O
+for	O
+mobile	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+main	O
+DLL	O
+is	O
+called	O
+"	O
+Reznov.DLL	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+''	O
+This	O
+DLL	O
+contains	O
+one	O
+root	O
+class	O
+called	O
+"	O
+eClient	O
+,	O
+''	O
+which	O
+is	O
+the	O
+core	O
+of	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+imports	O
+reveal	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+a	O
+second	O
+DLL	O
+called	O
+"	O
+eCommon.dll	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+''	O
+We	O
+determined	O
+that	O
+the	O
+"	O
+eCommon	O
+''	O
+file	O
+contains	O
+support	O
+code	O
+and	O
+structures	O
+that	O
+are	O
+platform	O
+independent	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+main	O
+DLL	O
+also	O
+contains	O
+eClient	O
+subclasses	O
+that	O
+implement	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+native	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+package	O
+certificate	O
+is	O
+issued	O
+under	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+,	O
+which	O
+also	O
+resembles	O
+the	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+main	O
+DLL	O
+name	O
+.	O
+
+Certificate	O
+information	O
+The	O
+Android	B-System
+package	O
+is	O
+named	O
+"	O
+verReznov.Coampany	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+''	O
+The	O
+application	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+label	O
+"	O
+Installer	B-Indicator
+''	O
+and	O
+its	O
+name	O
+is	O
+"	O
+android.app.Application	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+''	O
+Package	O
+permissions	O
+The	O
+trojan	O
+declares	O
+numerous	O
+permissions	O
+in	O
+the	O
+manifest	O
+,	O
+from	O
+which	O
+we	O
+should	O
+highlight	O
+the	O
+BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN	O
+,	O
+which	O
+provides	O
+nearly	O
+full	O
+control	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+trojan	O
+is	O
+highly	O
+evolved	O
+in	O
+its	O
+design	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+modular	O
+architecture	O
+implemented	O
+in	O
+the	O
+form	O
+of	O
+plugins	O
+,	O
+or	O
+it	O
+can	O
+receive	O
+new	O
+.NET	B-System
+source	O
+code	O
+,	O
+which	O
+will	O
+be	O
+compiled	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+in	O
+runtime	O
+.	O
+
+Initialization	O
+of	O
+the	O
+compiler	O
+object	O
+The	O
+plugins	O
+can	O
+be	O
+added	O
+in	O
+runtime	O
+,	O
+or	O
+they	O
+can	O
+be	O
+added	O
+as	O
+a	O
+package	O
+resource	O
+at	O
+packaging	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+means	O
+that	O
+the	O
+authors	O
+or	O
+the	O
+operators	O
+can	O
+add	O
+capabilities	O
+without	O
+the	O
+need	O
+to	O
+recompile	O
+and	O
+upgrade	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+package	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Trojan	O
+native	O
+capabilities	O
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+full-fledged	O
+trojan	O
+with	O
+capabilities	O
+ranging	O
+from	O
+those	O
+of	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+trojan	O
+to	O
+a	O
+full	O
+spying	O
+trojan	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+means	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+do	O
+anything	O
+from	O
+harvest	O
+the	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+banking	O
+credentials	O
+,	O
+to	O
+monitoring	O
+the	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+location	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+several	O
+indicators	O
+(	O
+see	O
+section	O
+"	O
+trojan	O
+activity	O
+''	O
+below	O
+)	O
+that	O
+it	O
+is	O
+in	O
+its	O
+last	O
+stages	O
+of	O
+development	O
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+has	O
+the	O
+potential	O
+to	O
+be	O
+a	O
+serious	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+Trojan	O
+details	O
+Upon	O
+boot	O
+,	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+will	O
+start	O
+by	O
+populating	O
+a	O
+shared	O
+preferences	O
+file	O
+with	O
+the	O
+configuration	O
+it	O
+has	O
+on	O
+its	O
+internal	O
+structures	O
+.	O
+
+Afterward	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+start	O
+several	O
+timers	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+different	O
+tasks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+timer	O
+will	O
+be	O
+fired	O
+on	O
+the	O
+configured	O
+interval	O
+(	O
+20	O
+seconds	O
+in	O
+this	O
+case	O
+)	O
+,	O
+pinging	O
+the	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+(	O
+C2	O
+)	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+response	O
+can	O
+either	O
+be	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+"	O
+OK	O
+,	O
+''	O
+or	O
+can	O
+be	O
+a	O
+request	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+some	O
+action	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+timer	O
+will	O
+run	O
+every	O
+five	O
+seconds	O
+and	O
+it	O
+will	O
+try	O
+to	O
+enable	O
+the	O
+WiFi	O
+if	O
+it	O
+'s	O
+disabled	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+third	O
+timer	O
+will	O
+fire	O
+every	O
+10	O
+seconds	O
+and	O
+will	O
+attempt	O
+to	O
+register	O
+the	O
+device	O
+into	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+and	O
+register	O
+wake-up	O
+locks	O
+on	O
+the	O
+system	O
+to	O
+control	O
+the	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+status	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+registration	O
+stage	O
+,	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+exfiltrates	O
+private	O
+information	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+'s	O
+model	O
+,	O
+IMEI	O
+,	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+and	O
+country	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+will	O
+also	O
+report	O
+the	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+that	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+is	O
+running	O
+and	O
+any	O
+additional	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Device	O
+registration	O
+This	O
+is	O
+the	O
+last	O
+of	O
+the	O
+three	O
+main	O
+timers	O
+that	O
+are	O
+created	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+trojan	O
+will	O
+register	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+handler	O
+,	O
+which	O
+will	O
+forward	O
+the	O
+contents	O
+and	O
+the	O
+sender	O
+of	O
+all	O
+of	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+on	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+final	O
+step	O
+in	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+'s	O
+initialization	O
+is	O
+the	O
+escalation	O
+and	O
+maintenance	O
+of	O
+privileges	O
+in	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+done	O
+both	O
+by	O
+requesting	O
+admin	O
+privileges	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+asking	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+access	O
+the	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+Privilege	O
+escalation	O
+requests	O
+The	O
+screens	O
+asking	O
+for	O
+the	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+approval	O
+wo	O
+n't	O
+close	O
+unless	O
+the	O
+user	O
+approves	O
+the	O
+privilege	O
+escalation	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+user	O
+closes	O
+the	O
+windows	O
+,	O
+they	O
+will	O
+appear	O
+again	O
+due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+timer	O
+configuration	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+of	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+,	O
+it	O
+will	O
+wait	O
+randomly	O
+between	O
+three	O
+and	O
+five	O
+minutes	O
+to	O
+activate	O
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+native	O
+capabilities	O
+—	O
+these	O
+are	O
+implemented	O
+on	O
+the	O
+eClient	O
+subclass	O
+called	O
+"	O
+GoogleCC	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+This	O
+class	O
+will	O
+open	O
+a	O
+WebView	O
+with	O
+a	O
+Google-themed	B-Organization
+page	O
+asking	O
+for	O
+payment	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+use	O
+the	O
+Google	B-Organization
+services	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+will	O
+take	O
+the	O
+user	O
+through	O
+several	O
+steps	O
+until	O
+it	O
+collects	O
+all	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+information	O
+,	O
+which	O
+will	O
+be	O
+checked	O
+online	O
+and	O
+exfiltrated	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+this	O
+process	O
+,	O
+an	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+money	O
+,	O
+configured	O
+by	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+operator	O
+,	O
+is	O
+requested	O
+to	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+Steps	O
+to	O
+request	O
+the	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+information	O
+In	O
+our	O
+sample	O
+configuration	O
+,	O
+the	O
+request	O
+for	O
+the	O
+views	O
+above	O
+can	O
+not	O
+be	O
+canceled	O
+or	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+—	O
+behaving	O
+just	O
+like	O
+a	O
+screen	O
+lock	O
+that	O
+wo	O
+n't	O
+be	O
+disabled	O
+without	O
+providing	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+communication	O
+with	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+is	O
+done	O
+over	O
+HTTP	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+will	O
+use	O
+either	O
+a	O
+standard	O
+web	O
+request	O
+or	O
+it	O
+will	O
+write	O
+data	O
+into	O
+a	O
+web	O
+socket	O
+if	O
+the	O
+first	O
+method	O
+fails	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+C2	O
+can	O
+also	O
+use	O
+WebSocket	O
+as	O
+a	O
+backup	O
+communication	O
+channel	O
+.	O
+
+Before	O
+sending	O
+any	O
+data	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+using	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+attempts	O
+to	O
+disguise	O
+its	O
+data	O
+,	O
+the	O
+data	O
+is	O
+serialized	O
+using	O
+JSON	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+then	O
+encoded	O
+in	O
+Base64	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+replaces	O
+the	O
+'=	O
+'	O
+by	O
+'AAAZZZXXX	O
+'	O
+,	O
+the	O
+'+	O
+'	O
+by	O
+'|	O
+'	O
+and	O
+the	O
+'/	O
+'	O
+by	O
+'	O
+.	O
+
+'	O
+to	O
+disguise	O
+the	O
+Base64	O
+.	O
+
+Request	O
+encoding	O
+process	O
+The	O
+HTTP	O
+requests	O
+follow	O
+the	O
+format	O
+below	O
+,	O
+while	O
+on	O
+the	O
+WebSocket	O
+only	O
+the	O
+query	O
+data	O
+is	O
+written	O
+.	O
+
+?	O
+
+q=	O
+-	O
+:	O
+As	O
+is	O
+common	O
+with	O
+trojans	O
+,	O
+the	O
+communication	O
+is	O
+always	O
+initiated	O
+by	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+request	O
+codes	O
+are	O
+actually	O
+replies	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+action	O
+requests	O
+,	O
+which	O
+are	O
+actually	O
+called	O
+"	O
+responses	O
+.	O
+
+''	O
+There	O
+are	O
+27	O
+response	O
+codes	O
+that	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+can	O
+use	O
+to	O
+make	O
+requests	O
+to	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+,	O
+which	O
+pretty	O
+much	O
+match	O
+what	O
+'s	O
+listed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+capabilities	O
+section	O
+.	O
+
+Error	O
+Registration	O
+Ok	O
+Empty	O
+SendSMS	O
+RequestGoogleCC	O
+Wipe	O
+OpenBrowser	O
+SendUSSD	O
+RequestSMSList	O
+RequestAppList	O
+RequestLocation	O
+ShowNotification	O
+SetLockPassword	O
+LockNow	O
+MuteSound	O
+LoadScript	O
+LoadPlugin	O
+ServerChange	O
+StartApp	O
+CallPhone	O
+SetPingTimer	O
+SMSBroadcast	O
+RequestContacts	O
+AddInject	O
+RemoveInject	O
+Evaluate	O
+Another	O
+feature	O
+of	O
+this	O
+trojan	O
+is	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+register	O
+injects	O
+,	O
+which	O
+are	O
+JavaScript	O
+snippets	O
+of	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+will	O
+be	O
+executed	O
+in	O
+a	O
+WebView	O
+object	O
+created	O
+by	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+gives	O
+the	O
+operators	O
+the	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+the	O
+user	O
+into	O
+accessing	O
+any	O
+site	O
+while	O
+stealing	O
+the	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+cookies	O
+or	O
+forging	O
+form	O
+fields	O
+,	O
+like	O
+account	O
+numbers	O
+or	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+.	O
+
+Trojan	O
+activity	O
+At	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+the	O
+writing	O
+of	O
+this	O
+post	O
+,	O
+all	O
+URLs	O
+(	O
+see	O
+IOC	O
+section	O
+)	O
+found	O
+on	O
+the	O
+sample	O
+were	O
+inactive	O
+,	O
+and	O
+it	O
+does	O
+not	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+be	O
+widespread	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+some	O
+indicators	O
+that	O
+this	O
+sample	O
+is	O
+just	O
+a	O
+test	O
+sample	O
+on	O
+its	O
+final	O
+stages	O
+of	O
+development	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+are	O
+several	O
+strings	O
+and	O
+labels	O
+still	O
+mentioning	O
+'test	O
+'	O
+or	O
+'testcc	O
+'	O
+—	O
+even	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+used	O
+for	O
+the	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+data	O
+exfiltration	O
+is	O
+named	O
+"	O
+testcc.php	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+''	O
+Debug	O
+information	O
+on	O
+logcat	O
+Another	O
+indicator	O
+is	O
+the	O
+amount	O
+of	O
+debugging	O
+information	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+is	O
+still	O
+generating	O
+—	O
+a	O
+production-level	O
+trojan	O
+would	O
+keep	O
+its	O
+logging	O
+to	O
+a	O
+minimum	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+only	O
+sample	O
+was	O
+found	O
+on	O
+public	O
+repositories	O
+and	O
+almost	O
+seemed	O
+to	O
+indicate	O
+a	O
+test	O
+run	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+the	O
+detection	O
+ratio	O
+of	O
+the	O
+sample	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+have	O
+observed	O
+this	O
+trojan	O
+being	O
+submitted	O
+to	O
+public	O
+antivirus	O
+testing	O
+platforms	O
+,	O
+once	O
+as	O
+a	O
+package	O
+and	O
+once	O
+for	O
+each	O
+DLL	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+the	O
+detection	O
+ratio	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+sample	O
+analyzed	O
+was	O
+targeted	O
+at	O
+Russian-speaking	O
+users	O
+,	O
+as	O
+most	O
+of	O
+the	O
+user	O
+interaction	O
+pages	O
+are	O
+written	O
+in	O
+Russian	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+given	O
+the	O
+way	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+is	O
+built	O
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+highly	O
+customizable	O
+,	O
+meaning	O
+that	O
+adapting	O
+it	O
+to	O
+a	O
+different	O
+language	O
+would	O
+be	O
+extremely	O
+easy	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+wide	O
+range	O
+of	O
+capabilities	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+limit	O
+this	O
+trojan	O
+to	O
+a	O
+specific	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+like	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+trojan	O
+or	O
+a	O
+ransomware	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+makes	O
+it	O
+impossible	O
+to	O
+create	O
+a	O
+target	O
+profile	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+This	O
+trojan	O
+shows	O
+a	O
+new	O
+path	O
+for	O
+threats	O
+to	O
+evolve	O
+.	O
+
+Having	O
+the	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+move	O
+code	O
+from	O
+desktops	O
+to	O
+mobile	O
+platforms	O
+with	O
+no	O
+effort	O
+,	O
+like	O
+the	O
+eCommon.DLL	B-Indicator
+demonstrates	O
+that	O
+malicious	O
+actors	O
+can	O
+create	O
+hybrid	O
+threats	O
+faster	O
+and	O
+with	O
+fewer	O
+resources	O
+involved	O
+than	O
+ever	O
+before	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+trojan	O
+'s	O
+design	O
+and	O
+implementation	O
+is	O
+of	O
+an	O
+uncommonly	O
+high	O
+level	O
+,	O
+making	O
+it	O
+a	O
+dangerous	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+kinds	O
+of	O
+threats	O
+will	O
+become	O
+more	O
+common	O
+,	O
+as	O
+more	O
+and	O
+more	O
+companies	O
+decide	O
+to	O
+publish	O
+their	O
+software	O
+directly	O
+to	O
+consumers	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+have	O
+been	O
+several	O
+recent	O
+examples	O
+of	O
+companies	O
+choosing	O
+to	O
+release	O
+their	O
+software	O
+directly	O
+to	O
+consumers	O
+,	O
+bypassing	O
+traditional	O
+storefronts	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+average	O
+user	O
+might	O
+not	O
+have	O
+the	O
+necessary	O
+skills	O
+to	O
+distinguish	O
+legitimate	O
+sites	O
+from	O
+malicious	O
+ones	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+'ve	O
+seen	O
+that	O
+this	O
+has	O
+been	O
+the	O
+case	O
+for	O
+many	O
+years	O
+with	O
+spear-phishing	O
+campaigns	O
+on	O
+desktop	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+platforms	O
+,	O
+so	O
+,	O
+unfortunately	O
+,	O
+it	O
+does	O
+n't	O
+seem	O
+that	O
+this	O
+will	O
+change	O
+any	O
+time	O
+soon	O
+.	O
+
+And	O
+this	O
+just	O
+means	O
+attackers	O
+will	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+be	O
+successful	O
+.	O
+
+Coverage	O
+Additional	O
+ways	O
+our	O
+customers	O
+can	O
+detect	O
+and	O
+block	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+are	O
+listed	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+Advanced	B-System
+Malware	I-System
+Protection	I-System
+(	I-System
+AMP	I-System
+)	I-System
+is	O
+ideally	O
+suited	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+the	O
+execution	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+used	O
+by	O
+these	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+Cisco	B-System
+Cloud	I-System
+Web	I-System
+Security	I-System
+(	I-System
+CWS	I-System
+)	I-System
+or	O
+Web	B-System
+Security	I-System
+Appliance	I-System
+(	I-System
+WSA	I-System
+)	I-System
+web	O
+scanning	O
+prevents	O
+access	O
+to	O
+malicious	O
+websites	O
+and	O
+detects	O
+malware	O
+used	O
+in	O
+these	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+Email	O
+Security	O
+can	O
+block	O
+malicious	O
+emails	O
+sent	O
+by	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+as	O
+part	O
+of	O
+their	O
+campaign	O
+.	O
+
+Network	O
+Security	O
+appliances	O
+such	O
+as	O
+Next-Generation	B-System
+Firewall	I-System
+(	I-System
+NGFW	I-System
+)	I-System
+,	O
+Next-Generation	B-System
+Intrusion	I-System
+Prevention	I-System
+System	I-System
+(	I-System
+NGIPS	I-System
+)	I-System
+,	O
+and	O
+Meraki	B-System
+MX	I-System
+can	O
+detect	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+associated	O
+with	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+.	O
+
+AMP	O
+Threat	O
+Grid	O
+helps	O
+identify	O
+malicious	O
+binaries	O
+and	O
+build	O
+protection	O
+into	O
+all	O
+Cisco	B-Organization
+Security	O
+products	O
+.	O
+
+Umbrella	B-System
+,	O
+our	O
+secure	O
+internet	O
+gateway	O
+(	O
+SIG	O
+)	O
+,	O
+blocks	O
+users	O
+from	O
+connecting	O
+to	O
+malicious	O
+domains	O
+,	O
+IPs	O
+,	O
+and	O
+URLs	O
+,	O
+whether	O
+users	O
+are	O
+on	O
+or	O
+off	O
+the	O
+corporate	O
+network	O
+.	O
+
+Open	O
+Source	O
+Snort	O
+Subscriber	O
+Rule	O
+Set	O
+customers	O
+can	O
+stay	O
+up	O
+to	O
+date	O
+by	O
+downloading	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+rule	O
+pack	O
+available	O
+for	O
+purchase	O
+on	O
+Snort.org	O
+.	O
+
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+compromise	O
+(	O
+IOC	O
+)	O
+URLs	O
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//5.9.33.226:5416	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//172.110.10.171:85/testcc.php	I-Indicator
+hxxp	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//sub1.tdsworker.ru:5555/3ds/	I-Indicator
+Hash	O
+values	O
+Package.apk	B-Indicator
+-	O
+A342a16082ea53d101f556b50532651cd3e3fdc7d9e0be3aa136680ad9c6a69f	B-Indicator
+eCommon.dl	B-Indicator
+-	O
+604deb75eedf439766896f05799752de268baf437bf89a7185540627ab4a4bd1	B-Indicator
+
+Reznov.dll	B-Indicator
+-	O
+17b8665cdbbb94482ca970a754d11d6e29c46af6390a2d8e8193d8d6a527dec3	B-Indicator
+Custom	O
+activity	O
+prefix	O
+com.cact.CAct	B-Indicator
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+-	O
+A	O
+new	O
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+from	O
+the	O
+underworld	O
+August	O
+2019	O
+In	O
+June	O
+2019	O
+,	O
+ThreatFabric	B-Organization
+analysts	O
+found	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+,	O
+dubbed	O
+“	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+”	O
+,	O
+being	O
+rented	O
+out	O
+on	O
+underground	O
+forums	O
+.	O
+
+Its	O
+authors	O
+claim	O
+that	O
+it	O
+was	O
+used	O
+for	O
+private	O
+operations	O
+for	O
+two	O
+years	O
+preceding	O
+the	O
+start	O
+of	O
+the	O
+rental	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+also	O
+state	O
+that	O
+the	O
+code	O
+is	O
+written	O
+from	O
+scratch	O
+and	O
+is	O
+not	O
+using	O
+parts	O
+of	O
+other	O
+existing	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+unlike	O
+many	O
+other	O
+Trojans	O
+that	O
+are	O
+either	O
+based	O
+completely	O
+on	O
+the	O
+source	O
+of	O
+another	O
+Trojan	O
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+leaked	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+source	O
+code	O
+that	O
+is	O
+now	O
+being	O
+resold	O
+)	O
+or	O
+at	O
+least	O
+borrow	O
+parts	O
+of	O
+other	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+thorough	O
+analysis	O
+we	O
+can	O
+confirm	O
+that	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+was	O
+indeed	O
+not	O
+based	O
+on	O
+the	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+source	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+One	O
+peculiar	O
+thing	O
+about	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+group	O
+behind	O
+this	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+that	O
+they	O
+have	O
+an	O
+“	O
+official	O
+”	O
+twitter	B-Organization
+account	O
+that	O
+they	O
+use	O
+to	O
+post	O
+promotional	O
+content	O
+(	O
+even	O
+videos	O
+)	O
+about	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Oddly	O
+enough	O
+they	O
+also	O
+use	O
+it	O
+to	O
+make	O
+fun	O
+of	O
+the	O
+AV	O
+community	O
+,	O
+sharing	O
+detection	O
+screenshots	O
+from	O
+VirusTotal	B-Organization
+(	O
+thus	O
+leaking	O
+IoC	O
+)	O
+and	O
+even	O
+engaging	O
+in	O
+discussions	O
+with	O
+malware	O
+researchers	O
+directly	O
+The	O
+following	O
+screenshot	O
+shows	O
+tweets	O
+from	O
+their	O
+advertisement	O
+campaign	O
+:	O
+That	O
+unusual	O
+behavior	O
+could	O
+be	O
+explained	O
+by	O
+the	O
+combination	O
+of	O
+the	O
+need	O
+for	O
+attention	O
+and	O
+a	O
+probable	O
+lack	O
+of	O
+experience	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+is	O
+sure	O
+is	O
+that	O
+the	O
+gap	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+malware	O
+rental	O
+business	O
+left	O
+open	O
+after	O
+the	O
+rental	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+2	I-Malware
+and	O
+RedAlert	B-Malware
+2	I-Malware
+Trojans	O
+ended	O
+provides	O
+a	O
+good	O
+opportunity	O
+for	O
+the	O
+actors	O
+behind	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+to	O
+grow	O
+their	O
+business	O
+quickly	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+Trojan	O
+rental	O
+business	O
+Rental	O
+of	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+is	O
+not	O
+new	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+was	O
+an	O
+existing	O
+business	O
+model	O
+when	O
+computer-based	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+was	O
+the	O
+only	O
+form	O
+of	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+and	O
+has	O
+shifted	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+equivalent	O
+a	O
+few	O
+years	O
+later	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+life	O
+span	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+limited	O
+to	O
+either	O
+the	O
+will	O
+of	O
+its	O
+author	O
+(	O
+s	O
+)	O
+to	O
+support	O
+it	O
+or	O
+the	O
+arrest	O
+of	O
+those	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malware-life-cycle	O
+has	O
+been	O
+observed	O
+to	O
+reoccur	O
+every	O
+few	O
+years	O
+,	O
+bringing	O
+new	O
+malware	O
+families	O
+into	O
+light	O
+.	O
+
+Each	O
+time	O
+a	O
+rented	O
+malware	O
+reaches	O
+the	O
+end	O
+of	O
+its	O
+life	O
+it	O
+provides	O
+the	O
+opportunity	O
+for	O
+other	O
+actors	O
+a	O
+to	O
+take	O
+over	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+rental	O
+market-share	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+visible	O
+on	O
+following	O
+chart	O
+,	O
+the	O
+lifespan	O
+of	O
+many	O
+well-known	O
+rented	O
+Android	B-System
+bankers	O
+is	O
+usually	O
+no	O
+more	O
+than	O
+one	O
+or	O
+two	O
+years	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+the	O
+family	O
+ceases	O
+to	O
+exist	O
+a	O
+new	O
+one	O
+is	O
+already	O
+available	O
+to	O
+fill	O
+the	O
+void	O
+,	O
+proving	O
+that	O
+the	O
+demand	O
+for	O
+such	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+always	O
+present	O
+and	O
+that	O
+therefore	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+has	O
+a	O
+good	O
+chance	O
+to	O
+survive	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+RedAlert	B-Malware
+2	I-Malware
+decided	O
+to	O
+quit	O
+the	O
+rental	O
+business	O
+,	O
+we	O
+observed	O
+a	O
+surge	O
+in	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+samples	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+the	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+actor	O
+was	O
+allegedly	O
+arrested	O
+and	O
+the	O
+source	O
+code	O
+was	O
+leaked	O
+there	O
+was	O
+also	O
+huge	O
+increase	O
+in	O
+the	O
+number	O
+of	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+samples	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+,	O
+but	O
+the	O
+new	O
+actors	O
+using	O
+Anubis	B-Malware
+have	O
+no	O
+support	O
+or	O
+updates	O
+.	O
+
+Due	O
+to	O
+this	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+will	O
+come	O
+in	O
+handy	O
+for	O
+actors	O
+that	O
+want	O
+to	O
+focus	O
+on	O
+performing	O
+fraud	O
+without	O
+having	O
+to	O
+develop	O
+and	O
+maintain	O
+a	O
+botnet	O
+and	O
+C2	O
+infrastructure	O
+.	O
+
+Analysis	O
+of	O
+evasion	O
+techniques	O
+Along	O
+with	O
+the	O
+standard	O
+payload	O
+and	O
+string	O
+obfuscation	O
+,	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+uses	O
+a	O
+rather	O
+interesting	O
+technique	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+.	O
+
+Using	O
+the	O
+device	O
+accelerometer	O
+sensor	O
+it	O
+implements	O
+a	O
+simple	O
+pedometer	O
+that	O
+is	O
+used	O
+to	O
+measure	O
+movements	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+idea	O
+is	O
+simple	O
+-	O
+if	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+belongs	O
+to	O
+a	O
+real	O
+person	O
+,	O
+sooner	O
+or	O
+later	O
+this	O
+person	O
+will	O
+move	O
+around	O
+,	O
+increasing	O
+the	O
+step	O
+counter	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+uses	O
+this	O
+counter	O
+to	O
+activate	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+-	O
+if	O
+aforementioned	O
+step	O
+counter	O
+hits	O
+the	O
+pre-configured	O
+threshold	O
+it	O
+considers	O
+running	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+be	O
+safe	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+simple	O
+measure	O
+prevents	O
+the	O
+Trojan	O
+from	O
+running	O
+and	O
+being	O
+analyzed	O
+in	O
+dynamic	O
+analysis	O
+environments	O
+(	O
+sandboxes	O
+)	O
+and	O
+on	O
+the	O
+test	O
+devices	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+analysts	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+code	O
+responsible	O
+for	O
+this	O
+verification	O
+is	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+following	O
+snippet	O
+:	O
+How	O
+it	O
+works	O
+When	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+first	O
+started	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+it	O
+will	O
+begin	O
+by	O
+hiding	O
+its	O
+icon	O
+from	O
+the	O
+application	O
+drawer	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+it	O
+will	O
+ask	O
+for	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+privilege	O
+as	O
+visible	O
+in	O
+the	O
+following	O
+screenshot	O
+:	O
+After	O
+the	O
+user	O
+grants	O
+the	O
+requested	O
+privilege	O
+,	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+starts	O
+to	O
+abuse	O
+it	O
+by	O
+granting	O
+itself	O
+additional	O
+permissions	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+permissions	O
+needed	O
+to	O
+send	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+make	O
+calls	O
+,	O
+without	O
+requiring	O
+any	O
+user	O
+interaction	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+also	O
+disables	O
+Play	B-System
+Protect	I-System
+(	O
+Google	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+preinstalled	O
+antivirus	O
+solution	O
+)	O
+to	O
+prevent	O
+its	O
+discovery	O
+and	O
+deletion	O
+in	O
+the	O
+future	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+conveniently	O
+granting	O
+itself	O
+additional	O
+privileges	O
+and	O
+securing	O
+its	O
+persistence	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+registers	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+in	O
+the	O
+botnet	O
+and	O
+waits	O
+for	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+while	O
+also	O
+being	O
+ready	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+overlay	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+commands	O
+supported	O
+by	O
+the	O
+analyzed	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+bot	O
+are	O
+listed	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+can	O
+be	O
+seen	O
+,	O
+the	O
+possibilities	O
+offered	O
+by	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+are	O
+pretty	O
+common	O
+.	O
+
+Command	O
+Description	O
+push	O
+Shows	O
+a	O
+push	O
+notification	O
+.	O
+
+Clicking	O
+on	O
+thenotification	O
+will	O
+result	O
+in	O
+launching	O
+a	O
+specified	O
+app	O
+startApp	O
+Starts	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+application	O
+getInstallApps	O
+Gets	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+installedapplications	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+getContacts	O
+Gets	O
+the	O
+contact	O
+names	O
+and	O
+phone	O
+numbers	O
+from	O
+the	O
+addressbook	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+deleteApplication	O
+Triggers	O
+the	O
+deletion	O
+of	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+application	O
+forwardCall	O
+Enables	O
+call	O
+forwarding	O
+to	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+number	O
+sendSms	O
+Sends	O
+a	O
+text	O
+message	O
+with	O
+specified	O
+text	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infecteddevice	O
+to	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+startInject	O
+Triggers	O
+the	O
+overlay	O
+attack	O
+against	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+application	O
+startUssd	O
+
+Calls	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+USSD	O
+code	O
+openUrl	O
+Opens	O
+the	O
+specified	O
+URL	O
+in	O
+the	O
+WebView	O
+getSMS	O
+Gets	O
+all	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+killMe	O
+Triggers	O
+the	O
+kill	O
+switch	O
+for	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+updateModule	O
+Updates	O
+the	O
+payload	O
+module	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+features	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+malware	O
+has	O
+the	O
+same	O
+capabilities	O
+as	O
+most	O
+other	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+overlay	O
+attacks	O
+,	O
+SMS	O
+control	O
+and	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+harvesting	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+Trojan	O
+can	O
+also	O
+leverage	O
+keylogging	O
+to	O
+broaden	O
+the	O
+attack	O
+scope	O
+.	O
+
+Overall	O
+,	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+has	O
+a	O
+pretty	O
+common	O
+feature	O
+list	O
+and	O
+although	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+have	O
+been	O
+written	O
+from	O
+scratch	O
+there	O
+does	O
+not	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+be	O
+any	O
+innovative	O
+functionality	O
+at	O
+this	O
+time	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+more	O
+advanced	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+now	O
+offer	O
+features	O
+such	O
+as	O
+a	O
+back-connect	O
+proxy	O
+,	O
+screen-streaming	O
+and	O
+even	O
+remote	O
+control	O
+.	O
+
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+embeds	O
+the	O
+following	O
+set	O
+of	O
+features	O
+that	O
+allows	O
+itself	O
+to	O
+remain	O
+under	O
+the	O
+radar	O
+and	O
+successfully	O
+perform	O
+attacks	O
+:	O
+Overlaying	O
+:	O
+Dynamic	O
+(	O
+Local	O
+injects	O
+obtained	O
+from	O
+C2	O
+)	O
+Keylogging	O
+SMS	O
+harvesting	O
+:	O
+SMS	O
+listing	O
+SMS	O
+harvesting	O
+:	O
+SMS	O
+forwarding	O
+Device	O
+info	O
+collection	O
+Contact	O
+list	O
+collection	O
+Application	O
+listing	O
+Location	O
+collection	O
+Overlaying	O
+:	O
+Targets	O
+list	O
+update	O
+SMS	O
+:	O
+Sending	O
+Calls	O
+:	O
+USSD	O
+request	O
+making	O
+Calls	O
+:	O
+Call	O
+forwarding	O
+Remote	O
+actions	O
+:	O
+App	O
+installing	O
+Remote	O
+actions	O
+:	O
+App	O
+starting	O
+Remote	O
+actions	O
+:	O
+App	O
+removal	O
+Remote	O
+actions	O
+:	O
+Showing	O
+arbitrary	O
+web	O
+pages	O
+Remote	O
+actions	O
+:	O
+Screen-locking	O
+
+Notifications	O
+:	O
+Push	O
+notifications	O
+C2	O
+Resilience	O
+:	O
+Auxiliary	O
+C2	O
+list	O
+Self-protection	O
+:	O
+Hiding	O
+the	O
+App	O
+icon	O
+Self-protection	O
+:	O
+Preventing	O
+removal	O
+Self-protection	O
+:	O
+Emulation-detection	O
+Architecture	O
+:	O
+Modular	O
+Overlay	O
+attack	O
+Most	O
+Android	O
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+use	O
+overlay	O
+attacks	O
+to	O
+trick	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+into	O
+providing	O
+their	O
+personal	O
+information	O
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+but	O
+not	O
+limited	O
+to	O
+:	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+information	O
+,	O
+banking	O
+credentials	O
+,	O
+mail	O
+credentials	O
+)	O
+and	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+is	O
+no	O
+exception	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+particular	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+bot	O
+abuses	O
+the	O
+accessibility	O
+service	O
+privilege	O
+to	O
+obtain	O
+the	O
+package	O
+name	O
+of	O
+the	O
+foreground	O
+application	O
+and	O
+determine	O
+whether	O
+or	O
+not	O
+to	O
+show	O
+a	O
+phishing	O
+overlay	O
+window	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+following	O
+code	O
+snippet	O
+:	O
+Targets	O
+Some	O
+examples	O
+of	O
+phishing	O
+overlays	O
+are	O
+shown	O
+below	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+exist	O
+in	O
+two	O
+types	O
+:	O
+the	O
+credentials	O
+stealers	O
+(	O
+first	O
+2	O
+screenshots	O
+)	O
+and	O
+the	O
+credit	O
+card	O
+grabbers	O
+(	O
+last	O
+screenshot	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+only	O
+active	O
+target	O
+list	O
+observed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+is	O
+available	O
+in	O
+the	O
+appendix	O
+and	O
+contains	O
+a	O
+total	O
+of	O
+30	O
+unique	O
+targets	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+interesting	O
+to	O
+observe	O
+that	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+target	O
+list	O
+contains	O
+:	O
+7	O
+French	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+7	O
+U.S.	O
+banking	O
+apps	O
+1	O
+Japanese	O
+banking	O
+app	O
+15	O
+non-banking	O
+apps	O
+This	O
+uncommon	O
+target	O
+list	O
+might	O
+either	O
+be	O
+the	O
+result	O
+of	O
+specific	O
+customer	O
+demand	O
+,	O
+or	O
+due	O
+to	O
+some	O
+actors	O
+having	O
+partially	O
+reused	O
+an	O
+existing	O
+target	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+Although	O
+not	O
+yet	O
+mature	O
+enough	O
+to	O
+provide	O
+the	O
+equivalent	O
+of	O
+a	O
+full-blown	O
+set	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+malware	O
+features	O
+(	O
+such	O
+as	O
+RAT	O
+,	O
+RAT	O
+with	O
+ATS	O
+(	O
+Automated	O
+Transaction	O
+Script	O
+)	O
+,	O
+back-connect	O
+proxy	O
+,	O
+media	O
+streaming	O
+)	O
+,	O
+or	O
+providing	O
+an	O
+exhaustive	O
+target	O
+list	O
+,	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+should	O
+not	O
+be	O
+taken	O
+lightly	O
+.	O
+
+Due	O
+to	O
+the	O
+current	O
+absence	O
+of	O
+maintained	O
+and	O
+supported	O
+Android	B-Malware
+banking	O
+Malware-as-a-Service	O
+in	O
+the	O
+underground	O
+community	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+a	O
+certainly	O
+demand	O
+for	O
+a	O
+new	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+is	O
+already	O
+capable	O
+to	O
+fulfill	O
+this	O
+demand	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+the	O
+feature	O
+base	O
+it	O
+already	O
+possesses	O
+and	O
+the	O
+money	O
+that	O
+can	O
+be	O
+made	O
+from	O
+the	O
+rental	O
+,	O
+it	O
+could	O
+evolve	O
+to	O
+compete	O
+with	O
+the	O
+mightiest	O
+Android	B-System
+banking	O
+Trojans	O
+.	O
+
+Next	O
+to	O
+the	O
+features	O
+,	O
+we	O
+expect	O
+the	O
+target	O
+list	O
+to	O
+be	O
+expanded	O
+to	O
+contain	O
+additional	O
+(	O
+banking	O
+)	O
+apps	O
+in	O
+the	O
+near	O
+future	O
+.	O
+
+Knowledge	O
+of	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+landscape	O
+and	O
+implementation	O
+of	O
+the	O
+right	O
+detection	O
+tools	O
+remains	O
+crucial	O
+to	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+protect	O
+yourself	O
+from	O
+fraud	O
+;	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+is	O
+yet	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Trojan	O
+active	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+!	O
+
+Appendix	O
+Samples	O
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+samples	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+:	O
+App	O
+name	O
+Package	O
+name	O
+SHA	O
+256	O
+hash	O
+Flash	B-System
+Player	I-System
+com.uxlgtsvfdc.zipvwntdy	B-Indicator
+728a6ea44aab94a2d0ebbccbf0c1b4a93fbd9efa8813c19a88d368d6a46b4f4f	B-Indicator
+Flash	B-System
+Player	I-System
+com.ognbsfhszj.hqpquokjdp	B-Indicator
+fe28aba6a942b6713d7142117afdf70f5e731c56eff8956ecdb40cdc28c7c329	B-Indicator
+
+Flash	B-System
+Player	I-System
+com.mwmnfwt.arhkrgajn	B-Indicator
+ffa5ac3460998e7b9856fc136ebcd112196c3abf24816ccab1fbae11eae4954c	B-Indicator
+Flash	B-System
+Player	I-System
+com.wogdjywtwq.oiofvpzpxyo	B-Indicator
+6ac7e7ed83b4b57cc4d28f14308d69d062d29a544bbde0856d5697b0fc50cde4	B-Indicator
+Flash	B-System
+Player	I-System
+com.hvdnaiujzwo.fovzeukzywfr	B-Indicator
+
+cfd77ddc5c1ebb8498c899a68ea75d2616c1c92a0e618113d7c9e5fcc650094b	B-Indicator
+Flash	B-System
+Player	I-System
+com.gzhlubw.pmevdiexmn	B-Indicator
+3f2ed928789c200e21fd0c2095619a346f75d84f76f1e54a8b3153385850ea63	B-Indicator
+Target	O
+list	O
+The	O
+actual	O
+observed	O
+list	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+apps	O
+targeted	O
+by	O
+Cerberus	B-Malware
+contains	O
+a	O
+total	O
+of	O
+30	O
+unique	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+list	O
+is	O
+expected	O
+to	O
+expand	O
+:	O
+Package	O
+name	O
+Application	O
+name	O
+com.android.vending	B-Indicator
+Play	B-System
+Market	I-System
+com.boursorama.android.clients	B-Indicator
+Boursorama	I-Indicator
+Banque	B-System
+com.caisseepargne.android.mobilebanking	B-Indicator
+Banque	B-System
+com.chase.sig.android	B-Indicator
+Chase	B-System
+Mobile	I-System
+com.clairmail.fth	B-Indicator
+Fifth	B-System
+Third	I-System
+Mobile	I-System
+Banking	I-System
+com.connectivityapps.hotmail	B-Indicator
+Connect	B-System
+for	I-System
+Hotmail	I-System
+com.google.android.gm	B-Indicator
+Gmail	B-System
+com.imo.android.imoim	B-Indicator
+imo	B-System
+free	O
+video	O
+calls	O
+and	O
+chat	O
+com.infonow.bofa	B-Indicator
+Bank	B-System
+of	I-System
+America	I-System
+
+Mobile	I-System
+Banking	I-System
+com.IngDirectAndroid	B-Indicator
+ING	O
+com.instagram.android	B-Indicator
+Instagram	I-Indicator
+com.konylabs.capitalone	B-Indicator
+Capital	B-System
+One®	I-System
+Mobile	I-System
+com.mail.mobile.android.mail	B-Indicator
+mail.com	I-Indicator
+mail	B-System
+com.microsoft.office.outlook	B-Indicator
+Microsoft	B-System
+Outlook	I-System
+com.snapchat.android	B-Indicator
+Snapchat	B-System
+com.tencent.mm	B-Indicator
+WeChat	B-System
+com.twitter.android	B-Indicator
+Twitter	B-System
+com.ubercab	B-Indicator
+Uber	B-Organization
+com.usaa.mobile.android.usaa	B-Indicator
+USAA	B-System
+Mobile	I-System
+com.usbank.mobilebanking	B-Indicator
+U.S.	I-Indicator
+Bank	O
+-	O
+Inspired	O
+by	O
+customers	O
+com.viber.voip	B-Indicator
+Viber	B-System
+com.wf.wellsfargomobile	B-Indicator
+
+Wells	B-System
+Fargo	I-System
+Mobile	I-System
+com.whatsapp	B-Indicator
+WhatsApp	B-System
+com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.mail	B-Indicator
+Yahoo	B-System
+Mail	I-System
+–	O
+Organized	O
+Email	O
+fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplus	B-Indicator
+Banque	B-System
+Populaire	O
+fr.creditagricole.androidapp	B-Indicator
+Ma	B-System
+Banque	I-System
+jp.co.rakuten_bank.rakutenbank	B-Indicator
+楽天銀行	O
+-個人のお客様向けアプリ	O
+mobi.societegenerale.mobile.lappli	B-Indicator
+L	O
+’	O
+Appli	O
+Société	O
+Générale	O
+net.bnpparibas.mescomptes	B-Indicator
+Mes	O
+Comptes	O
+BNP	O
+Paribas	O
+org.telegram.messenger	B-Indicator
+Telegram	I-Indicator
+Triout	B-Malware
+-	O
+Spyware	O
+Framework	O
+
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+with	O
+Extensive	O
+Surveillance	O
+Capabilities	O
+August	O
+20	O
+,	O
+2018	O
+No	O
+operating	O
+system	O
+is	O
+safe	O
+from	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+as	O
+cyber	O
+criminals	O
+will	O
+always	O
+want	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+,	O
+spy	O
+or	O
+tamper	O
+with	O
+your	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+proliferation	O
+of	O
+Android	B-Malware
+devices	O
+–	O
+from	O
+smartphones	O
+to	O
+tablets	O
+and	O
+smart	O
+TVs	O
+–	O
+has	O
+opened	O
+up	O
+new	O
+possibilities	O
+for	O
+malware	O
+developers	O
+,	O
+as	O
+all	O
+these	O
+devices	O
+pack	O
+microphones	O
+,	O
+cameras	O
+and	O
+location-tracking	O
+hardware	O
+they	O
+can	O
+turn	O
+into	O
+the	O
+perfect	O
+spy	O
+tools	O
+.	O
+
+Bitdefender	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+identified	O
+a	O
+new	O
+Android	B-System
+spyware	O
+,	O
+dubbed	O
+Triout	B-Malware
+,	O
+which	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+act	O
+as	O
+a	O
+framework	O
+for	O
+building	O
+extensive	O
+surveillance	O
+capabilities	O
+into	O
+seemingly	O
+benign	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+Found	O
+bundled	O
+with	O
+a	O
+repackaged	O
+app	O
+,	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+surveillance	O
+capabilities	O
+involve	O
+hiding	O
+its	O
+presence	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+recording	O
+phone	O
+calls	O
+,	O
+logging	O
+incoming	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+recoding	O
+videos	O
+,	O
+taking	O
+pictures	O
+and	O
+collecting	O
+GPS	B-System
+coordinates	O
+,	O
+then	O
+broadcasting	O
+all	O
+of	O
+that	O
+to	O
+an	O
+attacker-controlled	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+(	O
+command	O
+and	O
+control	O
+)	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+’	O
+s	O
+interesting	O
+that	O
+Triout	B-Malware
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+Bitdefender	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+machine	O
+learning	O
+algorithms	O
+,	O
+was	O
+first	O
+submitted	O
+from	O
+Russia	O
+,	O
+and	O
+most	O
+scans/reports	O
+came	O
+from	O
+Israel	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+sample	O
+’	O
+s	O
+first	O
+appearance	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+be	O
+May	O
+15	O
+,	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+when	O
+it	O
+was	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+VirusTotal	B-Organization
+,	O
+but	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+unclear	O
+how	O
+the	O
+tainted	O
+sample	O
+is	O
+disseminated	O
+.	O
+
+Third-party	O
+marketplaces	O
+or	O
+some	O
+other	O
+attacker-controlled	O
+domains	O
+are	O
+likely	O
+used	O
+to	O
+host	O
+the	O
+sample	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+subsequent	O
+investigation	O
+revealed	O
+that	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+has	O
+the	O
+following	O
+capabilities	O
+:	O
+Records	O
+every	O
+phone	O
+call	O
+(	O
+literally	O
+the	O
+conversation	O
+as	O
+a	O
+media	O
+file	O
+)	O
+,	O
+then	O
+sends	O
+it	O
+together	O
+with	O
+the	O
+caller	O
+id	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+(	O
+incall3.php	B-Indicator
+and	O
+outcall3.php	B-Indicator
+)	O
+Logs	O
+every	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+(	O
+SMS	O
+body	O
+and	O
+SMS	O
+sender	O
+)	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+(	O
+script3.php	B-Indicator
+)	O
+Has	O
+capability	O
+to	O
+hide	O
+self	O
+Can	O
+send	O
+all	O
+call	O
+logs	O
+(	O
+“	O
+content	B-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+//call_log/calls	I-Indicator
+”	O
+,	O
+info	O
+:	O
+callname	O
+,	O
+callnum	O
+,	O
+calldate	O
+,	O
+calltype	O
+,	O
+callduration	O
+
+)	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+(	O
+calllog.php	B-Indicator
+)	O
+Whenever	O
+the	O
+user	O
+snaps	O
+a	O
+picture	O
+,	O
+either	O
+with	O
+the	O
+front	O
+or	O
+rear	O
+camera	O
+,	O
+it	O
+gets	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+(	O
+uppc.php	B-Indicator
+,	O
+fi	O
+npic.php	B-Indicator
+orreqpic.php	B-Indicator
+)	O
+Can	O
+send	O
+GPS	B-System
+coordinates	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+(	O
+gps3.php	B-Indicator
+)	O
+The	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+to	O
+which	O
+the	O
+application	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+be	O
+sending	O
+collected	O
+data	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+operational	O
+,	O
+as	O
+of	O
+this	O
+writing	O
+,	O
+and	O
+running	O
+since	O
+May	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+January	O
+23	O
+,	O
+2017	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+posing	O
+as	O
+Netflix	B-System
+app	I-System
+As	O
+users	O
+have	O
+become	O
+more	O
+attached	O
+to	O
+their	O
+mobile	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+they	O
+want	O
+everything	O
+on	O
+those	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+There	O
+’	O
+s	O
+an	O
+app	O
+for	O
+just	O
+about	O
+any	O
+facet	O
+of	O
+one	O
+’	O
+s	O
+personal	O
+and	O
+professional	O
+life	O
+,	O
+from	O
+booking	O
+travel	O
+and	O
+managing	O
+projects	O
+,	O
+to	O
+buying	O
+groceries	O
+and	O
+binge-watching	O
+the	O
+latest	O
+Netflix	B-Organization
+series	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+iOS	B-System
+and	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+for	O
+Netflix	B-Organization
+are	O
+enormously	O
+popular	O
+,	O
+effectively	O
+turning	O
+a	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+into	O
+a	O
+television	O
+with	O
+which	O
+users	O
+can	O
+stream	O
+full	O
+movies	O
+and	O
+TV	O
+programs	O
+anytime	O
+,	O
+anywhere	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+the	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+with	O
+their	O
+many	O
+millions	O
+of	O
+users	O
+,	O
+have	O
+captured	O
+the	O
+attention	O
+of	O
+the	O
+bad	O
+actors	O
+,	O
+too	O
+,	O
+who	O
+are	O
+exploiting	O
+the	O
+popularity	O
+of	O
+Netflix	B-Organization
+to	O
+spread	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+Recently	O
+,	O
+the	O
+ThreatLabZ	B-Organization
+research	O
+team	O
+came	O
+across	O
+a	O
+fake	B-System
+Netflix	I-System
+app	I-System
+,	O
+which	O
+turned	O
+out	O
+to	O
+be	O
+a	O
+new	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+(	O
+Remote	O
+Access	O
+Trojan	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+is	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+performing	O
+a	O
+variety	O
+of	O
+alarming	O
+functions	O
+that	O
+includes	O
+:	O
+Activating	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+microphone	O
+and	O
+listening	O
+to	O
+live	O
+conversations	O
+Executing	O
+commands	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+Copying	O
+files	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+to	O
+a	O
+Command	O
+&	O
+Control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+center	O
+Recording	O
+screen	O
+captures	O
+Viewing	O
+contacts	O
+Reading	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+The	O
+screenshot	O
+below	O
+shows	O
+part	O
+of	O
+the	O
+sandbox	O
+’	O
+s	O
+report	O
+on	O
+the	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+signature	O
+and	O
+detected	O
+functions	O
+:	O
+The	O
+fake	O
+Netflix	B-Organization
+app	O
+we	O
+are	O
+analyzing	O
+in	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+be	O
+built	O
+using	O
+an	O
+updated	O
+version	O
+of	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+builder	O
+,	O
+
+which	O
+was	O
+leaked	O
+last	O
+year	O
+.	O
+
+Technical	O
+details	O
+Please	O
+note	O
+that	O
+our	O
+research	O
+is	O
+not	O
+about	O
+the	O
+legitimate	O
+Netflix	B-System
+app	I-System
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+spyware	O
+in	O
+this	O
+analysis	O
+was	O
+portraying	O
+itself	O
+as	O
+the	O
+Netflix	B-System
+app	I-System
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+it	O
+displayed	O
+the	O
+icon	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+actual	O
+Netflix	B-System
+app	I-System
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+As	O
+soon	O
+as	O
+the	O
+user	O
+clicks	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+icon	O
+for	O
+the	O
+first	O
+time	O
+,	O
+nothing	O
+seems	O
+to	O
+happen	O
+and	O
+the	O
+icon	O
+disappears	O
+from	O
+the	O
+home	O
+screen	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+is	O
+a	O
+common	O
+trick	O
+played	O
+by	O
+malware	O
+developers	O
+,	O
+making	O
+the	O
+user	O
+think	O
+the	O
+app	O
+may	O
+have	O
+been	O
+removed	O
+.	O
+
+But	O
+,	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+scenes	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+has	O
+not	O
+been	O
+removed	O
+;	O
+instead	O
+it	O
+starts	O
+preparing	O
+its	O
+onslaught	O
+of	O
+attacks	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+contacting	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+,	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+was	O
+found	O
+to	O
+be	O
+using	O
+free	O
+DNS	B-Indicator
+services	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+screenshot	O
+below	O
+:	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+uses	O
+an	O
+unusual	O
+trick	O
+to	O
+make	O
+sure	O
+that	O
+it	O
+remains	O
+up	O
+and	O
+running	O
+and	O
+that	O
+the	O
+spying	O
+does	O
+not	O
+stop	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+does	O
+so	O
+using	O
+the	O
+Services	O
+,	O
+Broadcast	O
+Receivers	O
+,	O
+and	O
+Activities	O
+components	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+platform	O
+.	O
+
+Services	O
+can	O
+perform	O
+long-running	O
+operations	O
+in	O
+the	O
+background	O
+and	O
+does	O
+not	O
+need	O
+a	O
+user	O
+interface	O
+.	O
+
+Broadcast	O
+Receivers	O
+are	O
+Android	B-System
+components	O
+that	O
+can	O
+register	O
+themselves	O
+for	O
+particular	O
+events	O
+.	O
+
+Activities	O
+are	O
+key	O
+building	O
+blocks	O
+,	O
+central	O
+to	O
+an	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+navigation	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+registers	O
+a	O
+service	O
+called	O
+AutoStartup	O
+and	O
+a	O
+broadcast	O
+receiver	O
+named	O
+BootComplete	O
+.	O
+
+MainActivity	O
+registers	O
+BootComplete	O
+with	O
+a	O
+boot	O
+event	O
+,	O
+so	O
+that	O
+whenever	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+booted	O
+,	O
+BootComplete	O
+gets	O
+triggered	O
+.	O
+
+BootComplete	O
+starts	O
+the	O
+AutoStartup	O
+service	O
+and	O
+the	O
+AutoStartup	O
+service	O
+makes	O
+sure	O
+that	O
+MainActivity	O
+is	O
+always	O
+running	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+follows	O
+are	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+features	O
+exhibited	O
+by	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+Command	O
+execution	O
+Command	O
+execution	O
+can	O
+create	O
+havoc	O
+for	O
+victim	O
+if	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+developer	O
+decides	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+commands	O
+in	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Leveraging	O
+this	O
+feature	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+developer	O
+can	O
+root	O
+the	O
+device	O
+using	O
+a	O
+range	O
+of	O
+vulnerabilities	O
+,	O
+well-known	O
+or	O
+zero-day	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+screenshot	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+command	O
+execution	O
+functionality	O
+in	O
+action	O
+:	O
+The	O
+paramString	O
+parameter	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+above	O
+screenshot	O
+can	O
+be	O
+any	O
+command	O
+received	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+Screen	O
+capture	O
+and	O
+audio	O
+recording	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+was	O
+able	O
+to	O
+take	O
+screen	O
+captures	O
+and	O
+,	O
+using	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+microphone	O
+,	O
+listen	O
+to	O
+audio	O
+conversations	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+capability	O
+was	O
+confirmed	O
+when	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+permission	O
+,	O
+called	O
+android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO	B-Indicator
+,	O
+was	O
+being	O
+requested	O
+along	O
+with	O
+code	O
+found	O
+in	O
+the	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+captured	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+screen	O
+activities	O
+along	O
+with	O
+audio	O
+using	O
+the	O
+MediaProjectionCallback	O
+functionality	O
+(	O
+available	O
+with	O
+Lollipop	B-System
+,	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+5.0	I-System
+release	O
+,	O
+and	O
+later	O
+)	O
+and	O
+saved	O
+the	O
+output	O
+in	O
+a	O
+file	O
+named	O
+"	O
+video.mp4	B-Indicator
+''	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+the	O
+following	O
+screenshot	O
+SMS	O
+stealing	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+was	O
+also	O
+observed	O
+stealing	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+from	O
+the	O
+affected	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+as	O
+shown	O
+in	O
+screenshot	O
+below	O
+:	O
+Stealing	O
+contacts	O
+The	O
+ability	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+contacts	O
+is	O
+a	O
+favorite	O
+feature	O
+for	O
+spyware	O
+developers	O
+,	O
+as	O
+the	O
+stolen	O
+contacts	O
+can	O
+be	O
+used	O
+to	O
+further	O
+spread	O
+the	O
+spyware	O
+
+.	O
+
+The	O
+following	O
+screenshot	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+contacts	O
+being	O
+stolen	O
+and	O
+written	O
+in	O
+a	O
+local	O
+array	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+then	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+:	O
+Uninstalling	O
+apps	O
+Uninstalling	O
+apps	O
+is	O
+another	O
+function	O
+favored	O
+by	O
+developers	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+spyware	O
+and	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+They	O
+tend	O
+to	O
+target	O
+any	O
+antivirus	O
+protections	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+uninstall	O
+them	O
+,	O
+which	O
+increases	O
+the	O
+possibility	O
+of	O
+their	O
+malware	O
+persisting	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Following	O
+screenshot	O
+shows	O
+this	O
+functionality	O
+in	O
+action	O
+:	O
+Other	O
+functions	O
+In	O
+addition	O
+to	O
+the	O
+functionalities	O
+we	O
+’	O
+ve	O
+described	O
+,	O
+the	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+was	O
+exhibiting	O
+many	O
+other	O
+behaviors	O
+that	O
+make	O
+it	O
+more	O
+robust	O
+than	O
+most	O
+off-the-shelf	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+was	O
+designed	O
+to	O
+function	O
+only	O
+over	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+the	O
+preferable	O
+mode	O
+for	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+to	O
+send	O
+files	O
+to	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+screenshot	O
+below	O
+shows	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+scanning	O
+for	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+and	O
+enabling	O
+it	O
+if	O
+a	O
+known	O
+channel	O
+is	O
+found	O
+:	O
+Additional	O
+features	O
+-	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+could	O
+click	O
+photos	O
+using	O
+the	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+camera	O
+,	O
+based	O
+on	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O
+
+-	O
+There	O
+were	O
+two	O
+interesting	O
+sub-classes	O
+found	O
+inside	O
+Main	O
+Activity	O
+:	O
+Receiver	O
+and	O
+Sender	O
+.	O
+
+Receiver	O
+was	O
+involved	O
+in	O
+receiving	O
+commands	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Server	O
+and	O
+the	O
+main	O
+functionality	O
+of	O
+Sender	O
+was	O
+to	O
+send	O
+all	O
+the	O
+data	O
+collected	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+over	O
+Wi-Fi	O
+.	O
+
+-	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+was	O
+also	O
+collecting	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+location	O
+to	O
+identify	O
+the	O
+exact	O
+location	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+.	O
+
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+builder	O
+The	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+Remote	O
+Access	O
+Trojan	O
+(	O
+RAT	O
+)	O
+builder	O
+is	O
+gaining	O
+popularity	O
+in	O
+the	O
+hacking	O
+community	O
+,	O
+so	O
+we	O
+decided	O
+to	O
+study	O
+its	O
+pervasiveness	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+we	O
+found	O
+were	O
+several	O
+other	O
+fake	O
+apps	O
+developed	O
+using	O
+the	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+builder	O
+,	O
+which	O
+should	O
+come	O
+as	O
+a	O
+warning	O
+to	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+targeted	O
+apps	O
+were	O
+:	O
+Whatsapp	B-System
+YouTube	B-System
+Video	I-System
+Downloader	I-System
+Google	B-System
+Update	I-System
+Instagram	B-System
+Hack	B-System
+Wifi	I-System
+AirDroid	B-System
+WifiHacker	B-System
+Facebook	B-System
+Photoshop	B-System
+SkyTV	B-System
+Hotstar	B-System
+Trump	B-System
+Dash	I-System
+PokemonGo	B-System
+With	O
+many	O
+more	O
+to	O
+come	O
+.	O
+
+Furthermore	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+that	O
+in	O
+just	O
+the	O
+first	O
+two	O
+weeks	O
+of	O
+2017	O
+,	O
+there	O
+have	O
+been	O
+more	O
+than	O
+120	O
+such	O
+spyware	O
+variants	O
+already	O
+built	O
+using	O
+the	O
+same	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+builder	O
+as	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+RAT	I-Malware
+and	O
+roaming	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+complete	O
+list	O
+of	O
+sample	O
+hashes	O
+is	O
+available	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+Conclusion	O
+The	O
+days	O
+when	O
+one	O
+needed	O
+in-depth	O
+coding	O
+knowledge	O
+to	O
+develop	O
+malware	O
+are	O
+long	O
+gone	O
+.	O
+
+Nowadays	O
+,	O
+script	O
+kiddies	O
+can	O
+build	O
+a	O
+piece	O
+of	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+can	O
+create	O
+real	O
+havoc	O
+.	O
+
+Moreover	O
+,	O
+there	O
+are	O
+many	O
+toolkits	O
+like	O
+the	O
+SpyNote	B-Malware
+Trojan	O
+builder	O
+that	O
+enable	O
+users	O
+to	O
+build	O
+malware	O
+with	O
+ease	O
+and	O
+few	O
+clicks	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+particular	O
+,	O
+avoid	O
+side-loading	O
+apps	O
+from	O
+third-party	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+and	O
+avoid	O
+the	O
+temptation	O
+to	O
+play	O
+games	O
+that	O
+are	O
+not	O
+yet	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Android	B-System
+.	O
+
+Yes	O
+,	O
+we	O
+are	O
+talking	O
+about	O
+SuperMarioRun	B-System
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+recently	O
+launched	O
+by	O
+Nintendo	B-Organization
+only	O
+for	O
+iOS	B-System
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Recent	O
+blogs	O
+by	O
+the	O
+Zscaler	B-Organization
+research	O
+team	O
+explain	O
+how	O
+some	O
+variants	O
+of	O
+Android	B-Malware
+malware	O
+are	O
+exploiting	O
+the	O
+popularity	O
+of	O
+this	O
+game	O
+and	O
+tricking	O
+Android	B-System
+users	O
+into	O
+downloading	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+version	O
+.	O
+
+(	O
+Have	O
+a	O
+look	O
+here	O
+and	O
+here	O
+.	O
+
+)	O
+You	O
+should	O
+also	O
+avoid	O
+the	O
+temptation	O
+to	O
+play	O
+games	O
+from	O
+sources	O
+other	O
+than	O
+legitimate	O
+app	O
+stores	O
+;	O
+such	O
+games	O
+are	O
+not	O
+safe	O
+and	O
+may	O
+bring	O
+harm	O
+to	O
+your	O
+reputation	O
+and	O
+your	O
+bank	O
+account	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+Masquerades	O
+as	O
+Postal	O
+Service	O
+Apps	O
+Around	O
+the	O
+World	O
+July	O
+1	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+KEY	O
+FINDINGS	O
+The	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+is	O
+investigating	O
+a	O
+new	O
+campaign	O
+involving	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+,	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+that	O
+emerged	O
+around	O
+October	O
+2017	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+is	O
+an	O
+information	O
+stealer	O
+used	O
+to	O
+steal	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+steal	O
+financial	O
+data	O
+,	O
+read	O
+account	O
+information	O
+and	O
+contact	O
+lists	O
+,	O
+steal	O
+application	O
+data	O
+,	O
+and	O
+do	O
+much	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+first	O
+targeted	O
+South	O
+Korean	O
+and	O
+Japanese	O
+speakers	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+it	O
+has	O
+begun	O
+to	O
+target	O
+users	O
+all	O
+around	O
+the	O
+world	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+users	O
+in	O
+countries	O
+like	O
+China	O
+,	O
+Taiwan	O
+,	O
+France	O
+,	O
+Switzerland	O
+,	O
+Germany	O
+,	O
+United	O
+Kingdom	O
+,	O
+United	O
+States	O
+,	O
+and	O
+others	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+masquerades	O
+as	O
+legitimate	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+transportation	O
+services	O
+in	O
+order	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+the	O
+users	O
+'	O
+trust	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+the	O
+application	O
+requests	O
+permissions	O
+so	O
+that	O
+it	O
+may	O
+control	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+steal	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+proliferate	O
+to	O
+other	O
+devices	O
+in	O
+the	O
+target	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+'s	O
+investigation	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+campaign	O
+is	O
+a	O
+Chinese-speaking	O
+group	O
+dubbed	O
+"	O
+Roaming	B-Organization
+Mantis	I-Organization
+''	O
+,	O
+a	I-Organization
+group	O
+that	O
+has	O
+led	O
+similar	O
+campaigns	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+has	O
+been	O
+in	O
+the	O
+wild	O
+since	O
+2017	O
+;	O
+this	O
+latest	O
+campaign	O
+indicates	O
+that	O
+it	O
+has	O
+become	O
+more	O
+powerful	O
+.	O
+
+Code	O
+improvements	O
+,	O
+new	O
+capabilities	O
+,	O
+anti-emulation	O
+techniques	O
+,	O
+and	O
+new	O
+,	O
+global	O
+targets	O
+all	O
+suggest	O
+that	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+well-maintained	O
+by	O
+its	O
+authors	O
+and	O
+continues	O
+to	O
+evolve	O
+.	O
+
+TABLE	O
+OF	O
+CONTENTS	O
+Key	O
+Findings	O
+Introduction	O
+Threat	O
+Analysis	O
+Fakespy	B-Malware
+Code	O
+Analysis	O
+Dynamic	O
+Library	O
+Loading	O
+Stealing	O
+Sensitive	O
+Information	O
+Anti-Emulator	O
+Techniques	O
+Under	O
+Active	O
+Development	O
+Who	O
+is	O
+Behind	O
+Fakespy	B-Malware
+'s	O
+Smishing	O
+Campaigns	O
+?	O
+
+Conclusions	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Mobile	I-Organization
+Detects	O
+and	O
+Stops	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+Compromise	O
+INTRODUCTION	O
+For	O
+the	O
+past	O
+several	O
+weeks	O
+,	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+has	O
+been	O
+investigating	O
+a	O
+new	O
+version	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+dubbed	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+,	O
+which	O
+was	O
+first	O
+identified	O
+in	O
+October	O
+2017	O
+and	O
+reported	O
+again	O
+in	O
+October	O
+2018	O
+.	O
+
+A	O
+new	O
+campaign	O
+is	O
+up	O
+and	O
+running	O
+using	O
+newly	O
+improved	O
+,	O
+significantly	O
+more	O
+powerful	O
+malware	O
+as	O
+compared	O
+to	O
+previous	O
+versions	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+is	O
+under	O
+active	O
+development	O
+and	O
+is	O
+evolving	O
+rapidly	O
+;	O
+new	O
+versions	O
+are	O
+released	O
+every	O
+week	O
+with	O
+additional	O
+evasion	O
+techniques	O
+and	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+analysis	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+malware	O
+is	O
+a	O
+Chinese-speaking	O
+group	O
+,	O
+commonly	O
+referred	O
+to	O
+as	O
+"	O
+Roaming	B-Organization
+Mantis	I-Organization
+''	O
+,	O
+a	I-Organization
+group	O
+that	O
+is	O
+known	O
+to	O
+have	O
+launched	O
+similar	O
+campaigns	O
+in	O
+the	O
+past	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+is	O
+an	O
+information	O
+stealer	O
+that	O
+exfiltrates	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+steals	O
+financial	O
+and	O
+application	O
+data	O
+,	O
+reads	O
+account	O
+information	O
+and	O
+contact	O
+lists	O
+,	O
+and	O
+more	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+smishing	O
+,	O
+or	O
+SMS	O
+phishing	O
+,	O
+to	O
+infiltrate	O
+target	O
+devices	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+a	O
+technique	O
+that	O
+relies	O
+on	O
+social	O
+engineering	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+attackers	O
+send	O
+fake	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+lure	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+to	O
+click	O
+on	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+link	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+link	O
+directs	O
+them	O
+to	O
+a	O
+malicious	O
+web	O
+page	O
+,	O
+which	O
+prompts	O
+them	O
+to	O
+download	O
+an	O
+Android	O
+application	O
+package	O
+(	O
+APK	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+most	O
+recent	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+campaign	O
+appears	O
+to	O
+target	O
+users	O
+of	O
+postal	O
+services	O
+around	O
+the	O
+world	O
+.	O
+
+New	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+masquerade	O
+as	O
+government	O
+post	O
+office	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+transportation	O
+services	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+analysis	O
+indicates	O
+that	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+are	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+limiting	O
+their	O
+campaigns	O
+to	O
+East	O
+Asian	O
+countries	O
+,	O
+but	O
+are	O
+targeting	O
+additional	O
+countries	O
+around	O
+the	O
+world	O
+.	O
+
+THREAT	O
+ANALYSIS	O
+Infection	O
+Vector	O
+:	O
+Smishing	O
+Your	O
+Device	O
+Thus	O
+far	O
+,	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+campaigns	O
+are	O
+characterized	O
+by	O
+SMS	O
+phishing	O
+(	O
+a.k.a	O
+.	O
+
+smishing	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+masquerade	O
+as	O
+a	O
+message	O
+from	O
+the	O
+local	O
+post	O
+office	O
+and	O
+link	O
+to	O
+the	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+download	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+a	O
+previous	O
+campaign	O
+reported	O
+by	O
+JPCERT	B-Organization
+,	O
+mobile	O
+users	O
+were	O
+alerted	O
+by	O
+phishy	O
+messages	O
+containing	O
+“	O
+delivery	O
+updates	O
+”	O
+purportedly	O
+from	O
+Sagawa	B-Organization
+Express	I-Organization
+.	O
+
+Fake	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+luring	O
+users	O
+to	O
+enter	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+website	O
+,	O
+which	O
+contains	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+APK	O
+(	O
+JPCERT	B-Organization
+report	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Clicking	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+link	O
+brings	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+website	O
+that	O
+prompts	O
+them	O
+to	O
+download	O
+and	O
+install	O
+the	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+APK	O
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+a	O
+local	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Targeting	O
+Postal	O
+and	O
+Transportation	O
+Services	O
+Companies	O
+One	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+significant	O
+findings	O
+is	O
+that	O
+new	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+target	O
+not	O
+only	O
+Korean	O
+and	O
+Japanese	O
+speakers	O
+,	O
+but	O
+also	O
+almost	O
+any	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+company	O
+around	O
+the	O
+world	O
+.	O
+
+Example	O
+of	O
+more	O
+recent	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+campaigns	O
+targeting	O
+France	O
+.	O
+
+New	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+campaign	O
+applications	O
+leveraging	O
+fake	O
+postal	O
+services	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+recent	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+versions	O
+contain	O
+the	O
+same	O
+code	O
+with	O
+minor	O
+changes	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+malware	O
+has	O
+been	O
+found	O
+to	O
+masquerade	O
+as	O
+any	O
+of	O
+the	O
+following	O
+companies	O
+:	O
+United	B-Organization
+States	I-Organization
+Postal	I-Organization
+Service	I-Organization
+-	O
+An	O
+independent	O
+agency	O
+of	O
+the	O
+executive	O
+branch	O
+of	O
+the	O
+United	O
+States	O
+federal	O
+government	O
+.	O
+
+USPS	B-Organization
+is	O
+the	O
+most	O
+well-known	O
+branch	O
+of	O
+the	O
+US	O
+government	O
+and	O
+provides	O
+a	O
+publicly	O
+funded	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+.	O
+
+Royal	B-Organization
+Mail	I-Organization
+-	O
+British	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+and	O
+courier	O
+company	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+most	O
+of	O
+its	O
+history	O
+it	O
+operated	O
+as	O
+a	O
+government	O
+department	O
+or	O
+public	O
+corporation	O
+.	O
+
+Deutsche	B-Organization
+Post	I-Organization
+-	O
+Deutsche	O
+Post	O
+DHL	B-Organization
+Group	I-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+German	O
+multinational	O
+package	O
+delivery	O
+and	O
+supply	O
+chain	O
+management	O
+company	O
+headquartered	O
+in	O
+Bonn	O
+.	O
+
+La	B-Organization
+Poste	I-Organization
+-	O
+La	O
+Poste	O
+is	O
+a	O
+public	O
+limited	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+company	O
+in	O
+France	O
+.	O
+
+Japan	B-Organization
+Post	I-Organization
+-	O
+A	O
+private	O
+Japanese	O
+post	O
+,	O
+logistics	O
+and	O
+courier	O
+headquartered	O
+in	O
+Tokyo	O
+.	O
+
+Yamato	B-Organization
+Transport	I-Organization
+-	O
+One	O
+of	O
+Japan	O
+'s	O
+largest	O
+door-to-door	O
+delivery	O
+service	O
+companies	O
+,	O
+also	O
+in	O
+Tokyo	O
+.	O
+
+Chunghwa	B-Organization
+Post	I-Organization
+-	O
+The	O
+government-owned	O
+corporation	O
+Chunghwa	B-Organization
+is	O
+the	O
+official	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+of	O
+Taiwan	O
+.	O
+
+Swiss	B-Organization
+Post	I-Organization
+-	O
+The	O
+national	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+of	O
+Switzerland	O
+,	O
+a	O
+fully	O
+state-owned	O
+limited	O
+company	O
+(	O
+AG	O
+)	O
+regulated	O
+by	O
+public	O
+law	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+fake	O
+applications	O
+are	O
+built	O
+using	O
+WebView	B-System
+,	O
+a	O
+popular	O
+extension	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+View	O
+class	O
+that	O
+lets	O
+the	O
+developer	O
+show	O
+a	O
+webpage	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+uses	O
+this	O
+view	O
+to	O
+redirect	O
+users	O
+to	O
+the	O
+original	O
+post	O
+office	O
+carrier	O
+webpage	O
+on	O
+launch	O
+of	O
+the	O
+application	O
+,	O
+continuing	O
+the	O
+deception	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+appear	O
+legitimate	O
+,	O
+especially	O
+given	O
+these	O
+applications	O
+icons	O
+and	O
+user	O
+interface	O
+.	O
+
+New	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+applications	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+post	O
+office	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+FAKESPY	B-Malware
+CODE	O
+ANALYSIS	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+user	O
+clicks	O
+on	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+link	O
+from	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+message	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+asks	O
+them	O
+to	O
+approve	O
+installation	O
+from	O
+unknown	O
+resources	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+configuration	O
+can	O
+be	O
+toggled	O
+on	O
+by	O
+going	O
+to	O
+‘	O
+Settings	O
+’	O
+-	O
+>	O
+‘	O
+Security	O
+’	O
+-	O
+>	O
+‘	O
+Unknown	O
+Resources	O
+’	O
+.	O
+
+PackageInstaller	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+permission	O
+access	O
+and	O
+asks	O
+for	O
+the	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+approval	O
+,	O
+which	O
+then	O
+installs	O
+the	O
+application	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+analysis	O
+dissects	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+Chunghwa	O
+Post	O
+app	O
+version	O
+,	O
+which	O
+emerged	O
+in	O
+April	O
+2020	O
+.	O
+
+During	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+asks	O
+for	O
+the	O
+following	O
+permissions	O
+:	O
+READ_PHONE_STATE	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+read-only	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+state	O
+,	O
+including	O
+the	O
+current	O
+cellular	O
+network	O
+information	O
+,	O
+the	O
+status	O
+of	O
+any	O
+ongoing	O
+calls	O
+,	O
+and	O
+a	O
+list	O
+of	O
+any	O
+PhoneAccounts	O
+registered	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+READ_SMS	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+read	O
+text	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+RECEIVE_SMS	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+WRITE_SMS	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+write	O
+to	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+stored	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+or	O
+SIM	O
+card	O
+,	O
+including	O
+y	O
+deleting	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+SEND_SMS	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+send	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+INTERNET	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+open	O
+network	O
+sockets	O
+.	O
+
+WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+write	O
+to	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+.	O
+
+READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+read	O
+from	O
+external	O
+storage	O
+.	O
+
+RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+a	O
+broadcast	O
+after	O
+the	O
+system	O
+finishes	O
+booting	O
+.	O
+
+GET_TASKS	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+get	O
+information	O
+about	O
+current	O
+or	O
+recently	O
+run	O
+tasks	O
+.	O
+
+(	O
+deprecated	O
+in	O
+API	O
+level	O
+21	O
+)	O
+SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+create	O
+windows	O
+shown	O
+on	O
+top	O
+of	O
+all	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+WAKE_LOCK	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+use	O
+PowerManager	O
+WakeLocks	O
+to	O
+keep	O
+the	O
+processor	O
+from	O
+sleeping	O
+or	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+from	O
+dimming	O
+.	O
+
+ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+access	O
+information	O
+about	O
+networks	O
+.	O
+
+REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS	O
+-	O
+Whitelists	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+it	O
+to	O
+ignore	O
+battery	O
+optimizations	O
+.	O
+
+READ_CONTACTS	O
+-	O
+Allows	O
+the	O
+application	O
+to	O
+read	O
+the	O
+user	O
+'s	O
+contacts	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+package	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+opening	O
+the	O
+app	O
+,	O
+two	O
+pop-up	O
+messages	O
+appear	O
+on	O
+screen	O
+:	O
+Change	O
+SMS	O
+App	O
+:	O
+This	O
+sets	O
+permissions	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+every	O
+SMS	O
+received	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+and	O
+send	O
+a	O
+copy	O
+of	O
+these	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+Ignore	O
+Battery	O
+Optimization	O
+:	O
+This	O
+sets	O
+permissions	O
+to	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+operate	O
+at	O
+full	O
+capacity	O
+while	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+'s	O
+screen	O
+is	O
+turned	O
+off	O
+and	O
+the	O
+phone	O
+locked	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+requests	O
+rely	O
+on	O
+the	O
+end	O
+user	O
+accepting	O
+the	O
+permission	O
+changes	O
+and	O
+points	O
+to	O
+the	O
+importance	O
+of	O
+healthy	O
+skepticism	O
+when	O
+giving	O
+applications	O
+permissions	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+Chunghwa	B-Organization
+Post	I-Organization
+version	O
+installation	O
+process	O
+and	O
+application	O
+UI	O
+.	O
+
+DYNAMIC	O
+LIBRARY	O
+LOADING	O
+Once	O
+the	O
+application	O
+has	O
+finished	O
+the	O
+installation	O
+process	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+starts	O
+its	O
+real	O
+malicious	O
+activity	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malicious	O
+application	O
+da.hao.pao.bin	B-Indicator
+(	O
+Chunghwa	B-Organization
+Post	I-Organization
+)	O
+loads	O
+a	O
+library	O
+file	O
+libmsy.so	B-Indicator
+used	O
+to	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+packed	O
+mycode.jar	B-Indicator
+file	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+JAR	O
+file	O
+is	O
+the	O
+decrypted	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+file	O
+tong.luo	B-Indicator
+,	O
+which	O
+is	O
+located	O
+in	O
+the	O
+assets	O
+folder	O
+.	O
+
+Decompiled	O
+APK	O
+resources	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+comparing	O
+the	O
+sizes	O
+of	O
+the	O
+encrypted	O
+asset	O
+file	O
+tong.luo	B-Indicator
+vs	O
+the	O
+decrypted	O
+JAR	O
+file	O
+mycode.jar	B-Indicator
+,	O
+it	O
+is	O
+interesting	O
+to	O
+note	O
+that	O
+it	O
+is	O
+the	O
+same	O
+file	O
+(	O
+almost	O
+the	O
+same	O
+size	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+Comparing	O
+encrypted	O
+vs	O
+decrypted	O
+asset	O
+file	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+libmsy.so	B-Indicator
+decrypts	O
+the	O
+asset	O
+file	O
+tong.luo	B-Indicator
+,	O
+it	O
+loads	O
+mycode.jar	B-Indicator
+dynamically	O
+into	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+process	O
+,	O
+as	O
+is	O
+shown	O
+from	O
+the	O
+output	O
+of	O
+the	O
+“	O
+adb	O
+logcat	O
+”	O
+command	O
+.	O
+
+Logcat	O
+logs	O
+show	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+uses	O
+libmsy.so	B-Indicator
+to	O
+execute	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+packed	O
+mycode.jar	B-Indicator
+file	I-Indicator
+.	O
+
+By	O
+analyzing	O
+running	O
+processes	O
+on	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+,	O
+it	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+creates	O
+a	O
+child	O
+process	O
+of	O
+itself	O
+to	O
+perform	O
+the	O
+multi-process	O
+ptrace	O
+anti-debugging	O
+technique	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+uses	O
+an	O
+anti-debugging	O
+technique	O
+by	O
+creating	O
+another	O
+child	O
+process	O
+of	O
+itself	O
+.	O
+
+By	O
+performing	O
+a	O
+deep	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+extract	O
+the	O
+unpacked	O
+JAR	O
+file	O
+mycode.jar	B-Indicator
+and	O
+reveal	O
+some	O
+very	O
+interesting	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+STEALING	O
+SENSITIVE	O
+INFORMATION	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+has	O
+multiple	O
+built	O
+in	O
+information	O
+stealing	O
+capabilities	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+function	O
+is	O
+used	O
+for	O
+contact	O
+information	O
+stealing	O
+:	O
+the	O
+function	O
+upCon	O
+steals	O
+all	O
+contacts	O
+in	O
+the	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+and	O
+their	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+Then	O
+,	O
+it	O
+sends	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+using	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+that	O
+ends	O
+with	O
+/servlet/ContactUpload	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+fields	O
+are	O
+:	O
+Mobile	O
+-	O
+The	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+and	O
+contact	O
+’	O
+s	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+Contacts	O
+-	O
+A	O
+headline	O
+used	O
+for	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+to	O
+distinguish	O
+between	O
+the	O
+type	O
+of	O
+stolen	O
+information	O
+he	O
+gets	O
+Name	O
+-	O
+Contact	O
+’	O
+s	O
+full	O
+name	O
+(	O
+Display	O
+name	O
+)	O
+upCon	O
+(	O
+upload	O
+contact	O
+)	O
+function	O
+used	O
+for	O
+stealing	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+testing	O
+purposes	O
+we	O
+inserted	O
+a	O
+fake	O
+contacts	O
+list	O
+to	O
+our	O
+Android	B-System
+Emulator	O
+and	O
+observed	O
+resultant	O
+behavior	O
+.	O
+
+Exfiltrated	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+data	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+second	O
+stealing	O
+function	O
+is	O
+the	O
+onStartCommand	O
+,	O
+which	O
+steals	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+data	O
+and	O
+additional	O
+information	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+is	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+using	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+ending	O
+with	O
+/servlet/xx	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+stolen	O
+data	O
+fields	O
+are	O
+:	O
+Mobile	O
+-	O
+The	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+Machine	O
+-	O
+The	O
+device	O
+model	O
+(	O
+in	O
+our	O
+example	O
+:	O
+Google	B-System
+Pixel	I-System
+2	I-System
+)	O
+Sversion	O
+-	O
+The	O
+OS	O
+version	O
+Bank	O
+-	O
+Checks	O
+if	O
+there	O
+are	O
+any	O
+banking-related	O
+or	O
+cryptocurrency	O
+trading	O
+apps	O
+Provider	O
+-	O
+The	O
+telecommunication	O
+provider	O
+(	O
+IMSI	O
+value	O
+in	O
+device	O
+settings	O
+)	O
+npki	O
+-	O
+Checks	O
+if	O
+the	O
+folder	O
+named	O
+NPKI	O
+(	O
+National	O
+Public	O
+Key	O
+Infrastructure	O
+)	O
+might	O
+contain	O
+authentication	O
+certificates	O
+related	O
+to	O
+financial	O
+transactions	O
+onStartCommand	O
+function	O
+for	O
+stealing	O
+device	O
+information	O
+and	O
+additional	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+Exfiltrated	O
+device	O
+information	O
+and	O
+additional	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+sent	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+asks	O
+to	O
+be	O
+the	O
+default	O
+SMS	O
+app	O
+because	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+function	O
+onReceive	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+saves	O
+the	O
+messages	O
+’	O
+metadata	O
+and	O
+content	O
+,	O
+filters	O
+the	O
+information	O
+by	O
+fields	O
+,	O
+and	O
+sends	O
+them	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+using	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+/servlet/SendMassage2	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+The	O
+fields	O
+it	O
+collects	O
+are	O
+:	O
+Mobile	O
+-	O
+The	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+which	O
+sent	O
+the	O
+SMS	O
+Content	O
+-	O
+The	O
+message	O
+body	O
+Sender	O
+-	O
+The	O
+contact	O
+name	O
+who	O
+sent	O
+the	O
+message	O
+Time	O
+-	O
+The	O
+time	O
+the	O
+message	O
+was	O
+received	O
+onReceive	O
+function	O
+used	O
+to	O
+intercept	O
+incoming	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+function	O
+sendAll	O
+to	O
+send	O
+messages	O
+that	O
+spread	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+other	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+sends	O
+a	O
+smishing	O
+message	O
+to	O
+the	O
+entire	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+of	O
+the	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+along	O
+with	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+link	O
+to	O
+the	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+installation	O
+page	O
+.	O
+
+sendAll	O
+function	O
+used	O
+to	O
+spread	O
+malicious	O
+messages	O
+to	O
+the	O
+contact	O
+list	O
+.	O
+
+Another	O
+interesting	O
+feature	O
+in	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+is	O
+the	O
+collection	O
+of	O
+the	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+IMEI	O
+(	O
+International	O
+Mobile	O
+Station	O
+Equipment	O
+Identity	O
+)	O
+number	O
+and	O
+all	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+using	O
+the	O
+function	O
+upAppinfos	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+sends	O
+all	O
+of	O
+this	O
+data	O
+to	O
+the	O
+C2	O
+server	O
+using	O
+the	O
+URL	O
+ending	O
+with	O
+/servlet/AppInfos	B-Indicator
+.	O
+
+upAppinfos	O
+function	O
+used	O
+for	O
+obtaining	O
+the	O
+device	O
+IMEI	O
+and	O
+all	O
+of	O
+its	O
+installed	O
+applications	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+is	O
+able	O
+to	O
+check	O
+the	O
+network	O
+connectivity	O
+status	O
+by	O
+using	O
+the	O
+function	O
+isNetworkAvailable	O
+.	O
+
+What	O
+makes	O
+this	O
+function	O
+more	O
+suspicious	O
+is	O
+the	O
+two	O
+strings	O
+written	O
+in	O
+Chinese	O
+characters	O
+:	O
+===状态===	O
+(	O
+===Status===	O
+)	O
+-	O
+Checks	O
+whether	O
+the	O
+device	O
+is	O
+connected	O
+to	O
+a	O
+network	O
+===类型===	O
+(	O
+===Type===	O
+)	O
+-	O
+Checks	O
+whether	O
+the	O
+device	O
+sees	O
+available	O
+nearby	O
+Wifi	O
+networks	O
+isNetworkAvailable	O
+function	O
+used	O
+for	O
+monitoring	O
+network	O
+connectivity	O
+status	O
+.	O
+
+ANTI-EMULATOR	O
+TECHNIQUES	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+appears	O
+to	O
+use	O
+multiple	O
+techniques	O
+to	O
+evade	O
+detection	O
+via	O
+the	O
+emulator	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+detect	O
+whether	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+running	O
+in	O
+an	O
+emulated	O
+environment	O
+or	O
+a	O
+real	O
+mobile	O
+device	O
+,	O
+and	O
+can	O
+change	O
+its	O
+code	O
+pattern	O
+accordingly	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+first	O
+example	O
+of	O
+this	O
+is	O
+in	O
+the	O
+onStart	O
+function	O
+,	O
+where	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+looks	O
+for	O
+the	O
+string	O
+“	O
+Emulator	O
+”	O
+and	O
+a	O
+x86	O
+processor	O
+model	O
+.	O
+
+Anti-emulator	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+order	O
+to	O
+simulate	O
+this	O
+technique	O
+,	O
+we	O
+took	O
+two	O
+videos	O
+side	O
+by	O
+side	O
+of	O
+how	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+(	O
+the	O
+Royal	B-Organization
+Mail	I-Organization
+sample	O
+)	O
+behaves	O
+differently	O
+on	O
+a	O
+physical	O
+device	O
+versus	O
+an	O
+emulator	O
+.	O
+
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+behavior	O
+on	O
+physical	O
+device	O
+vs	O
+emulator	O
+(	O
+anti-emulator	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+simulation	O
+shows	O
+that	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+behaves	O
+differently	O
+on	O
+a	O
+physical	O
+device	O
+versus	O
+an	O
+emulator	O
+.	O
+
+When	O
+executed	O
+the	O
+second	O
+time	O
+by	O
+clicking	O
+on	O
+the	O
+app	O
+on	O
+the	O
+physical	O
+device	O
+,	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+redirects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+app	O
+settings	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+contrast	O
+,	O
+on	O
+the	O
+emulator	O
+,	O
+a	O
+toast	O
+message	O
+is	O
+displayed	O
+that	O
+shows	O
+“	O
+Install	O
+completed	O
+”	O
+,	O
+at	O
+which	O
+point	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+removes	O
+its	O
+shortcut	O
+from	O
+the	O
+device	O
+'s	O
+homescreen	O
+.	O
+
+Another	O
+example	O
+of	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+anti-emulation	O
+techniques	O
+is	O
+how	O
+it	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+getMachine	O
+function	O
+,	O
+which	O
+uses	O
+the	O
+TelephonyManager	O
+class	O
+to	O
+check	O
+for	O
+the	O
+deviceID	O
+,	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+,	O
+IMEI	O
+,	O
+and	O
+IMSI	O
+.	O
+
+Some	O
+emulators	O
+build	O
+their	O
+phone	O
+number	O
+out	O
+of	O
+the	O
+default	O
+number	O
+created	O
+in	O
+the	O
+emulator	O
+software	O
+and	O
+the	O
+port	B-Indicator
+number	I-Indicator
+:	I-Indicator
+5554.	I-Indicator
+getMachine	O
+function	O
+using	O
+anti-emulator	O
+technique	O
+.	O
+
+UNDER	O
+ACTIVE	O
+DEVELOPMENT	O
+An	O
+analysis	O
+of	O
+new	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+samples	O
+to	O
+old	O
+ones	O
+showed	O
+code	O
+discrepancies	O
+and	O
+new	O
+features	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+artifacts	O
+indicate	O
+that	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+'s	O
+campaign	O
+is	O
+still	O
+live	O
+and	O
+under	O
+development	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+newer	O
+version	O
+of	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+uses	O
+new	O
+URL	O
+addresses	O
+for	O
+malicious	O
+communication	O
+with	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+The	O
+function	O
+main	O
+uses	O
+a	O
+DES	O
+encryption	O
+algorithm	O
+to	O
+encode	O
+these	O
+addresses	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+examples	O
+below	O
+show	O
+the	O
+plaintext	O
+key	O
+“	O
+TEST	O
+”	O
+to	O
+decrypt	O
+encoded	O
+hexadecimal	O
+strings	O
+(	O
+jUtils.decrypt	O
+(	O
+)	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+encoded	O
+strings	O
+contain	O
+the	O
+new	O
+URL	O
+addresses	O
+not	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+older	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+.	O
+
+Comparing	O
+strings	O
+from	O
+an	O
+old	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+sample	O
+to	O
+a	O
+new	O
+one	O
+.	O
+
+WHO	O
+IS	O
+BEHIND	O
+FAKESPY	B-Malware
+’	O
+S	O
+SMISHING	O
+CAMPAIGNS	O
+?	O
+
+The	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+suspects	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+operators	O
+and	O
+authors	O
+are	O
+Chinese	O
+speakers	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+findings	O
+,	O
+along	O
+with	O
+previous	O
+research	O
+,	O
+indicates	O
+that	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+these	O
+recent	O
+campaigns	O
+is	O
+likely	O
+a	O
+Chinese	O
+group	O
+dubbed	O
+“	O
+Roaming	B-Organization
+Mantis	I-Organization
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Roaming	B-Organization
+Mantis	I-Organization
+is	O
+believed	O
+to	O
+be	O
+a	O
+Chinese	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+group	O
+first	O
+discovered	O
+in	O
+April	O
+2018	O
+that	O
+has	O
+continuously	O
+evolved	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+beginning	O
+,	O
+this	O
+threat	O
+group	O
+mainly	O
+targeted	O
+Asian	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+Now	O
+,	O
+they	O
+are	O
+expanding	O
+their	O
+activity	O
+to	O
+audiences	O
+all	O
+around	O
+the	O
+world	O
+.	O
+
+As	O
+part	O
+of	O
+their	O
+activities	O
+,	O
+they	O
+are	O
+known	O
+for	O
+hijacking	O
+DNS	O
+settings	O
+on	O
+Japanese	O
+routers	O
+that	O
+redirect	O
+users	O
+to	O
+malicious	O
+IP	O
+addresses	O
+,	O
+creating	O
+disguised	O
+malicious	O
+Android	B-System
+apps	O
+that	O
+appear	O
+as	O
+popular	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+stealing	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+ID	O
+credentials	O
+by	O
+creating	O
+Apple	B-Organization
+phishing	O
+pages	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+performing	O
+web	O
+crypto	O
+mining	O
+on	O
+browsers	O
+.	O
+
+CONNECTION	O
+TO	O
+CHINA	O
+Chinese	O
+server	O
+infrastructure	O
+:	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+applications	O
+send	O
+stolen	O
+information	O
+to	O
+C2	O
+domains	O
+with	O
+.club	B-Indicator
+TLDs	I-Indicator
+and	O
+URLs	O
+ending	O
+with	O
+/servlet/	B-Indicator
+[	I-Indicator
+C2	I-Indicator
+Command	I-Indicator
+]	I-Indicator
+(	O
+mentioned	O
+above	O
+in	O
+the	O
+“	O
+Stealing	O
+Sensitive	O
+Information	O
+”	O
+section	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+All	O
+of	O
+these	O
+domains	O
+are	O
+registered	O
+to	O
+‘	O
+Li	O
+Jun	O
+Biao	O
+’	O
+on	O
+Bizcn	B-Organization
+,	I-Organization
+Inc	I-Organization
+,	O
+a	O
+Chinese	O
+Internet	O
+application	O
+service	O
+provider	O
+.	O
+
+Chinese	O
+language	O
+traces	O
+in	O
+the	O
+code	O
+:	O
+During	O
+the	O
+investigation	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Cybereason	B-Organization
+Nocturnus	I-Organization
+team	O
+discovered	O
+code	O
+artifacts	O
+that	O
+may	O
+indicate	O
+Chinese	O
+threat	O
+actors	O
+.	O
+
+For	O
+example	O
+,	O
+we	O
+found	O
+several	O
+suspicious	O
+strings	O
+written	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Chinese	O
+language	O
+in	O
+a	O
+function	O
+called	O
+isNetworkAvailable	O
+,	O
+previously	O
+discussed	O
+in	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+:	O
+An	O
+almost	O
+identical	O
+function	O
+is	O
+mentioned	O
+in	O
+an	O
+earlier	O
+research	O
+,	O
+that	O
+ties	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+and	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+the	O
+Roaming	B-Organization
+Mantis	I-Organization
+group	O
+.	O
+
+Chinese	O
+APK	O
+names	O
+:	O
+Some	O
+of	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+APK	O
+package	O
+names	O
+contain	O
+anglicized	O
+Chinese	O
+(	O
+Mandarin	O
+)	O
+words	O
+that	O
+might	O
+be	O
+related	O
+to	O
+Chinese	O
+songs	O
+and	O
+lyrics	O
+,	O
+food	O
+,	O
+provinces	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+CONCLUSIONS	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+was	O
+first	O
+seen	O
+in	O
+October	O
+2017	O
+and	O
+until	O
+recently	O
+mainly	O
+targeted	O
+East	O
+Asian	O
+countries	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+research	O
+shows	O
+fresh	O
+developments	O
+in	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+’	O
+s	O
+code	O
+and	O
+sophistication	O
+,	O
+as	O
+well	O
+as	O
+an	O
+expansion	O
+to	O
+target	O
+Europe	O
+and	O
+North	O
+America	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+mobile	O
+malware	O
+masquerades	O
+as	O
+legitimate	O
+,	O
+trusted	O
+postal	O
+service	O
+applications	O
+so	O
+that	O
+it	O
+can	O
+gain	O
+the	O
+users	O
+trust	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+it	O
+has	O
+been	O
+installed	O
+,	O
+it	O
+requests	O
+permissions	O
+from	O
+the	O
+user	O
+so	O
+that	O
+it	O
+can	O
+steal	O
+sensitive	O
+data	O
+,	O
+manipulate	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+and	O
+potentially	O
+infect	O
+contacts	O
+of	O
+the	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+now	O
+targets	O
+more	O
+countries	O
+all	O
+over	O
+the	O
+world	O
+by	O
+masquerading	O
+as	O
+official	O
+post	O
+office	O
+and	O
+transportation	O
+services	O
+apps	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+apps	O
+appear	O
+legitimate	O
+due	O
+to	O
+their	O
+app	O
+logo	O
+,	O
+UI	O
+appearance	O
+,	O
+and	O
+redirects	O
+to	O
+the	O
+carrier	O
+webpage	O
+--	O
+all	O
+luring	O
+end	O
+users	O
+to	O
+believe	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+the	O
+original	O
+one	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+blog	O
+,	O
+we	O
+showed	O
+that	O
+the	O
+threat	O
+actor	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+recent	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+campaign	O
+is	O
+a	O
+Chinese-speaking	O
+group	O
+called	O
+“	O
+Roaming	B-Organization
+Mantis	I-Organization
+”	O
+known	O
+to	O
+operate	O
+mainly	O
+in	O
+Asia	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+is	O
+interesting	O
+to	O
+see	O
+that	O
+the	O
+group	O
+has	O
+expanded	O
+their	O
+operation	O
+to	O
+other	O
+regions	O
+,	O
+such	O
+as	O
+the	O
+United	O
+States	O
+and	O
+Europe	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+malware	O
+authors	O
+seem	O
+to	O
+be	O
+putting	O
+a	O
+lot	O
+of	O
+effort	O
+into	O
+improving	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+bundling	O
+it	O
+with	O
+numerous	O
+new	O
+upgrades	O
+that	O
+make	O
+it	O
+more	O
+sophisticated	O
+,	O
+evasive	O
+,	O
+and	O
+well-equipped	O
+.	O
+
+These	O
+improvements	O
+render	O
+FakeSpy	B-Malware
+one	O
+of	O
+the	O
+most	O
+powerful	O
+information	O
+stealers	O
+on	O
+the	O
+market	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+anticipate	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+continue	O
+to	O
+evolve	O
+with	O
+additional	O
+new	O
+features	O
+;	O
+the	O
+only	O
+question	O
+now	O
+is	O
+when	O
+we	O
+will	O
+see	O
+the	O
+next	O
+wave	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+Twitter‑controlled	B-System
+Android	B-System
+botnet	O
+discovered	O
+Detected	O
+by	O
+ESET	B-Organization
+as	O
+Android/Twitoor	B-Malware
+,	O
+this	O
+malware	O
+is	O
+unique	O
+because	O
+of	O
+its	O
+resilience	O
+mechanism	O
+.	O
+
+Instead	O
+of	O
+being	O
+controlled	O
+by	O
+a	O
+traditional	O
+command-and-control	O
+server	O
+,	O
+it	O
+receives	O
+instructions	O
+via	O
+tweets	O
+.	O
+
+24	O
+Aug	O
+2016	O
+-	O
+02:05PM	O
+Android/Twitoor	B-Malware
+is	O
+a	O
+backdoor	O
+capable	O
+of	O
+downloading	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+onto	O
+an	O
+infected	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+has	O
+been	O
+active	O
+for	O
+around	O
+one	O
+month	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+,	O
+detected	O
+by	O
+ESET	B-Organization
+as	O
+a	O
+variant	O
+of	O
+Android/Twitoor.A	B-Malware
+,	O
+can	O
+’	O
+t	O
+be	O
+found	O
+on	O
+any	O
+official	O
+Android	B-System
+app	I-System
+store	I-System
+–	O
+it	O
+probably	O
+spreads	O
+by	O
+SMS	O
+or	O
+via	O
+malicious	O
+URLs	O
+.	O
+
+It	O
+impersonates	O
+a	O
+porn	O
+player	O
+app	O
+or	O
+MMS	O
+application	O
+but	O
+without	O
+having	O
+their	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+After	O
+launching	O
+,	O
+it	O
+hides	O
+its	O
+presence	O
+on	O
+the	O
+system	O
+and	O
+checks	O
+the	O
+defined	O
+Twitter	B-System
+account	O
+at	O
+regular	O
+intervals	O
+for	O
+commands	O
+.	O
+
+Based	O
+on	O
+received	O
+commands	O
+,	O
+it	O
+can	O
+either	O
+download	O
+malicious	O
+apps	O
+or	O
+switch	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+Twitter	B-System
+account	O
+to	O
+another	O
+one	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+Using	O
+Twitter	B-System
+instead	O
+of	O
+command-and-control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+servers	O
+is	O
+pretty	O
+innovative	O
+for	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+botnet.	O
+”	O
+“	O
+Using	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+instead	O
+of	O
+command-and-control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+servers	O
+is	O
+pretty	O
+innovative	O
+for	O
+an	O
+Android	B-System
+botnet	O
+,	O
+”	O
+says	O
+Lukáš	O
+Štefanko	O
+,	O
+the	O
+ESET	B-Organization
+malware	O
+researcher	O
+who	O
+discovered	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+that	O
+enslaves	O
+devices	O
+to	O
+form	O
+botnets	O
+needs	O
+to	O
+be	O
+able	O
+to	O
+receive	O
+updated	O
+instructions	O
+.	O
+
+That	O
+communication	O
+is	O
+an	O
+Achilles	O
+heel	O
+for	O
+any	O
+botnet	O
+–	O
+it	O
+may	O
+raise	O
+suspicion	O
+and	O
+,	O
+cutting	O
+the	O
+bots	O
+off	O
+is	O
+always	O
+lethal	O
+to	O
+the	O
+botnet	O
+’	O
+s	O
+functioning	O
+.	O
+
+Additionally	O
+,	O
+should	O
+the	O
+command-and-control	O
+(	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+)	O
+servers	O
+get	O
+seized	O
+by	O
+the	O
+authorities	O
+,	O
+it	O
+would	O
+ultimately	O
+lead	O
+to	O
+disclosing	O
+information	O
+about	O
+the	O
+entire	O
+botnet	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+make	O
+the	O
+Twitoor	B-Malware
+botnet	O
+’	O
+s	O
+communication	O
+more	O
+resilient	O
+,	O
+botnet	O
+designers	O
+took	O
+various	O
+steps	O
+like	O
+encrypting	O
+their	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+using	O
+complex	O
+topologies	O
+of	O
+the	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+network	O
+–	O
+or	O
+using	O
+innovative	O
+means	O
+for	O
+communication	O
+,	O
+among	O
+them	O
+the	O
+use	O
+of	O
+social	O
+networks	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+These	O
+communication	O
+channels	O
+are	O
+hard	O
+to	O
+discover	O
+and	O
+even	O
+harder	O
+to	O
+block	O
+entirely	O
+.	O
+
+On	O
+the	O
+other	O
+hand	O
+,	O
+it	O
+’	O
+s	O
+extremely	O
+easy	O
+for	O
+the	O
+crooks	O
+to	O
+re-direct	O
+communications	O
+to	O
+another	O
+freshly	O
+created	O
+account	O
+,	O
+”	O
+explains	O
+Štefanko	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+the	O
+Windows	B-System
+space	O
+,	O
+Twitter	B-Organization
+,	O
+founded	O
+in	O
+2006	O
+,	O
+was	O
+first	O
+used	O
+to	O
+control	O
+botnets	O
+as	O
+early	O
+as	O
+in	O
+2009	O
+.	O
+
+Android	B-System
+bots	O
+have	O
+also	O
+already	O
+been	O
+found	O
+being	O
+controlled	O
+via	O
+other	O
+non-traditional	O
+means	O
+–	O
+blogs	O
+or	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+many	O
+cloud	O
+messaging	O
+systems	O
+like	O
+Google	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+or	O
+Baidu	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+–	O
+but	O
+Twitoor	B-Malware
+is	O
+the	O
+first	O
+Twitter-based	B-System
+bot	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+according	O
+to	O
+Štefanko	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+In	O
+the	O
+future	O
+,	O
+we	O
+can	O
+expect	O
+that	O
+the	O
+bad	O
+guys	O
+will	O
+try	O
+to	O
+make	O
+use	O
+of	O
+Facebook	B-System
+statuses	O
+or	O
+deploy	O
+LinkedIn	B-System
+and	O
+other	O
+social	O
+networks	O
+”	O
+,	O
+states	O
+ESET	B-Organization
+’	O
+s	O
+researcher	O
+.	O
+
+Currently	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Twitoor	B-Malware
+trojan	O
+has	O
+been	O
+downloading	O
+several	O
+versions	O
+of	O
+mobile	O
+banking	O
+malware	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+the	O
+botnet	O
+operators	O
+can	O
+start	O
+distributing	O
+other	O
+malware	O
+,	O
+including	O
+ransomware	O
+,	O
+at	O
+any	O
+time	O
+warns	O
+Štefanko	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+Twitoor	B-Malware
+serves	O
+as	O
+another	O
+example	O
+of	O
+how	O
+cybercriminals	O
+keep	O
+on	O
+innovating	O
+their	O
+business	O
+,	O
+”	O
+Stefanko	O
+continues	O
+.	O
+
+“	O
+The	O
+takeaway	O
+?	O
+
+Internet	O
+users	O
+should	O
+keep	O
+on	O
+securing	O
+their	O
+activities	O
+with	O
+good	O
+security	O
+solutions	O
+for	O
+both	O
+computers	O
+and	O
+mobile	O
+devices.	O
+”	O
+Hashes	O
+:	O
+E5212D4416486AF42E7ED1F58A526AEF77BE89BE	B-Indicator
+A9891222232145581FE8D0D483EDB4B18836BCFC	B-Indicator
+AFF9F39A6CA5D68C599B30012D79DA29E2672C6E	B-Indicator
+Insidious	O
+Android	B-System
+malware	O
+gives	O
+up	O
+all	O
+malicious	O
+features	O
+but	O
+one	O
+to	O
+gain	O
+stealth	O
+ESET	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+detect	O
+a	O
+new	O
+way	O
+of	O
+misusing	O
+Accessibility	O
+
+Service	O
+,	O
+the	O
+Achilles	O
+’	O
+heel	O
+of	O
+Android	B-System
+security	O
+22	O
+May	O
+2020	O
+-	O
+03:00PM	O
+ESET	B-Organization
+researchers	O
+have	O
+analyzed	O
+an	O
+extremely	O
+dangerous	O
+Android	B-System
+app	O
+that	O
+can	O
+perform	O
+a	O
+host	O
+of	O
+nefarious	O
+actions	O
+,	O
+notably	O
+wiping	O
+out	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+bank	O
+account	O
+or	O
+cryptocurrency	O
+wallet	O
+and	O
+taking	O
+over	O
+their	O
+email	O
+or	O
+social	O
+media	O
+accounts	O
+.	O
+
+Called	O
+“	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+”	O
+,	O
+the	O
+banking	O
+trojan	O
+was	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+at	O
+the	O
+time	O
+of	O
+the	O
+analysis	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+app	O
+is	O
+fitted	O
+with	O
+standard	O
+information-stealing	O
+capabilities	O
+;	O
+however	O
+,	O
+this	O
+banker	O
+is	O
+exceptionally	O
+insidious	O
+in	O
+that	O
+after	O
+installation	O
+it	O
+requires	O
+a	O
+single	O
+action	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+–	O
+enable	O
+Android	B-System
+’	O
+s	O
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+–	O
+to	O
+fully	O
+unleash	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+malicious	O
+functionality	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+app	O
+made	O
+it	O
+onto	O
+the	O
+heavily	O
+guarded	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+store	I-System
+thanks	O
+to	O
+its	O
+extreme	O
+stealth	O
+.	O
+
+Its	O
+creators	O
+reduced	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+malicious	O
+surface	O
+to	O
+the	O
+bare	O
+minimum	O
+by	O
+removing	O
+all	O
+potentially	O
+malicious	O
+functionalities	O
+but	O
+one	O
+:	O
+abusing	O
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+.	O
+
+Accessibility	O
+Service	O
+is	O
+long	O
+known	O
+to	O
+be	O
+the	O
+Achilles	O
+’	O
+heel	O
+of	O
+the	O
+Android	B-System
+operating	O
+system	O
+.	O
+
+Security	O
+solutions	O
+can	O
+detect	O
+it	O
+in	O
+countless	O
+combinations	O
+with	O
+other	O
+suspicious	O
+permissions	O
+and	O
+functions	O
+,	O
+or	O
+malicious	O
+functionalities	O
+–	O
+but	O
+when	O
+faced	O
+with	O
+no	O
+additional	O
+functionality	O
+nor	O
+permission	O
+,	O
+all	O
+failed	O
+to	O
+trigger	O
+any	O
+alarm	O
+on	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+.	O
+
+By	O
+“	O
+all	O
+”	O
+we	O
+mean	O
+all	O
+security	O
+mechanisms	O
+guarding	O
+the	O
+official	O
+Android	B-System
+app	I-System
+store	I-System
+(	O
+including	O
+the	O
+detection	O
+engines	O
+of	O
+the	O
+members	O
+of	O
+the	O
+App	B-Organization
+Defense	I-Organization
+Alliance	I-Organization
+)	O
+and	O
+all	O
+security	O
+vendors	O
+participating	O
+in	O
+the	O
+VirusTotal	B-Organization
+program	O
+(	O
+see	O
+Figure	O
+1	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+was	O
+released	O
+on	O
+Feb	O
+3	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+and	O
+last	O
+updated	O
+to	O
+v1.4	O
+on	O
+May	O
+6	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+latest	O
+version	O
+is	O
+analyzed	O
+here	O
+;	O
+we	O
+weren	O
+’	O
+t	O
+able	O
+to	O
+determine	O
+if	O
+the	O
+earlier	O
+versions	O
+were	O
+also	O
+malicious	O
+.	O
+
+According	O
+to	O
+its	O
+profile	O
+at	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+(	O
+see	O
+Figure	O
+2	O
+)	O
+the	O
+app	O
+reached	O
+a	O
+mere	O
+10+	O
+downloads	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+reported	O
+it	O
+to	O
+Google	B-Organization
+on	O
+May	O
+16	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+and	O
+since	O
+May	O
+19	O
+,	O
+2020	O
+the	O
+app	O
+has	O
+no	O
+longer	O
+been	O
+available	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+The	O
+developer	O
+name	O
+used	O
+,	O
+GAS	O
+Brazil	O
+,	O
+suggests	O
+the	O
+criminals	O
+behind	O
+the	O
+app	O
+targeted	O
+Brazilian	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+Apart	O
+from	O
+including	O
+the	O
+country	O
+’	O
+s	O
+name	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+name	O
+is	O
+probably	O
+intended	O
+to	O
+imply	O
+a	O
+relationship	O
+with	O
+the	O
+antifraud	O
+solution	O
+named	O
+GAS	B-System
+Tecnologia	I-System
+.	O
+
+That	O
+security	O
+software	O
+is	O
+commonly	O
+installed	O
+on	O
+computers	O
+in	O
+Brazil	O
+as	O
+several	O
+banks	O
+require	O
+it	O
+to	O
+log	O
+into	O
+their	O
+online	O
+banking	O
+.	O
+
+However	O
+,	O
+there	O
+is	O
+also	O
+an	O
+English	O
+version	O
+of	O
+the	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+app	O
+(	O
+see	O
+Figure	O
+3	O
+)	O
+besides	O
+the	O
+Portuguese	O
+one	O
+,	O
+and	O
+that	O
+app	O
+has	O
+neither	O
+geographical	O
+nor	O
+language	O
+restrictions	O
+.	O
+
+Playing	O
+further	O
+off	O
+the	O
+suggested	O
+GAS	B-System
+Tecnologia	I-System
+link	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+promises	O
+better	O
+security	O
+for	O
+its	O
+users	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+description	O
+in	O
+Portuguese	O
+promises	O
+more	O
+protection	O
+for	O
+the	O
+user	O
+’	O
+s	O
+applications	O
+,	O
+including	O
+end-to-end	O
+encryption	O
+.	O
+
+Deceptively	O
+,	O
+the	O
+app	O
+was	O
+listed	O
+in	O
+the	O
+Education	O
+section	O
+.	O
+
+Functionality	O
+After	O
+starting	O
+,	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+requests	O
+the	O
+following	O
+permissions	O
+:	O
+allow	O
+modify	O
+system	O
+settings	O
+permit	O
+drawing	O
+over	O
+other	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+and	O
+activate	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+an	O
+unsuspecting	O
+user	O
+grants	O
+these	O
+permissions	O
+(	O
+see	O
+Figure	O
+4	O
+)	O
+,	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+can	O
+read	O
+any	O
+text	O
+displayed	O
+in	O
+any	O
+app	O
+the	O
+user	O
+may	O
+launch	O
+–	O
+and	O
+send	O
+it	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+means	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+can	O
+steal	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+credentials	O
+for	O
+logging	O
+into	O
+apps	O
+,	O
+SMS	O
+and	O
+email	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+displayed	O
+cryptocurrency	O
+private	O
+keys	O
+,	O
+and	O
+even	O
+software-generated	O
+2FA	O
+codes	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+fact	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+can	O
+steal	O
+both	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+credentials	O
+and	O
+also	O
+can	O
+control	O
+their	O
+SMS	O
+messages	O
+and	O
+generated	O
+2FA	O
+codes	O
+means	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+’	O
+s	O
+operators	O
+can	O
+bypass	O
+two-factor	O
+authentication	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+opens	O
+the	O
+door	O
+to	O
+,	O
+for	O
+example	O
+,	O
+fully	O
+controlling	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+bank	O
+account	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+make	O
+sure	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+survives	O
+a	O
+device	O
+restart	O
+,	O
+it	O
+abuses	O
+already	O
+activated	O
+accessibility	O
+services	O
+that	O
+will	O
+launch	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+right	O
+after	O
+start	O
+.	O
+
+Our	O
+analysis	O
+shows	O
+the	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+trojan	O
+can	O
+execute	O
+17	O
+commands	O
+received	O
+from	O
+the	O
+attacker-controlled	O
+server	O
+such	O
+as	O
+uninstalling	O
+an	O
+app	O
+,	O
+launching	O
+an	O
+app	O
+and	O
+then	O
+performing	O
+any	O
+click/tap	O
+action	O
+controlled	O
+remotely	O
+by	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+(	O
+see	O
+Figure	O
+5	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+2018	O
+,	O
+we	O
+saw	O
+similar	O
+behavior	O
+,	O
+but	O
+all	O
+the	O
+click	O
+actions	O
+were	O
+hardcoded	O
+and	O
+suited	O
+only	O
+for	O
+the	O
+app	O
+of	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+’	O
+s	O
+choice	O
+.	O
+
+In	O
+this	O
+case	O
+,	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+can	O
+get	O
+the	O
+list	O
+of	O
+all	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+and	O
+then	O
+remotely	O
+launch	O
+the	O
+victim	O
+’	O
+s	O
+app	O
+of	O
+their	O
+choice	O
+to	O
+either	O
+steal	O
+credentials	O
+or	O
+perform	O
+malicious	O
+actions	O
+(	O
+e.g	O
+.	O
+
+send	O
+funds	O
+via	O
+a	O
+wire	O
+transfer	O
+)	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+believe	O
+that	O
+this	O
+is	O
+the	O
+reason	O
+the	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+trojan	O
+requests	O
+the	O
+user	O
+to	O
+allow	O
+“	O
+Modify	O
+system	O
+settings	O
+”	O
+.	O
+
+Subsequently	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+will	O
+change	O
+the	O
+screen	O
+off	O
+time-out	O
+to	O
+10	O
+minutes	O
+.	O
+
+This	O
+means	O
+that	O
+,	O
+unless	O
+victims	O
+lock	O
+their	O
+devices	O
+via	O
+the	O
+hardware	O
+button	O
+,	O
+the	O
+timer	O
+provides	O
+plenty	O
+of	O
+time	O
+for	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+to	O
+remotely	O
+perform	O
+malicious	O
+,	O
+in-app	O
+operations	O
+.	O
+
+If	O
+the	O
+device	O
+gets	O
+locked	O
+,	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+can	O
+’	O
+t	O
+unlock	O
+it	O
+.	O
+
+Malware	O
+data	O
+leak	O
+When	O
+we	O
+analyzed	O
+the	O
+sample	O
+,	O
+we	O
+realized	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+operators	O
+left	O
+the	O
+remote	O
+database	O
+with	O
+some	O
+of	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+’	O
+data	O
+freely	O
+accessible	O
+,	O
+without	O
+any	O
+authentication	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+database	O
+contained	O
+the	O
+last	O
+activity	O
+performed	O
+on	O
+around	O
+60	O
+compromised	O
+devices	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+found	O
+no	O
+other	O
+information	O
+stolen	O
+from	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+to	O
+be	O
+accessible	O
+.	O
+
+Thanks	O
+to	O
+this	O
+data	O
+leak	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+confirm	O
+that	O
+the	O
+malware	O
+really	O
+worked	O
+as	O
+designed	O
+:	O
+the	O
+attacker	O
+had	O
+access	O
+to	O
+the	O
+victims	O
+’	O
+entered	O
+credentials	O
+,	O
+displayed	O
+or	O
+written	O
+emails	O
+and	O
+messages	O
+,	O
+etc	O
+.	O
+
+Once	O
+we	O
+reached	O
+the	O
+non-secured	O
+database	O
+,	O
+we	O
+were	O
+able	O
+to	O
+directly	O
+observe	O
+the	O
+app	O
+’	O
+s	O
+malicious	O
+behavior	O
+.	O
+
+To	O
+illustrate	O
+the	O
+level	O
+of	O
+threat	O
+the	O
+DEFENSOR	B-Malware
+ID	I-Malware
+app	O
+posed	O
+,	O
+we	O
+performed	O
+three	O
+tests	O
+.	O
+
+First	O
+,	O
+we	O
+launched	O
+a	O
+banking	O
+app	O
+and	O
+entered	O
+the	O
+credentials	O
+there	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+credentials	O
+were	O
+immediately	O
+available	O
+in	O
+the	O
+leaky	O
+database	O
+–	O
+see	O
+Figure	O
+6	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+6	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+banking	O
+app	O
+test	O
+:	O
+the	O
+credentials	O
+as	O
+entered	O
+(	O
+left	O
+)	O
+and	O
+as	O
+available	O
+in	O
+the	O
+database	O
+(	O
+right	O
+)	O
+Second	O
+,	O
+we	O
+wrote	O
+a	O
+test	O
+message	O
+in	O
+an	O
+email	O
+client	O
+.	O
+
+We	O
+saw	O
+the	O
+message	O
+uploaded	O
+to	O
+the	O
+attackers	O
+’	O
+server	O
+within	O
+a	O
+second	O
+–	O
+see	O
+Figure	O
+7	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+7	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+email	O
+message	O
+test	O
+:	O
+the	O
+message	O
+as	O
+written	O
+(	O
+left	O
+)	O
+and	O
+as	O
+available	O
+in	O
+the	O
+database	O
+(	O
+right	O
+)	O
+Third	O
+,	O
+we	O
+documented	O
+the	O
+trojan	O
+retrieving	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Authenticator	I-System
+2FA	O
+code	O
+.	O
+
+Figure	O
+8	O
+.	O
+
+The	O
+software	O
+generated	O
+2FA	O
+code	O
+as	O
+it	O
+appeared	O
+on	O
+the	O
+device	O
+’	O
+s	O
+display	O
+(	O
+left	O
+)	O
+and	O
+as	O
+available	O
+in	O
+the	O
+database	O
+(	O
+right	O
+)	O
+Along	O
+with	O
+the	O
+malicious	O
+DEFENSOR	O
+ID	O
+app	O
+,	O
+another	O
+malicious	O
+app	O
+named	O
+Defensor	B-Malware
+Digital	I-Malware
+was	O
+discovered	O
+.	O
+
+Both	O
+apps	O
+shared	O
+the	O
+same	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+server	O
+,	O
+but	O
+we	O
+couldn	O
+’	O
+t	O
+investigate	O
+the	O
+latter	O
+as	O
+it	O
+had	O
+already	O
+been	O
+removed	O
+from	O
+the	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+store	I-System
+.	O
+
+Indicators	O
+of	O
+Compromise	O
+(	O
+IoCs	O
+)	O
+Package	O
+Name	O
+Hash	O
+ESET	B-Organization
+detection	O
+name	O
+com.secure.protect.world	B-Indicator
+F17AEBC741957AA21CFE7C7D7BAEC0900E863F61	B-Indicator
+Android/Spy.BanBra.A	B-Indicator
+com.brazil.android.free	B-Indicator
+EA069A5C96DC1DB0715923EB68192FD325F3D3CE	B-Indicator
+Android/Spy.BanBra.A	B-Indicator
+MITRE	B-Organization
+ATT	O
+&	O
+CK	O
+techniques	O
+Tactic	O
+ID	O
+Name	O
+Description	O
+Initial	O
+Access	O
+T1475	O
+Deliver	O
+Malicious	O
+App	O
+
+via	O
+Authorized	O
+App	B-System
+Store	I-System
+Impersonates	O
+security	O
+app	O
+on	O
+Google	B-System
+Play	I-System
+.	O
+
+T1444	O
+Masquerade	O
+as	O
+Legitimate	O
+Application	O
+Impersonates	O
+legitimate	O
+GAS	B-System
+Tecnologia	I-System
+application	O
+.	O
+
+Discovery	O
+T1418	O
+Application	O
+Discovery	O
+Sends	O
+list	O
+of	O
+installed	O
+apps	O
+on	O
+device	O
+.	O
+
+Impact	O
+T1516	O
+Input	O
+Injection	O
+Can	O
+enter	O
+text	O
+and	O
+perform	O
+clicks	O
+on	O
+behalf	O
+of	O
+user	O
+.	O
+
+Collection	O
+T1417	O
+Input	O
+Capture	O
+Records	O
+user	O
+input	O
+data	O
+.	O
+
+Command	O
+and	O
+Control	O
+T1437	O
+Standard	O
+Application	O
+Layer	O
+Protocol	O
+Uses	O
+Firebase	O
+Cloud	O
+Messaging	O
+for	O
+C	O
+&	O
+C	O
+.	O