opinion: CITIZENS FOR AN ORDERLY ENERGY POLICY, INC., Vance L. Sailor, Eena-Mai Franz, John J. Foley and Dorothy V. Sheehan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Long Island Lighting Company and the Shoreham-Wading River Central School District, Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and Peter F. Cohalen, Defendants-Appellees.
  Nos. 570, 571, 573, Docket 85-7321, 85-7323, 85-7325.
  United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
  Argued Dec. 18, 1986.
  Decided March 9, 1987.
  Lucinda Low Swartz, Kensington, Md. (Ronald A. Zumbrun, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, Cal., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc.
  K. Dennis Sisk, New York City (Adeeb Fadil, Hunton & Williams, New York City, W. Taylor Reveley, III, Kathy E.B. McCleskey, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Va., Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Long Island Lighting Co., Hicksville, N.Y., of counsel), for Intervenor-plaintiff-appellant Long Island Lighting Co.
  J. Scott Greer, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Lou Lewis, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., of counsel), for Intervenor-plaintiff-appellant ShorehamWading River Central School Dist.
  David A. Brownlee, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Michael J. Lynch, Kenneth M. Argentieri, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Pittsburgh, Pa., Herbert H. Brown, Lawrence C. Lanpher, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Washington, D.C., Martin B. Ashare, Suffolk County Dept, of Law, Hauppaug, N.Y., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
  Before TIMBERS, MESKILL and KEARSE, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM:
  This is an appeal from a judgment entered March 21, 1986, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Altimari, J., dismissing the claims of plaintiff Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy (Citizens) and intervenors Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) and Shoreham-Wading River Central School District (District) under Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b). Citizens, LILCO and District allege that the County of Suffolk passed certain resolutions which violate and are preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1982). They also complain that Suffolk’s resolutions violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) on statutory, due process and equal protection grounds.
  We affirm the judgment below substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s opinion, 604 F.Supp. 1084 (E.D.N.Y.1985), and write solely to address appellants’ contention that the district court based its decision on the erroneous assumption that LILCO would receive, without difficulty, an operating license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
  BACKGROUND
  The events giving rise to the litigation in the district court are set forth in the district court opinion, 604 F.Supp. at 1087-89, and we assume familiarity with them. Less than one month after the district court issued its decision, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s licensing board denied LILCO’s application for an operating license on the ground that Suffolk’s refusal to cooperate rendered LILCO’s proposed radiological emergency plan inadequate. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) LBP-85-31, 22 N.R.C. 410 (August 26, 1985). On appeal, the Commission reversed the licensing board’s decision and remanded, directing the board to assume that, in an actual emergency, Suffolk would act responsibly and would use LILCO’s plan as the best source of information and options for its emergency response. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) CLI-86-13 (July 24, 1986). The licensing board has not yet issued its final decision on LILCO’s application.
  DISCUSSION
  Appellants contend that the district court based its decision on the incorrect perception that Suffolk’s resolutions would not impede LILCO’s application process. As noted above, the Commission’s licensing board initially denied LILCO’s application due to a determination, subsequently reversed by the Commission, that Suffolk’s resolutions prevented LILCO from submitting an adequate emergency plan. Appellants contend that the district court’s alleged misperception of the effect of Suffolk s resolutions on the licensing process somehow requires reversal.
  Appellants misread the district court’s opinion. The court did not base its decision on the assumption that LILCO would receive an operating license. Rather, the district court simply recognized that Suffolk’s resolutions do not prevent LILCO from applying for its license. 604 F.Supp. at 1094, 1097-98. The court further noted that only the licensing board, not Suffolk, could deny LILCO’s application. We find no support for appellants’ contention that the district court based its decision on the assumption that LILCO would receive an operating license.
  The opinion below requires no further elaboration. Suffolk has not affirmatively prevented LILCO from pursuing its license. Suffolk simply has refused to cooperate. LILCO’s remedies lie in attacking any improper affirmative act Suffolk might take to obstruct LILCO in the application process.
  The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
  
  Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private organization or association", specifically "other". Your task is to determine what subcategory of private association best describes this litigant.
choices: Civic, social, fraternal organization Political organizations - Other than political parties Examples: Civil rights focus; Public Interest - broad, civil liberties focus (ACLU) or broad, multi-issue focus (Common Cause, Heritage Foundation, ADA) or single issue - Environmental ENV, Abortion, etc. (prolife, pro-abortion), elderly, consumer interests: Consumer Federation of America, Consumer's Union, National Railroad Passenger Association; PAC Political party Educational organization - Private, non-profit school Educational organization - Association, not individual school - PTA or PTO Religious or non-profit hospital or medical care facility (e.g., nursing home) Other religious organization (includes religious foundations) Charitable or philanthropic organization (including foundations, funds, private museums, private libraries) Other Unclear