opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. W. Avery WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.
  No. 91-3136.
  United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
  Argued Sept. 21, 1991.
  Decided Jan. 21, 1992.
  William E. Hunt (Argued and Briefed), Office of the U.S. Atty., Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.
  David J. Scacchetti (Argued and Briefed), Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.
  Before MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges; and BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.
  BAILEY BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.
  W. Avery Wilson appeals the sentence imposed upon his plea of guilty to the charge of possessing “in excess of fifty (50) grams” of crack cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). Wilson challenges the district court’s using, as a basis for enhancing his sentence under the relevant-conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, statements he made to his probation officer. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (1990). We find that the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining that the government showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Wilson participated in the drug sales that were discussed in the probation officer’s report. Because the court properly considered the sales as relevant conduct, we AFFIRM the sentence.
  I
  Pursuant to a search warrant, law enforcement officers in Cincinnati, Ohio, entered a house in which Wilson was an occupant. They arrested him, along with others, for possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. At the time of his arrest, Wilson had in his possession $3,014.00. Having obtained and executed another search warrant, officers found in Wilson’s vehicle 135 grams of cocaine base and an additional $1,841.00.
  Wilson, a first-time offender, was charged in a one-count indictment for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988). Aware that the offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for ten years, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), he entered a plea of guilty. The court encouraged Wilson to cooperate fully with the investigation of the probation officer who was to complete his presentence report. Although the court also informed Wilson that he should continue to follow the advice of his counsel, Wilson's attorney was not present during the two presentence conferences.
  During one session, upon being asked how he became involved in drug sales, Wilson explained that, approximately two months before his arrest, he bought two ounces of cocaine and sold it at a profit. Doubling his purchase each time, he engaged in three additional drug transactions. Basing her calculations on this information, the probation officer determined that, in addition to the 135 grams found in his possession, Wilson had purchased for resale 850.5 grams of crack cocaine. To determine Wilson’s base offense level, pursuant to §§ 2Dl.l(a)(3) and lB1.3(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, the probation officer attributed to Wilson the possession with intent to distribute 985.5 grams of crack cocaine.
  At the sentencing hearing, the district court rejected the probation officer’s suggestion that points be added because one individual arrested with Wilson possessed a firearm. After subtracting points for Wilson’s acceptance of responsibility, the court, over Wilson’s objection to the pre-sentence report, sentenced Wilson at a base level of 34, two points higher than would have been applicable had the court not considered the possession with intent to distribute the 850.5 grams of crack cocaine revealed to the probation officer. The court sentenced Wilson to a 151-month term of imprisonment.
  Alleging that the probation officer improperly based her offense-level calculations on “unsubstantiated presumptive sales” of 850.5 grams of crack cocaine, Wilson now appeals his sentence. Wilson submits that the use of information obtained during the presentence conferences violates the Guidelines both in fact and in spirit and is an unjust application of unsubstantiated information. He also asserts that, even if the court followed the officer’s recommendation regarding relevant conduct, the 135 grams of crack cocaine found in his possession should have been deducted from the 850.5 grams.
  II
  A district court’s findings of fact regarding relevant conduct for the purpose of sentencing will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988). Moreover, we give deference to the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts. Id.
  Wilson does not deny making the incriminatory statements to the probation officer, nor does he contend that the statements fail to support the conclusion that he possessed with intent to distribute more than 500 grams, which is sufficient to support the base offense level upon which he was sentenced. Instead, he presents a policy argument against enhancing his sentence based on conduct admitted to the probation officer in a nonadversarial setting. He contends that doing so discourages an open and honest exchange of information and, contrary to the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines, undermines honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. Wilson further contends that it is improper to punish him for possession with intent to distribute amounts of crack cocaine that are not charged in the indictment.
  Admittedly, the results achieved through application of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 can be harsh. Congress, however, has balanced the risks of disparate sentencing against the possibility, under particular facts, of achieving apparently unjust results. For the sake of uniformity, Congress decided in favor of restricting the discretionary powers of sentencing courts. As a reviewing court, we are constrained by the mandates of Congress and are limited to determining whether the sentencing court clearly erred in its application of the Guidelines. In the instant case, we find that it did not.
  The law in this circuit is clear that to determine a base offense level, a sentencing court may consider conduct involving the possession and sale of “ ‘uncharged drugs [that] are part of a common scheme or plan.’ ” United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1327 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 980, 112 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1991). Such conduct is considered “relevant” for sentencing purposes. Furthermore, Miller, a case squarely on point, holds that, as a basis for determining relevant conduct, a court may consider information obtained during a presentence conference. Id.; see also United States v. Davis, 919 F.2d 1181, 1186-87 (6th Cir.1990).
  Additional support for the government’s position can be found in United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 532, 112 L.Ed.2d 542 (1990). In Walton, this court held that when the exact amount of drugs for which a defendant is responsible cannot be determined, a sentencing court may estimate the quantity so long as the estimate is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1302. In the instant case, the probation officer, based on information provided by Wilson, made a reasonable estimate of the amount of crack cocaine that Wilson purchased for resale. When, as here, the defendant admits to involvement in numerous drug transactions, it is not clearly erroneous for the court to determine that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the defendant has been involved in such transactions.
  For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.
  . We do not, in this opinion, discuss the issues dealt with in the opinion concurring in the result, because these issues were not raised in the district court or in this court.
  . The Drug Quantity Table in § 2D 1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines specifies a base offense level of 36 when a defendant’s activities involve between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base. Therefore, even if the 135 grams had been subtracted from the larger figure, the base level of Wilson’s offense would have remained unchanged. For this reason, we will not address whether the 135 grams should have been deducted.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.