opinion: WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES.
  No. 10824.
  United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit
  Argued March 5, 1951.
  Decided May 17, 1951.
  Joseph Levin, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
  Raymond E. Baker, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom George Morris Fay, U. S. Atty., John C. Conliff, Jr., and Joseph M. Howard, Asst. U. S.. Attys., all of Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
  Before CLARK, PROCTOR and FAHY, Circuit Judges.
  PROCTOR, Circuit Judge.
  An automobile truck was stolen in the District of Columbia; driven into Maryland; concealed in a woods; stripped of the wheels and tires, and the body burned. In the course of an investigation involving transportation of the stolen vehicle in interstate commerce, Federal agents obtained a confession from Williams, appellant. Upon his trial the confession was admitted by the court over the dual objection that it was the product of an illegal arrest and was involuntary. Those contentions are renewed here on appeal.
  Considerable testimony was adduced concerning the confession. We give only a brief outline. The Federal agents, Nau and Buscher, testified that after receiving a report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s office in Baltimore, indicating Williams’ complicity, they met him on the street near his home in Washington, D. C.; identified themselves as F. B. I. agents; informed him of their desire to talk with him about the stolen truck, and requested him to go to their office in Washington, which he willingly did. They put him under no physical restraint; did nothing to create any impression that he was under detention. He asked them if he were under arrest. They told him he was not; that he could leave or get a lawyer, if he desired. Although Williams at first denied any knowledge of the truck, when the agents related their information implicating him, he stated that he and one Lucas had stolen the truck in the District and had taken it to Maryland, where they removed the wheels and tires to install on another truck. The statement was put into writing by Agent Nau; then read carefully by Williams who, at request of the agents, added in his own handwriting, over his signature, that he had read the statement and it was true to the best of his knowledge. The agents then informed the United States Attorney of developments. Upon his advice they put Williams under arrest and took him before the United States Commissioner, who held him for action of the Grand Jury. The conversation leading to the confession lasted about forty-five minutes. The entire episode covering the meeting with Williams until arrival at the Commissioner’s office occupied the period from about noon until 2 P.M.
  Williams, testifying after the agents, did not contradict them in any material respect. Although testifying that he felt he had to> go with the agents, and was not at liberty to leave, he did not deny their assurance that he was not under arrest and could leave or get a lawyer. Further testifying, he stated that he first denied to the agents that he had stolen the truck, but when they informed him of a statement by Lucas, and pointed out that it might require a trial in Maryland for grand larceny, he became fearful that he would not be justly treated in Maryland. So, to avoid being taken there, he falsely confessed that he joined with Lucas in stealing the truck in the District and transporting it to Maryland.
  We think it clear that Williams was not under arrest or restraint when he made and signed the incriminating statement. Cf. United States v. Grote, 2 Cir., 1944, 140 F.2d 413. In our opinion no other inference can be fairly drawn from the evidence. We find nothing to suggest that his fears of unjust treatment in Maryland, if in truth he entertained them, or his hopes of favorable treatment in the District, were engendered by anything the agents said. They made no reference to such matters, and in no way coerced or induced the statement made by Williams. Hence, we conclude that the trial court was correct in holding the confession voluntary and admissible. There being no substantial evidence impugning the voluntary nature of the statement it was. unnecessary for the court to pass that on as a question for the jury to determine. Yet, as the court indicated, the truth, or falsity of the statement did remain for the jury’s consideration.
  Affirmed.
  FAHY, Circuit Judge, concurs in the: result.
  . 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. “Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a- motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 806.”
  . Although in his testimony he repudiated his confession as to theft and transportation of the truck, he nevertheless admitted on the stand that he was guilty of larceny in Maryland in stealing the wheels and tires.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.