opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Vance M. THOMPSON, Elizabeth T. Russell, H. Ripley Thompson, John G. Thompson, Ruth T. Trammel, Vance M. Thompson, Jr., and William H. Thompson, a Partnership, d/b/a The Summit House Apartments, and Robert C. Jordan, as Trustee, Appellants.
  No. 20395.
  United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
  Feb. 26, 1971.
  Moses, McClellan, Arnold, Owen & McDermott, Wayne W. Owen, Little Rock, Ark., on brief for appellants.
  W. H. Dillahunty, U. S. Atty., and Walter G. Riddick, Asst. U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., on brief for appellee.
  Before GIBSON and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and McMANUS, District Judge.
  GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
  Appellants, who were defendants in the original foreclosure proceedings, appeal from a denial of their motion in the District Court to set aside a foreclosure decree and order of confirmation. The facts of the controversy are not in dispute.
  Appellants in this case owned an apartment house in Little Rock, Arkansas, which was insured to the extent of 100 per cent by the Federal Housing Administration. Appellants were not personally liable on the mortgage. Upon appellants’ default in payments on the mortgage, which was owned by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, the Government honored its insurance obligation, and then brought suit in April 1966 to foreclose the mortgage. On August 24, 1967, the District Court filed a memorandum opinion directing foreclosure and ordering an appropriate decree to be entered. United States v. Thompson, 272 F.Supp. 774 (E.D.Ark. 1967). Counsel for the Government prepared a decree and submitted it to appellants, whose counsel, who was the same in that proceeding as this one, approved it as to form. The decree was filed October 23, 1967. The terms of the decree provided that the sale should be for cash.
  The Government (Secretary of Housing and Urban Development) was the only bidder at the sale and purchased the property for $2,600,000. (The amount due on the mortgage was something in excess of $3,400,000.) On February 27, 1968, the District Court entered its confirmation of sale. On February 27, 1969, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision. Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969).
  On March 6, 1970, the appellants filed the motion to vacate the confirmation and set aside the sale on the ground that the sale was in violation of an Arkansas statute, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 51-1109, which required that any judicial sale be upon a credit of not less than three, nor more than six months, and not for cash. It was also alleged that the Government was negotiating a private sale, not yet complete, of the property for $3,500,000, and that a new foreclosure sale would bring a greatly increased price. The trial court denied the motion and refused to pass on the merits of the contentions, holding that appellants’ participation in the 1967 proceeding estopped them from now attacking the foreclosure decree and sale.
  The Government contends that, although it was not so designated below, this proceeding must be denominated as a motion for relief from a final judgment or order under Rule 60(b), Fed.R. Civ.P. That rule provides six reasons for granting the relief requested. Reasons (1), (2), and (3) require the motion to be made within one year, which was not done here. Reason (5), satisfaction of the judgment, is not applicable here. Therefore, appellants must be relying on either reason (4), “the judgment is void,” or reason (6), “any other reason justifying relief.” In either case, the motion must be made within a “reasonable time” after the entry of the order.
  The Government argues that this motion was not made within a reasonable time. Appellants fully participated in the foreclosure proceedings, had notice of, and approved the final order of sale. An appeal was taken from this order, which was affirmed. Appellants did not object to the cash sale at that time, although they were fully informed of it. Appellants’ attorney was the same at that time as this and should have raised the question then. Obviously, rights of the sale purchaser, the Government, could be seriously prejudiced by appellants’ delay in raising this question.
  We think the District Court properly held that the grounds of the motion could not be asserted at this time. The most that can be said for appellants’ position is that they failed to bring the Arkansas statute to the District Court’s attention at the time the decree was entered. “It is generally held that neither ignorance nor carelessness on the part of an attorney will provide grounds for 60(b) relief.” Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833, 835 (8th Cir. 1969).
  Furthermore, the same result would be reached on the merits. If it is contended that the judgment is void under Arkansas law for failure to follow the statutory requirement (a question which is by no means clear), and that a void judgment may be set aside under 60(b) (4) without regard to a time limit, see 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, ff60.25 [4], the answer is that Arkansas law does not govern this suit. Unfortunately, appellants do not deal with this issue, but rely solely on their contention that the sale is void under Arkansas law. The only federal case relied on by appellants is O’Connor v. Townsend, 87 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1937). However, this case was a diversity ease and hence is not in point on this issue. We believe it is clear that the Government is correct in its contention that federal law controls in this case and that under the applicable principles the Arkansas statute should not be applied.
  The rule governing this case is that while state law will be followed to determine what security interests the Government obtains in its financial transactions in nationwide programs, federal law will be applied to determine what remedies are available to the Government to enforce its security interest. United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Chester Park Apartments, Inc., 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901, 85 S.Ct. 191, 13 L.Ed.2d 176 (1964); United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884, 80 S.Ct. 156, 4 L.Ed.2d 120 (1959).
  In applying this rule in the area of federal mortgages, the courts have held that the United States is entitled to a receiver to manage the foreclosed property, despite local law to the contrary, United States v. Chester Park Apartments, Inc., supra, and United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., supra; that the local law of coverture is not a defense to a personal judgment based on a note secured by a federal mortgage, United States v. Helz, supra; that'the United States is entitled to a deficiency judgment following a foreclosure sale, despite local laws prohibiting deficiency judgments, United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968); that the United States is not bound by state law regarding the time in which a deficiency judgment must be sought, United States v. Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1970); and that the United States is not bound by state law allowing for the redemption of property after foreclosure, United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., supra.
  In light of the foregoing authority, it seems evident that the Arkansas statute requiring foreclosure sales to be for credit and not for cash need not be applied to federal foreclosures, that is those foreclosures where the security interest is held in some manner by the United States Government. Even fewer policy justifications can be suggested for this Arkansas rule than for the other local state rules discussed and rejected in the cases above. The appellants urge that the obvious purpose of the statute is that a sale for credit will result in a higher price than a sale for cash. This is speculation of the highest order, in view of the fact that the credit period is only for three to six months and, most significantly, that the credit purchaser must execute a bond with good surety for the amount of the purchase price. Under current practices, if a purchaser could get a surety bond guaranteeing that he would ultimately pay the amount he bid, he could get cash, or its immediate equivalent, through the means of a loan commitment from a reputable mortgage investor and possibly short term interim bank financing. It would indeed be unusual and foolhardy for a purchaser even to bid unless he had either cash or a loan commitment in hand at the time.
  Since appellants have not briefed this issue for our benefit, it seems appropriate to note that in reaching our decision we have taken into consideration the case of United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 86 S.Ct. 500, 15 L.Ed.2d 404 (1966), the only case we have found which even remotely suggests that the state rule should be applied in this case. The Yazell case involved a Small Business Administration disaster loan made to a Texas husband and wife which was secured by a chattel mortgage. Following a default on the loan and foreclosure of the mortgage, the United States sought a deficiency judgment against the husband and wife. Texas law provided that a married woman could not subject her separate property to the obligations of a loan until she first obtained a court decree removing her liability to contract. The Supreme Court held that federal policy would not override the state law protecting the wife’s separate property.
  In the case at bar, however, we deal with no statute limiting the extent of contractual obligations incurred by any maker of a mortgage note. We are concerned only with the details in the manner in which a real estate mortgage need be foreclosed. Clearly, Yazell has no application here. We think it clear that the Arkansas restriction on the foreclosure remedy here was no more valid than the Idaho restriction in United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., supra.
  The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.