opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles W. NOLAN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
  No. 77-1231.
  United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
  Submitted Oct. 4, 1977.
  Decided Oct. 20, 1977.
  C. Rabón Martin, Tulsa, Okl., filed a brief for defendant-appellant.
  James P. Buchele, U. S. Atty., John K. Sargent, Asst. U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan., filed a brief for plaintiff-appellee.
  Before SETH and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PICKETT, Senior Circuit Judge.
  PER CURIAM.
  The sole issue presented for our review is whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside an order forfeiting appellant Charles W. Nolan’s bond. We find no abuse of discretion under the facts here and affirm.
  Nolan was arrested on drug charges on July 16, 1975 at the Wichita, Kansas airport. The facts surrounding his arrest and conviction are fully set forth in our opinion affirming the conviction on direct appeal. United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1977). Bond was set on July 18,1975 at $10,000. Among the conditions of the bond was a travel restriction which provided that Nolan could not travel outside of Pennsylvania, his home, without prior court permission except to travel to Kansas for court appearances and to New Mexico. Bond was reduced to $5,000 on August 15, 1975. Nolan as principal and his father as surety executed the bond and paid $5,000 into the court registry. Nolan was eventually convicted on December 10, 1975. He was sentenced on January 19, 1976 and allowed to remain free on bond pending appeal.
  On November 1, 1976 the government filed a motion for an order to show cause why Nolan’s bond should not be forfeited for breach of the travel restriction. The motion was based upon information received from the Drug Enforcement Administration that Nolan had traveled from New York to New Delhi, India on September 20, 1976. The district court issued a show cause order on November 2, 1976 directing Nolan to appear before the court at 9:30 a. m. on November 15, 1976 to show cause why the bond should not be forfeited for breach of the travel restriction. The record shows that the order was sent to Nolan’s home in Newcastle, Pennsylvania and the return receipt was signed by Nolan’s father. A copy of the show cause order was also' sent to Nolan’s attorney. Counsel for Nolan filed a response to the motion on November 11, 1976. Thereafter, Nolan failed to appear as directed on November 15,1976 and the district court entered an order forfeiting the bond for failure to appear as required by the bond and as set forth in the show cause order. The court also issued a bench warrant for Nolan’s arrest. On November 22, 1976, Nolan's attorney filed a motion to determine the conditions of setting aside the forfeiture and a motion for a rehearing. The district court treated the motions as a motion to set aside the forfeiture. Nolan subsequently was arrested when he returned to the United States from India on December 2, 1976.
  The district court held a hearing on Nolan’s motion on December 13, 1976. Nolan admitted the breach of the travel restriction and the matter was by agreement submitted to the court on the basis of the statements made by counsel. The court entered its order denying the motion to set aside the forfeiture on February 2, 1977.
  Pursuant to Rule 46, F.R.Cr.P., the district court had no discretion in determining whether the bond should be forfeited. That Rule provides in part that:
  “(e) Forfeiture
  (1) Declaration. If there is a breach of condition of a bond, the district court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.” (emphasis added)
  In the instant case, Nolan breached two conditions of the bond: he failed to appear in court as directed and he violated the travel restriction. These two violations mandated forfeiture of the bond. The pivotal question then, as noted earlier, is whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the forfeiture. See e. g., United States v. Coats, 458 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1972); Williams v. United States, 444 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1971). The burden of proving that the forfeiture should be set aside is on Nolan. United States v. Foster, 417 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1969). Factors to be considered in making that determination include willfulness of the breach and prejudice to the government. See e. g. United States v. Nell, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 515 F.2d 1351, 1353 (1975) and cases cited therein.
  Among the arguments advanced here is that the court erred in failing to set forth pursuant to Rule 46(e)(2) the conditions which would warrant setting aside the forfeiture. We think this contention is without merit. The section is permissive and certainly there is no obligation on the part of the trial court to set such conditions prior to hearing. Indeed, common sense dictates that a hearing would shed light on what conditions, if any, should be set. Here, following the hearing, the court implicitly found no conditions were appropriate. We agree.
  The district court found that Nolan’s breach of the conditions was willful, that the government was prejudiced thereby, and that neither Nolan as principal nor his father as surety offered any cogent reasons for the breaches. These findings are fully supported by the record. The record shows that Nolan fraudulently obtained the passport which permitted his sojourn in India by stating on the application that he had lost his prior passport while traveling in Kansas when in fact his passport had been confiscated at the time of his initial arrest on July 16, 1975. And, as noted, he admitted that he violated the travel restriction. Further, Nolan argued in the district court that he did not receive personal notice of the November 15, 1976 hearing. This lack of notice is clearly chargeable to Nolan. The show cause order was sent to the address given by Nolan and was signed by his father. As the district court found, if Nolan desired personal notice, he should have notified the district court of the change of his address. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the district court that both the failure to appear in court as directed by the show cause order and the breach of the travel restriction were willful on the part of Nolan.
  The district court also found that the government suffered prejudice. As noted, this finding is supported by the record and we believe it is unnecessary to go behind this finding to ascertain the exact extent of such prejudice.
  Finally, the record shows that no cogent reasons for the breaches were offered by either Nolan or his father. Under such circumstances relief is not available. Williams v. United States, supra.
  The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.