opinion: Manuel MENDEZ and Teresa Lastra de Mendez, Appellants, v. H. I. MAJOR, District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Appellee.
  No. 17621.
  United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
  Jan. 20, 1965.
  Forrest Boecker, St. Louis, Mo., William B. Ewald, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants.
  Don. R. Bennett, Attorney, Criminal Division, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Richard D. FitzGibbon, Jr., U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth C. Shelver, Attorney, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
  Before VAN OOSTERHOUT and MEHAFFY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIES, District Judge.
  RONALD N. DAVIES, District Judge.
  This action was first instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to review administrative action taken by the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization.
  The appellants, Dr. Manuel Mendez and Teresa Lastra de Mendez, his wife, are Mexican nationals who, accompanied by a son, were admitted into the United States in 1955 as exchange visitors under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. While residing in Baltimore, Maryland, a second son was born to them, August 31, 1956. In that same year the Information and Educational Exchange Act under which the appellants were admitted was amended to provide:
  “No person admitted as an exchange visitor under this section * * * shall be eligible to apply for an immigrant visa * * * or for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, until it is established that such person has resided and been physically present in a cooperating country or countries for an aggregate of at least two years following departure from the United States.”
  In 1957 Dr. Mendez applied for an extension of his temporary stay in the United States. By letter dated October 2, 1957, he was informed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that:
  “Present law and regulations provide that any alien who. was admitted to the United States after June 4,1956, as an Exchange Visitor, or otherwise acquired the status of an Exchange Visitor after that date shall not be eligible to apply for and receive an immigration visa, for permanent residence, or a non-immigrant visa as a trainee or to perform temporary services in the United States, or for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, unless the Consular Officer is satisfied that such an alien has resided and been physically present abroad for an agree-gate of at least two years since his departure from the United States, following the termination of his Exchange Visitor’s status, in a country or countries cooperating in the Exchange Visitors Program. This includes any Exchange Visitor who is granted an extension of his temporary stay in the United States after September 21, 1956.”
  After acknowledging that he had been informed of the conditions that would attach if he were granted an extension, Dr. Mendez again submitted his application for extension of temporary stay in this country which was granted.
  In 1961 the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was amended by adding Sec. 212(e), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(e), to provide for a waiver by the Attorney General of the United States of the two year x*esidence abroad requirement upon favorable recommendation of the Secretary of State made pursuant to x'equest of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization after he had determined that departure from the United States would impose exceptional hardship upon the alien’s spouse or child if the spouse or child were a citizen of the United States.
  In August of 1962 after the extension of their temporary stay had expired, Dr. Mendez and his wife each applied to the Distx’ict Director of Immigration and Natux'alization for a waiver of the two year foreign residence requix*ement, basing their applications upon the alleged exceptional hardship it would impose upon their United States citizen son if compliance were enforced.
  The District Director concluded that the “exceptional hardship” standard had not been met, and he declined to submit a request to the Secx-etary of State for a recommendation to the Attorney Genei’al that the waiver be granted. Upon a subsequent motion to reconsider the applications, the District Director again found that the degree of hardship requix-ed by the statute had not been demonstrated.
  Predicating jurisdiction upon the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009, appellants brought this action seeking judicial review of the Distx’ict Director’s refusal to submit the waiver applications to the Secretary of State. It was contended in Count One of the Amended Complaint that the District Director’s ruling was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, a usurpation of legislative power and contrary to law. Equitable relief was sought in Count Two by requesting cancellation of. their Exchange Visitor visas, and in effect changing their status to that of “non-quota immigrants” under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a) (27) (C). The District Director’s motion for summary judgment was granted. Mendez v. Major, D.C., 226 F.Supp. 364.
  An appeal was then perfected to this Court.
  In view of the 1961 amendment to See. 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a (a), which provides for initial review in the Circuit Courts of Appeals of “all final orders of deportation heretofore or hereafter made against all aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 1252(b) of this title * * * ”, we must first determine whether the Court below had jurisdiction to review the denial by the District Director of the relief sought under Sec. 212(e). The phrase “final orders of deportation” has recently been construed by the United States Supreme Court in Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217, 84 S.Ct. 306, 11 L.Ed.2d 281, the Court holding:
  “It can hardly be contended that the meaning of the phrase ‘final orders of deportation’ is so clear and unambiguous as to be susceptible of only a narrow interpretation confined solely to determinations of deportability. If anything, the literal language would appear to include a denial of discretionary relief, made during the same proceedings in which deportability is determined, which effectively terminates the proceedings. In arriving at the intended construction of this language, we must therefore inevitably turn to the purpose of Congress in enacting this legislation. The fundamental purpose behind § 106(a) was to abbreviate the process of judicial review of deportation orders in order to frustrate certain practices which had come to the attention of Congress, whereby persons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by dilatory tactics in the courts. •x * -»»
  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not view the decision in Foti as indicating an intention to include within the scope of See. 106(a) all discretionary determinations relating in any way to deportation proceedings and declined initial jurisdiction to review a denial of a petition for a waiver under Sec. 212(e) which was made prior to and separate from any deportation proceedings. Saínala v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 5 Cir. 1964, 336 F.2d 7.
  The appellee neither denied nor explained by answer any of the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, but instead relied upon the administrative record in support of his motion for summary judgment which the District Court granted. We think that such procedure was entirely proper. Todaro v. Pederson, D.C., 205 F.Supp. 612, aff’d 6 Cir. 1962, 305 F.2d 377, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891, 83 S.Ct. 190, 9 L.Ed.2d 124; Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, 9 Cir. 1962, 305 F.2d 249. Cf. Montgomery v. Ffrench, 8 Cir. 1962, 299 F.2d 730.
  The contention of appellants that to enforce the two year residence abroad requirement would be in violation of their United States citizen son’s constitutional rights is without substance. There can be no doubt that Congress has the power to determine the conditions under which an alien may enter and remain in the United States, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317; even though the conditions may impose a certain amount of hardship upon an alien’s wife or children. See Swartz v. Rogers, 1958, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 254 F.2d 338; United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 2 Cir. 1956, 233 F.2d 705, aff’d 353 U.S. 72, 77 S.Ct. 618, 1 L.Ed.2d 652; Papageorgiou v. Esperdy, S.D.N.Y.1963, 212 F.Supp. 874.
  There is no merit in appellants’ contention that it was improper for the District Director to resort to the legislative history of Sec. 212(e) in construing the phrase “exceptional hardship”. It cannot be said that the phrase is so clear and unambiguous as to be susceptible of only one meaning, and it was, therefore, necessary for the District Director to look to the intent of the Congress in passing the Section to determine the proper standard to apply. Though he did find that there was a degree of personal hardship and inconvenience to appellants’ citizen son, his further determination that it was not the degree of exceptional hardship contemplated by the statute was neither capricious, arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion. Talavera v. Pederson, 6 Cir. 1964, 334 F.2d 52.
  The remaining contention of any substance is that the appellants were entitled to equitable relief because when they entei-ed the United States as Exchange Visitors they could have entered as immigrants pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a) (27) (C), and no one, including the personnel of the United States Consulate who granted their visas, informed them of this right.
  Nowhere do we find any requirement that all possibilities under the Nationality and Immigration Act be explained to an alien who desires to enter the United States, Diminich v. Esperdy, 2 Cir. 1961, 299 F.2d 244, and as was said in Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, 305 F.2d 249, “ * * the government made no misleading statement to appellant[s], nor had it taken any misleading position on which appellant[s] could or did rely to his [their] detriment.” The appellants here were fully informed of the consequences if an application for an extension of stay were granted and, this being so, they are not entitled to the equitable relief which they seek.
  The judgment of the District Court is
  Affirmed.
  . 62 Stat 6 (1948).
  . 62 Stat. 6 (1948), amended 66 Stat. 276 (1952).
  . 70 Stat 241 (1956).
  . 75 Stat. 527-535 (1961).
  . 22 C.F.R., Sec. 63.6 (j) (which sets forth procedure).
  . But see Talavera v. Pederson, 6 Cir. 1964, 334 F.2d 52; Skiftos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 7 Cir. 1964, 332 F.2d 203; Giova v. Rosenberg, 9 Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 347, Rev’d. 85 S.Ct. 156 (1964).
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.