opinion: KIMBALL v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
  No. 4180.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
  Nov. 1, 1946.
  Before MAHONEY, GOODRICH (by special assignment), and WOODBURY. Circuit Judges.
  Robert C. McKay, of Boston, Mass., for petitioner for review.
  Melva M. Graney, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen., of Washington, D. C. (Douglas W.. McGregor, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and J. Louis Monarch, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for Commissioner.
  PER CURIAM.
  This case comes before us on a petition to review a decision of' The Tax Court of the United States which sustained a determination by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of a deficiency in petitioner’s liability for withholding income tax at the source for the years 1941 and 1942, under § 143(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 143(b).
  The petitioner is the sole trustee of a trust fund under the will of Annie Bi Webb, late of Salem, Massachusetts, who died in 1925. In Clause 18 of her will, the testatrix left the residue of her property to trustees and authorized them to pay from the net income:
  “(c) To Mabel Duncan and Ethel Duncan, now or recently residing at 6 Place St., Sulpice, Paris, an annuity of four hundred dollars, one half to each, and the whole to the survivor for life.
  “(d) To the following named persons, annuities for their respective lives, namely: Germaine St. Laurent, eight hundred dollars * *
  Both Ethel Duncan and Germaine St. Laurent were citizens of France and resided there in the years 1941 and 1942 and the latter had been in the employ of the testatrix from 1913 to 1925.
  The petitioner paid or deposited to the credit of Ethel Duncan and Germaine St. Laurent in each of the years 1941 and 1942 200 and 800 dollars respectively. These amounts were not included in the withholding tax returns as income subject to withholding, because the petitioner claimed that the annual payments to the former constituted a “life annuity” and to the latter both a “private pension” and a “life annuity” paid to citizens and residents of France, and hence were exempt under Article IX(c) of the Convention and Protocol on Double Taxation between the United States and the Republic of France executed April 27, 1932, and effective January 1, 1936. 49 Stat. 3145 (1935.) The Tax Court sustained the action of the Commissioner in refusing to accept this contention and held that the words “life annuities” in the Treaty could reasonably be limited to purchased or contractual annuities and therefore would not include testamentary annuities. It also held that it was unnecessary for it to decide the scope of the term “private pensions” as used in the Treaty because it found that in this case amounts paid to Germaine St. Laurent were not paid as a pension, but that she was simply one of several named beneficiaries under the terms of a trust. It further stated that there was no indication in the will that the payments were to be made for past services nor that an employee-employer relationship had existed between her and the decedent.
  Whether or not this was a pension is a question of fact and we are bound by the determination of the Tax Court. Dobson v. Commissioner, 1943, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248; Commissioner v. Scottish American Investment Co., 1944, 323 U.S. 119, 65 S.Ct. 169, 89 L.Ed. 113.
  Likewise we are in accord with the reasoning of the Tax Court and its conclusion that the payments made to Ethel Duncan and Germaine St. Laurent were not “life annuitiés” within the meaning of Article IX(c) of the Convention and Protocol on Double Taxation between the United States and France.
  The decision of the Tax Court of the-United States is affirmed.
  “See. 143. Withholding of tax at source
  $ * if. * *
  “(b) Nonresident aliens. All persons, in whatever capacity acting, including lessees or mortgagors of real or personal property, fiduciaries, employers, and all officers and employees of the United States, having the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of interest, * * * dividends, rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensation, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income (but only to the extent that any of the above items constitutes gross income from sources within the United States), of any nonresident alien individual, * * * shall * * * deduct and withhold from such annual or periodical gains, profits, and. income a tax * *
  Article IX- — Convention and Protocol on Double Taxation between the United States and the Republic of Prance.
  “The following classes of income paid in one of the contracting States to a corporation of tbe other State, or to a citizen of the latter State residing there, are exempt from tax in the former State: * * * *
  “(c) private pensions and life annuities.”
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.