opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorry Joy ORR, Defendant-Appellant.
  No. 81-1673.
  United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
  Submitted Aug. 3, 1982.
  Decided Oct. 25, 1982.
  Hollis, K. MeMilan, Eugene, Or., for defendant-appellant.
  Thomas M. Coffin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Eugene, Or., for plaintiff-appellee.
  Before SNEED and SKOPIL, Circuit Judges, and STEPHENS, District Judge.
  The Honorable Albert Lee Stephens, Jr., United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
  SKOPIL, Circuit Judge:
  I. FACTS
  Orr was charged with nine counts of embezzling a total of $3,715 from two banks that had employed her, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656. She pleaded not-guilty to all counts.
  Pursuant to plea negotiations, Orr pleaded guilty to a superseding indictment charging two misdemeanor counts of embezzlement of $100 from each bank. All other charges were dismissed. The plea agreement contained no reference to restitution, and specifically provided that the prosecution would take no position as to sentencing.
  According to the presentence report, Orr admitted taking approximately $3,815. At the presentence interview, she expressed her belief that restitution could be ordered only in the amount of the superseding indictment. There is no indication in the record that Orr agreed to restitution of the amount originally charged as a condition of probation.
  Orr was then sentenced to 90 days incarceration on count one. Imposition of sentence on count two was suspended with five years probation and two special conditions of probation. The probation condition challenged here requires restitution of $3,815, in such amounts and at such times as directed by the probation officer.
  II. ISSUES
  Orr challenges the imposition of a probation condition for restitution of an amount greater than that for which she was convicted. She also argues that restitution may not be ordered to a party not named in the count for which she received probation. We agree with Orr as to the first contention, but not the second. Accordingly, we reverse in part and remand for modification of the condition of probation as indicated below.
  III. DISCUSSION
  The authority for requiring restitution as a condition of probation is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3651:
  “[The court may] place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
  While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant ... [m]ay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had....
  In Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1950), this court held that the specific limitation, “actual damages ... caused by the offense for which conviction was had,” governs the general provision for “such terms and conditions as the court deems best.” Id. at 987. This court held that restitution could be ordered only for amounts in counts upon which conviction was had and not for amounts set forth in dismissed counts, since a conviction for greater amount could not have been had. Id. See also United States v. Follette, 32 F.Supp. 953 (E.D.Pa.1940), cited with approval in Karrell, 181 F.2d at 987.
  The Karrell construction of section 3651, limiting restitution to amounts for which the defendant was actually convicted, is the majority rule. See United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14, 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 431, 24 L.Ed.2d 423 (1969); United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894, 83 S.Ct. 193, 9 L.Ed.2d 126 (1963); United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1952).
  Since Karrell, the courts have developed a narrow exception to the general rule where a defendant has entered a plea agreement for restitution of amounts greater than the conviction as a condition of probation. See United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1055 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d at 33-34; United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F.Supp. 907, 908 (D.Md.1981).
  This court’s recent decision in Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1982), is in accord with these principles, although there we were concerned with a somewhat different problem. In Phillips, defendant had pleaded guilty to three counts of a multicount indictment, but none of the three counts specified an amount attributable to the offense. Defendant had agreed during plea negotiations to an amount of restitution, and that restitution be a condition of probation. Id. at 194. Since no restitution had been ordered for amounts in dismissed counts, we found that the defendant could be ordered to make restitution in the amount to which he had agreed. Id.
  In Phillips, we said:
  “We feel that when a defendant consents pursuant to a plea agreement to pay such a restitutionary amount and such plea bargain is fully explored in open court and the defendant thereafter signs a stipulation to the effect that restitution in such a sum is to be paid, then the court is bound by law to carry out that specific agreement.”
  679 F.2d at 194.
  Applying these principles to Orr’s case, we find that the order for restitution cannot stand. Orr was convicted on a guilty plea under a superseding indictment on which only a conviction for embezzling $200 could have been had. The plea agreement did not specify restitution as a condition of probation. The record indicates that Orr never plea bargained for, or consented to, restitution of an amount greater than the conviction as a condition of probation.
  We hold that, absent a fully bargained plea agreement or modification thereof for restitution in an amount greater than the conviction as a condition of probation, the sentencing court is limited by section 3651 to imposing restitution of amounts charged in counts for which conviction was had.
  Orr also contends that restitution may not be ordered to a party not named in the count for which probation was ordered. We find nothing in the language of the statute that requires such an interpretation. Several cases discussed here involved a similar sentence on multi-count conviction. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Runck, 601 F.2d 968, 969 (8th Cir. 1979).
  We therefore REVERSE IN PART and REMAND for modification of the probation condition to require restitution of $100 to each bank.
  . In Follette, the defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to embezzlement of $203.99 of postal funds. She was put on probation and ordered to make restitution of a greater amount to the surety who had made good the government’s loss. Reasoning that “[a] conviction for embezzlement and conversion of a greater sum could not have been had on this indictment,” the court held that restitution must be limited to the amount charged in the indictment. 32 F.Supp. at 955.
  . A different problem is raised where no specific amount of loss is charged for the offense. The critical issue then is whether the restitution is for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction is had. See, e.g., United States v. Boswell, 565 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894, 83 S.Ct. 193, 9 L.Ed.2d 126 (1963). Compare United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1979).
  . The government urges us to adopt the approach of the court in United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1975). In Landay, the bank suffering the loss had obtained a civil consent judgment against the defendant prior to his plea. Id. at 307. Defendant agreed to incorporate the terms of consent judgment as a condition of probation; the amount was greater than that covered by the counts on which he was convicted. The Fifth Circuit upheld the restitution order on the ground that the defendant “freely and voluntarily admitted the exact amount the [bank] claimed he owed.” Id. at 308.
  In this case the United States argues that Orr’s confession of the amount taken and her private agreements for restitution are analogous to the consent judgment in Landay. We disagree. Unlike Landay, Orr’s private agreement was not incorporated by her agreement in the order for restitution as part of the plea agreement.
  . We have also considered the Third Circuit’s holding in United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1977). In Buechler, the defendant had pleaded guilty to one count of embezzling $262.12. The court placed Buechler on probation on condition of restitution of $1,989.35.
  The Buechler court held that the restitution order was in conflict with the statutory limitation, and noted that the effect of a plea agreement for restitution as a condition of probation was not before it. Id. at 1008 & n.10. Buechler supports our decision in this case.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.