opinion: NORTHWEST EQUIPMENT SALES CO., a Washington Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WESTERN PACKERS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, The Small Business Administration, United States Government, Defendants.
  No. 78-1043.
  United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
  July 10, 1980.
  Herbert W. Rettig, Rettig, Rosenberry & Roberts, Caldwell, Idaho, for defendant-appellant.
  William F. Almon, Halverson, Applegate, McDonald, Bond, Grahn, Wiehl & Almon, Yakima, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee.
  Before SKELTON , Judge, and FARRIS and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.
  Hon. Byron G. Skelton, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation.
  FARRIS, Circuit Judge:
  Western Packers, Inc. is appealing from the Idaho federal district court’s decision that appellee Northwest Equipment Sales Co. has a security interest in certain fixtures which is prior to the interest that Western acquired by purchasing the fixtures at a foreclosure sale. Under Idaho law, the foreclosure sale discharged Northwest Equipment’s security interest. We, therefore, reverse and remand for the district court to enter an order directing Northwest to refund the judgment paid by Western Packers.
  FACTS
  Northwest Equipment sold to Orchards, Inc. various items of fruit packing machinery, retaining a security interest to secure the purchase price. Orchards, Inc. affixed the machinery to real property which it purchased the day after affixation. Cold-house, Inc. succeeded to Orchard’s interest in both the real property and the fruit packing machinery. Coldhouse mortgaged the real property with its fixtures to First Security Bank of Idaho and to Gem County Development Company.
  The Bank and Gem assigned their mortgages to the Small Business Administration (SBA). Coldhouse defaulted and the SBA foreclosed, selling both the real property and the fruit packing machinery to Western Packers. Northwest Equipment brought an action against both Western Packers and the SBA in an Idaho state court, alleging the priority of its purchase money security interest in the machinery. The SBA had the action removed to federal district court.
  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
  The appeal presents us for the second time with the conflict between the interests of Northwest Equipment and Western Packers in the fruit packing machinery purchased by Western at an SBA private foreclosure sale. Northwest Equipment initially sued both Western Packers and the SBA contending that each had purchased the machinery with knowledge of Northwest’s existing security interest. Thus, Northwest maintained, Western Packers and the SBA were not entitled to protection under Idaho Code § 28-9-313(4) (1967) as subsequent purchasers without knowledge.
  The district court rejected Northwest’s contention. It held that the SBA’s interest had priority over Northwest’s because the SBA had purchased the entire interest of the original mortgagees, First Security Bank and Gem County Development, who themselves had taken mortgages on the machinery without knowledge of Northwest’s interest. The district court held further that Western Packers’ interest was prior to Northwest’s since Western had purchased the entirety of the SBA’s superior mortgage interest.
  Northwest Equipment appealed from the district court’s judgment quieting title in Western Packers. We vacated the district court’s finding that the original mortgagee, Gem County Development, had taken its interest in the machinery without knowledge of Northwest’s purchase money security interest. Northwest Equipment Sales Co. v. Western Packers Inc., 543 F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1976). We remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Western Packers and the SBA had themselves taken without knowledge and were thus independently entitled to the protection of section 28-9-313(4) regardless of the priority of their predecessors’ interests.
  The district court, on remand, found that the SBA had taken the mortgage interests of Gem and the Bank without knowledge of Northwest’s interest but that Western Packers had knowledge when it purchased at the SBA’s foreclosure sale. The district court concluded, therefore, that the SBA took the property clear of Northwest’s interest but that Western Packers, not being entitled to protection as a purchaser without knowledge under section 28-9-313(4), took the property from the SBA subject to Northwest’s interest.
  DISCUSSION
  Northwest does not dispute the district court’s finding that the SBA lacked knowledge of Northwest’s security interest when it took the assignment of the mortgages from Gem and the Bank. Nor does Northwest contest the district court’s conclusion, based on that finding, that the SBA took the machinery clear of the purchase money security interest under section 28-9-313(4). Both parties agree that the crucial question is whether Western Packers’ knowledge at the time of its purchase from the SBA precluded it from taking the machinery clear of Northwest’s interest.
  Northwest Equipment argues that we resolved this question in the previous appeal. We disagree. The basis of our prior remand was our inability to accept the district court’s finding that there was “no evidence’’ in the record that Gem took its mortgage interest in the machinery without knowledge. 543 F.2d at 67. We stated further, in dictum, that “we would not make the assumption of law that the predecessors’ lack of knowledge fulfills the statutory requirement [of section 28-9-313(4)] for the S.B.A. and Western.” Id.
  In light of the new facts which the district court found pursuant to our remand, we conclude that the priority of Western Packers’ interest is not governed by section 28-9-314(4). The SBA held a security interest in the fruit packing machinery both under the Uniform Commercial Code and under its real estate deed of trust which covered the real property and fixtures. The SBA’s interest based on its deed of trust is prior, under section 28-9-314(4), to Northwest’s Article Nine security interest. The SBA’s Article Nine interest in the machinery, being unperfected because of an improper filing, was not prior to Northwest’s.
  Accordingly, Western Packers argues, the SBA’s sale was the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage governed by Idaho real estate law. Under Idaho Code § 45-1508, a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust “shall foreclose and terminate all interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom notice is given under subsection (2) of section 45-1505 . . . .” The SBA gave notice to Northwest Equipment of the sale of both the fruit packing machinery and the real estate. Northwest does not challenge the validity of this notice or of any other aspect of the foreclosure sale procedure. Thus, if Western Packers is correct in maintaining that Idaho’s real estate mortgage foreclosure law governs, the SBA’s sale terminated Northwest’s interest. Idaho Code § 28-9-312(1) (1967) provides that section 28-9-313 governs the priorities between security interests in fixtures and interests in real estate. If Northwest’s interest has been terminated, then section 28-9-313 is inapplicable.
  The result is the same even if the SBA’s sale was governed by Idaho’s commercial code, as Northwest Equipment asserts. Section 28-9-504(4) provides that, in a private foreclosure sale:
  When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor’s rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this Part or of any judicial proceedings
  . if the purchaser acts in good faith.
  Northwest contends that Western Packers cannot satisfy the “good faith” requirement because of its knowledge of Northwest’s subordinate interest. It is not clear from the face of this subsection whether the good faith requirement applies to purchasers at all private sales or only those at sales which fail to comply with Part 5 of Article Nine. The parties have not cited and we have not found any Idaho cases resolving the issue. Section 28-1-203, however, imposes “an obligation of good faith” in the performance or enforcement of “every contract or duty” within the code. We will accept arguendo Northwest’s contention that Western Packers cut off Northwest’s interest only if Western Packers purchased the machinery in “good faith.”
  The issue then becomes whether good faith is inconsistent with the purchasing an interest with knowledge of an existing subordinate claim. Section 28-1-201(19) defines good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.” An examination of the priority and foreclosure scheme of Article Nine demonstrates that absence of knowledge of subordinate security interests could not be a prerequisite for a purchaser to buy property free of encumbrances at a foreclosure sale.
  If absence of knowledge were required, the party whose interest would be undermined would be the secured party who was conducting the sale. Northwest, under such an interpretation of the good faith requirement, would be able to notify all prospective purchasers at the SBA’s sale either by filing a financing statement or by attending the sale and announcing its interest. The SBA would, thus, be able to sell only to someone willing to pay off Northwest’s interests. The SBA properly recorded its real estate mortgage without notice or knowledge of Northwest’s interest. Northwest could have protected itself by filing its financing statement properly. With certain specifically enumerated exceptions not applicable here, Article Nine consistently reflects the policy that conflicting interests in property should be resolved in favor of the party that properly filed and against the party that could have protected itself by filing but failed to do so.
  CONCLUSION
  The SBA properly recorded its real estate mortgage covering the machinery. The interpretation of the good faith requirement of section 28-9-504(4) which Northwest urges would devalue the interest acquired by a party in the SBA’s position in favor of a party that failed to properly avail itself of the Code’s protection. Western Packers purchased the fruit packing machinery in good faith and thus discharged Northwest’s interest.
  We reverse and remand to the district court for entry of an order directing Northwest to refund the money paid it by Western Packers in satisfaction of the court’s judgment.
  Reversed and remanded.
  . The version of the Uniform Commercial Code adopted by Idaho in 1967 governs this case. Note that an amended version was adopted in 1979.
  . The district court also concluded that Western Packers was not protected by Idaho’s successor-in-interest rule under § 28-9-312(2). Western has not appealed in this decision.
  . Because this case is governed by Idaho foreclosure sale law and not by § 28-9-313(4), we need not decide whether the requirement of lack of knowledge under that subsection may be satisfied by a purchaser’s predecessor’s ignorance.
  . Filing a financing statement alone might be insufficient since it would give prospective purchasers notice but not necessarily knowledge. Section 28-1-201 provides that knowledge means actual knowledge.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.