opinion: ALLEN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
  No. 4521.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
  Nov. 6, 1939.
  George E. Allen, of Richmond, Va. (George E. Allen, Jr., of Richmond, Va., on the brief), for petitioner.
  Lee A. Jackson, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen. (Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
  Before PARKER, SOPER, and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges.
  NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge.
  This is a petition for review of a decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals involving a deficiency assessed against the petitioner, George Edward Allen, in income taxes for the year 1934 in the amount of Seven Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars and Fifty-Nine Cents ($775.-59). The.decision of the Board was entered on March 30, 1939.
  Petitioner is engaged in the practice of law in the City of Richmond, Virginia, and in March, 1934, fifteen thousand shares of the common stock of the Virginia Airship Company, a Virginia corporation, par value One Dollar ($1) per share, were given to him for legal services to the corporation, chiefly to be rendered in the future.
  During the remainder of the year 1934 the petitioner sold two thousand five hundred twenty-seven (2,527) shares of this stock for One Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Seven Dollars ($1,977), or an average of approximately Seventy-Eight (78) Cents per share. During the years 1935, 1936 and 1937 the. taxpayer sold all of the remaining stock held by him with the exception of five hundred (500) shares which he gave to his daughter, six hundred (600) shares to his secretary, and one thousand five hundred seventy-three (1,573) shares given to his son. The nine thousand eight hundred (9,800) shares sold by him in 1935, 1936 and 1937 brought a total sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars ($5,547). The aggregate amount received by the taxpayer for the twelve thousand three hundred twenty-seven (12,327) shares sold by him was Seven Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-three Dollars ($7,523), an average of a little more than Sixty (60) Cents a share.
  There was evidence before the board that a block of twenty-five thousand (25,-000) shares of the same stock was sold in a-judicial proceeding, in August, 1934, for the par value of One Dollar ($1) per share.
  The petitioner testified that he had agreed not to sell all the stock at one time or before he had performed legal services in payment for it but also testified that he sold the stock as fast as he could, beginning on August 17, 1934.
  The taxpayer kept his accounts on a cash basis and reported as income the proceeds of the sales of the stock in question in the years in which they were made.
  The Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that there- was a deficiency in the taxpayer’s assessment of income taxes for the year 1934, in the amount above stated and upon a review of this finding the Board, upheld the. Commissioner’s determination.
  The taxpayer received the stock in the year 1934. Whether it was compensation to him for legal services already rendered or to be rendered in the future is immaterial. That the stock had some value cannot be denied. The Commissioner fixed the fair market value of the stock when received by the taxpayer at Sixty (60) Cents, a share. On the appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, taken by the taxpayer, the' burden was upon him to rebut the prima facie correctness of the Commissioner’s, finding. Manchester Board & P. Co. v. Commissioner, 4 Cir., 89 F.2d 315.
  The Board found as a fact, after considering the evidence, that the stock received by the taxpayer had a fair market, value of Sixty (60) Cents per share at the time he received it. The Board also found as a fact that there was no definite and binding agreement between the taxpayer and the corporation that he would not put. the stock on the market.
  Findings of fact by the Board will be sustained by the courts if supported by substantial evidence. Hummel-Ross Fibre Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 Cir., 79 F.2d 474, and cases there cited; Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 37, 57 S.Ct. 324, 81 L.Ed. 491.
  We are of the opinion that the evidence supports the Board in fixing the value of the stock at Sixty (60) Cents a share. Shortly after he received it the taxpayer sold more than two thousand five hundred (2,500) shares at an average price of Seventy-Eight (78) Cents a share and altogether sold nearly ten thousand (10,000) shares at an average of more than Sixty (60) Cents a share. Certainly we cannot say that there was no substantial evidence to support the finding of fact by the Board on this point.
  We are also of the opinion that the evidence sustains the finding of the Board as to the agreement not to sell. The taxpayer, himself, testified that, beginning in the month of August after he received the stock, he sold it as fast as he “possibly could”.
  The cases relied upon by petitioner are not in point. The stock was received by the taxpayer in the year 1934. It had a value and the Commissioner and the Board were justified by the evidence in fixing that value at Sixty (60) Cents a share.
  Affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.