opinion: UNITED STATES v. HEINRICH.
  (Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
  November 15, 1926.)
  No. 4892.
  Appeal and error ¡®=>854(2) — Reasons assigned for judgment not reveiwable.
  An appellate court sits in review of final judgments, and not of opinions, and, if a judgment itself Is correct, will not inquire into the reasons assigned therefor.
  In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Montana; Charles N. Pray, Judge.
  Action at law by the United States against Frank M. Heinrich. Judgment for defendant, and the United States brings error.
  Affirmed.
  For opinion below, see 12 F.(2d) 938.
  Wellington D. Rankin, U. S. Atty., Francis A. Silver, and Albert Anderson, Asst. U. S. Atty., all of Helena, Mont., and Ethelbert Ward, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.
  W. M. Johnston and H. J. Coleman, both of Billings, Mont., for defendant in error.
  Before GILBERT and RUDKIN, Circuit Judges, and NETERER, District Judge.
  RUDKIN, Circuit Judge.
  Section 8 of the Act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 754), provides, among other things, that:
  “All expenditures for irrigation work on the Crow reservation, Montana, heretofore or hereafter made, are hereby declared to be reimbursable under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe and shall constitute a lien against the land benefited, regardless of ownership, and including all lands which have heretofore been sold or patented.”
  The present action was instituted by the United States to recover the aggregate amount of several annual charges imposed by-the Secretary of the Interior upon or against certain lands owned by the defendant, pursuant to the authority thus conferred. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained by the court below, and the government electing to stand on its complaint and refusing to plead further, a judgment of dismissal was entered. The demurrer was sustained upon the ground that the statute imposing the liability is unconstitutional and void. United States v. Heinrich (D. C.) 12 F.(2d) 938. The ease has been brought here by writ of error.
  After the entry of the judgment in the court below, section 8 of the Act of June 4r 1920, supra, was amended by the Act of May 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 660). The amendatory act provides, that any allotment or part of allotment provided for thereunder, irrigable from any irrigation system now in existence or hereafter constructed by the government on the reservation, shall bear its pro rata share, computed on a per acre basis, of the expenditures made from tribal funds that were used in constructing such systems, where the Indians in council had not specifically approved such expenditures, and all moneys except gratuities expended on the construction of such irrigation systems out of the appropriations from the treasury of the United States, the amount so in the aggregate to be borne to be ascertained and proclaimed by the Secretary of the Interior.
  It was conceded on the argument before this court that the act of 1926 has superseded the act of 1920, and that there can be no recovery in this action, based as it is on the earlier statute. But, while conceding that the complaint states no cause of action, and that the judgment itself is correct, the government insists that it should not hereafter be confronted by an adjudication of the court below, based upon the ground that the earlier act is unconstitutional and void. But this court sits in review of final judgments, not of opinions, and, if the judgment itself is conceded to be correct, we cannot and will not inquire into the reasons assigned therefor. As said by the Supreme Court in Dinsmore v. Southern Express Company, 183 U. S. 115, 121, 22 S. Ct. 45, 47 (46 L. Ed. 111):
  “As the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals directing the dismissal of the suit accomplishes a result that is appropriate in view of the act of 1901, we need not consider the grounds upon which that court proceeded, or any of the questions determined by it or by the Circuit Court, and the judgment must be affirmed without costs in this court; and it is so ordered.”
  A similar order or judgment will be entered here.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.