opinion: BLACKMON v. LEE, Deputy Administrator, Civil Aeronautics Administration, et al.
  No. 11590.
  United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
  Argued April 20, 1953.
  Decided May 14, 1953.
  See also 12 F.R.D. 411.
  Mr. Claude L. Dawson, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
  Mr. Oliver C. Biddle, Atty., Department of Justice, of the bar of the Supreme Court of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, with whom Mr. Charles M. Irelan, U. S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, and Messrs. Edward H. Hickey and Joseph Kovner, Attys., Department of Justice, were on the brief, for appellees. Messrs. William R. Glendon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Joseph M. Howard, Asst. U. S. Atty. at the time the record was filed, and William E. Kirk, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, also entered appearances for appellees.
  Before PROCTOR, BAZELON and FAHY, Circuit Judges.
  FAHY, Circuit Judge.
  The appellant, plaintiff in the District Court, sought a declaratory judgment that his removal from a civilian position in the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce, violated his rights as a veteran’s preference eligible, and restoration to his proper position. The ap-pellees in this court, defendants below, are departmental officials and members of the Civil Service Commission. They answered and also filed affidavits which, with the complaint itself, give in full the proceedings eventuating in appellant’s removal. No counter affidavit was filed and on motions of both appellant and appellees for summary judgment the court granted the motion of appellees and dismissed the complaint.
  Concededly appellant was a veteran’s preference eligible. The removal proceedings therefore must be shown to have conformed with the provisions of Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act, set forth in pertinent part in the margin. From the complaint, answer' and affidavits it clearly appears that the reasons for the proposed separation were given in writing, specifically and in detail, appellant was allowed a reasonable time for answering personally and in writing and for furnishing affidavits .in support of such answer, he availed himself of the right to answer, the administrative officer thereafter notified him of his removal, stating that the answer had been considered and was not deemed satisfactory, appeal was taken to the Civil Service Commission, being filed with the acting chief law officer, who after hearing affirmed the removal decision, appeal to the Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission followed, with like result, and appellant then appealed to the full Board of the Civil Service Commissioners who also considered the case and reached the same conclusion. The procedural requirements of Section 14 were complied with during the appeal proceedings, which included extensive hearings.
  Appellant’s principal contention is that nevertheless the proceedings were fatally defective in that under Section 14 he. could be discharged only “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service” and the original decision of removal did not include an explicit finding to that effect. The facts relevant to this contention are that the proposed reasons furnished in detail to appellant stated that his activities had impaired the efficient operation of the agency as a whole, he was advised that the reasons constitute “notification of proposed adverse action as required by Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, as amended”, that he could answer personally and in writing and furnish affidavits in support of his answer, and that “In the event that your answer is not satisfactory * * * you will be removed from the service or other appropriate action will be taken”. Thereafter he was formally notified of his removal by a document which stated that his answer had been considered and was not deemed satisfactory. On appeal the acting chief law officer of the Civil Service Commission, after hearings, ruled that the dismissal “was for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service as provided in Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, as amended”. On further appeal the Civil Service Commission, upon consideration of the entire record, including further hearings before its Board of Appeals and Review, affirmed the decision of the acting chief law officer and also found that the separation was in the interest of promoting the efficiency of the service. Though all question might have been eliminated by more precision in the original notification of removal we think the foregoing demonstrates that the procedures which were followed complied in all substance with Section 14.
  We do not discuss the merits of the removal except to say that under the limited judicial review permissible the District Court properly did not disturb the departmental decision. See Powell v. Brannan, 1952, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 196 F.2d 871. See, also, Watson v. Pace, 1953, 92 U.S.App.D.C. —, 201 F.2d 713, adopting the opinion of District Judge Youngdahl reported at 101 F.Supp. 477 (D.C.D.C.1951).
  We have considered other questions raised and find no reason to disagree with the judgment below.
  Affirmed.
  . “No permanent or indefinite preference eligible * * * shall be discharged * * * except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service and for reasons given in writing, and the person whose discharge * * * is sought shall have at least thirty days’ advance written notice * * * stating any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for .any such proposed action; such preference eligible shall be allowed a reasonable time for answering the same personally and in writing, and for furnishing affidavits in support of such answer, and shall have the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission from an adverse decision of the administrative officer so acting, such appeal to be made in writing within a reasonable length of time after the date of receipt of notice of such adverse decision: Provided, That such preference eligible shall have the right to make a personal appearance, or an appearance through a designated representative, in accordance with such reasonable rules and regulations as may be issued by the Civil Service Commission; after investigation and consideration of the evidence submitted, the Civil Service Commission shall submit its findings and recommendations to the proper administrative officer and shall send copies of the same to the appellant or to his designated representative, and it shall be mandatory for such administrative officer to take such corrective action as the Commission finally recommends * * Section 14, 58 Stat. 390 (1944), as amended, 61 Stat. 723 (1947), 5 U.S.C.A. § 863.
  The result we reach would be no different under the provisions of 37 Stat. 555 (1912), as amended, 62 Stat. 354 (1948), 5 U.S.C.A. § 652.
  . “ * * * Where there has been a substantial departure from applicable procedures, a misconstruction of governing legislation, or like error going to the heart of the administrative determination, a measure of judicial relief may on occasion be obtainable. But no such basis for relief has here been laid.” 91 U.S. App.D.C. at page 17, 196 F.2d at page 873.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.