opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. CROSLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., Pacific Employers Insurance Company, and American Indemnity Company, Appellees.
  No. 6891.
  United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
  Argued Nov. 18, 1954.
  Decided Dec. 1, 1954.
  Fred E. Youngman, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen. (H. Brian Holland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack and A. F. Prescott, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., N. Welch Morrisette, Jr., U. S. Atty., and Irvine F. Belser, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Columbia, S. C., on the brief), for appellant.
  Thomas E. McCutchen, Columbia, S. C., (Whaley & McCutchen and Hoover C. Blanton, Columbia, S. C., on the brief), for appellees Pacific Employers Ins. Co. and American Indemnity Co.
  ' Before PARKER, Chief Judge, SOP-ER, Circuit Judge, and THOMSEN, District Judge.
  THOMSEN, District Judge.
  The only question presented by this appeal is whether the sureties on a bond eonditiofied that “the principal shall promptly make payment to all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work provided for in” a contract between the Crosland Construction Company, Inc. (the principal) and the Newberry County Memorial Hospital of Newberry, South Carolina (the obli-gee) for the construction of certain alterations and additions to said hospital, are liable to the United States under that bond for federal income withholding taxes under Sec. 1622 et seq., I.R.C., Title 26 U.S.C.A. and Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes under Sec. 1400 et seq., I.R.C., which were deducted and withheld by the principal from wages paid to employees engaged in the performance of said contract, but not paid over to the Government as required by law.
  Other claims in addition to the one pressed on this appeal were made against the principal and the sureties in the amended complaint filed by the Government in the district court. The sureties moved for an order dismissing that complaint as to them on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district judge treated that motion as a motion for summary judgment, under Rule 12(b), Fed. R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., heard arguments based on the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties, and filed an opinion and order entering judgment in favor of the sureties. U. S. v. Crosland Construction Co., Inc., D.C., 120 F.Supp. 792. From that order and judgment the Government has appealed, but is pressing only the question stated above.
  The parties do not contend that the language of the bond is extended or limited by any contract provision or statute. The question is simply whether the Government’s claim is covered by the terms of the bond, quoted above.
  The relevant statutes and regulations are set out in the note below. From a consideration of all of them, we conclude, as did the majority of the Tenth Circuit in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. U. S., 201 F.2d 118:
  “ * * * that when an employer withholds the tax from an employee’s wage and pays him the balance the employee has been paid in full. He has received his full wage. Part of it has gone to pay his withholding tax and the balance he has. The employer has discharged his contrae-tual obligation to pay the full wage. Thereafter there remains only his liability for the tax which he has collected. That is a tax liability for which he alone is liable to the Government as for any other taxes which he may owe.” 201 F.2d at page 120.
  That decision was adhered to by the Tenth Circuit in U. S. v. Zschach Construction Co., 209 F.2d 347, and followed by the Ninth Circuit in Westover v. William Simpson Construction Co., 209 F.2d 908 and Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co. v. U. S., 210 F.2d 472, and by the Fifth Circuit in General Casualty Co. of America v. U. S., 205 F.2d 753. It is supported by Central Bank v. U. S., 345 U.S. 639, 73 S.Ct. 917, 97 L.Ed. 1312, in which it was held that the Government’s claim against the contractor for amounts withheld could not be set off against amounts due the contractor’s assignee because of the provision of the Assignment of Claims Act, 54 Stat. 1029, 31 U.S.C.A. § 203, that “ ‘such payments shall not be subject to reduction or set-off for any indebtedness of the assignor to the United States arising independently of such contract.’ ” The Supreme Court said:
  “The requirement that Graham withhold taxes from the ‘payment of wages’ to its employees and pay the same over to the United States did not arise from the contract. The requirement is squarely imposed by §§ 1401 and 1622 of the Internal Revenue Code. Without a government contract Graham would owe the statutory duty to pay over the taxes due, just as it would to pay its income tax on profits earned. Graham’s embezzlement lay neither in execution nor in breach of the contract. It arose from the conversion of the withheld taxes which Graham held as trustee for the United States pursuant to § 3661 of the Code. Assignor Graham’s indebtedness to the United States arose, we think, ‘independently’ of the contract.” 345 U.S. at pages 645, 646, 73 S. Ct. at page 920.
  We agree with the Fifth Circuit: “Though measured by the amount of wages, the money due the United States was owing as taxes and not as wages.” General Casualty Co. of America v. U. S., 205 F.2d at page 755. Such a claim is not covered by the bond in this case. The judgment of the District Court must be
  Affirmed.
  . There were two bonds given by the principal and the sureties to the obligee —one a performance- bond in the u-sual form, the other a payment bond conditioned as set out above. The perform-anee bond was involved in some of the ' questions discussed in the district court; the claim pressed on this appeal is under the payment bond.
  . Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended, Title 26 U.S.C.A. § 35, 57 Stat. 126; § 322(a) (2), 58 Stat. 231; § 1400 et seq., 61 Stat. 793, 64 Stat. 477, esp. §§ 1401, 1402, 1427, 1430; § 1608, 53 Stat. 188; § 1622 et seq., 57 Stat. 126, 62 Stat. 110, 64 Stat. 906, esp. §§ 1622(a) (d) (e), 1623, 3627; § 3661, 53 Stat. 448. T. R. 116, See. 405.301. T.R. 128, Sec. 408.304.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.