opinion: COLLIN COUNTY LEVEE IMP. DIST. NO. 1, et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
  No. 14591.
  United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
  Dec. 9, 1953.
  Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1954.
  Roland Boyd, McKinney, Tex., for appellant.
  Irving L. Goldberg, Dallas, Tex., Warren G. Moore, U. S. Atty., Tyler, Tex., Royce Whitten, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denton, Tex., William M. Steger, U. S. Atty., Tyler, Richard A. Gump, Goldberg, Fonville, Gump & Strauss, Dallas, Tex., Perry W. Morton, Asst. Atty. Gen. Roger P. Marquis, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
  Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and HOLMES and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
  HUTCHESON, Chief Judge.
  This is an appeal from an order entered in a condemnation suit granting the motion of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for payment, out of funds deposited in the registry of the court, of the balance due on bonds issued by the Collin County, Texas, Levee Improvement District No. 1.
  Brought up on an agreed statement of facts, the appeal presents the single question whether the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had a lien on the lands taken in condemnation to secure the payment of their bonds on the day when the declaration of taking was filed.
  Both appellant and appellee agree that if the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had a valid lien on lands within the district at the time of the declaration of taking, such lien must be discharged out of awards made to the land owners.
  The parties are also in agreement that the levee district in question was organized and functioned under Section 59(a), Art. 16 of the Texas Constitution and Chapter VI, Levee Improvement Districts, Art. 7972 to and including Art. 8042, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.
  Reduced to its simplest terms, appellants’ claim is that the voting and issuance of bonds did not create a present lien upon the lands and the district but only a potential lien which did not become fixed on the land in the district until in each year a special lien as to the taxes due for that year was fixed by levy and assessment. In support of this view their brief discusses and relies on the Constitution of Texas, Art. VIII, § 15, Vernon’s Ann.St., and the Texas Statutes, Art. 7172 et seq. dealing with the levy, assessment and collection of taxes generally.
  Appellee insists that general taxes and the constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining thereto are completely irrelevant here. Its claim is that Section 59(c), providing for the creation of indebtedness necessary to achieve the purpose of the amendment and “all such indebtedness may be evidenced by bonds” of the district and “such indebtedness shall be a lien upon the property assessed for the payment thereof”, and Art. 8012, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., providing for the levy of taxes for the payment of bonds issued by any levee improvement district, and that “such levy may be made for or at the time of the issuance of said bonds for each year throughout the life of the bond issue which shall be the rate of levy for each of said years until modified”, establish beyond question that the bonds were a lien on the land as claimed and found.
  We are in no doubt that this is so. A reading of the provisions of the Constitution and statutes which appellee invokes and the decisions construing and applying these provisions makes this plain.
  The judgment was right. It is affirmed.
  . State of Texas v. Moody’s Estate, 5 Cir., 156 F.2d 698; U. S. v. 111,000 Acres of Land, 5 Cir., 155 F.2d 683; C/o U. S. v. Greer Drainage Dist., 5 Cir., 121 F.2d 675.
  . “(c) The Legislature shall authorize all such indebtedness as may be necessary to provide all improvements and the maintenance thereof requisite to the achievement of the purposes of this amendment, and all such indebtedness may be evidenced by bonds of such conservation and reclamation districts, to be issued under such regulations as any (may) be prescribed by law and shall also, authorize the levy and collection within such districts of all such taxes, equitably distributed, as may be necessary for the payment of the interest and the creation of a sinking fund for the payment of such bonds; and also for the maintenance of such districts and improvements, and such indebtedness shall be a lien upon the property assessed for the payment thereof; provided the Legislature shall not authorize the issuance of any bonds or provide for any indebtedness against any reclamation district unless such proposition shall first be submitted to the qualified property tax-paying voters of such district and the proposition adopted. (Sec. 59, Art. 16, adopted election Aug. 21, 1917 ; proclamation Oct. 2, 1917.)” (Emphasis supplied.)
  . Brown County Water Improvement Dist. v. Austin Mill & Grain Co., 135 Tex. 140, 138 S.W.2d 523; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Ellis County Levee Impr. District No. 3, Tex.Civ.App., 5 S.W.2d 227; Hidalgo and Cameron Counties Water Control and Impr. Dist., No. 9 v. American Rio Grande Land & Irrigation Co., 5 Cir., 103 F.2d 509; writ of certiorari denied, 308 U.S. 573, 60 S.Ct. 88, 84 L.Ed. 481; Borron v. El Paso National Bank, 5 Cir., 133 F.2d 698.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.