opinion: Sarah RICHMAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee.
  No. 82-1919.
  United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
  Argued May 2, 1983.
  Decided June 10, 1983.
  C. Donald Briggs, III, Boston, Mass., with whom Bernard A. Kansky, Boston, Mass, and Robert B. Rumrill, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.
  Nancy Serventi, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., with whom William F. Weld, U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., was on brief, for defendant, appellee.
  Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, ALD-RICH, Circuit Judge, and BONSAL, District Judge.
  Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
  BAILEY ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge.
  In this Federal Tort Claims action defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting seven grounds, four of which were accepted by the court, without opinion, with the following succinct order.
  Upon consideration of motion and supporting and opposing memoranda, motion allowed and ordered that the case be dismissed on grounds 1, 2, 3 and 6.”
  These grounds were, 1. The complaint fails to state a ground upon which relief may be granted. 2. Jurisdiction is lacking because plaintiff failed to file a timely administrative claim as required by law. 28 U.S.C. § 2675, 2401(b). 3. The claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 6. The complaint is barred by the earlier rulings of the district court in C.A. No. 81-0059-Mc.
  It is perhaps difficult, simply by reading the complaint, to find sufficient basis for defenses 2 and 3, and, for that matter, 6. However, the “supporting and opposing memoranda” agree on the underlying facts. We shall, accordingly, treat the order of dismissal as a grant of summary judgment for the defendant. So considered, it was correct.
  The facts are these. On January 11,1979 plaintiff, a woman entirely unacquainted with one George Chalpin, while walking on a public sidewalk was assaulted and seriously injured by Chalpin, apparently in a fit of temper brought on by anger from learning that his wife intended to divorce him. In December, 1980, while attending Chalpin’s criminal trial, plaintiffs counsel learned that he had been under treatment as an outpatient, and sometime inpatient, prior to the occurrence, at a Veterans Administration hospital for “nervous breakdown and emotional disturbances.” On January 9, 1981, plaintiff sued the United States and the Veterans Administration, but without having previously filed the administrative claim required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). That action was dismissed because of such failure. On September 28, 1981 plaintiff made the claim, appropriate except for the date, which, in due course, the Veterans Administration denied. This suit followed.
  Although suit was brought within the specified six months of the administrative denial, it is manifest that the administrative filing was not made within the two years as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), viz., January, 1981. Plaintiff would excuse this on the ground that this is an action for malpractice, which she says does not accrue until the fact of malpractice is learned, and that she did file administratively within two years of acquiring knowledge of the claim in December, 1980.
  Counsel’s ingenuity doubtless deserves recognition, but it is misplaced. The delayed accrual of a patient’s claim against his physician for malpractice is an exception to the general rule that, in the absence of fraudulent concealment, minority, or other special excuse, a statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the wrongful act. The present wrongful act, seemingly the failure to place Chalpin in physical confinement, occurred no later than January 11, 1979, and was not malpractice with reference to the plaintiff even if, for present purposes, it be assumed to be actionable negligence. The postponement of the running of the statute of limitations with respect to true malpractice, whether on the theory that part of the misconduct caused the delay in its discovery, or on some “humane” principle, is not applicable to plaintiff’s claim. See United States v. Kubrick, 1979, 444 U.S. 111, 122-25, 100 S.Ct. 352, 359-60, 62 L.Ed.2d 259. Plaintiff was not a patient, and her difficulty is not, and is not comparable to, a malpractice injury; it is simply that she did not realize there was another party she might be able to make a claim against. Indeed, the Court held even in United States v. Kubrick that if the plaintiff knew of the injury, but failed to inquire and learn of the doctor’s fault, the statute was not tolled. So here, plaintiff knew of her injury; there was no concealment that would toll the statutory period. Davis v. United States, 9 Cir., 1981, 642 F.2d 328, 331-32, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919, 102 S.Ct. 1273, 71 L.Ed.2d 459.
  “The mere failure of a wrongdoer to disclose his wrongdoing, where no fiduciary relation exists, is not a fraudulent concealment of the cause of action . ... ” Norwood Trust Co. v. Twenty-Four Fed. St. Corp., 1936, 295 Mass. 234, 237, 3 N.E.2d 826.
  Thus, if a pedestrian were struck by a negligent driver, the statute would run in favor of his undisclosed employer, and the barkeeper who allowed him to drink too much, even if the pedestrian were ignorant of their existence. There would be no limit to when the government might be sued if a plaintiff could assert ignorance as an excuse for not pursuing her claim within the statutory period.
  We may add that it is particularly inappropriate for this plaintiff to lament the expiration of the statutory period. If, upon learning of her possible claim, she had filed the statutorily required administrative papers instead of instituting this suit there would have been no problem. Her failure destroyed the court’s jurisdiction to order a judgment against the government, and cannot be waived. Employees Welfare Committee v. Daws, 5 Cir., 1979, 599 F.2d 1375, 1378.
  We need not reach defendant’s other grounds.
  Affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.