opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard CHANDLER, Appellant.
  No. 12273.
  United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
  Oct. 10, 1968.
  Richard Chandler on briefs for the appellant.
  Before BOREMAN, WINTER and CRAVEN, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM:
  On December 6, 1967, Richard Chandler was indicted on a charge of failing to report for and submit to induction into the Armed Forces of the United States, pursuant to the order of his Local Draft Board, in violation of Title 50 App.U.S.C. § 462. Upon arraignment he refused representation by counsel and entered a plea of not guilty.
  One month later the case came on for trial before the district court, sitting without a jury. Again Chandler elected to proceed without counsel. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of four and one-half years.
  The only question raised by Chandler at trial was with respect to the constitutionality of applicable law. He there contended that the law is unconstitutional and, therefore, void because it sanctions involuntary servitude contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The same and sole question is presented by Chandler, pro se, on this appeal. He has filed a one-page “brief” in which he alleges error of the court below “in refusing to uphold the 13th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.”
  Pursuant to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 7(b) of the Rules of this court, the Government has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is frivolous. In the alternative the Government moves for summary affirmance of the judgment below but in either event without allowing oral argument. In addition the Government has filed its brief as required by the Rules. No response in opposition to the motion has been filed.
  The Federal military service draft laws have been attacked frequently over the years as being in contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude, but such attacks have proved uniformly unsuccessful. Fifty years ago, in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 38 S.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed. 349 (1918), the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Selective Draft Law of 1917 in the face of several contentions of unconstitutionality, one of which was that the act provided for the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court declared that the authority of Congress to enact the Selective Draft Law of 1917 was to be found in the clauses of Article I, § 8, of the Constitution which give Congress power “to declare war; * * * to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; * * * to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.” Continuing, the Court stated:
  ■“ * * And of course the powers conferred by these provisions like all other powers given carry with them as provided by the Constitution the authority ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.’ Article I, § 8.
  “As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to compose it, on the face of the Constitution the objection that it does not give power to provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous for further notice.” 245 U.S. at 377, 38 S.Ct. at 161.
  The Supreme Court, having once determined in the Selective Draft Law Cases that legislation providing for conscription does not contravene the Thirteenth Amendment, has not seen fit to re-examine this conclusion. The same contention as made here by Chandler has been presented many times to various Courts of Appeal but without success. Some litigants have claimed that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits peacetime use of conscription. The courts have ruled, however, that the power of Congress to raise armies by conscription is not limited by either the Thirteenth Amendment or the absence of a military emergency.
  The trial judge strictly adhered to the principle as recognized by the courts and as stated in United States v. Bolton, 192 F.2d 805 (2 Cir. 1951), as follows:
  “If the constitutionality of a statute requiring compulsory military service is to be reconsidered, such reconsideration should be by the Supreme Court; we shall not presume to do, so.” 192 F.2d at 806.
  Chandler has not provided this court with any new line of reasoning to support his contention which has been so often rejected. He does not point to any authoritative constitutional interpretation to substantiate his contention. His “brief,” consisting of two short paragraphs on one page, contains a general statement concerning the cases relied upon by the trial judge. As pointed out by the Government, this lack of effort evidenced by Chandler’s brief reflects the lack of seriousness with which he pursues his appeal.
  In United States v. Gregg, 393 F.2d 722, 723 (4 Cir. 1968), we made it clear that the Government is free to file, before argument, a motion to dismiss an appeal as frivolous and invited the Government to call to our attention, prior to the time set for argument, those criminal appeals which appear to be frivolous on their face and present no question worthy of debate. In view of the unbroken observance for fifty years of the Supreme Court’s disposition of the contention similar to the one presented here, this court will dispose of the instant appeal as without merit and obviously frivolous. We deem oral argument unnecessary. The appeal will be dismissed and the judgment below will be
  Affirmed.
  CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:
  I concur specially because of the possibility, perhaps remote, that the very thorough opinion of the court may be read erroneously to offer partial answers to difficult peripheral problems not presented by this appeal. The question of the power of the executive to wage undeclared war is a political question which does not yield readily to judicial solution nor is it presented on this appeal.
  We hold only that compulsory military service under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 is not the sort of involuntary servitude forbidden by the 13th Amendment. I agree that appellant’s contention to the contrary ignores the history and purpose of the Amendment and is wholly without merit. I also agree the case is an appropriate one for summary affirmance.
  . Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (Title is § 462(a). 50 App.U.S.C. § 451 et seq.) Pertinent here
  . See, for example, Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798, 799 (5 Cir. 1944), where the court stated that:
  * * * the Thirteenth Amendment has no application to a call for service made by one’s government according to law to meet a public need, just as a call for money in such a case is taxation and not confiscation of property.
  See also United States v. Hoepker, 223 F.2d 921, 923 (7 Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841, 76 S.Ct. 81, 100 L.Ed. 750 (1955); Atherton v. United States, 176 F.2d 835, 840 (9 Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 938, 70 S.Ct. 338, 94 L.Ed. 578 (1950); Wolfe v. United States, 149 F.2d 391, 393 (6 Cir. 1945); Kramer v. United States, 147 F.2d 756, 759 (6 Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878, 65 S.Ct. 1026, 89 L.Ed. 1429 (1945); Roodenko v. United States, 147 F.2d 752 (10 Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 860, 65 S.Ct. 867, 89 L.Ed. 1418 (1945); United States v. Mroz, 136 F.2d 221, 223-225 (7 Cir. 1943), app. dism. 320 U.S. 805, 64 S.Ct. 23, 88 L.Ed. 487 (1943); Commers v. United States, 66 F.Supp. 943, 948 (D.Montana 1946), aff’d 159 F.2d 248 (9 Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 807, 67 S.Ct. 1189, 91 L.Ed. 1828 (1947); United States v. Ryals, 56 F.Supp. 772, 773 (N.D.Ga. 1944).
  . United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781, 784 (7 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 1835, 20 L.Ed.2d 856 (1968); United States v. Hogans, 369 F.2d 359, 360 (2 Cir. 1966); Howze v. United States, 272 F.2d 146, 148 (9 Cir. 1959); Bertelsen v. Cooney, 213 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856, 75 S.Ct. 81, 99 L.Ed. 674 (1954). See also United States v. Bolton, 192 F.2d 805, 806 (2 Cir. 1951) (denial of contention that statute was unconstitutional because men were being drafted to serve in Korea without any declaration of war); Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591, 593 (9 Cir. 1950) (“In the present phase of history, marked by wars undeclared under the law of nations, a failure to register manpower of the country would he a failure to provide for the common defense.”).
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.