opinion: Ida EVANS, etc., Appellant, v. Gertrude McCLUSKEY, Margaret McClus-key, and Mary McCluskey, as the last Officers, Directors, Owners and Statutory Trustees of Little Flower Nursing Home, Inc. and Little Flower Nursing Home, Inc., Appellees.
  No. 77-1053.
  United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
  Submitted Oct. 11, 1977.
  Decided Dec. 7, 1977.
  Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1978.
  Raymond Howard, Jr., and Kenneth R. Singer, St. Louis, Mo., on brief for appellant.
  Kenneth C. Brostron, St. Louis, Mo., and Raymond I. Harris and Jess W. Ullom, Clayton, Mo., on brief for appellees.
  Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, and TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.
  TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
  PER CURIAM.
  Ida Evans appeals from the dismissal of her race discrimination action against her employer brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970). The district court held that the statute of limitations barred the present .action, which is the second of two suits brought by Ms. Evans to redress the alleged discrimination. We affirm.
  The Little Flower Nursing Home (Little Flower I) fired Ms. Evans from her job as a nurse’s aide on April 16, 1971. Ms. Evans then filed charges with the EEOC claiming race discrimination. She received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on December 19, 1974, and filed a timely action against Little Flower Nursing Home, Inc., on March 18, 1975. After Ms. Evans filed her charges with the EEOC but before she brought the first action in district court, the owners of Little Flower I, Gertrude, Margaret, and Mary McCluskey, sold the home and dissolved their corporation. The purchasers, Marcus and Ersie Rogers, incorporated and operated as Little Flower Nursing Home, Inc. (Little Flower II). Thus, in the first action Ms. Evans actually sued Little Flower II, the only Little Flower Nursing Home, Inc. in existence at that time, although she intended to sue Little Flower I, the employer that had fired her.
  In February 1976, as the result of answers to her interrogatories, Ms. Evans learned of the change in ownership, but took no steps to press her claim against the proper defendant. Rather, she allowed the court, in October 1976, to dismiss her action without prejudice for her failure to. answer interrogatories. She neither appealed nor moved to reinstate the first suit. On November 9, 1976, Ms. Evans brought the present action, naming Little Flower I, its former owners, and Little Flower II as defendants. The district court held that the Title VII claim was barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. V 1975) because the action was not brought within ninety days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter.
  We agree with the district court. The present action was filed more than ninety days after Ms. Evans received her right-to-sue letter on December 19, 1974. Ms. Evans argues that the letter was not proper notice because it misled her by failing to inform her of the change in ownership of the home. In support, she cites decisions in which this court has held that a right-to-sue letter that fails to give actual and effective notice of the party’s right to sue does not trigger the ninety-day limitation period. See Lacy v. Chrysler Corp., 533 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959, 97 S.Ct. 381, 50 L.Ed.2d 325 (1976); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1052, 96 S.Ct. 782, 46 L.Ed.2d 641 (1976). These cases are inapposite. The EEOC’s letter adequately informed Ms. Evans of her right to sue; the only defect, if any, was in the notice of whom to sue. That defect, however, cannot be attributed to the EEOC, which merely named the employer Ms. Evans had named in her charge of discrimination.
  The district court also held that the five-year statute of limitations found in section 516.120(1) of Missouri Revised Statutes (1969), barred the claims under sections 1981 and 1983. Ms. Evans argues that the court erred in not applying section 516.280 of Missouri Revised Statutes (1969), which provides as follows:
  If any person, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any other improper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such action may be commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement of such action shall have ceased to be so prevented.
  Ms. Evans contends that the change in ownership without a change in name constituted concealment that prevented commencement of the present action. The record does not support her argument. The dissolution of Little Flower I and the incorporation of Little Flower II were matters of public record. Moreover, Ms. Evans learned of the sale of the home from the answers to interrogatories filed on February 24, 1976, as part of the original suit. The record discloses no concealment of the change in ownership of the nursing home.
  Under these circumstances, we affirm.
  . The opinion of the Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge, is reported at 428 F.Supp. 48 (E.D.Mo.1977).
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.