opinion: FOX & COMPANY, a partnership; F. H. Brandhorst; W. J. Grace; W. Knepper; A. L. McWilliams; S. Salniker; and D. M. Schuessler, Appellants, v. Vincent SCHOEMEHL, individually and as Mayor of the City of St. Louis; John Temporiti, individually and as Chief of Staff of Mayor Vincent Schoemehl; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Appellees.
  No. 81-1884.
  United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
  Submitted Jan. 14, 1982.
  Decided Feb. 24, 1982.
  Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen & Chubb, Andrew Rothschild, St. Louis, Mo., for respondent Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
  Joseph R. Niemann, City Counselor, Judith A. Ronzio, argued, Associate City Counselor, St. Louis, Mo., for appellees Schoemehl and Temporiti.
  Carroll J. Donohue, argued, Mark G. Arnold, Husch, Eppenberger, Donohue, Elson & Cornfeld, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants.
  Before BRIGHT, ROSS and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
  ROSS, Circuit Judge.
  Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that plaintiffs were dismissed from their positions as city auditors for the City of St. Louis, Missouri for political reasons in violation of the first amendment. The district court 519 F.Supp. 849, held that because plaintiffs were not public employees they were not protected from political dismissal. We affirm.
  FACTS
  Plaintiffs are a public accounting firm and its partners. They were appointed by Mayor James F. Conway of the City of St. Louis, Missouri to audit the books and records of the St. Louis Board of Education for the fiscal year ended June 30,1981. Mayor Conway appointed plaintiffs pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 165.181 (1981) which states in relevant part:
  At the close of each fiscal school year, the mayor of the city shall appoint one or more expert accountants, who shall examine the books, accounts and vouchers of the secretary and treasurer, auditor, commissioner of school buildings and all . other departments of expenditure of the board of the metropolitan district and shall make due report thereof to the may- or and board of education of the city.
  Following the election of defendant Vincent Schoemehl as mayor, plaintiffs were dismissed as city auditors and were replaced by defendants, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
  Count I of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that defendant Vincent Schoemehl and his Chief of Staff, John Temporiti, dismissed plaintiffs as city auditors solely because of plaintiffs’ political affiliation. Plaintiffs stated that they had not supported Mayor Schoemehl in his mayoral campaign whereas Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. had made financial contributions to the campaign. Counts II and III charged defendants Schoemehl, Temporiti and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. with tortious interference with plaintiffs’ contractual rights.
  The district court in an order and memorandum dated August 7, 1981, dismissed Count I for failure to state a cause of action. Counts II and III were dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction because the contract claims were pendent to Count I. Plaintiffs appeal. DISCUSSION
  Plaintiffs argue they are protected from dismissal based on their political affiliation by the Supreme Court’s holdings in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). In Elrod the Supreme Court held that political dismissal of nonconfidential, nonpolicymaking, public employees violated the first amendment. Elrod v. Burns, supra, 427 U.S. at 349, 96 S.Ct. at 2678. Bran- ti v. Finkel, supra, 445 U.S. at 520, 100 S.Ct. at 1295. Defendants argue that Elrod and Branti do not protect plaintiffs from political dismissal because plaintiffs are not public employees. We agree with defendants.
  In Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, at 545 (8th Cir. 1982), reh’g denied (Feb. 4, 1982), this court stated that “Elrod and Branti were limited to dismissals of.public employees for partisan reasons. We are not willing to extend the patronage decisions to cases which do not involve public employees.” Taking the facts as alleged in the complaint to be true we must assume that Mayor Schoemehl’s dismissal of plaintiffs was politically motivated. Additionally, the parties do not dispute the fact that plaintiffs are not public employees but are independent contractors. Therefore, based on this court’s recent decision in Sweeney, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.
  The plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed for the reasons that Count I fails to state a cause of action and Counts II and III do not support independent federal subject matter jurisdiction.
  . The Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
  . Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 803 (8th Cir. 1976).
  . Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973) is controlling in this case. In Lefkowitz the Court held that a state could not compel testimony in violation of the fifth amendment under the threat of loss of government contracts. The Court held that contractors as well as employees were protected by the fifth amendment. Id. at 83, 94 S.Ct. at 325. We decline to extend Lefkowitz’s fifth amendment protection of contractors to the present first amendment case. We note that the Supreme Court limited its rulings in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980) to public employees. It is not for this court to expand upon that ruling.
  We note further that Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist joined Justice White in the Lefkowitz case holding that a state could not compel testimony in violation of the fifth amendment. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented in Elrod, arguing that the governmental interest in a patronage system outweighed a public employee’s first amendment rights. Elrod v. Burns, supra, 427 U.S. at 387, 96 S.Ct. at 2696. In Branti, Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist dissented, again arguing that the government had a significant interest in the patronage system. It is therefore apparent that a different analysis may apply in weighing governmental interests against first amendment rights, as in cases such as this, and against fifth amendment rights as were at issue in Lefkowitz.
  . The parties indicated at oral argument that a breach of contract action had been filed in state court based on the facts alleged in the present complaint. This court’s decision in no way affects the validity of any possible contractual claims which may exist under state law. We find only that the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under federal law.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.