opinion: Herbert M. C. “Tommy” WALKER, Petitioner, v. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Respondent.
  No. 33, Docket 24538.
  United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
  Argued Jan. 8, 1958.
  Decided Jan. 31, 1958.
  Lord, Day & Lord, New York City (Woodson D. Scott, New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.
  Victor R. Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen.; Daniel M. Friedman, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Franklin M. Stone, Gen. Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board, John H. Wanner, Associate Gen. Counsel, Robert L. Park, Asst. Gen. Counsel, O. D. Ozment, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Litigation and Research, Gerald F. Krassa, Atty., Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington, D. C., for respondent.
  Before HINCKS, LUMBARD and WATERMAN, Circuit Judges.
  WATERMAN, Circuit Judge.
  Herbert M. C. “Tommy” Walker, a licensed pilot, petitions to set aside an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board revoking his airman’s certificate and directing that he should not be issued another certificate for a period of six months. On December 7, 1955 the Board suspended petitioner’s license for reasons which are not presently relevant, the suspension to commence December 17 and to continue in effect for a period of ten days thereafter if the certificate were surrendered on or before December 17. If the certificate were not so surrendered the license remained suspended until such time as the certificate was surrendered and for ten days thereafter. Walker surrendered his certificate on March 14, 1956. Petitioner admits that during the three month period between the effective date of the suspension and the surrender of the license certificate he flew aircraft on several different occasions. He alleges, however, that beginning December 17 and for ten days thereafter, though retaining possession of his certificate, he voluntarily grounded himself in order to avoid the consequences of ignoring the suspension order. The Board does not appear to have disbelieved this allegation, but it is entitled to little weight in view of a letter sent by petitioner on February 22, 1956 to the Board’s Chief Examiner in which petitioner stated that he, “with all due respect to the Board, cannot acknowledge the suspension imposed and feels constrained, in the best interests of justice, to continue the rights and privileges of his pilot license.”
  In any event, on April 18, 1956, the Administrator commenced the present proceeding by filing a complaint with the Board setting forth the violations of the suspension order of December 7, 1955. A hearing was held before a Board examiner who ordered revocation of petitioner’s certificate. A motion for rehearing before the examiner was denied, and an appeal was then taken to the Board, which, after reviewing the record, denied oral argument as requested by petitioner, and affirmed the examiner’s order and his denial of the rehearing petition.
  In seeking review by us of the Board’s order petitioner urges that under Section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1008(b), the Board exceeded its power in revoking the license. This argument, however, ignores the fact that the opportunity to achieve compliance granted by § 9(b) is expressly made inapplicable to cases involving a willful violation of regulations. The Board found that petitioner, by flying between December 17 and March 14, deliberately chose to disregard the suspension order. This finding is amply supported by the record. Petitioner contends that the order of revocation should be set aside because its severity is disproportionate to the offense. There is no merit to this contention. The Board is vested with a wide range of discretion in the imposition of penalties, cf. Wilson v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 1957, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 325, 244 F.2d 773.
  The petitioner also suggests that there were certain procedural irregularities in the administrative proceedings. Subsequent to the initial decision by the examiner, petitioner requested a rehearing because he allegedly was unaware that revocation rather than suspension of his license was under consideration and because he was not represented by counsel. However, the complaint which had been filed by the Administrator stated that either suspension or revocation of the license was sought; and the letter to Walker transmitting the complaint explicitly set forth that petitioner was entitled to representation by counsel. Petitioner also sought the rehearing in. order to enable him to withdraw his February 22 letter, and to permit him to introduce additional evidence of his experience and qualifications as a pilot and of his readiness to comply with all lawful orders and regulations. Assuming, arguendo, that these matters were relevant, there was no satisfactory explanation as to why they had not been offered at the initial hearing. We find no error in the denial of petitioner’s rehearing request, and the Board acted within proper discretionary limits in denying petitioner’s request for oral argument upon appeal from the examiner’s order. See Sisto v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 1949, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 179 F.2d 47.
  Petition dismissed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.