opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Donald W. LINGO, Appellant.
  No. 84-1367.
  United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
  Submitted July 23, 1984.
  Decided Aug. 13, 1984.
  Donald W. Lingo, pro se.
  W. Asa Hutchinson, U.S. Atty., Fort Smith, Ark., Deborah J. Groom, Asst. U.S. Atty., for appellee.
  Before HEANEY, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM.
  Donald W. Lingo appeals from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 153 for misappropriating funds from a bankruptcy estate for which he was acting as trustee. For reversal, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying Lingo’s motion for a continuance and that trial on the merits subjected Lingo to double jeopardy. We affirm.
  I. CONTINUANCE.
  After his indictment for misappropriating over $7,000, Lingo was arraigned on January 24, 1984, and trial was set for March 5, 1984. On February 3, 1984, Lingo moved unsuccessfully for a forty-five-day continuance to obtain counsel.
  The Supreme Court has held that the trial court is vested with broad discretion in considering continuances. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). Only an “unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence on expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates the right to the assistance of counsel.” Id., citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964).
  This Court has set forth five factors which the trial court must weigh in considering motions for continuance:
  1) the nature of the case and whether the parties have been allowed adequate time for trial preparation;
  2) the diligence of the party requesting the continuance;
  3) the conduct of the opposing party and whether a lack of cooperation has contributed to the need for a continuance;
  4) the effect of the continuance and whether a delay will seriously disadvantage either party;
  5) the asserted need for the continuance, with weight to be given sudden exigencies and unforeseen circumstances.
  United States v. Bernhardt, 642 F.2d 251, 252 (8th Cir.1981).
  From our review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial court adequately considered these factors. Lingo is an attorney and the charge he faced was simple enough to be tried to a jury in one day. Lingo’s trial was held nearly three months after his indictment and then weeks after arraignment, which suggests that he had adequate time for preparation or retention of counsel. In his motion for continuance, Lingo did not allege special complications or lack of government cooperation, nor does he now assert that he suffered any material prejudice. See United States v. Olson, 697 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir.1983) (measure of trial court’s proper use of discretion in whether appellant was materially prejudiced by denial of continuance). Therefore, we hold that the trial court’s denial of the motion for continuance was not an abuse of discretion.
  II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
  Lingo also suggests that he was twice placed in jeopardy by the judgment of contempt that was entered against him for his failure to appear at a bankruptcy court hearing and by his conviction on the merits in the case at bar.
  We find that the judgments against Lingo are for different offenses and do not subject him to double jeopardy. This Court has previously stated that “punishments for contempt of court and a conviction under indictment for the same acts are not within the protection of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.” O’Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 684 (8th Cir.1942), rev’d on other grounds, 317 U.S. 412, 63 S.Ct. 268, 87 L.Ed. 368 (1943). Accord United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C.Cir.1971). In the circumstances of this case, we note that Lingo’s contempt citation was for his failure to comply with the order of the bankruptcy court to appear before it. Alternatively, his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 153 was for misappropriation of funds. Although the two judgments are necessarily related, the elements of the two offenses differ significantly and they do not constitute double jeopardy.
  Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.