opinion: HANBACK v. DUTCH BAKER BOY, Inc.
  No. 7205.
  United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
  Decided Aug. 7, 1939.
  T. Edward O’Connell, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error.
  Paul J. Sedgwick, of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.
  . Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and STEPHENS and MILLER, Associate Justices.
  STEPHENS, Associate Justice.
  This case is here upon a writ of error to the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiff in error (hereafter referred to as plaintiff), an infant, brought suit, through her father as next friend, against the defendant in error (hereafter called defendant), a local bakery, for damages for illness caused by food poisoning. The plaintiff alleged that her mother purchased chocolate eclairs from the defendant, which had knowledge through its servants that they were intended for the plaintiff’s consumption, and that she ate one of them, which proved to be unwholesom'e, with resultant injury. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that “lack of privity of contract bars the right of the .infant to recover on implied warranty of wholesomeness and fitness for human consumption.” The plaintiff stood on her declaration and judgment was entered for the defendant. We granted a writ. The case presents but one issue — whether a consumer of food, other than a purchaser, can recover against a seller on an implied warranty that the food is wholesome.
  The appellant urges that for the protection of the public liability upon the theory of implied warranty should extend to all consumers and that the limitation to “privity of contract” is unreasonable and harsh in its results. But we considered this question in Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch, 1932, 61 App.D.C. 81, 57 F.2d 447, and therein held that there could be no recovery on an implied warranty where the suit was by sub-purchaser against manufacturer, this because of lack of contractual relationship between the parties. Under that holding the plaintiff must fail here. She is but the donee of a puchaser. The remedy in such situations in this jurisdiction is in tort for negligence.
  In Cushing v. Rodman, 1936, 65 App.D.C. 258, 82 F.2d 864, 104 A.L.R. 1023, we held that a purchaser of food could recover from a retailer upon an implied warranty of wholesomeness notwithstanding that the retailer could not have discovered the defect without destroying marketability of the article. . The plaintiff insists that language in the opinion, to the effect that the allowance of recovery upon an implied warranty better protects the consuming public than the restriction of liability to tort, indicates an intention to overrule Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch. These statements were but a part of the reasons given for choosing, from divergent lines of authority in other jurisdictions, the warranty rule. In Cushing v. Rodman, far from overruling the Pie Company case, in citing it we recognized its limitation of the warranty rule. And since Cushing v. Rodman involved a purchaser, it does not rule the case of a purchaser’s donee.
  Since Cushing v. Rodman, the Uniform Sales Act, D.C.Code (Supp.1939) tit. 11, c. 4, 50 Stat. 29(1937), has been passed for the District of Columbia. The sale involved in the instant case is subject to the Act, the sale occurring on September 23, 1937, and the Act taking effect on July 1 of the same year. So far as here pertinent, the Act provides:
  “Sec. 15. ... there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, ■ except as follows:
  “(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
  “Sec. 69. ... (1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his election—
  * * *
  “(b) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty ....
  “Sec. 76. .'. . ‘Buyer’ means a person who buys or agrees to buy goods or any legal successor in interest of such person.”
  We think the language of this'Act sufficiently broad to cover sales of food and that it therefore confirms the doctrine of Cushing v. Rodman. But the Act does not aid the plaintiff in the instant case. She is neither a buyer nor, within the normal sense of the term, a successor in interest of the buyer.
  Affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.