opinion: KNOWLES, County Treasurer, v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF SHENANDOAH, IOWA, et al.
  No. 9201.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
  April 14, 1932.
  L. H. Mattox, of Shenandoah, Iowa, for appellant.
  Addison G. Kistle, of Council Bluffs, Iowa (George S. Wright, of Council Bluffs, Iowa, on the brief), for appellees.
  Before Stone and Booth, Circuit Judges, and Wyman, District Judge.
  STONE, Circuit Judge.
  The First National Bank of Shenandoah, Iowa, brought a suit against the treasurer of Page county, Iowa, to enjoin collection of taxes assessed against its shares of stock. After a hearing upon the merits, the court granted a permanent injunction. From that decree, this appeal is brought.
  One basis of this suit is that the assessments for the years 1920, 1921, 1925, and 1926 violated the statutory requirement that shares of national banks should not -be taxed by a state at a greater rate than that “assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State coming into competition with the business of national banks.” USCA title 12, § 548. The situation as shown by the evidence and as found by the trial eourt and the special master clearly is that there was, during the years involved here and as to this complainant and other national banks, a consistent policy of discrimination pursued by the taxing officials. This discrimination was worked out as follows. Under the laws of Iowa (Code Iowa 1924, § 6984 et seq.), different rates of taxation were required upon different designated classes into which property, was to be divided. Two of these classes were “moneyed capital” and “moneys and credits.” The rate upon the former was higher than that upon the latter. The taxing officials consistently placed all bank stocks in the former class and no other property therein, while they-placed all other moneys and credits held by individuals in the latter class. As a very substantial amount of these moneys and credits were of the same character as those constituting the loaning feature of the banks, this difference in classification, which determined a different tax rate, constituted an obvious discrimination against the bank stock.
  This evidence makes clear that there was a large amount of money and credits used in direct competition with this complainant (during the tax years here involved) which was classified at the lower rate as “moneys and credits,” while the stock of this hank was placed in the higher rate classification as “moneyed capital.” The evidence leaves no doubt of a discrimination such as is forbidden by section 548.
  The serious question of law at the time this appeal was presented was whether this complainant was barred from judicial relief because it had failed to avail itself of an administrative remedy before coming into court. The contention of appellant was that the statutes of Iowa (Code 1924, § 7132) provided an adequate administrative remedy for correction of such discriminations by a hearing before a “Board of Review.” A few days after this case was submitted to us, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion which we think is decisive of this appeal. The case of Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 52 S. Ct. 133, 135, 76 L. Ed. -, is a mandamus proceeding brought in a state court of Iowa, Iowa Nat. Bank v. Stewart, 232 N. W. 445, by a national bank against county officers to compel tax refunds. The basis of the suit is precisely the same discrimination and violation of section 548 as here. The case came to the Supreme Court by certiorari to the Supreme Court of Iowa, which had held: “That no right of petitioners under the state law was violated, because they were not overassessed; that no right under the federal law was violated, because the lower taxation of their competitors due to usurpation by officials was not an act of the state;' and that the discrimination thus effected was remediable only by correcting the wrong under the state law in favor of the competitors and not ‘by extending * * * the benefits as of a similar wrong* to the petitioners.”
  The Supreme Court shortly disposed of a situation exactly like that before us, as follows: “Other competing moneyed capital in the form of investments held by individuals and by a few foreign, corporations was wrongfully classified by the assessor as ‘moneys and credits,’ and so returned upon the assessment rolls to the county auditor, who extended the assessments upon the tax books accordingly, and applied to them the 5-mill levy. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the right to complain of this discrimination had been lost by failure to avail of the method of review prescribed by the state. We have no occasion to consider this matter, as we hold that the more favorable taxation of the competing domestic corporations entitles the petitioners to the relief sought.”
  The decree of the trial court is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.