opinion: ANCHOR LINE LIMITED et al., Petitioners, v. FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION and United States of America, Respondents.
  No. 16257.
  United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
  Argued Dec. 6, 1961.
  Decided Feb. 1, 1962.
  Mr. Ronald A. Capone, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Elmer C. Maddy, New York City, and Robert H. Binder, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for petitioners.
  Mr. Edward Schmeltzer, Federal Maritime Commission, with whom Messrs. Robert E. Mitchell, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Federal Maritime Commission, and Irwin A. Seibel, Dept, of Justice, were on the brief, for respondents. Mr. Richard A. Solomon, Dept, of Justice, also entered an appearance for respondent United States.
  Before Bazelon, Bastían and Burger, Circuit Judges.
  BAZELON, Circuit Judge.
  In a report and order, decided December 14, 1959, and served March 2, 1960, the Federal Maritime Commission held that allegations of a complaint, charging petitioners with violations of § 15 of the Shipping Act, had not been sustained. After the complainants in that case filed a review petition in this Court, the Commission reopened the proceedings. Subsequently the Commission moved to dismiss the petition, but its motion was denied. Upon the original record and oral argument, the Commission entered a “second report and order,” decided January 23, 1961, and served the following day, wherein it vacated its first report and order and held that petitioners had engaged in activities in violation of § 15 of the Act. Petitioners bring the instant petition to review and set aside the “second report and order.”
  Petitioners contend first that the Commission lacked authority to reopen the proceedings because a petition to review the first order was then pending in this Court. We think, however, that the pendency of a review petition does not automatically bar reopening of an administrative proceeding. Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 101 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 248 F.2d 646 (1957). See Frontier Airlines Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 259 F.2d 808 (1958); WORZ, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 106 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 268 F.2d 889 (1959). It is true that when an agency seeks to reconsider its action, it should move the court to remand or to hold the case in abeyance pending reconsideration by the agency. We do not condone the failure to follow that procedure. But since this failure was not prejudicial in the circumstances of the present ease, we do not disturb the Commission’s action in reopening the proceedings.
  Petitioners also contend that the Commission failed to make findings in compliance with its rule that a reopening will be ordered if the Commission “finds such action is required by changed conditions in fact or law or by the public interest.” 46 C.F.R. § 201.261 (1958) (emphasis supplied). But petitioners failed to raise this objection before the Commission, and we find no compelling reason to consider it. United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952); Albertson v. Federal Communications Comm., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 243 F.2d 209 (1957); Barclay Home Prod. v. Federal Trade Comm., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 241 F.2d 451, cert. denied, 354 U.S. 942, 77 S.Ct. 1399, 1 L.Ed.2d 1537 (1957).
  Petitioners also complain that the Commission’s findings respecting their violations of § 15 are not supported by substantial evidence and reasons. We think the report and order under review, printed sub nom., Maatschappij “Zeetransport” N.V. (Oranje Line) v. Anchor Line Ltd., in Pike & Fischer Shipping Reg. 211 (decided Jan. 23, 1961), cite ample evidence and reasons to support the Commission’s conclusions. Accordingly, the order is
  Affirmed.
  . The Shipping Act of 1910 provides that “the board may reverse, suspend, or modify upon such notice and in such manner as it deems proper, any order made by it.” Shipping Act § 25, 39 Stat. 736 (1916), 46 U.S.C.A. § 824 (1958).
  . See Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., supra. Cf. Smith v. Pollin, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 178, 194 F.2d 349 (1952).
  . Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); National Labor Relations Board v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1952); Minkoff v. Payne, 93 U.S.App. D.C. 123, 210 F.2d 689 (1953). Petitioners have directed our attention to alleged discrepancies between a few statements in the Board’s second report and order and certain advertisements appearing in the record. These discrepancies, if such they be, are too insubstantial to affect our decision.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.