opinion: SHEPARD v. UNITED STATES.
  No. 564.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
  Jan. 9, 1933.
  C. L. Kagey, of Wichita, Kan., and Harry W. Colmery, of Topeka, Kan. (Hal M. Black, of Wichita, Kan., Harry S. Class, of Denver, Colo., L. M. Kagey, of Wichita, Kan., L. W. LundbJade, of Beloit, Kan., A. E. Crane and Balfour S. Jeffrey, both of Topeka, Kan.,. Kagey & Black, of Wichita, Kan., Kagey,, Lundblado & Kagey, of Beloit, Kan., and Doran, Kline, Colmery & Cosgrove, of Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellant.
  S. M. Brewster, U. S. Atty., and L. E. Wyman, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Topeka, Kan. (Donald Little and Dan B. Cowie, Asst. U. S. Attys., both of Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for the United States.
  Before LEWIS, COTTERAL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
  COTTERAL, Circuit Judge.
  Charles A. Shepard was convicted of murdering his wife, Zenana Shepard, by poisoning, June 15,1929, on the United States Military Reservation, at Fort Riley, Kan. The verdict of the jury was returned without capital punishment and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals, relying on eight assignments of error, which embrace complaints of: (1) The exclusion of jurors; (2) refusal to direct a verdict for the defendant; (3) the admission of incompetent evidence; and (4) prejudicial comments on the evidence.
  1. The defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges. Ten additional jurors wore excused by the court, and others were called and retained. Those excused had read an article printed in the Kansas City Star, purporting to emanate from the defendant, shortly before the trial. One of them, interrogated by the court and counsel for both ■sides, believed the article was a statement by the defendant, and answered he thought it would be considered. The others of those jurors were’examined solely by the court, all had read the article, and they were excused -without allowing inquiry from counsel for the defendant. The objections were to the excuse of these jurors, and to the denial of a motion, to quash the panel on that ground.
  The view of the court was reflected in a remark that the defendant may not put his statement in a newspaper, get it to the jurors, and ask them to sit in the case. We quite agree it was not permissible for the defendant to create an atmosphere favorable to his defense and be tried by jurors subject to such influence. The newspaper article was introduced for the use of the court, but is not in the récord. The trial court has the duty to pass on the qualifications of the jurors. Its action is- not reviewable, unless it discloses an abuse of discretion. While there was no showing that the defendant wrote or inspired the article, the court had the discretion to- determine its effect; and no error arose because the court examined the jurors. Remus v. United States (C. C. A.) 291 F. 501; Assaid v. United States (C. C. A.) 10 F.(2d) 752; Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 435, 7 S. Ct. 614, 30 L. Ed. 708; Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642, 646, 6 S. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755. In any event, the defendant'has no ground of complaint, as he was tried before an impartial jury. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 S. Ct. 350, 30 L. Ed. 578; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164, 26 S. Ct. 189, 50 L. Ed. 421.
  2. The motion to direct a verdict is based on the insufficiency of evidence to warrant the conviction. The prosecution claims the defendant poisoned his wife, with the motive of marrying Grace Brandon, with whom he had become enamored. We condense the evidence of guilt to the point that will illustrate its sufficiency.
  The defendant and his wife were married .•at Los Angeles, in 1916. He is a medical officer in the United States Army, and was commissioned as a major during the World War. 'Since that time he has been stationed at various posts, and in 1928 was transferred to Fort Riley, Kan. His wife accompanied him. In that year, leaving his wife at Fort Riley, She took a flight surgeon’s course at Brooks Field, near San Antonio, Tex. While there, he met Grace Brandon and took her to dinners, dances, theaters, and other places of entertainment. He told her he and bis wife were not cong-enial, but kept up appearances for the sake of his rank and reputation. In November, 1928, at Neuvo Laredo, Mexico, he asked Miss Brandon to marry him if he should get a divorce; and she assented. The promise was repeatedly made. He protested his love for her, and frequently made her gifts of candy, flowers, jewelry, and other articles. He asked her to write to him at Junction City, Kan., where he rented a post office box. He wrote to her often, occasionally several times a day, until after his arrest.
  In his letters he spoke of their marriage, and shortly before his wife became ill he wrote Miss Brandon his wife had changed her mind about a divorce, and he was depressed because of her request for an excessive financial settlement; also, that he had made over to Miss Brandon his life insurance of about $30,000. The correspondence with her was addressed in affectionate terms. In May, 1929, a few days before Mrs. Shepard became ill, he ordered a canary bird sent to Miss Brandon, but it did not reach her until two days before Mrs. Shepard’s illness began.
  Soon after his return from San Antonio in December, 1928, the defendant obtained some bichloride of mercury tablets from the pharmacist at the post dispensary. He obtained other such tablets there in March, 1929, and in the following month he obtained a prescription for a like tablet dissolved in eight ounces of alcohol. In his. statement made to the agents of the Department of Justice he denied the fact, but in his testimony said all doctors carried the tablets for disinfectant purposes. He also obtained from the dispensary about two hundred empty capsules. He had access to the dispensary and had the keys to it every five or six days, as officer of the day.
  Mrs.' Shepard enjoyed good health. In the afternoon of May 20, 1929, she went to Junction City to mail a letter. After her return defendant gave her a ginger ale highball. Later that evening, Mrs. Gertrude Skow, in answer to a call from Mrs. Shepard during her absence, telephoned the Shepard home and talked with the defendant, who told her that Mrs. Shepard was desperately ill and the doctor was there. She and Mrs. Constance Gates, another friend of Mrs. Shepard (both wives of army officers), called at the Shepard home but did not see her, and were told by the defendant she had gotten some bad liquor. Major Edward J. Striekler, a psychiatrist summoned by defendant, called at 8 o’clock. At about 9 o’clock, defendant called Mrs. Skew, asking her to stay with Mrs. Shepard until he could go for a nurse. He met Clara Brown, a nurse from Topeka, at Junction City, and she arrived that night. He told the nurse Mrs. Shepard had a nervous breakdown, and she need not keep a record of the ease. Mrs. Shepard was found delirious and vomiting, and her eyes were dilated. The defendant prepared capsules for Mrs. Shepard and the nurse gave them to her, one at a time. He said the capsules contained sodium bicarbonate and luminol. There were others he said contained bismuth.
  The next day, the defendant told Alice McDonald he did not think the patient would get well. Mrs. Shepard suffered and had hemorrhages. Defendant told Major Martin Du Frenne he thought she was a chronie alcoholic, and had a chronie appendix. He also told Major Paul R. Hawley she had heart trouble. But no evidence was found of either condition. Her mouth became sore and foul and a dentist prescribed a wash containing mercuric chloride, but she used only a little of it. She lingered until she died on June 15, 1929.
  The defendant opposed an autopsy asked by the officers, but yielded when it was ordered by General Symonds. The viscera were examined by several specialists and revealed the presence of mercury, taken in small doses. They agreed it was the cause of the dqath. This is practically conceded by counsel for the defendant.
  Shepard went with the remains to Los Angeles for cremation. Before he left, he, advised Miss Brandon of the time of his departure, and stated that he would be at the Roslyn Hotel. He wired her the night of his arrival. On Juno 29, he wired General Ireland a request for a transfer to the hospital at Fort Sam Houston, near San Antonio. He wrote to Miss Brandon while en route from Los Angeles to Port Riley. Immediately after his return, he obtained leave to go to Denver to sell some lots, but went directly to San Antonio, arriving there on June 30. The day previous, he wired Miss Brandon from Waco he would telephone her on arrival at hotel, signing, “Love, Charlie.” He met her and while driving with her, proposed a secret marriage. On her refusal, they fixed their wedding date for August, 1930. He continued to send her gifts and bought her a car. He made repeated efforts to obtain a transfer to San Antonio.
  There was such an array of circumstances pointing to defendant’s guilt as to leave no doubt of its sufficiency to withstand the motion for a directed verdict.
  3. The main testimony objected to was that of Sergeant J. C. Glesser and the nurse, Clara Brown, admitted in rebuttal. The sergeant testified that on the fourth or fifth day of her illness, Mrs. Shepard said she believed she was being poisoned. Nurse Brown testified Mrs. Shepard said on the second day of her illness “she was being poisoned,” and “Doctor Shepard has poisoned me.”
  The testimony of these witnesses was not admissible as dying declarations. There was testimony that Mrs. Shepard said she would not get well, had made threats of suicide, and did not want to recover; and it is a fair inference she believed, she would not recover. But there is no' evidence that she believed death was impending or about to ensue. Death need not actually follow as anticipated, but it is necessary that the patient believe it to be imminent. It is then an exception to the rule excluding hearsay arises, the temptation to falsehood being removed. Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 13 S. Ct. 50, 36 L. Ed. 917; Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) vol. 3, §§ 1440,1441. The testimony of Sergeant Grosser was that the statement of Mrs. Shepard was not one of fact but opinion, and for that reason it was not admissible as a dying declaration. Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) vol. 3, § 1447 ; 30 C. J. p. 274; Ehrhardt v. People, 51 Colo. 205, 117 P. 164.
  But we are convinced the declarations were admissible to rebut the theory of suicide, advanced by the defense. The statements imputed to Mrs. Shepard that she contemplated suicide and did not expect or want to get well, reflected the state of her mind and tended- to show the poison was self-administered.' To rebut that testimony, the declarations that her .husband had poisoned her and she believed she had been poisoned were clearly competent as tending to show a different state of mind. State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 216, 90 N. W. 733; 30 C. J. p. 165; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285, 12 S. Ct. 909, 36 L. Ed. 706; State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 N. W. 63; Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N. E. 961, 24 L. R. A. 235.
  It is argued that as the testimony was not of dying declarations, it was error to admit it, unless the jury was instructed as to the purpose for which it might be considered. There is authority for the contention. It was held error to omit the instruction whore the evidence was long or involved, in a conspiracy case. Minner v. United States (C. C. A.) 57 F.(2d) 506. But the general rule, which should be applied here, requires the adverse party to request such an instruction when he desires the benefit of it, and it was not done in this case. Butler v. United States (C. C. A.) 53 F.(2d) 800; Moffatt v. United States (C. C. A.) 232 F. 522; Hallowell v. United States (C. C. A.) 253 F. 865; Id. (C. C. A.) 258 F. 237, certiorari denied 249 U. S. 615, 39 S. Ct. 390, 63 L. Ed. 803; Id., 251 U. S. 559, 40 S. Ct. 180, 64 L. Ed. 413; Stassi v. United States (C. C. A.) 50 F.(2d) 526. Instead, when the instructions were finished, counsel for the defendant stated he was satisfied with them. This foreclosed objections to them. Mann v. United States (C. C. A.) 49 F.(2d) 131; Najera v. Bombardieri (C. C. A.) 46 F.(2d) 281; Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U. S. 77, 47 S. Ct. 300, 71 L. Ed. 545.
  Objection is urged to the introduction in evidence of various letters which were written by defendant to Miss Brandon, those he wrote to the concerns from which the gifts were obtained by him for her, and to the articles sent to her. The argument is the court abused its discretion in admitting' those exhibits. The obvious answer is they tended to establish a motive on defendant’s part to penetrate the crime charged. There is no force whatever in the objection.,
  The account given by the defendant to tfie agents of the Department of Justice is assailed. He stated he was advised as to his constitutional rights and made his statement freely and voluntarily. An admission given under such circumstances is properly received in evidence. Perovich v. United States, 205 U. S. 86, 91, 27 S. Ct. 456, 51 L. Ed. 722; O’Neill v. United States (C. C. A.) 19 F.(2d) 322.
  The introduction of Mrs. Shepard’s letters to her kin and mother were also questioned. They were offered to show the frame of her mind as being opposed to suicide. They were admissible on the same grounds as were her conversations.
  4. Finally, it is urged that the court, indulged in prejudicial comments upon the evidence, in ruling upon the objections. Those pointed out by counsel do not sustain their complaint. There were unwarranted remarks to counsel in different instances, but they were insufficient to constitute reversible error.
  The charge to the jury is assailed, in that it reviewed the evidence in favor of the prosecution in more detail than that favoring the defense. This was a natural course, in view of the burden to establish the offense by circumstantial evidence. But it suffices to say that the charge was accepted as satisfactory by the defendant’s counsel.
  We are of the opinion that the record discloses no material error, and for that reason the judgment in this ease is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.