opinion: SUPERSCOPE, INC., Plaintiff, Appellee, v. BROOKLINE CORP., etc., Defendant, Appellee. Robert E. Lockwood, Defendant, Appellant.
  No. 83-1129.
  United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
  Argued Aug. 3, 1983.
  Decided Aug. 31, 1983.
  George L. Bernstein, Boston, Mass., for defendant, appellant.
  Paul E. Heimberg, Brookline, with whom Julius Thannhauser, and Riemer & Braunstein, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for Superscope, Inc.
  Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, BOWNES, Circuit Judge, and PEREZGIMENEZ, District Judge.
  Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
  LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Chief Judge.
  Superscope, Inc., appellee, supplied Brookline Corp. with inventory for Brook-line’s chain of retail stores. Payment for the inventory was secured by a purchase money security interest. On November 14, 1980, appellant Lockwood, who was the president, treasurer, and clerk of Brookline, executed and delivered a personal guaranty to Superscope guaranteeing Brookline’s indebtedness in excess of $100,000. The guaranty provided that recourse to Lockwood would be had “simultaneous with proceeding against any security taken and held to satisfy all debt of [Brookline] to [Super-scope] and with exercising any other remedy available to [Superscope] against [Brook-line].”
  On April 8, 1981, Brookline filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On April 13, 1981, Superscope brought the present action against Brookline and Lockwood in the district court. On April 8, 1982, the Chapter 11 proceeding was converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation.
  After Superscope had moved for summary judgment in the instant case against both defendants, the parties stipulated that Brookline owed Superscope $176,814.19. Thereafter, the district court entered judgment in the amount of $76,814.19 against Lockwood, that being the portion of the stipulated amount owed by Brookline in excess of $100,000. From that judgment, Lockwood appealed to this court. We agree with the district court that Superscope established all the elements of its case and that no material factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment was raised. Brookline’s underlying obligation is undisputed and fully liquidated. Lockwood does not deny the existence of the debt or his guaranty of a portion thereof. Brookline is clearly in default as the debt has been due and owing for over 30 days and it has filed for bankruptcy. The several letters sent by Superscope to Lockwood and Lockwood’s position in the corporation, as well as the filing of this suit, provided sufficient notice to Lockwood of Brookline’s default. Lastly, the furnishing of credit to Brookline on Lockwood’s promise is sufficient consideration; no benefit need pass directly to Lockwood.
  The sole question on appeal is whether Superscope complied with the condition that it proceed simultaneously against both the security and the guarantor. Appellants argue that by filing a claim as an unsecured creditor, Superscope abandoned its security and therefore lost its right to proceed against Lockwood on the guaranty. The district court held, and we agree, that Superscope did not abandon its security and took all required action precedent to realizing on the guaranty.
  Brookline’s petition for reorganization listed Superscope as a secured creditor. Under § 1111(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a proof of claim is deemed filed under § 501 if that claim appears in the schedule filed by the debtor under § 521(1) so long as the claim is not scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliquidated. Thus, Superscope did not have to file a proof of claim for its secured interest because Lockwood had listed Superscope as a secured creditor in Brookline’s schedule. Superscope, to be sure, also filed a proof of claim as an unsecured creditor under § 501. But as the Committee notes to the Senate Report on § 501 explain, S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5847, a creditor who is only partially secured, as Superscope appears to have been, may file a proof of claim as an unsecured creditor. Given its listing elsewhere as a secured creditor, Superscope’s filing as an unsecured creditor did not operate to abandon the security but merely gave Superscope claims both as a secured and an unsecured creditor. Nothmg in § 1112 or elsewhere suggests that when the case was converted to Chapter 7 the proof of claim deemed filed under § 1111 disappeared.
  The only possible additional action that Superscope could have taken that it did not take was to seek relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d). Like the court below, we do not believe that the guaranty required Superscope to realize on its security before it could proceed against Lockwood. The condition merely required that it proceed simultaneously. The existence of a sufficient proof of claim as a secured creditor coupled with the filing of a proof of claim as an unsecured creditor and the bringing of this action meets this condition; thus, it was unnecessary for Superscope to seek relief from the stay.
  Affirmed.
  . Schedule A-2 entitled “Creditors Holding Security,” which was filed for Brookline by Lockwood himself, showed a debt to Superscope of $176,814.19; the schedule also showed that this amount was secured by $10,000 of inventory. It was explicitly stated in the schedule that the claim was not contingent, unliquidated or disputed.
  . Since Superscope was only partially secured, it properly filed a proof of claim as an unsecured creditor in hope of realizing more than the $10,000 value of its security.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.