opinion: HEBREW HOME FOR THE AGED v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
  No. 8622.
  United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia.
  Submitted April 4, 1944.
  Decided May 8, 1944.
  Messrs. Simon Hirshman and Norman Fischer, both of Washington, D. C., were on the brief for petitioner.
  Messrs. Richmond B. Keech, Corporation Counsel, D. C., Vernon E; West, Principal Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C., and Glenn Simmon, Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C., all of Washington, D. C., were on the brief for respondent.
  Before GRONER, C. J., and MILLER and EDGERTON, JJ.
  EDGERTON, J.
  The Hebrew Home for the Aged asks review of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia which upheld tax assessments for 1941 and the first half 1942.
  According to the Board’s findings, both the Home and the Jewish Social Service Agency are public charities. In 1939 the Home leased land to the Agency for twenty years. The lessee agreed to pay a nominal rent of $1 a year and to erect a building in accordance with plans and specifications to be approved by the lessor. “At the expiration of the term” this building was to “be and become the property of the lessor.” A building worth $25,000 was erected and used by the lessee and has been assessed to the lessor.
  The District of Columbia Code provides that real property “shall be assessed in the name of the owner.” The Code exempts from taxation, with certain exceptions, “buildings belonging to institutions of purely public charity * * The principal exception is that “if any portion of any such building, house, grounds * * * is larger than is absolutely required and actually used for its legitimate purpose and none other, or is used to secure a rent or income * * * such portion * * * shall be taxed against the owner of said building or grounds * * *.” If the Home is the owner of the building, and it is larger than is required and used for the Home’s purpose or is used to secure income, within the meaning of these Code provisions, the building is properly assessed to the Home. The fact that the lessee is also a public charity does not exempt the building from taxation.
  When a lessee of land erects a permanent building the lessor owns it. His ownership attaches immediately whether or not he derives immediate benefit from it. The apparent purpose of the covenant in the lease, that at the expiration of the tern the building would “be and become” the property of the lessor, was not to change the ownership in the meantime but to preclude any claim on the part of the lessee that the lessor should pay the cost or value of the building. No agreement that the lessee should be regarded as owner, either in general or for assessment purposes, during the term of the lease can fairly be read into this covenant. We need not consider whether such an agreement, if made, would be effective to prevent the District of Columbia from assessing the lessor.
  Exemptions from taxation are construed strictly. Since the building and the ground on which it stands are used for the purposes of the Agency, and not for those of the Home, they are “larger than is absolutely required and actually used” for the Home’s “legitimate purpose and none other.” Therefore the building was not exempt from taxation. We need not consider whether it was used to secure income.
  Affirmed.
  D.C.Code (1940) § 47—701.
  D.C.Code (1940) § 47—801. The Act of December 24, 1942, 56 Stat. 1089, D.C.Code 1940, § 47—801a et seq., is not applicable in this suit.
  Kutter v. Smith, 69 U.S. 491, 2 Wall. 491, 17 L.Ed. 830.
  People ex rel. International Navigation Co. v. Barker, 153 N.Y. 98, 47 N.E. 46.
  In a separate covenant the lessee Agency agreed “to pay, on the first day of October of each year, on presentation to it of proper tax bills, any taxes, general or special, which may be levied or assessed by the District of Columbia, or the Federal Government in connection with the use by the lessee of the land herein leased and the building to be erected thereon.” This covenant does not imply that taxes are to be assessed to the lessee.
  National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Young, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 290, 134 F.2d 524. Cf. Combined Congregations of District of Columbia v. Dent, — U.S.App.D.C. —, 140 F.2d 9.
  Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 6 S.Ct. 427, 29 L.Ed. 680.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.