opinion: Benito CONCEPCION, Appellant, v. Menelio Cruz SOTO and Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority.
  No. 75-1155.
  United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
  Argued April 22, 1975.
  Decided July 7, 1975.
  Leroy A. Mercer, Christiansted, St. Croix, V. L, for appellant.
  Verne A. Hodge, Atty. Gen. of the Virgin Islands, Emory W. Reisinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, V. I., for appellee.
  Before HASTIE, GIBBONS and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.
  OPINION OF THE COURT
  HASTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
  This is an appeal from a judgment that denied the petition of a judgment creditor for an order “commanding the [Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority] to make payment of” a $20,000 money judgment, plus costs and an attorney’s fee, entered against the Authority in a tort action for personal injury and property damage. Failure of the Authority to respond to the original complaint had resulted in imposition of liability by default. Thereafter, damages had been determined by a jury.
  The Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority is an incorporated instrumentality of the Government of the Virgin Islands. In the Act of August 13, 1964, No. 1248, Sess.L.1964, 30 V.I.C. (1974 Supp.) § 103, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands created this corporate instrumentality, defined its functions and powers, authorized it to issue bonds and created and limited its amenability to judicial process. While the enumerated powers of the Authority included the capacity “to sue and be sued”, 30 V.I.C. § 105(4), its amenability to judicial process was restricted by the following provision:
  “All property including funds of the Authority shall be exempt from levy and sale by virtue of an execution, and no execution or other judicial process shall issue against the same nor shall any judgment against the Authority be a charge or lien upon its property; Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply to or limit the right of bondholders to pursue any remedies for the enforcement of any pledge or lien given by the Authority on its rates, fees, revenues, or other income or any other funds.” 30 V.I.C. (1974 Supp.) § 111(a).
  We think that the relief sought here, a judicial order that would compel the Authority to surrender its assets in payment of a money judgment for tortious personal injury, is within the meaning of the quoted prohibitory language, since the order sought would be “judicial process” designed to reach the property of the Authority.
  This does not make the right to sue the Authority or the obtaining of judgment against it meaningless. As a responsible agency the Authority can, and apparently does, carry liability insurance.
  Separately, the appellant contends that the quoted provision of Section 111(a) was in effect repealed by a subsequent comprehensive waiver of governmental immunity from tort liability that was enacted in the 1971 Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act. 33 V.I.C. (1974 Supp.) § 3408.
  Whether this is a tenable argument depends upon the following provision of the Authority creating 1964 statute:
  “Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are inconsistent with the provisions of any other Act of the Legislature of the Virgin Islands, the provisions of this chapter shall be controlling and no law heretofore or hereafter passed governing the administration of the Government of the Virgin Islands or any parts, office, bureaus, departments, commissions, municipalities, branches, agents, officers, or employees thereof shall be construed to apply to the Authority unless so specifically provided . . . .” 30 V.I.C. (1974 Supp.) § 122.
  The Tort Claims Act does not expressly overrule the particular exemption from judicial process granted in Section 111(a) of Title 30 and now relied upon by the Authority. Indeed, the Tort Claims Act makes no mention whatever of the Authority. But Section 122 of Title 30, in terms and in legal effect, has precluded repeal of Section 111(a) by implication. Therefore, the Tort Claims Act cannot properly be read as having that effect.
  The judgment will be affirmed.
  . The briefs indicate that the Authority carries liability insurance but that the insurer has refused to entertain a claim in this case unless the default shall be set aside and opportunity provided to defend the action on its merits.
  . While we hold that the general waiver of governmental immunity in 33 V.I.C. § 3408 does not affect the special statutory provisions concerning the Water and Power Authority, we also observe that, even if the Tort Claims Act were applicable here, the plaintiff would be confronted with a statutory exclusion of default judgments from the benefits of the Tort Claims Act. 33 V.I.C. (1974 Supp.) § 3411. The time and method of asserting such a claim also are restrictively prescribed. 33 V.I.C. (1974 Supp.) § 3409. •
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.