opinion: PACIFIC STATES LIFE INS. CO. v. GILL et al. (CORN BELT BANK, Intervener).
  No. 5131.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
  June 13, 1934.
  E. R. Elliott, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
  John H. Page, of Eockford, Ill., for appellee Genevieve P. Gill.
  Shelby L. Large, of Eockford, Ill., for appellee Com Belt Bank.
  Before ALSCIIULER, EVANS, and FITZTiENRY, Circuit Judges.
  EVANS, Circuit Judge
  (after stating tho facts as above).
  Tho Chicago National Life Insurance Company, on September 2-8, 1981, borrowed $3-,009 of Gill and deposited as security a certain note and morigage for $12,500, known as the Schultz morigage. This loan became due in five days, and upon its maturity a new loan, payable in twenty-five days, was made for the same amount and secured by the same collateral. At the same time a cheek, payable to Gill, was drawn, by the Chicago National Life Insurance Company on the Saybrook Bank to pay the first loan. This cheek was certified by the cashier of said bank, but the hank closed before the check was presented. The first loan, however, was subsequently paid by the insurance company.
  The instant suit involves a controversy arising out of the second loan and mo-re particularly the refusal of Gill to deliver to appellant the Schultz note and mortgage. The second note, and the cheek executed by Gill, bore date of October 6-, or three days subsequent to the actual transaction. This postdating was in order to make sure that the cheek drawn by the insurance company would be cashed upon presentation.
  When the insurance company made good its first check, it desired the return of the mortgage security which had been deposited. Appellee Gill refused to turn over the security because of the second loan. An agreement was reached, however, which was reduced to writing, the important parts of which read as follows:
  “Now, Therefore, it is agreed by and between the parties hereto that if and when said cheeks last described clear and the proceeds are deposited to the account of Second Party, said Second Party will cause to he released and forwarded by registered mail to First Party the following described collateral:
  “A promissory note in the sum of $12,-500.00 signed by Annie L. and Louis Schultz, dated July 3, 1929.
  “1 Trust Deed securing same, signed by the same parties, to the Chicago- National Life Insurance Co., Trustee.
  “Two Interest Coupon notes #5 and #0 of the same date between the same parties, each in tho sum of $375.00.
  “It is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that upon tho release of and delivery of the aforesaid Three Thousand * * * Dollar cheek returned ‘N.S.F.’ to Second Party herein, Second Party will return and deliver cancelled to First Party the aforesaid principal note in the sum of Thirty Two Hundred * * * Dollars.”
  Ap-peliee Gill refused to carry out the written agreement by her made to return the collateral because, as she claims, she was induced to sign the agreement upon the false and fraudulent representations made at the time of its execution by the representativo of the insurance company. Upon this issue the court found:
  “ * * * The Chicago National Life Insurance Company at said conference, through its agents stated to the defendant, Genevieve P. Gill, that it desired to discontinue and terminate the loan of October 6, 1931 and desired the return of the Schultz mortgage. The defendant, Genevieve P. Gill, would not agree to return the Schultz mortgage unless her check for $3-,000, dated October 6, 1931 had not been negotiated and could be returned to her. The Chicago National Life Insurance Company, through its agents then and there stated that said check had not been negotiated and was in possession of the Chicago National Life Insurance Company and would be returned immediately to tho defendant, Genevieve P. Gill. Acting upon this representation “ * * Gill signed the contract. 8 * * Tha representations concerning the negotiation, of the said Gill cheek and concerning the possession of it by the Chicago National Life Insurance Company were untrue in this, that said check had been negotiated and said check; was not in the possession of the Chicago- National Life Insurance Company and that said statements made by the Chicago National Life Insurance Company through its agent as aforesaid, were known to be untrue and were made with the intent to deceive the defendant, Genevieve P. Gill, and to obtain her signature to said contract known as Exhibit 1. The defendant, Genevieve P. Gill, executed said contract * * * in good faith relying on the truth of the statements so made to her as to the negotiation and as to the possession of said check.”
  While the suit was pending the Corn Belt Bank was permitted to intervene, and it sought relief based upon the fact that it had paid the Gill cheek which the insurance company had falsely represented was in its possession and had not been transferred. Gill stopped payment on the cheek before it was presented to the bank upon which it was drawn, and the Com Belt Bank claimed it was a holder in due course and demanded payment from Gill of the amount represented by the check.
  When the rather involved statement of facts is analyzed, little difficulty is experienced in disposing of the issues presented. In fact determination of this appeal turns largely upon the question of whether the evidence suppor’s the findings. The important findings, aside from the one above set forth, are:
  “The collateral given by plaintiff as security for said second note of plaintiff, dated October 6,1931, and now in the hands of the Clerk of this Court still stands as security for the payment of said note.
  “Plaintiff is indebted to Genevieve P. Gill for the principal and interest due under said Second note; and Genevieve P. Gill is liable to the Com Belt Bank for the amount of her cheek in the sum of $3,000.00 and dated October 6, 1931.”
  In the absence of any agreement to the contrary it is clear that the Schultz mortgage was given to Gill as security for the loan. Gill’s check to the insurance company evidenced the loan. Until she is released from liability, her right to hold the security can not be successfully challenged.
  The evidence, we think, clearly showed her liability on the outstanding check to the Com Belt Bank, which the said bank acquired in the usual course of business. She was therefore indebted to this bank, as the court found, and the decree in favor of said bank against her was proper. As she was indebted to the bank in this sum, which indebtedness arose by reason of the insurance company’s depositing the cheek, the insurance company’s loan from her remained in force and was unsatisfied.
  Nor do we see force in the argument that the agreement changed the rights and liabilities of the parties. Gill’s signature thereto was obtained through false and fraudulent representations which she relied on and believed to be true. The evidence amply supports the finding of the court in this respect. Nor can we accept appellant’s contention that the agreement was a divisible one, only part of which should fall because of the fraud and the other part should stand. We agree with* the District Court that the agreement was an indivisible one and either stood or fell in to to.
  The decree is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.