opinion: Fritz HUTCHESON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pierce O’CARROLL and Monarch Air Service, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
  No. 12078.
  United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
  Jan. 24, 1958.
  Alfred M. Walter, Chicago, 111., Michael F. Mulcahy, Chicago, 111., of counsel for appellant.
  Herman L. Taylor, Richard E. Mueller, Cyrus Mead, III, Gordon R. Close, counsel, for appellant.
  Before MAJOR, FINNEGAN and PARKINSON, Circuit Judges.
  PARKINSON, Circuit Judge.
  This is an. action in damages for breach of contract. The District Court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint for the reason that the contract allegedly breached was violative of the Civil Aeronautics Act, Title 49 U.S.C.A. § 489(a) (6). This appeal followed.
  The complaint charged in substance that the defendant Pierce O’Carroll offered to sell a Curtiss-Wright C 46 A aircraft to the plaintiff for the sum of $120,000 and that the plaintiff accepted the offer; the terms were to be $45,000 down and the balance to be paid at $5,-000 a month; title to the aircraft was in Two Eight Mike, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and the defendant Monarch Air Service, Inc. held a $55,000 chattel mortgage thereon but said corporations were actually the alter ego of the defendant Pierce O’Carroll; that immediately following the payment of the $45,000 the plaintiff entered into a lease agreement wherein he was to receive an agreed monthly rental of $11,000 for the aircraft for a period of one year, and that by reason of the failure of the defendants to complete the sale and make delivery of the aircraft the plaintiff was unable to complete the terms and conditions of the lease to his damage in the sum of $200,000.
  It is agreed that the defendants have returned the $45,000 to the plaintiff and included in the relevant facts admitted by the complaint, the answers of the defendants and the reply of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff was an officer, director and stockholder of U. S. Air Coach, Inc., an air carrier as defined by the Civil Aeronautics Act.
  The plaintiff has limited the question before this court to whether the District Court had jurisdiction to determine that the contract in suit was violative of the Civil Aeronautics Act without first requiring a determination of the issue by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
  In his brief the plaintiff states,
  “Notwithstanding the several issues raised by the Court’s Order of April 30, 1957, dismissing the Complaint herein, plaintiff has elected to proceed, for the purpose of appeal, solely upon the issue of whether the District Court properly assumed unto itself the power to determine the legality and validity of the contract sought to be enforced, with respect to its application to Section 489(a) (6) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended,”.
  Accordingly we do not reach the issue of whether the contract in suit is valid or invalid under the Act but only whether the District Court had jurisdiction to decide that question without first requiring a determination thereof by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
  The Civil Aeronautics Act specifically makes an interlocking relationship unlawful unless such relationship has been approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board upon due showing that the public interest will not be adversely affected thereby.
  We need not look beyond the Civil Aeronautics Act itself to decide the issue presented by this appeal as limited by the plaintiff himself. The citation of case law is unnecessary to support the conclusion that unless an interlocking relationship is approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board it is unlawful per se. The Act so states in simple and direct language. The question here is not whether the District Court correctly decided that the relationship was unlawful but whether it had the power to decide that question without first requiring a determination by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
  The burden was upon the plaintiff to apply to the Board for that determination. Without having done so and securing an order of approval the District Court had jurisdiction to determine the question of the legality or illegality of the contract in controversy.
  The judgment is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.