opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Thomas R. PRENDERGAST, Appellant.
  No. 78-1357.
  United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
  Argued Sept. 5, 1978.
  Decided Sept. 29, 1978.
  Charles F. Scarlata, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
  Blair A. Griffith, U. S. Atty., by John P. Panneton, Faye M. Gardner, Asst. U. S. Attys., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
  Before ALDISERT and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges, and MEANOR, District Judge.
  H. Curtis Meanor, United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
  OPINION OF THE COURT
  PER CURIAM.
  Appellant, a pharmacist, was tried on a four count indictment. Count I, upon which he was acquitted, charged the unlawful distribution of phentermine contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Counts II and III, upon which he was convicted, asserted the making of false and fraudulent statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and Count IV, on which conviction also ensued, involved appellant’s failure to keep required records. 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(5).
  On March 17, 1976, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration made an undercover purchase of 1,000 phentermine tablets. It was discovered that appellant’s pharmacy had purchased phentermine from the same manufacturing lot that had been involved in the undercover purchase. An administrative search warrant was procured pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 880(d), following which the indictment was returned. Appellant moved to suppress the results of the search conducted pursuant to the administrative warrant and his motion was denied. United States v. Prendergast, 436 F.Supp. 931 (W.D.Pa.1977). He now asserts that this denial was error.
  First, we reject the argument that the affidavit in support of the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause for its issuance. 21 U.S.C. § 880(d) provides:
  For the purposes of this section, the term “probable cause” means a valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this subchapter or regulations thereunder sufficient to justify administrative inspections of the area, premises, building or conveyance, or contents thereof, in the circumstances specified in the application for the warrant.
  The affidavit presented in support of the warrant recited that appellant’s pharmacy sold drugs or other substances included in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-513) and that his pharmacy had not previously been inspected. Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required to support the issuance of an administrative warrant. Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1824, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 316 (1978). The fact that appellant’s pharmacy had never before been inspected to insure compliance with compulsory record keeping requirements is a circumstance that alone is sufficient to justify an administrative warrant in light of the deep public interest in enforcing compliance with record keeping requirements. United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 818-819 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Greenburg, 334 F.Supp. 364, 367 (W.D.Pa.1971); United States v. Prendergast, supra.
  It is further contended that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the procurement of an administrative warrant in aid of a criminal investigation was a subterfuge in avoidance of the probable cause burden that must be met to support a criminal search warrant.
  This precise issue was considered by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Goldfine, supra. There, the defendants were suspected of criminal violations of the drug laws. Despite this, an administrative warrant was secured and upon its execution evidence was gathered that, as here, was used in the subsequent criminal prosecution. There, as here, it was contended that the use of an administrative warrant was improper and that only a warrant based upon the traditional criminal law standards of probable cause could be used to gather evidence of the commission of crime. The Ninth Circuit answered this argument as follows:
  We agree with the Second Circuit in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 1969), rev’d on other grounds, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970), that “[acceptance of defendant’s contentions would place the agent in the position of being authorized to conduct a warrantless search [or administrative inspection] only when he had no reason to suspect a possible violation.” We reject the proposition that pharmacies as to which there is probable cause to suppose a violation are by that fact rendered exempt from administrative inspection and subject only to search for evidence of crime. The administrative need for and the public interest in inspection continue to provide justification apart from the obtaining of evidence of crime.
  If evidence of a crime is sought that would not be disclosed by an inspection under § 880(b)(1), limited to the purposes there specified, a search warrant specifying such evidence would be required and would have to be supported by a showing of probable cause to suppose the presence of that which was sought. However, if the extent of the intrusion is to be limited to an inspection under § 880(b)(1) an administrative inspection warrant upon probable cause as defined in § 880(d)(1) is all that is required.
  (Footnote omitted.) 538 F.2d at 819.
  We are in accord with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion and therefore hold that denial of the motion to suppress was correct. We have examined the other arguments raised by appellant and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
  . We do not find United States v. LaSalle National Bank, - U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 2357, 57 L.Ed.2d 221 (1978) to be of aid to appellant on this issue. There, the Court sanctioned the use of an IRS administrative summons solely to gather evidence in aid of a planned criminal prosecution because (1) there had been no recommendation by the IRS to the Department of Justice that criminal prosecution be undertaken, and (2) there had been no finding that the IRS had abandoned, “in an institutional sense” pursuit of civil tax liability. Here, there was no commitment to criminal prosecution by the DEA prior to the issuance of the administrative warrant as distinguished from imposition of civil penalties for violation of record keeping requirements. In light of the continuing potential pursuant to the administrative warrant issued here of civil enforcement of the record keeping requisites, there was no violation of LaSalle in utilization of that warrant.
  . These additional arguments are that the district court (1) erred in permitting the government to introduce a .chart purporting to reflect shortages of Schedule II substances; (2) that introduction of evidence of an unrelated undercover purchase of phentermine was improper; and (3) that appellant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal should have been granted because the government had not proven the record keeping violations with respect to phentermine.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.