opinion: SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Doyle COMBS et al., Defendants-Appellees.
  Nos. 73-1525, 73-1526.
  United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
  Aug. 14, 1973.
  John A. Lloyd, Jr., Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants, Southern Railway Co. and others; Daniel P. Dooley, Cincinnati, Ohio, on brief; Frost & Jacobs, Cincinnati, Ohio, of counsel.
  Covington & Burling, Charles A. Hor-sky, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellant Brotherhood of Railway Airline & Steamship Clerks; Walter F. Smith and Thomas J. Kircher, Cincinnati, Ohio, on brief; William J. Donlon, Gen. Counsel, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Rosemont, Smith, Latimer & Swing, Cincinnati, Ohio, of counsel.
  Jonas B. Katz, Cincinnati, Ohio, for def endants-appellees.
  Harlington Wood, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., William W. Milligan, U. S. Atty., Walter H. Fleischer, Judith S. Feigin, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., on brief for the United States as amicus curiae.
  Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, PECK, Circuit Judge, and MOYNA-HAN, District Judge.*
  PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.
  This is an appeal from the District Court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction in a labor dispute. Plaintiff-appellant companies, the Southern Railway Company (Southern), the Cincinnati-New Orleans & Texas-Pacific Railway Company (C.N.O. & T.P.), Central of Georgia Railroad Company and Central of Georgia Motor Transport Company (Motor Transport) are highly interrelated components of an integrated rail system commonly referred to as the Southern Railway System. In Cincinnati, Ohio, these companies conduct extensive operations at a train yard and terminal facility known as the Gest Street Yards.
  Plaintiff-appellant union is the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, AFL-CIO (Brotherhood). The Brotherhood has been certified as the collective bargaining agent for the employees of all the appellant companies. Pursuant to this certification the Brotherhood entered into collective bargaining agreements with the individual corporations which agreements were in effect at the time of the present dispute.
  The defendant-appellees include six former employees of K. & 0. Transportation Services and their collective bargaining agent, Local 100, Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union (Local 100). Local 100 does not have any contract with any of the appellant companies. Nor have the six individual defendants-appellees ever been employed by any of the appellant companies.
  The Southern Railway System’s Gest Street activities include the intra-yard transfer of freight and cargo incident to the carriers’ “piggy-back” operations. This involves the movement of goods, originally delivered to the Yard by independent motor carriers, to flat cars for rail movement and conversely the transfer of incoming cargo from flat cars to the trucks of awaiting consignees. Prior to March 15, 1973, this intra-yard transfer was performed by K. & O. Transportation Services. K. & O. was and is engaged in the general business of freight and cargo transfer in and about greater Cincinnati. K. & 0. employed eight individuals in connection with its Gest Street operations. These employees were represented by Local 100. Six of these individuals are appellees herein.
  The carriers decided not to renew their contract with K. & 0. upon its expiration on March 15, 1973. Instead they entered into a new agreement with their own affiliate, Motor Transport. Substantially all of Motor Transport’s activities on a national level involve similar intra-yard operations at various Southern Railway System facilities.
  When the termination of the K. & 0. contract was announced, all eight K. & 0. employees applied for jobs with Motor Transport. Because of the Motor Transport agreement with the Brotherhood only two K. & 0. employees were offered employment. Thereupon the remaining six applicants commenced peaceful picketing at both entrances to the Gest Street Yards.
  On the same day that picketing began, C.N.O. & T.P. brought suit in the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County, Ohio, to enjoin the picketing. An ex parte temporary restraining order was granted. Before a hearing on the motion for a temporary injunction could be held, the defendants removed the ease to the District Court. At that time the complaint was amended to include as plaintiffs all companies operating out of the Gest Street Yards. In addition the Brotherhood was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff and Local 100 voluntarily became a party defendant.
  The District Court conducted a hearing, made findings of fact, and on April 11, 1973, concluded that the motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied. On that same date appellants filed a notice of appeal to this court. On April 12, 1973, this court granted appellants’ motion for an injunction pending appeal. A subsequent application to stay the injunction was denied on May 15, 1973, by Circuit Justice Potter Stewart.
  With respect to the picketing, the District Court made the following findings of fact:
  “The defendants clearly will resume picketing if the state court order be dissolved and the injunction motions be denied.
  “The brief picketing did
  (a) interfere with the performance of work by plaintiff’s own employees, and
  (b) deter shippers from entering and/or delivering freight to the yard.
  “It will, if permitted to continue, result in shutting down the yards and in irreparable loss to the plaintiffs. The end objective of the picketing is to force Transport to comply with Local 100’s request that Transport employ six of its members and specifieally the six individual truck driver defendants who formerly did truck driving work in connection with the operation of Gest Street. The means to accomplish this objective as suggested by the picketing is to deter shippers from shipping across and drivers from driving across the picket line.
  “Necessarily, the discharging of Brotherhood employees of Transport is an objective of the picketing. The same is true with respect to the application of the contract between Transport and Brotherhood to the Gest Street operation and/or the prevention of seniority job bidding under the seniority provisions of their contract. The defendants (individual and Local 100) have and do assert the claimed right of the Teamster members to employment and in that sense assert a right of recognition.”
  The District Court properly recognized the general rule that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin picketing arising out of a labor dispute but that this rule is inapplicable where the parties may invoke the conciliatory procedures of the Railway Labor Act. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. L. & N. R. Co., 373 U.S. 33, 83 S.Ct. 1059, 10 L.Ed.2d 172 (1963); Southern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 119 U.S.App. D.C. 91, 337 F.2d 127 (1964). The District Court held that the special exception for Railway Labor Act cases was inapplicable here as it found that Motor Transport was not a “carrier” and that the pickets were not “employees” under the Act.
  The National Mediation Board first asserted jurisdiction over Motor Transport in 1958. At that time the International Brotherhood of Teamsters petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for a certification that the union was the bargaining agent for Motor Transport employees in Georgia. The N.L.R.B., as is its custom in cases where it appears that the N.M.B. may have jurisdiction, requested the N.M.B’s advice regarding possible coverage by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The N.M.B. conducted an extensive study and concluded that Motor Transport was a “carrier” under 45 U.S.C. § 151, First, and therefore subject to the Act. Thereafter the Teamsters voluntarily withdrew their petition.
  In 1967 and in 1969 the N.M.B. again asserted jurisdiction over Motor Transport. Pursuant to the 1969 assertion, the Brotherhood was certified as the collective bargaining agent for the “carrier’s” employees. Under the authority of this certification, the Brotherhood entered into a “systemwide” collective bargaining agreement with Motor Transport.
  We conclude that this is an appropriate situation to employ the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to obtain the views of the agency charged by Congress with the administration of the Act, the National Mediation Board.
  The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not determine whether a court or an administrative body ultimately shall be responsible for resolving an issue. Rather it is used to determine which tribunal shall make the initial determination. The doctrine permits courts to suspend the resolution of issues, which are originally cognizable in the courts, until such time as an administrative body, with special competence in the field, has an opportunity to present its views. United States v. Western Pac. RR. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956); Crain v. Blue Grass Stockyards Co., 399 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1968); 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 19.01 (1958). This concept was recently summarized in Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 91 S.Ct. 203, 27 L.Ed.2d 203 (1970), wherein the Court stated:
  “When there is a basis for judicial action, independent of agency proceedings, courts may route the threshold decision as to certain issues to the agency charged with primary responsibility for governmental supervision or control of the particular industry or activity involved.” 400 U.S. at 68, 91 S.Ct. at 208.
  Here we are calling upon the agency to interpret the statute upon which its jurisdiction rests. This differs from the traditional primary jurisdiction ease wherein complex issues of fact or the interpretation of administrative rules are involved. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952). However, where the interpretation of specific statutory provisions involve consideration of broad national policies, courts have not hesitated to defer questions of jurisdiction to insure the most thoughtful resolution. Locust Cartage . Co., Inc. v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 430 F.2d 334 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 365, 27 L.Ed.2d 383 (1970); J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966). In J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, Judge Brown wrote:
  “At the outset we recognize that this is a new application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. But considering the broad aim of this device and the consequent flexibility of it there is really nothing startling about submitting to an agency for initial decision the question of its own jurisdiction.
  “That that question of law happens to be one of jurisdiction does not force a different result. To the contrary, justification for judicial deferral of the jurisdictional question for initial resolution by an agency is even stronger than for a non-jurisdietional question. This is demonstrated by the many cases upholding the jurisdiction of administrative agencies to determine the coverage of their respective statutes and barring all attempts through judicial proceedings to avoid such determination.” (Footnotes omitted.) 367 F.2d at 111-112.
  We believe deference to the N. M.B. is appropriate in this case because far reaching considerations of national policy underlie the legal issues. The District Court decided that the “trucking service” exception to the Act’s definition of “carrier” precludes Motor Transport’s qualification. Research into the meaning of this exception indicates an inadequacy of recorded indicia of Congressional intent. By availing ourselves of the Board’s experience, we believe the groundwork will be laid for, “ . a more informed and precise determination by the Court of the scope and meaning of the statute. . . . ” Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 356 U.S. 481, 498-499, 78 S.Ct. 851, 862, 2 L.Ed.2d 926 (1958).
  Another area in which the views of the National Mediation Board will be necessary .is the applicability of the Act to a situation where those individuals picketing the Yard have never been directly employed by any company presently operating at the Gest Street Yards. Here too we believe an expression of the Board’s position will facilitate the ultimate resolution of the controversy.
  The injunction heretofore issued on April 12, 1973, by this court will remain in effect until the issuance of the mandate in this case and thereupon will be dissolved. Should any party desire further injunctive-relief pendente lite, application should be made before the District Court. See, Brawner Building, Inc. v. Shehyn, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 442 F. 2d 847 (1971).
  The decision of the District Court is vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs are taxed. Each party will bear his or its own costs.
  Honorable Bernard T. Moynalian, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
  . Local 100 is affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
  . Signs carried during the initial stages of the picketing read:
  “Central of Georgia Div. of Southern R.R. Refuses to Hire Members of Teamsters Local 100.”
  . The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.O. § 101 et seq.
  . 45 U.S.O. § 151, First, defines “carrier” as:
  “First. The term ‘carrier’ includes any express company, sleeping-car company, carrier by railroad, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, and any company which is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by or under common control with any carrier by railroad and which operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service (other than trucking service) in connection with the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of property transported by railroad.....”
  . 45 U.S.O. jj 151, Fifth, defines “employee” as:
  “Fifth. The term ‘employee’ as used herein includes every person in the service of a carrier (subject to its continuing authority to supervise anti direct the manner of rendition of his service) who performs any work defined as that of an employee or subordinate official in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, . . .”
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.