opinion: Richard WALLACH, Appellant, v. CITY OF PAGEDALE, MISSOURI et al., Appellees.
  No. 18078.
  United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
  April 1, 1966.
  Richard Wallach, pro se.
  Lon Hocker, of Hocker, Goodwin & MacGreevy and Henry S. Stolar, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee Globe-Democrat Pub. Co.
  Before VAN OOSTERHOUT and MEHAFFY, Circuit Judges, and HARPER, District Judge.
  PER CURIAM.
  Plaintiff, Richard Wallach, brought an individual action against the City of Pagedale, Missouri, its mayor, collector-marshal, building commissioner, city clerk, an alderman, and the Globe-Democrat Publishing Company. The District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). We affirm.
  There is no doubt that the complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a) as it does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The complaint is confusing, ambiguous, redundant, vague, and, in some respects, unintelligible. It is also highly argumentative. It is more in the form of a brief and is replete with citations of authorities and quotations of extracts from opinions and texts, and, in one instance, from a speech by the late Mr. Justice Holmes.
  Since plaintiff pleads pro se, we construe his pleadings with the utmost liberality and without regard for technicalities. Even so, defendants are entitled to know the extent of the claim against them as well as its precise nature. United States v. Classified Parking System, 213 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1954).
  Also, plaintiff has not furnished a record in compliance with the court rules, but we have overlooked this and have carefully scrutinized the original files of the District Court. We are convinced that even if the District Court had not dismissed the complaint for noncompliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), it would have been compelled to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action against any of the defendants within the jurisdiction of the federal court.
  The crux of plaintiff’s complaint seems to be that defendants conspired against him to destroy his credit and means of livelihood by refusing to permit the Richard Wallach Metals and Supply Company, a Missouri corporation, to operate a scrap iron business at 6820 East-on Avenue, Pagedale, Missouri.
  Plaintiff asserts that his business is interstate in nature and that the municipality only has authority to license those operations which are “appropriate to local concern”; that his livelihood was impaired by the arrest of an employee for traffic violation, thus interfering with an interstate shipment; and that while plaintiff was on the witness stand in the Pagedale police court, the police judge, who is not a defendant, allegedly suggested that plaintiff pay $2,000.00 for a four-year license to operate and upon such payment the charges of operating without a license would be dropped. Also, because he was unable to pay, plaintiff was sentenced to serve ninety days and pay a fine of $100.00. It is asserted that this action carried the conspiracy into effect as it restricted plaintiff’s ability to borrow money and was done with intent to drive him from Pagedale, and to destroy his business at 6820 East-on Avenue.
  The complaint against the Globe-Democrat Publishing Company is based upon publication of the city’s action in denying plaintiff a license to operate some five weeks before plaintiff himself was notified of said rejection.
  From all the pleadings we glean that plaintiff is attempting to bring a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1985.
  The salient allegations mentioned above lead us to conclude that the pleadings, even given the most liberal construction, do not state a cause of action against any of the defendants within the jurisdiction of the federal court.
  The complaint does not state a cause of action against the city because a municipality is not within the purview of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963); Spampinato v. City of New York, 311 F.2d 439 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 980, 83 S.Ct. 1115, 10 L.Ed.2d 144 (1963).
  Neither is a cause of action stated against Globe-Democrat Publishing Company as there is no allegation that the Publishing Company did anything other than publish some decision of a municipal board before plaintiff was officially notified of the decision. If the Publishing Company committed any libel, the federal court is without jurisdiction as no diversity of citizenship exists.
  The remaining defendants, officers of the defendant municipality, were merely enforcing a zoning ordinance which plaintiff thinks should not apply to his business because his scrap metal operations involved interstate commerce. Engagement in business involving interstate commerce does not excuse noncompliance with valid zoning ordinances. Our recent opinion in Mosher v. Bierne, 357 F.2d 638 (March 24, 1966), demonstrates that no civil rights action exists by reason of the enforcement of a lawful ordinance.
  In addition, we mention that plaintiff brought this suit individually, while the corporation is the entity denied license to operate the business at the Easton Avenue address.
  The judgment of the District Court is affirmed without prejudice to plaintiff’s rights, if any, to institute any proper action.
  . Rule 8(a) : “A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.”
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.