opinion: FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK, Defendant, Appellant, v. Francisco GONZALEZ Martinez, Plaintiff, Appellee.
  No. 5749.
  United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
  Heard Feb. 13, 1961.
  Decided Aug. 25, 1961.
  Wallace Gonzalez Oliver, New York City, with whom Edward M. Borges and McConnell, Valdes & Kelley, San Juan, P. R., were on brief, for appellant.
  A. Rivera Valdivieso, Hato Rey, P. R., with whom Raul A. Feliciano, Rio Piedras, P. R., was on brief, for appellee.
  Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge and MAGRUDER and HARTIGAN, Circuit Judges.
  Sitting by designation,
  MAGRUDER, Circuit Judge.
  The complaint in this case was originally filed in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part, on November 30, 1959. It was timely removed to the federal district' court in San Juan, which had jurisdiction of the cause of action pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 632.
  On June 27, 1958, plaintiff borrowed $384.00 from the defendant First National City Bank of New York at its branch office in Santurce in the Municipality of San Juan, Puerto Rico. He signed a note in which he agreed to repay the loan in twelve monthly installments of $32.00 each, payable on the 27th of each month. Plaintiff’s wife, Alfredo Caceres, and Felix Tollinche signed as co-makers on the note. Prior to February, 1959, the plaintiff, except in one instance, had not made the payments by the due date. The bank did not notify the co-makers of those delays, however, but it had assessed “late charges” of $1.60 for the August, 1958, payment overdue. The February, 1959, payment was not made when due, and on March 24, 1959, defendant wrote to the plaintiff requesting payment and sent copies of the letter to the co-makers. In early April plaintiff purchased a postal money order for $65.60 which he mailed to the defendant in payment of both the February and March installments, as well as payment for the “late charges” assessed for the delinquency of February. This postal money order was collected by the bank, but because of an error in the posting it was not credited to the plaintiff’s account and the bank continued to press for payment. The plaintiff as well as the co-makers were approached. According to one of the latter, Alfredo Caceres, “the National City Bank officers * * * called to my office a few times. They wrote me a few letters, and they sent people around to my house.” The plaintiff showed the stub of the postal money order to the officers of the bank, but they did not believe what he said and requested that he produce a copy of the money order. It was necessary for him to send to Washington for the copy, which eventually arrived in San Juan at the beginning of September. But in the meantime the plaintiff, on July 3, 1959, had paid all that the defendant demanded and closed out the loan. When the bank officials saw the copy of the money order, they repaid plaintiff the sum of $65.60, and the surcharges they had collected.
  Alfredo Caceres testified that before the incident with the bank he had intended to make the plaintiff the general manager of a branch of his business which he was opening in St. Thomas, but that he delayed this venture some three months awaiting the outcome of the trouble with the bank. In addition, there was testimony to the effect that persons other than the co-makers had known of the plaintiff’s difficulties with the bank. The district court found as a fact that plaintiff “undoubtedly suffered damage to his reputation and he also suffered mental anguish which were proximately caused by defendant’s acts and conduct. Plaintiff’s damages on said account are reasonably worth the amount of $2,000.00.” The court did not find that the plaintiff had suffered any pecuniary loss because of the three-month delay in opening the St. Thomas place of business. The court also found as a fact that defendant’s failure to post the credit to the plaintiff’s account was negligence on its part. As conclusions of law, the court stated that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in the amount of $2,000, for the reason that defendant was liable “for the damages suffered by plaintiff and caused by the former’s acts and omissions, pursuant to Title 31 LPRA, Sec. 5141.”
  The jurisdiction of the federal district court for Puerto Rico was rested upon 12 U.S.C.A. § 632, and although Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, may not be applicable, still it is clear that the federal district court in Puerto Rico must apply to this ease the law of Puerto Rico as declared by its insular courts, unless the law so declared is “inescapably wrong” or “patently erroneous.” See De Castro v. Board of Commissioners, 1944, 322 U.S. 451, 459, 64 S.Ct. 1121, 88 L.Ed. 1384.
  Puerto Rico had on its books § 1802 of its Civil Code of 1930, now found in 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141, the generalization which read as follows: “A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.” The Supreme Cout of Puerto Rico has given great deference to this generalization in the Code. For instance, in Rivera v. Central Pasto Viejo, Inc., 44 P.R.R. 236 (1932), the court said, at p. 266:
  “The provisions of our Civil Code are the source of our law with respect to negligence. We are not bound by the common law, nor by the construction given by the courts in the various States of the Union to statutes in force in their respective jurisdictions. It is natural that we should be governed by our own statutes and that we should adopt such principles as arise from their construction and which are in harmony with our civil law. The American jurisprudence is varied and abundant, and constitutes a source of useful information for the judicial mind.”
  See also Diaz v. San Juan Light & Transit Co., 17 P.R.R. 64, 69 (1911).
  Appellant’s main contention seems to be that the trial court erred in failing to treat the cause of action as one for libel and slander under 32 L.P.R.A. § 3141 et seq., and that, so considered, the defamatory statements were conditionally privileged and malice was not to be presumed. We do not think that this point is well taken, since the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has many times held that § 1802 of its Civil Code not only goes beyond the common law of negligence but also may overlap other statutory provisions. See, for example, Rivera v. Fagot, 79 P.R.R. 524 (1956); Hernandez v. Fournier, 80 P.R.R. 94 (1957). Also, in construing § 1802 literally, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that “[t]he right to claim damages in ex delicto actions, for humiliations and mental sufferings, independent of the existence of physical damages, has been definitely established' in this jurisdiction.” Muriel v. Suazo, 72 P.R.R. 348, 352 (1951). To the same effect, see Rios v. National City Bank, 51 P.R.R. 473 (1937); Rivera v. Rossi, 64 P.R.R. 683 (1945). In the latter case, at p. 689 the court said:
  “Section 1802, which in this jurisdiction is the source of the action for damages caused by fault or negligence, Mendez v. Serracante, 53 P.R.R. 807, makes no distinction between physical damages and damages to the feelings. It is inferred from its language and it is so held by the decisions and the text writers, that in order to be compensable the damage must be the natural consequence of the fault or negligence of the person from whom recovery is sought or of the persons for whom the latter is responsible. Civil Code, § 1803. In those cases where we have awarded compensation for mental suffering where physical injury also has been caused, the damages to the feelings have been the natural consequence of the physical injury, and since the latter is in turn the natural consequence of the fault or negligence of the defendant or of the person for whom he is responsible, the award for mental suffering and anguish in those cases has been but the logical application of the general principle of law involved in § 1802. But, must the mental suffering and anguish be subordinated to the existence of a physical injury? If the damages to the feelings have really existed and they are the natural consequence of the wrongful or negligent act of the defendant, or as it is said in the common law, if the proximate cause of the injury is the fault or negligence of the defendant, what logical reason, what principle of justice can prevent compensation? Indeed, is not a humiliation, such as the one suffered by the plaintiff in this case, more important than many physical injuries for which compensation is usually and unhesitatingly awarded ? And if § 1802 makes no distinction between the damages to the feelings and the physical damages for the purpose of compensation, why should we make any distinction?”.
  Certainly, mental or emotional disturbances are compensable by more than nominal damages, as was held in Rios v. National City Bank, supra, 51 P.R.R. 473 (1937), and Maymi v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 63 P.R.R. 515 (1944).
  Although $2,000 damages was perhaps more than we would have granted had we been the trier of the facts, nevertheless we are not prepared to say that the district court was “clearly erroneous” in its finding of damages in that amount. We do not forget that in Rios v. National City Bank, supra, 51 P.R.R. 473 (1937), the appellate court reduced the damages from $2,000, as found by the district judge, to $250. But in that case the court noted that, upon discovery of its error, the bank did all it could to mitigate damages and that in fact the plaintiff’s good name and reputation had not been adversely affected.
  A judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the District Court.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.