opinion: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. LOCAL 18, BRICKLAYERS, MASONS AND PLASTERERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Respondent.
  No. 71-1228.
  United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
  Argued Nov. 29, 1971.
  Decided Dec. 22, 1971.
  Ronald I. Tish, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C. (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel,
  Allison W. Brown, Jr., Attys., N.L.R.B., on the brief), for petitioner.
  John A. Craner, Craner & Brennan, Elizabeth, N. J. (Ronald J. Nelson, Elizabeth, N. J., on the brief), for respondent.
  Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, and KAL-ODNER and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
  OPINION OF THE COURT
  PER CURIAM:
  This case is before us on the application of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) for enforcement of its supplemental order issued against Local 18, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers’ International Union of America, AFL-CIO (the respondent Union). The matter was before this court heretofore. Local 18 Bricklayers, etc. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1309 (1969). In that case we entered judgment enforcing the Board’s order directing the respondent Union to cease its discriminatory practices toward the charging party Jesse Bulle and to make him whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a result of the discrimination practiced against him. Following entry of that judgment the parties were unable to agree upon the amount of back pay due Mr. Bulle under the terms of the Board’s order. The Regional Director then issued a back pay specification and notice of hearing. After several delays a hearing was held on March 31 and May 4-7, 1970. Following the hearing the Trial Examiner issued a supplemental decision awarding a specific amount of back pay to Mr. Bulle. The Board on January 27, 1971 affirmed the Trial Examiner’s findings and conclusions (with a slight and for present purposes immaterial modification) and ordered the respondent Union to pay Mr. Bulle a total of $24,728.71 in back pay.
  The respondent Union cannot in this case contest the propriety of the Board’s finding an unfair labor practice or that of its decision that a back pay order was an appropriate remedy. Both of those matters were decided in the Board’s favor when the case was last before us. The Union argues however, that the Board improperly calculated back pay when it failed to take into account the charging party’s failure to mitigate damage by availing himself of employment opportunities which were open to him, his failure to produce written records of employment, and his failure to accept a settlement offer made by the Union. With respect to the availability of employment and to Mr. Bulle’s efforts to seek other employment the Board resolved credibility issues in favor of the charging party. His testimony was not clearly incredible. The settlement offer, which was made at a hearing on August 14, 1967, was one to have Mr. Bulle referred out for employment without discrimination by the respondent Union’s hiring hall, or alternatively to get him a membership in another, less desirable local. The alternative offer was, however, conditioned upon his relinquishing the remedy of back pay for past discrimination and the protection of a Board order prohibiting future discrimination. The Board’s conclusion that Mr. Bulle need not have mitigated future damages by giving up both a claim for past damages and the prospective protection of a Board order is amply supported by the record and by common sense. There is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Trial Examiner which the Board affirmed. We cannot disturb these findings. NLRB v. Bab-cock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112, 76 S.Ct. 679, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1950). The appropriateness, in the circumstances, of the back pay order was for the Board to determine in the exercise of its informed discretion. NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Co., 396 U.S. 258, 90 S.Ct. 417, 24 L.Ed.2d 405 (1961).
  The supplemental order of the National Labor Relations Board will be enforced.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.