opinion: LANDRUM MILLS HOTEL CORP. et al., Defendants, Appellants, v. Misha FERHATOVIC a/k/a Misha Ferman, Plaintiff, Appellee.
  No. 6068.
  United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
  May 8, 1963.
  Andrew B. Goodspeed, Boston, Mass., F. Fernandez Cuyar, San Juan, P. R., on the brief, for appellants.
  Samuel J. Davidson, Jersey City, N. J., for appellee.
  Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
  HARTIGAN, Circuit Judge.
  This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico following a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000 in an action involving defendant hotel corporation’s alleged negligence in connection with the operation and maintenance of its beach and bathing facilities.
  Defendants urge that (1) the trial judge erred in allowing the case to go to the jury and in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendants and (2) in refusing to grant a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
  Plaintiff was a guest at the La Concha Hotel in Puerto Rico, operated by defendant, Landrum Mills Hotel Corp. He had arrived at the hotel a short time before the events at issue occurred. On August 12, 1959, plaintiff went to the hotel’s beach to go swimming. Upon finishing his swim and as he was about to leave the water, he was struck in the face by a surf board. The surf board was labeled “La Concha” and there was evidence that it was being used at the time by an employee of the hotel, but plaintiff makes no claim based on the employee relationship.
  Plaintiff’s theory of the case comes down essentially to the contention that defendants were negligent in (a) either allowing the use of surf boards in the area reserved for bathing or (b) in not providing more adequate supervision or safeguards in connection with use of surf boards.
  In a request for admission of facts, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants admitted that they had put up no warning signs or other devices to alert guests to the fact that surf boards were being used in the hotel’s bathing area. Defendants maintain that they had “beach employees in charge of activities therein, including the use of surfboard.” However, defendants offered no evidence to this effect.
  Although the question of negligence is a close one, we believe that the case properly was allowed to go to the jury and that there was no error in the trial judge’s refusal to direct a verdict for the defendants. As we have pointed out previously:
  “ * * * The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the ■contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of wit-messes, receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. * * * ” Roche v. New Hampshire Nat. Bank, 192 F.2d 203, 205 (1st Cir. 1951).
  In the instant case, there is no question that the surf board was the property of the hotel and, consequently, it can be fairly implied that the hotel having purchased it, could reasonably expect that it would be used in the water. This expectation, we believe, placed the hotel under a duty either to rigidly circumscribe the areas in which the surf board could be utilized or to take due measures to apprise guests — frequenting the area reserved for bathing — of the existence of the danger stemming from the use of surf boards. From all that appears in the record, defendants undertook neither of these steps. One of the means by which the hotel could have met this responsibility would have been to erect signs on the beach to alert the hotel’s bathing guests of the potential danger inherent in the presence of surf boards in its bathing area. The hotel admitted that it did not do so. As was stated by the Supreme Court in another context: “In this posture of the proofs, there is ample evidence for a jury to determine whether the procedure followed satisfied the standard to be expected from a prudent man in light of the hazard to be prevented.” Webb v. Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U.S. 512, 514, 77 S. Ct. 451, 1 L.Ed.2d 503 (1957). Consequently, we believe that a jury could reasonably conclude that the hotel breached its duty to plaintiff. Under all the circumstances, we agree with the trial judge that the “jury’s verdict * * * was no doubt based on their own appreciation of the facts proved to them at the trial and the logical inferences which they could consider as derived therefrom.”
  Judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the district court.
  . Plaintiff also joined as defendants Firemen’s Fund Insurance Company of New Fork and one Edwin Noel Cuevas.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.