opinion: Richard ALLEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. William H. BANNAN, Warden, State Prison of Southern Michigan, Respondent-Appellee.
  No. 15427.
  United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
  May 20, 1964.
  Richard Allen, in pro per.
  Frank J. Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski; SoL Gen., George E. Mason Asst. Atty- Gen Lansing) Mich„ for appeuee
  Before CECIL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and PECK, District Judge.
  HARRY PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
  This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The undisputed background facts may be summarized as follows:
  On morning of November 3 1957, fire occurred in a house in Grand Rapids mad resulting in the death of Qne of the inhabitants. That same day petitioner was taken into custody by the police and questioned concerning the fire. The next day petitioner consented to a polygraph test. This test indicated deception, and interrogation was resumed that evening. Further interrogation took place on November 5, and that afternoon petitioner admitted that he had set the fire. The next morning he was taken to the proseeuting attorney’s office where he dietated and signed a statement to that effect That aftemoon; November 6, petitioner was taken before a police magistrate.
  At his trial petitioner pleaded not guilty. During the trial his statements were admitted into evidence. The jury found petitioner guilty of murder and he was sentenced to life imprisonment,
  Petitioner’s application for leave to appeall to the Michigan Supreme Court was denied. The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari 364, U.S. 934, 81 S.Ct. 382, 5 L.Ed.2d 367, and a petition for rehearing, 365 U.S. 825, 81 S.Ct. 700, 5 L.Ed.2d 704. Subsequently, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. This was denied for failure to exhaust state remedies, and this Court affirmed in an unpublished order. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, vacated the judgment of this Court and remanded the case to the District Court for a hearing on the merits. 370 U.S. 725, 82 S.Ct. 1297, 8 L.Ed.2d 802.
  After a hearing the District Court again denied the petition for habeas corpus. The District Judge then issued a certificate of probable cause, and the ease is now before us.
  The District Court found that petitioner was arrested without a warrant on November 3, 1957, and not taken before a magistrate until November 6; that statements obtained from petitioner during this detention formed the basis of his conviction; and that petitioner was a mature man, familiar with police methods, and was not subjected to any excessive physical or psychological pressures during his detention.
  The District Court concluded that, under all the facts, the statements of petitioner made during this detention were voluntary, and therefore their admission into evidence did not violate the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  This appeal poses the question of the admissibility of a confession obtained during an unlawful detention. It is well established that in the federal courts such a confession is inadmissible, without even reaching the question of voluntariness. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479. The Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that this is a rule of evidence in the federal courts and not a constitutional limitation upon the state courts. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-601, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed; 469; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63, 72 S.Ct. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86.
  The Mallory rule is based on Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring that a federal prisoner be taken before a Commissioner “without unnecessary delay.” This holding has not been extended to proceedings in state courts upon any federal constitutional ground. In state court proceedings the test is whether the confessions were admitted in accordance with the standards of admissibility required of the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Essentially this is a question of whether the confession was voluntary. This issue must be determined from all the circumstances. Obviously the fact that the confession was obtained during an unlawful detention will be one of the considerations in determining voluntariness. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513; Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922; Culombe v. Connecticut, supra; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948. In the Culombe ease there is an exhaustive treatment of this entire subject by Justice Frankfurter.
  Federal due process has been held not to require arraignment in state courts within four days or an even longer period on penalty of exclusion of an interim confession. Gallegos v. Nebraska, supra; United States ex rel. Glinton v. Denno, 309 F.2d 543 (C.A.2), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 886, 9 L.Ed.2d 769; United States v. Sailer, 309 F.2d 541 (C.A.6), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835, 83 S.Ct. 1884, 10 L.Ed.2d 1057.
  The ultimate question to be determined on this appeal is whether or not petitioner’s confession was coerced in violation of the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying the standards set forth in Haynes v. Washington, supra, Lynumn v. Illinois, supra, and Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, we hold that the facts of this case establish no such violation. We concur with the District Judge that under the evidence here presented “the statements were not obtained by physical force or subtle psychological pressure, but were given freely, that their use in evidence did not offend due process.”
  Petitioner relies upon the Michigan statute, Section 764.13 of the Compiled Laws of Michigan, M.S.A. § 28.872, which, like Section 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires arraignment “without unnecessary delay.” The District Judge affirmatively found that there was an unreasonable delay in taking petitioner before a magistrate, in violation of this statute. However, as held in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522, a delay in arraignment in violation of a state statute does not make a confession secured during such period of illegal detention necessarily inadmissible in a prosecution in state courts.
  Further reliance is placed by petitioner upon the case of People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738, which appears to be the first Michigan case to hold a confession invalid at least partly because of failure of prompt arraignment. This decision traveled under state law a path parallel to that of Mallory and McNabb under federal law. In addition to the elapse of five days between arrest and arraignment, the Hamilton case involved a number of facts not present in the case at bar, including a foreigner with a language difficulty, a finding of denial of the right to see his attorney, an appendectomy ten days before the crime, illness during questioning and at least the possibility of physical abuse. Under all these facts the Michigan court found that the admission in evidence of the confession obtained under these circumstances violated the above-cited Michigan statute and deprived the prisoner of due process under the Constitution of Michigan. Assuming that by the Hamilton decision the Supreme Court of Michigan has adopted the McNabb and Mallory rule in state proceedings, this does not affect or alter the rule stated above that, in a federal habeas corpus case questioning the admissibility of a confession made in a state court proceeding during a period of illegal detention prior to arraignment, the test is whether the confession was voluntary or was coerced in violation of the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  It is to be emphasized that petitioner’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan from the jury’s verdict of guilty was denied by that Court on February 18, 1959, which was shortly prior to the decision of that Court in the Hamilton case.
  Petitioner further complains of various other alleged irregularities in his trial in the state court, including a contention that the corpus delicti was not established, that the true cause of the death of the decedent was “suppressed,” that three lines of his statement were deleted by the trial judge and that his court-appointed attorney was incompetent. As said by this Court in Wooten v. Bomar, 267 F.2d 900, 901 (C.A.6):
  “There seems to be a great misapprehension among prisoners in State penal institutions that a writ of habeas corpus in Federal Courts gives them an opportunity to have a general review of their original trials. This writ, powerful and important as it is, has its limitations. It is available to correct the denial of fundamental constitutional rights, but it may not be used to correct mere irregularities or errors of law. In other words, it may not be used as a substitute for error proceedings. This has been determined many times in this Court.”
  We find no merit in any of the contentions of petitioner.
  The judgment of the District Court denying writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
  . See discussion of Hamilton case in Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, 367 U.S. at 600, n. 53, 81 S.Ct. 1860; People v. McCager, 367 Mack. 116, 119, 116 N.W.2d 205; and People v. Walker, 371 Mach. 599, 124 N.W.2d 761.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.