opinion: Vladimir DOWHY v. HARVEY B. MOYER, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellant, v. EASTERN ENGINEERING COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant, Appellant.
  No. 13168.
  United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
  Argued May 10, 1960.
  Decided May 16, 1960.
  Joseph X. Heincer, Robert C. Kitchen, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief, for Eastern Engineering Company, third-party defendant-appellant.
  Thomas E. Comber, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa. (Perry S. Bechtle, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for Harvey B. Moyer, Inc., defendant and third-party plaintiff-appellant.
  Milton M. Borowsky, Philadelphia, Pa. (Abraham E. Freedman, Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee, Vladimir Dowhy.
  Before GOODRICH, MeLAUGHLIN and STALEY, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM.
  This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for direction of satisfaction of judgment. In the underlying action for damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff recovered a verdict of $25,000 against the original defendant and, on the third-party action, the original defendant recovered a verdict against the plaintiff’s employer, the third-party defendant. The plaintiff had already received $6,-782.47 in compensation payments, but the entire liability for compensation has not as yet been determined. Judgment has been entered against the original defendant but not against the third-party defendant inasmuch as the amount of its liability is still unliquidated.
  In this action the original defendant has paid into the registry of the court the amount of $18,643.71, representing $25,-000, less the amount paid by the employer as compensation together with costs and interest, and has moved the district court to have the judgment marked satisfied. In support of this proposition, the defendant relies upon Maio v. Fahs, 1940, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105, which interpreted the 1915 Compensation Act; however, as the district court noted, the Workmen’s Compensation Act has since been amended, Act of May 29, 1951, P.L. 507, 77 Purdon’s Pa.Stat.Ann. § 671. It is perfectly clear that by virtue of the amendment, the employee is entitled to a pro rata counsel fee measured by the amount of the employer’s liability to him for compensation whether the compensation has been paid or not. Soliday v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 1958, 187 Pa. Super. 44, 142 A.2d 425, allocatur refused. The statute makes no exception for the case where the employer has been found liable for contribution as a joint tortfeasor. Appellant would have us construe the statute to require an innocent employer to pay counsel fees but allow one who was at fault to recover in full.
  In effect, this is an attempt on the part of the original defendant to utilize the right of subrogation which is granted by statute to the employer. But the statute expressly provides that the employer is not only liable for compensation payments but also for a proportionate share of counsel fees. Even assuming that the original defendant (the nonemployer) can utilize the employer’s right of subrogation in satisfaction of its claim for contribution against the employer as a joint tortfeasor, as we have noted above, the statutory amount that the employer can recover under this right is the amount of payments of compensation less a pro rata share of counsel fees. All of this was thoroughly analyzed and covered in the opinion of Judge Kirkpatrick in the district court, 184 F.Supp. 31, with which we fully agree.
  The order will be affirmed.
  . Under the Pennsylvania law, which is applicable here, the original defendant can recover against an employer who was a joint tortfeasor with him a judgment for contribution, but not in excess of the employer’s liability to the plaintiff-employee for compensation.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.