opinion: Bernard SAMOFF, Regional Director of the Fourth Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on Behalf of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. WILLIAMSPORT BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO, Appellant in 19204, and Local 812, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Appeal of LOCAL 812, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, in 19205.
  Nos. 19204, 19205.
  United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
  Argued May 4, 1971.
  Decided Oct. 18, 1971.
  Michael Brodie, Pechner, Sacks, Cantor & Dorfman, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.
  Charles Both, N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for appellee.
  Before KALODNER, VAN DUSEN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
  OPINION OF THE COURT
  KALODNER, Circuit Judge.
  The District Court, by Order dated May 25, 1970, issued a temporary injunction against the appellant unions in proceedings instituted by the appellee Regional Director of the NLRB, pursuant to § 10 (Z) of the National Labor Relations Board Act, as amended. The temporary injunction restrained the appellants from engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(b) (4)(i), (ii) (B) of the Act, which prohibits certain types of secondary boycotts until final adjudication by the National Labor Relations Board of pending charges relating to such practices.
  The appellants have appealed from the District Court’s Order granting injunc-tive relief. They have also appealed from an Order of the District Court denying their application “to compel” the Regional Director to answer certain questions which he refused to answer during the taking of his deposition prior to the hearing on the injunction petition. The appellants contend that the denial of their application was an “unreasonable restriction” of discovery procedures available to them under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which so impeded their defense in the injunction action as to constitute prejudicial error.
  The stated contention presents the critical question whether the District Court, under the prevailing circumstances, committed prejudicial error in refusing to compel the Regional Director to answer certain questions during the prehearing deposition.
  Relevant to the resolution of this issue are these undisputed facts:
  The Regional Director filed his petition for temporary injunction on April 9, 1970. On April 10, 1970, the District Court issued an order directing, inter alia, the appellants to answer the petition and to appear before the Court on April 24, 1970 to show cause why they should not be enjoined as requested in the petition.
  On April 17, 1970, the appellants filed a Notice for the taking of the oral deposition of the Regional Director on April 21, 1970, pursuant to Rule 26 F.R.Civ.P. The Notice requested the production of “such documents in his file as he believes support the allegation of the Petition that the Petitioner has reasonable cause to believe that Respondents have violated” § 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act. No subpoena was issued to compel his appearance, as provided for by Rule 45(a) and (b) F.R. Civ.P. The Director appeared for the taking of his deposition. He, however, refused to answer certain questions, which appellants contend were asked “for the purpose of discovering both the facts on which the Regional Director intended to rely and such additional facts, known to him, as might have aided the Union in its defense. * * * ”
  On April 23, 1970, the appellants filed with the District Court an “Application For Order Under Rule 37(a) F.R.C.P.” which asked the Court “to compel” the Director to answer the questions he had refused to answer. Oral argument was heard on this Application on April 24, 1970, and the Court reserved decision.
  The injunction hearing proceeded on April 24, 1970, when the Director presented the testimony of his witnesses in support of his injunction petition. The Director’s witnesses were subjected to extensive cross-examination by the appellants. The hearing was then continued to May 1, 1970, to permit the appellants three days to prepare their defense in light of the testimony presented by the Director. The appellants presented their testimony on May 1, 1970. On May 24, 1970, the District Court, as earlier stated, filed an Order granting the temporary injunction, and the Order denying the appellants’ Application “to compel” the Director to answer the questions which he had refused to answer when his deposition was taken on April 21, 1970.
  The District Court, in its Opinion at 313 F.Supp. 1105 (M.D.Pa.1970), after ruling that discovery was available to respondents in a § 10 (l) temporary injunction proceeding, and that the Director did not contend to the contrary, said (P. 1109):
  “ -» * * The petition filed by the government had sufficient clarity upon which respondents could have prepared an adequate defense. Respondents heard all of the petitioner’s testimony and their counsel fully cross-examined petitioner’s witnesses three days before they were obliged to defend the case. In consequence, the court concludes that sufficient discovery had been made available to the respondents, and considering the necessity of expeditious proceedings, no further discovery was necessary. * -x- *»
  On review of the record we are of the opinion that the District Court, under the prevailing circumstances, acted within the scope of its permissible discretion in denying the appellants’ Application to compel the Director to answer the questions he refused to answer when his deposition was taken.
  As we recently said:
  “The injunctive proceedings allowed by Section 10(1) are an attempt by the National Labor Relations Act to provide an expeditious remedy to prevent a party from obtaining an unlawful result before the Board can consider the legality of the action in its ordinary course of business.” Terminal Freight Cooperative Association and Terminal Freight Handling Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 447 F.2d 1099, 1102 (decided August 30, 1971).
  The scheme of Section 10(1) would be thwarted and frustrated if a District Court, in such a proceeding, should be stripped of its general right to exercise its discretion with respect to the administration of the discovery rules.
  There remains this to be said with respect to the appeals from the District Court’s Order granting the temporary injunction.
  The scope of our review as to these appeals is limited to two considerations :
  (1) Was the District Court clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a) F.R.Civ. P., 28 U.S.C.A., in its finding that the Regional Director had reasonable cause to believe that the appellant unions had engaged in unfair labor practice or practices ?; and
  (2) Did the District Court abuse its judicial discretion in issuing the temporary injunction?
  On review of the record we cannot say that the District Court was “clearly erroneous” in its fact-finding that there was “reasonable cause” to believe that the appellant unions were engaged in acts and conduct in violation of § 8(b)(4) (i), (ii)(B). Nor can we say that the District Court abused its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction in its Order of May 25, 1970. We note, parenthetically, that the appellants have not on their appeal from the stated Order attacked the District Court’s findings of fact set forth in its Opinion.
  For the reasons stated, the Orders of the District Court, entered May 25, 1970, will be affirmed.
  . 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(1).
  . 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (i), (ii) (B).
  . The Director here says that his refusal to answer certain questions was premised on the grounds “that the questions were improper in that they were addressed to matters relating to the investigation conducted by the Director’s office, internal communications of Agency personnel, inquired into the mental process of the Director, and were irrelevant and immaterial and requested disclosure of privileged information.”
  . Cuneo v. Local No. 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 306 F.2d 394, 397 (3rd Cir. 1962).
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.