Connie L. BAKER, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee.
No. 91-1167.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted July 29, 1991.
Decided Jan. 29, 1992.
Rick Spencer, Mountain Home, Ark., for appellant.
William Cromwell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Fort Smith, Ark., Gayla Fuller, Karen Sharp, and Pamela Wood, Regional Counsel, U.S. Dept, of Health and Human Services, Dallas, Tex., for appellee.
Before BEAM, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Connie L. Baker appeals the district court’s order affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381a. Baker argues that there is not substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the Secretary’s decision. We affirm.
I.
Baker is 42 years old and has a seventh grade education. In 1969, after working as a seamstress for three years, she was involved in an automobile accident, sustaining a broken hip and pelvis and numerous lacerations on her back and left foot. Since then, she has raised a family and done housework, but otherwise has worked only sporadically as a water meter reader, grocery store clerk, and assembly line worker in a fiberglass boat factory. She has not held a job since 1984.
Baker applied for SSI benefits, claiming that she was disabled as of July 1, 1987 by scoliosis and residual back problems from the 1969 auto accident, and by a mental impairment. The Secretary denied her application both initially and on reconsideration. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Baker had a severe combination of impairments, but that these were not presumptively disabling. The AU found that Baker retained the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of medium work, including her past relevant work as a grocery store clerk, meter reader, and fiberglass worker in a boat plant. Therefore, she was not disabled.
The Appeals Council reversed and remanded for a new hearing, concluding that the AU had not properly considered Baker’s allegations of pain as required by Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1984). A second AU then ordered a psychological examination and conducted a second hearing.
The second AU concluded that the medical evidence did not support Baker’s stated inability to stand more than fifteen or twenty minutes at a time, to sit for more than thirty or forty minutes at a time, or to lift or bend; that Baker’s testimony regarding her pain and functional limitations was not credible; that even taking her subjective complaints of pain into account, her injuries did not physically impair her to the extent required by the SSI regulations; and that, while Baker’s IQ scores were below normal, the psychological examinations revealed no mental retardation or other significant psychiatric disorders. Based upon these findings, the second AU concluded, as had the first, that Baker retained the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of medium work, including her prior work, and therefore was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Baker’s request for further review, and she commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the administrative record contained substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision. This appeal followed.
II.
This court must affirm if substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the Secretary’s decision. Substantial evidence is “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence.” Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir.1989), quoting Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). We must search the record for evidence contradicting the Secretary’s decision and give that evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support is substantial. Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir.1991).
To be eligible for SSI benefits, Baker must prove that she is disabled, which is defined as “the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (1991). Given her work and medical history, Baker must show that her severe combination of impairments prevents her from doing her past work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.-920(e). Thus, we must affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s finding that Baker has the residual functional capacity to perform her past work. We conclude that there is.
Both ALJs found that Baker can perform the full range of medium work. By her own admission, none of Baker’s past jobs ever required her to lift more than ten pounds. Thus, they are properly classified as either light or sedentary work. The medical evidence showed that her only discernible physical impairments are a small degree of lumbar rotoscoliosis and some residual effects of her 1969 auto accident, namely, some scarring on her back and left foot and some muscle atrophy in her lower back. The consulting psychiatrist opined that she has suffered some moderate impairment of her ability to make occupational adjustments, but has a good ability to adjust to jobs that do not involve complex instructions. This evidence, combined with the physician’s assessment of her functional capabilities, adequately support the ALJs’ findings that she can perform her past jobs.
There is also substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Baker’s allegations of pain and pain-related functional limitations are not credible. Under this court’s decision in Polaski v. Heckler, an AU must look at five factors when determining the credibility of the claimant’s subjective allegations of pain: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain; (3) aggravating and precipitating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; and (5) functional restrictions. 739 F.2d at 1321-22. An AU who determines that the claimant’s testimony as to pain is not credible must make specific findings explaining that conclusion. Ghant v. Bowen, 930 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir.1991).
In this case, the AU fully considered Baker’s allegations of pain and made the requisite findings explaining his conclusion that they were not credible. The AU did not dispute that Baker is in some pain, but “[t]he question is not whether [Baker] suffers any pain; it is whether she is fully credible when she claims that her back hurts so much that it prevents her from engaging in her prior work.” Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 883 (8th Cir.1987). The AU found that Baker’s “virtual lack of medical treatment for the past 15 years, her very limited use of even over the counter analgesics, her poor work record, her daily activities and other inconsistencies in the records [render] the claimant’s testimony regarding her pain and functional limitations ... not very credible.” After careful review, we conclude that the record supports these findings, and they provide sufficient reason for discrediting Baker’s testimony about pain. See Dixon v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 237 (8th Cir.1990).
We conclude, in light of a record in which the medical evidence is scant and the claimant’s testimony about her pain and functioning is fraught with inconsistencies, that the above findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and justify the Secretary’s decision that Baker is capable of performing her prior work and therefore is not disabled. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259-60 (8th Cir.1991).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. The Hon. H. Franklin Waters, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. Chief Judge Waters' order adopted the report and recommendations of the Hon. Beverly R. Stites, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
. A claimant must show that he or she has severe impairment to qualify for SSI benefits. A "severe” impairment is one “which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities....” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1991). If a claimant’s severe impairment is part of or medically equivalent to those found on the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (1991), he or she is presumptively disabled. If not, the Secretary then looks at the claimant’s residual functional capacity to determine whether or not he or she is disabled.
. Baker does not challenge the ALJ’s decision to include all these jobs as past relevant work. We disagree with the dissent’s assertion that, under the regulations, a job must have constituted substantial gainful activity to be considered past relevant work. See Taylor v. Sullivan, 951 F.2d 878 (8th Cir.1991).
. Medium work is defined as requiring "lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).
. Light work is defined as requiring “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds ... [and] a good deal of walking or standing...." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Sedentary work is defined as requiring "lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers and small tools ... [with a] certain amount of walking and standing often necessary.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
We disagree with the dissent’s assertion that the AU classified Baker’s past work as medium work. In addition to finding that Baker can perform medium work, both ALJs found only that her prior work "did not require the performance of work related activities precluded by the [medium work] limitation,” not that the prior work was in fact medium work. The regulations expressly provide that "[i]f someone can do medium work, we determine that he or she can also do light and sedentary work,” § 404.1567(c).