opinion: WASHINGTON, MAYOR OF WASHINGTON, D. C., et al. v. DAVIS et al.
  No. 74-1492.
  Argued March 1, 1976
  Decided June 7, 1976
  White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blacicmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which Stewart, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 252. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 256.
  David P. Sutton argued the cause for petitioners. With him. on the briefs were C. Francis Murphy, Louis P. Robbins, and Richard W. Barton.
  Richard B. Sobol argued the cause for respondents Harley et al. With him on the briefs were George Cooper, Richard T. Seymour, Marian Wright Edelman, Michael B. Trister, and Ralph J. Temple. Mark L. Evans argued the cause for the Commissioners of the United States Civil Service Commission as respondents under this Court’s Rule 21 (4). With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Ronald R. Glancz, and Harry R. Silver.
  R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr., and Susan A. Cahoon filed a brief for the Executive Committee of the Division of Industrial-Organizational Psychology (Div. 14) of the American Psychological Assn, as amicus curiae urging reversal.
  Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Barry L. Goldstein, Deborah M. Greenberg, Eric Schnapper, and 0. Peter Sherwood filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
  Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Thaddeus Holt for the American Society for Personnel Administration; and by Howard P. Widens, Deanne C. Siemer, and John S. Kramer for the Educational Testing Service.
  Mr. Justice White
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case involves the validity of a qualifying test administered to applicants for positions as police officers in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. The test was sustained by the District Court but invalidated by the Court of Appeals. We are in agreement with the District Court and hence reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
  I
  This action began on April 10, 1970, when two Negro police officers filed suit against the then Commissioner of the District of Columbia, the Chief of the District’s Metropolitan Police Department, and the Commissioners of the United States Civil Service Commission. An amended complaint, filed December 10, alleged that the promotion policies of the Department were racially discriminatory and sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction. The respondents Harley and Sellers were permitted to intervene, their amended complaint asserting that their applications to become officers in the Department had been rejected, and that the Department’s recruiting procedures discriminated on the basis of race against black applicants by a series of practices including, but not limited to, a written personnel test which excluded a disproportionately high number of Negro applicants. These practices were asserted to violate respondents’ rights “under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and under D. C. Code § 1-320.” Defendants answered, and discovery and various other proceedings followed. Respondents then filed a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the recruiting phase of the case, seeking a declaration that the test administered to those applying to become police officers is “unlawfully discriminatory and thereby in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . No issue under any statute or regulation was raised by the motion. The District of Columbia defendants, petitioners here, and the federal parties also filed motions for summary judgment with respect to the recruiting aspects of the case, asserting that respondents were entitled to relief on neither constitutional nor statutory grounds. The District Court granted petitioners' and denied respondents’ motions. 348 F. Supp. 15 (DC 1972).
  According to the findings and conclusions of the District Court, to be accepted by the Department and to enter an intensive 17-week training program, the police recruit was required to satisfy certain physical and character standards, to be a high school graduate or its equivalent, and to receive a grade of at least 40 out of 80 on “Test 21,” which is “an examination that is used generally throughout the federal service,” which “was developed by the Civil Service Commission, not the Police Department,” and which was “designed to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension.” Id., at 16.
  The validity of Test 21 was the sole issue before the court on the motions for summary judgment. The District Court noted that there was no claim of “an intentional discrimination or purposeful discriminatory acts” but only a claim that Test 21 bore no relationship to job performance and “has a highly discriminatory impact in screening out black candidates.” Ibid. Respondents’ evidence, the District Court said, warranted three conclusions: “(a) The number of black police officers, while substantial, is not proportionate to the population'mix of the city, (b) A higher percentage of blacks fail the Test than whites, (c) The Test has not been validated to establish its reliability for measuring subsequent job performance.” Ibid. This showing was deemed sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendants in the action, petitioners here; but the court nevertheless concluded that on the undisputed facts respondents were not entitled to relief.. The District Court relied on several factors. Since August 1969, 44% of new police force recruits had been black; that figure also represented the proportion of blacks on the total force and was roughly equivalent to 20- to 29-year-old blacks in the 50-mile radius in which the recruiting efforts of the Police Department had been concentrated. It was undisputed that the Department had systematically and affirmatively sought to enroll black officers many of whom passed the test but failed to report for duty. The District Court rejected the assertion that Test 21 was culturally slanted to favor whites and was “satisfied that the undisputable facts prove the test to be reasonably and directly related to the requirements of the police recruit training program and that it is neither so designed nor operates [sic] to discriminate against otherwise qualified blacks.” Id., at 17. It was thus not necessary to show that Test 21 was not only a useful indicator of training school performance but had also been validated in terms of job performance-— “The lack of job performance validation does not defeat the Test, given its direct relationship to recruiting and the valid part it plays in this process.” Ibid. The District Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he proof is wholly lacking that a police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability” and that the Department “should not be required on this showing to lower standards or to abandon efforts to achieve excellence.” Id., at 18.
  Having lost on both constitutional and statutory issues in the District Court, respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals claiming that their summary judgment motion, which rested on purely constitutional grounds, should have been granted. The tendered constitutional issue was whether the use of Test 21 invidiously discriminated against Negroes and hence denied them due process of law contrary to the commands of the Fifth Amendment. The Court- of Appeals, addressing that issue, announced that it would be guided by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), a case involving the interpretation and application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and held that the statutory standards elucidated in that case were to govern the due process question tendered in this one. 168 U. S. App. D. C. 42, 512 F. 2d 956 (1975). The court went on to declare that lack of discriminatory intent in designing and administering Test 21 was irrelevant; the critical fact was rather that a far greater proportion of blacks— four times as many — failed the test than did whites. This disproportionate impact, standing alone and without regard to whether it indicated a discriminatory purpose, was held sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, absent proof by petitioners that the test was an adequate measure of job performance in addition to being an indicator of probable success in the training program, a burden which the court ruled petitioners had failed to discharge. That the Department had made substantial efforts to recruit blacks was held beside the point and the fact that the racial distribution of recent hirings and of the Department itself might be roughly equivalent to the racial makeup of the surrounding community, broadly conceived, was put aside as a “comparison [not] material to this appeal.” Id., at 46 n. 24, 512 F. 2d, at 960 n. 24. The Court of Appeals, over a dissent, accordingly reversed the judgment of the District Court and directed that respondents’ motion for partial summary judgment be granted. We granted the petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 820 (1975), filed by the District of Columbia officials.
  II
  Because the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the legal standards applicable to Title VII cases in resolving the constitutional issue before it, we reverse its judgment in respondents’ favor. Although the petition for certio-rari did not present this ground for reversal, our Rule 40 (1) (d)(2) provides that we “may notice a plain error not presented”; and this is an appropriate occasion to invoke the Rule.
  As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII, employees or applicants proceeding under it need not concern themselves with the employer’s possibly discriminatory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially differential impact of the challenged hiring or promotion practices. This is not the constitutional rule. We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today.
  The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis1 of race. It is also true that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.
  Almost 100 years ago, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880), established that the exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries in criminal proceedings violated the Equal Protection Clause, but the fact that a particular jury or a series of juries does not statistically reflect the racial composition of the community does not in itself make out an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Clause. “A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination.” Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945). A defendant in a criminal case is entitled “to require that the State not deliberately and systematically deny to members of his race the right to participate as jurors in the administration of justice.” Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972). See also Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 287-290 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 468-469 (1947).
  The rule is the same in other contexts. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), upheld a New York congressional apportionment statute against claims that district lines had been racially gerrymandered. The challenged districts were made up predominantly of whites or of minority races, and their boundaries were irregularly drawn. The challengers did not prevail because they failed to prove that the New York Legislature “was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines”; the plaintiffs had not shown that the statute “was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin.” Id., at 56, 58. The dissenters were in agreement that the issue was whether the “boundaries . . . were purposefully drawn on racial lines.” Id., at 67.
  The school desegregation cases have also adhered to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. That there are both predominantly black and predominantly white schools in a community is not alone violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The essential element of de jure segregation is “a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action.” Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 205 (1973). “The differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate.” Id., at 208. See also id., at 199, 211, 213. The Court has also recently rejected allegations of racial discrimination based solely on the statistically disproportionate racial impact of various provisions of the Social Security Act because “[t]he acceptance of appellants’ constitutional theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might be.” Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972). And compare Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), with James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971).
  This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a law’s disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination. A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). It is also clear from the cases dealing with racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an “unequal application of the law ... as to show intentional discrimination.” Akins v. Texas, supra, at 404. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881). A prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may be proved as well by the absence of Negroes on a particular jury combined with the failure of the jury commissioners to be informed of eligible Negro jurors in a community, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 (1942), or with racially non-neutral selection procedures, Alexander v. Louisiana, supra; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967). With a prima facie case made out, “the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.” Alexander, supra, at 632. See also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 361 (1970); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584, 587 (1958).
  Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact — in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires — may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964), that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
  There are some indications to the contrary in our cases. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971), the city of Jackson, Miss., following a court decree to this effect, desegregated all of its public facilities save five swimming pools which had been operated by the city and which, following the decree, were closed by ordinance pursuant to a determination by the city council that closure was necessary to preserve peace and order and that integrated pools could not be economically operated. Accepting the finding that the pools were closed to avoid violence and economic loss, this Court rejected the argument that the abandonment of this service was inconsistent with the outstanding desegregation decree and that the otherwise seemingly permissible ends served by the ordinance could be impeached by demonstrating that racially invidious motivations had prompted the city council’s action. The holding was that the city was not overtly or covertly operating segregated pools and was extending identical treatment to both whites and Negroes. The opinion warned against grounding decision on legislative purpose or motivation, thereby lending support for the proposition that the operative effect of the law rather than its purpose is the paramount factor. But the holding of the case was that the legitimate purposes of the ordinance — to preserve peace and avoid deficits — were not open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually motivated by racial considerations. Whatever dicta the opinion may contain, the decision did not involve, much less invalidate, a statute or ordinance having neutral purposes but disproportionate racial consequences.
  Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972), also indicates that in proper circumstances, the racial impact of a law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor. That case involved the division of a school district. The issue was whether the division was consistent with an outstanding order of a federal court to desegregate the dual school system found to have existed in the area. The constitutional predicate for the District Court’s invalidation of the divided district was “the enforcement until 1969 of racial segregation in a public school system of which Emporia had always been a part.” Id., at 459. There was thus no need to find “an independent constitutional violation.” Ibid. Citing Palmer v. Thompson, we agreed with the District Court that the division of the district had the effect of interfering with the federal decree and should be set aside.
  That neither Palmer nor Wright was understood to have changed the prevailing rule is apparent from Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, supra, where the principal issue in litigation was whether and to what extent there had been purposeful discrimination resulting in a partially or wholly segregated school system. Nor did other later cases, Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, and Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, indicate that either Palmer or Wright had worked a fundamental change in equal protection law.
  Both before and after Palmer v. Thompson, however, various Courts of Appeals have held in several contexts, including public employment, that the substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official practice standing alone and without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove racial discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause absent some justification going substantially beyond what would be necessary to validate most other legislative classifications. The cases impressively demonstrate that there is another side to the issue; but, with all due respect, to the extent that those cases rested on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation, we are in disagreement.
  As an initial matter, we have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies “any person . . . equal protection of the laws” simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups. Had respondents, along with all others who had failed Test 21, whether white or black, brought an action claiming that the test denied each of them equal protection of the laws as compared with those who had passed with high enough scores to qualify them as police recruits, it is most unlikely that their challenge would have been sustained. Test 21, which is administered generally to prospective Government employees, concededly seeks to ascertain whether those who take it have acquired a particular level of verbal skill; and it is untenable that the Constitution prevents the Government from seeking modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of competence, particularly where the job requires special ability to communicate orally and in writing. Respondents, as Negroes, could no more successfully claim that the test denied them equal protection than could white applicants who also failed. The conclusion would not be different in the face of proof that more Negroes than whites had been disqualified by Test 21. That other Negroes also failed to score well would, alone, not demonstrate that respondents individually were being denied equal protection of the laws by the application of an otherwise valid qualifying test being administered to prospective police recruits.
  Nor on the facts of the case before us would the disproportionate impact of Test 21 warrant the conclusion that it is a purposeful device to discriminate against Negroes and hence an infringement of the constitutional rights of respondents as well as other black applicants. As we have said, the test is neutral on its face and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally empowered to pursue. Even agreeing with the District Court that the differential racial effect of Test 21 called for further inquiry, we think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers, the changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force in general, and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any inference that the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that “a police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability.” 348 P. Supp., at 18.
  Under Title "VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved, and that it is an insufficient response to demonstrate some rational basis for the challenged practices. It is necessary, in addition, that they be “validated” in terms of job performance in any one of several ways, perhaps by ascertaining the minimum skill, ability, or potential necessary for the position at issue and determining whether the qualifying tests are appropriate for the selection of qualified applicants for the job in question. However this process proceeds, it involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes of applying the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this.
  A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.
  Given that rule, such consequences would perhaps be likely to follow. However, in our view, extension of the rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment, should await legislative prescription.
  As we have indicated, it was error to direct summary judgment for respondents based on the Fifth Amendment.
  Ill
  We also hold that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the judgment of the District Court granting the motions for summary judgment filed by petitioners and the federal parties. Respondents were entitled to relief on neither constitutional nor statutory grounds.
  The submission of the defendants in the District Court was that Test 21 complied with all applicable statutory as well as constitutional requirements; and they appear not to have disputed that under the statutes and regulations governing their conduct standards similar to those obtaining under Title VII had to be satisfied. The District Court also assumed that Title VII standards were to control the case, identified the determinative issue as whether Test 21 was sufficiently job related and proceeded to uphold use of the test- because it was “directly related to a determination of whether the applicant possesses sufficient skills requisite to the demands of the curriculum a recruit must master at the police academy.” 348 F. Supp., at 17. The Court of Appeals reversed because the relationship between Test 21 and training school success, if demonstrated at all, did not satisfy what it deemed to be the crucial requirement of a direct relationship between performance on Test 21 and performance on the policeman’s job.
  We agree with petitioners and the federal parties that this was error. The advisability of the police recruit training course informing the recruit about his upcoming job, acquainting him with its demands, and attempting to impart a modicum of required skills seems conceded. It is also apparent to us, as it was to the District Judge, that some minimum verbal and communicative skill would be very useful, if not essential, to satisfactory progress in the training regimen. Based on the evidence before him, the District Judge concluded that Test 21 was directly related to the requirements of the police training program and that a positive relationship between the test and training-course performance was sufficient to validate the former, wholly aside from its possible relationship to actual performance as a police officer. This conclusion of the District Judge that training-program validation may itself be sufficient is supported by regulations of the Civil Service Commission, by the opinion evidence placed before the District Judge, and by the current views of the Civil Service Commissioners who were parties to the case. Nor is the conclusion foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); and it seems to us the much more sensible construction of the job-relatedness requirement.
  The District Court’s accompanying conclusion that Test 21 was in fact directly related to the requirements of the police training program was supported by a validation study, as well as by other evidence of record; and we are not convinced that this conclusion was erroneous.
  The federal parties, whose views have somewhat' changed since the decision of the Court of Appeals and who still insist that training-program validation is sufficient, now urge a remand to the District Court for the purpose of further inquiry into whether the training-program test scores, which were found to correlate with Test 21 scores, are themselves an appropriate measure of the trainee’s mastership of the material taught in the course and whether the training program itself is sufficiently related to actual performance of the police officer’s task. We think a remand is inappropriate. The District Court’s judgment was warranted by the record before it, and we perceive no good reason to reopen it, particularly since we were informed at oral argument that although Test 21 is still being administered, the training program itself has undergone substantial modification in the course of this litigation. If there are now deficiencies in the recruiting practices under prevailing Title VII standards, those deficiencies are to be directly addressed in accordance with appropriate procedures mandated under that Title.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed.
  So ordered.
  Mr. Justice Stewart joins Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion.
  Under §4M03 of the District of Columbia Code, appointments to the Metropolitan Police force were to- be made by the Commissioner subject to the provisions of Title 5 of the United States Code relating to the classified civil service, The District of Columbia Council and the Office of Commissioner of the District of Columbia, established by Reorganization Plan No. 37 of 1967, were abolished as of January 2, 1975, and replaced by the Council of the District of Columbia and the Office of Mayor of the District of Columbia.
  Title 42 U. S. C. § 1981 provides:
  “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”
  Section 1-320 of the District of Columbia Code (1973) provides:
  “In any program of recruitment or hiring of individuals to fill positions in the government of the District of Columbia, no officer or employee of the government of the District of Columbia shall exclude or give preference to the residents of the District of Columbia or any State of the United States on the basis of residence, religion, race, color, or national origin.”
  One of the provisions expressly made applicable to the Metropolitan Police force by § 4M03 is 5 U. S. C. § 3304 (a), which provides:
  “§3304. Competitive service; examinations.
  “(a) The President may prescribe rules which shall provide, as nearly as conditions of good administration warrant, for—
  “(1) open, competitive examinations for testing applicants for appointment in the competitive service which are practical in character and as far as possible relate to matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought; and
  “(2) noncompetitive examinations when competent applicants do not compete after notice has been given of the existence of the vacancy.”
  The complaint asserted, no claim under § 3304.
  Those proceedings included a hearing on respondents’ motion for an order designating the case as a class action. A ruling on the motion was held in abeyance and was never granted insofar as the record before us reveals.
  In support of the motion, petitioners and the federal parties urged that they were in compliance with all applicable constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions, including the provisions of the Civil Service Act which since 1883 were said to have established a “job relatedness” standard for employment.
  When summary judgment was granted, the case with respect to discriminatory promotions was still pending. The District Court, however, made the determination and direction authorized by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b). The promotion issue was subsequently decided adversely to the original plaintiffs. Davis v. Washington, 352 F. Supp. 187 (DC 1972).
  “Although appellants’ complaint did not allege a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which then was inapplicable to the Federal Government, decisions applying Title VII furnish additional instruction as to the legal standard governing the issues raised in this ease .... The many decisions disposing of employment discrimination claims on constitutional grounds have made no distinction between the constitutional standard and the statutory standard under Title VII.” 168 U. S. App. D. C. 42, 44 n. 2, 612 F. 2d 956, 958 n. 2 (1975).
  The Civil Service Commissioners, defendants in the District Court, did not petition for writ of certiorari but have filed a brief as respondents. See our Rule 21 (4). We shall at times refer to them as the “federal parties.”
  Apparently not disputing the applicability of the Griggs and Title VII standards in resolving this case, petitioners presented issues going only to whether Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), had been misapplied by the Court of Appeals.
  See, e. g., Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717 (1962); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 412 (1947); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 16 (1941); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 45 (1924); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 362 (1910).
  Although Title VII standards have dominated this case, the statute was not applicable to federal employees when the complaint was filed; and although the 1972 amendments extending the Title to reach Government employees were adopted prior to the District Court’s judgment, the complaint was not amended to state a claim under that Title, nor did the case thereafter proceed as a Title VII case. Respondents’ motion for partial summary judgment, filed after the 1972 amendments, rested solely on constitutional grounds; and the Court of Appeals ruled that the motion should have been granted.
  At the oral argument before this Court, when respondents’ counsel was asked whether “this is just a purely Title VII case as it comes to us from the Court of Appeals without any constitutional overtones,” counsel responded: “My trouble honestly with that proposition is the procedural requirements to get into court under Title VII, and this case has not met them.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 66.
  To the extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our prior cases — as indicated in the text — are to the contrary; and very shortly after Palmer, all Members of the Court majority in that case joined the Court’s opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), which dealt with the issue of public financing for private schools and which announced, as the Court had several times before, that the validity of public aid to church-related schools includes close inquiry into the purpose of the challenged statute.
  Cases dealing with public employment include: Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F. 2d 1167, 1176-1177 (CA2 1972); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F. 2d 725, 732-733 (CA1 1972); Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm’n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1337 (CA2 1973); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1200 (Md.), aff’d in pertinent part sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F. 2d 1134 (CA4 1973); Douglas v. Hampton, 168 U. S. App. D. C. 62, 67, 512 F. 2d 976, 981 (1975); but cf. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F. 2d 1089, 1096-1097 (CA5 1975), cert. pending, No. 75-1026. There are also District Court cases: Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126, 143 (ND Miss. 1974); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736, 737 (ND Ohio 1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 553 (ND Ill. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721, 724 (Minn. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 498 F. 2d 143 (CA8 1974).
  In other contexts there are Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920 (CA2 1968) (urban renewal); Kennedy Park Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108, 114 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (zoning); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F. 2d 291 (CA9 1970) (dictum) (zoning); Metropolitan H. D. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F. 2d 409 (CA7), cert. granted, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975) (zoning); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F. 2d 731, 738 (CA7 1971) (dictum) (public housing); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 391 (ND Ga. 1971), aff’d, 457 F. 2d 788 (CA5 1972) (public housing); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F. 2d 1286 (CA5 1971), aff’d on rehearing en banc, 461 F. 2d 1171 (1972) (municipal services).
  It appears beyond doubt by now that there is no single method for appropriately validating employment tests for their relationship to job performance. Professional standards developed by the American Psychological Association in its Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals (1966), accept three basic methods of validation: “empirical” or “criterion” validity (demonstrated by identifying criteria that indicate successful job performance and then correlating test scores and the criteria so identified) ; “construct” validity (demonstrated by examinations structured to measure the degree to which job applicants have identifiable characteristics that have been determined to be important in successful job performance); and “content” validity (demonstrated by tests whose content closely approximates tasks to be performed on the job by the applicant). These standards have been relied upon by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in fashioning its Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR pt. 1607 (1975), and have been judicially noted in cases where validation of employment tests has been in issue. See, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 431 (1975); Douglas v. Hampton, 168 U. S. App. D. C., at 70, 512 F. 2d, at 984; Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Comm’n, 490 F. 2d 387, 394 (CA2 1973).
  Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 275, 300 (1972), suggests that disproportionate-impact analysis might invalidate “tests and qualifications for voting, draft deferment, public employment, jury service, and other government-conferred benefits and opportunities . . . ; [s]ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees, and other state-imposed charges.” It has also been argued that minimum wage and usury laws as well as professional licensing requirements would require major modifications in light of the unequal-impact rule. Silverman, Equal Protection, Economic Legislation, and Racial Discrimination, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 1183 (1972). See also Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N. C. L. Rev. 271 (1965).
  In their memorandum supporting their motion for summary judgment, the federal parties argued:
  “In Griggs, supra, the Supreme Court set a job-relationship standard for the private sector employers which has been a standard for federal employment since the passage of the Civil Service Act in 1883. In that act Congress has mandated that the federal government must use '. . . examinations for testing applicants for appointment . . . which ... as far as possible relate to matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointments sought.’ 5 U. S. C. §3304 (a)(1). Defendants contend that they have been following the job-related standards of Griggs, supra, for the past eighty-eight years by virtue of the enactment of the Civil Service Act which guaranteed open and fair competition for jobs.”
  They went on to argue that the Griggs standard had been satisfied. In granting the motions for summary judgment filed by petitioners and the federal parties, the District Court necessarily decided adversely to respondents the statutory issues expressly or tacitly tendered by the parties.
  See n. 17, infra. Current instructions of the Civil Service Commission on “Examining, Testing, Standards, and Employment Practices” provide in pertinent part:
  “S2-2 — Use of applicant appraisal procedures
  "a. Policy. The Commission’s staff develops and uses applicant appraisal procedures to assess the knowledges, skills, and abilities of persons for jobs and not persons in the abstract.
  “(1) Appraisal procedures are designed to reflect real, reasonable, and necessary qualifications for effective job behavior.
  "(2) An appraisal procedure must, among other requirements, have a demonstrable and rational relationship to important job-related performance objectives identified by management, such as:
  “(a) Effective job performance;
  “(b) Capability;
  “(c) Success in training;
  “(d) Reduced turnover; or
  “(e) Job satisfaction.” 37 Fed. Reg. 21557 (1972).
  See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607.5 (b) (3) (1975), discussed in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 430-435.
  The record includes a validation study of Test 21’s relationship to performance in the recruit training program. The study was made by D. L. Futransky of the Standards Division, Bureau of Policies and Standards, United States Civil Service Commission. App. 99-109. Findings of the study included data “support[ing] the conclusion that T[est] 21 is effective in selecting trainees who can learn the material that is taught at the Recruit School.” Id., at 103. Opinion evidence, submitted by qualified experts examining the Futransky study and/or conducting their own research, affirmed the correlation between scores on Test 21 and success in the training program. E. g., Affidavit of Dr. Donald J. Schwartz (personnel research psychologist, United States Civil Service Commission), App. 178, 183 (“It is my opinion . . . that Test 21 has a significant positive correlation with success in the MPD Recruit School for both Blacks and whites and is therefore shown to be job related . . .”); affidavit of Diane E. Wilson (personnel research psychologist, United States Civil Service Commission), App. 185, 186 (“It is my opinion that there is a direct and rational relationship between the content and difficulty of Test 21 and successful completion of recruit school training”).
  The Court of Appeals was “willing to assume for purposes of this appeal that appellees have shown that Test 21 is predictive of further progress in Recruit School.” 168 U. S. App. D. C., at 48, 512 F. 2d, at 962.
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