opinion: DELAWARE STATE COLLEGE et al. v. RICKS
  No. 79-939.
  Argued October 7, 1980
  Decided December 15, 1980
  Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Btjkger, C. J., and White, BlachmtjN, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenNAN and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 262. SteveNS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 265.
  Nicholas H. Rodriguez argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Harold Schmittinger and William D. Fletcher, Jr.
  Judith E. Harris argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent.
  Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Daniel R. Levinson filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal.
  Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Edwin S. Kneedler, Leroy D. Clark, Joseph T. Eddins, and Lutz Alexander Prayer for the United States et al.; and by David M. Rabban and Victor J. Stone for the American Association of University Professors.
  Justice Powell
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The question in this case is whether respondent, a college professor, timely complained under the civil rights laws that he had been denied academic tenure because of his national origin.
  I
  Columbus Ricks is a black Liberian. In 1970, Ricks joined the faculty at Delaware State College, a state institution attended predominantly by blacks. In February 1973, the Faculty Committee on Promotions and Tenure (the tenure committee) recommended that Ricks not receive a tenured position in the education department. The tenure committee, however, agreed to reconsider its decision the following year. Upon reconsideration, in February 1974, the committee adhered to its earlier recommendation. The following month, the Faculty Senate voted to support the tenure committee’s negative recommendation. On March 13, 1974, the College Board of Trustees formally voted to deny tenure to Ricks.
  Dissatisfied with the decision, Ricks immediately filed a grievance with the Board’s Educational Policy Committee (the grievance committee), which in May 1974 held a hearing and took the matter under submission. During the pendency of the grievance, the College administration continued to plan for Ricks’ eventual termination. Like many colleges and universities, Delaware State has a policy of not discharging immediately a junior faculty member who does not receive tenure. Rather, such a person is offered a “terminal” contract to teach one additional year. When that contract expires, the employment relationship ends. Adhering to this policy, the Trustees on June 26, 1974, told Ricks that he would be offered a 1-year “terminal” contract that would expire June 30, 1975. Ricks signed the contract without ob-jeetion or reservation on September 4, 1974. Shortly thereafter, on September 12, 1974, the Board of Trustees notified Ricks that it had denied his grievance.
  Ricks attempted to file an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on April 4, 1975. Under Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, however, state fair employment practices agencies have primary jurisdiction over employment discrimination complaints. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (c). The EEOC therefore referred Ricks’ charge to the appropriate Delaware agency. On April 28, 1975, the state agency waived its jurisdiction, and the EEOC accepted Ricks’ complaint for filing. More than two years later, the EEOC issued a “right to sue” letter.
  Ricks filed this lawsuit in the District Court on September 9, 1977. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the College had discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title VII and 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The District Court sustained the College’s motion to dismiss both claims as untimely. It concluded that the only unlawful employment practice alleged was the College’s decision to deny Ricks tenure, and that the limitations periods for both claims had commenced to run by June 26, 1974, when the President of the Board of Trustees officially notified Ricks that he would be offered a 1-year “terminal” contract. See n. 2, supra. The Title YII claim was not timely because Ricks had not filed his charge with the EEOC within 180 days after that date. Similarly, the § 1981 claim was not timely because the lawsuit had not been filed in the District Court within the applicable 3-year statute of limitations.
  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 605 F. 2d 710 (1979). It agreed with the District Court that Ricks’ essential allegation was that he. had been denied tenure illegally. Id., at 711. According to the Court of Appeals, however, the Title YII filing requirement, and the statute of limitations for the § 1981 claim, did not commence to run until Ricks’ “terminal” contract expired on June 30, .1975. The court reasoned:
  “ ‘ [A] terminated employee who is still working should not be required to consult a lawyer or file charges of discrimination against his employer as long as he is still working, even though he has been told of the employer’s present intention to terminate him in the future.’ ” Id., at 712, quoting Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F. 2d 187, 192 (CA3 1977), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 821 (1978).
  See Egelston v. State University College at Geneseo, 535 F. 2d 752 (CA2 1976); cf. Noble v. University of Rochester, 535 F. 2d 756 (CA2 1976).
  The Court of Appeals believed that the initial decision to terminate an employee sometimes might be reversed. The aggrieved employee therefore should not be expected to resort to litigation until termination actually has occurred. Prior resort to judicial or administrative remedies would be “likely to have the negative side effect of reducing that employee’s effectiveness during the balance of his or her term. Working relationships will be injured, if not sundered, and the litigation process will divert attention from the proper fulfillment of job responsibilities.” 605 F. 2d, at 712. Finally, the Court of Appeals thought that a rule focusing on the last day of employment would provide a “bright line guide both for the courts and for the victims of discrimination.” Id., at 712-713. It therefore reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for trial on the merits of Ricks’ discrimination claims. We granted certiorari. 444 U. S. 1070 (1980).
  For the reasons that follow, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the filing limitations periods did not commence to run until June 30, 1975. We agree instead with the District Court that both the Title YII and § 1981 claims were untimely. Accordingly, we reverse.
  II
  Title VII requires aggrieved persons to file a complaint with the EEOC “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). Similarly, § 1981 plaintiffs in Delaware must file suit within three years of the unfavorable employment decision. See n. 5, supra. The limitations periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 463-464 (1975); see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 558 (1977).
  Determining the timeliness of Ricks’ EEOC complaint, and this ensuing lawsuit, requires us to identify precisely the “unlawful employment practice” of which he complains. Ricks now insists that discrimination motivated the College not only in denying him tenure, but also in terminating his employment on June 30, 1975. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 26, 31-32. In effect, he is claiming a “continuing violation” of the civil rights laws with the result that the limitations periods did not commence to run until his 1-year “terminal” contract expired. This argument cannot be squared with the allegations of the complaint. Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, supra, at 558. If Ricks intended to complain of a discriminatory discharge, he should have identified the alleged discriminatory acts that continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of his employment. But the complaint alleges no such facts.
  Indeed, the contrary is true. It appears that termination of employment at Delaware State is a delayed, but inevitable, consequence of the denial of tenure. In order for the limitations periods to commence with the date of discharge, Ricks would have had to allege and prove that the manner in which his employment was terminated differed discriminatorily from the manner in which the College terminated other professors who also had been denied tenure. But no suggestion has been made that Ricks was treated differently from other unsuccessful tenure aspirants. Rather, in accord with the College’s practice, Ricks was offered a 1-year “terminal” contract, with explicit notice that his employment would end upon its expiration.
  In sum, the only alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced — at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks. That is so even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure — the eventual loss of a teaching position — did not occur until later. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held, in a similar tenure case, that “[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F. 2d 202, 209 (1979) (emphasis added); see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S., at 558. It is simply insufficient for Ricks to allege that his termination “gives present effect to the past illegal act and therefore perpetuates the consequences of forbidden discrimination.” Id., at 557. The emphasis is not upon the effects of earlier employment decisions; rather, it “is [upon] whether any present violation exists.” Id., at 558 (emphasis in original).
  III
  We conclude for the foregoing reasons that the limitations periods commenced to run when the tenure decision was made and Ricks was notified. The remaining inquiry is the identification of this date.
  A
  Three dates have been advanced and argued by the parties. As indicated above, Ricks contended for June 30, 1975, the final date of his “terminal” contract, relying on a continuing-violation theory. This contention fails, as we have shown, because of the absence of any allegations of facts to support it. The Court of Appeals agreed with Ricks that the relevant date was June 30, 1975, but it did so on a different theory. It found that the only alleged discriminatory act was the denial of tenure, 605 F. 2d, at 711, but nevertheless adopted the “final date of employment” rule primarily for policy reasons. Supra, at 255-256. Although this view has the virtue of simplicity, the discussion in Part II of this opinion demonstrates its fallacy as a rule of general application. Congress has decided that time limitations periods commence with the date of the “alleged unlawful employment practice.” See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). Where, as here, the only challenged employment practice occurs before the termination date, the limitations periods necessarily commence to run before that date. It should not be forgotten that time-limitations provisions themselves promote important interests; “the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S., at 463-464. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 820, 825 (1980).
  B
  The EEOC, in its amicus brief, contends in the alternative for a different date. It was not until September 12, 1974, that the Board notifiéd Ricks that his grievance had been denied. The EEOC therefore asserts that, for purposes of computing limitations periods, this was the date of the unfavorable tenure decision. Two possible lines of reasoning underlie this argument. First, it could be contended that the Trustees’ initial decision was only an expression of intent that did not become final until the grievance was denied. In support of this argument, the EEOC notes that the June 26 letter explicitly held out to Ricks the possibility that he would receive tenure if the Board sustained his grievance. See n. 2, supra. Second, even if the Board’s first decision expressed its official position, it could be argued that the pendency of the grievance should toll the running of the limitations periods.
  We do not find either argument to be persuasive. As to the former, we think that the Board of Trustees had made clear well before September 12 that it had formally rejected Ricks’ tenure bid. The June 26 letter itself characterized that as the Board’s "official position.” Ibid. It is apparent, of course, that the Board in the June 26 letter indicated a willingness to change its prior decision if Ricks’ grievance were found to be meritorious. But entertaining a grievance complaining of the tenure decision does not suggest that the earlier decision was in any respect tentative. The grievance procedure, by its nature, is a remedy for a prior decision, not an opportunity to influence that decision before it is made.
  As to the latter argument, we already have held that the pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the running of the limitations periods. Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229 (1976). The existence of careful procedures to assure fairness in the tenure decision should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer’s decision is made. Of. id., at 234-235.
  C
  The District Court rejected both the June 30, 1975, date and the September 12, 1974, date, and concluded that the limitations periods had commenced to run by June 26, 1974, when the President of the Board notified Ricks that he would be offered a "terminal” contract for the 1974-1975 school year. We cannot say that this decision was erroneous. By June 26, the tenure committee had twice recommended that Ricks not receive tenure; the Faculty Senate had voted to support the tenure committee’s recommendation; and the Board of Trustees formally had voted to deny Ricks tenure. In light of this unbroken array of negative decisions, the District Court was justified in concluding that the College had established its official position — and made that position apparent to Ricks — ho later than June 26, 1974.
  We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court so that it may reinstate the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint.
  Reversed and remanded.
  According to the Court of Appeals, the grievance committee almost immediately recommended to the Board that Ricks’ grievance be denied. 605 F. 2d 710, 711 (CA3 1979). Nothing in the record, however, reveals the date on which the grievance committee rendered its decision.
  The June 26 letter stated:
  June 26, 1974
  Dr. Columbus Ricks
  Delaware State College
  Dover, Delaware
  Dear Dr. Ricks:
  On March 13, 1974, the Board of Trustees of Delaware State College officially endorsed the recommendations of the Faculty Senate at its March 11, 1974 meeting, at which time the Faculty Senate recommended that the Board not grant you tenure.
  As we are both aware, the Educational Policy Committee of the Board of Trustees has heard your grievance and it is now in the process of coming to a decision. The Chairman of the Educational Policy Committee has indicated to me that a decision may not be forthcoming until sometime in July. In order to comply with the 1971 Trustee Policy Manual and AAUP requirements with regard to the amount of time needed in proper notification of non-reappointment for non-tenured faculty members, the Board has no choice but to follow actions according to its official position prior to the grievance process, and thus, notify you of its intent not to renew your contract at the end of the 1974-75 school year.
  Please understand that we have no way of knowing what the outcome of the grievance process may be, and that this action is being taken at this time in order to be consistent with the present formal position of the Board and AAUP time requirements in matters of this kind. Should the Educational Policy Committee decide to recommend that you be granted tenure, and should the Board of Trustees concur with their recommendation, then of course, it will supersede any previous action taken by the Board.
  Sincerely yours,
  /s/ Walton H. Simpson, President
  Board of Trustees of Delaware State College
  In addition to the College itself, other defendants (petitioners in this Court) are Trustees Walton H. Simpson, William H. Davis, William G. Dix, Edward W. Hagemeyer, James C. Hardcastle, Delma Lafferty, James H. Williams, William S. Young, Burt C. Pratt, Luna I. Mishoe, and Pierre S. duPont IV (ex officio); the academic dean, M. Milford Caldwell (now deceased); the education department chairman, George W. McLaughlin; and tenure committee members Romeo C. Henderson, Harriet R. Williams, Arthur E. Bragg, Ora Bunch, Ehsan Helmy, Vera Powell, John R. Price, Herbert Thompson, W. Richard Wynder, Ulysses Washington, and Jane Laskaris.
  Section 1981 provides:
  “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”
  The statute of limitations in § 1981 cases is that applicable to similar claims under state law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 462 (1975). The parties in this case agree that the applicable limitations period under Delaware law is three years.
  Because the claims were not timely filed, we do not decide whether a claim of national origin discrimination is cognizable under § 1981.
  Under certain circumstances, the filing period is extended to 300 days. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e); see Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980).
  Sixteen paragraphs in the complaint describe in detail the sequence of events surrounding the tenure denial. Only one paragraph even mentions Ricks’ eventual departure from Delaware State, and nothing in that paragraph alleges any fact suggesting discrimination in the termination of Ricks’ employment.
  The complaint does allege that a variety of unusual incidents occurred during the 1974-1975 school year, including one in which the education department chairman, George W. McLaughlin, physically attacked Ricks. This incident allegedly resulted in McLaughlin’s conviction for assault. Counsel for Ricks conceded at oral argument that incidents such as this were not independent acts of discrimination, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, but at most evidence that could be used at a trial.
  Complaints that employment termination resulted from discrimination can present widely varying circumstances. In this case the only alleged discriminatory act is the denial of tenure sought by a college professor, with the termination of employment not occurring until a later date. The application of the general principles discussed herein necessarily must be made on a case-by-case basis.
  Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae 19-22; 605 F. 2d, at 712-713.
  The Court of Appeals also thought it was significant that a final-date-of-employment rule would permit the teacher to conclude his affairs at a school without the acrimony engendered by the filing of an administrative complaint or lawsuit. Id., at 712. It is true that “the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S., at 461. But this is the “natural effec[t] of the choice Congress has made,” ibid., in explicitly requiring that the limitations period commence with the date of the “alleged unlawful employment practice,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (c).
  It is conceivable that the Court of Appeals’ "final day of employment” rule might discourage colleges even from offering a “grace period,” such as Delaware State’s practice of 1-year “terminal” contracts, during which the junior faculty member not offered tenure may seek a teaching position elsewhere.
  If September 12 were the critical date, the § 1981 claim would be timely. Counting from September 12, the Title VII claim also would be timely if Ricks is entitled to 300 days, rather than 180 days, in which to file with the EEOC. In its brief before this Court, the EEOC as amicus curiae noted that Delaware is a State with its own fair employment practices agency. According to the EEOC, therefore, Ricks was entitled to 300 days to file his complaint. See n. 7, supra. Because we hold that the time-limitations periods commenced to run no later than June 26, 1974, we need not decide whether Ricks was entitled to 300 days to file under Title VII. Counting from the June 26 date, Ricks’ filing with the EEOC was not timely even with the benefit of the 300-day period.
  See also B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 235 (1979 Supp.), and cases cited therein.
  We do not suggest that aspirants for academic tenure should ignore available opportunities to request reconsideration. Mere requests to reconsider, however, cannot extend the limitations periods applicable to the civil rights laws.
  We recognize, of course, that the limitations periods should not commence to run so soon that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil rights statutes. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 761 (1979); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 526-527 (1972). But, for the reasons we have stated, there can be no claim here that Ricks was not abundantly forewarned. In NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U. S. 672, 677 (1980), we noted that university boards of trustees customarily rely on the professional expertise of the tenured faculty, particularly with respect to decisions about hiring, tenure, termination, and promotion. Thus, the action of the Board of Trustees on March 13, 1974, affirming the faculty recommendation, was entirely predictable. The Board’s letter of June 26, 1974, simply repeated to Ricks the Board’s official position and acknowledged the pendency of the grievance through which Ricks hoped to persuade the Board to change that position.
  We need not decide whether the District Court correctly focused on the June 26 date, rather than the date the Board communicated to Ricks its unfavorable tenure decision made at the March 13, 1974, meeting. As we have stated, see n. 13, supra, both the Title VII and § 1981 complaints were not timely filed even counting from the June 26 date.
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