PER CURIAM:
When bankruptcy appeared inevitable, Mr. and Mrs. Roon consulted experienced bankruptcy counsel. One of the things they did on his advice to enhance their exemptions was to refinance their 1966 Chevrolet. The bank loaned them $2,325 on the car. From this amount they paid off the previous car loan and their attorney’s fees, and deposited $800 in the Union Féderal Savings & Loan Association. They then filed petitions in bankruptcy. They claimed that the $800 account was exempt from execution under California Code of Civil Procedure § 690.21 and was therefore exempt under section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 24, though the automobile would not have been. The exemption was allowed by the Referee and upheld by the district court, 305 F.Supp. 1123.
Wudrick’s case is very similar: On the advice of bankruptcy counsel and in order to maximize his exemptions, he obtained a $2,197 loan from a finance company on two previously unencumbered vehicles about three weeks before filing his petition in bankruptcy. He put $1,-300 in shares of the St. Joseph’s Children Employees’ Federal Credit Union, exempt from execution under California Financial Code § 15406.1. His subsequent claim of exemption in bankruptcy was denied by the Referee, who found the transfer fraudulent. The district court upheld this determination.
1. Michelman v. Roon
It has long been the rule in this and other jurisdictions that the purposeful conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy is not fraudulent per se. In re Dudley, 72 F.Supp. 942, 945-947 (D.Cal.1947), aff’d per curiam, Goggin v. Dudley, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir.1948); Love v. Menick, 341 F.2d 680, 682-683 (9th Cir. 1965); see 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 6.11, p. 853.
The Trustee argues that conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy by creation of a secured debt and deposit of the proceeds in an exempt account is fraudulent as a matter of law and therefore a claim of exemption based on such a transfer is invalid. 1 Collier, supra, if 6.11, p. 842.
We hold, however, that there is no significant distinction between the previously approved practice of conversion by sale and conversion by pledge as in the present ease. The creditor in a secured loan, like a purchaser, relies on the value of the property encumbered or transferred, and not the debtor’s other assets. Thus he is not prejudiced. General creditors of the debtor may be, but no more so than when nonexempt property is sold outright and the proceeds converted into exempt property. Since no more is shown in either case than the intentional conversion of nonexempt property to exempt property, Love v. Menick, supra, controls.
A different case would be presented if on the eve of bankruptcy a debt were created with no intention of repaying the creditor, either by purchasing goods on credit or borrowing money without security. See Love v. Menick, supra, at 682-683 of 341 F.2d.
2. Wudrick v. Clements
The underlying question is the same as in Roon. The finding of fraud was based solely on the fact that nonexempt assets were deliberately converted to exempt assets just prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. Since we see no difference between a conversion of assets into exempt form by sale or by pledge, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud.
The Trustee also argues that Wudrick failed to carry his burden of proving entitlement to the exemption under California Financial Code § 15406 because he did not establish that the institution in which the funds were deposited was a “credit union” or, if it was, that Wudrick was one of its “members,” within the meaning of the section
It is not disputed that Wudrick held shares or certificates of deposit in the amount claimed in the “St. Joseph’s Children Employees’ Federal Credit Union.” This was enough to establish a prima facie case since California statutes limit the issuance of credit union shares to qualified members (Cal.Fin. Code § 14800(b)), and prohibit use of the words “credit” and “union” in the name or title of any but an authorized credit union. Cal.Fin. Code § 14003.
The judgment is affirmed in Roon, No. 25,537, and reversed in Wudrick, No. 25,449.
“§ 15406. Exception from execution
The shares and certificates for funds received of member^ of any credit union and all the accumulation on such shares and certificates are exempt from sale on execution and proceedings supplementary thereto, to the amount of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500).”
What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.