IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge:
This case comes before us on petition of the taxpayers for review of a decision of the Tax Court, 48 T.C. 515 upholding the Commissioner’s determination of deficiencies in their income tax for the taxable year 1960. The issue it presents for our determination is the proper method of computing a casualty loss deduction claimed under § 165 of the Internal Revenue Code for the partial destruction of a timber tract.
I.
All of the petitioners herein either owned an interest in or filed a joint return for the taxable year 1960 with a person then owning an interest in the Namarib Company-Timber Venture, a joint venture organized under the laws of the State of New York [hereinafter venture]. Specifically, in 1960, Irene Rosenthal, with whom Fred Rosenthal filed a joint return, owned a 6%% interest in the venture, and Feyna Ginzberg owned a 3 %% interest in it. The Namarib Company [Company], a New York partnership, owned another 67%% interest in the venture. Joachim Ginzberg owned a 60% interest in the Company; Efim Golodetz, with whom Fanny Golodetz, now deceased, filed a joint return, owned a 20% interest in the Company; and Leo Eliash, with whom Zara Eliash filed a joint return, owned the remaining 20% interest in the Company.
As of January 1, 1960, the venture owned a timber tract of 24,605.6 acres in Tennessee. Of this total, 19,734.7 acres had been acquired in 1951 for $300,000, and the remaining 4,870.9 acres had been purchased in 1956 for $60,000. As required by the Regulations under § 611, dealing with depletion deductions, the venture allocated these purchase prices between the land and the timber on it. Thus, of the initial $300,000 expenditure (to which certain capitalized expenditures were added), $93,825 was allocated to the land and $217,875 to the timber; and of the later $60,000 purchase price (again plus capital expenditures), $19,225.93 was allocated to the land and $44,800 to the timber. As of January 1, 1960, the venture’s adjusted basis in all the land was $113,080.93, and its adjusted basis in the timber was $212.476.30. At that time, the total amount of saw timber on the tract was estimated for purposes of determining the venture’s depletion deduction to be 58,445,000 board feet.
On March 2, 1960, an ice storm struck the southern central section of the Tennessee River Basin, damaging the timber on the venture’s tract. It is not disputed that, as the taxpayers have contended, the fair market value of the entire timber tract of 24,605 acres immediately preceding the storm exceeded the fair market value of the tract immediately thereafter by at least $130,-000. The taxpayers computed this loss, for which they have received no compensation by insurance or otherwise, as follows:
destruction of 4,757.100 board feet of saw timber (i. e., timber from trees more than 8 inches in diameter at breast height) having market value of............. $104,787.29
destruction of 5,058.3 cords of pulpwood (timber from .trees between 4 and 8 inches in diameter at breast height) having a market value of................. 11,643.09
destruction of naturally produced young growth (trees measuring less than 4 inches in diameter at breast height) having a market value of................. 12,173.00
destruction of plantations on the tract having a market value of........................................ 1,906.00
$130,500.38
On its 1960 partnership information return, the venture claimed the entire $130,500.38 as a § 165 casualty loss, and each of the taxpayers took the appropriate percentage of this amount as a deduction on his individual income tax for the same year. The Commissioner allowed the $1,906 deduction for the loss of plantations but disallowed all except $17,315 of the remaining amount claimed as a loss for damage to the rest of the timber. Accordingly, in his notice to each of the taxpayers, he determined a deficiency resulting from the portion of the venture’s disallowed deduction each had claimed in his individual income tax return. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, and the taxpayers petition this court for review of that decision. The American Paper Institute, Continental Can Company, Inc., International Paper Company, The Mead Corporation, and West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company have, with the permission of the court, filed a brief as amici curiae supporting the position of the taxpayers. For the reasons below, we affirm the decision of the Tax Court.
II.
As noted, there is no dispute as to the market value of the taxpayers’ loss resulting from the ice storm. The only point of contention is how much of this loss may be claimed as a deduction under § 165.
Section 165(a) sets forth the general rule: “There shall be allowed as.a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” As the Regulations make clear, a casualty loss coming within the provisions of § 165 is deductible to the extent of (1) the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before and after the casualty, or (2) the taxpayer’s basis in that property, whichever amount is less. Treas.Reg. § 1.165-7 (b) (1). The issue on which the taxpayers and the Commissioner differ is the proper basis figure to be used in computing the amount of their loss deduction.
The taxpayers contend that the appropriate basis for this purpose is their basis in the entire tract. Under this theory, since the amount by which the market value of their property was reduced by the casualty ($130,500.38) is less than their basis in' the property ($212,476.30), they are entitled to deduct all of the former amount. The Commissioner argues in response that the taxpayers cannot apply the whole of their basis in the tract to this partial loss, but that they must apportion that basis between the timber destroyed and that left unharmed in the manner in which they apportion basis for determining the allowable depletion allowance when timber is sold.
Briefly, the Regulations provide that deductions for depletion of timber shall be computed in the following manner. Each year the taxpayer is to estimate the total number of units of merchantable timber (e. g., board feet) on his timber tract. This number is then divided into his adjusted basis in all the timber on that tract, and the quotient obtained is called the “depletion unit.” The depletion unit multiplied by the number of units of timber on the tract cut (or sold) during that year equals the amount of the depletion deduction to which the taxpayer is entitled for that taxable year.' Treas.Reg. § 1.611-3.
Following this formula, the Commissioner divided the taxpayers’ adjusted basis in the tract as of January 1, 1960 ($212,476.30) by the total number of merchantable units of timber on the tract as of that date (58,445,000 board feet of saw timber) to arrive at a depletion unit for the timber of $3.64 per 1,000 board feet. Multiplying this figure by the number of units of merchantable timber destroyed by the casualty (4,757,100 board feet of saw timber), he arrived at $17,315.48, which he claims to be the basis allocable to the timber lost. This amount, substantially less than the loss of market value due to the casualty, then sets the limit on the amount of the § 165 deduction to which the taxpayers are entitled.
III.
Both the taxpayers and the Commissioner seek to draw support for their respective positions from the language of the relevant Code provisions. The relevant words of the Code are to be found in typical “Cross-reference to” cross-reference and “exception upon exception” fashion. Dilliard, The Spirit of Liberty, 213 (quotation from Learned Hand). The starting point for both is § 165(b), which provides: “the basis for determining the amount of the deduction for any [§ 165] loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of property.” Section 1011 provides: “The adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property * * * shall be the basis (determined under section 1012 * * * [or other sections not applicable here]), adjusted as provided in section 1016.” Section 1012 in turn instructs: “The basis of property shall be the cost of such property * * *.”
The taxpayers argue quite simply that the “property” referred to in each of these sections is, in their case, the entire tract of timber. This is the unit of property they purchased and its cost therefore provides the relevant basis. Further, they urge, nothing in §§ 1011 or 1012, to which § 165 refers for the definition of basis “requires or suggests that their cost had to be allocated to the trees or board feet of the tract purchased.”
This overly simplistic argument, we believe, is of little help. It is true that §§ 1011 and 1012 in defining the basis of the property do not suggest any requirement that basis be allocated. But the “property” the taxpayers actually purchased was land with timber growing on it; and the Regulations make perfectly clear that for purposes of determining gain or loss on the sale of timber, the taxpayer must allocate his basis between the land and the timber. Treas.Reg. § 1.611-3(d) (3). Thus, the single property purchased — timberland — does become at least two separable properties for tax purposes. Indeed this proposition is so far beyond dispute that the taxpayers accept it unquestioningly while arguing that all the timber on the tract, separate from the land, is the relevant property for § 165 basis purposes in determining the allowable deduction for a partial loss.
The Commissioner’s argument is somewhat more complex. He also begins with § 165(b): “the basis for determining the amount of the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of property” [emphasis added]. This provision he quite reasonably interprets to mean that the same basis should be used in determining a loss deduction under § 165 as would be used in computing gain or loss had the same timber been sold. And in the case of a partial sale of timber, the taxpayer’s basis in all the timber on the tract must be allocated between the timber sold and that remaining. This is accomplished in the form of a depletion deduction. Thus, § 611(a) provides as the general rule: “In the case of * * * timber, there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing taxable income a reasonable allowance for depletion * * And § 612 provides: “the basis on which depletion is to be allowed in respect of any property shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for the purpose of determining the gain upon the sale or other disposition of property.” As we have stated, the amount of depletion allowable in any year is determined by allocating the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in all the timber on the tract equally among all the units of merchantable timber on the tract and then multiplying the basis per unit by the number of units cut. Treas.Reg. §§ 1.611-3, 1.612-l(a).
The taxpayers argue that § 611 is not relevant for our purposes because it provides for a depletion deduction not a tax basis of property. But again, their almost liturgical repetition of words in an area as complex as this, without supplying any convincing rationale, is to glorify semantics over substance. When the actual functioning of the depletion deduction is examined, it becomes apparent that it is in effect the basis used in determining the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of timber. The depletion deduction is determined at the time the timber is cut and is dependent upon the number of units of merchantable timber cut (and the depletion unit, or adjusted basis per unit of merchantable timber on the tract). However, to ensure that the depletion deduction for the timber cut will be matched against the income derived from the sale of that timber, the Regulations further provide: “To the extent that depletion is allowable in a particular taxable year with respect to timber the products of which are not sold during such year, the depletion so allowable shall be included as an item of cost in the closing inventory of such products for such year.” In short, the taxpayer obtains the benefit of the depletion deduction assignable to specific units of timber, which represents his cost in those units, only in the year when he actually disposes of the timber. Thus, the depletion deduction allocable to specific timber has precisely the same significance as basis in the case of an ordinary sale or disposition of property: it represents the cost of the property to the taxpayer, the standard for determining whether he enjoys a taxable gain or recognizable loss upon its sale or other disposition.
A consideration of § 631 buttresses the Commissioner’s analysis. Section 631(a) provides: “If the taxpayer so elects on his return for a taxable year, the cutting of timber * * * during such year by the taxpayer who owns * * * such timber * * * shall be considered as a sale or exchange of such timber cut during such year. If such election has been made, gain or loss to the taxpayer shall be recognized in an amount equal to the difference between the fair market value of such timber, and the adjusted basis for depletion of such timber in the hands of the taxpayer * * * ” [emphasis added] . And, as the Regulations make clear, “the adjusted basis for depletion of such timber” to be used in determining the gain or loss to be recognized upon a sale under § 631 equals the depletion unit applicable to the timber on the tract multiplied by the number of units of timber cut (and treated as sold). Treas.Reg. § 1.631-1 (d). Manifestly then, when the taxpayer makes an election to treat the cutting of timber as a constructive sale of such timber, he is required to allocate a portion of his adjusted basis in the entire tract to the specific timber cut — and that basis is the depletion deduction applicable to such timber provided for in § 611.
This analysis, we believe, conclusively rebuts taxpayers’ contention that the only basis available for use in determining the amount of their allowable deduction under § 165 is their basis in the entire timber tract. Rather, it is quite obvious that the basis used in determining gain or loss on a partial sale or exchange of timber is that portion of the basis in the tract ratably allocable to such specific timber. And since this allocable basis is “the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other exchange” of this property (i. e., the timber destroyed), the interrelated statutory provisions do provide strong support for the Commissioner’s result. We do not rest our conclusion as to the correctness of the Tax Court’s decision on the statutory language alone, however, for we believe that a reasoned consideration of the basic principles governing the deduction of casualty losses generally offers even more weighty support for this result.
IV.
The taxpayers strenuously contend that the Commissioner’s result would defeat the purpose of § 165, which they say is to provide tax relief “for economic loss suffered, not for some proportionate part of that loss.” This description of the statute’s purpose is wholly misleading. Undeniably, § 165 was designed to afford some measure of tax relief to persons suffering uncompensated casualty losses. But, as we have stated, the amount of the loss deduction allowable under this section is in every case limited to the lesser amount of either the decrease in market value of the property as a result of the casualty or the taxpayer’s basis in the property. Manifestly, the purpose of § 165 is not to allow the taxpayer a full deduction for every loss in market value his property suffers by reason of a casualty. The permissible deduction for such loss is always limited to the taxpayer’s basis, or cost, in the property damaged. And the reason for this limitation is clear. Where the taxpayer suffers a loss from a destruction of market value greater than the cost of the property to him, that excess of value destroyed represents unrealized appreciation. And he may not claim a deduction for such loss because he has never recognized or paid a tax on the gain. In the extreme case, where the taxpayer’s basis in the property damaged is zero, and its entire market value represents unrealized appreciation, he is entitled to no deduction despite the size of the loss, large as it may be. Consequently, taxpayers’ argument that the Commissioner’s result, by limiting the amount of their deduction to less than the full amount of their loss, would defeat the purpose of § 165 is simply incorrect.
The taxpayers also argue' with much fervor that a partial destruction of timber is fundamentally different from a partial sale of timber, and hence the Commissioner’s interpretation of § 165, requiring that the two events be treated similarly for tax purposes, produces “unreasonable” and “arbitrary” results. Thus, they urge, a timber tract is “a unique type of asset,” a “vital organic unit” experiencing a continual process of growth and regeneration. In this regard they urge that the health and quality of all the timber is vitally affected by the removal of certain trees from the tract.
Although we have no doubt as to the biological validity of taxpayers’ “organic unit” theory, we cannot accept it as relevant for tax purposes. A primary rule in the computation of a casualty loss deduction is that the loss incurred is to be' determined “by reference to the single, identifiable property damaged or destroyed.” Treas.Reg. § 1.-165-7(b) (2) (i). A taxpayer may not borrow basis from his unharmed property in order to increase the amount of his loss deduction for an injury to his other property. Thus, all agree that the taxpayers may not apply their basis in the land on which the timber tract is situated to their loss of trees. Yet were we to take their “organic unit” theory seriously, logic would require us to do just that, for surely the health of the timber is even more dependent upon the soil in which it is rooted than on the existence of other trees.
Moreover, it is essential to note that although taxpayers claim that the destruction of some trees reduced the value of the whole tract by decreasing its density and increasing the susceptibility of the remaining trees to damage, they have not even attempted to assign a dollar amount to this loss. Rather, as noted, they have estimated the whole amount of their claimed loss (approximately $130,000) solely in terms of the board feet of timber actually destroyed. Since the burden is always upon the taxpayer to establish the amount of his loss, we must conclude that the taxpayers have failed to show any loss to the remainder of their tract.
Furthermore, in view of the requirement that the amount of a casualty loss be determined solely with reference to the property destroyed, we believe that the Commissioner’s analogy of a partial destruction of timber to a partial sale of such timber is eminently justified. The salient fact is that property of the type involved in this case is usually merchanted by means of partial sales. Thus, the Commissioner’s contention that timber is commercially divisible into units of board feet is amply supported by the fact that it is actually sold in such units in the ordinary course of business.
In addition, the Commissioner’s determination is supported by the presumption inherent in the Code that gain or loss upon an involuntary conversion of property (e. g., a conversion resulting from a destruction, theft, or condemnation of property) is, as a general rule, to be computed in the same manner as on a voluntary conversion of such property. Thus, § 1001(a) prescribes the method of computing gain or loss “from the sale or other disposition of property.” (Emphasis added.) And § 1011, referred to in § 1001(a), similarly prescribes the method of ascertaining “[t]he adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property.” (Emphasis added.) Compare § 1002 dealing with recognition of gain or loss on the “sale or exchange” of property. Nor can it be doubted that the broadly inclusive term “disposition of property” includes a destruction of the property by an involuntary conversion such as that caused by the ice storm in this case. See, e. g., § 1033.
The taxpayers have constructed a horrible hypothetical designed to demonstrate the claimed anomaly of the Commissioner’s determination. What if, they say, there were to be a selective ice storm or other disaster which would single out only young trees for destruction? Our answer is that under the Commissioner’s analysis two results, neither of which is at all anomalous, are possible. If the taxpayer had planted the young trees or otherwise obtained them at some cost, then he would have a basis allocable to those trees separate from his basis in the merchantable timber. See Treas.Reg. § 1.611-3(d) (3). He would then be able to deduct his loss in the young trees to the extent of that basis or their decline in market value, whichever was less. If, on the other hand, the new growth was regeneration which had occurred at no cost to the taxpayer he would have no allocable basis, and would not be entitled to any deduction for the loss. If the taxpayers take issue with this result, it can only be because they disapprove of the basic principle applicable to all casualty loss — that a taxpayer may take no deduction for the destruction of property in which he has no basis. The owners of timber incurring a partial loss are entitled to no more sympathy than the owners of other property who are similarly prevented from deducting their losses by a lack of allocable basis.
Finally, it is important to note that under the Commissioner’s rule, the petitioners are proportionately no worse off in the case of a partial loss than they would be under the rule they seek in the event of a total loss of all the timber on the tract. Thus, had the entire tract of timber been destroyed by the storm, the taxpayers would inevitably be limited to a deduction of $212,476.30 (their basis in the tract), despite the fact that the market value of their loss would be far greater. Under the Commissioner’s analysis, they are in relatively the same position in the circumstances before us, since they are permitted a deduction up to a percentage of their basis in the tract equal to the percentage of the timber lost. Also, it is apparent that the rule they seek would place them in a far more advantageous tax position in the case of a partial destruction of timber than they would enjoy had the entire tract been lost — a result which really is anomalous.
In sum, we believe that basic principles applicable to the deduction of casualty losses generally confirm the correctness of the Commissioner’s interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions.
V.
Finally, we note that we are supported in our conclusions by the latest case on the subject and the only one called to our attention dealing specifically with a partial loss of depletable timber. Harper v. United States, 396 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), affirming 274 F. Supp. 809 (D.S. C.1967). In Harper, the Fourth Circuit held, as we do here, that the amount of a casualty loss deduction allowable under § 165 for the partial destruction of a timber tract is limited to the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the timber actually destroyed. The taxpayers here attempt to avoid the application of Harper to them by noting that the taxpayer there estimated the amount of his loss solely in terms of the amount and value of the timber actually destroyed, not in terms of the decline in value of the whole tract affected. But this claimed distinction is ephemeral. In the instant case also, the taxpayers assessed their loss of market value in the tract solely in terms of the individual trees actually destroyed by the storm. Although they, like the taxpayer in Harper, claim that the value of the timber remaining on the tract has been diminished by the casualty, they have not assigned any dollar amount to this alleged loss.
Failing to distinguish Harper, the taxpayers attempt to prove it erroneous in light of prior cases on the subject. To summarize, they claim that the Commissioner’s determination in this case is merely a resuscitation of the previously discredited percentage of basis rule. Under that rule, the amount allowable as a casualty loss deduction for the partial destruction of any property was limited to a percentage of the taxpayer’s basis in the property equal to the ratio of the loss in value of the property as a result of the casualty to the value of the property immediately before the casualty. Since the Commissioner’s allocation of basis per unit of merchantable timber leads to a result approximately the same as the percentage of basis formula would, taxpayers urge, the Commissioner’s result must also be discredited.
We find this syllogism unconvincing because it completely ignores the reasons why the percentage of basis rule was discarded — reasons which have no application to the Commissioner’s determination in this case. Thus, in Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468, 59 S.Ct. 260, 83 L.Ed. 292 (1939), where the Supreme Court rejected the use of the percentage of basis rule for partial loss deductions with respect to nonbusiness property, the property actually involved was an automobile. Unlike a tract of timber, an automobile is both functionally and commercially a single unit. It cannot be divided into smaller parts without destroying both the utility and the value of the whole. We therefore do not read Owens as reaching the question whether the partial destruction of a property ordinarily separable into smaller units for commercial purposes should be treated in the same manner as a partial sale of such property. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit, holding in Alcoma Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 239 F.2d 365 (1956), that the Owens rule also applied to business property, specifically recognized the possibility that a percentage of basis rule might still be appropriate in the case of property readily divisible, and deliberately refrained from deciding this issue because it had not been presented to the court. Accordingly, Alcoma, did not in any way discredit a pro rata allocation of basis in the case of a partial destruction of property as readily divisible as timber. All that the court decided was that the property there involved could not be distinguished from the property in Owens for the purpose of applying the percentage of basis rule solely on the ground that it was business rather than non-business property.
Taxpayers further complain that the Commissioner’s analysis discriminates against them vis-a-vis the owners of ornamental or fruit trees who are permitted a deduction for a partial loss to the extent of their basis in all the trees taken as a unit. Treas.Reg. § 1.165-7(b) (2) and (3). Without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of that treatment, we need merely point out that such properties are distinguishable in an important respect. The divisibility of the timber involved in this case derives from two related factors: that the individual trees are fungible, and that, when mature, they are cut and sold in units as an end product. While ornamental and fruit trees do share with timber the former characteristic of fungibility, they lack this latter characteristic. Since of these three types of trees only timber has the quality of being used up in units as an end product, it only is given a depletion deduction, which, as set forth above, provides a method of computing allocable basis as partial sales are made. Because of this essential difference between timber and ornamental and fruit trees, we find no incongruity or unfairness in the Commissioner’s determination.
The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed.
. This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Tax Court by virtue of § 7482(a) of the Code. Venue in this Court is proper under § 7482(b) (1) as to all the petitioners except the Rosenthals, since all filed their 1960 income tax returns with the District Director of Internal Revenue, Manhattan, New York. Venue is proper as to the Rosenthals who filed their return with the District Director, San Francisco, California, by virtue of the stipulation they entered into •with the Commissioner on May 27, 1968. § 7482(b)(2).
. Treas.Reg. § 1.611-3 (c) (2) and (d)(3).
. The joint venture has for tax purposes treated the whole property as a single tract. See Treas.Reg. § 1.611-3 (c) and (d).
. See Treas.Reg. § 1.611-3(e).
. See §§ 701 et seq. concerning taxation of partnership income.
. Since the record before us does not reveal the basis upon which the plantations were treated, we are unable to draw any inference as to the correctness of the Commissioner’s determination of the remainder of the permissible deduction from his allowance of this item.
. The required calculation is:
adjusted basis of timber on tbe tract
m-r--r: — r=depletion unit total number of units of merchantable timber on the tract
depletion number of units of _ depletion
unit timber cut (or sold) deduction
. That is:
$212,476.30
58,445,000 board feet of timber =?3-64 per lm board feet
$3.64
1,000 board feet
X 4,757,100 board feet=$17,315.48
. This treatment has the effect of allowing no deduction for the pulpwood or naturally produced young growth destroyed. Since both the taxpayer and the Commissioner have applied the entire basis of the tract to the saw timber in computing the depletion unit, there is no basis allocable to the pulpwood. Nor did the young growth have any basis; the trees that arose naturally subsequent to the purchase of the tract had no cost, and, so far as the record before us reveals, the taxpayers did not choose to treat any of their original purchase price as attributable to the immature trees then on the tract. See Treas.Reg. § 1.611-3 (d) (3). The plantations, for which the Commissioner allowed a deduction, were planted at taxpayers’ expense and thus had a separate basis.
. The advantage to the taxpayer of making an election under § 631 is that he may then treat the gain or loss to be recognized at the time of the constructive sale as arising from a sale or exchange under § 1231. Treas.Reg. § 1.-631-1 (a). Thereafter, any subsequent gain or loss upon the actual sale of such timber shall be determined in accordance with Treas.Reg. § 1.631-1 (e).
. The taxpayers argue that this Regulation, published January 16, 1960, to be applicable “to any taxable year beginning after the date of the publication,” is inapplicable to this case, since the taxable year here in question commenced January 1, 1960. However, we need not resolve this precise issue because we regard the Regulation as merely an exemplification of the manner in which the statute has consistently been interpreted. See, e.g., Carloate Industries, Inc. v. United States, 354 U.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Koshland, 208 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1953).
. The percentage of basis formula is:
adjusted basis in the property
X
value lost percentage of by casualty _ basis limiting
casualty loss deduction value before casualty