Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant, Pleasant Grove, a city in Alabama that until recently had an all-white population, is covered by §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and accordingly must seek preclearance before instituting any change in a standard, practice, or procedure affecting voting. Appellant unsuccessfully sought preclearance by the Attorney General for the annexation of two parcels of land, one vacant and the other inhabited by a few whites. Appellant also failed to convince a three-judge District Court that the annexations did not have the purpose of abridging or denying the right to vote on account of race. We noted probable jurisdiction, 476 U. S. 1113 (1986), and now affirm.
HH
Appellant, whose population numbers approximately 7,000, was described by the District Court as “an all-white enclave in an otherwise racially mixed area of Alabama.” 568 F. Supp. 1455, 1456 (DC 1983). The city has a long history of racial discrimination. The District Court’s opinions chronicle the city’s past discriminatory practices in some detail, and we will not repeat that history fully here. See 623 F. Supp. 782, 787-788 (DC 1985); 568 F. Supp., at 1456-1457. Suffice it to say that in housing, zoning, hiring, and school policies appellant’s officials have shown unambiguous opposition to racial integration, both before and after the passage of the federal civil rights laws.
The two annexations at issue in this case are the Glasgow Addition, a 40-acre parcel added in 1969, App. 7, and the Western Addition, a 450-acre area added in 1979. The Glasgow Addition was added at the request of its inhabitants, an extended white family who wished their children to attend appellant’s newly formed, all-white school district rather than the recently desegregated Jefferson County system. The Western Addition is uninhabited, but the District Court found that “its location and the City’s plans [for relatively expensive housing] indicate that it is likely to be developed for use by white persons only.” 623 F. Supp., at 784, n. 5.
While approval of the Western Annexation was pending before the Alabama Legislature, appellant’s City Council voted to withdraw fire and paramedic services that appellant was providing without charge to an adjacent black neighborhood known as Pleasant Grove Highlands (Highlands). In response, inhabitants of the Highlands, which has housing comparable to that in Pleasant Grove, petitioned for annexation to the city. The City Council restored free fire protection, but did not otherwise act on the petition. App. 18-19.
Appellant sought preclearance for the annexation of the Western Addition, but the Attorney General objected because he found the refusal to annex the Highlands indicative of an intent to annex only white areas. The city then filed this declaratory action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. In denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment, the court held, over one judge’s dissent, that “a community may not annex adjacent white areas while applying a wholly different standard to black areas and failing to annex them based on that discriminatory standard.” 568 P. Supp., at 1460. In its subsequent decision on the merits, the court, with one judge dissenting, denied declaratory relief, holding that the city had failed to carry its burden of proving that the two annexations at issue did not have the purpose of abridging or denying the right to vote on account of race. This appeal followed.
II
Before addressing appellant’s arguments, we find it useful to review two fundamental principles of the Voting Rights Act.
First. An annexation of inhabited land constitutes a change in voting practice or procedure subject to preclearance under §5. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 368 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 388 (1971)). Even the annexation of vacant land on which residential development is anticipated must be precleared before those moving into the area may vote in the annexing jurisdiction. In City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 (1980), this Court affirmed the denial of preclearance to 13 annexations, 9 of which were vacant land. See id., at 194,196 (Powell, J., dissenting); City of Rome, Ga. v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 246 (DC 1979). This holding is consistent with the well-established teaching of Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), that Congress intended the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act to be given “the broadest possible scope,” id., at 567, and to reach “any state enactment which alter[s] the election law of a. covered State in even a minor way,” id., at 566. Allowing a State to circumvent the preclearance requirement for annexations by annexing vacant land intended for white developments would dis-serve Congress’ intent to reach “the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.” Id., at 565. Moreover, the Attorney General, whose interpretation of the Voting Rights Act is entitled to considerable deference, see, e. g., United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm’rs, 435 U. S. 110, 131 (1978), has consistently interpreted § 5 to reach the annexation of vacant land intended for residential development. Finally, Congress was aware of the Attorney General’s view in this regard, and implicitly approved it, when it reenacted the Voting Rights Act in 1982. Cf. id., at 131-135.
Second. “Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent.” City of Rome, supra, at 172 (emphasis in original). See also, e. g., City of Richmond, supra, at 378. The burden of proving absence of discriminatory purpose and effect is on appellant. See, e. g., City of Rome, supra, at 183, n. 18.
III
The city does not claim that either of the two annexations was not a change in voting practices subject to preclearance under § 5, even though the Western Addition was at the time uninhabited. Neither does it disagree that it must prove that the two annexations had neither the discriminatory purpose nor effect prohibited by § 5 of the Act. Its challenge is to the District Court’s conclusion that the city had not carried its burden of showing that the annexations were untainted by a racially discriminatory purpose. In arriving at this judgment, the District Court relied on a variety of evidence, principally its finding that the refusal to annex the Highlands while annexing other areas was racially motivated. These findings, both as to the purpose of not annexing the Highlands and with respect to the weight of the evidence regarding the purpose of the two annexations at issue, are findings of fact that we must accept unless clearly erroneous. The city has not convinced us that they are.
Appellant insists, as it did below, that its failure to annex the Highlands was not racially motivated, but based upon economic considerations. The District Court found this justification “a mere pretext for race-biased annexation decisions.” 623 F. Supp., at 784. The.court found that appellant’s economic argument was developed after the fact and was not the true basis for the decision not to annex the Highlands. Id., at 784-785. Furthermore, the court found that appellant’s argument did not reflect economic realities in a number of respects. For example, appellant’s calculation of the costs of annexing the Highlands included the cost of services it was already providing gratis to that neighborhood. Id., at 786-787. Appellant also failed to consider that annexing the Highlands would generate immediate ad valorem taxes and possibly development fees from the construction of new homes. Id., at 786. At the same time, appellant’s comparative estimate of the revenues that would be generated by the Western Addition failed to take into account such necessary costs as the construction of a new fire station, a major traffic artery, and a new neighborhood park. Id., at 787, n. 21. The District Court concluded that refusing to annex the Highlands was racially motivated.
Appellant argues that even if its decision not to annex the Highlands was racially motivated, that decision was not a change respecting voting and hence not subject to § 5. That point is correct but not dispositive; as the Solicitor General argues: “[T]he failure to annex [black] areas, while the city was simultaneously annexing non-black areas, is highly significant in demonstrating that the city’s annexation here was purposefully designed to perpetuate Pleasant Grove as an enlarged enclave of white voters.” Brief for United States 21, n. 12.
Appellant also relies on the fact that there were no black voters in Pleasant Grove at the time the relevant annexation decisions were made, so that the annexations did not reduce the proportion of black voters or deny existing black voters representation equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged community. Cf. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S., at 370-371. Appellant contends that since the annexations could not possibly have caused an impermissible effect on black voting, it makes no sense to say that appellant had a discriminatory purpose. This argument is based on the incorrect assumption that an impermissible purpose under § 5 can relate only to present circumstances. Section 5 looks not only to the present effects of changes, but to their future effects as well, as shown by the fact that annexations of vacant land are subject to preclearance even though no one’s right to vote is immediately affected. See supra, at 467-468, and n. 8. Likewise, an impermissible purpose under § 5 may relate to anticipated as well as present circumstances.
It is quite plausible to see appellant’s annexation of the Glasgow and Western Additions as motivated, in part, by the impermissible purpose of minimizing future black voting strength. Common sense teaches that appellant cannot indefinitely stave off the influx of black residents and voters — indeed, the process of integration, long overdue, has already begun. See supra, at 465, n. 2. One means of thwarting this process is to provide for the growth of a monolithic white voting block, thereby effectively diluting the black vote in advance. This is just as impermissible a purpose as the dilution of present black voting strength. Cf. City of Richmond, supra, at 378. To hold otherwise would make appellant’s extraordinary success in resisting integration thus far a shield for further resistance. Nothing could be further from the purposes of the Voting Rights Act.
In light of the record before us, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the District Court was mistaken either in finding that the refusal to annex the Highlands was racially motivated or that there was insufficient proof that the annexation of the Glasgow and Western Additions did not have a purpose forbidden by § 5. Those findings are not, therefore, clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564 (1985).
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly
Affirmed.
Section 5, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, provides in relevant part:
“Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,1964. . . such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, . . . and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the' qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made.”
It is undisputed that appellant, being a subdivision of the State of Alabama, is covered by § 5. See 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965).
At the time the District Court denied appellant’s motion for summary-judgment, the city had 32 black inhabitants, all of them residents of a nursing home. Because these persons were not registered to vote, and because city officials were apparently unaware of their existence at the time appellant made its latest annexation of land, the District Court treated appellant as all white. 568 F. Supp., at 1456, n. 3. Appellant informs us that in addition to the black residents of the nursing home, its inhabitants now include three black families, with two blacks registered to vote. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. Two other black families have homes under construction within the city limits. Ibid.
Appellant’s school system was subsequently found by a federal court to be an impermissible attempt to thwart the implementation of a unitary school system. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 448 F. 2d 403 (CA5 1971). Appellant was ordered to provide bus transportation to the black children assigned to its schools, but declined to do so. Ultimately, the court abolished appellant’s school system and transferred control of the schools back to Jefferson County. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 466 F. 2d 1213 (CA5 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Board of Education of the City of Pleasant Grove v. Stout, 411 U. S. 930 (1973).
Appellant has since resumed free paramedic services to the Highlands, and has continued the provision of free police services. 623 F. Supp. 782, 785 (DC 1985).
At the same time that it terminated free fire and paramedic protection to the Highlands, the City Council also terminated such free services to the black Dolomite neighborhood, which likewise petitioned unsuccessfully for annexation. The District Court’s opinion does not address in detail the decision not to annex the Dolomite area and we shall not consider it separately.
During hearings in 1981 on the extension of the Voting Rights Act, Congress asked the Department of Justice to provide summaries of relevant eases. In summarizing the present case, the Department stated: “The Attorney General interposed a Section 5 objection to the annexation to Pleasant Grove of certain vacant land projected for all-white residential development because of the city’s refusal to annex certain black areas.” Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 2567 (1982).
The complaint sought relief only with respect to the Western Addition, but the District Court, when it became aware that the Glasgow Addition had never been precleared, ordered appellant to amend the complaint to include that annexation as well. 568 F. Supp., at 1466, n. 1.
The court also observed that even if the burden of proving discrimination was on the United States, the court “would have had no difficulty in finding that the annexation policy of Pleasant Grove is, by design, raeially-discriminatory in violation of the Voting Rights Act.” 623 F. Supp., at 788, n. 30.
See Brief for United States 26, and n. 26. The Attorney General’s position is as follows:
“Certain annexations, such as those of vacant land designated for use as a public park, do not require Section 6 review. Because Section 5 is concerned only with voting practices and procedures, the Attorney General does not require submission for preclearance of annexations of uninhabited land before such annexations take place. Rather, the Attorney General requires covered jurisdictions to submit such annexations for preclearance before inhabitants on the annexed area may vote in the annexing jurisdiction.” Id., at 21, n. 12.
Indeed, in 1982 the Department apprised Congress of the Attorney General’s decision not to preclear appellant’s annexation of the Western Addition. See n. 5, supra. See also 128 Cong. Rec. 14297 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Helms) (criticizing Department of Justice decision not to preclear the annexation of an undeveloped subdivision in Wilson, N. C.); S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 10, and n. 21 (1982) (citing United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals 65, which in turn notes that the Department of Justice has denied preclearance to the annexations of undeveloped areas zoned for middle-income housing).
The dissent finds it “difficult to see how the Court justifies applying § 5 preclearance procedures at all” to the annexation of the Western Addition, because the annexation did not immediately enlarge the number of eligible voters. Post, at 477. It may be that Pleasant Grove could have delayed seeking preclearance for the Western Addition until that area had inhabitants desiring to vote, see n. 8, supra, but it is understandable that the city chose to seek preclearance at an earlier juncture: developing a tract of land is an expensive proposition, and the marketability of the new homes may depend on assurances that buyers will be entitled to all the benefits of residency in the city — including voting. The Attorney General’s decision to permit Pleasant Grove to seek preelearance at the time it did accommodates the city’s interests and was surely not forbidden by § 5.
Appellant’s argument is also incorrect insofar as it implies that a covered jurisdiction can short-circuit a purpose inquiry under § 5 by arguing that the intended result was not impermissible under an objective effects inquiry. Much of the dissent’s argument is to the same effect. See post, at 474-477. We rejected such reasoning in City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975). There, an annexation deprived blacks of majority voting status, but we held that no impermissible effect had been shown because “the post-annexation electoral system fairly recognize[d] the [black] minority’s political potential.” Id., at 378. But while the effect of reducing the relative strength of the black vote was, standing alone, perfectly legal, we found it necessary to remand the case for further inquiry into purpose. In so doing, we stated:
“[I]t may be asked how it could be forbidden by § 5 to have the purpose and intent of achieving only what is a perfectly legal result under that section and why we need remand for further proceedings with respect to purpose alone. The answer is plain, and we need not labor it. An official action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute. ... An annexation proved to be of this kind and not proved to have a justifiable basis is forbidden by § 5, whatever its actual effect may have been or may be.” Id., at 378-379.
To the extent that there is any doubt on the subject, it should be remembered that appellant has the burden of proving the absence of discriminatory purpose respecting voting. See supra, at 469.