Per Curiam.
Upon a complaint issued by the National Labor Relations Board and on the basis of a substantial record of evidence before a Hearing Examiner, the Board held that respondent's no-solicitation rule with respect to corridors and the cafeteria of the respondent hospital was overly broad and an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8 (a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(1).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s order. 188 U. S. App. D. C. 109, 578 F. 2d 351 (1978). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals dealt with corridors and the cafeteria separately, assigning different reasons for its holding with respect to each. As to corridors, the court simply concluded that there was no substantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that the corridors were not entitled to the same protection accorded other areas devoted essentially to patient care.
The court’s holding with respect to the cafeteria was based, however, on a legal judgment that no valid distinction can be made between a hospital cafeteria and cafeterias and restaurants that operate independently or in department stores. In the latter type of cases, the Board uniformly has held that the presumption in favor of the right to solicit on nonwork time in non work areas, established by Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), is inapplicable. The Court of Appeals therefore applied the general rule applicable to commercial cafeterias and restaurants to the hospital cafeteria.
In Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483 (1978), the Court concluded that the Republic Aviation presumption did apply to a hospital cafeteria maintained and operated primarily for employees and rarely used by patients or their families. The corridors of the hospital serving patients’ rooms, operating and treatment rooms, and other areas used by patients and their families were neither involved nor considered by the Court in Beth Israel.
As the Court’s decision in Beth Israel is relevant to the cafeteria issue in this case, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Beth Israel only on that issue. Insofar as the petition for certiorari seeks review of the corridor issue, the petition is denied.
In the present ease, the Board had applied the Republic Aviation presumption to all areas of the hospital deemed by it not devoted “strictly [to] patient care,” in accord with its decision in St. John’s Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N. L. R. B. 1150 (1976). The Board held that the corridors throughout the hospital and the cafeteria were noncare areas.
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