opinion: Mr. Justice Douglas
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The question in the case is whether petitioner, by virtue of a vesting order issued under § 5 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, 40 Stat. 411, 50 U. S. C. App. § 5, is entitled to the res of a trust established in 1928 by one Cobb and administered by respondent under an indenture. The trust was created for the benefit of the descendants of Bruno Reinicke who, by reason of his powers over the trust and his ownership of the right of reversion, was the real settlor.
  In 1945, when this Nation was at war with Germany, the Alien Property Custodian issued an order vesting “all right, title, interest and claim of any kind or character whatsoever” of the beneficiaries of the trust, declaring that they were nationals of Germany. Subsequently the Custodian (for whom the Attorney General was later substituted) intervened in an action brought by the trustee in the New York courts for a construction of the indenture and for an accounting. Relief sought by that intervention was that the income of the trust be paid to the Attorney General and that the powers reserved to the settlor be held to have passed by virtue of the vesting order to the Attorney General. We are also advised by the report of the case in the Court of Appeals that the Attorney General also claimed that, if the vesting order had not transferred the settlor’s powers to the Attorney General, “then the trust had failed and all of the trust property should pass to the Attorney General under the vesting order as being property of alien enemies.” Chase National Bank v. McGrath, 301 N. Y. 602, 603-604, 93 N. E. 2d 495.
  The New York Supreme Court denied the relief asked by the Attorney General, holding he was not entitled to the income of the trust, that he had not succeeded to the powers of the settlor, and that those powers were vested in the trustee as long as the settlor was barred from asserting them. On appeal the Appellate Division affirmed. Chase National Bank v. McGrath, 276 App. Div. 831, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 724. The Court of Appeals in turn affirmed. Chase National Bank v. McGrath, 301 N. Y. 602, 93 N. E. 2d 495. No review of that order was sought here.
  Some years passed, when, in 1953, the Attorney General amended the vesting order by undertaking to appropriate “all property in the possession, custody or control” of the trustee. In a suit in the New York courts he asked, among other things, that the principal of the trust be transferred to him. The Supreme Court of New York denied the relief. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. Chase National Bank v. Reinicke, 286 App. Div. 808, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 623. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Chase National Bank v. Reinicke, 309 N. Y. 1030, 129 N. E. 2d 790. The case is here on certiorari. 350 U. S. 964.
  We do not reach the several questions presented under the Trading with the Enemy Act for we are of the view that the principles of res judicata require an affirmance. In the first litigation, the Attorney General sought to reach the equitable interests in the trust and the powers of the settlor. When the Attorney General now seeks the entire bundle of rights, he is claiming for the most part what was denied him in the first suit. That is not all. In the first suit he claimed that if he were denied the powers which the settlor had over the trust, the trust must fail and all the trust property must be transferred to him. In other words, the Attorney General tendered in the first suit his claim to the entire property. Cf. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U. S. 204, 208-209. Under familiar principles of res judicata, the claim so tendered may not be relitigated. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352; Tait v. Western Maryland R. Co., 289 U. S. 620, 623. If he was not content with the first ruling, his remedy was by certiorari to this Court. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 189. Having failed to seek and obtain that review, he is barred from relitigating the issues tendered in the first suit.
  Affirmed.
  Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
  The state of war between this country and Germany was declared ended by the Joint Resolution of October 19, 1951, 65 Stat. 451. That Resolution contained, however, a proviso that all property, which, prior to January 1, 1947, was subject to seizure under the Act, continued to be subject to the Act. The 1953 vesting order preceded by a few days the termination of the vesting program of German-owned properties announced by the President on April 17, 1953.
choices: comity: civil rights comity: criminal procedure comity: First Amendment comity: habeas corpus comity: military comity: obscenity comity: privacy comity: miscellaneous comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute) venue no merits: writ improvidently granted no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals) no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law) no merits: miscellaneous standing to sue: adversary parties standing to sue: direct injury standing to sue: legal injury standing to sue: personal injury standing to sue: justiciable question standing to sue: live dispute standing to sue: parens patriae standing standing to sue: statutory standing standing to sue: private or implied cause of action standing to sue: taxpayer's suit standing to sue: miscellaneous judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753) judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction judicial administration: review of non-final order judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision) judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question) judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction) judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal) judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata judicial administration: interpleader judicial administration: untimely filing judicial administration: Act of State doctrine judicial administration: miscellaneous Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction