opinion: Per Curiam.
  Petitioners were convicted of various state crimes and sentenced to fixed terms.of imprisonment. They were then committed to the Patuxent Institution in lieu of sentence, for an indeterminate period, pursuant to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 31B. They sought federal habeas corpus, challenging on constitutional grounds the criteria and procedures that led to their commitment, and the conditions of their confinement. They contend, inter alia, that the statutory standard for commitment is impermissibly vague, that they are entitled to put the government to the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the compulsory psychiatric examination prescribed by the statute they were entitled to have the assistance of counsel and to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, and that they are being denied a constitutional right to treatment. The District Court denied relief sub nom. Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 389 (Md. 1969), and the Court of Appeals affirmed sub nom. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F. 2d 1153 (CA4 1971). We granted certiorari, 404 U. S. 999 (1971), to consider whether, and to what extent, the constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners apply to this kind of commitment process. After briefing and oral argument, it now appears that this case does not present these issues in a manner that warrants the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
  1. Of the four petitioners, one has been unconditionally released from confinement, and the other three are subject to criminal sentences that have not yet expired, and that would bar their release from custody even if their claims were to prevail. This fact, while not necessarily dispositive of all the claims presented by these petitioners, casts those claims in a different light, not contemplated by our original grant of the writ. Cf. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, ante, p. 245.
  2. Under our decisions in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966), Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 (1972), petitioners’ challenge to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law should be considered in relation to the criteria, procedures, and treatment that the State of Maryland, makes available to other persons, not “defective delinquents,” committed for compulsory psychiatric treatment. We are informed that the statutes governing civil commitment, in Maryland are presently undergoing substantial revision, designed to provide greater substantive and procedural safeguards to committed persons. Accordingly, it seems a particularly inopportune time for this Court to consider a comprehensivé challenge to the Defective Delinquency Law.
  In these circumstances, the writ of fore dismissed as improvidently granted.
  It is so ordered.
  Petitioner Murel was originally committed as a defective delinquent in 1962, and Creswell in 1958; their separate petitions for federal habeas corpus were denied without hearing in 1963. On appeal, the Court of Appeals consolidated these and other similar cases, and remanded all of them for a hearing, sub nom. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F. 2d 506 (CA4 1964). The hearing was deferred, by agreement of the parties, pending the outcome of related litigation in the state courts, which culminated in tSe decision in Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A. 2d 397, cert. denied sub nom. Avey v. Boslow, 385 U. S. 940 (1966). The federal habeas hearing was then held in the consolidated cases, which by this time also included that of petitioners Hayes and Avey, who had been committed after the Court of Appeals’ remand order. The. petitions were again denied, 295 F. Supp. 389 (Md. 1969), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 436 F. 2d 1153 (CA4 1971).
  At the start of this litigation nine years ago both Murel and Creswell were subject to confinement' that was wholly attributable to the Defective Delinquency Law, their sentences having expired. This is no longer the case because Murel was recently released, and Creswell was convicted and sentenced on new charges. We therefore do not reach their claims.
  We do not suggest that these claims, are moot, or that a case or controversy is lacking, or that habeas corpus is inappropriate to test the special incidents, if any, of these defective-delinquency confinements. See Carajas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 (1963); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 248 (1971).
choices: comity: civil rights comity: criminal procedure comity: First Amendment comity: habeas corpus comity: military comity: obscenity comity: privacy comity: miscellaneous comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute) venue no merits: writ improvidently granted no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals) no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law) no merits: miscellaneous standing to sue: adversary parties standing to sue: direct injury standing to sue: legal injury standing to sue: personal injury standing to sue: justiciable question standing to sue: live dispute standing to sue: parens patriae standing standing to sue: statutory standing standing to sue: private or implied cause of action standing to sue: taxpayer's suit standing to sue: miscellaneous judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753) judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction judicial administration: review of non-final order judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision) judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question) judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction) judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal) judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata judicial administration: interpleader judicial administration: untimely filing judicial administration: Act of State doctrine judicial administration: miscellaneous Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction