opinion: Per Curiam.
  The general question presented by these two cases is whether it is within the scope of the reviewing authority of a Court of Appeals to postpone the operation of a valid cease and desist order of the Federal Trade Commission against a single firm until similar orders have been entered against that firm’s competitors. In proceedings arising out of alleged violations of the price discrimination provisions of the Clayton Act, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13, two Courts of Appeals reached opposed results on this underlying issue. In order to resolve the conflict we granted certiorari, 353 U. S. 908, 982.
  In No. 77, petitioner (Moog Industries, Inc.) was found by the Commission to have violated the Act and was ordered to cease and desist from further violation. 51 F. T. C. 931. Petitioner sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Upon affirmance of the order, 238 F. 2d 43, petitioner moved the court to hold the entry of judgment in abeyance on the ground that petitioner would suffer serious financial loss if prohibited from engaging in pricing practices open to its competitors. The court denied the requested relief.
  In No. 110, respondent (C. E. Niehoff & Co.) requested the Commission to hold in abeyance the cease and desist order that had been recommended by the hearing examiner, on the ground that respondent would have to go out of business if compelled to sell at a uniform price while its competitors were not under similar restraint. The Commission found that respondent had violated the Act and, in issuing its order, denied respondent’s request. 51 F. T. C. 1114, 1153. On review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Commission’s determination of statutory violation was affirmed; however, the court (one judge dissenting) directed that the cease and desist order should take effect “at such time in the future as the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit may direct, sua sponte or upon motion of the Federal Trade Commission.” 241 F. 2d 37, 43.
  In view of the scope of administrative discretion that Congress has given the Federal Trade Commission, it is ordinarily not for courts to modify ancillary features of a valid Commission order. This is but recognition of the fact that in the shaping of its remedies within the framework of regulatory legislation, an agency is called upon to exercise its specialized, experienced judgment. Thus, the decision as to whether or not an order against one firm to cease and desist from engaging in illegal price discrimination should go into effect before others are similarly prohibited depends on a variety of factors peculiarly within the expert understanding of the Commission. Only the Commission, for example, is competent to make an initial determination as to whether and to what extent there is a relevant “industry” within which the particular respondent competes and whether or not the nature of that competition is such as to indicate identical treatment of the entire industry by an enforcement agency. Moreover, although an allegedly illegal practice may appear to be operative throughout an industry, whether such appearances reflect fact and whether all firms in the industry should be dealt with in a single proceeding or should receive individualized treatment are questions that call for discretionary determination by the administrative agency. It is clearly within the special competence of the Commission to appraise the adverse effect on competition that might result from postponing a particular order prohibiting continued violations of the law. Furthermore, the Commission alone is .empowered to develop that enforcement policy best calculated to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress and to allocate its available funds and personnel in such a way as to execute its policy efficiently and economically.
  The question, then, of whether orders such as those before us should be held in abeyance until the respondents’ competitors are proceeded against is for the Commission to decide. If the question has not been raised before the Commission, as was the situation in No. 77, a reviewing court should not in any event entertain it. If the Commission has decided the question, its discretionary determination should not be overturned in the absence of a patent abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the judgment in No. 77 is affirmed, and the judgment in No. 110 is vacated and the cause remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to affirm the order of the Commission in its entirety.
  It is so ordered.
  Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
choices: comity: civil rights comity: criminal procedure comity: First Amendment comity: habeas corpus comity: military comity: obscenity comity: privacy comity: miscellaneous comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute) venue no merits: writ improvidently granted no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals) no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law) no merits: miscellaneous standing to sue: adversary parties standing to sue: direct injury standing to sue: legal injury standing to sue: personal injury standing to sue: justiciable question standing to sue: live dispute standing to sue: parens patriae standing standing to sue: statutory standing standing to sue: private or implied cause of action standing to sue: taxpayer's suit standing to sue: miscellaneous judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753) judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction judicial administration: review of non-final order judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision) judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question) judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction) judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal) judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata judicial administration: interpleader judicial administration: untimely filing judicial administration: Act of State doctrine judicial administration: miscellaneous Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction