PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged by indictment on August 9, 1978, along with one other individual, of conspiring to locate, steal and transport in interstate commerce a John Deere Model 480 forklift tractor (hereinafter the forklift) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 and 2313 (Count I), and with transportation of the forklift in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (Count II). On October 26, 1978 defendant entered a plea of guilty to Count II. The court accepted the plea, imposed a three-year prison sentence, and upon motion by the government dismissed Count I.
Relevant facts shown by the hearing transcript and admitted in defendant’s appellate brief include the following:
(1) Defendant personally stole the forklift from a location in Benton County, Iowa and delivered it to Keith Clark’s sod farm in Linn County, Iowa.
(2) Defendant knew when he stole the forklift it was going to be transported out of Iowa. The forklift was transported from Iowa to Washington state by an unindicted coconspirator. Defendant in his brief emphasizes he did not actually transport the forklift across any state lines, but it is admitted that defendant “seemed to have knowledge that the ultimate disposition of the tractor was through transportation, although the knowledge may have come at a time subsequent to the actual theft of the vehicle.”
(3) Defendant received $500.00 from the sale of the forklift. In his brief defendant claims he did not share in the profits from sale of the stolen forklift, although he states that he was paid for his services in stealing the forklift and that he was subsequently hired to drive the semi-tractor, which had been used to transport the forklift from Iowa to Washington, back to Iowa.
It is established that an unconditional plea of guilty waives all prior infirmities which neither affect the court’s jurisdiction nor the substantive sufficiency of the indictment. Coleman v. Burnett, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 302, 309, 477 F.2d 1187, 1194 (1973); Hopkins v. United States, 344 F.2d 229, 234 (8th Cir. 1965); Michener v. United States, 170 F.2d 973, 975 (8th Cir. 1948). Thus, on direct appeal of a conviction the accused ordinarily cannot be heard to contend that there is no evidence of his guilt.
In this direct appeal defendant contends (1) that all elements of the offense of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle must be present before jurisdiction attaches, (2) one element is that defendant must have transported or wilfully caused the transportation in interstate commerce, (3) the requirement of interstate transportation is not satisfied by some knowledge or even foreseeability of interstate transportation by others if defendant was neither directly involved nor an active assistant in the interstate transportation, and (4) the instant defendant did not transport the forklift across state lines or cause its transportation; thus the elements necessary to establish a violation under 18 U.S.C. § 2312 were not present, jurisdiction did not attach, and the judgment of the district court cannot stand.
Indulging the highly questionable assumption that by couching his attack in jurisdictional terms appellant may on direct appeal question the factual sufficiency of the record to support his conviction, we nevertheless conclude that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
While the Supreme Court has suggested that even with certain federal crimes requiring mens rea, a particular offender may be convicted without showing his knowledge of those facts which gave rise to federal jurisdiction, the record before us shows defendant was aware that the vehicle he stole was going to be transported in interstate commerce.
Indeed, the vehicle was stolen by defendant, it was transported in interstate commerce, and defendant specifically admitted guilty knowledge.
At the October 26, 1978 hearing the court read the elements of the indictment and crime including “that you transported or caused to be transported in interstate commerce the stolen vehicle.” And the defendant affirmatively stated that he understood the elements of the offense, and that he was voluntarily pleading guilty, admitting the commission of each element of the offense. The court specifically asked, “When you stole the tractor [forklift] did you have knowledge or understanding that it was going to be sent to the State of Washington, or the west coast; at least out of the State of Iowa?” And defendant answered, “Yes.” The court continued, “And you participated in the theft of this [forklift] knowing this was going to be the ultimate disposition?” Defendant again answered, “Yes.” This clearly is sufficient to show defendant understood and admitted the essential elements of the offense charged including the element of interstate commerce, and to uphold the conviction. Cf. Kress v. United States, 411 F.2d 16, 18 (8th Cir. 1969).
The judgment is affirmed.
. The Honorable Edward J. McManus, Chief United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 691-96, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975); cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1974).
What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.