DOBIE, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves income taxes for the years 1936 and 1937, in the amounts of $737.-95 and $747.30 respectively, assessed against the petitioner, William H. Moorhead (hereinafter called Moorhead). The appeal was taken from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (hereinafter called the Board).
Moorhead’s grandmother (hereinafter called the testatrix) died on August 21, 1908, leaving a will dated June 13, 1903, under which a trust was created for the benefit of Moorhead and others. A codicil to this will, executed by the testatrix in 1905, provided : “Third. — I will and direct that neither the income, payable to my grandson, William H. Watt (Moorhead), nor the corpus from which the same is derived, shall be liable to or for the contracts or debts of said William H. Watt or to execution or attachments, at the suit of any of his creditors; but shall be absolutely free from the same, and he shall have no power to sell, assign, or encumber the same or any part thereof, or to in any way anticipate the said income.”
After testatrix’s death, the trustees began to make payments to Moorhead, whose entire income came from the trust. On May 4, 1903, Moorhead married, and his wife, Gertrude Moorhead (hereinafter called the wife), remained his wife during the years involved in this case. In 1916, in an action brought by the wife, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, ordered Moorhead to pay the wife the sum of $7,000 a year, until further order of the court, for her maintenance and support. Later, the wife procured a decree from this same court enjoining the trustees from paying any portion of the trust proceeds until further order of the court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the wife could collect from Moorhead’s share of the trust proceeds, her allowance for maintenance and support. In re Moor-head’s Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802, 52 A.L.R. 1251, and, for an interesting note dealing with this case, see 28 Va.L.Rev. 527, 533. See, also, In re Stewart’s Estate, 334 Pa. 356, 5 A.2d 910. And, thereafter, the trustees, accordingly paid the sum of $7,-000 a year directly to the wife.
We are concerned only with a single question. Must Moorhead pay a federal income tax, under Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 22(a), for each of the years 1936 and 1937, on the sum of $7,000, paid by the trustees directly to the wife, out of Moorhead’s portion of the income payable to him under the spendthrift trust created by the will of testatrix? This question was answered affirmatively, and we also think correctly, in the decision of the Board.
Only one contention of Moorhead requires notice. He contends that testatrix entertained a lively affection for the wife and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of In re Moorhead’s Estate, supra, decided that the wife, as to the allowance to her from the proceeds of the trust fund, took an interest directly from the will of testatrix. Though certain expressions in the opinion in that case lend some support to this view, we nevertheless think that the contention lacks merit. As we read the opinion, all that the Court held, or intended to hold, was that the wife (i. e., this particular wife) was not excluded, under the words of testatrix’s will creating the spendthrift trust, from resorting to the income received by Moorhead under the trust in order that the wife might thereby satisfy any valid claim she might have against Moorhead arising out of his duty to maintain and support the wife.
In the instant case, it seems clear that Moorehead’s duty to maintain and support the wife was a continuing duty. Further, the allowance to the wife of $7,000 a year during the years in question was still in gremio legis and subject to the control of the Pennsylvania 'Courts. Moorhead, accordingly, derived obvious benefit from the payments to his wife in discharge of his marital obligations. He must, therefore, include the amounts thus paid to his obligee in his own gross income tax. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 59, 80 L.Ed. 3, 101 A.L.R. 391; Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U.S. 551, 56 S.Ct. 304, 80 L.Ed. 389; Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149, 60 S.Ct. 427, 84 L.Ed. 665; Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80, 60 S.Ct. 780, 84 L.Ed. 1087. Our holding, we think, is directly in line with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas in the very recent case of Pearce v. Commissioner, 62 S.Ct. 754, 86 L.Ed. -, decided by the U. S. Supreme Court March 9, 1942.
We, accordingly, affirm the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.
Affirmed.
What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.