opinion: Chief Justice Rehnquist
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  During the course of respondent Robinson’s mail fraud trial in the Middle District of Tennessee, his counsel urged in closing argument that the Government had not allowed respondent to explain his side of the story. The prosecutor during his summation informed the jury that respondent “could have taken the stand and explained it to you. . . .” App. 27. We hold that the comment by the prosecutor did not violate respondent’s privilege to be free from compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
  Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, respondent was convicted of two counts of mail fraud, 18 U. S. C. § 1341; both counts involved arson-related insurance claims. The evidence at trial showed that respondent leased a truck stop in Guthrie, Kentucky, in 1979. The business deteriorated over the next several months. Two days after respondent increased the insurance coverage on the truckstop an explosion and fire destroyed the premises. A number of unusual circumstances suggested arson. Respondent subsequently submitted an insurance claim of $80,000.
  Approximately one year later, respondent’s home in Clarksville, Tennessee, was badly damaged by arson an hour after respondent had departed for California in a large truck filled with household furnishings. When interviewed by investigators, respondent denied setting fire to his house and explained that he had removed the household furnishings to take them to his daughter in California. Respondent filed with his insurance company a proof of loss claim of $200,000, including a $106,500 personal property claim. Certain property included in this claim was later discovered by authorities in respondent’s California home.
  Respondent did not testify at trial. In his closing argument to the jury, the theme of respondent’s counsel was that the Government had breached its “duty to be fair.” Several different times, counsel charged that the Government had unfairly denied respondent the opportunity to explain his actions. Counsel concluded by informing the jury that respondent was not required to testify, and that although it would be natural to draw an adverse inference from respondent’s failure to take the stand, the jury could not and should not do so.
  Following this closing and out of the presence of the jury, the prosecution objected to the remarks of defense counsel and contended that the defense had “opened the door.” The court agreed, stating:
  "... I will tell you what, the Fifth Amendment ties the Government’s hands in terms of commenting upon the defendant’s failure to testify. But that tying of hands is not putting you into a boxing match with your hands tied behind your back and allowing him to punch you in the face.
  “That is not what it was intended for and not fair. I will let you say that the defendants had every opportunity, if they wanted to, to explain this to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury.” App. 25.
  Respondent did not object.
  Following a short recess, the prosecutor gave his rebuttal summation. He began by stating that the Government had an obligation to “play fair” and had complied with that obligation in this case. Specifically, he stated:
  “[Defense counsel] has made comments to the extent the Government has not allowed the defendants an opportunity to explain. It is totally unacceptable.
  “He explained himself away on tape right into an indictment. He explained himself to the insurance investigator, to the extent that he wanted to.
  “He could have taken the stand and explained it to. you, anything he wanted to. The United States of America has given him, throughout, the opportunity to explain.” Id., at 27.
  Defense counsel did not object to this closing and did not request a cautionary instruction. Nonetheless, the court included in the jury instruction the admonition that “no inference whatever may be drawn from the election of a defendant not to testify.” Tr. 694.
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed respondent’s convictions, finding that the prosecutor’s comment had “deprived the defendant ... of a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. §3481.” 716 F. 2d 1095, 1096, 1097 (1983) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), and Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 (1893)). The court held that because the prosecution’s reference to respondent’s failure to testify had been “direct,” it did not matter that it was made in response to remarks by defense counsel. This Court granted certiorari, vacated that judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded for reconsideration in light of United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1 (1985). 470 U. S. 1025 (1985). There we held that improper remarks by the prosecutor — in which he expressed his personal belief that the defendant was guilty — did not constitute reversible error under the standard properly applicable. On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reinstated its prior judgment. 794 F. 2d 1132 (1986). We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1083 (1987), to consider whether the remarks violated the Fifth Amendment, and if so, whether the violation constituted plain error. Because we conclude that there was no constitutional error at all, we do not reach the plain-error issue.
  In Griffin v. California, supra, the defendant, who had not testified, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder. The prosecution had emphasized to the jury in closing argument that the defendant, who had been with the victim just prior to her demise, was the only person who could provide information as to certain details related to the murder, and yet, he had “ ‘not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain.’” Id., at 611. In accordance with the California Constitution, the trial court had instructed the jury that although the defendant had a constitutional right not to testify, the jury could draw an inference unfavorable to the defendant as to facts within his knowledge about which he chose not to testify. Id., at 610. This Court reversed the conviction ruling that the prosecutor’s comments and the jury instruction impermissibly infringed upon the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent:
  “[Comment on the refusal to testify] is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege. What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.” Id., at 614 (citations omitted).
  The Court said that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Id., at 615.
  We think that the Court of Appeals’ holding in this case rests both upon too broad a reading of Griffin and upon too restrictive a reading of the closing comments of respondent’s counsel. Taking up the second of these points first, we think the reasoning of the opinion of the Court of Appeals necessarily rests on the assumption that the references by respondent’s counsel to the Government’s failure to provide respondent an opportunity to “explain” were directed only to the period during which the offenses were being investigated, and not the trial itself. Respondent understandably mirrors this position in his brief here. While we agree that defense counsel’s remarks could have been interpreted in this manner, we do not think that an appellate court may substitute its reading of ambiguous language for that of the trial court and counsel. The colloquy quoted earlier shows that the trial court, immediately after hearing counsel’s comment, understood them to mean that the Government had not allowed respondent to explain his side of the story either before or during trial. While respondent now contends that this interpretation is incorrect, he did not offer, while the matter was being considered by the trial judge, the explanation which he now supports. If counsel’s remarks were, as respondent now argues, so clearly limited to the pretrial period, we think it unusual, to say the least, that counsel would have stood silently by when the trial court made clear its contrary interpretation. We accept what we regard as a reasonable interpretation of the remarks adopted by the trial court.
  We hold that the prosecutor’s statement that respondent could have explained to the jury his story did not in the light of the comments by defense counsel infringe upon respondent’s Fifth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals and respondent apparently take the view that any “direct” reference by the prosecutor to the failure of the defendant to testify violates the Fifth Amendment as construed in Griffin. We decline to give Griffin such a broad reading, because we think such a reading would be quite inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment, which protects against compulsory self-incrimination. The Griffin court addressed prosecutorial comment which baldly stated to the jury that the defendant must have known what the disputed facts were, but that he had refused to take the stand to deny or explain them. We think there is considerable difference for purposes of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination between the sort of comments involved in Griffin and the comments involved in this case.
  In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 319 (1976), we stated that “Griffin prohibits the judge and prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt.” See also Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 338 (1978). In the present case it is evident that the prosecutorial comment did not treat the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt, but instead referred to the possibility of testifying as one of several opportunities which the defendant was afforded, contrary to the statement of his counsel, to explain his side of the case. Where the prosecutor on his own initiative asks the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence, Griffin holds that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated. But where as in this case the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel, we think there is no violation of the privilege.
  “Under Griffin ... it is improper for either the court or the prosecutor to ask the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence. But I do not believe the protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 515 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
  The principle that prosecutorial comment must be examined in context is illustrated by our treatment of a Fifth Amendment claim in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). We quickly dismissed the argument that the prosecutor had violated the defendant’s right to remain silent when he repeatedly remarked that the evidence was uncontradicted. We did not need to decide whether such comment was generally improper, because in that case “Lockett’s own counsel had clearly focused the jury’s attention on her silence, first, by outlining her contemplated defense in his opening statement and, second, by stating to the court and jury near the close of the case, that Lockett would be the ‘next witness.’” Id., at 595. We concluded: “When viewed against this background, it seems clear that the prosecutor’s closing remarks added nothing to the impression that had already been created by Lockett’s refusal to testify after the jury had been promised a defense by her lawyer and told that Lockett would take the stand.” Ibid.; cf. United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1 (1985); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168 (1986).
  “[The] central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225 (1975) . . . .” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 681 (1986). To this end it is important that both the defendant and the prosecutor have the opportunity to meet fairly the evidence and arguments of one another. The broad dicta in Griffin to the effect that the Fifth Amendment “forbids . . . comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence,” 380 U. S., at 615, must be taken in the light of the facts of that case. It is one thing to hold, as we did in Griffin, that the prosecutor may not treat a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent at trial as substantive evidence of guilt; it is quite another to urge, as defendant does here, that the same reasoning would prohibit the prosecutor from fairly responding to an argument of the defendant by adverting to that silence. There may be some “cost” to the defendant in having remained silent in each situation, but we decline to expand Griffin to preclude a fair response by the prosecutor in situations such as the present one.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
  Reversed.
  Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
  Respondent was acquitted on two counts of making false statements to a bank for purposes of obtaining a loan, 18 U. S. C. § 1014, and the District Court dismissed at the close of the evidence two counts of making and possessing a destructive device, 26 U. S. C. § 5861.
  “By the way, all of those statements, I don’t know how many statements we heard of Mr. Robinson, they were all about the arson. Did they ever give him a chance to explain about those sorts of things, about mail fraud?
  “Did they ever give this man an opportunity in their many, many statements they took at the time to say, “Well, I had two bedroom sets.’” App. 18.
  “The furniture and clothing, all that clothing out on the lawn, . . -. ‘What about your clothing?’ They never gave him a chance to explain.” Id., at 19.
  “Now, would you like to get indicted for that, without the Government being fair, and being able to explain, have him explain before you, members of your own community, rather than before the agents?” Ibid.
  “Now, here is what the Government, to be fair with the jury, should have done. They should have taken those items in the Kentucky inventory and just proved them. Why let the defendant disprove them, give him an opportunity to explain?” Id., at 21.
  “In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offense against the United States . . . the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption against him.” 18 U. S. C. § 3481.
  Concomitant with the protections of the Fifth Amendment are those afforded by § 3481. See n. 3, supra. For many years, the prohibition on adverse comment concerning a defendant’s failure to testify was grounded solely in § 3481. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 (1893). Since that time, however, the scope of the Fifth Amendment has been expanded to encompass in large part the terrain previously occupied solely by § 3481. See Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965). In circumstances such as these, the two provisions are generally construed in a parallel fashion. Id., at 613-614 (quoting a passage from Wilson and concluding: “If the words ‘Fifth Amendment’ are substituted for ‘act’ and for ‘statute,’ the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected”); see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 504-508 (1983).
  In United States v. Young and Darden v. Wainwright, we concluded that statements by the prosecutor which inflamed the jury, vouched for the credibility of witnesses, or offered the prosecutor’s personal opinion as to the defendant’s guilt were improper, but we held that, in context, those statements did not necessitate reversal. In contrast, a reference to the defendant’s failure to take the witness stand may, in context, be perfectly proper.