opinion: Mr. Justice Frankfurter
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Petitioner was tried in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 18, 1953, for robbery of a federally insured savings and loan a,sso-ciation, the General Savings and Loan Association of Cicero, Illinois, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2113. The case was tried to a jury and resulted in an acquittal. On January 8, 1954,- an Illinois grand jury indicted Bartkus. The facts recited in the Illinois indictment were substantially identical to those contained in the prior federal indictment. The Illinois indictment charged that these facts constituted a violation of Illinois Revised Statutes, 1951, c. 38, § 501,-a robbery statute. .Bartkus was tried and convicted in the Criminal Court of Cook County and was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Statute. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1951, c. 38, § 602.
  The Illinois trial court considered and rejected petitioner’s plea of autrefois acquit. That ruling and other alleged errors were challenged before the Illinois Supreme Court which affirmed the conviction. 7 Ill. 2d 138, 130 N. E. 2d 187. We granted certiorari because the petition raised a substantial question concerning the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. 352 U.' S. 907, 958. On January 6, 1958, the judgment below was affirmed by "’.an equally divided Court. 355 U. S. 281. On May 26, 1958, the Court granted a petition for rehearing, vacated the judgment entered January 6, 1958, and restored the case to the calendar for reargument. 356 U. S. 969.
  The state and federal prosecutions were separately con-' ducted. It is true that the agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had conducted the investigation on • behalf of the Federal Government turned over to the Illinois prosecuting officials all the evidence he had gathered against the petitioner. Concededly, some of that evidence had been gathered after acquittal in the federal court. The only other connection between the two trials is to be foufld in a suggestion that the federal sentencing of the accomplices who testified against petitioner in both trials was purposely continued by the federal court until after they testified in the state trial. The record establishes that the prosecution was undertaken by state prosecuting officials within their discretionary responsibility arid on the basis of evidence that conduct contrary to the penal code of Illinois had occurred within their jurisdiction. It establishes also that federal officials acted in cooperation with state authorities, as is the conventional practice between the two sets of prosecutors throughout the country. It does not support the claim that the State of Illinois in bringing its prosecution was merely a tool of the federal authorities, who thereby avoided the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment against a retrial of a federal prosecution after an acquittal. It does not sustain a conclusion .that the state prosecution .was a sham and, a cover for. a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fact another federal prosecution.
  Since the new prosecution was by Illinois, and not by the Federal Government, the claim of unconstitutionality must rest upon the Due Process Ólause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior cases in this Court relating to successive state and federal prosecutions have been concerned with the Fifth Amendment,- and the scope of its proscription'of second prosecutions by the Federal Government, not with the Fourteénth Amendment’s effect on state action. We are now called upon to draw on the considerations which have guided the Court in applying the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment on state powers. We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such. The relevant historical materials have been canvassed by this Court and by legal scholars. These materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress and the members of the legislatures of the ratifying States did' not contemplate that the Fourteenth Amendment was a short-hand incorporation of the first eight amendments making them applicable as explicit restrictions upon the States.
  Evidencing the interpretation by both Congress and the States of the Fourteenth Amendment is a comparison of the constitutions of the ratifying States with the Federal Constitution. Having regard only to the grand jury guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, the criminal jury guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, and the civil jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment, it is apparent that if the first eight amendments were being applied verbatim to the States, ten of the thirty ratifying States would have impliedly been imposing upon themselves constitutional requirements on vital issues of state policies contrary to those present in their own constitutions. Or, to approach the matter in a different way, they would be covertly altering provisions of their own constitutions in disregard of the amendment procedures required by those constitutions. Five other States would have been qnder-taking procedures not in conflict with, but not required by their constitutions. Thus only one-half, or fifteen, of. the ratifying States had constitutions in explicit accord with these provisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. Of these fifteen, four made alterations in their constitutions by 1875 which brought them into important conflict with one or more of these provisions of the Federal Constitution. One of the States whose constitution had not included any provision on one of the three procedures under investigation adopted a provision in 1890 which was inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. And so by 1890 only eleven of the thirty ratifying States were in explicit accord with these provisions of the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution. Four were silent as to one or more of the provisions and fifteen were in open conflict with these same provisions..
  Similarly imposing evidence of the understanding of the Due Process Clause is supplied by the history of the admission of the twelve States entering the Union after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of each, Congress required that the State’s constitution be “not repugnant” to the Constitution of the United States. Not one of the constitutions of the twelve States contains all three of the procedures relating to grand jury, criminal jury, and civil jury. In fact all twelve have provisions obviously different from the requirements of the Fifth,. Sixth, or Seventh Amendments., And yet, in the case of each admission, either the President of the United States, or Congress, or both have found that the constitution was in conformity with the Enabling Act and the Constitution of the United States. Nor is there warrant to believe that the States in adopting constitutions with the specific purpose of complying with the requisites of admission were in fact evading the demands of the Constitution of the United States.
  Surely this compels the conclusion that Congress and the States have always believed that the Due Process Clause brought into play a basis of restrictions upon the States other than the undisclosed incorporation of the original eight amendments. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, this Court considered due process in its historical setting, reviewed its development as a concept in Anglo-American law from the time of the Magna Carta until the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded that it was intended to be a flexible concept, responsive to thought and experience— experience which is reflected in a solid body of judicial opinion, all manifesting deep convictions to be. unfolded by a process of “inclusion and exclusion.” Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104. Time and again this Court has attempted by general phrases not to define but to indicate the purport of due process and to adumbrate the continuing adjudicatory process in its application. The statement by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, has especially commended itself and been frequently cited in later opinions. Referring to specific situations, he wrote:
  “In these and other situations immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.” 302 U. S., at 324-325.
  About the meaning of due process, in broad perspective unrelated to the first eight amendments, he suggested that it prohibited to the States only those practices “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” 302 U. S., at 323. In applying these phrases in Palko, the Court ruled that, while at some point the cruelty of harassment-by multiple prosecutions by a State would offend due process, the specific limitation imposed on the Federal Government by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not bind the States.
  Decisions of this Court concerning the application of the Due Process Clause reveal the necessary process of balancing relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial application of that Clause. In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, we held that a state ^conviction of murder was void because it was based upon a confession elicited by applying third-degree methods to the defendant. But we have, also held that a second execution necessitated by a mechanical failure in the first attempt was not in violation of due process. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459. Decisions under the Due Process Clause require close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. The Anglo-American system of law is based not upon transcendental revelation but upon the conscience of society ascertained as best it may' be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed by the best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment.
  Constitutional challenge to successive state and federal prosecutions based upon the same transaction or conduct is not a new question before the Court though it has now been presented with conspicuous ability. The Fifth Amendment’s proscription of double jeopardy has been invoked and rejected in over twenty cases of real or hypothetical successive state and federal prosécution cases before this Court. While United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, was the first case in which we squarely held valid a federal prosecution arising out of the-same facts which had been the basis of a state, conviction, the validity of such a prosecution by the Federal Government has not been questioned by this Court since the opinion in Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, more than one hundred years ago.
  In Fox v. Ohio . argument was made to the Supreme Court that an Ohio conviction for uttering counterfeit money was invalid. This assertion of invalidity was,based in large part upon the argument that since Congress had imposed federal sanctions for the counterfeiting of money, a failure to find that the Supremacy Clause precluded the States from punishing related conduct would expose an individual to double punishment. Mr. Justice Daniel, writing for the Court (with Mr. Justice McLean dissenting), recognized as true that there was a possibility of double punishment, but denied that from this flowed a finding of pre-emption, concluding instead that both the Federal and State Governments retained the power to impose criminal sanctions, the United States because of its interest in protecting the purity of its currency, the States because of their interest in protecting their citizéns against fraud.
  In some eight state cases decided prior to Fox the courts of seven States had discussed the validity of successive state and federal prosecutions. In three, Missouri, North Carolina, and Virginia, it had been said that there would be no plea in bar to prevent the second prosecution. Discussions in two cases in South Carolina were in conflict — the earlier opinion expressing belief that there would be a bar, the later, without acknowledging disagreement with the first, denying the availability of a plea in bar. In three other States, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Michigan, courts had stated that a prosecution by one government would bar prosecution by another government of a crime based on the same conduct. The persuasiveness of the Massachusetts and Michigan decisions is somewhat impaired by the precedent upon which they relied in their reasoning. In the Supreme Court case cited in the Massachusetts and Michigan cases, Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, there is some language to the effect that there would be a bar to a second prosecution by a different government. 5 Wheat., at 31. But that language by Mr. Justice Washington reflected his belief that the state statute imposed state sanctions for violation of a federal criminal law. 5 Wheat., at 28. As he viewed the matter, the two trials would not be of similar crimes arising out of the' same conduct; they would be of the same crime. Mr. Justice Johnson agreed that if the state courts had become empowered to try the defendant for the federal offense, then such a state trial would bar a federal prosecution. 5 Wheat., at 35. Thus Houston v. Moore can be cited only for the presence of a bar in a case in which the second trial is for a violation of the very statute whose violation by the same conduct has already been tried in the courts of another government empowered to try that question.
  The significance of this historical background of decisions prior to Fox is that it was, taking a position most favorable to advocates of the bars of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict in cases like that before this Court, totally inconclusive. Conflicting opinions concerning the applicability of the plea in bar' may manifest conflict in conscience. They certainly do not manifest agreement that to permit successive state and federal prosecutions for different crimes arising from the same acts would be repugnant to those standards of outlawry which offend the conception of due process outlined in. Palko. (It is worth noting that Palko sustained a first degree murder conviction .returned in a second trial after an appeal by the State from an acquittal of first degree murder.) The early state decisions had clarified the issue by stating the opposing arguments. The process of this Court’s response to the Fifth Amendment challenge was begun in Fox v. Ohio, continued in United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, and was completed in Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13. Mr. Justice Grier, writing for the Court in Moore v. Illinois, gave definitive statement to the rule which had-been evolving:
  “An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law.” 14 How., at 19.
  “Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable'to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both.” 14 How., at 20.
  “That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, , cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other.” Ibid.
  In a dozen cases decided by this Court between Moore v. Illinois and United States v. Lanza this Court had occasion to reaffirm the principle first enunciated in Fox v. Ohio. Since Lanza the Court has five times repeated the rule that successive state and federal prosecutions are not in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Indeed Mr. Justice Holmes once wrote-of this rule that it “is too plain to need moré than statement.” One of the post-Lanza cases, Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, involved the same federal statute under which Bartkus was indicted and in Jerome this Court recognized that successive state and federal prosecutions were thereby made possible because all States had general robbery statutes. Nonetheless, a unanimous Court, as recently as 1943, accepted as unquestioned constitutional law that such successive prosecutions would not violate the proscription of double jeopardy included in the Fifth Amendment. 318 U. S., at 105.
  The lower federal coürts have of course been in accord with this Court. Although some can be cited only in that they follow the decisions of this Court, others manifest reflection upon the issues involved and express reasoned approval of the two-sovereignty principle. In United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285, the Oregon Circuit Court was presented with a case just the obverse of the present one: the prior trial and acquittal was by a state court; the subsequent trial was by a federal court. The Circuit Court rejected defendant’s plea of autrefois acquit, saying that the hardship of the second trial might operate to persuade against the bringing of a subsequent prosecution but could not bar it.
  The experience of state courts in dealing with successive prosecutions by different governments is obviously also. relevant in considering whether or not the Illinois prosecution of Bartkus violated due process of law. Of the twenty-eight States which have considered the validity of successive state and federal prosecutions as against a challenge of violation of either a state constitutional double-jeopardy provision or a common-law evidentiary rule of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, twenty-seven have refused to rule that the second prosecution was or would be barred. These States were not bound to follow this Court and its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. The rules, constitutional, statutory, or common law which bound them, drew upon the same experience as did the Fifth Amendment, but were and are of separate and independent authority.
  Not all of the state cases manifest careful reasoning, for in some of them the language concerning double jeopardy is but offhand dictum. But in an array of state cases there may be found full consideration of the arguments supporting and denying a bar to a second prosecution. These courts interpreted their rules as not proscribing a second prosecution where the first was by a different government and for violation of a different statute.
  With this body of precedent as irrefutable evidence that state and federal courts have for years refused to bar a second trial even though there had' been á prior trial by .another government for a similar offense, it would be disregard of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication, for the Court now to rule that due process' compels such a bar. A practical justification for rejecting such a reading of due process also commends itself in aid of this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, defendants were tried and convicted in a federal court under federal statutes with maximum sentences of a year and two. years respectively. But' the state crime there involved was a capital offense. Were the federal prosecution of a comparatively minor offense to prevent state prosecution of so grave an infraction of state law, the result would be a shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right arid obligation of the States to maintain peace and order within their confines. It would be in derogation of our federal system to displace the reserved power of States over state offenses by reason of prosecution of minor federal offenses by federal authorities beyond the control of the States.
  Some recent suggestions that the Constitution was in reality a deft device for establishing a centralized government are not only without factual justification but fly in the face of history. It has more accurately been shown that the men who wrote the Constitution as well as the citizens of the member States of the Confederation were fearful of the power of centralized government and sought to limit its power. Mr. Justice Brandéis has written that separation of powers was adopted in the Constitution “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.” Time has not lessened the concern of the Founders in devising a federal system which would likewise be a safeguard against arbitrary government. The greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system yields results with which a court is in little sympathy.
  The entire history of litigation and contention over the question of the imposition of ,a bar to . a second prosecution by a government other than the one first prosecuting is'a manifestation of the evolutionary unfolding of . law. Today a number of States have statutes which bar a second prosecution if the defendant has been once tried by another government for a similar offense. A study of the cases under the New York statute, which is typical of these laws, demonstrates that the task of determining when the federal and state statutes are so much alike that a prosecution under the former bars a prosecution under the latter is a difficult one. The proper solution of that problem frequently depends upon a judgment of the gravamen of the state statute. It depends also upon an understanding of the scope of the bar that has been historically granted in the State to prevent successive state prosecutions. Both these problems are ones with which the States are.obviously more competent to deal than is this Court. Furthermore, the rules resulting will intimately affect the efforts of a State to develop a rational and just body of criminal law in the protection of its citizens. We ought not to utilize the Fourteenth Amendment to interfere with this development. Finally, experience such as that of New York may give aid to Congress in its consideration of adoption of similar provisions in individual federal criminal statutes or in' the federal criminal, code.
  Precedent, experience, and reason alike support the conclusion that Alfonse Bartkus has not been deprived of due process of law by the State of Illinois.
  Affirmed.
  [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Jxjstice Black, see post, p. 150.]
  [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, see post, p. 164.]
  See Proceedings of the Attorney General’s Conference on Crime (1934). At the conclusion of the state trial of Bartkus, State’s Attorney Gutknecht thus reviewed the cooperation between federal and state officials:
  “We have had a number of cases where the state’s attorney’s office have been cooperating very well with.the federal authorities, particularly in the narcotics cases, because in that connection the federal government should have the first authority in handling them because narcotics is a nation-wide criminal organization, and so when I see people going through this town and criticising the County of Cook and the City of Chicago, because of the police, the state’s attorney and the judges cooperating with the federal authorities, and giving that as proof of the fact that since we don’t take the lead we must be negligent in our duties, I am particularly glad to see a ease where the federal authorities came to the state’s attorney.
  “We are cooperating with the federal authorities and they are cooperating with us, and these statements in this city to thé effect that the fact that the federal authorities are in the county is a sign of breakdown in law enforcement in Cook County is utter nonsense.
  “The federal authorities have duties and we have duties. We are doing our duty and this is an illustration of it, and we are glad to continue to cooperate with the federal authorities. Give them the first play where it is their duty, as in narcotics, and we take over where our duty calls for-us to carry the burden. . . .”
  Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319; Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46.
  Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of.Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5.
  See Appendix, post, p. 140, in which are detailed the provisions.in the constitutions of the ratifying States, and of the States later admitted to the Union which correspond to these federal guarantees in the Fifth, Sixth', and Seventh Amendments.
  Cf. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 435, in which, in ruling that the Fifth Amendment was not to be read as applying to the States, Mr. Justice Daniel wrote: “it is neither probable nor credible that the States should have anxiously insisted to ingraft upon the f' deral constitution restrictions upon their own authority . . .
  See, e. g., 36 Stat. 569.-
  See, e. g., 37 Stat. 1728.
  See, e. g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 801; Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 169; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 659.
  It has not been deemed relevant to discussion of our problem to consider dubious English precedents concerning the effect of foreign criminal judgments on the ability of English courts to try charges arising out of the same conduct — dubious in part because of the confused and inadequate reporting of the case on which much is based, see the varying versions of Rex v. Hutchinson found in Beak v. Thyrwhit, 3 Mod. 194, 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (reported as Beake v. Tyrrell in 1 Show. 6, 89 Eng. Rep. 411, and as Beake v. Tirrell in Comberbach 120, 90 Eng. Rep. 379), Burrows v. Jemino, 2 Strange 733, 93 Eng. Rep. 815 (reported as Burroughs v. Jamineau in Mos. 1, 25 Eng. Rep. 235, as Burrows v. Jemineau in Sel. Cas. 70, 25 Eng. Rep. 228, as Burrows v. Jemineau in 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 476, and as Burrows v. Jemineau in 22 Eng. Rep. 443), and explained in Gage v. Bulkeley, Ridg. Cas. 263, 27 Eng. Rep. 824. Such precedents are dubious also because they reflect a power of discretion vested in English judges not relevant to the constitutional law of our federalism.
  Mattison v. State, 3 Mo. *421.
  State v. Brown, 2 N. C. *100.
  Hendrick v. Commonwealth, 5 Leigh (Va.) 707.
  State v. Antonio, 2 Treadway’s Const. Rep. (S. C.) 776.
  State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 44.
  State v. Randall, 2 Aikens (Vt.) 89.
  Commonwealth v. Fuller, 8 Metcalf (Mass.) 313.
  Harlan v. People, 1 Douglass’ Rep. (Mich.) 207.
  Mr. Justice Story’s dissenting opinion in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 47, displays dislike of the possibility, of multiple prosecutions, id., at 72, but also suggests the possibility that under some circumstances a state acquittal might not bar a federal prosecution, id., at 74-75.
  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; United States v. Arjona, 120 U. S. 479; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131; In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197; Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640; Sexton v. California, 189 U. S. 319; Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488; Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333; Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254.
  Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312; Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256; Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253; Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91.
  Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 258.
  In a chapter in Handbook on Interstate Crime Control, a book prepared in 1938 by the Interstate Commission on Crime, Gordon Dean, then Special Executive Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, wrote:
  “Mention should also be made of the National Bank Robbery statute. This statute punishes robberies of national banks, banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System, and banks the funds of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. And here again there has been no usurpation by the federal government. The states still may prosecute any robbery of any bank within their jurisdiction, and they frequently do. There have been several cases in the last few years where men have been convicted both under the state and federal law for robbing the same bank. In. fact, there have been cases where men have been tried'under the law of one jurisdiction, acquitted, and on the same facts tried under the law of the other sovereignty and convicted. Bank robbers know. today that ‘flight/ their most valuable weapon, has, under the operation of the National Bank Robbery statute, proved quite impotent. The bank robbery rate has been cut in half, and there has been a fine relation between state and federal agencies in the apprehension and trial of bank robbers.” Id., at 114.'
  McKinney v. Landon, 209 F. 300 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Morris v. United States, 229 F. 516 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Vandell v. United States, 6 F. 2d 188 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Levine, 129 F. 2d 745 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Serio v. United States, 203 F. 2d 576 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Jolley v. United States, 232 F. 2d 83 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Smith v. United States, 243 F. 2d 877 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Rios v. United States, 256 F. 2d 173 (C. A. 9th Cir.); United States v. Amy, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,445 (C. C. Va.); United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,211 (C. C. Del.); United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285 (C. C. Ore.); United States v. Palan, 167 F. 991 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.); United States v. Wells, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,665 (D. C. Minn.); United States v. Casey, 247 F. 362 (D. C. S. D. Ohio); United States v. Holt, 270 F. 639 (D. C. N. Dak.); In re Morgan, 80 F. Supp. 810. (D. C. N. D. Iowa); United States v. Mandile, 119. F. Supp. 266 (D. C. E. D. N. Y.). Of the many prohibition cases in the lower federal courts only United States v. Holt has been included; its inclusion is meant to represent that body of cases and is particularly justified by' its careful reasoning concerning the. entire question of dual sovereignties and double jeopardy. It is believed that the list contains most of the nonpro-hibition cases in the' lower federal- courts discussing and favoring the rule that trial in one jurisdictioñ does not bar prosecution in another for a different offense arising from the same act. Three lower federal court cases have been found questioning the validity of the rule: Ex parte Houghton, 7 F. 657, 8 F. 897 (D. C. Vt.); In re Stubbs, 133 F.1012 (C. C. W. D. Wash.); United States v. Candelaria, .131 F. Supp. 797 (D. C. S. D. Cal.).
  States Denying the BaR.
  Arizona. Henderson v. State, 30 Ariz. 113, 244 P. 1020 (despite a limited statutory bar, holding successive federal and state prosecutions permitted where one is for possession and the other for transportation).
  Arkansas. State v. Duncan, 221 Ark. 681, 255 S. W. 2d 430.
  California. People v. McDonnell, 80 Cal. 285, 22 P. 190; People v. Candelaria, 139 Cal. App. 2d 432, 294 P. 2d 120; People v. Candelaria, 153 Cal. App. 2d 879, 315 P. 2d 386 (these two Candelaria cases indicate that the California statutory bar, a statute of the kind discussed below, prevents a state robbery prosecution after a federal robbery prosecution, but not a state burglary prosecution in the same circumstances).
  Georgia. Scheinfain v. Aldredge, 191 Ga. 479, 12 S. E. 2d 868; Bryson v. State, 27 Ga. App. 230, 108 S. E. 63.
  Illinois. Hoke v. People, 122 Ill. 511, 13 N. E. 823.
  Indiana. Heier v. State, 191 Ind. 410, 133 N. E. 200; Dashing v. State, 78 Ind. 357.
  Iowa. State v. Moore, 143 Iowa 240, 121 N. W. 1052.
  Kentucky. Hall v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 179, 246 S. W. 441.
  Louisiana. State v. Breaux, 161 La. 368, 108 So. 773, aff’d per cur., 273 U. S. 645.
  Maine. See State v. Gauthier, 12. Me. 522, 529-531, 118 A. 380, 383-385.
  Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273.
  Michigan. In re Illova, 351 Mich. 204, 88 N. W. 2d 589.
  Minnesota. State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N. W. 181.
  Missouri. In re January, 295 Mo. 653, 246 S. W. 241.
  New Hampshire. State v. Whittemore, 50 N. H. 245.
  New Jersey. State v. Cioffe, 130 N. J. L. 160, 32 A. 2d 79.
  New York. People v. Welch, 141 N. Y. 266, 36 N. E. 328.
  North Carolina. See State v. Brown, 2 N. C. *100, 101.
  Oregon. State v. Frach, 162 Ore. 602, 94 P. 2d 143.
  Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth ex rel. O’Brien v. Burke, 171 Pa. Super. 273, 90 A. 2d 246.
  South Carolina. State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey 44.
  Tennessee. State v. Rhodes, 146 Tenn. 398, 242 S. W. 642; State v. Rankin, 4 Coldw. 145.
  Vermont. State v. O’Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 A. 98.
  Virginia. Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. (59 Va.) 933.
  Washington. State v. Kenney, 83 Wash. 441, 145 P. 450.
  West Virginia. State v. Holesapple, 92 W. Va. 645, 115 S. E. 794.
  See Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182, 197-198.
  Wyoming: See In re Murphy, 5 Wyo. 297, 304-309, 40 P. 398, 399-401.
  State Raising the ' Bak.
  Florida. Burrows v. Moran, 81 Fla. 662, 89 So. 111 (this case may be limited to the interpretation given by the Florida court to- the Eighteenth Amendment. See Strobhar v. State, 55 Fla. 167, 180-181, 47 So. 4, 9).
  Illinois had an additional and unique interest in Bartkus beyond the commission of this • particular crime. If Bartkus was guilty of the crime charged he would be an habitual offender in Illinois and subject to life imprisonment. The Illinois court sentenced Bartkus. to life imprisonment on this ground.
  Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 240, 293 (dissenting opinion).
  Some fifteen such statutes are listed in Tentative Draft No. 5 of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code (1956), p. 61.
  N. Y. Penal Code § 33 and N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 139.
  People ex rel. Liss v. Superintendent of Women’s Prison, 282 N. Y. 115, 25 N. E. 2d 869; People v. Mangano, 269 App. Div. 954, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 891 (2d Dept.) aff’d sub nom. People v. Mignogna, 296 N. Y. 1011, 73 N. E. 2d 583; People v. Spitzer, 148 Misc. 97, 266 N. Y. S. 522 (Sup. Ct.); People v. Parker, 175 Misc. 776, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 247 (Kings County Ct.); People v. Eklof, 179 Misc. 536, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 557 (Richmond County Ct.); People v. Adamchesky, 184 Misc. 769, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 90 (N. Y. County Ct.).
  In specific instances'Congress has included provisions to prevent federal prosecution after a state prosecution based upon similar conduct. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 2117 • (burglary of vehicle of transportation carrying interstate or foreign shipments).