opinion: Justice Brennan
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case presents the question whether a firm incurs an “injury” within the meaning of the antitrust laws when it loses sales to a competitor charging nonpredatory prices pursuant to a vertical, maximum-price-fixing scheme. We hold that such a firm does not suffer an “antitrust injury” and that it therefore cannot bring suit under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 15.
  I
  Respondent USA Petroleum Company (USA) sued petitioner Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging the existence of a vertical, maximum-price-fixing agreement prohibited by § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1, an attempt to monopolize the local retail gasoline sales market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 2, and other misconduct not relevant here. Petitioner ARCO is an integrated oil company that, inter alia, markets gasoline in the Western United States. It sells gasoline to consumers both directly through its own stations and indirectly through ARCO-brand dealers. Respondent USA is an independent retail marketer of gasoline which, like other independents, buys gasoline from major petroleum companies for resale under its own brand name. Respondent competes directly with ARCO dealers at the retail level. Respondent’s outlets typically are low-overhead, high-volume “discount” stations that charge less than stations selling equivalent quality gasoline under major brand names.
  In early 1982, petitioner ARCO adopted a new marketing strategy in order to compete more effectively with discount independents such as respondent. Petitioner encouraged its dealers to match the retail gasoline prices offered by independents in various ways; petitioner made available to its dealers and distributors such short-term discounts as “temporary competitive allowances” and “temporary volume allowances,” and it reduced its dealers’ costs by, for example, eliminating credit card sales. ARCO’s strategy increased its sales and market share.
  In its amended complaint, respondent USA charged that ARCO engaged in “direct head-to-head competition with discounters” and “drastically lowered its prices and in other ways sought to appeal to price-conscious consumers.” First Amended Complaint ¶ 19, App. 15. Respondent asserted that petitioner conspired with retail service stations selling ARCO brand gasoline to fix prices at below-market levels: “Arco and its co-conspirators have organized a resale price maintenance scheme, as a direct result of which competition that would otherwise exist among Arco-branded dealers has been eliminated by agreement, and the retail price of Arcobranded gasoline has been fixed, stabilized and maintained at artificially low and uncompetitive levels.” ¶ 27, App. 17. Respondent alleged that petitioner “has solicited its dealers and distributors to participate or acquiesce in the conspiracy and has used threats, intimidation and coercion to secure compliance with its terms.” ¶ 37, App. 19. According to respondent, this conspiracy drove many independent gasoline dealers in California out of business. ¶ 39, App. 20. Count one of the amended complaint charged that petitioner’s vertical, maximum-price-fixing scheme constituted an agreement in restraint of trade and thus violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. Count two, later withdrawn with prejudice by respondent, asserted that petitioner had engaged in an attempt to monopolize the retail gasoline market through predatory pricing in violation of §2 of the Sherman Act.
  The District Court granted summary judgment for ARCO on the § 1 claim. The court stated that “[e]ven assuming that [respondent USA] can establish a vertical conspiracy to maintain low prices, [respondent] cannot satisfy the ‘antitrust injury’ requirement of Clayton Act § 4, without showing such prices to be predatory.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 3b. The court then concluded that respondent could make no such showing of predatory pricing because, given petitioner’s market share and the ease of entry into the market, petitioner was in no position to exercise market power.
  A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 859 F. 2d 687 (1988). Acknowledging that its decision was in conflict with the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in several recent cases, see id., at 697, n. 15, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless held that injuries resulting from vertical, nonpredatory, maximum-price-fixing agreements could constitute “antitrust injury” for purposes of a private suit under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The court reasoned that any form of price fixing contravenes Congress’ intent that “market forces alone determine what goods and services are offered, at what price these goods and services are sold, and whether particular sellers succeed or fail.” Id., at 693. The court believed that the key inquiry in determining whether respondent suffered an “antitrust injury” was whether its losses “resulted from a disruption ... in the . . . market caused by the . . . antitrust violation.” Ibid. The court concluded that “[i]n the present case, the inquiry seems straightforward: USA’s claimed injuries were the direct result, and indeed, under the allegations we accept as true, the intended objective, of ARCO’s price-fixing scheme. According to USA, the purpose of ARCO’s price-fixing is to disrupt the market of retail gasoline sales, and that disruption is the source of USA’s injuries.” Ibid.
  We granted certiorari, 490 U. S. 1097 (1989).
  II
  A private plaintiff may not recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act merely by showing “injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 489 (1977). Instead, a plaintiff must prove the existence of “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the typeAhe-antitrust_ laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U. S. 104 (1986), we reaffirmed that injury, although causally related to an antitrust violation, nevertheless will not qualify as “antitrust injury” unless it is attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny, “since ‘[i]t is inimical to [the antitrust] laws to award damages’ for losses stemming from continued competition.” Id., at 109-110 (quoting Brunswick, supra, at 488). See also Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 539-540 (1983); Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U. S. 465, 483, and n. 19 (1982); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U. S. 557, 562 (1981).
  Respondent argues that, as a competitor, it can show antitrust injury from a vertical conspiracy to fix maximum prices that is unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act, even if the prices were set above predatory levels. In addition, respondent maintains that any loss flowing from a per se violation of § 1 automatically satisfies the antitrust injury requirement. We reject both contentions and hold that respondent has failed to meet the antitrust injury test in this case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
  A
  In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968), we found that a vertical, maximum-price-fixing scheme was unlawful per se under § 1 of the Sherman Act because it threatened to inhibit vigorous competition by the dealers bound by it and because it threatened to become a minimum-price-fixing scheme. That case concerned a newspaper distributor who sought to charge his customers more than the suggested retail price advertised by the publisher. After the publisher attempted to discipline the distributor by hiring another carrier to take away some of the distributor’s customers, the distributor brought suit under § 1. The Court found that “the combination formed by the [publisher] in this case to force [the distributor] to maintain a specified price for the resale of newspapers which he had purchased from [the publisher] constituted, without more, an illegal restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act.” Id., at 153.
  In holding such a maximum-price vertical agreement illegal, we analyzed the manner in which it might restrain competition by dealers. First, we noted that such a scheme, “by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that market.” Id., at 152. We further explained that “[m]aximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish services essential to the value which goods have for the consumer or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire and for which they are willing to pay.” Id., at 152-153. By limiting the ability of small dealers to engage in nonprice competition, a maximum-price-fixing agreement might “channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers.” Id., at 153. Finally, we observed that “if the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the fixed maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the maximum price approaches the actual cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices.” Ibid.
  Respondent alleges that it has suffered losses as a result of competition with firms following a vertical, maximum-price-fixing agreement. But in Albrecht we held such an agreement per se unlawful because of its potential effects on dealers and consumers, not because of its effect on competitors. Respondent’s asserted injury as a competitor does not resemble any of the potential dangers described in Albrecht. For example, if a vertical agreement fixes “[mjaximum prices . . . too low for the dealer to furnish services” desired by consumers, or in such a way as to channel business to large distributors, id., at 152-153, then a firm dealing in a competing brand would not be harmed. Respondent was benefited rather than harmed if petitioner’s pricing policies restricted ARCO sales to a few large dealers or prevented petitioner’s dealers from offering services desired by consumers such as credit card sales. Even if the maximum-price agreement ultimately had acquired all of the attributes of a minimum-price-fixing scheme, respondent still would not have suffered antitrust injury because higher ARCO prices would have worked to USA’s advantage. A competitor “may not complain of conspiracies that ... set minimum prices at any level.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 585, n. 8 (1986); see also id., at 582-583 (“[R]espondents [cannot] recover damages for any conspiracy by petitioners to charge higher than competitive prices in the . . . market. Such conduct would indeed violate the Sherman Act, but it could not injure respondents: as petitioners’ competitors, respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise the market price . . .”). Indeed, the gravamen of respondent’s complaint — that the price-fixing scheme between petitioner and its dealers enabled those dealers to increase their sales — amounts to an assertion that the dangers with which we were concerned in Albrecht have not materialized in the instant case. In sum, respondent has not suffered “antitrust injury,” since its losses do not flow from the aspects of vertical, maximum price fixing that render it illegal.
  Respondent argues that even if it was not harmed by any of the anticompetitive effects identified in Albrecht, it nonetheless suffered antitrust injury because of the low prices produced by the vertical restraint. We disagree. When a firm, or even a group of firms adhering to a vertical agreement, lowers prices but maintains them above predatory levels, the business lost by rivals cannot be viewed as an “anti-competitive” consequence of the claimed violation. A firm complaining about the harm it suffers from nonpredatory price competition “is really claiming that it [is] unable to raise prices.” Blair & Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1539, 1554 (1989). This is not antitrust injury; indeed, “cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition.” Matsushita, supra, at 594. The antitrust laws were enacted for “the protection of competition, not competitors.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in original). “To hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due to [nonpredatory] price competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share.” Cargill, 479 U. S., at 116.
  Respondent further argues that it is inappropriate to require a showing of predatory pricing before antitrust injury can be established when the asserted antitrust violation is an agreement in restraint of trade illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, rather than an attempt to monopolize prohibited by § 2. Respondent notes that the two sections of the Act are quite different. Price fixing violates § 1, for example, even if a single firm’s decision to price at the same level would not create § 2 liability. See generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 767-769 (1984). In a § 1 case, the price agreement itself is illegal, and respondent contends that all losses flowing from such an agreement must by definition constitute “antitrust injuries.” Respondent observes that § 1 in general and the per se rule in particular are grounded “‘on faith in price competition as a market force [and not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price of eliminating competition.’” Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 348 (1982) (quoting Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule — Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 137, 142 (1962)). In sum, respondent maintains that it has suffered antitrust injury even if petitioner’s pricing was not predatory under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
  We reject respondent’s argument. Although a vertical, maximum-price-fixing agreement is unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act, it does not cause a competitor antitrust injury unless it results in predatory pricing. Antitrust injury does not arise for purposes of § 4 of the Clayton Act, see n. 1, supra, until a private party is adversely affected by an anti-competitive aspect of the defendant’s conduct, see Brunswick, 429 U. S., at 487; in the context of pricing practices, only predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive effect. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 697-699 (1975); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ. 289, 292-294 (1980). Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition. Hence, they cannot give rise to antitrust injury.
  We have adhered to this principle regardless of the type of antitrust claim involved. In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., for example, we found that a plaintiff competitor had not shown antitrust injury and thus could not challenge a merger that was assumed to be illegal under § 7 of the Clayton Act, even though the merged company threatened to engage in vigorous price competition that would reduce the plaintiff’s profits. We observed that nonpredatory price competition for increased market share, as reflected by prices that are below “market price” or even below the costs of a firm’s rivals, “is not activity forbidden by the antitrust laws.” 479 U. S., at 116. Because the prices charged were not predatory, we found no antitrust injury. Similarly, we determined that antitrust injury was absent in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., supra, even though the plaintiffs alleged that an illegal acquisition threatened to bring a “‘deep pocket’ parent into a market of ‘pygmies,’” id., at 487, a scenario that would cause the plaintiffs economic harm. We opined nevertheless that “if [the plaintiffs] were injured, it was not ‘by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws’: while [the plaintiffs’] loss occurred ‘by reason of’ the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur ‘by reason of’ that which made the acquisitions unlawful.” Id., at 488. To be sure, the source of the price competition in the instant case was an agreement allegedly unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act rather than a merger in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. But that difference is not salient. When prices are not predatory, any losses flowing from them cannot be said to stem from an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant’s conduct. “‘It is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price competition.’” Cargill, 479 U. S., at 116 (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S. E. Johnson Co., 729 F. 2d 1050, 1057 (CA6), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1036 (1984)).
  B
  We also reject respondent’s suggestion that no antitrust injury need be shown where a per se violation is involved. The per se rule is a method of determining whether § 1 of the Sherman Act has been violated, but it does not indicate whether a private plaintiff has suffered antitrust injury and thus whether he may recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Per se and rule-of-reason analysis are but two methods of determining whether a restraint is “unreasonable,” i. e., whether its anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects. The per se rule is a presumption of unreasonableness based on “business certainty and litigation efficiency.” Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S., at 344. It represents a “longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have ‘a substantial potential for impact on competition.’” FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S. 411, 433 (1990) (quoting Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U. S. 2, 16 (1984)). “Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.” Maricopa County Medical Society, supra, at 344.
  The purpose of the antitrust injury requirement is different. It ensures that the harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first place, and it prevents losses that stem from competition from supporting suits by private plaintiffs for either damages or equitable relief. Actions per se unlawful under the antitrust laws may nonetheless have some pro-competitive effects, and private parties might suffer losses therefrom. See Maricopa County Medical Society, supra, at 351; Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 50, n. 16 (1977). Conduct in violation of the antitrust laws may have three effects, often interwoven: In some respects the conduct may reduce competition, in other respects it may increase competition, and in still other respects effects may be neutral as to competition. The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition -reducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior. The need for this showing is at least as great under the per se rule as under the rule of reason. Indeed, insofar as the per se rule permits the prohibition of efficient practices in the name of simplicity, the need for the antitrust injury requirement is underscored. “[P]rocompetitive or. efficiency-enhancing aspects of practices that nominally violate the antitrust laws may cause serious harm to individuals, but this kind of harm is the essence of competition and should play no role in the definition of antitrust damages.” Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1460 (1985). Thus, “proof of a per se violation and of antitrust injury are distinct matters that must be shown independently.” P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 334.2c, p. 330 (1989 Supp.).
  For this reason, we have previously recognized that even in cases involving per se violations, the right of action under §4 of the Clayton Act is available only to those private plaintiffs who have suffered antitrust injury. For example, in a case involving horizontal price fixing, “perhaps the paradigm of an unreasonable restraint of trade,” National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U. S. 85, 100 (1984), we observed that the plaintiffs were still required to “show that the conspiracy caused them an injury for which the antitrust laws provide relief.” Matsushita, 475 U. S., at 584, n. 7 (citing Brunswick) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519 (1983), we noted that a restraint of trade was illegal per se in the sense that it could “be condemned even without proof of its actual market effect,” but we maintained that even if it “may have been unlawful, it does not, of course, necessarily follow that still another party ... is a person injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act.” Id., at 528-529.
  C
  We decline to dilute the antitrust injury requirement here because we find that there is no need to encourage private enforcement by competitors of the rule against vertical, maximum price fixing. If such a scheme causes the anticompetitive consequences detailed in Albrecht, consumers and the manufacturers’ own dealers may bring suit. The “existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party... to perform the office of a private attorney general.” Associated General Contractors, supra, at 542.
  Respondent’s injury, moreover, is not “inextricably intertwined” with the antitrust injury that a dealer would suffer, McCready, 457 U. S., at 484, and thus does not militate in favor of permitting respondent to sue on behalf of petitioner’s dealers. A competitor is not injured by the anticompetitive effects of vertical, maximum price-fixing, see supra, at 336-337, and does not have any incentive to vindicate the legitimate interests of a rival’s dealer. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1, 33-39 (1984). A competitor will not bring suit to protect the dealer against a maximum price that is set too low, inasmuch as the competitor would benefit from such a situation. Instead, a competitor will be motivated to bring suit only when the vertical restraint promotes interbrand competition between the competitor and the dealer subject to the restraint. See n. 13, supra. In short, a competitor will be injured and hence motivated to sue only when a vertical, maximum-price-fixing arrangement has a procompetitive impact on the market. Therefore, providing the competitor a cause of action would not protect the rights of dealers and consumers under the antitrust laws.
  Ill
  Respondent has failed to demonstrate that it has suffered any antitrust injury. The allegation of a per se violation does not obviate the need to satisfy this test. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
  It is so ordered.
  Section 4 of the Clayton Act is a remedial provision that makes available treble damages to “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”
  Because the case comes to us on review of summary judgment, “ ‘inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. ’ ” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962)).
  The District Court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss the §2 claim as originally pleaded. 577 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (1983). Respondent subsequently amended its §2 claim, but shortly after petitioner filed for summary judgment, respondent voluntarily dismissed that claim with prejudice. See App. 76-78. The Court of Appeals framed the issue as “whether a competitor’s injuries resulting from vertical, non-predatory, maximum price fixing fall within the category of ‘antitrust injury.’ ” 859 F. 2d 687, 689 (CA9 1988) (emphasis added). For purposes of this case we likewise assume that petitioner’s pricing was not predatory in nature.
  See Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F. 2d 1409, 1418-1420 (1989); Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787 F. 2d 1197, 1201-1203 (1986); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F. 2d 698, 708-709, cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1018 (1984).
  We assume, arguendo, that Albrecht correctly held that vertical, maximum price fixing is subject to the per se rule.
  Albrecht is the only case in which the Court has confronted an unadulterated vertical, maximum-price-fixing arrangement. In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S. 211, 213 (1951), we also suggested that such an arrangement was illegal because it restricted vigorous competition among dealers. The restraint in Kiefer-Stewart had an additional horizontal component, however, see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 348, n. 18 (1982), since the agreement was between two suppliers that had agreed to sell liquor only to wholesalers adhering to “maximum prices above which the wholesalers could not resell.” Kiefer-Stewart, supra, at 212.
  The Court of Appeals implied that the antitrust injury requirement could be satisfied by a showing that the “long-term” effect of the maximum-price agreements could be to eliminate retailers and ultimately to reduce competition. 859 F. 2d, at 694, 696. We disagree. Rivals cannot be excluded in the long run by a nonpredatory maximum-price scheme unless they are relatively inefficient. Even if that were false, however, a firm cannot claim antitrust injury from nonpredatory price competition on the asserted ground that it is “ruinous.” Cf. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610-612 (1972); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 220-221 (1940). “[T]he statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.” National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 695 (1978).
  The Court of Appeals erred by reasoning that respondent satisfied the antitrust injury requirement by alleging that “[t]he removal of some elements of price competition distorts the markets, and harms all the participants.” 859 F. 2d, at 694. Every antitrust violation can be assumed to “disrupt” or “distort” competition. “[Ojtherwise, there would be no violation.” P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 340.3b, p. 411 (1989 Supp.). Respondent’s theory would equate injury in fact with antitrust injury. We declined to adopt such an approach in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477 (1977), and Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U. S. 104 (1986), and we reject it again today. The antitrust injury requirement cannot be met by broad allegations of harm to the “market” as an abstract entity. Although all antitrust violations, under both the per se rule and rule-of-reason analysis, “distort” the market, not every loss stemming from a violation counts as antitrust injury.
  This is not to deny that a vertical price-fixing scheme may facilitate predatory pricing. A supplier, for example, can reduce its prices to its own downstream dealers and share the losses with them, while forcing competing dealers to bear by themselves the full loss imposed by the lower prices. Cf. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S. 505, 522 (1963). But because a firm always is able to challenge directly a rival’s pricing as predatory, there is no reason to dispense with the antitrust injury requirement in an action by a competitor against a vertical agreement.
  We did not reach a contrary conclusion in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986), where we declined to define precisely the term “predatory pricing” but stated instead that “[f]or purposes of this case it is enough to note that respondents have not suffered an antitrust injury unless petitioners conspired to drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure of cost.” Id., at 585, n. 8. This statement does not imply that losses from wowpredatory pricing might qualify as antitrust injury; we were quite careful to limit our discussion in that case to predatory pricing. See ibid, (nonpredatory prices would not cause antitrust injury because they would “leave respondents in the same position as would market forces”). We noted that “[ejxcept for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the . . . market through predatory pricing, these alleged conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer an ‘antitrust injury.’” Id., at 586. We also observed that “respondents must show that the conspiracy caused them an injury for which the antitrust laws provide relief. That showing depends in turn on proof that petitioners conspired to price predatorily in the American market, since the other conduct involved in the alleged conspiracy cannot have caused such an injury.” Id., at 584, n. 7 (citations omitted); see also id., at 594; Cargill, supra, at 117, n. 12 (interpreting our decision in Matsushita). We have no occasion in the instant case to consider the proper definition of predatory pricing, nor to determine whether our dictum in Matsushita that predatory pricing might consist of “pricing below the level necessary to sell [the offender’s] products,” 475 U. S., at 585, n. 8, is an accurate statement of the law. See n. 3, supra.
  The Court of Appeals purported to distinguish Cargill and Brunswick on the ground that those cases turned on an “attenuated or indirect” relationship between the alleged violation — the illegal merger — and the plaintiffs’ injury. 859 F. 2d, at 695. We disagree. The Court in both cases described the injury as flowing directly from the alleged antitrust violation. See Cargill, supra, at 108; Brunswick, supra, at 487.
  “Both per se rules and the Rule of Reason are employed ‘to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint.’ ” National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U. S. 85, 103 (1984) (quoting National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S., at 692). “[Wjhether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same — whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.” 468 U. S., at 104.
  When a manufacturer provides a dealer an exclusive area within which to distribute a product, the manufacturer’s decision to fix a maximum resale price may actually protect consumers against exploitation by the dealer acting as a local monopolist. The manufacturer acts not out of altruism, of course, but out of a desire to increase its own sales —whereas the dealer’s incentive, like that of any monopolist, is to reduce output and increase price. If an exclusive dealership is the most efficient means of distribution, the public is not served by forcing the manufacturer to abandon this method and resort to self-distribution or competing distributors. Vertical, maximum price fixing thus may have procompetitive interbrand effects even if it is per se illegal because of its potential effects on dealers and consumers. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145, 159 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (maximum price ceilings “do not lessen horizontal competition” but instead “drive prices toward the level that would be set by intense competition,” by “preventing] retailers or wholesalers from reaping monopoly or supercompetitive profits”). Indeed, we acknowledged in Albrecht that “[m]aximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences in many situations.” Id., at 152. The procompetitive potential of a vertical maximum price restraint is more evident now than it was when Albrecht was decided, because exclusive territorial arrangements and other nonprice restrictions were unlawful per se in 1968. See id., at 154; United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365, 375-376 (1967). These agreements are currently subject only to rule-of-reason scrutiny, making monopolistic behavior by dealers more likely. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752, 761 (1984); Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 47-59 (1977).
  Many commentators have identified procompetitive effects of vertical, maximum price fixing. See, e. g., P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶340.3b, p. 378, n. 24 (1988 Supp.); Blair & Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1539, 1553 (1989); Blair & Schafer, Evolutionary Models of Legal Change and the Albrecht Rule, 32 Antitrust Bull. 989, 995-1000 (1987); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, part 2, 75 Yale L. J. 373, 464 (1966); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 886, 887-890 (1981); Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration by the Newspaper Monopolist, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 451, 452-456 (1984); Polden, Antitrust Standing and the Rule Against Resale Price Maintenance, 37 Cleveland State L. Rev. 179, 216-217 (1989); Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 797, 803-804 (1987).