opinion: Mr. Chief Justice Burger
  delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to the constitutionality of petitioner’s conviction (Parts I and II), together with an opinion (Part III), in which Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Stevens joined, on the constitutionality of the statute under which petitioner was sentenced to death, and announced the judgment of the Court.
  We granted certiorari in this case to consider, among other questions, whether Ohio violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by sentencing Sandra Lockett to death pursuant to a statute that narrowly limits the sentencer’s discretion to consider the circumstances of the crime and the record and character of the offender as mitigating factors.
  I
  Lockett was charged with aggravated murder with the aggravating specifications (1) that the murder was “committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment” for aggravated robbery, and (2) that the murder was “committed while . . . committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit . . . aggravated robbery.” That offense was punishable by death in Ohio. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04 (1975). She was also charged with aggravated robbery. The State’s case against her depended largely upon the testimony of a coparticipant, one A1 Parker, who gave the following account of her participation in the robbery and murder.
  Lockett became acquainted with Parker and Nathan Earl Dew while she and a friend, Joanne Baxter, were in New Jersey. Parker and Dew then accompanied Lockett, Baxter, and Lockett’s brother back to Akron, Ohio, Lockett’s hometown. After they arrived in Akron, Parker and Dew needed money for the trip back to New Jersey. Dew suggested that he pawn his ring. Lockett overheard his suggestion, but felt that the ring was too beautiful to pawn, and suggested instead that they could get some money by robbing a grocery store and a furniture store in the area. She warned that the grocery store’s operator was a “big guy” who carried a “45” and that they would have “to get him real quick.” She also volunteered to get a gun from her father’s basement to aid in carrying out the robberies, but by that time, the two stores had closed and it was too late to proceed with the plan to rob them.
  Someone, apparently Lockett’s brother, suggested a plan for robbing a pawnshop. He and Dew would enter the shop and pretend to pawn a ring. Next Parker, who had some bullets, would enter the shop, ask to see a gun, load it, and use it to rob the shop. No one planned to kill the pawnshop operator in the course of the robbery. Because she knew the owner, Lockett was not to be among those entering the pawnshop, though she did guide the others to the shop that night.
  The next day Parker, Dew, Lockett, and her brother gathered at Baxter’s apartment. Lockett’s brother asked if they were “still going to do it,” and everyone, including Lockett, agreed to proceed. The four then drove by the pawnshop several times and parked the car. Lockett’s brother and Dew entered the shop. Parker then left the car and told Lockett to start it again in two minutes. The robbery proceeded according to plan until the pawnbroker grabbed the gun when Parker announced the “stickup.” The gun went off with Parker’s finger on the trigger, firing a fatal shot into the pawnbroker.
  Parker went back to the car where Lockett waited with the engine running. While driving away from the pawnshop, Parker told Lockett what had happened. She took the gun from the pawnshop and put it into her purse. Lockett and Parker drove to Lockett’s aunt’s house and called a taxicab. Shortly thereafter, while riding away in a taxicab, they were stopped by the police, but by this time Lockett had placed the gun under the front seat. Lockett told the police that Parker rented a room from her mother and lived with her family. After verifying this story with Lockett’s parents, the police released Lockett and Parker. Lockett hid Dew and Parker in the attic when the police arrived at the Lockett household later that evening.
  Parker was subsequently apprehended and charged with aggravated murder with specifications, an offense punishable by death, and aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, he pleaded guilty to the murder charge and agreed to testify against Lockett, her brother, and Dew. In return, the prosecutor dropped the aggravated robbery charge and the specifications to the murder charge, thereby eliminating the possibility that Parker could receive the death penalty.
  Lockett’s brother and Dew were later convicted of aggravated murder with specifications. Lockett’s brother was sentenced to death, but Dew received a lesser penalty because it was determined that his offense was “primarily the product of mental deficiency,” one of the three mitigating circumstances specified in the Ohio death penalty statute.
  Two weeks before Lockett’s separate trial, the prosecutor offered to permit her to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery (offenses which each carried a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of $10,000, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2903.03, 2911.01, 2929.11 (1975)) if she would cooperate with the State, but she rejected the offer. Just prior to her trial, the prosecutor offered to permit her to plead guilty to aggravated murder without specifications, an offense carrying a mandatory life penalty, with the understanding that the aggravated robbery charge and an outstanding forgery charge would be dismissed. Again she rejected the offer.
  At trial, the opening argument of Lockett’s defense counsel summarized what appears to have been Lockett’s version of the events leading to the killing. He asserted the evidence would show that, as far as Lockett knew, Dew and her brother had planned to pawn Dew’s ring for $100 to obtain money for the trip back to New Jersey. Lockett had not waited in the car while the men went into the pawnshop but had gone to a restaurant for lunch and had joined Parker, thinking the ring had been pawned, after she saw him walking back to the car. Lockett’s counsel asserted that the evidence would show further that Parker had placed the gun under the seat in the taxicab and that Lockett had voluntarily gone to the police station when she learned that the police were looking for the pawnbroker’s killers.
  Parker was the State’s first witness. His testimony related his version of the robbery and shooting, and he admitted to a prior criminal record of breaking and entering, larceny, and receiving stolen goods, as well as bond jumping. He also acknowledged that his plea to aggravated murder had eliminated the possibility of the death penalty, and that he had agreed to testify against Lockett, her brother, and Dew as part of his plea agreement with the prosecutor. At the end of the major portion of Parker’s testimony, the prosecutor renewed his offer to permit Lockett to plead guilty to aggravated murder without specifications and to drop the other charges against her. For the third time Lockett refused the option of pleading guilty to a lesser offense.
  Lockett called Dew and her brother as defense witnesses, but they invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify. In the course of the defense presentation, Lockett’s counsel informed the court, in the presence of the jury, that he believed Lockett was to be the next witness and requested a short recess. After the recess, Lockett’s counsel told the judge that Lockett wished to testify but had decided to accept her mother’s advice to remain silent, despite her counsel’s warning that, if she followed that advice, she would have no defense except the cross-examination of the State's witnesses. Thus, the defense did not introduce any evidence to rebut the prosecutor’s case.
  The court instructed the jury that, before it could find Lockett guilty, it had to find that she purposely had killed the pawnbroker while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery. The jury was further charged that one who
  “purposely aids, helps, associates himself or herself with another for the purpose of committing a crime is regarded as if he or she were the principal offender and is just as guilty as if the person performed every act constituting the offense. . . .”
  Regarding the intent requirement, the court instructed:
  “A person engaged in a common design with others to rob by force and violence an individual or individuals of their property is presumed to acquiesce in whatever may reasonably be necessary to accomplish the object of their enterprise. . . .
  “If the conspired robbery and the manner of its accomplishment would be reasonably likely to produce death, each plotter is equally guilty with the principal offender as an aider and abettor in the homicide .... An intent to kill by an aider and abettor may be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt under such circumstances.”
  The jury found Lockett guilty as charged.
  Once a verdict of aggravated murder with specifications had been returned, the Ohio death penalty statute required the trial judge to impose a death sentence unless, after “considering the nature and circumstances of the offense” and Lockett’s “history, character, and condition,” he found by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the victim had induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett would have committed the offense but for the fact that she “was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation,” or (3) the offense was “primarily the product of [Lockett’s] psychosis or mental deficiency.” Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2929.03-2929.04 (B) (1975).
  In accord with the Ohio statute, the trial judge requested a presentence report as well as psychiatric and psychological reports. The reports contained detailed information about Lockett’s intelligence, character, and background. The psychiatric and psychological reports described her as a 21-year-old with low-average or average intelligence, and not suffering from a mental deficiency. One of the psychologists reported that “her prognosis for rehabilitation” if returned to society was favorable. The presentence report showed that Lockett had committed no major offenses although she had a record of several minor ones as a juvenile and two minor offenses as an adult. It also showed that she had once used heroin but was receiving treatment at a drug abuse clinic and seemed to be “on the road to success” as far as her drug problem was concerned. It concluded that Lockett suffered no psychosis and was not mentally deficient.
  After considering the reports and hearing argument on the penalty issue, the trial judge concluded that the offense had not been primarily the product of psychosis or mental deficiency. Without specifically addressing the other two statutory mitigating factors, the judge said that he had “no alternative, whether [he] like[d] the law or not” but to impose the death penalty. He then sentenced Lockett to death.
  II
  A
  At the outset, we address Lockett’s various challenges to the validity of her conviction. Her first contention is that the prosecutor’s repeated references in his closing remarks to the State’s evidence as “unrefuted” and “uncontradicted” constituted a comment on her failure to testify and violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 615 (1965). We conclude, however, that the prosecutor’s closing comments in this case did not violate constitutional prohibitions. . Lockett’s own counsel had clearly focused the jury’s attention on her silence, first, by outlining her contemplated defense in his opening statement and, second, by stating to the court and jury near the close of the case, that Lockett would be the “next witness.” When viewed against this background, it seems clean that the prosecutor’s closing remarks added nothing to the impression that had already been created by Lockett’s refusal to testify after the jury had been promised a defense by her lawyer and told that Lockett would take the stand.
  B
  Lockett also contends that four prospective jurors were excluded from the venire in violation of her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the principles established in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 528 (1975). We do not agree.
  On voir dire, the prosecutor told the venire that there was a possibility that the death penalty might be imposed, but that the judge would make the final decision as to punishment. He then asked whether any of the prospective jurors were so opposed to capital punishment that “they could not sit, listen • to the evidence, listen to the law, [and] make their determination solely upon the evidence and the law without considering the fact that capital punishment” might be imposed. Four of the venire responded affirmatively. The trial judge then addressed the following question to those four veniremen:
  “[D]o you feel that you could take an oath to well and truely [sic] try this case . . . and follow the law, or is your conviction so strong that you cannot take an oath, knowing that a possibility exists in regard to capital punishment?”
  Each of the four specifically stated twice that he or she would not “take the oath.” They were excused.
  In Witherspoon, persons generally opposed to capital punishment had been excluded for cause from the jury that convicted and sentenced the petitioner to death. We did not disturb the conviction but we held that “a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” 391 U. S., at 522. We specifically noted, however, that nothing in our opinion prevented the execution of a death sentence when the veniremen excluded for cause make it “unmistakably clear . . . that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.” Id., at 522-523, n. 21.
  Each of the excluded veniremen in this case made it “unmistakably clear” that they could not be trusted to “abide by existing law” and “to follow conscientiously the instructions” of the trial judge. Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478, 484 (1969). They were thus properly excluded under Witherspoon, even assuming, arguendo, that Witherspoon provides a basis for attacking the conviction as well as the sentence in a capital case.
  Nor was there any violation of the principles of Taylor v. Louisiana, supra. In Taylor, the Court invalidated a jury selection system that operated to exclude a “grossly disproportionate,” 419 U. S., at 525, number of women from jury service thereby depriving the petitioner of a jury chosen from a “fair cross-section” of the community, id., at 530. Nothing in Taylor, however, suggests that the right to a representative jury includes the right to be tried by jurors who have explicitly indicated an inability to follow the law and instructions of the trial judge.
  C
  Lockett’s final attack on her conviction, as distinguished from her sentence, merits only brief attention. Specifically she contends that the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of the complicity provision of the statute under which she was convicted, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.03 (A) (1975), was so unexpected that it deprived her of fair warning of the crime with which she was charged. The opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court belies this claim. It shows clearly that the construction given the statute by the Ohio court was consistent with both prior Ohio law and with the legislative history of the statute. In such circumstances, any claim of inadequate notice under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be rejected.
  Ill
  Lockett challenges the constitutionality of Ohio’s death penalty statute on a number of grounds. We find it necessary to consider only her contention that her death sentence is invalid because the statute under which it was imposed did not permit the sentencing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, her character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in the crime. To address her contention from the proper perspective, it is helpful to review the developments in our recent cases where we have applied the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to death penalty statutes. We do not write on a “clean slate.”
  A
  Prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), every State that authorized capital punishment had abandoned mandatory death penalties, and instead permitted the jury unguided and unrestrained discretion regarding the imposition of the death penalty in a particular capital case. Mandatory death penalties had proved unsatisfactory, as the plurality noted in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 293 (1976), in part because juries, “with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict.”
  This Court had never intimated pijior to Furman that discretion in sentencing offended the Constitution. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U. S. 576, 585 (1959). As recently as McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183 (1971), the Court had specifically rejected the contention that discretion in imposing the death penalty violated the fundamental standards of fairness embodied in Fourteenth Amendment due process, id., at 207-208, and had asserted that States were entitled to assume that “jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human [would] act with due regard for the consequences of their decision.” Id., at 208.
  The constitutional status of discretionary sentencing in capital cases changed abruptly, however, as a result of the separate opinions supporting the judgment in Furman. The question in Furman was whether “the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty [in the cases before the Court] constitute [d] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 408 U. S., at 239. Two Justices concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty altogether and on that ground voted to reverse the judgments sustaining the death penalties. Id., at 305-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 370-371 (Marshall, J., concurring). Three Justices were unwilling to hold the death penalty per se unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, but voted to reverse the judgments on other grounds. In separate opinions, the three concluded that discretionary sentencing, unguided by legislatively defined standards, violated the Eighth Amendment because it was “pregnant with discrimination/’ id., at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring), because it permitted the death penalty to be “wantonly” and “freakishly” imposed, id., at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), and because it imposed the death penalty with “great infrequency” and afforded “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was] imposed from the many cases in which it [was] not,” id., at 313 (White, J., concurring). Thus, what had been approved under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in McOautha became impermissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by virtue of the judgment in Furman. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 195-196, n. 47 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
  Predictably the variety of opinions supporting the judgment in Furman engendered confusion as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord with the Eighth Amendment. Some States responded to what was thought to be the command of Furman by adopting mandatory death penalties for a limited category of specific crimes thus eliminating all discretion from the sentencing process in capital cases. Other States attempted to continue the practice of individually assessing the culpability of each individual defendant convicted of a capital offense and, at the same time, to comply with Furman, by providing standards to guide the sentencing decision.
  Four years after Furman, we considered Eighth Amendment issues posed by five of the post-Furman death penalty statutes. Four Justices took the position that all five statutes complied with the Constitution; two Justices took the position that none of them complied. Hence, the disposition of each case varied according to the votes of three Justices who delivered a joint opinion in each of the five cases upholding the constitutionality of the statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, and holding those of North Carolina and Louisiana unconstitutional.
  The joint opinion reasoned that, to comply with Furman, sentencing procedures should not create “a substantial risk that the death penalty [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 188. In the view of the three Justices, however, Furman did not require that all sentencing discretion be eliminated, but only that it be “directed and limited,” 428 U. S., at 189, so that the death penalty would be imposed in a more consistent and rational manner and so that there would be a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the . . . cases in which it is imposed from . . . the many cases in which it is not.” Id., at 188. The plurality concluded, in the course of invalidating North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty statute, that the sentencing process must permit consideration of the “character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death,” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S., at 304, in order to ensure the reliability, under Eighth Amendment standards, of the determination that “death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Id., at 305; see Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633, 637 (1977); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 271-272 (1976).
  In the last decade, many of the States have been obliged to revise their death penalty statutes in response to the various opinions supporting the judgments in Furman and Gregg and its companion cases. The signals from this Court have not, however, always been easy to decipher. The States now deserve the clearest guidance that the Court can provide; we have an obligation to reconcile previously differing views in order to provide that guidance.
  B
  With that obligation in mind we turn to Lockett’s attack on the Ohio statute. Essentially she contends that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer be given a full opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances in capital cases and that the Ohio statute does not comply with that requirement. She relies, in large part, on the plurality-opinions in Woodson, supra, at 303-305, and Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325, 333-334 (1976), and the joint opinion in Jurek, supra, at 271-272, but she goes beyond them.
  We begin by recognizing that the concept of individualized sentencing in criminal cases generally, although not constitutionally required, has long been accepted in this country. See Williams v. New York, 337 U. S., at 247-248; Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U. S., at 55. Consistent with that concept, sentencing judges traditionally have taken a wide range of factors into account. That States have authority to make aiders and abettors equally responsible, as a matter of law, with principals, or to enact felony-murder statutes is beyond constitutional challenge. But the definition of crimes generally has not been thought automatically to dictate what should be the proper penalty. See ibid.; Williams v. New York, supra, at 247-248; Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U. S., at 585. And where sentencing discretion is granted, it generally has been agreed that the sentencing judge’s “possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics” is “[h]ighly relevant — if not essential— [to the] selection of an appropriate sentence . . . Williams v. New York, supra, at 247 (emphasis added).
  The opinions of this Court going back many years in dealing with sentencing in .capital cases have noted the strength of the basis for individualized sentencing. For example, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in Williams v. New York, supra, at 247-248 — a capital case — observed that the
  “whole country has traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions — even for offenses today deemed trivial.”
  Ten years later, in Williams v. Oklahoma, supra, at 585, another capital case, the Court echoed Mr. Justice Black, stating that
  “[i]n discharging his duty of imposing a proper sentence, the sentencing judge is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved in the crime.” (Emphasis added.)
  See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 245-246 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 297-298 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 339 (Marshall, J., concurring); id., at 402-403 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ; McGautha v. California, 402 U. S., at 197-203. Most would agree that “the 19th century movement away from mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened introduction of flexibility into the sentencing process.” Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 402 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
  Although legislatures remain free to decide how much discretion in sentencing should be reposed in the judge or jury in noncapital cases, the plurality opinion in Woodson, after reviewing the historical repudiation of mandatory sentencing in capital cases, 428 U. S., at 289-298, concluded that
  “in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Id., at 304.
  That declaration rested “on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different” from any other sentence. Id., at 305. We are satisfied that this qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed. The mandatory death penalty statute in Woodson was held invalid because it permitted no consideration of “relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense.” Id., at 304. The plurality did not attempt to indicate, however, which facets of an offender or his offense it deemed “relevant” in capital sentencing or what degree of consideration of “relevant facets” it would require.
  We are now faced with those questions and we conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. We recognize that, in noncapital cases, the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes. The considerations that account for the wide acceptance of individualization of sentences in noncapital cases surely cannot be thought less important in capital cases. Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases. A variety of flexible techniques — probation, parole, work furloughs, to name a few — and various postconviction remedies may be available to modify an initial sentence of confinement in noncapital cases. The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.
  There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be usqd to impose death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
  c
  The Ohio death penalty statute does not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors we now hold to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases. Its constitutional infirmities can best be understood by comparing it with the statutes upheld in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek.
  In upholding the Georgia statute in Gregg, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens noted that the statute permitted the jury “to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances,” see Gregg, 428 U. S., at 206, and that the Georgia Supreme Court had approved “open and far-ranging argument” in presentence hearings, id., at 203. Although the Florida statute approved in Proffitt contained a list of mitigating factors, six Members of this Court assumed, in approving the statute, that the range of mitigating factors listed in the statute was not exclusive. Jurek involved a Texas statute which made no explicit reference to mitigating factors. 428 U. S., at 272. Rather, the jury was required to answer three questions in the sentencing process, the second of which was “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 37.071 (b) (Supp. 1975-1976); see 428 U. S., at 269. The statute survived the petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment attack because three Justices concluded that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had broadly interpreted the second question — despite its facial narrowness — so as to permit the sentencer to consider “whatever mitigating circumstances” the defendant might be able to show. Id., at 272-273 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), citing and quoting, Jurek v. State, 522 S. W. 2d 934, 939-940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). None of the statutes we sustained in Gregg and the companion cases clearly operated at that time to prevent the sentencer from considering any aspect of the defendant’s character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an independently mitigating factor.
  In this regard the statute now before us is significantly different. Once a defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder with at least one of seven specified aggravating circumstances, the death penalty must be imposed unless, considering “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the offender,” the sentencing judge determines that at least one of the following mitigating circumstances is established by a preponderance of the evidence:
  “(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
  “(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
  “(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04 (B) (1975).
  The Ohio Supreme Court has concluded that there is no constitutional distinction between the statute approved in Proffitt and Ohio’s statute, see State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 86-87, 357 N. E. 2d 1035, 1045-1046 (1976), because the mitigating circumstances in Ohio’s statute are “liberally construed in favor of the accused,” State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 281, 358 N. E. 2d 556, 564 (1976); see State v. Bayless, supra, at 86, 357 N. E. 2d, at 1046, and because the sentencing judge or judges may consider factors such as the age and criminal record of the defendant in determining whether any of the mitigating circumstances is established, State v. Bell, supra, at 281, 358 N. E. 2d, at 564. But even under the Ohio court’s construction of the statute, only the three factors specified in the statute can be considered in mitigation of the defendant’s sentence. See, 48 Ohio St. 2d, at 281-282, 358 N. E. 2d, at 564 — 565; State v. Bayless, supra, at 87 n. 2, 357 N. E. 2d, at 1046 n. 2. We see, therefore, that once it is determined that the victim did not induce or facilitate the offense, that the defendant did not act under duress or coercion, and that the offense was not primarily the product of the defendant’s mental deficiency, the Ohio statute mandates the sentence of death. The absence of direct proof that the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim is relevant for mitigating purposes only if it is determined that it sheds some light on one of the three statutory mitigating factors. Similarly, consideration of a defendant’s comparatively minor role in the offense, or age, would generally not be permitted, as such, to affect the sentencing decision.
  The limited range of mitigating circumstances which may be considered by the sentencer under the Ohio statute is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors.
  Accordingly, the judgment under review is reversed to the extent that it sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
  So ordered.,
  Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
  APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
  The pertinent provisions of the Ohio death penalty statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (1975), are as follows:
  § 2929.03 Imposing sentence for a capital offense.
  (A) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder contains no specification of an aggravating circumstance fisted in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge, the trial court shall impose sentence of fife imprisonment on the offender.
  (B) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances fisted in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the verdict shall separately state whether the accused is found guilty or not guilty of the principal charge and, if guilty of the principal charge, whether the offender is guilty or not guilty of each specification. The jury shall be instructed on its duties in this regard, which shall include an instruction that a specification must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a guilty verdict on such specification, but such instruction shall not mention the penalty which may be the consequence of a guilty or not guilty verdict on any charge or specification.
  (C) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge but not guilty of each of the specifications, the trial court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment on the offender. If the indictment contains one or more specifications listed in division (A) of such section, then, following a verdict of guilty of both the charge and one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be determined:
  (1) By the panel of three judges which tried the offender upon his waiver of the right to trial by jury;
  (2) By the trial judge, if the offender was tried by jury.
  (D) When death may be imposed as a penalty for aggravated murder, the court shall require a pre-sentence investigation and a psychiatric examination to be made, and reports submitted to the court, pursuant to section 2947.06 of the Revised Code. Copies of the reports shall be furnished to the prosecutor and to the offender or his counsel. The court shall hear testimony and other evidence, the statement, if any, of the offender, and the arguments, if any, of counsel for the defense and prose-cutionp relevant to the penalty which should be imposed on the offender. If the offender chooses to make a statement, he is subject to cross-examination only if he consents to mate such statement under oath or affirmation.
  (E) Upon consideration of the reports, testimony, other evidence, statement of the offender, and arguments of counsel submitted to the court pursuant to division (D) of this section, if the court finds, or if the panel of three judges unanimously finds that none of the mitigating circumstances listed in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall impose sentence of death on the offender. Otherwise, it shall impose sentence of life imprisonment on the offender.
  § 2929.04 Criteria for imposing death or imprisonment for a capital offense.
  (A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
  (1) The offense was the assassination of the president of the United States or person in line of succession to the presidency, or of the governor or lieutenant governor of this state, or of the president-elect or vice president-elect of the United States, or of the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-elect of this state, or of a candidate for any of the foregoing offices. For purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if he has been nominated for election according to law, or if he has filed a petition or petitions according to law to have his name placed on the ballot in a primary or general election, or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary or general election.
  (2) The offense was committed for hire.
  (3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.
  (4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a detention facility as defined in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code.
  (5) The offender has previously been convicted of an offense of which the gist was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, committed prior to the offense at bar, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.
  (6) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer whom the offender knew to be such, and either the victim was engaged in his duties at the time of the offense, or it was the offender’s specific purpose to kill a law enforcement officer.
  (7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.
  (B) Regardless of whether one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of this section is specified in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when, considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the offender, one or more of the following is established by a prepondence [preponderance] of the evidence:
  (1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
  (2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
  (3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
  The pertinent provisions of the Ohio death penalty statute appear as an appendix to this opinion.
  The presentence report also contained information about the robbery. It indicated that Dew had told the police that he, Parker, and Lockett’s brother had planned the holdup. It also indicated that Parker had told the police that Lockett had not followed his order to keep the car running during the robbery and instead had gone to get something to eat.
  See 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 58-62, 358 N. E. 2d 1062, 1070-1072 (1976); id., at 69-70, 358 N. E. 2d, at 1076 (Stem, J., dissenting).
  See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 291-292, and h. 25 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and SteveNS, JJ.).
  See id., at 291-292; McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 200 n. 11 (1971).
  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 403 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
  The limits on the consideration of mitigating factors in Ohio’s death penalty statute which Lockett now attacks appear to have been a direct response to Furman. Prior to Furman, Ohio had begun to revise its system of capital sentencing. The Ohio House of Representatives had passed a bill abandoning the practice of unbridled sentencing discretion and instructing the sentencer to consider a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose the death penalty. The list of mitigating circumstances permitted consideration of any circumstance “tending to mitigate the offense, though failing to establish a defense.” See Sub. House Bill 511, 109th Ohio General Assembly §2929.03 (C)(3), passed by the Ohio House on March 22, 1972; Lehman & Norris, Some Legislative History and Comments on Ohio’s New Criminal Code, 23 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 8,10,16 (1974).
  Furman was announced during the Ohio Senate Judiciary Committee’s consideration of the Ohio House bill. After Furman, the Committee decided to retain the death penalty but to eliminate much of the sentencing discretion permitted by the House bill. As a result, the Ohio Senate developed the current sentencing procedure which requires the imposition of the death penalty if one of seven specific aggravating circumstances and none of three specific mitigating circumstances is found to exist. Confronted with what reasonably would have appeared to be the questionable constitutionality of permitting discretionary weighing of mitigating factors after Furman, the sponsors of the Ohio House bill were not in a position to mount a strong opposition to the Senate’s amendments, see Lehman & Norris, supra, at 18-22, and the statute under which Lockett was sentenced was enacted.
  See, e. g., Woodson, supra, at 300 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and SteveNS, JJ.); Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 446-448, 556 P. 2d 1101, 1116-1118 (1976) (Clark, J., concurring) (account of how California and other States enacted unconstitutional mandatory death penalties in response to Furman); State v. Spence, 367 A. 2d 983, 985-986 (Del. 1976) (Delaware Legislature and court interpreted Furman as requiring elimination of all sentencing discretion resulting in an unconstitutional statute); Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the “Boiler Plate”: Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 Geo. L. J. 757, 765 n. 43 (1978).
  See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1690, 1690-1710 (1974).
  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, supra; and Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976).
  We express no opinion as to whether the need to deter certain kinds of homicide would justify a mandatory death sentence as, for example, when a prisoner — or escapee — under a life sentence is found guilty of murder. See Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633, 637 n. 5 (1977).
  Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.
  Sentencing in noncapital cases presents no comparable problems. We emphasize that in dealing with standards for imposition of the death sentence we intimate no view regarding the authority of a State or of the Congress to fix mandatory, minimum sentences for noncapital crimes.
  The statute provided that, in sentencing, the jury should consider “any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law” in addition to 10 specified aggravating circumstances. See Ga. Code Ann. §27.2534.1 (b) (Supp. 1975). Mr. Justice White, who also voted to uphold the statute in an opinion joined by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice RehNQUist, noted that the Georgia Legislature had decided to permit “the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too intangible to write into a statute.” Gregg, 428 U. S., at 222.
  The opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and SteveNS in Proffitt noted that the Florida statute “provides that ‘[aggravating circumstances shall be limited to . . . [eight specified factors]' ” and that there was “no such hmiting language introducing the list of statutory mitigating factors.” 428 TJ. S., at 250 n. 8. Mr. Justice White, joined by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice RehNQUist, accepted the interpretation of the statute contained in the opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and SteveNS. See id., at 260.
  In view of our holding that Lockett was not sentenced in accord with the Eighth Amendment, we need not address her contention that the death penalty is constitutionally disproportionate for one who has not been proved to have taken life, to have attempted to take life, or to have intended to take life, or her contention that the death penalty is disproportionate as applied to her in this case. Nor do we address her contentions that the Constitution requires that the death sentence be imposed by a jury; that the Ohio statutory procedures impermissibly burden the defendant’s exercise of his rights to plead not guilty and to be tried by a jury; and that it violates the Constitution to require defendants to bear the risk of nonpersuasion as to the existence of mitigating circumstances in capital cases.