opinion: Mr. Justice Frankfurter
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, seeking recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b), for damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the Coast Guard in the operation of a lighthouse light. They alleged that on October 1, 1951, the tug Navajo, owned by petitioner Indian Towing Company, was towing Barge AS-16, chartered by petitioner Upper Mississippi Towing Corporation; that the barge was loaded with a cargo of triple super phosphate, consigned to petitioner Minnesota Farm Bureau Service Company and insured by petitioner United Firemen’s Insurance Company; that the tug Navajo went aground on Chandeleur Island and as a result thereof sea water wetted and damaged the cargo to the extent of $62,659.70; that the consignee refused to accept the cargo; that petitioners Indian Towing Company and Upper Mississippi Towing Corporation therefore became responsible for the loss of the cargo; and that the loss was paid by petitioner United Firemen’s Insurance Company under loan receipts. The complaint further stated that the grounding of the Navajo was due solely to the failure of the light on Chandeleur Island which in turn was caused by the negligence of the Coast Guard. The specific acts of negligence relied on were the failure of the responsible Coast Guard personnel to check the battery and sun relay system which operated the light; the failure of the Chief Petty Officer who checked the lighthouse on September 7,1951, to make a proper examination of the connections which were “out in the weather”; the failure to check the light between September 7 and October 1,1951; and the failure to repair the light or give warning that the light was not operating. Petitioners also alleged that there was a loose connection which could have been discovered upon proper inspection.
  On motion of the respondent the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division. Respondent then moved to dismiss on the ground that it had not consented to be sued “in the manner in which this suit is brought” in that petitioners’ only relief was under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, or the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112. This motion was granted and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam. 211 F. 2d 886. Because the case presented an important aspect of the still undetermined extent of the Government’s liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, we granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 810. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed by an equally divided Court, 349 U. S. 902, but a petition for rehearing was granted, the earlier judgment in this Court vacated, and the case restored to the docket for reargument before the full Bench. 349 U. S. 926.
  The relevant provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act are 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2674, and 2680 (a):
  § 1346 (b). “. . . the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
  § 2674. “The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”
  § 2680. “The provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall not apply to—
  “(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”
  The question is one of liability for negligence at what this Court has characterized the “operational level” of governmental activity. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 42. The Government concedes that the exception of § 2680 relieving from liability for negligent “exercise of judgment” (which is the way the Government paraphrases a “discretionary function” in §2680 (a)) is not involved here, and it does not deny that the Federal Tort Claims Act does provide for liability in some situations on the “operational level” of its activity. But the Government contends that the language of § 2674 (and the implications of § 2680) imposing liability “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . .” must be read as excluding liability in the performance of activities which private persons do not perform. Thus, there would be no liability for negligent performance of “uniquely governmental functions.” The Government reads the statute as if it imposed liability to the same extent as would be imposed on a private individual “under the same circumstances.” But the statutory language is “under like circumstances,” and it is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his “good Samaritan” task in a careful manner.
  Furthermore, the Government in effect reads the statute as imposing liability in the same manner as if it were a municipal corporation and not as if it were a private person, and it would thus push the courts into the “non-governmentar,-“governmental” quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations. A comparative study of the cases in the forty-eight States will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the decisions in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound. The fact of the matter is that the theory whereby municipalities are made amenable to liability is an endeavor, however awkward and contradictory, to escape from the basic historical doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act cuts the ground from under that doctrine; it is not self-defeating by covertly embedding the casuis-tries of municipal liability for torts.
  While the Government disavows a blanket exemption from liability for all official conduct furthering the “uniquely governmental” activity in any way, it does claim that there can be no recovery based on the negligent performance of the activity itself, the so-called “end-objective” of the particular governmental activity. Let us suppose that the Chief Petty Officer going in a Coast Guard car to inspect the light on Chandeleur Island first negligently ran over a pedestrian; later, while he was inspecting the light, he negligently tripped over a wire and injured someone else; he then forgot to inspect an outside connection and that night the patently defective connection broke and the light failed, causing a ship to go aground and its cargo of triple super phosphate to get wet; finally the Chief Petty Officer on his way out of the lighthouse touched a key to an uninsulated wire to see that it was carrying current, and the spark he produced caused a fire which sank a nearby barge carrying triple super phosphate. Under the Government’s theory, some of these acts of negligence would be actionable, and some would not. But is there a rational ground, one that would carry conviction to minds not in the grip of technical obscurities, why there should be any difference in result? The acts were different in time and place but all were done in furtherance of the officer’s task of inspecting the lighthouse and in furtherance of the Coast Guard’s task in operating a light on Chandeleur Island. Moreover, if the United States were to permit the operation of private lighthouses — not at all inconceivable — the Government’s basis of differentiation would be gone and the negligence charged in this case would be actionable. Yet there would be no change in the character of the Government’s activity in the places where it operated a lighthouse, and we would be attributing bizarre motives to Congress were we to hold that it was predicating liability on such a completely fortuitous circumstance — the presence or absence of identical private activity.
  While the area of liability is circumscribed by certain provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U. S. C. § 2680, all Government activity is inescapably “uniquely governmental” in that it is performed by the Government. In a case in which the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, a wholly Government-owned enterprise, was sought to be held liable on a crop-insurance policy on the theory that a private insurance company would be liable in the same situation, this Court stated: “Government is not partly public or partly private, depending upon the governmental pedigree of the type of a particular activity or the manner in which the Government conducts it.” Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 383-384. On the other hand, it is hard to think of any governmental activity on the “operational level,” our present concern, which is “uniquely governmental,” in the sense that its kind has not at one time or another been, or could not conceivably be, privately performed.
  There is nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that Congress intended to draw distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formulation. The statute was the product of nearly thirty years of congressional consideration and was drawn with numerous substantive limitations and administrative safeguards. (For substantive limitations, see § 2680 (a)-(m). For administrative safeguards, see § 2401 (b) (statute of limitations); § 2402 (denial of trial by jury); § 2672 (administrative adjustment of claims of $1,000 or less); § 2673 (reports to Congress); § 2674 (no liability for punitive damages or for interest prior to judgment); § 2675 (disposition by federal agency as prerequisite to suit when claim is filed); § 2677 (compromise); § 2679 (exclusiveness of remedy).) The language of the statute does not support the Government’s argument. Loose general statements in the legislative history to which the Government points seem directed mainly toward the “discretionary function” exemption of § 2680 and are not persuasive. The broad and just purpose which the statute was designed to effect was to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in circumstances like unto those in which a private person would be liable and not to leave just treatment to the caprice and legislative burden of individual private laws. Of course, when dealing with a statute subjecting the Government to liability for potentially great sums of money, this Court must not promote profligacy by careless construction. Neither should it as a self-constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a statute designed to limit it.
  The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warning that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable under the Tort Claims Act.
  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, and Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, controlling. Neither case is applicable. Feres held only that “the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. Without exception, the relationship of military personnel to the Government has been governed exclusively by federal law.” 340 U. S., at 146. And see Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49. The differences between this case and Dalehite need not be labored. The governing factors in Dalehite sufficiently emerge from the opinion in that case.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
  Reversed and remanded.
  A good illustration of the effort of a conscientious court to reconcile the irreconcilable is Haley v. City of Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 77 N. E. 888. For an example of the confusion prevailing in one jurisdiction, compare District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450 (municipal corporation liable for injuries caused by negligent failure to keep sidewalk in repair) with Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650 (municipal corporation not liable for injuries caused by negligent sprinkling of streets). But even in the law of municipal corporation and state liability, one State at least has sought to emerge from the quagmire. See the more recent New York cases: Foley v. State of New York, 294 N. Y. 275, 62 N. E. 2d 69 (State liable when negligent failure to replaced burned-out bulb in traffic light caused accident); Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N. Y. 361, 62 N. E. 2d 604 (city liable in negligence action for damages caused by runaway police horse). When the confused law of municipal corporations is applied to the Tort Claims Act, the same unsatisfactory results occur. Compare the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the instant case, 211 F. 2d 886, with its holding in United States v. Lawter, 219 F. 2d 559 (United States liable under Tort Claims Act for negligence of Coast Guard during helicopter rescue operation).
  Although the argument is more elaborately presented here, this is not the first statute which the Government has attempted to construe in this manner. The Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, provided that a libel in personam could be brought against the United States for damage caused by a Government-owned merchant vessel or tug in cases “where if such vessel were privately owned or operated . . . a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained . . and stated that “such suits shall proceed and shall be heard and determined according to the principles of law and to the rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties.” In Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, an action was brought under the Act to recover damages for the loss of a ship and cargo by collision with an unmarked wreck of a sunken Government-owned merchant vessel. The Government moved to dismiss the action on the ground, inter alia, that “The said alleged cause of action set out in the said libel relates to an alleged failure on the part of the officers and/or agents of the United States to perform a purely governmental function or to alleged negligence of such officers and/or agents in the performance of a purely governmental function; and gives rise to no liability on the part of the United States of America for which they are suable in the United States Court or elsewhere.” The motion to dismiss was granted on another ground but on appeal the Supreme Court rejected all arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction and reversed the judgment of the district court.
  Congress significantly withheld liability for claims relating, inter alia, to the postal service, tax collection, quarantine establishment, fiscal operations, combatant activities of the Coast Guard during time of war, and the activities of the TVA.
  The Court in Dalehite disposed of a claim of liability for negligence in connection with fire fighting by finding that “there is no analogous liability . . in the law of torts. 346 U. S., at 44. But see Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552.