Per Curiam.
Appellants contend that Oregon’s $25 appellate court filing fee, as applied in this case, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and, also, the First Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth. The Supreme Court of Oregon decided otherwise. 262 Ore. 375, 498 P. 2d 757 (1972). We affirm that decision for reasons we found persuasive in United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973).
Appellant Ortwein (who also was receiving social security and an urban renewal allowance) sustained a reduction of approximately $39 per month in his Oregon old-age assistance when his county welfare agency determined that he shared shelter and expenses with another person in a manner that relieved him of some of the costs upon which his original award had been based. Ortwein appealed to the Oregon Public Welfare Division. The Division conducted a hearing and upheld the county agency’s decision.
Appellant Faubion claimed that certain expenses related to work training under a federal program should have been deducted in calculating her income. Most of these deductions were disallowed, after hearing, by the Public Welfare Division. The disallowance resulted in smaller welfare payments to Faubion over a five-month period.
Judicial review of these agency decisions is authorized under state law. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 183.480 (1971). In cases that are contested, as these were, jurisdiction for judicial review is conferred upon the Oregon Court of Appeals. § 183.480 (2). All appellants in civil cases in Oregon pay a $25 filing fee in appellate courts. §§ 21.010 and 21.040 (1971). Each of the present appellants alleged that he was an indigent unable to pay the filing fee; each moved to proceed in forma pauperis in the Oregon Court of Appeals. The motions were denied without opinions. Appellants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Oregon for an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the Court of Appeals to accept appellants’ cases without payment of fees. The Supreme Court of Oregon requested supplemental briefs and then issued its opinion denying the petition for mandamus. 262 Ore. 375, 498 P. 2d 757 (1972). From this denial the present appeal is taken.
I
Relying on this Court’s opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), and on the remand-for-reconsideration order in Frederick v. Schwartz, 402 U. S. 937 (1971), appellants contend that the Oregon appellate filing fee, when applied to indigents seeking to appeal an adverse welfare decision, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973), this Court upheld statutorily imposed bankruptcy filing fees against a constitutional challenge based on Boddie. We emphasized the special nature of the marital relationship and its concomitant associational interests, and noted that they were not affected in that case and that the objective sought by appellant Kras could be obtained through alternative means that did not require a fee. Boddie, of course, was not concerned with post-hearing review. We now conclude that Kras, rather than Boddie, governs the present appeal, and we emphasize that Frederick was remanded, and not summarily reversed.
A. In Kras, we observed that one’s interest in a bankruptcy discharge “does not rise to the same constitutional level” as one’s inability to dissolve his marriage except through the courts. 409 U. S., at 445. In this case, appellants seek increased welfare payments. This interest, like that of Kras, has far less constitutional significance than the interest of the Boddie appellants. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971), with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). Each of the present appellants has received an agency hearing at which it was determined that the minimum level of payments authorized by law was being provided. As in Kras, we see “no fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending on the availability” of the relief sought by appellants. 409 U. S., at 445.
B. In Kras, the Court also stressed the existence of alternatives, not conditioned on the payment of the fees, to the judicial remedy. Id., at 446. The Court has held that procedural due process requires that a welfare recipient be given a pretermination evidentiary hearing. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 264, 266-271 (1970). These appellants have had hearings. The hearings provide a procedure, not conditioned on payment of any fee, through which appellants have been able to seek redress. This Court has long recognized that, even in criminal cases, due process does not require a State to provide an appellate system. McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687 (1894); see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1956); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 627 (1937); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 77 (1972). Under the facts of this case, appellants were not denied due process.
II
Appellants urge that the filing fee violates the Equal Protection Clause by unconstitutionally discriminating against the poor. As in Kras, this litigation, which deals with welfare payments, “is in the area of economics and social welfare.” 409 U. S., at 446; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485-486. No suspect classification, such as race, nationality, or alienage, is present. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). The applicable standard is that of rational justification. United States v. Kras, supra.
The purpose of the filing fee, as with the bankruptcy fees in Kras, is apparent. The Oregon court system incurs operating costs, and the fee produces some small revenue to assist in offsetting those expenses. Cf. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 21.590 (1971). Appellants do not contend that the fee is disproportionate or that it is not an effective means to accomplish the State’s goal. The requirement of rationality is met.
III
Relying on Lindsey v. Normet, supra, appellants contend that the fee is not required of certain classes of litigants, and that an appeal is thus “capriciously and arbitrarily denied” to other appellants, such as themselves, also in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See 405 U. S., at 77. They assert that criminal appeals, habeas corpus petitions from state institutions or civil commitment proceedings, and appeals from terminations of parental rights may be filed in forma pauperis in the Oregon Court of Appeals. Jurisdictional Statement 23. We are not told just why these filings are permitted, but the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oregon makes it clear that in forma pauperis appeals are allowed only if supervening law requires a right to a free appeal. 262 Ore., at 384, 498 P. 2d, at 761-762.
If the Oregon courts have interpreted the applicable law to give special rights in the criminal area, in civil cases that result in loss of liberty, and in cases terminating parental rights, we cannot say that this categorization is capricious or arbitrary.
A ,7 Affirmed.
The Division found that the county agency “acted within its discretion by determining that the claimant’s living arrangement represented a living situation in which shelter and expenses are shared.” The agency’s order explained that that reduction in the room and board allowance was proper because “[t]he eligibility of recipients who share shelter with non-recipients, and do not pay for room and board, shall be determined on a share/fraction basis at [Public Welfare Division] standards.” Record 9. In his petition for review, Ortwein contended that the order was not supported by “reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the whole record.”
Faubion received an incentive training allowance of $120 per month for approximately five months from a program under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, as amended, 76 Stat. 23, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2571-2574. Record 12. Faubion also was receiving over $210 per month through a state-administered AFDC program. Jurisdictional Statement 4; Record 11. States, in making their income calculations under AFDC, deduct from gross income all expenses “reasonably attributable” to the earning of the income. 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (7); 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (iv) (Sept. 1972). Faubion claimed that she had work-training expenses of $20 per month for essential clothing and grooming, of $20 per month for lunches on the job, of $30 per month for convenience foods for family use made necessary because of her job, of $5 per month for oil, tuneups and repairs, and of $5 per month for miscellaneous school supplies. Record 13. Although the Division allowed some deductions, it determined that the remaining expenses were not “reasonably attributable” to the training program. Record 12. On appeal, Faubion sought to challenge this finding.
See also Huffman v. Boersen, 406 U. S. 337 (1972).
These evidentiary hearings, of course, must meet the minimal requirements of due process. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 266-271 (1970). Appellants have alleged that the hearings were deficient in several ways, Jurisdictional Statement 9-10, but neither the record nor the opinion of the Oregon court provides support for these contentions.
Appellants also claim a violation of their First Amendment right to petition for redress. Our discussion of the Due Process Clause, however, demonstrates that appellants’ rights under the First Amendment have been fully satisfied.