Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On December 17,1943, the petitioner, Timoteo Mariano Andres, was indicted in the United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii for murder in the first degree. 18 U. S. C. §§ 451, 452. The indictment recited that Andres “on or about the 23rd day of November, 1943, at Civilian Housing Area No. 3, Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, said Civilian Housing Area No. 3 being on lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States of America . . . did . . . kill . . . Carmen Garni Saguid . . . .” Andres was tried before a jury which returned this verdict:
“We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled cause, do hereby find the defendant, Timoteo Mariano Andres, guilty of murder in the first degree.”
He was sentenced to death by hanging. He appealed his conviction to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, unanimously. 163 F. 2d 468. A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed in this Court and that petition was granted. 332 U. S. 843.
Four questions were presented in the petition for cer-tiorari. Three of these we do not consider of sufficient doubt or importance to justify an extended discussion. We shall dispose of them before we reach what is, for us, the decisive issue of this case.
Andres contends that 18 U. S. C. § 567, as interpreted by Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. 303, requires that the trial court explain to the jury the scope of their discretion in granting mercy to a defendant. In the Winston case, the judge had charged the jury that they could not qualify their verdict except . . in cases that commend themselves to the good judgment of the jury, cases that have palliating circumstances which would seem to justify and require it.” 172 U. S. at 306. This Court held that instruction erroneous. The Court read the statute to place the question whether the accused should or should not be capitally punished entirely within the discretion of the jury; an exercise of that discretion could be based upon any consideration which appealed to the jury. In the case now before us, the trial judge gave the instructions set forth in the margin. It is clear that he left the question of the punishment to be imposed — death or life imprisonment — to the discretion of the jury. We hold that the trial judge’s instructions on this issue satisfied the requirements of the statute.
It is next contended that the trial was unfair because the instructions quoted below indicated to the jury that the indictment against the petitioner reflected a finding by the Grand Jury that he was probably guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree. Perhaps the italicized language in the charge, read out of context, is misleading and it might have been better to omit it completely. However, when the language complained of is read in context, it seems to us that the petitioner had no real ground for complaint. No material error resulted from the words.
The petitioner also argues that the District Court for the Territory of Hawaii did not have the power to sentence him to death by hanging. 18 U. S. C. § 542 provides : “The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be the manner prescribed by the laws of the State within which the sentence is imposed. ... If the laws of the State within which sentence is imposed make no provision for the infliction of the penalty of death, then the court shall designate some other State in which such sentence shall be executed in the manner prescribed by the laws thereof.” The petitioner contends that the phrase “laws of the State” limits the statute to the forty-eight states and, consequently, provides for no method of inflicting the death penalty where that sentence is imposed by a district court sitting in a Territory. We reject that contention as being without merit. In many contexts “state” may mean only the several states of the United States. Here, however, we hold that its meaning includes the Territory of Hawaii.
The last and most difficult issue raised by Andres is the question of the propriety of those instructions by which the trial judge attempted to explain to the jury the requirements of unanimity in their verdict. This issue is a composite of two problems: (1) The proper construction of 18 U. S. C. § 567; and (2) the consideration of whether the instruction given clearly conveyed to the jury the correct statutory meaning.
Section 567 of 18 U. S. C. reads as follows: “In all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree . . . the jury may qualify their'verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment’; and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.” If a qualified verdict is not returned, the death penalty is mandatory. The Government argues that § 567 properly construed requires that the jury first unanimously decide the guilt of the accused and, then, with the same unanimity decide whether a qualified verdict shall be returned. As the statute requires the death penalty on a verdict of guilty, the contention is that the jury acts unanimously in finding guilt and the law exacts the penalty. It follows, that if all twelve of the jurors cannot agree to add the words “without capital punishment,” the original verdict of guilt stands and the punishment of death must be imposed. The petitioner contends that § 567 must be construed to require unanimity in respect to both guilt and punishment before a verdict can be returned. It follows that one juror can prevent a verdict which requires the death penalty, although there is unanimity in finding the accused guilty of murder in the first degree. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that unanimity of the jury was required both as to guilt and the refusal to qualify the verdict by the words “without capital punishment.” It interpreted the instructions, however, as requiring this unanimity.
The First Congress of the United States provided in an Act of April 30, 1790: “That if any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons on being thereof convicted shall suffer death.” This was the federal law, in the respects here relevant, until 1897. In that year Congress passed and the President signed the Act of January 15, 1897. That statute provided:
“That in all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder or of rape under sections fifty-three hundred and thirty-nine or fifty-three hundred and forty-five, Revised Statutes, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto ‘without capital punishment;’ and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life.”
It is this language, substantially unchanged, which we must construe in this case.
The reports of the Congressional Committees and the debates on the floor of Congress do not discuss the particular problem with which we are now concerned. There are, however, many expressions which indicate that the general purpose of the statute was to limit the severity of the old law.
Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply. In criminal cases this requirement of unanimity extends to all issues — character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment — which are left to the jury. A verdict embodies in a single finding the conclusions by the jury upon all the questions submitted to it. We do not think that the grant of authority to the jury by § 567 to qualify their verdict permits a procedure whereby a unanimous jury must first find guilt and then a unanimous jury alleviate its rigor. Therefore, although the interpretation of § 567 urged by the Government cannot be proven erroneous with certainty, since the statute contains no language specifically requiring unanimity on both guilt and punishment before a verdict can be brought in, we conclude that the construction placed upon the statute by the lower court is correct— that the jury’s decision upon both guilt and whether the punishment of death should be imposed must be unanimous. This construction is more consonant with the general humanitarian purpose of the statute and the history of the Anglo-American jury system than that presented by the Government.
The only question remaining for decision is whether the instructions given by the trial judge clearly conveyed to the jury a correct understanding of the statute. There was a general charge that “the unanimous agreement of the jury is necessary to a verdict.” Later, and the instructions on the specific issue under consideration can best be understood by the colloquy, the following took place:
“(At 3:45 o’clock, p. m., the jury returned to the courtroom, and the following occurred:)
“The Court: Note the presence of the jury and the defendant together with his attorney. I am advised by the bailiff that the jury wishes to ask the Court a question. Which gentlemen [sic] is the foreman- — • you, Mr. Ham? You are Mr. Ham?
“The Foreman: . . . The members of the jury would like to know if a verdict of guilty in the first degree was brought in, whether it would be mandatory on the part of the Judge to sentence the man to death, or hanging, or use his own discretion.
“The Court: Just a minute. I want to be right in my answer. You may sit down. Will the counsel come to the bench, please? (Discussion off the record.)
“The Court: Gentlemen of the Jury, the statute, as I recall, answers that question, but I wanted to look at it once again before I gave you a positive answer. The answer to the question is that, in the absence of a qualified verdict, if the verdict is guilty of murder in the first degree, the Court has no discretion, for the statute provides in such event that the person so convicted of such an offense — murder in the first degree — shall suffer the punishment of death. As I told you in your instructions, there is another Federal statute which enables you gentlemen to qualify your verdict and to add, in the event you should find the person guilty of murder in the first degree, to add to that verdict, I repeat, the phrase ‘without capital punishment.’ In that event the man, of course, under the statute so convicted would not suffer the punishment of death but it would life imprisonment, as I recall it under the statute.
“Does that answer your question?
“TheForeman: Yes.
“The Court: Don’t discuss your problems here, but if it is an answer to your question, you gentlemen can retire to your jury room if there are no other questions.
“The Foreman: No other.
“The Court: Counsel have asked me to reread the instructions to you on that particular point as an amplification of my answer to your question. Will you bear with me just a moment until I find that instruction? I will reread one or two instructions to you which bear on the question which you have asked:
“ ‘You may return a qualified verdict in this case by adding the words “without capital punishment” to your verdict. This power is conferred solely upon you and in this connection the Court can not extend or prescribe to you any definite rule defining the exercise of this power, but commits the entire matter of its exercise to your judgment.’
“ ‘Even if you should unanimously agree from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged, you may, as I have said, qualify your verdict by adding thereto “without capital punishment,” in which case the defendant shall not suffer the death penalty.’
“ ‘In this connection, I further instruct you that you are authorized to add to your verdict the words “without capital punishment,” and this you may do no matter what the evidence may be and without regard to the existence of mitigating circumstances.’
“And, finally, you will recall I said that you are instructed that before you may return a qualified verdict of murder in the first degree without capital punishment, that your decision to do so must, like your regular verdict, be unanimous.”
The Government concedes that, if the petitioner’s interpretation of § 567 is accepted, these instructions were inadequate; and we find ourselves in agreement with this concession. The court below concluded that the instructions were proper and that they did not mislead the jury. It based its conclusion upon two factors: (1) the common understanding of jurors that “they are under no legal compulsion to join in a verdict with which they are in disagreement, either in whole or in part . . .”; and (2) the general admonition of the trial judge that “the unanimous agreement of the jury is necessary to a verdict.”
It seems to us, however, that where a jury is told first that their verdict must be unanimous, and later, in response to a question directed to the particular problem of qualified verdicts, that if their verdict is first-degree murder and they desire to qualify it, they must be unanimous in so doing, the jury might reasonably conclude that, if they cannot all agree to grant mercy, the verdict of guilt must stand unqualified. That reasonable men might derive a meaning from the instructions given other than the proper meaning of § 567 is probable. In death cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in favor of the accused. The context of § 567 does not defy accurate and precise expression. For example: An instruction that a juror should not join a verdict of guilty, without qualification, if he is convinced that capital punishment should not be inflicted, would have satisfied the statute and protected the defendant. Or the jury might have been instructed that its conclusion on both guilt and punishment must be unanimous before any verdict could be found.
As we are of the opinion that the instructions given on this issue did not fully protect the petitioner, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.
“In all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree, or rape, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto ‘without capital punishment’; and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.”
In Winston v. United States, supra, the question presented was the proper construction of § 1 of the Act of January 15, 1897. 29 Stat. 487. 18 U. S. C. § 567, in its relevant part, has language identical to that of the earlier statute.
172 U. S. at 312-13:
“The right to qualify a verdict of guilty, by adding the words ‘without capital punishment,’ is thus conferred upon the jury in all cases of murder. The act does not itself prescribe, nor authorize the court to prescribe, any rule defining or circumscribing the exercise of this right; but commits the whole matter of its exercise to the judgment and the -consciences of the jury. The authority of the jury to decide that the accused shall not be punished capitally is not limited to cases in which the court, or the jury, is of opinion that there are palliating or mitigating circumstances. But it extends to every case in which, upon a view of the whole evidence, the jury is of opinion that it would not be just or wise to impose capital punishment. How far considerations of age, sex, ignorance, illness or intoxication, of human passion or weakness, of sympathy or clemency, or the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of death, or an apprehension that explanatory facts may exist which have not been brought to light, or any other consideration whatever, should be allowed weight in deciding the question whether the accused should or should not be capitally punished, is committed by the act of Congress to the sound discretion of the jury, and of the jury alone.”
“I instruct you that you may return a qualified verdict in this case by adding the words ‘without capital punishment’ to your verdict. This power is conferred solely upon you and in this connection the Court can not extend or prescribe to you any definite rule defining the exercise of this power, but commits the entire matter of its exercise to your judgment.
“I instruct you, gentlemen of the jury that even if you should unanimously agree from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged, you may qualify your verdict by adding thereto ‘without capital punishment’ in which case the defendant shall not suffer the death penalty.
“In this connection, I further instruct you that you are authorized to add to your verdict the words ‘without capital punishment,’ and this you may do no matter what the evidence may be and without regard to the existence of mitigating circumstances.”
“To the indictment which the grand jury returned against this defendant, this defendant entered a plea of not guilty. That is to say, he denied the charge stated in the indictment and placed himself upon his Country for the purpose of trial. The burden is upon the Government to show to your satisfaction, gentlemen, that this defendant is guilty beyond every reasonable doubt. This burden does not change at any time during the course of the trial. The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge stated in the indictment until he is proven guilty by the degree of proof to which I have previously referred. The presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant is not a mere formality to be disregarded by the jury at its pleasure. It is a substantive part of our criminal law. The presumption of innocence continues with the defendant throughout the trial until you are convinced by the evidence that he is guilty beyond every reasonable doubt.
“When the indictment was returned by the grand jury against this defendant, the defendant had had no opportunity to present his side of the case. The indictment was found by the grand jury upon evidence presented to it by the Government alone, and created in the minds of the grand jury a belief that it was probable that a crime had been committed and that this defendant probably committed that crime.
“Upon the evidence [which'] it heard, the grand jury indicted this defendant, thereby indicating that it was probable that a crime had been committed, which should be disposed of in this court where both sides could be heard, and this is the stage which we have now reached.
“I advise you, gentlemen, that it is the indictment in this case which frames the issues of the case.”
Petitioner complains of the italicized language.
Section 542, before its amendment in 1937, read: “The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be by hanging.” 35 Stat. 1151. The changes in the statute from that language to the present language were prompted by the fact that “Many States . . . use[d] more humane methods of execution, such as electrocution, or gas. . . . [Therefore,] it appear [ed] desirable for the Federal Government likewise to change its law in this respect . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 164, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1. Since Congress was well aware that federal courts had jurisdiction in territories and possessions, it would be incongruous to hold that they did not use the word “state” to cover such areas. The purpose of this legislation was remedial: the adoption of the local mode of execution. The intent of Congress would be frustrated by construing the statute to create that hiatus for which the petitioner contends.
18 U. S. C. §454: “Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death. . . ."
1 Stat. 113.
29 Stat. 487.
The Act of January 15, 1897, was incorporated into the Criminal Code of 1909 as § 330 with changes that are here unimportant. 35 Stat. 1152. Section 330 of the Criminal Code is now 18 U. S. C. § 567.
Dissatisfaction over the harshness and antiquity of the federal criminal laws led in 1894 to the introduction by N. M. Curtis of New York of a bill to reduce the number of crimes for which the penalty of death could be imposed and to give the jury the right to “qualify their verdict [in death cases] by adding thereto 'without capital punishment.’ ” See H. R. Rep. No. 545, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. The bill as introduced divided murder into degrees, §§ 1, 2 of H. R. 5836, 53d Cong., 2d Sess.; it was passed by the House without any substantial changes. 27 Cong. Rec. 823. After severe amendment it was favorably reported to the Senate by the Committee on the Judiciary. See S. Rep. No. 846, 53d Cong., 3d Sess. These amendments, however, did not affect § 5 of the original bill, the section which provided for qualified verdicts; that section was retained and became § 1 of the new bill. Id. at p. 2. The committee, however, “thought it inadvisable to make degrees in the crime of murder, or attempt new definitions.” Ibid. Consequently, it struck out the sections of the original bill which concerned themselves with these matters. The Committee Report stated that “The leading object of this bill is to diminish the infliction of the death penalty by limiting the offenses upon which it is denounced, and by providing in all cases a latitude in the tribunal which shall try them to withhold the extremest punishment when deemed too severe.” Id. at p. 1. The bill as amended was passed by the Senate and later by the House.
See note 11, supra; 28 Cong. Rec. 2649-2650, 3098-3111, 3651.
See American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464.
This conclusion is supported by Smith v. United, States, 47 F. 2d 518, which, with the exception of the present case, appears to be the only federal decision on this question.
Andres v. United States, 163 F. 2d 468, 471.
Id. atp. 471.
Ibid.