Per Curiam.
We granted the State’s petition for certiorari to decide whether respondent retained an expectation of privacy in a bag that he placed in the communal trash bin of a multi-unit apartment building. After briefing and oral argument on that issue, it has now become clear that the question is not properly presented in this case.
I
Based upon an informant’s tip that respondent was accepting wagers on professional football games at a specified telephone number, police began an investigation which eventually led to an application for a search warrant for 1120 North Flores Street, Apartment No. 8, West Hollywood, California. In conjunction with the application, a police officer submitted an affidavit including at least five details in support of the warrant: (1) that the informant had named Rooney and had correctly specified when Rooney would be at the apartment; (2) that the telephone number and utilities were listed to one Peter Ryan, and that use of a pseudonym is common among bookmakers; (3) that Rooney had previously been arrested for bookmaking at the apartment; (4) that through a search of the communal trash bin in the apartment building’s basement the police had retrieved a bag containing mail addressed to Rooney at Apartment No. 8, and containing evidence of gambling activity; and (5) that the police had dialed the telephone number the informant had given them and had overheard a conversation involving point spreads on professional football games. See App. 19-28. The Magistrate found probable cause for a search of Apartment No. 8, and issued a warrant. Incriminating evidence was found during the search, and respondent was arrested.
After he was charged with a number of felony offenses, respondent brought a motion to quash the search warrant and to dismiss the felony charges against him. He argued that there was no probable cause to support the warrant because the earlier warrantless search of the communal trash bin had violated his Fourth Amendment rights under a number of California Supreme Court precedents, and that, without the incriminating evidence found in the trash, there was insufficient evidence to support the warrant. A Magistrate granted respondent’s motion, agreeing that the evidence obtained from the trash bin could not be used to support the search warrant for the apartment, and ruling that the other evidence offered in support of the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. The Superior Court reached the same conclusion. Pursuant to California procedural rules, the State then informed the court that it could not prosecute the case without the evidence seized in the search of the apartment, and the case was dismissed, thus allowing the State to appeal the order quashing the warrant.
The Court of Appeal reversed on the only issue before it— to use the State’s words, “the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the search warrant.” 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 221 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1985). Although it concluded that the evidence found in the trash bin could not be used to support the search warrant, the Court of Appeal examined the other evidence offered in support of the warrant under the standards set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983), and held that there was sufficient other evidence to establish probable cause in support of the warrant. The Superior Court’s order dismissing the case was therefore reversed, allowing the prosecution to proceed. The California Supreme Court denied both petitioner’s and respondent’s petitions for review. The State then sought review in this Court, arguing that the California courts had erred in stating that the search of the trash was unconstitutional. We granted certiorari. 479 U. S. 881 (1986).
II
This Court “reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.” Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956); see also Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984); Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827). Here, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was entirely in the State’s favor — the search warrant which was the sole focus of the litigation was deemed valid. The fact that the Court of Appeal reached its decision through analysis different than this Court might have used does not make it appropriate for this Court to rewrite the California court’s decision, or for the prevailing party to request us to review it. That the Court of Appeal even addressed the trash bin issue is mere fortuity; it could as easily have held that since there was sufficient evidence to support the search even without the trash evidence, it would not discuss the constitutionality of the trash search. The Court of Appeal’s use of analysis that may have been adverse to the State’s long-term interests does not allow the State to claim status as a losing party for purposes of this Court’s review.
But, the State argues, if the case does come to trial, and if the State does wish to introduce the evidence, it will be barred from doing so because the reasoning in the Court of Appeal’s decision will constitute the law of the case. There are two too many “ifs” in that proposition to make our review appropriate at this stage. Even if everything the prosecution fears comes to bear, the State will still have the opportunity to appeal such an order, and this Court will have the chance to review it, with the knowledge that we are reviewing a state-court judgment on the issue, and that the State Supreme Court has passed upon or declined review in a case squarely presenting the issue. As it stands, we have no way of knowing what the California Supreme Court’s position on the issue of trash searches currently is. It is no answer to say that the California Supreme Court already had its chance to review the matter and declined to do so when it denied the State’s petition for review in this case. The denial of review may well have been based on that court’s recognizing, as we now do, that the prosecution won below, and was therefore not in a position to appeal. Giving the California Supreme Court an opportunity to consider the issue in a case that properly raises it is a compelling reason for us to dismiss this petition. Under these circumstances, our review of the trash-search issue, which has never been the subject of an actual judgment, would be most premature.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Justice Marshall concurs in the judgment.
Opening Brief for Appellant in No. B006936, Cal. 2d App. Dist.
Throughout the proceedings it was clear that the courts were passing only upon Rooney’s motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence found in the apartment; there was no motion to suppress the evidence found in the trash. For example, the first thing the Magistrate said after calling Rooney’s case was: “This is before the Court on the notice of motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5.” Clerk’s Transcript 2-3. After hearing argument involving the different parts of the affidavit supporting the search warrant, the Magistrate announced: “It is going to be the ruling of this Court that although this is a relatively close matter, but I feel that the notice of motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5 should be granted.” Id., at 21.
Again, when the ease came before the Superior Court, the first thing the judge stated was: “The matter pending, motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Section 1538.5. At this point, to classify the issue, is directed at the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the search warrant and challenges that affidavit on its face.” App. 50.
A careful and adequate reading of the record, cf. post, at 318 (White, J., dissenting), reveals that the State itself has never believed that the Court of Appeal’s judgment incorporated any motion to suppress the evidence found in the trash. For example, as Justice White notes, the State sought rehearing in the Court of Appeal, but as part of that petition it stated that the Court of Appeal’s “opinion should be appropriately modified to delete its discussion of the issue since its determination that the search warrant was based upon probable cause was made notwithstanding its conclusion that the Krivda rule [People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P. 2d 1262 (1971)] applies to communal trash bins.” Petition for Rehearing or Modification of Opinion in No. B006936 (Cal. 2d App. Dist.), p. 4. If the Court of Appeal had actually issued a judgment on the issue, the State would have sought a modification of the judgment — not a mere modification of the opinion. That the State does not believe that the Court of Appeal issued a judgment excluding the evidence from the trash search is further corroborated by the State’s own arguments before this Court. In its petition for certiorari, the State explained:
“At first blush, it might be urged that a petition for writ of certiorari should not be granted because the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the search of the apartment building communal trash bin was unreasonable constitutes obiter dicta. However, the Court of Appeal’s determination that the search of the trash bin was unreasonable cannot be deemed to merely constitute obiter dicta. . . . Unless overturned on this point, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion constitutes the law of the case. . . . Hence at the trial, the People would be precluded from introducing evidence as to what the police officers had found in the trash bin.” Pet. for Cert. 14-15 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Similarly, the Deputy District Attorney arguing the case before this Court candidly described the State’s reasons for seeking certiorari in this case:
“Q. So that everything you found under the search warrant is admissible.
“Mr. Guminski: That is correct, Your Honor. But the ruling ... is a ruling that forecloses the use of what was discovered as far as the trash bag; that would be the rule of the case.
“Q. And you think you’re really going to use that at this trial, or you think that you would really need to?
“A. Well, Your Honor, I think what we really want would be to . . . overrule People v. Krivda, which was here before this Court in 1972, and which was remanded then because there were independent state grounds.
“I mean, I wish to answer candidly to your question, Justice; there is an intention to use it, of course.
“But it is a vehicle of review.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27.
Of course, as we explain, see text this page and infra, at 313-314, the law-of-the-case doctrine provides no justification for our granting review at this stage. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 946 (1983); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 261-262 (1982); see generally R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 132 (6th ed. 1986).
Assuming that respondent’s motion to suppress the trash evidence will be granted, the prosecution will then have to decide whether it can prosecute without the evidence. If it cannot, then an order of dismissal will be entered, and the prosecution may immediately appeal. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1238, 1538.5 (West 1982). Even if the prosecution can proceed without the evidence, however, it may still obtain immediate review through a writ of mandate or prohibition. § 1538.5(o). A writ of mandate could compel the Superior Court to admit the evidence and “must be issued where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.” Cal. Civ. Proe. Code Ann. § 1086 (West 1982). See generally B. Witkin, California Criminal Procedure §§ 869, 870 (1985 Supp., pt. 2).
The California rule regarding trash searches is derived from the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P. 2d 1262 (1971) (en banc). We granted certiorari to review that decision but we were unable to determine whether the California Supreme Court had rested its decision on state or federal grounds. 409 U. S. 33 (1972). On remand, the court announced that it had rested on both state and federal constitutional grounds, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, cert. denied, 412 U. S. 919 (1973), which prevented us from reviewing the case. In 1985, however, the people of California amended their Constitution to bar the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the California, but not the Federal, Constitution. Cal. Const., Art. I, § 28(d); see generally In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P. 2d 744 (1985). Thus, the Court of Appeal was forced to rest its discussion of the trash-search issue in this case on the Federal Constitution.
While we express no view on the merits of the issue, we note that the arguments that the State now makes rely, in large part, on post-Krivda developments, including the state constitutional amendment discussed above, this Court’s intervening decisions, and decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals dealing with trash searches. The California Supreme Court should be afforded the opportunity to consider these factors before we intervene.
Moreover, because of the unusual posture of the case, we cannot know whether the prosecution will even seek to introduce the trash evidence at trial. If the evidence found in the apartment pursuant to the valid warrant is strong enough, the prosecution might not even be interested in presenting the more attenuated evidence found'in the trash.