Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here for the second time. It involves the indictment and conviction of petitioners for using, and conspiring to use, the mails to defraud. Criminal Code § 215, 18 U. S. C. § 338; Criminal Code § 37, 18 U. S. C. § 88. The fraudulent scheme charged was the promotion of the I Am movement, which was alleged to be a fraudulent religious organization, through the use of the mails. The nature of the movement and the facts surrounding its origin and growth are summarized in our prior opinion. 322 U. S. 78. It is sufficient here to say that petitioners were found guilty on a charge by the trial judge which withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of their religious beliefs or doctrines. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and granted a new trial, holding it was error to withhold those questions from the jury. 138 F. 2d 540. We, in turn, reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals and sustained the District Court in that ruling. Petitioners argued, however, that even though the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in reversing the judgment of conviction on that ground, its action was justified on other distinct grounds. But the Circuit Court of Appeals had not passed on those other questions; and we did not have the benefit of its views on them. We accordingly deemed it more appropriate to remand the cause to that court so that it might first pass on the questions reserved.
On the remand the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed the judgment of conviction without discussion of the issues raised. On a petition for rehearing, which was denied, the Circuit Court of Appeals filed an opinion which discussed some but not all of the questions which had been reserved. 152 F. 2d 941. We granted the petition for certiorari because of the serious questions concerning the administration of criminal justice which were raised.
We are met at the outset with the concession that women were not included in the panel of grand and petit jurors in the Southern District of California where the indictment was returned and the trial had; that they were intentionally and systematically excluded from the panel. This issue was raised by a motion to quash the indictment and by a challenge to the array of the petit jurors because of intentional and systematic exclusion of women from the panel. Both motions were denied and their denial was assigned as error on appeal. The jury question has been in issue at each stage of the proceedings, except the first time that the case was before us. At that time the point was not assigned or argued. But the case was here at the instance of the United States, not at the instance of the present petitioners. As we have said, there were other issues in the case obscured by the question brought here by the United States and which had not been passed upon below or argued before this Court. Consequently, when we remanded the case for consideration of the remaining issues by the Circuit Court of Appeals, the jury issue was argued. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not hold that it had been waived. That court passed upon the issue, concluding that there was no error in the exclusion of women from the panel. 152 F. 2d p. 944, and see dissent at p. 953. Under these circumstances we cannot say (and the Government does not suggest) that petitioners have lost the right to urge the question here. Moreover, in this case, as in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 168-169, the error, though not presented here on the first argument, appears on the face of the record before us. And see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 16.
Congress has provided that jurors in a federal court shall have the same qualifications as those of the highest court of law in the State. Judicial Code § 275, 28 U. S. C. § 411. This provision applies to grand as well as petit juries. Congress also has prohibited disqualification of citizens from jury service “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” It has required that jurors shall be chosen “without reference to party affiliations.” It has provided that jurors shall be returned from such parts of the district as the court may direct “so as to be most favorable to an impartial trial, and so as not to incur an unnecessary expense, or unduly burden the citizens of any part of the district.” None of the specific exemptions which it has created is along the lines of sex.
These provisions reflect a design to make the jury “a cross-section of the community” and truly representative of it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 86.
In California, as in most States, women are eligible for jury service under local law. Code of Civil Procedure, § 198. The system of jury selection which Congress has adopted contemplated, therefore, that juries in the federal courts sitting in such States would be representative of both sexes. If women are excluded, only half of the available population is drawn upon for jury service. To put the matter another way, Congress has referred to state law merely to determine who is qualified to act as a juror. Whether the method of selecting a jury in the federal court from those qualified is or is not proper is a question of federal law. Glasser v. United States, supra, pp. 85-86.
In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, we were presented' with a similar problem. It was a civil case which had been removed to the district court on the ground of diversity of citizenship and involved a question of the liability of a common carrier to a passenger. All persons who worked for a daily wage had been deliberately and intentionally excluded from the jury lists. We held, in the exercise of our power of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, that the plaintiff’s motion to strike the panel should have been granted. The gist of our ruling is contained in the following statement from the opinion in the Thiel case:
“The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. . . . This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.” 328 U. S. 220.
We conclude that the purposeful and systematic exclusion of women from the panel in this case was a departure from the scheme of jury selection which Congress adopted and that, as in the Thiel case, we should exercise our power of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts, McNabb v. United States, supra, to correct an error which permeated this proceeding.
It is said, however, that an all male panel drawn from the various groups within a community will be as truly representative as if women were included. The thought is that the factors which tend to influence the action of women are the same as those which influence the action of men — personality, background, economic status — and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men likewise do not act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who wpuld claim that a jury was truly representative of the community if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less representative of the community than would be true if an economic or racial group were excluded.
The present case involves a prosecution of a mother and her son for the promotion of an allegedly fraudulent religious program. Judge Denman in his dissent below stated:
“In the average family from which jurors are drawn, the souls of children in their infant and early adolescent bodies receive the first and most lasting teaching of religious truths from their mothers. In the same families the major social function of men is concerned with the creation of material things, largely food and clothing and housing of the children's bodies.
“In the public schools over ninety-five per cent of the primary and grammar school teachers are women. In the churches of all religions the numbers of women attendants on divine service vastly exceed men. The one large and vital religious group created in America since Joseph Smith is that of the Christian Scientists founded by a woman, Mary Baker Eddy.
“. . . It matters not that from my viewpoint there is . . . testimony of a conspiracy so mean and vile that it warrants some of the strongest strictures of the prosecution. I am not a woman juror sitting in the Ballard trial, who is the mother of five children at whose knee have been instilled in them the teachings of Jesus as interpreted by Mrs. Eddy.
“Well could a sensitive woman, highly spiritual in character, rationalize all the money income acquired by Mrs. Ballard as being devoted to the teachings of the same Jesus as are the profits of the trust created by Mrs. Eddy for the Christian Science Monitor.” 152 P. 2d pp. 951-52.
The point illustrates that the exclusion of women from jury panels may at times be highly prejudicial to the defendants. But reversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an individual case. The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of jury selection. The systematic and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group, Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, or an economic or social class, Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designed by Congress to have in our democratic society. It is a departure from the statutory scheme. As well stated in United States v. Roemig, 52 F. Supp. 857, 862, “Such action is operative to destroy the basic democracy and classlessness of jury personnel.” It “does not accord to the defendant the type of jury to which the law entitles him. It is an administrative denial of a right which the lawmakers have not seen fit to withhold from, but have actually guaranteed to him.” Cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 764-765. The injury is not limited to the defendant — there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.
If, as in the Thiel case, we had merely an instance of a petit jury drawn from an improper panel, we would remand the cause for a new trial. But, as we have said, the grand jury was likewise drawn from a panel improperly chosen and therefore the indictment was not returned in accordance with the procedure established by Congress. Accordingly, the indictment must be dismissed. In disposing of the case on this ground we do not reach all the issues urged and it is suggested that in so limiting our opinion we prolong an already lengthy proceeding. We are told that these petitioners will again be before us for the determination of questions now left undecided. But we cannot know that this is so, and to assume it would be speculative. The United States may or may not present new charges framed within the limits of 'our earlier opinion. A properly constituted grand jury may or may not return new indictments. Petitioners may or may not be convicted a second time.
Reversed.
Women have been members of both grand and petit juries in that district since the beginning of the February Term, 1944. See United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 682.
Thus Judicial Code § 276, 28 U. S. C. § 412 provides for the drawing of “All such jurors, grand and petit” from persons “possessing the qualifications prescribed” in § 411.
Judicial Code § 278, 28 U. S. C. § 415.
Judicial Code § 276,28 U. S. C. § 412.
Judicial Code § 277,28 U. S. C. § 413.
No person shall serve as a petit juror “more than one term in a year.” Judicial Code § 286,28 U. S. C. § 423.
Artificers and workmen employed in armories and arsenals of the United States are exempted from service as jurors. 50 U. S. C. § 57. Cf. Judicial Code §288, 28 U. S. C. §426, dealing with disqualifications of jurors in prosecutions for bigamy, polygamy or unlawful cohabitation.
Report to the Judicial Conference of the Committee on Selection of Jurors (1942), p. 23.
An earlier indictment (subsequently dismissed) was returned against petitioners who moved to quash because of the exclusion of women from the panel of grand jurors. The motion was denied. United States v. Ballard, 35 F. Supp. 105. That ruling seems to have been influenced by the thought that California law determined whether the exclusion of women resulted in a proper jury. Under California law the inclusion of women on the panel is not obligatory, the statutory provisions which qualify them for jury service being directory only. People v. Shannon, 203 Cal. 139, 263 P. 522; People v. Parman, 14 Cal. 2d 17, 92 P. 2d 387.
See Miller, The Woman Juror, 2 Oregon L. Rev. 30; cf. Carson, Women Jurors (1928), p. 15.
The problem is reflected in the discussions of the androcentric theory and the gynaecocentric theory in scientific literature. See Ward, Pure Sociology (1903), Ch. XIV; Draper, Dupertuis and Caughey, Human Constitution in Clinical Medicine (1944), Ch. VI.
Cf. Wuichet v. United States, 8 F. 2d 561-63.