Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether federal or state law controls the ownership of land, called accretion, gradually deposited by the ocean on adjoining upland property conveyed by the United States prior to statehood. The circumstances that give rise to the question are these. Prior to 1889 all land in what is now the State of Washington was owned by the United States, except land that had been conveyed to private parties. At that time owners of property bordering the ocean, such as the predecessor in title of Mrs. Stella Hughes, the petitioner here, had under the common law a right to include within their lands any accretion gradually built up by the ocean. Washington became a State in 1889, and Article 17 of the State’s new constitution, as interpreted by its Supreme Court, denied the owners of ocean-front property in the State any further rights in accretion that might in the future be formed between their property and the ocean. This is a suit brought by Mrs. Hughes, the successor in title to the original federal grantee, against the State of Washington as owner of the tidelands to determine whether the right to future accretions which existed under federal law in 1889 was abolished by that provision of the Washington Constitution. The trial court upheld Mrs. Hughes’ contention that the right to accretions remained subject to federal law, and that she was the owner of the accreted lands. The State Supreme Court reversed, holding that state law controlled and that the State owned these lands. 67 Wash. 2d 799, 410 P. 2d 20 (1966). We granted certiorari. 385 U. S. 1000 (1967). We hold that this question is governed by federal, not state, law and that under federal law Mrs. Hughes, who traces her title to a federal grant prior to statehood, is the owner of these accretions.
While the issue appears never to have been squarely presented to this Court before, we think the path to decision is indicated by our holding in Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10 (1935). In that case we dealt with the rights of a California property owner who held under a federal patent, and in that instance, unlike the present case, the patent was issued after statehood. We held that
“[t]he question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between the upland and the tideland, is necessarily a federal question. It is a question which concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States; it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law.” 296 U. S., at 22.
No subsequent case in this Court has cast doubt on the principle announced in Borax. See also United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 27-28 (1935). The State argues, and the court below held, however, that the Borax case should not be applied here because that case involved no question as to accretions. While this is true, the case did involve the question as to what rights were conveyed by the federal grant and decided that the extent of ownership under the federal grant is governed by federal law. This is as true whether doubt as to any boundary is based on a broad question as to the general definition of the shoreline or on a particularized problem relating to the ownership of accretion. See United States v. Washington, 294 F. 2d 830, 832 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U. S. 817 (1962). We therefore find no significant difference between Borax and the present case.
Recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing Borax, respondent urges us to reconsider it. Borax itself, as well as United States v. Oregon, supra, and many other cases, makes clear that a dispute over title to lands owned by the Federal Government is governed by federal law, although of course the Federal Government may, if it desires, choose to select a state rule as the federal rule. Borax holds that there has been no such choice in this area, and we have no difficulty in concluding that Borax was correctly decided. The rule deals with waters that lap both the lands of the State and the boundaries of the international sea. This relationship, at this particular point of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital interest of the Nation in its own boundaries to allow it to be governed by any law but the “supreme Law of the Land.”
This brings us to the question of what the federal rule is. The State has not attempted to argue that federal law gives it title to these accretions, and it seems clear to us that it could not. A long and unbroken line of decisions of this Court establishes that the grantee of land bounded by a body of navigable water acquires a right to any natural and gradual accretion formed along the shore. In Jones v. Johnston, 18 How. 150 (1856), a dispute between two parties owning land along Lake Michigan over the ownership of soil that had gradually been deposited along the shore, this Court held that “[l]and gained from the sea either by alluvion or dereliction, if the same be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, belongs to the owner of the land adjoining.” 18 How., at 156. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this rule, County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46 (1874); Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U. S. 178 (1890), and the soundness of the principle is scarcely open to question. Any other rule would leave riparian owners continually in danger of losing the access to water which is often the most valuable feature of their property, and continually vulnerable to harassing litigation challenging the location of the original water lines. While it is true that these riparian rights are to some extent insecure in any event, since they are subject to considerable control by the neighboring owner of the tideland, this is insufficient reason to leave these valuable rights at the mercy of natural phenomena which may in no way affect the interests of the tideland owner. See Stevens v. Arnold, 262 U. S. 266, 269-270 (1923). We therefore hold that petitioner is entitled to the accretion that has been gradually formed along her property by the ocean.
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Washington for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Jones v. Johnston, 18 How. 150 (1856); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46 (1874).
In Ker & Co. v. Couden, 223 U. S. 268 (1912), Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, held that under the governing Spanish law, lands added to the shore by accretion in the Philippines belonged to the public domain rather than to the adjacent estate.
It has been held that a State -may, without paying compensation, deprive a riparian owner of his common-law right to utilize the flowing water, St. Anthony Falk Water Power Co. v. Water Comm’rs, 168 U. S. 349 (1897), or to build a wharf over the water, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894). It has also been held that the State may fill its tidelands and thus block the riparian owner’s natural access to the water. Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co., 255 U. S. 56 (1921).