Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted on sixteen counts of an indictment charging the unlawful possession, concealment and alteration of certain Notice of Classification Cards and Registration Certificates in violation of § 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, and of § 48 of the Criminal Code. Prior to the trial, petitioner moved to suppress the evidence, which served as the basis for the conviction, on the grounds that it had been obtained by means of an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and that to permit the introduction of that evidence would be to violate the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. The motion to suppress was denied, and petitioner’s numerous objections to the evidence at the trial were overruled. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 151 F. 2d 837. Certiorari was granted because of the importance of the questions presented.
Two valid warrants of arrest were issued. One charged that petitioner and one Moffett had violated the Mail Fraud Statute by causing a letter addressed to the Guaranty Trust Company of New York to be placed in the mails for the purpose of cashing a forged check for $25,000.00 drawn on the Mudge Oil Company in pursuance of a scheme to defraud. The second warrant charged that petitioner and Moffett, with intent to defraud certain banks and the Mudge Oil Company, had caused a $25,000.00 forged check to be transported in interstate commerce, in violation of § 3 of the National Stolen Property Act.
Five agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, acting under the authority of the two warrants, went to the apartment of petitioner in Oklahoma City and there arrested him. The apartment consisted of a living room, bedroom, bathroom and kitchen. Following the arrest, which took place in the living room, petitioner was handcuffed and a search of the entire apartment was undertaken. The agents stated that the object of the search was to find two $10,000.00 canceled checks of the Mudge Oil Company which had been stolen from that company’s office and which were thought to have been used in effecting the forgery. There was evidence connecting petitioner with that theft. In addition, the search was said to be for the purpose of locating “any means that might have been used to commit these two crimes, such as burglar tools, pens, or anything that could be used in a confidence game of this type.”
One agent was assigned to each room of the apartment and, over petitioner’s protest, a careful and thorough search proceeded for approximately five hours. As the search neared its end, one of the agents discovered in a bedroom bureau drawer a sealed envelope marked “George Harris, personal papers.” The envelope was torn open and on the inside a smaller envelope was found containing eight Notice of Classification cards and eleven Registration Certificates bearing the stamp of Local Board No. 7 of Oklahoma County. It was this evidence upon which the conviction in the District Court was based and against which the motion to suppress was directed. It is conceded that the evidence is in no way related to the crimes for which petitioner was initially arrested and that the search which led to its discovery was not conducted under the authority of a search warrant.
In denying the motion to suppress, the District Court wrote no opinion. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the search was carried on in good faith by the federal agents for the purposes expressed, that it was not a general exploratory search for merely evidentiary materials, and that the search and seizure were a reasonable incident to petitioner’s arrest.
If it is true, as petitioner contends, that the draft cards were seized in violation of petitioner’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, the conviction based upon evidence so obtained cannot be sustained. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925); Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106 (1927). This Court has consistently asserted that the rights of privacy and personal security protected by the Fourth Amendment “. . . are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty of them is as important and as imperative as are the guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen . . .” Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 304 (1921).
This Court has also pointed out that it is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the constitutional interdict. The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms. “Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.” Go-Bart Importing Company v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357 (1931).
The Fourth Amendment has never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be effected under the authority of a search warrant. Search and seizure incident to lawful arrest is a practice of ancient origin and has long been an integral part of the law-enforcement procedures of the United States and of the individual states.
The opinions of this Court have clearly recognized that the search incident to arrest may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises under his immediate control. Thus in Agnello v. United States, supra, at 30, it was said “The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.” It is equally clear that a search incident to arrest, which is otherwise reasonable, is not automatically rendered invalid by the fact that a dwelling place, as contrasted to a business premises, is subjected to search.
Nor can support be found for the suggestion that the search could not validly extend beyond the room in which petitioner was arrested. Petitioner was in exclusive possession of a four-room apartment. His control extended quite as much to the bedroom in which the draft cards were found as to the living room in which he was arrested. The canceled checks and other instrumentalities of the crimes charged in the warrants could easily have been concealed in any of the four rooms of the apartment. Other situations may arise in which the nature and size of the object sought or the lack of effective control over the premises on the part of the persons arrested may require that the searches be less extensive. But the area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be determined by the fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took place in the living room as contrasted to some other room of the apartment.
Similar considerations are applicable in evaluating petitioner’s contention that the search was, in any event, too intensive. Here again we must look to the particular circumstances of the particular case. As was observed by the Circuit Court of Appeals: “It is not likely that the checks would be visibly accessible. By their very nature they would have been kept in some secluded spot . . . .” The same meticulous investigation which would be appropriate in a search for two small canceled checks could not be considered reasonable where agents are seeking a stolen automobile or an illegal still. We do not believe that the search in this case went beyond that which the situation reasonably demanded.
This is not a case in which law enforcement officials have invaded a private dwelling without authority and seized evidence of crime. Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927); Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 73 App. D. C. 85, 115 F. 2d 690 (1940). Here the agents entered the apartment under the authority of lawful warrants of arrest. Neither was the entry tortious nor was the arrest which followed in any sense illegal.
Nor is this a case in which law-enforcement officers have entered premises ostensibly for the purpose of making an arrest but in reality for the purpose of conducting a general exploratory search for merely eviden-tiary materials tending to connect the accused with some crime. Go-Bart Company v. United States, supra; United States v. Lefkowitz, supra. In the present case the agents were in possession of facts indicating petitioner’s probable guilt of the crimes for which the warrants of arrest were issued. The search was not a general exploration but was specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities by which the crimes charged had been committed, particularly the two canceled checks of the Mudge Oil Company. The Circuit Court of Appeals found and the District Court acted on the assumption that the agents conducted their search in good faith for the purpose of discovering the objects specified. That determination is supported by the record. The two canceled checks were stolen from the offices of the Mudge Oil Company. There was evidence connecting petitioner with that theft. The search which followed the arrest was appropriate for the discovery of such objects. Nothing in the agents’ conduct was inconsistent with their declared purpose.
Furthermore, the objects sought for and those actually discovered were properly subject to seizure. This Court has frequently recognized the distinction between merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized either under the authority of a search warrant or during the course of a search incident to arrest, and on the other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen property, weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be effected, and property the possession of which is a crime. Clearly the checks and other means and instrumentalities of the crimes charged in the warrants toward which the search was directed as well as the draft cards which were in fact seized fall within that class of objects properly subject to seizure. Certainly this is not a case of search for or seizure of an individual’s private papers, nor does it involve a prosecution based upon the expression of political or religious views in such papers.
Nor is it a significant consideration that the draft cards which were seized were not related to the crimes for which petitioner was arrested. Here during the course of a valid search the agents came upon property of the United States in the illegal custody of the petitioner. It was property of which the Government was entitled to possession. In keeping the draft cards in his custody petitioner was guilty of a serious and continuing offense against the laws of the United States. A crime was thus being committed in the very presence of the agents conducting the search. Nothing in the decisions of this Court gives support to the suggestion that under such circumstances the law-enforcement officials must impotently stand aside and refrain from seizing such contraband material. If entry upon the premises be authorized and the search which follows be valid, there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure by law-enforcement agents of government property the possession of which is a crime, even though the officers are not aware that such property is on the premises when the search, is initiated.
The dangers to fundamental personal rights and interests resulting from excesses of law-enforcement officials committed during the course of criminal investigations are not illusory. This Court has always been alert to protect against such abuse. But we should not permit our knowledge that abuses sometimes occur to give sinister coloration to procedures which are basically reasonable. We conclude that in this case the evidence which formed the basis of petitioner’s conviction was obtained without violation of petitioner’s rights under the Constitution.
Affirmed.
The indictment contained nineteen counts. Petitioner was convicted on the second, which charged the fraudulent concealment of 8 Notice of Classification Cards, DSS Form 57, and 11 Registration Certificates, DSS Form 2; the third, which charged fraudulent possession with intent to convert to his own use the above-mentioned property; the fourth through tenth, charging the unlawful alteration of a Notice of Classification card; the twelfth and fourteenth through nineteenth, charging the unlawful possession of an altered Notice of Classification Card. Petitioner was acquitted on the first count, which charged theft of government property. Count 11, which charged alteration of a Notice of Classification card, and count 13, which charged possession of an altered card, were dismissed. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years on each of the sixteen counts indicated, the sentences to run concurrently.
54 Stat. 885, 894-895, 50 U. S. C. App. § 311. Section 623.61-2 of the Selective Service Regulations states that “It shall be a violation of these regulations for any person to have in his possession” a Notice of Classification not regularly issued to him or to alter or forge any Notice of Classification. Section 11 of the Act makes the failure to perform any duty required by the Regulations punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00 or both.
35 Stat. 1098, 18 U. S. C. § 101. Insofar as pertinent, the section provides: “Whoever shall receive, conceal, or aid in concealing, or shall have or retain in his possession with intent to convert to his own use or gain, any . . . property of the United States, which has theretofore been embezzled, stolen, or purloined by any other person, knowing the same to have been so embezzled, stolen, or purloined, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; . . .”
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Insofar as pertinent, the Fifth Amendment provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, . . .”
35 Stat. 1130-1131, 18 U. S. C. § 338.
53 Stat. 1178-1179,18 U. S. C. § 413 et seq.
The agents who testified in the proceedings in the trial court clearly stated that the object of the search was the means employed in committing the crimes charged in the warrants of arrest. None of the subsequent statements of the agents, if read in their context, are in conflict with that assertion.
It appears that the checks were never found. Respondent concedes that, in addition to the draft cards, seven pens and a quantity of tissue paper capable of being employed as instruments of forgery were seized. Also taken were twenty-seven pieces of celluloid which at the trial were demonstrated to be useful in picking a lock. It was respondent’s theory that petitioner had obtained the canceled checks by theft from the offices of the Mudge Oil Company and that entry into the offices had been achieved in that manner. Petitioner alleged in his motion to suppress that various other items were taken, including sheets of blank paper, expense bills and receipts, personal mail, letters, etc.
151 F. 2d 837.
See opinion of Cardozo, J., in People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923); Trial of Henry and John Sheares, 27 How. St. Tr. 255, 321 (1798).
Examples of the practice are to be found in numerous eases in this Court and in the lower federal courts. Weeks v. United States, supra; Agnello v. United States, supra; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 (1927); Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927); Go-Bart Importing Company v. United States, supra; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932); Parks v. United States, 76 F. 2d 709 (1935); United States v. 7141 Ounces Gold, 94 F. 2d 17 (1938); Matthews v. Correa, 135 F. 2d 534 (1943).
Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 224 Ky. 117, 5 S. W. 2d 887 (1928); Banks v. Farwell, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 156 (1839). And see cases cited in 32 A. L. R.697; 51 A.L.R. 434.
Similar expressions may be found in the cases cited in notes 12 and 13. There is nothing in the Go-Bárt and Lefkowitz cases, supra, which casts doubt on this proposition.
Stricter requirements of reasonableness may apply where a dwelling is being searched. Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946) ; Matthews v. Correa, supra, at 537.
Searches going beyond the room of arrest were upheld in the Agnello and Marrón cases, supra. The searches found to be invalid in the Go-Bart and Lejkowitz cases were so held for reasons other than the areas covered by the searches. It has not been the understanding of the lower federal courts that the search in every case must be so confined. See, for example: United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F. 2d 829 (1944); Matthews v. Correa, supra; United States v. 71.41 Ounces Gold, supra.
Boyd v. United States, supra, at 623-624; Weeks v. United States, supra, at 392-393; Gouled v. United States, supra, at 309; Carroll v. United States, supra, at 149-150; Aquello v. United States, supra, at 30; Marron v. United States, supra, at 199; United States v. Lefkowitz, supra, at 465-466. The same distinction is drawn in numerous cases in the lower federal courts: Matthews v. Correa, supra, at 537; United States v. Lindenfeld, supra, at 832; In re Ginsburg, 147 F. 2d 749, 751 (1945).
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 1073-1074 (1765).
Davis v. United States, supra at 590. And see Boyd v. United States, supra, 623-624; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 380 (1911).
Milam v. United States, 296 F. 629 (1924); United States v. Old Dominion Warehouse, 10 F. 2d 736 (1926); United States v. Two Soaking Units, 48 F. 2d 107 (1931); Paper v. United States, 53 F. 2d 184 (1931); Benton v. United States, 70 F. 2d 24 (1934); Matthews v. Correa, supra.