Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question of a State’s power to impose a special tax on the press and, by enacting exemptions, to limit its effect to only a few newspapers.
I
Since 1967, Minnesota has imposed a sales tax on most sales of goods for a price in excess of a nominal sum. Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 32, Art. XIII, § 2, 1967 Minn. Laws 2143, 2179, codified at Minn. Stat. §297A.02 (1982). In general, the tax applies only to retail sales. Ibid. An exemption for industrial and agricultural users shields from the tax sales of components to be used in the production of goods that will themselves be sold at retail. §297A.25(l)(h). As part of this general system of taxation and in support of the sales tax, see Minn. Code of Agency Rules, Tax S & U 300 (1979), Minnesota also enacted a tax on the “privilege of using, storing or consuming in Minnesota tangible personal property.” This use tax applies to any nonexempt tangible personal property unless the sales tax was paid on the sales price. Minn. Stat. §297A. 14 (1982). Like the classic use tax, this use tax protects the State’s sales tax by eliminating the residents’ incentive to travel to States with lower sales taxes to buy goods rather than buying them in Minnesota. §§297A. 14, 297A.24.
The appellant, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., “Star Tribune,” is the publisher of a morning newspaper and an evening newspaper (until 1982) in Minneapolis. From 1967 until 1971, it enjoyed an exemption from the sales and use tax provided by Minnesota for periodic publications. 1967 Minn. Laws 2187, codified at Minn. Stat. § 297A.25(l)(i) (1982). In 1971, however, while leaving the exemption from the sales tax in place, the legislature amended the scheme to impose a “use tax” on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in the production of a publication. Act of Oct. 31, 1971, ch. 31, Art. I, § 5, 1971 Minn. Laws 2561, 2565, codified with modifications at Minn. Stat. §§297A.14, 297A.25(l)(i) (1982). Ink and paper used in publications became the only-items subject to the use tax that were components of goods to be sold at retail. In 1974, the legislature again amended the statute, this time to exempt the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed by a publication in any calendar year, in effect giving each publication an annual tax credit of $4,000. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 650, Art. XIII, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 1606, 1637, codified at Minn. Stat. §297A.14 (1982). Publications remained exempt from the sales tax, § 2, 1973 Minn. Laws 1639.
After the enactment of the $100,000 exemption, 11 publishers, producing 14 of the 388 paid circulation newspapers in the State, incurred a tax liability in 1974. Star Tribune was one of the 11, and, of the $893,355 collected, it paid $608,634, or roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax. See 314 N. W. 2d 201, 203, and n. 4 (1981). In 1975, 13 publishers, producing 16 out of 374 paid circulation papers, paid a tax. That year, Star Tribune again bore roughly two-thirds of the total receipts from the use tax on ink and paper. Id., at 204, and n. 5.
Star Tribune instituted this action to seek a refund of the use taxes it paid from January 1, 1974, to May 31, 1975. It challenged the imposition of the use tax on ink and paper used in publications as a violation of the guarantees of freedom of the press and equal protection in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the tax against the federal constitutional challenge. 314 N. W. 2d 201 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction, 457 U. S. 1130 (1982), and we now reverse.
I — I HH
Star Tribune argues that we must strike this tax on the authority of Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936). Although there are similarities between the two cases, we agree with the State that Grosjean is not controlling.
In Grosjean, the State of Louisiana imposed a license tax of 2% of the gross receipts from the sale of advertising on all newspapers with a weekly circulation above 20,000. Out of at least 124 publishers in the State, only 13 were subject to the tax. After noting that the tax was “single in kind” and that keying the tax to circulation curtailed the flow of information, id., at 250-251, this Court held the tax invalid as an abridgment of the freedom of the press. Both the brief and the argument of the publishers in this Court emphasized the events leading up to the tax and the contemporary political climate in Louisiana. See Argument for Appellees, id., at 238; Brief for Appellees, O. T. 1936, No. 303, pp. 8-9, 30. All but one of the large papers subject to the tax had “ganged up” on Senator Huey Long, and a circular distributed by Long and the Governor to each member of the state legislature described “lying newspapers” as conducting “a vicious campaign” and the tax as “a tax on lying, 2c [sic] a lie.” Id., at 9. Although the Court’s opinion did not describe this history, it stated “[the tax] is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information,” 297 U. S., at 250, an explanation that suggests that the motivation of the legislature may have been significant.
Our subsequent cases have not been consistent in their reading of Grosjean on this point. Compare United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 384-385 (1968) (stating that legislative purpose was irrelevant in Grosjean), with Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1978) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that purpose was relevant in Grosjean); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 383 (1973) (same). Commentators have generally viewed Grosjean as dependent on the improper censorial goals of the legislature. See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 419 (1970); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 592, n. 8, 724, n. 10 (1978). We think that the result in Grosjean may have been attributable in part to the perception on the part of the Court that the State imposed the tax with an intent to penalize a selected group of newspapers. In the case currently before us, however, there is no legislative history and no indication, apart from the structure of the tax itself, of any impermissible or censorial motive on the part of the legislature. We cannot resolve the case by simple citation to Grosjean. Instead, we must analyze the problem anew under the general principles of the First Amendment.
hH HH
Clearly, the First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press. It is beyond dispute that the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems. See, e. g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131, 139 (1969) (antitrust laws); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143, 155-156 (1951) (same); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951) (prohibition of door-to-door solicitation); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 192-193 (1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946) (same); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 6-7, 19-20 (1945) (antitrust laws); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 132-133 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972) (enforcement of subpoenas). Minnesota, however, has not chosen to apply its general sales and use tax to newspapers. Instead, it has created a special tax that applies only to certain publications protected by the First Amendment. Although the State argues now that the tax on paper and ink is part of the general scheme of taxation, the use tax provision, quoted in n. 2, supra, is facially discriminatory, singling out publications for treatment that is, to our knowledge, unique in Minnesota tax law.
Minnesota’s treatment of publications differs from that of other enterprises in at least two important respects: it imposes a use tax that does not serve the function of protecting the sales tax, and it taxes an intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale. A use tax ordinarily serves to complement the sales tax by eliminating the incentive to make major purchases in States with lower sales taxes; it requires the resident who shops out-of-state to pay a use tax equal to the sales tax savings. E. g., National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551, 555 (1977); P. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation §§10:1, 10:5 (1981); Warren & Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 49, 63 (1938). Minnesota designed its overall use tax scheme to serve this function. As the regulations state, “[t]he ‘use tax’ is a compensating or complementary tax.” Minn. Code of Agency Rules, Tax S & U 300 (1979); see Minn. Stat. § 297A.24 (1982). Thus, in general, items exempt from the sales tax are not subject to the use tax, for, in the event of a sales tax exemption, there is no “complementary function” for a use tax to serve. See DeLuxe Check Printers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Tax, 295 Minn. 76, 203 N. W. 2d 341, 343 (1972). But the use tax on ink and paper serves no such complementary function; it applies to all uses, whether or not the taxpayer purchased the ink and paper instate, and it applies to items exempt from the sales tax.
Further, the ordinary rule in Minnesota, as discussed above, is to tax only the ultimate, or retail, sale rather than the use of components like ink and paper. “The statutory scheme is to devise a unitary tax which exempts intermediate transactions and imposes it only on sales when the finished product is purchased by the ultimate user.” Standard Packaging Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 288 N. W. 2d 234, 239 (Minn. 1979). Publishers, however, are taxed on their purchase of components, even though they will eventually sell their publications at retail.
By creating this special use tax, which, to our knowledge, is without parallel in the State’s tax scheme, Minnesota has singled out the press for special treatment. We then must determine whether the First Amendment permits such special taxation. A tax that burdens rights protected by the First Amendment cannot stand unless the burden is necessary to achieve an overriding governmental interest. See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 (1982). Any tax that the press must pay, of course, imposes some “burden.” But, as we have observed, see supra, at 581, this Court has long upheld economic regulation of the press. The cases approving such economic regulation, however, emphasized the general applicability of the challenged regulation to all businesses, e. g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra, at 194; Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., supra, at 184; Associated Press v. NLRB, supra, at 132-133, suggesting that a regulation that singled out the press might place a heavier burden of justification on the State, and we now conclude that the special problems created by differential treatment do indeed impose such a burden.
There is substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment. The role of the press in mobilizing sentiment in favor of independence was critical to the Revolution. When the Constitution was proposed without an explicit guarantee of freedom of the press, the Antifeder-alists objected. Proponents of the Constitution, relying on the principle of enumerated powers, responded that such a guarantee was unnecessary because the Constitution granted Congress no power to control the press. The remarks of Richard Henry Lee are typical of the rejoinders of the Antifederalists:
“I confess I do not see in what cases the congress can, with any pretence of right, make a law to suppress the freedom of the press; though I am not clear, that congress is restrained from laying any duties whatever on printing, and from laying duties particularly heavy on certain pieces printed .. . .” R. Lee, Observation Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government, Letter IV, reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 466, 474 (1971).
See also A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention by a Federal Republican, reprinted in 3 H. Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist 65, 81-82 (1981); M. Smith, Address to the People of New York on the Necessity of Amendments to the Constitution, reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 566, 575-576; cf. The Federalist No. 84, p. 440, and n. 1 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed. 1948) (recognizing and attempting to refute the argument). The concerns voiced by the Antifederalists led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. See 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 527.
The fears of the Antifederalists were well founded. A power to tax differentially, as opposed to a power to tax generally, gives a government a powerful weapon against the taxpayer selected. When the State imposes a generally applicable tax, there is little cause for concern. We need not fear that a government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its constituency. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). When the State singles out the press, though, the political constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of general applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute. That threat can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical comment by the press, undercutting the basic assumption of our political system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government. See generally Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 Hastings L. J. 631, 634 (1975). “[A]n untrammeled press [is] a vital source of public information,” Grosjean, 297 U. S., at 250, and an informed public is the essence of working democracy.
Further, differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional. See, e. g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95-96 (1972); cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45 (1982) (First Amendment has its “fullest and most urgent” application in the case of regulation of the content of political speech). Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the interests protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such treatment unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation.
I — I
The main interest asserted by Minnesota in this case is the raising of revenue. Of course that interest is critical to any government. Standing alone, however, it cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available: the State could raise the revenue by taxing businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles out the press.
Addressing the concern with differential treatment, Minnesota invites us to look beyond the form of the tax to its substance. The tax is, according to the State, merely a substitute for the sales tax, which, as a generally applicable tax, would be constitutional as applied to the press. There are two fatal flaws in this reasoning. First, the State has offered no explanation of why it chose to use a substitute for the sales tax rather than the sales tax itself. The court below speculated that the State might have been concerned that collection of a tax on such small transactions would be impractical. 314 N. W. 2d, at 207. That suggestion is unpersuasive, for sales of other low-priced goods are not exempt, see n. 1, supra. If the real goal of this tax is to duplicate the sales tax, it is difficult to see why the State did not achieve that goal by the obvious and effective expedient of applying the sales tax.
Further, even assuming that the legislature did have valid reasons for substituting another tax for the sales tax, we are not persuaded that this tax does serve as a substitute. The State asserts that this scheme actually favors the press over other businesses, because the same rate of tax is applied, but, for the press, the rate applies to the cost of components rather than to the sales price. We would be hesitant to fashion a rule that automatically allowed the State to single out the press for a different method of taxation as long as the effective burden was no different from that on other taxpayers or the burden on the press was lighter than that on other businesses. One reason for this reluctance is that the very selection of the press for special treatment threatens the press not only with the current differential treatment, but also with the possibility of subsequent differentially more burdensome treatment. Thus, even without actually imposing an extra burden on the press, the government might be able to achieve censorial effects, for “[t]he threat of sanctions may deter [the] exercise [of First Amendment rights] almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963).
A second reason to avoid the proposed rule is that courts as institutions are poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods of taxation. The complexities of factual economic proof always present a certain potential for error, and courts have little familiarity with the process of evaluating the relative economic burden of taxes. In sum, the possibility of error inherent in the proposed rule poses too great a threat to concerns at the heart of the First Amendment, and we cannot tolerate that possibility. Minnesota, therefore, has offered no adequate justification for the special treatment of newspapers.
V
Minnesota’s ink and paper tax violates the First Amendment not only because it singles out the press, but also because it targets a small group of newspapers. The effect of the $100,000 exemption enacted in 1974 is that only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all, and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax. The State explains this exemption as part of a policy favoring an “equitable” tax system, although there are no comparable exemptions for small enterprises outside the press. Again, there is no legislative history supporting the State’s view of the purpose of the amendment. Whatever the motive of the legislature in this case, we think that recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme. It has asserted no interest other than its desire to have an “equitable” tax system. The current system, it explains, promotes equity because it places the burden on large publications that impose more social costs than do smaller publications and that are more likely to be able to bear the burden of the tax. Even if we were willing to accept the premise that large businesses are more profitable and therefore better able to bear the burden of the tax, the State’s commitment to this “equity” is questionable, for the concern has not led the State to grant benefits to small businesses in general. And when the exemption selects such a narrowly defined group to bear the full burden of the tax, the tax begins to resemble more a penalty for a few of the largest newspapers than an attempt to favor struggling smaller enterprises.
VI
We need not and do not impugn the motives of the Minnesota Legislature in passing the ink and paper tax. Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment. See NAACP v. Button, 371U. S., at 439; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 (1958); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451 (1938). We have long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment. E. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939). A tax that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify its action. Since Minnesota has offered no satisfactory justification for its tax on the use of ink and paper, the tax violates the First Amendment, and the judgment below is
Reversed.
JusTiCE Blackmun joins this opinion except footnote 12.
Currently, the tax applies to sales of items for more than 90. Minn. Stat. §297A.03(2) (1982). When first enacted, the threshold amount was 160. Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 32, Art. XIII, § 3(2), 1967 Minn. Laws 2143, 2180.
After the 1974 amendment, the use tax provision read in full:
“For the privilege of using, storing or consuming in Minnesota tangible personal property, tickets or admissions to places of amusement and athletic events, electricity, gas, and local exchange telephone service purchased for use, storage or consumption in this state, there is hereby imposed on every person in this state a use tax at the rate of four percent of the sales price of sales at retail of any of the aforementioned items made to such person after October 31, 1971, unless the tax imposed by section 297A.02 [the sales tax] was paid on said sales price.
“Motor vehicles subject to tax under this section shall be taxed at the fair market value at the time of transport into Minnesota if such motor vehicles were acquired more than three months prior to its [sic] transport into this state.
“Notwithstanding any other provisions of section 297A.01 to 297A.44 to the contrary, the cost of paper and ink products exceeding $100,000 in any calendar year, used or consumed in producing a publication as defined in section 297A.25, subdivision 1, clause (i) is subject to the tax imposed by this section.” 1973 Minn. Laws 1637, codified at Minn. Stat. §297A.14 (1982).
The final paragraph was the only addition of the 1974 amendment. The provision has since been amended to increase the rate of the tax, Act of June 6, 1981, ch. 1, Art. IV, § 5, 1981 Minn. Laws 2396, but has not been changed in any way relevant to this litigation.
Although the Minnesota Legislature records some proceedings and preserves the recordings, it has specifically provided that those recordings are not to be considered as evidence of legislative intent. See Minnesota Legislative Manual, Rule 1.18, Rules of the Minn. House of Representatives; Rule 65, Permanent Rules of the Senate (1981-1982). There is no evidence of legislative intent on the record in this litigation.
A third difference is worth noting, though it may have little economic effect. The use tax is not visible to consumers, while the sales tax must, by law, be stated separately as an addition to the price. See Minn. Stat. §297A. 03(1) (1982).
The Court recognized in Oklahoma Press that the FLSA excluded seamen and farmworkers. See 327 U. S., at 193. It rejected, however, the publisher’s argument that the exclusion of these workers precluded application of the law to the employees of newspapers. The State here argues that Oklahoma Press establishes that the press cannot successfully challenge regulations on the basis of the exemption of other enterprises. We disagree. The exempt enterprises in Oklahoma Press were isolated exceptions and not the rule. Here, everything is exempt from the use tax on ink and paper, except the press.
It is true that our opinions rarely speculate on precisely how the Framers would have analyzed a given regulation of expression. In general, though, we have only limited evidence of exactly how the Framers intended the First Amendment to apply. There are no recorded debates in the Senate or in the States, and the discussion in the House of Representatives was couched in general terms, perhaps in response to Madison’s suggestion that the Representatives not stray from simple acknowledged principles. See Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 92-82, p. 936, and n. 5 (1973); see also Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 16 (1941). Consequently, we ordinarily simply apply those general principles, requiring the government to justify any burdens on First Amendment rights by showing that they are necessary to achieve a legitimate overriding governmental interest, see n. 7, infra. But when we do have evidence that a particular law would have offended the Framers, we have not hesitated to invalidate it on that ground alone. Prior restraints, for instance, clearly strike to the core of the Framers’ concerns, leading this Court to treat them as particularly suspect. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 713, 716-718 (1931); cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936) (relying on the role of the “taxes on knowledge” in inspiring the First Amendment to strike down a contemporary tax on knowledge).
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent analyzes this case solely as a problem of equal protection, applying the familiar tiers of scrutiny. Post, at 599-600. We, however, view the problem as one arising directly under the First Amendment, for, as our discussion shows, the Framers perceived singling out the press for taxation as a means of abridging the freedom of the press, see n. 6, supra. The appropriate method of analysis thus is to balance the burden implicit in singling out the press against the interest asserted by the State. Under a long line of precedents, the regulation can survive only if the governmental interest outweighs the burden and cannot be achieved by means that do not infringe First Amendment rights as significantly. See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 257-258, 259 (1982); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).
Cf. United States v. Lee, supra (generally applicable tax may be applied to those with religious objections).
Star Tribune insists that the premise of the State’s argument — that a generally applicable sales tax would be constitutional — is incorrect, citing Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944), Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943), and Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103 (1943). We think that Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951), is more relevant and rebuts Star Tribune’s argument. There, we upheld an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation, even though it applied to prevent the door-to-door sale of subscriptions to magazines, an activity covered by the First Amendment. Although Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943), had struck down a similar ordinance as applied to the distribution of free religious literature, the Breard Court explained that case as emphasizing that the information distributed was religious in nature and that the distribution was noncommercial. 341 U. S., at 642-643. As the dissent in Breará recognized, the majority opinion substantially undercut both Martin and the cases now relied upon by Star Tribune, in which the Court had invalidated ordinances imposing a flat license tax on the sale of religious literature. See 341 U. S., at 649-650 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Since this decision cannot be reconciled with the Jones, Murdock and Martin v. Struthers cases, it seems to me that good judicial practice calls for their forthright overruling”). Whatever the value of those eases as authority after Breará, we think them distinguishable from a generally applicable sales tax. In each of those cases, the local government imposed a flat tax, unrelated to the receipts or income of the speaker or to the expenses of administering a valid regulatory scheme, as a condition of the right to speak. By imposing the tax as a condition of engaging in protected activity, the defendants in those cases imposed a form of prior restraint on speech, rendering the tax highly susceptible to constitutional challenge. Follett, supra, at 576-578; Murdock, supra, at 112, 113-114; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 609, 611 (1942) (Stone, C. J., dissenting), reasoning approved on rehearing in 319 U. S. 103 (1943); see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S., at 249; see generally Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). In that regard, the cases cited by Star Tribune do not resemble a generally applicable sales tax. Indeed, our cases have consistently recognized that nondiscriminatory taxes on the receipts or income of newspapers would be permissible, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 683 (1972) (dictum); Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at 250 (dictum); cf. Follett, supra, at 578 (preacher subject to taxes on income or property) (dictum); Murdock, supra, at 112 (same) (dictum).
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent explains that collecting sales taxes on newspapers entails special problems because of the unusual marketing practices for newspapers — sales from vending machines and at newsstands, for instance. Post, at 602. The dissent does not, however, explain why the State cannot resolve these problems by using the same methods used for items like chewing gum and candy, marketed in these same unusual ways and subject to the sales tax, see Minn. Stat. §§297A.01 (3)(c)(vi), (viii) (1982) (defining the sale of food from vending machines as a sale); see also §297A.04 (dealing with vending machine operators).
Further, Justice Rehnquist fears that the imposition of a sales tax will mean that vending machine prices will be 260 instead of 250; or prices will be 300, with publishers retaining an extra 40 per paper; or the price will be 250, with publishers absorbing the tax. Post, at 602. It is difficult to see how the use tax rectifies this problem, for it increases publishers’ costs. If the increase is a penny, the use taxes forces publishers to choose to pass the exact increment along to consumers by raising the price of the finished product to 260; or to increase the price by a nickel and retain an extra 40 per paper; or to leave the price at 250 and absorb the tax.
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent deprecates this concern, asserting that there is no threat, because this Court will invalidate any differentially more burdensome tax. Post, at 601. That assertion would provide more security if we could be certain that courts will always prove able to identify differentially more burdensome taxes, a question we explore further, infra.
We have not always avoided evaluating the relative burdens of different methods of taxation in certain cases involving state taxation of the Federal Government and those with whom it does business. See Washington v. United States, ante, p. 536; United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U. S. 452 (1977). Since McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), the Supremacy Clause has prohibited not only state taxation that discriminates against the Federal Government but also any direct taxation of the Federal Government. See generally United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720, 730-734 (1982). In spite of the rule against direct taxation of the Federal Government, States remain free to impose the economic incidence of a tax on the Federal Government, as long as that tax is not discriminatory. E. g., id., at 734-735, and n. 11; United States v. County of Fresno, supra, at 460. In that situation, then, the valid state interest in requiring federal enterprises to bear their share of the tax burden will often justify the use of differential methods of taxation. As we explained in Washington v. United States, “[Washington] has merely accommodated for the fact that it may not impose a tax directly on the United States . . . .” Ante, at 546. The special rule prohibiting direct taxation of the Federal Government but permitting the imposition of an equivalent economic burden on the Government may not only justify the State’s use of different methods of taxation, but may also force us, within limits, see Washington, ante, at 546, n. 11, to compare the burdens of two different taxes. Nothing, however, prevents the State from taxing the press in the same manner that it taxes other enterprises. It can achieve its interest in requiring the press to bear its share of the burden by taxing the press as it taxes others, so differential taxation is not necessary to achieve its goals.
Justice White insists that the Court regularly inquires into the economic effect of taxes, relying on a number of cases arising under the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. In the cases cited, the Court has struck down state taxes only when “[t]he inequality of the . . . tax burden between in-state and out-of-state manufacturer-users [was] admitted,” Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 70 (1963), and when the Court was able to see that the tax produced a “grossly distorted result,” Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 326 (1968) (emphasis added). In these eases, the Court required the taxpayer to show “gross overreaching,” recognizing “the vastness of the State’s taxing power and the latitude that the exercise of that power must be given before it encounters constitutional restraints.” Ibid.; see Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199, 205 (1961). When delicate and cherished First Amendment rights are at stake, however, the constitutional tolerance for error diminishes drastically, and the risk increases that courts will prove unable to apply accurately the more finely tuned standards.
If a State employed the same method of taxation but applied a lower rate to the press, so that there could be no doubt that the legislature was not singling out the press to bear a more burdensome tax, we would, of course, be in a position to evaluate the relative burdens. And, given the clarity of the relative burdens, as well as the rule that differential methods of taxation are not automatically permissible if less burdensome, a lower tax rate for the press would not raise the threat that the legislature might later impose an extra burden that would escape detection by the courts, see supra, at 588, and n. 11. Thus, our decision does not, as the dissent suggests, require Minnesota to impose a greater tax burden on publications.
Disparaging our concern with the complexities of economic proof, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent undertakes to calculate a hypothetical sales tax liability for Star Tribune for the years 1974 and 1975. Post, at 597-598. That undertaking, we think, illustrates some of the problems that inhere in any such inquiry, see generally R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 461 (2d ed. 1976) (detailing some of the complexities of calculating the burden of a tax); cf. id., at 475 (in evaluating excess burden of taxes, “quantitative evidence is sketchy and underlying procedures are necessarily crude”). First, the calculation for 1974 and 1975 for this newspaper tells us nothing about the relative impact of the tax on other newspapers or in other years. Since newspapers receive a substantial portion of their revenues from advertising, see generally Newsprint Information Committee, Newspaper and Newsprint Facts at a Glance 12 (24th ed. 1982), it is not necessarily true even for profitable newspapers that the price of the finished product will exceed the cost of inputs. Consequently, it is not necessary that a tax imposed on components is less burdensome than a tax at the same rate imposed on the price of the product. Although the relationship of Star Tribune’s revenues from circulation and its revenues from advertising may result in a lower tax burden under the use tax in 1974 and 1975, that relationship need not hold for all newspapers or for all time.
Second, if, as the dissent assumes elsewhere, post, at 602, the sales tax increases the price, that price increase presumably will cause a decrease in demand. The decrease in demand may lead to lower total revenues and, therefore, to a lower total sales tax burden than that calculated by the dissent. See generally P. Samuelson, Economics 381-383, 389-390 (10th ed. 1976); R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 21 (3d ed. 1980) (“[I]t is necessary, in designing fiscal policies, to allow for how the private sector will respond”). The dissent’s calculations, then, can only be characterized as hypothetical. Taking the chance that these calculations or others like them are erroneous is a risk that the First Amendment forbids.
In 1974, 11 publishers paid the tax. Three paid less than $1,000, and another three paid less than $8,000. Star Tribune, one of only two publishers paying more than $100,000, paid $608,634. In 1975, 13 publishers paid the tax. Again, three paid less than $1,000, and four more paid less than $3,000. For that year, Star Tribune paid $636,113 and was again one of only two publishers incurring a liability greater than $100,000. See 314 N. W. 2d. at 203-204. and nn. 4. 5.
Cf. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178, 183, 184 (1946) (upholding exemption from Fair Labor Standards Act of small weekly and semiweekly newspapers where the purpose of the exemption was “to put those papers more on a parity with other small town enterprises”).
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to address Star Tribune’s arguments that the $100,000 exemption violates the principles of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), and Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (1935).