What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. 

PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL et al. v. BABBITT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.
No. 98-1991.
Argued March 1, 2000
Decided May 15, 2000
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 750.
Timothy S. Bishop argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Steffen N. Johnson and Constance E. Brooks.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, David C. Frederick, William B. Lazarus, and John D. Leshy
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Wyoming by Gay Woodhóuse, Attorney General, Thomas J. Davidson, Deputy Attorney General, and Theodore C. Preston, Assistant Attorney General; for the Alameda Bookeliffs Ranch et al. by Karen Budd-Falen and Jeffrey B. Teichert; for the Association of Rangeland Consultants by W Alan Schroeder; for the Farm Credit Institutions by William G. Myers III and Marcy G. Glenn; for the Northwest Mining Association by William Perry Pendley and Steven J. Lechner; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by M. Reed Hopper; and for Congressman Don Young et al. by William K. Kelley.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Natural Resources Defense Council et al. by Thomas D. Lustig; and for the Nature Conservancy by W. Cullen Battle and Michael Dennis.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to interpret several provisions of the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1269, 43 U. S. C. §315 et seq. The petitioners claim that each of three grazing regulations, 43 CFR §§4100.0-5, 4110.1(a), and 4120.3-2 (1998), exceeds the authority that this statute grants the Secretary of the Interior. We disagree and hold that the three regulations do not violate the Act.
I
We begin with a brief description of the Act s background, provisions, and related administrative practice.
A
The Taylor Grazing Act’s enactment in 1934 marked a turning point in the history of the western rangelands, the vast, dry grasslands and desert that stretch from western Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas to the Sierra Nevada. Ranchers once freely grazed livestock on the publicly owned range as their herds moved from place to place, searching for grass and water. But the population growth that followed the Civil War eventually doomed that unregulated economic freedom.
A new era began in 1867 with the first successful long drive of cattle north from Texas. Cowboys began regularly driving large herds of grazing cattle each year through thousands of miles of federal lands to railheads like Abilene, Kansas. From there or other towns along the rail line, trains carried live cattle to newly opened eastern markets. The long drives initially brought high profits, which attracted more ranchers and more cattle to the land once home only to Indian tribes and buffalo. Indeed, an early-1880’s boom in the cattle market saw the number of cattle grazing the Great Plains grow well beyond 7 million. See R. White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A History of the American West 223 (1991); see generally E. Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman 83-113 (1929); W. Webb, The Great Plains 205-268 (1931).
But more cattle meant more competition for ever-scarcer water and grass. And that competition was intensified by the arrival of sheep in the 1870’s. Many believed that sheep were destroying the range, killing fragile grass plants by cropping them too closely. The increased competition for forage, along with droughts, blizzards, and growth in homesteading, all aggravated natural forage scarcity. This led, in turn, to overgrazing, diminished profits, and hostility among forage competitors — to the point where violence and “wars” broke out, between cattle and sheep ranchers, between ranchers and homesteaders, and between those who fenced and those who cut fences to protect an open range. See W. Gard, Frontier Justice 81-149 (1949). These circumstances led to calls for a law to regulate the land that once was free.
The calls began as early as 1878 when the legendary southwestern explorer, Major John Wesley Powell, fearing water monopoly, wrote that ordinary homesteading laws would not work and pressed Congress to enact “a general law ... to provide for the organization of pasturage districts.” Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States, H. Exec. Doc. No. 73, 45th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1878). From the end of the 19th century on, Members of Congress regularly introduced legislation of this kind, often with Presidential support. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt reiterated Powell’s request and urged Congress to pass laws that would “provide for Government control of the public pasture lands of the West.” S. Doc. No. 310, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1907). But political opposition to federal regulation was strong. President Roosevelt attributed that opposition to “those who do not make their homes on the land, but who own wandering bands of sheep that are driven hither and thither to eat out the land and render it worthless for the real home maker”; along with “the men who have already obtained control of great areas of the public land . . . who object . . . because it will break the control that these few big men now have over the lands which they do not actually own.” Ibid. Whatever the opposition’s source, bills reflecting Powell’s approach did not become law until 1934.
By the 1930’s, opposition to federal regulation of the federal range had significantly diminished. Population growth, forage competition, and inadequate range control all began to have consequences both serious and apparent. With a horrifying drought came ‘dawns without day’ as dust storms swept the range. The devastating storms of the Dust Bowl were in the words of one Senator “the most tragic, the most impressive lobbyist, that ha[s] ever come to this Capitol.” 79 Cong. Rec. 6013 (1935). Congress acted; and on June 28, 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Taylor Grazing Act into law.
B
The Taylor Act seeks to “promote the highest use of the public lands.” 43 U. S. C. §315. Its specific goals are to “stop injury” to the lands from “overgrazing and soil deterioration,” to “provide for their use, improvement and development,” and “to stabilize the livestock industry dependent on the public range.” 48 Stat. 1269. The Act grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to divide the public range-lands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, to issue leases or permits “to graze livestock,” and to charge “reasonable fees” for use of the land. 43 U. S. C. §§ 315, 315a, 315b. It specifies that preference in respect to grazing permits “shall be given ... to those within or near” a grazing district “who are landowners engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants or settlers, or owners of water or water rights.” § 315b. And, as particularly relevant here, it adds:
“So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions of this subchapter, grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded, but the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit. . . shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.” Ibid.
C
The Taylor Act delegated to the Interior Department an enormous administrative task. To administer the Act, the Department needed to determine the bounds of the public range, create grazing districts, determine their grazing capacity, and divide that capacity among applicants. It soon set bounds encompassing more than 140 million acres, and by 1936 the Department had created 37 grazing districts, see Department of Interior Ann. Rep. 15 (1935); W. Calef, Private Grazing and Public Lands 58-59 (1960). The Secretary then created district advisory boards made up of local ranchers and called on them for further help. See 2 App. 809-811 (Rules for Administration of Grazing Districts (Mar. 2, 1936)). Limited department resources and the enormity of the administrative task made the boards “the effective governing and administrative body of each grazing district.” Calef, supra, at 60; accord, P. Foss, Politics and Grass 199— 200 (1960).
By 1987 the Department had set the basic rules for allocation of grazing privileges. Those rules recognized that many ranchers had long maintained herds on their own private lands during part of the year, while allowing their herds to graze farther afield on public land at other times. The rules consequently gave a first preference to owners of stock who also owned “base property,” i. e., private land (or water rights) sufficient to support their herds, and who had grazed the public range during the five years just prior to the Taylor Act’s enactment. See 2 App. 818-819 (Rules for Administration of Grazing Districts (June 14, 1937)). They gave a second preference to other owners of nearby “base” property lacking prior use. Ibid. And they gave a third preference to stock owners without base property, like the nomadic sheep herder. Ibid. Since lower preference categories divided capacity left over after satisfaction of all higher preference claims, this system, in effect, awarded grazing privileges to owners of land or water. See Foss, supra, at 63 (quoting Grazing Division Director F. R. Carpenter’s remarks that grazing privileges are given to ranchers “not as individuals, nor as owners of livestock,” but to “build up [the] lands and give them stability and value”).
As grazing allocations were determined, the Department would issue a permit measuring grazing privileges in terms of “animal unit months” (AUMs), i e., the right to obtain the forage needed to sustain one cow (or five sheep) for one month. Permits were valid for up to 10 years and usually renewed, as suggested by the Act. See 43 U. S. C. § 315b; Public Land'Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation’s Land 109 (1970). But the conditions placed on permits reflected the leasehold nature of grazing privileges, consistent with the fact that Congress had made the Secretary the landlord of the public range and basically made the grant of grazing privileges discretionary. The grazing regulations in effect from 1938 to the present day made clear that the Department retained the power to modify, fail to renew, or cancel a permit or lease for various reasons.
First, the Secretary could cancel permits if, for example, the permit holder persistently overgrazed the public lands, lost control of the base property, failed to use the permit, or failed to comply with the Range Code, See, e. g., 43 CFR §§ 160.26(a)-(f) (1938); Department pf Interior, Federal Range Code §§ 6(c)(6), (7), (10) (1942) (hereinafter 1942 Range Code); 43 CFR §§ 161.6(c)(6)-(7), (10)-(12) (1955); 43 CFR §§4115.2-l(d), (e)(7)-(ll) (1964); 43 CFR §§4115.2-1(d) (e)(7)-(ll) (1977); 43 CFR §4170.1-2 (1994); 43 CFR §4170.1-2 (1998), Second, the Secretary, consistent first with 48 U. S. C. § 315f, and later the land use planning mandated by 43 U. S. C. § 1712 (discussed infra, at 737-738), was authorized to reclassify and withdraw land from grazing altogether and devote it to a more valuable or suitable use. See, e. g., 43 CFR §160.22 (1938); 1942 Range Code § 6(c)(4); 43 CFR § 161.6(e)(5) (1955); 43 CFR §§ 4111.4-2(f), 4115.2-1(e)(6) (1964); 43 CFR §§4111.4-3(f), 4115.2-1 (e)(6) (1977); 43 CFR §4110.4-2(a) (1994); 43 CFR §4110.4-2(a) (1998). Third, in the event of range depletion, the Secretary maintained a separate authority, not to take areas of land out of grazing use altogether as above, but to reduce the amount of grazing allowed on that land, by suspending AUMs of grazing privileges “in whole or in part,” and “for such time as necessary.” 43 CFR § 4115.2-l(e)(5) (1964); see also 43 CFR §160.30 (1938) (reservation (b)); 1942 Range Code § 6(c)(8); 43 CFR §161.4(8) (1955); 43 CFR §§4111.4-3, 4115.2-l(e)(5) (1977); 43 CFR §4110.3-2 (1994); 43 CFR §4110.3-2 (1998).
Indeed, the Department so often reduced individual permit AUM allocations under this last authority that by 1964 the regulations had introduced the notion of “active AUMs,” i. e., the AUMs that a permit initially granted minus the AUMs that the department had “suspended” due to diminished range capacity Thus, three ranchers who had initially received, say, 3,000, 2,000, and 1,000 AUMs respectively, might find that they could use only two-thirds of that number because a 33% reduction in the district’s grazing capacity had led the Department to “suspend” one-third of each allocation. The “active/suspended” system assured each rancher, however, that any capacity-related reduction would take place proportionately among permit holders, see 43 CFR §4111.4-2(a)(3) (1964), and that the Department would try to restore grazing privileges proportionately should the district’s capacity later increase, see § 4111.4-1.
In practice, active grazing on the public range declined dramatically and steadily (from about 18 million to about 10 million AUMs between 1953 and 1998) as the following chart shows:
Despite the reductions in grazing, and some improvements following the passage of the Taylor Act, see App. 374-379 (Department of Interior, 50 Years of Public Land Management 1934-1984), the range remained in what many considered an unsatisfactory condition. In 1962, a eongressionally mandated survey found only 16.6% of the range in excellent or good condition, 53.1% in fair condition, and 30.3% in poor condition. Department of Interior Ann. Rep. 62 (1962). And in 1978 Congress itself determined that “vast segments of the public rangelands are . . . in an unsatisfactory condition.” 92 Stat. 1803 (codified as 43 U. S. C. § 1901(a)(1)).
D
In the 1960’s, as the range failed to recover, the Secretary of the Interior increased grazing fees by more than 50% (from 19 cents to 30 cents per AUM/year), thereby helping to capture a little more of the economic costs that grazing imposed upon the land. Department of Interior Ann. Rep. 66 (1963). And in 1976, Congress enacted a new law, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744, 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq., which instructed the Interior Department to develop districtwide land use plans based upon concepts of “multiple use” (use for various purposes, such as recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural and scenic, scientific, and historical usage), § 1702(c), and “sustained yield” (regular renewable resource output maintained in perpetuity), § 1702(h). The FLPMA strengthened the Department’s existing authority to remove or add land from grazing use, allowing such modification pursuant to a land use plan, §§ 1712, 1714, while specifying that existing grazing permit holders would retain a “first priority” for renewal so long as the land use plan continued to make land “available for domestic livestock grazing,” § 1752(c).
In 1978, the Department’s grazing regulations were, in turn, substantially amended to comply with the new law. See 43 Fed. Reg. 29067. As relevant here, the 1978 regulations tied permit renewal and validity to the land use planning process, giving the Secretary the power to cancel, suspend, or modify grazing permits due to increases or decreases in grazing forage or acreage made available pursuant to land planning. See 48 CFR §§4110.3-2(b), 4110.4-2 (1978); see also 43 CFR §4110.4-2 (1994); 43 CFR §4110.4-2 (1998).
That same year Congress again increased grazing fees for the period 1979 to 1986. See Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978,43 U. S. C. § 1905. However neither of the two Acts from the 1970’s significantly modified the particular provisions of the Taylor Act at issue in this ease.
E
This case arises out of a 1995 set of Interior Department amendments to the federal grazing regulations. 60 Fed. Reg. 9894 (1995) (Final Rule). The amendments represent a stated effort to “accelerate restoration” of the rangeland, make the rangeland management program “more compatible with ecosystem management,” “streamline certain administrative functions,” and “obtain for the public fair and reasonable compensation for the grazing of livestock on public lands.” 58 Fed. Reg. 43208 (1993) (Proposed Rule). The amendments in final form emphasize individual “stewardship” of the public land by increasing the accountability of grazing permit holders; broaden membership on the district advisory boards; change certain title rules; and change administrative rules and practice of the Bureau of Land Management to bring them into closer conformity with related Forest Service management practices. See 60 Fed. Reg. 9900-9906 (1995).
Petitioners Public Lands Council and other nonprofit ranching-related organizations with members who hold grazing permits brought this lawsuit against the Secretary and other defendants in Federal District Court, challenging 10 of the new regulations. The court found 4 of 10 unlawful. 929 F. Supp. 1436,1450-1451 (Wyo. 1996). The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court in part, upholding three of the foui’. 167 F. 3d 1287,1289 (CA10 1999). Those three (which we shall describe further below) (1) change the definition of “grazing preference”; (2) permit those who are not “engaged in the livestock business” to qualify for grazing permits; and (3) grant the United States title to all future “permanent” range improvements. One judge on the Court of Appeals dissented in respect to the Secretary’s authority to promulgate the first and the third regulations. See id., at 1309-1318. We granted certiorari to consider the ranchers’ claim that these three regulatory changes exceed the authority that the Taylor Act grants the Secretary. 528 U. S. 926 (1999).
II
A
The ranchers attack the new “grazing preference” regulations first and foremost. Their attack relies upon the provision in the Taylor Act stating that “grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded_” 43 U. S. C. § 815b. Before 1995 the regulations defined the term “grazing preference" in terms of the AUM-denominated amount of grazing privileges that a permit granted. The regulations then defined “grazing preference" as
“the total number of animal unit months of livestock grazing on public lands apportioned and attached to base property owned or controlled by a permittee or lessee.” 43 CFR §4100.0-5 (1994).
The 1995 regulations changed this definition, however, so that it now no longer refers to grazing privileges “apportioned,” nor does it speak in terms of AUMs. The new definition defines “grazing preference” as
“a superior or priority position against others for the purpose of receiving a grazing permit or lease. This priority is attached to base property owned or controlled by the permittee or lessee.” 43 CFR §4100.0-5 (1995).
The new definition “omits reference to a specified quantity of forage.” 60

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