What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

MURRAY v. UNITED STATES
No. 86-995.
Argued December 8, 1987
Decided June 27, 1988
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SteveNS and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 544. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 551. Brennan and Kennedy, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
A. Raymond, Randolph argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs was Sitsan L. Lanner.
Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Weld, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Patty Merkamp Stemler.
Together with No. 86-1016, Carter v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court.
Larry W. Yackte, John A. Powell, David B. Goldstein, and John Reinstein filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in No. 86-995.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984), we held that police officers’ illegal entry upon' private’ premises did not require suppression of evidence subsequently discovered at those premises when executing a search warrant’obtained on the basis of information wholly unconnected with the initial entry. In these consolidated cases we are faced with the question whether, again assuming evidence obtained pursuant to an independently obtained search warrant, the portion of such evidence that had been observed in plain view at the time of a prior illegal entry must be suppressed.
I
Both cases arise out of the conviction of petitioner Michael F. Murray, petitioner James D. Carter, and others for conspiracy to possess and distribute illegal drugs. Insofar as relevant for our purposes, the facts are as follows: Based on information received from informants, federal law enforcement agents had been surveilling petitioner Murray and several of his co-conspirators. At about 1:45 p.m. on April 6, 1983, they observed Murray drive a truck and Carter drive a green camper, into a warehouse in South Boston. When the petitioners drove the vehicles out about 20 minutes later, the surveilling agents saw within the warehouse two individuals and a tractor-trailer rig bearing a long, dark container. Murray and Carter later turned over the truck and camper to other drivers, who were in .turn followed and ultimately arrested, and the vehicles lawfully seized. Both vehicles were found to contain marijuana.
After receiving this information, several of the agents converged on the South Boston warehouse and forced entry. They found the warehouse unoccupied, but observed in plain view numerous burlap-wrapped bales that were later found to contain marijuana. They left without disturbing the bales, kept the warehouse under surveillance, and did not reenter it until they had a search warrant. In applying for the warrant, the agents did not mention the prior entry, and did not rely on any observations made during that entry. When the warrant was issued — at 10:40 p.m., approximately eight hours after the initial entry — the agents immediately reentered the warehouse and seized 270 bales of marijuana and notebooks listing customers for whom the bales were destined.
Before trial, petitioners moved to suppress the evidence found in the warehouse. The District Court denied the motion, rejecting petitioners’ arguments that the warrant was invalid because the agents did not inform the Magistrate about their prior warrantless entry, and that the warrant was tainted by that entry. United States v. Carter, No. 83-102-S (Mass., Dec. 23, 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a-45a. The First Circuit affirmed, assuming for purposes of its-decision that the first entry into the warehouse was unlawful. United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F. 2d 589 (1985). Murray and Carter then separately filed petitions for certiorari, which we granted, 480 U. S. 916 (1987), and have consolidated here.
II
The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search, Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). Beyond that, the exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes “so attentuated as to dissipate the taint,” Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484-485 (1963).
Almost simultaneously with our development of the exclusionary rule, in the first quarter of this century, we also announced what has come to be known as the “independent source” doctrine. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920). That doctrine, which has been applied to evidence acquired not only through Fourth Amendment violations but also through Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, has recently been described as follows:
“ET]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting- the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. . . . When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431, 443 (1984)
The dispute here is over the scope of this doctrine. Petitioners contend that it applies only to evidence obtained for the first time during an independent lawful search. The Government argues that it applies also to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality. We think the Government’s view has better support in both precedent and policy.
Our cases have used the concept of “independent source” in a more general and a more specific sense. The more general sense identifies all evidence acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity. Thus, where an unlawful entry has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has been learned by other means, fact z can be said to be admissible because derived from an “independent source.” This is how we used the term in Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984). In that case, agents unlawfully entered the defendant’s apartment and remained there until a search warrant was obtained. The admissibility of what they discovered while waiting in the apartment was not before us, id., at 802-803, n. 4, but we held that the evidence found for the first time during the execution of the valid and untainted search warrant was admissible because it was discovered pursuant to an “independent source,” id., at 813-814. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 240-242 (1967); Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265, 280 (1961); Nardone v. United States, supra, at 341.
The original use of the term, however, and its more important use for purposes of these cases, was more specific. It was originally applied in the exclusionary rule context, by Justice Holmes, with reference to that particular category of evidence acquired by an untainted search which is identical to the evidence unlawfully acquired — that is, in the example just given, to knowledge of facts x and y derived from an independent source:
“The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others.” Silverthorne Lumber, supra, at 392.
As the First Circuit has observed, “[i]n the classic independent source situation, information which is received through an illegal source is considered to be cleanly obtained when it arrives through an independent source.” United States v. Silvestri, 787 F. 2d 736, 739 (1986). We recently assumed this application of the independent source doctrine (in the Sixth Amendment context) in Nix v. Williams, supra. There incriminating statements obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel had led the police to the victim’s body. The. body had not in fact been found through an independent source as well, and so the independent source doctrine was not itself applicable. We held, however, that evidence concerning the body was nonetheless admissible because a search had been under way which would have discovered the body, had it not been called off because of the discovery produced by the unlawfully obtained statements. Id., at 448-460. This “inevitable discovery” doctrine obviously assumes the validity of the independent source doctrine as applied to evidence initially acquired unlawfully. It would make no sense to admit the evidence because the independent search, had it not been aborted, would have found the body, but to exclude the evidence if the search had continued and had in fact found the. body. The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.
Petitioners’ asserted policy basis for excluding evidence which is initially discovered during an illegal search, but is subsequently acquired through an independent and lawful source, is that a contrary rule will remove all deterrence to, and indeed positively encourage, unlawful police searches. As petitioners, see the incentives, law enforcement officers will routinely enter without a warrant to make sure that what they expect to be on the premises is in fact there. If it is not, they will have spared themselves the time and trouble of getting a warrant; if it is, they, can get the warrant and use the evidence despite the unlawful entry. Brief for Petitioners 42. We see the incentives differently. An officer with probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant would be foolish to enter the premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he would risk suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and unseen, since his action would add to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers’ decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s decision to grant it. See Part III, infra. Nor would the officer without sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant have any added incentive to conduct an unlawful entry, since whatever he finds cannot be used to establish probable cause before a magistrate.
It is possible to read petitioners’ briefs as asserting the more narrow position that the “independent source” doctrine does apply to independent acquisition of evidence previously derived indirectly from the unlawful search, but does not apply to what they call “primary evidence,” that is, evidence acquired during the course of the search itself. In addition to finding no support in our precedent, see Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U. S., at 392 (referring specifically to evidence seized during an unlawful search), this strange distinction would produce results bearing no relation to the policies of the exclusionary rule. It would mean, for example, that the government’s knowledge of the existence and condition of a dead body, knowledge lawfully acquired through independent sources, would have to be excluded if government agents had previously observed the body during an unlawful search of the defendant’s apartment; but not if they had observed a notation that the body was buried in a certain location, producing consequential discovery of the corpse.
III
To apply what we have said to the present cases: Knowledge that the marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant, and if that later acquisition was not the result of the -earlier entry there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply. Invoking the exclusionary rule would put the police (and society) not in the same position they would have occupied if no violation occurred, but in a worse one. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S., at 443.
We think this is also true with respect to the tangible evidence, the bales of marijuana. It would make no more sense to exclude that than it would to exclude tangible evidence found upon the corpse in Nix, if the search in that case had not been abandoned and had in fact come upon the body. The First Circuit has discerned a difference between tangible and intangible evidence that has been tainted, in that objects “once seized cannot be cleanly reseized without returning the objects to private control.” United States v. Silvestri, 787 F. 2d, at 739. It seems to us, however, that reseizure of tangible evidence already seized is no more impossible than rediscovery of intangible evidence already discovered. The independent source doctrine does not rest upon such metaphysical analysis, but upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied. So long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one (which may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession) there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.
The ultimate question, therefore, is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here. This would not have been the case if the agents’ decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry, or if information obtained during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant. On this point the Court of Appeals said the following:
“[W]e can be absolutely certain that the warrantless entry in no way contributed in the slightest either to the issuance of a warrant or to the discovery of the evidence during the iawful search that occurred pursuant to the warrant.
“This is as clear a case as can be imagined where the discovery of the contraband in plain view was totally irrelevant to the later securing of a warrant and the successful search that ensued. As there was ho causal link whatever between the illegal entry and the discovery of the challenged evidence, we find no error in the court’s refusal to suppress.” United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F. 2d, at 603, 604.
Although these statements Can be read to provide emphatic support for the Government’s position, it is the function of the District Court rather than the Court of Appeals to determine the facts, and we do not think the Court of Appeals’ conclusions are supported by adequate findings. The District Court found that the agents did not reveal their warrantless entry to the Magistrate, App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a, and that they did not include in their application for a warrant any recitation of their observations in the warehouse, id., at 44a-45a. It did not, however, explicitly find that the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the warehouse. The Government concedes this in its brief. Brief for United States 17, n. 5. To be sure, the District Court did determine that the purpose of the warrantless entry was in part “to guard against the destruction of possibly critical evidence,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a, and one could perhaps infer from this that the agents who made the entry already planned to obtain that “critical evidence” through a warrant-authorized search. That inference is not, however, clear enough to justify the conclusion that the District Court’s findings amounted to a determination of independent source.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand these cases to the Court of Appeals with instructions that it remand to the District Court for determination whether the warrant-authorized search of the warehouse was an independent source of the challenged evidence in the sense we have described.
It is so ordered.
Justice Brennan and Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
The original petitions raised both the present Fourth Amendment claim and a Speedy Trial Act claim. We granted the petitions, vacated the judgment below, and remanded for reconsideration of the Speedy Trial Act issue in light of Henderson v. United States, 476 U. S. 321 (1986). Carter v. United States and Murray v. United States, 476 U. S. 1138 (1986). On remand, the Court of Appeals again rejected the Speedy Trial Act claim and did not reexamine its prior ruling on the Fourth Amendment question. 803 F. 2d 20 (1986). Petitioners again sought writs of certiorari, which we granted limited to the Fourth Amendment question.
Justice Marshall argues, in effect, that where the police cannot point to some historically verifiable fact demonstrating that the subsequent search pursuant to a warrant was wholly unaffected by the prior illegal search — v. g., that they had already sought the warrant before entering the premises —we should adopt a per se rule of inadmissibilty. See post, at 549. We do not believe that such a prophylatic exception to the independent source rule is necessary. To say that a district court must be satisfied that a warrant would have been sought without the illegal entry is not to give dispositive effect to police officers’ assurances on the point. Where the facts render those assurances implausible, the independent source doctrine will not apply.
We might note that there is no basis for pointing to the present cases as an example of a “search first, warrant later” mentality. The District Court found that the agents entered the warehouse “in an effort to apprehend any participants who might have remained inside and to guard against the destruction of possibly critical evidence.” United States v. Carter, No. 83-102-S (Mass., Dec. 23, 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. While they may have misjudged the existence of sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry (the Court of Appeals did not reach that issue and neither do we), there is nothing to suggest that they went in merely to see if there was anything worth getting a warrant for.
Justice Marshall argues that “the relevant question [is] whether, even if the initial entry uncovered no evidence, the officers would return immediately with a warrant to conduct a second search.” Post, at 548, n. 2; see post, at 549-550, n. 4. We do not see how this is “relevant” at all. To determine whether the warrant was independent of the illegal entry, one must ask whether it would have been sought even if what actually happened had not occurred — not whether it would have been sought if something else had happened. That is to say, what counts is whether the actual illegal search had any effect in producing the warrant, not whether some hypothetical illegal search would have aborted the warrant. Only that much is needed to assure that what comes before the court is not the product of illegality: to go further than that would be to expand our existing

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: