<transcript><audio_30>get elected into whatever seat he is he or she is contesting upon okay so that's also falls within this within this framework</transcript><transcript><audio_31>okay so we'll study the house allocation okay that's the first problem we want to</transcript><transcript><audio_32>study and the setting is as follows we have n agents each of them have have a</transcript><transcript><audio_33>house and each has a house and E and and a strict preference order over the</transcript><transcript><audio_34>so all of us in the room we have a house and we have a strict preference over the houses of all of us okay so I might prefer your house you might prefer his house you might prefer somebody else's</transcript><transcript><audio_35>house and so on okay so so each agent has a strict preference order for n houses so if look at agent one agent one might prefer J 1 strictly to j2 strictly</transcript><transcript><audio_36>to J 3 and so on so I'm going to use the same index for both the agent and the house that the agent is currently living in ok so similarly agent 2 will say well</transcript> get elected into whatever seat he is he or she is contesting upon okay so that's also falls within this within this framework okay so we'll study the house allocation okay that's the first problem we want to study and the setting is as follows we have n agents each of them have have a house and each has a house and E and and a strict preference order over the so all of us in the room we have a house and we have a strict preference over the houses of all of us okay so I might prefer your house you might prefer his house you might prefer somebody else's house and so on okay so so each agent has a strict preference order for n houses so if look at agent one agent one might prefer J 1 strictly to j2 strictly to J 3 and so on so I'm going to use the same index for both the agent and the house that the agent is currently living in ok so similarly agent 2 will say well
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