It happened at the end of three days after they had made a covenant with them, that they heard that they were their neighbors, and that they lived among them.
(85) Calvin was well qualified, by his legal education, to discuss the important question here raised, and it is impossible to dispute the soundness of his general positions in regard to it, both here and in the previous section of the Commentary on this chapter. There is, however, an appearance of inconsistency in some of the statements. In the section beginning with the third verse, he says in Latin, “Cum larvis ergo paciscitur Josue, nec quidquam obligationis contrahit, nisi secundum eorum verba;” or as it is in French, “Josue donques traitte alliance avec des masques ou phantosmes et n’est nullement oblige, sinon suivant leurs paroles;” “Joshua, then, makes an alliance with masks or phantoms, and is in no way bound, except according to their words.” Again, in the section beginning with verse the sixth, he says, “Dixi summo jure evanidum et irritum fuisse ejusmodi foedus,” or as it is in French, “J’ay dit qu’a la rigueur de droit une telle alliance estoit nulle et cassee;” “I have said, that in strict law such an alliance was null and void.” And he gives the reason in the form of a question, when he asks, “What do they (the Gibeonites) gain when their request is granted, but just that they are to be kept safe, provided they have come from a distant country?” But if the Gibeonites did not gain, or, in other words, were not entitled to demand anything, it is perfectly obvious that the Israelites could not be bound to grant anything. They were the two parties to a mutual contract, in which the claims of the one party were exactly the counterpart or measure of the obligations of the other. It might have been expected, therefore, that after Calvin had decided that the Gibeonites had no claim, he would, of course, have decided that the Israelites had incurred no obligation. Here, however, when considering this latter point, he seems to change his ground, by distinctly asserting, that we may not resile even from pactions in which we have been deceived. The inconsistency, however, is only apparent. He does not say that we are bound by such pactions, as if they were valid in themselves, but he adverts to circumstances which may lay us under a formal obligation to act as if we were bound by them. In other words, he removes the case from a court of law into the court of conscience, and thus brings it under the class of cases to which St. Paul referred, when he drew a distinction between things lawful and things expedient. Joshua and the elders had sworn rashly, but having by so doing put the honor of the God of Israel, so to speak, in pledge, they were bound, at whatever cost, to redeem it. — Ed. 