text: On realism One may be a realist about a range of subjects within philosophy from ethics and aesthetics to science and mathematics.  Realists claim that a given concept exists, has particular properties and is in some way mind independent, while non-realists deny this claim.  Quietists take a third position, claiming that there is no real debate between realists and non-realists on a given subject.  A version of this position espoused by John McDowell claims that the debate hinges on theses about the relationship between the mind and the world around us that are unsupported or unsupportable, and without those claims there will be no debate.  Others, such as Gideon Rosen argue more specifically against individual cases of the realism debate.
  On truth
  Quietism about truth is a version of the identity theory of truth.  Specifically, Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell argue against any ontological gap between what we think is true and what is actually true.  Quietists about truth resist the distinction between truth bearers and truthmakers as leading to a correspondence theory of truth.  Rather they claim that such a distinction should be eliminated, true statements are simply one thinking truly about the world.  The target of these thoughts is not a truthbearer, but rather the facts of the world themselves.