Kosovo Crisisin the Russian-American Relations (1998-1999)
Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999 was the reason for the first open collision between Russia and the USA in the post-bipolar period. It seriously aggravated Russian-American relations. In the 1990s Moscow believed that its opinion would be respected by Washington in solving current world policy problems, and thus considered to have the status of a great power. However the course of the crisis showed the opposite: the USA decided not to take Russia into account. American leadership believed that the United States would manage the reaction of RF. As can be seen Americans appeared to be right: Kremlin was angry for a short period and then restored business relations with the United States. Thus NATO’s aggression against SRYu manifested Russia’s helplessness in the world arena.The purpose of the article is to show the reaction of the Russian Federation to the actions of the USA in Balkan during Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999.Material and methods. The publication is based on works by Russian and American authors which center round the relations between the RF and the USA as well as the issues of Balkan regional security in the 1990s using general scientific and special historical research methods.Findings and their discussion. Destabilization of the Balkan situation in the late 1990s became a serious challenge for the Yeltsin Russia which was eager to become a part of the Western world. Since Kosovo crisis demonstrated serious discrepancies between the foreign policy lines of Moscow and Washington: if Clinton administration was sure that it used military force with humane purposes by protecting Kosovo people from the genocide of the Serbs, Russian leadership believed that the USA and NATO used the aggression against Yugoslavia for strengthening its leading position in the post-bipolar world. However, in response to NATO actions Moscow used only verbal rhetoric addressing Washington and Brussels, which American authorities did not takes seriously, as well as demonstrative interruption by E.M. Primakov of his visit to the USA and a sudden march of Russian marine corps from Bosnia to capture Pristine aerodrome at the final stage of the crisis. The Russia of those days certainly could not seriously oppose the West. It had neither force nor money nor political will of the country administration. Russia did not have military or diplomatic tools to oppose the West in the late 1990s. E.M. Promakov’s “U-turn” over the Atlantics was maximum what could be done to demonstrate Russia’s negative reaction to America’s using military force against Yugoslavia. At the same time, this act of the Head of Government of the RF was soon made insignificant by B.N. Yeltsin who yielded to the West. However, E.M. Promakov’s “U-turn” over the Atlantics had a delayed (cumulative) effect which conditioned the following development of the Russian-American relations. So Kosovo crisis concluded the romantic period of Russian-American relations. The NATO military operation against SRYu had negative effects for their further development. By his actions Washington openly showed Moscow that America is not going to consider Russia its equal and share with it the responsibility for the destiny of the post-bipolar world but that it is going to do what Americans think proper to doConclusion. Conclusion is made that Russia’s policy regarding Kosovo crisis depended much on the relations with the United States in the 1990s. Moscow, which did not support the force variant of the solution of this problem imposed by Washington, had to maneuver. On the one hand, Russian leadership which tried to make the country part of the Western world was not going to confront the USA because of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, B.N. Yeltsin and his close surrounding, aware of the Russian society and political circles’ negative reaction to NATO’s aggression against the SRYu, had to make sharp statements addressing the West. This led to Moscow’s hesitant, contradictory and inconsistent steps which played right into Americans’ hands. Thus, Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999 demonstrated the decline of Russia’s real weight in the world policy.