The meaning of the differences in the approach of I. Kant and I.G. Fichte to the task of deduction of law and morality
Kant, by virtue of his understanding of experience as the only possible form of knowledge, does not deduce law as a pure form of realization of the subject's freedom from the subject himself, but abstracts it from the integral unity of the form and content of the process of freedom realization. In this case, the unity of the form and content (motive) of the realization of freedom, i.e. morality. Although Kant does not directly derive the right from morality, morality is still primary for him, since it is her concept that delivers material for the postulation of the concept of law. On the contrary, for Fichte, the idea of law and its categories are the result of the reflection of the activities of the absolute I, and therefore do not need to be mediated by the idea of morality. This position is closer to the truth: law and morality are not genetically related, but they do not substantially contradict each other, being the result of the development of the idea of absolute good.