KEY CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS FOR SHARED MEMORY, AND TRANSPORT PROTOCOL. MONITOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE DYNAMIC SHARED MEMORY BETWEEN SENDER AND RECEIVER IN A IN A SYMMETRICAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHANNEL
The article is devoted to the description of key and transport cryptographic protocols developed for cryptographic systems using shared memory of the Sender (A) and Receiver (B) in the cryptographic symmetric channel of secret communication. The proposed bilateral protocols cover the following tasks: creation of a symmetric key (key protocols), message exchange protocol (transport protocols), protocol of remote control of the shared memory integrity based on the use of Damgard - Merkle hash tree technique using the transport protocol. Two variants of the key generation protocols are proposed - trustworthy and verifiable, differing in the degree of trust between the Sender (A) and Receiver (B). The developed protocols are sufficiently stable against enemy MITM-attacks in the communication channel. With the use of the design of Damgard - Merkle hash trees, there is a fundamental possibility of specifying different values of the shared memory with the help of Merkel’s proof procedure. It is indicated that with the introduction of a dynamic component in the shared memory, it is possible to eliminate the traditionally complex problem of symmetric cryptography: the transfer of a symmetric session key from the Sender (A) to the Receiver (B), or the creation of a symmetric key as a result of playback of a confidential protocol, in a sense analogous to the Diffie-Hellman protocol.