Intentionality in the Middle Ages: Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham
The article presents an overview of medieval approaches to understanding the phenomenon of intentionality. First, the author outlines the approach of Thomas Aquinas, according to which the process of cognition consists in assimilating the intellect to the object of cognition. This theory insists that there is no difference between the form of a real object, thanks to which it exists, and the form of this object in the mind of the cognizing subject. Duns Scotus makes this picture more sophisticated when he begins to distinguish in the mind the sensory image of the cognized thing (phantasma) and the intelligible representation (species) of this thing. William of Ockham, on the other hand, refuses to introduce any additional entities between the object of knowledge and the mind of the knower. This rejection, together with the nominalism, led to the emergence of the concept of mental language, in which there is no place for signs connecting thought and object, instead, a direct connection between the spoken word and the corresponding mental words is postulated. In conclusion, the author considers the problem of the justification and legitimacy of the discovery of proto-phenomenological concepts in medieval philosophy.