Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Expression - Where are the Boundaries?
Introduction. We are all too aware of people freely expressing their opinions, often via social media, on other media channels, and in public. Often such opinions are unpalatable to others, and when challenged, the speaker defaults to well-worn phrases along the lines of “but I have the right to free speech” or “I can say what I want, I have the freedom of expression”. However, these are not absolute rights without limit, and the purveyors of such opinions publicly expressed would be well advised to consider the legal boundaries to so called “free speech”. Notwithstanding this advice, however sound, there remains the practical problem of where exactly those boundaries lie. Theoretical Basis. Methods. The research was based upon comparative and analytical methods of law in the European and American jurisdictions. Results. An advocate appearing before a Court, arguing either for a party who claims this right has been infringed, or for a state party attempting to justify why there should be a restriction on their ability to speak their mind - has to be able to grapple with where the boundary is and how it should be defined. That “it depends” as to where this boundary is almost goes without saying - dependent for example upon the internal laws of a given State. Yet such laws can be in conflict with wider principles adopted by that State. The ability to explore the boundaries of a rule or law - and not simply know the wording of the law or rule - and to be able to present persuasive arguments to a decision maker or a decisionmaking panel is a key skill for an advocate. Our students need to acquire this, and its absence may be easily discerned by asking what they think about a particular matter - and noting whether the opinions are backed up with reasons or whether they are simply personal subjective views with no rationale. Discussion and Conclusion. As regards Freedom of Expression, two main cases are currently used to teach this skill amongst students undergoing preparation for participation in English language moot court competitions. One is from a European perspective and the second from a comparative law perspective from the USA. These cases (and the principles involved) are discussed in this article. A third European case shows how the European Court might have itself made a mistake. In conclusion there are remarks about how this might be useful in a context that is rather wider than student education.