The strategic triangle of Russia, China and Japan: History, present, and possible future
The concept of a strategic triangle, which is usually used to describe the great-power political dynamics among Moscow, Washington, and Beijing, can be relevant to analyze relations between Moscow, Tokyo, and Beijing. The paper provides an overview of the historical evolution of the Russia-China-Japan strategic triangle and examines contemporary relations in each pair of the triangle: Russia-China, Japan-China, Russia-Japan. The authors take the early 2010s as the start of the contemporary period in the Russia-Japan-China triangle development. From the late 19th century, the strategic triangle of Russia, China, and Japan has tried almost all possible configurations. Nowadays, the axis of Beijing and Moscow is directed against Tokyo. The peculiarity of the modern Northeast Asia triangle is that it is situated within the gravitational pull of the global triangle of the United States, China, and Russia. The dynamics in the relationships of Russia, China, and Japan is, to a significant extent, determined by the fact that Tokyo lacks full independence as a foreign policy actor, being attached to its senior ally, the US. This imposes considerable structural limitations on possible transformations of the triangle, as the antagonism between Washington and Beijing, as well as between Washington and Moscow, makes it more difficult for Tokyo to reach compromises with its great-power neighbors in Northeast Asia. This was one of the reasons why Abe Shinzō failed to make significant progress on the resolution of the territorial dispute with Russia. He also failed to prevent further rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. In 2020, when Abe stepped down as prime minister, the Russia-China relationship was much stronger than it was in 2013, when Abe launched his diplomacy of courting Moscow. It can be predicted, with sufficient confidence, that, in the coming years, the configuration and character of the strategic triangle in Northeast Asia will not undergo major changes. At the same time, the polarization of the triangle’s structure and the polarization of the international system as a whole will grow more intense. Japan will preserve and strengthen close political-military relations with the United States and other “Indo-Pacific” allies. For its part, Beijing will seek to build its own system of strategic partnerships and quasi-alliances, in which, apart from China itself, Russia will be the most important member.