THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEAS OF METAPHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY
The categories of metaphysics and ontology in aspect of their evolution are considered in the article. At the beginning of the article, we are talking about the absence of the term «being» in ancient languagesand its birth as a philosophical term-neologism in the 5th century BC. Further accident of the birth of the term «metaphysics» and the later, Christianity-related motivation for separating this term from the more ancient term «theology», which Christian monks reserve for themselves, to indicate the doctrine of the transcendental Other World, are shown below. As a result of this, the separation of the ancient being-existence into «being» and«existence» takes place. Later on, the article highlights the stages of criticism of metaphysics in the New and Modern times. Their differences and commonality are revealed. It is shown that the critics of metaphysics are not characterized by the separation of the categories of being and existence (starting with I. Kant and ending with logical empiricism). As the first stage of criticism of metaphysics, attention is drawn to the empiricism of D. Hume and I. Kant. In the framework of the second stage of criticism of metaphysics, in addition to empiricism, a logical analysis of the language is used as argumentation. Value of logical semantics and language of logic of the predicates, used in the theory of descriptions of B. Russell is shown. The solution of the problem of negative existential statements, which is a consequence of imperfections of the natural language, is noted. Variants of the interpretation of metaphysics and ontology are studied in the framework of the idea of «language frameworks» by R. Carnap, as well as the theory of «ontological relativity» by W. Quine. It is argued that starting with Quine there is a separation of metaphysics and ontology, ontological relativity coexists peacefully at this author with the metaphysical realism recognizing existence of the physical world. After Quine metaphysics flourishes already on the basis of non-classical logics, first of all on the basis of modal logic, introducing semantically purified, clarified (in compariso with classics), distilled categories of possibility, necessity, reality and others. Metaphysics of the modalities of the world becomes richer than the metaphysics of the real physical world, postulated by Quine. This new metaphysics, based on modal logic, begins to be developed within the framework of «new theories of reference», first by S. Kripke with his theory of «rigid designators» and causal interpretation of reference, then by H. Putnam and other thinkers who are ideologically close to him. In conclusion, it speaks of the value and inevitability of metaphysics, both in modern and future philosophy.The universalism and metaphysical potentialities of logic and mathematics as such are noted.