Modeling of the effects of double standards and soft power in competition by cellular automata
We consider a discrete analog of the classical A. Lotka - V. Volterra competition model in the environment of cellular automata. In the classical model, we know that the type of its evolution over time primarily depends on the coefficients of double standards affiliation to certain ranges of their possible values. The paper shows that the same situation holds for the discrete model either. We can see there is a soft power effect for the classical model. The classic competition model turns into a cooperative positional differential game, the limitations of which are the original system of competition equations by A. Lotka - V. Volterra. The controls are the coefficients of double standards when considering it concerning social systems. The effect of soft power is that the parties tend to compare the competitive pressure on them by the rival population with the one within the domestic population and may take the less stress of the opponent for his favorable attitude towards them, and more extensive - for the hostile manifestation. Whereas comparing the external competitive pressure with the internal pressure in this game does not give us any information - everything depends exclusively on the coefficients of double standards, which are controls and therefore are unavailable to the opponents in this game. Simulation experiments with the discrete analog of the competition model implemented in the cellular automata environment show that the effect of soft power also takes place in this case.