meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt/Tanakh/Commentary/Or HaChaim/Torah/Or HaChaim on Leviticus/English/Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk.txt"}
text: Or HaChaim on Leviticus
  אור החיים על ויקרא
  Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk
  
  
  Or HaChaim on Leviticus
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   ויקרא אל משה, וידבר, He called out to Moses and spoke, etc. According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on this verse G'd always called to Moses before He addressed him from the Tent of Testimony. We have to explore why the Torah records such a call on three separate occasions instead of allowing us to conclude that if it was stated once it would form the basis of a <i>Mah Matzinu</i> type of exegesis, i.e. that just as G'd called to Moses on the occasion mentioned here, or elsewhere, so He did on every other occasion He spoke to him from the Tent of Testimony. The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> proceeds to explain why such an exegesis could not be applied: "There are only two other occasions when this "call" is recorded as having preceded the דבור, the speech. The first time it occurred when Moses had the vision at the burning bush; the second time was at Mount Sinai, and the third time is here. We cannot establish a common denominator between these three occurrences as at the burning bush Moses had never previously been addressed by G'd and there was a need to prepare him mentally for such an address. At Mount Sinai (Exodus 19,3) G'd wanted Moses to convey His message to the entire Jewish nation. Neither of these two instances could serve as a valid precedent for G'd addressing Moses out of the Tabernacle on earth after having issued a "call." The reason that even this latter occasion does not serve as a precedent for the other two occasions is that in both other instances G'd had manifested Himself out of fire as opposed to the present occasion.
  According to Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, the source for the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> saying that the call at Mount Sinai came out of the fire is either Exodus 24,16: "G'd called to Moses on the seventh day," or Exodus 19,20 where the Torah writes: "G'd called Moses to (come up to) the top of the Mountain." It cannot be Exodus 19,3 where the Torah writes: "G'd called to him from the Mountain, etc." This follows the explanation of Rabbenu Hillel according to whom this latter verse was not addressed to Moses out of the fire and the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> has stated that the reason the three occasions cannot serve as precedent for one another is that at Sinai and at the burning bush G'd called out of the fire. Thus far Rabbi Mizrachi. With all due respect to Rabbi Mizrachi, the Rabbi was not quite exact in his observation. The premise of the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> was that inasmuch as the word ויקרא is followed by the word דבור, we should have been able to deduce that what happened at the burning bush also happened at the Tabernacle seeing that we have a <i>gezeyrah shaveh</i>, the use by the Torah of similar wording. When we follow this principle the word ויקרא should have been dispensed with in at least one of the three situations. I believe the proof is precisely from Exodus 19,3. The verse in Exodus 24,16 does not contain a single superfluous word as it serves as G'd's call for Moses to come up to the Mountain and to spend there the next forty days. The word ויקרא in that verse is used instead of the word דבור not in addition to it. The only verses which were of interest to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> are the verses in which the word קריאה is used as a prelude to the word דבור. Even the verse in Exodus 24,16 does not really meet the criteria established by the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as G'd had to issue a call to Moses to ascend the Mountain seeing he was down below. The word ויקרא is certainly not superfluous then. That particular קריאה, call, could only have served as a prelude to G'd speaking to Moses on the Mountain. Had it been omitted, we would have assumed that G'd spoke to Moses while the latter was at the base of the Mountain, something impossible as the Torah itself testifies that G'd spoke to Moses while the latter was on top of the Mountain.
  As far as Rabbi Mizrachi finding support for his theory in Exodus 24,16 where G'd called out to Moses on the seventh day out of the cloud before addressing him in the subsequent verses in 25,1-2 is concerned, the venerable Rabbi has forgotten that the verses 24,17-18 which do not involve G'd's addressing Moses make it impossible to consider 25,1-2 as a continuation of His call to Moses in 24,16. There is absolutely no evidence that what G'd said to Moses in 25,1-2 occurred prior to Moses' ascending the Mountain. G'd may have given Moses all the instructions concerning the donations for the Tabernacle after the latter had already been on the Mountain for a number of days.
  Rabbi Mizrachi rejected the opinion of Rabbenu Hillel that seeing the call at the Tabernacle in our verse was in lieu of G'd manifesting Himself out of the "fire" (seeing the divine fire had not yet descended on the altar). Accordingly, the Torah had to record G'd's call here. We cannot accept this argument either. Rabbi Mizrachi apparently thought that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> presumed that the "call" at the burning bush and at Mount Sinai was accompanied by Heavenly fire. This is not true. The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> only meant that the particular appearances by G'd to Moses were also followed or preceded by G'd manifesting Himself through fire, something that most certainly was not the case when G'd called to Moses here at the Tabernacle. G'd manifesting Himself through fire is an additional dimension to the degree of His manifestation and did not take the place of His "call" alerting the recipient of such a vision that he would shortly be addressed by G'd. Seeing that no such fiery manifestation took place in the encounter between G'd and Moses at the Tabernacle, it was important to record that G'd drew Moses' attention to an impending message by means of this "call."
  The author proceeds to insist that the principal proof that G'd always let the "call" precede His speaking to Moses is from Exodus 24,16. [I have abbreviated the polemics somewhat in the interests of brevity. Ed.]
  
  I find it difficult to understand the comment in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> that seeing that when G'd spoke to Moses at Mount Sinai this was something public, addressed to the whole nation, and that this is why He needed to introduce His address by a "call. After all, every commandment G'd revealed to Moses by speaking to him was intended for the whole nation. The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> claims that when G'd addressed the whole of Israel He had to reduce the intensity of His voice seeing the people were not attuned to Him to the same degree as Moses. Accordingly, if the Torah uses the the word ויקרא here it is to tell us that G'd did not reduce the intensity of voice He used when He addressed the people at large instead of only Moses. If we follow this approach we would have to understand the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as saying that when he speaks about לכל ישראל he did not consider this as a compliment to Israel. This is quite difficult to accept. I believe that the מעלה, compliment, expressed by the word ויקרא in Exodus 24,16 consisted in the fact that G'd included the whole of the people in what He was about to say instead of using Moses as His intermediary. The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> took the example of Exodus 24,16 as his cue to tell us that just as G'd employed the "call" as a compliment to the people at that time„ He continued to use this "call" forthwith as a compliment to Moses, even though He addressed Himself to the ears of Moses alone.
  The <i>Torat Kohanim</i> we have quoted above concludes by saying that this call not only preceded addresses by G'd to Moses which were followed by the relatively harsh דבור, but included every time G'd spoke to Moses from the Tabernacle even when employing the softer אמירה, or the word צו, "command." The proof lies in the repetition of the word וידבר in verse one, followed immediately by the word דבר at the beginning of verse two although no message had been delivered yet as a result of either the words ויקרא or the word וידבר. Seeing no such apparently superfluous verbiage occurred either during the Torah's report of the vision of the burning bush or when G'd communicated with Moses at Mount Sinai, all we could have deduced from those occasions is that a "call" always preceded a דבור. We needed this verse and its unusual construction to teach us that such a "call" preceded every communication Moses received from G'd at the Tabernacle. In the other two instances G'd's appearances in that location were restricted to a single communication such as at the burning bush or to a communication extending over a few days such as immediately before the revelation at Mount Sinai. "Calls" reported on those occasions could not have served as precedents for G'd "calling" Moses every time He spoke to him from the Tabernacle, something that became a frequent occurrence during the next 38 years. The first such occasion therefore had to be introduced by the words "from the Tent of Testimony," in order to demonstrate that this form of communication set a pattern for future communications by G'd to Moses which emanated from the Tabernacle. In this instance the previously mentioned method of exegesis מה מצינו, could be employed as there would not be new and different factors governing G'd's speaking to Moses in the future. The <i>Torat Kohanim</i> needed to address the problem of the nature of G'd's addresses, i.e. the various terms the Torah employs when reporting that G'd spoke to Moses. The author wanted to establish proof that when G'd commenced speaking to Moses and the Torah describes this as ויאמר השם, or ויצו, that such communications were also preceded by a "call" to Moses. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> repeats once more that in view of the repeated use of the word דבר or the very fact that the term דבר reflects a "stronger" speech, I would have thought that only that type of speech was preceded by a "call." Therefore, to ensure that we do not misread the Torah, the Torah wrote דבר ידבר, to include all kinds of addresses by G'd as having been preceded by a קריאה, a "call."
  I have seen that Rabbi Abraham ben David, (ראב"ד) quotes a version of the Torat Kohanim according to which the proof is contained in the words "דבר, וידבר, לאמור" occurring consecutively in our verse. This version makes much more sense than the one I am quoting from which does not strictly conform to the text in the Torah. According to that version, <i>Torat Kohanim</i> used the word לאמור which was unnecessary seeing that the word דבר followed immediately. Actually, the word לאמור would not have been extraneous at all; the Torah is full of constructions such as וידבר…לאמור. What is extraneous is the repetition of the words וידבר…דבר. We must consider the text of the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> at the disposal of the ראב"ד as the authentic one.
  I must add that as far as the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> proving that the word ויקרא in our verse is indispensable is concerned as we could not have assumed that such a call preceded G'd's communications to Moses from other instances such as the burning bush, etc., the fact is that the word is absolutely necessary regardless of the arguments advanced. How else would I have known that G'd's "call" preceded all other communications to Moses from the Tent of Testimony barring the first one were it not for that word?
  We must, however, pay closer attention to the text of the <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. Why did that author not question the word ויקרא as being superfluous in either the appearance of G'd at the burning bush or at Mount Sinai in conjunction with a "call," so that we could have deduced that such a call had taken place by deducing this from what happened when G'd spoke to Moses from the Tabernacle? The problem that the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> posed by saying that a combination of the use by the Torah of the word ויקרא either at the burning bush and at Sinai, or at the Tent of Testimony and at Sinai would not have served as a precedent to teach us concerning the third ocurrence would then not have to be raised at all. Furthermore, seeing that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> used the extraneous words מאהל מועד to prove that all subsequent communications from the Tabernacle were preceded by "calls," what is to stop him from applying that למוד also to what happened at Sinai and at the burning bush, so that the word ויקרא in both of those instances would be superfluous?
  I have read the commentary of Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi who was very aware of all these problems, but I must confess that I do not feel that his answers put my mind at rest. The venerable Rabbi argues that the reason that G'd had to record the call as preceding His speaking to Moses at the Tent was that Moses was afraid to enter unless invited. (The Torah had described the Tent as filled with G'd's cloud of glory and Moses being unable to enter in Exodus 40,35.) In other words, the reason for the call there was that it could not serve as precedent for G'd's need to "call" either at the burning bush or at Sinai. Why would the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> have been afraid to point out something as simple as that? I believe that had the Torah omitted mention of the word קריאה either at the burning bush or at Sinai, I simply would have considered the קריאה here as something new which had not occurred previously instead of assuming it had occurred without the Torah having mentioned it. [At this point the author continues in his polemic against the conclusions offered by Rabbi Mizrachi. The interested reader is referred to the original for further study. Ed.]
  
  
  
  
  ויקרא אל משה. He called to Moses. Why did the Torah not identify the caller? While it is true that the Torah identifies the caller as being G'd when it goes on to say: "G'd spoke to him from the Tent of Testimony," the omission of G'd as the subject at the beginning of this verse is most remarkable.
  Perhaps the Torah wanted to let us know the essence of G'd's "voice" which is such that even if it called extremely loudly it would be audible only to someone attuned to it and waiting to hear it. The words ויקרא אל משה, must mean that although G'd called out generally, only Moses heard it and not any other person standing in front of him [i.e. closer to the source of the voice. Ed.] Had the Torah written: "G'd called to Moses, etc.," I would have understood that G'd called out in a powerful voice but that by the time the sound-waves reached the ear of Moses they were considerably weaker than at their source. Moses would then have had to gauge by the volume of sound he heard from where that sound had emanated. He would also not have been surprised that people standing behind him had not heard that voice at all seeing those people were even further removed from the origin of that sound than he himself. At any rate, there would not have been any miraculous element in this call by G'd to Moses out of the Tabernacle. By writing ויקרא אל משה, the Torah draws our attention to the fact that Moses indeed heard a very powerful voice and that the super-natural element in this call was that he was the only one who heard it.
  Another reason why the name of G'd was not recorded in the Torah as associated with this "call" was that G'd was more interested in having His name associated with the commandments He was about to give to Moses than merely to record that it was His voice which invited Moses to receive a communication from Him, or as a sign of G'd showing him respect, if we want to adopt the approach of <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 1,8. According to that <i>Midrash</i>, Aaron, his sons and the elders had been wondering who was most beloved in G'd's eyes; They decided amongst themselves that they would find out by observing to whom G'd would turn first after the Tabernacle [Aaron's domain Ed.] was erected. When G'd called to Moses they realised that G'd liked Moses best of all. There was no cause for the Torah to mention Moses by name as the test was the call itself.
  By following the approach of the <i>Midrash</i> we can also understand why the Torah had to add the word אל משה instead of merely saying: אליו, "to him," seeing that Moses' name had appeared at the end of the last portion (Exodus 40,35). The Torah could have done the same as in Genesis 18,1 where we are told: "G'd appeared to him" (Abraham), without mentioning Abraham's name seeing he had been the subject of the last paragraph in <i>Parshat Lech Lecha</i>. In our situation G'd had to convince the sons of Aaron and the elders of His fondness for Moses.
  וידבר ה׳ אליו מאהל מועד. G'd spoke to him out of the Tent of Testimony. The reason that the Torah had to emphasise that G'd spoke only to Moses, i.e. that only Moses heard His voice, was to prevent misunderstandings. While it was understandable that the ordinary people did not hear G'd's voice, we could have thought that any priest inside the Tabernacle who had business there at the time G'd wished to address Moses would be privy to hearing G'd's voice. The Torah therefore emphasised that only Moses was privy to this voice by writing אליו, "to him exclusively."
  מאהל מועד, from the Tent of Testimony, etc. Why didn't the Torah first mention the site from which G'd's voice emanated before telling us who did the talking? Here the Torah reverses the norm completely by first telling us to whom the voice spoke, then telling us who did the speaking and only at the very end telling us from where G'd's voice emanated. When we consider the comments of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> which we quoted earlier, i.e. that all of G'd's communications from the Tent of Testimony were preceded by a call to Moses, it does make sense that this information was reserved for the end of the verse. Matters which will occur at a later stage deserve to be mentioned later than those which occur in the immediate future.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> also deduces from the wording of this verse that G'd's voice was "cut off, and did not travel beyond the confines of the Tabernacle." How could this be deduced from our verse seeing <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had already deduced the nature of the "call" from the same wording? Furthermore, if indeed the voice of G'd did not travel beyond the confines of the Tabernacle, why did the Torah have to word things in such a way that we learn that the Israelites could not hear this voice? Of course they could not hear a voice which was confined to the Tabernacle! I have seen that Rabbi Mizrachi answers this problem saying that the exegesis is based on the Torah not writing: ויקרא אל משה מאהל מועד, but writing instead: אליו מאהל מועד. The meaning is that the voice travelled in a straight line from the Tabernacle to Moses and stopped there. Our second question is answered by the ראב"ד who says that the Torah had to tell us that the voice of G'd being audible only to Moses was something new; previously it was either audible to the people who were assembled at Mount Sinai, or in the case of the burning bush, it would have been audible had there been anyone else present beside Moses. It was only after G'd took up residence in the Tabernacle that His voice reached only Moses.
  I must confess that I am not happy with either one of these two answers. As to the argument of Rabbi Mizrachi that the mention of the words מאהל מועד at the end of the verse after אליו indicates that the voice came directly to Moses and not to the people, how do we know where exactly Moses stood at that time? If Moses had stood in a spot adjoining the Tent of Testimony, the fact that no one else heard the voice does not prove they would not have heard it if he had stood some distance away. If Rabbi Mizrachi is correct, the voice should have been mentioned first followed by its objective, i.e. מאהל מועד אליו. The fact that the Torah writes the word אליו first makes it plain that it was not the Torah's intention to convey to us the exclusivity of G'd's voice by means of this wording. Why would the Torah reverse the normal syntax by telling us the end before the beginning? It is much easier to accept that the Torah imparts the information about G'd's voice being נפסק, cut off, from the sequence "מאהל מועד לאמור," instead of the sequence "וידבר ה׳ מאהל מועד אליו לאמור." If the Torah had not intended for us to deduce the various למודים, the rules of syntax would have required the Torah to first identify the place the speaker spoke from, followed by the identification of whom it spoke to. Now that the Torah did not do so, we have "room," i.e. a sufficient number of departures from the norm to allow for all the deductions we have been taught by <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> The additional words מאהל מועד teach that from that time onwards a "call" preceded every communication by G'd to Moses. The word לאמור may be used to include not only those communications by G'd which used the word דבר. The fact that the Torah did not write ויקרא מאהל מועד attests to the nature of G'd's voice, i.e. that only Moses was attuned to it. The sequence מאהל מועד לאמור teaches that the voice emanated from the Tabernacle, i.e. וידבר, and travelled only as as far as Moses and was not heard outside.
  As to the ראב"ד's answer to our second question that the Torah had to exclude previous calls which emanated from G'd as not having been exclusively for Moses' ears, and that this is why the Torah had to write the words מאהל מועד where it did, his words are nothing short of astounding. Surely the Torah had provided us with the words אהל מועד both in Exodus 25,22 and in Numbers 7,89. In both these instances G'd's voice is reported as emanating from the Tabernacle or a certain spot within it. Why would the ראב"ד need the words מאהל מועד in our verse to teach us such an exclusion? It is therefore much more plausible to believe that what <i>Torat Kohanim</i> focused on was not that the voice was cut off inside the Tabernacle but that the communication, i.e. the speech, the דבור was audible only inside the Tabernacle. When G'd called, i.e. invited Moses, His voice was audible outside the Sanctuary. When He spoke to Moses (after the latter had entered the Sanctuary), His voice was audible only to Moses, i.e. it was נפסק.
  Rabbi Mizrachi opines that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> clearly holds that Moses was inside the Tabernacle at that time and that this was only possible because the cloud had withdrawn at that time. [It is assumed that the readers are familiar with a Tannaitic disagreement as to whether Moses was inside the Tabernacle when G'd spoke with him at this point or not. Please refer to Exodus 40,35 where the Torah told us that Moses could not enter the Tabernacle due to the cloud containing the glory of G'd filling the Tabernacle. Some opinions (<i>Yuma</i> 4) hold that G'd took hold of Moses and placed him inside the Tent. On the other hand we have Numbers 7,89 from which it is evident that G'd spoke to Moses while he was inside the Tabernacle. Rabbi Mizrachi, based on Rashi, holds that the solution to the apparent contradiction in the verses we quoted is in the words "because G'd's cloud rested upon it" (Exodus 40,35); once the cloud moved Moses was able to enter. Ed.] We also find that Moses was able to "enter the cloud" in Exodus 24,18. The same may be presumed to have occurred in connection with this "call" in our verse here. As far as I am concerned the matter is very simple as it is not reasonable to assume that Moses had to wait until the cloud removed itself fom the Tabernacle and that Moses heard the call only then. Upon examination you will find that Rabbi Mizrachi quoted the text of the first part of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> 1,9 (The <i>Midrash</i> refers to Exodus 25,22 where G'd told Moses He would henceforth communicate with him inside the Tent of Meeting, G'd's voice emanating from between the cherubs which were situated on the lid of the Holy Ark): "When G'd said: 'I will communicate with you there,' He meant to exclude the Israelites who had not been deemed fit to ascend Mount Sinai; He also meant to exclude everybody else including Aaron, barring the ministering angels. Moses could not enter the Tabernacle until he had been summoned. This proves that at the time G'd called to him (in our verse) Moses was standing outside. The Torah writes that the voice came אליו, to him, i.e. from the inside of the Tabernacle and was cut off." Thus far the quote from <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. It is clear that the author of that <i>Midrash</i> was convinced that Moses stood outside the Tabernacle at the time G'd's voice called him. You may ask "how did the author of that <i>Midrash</i> know that the call preceded the communication (i.e. the substance of what G'd wanted to say)?" Seeing that the "call" was needed to invite Moses into the Tabernacle as he was afraid to enter unless summoned, how can we derive any additional למוד, exegetical content, from this word? The answer is that if G'd had wanted to He could have removed Moses' fear and he would have entered the Tabernacle without a special "call." Seeing G'd did not do this, this is proof that the "call" was something that had to precede the communication proper as we have outlined previously, and that Moses remained afraid to enter without invitation. He stationed himself close to the Tabernacle so as to be mentally prepared as soon as he would receive G'd's "call" at which time he would enter the Tent. The sound of the call to Moses "left" (was audible beyond) the Tabernacle, whereas the sound of G'd's communication to Moses never left the confines of the Tabernacle and thus was not heard by anybody else. Not even an echo of it was audible [as had been during the last eight commandments at Mount Sinai. Ed.].
  A moral-ethical approach to our verse sees in it a message to Moses to relate to the Israelites everything G'd would command him while he was still in the Tabernacle. This is the deeper reason why the text wrote the words מאהל מועד לאמור, "from the Tent of Testimony to say," in that order. There is a sound psychological reason for this. If the Israelites would hear G'd's commandments as emanating from the Tabernacle, it would inspire them to relate to them with far more reverence than if Moses were merely to tell them these commandments while assembling the people inside the camp. They would accept these commandments knowing that Moses would not have dared to add or omit a single word while he was communicating G'd's word at a place where the שכינה was present.
  There is yet another message contained in the words אליו מאהל מועד. Moses merited being called by G'd and addressed by Him as a sign that G'd had forgiven the sin of the golden calf and had taken up residence within the Tabernacle to signify this forgiveness. G'd wanted Moses to communicate this message to Israel. This is why the Torah wrote: "from the Tent of Meeting to say." When you find that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> interprets the substance of the message hinted at in the word לאמור as being דברי כבושים בשבילכם, "words of rebuke for your sake G'd communicates to me, etc.," this refers to Deuteronomy 2,16 where Moses told the people that G'd had resumed speaking with him using the friendly term אמירה only after all the people who were 20 years and over when the spies returned from their ill-fated misssion had died. This was 38 years after the moment described in our portion. This comment is in line with what I have said. The only difference is that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives the entire exegesis from the word לאמור, without dissecting the verse as carefully as we have done. מ<i>Torat Kohanim</i> states there that in the event we thought that G'd communicated with Moses because of His own concerns we should know לאמור, that it was only on account of the Israelites. The <i>Midrash</i> means that the word לאמור is to be understood as a מעוט, an exclusion. G'd made it clear that He would not have spoken to Moses on that occasion were it not for the fact that He did so for the benefit of the people, i.e. He wanted to speak to them. This teaches that the whole purpose of G'd speaking to Moses from the Tabernacle was in order for Moses to communicate sections of the Torah to the people. When we are told in <i>Avot</i> 1,1 that Moses received the Torah at Sinai and he delivered it to Joshua, etc., this means that Moses handed over the entire tradition; he neither omitted any part nor added something of his own. Every secret G'd had entrusted to Moses, Moses in turn faithfully communicated to the leader of the next generation. Israel are compared to Moses when it came to Torah knowledge, the only difference being that Moses had received the Torah directly from G'd.
  
  Verse 2
  
   דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת, "Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, etc." The first difficulty is the repetitive: "דבר ואמרת," speak and say!" Besides, why did G'd not say אמור ואמרת, but changed the instructions in mid-stream from דבר, harsh-sounding instruction, to ואמרת, i.e. a softer approach? The answer is that in this communication G'd issued legislation concerning two different kinds of sacrificial offerings. The first kind of offering mentioned here is one which is prompted by man's goodwill towards G'd, his desire to donate a free-will offering, the עולה, the burnt-offering. The second legislation deals with a sin-offering, a mandatory offering, the result of the owner having committed an inadvertent sin which requires him to obtain atonement. The word דבר, the relatively harsh form of communication applied to the legislation about the sin-offering, whereas the word ואמרת was used when telling the people the rules about the burnt-offering. Alternatively, we can recognise in this differential two separate aspects of the sin-offering legislation. The sin-offering is referred to by the word אמירה seeing G'd has declared Himself ready to accept a sheep, or in the worst case, an ox, as atonement for man's sin; on the other hand, the harsher דבר is justified inasmuch as man should not have committed such a sin, even inadvertently. The basic penalty for the sin in question is the death of the sinner. It is a sobering thought that an animal had to die to atone for man's mistake.
  The Torah addresses בני ישראל. According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> this expression is to exclude the practice of סמיכה, the owner of the sacrificial animal placing his weight on the animal before it is slaughtered, when such an animal is offered by a non-Jewish owner (something which will be mentioned shortly in this legislation). The word בני, is to exclude בנות, females, from this requirement. The word ואמרת is supposed to restrict the procedure of סמיכה to peace-offerings. This is difficult to understand seeing the expression אמירה is perceived as something additional to דבר, i.e. as inclusive, not exclusive. Although the author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> claims that the word לאמור would have taught us the lesson it did even if the word דבר had not occurred at the beginning of this verse, I beg to differ. Without the words דבר אל בני ישראל at the beginning of this verse I could not have deduced what I did from the word לאמור in the previous verse. There would have been no exegetical value to the word דבר seeing it was needed for the basic message the Torah is trying to convey.
  Perhaps the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> felt that seeing it is not clear which of the two words דבר ואמרת was to be used exegetically and which was needed for the basic message, it was in order to use either word exegetically. Alternatively, <i>Torat Kohanim</i> did not mean to focus on the word דבד at all but on the words בני ישראל. Seeing that the Torah could have written דבר אליהם instead of דבר אל בני ישראל, the extra words are available for exegetical purposes. It was quite obvious that Moses was to address the Israelites and not anyone else. By saying בני, the Torah excluded females as the Torah should have written דבר אל בית ישראל if it intended to include women in the requirement to perform סמיכה. The word ישראל excluded the סמיכה requirement from Gentiles offering sacrifices to G'd. Nonetheless, the alternative we offered earlier is more likely to be the correct one, seeing that somewhere in the commentary by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> it is argued that the words בני ישראל refer to the nation who had a Covenantal relationship with G'd, something which is related to its interpretation of the line אדם כי יקריב מכם, i.e. that the word אדם includes Gentiles.
  אדם כי יקריב מכם, "when any man of you brings an offering, etc." Why did the Torah have to use the term אדם? Whereas <i>Torat Kohanim</i> here claims that the word includes offerings brought by proselytes as being acceptable, the author of <i>Korban Aaharon</i> asks what need there was for the Torah to specifically include proselytes seeing we have a ruling in <i>Menachot</i> 73 that even sacrifices from Gentiles are acceptable. This ruling is based on either exegesis or logic derived from Leviticus 22,18. The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> suggests as an answer that we could have assumed that once the proselyte had converted he would become subject to the same restriction that the Israelites themselves are subject to as a result of the Torah writing בני ישראל….כי יקריב מכם, i.e. that not all the Israelites are entitled to offer such sacrifices. The word אדם then would confirm that sacrifices are accepted from all proselytes. I do not find this answer as grammatically tenable. Had the Torah not written the word אדם in our verse which included proselytes, the Talmud would not have been able to include Gentiles based on the wording איש איש in Leviticus 22,18, but would have included only proselytes as allowed to offer vows and gift-offerings. This is why the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> chose our verse as the basis for the ruling that offerings from proselytes are acceptable. This is the only reason that the formulation איש איש in Leviticus 22,18 may be interpreted as a directive to include Gentiles. Once we are clear about this there is no need to come up with forced explanations to justify the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as does the author of <i>Korban Aharon</i>.
  One cannot object that seeing that according to <i>Baba Metzia</i> 114 only Israelites are called אדם and not Gentiles, that therefore the words איש איש in 22,18 must refer to proselytes seeing the beginning of that verse specifically addressed Israelites and that it would not have occurred to anyone to include Gentiles so that they needed to be excluded specifically. Once we use the verse to expand the group of people from whom sacrificial offerings are acceptable we do not include every category of person but we include the group of people most closely resembling natural-born Israelites, i.e. the proselytes. Only if we find another word in the text which suggests that some other group of people is to be included in this legislation do we use it to include Gentiles. As a result, the law is that the proselyte may bring any kind of sacrificial offering whereas the Torah permits the Gentile only certain types of offerings. Rabbi Akiva holds that the Gentile may only bring a burnt-offering, עולה, whereas Rabbi Yossi Haglili holds that Gentiles may also offer a gift-offering, מנחה (<i>Menachot</i> 73).
  <i>Midrash Tanchuma</i> item 8 on our portion asks why the Torah used the expression אדם in our verse in preference to the customary איש? The answer given is that the Torah wishes to establish a parallel with the first human being who had sinned, i.e. אדם. We may understand the verse as follows: כי יחטא אדם כמו אדם הראשון שהתחיל לחטא יקריב קרבן; "If someone sins as did Adam who was the first human being who sinned, he shall offer a sacrifice." It appears from the wording of the author of the <i>Tanchuma</i> that Adam's sin was inadvertent seeing sin-offerings are acceptable only for sins committed inadvertently. The <i>Midrash</i> corresponds to what I have written on Genesis 3,12 on the words: "she gave to me." The entire פרשה here teaches us that G'd applied a different yardstick to man after Adam had sinned initially. Whereas the penalty for Adam's sin had been death, i.e. mortality, and the fact that he offered a sin-offering did not absolve him of his guilt, such offerings will help the Israelites to atone for the sins they commit inadvertently. The <i>Tanchuma</i> supplied the reason why G'd did not accept Adam's sacrifice as sufficient atonement, i.e. he had been the first human to sin; the evil urge had not been an integral part of him so that it would have been difficult to resist the lure of that urge. All subsequent human beings have been afflicted in that evil has become part of their life-force, נפש. The אות הברית, the sign of the covenant between us and G'd, i.e. the need to remove the foreskin through the act of circumcision, is the proof of the cardinal difference between us and Adam who had been created minus the foreskin.
  I believe that this consideration helps to explain a verse in Job 33,29 according to which G'd gives man two or three chances before decreeing something final resulting in his death. Why was Adam not measured by that yardstick? In fact, when it comes to sins committed by a community of people, we know on the authority of Amos 2,1, that G'd will forgive Israel's sins three times and only on the fourth occasion will He no longer forgive. There is, however, a good reason why G'd did not apply the yardsticks mentioned in either Job or Amos to אדם הראשון, the first man. On the day G'd created Adam He made him of totally good components, so that no part of him was either mentally or physically worthless which would cause him to go astray. Once he sinned he became the prototype of a sinner and the evil his life-force, נפש had absorbed became a part of every subsequent Israelite's body and soul. Even man's body absorbed that vestige of sin and the reminder of that contamination is the foreskin with which males are born. Keeping in mind that we all suffer from a handicap Adam had not suffered from, G'd decided to allow man up to three repetitions of mortal sins before making a decree final. It is man's heritage from the moment he emerges from his mother's womb to be infected with this evil pollutant. This pollutant endeavours to make man sin intentionally. It also endeavours to make him sin through mere thoughtlessness. In this latter case, the sin-offering helps to secure penitent Man atonement for such thoughtlessness. Although it is true that Adam's sin was also due to thoughtlessness, G'd dealt fairly with him by not allowing him a second chance seeing he did not have to overcome a spiritual or physical pollutant which urged him to disobey his Maker.
  כי יקריב מכם, "when one of you brings an offering, etc." We need to analyse why the Torah had to write the word מכם, "from you." Besides, why is that word written after the Torah had already written the predicate of the verse, i.e. "who offers a sacrifice." Normally, the subject, i.e. the person who performs the act is mentioned before the act he performs. Our sages in <i>Chulin</i> 5 state that the word מכם is intended to exclude Jewish heretics whose offerings are not acceptable. They arrive at this conclusion by viewing the word מן הבהמה, as suggesting that sacrifices by a heretic are aceptable. How was such an exegesis arrived at? The word מכם excluded only a Jew who either practices idolatry, (seeing this sin is equivalent to violation of all the Torah's commandments), or the kind of heretic who rejects all of the Torah's commandments. The wording מן הבהמה, on the other hand, suggests another group of animal-like human beings, i.e. heretics who reject only one or several of the commandments. The Torah says that these sinners do qualify for offering of sacrifices. The translation of the verse would be: "a certain animal-like person amongst you who offers a sacrifice, etc." The exegesis offered in <i>Chulin</i> helps to explain why the word מכם in our verse appears after the predicate instead of before. If the Torah had written: אדם מכם, in that sequence, the word would have appeared to exclude something instead of including something, or vice-versa. The intention of the verse, however, was that inclusions should apply only to proselytes, whereas exclusions should apply only to certain members of the Jewish community. The Torah achieved this aim by positioning the words כי יקריב between the words אדם מכם. We may also justify the position of the word מכם through reference to a different exegetical approach on the same folio of the Talmud. There the Talmud quotes a <i>Baraitha</i> which understands the word מכם as excluding offerings by heretics, and another <i>Baraitha</i> which uses the words מעם הארץ, (Leviticus 4,27)i.e. "from certain types of עם הארץ not from all of them," as the basis for not accepting sacrifices from such individuals. Rabbi Shimon disagrees saying that the words אשר לא תעשינה ואשם at the end of that verse make it clear that only an unrepentant heretic is not allowed to offer sacrifices. [Seeing that it seems strange that according to the first view even a repentant heretic should be forbidden to offer a sacrifice, Ed.], the Talmud defines the difference between the two views as applying only when someone who remains guilty of eating forbidden fat has repented for eating blood, and offers a sin-offering to achieve atonement for that sin. According to the first view, such an offering would be acceptable, whereas according to the second view it would not as the sinner continues to practice his heresy by eating forbidden fat. The Talmud there adds that one of the verses (1,2) speaks of the acceptance of a burnt-offering from a heretic, whereas the other verse (in Leviticus 4,27) speaks of the acceptance of a sin-offering from a heretic and that we need the exegetically usable words or letters of both verses. Thus far the T almud.
  Our sages have said in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> that the words כי יקריב refer only to voluntary offerings. This makes sense in view of the word מכם appearing after the words כי יקריב. The offerings which are excluded are voluntary offerings such as fulfilments of vows, i.e. עולה. This is what the Talmud in <i>Chulin</i> 5 meant when it said one verse speaks of the burnt-offering. Logic might have persuaded us that the Torah is willing to accept a free-will offering from a sinner who has not repented a specific sin, whereas a sin-offering from such a sinner would be rejected. The Torah therefore had to tell us that no offering is acceptable until the sinner has repented all of his sins. At the same time we also need the exclusion implied in the words מעם הארץ in 4,27 where the Torah speaks of a need to bring a sin-offering. The exclusion in that chapter is quite different from that in chapter one in that the only person from whom we do not accept a burnt-offering is the heretic who rejects the whole Torah. In 4,27, however, the Torah excludes sin-offerings even from a Jew who habitually only violates a single one of the 613 commandments when such a Jew wishes to offer a sin-offering for a different commandment which he violated unintentionally. Maimonides rules similarly in chapter three of his treatise on <i>Maaseh Hakorbanot</i>.
  If we wish to see a moral-ethical dimension in this verse we may pursue the following path. Seeing that the Jewish people had observed that G'd had brought Moses close to him, and called out only to him from amongst all the Israelites, the Torah goes on record to say that such distinctions are not restricted to Moses, but אדם כי יקריב, "anyone who wishes to come close to G'd, can do so provided מכם, is a member of the Jewish people." In fact, as we have already pointed out, G'd's call to Moses was only for the sake of the Israelites, for their benefit. Consider the fact that during 38 years of wandering in the desert when the Israelites were sullen [due to the decree that they would perish in the desert after adopting the majority report of the spies Ed.], and G'd kept His distance from them, G'd had not spoken even with Moses. This was clear evidence that when G'd had spoken to Moses out of the Tabernacle it had been for the benefit of the people and not for either G'd's or Moses' benefit.
  The Torah also wanted to give a hint to the elite amongst the people to influence the hearts of the Israelites so that they would worship G'd willingly. The reason that the offering or sacrifice is called קרבן, i.e. from the root קרב, "to come near," is that it is sin which separates man from his Father in Heaven. We know from Deuteronomy, 4,4 that "you who have cleaved to the Lord are all alive this day." The Israelites instead had become separated and distant from the presence of G'd, the שכינה, due to their support for the spies' report and their attempt to return to Egypt. G'd, on the other hand, is anxious to establish a close bond with Israel and commanded the elite to rebuke the sinner in order to bring his heart closer to the Lord his G'd. At the same time G'd punished those who ignored their duty in this regard. A proof that G'd indeed expects those who are the elite to take a leading role in influencing the hearts of the people, is found in the statement by our sages in <i>Avot</i> 5,21: "He who leads the multitude in righteousness shall have no sin come into his hand," seeing G'd will protect him against committing errors. These then are the messages contained in our verse.
  The word אדם used by the Torah here refers to the spiritually most advanced members of society, the elite. <i>Zohar Tazria</i> interprets the sequence of the words כי יקריב מכם, as "whom does one try and bring close to G'd, the מכם, the ones who have not been close in the first place, i.e. the spiritually lower level of society who have sinned and asked G'd not to bother them with His demands so that they could withdraw from the close bond with G'd." These are the people for the elite to focus on, to try and bring them back closer to G'd. This is why the Torah adds the words קרבן לשם, to be close to G'd, so that they will become what G'd called in the words of Isaiah 60,21: "the shoot that I planned, My handiwork in which I glory." A person of that calibre, involved in bringing others closer to G'd does not have to bring either free-will offerings or sin-offerings. Having finished with describing the task of the elite of the Jewish people, the Torah continues: מן הבהמה תקריבו את קרבנכם, i.e. the ordinary people are to offer their various kinds of sacrifices; after all, not everyone is on the spiritual level of those described as אדם, i.e. able to restore harmonious relations between sinners and G'd.
  
  Verse 3
  
   אם עולה קרבנו, if his offering consists of a burnt-offering, etc. Why is the wording of the Torah different here from the verses in which the burnt-offerings consisting of either sheep or fowl are described? In both those instances the Torah writes: ואם מן הצאן קרבנו, or ואם מן העוף קרבנו, whereas here the Torah writes: אם עולה קרבנו? If the Torah wanted to be consistent it should have written: אם מן הבקר עולה. We may understand this in conjunction with an idea mentioned in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> (3,20) in connection with the word את קרבנכם at the end of the last verse. We are told there that the Torah speaks of communal burnt-offerings. This would account for the plural ending in the word קרבנכם. In the other two instances we have mentioned the Torah uses the singular ending, i.e. קרבנו, making it plain that the Torah speaks of sacrifices offered by individuals. Moreover, the Torah uses the conditional אם, if, when introducing the burnt-offering to tell us that the only kind of communal burnt-offering acceptable is the one which consists of בקר, a male member of the cattle category. Peace-offerings may not be offered as communal offerings. [Peace-offerings are offerings which are eaten in the main by the owners, whereas the burnt-offering is completely consumed by the altar except for the skin and the hair. Ed.] Furthermore, the sequence קרבנכם אם עולה suggests that only burnt-offerings are acceptable as communal offerings and not peace-offerings as stated in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>.
  Furthermore, if the Torah had been consistent and written: אם מן הבקר עולה, we would have concluded that only animals which belong to the category of בקר, cattle, are acceptable as burnt-offerings and that sheep, etc., would be unacceptable as burnt-offerings. As a result of such considerations the Torah wrote the words אם עולה in that order to make it plain that there are other alternatives. Both cattle and sheep are acceptable as burnt-offerings, albeit communal burnt-offerings have to be of the בקר variety. Individual burnt-offerings on the other hand, may consist of either cattle or sheep. In order that we should not err concerning the acceptability of burnt-offerings consisting of certain kinds of fowl, the Torah added the word קרבנו once more (1,14) although this was not strictly necessary as pointed out in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> which understands the word as precluding communal burnt-offerings consisting of birds even when these communal offerings are in the nature of נדבה, voluntary offerings. 
  The wording of the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> (3,21) is: "Why did the Torah have to repeat the word עולה, burnt-offering, once more?" Answer: "I could have concluded that all the exclusions we have learned from the previous verses apply only to burnt-offerings which are voluntary offerings but that in the case of mandatory offerings they do not apply; hence the Torah repeats the word אם עולה to teach that the restrictions which we have learned about do not distinguish between voluntary and mandatory burnt-offerings." This concludes our quote from <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. It appears that the author of the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> thought that the Torah should have written: אם קרבנו עולה, "if his sacrifice is a burnt-offering." They answered that if the Torah had written the words in that sequence we would have assumed that the Torah spoke of a voluntary offering, an עולת נדבה, seeing that the words כי יקריב, definitely imply that the owner of that animal has a choice in the matter. The words אם עולה then mean any kind of עולה, any kind of burnt-offering be it a mandatory one or a voluntary one. The ראב"ד argues that the word עולה here was superfluous as the Torah could have relied on the next appearance of that word in the next verse. I consider this very forced.
  קרבנו, his offering. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> views this word as including the above-mentioned restrictions as applicable also to peace-offerings. If not for the word קרבנו I would have understood that the peace-offering is not subject to the same restrictions as the burnt-offering. Therefore this word is meant to include peace-offerings in the restrictions applicable to the burnt-offerings. There was never any reason to assume that peace-offerings should be subject to such restrictions in the first place so that the Torah had to counter that impression. [The fact that female animals are acceptable as peace-offerings as opposed to burnt-offerings which are restricted to male animals, lends substance to that assumption. Ed.] The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> did not use the pronoun ending קרבנו instead of קרבן as the basis for its exegetical comment as he did so already in verse 10 when the Torah speaks about the burnt-offering consisting of sheep or goats.
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
  
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
   את הכל. all of it. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> claims that the word הכל specifically includes the hooves and the horns of the animal. In view of this, we must ask why Abraham did not include the horns of the ram he offered in lieu of Isaac (Genesis 22,14), leaving the horns to be used as <i>shofarot</i> as described in <i>Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer</i> chapter 31. Perhaps we have to assume that Abraham did indeed offer, i.e. put the entire ram on the altar, and that due to the heat the horns פקעו מעל המזבח, cracked and fell off the altar; we learned in <i>Zevachim</i> 86 that once parts of the burnt-offering fell off the altar they do not need to be put back on.
  Another possibility is that the horns were separated from the ram prior to sprinkling its blood on the altar. Horns, etc., are not included as fit to be burned on the altar unless they are still attached to the body of the animal in question. If they have been detached, they have to be removed from the altar even if they had been placed on it already as we know from Deut. 12,27: ועשית עלותיך הבשר והדם על מזבח השם. According to Rabbi Zeyrah who stated in <i>Zevachim</i> 86 that the parts which had fallen off the altar are permitted for private use if they had been detached from the body prior to the sprinkling of the blood on the altar, one may fashion handles for knives from such horns.
  Another way of solving our question is that seeing the Torah had not been given as yet during Abraham's lifetime, the details recorded here did not obligate him. It is true that our sages in <i>Yuma</i> 28 held that Abraham carried out all the minutiae of the commandments. This included ערובי תבשילין, i.e. pre-cooking some food for the Sabbath following a festival on the eve of the festival in order to make preparation of food on the festival for the Sabbath permissible. I have already explained that Abraham did so voluntarily, in order to accumulate merits, not because he was under any obligation to do so. The same reasoning [that the Torah had not yet been given. Ed.] applied when Tamar married Yehudah her father-in-law, or when Jacob married two sisters while both were alive. The fact that the ram was stuck in the thicket by its horns was in itself a supernatural event; Abraham certainly did not have to burn up these very horns, a commandment applicable only in the future.
  
  Verse 10
  
   ואם מן הצאן קרבנו, If his offering consists of the category of sheep or goats, etc. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> remarks cryptically that the word ואם, in this verse [actually I think it would be better to say "the letter ו in the word ואם," Ed.] informs us of something additional to what we have learned about the עולה. What the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> means is that all the details mentioned in connection with a burnt-offering consisting of cattle and not repeated in this paragraph are nonetheless also applicable when the burnt-offering consists of צאן. Examples are the need to perform סמיכה, etc. This word ואם is also used to deduce that rules which are mentioned here for the first time, such as that the sheep used as burnt-offering is to be slaughtered on the northern side of the altar, apply equally to burnt-offerings consisting of cattle. The basic exegetical approach of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is to use all those words which appear to be repeated unnecessarily for a halachic דרוש.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> concludes: "why did the Torah then interrupt the previous paragrah and write a new paragraph altogether [if we treat the letter ו as making a single paragraph out of the two for exegetical purposes. Ed]? Answer: "in order to give Moses a breather during which time he could assimilate all the information he had just been given." Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi questions that apparently <i>Torat Kohanim</i> would not have queried the fact that verses 10-13 are a new paragraph if the Torah had not introduced it with the letter ו in the word ואם. How is this possible, he asks, seeing that the same <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on verse 1 (3,1) which deals with the meaning of the word ויקרא wrote as follows: "I might have thought that a "call" preceded every communication to Moses even including the separate paragraphs, הפסקות? Therefore the Torah wrote וידבר, to teach us that "calls" preceded דבור but not every paragraph which was a brief interruption of the same communication. What were the reasons for these הפסקות, brief interruptions? To give Moses a chance to assimilate the information he had been taught in the previous paragraph. Thus far the <i>Torat Kohanim</i>." This proves that such הפסקות, short intervals between different parts of the same communication, served to give Moses a breather even when the Torah did not introduce them by an otherwise superfluous letter ו. Rabbi Mizrachi proceeds to answer the question he posed. His words do not appeal to me. [The author refers to the question of Rabbi Mizrachi; he does not even relate to his answer to a question he does not perceive to have any merit in the first place. Ed.]
  I believe that when <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on verse 1 stated that unless the Torah had linked the paragraphs by an otherwise superfluous letter ו in our paragraph, I would have concluded that the reason for the הפסקה was not to enable Moses to assimilate the information G'd had given him but to warn Moses not to arrive at הלכות by a merely exegetical approach. The fact that the Torah introduced our paragraph with the word ואם, teaches that identical rules apply to a burnt-offering consisting of cattle and one consisting of sheep. What was mentioned in paragraph one applies to paragraph two, and what was recorded for the first time in paragraph two applies to what has not been recorded in paragraph one. Seeing that this is so, it is clear that the purpose of the pause must have been to give Moses a chance to assimilate all this information. [After Moses heard the second paragraph he had to apply the new information contained in that paragraph as additional to what G'd had revealed to him in the first paragraph. This obviously took some time. Ed.] The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> spoke about not just this particular paragraph commencing in verse ten, but about paragraphs and their purposes altogether.
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
   והקריב הכהן את הכל והקטיר, "and the priest shall offer it all and burn it up, etc." We have been told the very same thing already in the first paragraph dealing with the burnt-offering consisting of cattle. Why then did the Torah have to write this line? We cannot say that inasmuch as sheep are covered with wool the Torah wanted to include the wool in the part of the animal to be burnt up and that we could not have deduced the wool on the head of the ram and the hair of the beard of the billy-goat without a special verse, and that all these details could not have been derived from the word הכל in verse nine. The fact is that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> (4,57) derives the inclusion of these various kinds of animal hair in what is to be burned up from the word הכל in verse nine! Therefore, according to what we have stated that any detail applicable to burnt-offerings involving cattle applies also to burnt-offerings involving sheep, there was no need for the Torah to write a special verse containing this information! Furthermore, in our verse here the word הכל appears only next to the expression הקרבה, not to the הקטרה, the burning up of all these parts on the altar; our sages here in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> claim that the position of the word הכל teaches that only a priest may perform this service (bringing the animal to be burnt onto the altar), something we could not have deduced from what was written in verse 9. This makes the argument that the words from והקטיר המזבחה onwards in our verse are superfluous even stronger.
  I believe we can best explain the reason for these words here by reference to what <i>Torat Kohanim</i> wrote on the words והקטיר המזבחה in our verse. I quote: "he shall burn it up even though it may have become disqualified, even though it may have left the precincts of the Tabernacle (courtyard), even though the priest offering it may have had the wrong thoughts (פגול) already during the earlier stages of offering this sacrifice, and even if it had become ritually defiled. As a result of all these inclusions I might have concluded that the burning up ceremony should take place regardless of whether the disqualifying factors had occurred before the animal was on the altar or while it was still below the altar; therefore the Torah writes והקטיר המזבחה, he is to burn it up only if it had already been on top of the altar."
  It is difficult to know what is the source for the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> to derive the ruling that even if the sacrifice was already disqualified the priest must still burn up its parts. The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i>, aware of this problem, wrote that the fact that the Torah did not write והקטירם, "and he is to burn them up" [seeing the Torah had already written "all" concerning the הקרבה Ed.] is the source of the ruling by <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. If this were correct the author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> should have reacted similarly to the word והקריב instead of והקריבם. According to <i>Korban Aharon, Torat Kohanim</i> should have ruled that the priest ought to proceed with the offering in spite of the animal having suffered the kinds of disqualifications which did not affect the need for its being burned up. Seeing he did not do so, he cannot derive any הלכות, religious rulings, from the missing letter ם in the word והקריב either. The correct answer is that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> arrives at his conclusion based on the unnecessary repetition of the word והקטיר first in verse 9 and then again in verse 13. This brings us back to our original question why this whole line beginning with the word והקטיר in verse 13 had to be written at all. That line should have appeared either in verse 9 or in verse 13 but not in both verses. The very fact that the line is superfluous entitles <i>Torat Kohanim</i> to use it exegetically.
  עולה הוא. it is a burnt-offering. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> interprets the extraneous word הוא as making the slaughtering of animals to be offered as a burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar mandatory, i.e. unless the animal had been slaughtered on that side of the altar it could not be offered as a total-offering. This is the reason the Torah wrote this extraneous word only in the paragraph in which the northern side of the altar has already been mentioned, i.e. in verse 11. Clearly, the exclusion implied in the word הוא is related only to what was stated in verse 11, and there was no need to write the word הוא in the paragraph discussing a burnt-offering consisting of cattle which also discussed the need for סמיכה, the placing of the owner's weight on the animal prior to it being slaughtered. Had the word הוא occurred in that paragraph, we would have had to conclude that the act of סמיכה was mandatory and that failure to perform it would have disqualified that animal from becoming a burnt-offering. Actually, we have used the occurrence of the equally extraneous word עולה in verse 9 to establish that the act of סמיכה, i.e. the owner of the sacrifice placing his entire weight on the animal prior to its being slaughtered is not mandatory. We noted that the text hinted at some of the exclusions and inclusions respectively in the first paragraph, whereas other inclusions and exclusions respectively are hinted at in the second paragraph. We had stipulated that they all apply equally to both burnt-offerings consisting of cattle and of sheep, etc.; nonetheless there is something different about this particular exclusion which invalidates the premise concerning these two details of the burnt-offering regulations which we adhered to thus far. The two words עולה הוא, both of which are extraneous, refer to two separate commandments, i.e. the need for סמיכה, and the need to slaughter the burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar. We are therefore faced with the dilemma which of the extraneous words should serve exegetically for which of these two commandments. When we are faced with such a dilemma it is no more than reasonable to apply the extraneous word which appears next to an exclusion in its context, and the other extraneous word which appears next to an inclusion in its context. The word הוא in verse 13 is used exegetically as defining the commandment of where the animal is to be slaughtered since it appears in the text close to that commandment, whereas the word עולה which first appears in the text close to the inclusion of the סמיכה requirement is used exegetically as defining that requirement.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> supplies an additional reason for using the word עולה which is inclusive as applicable to the rules of סמיכה, and the word הוא which is restrictive to the rules about where the animal must be slaughtered. Seeing that the rule of סמיכה is not even an initial requirement for all kinds of burnt-offerings, -burnt-offerings brought on behalf of the public not requiring סמיכה at all,- it is reasonable to assume that even when required initially, such a regulation should not be so essential that its absence would invalidate the offering. The requirement to slaughter a burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar applies to all kinds of burnt-offerings, however. It is possible that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> was unduly expansive in its exegetical use of this detail; the reason we have stated was quite adequate already. Even though the two paragraphs in question deal with one basic subject, the fact that there was room for some doubt makes it justifiable to write something extraneous. You will find, for instance, that the words עולה הוא occur again in connection with a burnt-offering consisting of a bird (1,17); in that instance <i>Torat Kohanim</i> uses the word עולה inclusively; even if the blood had only been squeezed out of the bird's body and not out of its head, it is still acceptable as a burnt-offering in that condition. The word הוא is again interpreted as restrictive, i.e. if the blood of that bird had been sqeezed out of its head and not out of its body, it is not acceptable as a burnt-offering. <i>Zevachim</i> 66 asks on this interpretation מאי תלמודא? "what is the logic behind this kind of exegesis?" The Talmud's answer is that seeing most of the blood is in the body and not in the head, squeezing the blood out of the body is more important. We see from there that the Talmud too fell back on logic in order to resolve something that had been in doubt, i.e. where to apply the words עולה and הוא respectively as inclusive and where to apply them as restrictive.
  
  Verse 14
  
   ואם מן העוף, and if it is from the category of birds, etc. The letter ו in the word ואם means that the rules mentioned previously as applicable to burnt-offerings of four-legged animals apply also to burnt-offerings consisting of birds unless they are specifically negated by what is written in this paragraph. Amongst the differences are: 1) a bird cannot serve as any offering other than a burnt-offering. We derive this from the word העוף עולה as distinct from the descriptions used for burnt-offerings of four-legged animals in the previous two paragraphs. Alternatively, the very word עולה is superfluous and comes to tell us that it is the only kind of offering that can be offered using birds. 2) We also use the word קרבנו restrictively, i.e. that only an individual can offer a burnt-offering consisting of a bird, not a community. 3) the rule that instead of slaughtering the bird it must have its head pinched off is applicable only to a priest, whereas the parallel act of slaughtering the four-legged animal designated as a burnt-offering may be performed also by a non-priest, an Israelite. In instances where in the previous two paragraphs some details have been repeated needlessly, this means that they applied only to the burnt-offering consisting of four-legged animals. The other details, each of which appears in only one of the previous two paragraphs, apply equally to burnt-offerings consisting of birds. Examples of exclusions which are derived from the respective paragaphs are: animals which have been mated with other species, animals set aside to serve as sacrifice for an idol; animals which had been used for idolatrous purposes, animals which are טרפה, have a terminal defect; diseased animals, over-age animals; stolen animals. All of the aforesaid are unfit to serve as burnt-offerings, or as any other offering. All of these examples are listed in the fourth chapter of Maimonides' treatise <i>Issurey Hamizbeach</i>.
  קרבנו לשם, his offering to G'd. The reason the Torah adds these words here whereas they did not appear in the previous two paragraphs is that the Torah included birds which have certain physical defects as fit to serve as a sacrifice, something which is not the case with offerings consisting of four-legged animals. The source of this <i>halachah</i> is <i>Kidushin</i> 24: אין זכרות ותמות בעוף; "the requirement that sacrificial burnt-offerings be male and free from physical blemish does not apply to burnt-offerings consisting of birds." In view of this relaxation of certain rules when an offering consists of a bird, logic would have told us that any bird-offering is of an inferior nature, why else would the Torah permit a blemished bird to serve as an offering? The Torah therefore had to tell us that as far as G'd is concerned, קרבנו לשם the bird-offering is equally esteemed in the eyes of the Lord.
  We find support for our view from Isaiah 57,15 where the prophet describes G'd as especially close to the "contrite and lowly in spirit," and our sages in <i>Sotah</i> 5 interpret this as either: אני את דכא, "I descend from Heaven in order to be close to the contrite," or as אתי דכא, "I elevate the contrite to My domain." It is due to such considerations that the name of G'd is written next to the bird-offering and not next to the offerings consisting of four-legged animals. Anyone who offers a burnt-offering consisting of a bird is presumed to be in low spirits seeing he cannot afford to offer something of greater value to G'd. We find the same approach in <i>Menachot</i> 104 where the Talmud explains the reason for the wording נפש כי תקריב מנחה לשם, (2,1) as a hint that a poor person who cannot afford to offer more than a meal-offering is considered as offering his whole personality, נפש, to G'd by means of such a low cost offering.
  
  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
   אשה ריח ניחוח לשם, a fire-offering whose fragrance is pleasing to G'd. Our sages in <i>Menachot</i> 110 comment that the fact that the Torah used this expression when describing the burnt-offering consisting of a four-legged animal, as well as when a bird-offering is being offered, as proof that G'd does not judge a person's offering by its monetary value but by the attitude it reflects. As long as the donor's motivation is G'd-oriented, both kinds of offerings are equally welcome in His eyes. The problem the sages wanted to overcome was that if the Torah had written the term אשה ריח ניחוח לשם only in connection with the bird-offering which is worth a few coins, it is obvious that a burnt-offering consisting of a four-legged animal should qualify for that description no less. Hence why did the Torah have to write the expression in connection with the offering of a four-legged animal? This is why they were careful to write: אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט, that there is no difference between the person who offers a valuable animal as a sacrifice and the one who offers something less valuable. We should not imagine that the fact that the Torah mentioned ריח ניחוח in connection with the bird-offering was just an act of graciousness on the part of G'd towards the poor, whereas the four-legged animal offered by the wealthy is dearer to Him. The Torah made the point that the bird-offering is not considered inferior for any reason at all by writing the otherwise unnecessary words ריח ניחוח לשם also in connection with the burnt-offering consisting of four-legged animals. This is why the Rabbi in the Talmud did not simply write הממעיט כמרבה, as this would not have conveyed his true meaning. It is a rule that when one says: "this is as good as that," that the "this" is inferior to the "that" seeing it is a derivative of it. The "this" to "that" relationship is akin to the student-teacher relationship. Even if the student has absorbed all of the teacher's knowledge, the teacher remains superior by dint of having taught the student what he knows. When the Rabbi phrased his comment: "one who does a lot is as one who does a little," he made sure the reader would not consider either of the two as superior or inferior to the second one. This consideration prompted the Torah to write the same wording once more in connection with the meal-offering in 2,2.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   ונפש כי תקריב קרבן מנחה, And a person who offers a meal-offering, etc. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> views the word ונפש as both inclusive and restrictive, the singular נפש being considered restrictively in that a voluntary meal-offering is not acceptable from a community; on the other hand, the letter ו which introduced this verse is interpreted inclusively, to teach that whereas the כהן משיח, the High Priest who offers mandatory meal-offerings daily and who is not permitted to offer such a meal-offering as atonement in the event he had defiled himself before entering the Temple or while inside, -something that an ordinary Israelite is permitted to do,- is nonetheless allowed to bring a voluntary meal-offering in normal cirmcumstances.
  Why did the Torah write a single word which is restrictive and inclusive at one and the same time? Perhaps the reason is that seeing that the meal-offering by a group of people could be excluded only by reference to the High Priest's inclusion, the Torah felt that both of these <i>halachot</i> should be alluded to in the same word, even though these two הלכות themselves appear contradictory. Had it not been for the fact that the letter ו enabled us to include the High Priest in the category of individuals from whom ordinary (not intended for atonement) meal-offerings are acceptable, there would have been no need to write a word which would indicate that a group of people is denied such a privilege. Why would I even have imagined that groups would be allowed to offer such meal-offerings [the cheapest offering there is. Ed.] that I should have had to exclude them?
  
  Verse 2
  
  
  
  Verse 3
  
  
  
  Verse 4
  
   וכי תקריב, and if you will offer, etc. The letter ו at the beginning of the word כי is again an indication that the laws mentioned in this paragraph are to be viewed in conjunction with those of the previous paragraph. This means that the various details governing meal-offerings also apply to the High Priest's meal-offerings. As to the exclusion of communal meal-offerings, such rules apply also to the details of offering frankincense and the like.
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
  
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
   והנותרת מן המנחה, As to what is left over from the meal-offering, etc. Why did the Torah repeat this verse twice both here and in verse 3? Perhaps we can understand this by referring to what we learned in <i>Menachot</i> 58. The Talmud states that all meal-offerings whose left-overs are permitted to be eaten may be consumed together with honey; if the left-overs had become leavened, however, a person eating same is guilty of <i>Malkot</i> 39 lashes with a strap. <i>Menachot</i> 55 derives this <i>halachah</i> from Leviticus 6,10: לא תאפה חמץ חלקם, "it (the meal-offering) shall not be baked with leaven even partially." If I did not have the word והנותרת, I would have argued that the culpability for eating it when it had become leavened would apply only if the meal-offering had already been baked with leaven, not if it had become leavened after having been baked. The word כל המנחה in that verse makes it plain that even if only the left-over of the meal-offering had become leavened, the same law of not consuming it applies and he who does so is culpable. Even though our sages there derived their <i>halachah</i> from the Torah writing the words לא תאפה חמץ immediately before the word חלקם, that exegetical use of the word would not have sufficed to make someone culpable for eating only the left-overs of a meal-offering which has become leavened; culpability was established only for the person who had actually baked such a meal-offering. Even eating from such left-over turned-leaven meal-offering could not be culpable unless there was some additional indication in the text of the Torah. <i>Menachot</i> 55 and <i>Torat Kohanim</i> stated that baking meal-offerings as <i>chametz</i> had been part of a general prohibition applying to all kinds of meal-offerings so that there was no need to mention this here specifically. If the Torah nonetheless wrote the prohibition here specifically, it served notice that just as baking is something performed by an individual, so any other activity connected with the meal-offering which is performed by an individual is equally prohibited on pain of the penalty of <i>malkot</i>. I believe that even after having learned this, the culpability would be limited to such activities as taking a <i>Kometz</i>, a partial fistful of the ingredients of the meal-offering, etc. Eating from the left-overs should not have been culpable. In order to make one culpable for eating left-over parts of a meal-offering which had become leavened the Torah had to write the word והנותרת in our verse.
  The ראב"ד writes that both the letter ו and the letter ה in the word והנותרת are unnecessary and therefore available for exegetical purposes. This is why we were able to derive the requisite laws for not eating from the left-over meal-offering which had become leavened. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives additional inclusions from the word והנותרת, such as that even though the meal-offering did not contain salt (a requirement for any sacrifice), did not have all its frankincense burnt up, or that its main component the <i>kometz</i> had not reached the altar at all, the left-over parts may be consumed by the priests. The words מן המנחה in our verse are restrictive, i.e. that if a basic ingredient was missing or none of the frankincense had been burnt up, the remains, נותרת, may not be consumed. To come back to the exegetical use the ראב"ד made of the extraneous letters ו and ה before the word נותרת, I do not agree that these letters may be used for the purpose suggested by the ראב"ד. If we were to omit those two letters, the word נותרת would not make any sense at all. The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> felt that only the letter ו in that word is superfluous and may therefore be used exegetically to include something. I have my doubts even about this. Moreover, what is the source of the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> including the absence of the above-mentioned three additional requirements of the meal-offering as items considered non-essential? Whereas it is in the nature of a restrictive clause that the items excluded are thereby categorised as being מעכב, essential, it makes sense that the author uses the word מן המנחה as excluding the right to eat from the left-over parts if three items had been missing (any basic ingredient, none of the frankincense not having been burned up, and no <i>kometz</i> having been separated). This kind of reasoning is inadmissible when applied to inclusions, however. If at all, the extraneous word והנותרת could serve as including only a single item as non-essential in the מנחה and its absence therefore not prohibiting the priests from consuming the left-overs.
  Perhaps the consideration which motivated the author of the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> in this instance was the fact that the three מצות which he categorized as non-esential based on the extraneous word והנותרת are scattered throughout the text. They appear in different paragraphs. The need to burn up all the frankincense appears in connection with the מנחת סלת in 2,2. The need to offer the meal-offering on the altar appears in the paragraph of מנחת מרחשת, 2,8. The need to add salt to the meal-offering appears at the end of the meal-offering legislation in 2,13. It is remarkable that the legislation about what may be done with the נותרת, the left-over of the meal-offering, is not recorded at the end of the meal-offering legislation but already at the end of the first paragraph (2,3), even though the requirement for the meal-offering to be offered on the altar had not yet been mentioned. Clearly, this implies that the offering of the meal-offering on the altar is not something we have to consider as relevant to the rules applicable for eating the left-overs. We pointed out earlier (page 945) that when a new paragraph commences with the letter ו, this establishes a connection to the laws recorded in the previous paragraph and vice versa. Accordingly, the need to present the meal-offering on the altar which is written in the following paragraph which commenced with the word ואם should also govern the rules of the נותרת legislation. The fact that the legislation dealing with the left-overs is written in the middle of the total meal-offering legislation instead of at the end makes it clear that the requirement to present the meal-offering on the altar is only לכתחילה, i.e. an initial requirement, it is not so essential a requirement that its omission would invalidate the right to eat of the left-overs. On the other hand, omission of the burning up of any of the frankincense would invalidate the right of the priests to eat the left-overs of the meal-offerings. We find also that the Torah repeats the line והנותרת once more at the end of the paragraph dealing with the מנחת מרחשת (verse 10). Anyone reading this verse can see immediately that it is quite superfluous (except for exegetical purposes), as everything written therein has already been written in 2,3. Clearly, the reason for writing this verse is to teach us that compliance with the rules laid down in this paragraph (2,5-2,13) is enough to entitle Aaron and his sons to partake of the left-overs of such meal-offerings. There is no mention in that paragraph of frankincense altogether. The only major requirement written there is the קמץ, the partial fistful of the mixture containing the meal and oil of which the Torah says in verse 8 that "the priest shall take off from the meal-offering the memorial part thereof," i.e. the קמץ. Failure of the Torah to mention the לבונה, frankincense, in that paragraph persuaded the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> to deduce that even if not all of it had been burned up the priests could still consume the left-overs. This is why the author said: "even if it had not been brought on the altar, and even if not all its frankincense had been burned up, the right to eat the left-overs has not been jeopardised. The author adds his comment about the salting of the offering seeing that this requirement also appeared only at the end of the entire legislation, i.e. much later than the permission given to Aaron and his sons to partake of the left-overs of the meal-offering. [This "left-over" probably amounted to 90% of the mixture from which the קמץ was placed on the altar. Ed.]
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
  
  
  Verse 14
  
   ואם תקריב מנחת בכורים, "And if you bring a meal-offering consisting of first-fruit, etc." The word אם here means "when," and refers to the period when the first-fruit ripens. The offering of the first-fruit is mandatory whenever it is being offered. The word תקריב means "you are to offer it, it is a duty." The conditional word ואם refers only to the timing of the offering.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   אם זכר אם נקבה, be it male or female; the repetition of the word אם between the words זכר and נקבה indicates that the Torah does not favour a male animal over a female animal when it comes to the offering of such peace-offerings.
  
  Verse 2
  
  
  
  Verse 3
  
  
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
  
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
  
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
   ואם עז קרבנו, If his offering consists of a she-goat, etc. According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i>, the reason why the Torah interrupted the presentation of its subject with the legislation about the goat-offering is to teach that the אליה, fat of the tail, did not have to be included in the part to be offered on the altar (compare 2,9). We must first understand what is meant by "interrupted the subject?" <i>Korban Aharon</i> writes that whereas the Torah should have written here ואם עז, it wrote אם עז. This is obviously erroneous, seeing the Torah does write ואם עז.
  The ריב"א (Rabbi Yitzchak ben Asher Halevi), writes in a Tossaphot on <i>Pessachim</i> 96 that although the procedure outlined by the Torah for the offering of a goat is identical to that of the category כבש in the preceding paragraph except for the offering of the אליה, the fact that it was accorded a separate paragraph must be viewed as an "interruption." As far as I am concerned what the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had in mind is quite simple. When the Torah dealt with the procedures involving the עולה, the burnt-offering, the Torah wrote a paragraph commencing with the words: "if the burnt offering consists of the flock, either sheep or goats, etc. (1,10)," no separate paragraph is accorded to the goats serving as burnt-offering. If, nonetheless, the Torah wrote a special paragraph when the goats serve as peace-offerings, this must certainly be viewed as "an interruption." It indicates that this paragraph must contain a new הלכה.
  The paragraph does not start with the word אם but with the word ואם, to teach that all the laws pertaining to the זבח שלמים, peace-offering sacrifices, outlined previously in the first paragraph of chapter three, apply to such offerings. The only reason that the Torah interrupted its outline of the peace-offerings was to iindicate that the אליה of a goat did not need to be offered on the altar. The reason we know this is that in the enumeration of the details of a peace-offering consisting of a goat (after having listed the details of such offerings when they consisted of sheep), the only detail not mentioned is the reference to the fat of its tail.
  As to the absence of mention of an אליה when the Torah described the procedure of a peace-offering consisting of cattle, there was no need to write anything to exclude this as cattle do not possess a tail wich would fit the definition of אליה. Seeing that no one would have imagined that such a tail be offered on the altar even though it was mentioned in the paragraph dealing with sheep, there was no need to write anything which would serve to exclude the tail of the peace-offering consisting of cattle from being offered on the altar. The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> was perfectly justified then in writing that the rule about אליה does not apply to cattle, though there is no word in the Torah which excludes it. The rule we had established earlier that when a paragraph starts with the letter ו, the laws mentioned in the former paragraph and those mentioned in the subsequent paragraph are interchangeable, applies only when the anatomical facts enable us to apply these laws to animals mentioned in either paragraph. When such application is impossible due to the animal mentioned in the former paragraph not possessing the anatomical feature in question, we can ignore such considerations. In the case of an offering consisting of a goat, however, the anatomical conditions which apply to sheep also apply to goats. As a result the Torah needed to exclude the אליה of a goat specifically. Had the Torah lumped sheep and goats together as it did in its description of the rules applying to burnt-offerings, we would have assumed that the fat tail of the goat qualified for burning up on the altar. The Torah therefore wrote a special paragraph dealing with the peace-offerings consisting of goats.
  
  Verse 13
  
  
  
  Verse 14
  
  
  
  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
   חקת עולם, a perpetual statute, etc. This verse provides us with the ammunition necessary to prove that not only the חלב, certain fat parts of animals which are being offered on the altar, are forbidden for consumption by Jews, but that those fat parts are equally forbidden when the animal has been designated for consumption as חולין, secular purposes. This is why the Torah writes that this statute applies throughout the generations in all parts of the earth where Jews reside. This part of the verse would not make sense unless the prohibition applied to animals not slaughtered as sacrifices. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> (189) also explains the word חקת עולם as applying לבית העולמים, "when the permanent Temple would be built," whereas it explains the word לדורותיכם as לדירותיכם בכל מושבותיכם בארץ ובחוצה לארץ, "in all your dwellings both inside and outside the Holy Land." Seeing the Torah already wrote that this was a perpetual statute, what need was there for the additional words: "for all your generations in all your dwellings?" Clearly, the words חוקת עולם have to be read as a continuation of כל חלב לשם, (3,16), that all the fat parts are to be be offered on the altar, including the periods when the permanent Temple would be built. The Torah continues that this warning (law) is also applicable for all times and in all places, even in the diaspora. We might have thought that prohibition of these fat parts was a reasonable prohibition while these parts were offered as something sacred on the altar, but that at times when the entire sacrifice legislation was in abeyance due to the absence of a Temple or Tabernacle, such a prohibition did not make sense; we might also have argued that this legislation should apply only in locations where the Tabernacle or Temple was situated but not in other locations; the Torah therefore had to write that it applies unconditionally and universally. [The thought presented here by our author that there was a case for arguing that this fat should be permitted, may be based on the fact that the Torah permitted meat not offered on the altar (Deut. 12,20) after the Israelites settled in the Holy Land, while in the desert no meat other than sacrificial meat was permitted for general consumption. Ed.]
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   דבר אל בני ישראל, "speak to the children of Israel, etc." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> uses the expression בני ישראל as excluding Gentiles from offering sin-offerings in the event they violated any of the seven Noachide laws. This appears very difficult. Why should the idea that they could offer such sacrifices ever have arisen so that the Torah needed to refute it? If we would have made a comparison with the Gentile's right to offer free-will offerings, there is no comparison seeing that those offerings were not meant to achieve atonement as we know from <i>Chulin</i> 5 where the Talmud debated the source of denying the heretic the right to offer either total-offerings or sin-offerings respectively. The Talmud there makes it plain that the two kinds of offerings cannot be derived one from the other unless there was something in the text alluding to such entitlement. One argument used there is that if someone were denied to offer a free-will offering it does not follow automatically that he should be barred from offering a sin-offering seeing the latter is designed to help him achieve atonement. The same argument can be used here. As a result of such considerations, the Gentile would have been presumed as entitled to offer sin-offerings. The Torah therefore had to write בני ישראל, to exclude him from the privilege to offer such offerings. It appears to me that the need for this exclusion was accentuated by the word נפש which the Torah used in the very same verse in which it described who would be required (or entitled) to bring a sin-offering. The word נפש suggests that any human being is included in the legislation about to be unveiled. By writing first בני ישראל, the Torah enabled us to use the inclusive term נפש as including proselytes. 
  The obvious question is why the Torah did not simply omit both the words בני ישראל and נפש, and I would have excluded the Gentiles and included the proselytes? What possible reason could there have been to exclude the proselyte from the privilege to offer a sin-offering that prompted the Torah to write a word designed to include him? This is no objection as we find that the Torah had included proselytes already in 1,2 where the Torah used the term אדם, and this term included proselytes. We would naturally have assumed that proselytes were included only in the right to offer burnt-offerings but not sin-offerings. The Torah therefore had to write the word נפש in our verse to tell us that proselytes have the right to offer sin-offerings. Unless the Torah had also excluded the Gentiles by the restrictive term בני ישראל, one could have argued that proselytes did not need to be specifically included as they had already been included at the beginning of the portion with the word אדם. I would then have concluded that the absence of any further restrictive clause indicated that the Torah has no objection to Gentiles offering sin-offerings. We have now learned that the word נפש here, though inclusive, includes only the proselyte and that the inclusive term אדם at the beginning of our portion was not sufficient seeing the privilege of offering a sin-offering is a far greater privilege than that of offering a burnt-offering. The very fact that a separate paragraph was needed to sanction the offering of sin-offerings altogether indicates that it is a great privilege to be allowed to atone for a sin by offering a sin-offering (only). This privilege could not have been derived merely by exegesis, but needed to be stated outright. Moreover, it appears that the conclusion of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> that the words בני ישראל exclude Gentiles is not based on these words being superfluous, but rather on their plain meaning, i.e. "Jews and not Gentiles." The moment we accept this, the implication is that only natural-born Jews are subject to the legislation in this paragraph as the expression "children of Israel" refers to direct descendants of the patriarch Jacob. If the Torah wanted to include proselytes also, it had to write the word נפש in order for us to understand this beyond doubt. Having said this you will appreciate that though the expression בני ישראל in the whole Torah is not understood as available for exegetical purposes but as telling us to whom the respective legislation is addressed, it excludes Gentiles automatically.
  נפש, a person. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> views this word as including proselytes in the group of people entitled to offer sin-offerings. If the Torah had intended to also include women, the Torah should have written אדם כי יחטא as the term אדם includes males and females seeing the Torah referred to both males and females by the collective term אדם in Genesis 5,2.
  A moral-ethical meaning of the term נפש as used in this paragraph may be the following. The soul of a human being becomes defective when its owner has sinned intentionally. This is why sinners are referred to as "dead" even while they are still "alive," as we know from Ezekiel 18,32: "for G'd does not desire the death of the dead, etc." The sinner is referred to by the prophet as dead already seeing he no longer has a soul. Solomon refers to something similar in Proverbs 23,2 "if you are someone possessed of a נפש, soul." Our verse tells us that even sins committed inadvertently result in damage to one's soul. While it is true that such inadvertently committed sins do not destroy the soul completely, nonetheless the Torah requires a sin-offering in order for the damage to that soul to be repaired. The offering of that קרבן, the sacrifice whose purpose it is to re-establish the affinity of the soul with its origin, enables the diseased soul to be infused with the spiritual values which will heal its wounds. The same result cannot be achieved if someone who had sinned intentionally were to offer such a sacrifice seeing he had already forfeited his soul. There is nothing left that can be reconstituted until the sinner repented and experienced the beneficial effect of the Day of Atonement, as pointed out by Ezekiel 18,32 והשיבו וחיו, "when you return and cause others to return so that you may live."
  
  Verse 3
  
   אם הכהן המשיח יחטא, If the anointed priest shall sin, etc. The Torah begins its list with the sin of an individual, although the Torah writes לאשמת העם, that this individual thereby brings guilt on the entire people. This is to tell us that an inadvertent sin committed by the High Priest is equivalent to an inadvertent sin by the whole community. If so, why did the Torah not begin the list of people who have to bring sin-offerings with 4,13 where the sin of the community is described, and wait with mentioning a sin by the High Priest until after verse 21 when inadvertent sins by individuals are listed? Perhaps the Torah meant to tell us that in the event of the High Priest and the community having committed an inadvertent sin, the sin-offering of the High Priest takes precedence over that of the community as a whole. The same rule would apply if both the King and the people had committed a sin. The reason given in <i>Horiot</i> 13 is that the High Priest is active in securing atonement whereas the community achieves its atonement passively. I have found in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on verse 13 (item 240) in our chapter that when both a high Priest and the community have to offer bullocks as sin offerings, the bullock of the High Priest has to be offered first. This ruling is based on the word ואם in verse 13 meaning that what is listed here is only secondary to what has been listed before, i.e. the bullock of the High Priest. 
  This raises the question why our sages could not have deduced this rule simply from the fact that the Torah has written about the bullock to be offered by the High Priest before it wrote about the bullock to be offered by the community in the event the latter committed an error? Perhaps the sages reasoned that if there were no other hint that the High Priest's bullock takes precedence except the fact that the paragraph about the High Priest sinning was mentioned first, we would have misunderstood the words לאשמת העם as a reference to the error the people had committed which is described in verse 13. That verse deals with the people having acted on the basis of an erroneous decision of the High Court. I would have thought that the reason the Torah described the High Priest's error as "the sin of the people" was because he had concurrred with the erroneous decision of the High Court, or had even been part of the Court which handed down the erroneous decision. Such an interpretation would be wrong. If the High Priest had been part of the High Court which handed down an erroneous decision, his atonement is part of the atonement of the whole people, i.e. he does not have to bring a bullock as an individual sin-offering (<i>Horiot</i> 7). The Torah commenced the sin-offering legislation with the High Priest in order that we should not arrive at an erroneous conclusion. In view of this I would not have been able to use the fact that the first paragraph deals with the sin-offering of the High Priest as proof that his sin-offering takes precedence even over the communal sin-offering. We are still faced with the problem why two separate exegetical comments were necessary to teach us this, a) the word ואם in verse 13, and b) the words כאשר שרף, in verse 21 (compare <i>Torat Kohanim</i> 255 on that verse). I believe that the reason there are two such exegetical openings is simply that if I had only had one, I would have reasoned that the High Priest's offering may be offered first, but does not have to be offered first. Seeing that the Torah provided us with two exegetical openings it is clear that the Torah considers the High Priest's offering taking precedence as mandatory. I have seen a comment by <i>Korban Aharon</i> who claims that unless I had both these expressions available for exegetical use I would have assumed that the High Priest's offering would take only partial precedence but that before he completed his offering one would start with the offering of the community. I do not see any merit in such reasoning. If the author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> were correct the Torah should not have written כאשר שרף את הפר הראשון, "the first bullock" in verse 21, but should have written את הפר האחד, "the one bullock." This would have indicated that the procedure of offering the bullock of the High Priest had not been completed as yet at that stage.
  לאשמת העם, so as to bring guilt on the people; we may understand this statement as parallel to what we are taught in <i>Avot</i> 5,18: that if someone is engaged in conferring merits on others he himself will not commit a sin. When the High Priest himself commits a sin, this is proof that the people did not enjoy sufficient merits by reason of his activities that it should have protected him against committing a sin himself. This is the meaning of לאשמת העם.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> interprets the words אשמת העם as providing us with a clue as to the nature of the sin on account of which the High Priest has to atone with the bullock as a sin-offering. The sin is described as העלם דבר, lack of knowledge of the correct religious ruling which resulted in the people violating a negative commandment involving an activity, as mentioned in verse 13. If all the High Priest had been guilty of was an erroneous activity, some hold that he would be required to bring the same kind of sin-offering as an ordinary individual, whereas others hold that he would not be culpable at all. We learned in <i>Horiot</i> 11 that the words מעם הארץ in verse 27 are proof that if the High Priest had been guilty of a personal sin consisting of a sinful act that he would be free of the obligation to offer a sin-offering altogether. According to <i>Horiot</i> 7 if the High Priest does not happen to be an outstanding scholar he is not required to offer a sin-offering of either kind, not for having committed a sinful act inadvertently nor for having handed down an erroneous ruling upon which the people acted. We need to understand the reason for such an <i>halachah</i>. Perhaps the reason is that if an erroneous ruling is handed down by a High Priest who also happens to be an outstanding scholar and upon whom the people place a great deal of reliance, such an error makes a deep impression on his soul, creating a distance between his soul and its holy roots so that the merits of the Israelites which he has been instrumental in securing for them is insufficient to protect him against harmful effects on his own soul. Such an effect would not occur when the High Priest only erred in personally committing an inadvertent sinful act, or even if a High Priest who was not presumed to be a scholar handed down an erroneous ruling. Such sins would not create the kind of distance between his soul and its holy roots that he would need to bring an additional sacrifice in order to re-establish the bonds with his soul's holy roots. The merits a High Priest confers on the multitude by means of his daily activities are enough to protect the soul of such a High Priest from major harm. G'd would not despise him on account of the error he committed. Furthermore, seeing that the High Priest's error did not involve the people, it does not leave such a deep impression on his soul.
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
   לפני ה׳ אשר באהל מועד before the Lord who is in the Tent of Meeting, etc. In answer to the question why the Torah had to write the words "before the Lord" which had already been written in verse 6, Rabbi Nechemyah in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> says that seeing that we find that Aaron stood beyond the golden altar on the Day of Atonement when he sprinkled the blood on the dividing curtain, we could have assumed that the same procedure was to be followed here. The Torah therefore had to make clear that only the golden altar was "before the Lord," not Aaron. This suggests that except for the fact that the blood of the bullock on the Day of Atonement was sprinkled towards the dividing curtain, the words "before the Lord" in our verse would be superfluous. This is difficult. How would I have known where Aaron was to have stood if the Torah had not written the words "before the Lord?" Seeing that in that event the Torah had not designated a specific spot where Aaron had to stand to perform the sprinkling ceremony, I would have concluded that he had the choice of standing either in front of the golden altar or beyond it. The Torah therefore had to write the words: "in front of the Lord," to tell us that Aaron was to stand in front of the altar. Why was all this necessary? Because we find that there was another occasion when he was to stand beyond the golden altar. Another difficulty is this: why would I assume that Aaron was to perform the ritual of sprinkling the blood towards the dividing curtain while he was standing so far away that the altar was between him and the dividing curtain? Perhaps the words are to tell us that he was to sprinkle the blood on the altar while standing in front of it (facing the dividing curtain)? Seeing that in Leviticus 17,18 the Torah describes Aaron as exiting the Holy of Holies in the direction of the golden altar while putting some of the blood of the bullock on its corners, maybe the Torah wanted to tell us that the same procedure should be followed here, i.e. that when Aaron was to put the blood on the corners of the golden altar he was to do so while having his back to the dividing curtain and facing outwards before pouring out the excess blood at the base of the copper altar? As far as the sprinkling of blood towards the dividing curtain was concerned, however, this should take place when Aaron stood between the golden altar and the dividing curtain? If we had had no other detail than this to worry about, we could have answered this problem.
  However, I have seen that the same Rabbi Nechemyah speaking of the meaning of the words "and Aaron shall exit towards the altar which is in front of the Lord" (Leviticus 16,18), questions the meaning of these words. He answers that we find in connection with the bullock which Aaron has to offer concerning all the other inadvertently committed sins that he had to stand on the far side of the curtain with the altar between him and the dividing curtain. I might have concluded that he was to follow the same procedure also with the bullock on the Day of Atonement; therefore the Torah had to write the word ויצא, etc. Where did Aaron stand on that occasion? לפני השם, in front of the Lord." Thus far Rabbi Nechemyah in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> item 45 on 16,18 (item 45). It is difficult to understand why Rabbi Nechemyah had to find justification for the words of the Torah in that verse. Surely the Torah had to inform us (or the High Priest) that the High Priest had to leave the place he stood on and not sprinkle the blood on the altar while standing between it and the dividing curtain. Besides, the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> claims that the only reason we know where the High Priest stood at the time was that the Torah describes him as in the process of exiting towards the golden altar when he sprinkled blood on the dividing curtain. Furthermore, according to what Rabbi Nechemyah said that the words ויצא אל המזבח are not needed seeing that we now learned where Aaron was standing from the words לפני השם in 16,18 instead of as he said in our verse from the words לפני השם in 4,7. Rabbi Nechemyah glibly assumed that the High Priest would have stood outside the altar when sprinkling the blood of the bullock towards the dividing curtain when he performed this procedure on occasions other than the Day of Atonement. Where is there an indication in the text that this was indeed the case? If he were to use the words לפני השם to prove this theory, perhaps those words referred to the need to sprinkle some of the blood onto the altar itself which is the plain meaning of the verse! Besides, if the Torah had omitted both the words ויצא אל המזבח and the words לפני השם, how would I have known where Aaron was to have stood? How could Rabbi Nechemyah therefore even ask what these words were supposed to teach us?
  Actually, the exegesis of Rabbi Nechemyah in both parts of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is most appropriate. Had the Torah not written the words ויצא and not the apparently superfluous words לפני השם, I would simply have concluded that Aaron was free to sprinkle both onto the dividing curtain and onto the altar regardless of whether he stood between the altar and the dividing curtain or between the entrance to the Sanctuary and the golden altar. The Torah mentioned in connection with a wrong decision rendered by the High Court and acted upon by the community that a bullock had to be offered by the High Priest and that the blood was to be sprinkled as atonement on the golden altar (according to the plain meaning of the verse). The Torah also mentioned the golden altar as recipient of the blood of the bullock offered by the High Priest on the Day of Atonement as evident by the words ויצא אל המזבח. These facts established a halachic linkage between these two bullocks and the procedure to be followed concerning them. Not only this, but in both instances the Torah also speaks of the blood requiring to be sprinkled either upon or in the direction of the dividing curtain which is beyond the golden altar. Logic would have told us that the procedure prescribed in chapter 16 must be similar to that prescribed in chapter 4, i.e. that the sprinkling of the blood towards the dividing curtain was to be performed from a position beyond the golden altar, closer to the dividing curtain. We would then have made a מה מצינו kind of exegesis from what was missing in the information described in chapter 4, 13-21 by referring to chapter 16, 3-20. Rabbi Nechemyah tells us in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> that the words לפני השם are intended to prevent us from arriving at such a faulty conclusion. He asks rhetorically: Why were the apparently superfluous words לפני השם written seeing we would have used the same words in 16,18 and have applied them in our verse here? After all, we already know that the golden altar was used for sprinkling of the blood of the bullock offered as a sin-offering by the Torah writing ויצא אל המזבח. The words לפני השם could most certainly not be used to teach us that the High Priest was not to sprinkle the blood of the bullock on the copper altar seeing that altar was outside the Sanctuary. We are therefore back to the question what precisely the words לפני השם have been written for in our context seeing everything else could have been derived from the legislation about the bullock on the day of Atonement. Rabbi Nechemyah answers all these questions saying that the words לפני השם prove that the Torah did not want us to apply the מה מצינו type of exegesis by comparing the procedure to be followed with the bullock in our paragraph to the procedure followed with the bullock on the Day of Atonement. The essential difference between these two procedures involving the bullock as a sin-offering on the Day of Atonement and that in our chapter is, that there is no mention of the sprinkling of the blood on the dividing curtain by the High Priest while the latter is standing between the altar and the Holy of Holies in our verse. This is in contrast to the bullock to be offered on the Day of Atonement, where there is specific mention of this. Had I derived the various procedures applicable to the procedure followed with the bullock on the Day of Atonement, I would have also had to apply the detail of where the blood was to be sprinkled from the procedure outlined in chapter 16. The appearance of the word לפני השם in our verse teaches me not to derive any למוד from the bullock used on the Day of Atonement, be it the sprinkling of the blood on the dividing curtain or the sprinkling of the blood of that animal on the altar. Seeing this is so we would not have had any source upon which to base an assumption as to where the High Priest was to stand during the procedure of sprinkling the blood in the direction of the dividing curtain involving the פר העלם דבר, i.e. the bullock in our chapter. It seems clear therefore, that the words לפני השם must refer to the golden altar and not to the place where the High Priest was standing during all the sprinklings mentioned in our verse. Rabbi Nechemyah explains the words ויצא אל המזבח in 16,18 as follows: "What do these words teach us, i.e. what is the plain meaning of this verse?" Answer: "That the High Priest should not commence the sprinkling of the remaining blood on the altar until he has passed the golden altar on his way out of the Sanctuary." This teaches by inference that prior to that the High Priest had performed the sprinkling of the blood on the dividing curtain while standing between the golden altar and the dividing curtain.
  [Although the author continues to dissect the exegetical comments by Rabbi Nechemyah still further, I have decided to omit further details seeing we have shown how he solved the main problem. Ed.]
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
  
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
   ואם כל עדת ישראל ישגו, And if the entire community of Israel shall err, etc. The word עדת, "community of" is taken by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as referring to the Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court. The word עדה in this verse and the word עדה in Numbers 35,24-25 both are a reference to the Sanhedrin of 71 sages. The word ישראל is presumed to mean the Court which is unique to Israel, i.e. the Court comprising 71 judges. The word ישגו teaches that the legislation introduced here applies only if the Court erred in its judgment and the people acted upon that error in judgment. If the members of the Court themselves acted upon their faulty judgment this is still no reason to apply the legislation stated in this paragraph seeing that the Torah writes הקהל ועשו, "and the community did accordingly." Thus far the <i>Torat Kohanim</i>.
  A moral-ethical approach to this verse considers the word ישגו as referring to Israeli society committing moral errors and departing from Jewish norms. As a result of such conduct it would follow that the Jewish Supreme Court will also hand down faulty judgments as the judges and their Torah knowledge reflect the level of the people whom they represent. They are to blame for the people straying as they had not used their authority in controlling public morals. It had been their duty to discipline the individuals who were responsible for a trend away from traditional Jewish values. We have the example of Abbaye in <i>Gittin</i> 60, who erred in a ruling as he had not first obtained permission from his teacher to issue a ruling. We have been told this specifically in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 5.
  
  Verse 14
  
  
  
  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
  
  
  Verse 18
  
  
  
  Verse 19
  
  
  
  Verse 20
  
  
  
  Verse 21
  
  
  
  Verse 22
  
   אשר נשיא יחטא, When the prince (or king) commit an error, etc. This includes a situation where the ruler acted on the basis of a decision handed down by a properly constituted court. As long as the court is not guilty of a sin-offering on account of its decision, the ruler has to bring a a male goat as a sin-offering (Maimonides <i>Hilchot Shigegot</i> 15,8).
  
  Verse 23
  
   או הודע אליו חטאתו, or he has become aware of his inadvertent sin, etc. The Torah here writes "or" seeing in the previous verse it had written ואשם, that he was definite about having sinned. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> concludes that the ruler has to bring an אשם תלוי, a conditional sin-offering, if he is in doubt about having committed the sin in question. Our verse may discuss a situation where after having first offered an אשם תלוי while he was in doubt, the ruler now has to offer a definitive sin-offering as he is now certain that he committed the sin he had been in doubt about.
  
  Verse 24
  
  
  
  Verse 25
  
  
  
  Verse 26
  
  
  
  Verse 27
  
   ואם נפש אחת תחטא, And if anyone of the common people sin through error, etc. The letter ו at the beginning of the word ואם connects this paragraph to the rules established in the previous paragraphs concerning the details of the procedures.
  מעם הארץ, amongst the common people, etc. <i>Horiot</i> 11 teaches that this excludes the High Priest if the latter erred without there having been an erroneous decision handed down by the High Court. In such an event the High Priest does not even have to bring a female goat as a sin-offering to atone for his error. Exegetes also use the letter ם in the word מעם to exclude culpability of a ruler in the event he ate half (part) of the minimum amount of a forbidden food whereas he had eaten the other half before becoming the ruler. The method of exegesis is based on the words מעם הארץ being superfluous in the first instance; the words נפש כי תחטא would have been quite sufficient. The expression is therefore used to exclude prominent individuals such as the High Priest. The additional letter ם is now also available for exegesis "dividing" the concept of עם הארץ. Hence the exegete applies it to a commoner who has consumed part of a forbidden amount of blood, for instance, and was subsequently elevated to the status of king or High Priest before he ate the second part of that blood which constituted an amount for which one is culpable of bringing a sin-offering. The extraneous letter teaches us that such a High Priest or King does not have to bring a sin-offering.
  בעשותה, when she (the נפש) has performed it (the sin). This word is extraneous and <i>Torat Kohanim</i> interprets it both restrictively and inclusively. It is used restrictively to teach that if the person who committed the sin did so as a result of carrying out a ruling handed down by the High Court, he is exonerated. He has to bring the sin-offering mentioned in our verse only if he acted in accordance with his own opinion. The Torah had to state this separately because I might have thought that when the Torah legislated the bullock as a sin offering in verse 14, only people who committed that sin as a result of having heard of the High Court's decision would be covered by it, but that if an individual had not heard of that ruling and had nonetheless committed the same sin he would have to bring the she-goat as a sin-offering; the Torah therefore wrote בעשותה that he is to bring the personal sin-offering only if he had acted on his own and there was no faulty ruling by the High Court. The word בעשותה is interpreted inclusively in the event that the individual complied with the High Court's faulty ruling though he was well enough versed in Torah to know that the ruling was faulty. In such a case he cannot shield himself behind the High Court's ruling but has to offer a personal sin-offering of a she-goat for having acted against his better judgment. His sin-offering then is in addition to the bullock prescribed in verse 14. Had the Torah written only בעשות, I would have interpreted it only as inclusive; seeing the Torah added the letter ה at the end, I can also use it restrictively, i.e. only in such a case and not in any other case. When you reflect on this you will understand the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> correctly.
  
  Verse 28
  
  
  
  Verse 29
  
  
  
  Verse 30
  
  
  
  Verse 31
  
  
  
  Verse 32
  
   ואם כבש יביא קרבנו, And if he bring a lamb for his offering, etc. Why did the Torah have to make two separate paragraphs out of verses 27-31 and 32-35? Why did the Torah not simply state in the previous paragraph that the individual inadvertent sinner who is the subject in both paragraphs has the choice of bringing either a ewe or a she-goat to serve as his sin-offering? This would have eliminated the need for the entire paragraph commencing with verse 32? I believe that the reason why the Torah chose to write a separate paragraph is the same as why the Torah saw fit to write the paragraph starting with 3,6-11 and a separate paragraph commencing with 3,11-17 when the peace-offering consists of a she-goat. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on 3,12 (item 185) explained all that. In our instance when the Torah speaks of sheep and goats as sin-offerings rather than as peace-offerings as in chapter three, the Torah (4,31) speaks of separating and burning up on the altar all of the fat of the she-goat sin-offering, comparing it with 3,9 where the fat-tail of sheep is included in the parts to be burned up as a peace-offering. In the case of a sin-offering consisting of a sheep, all of the fat parts are to be offered on the altar (4,35) including the fat-tail. We could not have derived the legislation pertaining to voluntary peace-offerings from legislation describing what is to be done with the same kind of animal when it is offered as a mandatory sin-offering.
  Concerning the words וסמך את ידו, that the owner- sinner has to place his weight on the sin-offering prior to its being slaughtered, something that I would have derived from the same rule pertaining to the she-goat sin-offering, <i>Torat Kohanim</i> uses the superfluous words as applying to sin-offerings by a Nazirite or a person struck with <i>Tzora-at</i> after he has been declared healed. Both of these people have to bring a mandatory sin-offering at the end of the term of Nazirism or when the affliction has disappeared (compare Numbers 6,14, and Leviticus 14,11). In either instance the Torah did not mention the need for the person who obtains atonement by means of that offering to perform the rite of placing his weight on the animal. Therefore, the superfluous words וסמך ידו in our verse are used as applicable to those sin-offerings.  ושחט אותה לחטאת, and he is to slaughter it to be a sin-offering. <i>Zevachim</i> 7 derives from these words that the act of slaughtering must be accompanied by the intent that the animal in question become a sin-offering. This is another detail which could only have been derived by the repetition of this sentence. In the previous paragraph these words were needed for the plain meaning of the verse. You may learn from this verse that this rule applies both to the sin-offering of a she-goat and that of a ewe. במקום אשר ישחט את העולה, in the place where he (the priest) is to slaughter the burnt-offering. <i>Zevachim</i> 48 asks: "whence do I know that the sin-offering had to be slaughtered on the northern side of the altar? Answer: Leviticus 4,33." The Talmud goes on to ask: "granted that this is true of the slaughtering; whence do I know that this is not only an initial requirement but is mandatory? Answer: "from the additional and otherwise superfluous words במקום אשר ישחט את העולה." Again we have proof that the verse had to be written in two separate paragraphs (29 and 33). The Talmud there goes on to demonstrate that this requirement applies as a mandatory requirement to all categories of sin-offerings.  מדם החטאת, from the blood of the sin-offering, etc. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives from this superfluous repetition (compare verse 30) that the receiving of the blood into the receptacle provided for this was mandatory. The same kind of exegesis is used to derive <i>halachot</i> from every single repetition in these two paragraphs.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   כי תחטא, if one sins, etc. Why did the Torah have to introduce this paragraph with the words ונפש כי תחטא ושמעה?, It would have sufficed to write ונפש כי תשמע. Perhaps the reason is that the person who is the subject of this paragraph is one who had previously denied knowing of testimony which could result in an accused's exoneration. When he does so a second time, he proves that he had already incriminated himself previously. The Torah alludes to this state of affairs by writing נפש כי תחטא, someone who has already sinned, etc. The fact that the potential witness had lied already previously is accounted as a sin. All of this is confirmed by the letter ו the beginning of the word ונפש, at the start of this paragraph.
  We may also explain the wording based on <i>Shavuot</i> 30 where we learn of the culpability of someone who denied under oath that he knew testimony (concerning return of a loan being claimed by the creditor) and was aware that he would be guilty of offering a sin-offering even if he had denied testimony only inadvertently, but said person did not know that he had to bring a sin-offering for his perjury. If he did not know that he was culpable for the denial under oath of such testimony though he was aware that he lied, he is not guilty of such a sin-offering. Rashi explains that the Talmud means that only if the accused was unaware that he knew testimony that would help the creditor and was unaware of any penalty for withholding such testimony would he be free from bringing a sin-offering. Maimonides writes in chapter 1 of his <i>Hilchot Shavuot</i> that the definition of an inadvertent sin involving an oath concerning testimony is that the witness was unaware that refusal to testify to something one had knowledge of results in such a witness having to bring a sin-offering, whereas that same person is aware that his oath is sinful and that he perjures himself by swearing it. We note therefore that in order to be guilty of bringing the sin-offering the person had to be aware that his action was both forbidden and a lie. When the Torah writes: ונפש כי תחטא the meaning is that regardless of whether the denial was intentional or unintentional the culprit is aware that he commits a sin; the Torah thereby excludes a person who was unaware of the sin or had forgotten that he had witnessed what he is accused of having witnessed is not obligated to render the oath mentioned in our verse. The <i>Zohar</i> understands this verse as referring to the warnings issued by G'd to the soul which descends into this deceitful world when entering man's body.
  ושמעה קול אלה, when he heard a public imprecation, this is explained by the following statement in the <i>Mishnah</i> on folio 30 in tractate <i>Shavuot:</i> "Culpability for this kind of oath exists both when the guilty party swore in the presence of the court or without the presence of a court provided he volunteered the oath. If, however, he merely denied such knowledge without swearing to his denial or saying "Amen," confirming what was put to him, he is not culpable until he had specifically denied his knowing testimony in the presence of a court. So far the view of Rabbi Meir. The other rabbis hold that there is no culpability for a false oath be it in the presence of a court or otherwise unless the perjurer had specifically denied his knowledge of testimony in the presence of a court in so many words, i.e. that he did not know of any testimony which would help the accused. From the above we note that in the view of Rabbi Meir culpability does not depend on what the accused actually said but on what he heard. Hearing a request to testify by the court and failing to do so brings in its wake culpability, i.e. ושמעה קול אלה, as long as he has heard the request to render an oath.
  The view of the other rabbis is explained by the ראב"ד and later authorities as follows: If the perjurer heard the demand to testify regardless of whether this was in the presence of a court or not, he is culpable if he denied knowledge even if he did not say "Amen," as long as his denial occurred in the presence of a court even at a different time than that when the demand to render an oath was made upon him. Again, the determining factor in his guilt is the fact that he failed to respond to a request to testify which he had heard with his ears.
  Although Maimonides rules in accordance with the view expressed by the majority of the rabbis that the denial must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer to be culpable, he disagrees by saying that in order to be culpable in the absence of a court the accused must have at least said "Amen." (compare his rulings in chapter 9 ruling 1 and in chapter 10 ruling 17). This means that he holds that a denial in the absence of a court does not result in culpability unless the potential witness had uttered the word "Amen" in response to a statement suggesting that he had no knowledge of such testimony. ראב"ד disagrees with Maimonides claiming that one cannot rule according to Rabbi Meir. Furthermore, it is not clear why either according to Rabbi Meir or according to the other rabbis it should matter that the court is present at the time the potential witness denies under oath that he has any such knowledge as he is accused of having. Thus far the words of the ראב"ד. The author of כסף משנה adds that he has no idea about Maimonides' source for distinguishing between a denial in the presence of the court and a similar denial in the absence of a court.
  I believe that Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagreed only in a situation in which the potential witness volunteered his oath outside the confines of a court and did not deny any knowledge in the presence of the court at all. According to Rabbi Meir he would be guilty of perjury seeing Rabbi Meir derives this from a different kind of oath called שבועת הפקדון. Just as someone who denies having received money or objects on trust and he does so at his own behest he is guilty of perjury even if such an oath did not take place in the presence of a court. The other rabbis adhere to the principle known as דון מינה ואוקי באתרא, that one may derive the essential parts of one legislation and apply it to a different type of legislation without applying all the details pertaining to the legislation which serves as the source of the exegesis. [The principle is explained by Rashi in <i>Shevuot</i> 31. Ed.] In situations where the supposed witness is challenged to testify by third parties but not in the presence of a court, and the supposed witness declares that he does not know any such testimony, he does not have to bring a sin-offering even if he subsequently admits before a court that he had lied. When such a lie had occurred in front of a court and is subsequently retracted, the liar is guilty of the sin-offering according to all the rabbis.
  Maimonides holds that any oath which is not sworn to in the presence of a court needs to be initiated by the person who swears it in order for him to be guilty of perjury and the sin-offering which is required. He derives this rule from the following words in the <i>Mishnah</i> quoted in <i>Shevuot</i> 31: "What is meant by the term שבועת העדות, "an oath concerning testimony?" If a party said to two others: "please testify on my behalf that you have been witnesses to a certain occurrence;" if the two people in question reply: "we swear we have no such knowledge," or if they simply say: "we do not know anything about the matter you want us to testify to (without volunteering an oath)" and the first party challenges them to confirm this on oath and they confirm it by saying "Amen," they are guilty of perjury. If the person demanding such an oath repeated his request five times but never in the presence of a court, and received a negative answer each time and both parties subsequently come to court where the ones who had denied their knowledge five times now admit that they did have knowledge, they are not guilty concerning their previous denials. If they deny their knowledge also in front of the court and are subsequently found to have lied, they are guilty of a sin-offering for every previous denial separately. Thus far the <i>Mishnah</i>. We note that according to the text of the <i>Mishnah</i> the witnesses had said "Amen." Who is the author of that <i>Mishnah?</i> If it is Rabbi Meir and there was no subsequent denial in the presence of a court we would have a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis in the previous <i>Mishnah</i> followed by this <i>Mishnah</i> in which all rabbis are agreed. We are entitled to view this anonymous <i>Mishnah</i> as reflecting the opinion of Rabbi Meir, seeing he is not quoted as diagreeing. Seeing that Maimonides demanded that the perjurer must have first denied his knowledge in front of a court before becoming liable for the sin-offering even if his original denial had been at his own initiative, it is clear that he interpreted the <i>Mishnah</i> according to the consensus of the Rabbis. The <i>Mishnah</i> spoke of the perjurers having said "Amen." When did they do so? When they were not in the presence of a court, for if they had denied their knowledge in front of the court they would have been guilty of perjury according to all opinions even without having uttered the word "Amen" as confirmation of an oath. It emerges that according to the view of the majority of rabbis the word "Amen" is the minimum required for such potential witnesses to become guilty of perjury when not in the presence of a court. [At any rate our author has succeeded in demonstrating that Maimonides did not rule according to a minority view so that the complaint of ראב"ד is not in place. Ed.]
  Tossaphot, aware of an imprecision in the text of the <i>Mishnah</i>, state that this is due to the <i>Mishnah's</i> attempt to be brief; this is true if we were to assume that the alternative would have been for the perjurers to have said: "we do not know of any testimony we can offer on your behalf." Maimonides does not agree with this but holds that any oath sworn outside a court must be volunteered, i.e. the perjurer must have recited the substance of his oath with his own words. His reason is that the Torah discusses an occurrence in front of a court as we know from the words אם לוא יגיד, "if he will not reveal it." Only in such a situation is it enough for the perjurer to have merely heard the demand to testify, i.e. ושמעה קול for him to become guilty without uttering the substance of what he denies.
  <i>Shevuot</i> 32 asks: "whence do we know that the denial of the witnesses's knowledge must have occurred in the presence of the court so that he would only then be guilty for such denial (perjury)?" Abbaye answered there that we derive this from the words ואם לוא יגיד, "if he refuses to testify," and that these words only make sense in a setting in which one normally testifies, i.e. a court. Rabbi Papa counters that if we were to accept the exegetical comment by Abbaye we would come to the conclusion that even an oath freely volunteered but not within the confines of a court would not be subject to the laws of perjury seeing that it was not sworn at a place defined as one designated to hear testimony? This argument is rejected in light of a <i>Baraitha</i> which interprets the word לאחת, "one of" in 5,4 to mean that the party who has become guilty of perjury is liable for each violation separately. If we were to assume that any oath must be sworn only in front of a court in order for one to become guilty of perjury, why would we have to be told that if the perjurer perjured himself five times in the presence of a court (on the same subject) he needs to bring only a single sin-offering? It follows that an oath may be sworn to also outside a court, whereas the denial must have taken place in front of a court for the perjurer to be liable. All this teaches that the oath which is sworn in the presence of the court is identical to the one sworn outside the court, and that one is certainly liable for perjury if one had sworn falsely outside the court. Having accepted this, it makes no difference if the party who is the subject in our verse was sworn by others in the presence of the court or elsewhere. 
  This is important if we want to understand Maimonides' source for his ruling. The use of the word לאחת which we quoted to mean that the perjurer is liable for every previous denial is really problematical; after all, 5,4 speaks of שבועת בטוי [undertakings by a person on oath to either do something or not do something. Ed.]. How can we apply the rules which pertain to such an oath to the type of oath discussed in 5,1? The two types of oath are so dissimilar that we would need an exegetical instrument to permit us to derive הלכות applicable to the one kind of oath to the other! We are forced to conclude that the only situation in which the two oaths are comparable is when the שבועת העדות, the oath concerning testimony, has been entered into voluntarily just as the שבועת בטוי discussed in 5,4. In the case where the potential witness only responded to a challenge to deny his knowledge on oath there is no way we can derive a הלכה applicable to שבועת בטוי as applicable also to שבועת העדות. This is why Maimonides derives culpability in the case of שבועת העדות only when such denial occurred in the presence of the court. He saw no way of proving culpability of שבועת העדות which was imposed by the creditor on the supposed witnesses by comparison to culpability of the person who swore a שבועת בטוי. Let us now return to Rabbi Papa's suggestion that if we were to use Abbaye's interpretation of the words לוא יגיד, we would have to conclude that every oath has to be sworn in the presence of a court in order for someone to legally incriminate himself as guilty of perjury! We do not find that Abbaye rejected Rabbi Papa's conclusion! He only rejected Rabbi Papa's exegetical proof. This means that Abbaye agreed with Rabbi Papa that culpability for שבועת העדות, the denial of knowledge as a witness which is the result of the creditor initiating the formula of the oath, must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer having to offer a sin-offering. Thus Abbaye's view is identical with the ruling of Maimonides.
  According to all the foregoing we may interpret the words ושמעה קול אלה as referring to the perjurer having denied knowledge of what he had been invited to confirm even if he did not say "Amen." This must have taken place in the presence of a court as we derived from the words אם לוא יגיד. In the event he denied his knowledge by uttering an oath, he would also be liable for another aspect of this oath, the one that we derive from the גזרה שוה of the word תחטא occurring both here and in connection with the שבועת פקדון, (5,21) an oath in which one swears not to have been guilty of carelessness or other trespass involving an object entrusted to one to keep on behalf a third party, providing the denial occurred in court. As to the conclusion of the Talmud on <i>Shevuot</i> 32 that oaths may be sworn outside the court and result in the penalty for perjury, this refers to that kind of oath, i.e. someone denying that he had dealt treacherously with his fellow man's property while in fact having done so. [The unnecessary repetition of the word תחטא in those two paragraphs is the exegetical basis for learning across from one kind of oath to another. Ed.].
  We have now completely understood the way Maimonides interprets our verse. Our verse speaks of a single scenario namely that the creditor beseeches the witness to testify on his behalf in court and the (so-called) witness refuses to respond while in court. Both the two requirements mentioned in our verse are mandatory in order for the witness to become guilty of the sin-offering. 1) The attempt to make the witness deny on oath must occur in court, whereas if the denial occurred outside the court it does not result in a sin-offering even if at a different time the same witness had denied this in court. 2) The denial has to take place while the party denying is in court. If that were not the case the liar would not even be guilty of the sin-offering if he had volunteered a false oath outside the court as we derive from the comparison with the שבועת פקדון and the words תחטא that he would not be guilty. In the event that the denial occurred in the court whereas the oath had been sworn outside the court, we derive from the comparison with שבועת בטוי that if the perjurer had uttered the words of the oath himself that he is culpable for swearing a false oath. Anyone studying this carefully will agree that Maimonides' ruling is most illuminating and is fully supported by the text of our paragraph.
  
  Verse 2
  
  
  
  Verse 3
  
  
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
   ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה, if he is unable to afford a lamb, etc. This means that the individual in question can afford to present more than the two turtle-doves which are the next cheaper sin-offering and burnt offering the Torah demands of him. As long as he is not able to afford a lamb as his sin-offering, he is allowed to offer the bird-offerings designated for a needy person.
  The word ידו is interpreted by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> to mean that the individual in question does not have to borrow money to enable him to purchase a lamb for his sin-offering. Neither do we tell such a person to work harder in order to earn the money necessary to purchase the lamb. The reason for this is the principle חביבה מצוה לשעתה, it is important to perform a commandment at the time it is due rather than to perform it somewhat later but in a more perfect manner (based on <i>Pessachim</i> 68). <i>Torat Kohanim</i> describes the alternatives as follows: "the meaning of the words "if his means do not suffice for a lamb" is that even if the individual in question owned a lamb but he did not have the wherewithal for his elementary needs, i.e. for clothing, food or shelter, he is considered as if he did not have a lamb to offer. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives this from the expression די שה, "sufficient to afford to offer a lamb."
  I have seen a comment by Rabbeynu Hillel who defines "his needs" as referring to the lamb for the offering which this individual does not possess. <i>Halachah</i> demands that the owner of the lamb personally bring it to the courtyard of the Temple, etc. This explanation seems rather forced seeing it does not take more effort or time to bring a lamb to the Temple than it takes to take two turtle-doves to the Temple. If the Rabbi referred to the effort to bring a relatively sizable lamb to the Temple, let him bring the money instead and purchase it from the Temple-treasury. If Rabbeynu Hilel referred to the need to perform סמיכה on the lamb, something that need not be performed on the birds, this too is no argument as the performance of סמיכה is an initial requirement only; the requirement is not mandatory so that failure to perform it would invalidate the offering. Why should such an individual rather not bring the offering required of him and instead bring the offering designated for a needy person? We have learned at the end of tractate <i>Nega-im</i> (14,12) that if a well-to-do person offered the sin-offering designated for a poor person he has not fulfilled his obligation. The same applies to all the offerings commonly known as קרבן עולה ויורד, offerings which vary in value with the economic situation that the person who has to offer a sin-offering finds himself in. Maimonides also rules this way in <i>Hilchot Shega-got</i> chapter 10. The requirement of placing one's weight on the lamb is only meant to enhance the commandment and does not in any way interfere with the atonement value of the offering for the sinner in question as we know from <i>Zevachim</i> 6.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> interprets the words "if she cannot afford a lamb" in Leviticus 12,8 where the need for a woman who gave birth to bring a sin-offering is discussed, as follows: "If she owns a lamb but does not have her basic needs, how do I know that she need only bring the offering designated for a poor person?" Answer: "The Torah writes די שה, sufficient for a lamb." The reason <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had to use these words there in the same sense as in Leviticus 12,8 is that one of the offerings of a mother who has given birth is a burnt-offering and such burnt-offering requires to be accompanied by a drink-offering נסכים. This drink-offering is mandatory. Had the Torah not written די שה in that verse I could not have derived this meaning from our verse where we discussed an offering that is purely a sin-offering. As a result of such considerations, why did the Torah not merely write these words in Leviticus 12,8 and I would have applied them here also? There was no need to tell us that the sinner may forego the need for סמיכה, as we could have applied a קל וחומד, an inference from minor to major; if in the case of a sin-offering which does not involve a mandatory drink-offering, a person who owns a lamb but does not have money for his basic needs is allowed to bring the sin-offering applicable to a poor person in its place, then a mother who finds hereself in a similar economic situation and who would have to find the means for an additional drink-offering most certainly would be allowed to offer a poor person's offering instead, and I would not need additional superfluous words for such exegesis. I believe therefore that I was right. As long as the sinner has more than enough for two birds but not enough for a lamb, he is entitled to bring the offering designated for a poor person. <i>Korban Aharon</i> supports my interpretation.
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
   מחטאתו אשר הטא, concerning the sin which he committed, etc. In connection with the offering by a rich man the Torah writes: מחטאתו, whereas when describing the parallel offering by a poor man the Torah writes: מחטאתו אשר חטא. Why the difference between these descriptions? <i>Torat Kohanim</i> item 343, elaborating on verse 13 which deals with the sin-offering to be brought by the poorest of the poor, claims that I might have thought that the value of the various sin-offerings was determined by the relative severity of the sin it was to atone for; in order to disabuse us of such thinking the Torah wrote מאחת מאלה, that either kind of sin-offering could atone for either kind of sin and that what determined the kind of sin-offering was only the economic situation of the sinner. The reason for this comment is the fact that this paragraph deals with three distinctly different kinds of sins for which sin-offerings have to be brought. We have the sin of someone who is ritually impure introducing impurity into the Temple precincts (5,2), a sin which carries the <i>Karet</i> penalty if committed intentionally. This is the most severe sin for which a sin-offering is acceptable. We have the sin (5,1) of perjury committed by someone who withholds relevant testimony on behalf of a fellow Jew, a sin which is punishable by a sin-offering either if committed inadvertently or if committed intentionally. This sin is less severe than the one which preceded it, though it is more severe than the one involving שבועת בטוי an undertaking accompanied by an oath to do or not to do something and the failure to honour one's undertaking. This sin is listed in the Torah (5,5) after the שבועת העדות as it is relatively minor. Violation of שבועת בטוי is punishable by a sin-offering only if it occurred inadvertently. As a result of these distinctions I could have thought that different sins require sin-offerings of different value in relation to the severity of the sin. Therefore the Torah tells us in verse 13 that the value of the sin-offering is not related to the nature of the sin but to the ability of the sinner to afford the offering in question.
  The hypothesis that we could have misunderstood the intent of the Torah unless the Torah had written the words מאחת מאלה in verse 13 is baffling. After all, the Torah had spoken specifically of the sinner's inability to afford a certain kind of offering in our verse! This made it abundantly clear that the kind of sin-offering to be brought was not determined by the kind of sin but by the economic status of the sinner! Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi suggests in his commentary on verse 13, that the words מחטאתו אשר חטא were needed to prevent us from misinterpreting the words ואם לא תגיע ידו to mean that if the sinner's "hand" had not "touched" i.e. been guilty of committing a trespass involving the need to offer a sheep as a sin-offering, but had been guilty only of a minor trespass, that such a sinner has to bring the sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves. If the sinner had not even been guilty of a sin severe enough to require a sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves, then he has to bring only a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering." The words מחטאתו אשר חטא were written after the Torah discussed a lesser of the three categories of sin mentioned in our paragraph i.e. שבועת העדות, so that we would not err and think that the sin-offering consisting of turtle-doves is applicable only for atonement of the sin of שבועת העדות, but not to any of the categories of sin dealt with in this paragraph. Rabbi Mizrachi elaborates with further examples which we need not repeat here. I believe that his approach is very forced, seeing it is hard to imagine someone misinterpreting the words ואם לא תשיג ידו as referring to a greater sin.
  Perhaps <i>Torat Kohanim</i> was prompted by the following consideration: If the Torah had not written the words מאחת מאלה, I would have thought that if someone committed the most severe of the sins listed in this paragraph, the bringing of impurity into the precincts of the Tabernacle, the only kind of sin-offering acceptable from such a sinner would be a four-legged animal, a ewe. As to the line in verse 7: "if he cannot afford a lamb he should bring two turtle-doves, etc," this alternative does not apply except in the case where he was guilty of the lesser offence such as שבועת העדות which, because of the relatively milder nature of the sin, requires less in the way of atonement. If someone were to argue that the Torah's concession to the sinner extended even to a poor man guilty of bringing a sin-offering consisting of a sheep for a more serious offence, let him prove his case! Similarly, when the Torah wrote in verse 11 ואם לא תשיג ידו לשתי תורים, that if the sinner cannot afford two turtle-doves that he should bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering, I would have assumed that the Torah made this concession in a case where the sinner was guilty of only the least severe of the sins mentioned in this paragraph, the sin of שבועת בטוי. I would not have assumed that such a meal-offering could serve as a sin-offering for the sin of שבועת העדות which is more severe than שבועת בטוי. It would most certainly not suffice to achieve atonement for the severe sin of bringing impurity into the confines of the Holy Tabernacle. I would have been confirmed in this attitude by the fact that in all the sins listed by the Torah up to now where sin-offerings are called for the Torah never offered the concession of a bird or meal-offering replacing a sin-offering consisting of a four-legged animal. I would have reasoned "why should the Torah deal so leniently with someone guilty of a sin which carries the <i>Karet</i> penalty?" I would have assumed that the inexpensive sin-offering was certainly acceptable only for the lesser sins. I would have reasoned as follows: The wealthy person has to bring a four-legged animal as his sin-offering regardless of the relative severity or mildness of his sin. The Torah made a concession to the poor if he happened to have been guilty of the sin of שבועת העדות, in which case he could bring the turtle-doves. If he had been guilty of the sin of bringing impurity into the Tabernacle however, the Torah did not exempt him from the rule applicable to sin-offerings in נפש כי תחטא בשגגה, described in chapter four. If a person is destitute and committed only the sin of שבועת בטוי, the Torah relents and allows him to offer a sin-offering consisting only of a meal-offering. If that same destitute person was guilty of the sin of שבועת העדות, which is more severe, he cannot absolve his guilt by offering only a meal-offering as his sin-offering. This is the major error I could have made unless the Torah had written the words מאחת מאלה in verse 13. By means of these two words the Torah placed all the sins in the same category to teach us that the meal-offering as a sin-offering is acceptable to G'd provided the sinner is so destitute that he cannot even afford to bring two turtle-doves. This is what the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had in mind when he wrote: "I could have thought, etc." When he wrote that "we would have made a division in comparing the mild sins to the severe sins," this is an error; the text there should have read: "the severe sins to the milder sins."
  Another method of explaining the words of the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is by remembering that the paragraph deals with three separate sins and I notice that the Torah also describes three different kinds of sin-offerings. I would assume that the Torah arranged the list of the sin-offerings in keeping with the type of sins they are to atone for. The Torah therefore commences with the sin-offering to be offered in respect of the most severe of these three sins by saying that the sinner has to offer a female sheep. In the event that the sinner in question could not afford that, he should bring the kind of offering that would be appropriate for the sin mentioned by the Torah prior to this one, i.e. the sin of שבועת העדות. The sin-offering should consist of two birds regardless of the sinner's economic situation, whereas the sin-offering consisting of such birds would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of bringing impurity into the Temple only if the sinner was poor. The words ואם לא תשיג ידו, "if he cannot afford even a bird-offering" in verse 11 apply to the sin-offering if one was guilty of שבועת העדות, for which the regular sin-offering consists of two turtle-doves. If the sinner could not afford this, he would be allowed to bring the sin-offering appropriate for the next milder sin, i.e. שבועת בטוי. 
  As a result of such reasoning the sin-offering appropriate to atone for שבועת בטוי would be the least expensive one, a meal-offering, even if the offender were a wealthy individual. Similarly, a wealthy individual would be allowed to bring only a bird-offering for the sin of שבועת העדות even if he were well to-do. If he were especially poor however, he would only have to bring the meal-offering. If someone were guilty of bringing impurity into the Tabernacle and he is well to-do, he will have to bring a sheep or goat; if he is poor he would bring turtle-doves but not a meal-offering. This is what the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> meant when he wrote that the serious ones would be atoned for by a sheep. He meant that only in respect of the serious sins were sheep required as the sin-offering. No sheep as a sin-offering would be called for in respect of minor sins such as the two types of oaths even if the people who had committed these offences were wealthy individuals. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> did not worry that you might misinterpret what the Torah wrote and think that only a sheep or goat would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of impurity seeing that the Torah had written in the verse following the requirement to offer a sheep: "if he is unable to afford a sheep, etc. (compare verses 6 and 7)." However, the Torah had to tell us that whereas the less serious offences (the oaths) did not require a sheep or goat as a sin-offering, they did require bird-offerings. The bird-offerings themselves are required only for the sin of שבועת העדות, whereas the sin of שבועת בטוי can be atoned for by a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> also did not worry that someone might think that it would not be acceptable under any circumstances to try and atone for the sin of שביעת העדות with a meal-offering, seeing the Torah wrote immediately following the requirement to offer the bird-offerings: "if he is unable to afford this he may bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering" (compare verses 10 and 11). 
  As a result of all these considerations you would have concluded that 1) a sheep is only called for if the most severe of the three sins mentioned in this paragraph had been committed; 2) a bird-offering is called for in case the sin was relatively mild, but not in case it was the mildest of the three; 3) the appropriate sin-offering for the mildest of the three offences is the meal-offering. The most severe sin could not be atoned for by a mere meal-offering under any circumstances.
  [At this point the author devotes several pages to demonstrate why every line in the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is justified. The interested reader is referred to the original somewhat tedious presentation. Ed.]
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
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  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
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  Verse 21
  
   נפש כי תחטא, ומעלה מעל בשם, If someone sin and commit a trespass against the Lord, etc. Why did the Torah have to write the words כי תחטא here? It cannot mean that the sin referred to is a denial of the sin by the sinner seeing that the Torah already wrote וכחש בעמיתו, that the sinner denied having committed the trespass, i.e. having exploited his labourer by failing to pay him. Besides, why does the Torah in this instance describe the sinner as מעל בשם, "having committed a trespass against the Lord," words which have not appeared in any of the previous examples of sins committed? Why did the Torah have to add the word בעמיתו when writing וכחש בעמיתו? The meaning of the word is not clear.
  Perhaps the Torah wanted to inform us of three distinct wrongs committed by the sinner in question. 1) He appropriated to himself something which did not belong to him, i.e. an aspect of the sin of robbery. 2) ומעלה מעל בשם, the meaning of the words "against G'd" may imply that by trying to re-arrange the allocation of wealth to people other than those decreed by G'd, the sinner interfered with G'd's scheme of things. Hence the Torah describes him as having committed a trespass against G'd. By doing so, the sinner creates the impression that he denied G'd's justice and fairness in allocating wealth to different people at different times. It is even possible that the reason that the Torah repeats the expression, i.e. ומעלה מעל instead of merely saying ומעל includes the victim's impression of G'd's sense of justice and fairness. By the sinner having done what he did, he produces a feeling in the heart of the victim that G'd has allowed him to be victimised. This is an additional sin committed by the person described as guilty of "trespass." 3) The meaning of the words וכחש בעמיתו is that the sinner, i.e. the recipient of a loan who now denies to the lender that he had received it, accuses the righteous of being wicked when he makes it appear as if the lender was the liar. The exact meaning of the word בעמיתו is, that he puts his opposite number in the position of appearing to have stolen from the dishonest accuser. He has the nerve to challenge the person who extended a loan to him, and, instead of being grateful to him he makes him appear as a criminal. All of these three sins occur either when 1) someone has either received some deposit on trust, פקדון, or בתשומת יד, when he had a loan extended to him, the depositor not wanting a third party to know about it; or 2) when there is outright robbery, גזל;, or 3) עשק בעמיתו, when the sinner is guilty of withholding wages from his labourer and the like. When someone has found some object lost by a third party and denies it, the definition כחש בעמיתו does not apply, seeing he does not know who has lost it. This is the reason that the Torah wrote a separate verse to describe this example of wrongdoing.
  On the moral-ethical level, our paragraph also describes three negative effects on the soul of the sinner described here. 1) By accusing someone wrongly, the soul of the accuser loses some of its spiritual light; the expression נפש כי תחטא reflects this loss sustained by the soul itself. 2) the words ומעלה מעל בשם may be understood in kabbalistic terms. Every Jewish soul depends on continuous input from celestial forces called שפע נשמתו in order to sustain itself spiritually inside a body. The only soul which does not enjoy this continuous spiritual input is one whose נפש, the person it resides in, has become guilty of criminal sins which will result in its being deprived of the celestial spiritual input. This is what the Torah meant when it described the נפש being "cut off" in Genesis 17,14 as the consequence of a Jew ignoring the commandment to circumcise himself or be circumcised. The celestial spiritual input into our souls which we have described enters by means of two thin "threads" through a person's two nostrils as this is the area where the נפש is joined מקום דבקות, to its owner i.e. to G'd. This is what Moses meant when he said in Deut. 4,4: "all of you who have cleaved unto the Lord your G'd are alive as of this day." 
  If man commits the sins described in this paragraph his soul comes under the domination of the forces of evil. If the spiritual input from celestial sources were to continue, it would actually strengthen the forces of evil which have taken over in that person. When the Torah speaks of ומעלה מעל בשם, this describes such a process of strengthening him who trespassed against G'd. This is the mystical dimension of Proverbs 28,24: "Whoever robs his father and mother and says: 'it is no sin,' is a companion of a destroyer." Solomon means that inasmuch as this person makes common cause with evil, otherwise known as איש משחית, a destroyer, he has himself become a destroyer. 
  3) The denial of the truth by the individual in our paragraph impacts also on the community of Israel seeing that all of Israel are branches of one soul. If any branch of that soul becomes involved in evil this has repercussions on the entire people. This is the deeper meaning of the words וכחש בעמיתו, his denial extends to the members of his עם, his people. His people become כחש, "weak," through his sinful behaviour. This is exactly what Solomon referred to in the verse from Proverbs we have just quoted. <i>Berachot</i> 35 describes the word אמו in that verse as referring to the כנסת ישראל, the spiritual concept of the Jewish people, "mother Israel." The Jewish nation increases in spiritual power by means of its men of valour who contribute to it peace and harmony and who thereby assure it of life itself.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
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   צו את אהרון, "Command Aaron, etc." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> comments that the expression צו is always one which denotes a sense of urgency covering both the present and future generations. [I believe the meaning of "future generations" is that the commandment does not merely involve a one-time contribution such as the materials for the Tabernacle. Ed.]. Rabbi Shimon says that this expression is used especially when performance of the commandment involves personal expense. According to the first opinion quoted, the reason the expression צו is justified here more than elsewhere is because the legislation involving the burnt or total-offering involves also night-time activity, something which is not the case with any of the other offerings. The priests therefore had to be impressed with a special sense of urgency. We find a parallel passage in the Torah (Leviticus 24,2) where the expression צו is used in connection with the oil for the candlestick which was used primarily at night. That commandment also involved personal expense for the people contributing the oil. Aaron was commanded with those words, and the Torah reports in Numbers 8,3 that Aaron carried out the instructions to the letter. The word לדורות used by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> means that the rules laid down here after the word צו are not subject to change in the future. We encounter the following comment in <i>Pessikta</i> on our verse. "The need for the Torah to legislate with the word צו was based on the Israelites having said: 'in the past while we were wandering through the desert we used to offer daily communal burnt-offerings. Now that we have have stopped wandering, we will also discontinue the practice of these offerings.'" We see from the above that there was room for error as to the application of the daily תמידים offerings.
  As far as the חסרון כיס, the personal expense cited by Rabbi Shimon as the reason for the use by the Torah of the word צו in this instance is concerned, there are many interpretations as to what the Rabbi had in mind. Some say that Rabbi Shimon did not restrict his comment to when a commandment involved personal expense, but that he also referred to any commandment the fulfilment of which involved pain, discomfort, etc. to the person performing it. Others say that he included commandments which robbed the performer of his regular night's sleep or the work he would otherwise perform during that night. Others say that all the Israelites considered themselves as losing money when they observed the sacrificial animal being burned up and no one enjoying any part of it. Still others believe that Rabbi Shimon referred to the financial loss to the priest who would have preferred to officiate over a different offering, one from which he would have been able to eat at least a part. In the case of the burnt-offering the priest's share was limited to the skin of the animal. I consider all these interpretations of what Rabbi Shimon had in mind with his statement as missing the mark by a wide margin. 
  He may have referred to the pile of firewood which had to burn around the clock on the מזבח העולה, the altar for the burnt-offerings, as we know from <i>Yuma</i> 45. We are told there that the altar contained three separate piles of firewood, one of which was kept burning without any offerings being burned up on it. This was done in order to keep the fire going all night long. It seemed to the people that this was a waste of money. Hence the Torah used the word צו. Use of that word would preclude debate on that subject.
  There is another element which makes one think in terms of financial loss when one contemplates the procedures involving the burnt-offering. The Torah made a big fuss in connection with that offering. We read in verse 5 (after being told that the fire on the altar must not be allowed to go out): "and the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning and lay the burnt-offering on it." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> asks: "how do I know that no other offering could be offered up before the daily burnt-offering?" Answer: The Torah says עליה העולה, "the burnt-offering on [in addition to] it." We are told in the <i>Tossephta Pessachim</i> 4,2 that if any sacrifices were offered up prior to the daily burnt-offering of the morning they are automatically disqualified. This teaches that but for the burnt-offering all that precedes it is useless; this ruling has far-reaching consequences regarding the meaning of חסרון כיס, financial loss.
  Supposing some individual had brought a one year old male sheep to the Temple to offer it there as his burnt-offering. It happened to be early in the morning prior to the daily תמיד having been offered up. The individual is therefore told to wait for an hour until after the תמיד has been offered. We have a rule that when it comes to sacrificial offerings even hours make a difference. We derive this both from <i>Zevachim</i> 25 and <i>Bechorot</i> 39. [The male sheep used for the burnt-offering is not to be more than one year old. Normally, the day is considered a single unit, so that as long it was born on that date a year earlier it does not matter which part of the day. In this instance, if the sheep had been born on the same date the year before it had been offered up, but at an earlier hour than the time it was offered up, the extra hour would disqualify it as a potential burnt-offering. Ed.] The owner would suffer financial loss by not now being able to offer up his animal which had already been designated for a specific type of offering.
  The same rule which results in financial loss to the owner of a private burnt-offering applies if someone burned up the gift-offering prematurely. More importantly, during periods when Jerusalem was under siege and there were not always any sheep at hand, the automatic result would be that no other category of offering, be it cattle, sin-offerings consisting of goats or birds, or even meal-offerings, could be offered up on the altar seeing the daily תמיד had not been offered up. When you consider all this you will understand a report in <i>Baba Kama</i> 82 according to which the besieged Jews of Jerusalem lowered baskets full of golden coins to their besiegers in order to secure one or two sheep for the daily burnt-offering. [during a civil war about who should be king. Ed.] This was certainly an extreme example of the legislation of the daily burnt-offering causing substantial financial sacrifice to the people. Had the rule that the תמיד had to be the first offering on any day not existed, it is doubtful that the priests would have gone to such extremes in order to secure a single sheep.
  לאמור, to say. It is not clear to whom Aaron's sons were supposed to relay this legislation. If they were meant to do this for the benefit of future generations, we have already heard about this as being implied in the expression צו. If they were meant to tell the other Israelites so that these would prepare the animals for the offering as well as all the necessary tools to be used in connection with this as well as the wood for kindling, this had already been included in the words "G'd spoke to Moses לאמור." Why would I need a second לאמור?
  Perhaps G'd had told Moses to tell Aaron various exegetical details alluded to in the text He had dictated to Moses, seeing that the verse as it stands appears like a book sealed with seven seals. If you do find that our sages have offered many ingenious interpretations of the words in this verse, this was only because they already knew the actual הלכות and did not have to arrive at them by studying the text.
  Alternatively, seeing animals which ultimately could not be offered on the altar nonetheless were not removed from the altar once they had been placed on it --as pointed out expressly by <i>Torat Kohanim</i>,-- G'd had to inform Aaron that the priests must not allow animals unfit for sacrifice to be placed on the altar. The priests would have thought that the fact that such animals are not removed from the altar once they had been placed on it was proof that G'd did not really mind their being placed on the altar as long as they were not offered as a sacrifice. They would have reasoned that no special care had to be taken to prevent such animals from being placed on the altar. Therefore G'd commanded that only תורת עולה, an animal which corresponded in all details to the requirements of the עולה legislation was to be placed on the altar as such. This meant amongst other details that the animal could not have spent the previous night in the holy precincts, nor could it have been taken out of these precincts and been brought back there prior to slaughter.
  זאת תורת העולה, This is the law of the burnt-offering; Rabbi Yehudah in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> sees three separate restrictive clauses in this verse, i.e. the word זאת, the word היא and the letter ה in the word העולה the second time that word occurs. He reasons that the first restrictive clause is to forbid a burnt-offering being slaughtered at night; the second restrictive clause disqualifies a burnt-offering if its blood has been spilled to the ground and the extra letter ה which really limits the word עולה, if the blood had escaped beyond the hangings of the courtyard of the Tabernacle. If an animal which has been disqualified by one of the three reasons just mentioned had nevertheless been placed on the altar it must be removed.
  However, if the disqualification was merely due to the animal having spent the night within the Tabernacle without having been offered as a sacrifice, it need not be removed from the altar once it has been placed thereon. The same rule applies to sacrificial animals which had either become impure or had left the precincts of the Tabernacle after having been brought inside. Similarly, all other types of disqualifications do not result in the animal having to be removed from the altar once it has been placed on it, seeing that the word תורת is an inclusive one, it being unnecessary for the plain meaning of the text to be understood. The sequence זאת תורת העולה היא העולה means that once the animal has already become an עולה, i.e. placed on the altar, מוקדה, it is subject to the laws of the burnt-offering and cannot be disqualified unless the disqualification had occurred before it was placed on the altar. The altar "purifies" all the disqualified animals except for the three disqualifications mentioned at the beginning and derived from the exclusions in the text we mentioned. Unless it had wanted to teach us these additional הלכות we have pointed out, the Torah could have written merely תורת העולה על מוקדה.
  On the words היא העולה, Rashi comments that it excludes an animal which had sexual relations with a human being because such an animal was already disqualified before it entered the precincts of the Tabernacle. I do not know why Rashi preferred to explain the verse in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon rather than in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yehudah (whom we quoted in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>). [The author had not quoted Rabbi Shimon's view thus far though it appears in the same passage of Torat Kohanim as that of Rabbi Yehudah. Ed.]
  Furthermore, it would seem that Rashi did not pay careful attention to the words or letters which constitute the exegetically restrictive material. He did not refer to the restrictions deriving from the word זאת, but assumed them to derive from the words היא העולה. If Rashi indeed followed the method of Rabbi Shimon he should have derived the exclusion from the word זאת. Unlike Rabbi Yehudah who needed to find three different restrictive expressions, Rabbi Shimon does not have to look for a number of restrictive words or letters in our text seeing that he argues that all these disqualified animals have to be removed from the altar even if they have been on it already. If Rabbi Shimon did not learn that most or all the disqualified animals have to be removed from the altar even when they had already been placed on it, he would have to find many more restrictive expresssions than Rabbi Yehudah. We must therefore conclude that he derives the law that the disqualified animals need to be removed from the altar from a single restrictive expression. He holds that any animal whose disqualification occurred before it was slaughtered is automatically rejected by the altar. Seeing that he does not need more than a single restrictive clause, the <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Zevachim</i> 84 says that he used the word זאת as his restrictive clause.
  The question is therefore, whence does Rashi conclude that the exegetical source is the expression היא העולה? In <i>Horiyot</i> 2, the Talmud discusses the expression נפש אחת in 4,27, concluding that such expressions are restrictive. [The subject is the culpability of an individual who transgressed a law of the Torah that the High Court has declared permitted. The individual in question had not been aware of the High Court's decision but had acted on his own. Ed.] The Talmud assumes that the <i>Baraitha</i> quoted there reflects the view of Rabbi Yehudah. The Talmud challenges this assumption by asking that perhaps the example quoted in that <i>Baraitha</i> reflects the view of Rabbi Shimon? In answer to this question the Talmud is adamant that only Rabbi Yehudah adopted the exegetical approach that our verse contains a number of restrictive clauses such as היא העולה. You will note therefore that we cannot accuse Rashi of adopting Rabbi Shimon's approach.
  על מוקדה על המזבח כל הלילה, where it is burned up on the altar all night long, etc. These words are explained in <i>Zevachim</i> 85 as meaning that if these parts of a disqualified burnt-offering had been placed on the altar they are not to be removed from it, whereas if they had fallen off or been removed from it they are not to be placed upon the altar a second time. Ulla claims that this rule applies only to pieces of the disqualified burnt-offering which had not yet been "ruled" (thoroughly attacked) by the fire of the altar; if the pieces had been partially burned they may be put back on the altar. Although there is an opinion in the Talmud which holds that Ulla referred only to such items as bones, horns, and hooves which were still attached to the main body of the animal having fallen off the altar, the concensus of the Talmud is that Rabbi Chanina's dictum in the <i>Mishnah</i> which forms the background to Ulla's statement represented a disagreement only with the latter half of the <i>Mishnah</i>. He did not disagree with the opinion expressed in the earlier part of the <i>Mishnah</i> where it was stated that animals disqualified before they were even slaughtered are to be removed from the altar even if they had been placed on it by mistake and the fire had taken hold of them; [such animals had never qualified as food for the altar. Ed.]
  The Torah therefore wrote the words על מוקדה to inform us that once the fire had taken hold the animal is considered as food for the altar and is not to be removed. The Torah goes on to write the words על המזבח, to teach that even animals which had not yet begun to be consumed by the fire are also not to be removed if they fitted certain criteria. The Torah wrote what appeared to be the same law twice, as it distinguished between different kinds of disqualifications which a potential burnt-offering may undergo. על מוקדה means that once the fire took hold of the animal parts it may be put back on the altar regardless. The additional words על המזבח teach that the permission to leave such animals on the altar applies only because they had already been on it; 
  this is why the Torah had to write the words על מוקדה first before the words על המזבח, although under normal circumstances the word "altar" should have been mentioned first seeing it is the general location and מוקדה describes only the specific location on the altar. Instead, the Torah decided to describe first the circumstances when something which had become unfit may be placed on the altar a second time. It comprises parts which had already been suitable as food for the altar in the first place. This is why they may be put back on even if they had been taken off the altar. Afterwards the Torah describes a second category of disqualification which applies because the disqualified animal is already on the altar though it was not originally suitable as an offering; it need not be removed; however, if it was removed, it must not be put back on the altar a second time.
  We find a disagreement between Rabbi Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as to the implication of the words על המזבח. Rabbi Gamliel holds that if a potential sacrifice, even a drink-offering, had once been fit to be offered on the altar, it must not be removed from the altar under any circumstances, regardless of the kind of disqualification which occurred. Rabbi Yehoshua holds that the words על מוקדה teach that only such sacrifices as are intended to be burned up cannot be removed from the altar. Seeing that drink-offerings by definition are not burned up but poured out, the words על מוקדה do not refer to such offerings.
  On a moral-ethical plane we may consider this whole paragraph as an allusion to our present and final exile. The paragraph is designed to console us about the depressing conditions we find ourselves in. Inasmuch as the soul of every Israelite refuses to be comforted seeing our exile appears to be interminable, we are certainly in need of some comfort. At the time of this writing the exile has already lasted far longer than our previous exiles combined, (Egypt=400 years, Babylonia=70 years, whereas already 1672 years have passed since the destruction of the Temple). How much longer do we have to wait for redemption?! Besides, we do not only suffer from mere exile but from persecution, seeing that every country which hosts Jews discriminates against them and treats them as inferior. Whenever revolutions do occur amongst the Gentile Kingdoms this does not bode the Jews any good as the gentile politicians never speak to us with sincerity and their promises are only lies. The Torah, i.e. G'd, who has foreseen all things used this paragraph to inform Moses to urge the Israelites, and foremost amongst them the Torah scholars, notably the priests whose task it is to instruct the people in morality and ethics, to inform the people for all future times of the message contained here.
  זאת תורת העולה, the word זאת is an exclusion. The people are to be aware that there will not be an עולה=עליה an ascent comparable to the one mentioned in this paragraph. The Torah repeats who it is that will experience this ascent, i.e. הוא העולה, a reference to Song of Songs 3,6: מי זאת עולה מן המדבר, "who is this that ascends from the desert?" על מוקדה על המזבח "the ones who were burned up on the site for burning, on the altar;" The Torah refers to two details here; 1) that we are knowledgeable in Torah, i.e. זאת תורת העולה, something that does not exist amongst the Gentiles; 2) that we have endured many afflictions both by being in exile and by being impoverished. The word מוקדה is a reference to Torah, seeing Torah is often compared to fire; young Torah scholars are described in <i>Taanit</i> 4 as דרתח אוריתא, "we have to make allowances for the angry young Torah scholars as it is the fire of the Torah which causes their anger." When the Torah continues על המזבח, this is a reference to exile and all that is connected with it. The afflictions the Jewish people suffer in exile achieve for us what the sacrifices achieved on the altar, i.e. atonement for our sins. We find that the Talmud in <i>Berachot</i> 5 uses similar language to describe the purpose of יסורים, afflictions. The Torah therefore informs us here that there are two elements which will ensure our ascent to untold heights of good fortune, honour, etc. 
  The Torah also explains how long it will be until we will achieve this goal. We will achieve our goal in two stages, 1) כל הלילה, by means of enduring the whole night of exile; in Isaiah 21,11 the prophet already compared exile to night when he said: שומר מה מלילה שומר מה מליל. "Watchman what of the night, watchman what of the night?" as a reference to the duration of the exile. They also interpret Ruth 3,13: "stay the night until morning" in a similar vein. When "morning" arrives, G'd will pour over us His glory, etc. This time will arrive after the middle of the sixth millenium as we know from G'd's own words that 1000 years are equivalent to a "day" in His calendar (compare <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 8,2). Reason tells us that the first 500 years of that "day" are part of the "night" so that the time of the redemption will occur during the second five hundred years of that millenium. The words עד הבוקר in our verse make it plain that we cannot expect the ascent until some time during the latter 500 years of the present millenium. It was unclear from the time of the destruction of the Temple whether the "morning" referred to was the second half of the fifth millenium or the second half of the sixth millenium seeing that the Temple was destroyed in the latter half of the fourth millenium. G'd therefore revealed His secret by means of His prophets when Isaiah in chapter 33,3 spoke of "mornings." The verse reads: "Be their arm לבקרים, on mornings, also our deliverance in times of stress." Isaiah meant that if the deliverance does not occur on the first "morning," (i.e. the second half of the fifth millenium) it will surely occur during the second half of the sixth millenium. The word עד הבוקר is a reference to a "well known morning," i.e. the second one of these possible "mornings." Perhaps Isaiah even hinted in chapter 21,12 when he spoke about the morning having arrived and having been followed by another night, (without the redemption) that if Israel had been worthy it would have been redeemed already on the first of these two "mornings."
  When our sages claimed that no more than one day of exile had been decreed on the Jewish people, we may have to understand this in terms of Psalms 20,2: "The Lord will answer you on the day of trouble;" the "day" the Psalmist refers to being the "day" In G'd's calendar, i.e. 1.000 years in our calendar. According to this calculation the most that we would have have had to wait since the destruction of the Temple until redemption should have been 672 years, i.e. 172 years which were left in the fourth millenium when the Temple was destroyed plus the 500 years which represent the "night" of the fifth millenium. Upon the arrival of the "morning" of that half of the millenium the ultimate redemption should have materialised. Alas, due to the fact that our people have not rehabilitated themselves that "day" passed without our being redeemed. This was Isaiah's lament when he said in Isaiah 33,2: "O Lord, be gracious to us! It is to You we have looked." The word קוינו, "we have looked," refers to our hope to experience redemption on the first "morning" which has been disappointed. At any rate, the prophet continues, היה זרועם לבקרים, "be their arm on mornings," i.e. on the second morning after two nights of exile have passed.
  ואש המזבה תוקד בו, and the fire of the altar shall be kept burning thereby. The Torah informs us that when the dawn of that morning (of redemption) finally looms, G'd's anger will burn and consume all those who have tortured us during the many years of our exile and especially the Western nations [the Christians and their inquisition who tortured Spanish Jewry Ed.]. The words "and the fire of the altar" are an allusion to the many afflictions we have endured at the hands of the merciless Gentiles who did not have pity on us seeing G'd had already punished us for so many years. The word also recalls the self-sacrifice exhibited by Isaac when he lay bound on the altar. The word "altar" always conjures up the attribute of Justice in our minds. The mystical dimension of all these concepts is contained in the word תוקד, [also related to עקד =he bound. Ed.]
   ולבש הכהן מדו בד, and the priest will wear a linen garment; the Torah switches to allude to the attribute of Love and Mercy which has also been described by the word כהן. The Torah means that when that time arrives even such attributes as Love and Mercy will consent to G'd avenging the wrong done to the Jewish people by the nations of the world. (Compare my commentary on Exodus 6,2 on the words "He said to him: 'I am the eternal G'd.'") The words מדו בד may be understood in light of a comment by our sages that G'd makes a visible mark of the blood of any Jew who was killed because he was Jewish on His "garment." On the day when G'd goes out to exact retribution from our enemies He will wear that "garment" on His heart. The word מדו, recalls Bileam's statement that the Jewish nation עם לבדד ישכון, is "a nation which dwells in solitude" (Numbers 23,9); the root of that word is בד, i.e. that the very garments of the priest are a reminder of the Jewish people. The word is also a hint of the unity which was displayed by all the martyrs who died for the sake of Judaism, i.e. who refused to compromise G'd's unity by associating Him with any other religion.
  The Torah goes on to speak of ומכנסי בד, linen trousers, the word מכנסי from the root כנס, to enter, to join. This is a reference to the pagans who killed the leading Jews because they tried to introduce the concept of belief in G'd and in His uniqueness into the hearts of their fellow Jews. These are the very people who are most beloved by G'd; nothing separates them from G'd at all. The word מכנסי בד means that "this is what grants entry to the domain of G'd's uniqueness and unity." The additional word על בשרו "next to his skin," is an allegorical expression of the absolute affinity which exists between the martyrs for the Jewish faith we have mentioned and G'd Himself. The Torah uses the word על בשרו in a sense similar to Jeremiah 13,11: כי כאשר ידבק האזור אל מתני האיש כן הדבקתי אלי את כל בית ישראל; "for as the loincloth clings close to the loins of a man, so I brought close to Me the whole House of Israel, etc." The Torah employs anthropomorphical expressions to describe G'd in order to train our ears to assimilate certain concepts which are familiar to us, not in order to create the impression that G'd has a "body." In view of what these nations have done to these righteous Jews, G'd has sealed the decree of destruction of these wicked nations. 
  The Torah alludes to this in the words והרים את הדשן, "He will elevate the ashes." To the extent that the Gentile nations have reduced us to "ashes" by means of torture and persecution, G'd in turn will elevate these very ashes to unheard of heights. If you will examine the matter you will find that the persecution we have suffered during this exile is much worse than what we experienced during our slavery in Egypt. When the Jewish people were enslaved in Egypt, the Egyptians fed and clothed them. You only need to study the comment of the Mechilta on Numbers 11,5: "we remember the fish we used to eat in Egypt for nought, the cucumbers, the melons, etc." Hail to the people who never had to experience exile under the (Arabs) Muslims. Not only did they enslave us and torture us but they did not pay wages for labour performed but they demanded that we hand over what little we owned. People would be kidnapped to obtain their freedom by ransom. The Muslims would demand that people give them what they did not even possess and persecuted them to the point of death. The Torah alludes to this kind of persecution when it writes: והרים את הדשן אשר תאכל האש; G'd will elevate the ashes; when the nations of the universe experience troubles they are compared to fire by our prophets. The Torah predicts that G'd will consume these nations as if by fire. Compare Ezekiel 10,2 "fill your hands with fire from amongst the cherubs and throw them upon the city." The word את העולה refers to the nation called עולה.
  The words על המזבח may be understood as follows (continuing this allegorical approach): We find a disagreement between Maimonides and ראב׳ד in <i>Hilchot Teshuvah</i> chapter six about the nature of G'd's retribution against the nations who have abused the Jewish people. ראב׳ד holds that seeing these nations acted as free-willed human beings they will only be judged because they committed excessive cruelty when acting as G'd's agents and fulfilling His decree of exile for the Jewish people. Maimonides holds that they will also be judged for the fact that they exiled us in the first place. I have already written in my commentary on Genesis 15,14 that there is ample reason to punish all our adversaries for every act of hostility they have committed against us. What is written here only reinforces my argument. If the intention of our oppressors had only been to carry out G'd's retribution against the Jewish people they should have been exremely careful not to do anything over and beyond what G'd commanded. The fact that they indulged in excessive cruelty only proves that they were never motivated by acting as G'd's agents in the first place. When the Torah writes the unnecessary words על המזבח, it alludes to the unnecessary zeal and pleasure with which the Gentiles exploited their position of physical superiority. Whereas a certain measure of afflictions was decreed by G'd to serve as our atonement for sins committed, the decreed by G'd to serve as our atonement for sins committed, the extra words על המזבח indicate that what the Gentiles did to us was far more than was called for in order for us to achieve our atonement. ושמו אצל המזבח, and he will place it next to the altar. The altar is intended to serve as the instrument of atonement. Everything "beside" the altar is evidence of our enemies' hateful attitude, not their desire to help us achieve atonement for our sins. As a consequence of such an attitude amongst our enemies they will be punished not only for their excesses but for the part they would not have been culpable for had they perceived themselves as true agents of the Lord. An alternative meaning may be that though the days of our exile are not yet complete, G'd will count what has been done to us אצל המזבח, over and beyond the punishment decreed, and thereby hasten the final redemption. G'd will present the various afflictions the Jewish people have endured to the attribute of Justice which considers the concept "altar" as the instrument by means of which Israel receives its punishment and therefore atonement; By confronting the attribute of Justice with all the excesses perpetrated against us by our enemies, G'd will enlist its support for His plan to punish our enemies.
   ופשט את בגדיו, and He will put off His garments, i.e. seeing G'd wore a certain set of "garments" when He was engaged in disciplining our enemies, He will now put on different "garments" in order to do good with us, to take us out of exile. He will not delay the arrival of the redemption to occur on the date set for it originally until all the evildoers have perished, but will gather us all in immediately and lead us to מקום טהור. a pure place. This is a reference to the Land of Israel which is always perceived of as a pure place compared to the lands owned by the Gentiles. Our sages in <i>Shabbat</i> 15 have decreed that not only the soil of foreign lands is treated as infected with ritual impurity but also the very air of lands outside ארץ ישראל. The expression מקום טהור is also a reference to G'd's domain, seeing He is called טהור, pure.
  והאש על המזבח, and the fire on the altar, etc. Do not imagine that the only harm G'd will inflict upon our enemies will be that which occurs when He takes us out from amongst their midst. On the contrary; this "fire" of retribution לא תכבה will not go out. The priest (simile for G'd) will continue to stoke that fire with additional wood, i.e. more and more of the nations of the world who are perceived as dry wood ready for burning. עצים, trees, serve as a simile for man in Deut. 20,19 "for man is as the tree in the field;" in the introduction to <i>Midrash Eychah Rabbah</i> we read: "the trees are hyperbole for the exiles (i.e. for the people who have been exiled)."
   בבקר בבקר, every morning; this is an allusion to the two "mornings," i.e. the two latter parts of the fifth and sixth millenium we described as possible dates for the redemption. The Torah tells us that actually the redemption should have occurred already on the first of these "mornings" in the fifth millenium. It was delayed by a thousand years, i.e. another day in G'd's calendar only on account of our sins. The Torah tells us that the nations of the world must not assume that they will be the beneficiaries of the sins of the Jewish people and that they would therefore escape their just punishment. When the time comes, the nations will receive the punishment due to them for what they did to us in both of these millenia, i.e. בבקר בבקר.
  וערך עליה העולה, and He will arrange on it the burnt-offering, etc. We have to understand this in the sense of what we learned in <i>Baba Kama</i> 83: הכל לפי המביש והמתביש, "the amount of compensation payable to someone who has suffered 'loss of face' is determined by the relative social position of the party suffering the shame and the party who shamed him." One cannot compare an insult received by a socially highly placed person heaped upon a person who is also at the top end of the social ladder to someone at the bottom of the social ladder who insulted someone at the top of that ladder. We certainly cannot compare those situations to that of a slave insulting his master. When the Torah speaks of arranging the burnt-offering on it (the altar), the "burnt-offering" is a simile for the whole of the Jewish nation. והקטיר עליה חלבי השלמים, and He will burn up on it the fat parts of the peace-offering. G'd will also arrange on that altar the elite of this Jewish nation, חלבי השלמים whose lifestyle was equivalent to burning up sweet-smelling fragrances for G'd (compare Genesis 27,27: "look! the fragrance of my son is like the fragrance of the field which G'd has blessed"). Remember that we perceive of anyone who has committed a sin as exuding an unpleasant odour. The story is told that once the prophet Elijah passed by a wicked man and tried to avoid inhaling the evil smell which that person exuded and which was more pungent than the smell exuded by a carcass. On the other hand, the fragrance exuded by the righteous person is comparable to that which emanates from a rose-garden. The Torah therefore chose to describe the belovedness of the righteous before G'd in terms of a pleasant fragrance. The message of the verse is that G'd will match the punishment in detail to what the Gentiles have done to His righteous, the people who exuded fragrance such as the incense.
   אש תמיד, a continuous and ongoing fire; even though G'd will inflict severe blows on the nations who have abused us, the fire (of punishment) on the altar will not go out; this is similar to the final message of the prophet Yoel (Yoel 4,21): "I will not treat their blood as having been avenged;" this will not occur until the earth has been cleansed of the spirit of impurity and "G'd rules as King over the whole earth" (Zachariah 14,9).
  
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   והכהן המשיח תחתיו מבניו, and one of his sons, the priest who will be anointed in his stead, etc. The sages in <i>Menachot</i> 51 explain that this verse teaches that if a High Priest has died and no successor has as yet been appointed, that one of his sons must offer the daily meal-offering which is mandatory for the High Priest. They derive this הלכה from the words מבניו תחתיו, "one of his sons in his stead." The same sages use the letter ם in the word מבניו for a different exegetical purpose. The Talmud on that folio quotes a <i>Baraitha</i> according to which the word בניו means that the High Priest's sons enjoy the status of ordinary priests; to the query that may be the Torah intended them to have the status of High Priests (pl)? The sages point to the words והכהן המשיח תחתיו מבניו as proof that only one of the sons may be anointed as High Priest in place of their father. It seems clear that this conclusion is derived from the word מבניו, i.e. from amongst his sons, not all his sons.
  On this subject the Talmud <i>Horiot</i> 11 adds that even a High Priest who is the son of a High priest needs to undergo anointing with the oil of anointing. They derive this from the words: והכהן המשיח תחתיו מבניו; if anointment of the son were not required all the Torah would have had to write was והכהן מתחתיו מבניו the extraneous word המשיח teaches that even if the High Priest's own son is his successor he has to be anointed. This seems difficult. The word המשיח is essential to teach us that the sons who up until then were only ordinary priests, as per We could answer this query by saying that we did not need the word המשיח to enable us to allow the sons to offer the meal-offering in the absence of a newly appointed High Priest, for why else would the Torah write two verses dealing with the ordinary priest offering a meal-offering. It is clear therefore that on the first occasion the Torah mentions the meal-offering brought by an ordinary priest that the regular priest is meant, whereas on the second occasion the Torah refers to an ordinary priest who happens to be the son of a High Priest. The word המשיח did not have to be mentioned unless the Torah wished us to derive an additional lesson from that word. The Talmud concluded therefore that the word teaches that even if a High Priest is succeeded by his son he needs to be anointed for his new office.
  There remains the problem why the Torah had to write תחתיו מבניו, an inverted way of saying מבניו תחתיו, "from amongst his sons as his replacement." Perhaps the Torah was especially interested in the word תחתיו appearing next to the person whom he replaced in order for the Talmud in <i>Menachot</i> to be able to arrive at the conclusion that one of the High Priest's sons must offer the meal-offering normally offered by the High Priest pending appointment of a new High Priest. The whole verse may then be understood as follows: והכהן המשיח תחתיו יעשה, "and the priest who will be anointed in his place will carry out (the functions of that Office);" however, if a replacement has not yet been appointed, מבניו יעשה, "one of his sons may carry it out." Had the Torah written הכהן המשיח מבניו תחתיו, the meaning would have been that only if the son had already been appointed in place of his father, i.e. had been appointed or was considered fit to be appointed, would he be obligated to offer the meal-offering his father used to offer; seeing that the Torah reversed the words מבניו תחתיו and wrote תחתיו מבניו יעשה, we derive the law that any of the High Priest's heirs may bring the meal-offering. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that as long as no replacement for the High Priest has been appointed the meal-offering in question has to be paid for by the public purse (instead of by the High Priest or his estate). The significance of the sequence of the words תחתיו מבניו then is that no one other than the son of the deceased High Priest is entitled to replace him. After having given this explanation I have found that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> already preceded me in explaining these <i>Baraithot</i> in the same spirit.
  
  
  
  
  
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   אשם הוא, it is a guilt-offering. Rabbi Eliezer and the other rabbis disagree in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> whether the extraneous word הוא is intended to teach that if this offering was not slaughtered on the northern side of the altar that it is invalidated. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the word הוא means that if the guilt-offering was slaughtered while the priest entertained the wrong thoughts i.e. assumed that the animal in question was a different kind of offering, it is invalid. According to his reasoning, the words אשם הוא emphasise the need for the guilt-offering mentioned in verse 1 of our chapter to have been slaughtered for that purpose in order to be acceptable. We find in <i>Zevachim</i> 10 that Rabbi Yehoshua challenged Rabbi Eliezer's exegesis and that thereupon Rabbi Eliezer retracted and derived his ruling that the אשם must be slaughtered as such in order to be valid from the words כחטאת כאשם in verse 7 of our chapter. Considering this, we must ask what Rabbi Eliezer learns from the extraneous word הוא? Perhaps if the word הוא had not been written here I would have made the comparison made in <i>Zevachim</i> 11 between the guilt-offering and the sin-offering described in verse 7 as not applying to the need to perform סמיכה on the guilt-offering just as on the sin-offering, but I would have applied it to the need to slaughter either offering with the right intent in order for it to be acceptable. In order to prevent us from making such an error, the Torah wrote the word הוא next to the word אשם to inform us that this word tells us something about the אשם itself. The Torah wrote the words כחטאת כאשם in verse 7 in order to tell us that both these offerings require סמיכה as something mandatory. The other rabbis, the ones who disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer who used the word הוא to invalidate the guilt-offering unless it had been slaughtered on the northern side of the altar, understand that word to refer back to verse 2 where the principle of slaughtering the guilt-offering in the same place as the burnt-offering has first been mentioned. Repeating this by means of the word הוא indicates that the requirement is mandatory. Although one could challenge these rabbis with similar queries as the ones used by Rabbi Yehoshua to get Rabbi Eliezer to retract, the fact that they did not arrive at a new הלכה by dint of a סברה, a process of reasoning, but applied a rule applicable to other sacrifices also to the guilt-offering by their methodology, it is absolutely acceptable that the word הוא was intended by the Torah to make the site of the slaughtering mandatory. This is all the more so since in the case of the burnt-offering the Torah had spelled this law out in so many words. The contribution of those rabbis is that if we had only had verse 1 in our chapter, I would have reasoned that while it is a desired requirement, failure to slaughter the guilt-offering on the northern side of the altar would not have invalidated it.
  
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   וכל מנחה אשר תאפה בתנור, and every meal-offering which is baked in the oven, etc. The Torah mentions five separate categories of meal-offerings to exclude five matters. 1) The sons of Aaron do not divide the meal-offering according to the formula employed when animal offerings are shared out, i.e. that portions of one offering may be traded off against portions of another offering; rather every priest of the group performing service on that day receives his share of each of the meal-offerings presented on that day. 2) Bird-offerings are not shared out in the same way as the meal-offerings. One could have argued that the bird-offerings and the meal-offerings were both offerings presented by the poor and the very poor respectively. This factor does not have a bearing on the method employed in sharing out the meat of the bird-offerings, however. 3) The distribution of the meat of bird-offerings did not parallel that of the offerings consisting of four-legged animals, even though in both cases their blood is sprinkled on the altar. 4) The criteria applicable to the distribution of the parts of one kind of meal-offering are not identical to those of the sharing out of another kind of meal-offering, even though they all consist of flour of some kind. 5) Meal-offerings consisting of baked goods baked in one kind of pan or another kind are not shared out according to the same criteria as other meal-offerings prepared in a similar manner when these meal-offerings served different purposes.
  Although these five exclusions all concern different kinds of meal-offerings, the exegesis from which we derived these <i>halachic</i> differences is based on what is called אם אינו ענין, i.e. that if the Torah records certain information which is superfluous in its context, such information may be applied to supplement information lacking in a different context. I have seen that Maimonides in chapter 10, ruling 15 of his <i>Ma-asseh Hakorbanot</i> explains the exclusions in our two verses along different lines (other than <i>Torat Kohanim</i> which is similar to our author). He bases his exegesis on the fact that the Torah did not include the five kinds of meal-offerings mentioned here in the section dealing with מנחת סלת in 6,7-11 but records it in a different context. This is remarkable seeing that in the case of the meal-offerings which are baked as well as in the meal-offering consisting of fine flour mixed with oil and frankincense the Torah speaks of the offering belonging to the officiating priest. Maimonides reasons that we could have made a case for sharing out the meal-offering consisting of fine flour according to the same criteria as those applicable to some other meal-offering but we do not do so. It is clear from Maimonides' reasoning that he employs the words לכל בני אהרון "to all the priests" in 7,10 as the basis for his exegesis. This is not what we learned in the <i>Baraitha</i> (<i>Torat Kohanim</i> ).
  Maimonides also stresses the fact that the laws of the meal-offering do not all appear in a single paragraph. This teaches that unless the Torah had separated the laws of one kind of meal-offering (the מנחת סלת) which was not baked from the five categories mentioned in our chapter all of which are baked, we could not have used these verses exegetically and we would not have arrived at the conclusions derived by <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> Perhaps Maimonides thought that the fact that the Torah artificially separated the legislation pertaining to the offering of the meal-offerings is proof that it did not want us to assume that the formula of trading off by the priest of parts of one meal-offering against parts of another type of meal-offering is acceptable. Having arrived at this principle, it is applied to all the meal-offerings. You may find proof in the fact that in the case of מנחת מרחשת and מנחת מחבת the Torah does not mention a word about all the priests sharing in it equally. All that is mentioned is that priests not officiating on that day are not entitled to share in it. [the Torah phrases it positively, saying: "it belongs to the priest who offers it which means to the group of priests officiating on that day. Ed.] Whence does Maimonides know then that a meal-offering offered in a pan may not be traded off against a meal-offering offered in a stewing-pan seeing not a word is said about how these meal-offerings are to be shared out? Actually, the five exclusions we cited earlier as the basis of our exegesis are only of the type known as אסמכתא, a "lean-to." This type of exegesis is not binding but serves as a reminder of <i>halachot</i> with which we are already familiar. The principal exegetical tool is the fact that the Torah saw fit not to record all six examples of meal-offerings in the same paragraph.
  We are now left with the problem of why the Torah gave many details repeatedly when all it had to write was that "every meal-offering belongs to the officiating priest, and is to be shared by all the priests officiating on that day." Perhaps -in view of the fact that the Torah already entered into details of different kinds of baked meal-offerings- the Torah was afraid that we would apply totally different criteria to the מנחת סלת and others which were not baked. We find, for instance, in <i>Menachot</i> 63 that the Talmud explains the words וכל נעשה במרחשת ועל מחבת in 7,9 to mean that these meal-offerings and the rules pertaining to them are governed by the type of container they are offered up in and not so much by their composition. The practical significance of this becomes evident when a person vows to bring a meal-offering and he merely identifies the kind of meal-offering he undertakes to bring by naming the vessel it is to be brought in. For instance, he said: "I am obligated to a certain kind of baking pan" [one of the ones which existed in the Temple. Ed]. According to the school of Hillel such a vow is valid seeing the kind of pan he mentioned is a sacred vessel and can be used for the meal-offering and the Torah wrote: "anything prepared in either of these kinds of pans, etc." According to the school of Shammai it is doubtful what this person had in mind. His "offering" would need to remain untouched until the coming of Elijah the prpohet who would resolve our doubts about its validity. Rabbi Yossi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that all these meal-offerings are separate categories. Therefore, one may not bring less than a minimal quantity of a meal-offering על המחבת and add to it less than a minimal quantity of a meal-offering במרחשת in order to combine these quantities into a single meal-offering of minimal acceptable quantity. The words אשר תאפה תנור, teach that one cannot combine part of a meal-offering baked on a griddle with part of a meal-offering baked in an oven. The only extraneous words which have not yet been explained exegetically are the ones in verse 10 seeing what is written there is also a duplication.
  Perhaps Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Yehudah who holds that the words מאפה תנור mean two types of meal-offerings derived his ruling from the fact that the Torah employed the word כל both in verse 9 and in verse 10. As a result we have a double duplication. First of all there was no need for the extra verse; secondly, if you already had the extra verse, the word כל did not need to appear in both verses. This is why Rabbi Yossi is careful to mention the source of his ruling, i.e. וכל מנחה,…וכל נעשה במרחשת, ובל מנחה בלולה. He adds: "Just as the word וכל in verse 10 clearly refers to two separate meal-offerings, i.e. one containing a great deal of oil and one a dry one, so the word וכל in the previous verse also refers to two different categories of meal-offering. It follows from the above that if the Torah had only written the words מנחה בלולה, or כל מנחה חרבה, I would not have had an exegetical tool with which to derive the various <i>halachot</i> we have derived from the repeated use by the Torah of the word וכל. In fact, one could have argued that if the Torah had written כל מנחה חרבה this would furnish proof that the word כל applied to a single kind of meal-offering, [in spite of the Torah using the word כל meaning each or every. Ed.] and that when the Torah spoke about this kind of meal-offering without using the word כל such as in Leviticus 2,4: מנחה מאפה תנור (Leviticus 2,4), it also referred to only a single category of offering. The Torah had to write all the verses which appear to contain some duplication in order to teach us the various <i>halachot</i> we just described.
  
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  Verse 20
  
   ונפש אשר תאכל בשר וטומאתו עליו, And a person who eats of sacrificial meat….while he is ritually unclean, etc. Both this and the following verse are interpreted by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as speaking of personal ritual impurity [as opposed to the meat having become impure, as suggested by the masculine pronoun עליו which does not fit the subject נפש which is feminine. Ed.]. <i>Zevachim</i> 43 states that any verse which has not been interpreted by Rabbi Yitzchak son of Avdimi in this fashion cannot be interpreted in this way. Rabbi Yitzchak son of Avdimi had stated that only if a verse commences with a subject which is feminine and concludes with a subject which is feminine and in between we encounter a masculine pronoun may we interpret that the masculine pronoun refers to the original subject and not to the object which is masculine. Rashi explains that seeing that the verse following displays the same pattern and it is clear in that verse that the person who is the subject of the word ואכל, "and he eats," is a human being, verse 20 must be understood in the same sense. Rashi's words help us understand why the word וטומאתו "while he is impure," do not have to refer to the word בשר, which is the only masculine noun in that verse seeing that we thought that the laws about the meat being impure had already been concluded as Rashi explained in his commentary in <i>Zevachim</i> 43 where the verse is examined.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> also cites a <i>gezeyrah shavah</i> comparing the word טומאתו, mentioned here with the word טומאתו mentioned in Numbers 19,13. However, I have decided to concentrate on the reason the Torah saw fit to contravene the rules of grammar in our two verses. If the Torah had simply written the word וטומאתה in verse 20 instead of writing וטומאתו, we would not have had to resort to the exegetical use of the <i>gezeyrah shavah</i> in Numbers 19,13 at all. Also, why did the Torah not write verse 21 in a more straighforward manner?
  I believe that when the Torah wrote וטומאתו עליו in verse 20, it wanted to teach us something different altogether. The words refer to someone who had already undergone the purification process of seven days for someone who has become impure through contact with the dead, but had not yet experienced sunset on his seventh day; alternatively, it may refer to a person impure through contact with some kind of four-legged creeping animal who has not yet undergone ritual immersion. It is important to appreciate that such residual impurity as we have just mentioned is not so serious that it affects the soul of the person concerned. It is more like a veil of impurity which envelops only the outside of the body of a person. This is the reason why ritual immersion is sufficient to remove the last vestiges of such impurity although for the previous seven days such a ritual immersion would have been quite ineffective seeing the impurity had penetrated also the inside of the body. When the Torah wrote והנפש אשר תאכל…וטומאתו עליו, it informed us that not only is someone guilty of the <i>Karet</i> penalty when the impurity he is suffering from is עליה, envelops his soul, but even if the impurity has already been reduced to a state where it is only עליו on the outside of his body, the same penalty still applies if he eats sacrificial meat before having become totally pure. Similar considerations apply to someone who has not yet shed the relatively lighter impurity absorbed through his having contacted a dead creeping animal.
  Why then does the Torah use the masculine form ואכל in the middle of verse 21, when the correct term would have been ואכלה seeing that I could not have mistaken its meaning and it would have been so much simpler to have a uniform text in both of these verses? I believe that the reason the Torah chose to write נפש כי תגע, a feminine way of describing the contact instead of writing איש כי יגע the parallel masculine form, is to inform us that such contact with the source of impurity had to be intentional not merely accidental in order for the person to become culpable of the penalty mentioned. The word נפש alludes to such an intentional act. This is also the reason why the Torah chose the word נפש instead of איש in verse 20. The word איש would not have conveyed the fact that the act was committed intentionally. Keeping in mind the thought that the word נפש alludes to the awareness of the sinner of what he is doing will help us understand the recurrent use of the word נפש in chapter four and five which deals with inadvertently committed sins. This word explains the need for the sinner to offer sin-offerings or guilt-offerings in those situations. Had the sinner been totally unaware of committing a wrong the Torah would not have required these offerings from him so that he could atone for his mistakes. We may summarise that the word נפש indicates that the person who committed the trespass cannot claim unawareness of doing something wrong. In our two verses here the word נפש implies that the guilty party was aware of touching something he should not have touched (verse21) or he was aware that he ate something he should not have eaten (verse 20). We cannot therefore question why the Torah used a masculine term in the middle of both verses as there was no need to depart from the norm in describing the perpetrator of the sin as being a male. The reason the Torah wrote ונכרתה הנפש ההיא, "this soul will be exterminated," is to teach us that G'd will not only punish the body of the sinner by premature death or something like it, but that He will also punish his soul by death.
  In addition to the approach of our sages in the Talmud, we may find still another reason to justify the repetition of our verses by referring to the <i>Mishnah</i> in <i>Zevachim</i> 106. We learn there that a person who is ritually impure and eats sacrfificial meat is guilty regardless of whether that meat had already been defiled or not. Rabbi Yossi Haglili disagrees saying that if said meat had already been defiled, the person who ate it is not guilty. In discussing this problem on folio 108, the Talmud concludes that if the person became defiled before the meat became defiled there is a concensus that the person who ate from that meat is guilty. The disagreement between the majority opinion and Rabbi Yossi Haglili concerns only a situation when the meat became defiled before the person eating it became impure. This is why the Torah had to write two verses The first verse i.e. והנפש אשר תאכל describes a situation in which a person who is ritually unclean ate sacrificial meat of a peace-offering which was ritually pure; the second verse which writes ואכל מבשר זבח השלמים, speaks of a ritually impure person who ate sacrificial meat which had already become defiled. Perhaps the reason the Torah described the meat in the first verse as תאכל בשר מזבח שלמים, meat of a peace-offering, is that the meat in question had not yet become defiled; in the following verse the Torah changed this description by writing מבשר זבח שלמים, meaning the meat was of a category which qualifies as a meat-offering, but it had been defiled in the meantime and does no longer qualify for being eaten. It is no longer בשר שלמים. The letter מ in the word מבשר indicates that it is no longer wholly a meat-offering, זבח שלמים. The letter מ is therefore not exegetically available for some other למוד, <i>halachah,</i> to be derived from it.
  
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   מן הבהמה, from the beast, etc. This apparently superfluous word is interpreted by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as including the fat of animals each one of which would have been suitable as a sacrifice, and which have been crossbred, such as the product of a billy-goat mating with a ewe or vice versa; the fat of animals which are the product of such crossbreeding is unfit to eat on pain of the <i>Karet</i> penalty. The apparently extraneous word כל in the sequence כל חלב refers to an animal called כוי which is the product of a male goat mating with a gazelle. In my book פרי תואר in which I have commented on the טור יורה דעה טז you will find more about this subject.
  כל אוכל חלב, anyone eating such fat, etc. The word כל is interpreted by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as including the fat of animals which are not intended to become sacrificial offerings. We should not err and conclude from the words אשר יקריב ממנו אשה לה׳ that only חלב of such sacrificial animals is prohibited; therefore the Torah adds the word כל אוכל חלב. Seeing this inclusive word is not required to warn those who would eat it, it may be applied to the parts of the animal subject to being eaten.
  It seems rather difficult to understand why I would have made such an error and would have thought that without the word כל the Torah's injunction would have applied only to בשר קדשים, sacrificial animals. After all, the Torah mentioned specifically that the fat of a נבלה an animal which died by causes other than ritual slaughter may be used for the performance of all kinds of work but may not be eaten (24)? Besides, since when are the remnants of sacrificial animals permitted for use by non-priests? Does the Talmud not state specifically in <i>Pessachim</i> 82 that if an animal intended as a sacrifice was found to be <i>treyfah</i> after it has been slaughtered, such an animal has to be removed to a place called בית השרפה, to be burned there? We derive this from Leviticus 6,23 בקדש באש תשרף. This teaches that all sacrificial animals which have become unfit for the altar have to be destroyed. In view of this the words וחלב נבלה וחלב טרפה in verse 24 must refer to animals not intended as sacrificial offerings. Why then did the Torah have to write the words כל אוכל חלב to prevent me from making an error as to the prohibition of חלב applying to ordinary animals? We believe the main point <i>Torat Kohanim</i> wanted to make with its למוד from the words כל אוכל חלב is that the penalty of <i>Karet</i> applies both to someone who partakes of fat from sacrificial animals and to someone who partakes from the fat of ordinary animals. If not for the words כל חלב, I would have assumed that the prohibition is an ordinary negative commandment punishable by 39 מלקות lashes.
   כל חלב שור וכשב ועז לא תאכלו "You shall not eat any fat of ox, sheep or goat. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on this verse comments that the list of these animals is intended to exclude the prohibition of חלב from animals not suitable for consumption by Jews, בהמות טמאות, as well as free-roaming animals and fowl. In <i>Chulin</i> 116 Rabbi Mori is reported as having asked Rabbi Zvid if the fat-tail אליה of the sheep was considered חלב and therefore prohibited. Rabbi Zvid answered: "because of people who ask questions such as you have just asked the Torah wrote the verse כל חלב שור וכשב ועז לא תאכלו, to make clear that the term חלב applies only to the kind of fat which these three categories of animals have in common." How could Rabbi Zvid give such an answer seeing we have already used the animals mentioned in that verse for a different למוד, namely to exclude three other categories of animals? If the Torah had not written verse 23 to exclude the three categories of animals mentioned by <i>Torat Kohanim,</i> we would have learned a קל וחומר, i.e. used logic to arrive at the opposite conclusion as explained by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on that verse. Perhaps we could have derived the exclusion of those three categories of animals from the words אשר יקריב ממנה אשה לשם. These words would already have excluded both fowl (of which only two species may be used as an offering) and impure animals which are totally unfit as offerings, as well as free-roaming animals which are not suitable as offerings for different considerations although they may be consumed by Jews if ritually slaughtered, etc. Alternatively, once the Torah had specifically excluded impure animals and free-roaming beasts, the Torah made it plain that the קל וחומר which was based on the comparison with the prohibition to eat blood which applies to all of the three categories of animals alike although certain other disqualifications do not apply to it, is not to be applied here. You will find that Rashi's commentary on the <i>Mishnah</i> in <i>Chulin</i> 117 follows a similar path. It is important to take a good look at the next verse.
  מן הבהמה, from the beasts; <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives from this expression also that animals not intended to serve as sacrifices due to a physical blemish are nevertheless included in the legislation forbidding the consumption of their חלב, the fat parts offered on the altar, if they had been used as sacrifices. Although the Torah had already specifically prohibited the חלב of animals which have not been slaughtered ritually or of animals which were found defective after slaughtering (although these animals too were unfit for the altar and I could have used that fact to apply the legislation to said חולין בעלי מומין), this would not have been conclusive. According to Maimonides there is no biblical prohibition against a <i>treyfah</i> animal being offered on the altar (<i>Issurey Mizbeach chapter 2).</i> This prohibition is based only on Maleachi 1,8 that "G'd would reject an offering which does not reflect our high regard for Him seeing we would not dare offer something inferior to our governor." Accordingly, a special verse was needed to include <i>treyfah</i> animals. It is true that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on the same two words in Leviticus 1,2 mentions the exclusion of <i>treyfah</i> animals; however, this is only an אסמכתא a "lean to;" it is not the kind of exegesis which is binding as has been explained in that connection by the author of <i>Kesef Mishneh.</i> At any rate, seeing that a נבלה is prohibited as an offering by a biblical injunction because the Torah wrote the word ושחט, "he must slaughter the animal," in connection with every sacrifice, why was there a need to use the words מן הבהמה to include the categories mentioned by <i>Torat Kohanim?</i> We have to answer again that what <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had in mind was that the same penalty <i>Karet</i> which applies to someone who partakes of the fat of the sacrificial animal also applies to someone eating the fat parts of an ordinary animal which had become unfit as a sacrifice.
  אשר יקריב ממנה אשה לשם, from which he will offer a sacrifice to the Lord; <i>Torat Kohanim,</i> which zeroes in on the apparently extraneous words אשר יקריב, concludes that the Torah refers to the type of חלב which is suitable for burning up on the altar; it excludes the kind of חלב of the walls of the animal's cavities and fat on the ribs which is not suitable for the altar. According to this reasoning which uses the words כל חלב שור וכשב ועז to exclude application of the prohibition to eat the fat of impure animals and the like, the words אשר יקריב were not needed, and they were therefore available to exclude such fats as is on the ribs of the animal from the application of the prohibition to eat חלב.
  From where does Rabbi Zvid who used the words שור וכשב ועז to permit eating of the fat on the אליה, the fat part of the tail of the sheep, derive permission to eat also from the fat on the ribs, etc.? At the same time we may ask where the sage who derives permission to eat the fat of the אליה from the words שור וכשב ועז, finds a source for permitting consumption of such fat as that on the ribs, etc.? We may have to conclude that Rabbi Zvid holds that the words אשר יקריב exclude not only such animals as impure beasts, free-roaming animals and fowl from the prohibition of חלב, but also exempt fat on such parts of the animal as the ribs from the application of this law. The reasoning is simply that not only any animal but any part of an animal not burned up on the altar is excluded from this injunction. The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> also arrives at the same exclusion using the words שור וכשב ועז as excluding also the אליה from this injunction. If the verse had wanted to exclude only impure animals, birds and wild-roaming animals, it would have had to mention only שור וכשב. As soon as we would exempt even a single type of animal from the prohibition of eating חלב though the prohibition of eating of its blood still applied to it, the whole basis for the קל וחומר which <i>Torat Kohanim</i> wanted to refute by the Torah's use of the extraneous words מן הבהמה had already disappeared. We would have excluded such animals as חיה ועוף automatically. If the Torah nonetheless wrote extra words, such words may be used exegetically, i.e. to exclude the fat on the ribs. The three words שור כשב and עז would between them have excluded only the fat of the אליה from the prohibition of eating חלב.
  Why then did Rabbi Zvid disagree with the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> who derived the exclusion of the fat of impure animals, free-roaming animals, and birds from the words שור וכשב ועז? The author concludes that the principal exclusion of such animals as the impure, the free-roaming ones, and the birds is derived from the words שור וכשב ועז. He does not therefore accept the view of Rashi on the <i>Mishnah</i> in <i>Chulin</i> 117 which he quoted earlier.
  
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   זאת התורה לעולה למנחה ולחטאח, This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering and of the sin-offering. It is not clear what this verse wants to tell us. In <i>Torat Kohanim</i> we read that just as the details of the consecration rites of the Tabernacle which are discussed in the next chapter have all been handed down at Mount Sinai, so the details of permanent offerings have also been handed down at Mount Sinai. Seeing that the consecration rites consisted of public offerings, how do we know that the legislation concerning private offerings was also handed down from Sinai in all its details? Answer: This is why the Torah included the guilt-offering in our verse, an offering which is always a private offering. I have already said repeatedly such as at the beginning of <i>Parshat Mishpatim</i> what I have to contribute on the subject (compare page 689). <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as well as <i>Zevachim</i> 97 also derive from this verse that all the meat-offerings need to be slaughtered with a knife, same as the burnt-offering. It also teaches that all public peace-offerings are to be consumed by the male priests just like the meal-offerings. A more homiletical message contained in this verse may be the thought expressed by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish in <i>Menachot</i> 110 that anyone studying the laws of the burnt-offering is as if he had actually offered such a sacrifice. I plan to follow the same approach.
  Let me first preface my remarks by recalling that numerous Kabbalists who have engaged in a study of these matters have said that the principal purpose of Torah and its study is to recapture sparks of sanctity which have "fallen" and as a result are being held captive. We are dealing with two separate aspects of fallen sparks of sanctity here. One refers to the sparks of sanctity which descended into the world of chaos for reasons which are well known. The term "sparks" of sanctity is enough for these students of Kabbalah to know what we are talking about. The second aspect of that term is that it refers to souls which are being oppressed by cruel humans ever since the time Adam sinned in גן עדן. At that time Adam provided the negative elements in our world with a great deal of spiritual loot. The only way such souls can be rescued from the clutches of the spiritually negative forces which hold them captive is the study of Torah in such a way that Torah becomes the mainstay of our lives. Torah is the only effective antidote to the forces of Samael (the evil urge) as we know from <i>Kidushin</i> 30: "If Samael attacks you drag him to the hall of Torah study. If he had been as hard as stone before you dragged him to the house of Torah study you will find that he melts; if he had been as tough as iron he will explode." 
  In our verse the Torah has revealed the marvellous properties of our Torah. When the Torah writes: "This is the Torah," this is an introduction to the description of its powers. The Torah continues: לעולה, to tell us that by means of Torah study the Jewish people can elevate themselves to be the vehicle of G'd's Presence. The Torah goes on to say למנחה. This word may be translated in several ways all of which are correct. The word reflects the concept of מנוחה, rest; it reflects the concept נחת, calm, tranquillity; it also reflects the concept of הנחה, deposit, repose. This latter meaning is most likely the principal meaning of the word מנחה. In <i>Chulin</i> 91 the stones upon which Jacob placed his head when he went to sleep after having been surprised by an early sunset, are described as having merged in order that the righteous Jacob should be able to use all of them as his pillow, for his repose. In his commentary on Genesis 2,2 Rashi writes בא שבת בא מנוחה, "the arrival of the Sabbath brings with it a sense of repose." This is because the righteous, the foundation of the world, uses the Sabbath as his pillow (allegorically speaking). This is also the mystical dimension of Song of Songs 2,6: שמאלו תחת לראשי וימינו תחבקני. "His left hand is under my head and His right arm embraces me."
  ולתטאת ולאשם, and for the sin-offering and the guilt-offering. These words clarify two separate aspects of the descent of the sparks of sanctity into the nether regions which we referred to earlier. The sparks of sanctity which descended at the time the world was still in chaos, <i>Tohu Vavohu</i> [before the period which commenced with G'd creating light at the beginning of the Torah's report in Genesis 1,3 Ed.], are here referred to as לחטאת, i.e. "the Torah of the sin-offering," whereas the sparks of sanctity which descended into the realm of Satan after Adam sinned are referred to as לאשם, i.e. "the Torah of the guilt-offering." The Torah had to inform us of this division in order for us to appreciate that not only can it help us locate and isolate i.e. identify these sparks of sanctity in an environment inherently hostile to sanctity, but Torah can also be the instrument of rescuing these sparks of sanctity from their exile. The Torah alludes to this when it writes: ולמלואים, i.e. "to make them fill their original places." The word למלואים refers to the original place assigned to the sparks of sanctity which descended into chaos before G'd created order in the physical universe. The words ולזבח השלמים refer to the sparks of sanctity which descended into the clutches of the spiritually negative forces rampant in our world after Adam's sin. The expression זבח in this connection reminds us of Psalms 50,23: זובח תודה יכבדני אראנו בישע אלוקים, "he who offers a thank-offering honours Me….and I will show him salvation." <i>Sanhedrin</i> 43 comments on this verse that the person the Psalmist refers to sacrifices his evil urge. Slaughtering, זובח, means vanquishing that which one slaughters. By vanquishing one's evil urge one can again isolate the realm of good which had been inextricably fused with the forces of evil while that soul had been in the clutches of Satan, i.e. of the evil urge. This is a tremendous spiritual accomplishment as commented upon by David in Psalms 109,22 who viewed himself as לבי חלל בקרבי, "my heart was slain inside of me." David refered to having killed the evil urge within him. This is a very great spiritual accomplishment but it cannot be achieved except through Torah as we mentioned when we quoted the Talmud in <i>Kidushin</i> 30. The Talmud there also quotes G'd as saying: "whereas I have created the evil urge within you I have also given you a remedy to overcome it, i.e. the Torah."
  Another homiletical message is contained in the words ולזבח השלמים which tell us that the whole purpose of identifying and isolating these lost sparks of sanctity is to do so by means of the זבח, the sacrifice; Isaiah 34,6 speaks of כי זבח לה׳ בבצרה, "for the Lord holds a sacrifice in Bozrah;" our sages comment on these words that in the future G'd will slaughter Satan. The meaning of the word "slaughter" [when applied to a spiritual being such as Satan. Ed.] is that G'd will deprive Satan of the component which enables it to live, i.e. the spark of sanctity. This then will be the peace-offering שלמים alluded to in our verse which is a reference to the "happy ending" of human history. Our verse tells us that even the slaughtering of Satan will be accomplished by means of preoccupation with the Torah. Torah. It is the merit acquired by the righteous through preoccupation with Torah which will bring all this about. Our sages in <i>Sukkah</i> 52 alluded to this when they described the slaughter of Samael as being carried out jointly by G'd and the righteous, each one holding the knife from one end. This is meant to teach us that it is within the power of the righteous to contribute their share in the elimination of Samael-Satan. We have already stated that the words זאת התורה are to remind the reader of all the marvellous things which can be accomplished by means of the Torah. לעולה למנחה; these words allude to the elevation of the שכינה and its unification with the essence of G'd. The words לחטאת ולאשם allude to the respective identification and isolation of the sparks of sanctity which are the essential part of the living universe. The words ולמלואים ולזבח השלמים describe the unification of the sparks of sanctity which had gone astray with their erstwhile source, and the slaughtering of the evil source which enabled such a going astray of sanctity to have occurred in the first place. This will also deny that source the basis for any future existence. The word שלמים, perfection, completion, alludes to the fact that when that stage will have been reached all the challenges life on earth presents will have been met successfully. This is the time when G'd will be proclaimed king in this world for ever more and He and His name will be One.
   אשר צוה ה׳ את משה, which G'd commanded Moses, etc.; the Torah here reverts to the cause for all this, i.e. the Torah, as had been mentioned by the words וזאת התורה. It is as if the Torah had written in verse 37: "This is the Torah which G'd commanded Moses, etc." ביום צוותו את בני ישראל, on the day He commanded the children of Israel, etc. This ordinance was commanded to them at Mount Sinai seeing G'd said: "in the desert of Sinai." The Torah added: להקריב את קרבניהם, "to offer up their sacrifices." This is an allusion to what I have written previously that all particles of sanctity which exist are an integral part of Israel and that Israel will be able to reunite all these various "sparks" of sanctity by means of the Torah.
  
  
  
  
  
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   קח את אהרון, "take Aaron, etc." This paragraph was revealed to Moses before the Tabernacle was erected, and the reason it was not recorded up until now is to tell us that all the laws pertaining to the various sacrifices were revealed before the details of the consecration rites were revealed. Aaron and his sons had to become priests in order to perform any of the other services in the Tabernacle; this did not happen until Moses had taught him all the details about the various sacrifices and he had undertaken to perform every rite in accordance with what the Torah demanded. Only after he undertook to do this did G'd tell Moses to anoint him and his sons as priests. If this had not been the case, some Israelite might have decided to offer a sacrifice to G'd on the altar in front of the Tabernacle and he would not have known how to proceed.
  
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   והקהל העדה, the community was assembled, etc. Perhaps when the people saw Moses taking Aaron, his sons, and the priestly garments, they assembled spontaneously. It is also possible that the verse tells us that G'd ordered the people to assemble around the entrance to the Tabernacle as explained by <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 10,9 on the word הקהל in verse 3 and that our verse reports that the people did so.
  
  Verse 5
  
   ויאמר משה …זה הדבר, Moses said:…"this is the word, etc." Moses informed the people of what G'd had said so that they would not register a protest at a later date claiming he had made all these appointments of his own accord. Seeing that the Torah reported here that everything was done at the command of G'd, Korach had no basis for the claim that he had acted inadvertently when he challenged Aaron's position seeing he had been present at this time and had not challenged Moses when the latter presented these appointments as having been made at the direct command of G'd.
  It is also possible to explain this verse along the lines of <i>Shemot Rabbah</i> 2,6 and <i>Zevachim</i> 102 that Moses' position was equivalent to that of a king seeing the Torah wrote in Deut. 33,5: "He was king in Yeshurun." We have learned in <i>Ketuvot</i> 17 that even if a king is willing to waive the honour due him he is not allowed to do so. We observe that Moses did things (waived his claim to honour) which even a Jewish servant is not allowed to perform for his master, such as bathing him, etc. In our paragraph Moses is bidden to wash the entire body of Aaron and his sons. There is no more demeaning task that anyone can be asked to perform. This is why the Torah had to introduce this paragraph with the words: "G'd said to Moses to say." Moses explained to the people that if he was seen to perform such a demeaning task it was because G'd had told him to; it did not mean that by doing so he relinquished his claim to the position of king. This was the only demeaning task ever performed by Moses as all others were forbidden to him by his very status. Only G'd who was the One who had appointed Moses as king was in a position to ask him to perform a service not in keeping with a king's dignity.
  Furthermore, we may understand what happened in terms of a comment by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on verse 6: "he washed them in water." They say that the High Priest (and the ordinary priests when required) acquired the merit accompanied by ritual immersion and his washing his hands and feet before each act of service in the Temple on the Day of Atonement. The words זה הדבר אשר צוה ה׳ לעשות, "this is the thing which G'd has commanded to be done," means that these rites were to be performed also in the future, seeing performance of this command granted them the privilege of ritual immersion in the future. [According to ראב׳ד quoted by Malbim the ritual immersion referred to is the the ritual baths the High Priest underwent during the seven days he prepared himself for the Day of Atonement. Ed.]
  
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  וימשח את המשכן, He anointed the Tabernacle, etc. Why did the Torah interrupt the report of clothing Aaron in the priestly garments and his being anointed with the report of the Tabernacle being anointed? The reason is presumably that the Torah had reported that Moses was commanded to anoint the Tabernacle before it reported that he had been commanded to anoint Aaron (compare Exodus 40,9). You may argue that it would have been appropriate then for the Torah to report the anointing of the Tabernacle before reporting the dressing of the priests in their garments in order to conform with the order in which the Torah reported the commands as being issued by G'd. The reason Moses did not do so may be found in a detail in verse 2 where G'd had said to Moses: "take Aaron, his sons, the garments, and the oil of anointing." If the anointing of the Tabernacle had been intended to precede the sons of Aaron being dressed in their priestly garments, the Torah should have written as follows: "take the oil of anointing, etc." seeing the Torah wanted the first command to be carried out first. If the Torah had written verse 2 in that order we could not possibly have mistaken its intention. Seeing the Torah first mentioned Aaron, it is clear he was to be anointed first before he was to put on the priestly garments. It was not possible to misinterpret what G'd wanted because the Torah had already said in Exodus 28,41: "dress your brother Aaron and his sons in them and anoint them." It is clear therefore that the Torah intended to have the priests put on the priestly garments prior to anointing the Tabernacle with the oil of anointing. Why is it then that in פרשת פקודי the Torah reported the anointing of the Tabernacle before it reported Aaron being dressed in his priestly garments? We may answer that seeing the Torah did not want to interrupt between the act of Aaron's' getting dressed and being anointed, it wrote all the laws pertaining to Aaron consecutively; this did not mean however, that the anointing of the Tabernacle was to be preceded by anything but the anointment of Aaron himself. This is the point we learn from the sequence of the Torah's report in our chapter.
  
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   על העולה, upon the burnt-offering. These words mean that nothing else intervened. Perhaps the meaning is that Moses did not wait with accepting the meal-offering from the hands of the priests until the burning up of the burnt-offering had been completed.
  
  Verse 29
  
  
  
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   כאשר ציויתי, "as I commanded, etc." Moses referred to the site where the meat was to be consumed, seeing he had already commanded the priests to consume the meat. If a priest would be unwilling to eat these parts of the offering this would invalidate it (retroactively). If he wanted to eat it in a place other than the one designated he would also invalidate it. The Torah added the word לאמור to indicate that Moses did not initiate this <i>halachah</i> but that he had received specific instructions concerning this from G'd.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   ויהי ביום השמיני, it was on the eighth day; We need to analyse why the Torah had to introduce this chapter with the word ויהי. We are told in <i>Megillah</i> 10 that Rabbi Levi claimed there was an ancient tradition that every time the word ויהי appears it has a connotation of something painful having occurred. This view was challenged by the questioner pointing to the word ויהי in our portion which introduces the joyous event of Aaron performing the rites in the Tabernacle; furthermore, we have a <i>Baraitha</i> according to which this day was as joyous an occasion as the day on which G'd created Heaven and Earth, a day which is also introduced in the Torah by the words ויהי ערב ויהי בקר, "it was evening it was morning, etc." The Talmud answers that the saddening event in our portion was the death of Nadav and Avihu. The questioner in the Talmud continues, wanting to know why the word ויהי is used in Kings I 6,1 when the building of Solomon's Temple is reported. He also points to Genesis 29,10 where Jacob's encounter with his bride-to-be Rachel is introduced by the word ויהי. The questioner mentions a further occurrence of that word every time G'd completed part of the creation of the universe and the Torah describes the completion of that portion with the words ויהי ערב ויהי בקר. What were the negative elements on those occasions which prompted the Bible to draw our attention to them by means of the word ויהי? Rav Ashi answers that the word ויהי by itself may have either positive or negative connotations. When the word ויהי is followed by the word בימי, "during the lifetime of, etc." it invariably has a negative connotation. The Talmud added that there are five occasions when the expression ויהי בימי occurs in the Bible. Thus far the discussion in <i>Megillah</i> 10.
  Why did the questioner address his question to what is written in our verse, when the real question is what is written in Genesis over and over again, i.e. ויהי ערב ויהי בקר, which enabled the query about our verse not having a negative connotation? I must assume that the questioner obviously had all these verses in mind when he challenged Rabbi Levi's tradition. The only reason he introduced our verse was to make his question even more powerful by suggesting there are many such verses which clearly point to a joyous event. Alternatively, the questioner wanted to draw the opposite conclusion of the one Rabbi Levi reported as originating with the men of the great assembly. He wanted to argue that the word ויהי always introduces something joyous. He reasoned that just as the <i>Tanna</i> had compared our verse to the verse in Genesis in which the expression occurs for the first time and which certainly spoke about a positive event, so every time that expression occurs it denotes something positive, a joyous occasion. Using the verse ויהי ערב ויהי בקר in Genesis makes it much harder to refute the questioner's argument seeing no specific event is mentioned in that verse the nature of which could be disputed. Rabbi Levi's answer that our verse describes a day on which Nadav and Avihu died is somewhat astounding. This answer is applicable to our verse, but certainly not to the verses commencing with ויהי ערב in Genesis? It would not do to say that Rabbi Levi felt that the words ויהי ערב in Genesis also referred to something negative [after all they were preceded by G'd saying that He approved of how His instructions had been carried out, וירא אלוקים כי טוב, Ed.]. More to the point, why did not Rabbi Levi himself address those verses which begin with the word ויהי and which clearly speak of joyful events? He himself should have known the answer given by Rav Ashi!
  I believe that Rabbi Levi did not mean to teach us anything other than Rav Ashi. The Talmud alludes to this by not introducing Rav Ashi's words with the introductory: אלא אמר רב אשי, "however, Rav Ashi said, etc." Had the Talmud used that formula we would have been justified in understanding him as refuting Rabbi Levi. What Rav Ashi said is compatible with what Rabbi Levi said, i.e. that the word ויהי contains a negative connotation. There are indeed many verses when that word alludes to something saddening. He only answered the person who had challenged Rabbi Levi believing that Rabbi Levi had meant that the word ויהי without the addition בימי is employed by the Bible exclusively in a negative context. This is why the questioner chose our verse out of the many other verses he could have chosen. He wanted to show that the events described in our verse were exceptionally joyous. After all, what conceptual difference is there between ויהי ביום, and ויהי בימי? The answer given was that the reason the Torah wrote ויהי ביום instead of a formula which would have reflected the purely joyous nature of the occasion was that the two sons of Aaron died on that very day. [With all due respect to the author, if he had introduced the subject as it is introduced in the Talmud namely: ויהי בימי אחשורוש, followed by Rabbi Levi's statement that every place where the expression ויהי occurs it carries a negative connotation, his remarks would have been easier to follow. No doubt the author had his reasons and that is why I did not see fit to amend his quotation above. Ed.] 
  Subsequently the question about the meaning of the word ויהי when it is not followed by either the word בימי or ביום is dealt with. In that context Rav Ashi said that the word itself is neutral and that its meaning is modified by what follows, such as the word בימי, for instance. The questioner who quoted a number of verses in which the word ויהי is not modified by either the word ביום or בימי, refers to very joyous events and gave Rav Ashi cause to say that this need not lead us to the assumption that only the words בימי or ביום modify the meaning of the word ויהי to signal that something sad is being reported. There are other occasions when the word by itself may also introduce something sad. When we have the words בימי, however, what follows invariably contains a negative element. Incidentally, the negative element in Exodus 19,16 where the Torah states ויהי ביום השלישי and introduces the happy event of מתן תורה, was that all the Israelites died for a brief space of time when they found themselves unable to absorb G'd's revelation. According to <i>Shabbat</i> 88, G'd brought them back to life immediately.
  Perhaps another element of pain asscociated with the words ויהי ביום השמיני is that Moses realised on that day that it had become Aaron and his sons who were the "heirs" of his own spiritual stature and not his own sons. The Talmud (<i>Menachot</i> 109) tells about the High Priest Shimon Ha-tzaddik who had appointed one of his sons Chonov to be his successor, something which aroused the jealousy of Chonov's brother Shimi. The results were terrible. At any rate, we see from there that aspiring to something noble may cause the finest person anguish if one's desire goes unfulfilled. At the time G'd had repeatedly urged Moses to accept the role of leader of the Jewish people and Moses had repeatedly declined, G'd had become angry, deciding to deny Moses the position of High Priest [a hereditary position provided the son was suitable. Ed.] Up until now Moses had not felt saddened by not having been accorded the rank of High Priest. Now when he saw that Aaron had been given this honour, he was saddened by having forfeited the chance to be the High Priest. Although we know that Moses was the most humble and fair person his heart was not made of stone, and he suffered some emotional distress about this, especially as the position denied him involved being the instrument of atonement for his people, etc. Perhaps the Torah alluded to Moses' feelings in the matter in Numbers 7,1 where we read ויהי ביום כלות משה להקים את המשכן, "it was on the day Moses completed erecting the Tabernacle;" this was the same date as the day which is described in our portion as "the eighth day," i. e. the first of Nissan. Our suggestion would account for the fact that the Torah introduced both paragraphs with the words ויהי ביום, seeing that in our verse the sad event was the death of Nadav and Avihu whereas in Numbers the sadness the Torah alluded to was Moses' distress at having forfeited the chance to be the High Priest.
  ביום …קרא משה לאהרון, on that day Moses called Aaron, etc. Any psychologist realises that a person who is forced to give up a position of honour originally intended for himself to someone else, even if that someone is his own brother, may be expected to display his distress in three ways. 1) He is unlikely to carry out the command with dispatch; 2) he is unlikely to perform the command in the most effective manner; 3) he will try to avoid fulfilling this command publicly. The Torah here describes that Moses mastered all the inhibitions an ordinary individual would have displayed in carrying out this command. 1) He carried out the command on the first day it was possible, i.e. the eighth day. 2) He carried out the command with all its attendant subsidiary commands, i.e. he appointed Aaron's sons at the same time although there was no immediate need for Aaron's sons to substitute for their father and this was perhaps the hardest part for him to fulfil. 3) He called in the elders of the people and performed the command in public. Moses displayed an example of suppressing his personal feelings in order to fulfil G'd's command.
  
  Verse 2
  
   קח לך עגל, "take for yourself a bull-calf, etc." <i>Yuma</i> 4 questions the need for the words "for yourself," seeing that the Torah goes on to say that the he-goat in verse 3 was for the people; obviously then the bull-calf was for Aaron personally. The Talmud answers that the words קח לך meant that Aaron was to pay for that bull-calf out of his personal funds.
  Perhaps we may add that the word לך was intended as a sign for all times that Aaron had not made the golden calf with sinful intent nor had he been involved in its worship. This is why a bull-calf could serve as atonement for Aaron. The same could not be said of the people at large seeing their involvement in the sin of the golden calf had been במזיד, i.e. they had been aware of what they had been doing. Not only could a bull-calf not serve as atonement for their sin, on the contrary, it would remind G'd of their sin and be an accuser. You will find in <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 21,10 that the reason G'd did not want Aaron to enter the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement dressed in his golden garments was because he had been the one who made the golden calf and we have a principle of אין קטיגור נעשה סניגר, "something which served once as an accuser cannot reverse its role and serve as advocate for the defence." This was a consideration which did not apply to the Israelites who had sinned knowingly in the way they related to the golden calf so that a bull-calf could not serve as a sin-offering for them.
  In this connection we must explain why G'd commanded Aaron to take a bull-calf as a sin-offering altogther. Is not a sin-offering intended as atonement and there is therefore no more powerful advocate for the defence than such an offering? Apparently G'd judged matters very fairly. On the one hand, Aaron's involvement in the construction of the golden calf was peripheral; he had neither made its shape, nor believed in it when it emerged from the crucible, and, as he explained to Moses: "the calf emerged by itself" (Exodus 32,24), i.e. as a result of an action by the sorcerers Yeynuss and Yombrus amongst the mixed multitude as reported by Tanchuma 19 on <i>Parshat Ki Tissa.</i> It follows therefore that there were steps in the procedure which resulted in the golden calf materialising which Aaron did take knowingly. He told the people to bring the gold; he accepted it from them; he etched the gold with an etching tool. All of these details he performed in full awareness of what he was doing. Even though the reason he did these things was fear of the Israelites killing him just as they had killed his nephew Chur, and even though all he did was stall for time until Moses would return, he did something improper. This is why G'd told him to bring a sin-offering to atone for a sin which he had been instrumental in making possible. Concerning the gold which was the crucial element in that sin, G'd told Aaron not to appear before Him in the Holy of Holies dressed in gold seeing the accuser could not become an advocate for the defence. The same consideration did not apply to the Israelites as they had been involved in that sin knowingly and a bull-calf could not therefore be used as a sin-offering on their behalf. G'd therefore commanded the Israelites to prepare a he-goat as their sin-offering. 
  We have to question how it is possible that in view of the principle (<i>Rosh Hashana</i> 26) that the accuser cannot serve as an advocate for the defence that the Talmud <i>Erchin</i> 16 tells us that the purpose of the four golden garments of the High Priest was to atone for four different categories of sin. In view of this the accuser certainly did turn advocate for the defence! We must answer therefore that one cannot compare the process of atonement which occurs as a result of offerings presented on the copper altar outside the Tabernacle with the process of atonement initiated by offerings presented on the golden altar inside the Sanctuary. The function of the golden altar inside the Sanctuary is to cleanse the people from sin absolutely so that not a trace of their former sins remain. The well-known symbol for this was the red cord hung at the cliff from where the scapegoat was thrown off, which turned white as a result of the atonement procedures performed by the High Priest inside the Sanctuary being accepted by G'd (compare <i>Yuma</i> 67). The golden garments worn by the High Priest when he performed duties outside the Sanctuary did not interfere with the atonement process because that atonement process did not result in a complete removal of all vestiges of guilt. In order to achieve such total atonement, the High Priest could not wear anything in the Sanctuary which would remind G'd of his ever having been associated with the sin of the golden calf. The very fact that Aaron was commanded to wear the golden garments when performimg his duties on the copper altar was proof that his involvement with the golden calf had only been peripheral. The Israelites, whose sin had been far greater, could not obtain their forgiveness through any process performed only on the copper altar outside the Sanctuary.
  
  Verse 3
  
   תדבר לאמור, "you shall speak saying;" We need to explore the reason why Moses commanded Aaron to speak in this instance instead of instructing the Israelites himself as was his custom. Perhaps it was because at the time of the golden calf it had been Aaron who invited the people to bring him their gold, Moses now wanted to give him an opportunity to speak to the people and tell them to bring a male goat to be the sin-offering as atonement. This would be in line with the principle הפה שאסר הוא הפה שהתיר, "that the mouth which uttered the prohibition must be the mouth which utters the permission." We have repeatedly quoted our sages as saying that the sin which causes someone's reputation to become sullied can best be repaired when the method of rehabilitation is as closely linked to the circumstances of the sin it rehabilitates as is possible. This is why G'd ordered Aaron to inform the people of this procedure. The words תדבר לאמור mean that inasmuch as on the previous occasion Aaron had uttered words which resulted in the people becoming unrestrained, demeaning themselves, he was now to utter words which would eventually elevate the people and result in atonement for that sin.
  Furthermore, seeing that Moses had observed how Aaron had been elevated by G'd to such a high position, Moses told him to communicate soothing messages to the Jewish people. The word לאמור implies a message couched in a very friendly manner. Aaron told the people that G'd would appear to them (verse 4) to indicate that the whole procedure he was instructing them about was for their good, not for his own. This recalls what we wrote in the name of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> at the beginning of פרשת ויקרא, that the fact G'd did not communicate with Moses in the Tabernacle for 38 years was on account of the sin of the spies; when G'd is reported as communicating with Moses out of the Tabernacle this was a compliment to Israel.
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
   ויקתו את אשר צוה משה, They took what Moses had commanded, etc. When the Torah writes "which Moses had commanded," the Torah means what Moses had commanded to Aaron, i.e. that Aaron took the animals Moses had commanded him to take and sacrifice on behalf of the people. Had the Torah only written that the people took the animals Aaron had commanded them to take, I would not have known of Aaron's involvement, i.e. that Aaron carried out Moses' instructions. Furthermore, perhaps the Torah wrote "which Moses commanded" as a contrast to the usual "as G'd had commanded," that Moses' command sufficed for the people to carry out these orders although they had not been assured that the command which they were bidden to carry out had emanated from G'd.
  
  Verse 6
  
   זה הדבר אשר צוה ה׳ תעשו, "This is the thing G'd commanded you should do." What precisely does the Torah refer to by the word הדבר? Rashi explains that the reference is to Aaron's offering. [our editions of Rashi on the Torah do not have a commentary by Rashi on this verse. Ed.] This is not the plain meaning of the verse seeing that it addresses the Israelites, i.e. תעשו, (pl) and not Aaron. Perhaps Rashi referred to words in the previous verse: ויקרבו כל העדה ויעמדו לפני השם, that "the whole congregation drew near and stood in the presence of G'd." The Torah was careful there to write in the "presence of G'd," instead of "in front of the Tent of Meeting." The words were altogether superfluous seeing the Torah mentions that all this occured in front of the Tent of Meeting. We may therefore assume that in verse 5 the Torah describes the spiritual preparations made by the people to appear in the presence of the Lord. They achieved a spiritual niveau which made them fit to be in the presence of G'd. When Moses observed this, he added of his own accord in verse 6: "this is the thing which G'd commanded you should do;" Moses told the people that they should always remain on such a spiritual plane that they would be fit to be in G'd's presence. David spoke about this in Psalms 16,8: שויתי ה׳ לנגדי תמיד, "I am ever mindful of the Lord's presence." When doing this he could be assured of what is written in the second half of that verse: כי מימיני בל־אמוט, "so that He (i.e. Torah) is at my right hand and I (David) will never be shaken." The reward for such a spiritual preparation is "the glory of the Lord may appear to you." Another general meaning of the term לפני השם is that there should not be a curtain or barrier between Israel and G'd; Isaiah perceives of the sins of the Jewish people as constituting such a barrier (compare Isaiah 59,2). Accordingly, our verse reports that the Israelites were at peace with their G'd at that time enabling them to appear in the presence of the Lord.
  After I had written this I found a comment in <i>Bamidbar Rabbah</i> 12,8 on this verse which goes as follows: "What is the meaning of זה הדבר? It refers to circumcision. The same expression occurs in Joshua 5,4 when it describes the fact that Joshua circumcised all the Jewish males who had been born in the desert immediately after the people crossed the river Jordan." Thus far the <i>Midrash.</i> Actually, what do the two events have in common? After all Moses did not circumcise anyone on the day Aaron assumed the office of High Priest!
  I believe we must distinguish between circumcising the foreskin of the body and removing the "foreskin" of the heart, the קליפה, the peel, which makes us unreceptive to G'd's commands. Moses commanded the people to rid themselves of that foreskin in order to qualify for being in the presence of the Lord. If they were to do this the glory of G'd would appear to them.
  I have seen yet another <i>Midrash</i> quoted in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on our verse which goes as follows: The words זה הדבר refer to Moses urging the Jewish people to remove the evil urge from their hearts so that all of them would be of a single purpose and share the same sense of reverence for G'd as a result of which they would merit to serve in the presence of the Lord. Moses promised the people that their service of the Lord would be something unique as it is written "and you shall circumcise the foreskin of your hearts (Deut. 10,16), etc." Moses added: "when you do this, the verse 'the glory of G'd will appear to you' will be fulfilled."
  
  Verse 7
  
   וכפר בעדך ובעד העם. "and make atonement for yourself and for the people." We learn from this that Aaron's own atonement effected the atonement of the people. This is because Aaron's sin was brought about through the Israelites. Had they not demanded from Aaron that he make a deity for them, none of all this would have happened. As long as Aaron had not obtained atonement for his part in that sin, both the sinner and the one who had been the prime cause of that sin still remained guilty. As soon as Aaron obtained atonement, so did the people. We derive all this from the linkage of the two atonements in this verse i.e. "on your behalf and on behalf of the people."
  
  Verse 8
  
   ויקרב אהרון אל המזבח, Aaron approached the altar, etc. This verse alludes to a conversation in the celestial spheres which is reported in the Jerusalem Talmud <i>Makkot</i> 2,6: "They enquired from 'prophecy': what shall be the punishment of a person who has sinned? Answer: והנפש החוטאת היא תמות. 'The person (soul) who sins, she (the soul) will die (Ezekiel 18,4)'. When they asked 'mercy' the same question the answer given by 'mercy' was: 'he shall bring a sacrifice.'" The major factor determining the value of the animal sacrifice is the thoughts it evokes in the person offering it. If that person will realise that everything which is being done to the sacrificial animal is something that should really be done to him, the offering may effect atonement for its owner. When the Torah writes that Aaron approached the altar this is another way of saying that he readied himself to place his own soul on the altar as a guilt-offering. He was aware that when he performed the act of slaughtering the animal instead, this was an act of mercy by G'd who spared his life and allowed him to present the animal's life as a substitute for his own.
  In order to understand the system of crime and punishment and the apparent ease with which atonement can be obtained by the offering of an animal, we must consider various statements by our sages. <i>Tanchuma Shoftim</i> posits that G'd has sworn to hold the universe and the creatures therein responsible for their deeds. If anyone were to declare that G'd is a וותרון, an indulgent and lenient G'd, he will experience that his bowels יוותרו, will become loose. (Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 5,1). If, as the prophet said in Ezekiel 18,4, the sinner ought to die for his sin, how is it that he only has to offer a sacrifice in order to escape death? I believe we can find a reason for this which is acceptable even in legal terms. At the time a person commits a sin he does not do so as a human being in full command of his faculties. Rather, he has temporarily taken leave of his senses or he would never have committed the sin in the first place. Compare <i>Sotah</i> 3. We are told there that prior to committing a sin man's mind is afflicted by some mental disturbance. Had the person committing the sin not descended to a spiritual level such as that of a beast he would not have committed the sin. On the day such a person becomes a penitent, his רוח, spiritual level, has reasserted itself and he again assumes the spiritual level of a human being. Would it be fair to kill such a human being because of what he did while he was on the spiritual level of a beast? When such a person has to offer a beast in expiation of his sin he will realise the anguish the beast suffers when it has to die and he will appreciate that he himself had been in a situation similar to that of the beast which now has to die. Man's sensitivity to the animal's anguish then is what really saves him from the fate of the animal. This is what the Psalmist has in mind when he speaks of "man and beast You deliver, O Lord" (Psalms 36,7). G'd has delivered the part of man which is similar to the beast because man chose to allow his spiritual part to dominate him. His spiritual part had not deserved to be punished as it had no part in his sin. When looked at from this point of view the requirement to bring this sacrifice is part of justice as opposed to being in lieu of justice. This is why the Psalmist introduced the verse we quoted by saying: משפטיך תהום רבה, "Your justice is like the great deep;"
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
  
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
  
  
  Verse 14
  
  
  
  Verse 15
  
   ויקרב את קרבן העם. He presented the people's offering. This refers to the presentation of the "lights" [a term denoting enlightenment in kabbalistic jargon. Ed.] which were planted in the Israelites from the source of the original "light" which had been diffused due to Adam's sin and which had prevented man from achieving the close relationship with G'd he should have maintained. The change which took place in man's soul dictated that he keep a certain distance from G'd as ever since the sin G'd and man are perceived of as two different species, [a halachic term used when two categories of food, a forbidden one and a permissible one become mixed and the question arises if one of them loses its former identity. Ed.] The Torah tells us here that by means of the service performed by Aaron two species which had previously been incompatible had again become compatible. The words "he brought close the offering of the people" mean that he re-united what had become estranged. Actually, by rights, this verse should have been written at the end of the whole procedure in verse 23. Why did the Torah write this verse prior to describing the details of the procedure? The Torah wanted to teach us the lesson that it is not the actual procedure which is crucial in achieving the objective of the sacrifice. It is the intent with which such a procedure is initiated which determines if the execution of the ritual will achieve its objective.
  We have a mystical element in this verse also. I have mentioned on a previous occasion that the burnt-offering, עולה, represents the concept of כנסת ישראל, [a concept known in kabbalistic language as the שכינה תחתונה, the lower manifestation of the שכינה in the emanation מלכות. Ed.] the ideological concept of the people of Israel. If the Israelites fail to behave as they should they "lower" the concept of כנסת ישראל. On the other hand, if they draw near to G'd as expressed in the words ויקרב את העולה, they will experience one spiritual ascent after another. Not only will they not be tainted by sins but they will be able to face the most rigorous standards of justice. This is what is implied in the words ויעשיה כמשפט.
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
  
  
  Verse 18
  
  
  
  Verse 19
  
  
  
  Verse 20
  
  
  
  Verse 21
  
  
  
  Verse 22
  
   וישא אהרון אח ידיו, Aaron raised his hands, etc. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> claims that this verse is truncated and the words: "he descended from offering the sin-offering, etc." should have been written before the words "he raised his hands and blessed them." We therefore have to explore why the Torah chose this unusual sequence. Perhaps when Aaron realised that the Presence of G'd had not manifested itself (by consuming the fat and meat on the altar by means of heavenly fire) he may have felt that both he and the people had not yet been completely exonerated from their respective share in the sin of the golden calf. He therefore considered himself as having brought a curse on the people. By raising his hands already at this time and blessing the people, Aaron hoped to counteract that curse. Only after he had blessed the people did he feel that he had really completed the ritual of the sin-offering. He was then able to descend from the altar secure in the knowledge that he had done all he could. Perhaps the Torah wanted the blessing of the Israelites to be included in the procedure of offering the sin-offering because it also exonerated Aaron from his share in the guilt. The word וירד may also refer to a spiritual descent; when Aaron saw that the שכינה had not yet descended, he felt reduced in stature, i.e. וירד. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on our verse reports Aaron as having cried out to Moses that the latter had commanded him to present these offerings on the altar only to now shame him when G'd had not indicated that He had accepted these offerings. Moses then entered the Tabernacle together with Aaron and after they asked G'd to show mercy the fire from heaven materialised.
  
  Verse 23
  
   ויצאו ויברכו את העם, They emerged from the Tabernacle and blessed the people. Perhaps they had been commanded to do so by a prophetic vision. It is also possible that the Torah substitutes the word "blessing" here for the word "prayer." The prayer may have been that G'd's Presence should continue to manifest itself in the camp. Even though the people had already been blessed by Aaron, it was good to be blessed by both brothers each of whom represented a different nuance of spirituality, one that is unique to the Levite and the other the spirituality unique to the priesthood. In kabbalistic terms the two brothers Aaron and Moses represented the emanations חסד וגבורה respectively.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  ויקחו בני אהרון נדב ואביהו איש מחתתו, And the two sons of Aaron Nadav and Avihu each took his censer, etc. The Torah tries to explain the twofold nature of the error committed by Nadav and Avihu. Firstly, seeing they were priests they naturally felt the urge to perform service in the Tabernacle; this is why the Torah introduces this chapter by referring to them as the sons of Aaron, something we have been told already on three separate occasions in the Book of Exodus. Secondly, they were both oustanding individuals by deed and equal to Moses and Aaron (compare <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as well as <i>Zohar</i> at the beginning of פרשת אחרי). The Torah alludes to this by referring to their names נדב ואביהו which reflect an excellence not found in Aaron's other two sons Eleazar and Ittamar. The latter derived all their stature by reason of their father being Aaron; their elder brothers possessed יחוס עצמו, claims to nobility in their own right. You will find this confirmed by the comment of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on 10,16 where Moses is reported angry at Eleazar and Ittamar. The two sons Eleazar and Ittamar are described by the Torah as הנותרים, "the left-over ones." At any rate, Nadav and Avihu entered the Holy of Holies relying on their combined hereditary and personal merit. The fact that they made a point of entering simultaneously is to their credit. They did not want to take from the fire on the copper altar believing that it might only be allowed to use that fire when a mandatory incense-offering was presented. Seeing their own incense-offering was of a voluntary nature, they decided to bring fire which did not originate on the altar at all.
  וישימו עליה קטורת, they placed incense on it (the censer). The Torah does not write that they placed the incense "on them," as it had described the act of placing fire on the censer in the plural, i.e. ויתנו בהן lumping the censers together. The reason the Torah distinguishes in its description is to emphasise that the crucial part of their error was the fire which did not originate on the altar.
  זדה, אשר לא צוה אותם, strange fire, which He had not commanded them. The words "which He had not commanded them" define the nature of the strangeness of the fire. It is possible that if these two sons of Aaron had taken the fire for their incense from the altar G'd would not have minded so much; it is also possible that G'd would have minded for a different reason; at any rate, the sin consisted in their doing something on their own initiative which G'd had not commanded them.
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   וימותו לפני השם. They died in the presence of the Lord. The words: "in the presence of the Lord" may be intended to inspire fear and reverence for the Tabernacle in the people who witnessed that even people who entered in order to offer the offering dearest to G'd, incense, had died as a result of doing something unauthorised. There is also an allusion here that their death was due to something they had done previously and which involved the presence of G'd. I refer to Exodus 24,10 where these two sons were reported as having beheld G'd (compare <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 20,10 and G'd was reported there as not punishing the "nobles of Israel" at that time). These "nobles" were Nadav and Avihu.
  
  Verse 3
  
   הוא אשר דבר השם, this is what G'd has said: etc. The word הוא needs further analysis. Another word which seems peculiar is the word לאמור. This word gives the impression that Moses had already been commanded to communicate this idea that G'd is most exacting with those near and dear to Him. If Moses had been instructed to communicate this concept, why had he not done so before? Perhaps this error of Moses was similar to the one we described in connection with Moses' failure to communicate to the people all the details about the manna on the Sabbath, as mentioned in Exodus 16,23 where we also find the expression הוא אשר דבר השם. We had supplied sufficient reasons why Moses at the time did not communicate the laws about the Sabbath to the Israelites in advance, basing ourselves on the absence of the word לאמור in that context. In this instance then, why had Moses not told Aaron of this concept sooner?
  Our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on our verse describe Aaron as in despair accusing both himself and his sons as having sinned and having been punished for it. When Moses heard this, he entered Aaron's tent and tried to put his mind at ease by telling him that G'd had told him when he was on Mount Sinai that in the future He, G'd, would sanctify the Tabernacle by means of persons of great stature. At the time, Moses said, he had thought that G'd referred either to himself or to Aaron. Now, in view of what had just occurred, it had become clear to him that both Nadav and Avihu were of greater stature than either he or Aaron seeing G'd had selected those two to sanctify His Tabernacle. Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> Another approach may be this: while it is true that Moses had been told about this concept at Sinai, he had not understood in which context this lesson would assume practical significance. Only now, when Nadav and Avihu had died under peculiar circumstances did he, Moses, realise what G'd had meant to tell him at that time when He said to him: בקרובי אקדש, "I will be sanctified by means of those who are close to Me." Moses told Aaron: "the only reason your sons had to die was to glorify the name of the Lord." This is how he suddenly understood the words in Exodus 29,43: ונועדתי שמה לבני ישראל ונקדש בכבודי, "there I will meet with the children of Israel and there My glory shall be sanctified." As soon as Aaron heard that the two sons of his who had died were ידועי השם, based on Exodus 29,43, he remained silent and did not utter a lament.
  According to the first approach the word הוא has to be understood thus: Seeing Aaron was saddened by his interpretation of the reason his sons had died, Moses corrected him by saying הוא "this is the reason your sons died," i.e. because they were too close to G'd not because they had become estranged from G'd. Accordingly, the word הוא refers to the cause. According to the second approach to our verse we have to understand the word הוא as a reference to the comment G'd had made to Moses without specifying His meaning. Moses said that now he understood הוא, i.e. "it," the "it" being what G'd had told him about being sanctified by men of stature. As to the meaning of the word לאמור, Moses now understood that when G'd had told him that He would be sanctified ונקדש בכבודי, you may understand this as לאמור, "to say," בקרובי אקדש. This takes care of the various problems in the text we have raised. There remains the difficulty why Moses had failed to communicate the concept of בקרובי אקדש sooner. We also need to understand the deeper meaning of why-according to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> -Moses did not practice his customary humility when saying to Aaron: "I thought G'd referred either to me or to you." We would have expected Moses to have said: "I thought G'd referred to either you or me." Why did he mention himself first?
  We have to remember that we are dealing with an event which contained two vastly different elements. 1) The lesson that Nadav and Avihu were men of great stature. 2) The fact that they died while in the process of committing a sin. When Moses told Aaron that he had understood what G'd had meant when He spoke about being sanctified by men of great stature, men close to Him, he did not necessarily refer to the first element. If Moses had only related to G'd having spoken about people of great stature being the ones by means of whom He would be sanctified, the fact that he mentioned himself first would indeed have to be interpreted as somewhat presumptuous. However, seeing that Moses added that he had now become aware that G'd had considered Nadav and Avihu as greater than himself or even Aaron, it became clear that Moses had not meant to be presumptuous at all. Also, if the major aspect of Moses' new understanding had been who was supposed to be the victim in terms of giving up his life so that G'd would be glorified, it would hardly have been appropriate for Moses to volunteer this honour for Aaron. This is why he mentioned himself first. On the contrary, when one speaks of a possible tragedy befalling either oneself or the person with whom one discusses such an eventuality, good manners require that one mentions oneself as a possible victim first. Moses phrased the whole matter as something concerning which he had previously entertained some doubt.
  There remains the difficulty that according to what Moses told Aaron only one person had to die in order to demonstrate to the people that G'd is sanctified by someone close to Him. Why did both sons die? After all, according to Moses' own words he had only been in doubt which one would be the victim. He never considered that there could be two or more victims to demonstrate the point G'd wanted to make. Besides, whence did Moses know that Nadav and Avihu were of greater stature than either Aaron or himself? Seeing that G'd had mentioned one person as dying, it is plausible that that one person was of greater stature than either Moses or Aaron. Why would I assume that both were greater? In fact it seems strange that two had to take the place of one, i.e. either Moses or Aaron? If so they were not greater than Moses or Aaron individually. One can certainly not argue that in this case Solomon's rule (<i>Kohelet</i> 4,9) applies that טובים השנים מן האחד, "that two are better than one?"
  I believe what <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had in mind is that when G'd said to Moses ונקדש בכבודי that the Tabernacle would be sanctified by a person who is considered as of great stature by Me (G'd), Moses realised that one of the צדיקים, righteous persons, would die. However, he assumed that according to the plain meaning of the words that G'd referred to an outstandingly righteous person (singular). This was the reason he was not sure whether the victim would be either himself or Aaron. Now that he saw that two men had died he re-evaluated the meaning of what G'd had told him. He now realised that when G'd had spoken about ונקדש בכבודי, the meaning was not that it required a single person whose death would confer glory on G'd and the Taberncale, but that G'd had referred to something of a more comprehenive nature. This is why Moses re-phrased what G'd had told him and he said to Aaron בקרובי אקדש, "by means of those who are close to Me (plural) I will be sanctified." He added that G'd had said: ועל פני כל העם אקדש; "and I will be seen to have been glorified in front of all the nation." This meant that when G'd had previously spoken of כבודי, My Glory, the meaning was "on account of My Glory." If we accept this interpretation G'd never applied the singular as applying to the צדיקים. The word ונקדש is a collective term referring to whatever righteous will be the instrument by which G'd's Glory is sanctified. The proof that this had indeed been G'd's meaning was the fact that two people died. Moses said "this is what He had said" in order to console Aaron. The word לאמור means that Moses now understood that he had to communicate, i.e. explain G'd's meaning as being: "I will be sanctified by those who are close to Me." The principal reason for the word לאמור was to forestall any other erroneous interpretation of what G'd had in mind in Exodus 29,43.
  It is also possible that Moses had already understood G'd correctly originally; he had realised that there were actually three possibilities. Either several people would die, or he himself or Aaron would die and thereby demonstrate G'd's principle of ונקדש בכבודי, i.e. the same as בקרובי אקדש. When <i>Torat Kohanim</i> quotes Moses as having said to Aaron that he had thought that either he or Aaron would be chosen to demonstrate the principle in question, Moses meant that originally he had entertained three doubts about who would be the people chosen for this kind of martyrdom. He had now learned which of the three possibilities was the correct one.
  There still remains one difficulty. How could Moses have been certain that he had interpreted G'd's words correctly? Perhaps the combined merits of Nadav and Avihu equalled that of either Moses or Aaron and that is why both of them had to die to demonstrate the principle of בקרובי אקדש? This latter supposition is quite untenable. The whole purpose of G'd allowing those who were close to Him to become the victims of the principle בקרובי אקדש was to inspire sufficient reverence in the people not to treat the sanctity of the Tabernacle lightly. Once the people had observed that G'd had taken up residence in the Tabernacle, as it were, they would begin to take His presence for granted and not relate to it with the necessary degree of reverence. The more highly placed the individual Israelite, the more likely that he would feel so familiar with his G'd that he would become guilty of a trespass. The people most likely to make such an error were the spiritual elite of the people, among them Nadav and Avihu. As a result these people would enter the Sanctuary at will whereas the lesser individuals would keep their distance as required. The result of such considerations would be that the spiritual leaders would be less respectul towards the sanctity of the Tabernacle than their counterparts the ordinary Israelite. In order to prevent such a situation from developing, G'd had to demonstrate by what happened to Nadav and Avihu that He was especially mindful of His honour when it came to the elite in order for the common people not to ever lack in reverence for the Tabernacle. If we were to accept that Moses or Aaron individually were more outstanding than either Nadav or Avihu, G'd would have failed to demonstrate His principle seeing He had excluded both Moses and Aaron from the restriction the principle of ונקדש בכבודי was to teach the people. G'd demonstrated the principle of בקרובי אקדש by literally applying it to the people who represented the elite of the elite. The death of Nadav and Avihu demonstrated that nobody, Aaron and Moses included, could treat the Tabernacle as such familiar ground that they were allowed to enter it at will. The suggestion that only Nadav and Avihu combined represented greater stature than either Aaron or Moses is rejected by the author who explains that if you have a single diamond of ten carats, such a diamond does not become relatively inferior because someone else has two diamonds the combined weight of which is eleven carats.
  
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  Verse 6
  
   ראשיכם אל תפרעו; "do not let the hair of your head grow wild." The Torah warns that if the people at large were to do the same as the priests, i.e. trim their hair while in mourning for a close relative, G'd would become angry. There are differences in the manner ordinary Israelites mourn their dead and in the manner in which priests charged with serving the Lord do this. Whereas the priests are not allowed to let their hair grow wild, they are obligated to rend their garments when hearing of the death of a close relative. Perhaps, in this instance, the rules applied were those we apply when the president of the Supreme Court dies; at such a time all of Israel are commanded to rend their garments as a sign of mourning (<i>Moed Katan</i> 22). In view of the opinion that Nadav and Avihu were of greater stature than even Moses and Aaron, it was certainly appropriate for the whole nation to mourn their deaths.
  ואחיכם כל בית ישראל יבכו, "and your brethren the whole house of Israel will weep, etc." This is a מצוה, a desirable act; failure to do so will not arouse G'd's anger. The Torah is particular to write אשר שרף השם. This may best be understood in accordance with a statement in <i>Shabbat</i> 105 that anyone who weeps and mourns another person' death has his own sins forgiven and will not have cause to weep [for a tragedy in his immediate family. Ed.]. This thought is alluded to in the words אשר שרף, "He had burned." If the Israelites were to weep for the death of Nadav and Avihu now, there would be no future burning to be wept for. The words ולא תמותו ועל כל העדה יקצוף "so that you will not die and G'd will be angry at the whole congregation" mean, that when the righteous die G'd's anger is unleashed against the whole of Israel. The reason is that the righteous by their very existence had kept G'd's anger against Israel in check while they were alive. The death of priests is especially apt to result in G'd's anger becoming manifest as it was the task of the priest to assuage G'd's anger by means of the Temple service he performed while alive.
  
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  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
   דרוש דרש משה; Moses kept asking for, etc. Personally, I think that Moses had not yet decided to permit consumption of the meat of that sin-offering. Proof of this is the fact that he had not told the priests exactly what to do as he had done in the case of the meal-offering concerning which he had said (verse 12) "take what is left over of the meal-offering and eat it!" If it had been clear to Moses that the priests (i.e. the bereaved family of Nadav and Avihu) were to eat the meat in their present emotional state of being אוננים he himself would have told them to do so. Should you argue that Moses had assumed as a matter of fact that by telling Aaron and his remaining sons to eat the left-over parts of the meal-offering, that they would do the same with the sin-offering, then why did he enquire about the meat of the sin-offering? Why would it even have occurred to him that maybe Aaron and his sons had not eaten that meat? Therefore we must assume that Moses had left the matter of the meat of the sin-offering in abeyance, seeing he himself was not certain as to the correct procedure to be followed. It had been clear to Moses that the law applicable to the meal-offering which was a one-time affair and concerning which he had received clear instructions from G'd (verse 12) was similar to that of the male-goat offered by Nachshon (the first of the offerings by the princes which occurred on that day) which was also a one-time offering. He was not at all sure whether he could make an inference from the laws applicable to those offerings to the sin-offerings offered on the New Moon seeing that was a regular offering to be presented every New Moon for all future generations. We may therefore understand the words דרוש דרש that Moses was still busy researching the applicable הלכה. The repetition of the words is a hint that it could have either of two הלכות, rulings. The reason Moses was angry was not because Aaron and his sons had done wrong but because they had taken it upon themselves to decide the issue without asking him. It did not matter that at that time Moses would not yet have known what to answer them if they enquired. Even though Moses eventually (verse 18) told Aaron and his sons to eat that meat in accordance with his previous instructions, this only meant that Moses told them to apply the same ruling as G'd had told him to apply to the eating of the meal-offering. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> understands the repetition of the words דרוש דרש to mean that Moses enquired 1) why this meat should be burned, 2) why it should be eaten. This seems a far-fetched way of understanding the verse. What would have been the point in enquiring why the meat should be burned seeing it had been burned already instead of having been eaten? One needs to find a suitable answer to this comment of the <i>Torat Kohanim.</i>
  
  Verse 17
  
  
  
  Verse 18
  
  
  
  Verse 19
  
   וידבר אהרון אל משה. Aaron spoke (harshly) to Moses. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> reminds us that the word דבר invariably signals harsh talk. Why was Aaron justified in adopting this tone of voice when speaking to Moses? Moses had not even addressed him, much less criticised him! Perhaps Aaron had felt slighted by Moses' angry reproof in verse 16-17 to his sons why they had not eaten the meat of the sin-offering. Moses' accusation did not sound unlike a curse. Aaron felt that at a time when he was still in shock from the death of his two older sons and Satan had a relatively free hand that such an accusation would endanger the lives of his surviving sons. Aaron's outburst may therefore be interpreted as the complaint of a father whose feelings of mercy towards his children have been aroused.
  הן היום, "behold, this very day, etc." Our sages in <i>Zevachim</i> 101 understand this expression as follows: "did Eleazar and Ittamar offer the sin-offerings this day, a day when they are prohibited of performing the service seeing their brothers have not yet been interred and this is why you acuse them of have burned the meat? It was I who have offered the sacrifice and in my capacity as High Priest I am entitled to perform this sacrifice even while in mourning for my sons who have not yet been interred!" The implication is "why did you accuse my sons of something they have not been guilty of at all?"
  The plain meaning of the verse is this: הן היום הקריבו, Nadav and Avihu offered their burnt-offerings and their sin-offerings in the presence of the Lord this very day. Aaron reminded Moses that he was an אונן, a mourner who had not yet commenced the mourning rites as his sons had not yet been buried ואכלתי חטאת היום, He went on: "If I had eaten the regular sin-offering this day?" i.e. the sin-offering which is offered on every New Moon. This was Aaron's way of hinting that there is a difference between eating of the meal-offering which was a one-time offering and eating of the sin-offering which was part of a cycle of regular public offerings. He questioned: "would it have been pleasing in the eyes of the Lord if I had eaten this offering?"
  Perhaps we can prove from here under what circumstances a disciple is permitted to give a halachic ruling in the presence of his teacher instead of referring the problem to the teacher first. I have seen a comment by the רא"ש on <i>Eyruvin</i> 63 that in the situation quoted of Ravina examining the knife of a ritual slaughterer in a location some distance removed from his teacher Rav Ashi, that in such a situation the teacher may be presumed not to feel that his dignity has been offended. [The subject matter discussed in the Talmud there is the permissibility of students giving halachic rulings in the area presided over by their teacher. The standard opinion is that even a relatively simple query such as if one may use a fully formed egg found inside a hen after one has slaughtered it together with milk, the query must be submitted to the local Rabbi. Ed.] At any rate, it seems that Aaron had taken it upon himself to give a ruling and thereby offended the honour of Moses his teacher. Perhaps we can answer this by saying that Aaron's decision was not really what we call a halachic ruling. Aaron had simply used logic. We know from Deut. 26,14 that the farmer had to declare that he had not eaten of the second tithes or the like while in a state of אנינות, pre-mourning. Seeing that the level of sanctity of such tithes was on a far lower level than that of the sin-offering, Aaron simply reasoned that he would most certainly be forbidden to partake of the meat of that offering (compare Rashi on <i>Yuma</i> 5 and <i>Zevachim</i> 101). He himself had been taught the law about the tithes by Moses. All he had done therefore was apply what Moses had taught him to a different situation. He had therefore thought that Moses himself had instructed him to burn the meat seeing there was no one authorised to eat it. This is much less than the example given in the Talmud about the egg found within the chicken we mentioned earlier. It is worthwile to study what <i>Tossaphot</i> have to say on that subject in <i>Eyruvin</i> 62.
  
  Verse 20
  
   וישמע משה וייב בעיניו. Moses heard this and it was pleasing in his eyes. Why had Moses either forgotten or been unaware of such a simple <i>halachah</i> as that one has to distinguish between the degrees of sanctity of one-time offerings and that of regular offerings? If Moses was aware of an argument why such a differentiation should not be made, why did he accept Aaron's reasoning instead of trying to convince him that his own argument was correct? Moses had no right to command Aaron to either eat or burn sacrificial meat unless he was convinced that the <i>halachah</i> demanded this. His anger against Aaron and his sons was not caused by his conviction that they had committed an <i>halachic</i> error, but merely because he did not think they had adequate reason to burn up that meat. Alternatively, as suggested by <i>Zevachim</i> 101, he may have thought that all three of them had become ritually impure preventing them from consuming the meat of the sin-offering. According to the Talmud, Moses had enquired if something had gone wrong during the sprinkling of the blood or whether for some reason the animal had left the precincts of the Tabernacle. All of these events would have been due to some degree of negligence on the part of the priests and would have given Moses reason to be angry. Once Aaron had countered by citing the logic which had prompted him to make the decision to burn the meat Moses was put at ease. He realised that Aaron had not burned the meat until he had correctly judged the circumstances which demanded such action. If Aaron had not had logic going for his decision, it would indeed have been difficult to decide whose considerations were weightier; as it was, Moses was entitled to accept the קל וחומר Aaron had learned. When the Torah said וייטב בעיניו, this means that Moses approved of the meat having been burned. It is also possible that the words refer to Moses now approving of Aaron having made the decision without consulting him.
  Another approach would focus on the first words in the verse, i.e. "Moses heard." This may mean that Moses had heard from G'd about the difference between the degree of sanctity of one-time offerings and those of regular offerings. As a result he approved of what Aaron had done, i.e. וייטב בעיניו. You may counter by saying that if Moses had heard the הלכה from G'd why had he been angry at Aaron? Perhaps he was angry because he himself had not yet told Aaron about this and he thought that Aaron had done what he did without adequate reason. It is also possible that Moses who was able to receive prophetic revelations at any time (as we know from Numbers 9,8: "stand still and I will hear what G'd will command") now received word from G'd as to the correct procedure; as a result he was pleased to have G'd confirm that Aaron had acted correctly. 
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on our verse writes as follows: "Rav Yehudah said that as long as Rabbi Chananiah son of Yehudah was alive he used to explain that anger is a terrible affliction as it caused Moses to err. Seeing that Rabbi Chananiah is dead already, I feel I must respond to what he said. Anger did not cause Moses to err but his error caused Moses to become angry." Why did Rav Yehudah say that "Rabbi Chananiah said as long as he was alive etc.?" Why did he interpret events differently from Rav Yehudah whose opinion seems psychologically more sound and seems better supported by the text? We must also analyse why Rav Yehudah waited until after Rabbi Chananiah's death before he took issue with his explanation. It seems that both Rav Yehudah and Rabbi Chananiah ben Yehudah intended to be complimentary to Moses by their statements. The fact is that what happened can be explained by two different approaches. 1) Forgetting what G'd had said to Moses; it does not reflect credit on someone of Moses' stature if we were to accuse him of having forgotten some instruction G'd had taught him. 2) Moses became angry at the surviving sons of Aaron and spoke harshly with them as reported in our verse. In fact he was also angry at Aaron but he expressed this by speaking to Aaron's sons; he did not criticise Aaron to his face. Rabbi Chananiah chose to attribute Moses' having forgotten a הלכה as due to his anger, an inadvertent sin, as he did not want to accuse Moses of simply having forgotten something G'd had told him. We find a similar approach in <i>Sifri Mattot</i> 31,21 where Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah quoted three occasions when Moses was reported as becoming angry and we find in each case that he committed an error. Numbers 31,14 describes Moses as angry at Eleazar the High Priest. The anger is not reported as caused by an error on his part. We therefore have to find a different reason to explain Moses becoming angry at the sons of Aaron. The reason had to be the failure of the sons of Aaron and Aaron himself to request a ruling from Moses before deciding to burn the meat. Moses' anger caused him to rule incorrectly and to tell them to eat the meat. Moses was convinced at the time that he had ruled correctly and that the sacrificial meat was fit for consumption by priests in their condition. (The author adds: "Rabbi Chananiah's reasoning is not compatible with the explanation I gave earlier that Moses simply told Aaron that he had good reason to rule differently from him and was in doubt about the issue"). 
  Rav Yehudah did not want to contradict Rabbi Chananiah outright and to reject his explanation as wrong. All he wanted to do was to come to the defence of Moses by pointing out that error need not necessarily be the result of anger. He did so because one can argue that anger is more of a negative virtue than forgetting something one has been told by G'd. It may therefore be preferable to explain what happened in terms of Moses simply having forgotten a relevant הלכה. When he realised he had forgotten the הלכה, Moses became angry once he had the feeling that Aaron and his sons had not acted in accordance with G'd's will. His anger had nothing whatsoever to do with his own honour or dignity. Rav Yehudah did not feel that this explanation was the only possible one; rather he felt that it was no less likely than that offfered by Rabbi Chananiah. After all, one could explain Moses' anger without implicating him in something unbecoming and one could explain his forgetting without Moses' image suffering much in our eyes as a result. This is why Rav Yehudah did not voice his dissent until after Rabbi Chananiah had died. Rabbi Chananiah had not shared Rav Yehudah's view that one could allow for both considerations but insisted that Moses' error could only be explained in terms of his having first become angry. The text of the <i>Sifri</i> states: הרני כמשיב על דבריו meaning that Rav Yehudah appeared to dissent. [Our text of the <i>Sifri</i> does not have the letter כ mentioned by the author. Ed.] This version of the text is compatible with the view we have expressed. One may also understand Rav Yehudah as having most definitely held the view that Moses only became angry because he had erred and presumed that Aaron and his sons had sinned by burning the meat. One may err by simply not concentrating on a problem, i.e. by הסח הדעת, being absent-minded. This is something quite inadvertent. One cannot, however, become angry and be absent-minded at the same time. Anger, by definition, implies that one has one's mind on the subject of one's anger. Whereas a sin associated with anger is one that is considered מזיד, the result of an action one is aware of, the same is not the case when the sin is the result of one's having forgotten something. Furthermore, if we say that Moses erred, i.e. forgot something, the result of his forgetting did not result in a sin occurring at all. If we perceive Moses as having been irritated by the actions of Aaron and his sons his anger was caused by this and this anger was an outright sin. Rav Yehudah chose to portray Moses' anger as having been caused by an error not by his irritation. In this way he helped us maintain a better image of Moses. If he said that he disagreed with Rabbi Chananiah after the latter's death, this did not mean that he had not voiced his disagreement during his lifetime, but that even after Rabbi Chananiah's death he still felt that he had to go on record as disagreeing with Rabbi Chananiah. Alternatively, Rav Yehudah may have not voiced his dissent until after Rabbi Chananiah died because he was afraid that Rabbi Chananiah would offer proof that he was right, something he could no longer do after he had died.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   אל משה ואל אהרון, to Moses and to Aaron, etc. Perhaps the extra word ואל in ואל אהרון is intended to put Aaron on the same footing as Moses in their duty to communicate the laws of forbidden foods to the Israelites. G'd also addressed them as equals when He said: דברו (pl) אל בני ישראל. We find something similar in Exodus 12,1 where G'd used the same wording to introduce the legislation of the Passover. This interpretation is possible seeing that from an exegetical point of view we have other verses which teach us that Moses was to teach Aaron the law before the latter was able to communicate it to the Israelites.
  לאמור אליהם, to say to them. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on our verse explains the word אליהם, "to them," as a reference to Eleazar and Ittamar. The idea is that these two sons of Aaron were to be acquainted with this legislation before it was to be taught to the entire people. This is based on <i>Eyruvin</i> 54. Perhaps the Torah had in mind to emphasize a point made by the prophet in Maleachi 2,6 that the lips of the priests are to preserve knowledge and that people seek to obtain knowledge of Torah from the priests. The words לאמור אליהם may also reflect what I have explained in connection with Exodus 20,1 that the reason for the word לאמור is that the word emanates from the Supreme G'd and that G'd made an angel out of it and that it was that angel who spoke to Moses. [The concept is that the "word" is something in between a totally abstract concept and something which has at least a semblance of something physical about it. The absolute abstract, i.e. the Essence of G'd, cannot communicate with a human being who is part body by means of something entirely abstract. G'd therefore created an intermediary called an "angel" to accomplish communication by word of "mouth." Ed.] The word לאמור refers to that angel who would communicate with Moses and Aaron. This explanation is not at variance with what our sages said in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> at the beginning of the Book of Leviticus that G'd communicated verbally from the inside of the Tabernacle only with Moses, not with Aaron. What it means is simply that the angel who addressed Moses used the plural form דברו! when addressing him instead of saying to him דבר! (singular). Moses relayed the words to Aaron before he spoke to anyone else.
  
  Verse 2
  
   אל בני ישראל לאמור. to the children of Israel saying. The word לאמור here indicates that the legislation following conferred a distinction upon the Israelites who were to keep their distance from matters considered impure. <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 13,2 quotes Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai commenting on Chabakuk 3,6: "When He stands He measures the earth;" Rabbi Shimon interprets that G'd measured all the nations and found not one of them deserving to receive the Torah except the generation travelling through the desert. G'd measured all the mountains and the only one fit to hand down the Torah from was Mount Sinai. The word לאמור in this context must be understood along the lines of Isaiah 3,10: אמרו צדיק כי טוב כי פרי מעלליהם יאכלו. "Hail the just man, for he shall fare well; he shall eat the fruit of his works." The sequence of לאמור זאת means that Moses and Aaron are to take every kind of creature into their hands and display them saying: "this you may eat and this you may not eat." It was not enough to instruct the Israelites only orally.
  זאת החיה אשר תאכלו; "these are the living things which you may eat;" I have already explained elsewhere why the term חיה is applied here to domesticated animals בהמה. The term חיה implies that nothing evil adheres to these creatures. This term is used in contradistinction to other domesticated beasts which are not associated with the concept of sanctity at all.
  
  Verse 3
  
   כל מפרסת פרסה, Whatsoever parts the hoof; <i>Chulin</i> 59 explains that any beast which has cleft hooves also ruminates except for the pig. If the Torah nonetheless says "every animal with cleft hooves…is chewing the cud," and subsequently mentions the pig as being the exception to this rule, there is a deeper reason. Rabbeynu Bachyah, quoting a <i>Midrash Tanchuma,</i> states that even the pig will conform to the pattern of chewing the cud in the idyllic future foreshadowed by our prophets. The very word חזיר from the root חזר, to return, i.e. to reverse oneself, alludes to that future in an ideal world when even the pig will revert to being a pure animal fit for consumption by Jews. When viewed in this light, the fact that the Torah commences with the words כל מפרסת פרסה is quite appropriate as it does not exclude anything in the long run.
  
  Verse 4
  
   ממעלי הגרה זממפריסי הפרסה, of those which chew the cud or only part the hoof, etc. According to <i>Bechorot</i> 6 the apparent duplication in these words is to teach that if an unborn animal which has parted hooves and chews the cud is found inside a mother-animal which belongs to a forbidden category, such an unborn animal may not be eaten. However, the plain meaning of the verse is as follows: the words "of the ones which chew the cud" i.e. the camel, or of "the ones which part the hoof," i.e the pig. The letter ו is not a conjunctive letter but has the same meaning as או, "or."
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
   ואת הארנבת, and the rock-badger. The reason the Torah chooses to describe the whole species by its female gender is because when one deals with concepts of impurity one finds on occasion that the female is on top of the male making the male subordinate to the female. Mention of the female of the species first then is for the very same reason that the male is mentioned first most of the time, i.e. to describe the dominant part of the species. There is an interesting comment in the <i>Zohar</i> on פרשת פנחס page 231 according to which the mystical aspect of the יותרת הכבד (Leviticus 3,4 et al) is that the female input results in the male achieving whatever excess it possesses. [Seeing the word כבד, liver, is masculine, one would have expected the Torah to describe the lobe, יותרת as something masculine rather than something feminine. Ed.] We have already pointed out that all the forbidden species originate or have become part of the קליפה, the domain described in Kabbalah as part of the negative side of the emanations, that which is not destined for eternal life.
  
  Verse 7
  
   והוא גדה לא יגר, but it does not chew the cud, etc. The Torah uses these words as a condition, i.e. as long as the pig has not reverted to chewing the cud it may not be eaten. In the future, when it undergoes evolutionary changes so that it will become a ruminant, it will again be fit to be eaten by Jews. It is not the Torah which will adapt to "realities," but "reality" which will adapt to Torah; the laws of the Torah are immutable, the nature of the pig is not.
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
   שקץ הם לכם, they are a detestable thing unto you. The letter in ו verse 11, beginning with the words ושקץ יהיו לכם, is to be understood as the rationale; "because the Torah has determined in verse 10 that certain kinds of fish and other animals which populate the sea and the rivers are detestable, they must be regarded as detestable by Jews." We are taught in <i>Chulin</i> 5 that G'd protects the animals of the righteous so that they will not consume the kind of food forbidden to their owners. If G'd is so concerned about the food eaten by the property of the righteous, how mcuh more concerned must He be that the righteous themselves do not consume such food? <i>Tossaphot</i> comment there that we observe that a famous scholar committed judicial murder by executing a certain witness believing him to be an עד זומם, the type of false witness for whom the Torah legislated this penalty. How do we square this with the statement just quoted? <i>Tossaphot</i> answer that the rule applies only to food-intake, not to the commission of other sins. It would be demeaning for the צדיק to eat something the Torah characterised as שקץ even if he did so inadvertently. It is this idea the Torah refers to by writing ושקץ יהיו לכם, i.e. to include even people who eat these creatures inadvertently. The negative effect on the Jewish soul is not determined by whether such foods have been eaten deliberately or unintentionally. The words יהיו לכם tell us of the permanent effect consumption of such fish or crustaceans has on our personality, נפש.
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
  
  
  Verse 14
  
   ואת האיה למינה, and the falcon after its kind. The falcon mentioned here includes many different kinds of birds all of which are sub-categories of the falcon family. Our sages in <i>Chulin</i> 63 state that at the time they were familiar with 120 different species of birds all of which belonged to that family. There may be even more than that number. The same applies to the many varieties of ravens, though the Torah mentions only the word "the raven" as if there were only one such bird.
  
  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
  
  
  Verse 18
  
  
  
  Verse 19
  
  
  
  Verse 20
  
  
  
  Verse 21
  
   אשר לו כרעים. which have jointed legs above their feet, etc. In my treatise on <i>Tur Yore Deyah</i> 85 I have explained in detail that Rashi is correct that these winged creatures have to have legs which are attached close to their throats. People who permit these creatures to be eaten because there are no species which conform to this description are in error. The fact is that of the four, respectively eight categories of winged creatures listed in verses 22 as permitted to eat, only one category is found in our parts of the world. The eight kinds of forbidden swarming things listed in verses 29 and 30 also do not have their habitat in parts of the globe inhabited by Jews. Most of the winged things that do abound in our part of the globe do not have the kind of jointed legs that would make them edible according to the Torah's criteria. Most of these details are discussed in <i>Chulin</i> 63-65. The important thing is that the fact that we do not find the species mentioned in the Torah in our parts of the globe is no proof that they do not exist and that our sages have misinterpreted the Torah. Any G'd-fearing Jew will abstain therefore from eating any of these things and will protest when he sees other Jews eating them. For the last 12 years after I have published these words and people stopped eating these kinds of "grasshoppers," our land has not been afflicted by the plague of locusts. This is proof that observance of Torah and the commission of good deeds protects us against natural disasters.
  
  Verse 22
  
  
  
  Verse 23
  
   אשד לו ארבע דגלים, which have four legs. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains that the reason the Torah appears to repeat something here that has been written in verse 20 is to tell us that if such a creature has five legs it is permitted to be eaten. It would appear that the same holds true if such creatures have six or more legs. We need to examine why the Torah saw fit to write this legislation in an indirect way requiring us to arrive at the ruling that 5-legged winged swarming things are permitted by exegesis instead of writing outright that if such creatures have five legs we may eat them. Alternatively, the Torah could have written that any such creatures moving on more than 4 legs are permissible. Perhaps the Torah also had to inform us about the permissibility of brine in which forbidden locusts had been stored. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had interpreted the repetition of the word שקץ הוא to be an exclusion, i.e. only the actual body of the winged swarming thing is prohibited. The Torah therefore had to write this verse in order to get this point across.
  
  Verse 24
  
   ולאלה תטמאו. And by these you will become unclean; According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the word ולאלה refers to the future, i.e. the animals mentioned in the paragraph commencing now. If this were so, I do not understand the letter ו in the word ואלה. There was no need for that letter if all the Torah wanted to introduce here was the list of animals which confer impurity if one touches their carcass.
  Perhaps <i>Torat Kohanim</i> meant that the animals listed in the paragraph commencing here have the same הלכה concerning impurity as the ones already mentioned in the previous paragraph. In other words, every species of domestic animal and free-roaming animals whether of the pure or the impure categories which do not chew the cud or have parted hooves and are not listed by name are all included in the expression כל הבהמה. This would justify the extra letter ו before the word ולאלה. The letter ו then includes all the unnamed animals. This same rule applies also to all the animals listed in the paragraph detailing which identifying features make an animal suitable for consumption by Jews. Hence the Torah wrote the letter ו. In order that we should not make a mistake and include everything which had been mentioned earlier in this regulation, the Torah had to spell out that this legislation applies only to בהמה וחיה, to mammals.
  Another possibility is that the Torah was very interested in writing the regulations about impurity immediately adjoining the regulations about what may and what may not be eaten. The lesson is then that just as culpability for eating something forbidden commences when one has consumed a minimum amount of meat the size of an olive, so one does not become defiled unless one had contact with some dead animal or part of an animal not smaller than the size of an olive.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> posits that the verse deals with אבר מן החי, the law that one may not eat living tissue, i.e. tissue of an animal still alive regardless of whether the animal is of the permitted or the forbidden category. The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives the rule about the minimum size of an animal which confers impurity through contact with its carcass from verse 40 where the Torah writes that האוכל מנבלתם טמא עד הערב, that someone eating of the carcass of such dead animals remains impure until the evening of that day (after immersion). The exact wording in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is that "the words ולאלה תטמאו were only written in order to provide us with the minimum quantity that someone in contact with dead animals has to either consume or carry in order to become impure by such contact or eating." Perhaps one may say that an additional allusion found in these words is that if the animal gave birth to a category of animal such as the ones listed it is subject to the same ruling.
  I have seen that Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra wrote that he believed that the word אלה referred back to all the animals mentioned earlier including the winged swarming creatures. I think he would have done well not to write such a comment and to quarrel with the ancient commentators seeing that what he wrote cannot be supported at all. Who is going to take him seriously especially when he teaches something which contradicts our accepted tradition? Even a junior scholar can determine that this could not be the plain meaning of the verse. [The author continues to lambast Ibn Ezra in this vein. Ed.]
  
  Verse 25
  
  
  
  Verse 26
  
  
  
  Verse 27
  
  
  
  Verse 28
  
  
  
  Verse 29
  
   וזה לכם הטמא. This is what is impure for you among the swarming things which swarm on the earth; considering that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on the previous paragraph explained the word ואלה as teaching that eating living tissue of an animal causes impurity, the word וזה may be interpreted as comparing present legislation to previously announced legislation. Accordingly, this word teaches that our paragraph also speaks about אבר מן החי, teaching us that it is the limb size and not the size of the meat on it which determines when one becomes culpable regardless of whether we speak of mammals or swarming creatures.
  Furthermore, the letter ו before the word זה does not have to mean that we are to make the legislation in this paragraph interchangeable with that in the previous paragraph (as is the usual function of this letter ו at the beginning of a new pragaraph), but to give us warning that an additional type of impurity is conferred upon the person contacting the dead שרץ, namely having contacted merely its blood. Touching or otherwise being in contact with the blood of a dead mammal does not confer ritual impurity on a person (compare <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on our verse).
  The word לכם, "unto you," is explained by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as excluding blood from such creatures making plants susceptible to impurity as opposed to water and certain other liquids. The word also means that impurity is conferred by such creatures only on Jews, not on Gentiles.
  We need to examine why the Torah did not include the snake, the original cause of all ritual impurity, in the list of creatures whose carcass causes impurity on contact? Perhaps the reason is that the impurity caused by the serpent was of a spiritual rather than a physical nature. When the serpent dies, its body remains devoid of any vestige of spirituality so that impurity has nothing to attach itself to. We find a similar reasoning in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 114 where we are told that the reason the corpse of a pagan does not confer ritual impurity when one finds oneself under the same canopy with such a body is for this very reason. [The Talmud reports the prophet Elijah explaining that the term אדם is not applicable to pagans; hence their dead bodies cannot confer impurity by one being under the same canopy with such bodies. Ed.] Whereas the bodies of Israelites confer impurity when one is under the same canopy with them, this is because there is a residue of spirituality adhering to such bodies. [in kabbalistic terms there has not yet been a clean break between the fusion of soul (source of spirituality) and body which existed when the person was alive. Ed.] שרצים confer impurity by their bodies rather than by their spirits and this is why they confer such impurity only after they are dead. The impurity of the serpent by contrast is far more intense than that of the שרצים.
  למינהו, according to its kind. The meaning of the word is that there are numerous categories of turtles and lizards. Even if there were only one category of lizards the Torah would still use the word למינהו. In <i>Chulin</i> 122 we find the following <i>Baraitha:</i> "when the Torah speaks of הטמאים, the impure ones (an unnecessary letter ה ), this includes the skin of the soft skinned שרצים being considered as part of their flesh [when the skin is attached to the flesh. Ed.]; I might think that this rule applies to all of the animals listed; to inform me that this is not so the Torah writes אלה in the following verse (30). To the question that the word אלה is a collective term including all the previously mentioned animals, Rav answered that the word למינהו separates between what was described in the previous verses and what follows from here on in." Whence does Rav know that the word למינהו is intended to serve as an interruption of what was listed before instead of telling us that there are several varieties of turtles and lizards? We must assume that Rav did not mean to invalidate the plain meaning of the verse, i.e. that there are different varieties of lizards. He considered the fact that on the one hand the word הטמאים is used inclusively to extend the ritual impurity to the skins of these animals. On the other hand, the verse immediately adds an exclusion by writing the word אלה. If the word למינהו had not been written in between I would not have known how to apply the inclusive ה in the word הטמאים and the exclusive message contained in the word אלה. Now, -even though the word למינהו - is required in its own right, it also serves to separate between what was written in the previous verse and what is written in verse 30. This also answers the question raised by <i>Tossaphot</i> on that folio that if the word למינהו acts as separating the previous verse from the following one, why did the Torah have to write the word אלה? (<i>Tossaphot</i> remain with the question). When you adopt our approach there is no problem even according to the opinion that the word הטמאים includes the legislation that the skin of these animals also confers impurity. If we follow the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, the determining factor of whether the skin is treated like the flesh of the animal depends on the feel of the skin relative to the flesh. It does not depend on the verse these animals are mentioned in relative to other verses. [it appears that the main disagreement concerns the skin of the lizard which according to Rabbi Yehudah (<i>Shabbat</i> 107) would certainly not be considered as integral to the rest of the body. Ed.] At any rate, the word למינהו is certainly needed in its own right.
  
  Verse 30
  
  
  
  Verse 31
  
   הטמאים. the impure ones. How does the Rabbi who did not derive the impurity for the skins of these animals from the word הטמאים explain this word? According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on this verse that Rabbi derives from this word that the eggs of such שרצים are impure if they have developed to a stage where they clearly contained an embryo. <i>Me-ilah</i> 17 also teaches that the blood of one category of שרץ and another category of שרץ combine to form the minimal quantity which confers impurity on those contacting same.
  We have to know what the word אלה is to exclude according to the exegetical approach adopted by that Rabbi. Perhaps we must understand that Rabbi in terms of what Maimonides wrote in the fourth chapter of his treatise <i>Avot Hatumah,</i> namely that the blood of a שרץ conforms to the same rules as the שרץ itself as long as it is part of the animal. The word אלה teaches that when the blood of such a שרץ is no longer part of it, it does not combine with the animal it was taken from to form the minimal quantity which would confer impurity on someone who comes in contact with it.
  
  Verse 32
  
  
  
  Verse 33
  
  
  
  Verse 34
  
  
  
  Verse 35
  
  
  
  Verse 36
  
  
  
  Verse 37
  
  
  
  Verse 38
  
  
  
  Verse 39
  
  
  
  Verse 40
  
   והאכל מנבלתה, anyone eating of its carcass, etc. According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the only reason this verse was written is to inform us that the size of an animal which confers ritual impurity on someone carrying or touching its carcass is the same as that of someone eating of it, i.e. the size of an olive. The verse does not intend to convey the meaning that a reader who did not read any of the aforegoing would have derived from it, namely the prohibition of eating from such a carcass and that swallowing it confers impurity. The reason that we cannot understand the verse in that way is that we already have a clear verse in Leviticus 22,8: "he must not eat it on pain of becoming impure through it." The word בה in that verse is an exclusion and means that only the carcass of a pure bird which died of natural causes confers such impurity as soon as one swallows it but not the swallowing of parts of a mammal which dies of natural causes rather than ritual slaughter. Dead birds do not confer impurity through contact; therefore the Torah had to tell us that if the bird was a pure bird it does confer impurity as soon as it reaches one's esophagus and if a priest ate from that bird he is disqualified from performing his duties unless he purifies himself. Why did the Torah not spell out such a regulation but depended on our deriving it through exegesis? Perhaps the Torah intended to teach us numerous <i>halachot</i> from a single verse, something that would have been difficult if the verse had only stated that the carrion of a clean bird is capable of conferring impurity by one's swallowing it. We are taught in <i>Chulin</i> 71, for instance, that if the meat of a dead swarming thing has deteriorated to the extent that a dog would reject it as unfit to eat, it no longer confers impurity. This <i>halachah</i> is derived by <i>Tossaphot</i> in <i>Bechorot</i> 23. We have a verse in Kings II 9,10 where Izzevel, wife of king Achav, is described as being eaten by the dogs, not being buried. We note that consumption of meat by dogs is described by the term אוכל the same term used for humans consuming food. Seeing that it is the intention of our verse to establish a linkage between eating and impurity, it is only logical that other <i>halachot</i> of that nature may be derived from this verse.
  
  Verse 41
  
  
  
  Verse 42
  
  
  
  Verse 43
  
   אל תשקצו את נפשותיכם, "Do not make something detestable out of your persons, etc." Why did the Torah repeat this commandment? <i>Torat Kohanim</i> writes that this includes separate culpability for someone who after having contacted the dead part, let it go, and then touched it again. Granted that what is stated in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is true and that one is indeed culpable for repeated contact with carrion, why did the Torah have to write this? Who would have imagined that the second time one contacted the carrion one would not be culpable? Perhaps the verse wants to inform us that if someone eats these swarming things his soul will become something detestable and the Torah warns us in clear terms not to cause our souls to become something detestable. The Torah hints at the same time how much or how little of such carrion will have such an effect on our souls. Look at what we have written on Genesis 1,26 on the words וירדו בדגת הים, "and they are to have dominion over the fish of the sea, etc." You will find there that our sages in <i>Pessachim</i> 49 referred to עמי הארץ, unlearned and therefore not truly observant Jews, as שקץ and that they compared the daughters of such people to שרץ also. All such statemnents of our sages are inspired by the Holy Spirit. These words are identical to what we have written here.
  The Torah says here ולא תטמאו בהם, "do not make yourselves unclean with them." We need to be very circumspect concerning anything which may possibly infringe on this warning. Whenever we are in doubt about contacting something which may or may not fall under the category of things that would confer impurity on our souls we must avoid such things at all costs. There is no vegetable or other produce which is not infested with some of the things which are detestable; we must therefore be most careful in examining all such produce before consuming it.
  
  Verse 44
  
   כי אני ה׳ אלוקיכם, "for I am the Lord your G'd." The major difference between Israel and any other nation is that G'd has not described Himself as the "Lord G'd" of any other nation. This obligates us to keep our distance from anything which contaminates us. 
  והתקדשתם והייתם קדושים, "sanctify yourselves and be holy." The meaning of this statement is that if we do our share in trying to deserve the appellation "holy," G'd on His part will bestow such a title upon us by not allowing such contaminating elements to enter our bodies. We have already quoted the Talmud <i>Chulin</i> 4 in which G'd is described as insuring that even the beasts of the righteous do not eat matters unfit for the owner to eat. G'd would certainly protect the צדיק himself against erroneously consuming such matters.
  Another meaning of the word והתקדשתם is "sanctify yourselves by means of erecting protective legal fences," i.e. rabbinic ordinances designed to reduce the likelihood of contacting and absorbing impure material. G'd tells us that if you do this: "I in turn will help you become holy." The Torah then spells out in what respect you are going to be holy. כי קדוש אני, "for I am holy;" G'd made His presence amongst us dependent on our keeping ourselves apart from contaminating influences. This is why such people are entitled to the same appellation "holy" as is applied to G'd Himself. ולא תטמאו "and you will not become defiled, etc." This is a promise by G'd that if we make every effort not to become contaminated by the שרצים ושקצים swarming detestable things mentioned in this chapter, G'd's appreciation will become manifest in that we will not become the passive victims of other kinds of impurity. Pagans are included in the terminology שרצים ושקצים. G'd promises that if we make every effort not to become contaminated by the swarming or creeping things mentioned in this chapter, He will make sure that we will not be under the dominion of pagans.
  
  Verse 45
  
   כי אני ה׳ המעלה אתכם מארץ מצרים, "For I am the Lord who has brought you out of the land of Egypt, etc." The Torah provides proof that G'd will protect the Jewish people from becoming enmeshed in the sin of contamination by impuriy. He took the Israelites out of such a contaminated environment in which their souls were completely submerged. We have mentioned this concept on previous occasions. If the Israelites will now take active steps to preserve their isolation from such contamination, G'd will certainly do His share to see that it does not occur again. If, on the other hand, the Israelites were to absorb any of these forbidden שקצים ורמשים as nutrients, they would revert to the environment dominated by the spiritually negative forces of the world, the קליפות. In such a case G'd could not be their companion as He does not associate His name with such forces. This was the reason He never associated His name with the Israelites until after the people had left Egypt.
  
  Verse 46
  
   זאת תודת הבהמה והעוף, "This is the law of the beast and of the fowl, etc." The entire verse appears superfluous. <i>Chulin</i> 27 explains that the reason for the verse is to teach us that birds too require ritual slaughter; we learn this from the fact that the word עוף appears between the word בהמה and the word חיה הרומשת, the fish. Placing the bird where it did, the Torah indicated it was part חיה and part דג, fish. This is why when you slaughter a bird you need to sever only either the gullet or the windpipe not both, as in the case of mammals. We now understand why the Torah (Moses) in Numbers 11,22 does not use the expression ישחט when describing the fish of the sea. We never would have expected that fish would require ritual slaughter; why did the Torah have to exclude it by writing יאסף in that verse? Answer: seeing that the Torah in our verse listed mammals, birds, and fish in one sequence, I might have thought that the common denominator is that all of them require ritual slaughter. The word יאסף in conjunction with the words: "the fish of the sea" in Numbers 11,22 ensures that we do not arrive at the conclusion that fish need to be slaughtered in the regular way. Once we know that mammals need to have two vital pipes severed by slaughter and fish none, it is easy to arrive at the conclusion that birds need to have only one vital pipe severed by slaughter.
  You may ask that if this is so why did the Torah bother to also mention נפש השורצת על הארץ "every creature that swarms on earth" i.e. the grasshoppers or locusts in our verse? Answer: The Torah was concerned that since these creatures were not mentioned as exempt from ritual slaughter by the word יאסף in connection with fish in Numbers 11,22 that I might conclude locusts have to be slaughtered. By mentioning them in our verse after the fish which do not require slaughter the Torah precludes us from making such an error.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   דבר …לאמור. "Speak…to say." Why does the word לאמור have to be repeated here, seeing verse 1 ended with the word לאמור, "to say?" Perhaps the reason is that this commandment is addressed primarily to women. The word לאמור after "the children of Israel," is a warning to the women to pay special attention to this legislation. We may also explain this extra word לאמור in accordance with <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on this verse which explains the words בני ישראל as excluding Gentiles. The word לאמור stresses that it is a privilege for Jewish women to be given this legislation. Had they not been on a spiritually higher level than their non-Jewish counterparts they would not have been considered as having suffered impurity through such a natural process as giving birth. [seeing that their spiritual level had been temporarily eclipsed by the need to focus on purely bodily functions, the mothers need to purify their bodies to make it fit again for their spiritual functions. Ed.]
  אשה כי תזריע וילדה זכר, a woman who brings forth seed by giving birth to a male child, etc. Why did the Torah not simply write: אשה כי תלד זכר, "when a woman gives birth to a male child, etc.?" The words כי תזריע appear superfluous. Our sages disagree about the reason. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on our verse writes that these words tell us that contrary to expectations a woman who was already pregnant before this legislation was revealed to the people is also subject to it, whereas she does not contract impurity if she gave birth just before this legislation was revealed. Anonymous sages state that when the baby is delivered by caesarean incision the mother does not contract impurity. The fetus has to exit from the same place where the seed entered. Rabbi Shimon holds that even if an indeterminate mass is delivered, i.e. some fetus clearly unable to live, the mother does contract impurity and has to bring the required offerings. He does not accept the view that if a woman gives "birth" by caesarean incision that she is not subject to the legislation in our chapter. Why did the Torah use the future tense in the words כי תזריע, and switch to the past tense writing וילדה instead of ותלד? We find that the Torah does use the word ותלד when describing the birth of a female child in verse 5! Although there are numerous instances when a form of the past tense of the verb is used by the Torah to describe something in the future, the Torah does not switch tenses unnecessarily without trying to draw our attention to some additional meaning. Furthermore, why does the Torah write וילדה, "she gave birth," instead of אם ילדה זכר, "if she gave birth to a male child as a result," seeing there is no certainty that she will indeed give birth to a male child rather than to a girl? One could answer the last question by saying that the word כי in כי תזריע is equivalent to the word אם, "if," and that this word belongs to the latter half of the verse. This is a forced explanation, however.
  Our sages in <i>Niddah</i> 31 as well as in <i>Berachot</i> 60 are of the opinion that if the woman achieves orgasm first during marital intercourse the baby born from such a union will be male, and that the Torah here informs us of this biological fact. This is why the Torah wrote וילדה זכר as something that is definite. While it is true that Rabbi Tzadok arrived at this conclusion exegetically from Genesis 46,15 ואת דינה בתו, the fact is that the Torah made the birth of a male child dependent on an experience of the mother, and the birth of a female child on the experience of the father during their union. The verse in Genesis does not provide a reason for this linkage to the respective experience of father and mother during their union. [The author of <i>Torah Temimah</i> comments on that verse that the scientific aspect of the matter was an established fact for our sages; they knew that when two factors have to combine to create something it is the last factor which determines the nature of the product. Hence, if the male has spent his reproductive effort before the woman, the result will be a female child corresponding to the reproductive power of the woman. We do not "learn" this from that verse; the verse only alludes to something already known. Ed.] In our verse the Torah explains the reason for this fact of life, namely that the crucial factor is who spends his reproductive power first. The Torah did not need to add the word "first" in our verse for even if the mother were not to expend her reproductive power first she does have to spend it in order to produce a child of either gender. This is why the Torah also had to write the verse in Genesis 46,15 so that from the two verses combined we would know what factors determine the sex of a baby. [The word ואת, "and in addition," in that verse in Genesis indicates that Leah was last in spending her reproductive power during the union that led to the birth of Dinah. Hence the child was a female. Ed.].
  The Torah managed to include still more information in these few words. In Psalms 139,5 David says: "you have created me both last and first." This line is explained by <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 8,1 as referring to two separate creations of man. His body was created at the very end of the six days of creation whereas his spirit had been created already in the first verse of the Torah prior to the creation of the light, when the Torah described the spirit of the Lord as hovering over the deep. We are told by the <i>Zohar Kedoshim</i> page 80 that the nature of the soul or personality of a baby is determined by the thoughts of the father and mother during marital union. If the parents entertain unworthy thoughts during such a union the personality of the baby will tend to be attracted to spiritually negative forces, whereas if the thoughts of the parents during their physical union are worthy this will be reflected in the children of such unions. Consider carefully what we are told in <i>Berachot</i> 10 and the Jerusalem Talmud <i>Sanhedrin</i> 10,2 about what happened to the children of the pious king Chizkiyah who had married the daughter of the prophet Isaiah. [the regular text of the Talmud does not have this; parts are found in <i>Eyn Yaakov</i> Ed.) According to the Talmud there the reason that Menashe and Ravshoke, the sons of that union, became such heretics was some unworthy thoughts entertained by Chiskiyah's wife at the time the child was conceived. (supposedly she fantasized about the servants of Merodach Baladon king of Babylon) If we accept this, the most important part of the "birth," i.e. the fusion of soul and body takes place already at the time of conception. Not only that, but the thought which precedes ejaculation of the semen has a determining influence on the tendency of the baby's character development. This would be the mystical aspect of the words כי תזריע וילדה, the nature of what will be born is determined at the time of conception. After that period it is already too late to reverse what occurred at the time of the union between father and mother. The term לידה, birth, is therefore applicable to a process which is a long way from becoming visible. Once we have appreciated this we will have a better understanding of Genesis 12,5 where the Torah speaks of personalities נפש which Abram and Sarai made in Charan, i.e. due to their union as man and wife. Although Sarai had not given birth to a physical child in those years, the thoughts that she and her husband entertained while they tried to conceive children produced the kinds of souls which became G'd fearing individuals in other bodies. This does not contradict the truth of the statement that the sex of the child is determined at the time of conception. The Torah wrote the word זכר, male, as a hint that already during the moments when the bodies of the parents join in marital union they have it within their power to determine the sex of the child which will be the result of such a union by dint of the thoughts which they entertain at that time. These will enable them to draw down from heaven a male soul. (or "a soul from the part of heaven inhabited by male souls").
  The verse contains an allusion to other psychological factors which are part of the process of conception, i.e. the physical union between man and wife. A woman is neither obligated to have children, nor does she as a rule volunteer to beconme pregnant, an experience she finds often painful, fraught with many discomforts and danger to her health culminating in the excruciatingly painful experience of giving birth. In fact, there are women who avoid getting married in order to avoid the experience of pregnancy and birth. If the woman does get married, the feelings she entertains during marital intercourse are frequently limited to gratifying her physical pleasure during such intercourse. According to <i>Gittin</i> 49 a woman's desire in this respect is greater than that of her husband. [according to the author this is the meaning of the statement in the Talmud that "her urge to get married is greater than that of her husband." Ed.] In our verse the Torah hints that if a woman enters marriage although she is not commanded to do so, this will be accounted for her as a meritorious deed, as if she were a male and had fulfilled the commandment to procreate incumbent upon the male. The Torah writes: אשה כי תזריע, that when a woman is active in joining in an activity which will result in the birth of a baby, i.e. she engages in intercourse in order to have children, and not in order to satisfy her biological urge, she may have a son. If the Torah had merely written אשה כי תלד זכר," when a woman gives birth to a male child, etc," we would have understood that the process described above occurs as a result of any mating between husband and wife irrespective of their thoughts at the time. As it is, the Torah teaches how a woman can acquire the stature of a זכר, male. The reason the Torah has to add the word וילדה is to tell us that she attains that level only if the thoughts she entertained during intercourse also result in the actual birth of a child. Perhaps this is also part of the meaning of the word לאמור in verse 2, the need for which we had questioned earlier. The sequence of לאמור אשה, suggests that Moses was to tell the women how a woman may attain a spiritually superior niveau; she will do so by volunteering to have children and by entertaining lofty thoughts during the process of conception. Perhaps this is the mystical dimension of Proverbs 10,1; בן כסיל תוגת אמו; "a foolish son is his mother's sorrow." A son who is not up to the expectations of his mother may well be the outcome of the kind of thoughts the mother did not entertain when she conceived him.
  The verse also contains an allusion to the כנסת ישראל, the Jewish people as a conceptual entity. We find that this term is applied to women in such verses as Isaiah 54,5: כי בעליך עושיך, "for He who has made you will espouse you;" the prophet also continues: ואשת נעורים, "and the wife of your youth;" the prophet Hoseah describes the relationship of G'd and כנסת ישראל in Hoseah 2,21: וארשתיך לי לעולם, (G'd speaking to His bride) "I will betroth Myself to you forever, etc." Isaiah 50,1: "where is the bill of divorce I have given you?" There are more such verses to be found scattered throughout the Books of the Prophets. וילדה זכר, "and she gives birth to a male child, etc." when viewed from a moral-ethical vantage-point, the Torah reveals that when the מזריע the initiative for the husband-wife relationship with G'd originates with the Jewish people, the כנסת ישראל, then the product of such an initiative will be a male child, זכר, the entire nation will attain the highest spiritual level. The word זכר, male, is hyperbole for the highest moral-ethical achievenment. In <i>Sanhedrin</i> 98 and <i>Shemot Rabbah</i> 15 the superiority of the ultimate redemption to the redemption at the time of the Exodus from Egypt is described. The ultimate redemption is perceived there as the corollary of Israel distinguishing itself by the performance of good deeds, etc. The prophet described the Exodus in terms of Israel being "naked and nude" (Ezekiel 16,7). Clothing is perceived as a layer of מצות and good deeds covering our bodies. The inadequacy of the Jewish people at the time of the Exodus is underlined in Deut. 4,34 where G'd describes the Exodus as wrenching one people from the midst of the same people, something that made it legally difficult for G'd to justify taking the Israelites out of Egypt when He did. That redemption has been described only in female terms and that is why it did not endure in the end and the Temple was destroyed. Not so the redemption of the future which will occur as a direct result of Israel's merits. First and foremost among those merits is Israel's preoccupation with Torah as described in Deut. 31,21 something that will never be forgotten even during a protracted period of exile. The Torah continues: וטמאה, the mother contracts ritual impurity as a result of giving birth. Here the Torah alludes to the way G'd initiates a process which culminates in the rehabilitation of Israel so that it will attain a spiritual level that qualifies for the description זכר. The "days" mentioned here are to be understood as seven years similar to Genesis 24,55 where Laban and his mother wanted Rebeccah to delay her departure by ימים, i.e. a year. The years which are viewed as the חבלי משיח, the birth-pangs of the Messiah, last for seven years during which Israel will be refined spiritually in preparation of his arrival. He will make his appearance during the eighth year. On the eighth day, at the beginning of the eighth day (year), the baby is to have its foreskin removed, i.e. the concept of a foreskin which acts as a barrier between man and G'd will be removed from the universe. We read in Zachariah 13,2 that G'd will destroy the spirit of impurity from the earth. This will occur during the eighth year. It is well known that conceptually the foreskin is identical with the forces of the קליפה, the spiritually negative emanations. When the Torah wrote the word וטמאה, describing the state of the mother, this is a simile for the afflictions experienced during the birth-pangs of the Messiah.
  
  Verse 3
  
   וביום השמיני, and on the eighth day, etc. Why did the Torah have to instruct us to circumcise a male baby on the eighth day, something that has been legislated already in Genesis 17,12 prior to the birth of Isaac, even? If all the Torah wanted was to tell us that the rite of circumcision must be performed by day and not by night, or that the importance of circumcising the baby on the eighth day is so important that the Sabbath may be violated in order to fulfil this commandment on time (compare <i>Shabbat</i> 132), why did G'd not include this information in Genesis?
  Perhaps the reason G'd did not mention all this to Abraham at the time was so that people should not think that only the patriarchs were allowed to violate the Sabbath in order to circumcise the baby on the eighth day, seeing they had not yet been commanded to observe the Sabbath as a day of rest and that therefore the observance of the Sabbath was not so important. However, the Israelites, who were warned in Exodus 31,14 not to violate the Sabbath on pain of execution, were not expected to circumcise their babies on the Sabbath. The Torah repeated the legislation here in order to include the detail that the Sabbath was not to take precedence over circumcision on the eighth day. While it is true that the Talmud in <i>Chulin</i> 101 states that the legislation about גיד הנשה was legislated at Mount Sinai, the Torah decided to record it in Genesis 32,33 to inform us of the reason for this legislation. Similar considerations may have motivated the Torah in recording the legislation about circumcision already in Genesis 17,12 though it was commanded to the Jewish people collectively at Mount Sinai. All of this still enables those who want to, to argue that there is reason to be more lenient about the date of the circumcision prior to the revelation at Mount Sinai than afterwards.
  Furthermore, we may assume that what the legislation revealed to Abraham in Genesis 17,12 means is that it is as binding as if it had been revealed at Mount Sinai and that therefore the Torah did not need to add any details to that legislation when the Israelites stood at Mount Sinai. G'd did not need to write a special verse to tell Abraham to perform circumcision even on the Sabbath as he would have understood this on his own just as he understood many other מצות which were never spelled out to him. The reason he would have considered the circumcision legislation as overriding the Sabbath legislation is that G'd had not bothered to command him specifically to observe the Sabbath, but He had commanded him specifically concerning the circumcision. In fact, if G'd had spelled out to Abraham that the circumcision on the eighth day overrides the Sabbath legislation, every exegete would have written reams of paper wanting to know why G'd had bothered to do this, seeing that Abraham could have arrived at this by simple logic. Seeing G'd did not tell Abraham, He had to tell the Israelites who, after all, had been commanded to observe the Sabbath and who could not have arrived at these details by using logic as could Abraham at the time.
  Let us now turn to why the Torah wrote this piece of legislation immediately after the law about the mother who gave birth contracting a kind of ritual impurity lasting for seven days similar to the menstrual impurity. The Torah simply wanted to explain why the circumcision of the baby has to be delayed for seven days (compare <i>Shabbat</i> 135). This is the reason that the Torah wrote וביום השמיני, the letter ו indicating that the timing was related to what has been described previously. The Talmud in <i>Niddah</i> 31 elaborates further, suggesting that the "whole world should not be rejoicing when the baby is introduced to Judaism while its mother is depressed being ritually impure." <i>Devarim Rabbah</i> 6,1 writes as follows: "why does the baby have to be circumcised on the eighth day after its birth? G'd exercised His mercy on the baby waiting until it was strong enough to endure this operation. Just as G'd exercises His mercy on human beings He did so on animals and this is why a new born animal may not be offered as a sacrifice until the eighth day after it has been born (compare Leviticus 22,27).
  How do we know that the baby attains a certain amount of physical strength by the eighth day after its birth? It appears that we have to rely on the Zohar both in our <i>Parshah</i> as well as in <i>Parshat Emor</i> where it is explained that the experience of a single Sabbath in its life confers such additional physical strength upon both the baby and the new-born animal. The Sabbath experience provides what is called כח חיוני, a life-sustaining force. You will also find the comment of <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 10 that prior to the first Sabbath the universe was in a very unstable condition. It was only the Sabbath which helped stabilise the entire universe. This is what the sages meant when they said that the experience of a Sabbath helps stabilise the vital signs of new-born babies and animals. The letter ו in the word וביום also links the impurity of the mother to the circumcision experience of the baby, i.e. if the baby's mother is meticulous in her observance of the laws pertaining to menstruating women, her baby's chances of living long enough to experience circumcision and not being harmed by it are improved.
  Our verse may also be explained in terms of <i>Tanchuma Tazria</i> 5 where we have the following statement: "The Roman Governor Turnus Rufus asked Rabbi Akiva whose actions were more pleasing, G'd's or man's? Rabbi Akiva answered that man's actions were more pleasing. Turnus Rufus asked why the Israelites circumcised themselves? Rabbi Akiva said he had known that Turnus Rufus would ask him this and this is why he had said immediately that man's actions were more pleasing. Rabbi Akiva brought both ears of corns and white flour proclaiming: "the former are representative of G'd's works, the latter are representative of man's works. Are not the latter nicer than the former?" Thereupon Turnus Rufus wanted to know why G'd commanded circumcision instead of creating man without a foreskin? Rabbi Akiva replied that the whole reason for Torah legislation is in order to refine human beings as we know from Psalms 18,31 'the word of the Lord is refining;' Rabbi Akiva did not content himself with the example of the ears of corn versus the finished product, the scone or roll, seeing that the improvement necessary in order to convert ears of corn into flour is intended to add to man's enjoyment and man therefore is motivated to convert ears of corn into flour. This cannot be said of his body. Man does not feel that the foreskin is a hindrance to his physical perfection. There was a reason therefore for G'd Himself to create man without a foreskin if that was His will. Why did He leave this to man instead of doing it Himself? Rabbi Akiva therefore answered Turnus Rufus that G'd's laws are designed to refine man. This appears to be a very enigmatic answer for someone like Turnus Rufus. A pagan of the type of Turnus Rufus does not understand the concept that man has to attain his relative perfection by means of carrying out G'd's commandments. He therefore accepted the answer at face value. We Israelites, G'd's favourites, have to examine the matter on a different level. One of the remarkable things is the fact that whereas in nature we observe that nature's products reproduce themselves true to existing features, i.e. the farmer having achieved a certain strain of wheat, for instance, will find that if he sows seed of that strain they will reproduce themselves identically, the same is not true of circumcised Jews producing children without a foreskin. All our evolutionary studies ought to dictate that after thousands of years of male Jews living their lives without foreskins, their children should be born without foreskins! Even if we were to argue that once one has been born with a foreskin the laws of mutation will ignore such a fact and he will reproduce children with a foreskin, why did someone such as Moses who was born without a foreskin (compare <i>Sotah</i> 12) not produce children without foreskins?
  Let me enlighten you in matters of G'd's instructions to us. We have learned that the foreskin symbolises evil, its very presence drawing attention to hidden characteristics. Man's entire body is a sheath for the personality it hides within. The sheath reveals information concerning what is inside it. G'd told the Jewish people that by removing the visible evidence of evil within them, i.e. the foreskin, they would be able to diminish the power of evil hidden inside their bodies also. If the Gentiles were to do the same, the effect would not be the same as their entire personalities are the outgrowths of spiritually negative forces, as represented by their foreskins. When the prophet Jeremiah 9,25 refers to all Gentiles summing them up as "foreskins," this is very significant. It is a well-known fact that Adam possessed perfect health, that his body created by G'd Himself lacked any particle of impurity; as a result he had no foreskin which could symbolise any hidden impurity. When the Talmud <i>Sanhedrin</i> 38 describes Adam as "pulling" on his foreskin after he committed the sin of eating from the tree of knowledge, this is a way of saying that he had developed a foreskin. After Eve had eaten from the tree of knowledge, she too developed signs of physical impurity reflecting the fact that her personality had absorbed input by the forces of impurity. In her case the external sign of such impurity which corresponded to the foreskin in Adam was the menstrual blood. The Talmud <i>Eyruvin</i> 100 describes no less than ten curses Eve suffered as a result of her eating from that tree. Man's sin impacted on nature as a whole. Starting after the sin, the earth began to produce fruit covered with many peels, the husks of an ear of grain being one example of such קליפות, "peels. 
  Proof of all this is that man cannot enjoy bread until he has first removed these peels from the kernel of grain. He can convert it into flour only after having removed the outer husk. In fact, the grain has to undergo no less than 10 stages of refinement before we can serve it up as bread (compare <i>Shabbat</i> 73). These ten stages correspond to the ten curses we mentioned earlier (compare <i>Zohar Pinchas</i> page 243). This is why when the time comes which is envisaged by the prophet Zachariah 13,2 the earth will once again give forth rolls or scones, ready to eat. This is what Rabbi Akiva had in mind when he contrasted the rolls with the ears of corn. The reason that nature (G'd) does not produce perfection nowadays is not G'd's inability to do so but man's interference in the mechanism G'd had provided for nature. As a result, when man procreates at a time when he is already minus the foreskin, the forces represented by the foreskin have not thereby been vanquished; they are still as active as ever in our universe and man is nourished daily by products which have been influenced by all the spiritually negative forces which are rampant in nature. As a result, the seed which ultimately develops into a baby, has been inhibited by all these negative forces in our world preventing it from developing into a human being minus the foreskin. As to Turnus Rufus' second question that if G'd does indeed want man to be circumcised why had He not created him so, this question was based on his ignorance of the relationship between spiritual inadequacy and the resultant inadequacies in nature.
  Alternatively, Turnus Rufus was aware that man's external appearance, i.e. that tangible aspects of man reflect some of his intangible parts inside of him; he thought that such stains on man's character as were reflected by his exterior had been given to him by G'd at birth. He believed that when G'd ordered for man to remove his foreskin, the character stains which his foreskin reflected would be removed from him by G'd. Rabbi Akiva gave him a general answer concerning the purpose of the positive and negative commandments. Having a foreskin is not indicative of a single stain on one's character or even a single inadequacy which has become part of human nature. Rather, it is a reminder of basic inadequacies which man is troubled by ever since Adam ate from the tree of knowledge. Inasmuch as man caused these inadequacies, he must labour to overcome them. G'd does not do it for him. Rabbi Akiva explained that all the positive commandments combined are designed to refine man, i.e. to gradually remove the stains which are part of his being a creature born of woman. Performance of each positive commandment restores some of the spiritual light which has become encapsuled in a "peel" as a result of eating from that tree. The negative commandments on the other hand, are the agents which remove the sickness which adheres to man's soul ever since first man allowed such diseases to become part of him. The whole process of rehabilitation is best described in Proverbs 6,23 כי נר מצוה ותורה אור, "performance of a single commandment is equivalent to providing the kind of light given by a single candle, whereas the performance of all of the Torah's commandments (not given to a single individual to perform) provides "Light", i.e. will restore the light which existed when Adam was in גן עדן." It is not G'd who does all this; G'd gave man the commandments as tools in order to enable him to find his way back to "paradise lost." Seeing Adam had contaminated all future souls, it is up to each human being to rehabilitate himself individually. I have dealt with the subject in my commentary on Genesis 4,7.
  Furthermore, if we were to allow G'd to remove all these impediments man faces nowadays, the whole concept of reward and punishment which is the philosophical basis of Judaism would be negated. How can one expect to be rewarded for gifts given to us by G'd? To sum up: the fact that we are born with a foreskin is the result of spiritual damage caused to man's soul as a by-product of his sin. This spiritual damage is reflected in an outgrowth of his body, i.e. the foreskin. G'd ordered every male Israelite to excise the visible part of this evil from his body. Having done this his soul will also be on the road to recovery. This is why the Torah stresses וביום "and on that day," etc. There was already the need for the mother to purify herself from the impurity contracted through giving birth. Now there is the added commandment to remove the foreskin from the baby. G'd commands concerning both these rehabilitative steps simultaneously. This is the meaning of וביום השמיני, "and on the eighth day, etc." Seeing that the sin of Eve had been greater than that of Adam, man is able to remove the physical reminder of his impurity with one stroke i.e. the foreskin does not grow back [as distinct from normal skin Ed.], whereas woman experiences menstrual bleeding at regular intervals.
  Perhaps another reason why G'd commanded that circumcision should be performed on the eighth day, not sooner and not later, was because on that day G'd judges the mother who has to count seven days of impurity from the moment the baby left her womb. The baby is perceived as having left a grave [simile for the mother's womb. Ed.] hence the baby itself has become contaminated by contact with the impurity suffered by its mother. Seeing that circumcision is equivalent to G'd revealing His name to man as I have hinted in my commentary in <i>Parshat Vayera</i> where G'd visited Abraham after he had circumcised himself, He wanted to wait until the seven days during which cleansing from that impurity occurs have passed. On the eighth day the baby is fit to be circumcised.
  ימול בשר ערלתו. "the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised." We understand this in terms of what we have already mentioned, namely that the foreskin is a tangible symbol of the קליפה, the spiritually negative part of the emanations. The Torah hints here that the ritual of circumcision consists of three stages. They are called: מילה, פריעה, מציצה; 1) the removal of the foreskin itself; 2) the splitting of the membrane and pulling it down; 3) the sucking of some blood from the place where the foreskin has been cut. The word ימול refers to the cutting of the foreskin. The פריעה does not involve cutting that membrane and is alluded to in the text by the word בשר. This rite insures that the foreskin will not grow back. The word בשר suggests "dead meat." The מציצה consists of removing blood which had been contaminated by the two parts of the foreskin which have been removed. This blood was considered as part of the foreskin and has to be removed alongside with the foreskin. This ritual is alluded to in the text by the word ערלתו, his foreskin.
  There is an interesting analysis of the concept of קליפות, peels, in an appendix to the first volume of the <i>Zohar</i> page 262. The "peels" surrounding the kernel "sanctity" are compared to the four peels surrounding the walnut. The comparison is based on Solomon speaking of the גנת אגוז, in Song of Songs 6,11. 1) There is an outer shell which is bitter in taste, eventually dries out and falls of its own accord. 2) There is the hard shell. 3) There is the flexible type of shell which separates different edible parts of the nut from one another. 4) There is the thin peel which adheres to the fruit itself and is edible when attached to the fruit. This inner peel is not considered so despicable unless it is separated from the edible part of the nut. When we contemplate the ritual of circumcision, we think in terms of three peels. The foreskin itself is somewhat like the outer shell of the walnut. The membrane we fold back during what is called פריעה corresponds to the hard shell of the nut which is broken before one can get at the edible part. Finally, the act of מציצה, the sucking away of contaminated blood, corresponds to the inner peel of the nut which separates edible parts from one another. It too has to be removed in order to enable us to eat the nut without hindrance. Man still remains with the last "peel" the one that we described as not totally despicable while it is attached to the edible part. <i>Zohar</i> part one, page 78, refers to this part as the peel which is attached to a boy until he reaches the age of 13. Until that time he is still considered as possessing some kind of ערלה, foreskin in the allegorical sense, seeing he does not yet have an antidote to the evil urge he has been born with. To carry the simile a little further. Just as every fruit-bearing tree is considered by the Torah as ערלה during its first three years of existence, so man, who is compared elsewhere by the Torah to the tree in the field, is considered as still possessing some ערלה until his בר מצוה. Once he enters the fourteenth year of his life he is קדש הילולים, all his products (deeds) may become holy unto G'd.
  Another way of looking at our verse may be parallel to what is written in the תקוני הזהר section 24, folio 69. The commandment of circumcision consists of three levels. The highest level of this commandment is the circumcision of the children of the righteous, the children of the living G'd. Their circumcision is an experience comparable to revelation of G'd's very name to them. They will consider the experience as if G'd's holy name had been engraved on their very flesh which had thus become sanctified. The next lower level of the circumcision experience is that experienced by the average person. For such people the experience of circumcision is equivalent to their having become a sacrificial offering to G'd. The third level of circumcision is when children of forbidden unions are circumcised, people who are evil and hated by G'd. When people like that perform the ritual of circumcision it is as if they donated part of themselves to the original serpent, as if giving it dust which is its bread, i.e. these people feed the forces of evil (compare <i>Tikkuney Hazohar</i> folio 10). These three levels of the circumcision experience are alluded to in the Torah by the words ימול־בשר־ערלתו. The first word ימול may be understood as יו׳ד מול, G'd (יו׳ד) is perceived as present by the person being circumcised. The word בשר is a simile for the meat-offerings, i.e. the person being circumcised conceives of himself as being sacrificial meat. The word ערלתו is a simile for the people whom G'd hates being circumcised. The word "his foreskin" is a reference to the unworthy part of man which in reality is part of Satan. Unworthy people are perceived as donating those parts to Satan when they undergo circumcision. As a result of these considerations we find that G'd commanded all three levels of our people to undergo the ritual of circumision so that a Jewish court would not be able to say that there is no point in performing circumcision on the body of a ממזר, a "bastard" (the product of a union between partners who are forbidden to be joined in marriage on pain of the <i>Karet</i> penalty). The reason the Torah wants the foreskin of such a bastard removed is to weaken the Satanic forces active within such a person. This is so even though such a male is not allowed to marry a Jewish girl even after he has been circumcised. Once his foreskin has been removed this (innocent) victim of the sins of his parents has a chance to perfect his personality and to strengthen all the positive elements within him. This is why our sages in <i>Horiot</i> 13 are on record that a ממזר who is a Torah scholar takes precedence in matters of personal honour over a High Priest who has not studied Torah.
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
   ואם נקבה תלד, and if she gives birth to a female child, etc. Why does the Torah not describe the birth with the word וילדה as it did in the case of a male child? <i>Torat Kohanim</i> write: "how would I have known that the legislation of impurity due to giving birth applies not only in the case of a female child being born but also if a child of undetermined sex or a bisexual child had been born? The Torah writes אם נקבה תלד וטמאה, "if she gives birth to a female she is ritually impure" to teach us that the basic ritual impurity depends on the birth process not on the sex of the baby being born." I most certainly do not want to dispute what <i>Torat Kohanim</i> has written, but I do want to add something to that comment. Perhaps the author of this comment arrives at his conclusion by the failure of the Torah to write simply וכי תלד נקבה, "if she gives birth to a female," with the verb at the beginning of the sentence instead of at its end. This latter sequence of the words would have indicated that what the woman gave birth to would result in her becoming ritually impure only if the baby was definitely female. As it is, the wording allows also for babies of indeterminate sex.
  Alternatively, the fact that the position of the word תלד is interpreted by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as including אנדרוגינוס, bisexual children, may reflect the fact that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> holds a view similar to that expressed in <i>Bikkurim</i> 4,5 that such a creature is considered as in a category by itself. [The author proceeds to analyse this problem; the interested reader is referred to the original. Ed.]
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
   והקריבו לפני ה׳ וכפר עליה; and he shall offer it before G'd and make atonement for her. Concerning the offering of the sheep as a burnt-offering the Torah said והקריבו, whereas concerning the turtle-dove as the sin-offering the Torah writes וכפר עליה, "and he will make atonement for her." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> write that the two sacrifices are not both dependent on each other in order to fulfil their respective tasks but that only one depends on the other. I do not know therefore which of the two sacrifices is indispensable, and this is why the Torah said והקריבו, he will offer it up. Had, the Torah only written these words I still would not have known which one of these two sacrifices was indispensable; therefore the Torah adds the words וכפר עליה to tell us that the sin-offering is indispensable. Perhaps the exegesis is derived from the fact that the Torah could have simply written והקריבם, "and he is to offer them up." The fact that the Torah spent all these extra words teaches that the two sacrifices are not of equally indispensable nature.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   אדם כי יהיה בעור בשרו שאת או ספחת, when a person shall have in the skin of his flesh a rising or a scab, etc. We have to explain this verse in a similar vein to the statement in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 114 on Numbers 19,14: "you are called אדם, whereas the title אדם is never applied to Gentiles, for the Gentiles are not susceptible to the impurity resulting from the various skin-diseases enumerated in our <i>Parshah</i>." This statement, attributed to the prophet Elijah, is proof that the clothing of Gentiles afflicted with these נגעים, stains mentioned in our chapter, does not confer impurity on Jews in contact with them as we have learned at the beginning of the eleventh chapter of the tractate נגעים.
  כי יהיה בעור בשרו, which he will have on the skin of his flesh, etc; the Torah informs us here that only the skin of Israelites afflicted with this disease is affected. The disease does not penetrate below the skin. This is a principal difference between Israelites and Gentiles; the latter are perceived as afflicted with this disease through and through. Their entire being is perceived as being part of the צרעת syndrome. If an Israelite has committed a sin which results in נגע צרעת, the skin afflictions mentioned in this chapter, it is visible only on his exterior not on his flesh and certainly not his soul, personality.
  Our sages in <i>Erchin</i> 3 explain the word אדם as meaning that even a baby can be afflicted with the disease related here as babies too qualified for the term אדם. Women too are included as the Torah refers to man and woman combined as אדם in Genesis 5,8. 
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> adds that the reason the Torah chose the expression בעור בשרו, the skin of his flesh, instead of merely בעורו, on his skin, is to include the skin on which hair does not grow. We are not to think that only skin with follicles, i.e. capable of producing hair, is included here. [the Torah features the colour of hair surrounding these skin blemishes, and it was therefore reasonable to assume that only those patches of hair are subject to this legislation. Ed.] As it is, if a white hair grew in an area normally devoid of hair, the legislation in this chapter applies. Nonetheless the white spot on the skin has to precede the appearance of the hair before this legislation can apply. If an old man or an albino who normally has white hair, first develops the symptoms on the skin described here and a white hair makes its appearance subsequently, it is doubtful if such a person is considered afflicted seeing the hair did not turn white as a result of the condition of the skin surrounding it. On the other hand, the progression of the symptoms conforms to what is written in the Torah. We are unable to determine with certainty that the hair grew white from the source as at the time the person appears before the priest we only see the ultimate result and do not know whether the hair grew black and immediately turned white. <i>Tossaphot</i> in <i>Niddah</i> 19 feel that the bright spot on the skin, בהרת, is presumed to have caused the hair to turn white. At any rate, such a situation is one which is known in הלכה as ספק טומאה, a state of doubtful impurity.
  שאת או ספחת, a rising or a scab; we are taught in <i>Nega-im</i> 1,1 that the meaning of the word ספחת is a kind of שאת, a whiteness which is a shade darker than that of בהרת, as the colour of שאת is similar to clean wool and similar in whiteness to the whitewash used in the Temple. Even though the expression ספחת occurs in the Torah only in our verse, the same rule is true for a lower degree of whiteness of בהרת which is the whitest of whites, similar to snow in colour. The verse ought to be understood as if the Torah had written: שאת או ספחת, או בהרת וספחתה.
  We need to understand why the Torah mentioned שאת before it mentioned בהרת, seeing the latter is whiter than שאת, in fact unmatched by anything else in whiteness? Why did the Torah not give us a list of degrees of white in a descending order? We believe that if the Torah had commenced by describing the whitest possible kind of skin-affliction, i.e. בהרת first, and had mentioned the word ספחת later, I could not have derived that שאת also may occur in shades of a secondary degree of whiteness which is part of its category and is called ספחת דשאת. Even if the Torah had written: בהרת או ספחת או שאת, I would have concluded that there are only three categories of the colour white which form a נגע צרעת instead of there being four such categories (2 of them being sub-categories). Even if the Torah had written: בהרת או שאת או ספחת, I would not have known that there is an additional category called ספחת הבהרת, seeing the word appeared only at the end of the sequence. As it is, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the Torah wanted us to know that ספחת is both a sub-category of שאת as well as a sub-category of בהרת.
  <i>Erchin</i> 15 explains that these afflictions are a penalty for people who have spoken ill of their fellow man. Maimonides explains this in greater detail in the seventh chapter of his <i>Hilchot Deyot</i>. This is what he writes: "A person is guilty of the sin of לשון הרע, a wicked tongue, when he tells something detrimental to the image of this fellow man even though he speaks the truth. If he tells lies about his fellow man he is guilty of the sin of מוציא שם רע, bad-mouthing another human being." We see therefore that one is called בעל לשון הרע, even if one tells the truth about someone, whereas one is called מוציא שם רע when the evil gossip one spreads has no basis in fact. The Torah therefore describes two different categories of skin afflictions, one to be applied to people guilty of לשון הרע, i.e. בהרת, the other to be applied to people guilty of מוציא שם רע, described by the Torah as שאת.The reason the Torah chose the term שאת as an allusion to people guilty of מוציא שם רע is because the Torah said in Exodus 23,1: "do not utter a falsehood." The word בהרת aptly describes someone who engages in לשון הרע, as the word describes something which is the brightest of bright, i.e. true. Although such a person speaks the truth, what he has done is despicable. The sub-categories of which the Torah speaks may be regarded as alluding to the verbiage which surrounds the basic detrimental information which the respective guilty party tries to convey conversationally.
  והיה לנגע… צרעת, and it will turn into a skin-afliction. Inasmuch as the most important factor determining the impurity resulting from what is and what is not a נגע צרעת is revealed by the colour of certain hairs and not by the colour of the skin alone, the Torah uses the expression צרעת independent of mention of any hair. The word והיה, "it will be," alludes to the fact that what determines if we are dealing with a נגע צרעת has yet to occur.
  
  Verse 3
  
   ומראה הנגע, and the appearance of the affliction, etc. Here we come face to face with the mystical dimension of Psalms 39,7: "man walks about as a mere shadow;" the Psalmist refers to the appearance of raw flesh. When the forces of evil assert themselves in man this makes a visible impression on his flesh. The healthy appearance of his skin disappears. It appears that there is something physically missing, i.e. the skin appears as "deep," as having lost its normal surface. It is remarkable that according to הלכה, one is not ritually impure if this condition covers the entire body, i.e. if this "deepness" leaves no visible mark seeing we cannot detect a contrast with other skin or flesh (compare <i>Shevuot</i> 7).
  וראהו הכהן וטמא אותו, and when the priest takes a look at him he will declare him ritually impure. The Torah made the impurity conditional on the priest declaring him so. This reminds us of a statement in <i>Shabbat</i> 119 that two angels accompany a person on his way home from the synagogue on Friday nights and they examine if this person had made the preparations for the Sabbath prior to going to the synagogue. If he did, one angel commends him (the 'good' angel) exclaiming "may you continue to do so," whereas the second angel [who represents man's negative actions Ed.] says "Amen." The reverse happens when the person in question had not made preparations for the Sabbath before the onset of the Sabbath. At any rate, the Talmud suggests that once a positive or negative momentum has been built it feeds upon itself unless something contrary happens. Seeing that it is the priest's duty to obtain atonement for Israel from their impurities, diseases, etc., G'd has commanded him to concur with the judgment of impurity the afflicted person has been subjected to. This state of impurity will continue until the afflicted person turns into a penitent when G'd will remove the symptoms of impurity from him.
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
   והנה כהה הנגע, and the affliction has dimmed, etc. Rashi explains this to mean that if the appearance of the affliction remains either stationary or has spread, the person suffering from it is impure. Maimonides writes in chapter one of his treatise <i>Hilchot Tum-at Tzora-at</i> that the word כהה means that if the appearance is less white than any of the four degrees of whiteness the Torah had described, the person afflicted by it is now טהור, "clean." Similarly, if it neither spread nor dimmed nor sprouted a white hair in the area of the affliction, the person who suffered these symptoms is "clean" also. Thus far Maimonides.
  According to Rashi the expression כהה in the Torah describes a comparison to a previous condition which definitely was one of the other three symptoms qualifying for the description נגע צרעת, whereas the present appearance is not one which does not qualify for any of the four degrees of whiteness which would constitute the presence of a נגע צרעת. Had the Torah wanted to exclude the presence at this stage of all the four possible symptoms which constitute the presence of a נגע צרעת, the Torah should have written that there was no appearance of anything which looked like נגע צרעת. We must conclude therefore that our verse discusses someone who had previously displayed at least one of the three other kinds of white areas which would signify נגע צרעת such as the בהרת described in verse 2 which had a subcategory ספחת. If, however, the appearance had already been at the lowest end of the scale of white, i.e. the skin covering an egg, it could not have dimmed any further [and still be of concern to us halachically at all. Ed.] Alternatively, we would have to assume that there is a lower degree of whiteness in any of the four categories נגע צרעת the Torah has discussed thus far, and it is this relatively dimmer appearance the Torah describes here as כהה הנגע. The נגע described as בהרת itself would consist of either of two degrees of whiteness, both being close in appearance to snow-white. One of these degrees existed prior to the stage described in the Torah as כהה, the other after that stage had been reached. We find the following statement in <i>Nega-im</i> 1,4: Rabbi Chanina says there are altogether 16 shades of a colour which could qualify as נגע צרעת. Rabbi Dotha claims that there are 36 such shades. Akavyah ben Mahallel says that there are no fewer than 72 such shades which have to be examined. We may assume that these Rabbis do not disagree as to which shades constitute an affliction resulting in the victm becoming declared ritually impure, etc; they disagree only as to the number of shades there are that a priest must be familiar with in order to render the proper ruling. [these shades include also other kinds of skin afflictions such as מכרה and שחין, נתקים, etc.. Ed.] Maimonides in his commentary on the <i>Mishnah</i> also writes that the disagreements do not concern basic categories which would qualify as נגע צרעת. Only a few of these shades actually qualify as נגע צרעת. There are two basic methods which may bring about a change in the legal status of the afflicted person, seeing that the "dimming" is what determines the process of the afflicted person becoming "clean." Either there has to be a dimming from one basic category to a lower basic category of whiteness, or there only needs to occur a dimming from the higher level of a category to a lower level of whiteness within the same basic category. One may make a case for either of these approaches except that the first method appears somewhat forced. Rashi is true to his method of interpretation of the Torah and adopts the approach that the word כהה הנגע is followed in the Torah by the word הנגע indicating that the affliction has not been totally uprooted though it has improved. It has only improved in appearance. Therefore he arrives at the conclusion that if the appearance even dimmed only relatively, within the major category it belonged to previously, this is sufficient to have this person declared "clean."
  According to Maimonides, when the Torah speaks of the נגע having dimmed, this means that it has become dimmer than any of the four basic categories of whiteness which cause the priest to pronounce the person so afflicted as impure. The present state of colour is dimmer than any of the four degrees of whiteness described in the Torah. In this respect Maimonides agrees with Rashi that if the whiteness had dimmed to a degree of whiteness less bright than the four categories listed, the person concerned is declared "clean." If, however, we were to understand that the words כהה הנגע, are a dimming which is darker than the original white but still within the four shades of white which constitute נגע צרעת, what news does the Torah reveal by saying that such a person remains impure? We have to explain the words of Maimonides as referring to the need for the afflicted person to wash his clothing [complete ritual immersion. Ed.] even if the present appearance of the formerly white spot is dimmer than any of the four categories of whiteness which result in the priest declaring such a person as afflicted with נגע צרעת.
  If we accept Rashi's opinion, why did the Torah not make the dimming of the afflicted spot conditional on it reverting to its original colour just as the Torah made the declaration by the priest that the person is definitely afflicted dependent on the area of the whiteness spreading? According to Maimonides, when the Torah speaks of the afflicted area as not "having spread," the meaning is that it has not dimmed in colour either. According to Rashi we do not know what the legal status of the person under observation at the end of the second week would be in such a situation.
  As mentioned previously, we can approach the problem in two ways. According to method one, both expressions i.e. כהה and לא פשה הנגע describe conditions which result in the formerly afflicted person being considered "clean." Seeing that we do not need both expressions in order to teach us the same הלכה in the same setting, one of these expressions is used exegetically as applicable to a situation other than the one described in our verse. [something which in the thirteen exegetical rules of Rabbi Yishmael is called לא ללמד על עצמו יצא אלא על הכלל כולו יצא; Ed.] In our case one example, i.e. that the whiteness has dimmed, teaches that if it resumes its former brightness the person previously under suspicion of being a צרוע will this time be considered as definitely afflicted. This will be so even though the white spot he suffers from now is no brighter than the whiteness of the spot he suffered from previously while he was only under observation. This is only true however, if previously the white spot had never dimmed enough to be less white than any of the basic four categories of whiteness which potentially make him impure, afflicted. Seeing he had previously not been declared impure, his again having a spot of that degree of whiteness on his skin would not make him worse off than before, i.e. under observation by the priest only. Do not ask concerning the example of פשיון, spreading, which the Torah describes as one following the afflicted person having come under the priest's scrutiny and isolation and having been declared ritually pure. The person in question is one who is again ritually pure. Nonetheless the Torah ordered that if such a spread occurred again, the person afflicted is considered impure and the Torah does not allow for a situation where the area concerned either contracted or remained stationary. Why does the Torah not allow for a situation there where the afflicted person reverts to the status prior to the white area having spread, i.e. his status would be one of suspended ritual purity pending further developments? This is not a valid question because in a situation of פשיון, a horizontal spreading of the affected area, the priest declares such a person as definitely צרוע already at the end of the first seven days of quarantine, unlike the situation described in verses 4-6 where the shade of white is the determining factor. Perhaps Rashi thought that the second approach to our problem is based on reasoning and does not require a specific verse to confirm it. This is an essential weakness in Rashi's approach.
  Personally, I prefer to explain our verse in the following manner: והנה כהה הנגע; "and behold, the affliction has dimmed;" it has become dimmer than its original appearance but it still is white enough to qualify under one of the basic four categories as a נגע צרעת, (just as Rashi had said). However, the intention of our verse is that even if the appearance of the white spots had dimmed, the individual in question is to be declared "clean" only if there had not been a horizontal expansion of the afflicted area on the skin during the week in question. If the white area on the skin has expanded horizontally, the person retains the same status as he had at the previous inspection by the priest a week earlier. My only difficulty is to know on what basis our verse arrives at this conclusion.
  Meanwhile I have seen the following statement of our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. "You might have thought that the words והנה כהה הנגע mean that the appearance of the white spot is dimmer than any of the four basic categories of white which would qualify as נגע צרעת; therefore the Torah adds the word הנגע, to tell you that the Torah speaks of one of these four categories. If the Torah had only written the word הנגע you would have thought that it could have remained looking the same as on the last inspection. Therefore the Torah had to write והנה כהה, it had definitively dimmed when measured against its previous appearance but not sufficiently to be dimmer than any of the four categories of white which qualify as a נגע צרעת. The words והנה כהה also mean that if its whiteness intensified during that week and dimmed subsequently it is as if it had not intensified; the word הנגע means that if it had first dimmed during that week only to intensify again, it is as if it had never dimmed at all." Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. Clearly, the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> feels that the dimming was not sufficient to result in such a dim appearance that it no longer would have qualified as a נגע צרעת at all, unlike the comment of Rashi. However, from the statement that if the afflicted area had intensified in whiteness at some time during that week or dimmed and intensified again, we disregard all dimming or intensification respectively as if they had not occurred, it is clear that this conforms to our own interpretation. It is the intention of our verse that if a certain degree of whiteness was not visible originally, then even if it had become much whiter in the interval as long as it had dimmed by the time the priest inspected it again it would be declared healed, provided it had not spread horizontally. Having established this, the author of this <i>Baraitha</i> clearly disagrees with both Rashi ad Maimonides. Nonetheless, as mentioned we still have no source for the opinion offered by the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. Perhaps it is simply a condition that there has to be a dimming of some kind before the quarantined person may qualify for the description "clean."
  I have found another comment in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on our portion which is as follows: "the meaning of the word מספחת in our verse is that though it did not change its appearance." This means that even if it did not become weaker in appearance the person under observation is declared "clean" on the second inspection by the priest. If so, we can once more revert to explain that the reason is that the word כהה means that the priest does not initially examine if the whiteness has dimmed; neither does he immediately consider if it had intensified. Both the words of Rashi and Maimonides need further examination and seem very difficult to reconcile with <i>Torat Kohanim</i>.
  מספחת הוא, it is a scab. This means that it is not a צרעת, similar to the word בהק הוא in Leviticus 13,39: "it is a brightness." Nonetheless the Torah commands people afflicted with such symptoms to wash their clothing, i.e. an indication that they have contracted a minor form of impurity. If we look for a homiletical meaning for this law it may be that it indicates that the victim was guilty of something called אבק לשון הרע, a peripheral form of loose talk about a third party. We find an example for this in <i>Erchin</i> 15 where a person who described a fire in a neighbour's house is described as guilty of אבק לשון הרע.
  Another meaning of the expression מספחת היא is simply that this is a form of affliction which requires the person so afflicted to "wash the clothing he wore when this affliction was diagnosed by the priest." [actually it means ritual immersion. Ed.] We derive this from the sequence of the words מספחת היא וכבס בגדיו. From the words וטהרו הכהן just prior to this sequence it seems clear that the priest first has to say to the afflicted person "you are clean" before he is back to normal. This appears to be difficult to understand. It makes sense that the person quarantined because of certain symptoms would not be considered טמא, impure, unless so declared by the examining priest; but why should a person who has not so far been declared as impure require to be declared pure by the priest before returning to society? Granted that Rashi says somewhere that this is because the person had already been quarantined, this is not a sufficient reason. When you accept our approach to the whole verse there is an adequate reason for the priest having to declare such a person as "clean." We had characterised this symptom as a form of skin-affliction. If so, it is reasonable that the victim cannot be purified from it without the formal declaration by the priest that he is "clean" henceforth.
  
  Verse 7
  
  
  
  Verse 8
  
   צרעת הוא. it is a form of leprosy. The meaning of these words is that even if the priest had previously declared the person afflicted as "clean," this judgment is reversesd retroactively in light of the afflicted area having spread. The reason is that a scab which does not indicate ritual impurity is not in the habit of spreading. The Torah indicates that the spreading needs only to be minimal in order for the afflicted person to be declared as ritually impure. It is the scab which is the affliction, not its size.
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
  והיא הפכה שער לבן ומחית בשר חי, and it has turned the hair white, and there be healthy flesh, etc. The plain meaning of the verse is that two conditions must be present in order for the afflicted person to be ritually impure, 1) healthy flesh, 2) white hair; our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> write as follows: "I might have thought that the person remains "clean" until he develops white hair plus an area of healthy flesh; to teach me that this is not so the Torah wrote: 'it is an old צרעת,' i.e. it is impure and no other symptom is needed. If so, why does our verse speak about white hair and healthy flesh? this teaches that impurity is not decreed unless the area of skin is large enough to accomodate both white hair and healthy flesh." Apparently the inference from the text that healthy flesh alone (when inside the white area) is sufficient cause to declare the person ritually impure was based on the word נושנת; this poses a problem, however; granted that the presence of healthy flesh inside the white area does not need an additional symptom in order for the afflicted person to be declared ritually unclean -as distinct from the presence of white hair alone,- whence do we know that the presence of such healthy flesh by itself results in ritual impurity? Perhaps the word היא in our verse refers back to either one of two symptoms appearing; 1) the hair turning white in which case there is no need for a further symptom; 2) healthy flesh appearing, and not as <i>Korban Aharon</i> explains it as referring only to the appearance of healthy flesh. It is also possible that the rule that an area of healthy flesh within the white area is sufficient by itself to declare the afflicted person ritually impure is derived from the additional words בשר חי at the end of the verse. The words טמא הוא in verse 11 make it plain that no other symptoms were needed. Ignoring the words of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> for the moment, I believe that the absence of the words או מחית בשר חי tells us that if both symptoms exist and the white area covers the entire surface of the skin this indicates that the person is ritually pure, something I could not have inferred if the Torah had written the word או. How would I then have known that the person could be declared "clean" while suffering simultaneously from two symptoms each of which is basically a symptom signifying ritual impurity?
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
  
  
  Verse 14
  
  
  
  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
  
  
  Verse 18
  
  
  
  Verse 19
  
   שאת לבנה או בהרת לבנה, "a white rising or a very bright spot, etc." According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the reason the Torah writes לבנה, white, is to exclude אדמדמת, a שאת of a reddish appearance; the words בהרת לבנה אדמדמת refer to a בהרת mixed with a reddish appearance. [I did not find this in my edition of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on this verse. Ed.] How do I know that the rules stated in our verse apply to a שאת אדמדמת, and to בהרת לבנה that instead of the שחין there is now a completely white spot of the intensity called בהרת? This is why the Torah added the words נגע צרעת, "it is a form of leprosy," in verse 20. At first glance it seems that these extra words should have been necessary only in respect of שאת, the rising on the skin which was of a mixed colouring (white and reddish); seeing that the basic colour was not an intense white I might have presumed that it did not qualify anymore as a symptom conferring ritual impurity. We never would have assumed this of an area which contained the kind of bright whiteness known as בהרת. We never find that שאת is more susceptible to impurity than בהרת.
  The true explanation of the verse then is this: "a white rising on the skin of the kind called שאת לבנה or an intensely white spot called בהרת which contains also some reddish appearance is still a symptom of ritual impurity because the colour of בהרת contains some rising, שאת, and will not result in purification seeing a leprosy like appearance grew in it." The words נגע צרעת are not necessary except to tell us that the שאת underwent a dimming of its white colour. While it is true that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> speaks of two divisions, the second one is mentioned as incidental not because we needed the words נגע צרעת to convey this information.
  
  Verse 20
  
  
  
  Verse 21
  
  
  
  Verse 22
  
  
  
  Verse 23
  
  
  
  Verse 24
  
  
  
  Verse 25
  
  
  
  Verse 26
  
  
  
  Verse 27
  
  
  
  Verse 28
  
  
  
  Verse 29
  
   ואיש או אשה, and a man or a woman, etc. The Torah had to spell out "or a woman," instead of using the collective term אדם for both man and woman because women do not usually grow beards. The reader who sees the word אדם would conclude that the legislation only applies to people who normally grow beards, i.e. men, and I would have assumed that either minors or Gentiles are included in this legislation whereas any plagues on the beard of a woman would not be subject to the legislation introduced here. The Torah therefore wrote איש או אשה, to tell us that if a woman grows hair in a part of her face where a man grows a beard, the legislation applies to her also.
  
  Verse 30
  
   שער צהב דק, thin blond or yellowish hair; according to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the word "yellowish" is intended to exclude hair which is of a greenish, reddish or black colour. The use of the word "yellowish," serves to exclude all colour except white. The colour white did not need exclusion. We might have arrived at this through simple logic. Just as the colour yellow is not a colour mentioned in connection with other afflictions of the skin considered as leading to ritual impurity, so the colour white, which is the prime colour for skin-afflictions resulting in ritual impurity would most certainly also qualify for such impurity if it occurred in the area of the beard. The Torah therefore mentions "yellowish" to tell us that white would not qualify as a colour resulting in ritual impurity in this legislation dealing with hair discolouring in the area where the beard grows. I find it difficult to follow this קל וחומר, inference from minor to major. Maybe the word צהב, yellowish, is needed to teach us the basic law that this colour if present in a נתק, scall, confers ritual impurity on the person concerned even though the colour has no negative implications in other skin-discolourations. If so, white would cause ritual impurity in the case of a scall just as it does in other skin afflictions which the Torah has legislated previously. This reasoning is reinforced by the mere fact that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> did not spell out a קל וחומר saying: "if yellowish, which does not normally confer ritual impurity etc.," until after he had established that yellowish does confer ritual impurity in a scall. From the sequence of the reasoning in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> you may infer that the Torah did not exclude your right to make the קל וחומר we have just mentioned. If so, how does the word צהב, yellowish, demolish the validity of the קל וחומר?
  I must assume therefore that the exegetical approach of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> goes along these lines: "The Torah writes about the afflicted person who has already been mentioned וטמא אותו הכהן, instead of the shorter וטמאו, which the Torah used already on several occasions (verses 8,11,15,20). The extra word אותו is used to exclude a white scall from causing the afflicted person to become ritually impure. We would translate the verse as follows: וטמא אותו, i.e. "the yellowish colour confers impurity;" it is as if the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had said: "the word 'yellowish' teaches that only it and no other colour including white results in ritual purity in this instance." If you will examine what the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> has written every other time the Torah wrote וטמא אותו instead of וטמאו, you will find an approach consistent with what he wrote in this instance. Why did he not bother to tell us that he used the word אותו to arrive at his conclusion? The reason may be that he still wanted to use the word דק which preceded the word אותו for an additional exegetical message. A careful scholar does not jump from the right to the left and rely on his reader to read his mind so as not to arrive at a faulty conclusion about his true intentions. You will find that after explaining the exclusion contained in the word אותו, our author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains the exclusion contained in the sequence of the words וטמא אותו הכהן נתק הוא using only the word הוא in that sequence as an exclusion. The reason he did so is because he had already used the word אותו in the sense we explained.
  You may reason that if all this is correct, why do we not use a קל וחומר type of reasoning to prove that just as the colour yellow results in the afflicted person becoming ritually impure when he contracted a נתק, the same should hold true for yellowish hair in other situations where hair is a factor in the afflicted person contracting ritual impurity in connection with skin turned white? The logic is simple. If a white hair which which does not confer ritual impurity when present in a נתק, nevertheless confers ritual impurity when present with other skin afflictions, then a yellow hair which even confers ritual impurity when present only in a נתק, certainly confers ritual impurity when it appears in conjunction with other skin afflictions. Perhaps the very fact that the Torah needed to exclude white as a colour resulting in ritual impurity in the case of a scall was equivalent to telling us that we should not engage in learning the קל וחומר in reverse as applying to situations such as בהרת או שאת. You may wish to read what we have written on Leviticus 14,7 in connection with the <i>Baraitha</i> which explains why the person afflicted with צרעת has to experience seven sprinklings of מים חיים in his purification process as opposed to the person who contacted ritual impurity through contact with a dead body, and who has to undergo only two such sprinklings one each on the third and on the seventh day of his purification rites. This is so in spite of the fact that I could have arrived at the opposite conclusion by using the קל וחומר type of reasoning. 
  In that instance, the author falls back on the explanation of the word צהב he has given on our verse here. Why is the colour צהב the only one which confers impurity in the case of a scall? <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains that this colour symbolises gold. Maimonides explains in his commentary on tractate <i>Nega-im</i> 6,1 that צהב is a colour which is a mixture of red and green. I have seen that Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra explains it as follows: "The word means something close to egg-white in Arabic." It appears therefore that Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra understood the word צהב as ivory coloured. We, who live under Mohammedan rule, know that the Arabic word <i>tzahov</i> means some kind of dim white. This would all contradict the opinion expressed by the Tannaim in the Mishnah. I do not see what purpose would be served to explain words in the Torah in terms of the Arabic language; this would lead to making our Torah into a book of lies, G'd forbid. What is so objectionable in our traditional sources explaining the word צהב as yellowish-gold? I am afraid that Rabbi Ibn Ezra lent his hand to those who make a mockery of our holy Torah. Anyone who toys with commentaries of this nature would do better to suppress them and not to publish them.
  
  Verse 31
  
  
  
  Verse 32
  
  
  
  Verse 33
  
  
  
  Verse 34
  
  
  
  Verse 35
  
  
  
  Verse 36
  
  
  
  Verse 37
  
   טהור הוא וטהרו הכהן, "he is 'clean;' and the priest shall declare him "clean" (ritually pure)." This apparent repetition is explained in the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as follows: We would have thought that it suffices if the priest simply allows the afflicted person whose נתק has remained unchanged in appearance except that black hair grew on it, to go back to the camp; to teach me that this is not sufficient, the Torah tells us that the priest must first declare such a person as "clean." I would also have thought that if the priest erred and erroneously declared a ritually impure person "clean," that he would henceforth be considered "clean;" this is why the Torah had to write טהור, he is objectively "clean;" the priest merely confirms it. This is an exegesis which Hillel taught when he came from Babylonia as the scholars in Israel at the time had been unable to furnish proof for this <i>halachah</i> from the text of the Torah (compare Jerusalem Talmud Pessachim 6,1). We need to understand why the scholars who had disagreed with Hillel at that time did so.
  It seems clear that the meaning of the line is as explained by <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. If the word טהור had not appeared, I would naturally have assumed that the priest, who is after all the expert in all these laws, would decide the status of the person in question. As a result, if the priest is aware that there is a בהק, a dull white spot, he will release the person from his quarantine so that he can go home to his family. The Torah therefore writes both טהור וטהרו to inform us that there is a formality to be observed. This exegesis could not be confirmed until Hillel returned to the land of Israel and quoted it in the name of his teachers Shmayahu and Avtalyon. Let us now return to the statement that this ruling of Hillel (resp. his teachers) is good only if the priest did not err and declare someone as "clean" whose skin had not undergone the necessary changes. Do not ask that perhaps what the Torah meant with the word טהור was that even if the afflicted person was himself aware that he was "clean" by then, the priest's declaration was still essential for him to resume his normal life. Such reasoning is very forced and if one had to choose between both possible approaches Hillel's exegesis is far superior. Seeing that the reasoning we apply is the basis of a religious ruling, it is preferable to accept the approach of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> rather than getting involved in forced explanations.
  I have seen a statement in <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 22,1 that there is nothing in the way of Torah exegesis which had not been taught to Moses while he was on Mount Sinai, including what renowned scholars thought they revealed for the first time in the distant future. At the same time we have a statement in <i>Bamidbar Rabbah</i> 19,6 that Rabbi Akiva expounded exegetically matters which even Moses did not know. The <i>Midrash</i> is based on a verse in Isaiah 42,16: "these things (such as making the blind see, etc.) I have done (G'd speaking)." It does not say there that G'd will do these things in the future, but that He has already done them. When did He do them? When He revealed to Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues Torah insights He had not even revealed to Moses." Thus far the <i>Midrash</i>. We appear to be faced with a contradiction between the two <i>Midrashim</i> we have quoted. Many statements in a similar vein abound in our Midrashic literature.
  I think we have to understand these statements in the following manner: It is true that everything which is of a Biblical nature was revealed to Moses and no one since has become privy to something Moses did not already know at that time. The difference between Moses and subsequent generations of scholars is that Moses had been given both the written and the oral Torah from G'd directly. G'd, in His wisdom, had recorded all the parts of the oral Torah He had revealed to Moses in the written Torah also. He had not, however, revealed to Moses where all the parts of the oral Torah He had taught him were to be found in the written Torah. The labour of discovering all these allusions to the oral Torah in the written Torah was left for all the Torah scholars after Moses. It is their task to find proof in the written Torah for all the <i>halachot</i> G'd had taught Moses orally. The reason the scholars of the <i>Mishnaic</i> period compiled commentaries such as <i>Torat Kohanim</i> was to provide us with the key that enables us to find where the oral law is anchored in the written law. This labour is an ongoing process and it remains our task to establish this linkage between the oral and the written law. The labour is generally called ארץ החיים. Moses was not informed about all this and this is why the sages could state that Rabbi Akiva had become privy to insights not even revealed to Moses. The proof of how this works is found in Hillel's reconstructing from the written text a הלכה which had been revealed to Moses at the time but whose "anchor" in the written Torah had been unknown until that time.
  
  Verse 38
  
  
  
  Verse 39
  
  
  
  Verse 40
  
  
  
  Verse 41
  
  
  
  Verse 42
  
  
  
  Verse 43
  
  
  
  Verse 44
  
   צרוע הוא טמא הוא, he is "leprous," he is ritually impure. It appears best to approach these words in the same way Hillel approached the words טהור הוא וטהרו הכהן in verse 37. Here the force of the exegesis is even more convincing as the word צרוע refers to the body of the afflicted person whereas we still require that the priest declare him to be ritually impure. This means that legally speaking, his symptoms notwithstanding, the afflicted person would not be considered subject to the laws of impurity until the priest had declared him to be impure.
  The reason the Torah repeated טמא הוא is to make it clear that if the priest had erred and had declared a person as ritually impure although his symptoms did not justify this, the priest's declaration is invalid. The reason the Torah also repeated טמא יטמאנו is explained in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as including all other categories of ritual impurity. A person never becomes legally impure due to symptoms on his skin unless the priest has declared him to be so.
  צרוע הוא, he is "leprous." Why does the Torah not use the expression צרעת הוא in order to describe the affliction as it has done repeatedly? Perhaps the Torah wanted to indicate G'd's extreme displeasure with a person whom He has afflicted with this disease in such exposed areas of the skin of the head and beard. Most other afflictions listed in our portion occur in more private parts of the body. Generally speaking, G'd displays great concern for the sensitivities of a person even when He punishes him. The person described here as צרוע has forfeited the consideration G'd normally shows even to sinners; this is why he is described as a "leper" throughout. The words בראשו נגעו that his affliction is already in his head, is the justification for calling him a צרוע.
  
  Verse 45
  
  
  
  Verse 46
  
   כל ימי אשר הנגע בו, all the days that the plague is within him, etc. This means that as long as his sin is still part of him he remains in the state of ritual impurity. The emphasis expressed by the words טמא הוא after the word יטמא is a reminder of Jeremiah 2,19 where the prophet exclaims: תיסרך רעתך, "your discipline has been the result of your wickedness." In other words it was not G'd who inflicted these misfortunes on the sinner but the sins he committed. Jeremiah expresses a similar thought in Lamentations 3,39: "Of what shall a living man complain?! Each one of his own sins." <i>Yalkut Shimoni</i> item 1040 on this verse is worth studying. You may want to read what I have written on Genesis 4,4 אם תיטיב שאת.
  
  Verse 47
  
   והבגד כי יהיה בו נגע צרעת, And the garment which is afflicted by the plague of "leprosy," etc. The conjunctive letter ו at the beginning of this paragraph is explained in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> by Rabbi Yossi Haglili by reading together the last three words of the previous verse with this verse, i.e. מחוץ למחנה מושבו והבגד, "his dwelling is outside the camp together with the garment." This teaches that the garments also need to be removed outside the three camps. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> added that the wording reflects that the rule applies not only to garments made out of wool or linen each but even to garments made of a mixture of those materials but not to garments made of cotton, silk, and other fabrics. This seems difficult as it is possible that what we have perceived to be a conjunctive letter ו is only intended to draw attention to the proximity of the legislation to remove garments made of linen or wool outside the three camps or to include garments made of a mixture of linen and wool. Perhaps Rabbi Yossi Haglili's inference is based on the letter ו whereas the inference regarding inclusion of garments made of a mixture of linen and wool is based on the letter ה in the word והבגד.
  בבגד צמר או בבגד פשתים in a garment made of wool or in a garment made of linen. We have to analyse why the Torah wrote the word או instead of simply writing בבגד צמר ובבגד פשתים. This is particularly difficult when we consider the words of the author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> who argues that the reason a mixture of wool and linen had to be included in this legislation was because the Torah used the word או which amounted to dividing the word "wool" from the word "linen." The problem becomes even more complex when we consider that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> writes that we might have assumed that these garments contract impurity regardless of whether the fabrics which these garments have been made of have been dyed or not. The words בבגד צמר are to teach us therefore that just as linen garments are usually made of undyed fabric so the legislation is applicable to woollen garments only when these fabrics have not been dyed. This comment is also problematical; on the contrary, it is directly opposed to the statement that the word או is divisive and one could therefore not derive any rule applying to linen garments as also applying to woollen garments.
  We believe that the reason our verse had to write the word או was so that we should not think that unless the garment was made of a mixture of wool and linen it would not contract impurity. If so, the word או is needed in its own right and cannot be used exegetically anymore. Once this is so it does not represent a contradiction to what is implied by the words צמר and פשתים appearing next to each other. We have to understand our verse thus: בבגד צמר means that not only if the garment is made of wool, but the same legislation applies if it is made of linen; both materials are treated equally in הלכה. This is why <i>Torat Kohanim</i> wrote that just as linen garments are made of undyed fabric so the woollen garments the Torah has in mind here are the ones whose wool retains its original colour. The reason that the Torah had to include garments made of a mixture of linen and wool is not because we would make the mistake by misreading the meaning of the word או as <i>Korban Aharon</i> would have us believe, but that seeing the Torah mentioned only these two fabrics how would I have arrived at a valid assumption about a mixture of wool and linen? If, on the other hand, we were to accept the argument of <i>Korban Aharon</i> that the word או is divisive, thoroughly separating the words צמר and פשתים from each other, then how could one argue that just as linen garments are of undyed material so the woollen garments the Torah describes are also only those whose fabrics have not been dyed? We would therefore need the letter ו before the word הבגד to re-establish some linkage between these two kinds of garments.
  
  Verse 48
  
  
  
  Verse 49
  
  
  
  Verse 50
  
   ודאה הכהן…והסגיד and the priest will observe and quarantine it, etc. We need to understand why the Torah changed its legal approach when speaking of the afflicted garment as compared to the legal approach used in connection with afflictions of the skin. The reason may be that an affliction of the skin may exist without quarantine, i.e. the priest will declare the afflicted person impure without a waiting period upon his first inspection (13,3). In the case of a parallel affliction appearing on the clothing of the afflicted person, the priest will first decree quarantine of seven days even though the symptoms are quite clear that we are dealing with צרעת, a form of "leprosy." The Torah therefore wished to distinguish between a person himself and his clothing. On the other hand, once the garment has been declared as definitely "leprous" it has to be utterly destroyed; unlike a person who may be cured of his "leprosy" if certain symptoms disappear, this is not true of his garments. If the Torah had legislated that the garments have to be declared as irrevocably impure at the first inspection by the priest, the impression would have been created that the wearer of those clothes cannot rehabilitate himself by means of repentance. We know from other parts of our commentaries that G'd does not desire the loss or destruction of man's money. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as well as <i>Nega-im</i> 15,5 explained Leviticus 14,36: "and the priest shall command that they empty the house before the priest will go in to see the plague" that the declaration that the afflicted house is to be demolished is delayed until as much as possible of the owner's possessions have been "saved" by having first been removed from it. G'd therefore is on record that He is mindful of the possessions of even the lowest of the sinners. This then is the reason that the garments of the afflicted person are not declared as irrevocably impure during the first inspection by the priest. Seeing that man is given the opportunity to repent even after he has been ostracised and declared impure, no harm is done if he is declared impure, suffering from "leprosy" even at the first inspection by the priest.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   זאת תהיה תורת המצורע, "This shall be the law of the "leper," etc. The entire verse seems superfluous. All the Torah had to tell us was that the afflicted person shall purify himself and be brought to the priest. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains the word זאת as excluding the purification ritual on an altar other than the one in the Temple. The word תהיה is explained as including people in our own times who suffer from the symptoms described in the Torah. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on verse 4 relates that Rabbi Tarphon had a staff with which he used to purify "lepers" in his day [he was a survivor of the period during which the Temple was destroyed by the Romans. Ed.]. The word תורת is explained as teaching us that even though the different symptoms produce different kinds of צרעת, and different regulations regarding quarantine etc., they are all terminated by the offering of the same kind of offering as outlined in this chapter. The word ביום means that the process of purification described here must take place by day. One might think that the slaughtering of the birds for the offering and the afflicted person's shaving himself would be permissible at night; to prevent us from thinking this the Torah wrote זאת. Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim</i>.
  You note that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> used the word זאת exegetically both to exclude temporary altars or altars outside the Temple, as well as to forbid the afflicted person shaving himself at night, etc. The basis for these multiple inferences from the same word is that the Torah wrote two restrictive clauses (זאת, ביום) before mentioning the word טהרה, "purification." If the Torah had wanted to make only a single exclusion, the main subject of the verse, i.e. the purification, should have appeared next to either one of these מעוטים, restrictive expressions. For example, the Torah could have written: תורת המצורע, זאת תהיה ביום, "the law of the leper; this shall occur by day." We would then have understood that only the word ביום was to serve as a restrictive clause. The purification rites would then have been permissible on whatever altar was in use by the Jewish people at that time. The Torah could also have written the following sequence: ביום טהרת המצורע זאת תהיה תורתו, "on the day the 'leper' is purified, this shall be the law of his purification rites." The restrictive clause would then have applied only to the offerings, not to the time of day when the offering had to be brought. This latter version would not have contained a single additional letter except that the words would have been rearranged.
  <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 16,2 derives the idea that the person afflicted had been guilty of slander from the unnecessary words זאת תהיה. We need to understand why the Torah chose to allude to this fact at this point just when the afflicted person undergoes the rites of purification. I believe that the fact that his first offerings have to be the birds which are characterised by their constant twittering is the key to this. These birds are a reminder of the afflicted person's loose tongue, the sin of לשון הרע. The Torah first wrote these unnecessary words to allude to the reason why the first offerings in his rehabilitation process must be the birds.
  We may also understand these verses as follows: the affliction of "leprosy" develops due to pollutants in the body and gradually these negative influences within the body gain in strength until their presence becomes noticeable on the skin. Such physical symptoms also are accompanied by psychological symptoms developing. The afflicted person becomes morose, miserly, and his mind becomes depressed. The natural antidote are activities which help to cheer up a person, cause him to laugh and to enjoy himself. Now that the person under discussion has become afflicted with צרעת, it was natural for him to think that his disease was a natural occurrence. If someone were to tell him that it was his loose tongue which had resulted in this affliction he would not believe such a person, nor would he admit that he had been guilty of a loose tongue. This is why G'd in His wisdom decided to decree isolation for such a person, for his garments, (13,45) etc. While quarantined, such a person is apt to take stock of himself and to regret his former conduct. He will then observe that he has not been able to use his tongue against other people and that during this period his symptoms recede or vanish although by natural law he would have expected the symptoms to increase; he will find that the very affliction opened his eyes and he will realise why he had been afflicted. He will repent, confess his sin, and purify his tongue and realise that he was not the victim of a chance disease. When the Torah writes זאת תורת המצורע, this is an allusion to the new insights the afflicted person has discovered and which will lead to his purification. His new insights will prove all this to him ביום טהרתו, on the day of his purification; i.e. that although his isolation deprived him of what would naturally have served to cheer him up, he was healed despite the fact that he should have been morose and depressed while in solitary confinement. This will convince him that it was the wrong use he had made of his tongue which had resulted in his affliction and he will henceforth guard his tongue carefully. When the Torah concludes verse 3 with the words והנה נרפא נגע הצרעת מן הצרוע, and behold, the "plague of leprosy has been healed 'from the leper,'" the extra words מן הצרוע tell us that the cure was due to the disease itself.
  והובא אל הכהן, and he is brought to the priest. Seeing the Torah had previously spoken of ביום טהרתו, on the day of his purification, the formerly afflicted person could have thought that his purification was complete already seeing his symptoms had disappeared; the Torah therefore explains that until he has been declared "clean" by the priest this is not so. Our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> also observe that the words "he will be brought to the priest" imply that there is to be no delay. The reason that the Torah uses a passive form "he will be brought," instead of the usual "he shall come to the priest," indicates that the court will obligate him to go to the priest, or that the priest will take hold of him forcing him to leave his present residence. The same may apply when the symptoms had first shown up; he is obligated to go to the priest and to have the priest examine him.
  
  Verse 3
  
  
  
  Verse 4
  
   וצוה הכהן ולקח למטהר, and the priest will command to take for the person to be purified, etc. According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the priest issues the instruction but anybody is authorised to take the birds. In the following verse <i>Torat Kohanim</i> again understands that according to the view of Rabbi Yehudah son of Rabbi Yossi the priest issues the instructions but that any non-priest is qualified to slaughter these birds. Rabbi disagrees, insisting that also the slaughtering of the birds must be performed by a priest. Why did Rabbi Yehudah son of Rabbi Yossi and Rabbi not disagree concerning what is written in verse 4?If we were to assume that in verse 4 the word וצוה applied only to another verb, i.e. ולקח instead of to an object, this is not an adequate reason as even in verse 5 the word וצוה refers to another verb, namely ושחט, and we do not know that it refers to any other object. In fact, in verse 4 we are entitled to assume that the word וצוה implies that the birds be brought to the priest and he would receive them personally from those who bring them to him so that he would perform two commandments, something that is not so in verse 5 if we read it to mean that the words וצוה ושחט apply to one and the same person, i.e. the priest.
  I have seen a comment by <i>Korban Aharon</i> according to which the commandment is that the priest command that two birds be brought to him so that he could choose one of them as the offering and one to be released later (verse 7). The reason that Rabbi did not disagree with Rabbi Yehudah ben Rabbi Yossi in verse 4 insisting that only the priest is to take the birds is, that he could not tie the word וצוה to the commandment, i.e. he could not prove that the priest had to make this selection. Thus far <i>Korban Aharon</i>. I do not agree with the author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> as there is no indication from the words that the commandment to select the birds had to be performed by the priest and that it could be derived from the word וצוה. On the contrary, we may infer that the word וצוה as positioned in this verse indicates that the selection of the bird may be performed either by the priest or by someone else, whereas the slaughtering of the bird selected had to be performed by the priest, and Rabbi could explain verse 4 along the same lines as he did verse 5 saying that the selection of the birds could be performed only by the priest. It would then have appeared that Rabbi disagrees with Rabbi Yehudah ben Rabbi Yossi and thought that the slaughtering of the birds also could be performed only by priests.
  The reason, however, would not be because of something specific in our verse, but because it corresponds to the nature in which the subject matter is described by the Torah. G'd had commanded that the slaughtering take place in a vessel made of earthenware over water running from a well. This is not an act which is only "slaughtering," seeing a second action must accompany it immediately afterwards. This latter act is the principal ingredient of the purification ritual. Seeing that this is so it is reasonable to assume that it can be performed only by the priest. This kind of reasoning cannot be applied in verse 4 in which no action is demanded that is part of the purification process. There was therefore no reason to assume that the Torah demanded it to be performed by the priest exclusively unless the Torah had so indicated by some extra word or letter. The Torah preferred to leave the matter to be decided by the scholars.
  Furthermore, we may assume that the plain meaning of verse 4 in which the Torah mentions the taking of the birds is that the Torah addresses the priest. The reason for this is that there was no need to mention the word "the priest" in the verse in connection with each separate activity. The Torah had repeated the word "the priest" already several times in verses 2-3. In the absence of a further repetition of that word at the beginning of verse 4 we would have reasoned that the commandment is not restricted to the priest as the Torah did not again mention the word "the priest" until the end in verse 5. These considerations are invalid seeing the Torah did write the word "the priest" at the beginning of verse 4. This indicates that just as everything which had been mentioned in verses 2 and 3 had to be performed by the priest the same is true of what is said in verse 4. Seeing that the Torah bothered to write the words וצוה הכהן once more in verse 5, the meaning must be that at least something of what is described in verse 4 need not only be performed by the priest. The word ולקח therefore does not refer to the priest. If everything in verse 4 could only be performed by a priest, why did the Torah have to write the words "the priest" again in verse 5? All the Torah had to write in verse 5 was וצוה ושחט, and I would have known that it is the priest who is the subject of these instructions. Clearly then the instructions in the Torah have to be split up differently. When the Torah writes the word ולקח in verse 4 for the first time, this refers to anybody, not only to the priest. The same interpretation cannot be applied to the word ולקח in verse 5 as we have no indication from Rabbi that he holds that the הלכה is based on the plain meaning of the verse. This is especially so as both the word וצוה and the word ושחט are positioned next to the word הכהן on either side of it.
  Rabbi Yehudah ben Rabbi Yossi, however, feels that seeing we found in verse 4 that the word ולקח does not need to refer to the word הכהן although it is written adjoining to the word הכהן we may interpret what is written in verse 5 in a similar manner.
  All this would be fine except for a statement in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> at the beginning of our portion. This is what is written there: The law about purifying the "leper" is entrusted to the priest. I would have thought that the priest's function is only to declare the "leper" either impure or healed, i.e "clean." How do I know that the priest also has to offer the birds and perform the sprinklings of the blood as well as shave the "leper?" This is why the Torah says: תורת המצורע בכהן. Seeing this is so, I would have thought that also the taking of the birds and the sending away of the live bird and the washing of the "leper" and his clothing are to be performed only by the priest? To teach me that this is not so the Torah wrote זאת. Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. From the plain text of the <i>Baraitha</i> it seems clear that only three parts of the purification process of the "leper" have to be performed by the priest. In view of this there was no need for the Torah to command the priest about taking the birds or slaughtering them. From the combined text of the two <i>Baraithot</i> it emerges clearly that both Rabbi and Rabbi Yehudah ben Yossi hold that the priest must issue directives concerning two procedures. There appears to be a clear contradiction then between these two <i>Baraithot</i>.
  Perhaps the reason why the author of the <i>Baraitha</i> did not mention the two clear directives to the priest contained in verses 4 and 5 is that he considered only things which involve the body of the "leper" as part of his purification ritual; he had already excluded numerous things as a result of the restrictive word זאת. If the Torah had not specifically demanded in verses 4 and 5 that the priest perform the act of selecting the birds and slaughtering them, I would have concluded that the word זאת in verse 2 had already relieved the priest from these two duties. The author of the <i>Baraitha</i> therefore only mentioned matters included in the definition תורת המצורע. He was well aware that he would make separate comments on verses 4 and 5; hence he ignored these aspects in his earlier comments.
  However, I have seen in chapter 11,5 of <i>Hilchot Tum-at Tzora-at</i> by Maimonides that only the slaughtering of the birds and the shaving of the body-hair of the "leper," as well as the sprinkling of the blood of the bird have to be performed by the priest. No mention is made of the priest having to select the birds. In fact, Maimonides mentions specifically that all the rituals he has not mentioned may be performed by ordinary Israelites as well as by priests. Although we have a <i>Tossephta</i> in chapter eight of tractate נגעים according to which only three things have to be performed by the priest, -just as Maimonides has written,- the matter of the directives the Torah issued to the priest in verses 4 and 5 is not mentioned at all. Ordinarily, we would not need to consider the fact that the <i>Tossephta</i> does not conform to the views expressed in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as unduly disturbing. We could even argue that the author of the <i>Tossephta</i> presumably dealt with verses 4 and 5 in a different context, something that we cannot say about Maimonides who is under an obligation to deal with those verses in his treatise on the subject.
  We cannot argue that what the Torah has written in verses 4 and 5 is not clear enough to require Maimonides to refer to it in his treatise on the afflictions suffered by a "leper." After all, the authors of the <i>Baraithot</i> did consider it necessary to derive these הלכות from a biblical source. Neither can we argue that Maimonides thought that the plain meaning of the <i>Tossephta</i> which said: "and the other matters may be performed by any person" include even the ones concerning which the Torah issued directives to the priest, and that he would therefore ignore the views of both Rabbi and Rabbi Yehudah ben Yossi. If we were to assume this there is an additional difficulty, namely that a <i>Tossephta</i> which ignores both the views of Rabbi and of Rabbi Yehudah ben Yossi need not be considered authentic at all. What has been recorded in the <i>Sifra de bey Rav</i> is a carefully edited text, much more reliable than the collection of <i>Tossephtot</i> at our disposal.
  Perhaps we may resolve the contradictions resulting from Maimonides' text by assuming that Maimonides relied on the first Baraitha in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> in which the items the priest has to perform in connection with the purification of the "leper" under the heading תורת המצורע are discussed. Maimonides understood those rites to be so mandatory that any deviation would cancel the whole procedure. The directives given in verses 4 and 5, however, Maimonides understood as something that would be performed preferably by the priest. Anything which is commanded by the priest is imbued with additional importance. We know this principle from Genesis 41,40 where Pharaoh issued a directive to his subjects that all of Joseph's directives were to be considered as binding on the Egyptians. In our instance, the Torah issued a directive that the steps of the purification rites mentioned in verses 4 and 5 should be initiated by a command from the priest but that they may be carried out by non-priests. If, for some reason, these instructions were not carried out at his initiative but someone else issued the instructions this would not invalidate the procedures. There is also a קל וחומר which can be applied to reinforce this logic. If the Torah had made it plain that the releasing of the live bird is not mandatory, then the instructions of how and by whom they have to be selected and slaughtered is certainly not mandatory. If Rabbi holds that even the slaughtering of the bird must be performed by the priest, he did not base this on the words in verse 5 but on his understanding that it is part of the procedures called תורת המצורע seeing it is similar to the sprinkling of the blood and the need to have the hair of his body shaved off. This corresponds to the view held by the first Rabbi quoted in the Baraitha according to whom the slaughtering is included in the three procedures which have to take place by day.
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
   והזה על המטהר מן הצרעת, and he shall sprinkle on him that is to be purified, etc. Why did the Torah have to write the words מן הצרעת? Is it not obvious that we speak about someone who had suffered from "leprosy?" Perhaps the fact that this sprinkling of the blood mixed with מים חיים of the slaughtered bird still did not complete the purification process and the former "leper" still has to remain outside his home for another seven days shows he is comparable to a woman who had suffered from vaginal secretions, זבה. During these seven days before the former "leper" brings his final offerings and undergoes the procedure outlined in verses 9-20 he is still a primary source of ritual impurity, אב הטומאה. The Torah therefore emphasised by the words המטהר מן הצרעת that the person is being cleansed only of the actual plague called צרעת; he is not yet "clean." If we learn in verse 9 that this person must wash his garments on the seventh day this proves that his body conferred impurity on his clothing during the preceding seven days. This proves in turn that he was a primary source of ritual impurity as secondary sources of impurity do not confer טומאה on clothing. The words מן הצרעת are amply justified then.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> offers a different explanation, saying that the words מן הצרעת are intended to teach that if someone's ritual impurity is due to contact with a dead body he does not have to undergo seven sprinklings of מים חיים. Had the Torah not written the words מן הצרעת, I would have concluded through a קל וחומר that if a "leper" who does not require sprinklings of water from a well (mixed with the ash of the red heifer) on the third and seventh day of his purification process nonetheless requires seven sprinklings of blood, then a person whose impurity is due to contact with a dead body would certainly need these seven sprinklings of מים חיים spring water mixed with the blood.. Hence the Torah wrote the words מן הצרעת in order to teach me that such a קל וחומר is not admissible. At the end of that <i>Baraitha</i> it is stated that the word וטהרו in verse 7 is restrictive and teaches that the "leper" does not have to undergo sprinklings of well water mixed with the ash of the red heifer on the third and seventh day of his purification rites as does the person who purifies himself from ritual impurity due to contact with a dead body. Had the Torah not written the word וטהרו, I would have learned a קל וחומר that if such a טמא מת who does not require the seven sprinklings of מים חיים plus blood, nonetheless requires sprinkling of well water mixed with the ash of the red heifer on the third and seventh day of his purification rites, the "leper" who even requires the seven sprinklings of blood mixed with מים חיים certainly would also require the sprinkling with well water (containing ash from the red heifer) on the third and seventh day of his own waiting period. The word וטהרו therefore means that the ritual described previously is sufficient.
  I do not understand this. Seeing we have already used the words מן הצרעת to teach us that a comparison between a טמא מת and a צרוע, leper, is inadmissible, why did I need the word וטהרו to teach me the same thing?
  We may explain this as follows; In the case of the טמא מת the Torah legislated sprinklings of מי פרה on the third and seventh day respectively (Numbers 19, 18-19) without mentioning how many of these sprinklings there had to be. On the other hand, the Torah did mention the number of sprinklings to be administered to someone whose ritual impurity was due to the plague, but it did not mention on which days these sprinklings had to be administered. It would have been quite reasonable to argue that a purification procedure requiring seven sprinklings is a more comprehensive procedure than one which occurs only on the third and seventh day respectively because it takes place only twice. The Torah therefore had to write the word וטהרו to teach that such reasoning is invalid. On the other hand, one could have argued with equal force that if the Torah legislated sprinklings to occur on two days in the case of a טמא מת, whereas the צרוע requires sprinkling only on one day of the seven days he is waiting, this is proof that the purification procedure of the טמא מת is of greater force than the one involving the "leper." Different scholars each adopt one of these two arguments in their approach to our problem. Accordingly, one scholar would have learned the קל וחומר using as his point of departure the case of the טמא מת, whereas the other scholar would have used the קל וחומר using as his point of departure the case of the "leper." As a result the Torah had to write two restrictive expressions, i.e. מן הצרעת as well as וטהרו in order to invalidate either קל וחומר.
  Seeing that the logic of at least one of the two scholars arguing in opposite directions must be faulty, you may ask why the Torah should have to bother to invalidate faulty reasoning by writing an extra word! The answer is that we find that the Talmud <i>Berachot</i> 47 on the words עליך אמר קרא, explains that there are numerous instances in Tannaitic exegesis when a verse is used to refute a statement whose logic was faulty in the first place.
  I have seen a comment by the outstanding scholar Rabbi Yehudah Rosenish, author of <i>Mishneh Lamelech</i> (commentary on the יד החזקה by Maimonides) on <i>Hilchot Chametz Umatzah</i> 6,2, where he quotes a <i>Baraitha</i> similar to the one we have quoted before whose text is as follows ( <i>Torat Kohanim</i> chapter 11 on Leviticus 23,6): the words הזה חג המצות, mean that on this day <i>matzot</i> are mandatory; on <i>Sukkot</i>, however, <i>matzot</i> are not mandatory. We could have learned a קל וחומר reasoning that if a festival (Passover) which does not require that we move into a <i>Sukkah</i> still requires us to eat <i>matzot</i>, then surely a festival on which we have to move into a <i>Sukkah</i> requires us to eat <i>matzot</i>. The Torah therefore wrote הזה חג המצות to make it clear that <i>matzot</i> are mandatory only on Passover. In chapter 14 of the same <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on Leviticus 23,34 on the sequence of the words הזה חג הסוכות, the following <i>Baraitha</i> is quoted: These words mean that only the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> requires us to move out into huts whereas the festival of Passover does not include such a requirement. I could have learned a קל וחומר saying that if this festival which does not require us to eat <i>matzot</i> nonetheless requires us to move into huts, then a festival, i.e. Passover, which does require us to eat <i>Matzot</i> most certainly also requires us to move into huts. The Torah therefore writes הזה to teach us that only on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> are we required to move into huts. The author of <i>Lechem Mishneh</i> there raises the same questions we have raised in connection with the <i>Baraitha</i> concerning the words מן הצרעת and וטהרו in our portion. It will be worth your while to see what Rabbi Rosenish answers there although I consider his words slightly forced. There are a number of authorities who do not consider it worth their while to examine Maimonides' rulings critically when what is at issue is a lenient ruling concerning a matter whose biblical origin is doubtful at best. [This is relevant because Maimonides' ruling concerns whether it is adequate to swallow the bitter herbs without tasting them. Ed.]
  I believe that the solution to why both of these <i>Baraithot</i> are quoted by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is quite self-explanatory as we explained earlier. The whole point of our moving into the <i>Sukkah</i> is to remind ourselves of the miracles G'd performed for us after the Exodus as we know from Leviticus 23,43. This move into the <i>Sukkah</i> is an additional dimension of our recalling the Exodus. It was quite natural therefore to suppose that we should also eat <i>matzot</i> on that festival to symbolise our remembrance of that miracle seeing the Torah commanded us to sit in the <i>Sukkah</i>, something we do not have to do on Passover. The Torah had to write the word הזה to teach us that there is no need to do this. On the other hand, the festival of Passover also reflects a dimension of that miracle which is not present in the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> in that we celebrate it on the anniversary of its occurrence, on the 15th of Nissan. One could have supposed therefore that it would be in order to observe it while sitting in <i>Sukkot</i>, seeing that we have to sit in the <i>Sukkah</i> even when we observe this remembrance without it being on the anniversary of the event it commemorates. It was reasonable then for the author of the <i>Baraitha</i> to assume that but for the extra words הזה on both occasions such a קל וחומר would have been in order. The author tries to demolish the explanation by <i>Lechem Mishneh</i> arguing that if the whole קל וחומר was only based on a possible הלכה as opposed to a definite one, it could not have been called קל וחומר at all. [I have left out some of the details of this reasoning. Ed.]
  
  Verse 8
  
   וכבס המטהר את בגדיו, and the person to be "cleansed" is to wash his garments, etc. Why does the Torah decree this washing of the garments seeing that during the ensuing seven days the מטהר keeps on conferring impurity on garments by contact with them? I have explained on verse 7 that the words מן הצרעת refer to the impurity his body had suffered from up until now and which he is rid of, and this requires that at some stage he washes his garments in order to purify them, why do it now when they will likely become defiled again immediately by a different level of ritual impurity? I have found the following answer to this in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. "What does the word וכבס teach us? If it is to tell us that the "leper" conferred ritual impurity on these garments through touching them, I did not need a verse to tell us this as I could have arrived at this by a קל וחומר based on the status of the afflicted person while he awaits the priest's final decision. During those days he does not confer impurity on people by reason of his entering the camp (based on Leviticus 13,3) although his garments become impure on contact. During the purification days when he would confer impurity on entering the camp, surely his garments also absorb impurity from him during those days? The verse therefore informs us about the additional ways the מטהר confers impurity, i.e. through someone sitting on those garments or lying on them even without touching them. Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. According to this, the word וכבס would indicate that after this washing the garments of the person undergoing purification rites will no longer confer impurity by someone lying on them or sitting on them. The main thrust of the <i>Torat Kohanim's</i> comment on the word וכבס is based on our very question that the procedure seems useless seeing the clothing will become impure again immediately. There was no need to question the plain meaning of the word וכבס, seeing washing will result in purification of the garments. There would have been nothing unusual in the Torah requiring someone to remove impurity at the first possible opportunity; we would not have had to look for any explanation beyond this were it not for the question of what function such washing of the clothing would serve at that stage. The Torah did issue similar directives when it comes to the shaving of the hair of the מטהר which also is something that has to occur both on the first day of the purification rites as well as on the seventh day.
  I have seen that Rabbenu Hillel actually writes that the conclusion of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> that as of the time of this washing the clothing of the מטהר no longer confers impurity by sitting on them or lying on them should be stricken from the text. The reason he advances for this is a statement in <i>Pessachim</i> 67 that the ritual impurity of a person suffering an involuntary seminal emission, זב, is more severe than that of a person afflicted with צרעת seeing that a זב confers impurity on anything he sits or sleeps on and also is a cause of impurity by entering areas forbidden to him. If Rabbenu Hillel were correct we would have to emend the text of a number of <i>Baraithot</i> in which it is expressly stated that the "leper" causes impurity to things he sits on or lies on. The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> has already refuted the arguments voiced by Rabbenu Hillel. It is argued there that the claim that a זב is indeed afflicted with a deeper degree of impurity is true during the days he counts towards his purification when he causes impurity to what he sits on and lies on whereas the מטהר does not. The מצורע on the other hand, does not cause this kind of impurity during the days he counts towards final purification. This is precisely what we learned from the words וכבס המטהר occurring both in verse 8 and in verse 9. Maimonides and all the other authorities are unanimous in this ruling. Rabbenu Hillel was not correct in this instance.
  ורחץ במים וטהר, and he will bathe himself and be "clean." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> write that the additional word במים means that even immersion in a מקוה, a ritual bath, is acceptable. If not for that word, we could have learned the following קל וחומר. If a זב who does not require to be sprinkled with running water from a well, nonetheless has to immerse himself in running water from a well, i.e. מים חיים, the מצורע who does require to be sprinkled with such running water would most certainly also have to immerse himself in such running water from a well; the Torah therefore writes: ורחץ במים to teach us that the water of a ritual bath suffices for this washing. The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> explains the extra word במים in the same vein. The difficulty with this exegetical comment is that according to the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the Torah had already informed us in 15,13 on the words ורחץ בשרו במים חיים that only the זב requires immersion in running water from a well and not a מצורע. The reasoning presented there is identical to that presented here. The only difference is that in 15,13 the word בשרו is the one considered extraneous whereas in our verse it appears to be the word במים. The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> also concurs. If all this is correct, why did the Torah write the word במים in our verse? Perhaps one may answer that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> considers the word במים in our verse as crucial to his inference that the words "in water" are a suitable expression if the subject is a ritual bath, מקוה. The word בשרו, his flesh, is really needed primarily to exclude the need to wash his clothing in running water from a well but that it may be washed in any kind of water. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on 15,13 explains this also. The author overcomes the accusation that he wanted to use the word בשרו for two exegetical comments by mentioning the word במים in our verse for this combined exegesis. <i>Korban Aharon</i>, on the other hand, bases himself on the Torah not writing ורחץ הזב, but merely ורחץ בשרו. If you adopt our approach you do not need all this.
  Concerning another comment by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on Leviticus 6,21 ומרק ושוטף במים, "it shall be scoured and rinsed in water," where the Torah speaks of the vessel wherein the sin-offering has been cooked, we find another definition of the Torah's use of the word במים when not defined further. Here is the text of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> there. "If the Torah had only written ושטף, I would have concluded that it is required to be immersed in at least 40 <i>Sa-ah</i> of water, i.e. a ritual bath. The additional word במים teaches that a minimal amount of water is sufficient. The word במים also excludes wine as the liquid in which such an earthenware vessel may be scoured." We cannot compare the superfluous word במים the Torah wrote in connection with the sin-offering with the superfluous word במים in our verse. If the Torah had not written the word במים in Leviticus 6,21 I would not have required more than 40 <i>Sa-ah</i> of the waters of a ritual bath. We would not have jumped to the conclusion that the vessels in question had to be scoured in מים חיים, running water from a well, and that the extra word במים precluded this requirement. I would simply have concluded that the word was necessary to tell us that what is required is 40 <i>Sa-ah</i> of "mikveh-water" rather than any quantity of any kind of water. This is not so in our context. If not for the restrictive word במים, I would have had cause to assume that what is required is running water from a well. The extra word במים therefore teaches us that no מים חיים, running water from a well, is required. If <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on Leviticus 6,21 added that the word במים means that the vessel must not be scoured in wine, this is not derived from the word במים being extraneous but from the plain meaning of the word, i.e. "water, yes, wine , no."
  
  Verse 9
  
   ורחץ את בשרו במים וטהר and he will bathe his flesh in water and be "clean." Why did the Torah have to write the word בשרו, his flesh? We have stated that the word בשרו in 15,13 in connection with the זב meant that only the זב and not the מצורע requires immersion in מים חיים, and that the word excludes washing of the clothing in מים חיים from the requirement. It is not possible to justify both these exegetical comments from the use of a single word בשרו. Now that this word appears here also and is not needed in its own right, the comment of <i>Korban Aharon</i> on 15,13 is acceptable. We can also ask why the word במים had to be written in this verse again. The explanation we offered for that word being written in verse 8 does not apply here. In that verse we could have erred by thinking that but for that word the מטהר would have had to immerse himself in מים חיים, seeing he had already had to undergo sprinkling with מים חיים. There was no reason to make such a קל וחומר the second time. If you were to argue that the whole procedure of purifying the מצורע is a single procedure and that therefore any possible misunderstanding and the subsequent קל וחומר would apply equally to both washings, we have already eliminated the need for bathing in מים חיים, even in an instance when sprinkling with מים חיים had been necessary. There could not have been room for error then to make the word במים necessary a second time. 
  We would have to answer that the scholar arguing that without the word במים a second time, the only thing which the first word במים eliminated was the need for מים חיים for his first bathing, something that anyway did not confer complete purity on him. On the other hand, we could have argued that the final bathing, which results in the absolute purity of the מטהר, would require מים חיים unless specifically excluded by the word במים again in our verse. We must not forget that the זב is purified completely by a single bathing (15,14). The two situations are therefore not comparable. Even though the second purification process of the מצורע is not accompanied by sprinkling of מים חיים, I could have argued that it should not involve a procedure inferior to that of the זב. If the Torah wrote the word במים also in our verse, this teaches that no מים חיים is required in the final bathing of the מצורע.
  The Torah was particular to write the word בשרו which is the very word which caused us to argue in the case of the זב that he needed to bathe himself in running water from a well. Had the word בשרו not been mentioned in our verse also, I would have concluded that the only thing which the word במים excluded was the need to wash the clothing, etc., of the מצורע in מים חיים, but that he would have to bathe at least his body in running water from a well based on the קל וחומר from the situation the Torah describes when telling us about the purification rites of the זב.
  You may be tempted to ask why the Torah did not merely write ורחץ בשרו במים in verse 9 and the word במים would have been totally unnecessary in verse 8. The reason this does not work is that I would then have argued that the need for מים חיים was eliminated only for the second bathing which did not have to be preceded by sprinkling the מצורע with מים חיים. This argument, however, is not true for the first bathing by the מטהר which was preceded by his being sprinkled with מים חיים. I would then still have learned the קל וחומר from the זב so that I would have needed the word במים to counter that קל וחומר. [The author continues examining other alternatives for another page or so. I have decided to omit those in the interest of brevity. Ed.]
  A moral-ethical approach to this whole paragraph sees it as describing Israel's exile. According to the <i>Zohar</i> the Gentiles are viewed as a צרעת infesting Israel, and dominating them by means of this plague. The plague of צרעת is viewed a "surrounding or encircling" the Israelites bodies. You will also find statements by our sages that even in Egypt Israel's redemption was only possible because they did not indulge in לשון הרע, bad-mouthing each other. This compliment is based on Exodus 3,22 where the Israelites are told that they should ask their neighbours to lend them silver and golden trinkets something they did not do until 12 months later in Exodus 11,2. They were able to contain themselves during all this time without taunting their Egyptian neighbours during this entire period. No single sin results in as much alienation between man and his Maker as the sin of לשון הרע, careless and even defamatory use of one's tongue. This is why the Torah wrote: זאת תהיה תורת המצורע, referring to the Jewish people which had become victimised by this affliction. The words ביום טהרתו imply that Israel is to purify itself by refraining from the sin of לשון הרע and all that it involves. The word הכהן in the sentence והובא אל הכהן refers to G'd. Having previously been alienated from its G'd, the repentance of the Jewish people will once again bring it close to Him (compare <i>Zohar</i> based on the verse in Isaiah 57,19: שלום שלום לרחוק ולקרוב, "Peace, peace to the far and subsequently near.") Following this reconciliation, G'd is described in Zachariah 14,3 as "going out to fight the nations of the world." This is alluded to here by the words ויצא הכהן אל מחוץ למחנה, that G'd had left the camp of the שכינה, i.e. the land of Israel, to a place of impurity to which the Israelites were exiled due to their sins. וראה הכהן והנה נרפא הנגע and as soon as G'd sees that the sin which was the cause of the plague (the exile under the dominion of the Gentiles) has been healed, 
  וצוה הכהן, G'd will issue directives for two birds to be taken, etc. These two birds represent the two Messiahs, the Mashiach ben Yoseph and the Mashiach ben David. The reason the Messiah is called a bird is that this is a description for souls in the higher regions. <i>The Zohar</i> on פרשת בלק Numbers 24,17 quotes another example of the Messiah being called a "bird." We quote: "From this cave there emerges a very great bird which will rule over the world and the kingdom will be handed over to him." All these expressions are euphemisms for celestial forces as any student of the Kabbalah is aware of. We have found that the first Messiah will be from the tribe of Ephrayim who will nevertheless die while revealing himself; he will be followed by the Messiah descended from David. When the Torah speaks of G'd taking "two birds which are pure," these words are similes for the two kinds of Messiah.
  The words ועץ ארז ושני חולעת ואזב, "and the cedar-wood and the scarlet and the hyssop," are allusions to the merits of the three patriarchs. Abraham is represented by the word עץ ארז; He was a man of gigantic spiritual stature. Jacob is represented by the words ושני תולעת, seeing he is called by that "nickname" in Isaiah 41,14 i.e. אל תירא תולעז יעקב, "do not be afraid O worm Jacob;" Isaac is represented by the word אזוב, seeing Isaac symbolises the attribute of גבורה, strength, heroism. The Messiah will have to combine all those attributes within himself. 
  The word ושחט in this context is an allusion to the death of the first Messiah as G'd said אל כלי חרש על מים חיים. He will die as atonement for the sins of the people. The Torah speaks of כלי חרש, "a vessel made of earthenware," because original man was made of "dust from the earth" (Genesis 2,7); the entire human race was perceived as a כלי חרש, subject to irrevocable fragmentation, because man had not yet been given the Torah. Torah is compared to running water from a well, i.e. מים חיים. When there is no Torah in Israel it is no better than a כלי חרש, subject to total annihilation. This is why one of the two "birds" had to be slaughtered, i.e. would die. The death of that bird at the hands of the Gentiles, i.e. the death of the Messiah from the tribe of Ephrayim would give G'd a legal excuse to don His garments of revenge and to reverse His customary practice of wearing His "suit of mercy" by donning His "suit of retribution." As a result, He would dispose of all the wicked nations. Having been told what would happen if Israel would not practice Torah you can extrapolate that if they would observe Torah none of the afflictions alluded to in our portion as a national disease would have to occur, and the righteous (the first Messiah) would not have to die. The <i>Ari Zal</i> wrote that whenever we pray our regular prayers we must include the request that the Mashiach ben Yoseph should not die. Every prayer adds to the merit of that Messiah so that the collective prayers of the Jewish people may be sufficient to cancel the decree that he would die at the hands of the Gentiles. 
  The Torah goes on to speak about the צפור החיה, the surviving bird, i.e. the Mashiach ben David whom G'd will take and to whom He will attach the merits of the Patriarchs plus the right to avenge the murder of the <i>Mashiach ben Yoseph;</i> this is why the Torah writes: "He will take it together with the cedar-wood, etc., and dip it in the blood of the bird which has been slaughtered." This means that the combined power of the attribute of Mercy will outweigh the power of the attribute of Justice so that all the impurities of the Jewish people will be atoned for. When the Torah speaks here about the seven sprinklings to be performed on the מטהר, this is an allusion to the seven levels of impurity. Israel will be cleansed of one level of impurity by each of the seven sprinklings. Once this has been accomplished the "bird" will emerge from the cave mentioned in the <i>Zohar</i>, etc. The words על פני השדה, refer to this present world, and the message is that the Messiah will then rule over the whole world. After that, וכבס את המטהר, He will bathe Israel and its clothes, i.e. the sins which have formed its dirty garments and have stained its soul. The removal of the "dirty clothing" may be compared to the vision of the prophet Zecharyah 3 where the angel is described as removing the sin-stained clothing from the High Priest Yoshua in a similar simile describing the redemption from the exile in Babylon. וגלח את כל שערו, "and he will shave the hairs off his entire body;" these words are hyperbole for the removal of unworthy mental outgrowths. The words ורחץ במים are hyperbole for Israel immersing itself in Torah. This latter procedure will purify Israel's thought processes also. ואחר יבא אל המחנה, "After that he can enter the camp;" this is a reference to the camp of the שכינה, i.e. Jersualem on earth which will descend to earth having been built in Heaven.
  The Torah goes on to say: וישב מחוץ לאהלו, he will still have to sit outside his own residence seeing that he cannot unite with the שכינה until the seven days of purification have passed which are necessary in order that one receive an important guest with due honour. On the seventh day then the Israelites are ready to welcome the holy guest. You will find a similar concept alluded to in Ezekiel 43,26: "for seven days let them purify the altar, cleanse it, etc." You will note that Ezekiel speaks of two purifications. The first purification achieves the removal of negative influences, The second purification accomplishes the repentant sinner's approach to the sacred, to that which is holy.
  
  Verse 10
  
  
  
  Verse 11
  
   והעמיד הכהן המטהר, and the priest administering the purification rites will place, etc. this is best explained in light of a comment in <i>Keylim</i> 1,8 that someone whose atonement is not complete is not allowed to enter the courtyard of the Temple intended for the Israelite public. Here the Torah commands that the person undergoing the purification rites stand outside at the entrance to the Nikanor gate as stated in <i>Sotah</i> 7, based on the Torah writing the words לפני השם, "in the presence of the Lord." The Torah charges the administering priest with ensuring that the former "leper," the מטהר, not cross the threshold into the courtyard. He must not even stretch his hand inside and perform סמיכה on the sin-offering. According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the Torah permitted him only to place his head inside that area so that the priest could place the oil on his right earlobe and on his respective right thumbs. The principal reason the priest was charged with this task was to prevent the מטהר accidentally crossing the borderline with a substantial part of his body.
  הכהן המטהר, the priest who performs the purification rites; the reason both these words are necessary is this. If the Torah had only written הכהן, I would not have known that this particular part of the commandment could not be performed by any priest but had to be performed by the priest who administered all the rites. If, on the other hand, the Torah had written only the word המטהר, I would not have been sure that this chore had to be supervised by a priest at all; there are, after all, functions in the total purification procedure which may be performed by a non-priest. Hence the Torah had to write הכהן המטהר.
  האיש המטהר ואותם, the man who must be purified and these things; the Torah had to write both the word האיש and the word המטהר, so that we would not conclude that the word האיש excludes a minor as not being included in this part of the legislation although he is liable to be afflicted by צרעת and such affliction makes him ritually impure. Hence the Torah had to add the word המטהר. On the other hand, this word would not have sufficed without the additional word האיש as I might have reasoned that the need for the priest to supervise where the former "leper" had to stand applied only to a minor who had been afflicted and who might not take care where he stood. I would have assumed that an adult could be trusted to watch where he stands at the entrance to the courtyard. The Torah indicates that we do not trust an adult without supervision either. This is why the additional word איש is in place.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains the reason that the Torah added the word האיש as excluding the sin-offering and the burnt-offering from the need to undergo the תנופה, the waving, which the Torah demands for the guilt-offering in verse 12. The Torah then writes another exclusion by means of the word אותו in verse 12 excluding also the man himself, meaning that only the guilt-offering and the log of oil need to be waved. Should you ask that if the word אותו excludes the איש המטהר from the need to undergo the "waving," how could it serve to exclude others from a procedure which does not even apply to itself? This is no problem. We can always use the exclusion by falling back on the exegetical tool אם אינו ענין, that if a word is superfluous in one situation, it may be applied to another situation where it is felt to be appropriate. This is the reason the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> chose his words very carefully in this instance. We quote: "The Torah wrote האיש, לא חטאת ולא עולה. You note that the word תנופה is not even mentioned here." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> meant to say therefore that the word האיש excludes חטאת ועולה by using the same reason although the הלכה whose application is being excluded did not apply to the איש in the first place. Our sages were authorised to know where to apply this exclusion seeing the word is evidently unnecessary in its own context. This makes the language of <i>Torat Kohinim</i> on our verse easily intelligible. The alternative explanation given by <i>Korban Aharon</i> seems very forced to me.
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
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  Verse 15
  
  
  
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  Verse 17
  
  
  
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  Verse 20
  
  
  
  Verse 21
  
   ואם דל הוא ואין ידו משגת, And if he is poor and he cannot afford (3 sheep as the respective offerings). Why did the Torah have to repeat, i.e. tell us that the meaning of "he is poor" is that "he cannot afford," etc.? Perhaps the <i>Mishnah</i> in <i>Kritut</i> 27 may clarify this for us. We are told there that "if someone set aside a sheep or nanny-goat as the offering he had to bring, and said animal becomes disqualified for the altar by developing a blemish, and the owner also became poor during the interval, he may sell the animal in question and offer a bird -offering with the proceeds of the sale." The Talmud derives this ruling from the word מחטאתו written in the Torah in connection with the sin-offering reserved for the very poor people. There would be good reason to argue that seeing that in the case of a מצורע the Torah had not made provision for a meal-offering by the very poor people to take the place of either the sheep or the birds as the case may be, it is not in order to use words exegetically which were written in a situation that is quite different. [The sin-offering dealt with there is one brought by a person who committed the kind of sin which carries the כרת penalty or worse, if it had been committed knowingly, something that certainly is not the case with the מצורע who brings a guilt-offering. Ed.] It would have been reasonable to suppose that just as the Torah did not allow a very poor מצורע to offer a meal-offering as his guilt-offering, so it would also not allow him to make the kind of substitution discussed in connection with the sin-offering in the Talmud in <i>Kritut</i>. The Torah therefore writes the extra words ואין ידו משגת, to tell us that the substitution for two turtle doves would be in order also in the case of the מצורע.
  Alternatively, we could explain the apparently unnecessary words ואין ידו משגת by referring to the reverse situation described on the same folio in <i>Kritut</i>. A very poor person had set aside the meal-offering required for his sin-offering; it became unfit for the altar. Before this person could arrange a substitute his economic situation improved but not sufficiently to enable him to offer a sheep. He therefore prepared birds. When the same story repeated itself with the birds becoming unfit as an offering, the owner became still better off so that he could afford to bring the sheep as a sin-offering that normally well-situated people have to bring to obtain their atonement. This person has to bring the expensive offering though at the time he became liable for the offering he had indeed been very poor. The extra words ואין ידו משגת may therefore be used to teach that the Torah describes a temporary state of affairs and that the words may work to the advantage or the disadvantage of the person described in <i>Kritut</i>.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> writes as follows: "The words 'he is poor,' might be understood to mean that he used to have 100 dollars and now only has 50 dollars. The Torah tells you that it does not speak about such a subjective 'poverty' but about someone who does not have enough money left to afford to buy a sheep. Alternatively, you may read this backwards. He started out being unable to afford…etc. Or, he was able to afford but could not find a sheep to purchase; then the Torah considers him as 'poor' and he brings two birds." We have to understand what is meant by the words 'he could not find.' It may mean that there simply were no sheep to be had, such as happened during the siege of Jerusalem. It is obvious that in such a situation the Torah would not obligate such a person to wait indefinitely with bringing his guilt-offering, but would agree that he bring two birds as do people who cannot afford more. After all, at a time like this the money which normally defines a person as being rich has lost its value to the owner and he now is poor. We would not need <i>Torat Kohanim</i> to tell us that such a person fits the definition of 'poor.' It is more likely that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> meant that sheep were not available at the regular price and could be bought only at exorbitant prices.
  We may assume that the obligation to bring a sheep or goat as his guilt-offering is conditional on the owner not depriving himself of the necessities of life. Even if his poverty is only relative to his former wealth he may bring the guilt-offering designated for an objectively poor person and use the balance of his funds to defray his regular expenses. This explanation of our sages does not contradict what we have written. You should know that if the Torah had not wanted to tell us more than what our sages have already explained it would have sufficed for the Torah to write ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה וכבשה, והביא as the Torah wrote in Leviticus 5,7 in connection with another guilt-offering. Clearly then the Torah intended to convey the additional message we have pointed out by changing its syntax in this instance.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> (verses 30-31) also comments on the three unnecessary expressions the Torah uses in connection with the terms describing a person's ability or lack of ability to afford certain expenses. They are: 1) אשר תשיג ידו, 2) מאשד תשיג ידו, 3) את אשר תשיג ידו. Here is their comment: The expression אשר תשיג ידו refers to someone who started out being wealthy but had become impoverished by the time he was required to bring the guilt-offering. The Torah therefore tells us that such a person brings the offering appropriate for a poor person. The words ומאשר תשיג ידו speak about a person who had been well off and set out to bring the guilt-offering appropriate to a wealthy person but whose offering became disqualified before it reached the altar. The owner of that offering had meanwhile become impoverished. He too is required to bring only the offering appropriate for a poor person. Finally, the words ואת אשר תשיג ידו refer to someone who was poor and had prepared to offer the guilt-offering appropriate to his economic status. He had become wealthy before completing this offering. The Torah tells us that such a person has to bring the offering appropriate for a wealthy person. If, however, he had already offered the sin-offering while in a state of poverty he does not have to bring the rich man's burnt-offering which he is still obligated to offer to complete the process of atonement. This conclusion is derived from the words אחד לחטאת ואחד לעולה, meaning that both the sin-offering and the burnt-offering must be of the same category, i.e. either both have to be rich man's offerings or both have to be poor man's offerings. All of these exegetical derivations do not include what we have mentioned earlier as based on the repeated expression דל הוא ואין ידו משגת. Even after we have all the commentaries of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> our sages have offered us, my own comments were still necessary to explain the extra verbiage in our verse.
  
  Verse 22
  
  
  
  Verse 23
  
  
  
  Verse 24
  
  
  
  Verse 25
  
  
  
  Verse 26
  
  
  
  Verse 27
  
  
  
  Verse 28
  
  
  
  Verse 29
  
  
  
  Verse 30
  
  
  
  Verse 31
  
  
  
  Verse 32
  
   זאת תורת אשר בו נגע צרעת, This is the law concerning someone afflicted with "leprosy," etc. The entire verse seems superfluous. Our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explain that the extraneous words זאת תורת refer to the situation when a poor person insisted on bringing the guilt-offering appropriate for a rich person. His offering is acceptable. You may well ask why the Torah had to tell us this. Why should it not be simple logic seeing the Torah's verses dealing with the poor man were designed only to lighten his burden. If such a person is willing to extend himself beyond what he is obligated to do more power to him! He will surely be blessed! It appears that seeing that the Torah used the word זאת to exclude a wealthy man who brought the offering appropriate for a poor man, the Torah was afraid that the reader might feel that a poor man would also not be allowed to deviate from the rules laid down previously. The word תורת therefore teaches that the poor is free to do better than the Torah demanded of him.
  This still leaves the words אשר לא תשיג ידו in our verse unaccounted for. Perhaps the Torah was afraid that some scholar would attempt to draw a comparison between what has been written about relative poverty of people who have to bring guilt-offerings because of failing to testify, or contracting impurity and entering the Temple in such a state, etc. in Leviticus 5,7. In those cases the Torah had provided for the minimal meal-offering to be brought by the lowest category of the poor. Such people are required to bring only two tenths <i>Eypha</i> of fine flour etc. instead of two birds. The scholar may have wanted to extrapolate that if the "leper" is too poor, he too may discharge his obligation by such a meal-offering. The Torah therefore had to write אשר לא תשיג ידו בטהרתו, that such a person cannot attain his purification unless he brings two turtle doves, etc.; the Torah therefore wrote זאת תורת אשר…לא תשיג ידו בטהרתו to tell us that although he cannot afford it at the time he is being purified and he is wallowing in misery he still must bring two birds, no less.
  A moral-ethical approach to this verse may be based on the <i>Zohar (Tikkunim 22)</i> according to which the state of poverty is called צרעת which accounts for the fact that both people afflicted with poverty and those afflicted with "leprosy" are described as "dead" in <i>Nedarim</i> 64. This is what the Torah alludes to when it wrote אשר בו נגע צרעת, meaning the fact that the person who has to bring the offering is still poor is evidence that he is still afflicted with the plague of "leprosy." The Torah explains this by adding: "that he cannot afford it during his purification rites."
  
  Verse 33
  
  
  
  Verse 34
  
   כי תבאו…ונתתי נגע צרעת, When you come to the land…and I will give a plague of "leprosy," etc. How can one describe the plague of "leprosy" breaking out on one's house as good news so that the Torah describes it as a gift from G'd? Why did the Torah not merely write: "when the walls of your houses develop certain stains, etc." in the same way as the Torah described such a skin disease in 13,9? <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 17,6 was conscious of this and explained that the Canaanites who heard that the Israelites were approaching hid their valuables inside the walls of their houses. When the walls would display signs of "leprosy," the Jewish owner would investigate and discover the hidden treasure. This is homiletics, of course. Rabbi Levy explains in that same <i>Midrash</i> that when G'd wishes to reprove us He does not immediately inflict pain on our bodies, but He first afflicts our houses, and in the event this does not help He afflicts our clothing. Only if we fail to respond to these two warnings does G'd inflict the plague on our bodies, i.e. our skin. When viewed in this light the affliction on the house is indeed a "gift" i.e. a demonstration of G'd's loving concern for us.
  Why then did the Torah list the respective plagues on man, his clothing, and his house, in the reverse order of what Rabbi Levy would have us believe? I have explained this previously. At the time the legislation was revealed the Israelites had not yet entered the Holy Land and therefore G'd could not warn the guilty individual by smiting his house first. The reason the Torah introduced this paragraph with the words: "when you come to the land, etc." is to tell us that as of that time the order of afflictions would be reversed and G'd would first strike the house of the guilty person whom He wanted to warn to mend his social behaviour. You may still ask why the Torah does not list the "leprosy" on one's clothing before the "leprosy" on one's skin, seeing that everyone wore clothing at the time this legislation was revealed? G'd could have demonstrated His loving concern for the guilty by first smiting his clothing and the Torah describing this as the first example of such a נגע צרעת? It appears that the reason the Torah chose to position the legislation of "leprosy" on one's clothing in between the legislation of skin disorders and "leprous-like stains" on the walls of one's house, is because there are some common denominators between the stains on the house and on the clothing on one side, and between the stains on the clothing and on the skin on the other side. The minimum size of a נגע צרעת on one's skin and the size of such a נגע צרעת on one's clothing is identical, whereas the minimum size of that plague on a house to be considered as טמא is twice that of people or clothing. On the other hand, the plague on both clothing and houses is characterised by a greenish colour, whereas the skin disorder which afflicts man is of some kind of whitish shade.
  Furthermore, we need to understand why the Torah did not complete the laws pertaining to the plague on people before introducing the legislation about a plague afflicting one's clothing. The reason cannot be that the Torah wanted to group together all the laws of ritual impurity resulting from such stains before describing the procedures leading to their purification. If that had been the Torah's intention why did it not also describe the impurity arising from a plague on houses before commencing with the laws of purification? I think it is quite obvious that the unusual positioning of the law of the plague on one's clothing right in the middle of the legislation concerning "leprous" skin, is proof that the Torah wanted to teach that G'd first afflicts man's garments before afflicting man himself. The Torah made plain by the positioning of the נגע בגדים that it too was caused by man's sinful conduct. When the Torah describes the purification rites after having spelled out the law about the respective ritual impurity the garments conferred on the sinful man who wears them, it is clear that had man responded to the call to repentance of the plague on his garments, he would not now also need to purify himself from the effects of the נגע צרעת on his skin.
  Another reason the Torah did not first mention the affliction on man's garments is that had it done so we would have assumed that a plague on one's garments indicates guilt of a minor nature, whereas a plague on one's skin is indicative of a sin of a more serious nature, rather than that both plagues are a punishment for the same sin, the skin-disease being a punishment for lack of sensitivity to the message G'd sent to the wearer by afflicting his clothing.
  
  Verse 35
  
  והגיד לכהן לאמור, and he shall tell the priest, saying, etc. The word לאמור appears to be superfluous. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains that the word means that the priest is to tell the afflicted person words of admonition, explaining to him why he had been so afflicted. This is pure homiletics, seeing that the Torah speaks of the owner of the house doing the talking, not the priest. Our sages simply used the principle of אם אינו ענין לדברי בעל הבית תנהו ענין לדברי כהן, "if we could not find a reason for the owner to say something other than what the Torah recorded here, we may apply the words exegetically to what the priest says instead." The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> explains the sequence as follows: והגיד לכהן, the reason the owner of the affected house is forced to tell the priest about his problem is לאמוד, so that the priest can sermonize to him and explain why he was made to suffer this plague. If this explanation were correct the Torah should have written the word לאמור after the words כנגע נראה לי בבית, "it seems to me that the house has developed a plague." No doubt the approach of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is quite correct.
  However, the question remains why the Torah did not simply write that "the priest spoke, etc.," and I would not have had to search for the meaning of the verse? Clearly, the Torah wanted to leave something for us to exploit exegetically. Our sages have articulated this very principle themselves in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>. This is what is written there: "why did the Torah not write that the owner said נגע, but describes him as saying כנגע, "something like the plague?" They answer that the letter כ teaches that even if the owner is very learned and he has no doubt that the symptoms he has found are those of a נגע, he must not take it upon himself to pronounce judgment but he must leave it to the priest. What forced the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> to explain the extra letter כ in this manner? Perhaps the Torah was afraid that if it wrote simply נגע the owner would feel that unless he was certain that the symptoms were really those of the נגע צרעת there was no need to call in the priest. The Torah therefore made it plain by the additional letter כ that the priest has to be called in regardless of whether it is doubtful if the symptoms were truly the ones resulting in the house having to be torn down. What the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> meant was that all the Torah had to write were the words והגיד לכהן. The words "I think that something like a נגע appears on my house," were quite unnecessary. It was clear from the context of the paragraph that the owner referred to this. Considering these extra words, <i>Torat Kohanim</i> concluded that the reason was to teach us that the priest has to be called in regardless of whether there is doubt or not. This explanation is based on the scholar who holds that on occasion the Torah wrote things in order to encourage us to engage in exegesis. 
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> continues to exploit practically every word here in a similar fashion. The words נראה לי, are explained as "appeared to me and not to my light," i.e. I could see it with my own eyes unassisted by artificial light. This is the basis for the rule that one need not open the windows of a house in order to start searching for symptoms of a נגע. The word בבית, "in the house," is taken to mean that even if the stain occurred in the upper floor, the whole house is afflicted. Many other <i>halachot</i> are all derived from these basically superfluous words of our verse. Even though our sages often use the above mentioned method of exegesis, it is preferable to derive a rule from a direct sequence of words such as לאמור כנגע in this verse. It means that regardless of how definite the appearance of that stain, the owner has to report it as being only "like a נגע." We are not bound by the exegetical method used by our sages in deriving certain rulings from the presence of or absence of certain words or letters provided we follow accepted norms of exegesis. The major restriction we are bound by is that our exegesis must not result in הלכות directly opposed to those arrived at by the classical commentators.
  
  Verse 36
  
   בטרם יבא הכהן, before the priest arrives. The reason the Torah had to write the word הכהן "the priest" again is, that otherwise I could have thought that the priest can issue directives before he arrives at the scene. According to that, the priest would not have had to delay himself until the people had cleared the house in question of all its contents. By writing the word הכהן, the Torah made it plain that the word בטרם is not linked to the mention of the priest as the one who issues the directive but is connected with the words ופנו "and they shall clear out."
  כל אשר בבית, everything that is within the house. The meaning is that none of the items that have been removed prior to the arrival of the priest will be affected by the declaration that the house and all its contents have become ritually impure. The reason is that G'd is concerned with the belongings of even the person for whom He expressed some disdain. We must ask ourselves that seeing this is so why did all these items have to be removed prior to the priest's arrival when the impurity decreed on these items does not become effective until after the priest's departure (compare verse 38)? The Torah wrote ולא יטמא כל אשר בבית, "in order that all that is in the house not become defiled," to teach us that once the priest has observed the symptoms on the walls of the house as being those of a נגע, he may not delay pronouncing the house and its contents as ritually unclean any longer. If the people in the house had waited until the last possible moment with removing all mobile objects they would most likely have forgotten some in their haste. It is better therefore that they should do so as soon as they became aware that the priest was on his way.
  We are taught in <i>Keylim</i> 12,5 that G'd's concern is only for earthenware vessels seeing all the other vessels are subject to purification rites except earthenware jars, etc. According to our explanation G'd is concerned even about very small and inexpensive earthenware vessels.
  
  Verse 37
  
   וראה…בקירות הבית, and he sees…on the walls of the house, etc.This paragraph alludes to the actions of G'd and how He deals with the wicked who chose to be defiled by associating themselves with the evil urge which is known by our sages as נגעי בני אדם, the plague which afflicts human beings. According to the <i>Zohar</i> volume 1 page 187 G'd equips the body with a soul. If the partnership is successful, all well and good. If not, G'd yanks the soul from that body and places it in a different body. This is hinted at here in the Torah's description of what happens to the afflicted house. The house symbolises man's body. The priest represents G'd as we have pointed out previously in our analysis on page 1106. The Torah describes that G'd examines the walls of the house to determine how far the evil urge has penetrated the body of the person concerned. The word שקערורת may be understood as a composite of the two words שקע רורות with the letter (vowel) <i>patach</i> being swallowed up as part of the pronunciation. The missing letter is perceived as being an א. The meaning of the two words would be "the cursed one (ארור) has penetrated deeply (שקע). Inasmuch as wickedness is multi-faceted, the Torah uses the plural ending when describing the evil urge. The Torah goes on to speak of ירקרקת, an allusion to sin we are familiar with from <i>Shabbat</i> 33, where הדרוקן, dropsy, is described as a symbol of the wickedness of the person afflicted by it. The word אדמדמות, refers to the sin of bloodshed. When the Torah speaks of the priest ordering the house to be shut up, this means that the person represented by the house will cease to receive outpourings of G'd's generosity. This is the mystical dimension of the banishing of certain wicked people from society. They are banished in order to prevent them from receiving the outpourings of heavenly bounty. If the person so afflicted becomes aware of what is happening to him and why, well and good; if not, the priest i.e. G'd, will subject this person to sufferings. If that does not help either, He will eventually order the destruction of the house, i.e. the body which the soul in question inhabits. This is the meaning of ונתץ הבית את אבניו, "he shall break down the house, its stones, etc."
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   דברו אל בני ישראל ואמרתם, "speak to the children of Israel and say to them, etc." This entire verse appears redundant in view of verse 1 before it. Perhaps we may understand it in light of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> which explained that whereas the Israelites confer ritual impurity when they suffer from the involuntary seminal emissions called זיבה, the Gentiles do not confer such ritual impurity if they come into contact with Jews or touch their belongings, etc. The Torah therefore employed the expression דברו to indicate the relative severity of this legislation. Expressions such as דבר always indicate some degree of harshness when compared to the expression אמור. A Jew suffering from this disease transmits ritual impurity to anything he sits on or lies on, even. The Torah continued with the softer ואמרתם to console the Israelites that the fact that they transmit ritual impurity is a compliment for them as it shows that prior to that disease they were in a state of ritual purity, a status never enjoyed by Gentiles. The word אמר is used as indicating spiritual superiority in Deut. 26,17 where G'd described the mutual bond between G'd and Israel in those terms. The considerations we have just outlined form the mystical dimension of the statement in <i>Shabbat</i> 13 that a שוטה, a person of unsound mind, does not suffer afflictions. The meaning is that he does not realise that he is discriminated against by suffering what others do not suffer.
  איש איש כי יהיה זב, any man that has an issue, etc. Why did the Torah repeat the word איש? Perhaps the Torah wanted to inform us of something we learned in <i>Tanna de bey Eliyahu</i> chapter 15 that if a man experiences a seminal emission he is obligated to immerse himself in a ritual bath. Such a person may reason that inasmuch as no outsider is aware of this emission, he need not bother to go to a ritual bath. He will use the same kind of reasoning when it occurs a second time. If he experiences such an emission a third time without having purified himself in the interval, he would become guilty of what is written in Job 33,29 פעמים שלוש עם גבר, "twice or three times with a man;" i.e. that G'd lets man get away with his inadequacies twice or three times before disciplining him severely. Ignoring the need for ritual immersion will eventually result in such a man becoming a זב, afflicted with the flux which forms the subject matter of our paragraph. The word ,איש איש alludes to the person who ignores the need to purify himself repeatedly. We find the word איש used in Deut. 23,11 where the Torah speaks of a man experiencing nocturnal seminal emissions and becoming ritually impure as a result. The Torah hints that such a person cannot expect to get away with his failure to purify himself more than twice.
  זוכו טמא הוא, in his issue, he is impure. Our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> understand the last three words of the verse, i.e. זובו טמא הוא as belonging together. The verse tells us that the flux he emitted is ritually impure. You may ask that this could have been arrived at by simple logic, seeing that the Torah had told us that the person who emitted the flux is ritually impure although he is one step removed from the cause of the impurity; it would therefore stand to reason that the agent causing the impurity would be ritually unclean! We may counter that we do not apply this kind of reasoning in connection with the scapegoat which is considered pure although it confers ritual impurity on the persons touching it (compare Leviticus 16,28). The Torah therefore had to write that the emission itself is ritually impure. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> uses another argument justifying the statement זובו טמא הוא. The emission is ritually impure whereas any blood issuing from the same bodily orifice of this afflicted person is not impure. Had it not been for these three words I would have reasoned that seeing that the spittle of the afflicted person is impure although it issues forth from a pure area of the individual, blood which issues forth from the same orifice as the seminal discharge would most certainly be ritually impure! The Torah therefore wrote זובו טמא הוא, that only "it," i.e. the seminal discharge from that canal is ritually impure. The scholar quoted in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> uses similar reasoning in reverse when he needs to find an otherwise unnecessary word or letter to include the urine of the person afflicted with זוב as conferring ritual impurity. This is based on the letter ו in the word וזאת in verse 3. Had it not been for that extra letter I would have reasoned that if the spittle which issues forth from a "clean" part of the afflicted person's body transmits ritual impurity then urine which issues forth from an already impure part of his body certainly does so? Why then did the Torah have to include such a הלכה by writing וזאת? Answer: Seeing above reasoning is not true in the case of any blood issuing forth from that orifice which nonetheless does not transmit impurity, the Torah had to write a letter to include urine in the liquids which do transmit impurity. <i>Niddah</i> 56 raises the question of why blood is included in the list of liquids which does not transmit impurity whereas urine is included in the list of liquids which does transmit impurity. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai answers that urine leaves the body only after a quantity has collected, similar to spittle, whereas blood leaves the body one drop at a time. Besides, both spittle and urine can be re-absorbed by the body in the form in which they left the body, something that is not possible with blood seeing it congeals and hardens. 
  The difficulty with this answer is that if true, all the Torah had to write was the word וזאת in order to include urine. I would then have applied the previously mentioned contradictory two קל וחומר to arrive at the conclusion that the logic of either cancel each other out. This would have led me to realise that the Torah wrote the inclusive letter ו in וזאת in order to demolish the קל וחומר. Seeing that the letter ו could include only one liquid, I would have known that the liquid in question had to be urine according to the explanation offered by Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai. I would therefore have excluded blood. I would not have needed the word הוא to exclude blood as not transmitting ritual impurity. [I have omitted a few more arguments along this line presented by the author. Ed.]
  The author concludes from all this that there is a moral-ethical dimension to the restrictive word הוא. The Torah teaches by means of the superfluous word הוא that not only the body of the afflicted person causes him to be impure but there is a meta-physical dimension. G'd is trying to impress the afflicted person that his affliction is due to his sinful conduct. The word הוא refers back to the afflicted person, not to the seminal fluid. This is why the Torah decreed that the entire person becomes a primary source of ritual impurity, i.e. אב הטומאה. In that capacity the afflicted person confers ritual impurity on both humans and all kinds of vessels he will come in contact with. Although the scholar in the <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had used the word הוא to exclude the afflicted person's blood from conferring impurity on others, this was prior to the exegetical use made by the interpretation of the word וזאת. After having explained the word וזאת, the previous interpretation of the word הוא became subject to revision and to different interpretations. There are numerous instances in which <i>Torat Kohanim</i> proceeds in this manner. The author of Torat Kohanim thus left room for subsequent scholars to offer their own interpretations.
  
  Verse 3
  
   טומאתו בזובו, his impurity in his issue, etc. According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the sequence of these words mean that only the whitish coloured discharge transmits impurity as distinct from a reddish, blood-coloured discharge. The meaning is that but for the restrictive letter ב in the word בזובו, a discharge of blood would have been considered as conferring impurity even if the Torah had written the word זובו טמא הוא as it did in verse 2, we would have had to rule that a discharge of blood is also conferring ritual impurity. In other words, the restrictive expression we discussed at length in verse 2 would not have sufficed. The reason would have been that the expression זובו was used by the Torah in both verses. We would have been forced to conclude that the restrictive nature of the word זובו referred only to the afflicted person himself and not to his discharge. I would then have learned the קל וחומר from the הלכה that his spittle confers impurity as we explained on verse 2. Alternatively, we would have reasoned that the reason we have to exclude it is only because there was a special letter needed (the letter ו in the word וזאת) to include urine otherwise we would have excluded it.
  טומאתו היא. it is his impurity. In <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the sages explain the logic as follows: If a זב, a male afflicted with this discharge who does not transmit impurity through a discharge of blood, nonetheless transmits impurity when discharging a whitish fluid, a זבה, female equivalent, who transmits impurity when discharging blood (from that orifice), most certainly would also transmit impurity if she discharges a whitish fluid. Therefore the Torah had to write טומאתו היא, it is his impurity, seeing the word טומאתו was quite unnecessary unless it was meant to tell us that a female when in the throes of this disease does not confer impurity by the discharge of a whitish fluid but only by discharging blood. This exclusion is based on the pronoun-ending טומאת־ו as opposed to the pronoun-ending טומאת־ה. We disagree with the author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> who uses the word היא as the basis for this exclusion. When you will examine the exclusion to be derived from the word היא more carefully you will be forced to admit that the word describes the impurity and not the person who has become impure.
  I have already discussed at length the fact that the קל וחומר that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> presents here as a possible reason why the text had to specifically teach us an exclusion is the exact opposite of the קל וחומר the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> suggested as a possible reason for the inclusion of the urine in the fluids causing impurity. I have told you that such hypothetical logical approaches are not necessarily final and may be abandoned when new tools of exegsis come to light. Another example had been <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on Leviticus 14,7. We can answer these apparent contradictions by pointing out -as did the Talmud in <i>Niddah</i> 54- that there are elements in the laws about the blood of a menstruating woman which provide us with a reason to consider her as the more stringent case. Details are that her blood confers impurity regardless of whether it is still wet or has already dried whereas the discharge of someone afflicted with זיבה transmits impurity only while it is wet. Also, a menstruating woman causes impurity as soon as she has spotted blood the first time, whereas the blood of a person afflicted with זיבה transmits impurity only after several sightings or sightings on consecutive days respectively. The menstruating woman causes impurity to things she sits on or lies on as soon as she sights her menstruating blood the first time, something that is not the case with a male זב. These factors combined entitle us to assume that discharge of blood should cause impurity, more so than the discharge of a whitish fluid. On the other hand, the fact that a male זב transmits impurity already after several sightings of discharge even on the same day, as opposed to his female counterpart who only causes such impurity, after sighting a discharge on the third of three consecutive days, indicates that his discharge is viewed more severely and that therefore also a bloody discharge of his could confer impurity. For the above cited reasons we can understand why the two apparently contradictory attempts to learn a hypothetical קל וחומר are both reasonable.
  The reason why the Torah wrote the word היא (a second restrictive expression in addition to טומאתו בזובו), may be because the Torah was concerned that unless there was an additonal restrictive expression one might interpret the first such expression as merely reducing the level of impurity the whitish fluid from a זבה transmits i.e. a lower degree of impurity than that transmitted by her blood. Whereas the blood she emits confers ritual impurity on anything she sits or lies on already at the first sighting, the whitish fluid would not have that effect until after several sightings on several days, etc,. I would not conclude, however, that the whitish fluid does not confer impurity at all. Hence the restrictive word היא is needed to teach that whitish fluid issuing from a זבה does not confer impurity at all. Only the male זב confers impurity through emission of a whitish fluid. [I confess I have some problem with this seeing that verse 25 did not mention anything other than the blood of a זבה. Why was there a need to exclude anything other than blood? Ed.]
  
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   ורחצו במים, they shall both bathe themselves in a ritual bath. The reason the Torah again mentions the male partner and the requirement that he has to bathe himself -something mentioned expressly in verse 16- is explained by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> as teaching that both he and she are subject to exactly the same procedure when it comes to the immersion in a ritual bath. You may argue that if that was all the verse teaches us there was no need to write ורחצו..וטמאו, but we could have derived all this from the letter ו in the word ואשה, seeing we have numerous instances where that letter was used to compare the laws in a later paragraph to those spelled out in the Torah in a previous paragraph (compare the first few chapters of Leviticus)! The fact is that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> already used the letter ו in the word ואשה to teach that it includes a minor of three years and one day. Accordingly, if the Torah had not written the word ורחצו, I would have interpreted that letter as referring to details about the immersion in the ritual bath instead of interpreting it as including a girl of three years plus. We would have had no extraneous letter or word to teach us that even a three-year old girl would have to purify herself if she had become the victim of sexual intercourse with a male.
  Had it not been for the interpretation of the sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>, I would have interpreted the words אשר תצא ממנו שכבת זרע in verse 16 to mean that unless the semen actually leaves the body of the man who became aroused by it, and is visible on the male's flesh, there is no need for a ritual bath because all of it has been absorbed internally. The same law would not apply to a woman; she could become ritually defiled even if the semen entered her without a trace of it being visible on her body. If she touched herself internally and came into contact with the semen she would be ritually impure. The Torah had to write ורחצו, "they have to bathe themselves," to make it clear that both the male and the female partner in such intercourse have to undergo the same procedure to become ritually clean again although the manner in which they each contracted the impurity differed. We are now able to explain the additional letter ו at the beginning of the word ואשה to mean that on occasion also the woman may be subject to the same law as the male in that her hidden parts do not become defiled if her partner cohabited with her in a manner which is not the standard way of conducting sexual intercourse [anal intercourse, for instance, Ed.]. This would be so according to the view of the majority of rabbis cited in <i>Yevamot</i> 34. According to the view of Rabbi Yehudah there, the example of such a הלכה would be a virgin bride on her wedding night. The rabbis derived this rule from the word אותה. Had the Torah not written the word ורחצו and I would have had to figure out the need for both the man and the woman who was his partner to bathe themselves in a ritual bath based only on the additional letter ו in the word ואשה, I would have concluded that the man transmits ritual impurity even if his semen had not seen the light of day. I would have interpreted the word תצא in verse 16 to mean that the semen had left its customary place, i.e. the scrotum, and that it had merely entered the seminal canal of the male member without being ejaculated. Alternatively, I would have understood the words כי תצא as a future tense, i.e. that the man's semen was capable of being ejaculated even though it had not actually been ejaculated, a situation which is similar to the normal situation in a woman. Both would be considered as ritually impure in such a situation. The Torah wrote the word ורחצו to prevent us from pursuing this kind of exegesis, i.e. that in this instance the inference we normally draw from the conjunctive letter ו at the beginning of a paragraph such as the word ואשה does not apply. If the Torah had written אשה אשר ישכב איש אותה ורחצו, i.e. the letter ו at the beginning of the verse would have been absent, I would still have been left with the restrictive meaning mentioned in connection with the word אותה (see above: Rabbi Yehudah, etc.), but I would have to apply this restriction differently having been told explicitly by the text that the woman transmits impurity even if the semen is inside her private parts. In such circumstances there would be no logical reason to differentiate between a virgin-bride (whose hymen was still intact and who therefore could not keep the semen inside her private parts) and any other woman. I would have been forced to conclude that the expression אותה is inclusive rather than restrictive and that the woman transmits impurity if the semen is in any of her private parts (such as her armpits). By adding the letter ו at the beginning of the word אשה, the Torah makes it clear that just as a woman's private parts other than her vagina do not transmit ritual impurity due to the presence of semen, so her vagina does not either. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> made it clear by using the letter inclusively, that the word אותה is to be used only as a restrictive clause. As a result, the letter ו in ואשה was superfluous and could be used to include a girl of three years plus one day and up.
  
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   ואם טהרה מזובה וספרה, But if she be cleansed from her issue, then she shall number, etc. We have to try to understand the use of the past tense for the word וספרה instead of the future tense, i.e. ותספור. Precisely when is the count to commence? If the count is to commence immediately, why does the Torah not write ותספור? If it is to occur only after she has become purified, the words "afterwards she shall be clean" do not make sense. We may have to explain this in light of what <i>Torat Kohanim</i> wrote on the meaning of the words טהרה מזובה. They interpret it as a cessation of the issue. The Torah tells us how we are to know that she may be considered cleansed from her issue, i.e. from the time the flow of blood stops. Her "purity" is then sufficient to permit her to begin the count of seven days (during which the flow must not recur). Rashi concurs with this interpretation in <i>Megillah</i> 8. He writes that she may begin counting without first having to immerse herself in a ritual bath.
  There is another way of interpreting our verse. The words ואם טהרה, "if she is cleansed," mean that the flow of blood has stopped; after all, this is the plain meaning of "she is clean from her flow of blood." You should not think, however, that the impurity has departed from her; the only thing which has departed from her is the contaminating issue. This is why the Torah underlined this by the extraneous word מזובה, "from her issue." What has not departed is the impurity transmitted to people touching the afflicted person. She is still ritually impure and has to count seven days during which she must be free of renewed symptoms. This is why the wording וספרה, a past tense converted by the use of the וו ההיפוך, the letter ו which reverses the tenses is in order.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   וידבר ה׳ אל משה אחרי מות, G'd spoke to Moses after the death, etc. Why doesn't the Torah spell out what G'd told Moses on this occasion? Secondly, why did the Torah have to add that this communication occurred after the death of two of Aaron's sons? What bearing does this have on the content of G'd's message? Thirdly, why did the Torah have to add the words: בקרבתם לפני ה׳ וימותו, "when they came close to the presence of G'd and died?" If the Torah wanted to tell us the reason these sons died, we have been told this already in Leviticus 10,1, when the Torah wrote: ויקריבו לפני ה׳ אש זרה? The Torah was far more specific about the death of these sons in that context than it is here. We could not determine what the sin of these sons of Aaron had been by relying merely on what the Torah has written here. What is so terrible about wanting to come close to the presence of G'd? Fourthly, the word וימותו, they died, is quite superfluous seeing the verse commenced with the mention of their deaths? Fifthly, why did the Torah use the additional letter ו in the word וימותו?
  It appears that the Torah tries to tell us that G'd warned Moses not to think that seeing that he personally was closer to the Kingdom of Heaven and at home in G'd's palace, that he could enter the Sanctuary at will. Even though G'd addressed this command to Aaron, Moses was not to think that he was not included in this restriction because the Torah itself testified in Numbers 12, 7-8 that Moses' prophecy was superior to that of Aaron. G'd had to speak to Moses to warn him not to misunderstand the prohibition He was about to issue to Aaron concerning entry into the Sanctuary, i.e. the Holy of Holies. G'd said וידבר ה׳ אל משה, i.e. the directive was addressed exclusively to Moses. He spoke to him shortly after the death of the sons of Aaron who had attempted to come too close as a result of which they died. The Torah meant that although they were the sons of Aaron, i.e. highly placed personages so much so that the Torah testified that their death was due to their closeness to G'd, (compare comment of <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 12,2 on Leviticus 10,3 "I will be sanctified through those close to Me.") G'd did not have pity on them in spite of their closeness to Him. The principal lesson to be derived from all this is that he who occupies a privileged position is not entitled to take liberties with G'd who has granted this privilege in the first place.
  Another aspect of the word בקרבתם may be that these people were closer to G'd than anyone. Had Moses been closer to G'd than Nadav and Avihu, G'd should have demonstrated the lesson of בקרובי אקדש by punishing Moses for some minor infraction he was guilty of. If G'd chose Nadav and Avihu instead to demonstrate this principle, they must have been the people closest to G'd at that time. Perhaps G'd explained all this to Moses on this occasion so that afterwards Moses said to Aaron in Leviticus 10,3: הוא אשר דבר ה׳ לאמור בקרובי אקדש, "this is what G'd has said to say: I will be sanctified by those who are close to Me." We would then have to assume that the content of G'd's communication in verse 1 of our chapter was said to Moses immediately after the death of Nadav and Avihu. The fact that their deaths had been reported earlier does not matter as we have a principle that the Torah is not bound to report events in chronological order.
  <i>Torat Kohanim</i> writes one could have thought that when G'd addressed His warning to "your brother Aaron," Moses felt that he was not included in that prohibition and could enter the Holy of Holies at will. They conclude that the word אחיך was meant to include only Aaron's other sons so that Moses himself would have remained free to enter at will. Accordingly, I would not have known if Moses was included in the prohibition or not unless G'd told Him so specifically. The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> writes that it is clear that only someone who had received permission to enter at certain specified times had to be told not to enter at other times. He who had never been permitted to perform a duty inside the Holy of Holies did not need to be told that he could not enter at will. According to what I have written the entire warning is contained only in verse 1. I do not think that the reasoning of <i>Korban Aharon</i> is correct. The author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> meant that our verse did not mean to exempt Moses from the warning issued to Aaron at all and that we remain without a verse either permitting or prohibiting Moses from entering the Holy of Holies. The author chose to use the extraneous word אחיך to also include Aaron's remaining sons in the prohibition instead of using it to exempt Moses from the warning.
  All of this is in line with the opinion that the word אחרי is a signal that something occurred close to what was reported earlier, whereas the word אחר indicates that it occurred some considerable time later than what has been reported last (compare <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 44,5). There is also an opposite view that the word אחרי introduces something that occurred much later chronologically than what had been reported immediately before, whereas the word אחר refers to what had happened immediately before the paragraph commencing with the words אחר הדברים. According to the latter view we have to explain our verse in the following manner. The death of Aaron's sons was due to their having entered the Sanctuary on their way to the Holy of Holies without permission. While it is true that in פרשת שמיני the reason for their deaths given by the Torah is the "strange fire" they introduced into the Sanctuary (10,1), our verse teaches that they would have been guilty of death for merely entering the Holy of Holies even if they had not brought strange fire into the Sanctuary. The Torah stressed the word וימותו, "they died," so that we should not think that Nadav and Avihu succeeded to carry out their intention to enter the Holy of Holies. They died before they could carry out their intention. The Torah is at pains to let us know this in the event a person would be willing to enter the Holy of Holies even at the cost of his life. We are warned here that the effort would be futile as G'd would not allow such a person to realise his intention. The Torah does not warn us about this because it presumes a criminal intent by someone who insists on entering the Holy of Holies. On the contrary, the assumption is that such an attempt would be prompted by the religious fervor of the individual, an overpowering desire to come close to the source of the שכינה on earth which makes such a person ignore the danger to which he exposes himself.
  All of the above is based on the approach of Rabbi Yossi who claimed that it was the unauthorized entry which caused the death of Nadav and Avihu. It also conforms to the view of Rabbi Avraham ibn Ezra according to which they committed two deathly sins, i.e. the offering of unauthorised incense, and entering the Sanctuary without authority. According to the view of Rabbi Akiva who holds that they died only because they offered incense, you have to explain our verse differently if you assume that the word אחרי refers to something which had occurred some time previously. In order to understand this we must first ask ourselves why G'd did not mention the legislation involving the Day of Atonement until this day instead of revealing this information on the day He commanded the details about all the other sacrificial offerings in the first two portions of the Book of Leviticus. We could have expected Moses to tell Aaron not to enter the Holy of Holies unbidden in Leviticus 9,7 where he also told him to approach the altar and offer his sin-offering, etc. This would have been the logical place to add that Aaron should not enter the Sanctuary unless bidden to do so. The fact is that one could have derived that prohibition from the positive permission to approach the altar (in the courtyard of the Tabernacle). All Moses had to tell Aaron at that point was: "offer your sin-offering," and I would have known that it was to be offered on that altar." If he added the words קרב אל מזבח, Aaron could have figured out that he was allowed only to mount the copper altar at will, not the golden altar in the Sanctuary. Our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explain all sorts of things in connection with that verse. According to our own approach Moses only told Aaron that he could use only the outer altar. The question is why he did not add that entering the Holy of Holies would result in his death?
  Our sages (<i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 7,1) remark that the two sons of Aaron died on account of the sin of the golden calf, based on Deut. 9,20: "G'd was also very angry at Aaron to have destroyed him;" if it had not been for Moses' prayer all four sons of Aaron would have died prematurely. The original cause of the death of Nadav and Avihu was the involvement of their father in the sin of the golden calf, and their deaths served as atonement, much as a sacrifice on the altar serves as atonement for the owner of his sin-offering. Do not argue that we have quoted different sages as attributing the deaths of these sons to either their unauthorised offering of incense, or their entering the Holy of Holies without authorisation or the Torah's speaking of their unauthorised use of man-made fire. The answer to all these arguments is that had it not been for the involvement of their father in the sin of the golden calf, G'd would have found a way to guard the feet of His pious so that they would not become guilty of such an inadvertent sin as bringing incense, etc. The statement in <i>Zevachim</i> 115 that these sons died as martyrs for the glory of the name of the Lord is also not at variance with what the <i>Midrash</i> said in <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 7,1. Had it not been for the sin of their father, G'd would have had to glorify His name by means of the death of another one of His beloved people. We have it on good authority (Psalms 116,17) that "the death of His pious ones is a very precious event for the Lord;" the reasons for this may be difficult for anyone other than G'd Himself to fathom. Nonetheless, it is our tradition that sometimes G'd desires the deaths of such pious people. In such instances, the pious person in question whose departure from earth G'd desires, must have committed at least some minor infraction so that his death can be justified legally. I have elaborated elsewhere on this theme. It is worth looking at <i>Avot de Rabbi Natan</i> chapter 38 in which the martyrs who died at the hands of the Emperor Hadrian were unhappy that their violent deaths could be interpreted as due to their having violated basic laws of the Torah. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel found a justification for his violent death when his colleague suggested he could have been guilty of the minor infraction of having had a poor man wait too long before he gave him food to eat, or that he was guilty of enjoying the honour of discoursing on Torah before an audience of 600,000 people. It is difficult to accept that a person should be guilty of a violent death for such a minor indulgence. If this were the norm G'd applies to His Torah scholars there would hardly be anyone left alive! You must understand these happenings in light of the fact that G'd already waited for an excuse to gather in the souls of these people to the Celestial Regions. Simltaneously, the very death of such martyrs insures that G'd can delay the retribution which the other people of the martyrs' generation had become guilty of. When we keep this consideration in mind we will better understand that the death of the sons of Aaron was a blessing for the survivors. As far as the public was concerned the sin of the golden calf had been forgiven as demonstrated by the establishment of the Tabernacle and the presence of the שכינה in the Holy of Holies. Aaron's sin-offering on the eighth day of the consecration rites had been the final public step in that rehabilitation. The decree according to which Aaron's sons had to die had therefore been cancelled already. However, the impression this sin had made in the celestial regions had not been erased. It was the residue of that impression which resulted in G'd not guarding the feet of these sons from inadvertently committing a deadly sin as described by the Torah and the various sages.
  When we take a long look at all the factors we have just outlined, it is clear that Aaron had not yet been qualified to enter the inner sanctum of the King of Kings had it not been for the death of his two sons serving as atonement for his share in the sin of the golden calf. It was only then that the record of his involvement was erased in the celestial spheres. We can now understand our verse properly. וידבר ה׳ ….בזאת יבא אהרון אל הקדש, "G'd said..only after Aaron has been equipped with this (i.e. the atonement attained through the death of his two sons) Aaron is able to enter the Holy of Holies." The Torah stresses that the two people who died did so in their capacity as בני אהרון, sons of Aaron. This is an allusion to the guilt of their father which had been fully atoned for by their deaths. This also accounts for the fact that G'd did not command Aaron concerning not entering the Sanctuary at will until now. As long as Aaron was not qualified to enter the Sanctuary even when he was to perform a specific task there, there was no point in prohibiting him from entering when he did not have a specific function to perform there. Once the Torah had informed us that the death of the sons of Aaron was linked to the guilt of their father, the Torah also had to inform us that this was not the only reason they died. There were other reasons which were quite unconnected to anything their father had done or had failed to do. Their father's part in their death was limited to G'd having withdrawn His protective supervision from them so that they should not become guilty of inadvertently committing deadly sins. The word בקרבתם לפני השם may be understood as the second cause of their death. Had they not been the sons of Aaron who was still guilty of some involvement in the sin of the golden calf at that time, the fact that they were about to enter the Holy of Holies might not have resulted in their deaths. In view of the fact that even both factors combined would not represent sufficient reason for these people to be guilty of death, G'd added that their closeness to G'd was what made these two priests ideal to serve as a means of glorifying the name of G'd, i.e. בקרובי אקדש. In recognition of the fact that even the two causes mentioned were not sufficient to account for the deaths of Nadav and Avihu at that time, the Torah adds the latter ו at the beginning of the word וימותו, to hint that there was a need for someone to die in order to demonstrate the sacred nature of the Tabernacle and G'd's presence associated with it. G'd felt that He had to demonstrate that anyone who approached this sacred place without specific authority would die. This is why the paragraph dealing with the warning not to enter the Sanctuary at will was legislated here.
  Accordingly, we have three factors which combined to cause the death of Nadav and Avihu at that time. 1) The sin of the golden calf, i.e. Aaron's share in it. 2) offering of the incense; 3) the need to demonstrate the sanctity of the Tabernacle through the death of someone who entered it without authority. G'd alluded to all three of these factors when He wrote: אחרי מות שני בני אהרון, i.e. on account of Aaron's sin, בקרבתם, because they approached too closely to the center of holiness; וימותו, because someone had to die to demonstrate לבל יבא...אל הקודש, that neither ordinary people nor the High Priest himself could enter there unbidden. The Torah had to list all three reasons here. 1) Had it not been for the sin of the golden calf these righteous sons of Aaron would certainly have enjoyed sufficient protection from G'd not to allow them to become guilty of such a trespass. 2) The sin of venturing too close to G'd also had to be mentioned as they would never have died on account of their father's sin unless they had been guilty of a sin themselves. 3) The nature of the sanctity of the Tabernacle also had to be recorded here since, if it had not been for this consideration, G'd would not have allowed the joy prevailing over the evidence that His presence had returned to the Jewish people to be disturbed by such a tragic occurrence. He would have waited to let these sons of Aaron die at some later date. It was because G'd wanted to sanctify the Tabernacle on that day that the sons of Aaron died on that day. The need to sanctify the Tabernacle on that day would not have been sufficient reason by itself to let them die then.
  In view of all the foregoing we can understand what prompted Moses to tell Aaron that he found out through what happened to Nadav and Avihu that they were men of greater stature than either Aaron or himself (see <i>Torat Kohanim</i> our quote on page 1035). Moses simply found out that had it not been for the sin of Aaron their father, G'd could not have found anything these sons had been guilty of to allow them to die. The same could not have been said of either Moses or Aaron.
  If you follow our approach to the whole subject, it is possible to understand Proverbs 22,20: "indeed I wrote down for you threefold learnings and knowledge." There were three causes which combined to result in the deaths of Nadav and Avihu; two of them can be categorised as מועצות, learning, the third one as דעת, knowledge. These are the three aspects which caused the deaths of Nadav and Avihu. It teaches that G'd had not completely forgiven Aaron despite his threefold efforts, i.e. his prayers, his good deeds and his sacrificial offerings. The word מועצות is also an allusion to the failure of G'd to watch over the feet of the righteous so that they should not stumble into sin. This second aspect of מועצות is even more sophisticated than the former one. G'd deliberately failed to forgive Aaron completely so that He would have an excuse to allow Nadav and Aavihu to die.
  Another reason why the Torah wrote אחרי מות is connected with the prohibition for Aaron to enter the Holy of Holies dressed in his golden garments (<i>Rosh Hashanah</i> 26) as the accuser (reminder of the gold of the golden calf) could not function as counsel for defense at the same time. The Torah was concerned that we might reason that the prohibition to wear his golden garments was applicable only as long as the last vestiges of Aaron's sin had not yet been erased in the celestial regions. I might have thought that as soon as his sons died and had thereby achieved atonement for their father's remaining vestiges of sin, Aaron would be allowed into the Holy of Holies even while wearing his golden garments. The Torah had to tell us that even after the deaths of his two sons Aaron could still not wear his golden garments in the Holy of Holies. All he was to wear when entering that part of the Sanctuary was כתנת בד קדש ילבש, "a holy linen tunic, etc." While it is true that our sages in <i>Erchin</i> 16 mention that the golden garments performed a function in the atonement process, the gold could not atone sufficiently for the sins to become completely "snow white." Please read what I have written in my commentary on <i>Shabbat</i> 30 what Solomon had in mind when he said "remember the kindness of David Your servant" (Chronicles II 6,42). [I have not seen the author's comment, but I presume that although David had tried to obtain forgiveness by all the means at his disposal, it was not until the prayer of his son Solomon that G'd erased the last vestiges of his sin. The Talmud is on record that the gates of the Sanctuary had refused to open for Solomon until he completed this prayer. Ed.]
  When the Torah mentions the cause of death as בקרבתם לפני השם, this is meant to free Moses from the suspicion that his own prayer on behalf of Aaron at the time of the golden calf episode had been unsuccessful. The Torah had mentioned Moses's prayer on behalf of Aaron in Deut. 9.20. Moses himself may have been under the allusion that his prayer had not elicited the desired response. G'd told him therefore that these sons did not die because of Aaron's sin alone, i.e. Aaron's guilt had been reduced to a level where he would not be punished by the death of his sons. Moses' prayer had been effective enough to reduce Aaron's guilt and save his sons. Once we accept this approach we need not say that Moses' prayer was effective only 50% and that instead of all four of Aaron's sons having to die only two of them died (compare <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 10,5). None of them had to die were it not for the fact that two of them had become guilty of a sin of their own. What the <i>Midrash</i> meant was that since eventually two of Aaron's sons died at the hands of G'd this was proof that Moses' prayer was only partially effective. We measure the effectiveness of a prayer by its ultimate outcome, not by the short-term reprieve it may afford a sinner.
  וימותו, they died; Perhaps G'd had informed Moses that these two sons of Aaron had committed the sin of approaching too closely or offering incense using man-made fire while they had already been guilty of death due to a sin committed by their father when G'd had become angry at Aaron. Had it not been for this, G'd might have stretched His patience so that they would not have died immediately for the sin committed now. If they had escaped death until that moment it had only been due to the prayer of Moses on behalf of Aaron at the time.
  Another approach to the word וימותו focuses on the nature of these sons' deaths rather than on the fact of their deaths. The Torah writes: בקרבתם לפני השם, to describe that due to their love for G'd these people came too near the celestial source of light which has a deadly effect on man. This is the mystical dimension of what is commonly known as "death by Divine kiss," the kind of death experienced by both Aaron and Moses eventually. The deaths of Nadav and Avihu were similar to the death of all other completely righteous men. The only difference was that in the case of the deaths of people such as Moses and Aaron G'd's "kiss of death" approaches them, whereas in this case Nadav and Avihu approached "the kiss of death." 
  This is the meaning of the extra letter ו in בקרבתם לפני ה׳ ו־ימותו. The Torah alludes to the fact that though these righteous people felt that they were approaching an area which would result in this "kiss of death" they did not flinch and kept getting closer. They attained a state of religious intoxication. The desire of their souls to fuse with the divine was so overpowering that they no longer made decisions in which their powers of conscious perception were involved. If we were to evaluate part of the emotional process these people underwent, perhaps the following may help. There are times when certain people feel such an overpowering hatred for someone that they will abandon all restraining influences in the desire to exercise their revenge even while they are subconsciously aware that they are forfeiting their very lives by the act of revenge. This may be the mystical dimension of what appears as licentious behaviour by prophets in Samuel I 19. There is a mystifying verse in Samuel I 19,24 which tells of Saul's pursuit of David and the religious experiences first experienced by the messengers despatched to capture David who at that time was in the proximity of the prophet Samuel and other prophets. All the messengers are reported as being overcome by an aura of religious experiences of these prophets. Eventually, the same happened to Saul himself. He is described as having divested himself of his clothing and remained naked [symbol of the desire to abandon the restrictions imposed on man by his body, Ed.] for a whole day in the presence of the prophet Samuel. Perhaps that verse affords us an inkling of the result of overpowering emotions of hatred. When we think of the other extreme of man's emotional range, his love for his source, i.e. his Creator, and the overpowering desire to be united with that source, we may have an inkling of what possessed Nadav and Avihu at the time. Basically speaking, we are dealing with the natural abhorrence each soul has for the need to be imprisoned inside a mere body. It is always the soul's desire to escape this body. Nadav and Avihu's souls experienced such an urge in an unusual manner. [At this point the author describes how a person may arrive at progressively purer insights due to his mind's ability to triumph over the impeding element of self, ego. Eventually, such a person will view "life" itself in an entirely new light such as hinted at by Moses in Deut. 30 19 when he exhorts the Jewish people to "choose life." The letter ב at the beginning of the word ב־חיים, is understood to refer to a life devoid of what he calls הרגש הכללי, emotions felt by all normal human beings. The author blesses the Lord for having granted selected individuals the ability to rise to such spiritual heights. Ed.]
  There is yet another approach to our problem based on <i>Torat Kohanim</i> which quotes a <i>Baraitha in Yuma</i> 53."Rabbi Eliezer says: ולא ימות עונש, כי בענן אראה אזהרה; יכול קודם מיתת בני אהרון, תלמוד לומר אחרי מות; יכול שניהם אחר מיתת בני אהרון, תלמוד לומר אראה. הא כיצד אזהרה קודם, מיתה אחר כך. "The words: 'so that he shall not die," are the penalty for entering; 'for I will be visible through the cloud is the warning;' I might have thought that this warning was issued prior to the deaths of the sons of Aaron; hence the Torah writes: 'after the death.' How did it all work? The warning was issued before, the death followed afterwards." The Talmud there enquires what we are to learn from Rabbi Eliezer's statement. Rava says that the expression אראה is a future tense, and that the Torah speaks of something that had not yet occurred, i.e. the cloud had not yet enveloped the Tabernacle (Leviticus 9,23). Accordingly, the sons of Aaron who are reported to have offered incense did so after the cloud had already appeared on that very day (Leviticus 10,1) and they were killed before a penalty had been decreed for this by the Torah. Keeping this in mind, we have to explain our verse here as follows: אחרי מות, after the death, etc.; G'd does not want you to think that the fact that the Torah records the prohibition to enter the Holy of Holies at will except when the High Priest was equipped with the cloud of incense was a belated warning, and that the sons of Aaron died for not heeding it. It says in 10,1 that "the sons of Aaron each took a censer with incense and placed fire on it, etc." The fact is the sons of Aaron had not been warned not to enter the Holy of Holies. This leaves us with the question why they had to die. The Torah therefore had to inform us that these deaths were not just a legal matter, a penalty which anyone else who had done the same thing would also have been subject to. The reason that the sons of Aaron died when attempting to enter the Holy of Holies was because בקרבם לפני ה׳, they attempted to draw too near to G'd. Seeing that they considered themselves as fit to be so close to G'd, G'd applied a more stringent yardstick when judging their behaviour. This is why a minor misdemeanour was treated as if it were a major sin. The Torah alluded to this with the additional letter ו in the word וימותו, i.e. there was an additional factor which contributed to their deaths.
  We find the following comment in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> concerning the words: "speak to Aaron, etc;" we do not know what G'd had said to Moses in the previous verse (verse 1). Rabbi Eleazer ben Azaryah used to say that this could be explained by a parable. A physician comes to a patient and tells him not to eat cold food and not to lie on wet moss. Later on another physician enters the room of that patient and tells him not to eat cold food or to lie down on wet moss else he would die just as so-and-so has died. The comment of the second physicain made a more powerful impression on the patient than the instruction of the first physician. We must understand why these instructions were issued in this order. Besides, why does <i>Torat Kohanim</i> not simply commence the comment with the words: "Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah said, etc.?"
  It appears that Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah did not address the problem of the warning itself but the problem of why the warning coupled with the threat of death for ignoring it was so much delayed that G'd issued it to Aaron only in our portion instead of in chapter 9, and why he compared it to the parable with the physician. Normally, a physician who wants to impress his patient mentions that failure to adhere to his instructions has already cost patients' lives. The physician of the Jewish people, i.e. G'd, did just this when He issued His instructions to Aaron in this instance. Until the sons of Aaron died G'd had not been in a position to accompany His warning with an example of the consequences of not heeding it. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> therefore quoted Rabbi Eleazar who also answered the question why the same warning had to be issued a second time. We have a rule in the Talmud that there are occasions when a scholar who explains a problem does so by means of an answer without his having spelled out the question first. In our case the unspoken question was what G'd had told Moses in verse 1. We now understand that in the first verse G'd told Moses why these sons of Aaron had died though their quest had been to draw near to Him. Now G'd told Moses to warn Aaron that the same could happen to him even if he did not bring strange fire or incense at a time he was not authorised to enter the Holy of Holies. He should remember what happened to his two sons.
  I have seen a further statement at the end of the <i>Baraitha</i> containing Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah's statement that the last of the warnings had achieved the greatest effect. This is why the Torah said: "speak to your brother Aaron that he shall not enter, etc. If he would enter he would die." Mention is made there of Exodus 4,14 where G'd had told Moses that his brother Aaron would be very happy about his appointment. Here G'd also told Moses to say to "your brother Aaron" as if we did not know that Aaron was Moses' brother. Moses was supposed to frighten Aaron so that he should not share the fate of his sons. The whole reason that Moses was to warn him was that seeing he was his brother, plus the fact that Moses was not forbidden to enter this would be difficult for Aaron to accept. The problem with all this is that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had already used the word אחיך as including Aaron's other sons in the prohibition as I have mentioned earlier.
  I believe the intent behind that statement is clear from its position in the chapter. It is peculiar that G'd told Moses to warn Aaron not to die as had his sons before he had even told him of the prohibition to enter the Holy of Holies at will (verse 2). We would have expected such a warning to follow on the heels of the prohibition not to enter the Tabernacle at will. The fact that Moses isssued the warning earlier indicates that the basis of the warning was nothing but brotherly concern for Aaron. This is why <i>Torat Kohanim</i> made reference to Exodus 4,14 where the brotherly relations between Moses and Aaron have been stressed. At that time G'd had indicated to Moses that Aaron would become the High Priest and Moses had not minded (<i>Zevachim</i> 102). At the same time Aaron had rejoiced when he saw that his younger brother had been chosen to be leader of the people. When G'd suggested that Moses tell Aaron about the danger of entering the Holy of Holies, He meant for Moses to demonstrate his concern for Aaron's well being.
  We may interpret the additional letter ו in the words ואל יבא as a warning that Aaron should take care that what happened to his sons would not happen to him. The words ולא ימות then are a continuation of that warning.
  I have seen in the commentary of Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi that according to the interpretation of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah there were three kinds of warnings [according to a variant reading in <i>Torat Kohanim. Ed.]</i> The Rabbi is at pains to reconcile the various verses according to the viewpoint of Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah. According to my own point of view, all Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah was concerned with was what G'd had said to Moses in verse 1 where the Torah did not elaborate on the content of G'd's communication to Moses. He arrived at the conclusion that in that communication G'd advised Moses to tell Aaron that if he would violate His instructions he would die just as his sons had died. Moses was troubled by the fact that G'd had not merely told him to warn Aaron not to enter on pain of death but had added that he would die "just as his sons had died." This is why Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah related the parable illustrating the point. Rabbi Eleazar related the story as involving three physicians, not just one or two. Each physician added an additional element of urgency to the warning expressed by the previous physician. According to Rabbi Eleazar, G'd was the physician who was the most persuasive in His warning when He said the patient should take care not to die as had so-and-so before him. According to the explanation offered by Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, G'd did not compare to either of the three physicians mentioned by Rabbi Eleazar. According to him the first and second physicians did not draw a comparison with another patient, whereas the third physician did mention death already during his first warning, something which is not applicable to G'd who had not warned Aaron in that manner until the third warning. [I do not bother to add the additional criticism levelled by our author against the interpretation offered by Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi. Ed.]
  
  Verse 2
  
   ויאמר ה׳ אל משה, G'd said to Moses, etc. The Torah employs the "soft" language usually associated with the word אמור, although the subject matter is a dire warning according to Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah. The very warning was a demonstration of G'd's loving concern for Aaron, just as the physician who warned the patient of the consequences of not following his advice did so out of concern for the life of his patient.
  Alternatively, G'd demonstrated how much He valued Moses by showing that even when His message concerned primarily Aaron He did not address Aaron with that message but Moses. We may understand the very words ויאמר ה׳ אל משה in a way similar to Deut. 26,18: וה׳ האמירך היום, "and G'd achieved by speaking to you this day, etc." <i>Bamidbar Rabbah</i> 14,21 comments on this that even where we find the Torah reporting that G'd "spoke to Moses and Aaron," the meaning is that Moses was to tell Aaron what G'd had said to him. Our verse then is proof of that statement seeing that G'd addressed Moses even when the commandment He wanted to communicate was addressed exclusively to Aaron.
  ואל יבא, and that he must not enter, etc. In addition to the reason we offered previously for the unusual letter ו at the beginning of a message, we may say that inasmuch as Moses had told Aaron on the very first day of his anointment as High Priest to go ahead and offer his sin-offering on the outer altar (Leviticus 9,7) the meaning was that it was only the altar situated in the courtyard which Aaron had unrestricted access to. Our sages derive this from the principle called לאו הבא מכלל עשה, that the wording of a positive commandment contains within it a negative commandment which was not spelled out by the Torah specifically. The letter ו in the word ואל provides the clue to that negative commandment.
  בכל עת, at all times. The implication is that there are times when Aaron would be permitted to enter the Holy of Holies. Details of this are mentioned later beginning with the words בזאת יבא אהרון אל הקודש. Once every year Aaron was to enter the Holy of Holies. The reason the Torah had to introduce this information by the negative commandment that Aaron was not to enter the Holy of Holies before mentioning the exception, was to tell him that if he refrained from entering the Holy of Holies during the rest of the year he would merit entering the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement. If, however, he were to enter the Holy of Holies during any other period he would forfeit the opportunity of entering it on the Day of Atonement at a time when permission had been granted. The Torah chose the expression בכל עת, so as to prohibit entering the Holy of Holies even on the Day of Atonement except in order to perform certain regulated activities, i.e. to burn incense and to splash blood of two sacrifices onto the dividing curtain. When we keep this in mind we derive another meaning from the letter ו at the beginning of the words ואל יבא. The letter relates to an additional warning. Aaron was not only not to enter the Holy of Holies except on the Day of Atonement, but even on that day he was to enter it only for the purpose designated in our chapter. In <i>Torat Kohanim</i> they derive the prohibition of entering the Holy of Holies on the other days from the words אל הקודש. The reason is that the Torah could have written merely the words מבית לפרוכת and I would have known what was meant. The additional words אל הקודש therefore became available for exegesis. Do not concern yourself with the letter ו at the beginning of the word ואל. It is not unusual for the Torah to write such a letter in such a context. We have proved this at length on other occasions.
  כי בענן אראה על הכפורת, "for I will appear in a cloud above the ark-cover." Seeing the Torah had reported G'd's cloud of glory as becoming visible to the entire people in Leviticus 9,23, the Torah had to tell us that there was an even greater proof of G'd's presence in the form of a light of a celestial source above the ark-cover.
  
  Verse 3
  
   בזאת יבא אהרון, "Aaron is to enter with the following:" The reason the Torah repeats Aaron's name though it could have written merely: "with this he is to enter, etc.," is that what has been written in verse 2 applied only to Aaron. From this verse on the Torah deals with commandments applicable not only to the High Priest personally; seeing that Aaron's duties in the Sanctuary were performed on behalf of the entire people, and the clothing he wore while performing this service was as a representative of the people as a whole, G'd commanded His people to perform these rites using Aaron as their representative so as to obtain forgiveness once a year. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> emphasises that the linen tunic Aaron wore was paid for by the Temple treasury. The Torah hinted at this by mentioning Aaron by name as the people's representative.
  
  Verse 4
  
   כתנת בד קודש ילבש, "He shall put on the holy linen tunic, etc." The reason the Torah used the word קרש, holy, in connection with the linen tunic and was not content to include it in the subsequently mentioned בגדי קודש, sacred garments, may be that the Torah was afraid that we would reason that G'd had only ordered three garments to be paid for from the treasury of the Temple seeing they are not garments an ordinary person has to wear anyway. Inasmuch as every person has to wear a tunic, it could have been reasoned that Aaron had to pay out of his own funds for that tunic. The Torah therefore added the word קדש, sacred, to teach that this tunic too was paid for by funds from the Temple treasury. The Torah added the words בגדי קודש הם, so that we should not think that only the tunic was to be paid for by the Temple treasury. The Torah wanted to make plain that the same rule applied to all four garments.
  Furthermore, the Torah may have intended to inform us that the material the tunic was made from was paid for by the Temple treasury. The same applied to the other three garments mentioned here. The Torah wanted to make this plain already when mentioning the first garment. The meaning of the words בגדי קודש הם, may be that the cost of constructing the garments, not only their materials, should be defrayed by the Temple treasury.
  The Torah may also have intended to convey that these garments are of holy character by writing the words בגדי קודש הם, One should not think that it is demeaning that the very servant of G'd who had been equipped with eight garments described in Exodus 28,2-5 as לכבוד ולתפארת, "for glory and splendour," should now wear only inferior garments when performing the service inside the Holy of Holies. Only the four garments listed here are suitable for the mission the High Priest was to fulfil inside the Holy of Holies. One of the reasons is that אין קטגור נעשה סנגור, that the accuser cannot also function as the counsel of defence, as we pointed out repeatedly. The presence of gold on the garments of the High Priest would have reminded the attribute of Justice of the episode of the golden calf.
  Alternatively, the reason such garments would not have been in place inside the Holy of Holies is based on Proverbs 25,6: "Do not be boastful in front of a king;" it is bad manners to harp on one's own importance in the presence of G'd Almighty. The words בגדי קודש הם are the Torah's reassurance to us that just these four garments are the sacred vestments suitable for the service about to be described in our chapter. Our sages see in the expression קודש ילבש a reference to where the tunic is to be worn, i.e. inside the Holy of Holies, the place where the Holy Presence of G'd resides. The apparent repetition בגדי קודש הם mean that all of these garments are to be the property of the Temple treasury. (<i>Torat Kohanim</i>).
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
   ולקח את שני השעירים, "He will take the two male goats, etc." This entire procedure needs much explaining. Why would G'd command procedures such as these? If it is one of the commandments for which the Torah has not provided a rationale, why has it not been described as a חוק, something the Torah normally does in situations where our intellect is too limited to understand G'd's motivations? The problem is made worse in light of the comment of our sages (<i>Zohar</i> volume 3, page 101) that the <i>Azazel</i> is a euphemism for Satan. If we accept this, the entire procedure smacks of a pagan rite, G'd forbid? This impression is reinforced by the statement in <i>Yuma</i> that the two goats are to be indistinguishable from one another in appearance!
  In order to understand this whole subject we must first refer to a statement made by our sages in <i>Avot</i> 4,11 where we are told by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov that if one performs a single מצוה one acquires an advocate on one's behalf; the reverse is true if one commits a sin. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's words are explained by the <i>Zohar</i> volume 2, page 76 and elsewhere as well as by the <i>Ari Zal.</i> A sin is perceived as creating a spiritually negative force in our world. It is this spiritually negative force which is considered the actual sin perpetrated by the individual in question. We have explained Jeremiah 2,19 and Isaiah 64,6 as conveying this idea. When G'd forgave David in Samuel II 12,14, telling him he would not die, the message was also that the evil power David had created through his deed would be destroyed as a result of his repentance. This is why the prophet Nathan could say that "G'd has also removed your sin and you will not die." The sin man committed created the lethal force which has the power to kill the sinner. Once the sin has been removed, the force that potentially could have killed the sinner has been neutralised, is unable to kill. In other words, it is not G'd who kills but the forces created by the sinner are what cause death. Seeing that G'd much prefers our welfare to our death, He commanded that whosoever committed a sinful act unintentionally should offer a sin-offering; the owner should place his weight on the animal which is to serve as this offering, an act which drains him of the negative influences he has absorbed due to his evil deeds and transfers them to the sacrificial animal instead. G'd has informed us that this act of man when performed in the precincts of the Holy Temple is imbued with the unifying power of the אלוקי הרוחות לכל בשר, G'd's attribute as the spirit of all flesh. This is the mystical dimension of the need to perform סמיכה prior to the offering of sin-offerings. Every activity performed by man as part of the sin-offering procedure, i.e. the slaughtering, and the burning up of the animal's parts designated for this, he performs as a continuation of the act of placing his own physical weight on the animal first. The evil force his sin had created is neutralised, is completely uprooted. You have been aware already that the sin-offering is applicable only in respect of sins committed inadvertently because such a sin does not add to the already extant power of the pollutant which is residual in man since Adam ate from the tree of knowledge. If man committed a sin knowingly and willingly, something which increases this pollutant within him, he cannot erase this by means of a sin-offering. This is what is meant by Solomon in Proverbs 21,27: "the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination." G'd abhors someone who abuses the institution of the sacrificial altar to offer his abomination on it. There is nothing as abhorrent to G'd as the misuse of the altar in an attempt to expiate for intentional sins.
  After these introductory lines we may be able to understand the procedure prescribed in our paragraph, especially when we add the following comment quoted in <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> on verse 16. "He shall make atonement for the holy place, because of the uncleannesses of the children of Israel and their transgressions, etc." The verse speaks of the sin of defiling the Temple and its sacrifices which are being atoned for by the male goat whose blood is sprinkled inside the Sanctuary onto the dividing curtain. All other sins listed in the Torah, both the relatively minor ones as well as the most severe ones, both intentionally committed ones as well as those committed unintentionally, even those for which judicial execution of the sinner is mandatory, etc., will be atoned for by the scapegoat." Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> The wording in the Talmud is as follows: "The scapegoat carries on it all the sins of the Jewish people, the intentional sins, (both serious ones and relatively minor ones), as well as unintentionally committed trespasses." The atonement for sins committed by the priests is also attained by means of the scapegoat as we know from <i>Menachot 92 and Shavuot 13.</i> The exact quote from the Talmud there reads as follows: "Rabbi Yehudah says that the priests also attain their atonement by means of the scapegoat." After G'd has informed us of all this you have sufficient reason to understand the purpose of the two male goats. Between them they carry away the accumulated pollutants which have polluted the souls of the Israelites during the preceding year. G'd is willing to accept as a sacrifice the animal whose function it is to atone for the defiling of the Temple precincts and the various animals therein which became contaminated before being offered on the altar. He does not abhor that sacrifice. G'd is not willing to accept the animal which carries the burden of all the other sins of the Israelites and He consigns that animal to death in a place far removed from the sacred precincts of the Holy Temple. He commanded Aaron to place his weight on that scapegoat prior to dispatching it to its death, seeing that Aaron acts as the plenipotentiary of the Jewish people. He could do so seeing we have the principle that a man's messenger can take the place of the one who has authorised him to be his messenger. When the Torah writes: "he shall place them on the head of the live scapegoat, the verse makes it plain that Aaron transfers all the pollutants which have contaminated the souls of the Jewish people to the scapegoat by means of placing his weight on that animal's head. The Torah simply informed us that the scapegoat is G'd's appointee for carrying the sins of the Israelites away to a barren land.
  We will understand the procedure better by means of a parable. A king examined the garments of his son and found that some of them were clean whereas others were stained. If the garment had a single stain, the king rubs it clean and returns the garment to his son. If he comes across garments which are greatly soiled, he hands these garments to one of his servants instructing him to launder it. The servant does not mind getting his hands dirty while washing the garment. G'd acts in a similar manner with the Jewish people, His children. When one of them presents an offering asking Him to remove a minor stain, i.e. the result of inadvertently committed sins or a stain caused by defiling a Holy Place, G'd does not despise such an offering. However, all the pollutants the Israelites accumulated on their souls due to all the other sins are something G'd considers as most despicable. This is why He instructed one of His most junior servants- the scapegoat- to consign these dirty clothes to a barren spot on earth. This servant is considered expendable by G'd. The death of the scapecoat without slaughter is considered as an undesirable assignment for this servant. Nonetheless, the fact that the servant accomplishes by this mission something similar to what is accomplished by the slaughter of its colleague, namely the cleansing of the Israelites from sin, his mission is a worthy one. This is alluded to in our verse by the requirement that both male goats need to be almost indistinguishable in outward appearance and they have to be presented in the courtyard of the Temple before the lot is cast to determine which one of them is to perform which function. The reason G'd did not command to simply take any male goat from the market to serve as the scapegoat is, that it is impossible for one such animal to absorb all the sins of the Jewish people on its head until it has been imbued with additional strength by having been presented in the holy precincts in the presence of G'd. Once this occurred it was not clear to an observer which of the two goats had been chosen for the task of carrying away the sins of the Jewish people. This is why the Torah arranged for Aaron to draw lots. Only G'd Himself could determine which of His servants (goats) would perform which task. If we consider that according to the kabbalists numerous animals became bodies which housed the souls of former sinners whose souls were given an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves through another re-incarnation on earth, the chances are that the goat which had been chosen by lot to be the scapegoat was such an animal. There are also mystical dimensions to the procedure of the lottery itself as mentioned in the <i>Zohar</i> volume three page 101.
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
   יעמד חי, shall be set alive, etc. These words need analysis. <i>Yuma</i> 40 and <i>Torat Kohanim</i> offer many explanations. According to our own approach the meaning is simply that Aaron was not to confess the sins of Israel on that animal immediately after the lot had been drawn, but was to leave it "alive" for a while. We have explained on several occasions that sinners are called "dead" even while they are physically still alive. An animal which carries the burden of the sins of the nation would therefore certainly be considered "dead" from the moment it assumed that burden. Consequently, the Torah had to mention that this procedure was not to take place immediately and that in the meantime the scape-goat remained "alive." Our interpretation is confirmed by the Torah as correct as you can see from verse 21. Only then does Aaron place his hands (weight) on the head of the שעיר החי, the "living goat," and confesses the sins of the people and transfers them to the head of that animal. At that point the Torah no longer adds the adjective "the live one," when speaking of the scapegoat. Seeing the animal is considered dead from that point on we can understand why the messenger who took the scapegoat to the place from where it was thrown off the rock had to immerse himself in a ritual bath. He had become ritually defiled by contact with an animal considered dead according to <i>halachah</i> though it had been walking all the time that the איש עתי accompanied it (verse 22).
  
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  Verse 26
  
   והמשלח לעזאזל "And he who sends the scapegoat to Azzazel, etc." Who or "what" precisely is the "Azzazel?" We are told in <i>Yuma</i> 67 that it is something "tough and hard." This in turn has given rise to many explanations none of which are satisfactory. My eyes have been opened by kabbalists who are privy to the "370 illuminating lights of the Torah," who have written in the <i>Zohar</i> volume 2 page 157 that the barren desert is the habitat of Samael (Satan). In fact, the reason such a piece of earth is called "desert" is because it is Satan's habitat. An alternate name for this desert is Azzazel; a derivative of that name is עוזא, עזאל. Perhaps the word עזאזל is a composite of עז אזל, "a place where the glory of their existence departed." Alternatively, עזא זל, the site of the force of something base, mean; seeing that Samael is the basest of all spiritual forces, the description would be quite appropriate.
  
  Verse 27
  
  
  
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  Verse 29
  
   והיתה לכם לחקת עולם, "and it shall become for you an eternal statute, etc." The reason the Torah had to add the word לכם, "for you," is that during the earlier part of the chapter G'd had told Moses to address Aaron. At this point Moses is to address the entire nation, to wit "the natural-born Jew and the stranger who had converted." The Torah wants to avoid our making a mistake and tells us that the commandment concerning the activities of the priests only appears at the beginning of the paragraph. We should not think therefore that the commandment to afflict oneself on that day applies only to the non-priests. The word לכם makes it plain that it applies to the whole nation including the priests. We might have reasoned that the priests do not need to afflict themselves, and that especially the High Priest's service on that day would take the place of the afflictions the people submit themselves to. People of the stature of Moses and Aaron might have thought that their bodies were pure enough not to have to undergo the affliction described. This is why the Torah wrote והיתה לכם, "it will be applicable to you" i.e. to Moses and Aaron. We might now have thought that the law to afflict themselves applied only to Moses and Aaron; therefore the Torah wrote האזרח והגר, "the natural-born Israelite as well as the proselyte."
  לחקת עולם, as an eternal statute. The reason for the word עולם is because some people would reason that the purpose of the affliction is to expiate for sins. He who feels he has not sinned might decide that he need not submit to the afflictions either. The Torah therefore tells us that the statute is not connected to the guilt or otherwise of the individual, or even of the nation as a whole. On a more profound level, the word עולם with its connotation of something concealed is a reference to the hereafter. Our afflictions in this world have a profound effect on our wellbeing in the hereafter.
  תענו את נפשותיכם, ''afflict your persons!" The meaning of the word נפשותיכם here is an affliction which is evenly distributed to all parts of the body and soul, i.e. the abstention from food and drink. Should you argue that what is meant is abstention from work such as on the Sabbath, such an affliction would not meet the criteria we just laid down. 1) the part of the body which performs a certain labour is more affected than other parts of the body when one either abstains from performing that work or performs it; 2) the Torah should have written תענו את גופותיכם, "afflict your bodies," seeing that the soul is not involved unless it is deprived of food and drink. The argument of the Karaites that the words are addressed to the hardship of not being allowed to perform physical labour is null and void.
  האזרח והגר, the natural-born Israelite and the proselyte. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives from these two words (the extra letter ה in front) that the wife of the natural-born Israelite as well as the wife of the proselyte are included in this legislation. They further deduce from the word בתוככם that wives and slaves are included. This still leaves the problem why the Torah even had to mention that this legislation applies to natural-born Israelites. Surely we did not need the whole word so that we could derive from the letter ה at the beginning that the wife is included! Surely G'd has many other words at His disposal if He wanted to include the wives without His having to write such a superfluous expression as אזרח and גר.
  We will understand the matter when recalling a statement in <i>Sukkah</i> 28. We are told there: "what is the reason the Torah wrote האזרח? Answer: "to include the women in the legislation to afflict oneself on the Day of Atonement." Our source for this is Rabbi Yehudah in the name of Rabbi Nafka who said that the Torah compared women to men as far as the the penalties for transgressions are concerned. Clearly then the only reason the word had to be written was to teach that the duty to abstain from food and drink applies already shortly before the onset of the Day of Atonement proper (a few minutes before sunset). Seeing that failure to abstain earlier does not carry the <i>karet</i> penalty [as the Torah associates that penalty with the words "on the day itself" Ed.], I might have thought that women are not liable to the additional time for fasting though they have to abstain from food and drink during the Day of Atonement proper; hence the Torah had to write the word האזרח to teach us that she who has to fast on the day proper also has to fast already during the period the rabbis have seen fit to add before the onset of the Day of Atonement proper. When you consider this statement you can understand why the Torah had to write the word אזרח. The only extraneous letter then was the letter ה which included the additional period in the requirement to fast. The word האזרח then means that in this case, just as in other cases where the Torah employs the word האזרח, it applies to women in the same manner as it does to men. Once the Torah had used the word האזרח to exclude someone from something, it was reasonable that the exclusion would apply to a recent convert who would not require the atonement feature of the Day of Atonement. The Torah therefore added the word והגר to ensure we do not make such a mistake. This left us with the question why the Torah had to add the letter ה also in front of the word וגר? Inasmuch as the Torah is not on record as comparing proselytes' wives culpability as similar to that of their husbands,' I might have thought that a distinction would be made regarding the laws connected with abstention from food and drink. The Torah therefore added the letter ה in front of the word גר to show us that this is not so. Furthermore, the reason the Torah had to spell all this out is that otherwise we might have read into the letter ה in front of the word הכהנים that this is a restrictive clause and that the entire legislation applies only to the priests.
  
  Verse 30
  
  
  
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   והיתה זאת לכם לחוקת עולם, "and this shall be for you an eternal statute, etc." This verse refers back to the priests and in particular the High Priest to whom the Torah addressed itself at the beginning of our chapter. The legislation mentioned there is described now as everlasting, i.e. when the facilities exist the procedures of the Day of Atonement are irrevocable. The procedure by means of which atonement is attained on that day contains mystical elements which can only be activated by the High Priest, etc.
  Another reason for the verse here is that we might have thought that the restriction on wearing his golden garments applied only at that time and only to Aaron seeing he himself had been involved in the golden calf episode and it had not yet been fully atoned for. In the future, however, the respective High Priest would be able to discharge his duties in his full regalia. The Torah therefore had to inform us that this is not so. The Torah adds the words לכפר על בני ישראל to tell us that although all of Aaron's share in that sin had been completely erased even in the celestial spheres, the same could not be said of the people. They would need further instalments of atonement year after year indefinitely. Seeing this was so Aaron became part of that vicious circle once again.
  ויעש באשר צוה ה׳ את משה. He did as the Lord commanded Moses. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> writes that this verse is a compliment to Aaron who did not perform all these procedures in order to attain greater stature amongst the people and to aggrandize himself, but who performed all his duties only as a servant of G'd with no ulterior motive. It appears that the Torah also compliments Moses himself seeing that G'd had not spoken to Aaron except via Moses. The Torah goes on record that G'd did not address the person to whom His message was intended directly, but did so only via his trusted servant Moses. When the Torah stated that Aaron complied exactly with what G'd had said, this is proof that Moses had relayed G'd's instructions without adding or omitting one iota. The fact that Moses replicated exactly what G'd told him without adding or detracting is the foundation of our belief in the authenticity of the written Torah, i.e. that it reflects G'd's word no less and no more.
  
  
  
  
  
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   איש איש …אשד ישחט, any person who slaughters, etc. Why is the word איש repeated here? In <i>Zevachim</i> 108 they explain this in terms of Rabbi Shimon who claimed that if someone slaughters an animal (intended as a sacrifice) on behalf of a private individual he would be guilty of slaughtering sacred things outside the Temple precincts. They base this on the repeated mention of איש meaning איש לאיש. They do not explain it as meaning that if two people combined in that act that they would both be culpable for that sin. The reason is that the Torah phrased culpability by referring to האיש ההוא, i.e. a single individual. The Talmud also explains the restrictive word ההוא as excluding anyone who committed this act accidentally, erroneously or inadvertently. At the same time they explain the word as excluding two people who combined to slaughter the animal by saying the Torah did not write ההם, but ההוא. We find this somewhat difficult seeing that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is on record as deriving this <i>halachah</i> from the words דם שפך and not from the word ההוא. One may answer that inasmuch as there are two separate restrictive expressions, i.e. ההוא as well as שפך (verse 4), <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives from the one that when two people slaughter jointly that they are not culpable, and from the other that if the act did not occur intentionally and without outside coercion the perpetrator is not punishable.
  אשד ישחט, who will slaughter, etc. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> phrases its comment thus: "From the mention of the words 'ox, sheep, and goat' I can only derive culpability for slaughtering four-legged mammals; whence do I know that slaughtering birds intended for the altar outside the precincts of the Temple or Tabernacle is also prohibited on pain of the <i>karet</i> penalty? Answer: from the words או אשר ישחט. I could have reasoned that if slaughtering the bird's neck, which is not the normal procedure is culpable, then someone who merely severed the bird's neck by pinching, i.e. מליקה i.e. the normal procedure, would certainly be culpable if he performed this act outside the precincts of the Temple, therefore the Torah had to tell us that he would only be culpable for שחיטה, slaughter, but not for מליקה, pinching." Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> From the above we learn that the word או serves to include culpability for slaughtering the bird in the wrong place whereas from the words אשר ישחט I derive that pinching is not culpable which I would otherwise have considered punishable due to the קל וחומר. How do I reconcile this with a <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Zevachim</i> 107 where we are told by Rabbi Yishmael that he derives the culpability for slaughtering the bird from the expression אשר ישחט, whereas he derives the exclusion of culpability for pinching the bird's neck from the words זה הדבר (in verse 1) which I would have included on the basis of the קל וחומר had it not been for the words זה הדבר? Even Rabbi Akiva who disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael in <i>Zevachim</i> uses the extra words דם יחשב in order to derive the law that slaughtering sacrificial birds in the wrong place is culpable. He derives the exclusion of this culpability when the bird's neck is merely pinched from the expression אשר ישחט. We are forced to conclude that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> was neither Rabbi Yishmael nor Rabbi Akiva. It is quite impossible to reconcile the view of Rabbi Yishmael with that of the author of <i>Torat Kohanim,</i> because the former uses the expression זה הדבר for an exegesis based on a גזרה שוה, comparing it to the same expression in Numbers 30,2, where the Torah speaks about who can cancel vows. On the other hand, the fact that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> does not record the exegetical comment of Rabbi Yishmael concerning the extraneous words דם יחשב, who includes culpability of someone who sprinkles the blood outside the precincts of the Tabernacle, it appears that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> accepts the view of Rabbi Akiva. The exegetical use made by <i>Torat Kohanim</i> of the words או זבח in verse 8 i.e. that the blood is included in the prohibition and culpability of שחוטי חוץ makes it plain that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> does appear to accept the viewpoint of Rabbi Akiva as per the folio of the Talmud we quoted. From all this it emerges that the exegesis that the slaughtering of the bird is culpable when performed outside the courtyard of the Tabernacle is based on the words דם יחשב, whereas the exclusion of pinching the bird's neck as culpable is based on the words אשר ישחט. The question therefore arises why the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives two separate הלכות from the words אשר ישחט? Besides, why does the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> need the words דם יחשב in verse 4?
  I have seen the following comment by Maimonides in chapter 18 of his treatise on <i>Ma-asseh Hakorbanot</i>. "When two people get hold of a knife and they perform ritual slaughter jointly they are free from punishment because the Torah wrote: אשר ישחט או אשר ישחט, i.e. one who slaughters not two who slaughter." Why did Maimonides have to look for a different expression in our verses and could not derive this הלכה from the existing exegesis either in the Talmud or <i>Torat Kohanim</i> ? Another difficulty in the statement by Maimonides is that the very words from the verse used by Maimonides for exonerating two people who slaughter jointly have already been used exegetically to derive the law about slaughtering birds, something which both Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva had agreed on in <i>Zevachim</i> 107? We have explained earlier that according to one of these Rabbis the word אשר ישחט is used to include culpabiity for slaughtering the bird, whereas according to the other Rabbi this word serves to exclude culpability if one merely pinched the neck of the bird in question. Maimonides accepts this latter ruling in chapter 19 of the treatise we mentioned earlier. We have still another difficulty with the exegesis of Maimonides' ruling in the matter of someone slaughtering on behalf of a private individual, i.e. איש. He derives this from the words דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך. This is how Maimonides explains his exegesis: "Although the person in question had not intended to slaughter these קדשים, sacrificial animals, for G'd as such, he will still be culpable because the Torah wrote: "it shall be accounted as blood (guilt) for that man, he has spilled blood." The latter words mean that though in his own mind this blood was similar to ordinary blood spilled on the ground and not blood intended for the altar at all he is guilty. Thus far Maimonides. The Talmud, on the other hand, uses the words איש איש as the basis for the culpability of someone who slaughters such an animal; furthermore, <i>Torat Kohanim</i> uses the words דם שפך as the exegetical base for excluding joint slaughter by two parties or people who slaughtered inadvertently or while under duress as we mentioned earlier. How can we use the same words exegetically to derive the prohibition of שחוטי חוץ? The last mentioned explanation is offered in the name of Rabbi Yossi who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon concerning the meaning of איש איש in <i>Zevachim</i> 108.
  We must understand therefore that Maimonides chose to bring proof for his הלכה from the superfluous words דם שפך, as it is a stronger kind of proof than the exegesis based on the repetition of the word איש. Proof of this is found in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 31 where the repetition of the word העבט תעביטנו in Deut.15,8 is discussed. In that instance Rabbi Shimon took the view that the Torah employed normal human syntax and that the extra word was not intended for special exegetical purposes. <i>Tossaphot</i> write there that when there is evidence in the verse under discussion that the repetition is not justifiable in the context of that verse, we say that it has exegetical significance. When there is some justification for the repetition, however, we may choose not to look for further הלכות based on that word. Rabbi Shimon holds that in the case of Deut. 15,8 the words די מחסורו אשר יחסד לו, "in the amount that he is short," provide ample reason to rule that when the impoverished person does not want to turn his assets into cash and prefers to receive handouts, one need not assist such a person. This is what is meant by our "ignoring the repetition תעביטנו and declaring that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax." Considering this comment by <i>Tossaphot,</i> we can appreciate why the words איש איש are not as good an exegetical base as are the words דם שפך which are used by the Talmud as the exegetical basis according to Rabbi Yossi. Although the Talmud uses this exegetical basis only according to the view of Rabbi Yossi, we are entitled to assume that Rabbi Shimon feels the same way about it seeing we have no reason to assume that the two Rabbis disagree. While it is true that the Talmud (<i>Zevachim</i> 108) presents Rabbi Shimon as using the repetition by the Torah of the word איש איש as teaching that it is culpable to slaughter a mammal outside the precincts of the Temple if said animal was slated to be a sacrificial animal, this was only before Rabbi Shimon had heard of the exegetical value of the words דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך. This is presumably why Maimonides also quoted this latter exegesis as the basis for our הלכה.
  [The author proceeds to deal with the first question he raised against Maimonides. I have decided to skip this. Ed.]
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
   זבחי שלמים לה׳. "sacrifices of peace-offerings to G'd." Why did the Torah not content itself by writing וזבחו אותם, instead of repeating the words זבחי שלמים once more? Perhaps G'd wanted to demonstrate His fondness of the holy offerings brought by His people. He did so by emphasising that He considered these offerings as "peace-offerings," offerings by means of which Israel and G'd are perceived as dining at the same table, just like children at the table of their father. When the Torah writes שלמים לה׳ אותם, we may view the word אותם as referring to the previous subject בני ישראל which was mentioned at the beginning of our verse. The Torah describes how the soul of the Israelites leaves its mortal sheath, so to speak, in order to perform the service for its Maker, completely unaware of the "exaggerated" fondness displayed in return by G'd towards a soul so attuned to its G'd. All this is still insignificant compared to what we owe G'd in response to all He has done on our behalf already before we got around to acknowledging this by means of any peace-offerings.
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
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   ואליהם תאמר, "And to them you are to say, etc." According to Rabbi Yishmael in <i>Zevachim</i> 107 we are dealing here with an example of a phenomenon known as ערוב פרשיות, i.e. that the Torah writes a verse in a paragraph dealing with one subject whereas that verse really had its place in a different paragraph dealing with another subject matter. In our case our verse teaches that whereas so far the prohibition against שחוטי חוץ was presumed to apply only to the act of slaughtering outside and not to burning up the remains of the animals outside the sacred precincts, our verse comes to include also the burning up of the remains of such animals in all instances where these animals had been slated to be burned up on the altar. According to the first <i>Mishnah in Zevachim</i> chapter 13 if one slaughtered the sacrificial animal within the sacred precincts but burned the remains outside those precincts one is just as guilty as if one had slaughtered the animal outside the permitted perimeter. This prohibition applies even if the remains of that animal had not been meant to be burned up on the altar at all. Compare Rashi on the <i>Mishnah</i>.
  
  מבית ישראל, from the house of Israel, etc. The Torah had to write the words "from the house of Israel" and could not content itself with writing the pronoun ואליהם at the beginning of this verse which would have created the impression that it referred to the matters discussed earlier in the paragraph. The word איש איש would have referred to two people who commit a sin jointly such as slaughtering an animal intended for the altar outside the sacred perimeter as we have already discussed. The Torah was afraid that an exegete would use the repetition of the word איש to include Gentiles. The Talmud in <i>Menachot</i> 73 when explaining the word איש איש in Leviticus 22,18 uses the repetition to mean that free-willed offerings by Gentiles are acceptable for the altar of the Temple. In order to prevent us from interpreting the additional word איש in our context in a similar manner the Torah had to add the words מבית ישראל. Burnt-offerings and peace-offerings are acceptable only from Israelites. This in turns leads us to interpret the other meanings we have attributed to the extra word איש in our chapter. Once the Torah was worried about our misinterpreting the word איש איש, so that it had to add the words מבית ישראל, the Torah next had to worry that the words מבית ישראל would lead us to interpret that even proselytes could not offer burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. This is why the Torah had to add the words: "and from amongst the proselyte who lives amongst you." 
  At this point there was a need to write all these words of an inclusive nature. Were it not for these additional examples of inclusive letters, etc. we would be tempted to interpret that the Torah did not include anything which was not spelled out specifically. This is true even according to Rabbi Yossi who holds that the Torah used the ordinary human syntax. Perhaps Rabbi Yossi Haglili holds that the principle of the Torah using ordinary human syntax applies only when there is some evidence that the Torah does not want us to use a specific extraneous word exegetically. [The Talmud in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 31 deals with numerous phenomena of the Torah repeating a word, such as :,שלח תשלח, הוכח תוכיח, הקם תקים, עזוב תעזוב and others. In all these instances the extra word is used exegetically, no one claiming that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax. Ed.] Although the Talmud queries the right of Rabbi Yossi Haglili who fails to use the extra word איש exegetically in one context to use it exegetically in other contexts, this would hold true were it not for the fact that the Talmud found an alternate expression to arrive at the same הלכה by using the word דם שפך exegetically instead of the extra word איש. Whenever the result of interpreting the extra word איש is not in conflict with known הלכות, we do not resort to the principle that "the Torah merely used ordinary human syntax." Tossaphot on <i>Baba Metzia</i> 31 point out that it is unreasonable to suppose that the rabbis were unable to find some exegetical use for the repetition of the word איש in every case where it appears, or for that matter, for any of the many examples where the Torah repeats a word, albeit in a slightly modified form. While it is true that <i>Tossaphot</i> there address the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the same applies to the opinion expressed by Rabbi Yossi Haglili. The main thrust of the argument of those who hold that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax is that we fall back on that principle only where exegetical use of the word would bring us into conflict with accepted הלכות. It can be demonstrated that even Rabbi Shimon frequently accepts that principle although he does use repetitions exegetically.
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
   ואיש איש מבית ישראל אשר יאכל, "And any person from the house of Israel who will eat, etc." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains the repetition of the word איש in these words: "The word ישראל refers to the Israelites; the word גר refers to a proselyte; the letter ה before the word גר refers to the wife of the proselyte; the word בתוכם refers to women and slaves. In view of this, why did the Torah have to repeat the word איש? Rabbi Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon answers that it is meant to include a baby of a Jewish mother fathered by a stranger or a slave." We need to know why the Torah had to write so many words to include all these details just as the <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> 28 asked concerning the word האזרח including the wives, etc. In that instance we find the following discussion [concerning who has to observe the commandment of fasting on the Day of Atonement, (Leviticus 23,27) a positive commandment applicable only at a certain time, something not normally applicable to women, Ed.]. "Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rav that the Torah compared men and women as being equal when it comes to the penalties for violations of Torah laws. As a result, the question arises why the Torah had to write words such as האזרח to restrict the law to adult males, or the words איש או אשה in Numbers 5,6 where clearly we speak of violation of a negative commandment, something that applies to women even if the Torah did not write the word אשה?" The answer given there is that the Torah included the application of the law even to the additional time before nightfall. Without the extra word I might have assumed that seeing neither men nor women are culpable for failure to observe that part of the fast, women would not even be obligated to observe it; therefore the Torah had to write a word indicating that observance is obligatory for women also. Using the approach underlying the discussion in the Talmud, we are entitled to ask here also why the Torah needed to write anything to include women? Who would have thought that women are relieved of the prohibition to eat blood? It is a negative commandment and it goes without saying that women are culpable if they violate it! Besides, why would we have made a difference between a baby born by a proselyte and one born by a natural-born Jewess that the Torah had to write something special to include such a woman? Furthermore, whom did the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> refer to when he spoke about a baby fathered by a proselyte so that the Torah had to specifically include such a child in its legislation by writing איש איש? If such a child reverts to paganism when he grows up, clearly the legislation does not apply to him. If, on the other hand, he grows up as a Jew, why would we need a word in the Torah in order to let us know that this legislation applies to him? In view of the fact that <i>Torat Kohanim</i> describes the child as an Israelite, it is clear that the assumption is that the child remained Jewish willingly. There is no reason why he should be inferior to a proselyte who was not even born as a Jew!
  The author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> writes that the correct wording in the <i>Baraitha</i> quoting Rabbi Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon should be: מן הגוי ומן העבד. The lesson would be that although the father of such a child is or was a pagan or a slave who had not been forbidden to eat blood, the child is forbidden to eat blood as he is considered part of the people his mother belongs to. The child of any union between a male Gentile and female Jewess is considered Jewish as we know from <i>Yevamot</i> 23, where the Talmud bases this on Deut. 7,3-4 the word בנך referring to a grandchild whose father was a Gentile. Thus far <i>Korban Aharon</i>. I find it difficult to accept a distinction between the son of such a mixed union who has decided to opt out of Judaism and one who has not. Once the Torah designated such a son as Jewish he is Jewish in the full sense of the word. If the Torah spoke of a son who did not want to remain Jewish, he has thrown off all of Torah! The Torah certainly does not address such a person! If we are able to impose Torah law on such a youngster we are obligated to do so just as we do with any natural-born Israelite who defies Torah law. If he is not under our control, what point is there in the Torah writing laws concerning such a person?
  I believe that in order to understand what motivated the comments of <i>Torat Kohanim and Korban Aharon</i> it would help if we first examined the reason underlying the prohibition to eat blood which is the subject of our paragraph. Our sages have enlightened us in describing the souls of all Israelites as of a quality which is unmatched, when they interpreted Deut. 32,9 כי חלק ה׳ עמו, to mean that "His people are part of G'd Himself." They also added that although we live our lives in the "lower" world, physically distant from the "higher" celestial regions, we nonetheless retain a חוט של חסד, an umbilical cord of love which ties us to the celestial regions as demonstrated by the words יעקב חבל נחלתו, that "Jacob is the "rope" of His inheritance" (ibid.). The "soul" of an animal, on the other hand, is rooted in the "lower" world. It is related only to the spiritual forces of the lowest order, the קליפת נוגה. Whenever man -knowing it is forbidden-consumes the life-blood of an animal i.e. blood whose loss would result in the death of that animal (as opposed to blood of the capillaries), such eating is punishable by כרת, the premature death and/or extinction of the Jew eating such blood. The reason is very simple. By eating such blood and absorbing a lower category of animal soul thus diluting the "higher" soul G'd has equipped him with, one demonstrates his contempt for higher spiritual values, denying his דבקות, attachment, to one's celestial origin. The Torah writes: "I will set My face against the person (soul) who eats the blood and will cut him off from amongst his people." The Torah refers to what we have called the חוט החסד, the "thread (or rope) of love" which connects the Jewish soul to its celestial origin. All Jewish souls have a common celestial origin near the throne of G'd; this is why the Torah spoke of מקרב עמה, "from the midst of his people."
  Furthermore, it is a well known fact that though the Jewish people share a common root, they are different individually in their relative spiritual levels. This is the mystical dimension of Kohelet 5,7: כי גבוה מעל גבוה שומר וגבוהים עליהם, "for there is One higher than the high Who watches and there are high ones above them." Seeing this is so, one might reason that in view of the fact that this animal which is ritually fit to be eaten cannot therefore have a ritually impure "soul," (life-force) and that imbibing its soul could not be damaging to our souls. I would have reasoned that if consumption of blood is capable of contaminating Jewish souls at all, it can have such an effect only on the most superior of souls, i.e. that of the males. It would follow that the penalty decreed by the Torah is restricted to Jewish males. This is why the Torah had to write words which make it plain that women are no less culpable for infraction of this prohibition than are men. Once the Torah had to write words or letters to include people whom we would not normally have included in that legislation, it had to spell out all the ones included or I would have reasoned that the respective inclusion applied only to the particular "lower" category of person singled out by special reference. The Torah therefore had to demonstrate that though Jewish souls are not all of the same calibre, all are holy enough to jeopardise their holiness if the bodies they inhabit consume animal blood.
  You may also choose to pursue a different approach to our problem. You may argue that consumption of animal blood, i.e. the "soul" of such an animal could prove damaging only to the lowest categories of Jewish souls, and that therefore only those kinds of Jews should be prohibited from eating animal blood. A superior soul would be able to resist the subversive influence of such an animal's "soul" although it might not be totally immune to it. Such potential damage would certainly not be sufficient to rate the harsh כרת penalty. The Torah therefore carefully phrased the legislation in such a way that we cannot arrive at such faulty conclusions. By writing a series of expressions each one designed to include more and more categories of people in this legislation the Torah makes it clear that it applies to both people equipped with superior souls and those whose souls are on a lower level.
  Here is a list of different levels of sanctity. The highest level belongs to the Israelite males; the second highest level belongs to their wives seeing that a female soul is not on the same level of spirituality as is that of a male; the next lower level is the son of a union between a natural born Jewish father and a proselyte. Next in line of sanctity from birth is the son of a proselyte married to a natural-born Jewish woman. Next in line is the female proselyte, daughter of either of the two last mentioned unions. Below this is the son of a union between a male proselyte and a female proselyte. Next in line of sanctity from birth is the daughter born from a union between a male and a female proselyte. Finally, there is the level of the proselyte himself. All of the above-mentioned levels are alluded to in the Torah at some point or other. The first and highest category of sanctity from birth is spelled out in the <i>Baraitha</i> of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> when they interpret the word ישראל in our verse as a reference to a male, natural-born, Israelite. Proselytes are mentioned twice in that paragraph when the words הגר הגר are understood as referring to two separate types of proselytes. You will also find that in <i>Sukkah</i> 28 they interpret the letter ה of the word האזרח as including the wives of the proselytes. This teaches us that the letter ה in the word הגר is to be understood as a רבוי, an additional dimension of the word גר. This means that the words הגר הגר in our verse really include four different kinds of combinations of proselytes. You therefore have a total of 4 extra words or letters each including additional categories of proselytes. Perhaps the wording of the author of our paragraph in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> who wrote גר אלו גרים, instead of זה גר as we would have expected, reflects that what he had in mind are two different categories of proselytes as opposed to a multiplicity of proselytes all of the same category, whereas the letter ה in front of the first גר refers to the wives of the proselytes. When the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> went on to write that the word בתוכם refers to the wives and slaves, he meant natural-born Jewish wives and slaves whose status in Jewish <i>halachah</i> is the same as that of women. Do not query the need for these people to have been especially included in the legislation seeing we could have included them by applying a קל וחומר from the application of the legislation to proselytes, i.e. if even proselytes are included what possible reason could there be for not including natural-born Jewish women? After all, natural-born Jewish women possess souls that are intrinsically less holy than those of their husbands, and if so what need was there for the Torah to mention them as being included in the group of people to whom the כרת penalty applies if even their husbands are so vulnerable that they are liable to the כרת penalty if they eat blood? Remember that if it had not been for the inclusive word בתוכם which we used to include women in the prohibition to eat blood and the resultant penalty, we would not have used the letter ה in the word הגר to include two categories of proselytes as we have described. Altogether we are faced with six different "inclusive" words or letters. The Torah wrote איש איש i.e. 2 more "inclusive" words which the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> uses to include the child born of an Israelite woman from a union with either a proselyte of a slave i.e. a child containing Jewish seed albeit seed from a Jew who was not a natural-born Jew. This is why the Torah wrote the additional words מן הגר, "originating in a proselyte." The intention of the verse was to refer to a proselyte who had married a natural-born Jewess or vice versa. These last named two categories are derived from the words איש איש.
  Do not raise the objection that there was no need to write extra words or letters to include all these different levels of proselytes and the offspring of their unions seeing that even a total proselyte, i.e. one in whose veins not a drop of "Jewish" blood flows is subject to this legislation? If it had not been for the extra word איש which tells us that the proselytes mentioned in this verse were second generation proselytes, i.e. those whose father or mother or both had already been Jewish at the time they were conceived, I would not have known all this. Having written the extra word איש enabled the Torah to describe that there are different levels of proselytes, the most spiritually endowed being the ones in whose veins there flows some blood of a natural-born Jew. These are followed by the proselytes in which no such blood of natural-born Jews flows at all. You may ask whence do we know that a female child whose father was a proselyte and whose mother was a natural-born Jewess is subject to this legislation? Answer: if even a proselyte in whose veins no Jewish blood flows at all is included in the above legislation there was no need to add further רבויים, letters of an inclusive nature, to add such people to the groups of people covered by our verse.
  בנפש האכלת, against the person (soul) eating, etc. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> understands the word בנפש in the singular as teaching that G'd does not punish a community who collectively consume blood with the כרת penalty, as the sin does not have the power to destroy the holiness of a group of people.
  מקרב עמה, from amongst his people. According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> the purpose is ועמה שלום, "and his people will be at peace." I am not sure what this is supposed to mean. If the people are guilty of that penalty because they are each responsible for the proper conduct of a fellow Jew, why should they not be punished? If, on the other hand, the Torah does not speak of people whose culpability originates in the הלכה of ערב, i.e. that each Jew is a sort of guarantor vis-a vis-G'd of a fellow Jew's behaviour, such as in instances when the sin was committed accidentally or unbeknown to the fellow Jew, why would the Torah have to even hint that such people are free from this penalty or any penalty at all? I believe that what <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had in mind was that when you cut off diseased branches from a tree you thereby improve what remains of the tree. The words מקרב עמה, from the midst of his people, mean that G'd decided to cut off this branch in order for the diseased branch not to infect the rest of the tree so that the tree itself remains healthy, שלם.
  
  Verse 11
  
   כי נפש הבשר בדם היא, for the life-force of all flesh is in its blood; why is the fact that the life-force is in the blood repeated twice in this verse? According to what I have written earlier this verse explains why the soul of the person eating blood is destroyed. The reason is that the blood contains the נפש, the essence of the animal it comes from. Consuming that life-force results in the soul- i.e. life-force of the person who consumed it becoming diluted with this spiritually inferior life-force. We still need to investigate why the Torah chose the expression נפש הבשר, "life-force of the flesh," instead of writing "the life-force is within the blood?" I believe G'd was anxious to answer a potential questioner that if the imbibing of the animal is so detrimental to the soul of a Jew, why did He not forbid the consumption of the flesh (meat) also? After all, the flesh too contained the life-force of the animal so that eating it would also cause irreparable harm to a Jewish soul? The Torah therefore repeats that it is only the blood in the flesh which contains the essence of the animal not the flesh itself. The essence of the animal is found in its blood, and not in the flesh. This is the meaning of נפש הבשר בדם היא. G'd did not make a human being in such a fashion. In the case of man, the life-force is not only in the blood but also in the flesh and the bones. Our sages refer to this life-force as הבלה, a certain moisture which survives in the bones of the righteous for many years after they have died. This is why they do not rot away. On the other hand, the wicked who are compared to animals are those who will not be resurrected when the time comes seeing that all their bones have dried out and have rotted away completely so that not an iota of their one-time life-force still exists.
  ואני נתתיו לכם, "As for Me, I have given to you, etc." The Torah is telling us that the proof of the fact that the blood of the animal contains its "soul," its life-force, is that G'd allowed us to offer up the blood of the animal on the altar as a means to obtain atonement for our inadvertent trespasses. The process may be called נפש תחת נפש, G'd accepts one "soul" in lieu of another soul, i.e. the soul (life-force) of the sinner.
  The verse also intends to warn us not to kill animals without an ulterior purpose. We are only allowed to take the life of an animal (the ones which are fit for consumption by Jews) to help us atone for our sins. The sequence of the words נתתיו לכם על המזבח are intended to demonstrate that the "gift" G'd has made us of the domesticated animals on earth carries with it some restrictions. We are not absolute owners of these animals to do with them whatever we please; rather they should serve to help us recapture our standing with the Almighty in the event that we became guilty of certain sins. We are taught in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 2 that if a domestic animal is guilty of an offence for which the Torah decreed that said animal has to die, such as initiating sexual intercourse with a human being, it is judged by a tribunal of no fewer than 23 judges, the same number required to judge a human being, someone who has killed a human being. It is not permitted to slaughter such an animal except when one wants to consume its meat. In Deut. 12,20 the Torah is on record as permitting man to indulge his craving for meat. In other words, the Torah had to write a special verse in order to permit us to eat meat which was not intended as sacrificial meat.
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
   אשד יצוד ציד חיה או עוף, who hunts any beast or fowl, etc. We need to analyse why the Torah had to write this whole introduction instead of merely writing that if someone slaughters or otherwise kills a free-roaming animal or fowl he has to cover its blood with earth. Furthermore, if it is a decree without the Torah revealing its rationale, why does the Torah not merely write יכסהו, "he shall cover its blood with dust," instead of writing וכסהו, which implies that he had to fulfil another commandment prior to covering the blood of the creature in question.
  I believe that by writing the words אשר יצוד the Torah intended to forbid the hunting of any species that are impure, i.e. whose meat is forbidden for Jews to eat although it may be used in another context. I have discussed this in my book פרי תואר item 117 in accordance with the view of Maimonides in his treatise <i>Maachalot Assurot</i> chapter 8 where he writes that permission to hunt is dependent on one's intention to hunt those free-roaming animals which we are allowed to eat. The fact that amongst the herd of animals one hunts there are some which do not qualify as food for Jews does not pose an halachic problem to the hunter in such an instance. This is the true meaning of the expression כי יצוד אשר יאכל, i.e. the activity of hunting is permissible only when its object is to provide you with permissible food. The Torah continues with וכסהו, [the emphasis being on the conjunctive letter ו Ed.] to draw our attention to the preceding מצוה, namely not to engage in hunting animals for sport but only for food. The Torah writes that the permission to eat, i.e. אשר יאכל, is contingent on the covering of the blood of such animal by earth once it has been spilled i.e. ושפך את דמו. In Deut. 12,24 the Torah warns that blood of free-roaming animals must not be consumed either. This teaches that already in our verse the Torah was concerned with our not eating the blood even of free-roaming animals or fowl by writing כי נפש כל בשד, that the life-force of all flesh, not only that of pure domestic animals, is situated in its blood. As a result of what we have just described you find three distinct commandments in our verse. 1) Not to hunt impure animals for one's pleasure; 2) Not to eat the blood of either חיה or עוף; 3) To cover the blood of such animals instead of pouring it down the sink, etc.
  I believe we can also detect in the expression ושפך וכסהו an allusion to the need to cover only some of the blood with earth whereas the rest may be poured down the sink, compare <i>Chulin</i> 88.
  
  Verse 14
  
   דמו בנפשו, its blood is bound up with its essence. The meaning of this expression is that the blood is equivalent to its life-force [the life-force being something abstract. Ed.]. Here the Torah has provided us with the reason why we have to cover i.e. "bury" the blood of the above-named categories of animals. Seeing that the blood is its life-force, it is a matter of showing some respect for that life-force. The Torah also commanded that the remains of a human being be buried only as a demonstration of respect for the life (or life-force) of a human being.
  The reason the Torah did not use the same syntax when it described the free-roaming animals as it did when it referred to the pure domesticated mammals where the Torah described the blood as דמו בנפשו, may be because the "pure" domesticated animal possesses a "soul," something which has been placed in its blood, whereas in the case of free-roaming animals or fowl the blood itself is in lieu of the "soul" G'd provided for the "pure" domesticated animals. This explains why such free-roaming animals and fowls are not suitable as sacrifices on the altar to achieve atonement for their owners with the exception of the pigeon and the turtle-dove. Even in the case of the latter, their blood is not sprinkled on the altar, seeing it does not represent the "soul" of the bird but its blood, i.e "soul" equivalent has been removed when the priest pinched the neck of the pigeon instead of slaughtering it.
  כי נפש כל בשד דמו היא, for the life-force of all flesh is its blood. The Torah explains that the reason it forbade us to eat the blood of such animals is not that it is used to attain atonement for our own souls, i.e. the life we had forfeited by our sin, in which case there would have been a reason to distinguish between the blood of those animals which are fit as a sacrifice and those which are not. Rather, the reason is that we are not to consume the essence of such an animal.
  כל אוכליו יכדת, anyone eating it will be cut off. I have explained already why this penalty is appropriate. The reason the Torah writes the word אוכליו in the plural whereas the penalty יכרת is in the singular is to alert us to the effect of the penalty. כרת means the withdrawal of the life-sustaining connection with the soul's celestial root. Seeing that all the Jewish souls have a common root, any reference to that root is in the singular. The reason the Torah describes the people consuming such blood as אוכליו, i.e. in the plural is, that there are many who derive some satisfaction of what a single person eats. The source of physical vitality attached to the celestial root contains a variety of preparatory steps to enable it to be absorbed successfully by bodies which have become fused with a soul. Although the body is essentially a material phenomenon G'd has created a force called נפש whose nature it is to develop liaison with material forces and which develops an urge to participate in the experiences a body finds pleasant. G'd created this force so that the soul would be able to function harmoniously within the body. The corresponding force, i.e. a somewhat diluted version of the purely spiritual soul, נשמה, is known as רוח, spirit; it is called thus because just as the wind is a phenomenon on earth but remains intangible, so this phenomenon we call רוח, spirit, performs both a physical and a spiritual function. When man eats, i.e. when the body eats, these other parts of the human personality also receive their sustenance from the food absorbed first by the body. This is why the Torah speaks about multiple אוכליו, "beings which eat of the blood." We may perceive of the following as all partaking of the nourishment a human being absorbs in ascending order. The body, the animalistic life-force נפש; the רוח, and finally the נשמה. As to the element subject to the כרת penalty, this is applied only to the חוט החסד, the "umbilical cord of love" connecting the נשמה to its celestial root. When this cord is severed from its root all other parts of the spiritual side of man will dry up and wither automatically..
  We may also understand the verse on the basis of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> which explained on the word בנפש in verse 10 that the penalty applies to an individual eating and not to a community eating blood as the animalistic life-force contained in the blood is not powerful enough to destroy the fabric of the collective souls of such a community. This is alluded to here when the Torah refers to a number of people who eat but to the destruction of only a single soul.
  I have tried to understand why G'd commanded that the blood of free-roaming animals or fowl has to be buried whereas the blood of pure domestic animals which have not been offered as a sacrifice does not need to be covered with earth. It is understandable that when the blood has been offered on the altar that no further procedure is needed; however, seeing that even when the Temple was standing most animals which were slaughtered were not offered as sacrifices, why did the blood of such animals not enjoy burial? Seeing we have explained that the "soul" of such a בהמה טהורה is superior to the life-force G'd supplied to free-roaming animals and fowl, why do we appear to discriminate against the בהמה טהורה by pouring away its life-blood instead of according it the honour of burial? Our question is reinforced by the fact that G'd rejected all free-roaming animals and almost all birds as unfit to serve as a sacrifice?
  When we consider that I have explained that the blood of the free-roaming beast is itself its "soul" i.e. its life-force, as distinct from the pure domestic animal whose life-force is separate from its blood though carried by its blood, it emerges that G'd commanded only blood which is at the same time the essence of the vitality of the creature to be buried. Any blood which does not represent the essence of the creature does not need to be accorded such a symbolic funeral. Although the blood of the pure domestic animal contains its life-force, its "soul," the fact remains that its blood and its "soul" are not identical. Covering of the blood is required only for the מורגש, the tangibly peceptible, not for the היולי, that which is perceived only in the abstract, in its potential.
  I wish to pursue the thought of why G'd decided to create the categories of the pure domestic animals as being so essentially different from the free-roaming beasts, animals which at first glance appear to have so much in common. We will understand the reason better if we first appreciate the factors which enable G'd's various creatures to fulfil their overall purpose and function on earth. Inasmuch as G'd is the source of all life in its various forms, He has made sure that all His creatures are equipped with the wherewithal to function in nature. He made all living creatures as composites of four basic raw materials, i.e. fire, air (spirit), water, and dust. The origin of these four raw materials is something that has not been made accessible to us, it is (at least partially) spiritual in nature and is described in kabbalistic literature as the "four legs of the throne of the Almighty," Ezekiel describes four carriers of this throne as creatures with the faces of four different animals including man in the opening chapter of his book as carriers of G'd's throne. There are also four angels who correspond to this basic "foursome" of creation, i.e. Gabriel, Rafael, Michael, and Nuriel. These three "foursomes" may be perceived as providing providing the background to the creation of a physical universe, the gradual reduction of pure spirit to something material. Each "foursome" is a preparatory level to a lower level of spirituality, something closer to the physical material world. The "foursome" described as part of G'd's throne in Ezekiel are the four categories of creatures which form the basis of life on earth. The face of אדם refers to the human species; the face of the ox refers to the pure domestic animals; the face of the lion refers to the free-roaming beasts on earth; and, finally, the face of the eagle refers to the fowl. Just as there are four categories of life on earth [living creatures containing blood Ed.] so there are four categories of inert beings, i.e. fire, wind, water, and dust. All creatures are composites of these four elements. Even amongst the intangible souls or life-forces G'd has created we find "foursomes." The highest of these are the celestial lights G'd has created which are almost part of the essence of G'd Himself. In every single sphere of creation we find the active, the dispenser, the male on one hand, and the passive, the recipient, the female. In the final analysis even the most inert component of our physical universe is the recipient of celestial input, i.e. from the region of the throne of G'd.
  Let us now examine the nature of the celestial influences the foursomes in our world are exposed to. Inasmuch as the face of one of the foursomes in Ezekiel's vision is that of the ox, i.e. a pure domestic animal, it is reasonable to suppose that the pure domestic animals in our universe i.e. its counterpart in our regions, receive their spiritual input via their celestial counterpart. However, the face of the lion represents an impure free-roaming animal. It is reasonable therefore to assume that all free-roaming animals (including the pure ones) receive the kind of spiritual input from the celestial regions associated with their counterpart the lion and what it represents. They are therefore deprived of primary positive spiritual input. The same applies to the fowl, seeing that the face of the eagle in Ezekiel's vision is also that of an impure category of bird. We need to examine why the counterpart of these "faces on the throne of G'd" have not been granted positive spiritual input as did the pure domestic animals which are recipients of spiritual input from the ox in Ezekiel's vision? Furthermore what is the source of the criteria which enabled some free-roaming beasts such as the gazelle, etc. to be considered pure beasts, fit for consumption by Jews?
  Remember that there are levels of perceptions which the recipient's mind is incapable of perceiving even if the source from which such perceptive powers emanate makes an effort to transmit such receptive power. Torah scholars are well aware of the fact that there are gradations of such perceptive powers and some of them are endowed with greater such powers than others. [I believe we can best describe what the author is trying to tell us when we imagine the receiver of a person equipped to handle a minimum of 5000 volt being bombarded from a transmitter which sends out impulses of 1000 volt maximum. The receiver in the hands of the person described would not be able to handle such transmissions. I shall continue to paraphrase the comments of our author as I feel that rendering them literally would not result in the reader's enlightenment. Ed.] The lion and eagle in our world are to be perceived as possessing such receivers having made efforts to exceed the natural receptive powers granted to them. As a result, the impulses emitted from their celestial counterparts are largely wasted on them and they are forced to stay outside the garden that G'd had intended for them to be part of seeing they have not achieved the spiritual goals they were meant to achieve. As a result of being under-achievers in G'd's overall scheme for His universe, He commanded the Israelites to keep a distance from such animals so as not to absorb any of their failings. We know from Deut. 4,11 that in order to remain both spiritually and physically alive one needs to maintain a close affinity to G'd and His commandments. We know from Job 14,4 that it is reserved for G'd alone to know by what devious paths purity can develop out of something that started with an impure base. If the original bird in Ezekiel's vision was the eagle, symbol of an impure bird, and so was the eagle in our world, this does not mean that amongst all the fowl some will not evolve which bear the mark of purity, such as the pigeons amongst the domesticated birds or the chickens, geese, turkeys, etc.. The same holds true for the free-roaming mammals. Although their archtype is the lion, this did not prevent certain categories evolving into pure free-roaming beasts such as the hart, the gazelle, and the roebuck. Due to their being cut off, or better, having caused themselves to be cut off from their celestial counterpart and not having received the required positive spiritual input from the source of their part of the celestial "foursome," the only level of "soul" these animals possess is their blood itself.
  
  Verse 15
  
   וכל נפש אשר תאכל גבלה, and every person eating an animal which died of natural causes, etc. The reason the paragraph commences with the letter ו before כל is to remind us that all the rules which apply to the eight different categories of Israelites and proselytes we listed in the last paragraph (verse 10) apply here also. The Torah here mentioned two categories, i.e. אזרח וגר, natural-born Jew and proselyte, to tell us that these are respective "headings" for the various categories of natural-born Jews and proselytes.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   ,דבד…. ואמדת כמעשה ארץ מצדים, "speak ….and say:…according to the doings in the land of Egypt, etc." We need to know why our verse repeated the instruction to Moses by writing both דבר and ואמרת. Besides, what news does our verse convey by having G'd describe Himself as "I am the Lord your G'd?" Was there anyone who did not know this as yet? Besides, what is the Torah's intention with the unusual introduction כמעשה? If the object of the word כמעשה was not known how would we know to what these מצות addressed themselves? This is true both for the מעשה which was presumed to be the norm in Egypt as well as the מעשה which was presumed to be the norm in the land of Canaan at that time. The entire paragraph from verse 2 through 5 is extremely vague.
  Our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> said that the Torah compared practices rampant in Egypt with practices rampant in the land of Canaan. According to their interpretation, why did the Torah have to repeat the commandment? If all the Torah wanted to tell us was that the people of both these countries committed the same kind of sins, why did the Torah have to phrase this in such a cumber-some manner? Besides, why did the Torah have to add the gratuitous remark אשר ישבתם בה, "that you have dwelled amongst," when speaking of Egypt? Who did not know that the Jewish people used to reside in Egypt? Is there then another country called "Egypt?" We can ask a similar question concerning the land of Canaan concerning which the Torah writes: "which I am about to bring you to?" What other land of Canaan is there? Even assuming that there was another country called Canaan, one we have never heard of, how would we know anything about their practices?
  It appears to us that the fact that the commandment mentioned here appears next to the various laws about incest as well as the fact that in verse 24 we are told not to defile ourselves by transgressing any of these commandments seeing that the nations mentioned have defiled themselves by ignoring these sexual mores, it is clear that the commandment introduced by the word כמעשה refers to sexual mores. Once we keep this in mind we have no problem explaining the wording of the Torah here.
  It is well known that a Jew is able to fulfil all the commandments G'd has demanded of His people without suffering undue hardship and that he can develop a tendency to do so willingly. The only exception to this rule is the commandment to refrain from certain sexual unions. The נפש, animalistic life-force within man, exercises a powerful influence over man urging him to disregard those commandments. The Israelite can successfully battle this urge only if he a) controls his visual contact with the opposite sex and b) if he controls his fantasizing. If a person fails to control these two senses he will fall victim to temptation. If a person does not limit his visual contact with the opposite sex, the fact that he does not think about it does not guarantee that he will not be aroused through visual contact. You may learn a valuable lesson in the psychology of sexual attraction from the following incident reported in <i>Kidushin</i> 81. Rav Amram who was the Rabbi of the pious, had a number of female prisoners whose freedom was bought by the community of Nehardea brought to his house. He gave them accomodation in the upper floor in his house and disconnected the stairs to that floor to prevent men from visiting there. It happened that one of these women passed the place where the ladder used to stand and Rabbi Amram felt as if he had seen a bright light, i.e. the beauty of that woman made a powerful impression upon him and he felt a strong attraction to her. He brought a ladder which was so heavy that it took ten people to move it and moved it single-handedly to climb to the upper floor. By the time he had climbed half the rungs of the ladder he managed to control his lust and cried out: "Amram! the house is on fire!" As soon as people heard him they came running and observed that Rabbi Amram was standing half way up that ladder. The rabbis scolded him for having caused them embarassment as it was clear to all of them what had prompted Rabbi Amram to call out. So he told them it was better they should be embarassed on his behalf in this world than to have to be embarassed by him when they would meet him in the Hereafter. He made the evil urge swear an oath to stop tempting him and the latter swore such an oath. Thereupon he said to Satan: "see here, you are fire and I am only flesh; I have proven now that though I am flesh I am stronger than you." The story proves that even though Rabbi Amram had not been able to control his thoughts, as long as he was not aroused by looking at the object of his lust he was able to fight his impulses. There is another story told in <i>Yalkut Shimoni parshat Vayechi</i> in which someone had himself blinded in order to withstand the lure of the evil urge to commit sexual offences. If exposure to even one of these causes of temptation is dangerous, how much more so is it impossible to fight off temptation which is the result of both a lively imagination and the visual allure of the object of one's fantasy. The author lists a few more examples of the deadly nature of combining fantasy with visual allure. When one is exposed to both these temptations they are almost impossible to resist. The author explains the statement in <i>Berachot</i> 34 that "in the place where the rehabilitated sinners stand, the perfectly righteous are not able to stand," as meaning that the perfectly righteous never had to battle his sexual urges, whereas the rehabilitated sinner "stood still," i.e. arrested his urge to run towards the object of his temptation only after a battle with his evil urge.
  This brings us to the commentary on our verse. The Lord G'd was very clever in giving this commandment. He explained to us that an ordinary person who finds himself in the throes of sexual passion need not say that the fight against his evil urge is doomed to failure anyway. G'd does not demand anything of us which we are incapable of delivering. If He did not know that given the proper circumstances which we ourselves can create we are able to fulfil what He expects from us, He would not have given such a commandment. G'd expects His commandment to test only those people who have first taken measures not to expose themselves visually to such temptation or to indulge in fantasies arousing their desire. If a person did not take the above-mentioned precautions to help him fight temptation based on his sexual urge he is not likely to withstand temptation when it comes his way. This is what the Torah hinted at when it wrote כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם, meaning that although you resided in a country such as Egypt which is a centre of sexual permissiveness and you were therefore not able to avoid thinking about such temptations, I still command you to triumph over your evil urge. The word ישיבה is a metaphor for inactivity, for an inhibition. The Torah refers to the Jewish people who displayed the ability to resist sexual temptation while they were surrounded by it. This encouraged G'd to legislate such resistance to temptation in an environment which would be more friendly to those who wish to resist temptation. You are not to emulate the actions of the Egyptians. 
  At the same time, G'd continues: "though I will bring you to a country in which you will be constantly aroused by seeing sexual permissiveness all around you so that you would not even have to exercise your imagination in order to become aroused, I demand from you not to copy their activities."
  As far as someone saying that he is unable to control his thoughts in this manner, the Torah introduced this commandment by the repeated דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת אליהם אני ה׳ אלוקיכם, "speak and say to the children of Israel I am the Lord your G'd," that while it is quite true that the human species as such finds it almost impossible to control their fantasies regarding their sexual passions this is not so in the case of Israelites seeing that the Lord is our G'd. Our affinity to G'd enables us to master drives which are of a purely biological nature. As soon as an Israelite has agreed to cleave to G'd this means that G'd in His turn dominates his nature, i.e. that the צורה תשלוט בחומר, "mind controls matter." This is in accordance with the statement of our sages in <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 34,11 that the hearts of the righteous are under their control whereas the wicked are controlled by their hearts. What the <i>Midrash</i> means is that the heart is the seat of man's desires whereas the seat of his will-power is his mind, his brain. G'd has granted man two separate levels of decision-making power. In matters of the libido the heart is the dominating factor, though the will situated in and controlled by the brain is capable of overriding the urges of the heart and prevent it from carrying out its urge. You find that people are able to impose fasts on themselves through sheer will-power though they have a strong urge to eat and drink, an urge that originates in their hearts. The same is true of people's ability to overrule their hearts' craving to indulge their sexual urges. The righteous always conduct themselves in this manner, their hearts being controlled by their will-power in spite of any urges originating in their hearts which they may experience. Their שכל, intelligence, i.e. their soul, makes the choice of how to act. If, moreover, G'd has warned us not to indulge in certain activities or that He has made it plain that certain categories of activities are abhorrent to Him, the rightous will desist from idulging his urge even if He did not spell out any specific penalty in that context. As a result, the will of a righteous person does not experience any difficulty in curbing the craving to indulge in such an activity. The wicked, on the other hand, are so captive to the urgings originating in their hearts that their will is not powerful enough to restrain their hearts. Perhaps this is due to their not possessing a נשמה, soul, (in the case of Gentiles) or that their soul has already become too contaminated by their behaviour so that it has submitted to other forces within the personality of the body it inhabits. G'd said: כי אני ה׳ אלוקיכם, that due to our נשמה in which some divinity resides, we the Israelites are able to successfully combat the cravings of our libido. Compare Psalms 78,60: אהל שכן באדם, "the tent He set within man." In this verse G'd refers to the soul in man as a form of Tabernacle. It is this which lends the Israelite the strength to cope with even the strongest temptations of the evil urge.
  This is also what David had in mind when he said in Psalms 40,9: "my desire is to do what pleases You." David meant that he cleaved to G'd so much that even his heart, the seat of his desire was anxious to do G'd's will. David's heart did not have to be reigned in by his will-power, but it had so reformed that it would do G'd's will of its own free will. His heart hated those things which the heart, the seat of desire for material physical things normally desires. David alluded to this with the word חפצתי, in the past tense, meaning that whatever used to be his חפץ, the desire inspired by his heart, seat of his physical cravings, had stopped being that. David also alluded to this in Psalms 109,22 when he said: ולבי חלל בקרבי, "my heart was empty (or dead) within me;" in either event he says that the desires which normally fill a heart have departed from him. Instead, in 40,9 David says: "ותורתך בתוך מעי," "Your teachings fill my innards." David says that whereas a normal person feels that his guts have been filled with physical food, he feels that his guts have been filled with G'd's Torah which have replaced the need for such physical food.
  Perhaps David wanted to tell us something I have heard in the name of the sainted <i>Ari Zal</i> in the introduction to his שער הגלגולים. There are occasions when a person who was good changes into an evil person and that person himself is unable to account for such a change in his character. The sainted rabbi attributes this character change in a person to his having eaten some some food which contained forbidden, i.e. harmful natural ingredients or the residue of an evil being whose soul had undergone a transmigration. When the basically good person consumes such food it affects his character negatively as he absorbs part of the life-force of the soul of the wicked. It follows that one has to be extremely careful not to eat anything which might have absorbed the soul of a sinner in a previous incarnation. David may therefore have alluded to something of this nature when he said that even his heart, i.e. the seat of his חפץ, had become attuned to doing the will of its Creator and that his guts were full of G'd's Torah, i.e. food permitted by the Torah.
  The following will help to understand the plain meaning of ותורתך בתוך מעי, "Your Torah is inside my guts." The origin of all plants, be they the kind that are essential for the survival of our נפש, our physical life-force, be they part of the multitude of beneficial herbs nature is full of, or be they plants which we merely eat for our own gratification, is rooted in the Torah which is the "mother" of all. Just as the Torah itself contains several levels i.e. פשט ,רמז, דרש ,,סוד so the various foodstuffs we find in this world may also be classified according to different levels; each level i.e. category of food, makes a different kind of contribution to our wellbeing. In my commentary on Song of Songs called ראשון לציון have explained the verse (2,4) הביאני אל בית היין that just as there are herbs which have a natural beneficial effect on those who consume them, so there are commandments in the Torah the fulfilment of which has a natural beneficial effect on the body of the person fulfilling them. This is a most important prerequisite to the understanding of the commandments of the Torah. I have mentioned here only an outline of the subject in order to make Psalms 40,9 intelligble on the basis of the plain meaning of the verse. The nutritional value of every food a person eats derives from its having absorbed some of the sanctity of Torah. Ever since the time Adam ate from the tree of knowledge beneficial and harmful effects of food have become mixed up so that every food contains a negative element also. G'd commanded us not to eat from the fruit of a tree which is less than four years old in order to allow time for the harmful effects to have been screened out. Wheat, (since Adam's sin) is surrounded by husks, straw, and other parts which have to be discarded. G'd has instructed us through the Torah to abstain from numerous foods in which the harmful elements cannot be separated from the beneficial elements so that the life-force of the chosen people not become contaminated. It follows that when an Israelite eats food which is permitted, it is as if he benefited directly from the light of Torah, the light from the celestial regions. The only difference is that this light underwent a metamorphosis in accordance with the needs of the physical universe all of whose creatures require physical food each in accordance with his specific needs. David simply said that G'd's Torah reached his guts via the method G'd had prescribed for this food to fulfil its function within man. His desire to carry out G'd's will was aided by his having partaken only of permitted food. His guts do not contain anything which would deter him from making his desire correspond to G'd's will.
  Let us now go back to the main subject under discussion, the Israelite's imagination as applied to matters concerning his libido. The more he thinks about this subject the more his desire becomes aroused making it harder for his רצון, will, to control his emotions, the urges rooted in his being flesh and blood. Whereas normally, one needs to concentrate on the subject of G'd's commandments in order to ensure that one fulfils them in the best way possible, in this case one must avoid even thinking about it so that one does not see the object of one's desire with one's eyes. The moment one looks upon the object in question one places one's innocence in jeopardy. We know that King David fell victim to his carnal urges as a result of looking at Bat Sheva (Samuel II 11,2) bathing on the roof of her house. Up until that moment David's heart which had been devoid of lust had not been aroused. He did what he did only as a result of what he saw with his eyes. The moment one begins to think carnal thoughts one's temptation is reinforced, and as a result this makes preoccupation with carnal thoughts appear as something natural. The wise Solomon was fully aware of this and this is why he wrote in Proverbs 1,10: "my son, if sinners entice you, do not consent." He meant that one should not engage in arguing with anyone who tries to entice one to sin. The mere fact that one argues about it already strengthens the forces of temptation. When David said in Psalms 19,9 that the precepts of G'd are clear and brilliant, he referred to the expressions דבור and אמירה respectively, i.e. that on the one hand G'd gave clear directives, i.e. like the decree of a king, דבור; on the other hand, He also phrased this commandment as אמירה, as a soft-spoken one, the kind of tone one adopts with highly placed people and He asked Moses to tell them that He is their G'd, i.e. to bestow His Holy Name on them. There is no greater tribute G'd can pay to a people.
  
  Verse 3
  
  
  
  Verse 4
  
   את משפטי תעשו, "You shall carry out My ordinances, etc." In view of the fact that the entire chapter deals only with regulations about forbidden sexual unions, what does the Torah mean by referring to "My statutes and My ordinances?" Besides, what does the Torah mean with the words ללכת בהם, "to walk in them?"
  I believe we may explain this in connection with what we wrote that thinking about the subject of sex increases one's lust at the expense of the power of the will to dominate one's decision-making process. The Torah was afraid to tell us to distance ourselves from the subject of sex absolutely in order that we would not refrain from fulfilling the commandment to be fruitful and to multiply, or to marry the widow of a brother who died without children, and other related commandments. Taking the warnings of the Torah too much to heart would result in something counterproductive to G'd's "statutes and ordinances." Therefore the Torah introduced the subject by first repeating the need to carry out G'd's ordinances, i.e. את משפטי תעשו, referring to the commandment to be fruitful and to multiply, before warning us to observe the prohibitions about to be legislated in that context, i.e. ואת חקותי תשמרו. <i>Sukkah</i> 52 describes man as possessing a small organ which becomes more hungry in direct proportion to the amount of food it is provided with, whereas it feels satisfied with less and less if one starves it. The organ is, of course, man's reproductive organ. Therefore G'd had to tell us to walk in His ordinances, i.e. to perform the basic commandment of procreation, populating earth, etc.. At the same time, and while fulfilling those ordinances, we must be careful also to observe G'd's statutes, i.e. the limitations legislated in this chapter as to who we are allowed to mate with.
  Alternatively, we may view the entire legislation about forbidden sexual unions as a form of mental preparation for the performance of the positive commandment to procreate in the proper spirit. If the Torah had not introduced the whole subject matter by asking us to carry out the various positive ordinances and by refraining from the various statutes so that we would be mentally prepared to conform with G'd's wishes, we would have considered indulgence in the sexual act as something which contaminates the soul and body of the human being. We would have thought that it is so fraught with both spiritual and physical impurity that it contaminates each and every organ of a human being as well as all his faculties. As a result, we would have considered ourselves as unable to fulfil any of the Torah's positive commandments properly unless we abstained from all sexual activity. We would have considered ourselves as in the class of the wicked whose מצוה-performance Assaph describes in Psalms 50,16 as: "who are you to recite My laws and to mouth the terms of My covenant?" Assaph implies that G'd is not interested in anyone performing His commandments unless such a person has attained a certain level of sanctity first.
  The Torah added the words ללכת בהם as a reference to the raw material the human being represents when performing G'd's commandments. If man has performed the sexual act after proper spiritual and mental preparation he will be able to father children whose natural tendency it will be to observe G'd's commandments. David referred to something like this when he said in Psalms 119,59: "I have considered my ways and have turned back my feet to Your decrees." Our sages in <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 35,1 understand these words to mean that David had so trained himself that his feet automatically would walk towards the Torah Academy out of habit and out of a desire to study G'd's Torah. When the Torah asked us ללכת בהם, it urged us to so relate to G'd's commandments that we would develop a "natural" tendency to walk in the paths of Torah.
  Another meaning of the words ללכת בהם may be similar to the meaning of Ezekiel 33,12 who said: "the righteousness of the righteous one will not save him on the day of his iniquity." Ezekiel meant that even if a person had lived a perfectly righteous life all his years but turns to sin in the end he has lost the merits he accumulated during the years prior to his turning to sin. His merits will not accompany him on his way to judgment after death. [According to the Talmud this is so only if he regrets having lived a righteous life before he turned to sin. Ed.] When we consider the words of Ezekiel we must understand the words ללכת בהם to mean that a person has to walk in the path of the Lord's commandments in order that his merits will accompany him on his most important journey, i.e. on the way to the last judgment.
  Another meaning of the Torah's admonition to walk in G'd's ordinances and statutes is to remind us not to perform them in order to receive our reward in this life. Our sages in <i>Eyruvin</i> 22 phrase the line in Deut. 7,11 היום לעשותם as meaning "you are to perform the commandments this day (in this life) in order to receive your reward tomorrow, i.e. in the hereafter." It is a warning to us not to want to cash in all our rewards in this life.
  Another meaning of the expression ללכת בהם may be related to the verse in Proverbs 6,23: כי נר מצוה ותורה אור, that a single commandment is like a lamp whereas the Torah in its entirety is compared to Light with a capital L. The celestial universe is distant and when the soul of man ascends from this world to the celestial regions he will find the road dark if he lived the life of a sinner. On the other hand, if a person lived a life filled with מצוה- performance, the commandments he performed will light up the way between this world and the celestial regions. We have a verse in Psalms 119,105: "Your word is a lamp at my feet, a Light for my path," expressing a similar sentiment. What the Psalmist means is that both the lamp and the Light possess features not shared by the other. The advantage of a lamp is that its source of light is close to the person holding it, and this is why our sages in <i>Pessachim</i> 2 insist that the search for leavened things on the evening prior to Passover must be conducted in the presence of a lamp, i.e. at night when there is no light. A lamp's advantage is that it illuminates all the dark corners in the room, something the brightest natural daylight fails to do. On the other hand, Light possesses a great advantage compared to a lamp as it enables one to see for great distances. This is why David said that performance of G'd's commandments results in two benefits to the person performing them; 1) he will be able to see what is nearby, i.e. נר לרגלי; "they are a lamp at my feet," at the same time it also provides Light increasing the ability to see for long distances ahead. This is why David said ואור לנתיבתי. When the Torah said that the function of the ordinances and the statutes is ללכת בהם, to walk by them, it referred to both the lamp and the Light which performance of the commandments secures for the people performing them.
  In the <i>Zohar</i> volume 1, page 170 Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai states that the 613 commandments which are divided into 248 positive commandments and 365 negative commandments, are symbolic of man's bones and sinews respectively. The performance of each commandment provides a positive momentum for the respective bone or sinew it represents. The words ללכת בהם refer to the power of מצוה-performance to move man's limbs. Performance of each מצוה also results in G'd's name, or rather part of it, coming to rest on the limb or sinew which that מצוה represents. The word מצוה is equivalent to the 4-lettered name of G'd י־ה־ו־ה, when one employs the system known as א־ת,ב־ש,ג־ר i.e. that one reverses the sequence of the letters in the aleph-bet. Inasmuch as we subscribe to the principle of ה׳ אחד ושמו אחד, that the unity of G'd is expressed also in His very name, this is the mystical dimension of Exodus 25,8: ושכנתי בתוכם. "I will be present within them." In that verse G'd demonstrated that we, the Jewish people, have become the carriers of the מרכבה, the presence of G'd and His entourage. The same idea is also found in Leviticus 26,12 where G'd speaks of "walking" amongst us. All of this is provided we fulfil what is written in Deut. 4,4: "you who cleave to G'd are alive this day."
  
  Verse 5
  
   ושמרתם את חקותי, "You shall keep My statutes, etc." Why did the Torah have to repeat in this verse almost word for word the same directive it had written in the previous verse? Perhaps we may best explain this on the basis of <i>Sanhedrin</i> 74 where the Talmud explains the words וחי בהן, "so that he may live by them," as meaning "so that he will not die by them." If a Jew is forced to violate one of G'd's commandments, he should rather violate such a commandment than make a martyr of himself. The Talmud adds that there are three exceptions to this rule, idol-worship, forbidden sexual relations, and killing an innocent person. If a Jew is threatened with death if he does not violate any of these three commandments he must choose death rather than violate any of these commandments. You will observe that in verse 4 no mention is made of וחי בהם, that one should prefer life over martyrdom, whereas in our verse the Torah added the words וחי בהם. It follows that the commandments mentioned in verse 4 are those for which a person must be prepared to martyr himself and to sanctify the name of G'd by laying down his life.
  Furthermore, when we examine the different nuances in these two verses we will be enlightened further. In verse 4 the Torah writes אני ה׳ אלוקיכם, "I am the Lord your G'd," whereas in our verse the Torah only writes: אני השם, "I am the Lord." We may infer from this that the Torah addresses different Jews in the two verses. In one verse the Torah addresses the Jews who fulfil the commandments due to a feeling of love for G'd, whereas in the other verse the Torah addresses Jews who fulfil the commandments due to a fear of punishment should they fail to observe G'd's laws. <i>Sotah</i> 31 has already taught us that the reward for people performing the commandments out of a sense of fear of the Lord extends for up to one thousand generations, whereas the reward for people whose motivation is love for G'd extends for up to two thousand generations. It is quite impossible for a person to attain the level of serving the Lord out of feelings of love until he had first experienced the level of serving the Lord out of a feeling of fear of punishment. This is the mystical dimension of Psalms 118,19: "this is the gate of the Lord, the righteous are able to enter it." In accordance with this, verse 4 addresses itself to people who serve the Lord from a sense of fear, and the Torah writes: את משפטי תעשו, "you are to perform My ordinances, etc., ending with the words "I am the Lord your G'd," the word אלוקיכם being a clear reference to G'd in His capacity of the attribute of Justice. In verse 5, however, when the Torah addresses itself to someone who has already passed the initial stage of serving the Lord out of fear and he serves the Lord out of feelings of love, the Torah no longer has to make mention of the attribute of Justice because the person addressed would not be influenced in his observance by mention of that attribute.
  The Torah adds the words וחי בהם in our verse to tell us that when someone serves the Lord out of feelings of love, he will also partake of the good to be found in this life in addition to any reward he accumulates for use in the hereafter, in eternity. Perhaps this is why the Torah wrote the letter ו before the word חי, to tell us that the good experienced by such a person in this life is additional to i.e. ו, to the reward he stores up for himself in the hereafter. People addressed in verse 4 who serve G'd motivated by fear do not qualify for this assurance. According to what we have just explained the words ללכת בהם in verse 4 apply basically to the hereafter whereas they apply also in this life if the people concerned serve G'd because they love Him. We may explain Deut. 11,13 "It will be if you hearken diligently to My commandments…to love the Lord your G'd….and I will grant the rain of your land in its season, etc." in the same way we have just mentioned, that מצוה-performance based on love of G'd results in dividends in this life and that such people deserve reward in both worlds. This in spite of the fact that our sages in <i>Kidushin</i> 39 state that there is no reward in this life for מצוה-performance. The Talmud did not refer to people who receive a bonus in this life rather than the actual reward due them. The Torah (Deut. 11,14) also alludes to reward in the hereafter by commencing with the conjunctive letter ו, i.e. ונתתי. The meaning of that letter ו is that any blessing experienced in this life is only a bonus in addition to the reward itself which will be paid in the hereafter, the exact nature of which the Torah has not revealed.
  האדם, man. We have several statements in the Talmud (<i>Baba Kama 38, Avodah Zarah</i> 3 et al) in the name of Rabbi Yirmiyah according to which a Gentile who engages in study of the Torah may attain a spiritual level comparable to that of a Jewish High Priest. The Talmud derives this from our verse, i.e. האדם וחי בהם. The Torah does not speak of "priests, Levites, or Israelites, but only of האדם." Thus far Rabbi Yirmiyah. Rabbi Yirmiyah's comment was prompted by the apparently superfluous word האדם. He was also perplexed by the fact that the Torah wrote those few words in the third person whereas the rest of the two verses are written in direct speech. The Torah should have written אשר תעשו אותם if it wanted to be consistent with the syntax of the chapter up to this point. Rabbi Yirmiyah therefore concluded that the words האדם וחי בהם refer to someone not included in the people addressed by the Torah directly in the previous verses, i.e. neither Israelites, Levites, or priests. The only person left therefore is the Gentile. Tossaphot query this from a <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 114 which quotes Rabbi Shimon as saying that only Israelites qualify for the complimentary description אדם, based on Ezekiel 34,31 "אדם אתם, אני ה׳ אלוקיכם." Tossaphot answer that we must distinguish between the term אדם and האדם. Whereas the term אדם refers only to Jews, the term האדם does not have such a narrow connotation. I saw a similar comment in the <i>Zohar</i> volume 1, page 25 stating that this is not merely an artificial semantic distinction. Adding a letter does not enhance the concept it represents but diminishes it. Perhaps it is true that when a Gentile occupies himself with Torah for valid reasons he too will be able to qualify for the complimentary title אדם. At any rate, Rabbi Yirmiyah sees in the additional letter ה an indication that Gentiles are included in the term אדם if they study Torah. The letter ה is not to be considered as integral to the noun האדם.
  
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   אל תטמאו בבל אלה, "Do not defile yourselves with any of these things." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> comments that this refers to both some of them and all of them. This seems very strange as the Torah could have simply stated that we must not defile ourselves by sexual intercourse with even a single one of the categories mentioned in this chapter and we could have avoided any chance of misunderstanding. Another difficulty is the ending of the verse "for the nations whom I drive out on your account have become defiled with all these." In view of these words how can we interpret the first half to mean that defilement through involvement in only one of these forbidden unions is meant? The words בכל אלה are not clear; they appear to mean that every one of the Canaanite nations indulged in all of the abominable practices listed in this chapter.
  We may have to resort to a kabbalistic approach in order to properly understand our verse. This involves knowing the reason why the Torah has not taken us into its confidence concerning the relative importance of one commandment when compared to another; nor has the Torah informed us about specific סגולות treasures or characteristics of individual commandments. On the contrary, when speaking about the Torah, Solomon says in Proverbs 5,6: "She does not chart a path of life, her ways are unstable, you do not know them." Our sages in <i>Avot</i> 2,1 tell us that we should not say that one particular מצוה is important whereas another is not so important. The Jerusalem Talmud <i>Peah</i> 1,1 as well as <i>Devarim Rabbah</i> 6 provide proof for this by saying G'd allocates the same amount of reward for fulfilling a "minor" commandment as He does for someone who fulfils a "major" commandment. We have good reason to believe that G'd considers some commandments as "major" and others as "minor." Why then did the Torah not provide us with a key to help us determine the relative importance of the commandments?
  Presumably the reason is that the so-called "minor" commandments are as necessary in G'd's plans for our personality development as are the so-called "major" commandments. Each מצוה is a סגולה, a treasure of a unique kind. What does it matter that the reward for one kind of מצוה is greater or smaller than the reward for its counterpart seeing that each reward is something unique, contributes in a unique manner to our personality development to ensure our progress to becoming the most perfect human being? This is why G'd presented the commandments as if they were all of the same level of importance in order that the Israelites should perform all of them. This is what Solomon had in mind when he said in Kohelet 9,10: "whatever you are able to do with your might, do it!"
  Another reason may be this. There are commandments the fulfilment of which may result in material wealth in this world, whereas others may result in longevity in this world. The performance of still other commandments may determine if someone will be blessed with children, etc., etc. G'd was afraid that if He revealed to us which commandment would bring which blessing in its wake some people who are interested only in a particular blessing would neglect performance of those commandments which promise blessings they do not particularly care for. This is why G'd decided to conceal these details to ensure that we endeavour to observe and carry out all the commandments. This encourages a person to perform a מצוה which has a unique benefit for his wellbeing though he does not know of this. This helps us understand why we sometimes observe people who are basically wicked and non-religious enjoy prosperity and peace of mind. They may have performed one of the commandments whose specific סגולה it is to bestow on him economic success and peace of mind in this world. The sins these people are guilty of do not prevent G'd from letting them enjoy the particular blessing they are entitled to on the basis of the מצרה they did fulfil. Whatever we have written thus far about the Torah keeping us in the dark about the relative importance of different commandments, applies only to the performance of positive commandments.When it comes to the severity of transgressing negative commandments, however, the Torah has made it plain by means of the penalties provided which transgressions are more serious than others. Some transgressions are of consequence only to man's life in the hereafter. This is why people guilty of them may enjoy a successful life in this world, not knowing that all this is at the expense of their share of the life in the hereafter. Other transgressions result in afflictions long delayed but in this life. Still others may result in relatively benign punishments; there are others in which the penalty is of a particularly harsh and cruel-appearing nature. You will find that many sinners were obviously guilty of sins for which the Torah threatened כרת, untimely death, and yet we find these sinners alive and well into ripe old age. How are we to explain this? Clearly, some people receive their due in this world whereas others receive it only after departing this life. It is a psychological fact that most people feel more concerned about what might happen to them in this life than about what awaits them in the hereafter.
  We know that G'd is very strict with even the people closest to Him and does not allow them to speak an untruth or even something which may be interpreted as a lie. When Rabbi Akiva returned from his journey to the פרדס, the regions where the secrets of Torah are to be found, he warned his colleagues that when they approached an area that appeared like transparent stones of marble [like crystallised water Ed.], they should not mistakenly describe it as water (<i>Chagigah</i> 14). If such restrictions apply to humans, how much more so may we expect the Torah not to express itself in a misleading fashion?
  This brings us to the explanation of our verse. The penalty the Torah threatens for violation of the sexual mores is expulsion from the Holy Land by the land itself, and is applicable only to the commission of one of the many detestable acts described in this chapter as I will demonstrate shortly. Other types of abominations of a sexual nature result in different kinds of retribution, each according to its specific transgression. G'd did not want to point out which one of the many forbidden sexual unions described in our chapter results in the sinner being spewed out by the Holy Land in order that a person should worry about this prospect when contemplating violation of any (i.e. all) of these prohibitions. This is in accordance with the psychology that one worries more about a penalty that has been spelled out than about one which is couched in vague terminology. Seeing each of the prospective violations might result in the sinner being spewed out of the country he has more reason to worry. The words אל תטמאו בכל אלה therefore means "do not defile yourselves through any one of these abominations." כי בכל אלה נטמאו הגוים אשר אני משלח מפניכם ותטמא הארץ ואפקוד עונה, means that there is a single cause, i.e. one of the many abominations, which was the reason the Canaanites lost their country. If that was so, it is clear that also the words אל תטאמו בכל אלה refers to a single sin and not the sin of violating all the abominations mentioned in our chapter.
  The Torah also writes ושמרתם..ולא תעשו מכל התועבות, "be careful not to commit any of these abominations." This verse tells you that the inhabitants of Canaan were indeed guilty of engaging in all of these perverse practices, that from a moral point of view they may all be subsumed under the same heading. The only abominations which are not potentially subject to the penalty of the land expelling its perpetrators are the abominations the Canaanites did not become guilty of. This is why the Torah had to write the words: כי כל, "for all, etc." You may view the whole subject in parable form. You have a number of vessels in front of you, each one containing drinking water. You have become aware that a poisonous snake spit into one of the vessels but you do not know into which one. People will be scared to drink out of any of these vessels fearing it is the one containing the invisible poison. Although only a single sin causes expulsion from the country whereas G'd issued many prohibitions, it is a sad fact that man is inclined to commit such abominations and he is considered in law as someone who is by nature taking the law into his own hands instead of keeping his distance from abominations as a matter of nature. I have enlarged on this phenomenon in my book פרי תואר on <i>Yore Deyah</i> 110 where I explained that everyone who is considered as having a 50-50 chance of sinning is considered as a definite potential sinner. In <i>halachah</i> we call this כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי, that as long as there is at least one definitely forbidden object in front of us even if there are 100 permitted items, as long as we have not identified the forbidden item a person consuming one of these items is not given the benefit of the doubt that the chances that he ate the permitted items are overwhelmingly in his favour; he is considered as having had a 50-50 chance of having eaten the forbidden item. Once G'd had frightened the Israelite into considering that he might be guilty of expulsion if he indulged in forbidden sexual relations and that even the other prohibitions carry the כרת penalty he has every reason to refrain from committing such a sin.
  
  Verse 25
  
   ותטמא הארץ, and the land became defiled, etc. The Torah here intends to tell us something similar to what we have read in the <i>Zohar</i> volume 3 page 53 that the actions of Israel determine the amount of spirituality in our world both positively and negatively. Our sages in <i>Avot</i> 4,11 say that a spiritually positive force is created with the performance of every commandment, whereas a spiritually negative force is created due to a sin being committed. The Torah alludes to this concept when it wrote ואפקוד עונה עליה, "I punished it for its iniquity, etc." This is in line with Jeremiah 2,19 that "your wickedness caused you to be disciplined." Performance of sinful deeds keeps strengthening the accuser against us at the celestial court. Man will be paid in accordance with his deeds. <i>Tomer Devorah</i> chapter 1 describes this payment as the creation of a destructive "angel" who will in due course repay the sinner who had created him. This "angel" loses potency in direct proportion to the afflictions experienced by its victim, so that once the victim has experienced sufficient pain the "angel" expires by itself. G'd deals with everyone absolutely fairly, treating each person individually. The meaning of ואפקד עונה is that the sin itself and its effect is visited upon the sinner. I have already explained why the Torah uses the singular. According to our approach it is possible that the various destructive "angels" man creates due to his sins are activated one at a time and not simultaneously and that this is why the Torah describes the sin in the singular.
  
  Verse 26
  
   ועמדתם אתם, "and you shall observe, etc." The reason the Torah uses the word אתם, "you," after having already addressed the people as "you" by addressing them directly is, that this commandment is intended as a warning that the various statutes and ordinances not be disregarded by all the people who have been commanded to observe them. A person should not say that his only concern is that he personally should not be the cause of the particular commandment being ignored. By saying ושמרתם את חקותי, the Torah imposes upon each one of us the obligation to see to it that others observe these statutes. Seeing that such an obligation devolves only on the people with influence on the people, i.e. Moses and his court, the Torah added the word אתם to make sure that we understood who was being addressed here. It is the function of a Jewish court to ensure that the people observe G'd's commandments. In <i>Torat Kohanim</i> our sages said that the reason that Moses and his court are being charged with that responsibility is that they themselves were already in the habit of observing these commandments. This made them a natural for supervising observance of these laws by the whole nation. We have a similar approach to Song of Songs 4,12: גן נעול אהותי כלה גל נעול מעין חתום. "A garden locked up is my sister, a spring locked up a fountain sealed." Solomon used a well understood hyperbole to describe chaste behaviour by the Jewish people. The message is that the legislation about sexual prohibitions is not something new and strange to the Jewish people but that they had always excelled in chastity as part of their nature. The Torah may have alluded to this by reminding the people with the word אתם, i.e. "something that you are already used to."
  האזרח והגר, "the natural-born Jew as well as the proselyte." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains that were it not for the extra letter ה at the beginning of the word אזרח I would have interpreted these laws as applying only to the males. The same is true about the letter ה at the beginning of the word הגר. As it is, the laws also apply to the wives of the natural-born Jews as well as to the wives of the proselytes. Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> The only reason that the Torah had to write something at all in order to include the women is the word אתם which is clearly masculine.
  Another reason the Torah even mentions the proselytes is to tell us that if both the Israelites and the proselytes will adhere to these regulations on sexual chastity, then the deviations practiced by the local population will lose the power to make the land spew out its inhabitants. The tendency of the land to do this was limited to the period prior to the Israelites occupying it. In other words, it is entirely up to Israel and the proselytes if the land will or will not spew out its inhabitants.
  You are no doubt aware of Exodus 23,33 in which the Torah warns not to conclude any treaties with the local inhabitants of the land of Canaan as they are apt to persuade you to sin against G'd. Maimonides as well as the author of the <i>Semak</i> remark that a Gentile who fails to observe the seven Noachide laws is not even allowed to dwell in the land of Israel for this very reason. This teaches you that if it had not been for their failure to accept the Noachide laws the land would not have spewed out anybody on their account. [Many of the prohibitions in our chapter do not form part of the Noachide laws. Ed.]
  
  Verse 27
  
  
  
  Verse 28
  
   ולא תקיא הארץ אתכם…כאשו קאה, "so that the land will not spew you out as it spewed out, etc." The Torah was not content with the statement in verse 25 that the land had already spewed out its inhabitants on account of their sins. It stresses the urgency of the matter much as what has been described in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> about the patient who receives a visit from a doctor who warns him not to eat certain things. This is followed by another doctor who warns the same patient that if he fails to heed his warning he would die just as another patient who had failed to heed the warning had died already. The patient takes the second warning more seriously than the first warning. Our verse may be viewed as the second warning.
  
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  Verse 30
  
   ושמדתם את משמדתי, "You shall observe My ordinance, etc." Here G'd issues a warning to observe the "security fence" erected by the sages so as to make it unlikely that one breaches one of the Biblical commandments concerning sexual mores. The word משמרת refers to such a "fence." The reason the Torah added the words לבלתי עשות, "not to do, etc," is to explain that the "fence" is designed to protect us from even inadvertently breaching the עריות legislation. Even though a person would not become guilty of the penalties provided for people who willingly violate the prohibitons in this chapter, they would still defile themselves. In order to avoid this, the Torah urges "observe My protective fence."
  The Torah concludes the chapter with the words: "I am the Lord your G'd" in order to inform us that we are in danger of jeopardising this superior status even if we violate the commandments in this chapter only inadvertently. The abominations mentioned in this chapter are so serious that commission of any one of them even inadvertently creates a schism between the Israelite and his G'd. It makes it difficult for G'd's presence to remain amongst us. Such a presence can reside only amongst people devoid of abominable acts and concerned with maintaining their sanctity.
  
  
  
  
  
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   אל כל עדת בני ישדאל, "to the whole community of the children of Israel." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains why the Torah writes the words "to all." Seeing that most of the important commandments of the Torah are contained in this portion Moses addressed them to the whole nation as outlined in <i>Eyruvin</i> 54. Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi describes the logistics of this [seeing they did not have a public address system in those days, Ed.] as distinctly different from other occasions when Moses revealed legislation. Whereas usually the people approached Moses in group after group- "a group" meaning a בית אב,- in this instance they all approached simultaneously. This is very difficult. If the Rabbi meant that whereas usually the elders came to Moses first to be followed by the people at large in groups, Moses would have had to repeat the same lecture more than 65 times. According to the <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Eyruvin</i> 54 Moses taught the same legislation only four times. The Talmud there describes that by the time Moses taught the legislation to the people at large, Aaron had heard it four times, etc. If Rabbi Mizrachi meant by the words "group after group," that Aaron was one group, Nadav and Avihu a second group, and the elders a third group, whereas in this instance the Israelites, the elders, Nadav and Avihu and Aaron all came at the same time, the question is why Moses used a different system when he taught all the other commandments. Why did Moses not teach all of the people these commandments 4 times? Surely if the other commandments warranted that Aaron would hear them 4 times, in this instance it was warranted that all the people hear these commandments 4 times! It would be better if they heard it each time from Moses directly than just once, and the other times only from people who themselves had heard it only from Moses. I believe there are one of two possible reasons for the manner in which Moses normally taught the Torah precepts G'd had revealed to him. 1) He wanted to accord honour to the different levels of spiritual achievements attained by his respective listeners. Accordingly, he would first honour Aaron, then his sons, followed by the elders, and finally the people at large. 2) He wanted to ensure true transmission of his words. Seeing that he taught each group of people separately, when they in turn discussed what they had learned they would be able to compare if each one remembered exactly the same. If the entire people had learned the same lesson from Moses four times in a row, there would not have been any way to compare any discrepancies due to someone's faulty memory. This is something that the listener would be well aware of. It would therefore have been better to follow the pattern of teaching the legislation separately to different groups at different times in this portion also. Why would Moses deprive Aaron of his privileged status when teaching this legislation, or, why would he deprive everyone of the chance to double-check if he heard and remembered correctly? The more important the legislation, the more important that there should be unanimity about exactly what the legislation consisted of! On the other hand, if it was appropriate to teach these commandments to all the people at the same time, why was it not appropriate to have done so with the commandments Moses revealed prior to this occasion? It appears, at least when we look at this superficially, that the Torah's departure from its norm in this case represented a change for the worse!
  I believe that the solution to our problem is that up until now Moses had not taught the commandments directly to the women but had spoken only to the men even when he addressed the people at large. In this instance G'd ordered Moses to speak directly also to the women and even to the children. They were to line up just as they had lined up at the revelation at Mount Sinai. We will offer an alternate solution shortly.
  ואמדת אליהם, "and say to them." According to <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 24, the reason we find both the harsh דבר and the softer ואמרת is that seeing this portion contains so much basic legislation G'd wanted it presented in a manner similar to the revelation at Mount Sinai. We find the combination of דבר ואמרת also in Exodus 19,3 where the dual form of כה תאמר ותגד is also explained as both harsh speech and softer speech.
  קדושים תהיו, "be holy!" We need to analyse what precisely G'd meant when He commanded us to either be or become "holy." I believe the Torah wanted to add a positive commandment as a corollary to the string of negative commandments we have just read in chapter 18. Inasmuch as G'd commanded us to be holy, a person who violates any of the transgressions of a sexual nature is not only guilty of violating a negative commandment but also simultaneously violates the commandment to strive and be holy.
  Furthermore, our verse may reflect something we have learned in <i>Kidushin</i> 39: "If a person sits quietly and refrains from committing a transgression he is given a reward as if he had performed a positive commandment. This is the meaning of our verse. If you are presented with an opportunity to commit a sin and you refrain from grasping that opportunity, you have fulfilled the commandment to be or to become holy. The reason G'd commanded Moses to tell this commandment directly to the whole congregation of Israel was to inform them directly of this and to show them how easy it is to be counted amongst the people described as "holy." Every single individual can achieve that spiritual level by merely fighting off the desire to violate a commandment when the opportunity presents itself. Every Israelite is on the same spiritual level concerning the acquisition of this merit. This also explains why the Torah used both the harsh דבר and the softer ואמרת when introducing this comandment. The harsh דבר reminds us that violation of a commandment in chapter 18 is simultaneously a violation of the commandment to be holy. The softer ואמרת is a reminder that the merit of becoming holy can be attained by simply not violating a commandment when presented with an invitation to do so. Possibly, it is only the Israelites who qualify for reward simply for resisting the invitation to commit a sinful act. To assure us that this is so the Torah may have written the words: "to all the children of Israel."
  כי קדוש אני, "for I am holy." What kind of a reason is this? Besides, how can a creature be expected to be similar to its Creator? Does not G'd possess many virtues and attributes not found amongst the Israelites? If the Torah wrote this line to explain that the reason why G'd commanded us to strive to be holy is that He Himself is holy, i.e. He wants us to be as much like Him as possible, but that this is not a reason which obligates us to be so, why would the Torah suddenly feel it incumbent upon itself to state a reason why G'd wishes us to behave in a certain manner?
  It appears that our sages were sensitive to this point and that this is why they said the following in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> "If you sanctify yourselves I will account it for you as if you Had sanctified Me." Accordingly, we must view the word קדוש not merely as an adjective, but as a description of the usefulness of our action as well as of its reverse. If we were to do the reverse, G'd forbid, our moral failure would impair the very holiness of G'd Himself! The sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> phrased it thus: "If you do not strive to become holy, I will account it for you as if you had failed to sanctify Me." Possibly this is also a reason why the Torah used the dual דבר ואמדת, to teach us through the word דבר how seriously the Torah views the mere lack of effort to sanctify ourselves. On the other hand, ואמרת alludes to the Torah viewing a person who does try to sanctify himself as someone achieving spiritual stature.
  Another way of explaining this verse is this. In the last chapter G'd issued a number of directives all of which ask us to deny a natural biological urge, something that threatens to dominate and subvert our רצון, our will, which is seated in the mind. I have already written concerning this subject on Leviticus 18,2 when the Torah referred to practices rampant both in Egypt and in the land of Canaan. We explained in that context that it is impossible to resist the lure of one's biological urge unless one not only avoids visual exposure but also makes a conscious effort not to allow one's imagination to dwell on the subject. Seeing that G'd did command us to procreate and thereby to insure the continuity of the human species, one cannot totally dissociate oneself from the subject of sex and all that this entails. Not only that, there are times when the very preoccupation with that subject becomes a positive commandment, how else is one to engage in one's marital duty at the right time and place? Is this not what Solomon (Proverbs 30,19) had in mind when he spoke of דרך גבר בעלמה, "the way of a man with a maiden?" He referred to the duty to procreate, something which cannot be done by total denial of any thoughts involving one's sexuality.
  The Torah commanded us to be holy in order that we elevate the subject of procreation to a spiritual experience, not to the fulfilment of a mere biological urge. Marital relations are not to be merely a means to gratify the urges of one's body. The act is to be performed as a מצוה, much like putting on טלית ותפלין. When a person feels himself assailed by thoughts of sex unrelated to the duty to sire children, he should reject such thoughts and suppress them. He should conduct himself in accordance with the story told by a woman of her husband's conduct during marital relations (<i>Nedarim</i> 20). She described the reason why they were blessed with exceedingly handsome looking children as due to her husband's rigorous self-control even during the act of procreation. She said that her husband acted as if the very act itself were forced upon him by a demon. Such a person can truly be described as holy, and it is this the Torah wishes us to strive for and emulate.
  Seeing that man will ask how it can be expected of him to suppress thoughts and emotions which overcome him without his having invited them, and how would he know which thoughts are inspired by simply physical urges, the Torah writes כי קדוש אני ה׳ אלוקיכם, that whenever someone performs a מצדה, G'd's holy name will come to rest on one of his organs. It will invariably be the organ involved in performance of that מצוה. It follows that if man uses his male organ only for the performance of the commandment to procreate and to multiply that he will enjoy a heavenly assist helping him control his biological urges (<i>Tikkuney Ha-Zohar</i> 70). In fact our verse alludes to the type of מצוה which secures one this heavenly assist. I have explained on Leviticus 18,4 why half the holy name of G'd is spelled recognisably while the other half is spelled in a deliberately obscure fashion (page 1181).
  Another approach to the words כי קדוש אני is that these words are a reminder of the mutual bond between Israel and its G'd. We know from Deut. 4,4 that "you who cleave to the Lord are alive this day," that the key to our survival is the דבקות, the affinity we maintain with G'd. This theme has been repeated by the prophet Jeremiah in Jeremiah 13,11 where the prophet (G'd) describes this relationship in these words: "for as a loincloth clings close to the loins of a man, so I brought close to Me the whole House of Israel;" G'd therefore has the right to demand of us: קדושים תהיו, "be and maintain your sanctity because I am holy and you adhere to Me." If you were to argue: "how can one compare the straw to the grain," G'd answers "I am the Lord your G'd." This is a clear allusion to the principle that the presence of the שכינה in our midst is directly related to the degree of affinity we display in our relationship with G'd.
  Another reason why the Torah writes: "be holy for I am holy," is that had it not been for this line we would have thought that as long as we had refrained from violating any of the sexual mores legislated in chapter 18 in deed, we had conformed with G'd's wishes. We would have thought that mere visual contact or fantasizing about such unions is not forbidden. We are told in <i>Berachot</i> 61 that even counting coins into the hands of a woman (in order to have an excuse to look at her) is forbidden. This prohibition is even derived from a biblical verse (Proverbs 11,21): יד ליד לא ינקה רע, "when [man and woman] join hands they will not be considered innocent of doing evil." (compare my translation of Alshich's commentary on that verse, page 209). In this instance G'd commanded the words "be holy," i.e. matters which are designed to maintain our distance from direct involvement with the women forbidden to us as sexual partners. The <i>Zohar</i> on 19,4 has interpreted the words: "do not turn in the direction of idols" in a similar manner. The Torah was not concerned with idolworship in that verse but with a mode of life which brings us into proximity with idols. We have interpreted Deut. 23,11 to mean that a ritually pure person will not experience involuntary seminal emission during his sleep. This is based on the same approach as the Torah employs here. He who does not entertain thoughts of forbidden sexual unions will not be aroused and lose control. A person is liable to claim that such nocturnal emissions during his sleep are entirely beyond his control, why should they be held against him? The Torah replies: "for I the Lord your G'd am holy." G'd implies: "I am able to protect you against such experiences for I will prevent a Jewish person falling victim to this kind of defilement unless the Israelite in question allows himself to dwell on the subject of forbidden sexual unions."
  We may also interpret the words קדושים תהיו by emphasizing the future tense, i.e. תהיו, "you shall become holy." The implication is that this is a commandment which is an ongoing process. The Torah asks us to eat מצה on Passover, to sit in huts on סוכות, to abstain from certain kinds of activities on the Sabbath, etc. The common denominator of all those commandments is that they apply on certain days or on certain dates only. Not so the commandment of "be holy." This commandment applies day in day out throughout our lifetime. The imperative to strive for sanctity is one that we cannot take a vacation from. Even while we are busy performing this commandment it is one that we never have mastered completely. Whatever sanctity we attain is superior to what we had achieved previously but inferior to what we still hope to achieve. We know from our prophets that they too possessed sanctity in varying degrees, Moses having achieved the relatively highest level of sanctity. Nonetheless it is entirely possible that one can achieve even greater heights of sanctity than the level attained by Moses. The level of sanctity that will have been achieved by the Messiah when he reveals himself will prove to be even superior to that of Moses. We know this from Isaiah 11,2 in which the attributes of the Messiah are described. They include: "The spirit of the Lord shall descend upon him, a spirit of wisdom and insight, etc. etc." If we accept the words of <i>Bamidbar Rabbah</i> 19 and <i>Devarim Rabbah</i> chapter 2 that Moses himself will be the Messiah, this is further proof that there is no upper limit to the "holiness" described here by the Torah. The Torah writes תהיו in order to remind us that the ultimate realisation of the ideal of holiness will forever remain "in the future." 
  The Torah supplies the reason for this with the words "for I the Lord your G'd am holy." G'd implies that just as there is no limit to His holiness, so our striving for holiness must remain something that has no upper limit. G'd desires that His favourite creatures engage in an ongoing process of becoming more and more like their father in Heaven.
  When G'd supplied the reason that we have to strive to become holy as "for I am holy," He meant that if one wants to compare oneself to someone superior the degree of effort one has to make depends on the relative loftiness of one's ideal, of the person one wants to emulate. Seeing that it is G'd who wants us to emulate Him, we can imagine that the effort to strive for holiness is not merely a relative one but the task is monumental inasmuch as our ideal is so indescribably superior to us. When a junior minister invites the king to be his guest, he makes suitable preparations so that the king will feel at home in his house. When we invite G'd to make His residence amongst the Jewish people must we not make extraordinary preparations to merit His presence on a permanent basis? This is what the Torah reminds us of when it describes G'd as "for I the Lord your G'd am holy."
  You are familiar with the statement in <i>Shabbat</i> 112 that if "former generations could be compared to angels then we nowadays are merely like ordinary mortals; if, however, even the earlier generations were comparable only to ordinary mortals, then our generation is comparable to donkeys." This only underlines how much and how hard we have to strive to fulfil the commandment the Torah has legislated in our verse. As an illustration of how hard even the members of former generations worked at this, look at the example of Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah (compare <i>Shabbat</i> 54). When the cow of his neighbour [the text in our <i>Mishnah</i> speaks of Rabbi Eleazar's own cow, Ed.] left her stable on the Sabbath wearing a strap between her horns -something the Rabbis disapproved of-although according to the view of Rabbi Eleazar it was perfectly permissible, he fasted so many days that his teeth turned black (compare Jerusalem Talmud <i>Shabbat</i> chapter 5) as a form of penitence. The Torah uses the word דבר when introducing this commandment to alert us to the extraordinary demands this commandment makes upon us; on the other hand, the Torah continues with ואמרת, to remind us of the extraordinary spiritual benefits that accrue to people who take observance of this moral directive seriously. The words אל כל עדת בני ישראל are necessary so we should not say that a commandment demanding such stature could only be addressed to the elite of the people. The Torah stressed that everyone is included in this commandment to teach us that every single Israelite could become a potential Moses if he tried (compare <i>Tannah be bey Eliyahu, and Maimonides hilchot Teshuvah</i> chapter 5).
  Yet another meaning of the words קדושים תהיו views this call as an ivitation to become like the angels who are called קדושים. We know this from Daniel 8,13 where Daniel reports overhearing a קדוש speak, etc. We must understand this as similar to Psalms 82,6 in which the Psalmist Assaph describes the human species as אלוהים, divine beings prior to Adam's sin. Seeing that G'd used to reside in the heavens, the domain of the angels, it is no more than reasonable to describe the Israelites as angels once they qualified to provide G'd's new home on earth. You may be interested to read about the reaction of the angels in the celestial regions when they found out that G'd took up residence amongst the humans on earth. (compare <i>Zohar</i> volume 2 page 140). In view of the agitation amongst the angels in the celestial regions who heard that G'd intended to move His residence to earth, He decided to command the Israelites to be holy like angels in order that the angels should cease complaining. This lends additional meaning to the words "I am the Lord your G'd." Thus far the <i>Zohar</i> on the subject.
  
  Verse 3
  
   איש אמו ואביו תיראו, "Each one of you shall fear his mother and father." The reason the Torah wrote this commandment next to the commandment to be holy is also related to the legislation about forbidden sexual unions. Our sages in <i>Sotah</i> 36 interpret Genesis 49,24: "and his arms were made firm by the hand of the Mighty One of Jacob" as a reference to how his father's image helped save Joseph from the temptation he experienced at the hands of the wife of Potiphar. At the critical moment, when Mrs Potiphar grabbed hold of Joseph's tunic, he saw a vision of his father's face outside the window. This caused him to resist the advances of Mrs Potiphar and to leave the tunic in her hand and flee her presence. According to the Talmud, Joseph's semen escaped via his hands instead of via his male organ, etc. I have heard it said in the name of Kabbalists (<i>Kav Hayashar</i> chapter 2) that the image of one's father's face strengthens the forces of sanctity within his son and helps him resist becoming a victim to temptation involving sexual abominations. The reason the Torah speaks about "his mother and his father you shall fear," at this juncture close to chapter 18 is that anyone in the throes of carnal temptation should summon up the image of his parents before his eyes. He will find that this will help him resist the temptation.
  We also have a hint here that if someone indulges in forbidden sex he shames the honour of his father. This is why the Torah wrote the commandment to fear mother and father so close to the legislation dealing with fordidden sex. In other words, indulgence in forbidden sex is equivalent to a violation of the commandment to fear one's mother and father. The parents would curse a son who commits such an act because they feel ashamed to have brought such a son into the world. This is also the reason the mother is mentioned here first as she feels the shame more deeply than her husband. Solomon explained this in Proverbs 10,1 when he wrote: "and a foolish son is his mother's sorrow." [The "foolishness" of the son is that he was invaded by a spirit of foolishness else he would not have committed the sin. See commentary of Alshich on that verse, my translation page 179. Ed.]
  Having appreciated this, we can now understand why the second half of our verse speaks about the need to observe the Sabbath legislation. The <i>Zohar</i> volume 2 page 277 and volume 3 page 301 explains that the seven days of the week were allocated to seven righteous people. [They are identical with the seven "guests" we welcome in our Sukkah, a different one each day. Ed.] According to the <i>Zohar Chadash</i> at the beginning of <i>Parshat Toldot</i> the Sabbath was allocated to Joseph. He represents the mystical dimension of peace. This is the reason we greet each other with the greeting שבת שלום on the Sabbath. It is also the reason that we re-phrase the conclusion of the prayer השכיבנו on Friday nights by adding the words "spread over us the the tabernacle (shelter) of Your peace, etc." Joseph earned his title "the righteous" because he preserved the covenant G'd had concluded with all Jews through the circumcision when He put the stamp of that holy covenant on our very flesh. When the Torah speaks of "My Sabbath days" in the plural, it refers to two dimensions of the Sabbath. The first is the generally accepted meaning of the word, i.e. the need to observe the Sabbath itself. The second is the need not to defile the holy covenant of the circumcision. Actually, both commandments are merely two sides of the same coin, so to speak. This is the reason that both circumcision and the Sabbath are referred to in the Torah as אות, a visible sign. The Sabbath is called אות in Exodus 31,13, whereas the circumcision is called אות in Genesis 17,11. The two commandments are different when it comes to their performance as an activity; [Sabbath is repetitive for instance, commitment having to be renewed weekly, whereas circumcision is once in a lifetime, and other differences, Ed.] from a passive point of view, i.e. the spiritual credit accruing to people observing these commandments both are so similar as to be considered one. Anyone who actively observes either one of these commandments confers the benefit of both commandments on his soul. This is why the Torah speaks of שבתתוי.
  ואביו תיראו, "and fear your (his) father." <i>Torat</i> <i>Kohanim</i> draws attention to the fact that whereas here the Torah mentions the mother first, the father is mentioned first in the Ten Commandments where the Torah commands us to "honour your father and your mother." The reason the Torah varies the order is to teach us that both father and mother are of equal importance; however, the father takes precedence over the mother when it is impossible to accord honour to both simultaneously seeing that both father and mother (wife) are obligated to honour the father i.e. husband. The <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Kidushin</i> 31 also deals with this subject: Rabbi said "it is clear to G'd that it is natural for a son to honour his mother more than his father, and that it is natural for a son to fear his father more than his mother. This is why G'd mentioned the need to honour one's father before He mentioned the need to honour one's mother, and He mentioned the need to fear one's mother before He mentioned the need to fear one's father." I have difficulties with both the reasoning underlying the exegesis of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> and that of Rabbi in the Talmud. If we really think about these two verses we will find that the Torah gave more weight to the father in both. In the Ten Commandments the word "father" appears next to the word "honour." In our verse the word "you shall fear" also appears next to the word "his father." It is a fact that our sages follow the above-mentioned method of Rabbi on numerous occasions in their exegesis. If it were not for the fact that the exegesis is designed to teach us a <i>halachah,</i> I would not hesitate to accept this interpretation as we are entitled to use the method used by Rabbi. Our sages did not mind as long as a departure from their rules did not result in a הלכה which is contrary to our tradition. In this instance, however, there would result a difference in the הלכה, i.e. that if we accept the above exegesis the father would not take precedence in situations where there are conflicting claims on the son's sense of respect for either parent. If you accept our interpretation, for instance, if both mother and father ask the son to give them some water to drink, the son would have to give first to his father based on both interpretations. If, however, father and mother were divorced so that the mother (ex-wife) no longer is obligated to honour her (ex) husband, according to our interpretation the son would be obligated to first give water to his father, whereas according to both the Talmud and <i>Torat</i> Kohanim the son would have the choice whose request he wanted to honour first. In fact, the Talmud presents the scenario of the son of a widowed mother asking Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua: "what is the הלכה if father and mother are divorced and they both want to be given water? The answer given by Rabbi Eliezer was to put a bowl of water at the disposal of both father and mother so both can help themselves from it. It is apparent that Rabbi Eliezer felt that father and mother are absolutely equal as far as the son's obligation to honour them is concerned.
  It is possible that this is based on a further piece of exegsis we find in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on this verse. Here is the quotation: "The Torah writes איש אמו ואביו תיראו. From the word איש I know only that the duty to fear mother and father applies to males. How do I know it also applies to females? This is why the Torah wrote the word תיראו in the plural. If so, why did the Torah commence the verse with the word איש? Answer: "Usually the man is free to observe this commandment whereas most women are preoccupied with carrying out prior commitments." Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> According to this last <i>Baraitha</i> the word איש is restrictive and excludes women when it comes to paying honour to father and mother [seeing the Torah does not use such phraseology in the Ten Commandments, Ed.] though the word תיראו (pl) had included women when it comes to displaying fear, i.e. respect for both mother and father. We may now extrapolate that as far as honouring the mother is concerned the Torah imposed this duty primarily on the man. Seeing the Torah had already done this explicitly in the Ten Commandments, this directive may now be used to teach us something different though related. It teaches that as far as honouring either father or mother is concerned the mother is to take precedence when it is impossible to honour both father and mother simultaneously. All of this is an argument to explain why the <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> wrote as it did. According to the view expressed by Rabbi in <i>Kidushin</i> 31 which explained why the Torah mentioned the father as being the subject of honour prior to mentioning the mother we are still left with a problem. Perhaps the fact that the explanation of Rabbi is homiletical in nature makes it unnecessary to resolve the problem, seeing no הלכה is involved. After all, both mother and father are to be feared. We do not need much of an ambiguity in the Torah to permit us to draw conclusions of a homiletical nature.
  It is also possible that the sages of the <i>Baraitha</i> did not feel that the position of the word "father" in relation to the directive was of consequence when we have to decide which of the two (father or mother) are entitled to precedence in a situation when both claim the honour due to them at the same time. The reason is that the Torah was forced to mention the two parties consecutively and could not mention them simultaneously. As a result, they assumed that whoever was mentioned first in the verse is the one vis-a-vis whom the particular duty described devolves first. It follows that if it is a matter of honour the father has to be shown honour first; if it is a matter of fear the mother has to be shown respect first, whenever it is impossible to do so simultaneously. The reason the word תיראו is written at the end of the verse is to show that the law also applies to women.
  There is another reason why the Torah commences with addressing an individual whereas at the end of the verse it addresses several people, at least. The Torah hints that if a son demonstrates that he respects his own father, the chances are that his son in turn will also show respect for him. You may attribute this to the principle we wrote about in connection with Genesis 49,3 that the roots of sanctity and impurity respectively are found in the mind of the father when he engages in marital intercourse in order to fulfil the commandment to be fruitful and to multiply. His spiritual input at that critical time will be reflected in the spiritual level of the child that is born from a union based on lofty ideals. Alternatively, the matter is psychological. When a son observes that his father belittles his grandfather or grandmother, he in turn will not feel the inclination to show respect or honour to his own father or mother. On the other hand, when a son observes that his father treats his grandfather with great respect, he in turn will be in awe of his father. As a result of such considerations the fulfilment of one act of reverence will lead to the fulfilment of two (or more) acts of reverence spanning at least two generations. This is reflected in the Torah's use of the word תיראו in the plural at the end of our verse. The Torah wrote the word at the end of the verse [not like כבד את אביך at the beginning of the verse in the Ten Commandments, Ed.] to show that one act of respect will eventually produce more acts of respect. This is a perfect illustration of what our sages in <i>Avot</i> 4,2 described as מצוה גוררת מצוה, that the fulfilment of one מצוה brings another in its wake.
  Yet another way of explaining our verse is based on a ruling in <i>Tur</i> item 240 where the author rules as follows: "I believe that inasmuch as the father demonstrated that he is wicked by not honouring or respecting his father, the son (grandson) is not obligated to show honour to a wicked father. We base this ruling on <i>Baba Kama</i> 94 where the Talmud rules that if a father bequeathed a stolen cow to his children the latter have to return it to the party from whom it was stolen as part of the commandment to honour their father. The Talmud challenges this ruling saying that seeing the father had placed himself outside the circle of Torah observing Jews by stealing, the son is not bound by the commandment "honour your father?" The Talmud answers that the case under consideration was one where the father had done תשובה, had repented. We see from here that the author of the <i>Tur</i> holds that unless one had seen the father repent we do not merely assume that he had done so and we would not accord him the honour our verse calls for. [The whole exemption of someone from the law of honouring father and mother is based on the word בעמך in Exodus 22,27 that one must not curse a prince. The word בעמך IS considered a restrictive clause, i.e. the law applies only if the prince acts in accordance with Torah tradition. Ed.] According to the above we have to read our verse as follows: "a man must display respect for his mother and father provided the man (his own father) conducts himself with his own father and mother in accordance with what the Torah demands." This is the reason תיראו, that you must accord them respect. If, however, a father slighted his father or mother, the son is free from the obligation our verse imposes upon him. The words אמו ואביו, "his mother and his father" refer back to the word איש who is perceived as the man who begot the son in question.
  In my book פרי תואר I upheld the words of Maimonides on this subject who holds that one may assume that one's father had repented even if one did not have direct evidence of this. Maimonides bases this on <i>Kidushin</i> 49 where the Talmud discusses someone betrothing a woman on the assumption that he is a righteous person. If the individual in question had been known to have violated Torah commandments in the past we nonetheless assume that he would not have made such a statement unless he had repented previous mistakes. We have therefore repudiated the argument advanced by the <i>Tur.</i> How could we assume that the father mentioned in <i>Baba Kama</i> had become a penitent seeing he himself had not returned the stolen cow? Where there is no circumstantial evidence that the father who was a sinner had not repented, I assume that he had and his son is therefore duty-bound to observe the legislation presented in our verse. Our words that the son is free from the obligation to honour his father when his own father is still actively engaged in belittling his (own) father are absolutely correct as we then have no reason to assume that the father in question had repented. Such a father is no better than the father who bequeathed a stolen cow to his children in the example in <i>Baba Batra.</i>
  Another way of looking at this plural form of the word תיראו is that it addresses the father himself. If the father behaved in a manner which is sinful, he would become guilty of violating the commandment not to put an obstacle before a blind man, i.e. not to cause his son to become guilty of neglect of the commandment legislated in our verse by making himself unworthy of being respected by his own son.
  ואת שבתותי תשמדו, "and observe My Sabbath days." Our sages in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 32 ask: "Whence do we know that if a father orders his son to desecrate the Sabbath, etc., that the son is not obligated to do his father's bidding?" Answer: "It says איש אמו ואביו תיראו ואת שבתותי תשמרו, that the commandment to respect one's father is premised on one's observing G'd's Sabbath days." G'd reminds us that He is the One whom both the father and the son have to honour." Thus far the Talmud. From the comparison of "you and your father are obligated to honour Me," it is clear that the example of the Sabbath in our verse is only just that i.e. that a son must not violate any of the Torah laws even when it results in his declining to respect his father's halachically illegal request. Why did the Torah choose to describe Sabbath observance, a law whose violation is punishable by death, as the example for G'd's laws taking precedence over a father's demands when it could have made the same point by writing the commandment to respect one's father next to the law to restore someone's lost property, for instance? Moreover, there was no need to add the words "I am the Lord your G'd?" How does this add to our case? Everybody knows that G'd's laws take precedence over man's law, i.e. the father's authority over his son.
  I believe we can explain all this in light of what Maimonides wrote in <i>Hilchot Mamrim</i> chapter 5. Here is what he wrote: "If someone's father or mother are absolute sinners it is still a punishable offence for their son to physically abuse them." All the codifiers conclude from this that all that is forbidden is physical abuse of one's parents in such a case; however, the son or daughter does not have to accord such parents any honour or respect. I have raised this problem in my commentary on <i>Yore Deyah</i> when dealing with Maimonides' view in connection with what he wrote in chapter 7 of <i>Hilchot Mamrim</i> that according to my understanding Maimonides' ruling applies only if the father was guilty of transgressions לתאבון, because he had trouble controlling his evil urge and he sinned only occasionally. In our case we talk about a habitual sinner; this is why Maimonides in chapter 5 made sure to use the wording רשע גמור, "a confirmed sinner," instead of simply writing: "a sinner." I believe that the term "confirmed sinner, רשע גמור, is applicable to people who habitually violate any commandment that presents itself for them to observe. A son is totally absolved of the commandment to honour or respect father and mother when he has the misfortune to have such a רשע גמור as his father. Our verse addresses such a situation when it writes: איש אמו ואביו תיראו ואת שבתותי תשמרו. The last three words refer to the duty of both generations to observe G'd's commandments. The reason the Torah chose the example of the Sabbath to illustratte its point is because Sabbath-observance is equivalent to total Torah-observance as we know from <i>Shemot Rabbah</i> 25,12.
  One may also approach the moral-ethical allusions contained in this verse as evident from the plural שבתותי as opposed to the Torah's custom to speak about the Sabbath in the singular. Our sages in <i>Shabbat</i> 69 explain the plural to mean that in certain cases the non-observance of many work-prohibitions over a period of numerous Sabbaths may be viewed as a sin which requires only a single sin-offering to atone for it. This is so when the person in question was unaware of a Sabbath legislation at all. The <i>Zohar</i> part 2 page 5 understands the plural to refer to the two parts of each Sabbath, i.e. night and day. This had to be stated as the Torah requires us to separately sanctify (קדוש) both Friday night and Sabbath morning. We know that the sanctity of the night is not of the same level as the sanctity of the day; had the Torah not spoken of "My Sabbath-days" in the plural we would not have known that we had to sanctify also the evening. Our mystical literature views the sanctity of the Sabbath evening as in the nature of the light to which a bride relates, the שמר aspect of the Sabbath. The sanctity of the Sabbath morning is viewed as a supernatural light one which surpasses the intensity of the light at night, something to which the bridegroom relates, i.e. the זכור aspect of the Sabbath. Kabbalists are familiar with these concepts. This is why the <i>Zohar</i> volume 2 page 88 compares the Sabbath evening meal to the apples from a holy piece of earth, whereas when one partakes of the meal of the Sabbath day it is considered comparable to dining at G'd's own table. This is the reason that the sages called the קדוש sanctification of the Sabbath we recite by day, by the name קדושא רבא, "the major sanctification" (compare <i>Pessachim</i> 106). [Interestingly, the Talmud relates this to prove that on Sabbath morning the קדוש consists of reciting only the benediction over wine without the addition of any paragraph from the Torah. Ed.] I have also found at the end of the <i>Shulchan Aruch of the Ari Zal</i> that he relates that during the period of Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah someone erred by writing that the Sabbath is different from all other days in that the day precedes the night. Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah became aware of this writer's error by some miracle (not having seen the text or heard about it) and he succeeded in preventing publication of this work. In his book אגרת שבת, the <i>Ari Zal</i> explains the words of our verse as follows in order to prove that the writer who believed the day precedes the night in the case of the Sabbath erred. The Torah mentioned the mother before the father and equated the commandment to respect mother and father to the commandment to observe the Sabbath days. The reason that the Torah wrote איש אמו ואביו תיראו mentioning the mother before the father is to establish a linkage with the words ואת שבתותי תשמרו, the word ואת referring to the preceding evening whereas the word שבתותי refers to the daytime. The Torah hints that we need to recite קדוש also at night, a period compared to the feminine attribute (אמו) as well as by day the period compared to the masculine attribute (אביו). The reason that both commandments appear in the same verse side by side then is to compare the order of precedence of the parts of the Sabbath to the order of precedence of the two parents; the night i.e. the feminine attribute precedes the day, the masculine attribute.
  
  Verse 4
  
   אל חפנו אל האלילם "Do not turn to the idols, etc. This verse prohibits idolatrous thoughts. One should not turn one's thoughts in that direction. In order to understand this better remember that when a Jew thinks of idolatry it is as if he regresses, i.e. read אחורים, "backwards," instead of אחרים, "others." On the other hand, when a Jew dwells on the subject of the true G'd, it is as if G'd turns His face towards him.
  האלילם, the idols. The reason the Torah uses the plural form when speaking of even a single idol is that idolatry represents a belief in a multiplicity of domains in this world, separation of powers. Judaism, however, represents the belief in a single Creator, in a single Supreme Power in this universe. When idols are described as deities, אלוהים, they are automatically described as אלוהים אחרים, other deities, i.e. in the plural.
  ואלהי מסכה לא תעשו לכם, "neither construct for yourselves molten gods;" seeing that the Torah has already prohibited all kinds of idols why did it single out the molten gods as something we must not construct? Besides, why did the Torah have to stress the word לכם, "for yourselves?" Perhaps we can understand this in connection with chapter 18 in <i>Tikkuney Ha-Zohar</i> where we read that if someone performs a good deed G'd's presence will dwell upon him; if, however, he transgresses one of G'd's commandments the שכינה will depart from the respective organ that should have performed a commandment and that organ will become the home of a spirit of defilement, of טומאה. This spirit of טומאה is the "iron curtain" which is a barrier between such a person and his G'd. Isaiah 59,2 spelled it out when he said: "your iniquities have created a barrier between yourselves and your G'd." When the Torah writes ואלהי מסכה, this means "and a god which forms an iron curtain (from the word מסך, curtain) you must not construct for yourselves." If you do, you would separate yourselves from your source of life. G'd adds the words: "I am the Lord your G'd," to remind you Who it is that you sever your connections with if you violate this commandment.
  The words: "I am the Lord your G'd" may also mean that if we refrain from violating this commandment we qualify for the promise that the Lord is indeed our G'd. Our sages in <i>Chulin</i> 5 phrased this as follows: "Anyone who denies the validity of idolatry is considered as if he had expressed his belief in everything written in the Torah."
  A moral-ethical dimension of this verse may teach us the lesson spelled out in <i>Megillah</i> 28 in connection with Kings II 3,14 לולי פני יהושפט אני נשא אם אביט עליך, "if I did not (at the same time) behold the face of Jehoshaphat king of Yehudah I would not even look at your face." Elisha explained to Achav that it is forbidden to even look at a confirmed sinner such as he. G'd warns that we must not make ourselves into a molten image so that it will be prohibited to even look at ourselves.
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
  
  
  Verse 8
  
   ונכרתה הנפש ההיא מעמיה and this person (soul) will be cut off from its people. We must explore the reason why the penalty for a priest who eats sacrificial meat after the time the Torah allocated for it is so severe. Why is this sin worse than eating all kinds of animals which were not allowed to be consumed at any time, such as creeping things, certain kinds of grasshoppers, or even mammals which died of natural causes or were found to be diseased? You should know that the reason is connected to what we learned in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 114 that the corpse of an Israelite confers ritual impurity on people under the same roof, whereas the corpse of a pagan does not. In other words, the bodies of Israelites are of a higher level of sanctity (while alive) than are the bodies of pagans. Once the sanctity departs from the body of the Jew when he dies, this is replaced by all kinds of spiritually negative phenomena. This accounts for the fact that the difference between a live Jew and a dead Jew is far greater than the difference between a live pagan and a dead pagan. No sanctity departed from the pagan when he died, hence no additional קליפות, spiritually negative forces, will invade that body. The same principle operates in connection with the legislation in our verse. The parts of the animal offered on the altar have enjoyed a higher status than any other animal dead or alive, seeing the remains of this animal have been considered fit to be offered up in holy precincts, an area that most Israelites are not allowed to enter either dead or alive. As soon as the time allocated for these parts to be eaten has elapsed the animal forfeits all the holiness it possessed and this is replaced in turn by spiritually negative forces, just as in the case of the body of a Jew who has died. These forces of טומאה which have now invaded the remains of that animal cause the premature death, etc. of the priest who will eat these parts belatedly. None of the other animals which the Torah has outlawed for consumption by Jews had ever been imbued with any sanctity so that this could have been replaced upon its death by spiritually negative forces which would represent mortal danger to a Jew eating such an animal. Any negative influences a Jew absorbs when he eats these forbidden animals can be expunged by the sinner receiving corporal punishment, מלקות.
  The reason the Torah gives for the harsh penalty "that he (the priest) has defiled something that is sacred," appears to mean that the Torah is concerned with the status of the remains of the animal; according to our approach, however, it seems to indicate that G'd is very concerned with the sacred status of the priest. The Torah does not want the priest to jeopardise his status. Possibly, the fact that peace-offerings are not complete until the priests had consumed their portions, is the reason why the Torah had to be very blunt in outlawing eating any of that sacrificial meat after the deadline, even if, as a result of the priest not having eaten all of it on time some of it became נותר.
  
  Verse 9
  
   ובקצרכם את קציר ארצכם, "And when you reap the harvest of your land, etc." The Torah commenced this verse by speaking in the plural, whereas it concluded by addressing an individual i.e. לא תכלה פאת שדך, "you (sing.) must not reap the corner of your field." The Torah may have wanted to dispel the faulty notion that when the amount of gleanings, etc. does not amount to anywhere near enough to provide something meaningful for the poor that the law does not apply. We find an example of such thinking in Kings II 4,43 where Gechazi, Elisha's servant, questioned the use of sharing out twenty loaves amongst over one hundred of Elisha's followers. The Torah therefore addresses each farmer individually to tell him that even though his individual contribution is minimal he must abide by this legislation. The Torah uses the singular for each one of the types of gifts for the poor listed in our verse.
  The Torah may have felt forced to write this positive commandment immediately following mention of the severe כרת penalty for the priest who violates the perimeters of eating sacrificial meat. It wanted to disabuse a person who has become guilty of such a penalty from saying to himself that there is no point in observing any of G'd's commandments because he had already forfeited his share of the hereafter by violating a different commandment. The Torah says: "when you reap the harvest of your fields;" this is a reference to the people (i.e. the nation at large) who had "harvested" i.e. cut themselves off by commission of a sin which made them subject to extinction. G'd directs: "do not destroy the corner of your field to harvest it;" this is a warning to the people or individuals not to become guilty of additional misdemeanours. He advises us that not the whole soul will be destroyed. The only part of the personality (soul) which will be destroyed is the branch to which this particular commandment had been addressed in the first place. Other parts of that soul continue to maintain their affinity with their holy origin. Every Jewish soul has roots in the celestial regions, one root corresponding to each of the commandments in the Torah. The Torah continues: ולקט קצירך לא תלקט, "do not gather the gleanings of your harvest." This is a reminder not even to repeat the specific sin for which one has already once become guilty of the כרת penalty. The rationale for this can best be understood in light of a comment by the <i>Ari Zal.</i> He said that it is in the nature of sanctity to leave behind some mark even if its bulk has been erased. If this is so, it follows that although the sinner has "harvested," i.e. put an end to his spiritual career by his sin, there is still a residue of the former sanctity he has forfeited by his deed. The Torah commanded such a sinner to be careful not to commit an act which would wipe out even that residue by repeating his sin, i.e. לקט. It is G'd's hope and desire that this לקט, residue of former sanctity, should prompt the sinner to become a penitent so that G'd will have cause to extend His mercy to him. After all, we are told in <i>Yuma</i> 86 that although a person may be guilty of a variety of sins which are punishable either by execution in this life or כרת at the hands of G'd, his repentance will atone for such sins. We are all aware of the call of Hoseah to the sinner (Hoseah 14,2) to become a penitent and to express his guilt first of all with his lips. Our sages explain in this connection that "repentance is great indeed as it penetrates up until the throne of G'd's glory." The meaning of these words is that although the חוט, the lifeline which connects every Jewish soul directly to that throne, had already been severed so that only the thinnest of threads remains within the sinner, repentance enables the sinner to re-establish contact with the throne of G'd.
  
  Verse 10
  
  
  
  Verse 11
  
   לא תגנבו, "Do not steal, etc." What is the reason the Torah chose to write this commandment next to that of leaving your gleanings for the poor? Perhaps <i>Torat Kohanim</i> provides the clue. They quote Ben Bag Bag who said: "do not steal your own property back from the thief lest you will be perceived as a thief" (i.e. by those who do not know that what you took was yours in the first place). Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> Here the Torah warns the farmer that if he collects the gleanings of his own harvest he should not rationalise this by saying that he is only taking what belongs to him anyway. 
  Our verse actually contains three prohibitions. 1) "Do not steal!" i.e. to not take someone else's money without that person being aware of it. 2) "Do not deal falsely!" i.e. do not deny that you have in your possession money belonging to your fellow man though you obtained this money legally. 3) "Do not lie!" i.e. do not deny that you have money of your fellow man in your possession and there are witnesses who testify to this. The Torah tells us that even in a case such as this where the claim of the thief is easily disproved and the money will be restored to its rightful owner, the thief is guilty of having lied.
  The Torah also hints here that in the event a person violates the first of these three commandments and steals, G'd will see to it that the theft becomes known. Our sages in <i>Chagigah</i> 16 have stated that if someone commits a sin in secret G'd will make the sin public so that the sinner's wickedness will be exposed. This is why the Torah writes the prohibition to deny one's guilt immediately after writing the prohibition to steal. When the Torah wrote לא תכחשו, "do not falsely deny your guilt," it speaks of a situation where the culprit would be able to get away with his denial legally such as when he is confronted by only one witness; if the thief confesses, all well and good; if he denies the accusation, the Seer, i.e. G'd Himself, will act as the second witness against the guilty person; needless to say that in that event the culprit will not be able to get away with his lie; the Torah adds: "do not lie!" to teach that in addition to the culprit's denial having proven useless to him he will also have become guilty of the sin of lying.
  The reason the Torah employs the plural here and in subsequent verses as opposed to the first ten verses in this chapter and the commandments starting with verse 16 may be to warn the victim of the thief not to take the law into his own hands and retrieve what has been stolen from him in that fashion. The words לא תגנובו therefore are addressed to both the original thief as well as the victim who resorts to stealing to retrieve his own property. The result of taking the law into your own hands would likely result in both of you becoming guilty of violating the related commandments לא תכחשו ולא תשקרו. As to the reason why also verse 12 is in the plural, I believe the reason is identical. If someone observes that the thief denies on oath that he has stolen someone's property, that someone may feel justified in recovering his property by swearing a false oath himself. This is why the Torah warns לא תשבעו בשמי לשקר, not to swear a false oath by citing G'd as one's witness. Inasmuch as this would involve a desecration of the name of G'd, the Torah reverts to addressing such a person in the singular (in the middle of verse 12); this makes it plain that the Torah addresses only the person who profanes G'd's name in order to salvage his own property by swearing an oath. There was no need to include the thief seeing he was already included in the general prohibition לא תשעבו בשמי לשקר. It is also possible that the words לא תשעבו are a warning to the party who tries to make a second party swear an oath when he has reason to believe that that party will perjure himself. Better not to let him swear than to contribute to his desecrating G'd's name. In the worst case scenario then there will only be one person involved in desecrating G'd's name.
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
   לא תעשוק את דעך, "Do not oppress your fellow Jew." After the Torah had forbidden the acquisition of someone else's money through theft a person might conclude that the Torah's objection is only to thievery and not to other ways of appropriating something which is rightfully someone else's. This is why the Torah had to outlaw the obtaining of money by someone exploiting his position of strength vis-a-vis a person whose social or financial position places him at a disadvantage. The prohibition includes withholding wages of a labourer even only for one night.
  The reason the Torah describes the injured party as רע, a colleague or friend, is to warn us not to presume on the other party's friendship towards us to shortchange them in what is due to them. One must not play loose with a friend's money because he is one's friend and presumably will not voice his objection for the sake of preserving the friendship. The word את רעך is justified seeing the subject is one which involves only people, not G'd directly. Moreover, if the friend forgives the harm done to him such behaviour is not considered a sin vis-a-vis G'd.
  A moral-ethical dimension of these verses is found in <i>Berachot</i> 35 where the Talmud discusses Proverbs 28,24: "he who robs father or mother saying it is no sin is a companion of a destroyer." The Talmud views the verse as referring to someone enjoying the products of this world without first reciting a benediction acknowledging that it all belongs to G'd. Father and mother in that verse are supposed to be G'd and the concept of the people of Israel, commonly referred to as כנסת ישראל. The word רעך in our verse would refer to G'd Himself. We are entitled to this homiletical approach based on Proverbs 27,10 where Solomon warns not to abandon "your friend and the friend of your father." This means one should not "rob" G'd of what He provides without first acknowledging it, taking permission, so to speak. The reason the Torah adds the words "do not rob," is to tell you that even the paucity of מצוה-performance contains an element of robbery. When one fails to carry out a commandment which one is obligated to observe and has the opportunity to observe one causes harm to the entire Jewish people, i.e. one is guilty of transgressing the commandment לא תלין, not performing one's duty on time. When the Torah writes: "do not keep overnight with you the wages due to a labourer," this is a demand to perform daily and punctually in one's מצוה-performance. <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 26,4 describes the practice of day borrowing from night during the summer months, whereas night borrows from day during the winter months. [ideally, both day and night should be 12 hours long all year long were it not for the fact that the earth's axis is (nowadays, since the deluge) at an angle. Ed.] The <i>Midrash</i> presents this as an ideal way of two parties helping each other out without recourse to written contracts, demands for repayment, etc. When the Torah writes לא תלין פעולת שכיר אתך, "do not hold back the wages of your labourer with you all night long," the word אתך, refers back to the word שכיר, "someone hired by G'd," a reference to the spirit G'd has granted His labourers, i.e. man. G'd looks upon man as His hired hand. He has granted this spirit both to the hired hand as well as to the resident. Man's wages are that he is granted the privilege to carry out the commandments of G'd. Anyone of us failing to do so or doing so belatedly harms the whole people.
  This verse also contains an allusion to the well known statement by our sages (<i>Berachot</i> 28) that Torah scholars do not find much sustenance in this life. We also have a <i>Yalkut Shimoni</i> (item 934 on Proverbs) on Proverbs 3,3 which appears to promise much temporal reward for Torah study. The Torah is supposed to have wanted to know why people studying it are usually so poor. I have heard a good answer to this question in the name of the <i>Ari Zal.</i> He explained that the physical universe we live in would be unable to absorb all the goodness G'd would have to bestow on the Torah scholars. G'd therefore decided to bestow such goodness only on the average individuals who in turn are charged with looking after the material needs of the Torah scholars. This teaches that the only reason there are apparently undeserving wealthy people in this world is that they serve as a מרזב, a channel to furnish sustenace to the Torah scholars. G'd has commanded here that that a (wealthy) person must not oppress a Torah scholar by withholding the material benefits from him which it is his function to provide for his רע, his friend, the Torah scholar.
  The word את in the verse לא תעשוק, next to the word רעך, -a reference to G'd as we explained,- is to be understood as similar to what Rabbi Akiva explained in <i>Pessachim</i> 22. In that instance Rabbi Akiva explains the word את in את ה׳ אלוקיך תירא as referring to Torah scholars. The Torah intended to warn us to revere Torah scholars, the judges, in much the same manner as we revere G'd Himself. Judges are also known as אלהים, so that we can say the Torah warns not to steal or rob as G'd has representatives on earth who will deprive the thief or robber of whatever he has taken unlawfully.
  
  Verse 14
  
  
  
  Verse 15
  
   לא תעשו עול במשפט. "Do not render an unfair decision in judgment." This warning is addressed to litigants who are not to try and secure favourable judgment by ruses. If this were to happen it would be considered an עול, an injustice, a perversion of justice. This is the reason the Torah addressed the prohibition in the plural form, i.e. litigants (pl).You may understand this as follows: עול במשפט, the injustice would occur during judgment the judges hand down seeing that the judge is obligated to arrive at his decision on the basis of the arguments presented by the litigants. This is also the reason that this commandment followed the directive not to place obstacles before the "blind." Usually the reason a judge arrives at a faulty decision is that one of the litigants has deceived him.
  Another meaning of this verse is that if a litigant finds that the judge found in his favour although he himself is aware that such a ruling was unfair, he must not accept the judgment but must strive to have such a judgment set aside. This is another reason the Torah used the plural here, seeing that we deal with injustice to at least two parties.
  The verse also addresses the judge himself. If the judge himself feels that the judgment he is bound to hand down on the basis of the evidence presented is unjust, he would become guilty of perverted judgment. He is to hand down only the kind of verdict he himself will be comfortable with.
  We also need to consider the vowel <i>patach</i> under the letter ב in the word במשפט. This definitive article reminds us of something we learned in <i>Beytzah</i> 16 that on New Year's Day G'd allocates to man his material needs for the new year, based on what he deserves. If a judge were to declare the guilty as innocent and vice versa he would pervert G'd's judgment. As a result, the victim would question G'd's fairness as it were.
  
  Verse 16
  
   לא תלך רכיל בעמיך, "Do not go about your people bearing tales." Our sages in the <i>Zohar</i> have already preceded me in drawing attention to the apparent duplication when the Torah speaks both about לא תלך, "do not go," and רכיל, "bearing tales." The latter word implies that one goes from one person to another. So why do we need the words: "do not go?" The <i>Zohar's</i> answer in Nasso subsection <i>Idra Rabbah</i> 128 is of a mystical dimension. I believe the plain meaning of the Torah is a warning to each individual not to become a vehicle for potential defamatory information about a second party. How does one prevent this? By not revealing any information even innocent information in the hearing of anyone who might use this information or part of it and turn it into something defamatory. If that were to happen then the person who merely related the original harmless sounding story shares part of the guilt. The Torah purposely writes בעמיך, "amongst your own people," referring to people close to you who are indiscreet and blabber about any confidence they have heard or overheard. G'd adds: "I am the Lord" i.e. I am going to track down whence the defamatory remarks originated.
  Another aspect of our verse is that the Torah warns that we must not associate with nor tolerate the presence of people who spread evil gossip. Providing such people with a home or otherwise assisting them makes the host an accessory to their sin, part of the cause.
  לא תעמוד על דם רעך, "Do not stand idly by when your colleague's blood is being spilled." This part of the verse is a natural corollary of the prohibition to bear tales. When one becomes aware of an assassination attempt for instance, one has to warn the potential victim in order to enable him to save himself. The Torah writes the words: "Do not stand by idly, etc," to warn us that relaying a warning to a person of an attempt to assassinate him which one has overheard does not fall under the prohibition not to bear tales. Failure to warn the potential victim which results in the murder being carried out makes the party who did not issue the warning guilty of violating this commandment. Jeremiah 40,14 reports that Gedalyah ben Achikom was warned of an assassination attempt against him by a fellow Jew Ishmael ben Netanyah. Gedalyah's refusal to believe that he was in danger resulted in his death at the hand of assassins.
  
  Verse 17
  
   לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך, "do not hate your brother in your heart, etc." The Torah urges us that if we harbour some resentment against a fellow Jew not to bottle it up in one's heart saying nothing but hating the Jew in question. One has to come out with one's feelings into the open, בפיך, and rebuke the person who one thinks as guilty of having bad-mouthed him or otherwise hurt him to cause such hatred. הוכח תוכיח, "rebuke him, even repeatedly," ולא תשא עליו חטא, "so that you will not bear a sin on account of him." Do not assume in your heart that whatever it is the other Jew has done to cause you to hate him he has done purposely and that he continues to feel hostile towards you. Give him the benefit of the doubt and discuss the matter with him. The discussion could lead to one of two possible results. 1) He may explain to you that he had a good reason for what he did so that there is no reason to hate him. 2) He may change his attitude towards you, undertaking not to continue his hostile conduct. As a result he becomes "your friend, your brother."
  Another approach to our verse is based on the unusual structure of the verse. It should have read: "לא תשנא בלבבך את אחיך, the word "in your heart" which we consider central should not have been written at the end. The source of the hatred, the heart, should have been mentioned before the object of the hatred, a fellow Jew. If the Torah reversed this order there must be a reason for this. I believe that the message is that a person should not think that the Torah only forbids the kind of hatred which is the forerunner of acts of revenge or violence but does not forbid harbouring ill feelings towards someone in one's heart. By mentioning the object of one's hatred immediately next to the prohibition to hate, the Torah made it clear that even the kind of hatred which is not related to acts of retaliation is forbidden. As soon as a person distances himself mentally and emotionally from his fellow Jew he begins to violate the prohibition of hatred as defined by the Torah in this verse.
  We need to examine why the Torah chose the term אחיך, "your brother," when describing who it is you hate, whereas the person that you are advised or directed to admonish is described as עמיתך, "your colleague."
  Perhaps the best way to understand this distinction is based on what we read in <i>Tannah de bey Eliyahu Rabbah</i> at the end of chapter 3. We are told that if one observes a man known as a Torah scholar commit an obvious violation of a Torah precept, one should not think about this during the night, but rather assume that said scholar had already repented his mistake. We also find in <i>Pessachim</i> 113 where the Talmud discusses the implications of Exodus 23,5 that one must not stand by idly when the ass of someone whom one hates breaks down under its burden but one must assist the owner to unload the beast. The Talmud explains that the שנאך who is described as the owner of the donkey is a person whom one has observed commit sins, in other words someone who one is permitted to hate. Accordingly, there are exceptions to the rule "not to hate your brother." A Torah scholar is exempted from the list of sinners one is allowed to hate as it is to be presumed that he is not a habitual sinner but has momentarily committed a mistake which he will promptly regret. The Torah described such a Torah scholar as "your brother," to teach you that even if this Torah scholar became guilty of a transgression you must not hate him but assume that he has already done penitence and recaptured his status (and therefore stature) as a Torah-observant Jew. We base this on Psalms 122, 8 למען אחי ורעי אדברה נא שלום בך, "for the sake of my brethren and friends I pray for your wellbeing." We can also derive this from the way the Talmud <i>Kidushin</i> 57 interprets the verse את ח׳ אלוקיך תירא, "you shall fear the Lord your G'd," where the word את is taken to refer to the Torah scholars (Deut. 6,13). Similarly, the word אחיך here refers to G'd Himself who is described on occasion as a "brother of Israel" (compare <i>Midrash Shochar Tov</i> 23).
  When the Torah wrote הוכח תוכיח, it speaks of a different situation altogether, i.e. it addresses your conduct vis-a-vis the average Israelite. In order to make this clear, that "average" Israelite is not described as "your brother" but as "your colleague." This is more pronounced by the Torah not saying הוכח תוכיחנו, "you shall rebuke him repeatedly, as we would have expected if the Torah had not changed the subject it speaks of in the first half of this verse. By rebuking your "average Israelite" you will help him to avoid becoming guilty of hating you so that the righteous will not be punished for his share in the guilt of the wicked. Failure to rebuke, however, will make the individual who is Torah-observant an accessory in the guilt of the sinners who have not been rebuked. 
  
  We have proof of this In Ezekiel 33,9 where the prophet is told that seeing he had warned the people he himself will be saved and does not have to share their fate.
  I have found another interesting statement in chapter 18 of <i>Tannah de bey Eliyahu Rabbah</i> who writes as follows: "Does the Torah here refer to brothers of the same father or brothers of the same mother? In answer to this question he says that the word "your brother" refers to G'd who does not have any "brothers" either in this world, the world to come, or after the arrival of the Messiah, except for the righteous who perform His commandments meticulously day after day. Thus far <i>Tannah de bey Eliyahu Rabbah.</i> From this comment It emerges that "brothers" are considered as closer relations than "sons" or "daughters" as we know from <i>Shir Hashirim Rabbah</i> 3 that G'd first called Israel "My daughter," whereas eventually He called her "My sister" (i.e. a higher form of endearment).
  
  Verse 18
  
   לא תקום ולא תטור, "Do not take vengeance and do not bear a grudge." <i>Yuma</i> 23 defines vengeance as someone responding in kind to a hateful act by his neighbour he has experienced, whereas the "grudge" is defined as repaying a hateful act with a kind act pointing out, however, that one is morally superior to the person who committed the hateful act. The proof for this is the verse following that one should "love your neighbour as yourself." The reason the Torah has to say this is to indicate that it is G'd's wish that we relate to our fellow Jews with the same love we have for ourselves. If the person described as bearing a grudge told his neighbour that despite the fact that the latter refused to lend him his spade, he in turn was willing to lend him his own spade, he indicated that he had harboured resentment against his neighbour first. G'd tells us that the reason we must not bear a grudge is because the Lord is our G'd. This means that by means of individual Israelites experiencing a unification of their hearts, G'd's Unity itself is enhanced. This is all based on the kabbalistic concept that all Jewish souls are branches of the Holy name of G'd (י־ה־ו־ה) based on Deut. 32,9 "for His people are part of Him" (compare <i>Zohar</i> volume 3 page 16).
  The Torah was very shrewd in giving these directives to the Israelite in a staggered form. 1) First of all, one is not to hate a fellow Jew; 2) next, one is not take revenge for something a fellow Jew has done to him; 3) one is not even to bear a grudge; 4) one is to love one's fellow Jew. The Torah uses 2 different descriptions for a fellow Jew, a) "your brother;" b) "your colleague" or "member of your people." This tells us that the legislation applies only to Jews who basically are Torah-observant but with whom you have a disagreement of a personal nature. If your hatred for them is due to such a Jew displaying his disdain for the Jewish religion one must not only not love them but hate them as we have been told by David in Psalms 139,21 "You know I hate those who hate You, etc."
  
  Verse 19
  
   את חקותי תשמרו, בהמתך לא תרביע כלאים, "You shall keep My statutes. Do not let your cattle mate with a different species of animal." Here is the way <i>Torat Kohanim</i> interprets this verse: "From the wording of the text I only know a prohibition concerning a domestic animal owned by one. How do I know that the same prohibition applies also to the domestic animals owned by one's neighbour? We derive this from the extraneous word את in the expression את חקרתי. If this is correct, why did the Torah use the suffix "your" altogether when describing the domestic animal? It could have written בהמה לא תרביע כלאים and saved both the word את as well as the possessive ending ך. I have seen a comment by the author of <i>Korban Aharon</i> explaining that the verse deals with a normal situation, i.e. an owner cross-mating his own animals. I do not believe that this is an adequate reason for the Torah phrasing the commandment in this fashion.
  I believe that the key to the verse is the fact that the Torah wrote this law immediately after the commandment to love fellow Israelites like ourselves. The message of that commandment is that G'd loves for Jews whose souls are all branches of the same pool of sanctity to behave accordingly towards each other. As a result we might think that G'd does not mind if those mammals which are fit for consumption by us, i.e. the בהמות טהורות, would intermate. The Torah tells us that this is against G'd's will. The ending ך in the word refers to the fact that these animals are yours to eat, not that they are owned by you. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> also writes that the verse as it stands forbids only the crossbreeding or mating of pure animals with other pure animals. Whence do I know that one must not crossbreed or mate impure animals with pure animals? Answer: This is why the Torah says את חקותי תשמרו. This shows you quite clearly that the author had understood the word בהמתך to mean pure animals as opposed to animals which are your own. If the Torah had not written the suffix ך, I would not have known that the subject are pure animals at all, but would have assumed that inasmuch as the pure animals are fit to eat, mating between pure animals would be permissible as opposed to mating between impure and pure species.
  
  Verse 20
  
  
  
  Verse 21
  
  
  
  Verse 22
  
  
  
  Verse 23
  
   וכי תבאו אל הארץ, "and when you arrive in the country, etc." This verse contains three commandments. 1) The arrival in the land of our ancestors. We understand this in accordance with <i>Ketuvot</i> 110 that הכל מעלין לארץ ישראל, a father may force all the members of his household to migrate to the land of Israel as opposed to leaving the land of Israel. 2) One must plant fruit-bearing trees in order to enhance the stature of the land. 3) One has to observe the years of ערלה before one is entitled to eat or use the fruit of these trees.
  The introduction of the verse with the letter ו at the beginning of this paragraph indicates that one's migration to the land of Israel should not be motivated purely by self-gratification but it should be accompanied by a love for the land G'd has given us as an inheritance, the land G'd has chosen for His name to dwell in. Mount Zion bears His name. The Torah commands us to plant these trees so that we should not think all we have to do in the Holy Land is to simply it make it our home without civilising the country. You have appreciated that the words אל הארץ, to the land, etc., imply that the Torah speaks about spiritual values connected with this land.
  Perhaps we may look at the verse homiletically and view in the expression עץ מאכל, "a fruit-bearing tree" an allusion to Torah students who are also referred to as נטעים, "saplings" on occasion. The Talmud <i>Shabbat</i> 118 quotes Rabbi Yossi as sayings: "I have had marital relations on five occasions and I have planted five saplings." [in my text of the Talmud the word is not saplings but ארזים mighty cedars. Ed.] He referred, of course, to the five Torah scholars whom he fathered as a result of these unions and who are all enumerated by name in the Talmud. We have a verse in Isaiah 65,22 which describes the lives of "My people are like the life of a tree." <i>The Zohar</i> writes something similar on the commandment in Deut. 20,19 where the Torah prohibits destroying fruit-bearing trees in order to conquer a town one has laid siege to sooner. The words not to "destroy its trees" are understood as referring to Torah students. The air in the Holy Land helps in the acquisition of wisdom and purifies one's soul as we know from <i>Baba Batra</i> 158. The reason Torah students are compared to fruit-bearing trees is that they provide spiritual food for their listeners. You may wish to read about a story about Rabbi Akiva in <i>Massechet Kallah Rabbati</i> chapter 2 which described the venerable Rabbi teaching an orphaned child how to read. The father of this child had encountered great difficulties in the hereafter until the day his son was able to read and recite prayers. This paved the way for his father's progress in the hereafter.
  שלש שנים יהיה לכם ערלים, "for three years shall it be unto you as 'uncircumcised;'" the meaning of ערלים is אטומים, shut, impenetrable; during the first three years a Torah student studies he does not dare open his mouth to give forth of his newly acquired wisdom just as most babies do not speak intelligently during the first three years of their lives. (<i>Tanchuma Kedoshim</i> 14). One normally starts teaching the child Torah in his fourth year so that he can recite the most simple prayers. Prayers such as <i>Keriat Shema, Modeh Ani</i> are called here קדש הלולים. In the fifth year the fruit of the tree is permitted to be eaten, compare the <i>Mishnah in Avot</i> 5,24 that a five year old child is old enough to start learning the written Torah. He begins to qualify for the description "a fruit-bearing tree."
  The Torah immediately follows with the prohibition לא תאכלו על הדם, "do not eat it with blood!" This is a hint that one should not make the consumption of physical food a totally secular experience as if one's life were bound up in the act of eating, much as the life of an animal is bound up in its blood. לא תנחשו, "do not practice divination." If one were to eat blood one identifies with the concept of the נחש, the original serpent, Satan the seducer. Isaiah describes the mystical dimension of this when he wrote (Isaiah 65,25) "and the bread of the serpent is dust." According to this it is the serpent's nature to try and consume man who is made of dust, or to reduce man to a totally materially oriented creature. לא תעוננו, "do not practice soothsaying." We find a reference to this in Job 7,9 כלה ענן וילך, "just as the cloud once it has disappeared is gone forever, so man, once he has died is gone forever." This verse describes people who spent their lives chasing only the physical, the tangible, ignoring life's spiritual aspects. The Torah exhorts us not to exhaust our existence in our physical needs and pleasures.
  
  Verse 24
  
  
  
  Verse 25
  
  
  
  Verse 26
  
   לא תאכלו על הדם, "You shall not eat with the blood;" <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 21,7 say that the reason that this commandment appears next to the prohibition of ערלה is an allusion to Adam who had eaten from the tree of knowledge before its period of being ערלה had expired. [the other trees had been expressly permitted by G'd so that that prohibiton was overridden. Ed] According to the <i>Midrash,</i> all Adam had to do was to wait until the advent of the Sabbath. He would have been permitted to recite the benediction over wine; [according to the view that the fruit of the tree of knowledge were grapes. Ed.] This is the mystical dimension of the statement in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 38 that אדם מושך בערלתו היה, that "Adam was pulling at his ערלה." The word refers to the as yet not permitted fruit; Adam was too impatient. This is why the Torah writes next to the commandment וערלתם ערלתו, "do not eat with the blood," i.e. "do not eat of the fruit of the tree which is still ערלה because of the blood," i.e. all bloodshed in the world originated when Adam ate from that tree prematurely. We may extrapolate from this that had it not been for Adam's failure at the time there never would have been such a prohibition as the one described in our paragraph. Neither plants nor animals would have become restricted to man at all, either temporarily or permanently.
  
  Verse 27
  
   לא תקיפו פאת ראשכם, "Do not round off the corners of your head, etc." In this instance the Torah addresses the Israelites in the plural, whereas when speaking of the beard (in the same verse) it addresses the individual, i.e. in the singular. This teaches that the first admonition in the verse applies even to people who cannot apply the second half of the verse to themselves seeing they do not have a beard. We could easily have made such a mistake as women who do not have beards also are not subject to the prohibition of rounding the corners of their heads compare (<i>Kidushin</i> 38). Should you ask why we have arrived at such an apparently arbitrary distinction, i.e. that the males are included in both prohibitions whereas the women are exempt from both, the answer is that the males become subject to the second prohibiton as soon as they are old enough whereas the women as a rule never become subject to the second prohibition. Nature did not endow them with hair in that area of their faces.
  
  Verse 28
  
   ושרם לנפש לא תתנו בבשרכם, "And you shall not make an incision on your flesh in mourning of someone who died." The reason the Torah emphasises the word נפש is to make plain that though the incision is an injury to one's body, the reason for it is the departure of someone's נפש, someone's soul. The Torah is careful to describe this as לא תתנו בבשרכם, "do not give it on your flesh," to explain that the incision will not leave an injury on one's soul but only on one's flesh. The reason that the incision does not leave permanent damage on one's soul is that the body is considered the sheath of the soul, and man is very excited and hasty when he loses a dear relative to death (<i>Shabbat</i> 43). The Torah therefore continues with a different kind of bodily defacement which leaves a deeper and more permanent mark, i.e. וכתובת קעקע לא תתנו בכם, "and do not tatoo yourselves;" you will note that in this instance the Torah did not use the restrictive word בבשרכם, to show you that tatoos are considered as injuring not only the body but also the soul. The reason tatooing leaves an injury also on one's soul is that it is something which requires great care, is not performed hastily like the incision called שרט. It is only natural then that it leaves a far deeper impression on one's personality than the hastily performed incision. We are told in <i>Baba Batra</i> 16 that a person is not "seized" i.e. held totally responsible, for things he does at the time when he experiences deep mental anguish.
  The Torah concludes the verse with the words אני השם. The reason for this is explained by Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in <i>Zohar</i> volume 3, page 247. The word אני refers to G'd's throne which we are in the habit of referring to as His שכינה, His Presence. The tetragram i.e. the name י־ה־ו־ה on the other hand, is a reference to He who sits on that throne. With the expression אני השם G'd indicates that He is punctilious regarding the honour due to Him as well as the honour due to His throne. The relationship between man's body and his soul is similar to the relationship between G'd's throne and His essence. Seeing man has been created in the image of G'd, He does not want us to injure either our bodies or our souls.
  
  Verse 29
  
   אל תחלל את בתך, "Do not profane your daughter, etc." G'd commands the father of a daughter not to make her into a sex-object even by merely displaying her beauty and enjoying the compliments paid to her beauty. The honour of a daughter is not in the admiring glances she receives by men ogling her but by her presiding in her domain inside the home. Even though a father displays his daughter in order to facilitate finding a suitable husband for her, G'd still commanded that from the girl's point of you it is a profanation for her; such displays may eventually lead to the daughter engaging in harlotry even at the instigation of her father. Once the father uses his daughter's physical charms to attract a husband and thereby a substantial dowry for himself, he may become tempted to use her earnings from illicit sex for himself instead. He may be exploiting the natural sexual desires which are kindled when the girl knows she is on display and admired. The next step in such permissiveness may be the spread of harlotry in the land until the land becomes so permeated by this sin that it will spew out its inhabitants. Eventually, the whole sin will be debited to the father who first ignored the prohibition in our verse. Read what I have written on Leviticus 18,2 in connection with the verse כמעשה ארץ מצרים. I have explained there that the sense of vision and the fantasies it conjures up is stronger than the will-power seated in one's brain and that this is why one must not feed the sense of vision with anything liable to arouse one's libido or someone else's libido either.
  
  Verse 30
  
   את שבתתי תשמרו, "You shall observe My Sabbaths, etc." Why did the Torah repeat here a commandment already written at the beginning of our <i>Parshah</i> (19,3)? Here is how <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains this: "I might have thought that the commandment to build the Holy Temple supersedes that of not working on the Sabbath. The Torah therefore repeats that you must observe "My Sabbaths" to teach us that the Sabbath legislation takes precedence even over the commandment to build the Holy Temple." The words of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> do explain why the subject of building the Temple and the subject of Sabbath observance appear side by side; they do not, however, address the question why the Torah could not then have dispensed with mentioning this commandment in 19,3? Or, the commandment of building the Holy Temple should have been written in verse 3 instead of here.
  I believe that the commandment to observe the Sabbath is connected to what was written before rather than to the commandment to build the Holy Temple. Whereas the Torah commanded the father not to desecrate his daughter by instructing her to practice harlotry, the fact remains that some girls engage in that profession without being urged by their fathers to do so. When they do that they do not only desecrate their own name but they bring shame on the name of their fathers as well even though the father was quite innocent in the matter. This is why the Torah commanded the father to keep strict control of the movements of his daughter so that she will not prostitute herself. The Torah blames the father, i.e. the person who begot the child for the eventual misdemeanours of the child. The fact is that there are three separate causes which may be to blame for the delinquency of children. 1) If at the time of conception the father was bent on the physical pleasure of the union with his wife instead of being motivated purely by the desire to fulfil G'd's commandment to be fruitful when they had marital relations. As a result, the child born from such a union may inherit a tendency to engage in sex for gratification of a biological urge. 2) The cause may be the mother; if the deeds of the mother are not morally good, "the lamb will tend to become like the sheep which has given birth to it" (compare <i>Ketuvot</i> 63). 3) If both father and mother had forbidden thoughts at the time they conceived the child. The classic example is King Chiskiyah and his wife (the daughter of the prophet Isaiah) who produced two great sinners from that union (compare <i>Sanhedrin</i> 104). The tragedy of that incident is the fact that though both father and mother were pillars of piety they nonetheless produced such issue.
  The words את שבתותי תשמרו are addressesd to possibility number one, similar to something the <i>Zohar</i> explains on Isaiah 56,4: לסריסים אשר ישמרו את שבתותי, "as to the eunuchs who have chosen to observe My Sabbaths" (volume 2 page 89). The "eunuchs" referred to are the righteous people who make eunuchs of themselves by refusing to have marital relations with their wives except on Friday nights, and who, as a result, produce only morally elitist children by ensuring that they are all born with holy souls. Thus far the <i>Zohar</i> on that subject. The lesson we derive from that is that if someone wants to make sure that the children he sires are of that holy level, he must first learn how to control his libido and put it exclusively into the service of performing G'd's commandment to be fruitful. In other words, "do not have relations with your wife except on Friday nights." When you have achieved this level of conduct you may be certain that your daughter will not engage in harlotry or anything similar to it. Concerning the second reason we have listed which may be to blame for a child turning out to be delinquent, namely that its mother had sensual thoughts which the daughter inherited, the Torah writes ואת מקדשי תיראו, "and revere My Holy Temple." This is a warning to be afraid to violate the sanctity of the Temple, i.e. to ensure that a daughter will never become a סוטה, a wife suspected of infidelity who can clear her name only by drinking the מים המאררים, the waters described in Numbers chapter 5 which have to be drunk on hallowed ground and which bear within them a deadly disease if the suspected woman drinking them had been guilty of the suspicion her husband cast on her. Finally, (verse 31) concerning the third reason which may be responsible for even the most elitist fathers and mothers producing children they will be ashamed of, the Torah writes אל תפנו אל האבות ואל הידעונים, "do not turn to the ghosts and to familiar spirits;" these phenomena are manifestations of different kinds of spiritual impurity whose natural tendency is to stick to people's souls much like leeches stick to their bodies. 
  The word אבות is from the root אבה, in the sense of Deut. 23,6 where G'd is depicted as not willing to listen to Bileam. The word ידעני contains an allusion to ידוע, something one knows, is familiar with. A person should not claim that seeing he is familiar with these kinds of phenomena that he is immune to them. As soon as one establishes the kind of intimacy with such phenomena that enable one to claim that one knows all about them, one has already become victimised by these spiritually negative phenomena and their manifestations.
  אני ה׳ אלוקיכם, "I am the Lord your G'd." The Torah writes these words as the reason for prohibiting contact with these forms of soothsaying. Seeing that G'd, i.e. something divine, dwells inside every Jew, contact with such manifestations of Satan and what he represents would result in the divine within us leaving us. We would lose whatever sanctity we had possessed and become part of the evil represented by these forces. Anyone who does not take care of these three commandments will only have himself to blame if his daughter profanes herself or the father himself took the first step by displaying her.
  
  Verse 31
  
  
  
  Verse 32
  
   מפני שיבה תקום, "You shall rise in the presence of an aged person, etc." <i>Kidushin</i> 32 explains that the word שיבה refers to someone advanced in years, whereas the word זקן refers to someone who has acquired wisdom. The word תקום means to rise as a sign of respect, והדרת פני. The wording in the Talmud is difficult as in order to correspond to what the Talmud says the Torah should have written: מפני שיבה ומפני זקן תקום והדרת. Perhaps the Talmud intended to distinguish between different signs of recognition to be accorded to physical maturity, old age, and to spiritual maturity, i.e. זקנה. In the former case it suffices to rise from one's seat momentarily, whereas in the latter case one is to remain standing for longer; the idea is that זקנה, spiritual maturity, rates a greater degree of recognition than שיבה, mere physical old age.
  We may also take our cue from <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 65,9 where we are told that Abraham asked to look old in order that he could be told apart from his son Isaac who resembled him greatly (based on Genesis 24,1 ואברהם זקן). When the Torah says to rise on account of a man aged in years, this is the way to be מהדר, to lend distinction to someone like Abraham who was advanced in years.
  There may also be an allusion here to the statement in <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 12,6 that one of the consequences of Adam's sin was that he lost in "height," i.e. that the wicked do not attain their full height or that they shrink in height. G'd therefore commanded Adam to be sure to repent his error and to mend his ways so that he could attain his full stature. Our sages said in <i>Yevamot</i> 50 that if one possesses the necessary merit one is granted the full number of years allocated to him (70 or more) at birth; if one has not lived in accordance with G'd's commandments one forfeits some of these years and dies before one has completed the normal lifespan of 70 years. The word קומה therefore does not represent physical height but spiritual height. The measure of the verse then is: "if you want to reach a good old age, attain the spiritual height you are meant to attain!" The verse challenges each individual to develop to his full spiritual potential as much as it directs us to display honour for people who have attained old age. Inasmuch as Kohelet 12,1 has already told us that old age is frequently accompanied by afflictions so that one curses those years, the Torah suggests that the way to head off these frequent by-products of aging is to תקום, rise to one's spiritual stature מפני, on account of what might otherwise befall one in old age. Once one reaches that stage, one becomes totally dependent on G'd's personal and beneficial providence.
  The words והדרת פני זקן may even allude to one's own old age; our sages (<i>Sukkah</i> 53) are on record as saying about themselves: "hail to our youth which has not shamed our old age;" they referred to the kind of old age in which one can recall that one had led an exemplary life already from one's youth so that no one could point to a "skeleton in one's cupboard." The Torah therefore advises young men to lead the kind of lives now that would not make it necessary for them to ever be ashamed of their younger years. We are taught in <i>Chagigah</i> 14 that when a righteous person departs this life they compliment Abraham in heaven on the fact that this righteous person was a descendant of his. On the other hand, when a wicked person dies not only does no one compliment Abraham, but he is pained by the failure of that person to have become a penitent before he died. When the Torah speaks of "enhance the face of the old man," the reference is to Abraham who feels chagrined that not all of his descendants are true to his example. The Torah continues to warn us of what is in store in the hereafter by writing ויראת מאלוקיך, "and you shall fear your G'd." This refers to the fear of the punishment to be meted out when the soul comes up for judgment. אני השם, "I am the Lord." This refers to the reward for one's exemplary lifestyle, i.e. that one qualifies for life in the hereafter. Alternatively, these concluding words of our verse may illustrate both fear and love. G'd is telling us that He is to be both feared and loved. G'd's very name is the epitome of love, He is the root cause of all love.
  
  Verse 33
  
   וכי יגור אתך גר, "And if a proselyte sojourn with you in your land, etc." The Torah commences with the singular, i.e. אתך, amongst you (sing), while switching to plural, i.e. ארצכם, "your country" (pl); the reason is that proselytes have been attracted to Judaism through the original proselyte, the first Jew, Abraham, the "spiritual father" of all proselytes. Another factor in attracting pagans to convert to Judaism is the Holy Land itself. We perceive all the souls of the converts as having been "captured" souls which had been ensnared by Satan either in bulk as a result of Adam's sin or individually on subsequent occasions. The word אתך alludes to Abraham's ability to attract converts, the word ארצכם to the ability of the land of Israel itself to exert such an influence.
  This verse also contains an allusion to the manner in which the שכינה remains with us in this life. Accordingly, the "alien" referred to is the One whose original home was in a different, i.e. celestial domain. G'd commanded His presence to take up residence within each individual Jew as mentioned in Psalms 78,60: אהל שכן באדם, "a tent which He established within (amongst) man." ארצכם, in your land; this is a reference to the Holy Land, the home of G'd's presence. It left its home to take up residence on earth. כאזרח מכם, This is a warning for strangers in the land of Israel to convert to Judasim.
  
  Verse 34
  
   כאזרח מכם, "he shall be like a natural-born resident amongst you." Here the Torah reveals the mystical dimension (i.e. their spiritual status) of all the souls of the Jewish people while they were submerged in Egypt and its culture amongst the various nations. This is why the Torah describes them as "like one of your very own," i.e. you have much more in common with converts than you think. Should you query how it is possible that the seed of wicked people, someone whose father was a Gentile, could suddenly be rated as equal to people whose fathers were beloved of G'd, the Torah reminds us כי גרים הייתם בארץ מצרים, "that the souls of these strangers (converts) were intertwined with those of your own when you were still in Egypt." Please read what I have written on this subject in <i>Parshat Yitro</i> on 20,2 (page 673) and the meaning of "I have taken you out of Egypt, etc." What applied to that situation also applies to the situation described here. The "stranger" who was part of the קליפות, the spiritually negative domain, has come to take refuge under the wings of G'd's שכינה. As of now his soul has returned to its holy roots. Once we adopt this approach it is clear that when the Torah speaks of כי גרים הייתם בארץ מצרים, "for you yourselves were strangers in the land of Egypt," the Torah compliments the converts. If the Torah were concerned only with the conversion of people whose souls were never attached to sanctity and whose bodies now wanted to become part of the families of the Israelites, it is hardly likely that they would suddenly become beloved by G'd seeing that their family background is so different. Jewish families are not comparable to Gentile families. The only reason these proselytes are embraced wholeheartedly by the Torah is that the Torah views these converts as people who are returning to their roots.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   ואל בני ישראל תאמר, "Moreover, you shall say to the children of Israel, etc." The reason for the expression "and to the children of Israel" is that all of them are to be involved in executing anyone who hands any of his children to the fire-god Molech. The conjunctive letter ו at the very beginning of the paragraph hints that not only the person who delivers a child to the Molech is guilty of punishment but also those who fail to punish such a person.
  
  Verse 3
  
   ואני אתן את פני באיש ההוא, "And also I Myself will set My face against that person, etc." What further punishment does G'd have in mind seeing the guilty party has already been executed by a human tribunal?
  I believe the Torah informs us that in addition to the physical death of that person by execution there is further punishment in store for his soul. This is alluded to by the words והכרתי אותו מקרב עמו, "I will cut him off from amongst his people." This is a reference to the holy root from which all Jewish souls emanate. The Torah explains the reason for these two punishments and writes: 1) "for he has given of his seed to Molech in order to defile My Sanctuary" 2)…"and to desecrate My holy name." The execution of the sinner's body is the retribution for defiling the Sanctuary, the destruction of the sinner's holy roots is retribution for profaning the Lord's name.
  
  Verse 4
  
   ואם העלם יעלימו עם הארץ, "And if the people at large choose to ignore, etc." The reason the word "they will ignore" is repeated is to tell us that if the people choose to ignore the first time this abominable crime is committed, they will have paved the way for ignoring all subsequent repetitions of this abomination. Even if they would want to punish people then for practicing this cult, the guilty party would challenge the authorities pointing out that the first guilty party had been allowed to get away with this practice. Alternatively, the first word העלם refers to the failure of preventing the father from carrying out his intention to sacrifice his son to the Molech; the second יעלימו refers to the failure of the people to bring such a father to justice.
  
  Verse 5
  
   ושמתי אני את פני, "then also l will set My face, etc." The plain meaning of the text appears to be that if the people will not exact retribution then G'd will turn His wrath also against the whole family of that father. If the people had carried out the prescribed judgment, G'd on His part would have punished only the guilty individual. This seems a most unusual aspect of G'd's justice! If members of the family shared in the father's guilt why would G'd not punish them regardless of whether the father has been executed?
  We feel that the meaning of the verse is to tell us that whenever the judges appointed by G'd on earth fail to mete out justice, justice will be meted out in the celestial spheres. G'd announces this by saying: "I will set My face, etc." Once the heavenly tribunal opens the file of the accused, the files of his family members will be scrutinised at the same time. This is what the Torah meant by mentioning ובמשפחתו, "and against his family." The Torah explained in our verse that G'd's setting His face against the sinner would result in his being being cut off, plus all others who had gone astray by making common cause with the father. The files of the family members will be examined each on his own merit. Any family member who will not be found guilty of the Molech cult whether in deed or thought will not be wiped out. The Torah uses the words הזונים אחריו לזנות, "who go astray after him in order to go astray" (the Molech cult) in the present tense to tell us that even if they had not yet been guilty in deed they are considered as guilty as if they already had performed the abominable act. Ezekiel 14,5 expressed this thought more directly when he wrote למען תפש את בית ישראל בלבם, "in order to catch the house of Israel while (the sin) is still in their hearts." [We find independent confirmation of this in <i>Chulin</i> 142. Ed.]
  As a result of what we said we may intepret our verse as assuring us that if the people at large bring the guilty party to justice he alone will be punished and his family will not even be examined by the heavenly tribunal at that time. Should the people fail to get involved, G'd will involve the family of the sinner to the extent that they harbour thoughts similar to those of the father. If so, the family members will be punished by G'd for their ideology though they cannot, of course, be brought to trial on earth. This is the meaning of <i>Devarim Rabbah</i> 5,4 that "in a place where there is judgment there is no judgment, whereas in a place where there is no judgment there is judgment." The difficulty with this saying is that it is obvious that when judgment is carried out in our world that there is no need to carry out judgment in the celestial spheres. Why would the <i>Midrash</i> have to tell us something so obvious? When you follow our approach, however, the <i>Midrash</i> makes sense as the judgment in the celestial spheres referred to is that of the family of the guilty party. You will find that our sages said in <i>Rosh Hashanah</i> 16 that whenever the Book of judgment of a person is opened in the celestial spheres that person's life is in danger and he needs a special merit in order to emerge unscathed.
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
   והתקדשתם והייתם קדושים, "and sanctify yourselves so that you will be holy." G'd directs that we should strive to be holy; when people do this they are assured of attaining the spiritual level of angels who are called קדושים, "holy beings." We know this from Daniel 8,13 "ויאמר אחד קדוש," "one holy one said, etc." This is what is meant by והייתם קדושים. Our sages in <i>Bamidbar Rabbah</i> 20, comment on Numbers 23,23 כעת יאמר ליעקב ולישראל מה פעל אל. "at a time when Jacob as well as Israel is told at once what G'd had worked." They describe an outer circle of angels and an inner circle of Israelites. The angels who are standing in the outer circle are forced to ask the Israelites (who are closer to the centre) what G'd has been doing. This teaches that when the Bible speaks of "His holy ones" in a context of angels, the reference is to the Jewish people. In verse 8 the Torah specifies the means by which the Israelites are to sanctify themselves by saying: ושמרתם את חוקותי ועשיתם אותם. The word ושמרתם refers to observance of negative commandments, whereas the word ועשיתם refers to the performance of positive commandments. Between them the commandments are the means by which G'd will sanctify us. The Torah associates G'd's four lettered name י־ה־ו־ה with the performance of the commandments. The <i>Tikkuney Ha-Zohar</i> chapter 70 explain how by the performance of each commandment the respective organ with which that commandment is performed merits that G'd's name comes to rest on it, a concept alluded to in the letters of the word מצוה.
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
   כי איש איש אשר יקלל, "for any man whatsoever who curses, etc." Why did the Torah commence this verse with the word כי, a word which indicates that the reason for something is to be found in what had been discussed previously? How is the fact that someone might curse his father or his mother related to what the Torah described in the previous verses? Moreover, why did the Torah have to repeat the word איש? <i>Torat Kohanim</i> claims that if the Torah had written the word איש only once I would have assumed that the prohibition applies only to males and not to females. As a result the Torah was forced to repeat the word איש איש to include everybody in this prohibition. This is most perplexing. Why would anyone have doubted that this commandment applies also to females? We have learned repeatedly that negative commandments apply equally to males and females and that the penalties are the same for both males and females (compare <i>Baba Kama</i> 15). If the Torah did not feel comfortable with the choice of the word איש, it could simply have written the word אדם and I would have known that both males and females were being addressed. Furthermore, why did the Torah repeat the words: "for he has cursed his father or his mother?"
  I believe that the key to all this is in the previous commandment concerning someone who subjected a son or daughter to the cult of the fire-god Molech. In that instance the Torah was careful to make the culprit culpable only if he sacrificed "some of his own seed." Nothing was said about someone inducting someone else's offspring to the cult of that fire-god. According to that verse if someone sacrificed his brother, sister, or other relative to the fire-god he would not be punishable. In fact we have the following <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 64 which states: "he is not guilty (of punishment) unless he committed this abomination with a direct descendant of his." Thus far the <i>Baraitha.</i> We have to explain why there should be a penalty for inducting one's offspring whereas doing the same thing with one's other relatives is not punishable. The reason may be that one's children are considered as if they were part of a person's assets. This is why there is a direct relationship between someone who sacrifices his possessions to an idol such as passing his child through the fires of the Molech cult. When one does a similar thing with people who are not considered as his possessions the idol to whom one presents such a sacrifice remains unimpressed When the idol remains unimpressed so does G'd; seeing one did not"sacrifice" his dearly beloved possessions to an alien deity. We know from <i>Baba Metzia</i> 7 that even when one sanctifies one's property for G'd one cannot do so unless one owns what one has sanctified. In view of all this a person may say that a father does not own his child outright seeing that the mother is an equal party. The Talmud in <i>Niddah</i> 31 tells us that father and mother are partners in the child they produce, the father having contributed the white (bloodcells) whereas the mother contributed the red (bloodcells). Seeing that this is so the father cannot be held totally responsible for the actions of his son because the son represents the mother's input also. After telling us of the punishment for a father who uses his son or daughter as an offering to the fire-god Molech, the Torah continues with איש איש אשר יקלל, saying מות יומת, such a son or daughter shall be executed. The Torah is careful to speak about cursing את אביו ואת אמו, i.e. either the father by himself or the mother by herself. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains that it suffices to curse either father or mother to incur the penalty prescribed. In other words, we do not apply the principle that seeing son and daughter are both composites of the input of both father and mother, that the mother's part (of the sinner) cannot be executed on account of a sin committed by the father's part of the sinner. The reason the son has to die is because he insulted either the father's or the mother's honour.
  The Torah repeats אביו ואמו קלל, "he cursed his father or his mother," to tell us that anyone cursing father or mother automatically also cursed his other parent. This is so because each individual contains elements of both his father and his mother. This is a practical consequence of the statement of our sages in <i>Berachot</i> 24 אשתו כגופו, that one's wife is considered part of one's body.
  Accordingly, it does not matter whether the sin is committed by either son or daughter or is committed against either one's son or one's daughter, the act is totally culpable, i.e. it is considered as if it had been committed by both the female and the male part of the human being who executed it. The words איש איש remind us of the fact that every individual is a composite of male and female input but that the Torah does not separate between them once they are part of one body. We are taught in <i>Niddah</i> 31 "when a woman experiences orgasm first she will give birth to a male child." This means that the female input determines the sex of the male child and that the male input determines the sex of the female child. As a result of this statement the Torah differentiates in the ritual impurity legislation applying to the mother depending on whether she gave birth to a male child or to a female child. This also demonstrates that the two partners who respectively beget or give birth to the child are not equal in all respects. This fact gave rise to the thought that fathers should not be executed when they use a son for the Molech cult, nor mothers when they use a daughter for that cult seeing a person is considered the product of his father or mother respectively rather than an independent entity. The Torah therefore had to repeat איש איש to ensure that we appreciate that the individual committing the sin is evaluated as an entity by itself, is not part of either mother or father when it comes to his culpability. Either a father or a mother using either son or daughter for the abomination described in our paragraph is fully liable for his or her respective sin.
  <i>Yalkut Shimoni</i> item 619 on our verse interprets the word אביו, "his father," as excluding the grandfather from the death penalty if he uses his grandson as an offering for the Molech cult, and the word אמו as excluding the grandmother from that penalty if she does likewise. The Torah was very conscious that careless wording would lead to faulty conclusions on the part of the sages. Therefore the Torah wrote איש איש in the legislation about cursing father or mother so no one should interpret that the culpability extends only to אביו, "his father," and not to אביה, "her father," i.e. that if a daughter cursed her father she would not be culpable for her deed.
  
  Verse 10
  
  
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
  
  
  Verse 14
  
  
  
  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
  
  
  Verse 18
  
  
  
  Verse 19
  
  
  
  Verse 20
  
  
  
  Verse 21
  
  
  
  Verse 22
  
   ושמרתם את כל חקותי, "And you shall observe all My statutes, etc. The reason the Torah had to repeat this verse although we have read it already in 18,26 is to urge us to ensure that the statutes do not become abolished in practice through failure of either oneself or others to observe them. Observance of the statutes insures that the land will not spew you out. If the community one lives in fails to protest non-observance of these חוקים by others one will still be subject to the land spewing out its inhabitants even if personally one had been meticulous in one's observance of Torah law.
  
  Verse 23
  
  
  
  Verse 24
  
   ואני אתננה לכם..ארץ זבת חלב ודבש, "And I give to you… a land flowing with milk and honey." After G'd had already said: "in order for you to inherit it," why does the Torah have to add the words: "and I will give it to you?" Besides, why does the Torah link the excellence of the land to our inheriting it? The answer may be that not only does G'd give us the land as an inheritance, but He gives us an addditonal gift namely the excellence of this land. The Torah also hints that the excellence of the land is linked to our inhabiting it as an inheritance. Should the Temple and Jewish independence be destroyed, the excellence of the land would disappear because it no longer serves as our inheritance. Unfortunately we have had to learn the truth of this due to our sins.
  
  Verse 25
  
  
  
  Verse 26
  
   והייתם לי קדושים, "And you shall be holy unto Me, etc." The reason the Torah adds the word לי in this verse may best be understood in connection with the comment of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on this verse that one should never say: "I cannot eat pig's meat," but one should say: "I would love to eat pig's meat but alas, G'd has forbidden it to me." Similarly in our verse G'd does not want us to be holy because we detest the various phenomena in this world G'd has prohibited to us, but He wants us to be holy because He has commanded us to be so, i.e. לי. This is also the reason this verse appears next to the commandment to separate between the ritually pure and the ritually impure mammals and fowl (verse 25).
  The Torah added: כי קדוש אני, "for I am holy," to tell us the reason we must keep our distance from the impure creatures. G'd continues to explain this concept of separation. He has separated us from the Gentiles; it is no more than fitting then that we separate ourselves from the impure species. We have reason to bless the Lord for having set us apart from both human and animal impurity.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   ויאמר ה׳ אל משה, אמור וגו׳ G'd said to Moses: "say! etc." Why does this paragraph begin with the word אמור instead of the word דבר which is the customary introduction when G'd announces legislation? Furthermore, why did the Torah mention the "adjective," i.e. the priests before mentioning the noun that the "adjective" belongs to, i.e. the "sons of Aaron?" The correct description should have been בני אהרון הכהנים! Our sages both in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> and elsewhere have offered a number of explanations why the Torah chose this order. Perhaps the <i>Tanchuma</i> is worth quoting. "G'd said to Moses: 'it is not fitting that someone who goes in and out of My Tabernacle should be exposed to looking at dead bodies all the time, etc.'" Thus far Tanchuma. The address with the word אמור implies a compliment, an advantage; the words אל הכהנים is intended to justify the compliment, i.e. because the priests go in and out in the Tabernacle, i.e. in G'd's Presence where they perform service for the King of Kings. What does this compliment or advantage consist of? The priests are not to defile themselves through contact with the dead, as mentioned in <i>Tanchuma.</i> Seeing the כהנים are privileged to enter the Tabernacle and to be in G'd's presence most of the time, their present superior status is mentioned first before the Torah tells us how they came to be priests, i.e. through being descendants of Aaron. If the Torah had used the customary phraseology this point would not have come across.
  ואמרת אלהם לנפש לא יטמא בעמיו, "and say to them not to defile himself for the dead amongst his people." Why is the word ואמרת i.e. אמור ואמרת repeated? Our sages in <i>Yevamot</i> 114 as well as in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> offer a variety of commentaries on this. I believe that there is room for still other approaches not yet explored by our classical commentaries. We may do well to refer to what Maimonides wrote in chapter 3 of his treatise on the rules to be observed by mourners. This is what he wrote: "If someone deliberately defiles a priest and the priest co-operates of his own free will, the priest is subject to the corporal punishment of 39 lashes, whereas the person who initiated the defilement is guilty of transgressing the injunction not to place an obstacle in the path of a blind man (Leviticus 19,14). Neither <i>Radbaz</i> nor <i>Maharik</i> comment on this. The problem is whence does Maimonides get the ruling that the priest is liable to 39 lashes? <i>Lechem Mishneh</i> comments as follows: "Maimonides wrote in his treatise on <i>kilayim</i> that if someone dresses a fellow Jew in garments containing a mixture of wool and linen such a person is guilty of 39 lashes provided the person wearing this mixture is unaware of committing a sin." <i>Kesseph Mishneh</i> (Rabbi Joseph Karo) queries this ruling mentioning that the <i>Rosh</i> asked this question of the <i>Rashba</i> without receiving an answer. Perhaps Maimonides' source was <i>Nazir</i> 44 according to which the person who defiles a Nazir is not treated in the same way as the Nazir who became defiled as a result of that person's doing. This is based on Numbers 6,9: וטמא ראש נזרו which means that under normal circumstances the same guilt applies to the person causing the sin as to the one committing it. This is why Maimonides writes in chapter 5,20 of his treatise about the laws of the Nazirite that in this case if the <i>Nazir</i> himself was unaware of committing a sin neither he nor the person defiling him deliberately is subject to מלקות, corporal punishment. Maimonides quotes the verse in Numbers 6,9 as the basis for his ruling. He understands that verse to mean that culpability does not occur until the Nazirite himself defiles his head. This ruling appears incomprehensible. 1) Why should the Nazirite legislation not serve as a בנין אב, as a model for many other similar situations where two parties are involved in committing a sin, the first one being guilty of לפני עור לא תתן מכשול? Furthermore, the situation involving the Nazirite required a special verse to exclude culpability because I could have learned a קל וחומר from the situation in which he shaved his hair and is guilty. Seeing that defiling himself is a more serious sin than shaving off his hair, the Torah had to write a verse to tell us that even defiling himself does not carry the penalty of מלקות. If this is so, it follows that had it not been for this קל וחומר, I would not have needed to write a single verse to exclude the Nazirite's not being guilty of מלקות if someone had deliberately defiled him. In fact the query against Maimonides's ruling in chapter 3 of his treatise on the laws for mourners would have been still stronger!
  I believe the true reason why Maimonides ruled as he did is based on the Talmud in <i>Nazir</i> 44. This is what the Talmud writes there: "if in the case of someone defiling the Nazirite we do not treat the person causing the impurity as equally guilty as the person who has become defiled (although as a result of this action the preceding days of the Nazirite's abstention are completely invalidated), then in the parallel case of someone shaving off the Nazirite's hair I most certainly would not treat such a person as guilty of corporal punishment (seeing the result of his action did not cause the Nazirite to lose more than a maximum of thirty days of the preceding days during which he had not shaved)! The Torah therefore had to write the word תער לא יעביר על ראשו that the Nazirite must not allow someone else to shave him, to insure that I do not learn such a קל וחומר. According to the Talmud we equate the spelling לא יעביר with the spelling לא יעבור, i.e. that he himself must not apply the razor to his own hair or to someone else's hair. Rashi corrects this wording by saying "someone else must not apply a razor to the hair of the Nazirite." We now need to examine why the Talmud assumes that the word לא יעביר (which is spelled defective) refers to someone other than the Nazirite himself applying the razor to his hair. If the Talmud applied the principle of using our tradition as the basis for the spelling, the word יעבר should have been spelled יעביר with the letter י to indicate the fact that it is meant transitively, i.e. לשון הפעיל. Even if we were to argue that the absence of the letter י is not crucial to the meaning, at least the word לו is missing without which I would not know that the meaning of יעבר without the letter י is transitive and that the Nazirite must not shave others!
  I believe that the Talmud concentrated on the fact that the Torah used the expression תער לא יעבר על ראשו, "a razor must not pass over his head," instead of the simple לא יגלח את ראשו, "he must not shave his head," or at least לא יעביר על ראשו with the letter י to indicate the transitive meaning of the expression. If the Torah had used the simple expression we would have known that the prohibition applied to the person who was commanded not to shave rather than to the action of the razor. The word יעביר would refer to the <i>Nazir</i> himself who is mentioned adjacently in that verse. The Torah would then have attributed the prohibition to the person committing it and not to the action of the razor. This would not be the impression if we accept the wording תער לא יעבור על ראשו, "a razor must not be applied to his head;" this wording suggests that the principal concern of the Torah is the fact that the hair of the Nazirite is shaved, regardless by whom. This is what the Talmud had in mind with the words: קרי ביה לא יעבור הוא ולא יעביר לו אחר, "read as if it said: 'neither he himself nor someone else must apply the razor to his head.'" Clearly the word is meant to prohibit shaving the Nazirite either by himself or someone else. The words קרי ביה in the Talmud are not really accurate but they describe a concept rather than a grammatical comment.
  We can now extrapolate to the laws of כלאים in 19,19 where the Torah wrote: ובגד כלאים שעטנז לא יעלה עליך, "a garment made of a mixture of linen and wool shall not cover you" (יעלה עליך) instead of writing לא תעלה עליך. The word תעלה is transitive and applies to the person putting such a garment on the wearer. The word יעלה is intransitive and applies to the garment rather than to the person putting it on. The Torah's wording makes it plain that it is immaterial who puts the garment on the wearer. If he wears it knowingly he is guilty of violating the prohibition of כלאים. This is why Maimonides rules in chapter 10 subsection 1 of his treatise <i>Hilchot Kilayim</i> that "if someone deliberately places a garment containing a mixture of linen and wool on a fellow Jew he is subject to 39 lashes." Similarly, any ruling in our situation dealing with the defilement of the priest is based on the wording לא יטמא, "he (the priest) must not become defiled." The fact that the Torah does not add a pronoun indicating that it is only the priest himself who must not defile himself makes the verse a warning to anyone else not to contribute to the defilement of the priest. It follows that anyone who defiles a priest, be it the priest himself or someone else, is subject to the penalty of 39 lashes. Maimonides is consistent in all his rulings then.
  This brings us to the reason why the Torah saw fit to repeat the word אמר, by writing אמר ואמרת. It is simply that the Torah commands both the priest himself and anyone else not to defile him. The word אמר tells the priest not to defile himself, whereas the word ואמרת tells others not to defile the priest. Perhaps the word אלהם, "to them," refers back to the Israelites (not the priests) who are commanded to observe all the commandments. You will note that at the very end of this chapter (verse 24) the Torah writes: "Moses spoke to Aaron, to his sons and to all the children of Israel." This indicates that the legislation in this chapter is addressed to all of the Israelites. This justifies our explanation that also at the beginning of the chapter the Torah extends a warning to the whole people, not just to the priests, that they must not cause the priests to become ritually defiled. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on 21,24 writes as follows: "The words וידבר משה are a warning to Aaron through his children whereas the words אל כל בני ישראל are a warning to the sons by the Israelites. They are each warned to ensure that the others do not become guilty of the sin of ritual impurity." Both what we read in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> and what we have written ourselves are דברי אלוקים חיים, legitimate exegesis of the text of the Torah.
  לנפש לא יטמא, "he must not become defiled through a dead body." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> derives from this word נפש that contact with an amount of blood equivalent to 86 grams (רביעית) is sufficient to confer ritual impurity on the priest. I have seen that Maimonides writes as follows in chapter 3 subsection 1 of his <i>Hilchot Avel:</i> "There is no halachic difference between impurities of the body of the dead and impurities which emanated in the body of the dead (such as blood which oozed out) seeing the Torah used the expression נפש when prohibiting ritual defilement through the dead." Commentators attack Maimonides for this statement basing themselves on a <i>Baraitha</i> in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> which writes as follows: "From our verse (21,1) I only learn that one defiles oneself through contact with the dead body itself. Whence do we know that one also becomes defiled through contact with the blood (of the dead person?)" Answer: This is why the Torah wrote the otherwise extraneous word לנפש. How do I know that all other excretions from the dead body also confer ritual impurity on contact? This is why the Torah added the word אלהם." Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim. Kesseph Mishneh</i> defends Maimonides by pointing out that he must have thought that the word לנפש is sufficient to teach us that everything which originates in the dead body confers the same degree of ritual impurity on all those who come in contact with it; there is no need for further scriptural proof; any additional word in the Torah is only in the nature of an אסמכתא, something to jog our memory. Thus far <i>Kesseph Mishneh.</i> I do not accept the comment by the author of <i>Kesseph Mishneh.</i> What gave Maimonides the right to come up with a new approach other than the one of the <i>Baraitha?</i>
  The fact of the matter is that Maimonides bases himself on another <i>Baraitha</i> which he found in <i>Pessikta.</i> This is what is written there: "The words אמר ואמרת are meant to tell us that the adults are warned to see to it that the minors do not become ritually impure; the words לנפש לא יטמא are intended to tell us that even a רביעית דם, a small amount of 86 grams of blood is enough to confer ritual impurity on contact if it has escaped from the dead body." Thus far the <i>Pessikta.</i> The <i>Baraitha</i> we just quoted is mentioned in <i>Yevamot</i> 114. We are entitled to understand that <i>Baraitha</i> as including all other excretions from the dead body as being included in this legislation based on the word לנפש, seeing the author used the repetition of the words אמר ואמרת as commanding the adults to warn the minors concerning this legislation. I am quite certain that the author of the <i>Kesseph Mishneh</i> had not seen or remembered this latter <i>Baraitha.</i> Proof of this is to be found in something the same author wrote in the same chapter we have quoted earlier in subsection 12. "Adult priests are responsible to see that they do not cause a priest who is a minor to become ritually impure. If, however, the priest who is a minor causes himself to become ritually impure it is not the task of the Jewish court to prevent this." So far Maimonides on the subject. According to <i>Kesseph Mishneh</i> this is in accordance with Rashi's interpretation of the meaning אמר ואמרת. Clearly, if the author of <i>Kesseph Mishneh</i> had known about this <i>Baraitha</i> he would not have written that Maimonides based his ruling on Rashi's exegesis which is of much more recent origin.
  There remains the question of how anyone derived from the word לנפש that a רביעית of blood confers ritual impurity on contact? Perhaps we must understand that the meaning of the word לנפש is confined to the ability of blood to confer ritual impurity to the category of impurity called טומאת מת, as distinct from other categories of ritual impurities. It would have sufficed for the Torah to write למת לא יטמא that the priest must not become ritually impure through a dead body. The fact that the Torah added the word לנפש led our sages to conclude that an amount of blood which is sufficient to keep an organism alive is the amount which is capable of conferring the ritual impurity associated with dead bodies. People who are themselves ritually impure only through indirect contact with the dead are not included in that definition of לנפש.
  לא יטמא. "He must not become defiled." The Torah switched to the use of the singular although the verse had commenced with G'd addressing the Israelites in the plural, i.e. אלהם. According to the reasoning of the scholar who explained the repetition of the words אמר ואמרת as a warning that a person other than the priest himself should also not cause the priest to become defiled, the switch from plural to singular is easy to understand, i.e. the people (pl.) are commanded not to defile the priest (sing.).
  In addition, the Torah may have been afraid to write לא יטמאו, "they shall not become defiled" as the impression would have been that the Torah only minded if the priests as a group became defiled, not if an individual priest became defiled. The Torah therefore worded the commandment in the singular i.e. יטמא to show the Torah shows its concern for the defilement of each individual priest.
  Furthermore, the Torah had to avoid the comparison of this legislation with Leviticus 10,9 where the Torah commanded that the priests were not to enter the Tabernacle while intoxicated. In that instance the legislation was phrased as applicable only in connection with the priests entering the precincts of the Tabernacle drunk when they were about to perform the sacrificial service. The impression left was that at times when the priests were not engaged in service they were free to indulge in wine and alcohol. It would have been easy to deduce from there that when the priests were not about to engage in sacrificial service they are at liberty to defile themselves. The Torah used the singular when legislating this commandment to make it clear that the priests are not to defile themselves at any time, except for the occasions listed in subsequent verses. This teaches that the prohibition for a priest to defile himself is totally unconnected to the Temple-service and its requirements. The Temple-service, after all, is not in danger of becoming defunct due to the temporary impurity of a single priest. The duty of the priest to remain in a state of ritual purity is one that devolves upon him independent of any consideration for the function he can perform only while in such a state.
  
  Verse 2
  
   כי אם לשארו, except to his wife, etc. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains that the meaning of the word שארו is "his wife." The words הקרוב, "who is close," a word which is not really necessary, refers to the exclusion of ארוסה, a woman betrothed to a priest who does not yet live in his home, the final marriage vows not having been completed as yet. She is excluded from relatives for the sake of whose burial a priest must defile himself as a mourner. The word אליו "to him," another extraneous word, teaches that the death of a divorced wife of a priest also does not qualify as an excuse for her erstwhile husband to defile himself ritually. The reason is that such a woman is no longer קרוב, close to her former husband the priest. Why does the Torah add the words לאמו ולאביו? Seeing the mother is not of the same tribe as the son (or is subject to being demoted in status if she survives her husband the priest), I might have thought that the son may not defile himself at her death. The Torah therefore had to tell us that the son is to defile himself at his mother's death. Once we have established this, why would I have thought that the son must not defile himself over the death of his father unless the Torah spelled this out for us? Would I not have reasoned that inasmuch as the son must defile himself at his mother's death even though the mother was most likely not the daughter of a priest, the son most certainly has to defile himself at his father's death seeing the father was a priest also (and is not subject to lose his status through the death of his spouse)? The Torah had to write that the son who is a priest must defile himself due to the death of his father although we do not know for a fact that the man who described himself as his father really was his father. Paternity is established only by reason of חזקה not by reason of definitive knowledge such as maternity. The scholars of Luneil raised an objection to this <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> They felt there was no need for the Torah to mention that the son must defile himself at the death of his father as I could have arrived at this legislation by learning a קל וחומר from his mother. They reasoned that the son has to defile himself precisely because either the father is a priest who does not cause himself to be demoted and as such qualifies as a close relative even more than the mother who is subject to demotion in status; or there is no certainty that his father is his real father in which case the son is not a priest and there is no reason he cannot defile himself at the death of this man. [the scholars of Luneil described the son as a bastard, something I have not been able to understand. Why could the father not simply have been a non-priest claiming to be a priest? Ed.] 
  Our author does not consider the objection of the scholars of Luneil as serious seeing our verse is concerned with permitting something which had so far been forbidden to the parties concerned. We cannot permit something which was forbidden by using the קל וחומר (according to the principle דיו לבוא מן הדין כנדון) as our exegetical instrument. All a קל וחומר can accomplish is to teach that a situation is similar to the one which forms the basis of the קל וחומר; It cannot teach additional <i>halachot</i> of a more stringent nature. The Torah permits the son to defile himself for the sake of near relatives whereas the prohibition to defile himself at the death of more distant relatives remains in force. Furthermore, in the event that the son does not want to defile himself, he is forced to do so as part of honouring his father who has died. This is the meaning of the words לה יטמא, "he must defile himself for her sake." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explain these words by saying: "it is a positive commandment for every priest to defile himself at the death of any of the seven relatives mentioned in our verse." While it is true that the Torah wrote this expression only next to the sister of the priest, <i>Torat Kohanim</i> already explained this in connection with a true story involving a priest called Joseph whose wife died on Passover eve and the priest did not want to defile himself so as not to forego the commandment to offer the Passover sacrifice, etc. The local rabbinic authorities forced that husband to defile himself and take part in the burial of his wife. Thus far the story related in <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> The story proves that the authorities did not restrict the meaning of the words לה יטמא as applicable only in the event a priest loses a sister. What all this proves is that one must defile oneself for the sake of any of the relatives enumerated in verses 2 and 3. It follows that if I had derived the directive to defile oneself at the death of one's father based on exegesis alone I could not have arrived at such a law as I would not have been able to be certain that the man who died was indeed the father of the son described here. I certainly would not have been entitled to refrain from offering the Passover sacrifice if such a "father" had died on the eve of Passover. Doubts concerning the application of a biblical commandment cannot be resolved through abrogation of that commandment, even temporarily. Not only would such a son not be permitted to defile himself on the father's grave based on the doubt (according to Maimonides and <i>Pri Chadash</i> who hold that doubt concerning a biblical commandment's applicability may be resolved by a lenient ruling), but even according to those who hold that we never apply a lenient ruling when the doubt concerns a biblical injunction the son could still not defile himself merely on the chance that the deceased was not his real father and as a result postpone celebrating the Passover on time. After all, no doubt exists about the need to perform the commandments connected with Passover. The Torah therefore had to write both the words לאמו ולאביו to tell us that a son who is a priest must defile himself for the purpose of bringing either his father or his mother to burial.
  Furthermore, we are dealing here with a situation where the son's status as a priest is based only on the assumption that his father who claims to be his father is also a priest, another assumption which is itself not based on definitie evidence. In view of the fact that neither son nor father can establish a definitve claim as to their paternity and priesthood respectively, I would not have allowed the son to violate his legal status and defile himself on the basis of a חזקה that the man he knew as his father was indeed his father unless the Torah had decreed this specifically
  ולבנו ולבתו ולאחיו, "and for the death of his son, his daughter or his brother." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> comment as follows on this verse: "The Torah should have been content to mention the son and the daughter; why did the Torah also have to write that the son must defile himself for the sake of burying his father and his mother? If the Torah wrote that a father must defile himself in order to bury his son or daughter whom he is not obligated to honour, is it not logical that he certainly has to defile himself for the sake of burying his father or mother whom he is obligated to honour?" If this reasoning were correct, I would have had to conclude that the words "son or daughter" were meant to apply to children who were aborted and had never drawn a breath of life. The Torah therefore had to write the words "son and daughter" to ensure that I would not apply the קל וחומר we just described. The Torah told us that only sons and daughters who had demonstrated viability qualify for their father the priest defiling himself at their burial." Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> I find this difficult to understand. If it were correct, all the Torah had to write were the words לאמו ולבנו, and I would have derived this information from these two examples. The word לאביו would have been quite unnecessary. Also, according to the argument that seeing the mother is a definite blood-relation therefore I could not have concluded that the father also qualified for the son defiling himself at his grave unless the Torah had stated so specifically, we could have extrapolated this from the words "his son or his daughter." Whose father is known with certainty? Yet the Torah spelled out that the father must defile himself at the grave of a son whose identity as his son is based on an assumption, חזקה only. We cannot even argue that the identity of the father is less certain than the identtiy of either son or daughter (as far as their respective paternity is concerned) for we find that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> used their identities as the basis for his קל וחומר to include the father in the same legislation. So we are back to the question of why the Torah had to spell out that the "son" has to defile himself at the burial of his "father?" If the only reason the Torah wrote "his father" was to teach that the commandment to defile himself applied only to children who were viable, so that the term "father" applied in the full meaning of the word, we could have derived this from the fact that the Torah wrote לאמו though this too could have been derived from קל וחומר seeing we already have the words בנו ובתו. There is no reason to say that we need both the words לאביו ולאמו together in order to exclude aborted fetuses; why would the word "father" or "mother" not be sufficient to teach us that rule? Besides, if we really needed both these words why did the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> go to the trouble to demonstrate that each word by itself was required separately? We already needed both words together to exclude the aborted infants from the regulation discussed by the Torah in our verse?
  
  However, another statement concerning the words לאמו ולאביו at the end of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> presents a problem. We read there as follows: "If the Torah had only written the word לאביו and had not also written the word לאמו I would have reasoned that if the Torah demanded that the son defile himself for the burial of his father whose identity is based merely on חזקה, an assumption, such a son most certainly would have to defile himself at the death of his mother who is his biological mother beyond any doubt! I would then have countered that the mother's status as a priest's wife is not constant since she stands to lose it on the death of her husband or through a divorce. Therefore the Torah had to write the word לאמו to also include her in the number of blood relations for whose burial the son who is a priest has to defile himself." We see that the Torah had to write the word לאמו to include a mother who had already forfeited her status as a priest's wife prior to her death! If so, what word is there left for exegetical use to exclude aborted infants from the legislation that the father who is a priest must defile himself on their account? On the other hand, if you use the word to exclude these aborted fetuses, which word is left to include that the son, the priest, must defile himself over a dead mother who had become נתחללה, lost her former status as the wife of a priest? Besides, whence do I know that the father the priest has to defile himself on account of a daughter who had lost her status as the wife of a priest? One could argue that case in either direction! One could say that seeing the son has to honour his mother regardless of her marital status, he also has to defile himself on her account when she dies; on the other hand, one could argue that the Torah had already made it plain that the fact that a woman forfeited her marital status as the wife of a priest did not affect her blood relationship to her son and therefore should have no bearing on the need of her biological son the priest to defile himself at her funeral; also that just as the son has to defile himself for his mother, so, in the event that he has a daughter he has to defile himself if she dies.
  Let us examine precisely how the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> arrived at the conclusion that the son the priest must defile himself on account of a mother who had lost her status as the wife of a priest. Was this conclusion based on the extraneous word לאמו? Perhaps the word לאמו was not at all superfluous and we needed it to prove that defilement is in order seeing the mother's status was inferior as she was subject to becoming מתחללת, losing her privileges as the wife of a priest, something that cannot happen to the father except if he does something wrong himself. Similarly, the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> had been careful to point out already at the beginning of his discourse: "What distinguishes the father? The fact that he is not subject to losing his status as a priest." This meant that this consideration established the basis for a certain asymmetry in the status of the "father the priest" and the "mother the priest's wife." The remarkable thing is that even though in effect the mother died without ever losing her status as the wife of a priest, the fact that she might have done so is considered as sufficient reason to rate her priestly status as inferior to that of her husband. Following this train of thought, we are entitled to the conclusion that if the mother had indeed already been disqualified from being the wife of a priest her son would really not be allowed to defile himself at her burial. We are therefore compelled to say that the author of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> proceeded from the premise that mention of the word לאמו means that a priest has to defile himself for his mother regardless of whether or not she has in effect been disqualified from being the wife of a priest. Now the fact remains that if the Torah had only written the word לאביו I would have been entitled to argue that the mother is inferior in status to her husband the priest even while she enjoys her status as the wife of her husband the priest because of her potential disqualification. Now that the Torah also wrote the word לאמו the Torah made clear that even if she had become disqualified her son the priest has to defile himself on her account when she dies. You can apply the same reasoning to the word ולבתו, and on account of his daughter. By the simple expedient of mentioning the daughter the Torah included a daughter who had become disqualified as a possible wife for a priest. Her father the priest must defile himself on her account in the event she dies. The only factor which governs all this legislation is the biological relationship. Seeing a mother or daughter who do not qualify as a wife for a priest have not ceased to be called mother or daughter respectively, the legislation for the son or father to defile himself is in place. This brings us back to the question why the Torah had to write the word לאמו, seeing we could have derived the law for the mother from the word בתו?
  Nonetheless, if the Torah had not written the word לאמו, I would not have concluded that the word לאביו was meant to exclude children which had been aborted before they became viable, but I would have concluded that it excluded אמו, his mother. It is far more more reasonable to exclude the mother of the priest than to search for such far-fetched exclusions as the need to defile oneself at the death of premature stillborn children. The reason I would have excluded the mother would be her status, i.e. the fact that she is constantly subject to losing her status as a priest's wife and the privileges which accrue to her thanks to that fact. We would have limited the fact that the daughter qualifies for her father defiling himself as applying to a daughter who had not actually jeopardised her status as a priest's wife, or at least as potentially a priest's wife, whereas I would have limited the exclusion of the priest's mother to a mother who had actually lost that status. A mother who had not jeopardised her status as the wife of a priest would qualify for her son the priest defiling himself at her funeral. I would have used a קל וחומר extrapolating from the word בתו to arrive at that conclusion. When discussing the status of a daughter, even one who had forfeited her status, we would have remembered that she is still called "his daughter" in the Torah regardless of whether she qualifies for marriage to a priest or not. We would then have reverted to apply that same reasoning to a daughter who had jeopardised her status by comparing her to a mother who had jeopardised her status, based on the unnecessary word לאביו. We would have reasoned that just as a mother who has jeopardised her status as the wife of a priest does not cause her son the priest to defile herself on account of her funeral, so a daughter in her condition most certainly does not confer the duty on her father the priest to defile himself on account of her death. We would have argued this in spite of the fact that the very word בתו in the Torah implies that this daughter did not jeopardise her status as a blood relative by losing her status as a woman a priest may marry. The word בתו would only commit us if I did not either have a restrictive clause or a קל וחומר to counter our reading of the text. We would therefore read the word בתו as applying only to a daughter who had not lost her status, i.e. לא נתחללה.
  What emerges from all these examinations of the deeper meaning of our text is that if the Torah had not written the word לאביו which could have misled us into thinking that it was intended to exclude the son the priest defiling himself at his mother's funeral, there would indeed have been no need to write the word לאמו. I would have derived all the הלכות I needed from the words בנו ובתו, his son or his daughter as mentioned earlier. If the Torah had not written the word לאמו from which the error concerning excluding the father whose status is based only on חזקה would have resulted, there would have been no need to write the word לאביו. If so, you would ask why does the Torah not simply write only לאביו, leaving out the word לאמו altogether? In order to forestall this question <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explained that the word was intended to exclude premature stillborn infants. Seeing that this is so there is no more room to argue that the word לאמו or לאביו should have been written by itself. The moment the Torah would write only one of these two words I would arrive at an erroneous conclusion and demolish the whole pyramid we have built thus far. The Torah was therefore very clever in writing exactly what it did. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> was conscious of this and informed us of a possible error we could make if the Torah had not written precisely the words we find in our text.
  
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  Verse 8
  
   וקדשתו, "You shall sanctify him, etc." The Torah refrains from addressing the priests in the plural, i.e. as a group as it had done up to now. <i>Yevamot</i> 88 explains that the word וקדשתו is a warning to a priest who married a divorcee, or some other category of woman forbidden to him and who refuses to divorce her. The court is to administer corporal punishment to such a priest and otherwise afflict him until he agrees to divorce such a woman. The words כי את לחם אלוקיך הוא מקריב "for he offers the bread of your G'd" mean that as long as there are many other priests who are ritually able to perform the service in the Temple there is no need to apply corporal punishment to the dissident priest who refuses to divorce a wife he married in violation of Torah law. This explains why the Torah addressed the priest in the singular in this instance.
  קדוש יהיה לך, "he shall be holy unto you." This means that in order for him to be holy he has to be a priest unto you. In other words, it is up to you to see that he conducts himself in a holy manner. The emphasis on the words "for he is holy" stems from the premise that holiness is something that is acquired through one's free-willed effort, one does not achieve it because it is forced upon one. How then can the Torah command us to "force" holiness on the priest? This is why the Torah had to repeat: "for he is holy," that the holiness of the priest is of a different nature than that of ordinary Israelites (if and when they achieve it in some measure). We do not impose holiness on the priest. We are commanded to see to it that he does not lose or abandon the holiness which is his by birth. The Torah underlines this at the end of our verse with the words: "for I the Lord sanctify you." G'd allows His Presence to rest on the whole people only through the priests. When there is no priest there is no sacrificial service; when there is no sacrificial service there is no Sanctuary. When there is no Sanctuary G'd's Presence is not at home amongst us.
  
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   דבר אל אהרון לאמר, "speak to Aaron to say: etc." The reason the Torah added the word לאמר once more, is to tell him that Aaron in his capacity as High Priest is charged with the task to see to it that no physically blemished priests perform service in the Tabernacle. He has to warn all the priests to be careful to abide by this commandment. The result of this wording is that the priests themselves are commanded to observe this directive and Aaron is commanded to see that the priests abide by this directive.
  איש מזרעך, "any man who is a descendant of yours, etc." The Torah did not adhere to the order it had displayed at the beginning of the <i>Parshah,</i> nor did it use the order it employed subsequently, i.e. "speak to Aaron and to his sons that they should abstain, etc." Neither did the Torah use the form of address used in Leviticus 10,9 where the Torah addressed both Aaron and his sons directly about not entering the holy precincts after having drunk wine or alcohol. Why these changes in syntax each time? Perhaps the fact that since neither Aaron nor his sons personally suffered from any of the deficiencies mentioned in this paragraph, G'd did not mention them directly but referred only to their future issue amongst whom there could be someone who did suffer from the blemishes listed in this chapter. Although Aaron's sons are also included in the description זרעך "your seed," the change in the Torah's syntax is intended to alert us that in this instance the sons are not included in the word זרעך. In fact, the Torah made this point even clearer by writing מזרעך, "some of your seed," instead of the usual זרעך, "your seed." This was a promise to Aaron and his sons that they themselves would not be disqualified by a physical blemish during their respective lives. (compare my commentary on 22,4, "והוא צרוע").
  
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   כל איש…מזרע אהרון, "Any man of the descendants of Aaron..who has a blemish,etc." The reason the warning has been repeated is to alert the Israelites that they must not allow a priest who suffers from such a blemish to perform sacrificial service. The Torah phrased this warning in indirect speech to make clear it was not addressed to the priest directly.
  
  
  
  
  
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  Verse 3
  
   אמר אלהם, "say to them, etc." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> write that the people addressed in this verse were the ones standing at Mount Sinai. The author tried to answer why the Torah added the apparently superfluous words אמר אלהם seeing that the verse is a continuation of chapter 21 and the opening verses of this chapter. The previous directives had been addressed to the priests, so that this chapter is merely a continuation. If, on the other hand, this chapter is addressed to the Israelites at large, these had not even been mentioned in any of the adjoining verses! It follows therefore that it was addressed to all the people who had stood at Mount Sinai, the time they had become G'd's bride, so to speak. When the Torah does not bother to mention to whom the speaker addresses Himself, we may assume that the speaker is G'd Himself and that He speaks about the whole people. It follows that the retribution threatened in this paragraph for desecrating the holy name of G'd applies to all the people who had heard the revelation at Mount Sinai. [the word אלהם is therefore equivalent to עלהם. Ed.] You may well ask that if this is so why does the Torah in all other instances mention that the Israelites are addressed by writng such formulae as דבר אל בני ישראל, or something similar instead of merely writing אמר אלהם? Our sages in <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 2,5 already answered this with a parable. A father had an only son and he always mentioned the fact that he was his son by saying to him: "eat my son, drink my son, etc. Similarly, G'd told Moses on an almost daily basis: 'Tell the Israelites, etc.' He mentions their name as a reminder of how fond He is of them." This kind of address is standard procedure in the Torah. Whenever the situation appears to allow for some additional message we endeavour to extract it from that text.
  
  Verse 4
  
   מזרע אהרון, "from the seed of Aaron, etc." Why did this prohibition have to be mentioned a second time seeing that it was included in the overall directive in verse 3 that approaching holy things or holy places is forbidden on pain of the penalty of <i>karet?</i> Actually, the purification process for a priest afflicted with צרעת or זיבה or other impurity emanating from his body is not completed until sunset in order for him to be allowed to eat קדשי קדשים, sacrificial offerings of a kind forbidden to be eaten by an ordinary Israelite. If an ordinary Israelite had contracted the same kind of impurity he would be allowed to eat from the peace-offerings (a lower form of sanctity) as soon as he had immersed himself in a ritual bath without awaiting sunset. This is stated in <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> [I have not found it. Ed.]
  והוא צרוע, "and he suffers from צרעת, the skin affliction, etc." On this word <i>Torat Kohanim</i> write. "From this wording I would only have known that the descendants of Aaron (or another High Priest) would be subject to this legislation. How do I know that the same legislation applies to the High Priest himself? Answer: This is why the Torah added the word והוא, 'and he himself.'" Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> In this instance we cannot apply what we explained on 21,7, that the words איש מזרעך imply that G'd would protect both Aaron and his sons from becoming afflicted with a מום, a physical blemish of the kind that disqualifies them from performing sacrificial service, seeing the Torah includes impurity caused by emission of semen, something which is not only natural but absolutely necessary in the fulfilment of the commandment to be fruitful and to multiply. We know for a fact that Aaron, -as opposed to Moses- did not separate from his wife and thereby avoid emission of semen. If the Torah had not added the word והוא I could have erred thinking that Aaron himself was permitted to eat sacrificial meat while in a state of such ritual impurities as are described in this verse. Once the Torah included Aaron in this prohibition his sons are automatically included in it also. As a result of these considerations, the earlier verse in which the Torah speaks about priests who suffer from a physical blemish and which did not include Aaron could have been interpreted as Aaron being exempted from this legislation in principle. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> therefore told us that the reason he is exempted is only that G'd promised that neither he nor his sons would suffer such a blemish.
  
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  Verse 12
  
   ובת כהן כי תהיה לאיש זר, "And the daughter of a priest who marries an non-priest," etc. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> uses the restrictive word היא, "she," to exclude her mother, meaning her mother (the wife of a priest) may eat תרומה even though her daughter is not allowed to do so even if the mother had meanwhile become a widow (who had not remarried). 
  I have seen an allusion of a moral-ethical nature in this paragraph which it is important for people to appreciate. Remember that <i>Sanhedrin</i> 93 taught us that the spiritual level of the Israelites is higher than that of the angels. We have also been taught in the <i>Zohar</i> second volume page 155 that G'd created four different worlds, each one higher than its counterpart. All this is derived from Isaiah 43,7 כל הנקרא בשמי ולכבודי בראתיו, יצרתיו, אף־עשיתיו. "All that is called by My name I have created, for My glory, fashioned it, and completed it." The word לכבודי refers to a higher world called עולם האצילות. The word בראתיו refers to a world known as עולם הבריאה. The word יצרתיו refers to the world known as עולם היצירה, whereas the word עשיתיו refers to our world, the world known as עולם העשיה. You must also appreciate that G'd's glory fills the entire universe including all these worlds we have described. It says in Deut. 33,27 ומתחת זרעות עולם, "and from beneath the arms of the world." G'd's "light" illuminates all four worlds. This is the mystical dimension of the tetragram, the four-lettered name of G'd י־ה־ו־ה. The letter י refers to G'd illuminating the domain called עולם האצילות, the totally spiritual, abstract world which we described. The first letter ה refers to the עולם הבריאה; the letter ו refers to the עולם היצירה, and the second letter ה refers to the עולם העשיה.
  The <i>Zohar</i> volume 1 page 80 also states that the vital parts of man are divided into four categories each of which is identified by a different name. One part is called נפש, a second part is called רוח whereas a third part is called נשמה. A fourth, and still more spiritual part, is called חיה. The part called חיה belongs to a domain called אפנים [a domain of the angels supporting G'd's throne Ed.] a celestial domain which may best be described as the "soul of the soul; Kabbalists claim that the vital part of man which is due to the light G'd employs in the עולם העשיה, our physical universe, is relatively weak and provides only the small part of the vitality needed to enable creatures to move. This is the only part of the "soul" that we are conscious of in this life. G'd arranged things in this way seeing the world we live is relatively gross, coarse. This "soul" is commonly referred to as נפש, "a physical life-force." On the other hand, the category of "vitality" which emanates from the light of G'd with which He illuminates the עולם היצירה is commonly known as רוה, spirit. It is a commensurately stronger spiritual force. The "vitality" which originates in the light with which G'd illuminates the עולם הבריה is called נשמה, in accordance with the degree of spirituality which permeates the world it originates in. Finally, the vitality originating in the עולם האצילות is best known as נשמה לנשמה, "the soul of the soul."
  The Lord G'd, Master of all the worlds, established some degree of fusion between the various spiritual domains with the physical domain in the creature called אדם, man. The phyical part of man is composed of four basic elements; G'd imposed the laws governing the various levels of spirituality in the different worlds on these elements. You must know that גשמיות, corporeality, opposes fusion with spirituality by definition, by its very nature. This opposition between these two domains is more powerful than the opposition between fire and water. This is why G'd in His wisdom created within man the lowest level of spirituality, i.e. the נפש because it represents only a minimum of spirituality and is therefore not as opposed to corporeality as would be higher forms of spirituality. G'd imbued this נפש with a minute part of the next higher form of spirit, i.e. the רוח. As a result we may view the נפש as sort of a half-way house between body and spirit. The רוח by itself would be unable to maintain an existence due to the fierce resistence by the physical elements in man. In a similar fashion we may view the רוח as a half-way house between the נפש and the נשמה, for the value relationship between the נפש and that of the נשמה which has been illuminated by an immeasurably greater light from G'd is similar to that of the body to that of the רוח. Similarly, the נשמה itself may be viewed like a half-way house between the רוח and the נשמה לנשמה. In other words the נפש is able to to stand on its own, the רוח requires two elements to support it whereas the נשמה requires three elements to support it, whereas the נשמה לנשמה requires four elements to suppport it.
  Another statement by the sages of the <i>Zohar</i> volume 2 page 94 describes the progressive strengthening of the pious by means of the לקח טוב, the good lesson, the Torah which enables man to rise to spiritually higher and higher levels. In this fashion the נפש develops into רוח, and רוח in turn develops into נשמה. Eventually, the נשמה develops into נשמה לנשמה, the "soul of souls" known in kabbalistic parlance as חיה. This is the purpose of the creation of man the most advanced terrestrial creature.
  Our sages have said further that as a direct result of man achieving the spiritual tasks set for him he in turn will make use of G'd's universe as if it belonged to him. This is the mystical dimension of Psalms 128,2: "When you enjoy the fruit of your labour you will be happy and you will be well off." David assures us that the אשר and the טוב he is speaking about will be "yours." This is also what the sages had in mind when they said that before or upon entering this world the נפש consumes what it enjoys in this world as if she were a grown up daughter [who still depends on her father without contributing to the expense of the household, Ed.], whereas when that נפש returns (after death of the body) she has qualified for the status of a married daughter.
  You also need to appreciate that whatever G'd created in this world is dependent on input of sustenance from a higher world called the עולם האצילות. This is an allusion to the light of G'd represented by the letter י in the tetragram. The מזון, sustenance, we refer to is called קדש, holy, the source of all the goodness referred to in the Psalm we quoted. This is the deeper meaning of Nechemyah 9,6 ואתה מחיה את כולם, "and You provide sustenance for them all." The degree and visibility of G'd's contribution to the maintenance of phenomena in our terrestrial world becomes more and more distant looking, much as the source of a plant which grows bigger and bigger seems further and further removed from the source it originally received its nourishment. G'd has arranged things in this manner so that every creature receives what it is entitled to in accordance with its spiritual development. It is also G'd who provides water for physical earth. This is its bounty, i.e. the vitality which corresponds to the vitality called נפש in man. This is the only way earth is able to fulfil its function of growing plants, etc. Indirectly then, earth too contributes to the development of the various levels of vitality in man, i.e. נפש, רוח, נשמה, and נשמה לנשמה. There is no creature in the universe be it the terrestrial regions or the celestial regions which does not depend on the continued input by its holy source, its sacred origin. Each creature, be it totally abstract or totally physical is provided with its respective needs by G'd Almighty.
  Another thing which you the reader must know is that some people achieve the highest of the levels of spirituality we have described, i.e. they possess the נשמה לנשמה, whereas others achieve only lower levels respectively. However, if someone has not progressed beyond the level of possessing the נפש which is common to all creatures at birth even his good deeds count for nothing. His deeds do not possess the spiritual power to raise them towards the celestial regions. Our deeds in this terrestrial world impact on higher celestial regions only by means of the רוח, the first higher level of spirituality. The נפש itself is elevated to the level of רוח by means of man's (intentional) good deeds. When man achieves that level, the good deeds he performed previously become "his own," so that he is called in our literature בעל מעשים טובים, "the owner of good deeds." This is the mystical dimension of Proverbs 23,2: אם בעל נפש אתה, "if you have become the <i>owner</i> of the נפש. Ownership of your נפש is the result of having laboured to acquire it. The concept is that the רוח becomes the "owner" of the נפש as a result of fatigue caused by performance of good deeds by the body whom it inhabits. Both the נפש and the רוח ascend together and imbibe from the same holy source of sustenance as equals. The same holds true for the רוח in its value relationship compared to the נשמה, and for the נשמה in its comparative value relationship with the נשמה לנשמה. Acquisiton of the requisite spiritual level by a person may be due to one of two reasons. 1) The spiritual power bestowed by the father at the time of conception of the fetus; I have explained this in greater detail in Genesis 49,3 on the words ראובן בכרי, "Reuben is my firstborn." 2) It may be achieved by the independent effort of the person involved especially if assisted by Torah study. In connection with Leviticus 22,27: שור או כשב או עז כי יולד, "when an ox, a sheep, or a goat is born, etc.." The <i>Zohar</i> volume 3 page 91 describes that a human being through the help of Torah study is capable by his own efforts to achieve the highest spiritual plateau even though at birth he was spiritually under-endowed to the worst possible degree. The key to his success is how much he is prepared to tire himself in the process of Torah study. You should realise that in addition to the positive achievements of a spiritual nature we have described, the residue of Adam's sin which inhabits every human being to a greater or lesser degree affects different categories of people differently according to the level of spirituality they have attained. The reason for this is simply that the impact of that residue on the force called נפש is not to be compared with the impact of that same residue of spiritual pollution on such forces as רוח, נשמה, or נשמה לנשמה respectively.
  We know from Ezekiel 18,4 that הנפש החוטאת היא תמות, "that the נפש which sins will die, i.e. that the defect or blemish on the נפש is powerful enough to cause the sinner's destruction, his physical death. If the person who is on the spiritual level of רוח displays such symptoms as צרעת, etc., this is already considered a sign of a very grave defect although it does not result in physical death. Kohelet 17,7 describes this as a situation והרוח תשוב אל האלוקים אשר נתנה, "the spirit ought to return to G'd who has provided it." However, our sages in <i>Shabbat</i> 152 explain that statement as a commandment to man that when the time comes for him to die he is to return the spirit G'd has provided in its original unstained condition, without the spots signifying that the person suffered a צרעת, skin-eczema, i.e. has been guilty of misdemeanours. If man has not managed to get rid of these blemishes (through repentance, etc.) it will prevent his רוח from returning to its celestial origin and his spirit will instead be consigned to the domain of the סטרא אחרא, a spiritually negative domain. Although the immediate impact of a defect in a person of the נשמה spiritual level is "only" the fact that G'd will withdraw the level of Divine light that such a person was bathed in, this very absence is equivalent to a major disgrace for such a person. The impact of any misdemeanour is in direct ratio to the esteem that such a person was held in by G'd before he became guilty of that misdemeanour. The result of a misdemeanour committed by someone who had attained the level of spirituality we defined as נשמה לנשמה, is not the withdrawal of G'd's light but the withdrawal of the automatic protection which G'd grants such people against becoming guilty of trespasses against the laws of the Torah. This is discussed in <i>Tikkuney Ha-Zohar</i> chapter 70 in connection with the verse in Proverbs 12,21 לא יאנה לצדיק כל און, "no harm will befall the righteous." The author of תקוני הזהר understands that the kind of person described by Solomon in that verse is the one who has attained the level of נשמה לנשמה. When such a person will find himself on the threshold of committimg a second sin, the holy soul which so far protected him against actually committing such a sin is withdrawn from him so that he remains unprotected in the presence of his temptation. His situation is comparable to a person who had once enjoyed the privilege of playing host to the King in his home but who had been foolish enough to expel his illustrious guest.
  After G'd has informed us about all these aspects of the various parts of the soul, etc., the Torah commenced (verse 10) with the words וכל זר לא יאכל קדש, "that any non-priest must not eat something holy," it is clear that the Torah speaks of different categories of "holy things," i.e. of 1) sacrificial meat, and 2) of things the holiness of which is hidden, i.e. the bounty from G'd who provides spiritual food for the בני אלוקים, the people who have acquired a degree of sanctity.
  The words תושב כהן ושכיר allude to the phenomenon of נפש and רוח respectively. The רוח is described as תושב כהן, a permanent resident within a priest, who is by definition the home of the נשמה called כהן, a superior level of spirituality. The word שכיר describes the force we know as נפש, seeing it is this force which carries out all the activities man performs. The Torah tells us that these two aspects of man are not entitled to consume the kind of spiritual food the Torah here calls קדש, seeing that this food is of a very superior level of holiness. It is worthwhile to read what Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai wrote in the <i>Zohar</i> volume 2 page 121 about the difference between the word <i>kodesh and kadosh.</i>
  The Torah continues וכהן כי יקנה נפש קנין כספו, "when a priest buys a soul, an acquisition by his money, etc." Here the Torah describes the superior נשמה העליונה by the term כהן. The Torah describes this נשמה as if it were masculine by speaking of the נשמה i.e. as כספו something masculine. The Torah's message is that once a person has achieved this level of spirituality it deserves to be described in masculine terms. [Normally, the Torah would have spoken of the purchase being made by the aspect of a person called נפש, and the Torah would have had to write ונפש כי תקנה instead of כי יקנה. Ed.] The words כי יקנה נפש mean that the means by which this כהן has attained the spiritual level of נשמה is that his deeds were superior enough for him to "acquire" his נפש and to elevate it to the level of his נשמה so that such a person may now be called בעל נפש, as we mentioned in connection with Proverbs 23,2.
  הוא יאכל בו, "he may eat of it;" having attained this level of sanctity enables also the normally spiritually lowly נפש to partake of that "holy" nourishment which was out of bounds to it prior to its spiritual ascent.
  ויליד ביתו, "and those born in his house." This is a reference to the souls which had descended into a nether domain after Adam's sin, and which are gradually being rescued from that spiritually negative environment through the good deeds of the righteous. The good deeds are like a magnet which attracts the sparks of goodness which existed in isolated form in different parts of the universe. They are here described as "children of the נשמה," the Torah telling us that even they will experience such a spiritual ascent. 
  The Torah continues (verse 12) ובת כהן. Here the Torah refers to the נשמה which has become defective and defiled through the deeds it performed so that it has forfeited the right to enjoy G'd's spiritual nourishment, the one described by the Torah previously as <i>kodesh.</i> When the Torah writes כי תהיה לאיש זר, "who will be married to a stranger," the reference is to the fact that she (the soul) has betrothed herself to the forces of Satan (the stranger). והיא בתרומת הקדשים לא תאכל, "and she must not eat portions set aside from holy things." The Torah makes a point of singling out בתרומת to tell us that even things of which only 2% are sanctified must not be eaten by someone whose soul has been demoted due to a misdemeanour; such a backsliding person must certainly not eat from the קדש itself. The emphasis, i.e. repetition of the word והיא is intended to separate this law from what follows in the next verse seeing the next verse starts with the conjunctive letter ו at the beginning of the word ובת. The denial of this kind of food to such a person who had achieved the level of נשמה is a true affliction for his life-force and that soul will feel painfully demoted as a result of forfeiting the divine light which had illuminated its life previously.
  
  Verse 13
  
   ובת כהן כי תהיה אלמנה, "And if a priest's daughter will become widowed, etc." In this verse the Torah speaks of the person who had achieved the most spiritually advanced level that of being נשמה לנשמה. We have explained that as a result of such an ascent this kind of person is separated from sin almost absolutely, his whole lifestyle being one of avoiding even the proximity of sin. The Torah hints at this by describing such a בת כהן as "married," i.e. closely attached to her holy roots. This is the kind of soul of which Solomon had spoken in Proverbs 12,21 when he described it as not becoming the victim of any mishap, i.e. sin. When such an elevated soul somehow commits a sin, the result is that it will lose its status of being "married" to her holy roots and will become "widowed or divorced," as the case may be, in either case forfeiting the source of its sustenance, the most holy domain, the עולם האצילות. The example גרושה refers to the nature of its misdemeanour having been more serious than the one in which it is described as אלמנה, widowed. When the Torah adds וזרע אין לה, that she (the soul of souls) did not have any seed, this is a simile for such a soul (person) not having performed the kind of good deeds in this world that are known as פרות, "fruit." Nonetheless, the punishment is "only" that "she will return to her father's house," to eat of the food dished out at the table of her father such as she did before her soul had begun to ascend to spiritual heights. The fact that she has to eat once more the kind of food she used to eat when she had been only on the level of נפש or רוח, is a very painful experience for such a soul. It is equivalent to a person who had sinned and who had never ascended beyond the נפש level of existence, having to die as a punishment for his sin. If the person who had attained the spiritual level of being a נשמה לנשמה had also performed the kind of good deeds on earth known as פרות, its punishment for having committed a trespass would be "only" that she is considered as eating at her own table.
  וכל זר לא יאכל קדש, "any non-priest must not eat sacred things." Here the Torah provides a rationale why G'd does not display His mercy to such a soul, permitting her to eat sacred things if not as a matter of right then at least as a matter of G'd's grace. When a soul which had once ascended to lofty spiritual heights had allowed herself to backslide and make common cause with spiritually negative forces known as זר, as alien, she can no longer qualify for partaking from קדש, "G'd's table," as it were.
  
  Verse 14
  
   ונתן לכהן את הקדש, "and he shall give to the priest the holy thing." Our sages in the sixth chapter of <i>Terumot</i> are divided about the meaning of this verse. Rabbi Eliezer holds that what is meant is anything which can potentially become holy, sacred may be used as compensation for the תרומה which a person had consumed inadvertently. Rabbi Akiva holds that only the same category of food which the person consumed inadvertently may be used as compensation for the תרומה which someone who was not entitled to ate inadvertently. Thus far the <i>Mishnah.</i> Perhaps Rabbi Akiva meant that by means of making this restitution the Torah considers it as if the guilty person had actually restored the holy things he had consumed and had recreated a situation similar to that which existed before he inadvertently ate the holy things.
  
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  Verse 16
  
   והשיאו אותם עון אשמה, "and so cause them to bear the sin which brings guilt, etc." The meaning of the verse is that if the guilty person did not make restitution of both the value of the amount of holy things consumed plus the 20%, the parameter of the sin will grow wider so that it will be classified as if it had been committed intentionally (i.e. עון). The justification for this is that when one fails to correct a sin inadvertently committed although one has been given an opportunity to correct it, the original sin becomes so much more serious. The word והשיאו is equivalent to ינשאו "they will have to bear them;" הם i.e. the combined sins. The Torah adds: באכלם את קדשיהם, the sin will now be considered not merely failure to pay the penalty but it will be considered as if they had eaten their holy things on purpose. Compare my comments on the last verse.
  
  
  
  
  
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   מועדי ה׳ אשר תקראו אותם, "appointed seasons (festivals) of G'd which you shall proclaim, etc." G'd decreed that these festivals will come into force as a result of the court declaring them to be in force (<i>Torat Kohanim</i>). We need to understand why the Torah repeated the words אלה הם מועדי, "these are My festivals." We must also try and understand how the Sabbath (verse 3) fits into this chapter seeing it is most certainly not subject to the manipulations of the Jewish High Court! Moreover, why did the Torah have to write the words: "these are the festivals of the Lord" a third time in verse 4?
  I believe we must understand this verse in the following manner. In the first instance G'd informed the Jewish people that in principle the exact time (though not the calendar date) of these "appointed seasons" are subject to input by the Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court. In view of this principle, the Torah feared that we might err and believe that even the Sabbath itself was subject to such input by the Sanhedrin, i.e. to postponement if it suited the court. The Torah therefore wrote: "these are My appointed seasons, you are to have work performed for six consecutive days and only the seventh day is the Sabbath on which you may not perform all manner of work." The Torah had to write once more: "these are the appointed seasons of the Lord which you are to proclaim," to inform us that we are entitled to adjust the part of the calendar dealing with those days to suit our needs. This is followed by the respective dates in the first month, the third month and the seventh month which are liable to be affected by adjustments made by the Sanhedrin.
  There may be yet another reason why the Torah repeated the formula אשר תקראו אותם, "which you are to proclaim (or may) proclaim." Maimonides writes as follows in chapter 4 of his treatise on the sanctification of the new month: "There are three considerations which justify lengthening the year by means of the insertion of an extra month. 1) Bringing it in line with the solar seasons of the year. 2) Ensuring that Passover occcurs in the spring as demanded by the Torah. 3) Enabling the period when the fruit of the trees ripen to occur in summer. Maimonides mentions some other reasons which may prompt the Sanhedrin to adjust the calendar, such as to enable travellers to make their pilgrimage to Jerusalem at a time when the roads are passable, etc., or at a time when the bridges are safe from flooding, etc. The secondary reasons are mostly connected to the fact that many Israelites lived in the diaspora. In other words, the two principal considerations for adjusting the calendar are A) climate-related reasons. B) people-related reasons. Seeing that the Torah described the Passover festival as occurring in the season of the spring, the religious authorities made the necessary adjustments to conform with this requirement. The Torah repeats the right of the Sanhedrin to proclaim when these dates should occur in order for us to know that both climate-related considerations and people-related considerations are valid reasons for the Sanhedrin to make use of its authority in this regard.
  
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   בין הערבים פסח לשם, "at dusk it is the Lord's passover." This means that the part of the passover offering which belongs to G'd, i.e. the sprinkling of the blood and the burning of the fat parts of the lamb must occur on the eve of the 14th of Nissan. However, the part of that sacrifice which is to be consumed by every Jew has to occur after nightfall in conjunction with the eating of unleavened bread and bitter herbs. Furthermore, the expression "a passover to G'd" is a reminder of the very first passover sacrifice, the one the Jews slaughtered in Egypt. That Passover was of immediate benefit to the Jewish people so that the sacrifice could hardly be called "a passover for G'd." It included elements which were never repeated. In <i>Shemot Rabbah</i> 19 we are told concerning the Passover of Moses (not he personally but the one he commanded at the time) that it contained the fragrance carrried by the winds from Paradise. Compare what I have written in my commentary on Exodus 12,43 in this connection. In addition to that, the first Passover was responsible for G'd killing the firstborn of the Egyptians. Now that the Passover was merely a commemoration of what had occurred as part of the first Passover the people offering it could truly claim that they did so for G'd i.e. that it is a "passover for G'd."
  
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   וספרתם לכם, "and you shall count for yourselves, etc." The reason the Torah adds the word "for yourselves" is that G'd commanded to count for seven weeks consecutively. We are told in the <i>Zohar</i> volume 3 page 97 that seeing the Jewish people were in a state of impurity and G'd wanted to betroth them to Himself He applied the legislation pertaining to a menstruant woman who is required to purify herself for seven days. He therefore commanded them to "purify" themselves for seven weeks by counting those days much as a menstruant counts the seven days. The count then was for the benefit of the Israelites in order that they would become G'd's "bride" as it were and would be able to step under the wedding canopy at Mount Sinai. The reason that the period of counting was seven weeks instead of seven days was the extraordinary amount of impurity the Jewish people had accumulated during their extended stay in Egypt. Another reason is that in this instance we speak about an entire people having to shed their accumulated impurities. I have explained on Exodus 19,1 that the word בצאתם was to be understood as a cause for G'd having delayed the giving of the Torah, i.e. the presence of the Israelites in Egypt for a long time necessitated the period of seven weeks during which the Jews prepared themselves for this event. The sentiment that the reason the Torah was not given immediately after the Exodus is supported by the words ממחרת השבת, that the Torah would not be given immediately after the Sabbath, i.e. Passover, but after a period described as the morrow of that day. The nature of this count is that the days have to be whole days, as opposed to parts of days. Seeing the 15th of Nissan at that time was a Sabbath and that on part of that day the Israelites were still in Egypt, the count of the seven weeks could not commence until the following day, i.e. ממחרת. While it is true that this consideration applied only to the generation of Israelites who left Egypt at that time, the Torah legislated that the same procedure be followed year after year starting with the year of the Exodus. Kabbalists understand why we have to re-enact history in this fashion. According to the plain meaning of the text the reason the Torah refers to "the day following the Sabbath" is a reminder of the fact that while in Egypt the Jews had to perform slave labour also on the Sabbath. You may do well to read what I have written on Genesis 2,2 in connection with the words ויכל אלוקים ביום השביעי.
  A moral-ethical approach to our verse may be derived if we see in the word וספרתם the root ספיר, sapphire, the material the second tablets were made of (compare <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 32,2). The souls of the Jewish people are compared to the nature of sapphires which lose their lustre when they become dirty. As a result of sins committed by their owners (bodies inhabited by these souls) something similar happens to their souls. The message of the word וספרתם is that by means of the count the Jewish people would "polish up" their souls so that they would be unblemished by the time they would experience the revelation at Mount Sinai.
  ממחרת השבת מיום הביאכם, "on the morrow of the Sabbath from the day you offer the Omer, etc." The meaning is that the count commences now before you come to the Holy Land. As far as what is to happen after the people will come to the land of Canaan the Torah writes: "from the day you offer the Omer sacrifice." The reason the Torah first mentioned the words ממחרת השבת, is that the commandment of counting commenced already at the time of the Exodus.
  
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  Verse 22
  
   ובקצרכם את קציר ארצכם, "And when you reap the harvest of your land, etc." Why does the Torah introduce this kind of legislation at this juncture when it is totally out of context with the subject matter being legislated in this chapter? Perhaps the Torah wanted to inform us that the owner of a field from which the barley for the Omer sacrifice has already been taken is still subject to the variety of tithes the farmer is commanded to leave for the poor when he harvests his field. Had the Torah not written this I might have thought that inasmuch as this field had already become a sacrifice to G'd in that the Omer of barley had been offered from it on the altar it would no longer be subject to the legislation of the various donations which have to be separated from the harvest. Perhaps this is why only two of those gifts to the poor are mentioned here, i.e. פאה ולקט, the corner and the gleanings, both of which are duties which devolve on the actual field itself. This is different from the legislation of שכחה, already harvested sheaves, which the owner has forgotten to pick up. Our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> say that the Torah alludes to the moral-ethical message that anyone who gives פאה, לקט, and שכחה is considered as if he had assured the continued existence of the Holy Temple and had offered sacrifices therein; thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> The reason they mention the word שכחה although it does not even appear in our verse is because it is also a commandment similar to לקט ופאה. In this way they have hinted at what we have written above.
  
  Verse 23
  
  
  
  Verse 24
  
  
  
  Verse 25
  
  
  
  Verse 26
  
  
  
  Verse 27
  
   יום הבפורים הוא מקרא קדש, "it is a Day of Atonement, a holy convocation." The reason the Torah writes the word הוא is to tell us that this day is in a class by itself, the date alone making it a Day of Atonement independent of any pronouncement. As a result one qualifies for reward by observing the second half of the verse, i.e. proclaiming it holy and afflicting oneself through abstention from food and drink, etc. This is an additional bonus apart from the atonement we are granted simply by being alive on that day.
  
  Verse 28
  
   וכל מלאכה לא תעשו, "and you must not perform any work." The unusual way the Torah explains the reason for the work prohibition may be understood in light of something we have been taught in <i>Sotah</i> 40. The Talmud there states that the congregation is not to recite verses from scripture while the priests are pronouncing the blessing, as it would be equivalent to a slave receiving a blessing from his master while not even bothering to listen. We may understand the legislation here in a similar manner. Seeing that the Day of Atonement itself confers a blessing, i.e. forgiveness, it would be most inappropriate to observe "business as usual" on such a day. It is more appropriate to spend one's time contemplating the grandeur of the Lord of the universe who has set aside a day on which His creatures are rehabilitated.
  
  Verse 29
  
  
  
  Verse 30
  
  
  
  Verse 31
  
  
  
  Verse 32
  
  
  
  Verse 33
  
  
  
  Verse 34
  
   הזה חג הסכות, "this one is the festival of huts." The extraneous words are explained in <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> Please refer to my comment on this in connection with Leviticus 14,7.
  
  Verse 35
  
  
  
  Verse 36
  
  
  
  Verse 37
  
   מועדי השם, "the appointed seasons of the Lord, etc." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on verse 35 quotes Rabbi Akiva as saying that these are the days on which the performance of work is prohibited. I believe this may also be the reason why the Torah concludes by writing: ומלבד מתנותיכם, "and beside your gifts, etc., which you will present to the Lord." These "gifts" include burnt-offerings. We know from <i>Beytzah</i> 19 that burnt-offerings may not be offered on festivals. The Talmud derives this from the word לכם, "for you," and "not for G'd." When we take this into consideration it is clear that verse 38 speaks of the intermediate days of the festivals of Passover and Sukkot.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
  
  
  Verse 2
  
   צו את בני ישראל, "command the children of Israel, etc." Why is this the appropriate place in the Torah to acquaint us with the rules of the oil for the Candlestick and the manner in which it is to be lit? We also need to explain why the procedures involving the Table have to be written at this juncture. After all, the Torah has dealt with those subjects when it described the construction of the Tabernacle! We shall leave aside Rashi's comment as we do not consider his words as adequate to answer the problem we have raised. Nachmanides wrote that at that time the olive oil which the princes had donated when the materials for the Tabernacle were being collected had come to an end. This is mere speculation, there is no supporting evidence for this assumption.
  Perhaps the fact that the Torah here deals with commandments whose common denominator is the number seven, i.e. 7 days of Passover, 7 days of Tabernacles, the New Year and Day of Atonement which occur in the 7th month, prompted the Torah to add laws about the 7-armed Candlestick. The procedures involving the Table also have a mystical dimension involving the number seven, seeing the Torah speaks about two rows of six breads (verse 6). When you add the table itself to the respective rows of 6 showbreads you have the number seven. The number seven is always considered as completing a cycle. You also had the legislation of the Omer in this portion; that commandment also involved the counting of seven times seven days, i.e. seven weeks. You have a reference to the commandment of the Sabbath, another commandment which features the number seven. We may therefore assume that the Torah was interested in mentioning all the commandments featuring the number seven in one portion.
  It is also possible that the laws pertaining to the Candlestick were written adjoining the legislation about the festival of Tabernacles to teach us some lessons about the difference between physical and spiritual light. G'd neither needs the light of the Candlestick to illuminate the Tabernacle for Him, nor did the Jewish people travel through the desert for 40 years using physical light (compare <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on the words מחוץ לפרוכת in verse 3). The ענני הכבוד, the clouds of glory i.e. the שכינה, illuminated the way for the Jewish people and the shade they provided actually screened out the sunlight during all those years (compare <i>Tossaphot</i> on <i>Shabbat.</i> 22,B). It follows that the commandment to light the Candlestick daily was only for the sake of the dividing curtain which was so called as it provided testimony for the nations of the world that G'd's presence resided within the camp of the Jewish people.
  
  Verse 3
  
  
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
  
  
  Verse 7
  
  
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
   ויצא בן אשה ישראלית, The son of a Jewish woman went out, etc. We must understand the meaning of the expression ויצא as analogous to the way <i>Tanchuma</i> understood the same word when the Torah described the emergence of the golden calf in Exodus 32,24. <i>Tanchuma</i> defined the word as describing an unplanned occurrence, i.e. the emergence of the golden calf from that crucible was totally unexpected. We may therefore relate to the portion of the מקלל, the blasphemer, as the ultimate result of an act by the mother which was totally outside her consciousness. <i>Shemot Rabbah</i> 1,28 describes that the Egyptian overseer killed by Moses once entered the house of his victim pretending to be her husband and slept with her. The child born from that union developed into the blasphemer who is the subject of our verse. This is the reason the Torah describes the mother as אשה ישראלית, comparing her to איש הישראלי, to tell us that her guilt in this matter was no greater than the guilt of the איש הישראלי, i.e. she was free from guilt. The Torah goes on to write בתוך בני ישראל, to inform us that there were no ממזרים, bastards, amongst the Jewish people, i.e. children from unions who may not marry Israelites.
  We may also deduce from the word ויצא that the Israelites were not prepared to allocate space to that individual in their respective parts of the encampment, each one claiming that he did not belong there. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> write that the manner in which the Torah introduces the blasphemer indicates that he had converted to Judaism. [seeing he was born before the Torah was given, he was not automatically Jewish due to his having a Jewish mother. Ed.] Both commentaries are perfectly true and compatible with Torah principles.
  ואיש הישראלי. and the Jewish man. It is possible that the reason the Torah does not disclose the name of this man is that it was he who caused the name of G'd to be blasphemed by the son of the Jewish woman, Shlomit bat Divri. G'd is not anxious to condemn a person, especially not in a book such as the Torah which will be read for all future generations so that a dishonourable mention is especially painful to the party concerned.
  Furthermore, the Torah wanted to reveal that the substance of the quarrel between these two men concerned the difference between being known as merely "the son of a Jewish woman," and being known as "the son of a Jew." The wording of the Torah comprises all that our sages have said about the substance of this quarrel in <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 32,3, some saying the quarrel was about the showbread legislation, the blasphemer ridiculing it. Others say that the quarrel centred about whether the blasphemer was a member of the Jewish people, and if so if he could claim membership of a particular tribe. The Torah did not bother to be specific and mention his name as it did not make any difference in the end.
  
  Verse 11
  
   ושם אמו, and the name of his mother, etc. Why was the name of this woman only mentioned here instead of at the time her existence was mentioned in verse 10 prior to the confrontation of her son with Moses? One may answer this in either one of two ways. 1) It reflects credit upon her seeing the Torah wrote: "they brought him to Moses, whereas the name of his mother was Shlomit." This implies that his mother was one of those who brought the blasphemer to Moses to be judged. 2) Mention of Shlomit at this stage reflects discredit upon her. Had it not been for the fact that others brought the blasphemer to Moses for judgment his mother could have remained anonymous. The general tenor of the story indicates that the blasphemer's mother could not overcome her feelings of pity for her son. The Torah teaches the lesson which we learned in Proverbs 12,10 that compassion for the wicked is actually an act of cruelty. The Torah discloses the name of the woman who had been foolish enough to display such feelings for her son the blasphemer. The fact that the Torah also reveals the name of her tribe is an indication that members of a tribe have a tendency to be protective of members of that tribe. This is why the <i>Midrash</i> we quoted earlier stated that when a person disgraces himself he also disgraces his tribe.
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
  
  
  Verse 14
  
  
  
  Verse 15
  
  
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
  
  
  Verse 18
  
  
  
  Verse 19
  
  
  
  Verse 20
  
  
  
  Verse 21
  
  
  
  Verse 22
  
   כגר כאזרת, convert and natural-born Israelite alike. The Torah did not write: הגר כאזרח, "the convert himself is equal to the natural-born Israelite." The reason is that in the scale of relative degrees of sanctity the convert ranks below the natural-born Israelite. The wording the Torah did use relates only to both categories of Israelites being equal before the law.
  
  Verse 23
  
   ובני ישראל עשו כאשר צוה השם. The children of Israel did as G'd commanded. Why did the Torah write that the children of Israel did what G'd commanded after it had already reported in the first part of the verse that they took the blasphemer out of the camp and executed him by stoning him? Seeing that the cause of this execution was a quarrel between a Jew and the son of a Jewess, one could have argued that though the judgment was carried out, many people harboured reservations in their hearts about this execution. The Torah therefore repeats that the children of Israel did what G'd commanded to indicate that their motivation was to carry out G'd's commandment.
  Alternatively, the Torah wished to give credit to the whole people for having fulfilled this commandment although it was obviously impossible for the entire nation to physically participate in this execution.
  The Torah may even go beyond this and credit the whole people with having fulfilled all the commandments because they all identified with this execution. This is why the line is couched in general terms, the Torah not specifying which command of G'd the people had fulfilled.
  It is also possible that the Torah had to write this line seeing that the command to execute the blasphemer had been addressed to Moses, G'd addressing him in the singular and saying (verse 14) "take the blasphemer outside the camp and have all those who heard his blasphemy place their hands upon his head and the whole congregation shall stone him." According to that verse we thought that whereas Moses was only to take the blasphemer outside, the entire people had to execute him. Here the Torah wrote: "they took the blasphemer outside the camp and stoned him to death." The verse makes the people the whole subject. The Torah now proceeds to praise Israel for not having waited until Moses took the blasphemer outside the camp; they did so themselves and proceeded to complete the commandment to execute him. If we adopt the previous ways of interpreting the verse the word הוצא "take out" which G'd said to Moses may be understood to mean that either Moses or the people were to do this.
  
  
  
  
  
  Verse 1
  
   בהר סיני, at Mount Sinai. We need to know why the Torah found it necessary to mention that this legislation was revealed at Mount Sinai. While it is true that our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explain that this is merely a reminder of the fact that all the commandments were given to Moses at Mount Sinai, both in general terms as well as in all their details, this does not answer the question why the Torah selected this commandment to remind us of that fact. It would have made much better sense to state this fact either when relating the first or the last of the Torah's commandments. Perhaps the fact that here G'd describes His gift to the Jewish people, the land of Israel, prompted Him to remind the people that the gift of the land was conditional on the people observing the commandments they had accepted at the time they stood at Mount Sinai and received the Ten Commandments. The present tense, i.e. אשר אני נותן ties the gift to Mount Sinai where the Israelites undertook to keep the Torah.
  Another reason may be related to a statement we find in <i>Avodah Zarah</i> 20 and considered as binding by Maimonides in chapter 3 of his treatise called <i>Zechiyah.</i> Here is what Maimonides writes: "It is forbidden to give a gift to a pagan (unless it is in return for services rendered)." We must remember that prior to acceptance of the Torah by the Jewish people they themselves were legally in the category of pagans, i.e. G'd could not legally make a gift of the land of Israel to the Jewish people until they offered some value in return. He could only give the land of Israel to them after the revelation at Mount Sinai. G'd alluded to this when the Torah mentioned Mount Sinai as the reason for "the land which I am about to give to you." This also answers the question why G'd had to say: "which I am giving to you." There was never any doubt that it was G'd from whom we would receive this gift so that we could have erred if the Torah did not repeat it. You will note that in Leviticus 19,23 where the Torah legislates about the ערלה restrictions the subject is introduced as follows: "when you come to the land and plant fruit-bearing trees, etc." In that instance the Torah did not mention who gives the land to the Israelites, etc. This supports our theory about why G'd selected the example of our verse to teach us that the gift of the land of Israel is tied to the experience at Mount Sinai.
  
  Verse 2
  
   דנר אל בני ישראל, "speak to the children of Israel, etc." The reason the Torah repeats דבר ואמרת is that this legislation involves both a prohibition to work the land (for a limited period) as well as denying oneself ownership of what one's field or orchard produces during that year (especially the fruit of the trees which grow without planting). The Torah uses the relatively harsh expression דבר to introduce the prohibition to work the land seeing it is difficult for a farmer to reconcile himself to such a commandment. The expresssion ואמרת applies to the requirement to declare one's produce הפקר, i.e. accessible to anyone who finds it, something which does not involve too much hardship as the farmer becomes the beneficiary of his neighbour's parallel declaration. Moreover, G'd's promise that the land would produce an extra generous harvest during the sixth year of the cycle (compare verse 21) will gladden the heart of the farmer and reconcile him to loss of ownership of what his own field or orchard produces during the seventh year.
  Another reason why the apparent duplication of דבר ואמרת is justified is the dual nature of the "Sabbath" i.e. rest, of the land. One aspect of this legislation is that the King commanded us to let the land lie fallow, ergo we carry out this command. 2) Although the practical performance of this commandment involves the relationship between man and man rather than the relationship between man and G'd, our obligation to comply is anchored in our relationship with G'd, i.e. the fact that the gift of the land to the Jewish people had been made conditional on our observing the Torah. When G'd did not say: "I have given you the land," but "I am giving you the land," He made it plain that the condition which is attached to that gift is an ongoing one, i.e. the land never became ours irrevocably. The word דבר therefore alludes to G'd's right to legislate; the word ואמרת on the other hand, refers to the social element of this legislation which also is the prerogative of the King to legislate. The Torah is under no obligation to furnish us with the reasons which motivated G'd the legislator, when He commanded us to perform these statutes.
  ושבתה הארץ שבח לשם, "and the land shall keep a Sabbath for G'd." What precisely does the Torah have in mind here? If the Torah refers to the seventh year, this is already stated in verse 4, "in the seventh year shall be a Sabbath of solemn rest for the land."
  We must therefore understand this verse as belonging to the previous verse in which G'd proclaimed that He was giving us the land. Our verse is a codicil, i.e. that G'd has made a reservation concerning that gift. The reservation is that we, the new "owners," agree to to let the land rest from time to time; "to G'd," i.e. to the G'd who still has title to the land. In verse 4 the Torah defines the nature of this "rest," i.e. when and for how long it is to occur. First we are to work the land for six consecutive years and only the seventh year is to be a year of rest. If the Torah had not written the verse ושבתה הארץ and contented itself with verse 4, I would not have known that G'd had reserved a claim to that land for Himself.
  Upon closer examination we find that G'd was extremely kind in this matter. Generally speaking when a gift is conditional, such a gift may be revoked when the party who received it violates the condition attached to it. In this instance G'd did us a favour by retaining part of the land He had given us as a conditional gift. When the Jewish people violated the conditions of the gift by not observing the <i>Shemittah</i> legislation they did not lose the entire land but merely had to recompense G'd for having deprived Him of what He had reserved for Himself, i.e. the seventh year, the שבת לשם. We find proof of this in 26,34-35 where the Torah writes: "then the land shall be paid her Sabbaths, …the rest it had not had, etc." As a result of G'd retaining part ownership of the land of Israel the gift part of the land will never be cancelled.
  The reason why the Torah wrote the word ושבתה next to the words אשר אני נותן is connected to what we learned in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 23 that when a Torah scholar identifies an object he claims as belonging to him this is accepted without an accompanying oath. G'd's word is certainly at least as trustworthy as that of the greatest Torah scholar and there was therefore no need for Him to use an oath when giving the land of Israel to us. Besides, the gift may be considered an act of charity and G'd's utterance concerning it is to be considered as equivalent to a vow (compare <i>Rosh Hashanah</i> 6) so that the words ושבתה הארץ immediately after the promise אשר אני נותן are actually part of the gift itself and not an afterthought. If the Torah had relied only on verse 4 the שמטה legislation could no longer have been considered as an integral part of the gift of the land. The verse speaking about our working the land for six consecutive years, etc., would have constituted an interruption of the subject matter.
  
  Verse 3
  
   שש שנים תזרע, "You shall plant seed for six years, etc." The Torah wanted to phrase the procedure of the farmer seeding his land as a positive commandment, and the pruning of the vines in the seventh year as a negative commandment so that the negative commandment which is a derivative of a positive commandment is also considered as a positive commandment (compare <i>Pessachim</i> 41). Although Maimonides wrote in the first chapter of his treatise <i>Hilchot Shemittah</i> that the positive commandment is based on the words ושבתה הארץ שבת at the end of verse 2, this would certainly not be enough to make the act of seeding and the act of pruning positive commandments. Perhaps what Maimonides had in mind was to make a person who ignores the laws of seeding and pruning guilty of violating two positive commandments instead of merely one.
  ושש שנים תזמר, "and for 6 years you shall prune your vineyard." Why did the Torah repeat the words ושש שנים when it could have written: שש שנים תזרע שדך ותזמר כרמך? Our sages explain this in chapter 5 of <i>Massechet Shvi-it</i> by reference to בנות שוח שביעית שלהם שניה, certain kinds of white figs which ripen only once in three years. The <i>shemittah</i> legislation applies starting only with the second year of the cycle. The Talmud explains that in the case of the fruits of that tree the cut-off date is the date they blossom which occurs in the seventh year so that these fruit are harvested in the second year after the <i>shemittah</i> year. In other words, when it comes to the trees, the time the fruit blossoms determines the calculation for when the <i>shemittah</i> year applies. In the case of grains and vegetables however, the time they are harvested determines the application of the <i>shemittah</i> prohibition as we know from <i>Rosh Hashanah</i> 13. There is a good reason then why the Torah had to write the words שש שנים twice, seeing that trees and fields have different six-year cycles respectively, the former determined by the time of the harvest the latter by the time the fruit blossoms.
  ואספת את תבואתה, "and you shall gather in its harvest." What need was there for the Torah to write the word ואספת? Perhaps the Torah's use of the expression ואספת את תבואתה is meant to contrast with the ספיחים, the wild growing crop of the seventh year which was not planted which must not be gathered in. The intention of the Torah then would be to add a positive commandment, i.e. the type of positive commandment which is actually a derivative of the negative commandment not to harvest the wild growing crop. This would make the negative commandment not to harvest this kind of crop into a positive commandment with the appropriate halachic consequences for people transgressing it. Possibly the Torah hints that although a piece of land which has been farmed for six years consecutively does not have the strength left to produce a crop in the seventh year, especially seeing it has not even been ploughed or seeded, in this case this is precisely what will happen. The normal procedure is to cultivate a field for a year and then to give that piece of land a year of rest (compare <i>Baba Batra</i> 29). In other words, the Torah praises the quality of the soil in the land of Israel and assures us that observance of the legislation in this chapter will enhance the value of the land. We may even interpret the opening words דבר ואמרת as reflecting this message. The word דבר is normal, the word ואמרת which tones town the harsh דבר hinting at the veiled blessing that the observance of the שמטה legislation will result in an improvement of the yield from the soil.
  We may also find a clue to the meaning of our verse in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 26 which reports Rabbi Yannai calling on the people to plant their fields in the seventh year as the government levied a tax on the fields and people could not have met this unless they planted a crop. <i>Tossaphot</i> comment on this: "how could Rabbi Yannai permit something which is forbidden by biblical injunction?" They answer on two levels. Rabbi Yannai spoke of a period when the <i>shemittah</i> legislation applies only because of a rabbinic decree. Alternatively, when a matter of פקוח נפש, physical survival, is involved it is in order to temporarily cancel even a biblical injunction.
  
  Verse 4
  
  
  
  Verse 5
  
  
  
  Verse 6
  
   והיתה שנת הארץ לכם לאכלה, "And the Sabbath-produce of the land shall be for you as food;" The principal reason for this verse is to inform us that contrary to other sacred matters which are restricted to the altar or to the priests, in this instance everybody is entitled to consume what has grown during the seventh year. The Torah then details who are all the people who are included in that permission. You may well ask that in view of this, why did the Torah have to write the word לכם, "to you," which is normally a restrictive word, i.e. "you and no one else?" All the Torah had to write was הארץ לך לאכלה! I suppose the best approach to this is as follows. Normally, I would have expected that whosoever is mentioned in the verse first is first in line for the permission to eat. We have a parallel to this when the Torah legislated the order of priorities when giving charity. In that instance (Deut. 15,7) The Torah lists: "your poor (family members)," followed by "the poor of your town," followed by the people in "your land" (based on <i>Sifri</i> on that verse). To ensure that we do not understand the last half of our verse in the same way as Deut. 15,7 the Torah here first wrote the word לכם to tell us that all people have an equal claim on what grows in the fields during that year.
  
  Verse 7
  
  
  
  Verse 8
  
  
  
  Verse 9
  
  
  
  Verse 10
  
  
  
  Verse 11
  
  
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
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  Verse 14
  
   וכי תמכרו ממכר לעמיתך, "And if you sell anything to your neighbour, etc." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on this verse asks: "whence do we know that the legislation concerning overcharging does not apply to transactions involving real estate?" Answer: "this is why the Torah wrote או קנה מיד עמיתך, "or if you will buy from the hand of your neighbour." This means that the commandment not to charge too much applies only to מטלטלין, mobile goods, chattels. The Talmud <i>Baba Metzia</i> 56 queries this ruling pointing to Numbers 21,26 where the word יד is used in connection with land, i.e. "he took his whole land from his hand, as far as the river Arnon." The Talmud concludes by saying that in every other instance the word ידו is to be understood literally, whereas only in this instance (Numbers 21,26) the word means "in his possession." Thus far the Talmud. The question arises why we do not use the verse in Numbers to deduce that the word ידו never needs to be understood literally as "his hand?" We must answer that the meaning of the word ידו is certainly "his hand" in the literal sense of the word. It is not disputed that the meaning of the word ידו may also be "something under one's control," however the literal meaning is the more likely in our context. When I have the choice of how to understand the word I naturally choose the meaning which fits the context in which the word appears. Moreover, if the Torah had not intended that we understand the word ידו literally it should have used a different word to prevent us from misunderstanding its purpose. We need to explore therefore why the sages inisted that the legislation against overcharging in our verse speaks only of the sale of chattels and that the verse does not speak at all of sales involving real estate.
  It appears that although the exegesis employed by our sages is based on their prior knowledge of these הלכות which had been handed down orally from Mount Sinai, they were interested in linking all these הלכות to the written text of the Torah. The plain meaning of our verse is perfectly compatible with the known הלכות on this subject. We must remember that the Torah had already prohibited the irrevocable sale of real estate in the land of Israel through the institution known as יובל, Jubilee year legislation. That legislation precluded overcharging for the land as the Torah expressly stipulated that the sale price be based on the number of harvests the land in question would produce before the next Jubilee year (verses 16-17). Verse 17 speaks specifically about not overcharging an unsuspecting purchaser who thought that he bought title to that land outright. The seller meanwhile intended to invoke Torah law in the Jubilee year and claim back the land in question without compensating the buyer. In such a situation, i.e. that the seller purports to sell property against which there is no potential lien, the principle of overcharging does apply so that the original sale is invalidated due to the seller having misrepresented what he sold. Seeing that the Torah took care of potential overcharging for land in those verses, it is clear that in verse 14 the Torah speaks only of the sale of chattels and the word ידו is to be applied only in its literal sense. In our case the Torah protected the buyer of land against being overcharged seeing no outsider would protest the sale, only the seller himself who claims to base his protest on Torah law. The Torah therefore saw fit to protect the unsuspecting buyer against this particular claim only by writing that the price had to be based on the number of years till the Jubilee year from the time of the sale. By contrast then, the words אל תונו in verse 14 apply only to the sale of chattels.
  
  Verse 15
  
   במספר שנים אחר היובל, "according to the number of years after the Jubilee year, etc," We must establish first of all why the Torah speaks of the years "after the Jubilee," rather than "the number of years until the Jubilee year," seeing that the years the purchase is in effect are part of those years? Secondly, why did the Torah change its wording in the middle of a verse? The Torah describes the transaction as a purchase,מקנתו, when speaking of the number of years which determines the purchase price, i.e. making the purchaser the principal figure. When the Torah speaks of the number of harvests, however, it switches and describes the transaction as a sale, i.e. הוא מוכר לך, "he sells to you?"
  We have the following <i>Mishnah in Massechet Arachin</i> folio 29: "When someone sells a field in the Jubilee year he is not allowed to redeem it until at least 2 years have elapsed seeing that the Torah stipulates that the sale has to be in effect for "a number of harvests," i.e. not less than two harvests. If one of those two years happens to be a year of drought so that no harvest is brought in, or it was the <i>shemittah year</i> (when the harvest is public property), such a year does not form part of the two years we have just mentioned. Rabbi Eliezer says that if the seller sold the field immediately before New Year's day while it had not yet been harvested the buyer may enjoy 3 harvests before the seller can redeem the field." Thus far the <i>Mishnah</i>. When the Talmud elaborates on this, it is pointed out that the <i>Mishnah</i> did not say that redemption of the field in less than two years would be legally ineffective, but said only that the "seller is not allowed to redeem it." This means that there is both a negative and a positive commandment, the positive commandment being that one must allow the purchaser to enjoy the field for at least two harvests. The wording of the Torah applies the positive commandment also to the purchaser, not merely to the seller having to allow the purchaser to enjoy possession for a minimum of two harvests ; this is based on the word תקנה "you shall purchase." We also find a <i>Baraitha</i> in that connection which states as follows: "if the purchaser enjoyed only one harvest prior to the Jubilee year one allows him to enjoy the harvest of an additional year after the Jubilee year." As a result of the foregoing we have four separate הלכות, rulings, on the subject which are based on our verse. 1) It is a commandment applicable to both seller and buyer that the sale be valid for no less than two years as stated in the Torah. 2) If there were three harvests within the space of two years they all belong to the purchaser. 3) If there was a year of drought so that there was no harvest, the purchaser is entitled to another year. 4) If the Jubilee year occurs during one of the two years the purchaser contracted for, this year is considered as null and void and the purchaser continues in possession for another year. Maimonides rules in accordance with what we have just stated in chapter 11 of his treatise <i>Shemittah Veyovel.</i>
  Keeping the above in mind the wording of the Torah can be fully appreciated. The words במספר שנים אחר היובל mean "the number of years that have to be completed in the event the Jubilee year does not require the present owner of the field to relinquish it." The Torah then changed its wording from buyer to seller in order to make the law apply to the purchaser as well. Both seller and buyer are responsible for the sale not to remain effective for less than the time legislated by the Torah. The Torah mentions both the number of years and the number of harvests (pl) in order to allow for the eventuality of a drought or the Jubilee year which would result in the number of harvests being less than the number of years contracted for.
  We need to understand the reason why G'd does not permit the buyer to return the field he purchased to the seller before two (harvest) years have passed. Since when is it forbidden for a person to waive financial claims in favour of someone else? The answer to this peculiar piece of legislation must be sought in the Torah's looking askance at anyone who sells land which is his heritage in the Holy Land. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> on verse 25: "if your brother becomes poor and sells part of his ancestral heritage, etc." explains that a person is not permitted to sell his field and to use the proceeds to invest in livestock or chattels. They base this on the fact that the Torah described permission to sell as due only to poverty, i.e. כי ימוך. The Torah hopes to dissuade a potential seller of his ancestral property from selling if he is aware that he will not be able to redeem it for at least two years.
  Another reason may be connected to a ruling by Maimonides in chapter 11 of <i>Hilchot Shemittah Veyovel</i> that if someone sold his field for a period of 60 years such a field does not revert to the seller in the Jubilee year. The only purchases which are reversed in the Jubilee year are lands sold without a specific time frame, or a piece of property sold "forever." The author of <i>Kesseph Mishneh</i> does not quote the origin for Maimonides' ruling. Perhaps Maimonides derived it from a nuance in our text here. When the Torah writes במספר שנים אחר היובל the meaning may be that if the seller mentions a specific number of years that the sale is to be in force, be it 40 years or 60 years, ימכר לך, "he may go ahead and sell it to you." -The additional words ימכר לך mean that the sale is effective for the number of years contracted. In such a situation the Jubilee year does not override the agreement reached between buyer and seller. The words במספר שני תבואות explain why such a sale can remain effective beyond the Jubilee year, i.e. seeing that the seller sold a number of harvests he did not contravene Torah law not to sell soil. The Torah's principal concern is that a Jew must not sell the land which is his heritage in the land of Israel.
  
  Verse 16
  
  
  
  Verse 17
  
   ולא תונו איש את עמיתו, "And you shall not take advantage of one another." <i>Baba Metzia</i> 58 explains that our verse discusses אונאת דברים, "verbal wrongs." The plain meaning of the verse is that seeing the Torah had already issued a similarly phrased commandment in verse 14, and we had explained that commandment as applicable when overcharging for chattels, we could have thought that overcharging for land was permitted. The Torah therefore had to repeat this commandment in connection with land sales so that the reader would not err and assume it is permitted to overcharge on land. The verse therefore concludes with the exhortation: "you shall fear your G'd," telling us that although the normal legislation against overcharging does not have a legal effect when the sale of real estate is involved, this is so only in connection with land sales in the rest of the world and to members of society at large (Gentiles). The prohibition to overcharge is in effect, however. The reason there are no legal repercussions when someone overcharges for the land he sells is that G'd personally will exact the appropriate penalty from the guilty party; this is why after the words: "you shall fear your G'd" the Torah adds the words: "for I am the Lord your G'd." G'd reminds us that He Himself will judge us in this respect and that we must not assume that it is permissible to overcharge when selling real estate. There are many instances of the Torah forbidding something without making such prohibitions a matter punishable by our legal system. You may do well to read what I have written on Exodus 21,12 in this connection. In our specific case, a court might find it difficult to determine precisely when the seller has violated the rule that he must not overcharge, seeing a purchaser may have been willing to pay more than the market price. (the same applies if the buyer bought the property for less than the market price, exploiting the economic weakness of the seller). G'd alone knows where to draw the line between what a buyer is truly willing to pay and what he feels he is forced to pay. This is why G'd Himself will administer any penalty due to either of the parties involved.
  I have already stated earlier that the principle of a sale being declared an "erroneous transaction" and the court reversing it applies also to land sales. Maimonides also writes in that vein in chapter 15 of his treatise <i>Hilchot Mechirah</i>. The principle is based on the transaction having a blemish of which the buyer was unaware at the time he concluded the purchase. In such cases the buyer is at liberty to return the land even if a number of years have passed since the purchase was concluded. Our explanation is based on the wording of אל תונו the Torah uses here. The expression אונאת דברים covers every deception caused by words which misrepresent true facts. Lying to a person is a form of "wronging" him and includes overcharging for land, i.e. misrepresenting its true value.
  
  Verse 18
  
  
  
  Verse 19
  
   ונתנה הארץ פריה, "And the earth shall yield her fruit, etc." The meaning of "her fruit" is that which corresponds to the potential it has been endowed with. When we observe the earth producing fruit this does not prove that the amount of fruit we observe the earth produce is equivalent to the amount the earth is capable of producing. We find in <i>Ketuvot</i> 112 that a certain sage was angry at the earth and decreed that it be prevented from yielding its fruit. As a result of this curse the earth produced far less than previously. If someone had not seen the amount of fruit that piece of earth produced before the sage cursed it, he would have thought that the amount it produced subsequently was the maximum it was capable of producing.
  ואכלתם לשבע, "and you will eat to your satisfaction, etc." Perhaps the Torah had to emphasise this as we could have thought that if the earth were to produce fruit according to its full potential the excess fat of the produce would be so filling that one could not eat one's fill, i.e. לשבע. The Torah therefore reassures us that we will be able to enjoy such fruit to the full.
  וישבתם לבטח עליה. "and you will dwell on it in safety." Although the Torah had already written in verse 18 that we would dwell in the land in safety as a result of performing G'd's comandments, the Torah repeats this promise to assure us that the excellence of the land's produce will not attract raiders bent on stealing our harvests. This verse contains G'd's promise that neighbouring countries would not attack us out of greed for our excellent land.
  
  Verse 20
  
   וכי תאמרו מה נאכל בשנה השביעית, "When you will say: 'what shall we eat in the seventh year?'" The plain meaning of the verse is as follows: "When you will say (in the seventh year) 'what shall we eat?'" The question posed by the Torah as being asked by the Israelites in this verse could be read in one of two different ways 1) the Torah reveals a motive for the Israelites' reluctance to observe the commandment not to seed the land during the seventh year, i.e. "if we do not seed what shall we eat?" 2) The question centers on the result of observing the commandment not to seed in the seventh year. The Israelites will ask that seeing they have observed G'd's directives "what shall we eat?" In order to make sure we understand the question as the second alternative we mentioned, the Torah adds הן לא נזרע, "behold we may not seed?" The question is one posed by the son to the father who wants to know where his sustenance is to come from seeing it is not available by natural means. The Torah answers that in that case, i.e. that you have fulfilled G'd's command, He will command the earth to provide a more than usually bountiful harvest in the sixth year so that you will not experience any shortfall. This blessing will occur only if your question was not intended to excuse your failure to observe My command. If you were asking to excuse your non-observance, the promise of a bountiful harvest in the sixth year will not materialise.
  
  Verse 21
  
   וצויתי את ברכתי, "And I shall command My blessing, etc." The blessing referred to in this verse does not pertain to the growth of the crop; that blessing has already been mentioned when the Torah spoke of the earth giving its full yield. The blessing the Torah speaks of here is in the nature of what we read in Kings I 17 and Kings II chapter 4 where the prophet made the little bit of oil of the respective petitioners stretch miraculously. This is alluded to in the words of our verse that ועשת את התבואה, i.e. that the existing crop will be made to last for three years. My comments on Genesis 33,9-11 are relevant to this verse.
  לשלש השנים, for the three years. The meaning of the verse is that the blessing will be in effect during the sixth, the seventh and eighth year. Statistically speaking the period of three years the Torah speaks of commences in the month of Sivan during the sixth year, i.e. the month most of the grain is harvested, and continues till the month of Sivan in the ninth year. The Torah had to write the word לשלש השנים so we would not think that part of a year is considered a whole year [as when we count the years a king reigned. Ed.]
  
  Verse 22
  
   וזרעתם את השנה השמינית, "And you will seed the eighth year, etc." The Torah had to spell this out on account of having written that the harvest of the sixth year would last for three years. We might have thought that if the harvest of the sixth year lasts into the ninth year why sow in the eighth year? Surely G'd would not perform an unnecessary miracle! The Torah provides the reason by writing that the people were to enjoy the harvest brought in during the sixth year until the harvest of what was planted in the eighth year was at hand. The lesson of the verse is that a harvest which is three years old is superior to grain from the new harvest. (<i>Baba Batra</i> 91 confirms this).
  
  Verse 23
  
  
  
  Verse 24
  
  
  
  Verse 25
  
   כי ימוך אחיך ומכר מאחוזתו, "If your brother becomes poor and has to sell part of his heritage, etc." This paragraph contains cardinal moral-ethical lessons to mankind. Kohelet 10,18 alludes to this when he says: "through slothfulness the ceiling sags." Our sages in <i>Taanit</i> 7 comment on this "you have made "poor" the One of Whom it is said (Psalms 104,3) "המקרה במים עליותיו" "Who sets the rafters of His lofts in the waters;" When people who dwell in the lower parts of the universe stray from the correct path they cause the beneficial outpourigs from the upper part of the universe to cease. They thereby endanger the continuous presence of sanctity on earth. In the final analysis the fate of the universe is determined by the conduct of the creatures who inhabit earth, i.e. "the lower world."
  When the Torah says: ומכר מאחוזתו "and he sells part of his heritage," this is a reference to the משכן, the Holy Tabernacle, which is G'd's heritage. The Torah warns us that our sins may result in G'd "selling off" His heritage, i.e. our enemies appropriating our (G'd's) Sanctuary. We find an allusion to this concept in Psalms 79,1 where Assaph describes the Gentiles as having entered G'd's domain. <i>Midrash Tehillim</i> comments on this verse that the redemption of G'd's Sanctuary is in the hands of the righteous who endeavour to be close to G'd. G'd has already told us this in Leviticus 10,3 when He said בקרובי אקדש, "I will be sanctified by those near Me." "They, the righteous, have to redeem what I had to sell." G'd is perceived as calling on the righteous in their capacity as אחי ורעי, "My brothers and My friends" (compare Psalms 122,8). Redemption will occur when the righteous succeed in awakening the hearts of their contemporaries by convincing them that it is really not in their best interest to spend their time exiled from the table of their Father in Heaven. The righteous have to convince the average Jew that what he considers success in his world is illusory if bought at the expense of forfeiting his respective eternity in a better world. In the future all Torah scholars who have failed in their efforts to convince their peers to adopt a Torah-true lifetsyle, etc. will have to render an account before the highest tribunal. G'd will hold those Torah scholars responsible for the continued disgrace suffered by the Holy Temple.
  
  Verse 26
  
   ואיש כי לא יהיה לו גואל, "And if a man has no redeemer, etc." According to <i>Sanhedrin</i> 93 the Torah occasionally uses the word איש as a simile for G'd, such as in Exodus 15,3 ה׳ איש מלחמה. The Torah's message in this verse is that in the event no Jewish leader is at hand to arouse the people to return to G'd as penitents, this is no reason to abandon hope altogether. Rather, והשיגה ידו ומצא כדי גאולתו, the Jewish people will achieve their redemption by alternative means. <i>Sanhedrin</i> 98 describes both afflictions and national exile as means to bring about redemption. The expression והשיגה ידו may be understood as similar to Deut. 2,15: יד ה׳ היתה בם, "the hand of G'd was against them," a reference to G'd exacting retribution through exiling a nation under harsh conditions. Such an exile will eventually lead to redemption of the Holy Temple.
  
  Verse 27
  
   וחשב את שני ממכרו, "let him count the number of years of his sale," etc." The sale occurred due to our sins as mentioned by Isaiah 50,1: "here you have been sold due to your sins," and the sin is equivalent to a debt to be paid off. When the time comes to tear up the I.O.U. a careful accounting is made of any remaining indebtedness before the promissory note is torn up. The Torah speaks about the remaining years the Temple has been in foreign hands. The time it is redeemed depends on the quantity and severity of the collective sins of the people of Israel. We are told in <i>Yuma</i> 86 that if a person actually enjoyed the sins he committed, he has to flagellate himself in a measure which corresponds to the amount of pleasure he had when committing the sins he is guilty of. This is part of the rehabilitation of the sinner. In this manner he will repay his debt. G'd will deal with us in this manner at the time the redemption will be close at hand. This is also what the sages had in mind in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 98 when they refer to the חבלי משיח the birth-pangs to be endured as part of the coming of the Messiah. After that, ושב לאחוזתו, G'd will return to His heritage. The word ושב also refers to Israel. We have a parallel in Deut. 30,3 ושב ה׳ את שבותך "and G'd will return with your captive ones;" we would have expected the Torah to speak about והשיב i.e. "He will bring back" instead of "He will come back" (compare <i>Megillah</i> 29).
  
  Verse 28
  
   ואם לא מצאו ידו די השיב, "But if he does not have sufficient means to restore it to himself, etc." If G'd observes that the people do not possess the strength to endure all the suffering that is their lot, and the debt they owe is still great, והיה ממכרו עד שנת היובל, "then its sale will extend (only) to the Jubilee year, etc." Here the Torah refers to G'd's timetable, i.e. the ultimate date for the eventual redemption. At that time, ויצא ביובל ושב לאחוזתו, He will come out in the Jubilee year and return to His heritage (rebuild the Temple). Exile will come to an end even if the Israelites will be (G'd forbid) absolute sinners.
  
  Verse 29
  
   ואיש כי ימכר בית מושב, "And if a man sells a house which is (his) residence, etc." After the Torah has described how G'd "sold" the Temple, the Torah now explains how it could happen that G'd would "sell" His heritage, the Holy Temple. This is why the paragraph starts with the word ואיש, so that we understand that the word refers to G'd, just as it had in the previous paragraph. The extraneous word מושב refers to the house in which G'd has His residence, the Holy Temple; the expression עיר חומה refers to Jerusalem, the "walled city" which is described by David in Psalms 125 ,2 as "the city ringed by mountains, (i.e. like wall)." The Torah continues by explaining that these very "walls" are why the city may be be redeemed after as little as a year already. The reason is similar to what has been revealed to us by <i>Midrash Tehillim</i> on Psalms 79,1. We were told there that when G'd vented His anger on the stones and timber of the city allowing it to be destroyed, this was in lieu of venting all His anger on the people inside the city. Had G'd not vented His anger on stone and wood, not a single Jew would have survived that experience. If Israel had been wiped out, there would never again have been either a Holy Temple or a city of Jerusalem.
  
  Verse 30
  
  
  
  Verse 31
  
  
  
  Verse 32
  
  
  
  Verse 33
  
  
  
  Verse 34
  
  
  
  Verse 35
  
   וכי ימוך אחיך ומטה ידו, "If your brother becomes poor and his means fail while he is with you, etc." This paragraph tries to awaken us to the reason why the spirit of G'd "our Brother" who used to dwell in our midst has become so infirm. When the Torah describes "our Brother becoming poor," it refers to the "spirit of life within us; the reason it seems to weaken is that it observed that we failed to study Torah and practice the commandments. There is no greater kind of poverty than the dearth of merits due to Torah study and the performance of kind deeds towards one's fellow man. As a result, the individual Israelite's light fails. The word עמך emphasises that the failure is due to its having concentrated on you. Had it not been for G'd channelling His light through you (the Jewish people), His light would have permeated the whole universe from one end to the other. Under the changed conditions, G'd wants to return the רוח light, to His celestial domains as described in Kohelet 12,7: "and the spirit returns to the Lord who had provided it." <i>Shabbat</i> 152 comments on this that G'd demands that the spirit be returned to Him in mint condition, i.e. שנתנה לך "in the condition He gave it to you." The Torah goes on והחזקת בו "you are to uphold him;" this means that you are to assist such a Jew who has strayed from the true path to do תשובה to help him rehabilitate himself. There is no other means which can ensure that the vital רוח be sustained within us which is comparable to the power of repentance.
  גר ותושב וחי עמך, "a stranger or a resident he shall live with you." According to a mystical text קב הישר chapter 32 there are souls G'd places in a body (person) in accordance with the principle we call סוד העבור, so that they can participate in the performance of a specific commandment and that person will acquire the merit which results from performance of that commandment. Other souls are provided for man for no specific task but as an opportunity afforded to the body (person) within whom the soul dwells to rehabilitate that personality. The words גר ותושב refer to these two kinds of souls. The former is called גר, the latter is called תושב. The Torah says: וחי עמך "it shall live within you" concerning either kind of soul, seeing a person does not know which kind of soul he has been endowed with he is well advised to assume that it is his task to rehabilitate himself by doing תשובה so that he would not lose the light G'd has granted him and as a result of which He resides within him. אל תקח מאתו נשך ותרבית, "Do not take an advance from him or accrued Interest;" I will explain presently what is meant by these words. When the verse goes on ויראת מאלוקך, "you shall fear your G'd," this refers to the light which G'd has endowed you with by granting you a pure soul which you are under an obligation to return in mint condition. The Torah demands further וחי אחיך עמך, that when the time comes to return your soul to G'd it should return equipped with additional vitality acquired through the fact that you lived a life dedicated to the service of G'd. While it is true that Kohelet only spoke about returning the רוח in the condition that you received it, this was a minimal demand. Alternatively, you may refer to what I explained in my book חפץ השם on <i>Shabbat</i> 152, that the words "as He has has given to you," mean that the soul by definition is a spiritual force which is apt to add vitality and spiritual light to the body it inhabits.
  
  Verse 36
  
  
  
  Verse 37
  
   את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך, "You shall not give him your money upon interest;" Here the Torah explains what the words נשך ומרבית are all about; they darken the divine light G'd provides. The word את כספך refers to the material things man yearns for in this world believing them to be of real value though their value is totally illusory. לא תתן לו בנשך When man fulfils his animalistic instincts and thereby tries to gratify his spiritual needs his spirit is actually "bitten," נשוך and the poison of sin is absorbed by that person's רוח. The Torah continues: ובמרבית לא תתן אכלך, "and you must not give him your food in return for increase." The Torah means that even your food, i.e. something that it is certainly permissible for you to eat you must not consume to excess, i.e. מרבית. When a person follows the needs of his palate he gradually increases his appetite for more food than is needed to sustain him. This is turn also leads to the divine light G'd has granted us by means of our pure soul being gradually more and more "blacked out." The stronger the physical in man the weaker his spiritual capacity. Encouraging the body to grow stronger through gratifying its appetites therefore is sinful. This is why Proverbs 13,25 teaches us that "the righteous eats onIy to satisfy the needs of his life-force, נפש." Solomon says this to remind us that it is not our palate which should dictate the quantity or quality of our food-intake. When the Torah continues אני השם (verse 38), this means that although G'd has taken us out of Egypt in order to give us the land of Canaan, the purpose was not in order for the Jewish people to stuff themselves on the good fruit of the land but in order for Him to be our G'd, something that requires the land of Israel. Our sages in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> say that anyone who merely lives in the land of Israel is as if he had accepted for himself G'd's sovereignty.
  
  Verse 38
  
  
  
  Verse 39
  
   וכי ימוך אחיך, "And if your brother becomes poor, etc." This paragraph is an allusion to something we find in the <i>Tikkuney HaZohar</i> chapter 10 that G'd ordered the spiritual representative of Edom (Samael) in the celestial spheres not do deal cruelly with Israel. When the Torah speaks of the Jewish people becoming poor this is a reference to the exile under the Romans. The reason the Torah speaks of "your brother" is the same as the prophet Maleachi reminding the Jewish people in G'd's name (Maleachi 1,2) that Esau was Jacob's brother but that nonetheless G'd loved Jacob. The word עמך, "with you," is a reminder that the impoverishment of Israel is due to its proximity to Esau/Edom and the fact that it started to copy the evil ways of Edom. The words ונמכר לך, "and he sold himself to you," may be understood as similar to Isaiah 52,3 in which the Jewish people are described as having sold themselves in return for חנם, "nought". According to the <i>Zohar</i> volume 2 page 128, Samael is equated with the domain of חנם, nought, seeing the prophet speaks of the exile under Roman (Edom) domination. (compare Psalms 137,7 where the Jewish people ask G'd to repay Edom for the cruel treatment they dished out to the people of Israel)
  לא תעבוד בו עבודת עבד is G'd's command to Edom the host country not to make the Jewish people perform slave labour. (compare Jeremiah 2,14 who asks plaintively: "is Israel then a slave?") but to treat them as one treats a hired hand, כשכיר כתושב יהיה לך, "it shall be like a hired hand or a resident for you." The reason the Torah uses two alternatives here is that Israel may be divided into two categories. 1) The multitude; 2) the elite, as per Samuel II 23,8 where this elite is described as "sitting in the council of the wise." You find on occasion that Israelites rose to the rank of tax collectors even while in exile; these tax collectors may have been the elite in terms of secular rank but they do not represent Israel's spiritual elite. Israel's spiritual elite are characterised by Moses in Deut. 33,3, as והם תכו לרגליך ישא מדברותיך, "but they followed in Your footsteps, accepted Your pronouncements." Concerning this verse our sages in <i>Baba Batra</i> 8 quote Ezra 7,24 that it was forbidden by royal decree to impose any kind of taxes on the Torah scholars (literally the priests and the Levites) even in exile (under Artaxerxes). When the Torah speaks of the Edomites who have exiled us treating us like hired hands, שכיר, this refers to the common people; the term תושב, however, refers to the spiritual elite of the Jewish people in exile. They are not to be burdened with taxes and other governmental demands.
  The Torah continues עד שנת היובל יעבוד עמך, "until the Jubilee year he will serve with you;" in this instance the Jubilee year is a reference to the most remote date possible for the redemption. G'd advises Edom that in the end the Jewish people will go free from its exile, i.e. ויצא מעמך. The reference to ובניו is to the "sparks" which have become isolated and which are the mystical dimension of the whole concept of the value of exile. This is the mystical aspect of Kohelet 8,9: "there is a time when one man rules over another to his detriment." [These holy souls had been scattered throughout the nations as a result of Adam's sin and are to be rescued and reunited with the pool of holy souls through their coming into contact with the Jewish people. The author explained this concept on several occasions. Ed.]
  You may well ask what would have happened to all these souls if Israel had not sinned and as a result had been scattered throughout the world in exile? Know that if Israel had not sinned they would have possessed the spiritual power to attract these lost souls from wherever they were instead of having to be physically near them in order to exert some influence on them. It was the Israelites' sin which weakened their spiritual power; these sins so weakened Israel's spiritual power to act as a magnet for these souls that even while in exile and physically close to them they do not succeed in all instances to rescue the souls in question.
  The Torah continues: ושב אל משפחתו, "and HE will return to his family;" when the redeemer arrives G'd will plant His light amongst us so that He will again take up residence amongst His family, the people of Israel. At such a time the dead will arise and each one will return to אחוזת אבותיו, "the heritage of his fathers," the Holy Temple established by G'd's hands Himself.
   לא תרדה בו בפרך, "Do not rule over it with oppression." Samael will be guilty of the death penalty in the future because he ignored the instructions in this verse as we know from <i>Sukkah</i> 52.
  
  Verse 40
  
  
  
  Verse 41
  
  
  
  Verse 42
  
  
  
  Verse 43
  
  
  
  Verse 44
  
  
  
  Verse 45
  
  
  
  Verse 46
  
  
  
  Verse 47
  
  
  
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   כי לי בני ישראל עבדים, "For the children of Israel are My servants, etc." Why did the Torah write once more עבדי הם, "they are My servants?" Perhaps the point G'd makes here is that "they are My servants" as they are of sacred origin, their souls and their bodies are intrinsically holy independent of the Exodus from Egypt. The factor which obligates the Israelites to conduct themselves in a manner befitting holy creatures is "that I took them out of the land of Egypt." Ever since, G'd says, they themselves realise that they are My servants.
  אני ה׳ אלוקיכם, "I am the Lord your G'd." Why did the verse commence in the third person, i.e. G'd speaking about the Israelites, whereas it concludes with direct speech, i.e. "I am the Lord your G'd?" Perhaps we have to look for the reason in the laws governing the sale and purchase of a slave. We have the law that if someone acquires a Jewish servant he has to free him in the Jubilee year. G'd therefore had to state that the Jew remains His servant also in the Jubilee year and beyond, i.e. עבדי הם. The purchaser of the Jewish servant may argue that this fact is justification for a Jew not being allowed to sell himself into permanent servitude, but this fact does not impose an obligation on the purchaser. If the Jew had sold himself to a resident stranger, גר תושב, that resident stranger would argue that he had no oligation to release the servant merely because of the Jubilee year. G'd therefore states categorically: "I am the Lord your G'd," i.e. I address you the purchaser the very person whom the Torah addressed at the beginning of this paragraph in verse 39 and subsequently in verse 44 when it spoke about ונמכר לך, "and he was sold to you." The Torah wanted to be sure the owner understood that he was expected to comply with the entire legislation recorded here.
  
  
  
  
  
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   את שבתתי תשמורו, "Observe My Sabbaths!" Why did the Torah again repeat the commandment to observe the Sabbath? I believe the Torah wanted to write the commandment of Sabbath-observance next to the commandment preceding it not to make anything resembling idolatrous symbols. This is the Torah's way of reminding us that just as idolatry or rather abstaining from it is equivalent to observing the entire Torah, so Sabbath-observance is also equivalent to observance of the whole Torah. [This does not absolve a person from the observance of any other commandment; it simply means that one demonstrates one's commitment to Torah by either Sabbath-observance or abstaining from anything idolatrous. Ed.]
  In addition to that the fact that the שמיטות are also called "Sabbaths" (compare 28,2) and that commandment is tied to reverence for the Holy Temple, we are reminded of the statement that the Holy Temple was destroyed due to the failure to observe the שמיטה laws (compare 26,34).
  The Torah linked Sabbath-observance to reverence for the Holy Temple to tell us not to become guilty of the destruction of the Temple due to failure to observe the Sabbath. We have pointed out previously that when G'd pours out His anger over stones and wood, this is one way of G'd's restraining His anger at human beings.
  
  Verse 3
  
   אם בחקותי תלכו, "If you walk in My statutes, etc." In <i>Torat Kohanim</i> they explain this as follows: "if the Torah had spoken only about בחוקותי, I would have assumed that what was meant were the מצות. Now that the Torah added the words ואת מצותי, the word בחקותי cannot apply to the מצות seeing the Torah already wrote about them. The additional word בחקותי therefore teaches us that that one has to toil in order to get Torah knowledge." The reason the Torah refers to toiling over Torah by using the expression חקה is because there is a commandment to study matters again and again even if one had already studied them several times and they have been well absorbed. G'd wants us to study Torah out of a fondness for it and this is why He formulated a statute to that effect. We find that our sages in <i>Kohelet Rabbah</i> 3 state that G'd decreed that we will forget part of what we learned in order that we should sit down and learn it repeatedly.
  The reason the word חקותי, "My statutes," is in the plural is an allusion to the two aspects of Torah, i.e. the oral as well as the written Torah. We have a tradition not to spell the word חקתי with the letter ו between the ק and the ת (which would normally indicate that the word is in the plural) in order to emphasise the essential unity of the oral and the written Torah. Another allusion in the plural ending of the word בחקתי is to the instruction G'd gave Joshua in Joshua 1,8 to study (review) Torah by day and by night. We must allocate time to Torah study both by day and by night. This makes Torah-study a dual activity. According to the traditional spelling the study occurs on the same day (date) (i.e. the day following the night) so that essentially we study Torah twice daily. Moreover, the plural hints at the fact that in order to observe G'd's commandments two elements are essential. One has to study Torah and teach it to others as the Torah says in Deut. 11,19: "teach them (the words of Torah) to your children, etc." The word בחקתי therefore refers to both of these activities forming part of walking in G'd's statutes. Moreover, there is the aspect of performing positive commandments and not violating negative commandments. These latter two activities are covered by the words את מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם.
  The reason the Torah uses the term הליכה, walking, when speaking about the חקים is to remind us that one needs to be occupied with matters of Torah even when engaged in walking on one's way, much as when the Torah said in Deut. 6,7 ובלכתך בדרך "and when you walk on the way."
  A second reason why the Torah uses the expression of "walking" in G'd's statutes is based on an interpretation of <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 35,1 of the verse in Psalms 119,59: "I have considered my ways and have turned back to Your decrees." According to the <i>Midrash</i> David had considered daily to do "his own thing" but had found that invariably his feet brought him to the Torah academy or the House of prayer. The lesson is that when one applies oneself to Torah and its precepts diligently one's very organs will automatically help one to head in the spiritually correct direction. You may translate the line: "if according to My statutes, you will find yourselves walking in the right direction."
  A third meaning of the simile "you will walk" is based on the <i>Zohar</i> volume 3 page 202 that Torah can be studied on four different levels, the פשט, רמז, דרוש, and סוד. These four methods between them account for what our sages call the 70 facets of the Torah. Each of these 70 facets is perceived as being a "path" one walks in the study of G'd's statutes. The lesson is that the approach to Torah study should be along a variety of paths.
  A fourth meaning of the word תלכו is based on Proverbs 3,6: בכל דרכיך דעהו, "In all your ways acknowledge Him." Maimonides writes in chapter 3 of his treatise <i>Hilchot Deyot</i> that "a person should set his mind on having a perfect body in order to possess the physical strength to devote himself to Torah study for it is impossible to properly evaluate and understand Torah and G'd's objectives when one suffers from hunger, thirst or physical pain. When one follows the path I suggest regularly, one is a servant of the Lord." Thus far Maimonides. This is the meaning of our verse "if you walk in the path of My statutes," i.e. if your walking is designed to comprehend My statutes. All your physical activities should be guided by the desire to better observe My commandments.
  A fifth reason for the Torah's choice of the word תלכו may be understood in light of <i>Sanhedrin</i> 34 that people studying the Torah have been given permission to offer their respective commentaries and to explore a variety of paths in doing so. [The simile used by the Talmud is that when one beats with a hammer on an anvil the sparks fly in all directions. Ed.] An experienced scholar will elicit new insights through studying the text repeatedly in accordance with his mental capacity. The words ואת מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אותם are perceived as the framework for investigative Torah exploration. As long as the purpose of Torah study is to lead to performance of G'd's commandments, the Torah encourages the pursuit of diverse paths of study. Under no circumstances must the pursuit of novel ways of Biblical exegesis result in what our sages call מגלה פנים בתורה שלא כהלכה, "revelation of aspects of the Torah which conflict with traditional rulings." That which has always been known as impure must not be declared pure nor vice versa. If Torah study results in such abnormal results it is clear that the approach of the scholar was defective, flawed. This is why we are told in <i>Avot</i> 3,11 that anyone who reveals that he has reached a result in his Torah study which upsets traditional הלכות will not enjoy a share in the life after death.
  A sixth reason why the Torah used the word תלכו may be understood in light of <i>Avot</i> 2,6 that an unlearned man cannot truly be pious. This is interpreted to mean that it is forbidden for such a man to practice the lifestyle reserved for the truly pious who impose a variety of restrictive practices upon themselves. The reason is that such a person while thinking that he imposes a restriction upon himself which is pleasing in the eyes of G'd actually contravenes Torah law through his ignorance of what the rules our הלכות are based on. An example of ignorance leading the most well meaning person astray is that the ignorant person knows that it is a commandment to sleep with one's wife on the night following her ritual immersion. He may therefore do so on the night of the Day of Atonement when this is forbidden. For this and simliar reasons the sages forbade the עם הארץ to practice what is called לפנים משורת הדין so that by adhering to the law i.e. בחקתי תלכו walking in My statutes he will perform the מצות properly.
  A seventh reason for the Torah's use of the word תלכו may be related to the statement of our sages in <i>Avot</i> 4 to exile oneself to a place where Torah is to be found. One needs to beat a path to Torah centers in order to study there, hence the Torah speaks of תלכו, "you shall walk." There is a story in <i>Chagigah</i> 5 about a certain Rabbi Idi who used to have to travel 3 months in one direction to attend to his business and three months back home in order to spend a single day in the house of his Rabbi. The Torah suggests here that even if one has the opportunity to study at home it is better to to leave home in order to study and to fulfil the commandment to "walk in My statutes."
  As to the words ואת מצותי תשמרו, these may be understood in light of a comment by our sages in <i>Shabbat</i> 31: "Rabbi Yannai proclaimed: 'how sad if a person who does not own a courtyard constructs an entrance-gate to such a non-existent courtyard.' He referred to people who do not have reverence for G'd and yet study Torah. The important thing is to observe the commandments. Unless studying Torah has as its objective performance of its precepts, such study is of questionable value. When the Torah speaks of בחקותי תלכו it referred to study whereas it admonishes us that this must be in order את מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אותם, 'to observe and perform My commandments.'" We have a statement in <i>Berachot</i> 17 according to which if someone studies for unwholesome reasons he would have been better off if he had never been born. Tossaphot question this statement in light of the well known principle that it is acceptable to do things for the wrong reason because this leads to one eventually doing the right thing for the right reason. They answer that there are two ways of doing things for the wrong reason. 1) To find a reason to criticise G'd's Torah; 2) to gain personal fame due to one's Torah knowledge. If one studies Torah in order to criticise G'd and the Torah scholars it is better if one had not been born at all; if, on the other hand, one had ulterior motives such as wanting to be called Rabbi and the like, we may assume that eventually one will study Torah for the right reasons without ulterior motives. The Torah here assures us that if one does not pursue Torah study for the wrong reasons תשמרו ועשיתם אותם, you will observe and perform My commandments even when confronted with temptation, etc. The Torah you have studied for the right reasons will protect you against the pitfalls and the temptation by Satan. <i>Sotah</i> 21 is on record that Torah protects and saves from the evil inclination; <i>Avodah Zarah</i> 17 tells of Rabbi Chaninah and Rabbi Yonathan who were faced with the choice of either passing a house of idol worship or a whorehouse. They debated which was the worse temptation and decided to pass the house of ill-repute in order to merit the reward for resisting the temptation to enter there. When they reached the house in question the harlots withdrew to the inside. One Rabbi asked the other how they had merited to not even have to come face to face with temptation. The colleague answered by quoting Proverbs 2,11: "Foresight will protect you, understanding will preserve you." If one is on one's guard against temptation one will be fortified against it. Rava concluded that the word מזמה (which we translated as "foresight") refers to matters of harlotry against which Torah study is an effective defence. The word ועשיתם is also understood by <i>Kidushin</i> 39 as follows: "When a person sits still, not committing a sin, he receives the reward due for performing a commandment; they understood this to mean that when a sin approaches him he will be saved from committing it; we learn from here that though a person was only passive in abstaining from wrongdoing it is accounted for him as an activity, i.e. ועשיתם אותם.
  It is true that in <i>Pessachim</i> 50 the Talmud interprets the difference between the expression: "for your kindness extends to the Heavens" (Psalms 57,11) and Psalms 108,5 "for Your kindness extends beyond the Heavens" to mean that the former refers to a person studying Torah שלא לשמה, but to gain honour for himself. The reason for this is not that G'd is so delighted with this kind of Torah study but He is confident of the eventual impact Torah study makes on the student, refining his character and changing his outlook in life. This kind of Torah study does not possess the power to protect the person studying against the temptation by the evil urge. This fact helps us answer the statement of Rabbi Yoseph that Torah protects the student both at the time he is busy studying as well as at other times. The world asks that if this statement is true how was it that the Torah study of Doeg and Achitophel did not protect them against the evil urge in their time? According to our approach we can answer this simply by assuming that their Torah study was not לשמה but that they had ulterior motives and this is why the merit of their Torah study did not act as a shield against the יצר הרע, the evil urge.
  An eighth reason why the Torah wrote the word תלכו in our verse may have been illustrated by the story we related earlier about Rabbi Chaninah and Rabbi Yonathan debating which path to take (<i>Avodah Zarah</i> 17). The Rabbi who had suggested to take the path leading past the house of idolatry did so because he did not worry about the evil urge to commit idolatry, that evil urge having already been destroyed by G'd (compare <i>Sanhedrin</i> 64). The other Rabbi who was prepared to walk by the house of ill-repute was aware of the existence of the temptation but wanted to earn the merit for not succumbing to it. This Rabbi probably relied on having learned Torah לשמה something which would protect him in such situations. He interpreted the three words אם בחקתי תלכו, as a promise by G'd to be able to walk calmly into any situation firm in the knowledge that he had studied G'd's Torah לשמה, for the Torah's sake and not for his own personal reasons. In fact he interpreted the words ועשיתם אותם as an encouragement to face difficult situations rather than to avoid them in order to receive the appropriate reward.
  A ninth reason why the Torh wrote the word תלכו may become clear when we recall a statement in <i>Avot</i> 6,3 that the Torah may be acquired in 48 different ways. This means that not every person who wishes to can "acquire" Torah; there are only 48 different ways in which Torah can be acquired. Our verse warns the potential Torah student that one of the preconditions for acquiring Torah is that one observes G'd's commandments. All the details listed in the <i>Mishnah</i> for successful Torah study are summed up in this one line.
  The tenth reason for the word תלכו is the Torah's desire to communicate to us the exalted nature of Torah study and preoccupation with Torah. It is an activity which cannot be compared to the preoccupation with any other commandment. When a person is preoccupied with the performance of any other commandment, he may or may not succeed as due to some sin he may fail to observe it correctly. When a person studies Torah for the right reason he need not worry that his purpose will be thwarted because of anything wrong he did in the past. Rather, his righteousness will accompany him as we know from <i>Sotah</i> 21 that "a sin may extinguish a מצוה one is in the process of performing; it will not, however, extinguish Torah. This merit will accompany its student on the way to the Hereafter. See what I have written on the subject on Leviticus 18,4: ואת חקתי תשמרו ללכת בהם.
  The eleventh reason why the Torah wrote the word תלכו in our verse is related to the Talmud's (<i>Shabbat</i> 63) interpretation of the verse אורך ימים בימינה, (Proverbs 3,16) "that the "right" side of the Torah offers its student long life." It means that people who keep to the "right" of Torah will enjoy life in the hereafter, whereas the ones keeping on Torah's "left" will enjoy their reward only in this life. The same idea is expressed in our verse, i.e. "if your preoccupation is with My statutes, it should not be for the sake of what Torah has to offer in this life, but תלכו, it should be for the sake of what a Torah student has to look forward to in the hereafter i.e. the group of people who are called the "rightists."
  A twelfth reason for the Torah's use of the word תלכו is connected to the admonition in <i>Avot</i> 3,9: "if a person abuses his acquired wisdom to neutralize his fear of committing a sin, he will find that his wisdom does not endure." The reverse is true also, says the author of that <i>Mishnah</i>. Our verse alludes to the same idea when the Torah writes that the governing consideration in one's effort to acquire Torah wisdom must be to observe the commandments which ensure that one does not commit a sin.
  A thirteenth reason for the word תלכו is based on the first <i>Mishnah</i> in פאה that of all the things for which the Torah did not set a minimum quantity in order for a person to be able to claim that he had fulfilled that particular commandment the study of Torah is the prime example. The word תלכו describes an activity without setting a specific objective to be reached. As long as one is on the way, i.e. studies G'd's statutes, one has complied with the requirement.
  A fourteenth reason for the Torah's use of the word תלכו in our verse is linked to Leviticus 7,37 זאת התורה לעולה למנחה ולחטאת. "This is the law for the burnt-offering, the gift-offering and the sin-offering, etc." Our sages in <i>Menachot</i> 110 explained on this verse that if a person studied the Torah portion dealing with a burnt-offering it is accounted for him as if he had personally offered an animal as a burnt-offering. This is based on Hoseah 14,3: "let us pay with our lips instead of with bulls." This is not the only instance in which Torah study compensates for the performance of a specific commandment. Whenever a commandment is not capable of fulfilment by a person (such as all the legislation involving the priesthood for non-priests) study of the relevant portion in the Torah is accounted for the person studying it as if he had personally fulfilled that commandment. Accordingly we understand אם בחקתי תלכו followed by ואת מצותי תשמרו to mean that "if you study the commandments which you can only study, then you will be considered as having fulfilled My commandments." The word תשמרו means you are anxiously awaiting an opportunity to physically fulfil such commandments. As a result -ועשיתם אותם, you will not only receive the reward for studying the laws in question but for having fulfilled them physically.
  A fifteenth reason for the word תלכו may be the reverse of the coin. A person should not use his study of G'd's commandments as an excuse not to perform them physically. The words ואת מצותי תשמרו, refer to the negative commandments which you have to observe. The only commandments one is relieved from observing as a result of Torah study are the ones which are incapable of fulfilment either temporarily or permanently.
  A sixteenth reason for the word תלכו may be connected to a statement in <i>Berachot</i> 14 that a person must not set out on a journey until he had studied some words of Torah. [My text only says that one must not do one's thing before one has prayed. Ed.] The <i>Zohar</i> volume 1 page 69 writes that if people engage in a journey together without exchanging words of Torah between them they are endangering their lives. Accordingly we may understand the word in our verse to mean: "if you study Torah, i.e. go in My statutes, you will travel safely seeing that the merit of Torah study accompanies and protects a person."
  A seventeenth reason for the word תלכו is based on <i>Shabbat</i> 63 where the Talmud speaks of someone who had intended to perform a commandment but was prevented from doing so by forces beyond his control. The fact that the Torah speaks in the future tense in our verse is understood as an allusion to just such a situation. The Torah therefore assures such a person that G'd will consider the good intention as actually having been executed. You will be rewarded as if you had performed the commandment.
  The eighteenth reason for the word תלכו is related to <i>Sukkah</i> 45 where the elite (people experiencing some revelation of the שכינה) of the Jewish people are divided into three levels. The lowest level is the group granted what is termed a "blurred vision." The next higher level of the elite are the people who are granted a "clear vision." The highest level of the elite are those who enjoy such communications without first having to obtain special permission from G'd. I have explained Job 3,19 קטון וגדול שם הוא ועבד חפשי מאדוניו, "both the small and the great are there and the slave is free of his masters" in a similar sense. The "small" refers to the person granted a blurred vision, the "great" to the the person granted a clear vision, and the slave who is free of his masters refers to the person who does not need to ask permisssion in order to receive a communication from G'd. The word קטון is an allusion to the "small luminary," the moon in Genesis 1,16, whereas the word גדול is borrowed from the same verse where it refers to the sun. I would not be sure what are the criteria by means of which a human being achieves the great honour described in that verse. This is why the Torah here defined the rules by saying אם בחקתי תלכו, to tell us that Torah study, performance of its precepts, and the manner in which we do so is the key to achieving this level of communication with G'd.
  The nineteenth reason for the word תלכו in our verse is related to <i>Sanhedrin</i> 102 where the Talmud describes G'd asking Jerobam king of Israel, to repent so that both G'd, Jerobam, and David could stroll together in Paradise. Kabbalists explain that the "strolling" the Talmud had in mind is hyperbole for the most intimate and delightful communication. Hail to a human being who is granted this kind of intimacy with the Divine. The way to achieve such a goal is via אם בחקת תלכו, walking in the paths of G'd's statutes, etc. Torah is the means enabling a human being to penetrate areas closed to normal individuals.
  The twentieth reason why the Torah saw fit to write אם בחקתי תלכו may be appreciated in conjunction with <i>Yalkut Shimoni</i> item 831 on Psalms. We are told there that when G'd created man He did not do so in order for man merely to remain stationary in this present world forever and not to commit a sin. In fact, such an existence would in itself represent spiritual decline and be sinful. It had always been G'd's intention for man to ascend to the celestial regions just as did the prophet Elijah (Kings II 2,11). Due to the original sin, man has to have his skin removed and his body remains behind in this world when his soul ascends to Heaven. Our verse informs us that by means of intensive preoccupation with Torah he may overcome the pain involved in separation of body and soul but to feel like a person who walks from one place to another when that day arrives. In other words: אם בחקתי, if you are deeply engrossed in My statutes then you will merely walk from the physical domain to the celestial domain. [The relevant passage in Psalms is chapter 82 verse 6. Ed.] <i>The Zohar</i> volume 2 page 174 states that the truly righteous do not feel the pain of dying and that this is what Solomon alluded to when he said in Kohelet 5,11: "sweet is the sleep of the labourer." When someone labours on behalf of G'd his sleep i.e. his death is sweet and he accepts it with joy. Elijah is living proof that if one intensifies one's Torah study even one's body does not die.
  The twenty-first reason for the word תלכו in our verse is related to a statement in <i>Avot</i> 4,22 that man had no control over his being born, nor does he have any control over when he may die. The Rabbi meant that man does not die voluntarily even if he wants to die (at a certain point in his life). Alternatively, if he expresses a wish to die he is not free to do so. We are told in <i>Niddah</i> 36: "When Rav was about to die he told Rabbi Assi to instruct a certain Shilo that he had changed his opinion about a certain ruling he had given. The latter refused to believe this and told his wife to prepare his תכריכין, the gown he was to be buried in, as he wanted to die and confront Rav in Heaven concerning this halachic ruling. His wife complied and he died, etc." We see from this incident that on occasion man is in control as to when he wants to die. Our verse אם בחקתי תלכו teaches us what are the criteria which determine who is of such stature that G'd honours his wish to die at a certain time even though it is not the time at which G'd had originally intended for that person to die.
  The twenty-second reason why the Torah wrote the word תלכו in our verse is to teach us about the exceptional usefulness of profound Torah study. A person preoccupied with Torah constantly pines for ascent to a higher world because he appreciates the value his personality will derive from sitting in the celestial regions close to G'd. I have explained Psalms 49,16 in that sense. The Psalmist says: "But G'd will redeem my life from the clutches of שאול, Hades, for He will take me. Selah." The author, one of Korach's sons, means that when a person is certain that he will not be consigned to שאול but will enjoy גן עדן after he leaves this world, he becomes filled with the desire to proceed to that sphere, i.e. יקחני סלה. These words are a prayer to G'd. You may compare <i>Yalkut Shimoni</i> in <i>Parshat Massey</i> item 787 that when Aaron ascended <i>Hor Hahor</i> on the way to die he said to Moses that if he had known the manner of his death beforehand he would have volunteered to die sooner. This is what is alluded to in our verse אם בחקתי תלכו, "if you follow My statutes by toiling in your application to Torah study, you will be willing to march, תלכו, towards death."
  The twenty-third allusion in the words אם בחקתי תלכון is found in connection with a comment of the <i>Zohar</i> volume 3 page 91 on Leviticus 22,27: "when an ox or sheep is born, etc." The author points out that the essential difference between man and beast is that "once a beast always a beast;" man, on the other hand, is able to refine himself into something far superior to what he is at birth. Man's deeds are the key to his spiritual elevation. Man is endowed with greater and greater potential in accordance with the merits he accumulates. The Torah here provides the key as to how these merits may be earned. This is the meaning of אם בחקתי חלכו, study of and immersion in Torah enables one to progress, תלכו.
  A twenty-fourth approach to our verse is based on the <i>Zohar's</i> comment in volume 1 page 175 on Proverbs 6,22: "When you walk it will guide you." The paths by means of which you will experience spiritual ascent when you leave this world normally lead to a region of darkness and the shadow of death. These regions abound with rebuke by G'd. If, however, a person leaves this life equipped with Torah, it will light the path for him as we know from Psalms 119,105: "Your word is a lamp at my feet, a light for my path." The Torah's recommendation is therefore אם בחוקתי, if you are equipped with My statutes, you will walk, you will proceed." If not, your fate is expressed by Proverbs 4,19: "the path of the wicked is like darkness."
  A twenty-fifth lesson to be derived from the word תלכו in our verse is that the Torah refers here to a commandment known as חקה, i.e. the commandment to wear phylacteries. In Exodus 13,10 the Torah specifically refers to this commandment as a חקה, statute, when we read: ושמרתם את החקה הזאת, "you shall observe this statute." Prior to that statement the Torah had spoken (verse 9) about placing phylacteries on one's head and one's arm as a commemoration of the Exodus and G'd's part in it. When the Torah describes performance of the commandment with the word תלכו, you must remember that in former days the average Jew wore his phylacteries all day long, on his way to prayer, on his way to study, etc. In fact, we are told in <i>Sukkah</i> 28 that Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai and Rabbi Yehudah Hanassi did not use to walk a distance of eight feet without first putting on their phylacteries. This is what the words אם בחקתי תלכו are all about. When the Torah adds ואת מצותי תשמרו this refers to the regulations governing the wearing of phylacteries such as that one must have a clean body in order to be permitted to wear תפלין. <i>Shabbat</i> 49 makes a point of warning us against passing gas while wearing phylacteries. One must not fail to be conscious of wearing phylacteries and what this implies. The Torah adds: ועשיתם אתם the word <i>otam</i> being spelled <i>attem</i> "you." This is a hint that by wearing phylacteries and fulfilling the regulations attached to that you will refine yourselves so that G'd's Presence will come to rest upon you. This is what is meant by Deut. 28,10: "and all the nations will observe that the name of G'd is proclaimed upon you."
  A twenty-sixth allusion to be found in these words can be gleaned from <i>Bereshit Rabbah</i> 44,12 on Genesis 15,5: "please look at the sky." G'd meant that Abraham should look beyond a universe governed by horoscopic influences. The words חקתי in our verse mean that if we concentrate on G'd's statutes instead of on what are perceived as the laws of nature as reflected by horoscopic influences, תלכו, "you will be able to proceed" beyond what you think is the limitation imposed on your fate by astrological factors. Abraham succeded in doing so and that is why he was able to father children although he had thought that the horoscopic constellation under which he was born made this impossible. The Torah adds: ועשיתם אתם. Isaiah 41,2 refers to צדק יקראהו לרגלו when speaking about Abraham. According to the Talmud in <i>Shabbat</i> 156 G'd asked Abraham if he thought that his fate was governed by the star צדק, Jupiter. Clearly, Abraham was occupied with astrology and had examined what his chances were to father children else he would not have said to G'd that He had prevented him from having them. How would he have known if not through a study of astrology? He did, however, give G'd credit for having arranged the constellations even at that stage of his development. We have to understand the words ועשיתם אתם as an instruction how to re-arrange the laws of nature in our favour through observance of G'd's statutes. This is the real meaning of the saying of our sages there that אין מזל לישראל, "the fortunes of the Jewish people are not irrevocably determined by astrological factors." Another way of interpreting the meaning of the words ועשיתם אתם, is based on Isaiah 66,22: "just as the new heaven and the new earth which I shall make will stand before Me;" G'd did not speak of something He had already made,עשיתי, but about something He would do. This teaches that Torah study and performing of its precepts lead to the creation of an entire new universe (compare <i>Zohar</i> volume 1 page 5). The Torah tells us that it is up to us to bring this about, i.e. ועשיתם אתם.
  A twenty-seventh approach to our verse is connected to the statement in <i>Shabbat</i> 156 that a person born under the constellation Venus would tend to be lecherous. Another statement we find there is that the Chaldaens told the mother of Rabbi Nachman that her son was going to be a thief. She made sure he always had his head covered as a reminder that he had a G'd above him to whom he was accountable. These and other examples seem to prove that our sages thought that Israelites are subject to the influence of horoscopic constellations during the hour of their birth! G'd was very conscious of the fact that if we were allowed to think along those lines we would use our <i>mazzal</i> as an excuse to claim that we were predestined to be evil and could not be held accountable. This is why the Torah had to write אם בחקתי, if you rely merely on the laws of nature such as astrological constellations,תלכו, you will cause yourselves to walk along a path that does not free you from accountability; but ואת מצותי תשמרו if nonetheless you will observe My commandments then your מזל is subject to change just as happened to Rabbi Nachman, i.e. ועשיתם אתם, you will be the architect of reversing the horoscopic influences you were born under.
  A twenty-eighth way of interpreting the wording of our verse. We again refer to folio 156 in <i>Shabbat</i>. We are told there that someone born under the constellation of Mars [the hour when that constellation predominates, Ed.] will be a bloodthirsty man. Rabbi Ashi suggested a variety of ways for channelling such tendencies into something harmless and useful, such as such people becoming butchers or physicians concerned with performing bloodletting, or performers of circumcisions. According to that approach the words אם בחקתי refer to channelling a predeliction to engage in a nefarious vocation due to the horoscopic influences under which one has been born into something acceptable so that one can neutralise these influences. This is why the Torah exhorts את מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אתם, to channel what were perceived to be negative traits into something positive, i.e. Torah study and a vocation involving מצוה-performance.
  A twenty-ninth way of explaining the wording in our verse reflects something we have learned from <i>Sifri Ha-azinu</i> that a person has to learn a moral lesson from observing the laws of nature in operation. We observe the planets all performing G'd's directives joyfully, never deviating from their orbits. The Torah speaks of אם, "if" you walk in My statutes; the lesson the Torah teaches is that if, like the planets, we will approach G'd's statutes with an attitude similar to that of the planets in their orbits, we will succeed in observing all of G'd's commandments both the negative ones and the positive ones. Our inspiration should be derived from the planets who obey G'd although they do not receive a reward for their loyalty nor do they face penalties for non-compliance.
  A thirtieth way of looking at our verse is based on Avot 3,17 that "where there is no prosperity Torah cannot flourish, whereas where there is no Torah you cannot expect economic prosperity." I have explained that <i>Mishnah</i> to mean that the words "if there is no flour" mean that when you observe that G'd grants His blessing you may be certain that the reason for this is the presence of Torah. This is what Moses had in mind in Deut. 32,2 when he said: "let my doctrine drop as the rain." Just as rain is caused by G'd alone, so in accordance with the amount He wishes to supply, our economic prosperity is due to our absorbing and living in accordance with G'd's doctrine. On the other hand, when you observe lack of economic prosperity you may similarly attribute this to the fact that Torah is not being studied and observed by the multitude. When the Torah speaks about אם בחקתי this means that if you want to be the beneficiary of My statutes, i.e. the causal relationship between economic prosperity and G'd you must observe My commandments. The words ואת מצותי תשמרו are similar to the word לקחי used by Moses as the measure of the rain G'd will allocate in the verse we quoted from פרשת האזינו above. The Torah added the words ועשיתם אתם as a reminder that if we want prosperity to be constant we must be constant in מצוה-performance.
  A thirty-first meaning of the words in our verse is related to Psalms 72,5: "Let them fear you as long as the sun shines, etc." our sages in <i>Berachot</i> 29 comment on this verse that the time for all creatures to perform their service for the Lord is in the morning, the time allocated for our morning prayers. The next time for the creatures to perform their service for G'd is when the sun sets. We may understand the meaning of אם בחקתי תלכו as reflecting Psalms 55,15: "let us walk together in G'd's house when there is turmoil (outside)." The words ואת מצותי תשמרו refer to the practice of the early חסידים who used to assemble an hour before prayer in order to prepare themselves emotionally (<i>Berachot</i> 29). The words ועשיתם אתם are to be understood as a medicine against natural disasters involving the sun and the moon (eclipses and the like which are interpreted as harbingers of catastrophes) The premise underlying this concept is that misconduct by the inhabitants of the "lower" part of the universe will have an impact on the conduct of the planets, especially those influencing our daily lives such as the sun and moon (compare <i>Sukkah</i> 29).
  The thirty-second allusion found in the words אם בחקתי תלכו is related to the word חקה being applied by the Torah to animal sacrifice as we know from Leviticus 6,11 and 7,36. The words then mean that these sacrifices will be acceptable only if they are the result of observing the commandments pertaining to these sacrifices, i.e. ואת מצותי חשמרו. A stolen animal is not fit to be offered as a sacrifice as we have the principle of מצוה הבאה בעברה, that the fulfilment of a commandment is worthless if one had to commit a transgression in order to fulfil it. Even if the person from whom such an animal was stolen had already abandoned hope to retrieve it such an animal is not acceptable to G'd as a sacrifice. A stolen animal is in the same category as one that is physically flawed, such as a lame animal. <i>Sukkah</i> 30 quotes Rabbi Yochanan interpreting Isaiah 61,8: אני ה׳ אהב משפט שונא גזל בעולה, "I the Lord love justice and hate robbery in a burnt-offering" to mean that G'd hates a burnt-offering consisting of a stolen animal. He compared such an offering to a king who passed the customs house telling his subjects to join him in paying the duties required. The servants asked him: "do not the proceeds of all duties belong to you anyway? The king answered that the travellers were to learn from his personal conduct not to engage in smuggling. Similarly, G'd hates a sacrifice which is a stolen animal although in the last analysis all animals belong to Him. We have learned in <i>Kidushin</i> 39 that if someone is presented with an opportunity to commit a sin and is saved from committing it, he is rewarded as if he had performed a positive commandment. This is the reason the Torah does not want a stolen animal as a sacrifice. We are to train ourselves to escape from anything which smacks of robbery (even if according to legal yardsticks the animal in question had become ownerless prior to its being a sacrifice due to its former owner having mentally given up on ever getting it back). The Torah calls failure to offer such an animal מעשה, a deed, i.e. ועשיתם אתם, even though in the literal sense of the words no deed had been performed.
  A thirty-third way of explaining the words אם בחקתי תלכו in our verse has to do with the perception of ordinary people when they evaluate מצוה-performance. Most people believe that unless they understand the deeper significance of a commandment they perform such performance is as useless as a body without a soul. In fact the <i>Ari Zal</i> is reported to have said something to this effect according to <i>Likutey Torah Parshat Eykev</i> where the author quotes him as saying that a deed which lacks proper concentration is comparable to an empty vessel seeing that the most important element of the commandment are the thoughts which accompany its performance. Accordingly, the words אם בחקתי תלכו mean that if you have the right thoughts when about to perform My statutes you may consider that you have performed My commandments in the manner G'd wanted you to perform them. The plural of the word מצותי then refers to the various aspects of מצוה-performance. A person might then conclude that if the thoughts accompanying the performance are all important, why did he have to perform the deed itself? The Torah warns you not to jump to such a conclusion by completing the verse with the words ועשיתם אתם, i.e. the thoughts count in your favour only when you also performed the actual deed. G'd only considers the thought as sufficient when you are prevented from carrying out the deed through forces beyond your control.
  A thirty-fourth reason for the wording of our verse is based on Rabbi Karo's (<i>Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim</i>) ruling in <i>Hilchot Tefillin</i> 32,18. This is what he writes: "If a letter in the parchment is attached to an adjoining letter so that there is no space separating these two letters, the phylactery is unfit for use." [The difficulty with the writing of phylacteries is that the letters must be written in the order in which they appear in the Torah and are not subject to correction once they were not written in the proper order. Ed.] The <i>Rosh</i> in his discussion of the laws pertaining to the writing of a Torah scroll writes that if two letters touched each other this results in the Torah scroll being unfit to read from; however, if the scribe succeeds in separating these two letters through rubbing out the area where they are attached, the Torah scroll is fit to be used. We learn from the above two quotations that whereas one may rub out part of the letter in the Torah scroll the same is not allowed in a parchment intended for use in the phylacteries. Our verse alludes to this ruling if we understand the word בחקתי as a reference to חקיקה, a form of erasure. The Torah tells us תלכו you may "go ahead," i.e. erase some of My statutes whereas you must strictly preserve מצותי תשמרו, other commandments of Mine, i.e. the laws of the phylacteries, by not erasing any part of them even if it is only the area where two letters touch each other. The words ועשיתם אתם may be understood as reflecting a ruling by the <i>Rosh</i> in his responsum number 16, principle number 3. He writes: "When the open letter מ (as opposed to the final letter ם) has accidentally been written in a manner which makes it appear as if it is closed, it may be completely erased [literally to hollow out, לחקק Ed.] and a new letter מ may be written in its place. [This refers to the rules about writing a Torah scroll. Ed.] If instead of following the procedure indicated the scribe "erased" the part of the original מ which was closed so that it now appears as a regular מ as intended originally, this does not make a usable letter of it as it violates the principle of חק תוכות, "hollowing out instead of writing." We have been taught in <i>Gittin</i> 20 that one must not write by means of hollowing out a blot of ink so that one winds up with the outlines of the letter one wanted to write. All this is derived from the directive ועשיתם אתם, not to hollow it out but to scrape off the whole letter and rewrite it.
  A thirty-fifth reason for the Torah writing the words אם בחקתי תלכו may reflect what later authorities such as <i>Magen Avraham</i> write in chapter 143 of the <i>Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim.</i> We find the following comment: "If one finds two letters stuck together in a Torah scroll one may continue to read from it and does not have to take out another scroll from the Holy Ark to continue reading." The reason is that the imperfection is capable of being remedied by the simple expedient of erasure of the offensive area. We therefore apply the well-known principle of כל שראוי לבילה, that if there is enough oil in a mixture of flour and oil for an offering to thoroughly wet all the flour through proper mixing, we consider all the flour as having been wetted although the mixing had not been carried out (<i>Menachot</i> 103). Other authorities such as the author of <i>Turey Zahav</i> on chapter 32 in the <i>Orach Chayim</i> point out that although the letters had been noticed on the Sabbath, a day on which no repair could be made due to the nature of the day, this still does not prevent us from continuing to read in that Torah scroll because the inability to make the repair is not due to the nature of the Torah scroll itself but only to the day which happens to be the Sabbath. What does all this have to do with our verse? The Torah writes אם בחקתי, that if something is subject to being "erased," i.e. the place where the two letters touch, תלכו, you have permission to give a permissive ruling, i.e. you may continue to read without having to take out another Torah scroll. This is so even at a time when you cannot make the correction because of מצותי i.e. the restriction on writing due to the Sabbath. The reason that you are allowed to carry on reading is ועשיתם אתם, because in principle you are permitted to make the necessary correction as soon as the Sabbath is over.
  A thirty-sixth meaning of our words is connected with the ruling of Rabbi Karo in <i>Yoreh Deyah</i> 276,11. This is what he writes: "if a letter was attached to another letter forming the name of G'd, it may be erased." <i>Mordechai</i> comments in <i>Menachot</i> on this subject that although the <i>halachah</i> not to erase the letters of the name of G'd is derived from Deut.12,4 "you must not do so to the Lord your G'd," in this instance we are concerned with an erasure in order to achieve a correction. This is the meaning of the words אם בחקתי תלכו, i.e. "even though I have forbidden you to 'erase' (חקק), when such 'erasure' serves the purpose of making a correction you may proceed." The word תלכו is used in a sense similar to Exodus 18,20: "and the way they are to walk." The additional words ואת מצותי are a condition to touch only the area where the two letters touch each other but not to erase either of the letters themselves. The reason the Torah wrote מצותי in the plural is because two letters are involved. Perhaps one may also see in these words an allusion to what we learned in <i>Shavuot</i> 35 that it is forbidden to erase a suffix attached at the end of the name of G'd. This may be the reason that the Torah employed the word מצותי in the plural, i.e. not only G'd's name must not be erased but also the suffix must not be erased. When a letter of the next word is attached to such a suffix it must not be erased as it has been hallowed by the name of G'd preceding it. The words ועשיתם אתם provide the background to the comment of the Mordechai that one may erase the area in which the letters are joined seeing that when one does this it is something constructive, i.e. ועשיתם. This expression may also be the justification for a <i>halachah</i> in <i>Massechet Sofrim</i> chapter 5 that if the scribe's ink spilled onto a letter of the name of G'd already written, he may erase that inkstain because his intention is to restore the name of G'd not to erase it. <i>Bet Yoseph</i> quoting Ri of Ascandrani writes that even if one of the letters is lost (damaged) the scribe may erase the rest of it in order to restore it. We may base this on the word אותם in the expression ועשיתם אותם, i.e. even if the letter itself has to be erased this is acceptable. The condition we read into the words ואת מצותי is applicable when the only problem we have to deal with is that the area where two letters are attached to one another, something that can be fixed by thinning the letters through a slight erasure at the place they are joined. When we are dealing with an inkstain blotting out part of the letter this restriction does not apply.
  A thirty-seventh reason for the words אם בחקתי תלכו in our verse may be something we learned in <i>Rosh Hashanah</i> 21. Rav Hunnah bar Avin sent an instruction to Rava: "When you observe that according to the Jewish calendar the winter season [which ends with the equinox on the 22nd of March in our solar calendar, Ed.] would end later than the 16th of Nissan, extend the year (add an extra month of Adar) in order to comply with the Biblical requirement that the Passover festival is to occur in spring i.e. after the equinox (Deut. 16,1)." Our verse speaks of אם בחקתי תלכו meaning that you should apply the calculations on which you base your calendar to comply with the laws of nature, i.e. astronomical considerations based on interaction between solar and lunar orbits. The word אם is conditional, i.e. ואת מצותי תשמרו so that you will also be able to fulfil My commandments, i.e. that פסח is to occur during spring. The words ועשיתם אתם are your authority to manipulate the calendar so that you can do justice to both requirements, as per the instructions of Rav Hunnah bar Avin to Rava.
  A thirty-eighth reason for the wording in our verse may be to provide backing for something we learned in <i>Shabbat</i> 156. "Two scholars, Shemuel and the Gentile scholar Avlet, were sitting together when they observed certain people walk towards a lake. Avlet pointed to a certain man in that group and said that the individual in question would not reach that lake alive. A snake would bite him and he would die. Shemuel replied that if the person in question was a Jew he would reach his destination alive. It so happened that the person in question reached the lake alive. When the man in question passed the two scholars on his way back from the lake, Avlet examined his rucksack and found a snake in it which had been crushed to death. Shemuel questioned the man to find out what merit he had which had saved him from imminent death. The man told him that the group he belonged to would usually eat lunch together, each one unpacking his lunch-box and throwing the contents into a common pool. On that particular day one of them had not brought a lunch and he felt embarassed about not having anything to contribute to the common pool. The person who had the snake in his rucksack pretended to take bread from the rucksack of his companion who did not bring any food and threw his own bread into the common pool so as to save his friend from embarassment. Shemuel complimented him on the noble deed. The story indicates that although according to hososcopic influences the man in question would have died on the way, the fact that he had accumulated a merit saved him from the death horoscopic influences would have foreshadowed. This is the meaning of אין מזל לישראל, that Jews need not be the victims of horoscopic influences. The words in our verse provide the condition under which we can free ourselves from unfavourable horoscopic influences. The so-called חקות, horoscopically decreed laws, are inoperative if את מצותי תשמרו, you will observe My commandments.
  A thirty-ninth reason why the Torah chose the wording it did in our verse has to do with what we learned in <i>Pessachim</i> 56. We are told that King Chiskiyah destroyed the copper snake Moses constructed (Numbers 21,9). The reason he did so was because he observed people making an idolatrous symbol out of it. The construction of the snake at the time had been a חקה, statute, which G'd had legislated in order that by looking at the copper snake people would demonstrate their trust in G'd. When people started to relate to it in the opposite manner, believing it had magic qualities, the time had come to destroy it. Chiskiyah interpreted our verse simply as follows: "as long (אם) My statutes serve spiritual progress i.e. תלכו, it was alright to look at that copper snake. If, however, this was no longer the case, then the overriding consideration became ואת מצותי תשמרו the need to observe G'd's commandments.
  A fortieth justification for why the Torah wrote these words in our verse may be that the Torah speaks here about the people eating untithed produce. We find that people who do this are guilty of death, and that even a priest who does so is guilty of the same. You have good reason to wonder why it is that a priest who is allowed to eat the tithe (תרומה) itself, should be forbidden on pain of death to eat from a quantity of produce which by definition is a mixture of both תרומה, the tithe due to a priest and ordinary produce which has no status as something sacred? We must conclude that the law is in the nature of a חוקה, statute, concerning which G'd has not revealed a rationale. Our verse tells us that if the priest will walk in G'd's statutes not to eat from untithed produce he will contribute to the fulfilment of את מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אתם that the produce will become permissible to eat for the Israelite once the commandment of tithing it has been performed on it.
  The forty-first reason the Torah has written the words אם בחקתי תלכו in our verse may be connected with the advice we are offered in <i>Avot</i> 2,10 to repent one day before one's death. If one heeds this advice one is a penitent all one's life. The Torah therefore says אם בחקתי תלכו if you will be constantly conscious of My statutes that man is bound to die then you will surely be motivated to observe My commandments so that you can face the Day of Judgment.
  A forty-second meaning for the words אם בחקתי תלכו in this verse may become clear when we look at a passage in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 85 where one of the scholars was given a sign by the prophet Elijah how to recognise the chair of Rabbi Chiyah because the latter did not require angels to lift his chair to the celestial regions. Rabbi Chiyah's chair ascended unassisted. The reason Rabbi Chiyah merited this was his unequalled vigor in studying Torah and teaching it. The word תלכו alludes to this energetic approach to Torah study. When a person studies and teaches with the vigor of a Rabbi Chiyah his chair will ascend all by itself, i.e. תלכו.
  
  Verse 4
  
   ונתתי גשמיכם בעתם, "And I will provide your rains at their proper time." We must first understand why the verse commences with the letter ו seeing the verse is not preceded by another promise that this verse adds on to. If you accept my interpretation of the word תלכו itself being the promise in the last verse, there is no need to wonder about the letter ו at the beginning of this verse.
  The letter ו may also be justifiable in light of the plain meaning of this verse appearing to promise that there is a reward for observing the commandments in this life and that this reward is the beneficial rainfall. One might assume therefore that G'd has discharged His promise of rewarding us for מצוה-observance with economic prosperity. The letter ו indicates that prior to promising any benefit for our observance in this life the Torah had already promised reward in the hereafter in the previous verse. I have alluded to this in one of my commentaries on the words אם בחקתי תלכו. Alternatively, the key to the verse is the suffix כם in the word גשמיכם, "your rains." Normally, we would have considered that seeing the rain comes from heaven it is G'd's rain. The Torah had previously promised a reward in the hereafter, which is something no one in this world can experience. The Torah therefore wanted us to know that there is something over and beyond that in our world but that it emanates from the celestial spheres. In order that we should not look upon these rains as a reward for Torah observance G'd describes them as "your rains." It is something that is ours not as a result of our מצוה-observance but because the Torah scholars are the pillars of the world. Anyone who studies Torah is entitled to view them as something belonging to him. Perhaps it is this consideration which led <i>Baba Kama</i> 38 to conclude that since the Israelites can lay claim to the whole world based on this consideration, the properties of the Gentiles legally belong to them. [The Talmud there bases the ruling that the Jewish owner of an ox which gores an animal belonging to a Gentile does not have to pay compensation, on Chabakuk 3,6. Ed.]
  Another reason why the verse commences with the letter ו may be G'd telling us that although we receive the rain as a gift from Him, He does not consider it as belonging or having belonged to Him but as belonging to "you."
  The Torah is careful to use the word: "And I will give," to underline that it is the exclusive domain of G'd to provide rain both quantitatively and qualitatively. He alone can judge how much rain is needed by the earth in the land of Israel. This is the meaning of <i>Vayikra Rabbah</i> 28,3 that while man lies down to sleep G'd is busy gathering the clouds to provide rain.
  The word גשמיכם may be understood as a collective term for food or nourishment, both the kind which is required for the earth, and that which is required for the creatures inhabiting it. There is both spiritual and physical nourishment. The earth is recipient of nourishment in the form of rain or dew. I have explained all this in my commentary on פרשת בהר.
  
  Verse 5
  
   והשיג לכם דיש את בציר. "And your threshing shall reach unto the vintage, etc." This is the blessing applicable to the crop after it has been harvested. Our sages in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 42 have taught that when one enters one's barn in order to measure the size of one's crop one is to recite an appropriate prayer invoking G'd's blessing. If G'd would not bless the crop also after man had harvested it such a prayer would be inadmissible as one must not ask G'd for something that has already been determined. Please read my comments on Leviticus 25,21 on the words ועשת את התבואה.
  ואכלתם לחמכם לשובע, "and you will eat your bread to your satisfaction." This is the blessing G'd bestows on the food after we have eaten it and it is within our bowels as stated in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> who write "one eats a small amount and it is blessed within one's entrails."
  Another meaning of these words is that you will not suffer from a fairly common phenomenon that in spite of large quantities of food intake one does not feel satiated; G'd promises that one will feel completely satiated.
  Another meaning may be related to <i>Megillah</i> 7 where we are told of a popular proverb according to which the stomach is always able to accomodate an additional amount of good tasting food and although one previously had one's fill one can still enjoy this.
  The emphasis on the word לחמכם means that there is no need for relishes and other additions but that the bread itself will taste so well a person will not look for any additional condiments.
  There may also be a veiled promise here that even if one eats over and beyond what is needed such eating will not hurt one as opposed to <i>Gittin</i> 70.
  Still another lesson contained in our verse is related to <i>Sotah</i> 48 where the <i>Mishnah</i> describes the quality of fruit in the land of Israel as having declined dramatically both in taste and food value after the destruction of the Temple. The Mishnah meant that when the fruit contains what is described as שומן, a person eating thereof will experience the feeling of being sated. The reverse is the case when that element called שומן is absent. The Torah promises here that the feeling of satiation will be experienced even if one merely eats bread as G'd has endowed the grain with the element called שומן.
  וישבתם לבטח בארצכם, "and you will dwell securely in your land." This promise is most important because all the preceding promises are esentially meaningless unless one can live free from worry that an enemy will invade one's country. G'd promises continued prosperity uninterrupted by the need to defend one's country at the expense of growing crops. The word בארצכם underscores that the whole world will recognise that the land of Israel is rightfully yours.
  Another aspect of the blessing contained in this verse is that foreigners will perform the heavy labour in our country whereas the Israelites will "sit securely in your land," not even worrying that the foreign labourers may steal and cheat them out of their harvest.
  
  Verse 6
  
   ונתתי שלום בארץ, "and I will grant peace to the land." Why did the Torah have to mention this seeing it had already promised us that we would dwell securely in our land? Perhaps the Torah refers to the people of Israel keeping the peace amongst themselves, that there would not be internal divisiveness. G'd promises to implant a tendency for mutual tolerance amongst the people. Remember that when the Torah speaks of the land it usually describes it as "your land," i.e. the land with a suffix. When the word ארץ is used without the suffix it refers to the whole earth. In this instance you find that G'd wants universal peace. When you consider the 70 bulls the Israelites offered in the Holy Temple on behalf of the Gentile nations on Sukkot, our rabbis in <i>Sukkah</i> 55 speak about this. Moreover, whenever wars occur on earth even people who are at peace in their respective countries worry about their becoming themselves involved in warfare. This is why the Torah adds the assurance ושכבתם ואין מחריד, "you will lie down to sleep without anyone frightening you."
  והשבתי חיה רעה מו הארץ, "and I will banish wild beasts from the land." In view of G'd having promised that everyone will dwell securely under his respective fig tree and vineyard it is likely that people will not travel a lot and the outlying roads may become relatively deserted so that the roaming beasts may lose their fear of man. G'd promises that He will see to it that there will be a decrease in such activities The word הארץ must be understood as the land where these wild beasts normally have their lairs and from where they forage. This explains why the Torah did not use the expression בארצכם in this instance.
  
  Verse 7
  
   ורדפתם את אויביכם, "and you will pursue your enemies." Why does the Torah have to give the Israelites this assurance after having assured them of dwelling securely and no one frightening them? The assurances which preceded this verse related to Israel feeling secure from surrounding nations. The latter would neither cause death nor destruction. Now the Torah speaks about relations between Israel and the nations with Israel as the aggressor. The Torah assures Israel that the promise of safety from invasion does not mean that it ties Israel's hands versus its neighbours. The Torah therefore speaks of the Israelites pursuing their enemies. This reinforces the previous assurances. Even though Israel may have started a pre-emptive campaign against its enemies, G'd assures them of success. They will return to their country not having to fear retaliation. If the Torah called the opponents of Israel "enemies," this was not because they invaded the country but because they are enemies of the Lord. The wicked people amongst the Gentiles are always referred to as both G'd's enemies and hence our enemies. It is a law of nature that the Gentile nations hate us.
  ונפלו לפניכם לחרב. "and they will fall before you by the sword." The unusual לחרב instead of בחרב, by the sword, is a hyperbole. The way the enemies will fall before the Jewish armies will be similar to their falling by the sword. A moral-ethical approach to these words conjures up the deeds of the Hasmoneans. The historian Josephus describes seeing an angel of the Lord drawing his sword against the enemy. When the Torah speaks here of ונפלו, they will fall, it may refer to the thrusts of the sword by the angel.
  
  Verse 8
  
   ורדפו מכם חמשה מאה, "And five of you will put one hundred of them to flight, etc." The obvious difficulty in our verse is that the enemies will fall before the pursuing Jewish army. This promise included such assurances as that even ten thousand enemy soldiers would fall before as few as two Jewish soldiers. Why did the Torah now limit the blessing contained in the previous verse?
  I believe the verses have to be explained in accordance with what we learned in <i>Sotah</i> 11 that G'd always quantifies a blessing more generously than He quantifies a curse. [We have examples in Deut. 5,9-10 where G'd promises to remember sins for up to 4 generations whereas He will remember good deeds for up to two thousand generations. Ed.] Tossaphot query the fact that the Talmud phrases the principle as one that applies invariably, i.e. לעולם. They refer to Deut. 32,30 where the Torah asks rhetorically: "How was it that one (enemy soldier) could pursue a thousand Israelites and two could put ten thousand to flight?" Surely this is an example of the curse having been quantified as proportionately far more powerful than the blessing in our portion when you compare the numbers in both instances? They answer that in Deuteronomy 32 the Torah speaks only of pursuit and not killing and that this is is hardly a curse. In our portion the pursuit is described as resulting in our enemies dying. I find this an inadequate response to the question. There is a discussion in <i>Moed Katan</i> 16 about the exploits of David's heroes one of whom is described as having killed 800 of the enemy with a single arrow. David complained that the assurance that he could kill a thousand of the enemy with one stroke had not been fulfilled. A heavenly voice told him that the reason that G'd's promise had not been fulfilled fully was due to his own involvement with Uriah. It is clear from the Talmud in <i>Moed Katan</i> that David understood the promise in our verse to refer not merely to putting the enemy to flight but to killing him. If not, why did he complain about something G'd had never promised?
  We must assume therefore that both verse 7 and verse 8 speak of enemies dying. The way to answer the query of Tossaphot is best answered by reference to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> who understand the word מכם in verse 8 as a reference to the physically weakest of the Israelites. The wording in <i>Torat Kohanim</i> is: "from the weakest amongst you and not from the strongest amongst you." Why did <i>Torat Kohanim</i> add the words "and not from the strongest amongst you?" The obvious intention of <i>Torat Kohanim</i> was to emphasise that the words "from the weakest" should not be interpreted as "even from amongst the weakest amongst you, but should be understood as "the weakest amongst you excluding the strongest." In light of this it is not surprising that in this verse the Torah only speaks of a blessing extended to the physically weak members of the Israelites who are able to mount a pursuit in a ratio of five against a hundred. Amongst the Gentile nations the physically weak specimen do not take part in warfare at all. When the Torah asked rhetorically in Deuteronomy how it is that suddenly one Gentile is able to pursue 1000 Israelites the reference is to the physically strongest Gentiles amongst them. The Torah did not have to make these distinctions amongst the Israelites as we know that the curse is always quantified as proportionately weaker than the corresponding blessing.
  From all the above it emerges that G'd actually ordered two separate blessings to be effective instead of limiting the blessing of verse 7 in verse 8. First of all the Torah describes the valour of the individual Israelites during generations when the people observe G'd's statutes. Concerning these men of heroic proportions the Torah says that they will pursue their enemies and the enemies will fall before them. In the event you are interested how many enemies a single Israelite can pursue, you only have to refer to the verse in Deuteronomy which describes the exploits of your enemies. Since you are aware that G'd quantifies a blessing more generously than a curse you can draw your own conclusions. The Talmud in <i>Sotah</i> 11 only illustrated how David interpreted the blessing. He based himself on the statement that anyone who studied Torah for a single day is considered as if he had done so for a whole year. This statement is proven from the punishment G'd meted out to the people of Israel who had accepted the majority report of the spies. In Numbers 14,34 the Torah condemns the Israelites to wandering in the desert for one year in exchange for every day the spies had toured the land of Canaan and had returned with a devastating conclusion. If G'd's quantification of the curse was 365 to one, then His quantification of a blessing could not possibly be of a lesser ratio. It is not surprising therefore to hear David complain that even the greatest of his warriors had not been able to destroy 1000 of the enemy with a single blow.
  You will find an interesting remark in Chronicles I 12,15. "These are the leaders (in exploits) of the army of the tribe of Gad (in the time of David) the weakest disposed of 100 of the enemy, the strongest disposed of 1.000. This is sort of proof of what the Torah said here that the weak pursue and kill in a ratio of 5 to 100, and 100 pursue 10.000 must refer to the weaker specimen amongst the Israelites. When the Book of Chronicles speaks of "one to a hundred and one to a thousand respectively, the reason the comparison made by the author of the Book of Chronicles is with "one" i.e. a single warrior, is because these are examples of particularly powerful individuals, not the run of the mill. All of this leads us to the conclusion that verse 7 which does not impose a limit on how many warriors will pursue how many enemies speaks of the Israelites whose physique is of heroic dimensions. The Torah deliberately does not describe their feats in terms of numbers as their prowess is unlimited in principle. For all we know one such Israelite could pursue a half million of the enemy; under no circumstances would he pursue fewer than a thousand as in the reverse situation in the Book of Deuteronomy. Inasmuch as different periods in history produced Israelites of different calibre the Torah did not go into specifics.
  ונפלו אויביכם לחרב. "and your enemies will fall by the sword." Why did the Torah repeat this promise both in verse 7 and in verse 8? <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explain that the meaning is that the enemies will fall by each other's sword. We may add that the Torah wanted to distinguish between a pursuit by five men of a hundred men of the enemy respectively, and the pursuit by a hundred men of ten thousand. If Israel can dispose of one thousand pursuers, the defeat of the enemies will assume proportions that are greater than a mere arithmetical progression. The word לחרב refers to the effectiveness of the avenging sword.
  
  Verse 9
  
   ופניתי אליכם, "And I will turn to you, etc." This word is to be understood as similar to what we learned in <i>Taanit</i> 2 that G'd holds three keys; one of them is the key to לידה, to birth, i.e. procreation. This is why G'd had to say: "I will turn to you" before mentioning that He would make the Jewish people fruitful. The word ופניתי is indicative of G'd personally involving Himself in the fertility of the Jewish people instead of leaving the matter in the hands of the agent He has appointed as part of the laws of nature to deal with such tasks. It is also possible that when the verse continues with והרביתי אתכם, "I will multiply you," that this refers to a second key G'd holds in His hands, i.e. the key to פרנסה, livelihood. Adequate food assists physical growth. This may be why <i>Torat Kohanim</i> understand this blessing as contributing to the physical size of the Israelites. Moreover, we are taught in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 90 that the words והקימותי את בריתי אתכם at the end of our verse refer to the covenant with the dead that when the time comes their bodies will be resurrected. The word והקימותי then refers to the third key G'd holds in His hands, the key to life and death. The word ופניתי may thus be understood as G'd granting us access to all the three keys in His possession.
  Another aspect of this verse is related to the statement in <i>Shabbat</i> 156 that Israel is not subject to the restrictions inherent in the term <i>mazzal,</i> such as referred to by Isaiah 41,2 when he described Abraham as having thought his fate was determined by the constellation of Jupiter (compare page 1302). The word ופניתי simply means that G'd will turn aside the horoscopic influences and apply a different set of rules to the dispensation of the blessings involving the three areas to which G'd personally holds the keys. Although, according to <i>Moed Katan</i> 28, the three domains over which G'd holds the key are not subject to man's merit but to his <i>mazzal,</i> G'd will make an exception to this rule by "moving the relevant constellation (מפנה) "aside," to enable Israel to overcome negative influences. The expression לפרות refers to the ability to have children, the expression והרביתי אתכם refers to long life, similar to Deut. 11,21 למען ירבו ימיכם; the words והקימותי את בריתי refer to the supply of adequate sustenance. The reason that the Torah referred to the covenant here is because G'd had concluded such a covenant with Noach in Genesis 8,22 not to again destroy the seasons and the harvest they are to produce. <i>Shavuot</i> 36 comments on that verse in Genesis where G'd is reported as saying this "to His heart," that this is equivalent to an oath. In Genesis 9,12 G'd referred to the "sign of the covenant" i.e. the rainbow as a reminder of this covenant which included all the various promises made by G'd after Noach left the ark. The oath G'd swore at the time did not comprise the whole globe. After all, we all know that part of the surface of the globe does not produce crops in certain years due to some catastrophe or other, the years of famine both in Canaan and in Egypt being just a minor example. What G'd had sworn was that He would not deprive the entire earth of sustenance simultaneously such as happened during the deluge. Please refer to what I have written on the words "and you shall love the Lord your G'd" on Deut. 6,5.
  Another meaning of the words ופניתי אליכם may be gleaned after we examine Samuel II 6,10. The prophet reports that David did not want to transfer the Holy Ark to him in Jerusalem and instead made it detour to the house of Oved Edom Hagitti. As a result of the latter's willingness to be host to the Holy Ark G'd blessed his entire family. Our sages in <i>Berachot</i> 63 describe the blessing as Oved Edom's wife and eight daughters-in-law being very prolific in bearing many children during the three months that the ark stayed in Oved Edom's home. According to Chronicles I 26, 6 children were born to that family during that time. This is the kind of blessing referred to by the words… ופניתי אליכם והרביתי אתכם, "I will turn to you….and multiply you." Once G'd turns His face to you, the rest will follow automatically. The expression והרביתי אתכם contains within it a special distinction. Normally, when we encounter a great number of something, the multiplicity of the numbers is at the expense of the worth of the individual. If someone owns 1.000 head of cattle for instance, he does not treasure each animal as a separate possession as much as he would if he only owned three cows. G'd blessed Oved Edom in that though his family became very numerous this did not detract from the individual worth of each family member (compare our comments on Exodus 1,9 and Numbers 13,18). The words והקימותי את בריתי אתכם are a blessing similar to that in Isaiah 59,21: "and as for Me, this will be My covenant with them says the Lord….My words will not depart from your mouth or the mouth of your children." It is the promise that the Torah will not depart from their offspring. Another meaning of the words is that G'd renews the covenant which He had already entered into with the patriarchs.
  
  Verse 10
  
   ואכלתם ישן נושן, "And you will eat old store, long kept." This is a promise that the harvest which has been stored will not rot or become worm-eaten. On the contrary, you will experience that it improves with age.
  וישן מפני חדש תוציאו, "and you will bring forth the old from before the new." You will not bring it forth because it has become too old and inferior, but because you have to make room for the new harvest. The reason the Torah wrote this here and not earlier when the goodness of the land of Israel is extolled is that the Torah wants to make the point that although the population keeps increasing this does not mean that there will be a contraction of the surplus experienced previously. There will still be so much that the people will eat the old rather than to have to eat the new harvest right away.
  
  Verse 11
  
   ונתתי משכני בתוככם, "And I will place My Sanctuary among you." We must understand this in a sense similar to Psalms 78,60: "the tent He had set among men." The reference is to the souls of His holy people within whom G'd had made Himself at home.
  ולא תגעל נפשי אתכם, "and My soul will not abhor you." It was not enough to say that G'd will make His home inside people's souls seeing G'd was afraid that people would not take such a promise seriously. It seemed to exceed their fondest hopes. They could not imagine how a creature of flesh and blood could become "home" to G'd's presence. They would have imagined that G'd merely exaggerated out of His love for the Jewish people. People imagined something akin to what Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai explained in the <i>Zohar</i> volume 3 page 241 on Song of Songs 5,1: "I came to My garden My sister My bride, I ate My honeycomb and drank My wine, etc." The entire verse is a parable describing the relationship between a groom and his bride, i.e. G'd and the people of Israel. Rabbi Shimon's words are worth studying. Nothing in that verse is remotely comprehensible if we try and stick to the literal meaning. The very idea of someone such as G'd Who is totally spiritual being described in such physical terms is repulsive. What G'd is trying to say to the Jewish people is that although by definition His very Essence should be revolted at the mere thought of intimacy with His creatures made of flesh and blood, this will not be the case.
   והתהלכתי בתוככם, "And I will walk among you, etc." "Not only will I not find intimacy with you loathsome but I will continue to walk among you." The expression is one which one normally applies to kindred souls. It is remindful of a statement by our sages that seeing that the souls of the Jewish people originate in G'd's own Light, their having been despatched earthwards does not mean that they have become estranged from their sacred origin. The author continues in this vein elaborating on this concept of the intimacy that can exist between man and G'd and how through man's failure to choose the path of Torah this very intimacy turns into loathing.
  Another (esoteric) way of explaining our paragraph is to see in it both promises for success in this world as well as promises of even greater bliss in the hereafter. The paragraph commences with the promise of adequate food supply i.e. "I will provide your rains at the proper times," followed by a promise of a secure and serene existence in the Holy Land, i.e. "and you will dwell in it in safety."
  From here on in the Torah addresses blessings which will accrue in the hereafter. The most basic is "I will grant peace." Although man may live the life of the completely righteous, the fact is that the mere thought of leaving this life casts a pall over his serenity. This is especially so since man never knows when that day on which he will die will occur. G'd compensates us for this anxiety by promising that on the day such a person will depart this earth he will not experience fright of what lies beyond this physical life, i.e. "you will lie down and no-one will frighten you." G'd will see to it that the transition from one form of life to another will be smooth and painless.
  When the Torah speaks of "I will grant peace," you may understand this in light of the Talmud <i>Shabbat</i> 10 that the name of the Almighty is שלום. At the time death approaches, G'd's Light will approach the righteous; this is the mystical dimension of the term "the kiss of death" experienced by people such as Moses and Aaron. The experience of death will thereby be transformed into an experience similar to lying down to sleep, i.e. ושכבתם. The Torah has used this expression when describing the death of the patriarchs. The secret of this is that the soul which experiences the approach of that Light which is so welcome to it longs for a closer union with it so much that it is eager to tear itself loose from whatever still binds it to this life on earth. The process feeds upon itself. I have written more about this at the beginning of my commentary on פרשת אחרי מות (page 1306). This is what Solomon had in mind when he said in Kohelet 5,11 that "the sleep of the labourer is sweet." The "sleep" he referred to is the departure of the soul from the body. The person who was a true עובד, servant of G'd, will find this experience "sweet," i.e. pleasant. The Torah adds the words ואין מחריד, to tell us that the angel of death who has the power to frighten ordinary people, making them afraid of death, does not possess the power to frighten the truly righteous.
  Still another meaning of the words ונתתי שלום may relate to the preservation of the body after death so that the 4 basic raw materials of which the body is composed do not disintegrate. You are familiar with the story of Rabbi Achai bar Yoshia related in <i>Shabbat</i> 152 whose remains were found in good shape by Rabbi Nachman many years after his death. Obviously this could only have been due to G'd commanding the basic raw-materials man is made of not to disintegrate in this instance. We are told that this could happen by Solomon in Proverbs 6,22: בשכבך תשמר עליך, "when you go to sleep (die) it will preserve you." The "it" are the Torah study and performance of good deeds by the person Solomon speaks of. When the Torah writes ושכבתם ואין מחריד this may also be understood in the sense of what the prophet said in Isaiah 57,2 where he described the righteous as "resting comfortably in their slumber" meaning they will not be disturbed by their remains being worm-eaten. We have confirmation of this in a story in <i>Baba Metzia</i> 84 where it is related that the remains of Rabbi Eleazar bar Shimon which had been kept in an upper story in his house had remained intact for a number of years (18 or 22). His widow had examined them almost daily and they did not deteriorate. One day she found that a hair had fallen out and there was some blood at the spot where the hair had come out. We have numerous such stories all of which prove that when the conditions are right a body may rest in its grave without disintegrating. This may also be the reason why the Talmud <i>Shabbat</i> 13 describes the body's reaction to worms as being as if a living body would be pierced by a needle. Every creature is sensitive to an invasion of its body by an alien body in accordance with the general capacity for sensitivity with which it has been endowed by G'd.
  The words והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ in verse 6 refer to the spirit of impurity which is called חיה רעה, a spiritually negative vitality which surrounds the body after death. The reason a priest is forbidden to remain in the roofed domain of a body is the very presence of that חיה רע around the dead body. This is why contact with the dead or even remaining under the same canopy with him results in such a person contracting ritual impurity for a period of not less than seven days. G'd promises here that if the lifetime of the person who has now died was marked by his observing all the commandments, his remains will not be surrounded by such a spiritually negative force so that anyone in touch with such remains would not contract ritual impurity.
  As to the meaning of the words וחרב לא תעבור בארצכם, "a sword will not traverse your land," this is the Torah providing the rationale why impurity will not be allowed to surround the corpses of such righteous people. Man's death is perceived as his succumbing to the flawed sword of the Angel of Death. This results in the body becoming נבלה, unfit to serve as a sacrifice as would a body which was slaughtered with a ritually pure and unblemished knife. The Torah has described a נבלה as the kind of corpse fit to feed to the dogs (Exodus 22,30). Impurity itself is often compared to a dog, an inferior animal, representative of all that is despised. The Torah assures us that people who live the kind of life they ought to live will not experience that the sword of the Angel of Death touches their bodies.
  The Torah goes on to write: ורדפתם את אויביכם, "And you will pursue your enemies." From this point on the Torah deals with the activities of the invisible spirituality which results through a person's having lived a life dedicated to Torah and its precepts. The purpose of studying Torah and performing its commandments with vigor is to pinpoint isolated "sparks" of holiness. These "sparks" are to be joined one to another so that they can reunite with their origin. They had become isolated as a result of Adam's sin and the power of the forces of the קליפה, the spiritually negative forces in our universe, to separate them from the main body of holiness. This is the mystical dimension of Isaiah 59,2: "your iniquities have created a division between yourselves and your G'd." Please read what I have written in connection with Exodus 19,5 והייתם לי סגולה and how the קליפות are described by such terms as שונאים and אויבים. See my commentary on Psalms 92,10: כי הנה אויביך ה׳ יאבדו. Here the Torah reveals how these forces of the קליפה can be pursued through the preoccupation with Torah and its commandments and how the pursuit will result in these forces collapsing, i.e. ונפלו לחרב. In short, this paragraph describes the defeat of the phenomenon called impurity. The prophet Zachariah refers to this when he writes in Zachariah 13,2: "And I will abolish the spirit of impurity." We may understand the word לחרב in our verse in the same spirit as Song of Songs 3,8: איש חרבו על ירכו, "each with his sword at his side." Concerning this verse we read in <i>Tikkuney Hazohar</i> chapter 7 that people who keep the covenant with the Lord by never touching anything which is forbidden to them possess the power to kill the enemies of the Lord with the breath of their lips. This is the reason the Torah did not write here the usual בחרב, but לחרב.
  The words ורדפו מכם חמשה מאה, may be understood as a reference to the five Books of Moses. In other words, that which emanates from you, the teaching of the five Books of Moses, will pursue one hundred manifestations of the קליפות. You may apply Proverbs 16,26 to this situation. "A person who toils, toils for himself." Our sages in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 99 understand this verse as follows: "When a person toils by studying Torah in one place the Torah will toil on his behalf in another place by annihilating G'd's enemies.
  The end of this verse i.e ומאה מכם רבבה ירדפו, may be understood in light of a comment by <i>Tanchuma</i> at the end of <i>Parshat Korach</i> on Deut. 10,12: מה ה׳ אלוקיך שואל ממך, "What does the Lord your G'd ask of you, etc.?" the <i>Midrash</i> suggests that we substitute for the word מה, "what," the word מאה, "one hundred." The word would refer to the recital of one hundred benedictions daily. The Torah promises that the merit of reciting 100 benedictions daily enables us to pursue and destroy ten thousand manifestations of the power of the קליפות.
  When the Torah repeats the words ונפלו אויביכם לחרב a second time this reflects a statement by our sages in <i>Berachot</i> 5 according to which anyone who recites the קריאת שמע is compared to someone who seizes a double-edged sword. This is based on Psalms 149,6: "when they have the exaltations of the Lord in their throats this is equivalent to being armed with a double-edged sword." The first verse mentioning the enemies falling by the sword detailed the result of performing sacred deeds. The second verse speaks of the result of uttering holy words. 
  The Torah goes on: ופניתי אליכם, "and I will turn to you." This is a description of the purpose of the destruction of G'd's and Israel's enemies. As a result of the destruction of these enemies all the "sparks" of holiness will return to their roots, i.e. the "umbrella" called כנסת ישראל, the concept of the Jewish people. They will resume their classification as being part of the domain of G'd whence they had originated. From then on they will increase and multiply. Please read what I have written at the end of פרשת ויגש on Genesis 47,27 (page 382).
  Another meaning of the words ופגיתי אליכם is that inasmuch as the iron curtain dividing Israel from its G'd has collapsed with the defeat of the concept of impurity, G'd can once more turn to us and cleave to us.
  Furthermore, there is a message here that if Israel has made the first move in battering the wall between it and G'd, G'd in turn will help us so that we shall become ever more successful in tearing down that wall.
  
  The words והפריתי אתכם, "and I will make you fruitful" are an allusion to the "sparks" of our holiness which had become prematurely lost and had been aborted and had therefore lost their "sparkle;" they would now resume their appointed function. The Torah adds: "and I will multiply you," to reassure us that we should not think that due to our lengthy sojourn in the domain of the קליפה we have sustained permanent impairment of our ability to develop. The Torah states that this is not so, but that our light would shine forth like the "Light of the King's face."
  Another interpretation of the words והרביתי אתכם is based on the root of the word being רב, in the sense of רבנות, authority, or superiority. Accordingly, the promise here is similar to G'd's promise in Exodus 19,6 where G'd defines our purpose as a nation to be a kingdom of priests, a holy nation." We have explained in that context that the reference is to the Jewish people exceeding even the angels in holiness. The Torah continues with the words והקימותי את בריתי אתכם; this is a reference to the promise that the dead will be resurrected. G'd restricts this promise to those who have studied Torah. We base this on <i>Ketuvot</i> 111 כל העוסק בטל טל תורה מחייהו, "everyone who is preoccupied with dew, the dew of Torah will revive him." [Actually, this is an inaccurate quotation. The Talmud first said that the word טל may refer to the Light of Torah basing itself on a verse in Isaiah 26,19 i.e. that G'd's dew is equivalent to illumination. In an extrapolation of this, the Talmud continues by saying that if one did not study this divine illumination, i.e. Torah, one cannot look forward to resurrection. Ed.]
  The promise contained in the words: "and I will keep My covenant" may also refer to something we learned in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 90 that the patriarchs personally will arise and take possession of the land of Israel as G'd had promised to each one of them separately in different chapters of the Book of Genesis. In Exodus 6,4, G'd made a specific promise that the patriarchs would be resurrected and receive the land He had promised to them. G'd is on record here that everyone who keeps the covenant with G'd will be resurrected; G'd will keep with Him the covenant pertaining to making the land of Israel his eternal possession.
  We also find an allusion to where the souls will be stored during the time they wait for resurrection. The ברית the Torah speaks about is the ultimate ברית, i.e. שלום. The domain in which the souls of the Israelites will repose during that period of awaiting resurrection of their assigned bodies is what we usually refer to as the צרור החיים.
  The Torah continues ואכלתם ישן נושן, this is a hyperbole for the meal G'd will serve the righteous in the hereafter when wine dating back to the days of Adam in גן עדן will be served as well as the meat of the Leviathan which G'd had salted away since time immemorial. There is nothing more ancient seeing it dates back to a time preceding the creation of man himself.
  The meaning of the words וישן מפני חדש תוציאו "that you will clear out the old on account of the new," may refer to a verse in Job 38,15 which is the subject of discussion in <i>Chagigah</i> 12. G'd speaks about the wicked being deprived of their light. The Talmud understands that this refers to the original Light G'd created by means of which Adam was able to see from one end of the earth to the other. As a result of his sin, he and subsequent human beings were deprived of this Light. Our verse may allude to the withdrawal of the "new" light which substituted ever since for the original Light. G'd promises that in the future under discussion He will make available the original Light for the righteous.
  The Torah continues: ונתתי משכני בתוככם, "And I will make My Sanctuary among you;" this means that in the future G'd will lower a Sanctuary from the Heaven as we learned in <i>Baba Batra</i> 75. Some of our rabbis claim that that Sanctuary will be made of Shoham stones. Others claim it will be made of Joshpeh stones, each one basing himself on scripture, i.e. Exodus 15,17: "The Sanctuary of the Lord which You have established with Your own hands." G'd promises that this Sanctuary which He has fashioned with His own hands He will erect among us and this is why it will endure forever. The reason G'd will not loathe us is because He will have done away with the spirit of impurity in this world.
  Another meaning of this statement is based on what we explained in conection with Numbers 23,23 that the Israelites will form the inner circle around the Presence of G'd so that the angels will have to ask us what G'd is in the process of doing.
   והתהלכתי בתוככם, "And I will walk among you." This is best understood as reflecting the promise of the prophet in Yoel 3,1 that "your sons and daughters will all prophesy." G'd's Light will walk among them i.e. a reference to the spirit of prophecy. This reminds us of Moses' wish that all the Jewish people should be granted the spirit of prophecy (Numbers 11,29).
  The promise may also refer to something we learned in <i>Taanit</i> 31 that in the future G'd would provide a circle for the righteous and He would take up a position amongst them so that everyone of them would look at G'd and exclaim "This is My G'd let me glorify Him." The reason the Torah chose the expression והתהלכתי "I will walk is that His Light will travel to provide spiritual nourishment to the souls who are sitting around Him. This is called הליכה. The Torah continues with: "I shall be your G'd," referring either to the verse we have just equated the righteous as proclaiming, or that the very dwelling [נוה in the verse זה קלי ואנוהו Ed.] of the righteous is considered something of a divine nature. The additional promise: "and you will be My people" means that the Jewish people will be closer to G'd than any of the hosts of the heavens.
  The words: "and I will be your G'd," may also reflect the contrast between then and now. Nowadays the faith in G'd is due to G'd having provided prophets for us who help us maintain our faith. In the future described in our verse there will no longer be a need for prophets as G'd will be recognised as such directly by everyone without any external assist. This is in line with the prophet's Zachariah's promise that "on that day G'd and His name will be one." The words: "and you will become My people" refer to the fact that the degree of recognition of G'd by various layers of the population will be the same; there will no longer be such distinctions as עם on the one side and בני ישראל on the other.
   אני השם. "I am the Lord." We may understand this in light of the comment in <i>Berachot</i> 12 that in the future the outstanding attribute of G'd will no longer be the fact that He took us out of Egypt but His new manifestation as the G'd who brought the Messiah (compare Jeremiah 23,7). The first half of our verse refers to G'd who manifested Himself through orchestrating the Exodus from Egypt, whereas the second half refers to G'd redeeming us from any kind of exile, i.e. the final redemption. Please compare what I have written on Exodus 20,2.
  
  Verse 12
  
  
  
  Verse 13
  
  
  
  Verse 14
  
   ואם לא תשמעו לי, "And if you will fail to hearken to Me, etc." We need to know where obedience to G'd ever was something optional at the beginning of our portion so that the Torah would be justified in introducing this paragraph with the conditional "if." The paragraph should simply have commenced with the words: "If you despise My statutes, etc." Apparently, the wording of the Torah in this verse shows that the meaning of the opening paragraph of the portion "if you will walk in My statutes" refers to precoccupation with Torah study and not to performance of any specific commandmments. This is why the Torah is able to consider the alternative in our verse as something which is related to one's hearing. It is similar to Isaiah 55,3: "listen so that you will live," or Proverbs 1,5 "the wise will listen and increase learning." Inasmuch as the Torah intended to convey so many different lessons with the words אם בחקתי תלכו as I have demonstrated, the failure to exercise these options are at the root of all the misfortunes which will befall the Jewish people if they ignore such glorious opportunities as offered by the Torah in the opening verse of our portion.
  Furthermore, seeing that the Torah is about to discuss the result of not carrying out G'd's wishes the Torah pinpoints the root of such non-observance as being the failure to listen to the Torah's instructions by not studying the Torah. Concerning this we learned in <i>Kidushin</i> 30 that G'd told the Jewish people that the only antidote to the danger of succumbing to the temptations by the evil urge is Torah, i.e. study of Torah and performance of its precepts.
  Our paragraph is also concerned with awakening sleeping hearts. If someone pursues a path which is not good this is only proof that he has not acquired knowledge about G'd and the good he would derive by serving the Lord. We may therefore understand the conditional "if you will not listen" in the sense of "if you fail to understand." Failure to understand the advantages of serving the Lord may result in someone refusing to do so. The prophet Isaiah summed it up when he said that Israel went into exile as a direct result of lack of knowledge (Isaiah 5,13).
  Another message contained in our verse is derived from the Torah's emphasis on the words ולא תעשו את כל המצות, "and you will not perform all the commandments, etc." Seeing we have explained on the words אם בחקתי תלכו that one's preoccupation with Torah protects one against and saves one from the evil urge (<i>Sotah</i> 21), the Torah here spells out the condition both positively and negatively, i.e. what will happen if you study Torah for My sake, and what will happen if you do not study for the right reasons. G'd reminds us that even if we study Torah as long as we do not do so for the sake of G'd and perform the commandments, Torah will not act as a shield for us against the evil urge.
  Another nuance contained in our verse is the message that even preparedness to perform all the commandments is of not much use by itself; unless one has studied Torah in depth one simply is not able to perform all its precepts properly. As a result such performance cannot protect one against temptation by the evil urge. We may also understand this pronouncement along the lines of <i>Menachot</i> 110 on the verse "This is the Torah of the burnt-offering (Leviticus 6,2)." If one studies the details of the legislation of the sacrifices nowadays when there is no chance to translate one's knowledge into practice, he has fulfilled the commandment better than when the Temple stood and one performed the actual sacrificial rites without knowing all its details.
  The word לי in our verse reminds us that failure to heed the words of Torah is similar to someone refusing to listen to his king when he wants to speak to his subject. The words אם לא תשמעו לי are G'd's way of saying that He, personally, will feel insulted by our failure to study Torah.
  You may also understand the verse as conveying a message similar to that in Jeremiah 16,11: "and Me they have forsaken and My Torah they have not observed." Rabbi Moshe Alshech explains this verse by means of a parable. He warns that the Israelites should not think that because they studied Torah this would neutralise their abominations including idol worship as proved by the fact that the Temple had not been destroyed while idol worship was going on for hundreds of years. The Torah explains here what the parameters are to be. "If you do not listen to Me this will lead to non-performance of My commandments and eventual destruction." If, however, you listen to Me, i.e. your attitude to G'd is positive, even if you do not fulfil all the commandments, this will not bring about catastrophe either on a personal or national level.
  Another way of justifying the opening words of our paragraph is that G'd is aware of how man's mind and heart functions and of the machinations of the evil urge which exploits man's psyche. G'd therefore decided to address the very first stage of any seduction planned by the evil urge. We have explained repeatedly that Satan is well aware of the intimate relationship between G'd and Israel as a result of which he never counsels that a Jew commit acts of outright rebellion against G'd and His Torah. Satan works far more insidiuously. He will ostensibly agree that everything written in the Torah is, of course, binding on a Jew but that all the additional ordinances with which the sages have surrounded Biblical Law are not really of significance and may be ignored without peril to oneself. Once a person begins to consider if there is merit to that argument he has already been entrapped by the evil urge.
  In our verse the Torah addresses two kinds of seductions. 1) "If you do not hearken to Me;" this is a reference to G'd having authorised the Torah scholars to make ordinances. This authority is based on Deut. 17,12; "Any man who deliberately fails to listen to the priest who stands to minister to the Lord your G'd, that man shall die." The reason the Torah insisted on writing the word לי in our verse is to remind us that anyone who questions the authority of the rabbis is as if he questioned G'd Himself (compare <i>Sanhedrin</i> 110). The word לי means: "it concerns Me." Moreover, the sages are considered as the "Sanctuary" of the Lord.
  Concerning the second kind of seductive tactic by Satan namely his trying to convince us that the number of positive commandments is unnecessarily large, the Torah writes: "and you will not perform all these commandments." The Torah also implies here that if someone fails to believe in the authority of the sages to interpret the law he most certainly will not fulfil any commandment. The reason is simple. The definition of the 613 commandments (מנין המצות) is something which the sages of former generations have determined. Anyone who does not accept that principle is not considered as having observed any of the commandments. When the Torah speaks of ולא תעשו this is merely the result of not listening. [The letter ו is not meant as an alternative to the words ואם לא תשמעו. Ed.]
  
  Verse 15
  
   ואם בחקתי תמאסו, "And if you will despise My statutes, etc." Why did the Torah have to repeat the conditional word ואם once more instead of being content with the opening word ואם in the previous verse? Besides, why did the Torah write בחקתי instead of merely חקתי תמאסו, "you will despise My statutes?" The letter ב is no more appropriate for describing a negative attitude to G'd's statutes than it would have been to the reference about G'd's social laws of which the Torah merely says את משפטי תגעל נפשכם, "your soul abhors My social laws" without adding the letter ב in front of the word משפטי. Moreover, why does the Torah again use the word ואם when speaking of our attitude to G'd's משפטים? Why did the Torah not simply lump together our attitudes to both G'd's statutes and G'd's social laws by writing ואם בחוקותי תמאסו, or something similar? Furthermore, why does the Torah describe the attitude of the sinners to the "statutes" as one of מאוס, i.e. "despicable," whereas the attitude to the social laws is described as תגעל נפשכם, "something your soul abhors," i.e. a stronger form of rejection? Having already described the sinful Israelites' attitude to G'd's respective commandments, why did the Torah have to elaborate that "they would refuse to carry out all these commandments?" The Torah had already mentioned in verse 14 that we speak about a situation when the Jews would not carry out the positive commandments! We had offered an explanation to that statement but we must not forget that the verse must make sense as it is written! What does the Torah mean by adding: "to break My covenant?"
  Clearly, we must understand the wording of these verses as corresponding to the manner in which Satan operates in seducing us into neglecting G'd's commandments. Satan is clever enough to attack the weakest link in the chain, i.e. observance of the commandments called חקים, the ones for which the Torah does not offer a reason and which we ourselves find impossible to rationalise. Satan appeals to us on two fronts; on the one hand he claims that it is impossible to believe that someone as clever as G'd could have legislated laws that appear to make no sense. Alternately, he argues that granted that G'd may indeed have legislated such a law, but surely the legislation was not meant to be understood literally. Once Satan finds that he has the attention of his prospective victim he begins to attack other commandments also even though they appear to have good reasons. He will then easily inveigle his victim to transgress one of G'd's commandments due to some ficticious argument he presented. The doubts he sowed in his victim's mind previously had already caused the victim to become somewhat removed from holiness. Once a person has committed the first sin without experiencing negative fallout it becomes ever easier for his evil urge to lead him further astray. Eventually the evil urge will convince a person that instead of facing punishment for each one of his transgressions he might as well commit a trangression of a cardinal nature and face only a single punishment for that transgression, i.e. his treason against the covenant he became a party to at Mount Sinai.
  The verses we have here confront the different stages of seduction and deception by the evil urge. The Torah first deals with the opening argument of the seducer which was aimed at undermining observance of the חקים by saying "if you will despise those of My commandments which have no rationale;" our sages in <i>Bamidbar Rabbah</i> 19, portray both Satan and the nations of the world as questioning the reason for the law of the red heifer. The letter ב in the word בחקתי, is a letter denoting a reason. You may translate the verse as: "If you despise My statutes because they do not have a rationale, etc." The Torah continues with the word ואם, leading to the next level of seduction by Satan, i.e. that you may follow up your initial sin by even transgressing some negative commandment. The additional ואם also means that there is separate culpability for failing to observe negative commandments.
  Concerning the second assault on us by Satan, his attempt to seduce us further, the Torah writes ואם את משפטי תגעל נפשכם, this is a reference to commandments for which there is ample rationale. The reason the Torah uses the stronger "your soul loathes them" is that unless one did so what possible reason could a Jew have to defy those of G'd's laws which are demonstrably beneficial and reasonable? Ignoring G'd's statutes could at least be due to one's failure to appreciate the purpose of that legislation.
  Another reason why the Torah attributes non-observance of the social laws to such strong feelings on the part of the sinner may reflect a statement in the <i>Sefer Hayashar</i> by Rabbenu Tam chapter 9 who views an attitude such as described here as reflecting a diseased psyche and body. <i>Berachot</i> 61 describes this as saying that the wicked are judged by their evil passions. This is the reason the Torah writes לבלתי עשות את כל מצותי, such people object to doing anything which G'd has said merely because G'd has said it. Finally, the words להפרכם את בריתי are the Torah's reference to Satan's ultimate challenge when he asks his victim to commit a provocative act against G'd justifying it by promising his victim that he then will have to face only a single penalty namely the one for that ultimate act of rebellion. The Torah goes on record that the prospective sinner should not be deceived but that he would be held culpable for all his transgressions. We also have this spelled out in Ezekiel 25,8 and Ezekiel 20,33 respectively. Satan had argued that the same rules which apply to mankind at large also apply to Yehudah (25,8), whereas the prophet threatens Israel in the name of G'd that it will be treated with G'd's full retributive arm (20,33).
  The verses under discussion may also be understood along the lines of the <i>Zohar</i> volume 1 page 100 that in order to achieve perfection in one's service of the Lord three ingredients have to be present, i.e. thought, speech, and deed. By repeating the word ואם, the Torah alludes to all of these three factors. The words ואם לא תשמעו refer to a flaw in one's speech when serving G'd; the words ולא תעשו refer to a flaw in the deeds required when serving the Lord. The words ואם בחקתי תמאסו refer to flaws in the thought processes which accompany one's service of G'd. Inasmuch as one's thoughts are generated both in one's brain and in one's heart, the Torah employed the term תמאסו when speaking about thoughts originating in one's brain, whereas it used the term תגעל נפשכם when referring to thoughts originating in one's heart.
  It is also possible that the Torah speaks here about three different spiritual levels that are present amongst the Jewish people. One level comprises the Torah scholars, the spiritual elite of the people whose principal concern is Torah and service of the Lord. Concerning this group of people the Torah says ואם לא תשמעו לי, "if you do not hearken to Me, etc." Seeing that this group of people have to be most circumspect in their performance of the commandments it is essential that they listen to every detail of the Torah's instructions else they forfeit their very lives. We are given an example of this in <i>Yuma</i> 86 where the scholars themselves debate the nature of the sin of desecrating G'd's Holy Name. What may not be considered as desecration of the Holy Name for one person may yet rank as such for another, depending on his stature in the community. Rav said that if he entered a butcher store and did not pay immediately this would be accounted as a desecration of G'd's name (seeing onlookers would assume he received it for free as a sort of bribe.) Rabbi Yochanan said that if he walked around for a distance of 4 cubits without Talit and phylacteries this would be accounted against him as the sin of desecrating the name of the Lord. Concerning such people the Torah wrote: "if you will not hearken to Me." The Torah adds: "and you will not perform all these commandments." What is meant by the word all is that such Torah scholars must observe the commandments down to the very last detail otherwise it would be held against them as a great sin. There is another category of Jews who are not well versed in the Torah but who are intelligent and certainly understand the difference between right and wrong, and who are careful to practice the virtue of gratitude. Concerning this category the Torah writes ואם בחקתי תמאסו that if they display disdain for the statutes because they do not understand their reasons G'd will punish them although He will not punish them for performance of the commandments without attention to all the finer points. There is a third category, the fools, whose knowledge is so limited that they will not perform the statutes at all, but not because they despise them. Concerning this latter category the Torah writes: ואת משפטי תגעל נפשכם; G'd will hold such fools responsible for their sins only if they loathe social laws which even they are fully conversant with and the need for which they can fully understand. This latter category of people will not be punished by the penalties listed in the remainder of this chapter. G'd will treat them as if they had sinned inadverently.
  לבלתי עשות את כל מצותי, "not to carry out all My commandments." G'd limits retribution to people who are still bent on defying Him by not performing the commandments. If such people have changed their attitude and plan on observing the commandments G'd will hold off punishing them until they have had a chance to prove their penitence. G'd may even hold off punishing people who have not yet expressed the intention to mend their ways but concerning whom G'd knows that they will do so.
  להפרכם את בריתי, "to break My covenant." G'd makes the punishments in store for the Jewish people in the verses following dependent on their intention to break the covenant by their failure to observe the Torah. People who violate G'd's commandments merely because it is less burdensome for them or they believe they will enjoy life better by doing so (מומר לתאבון) are not included in what the rest of this chapter threatens in the way of retribution. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> writes as follows on the verse ואם לא תשמעו: "There are people who do not study the Torah but they do observe its commandments. Concerning such people the Torah wrote that they will be punished only ולא תעשו, if they fail to observe the commandments. There are other people who neither study nor practice Torah laws but they do not despise others who are observant. Concerning such people the Torah writes that as long as they do not despise G'd's statutes the list of retribution which follows does not apply to them. All those who neither study, nor perform and at the same time despise others who are observant and who hate the Torah scholars to boot are included in the description תגעל נפשכם. Finally, there are people who actively prevent other Jews from observing the commandments. This latter category is meant by the words לבלתי עשות, 'they do not let others perform.'" Thus far <i>Torat Kohanim.</i> According to what we have just quoted from <i>Torat Kohanim</i> one forms the impression that the whole chapter of the retribution G'd threatens is addressed only to the final category of sinners who not only anger G'd on purpose but interfere with the observance of the Torah by other Jews. If so, we must ask ourselves why the Torah bothered to list any of the other categories of sinners altogether? The reason the Torah was not content to list only the last category of sinner is that the Torah wanted to describe the stages that lead a sinner to eventually become so entrapped by his evil urge that he even prevents other Jews from observing their religion. When reading the entire passage one appreciates the terrible consequences which ensue if one takes the first step in ignoring our traditions. This is what Jeremiah 9,12 had in mind when he describes the loss of Jewish statehood as due to the people forsaking the Torah and not listening to G'd's voice. It is the first step away from tradition which is crucial.
  
  Verse 16
  
   אף אני אעשה זאת לכם, "I will also do this unto you, etc." The meaning of the word אני is the attribute of Mercy. G'd says that under the circumstances even the attribute of Mercy will agree to the acts of retribution the Torah is about to describe as being performed by the attribute of Justice.
  והפקדתי עליכם בהלה, "I will appoint terror to afflict you, etc." G'd's selection of the list of afflictions enumerated here corresponds to the negative virtues of the wicked. Inasmuch as their principal sin is the neglect of Torah study G'd measured the people with the same yardstick. Torah has been compared to fire (compare Jeremiah 23,29) "is not My word like fire says the Lord." 
  You have to appreciate that the Torah brings out three good qualities in a man's soul. 1) Preoccupation with words of Torah effectively refines man's soul much as the fire of the crucible refines ore into pure metal. As a result such a person does not need to descend into שאול, hades, after he dies so that his soul will be cleansed by the fires of Hell. <i>Chagigah</i> 27 describes the fire of Torah as being more powerful than the fire of Gehinom. The fires of Gehinom will therefore not make any impression on the soul of a person who has spent his life in Torah study. This is why <i>Shemot Rabbah</i> 7,4 describes Gehinom as complaining that it does not like the righteous as they undermine its power and extinguish its fire. The second advantage derived by Torah is that it illuminates one's eyes. The Israelites require a great light in order to be able to benefit from the brilliance of the שכינה, G'd's presence. G'd gave us the Torah which is called light (compare Proverbs 6,23) out of His great love for us. Torah study will enhance our power of vision. The degree of one's perception of the divine is in direct ratio to the amount of Torah one has studied. Isaiah 42,7 calls all the people who have not studied Torah "blind ones," describing the power of Torah as making the blind see. The third advantage that accrues to the person who studies Torah is that it gladdens his heart; we know this both from Psalms 19,9: "G'd's precepts gladden the heart of man," as well as from Psalms 97,11: "and for the upright there is radiance." Just as there are three distinct advantages which accrue to people studying Torah there are three kinds of corresponding penalties for those who fail to do so. Instead of the purifying fire of Torah study, G'd will smite those who failed to study with a destructive kind of fire, שחפת וקדחת, different kinds of fever. The reason the Torah also speaks about בהלה, terror, is because it is the reverse of the peace of mind one experiences as the result of engaging in Torah study. Whereas G'd had granted מאור עינים, enhanced vision, to people immersing themselves in Torah, G'd will deprive those who failed to study Torah by מכלות עינים, failure of their eyesight. Whereas G'd had granted joy to the people who did study Torah, He will afflict those who failed to do so with מדיבת נפש, feelings of melancholy.
  Our paragraph also contains an allusion to success of the people studying Torah in the celestial spheres. We are taught in <i>Uktzin</i> 3,12 (the final Mishnah in the oral Torah) that in the future G'd will let every righteous person inherit 310 worlds. It is a well known fact that the negative experiences the wicked have to look forward to parallel the positive experiences which the righteous will enjoy. Kohelet 7,14 has already spelled this out when Solomon said: "G'd has made one as well as the other." Just as the 310 worlds described in the above mentioned <i>Mishnah</i> are distinguished one from the other in quality, so the 310 possible domains of afflictions for the sinners are also each different from its counterpart. Their common denominator is called קרי, the word ריק, empty, spelled backwards. This is the mystical dimension of וזרעתם לריק זרעכם, "you will sow your seed in vain." [In talmudic parlance the word קרי often refers to the result of semen which has gone to waste, i.e. which is "empty" of content. Ed.] Instead of 310 worlds the wicked can look forward to 310 different kinds of emptiness. The 310 worlds which the Mishnah spoke about are based on Proverbs 8,21: להנחיל לאוהבי יש, That G'd will give an inheritance to the righteous described as something substantial. The numerical value of the word יש is 310. The numerical value of the word ריק, empty, is also 310. The Torah therefore threatens the wicked with the exact opposite it promises to the righteous. The number of spiritually negative manifestations of the קליפה is 310. The Torah uses the word "sowing," as it is also applicable to activities of a spiritual nature such as in Hoseah 10,12: "sow righteousness for yourselves!" ואכלוהו אויביכם "and your enemies will consume it." The powers of the קליפה derive pleasure from the activities of the wicked. The Torah describes them as "the enemy of man."
  
  Verse 17
  
   ונתתי פני בכם, "And I will set My face against you, etc." The Torah speaks of G'd's angry "face." The reason that justice or judgment is called פנים, face, is that there is always a group of creatures whose whole intent is to bring about destruction. They are therefore described as "the face of G'd," i.e. the ones facing the presence of G'd. The words: "I will set My face against you" are addressed to these evil forces. The words: "and you will fall before your enemies" are about the Gentile nations all of which are branches of these forces of evil. The word פני may also mean that G'd will not hide His face from them even while He delivers the Israelites into the hands of their enemies, otherwise they would perish, G'd forbid. The Torah reveals the intent of G'd only at the very end of the passage in the words of verse 44. The reason the Torah writes the word בכם here is to emphasise that at this stage G'd's anger will become manifest against the people not against the Sanctuary. The Sanctuary will become the victim of G'd's anger only at a later stage than that discussed in our verse.
  
  Verse 18
  
   לא תשמעו לי, "you do not listen to Me." Teshuvah is made conditional on "listening" to G'd, i.e. studying Torah. True repentance is impossible without Torah study.
  שבע על חטאתיכם "sevenfold for your sins." The Torah does not mean that G'd will exact seven retributions for each sin but that G'd will exact retribution for the sins of the Jewish people which number seven. The punishment will fit the crime both qualitatively and quantitatively. The seven sins consist of the following: 1) failure to listen; 2) failure to perform; 3) relating to the statutes with disdain; 4) loathing of G'd's social laws; 5) preventing others from performing the commandments; 6) breaking G'd's covenant; 7) remaining unaffected by G'd's penalties and thereby closing the gates of repentance. This explains what the sages meant when they said in <i>Rosh Hashanah</i> 16 that three books are open in front of G'd on New Year's Day; one contains the names of the totally wicked; one contains the names of the totally righteous, and one contains the names of the "average" people (the ones whose merits and demerits are in balance). The latter are given until the Day of Atonement to see if they will repent. If they fail to do so they will automatically be inscribed in the book of the confirmed sinners.
  
  Verse 19
  
   ושברתי את גאון עזכם, "And I will break the pride of your power." According to <i>Torat Kohanim</i> our verse speaks of the Holy Temple and its destruction. Seeing the Jewish people did not repent in spite of their afflictions G'd will deprive them of the Holy Temple. The Jews erred in thinking that as long as the Temple remained standing this was proof that G'd related to them positively.
  
  Verse 20
  
   ותם לריק כחכם, "and your strength will be spent in vain." The meaning is the same as if the Torah had written ותם כחכם לריק, meaning that your entire efforts will be to no avail. The Torah had to tell us this as the power of destructive forces often is only partially effective.
  
  Verse 21
  
   ואם תלכו עמי קרי, "and if you walk contrary unto Me, etc." Inasmuch as the afflictions which have been visited upon the Jewish people are clearly the hand of G'd, their failure to react is described as walking contrary to G'd.
  שבע כחטאתיכם, "seven times more, according to your sins." Even though the Israelites had not become guilty of additional sins the fact that they had not become penitent is accounted as if the sins had been committed anew.
  
  Verse 22
  
   חית השדה. "the wild beasts of the field." Inasmuch as the Israelites were guilty of behaving like animals they in turn will be afflicted by animals.
  
  Verse 23
  
  
  
  Verse 24
  
   והלכתי אף אני עמכם בקרי, "and then I will also walk contrary unto you." This means that from now on G'd will not bother any longer to make the afflictions fit the sins committed so that the very afflictions would serve as a reminder to do תשובה. Up until this point G'd had brought the kinds of retribution which could be traced to specific sins the people had been guilty of. Up until then G'd had done as the Psalmist describes in Psalms 62,13: "You pay each man according to his deeds." From now on the people will be deprived of the positive effect of the afflictions as they cannot relate them to any sins they have committed.
  
  Verse 25
  
  
  
  Verse 26
  
  
  
  Verse 27
  
  
  
  Verse 28
  
  
  
  Verse 29
  
   ואכלתם בשר בניכם, "and you will eat the flesh of your own sons." The reason the Torah repeats this statement by also writing: "you will eat the flesh of your daughters" is to tell you that even after having eaten the flesh of their sons their pity will not have been stirred and they will continue by eating the flesh of their daughters.
  It is also possible that the Torah stresses that the sons will be eaten first so that they would not try and escape when they observed their parents getting ready to eat their daughters. The daughters were weaker and therefore less likely to escape.
  It is also possible that the reason the parents would eat the sons first is because according to <i>Rashi on Shabbat</i> 66 fathers display extraordinary leniency and mercy towards sons. Once they had consumed the sons they would certainly not feel any compunction about also consuming their daughters.
  
  Verse 30
  
   וגעלה נפשי אתכם, "and My soul will abhor you." Why did the Torah have to spell this out? It is something that we can extrapolate from verse 11 where G'd had said that as long as the Israelites would observe the commandments they would be blessed in that G'd would not abhor them. Clearly such a blessing would not continue when the people turned sinful. If G'd wanted to write how blessings would be reversed during periods when the Jewish people rebelled against G'd, the Torah should have presented all of the previously mentioned blessings as being reversed.
  We must assume therefore, that G'd listed the various punishments independent of the fact that the blessings would now be absent. I believe the message of the verse is that even the righteous who would live during these times when the bulk of the people turned sinful would not enjoy a display of G'd's favour. We find a statement to this effect in Hoseah 4,5 that "even the prophet who is among you will stumble." Another meaning of all this is that the gift of prophecy will be withdrawn [or handed to totally ineffectual individuals such as children or idiots, Ed.] so that no longer will there be prophets to admonish the people. G'd's "soul" manifests itself through His communication with His prophets. This is just about the worst curse there is and it is the reason the Torah mentioned it only after having already listed many other curses. Tragically, we are still witnessing this curse as being in effect in our own days.
  
  Verse 31
  
   ונתתי את עריכם חרבה, "and I will turn your cities into ruins." The Torah means that not only will our cities no longer be a model for other nations but that they will be inferior to the civilisation of the Gentile nations. This is a source of great distress. Isaiah had this in mind when he described the cities of Yehudah and Zion as being turned into a desert (Isaiah 64,9) unless the Jewish people would mend their ways.
  והשימותי את מקדשיכם, "and I will make your Sanctuaries desolate." This is a reference to symbols of impurity in the Temple. The forces of the קליפה are also known as שממון.
  ולא אדיח בריח ניחחכם. "and I will not savour the fragrance of your sweet odours." This means that G'd will not even be pleased by the good deeds of the Jewish peolpe at that time. Good deeds also qualify for the description ריח ניחח, sweet odour. Jeremiah made the same point in Lamentations 3, 5 שתם תפלתי, "He shut out my prayers."
  
  Verse 32
  
   והשמותי אני את הארץ, "And I will make the land desolate, etc." The reason the Torah uses the word אני although it is implied in the word והשמותי is to identify the Attribute of G'd causing this desolation. It is the attribute of mercy. <i>Torat Kohanim</i> explains that the desolation of the land is intended to deny our enemies the pleasure of what had been our land before they conquered it.
  
  Verse 33
  
   ואתכם אזרה בגוים, "And you I will scatter among the nations." This verse is best explained in conjunction with what we have learned in <i>Ketuvot</i> 111 that G'd made the (Jews) people swear three (two) oaths at the time they went into exile.. 1) they would not try and recapture the land of Israel by force of arms; 2) they would not start a rebellion against their host countries while in exile. 3) G'd made the nations swear that they would not oppress the Jews excessively. In our verse the Torah alludes to two things. The word אזרה alludes to the oath not to try and recapture the land of Israel by force. The word בגוים refers to the oath not to start a rebellion against the host countries. The words והריקותי אחריכם חרב, "I will draw out the sword after you," is a threat that if the Israelites do not abide by the oaths mentioned G'd would make their lives הפקר, abandoned property. The words והיתה ארצכם שממה "your land will be waste-land," is the reason why G'd has to scatter the Israelites among the nations. Otherwise He could not fulfil His decree for the land to rest by not being worked and thus make up for the failure of the Jewish people to observe the שמטה years while they occupied the land. This is also why the Torah emphasises that all this would happpen while the Jewish people are in exile, i.e. ואתם, "as for you."
  
  Verse 34
  
  
  
  Verse 35
  
  
  
  Verse 36
  
   והנשארים בכם, "As to those of you who are still left, etc." Here the Torah refers to Israelites who continue in their wicked ways in spite of having experienced all the curses listed come true. At this stage G'd announces that such people would be afflicted with faint-heartedness while they are in exile and they would experience fear without cause and fall even without being pursued. In spite of all the terrible experiences the Jewish people undergo while in exile they will not be wiped out as a nation.
  
  Verse 37
  
  
  
  Verse 38
  
  
  
  Verse 39
  
  
  
  Verse 40
  
   והתודו את עונם, "And they will confess their sins, etc." Earlier commentators have not explained these verses to our satisfaction; most of their commentaries are too far fetched to be taken seriously. One of the reasons is that there appears no reason why the Jewish people at that time should confess the sins of their ancestors. As soon as they confess their own sins they are no longer guilty of perpetuating the evil ways of their fathers (compare <i>Berachot</i> 7). Secondly, why did the Torah (verse 41) write: "also I will walk contrary unto them?" Why does the Torah mention a punishment after the people have already confessed their sins? Thirdly, why does the Torah speak about G'd bringing the Israelites into the land of their enemies when we have heard this already in verse 33? Fourthly, what is the meaning of the words או אז יכנע לבבם הערל, "or perhaps their uncircumcised heart will be humbled?" Nachmanides interprets the word "or" as alluding to the two possible causes of the eventual redemption. Either it would occur due to repentance on a nation-wide scale or it would occur because G'd's timetable had been exhausted and the Jews had experienced sufficient punishment during their long years in exile. I believe this is a very forced explanation..
  I believe the appropriate approach to these verses is an examination of the causes of sinful conduct by the people. The people who experienced G'd's retribution on their own bodies had first observed how their fathers and forefathers had failed to observe the Torah and G'd had not seemed to react. The sinners appeared to have prospered. As a result of G'd's long-lasting patience, even reading in the Torah all the warnings about what would happen if we failed to observe the Torah or even listening to the warnings of the prophets became progressively less effective. The evidence of the people's eyes contradicted what they read in the Torah. As a result it became impossible to warn people of the disastrous results in store if they continued to ignore the Torah's precepts. In fact, the so-called facts undermined the people's belief in the whole concept of reward and punishment. This is why once G'd began to exact the retribution He had warned of such misfortunes as befell the Jewish people they would not be recognised as part of G'd's system of reward and punishment. Only after most of the dire warnings in the Torah had actually occurred, matching what the prophets had warned of for a long time, would the people begin to recognise it for what it was. G'd therefore demanded that when the time came the Israelites would not only have to acknowledge and confess their own sins, but unless they also confessed that their fathers and ancestors had been at fault, confessions of their own misdemeanours would not guarantee that this would not occur again.
  Confessing their fathers' sins reinforces the people's confession of their own sins as it deprives them of the argument that whatever sins they had committed were no worse than what their fathers had committed without being punished. When the Torah writes ואף אשר הלכו עמי בקרי, "even though they walked contrary unto Me," this is the Torah's way of explaining the reason why the Israelites interpreted their misfortunes as being accidental, מקרה, rather than as a natural consequence of continued defiance of Torah precepts. The people would have to confess this error as an additional sin.
  
  Verse 41
  
   אף אני אלך עמם בקרי, "Also I will walk with them as if accidental." Part of what the people have to acknowledge as part of their confession is that all G'd's retributions were justified. Even G'd's having withdrawn His personal supervision over the fate of the Jews must be acknowledged.
  והבאתי אותם, "and I will bring them, etc." This is also part of what the people will say as part of their confession. The fact that the Torah demands that the people acknowledge that their exile was part of G'd's punishment in line with His warnings indicates that they had previously denied that their exile was connected to their wrongdoing. The people had argued that if G'd really wanted to use His retribution to result in the people's repentance, exile was a peculiar means to achieve this. They reasoned that exile was bound to result in assimilation, the very reverse of what G'd wanted to achieve by disciplining His people. Such considerations reinforced the people's thinking that what had befallen them was accidental and not part of G'd's design. This is why G'd wrote that they have to confess also their erroneous assessment of why they had experienced all the curses predicted in the Torah.
  The words או אז mean that the exiled Israelites attribute their presence in other countries to be a result of natural migration or as an attempt by G'd to induce humility in them. G'd had known from experience that a sinner may humble himself such as Achav the king of Israel (Kings I 21, 27-29). Our sages in <i>Berachot</i> 7 have said that "better one severe chastisement which results in the sinner feeling humbled than 100 lashes of the whip (as these are effective only externally). Following such a humbling of oneself their guilt may become something they can acknowledge and come to terms with."
  
  Verse 42
  
   וזכרתי את בריתי יעקוב, "And I will remember My covenant, the one with Jacob, etc." The Torah announces here that whereas the confession of their guilt helps to reduce the severity of the afflictions to which G'd subjects the Jewish people, G'd has to invoke the merit of the patriarchs in order to restore them to their former status
  The verse also supplies an additional reason for G'd having driven the Jewish people into exile into the land of their enemies. The abuse the people would be subjected to there will become the catalyst that will make G'd remember the merit of the patriarchs. In addition, G'd will remember the sad state of the Holy Land while its people are absent. If G'd had not first exiled the Jews He would not have any reason to remember the land itself with special kindness. As it is, the sequence וזכרתי את בריתי….והארץ אזכר makes perfect sense.
  את בריתי יעקוב, if the merit of Jacob suffices, all well and good; if not G'd will also invoke the merit of Isaac, etc.
  
  Verse 43
  
   והארץ תעזב מהם…יען וביען, "And the land shall be forsaken without them..…because, even because, etc." The words יען וביען may be understood as expressing a sentiment similar to that of Jeremiah 9,12. The Talmudists (<i>Baba Metzia</i> 85) had grappled with the question why the land should have to be punished for the sins of the Israelites. Finally, G'd Himself explained the reason through the words of Jeremiah we have quoted. Once the people had failed to observe the Torah, the land itself was no longer interested in being occupied by the Jewish people. This reason becomes more plausible in view of the Torah's statement that during the years of Israel's exile the land had a chance to experience the many שמטה years Israel had ignored. We therefore have two good reasons why the punishment of exile was appropriate.
  The words יען וביען reflect these two reasons. The Torah repeats once more: 1) במשפטי מאסו, i.e. neglect of the <i>Shemittah</i> legislation; 2) ואת חקתי געלה נפשם, "and their soul abhorred My statutes;" they hated Torah study. It is clear from the end that if the Israelites had been guilty of only one of these categories of sins their punishment would have taken a different form altogether. If the people had only neglected to study the Torah but had observed the <i>shemittah</i> legislation at least they would not have experienced exile.
  
  Verse 44
  
   ואף גם זאת בהיותם, "And yet even when they are in the land of their enemies, etc." How can this verse which speaks of a favour G'd does to the exiled Jewish people be part of this sequence of dire predictions? Perhaps this is a reference to the earlier part where G'd explained that He was entitled to withdraw His providence from the people because they had accused Him of having done so. G'd goes on record that He does not withhold His supervision from the people and does not despise them [even though the people may not be aware of it. Ed.]
  The verse may also supply another consideration why exile actually saved the Jewish people. We explained, based on <i>Midrash Tehillim</i> 69 that G'd vented His anger on the stones and the trees in order to spare as many of the human beings as possible. Had the Jews remained in the land of Israel they themselves would have experienced G'd's anger on their bodies, much as did the land itself. Moreover, the presence of a people who had formerly been so exalted with Jerusalem as their capital, now languishing in foreign lands, maltreated by pagan kings, would satisfy even the attribute of Justice so that it would not insist on their utter destruction. The words ואף גם זאת are therefore to be understood as the cause why G'd wanted the Israelites to experience exile among foreign and hostile nations.
  להפר בריתי אתם, "to break My covenant with them." This is the covenant not to exchange the Jewish people for another nation, a covenant G'd kept for the people who experienced the Exodus. It is the deeper meaning of the words: "for I am the Lord their G'd." The sign of the covenant is that G'd does not adopt another nation in our place. G'd's promise at the time of מתן תורה that the Jewish people would be an עם סגולה וממלכת כהנים was equivalent to a covenant.
  The verse may also refer to the second party to the covenant, the Torah, who would be orphaned if G'd destroyed the Jewish people seeing no one would observe it. G'd would therefore have broken His covenant both with the Jewish people and with the Torah.
  
  Verse 45
  
   וזכרתי להם כרית ראשונים, "And I will remember for their sakes the covenant with the ancestors, etc." <i>Torat Kohanim</i> asks: "whence do we know that G'd concluded a covenant with the tribes?" They quote our verse as the source. Perhaps we should understand this in the way Jeremiah quotes G'd as remembering the time after the crossing of the sea of reeds when the Israelites willingly followed G'd into the desert, etc. (compare Jeremiah 2,2). G'd goes on record here that He will remember such deeds by our forefathers to their descendants in due course. The word ראשונים refers to the first ever generation of the Jews as a people G'd concluded a covenant with.