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text: English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה כריתות
  Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
  
  Introduction
  
  Keritot (sometimes pronounced Keritut) is the plural of karet, which is a punishment found quite frequently in the Torah for various transgressions (Leviticus 17:4, 9; Exodus 30:33, 38; Genesis 17:14; Numbers 15:31 and many others). Karet is variously translated as “excommunication” or “extirpation” or other similar term. The rabbis interpret this punishment to be one that is meted out by God and not by a human court. One interpretation is that the person will die an early death. Another interpretation is that the punishment is meted out on the person in world to come. 
  Despite the fact that the title of the tractate is Keritot, the subject of most of the tractate is those who are obligated to bring a hatat (sin-offering) an asham, and especially an “asham talui.” The “asham talui” is referred to in Leviticus 5:17-19:
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  There are in the Torah thirty-six [transgressions which are punishable with] karet:When one has intercourse with his mother,His father's wife;Or his daughter-in-law;When a man has intercourse with a male,Or with a beast,Or when a woman brings a beast upon herself;When one has intercourse with a woman and her daughter;Or with a married woman;Or with his sister;Or with his father's sister;Or his mother's sister;Or his wife's sister;Or his brother's wife;Or the wife of his father's brother;Or with a menstruating woman;One who blasphemes [the Lord];One who worships idols;Or dedicates his children to Molech;Or has a ba’al ov;Or desecrates the Shabbat;When an unclean person eats of sacred food;Or when one enters the precincts of the Temple in an unclean state;When one eats forbidden fat,Or blood;Notar;Or piggul;When one slaughtersOr offers up [a consecrated animal] outside [the Temple];One who eats anything leavened on Pesah;One who eatsOr works on Yom Kippur;One who compounds the oil [of anointing];Or compounds incense;Or uses [unlawfully] oil of anointing;And [when one transgresses the laws of] the pesah,And circumcision   from among positive commandments.Keritot opens with a list of thirty-six transactions for which one is liable karet if one commits the transgression intentionally, but without prior warning.This is not really the place to explain each of these transgressions. Rather I will give brief biblical references for each and explain anything that I feel is a bit more complicated.I have merely duplicated each section below for ease of reference. Sorry if this is a bit long…1) When one has intercourse with his mother; Leviticus 18:7.2) His father's wife; ibid: 8.3) Or his daughter-in-law; ibid: 15.4) When a man has intercourse with a male: ibid: 22.5) Or with a beast: ibid: 23.6) Or when a woman brings a beast upon herself: ibid.7) When one has intercourse with a woman and her daughter: ibid: 17.8) Or with a married woman: ibid: 20.9) Or with his sister; ibid: 9.10) Or with his father's sister: ibid: 12.11) Or his mother's sister: ibid: 13.12) Or his wife's sister: ibid: 18.13) Or his brother's wife: ibid: 16.14) Or the wife of his father's brother: ibid: 14.15) Or with a menstruating woman; ibid: 19.16) One who blasphemes [the Lord]: Numbers 15:30.17) One who worships idols: No shortage of references in the Tanakh.18) Or dedicates his children to Molech; Leviticus 18:21.19) Or has a ba’al ov; Leviticus 19:31.20) Or desecrates the Shabbat: Many references, see for instance, Exodus 31:24.21) When an unclean person eats of sacred food: Leviticus 7:20.22) Or when one enters the precincts of the Temple in an unclean state:Numbers 19:13.23) When one eats forbidden fat: Leviticus 7:25.24) Or blood; ibid, 27.25) Notar: Leviticus 19: 6-8.26) Or piggul; Leviticus 7:18.27) When one slaughters: Leviticus 17:4.28) Or offers up [a consecrated animal] outside [the Temple]; ibid, 8-9.29) One who eats anything leavened on Pesah; Exodus 12:19.30) One who eats:31) Or works on Yom Kippur;  Leviticus 23:28-30 (this and the previous transgression).32) One who compounds the oil [of anointing]; Exodus 30: 32-33.33) Or compounds incense; Exodus 30: 37-38.34) Or uses [unlawfully] oil of anointing; ibid, 32-33.35) And the pesah: Deuteronomy 16: 2; Numbers 9:13.36) And circumcision are positive commandments: Leviticus 12:3; Genesis 17:14.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah refers to the list of transgressions in yesterday’s mishnah.
  For these [transgressions] one is liable to karet if committed intentionally, and if committed unwittingly to a hatat.  One who commits any of the transgressions listed in mishnah is liable for karet if done intentionally and a hatat (a sin-offering) if done unwittingly.
  If there is a doubt whether he had committed the transgression to an asham talui, except in the case of one who defiled the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case one is liable in this case to a sliding-scale sacrifice, the words of Rabbi Meir.  If he does not know whether he committed the transgression (see the introduction), then he brings an “asham talui” (a type of guilt-offering, see the introduction). This is true for all of the sins in mishnah one, except for defiling the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case a person brings a sliding scale sacrifice (see Leviticus 5:2ff). For a sliding scale sacrifice a rich person brings an animal, a poor person brings a bird and a very poor person brings grain.
  But the sages say: also the blasphemer [is an exception], as it says: “You shall have one law for one that acts in error” (Numbers 15:29), this excludes the blasphemer who performs no action.  The sages hold that there is another exception to who brings a hatat and an asham talui, and that is the blasphemer. When it comes to the hatat, the Torah states, “You shall have one law for one that acts in error.” The midrashic implication is that in order to be liable for a hatat you must perform an action. Since the blasphemer doesn’t do anything, but merely speaks, he does not bring a hatat or an asham talui.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  According to Leviticus 12:6, after a woman gives birth and then undergoes a period of purification, she must bring two offerings. The first is a lamb, offered as an olah, and the second is a bird for a hatat. The remainder of our chapter deals with various scenarios in which a woman would bring a hatat and either eat it or not.
  Some women [after childbirth] bring an offering which is eaten; some bring one which is not eaten, and some bring no offering at all.  This is an introduction to the following four mishnayot.
  These bring an offering which is eaten:  In the cases which follow, despite the fact that the woman has not given birth to a live child, she must still bring a sacrifice and the sacrifice can be eaten. The significance of the sacrifice being edible is that it implies that she is fully obligated to bring the sacrifice. As we shall see in mishnah four, in cases of doubt concerning whether she is obligated or not, she brings the sacrifice but it is not eaten.
  If a woman miscarries a fetus which has the shape of beast, or a wild animal or a bird, the words of Rabbi Meir; but the sages say: only if it has a human shape.  According to Rabbi Meir, if the miscarried fetus has the shape of a living being, even an animal, she must bring the sacrifice and the sacrifice is eaten. The other sages hold that the fetus must have a human shape for her to eat the sacrifice. This is the same dispute that we saw in Bekhorot 8:1.
  Or if a woman miscarries a sandal-like fetus or a placenta or a fully formed fetus, or one that comes out in pieces.  A sandal like fetus is considered to be human enough for it to count as a human miscarriage, which makes the woman liable for a sacrifice that can be eaten. If a woman miscarries a placenta, the assumption is that she also miscarried a fetus and somehow it was missed. A fully formed fetus or one that is cut up in pieces also count as births.
  Similarly, if a female slave miscarries, she brings an offering which is eaten.  A female slave is liable to observe the same commandments that a Jewish woman is liable to observe. Therefore, if she gives birth, the same rules that apply to the Jewish woman apply to her.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  In today’s mishnah we learn of cases in which a woman brings a sacrifice but the sacrifice is not eaten. In all of these cases there is doubt whether she is liable for a sacrifice: therefore she brings (just in case she was liable) but the sacrifice cannot be eaten (in case she was not liable).
  The following bring an offering which is not eaten:A woman who miscarries but does not know what the miscarriage was,  If she doesn’t know whether the form of the fetus which she miscarried is something over which one must bring a childbirth sacrifice (see yesterday’s mishnah) or not, then she brings a sacrifice but it is not eaten.
  Or if two women who have a miscarriage, one of a kind which did not render her liable [to an offering], and the other of a kind that does render her liable [to an offering].  In this case two women miscarry; one miscarries a fetus that renders her liable for a sacrifice and one miscarries something that does not render her liable. However, the women don’t know who miscarried what (I know this sounds really absurd). Both women are in the category mentioned in section one (doubtful whether they are liable), and therefore both bring a sacrifice and neither sacrifice may be eaten.
  Rabbi Yose said: When is this so? This applies only if one went towards the east and the other towards the west, but if both remained together they bring [together] one offering which is eaten.  Rabbi Yose modifies what was stated in section two. That ruling applies only to a case where two women gave their sacrifices to a priest and he is not sure which of the sacrifices came from the woman who was really liable. If they are not around to ask them who gave birth to what, then neither sacrifice can be eaten. However, if they remain together, then together the two of them can bring one sacrifice and stipulate that it is brought on behalf of the woman who is actually obligated.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah lists women who do not bring a childbirth sacrifice.
  The following do not bring a sacrifice:A woman who discharges a sac filled with water or with blood or with pieces of flesh;  This sac is not considered to be evidence that the woman gave birth, and therefore she does not bring a sacrifice.
  Or if the miscarriage was in the shape of fish, locust, unclean animals or reptiles;  These shapes are not indicative of a human fetus and therefore she does not bring a sacrifice. We should note that there might be some ideology in effect here. In mishnah two Rabbi Meir said that a woman who gives birth to a fetus in the shape of a beast, wild animal or bird is obligated. These were all kosher animals. They are also the animals that require shekhitah (slaughtering) in order to be eaten. Today’s mishnah refers to living things that are either of a lower form (fish and locusts) or are not kosher (unclean animals and reptiles). Perhaps it is an ideological statement of Rabbi Meir that dictates that humans look like the former, kosher animals of a higher form, but not the latter.
  Or if it was extracted by means of a caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon declares her liable [to an offering] in the case of a caesarean section.  According to the rabbis, the fetus is not considered to come into existence until the fortieth day. A woman who miscarries before that point is considered to have discharged a sac full of water and she is not liable for a sacrifice.
  According to the first opinion, a child born through caesarean section does not make his/her mother liable to bring a sacrifice because this is not really “birth.” However, Rabbi Shimon holds that she is liable.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  According to Leviticus 12:5-6, on the eighty-first day after giving birth to a girl a woman brings a sacrifice. Our mishnah discusses a case where on the eve of the eighty-first day the woman has a miscarriage. Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate whether she must bring a sacrifice.
  Note that the debate is specifically concerning this night. All agree that if she miscarried earlier she is not liable. It seems that the sacrifice brought for the previous birth will cover the subsequent miscarriage as well. And all hold that if she miscarries on the eighty-first day, she is liable for a sacrifice, because the first sacrifice cannot cover the miscarriage. The debate is only over a woman who miscarries the night before.
  If a woman miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day: Bet Shammai say: she is exempted from an offering. But Bet Hillel say: she is liable.  These are the positions of the two houses; they will be explained below.
  Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: what is the difference between the eve of the eighty-first day and the eighty-first day itself? Since these are considered equal with regard to [blood] uncleanness, why should they not be considered equal also with reference to the offerings?  If a woman has a bloody discharge for the first 80 days after giving birth to a girl, the blood is pure. However, if she discharges blood on the 81st day, even at night, the blood is impure. Since the night of the 81st day is reckoned with the next day in terms of blood impurity, Bet Hillel reasons that the same must be true with regard to a sacrifice. If she miscarries on the night of the 81st day, she must bring a sacrifice, just as she would if she miscarried the next morning.
  Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you said this in the case where she miscarries on the eighty-first day where it occurred at a time when she was fit to bring an offering, can you say this where she miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, where it did not occur at a time when she was fit to bring an offering?  Bet Shammai responds that there is a difference between a woman who miscarries on the 81st day and one who miscarries the night before. On the morning of the 81st day she can bring a sacrifice for the previous child. Therefore, when she miscarries she must bring a new sacrifice for the miscarriage. The first sacrifice cannot cover the miscarriage. However, if she miscarries at night, she had not yet arrived at a time when she could bring the sacrifice for the first child, because sacrifices cannot be offered at night. Therefore, she does not bring a sacrifice for the miscarriage.
  Bet Hillel said to them: the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat shall prove it, where it did not take place at a time when she was fit to bring an offering and yet she is liable to bring a [new] offering.  Bet Hillel responds that in certain cases a woman might miscarry on the 81st day, but not be able to bring her sacrifice for the previous child. This would happen if the 81st day fell on Shabbat. Nevertheless, despite the fact that she cannot yet bring her previous sacrifice, all agree that she is liable for another sacrifice for the miscarriage. The same is true, according to Bet Hillel, if she miscarries on the night of the 81st.
  Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you says this of the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat for although it is not fit for offerings of an individual, it is at least fit for communal offerings, would you maintain this concerning a woman who miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, seeing that the night is fit neither for offerings of the individual nor for communal offerings?  Bet Shammai says that night and Shabbat are not comparable. At night, no sacrifices may be offered, whereas on Shabbat, although individual sacrifices, such as those brought by the childbearing woman, cannot be offered, communal sacrifices such as the tamid and musaf can be. This rejects Bet Hillel’s proof in section four.
  As to [your argument of the uncleanness of] the blood, it proves nothing, for if she aborted within the period of cleanness the blood is unclean, and yet she is exempted from an offering.  The sensitive reader will note that Bet Shammai has still not answered Bet Hillel’s proof found in section two: the comparison between blood impurity and the sacrifice. Bet Shammai says that the two issues are different, as can be seen by the case of a woman who aborts during the first 80 days of blood purity after having given birth to a girl. While bloody discharge that comes as a result of the first birth is pure during this period, blood that is a result of a new miscarriage during this period is impure. Nevertheless, all agree that if she miscarries during this time, she is not liable for a sacrifice. Bet Shammai argue that the same is true of a woman who miscarries on the night of the 81st at this point any blood is impure because the 80 days of purity are up, but if she miscarries she is still exempt.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  If a woman had five doubtful genital discharges or five doubtful births, she needs to bring only one offering, and she may eat sacrifices [immediately], and she is not liable to bring the other [offerings].  There are two situations that are described here. 1) A woman had genital discharge for three consecutive days once a month for five months and she doesn’t know if these occurred during her menstrual cycle, in which case she was not a “zavah” and does not need to bring a sacrifice, or not during her menstrual cycle and she is a zavah does need to bring a sacrifice. 2) She had five miscarriages and she doesn’t know whether what she miscarried counts as a birth and she must bring a sacrifice or doesn’t count as a birth and she does not bring a sacrifice. In both of these cases, the woman might be liable for as many as five sacrifices (each consisting of an olah and a hatat) or she might not be liable at all. The rule in this case is that she needs to bring only one sacrifice and then she can eat any sacrificial meat, as is always the case when a woman brings a sacrifice for being a zavah or for giving birth. While she can, if she wants, bring four more sacrifices, she need not do so.
  If a woman had five certain births, or five certain genital discharges, she brings one offering and may then eat sacrifices [immediately], and she is liable to bring the other offerings.  However, if she had five certain cases of genital discharge or five certain births, then she must bring all five sacrifices. After she brings the first sacrifice she can already resume eating sacrifices.
  It once happened in Jerusalem that the price of a pair of doves rose to a golden denar.  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: By this sanctuary, I shall not go to sleep tonight before they cost but a [silver] denar! Then he entered the court and taught: if a woman had five certain births or five certain genital discharges she needs to bring only one offering, and she may then eat sacrifices, and she is not liable to bring the other [offerings]. Thereupon the price of a pair of birds stood at a quarter of a [silver] denar each.  This section contains a fascinating story. Because of the previous halakhah that demanded that a woman bring a sacrifice for every certain birth or certain genital discharge, the price of the birds used for the sacrifices went all the way up to a golden denar for a pair. A golden denar is the equivalent of 25 silver denars. Market forces were working in favor of those selling the birds and would have discouraged women from bringing the sacrifices that they so frequently had to bring. To combat this, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel boldly changed the halakhah so that a woman would have to bring only one sacrifice, even if she had had five certain births or discharges. This new halakhah immediately brought the price down to ¼ of a denar. The actions of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel are one of the clearest examples of a rabbi adapting the halakhah to fit the needs of the Jews of his time. The halakhah to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is not supposed to be something that is simply too costly to fulfill. When he saw that the cost of sacrifices was becoming prohibitive, he didn’t refrain and simply say, “What can I do? That’s what the law demands.” Rather he acted to ensure that what the law did demand was something that people could reasonably observe.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Generally a person who is impure and then immerses in a mikveh can begin to eat sacrifices after immersion. However, there are four categories of people who must first bring sacrifices before they can eat other sacrifices. This process is called “a ceremony of atonement.”
  Our mishnah also mentions another category, but since tomorrow’s mishnah discusses it more fully, we shall explain it tomorrow.
  There are four persons who require a ceremony of atonement, and there are four who bring a sacrifice for willful as well as for inadvertent transgression.  This section introduces today’s and tomorrow’s mishnah.
  The following are those who require a ceremony of atonement: the zav, the zavah, the woman who gave birth and the metzora.  A “zav” is a man who has an abnormal genital discharge (see Leviticus 15:15) and a “zavah” is a woman with an abnormal genital discharge (see Leviticus 15:29-30). Both must bring sacrifices before they complete their purification process. So must a woman who gave birth (as we learned in 1:3) and a person who had some type of skin disease (Leviticus 14:10ff).
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: also a convert is regarded as a person who still requires a ceremony of atonement until the blood has been sprinkled for him; the same applies to the nazirite with reference to wine, haircutting and uncleanness.  Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob adds two more to this list. A convert who has already been circumcised (if he is a man, of course) and immersed in the mikveh, must bring a sacrifice. He cannot eat sacrifices until the blood from the olah that he brings is sprinkled on the altar. Similarly, a nazirite cannot drink wine, cut his hair or become impure from contact with a dead body until he brings his sacrifices (see Numbers 6:14 and Mishnah Nazir 6:9). Both of these are also cases where a person needs to bring a sacrifice to complete the process of purification.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Usually a person brings a sacrifice only when s/he transgresses unwittingly. For instance, if one willfully breaks Shabbat, one does not bring a sacrifice. But if one didn’t know that a certain act is forbidden on Shabbat and then he performed that act, he can bring a sacrifice to atone for the transgression. However, there are four cases in which a person must bring a sacrifice even if he intentionally transgresses.
  The following bring a sacrifice for willful as well as for inadvertent transgressions:One who has intercourse with a female slave,  This shall be explained in mishnayot 4-5 of this chapter.
  A nazirite who has become unclean,  A nazirite is not supposed to defile himself through contact with a dead body (see Numbers 6:9-12). If he does he must bring two sacrifices a hatat and an olah. He is liable for these sacrifices even if he intentionally comes into contact with the dead.
  For a false oath concerning testimony;  If a person swears that he does not know any testimony for another person, and it turns out that he did know testimony, he must bring a sacrifice to atone for his sin. By its very nature, this false oath had to have been done intentionally, and therefore we have another case of a person who brings a sacrifice for an intentional sin. This topic was discussed in Shevuot 4:2-5.
  And for a false oath concerning a deposit.  If a person swears falsely that someone else’s property was not deposited with him, and then it turns out that he was lying, he brings a sacrifice. Again, by its very nature this is an intentional sin. This topic was discussed in Shevuot 5:1-2.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah introduces two more categories of “five people.” The first is the person who brings one sacrifice for multiple transgressions. The issue here is what can make the same act performed on repeated occasions considered to be separate transgressions? This is a topic that will prove of great interest to the rabbis and we shall discuss it for the next few chapter.
  The mishnah also refers to five people who bring a sacrifice of higher or lesser value a rich person brings a beast and a poor person a bird. These people will be listed in mishnah four.
  There are five persons who bring one sacrifice for multiple transgressions, and five who bring a sacrifice of higher or lesser value. The following bring one sacrifice for multiple transgressions:One who has intercourse with a female slave several times,  Having intercourse with a female slave several times is considered one transgression and therefore he brings only one sacrifice. We will discuss this issue more in mishnayot 4-5.
  A nazirite who became unclean several times.  This category was explained in yesterday’s mishnah.
  One who warns his wife in regard to several men,  This refers to the beginning of the “Sotah” process. The Sotah process begins with a man warning his wife not to be secluded with so-and-so, and (in the case mentioned here) not with so-and-so, etc. He warns her concerning several men. If she goes and is secluded with all of these men, she must bring only one sacrifice, “the minhah of jealousy” (see Numbers 5:15ff) for all of her seclusions. The reason that she brings only one minhah and not one minhah for each man with whom she was secluded is that since the warning was done collectively, we look at her acts as one transgression, not many. Had he issued separate warnings for each man, she would have brought one sacrifice for each man with whom she was secluded.
  And a metzora who has contracted skin disease several times.  If a person contracts skin disease, then is healed and then contracts it again repetitively, he brings only one sacrifice for all of the outbreaks of the disease. Since he was not purified in between each outbreak, it is considered one case of skin disease and not many.
  If he has offered the birds and then contracted the disease again, they do not count for him until he has offered his hatat. Rabbi Judah says: until he has offered his asham.  The purification process from skin disease is described in Leviticus 14. After being pronounced free of the affliction, a person brings two birds; one bird is slaughtered and its blood is sprinkled on him and the other is set free. On the eighth day he brings two lambs, one as an asham and the other as an olah. If he can’t afford two lambs, he brings one lamb as an asham and two birds, one as a hatat and one as an olah. In either case, he offers the asham first and the hatat afterwards. If he brings the birds and then contracts skin disease again, the two skin diseases are considered as one and he need bring only one set of sacrifices at the end. Even the two birds that were already brought count. When he is healed, he will bring only the lambs or lambs and birds as olah and hatat. According to Rabbi Judah, this is true until he brings the hatat at the very end. If he contracts the skin disease again after this point, then it is a new case of skin disease and he has to bring a new set of sacrifices.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah: the five who bring one sacrifice for many instances of obligation. Today’s mishnah discusses the final such case and then moves on to explain the second topic in mishnah three the five who bring a higher or lower sacrifice.
  A woman who has had several births.  The last category of person who might bring one sacrifice for multiple cases is the woman who gave birth if she did not bring a sacrifice for one birth, she can bring one sacrifice for multiple births.
  If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth.  The mishnah now explains other types of cases where a woman might bring one sacrifice for multiple births or miscarriages. Generally, she brings her sacrifices 80 days after the birth of a female. If she miscarries within this period, she need not bring a sacrifice for both the birth and the miscarriage. If the miscarriage is female, and then she miscarries again within 80 days, she still brings only one sacrifice. Similarly, if she miscarries twins, she brings only one sacrifice for both. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the previous opinion. According to Rabbi Judah she brings a sacrifice for the first birth. For the miscarriage that occured within 80 days of the first, she does not bring, because it was within the time covered by the first. However, she does bring for the third (the second miscarriage) because it was not within the time of the first. The second (the first miscarriage) does not cover the third, because she didn’t bring a sacrifice for the second. Then she doesn’t bring for the fourth (the third miscarriage) because it was during the time of the third. In this way she ends up bringing for every other miscarriage.
  The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora.  This is the list of the five categories of people who can bring either a more or less expensive sacrifice, depending upon their wealth. A) This refers to the person who swore falsely that he didn’t know testimony. The language of the mishnah is based on Leviticus 5:1. Lev 5:5-11 discuss the various sacrifices that can be brought. B) This refers to one who made a false oath. See Leviticus 5:4. C) One who enters the Temple while impure or eats holy things while impure must bring a higher or lower sacrifice. This is also mentioned in Leviticus 5. In all three of these cases, the person who is really poor can bring just a grain offering. D) See Leviticus 12:6-8. E) See Leviticus 13.
  What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations?  For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.  Leviticus 19:20-21 states, “If a man has carnal relations, having an emission, with a woman who is a slave and has been designated for another man, but has not been redeemed or given her freedom, there shall be an indemnity; they shall not, however, be put to death, since she has not been freed. But he must bring to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, as his guilt offering (asham) to the Lord, a ram of guilt offering.” Our mishnah explains what the difference is between a man who has intercourse with a slave woman such as is described here and a man who has intercourse with any other forbidden sexual relation. In the two cases, a different punishment is meted out if done intentionally, and if done unwittingly, a different sacrifice is brought. The punishment for all other sexual sins is either death or karet, whereas in this case the punishment is lashes. The mishnah now explains the differences with regard to the sacrifice. A + B)  For other forbidden relations one must bring a female hatat, whereas here one brings a male asham. (Note that a hatat is always female and an asham is always male. Thus it turns out that this is only one difference between the two sins.) C) For all other sexual sins, both the man and woman are equal in matters of lashes (if done intentionally but without prior warning) and in bringing a sacrifice, if done intentionally. But in this case, the female slave is the one lashed (this is how the rabbis understand the word that is translated “indemnity”) and the man brings the sacrifice (whether done intentionally or intentionally see mishnah two). D) In all other cases the man is liable as soon as sexual contact begins, but with a slave woman, he is liable only when he emits seed, as is stated in the verse itself. E) In all other cases, if a man sleeps multiple times with a woman forbidden to him, he is liable only once, whereas here with the female slave, he is liable for each act of intercourse. The mishnah notes that this is a balancing stringency. Since there is a leniency when it comes to having intercourse with the female slave he brings a sacrifice even if done intentionally there is also an accompanying stringency he must bring a sacrifice for each act.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah defines what type of female is referred to in Leviticus 19:20-22.
  To which type of female slave [does this refer]?To one who is half a slave and half a free person, as it is written: “And she has been redeemed and not redeemed” (Leviticus 19:20), the words of Rabbi Akiva.  According to Rabbi Akiva, the type of female slave referred to in the verse is one who is half a slave and half free (for instance she was owned by two masters and one freed her). He derives this from the strange phrasing in the Torah. The simple meaning of these words is that she has not been redeemed, but the Hebrew syntax allows Rabbi Akiva to interpret the words as if she has been partially redeemed/freed.
  Rabbi Ishmael says: to a full female slave.  Rabbi Ishmael interprets more in accordance with the simple meaning the female slave referred to is fully a slave. She has not been redeemed at all.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: all other forbidden sexual relations are stated explicitly, and of the remainder there is only one who can be half a slave and half a free person.  All of the other prohibited relations in the Torah are fully free females (they could not be related to the man if they were slaves). There is, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, a long standing tradition that there is one prohibited woman who is half slave/half free. The only one that this can be is the female slave referred to in Leviticus 19. It is interesting that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agree that the slave is half free, but they disagree with regard to how we know this; Rabbi Akiva derives it through a midrashic reading of the verse whereas Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov derives it from a received tradition. These are two of the main sources of Jewish law tradition and midrash/interpretation.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  After having delineated several differences between the case of the female slave and other cases of forbidden sex, the mishnah notes that in other ways, most cases of forbidden sexual relations are the same.
  In the case of all forbidden relations, if one partner was an adult and the other a minor, the minor is exempt; If one is awake and the other asleep, the one asleep is exempt;  A minor or one asleep cannot be held responsible for his/her actions, therefore they are exempt.
  If one is an inadvertent and the other intentional, the former is liable to a hatat, the latter to karet.  This rule is true of most cases prohibited relations (it is not true with regard to female slaves) for inadvertent transgressions, one brings a hatat and for intentional transgressions, one is liable for karet (if done without warning).
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah talks about various types of cases where a person might or might not have eaten forbidden fat, a transgression that would cause him to bring a hatat for atonement.
  If they said to him: you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to a hatat;  This is the obvious case. If a person ate a piece of fat and doesn’t know whether it was helev (forbidden fat) or shuman (permitted fat), then he must bring a hatat.
  If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui.  In this case, there is contradictory testimony with regard to whether the fat he ate was forbidden. Furthermore, there is either only one witness who testifies that he ate forbidden fat, or that witness is a woman, whose testimony does not fully count. Since there is no proper testimony, he does not bring a hatat. However, he does bring an asham talui, a “suspended asham.” As I explained in the introduction to Keritot, this is a sacrifice brought when it is not clear if a person transgressed.
  If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui.  In this case, there is no solid testimony that he ate forbidden fat, and he himself denies having done so. These two factors combine to exempt him from having to bring a sacrifice.
  If one witness says, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat, he is exempt.  In this case, there is proper testimony against him, but he himself denies having eaten forbidden fat. Rabbi Meir argues that just as in a case of the death penalty, where two witnesses can make him liable, so too here, when it comes to bringing a sacrifice to atone for a sin, two people can make him liable, even if he denies having transgressed. The other rabbis argue against Rabbi Meir by noting that there is a difference between testimony for a capital crime, such as murder, and testimony with regard to liability for a sacrifice. In the case of the sacrifice, if the person admits to having eaten the forbidden fat, but claims to have done so intentionally, he is not obligated for a sacrifice, because sacrifices are brought only for accidental sins. Therefore, when he says, “I didn’t eat” he is believed.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah begins discussing the topic of how to divide one act of transgressing into several transgressions, such that a person would be considered as having transgressed only one, or join separate acts into one act such that a person would be liable independently for each act. This is a topic of immense interest to the rabbis and they will continue to discuss it throughout the chapter and even in chapter four.
  If one twice ate forbidden fat in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to but one hatat.  If a person ate forbidden fat twice, but both times he was unaware of what he was doing, for instance he didn’t know that what he was eating was forbidden fat, he is liable for only one hatat. As long as he was not informed of his sin in between the acts, this counts as only one sin.
  If one ate forbidden fat, blood, piggul and notar in one spell of unawareness, he is liable for each kind.  However, if he ate different kinds of prohibited substances within one period of unawareness, meaning he was not told in between each item that what he is eating is prohibited, he is liable for a hatat for each kind of prohibited substance. This is because each is its own prohibition. “Piggul” is sacrificial meat that was offered with a disqualifying intention, and “notar” is remnant, sacrificial meat left over beyond the time when it must be eaten.
  This is an instance where different kinds [of food] are more stringent than one kind.  As the Mishnah so often does, it compares the above case with another case, noting that sometimes eating differently prohibited substances is treated more stringently, and sometimes it is treated more leniently. The above case is one in which it was treated more stringently.
  In the following instance, however, one kind [of food] is more stringent than several kinds: if one ate half an olive-size and then again half an olive-size, both in one spell of unawareness, if of one kind he is liable, if of two kinds, he is exempted.  In contrast, if a person eats half of an olive’s worth of one prohibited substance and then another half of an olive of the same substance, he is liable for a hatat, because he ate one olive’s worth, the amount necessary to be liable. If the two half-olives were of different substances, then he is exempt because he didn’t eat an olive’s worth of a single prohibited substance.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  At the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a person eats two halves of an olive’s worth of one prohibited substance, he is liable. Our mishnah deals with the question of how close these two acts must be for them to be considered one act of eating, such that he would be liable.
  Within what time must he eat them [for him to be liable]?   [The time he would need] if he ate a similar amount of parched grains of corn, the words of Rabbi Meir.  Rabbi Meir holds that we imagine the prohibited substances as if they were parched grains of corn. If it took him longer to eat the prohibited substances than it would have to have eaten a similar amount of parched grains of corn, then he is exempt.
  But the rabbis say: he must take from the beginning to the end [of his eating] no more time than is required for the eating of a peras (a half a loaf of [to be liable].  The other rabbis say that as long as he ate the half-olives within the amount of time it would take to eat half a loaf of a standard sized loaf of bread (four olive’s worth of bread) then he is liable. We should note that in later halakhah this became a standard as far as eating obligatory substances, such as matzah on Pesah. One must eat the matzah within this period of time for it to count as his obligatory matzah. Tiny pieces of matzah eaten throughout the meal are not sufficient to fulfill one’s obligation.
  If one eats unclean food or drinks unclean drinks, or if he drinks a quarter [of a log] of wine and then enters the Temple [he is liable if it takes less time] than it takes to eat a peras.  This section deals with a priest who does something to disqualify himself from either eating holy food (terumah and sacrifices) or from entering the Temple. If he eats or drinks impure foods he cannot eat holy foods. If he drinks wine, he cannot go into the Temple (see Leviticus 10:9). Our mishnah teaches that if he eats or drinks these things within the amount of time it would require to eat half of a loaf of bread, then he cannot eat holy food (if he ate impure food or drink) or go into the Temple (if he drank wine).
  Rabbi Elazar says: if the drinking was interrupted or if he diluted it, he is exempt.  Rabbi Elazar provides a different measure when it comes to drinking the wine. If he interrupted his drinking, or if he stopped long enough to dilute it with water, meaning he didn’t drink the whole quarter log at once, then he is allowed to go into the Temple.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah the rabbis try to figure out how a person could eat one piece of forbidden fat and by that one act become liable to four hatats and an asham. As we have seen before, this is the kind of question the rabbis like to ask. Think of this as a rabbinic riddle, almost like asking a Scrabble or Boggle player, how many words you can make from another word. Fun!
  It is possible that by one act of eating a person could become liable to four hatats and one asham:If an unclean person eats forbidden fat, which was at the same time notar of an offering, and [it was on] Yom Kippur.  Let’s list the hatats and asham. First the hatats: 1) For eating holy food while in an impure state. 2) For eating forbidden fat. 3) For eating notar. 4) For eating on Yom Kippur. The asham is for eating sacrificial meat in the first place. This is called “meilah” and it means illicit transgression of holy property.
  Rabbi Meir says: if it was on Shabbat and he carried it out, he is liable [to yet another hatat]. But they said to him: this is a different name.  Rabbi Meir adds a fifth hatat if it was on Shabbat and he carried it from one domain to another. The other rabbis disagree because this hatat is for carrying and not for eating. All of the other hatats and the asham were for the eating itself.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  We’ve talked about food, now let’s talk about sex! Seriously, today’s mishnah is similar to yesterday’s in its form and style, but instead of discussing how many hatats one can be liable for eating forbidden food, now the rabbis try to figure out how many hatats one can be liable for one act of forbidden sex.
  By one act of intercourse one may become liable for six hatats: If one had intercourse with his daughter, he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter, his sister, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, and [he can also be guilty] of intercourse with a married woman and a menstruant.  Try to follow this one. A man has sex with his mother and they have a daughter. She is his sister and his daughter. If she marries his paternal brother (this is legal) she is now his brother’s wife. When she is divorced or widowed, she marries his father’s brother (this is also legal). When he has relations with this one woman, he has transgressed four incest prohibitions, all at the same time. In addition, if she is married at the time and she is also a menstruant, he has transgressed six times with one act. [I hope it was worth it!].
  If one had intercourse with his daughter’s daughter he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter's daughter, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant.  If six hatats wasn’t enough for you, here’s the seventh. If his daughter’s daughter marries his son (possible if they were from different mothers), and she is his wife’s sister (if his wife is his son-in-law’s daughter from a different wife), then it turns out that his daughter’s daughter can be his daughter-in-law and his wife’s sister (three hatats). Then she marries his brother, and then his father’s brother (as in section one). If she is married and a menstruant when he has relations with her, he is liable for seven hatats.
  Rabbi Yose said: if the grandfather transgressed and married her first, he may thereby become guilty for offending with his father's wife.  In this case, his father can marry her, although this is prohibited by the rabbis. She is his great-granddaughter, and this is only a rabbinic prohibition. Note that he can only marry her in a case of yibbum, because she was married to his brother. She is not his daughter-in-law because she was married to his son’s maternal brother and not maternal brother. This would add another hatat. I know this is complicated, so if you would like to send me a chart, I’d be happy to check it for you.
  So too, if one had intercourse with his wife's daughter or her daughter's daughter.  A person can be liable for the same number of hatats if he has the same scenario but with his wife’s daughter and with his wife’s granddaughter. You might ask how his wife’s daughter can be his sister, since he can’t normally marry his sister’s mother. This could happen if his father had a daughter out of wedlock with a woman and he married this woman (this is permitted, although prohibited rabbinically). It now turns out that this child is wife’s daughter and his paternal sister.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. There are more attempts to figure out how many transgressions a person can transgress with one act of intercourse.
  If one had relations with his mother-in-law he may thereby become guilty for [having relations] with his mother-in-law, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant.  I’ll use some names for this one. Let’s say Lavan has sex with Leah his daughter and they have a daughter, Dina. Yaakov marries Dina, so that Leah is his mother-in-law and his wife’s sister. Leah marries Reuven, Yaakov’s son, and now Leah is his daughter-in-law. If Reuven dies or divorces her and then she marries Yaakov’s brother, she is now his brother’s wife. Then, after death or divorce, she marries Yaakov’s father’s brother, so she is his father’s brother’s wife. If she is married and a menstruant when Yaakov has relations with her, he is liable for seven hatats.
  And so too, if one had intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or of his mother-in-law.  One can become liable for the same hatats if the woman is the mother of his father-in-law or the mother of his mother-in-law.
  Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: if one had intercourse with his mother-in-law he may thereby become guilty for [having relations] with his mother-in-law, the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. They said to him: all these three are the same name.  Eve has two daughters Rachel and Leah and one son, Lavan. If Yaakov marries Rachel and Leah’s daughter and Lavan’s daughter, then Eve is his mother-in-law (Rachel’s mother), his mother-in-law’s mother-in-law (Leah’s daughter’s mother) and his father-in-law’s mother (Lavan, his father-in-law’s, mother). If you added these prohibitions to the previous scenario, you could come up with nine hatats (don’t try this at home!). The other rabbis say that “mother-in-laws” are all one name, meaning that they are all one prohibition. This is because the prohibition of various types of mother-in-law’s is included in Leviticus 18:17: “Do not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; nor shall you marry her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter and uncover her nakedness: they are kindred, it is depravity.” Since they are all included in one verse if someone manages to have a woman who is all three at the same time, there is only one hatat for the “mother-in-law” prohibitions.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  In our mishnah Rabbi Akiva begins to ask concerning the question of how one distinguishes between separate transgressions, for which one is liable for each individually, and one extended transgression, for which one is liable only once.
  Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua at the meat-market of Emmaus, where they went to buy meat for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son:  The mishnah begins with an interesting tidbit of historical information. Rabbi Akiva was in Emmaus (near the Latrun exit on the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem highway, not far from my house). There he ran into Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua buying meat for Rabban Gamaliel’s son’s wedding. Feeling himself lucky to run into some rabbis, probably not an everyday occurrence, he decides to ask them a halakhic riddle. Note that the question is not a practical one, but rather an academic one. This is an interesting window into what kinds of questions rabbis asked each other when they met.
  What [is the law concerning] a man who had intercourse with his sister, his father's sister and his mother's sister? Is he liable for one sacrifice for all of them, or to one [separate sacrifice] for each of them?  The case is one in which a man had relations with three women prohibited to him, all of whom are different types of prohibited “sisters.” All three transgressions were done in one period of unawareness. Either he didn’t know that there was such a prohibition, or he didn’t know that these women were his sister, father’s sister and mother’s sister. Thus the question is, if in one period of unawareness one commits three transgressions that are called by a similar name, is he liable for three hatats or one?
  They replied: we have heard nothing [about this], but we have heard that if one had intercourse with five menstruants in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to a sacrifice for each [act], and it seems to us that the case [you asked about] may be derived by an a fortiori conclusion (kal.  Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua respond that they don’t have an answer to the question, at least not one that they have received from their teachers. In other words, Rabbi Akiva has thought of a new situation that was never before discussed. [Good job, Rabbi Akiva!] While they don’t have a received answer, they do have a similar received tradition concerning a man who has relations with five menstruants in one period of unawareness. Despite the fact that this is one type of transgression (prohibition of sex with a menstruant) he is liable for a hatat for each transgression. It seems that he is liable for five hatats because each one is a different woman. The distinctness of their bodies one from the other makes these five sins and not one sin of transgressing the prohibition of sex with a menstruant. From this case Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua conclude that all the more so (kal vehomer) in the case of the three sisters, he would be liable for a hatat for each sister, because there is some difference between the status of each sister while they are all sister’s they are different types of sisters.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Rabbi Akiva asks another question to Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua.
  Rabbi Akiva further asked: If a limb hangs loose from the body of a living beast, what is the law?  A limb removed from a living animal is considered to convey impurity like carrion. Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a case of a limb that is hanging loose from an animal. A sinew or some skin is connecting it to the animal, but the limb will not heal and become fully reattached to the animal. Does such a limb convey impurity even though it is still attached?
  They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard about a limb hanging loose from the body of a man, that it is clean.  As was the case in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua do not have a received tradition, but they can again figure out the answer by comparing it to a case for which they do have a tradition. If a person has a limb hanging loose from his body, it does not convey impurity as if it were a dead body.
  And thus those that were afflicted with boils used to do in Jerusalem. He would go on the eve of Pesah to the doctor, and he would cut the limb until only contact of a hairbreadth was left; he then stuck it on a thorn and then tore himself away from it.  In this manner both that man and the physician could make their pesah offering.  They now explain how people would use this halakhah to prevent them from becoming impure on the eve of Pesah, and thereby lose their ability to sacrifice and eat the pesah offering. People who had boils and needed to have a limb removed would go to the doctor. He could not cut off the limb because then he would become impure. To solve this problem, he would cut off most of the limb until it was only connected by a hairbreadth. At this point the limb was still pure. He would then stick the limb on a thorn stuck into the ground like a peg. The person with boils would then rip his own limb off (ouch!). In this way, the doctor would not touch the limb while it was being ripped off. Both the doctor and his patient could then offer their pesah sacrifice that evening.
  And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal vehomer.  From this case we can draw a “kal vehomer” argument. If the limb hanging from a human body which would convey the more serious impurity of a dead body is pure as long as it is still hanging from the body, all the more so the limb hanging from a live animal, which would have the lesser impurity of “carrion,” is pure if it is still hanging.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all?They replied: we have heard nothing about this.Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer.Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar ( from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness   what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them?They replied: we have heard nothing about this.Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer.Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal.He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it.He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar ( where not one of these laws applies.Rabbi Akiva continues to ask questions. This mishnah returns to the subject of mishnah seven what constitutes separate transgressions?Section one: After having heard from Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua that if a man has relations with five different menstruants during one period of unawareness he is liable for five separate hatats, Rabbi Akiva asks a follow-up question concerning a person who slaughters five sacrifices outside the Temple, all in one period of unawareness. We might say that in the case of the menstruants there were five separate transgressions because the prohibition of relations with a menstruant applies to the women as well, and therefore, since each woman is transgressing, so too the man must be committing a separate transgression with each woman. In contrast, when it comes to the sacrifices, they can all be treated as one, because they (obviously) are incapable of committing their own transgressions.Section two: Again, both rabbis respond that they do not have an answer to his question.Section three: Rabbi Joshua derives a kal vehomer from a person who illegally eats one sacrifice which has been put onto five plates. Here, the fact that the meat is on different plates serves to separate these into different transgressions of sacrilege, even though it is only one sacrifice. If the separate plates make us consider one act to be several different acts, all the more so would we consider five different sacrifices to be five different acts, for which he is liable for five hatats.Sections 4-6: Rabbi Shimon, a student of Rabbi Akiva’s, rejects the previous version of the question and answer between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Joshua, because it made a comparison between slaughtering and eating. Rather Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Joshua about a person who ate “remnant” (sacrificial meat left over beyond the time in which it must be eaten) from five different sacrifices. To this question Rabbi Joshua responded with the same answer given above. If someone is guilty for five different offenses for eating one sacrifice divided into five different plates, all the more so he is guilty of five separate transgressions for eating remnant from five different sacrifices.Section seven: Rabbi Akiva responds that if what Rabbi Joshua is saying is a received tradition, one that Rabbi Joshua learned from his teachers, then he will accept it. But if it is deduced logic, he can offer a logical rebuttal.This answer is generally understood as showing a preference for revealed tradition over logic Rabbi Akiva would have accepted Rabbi Joshua’s answer if it was a tradition, but logic can be refuted. However, in my opinion, this is merely lip service. It is easy for Rabbi Akiva to say that he would accept Rabbi Joshua’s answer if it was a revealed tradition when he knows very well that it is not so Rabbi Joshua said it was a “kal vehomer,” a type of reasoned argument. Rather, Rabbi Akiva and the editors of the mishnah espouse a philosophy of accepting tradition over reason, but at the same time undermine that preference by pointing out that tradition does not answer many questions, and that therefore one must rely on reason to arrive at answers to new questions. Although reason is susceptible to argumentation, it is, in the end, what we must rely upon to know what to do.Sections 8-9:  Rabbi Joshua now gives Rabbi Akiva a chance to rebut his answer, and Rabbi Akiva eagerly takes up the challenge. He points out that Rabbi Joshua was dealing with a case of “sacrilege” a person eats holy things when he is not allowed to do so. Sacrilege is treated strictly in three ways: 1) a person who gives to another person to eat is just as guilty as if he ate it himself; 2) similarly, if he allowed others to benefit from holy things, he is guilty as if he himself benefited; 3) if a person ate or derived benefit today from a half a perutah’s worth of holy things, and then at a much later period derived benefit from another half of a perutah, these two half perutahs are joined together and he is liable for sacrilege. None of these stringencies apply to notar, remnant. Therefore, one cannot make an analogy from a tradition concerning sacrilege which is treated stringently, to a question concerning notar, which is treated more leniently.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  In today’s mishnah, the last one of this fascinating chapter, Rabbi Akiva asks Rabbi Eliezer a question concerning Shabbat.
  As background we should remind ourselves of a couple of general rules concerning Shabbat. There are 39 different categories of prohibited labor on Shabbat. If one performs labor from different categories, for instance he cooks and he plants, he is liable for a hatat (if done unwittingly) for each labor. However, if one performs two different acts that stem from the same category, for instance he cooks and bakes, he is liable for only one hatat. Our mishnah deals with a person who does many acts that all belong to the same category (cooking for instance) but he does them on different Shabbats. Is he liable for each transgression?
  Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them?  Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a person who does many acts of forbidden labor, all from the same category, on many different Shabbats, all within one period of unawareness. For instance, he does not know that it is forbidden to cook on Shabbat, so he cooks, bakes, broils, boils, etc. on many different Shabbats. Does the fact that these acts were performed on different Shabbats make him liable for one hatat for each Shabbat, or do we consider this one sin of cooking, and he is liable for only one hatat?
  He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning!  Rabbi Eliezer responds with the same kal vehomer argument that Rabbi Joshua used in the previous mishnah. If one is liable for one hatat for every menstruant he has relations with, even though this prohibition does not have categories and many ways of sinning as does Shabbat, all the more so one is liable for one hatat for every transgression of Shabbat.
  I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning?  Rabbi Akiva rebuts Rabbi Eliezer’s comparison. Relations with different menstruants are considered different transgressions because the women are also sinning, as we explained in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the women are warned against sinning just as much as the men, we must consider these different acts. In contrast when it comes to Shabbat, there is only one warning, because there is only one party.
  He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act.  Rabbi Eliezer defends his answer by slightly adjusting the question. Instead of basing his kal vehomer on relations with five menstruating women, whom he admits are liable for transgressing the prohibition, he bases the kal vehomer on a man who has relations with five menstruating minors. Because they are minors they are not liable, and nevertheless, he is liable for five separate transgressions. Therefore, the same is true with regard to Shabbat.
  I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]?  Rabbi Akiva rejects this by noting that although minors are not now liable, they will be in the future. In other words, this is a transgression that still counts as having two parties, unlike Shabbat, where there is only the transgressor.
  He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point.  Rabbi Eliezer finds another case of sexual transgression, where there is a sin but only one person sins the case of intercourse with an animal. Just as one is guilty for five hatats if he has intercourse with five different animals, so too he is guilty if he performs one forbidden labor on five different Shabbats.
  I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.  Finally, Rabbi Akiva admits that the analogy is appropriate, yet he still rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s answer. He says that his question is about the case of intercourse with animals just as it is about Shabbat. In both cases you have one sin done on multiple occasions and he wants to know if the act should be divided into different acts for which he is liable for each individual sin, or if this is considered just one sin, for which he is liable only one hatat. Final notes on Rabbi Akiva:  In my opinion this debate should be looked upon as a debate between two different approaches to law: realistic versus nominal. To Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Joshua and Rabban Gamaliel, if one does several different acts, each of which is a transgression, one is liable for each act. This is a “realistic” approach it examines what a person has actually done. In contrast, Rabbi Akiva adopts a more “nominal” approach. The person has committed one transgression, even though he did so on separate occasions. He ate forbidden foods, he had forbidden sex or he broke the prohibition of cooking, for instance, on Shabbat. Nominally, or legally, speaking, these are all one transgression, and therefore he should be liable for only one hatat. In general, I think that there is a trend in rabbinic Judaism to go from a more “realistic” approach, which probably typified an approach to halakhah commonly found among the priests, to a more “nominal” one. The leader of this movement seems to have been Rabbi Akiva.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah returns to the subject of the “asham talui.” This is a guilt offering brought by one who is not sure if he transgressed.
  If [a person was] in doubt whether he had eaten forbidden fat or not, or even if he had certainly eaten [of it] but [was] in doubt as to whether it had the requisite quantity or less; or [if there were] before him permitted fat as well as forbidden fat, and he ate of one of them and does not know of which of them he ate;  These are various scenarios in which a person is not sure whether he ate forbidden fat (helev) and even if he did eat forbidden fat, he is not sure if he ate enough to make him liable for a hatat.
  Or if his wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly [had sex] with one of them and does not know with which of them he unwittingly [had sex];  In this (albeit hard to imagine scenario) a man is not sure whether he had sex with his wife or sister (for whom he would be liable a hatat).
  Or if he did forbidden labor and does not know whether it was on Shabbat or on a weekday,  Here, he is not sure if he did the forbidden labor on Shabbat or on a weekday (perhaps he was traveling and lost track of the days of the week).
  He is liable for an asham talui.  In each of these cases he cannot bring a hatat, because perhaps he did not transgress. Therefore, he brings an asham talui, which will offer him atonement in case he did transgress. If later he finds out for sure that he did transgress, then he will have to bring a hatat.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Just as a person who ate forbidden fat twice in one spell of unawareness is liable to only one hatat, so too, when the transgression is in doubt, he is liable to only one asham talui.If in the meantime he became aware [of the possible sin] he is liable to a separate asham talui for each act, just as he would [in similar circumstances] be liable to a separate hatat for each act.Just as one is liable to separate hatats if he ate, in one spell of unawareness, forbidden fat and blood and piggul and notar, so, too, when the transgression is in doubt, he is liable to an asham talui for each different act.[If both] forbidden fat and notar lay before a person and he ate one of them but does not know which;Or if his menstruant wife and his sister were with him in his house and he has sex unwittingly with one of them and does not know with which,Or if Shabbat and Yom Kippur [followed each other] and he did forbidden work at twilight and does not know on which day: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat; But Rabbi Joshua exempts him.Rabbi Yose said: they did not dispute about a person that did work at twilight, for he is certainly exempt, for I may assume that part of the work was done on the one day and part on the following day.About what did they dispute? About one who did work during the day itself but he did not know whether he did it on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, or if he did work and did not know what manner of work he did: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat; But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Judah said: Rabbi Joshua exempts him even from an asham talui.Today’s mishnah deals with two issues. The first part deals with multiple sins performed in one spell of unawareness. The second part deals with cases where a person definitely sinned, but he is not sure which of two possible sins he committed.Section one: If a person eats many pieces of helev (forbidden fat) during one period of unawareness, for instance, he didn’t know that what he was eating was helev, or he didn’t know that helev was prohibited, he is liable for only one hatat. This counts as one sin, since it was done in one period of unawareness. Similarly, if in one period of unawareness he is not sure if he ate helev or something else, he is liable for only one asham talui, even if he did the act multiple times.Section two: If in between sessions of eating something that might or might not be helev he finds out that it is perhaps helev, he is liable for an asham talui for each session. For instance he sits down to dinner and eats. Then his wife tells him, “Honey, that fat you just ate might have been helev.” He is now liable for an asham talui. If the same thing happens the next night, he is liable for two asham talui’s. This is the same rule that applies to cases where he knows that what he ate was helev he is obligated for one hatat for each period of unawareness.Section three: If one eats foods that carry different prohibitions, one is liable for a hatat for each prohibition, if he knows he transgressed, and an asham talui for each transgression, if he is not sure that he transgressed. I.e. she sits down to dinner and when she is done her husband tells her, “Dear, you might just have eaten helev, blood and notar (remnant).” She is liable for three asham talui’s. If he said, “Dear, you ate helev, blood and notar,” she is liable for three hatats.Sections 4-6: The second half of the mishnah is patterned after mishnah one. In that case, the person might have transgressed or he might not have transgressed. In the cases mentioned here he definitely transgressed, but he doesn’t know which transgression he did what forbidden food did he eat, which forbidden woman did he have sex with or what day did he do the forbidden labor on?Rabbi Eliezer says that since he definitely did a forbidden act, he must bring a hatat, even though he is not sure what he actually did. We can see that Rabbi Eliezer adopts a more realistic approach one who certainly sins must bring a hatat.Rabbi Joshua says that since he doesn’t know what he actually did, he is exempt. This seems to me to be more of a “nominal” approach.  Since we cannot find a legal category under which to place his sin, we cannot make him liable.Section seven: Rabbi Yose says that even Rabbi Eliezer would agree that if one does a sin at twilight between Shabbat and Yom Kippur he is exempt, because he might not have transgressed at all. It is possible that he did half of the prohibited labor on Shabbat and half on Yom Kippur, in which case he did not perform a forbidden labor on either day.Rather the debate was over one who simply does not know whether he did the labor on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, or knows that he performed a forbidden labor, but doesn’t know which labor it was. In this case Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable, for her certainly transgressed, even though we can’t find a legal category under which to place his transgression.Section eight: Finally, Rabbi Judah explains that when Rabbi Joshua exempted him, he exempted him even from the asham talui. An asham talui is brought only in a case where a person might have sinned. Since this person definitely sinned, he cannot bring an asham talui. He is left without any sacrifice to bring.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. Later sages continue to argue what Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua were arguing about.
  Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: They did not dispute regarding transgression of the same name, that in that case he is liable.  According to these rabbis, Rabbi Joshua agrees that if he is not certain what labor he did, but he knows that it was one of two possibilities that are both “of the same name,” meaning of the same category, that he is liable. For example, if he picked some sort of fruit, but he is not sure what type of fruit he picked grapes or figs. In this case, he definitely violated the transgression of “reaping” and therefore, Rabbi Joshua agrees that he is liable.
  About what did they dispute? About transgressions of different names: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat, And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt.  They disagree about a case where he transgressed one of two possible categories of transgression, for instance he ate something forbidden but he is not sure whether it was helev or notar.
  Rabbi Judah said: even if he intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or grapes and he picked figs, white [grapes] and he picked black ones, or black and he picked white ones Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat. And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt.  Rabbi Judah is directly opposed to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri. Whereas the latter say that Rabbi Joshua exempts only if he is not sure what category of labor he performed, Rabbi Joshua exempts him even if he doesn’t know what color the grapes were, and even if he didn’t fulfill his intention as to what color grapes or figs he wanted to pick.
  Rabbi Judah said: I wonder whether Rabbi Joshua indeed declared him exempt in such a case. For then why is it written, “with which he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23)? To exclude mindless action.  Rabbi Judah then acts surprised that Rabbi Joshua would exempt him from such a case. He therefore adjusts the exact case in which Rabbi Joshua exempts.  Rabbi Joshua exempts a person who didn’t intend to do a labor at all. For instance, he intended to pick up a piece of unattached grass from the ground and he accidentally plucked a piece of attached grass. This is called “mindless” action and the doer is therefore exempt. However, if he intends to perform a labor and he does perform that labor, he is liable, even if he does not do exactly what he intended to do.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The Torah prohibits the consumption of blood. One who eats blood is liable for karet if done intentionally, and that is why this halakhah is found in tractate Keritot. If done unwittingly, he is liable for a hatat.
  If one ate blood of a slaughtered beast, a wild animal or a bird, either clean or unclean, or blood of an animal stabbed in his throat or neck, or of the blood of an animal slaughtered by having his throat ripped, or of the blood of the arteries whereby life-force escapes, he is liable.  This is a list of all of the kinds of blood for which one is liable for a hatat, as long as he eats an olive’s worth of it. The blood does not have to come from a clean (kosher) animal, nor does it have to be the blood of an animal that is slaughtered in a kosher fashion. As long as the blood is the blood whose loss causes the death of the animal, one who eats it is liable. The idea that one is liable only for this type of blood seems to come from Leviticus 17:14, which refers to blood as the life-force. The rabbis deduce from here that one is liable only for blood which is the life-force, and not for other types of blood.
  But [if he ate] the blood of the spleen or of the heart, or blood found in eggs, or blood of fish, or of locusts, or secondary blood, he is not liable.  This is a list of either internal organs, taken out of the animal after it is dead, or blood found in other things, such as eggs, fish, or locusts, or blood that comes out after the animal is dead (secondary blood). While some of these are prohibited, they are only prohibited by the rabbis and not by the Torah; one who eats them is not liable to bring a hatat. Note that Leviticus 7:26 specifically states that animal (beast) and bird blood is prohibited. Since it doesn’t list fish or locusts, the rabbis deduce that fish and locust blood is not prohibited.
  Rabbi Judah says: he is liable for secondary blood.  Rabbi Judah holds that one is liable for eating secondary blood.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  “Sacrilege” refers to one who makes illicit use of Temple property. For instance, he eats meat from an animal that was  sacrificial. The penalty for doing this is that he must bring an asham, and he must pay the value of that which he benefited, and he must also add an extra fifth to the restitution. Our mishnah deals with a person who may or may not have committed sacrilege.
  Rabbi Akiva declares one liable to an asham talui for sacrilege; But the sages declare him exempt.  Rabbi Akiva says that one who might have committed sacrilege must bring an asham talui. The other rabbis disagree because they hold that one brings an asham talui only for sins for which one brings a hatat if one knows one did that he sinned (see 1:2). Since the sacrifice for sacrilege is an asham and not a hatat, there can be no asham talui for a case of uncertainty.
  Rabbi Akiba admits that he does not bring his restitution money until he becomes aware [of his trespass], when he must bring with it a certain asham.  Rabbi Akiva holds that when one might have committed sacrilege he brings the asham talui immediately. However, he need not restore the value of the benefit he illicitly derived until he is certain that he committed sacrilege. At this point he will bring the restitution money, and a certain asham.
  Rabbi Tarfon: Why should he bring two ashams?  Rather, let him set aside the principal with an added fifth, and bring an asham the value of two sela's and stipulate: “If I did commit sacrilege, here is my restitution and this my asham; and if the sacrilege was doubtful, let the money be a freewill gift and the [offering an] asham talui;” since the same type of sacrifice he brings for a case where he doesn’t know, he brings for one where he does know.  Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva on principle that one who might have committed sacrilege would have to bring an asham talui. However, there is an additional problem here that there is not for the regular asham talui. In other cases, when he finds out for certain that he sinned, he brings a hatat. In our case, he would end up bringing two ashams, which strikes Rabbi Tarfon as unreasonable or unnecessary. To avoid this problem he suggests a way of bringing one asham and making a stipulation, that if he did sin, then the asham is a certain asham and the restitution is his restitution. If he never finds out whether he sinned, then the asham is an asham talui, and the money will go towards buying freewill offerings. The reason that he can do can do this is that both ashams are of the same type of animal a two year old male ram. The hatat is of a different type, and therefore one could not make such a stipulation in other cases.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first part of this mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.
  Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege.  Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in a case where the sacrilege was of a small amount. In this case, the person might save money by not having to bring two asham sacrifices. However, if the sacrilege was for a very large amount, a hundred manehs, he would not be well served to pay the restitution and save himself from having to bring two ashams. Note that the debate seems to be practical if someone is not sure if he committed sacrilege, what would be the cheapest way for him to receive possible atonement. There does not seem to be a debate about whether a person could do either according to Rabbi Tarfon or Rabbi Akiva. In the end, the mishnah notes that Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Tarfon, that if the sacrilege was for a small amount, he can make a stipulation and get away with bringing only one asham.
  If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt.  If a woman miscarries and is not sure whether it was the type of miscarriage that would make her liable for a hatat or not (see 1:4), she brings a hatat, but since the hatat comes for a case of doubt the hatat is not eaten. If before the hatat’s head is pinched (this is how sacrificial birds were slaughtered in the Temple) she finds out that the miscarriage was one for which she is certainly liable, then she can use the same bird as a certain hatat. The reason is that the same type of bird is used for both offerings.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with the issue of doubtful sacrilege.
  [If there was] a piece of hullin meat and a piece of sacred meat, and a person ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he is exempt. Rabbi Akiba declares him liable for an asham talui.  This is the same debate we saw in mishnah two of this chapter. According to Rabbi Akiva one must bring an asham talui for a doubtful case of sacrilege.
  If he then ate the second [piece], he is liable to a certain asham.  If he eats both pieces of meat, then we know for sure that he ate sacrificial meat, and he is obviously liable for sacrilege.
  If he ate one [piece] and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to an asham talui, the words of Rabbi Akiba. Rabbi Shimon says: they together bring one asham. Rabbi Yose said: Two people cannot bring one asham.  In this case, one person definitely ate a piece of sacrificial meat, but one person did not. According to Rabbi Akiva, they both bring an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon agrees in principle with Rabbi Akiva, but says that in this case, there is no need for them both to bring the asham talui. They can together bring one asham, and make a stipulation, that if person A ate the sacrificial meat, it is his sacrifice, and if person B ate the sacrificial meat, it is his sacrifice. Rabbi Yose says that such a system does not work and that two people cannot bring one asham. It seems that he would hold like Rabbi Akiva that each person must bring his own asham.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah is virtually the same as yesterday’s mishnah, except that in today’s mishnah a person is not sure whether he ate permitted unconsecrated fat, or helev, for which one brings a hatat. In other words, yesterday the question was whether one had to bring an asham, today the question is whether one needs to bring a hatat.
  Since the mishnah is so similar to yesterday’s mishnah, my comments below are quite brief.
  If there was a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of hullin [permitted fat], and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to an asham talui.  Since he doesn’t know if he sinned, he brings an asham talui.
  If he then ate the second piece, he is brings a hatat.  Since he knows that he did sin, he brings a hatat, the sacrifice for accidentally eating helev, forbidden fat.
  If he ate the one [piece] and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon says: they together bring one hatat. Rabbi Yose says: two people cannot bring one hatat.  According to the first opinion, since we don’t know which of the two ate helev, they both bring an asham talui. This is not any different, at least from the perspective of the individual, from the first case. Rabbi Shimon says that the two people can bring a hatat jointly and stipulate that if the first one ate the helev, that it is his hatat, and if the second one did, it is his hatat. Rabbi Yose says that people cannot jointly bring a hatat.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  In today’s mishnah, he is not sure whether he ate forbidden fat, for which he would need to bring a hatat, or consecrated, permitted fat, for which he would need to bring an asham.
  For the parts of this mishnah that have already been explained above, I will just make reference to those mishnayot.
  If there was a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of consecrated [permitted fat], and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to an asham talui;  He brings the asham talui for the fact that he might have eaten forbidden fat. For Rabbi Akiva who holds that one brings an asham talui for a case of doubtful sacrilege, the asham talui also covers the possibility that he ate consecrated fat. In other words, one asham talui can cover two possible sins, since we know he only did one of them.
  If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to a hatat and a certain asham.  In this case we know that he ate forbidden fat and consecrated fat, so he must bring a hatat and an asham.
  If he ate the one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them brings an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon holds: they together bring a hatat and an asham. Rabbi Yose: two people cannot together bring one hatat and one asham.  See mishnayot 4-5.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  In today’s mishnah, we find on the person’s plate two pieces of forbidden fat, one consecrated and one unconsecrated. The plot thickens!
  If there was a piece of unconsecrated forbidden fat and a piece of consecrated forbidden fat, and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to a hatat. Rabbi Akiva says: also to an asham talui.  We know that this person has eaten forbidden fat, so he definitely must bring a hatat. According to the first opinion, that is all that he brings. According to Rabbi Akiva he also brings an asham talui for doubtful sacrilege. This has been Rabbi Akiva’s position since mishnah two.
  If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to two hatats and one certain asham.  If he ate the second piece in a second period of unawareness, he is liable for two hatats, one for each piece of forbidden fat. He is also liable for an asham for the sacrilege.
  If he ate one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to a hatat. Rabbi Akiva says: each of them brings [in addition] an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon holds: each of them brings a hatat and together they bring one asham. Rabbi Yose: two people cannot bring one asham.  Both people are liable for a hatat for eating forbidden fat. According to Rabbi Akiva, they are both also liable for an asham talui for doubtful sacrilege. Rabbi Shimon says that they can bring one certain asham jointly whereas Rabbi Yose says that this is not possible. This is the same debate we have seen over and over since mishnah four.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of our chapter deals with a case where one of the pieces of meat was regular forbidden fat and the other was forbidden fat and notar (remnant).
  If there was a piece of forbidden fat and another piece of forbidden fat [which was at the same time] notar, and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to a hatat and to an asham talui.  If he eats one of the pieces, he certainly must bring one hatat for eating helev. He must also bring an asham talui lest he ate the piece that is also notar.
  If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to three hatats.  Two hatats are for the forbidden fat, assuming that they were eaten in two periods of unawareness and the third hatat is for eating notar.
  If he ate one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them brings a hatat and an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon says: each of them brings a hatat and together they bring another hatat. Rabbi Yose says: any hatat that is brought for the expiation of sin cannot be offered by two people.  They both must bring one hatat for they both certainly ate helev. According to the first opinion they both bring an asham talui, for each one of them might have also eaten helev. Rabbi Shimon holds they can jointly bring a second hatat. And Rabbi Yose again holds that two people can never jointly bring a sacrifice that comes to expiate for sin.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  An asham talui is brought when a person is not sure if he has sinned. Our mishnah discussed what happens if after he brought it, he finds out that he did not sin (i.e. he ate the right piece of meat, or perhaps he had sex with his wife and not his sister).
  If a person brought an asham talui and then found out that he did not sin: If it was before the animal was slaughtered, it may go out to pasture among the flock, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: it goes out to pasture until it becomes blemished and it is then sold, and the money goes for freewill-offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be offered up, for if it does not expiate this sin, it will expiate another sin.  If before the animal is slaughtered he finds out that he didn’t sin, Rabbi Meir holds that the animal is not at all holy. It can go out to the flock with the rest of the hullin animals. The other sages say that it is holy and therefore it does not automatically revert to being hullin. However, it also cannot be sacrificed, because now it is not necessary. The solution is to let it go out to pasture until it becomes blemished. At this point the animal may be sold and he must use the money from the sale to buy freewill offerings. Rabbi Eliezer assumes that a person might frequently commit sins which require expiation, and he might not even know that he has done so. Therefore, he can go ahead and sacrifice this asham talui, and it will expiate for other unknown sins. Note that the rest of the mishnah does not go according to Rabbi Eliezer.
  If he learns of it after it was slaughtered, the blood shall be spilled out and the flesh is removed to the place of burning.  If he learns that he didn’t sin after the animal was already slaughtered, then the blood must be poured out into the aqueduct that runs through the Temple, and the flesh must be burned. In other words, it is a disqualified sacrifice.
  If the blood had already been tossed [onto the altar], the flesh may be eaten. Rabbi Yose says: even if the blood is still in the vessel, it should be tossed and the flesh then eaten.  Once the blood has been tossed onto the altar, the sacrifice is valid, even if it turns out that he didn’t sin. The flesh can be eaten. Rabbi Yose holds that once the blood is in the vessel, where it is put immediately after the animal is slaughtered, the sacrificial process can continue even if it turns out that the person didn’t sin.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Yesterday’s mishnah dealt with a person who set aside an asham talui and then found out that he did not sin. Today’s mishnah deals with other situations in which a person sets aside an animal and then finds out that the circumstances that caused him to set aside the animal were not as he thought they were.
  The law is different with a certain asham: If before the animal was slaughtered, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was slaughtered, it shall be buried; If after the blood was tossed, the flesh must be removed to the place of burning.  The law concerning a certain asham is different from the law concerning an asham talui. If before it is slaughtered it turns out that he didn’t sin, then the animal can go out to pasture. This is simply a case of “mistaken consecration” and in such a case the consecration is not valid. This case differs from that of the asham talui which was dedicated from the outset with the possibility that the person did not sin. Therefore, it, according to the sages’ opinion in mishnah one, is holy even if it turns out he didn’t sin. Once the animal is slaughtered, it counts as “hullin that were slaughtered in the courtyard” and it therefore must be buried. It is forbidden to derive benefit from it. If the blood was already tossed, then the flesh must be burned in the place of burning, because it looks like a sacrifice that has been disqualified. Disqualified sacrifices are always disposed of by being burned in the “place of burning.”
  The law is also different regarding an ox to be stoned: If before it was stoned, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was stoned, it is permitted for use.  This section deals with an ox that is to be stoned for having murdered. If before it is stoned it turns out that it didn’t actually commit the murder, the ox can simply return to the herd. If it has already been stoned, one can derive benefit from the carcass (but not eat it, of course, because it is not kosher), which would not be the case if it was stoned for a murder it had committed. In that case it is forbidden to derive benefit from the carcass.
  The law is also different regarding the heifer whose neck is to be broken: If before its neck was broken, it may go out to pasture among the flock. If after its neck was broken, it shall be buried on the spot, for it was from the outset brought in a matter of doubt, it has atoned for the doubt, and so has served its purpose.  There is also a different rule with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken for a case where a murderer has not been identified. If the murderer is found before the neck is broken, the heifer simply returns to the flock. If after its neck is broken the murderer is found, then the heifer must be buried. It is forbidden to derive benefit from its flesh, because its neck was broken to atone for a case of an unsolved murder. Since when its neck was broken the murder was indeed unsolved, it has fulfilled its role and it is treated like all other broken-neck heifers one cannot derive benefit from the carcass.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and the sages debate whether one can/should bring an asham talui “every day.”
  Rabbi Eliezer says: one may freely offer an asham talui every day and at any time he pleases and such a sacrifice is called the asham of the pious.  Rabbi Eliezer holds that one can freely offer an asham talui whenever he wants, even if he doesn’t know that he has sinned. This differs from the rules concerning a hatat. A hatat can be brought only by one who knows that he sinned, because a hatat must effect atonement. In contrast, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the asham talui does not really effect atonement, because when the person finds out that he actually sinned, he must bring a hatat. This is evidence that the asham talui is really just a freewill offering. Note that this matches his opinion in mishnah one. This asham is called “the asham of the pious (hasid)” because one brings it just in case he sins.
  They said of Bava ben Buti that he used to freely offer an asham talui every day, except on the day after Yom Kippur. He declared: By this temple! Had they allowed me, I would have offered one even then, but they said to me, wait until you have come to a state of doubt.”  The mishnah now relates the story of Bava ben Buti who would bring an asham talui every day (besides being pious, he must have been quite rich) except for the day after Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur atones for all sins, and certainly for ones which a person doesn’t even know if he committed, he didn’t need to bring it that one day. But, he goes on to say that he wanted to bring an asham talui that day as well. The other sages seem to have convinced him that he shouldn’t do so until there is at least a chance that he sinned. It is possible that the other sages worried that if he would bring an asham talui on the day after Yom Kippur, people would think that Yom Kippur doesn’t atone. Therefore, they opposed his doing so.
  But the sages say one may not bring an asham talui except for a sin that [is punished by] karet [when done intentionally and for which one brings a hatat [when done unwittingly.  The other sages reject Rabbi Eliezer. They hold that one can bring an asham talui only if he thinks he might have committed a sin for which he would be liable for karet if done intentionally or a hatat if done unwittingly. He cannot simply freely donate an asham talui out of piety.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Since yesterday’s mishnah dealt with Yom Kippur, today’s mishnah deals with the effect that Yom Kippur can have on those who are liable to bring expiatory sacrifices.
  Those that are liable to hatats or to certain ashams and Yom Kippur passes over them, are still liable to bring them after Yom Kippur.  Yom Kippur does not atone for sins if he finds out before Yom Kippur that he certainly sinned. Thus if one becomes liable to bring a hatat or a certain asham before Yom Kippur, he is still liable after Yom Kippur.
  Those that are liable to asham talui’s are exempt.  However, if he has doubtfully sinned and needs to bring an asham talui, Yom Kippur atones and he need not bring the asham talui after Yom Kippur.
  He who has committed a doubtful sin on Yom Kippur, even at twilight, is exempt, because the whole of the day effects atonement.  Yom Kippur atones for doubtful sins even if they are committed (unwittingly) on Yom Kippur itself, and even at the very end of the day. It is actually hard to imagine this happening unless one simply miscalculates the date of Yom Kippur and eats meat which might or might not have been forbidden fat. For if one knows that it is Yom Kippur, he shouldn’t have been eating in the first place.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  If a woman is liable to a bird hatat brought in a case of doubt and Yom Kippur intervenes, she is still bound to offer it after Yom Kippur, because it renders her fit to eat sacrifices.  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a person was liable to bring an asham talui because he might have sinned, and Yom Kippur intervenes, he is no longer liable to bring the asham talui. In contrast, today we learn that if a woman is liable to bring a doubtful hatat because she had a miscarriage that might or might not make her liable to bring a hatat, she must bring the bird hatat even if Yom Kippur comes first. The reason she must bring the hatat is that without doing so she cannot eat sacrifices.
  If a hatat of a bird was brought for a matter of doubt and, after the pinching of its neck it became known [that there was no need for it], it must be buried.  If the woman finds out that she didn’t need to bring the hatat, but the bird’ neck has already been slaughtered by having its neck pinched, then it is treated like a non-sacred bird slaughtered in the Temple which must be buried. This is different from a bird hatat that is brought in a case of doubt which is burned (see Temurah 7:6).
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah deals with one who sets apart two selas to buy an asham, as he is supposed to do (see 5:2) but then for some reason doesn’t simply buy one ram to be used as the asham. Instead he buys two rams. The question is what to do with the extra ram. The mishnah also addresses the possibility that one of the rams was bought for non-sacred purposes, in which case he has committed sacrilege.
  A man set apart two sela's for an asham:If he bought with it two rams for an asham; if one was of the value of two sela's, it may be offered for his asham, and the other must be let out to pasture until it becomes blemished when it is sold and its value goes for freewill-offerings.  If he buys two rams with two selas, then at the time of purchase could have been worth two selas. However, by the time he comes to sacrifice one of them, it has gone up in value and reached the requisite two selas. That ram can be offered as his asham. The other ram is holy because it was bought to be an asham. However, it cannot be offered as an asham because its owner has already received atonement through the other asham. Therefore, it must go out to pasture until it becomes blemished. Then it can be sold and the money used to buy free-will offerings.
  If he had bought with the money two rams for hullin use, one worth two sela's and the other worth ten zuz, that which is worth two sela's should be offered for his asham and the other for his sacrilege.  If he used the money to buy two hullin, non-sacred rams, he has now committed sacrilege. He bought two rams, and one is now worth two selas (again, it has gone up in value). He can offer that one as the asham sacrifice that he is liable to bring for having committed sacrilege. The other ram is worth ten zuz. A sela is worth four zuz. So ten zuz is enough to count for the two sela’s that he must restore for having committed sacrilege, and the other two zuz is the added one-fifth, which the rabbis counted as being one-fifth of the final amount and not the original amount (in this case one-fifth of ten zuz and not eight zuz). So he can take this ten zuz ram and sacrifice it as the asham that he was originally liable for, because it is worth 1/5 more than that asham needed to be. Strangely enough, it all worked out for him in the end.
  [If he had bought with the money] one for an asham and the other for ordinary use, if that for the asham was worth two sela's it should be offered for his asham and the other for his sacrilege, and with it he shall bring a sela and its fifth.  In this case he again buys two rams, this time one for the asham and the other for a hullin ram. If the one for his asham is worth two selas he can sacrifice it as an asham. If the other ram is also worth two selas, then it must be used as an asham for his sacrilege. Along with that he must bring another sela and a fifth as reparation for having committed sacrilege. This extra money will be used to buy free-will offerings.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains some rules governing the hatat.
  If a man set aside his hatat and then died, his son should not offer it after him.  If the owner of a hatat has died, the animal cannot be offered, not even by his son. Rather, it must be left to die (see Temurah 2:2).
  A man may not offer [what was set apart] for one sin for another sin. Even if he had set apart [the hatat] for forbidden fat that he had eaten yesterday, he may not offer it for forbidden fat that he has eaten today, for it is said, “His offering ... for his sin” (Leviticus 4:28) the offering must be for that particular sin.  If an animal was set aside to be a hatat for one sin, he cannot offer it for another sin, even if it is the same sin, such as eating helev. This is derived from a midrashic reading of Leviticus 4:28.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Most of this mishnah deals with the “higher and lower sacrifice” which is the sacrifice that is more or less expensive depending upon the wealth of the sinner. This type of sacrifice is mentioned in Leviticus 5, where there are three levels (lamb/goat, birds, grain) and Leviticus 12-14 where there are two levels (lamb/goat and birds).
  One may bring with [money] dedicated to buy a lamb [for a hatat] a goat, or with [what was] dedicated to buy a goat [one may bring] a lamb; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy a lamb or a goat [one may bring] turtle-doves or young pigeons; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy turtle-doves or young pigeons [one may bring] the tenth of an ephah.  If one sets aside money to buy a female lamb (one year old) as a hatat he can use it to buy a female goat (two years old) because both are usable as a hatat. If he sets aside money to buy a lamb or goat and then becomes poor he can use the money to buy bird offerings, as section two explains. Similarly, if he sets aside money to buy bird offerings and then becomes even poorer, he can use the money to buy a tenth of an ephah of grain. This would only work for those who can bring such an offering, see 2:4.
  How so? If a man set apart [money] for a lamb or a goat [for a hatat] and he became poor, he may bring a bird-offering; If he became still poorer he may bring the tenth of an ephah.  This section simply explains section one.
  If a man set apart [money] for the tenth of an ephah and he became richer, he must bring a bird-offering; If he became still richer he must bring a lamb or a goat.  Just as one who grows poor can use money set aside to buy an expensive offering to buy a cheaper one, so too one who becomes rich can/must use money set aside to buy a cheap offering to buy a more expensive one.
  If a man set apart a lamb or a goat and they became blemished, he may bring with their price a bird-offering; But if he set apart a bird-offering and it became blemished, he may not bring with its price the tenth of an ephah, since a bird-offering cannot be redeemed.  If a man set apart a lamb or goat and then became poor and the animal became blemished, he may sell the animal and use the money to buy a cheaper offering. However, if he sets aside a bird offering and it loses a limb (this counts as a blemish for birds) and he becomes poor enough to offer a grain sacrifice he cannot sell it and use its price to buy grain, because there is no way to redeem bird sacrifices. The verses about redeeming a sanctified animal (see Leviticus 27:11-13) refer only to a beast (cow, sheep or goat). Bird offerings can never be redeemed.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of our tractate deals with the question of why some things are usually mentioned before others in the Torah.
  Rabbi Shimon says: lambs are mentioned before goats in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “And if he brings a lamb as his offering,” (Leviticus 4:32) to teach that both are equal.  In the Torah “lambs” are always mentioned before “goats,” when the two come in one verse. See for instance Exodus 12:5, or Leviticus 5:6. This is not because there is any preference to offer a lamb. The proof of this is Leviticus 4:32, which mentions the lamb, whereas in vs. 28 of the same chapter the goat is mentioned. The Torah switches the order to let us know that the two are equal.
  Turtle-doves are mentioned before young pigeons in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “A young pigeon or a turtle-dove for a hatat,” (Leviticus 12:6) to teach that both are equal.  The same is true with regard to turtle doves and pigeons see Leviticus 1:14, 5:7; 12:8; 14:22 and others. To teach that they are the same, the Torah switches the order in Leviticus 12:6.
  The father comes before the mother in all places. You might think that it is because the honor due a father is greater than the honor due a mother, therefore Scripture states, “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” (Leviticus 19: to teach that both are equal. But the sages have said: the father comes before the mother in all places, because both a son and his mother are obligated to honor the father.  Generally, a father is mentioned before the mother, for instance Exodus 20:12; 21:15, 17; Leviticus 20:9 and others. To teach that both are equal in terms of honor, the Torah switches the order once in Leviticus 19. The other rabbis, however, hold that the father does take precedence over the mother. This is because a wife is obligated to honor her husband. Personally, I will admit that this is one of those times that one could say that the Mishnah is best explained when we remember that it was written by men.
  And so it is also with the study of Torah; if the son has been worthy [to sit] before the teacher, the teacher comes before the father in all places, because both a man and his father are obligated to honor the teacher.  Finally, at the top of the ladder of respect come those who teach Torah. Both the father and son are obligated to honor the teacher of Torah. Congratulations!  We have finished Tractate Keritot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. The main topic of Keritot was sacrifices brought in cases of doubt, whether the hatat or the asham talui. I think that this subject helps get us into the mindset of Temple worship. A sacrifice is not a penalty but rather an opportunity for atonement. Indeed, one who transgresses intentionally is not allowed to offer a sacrifice to achieve atonement. But one who is not sure whether he transgressed or not may actually be afraid that without the ability to bring a sacrifice, he will never be able to achieve atonement. Tractate Keritot taught us that there were two ways for one to receive atonement for an uncertain sin: the asham talui and Yom Kippur. Both of these institutions remind us that we need and can fix not just the things that we know we did wrong, but those that we might have done wrong as well. I hope you have enjoyed Keritot. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Meilah.