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text: English Explanation of Mishnah Kiddushin
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה קידושין
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  -
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Kiddushin
  
  Introduction
  
  Jewish marriage consists of two stages—betrothal and marriage.  In Hebrew the first stage is termed “kiddushin” in mishnaic Hebre and “erusin” in biblical Hebrew.  The second stage is termed “nisuin.”  At betrothal the couple become fully and legally connected to one another. The most important consequence is that a get would be required to end their betrothal.  Other consequences would include inheritance, breaking of vows and if he is a priest for his becoming impure in order to bury her.  Since the connection between the couple is created at the point of betrothal, the laws of betrothal are much more important in halakhah than are the laws of full marriage (nisuin).  
  Much of our tractate deals with how a woman becomes “mekudeshet”—betrothed—to a man.  Basically there are three ways to effect betrothal—money, document or sexual relations.  It seems quite clear that betrothal was nearly always affected through the use of money.  Today the ring given from the husband to the bride is the money used to affect betrothal.  
  The rabbis often attempt to learn these three means of betrothal from various verses in the Torah.  Without examining these midrashic attempts, we should note that the Torah provides little information as to how betrothal, or marriage for that matter, was contracted.  This is typical of the Torah’s laws—the Torah often skips the mundane, every day matters and legislates only the unusual.  There may be hints that money and sexual relations are involved in the marital process but their function in the Torah is unusual.  It was left for the rabbis to clarify exactly how betrothal was entered into.
  Besides the laws of betrothal, there are other laws which are discussed at length in this tractate.  Since betrothal is a form of acquisition, whereby a husband acquires a wife, the Mishnah discusses how other things (slaves, animals, land etc.) are acquired.  While this chapter seems to consider women to be chattel (possessions), we should note that there are some key differences.  The acquisition of women is symbolic, since as we will learn, a woman can be acquired for a symbolic amount of money.  Secondly, everything else that a person acquires he may eventually sell.  A husband cannot sell his wife.  Nevertheless, we should admit that the mishnaic laws of marriage are not egalitarian—the man acquires a woman and the woman does not acquire a man.
  The fourth chapter discusses laws of personal status, defining how genealogical ranks are passed down from generation to generation.  These laws begin with a mishnah which teaches that Judaism is passed through the mother.  When we learn these mishnayot we shall note their connection with betrothal, the main topic of the tractate.  
  I should note that throughout my commentary on kiddushin, I will intermittently use the words kiddushin and betrothal. Both refer to the same thing, the act by which a man betroths a woman.  I will not use the word kiddushin to refer to a couple that is already betrothed.  
  Good luck in learning Kiddushin!
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first mishnah of Kiddushin teaches how a woman is “acquired” in marriage and how she “acquires” herself, that is to say, how she becomes free to marry another man.  The mishnah also teaches how a “yevamah” is “acquired.”  A “yevamah” is a woman whose husband has died without any children (see the intro to tractate Yevamoth).  According to the Torah she must either marry her husband’s brother or perform halitzah, the release from the obligation to her brother-in-law.
  A woman is acquired in three ways and acquires herself in two: She is acquired by money, by document, or by intercourse. “By money”: (1) Bet Shammai says:  a denar or the equivalent of a denar; (2) Bet Hillel says: a perutah or the equivalent of a perutah. ( And how much is a perutah? ( An eighth of an Italian issar.  A man can betroth his wife in any one of three ways.  The first is by giving her a small amount of money and saying to her “Behold you are betrothed to me with this money.”  Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate how much money is needed to effect betrothal.  What is crucial is that both a denar and a perutah are small amounts of money; a perutah is almost valueless.  These are not representative of a woman’s true value, which is clearly much greater.  Rather they are symbolic, especially in Bet Hillel’s opinion.  To this day, nearly all betrothals are effected through money.  Since the Middle Ages and perhaps earlier, Jews have used rings to effect betrothal.  This custom was originally a Christian custom.  In the Talmud rings are never used. The second way is for the husband to write her a document in which it is stated, “Behold you are betrothed to me.”  This document is not to be confused with a ketubah, although some scholars posit that they are both derived from common origins and that originally they were written together. The thirds means of betrothal is sexual relations.  This act must be done with the intent of betrothal.  No one holds that casual intercourse can effect betrothal. The thornier problem is whether or not sexual relations between a couple “living together” can effect betrothal.  Most modern halakhists rule that it does not, although there are some who hold that couples who live together with the intent to form a familial type of unit do require a get in order to separate.
  And she acquires herself by divorce or by her husband's death.  A woman becomes halakhically separated from her husband either by divorce or by death.  Without one of the two, any relations that she has with another man will be considered adultery.
  A yevamah  is acquired by intercourse.  The dead husband’s brother-in-law “acquires” his brother’s widow through sexual intercourse.  As we learned in Yevamot, the yevamah is not acquired by money, as a woman would be in cases of normal betrothal.  However, the rabbis added on that before the couple has sexual relations, the yavam should perform an act of betrothal through money, as is done in normal cases.  This act of betrothal does not have toraitic (deoraita) legal consequences.
  And she acquires herself by halitzah or by the yavam’s death.  The yevamah is free to marry another man if she performs halitzah with the yavam.  Alternatively, if the yavam dies (in a situation where there is only one yavam) she also may marry anyone she so chooses.  Note that once she is married she is considered a normal wife, and she “acquires” herself through the death of her husband or through divorce.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  There are different rules for Hebrew slaves than there are for “Canaanite” slaves non-Jewish slaves.  One of the major differences is that all of the biblical verses which discuss a slave’s going free after a certain period of time are considered by the rabbis as referring to Hebrew slaves.  This includes Exodus 21:1-11; Leviticus 25:39-44, 47-55; Deuteronomy 15:12-18.  Leviticus 25:44-46 refers to Canaanite slaves.  Non-Jewish slaves are called “Canaanite” after Genesis 9:25, “Cursed be Canaan; the lowest of slaves shall he be to his brothers.”  The major difference between the two is that a Hebrew slave goes free automatically after a certain number of years of servitude, whereas a Canaanite slaves works in perpetuity.  We should note that the practice of owning Hebrew slaves was probably non-existent, or at least almost non-existent, in the mishnaic/talmudic periods.  However, Jews did own non-Jewish slaves.  Slavery was a common feature of the Greco-Roman world.  The halakhah in general mandates relatively liberal treatment of the slave, but it did not forbid slavery.
  A Hebrew slave is acquired by money and by document;  There are two possibilities for how an Israelite can legally be sold as a slave. First of all, he may sell himself into slavery in order to pay off his debts.  In such a case he may be sold to a Jew or to a Gentile.  The second possibility is that the court may sell him in order to make compensation for something he sold.  The mishnah teaches that in these cases the sale must be done either through money or through a sale document.
  And acquires himself by years, by Jubilee, and by deduction from the purchase price.  The slave goes free after six years of servitude, as is taught in the beginning of chapter 21 of Exodus.  If the Jubilee year, which occurs once every fifty year, happens before he serves out his six years, then he goes free earlier (see Leviticus 25:40).  If the slave somehow earns enough money to pay back the original sale price, he has the right to do so at any time.  For instance if he was sold for 600 denar, and he would have worked for six years, each year is worth 100 denar, and depending upon when he wants to buy himself back, he pays back 100 denar per year left of work.  The master cannot refuse to allow the slave to buy himself back.  In this way, the Hebrew slave is more like an indentured servant than truly a slave.
  A Hebrew maidservant is greater in that she acquires herself by ‘signs [of physical maturity]’.  The sale of female Hebrew slaves is even more restricted.  According to halakhah there is no such thing as a female adult Hebrew slave.  She can only be sold as a minor and when she shows physical signs of reaching maturity (pubic hair) she becomes free automatically, without having to pay back her sale price.  In addition, she can also become free in any of the ways that a male Hebrew slave becomes free.  It seems that the institute of minor female slaves was probably a way for the father to marry off his daughter without paying a dowry.  While this practice seems cruel to us, it may have been a better option for the daughter than the alternative.
  He whose ear is bored is acquired by boring, and acquires himself by Jubilee or his master's death.  In Exodus 21:5-6 we learn that a slave who does not wish to regain his freedom must have his ear pierced and then he may work indefinitely for his master.  The piercing causes him to be acquired to his master for a period beyond the normal period of servitude.  However, he does not work forever and his master’s inheritors do not inherit him.  Rather he goes free either at his master’s death or at the Jubilee year, which ever comes first.  At this point, even if he wishes to remain a slave he has no such choice.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  In today’s mishnah we learn how Canaanite slaves are acquired.  We should note that Canaanite slaves essentially become Jews by being owned by Jews. The males are usually to be circumcised, both male and female slaves must undergo ritual immersion and according to halakhah are obligated by most of the commandments.
  A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, deed, or by possession, And acquires himself by money through the agency of others, and by document through his own agency, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: by money, through his own agency, and by document, through the agency of others, providing that the money comes from others.  Money and deed acquire Canaanite slaves, just as they acquire Hebrew slaves.  In addition, Canaanite slaves can be acquired through “possession”, which could also alternatively be translated as “presumption of ownership.”  We learned the rules of possession in the third chapter of Bava Batra.  Practically this would mean that a slave, who treated a certain person as if that person were his owner, would become the property of that person.
  Both Rabbi Meir and the Sages agree that a slave acquires his freedom either through a manumission document or through his freedom being purchased with money.  However, they disagree over whether or not the slave may purchase himself back.  According to Rabbi Meir a Canaanite slave can never own property.  Any property which he would acquire would automatically become the property of his owner, since the owner owns the slave.  Therefore, only other people may purchase the slave’s freedom.  When it comes to a document, the document must be received by the slave himself. The Sages disagree on both counts.  They hold that a slave may, under certain circumstances, own his own property.  This is possible if other people give the slave money with the condition that the owner not take possession of that money.  According to the Sages either he or others may purchase his freedom.  Similarly, they disagree about the document.  The master can write out a manumission document, give it to another person beside the slave and thereby free the slave.  Note that the Sages could have stated that “a slave is acquired by documents or money through his own agency or the agency of others.”  This would have been a clearer and slightly briefer statement of the sages’ intent.  Instead, the mishnah phrases their statement as the opposite of Rabbi Meir’s statement in order to retain the parallelism.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah teaches how large animals such as cows and oxen, and small animals such as sheep and goats are acquired.  We should note that money does not acquire animals, nor does it acquire any other movable property.  According to mishnaic law a person must actually come into contact with the animal in order to acquire it.  We should note that while this may have worked for the small agricultural communities of Palestine in antiquity it became very difficult by and perhaps long before the Middle Ages.  By that time Jews were heavily involved in international trade and could not possibly physically handle every commodity that they acquired.    Hence alternative legal means were worked out whereby money could be used to acquire legal rights to movable commodities.
  Large animals are acquired by being handed over and small animals by lifting, the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar. The sages say: small animals are acquired by being led. According to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar large animals are acquired by being “handed over” from their owner to the purchaser. This would entail the purchaser taking hole of the reins, saddle or even hair of the animal.  Small animals, however, may be lifted and therefore they are acquired only through lifting.  They are not acquired by being handed over or by being led. The sages disagree with regard to the acquisition of small animals.  Despite the fact that they can be lifted, it is still difficult to do so. Therefore they are acquired by being led.  Since goats and sheep do not have reins they are led by being pushed or directed by voice commands.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah discusses the acquisition of land and movable property.  Land in the Mishnah is called property which “has security.”  This means that creditors can collect from this property for outstanding debts, even if the land is already owned by a third party (not the debtor).  “Movable property” cannot be used for debt collection from third parties.
  Property which has security is acquired by money, by deed or by possession.  Land is acquired through money, deed or possession.  That is to say if Reuven wants to acquire land from Shimon he can do one of three things.  Either he can pay money to Shimon, write out a document, or demonstrate possession over the land with Shimon’s consent.
  [Property] which does not have security is acquired only by being drawn [to the purchaser].  Just as animals are not acquired by money, so too “things” are not acquired through money.  Rather the purchaser must physically take the object he wishes to acquire into his possession.  Until he does so, the item still belongs to the seller.
  Property which does not have security may be acquired in conjunction with property which does have security by money, deed, or possession;  A person may acquire land through money, deed or possession, and at the same time acquire movable property without making a separate demonstration of acquisition. For instance if Reuven wishes to buy from Shimon a piece of land and a herd of sheep, he may acquire the land and the sheep with money, even though money alone would not be sufficient to acquire the sheep.
  And it obligates the property which provides security, to take an oath concerning them.  In Shevuoth 6:5 we learned that people do not take oaths over land.  For instance, if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him land, and Shimon admits to part of the claim, he need not swear that he does not owe him the rest, as he would were Reuven to claim that Shimon owes him money or animals.  However, if Shimon needs to take an oath over movable property and land, since he must take an oath over the movable property he must also take an oath over the land.  This could happen if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him a piece of land and a 100 sheep.  If Shimon admits that half of the land is Reuven’s and half of the sheep, he must take an oath over both the land and the sheep which he claims not to owe.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The first half of the mishnah discusses acquiring things through barter.  The second half of the mishnah delves into the difference between the laws of acquisition for the Temple and those for an ordinary person.
  Whatever can be used as payment for another object, as soon as this one takes possession [of the object], the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, as soon as this one takes possession, the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange.  The general rule of acquiring things through exchange is illustrated simply in the example of the cow and ox.  If Reuven and Shimon exchange an ox for a cow, when Reuven takes physical possession of Shimon’s cow, Shimon becomes owner of the ox, even if Shimon doesn’t take physical possession.  The implication would be that if the ox dies or is stolen, Shimon is out of luck for it is his ox that died or was stolen.  Alternatively, if the oxen market rises dramatically Shimon wins out.  For better or for worse, in an exchange once one party takes possession of one of the objects being exchanged, the other party automatically owns the other object.
  The sanctuary’s title to property [is acquired] by money; the title of an ordinary person to property by hazakah.  Ordinary people cannot acquire movable property by using money (see mishnah five), but the Temple can use money to acquire movable property.  So if the Temple’s treasurer wants to buy a cow, once he gives the cow’s owner money the cow is sanctified and belongs to the Temple.
  Dedication to the sanctuary is equal to delivery to an ordinary person.  A verbal declaration is not sufficient to transfer ownership.  In other words, if I just pick up an object and say “This belongs to Reuven”, the object does not yet belong to Reuven.  However, when it comes to dedicating something to the Temple, a verbal declaration is sufficient.  If I state, “This cow belongs to the Temple,” the cow belongs to the Temple and is considered sacred.  We can see through both of these sections that the Temple more easily acquires property than does an ordinary human being.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with the distinction between commandments obligatory for men and those obligatory for women.  The mishnah can be divided into two subjects:  1) mutual obligations between parents and children; 2) general commandments both negative and positive.  It is not entirely clear why this mishnah is in this chapter.  Inside my commentary, I have not delved into the ramifications of these rules in our day, when many women wish to be more involved in Jewish ritual life.
  All obligations of the son upon the father, men are obligated, but women are exempt.  This refers to obligations that the father has in raising his son.  They include circumcising him, redeeming him from a priest if the son is a first-born, teaching him Torah, teaching him a profession and finding him a wife.  The father and not the mother is responsible to fulfill these commandments.
  But all obligations of the father upon the son, both men and women are obligated.  When it comes to obligations that a child has to his/her parent both men and women are obligated, and they are obligated equally to both their mother and father.  This includes fear and respect.  According to the rabbis respect means providing financially for the parent in his/her old age.
  All positive, time-bound commandments, men are obligated and women are exempt.  Only men are obligated in positive time-bound commandments.  This includes the reading of the Shema, blowing the shofar, sitting in the Sukkah and several other commandments.  Note that the mishnah does not state that women are forbidden from fulfilling these commandments it says only that they are not obligated to do so.
  But all positive non-time-bound commandments both men and women are obligated.  Positive commandments which are not time-bound are obligatory upon both men and women.  This would include such mitzvoth as mezuzah, charity and returning lost objects.
  And all negative commandments, whether time-bound or not time-bound, both men and women are obligated, except for, the prohibition against rounding [the corners of the head], and the prohibition against marring [the corner of the beard], and the prohibition [for a priest] to become impure through contact with the dead.  Nearly all negative commandments are equally obligatory upon men and women.  The mishnah notes a few exceptions.  The prohibitions of rounding the corners of the head and marring the beard (Leviticus 19:27) are obligatory only upon men. Since most women don’t have beards the beard prohibition would not apply to them the prohibition of rounding the corners of the head is an accompanying prohibition appearing in the same verse and hence women are exempt from it as well.  In addition, women do not act as priests and therefore the prohibition of a priest from coming into contact with a dead body applies only to male priests and not to daughters of priests.  .
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah lists a number of ritual procedures performed upon bringing a sacrifice which are performed by men and not by women.  The exclusion of women from performing these rites is derived in the Talmud from the frequent use in the Torah of the language “Speak to the sons (b’nei) of Israel”, where the word “sons” is understood to preclude daughters.
  The [rites of] laying hands, waving, presenting [the meal-offering], taking the handful, burning [the fat], cutting [the neck of bird sacrifices], sprinkling and receiving [the blood] are performed by men but not by women, except the meal-offering of a sotah and a female nazirite, where they [themselves] wave the offering. The [rites of] laying hands:  Most animal sacrifices require the person offering the sacrifice lay his hands upon the animal before the animal is slaughtered (see for instance Lev. 1:4).  Only men lay their hands upon the sacrifice. When women bring the sacrifice, no one lays their hands. Waving:  After the animal is slaughtered parts of it are waved jointly by the priest and by the male owner of the sacrifice (see Lev. 7:30).  If a woman brought the sacrifice the priest waves it by himself. Presenting [the meal-offering]:  When a person brings a meal-offering (a minhah), they present it to the priest. The priest then takes it and presents it to the altar (Lev. 6:7).  Only male priests present the minhah daughters of priests do not. Taking the handful:  With a minhah offering, the priest takes a handful of the offering (Lev. 2:2).  Again, only male priests perform this rite. Burning [the fat]:  See Lev 3:5. Cutting [the neck of bird sacrifices]:  See Lev 1:15. Sprinkling and receiving [the blood]:  See Lev 5:9. Except the meal-offering of a Sotah and a female nazirite, where they [themselves] wave the offering:  The Sotah waves a minhah offering and the nazirite waves the leg of the animal she/he brings, a bread-offering and a wafer (see Sotah 3:1 and Nazir 6:9).   In each case the woman and the priest would jointly wave the offering.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with commandments which are “dependent on the land.”  “Dependent on the land” refers to commandments which are agricultural in nature, such as the giving of the first fruits, tithes, terumah, the leaving of corners of fields etc.
  The reason that this mishnah is here is its linguistic connection to the previous mishnayoth, especially mishnah seven.
  Every commandment which is dependent on the land is practiced only in the land [of Israel]; and every commandment which is not dependent on the land is practiced both in and outside the land, except orlah and kilayim. Rabbi Elazar says:  also [the prohibition of] new produce. In general, all commandments which are connected to the land are practiced only in the land of Israel.  There are some commandments such as tefillin concerning which the Torah uses language such as “When God brings you into the land…” (Exodus 13:5).  One might have thought that these commandments would only be obligatory for a Jew living in the land of Israel.  The mishnah, however, says that the distinction between commandments observed in and outside of Israel is not the language used in the Torah but rather whether or not the observance of the commandment itself is tied to land. The only exceptions to this rule are “orlah” and “kilayim.”  “Orlah” is the prohibition of using the fruit of a tree for its first three years.   “Kilayim” refers to the prohibition of planting wheat in a vineyard. Rabbi Elazar adds to the list of exceptions the prohibition of new produce.  This refers to the prohibition from eating from the new grain harvest until the omer sacrifice is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:14).
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah presents a very straightforward version of rewards and punishments.  Those who perform commandments are rewarded and those who do not are not rewarded.  Obviously, this mishnah is expressing an ideal which often does not match reality.  The problem of good people not being rewarded, or the problem of an omnipotent God in control of a random and often cruel world is called “theodicy” and was recognized well by the rabbis.  There are many other answers in rabbinic literature to the problem of theodicy, including an extreme statement such as “there is no reward in this world.”   Our mishnah persists with what I perceive to be a very optimistic outlook.  Despite all of the evidence to the contrary the world in which we live is ordered and good.  It is a reward in which the righteous receive reward and the wicked are punished.
  The second half of the mishnah, the final part of the chapter, teaches that in order to be considered part of the “civilized” world a person must be versed in Bible, in Mishnah and participate in the “ways of the world.”  The “ways of the world” probably means to have a profession although it may also mean to have polite manners.
  He who performs one commandment is rewarded, his days are prolonged, and he inherits the land, But he who does not perform one commandment, is not rewarded, his days are not prolonged, and he does not inherit the land.  The mishnah’s statement sounds almost too extreme to receive reward all you have to do is perform one commandment?  Therefore the Talmud interprets this to mean that a person who has half merits and half faults is rewarded for the performance of the one commandment that puts him or her “over the top.”  Similarly, a person who has more faults than merits and does not perform more commandments in order to even things up does not receive a reward.  The important thing is that since a person never knows what their status is they should treat each opportunity to perform a commandment as it that is the commandment that will “put them over the top.” This is an attitude to life that bequeaths importance to each of our individual choices, leaves hope for those who have led less than perfect lives and prevents haughtiness in those who believe that they have led good lives. The peculiar language of the mishnah “he who does not perform one commandment” is a euphemism for “he who commits one transgression.” “Days are prolonged” is understood to refer to a long life in this world and “inherit the land” is typically understood to refer to a reward in the world to come.
  He who is familiar with Bible, Mishnah, and the ways of the land will not easily sin, as it is said, “And a threefold cord is not quickly broken” (Ecclesiastes 4:1. But he who is not familiar with Bible, Mishnah and the ways of the land does not belong to civilization.  To be a part of civilized Jewish society one must be both learned and take part in worldly activities, namely work.  Occupation with the study of both written and oral Torah, accompanied by a livelihood provides a person with a culture which will prevent him from sinning.  One who is not engaged in all three is not considered to be civilized.  In another words, in the eyes of the rabbis, such a person is a barbarian.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first half of today’s mishnah teaches that betrothal can be contracted through an agent.  This means that a man or a woman can appoint an agent to either betroth or be betrothed.
  The second half of the mishnah refers to the first mishnah of chapter one where we learned that betrothal can be done with money or with something that has value.  The value needed is only a perutah, the smallest coin that was in existence.  Our mishnah deals with a man who gives a woman dates in order to betroth her.
  A man can betroth [a woman] through himself or through his agent. A woman may be betrothed through herself or through her agent.  As explained in the introduction, a man can betroth a woman through an agent. This would mean that the man gives money to an agent to use in betrothing a certain woman.  This probably would have been a common means of doing betrothal if the couple lived far apart from one another and was matched by others, as was nearly always the case.  Similarly, a woman may appoint an agent to receive her betrothal money.
  A man may give his daughter in betrothal when a young girl [either] himself or through his agent.  A father has the right to marry off his daughter while she is still a young girl (na’arah). This is defined as a girl between the ages of 12 and 12 1/2 who has already reached puberty.  He may also marry her off at a younger age, but not when she is past that age.  When marrying her off, he may use an agent to accept her betrothal money.  Basically, the father takes her place in matters of betrothal. I should note that while a father had the legal right to marry off his daughter and not his son, and this right extends only until she reaches 12 1/2, in practice the father played a very large role in arranging matches for both sons and daughters no matter what age they were when they married.  The idea that a 12 1/2 year old girl became totally independent of her father was probably as strange of an idea in the mishnaic period as it would be today.
  He who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with this date, be betrothed to me with this one”   if any one of them is worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.  In this case a man gives a woman several dates (palm dates) in an attempt to use the dates as betrothal money.  Here he says the words “Be betrothed to me” as he gives each date.  The fact that he repeats the formula each time means that each act is a separate act of betrothal.  Since they were separate acts, in order for the betrothal to be effective at least one of the dates must be worth a perutah.  If each individual date is worth less than a perutah, we do not add the dates up so that together they make a perutah.
  [If he says,] “[Be betrothed to me] with this one and with this one and with this one”   if together they are worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.  In this case, since he made one betrothal statement, we can add up the dates.  If together they are worth a perutah then she is betrothed.
  If she eats them one by one, she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a perutah.  This section continues the scenario of the previous section.  In this case, while he is giving her the dates she starts to eat them one at a time (dates are quite delicious, and I guess she just couldn’t resist!)  Unless one of them is worth a perutah she cannot be betrothed by the combined value of them all because they are never all in her hand at the same time.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  [If a man says to a woman], “Be betrothed to me with this cup of wine,” and it is found to be of honey, or “of honey” and it is found to be of wine;“with this silver denar,” and it is found to be of gold, or “of gold” and it is found to be of silver;“on condition that I am wealthy,” and he is found to be poor, or “poor” and he is found to be rich, she is not betrothed.Rabbi Shimon says: if he deceives her to [her] advantage, she is betrothed.A man may not deceptively betroth a woman; she must agree to her betrothal with full understanding of what he is giving her and under what conditions.  This mishnah deals with a man who somewhat deceptively attempts to betroth a woman.In each case in this mishnah, the husband makes an incorrect statement as part of the betrothal formula.  For instance, he states that he is betrothing her with a cup of a certain liquid and it turns out to be a different liquid.  Alternatively, he says that he is betrothing her with a certain type of coin and it turns out to be a different coin.  Finally, he tells her that he is of a certain economic status and he is not.  According to the first opinion, since the facts as he stated them are incorrect, the betrothal is ineffective.  This is true even if he deceived her to her own advantage.  For instance, he said that he was giving her a cup of wine and it turned out to be a cup of honey, which is more valuable than wine.  According to the first opinion, we don’t reason that a woman who would agree to be betrothed to a certain man with a cup of wine would also agree to such a betrothal if done with a cup of honey, since she could always sell the honey to buy wine.  Rather, the betrothal statement must be accurate.Rabbi Shimon disagrees.  He holds that if the deception is clearly to her advantage, the betrothal is valid.  Therefore, if he says that the cup was honey and it turned out to be wine (cheaper) she is not betrothed.  But if he told her that the cup was wine and it turned out to be honey, she is betrothed.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  “[Be betrothed to me] on condition that I am a priest,” and he is found to be a Levite, or “a Levite” and he is found to be a priest; “a natin,” and he is found to be a mamzer, or “a mamzer” and he is found to be a natin;“a townsman,” and he is found to be a villager, or “a villager” and he is found to be a townsman;“on condition that my house is near the bathhouse,” and it is found to be far, or “far” and it is found to be near;“on condition that I have a daughter or maidservant that braids hair” and he does not have, “or on condition that I do not have”, and he has;“on condition that I have no sons”, and he has, or “on condition that I have sons, and he does not have--in all these cases, even if she declares, “In my heart I would have agreed to be betrothed to him in any case,” she is not betrothed.Similarly if she deceives him.This mishnah continues to teach that deception in matters of betrothal renders the betrothal invalid.Sections 1-5:  As was the case in the previous mishnah, in all of these cases the man makes a false statement when betrothing the woman.  What is different in today’s mishnah is that in these cases it is not clear which is “better.”  For instance, yesterday it was clear that having a gold denar was better than a silver one.  However, here it is not clear whether the woman would rather be married to, for example a townsman, more than she would want to be married to a villager.  Even living near the bathhouse is not clearly an advantage, as the foot traffic there will be greater.  Since we cannot affirm which is necessarily better, in these cases Rabbi Shimon would agree that she is not betrothed.Section one:  In the context of the mishnah, we have to understand that marrying a priest is not necessarily advantage.  Even though the priest receives terumah which would have been a substantial economic benefit, the woman may potentially prefer to be married to a Levite who receives tithes.Section four:  “Braids hair” might also be translated as “grown up.”  While this would change the meaning of the mishnah, in either case we have to interpret that it is not a clear advantage to either have or not have a daughter or maidservant that braids hair or is grown up.  Whether it is a benefit would depend if the woman prefers having some extra help over her privacy.Section five:  Having or not having sons may be connected to issues of inheritance or yibbum (levirate marriage).  She may want him to have sons (or children in general), so that if he dies she won’t have to undergo yibbum. She may not want him to have sons since those sons will share with her own sons in his inheritance.  Again, since we cannot affirm which is preferable, Rabbi Shimon would agree that she is not betrothed.Section six:  There is a general rule in laws of betrothal and other areas of halakhah thoughts that a person keeps to himself or herself are not legally consequential.  Therefore, even if she thinks to herself that she would have agreed to be betrothed to him in any case, she is not betrothed.  Had she wanted to be betrothed in any case, she should have responded at the time of betrothal, “I agree to be betrothed to you whether you are a priest or a Levite” etc.Section seven:  All of the above rules also apply if she deceives him.  For instance, if she says “I am a priest’s daughter” and she is a Levite’s daughter, she is not betrothed.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  If he says to his agent, “Go out and betroth to me so-and-so in such and such a place,” and he goes and betroths her elsewhere, she is not betrothed.“She is in such and such a place,” and he betroths her elsewhere, she is betrothed.The mishnah now returns to discuss betrothal performed by a person’s agent.  Today’s mishnah is nearly identical to Gittin 6:3.In both sections, a husband appoints an agent to betroth his wife and gives the agent instructions as to where to betroth the woman.  If the husband tells the agent to betroth the woman in a certain place, she is not betrothed if the agent betroths her in another place.  In such a case we can assume that the husband wanted the betrothal to be performed in that specific place.However, if the husband merely tells the agent where to find the woman, the husband does not necessarily care if she is really somewhere else.  He was only helping the agent locate her. Therefore the betrothal is valid no matter where the agent eventually finds her.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah discusses a man who betroths a woman on condition that she not have made any vows or have any defects.  The exact same mishnah can be found in Ketubot 7:7.
  If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah.  It can be assumed that a husband does not want his wife to be subject to vows that will prevent her from engaging in certain activities, such as eating meat or drinking wine.  Such vows would certainly disrupt the normal functioning of a marriage.  If he betroths her on the specific condition that she is not subject to any vows, and after betrothal it is found out that she is subject to vows, she is not betrothed.  Since the betrothal was made under false pretenses it is invalid and she does not need a get to remarry, nor does she receive her ketubah.  However, if he did not make such a condition, and then later finds out that she is subject to vows, the marriage is valid. Nevertheless, since she should have told him that she had vows, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah.  In other words, the marriage was not exactly made under a false assumption and therefore she needs a get in order to remarry, but she still was dishonest with him and therefore she loses the ketubah.
  [If a woman was betrothed] on condition that she has no bodily defects, and she was found to have defects, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to have defects, she leaves without her ketubah. All defects which disqualify priests also disqualify women.  The same rule concerning a woman subject to vows is also true with regard to a woman who has physical defects.  If he specifically stipulated that she not have any physical defects (assumedly ones that he could not detect when she was clothed), and she does, the betrothal is invalid.  If he did not make a stipulation, the betrothal is valid but he may divorce her without paying the ketubah. With regard to physical defects, it is essential for us to know what physical defects are significant enough that they invalidate the betrothal or allow the husband to divorce her without paying the ketubah.  The answer is that any defect that disqualifies a priest from serving at the altar (see Lev 21:17), also disqualifies a woman.  These defects are listed in the seventh chapter of tractate Bekhorot.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah talks about a man who performs an invalid act of kiddushin and then later on sends presents to the woman whom he tried to betroth.  The question is, is the sending of presents equivalent to a renewed and now valid act of betrothal, or are the presents not considered as effecting betrothal?
  If he betroths two women with the value of a perutah, or one woman with less than the value of a perutah, even if he subsequently sends gifts, she is not betrothed, because he sent them on account of the first kiddushin.  In both of these cases the first act does not cause the woman, or women to be betrothed because there was not a perutah’s worth given to each woman.  When the man later on sends gifts which are worth more than a perutah, we might have thought that these gifts can now act as the betrothal money.  After all, he clearly intended to betroth her and she clearly agreed.  However, the mishnah rules that since these gifts were not sent with the intent of effecting betrothal, they do not act as such.  We also do not assume that the man realized that his first act of betrothal was invalid and that he is now sending betrothal money.
  The same is true if a minor betroths.  A minor cannot betroth a woman.  Betrothal requires “awareness”, and minors legally lack the required “awareness.”  Therefore, if he tries to betroth a certain woman, she is not betrothed.  Even if he later on sends presents to the woman whom he tried to betroth, the presents do not effect kiddushin, for they were not sent as such but rather on account of the first act of betrothal, which was invalid.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The main point of this mishnah is that a man who tries to simultaneously betroth two women whom cannot be simultaneously betrothed to him has betrothed neither woman.
  If one betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister at one time,   they are not betrothed.  A man cannot simultaneously marry a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister.  If he was already married to a certain woman and he attempted to betroth her daughter or sister, the betrothal would not be effective.  The mishnah deals with a case where a man tried to betroth two such women simultaneously.  Since they cannot both be effective neither is.
  And it once happened that five women, among whom were two sisters, that a man gathered a basket of figs, which was theirs, and which was of the seventh year, and he said, “Behold, you are betrothed to me with this basket,” and one accepted it on behalf of them all and the sages said: the sisters are not betrothed.  This is a classic rabbinic story, utterly packed with information.  The main thing which we learn is that if one tries to simultaneously betroth two sisters, neither sister is betrothed.  However, we also learn the following halakhot. 1) A man can betroth a group of women with one act of betrothal, and even if the betrothal is ineffective with some of the women (the sisters) it is effective with the others. 2) During the seventh year (the sabbatical year) a man can betroth using the agricultural produce of the women he is betrothing.  This is because such produce is considered ownerless during the sabbatical year and when the man picks it up he owns it. 3) One woman can simultaneously accept kiddushin for herself and for other women. By packing all of these details into one brief story, the story becomes an excellent didactic opportunity, far exceeding that which it is brought to explicitly demonstrate  that if one tries to simultaneously betroth two sisters, neither sister is betrothed
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with attempts to betroth using various different types of sanctified property.  The real question is, does the property belong to the one using it such that his betrothal is effective?
  If he [a priest] betroths [a woman] with his portion, whether it is of higher holiness or of lower holiness, she is not betrothed.  Portions of many sacrifices go to the priests who eat them.  However, a priest cannot use them as his betrothal money because these portions are not considered to be his possessions.  Rather, the priest’s right to them is limited to his or other priests eating.  Since for kiddushin to be effective the man must own that which he gives to the woman, the priest’s portion in sacrifices may not be used.
  [If one betroths] with second tithe, whether unwittingly or deliberately, he has not betrothed [her]: the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her]; if deliberately, he has betrothed [her].  Second tithe must be taken to Jerusalem and there it may be eaten by its owner.  According to Rabbi Meir, second tithe does not belong to its owners.  It is sanctified property “kadosh” and just as portions of sacrifices cannot be used for kiddushin, so too second tithe cannot be used.  Rabbi Judah says that second tithe does belong to its owner.  Therefore if he deliberately did kiddushin with it, she is betrothed.  However, if he unwittingly uses the second tithe for kiddushin then she is not betrothed for this was a mistaken act of kiddushin.
  [If] with sanctified property, if deliberately, he has betrothed her; if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if unwittingly, he has betrothed her; if deliberately, he has not betrothed her.  Sanctified property can become non-sanctified property if it is redeemed.  However, if it is not redeemed then it remains sanctified and cannot be used for betrothal.  According to Rabbi Meir, if the man intentionally uses sanctified property as his betrothal money, he is in essence redeeming it.  The betrothal is valid and the man will owe to the Temple the value of that which he gave to the woman.  However, if he does so unwittingly, then the sanctified property is not redeemed and therefore the betrothal is invalid. Rabbi Judah disagrees on both counts.  He holds that one who intentionally uses the sanctified property for betrothal does not thereby redeem it, therefore the betrothal is invalid. However, if he unwittingly uses the sanctified property this is considered “me’ilah” improper use of sacred property.  In such cases the object which was misappropriated loses its sacred status and the person who misappropriated the property owes the Temple the value of the object plus one-fifth and must bring a guilt offering.  The key for our purposes is that the object is no longer sacred, and therefore the betrothal is valid.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah lists things from which it is prohibited to derive benefit.  Therefore, a man who tries to betroth a woman with one of these items has not betrothed her.  In my explanation I will explain what each of these items is.
  “Orlah”:  Fruit from a tree during its first three years (Leviticus 19:27). “Kilayim of the vineyard”:  Wheat which has been planted in a vineyard (Deuteronomy 22:19). “An ox which is to be stoned”:  An ox that has killed a person must be stoned to death (Exodus 21:28). “The heifer whose neck is to be broken”:  This refers to the ceremony performed when a body is found and its murderer is unknown (Deuteronomy 21:4). “A leper’s bird-offerings”: At the end of his leprosy (tzaraat) the leper brings two birds as sacrifices (Leviticus 14:4). “A nazirite’s hair”:  The nazirite cuts his hair at the end of his naziriteship and burns it (Numbers 6:18). “The first-born of a donkey”:  The first-born of a donkey must be redeemed by donating a sheep.  Until that point it is prohibited to derive benefit from it (Exodus 13:13). “Meat [boiled] in milk”:  Exodus 23:19 and parallels. “Non-sacred meat slaughtered in the Temple court”:  It is forbidden to slaughter non-sacrificial meat in the Temple court.
  If he sells them and betroths [her] with the proceeds, she is betrothed.  It is forbidden to derive benefit from all of the above items.  They also may not be sold.  However, if he does sell them, the money does not retain the prohibited status of the original item.  Therefore, the money is effective for betrothal.  Note that the mishnah does not state that it is permitted to use the money for betrothal.  The act may be prohibited but nevertheless effective.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah we learn about a man who betroths a woman using certain things from which it is not prohibited to derive benefit.
  If he betroths with terumot, tithes, priestly gifts, the water of purification or the ashes of purification behold she is betrothed, even if he is an Israelite. Terumot:   Terumah can only be eaten by a priest.  A priest can use terumah for betrothal and then the woman may sell it. However, even an Israelite can potentially own terumah.  For instance, if someone’s maternal grandfather is a priest, he is not a priest because the priesthood is not inherited through his mother.  In such a case he will inherit from his grandfather, if his mother inherits from her father and then dies.  The non-priest cannot eat the terumah which he inherits, but he can sell it.  He could also use it for betrothal and then the woman can sell it.  He would have to tell her that it is terumah, because terumah is less valuable than regular food. Tithes:  These are given to the Levite, who may use them for betrothal.  An Israelite can use them for betrothal in the same way described above. Priestly gifts:  This refers to parts of non-sacred animals given to priests (see Deuteronomy 18:3).  The priest can use them as betrothal money and if they come into the hands of an Israelite, he too can use them. The water and ash of purification:  To purify someone who came into contact with a dead body, they would burn the red heifer and put its ash into water.  According to the Talmud, our mishnah refers to someone who betroths with payment he received for drawing the water or for bringing the dust.  One cannot betroth with the water or ahs itself because there is no financial benefit to be derived from them. I should note that I have explained that an Israelite cannot betroth with terumot or tithes that he separates from his own produce.  Such gifts must be given for free directly to a priest or Levite.  However, it is possible to explain that the mishnah is referring to the tithes or terumot that an Israelite himself separates from his produce.  The Israelite has the benefit of being able to give such gifts to whichever priest or Levite he so desires.  This benefit is worth money for it will make the priest or Levite look favorably upon him.  It is with this benefit that he is betrothing the woman.  She now has the benefit of giving the terumot or tithes to anyone she wishes.  While this may be a small benefit, remember, it only takes a perutah.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first section deals with a person who sends an agent out to betroth a woman on his behalf and then the agent betroths the woman to himself.
  The second section deals with a man who betroths a woman but sets the betrothal date to occur in thirty days.  The question is, if someone else betroths her within those thirty days, is she betrothed to the first man or to the second?
  If he says to his fellow, “Go out and betroth me such-and-such a woman,” and he goes and betroths her to himself, she is betrothed.  Reuven sends Shimon out to betroth Rachel on his behalf.  Upon seeing Rachel, Shimon decides that he himself wants to betroth her, and when he proposes betrothal, Rachel agrees. She is now betrothed to Shimon and the fact that Shimon was supposed to act as Reuven’s agent is irrelevant.  Of course, we can be sure that Reuven will not be happy with Shimon and Shimon has acted shamefully with his friend (sounds like a movie plot).  Nevertheless, this fact is not of legal significance.
  Similarly, if he says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second, [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest may eat terumah.  The connection between this section and the previous one is that in both the woman under discussion is betrothed to the second man.  In this case, Reuven betroths the woman but sets the betrothal to begin in thirty days.  When Shimon betroths her within thirty days, she is betrothed to Shimon, because Reuven’s betrothal has not yet begun.  When the thirty days are up, Reuven’s betrothal does not “kick-in”, because she is already fully betrothed to Shimon.  The mishnah expresses the fact that she is fully betrothed to Shimon by stating that if she is an Israelite’s daughter and therefore prohibited to eat terumah, she is now fully betrothed to Shimon and if he is a priest she may eat terumah.  Were she not fully betrothed, the mishnah would not say that she can eat terumah.
  [But if he says, “Be betrothed to me] from now and after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed [to both]:   [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest, or a priest’s daughter [betrothed] to an Israelite, may not eat terumah.  In this case, Reuven makes an ambiguous statement, “Be betrothed to me from now and after thirty days.”  It is unclear whether his betrothal begins now, or after thirty days.  Alternatively, she may begin to be betrothed now but not fully betrothed until thirty days.  In any case, if Shimon comes along and betroths her within the thirty days, his kiddushin is also doubtfully valid.  If Reuven’s betrothal has begun, then she is betrothed to Reuven and Shimon’s act is irrelevant; but if Reuven’s betrothal has not begun, then she would be betrothed to Shimon.  Alternatively, if Reuven’s betrothal has begun but not been completed, she may be betrothed to both of them at the same time.  In such a situation she would be forbidden to both and require a get from both (see Gittin 7:3).  If she was the daughter of a priest and one of them was an Israelite, she would no longer eat terumah lest her marriage to that man was valid.  Similarly, if she is the daughter of an Israelite and one of the men was a priest she would not eat terumah lest her marriage to that man was not valid.  In other words, we act stringently and she doesn’t get to eat terumah no matter what the case.  Again, this is the mishnah’s way of saying that she is doubtfully married to both men and not fully married to either.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a man who attempts to betroth a woman on condition that he either give her two hundred zuz, has two hundred zuz or owns two hundred zuz.
  If one says to a woman. “Behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that I give you two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, and he must give it.  In such a case the woman is immediately betrothed and the man must thereafter give her two hundred zuz.  If he does not give her two hundred zuz, the betrothal becomes invalid.  The problem is that since he didn’t set a time limit he has an unlimited time to give her the two hundred zuz.  Potentially, the only way for the betrothal to become invalid would be for him to die before he gives her the money.  In such a case she would not be considered his widow and she would not be liable for yibbum.  Therefore, this is not a particularly good way of performing betrothal, especially for the woman.
  “On condition that I give you [two hundred zuz] within thirty days from now”: if he gives her within thirty days, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.  In this case he did set a time limit for the fulfillment of his condition.  Therefore, if he doesn’t give her the betrothal within thirty days, she is not betrothed.  In fact, this may have been a common form of betrothal. The man would have thirty days (or a longer period of time) to come up with the money necessary to betroth the woman and if he did not, the betrothal was invalidated with no need for a get.  This prevented the woman from being left hanging.
  “On condition that I have two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, providing he has [two hundred zuz].  In this case, all the man has to do is demonstrate that he owns two hundred zuz.  Again, she is betrothed immediately and he must prove that he has two hundred zuz.  However, we should note that in order to be certain that the betrothal is invalid she would have to prove that he doesn’t own two hundred zuz.  This will not be easy and again the woman is in a disadvantageous situation.
  “On condition that I show you two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, and he must show her. But if he shows her [money lying] on the table, she is not betrothed.  Here he must not only own two hundred zuz, but show her the cash (or its equivalent).  He may not show her two hundred zuz lying on a table unless he actually owns them.  Just as in section two, this too seems to be better for the woman.  Here she can actually see that he owns the two hundred zuz and need not worry about proving (or disproving) it.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is quite simple to understand and is nearly the same as yesterday’s mishnah.  I will explain it therefore briefly.
  [If he says to her “Be betrothed to me] on condition that I own a bet kor of land”,   she is betrothed, providing he does own it.  A “bet kor” is the amount of land it takes to grow a kor of produce.  In modern terms it is about 17,000 sq. meters, a rather large piece of land.  This clause is nearly the same as section three from yesterday’s mishnah.
  “On condition that I own it in such and such a place”, if he owns it there she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed.  Land value differs from place to place.  It seems here that the woman wants to know that he owns good land, and not a worthless piece of land.
  “On condition that I show you a bet kor of land,” she is betrothed, providing that he does show it to her. But if he shows it to her in a plain, she is not betrothed.  This is nearly the same as the final section of yesterday’s mishnah.  Showing it to her in “the plain” means that he shows her land that is not his. This is not what she thought he meant by his “showing her a bet kor.”
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains a general principle of Rabbi Meir:  any stipulation must be a double stipulation.  This means that if I make a stipulation I must state both the consequences of the condition being fulfilled and the consequences of its not being fulfilled.  For instance, if I want to say that I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake (and I would), I must say, “I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake, and I will not come to your house if you don’t give me chocolate cake.”  Otherwise the stipulation is not legally binding, and even if you give me chocolate cake, I am not legally bound to come to your house (but I would never do such a thing).
  Rabbi Meir derives this principle from Moses’s words to the children of Gad and Reuben, as we shall explain below.
  Rabbi Meir says:  every stipulation which is not like that of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben is not a [valid] stipulation, as it say, “And Moses said to them, ‘If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will pass [with you over the Jordan, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession].” and it is also written, “But if they will not pass over with you armed, [then they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan]” (Numbers 32:29-30). Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: the matter had to be stated, for had it not been stated it would have implied that even in Canaan they should not inherit. The children of Gad and Reuven did not want to inherit on the west side of the Jordan river; they wished to remain on the east side, in a place good for their cattle.  Moses responded to them that if they cross to help fight in the conquering of Canaan, then they may inherit on the east side of the Jordan.  He also added that if they did not cross and fight with the rest of Israel, then they would only be able to inherit in Canaan.  From the fact that Moses “doubled” his stipulation, Rabbi Meir derives that all stipulations must be doubled. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel responds that Moses had to state the second half of his statement.  Had he not done so, he might have implied that if they didn’t fight for Canaan they wouldn’t even get an inheritance in Canaan.  Since the second half is a necessary statement, we cannot learn that stipulations that don’t need a “negative” side do not need to be doubled. The mishnah ends with Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel’s response to Rabbi Meir.  Had Rabbi Meir responded he might have said that it is obvious that the children of Gad and Reuven would inherit in the land of Canaan, since all of the tribes inherited there irregardless of their participation in the conquest.  Since the second half of his stipulation was unnecessary, we can learn that the only reason Moses added it in was because all stipulations must be thusly doubled.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah teaches that if a man was mistaken about some part of a woman’s identity before he betrothed her but she wasn’t the one who mislead him into making that mistake, the betrothal is still valid.
  The second two sections of the mishnah deal with a man who tries to betroth a woman who could not currently be betrothed to him. The question is whether the betrothal can become valid at a later point without its being performed again.
  If he betroths a woman and then declares, “I thought that she was a priest’s daughter, and behold she is [the daughter of] a Levite” or “a Levite’s daughter whereas she is [the daughter of] a priest”; “Poor, whereas she is wealthy”, or “wealthy, whereas she is poor,” she is betrothed, since she did not deceive him.  In this case the man made a mistake with regard to the woman’s identity, but she didn’t cause the mistake.  The betrothal is therefore valid.  After all, were this grounds to annul a betrothal a man could always annul his betrothal. He could always say that he thought something was true and it turned out to be untrue and there would be no way of falsifying his claim.
  If he says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or “after you convert,” “After I am freed from slavery,” or “after you are freed from slavery”; “After your husband dies” or, “after your sister dies”; “After your yavam performs halizah for you”; she is not betrothed.  The general principle in this section and in the next is that if the betrothal is invalid now, it cannot become valid later on through an act performed now.  There are five things that prevent the betrothal from being possible at this point. 1) Either the man or woman is not Jewish. 2) Either the man or woman is a slave. 3) The woman is married. 4) The man is married to the woman’s sister. 5) The woman is awaiting halitzah (release from levirate marriage). In all of these cases, the betrothal cannot currently occur. Therefore, even if he says that the betrothal should only become valid when their statuses change such that betrothal would become possible, the current act of betrothal is invalid.
  Similarly, if he says to his friend, “If your wife gives birth to a female, behold she is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. [If his wife is pregnant, and her fetus is discernible, his words are valid, and if she bears a female, she is betrothed.]  In this section too the man is attempting to betroth someone in the future to whom he could not be currently betrothed. Here he couldn’t betroth her now because she doesn’t even exist.  She hasn’t even yet been conceived. This guy is really trying to get his bid in early!    Again, the mishnah rules that his kiddushin are invalid. The last section of the mishnah is an addition to the mishnah (meaning it is missing in mishnaic manuscripts).  It is clause from the Talmud that somehow crept in and it changes the meaning of the mishnah, for here we have an example where kiddushin that could not currently occur can be currently contracted.  According to this clause, as long as it is already recognized that the woman is pregnant, the betrothal is valid and if a girl is born she is betrothed to that man.  In order to make this clause match the remainder of the mishnah, the Rambam explains that he must betroth her again when she is born.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The first section of the mishnah teaches that a man may stipulate that his betrothal to a woman is contingent upon his performing for her a certain favor.
  The second section of the mishnah discusses a man who makes his betrothal contingent upon his father’s approval.
  If he says to a woman, “Behold you are betrothed to me on condition that I speak to the government on your behalf”, or “That I work for you as a laborer”, if he speaks to the government on her behalf or works for her as a laborer, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.  This mishnah is fairly straightforward.  We should note that the favor is not the money for kiddushin itself.  Rather it is a condition upon which the betrothal is contingent.  In addition to the act which he must perform, according to halakhah he would also need to give her money to effect the kiddushin.
  [If he says,] “[Behold you are betrothed to me] on condition that [my] father consents,” if his father consents, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. If his father dies, she is betrothed; if the son dies, the father is instructed to say that he does not consent.  The first part of this section is straightforward.  Slightly more complicated is the second part.  If the father dies, he cannot consent to the betrothal.  Nevertheless, the mishnah rules that she is betrothed.  The assumption is that when the man said “on condition that my father consents” he really meant to say, “on condition that my father does not disapprove.”  Since after his death the father cannot disapprove, the betrothal is valid.  If the son dies, the mishnah finds a convenient way for the woman to avoid the need for yibbum (levirate marriage to her husband’s brother).  The court would instruct the father to state that he did not approve of the marriage and he would thereby annul the betrothal.  If the betrothal was annulled, the woman would not be liable for yibbum.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  A father has a right to betroth his daughter before she reaches majority age, defined by halakhah as being 12 1/2.  Our mishnah deals with a father who says that he has betrothed his daughter but does not remember to whom.
  [If a father declares,] “I have given my daughter in betrothal, but do not know to whom I have betrothed her,” and then a man comes and states, “I betrothed her,” he is believed.  The father does not remember to whom he betrothed his daughter.  At this point she is in a terrible situation; she could be married to anybody therefore she is forbidden to everybody, lest she be married to someone else.  Comes along a man and says that he was the one who betrothed her.  He is believed, since there is no contradictory testimony.
  If one says, “I betrothed her,” and another [man] says, “I betrothed her,” both must give a get; but if they want, one may give a get and the other marry her.  In this case two men come along and claim that they are the ones who betrothed her.  Neither can marry her lest she is betrothed to the other.  They must both give her a get.  However, if they come to an agreement, one may give a get and then the other may marry her.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  The main topic discussed in this mishnah is when a man is believed with regard to statements he makes that impact his children’s personal status.  The general rule is that a man is believed to say that he has done something which he currently has the legal ability to do.  We shall see examples of this in the mishnah.
  [If a man declares] “I have given my daughter in betrothal,” [or] “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is [now] a minor, he is believed.  As we have learned already, a man has the legal right to betroth his daughter before she reaches majority age.  He also has the legal right to accept a get on behalf of his married daughter as long as she has not reached majority age.  If the daughter about whom this father is testifying is now a minor, he is believed to say that he betrothed her, or that he betrothed her and then accepted her get, since he currently has the power to perform either activity.  The ramification of his being believed to state that he accepted her get, is that she will be disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest.
  “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is now of majority age, he is not believed.  If she is now an adult (past 12 1/2 years old), he is no longer believed if he makes these statements, since he no longer has the legal right to either accept betrothal or a get on her behalf.  We should note that this limits the power of the father over his daughter.  Once she is past a relatively young age, he has no legal right to make decisions regarding her kiddushin, nor can he make any statement which would severely impact her status.
  “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” whether she is a minor or of majority age he is not believed.  A woman who was taken captive is forbidden from subsequently marrying a priest (see Ketubot 2:5).  This is because it is assumed that her non-Jewish captors had sexual relations with her and a woman who has had intercourse with a non-Jew is forbidden from marrying a priest.  The father is not believed if he states that his daughter was taken captive, no matter how old she is when he offers such testimony.  A father does not have the legal right to give his daughter in marriage to a non-Jew and therefore he doesn’t have any special right to testify about this having happened in order to thereby prohibit her to a kohen.  Note that when she is a minor the father does have another means by which to prohibit his daughter to the priesthood; he can testify that he betrothed her and then accepted her divorce.  Nevertheless, he does not have the right to testify that she was taken captive.
  If a man declares at the time of his death “I have sons,” he is believed; “I have brothers,” he is not believed.  This section discusses a man who offers testimony which will impact his wife’s subjectivity to the laws of yibbum.  By stating that he has sons he is exempting her from yibbum.  He is believed because if all he wanted to do was exempt her from yibbum he could divorce her.  However, he is not believed to state that he has brothers, thereby obligating her for yibbum.  Unless we know that he has brothers, he (or others) would have to bring evidence to make his wife subject to yibbum.
  If one betroths his daughter without specifying which, the daughters of majority age are not included.  This section connects back to the previous mishnah as well as to the next mishnah.  If a father states that he betrothed one of his daughters, but does not remember which one he betrothed, all of his minor daughters are in a state of possible betrothal, since he has the legal right to betroth any of them.  None of them can marry until the matter is clarified.  However, the girls who are of majority age are not doubtfully betrothed since the father has no legal right to betroth them.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss a father who betroths one of his daughters but does not remember which one he betrothed.  Specifically, the mishnah refers to a situation where a man has two sets of daughters with two different wives and one set of daughters is older than the other set (i.e. all of the daughters of one wife are older than the eldest daughter of the other wives.)
  If one has two groups of daughters by two wives, and he declares, “I have given in betrothal my eldest daughter, but I do not know whether the eldest of the seniors or the eldest of the juniors, or the youngest of the seniors who is older than the eldest of the juniors,” all are forbidden [to marry other men], except the youngest of the juniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the eldest of the seniors.  The father says he has given in betrothal his “eldest daughter” to a man, and he has forgotten who that man is, and the question is who his “eldest daughter” is?  Once we figure out whom the eldest daughter is that daughter will be forbidden to marry any other man, and his other daughters will be permitted.  Again, the man has two sets of daughters; one set is a group of “seniors” in that they are all older than the other set which are “juniors.”  According to Rabbi Meir, any daughter who has a younger sister may be called the “eldest daughter” since she is older than another daughter.  The only daughter who cannot possibly be called the “eldest daughter” is the youngest daughter of the youngest set. Rabbi Yose rules that only the eldest daughter of the seniors is called the “eldest daughter” and therefore only she is prohibited.
  “I have betrothed my youngest daughter, but I do not know whether the youngest of the juniors or the youngest of the seniors, or the eldest of the juniors who is younger than the youngest of the seniors,” they are all forbidden, except the eldest of the seniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the youngest of the juniors.  This section is basically the same as the previous section, except that in this section the father claims that he gave his “youngest daughter” in betrothal.  The opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose are consistent with those above.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the next one deal with cases where a man says that he betrothed a certain woman and she contradicts him or where she claims that he betrothed her and he denies it.
  The general principle upon which this mishnah stands is that a person can make a statement which impacts himself/herself but does not impact others. Stated otherwise, a person is believed with regard to personal consequences but not with regard to consequences to others.
  If he says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You did not betroth me”: he is prohibited to her relatives, but she is permitted to his relatives.  The man claims he has betrothed the woman, and therefore he is believed with regard to himself.  The consequence is that all of the woman’s relatives (daughter, mother, sister etc. for a full list see Yevamot 4:7) are prohibited to him, because according to him, he is betrothed to their relative.  However, the woman denies that this man betrothed her.  Hence she is not prohibited to his relatives.
  If she says, “You betrothed me,” and he says, “I did not betroth you,” he is permitted to her relatives but she is prohibited to his relatives.  This is the opposite case.  Since she claims to be betrothed to him, she is prohibited from marrying his relatives.  Since he denies being betrothed to her, he is permitted to her relatives.
  “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You betrothed my daughter,” he is forbidden to the relatives of the senior [the mother], but the senior is permitted to his relatives; he is permitted to the junior’s [the daughter’s] relatives, and the junior is permitted to his relatives.  The mishnah adds a wrinkle to the previous cases.  Here the husband claims that he betrothed a woman and she responds that he didn’t betroth her but rather he betrothed her daughter (again, one can imagine a Hollywood scenario lurking behind this mishnah!).  As above, he is prohibited to her relatives because he claims that he betrothed her.  The mother (the senior woman) is not prohibited to his relatives, because she claims that she is not betrothed to that man.  The man is not prohibited to the daughter’s relatives because he denies having betrothed her.  The daughter is also permitted to his relatives, since she didn’t claim that she was betrothed to him, but rather the mother did.  A mother does not have the legal ability to give her daughter in betrothal and hence, unlike a father who does have such a legal ability, she is not believed to say that she has done so.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  This is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.
  [If a man says to a woman], “I betrothed your daughter,” and she replies, “You betrothed me”; he is forbidden to the junior’s [the daughter’s] relatives, while the junior is permitted to his relatives; he is permitted to the senior’s [mother’s] relatives, while the senior is forbidden to his relatives. This mishnah provides the opposite scenario to that which we saw at the end of yesterday’s mishnah.  The man claims that he betrothed the woman’s daughter, and is therefore forbidden to the daughter’s relatives.  However, the daughter is still permitted to his relatives, since neither she nor her mother claimed that she was betrothed to him. The mother’s relatives are permitted to him, because he doesn’t claim to have betrothed her.  However, she is forbidden to his relatives because she claims to have been betrothed to him.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah begins discussing a subject which will be covered throughout the remainder of Kiddushin:  lineage.  We have already encountered throughout Seder Nashim many different genealogical statuses:  priests, Levites, Israelites, converts, mamzerim, natinim and more.  Our mishnah discusses how these lineages are transmitted from generation to generation, namely the issue of whom the child’s lineage follows, that of the father or that of the mother.  We should note that lineage was probably the most important factor in choosing a spouse in the ancient Jewish world and probably was a key factor in the entire ancient world.  Indeed until the modern period many matches between young men and women were made based on lineage.  Lineage largely determined a person’s social standing.  It is sometimes hard to relate to this value for those of us living in 20-21st century America, a country where societal standing is perhaps less based on lineage than almost any nation throughout history.
  The final clause of our mishnah contains the famous principle of “matrilineal descent” the “Jewishness” of the child follows the mother and not the father.  This principle is surprising since ancient Jewish society was clearly patriarchal.  Men were almost always the heads of their households, the woman would typically leave her family to enter the man’s house, men had custody and overall responsibility for their children etc.  Furthermore, it seems quite clear that the Bible operates on the principle of “patrilineal descent.”  Throughout the Tanakh men marry women of foreign descent and the women assimilate into their husband’s culture and homes (or notoriously fail to assimilate).  The same is true of Second Temple literature such as the later books of the Bible, Josephus and Philo.  How the matrilineal principle came to dominate rabbinic halakhah and literature is a mystery.  There are a few places in rabbinic literature with a hint of a patrilineal principle, but there are few of them and they are usually rejected.  A good discussion of these issues can be found in Shaye Cohen’s excellent book, The Beginnings of Jewishness.
  Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this?  When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite.  In normal marriages the status of the child follows that of the father:  the child of a priest is a priest, of a Levite is a Levite and of an Israelite is an Israelite.
  And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this?  When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin.  However, if the marriage is valid, meaning that the woman requires a get to separate from the man, but the marriage involves a transgression, the child receives the lower status. Therefore, the child of a mamzer or a mamzeret is a mamzer(et).  Furthermore, if the marriage is prohibited but neither parent is “flawed” (such as a mamzer or a natin), a female child from such a marriage is disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest.  For instance the daughter of a priest and divorcee cannot marry a priest.
  And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this?  One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah.  If the marriage is invalid, but the woman could be betrothed to other men, the child is a mamzer.  The example given is incest.
  And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this?  The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.  This section is where we see the famed “matrilineal principle.”  We should note that it is incomplete.  The mishnah states that the child of non-Jewish woman or slave is not Jewish or is a slave, but it does not specifically address the status of the child of a Jewish mother and male father.
  
  Mishnah 13
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss personal status and lineage. The specific issue is whether or not a mamzer can purify his lineage.
  Rabbi Tarfon says: mamzerim can be purified. How is this so? If a mamzer marries a slave woman, her son is a slave; if he frees him, it is found that the son is a free man. Rabbi Eliezer says: behold, he is a slave mamzer. Rabbi Tarfon uses the rules in the previous mishnah to find a means by which a mamzer can have a child that is not a mamzer.  A mamzer is allowed to marry a slave woman, even though a non-mamzer cannot. If the mamzer owns the slave woman, then he owns the child.  If he frees the child the child loses his mamzer status and becomes a regular Israelite. Rabbi Eliezer, however, holds that such a “trick” does not work. The status of the child is “slave mamzer.”  When his father/master frees him, he is no longer a slave but he is still a mamzer.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Ten genealogical classes went up from Babylonia [in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah]:   Priests, Levites, Israelites, halalim, converts, freed slaves, mamzerim, netinim, hushlings and foundlings.Priests, Levites and Israelites may marry each other.Levites, Israelites, halalim, converts, and freed slaves may marry each other.Converts, freed slaves, mamzerim and netinim, hushlings and foundlings, may marry each other.This mishnah introduces a concept that was very important in marital law in the mishnaic/talmudic times and continued to be a prominent factor in the choice of spouse throughout Jewish history:  genealogical class.  In Hebrew this is called:  yichus. There are some genealogical “classes” who may not marry each other (Israelites and mamzerim, priests and converts).  As I have stated before, in our modern society it is hard to grasp the importance of such categories in the ancient world.  Until recently it was believed that a person is qualitatively reflected in their class; belonging to a social/religious class is an integral part of one’s identity.  However, we should realize that in rabbinic halakhah class structure is only legally relevant to choice of marriage, and occasionally to positions of leadership.  When it comes to other elements of society, Jews seem to have mingled relatively freely.  The rabbis recognized well that a person’s integrity, wisdom and virtue did not depend upon his social class.  Nevertheless, it was an important criterion in choosing a spouse.Section one: The mishnah attributes the separation of the Israelites into ten genealogical classes to the return to Zion from the Babylonian exile in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah.  It is clear from the book of Ezra that genealogical lineage was an important issue to the authors of the book and to the leaders of that time period.  Ezra demands that the men send away their foreign born wives.  In the lists of returning exiles lineages are listed and there are verses which show that priests who couldn’t demonstrate their lineage were denied their priestly rights.  In other words, although this mishnah may contain what is basically a legend, in may be based on some historical recollections.According to the mishnah, which is probably legend, lineage was so important to Ezra that when he gathered up the exiles and brought them back to the land of Israel, he separated them into classes.  When they returned to Israel, each person would therefore know their proper status.Most of the classes mentioned in this mishnah should be familiar by now.  Natinim are descendents of Temple slaves, and are actually mentioned in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah (see for instance Ezra 8:20 and Nehemiah 7:62).  Halalim are the children of disqualified priests.  Hushlings and foundlings will be explained in tomorrow’s mishnah.Sections 2-4:  Here the mishnah lists who may marry whom.  Subsequent mishnayot will clarify some of these statements.  For now we should note that converts can marry Israelites and can marry mamzerim.  Other sages hold that converts may not marry mamzerim. There is also some debate over whether certain types of converts may even marry priests.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned of two genealogical categories which we previously have not encountered:  the foundling and the hushling.  Our mishnah defines these two categories.
  These are they: a hushling (: he who knows who his mother is but not his father;  A shtuki or a hushling is a kid who knows who his mother is, but doesn’t know who his father is.  The word “shtuki” comes from the word for silence.  When you ask the kid who his father is he is quiet because he doesn’t know.
  A foundling (: he who was gathered in from the marketplace and knows neither his father nor his mother.  An asufi or a foundling is a kid found in the streets who doesn’t know who his parents are.  The word “asufi” comes from the word to be gathered, because he is gathered in from the streets.
  Abba Saul used to call the hushling (, “checked one” (b’.  Abba Saul would call the shtuki a b’duki (a checked one).  The different name reflects a different halakhic position. According to Abba Shaul the child’s mother is believed to testify that the father is so-and-so. This is according to Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer in Ketubot 1:8-9.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with the question of who can marry whom.
  All who are forbidden to enter into the assembly may intermarry with each other.  According to this opinion, any person who cannot marry into the assembly (see Deuteronomy 23:1-9), meaning mamzerim, natinim, the shtuki and asufi (see yesterday’s mishnah for a definition of these terms) can marry each other.  A mamzer, for example, could marry an asufi.
  Rabbi Judah forbids it.  Seemingly Rabbi Judah says that every person from a class forbidden to enter into the assembly must marry another person from the same class.  A mamzer would have to marry a mamzer, a shtuki would marry a shtuki, etc.  The problem with this interpretation of his words is that there is no inherent logic to it.  The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah prohibits converts from marrying mamzerim.  The Torah states that a mamzer should not come into the assembly of the Lord (Deuteronomy 23:3). The question is: are converts considered part of the “assembly of the Lord”?  According to Rabbi Judah the convert is part of the assembly of the Lord, and therefore they cannot marry mamzerim.
  Rabbi Elazar says: those who are certain [may marry] those who are certain, but those who are certain with those who are doubtful and those who are doubtful with those who are certain and those who are doubtful with others who are doubtful this is prohibited.  Rabbi Elazar says that those who are certainly prohibited from marrying into the assembly may marry others who are certainly prohibited.  However, those who are doubtfully prohibited cannot marry anyone.  The problem is that they don’t really know whether or not they are prohibited.  If they are prohibited than they can’t marry priests, Levites or Israelites, but if they are not prohibited they can’t marry mamzerim, natinim, shtukim and asufim.  A shtuki, for instance, couldn’t even marry another shtuki, lest one is “fit” and the other not “fit.”  Therefore, they can’t marry anyone.
  Who are “those who are doubtful”?  The shtuki, the asufi and the Samaritan.  A shtuki and an asufi are in the category of “doubtful” because they don’t even know who their parents are.  The Samaritans are “doubtful” because the very halakhic status of the Samaritans is questionable.  Without delving into the history of the Samaritans (see the Encyclopedia Judaica for more details), they were (and still are) a group in the northern part of Israel that separated from those Jews living in Judea at an early period.  They observed some of the same laws as did other Jews, but not in the same way.  Marriage laws, namely kiddushin and gittin, were not observed in the same way that the rabbis prescribed and therefore any Samaritan is by definition of doubtful lineage.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Before marrying, men were supposed to make “background checks” of their potential wives to uncover any potential “flaws” in their lineage.  Our mishnah teaches that there are eight mothers whom he must check; if these eight mothers are fit to marry priests, then the man may assume that the woman whom he wants to marry is fit as well.
  He who marries a the daughter of a priest must investigate her lineage up to four mothers, which are eight:  her mother and her mother’s mother, her mother’s father’s mother and her mother, her father’s mother and her mother, her father’s father’s mother and her mother.  The first clause deals with priests who wish to marry the daughters’ of priests.  In ancient times it was common for priestly families to intermarry with one another. The “four mothers” are 1) her mother; 2) her mother’s father’s mother; 3) her father’s mother; 4) her father’s father’s mother.  For all four of these mother’s he must also check her mother. The Talmud explains that the mothers are checked and not the fathers since if there was a “flaw” in the male lineage, the men, when they argued with each other, would have cursed each other based on their faulty lineage.  However, women don’t argue in such a manner and therefore if there were flaws in their lineage they would not have been made known. Therefore, he must check the mothers and not the fathers. The man must check and not the woman because women who are fit to marry priests are allowed to marry men disqualified from the priesthood, whereas priests are prohibited from marrying women disqualified from marrying priests.
  [In the case of] the daughter of a Levite or an Israelite, one more is added.  Those men who wish to marry women of Levitical or Israelite families must check one more mother.  It is unclear exactly what “one more mother” means.  It either means that he goes back one more generation for each mother already checked (bringing us to 12 mothers), or that he checks one more mother on each side (for a total of 10).  The reason that he must check back further is that it is more common for there to be faulty lineage in Levitical and Israelite families than it is in priestly families.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that men need to check their wives’ lineage before marriage.  The normal check was eight mothers.  Our mishnah teaches that if the woman father’s or one of the mother’s father’s served in a role where disqualified priests were not allowed, then they need not check back any further.  I would make the following analogy:  sometimes companies do background checks on potential employees.  However, if the company for which the person previously worked is known for doing thorough background checks, a fresh check need not be done.
  They do not check from the altar and upwards, nor from the duchan [dais] and upwards, nor from the Sanhedrin and upwards.  If one of the woman’s fathers either served as a priest at the altar, or sung as a Levite from the duchan in the Temple or served in the Sanhedrin, the man who wishes to marry her need not check back in that branch any further.  We should note that it is clear from here that lineage was a criterion for serving in the Sanhedrin.
  And all those whose fathers were established to have been among the public officers or charity collectors may marry [their daughters] into the priesthood, and he doesn’t need to check after them.  Furthermore, if the father held a position of public trust then the husband need not check any further.  Again we can note that lineage was a criterion in appointing men to positions of leadership. This section probably refers to the post-destruction period, whereas the previous section referred to positions held when the Temple still stood.
  And all those whose fathers were established to have been among the public officers or charity collectors may marry [their daughters] into the priesthood, and he doesn’t need to check after them.  According to Albeck, Rabbi Yose is referring to people appointed to approve documents in the old court in Tsippori.  Normal witnesses would not undergo such thorough background checks.
  Rabbi Yose says: even one who was signed as a witness in the old court of Tzippori.  While all sorts of people with all sorts of lineages could certainly serve as soldiers, only those with proper lineage were listed in the king’s list of officers (see I Chronicles 7:40).
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  If a woman who is prohibited to a priest (a divorcee or a convert) has relations with a priest, she becomes a “halalah”, or a “profaned woman.”  Her male child from such a union is a “halal”.  A priest may not marry a “halalah”, as we learned in the first mishnah of this chapter.
  The word “halal” or “halalah” comes from Leviticus 21:7 where it states, “[He shall not take] a harlot (zonah) or a ‘halalah’”.   While JPS translates this word as describing the harlot “a woman defiled by harlotry”, the rabbis understand the vav between harlot and halalah to be conjunctive.  “Halalah” is not a description of the harlot but a woman of a different category.
  The final clause of the mishnah compares the rules for converts with those for the halal and halalah.  A priest cannot marry a convert, as it says in Ezekiel 44:22, “They may marry only virgins of the stock of the House of Israel.”
  The daughter of a male halal is unfit for the priesthood for all time.  The daughter of a male halal is a halalah.  She may not marry a priest.  Furthermore, the daughter of the son of a halal is also a halalah.  The flaw of being a “halal” is passed down through the sons and therefore the daughter of any subsequent son of one of these halalim is herself a halalah and prohibited from marrying a priest.
  If an Israelite marries a halalah, his daughter is fit for the priesthood.  As stated above, being a halal is not passed down through the mother but through the father. Therefore the daughter of a marriage between an Israelite male and a halalah is permitted to marry a priest.
  If a halal marries the daughter of an Israelite, his daughter is unfit for the priesthood.  This section repeats the rule which we learned from section one.  It serves as a contrast to section two and an intro to section four.
  Rabbi Judah says: the daughter of a male convert is as the daughter of a male halal.  Just as halalot (the plural of halalah) cannot marry priests, so too female converts may not marry priests.  Rabbi Judah adds that just as the descent of halalot is determined by the father, so too is the descent of the convert.  The daughter of a convert may not marry a priest.  According to Rabbi Judah if an Israelite male married a female convert, their daughter could marry a priest.  The next mishnah will continue to discuss this subject.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss which descendents of converts may marry priests.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if an Israelite marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood, and if a male convert marries the daughter of an Israelite, his daughter is fit for the priesthood. But if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is unfit for the priesthood.  [The same law applies to] a convert as to freed slaves, even for ten generations, [his daughter is unfit] unless his mother is of Israelite stock.  At the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that according to Rabbi Judah, the daughter of a male convert is unfit to marry a priest, even if the mother is an Israelite.  Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob goes one step further.  As long as one of the parents is of Israelite lineage, the daughter may marry a priest.  Only if both parents are converts is the female child forbidden from marrying a priest.  The laws regarding the lineage of freed slaves are the same as those regarding converts.  The daughter is unfit unless the mother, and also the father are of Israelite stock.  [Note that the mishnah says his mother, but since we are referring to which daughters may marry priests, other versions read “their mother.”  Also, although the mishnah only says “mother” it must also mean father, since even Rabbi Judah says that if the father is an Israelite, his daughter is fit to marry a priest.]
  Rabbi Yose says: even if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood.  Rabbi Yose’s opinion is that the only type of convert prohibited from marrying a priest is the convert herself.  Children of converts, even if both parents are converts, are allowed to marry priests.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah we learn that parents are not believed if they say that their child is a mamzer.
  If a man declares, “this son of mine is a mamzer,” he is not believed.  There are two explanations given for why a father is not believed to say that his child is a mamzer.  The first is that the father is related to the child and relatives may not testify.  The second is that by saying that the child is a mamzer, the father is testifying against himself and halakhah does not allow self-incrimination.
  And even if both [the husband and wife] say about the fetus inside her, “it’s a mamzer” they are not believed.  Even if both parents say that their child is a mamzer, which means that they are saying that the child is not from the husband but from an adulterous affair, they are not believed.
  Rabbi Judah says: they are believed.  Rabbi Judah disagrees with both of the previous clauses.  In the Talmud Rabbi Judah’s ruling is based on a midrash.  That is to say his halakhah is not necessarily logical; rather it is based on his interpretation of Scripture.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with a scenario whereby a father sent an agent to betroth his daughter to a certain man and then the father betrothed her to a different man.
  If a man gives permission to his agent to give his daughter in betrothal, and then he himself goes and gives her in betrothal to another, if his [betrothal] was first, his betrothal is valid; if the agent’s was first, his betrothal is valid. And if it is unknown, both must give her a divorce.  And if they wish, one gives a divorce, and the other marries her.  The ruling in this mishnah is straightforward:  she is betrothed to who ever betrothed her first.  Without the mishnah we might perhaps have thought that when the father sends an agent to betroth his daughter, and then he himself does that very same act, that he is in essence canceling the agent’s authority.  Were that the case, then even if the agent’s betrothal came first, the daughter would be betrothed to the man the father betrothed her to.  The mishnah teaches us that this is not so, and therefore whichever betrothal comes first is the betrothal that is valid. If it is unknown which came first, then they are both potentially married to her.  Therefore, both of them must divorce her, or alternatively, one may divorce her and then the other can marry her.
  Similarly, if a woman gives permission to her agent to give her in betrothal, and she goes and betroths herself [to another]: if her own preceded, her betrothal is valid; if her agent’s preceded, his betrothal is valid. And if they do not know, both must give her a divorce.  And if they wish, one gives a divorce and the other marries her.  This halakhah is the same, but from the woman’s perspective. She sends out an agent to accept betrothal on her behalf and then she changes her mind and accepts betrothal from someone else.  The ruling is the same as above.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and tomorrow’s mishnah deal with establishing the identity of the wife of a man and children who come from overseas.  In order to marry them to other Jews, he would need to establish their identities.
  If a man went overseas together with his wife, and then he, his wife, and his children returned, and he said, “Behold, this is she [who went with me overseas,] and these are her children”, he need not bring proof with regard to the woman or the children.  The mishnah rules that if the man went overseas with his wife and now returns with children he need not bring proof of the lineage of any of them.  He need not bring proof of his wife’s lineage because he already checked it when he married her.  He need not bring proof of the children’s lineage because it can be assumed that they are the children of his wife.  The Talmud adds that the children must be “hanging on her”, meaning acting as if they are his children.  [I’ll add that every time I return with my family from overseas, our children are certainly hanging all over us.]  If the children are not treating her as their mother, we might suspect that they are not her children.
  [If he declares,] “She died [abroad] and these are her children,” he must bring proof with regard to the children, but not with regard to the woman.  If the woman with whom he went abroad died there and then he returns with children, claiming they are her children, he must bring proof that this is so.  However, once he does so, he need not prove the “fitness” of the woman, because he already did so when they were married.  It seems that he would need to have witnesses who would testify that these are his (deceased) wife’s children.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.
  [If he says,] “I married a woman overseas, and behold, this is she, and these are her children”, he must bring proof about the woman, but not about the children.  In this case, he goes abroad without a wife and returns with a wife and children.  He must prove the lineage of the wife, because they were not married when he went abroad.  However, once he proves her lineage, he need not prove the fitness of the children’s lineage, since it can be assumed that the two of them are the parents.
  [If he says,] “She died, and these are her children”, he must bring proof about the woman and about the children.  If he returns with children but no wife, he must prove two things. First he must prove that the woman he was married was not prohibited to him and that she had proper lineage.  Once he proves that, he must prove that the children are her children.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the prohibition of “yihud” a man may not be alone in a room with a woman.  Indeed, the mishnah assumes this prohibition is known and qualifies it in various ways.  The reason for this prohibtion seems to be that the rabbis made two assumptions:  1) men cannot control their sexual urges and therefore they will attempt to have sex with any woman with whom they are alone; 2) women cannot stop the men from making such advances.
  A man may not be alone with two women, but one woman may be alone with two men.  It is taken for granted that a man may not be alone with one woman.  The mishnah adds that one man may not be alone even with two women.  The fear is that the presence of two women will not deter the man from making advances on either or even on both of the women.  However, one woman may be alone with two men, under the assumption that the presence of another man will deter each man from engaging in a prohibited and socially unacceptable act (sex with a woman not his wife).
  Rabbi Shimon says: even one man may be alone with two women, if his wife is with him, and he may sleep with them in an inn, because his wife watches him.  Rabbi Shimon is more lenient and allows a man to be secluded with two women.  According to the version of the mishnah which I translated above, such seclusion is only permitted if his wife is with him, for she will watch over him.  However, other versions add the word “and” making this into a separate clause.  They read that if a man’s wife is with him he may be alone with one other woman, and may even sleep in the same room with both of them in an inn.
  A man may be alone with his mother and his daughter, and he may sleep with them in immediate bodily contact; but when they grow up, she must sleep in her garment and he in his.  Seclusion is not prohibited with one’s mother or daughter.  While he is a minor he may sleep naked in bed with his mother, and while his daughter is a minor, she may sleep naked in bed with him.  When they grow up they may continue to sleep in the same bed, but they must be clothed.  As an aside, it seems that people normally slept without a “garment.”  After all, the land of Israel is rather warm and a blanket often suffices.
  
  Mishnah 13
  
  Introduction
  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned some of the laws which prohibit a man from being alone with a woman.  As we saw, the assumption was that men cannot control themselves around women and women will not be able to ward off the men.  Our mishnah and the next contain discussions of which professions are appropriate for men in light of these assumptions.
  An unmarried man must not learn to be a scribe, nor may a woman learn to be a scribe.  Part of a scribes work was to teach children how to read and perhaps how to write.  In those days, it was often the child’s mother who would bring the child to school.  Hence the teacher would have a lot of contact with the children’s mothers.  Therefore, a man who has never been married should not learn to be a scribe/teacher, lest he come into too much contact with the mothers.  Furthermore, sometimes men would bring their children to school.  Hence, women and even married women should not be teachers.  Note the difference in the halakhah between men and women.  Only a man who has never been married may not work as a teacher.  Once he is married he will be better able to control himself, for one of two reasons:  1) he has a place to channel his sexual energy; 2) his wife will watch over him.  However, even a married woman should not be a teacher, because the men will make advances on her (even if they are married) and she will not be able to ward them off.
  Rabbi Elazar says: even one who has no wife should not learn to be a scribe.  Rabbi Elazar adds that not only a man who has never been married but even one who currently does not have a wife should not work as a teacher.  Although he was once married, he will still have the same lack of sexual control and therefore should be controlled by the halakhah.
  
  Mishnah 14
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is the final mishnah of tractate Kiddushin, and the final mishnah of Seder Nashim.  Large portions of the mishnah are not actually part of the Mishnah but were appended to it in later times, a not uncommon phenomenon in ends of tractates.  However, we will explain the entire mishnah.
  Most of the mishnah discusses appropriate professions for scholars, the topic of yesterday’s mishnah as well.  Whereas the mishnah begins by discussing those professions which are inappropriate because they might lead to sexual impropriety, it continues with professions that are inappropriate for other reasons.  Finally, according to some rabbis, it is not proper for a sage to work at all.  Rather he should spend his entire time learning Torah.
  While reading the mishnah we should keep in mind that our attitudes towards certain occupations have radically changed over the past two thousand years.  Also our opinions about the value of work in general have largely changed.  I read this mishnah as an exhortation for a person to place a priority upon their spiritual life over their material wealth.
  Rabbi Judah said: an unmarried man must not tend cattle, nor may two unmarried men sleep together under the same cover.  But the sages permit it.  This section continues the topic of yesterday’s mishnah.  According to Rabbi Judah men should not be shepherds, lest they engage in bestiality.  They should not sleep together in the same bed lest they have relations with each other.  In contrast, the Sages permit men to work as shepherds and sleep in bed together because it is not feared that they will engage in bestiality or homosexuality.
  One whose business is with women must not be alone with women.  And one should not teach his son a woman’s trade.  A man shouldn’t work in a profession where there will be many women around, lest they are left alone with women.  Therefore a father should not teach his son a woman’s profession.  We should note that the reason that a man shouldn’t engage in a woman’s profession is not that it is not “manly” enough.  Rather the reason is that such a profession will bring him too much into contact with women.
  Rabbi Meir says: one should always teach his son a clean and easy profession, and pray to Him to whom wealth and property belong. For a profession does not contain [the potential for] poverty and wealth, for poverty is not due to one’s profession nor is wealth due to the profession, but all depends on merit.  Rabbi Meir teaches that there are two important aspects in choosing a profession.  The first is that it be honest work, and the second that it not be overly taxing.  Overly taxing work would prevent him from having enough time to study Torah.   With regard to earning a living substantial enough to support one’s needs, this is not a function of choice of profession but rather of merit earned by living a life of Torah and prayer.  When learning these words I find that it helps to remember that professions were not generally the means to become rich during this period in history.  A person became wealthy by being a landowner, and land was usually inherited.  Choice of profession and hard work certainly would have made some difference, but not nearly as much as it does today.  If one couldn’t guarantee becoming wealthy in any case, Rabbi Meir says he might as well choose an honest profession that leaves him time to study Torah.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: have you ever seen a wild beast or a bird with a profession? Yet they are sustained without trouble. Now, were they not were created only to serve me, while I was created to serve my master: surely then I should make a living without trouble! But my evil acts have done me in and withheld my livelihood.  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar presents a naturalistic ideal of human welfare.  Were people to return to a more innocent state, they could provide for themselves as do animals without trouble.  Transgressions and misbehavior have caused human beings their current hardships.  There is in this section an allusion to the sins of Adam and Eve.  Part of Adam’s curse was that he would have to work the land with great toil, and this curse was a direct result of his sin of eating of the Tree of Knowledge.  I also read into these words an ecological message the more we corrupt the earth, the more difficult it will become for us to get from the earth that which we need.  There is a lot we could learn from the animals when it comes to taking from our environment only what we need.
  Abba Gurion a man of Sidon says in the name of Abba Guria: one should not teach his son [to be] a donkey-driver, camel-driver, wagon-driver, sailor, shepherd, or shopkeeper, because their profession is the profession of robbers.  Abba Gurion says that certain professions lead to thievery.  The first four of these are professions which involve traveling and travel was dangerous in the ancient world.  The problem is that these people may rob those whom they were hired to bring from one place to another.  A shepherd was suspected of bringing his flocks to another person’s field.  Storekeepers were suspected of cheating their customers.  (We can see that this opinion did not stop Jews throughout history from engaging in some of these professions.)
  Rabbi Judah says in his name: most donkey-drivers are wicked, while most camel-drivers are worthy men; and most sailors are pious.   The best of doctors are destined for Gehenna, and the worthiest of butchers is Amalek’s partner.  Rabbi Judah disagrees with Abba Gurion about the camel-drivers and sailors.  Since these were professions that involved great danger, Rabbi Judah assumes that they would pray fervently to God for deliverance.  In other words, being in dangerous situations makes people realize just how precarious life is, what a gift it is and that they should be thankful to God.  Rabbi Judah adds that the best of doctors is going to end up in Gehenna in other words hell!  To understand this we need to keep in mind that medicine in the ancient world was nothing like medicine is today.  Often people who went to doctors would end up dying, perhaps even quicker than they would have otherwise.  Being a butcher breeds cruelty, for the butcher must make himself insensitive to the animals pain.
  Rabbi Nehorai says: I will abandon every profession in the world and I will not teach my son anything but Torah, for a person enjoys its reward in this world while the principal remains for him in the world to come. But all other professions are not so; for when a man comes to sickness or old age or suffering and cannot engage in his profession, he must die of starvation, whereas the Torah is not so, for it guards him from all evil in his youth and gives him a future and hope in his old age. Of his youth what is said? “But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength” (Isaiah 40:31). Of his old age what is said? “They shall still bring forth fruit in old age” (Psalms 92:15).  And it is also said of our father Abraham, “And Abraham was old … And the Lord blessed Abraham with everything” (Genesis 24:1).  We find that Abraham our father observed the whole Torah before it was given, for it is said, “Because Abraham obeyed My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws” (Genesis 26:5).  Rabbi Nehorai’s statement is perhaps as extreme of a statement as can be found on the issue of work versus Torah study.  It is not a vision that many rabbis shared, at least not in a practical sense.  Nevertheless, there are some elements that in my opinion strike a deep chord.  The first is that in a society without a system to provide for its elderly and in which people cannot save up large sums of money, a life of work does not leave one with enough to live on later in life.  While there are some safeguards that exist today that didn’t exist in the ancient world, care of the elderly is still one of the most difficult and important issues facing society.  The second is that when a person is older, nearer to the end of life, they usually judge their lives not based on how much work they have done, but what good deeds they have done, how well they have treated their families and what kind of a spiritual/moral legacy they will leave behind.  I think that that is partly what Rabbi Nehorai is speaking about:  when a person is older, all the work they did will not matter as much as the quality of the lives they led, and for the rabbis, the quality of life was measured by the amount of Torah studied. The mishnah, the tractate and the entire seder end with a midrash on Abraham. Abraham’s strength stood for him until very late in life.  Indeed, he had Isaac when he was nearly 100 years old! The final midrash on Abraham states that he kept the whole Torah before it was given.  In this context, this means that Abraham’s blessing came to him because of his observance of the Torah and not merely because of his faith in God (as the Christians taught). Congratulations!  We have finished Kiddushin. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning this tractate and this entire Seder and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning them, so that we may not forget them and so that their lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. By now, if you have been learning with Mishnah Yomit from the beginning, you have finished two entire Seders of Mishnah.  This is a tremendous accomplishment and you should feel satisfied with your hard work and devotion.  Seder Nashim began with Yevamoth, a tricky tractate with many difficult laws concerning levirate marriage, worked its way through a tractate on marriage contracts (Ketuboth), two tractates on vows (Nedarim and Nazir), one on adulterous women (Sotah), neared completion with a tractate on divorce and finally, after all this learning, a tractate on how one enters marriage.  So you had to wait until the end for the best part, but I’m sure it was worth the effort. So congratulations on making it through another tractate and seder.  May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah!  Tomorrow we begin the first tractate of Seder Z’manim (appointed times), tractate Shabbat.