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text: English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה נדרים
  Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim
  
  Introduction
  
  Tractate Nedarim deals with vows.  It is found in Seder Nashim because the section of the Torah that deals most extensively with vows (Numbers 30:2-17) discusses a husband’s right to break his wife’s vows.  
  Usually, the word “neder” or vow in the Bible refers to a voluntary sacrificial offering (see for instance Number 29:29).  Vows were sometimes given on condition that something good happen to the giver (see Genesis 28:20-22 or Numbers 21:2).  In that way they were similar to the way today a person might promise to give charity if something good happens, such as recovering from a disease.  However, vows may have also been used in the Torah as a means by which a person prohibits something upon themselves.  The way that this works is that a person says that something is forbidden to him/her like a voluntary sacrifice; in other words the object belongs to God and not to the person vowing.  These types of vows may also be made with stipulations; for instance, if I don’t come to your house, may all bananas be like a sacrifice to me, and hence forbidden.  Our mishnah discusses vows of this nature; a person says that a certain object will be to him a “korban”, a sacrifice.
  In the ancient world vows were an important feature of a person’s religious life and people made them frequently.  There were contradicting tendencies; both to make many vows, and to be fearful lest one break one’s vows.  One result is that there developed a means of substituting other words for vows.  For instance, instead of saying “qorban”, people would say “konam”.  In this way a person could feel that he is not actually saying the vow.  However, according to the mishnah, although these are only substitutes, their validity is the same as that of real phrasings of vows.  
  The difference between a vow and an oath is that with a vow a person forbids an object to him/herself, whereas with an oath the person forbids himself to the object.  A vow:  “this bread is like a korban (a sacrifice) to me”.  An oath:  “I swear I will not eat this piece of bread”.  However, it seems that people did not always keep straight the differences between vows and oaths.
  Our tractate discusses women’s vows, who can break them (the husband or the father), when they can break them, and under what conditions.  The breaking of women’s vows is mentioned by the Torah, and explicated by the Sages.  
  According to the Torah only a woman’s vows may be broken by another, and only under certain circumstances.  However, the Sages gave themselves the power to release people from their vows, at least under certain circumstances, usually if the vow was mistaken.  This was probably one of the more important functions of the Sage in rabbinic times; to release people from vows which they no longer wanted to take.  
  As a side note, that does not have to do strictly with the Mishnah, the custom of saying “Kol Nidre” on Yom Kippur is a later version of release from one’s vows.  It was first recited in Geonic times (around the 10th century) and was meant to release a person from vows that they made that they may have forgotten.  The popular idea that it is somehow related to persecuted Jews who were forced to convert does not have any basis, although it is a moving theory.  There were Jewish leaders who attempted to abolish the Kol Nidre, including Orthodox leaders, but they were not successful.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Nedarim begins by clarifying the validity of substitute words used for vows.  Also mentioned in this mishnah are different types of vows, all of which are mentioned in the Torah.  The second part of the mishnah deals with the validity of certain statements as oaths.
  All the substitutes for vows have the validity of vows. Those for haramim have the validity of haramim, And those for oaths have the validity of oaths, And those for nazirite [vows] have the validity of nazirite [vows].  A substitute formula is just as effective at making a vow as is a regular vow formula.  The mishnah lists several types of vows for which this is true.  The first is a “neder”.  The second is a “herem” (see Leviticus 27:28).  The third is an oath (shevuah).  The fourth are nazirite vows.
  If one says to his fellow, “I am forbidden from you by a vow”; “I am separated from you”; “I am distanced from you”, “that I should eat from yours”, “that I should taste from yours”, he is prohibited.  These are all valid vow formulas, even though he doesn’t formally say that the thing which he is forbidding upon himself would be like a sacrifice.  In other words, a full formula would be “All of your food is like a sacrifice to me”.  Instead he says one of the formulas in section 2, combined with one of the ones in section 2a and thus forms a vow.  For instance he says, “I am forbidden from you by a vow that I should eat from yours”.  Or “I am distanced from you that I should taste from yours”.  In all such cases it is forbidden for the one taking a vow to subsequently eat from the other person’s food.
  If he says: “I am banned to you”, Rabbi Akiba was inclined to rule stringently.  This case is more questionable, whether the vow formula is valid. Rabbi Akiba rules that it is, but even he seems uncertain about his ruling.
  [If one says] “As the vows of the wicked”, he has vowed in respect of being a nazirite, or a sacrifice, or an oath. [If he says] “As the vows of the fit”, he has said nothing. [But if he said] “As their freewill-offerings” he has vowed in respect of being nazirite and a sacrifice.  If he says a regular vow formula and then tacks on at the end the words, “As the vows of the wicked” his vow is valid, whether it be a vow, a nazirite vow or an oath.  Alternatively, there might be a nazirite walking by him and he says, “Behold I am like the vows of the wicked”, he is a nazirite.  Or if he says, “Like the vows of the wicked I shall not eat from you”, he can’t eat from the person’s food.  We can see here that vows are viewed negatively and those who vow frequently are considered to be wicked. However, if he says, “As the vows of the fit” his formula is not valid, since people who are “fit”, do not frequently make vows.  We can certainly sense here that part of the intent of this mishnah is to relate a negative message about taking frequent vows. However, if he says, “like their free-will offerings”, then his vow is valid, because fit people do make vows to bring free-will offerings.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss the various substitutes for vows. All of the cases here are words that sound like the normal word used for taking a vow, or a typical substitute.
  Interestingly, there is a debate in the Talmud over the source of these substitutes.  R. Yochanan says that their source is the language of the Gentiles and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the Sages invented them so that people would not actually say the real word.
  One who says, “konam” “qonah” or “qonas”: these are the substitutes for korban.  The normal substitute for “korban”, a sacrifice is “konam”.  Our mishnah lists substitutes for “konam”.  All are valid as vows.
  “Herek” “herech” or “heref,” these are substitutes for herem.  All of these are words that have just been slightly changed from the real word “herem” which we already saw in yesterday’s mishnah.
  “Nazik” “naziah” “paziah” these are substitutes for nazirite vows.  All of these are slight modifications of the word “nazir”, the Hebrew for nazirite.
  “Shevuthah” “shekukah” or one who vows with the word “mota” these are substitutes for shevuah (an.  The first two are slight modifications of “shevuah”, an oath.  “Mota” is a modification of the Aramaic word, “momta”, which means oath. In all of these cases the substitution is effective.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  If one says “Not-unconsecrated food shall I not eat from you”, “Not fit”, or “Not pure”, “Clean” or “Unclean”, “Remnant” or “Piggul he is bound [by his vow].[If one says, “May it be to me], as the lamb”, “As the Temple pens”, “As the wood [on the altar]”, “As the fire [on the altar]”, “As the altar”, “As the Temple” or “As Jerusalem”; [or] if one vowed by reference to the altar utensils, even though he did not mention “korban”, behold this one was vowed by a korban.Rabbi Judah said: He who says “Jerusalem” has said nothing.The normal way of making a prohibitive vow is for a person to say that a certain something is like a sacrifice, a “korban”, which is forbidden to him.  Our mishnah talks about various ways in which a person can make a valid vow without actually saying the word “korban”.  As we could see in the first two mishnayoth of Nedarim, people were hesitant to actually say the word “korban” and hence looked for substitutes.Section one:  In this section a person says something which is interpreted to mean “That which I eat from you should be to me like x”, and the “x” is prohibited to him and therefore he has prohibited the food upon himself.  There are seven examples.1)  “Not-unconsecrated food”, meaning the food should be to the one swearing as if it were consecrated like a sacrifice.2) “Not fit” interpreted to mean, not fit for people to eat but rather fit for sacrifice on the altar.3) “Not pure” your food shall not be pure and permitted for me to eat, but rather set aside for sacrifice on the altar.4) “Clean” your food shall be pure, as is a sacrifice, and hence not permitted to me.5) “Unclean” your food shall be considered unclean to me, but clean for sacrifice on the altar.(6+7) “Remnant” or “Piggul” your food shall be prohibited to me as remnant (sacrificial meat which has been kept too long after being sacrificed and is forbidden), or piggul (sacrificial meat prohibited because it was sacrificed with the wrong intent).  Since both of these are forbidden, the vow is effective.Section two: In this section the person swearing states that food that belongs to another should be to him like something in the Temple.  Although he doesn’t say that the food is like a “korban”, these statements are sufficient to make the vow valid.  The examples are 1) a sacrificial lamb; 2) pens in the Temple used to store the sacrifices; 3) the wood used to fuel the fire on the altar; 4) the fire itself; 5) the altar itself; 6) the Temple; 7) Jerusalem, which could be interpreted to refer to the sacrifices eaten in Jerusalem.  A vow formula may also employ any of the utensils used at the altar.  In all of these cases, even though he did not say that the food would be like a “korban”, the vow is valid and binding.According to Rabbi Judah, saying that food should be “Jerusalem” is not sufficient because he may be referring to other things in Jerusalem besides the Temple.  As we shall learn in the next mishnah, Rabbi Judah also holds that in order for the vow to be valid he has to say “Like x”, and not just “x” itself.  Since he did not say “like Jerusalem”, the vow is not valid.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The first three sections of this mishnah teach that instead of stating “korban” a person can name different types of sacrifices and his vow will still be effective.
  The final section of the mishnah teaches that a person can make parts of his body forbidden to other people.
  If one says “A korban”, “A wholly burnt-offering”, “A meal-offering”, “A sin-offering”, “A thanksgiving-offering”, “A peace-offering, should be that which I eat from you”   he is bound [by his vow]. Rabbi Judah permitted [him].  In this section, instead of just stating “korban”, the person vowing names other types of sacrifices. The mishnah teaches that these are equally effective in forming vows.  Rabbi Judah holds that since he didn’t say “like a …”, the vow is not valid.
  [If he says] “The korban”, “like a korban”, “korban”, should be that which I eat from you   he is bound [by his vow].  All of these ways of phrasing a vow are also valid.
  If he says, “That which I shall not eat of yours should be a korban”, Rabbi Meir forbids [him].  In this case the person adds an additional negative to his statement.  Instead of saying “that which I eat from you should be a korban”, he says “that which I shall not eat…”.  Hence we might have interpreted the vow to meant that that which he doesn’t eat should be a korban, but that which he does eat should be permissible.  Nevertheless Rabbi Meir rules that it is a valid vow, for the statement could also be interpreted to mean, “Your food is a korban to me, therefore I shall not eat from yours.”
  If one says to his fellow, “Konam be my mouth which speaks with you”, “My hands which work for you” [or] “My feet which walk with you,’ he is forbidden.  In these cases instead of stating that a certain object shall be prohibited, the person states that a certain part of his body shall not do something for his friend.  Now usually one cannot make a prohibitive vow on an action.  Prohibitive vows are only effective on things and not on intangibles.  However, a person can make a prohibitive vow on a part of his body, since parts of bodies are things.  For instance one can say “Konam be my mouth to you”, but not “Konam be my speech to you”; mouths have substance but speech does not.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  And these [vows] are not binding: [One who says] “What I eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”; “As the flesh of the swine”; “As an object of idolatrous worship”;  “As hides pierced at the heart”; “As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”; “As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”--[in all these cases the vow is] not binding.If one says to his wife, “Behold! You are like my mother to me”, he must be given an opening on other grounds, in order that he should not act lightly in such matters.[If one says,] “Konam if I sleep”; “If I speak”; or “If I walk”;  or if one says to his wife, “Konam if I cohabit with you,” he is liable to [the biblical prohibition] “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:.[If he says,] “I swear] an oath not to sleep”, or, “talk,” or, “walk,” he is forbidden [to do so].The first section of this mishnah deals with vows that are not binding.  The second and third sections deal with vow that are semi-binding.Section one: I shall explain each of these cases one at time.“What I might eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”:  Unconsecrated food is permitted, hence he has not stated that anything should be prohibited to him.“As the flesh of the swine”: Vow formulas only work if the object used as a vow is something which can be vowed/dedicated to the Temple, such as an offering.  While swine and the subsequent objects listed in this mishnah are forbidden, they cannot be offered to the Temple, and hence the vow is invalid.“As an object of idolatrous worship”:  This vow does not work for the same reason as above.“As hides pierced at the heart”:  These were used in idol worship.“As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”:  These are all things which Jews may not eat.  Carrion is an animal which was slaughtered improperly, “terefoth” are animals which died or would have died without being slaughtered.  “Abominations and creeping things” are forbidden reptiles and other small animals, all of which are forbidden to eat.  Again, the vow formula is ineffective because he didn’t vow using something which can be donated to the Temple.“As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”:  These are both gifts that must be given to priests (Aaron’s sons).  They are forbidden for consumption for non-priestly Jews.  However, since one cannot offer them to the Temple, they cannot be used in vow formulas.Section two:  In this case, a husband attempts to forbid his wife to himself sexually, by stating that she should be to him like his mother, who is obviously prohibited to him (nothing Oedipal here).   The vow does not work, since he didn’t use something that can be vowed as part of his vow formula.  However, the rabbis did not want people to take these matters lightly and hence they said that he had to find an “opening” for breaking his vow.  For this, he will need to see a Sage.  We will learn more about how this is done towards the end of the tractate.Section three:  At the end of the previous chapter we learned that a vow does not work on something that has no substance.  Therefore, when one says “Konam (a valid formula) that I should not do something” the vow is not valid, since actions do not have substance.  However, our mishnah rules that the one who took such a vow should nevertheless keep his word.  He still must follow the prohibition in Numbers 30:3, that a person must do all that he promised.In contrast, oaths (shevuoth) can be made on actions, for an oath relates to the person and not to the object.  Therefore, one who swears an oath not to do something is bound by Torah law to keep his word.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah compares vow formulas with oath formulas.
  [If he says,] “A korban should be what I do not eat of yours”; “By a korban! If I eat of yours”; “What I do not eat of yours should not be a korban to me” the vow is not binding.  I will explain each of these individually. “A korban should be what I do not eat of yours”:  This is an ineffective vow, because he is not forbidding anything which he will eat. The only thing that is forbidden to him is that which he will not eat in any case. “By a korban! If I eat of yours”:  This translation is based on an emendation to the mishnah, created by the Talmud.  The mishnah itself states “A korban should be what I eat from you”.  That should not be considered invalid formula.  Therefore the Talmud suggests that the mishnah should read “By a korban!  If I eat of yours.”  He has not stated that the food should be forbidden, rather he has used the word “korban” to state that he will not eat from the other person. Such a formula is not valid in vows. “What I do not eat of yours should not be a korban to me”:  We might have assumed that this double negative implies that what he doesn’t eat should not be a korban, but what he does eat should be a korban. However, this mishnah holds that we do not learn positive implications from negative statements.  Saying that something  will not be a korban does not mean that other things will.
  [If he says], “An oath [that] I will not eat of yours”; “An oath that  I eat of yours”; “No oath [that] I will not eat of yours” his oath is valid.  All of the above formulas are valid if the word “shevuah” or oath is used instead of a vow.  Again, I will explain them one at a time. [If he says], “An oath [that] I will not eat of yours”:  This is a normal oath formula is certainly valid. “An oath that I will eat of yours”:  It would seem that this statement should not cause him to be prohibited to eat from his fellow’s food.  On the contrary it seems that he is saying that he will eat from his friend.  The Talmud understands this to be referring to a case where Reuven is pressuring Shimon to eat at his house.  Shimon says several times that he will not, and then finally blurts out “An oath that I will eat of yours”. The context of his saying makes it clear that Shimon’s intent was not to eat at Reuven’s home.  However, in other contexts this is not an oath formula that would cause a prohibition. “No oath [that] I will not eat of yours”:  We could deduce from here that although he has not made a prohibitive oath on that which he will not eat from his fellow, he has made a prohibitive oath on that which he will eat.  Although above, in section one regarding vows we stated that we do not make positive deductions from negative statements, with regard to oaths we do.
  In these instances oaths are more stringent than vows. There is [also] greater stringency in vows than in oaths. How so? If one says, “Konam be the sukkah that I make,”; “The lulav that I take”;  “The tefillin that I put on”; as vows they are binding, but as oaths they are not, because one cannot swear to transgress the commandments.  The mishnah now points out that since the vows made in section one were invalid whereas the oaths were valid, oaths are in some senses stricter than vows. However, in another matter vows are more strict.  A person cannot take an oath not to observe a commandment, because he is already biblically obligated to observe the commandment.  However, he could state that a given ritual object is forbidden to him with a “konam” vow.  In such a case he is still obligated to perform the commandment.  He just must perform it with another object.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to draw distinctions between vows and oaths.
  There is a vow within a vow, but not an oath within an oath.  This section teaches that there is an additional stringency in vows that does not exist for oaths.  One can make two vows on the same thing but not two oaths.  The mishnah will now explain how this can happen.
  How is this so? If one declares, “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]”; “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is liable for each and every one. “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]”, “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is only liable for one oath.  If a person said twice that he will be a nazir if he eats a certain thing, and then he eats that thing, he must be a nazir twice.  Since an unspecified nazirite period is thirty days (we will learn more about this in the next tractate), this person must act as a nazir for sixty days. However, if he takes two oaths that he will not eat a certain thing, and then eats it, he is only liable for breaking one oath.  If he breaks the oath intentionally he only receives one set of lashes, and if accidentally, he only brings one sacrifice.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with cases where it is unclear whether the person vowing used something which can be dedicated to the Temple in the vow formula, in which case the vow is binding, or whether he used something else, in which case the vow is not binding.
  Unspecified vows are interpreted strictly, but if specified [they are interpreted] leniently. How so?  This is an introductory rule which will guide the entire mishnah.  If a person takes a vow and he himself is unclear what his intention was, whether it was to make a valid or invalid vow, we rule strictly and the vow is valid.  However, if he states that his intention was to make an invalid vow, the vow is ruled invalid. The mishnah now lists several examples where it is unclear whether he made a valid vow by referring to something that may be donated to the Temple, or whether he referred to something which may not be donated to the Temple.
  If one says, “Behold! This is to me as salted meat”; or “As wine of libation” If he vowed by that which is to Heaven, his vow is valid. If by that which is idolatrous, his vow is invalid. And if it was unspecified, his vow is valid.  The first example is where a person says that a certain thing should either be to him like “salted meat” or “wine of libation”.  Either could refer to something which could be put onto the altar.  “Salted meat” could refer to a sacrifice and wine could refer to one of the libations offered at the Temple altar.  Therefore, if his intention was to refer to something which was for “Heaven”, i.e. for the Temple, then his vow is valid.  However, if his intention was that the object should be prohibited to him as is meat sacrificed for idols or wine offered to idols, his vow is invalid.  As we have learned before, using a prohibited item in the vow formula does not make a vow work.  If he didn’t know what his intention was, then the vow is ruled valid.
  [If he says], “Behold! This is to me as herem” If as a herem to Heaven, his vow is valid; If as a herem to the priests, his vow is invalid. If it was unspecified, his vow is valid.  A “herem” can either refer to an offering in the Temple, or it can refer to things that are given to the priests (see Numbers 18:14).  If his intention was the former, the vow is valid, if the latter his vow is invalid.  The reason is that once the “herem” was given to the priest, it is no longer forbidden for general consumption.  Again, if he is unsure, the rule is strict.
  “Behold! This is to me as a tithe” If he vowed, as tithes of beasts, his vow is valid. If as grain tithes, his vow is invalid. If unspecified, his vow is valid.  There are several kinds of tithes.  When a person vows that something should be like “tithe” to him, it could refer to animal tithes.  If so, his vow is valid for animal tithes are sacrificed on the altar.  However, if he refers to grain tithes, his vow is not valid, for anyone may eat grain tithes and they are not sacrificed but rather given to Levites.
  “Behold! This is to me as terumah” If he vowed, as the terumah of the Temple-chamber, his vow is valid. If as the terumah of the threshing-floor, his vow is invalid. If unspecified, his vow is valid. The words of Rabbi Meir.  There are several kinds of “terumah”. If he refers to “terumah of the Temple-chamber” his vow is invalid, for these were donations used to buy sacrifices.  However, if he refers to the regular terumah given to priests, his vow is invalid, for this terumah is not offered to the Temple, but rather is for priests and forbidden to non-priests.
  Rabbi Judah says:  An unspecified reference to terumah in Judea is a valid vow, but not in Galilee, because the Galileans are unfamiliar with the terumah of the Temple-chamber. Unspecified references to haramim in Judea are not binding but in Galilee they are, because the Galileans are unfamiliar with priestly haramim.  The previous section was according to Rabbi Meir.  Rabbi Judah says that there are regional differences in our interpretation of vows.  If he makes an unspecified vow using “terumah”, in Judea he may be referring to “terumah of the Temple-chamber”, and therefore his vow is valid.  However, those of the Galilee, who live further away from the Temple, would not know as much about “terumah of the Temple-chamber” and hence we can assume that they were referring to the terumah given to priests. Similarly, unspecified vows using “herem” are interpreted leniently in Judea because they may refer to the “herem” of the priests, for many priests lived in Judea.  In contrast, in the Galilee, “herem” would more typically refer to a sacrifice and therefore the vow is valid. We see here that Rabbi Judah assumes that the interpretation of the vow depends on the commonly used language of the one who vows.  Since commonly used language will depend on geographical origin, it too must be taken into account.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a person who makes a vow using language that would normally be valid for a vow, and then subsequently claims that he had an intention which would make the vow invalid. Most of these cases involve puns.  In order to emphasize the puns, which are of course in Hebrew, I have transliterated many of the words.
  If one vows by herem, and says, “I vowed only by a herem (a of the sea”;  “Herem” can either refer to a type of vow, or to a fishing net.  Obviously, if his intention was to the latter, then his vow is not valid.
  [If he says] “By a korban”, and then says, “I vowed only by korbanot ( of kings”;  The word “korban” usually means sacrifice, but it could mean gifts given to kings.
  [If he says] “Behold! I myself ( am a korban”, and then says, “I vowed only by the etzem ( which I keep for the purpose of vowing”;  Saying “I am a korban” is a way of obligating oneself to pay one’s worth to the Temple.  The Torah lists how much each person is worth (see Leviticus 27).  Therefore, saying “I am a korban” is a vow.  However, one cannot vow with by using a bone, the same word as “I myself”.
  [If he says,] “Konam be any benefit my wife has from me”, and then says, “I spoke only of my first wife, whom I have divorced”  Usually when a husband refers to his wife, he refers to a wife to whom he is currently married.  However, the word “wife” could refer to his previous wife.
  Regarding none of these [vows] should they inquire [of a sage in order to break them], but if they inquire about them, they are punished and treated strictly, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: they are given an opening on other grounds, in order that they should not act lightly with vows.  The mishnah now provides the rule in all of these cases.  All of these vows are not valid, for the person claims that his intention was not to make a vow.  As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, if a person vows and then explains that his intention was not to make a valid vow, his vow is not valid.  Therefore, the person should not approach a sage to ask the sage to absolve him of his vow.  However, if he nevertheless does approach the sage, Rabbi Meir says he should be punished and not absolved of his vow.  This is because his very asking shows that he is an ignoramus, and Rabbi Meir holds that ignoramuses should not be allowed to get out of vows, so that they will not make more vows in the future. The Sages hold that the sage who is approached to dissolve the vow should find other grounds to dissolve the vow, for the Sages hold that such a vow is actually valid.  Since the likelihood is that the person intended the vow to be valid, his claim that he intended something else is not accepted.  If the sage wishes to dissolve the vow he can only do so on other grounds, the same way that he dissolves all vows.  Furthermore, we teach him not to make frivolous vows, however he is not punished as Rabbi Meir says.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first four mishnayoth of this chapter deal with vows that use valid language but are nevertheless not valid because the person did not really intend for his vow to be valid.  The first category is one who vowed in order to give himself or someone else more incentive to do something.  This might be like today if someone says “I bet you a million dollars that I will do a certain thing”.  If it doesn’t happen, no one expects the person to actually pay a million dollars.  People say these things in order to give themselves more incentive.
  Four types of vows the Sages have invalidated:  Vows of incentive, vows of exaggeration, vows in error, and vows [broken] under pressure.  The first section of the mishnah lists those vows which are not valid.  The mishnah and the following mishnayoth will now bring examples of each.
  Vows of incentive how so? If one was selling an article and said, “Konam that I will not reduce below a sela”; and the other replied, “Konam that I will not add above a shekel” both of them want [a price] of three denarii.  In this scenario both the buyer and the seller make vows that they will not budge in their prices.  One says he will not go above a shekel (two denarii) and the other says he won’t go below a sela (four denarii).  Since their intention was for a price of three denarii, they may agree to that price.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says:  Also one who wishes to subject his friend to a vow to eat with him, may say: “Every vow which I may make in the future shall be void”, providing that he remembers this at the time of the vow.  Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that one who wants to get his friend to eat at his place, and vows that if his friend does not do so all of his food will be forbidden to him, should say beforehand that all of his vows that he takes in the future shall be invalid, and then he need not keep his vow.  However, when he makes the vow, he must remember that he made the original stipulation that his vows would not be valid. The above explanation of Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob’s statement is according to the words in our mishnah, where it seems as if he is stating one halakhah.  However, the Talmud explains that Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob actually says two things. First of all, a vow taken to get another person to eat at one’s place, is a vow of incentive, and therefore need not be kept. Second, a person may state that all future vows will be invalid, and as long as he remembers this statement when he vows in the future, his vows will be invalid. By the way, the latter statement is one of the sources of the practice to nullify future vows at Kol Nidre on Yom Kippur.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  The first section of the mishnah illustrates vows of exaggeration and the second illustrates vows that were made in error.
  Vows of exaggeration: If one says, “Konam if I did not see on this road as many as departed from Egypt”;  “If I did not see a snake [as thick as the] the beam of an olive press.  Vows of exaggeration need not be kept, because the person did not really intend to take a vow.  His only intention was to exaggerate.
  Vows in error: [If one says, “Konam,] if I ate or drank”, and then remembered that he had; “If I eat or drink” and then forgot [his vow] and ate or drank; “Konam be any benefit which my wife has from me, because she stole my purse or beat my child, and it was subsequently learnt that she had not beaten him nor stolen”; If one saw people eating [his] figs and said to them, “Let the figs be a korban to you,” and then discovered the people to be his father or his brothers. If others were with them: (1) Beth Shammai says: his father and brothers are permitted, but the rest are forbidden. (2) Beth Hillel says: all are permitted.  This section teaches the important principle that vows made in error are invalid, and that a person has not broken his vow if he broke it in error.  Furthermore, vows made based on false assumptions, such as that one’s wife stole something or beat one’s child, or the false presumption that people eating one’s figs should not be eating them, are also invalid. The final question in the mishnah is whether or not a vow can be half-valid, in other words valid with regard to some people and invalid with regard to others.  In the case of the figs, both Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that the brothers and father can eat, because the person who vowed intended to prohibit the figs only to strangers.  However, Beth Shammai holds that the figs are prohibited to others who are there eating with them.  Beth Hillel holds that since part of the vow isn’t valid, the whole vow is invalid.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah begins to discuss vows broken under pressure.  There are actually two types of such vows.  Our mishnah discusses the first type, whereby a person made a fully valid vow, but then due to circumstances beyond his control, was not able to keep the vow.
  Vows [broken] under pressure: if one subjected his neighbor to a vow to eat with him,  and then he or his son fell sick, or a river prevented him [from coming]   such is a vow [broken] under pressure. In this case Reuven says to Shimon that Reuven’s things will be forbidden to Shimon if Shimon does not come over to eat at his house. Shimon intends to come but cannot due to his or his son’s sickness, or his inability to cross the river.  The mishnah rules that when Reuven made the vow he did not intend for it to be valid if Shimon wanted to come but was prevented by circumstances beyond his control.  His only intention was that his things should be prohibited to Shimon if Shimon did not come because he chose not to. Therefore, the vow is invalid.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the second types of “forced vows”, those made under coercion.  While all rabbis agree that one is allowed to make a false vow in order to protect oneself or one’s property, Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagree with regard to some of the details.
  One may vow to murderers, robbers, or tax collectors that it [the produce which they demand] is terumah, even if it is not; [or] that it belongs to the royal house, even if it does not.  One is allowed to make a false vow that one’s produce is terumah in order to prevent it from being taken away.  What is strange here is that the mishnah assumes that while someone might be willing to murder, rob or illegitimately collect taxes, he will not take terumah.   Indeed, this is truly hard to imagine; after all, what worse crime is there than murder.  Albeck explains that the terumah vow refers only to tax collectors, who would not collect taxes from terumah.  He refers to Josephus who says that the Romans allowed terumah to be exempt from taxes. The second false vow referred to is stating that the property belongs to the king.  Indeed, it is easier to imagine a murderer or robber fearing taking property that belongs to the king.
  Beth Shammai says: one may make any form of vow, except an oath; But Beth Hillel says: even an oath.  The mishnah now begins a series of debates between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai holds that since oaths are more consequential than vows, one may not make a false oath, even under this type of coercion.  Beth Hillel says even false oaths may be made.
  Beth Shammai says: he must not volunteer to vow; Beth Hillel says: he may do so.  Beth Shammai says that one may not initiate taking the vow.  If the murderer or robber did not ask the person to vow that the produce was terumah or belonged to the king, then he should not.  Beth Hillel says even if not asked, he may take a vow.
  Beth Shammai says: [he may vow] only as far as he makes him vow; Beth Hillel says: even in respect of what he does not make him vow. How so? If they said to him, say: “Konam be any benefit my wife has of me”, and he said, “Konam be any benefit my wife and children have of me,” (1) Beth Shammai says: his wife is permitted, but his children are forbidden; (2) Beth Hillel says: both are permitted.  Beth Shammai says that the person should only vow exactly what was asked of him by the murderer/robber.  If he, upon his own initiative, adds on to the vow, then that which he added has validity.  Beth Hillel says he may add on, and just as his vow has no validity regarding that which the murderer/robber told to him to swear, so too the part he added has no validity.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with situations in which a person might attempt to take a vow to prevent either his saplings or his garment from being destroyed.  In this case a person dedicates them to the Temple.  Generally, when someone dedicates something to the Temple, if it can be sacrificed (such as a cow, sheep or grain) he may not redeem the item by giving money in its stead.  However, if it cannot be sacrificed (a donkey, camel or bananas), then a person gives the worth of the item, and the item becomes non-sacred property.
  [If one says,] “Behold these saplings are a korban if they are not cut down”; or, “This garment is a korban if it is not burnt”, they can be redeemed.  If a person sees that something is about to happen to his saplings or to his garment, and he says that if the saplings are not cut down, or the garment is not burnt they should be a korban, they are dedicated to the Temple and they must be redeemed. We do not say that the vow was mistaken because he thought that the saplings would surely be cut down or that his garment would surely burn.
  [If he says,] “Behold these saplings are a korban until they are cut down”; or, “This garment is a korban until it is burnt”, they cannot be redeemed.  If he says that they are a korban “until they are cut down” he cannot redeem them, and if he does try to redeem them, they remain sanctified property. This is because he set a time for how long they are to remain a korban; until that time is up they cannot be taken out of that status. However, according to the Rambam, when the saplings are cut down, they are no longer a korban and he may use them as he wishes.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the remainder of the chapter deal with a person who vowed that he would not benefit from a certain type of person.  These mishnayoth provide definitions who are those types of people.
  He who vows [not to benefit] from seafarers, may benefit from land-dwellers; [But he who vows not to benefit] from land-dwellers, is forbidden [to benefit] even from seafarers, because seafarers are included in land-dwellers; not those who merely travel from Acco to Jaffa,  but even those who sail away great distances [from land]. This mishnah teaches that the term “seafarers” does not include land-dwellers, and therefore if one vows not to benefit from seafarers he may derive benefit from land-dwellers.  However, the term “land-dwellers” does include seafarers, because all seafarers occasionally come to land.  This is obviously true for seafarers who make short journeys from Acco to Jaffa, but even for those who make long journeys.  Therefore, if he makes a vow not to benefit from land-dwellers, he cannot derive benefit even from seafarers.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a person who swears that he will not receive benefit from a type of people whom he calls “those who see the sun”.
  He who vows [not to benefit] from those who see the sun, is forbidden [to benefit] even from the blind, because he meant those whom the sun sees. “Those who see the sun” does not only mean those who can see but can also mean those who live under the sun, i.e. everybody.  Hence he may not benefit from anybody.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that one who vows not to benefit from “the black-haired” is forbidden to benefit from all men, but not from women and children.
  He who vows [not to benefit] from the black-haired may not [benefit] from the bald or the gray-haired, but may [benefit] from women and children, because only men are called black-haired. The word “black-haired” is interpreted to be a reference to men, whether or not they have black hair, gray hair or no hair at all.  Women are not called “black-haired” because they typically covered their hair.  They were called “head-coverers”.  Children were called “head revealers” because they went without a head covering.  However, men were called “black-haired” because sometimes they covered their heads and sometimes they did not.  Furthermore, nearly all men had black hair.  Indeed, the only other hair color referred to in the mishnah is gray.  No blondes or brunettes in Palestine in the Mishnaic period.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with someone who swore not to receive benefit either from those born or from those who are to be born.
  One who vows [not to benefit] from those born may [benefit] from those to be born; from those to be born, he may not [benefit] from those born. Rabbi Meir permits [him to benefit] even from those to be born; But the Sages say: he meant all whose nature it is to be born. We will understand this mishnah better if we take note of the Hebrew.  The word “those born” is “yilodim” and “those to be born” is “noladim”.  The former term does not encompass the latter, and therefore, if one swears not to receive benefit from “yilodim” he may still receive benefit from those who are to be born, the “noladim”.  However, the latter term does encompass the former, and therefore, one who swears not to receive benefit from “noladim” cannot benefit even from those who are already born. Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that one who swears not to receive benefit from those who are to be born, the “noladim,” can receive benefit from those already born, the “yilodim”.  To  Rabbi Meir both terms are completely distinct. The Sages disagree.  One who swears not to receive benefit from the “noladim” does not mean that he will not benefit from those who will be born, but rather from those whose nature it is to be born.  This would encompass all of humanity.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  According to the Talmud, the Samaritans descend from a group of non-Jews brought to Samaria (the north of Israel) by the Assyrians, see II Kings 17.  They are called by the rabbis Cutheans because many of them came from Cuta. There is a debate in the Talmud whether or not there conversion was sincere.  They seem to have partially assimilated into Israel. The main difference between Samaritans and other Israelites is that their Temple was, and remains to this day, on Mt. Gerizim.  They do not recognize Jerusalem as a place of importance.  Besides this difference, they observed many commandments as did the other Israelites, certainly those in the Bible but even some not mentioned in the Bible.  Our mishnah reflects these similarities and differences between Israelites and Samaritans.  [For more information on the Samaritans see either the Encyclopedia Judaica, or check out The Jewish Encyclopedia, which can be found for free on-line at www.jewishencyclopedia.com.]
  He who vows [not to benefit] from those who rest on the Sabbath, is forbidden [to benefit] both from Israelites and Samaritans (.  Samaritans and Israelites both kept the Sabbath, and therefore one who swears not to receive benefit from “those who rest on the Sabbath” may benefit from neither.  However, he may benefit from non-Jews who do not rest on the Sabbath.
  If he vows [not to benefit] from garlic eaters, he may not benefit from Israelites and Samaritans (.  According to most commentators, this refers to a custom to eat garlic on Friday evening in order to act as an aphrodisiac, for sexual relations, which are recommended on Friday night.  Evidently, Samaritans observed this custom as well.
  From those who go up to Jerusalem, he is forbidden [to benefit] from Israelites but from Samaritans ( he is permitted.  As stated in the introduction, Samaritans did not worship in Jerusalem.  Therefore, one who swears not to receive benefit from those who “go up to Jerusalem” may receive benefit from Samaritans.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  This long mishnah actually contains several mishnayoth.  The first part begins with a definition of the terms “Children of Noah” and “Children of Abraham”.  The second part deals with vows not to benefit from Israelites and the third part deals with vows not to benefit from the uncircumcised or the circumcised.  The mishnah ends with an ode to the importance of circumcision in Judaism.
  [If one says,] “Konam that I do not benefit from the Children of Noah,” he may benefit from Israelites, and he is forbidden to benefit from the nations of the world. [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from the seed of Abraham,” he is forbidden [to benefit] from Israelites, but permitted [to benefit] from the nations of the world.  Technically speaking, all of humanity are the descendents of Noah, for only his family survived the flood.  However, the term “Children of Noah” refers to non-Jews (Noahides, as in the “Noahide commandments”) and not to Jews. Similarly, the “Seed of Abraham” could refer to Ishmaelites, Edomites (descendents of Esau).  However, it is taken as referring to Jews and not non-Jews.  We should note that descent, both physical and spiritual from Abraham was a “hot” issue in Mishnaic times, and we often find it being debated in early Christian texts.  In Christian texts we find Christian leaders telling Jews that although they are physical (carnal) descendents of Abraham, they are not his only spiritual descendents.  In our mishnah we sees rabbis claiming that only Jews are Abraham’s descendents; non-Jews, although some of them may trace their roots to Abraham, are not actually his descendents.  This polemic, which we may hear here between Jews and Christians, will sharpen at the end of this mishnah, which discusses the hottest topic between Jews and early Christians the importance of circumcision.
  [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from Israelites”, he may buy things from them for more [than their worth] and sell them for less. [If he says, “Konam] if Israelites benefit from me, he must buy from them for less and sell for more [than their worth], if they will listen to him. [If he says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from them, nor they from me”, he may benefit only from non-Jews.  With regard to vows not to benefit from or give benefit to Israelites, the mishnah interprets these vows minimally.  One who says that he will not benefit from Israelites is still allowed to buy from them, provided he pay more than the fair price, and sell to them, provided he buy at a higher price.  Because he loses out, he is not considered as benefiting from them.  One who says that he will not give benefit to Israelites, is still permitted to buy, but only at a price lower than the going rate, and sell, but only at a price higher than the going rate.  Of course, in the latter case it will be more difficult to get someone to agree to do so with him.  The only one who is totally prohibited from buying from or selling to Israelites is one who vows not to benefit from or give benefit to them.  This person could only conduct business with non-Jews.
  [If one says,] “Konam that I do not benefit from the uncircumcised”, he may benefit from uncircumcised Israelites but not from circumcised heathens”; [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from the circumcised,” he is forbidden to benefit from uncircumcised Israelites but not from circumcised non-Jews, because “uncircumcised” is a term applicable only to non-Jews, as it says, “For all the nations are uncircumcised and all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25). And it says, “And this uncircumcised Philistine shall be [as one of them]” (I Samuel 17:6). And it says, “Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised exult” (II Samuel 1:20). Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says: The foreskin is loathsome, since it is a term of disgrace for the wicked, as it says, “For all the nations are uncircumcised”. Rabbi Ishmael says:  Great is circumcision, since thirteen covenants were made upon it. Rabbi Yose says: Great is circumcision, for it overrides the Sabbath. Rabbi Joshua ben Karha says: Great is circumcision for Moses’s punishment for neglecting it was not suspended even for one hour. Rabbi Nehemiah says:  Great is circumcision, since it overrides the laws of leprosy. Rabbi says:  Great is circumcision, for despite all of the commandments which Abraham fulfilled he was not designated complete until he circumcised himself, as it says, “Walk before me, and be complete” (Genesis 17:1). Another explanation: “Great is circumcision, for were it not for it, the Holy One, Blessed Be He, would not have created the world, as it says, “Were it not for my covenant by day and night, I would not have appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:35).  The term “circumcised” refers to Jews, even to those Jews who are not circumcised, for either legitimate or illegitimate reasons.  The term “uncircumcised” refers to non-Jews, even to those non-Jews who did circumcise (it is known that some non-Jews did practice circumcision, for instance Arabs and Egyptians).  As a prooftext Jeremiah 9:25 is brought.  According to this verse non-Jews are uncircumcised, no matter whom they are.  Israelites, however, are circumcised in their foreskins, even if they are not always circumcised in their hearts.  We should again note that there may exist a polemic in this mishnah with early Christianity.  In Acts 7:51, Stephen says “You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart”. In Romans 2:29, Paul says, “Rather, a real person is a Jew who is one inwardly, and real circumcision is a matter of the heart it is spiritual and not literal.”  We can clearly see the distinction between the Jews and the Christians (who, of course, claimed at the time to be the true Jews).  The Jews admit, based on Jeremiah, that they are not necessarily “uncircumcised of the heart”.  A Jew still must strive to be better and to obey God’s commands.  However, the validity of real circumcision (of the foreskin) is not lessened at all.  Indeed, as a sign of God’s covenant, it is the primary commandment.  It was certainly, the greatest distinguishing sign between Jew and non-Jew, both in the ancient world and to this day.
  The mishnah now brings seven statements that emphasize the importance of circumcision. 1.  The first of these statements connects to the verse used above from Jeremiah.  This is the bridge to the rest of the mishnah. 2. In Genesis 17, the word “berith”, covenant, as in “berith milah”, the “covenant of circumcision”, is stated thirteen times. 3. Circumcision may be performed on the Sabbath, even though it involves the cutting of the flesh which is otherwise prohibited on the Sabbath. 4. In Exodus 4:24, on his way back to Egypt, despite Moses’s great merits, and despite the fact that God had just instructed him to lead the people out of Egypt, God almost kills him for not having circumcised his son. 5. Normally, one may not cut off a spot of leprosy (see Deuteronomy 24:8).  However, if the spot of leprosy appears on the foreskin, it may be cut off. 6. Only after circumcision is Abraham called “complete”. 7. This verse mentions a covenant kept day and night.  The midrash states that this must refer to circumcision, which exists on a person’s body both day and night.  Indeed, were it not for this important commandment, God would not have created the world. There is little doubt in my mind that this long mishnah is aimed either at early Christians who denied the importance of physical circumcision, or at Hellenizing Jews, who refused to circumcise themselves, or “uncircumcised” themselves.  Romans often forbade circumcision, and these statements, which may be slightly exaggerated, are meant to encourage Jews to maintain this commandment, one which would not have been easy, for both physical and social reasons, in the ancient world.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the subsequent mishnayoth discuss what is prohibited to a person who is under a vow not to benefit from his fellow.  Note that these types of vows can be initiated by either party:  Reuven may swear that Shimon may not benefit from Reuven’s property and Shimon may swear that he may not benefit from Reuven’s property.
  The only difference between one who is under a vow not to benefit at all from his neighbor, and one who is under a vow prohibiting food benefit, is in respect of walking [on his property] and [the use of] utensils not employed in the preparation of food.  There are two things which are permitted to one who is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor that are not permitted to one who may not benefit from his neighbor at all:  walking on his property and the use of things not involved in the making of food.  The next section of the mishnah will qualify this statement.
  If a man is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor, he may not lend him a sifter, sieve, mill-stone or oven, but he may lend him a cloak, ring, garment, and earrings, and whatever is not employed in the preparation of food. In a place where things such as these are rented out, it is forbidden.  A man who cannot derive food benefit from his neighbor may not borrow vessels which are involved in the making of food, but he may borrow things not involved in the making of food.  However, if in such a place, the custom is to rent these things (a cloak etc.) then borrowing them is prohibited.  For if the one who cannot receive benefit from his friend borrows these things without paying, he saves the money he would have otherwise had to spend.  With that money he may now go and buy food.  Indirectly, therefore, he has derived food benefit. Therefore, in such a place borrowing any item would be prohibited.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the remainder of the chapter teach what a person can do with/for his friend, even though he is under oath not to give any benefit to him.
  If one is under a vow not to benefit from his neighbor, [his neighbor] may pay his shekel, pay off his debts, and return a lost article to him. Where payment is taken for this, the benefit should become sacred property. When the Temple still stood every Jew had to send a half shekel every year for the upkeep of the Temple.  Even if Reuven cannot receive benefit from Shimon, Shimon may pay his half shekel.  Similarly, Shimon may pay off Reuven’s debts.  Both of these are permitted because Shimon is not giving money directly to Reuven. Shimon may also return a lost object to Reuven because he is only returning to Reuven what is already his.  Furthermore, all Shimon is doing is fulfilling the mitzvah of returning lost objects. If people customarily offer financial rewards to someone who returns a lost object, Shimon may not turn down Reuven’s offer of a reward, because by doing so he would be giving financial benefit to Reuven.  If Shimon does not want to just take the money, he may donate it to the Temple by making it sacred property. Other commentators explain that this last clause refers to a case where neither party may benefit from the other. They are still allowed to return each other’s lost property, for that is a mitzvah.  However, if a reward is given it must go to charity.  The one who returned the lost object cannot take the reward nor can the one who received it not give the reward, for in either case, someone would have received financial benefit.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss what Shimon may do for Reuven who has sworn not to receive benefit from him. The first part of the mishnah discusses certain mitzvoth which might cost money.  The second part deals with feeding those whom the person who cannot receive benefit has a responsibility to feed.
  He may donate his terumah and his tithes with his consent.  If Reuven cannot receive any benefit from Shimon, Shimon may still donate Reuven’s terumah and tithes, as long as Reuven consents.  This could happen in two ways.  First of all, Reuven could say that anyone who wants to donate his terumah or tithes may do so.  Shimon may then take of Reuven’s produce and donate it.  Alternatively, Shimon may donate of his own produce as if it was Reuven’s and thereby exempt Reuven from giving terumah or tithes.  Reuven may not specifically tell Shimon to donate his terumah for then Shimon would be an agent of Reuven’s, which is forbidden.
  He may offer up for him the bird sacrifices of zavim and zavoth and the bird sacrifices of women after childbirth, sin-offerings and guilt-offerings.  When a person is purified from having been a zav or a zavah (some type of gonorrhea), s/he must bring bird sacrifices.  Similarly, after having given birth, a woman must bring bird sacrifices.  After sinning, a person must bring either a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, depending upon the sin.  The mishnah teaches that if Shimon is a kohen, and Reuven cannot receive benefit from him, Shimon may still offer up his sacrifices, because kohanim are agents of God and are not considered the agents of those whose sacrifices they are offering.
  He may teach him midrash, halakhoth and aggadoth, but not Scripture, yet he may teach his sons and daughters Scripture  Shimon can teach Reuven midrash (explanation of Scripture), halakhah (mishnah) and aggadah (legends) because all of these are part of the oral Torah, and teachers of the oral Torah were not paid for their teaching.  Therefore, Reuven is not receiving financial benefit.  However, Shimon may not teach Reuven written Torah (Scripture) without receiving pay, because people customarily were paid for this.  If Shimon forgoes his pay, Reuven will have received financial benefit.  However, Shimon may teach Reuven’s sons and daughters Scripture, for this is a commandment placed upon the father.  Shimon’s helping Reuven fulfill a commandment is not considered financial benefit, even though in reality, Reuven is saving money.  Note, that this mishnah implies that a parent is obligated to teach his child Torah, more than he is obligated to learn Torah himself.
  And he may support his wife and children, even though he is liable for their maintenance.  Shimon may feed Reuven’s family, even though Reuven is obligated to do so.  This is because Shimon is not giving anything to Reuven.
  But he may not feed his beasts, whether clean or unclean. Rabbi Eliezer says: he may feed an unclean beast of his, but not a clean one. They said to him: what is the difference between an unclean and a clean beast? He replied to them, a clean beast, its life belongs to heaven, but its body is his own; but an unclean animal its body and life belongs to heaven. They said to him: The life of an unclean beast too belongs to heaven and the body is his own for if he wishes, he can sell it to a non-Jew or feed dogs with it.  There is a debate whether or not Shimon may feed Reuven’s impure (unkosher) animal.  All hold that he may not feed Reuven’s clean (kosher) animal, because that is giving Reuven money which he eventually might consume.  However, the unkosher animal will not be eaten.  Rabbi Eliezer argues that the impure animal’s flesh, when it dies, returns to God, just as its life-force does as well.  Since the flesh doesn’t belong to its Jewish owner, Shimon may feed it and it is not considered direct benefit to Reuven.  The other Sages argue that since Reuven may give the animal (its meat) to a non-Jew or feed it to a dog, by feeding it Shimon would be benefiting Reuven, and it is therefore prohibited.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The mishnah deals with several types of benefit that Shimon must refrain from giving Reuven who has sworn (or been sworn by Shimon) not to receive benefit from him.
  If one is forbidden to benefit from his neighbor, and he pays him a visit [in sickness] he must stand, but not sit.  Shimon may visit Reuven when he is sick, because that is a mitzvah.  However, he shouldn’t sit with him for a long time, because that would be causing benefit to Reuven.
  He may afford him a cure of life, but not a cure of money.  The Talmud explains that Shimon may help cure Reuven for that is a commandment.  However, he may not cure Reuven’s animal for that is a monetary benefit.
  He may bathe together with him in a large bath, but not in a small one.  If Shimon gets into a small bath with Reuven, he will raise the level of the bath water, and thereby benefit Reuven.  Therefore he may not do so.  However, he may get into a large bath with him where the water level will barely be raised.
  He may sleep in a bed with him. Rabbi Judah said: in summer, but not in winter, because he thereby benefits him. He may [nevertheless] recline with him on a couch.  He may sleep in bed with him, even though he warms up the bed.  Rabbi Judah restricts this to the summer months, when it is warm anyway.  However, even Rabbi Judah agrees that he may recline with him on the same couch, and we are not concerned lest he fall asleep.
  [He may] eat at the same table with him but not out of the same bowl; but he may eat with him out of a bowl which returns. He may not eat with him out of the food trough put before laborers.  Reuven may eat at the same table as Shimon, and we are not concerned lest Reuven eats from Shimon’s plate and thereby derives benefit.  However, they may not eat out of the same communal bowl, lest Shimon intentionally leave the best part of the food for Reuven, and thereby cause him benefit.  If the communal bowl was a “returning bowl” meaning one that was full of food, such that each person eating could eat his fill and still have leftovers, then they may share.  In such a case, there is no concern that Shimon will leave food for Reuven because there is enough for everyone. They may not eat out of the same bowl put before laborers, because laborers are always hungry and there are never leftovers.  Therefore, Shimon might eat less so that Reuven could eat more.
  He may not work with him on the same furrow, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: he may work at a distance from him.  According to Rabbi Meir they may not work plowing the same furrow, since if Shimon works harder he will benefit Reuven by allowing him to work less. The Sages allow them to work in the same furrow, as long as they keep their distance.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  During the sabbatical (seventh) year, the produce that a person’s fields grow is legally ownerless and therefore anyone can enter anyone else’s fields and eat what he wishes.
  Our mishnah teaches about prohibitive vows and the sabbatical year.
  He who is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, [if the vow was imposed] before the seventh year, may not enter his field, nor eat produce that hangs over [from the other’s property].  If Reuven takes a vow that Shimon shall not benefit from his property before the seventh year, Shimon may not enter Reuven’s field, because as we learned in mishnah one, when one is forbidden by vow to benefit from another, even walking in his field is forbidden.  He may also not eat of the produce that hangs over from the field, even when in the seventh year.  Although this produce is now ownerless, and Shimon is not benefiting from Reuven, since this produce was prohibited to Shimon, the seventh year does not make it permitted.
  If [the vow was imposed] in the seventh year, he may not enter his field, but may eat of the produce that hangs over [from the other’s property].  If the vow was imposed in the seventh year, then Shimon still cannot go onto Reuven’s property.  However, he may eat of the produce that hangs over the property line since Reuven did not own the produce when the vow was taken, such that he could forbidden it to Shimon.
  If he was forbidden [merely] in respect of food, [and the vow was imposed] before the seventh year, he may enter his field, but may not eat of its fruits.  If the vow was not prohibitive of all benefit, but just of food, then Shimon may enter Reuven’s property.  However, if the vow was taken before the sabbatical year, then Shimon may still not eat the food.
  But [if it was imposed] in the seventh year, he may enter [his field] and eat [of its fruits].  If the vow which only prohibited food was taken on the sabbatical year, Shimon may enter Reuven’s property and eat, for the produce was not Reuven’s to prohibit.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The first section continues to discuss prohibitions applicable to a person who cannot derive benefit from another because of a vow.  The second section is a digression from the topic of our chapter.
  He who is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor may not lend [objects] to him or borrow from him, lend [money] to him or receive from him a loan, sell to him or purchase from him.  If Reuven cannot receive benefit from Shimon, he certainly may not borrow from him. Our mishnah teaches that he is prohibited even from lending to him, lest by doing so he also borrows.  This fear of reciprocity is the reasoning that lies behind the following mutual prohibition as well.  Obviously, Reuven cannot borrow money, but the mishnah teaches he may not even lend money to Shimon, lest he borrow as well.  Reuven cannot sell or buy lest he benefit from either transaction.
  One says to another, “Lend me your cow.” [The other] says, “It is not available.”  [The first one] says, “Konam, if I ever plow my field with it’. If he generally plowed himself, he is forbidden, but others are permitted. But if he did not generally plow himself, he and others are forbidden.  This section is not directly related to the larger topic of this chapter.  It is brought here because it also has to do with lending and vowing. Reuven asks Shimon to borrow his cow to plow with it.  Shimon responds that his cow is not available.  Reuven, being somewhat impatient, takes a vow that he will never use Shimon’s cow to plow his field.  The mishnah rules that if Reuven normally plows on his own, Shimon can lend him the cow and others can plow Reuven’s field with it.  In other words, we interpret Reuven’s vow literally; Reuven cannot plow with it, but others can.  However, if Reuven does not normally plow, then obviously when he said “Konam, if I ever plow my field with it”, then he meant “Konam, if my field is ever plowed with it.”  Therefore, even others may not plow his field with Shimon’s cow.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a situation in which Shimon is forbidden by a vow from receiving benefit from Reuven, yet is in need of financial help and Reuven wants to help him.  The mishnah provides legal fictions by which Shimon may derive benefit from Reuven without actually transgressing his vow.
  If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, and he has nothing to eat, he [the neighbor] can go to the shopkeeper and say, “So-and-so is forbidden by vow to benefit from me, and I do not know what to do.” The shopkeeper may then provide for him, and come and receive payment from him [the neighbor].  Shimon, who may not benefit at all from Reuven, has nothing to eat, and Reuven wishes to help him.  Reuven cannot, of course, give directly to Shimon, but he may go to a shopkeeper and tell him that Shimon has nothing to eat, and that Reuven would like to do something. Reuven should not directly tell the shopkeeper to give food to Shimon, but rather should hint at it.  The shopkeeper may then provide Shimon with food and receive payment from Reuven, without Shimon breaking his vow.  The crucial factor here is that Reuven did not actually tell the shopkeeper to feed Shimon.
  If he had to build his house, or his fence to set up, or his field to harvest, he [the neighbor] may go to laborers, and say, “So-and-so is forbidden by vow to benefit from me, and I do not know what to do.’ They may then work for him and come and receive wages from him [the neighbor].  In this case, Shimon had to (re)build his house, set up a fence, or harvest his field, but did not have any money to pay workers.  Again, Reuven wants to help him (Reuven is quite a generous guy), but cannot do so directly because of the vow.  As he did with the shopkeeper in the previous section, he may hint to laborers that Shimon needs work done for him, and that he would like to help Shimon, but doesn’t know what to do.  The workers may then go to Shimon and afterwards collect their wages from Reuven. The mishnah needs to teach the second clause, even though the ruling should have been obvious after the first clause, in order to emphasize that this type of “legal fiction” is permitted even in cases not involving food.  Since the case in section two is less likely to be a matter of life and death, we might have thought that in this case, the legal fiction would not be permitted.  The mishnah therefore emphasizes that it is.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a situation where Shimon who may not benefit from Reuven, is walking on the road with Reuven and Shimon runs out of food to eat.  The question is, how can Reuven give food to Shimon without breaking the vow?
  If they are walking together on the road, and he has nothing to eat, he can make a gift to a third person, and he is permitted [to eat] it.  In this scenario, there is a third person walking on the road with Reuven and Shimon.  Reuven may give the food to the third person, with the assumption that Shimon will take it from him.  As long as Reuven does not give the food directly to Shimon, the vow has not been transgressed.
  If there is no one else with them, he may put it on a stone or a wall and say, “This is free to whomever desires it”, and the other takes and eats it. Rabbi Yose prohibits this.  According to the first opinion, if there is no third person walking with them, Reuven may put the food down and declare it legally ownerless and then Shimon may take it.  Although it is obvious that Shimon is going to take the food, and no one has taken possession of it since Reuven had possession, this is still permitted. Rabbi Yose forbids this, and considers it to be no different than Reuven giving directly to Shimon.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  In the time of the Mishnah, people’s homes opened into jointly possessed courtyards.  The custom was to use the courtyard for various purposes, including cooking, grinding wheat and raising chickens.  However, each resident could prevent the others from using the courtyard for such purposes.
  Our mishnah discusses a situation in which either both or one of the owners of the courtyard has taken a vow not to benefit from the other.  The question is, can they still use the courtyard?
  If  joint owners [of a courtyard] made a vow not to benefit from one another, they may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says:  This one enters his own property and this one enters his own property.  If both owners of the courtyard vowed not to benefit from the other, according to the first opinion neither may enter the courtyard at all.  As we learned above (4:1), one who is not allowed by vow to benefit from another, may not walk on his property.  Since the property is jointly owned, each one would be entering the other’s property. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob holds that since in general both people can enter the courtyard, neither is really entering someone else’s property.  At each point where he stands he could claim that this part is his.  Therefore, both can enter the courtyard.
  And both are forbidden to set up a mill-stone or an oven or raise chickens.  Neither may use the courtyard for any of its normal uses.  Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob would agree with this, since putting any of these things in the courtyard requires the neighbor’s permission, and in this case, permission cannot be granted.
  If [only] one was forbidden by vow to benefit from the other, he may not enter the court. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: He can say to the other, “I am entering into my own, and I am not entering into yours.’  If only one owner is prohibited by vow from benefiting from the other, he may not enter the courtyard. Again, Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob holds that this is permitted.
  They force the one who vowed to sell his share [of the courtyard].  In such a case, the one who vowed must sell his share of the courtyard, lest he come to use the courtyard, which even Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob prohibits.  However, this is only true if he himself swore not to benefit from his neighbor.  If his neighbor swore that he should not benefit from him, he is not forced to sell his share of the courtyard.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.  It again deals with the question of joint ownership of courtyards.
  If a man from the street was forbidden by vow to benefit from one of them, he may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: He can say to him, “I am entering into your friend’s and not into yours.” Reuven and Shimon share a courtyard.  Levi is prohibited by vow from benefiting from Reuven.  According to the first opinion, Levi may not enter the courtyard, because by doing so, he would be benefiting from Reuven’s property. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says the same thing which he said in yesterday’s mishnah. Levi can enter the courtyard and tell Reuven that he is not benefiting from his property but rather from Shimon’s.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  In the previous mishnayoth we learned rulings regarding entering a courtyard for someone who by vow is prohibited from receiving benefit from his neighbor.  In this mishnah we learn the rules regarding other types of property:  a bath-house, an olive press, a house and a field.
  If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, and he owns a bath-house or an olive press which is leased to someone in the town, and he has an interest in them, he is forbidden [to make use of them]; If [he does] not [have an interest in them], he is permitted.  Shimon is prohibited by vow from receiving benefit from Reuven, who owns a bath-house or an olive press.  If Reuven rents the bath-house or olive press to a third party, but still retains an interest in them, for instance he gets a percentage of the profits or he did not rent out the whole thing, then Shimon may not enter them, for they are still partially Reuven’s property. However, if he retains no interest, and receives only a fixed sum as rent, then Shimon may enter.  In the latter case when Shimon enters, he is entering a third person’s property, and it is therefore permitted.
  If a man says to his neighbor, “Konam, if I enter your house”, or “[Konam] if I purchase your field”, and then [the owner] dies or sells it to another, he is permitted [to enter or buy it]; [But if he says] “Konam, if I enter this house”, or “[Konam] if I purchase this field”, and [the owner] dies or sells it to another, he is forbidden.  If Shimon says to Reuven, “Konam if I enter your house” or “Konam if I purchase your field”, when Reuven dies or sells the property, Shimon may enter his house or buy his field, because it is no longer Reuven’s house or field.  However, if he says “Konam, if I enter this house”, or “Konam, if I purchase this field”, he may not enter the house or buy the field even when they no longer belong to Reuven.  In this case the house and the field itself are prohibited to him, no matter who owns them.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The point of this mishnah is to teach the status of people who may not benefit from one another vis a vis public property.  There are two types of public property mentioned in our mishnah and explained in the following mishnah.  The first is property which belongs to the people of a given city and the second is property which belongs to all of Israel.  Included in the latter category are wells dug by pilgrims from Babylonia coming up to Jerusalem.  Hence, the last category is called  “things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia”.
  [If a man says to his neighbor] “Behold, I am herem to you” the opposite party is forbidden [to derive benefit from the one who swore]. “Behold, you are herem to me” the one who swore is forbidden. “Behold, I am [herem] to you, and you are [herem] to me”, both are forbidden.  The first section of the mishanh basically teaches an additional way in which people may prohibit others from benefiting from themselves, or prohibit themselves from benefiting from others.  Each may declare himself “herem” forbidden property, to the other, or the other “herem” to himself.  In such a way Reuven may prohibit Shimon from benefiting from him, and he may prohibit himself from benefiting from Shimon, or he may even do both in the same statement.
  Both are permitted [to enjoy the use of] those things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem], but are forbidden [the use of] things that belong to that town.  Although they may not benefit from each other, they may each still use “things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem]”.  Each individual Jew is not considered an owner of these things, or even a partner in their ownership.  Rather they belong collectively to the children of Israel. However, town property is owned in partnership by all of the members of the town. Therefore, it is treated like the common courtyard mentioned in mishnayoth one and two.  If Reuven and Shimon cannot benefit from one another, then they may not use the commonly owned town property.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah explains the categories mentioned at the end of the previous mishnah.  It also discusses how people can avoid some of the difficult consequences of being forbidden to derive benefit from one another.
  What are the things that belong to those that came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem]? For example the Temple Mount and the Temple courtyards and the well in the middle of the road.  The things that belong to “those who came up from Babylonia” are mostly holy property, for example the Temple and the courtyards.  Also included in this category are the wells dug for the pilgrims so that they would have water on their way over.  Those who may not receive benefit from one another may still benefit from this type of property since individuals do not own shares in them, rather they are owned collectively.
  What are the things that belong to that town? For example the public square, the bath-house, the synagogue, the ark, and the [sacred] scrolls.  The city property includes most structures built specifically for a certain city, including the town square, synagogue, ark for keeping the scrolls and the scrolls themselves. Note that although these things are religious items, they still are jointly owned by the people of the city and not by all of Israel.  Therefore, if people cannot benefit from one another, they may not benefit from this property as well.
  And he should assign his portion to the Patriarch. Rabbi Judah says: it is the same whether he assigns it to the Patriarch or to a private individual. But what is the difference between one who assigns it to the Patriarch and one who assigns it to a private individual? If he assigns it to the Patriarch, he need not [formally] confer title. But the Sages say: both this and this  require formal conferring of title, they mentioned the Patriarch in particular as this is usual. Rabbi Judah said: The Galileans need not assign [their portion], because their ancestors have already done so for them.  This next section gives advice on how to deal with a situation in which Reuven cannot benefit from all municipal property because he cannot benefit from Shimon’s property and likewise Shimon may not benefit from municipal property because of Reuven’s partial ownership.  After all, this could make life quite difficult.  The solution is that both write out a document assigning their shares to the Patriarch, so that he owns their share of the municipal property.  In this way, they will not be benefiting from each other’s property but from the Patriarch’s. Rabbi Judah says that they need not assign the property to the Patriarch but rather may assign it to any individual.  The only difference between the two is that the transaction with the Patriarch does not require any formal transaction, whereas a transaction with an ordinary person does. The other Sages hold that no matter whom one assigns the property, a formal transaction is required.  The only reason that the earlier halakhah mentioned assigning the property to the Patriarch was that this was the normal way of doing things.  In other words, it is a suggestion and not mandatory.  In contrast, Rabbi Judah would say that the halakhah mentions the Patriarch because it is easier to assign him property than to an ordinary individual.  Nevertheless, he too would hold that this is not mandatory. Finally, Rabbi Judah says that in the Galilee the Patriarch is already the formal owner of all municipal property, and hence the entire problem will not arise.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a subject already dealt with in 4:8, how a person who cannot benefit from another person may nevertheless derive benefit from him by there being a third party intermediary.  Our mishnah teaches that when Reuven gives the property to Levi so that Shimon who cannot receive benefit from Reuven, may use the property, the gift needs to be complete. In reality, Levi need not do with the property as Reuven requested.  A poignant story shall illustrate this.
  If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor and has nothing to eat, he may give it [the food] to a third party, and he is permitted to use it.  This halakhah was basically taught above in mishnah 4:8.  It is brought here as an introduction to the story.
  It happened to one in Beth Horon that his father was forbidden to benefit from him. Now he [the son] was giving his son in marriage and he said to his neighbor, “The courtyard and the banquet are give to you as a gift, but they are yours only that my father may come and feast with us at the banquet.” He said to him, “If they are mine, let them be dedicated to heaven!” [The son] responded, “But I did not give you my property to dedicate it to heaven.” [The other] responded, “You gave me yours so that you and your father might eat and drink together and become reconciled to one another, while the sin [of a broken vow] should devolve upon his (i.e. head.” When the matter came before the Sages, they ruled: every gift which is not [so given] that if he [the recipient] dedicates it, it is dedicated, is no gift [at all].  The father could not enter his son’s courtyard or eat of his food, because he was forbidden by oath to benefit from his son. It is unclear how this situation arose, whether the father or the son initiated the vow.  In any case, there was clearly strife in their past.  Now that his own son is marrying, the son wants his father to be able to attend the wedding and join in the feast.  To solve the problem he gives the courtyard and the food to a third party.  However, the third party declares that it is all dedicated to the Temple, which would make it impossible to use for a feast.  The Sages rule that since the son does not want the dedication to be valid, he did not really give it to the third party.  Therefore it is still his, and his father may not come to the wedding. This is truly a sad situation, and it is clearly meant to demonstrate what disastrous results may arise from rashly-made vows taken against loved ones.  Indeed, it may still ring as a warning in our ears, not to let our disagreements with family members cross the line of no return.  It is a message that unfortunately too many families need.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  As I previously explained, when we interpret what the one who swore intended by his vow, we interpret his words according to the normal way in which people talk.  Our mishnah and those that follow explain how certain vows are to be interpreted based on this principle.
  He who vows [not to eat] what is “cooked [mebushal] is permitted what is roasted or seethed.  In Mishnaic Hebrew there are three types of cooking:  boiling, roasting and seething.  The latter refers to cooking something in water until it is really well-done (the way they used to serve vegetables in school lunches).  Since people distinguish between these types of cooking, one who swears not to eat one type, is not prohibited from the other.
  If he says, “Konam if I taste any cooked dish [tabshil]” he is forbidden [to eat] food loosely cooked in a pot, but is permitted [to eat] food solidly-cooked. He may also eat a lightly boiled egg and gourds put in ashes.  If he says that he is forbidden to eat a “cooked dish”, “tabshil” in Hebrew, he may not eat food cooked loosely, such as food with a sauce. However, he may eat food cooked in a pot that comes out solid, such as cereals.  Furthermore, the Talmud explains that “tabshil” refers to food eaten with bread, such as hummous or other spreads.  Food not eaten with bread, such as hot cereal, is not called “tabshil”. He may eat a lightly-boiled egg and bitter gourds mixed with ashes which sweeten them since these are also not called “tabshil”. (This doesn’t really sound like it tastes so good, but then again, taste is culturally dependent.)
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a person who vows not to eat food which goes into a pot.  The mishnah relates to two such types of food; 1)  food that is totally boiled in the pot; 2)  food that is lightly cooked in a pot and is finished cooking somewhere else, such as in a frying pan or in an oven.
  He who vows abstinence from food prepared in a pot, is forbidden only from food boiled in a pot;  If a person takes a vow forbidding himself from eating anything “prepared in a pot” he is only forbidden from eating things totally prepared in the pot, meaning that they were completely boiled in the pot.  An example would be a grain dish, which in Talmudic times was boiled in water.  He would still be permitted to eat things which had preliminary stages of their cooking in a pot and were later baked or fried.
  But if he says, “Konam that I taste whatever goes down into a pot”, he is forbidden everything prepared in a pot.  However, if he says “whatever goes down into a pot”, he is forbidden to eat anything that has at any time been in a pot.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  [He who vows abstinence] from what is pickled is forbidden only pickled vegetables; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything pickled”, he is forbidden all pickled.[He who vows abstinence] from what is seethed is forbidden only seethed meat; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything seethed” he is forbidden every thing seethed.[He who vows abstinence] from what is roasted is forbidden only roasted meat, the words of Rabbi Judah. [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything roasted” he is forbidden anything roasted.[He who vows abstinence] from what is salted is forbidden only salted fish; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything salted” he is forbidden anything salted.In all of the clauses in this mishnah there is one type of food that is the typical example of food prepared in a certain way, yet there also exist other foods prepared in the same way.  This is similar to the way we say “pickle” to refer to a pickled cucumber, or a “roast” to refer to roasted meat.  There are other foods that are pickled but still no one says “I’ll have a pickled cucumber” because a pickle is a pickled cucumber.The mishnah teaches whether a person who swears abstinence from a food prepared in a certain way is prohibited from all food prepared that way, or just the food that is usually referred to as being prepared in that way.Section one:  “Pickled” normally refers to pickled vegetables.  Hence one who vows not to eat “what is pickled” is forbidden only to eat pickled vegetables.  However, if he says “Konam if I taste anything pickled”, since he his statement applies that he wishes to forbid himself to anything pickled he may not eat anything “pickled”.This same paradigm applies to all of the sections of the mishnah.  “Seethed” (overly boiled) normally refers to seethed meat.  “Roasted” normally refers to roasted meat.  “Salted” normally refers to salted fish.  All of these cases are exactly like the case of “pickled” as explained above.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses vows of abstinence from types of fish.
  ‘[Konam,] if I taste fish or fishes,” he is forbidden [to eat] them, whether large or small, salted or unsalted, raw or cooked. But he may eat chopped terith and brine.  If one forbids himself to eat either “fish” or “fishes” he is forbidden to eat all kinds of fish.  Since he used both plural and singular, he clearly intended to forbid himself from all fish.  However he may eat chopped terith, because that is not called fish.  Although I don’t know exactly what this was, I assume that it was so chopped up that people didn’t really think of it as fish. He may also eat the brine, the liquid that comes out of fish (sounds gross to me, but certain members of my family do seem to enjoy this).
  He who vows [abstinence] from zahanah is forbidden chopped terith, but may eat brine and pickled fish brine.  Zahanah is a foul-smelling mixture of different chopped fish, and hence one who vows not to eat zahanah, may also not eat chopped terith.  However, he may still eat different types of brine.
  He who vows [abstinence] from chopped terith may not eat of brine and pickled fish brine.  Chopped terith includes in it brine and  pickled fish brine.  Therefore one who forbids himself from eating chopped terith may not eat any type of brine either.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses one who vows abstinence from different milk products.
  He who vows [abstinence] from milk is permitted to eat curds. But Rabbi Yose forbids it.  A person who vowed abstinence from milk may still eat curds, the water that remains after milk has been curdled into cheese.  This is not called milk and hence is not forbidden.  Rabbi Yose disagrees.
  [He who vows abstinence] “from curds,” is permitted milk.  Again, curds are not considered to be milk and hence one who forbids himself from eating curds may still drink milk.
  Abba Shaul says: he who vows abstinence from cheese, is prohibited to eat [cheese], whether salted or unsalted.  A vow of abstinence from cheese forbids one from eating any kind of cheese.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The first part of our mishnah discusses what is prohibited when one vows to abstain from meat.  The second part of the mishnah discusses the problem of a forbidden food (in this case forbidden through a vow) becoming mixed up with other permitted foods.
  He who vows [abstinence] from meat may eat broth and meat sediment. But Rabbi Judah prohibits.  One who vows not to eat meat, may still eat broth and the pieces of meat that stick to the pot (meat sediment) for those are not considered to be what the person intended when he vowed to abstain from “meat”. Rabbi Judah says that even the broth and meat sediment are prohibited.
  Rabbi Judah said: it once happened that Rabbi Tarfon prohibited me from eating [even the] eggs boiled [with the meat]. They replied:  That is so.  When is this true? When he says “This meat is prohibited to me.” For if one vows [to abstain] from something, and it is mixed up with another thing, if there is a sufficient [amount of the prohibited food] to impart its taste [to the other] it  is forbidden.  To support his opinion, Rabbi Judah tells a story of how Rabbi Tarfon prohibited him from having even the eggs boiled with the meat.  The reason is that the eggs had absorbed some of the taste of the meat.  If even the eggs are prohibited, obviously the broth and the meat sediment should be prohibited as well. The Sages respond that the case where Rabbi Tarfon prohibited the eggs proves their point, for in that case the person said “This meat is prohibited to me” and not “Konam, the meat that I eat.”  In the former case, he may not eat anything that has the taste of the prohibited meat, including the eggs cooked with it.  However, in the latter case, his intention was to abstain only from things called “meat” and not from broth or meat sediments.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to illustrate the principle learned in yesterday’s mishnah.  If one vows abstinence from a type of food, he may not eat anything which is called by that name.  However, he may eat derivatives of the food as long as they are called by a different name.  But, if one vows abstinence from a specific piece of food, i.e. “this piece of meat” or “this wine” he is forbidden to eat not only that piece of food but anything that has derived taste from it.
  The mishnah discusses wine, grapes, olives and olive oil.
  He who vows [abstinence] from wine, may eat food which contains the taste of wine. If he says, “Konam if I taste this wine”, and it falls into food, if it is sufficient to impart its taste [to the food] it is forbidden.  If he vows to abstain from wine, he may still eat food that has wine in it, because it is not called “wine”.  However, if he vows to abstain from “this wine” he may not eat anything which has received some taste from that specific wine.
  He who vows [abstinence] from grapes is permitted wine; from olives, is permitted oil. If he says, “Konam if I taste these olives and grapes”, he is forbidden to eat them and [the liquids] that come out of them.  Although grapes are generally made into wine and olives into olive oil, one who vows not to eat grapes or olives may still drink wine and use olive oil.  However, if he forbids specific grapes or olives, he may not eat anything to which they impart their taste.  Obviously, this would include wine made from the grapes or oil made from the olives.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Employing the example of dates and date honey, and winter grapes and winter grape vinegar, the mishnah discusses food derivatives that still partially retain the name of the foods from which they derive.  An example today might be apples and apple juice.  This differs from wine and oil (in the mishnah “oil” always refers to olive oil), which are not called “grape wine” or “olive oil”.
  He who vows abstinence from dates is permitted date honey; from winter grapes, is permitted winter-grape vinegar. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said: if it bears the name of its origin, and he vows to abstain from it,  he is forbidden [to benefit] from what comes from it. But the Sages permit it. He who vows abstinence from dates is permitted date honey; from winter grapes, is permitted winter-grape vinegar. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said: if it bears the name of its origin, and he vows to abstain from it,  he is forbidden [to benefit] from what comes from it. But the Sages permit it.  According to the sages, whose opinion is expressed here and at the end of the mishnah, although “date honey” and “winter grape vinegar” are called by the same name as “dates” and “winter grapes”, they are permitted to one who vowed to abstain from dates or winter grapes.  [Winter grapes are a type of grape that ripens in late fall and are only used for making vinegar.]  We assume that when he prohibited dates or winter grapes to himself, his intention was the dates or winter grapes themselves, and not anything that derives from them. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra says that since they still retain the name of dates or winter-grapes, they are forbidden.  This would be true in any case of a food which retains the name of the food from which it derives.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that if a person vows to abstain from a type of food, he may still eat another type of food that bears the same name, if that other food also has an accompanying name and is not called by the name itself.  This rule will be clear from the examples.
  He who vows abstinence from wine is permitted apple-wine; from oil, is permitted sesame oil; from honey, is permitted date honey; from vinegar, is permitted winter grape vinegar; from leeks, is permitted porrets; from vegetables, he is permitted field-vegetables, because it is an accompanying name. In all of the cases in this mishnah, a person vows abstinence from a certain food, but may still eat another food that has the same name, but also has an accompanying name.  For instance, when a person vows to abstain from wine, his intention is grape wine and not apple wine.  The same is true for honey, which is normally from bees and therefore date honey, which is not called “honey” is permitted. Porrets are a type of leek, but are not called “leeks”. Field-vegetables are vegetables that grow on their own in the fields.  They are not called “vegetables”, whereas garden-grown vegetables are called “vegetables”.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who vows to abstain from certain foods may still have other foods that have the same name, if they also have an accompanying name.  Today’s mishnah teaches that one who vows to abstain from certain other foods, may nevertheless also be prohibited from having foods which are in those foods.
  [He who vows abstinence] from cabbage is forbidden asparagus; from asparagus, is permitted cabbage; From grits, is forbidden grits pottage; Rabbi Yose permits it; from grits pottage is permitted grits. From grits pottage, is forbidden garlic; Rabbi Yose permits it; from garlic, he is permitted grits pottage. From lentils, is forbidden lentil cakes; Rabbi Yose permits them; from lentil cakes, is permitted.  In these cases one food includes other food, but the inclusion is not mutual.  Cabbage (at least in Hebrew) includes asparagus.  Therefore, one who vows not to have cabbage must also not have asparagus.  However, asparagus does not include cabbage, and therefore one who vows not to have asparagus, may still have cabbage. “Grits pottage” is a dish that includes grits, oil and garlic.  According to one opinion, since people sometimes call “grits pottage”, “grits”, one who vows not to have “grits pottage” may also not have “grits”.  Rabbi Yose says that the two are usually called by different names. One who vows not to have “grits pottage” may also not have the garlic put into the pottage.  Rabbi Yose disagrees and holds that by his vow he did not intend to include the garlic and therefore garlic is permitted.  All agree that if he vowed to abstain from the garlic he may still have the pottage. One who vows not to have lentils may not have lentil cakes, for lentils are the prime ingredient of lentil cakes.  Rabbi Yose again disagrees.  However, all agree that if one vows not to have lentil cakes he may still have regular lentils.  We can see a trend by now.  One who vows not to have the main ingredient of a certain dish, may not eat the dish or the main ingredient separate from the dish.  However, one who vows not to have the dish, may eat the main ingredient separate from the dish.
  [If one says] “Konam, if I eat wheat [or] wheats,” he is forbidden both flour and bread. “If I eat grit [or], grits,” he is forbidden both raw and cooked. Rabbi Judah says: [If one says], “Konam, if I eat grits or wheat,” he may chew them raw.  According to some commentators, the person vowing in this section used double language, and is therefore prohibited from wheat in any form.  Others explain that the mishnah refers to a person who said “wheat” or “wheats” (which is proper diction in Hebrew), but not both.  The same rule holds true for grit or grits. Rabbi Judah holds that one who vows not to have wheat or grits may still chew raw grains.  “Wheat” refers to flour and “grits” refers to semi-processed kernels.  Neither word is generally used to refer to raw, unprocessed kernels, and therefore they are still permitted to him.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah demonstrates one means by which the sages determined what a typical person’s intent might be when he prohibits to himself a specific food.
  He who vows abstinence from vegetables is permitted gourds. Rabbi Akiba prohibits. They said to him: And does not a man say to his messenger “Bring me vegetables,” and he replies, “I could find only gourds.” He said to them:  That is so! But would he say, “I could find only pulse?” For gourds are included in vegetables, while pulse is not.  The argument in this mishnah is whether or not one who vows to abstain from vegetables must also abstain from gourds.  In other words, are gourds a type of vegetable?  The Sages argue that gourds are not included in vegetables, whereas Rabbi Akiva argues that they are. In order to prove their point, the sages point out to Rabbi Akiva that when a man sends his messenger to the market to buy vegetables, he might come back and say “I could find only gourds.”  Gourds are not vegetables, and therefore he did not buy them. Rabbi Akiva responds that the messenger’s words prove his point.  The messenger is asking if he should buy the gourds, because the gourds are included in vegetables.  He would not say “I could find only pulse (legumes)” because pulse is different from vegetables. In summary, Rabbi Akiva finds the hypothetical response of the messenger to imply that gourds are included under the category of vegetables, whereas the rabbis find his reply to mean that they are not.
  He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans but permitted the dry species.  Although the mishnah just stated that pulse is not included under the category of vegetables, wet Egyptian beans are.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Yesterday’s mishnah defined “vegetables”.  Today’s mishnah defines two other terms:  “produce” (tevuah) and “grain” (dagan).  Note that the Hebrew words are not exactly equivalent to their English translations.
  He who vows abstinence from grain is forbidden dry Egyptian beans, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: only the five species of grain are forbidden him.  According to Rabbi Meir “grain” includes dry Egyptian beans, which we learned yesterday were not included under the category of “vegetables”.  The Sages disagree and say that “grain” refers only to one of the five species:  wheat, barley, spelt, rye and oats.
  Rabbi Meir says: He who vows abstinence from produce ( is forbidden only the five species; but one who vows abstinence from grain (, is forbidden all; yet he is permitted the fruits of the tree and vegetables.  Whereas the Sages held that “grain” refers to the five species, Rabbi Meir holds that “produce” refers to the five species.  Under the category of “grain” Rabbi Meir includes other things besides the five species, including pulse, as we learned in section one.  The only thing not included in “produce” are fruits and vegetables.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  After having discussed at length vows of abstinence from food, the mishnah now discusses vows of abstinence from garments.
  He who vows not to wear garments is permitted sack-cloth, curtain, and blanket wrapping.  Sack-cloth, curtain and blanket-wrapping are not considered “garments”.  Therefore, if one vows not to wear “garments”, he may still cover himself with these rough cloths.
  If he says, “Konam, if wool comes upon me,” he may cover himself with wool shearings; [Konam] if flax comes upon me”, he may cover himself with stalks of flax.  In this section we learn that if a person vows not to cover himself with a finished type of material, he may still wear the unfinished product.  Thus, if he vows not to wear wool, he may still wear unprocessed wool shearings.  If he vows not to wear flax (linen), he may still cover himself with unprocessed stalks of flax.
  Rabbi Judah says: It all depends upon the person who vows, [thus:] if he was bearing a burden [with wool or flax] and perspires and had bad odor, and he said “Konam if wool or flax come upon me,” he may wear them, but not throw them [as a bundle] over his back.  Rabbi Judah states a general rule applicable to the interpretation of vows; the situation in which the person vowed must be taken into account.  Normally, when one vows that wool or flax should not come upon him, he means that he shall not wear them.  However, if a person was carrying a heavy bundle of flax or wool, and sweating and emitting a foul odor because of his intense perspiration, and then said, “Konam, if wool or flax come upon me”, his intention was that he should not carry them.  In such a situation, he may still wear them, but not throw them behind his back as a bundle.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses one who vows not to use a house or the upper story of a house.
  One who vows not to benefit from a house is permitted the upper story, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: the upper story is included in “house”. He who vows not to benefit from the upper story is permitted the use of the house. According to Rabbi Meir, when a person vows not to benefit from a “house” he may still make use of the upper story in that house.  The Sages disagree and hold that the upper story is included in the house and therefore, one who vows not to use the house may also not use the upper story.  However, one who vows not to use the upper story, may according to all opinions, still use the house.  This is because the upper story is a specific part of the house, and hence one who vowed not to use it, certainly did not intend to prohibit upon himself the entire house.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Section one of this mishnah deals with the definition of a bed and a couch.  Section two deals with defining the borders of a city and a house, in cases where a person has vowed not to enter either.
  One who vows abstinence from a bed is permitted a couch, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say:  A couch is included in “bed”. If he vows abstinence from a couch, he is permitted the use of a bed.  This section is similar to the yesterday’s mishnah and the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.  Rabbi Meir holds that a couch and a bed are two separate items, and one who vows abstinence from one is permitted the other. The Sages hold that a “bed” is a collective name and includes couches.  Therefore, one who vows abstinence from beds, is also prohibited from deriving benefit from couches.  However, a “couch” is specific, and therefore one who vows not to derive benefit from couches may still derive benefit from beds.
  One who vows not to benefit from a town, may enter the town’s [Shabbat] border but may not enter its outskirts. But one who vows not to benefit from a house, is forbidden [only] from the door-stop and inwards.  This section deals with the border of areas which have been prohibited by a vow.  One who vows not to enter a city, may still enter into the city’s Shabbat border.  This is a perimeter around a city of 2000 amot, which is the distance a person can walk outside of the city on Shabbat.  In Numbers 35:5, this area is referred to as “outside the city.”  However, he may not enter its “outskirts”, a perimeter of 70 amot and four tefachim outside of the city.  The Shabbat borders are measured from the end of the outskirts, and hence the outskirts are considered part of the city. In contrast, one who vows not to benefit from a house, may not enter from the place of the door and inwards. However, he may go onto the porch even though this area is similar to the “outskirts” of a city.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah teaches that sometimes, when a person prohibits a certain fruit to himself, he may not have that which grows from the fruit or that which is exchanged for the fruit.  However, on other occasions only the actual fruit itself is prohibited.
  [If one says] “Konam be these fruits to me”, “Konam they are for my mouth,” or “Konam they are to my mouth,” he is forbidden [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows from them.  The three languages used in this section prohibit the one who vowed to receive any benefit from the fruit.  This would include anything exchanged for that fruit or anything that grows from the fruit.
  [If one says “Konam] if I eat or taste of them,” he is permitted [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows of them, if it is a thing of which the seed itself perishes, but if the seed does not perish, even that which grows out of that which [first] grew from it is forbidden.  However, if he says  “Konam if I eat or taste of these fruits”, he has only caused a prohibition on these fruits themselves.  He has not created a blanket prohibition of receiving benefit from the fruits. Therefore, he may eat things that are exchanged for these fruits and he may eat things that grow from the seeds of the fruit. However, sometimes there is still a prohibition on deriving benefit from that which grows from the fruit.  In order for what grows from the fruit to be permitted, the original seed must cease to exist.  For instance, if one were to say “Konam if I eat this apple,” he may use the seed to grow a tree and eat the apples from the tree.  However, if the seed doesn’t cease to exist, such as an onion (which they considered to be like a seed) he may not eat what grows from it, because the originally prohibited object still exists.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to teach when things which were exchanged for or grown from things prohibited by vow remain prohibited.  The mishnah began to discuss this topic yesterday, and mishnah seven is largely the same as mishnah six.  The difference is that today’s mishnah deals with the handiwork of a wife, which we learned in Ketuboth, belong to her husband.  The husband can say that anything that she makes is “Konam”, i.e. prohibited to him.
  If one says to his wife, “Konam be the work of your hands to me,” or ”Konam be they for my mouth, or “Konam be they to my mouth”, he is forbidden that which is exchanged for them or grown from them.  Since in this case he has prohibited upon himself anything that is a result of what his wife does, he may not benefit even from what is exchanged for his wife’s handiwork, or what grows from it.  “What grows from it” would refer to a case where she planted a tree. He may not benefit from the tree itself, nor from any trees that come from seeds produced by this tree.
  [If he says “Konam] if I eat or taste [of what they produce],” he is permitted [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows of them, if it is a thing of which the seed itself perishes, but if the seed does not perish, even that which grows out of that which [first] grew from it is forbidden.  In this case, he has prohibited upon himself only the food that his wife makes for him (I’m sure she will be quite insulted!).  Therefore he may sell things that his wife makes for him and then use them to buy other things or he may use things grown from things his wife has made.  Again, this is only true if there is nothing actually left over from the original;  if the seed of the originally prohibited object still remains, the prohibition remains, as we explained yesterday.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss a husband who forbids that which his wife produces.  In the case in our mishnah he sets a time limit for the prohibition.
  [If he says to his wife, “Konam that] what you will produce I will not eat from it until Pesach” or “That what you will produce, I will not wear until Pesach”, he may eat or wear after Pesach that which she produces before Pesach.  In this section he vows not to eat of what she produces or wear things that she makes until Pesach.  However, once Pesach passes he may eat anything she produced and wear anything she made, even before Pesach.  The prohibition was on a time period and not on things made within that time period.
  [If he says to his wife “Konam that] what you produce until Pesach I will not eat”, or “That what you produce until Pesach I will not wear”, what she produces before Pesach he may not eat after Pesach.  In this case the prohibition was on anything made between the time of the vow and Pesach.  In other words, the prohibition was not on the time period but on the objects themselves.  Therefore, these things remain prohibited even after Pesach.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah a husband make’s a vow that if his wife goes to her father’s house before a certain time, she shall not be able to benefit from him for a defined period of time.
  [If he says, “Konam] be any benefit you have from me until Pesach, if you go to your father’s house until the festival [of Sukkot],” if she goes before Pesach she may not benefit from him until Pesach; if she goes after Pesach she is subject to, “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:3).  The husband says to his wife after Sukkot that if she goes to her father’s house before the following Sukkot, she shall be forbidden to have any benefit from his (the husband's) things until Pesach.  If she goes before Pesach to visit her father, she may not benefit from her husband until after Pesach.  After Pesach the prohibitive vow has passed and she may derive benefit from his things. However, there is a problem if she goes to his house after Pesach for the time of prohibition created by the vow has already passed.  Therefore the mishnah teaches that if she did benefit from him before Pesach, she should not go to her father’s house after Pesach.  If she does go, she shall have broken the vow.
  [If he says, “Konam] be any benefit you have from me until the festival [of Sukkot] if you go to your father’s house before Pesach”, if she goes before Pesach, she may not benefit from him until the festival [of Sukkot], but she is permitted to go after Pesach.  If he vows that if she goes to her father’s house before Pesach, she shall not have any benefit from him until Sukkot, if she goes before Pesach she may not benefit from him until Sukkot. However, after Pesach it is permitted for her to go to her father’s house, for he vowed only that she shouldn’t go until Pesach.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a person who sets a limit for his vow of a day, a week, a month, a year or a week of years (seven years, a sabbatical cycle).  The mishnah teaches how long the vow is to last.  As we shall see, this depends on how he expresses his vow, and when the set time is determined to expire.
  [If one vows,] “Konam, if I taste wine today,” he is forbidden only until it gets dark.  “Today” includes only the day time, and therefore by night the one who vowed not to drink wine may drink.
  “This Sabbath,” he is forbidden the whole week and the Sabbath belongs to the past [week];  “Sabbath” in Mishnaic Hebrew can mean “week” and not just the  Sabbath day itself. Therefore, one who vows not to drink wine on the Sabbath is prohibited from drinking all week.  The Sabbath day which follows the week is counted with the previous week.
  “This month,” he is forbidden the whole of that month, and the beginning of the [following] month belongs to the next month.  The first of the new month counts as part of the subsequent month.  Therefore, one who vows not to drink wine all month, may do so on the first of the next month.
  “This year,” he is forbidden the whole year, and the beginning of the [following] year belongs to the next year.  Similarly, the first day of the following year is counted with the following year.
  “This week of years,” he is forbidden the whole of that week of years, and the [following] sabbatical year belongs to the past.  In this section he prohibits himself from drinking wine for an entire cycle of sabbatical years, which is seven in number and is therefore called a week of years.  The sabbatical year, like the Sabbath itself, is considered the last of the years in the cycle and therefore it belongs to the cycle which proceeds it.
  But if he says, “One day,” “One Sabbath,” “One month,” “One year,” [or] “One week of years,” he is forbidden from day to day.  In all of the above cases the one who vowed said, “Today”, “This Sabbath”, “This month” etc., which implies that the prohibition will last until the current day, week, month, etc., expires.  However, if he says “One day”, “One week” etc., the vow must last the duration of the time he mentions.  Therefore, no matter when he vows it will last as long as he said it would.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah discusses various ways one might phrase a vow when one’s intent is for the vow to be completed by or perhaps right after Pesach.  The question asked is, does the language which the one who vowed used mean that the prohibition should include the seven days of the holiday or not?
  [If one vows,] “Until Pesach,” he is forbidden until it arrives;  If he says “Until Pesach” his intention is that the vow should last until Pesach begins.  “Until” in the everyday speech of people means “until” but not including.
  “Until it is [Pesach],” he is forbidden until it is completed.  However, “Until it is Pesach” would include the entire holiday, because the entire holiday is still Pesach.  Therefore, the vow lasts until Pesach is completed.
  “Until before Pesach,”:  Rabbi Meir says: he is forbidden until it arrives; Rabbi Yose says: he is forbidden until it is completed.  There is a debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose over the meaning of the phrase “Until before Pesach.”  According to the former, this means before it arrives, whereas according to the latter this means until before the last hour of Pesach.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah provides a general rule for determining when time bound vows end.
  [If he vows,] “Until the grain harvest, “Until the grape harvest”, or, “Until the olive harvest,” he is forbidden only until it arrives.  As we shall learn in the second half of this mishnah, since harvests do not have set times, no matter how he vows, he will only be prohibited until the beginning of the harvest.
  This is a general rule: Whatever has a fixed time and one vows, “Until it arrives,” he is forbidden until it arrives; if he says, “Until it be”, he is forbidden until it is over. But whatever has no fixed time, whether he says, “Until it be,” or “Until it arrives,” he is forbidden only until it arrives.  The first half of this rule matches what we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.  Since Pesach has a set time, if he said “Until it be” he is forbidden until Pesach is over. The second half of the rule matches what we learned in the above section.  Since harvests have no set time, he is permitted as soon as the harvest begins, no matter how he vowed.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The first section of the mishnah deals with a person who vows not to eat something until summer, which here is defined as referring to the summer harvest of figs, begins or ends.  The second section teaches about someone who sets his vow to end at the beginning of the grain harvest.
  [If he says,] “Until the summer,”  or, “Until the summer shall be,” [he is forbidden] until people begin to bring [the figs] home in baskets. “Until the summer [harvest] is past,” [he is forbidden] until the knives are folded up [and put away].  The summer is the time of the harvest of figs.  Since this is not a fixed time, it matters not whether he says “Until” or “Until it shall be”.  In either case, the summer harvest is considered to begin when people begin to bring in figs in baskets.  Merely bringing in a few loose figs would not be sufficient to consider the harvest as having begun.  The harvest is considered over when the knives used to cut the figs, have been folded up and put away for the next season.
  [If he vows,] “Until the harvest,” [he is forbidden] until the people begin reaping the wheat harvest, but not the barley harvest.  If one vows not to eat something “Until the harvest”, he is assumed to be referring to the wheat harvest, which is “the” harvest, and not the barley harvest.  Had he wished to refer to the barley harvest, he would have had to specify so.
  It all depends on the place where he vowed:  if in hill-country, the hill-country [harvest]; if in the valley, the valley harvest.  The wheat harvest arrives at different times in different zones.  Therefore, the beginning or end of his vow will depend upon the times of harvest typical in the zone in which he vows.  If he was in the hill-country, the vow follows the harvest of the hill-country; if in the valley, it follows the harvest of the valley.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The first two sections of our mishnah deal with a person who makes a vow which is to be completed either when the rains begin or when they end.  It is important to remember that in Israel it only rains from the fall through the spring, roughly speaking from Sukkot until Pesach.  In the late spring and summer it almost never rains, and even on the rare occasion that it does, such rain does not benefit the crops.
  The third section deals with the problem of leap (intercalated) years. The Jewish year consists of twelve lunar months.  To adjust the lunar calendar to the solar calendar, about once every three years an extra month is added. This month is called “second Adar”, for it falls after first Adar, the last month of the year (if we count from Nisan, as the Torah does).
  The final section of the mishnah returns to the topic taken up above in mishnah 2, about when vows end if they were made “until Pesach.”
  [If one vows,] “Until the rains,” [or], “Until the rains shall be”, [he is forbidden] until the second rainfall descends. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: until the [normal] time for the [second] rainfall is reached.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, if one vows “Until the rains,” or “Until the rains shall be,” the “rains” is understood to refer to the “second rainfall.”  In ancient Israel they divided the rainfall into three seasons (all within the rainy season).  In the Talmud they dispute when the second rainfall is; some say the seventh of Heshvan, some the 17th, and others the 23rd.  Therefore, according to this opinion, he would have to wait for this date (according to whichever date is the accepted opinion) and then for it to rain. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the vow is over when the time is reached (whatever that date may be), even if it has not yet rained.
  [If one vows,] “Until the rains cease,” [he is forbidden] until all of Nisan is completed, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says:  Until Pesach is over.  If he vows “Until the rains cease,”, Rabbi Meir holds that he must wait until Nisan is completed, for he holds that all of Nisan is still considered the rainy season.  In contrast, Rabbi Judah considers the rainy season to have ended after Pesach, about a week before the end of Nisan.
  [If one vows,] “Konam that I taste not wine for a year”, if the year is intercalated, he is forbidden during the year and its extension. [If one says,] “Until the beginning of Adar,” [he is forbidden] until the beginning of the first Adar; “Until the end of Adar,” until the end of the first Adar.  If one vows not to have wine “this year”, if the Sages decide that the year must have an extra month added, he is prohibited during that month as well.  The second month of Adar is considered part of the year.  However, if he connects his vow to “Adar”, his intention was the first Adar, and therefore he is only prohibited until the beginning or end of Adar. This is probably because when he made his vow he did not know whether or not there would have even been a second Adar.  Hence, his intention was clearly “first Adar”.
  Rabbi Judah says: [If one vows, “Konam that I taste no wine until Pesach shall be,” he is forbidden only until Pesach night, for he meant until the hour when people usually drink wine.  Rabbi Judah holds that “Until Pesach shall be” refers to right before Pesach night actually begins.  Some commentators hold that Rabbi Judah disagrees with the opinion in mishnah two, according to which “Until Pesach shall be” refers to the end of Pesach, and therefore the vow lasts until Pesach is over.  Other commentators hold that Rabbi Judah does not disagree with that opinion but rather the two mishnayoth refer to vows on two different vows, wine and other things.  Rabbi Judah holds that if he says “Until Pesach shall be,” with regard to other prohibitions, his intention is until Pesach is over.  However, with wine, since people drink wine on Pesach night, his intention was only until Pesach begins.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  At the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that “Until Pesach shall be” refers to Pesach eve, for that is when people are accustomed to drinking wine at the Seder.  Our mishnah lists other times of the year when people customarily eat certain things, namely meat on Yom Kippur eve and garlic on Friday eve.
  If he vows, “Konam that I taste no meat until the fast [i.e., Yom Kippur] shall be,” he is forbidden only until the eve of the fast, for he merely meant until people usually eat meat.  On the afternoon before the fast of Yom Kippur it is customary to eat meat.  Therefore, one who vowed not to eat meat until Yom Kippur, meant that he will not eat meat until the eve of Yom Kippur, when people eat meat as their last meal before the fast.
  Rabbi Yose, his son, says: “Konam, that I not taste garlic until the Sabbath,” he is forbidden only until Sabbath eve [i.e., Friday night], for he meant, until it is customary for people to eat garlic.  As we learned in Nedarim 3:10, garlic was considered an aphrodisiac and hence was eaten by Jews on the Sabbath eve, a time considered proper for sexual relations.  Therefore, one who vows not to eat garlic until the Sabbath, must have intended for garlic to be prohibited until Friday night, when people customarily eat garlic.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah in chapter seven deals with cases where a person made a vow in order to spur someone or himself into doing something.  The mishnah interprets his vows according to what their intent probably was.
  If one says to his neighbor “Konam, what I benefit from you, if you do not come and take for your sons a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine,” the latter may annul his vow without the release of a sage, by declaring, “Did you vow for any other purpose but to honor me? This [refusal] is my honor.”  The person vowing in this mishnah wanted to honor his friend by giving him wheat and wine for his son.  It seems that the person receiving did not want to accept his generosity, so the person giving made a vow to urge him on.  The mishnah teaches that this vow may be released even without the declaration of a sage, a process which we will learn about in chapter nine.  The person receiving may in essence annul the vow by saying that since the vow was only intended for his own honor, he is honored by not accepting the gift.
  Similarly, if one says to his neighbor, “Konam, what you benefit from me, if you do not give my son a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine”: Rabbi Meir says: he is forbidden until he gives; But the Sages say: he too can annul his vow without the release of a sage, by saying to him, “I regard it as though I have received it.”  In this situation the one vowing wants his sons to receive a gift of wheat and wine from his friend.  To urge his friend on, he makes a vow stating that if his friend does not give his sons such a gift, everything he owns will become prohibited to his friend.  According to Rabbi Meir this vow stands and the friend cannot benefit from the one who vowed until he brings the wheat and wine.  The Sages, however, rule that this vow too may be annulled without a sage’s intervention.  The one who vowed may, if he regrets having made the vow, say that it is as if he has already received the goods and therefore the prohibition is void.
  If they were urging him to marry his sister’s daughter, and he said, “Konam, what she benefits from me forever”; Likewise, if he is divorcing his wife and he said, “Konam, what my wife benefits from me forever,”   they are permitted to benefit from him, because he meant only marriage.  In these cases a man was being urged either to marry his sister’s daughter (a common phenomenon in mishnaic times, and not considered incestuous) or was divorcing his wife.  In either case, he makes a vow that the woman should not benefit from him. The intent of the vow was to make sure this woman could not either become his wife or remain his wife. The mishnah rules that since the intent of the rule was merely to prevent himself in marriage to these women, they may still derive other types of benefit from him.
  If he was urging his neighbor to eat at his house, and he replied, “Konam be your house which I do not enter,” or, “The drop of water that I do not drink,” he may enter his house and drink cold water because he only meant eating and drinking in general.  In this case someone was urging his friend to eat over at his house.  In order to increase the leverage on his friend, he said that if he didn’t come over to his house, the other’s house would be Konam (forbidden) to him, or that the other’s water would be Konam to him.  Seemingly, as long as his friend doesn’t come to his house, he may not even enter his friend’s house, nor drink a simple cup of water.  The mishnah, however, rules that his intent was to prohibit eating a full meal at his friend’s house. Therefore he may enter the house and drink water, although he may not sit down for a proper meal.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  If a person makes a vow and then regrets his vow and wishes to be released from its prohibition, he may approach a Sage who has the power to release the vow.  The Sage asks him questions and shows how the vow may have been mistaken and thereby annuls the vow.  He also may go to a court of laypersons who also have the power to release vows.  Our chapter deals with under what circumstances and how a Sage releases vows.  The word for releasing vows in Hebrew is “patach”, to open.  I have chosen to translate this as “release”, which in Hebrew would be “matir”, as in to permit.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: They release a vow [by reference] to the honor of his father and mother but the Sages forbid.  When one comes in front of a Sage to have his vows released, the Sage may ask him, “Had you known that by making such a vow you bring shame to your father and mother, would you have made such a vow?”  If he shows regret, then the vow may be released.  The Sages rule that such a technique is not valid, for he may lie in order not to let it be known that he would have taken such a vow in any case.
  Rabbi Zadok said: Instead of releasing through the honor of his father and mother, they should release [by reference] to the honor of God.  If so, there would be no vows!  Rabbi Zadok also disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer.  Were Sages allowed to use this technique to release vows, they might as well say, “Had you known that by making such a vow God considers you to be a disgrace, would you have made such a vow?”  If such a technique were valid, there would be no more vows, because everyone could have them easily released.
  But the Sages admit to Rabbi Eliezer that in a matter concerning himself and his father and mother one may release a vow [by reference] to the honor of his father and mother.  The Sages agree though, that if the vow directly involved his father or mother, the Sage may make reference to their honor in order to release the vow.  This might happen, if for instance, he vowed that his father or mother should not benefit from his property.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  The debate in this mishnah is over whether or not a vow can be released if the one who vowed regrets his vow because of something that happened since the vow was made.  The mishnah brings two examples of these types of situations.  As in yesterday’s mishnah the Sages argue with Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rabbi Eliezer also said: They release a vow by reference to a new fact; but the Sages forbid it. How is this so? If one said, “Konam that I will not benefit from so and so,” and he [the latter] then became a scribe, or was about to give his son in marriage, and he said, “Had I known that he would become a scribe or was about to give his son in marriage, I would not have vowed;” [Or if he said,] “Konam, is this house that I will not enter,” and it became a synagogue, and he declared, “Had I known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed,” Rabbi Eliezer permits [the vow to be released],but the Sages forbid it. According to Rabbi Eliezer if something new happens since the vow was taken, the recent occurrence may be grounds to release the one who vowed from his vow.  The mishnah illustrates this with two examples.  In the first, a person vows that a certain so-and-so should not benefit from him, but then later on so-and-so either becomes a scribe, meaning a teacher of Bible, or is about to give his son in marriage.  Similarly, one vows that he will not enter a certain house, and then it becomes a synagogue.  The one who vowed claims that had he known these things would happen, he would not have made his vow.  Rabbi Eliezer allows this new fact to be grounds for the release of the vow, but the sages do not.  The Sages reason that since the new fact did not exist when he vowed, we cannot say that the vow was made by mistake.  Rather the one who vowed did not take into account all future possibilities.  That is not sufficient grounds for releasing the vow.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  We learned above in mishnah 3:2 that if someone makes a vow based on a mistaken premise, he is not obligated to keep his vow, and he does not even need a sage to release the vow.  Our mishnah discusses situations in which a person makes a vow that was not originally based on a mistaken premise, but the premise upon which the vow was based changes later.  Rabbi Meir says that these are not really considered “new facts” (see previous mishnah) and therefore, the vow may be released using them as grounds.  The sages disagree.
  Rabbi Meir says: Some things are similar to a new fact, and yet are not [treated] as new; but the Sages do not agree with him. How so? If one says, “Konam that I do not marry so and so, because her father is wicked,” and [then] they say to him “He is dead,” or, “He has repented,”; “Konam is this house which I will not enter, because it contains a wild dog,” or, “because there is a snake in it,” and [then] they say to him, “The dog is dead,” or, “The serpent has been killed,” behold these are like new facts, yet actually not [treated] as new facts. But the sages do not agree with him. In both cases the person vowing states why he has made his vow and the premise was correct at the time of the vow.  For instance, when he vowed not to marry the woman her father was wicked and alive. However, he subsequently died and therefore the reason for the vow ceased to exist.  In the other case, when he vowed not to enter the house, the wild dog or snake was still alive and only died later.  According to Rabbi Meir this is more similar to a vow based on a mistaken premise than to a new fact.  Although the person did not say specifically, “Konam that I do not marry so and so as long as her wicked father is alive”, this was his intent. Therefore, although he is not automatically released from his vow (as he would have been if the premise had been mistaken) a sage may use this as a basis to release the vow. The Sages disagree and say that this too is a situation of a “new fact”, and as they said in the previous mishnah, so too here, a “new fact” cannot be used as the basis for the release of a vow.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Rabbi Meir also said: They release [the vow] by using what is written in the Torah, and they say to him, “Had you known that you were violating [the prohibitions]:“You shall not avenge” (Leviticus 19:18),“You shall not bear a grudge” (ibid.),“You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart (ibid., v. 17),“Love your neighbor as yourself” (ibid., v. 18),“Let him live by your side” (ibid. 25:37), for he might become poor and you would not be able to provide for him, [would you have vowed]?”. And should he reply, “Had I known that this is so, I would not have vowed,” he is permitted [the vow is absolved].In this mishnah Rabbi Meir teaches that the Sages may tell a person that by making a vow prohibiting another person from using his things he has transgressed several commandments in the Torah, and if he expresses regret, they may use that regret as grounds for releasing the vow.The type of vow being released in this mishnah is one in which a person prohibits his fellow Jew from benefiting from all or part of his property.  This very act is actually a transgression of five separate commandments, four of which are found in Leviticus 19:17-18.  The fifth commandment is that a Jew may not let his fellow become poor but rather they must live “side by side”, which is interpreted here to mean, that those who have means must aid those who do not.  If the one who vows admits that had he known that his vow would cause him to transgress so many commandments he would not have vowed, he may be released from his vow.In my opinion this mishnah is emblematic of Jewish social ethics.  The mitzvot regarding concern for one’s neighbor and love for one’s fellow human being, are not merely ideals, left for individuals to pursue according to their own understanding.  Rather they have real manifestations in this world and govern our everyday actions.  Judaism is a religion in which ideals are translated into laws, which dictate precisely how a Jew is to live.  The laws of “love” dictate that a vow which prohibits one’s property to another is a sinful vow which should be released.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  If a husband makes a vow that he shall not benefit from his wife he must divorce her and pay her ketubah. Our mishnah teaches that his vow may be released by reference to her ketubah.
  They release a vow by reference to a wife’s kethubah. And it once happened that a man vowed not to benefit from his wife and her ketubah amounted to four hundred denarii. He went before Rabbi Akiva, who ordered him to pay her the ketubah [in full]. He said to him, “Rabbi!  My father left eight hundred denarii, of which my brother took four hundred and I took four hundred. Isn’t it enough that she should receive two hundred and I two hundred?” Rabbi Akiva replied: even if you have to sell the hair of your head you must pay her her ketubah. He said to him, “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed.” And Rabbi Akiva released his vow. In this story the man must divorce his wife because he vowed not to receive benefit from her.  There is no way that he can remain married without receiving some benefit from her because he is obligated to have sexual relations with her and would at that time receive benefit.  However, when he divorces her he doesn’t want to pay her large ketubah.  He goes in front of Rabbi Akiva to try to receive an exemption but Rabbi Akiva tells him he must pay the ketubah in full.  He then complains that if he pays her entire ketubah he will be left with no inheritance. Rabbi Akiva, using illustrative language, tells him that even if he has to sell the hair on his head (assumedly he was not bald, or Rabbi Akiva was speaking tongue in cheek) he must pay her ketubah in full.  The husband’s statement “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed” shows his regret and is therefore accepted as grounds for releasing the vow.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The specific topic of this mishnah is releasing a vow that a person made to fast on a day on which it is forbidden to fast.  However, the second part of the mishnah discusses a rule of larger consequence:  the overall validity of a vow when part of the vow has been released.  The following two mishnayoth will continue to deal with this subject.
  They release vows by reference to the sabbaths and festivals.  If a person made a vow to fast on a day upon which it is forbidden to fast, for instance the Sabbath or one of the festivals, a sage may say to him, “If you had known that it was forbidden to fast on the Sabbath or on the festivals would you have still made your vow?”  If he expresses regret the vow is released.
  The earlier ruling was that for these days the vow is cancelled, but for others it is binding, until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: a vow which is partially released is entirely released.  Originally, the rule was that the vow was released for the sabbath or festival days but if the vow to fast was for a longer period of time, then the vow retained its validity on the other days.  Thus it would be forbidden for him to fast on the sabbath, but he would be obligated to fast the day before and the day after (depending on the length of his vow).  This ruling was changed by Rabbi Akiva who said that a vow that had been partly released is entirely released. Note that we learned a similar principle above in 3:2. There we learned that if a vow is partially invalid, according to Beth Hillel it is entirely invalid.  The principle of Rabbi Akiva in our mishnah continues from that Hillelian position.  Rabbi Akiva says that just as a vow that was partially invalid from its inception is totally invalid, so too a vow that was later partially invalidated is completely invalidated.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah illustrates the principle taught by Rabbi Akiva at the end of yesterday’s mishnah, that a vow that has been partly released is entirely released.
  How is this so?If one says, “Konam that which I benefit from any of you,” if one [of those subject to the vow] was [subsequently] released, they are all released.  If the one who vows groups a bunch of people collectively into his prohibitive vow, and then the vow is released for one of them, the vow is completely released.  The vow could be released for one of them if for instance one of the group was his father and they asked the one who vowed, “Had you known that one of the group was your father, would you have vowed?”  If he expresses regret, he is allowed to receive benefit not only from his father but from anyone else in the group as well.
  [If he said, “Konam] that which I benefit from this one or this one”: if the first was released, all are released; if the last one was released, he is released, but the rest are forbidden. if the middle person was released, those [mentioned] after him are [also] released, but those [mentioned] before him are forbidden.  In this case, he states the word “Konam” and then lists each individual person.  If the vow to the first one was released, then they are all released.  This is because the word “Konam” was attached to him, and it is as if the one who vowed made the entire vow dependent upon him.  If the last one was released, then only he is released but the others are still prohibited.  If the middle person was released, any one whose name follows him are also released, but those whose name preceded his are still forbidden.  The reason that the general rule does not apply in this case is that since he mentioned each name specifically, it is as if they are separate vows.  However, since the word “Konam” was only mentioned once, if one of the earlier people mentioned was released, anyone mentioned afterward will also always be released.
  [If one says,] “Korban that which I benefit from this one, and from this one Korban,” they each require a separate release.  In this section, the one vowing uses the word “Korban” (=Konam) with reference to each person. These are entirely separate vows, even though he only said one time “that which I benefit”.  Therefore, they each require a separate release and even if one is released the others are still prohibited, both those before and those after.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to illustrate the principle that a vow that has been partially released is fully released.
  “Konam is the one that I taste, because wine is damaging to the stomach.” They said to him, “But mature wine is beneficial to the stomach.” He is released in respect of mature wine, and not only in respect of mature wine, but of all wine.  When the person vowed not to have wine, he stated that he is doing so because he believes that wine is bad for one’s stomach.  People then pointed out to him that not all wine is bad for the stomach.  Mature wine (aged at least three years) is not damaging for the stomach. [By the way, I don’t know if this is considered true today, so be on guard!] He then responded, “Had I known that mature wine is beneficial for the stomach, I would not have vowed.”  The regret is sufficient to allow him to drink mature wine, and since the vow has been partially released, it is completely released.
  “Konam the onions that I taste, because they are damaging to the heart.” They said to him, “But village onions are good for the heart,” He is released in respect of village onions, and not only of village onions, but of all onions. Such a case happened before Rabbi Meir, and he permitted all onions.  This section basically teaches the same principle learned in the previous section.  In addition, the mishnah relates that Rabbi Meir, a student of Rabbi Akiva’s, actually ruled this way in a case that came before him.  We should note that in the eyes of the mishnah precedents are of extreme importance.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah returns to the central theme of the chapter, the release of vows.  In the first mishnah we learned that vows cannot be released by reference to God, but that they may be released by reference to parents.  Our mishnah discusses releasing the vow by reference to his own or to his children’s honor.
  They release one’s vows [by reference] to his own honor and the honor of his children. They say to him, “Had you known that tomorrow they will say of you, ‘It is the regular habit of so-and-so to divorce his wife’; and concerning your daughters they will say, ‘They are the daughters of a divorced woman. What fault did he find in their mother to divorce her?’ If he replies, “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed,” he is released from his vow. The specific instance in this mishnah is one in which a man made a vow to divorce his wife.  He then comes to the sage asking to be released from the vow. The sage says to him that after he divorces his wife, people will say things about him and his children behind his back. Of him they will say that he is a man who divorces frequently.  Of his children they will say that they are the children of a divorced, and hence less than respectable woman.  Their father would not have divorced her had he not found something wrong with her.  If he expresses regret the sage may use this regret as grounds for releasing the vow. We should note that the attitude towards divorce expressed in this mishnah is probably not shared by most people today, nor was it shared by all in the time of the mishnah.  According to some rabbis (and according to some early Christians), divorce was only permissible if the woman was adulterous.  There were no other grounds for divorce.  Most rabbis, including Beth Hillel and later Rabbi Akiva, were more lenient and allowed divorce more easily.  For the former position, the children and indeed former husband of the divorced woman, were shamed.  For Beth Hillel and Rabbi Akiva this was less so.  Indeed, in American society, which was and still is to a certain extent dominated by Christian values, divorce is still considered by some to be a stain on one’s moral record.  It is really only in the last few decades that attitudes toward divorce have changed.  In Jewish law, while people may have looked askance at the children of divorced women, they were never really at a legal disadvantage.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah begins by describing another type of mistaken vow which is void.  The second part of the mishnah tells a story with a quite poignant line from Rabbi Yishmael.
  Before learning this mishnah we should note that in ancient Palestine light skin was considered more aesthetically pleasing than dark skin.  This is probably explained simply by the fact that most people in this area of the world are dark-skinned.  Light skin would be the rarer commodity, and as is typical, that which is unusual is held in greater esteem (after all, why are diamonds considered precious stones? Why are dandelions weeds and not flowers?).  Furthermore, light skin is a sign of wealth, for fieldworkers do not have light skin.  In any case, my point is that this attitude is geographically determined and is certainly not a statement on the inherent value of one skin color over another.
  “Konam if I marry that ugly woman,” and she turns out to be beautiful; “That black-skinned woman,” and she turns out to be light-skinned; “That short woman,” and she turns out to be tall, he is permitted to marry her, not because she was ugly, and became beautiful, or black and became light-skinned, short and grew tall, but because the vow was made in error.  The one who made the vow mistakenly thought the woman whom he did not want to marry was ugly, dark-skinned or short.  When it turns out that she was beautiful, light-skinned or tall, the vow is released because it was mistaken.  He need not even turn to a sage for this vow to be released.
  And thus it happened with one who vowed not to benefit from his sister’s daughter, and she was taken into Rabbi Ishmael’s house and they made her beautiful. Rabbi Ishmael said to him, “My son!  Did you vow not to benefit from this one!” He said, “No,” and Rabbi Ishmael permitted her [to him].  The story in this section is slightly different from the halakhah learned in the previous section.  Here the ugly woman (his niece) actually was ugly and then was helped to become beautiful by those of the house of Rabbi Ishmael.  This is a “new fact” (see mishnah two above), and Rabbi Ishmael holds that a “new fact” may be used to release a vow.  When the man expresses regret from his vow, Rabbi Ishmael permits the woman to him.
  In that hour Rabbi Ishmael wept and said, “The daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty disfigures them.” And when Rabbi Ishmael died, the daughters of Israel raised a lament, saying, “Daughters of Israel weep for Rabbi Ishmael.” And thus it is said too of Saul, “Daughters of Israel, weep for Saul” (II Samuel 1:24).  After having beautified the woman, thereby permitting her to the man who had vowed, Rabbi Ishmael laments the state of Jewish women in his day.  Rabbi Ishmael lived through and after the Bar Kochba revolt, a revolt that was quelled by the Romans in 135 and that may have been even more devastating than the destruction of the Temple.  Rabbi Ishmael laments that the oppressive state in which they live prevents the inner beauty of Jewish women from being seen.  We might add, that this oppressive state may have also made it more difficult for men to have seen through the women’s worn exteriors into the deeper layers of beauty.  For such sentiments and recognition of the difficulties under which they live, and perhaps also for his outstanding abilities as a cosmetician (!), the daughters of Israel lament him at his death, just as they King Saul was lamented at his death.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The final two chapters of Nedarim discuss a father’s and husband’s right to annul the vows of their daughters or wives.  Whereas the release of vows, the topic of the previous chapter, is not mentioned in the Torah, chapter 30 of Numbers discusses the father/son’s right to annul vows at length.  Indeed most of what we know about vows comes from the context of this chapter.  Thus vs. 6 states, “But if her father restrains her on the day he finds out, none of her vows or self-imposed obligations shall stand.”  Vs. 13 makes a similar statement concerning the husband.
  There are several limits that the rabbis placed on this right of fathers/husbands.  First of all, as we shall learn later in the chapter, not all vows may be annulled.  Second, the father may annul his daughter’s vow only until she has reached what was considered majority age (12 ½).  Beyond that age she was obligated, as are all people, to keep all her vows.
  Our mishnah discusses the betrothed young woman, one between the ages of 12 and 12 ½.  This girl is still living in her father’s house and yet is already betrothed to another man.  She is therefore a classic example of a borderline case, which as we have seen time and time again, is typically the focus of the Mishnah.
  In the case of a betrothed young woman, her father and her betrothed husband annul her vows. If her father annulled [her vow] but not the husband, or if the husband annulled [it] but not the father, it is not annulled; and it goes without saying if one of them upheld [it]. The simple message of the mishnah is that since she is partly in her father’s domain, for she has not yet reached majority age and she is still living in his house, and partly in her betrothed husband’s domain, both parties must annul her vows.  If either party does not annul the vow, or upholds the vow, the vow is not annulled.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss the ability of fathers and husbands to annul their daughters’ or wives’ vows.
  If the father dies, his authority does not pass over to the husband. If the husband dies, his authority passes over to the father.  The mishnah is still discussing the betrothed young girl.  Generally, both the father and husband must jointly annul her vows.  If, while she is in this status, her father dies, her husband still cannot annul her vows on his own. This is because she is only betrothed and not fully married.  A husband’s right to annul his wife’s vows on his own begins only at the point of marriage.  In contrast, should her betrothed husband die, her father may annul her vows.  This is because she was never fully married, nor has she reached majority age.
  In this respect, the father’s power is greater than the husband’s. But in another respect, the husband’s power is greater than that of the father, for the husband can annul [her vows] when she is of majority age but the father cannot annul her vows when she is of majority age.  After pointing out a way in which the father’s authority over his wife is greater than the husband’s, the mishnah now contrasts that with an example in which the husband’s ability to annul vows is greater.  As we stated in yesterday’s mishnah, the father’s authority ends when his daughter reaches majority age.  In contrast, the husband’s ability to annul his wife’s vows exists even when she is of majority age.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that while a full husband cannot annul vows his wife made before their marriage, a betrothed husband who annuls her vows jointly with her father has the ability to do so.
  If one vowed as a betrothed woman, and then was divorced on that day and betrothed [again] on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and last betrothed husband can annul her vows. This is the general rule: as long as she has not passed out into her own control for even one hour, her father and last husband can annul her vows. If a woman takes a vow while she is betrothed and then on the same day is divorced and betrothed again to another man, the last husband and her father can still annul her vows.  This all must occur on the same day, because as we shall learn in mishnah 8 and as is stated clearly in Numbers 30, the woman’s vows must be annulled that very day.  The mishnah is teaching that although she vowed while betrothed to another man, the last betrothed husband may annul her previous vows because her father has continuously had the right to annul her vows. As is stated in the general rule at the end of the mishnah, should she be fully married or reach majority age, even for one hour and thereby leave her father’s control, her husband will not be able to annul her earlier vows.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  As we mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah a father and husband jointly annul the vows of a betrothed girl who has not yet reached majority age.  Furthermore, at this point the husband may annul vows that she took before she was betrothed.  Once she is married, no one, neither her father nor her husband may annul the vows that she took before she was married.
  Our mishnah relates what Torah scholars would do in order to avoid this problem.
  It is the practice of scholars, before the daughter of one of them departs from him, he says to her, “All the vows which you vowed in my house are annulled.” Likewise the husband, before she enters into his domain would say to her, “All the vows which you vowed before you entered my domain are annulled,” because once she enters into his domain he cannot annul them. Evidently husbands in general and husbands who are Torah scholars (and hence understand the halakhot) in particular did not want to be surprised to find out that they had married a woman who was restricted by vows.  Furthermore, a father would not want his daughter to be caught by her husband with previously made restrictive vows, for that may be grounds for divorce without payment of the ketubah (see Ketuboth 7:7).  Therefore, right before the girl would leave her father’s domain to enter her husband’s domain, both the father and husband would annul vows that she had previously taken.  Once she enters his domain, the husband would no longer be able to annul previously taken vows. By the way, it seems likely that if we read between the lines of this mishnah, scholars married other scholars’ daughters. Rabbis formed a social class somewhat separate from other Jews and as a result, rabbis often married each others daughters.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  In Mishnah Ketuboth 5:2 we learned that a girl who was betrothed and then reached majority age has 12 months during which she prepares herself for marriage. During this time he prepares himself and the wedding as well.  A widow or a divorcee receives thirty days.  If the betrothed husband does not marry her within this time, she receives her maintenance (cost of food) from him.  In our mishnah, the Sages debate whether the husband also has the ability to annul her vows during this period.
  [In the case of] a girl who has reached majority age who waited twelve months, or a widow [who waited] thirty days, Rabbi Eliezer says: since her [betrothed] husband is responsible for her maintenance, he may annul [her vows]. But the Sages say: the husband cannot annul [her vows] until she enters into his domain. Rabbi Eliezer holds that since he is responsible for her maintenance, in other words has financial responsibility for his betrothed wife’s well-being, he receives the right to annul her vows.  In contrast, the Sages do not give him this right until she actually enters his domain.  According to the Sages he should have married her after this time period had elapsed.  Therefore, while he is penalized and liable to pay for her maintenance, he does not receive the right to annul her vows as would a full husband.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a yavam’s rights to annul the vows of a woman who is awaiting yibbum or halitzah with him.  To remind ourselves briefly, if a husband dies without children his wife is liable for either yibbum (levirate marriage) or halitzah (the release from levirate marriage) with his brother.  Generally speaking, any brother may perform yibbum or halitzah.
  If a woman waits for a yavam, whether for one or for two [yevamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: he can annul [her vows]. Rabbi Joshua says: [only if she waits] for one, but not for two. Rabbi Akiva says: neither for one nor for two.  There are three halakhic opinions in this section.  According to Rabbi Eliezer, even if there are several brothers (yevamim) any one of them may annul her  vows.  According to Rabbi Joshua if there is only one yavam he may annul her vows but if there are more than one, neither may annul her vows. Rabbi Joshua believes that the connection between a yavam and his yevamah is strong enough that he may annul her vows but if there are two yevamim each prevents the other from doing so.  Also, if there are two yevamim we don’t know who will end up performing yibbum and therefore neither may annul her vows.  According to Rabbi Akiva a yavam never has the right to annul his yevamah’s vows.
  Rabbi Eliezer said: if a man can annul the vows of a woman whom he himself acquired, isn’t it logical that can he annul those of a woman bequeathed to him by Heaven! Rabbi Akiva said to him: No! If you speak of a woman whom he himself acquires, that is because others have no rights in her; will you say [the same] of a woman given to him by Heaven, in whom others too have rights! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Akiva, your words apply to two yevamim; but what will you answer if there is only one yavam? He (Rabbi said to him (Rabbi: the yevamah is not as completely acquired to the yavam as a betrothed girl is to her [betrothed] husband.  In this section the three rabbis argue out their respective positions.  Rabbi Eliezer reasons that in a normal marriage a woman is acquired by the man himself (“acquisition” is one of the typical ways by which the mishnah refers to marriage) but in yibbum Heaven bequeaths the yevamah to the yavam.  In other words the relation between the yavam and the yevamah is created at the moment of the brother’s death without any action by the yavam and therefore it is a stronger connection.  If in the weaker acquisition the husband is allowed to annul vows, so too in the stronger acquisition. Rabbi Akiva responds by pointing out that the two situations are not truly analogous.  If there are two or more yevamim then each has some rights in her, because any of them can perform yibbum or halitzah with her.  However, in cases of normal marriage, only the betrothed husband has rights in her, for only he will be able to marry her. Rabbi Joshua points out that Rabbi Akiva’s refutation of Rabbi Eliezer holds true only if there is more than one yavam.  If there is only one yavam he is the only one who has rights in her, and therefore he should be allowed to annul her vows.  Why then does Rabbi Akiva say that he cannot. Rabbi Akiva responds again, this time with a more fundamental difference between normal marriage and yibbum.  The union between a betrothed couple is stronger than the unity between a yavam and a yevamah (remember this is before yibbum has been performed; after yibbum she is his wife in all regards).  A betrothed woman who has relations with a man other than her betrothed husband is an adulteress and is technically liable for the death penalty.  In that sense Jewish betrothal works like marriage.  In contrast, a yevamah who has relations with a man other than her yavam is not considered an adulteress and has merely broken a less severe commandment, one not punishable by death.  From here we can deduce that the bond of betrothal is stronger and therefore a betrothed husband may annul his betrothed wife’s vows but a yavam may not do so for his yevamah.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah discusses whether or not a husband can uphold or annul vows that his wife will take in the future.
  If a man says to his wife, “All vows which you may vow from now until I return from such and such a place behold, they are upheld,” he has not said anything.  Everyone agrees that the husband may not legally uphold vows that his wife has not yet taken.  If, when he returns from the trip he hears that she has taken a vow and he wants to annul it, he still may do so, despite his earlier statement that her vows were upheld.
  [If he said: All vows which you may vow from now until I return from such and such a place], behold, they are annulled,”: Rabbi Eliezer says: they are annulled; The Sages say:  they are not annulled. Said Rabbi Eliezer: if he can annul vows which have already had the force of a prohibition, surely he can annul those which have not had the force of prohibition! They said to him: behold, it is said, “Her husband may uphold it, and her husband may annul it” (Numbers 30:14), that which has entered the category of upholding, has entered the category of annulment; but that which has not entered the category of upholding, has not entered the category of annulment.  This section discusses the reverse situation, in which the husband wishes to annul vows that his wife takes while he is away.  Rabbi Eliezer says this annulment is effective and the Sages say that it is not. Rabbi Eliezer argues that if a man can annul a vow that has already taken effect, he should be able to annul a vow before it has begun to be effective. A husband can annul vows on the day he hears them even though she vowed earlier (we will learn more about this tomorrow).  In other words, even if she vowed earlier and therefore had to keep her vow before it was annulled, on the day that he hears of the vow he may still annul it.  From here Rabbi Eliezer concludes that he certainly should be able to annul a vow that has not yet had a prohibitory force. The Sages respond with a midrash on a verse in Numbers.  This verse compares upholding and annulling.  Since, as we learned in section one, only a vow which has already been made can be upheld, so too only a vow that has already been made can be annulled.  To the Sages their midrash is more authoritative and convincing than Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Numbers 30:6, 9 imply that the husband or father must annul their wives’ or daughters’ vows on the day on which they heard of them.  Our mishnah explains how this day is calculated.
  The annulment of vows is the whole day. This may result in a stringency or in a leniency. How is this so? If she vowed on the eve of the Sabbath, he can annul on the eve of the sabbath and on the Sabbath day until nightfall. If she vowed just before nightfall, he can annul only until nightfall: for if night fell and he had not annulled it, he can no longer annul it. The period allotted for annulling vows is one whole day.  That day is calculated by the calendar and not by counting 24 hours from the time the father/husband heard the vow.  In other words, the vow must be annulled on the calendar day on which it was taken.  Remember, the Jewish day is calculated from evening until evening.  As the mishnah points out, sometimes this will result in a longer time and sometimes in a shorter time.  For instance, if he hears of the vow on the eve of the Sabbath (late Friday afternoon, towards twilight), he has until nightfall the following night, when the Sabbath is over.  This is because twilight is already considered part of the Sabbath and the Sabbath is not over until nightfall. However, if he hears of the vow just before nightfall on the Sabbath itself, he only has until nightfall.  After that he may no longer annul the vow. The reason that the mishnah uses the example of the Sabbath and not any other day of the week is to teach that vows may be annulled on the Sabbath.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Numbers 30:14 states, “Every vow and every sworn obligation of self-denial may be upheld by her husband or annulled by her husband.”  From this verse the rabbis conclude that only vows which are of “self-denial” can be annulled.  Furthermore, vs. 17 states, “These are the laws that the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife.”  From this verse the rabbis learned that even if the vow is not one of self-denial, if it involves an issue between the woman and her husband, the man may annul the vow.  This chapter discusses these issues.
  We should note that by placing these limits on her vows, the rabbis limit the power the husband has over his wife.  She has the ability to vow without his interference; only those things that will come in between their marriage or cause her to be denied something are subject to his approval.
  And these are the vows which he can annul: vows which involve self-denial. [For instance:] “If I bathe” or “If I do not bathe;” “If I adorn myself,” or, “If I do not adorn myself.” Rabbi Yose says: these are not vows of self-denial. If the woman vows, “A certain something shall be konam (forbidden) to me if I bathe, but if I don’t bathe it shall be permitted to me,” the husband can annul her vow because not bathing or not adorning oneself is considered self-denial. Another interpretation of this mishnah is that the woman says, “Bathing is forbidden to me forever if I bathe today” or “A shevuah that I shall not bathe”.  Again, since these are examples of self-denial the husband may annul the vow. Rabbi Yose does not believe that these are vows of self-denial.  Rabbi Yose’s definition of vows self-denial will be brought up in the next mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is the continuation of Rabbi Yose’s opinion, begun in yesterday’s mishnah.  Yesterday Rabbi Yose said that if the wife vows not to adorn herself or not to bathe the husband cannot annul because these are not considered vows of self-denial.  In our mishnah Rabbi Yose provides his definition of vows of self-denial.
  But these are vows of self-denial:If she says, “Konam be the produce of the [whole] world to me”, he can annul.  If the woman forbids upon herself all produce everywhere the husband may annul the vow because this is certainly considered a vow of self-denial.
  “Konam be the produce of this region to me,” he should bring her that of a different region.  In this case he cannot annul the vow because he may bring her produce from another region.
  “[Konam be] the produce of this shopkeeper to me”, he cannot annul. But if he can obtain his sustenance only from him, he can annul, the words of Rabbi Yose.  Similarly, if she vows not to eat the produce of a certain shopkeeper, he may not break the vow because he may bring her produce from other shopkeepers. However, if the husband has a deal with the shopkeeper from whom she swore not to receive benefit, whereby the shopkeeper provides him with food on credit, then he may annul the vow.  Since the husband will not be able to bring his wife food from the other shopkeepers who do not give to him on credit, he will not be able to provide her with food, and therefore her vow will be one of self-denial. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Yose and hold that even though she has sworn not to receive benefit only from one specific person and she could receive from others, this is still considered a vow of self-denial and the husband may annul it.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first section of the mishnah continues to discuss which vows a husband may annul.  The second section of the mishnah discusses a person who swears that priests and Levites may not derive benefit from him.
  [If she vows], “Konam, that which I benefit from mankind,” he cannot annul, and she can benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field.  The husband cannot annul this vow because there are still people from whom she may receive benefit (food, clothing etc.).  “Mankind” implies people other than her husband.  Since her husband may still provide for her, this is not a vow of “self-denial”.  Furthermore, she may still collect the produce which is mandated to be given to poor people from people’s fields.  These do not actually belong to the owner of the field; rather they are considered ownerless.  This includes “gleanings” which is the wheat which falls from people’s hands as they collect, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of fields.
  [If one says], “Konam be the benefit which priests and Levites have from me”, they can take [from him] against his will.  A person must give certain parts of his produce to priests and Levites.  He must give terumah to priests and first tithe to Levites.  If he vows that priests and Levites should not be able to derive benefit from him, they still may take terumah and tithe, because these do not actually belong to the one who vowed. The connection between this section and what we learned above is that just as things left for the poor do not actually belong to the owner of the field, so too terumah and tithes do not actually belong to the person who separates them to give them to the priests and Levites.
  [But if he vows,] “Konam be the benefit these priests and Levites have from me,” other [priests and Levites] should take.  In this case the one who vows does not prohibit all priests and Levites from benefiting from him, just certain priests or Levites.  In this case the vow is effective and other priests and Levites should take the terumah or tithes. Although as we stated above the person does not own these, he has the right to choose to whom to give them. Therefore the vow is effective.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The first part of the mishnah discusses a woman who vows not to provide benefit for either her own or her husband’s father or brother.  The second part discusses a woman who vows not to provide benefit for her husband himself.
  [If she vows,] “Konam that which I do for my father,” [or] “your father,” [or] “my brother,” [or] “your brother,” [the husband] cannot annul it.  In all of these cases the woman vows that anything that she produces shall be forbidden to either her or her husband’s father or brother.  Since none of these vows involves self-denial, the husband may not annul the vow.
  [“Konam] “that which I do for you,” he need not annul it. Rabbi Akiva says: he should annul it, lest she make more than is fitting for him. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: he should annul it, lest he divorce her and she thereby be forbidden to him.  We learned in the fifth chapter of Ketuboth that a woman is obligated to perform certain duties for her husband and her handiwork belongs to him.  Since she has this obligation, she may not vow that her husband may not benefit from her handiwork.  In essence, she does not own her handiwork and therefore it is not hers to prohibit by vow. Rabbi Akiva points out that not all of the handiwork automatically goes to her husband.  According to Ketuboth 5:9, she has a set amount of handiwork which she must do; anything over that amount she gets to keep.  If so, the vow is potentially effective for this extra amount.  Since if she does produce an extra amount, it will be difficult for a husband not to derive some benefit from it, he should annul the vow to avoid the potential problem. The reason that he has a right to annul the vow even though it is not a vow of self-denial is that this is something that comes between him and her. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri points out that if the husband divorces his wife, the vow will become valid, since she is no longer obligated to provide him with her handiwork.  Once divorced, he will also no longer be able to annul the vow.  In such a case he would not be able to remarry her.  To avoid this problem, Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri suggests that the husband annul the vow.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah teaches that if a husband/father annuls a vow of his wife/daughter but is mistaken with regard to who vowed, what type of vow they took or what was being prohibited, he must annul the vow again in order for it to be annulled.
  If his wife vowed, and he thought that his daughter had vowed, or if his daughter vowed and he thought that his wife had vowed;  In this case the husband/father was mistaken with regard to who vowed.
  If she took the vow of a nazirite, and he thought that she had vowed by a korban, or if she vowed by a korban, and he thought that she vowed a nazirite vow;  In this case the mistake was with regard to the type of prohibition.  For instance, she vowed by a nazirite vow but her husband/father thought that the vow was a vow using a korban to prohibit wine (i.e. “wine is a korban to me”), or vice versa.  Although in both cases she would be forbidden to have wine, the husband still annulled the wrong type of vow.
  If she vowed [to abstain] from figs, and he thought that she vowed [to abstain] from grapes, or if she vowed [to abstain] from grapes and he thought that she vowed from figs, he must annul [the vow] again.  In this case the husband was mistaken with regard to what was being prohibited, figs or grapes. In all three cases, since the husband did not have full grasp of who was vowing, what type of vow they were taking, or what they were prohibiting, he must annul the vow again.  If he does not, the vow is valid.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that a vow that has been partially annulled is not annulled at all.
  We should note that this is a different rule than that which we saw with regard to the releasing of vows done by a sage.  There we saw that according to Rabbi Akiva a vow that has been partially released is fully released (9:6).  According to the Talmud, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with our mishnah.
  If she vows, “Konam these figs and grapes which I taste”, and he [the husband] confirms [the vow] in respect of figs, the whole [vow] is confirmed;  In the cases in this mishnah, the woman vows not to have figs and grapes.  If the husband confirms part of the vow, the whole vow is confirmed.  After he has confirmed it, he can no longer annul it.
  If he annuls it in respect of figs, it is not annulled, unless he annuls in respect of grapes too.  However, if he annuls part of the vow, the whole vow is not annulled and she is still forbidden in respect to that which he annulled.  In this case, she would be forbidden to have both figs and grapes.  For the vow to be annulled he must annul the whole vow.
  If she vows, “Konam the figs that I taste and these grapes that I taste”, they are two distinct vows.  In this case the mishnah considers it as if she had taken two vows.  Therefore, if he annuls the vow with respect to figs, that vow is annulled and she may have figs but she may not have grapes.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Yesterday we learned that if when the husband/father annulled his wife/daughter’s vow he did not have full comprehension of who vowed, what type of vow they took, or what they prohibited, he must annul it again.
  Generally the vow may be annulled only on the day that the husband/father hears of the vow (see 10:5).  However, in this case he may annul the vow when he learns the details, even though the day that he heard the vow has passed, because for him the day that he learns of the vows correct details is considered the day that he heard the vow.
  Our mishnah discusses a husband who did not know that he could annul the vow, or that there was even a vow to annul.  The question is can he annul the vow when he learns that he has such a power, or that it was a vow.
  [If the husband declares,] “I knew that there were vows, but I did not know that they could be annulled”, he may annul them [now].  In this case the husband/father knew that there was a vow, but did not know that he could annul the vow or that in general he can annul vows.  The mishnah rules that he may annul the vow later when he learns that he has such a right.  The day that he learns that he can annul vows is considered the “day that he heard the vow”.
  [But if he says:] “I knew that I could annul them, but I did not know that this was a vow,” Rabbi Meir says: he cannot annul it, But the Sages say: he can annul.  In this case the father/husband knew that he has the right to annul vows in general, but did not know that what his daughter/wife had said was considered a vow.  Hence he did not annul the vow on the day that he heard the original remark.  When he later learns that this was a vow, Rabbi Meir says he can no longer annul it.  Since he knew on the day that he heard the vow that he can annul vows, he should have annulled what she had said in any case, even though he was not sure that it was a vow.  The Sages, however, rule that he may still annul the vow when he learns that it was truly a vow. According to their opinion, this is the day that is actually called “the day that he heard the vow.”
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a situation in which a man is under a vow not to provide any benefit to his son-in-law.  The mishnah teaches how the father may give money to his daughter without allowing his son-in-law to receive benefit.
  We should note that this mishnah probably more properly belongs in chapter four where the mishnah discussed circumventing vows such as these.  Assumedly, the mishnah is brought in this chapter because it mentions fathers and daughters.
  If a man is under a vow that his son-in-law shall not benefit from him, and he wants to give money to his daughter, he must say to her, “This money is given to you as a gift, providing that your husband has no rights with it, [and it is only given to you] so that may put to your personal use.” If the father wants to give his daughter money he may make a stipulation that the son-in-law should have no rights to the money and that the only use for the money is for the personal use of the daughter.  In this way, the father can circumvent the vow prohibiting his son-in-law from deriving benefit from him.  Were the father not to make such a stipulation, the present would be a transgression of the vow because anything that the wife owns the husband has rights over as well.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The Torah states that a widow and a divorcee’s vows are binding. This ruling is seemingly obvious, for a widow and a divorcee do not have any husband who could possibly annul their vows.  In order to prevent the Torah from being obvious, the mishnah finds situations in which the ruling is not so obvious.
  After quoting the verse from Numbers, the mishnah proceeds to explain it in a way that it is not overly simple.
  “But every vow of a widow and of a divorcee… shall be binding upon her” (Numbers 30:9).How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days”, even if she married within the thirty days, he cannot annul it.  In this case the woman vowed before she was married but vowed in such a way that the vow would not begin to take effect for another thirty days.  During the thirty days before the vow takes effect, she was married.  Although the vow begins to take effect when she is already married, her husband cannot annul it because she made the vow before she was married.
  If she vows while in her husband’s domain, he can annul [the vow] for her. How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days,” [and her husband annulled it], even though she was widowed or divorced within the thirty days, it is annulled.  This case is opposite to that in the previous section.  Here the woman vows while still married, but stipulates that the vow will not take effect for another thirty days.  While still married, before the vow takes effect, the husband annuls the vow.  Even though by the time the vow took effect she was already divorced, since the husband annulled it while she was still married, the vow is annulled.
  If she vowed on one day, and he divorced her on the same day and took her back on the same day, he cannot annul it. This is the general rule: once she has gone into her own domain [even] for a single hour, he cannot annul.  In this case, she vowed while married, was then divorced and then remarried on the same day (seemingly a theoretical situation, or two people who have trouble making up their minds!).  The mishnah teaches that the husband can no longer annul the vow that she took during their first marriage, even though the second marriage was on the very same day.  In the last clause, containing the general rule, the mishnah explains that if she had gone out of her husband’s domain before he annulled the vow, he cannot subsequently annul the vow.  This is what the Torah means when it states that a widow or divorcee must keep their vows. Sometimes they must keep them even though they made the vow when they were married.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  At the end of the previous mishnah we learned that a girl who leaves her husband’s domain even for one moment does not return to have her vows annulled by this same husband.  Our mishnah teaches that the same is true for a girl who leaves her father’s domain either by reaching majority age, by being married or by her father dying.  The mishnah lists nine types of such women.  The first three left their father’s domain by being married, the next three by their father dying and the final three by reaching majority age.  Hence I have broken this mishnah down in three subsets of three.
  Usually “young girl” refers to a girl who has not yet reached majority age (12 ½).  However, here the term is used more loosely and includes even those girls who are already past 12 ½.
  There are nine young girls whose vows stand: [1a] a girl who reached majority age who is [like] an orphan; [1b] a young girl [who vowed] and [then] reached majority age who is [like] an orphan; [1c] a young girl who has not yet reached majority age, who is [like] an orphan; [2a] a girl who reached majority age and whose father died; [2b] a young girl [who vowed] and [then] reached majority age and whose father died; [2c] a young girl who has not yet reached majority age and whose father died; [3a] a young girl whose father died, and after her father died she became of majority age; [3b] a girl who has reached majority age whose father is alive; [3c] a young girl who has reached majority age and whose father is alive. Rabbi Judah says: also one who married off his daughter while a minor, and she was widowed or divorced and returned to him [her father] and is still a young girl.  The first section lists girls who were married off by their fathers when they were young (before 12 ½) and then were widowed or divorced.  Since they were married, their fathers no longer have the ability to annul the vows.  Halakhically they are considered “orphans during their father’s lifetime.”  There are three types of girls in this category:  1)  a girl who vowed after she had reached majority age; 2)  a girl who vowed before reaching majority age and has now reached majority age; 3)  a girl who is still considered a “young girl” (12-12 ½).  Since all three of these girls have no husband and no father, their vows stand.
  All three of these girls vowed after their fathers died and have never been married off.  Since they have no husbands or fathers, their vows stand.  The age categories are the same as in the previous section.
  This section lists three girls whose fathers have no authority over them and therefore there is no one to annul their vows.  In the first case the father is dead.  In the second case she vowed after she had already reached majority age  At this point the father may no longer annul her vows.  In the third case she vowed before reaching 12 ½ but then reached majority age. According to one interpretation of the last section of this mishnah, Rabbi Judah adds a tenth girl to the list, the girl who was married off as a minor and then widowed or divorced and is still a young girl who has not reached 12 ½.  Since she has been married, her father may no longer annul her vows, even though she is still a young girl.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah returns to discuss the category of vows made between the couple (“between him and her”) the type of vow that in general the husband has a right to annul.
  [If she vows,] “Konam the benefit that I derive from my father or from your father if I make anything for you,”  In the first case the wife says that she will not benefit from her or her husband’s father if she makes anything for her husband.  Seemingly this is not the type of vow that the husband could annul because she could make something for him and then not benefit from her father or his father.  This should not be considered a vow “between him and her”, the only type of vow that the husband can break.
  Or, “Konam the benefit that I derive from you, if I make anything for my father or your father,” he can annul.  Similarly this too is should not be a vow that the husband could annul because she could just refrain from making anything for her or her husband’s father.  This also should not be considered a vow “between him and her.” Despite this, the mishnah rules that the husband may annul the vows.  This is because the husband does not want work that his wife does for him to come between her and her father or his father.  It is also disgraceful for him that she should not be allowed to do anything for her father or his father, lest she not be able to make anything for him.  Therefore, in both cases he has the right to annul.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  One of the thorniest problems in halakhah is that a woman may not initiate divorce.  If a woman is stuck in a bad marriage and wants to be divorced, it is difficult, if not impossible, for her to force her husband to divorce her and still receive her ketubah.  We should however note that in talmudic times it was not impossible for a woman to force her husband to divorce her if she was willing to forego her ketubah.  Unfortunately, today, even this is difficult.
  Our mishnah contains fascinating testimony regarding attempts that women made to force their husbands to divorce them.  Originally, these attempts were effective, for the sages believed the woman’s claims.  However, when they began to suspect these women of lying so that they could marry others, they changed the laws such that these claims would not be an effective means by which a woman could force her husband to give her a divorce and her ketubah.
  At first they would say that three women must be divorced and receive their ketubah: She who says: “I am defiled to you”; “Heaven is between me and you”; “I have been removed from the Jews.”  The mishnah mentions three claims that used to work in forcing a husband to divorce his wife. 1) “I am defiled to you”.  The Talmud explains that this claim is made by a priest’s wife who says that she has been raped.  As we have learned, a priest may not stay married to his wife if she has had sexual intercourse with someone prohibited to her, even if the intercourse was against her consent. 2) “Heaven is between me and you”.  Some commentators interpret this to be a veiled reference to the husband’s inability to perform the sexual act.  She is saying, as distant as the heaven is from the earth, that is how distant you and I are from each other in sexual matters. 3) “I have been removed from the Jews”.  This refers to a vow she made not to receive sexual benefit from Jews, which includes her husband.  She may have made the vow because sexual intercourse is not pleasurable for her. The sages believed these statements because they assumed that a woman would not make such things up.
  But subsequently they changed the ruling to prevent her from setting her eye on another and spoiling herself to her husband: She who said, “I am defiled unto you” must bring proof. “Heaven is between me and you” they [shall appease them] by a request. “I have been removed from the Jews”   he [the husband] must annul his portion, and she may have relations with him, and she shall be removed from other Jews.  When the sages saw that women were lying and using these claims to leave their husbands because they wanted to marry someone else, they came up with other solutions to these problems.  These solutions did not allow the woman to force her husband to divorce her and pay her ketubah. 1) If she says that she has been raped, she must bring proof.  Until she does so, she is not believed and she is not prohibited to her husband, nor is he forced to divorce her. 2) If she complains that her husband cannot function sexually, the sages should try to bring them together with words of reconciliation.  This may have been the rabbinic equivalent of going to a sex therapist. 3) If she says that she made a vow not to have sex with Jews, the husband may annul that part of the vow that prohibits her from having sex specifically with him, and she will be prohibited from having sex with other Jews, even should she be subsequently divorced. Congratulations!  We have finished Nedarim. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Despite the fact that some of these mishnayoth may have been slightly obscure, we should remember what an important role vows played in the religious life of Jews in the mishnaic and talmudic periods.  Vows were a way of turning everyday matters into issues of greater significance, from matters between human beings and other human beings, to matter between human beings and God.  Learning the laws of vows, and especially how to get out of vows, shows us how humans can make mistakes, get out of them, and yet retain their ultimate covenant with God.  Congratulations on making it through this difficult tractate.  May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah!  Tomorrow we begin Nazir.