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text: English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה יבמות
  Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot
  
  Introduction
  
  The laws of levirate marriage are contained in Deuteronomy 25:5-10.  According to these laws, if a husband dies without children, his brother should marry his widow and the first son that she bears shall be “accounted to the dead brother”.  This is in order for the dead brother’s genealogical line to be continued.  If the live brother refuses to marry his dead brother’s widow, she performs a ceremony known in the Mishnah as “halitzah”.  This entails her taking off his shoe and spitting in his face (the rabbis understand this to mean spitting on the ground).  After halitzah, the woman can marry whomever she chooses, as can a normal widow.
  There are two instances of levirate marriage in the Tanakh, one involving Judah’s sons and daughter-in-law (Genesis 38) and one involving Ruth and Boaz (see Ruth 3:12 and chapter 4).  Some of the legal details of these instances do not match those of Deuteronomy.  It is sufficient to note that the rabbis follow the laws of Deuteronomy and do not derive the laws of levirate marriage from Genesis or Ruth.  
  There are a few rules that we should explain here in the introduction, in order to make the learning of this sometimes difficult tractate simpler.  First of all, a woman whose husband has died without children is forbidden to marry another man until she has levirate marriage or halitzah.  Second, a man may not perform levirate marriage for a woman who is forbidden to him.  For instance, if two brothers marry two sisters and one dies, the widow is not subject to the laws of levirate marriage, because her sister is married to the levir (a man cannot marry two sisters). Third, both betrothed women and married women are subject to the laws of levirate marriage.  Fourth, levirate marriage is obligatory only for paternal brothers.  
  There is some debate in the Talmud whether or not levirate marriage is currently preferable to halitzah.  In post-Talmudic times, Ashkenazim held that halitzah was mandatory and they abolished levirate marriage.  Certain Sephardi groups continued to practice levirate marriage until the formation of the State of Israel, which has adopted the Ashkenazi position.  Much of these differences can be attributed to the fact that Ashkenazim banned bigamy, while most Sephardim did not.
  The following is a list of Hebrew terms and their meaning.  I will use these terms in transliteration because they are less cumbersome.  I suggest you print this page so that you can reference it while we learn the tractate.
  Halitzah—release from levirate marriage.
  Halutzah—a woman who has performed halitzah.  A priest cannot marry a halutzah.  
  Ma’amar—the giving of money from the yavam to the yavamah, a parallel to the betrothal money given as “kiddushin” in normal marriages.  According to the Torah there is no marital process for the widow who goes through yibbum.  All that really happens is that he has relations with her, and thus yibbum is performed.  However, the rabbis created an institution called “ma’amar” whereby the yavam would give her betrothal money similar to the betrothal money given in regular marriages (we will learn these laws in tractate Kiddushin).  Ma’amar, however, does not make the woman the yavam’s full wife.  The status of their marriage is only rabbinic.  This will have many important implications in certain mishnayoth.
  Mamzer—the child of an illicit union or the child of a mamzer.  The Torah states, “A mamzer shall not be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:3).  We will see in the mishnah that there are several different opinions as to which type of illicit union creates a mamzer.  A mamzer cannot marry a regular Israelite.  I will not translate mamzer as “bastard”, as it is often translated, because in American lingo a “bastard” is also the child of an unmarried couple.  This is untrue in Jewish law.   
  Shomereth yavam (yavamah)—a woman who is subject to the laws of levirate marriage (i.e. her husband died without children).
  Yavam—the living brother (there may be more than one, if the dead brother had two or more brothers.)  In English he is called the levir.
  Yibbum—levirate marriage.
  Z’kukah—a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah, but with whom he has not yet done so.  The word z’kukah comes from the word zikah which means “tied to” or “bound”.  A z’kukah is bound to the yavam until halitzah or yibbum (then she is bound as a regular wife is to her husband).  
  The first few chapters of Yevamoth are extremely complex.  In order to make things simpler I will use names, generally Biblical one.  Please don’t despair if you get lost.  Once the principles become clear, most of the rest is just details.
  Good luck!  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  If a woman’s husband dies without children she is liable for yibbum to her husband’s brother.  However, if she is forbidden to her husband’s brother because of an incest prohibition, she is not liable for yibbum.  Our mishnah teaches which incest prohibitions exempt a woman from being liable for yibbum.  Furthermore, the mishnah teaches that not only is the prohibited woman exempt from yibbum, but all of her rival wives (those who were also married to the dead husband) are exempt from yibbum.  The mishnah states that this exemption is “ad infinitum”.  This means that if one of this woman’s rival wives has yibbum with another brother, one to whom the wife prohibited to the other brother is not prohibited, and then this brother also dies, all of her rival wives from the second marriage are also exempt from yibbum.
  We will explain each category of forbidden relationships and try to give concrete examples.
  Fifteen [categories of] women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives and so on ad infinitum from halitzah and from yibbum. And these are they:  (1) his daughter, (2) and the daughter of his daughter, (3) and the daughter of his son, (4) and the daughter of his wife, (5) and the daughter of her son (6) and the daughter of her daughter; (7) His mother-in-law and (8) his mother-in-law’s mother, (9) and his father-in-law’s mother; (10) His maternal sister and (11) his mother’s sister and (12) his wife’s sister (13) And his maternal brother’s wife;  (14) and the wife of his brother who died before he was born, (15) And his daughter-in-law. All these exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives, and so on, ad infinitum, from halitzah and from yibbum. If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted. And you cannot say of a man’s mother-in-law, or the mother of his mother-in-law and of the mother of his father-in-law that they were found incapable of procreation or that they made a declaration of refusal. His daughter:  Reuven and Shimon are brothers.  Shimon marries Reuven’s daughter (this is permitted) and another woman.  If Shimon dies, Reuven cannot perform yibbum with his daughter.  Hence, she and her rival wives are exempt from yibbum or halitzah. And the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son:  These cases are the same as the case above, except Shimon married Reuven’s granddaughter and not his daughter. And the daughter of his wife and the daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter:  Meaning his wife’s descendents who are not his children.   Even though these women are not blood relatives of his, they are still forbidden to him. His mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother:  In this case Shimon marries Reuven’ wife’s mother, or Reuven’s wife’s maternal or paternal grandmother.  Since these women are all forbidden to Reuven, when Shimon dies without children they and their rival wives are exempt from yibbum. His maternal sister:  Reuven and Shimon are paternal brothers.  Shimon marries Reuven’s maternal sister. This is permitted since she does not share any parent with Shimon.  When Shimon dies, she cannot have yibbum with Reuven, since he is her brother.  Therefore, she and her rival wives are exempt. And his mother’s sister:  Again, Reuven and Shimon are paternal brothers.  Shimon marries Reuven’s mother’s sister, and then dies.  Since she, as Reuven’s aunt, is prohibited to him, she and all of her rival wives are exempt from yibbum. And his wife’s sister:  Reuven and Shimon marry two sisters.  When Shimon dies, Reuven cannot marry his wife’s sister.  This will be the typical case mentioned in many subsequent mishnayoth. And his maternal brother’s wife:  Reuven and Shimon are maternal brothers and Reuven and Levi are paternal brothers.  When Shimon dies Levi marries his widow (not through yibbum).  She is permitted to him since Levi and Shimon are not brothers.  When Levi dies, Reuven should have to do yibbum with his wife.  However, she was originally Shimon’s wife and as Shimon’s wife she would not have had to do yibbum with Reuven, since yibbum is done only with paternal brothers.  Since she was originally married to a man who made her forbidden to Reuven (the general prohibition of marrying your brother’s wife is true for both paternal and maternal brothers), she cannot have yibbum with him even after subsequent marriages. And the wife of his brother who died before he was born:  Reuven marries a woman and dies before Shimon, his brother, is born.  This woman has yibbum with Levi, a different brother.  When Shimon grows up, Levi dies without children.  Since Shimon was not alive when this woman married Reuven, he cannot have yibbum with her (this is learned exegetically from a verse).  She and her rival wives are therefore exempt. And his daughter-in-law:  Reuven and Shimon are brothers.  When Reuven’s son dies, Shimon marries the widow.  When Shimon dies, this woman, who used to be Reuven’s daughter-in-law, becomes liable to yibbum.  Since she is forbidden to him, she and all of her rival wives are exempt. If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted:  If any of these women who were forbidden to the yavam, and therefore were themselves exempt and caused their rival wives to be exempt, were not married at the time of the brother’s death, the rival wives are permitted to have yibbum. The mishnah lists several ways in which the marriage could have been terminated.   The two simplest are death and divorce.  The “declaration of refusal” (me’un), refers to a case where an orphan girl’s marriage was arranged by her mother or brother.  This type of marriage is different from the usual marriage, which is arranged by the father.  Marriage arranged by a mother or brother is only of rabbinic status; therefore the girl has a right to refuse, and thereby annul the marriage upon her reaching majority age.  “Incapable of procreation” (aylonit) refers to a woman who never reaches puberty.  She is clearly female, but never looks like an adult female, i.e. she has no breasts or puberty hair.  [An aylonit is not merely a woman who has not had children.  She must also not look like an adult female.] By definition, this type of woman cannot procreate.  Since she cannot procreate, she is not liable for yibbum.  After all the purpose of yibbum is to have children.  Since she is not subject to the laws of yibbum, the fact that she is prohibited to the yavam does not exempt her rival wives.  In all of these cases, the brother dies after his marriage to the wife forbidden to his brother has already been terminated.   Therefore, the forbidden (former) wives do not exempt their rival wives from yibbum. And you cannot say of a man’s mother-in-law, or the mother of his mother-in-law and of the mother of his father-in-law that they were found incapable of procreation or that they made a declaration of refusal:  The mishnah merely points out that three of the above categories cannot fit two of the possibilities for terminating marriage.  A woman who has already had children (by definition a mother-in-law has had children) cannot be considered “incapable of procreation”.  Nor could she “refuse” a marriage, for refusal of marriage takes place upon reaching majority, and not afterwards.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of the previous and it explains many of the details.
  How do they exempt their rival wives? If his daughter or any other of these forbidden relatives was married to his brother who also had another wife, and he died, then just as his daughter is exempt so is her rival exempt. If his daughter’s rival went and married a second brother of his, who also had another wife, and he died, then just as the rival of his daughter is exempt so is his daughter’s rival’s rival exempt, even if there were a hundred [brothers]. How is it that if they had died, their rivals are permitted? If a man’s daughter or any other of these forbidden relatives was married to his brother who also had another wife, and his daughter died or was divorced, and afterwards his brother died, her rival is permitted. The rival of any one who can make a declaration of refusal but did not make a declaration of refusal, must perform halitzah and may not have yibbum.  This section explains the opening statement of mishnah one, “Fifteen [categories of] women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives and so on ad infinitum from halitzah and from yibbum”.  For the sake of clarity, I will explain it again here.  Reuven and Shimon are brothers.  Shimon marries Reuven’s daughter.  When Shimon dies without children, Reuven cannot perform yibbum with his own daughter.  Hence, she and all of her rival wives are not liable for yibbum.  If Reuven and Shimon had a third brother, Levi, and Reuven’s daughter’s rival wife married Levi and then Levi died without children, the rival wife is not liable for yibbum with Reuven and neither are any of Levi’s other wives.  This law is true even if there are 100 brothers. As an aside, this mishnah also teaches that if there was a third brother, for whom none of the dead brother’s wives was prohibited, they are liable to have yibbum or halitzah with him. The exemptions are only in a case where Reuven was the only brother.
  This section explains the second section of mishnah one, “If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted.”  If Reuven’s daughter died or was divorced before Shimon, her husband, dies, her rival wives are permitted to have yibbum with Reuven. There is a special rule regarding the wife who could have made a declaration of refusal (meun) but did not.  As we recall, this wife’s marriage, arranged by her brother or mother, is of only rabbinical status (and not biblical).  Her liability to have yibbum is therefore only rabbinic and not biblical.  If she were to refuse the marriage, the rival wives are certainly liable for yibbum.  However, even if she does not, her rival wives are not totally exempt.  They are rabbinically exempt, because the rival wife cannot have yibbum with the yavam, but they are biblically liable, because the rival wife was not biblically married to the brother.  The solution in such a case is for the yavam to perform halitzah.  As we shall see throughout the tractate, in cases of doubt whether or not yibbum should or can be performed, the solution is usually the performance of halitzah, which avoids the possibility of forbidden sexual relations.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah three introduces a different list of women which is compared to the list in mishnah one.
  There are six relatives that are more restricted than these, in that they may be married only to strangers, marriage with their rivals is permitted:   his mother and his father’s wife, his father’s sister, his paternal sister, his father’s brother’s wife and his paternal brother’s wife. The six women mentioned in this mishnah are considered “more restricted” because they cannot be married to a man’s paternal brother (remember, yibbum is restricted to only paternal brothers).  For instance, a man’s mother cannot marry his paternal brother, because she is the wife of the paternal brother’s father, and it is forbidden to marry your father’s wife.  Likewise, it is forbidden to marry one’s father’s sister, one’s sister (from either parent), one’s father’s brother’s wife or one’s brother’s wife.  This last case can occur when one brother marries a woman and divorces her or dies with children.  This wife is now forbidden to all of her dead or divorced husband’s brothers. In all of these cases, if one of these women was married to another man and their husband died, their rival wives may marry one of the brothers.  The rival wife of a woman forbidden due to kinship is forbidden only when the forbidden women became eligible for yibbum.  These women were never eligible for yibbum to these brothers, therefore their rival wives are permitted.  Furthermore, even if the brother tried to marry one of these women, and then died, the rival wives are eligible for yibbum, since the marriage of the brother to the forbidden woman was not valid.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four teaches us that the first three mishnayoth of the tractate were all according the opinion of Beth Hillel.  Whereas Beth Hillel ruled that a woman whose rival wife is forbidden to the yavam is exempt from yibbum (as is the forbidden wife), Beth Shammai ruled that she must have yibbum or halitzah.  The mishnah then lists a few correlating disputes on this matter.
  Finally, the mishnah sounds what is surely the most pluralistic note in the entire Mishnah:  despite their many disagreements, Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai did not separate into two different sects.
  Beth Shammai permits the rival wives to the surviving brothers, and Beth Hillel prohibits them. If they perform the halitzah, Beth Shammai disqualifies them from marrying a priest,  and Beth Hillel makes the eligible. If they performed yibbum, Beth Shammai makes them eligible [to marry a priest],  and Beth Hillel disqualifies them. Though these forbid and these permit, and these disqualify and these make eligible, Beth Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from [the families of] Beth Hillel, nor did Beth Hillel [refrain from marrying women] from [the families of] Beth Shammai. [With regard to] purity and impurity, which these declare pure and the others declare impure, neither of them refrained from using the utensils of the others for the preparation of food that was ritually clean.  I have explained this section above in the introduction.
  If the yavam should perform halitzah with the rival wife, according to Beth Shammai, this halitzah is valid and allows this woman to marry other men.  Since a woman who has had halitzah is prohibited to a priest (just as a divorcee is forbidden to a priest), this woman is now prohibited to marry a priest.  According to Beth Hillel, this was an unnecessary halitzah, for the woman could have married other men even without it.  Since it was not true halitzah, she can still subsequently marry a priest.
  If she has yibbum, full levirate marriage, Beth Shammai would consider this to be valid, as they stated in section one.  Should this marriage end in the husband’s death, she could marry a priest, as can all widows.  However, according to Beth Hillel, this yibbum was actually forbidden.  Therefore this woman can no longer marry a priest, since all women who have engaged in forbidden sex cannot subsequently marry priests (we will learn more about this law later in the tractate).
  In Jewish law the child of many forbidden unions is considered to be a mamzer (we will also learn these laws later in the tractate).   A mamzer cannot marry a regular Israelite (Jew).  In the above dispute, if the rival wife did perform yibbum, the child would be a mamzer according to Beth Hillel.  Since this was not a situation requiring yibbum, the woman was biblically forbidden to her dead husband’s brother.   If the rival wife married another man without yibbum or halitzah, the child of this subsequent marriage would be a mamzer according to Beth Shammai.  This is because this woman married “out” while still bound to her yavam.  This section teaches that although this dispute would have created children considered by some to be mamzers and others not to be, neither side refrained from marrying those from the other side. This is a remarkable note of pluralism in the Mishnah, indeed it seems that this ideology is what kept the rabbis from forming splinter groups.  Although Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagreed on many topics, they continued to live together and intermarry.  Unlike other groups, specifically the Dead Sea sect, which left Jerusalem over halakhic disputes with their opponents, the halakhic disputes between the rabbis did not cause them to break into many little groups.  The mishnah further teaches that despite the fact that things that Beth Hillel considered pure, Beth Shammai considered impure, and vice versa, they did not refrain from eating together and from using each other’s utensils.  Again, if we look at the group that did split, the Dead Sea sect, two of the halakhic issues which they considered the most important were marital laws and purity laws (sacrificial laws were also important.)  The authors of the Dead Sea scrolls are constantly accusing their opponents of not properly observing marriage laws or purity laws.  Despite the fact that Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel also debated these subjects, they did not refrain from marrying each other and from eating together.  In other words, they remained one society.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah explains how “the wife of his brother who died before he was born” exempts her rival wife from yibbum.  This category of women was mentioned in the first mishnah of chapter one (there it was the 14th category).
  What is the case of “the wife of his brother who died before he was born”? If there were two brothers, and one of them died, and then a third brother was born, and then the second brother had yibbum with his dead brother’s wife and then died himself, the first woman is exempt as the wife of his brother who died before he was born, and the second wife [is exempt] because she is her rival wife. If he had ma’amar with her and died, the second wife, must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum.  Reuven and Shimon are brothers and Shimon dies.  Afterwards, Levi is born.  Reuven then takes Shimon’s widow in yibbum.  Afterwards Reuven also dies without children.  This same widow, who was originally Shimon’s wife and then became Reuven’s wife, now technically should become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Levi, the third brother. However, since Levi was not yet born when Shimon died, she is not liable for yibbum with Levi.  Since she is exempt, all of her rival wives are exempt as well.
  In order to understand this section, we must remind ourselves that ma’amar is the giving of money from the yavam to the yavamah, a parallel to the betrothal money given as “kiddushin” in regular marriages.  As I explained in the introduction, according to the Torah there is no marital process for the widow who goes through yibbum.  All that really happens is that he has relations with her, and thus yibbum is performed.  However, the rabbis created an institution called “ma’amar” whereby the yavam would give her betrothal money similar to the betrothal money given in regular marriages (we will learn these laws in tractate Kiddushin).  Ma’amar, however, does not make the woman the yavam’s full wife.  The status of their marriage is only rabbinic.  This will have many important implications in future mishnayoth. In our mishnah, Reuven does not have full yibbum with the woman, but only does ma’amar, and then dies.  The woman therefore, is not biblically liable to have yibbum with Levi, the third brother, but only rabbinically liable.  Since she is only rabbinically liable, her rival wife is not truly exempt, and according to biblical law she could have yibbum.  However, since Reuven did perform ma’amar with the other wife, the rival wife can only have halitzah.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with the same topic as the previous mishnah, the exemption of “the wife of his brother who died before he was born” and her rival wife.
  If there were two brothers and one of them died, and the second had yibbum with his dead brother’s wife, and after a [third] brother was born the second died, the first wife is exempt on account of her being the wife of his brother who died before he was born, while the second is exempt as her rival. If he had ma’amar with her, the second wife must perform the halitzah but she may not have yibbum. Rabbi Shimon says: he may have yibbum with either of them or perform halitzah for either of them.  The scenario in this mishnah is only slightly different from that in the previous one.  Again, Reuven and Shimon are brothers.  Shimon dies and in this case Reuven has yibbum with Shimon’s wife even before Levi is born.  In the previous mishnah Levi was born and then Reuven had yibbum with Shimon’s wife.  When Reuven dies, his wife who had previously been married to Shimon is exempt from yibbum with Levi because she is “the wife of his brother who died before he was born”.  The rival wife is again, also exempt.  The innovation of this mishnah is that even though when Levi was born, the woman was no longer waiting to have yibbum, in other words she was at the time a regular wife to Reuven and not a shomeret yavam, and Reuven did not die before Levi was born, in any case she is forbidden to Levi because he was not yet born when Shimon died.
  If  Reuven had ma’amar with the woman and then died, according to the first opinion, the ruling is the same as it was in the previous mishnah.  Since she is only partially Reuven’s wife, she does not fully exempt her rival wife from yibbum.
  In this section we see that R. Shimon disagrees with the previous opinion and rules that in the case under discussion in this mishnah, either the wife who was formerly married to Shimon or the rival wives may have yibbum or halitzah.  Since Levi was born when the woman was no longer a shomeret yavam, all connection she had to Shimon is lost.  She only becomes liable for yibbum because of her marriage with Reuven, and Levi was born before Reuven died (unlike Shimon).  Therefore, according to R. Shimon, Levi must have halitzah or yibbum with either wife.  In other words this is only a normal case of a man’s wives becoming liable for yibbum. Note that the mishnah says that Levi performs halitzah, even though in reality the woman performs halitzah by taking off his shoe and spitting.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah gives some general principles for when a woman is liable for yibbum (or halitzah) and when she is forbidden/exempt.
  A general rule has been said about the yavamah: Wherever she is prohibited as a forbidden relation, she may neither perform halitzah nor have yibbum. If her prohibition is due to a commandment or a prohibition due to holiness, she must perform halitzah but she may not have yibbum. If her sister is also her sister-in-law, she may perform halitzah or have yibbum.  This general rule has been amply illustrated in the previous chapter and a half.  If the yavamah was prohibited to her yavam according to the biblical laws of incest, she may not perform halitzah nor have yibbum.  Indeed, she is not truly subject to the laws of yibbum, since the prohibition of incest “trumps” the obligation of yibbum.
  This section mentions two lesser prohibitions, the “prohibition due to a commandment” and a “prohibition due to holiness.  Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain what both of these categories are.  Suffice it now to say that they are less consequential than the biblical incest prohibitions mentioned in the previous section.  If a woman who is prohibited to her yavam in one of these ways should be liable for yibbum, she must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum.  This is another way of stating that she is biblically liable for yibbum, but to avoid the problems that this type of yibbum would cause, the only option is halitzah.
  If the sister of the prohibited woman is also her sister-in-law, meaning there is a situation in which two sisters married to two brothers, and then both brothers die and both women become liable for yibbum to a third brother, even though this brother is prohibited from one of the sisters, he can have yibbum or halitzah with the other.  I will illustrate this complicated situation using names.  Reuven, Shimon and Levi are brothers.  Leah and Rachel are sisters.  Leah marries Reuven and Shimon marries Rachel, and then both men die without children.  Levi is married to Rachel’s daughter (from a marriage before she married Shimon).  Levi can therefore not have yibbum with Rachel, since a man cannot marry a woman and her daughter.  Nevertheless, Levi can have yibbum with Leah.  Although in general a man cannot have yibbum with the sister of his yavamah (we will learn this in chapter three), in this case since Rachel was forbidden to him, she was never his yavamah.  Therefore, Leah is permitted.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four defines the two categories mentioned in section two of mishnah three.
  A “prohibition due to a commandment” [refers to] the secondary incest prohibitions forbidden by the scribes. “A prohibition due to holiness” [refers to the following forbidden relationships]: a widow to a high priest; a divorced woman, or one that had performed halitzah to a regular priest; a mamzereth or a netinah to an Israelite; and an Israelite woman to a natin or a mamzer.  Women who are not themselves forbidden because of incest laws, but the scribes (rabbis) decreed that they were nevertheless prohibited are called “secondary incest prohibitions”.  Some examples of “secondary incest prohibitions” are one’s grandmother and one’s son’s or daughter’s daughter-in-law.  The reason that the rabbis prohibited these women is to keep people away from potential sin.  That is to say, if it became permitted to have relations with your son’s daughter-in-law, you might think that relations with one’s own daughter-in-law are also prohibited.  These prohibitions are called “prohibitions due to commandments” due to the commandment to obey the words of the sages.
  “Prohibitions due to holiness” are prohibitions that are not due to incest (or adultery) but rather to the sanctity of the priests (see Leviticus 21:6-7) or the sanctity of the people of Israel. A widow to a high priest:  If a widow becomes liable for yibbum to a high priest, he must perform halitzah for her.  He cannot have yibbum with her because she is prohibited to him (Leviticus 21:14). A divorced woman or one that had performed halitzah to a regular priest:  If a previously divorced woman or a woman who had halitzath, should become liable for yibbum with a regular priest, she must perform halitzah and cannot have yibbum, since she is prohibited to him (Leviticus 21:7). Note that this situation will usually not happen because a divorced woman or one who had halitzah cannot marry a priest, and therefore, she should not have married the yavam’s (who is a priest) brother, who is also a priest.  Nevertheless, if the brother transgressed and did marry a divorcee (marriage between a priest and a divorcee is prohibited but valid), and then died, the divorcee (who is now also a widow) has halitzah with the brother but not yibbum. A mamzereth or a netinah to an Israelite and an Israelite woman to a natin or a mamzer:  A mamzer (or mamzereth, a female mamzer) is the child of a forbidden union (Deuteronomy 23:3.  The definition of a mamzer appears in chapter 4:13).  A natin (or a netinah, a female natin) is a descendent of a tribe of foreigners who converted through trickery in the days of Joshua and were declared temple slaves (Joshua 9:27).  Neither of these categories of men or women can marry full Israelites.  Therefore, if one of these people becomes liable to have yibbum with an Israelite, or if an Israelite becomes liable to have yibbum with one of them, they have halitzah and not yibbum.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  A wife of a deceased husband is liable for yibbum only if her husband had a brother and no sons.  Our mishnah defines what types of brothers cause the woman to be obligated for yibbum and what types of sons exempt them.
  If one has any kind of brother, [that brother] requires his brother’s wife to have yibbum, and he is his brother in every respect, except for a brother born from a female slave or a non-Jewish woman. If one has any kind of son, [that son] exempts his father’s wife from yibbum, and he is liable for striking or cursing [his father], and he is his son in every respect, except for the son of a female slave or a non-Jewish woman.  Any kind of brother, even a mamzer, requires the brother’s wife to have yibbum or halitzah.  This brother is his brother in every respect.  For instance, if his brother is a mamzer, his brother is still eligible to inherit from him.  If one brother is a priest and his brother is a mamzer, for instance his father was a priest and had an adulterous affair with a married woman and they had a child, the priest is still allowed to become impure to help bury his mamzer brother.  [Priests can only become impure for their seven immediate relatives.]  The only exception to this rule is his brother from a slave or non-Jew.  Since the child of a slave or a non-Jewish woman is not considered to be related to his father, for the child is not Jewish, the child is not considered to be related to his paternal father.
  This section basically teaches the same law with regard to a son.  Any son exempts a wife from yibbum or halitzah, even a mamzer son.  For instance, if a man had an adulterous affair and a child was born, and then the man subsequently married another woman and died without any more children, his wife is exempt from yibbum, because he already has a child.  This child is considered his in all legal matters.  For instance if he strikes or curses his father he is liable for the death penalty (see Exodus 21:15, 17).  He inherits his father, and if his father is a priest his father may become impure in order to bury him.  Again, the only exception is the son of a female slave or non-Jew, who is not considered to be related to his father.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with the situation where a man has married one of two sisters but does not know which one he has married.  The Mishnah mentions situations such as these quite frequently, not because they were realistic, but because they are useful for teaching law.
  In order to understand the mishnah, we need to know that a man cannot have relations with a sister of a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah.  A woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah is called his “z’kukah”.  He can’t have relations with the sister of his z’kukah, just as he can’t have relations with the sister of his wife.
  If a man betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which of them he has betrothed, he must give a get (a bill of to this one and a get to this one. If he died, and he had a brother, the brother must perform halitzah for both of them. If he had two brothers, one is to perform halitzah and the other may have yibbum. If they both preempted and married them they do not take [the women] away from them.  If a man betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which he betrothed, he must divorce both.  He cannot divorce one and marry the other because it is forbidden to marry your wife’s sister, even after you have divorced your wife.  In other words, if he divorces one and marries the other, he may have divorced the one that he betrothed and therefore it would be forbidden for him to marry the other.
  If he dies, both sisters become liable for yibbum or halitzah to his brothers.  If he has one brother, that brother cannot have yibbum with either because it is forbidden to have relations with the sister of a woman with whom you are liable to have yibbum (z’kukah).  In other words, if he were to have yibbum with one of them, it could be that the other was the one who was really betrothed.  Therefore, he must perform halitzah for both.
  If there are two brothers, the first brother performs halitzah for one of the women and then the second brother can have yibbum with the other sister.  The first brother should do halitzah because if he were to have yibbum he might be having relations with the sister who was not betrothed, and therefore he is having relations with the sister of his z’kukah (as in the above situation).  However, after the first brother has halitzah with one of the sisters, there can be no problem for the second brother to have yibbum with the second sister.  If she is the one who was betrothed to the dead brother, then he has yibbum with her, which is perfectly okay.  If the other woman was the one betrothed, she has already had halitzah, and her ties to the brother are severed.  Therefore, this woman is not the sister of his z’kukah.
  If both brothers have yibbum with the two sisters, the court does not force them to separate, even though the first brother should have had halitzah.  Although the brother who first performed yibbum may have originally had yibbum with the sister of his z’kukah, since her sister has now had yibbum, her ties to the other brother have been severed and neither brother is currently married to the sister of his z’kukah.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to provides scenarios whereby two men betroth two women, but neither know who betrothed whom.
  For the sake of clarity I will use names in explaining this complex mishnah.  There are two families of men in the mishnah.  The first family I will call Reuven, Shimon and Levi, who are all brothers.  The second family of men I will call George, Bill and Ron, again all brothers.  The two sisters in the mishnah I will again call Rachel and Leah.  This should make the mishnah somewhat easier.
  If two men betrothed two sisters and one does not know whom he betrothed and the other does not know whom he betrothed, this one gives two bills of divorce and the other gives two bills of divorce. If they died and this one has a brother and this one has a brother, this brother performs halitzah for both widows and this brother performs halitzah for both widows. If  one has one brother and the other has two brothers, one brother performs halitzah for both widows and [as regards] the two, one performs halitzah and the other may perform yibbum. If they both preempted and married they do not take [the women] away from  them. If this one had two brothers and the other had two brothers, one brother of one performs halitzah for one widow and one brother of the other performs halitzah with the other widow, [and then the other] brother of the first may have yibbum with the halutzah of the second and [the other] brother of the second may have yibbum with the halutzah of the first. If both preempted and performed halitzah, the [other] two must not perform yibbum, rather one must perform halitzah and the other may then have yibbum. If they both preempted and married they do not take [the women] away from  them.  Reuven and George betroth Rachel and Leah but neither knows who betrothed whom.  They both must then divorce both women in order for the women to go marry other men.
  If Reuven and George die, and each has only one brother (Shimon and Bill), Shimon must perform halitzah with both women and Bill must perform halitzah with both women.  Neither can have yibbum with either women because each woman might be the sister of the woman with whom he is truly liable to have yibbum, the z’kukah (because we don’t know who betrothed whom).
  If Reuven has two brothers, Shimon and Levi and George still only has Bill as a brother, Bill must have halitzah with both Rachel and Leah.  With regard to Shimon and Levi, one brother must have halitzah with both women but the other brother can have yibbum.  This rule was explained in the above mishnah as well.  The second brother can have yibbum with either women because if she was truly the woman who Reuven betrothed, then yibbum is proper.  If Reuven betrothed the other sister, then the sister with whom this brother now has yibbum is no longer the sister of his z’kukah, because this other sister has already received halitzah from his other brother.
  As we learned above in mishnah six, if both brothers preemptively marry both sisters, they are not forced to have a divorce.  Certainly the second marriage is okay, and even the first marriage was only problematic in the beginning, before the second sister had yibbum.  Even though the woman whom he married may have once been the sister of his z’kukah, after she has had yibbum the other sister is no longer a z’kukah.  For further explanation see mishnah six.
  If both Reuven and George have two brothers, one brother of each dead brother has halitzah with both sisters.  Let’s say that Shimon and Bill have halitzah with both sisters.  Now Levi can have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with George and Ron can have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Shimon.  This is permitted because if this sister was the one whom his brother had betrothed than yibbum is proper.  If she is not the correct sister, then his other brother has already had halitzah with the other woman and she is no longer a z’kukah.  The reason that Levi cannot have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Shimon and that Ron can’t have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Bill is that it is forbidden to marry a woman with whom your brother had halitzah.
  If Shimon and Levi preemptively perform halitzah with both Rachel and Leah, the other two, Bill and Ron, cannot both have yibbum with Rachel and Leah, because the first to do yibbum might do so with the sister of his z’kukah.  Rather one (either Bill or Ron) should do halitzah and then the other may have yibbum.
  Again, if Bill and Ron both do yibbum, after Shimon and Levi both performed halitzah, neither are forced to divorce them.  This is the same ruling as in section four and in the previous mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah gives a general rule about yibbum and then begins to discuss a different issue, namely one who is suspected of having relations with a woman who is forbidden to him.
  The commandment to perform yibbum is upon the oldest brother. If a younger brother preempted him [by performing yibbum], he has acquired [a wife]. If a man is suspected of [having relations] with a slave and then she was freed, or with a non-Jewish woman who then converted, he must not marry her. If, however, he did marry her they do not take her away from him. If a man is suspected of [having relations] with a married woman, and then [in consequence] she was taken away from her husband, even though he married her, he must divorce her.  Any brother of the deceased husband may perform yibbum or halitzah.  However, the first option is supposed to go to the oldest remaining brother.  If, contrary to what is supposed to happen, a younger brother does perform yibbum, the yibbum is valid and she is his wife.  We will learn more about this in chapter four, mishnah five.
  The three parts of this section all deal with a man who is suspected of having relations with a woman who is forbidden to him.  In the first part, he is suspected of having relations with either a slave or a non-Jew.  Both of these women are prohibited to him.  Subsequently, the slave is freed (thereby becoming a fully Jewish woman) and the non-Jewish woman converts to Judaism.  In their current state both women are permitted to him.  Nevertheless, he is not allowed to marry them.  There are two reasons given for this.  One, so that people will not confirm the original rumor that he had relations with a woman forbidden to him.  Two, so that people won’t say that she only converted in order to marry him. In contrast, if he is suspected of having an affair with a married woman, and then she is forced to separate from her husband, and the suspected adulterer marries her, the court imposes a divorce.  Adultery is a much more serious crime than relations with non-Jews and therefore just a suspicion that he had adultery with her, rules out all future marriages.  Note that this rule is ultimately meant to protect marriages.  A man whose wife has had adultery can no longer remained married to her.  To prevent a situation whereby she sets her eyes on another man and forces her husband to divorce her by committing adultery, the rabbis permanently forbade her to the adulterer. .
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does section two follow section one?  What is the connection, if any, between the two laws?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does section two follow section one?  What is the connection, if any, between the two laws?
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The second part of mishnah eight dealt with men who are suspected of having relations with women prohibited to them.  Mishnah nine deals with men who are suspected of lying in order to free a woman of her husband so that they could marry her.
  A man who brings a bill of divorce from a country beyond the sea and states, “it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”, must not marry the [divorcer’s] wife. [Similarly, if one states] “he died”, “I killed him”, or “We killed him”, he must not marry his wife. Rabbi Judah said: [If he says], “ I killed him”, the woman may not marry [any one]; [If, he states], “We killed him”, the woman may marry.  A messenger who brings a bill of divorce from overseas must state “It was written in my presence and signed in my presence”.  This is to ensure that the divorce document was done properly and that the husband actually requested that it be given (we will learn these laws in tractate Gittin).  Our mishnah teaches that the messenger is not allowed to marry the divorcer’s wife, lest the messenger fake the get in order to marry her.  His participation in “freeing” her of her husband, disqualifies him from subsequently marrying her.
  Similarly, if a man testifies that a woman’s husband is dead, he may not marry her.  Jewish law generally does not allow testimony with less than two witnesses.  However, in the case of testimony about the death of a man, testimony that will allow her to remarry as a widow, only one witness is required.  Since this man is our sole means of knowing that she is a widow, he cannot marry her, lest he lie in order to marry her.  Even if he says “I killed him” or “We killed him” he cannot marry her.
  A murderer is forbidden from testifying in a court of law.  Therefore, according to Rabbi Judah, if one testifies that he murdered a woman’s husband, his testimony is disqualified and it turns out that there is no testimony to her husband’s death.  Therefore, she cannot remarry.  However, if he says, “We killed him” he may mean to say, “I was there when other people killed him”.  Since he does not definitively say that he is a murderer, his testimony about the death of the woman’s husband is valid, and she may remarry.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah ten is a continuation of mishnah nine.
  A sage who has pronounced a woman forbidden to her husband because of a vow   must not marry her himself. If, however, a woman made a declaration of refusal or performed halitzah in his presence, he may marry her, since he [is part of a] court. If any of these had wives who [subsequently] died, [the other women] are permitted to marry them. If [the women] were married to others and were [subsequently] divorced, or widowed, they may be married to these. They are permitted to their sons or brothers.  The sage may not marry the woman whom he has declared forbidden to her husband due to a vow.  This could happen if the woman vowed to receive no benefit from her husband, and then came in front of the sage to release her vow (we will learn how a vow is released in tractate Nedarim).  If the sage could not find an opening to release the vow, then the woman remains forbidden to her husband.  The sage may not marry her lest he did not search hard to find a way to release the vow because he wanted to marry the woman himself. However, if a woman performs the declaration of refusal (an annulment of marriage made by a woman upon reaching majority in a case where her marriage was contracted by her brother or mother) or halitzah in front of a sage, that sage may still marry her.  In this situation he is part of a court, and we are not suspicious of courts.  Furthermore, with a court, if he wanted to illegally accept her declaration of refusal or halitzah just so that he could marry her, he would have to get the rest of the court to agree.  Since this would not be so simple, we are not suspicious and he may marry her.
  This section places certain limits on the preceding laws in this mishnah and the previous one.  If these men, who testified and thereby allowed the woman to be freed from her husband (the one who brought the get, or the one who testified about the husband’s death or the sage who did not release the vow), had other wives at the time, then they may later, after their current wives die, marry these other women.  Since at the time of their testimony there is little chance that they would marry the woman about whom they are testifying, they are not suspected of lying.  Note that this mishnah assumes that bigamy is not common, even though it is permitted. Furthermore, if these women subsequently marry other men and then are again divorced or widowed, they may marry the men who testified in order to “free” them from their previous marriage.  The fact that they married someone else first, means that the original testimony did not directly allow them to marry the one who brought the get, testified about the death or did not release the vow.  The step in between gets rid of the suspicion that they were lying. Finally, these women may marry the children or brother of these men.  While we suspect that one may lie in order to free a woman for himself, we do not have such suspicions for his son or brother.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Mishnayoth one through four are all one long mishnah dealing with a case of four brothers, whom we will call, Reuven, Shimon, Levi and Judah, two of whom married two sisters, Rachel and Leah.
  Four brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters, if those who were married to the sisters died, behold these must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum. If they preemptively married them, they must divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer said: Beth Shammai holds that they may retain them, and Beth Hillel holds that they must divorce them.  Reuven and Shimon marry Rachel and Leah and then both die.  Rachel and Leah are technically liable for yibbum or halitzah with either Levi or Judah.  The mishnah teaches that neither Levi nor Judah may have yibbum with either sister, because each sister is the sister of his z’kukah (a woman with whom he is liable to have either yibbum or halitzah).  In other words Leah is liable to have yibbum or halitzah with each brother as is Rachel.  They are both considered to be “z’kukah” to both brothers.  If Levi or Judah were to have yibbum with either one, he would be having relations with the sister of his z’kukah, which is forbidden just as it is forbidden to have relations with one’s wife’s sister.  Even after one sister has had halitzah with one of the other brothers, thereby ending her status as z’kukah, the other may not have yibbum because any one woman is forbidden to him at the time when she becomes liable for yibbum, remains forbidden forever.
  If the brothers did marry the sisters, against the ruling in clause one, they must divorce them.  Although the marriage is valid and therefore requires a divorce, it is forbidden and therefore a divorce is mandatory.
  According to Rabbi Eliezer, the previous ruling is only according to Beth Hillel.  Beth Shammai disagrees and rules that the marriage may be upheld.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss variations that could arise from the scenario brought up in mishnah one.
  If one of the sisters was forbidden to one [of the brothers] under the prohibition of incest, he is forbidden to marry her but may marry her sister, while the second brother is forbidden to marry either of them. [If one sister] was forbidden due to a commandment or due to holiness they both perform halitzah and may not be taken in yibbum.  If one of the sister’s was forbidden to one of the remaining brothers because of one of the various incest laws, for instance he was already married to her daughter, she is not liable to have yibbum with him (as we learned in chapter one).  Therefore he can marry the other sister, for she is not the sister of his z’kukah.  Nevertheless, the other brother, to whom neither sister is forbidden, is still prohibited from marrying either sister, since each is the sister of his z’kukah.
  In chapter two, mishnayoth two and three, we learned that there are two other categories of forbidden relationships besides primary incest prohibitions:  secondary incest relationships prohibitions and prohibitions due to the inherent holiness of the priests (for instance divorcees are forbidden to priests) or of all of Israel (for instance the prohibition of a mamzer). If one of the sisters was forbidden to one of the remaining brothers due to one of these prohibitions, for instance he was a priest (and his paternal brothers were not), or he was a mamzer (and his paternal brothers were not) the two sisters must have halitzah and cannot have yibbum.  This accords with what we learned in chapter two, that in any case where a woman becomes liable to have yibbum with a man prohibited to her due to a commandment or holiness, she must have halitzah and not yibbum.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This is the final mishnah which deals with the subject raised in mishnah one.
  If one of the sisters was forbidden to one brother under the prohibition of incest and the other sister was forbidden to the other under the prohibition of incest, she who is forbidden to the one is permitted to the other and she who is forbidden to the other is permitted to the first. This is what they said: when her sister is her sister-in-law she may either perform halizah or be taken in yibbum.  If each sister is prohibited to one brother due to an incest prohibition, for instance Levi is married to Rachel’s daughter and Judah is married to Leah’s daughter, Levi may have yibbum with Leah and Judah may have yibbum with Rachel.  This is because each sister is a z’kukah to only one brother.  Rachel is a z’kukah only to Judah and Leah only to Levi.  When yibbum is performed neither brother is having relations with the sister of his z’kukah.
  This refers to the end of mishnah 2:3.  Rachel and Leah are both sisters and were sisters-in-law before Reuven and Shimon died.  The only time that both Rachel and Leah could have yibbum with a brother is when both are forbidden to one brother through a prohibition of incest, as our mishnah describes. Note that our mishnah is actually quoting an earlier mishnah and explaining it.  This phenomenon of mishnah explaining an older mishnah does occasionally occur in the Mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the three that follow it, deal with situations in which there are three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi, two of whom are married to two sisters, Rachel and Leah or a mother and her daughter, or a mother and her granddaughter.  The commonality to all of these cases is that a man may not have relations with both of these women.  Therefore, if both women should become liable for yibbum with the surviving brother, he may not have yibbum with either, because each one is the relative of his z’kukah (the other woman who becomes liable for yibbum).  We have learned most of these rules above in mishnah two.
  Three brothers:  two of whom were married to two sisters, or to a woman and her daughter, or to a woman and her daughter’s daughter, or to a woman and her son’s daughter, behold, these must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Rabbi Shimon exempts them. If one of them was forbidden to him by a prohibition of incest, he is forbidden to marry her but is permitted to marry her sister. If the prohibition is due to a commandment or to holiness, they must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum.  If Reuven marries Rachel and Shimon marries Leah, who are either sisters or a mother and her daughter or a mother and her granddaughter, and then Reuven and Shimon both die without children, Levi cannot have yibbum with either woman.  This is because each woman is the immediate relative of the other woman who is his z’kukah.  Just as we have learned before that one cannot marry the sister of a z’kukah, here we learn that one cannot marry the mother, daughter, grandmother or granddaughter of a z’kukah. Rabbi Shimon holds that since he cannot have yibbum with either one of them, neither are even obligated for yibbum.
  If one of the two women was forbidden to him by a prohibition of incest, for instance if Leah’s daughter was married to Levi already, since Leah is not obligated for yibbum, Levi may have yibbum with Rachel (in this case Leah’s sister).  We have already learned this rule in mishnah two.
  If one of the two women was forbidden but only due to a prohibition of a commandment or a prohibition due to holiness, both women are technically liable for yibbum.  Since he cannot have yibbum with either, he must do halitzah with both.  Again, this law was learned above in mishnah two.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with variants upon the situation where two of three brothers were married to two sisters.
  Three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was unmarried: When one of the sisters’ husbands died, the unmarried brother performed for her ma’amar, and then his second brother died: Beth Shammai says: his wife [remains] with him while the other is exempt because she is his wife’s sister. Beth Hillel however says that he must divorce his wife with a get and by halitzah,   and his brother’s wife by halitzah. This is the case in regard to which they said: “woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife.” Reuven and Shimon were married to Rachel and Leah, and Levi was unmarried.  When Reuven dies, Levi performed ma’amar with Rachel.  Ma’amar, as we have learned before, is an act parallel to betrothal with a regular woman, and is only done in the case of yibbum.  Ma’amar is performed by the man giving a symbolic amount of money to the woman.  Rachel becomes his quasi-fiancee after having ma’amar, but she is not fully his wife until he performs yibbum (intercourse).  Before Levi can have yibbum with Rachel, Shimon also dies, thereby making Leah liable for yibbum.  The question is now asked, can Levi continue to stay married to Rachel, even though he is liable to have yibbum with Rachel’s sister. According to Beth Shammai, the first woman (Rachel) remains Levi’s wife and Leah is exempt from either yibbum or halitzah.  In other words, Beth Shammai sees in ma’amar a full marital act, one which makes Rachel Levi’s full wife.  Since he is already married to Rachel, he cannot have yibbum with Leah, Rachel’s sister, and she is completely exempt. According to Beth Hillel, ma’amar does not make Rachel into a full wife, such that it would be biblically forbidden for Levi to marry her sister.  Therefore, when Leah becomes obligated for yibbum, it is the case of two sisters who are both liable to have yibbum with the same man.  As we have learned previously, in such a case both must have halitzah, and neither may have yibbum, since a man cannot marry the sister of his z’kukah.  In addition, Rachel requires a get, since she did have ma’amar, which is an act of betrothal. The final clause of the mishnah relates that it is about such a case that people say, woe to him for losing his wife and woe to him for losing his brother’s wife.  For without having done anything wrong, both of these women are prohibited to him.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The key to understanding the laws in these mishnayoth is that ma’amar, the equivalent of betrothal in cases of yibbum, does not create a full marriage between the yavam and the yavamah but does create a tie.  Often the solution in cases where a woman has had ma’amar and then her husband dies without having done yibbum thereby making her obligated for yibbum with the other brother, is that she has halitzah but not yibbum.
  Three brothers:  two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger:  If one of the sisters’ husbands died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife and then died himself, the first is exempt [from yibbum or halitzah] because she is his wife’s sister, and the second is exempt as her rival. If he had only had ma’amar with her and died, the stranger is to perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Three brothers:  two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If the brother who was married to the stranger died, and one of the sisters’ husbands married his wife and then died himself, the first is exempt [from yibbum or halitzah] because she is his wife’s sister, and the second is exempt as her rival. If he had only had ma’amar with her and died, the stranger is to perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum.  Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah.  Levi is married to Tovah, who is not a sister of Rachel or Leah (she is a “stranger”).  When Reuven dies, Levi has yibbum with Rachel his wife.  Subsequently Levi dies and Rachel and Tovah become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Shimon.  Rachel is exempt because Shimon is married to Leah, her sister.  Tovah is exempt because she is Rachel’s rival wife (see chapter one, mishnah one).
  If Levi had ma’amar with Rachel instead of full yibbum, and then Levi died, Rachel was not truly his wife in order to exempt Tovah as a rival wife.  Therefore, Tovah must have halitzah, but still cannot have yibbum since Levi did have ma’amar with Rachel.
  In this case, Levi dies and Reuven has yibbum with Tovah. When Reuven subsequently dies, Rachel and Tovah become obligated to have yibbum with Shimon. Rachel is exempt because Shimon is married to Leah, her sister.  Tovah is exempt because she is Rachel’s rival wife (see chapter one, mishnah one).
  If Reuven had ma’amar with Tovah instead of yibbum, and then he died, Tovah was not truly his wife and therefore the fact that Rachel is Leah’s sister does not exempt her from yibbum.  She still must have halitzah because Reuven did have ma’amar with her.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to the discuss the situation of two brothers married to two sisters and a third brother married to a woman who is not a sister.
  Three brothers:  two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger:  If one of the sisters’ husband died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife, and then the wife of the second brother died, and afterwards the brother who was married to the stranger died, behold she is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment. Three brothers:  two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger.  If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, and then the brother who was married to the stranger died, and he who had divorced his wife married her and then died,- this is a case concerning which they said:  If any of them died or were divorced, their rivals are permitted.  Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah and Levi is married to Tovah.  Reuven dies and Levi has yibbum with Rachel, and then Leah dies and then Levi dies (sounds a bit like a Shakespeare tragedy, doesn’t it!).  In this case both Tovah and Rachel should become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Shimon.  Note that this is the second time that Rachel has become potentially liable for yibbum with Shimon, the first time when Reuven died and now when her current husband, Levi died.  Our mishnah teaches that since she was exempt from yibbum with Shimon the first time, for at the moment he was married to her sister, she is exempt from yibbum the second time, even though Leah, her sister, is no longer alive.  The fact that she was once forbidden to have yibbum with Shimon, means that she will always be forbidden to have yibbum with him.  Tovah is also exempt because she is the rival wife of a woman exempt from yibbum.
  Again, Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah and Levi is married to Tovah.  Reuven divorces Rachel, and then Levi dies, and Reuven has yibbum with Tovah, and then he dies.  At this point Tovah becomes liable for yibbum with Shimon.  The mishnah teaches that Tovah can have yibbum with Shimon even though Reuven was once married to the sister of Shimon’s wife.  In other words, if Rachel had still been married to Reuven she would have been exempt from yibbum, and Tovah would have been exempt from yibbum, and hence forbidden to have yibbum (anyone exempt from yibbum may not have yibbum).  Now that Rachel is no longer married to Reuven, Tovah can have yibbum.  The mishnah refers to this law which has already been stated in chapter one, mishnah one.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah refers back to the first mishnah of the tractate, which stated that if one of the wives was forbidden to the yavam, and therefore did not require yibbum or halitzah, the rival wife was also exempt from yibbum or halitzah.  In that mishnah (and in the previous mishnah of our chapter) we learned that if the forbidden wife had been divorced, the rival wife was again liable for yibbum or halitzah.  Our mishnah teaches what happens to the rival wife if the forbidden wife was doubtfully divorced or only doubtfully married in the first place.
  [If in any of these cases] the betrothal or divorce was in doubt, behold, these rivals must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. What is a case of doubtful betrothal? If when he threw to her betrothal money it was uncertain whether it fell nearer to him or nearer to her – this is a case of doubtful betrothal. [What is a case of] doubtful divorce? If he wrote a get in his own handwriting and it bore no signatures of witnesses, or if it bore signatures of witnesses but was note dated, or if it was dated but had the signature of only one witness this is a case of doubtful divorce.  If the forbidden wife was doubtfully betrothed, then there is a doubt whether or not the rival wife must or even can have yibbum.  If the divorce was valid, then the rival wife can and must have yibbum; if the divorce was invalid then the rival wife is exempt.  Similarly, if there was a doubt about whether or not the wife forbidden to the yavam was even married in the first place, there is a doubt whether or not the rival wife must or can have yibbum.  If the betrothal was valid, then the rival wife is exempt; if the betrothal was not valid, then the rival wife was never even this woman’s true rival wife, and hence she is liable for yibbum or halitzah.
  This section and the next define potential cases of doubtful divorce and betrothal. We should note that there are other cases of doubtful divorce and betrothal that we will learn when we learn tractates Gittin and Kiddushin. A man may betroth his wife by throwing the money used for betrothal at her (money is one of the means by which a woman is legally betrothed), as long as it is closer to her than to him. [Note that the woman must always consent to becoming his betrothed.  A man cannot throw money at any woman he wishes and thereby betroth her against her will].  If it was doubtful whether the money landed closer to him or closer to her, she is doubtfully betrothed.
  A normal get (divorce document) is written by a scribe, is signed by two witnesses and is dated.  If the two witnesses are missing, but the husband wrote the get himself, or it has two witnesses but no date, or one witness but it has the date, the get is valid according to the Torah but the sages stated that it was invalid (see Gittin 8:2, 9:4).  If a woman were to get remarried using one of these divorce documents, the children from the second marriage are not mamzers (as they would be if she remarried without ever being divorced).  Our mishnah considers these divorce documents cases of “doubtful divorce” since they are on the one hand valid (from Torah law) and on the other hand invalid (due to a stringency of the rabbis).
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is quite complex so I recommend paying careful attention to the details.  If you are beginning to despair, we are almost out of the most complex section of Yevamoth.
  Three brothers were married to three women who were strangers [to one another] and one of them died and the second brother did ma’amar with her and then he died, behold, these must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum; for it is said “And one of them died…her husband’s brother shall unite with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5) only she who is bound due to one yavam but not she who is bound to due to two yavamim. R. Shimon says: he may have yibbum with whichever of these he wishes and then perform halitzah for the other. If two brothers were married to two sisters, and one of the brothers died, and afterwards the wife of the second brother died, behold, she is forbidden to him   forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment.  Reuven, Shimon and Levi are married to Rachel, Tovah and Yael, none of whom are sisters.  Reuven dies and Shimon does ma’amar with Rachel.  When Shimon dies, Rachel and Tovah should, we would think, become liable for yibbum r halitzah with Levi.  Our mishnah, using a midrash based on Deut. 25:5, states that neither woman may have yibbum with Levi.  This is because Rachel is bound to Levi through her marriage to two of Levi’s brothers.  She is still bound to him by force of her marriage with Reuven, because the ma’amar that Shimon did with her was not as strong as a full yibbum.  [If Shimon had done yibbum, her ties to Reuven would have been fully severed.]   She is bound to Levi through her marriage to Shimon because of the ma’amar she did do with him.  In other words ma’amar is strong enough to create a relationship with the second brother, but not strong enough to sever the ties with the first brother.  Therefore Rachel is bound to Levi through the force of her marriage to two brothers who are now deceased.  The mishnah understands the words “And one of them died” to exclude a case where two brothers died.  Since Rachel is exempt, her rival wife, Tovah, is also exempt.  However, since ma’amar is not a biblical institution, and therefore the ties to Shimon are not complete, halitzah must be performed.
  Rabbi Shimon holds that ma’amar either completely acquires the woman for the man who does ma’amar, in other words it creates a complete and valid relationship according to the Torah, or it doesn’t create any legal relationship whatsoever, not even a rabbinicly ordained marriage.  If it creates a complete betrothal, then Rachel’s ties to her first husband, Reuven, are ended by Shimon’s ma’amar.  When Shimon dies, she becomes liable to yibbum with Levi only because of her marriage to Shimon.  If it doesn’t create any tie, then she was never at all married to Shimon, and she is liable for yibbum with Levi only because of her marriage to Reuven.  In either case, she does not fit the category of one who is liable to yibbum through two dead husbands at the same time.  Therefore, either of these wives may have yibbum.  The second wife must have halitzah, lest the ma’amar not have created a tie with Shimon, and therefore Rachel became obligated for yibbum because of her marriage with Reuven and Tovah became obligated because of her marriage with Shimon.  He cannot have yibbum with the second one as well, lest the ma’amar did create a tie, and a yavam cannot have yibbum with two wives of one dead husband.
  Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah.  Reuven dies and Rachel then would become liable for yibbum with Shimon, except she is exempt because he is married to her sister.  The mishnah teaches that even though Leah subsequently dies, and hence Rachel might be able to have yibbum with Shimon, she cannot because she was at one point forbidden to him.  Note that this law was already explained in mishnah seven.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah discusses all of the potential violations that could occur in a case where two brothers betroth two women and the women are accidentally switched when the two couples enter the bridal chamber (huppah).  In other words, Reuven has relations with Shimon’s wife and vice versa.  Note that the mishnah is only discussing a situation where this occurred accidentally.  Had the switch been intentional, they would all be intentional adulterers and the men would have to divorce their wives.
  If two men betrothed two women, and as they were entering into the bridal chamber, they exchanged the one for the other, behold, they are guilty of having relations with a married woman. If they were brothers they are guilty of having relations with a brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty of having relations with a wife’s sister. If they were menstruants [they are guilty] of having relations with a menstruant. They must be kept apart for three months, lest they are pregnant. If they were minors incapable of bearing children, they may be returned [to their rightful husband] at once. If the women were of priestly families they are disqualified from eating terumah.  At the time of the mishnah, in typical situations a man would betroth a woman and only some time later marry her.  The marriage was actualized by him bringing her into the huppah, which was a true bridal chamber, and not the symbolic huppah used today.  In the huppah the couple would have sexual relations. Once the woman is betrothed, she is considered like a full wife with regard to adultery.  Therefore, if the two brides were switched, each brother who has relations with the other’s wife has violated the prohibition of adultery.
  He has also violated the prohibition of having relations with your brother’s wife.  See Leviticus 18:16 and 20:21.
  If they were sisters he has also violated the prohibition of having relations with one’s wife’s sister.  See Leviticus Leviticus 18:18.
  If they were menstruating, the brothers have violated the prohibition of having relations with a menstruant.  See Leviticus 18:19.
  Before each wife can return to having relations with her lawful husband, she must wait three months, lest she was impregnated on her wedding night. The three months allows us to recognize whether the child is from the wrong husband. If she was impregnated by the wrong husband, the child will be a mamzer. If she was a minor who could not become pregnant, the three month waiting period is unnecessary.
  If these women were from priestly families, they will no longer be allowed to eat terumah, for any woman who has had relations with someone forbidden to her, can no longer marry a priest or eat terumah.  If her husband should die without children, she does not return to her priestly family and resume eating terumah, as would a normal widow in such a situation (see Leviticus 22:13).
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the case where a yavam performs halitzah, but then the woman who had halitzah is found to be pregnant with the dead husband’s child.
  A yavam performs halitzah for his yevamah, and she is subsequently found to be pregnant and she gives birth:If the child is viable, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest.  If the child is viable, meaning there was no miscarriage, then the halitzah was unnecessary, because only a husband who has no children cause his wives to be subject to yibbum.  Since the halitzah was not necessary, all of the results of a man performing halitzah for a woman do not occur.  He is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives [mishnah 7 below will list which relatives are forbidden had the halitzah been necessary].  Furthermore, since the halitzah was unnecessary, she is not disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest, as a regular halutzah (a woman who has had halitzah is).
  If the child is not viable, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he disqualifies her from marrying a priest.  If the child was not viable, meaning she had a miscarriage, then the halitzah was necessary.  Therefore, all of the results of a valid halitzah do occur.  He is forbidden to marry her relatives and she may not marry his.  She is considered a halutzah, and therefore she can no longer marry a priest.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with a case where the yevamah is found to be pregnant after having yibbum.  In the previous mishnah she was found pregnant after halitzah.
  A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth:If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice;  If the child is viable, then the yibbum was unnecessary, for only the wives of childless husbands must go through yibbum.  Not only was the yibbum unnecessary, but the marriage of the yavam to the yevamah was prohibited, for she is the wife of his brother [Marrying one’s brother’s wife is forbidden in all cases except for when yibbum is obligatory].  Therefore, he must divorce her and both must bring a sin-offering for having forbidden relations.
  If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife].  If the child was not viable, then the yibbum was valid and he may retain her as a wife.  Neither must bring a sin-offering.
  If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui.  If it is unclear whether the child was from the first husband, and the pregnancy was full-term, or the child was from the second husband (the yavam) and the pregnancy was only seven months long, then the yavam still must divorce her, lest the yibbum was unnecessary and she is forbidden to him because she is his brother’s wife.  The child is not in any way illegitimate, whether or not it was from the first or second husband.  Both the man and the woman must bring a sacrifice known as an “asham talui” (a dependent guilt-offering), which is brought when a person does not know whether or not what he did was sinful.  In this case he has only transgressed if the child was not his. Note that the mishnah does not talk about an eight-month child.  In the ancient world, it was considered impossible for a child born in the eighth month of pregnancy to live.  Children born at nine or at seven months could live, but not those born after eight months.  The rabbis also believed this “scientific” belief, and hence will often call a child born in the eighth month a “miscarriage”.  If the child nevertheless lived, they probably assumed that they had counted the months wrong.   The rabbis also developed a theory that there were two different types of pregnancies:  a seven month and a nine month.  If the child was born at eight months and lived, it must have been a seven month pregnancy that was overdue.  If the child was born at eight months and died, it must have been a premature nine month pregnancy.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  In order to understand this mishnah, we must understand some background laws concerning a woman’s ownership of property, her dowry and her ketubah.
  When a man marries a husband he writes her a ketubah (a marriage document).  In the ketubah is written the amount of money he will pay her upon divorce or his death.  Additionally, some of the dowry that the woman brings into the marriage is written in the ketubah.
  Dowry can come in two forms.  The first form is called “pluckable property” (nikhse melog).  This is money that she brings from her father’s house that remain hers and the husband may not use.  The husband has rights to the profit earned from this money during the marriage.  He has no responsibility for the money.  For instance, if she brings in a piece of land, the land is hers but the husband may use the fruits of the land.  If the land should be taken by the Romans, he is not responsible to pay his wife the value of the land.  Money that she receives as a gift or as an inheritance is part of this category.
  The second form is “property of iron sheep” (nikhse tzon barzel).  This is written in the ketubah and hence the husband has responsibility for it, should the property be lost, stolen or destroyed.  The husband may use the property.  His sole responsibility is to return the value of the original property upon death or divorce.
  A wife may not sell either of these types of property without her husband’s permission.  Neither may a husband sell the first type of dowry without his wife’s permission, since it is still hers.  He may however sell “property of iron sheep”.
  Our mishnah discusses the status of the shomeret yavam, a widow who is waiting for her yavam to do yibbum or halitzah.
  If a shomeret yavam came into possession of money: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away, and that her act is legally valid.  Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that a shomereth yavam can sell new property that has come into her hands since the death of her first husband.  She does not need the permission of the yavam, because he has not married her.
  If she dies, what shall be done with her ketubah and with property that comes in and goes out with her? Beth Shammai says: the heirs of her husband are to share it with the heirs of her father; Beth Hillel says: the property is to remain with those in whose possession it is, the ketubah is to remain in the possession of the heirs of the husband and the property which comes in and goes out with her remains in the possession of the heirs of her father.  If she dies, there is a dispute between the two houses concerning her inheritance.  Usually a husband inherits his wife, but in this case she only had a yavam who had not yet performed yibbum.  He is not fully her husband. Beth Shammai holds that the heirs of her husband, meaning the yavam who inherits from his dead brother, splits the money with the heirs of her father.  The heirs of the father inherit since an unmarried woman is inherited by her father. Beth Hillel does not split the money evenly.  Rather, each part of the inheritance remains where it is presumed to be.  Since the ketubah, meaning the money paid from the husband to the wife upon death or divorce, is still with the husband’s estate, the husband’s inheritors collect this money.  Additionally, the “property of iron sheep” is in her husband’s possession since he has full ownership over it.  Therefore, the husband’s owners collect this as well.  [This is Albeck’s explanation.  The talmud explains that “property of iron sheep” is split between the husband’s and father’s inheritors.] The “pluckable property” is in the wife’s possession, since the husband cannot sell it.  Therefore the wife’s father’s inheritors inherit this property.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is the final clause of yesterday’s mishnah, which discusses the shomeret yavam.
  If he married her she is his wife in every respect save that her ketubah remains a debt on her first husband’s estate. When the yavam has yibbum with the shomeret yavam, she becomes his wife in every respect.  If he wishes to divorce her he must give her a get and she doesn’t require halitzah.  He can remarry her after divorcing her (provided she doesn’t remarry in between) and she is not forbidden as “his brother’s wife”.  When she dies he inherits her. The only difference between her and a regular wife is that if he dies or divorces her, the ketubah is paid from the estate of the first husband.  In any case, the rabbis declared that if the dead brother died penniless, the yavam must pay for her ketubah.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah answers the question, which of the surviving brothers must or can perform yibbum or halitzah.
  The commandment of yibbum is upon the eldest [of the surviving brothers]. If he declines, they pass in turn to all the other brothers. If they decline, they return to the eldest and say to him, “the commandment is upon you; either perform halitzah or yibbum.” As we taught above in chapter two, mishnah eight, the duty of yibbum is incumbent upon the eldest surviving brother.  The other brothers should not perform yibbum until their elder brothers have declined the opportunity. However, as we learned there, if a younger brother does perform yibbum before the older brother has a chance to accept or decline, his yibbum is valid. If the eldest brother does not want to perform yibbum, all of the other brothers are given the opportunity, in order of their age. If they all do not wish to perform yibbum, they (perhaps referring to a court) return to the eldest brother and tells him that he must either perform yibbum or halitzah.  He is not allowed to leave this woman hanging any longer.  The mishnah also teaches that the duty of halitzah is also primarily upon the eldest surviving brother.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a direct continuation of the previous one.
  If he wished to suspend [his decision] until a minor becomes of age, or until the eldest   returns from a country beyond the sea or [until a brother who was] a deaf-mute or an imbecile [should recover],  he is not to be listened to, but is told, “the commandment is upon you; either perform halitzah or yibbum.” . If the eldest brother does not want to perform halitzah or yibbum, but rather wait until a younger brother becomes old enough to have yibbum with this woman, he is not listened to.  Rather he is told that he must either perform yibbum or halitzah.  The mishnah teaches that it is not fair to the woman to keep her waiting for halitzah.  She has the right to be released now, so that she can go and marry whomever she wants. Similarly, if one of the younger brothers wants to wait for an older brother to return from abroad, or recover from deafness or from being an imbecile (this may be some sort of temporary insanity), they do not listen to him and force him to do yibbum or halitzah immediately. Note that a deaf-mute and an imbecile cannot contract yibbum or any type of marriage because they are considered to lack intelligence.  As I have pointed out before, in mishnaic times real sign language did not exist, and therefore deaf-mutes could not really communicate.  Now that sign language has been developed it is recognized that deaf-mutes do not inherently lack intelligence and they may contract marriage.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The first half of this mishnah discusses how the brothers divide the inheritance from the dead brother.
  The second half of the mishnah teaches that when a man performs halitzah, he is thereafter forbidden to marry his halutzah’s relatives and she is forbidden to marry his.
  He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, behold he is regarded as one of the other brothers in respect of inheritance. If the father was living, the estate belongs to the father.The other brothers are permitted.  When a man dies without children, his primary inheritor is his father.  If his father is not alive, then his brothers split the inheritance.  When a man performs halitzah for his dead, childless brother’s widow, he now reverts to being like one of the other brothers with respect to his dead brothers inheritance.  His having performed halitzah does not acquire for him any special rights vis-a-vis the inheritance.  If his father was still alive, the father inherits as usual.
  He who marries his yevamah acquires his brother’s estate. R. Judah said: in either case, if the father was living the estate belongs to the father.  If, however, he performed yibbum, he has now taken the place of his dead brother.  Therefore, according to the first opinion in the mishnah, he inherits his brother’s entire estate, even if the father is alive.  R. Judah disagrees and holds that if the father is still alive, the father’s right to the inheritance trumps the yavam’s right.
  He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives: He is forbidden to marry her mother, her mother’s mother and her father’s mother; her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter; and also her sister while she is alive. She is forbidden to marry his father and his father’s father; his son and his son’s son; his brother and his brother’s son.  Just as a man cannot marry the relatives of his wife or his divorcee, so too, our mishnah teaches, a man cannot marry his halutzah’s relatives and she cannot marry his.  The mishnah now lists which relatives are forbidden.  These relatives are forbidden even if the halutzah should die, just as they are forbidden to a man should his divorcee die.  The list includes her mother, grandmothers, daughter and granddaughters.  The yavam may not marry the halutzah’s sister, but this prohibition is only while the halutzah is alive. After she dies he may marry them, just as a man may marry his divorcee’s sister after the divorcee dies. The mishnah teaches that only the brother who performs halitzah is forbidden from marrying her relatives.  The other brothers of the deceased brother are not forbidden, since once halitzah has been performed their ties to her have been severed. The halutzah is forbidden to marry his relatives as well.  These include his father and grandfathers, his son and grandsons, and his brother and his brother’s son. Note that most of these relatives would have been forbidden to her because of her marriage to the first brother.  For instance, she cannot marry the father of the yavam, because he is also the father of her deceased husband and a man may not marry his daughter-in-law, even after his sons death.
  A man is permitted to marry the relative of the rival of his halutzah but is forbidden to marry the rival of the relative of his halutzah.  Although the rabbis declared that a man may not marry the relatives of his halutzah, he may marry the relatives of the rival wife of his halutzah.  For instance, if Reuven dies and leaves two wives, Rachel and Tovah (not sisters), and Shimon performs halitzah for Rachel, even though he cannot marry Tovah, for she is the rival wife of his halutzah, he may marry Tovah’s relatives. The final piece of the mishnah presents the following scenario.  Reuven dies leaving two wives, Rachel and Tovah, and Shimon performs halitzah for Rachel.  Leah, Rachel’s sister was married to Chaim who is not related to Shimon.  Chaim has another wife named Chana.  Then Chaim dies.  Just as Shimon cannot marry Rachel, because she is the relative of his halutzah, so too he cannot marry Chana, for she is the rival wife of the relative of his halutzah.  This is how Rashi explains this piece, but there are others who explain it differently.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to teach that it is forbidden to marry the sister of one’s halutzah.
  If he performed halitzah for his yevamah, and his brother married her sister and died, she must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum.  If Reuven performs halitzah for Rachel (who had been married to Shimon) and then Levi marries Leah, Rachel’s sister, and then Levi dies, Leah now falls in front of Reuven for yibbum or halitzah.  Since Leah is the sister of his halutzah, Rachel, Reuven cannot have yibbum with her.  However, since the prohibition of the sister of one’s halutzah is only of rabbinic origin (derabbanan), she must have halitzah and is not totally exempt.
  Similarly if a man divorces his wife and his brother marries her sister and dies behold she is exempt from halitzah and from yibbum.  Similarly, if Reuven divorces Rachel, and Shimon marries Leah and then Shimon dies childless, Leah is exempt from both halitzah and yibbum, since she is the sister of his former wife.  Since this is biblically prohibited, Leah does not even need to have halitzah.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah nine continues to discuss various scenarios of yibbum.
  If the brother of the yavam had betrothed the sister of the shomeret yavam, in the name of Rabbi Judah ben Batera they said:  they say to him “Wait until your older brother has done something”.  Rachel becomes liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Reuven, her dead husband’s brothers.  Before Shimon, the oldest surviving brother does yibbum or halitzah with her, Levi betroths Leah, Rachel’s sister. This is problematic because Leah is the sister of his z’kukah, a woman who is tied to him by her requiring yibbum or halitzah.  However, the betrothal is valid.  According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, they tell Levi, the betrother, that he should not fully marry Leah until Shimon (or another brother) has done yibbum or halitzah with Rachel.  That would end any ties between Rachel and Levi and allow Levi to fully marry Leah.
  If his brother performed halitzah for her or married her, he may marry his [betrothed] wife.  If Levi’s brother does halitzah or yibbum, Levi can now marry Leah.
  If the yevamah died he may marry his [betrothed] wife.  If Rachel dies, Levi can marry Leah, for she is no longer the sister of a woman tied to him.  The woman who was tied to him is now dead.
  If the yavam died, he must divorce his wife with a get and [release] his brother’s wife by halitzah.  If Shimon dies, and there are no other brothers, Levi is now in quite a pickle.  Levi must perform halitzah or yibbum for Rachel for he is the only surviving brother.  However, he cannot do either while he is betrothed to Rachel’s sister Leah.  Therefore he must first divorce Leah and then perform halitzah for Rachel.  He cannot have yibbum with her because she is the sister of his divorcee.  Furthermore, the mishnah teaches that although generally the sister of one’s divorcee is exempt from either yibbum or halitzah (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah), in this case since the ties to Rachel existed before the betrothal to Leah, Rachel is not exempt.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that certain women must wait three months before remarrying in order that there will be no confusion as to whether the subsequent pregnancy is from the previous husband or the new husband.
  The yevamah shall neither perform halitzah nor be taken in yibbum before three months have passed [since her husband’s death].  The yevamah may not perform halitzah or be taken in yibbum for three months lest she be pregnant with her first husband’s child.  We encountered this problem in mishnayoth one and two of this chapter.  There the mishnah dealt with the problems that could occur if she does get married or perform halitzah within this period.  Here the mishnah states that in order to avoid those problems, she should wait three months.
  Similarly all other women shall be neither be betrothed nor married before three months have passed. Whether they were virgins or non-virgins, whether divorcees or widows, whether married or betrothed. Rabbi Judah said: those who were married may be betrothed [immediately], and those who were betrothed may be married [immediately], with the exception of the betrothed women in Judea, because there the bridegroom was intimate with [his bride]. Rabbi Yose said: all [married] women may be betrothed [immediately] with the exception of the widow because of her mourning.  The mishnah now broadens its scope and says that all widows and divorcees should not remarry within three months, again so that it is clear whose child the new baby is.  Note that in these cases the only issue is inheritance and status of the child (i.e. is the child a kohen). There are now three opinions in the mishnah as to which women must wait three months.  According to the first opinion, all women, even if they were merely betrothed must wait three months.  Although generally betrothed women should not have had sexual relations with their husbands, and hence it should be clear that the pregnancy with her new husband is from him, she should still wait.  The idea may be that in order not to create confusion, all women wait an equal period. According to Rabbi Judah a woman who was divorced or widowed from a full marriage may be betrothed within three months, because betrothal does not usually entail sexual relations.  A woman who was divorced or widowed from betrothal may even be married within three months for the same reason.  The only exception is the betrothed woman in Judea.  According to this source and Mishnah Ketuboth 1:5, there was a suspicion that in Judea men might have relations with their betrothed wives before proper marriage.  Therefore in Judea the betrothed woman is treated like a married woman and she must wait. Rabbi Yose says that all women may be betrothed within three months, but not widows.  The reason that widows have to wait (and divorcees do not) is not in order to recognize whose child the new baby is, but because the widow cannot even be betrothed while mourning.  We can see in this mishnah that betrothal was seen to be a joyous occasion and that they probably would celebrate it with a party.  The Talmud states that this period is one month.  Hence divorcees can be betrothed immediately and widows must wait a month.  Of course, both would have to wait three months for proper marriage.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah teaches that one yavam can perform yibbum for several women if they were widows of different brothers.  However, if they were all from the same brother he can have yibbum with only one of them.
  If four brothers were married to four women, and they died, if the eldest [surviving brother] desires he may contract yibbum with all of them.  In this case four widows from four different brothers all fall before the same brother for yibbum or halitzah.  The mishnah teaches that this one yavam may have yibbum with all of them.  The Talmud, however, notes a certain reservation. He is allowed to do so only if he is going to be able to provide well for them all.  Bigamy was permitted under Jewish law, but only on the condition that the husband provide equally well for each wife. Also, the Talmud notes that it is not such a good idea to have four wives for there will be much strife in his home.  Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible.
  If a man was married to two women and died, sexual relations or halitzah with one of them exempts her rival.  If two women who were married to the same brother fall in front of the yavam for yibbum, he need perform halitzah or yibbum for only one of them. He is not allowed to have yibbum nor halitzah with both.
  If one of them was eligible [to marry a priest] and one ineligible [to marry a priest], then if he performs halitzah it should be to her who is ineligible, and if he contracts yibbum it may be with her who is eligible.  If one of these two women was already ineligible to subsequently marry a kohen, for instance she was a divorcee from a previous marriage, the yavam should do halitzah with her and not with the other sister.  This is because halitzah makes her forbidden to subsequently marry a kohen and there is no reason to needlessly disqualify the eligible widow from marrying a kohen.  However, if he is going to do yibbum, he can have yibbum even with the sister eligible to the kohen, since this does not disqualify her from later marrying a priest.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah begins to discuss the definition of a mamzer, the child of an illicit union.  The question that is asked is:  which illicit unions produce children that are considered mamzers?
  A man who remarried his divorced wife, or married his halutzah, or married the relative of his halutzah must divorce her, and the child is a mamzer; the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: the child is not a mamzer. They agree that where a man married the relative of his divorcee the child is a mamzer. According to Deuteronomy 24:2-4 if a man divorces his wife and she remarries and then is divorced or widowed, the first husband may not remarry her. As we have seen throughout this tractate a man may not marry his halutzah or the relative of his halutzah (for instance her mother or daughter). Rabbi Akiva says that if the man does transgress and marry one of these women he must divorce her and the child is a mamzer.  As we shall see in the next mishnah, Rabbi Akiva holds that the child of any illegal union is a mamzer. The Sages disagree and hold that the child is not a mamzer.  As we shall see in the next mishnah, the Sages hold that a union that is a transgression of a negative commandment that is not punished by death or kareth does not create a mamzer.  Since these transgressions are not punished by kareth, the child is not a mamzer. Furthermore, the prohibition of the sister of one’s halutzah is only derabbanan (of rabbinic origin) and therefore the child cannot be a mamzer. Marrying the relative of one’s divorcee is biblically prohibited and is punishable by kareth.  Therefore the Sages agree with Rabbi Akiva that the child is a mamzer.
  
  Mishnah 13
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah defines a mamzer. The second section teaches that the prohibition of a wife’s sister (Leviticus 18:18) is only while the wife is still alive, but is effective even if the couple is divorced.  However, once the wife dies he may marry her sister.
  Who is a mamzer? [The offspring of a union with] any relative with whom cohabitation is forbidden, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Shimon the Yemenite says: [The offspring of any union] for which one is obligated kareth at the hands of heaven; and the halachah is like his words. Rabbi Joshua says: [The offspring of any union] for which one is obligated death at the hands of a court.Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: I found a scroll of genealogical records in Jerusalem, and it was written on it, “So-and-so is a mamzer [having been born] from an adulterous woman”, which confirms the view of Rabbi Joshua.  In this section there are three opinions as to which type of forbidden unions create mamzers.  Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is the strictest:  any forbidden union of an incestuous nature creates a mamzer.  This would preclude only forbidden unions that are not incestuous, such as a kohen and a divorcee. Shimon the Yemenite (who is not called rabbi) holds that any forbidden union punishable by kareth creates a mamzer.  Shimon the Yemenite rejects Rabbi Akiva and holds that forbidden unions that are merely prohibited but not punishable by kareth or death do not create mamzers.  An example of such a case is a shomeret yavam who gets remarried to an outsider without first having yibbum or halitzah with her yavam.  According to Rabbi Akiva the child of such a marriage is a mamzer and according to Shimon the Yemenite the child is not.  Interestingly, the mishnah explicitly states that the halakhah is according to this view.  This is one of the few times that the Mishnah makes such a remark. Rabbi Joshua is even more lenient concerning the creation of mamzers.  Only a union punishable by death creates mamzers. Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai claims that he found a scroll of genealogical records in which it was recorded that So-and-so was a mamzer because he was the son of an adulterous affair, which is punishable by death. From here he concludes that the halakhah is like Rabbi Joshua.  However, Rabbi Akiva and Shimon the Yemenite could both claim that just because this mamzer was from an adulterous affair punishable by death does not prove that the halakhah is like Rabbi Joshua.
  If a man’s wife died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If he divorced her and then she died he is permitted to marry her sister. If she was married to another man and died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If a man’s sister-in-law died, he may marry her sister. If he performed for her halitzah and then she died, he is permitted to marry her sister.  This section teaches that the sister of one’s wife is only forbidden during the wife’s lifetime, even after divorce. This is stated explicitly in Leviticus 18:18, “Do not marry a woman as a rival to her sister and uncover her nakedness in the other’s lifetime.”  Once the wife dies, whether while the couple is still married, after they are divorced or after her remarriage, the husband may marry her sister.  However, if any of these things occur and the wife is still alive, he may not marry her sister. Similarly, a man cannot marry the sister of his yavamah while she is alive, even after he performed halitzah for her.  However, after she dies he may marry her sister.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  In order to understand this chapter we should review a few general issues of yibbum.
  1) According to the Torah the shomeret yavam becomes the yavam’s wife only through sexual intercourse.  However, the Sages decreed that the yavam should first perform “ma’amar”, an act whereby he betroths her, either by money or by a document, the same way betrothal is enacted with other women.  After ma’amar then the couple would have yibbum, enacted by sexual intercourse.
  2) A shomeret yavam’s ties to her yavam are biblically severed only through halitzah.  However, the Sages decreed that if the yavam gives her a get, while it does not exempt her from halitzah, it makes the performance of yibbum forbidden.  In other words it does in some sense sever the tie, thereby making her forbidden due to the prohibition of marrying a brother’s wife.  Furthermore, after giving her a get he is forbidden to marry her rival wives, as are the rest of the brothers.  He is also forbidden to marry any of her relatives.  She is forbidden to marry a priest, as are all divorcees.
  3) If the yavam performed ma’amar and then changes his mind and doesn’t want to have yibbum with her, he must give her a get and perform halitzah.  The get severs the ties created by ma’amar and the halitzah performs its usual function of exempting her from yibbum.
  This mishnah is formulated in classic mishnaic style.  It is terse, somewhat cryptic, easy to remember, and most importantly, it packs a lot of information into only a few words.  Our job in explaining the mishnah will be to “unpack” it and decipher each clause. There is no [validity] to a get given after a get:  If two women are widowed from one brother and both become liable for yibbum with one yavam and he gives the first one a get and then the second one a get, the get that was given to the second woman is meaningless and she is not considered to be a divorcee. As we stated in the above introduction, according to biblical law, a shomeret yavam does not receive a get.  However the Sages decreed that a get is sufficient to make the other rival wives forbidden to the yavam and to make yibbum forbidden with the one who received the get.  Since the second woman to receive the get is not a divorcee, the yavam may subsequently marry her relatives, and she may subsequently marry a priest. Nor to a ma’amar after a ma’amar:  If one yavam does ma’amar to both of the women who become liable to him for yibbum, or two yavamim do ma’amar with one women who became liable for yibbum with either of them, the second ma’amar is meaningless.  Although ma’amar is only of rabbinic origin, its strength is sufficient to render the acquisition of the yevamah as final.  The second wife then received a meaningless ma’amar, for she was no longer liable for yibbum.  Similarly, the second yavam performed a meaningless ma’amar for the woman was no longer available. Nor to an act of sexual intercourse after another act of sexual intercourse:  If one yavam had intercourse, that is, an act of yibbum, with two yevamoth, the second act does not make that yevamah his wife.  It is merely licentious sexual relations, for the woman is no longer liable for yibbum after her rival wife has had yibbum.  She would not need a get in order to remarry. Nor to a halitzah after another halitzah:  Whether one yavam performed halitzah for two yevamoth, or two yevamim performed halitzah for one yevamah, the second act of halitzah is meaningless, for the first act already severed all ties.  The result is that the second woman to receive halitzah is not considered to be a halutzah.
  However, the Sages say:  There is [validity] to a get given after a get, and to a ma’amar after a ma’amar but not to an act of sexual intercourse after another act of sexual intercourse, or to a halitzah after another halitzah.  The Sages disagree with the first two parts of Rabban Gamaliel’s statement.  They hold that a yevamah who receives a get is not like one who has had halitzah.  Since the one who receives a get still needs halitzah, the second get also has some validity.  The fact that the second woman to receive a get is in some sense his divorcee, means that he cannot marry her relatives.  She also could not subsequently marry a kohen.  Similarly, the Sages hold that ma’amar does not acquire like yibbum.  Since one who has been given ma’amar still needs yibbum to complete her becoming his wife, the second ma’amar does have some validity.  The second woman to receive ma’amar would need a get to remarry, and the one who gave her ma’amar is subsequently forbidden to marry her relatives. In brief, we can see in this mishnah a debate concerning the power of rabbinic decrees.  According to Rabban Gamaliel, the rabbinically decreed ma’amar and get for the yevamah are almost as strong as the biblically ordained yibbum and halitzah.  According to the Sages, they are substantially weaker.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  The remainder of the chapter gives various scenarios of a yavam’s releasing his yevamah from the necessity for yibbum.  In order to understand these mishnayoth, it is important to keep in mind that a get (a divorce document) severs the ties created by ma’amar (an act of betrothal) and halitzah severs the ties created by the need for yibbum.
  How [is the release from yibbum effected]?If he performed ma'amar for his yevamah and gave her a get, she requires halitzah.  When the yavam performed ma’amar he made the yevamah into his betrothed wife.  When he subsequently gives her the get, he has ended the ties created by ma’amar.  Since he never did yibbum or halitzah, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum.  He could not have yibbum with her because she is already his divorcee.
  If he performed ma'amar and and did halizah, she requires a get.  If he did ma’amar and then halitzah, she still needs a get to sever the ties created by the ma’amar.  The halitzah is not sufficient to break the betrothal created by ma’amar.  He cannot marry her because she is his halutzah.
  If he performed ma’amar and then had intercourse with her, behold this is in accordance with the commandment.  The normal, prescribed means of fulfilling the mitzvah of yibbum is for the yavam first to perform ma’amar and then, assumedly some time later, for them to have sexual relations.  This is the same way that normal marriage is enacted: first the betrothal is done and then the couple begins to live together, today symbolized by the huppah (the wedding canopy).  Since some time in the middle ages, Jews have combined the betrothal ceremony and the marriage proper into one event. 
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  If the yavam gave her a get and then ma’amar, she needs [another] get and halitzah.  As we learned above, only halitzah exempts the yevamah from her requirement for yibbum.  When the yavam gave her a get, her ties to him were not completely severed.  The only effect was that it was subsequently forbidden for him to have yibbum with her. When he then does ma’amar with her, she now requires another get in order to sever the ties created by this ma’amar.  Finally, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum.
  If he gave her a get and then had intercourse with her, she needs [another] get and halitzah.  In this case, after giving her the get, he has intercourse with her.  This intercourse was forbidden, since she had already received a get.  Therefore, since this was forbidden, it does not count as an act of yibbum.  However, the mishnah teaches that it still has enough power to obligate him to give her another get, to sever the ties created by the intercourse [intercourse is one of the three means by which betrothals are contracted]. Finally, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum.
  If he gave her a get and then did halitzah, there is nothing after halitzah.  Here the mishnah teaches that once he has performed halitzah, she is totally free and there is no longer anything preventing her from marrying anyone else.
  If the yavam did halitzah and then he did ma’amar or gave her a get, or had intercourse with her; Or if he had intercourse with her and then did ma’amar, or gave her a get, or did halitzah, there is nothing after halitzah.  The first part of this section teaches that once he does halitzah, whatever he does afterwards, be it give her ma’amar, a get or have intercourse, does not count for anything.  The halitzah severs all ties and anything done afterwards is inconsequential. The second part of this section teaches that just as there is no validity to anything after halitzah, so too there is no validity to anything after yibbum.  For instance, were he to do halitzah after having already performed yibbum, the halitzah would be inconsequential.  Of course, if he gives her a get after having done yibbum she is a divorcee, as is any wife who receives a divorce.  The mishnah intends only to teach that yibbum turns a yevamah into a full wife and halitzah totally exempts her from any subsequent need for yibbum.
  [And the law is the same] whether there is one yevamah to one yavam or two yevamoth to one yavam.  With regard to all the combinations that we have been learning in the previous mishnayoth, it matters not whether they were done by one yavam with one yevamah or with two different yevamoth.  The general rule is always true:  there is “something” after a get and after ma’amar, and after halitzah and yibbum there is nothing.  The following mishnayoth will continue to explain these complex possibilities.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah demonstrates the different possibilities and combinations of halitzah, yibbum, ma’amar and a get and their consequences on a case where there is one yavam and two yevamoth (i.e. the brother who died without children left two wives).
  How is this so?If the yavam did ma'amar with this one and ma'amar with the other one, they need two letters of divorce and [one of them must have] halizah.  The ma’amar performed with both yevamoth means that both require a get if they wish to marry someone else.  In addition, one of them requires halitzah to end the ties created by their need for yibbum.  As we recall, they don’t both need halitzah, since the halitzah of one wife exempts all of her rival wives.  He could not have yibbum with either, since he gave ma’amar to both.
  If he did ma'amar with one and gave a get to the other, the [first one] needs a get and [one of them must have] halitzah.  In this case he must give the get to the first one, the one with whom he had ma’amar, and he can have halitzah with either. Again, the halitzah of either releases them both.  He cannot have yibbum even with the one with whom he had ma’amar since he gave a get to her rival wife.
  If he did ma'amar with one and had intercourse with the other, they need two gets and [one of them must have] halitzah.  Once he had ma’amar with one wife, he should not have gone and had intercourse with the other wife.  The intercourse was in an essence an ineffective act of yibbum.  Therefore, they both need gets, one to end the ties created by the ma’amar and the other to end the ties created by the intercourse (which can be an act of betrothal) and one requires halitzah in order to release them both from the ties of yibbum.
  If he had ma'amar with one and gave halitzah to the other, the first needs a get.  Although in this case he did have halitzah with the second wife, the ma’amar that was previously done with the first wife means that she still needs a get. In other words, the ties created by the necessity of yibbum have already been severed, but there are still the ties created by the ma’amar.  He could not have yibbum with her, since he has already done halitzah with the other wife, and it is forbidden to marry the wife of one’s halutzah.
  If he gave a get to one and a get to the other, [one of them] requires halitzah.  After having given a get to both women, he still needs to perform halitzah to totally release them.  The get is not sufficient to sever those ties.  However, he may not have yibbum with either woman since they both already received gets.
  If he gave a get to one and had intercourse with the other, [the second one] requires a get and [one of them must have] halitzah.  In this case, once he has given a get to the first wife, the yibbum done by intercourse with the second wife, was invalid.  Therefore, he must give a get to the second wife, with whom he has already had intercourse, to sever the ties created by the intercourse.  One of them still needs halitzah.
  [If he gave] a get to one and had ma'amar with the other, [the second] requires a get and [one of them must have] halitzah.  Similar to the previous case, if he gave a get to the first one, the ma’amar with second one is not valid.  He could not subsequently have yibbum with her.  However, he must still give her a get to sever the ties created by the ma’amar.  As always, one of them still needs halitzah.
  [If he gave] a get to one and halizah to the other, there is nothing after halitzah.  As we learned in mishnah three, once he has performed an act of halitzah, there are no more steps which must be taken.  Both women may now go marry other men.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  If he performed halitzah [for one] and then performed halitzah [for the other],Or performed halitzah [for one] and did ma'amar [with the other], or gave her get, or had intercourse with her;Or if he had intercourse [with one] and then with the other,Or had intercourse [with one] and then ma'amar with the other, or gave her a get, or performed halitzah there is nothing after halitzah.[There is no difference in the law] whether there was one yavam to two yevamoth or two yavamim to yevamah.This mishnah continues to teach that once one of the yavamim has performed halitzah or yibbum with one of the yevamoth, any subsequent action done with the other yevamah, be it halitzah, a get, ma’amar or intercourse, is meaningless.Section one:  In this case the yavam has halitzah with one of the yevamoth and then halitzah with the other.  As we will learn in section four, since the second halitzah was unnecessary, it has no effect.  He can marry that halutzah’s relatives and she can marry his.Section two:  Similarly, if he has halitzah with one and then ma’amar, a get or intercourse with the other, the subsequent actions are invalid.  The woman who received ma’amar does not need a get, nor does the woman with whom he had intercourse.  The woman who received the get is not a divorcee but a widow, who may subsequently marry a kohen.  In all of these cases, he can marry her relatives and she may marry his.Sections three and four:  These sections teach the same ruling, but with regard to yibbum, performed through intercourse.  Once the yavam has yibbum with one of the yevamoth, all subsequent actions are invalid.  Although the mishnah states only that “there is nothing after halitzah”, the meaning is that there is nothing after halitzah or yibbum, as was taught in mishnah one of our chapter.Section five:  The rule that there is nothing after halitzah (or yibbum) is true whether or not there was one yavam who had halitzah with one of two yevamoth (and then did something else with the other yevamah), or two yevamim, one of whom had halitzah or yibbum first with one yevamah (and then the other brother did something else with the same yevamah).  In all cases, once one brother has had halitzah or yibbum with one yevamah, all subsequent actions are meaningless.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah, the last in this chapter, continues to define the principle that there can be no valid act after halitzah or yibbum.
  [If the yavam] performed halitzah and then did ma’amar, gave her a get, or had intercourse with her; Or if he had intercourse with her and then did ma'amar, gave her a get, or performed halitzah, there is no valid act after halitzah,Whether [it was performed] in the beginning, in the middle, or at the end.  The beginning of this section (until the words “there is nothing after halitzah) was taught word for word above, in mishnah three.  The reason that it is repeated here is as in introduction for issue of “beginning, the middle and the end”.  The mishnah adds that with regard to halitzah, it doesn’t matter when the halitzah was performed, no subsequent acts (intercourse, a get or ma’amar) can have any validity.  Since the halitzah totally severs the connection between the yavam and the yevamah, anything done afterwards can have no validity.
  Concerning intercourse, if it took place first there is no valid act after it; If it occurred in the middle or at the end there can be a valid act after it. Rabbi Nehemiah says: with both intercourse and halizah, whether it took place in the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity in any act that follows it.  According to the first opinion in this section, intercourse works differently from halitzah.  If done at the beginning, the yevamah becomes his full wife and any act done afterwards is meaningless with regard to the laws of yibbum.  In other words, after yibbum she becomes his normal wife. However, if the intercourse is done after another act, such as giving her a get or doing ma’amar with a rival wife, there is potential validity to subsequent acts.  For instance, if he gives her a get it is now forbidden for him to have yibbum with her but she still needs halitzah, since the get does not sever the ties created by the necessity for yibbum.  If he now goes ahead and has intercourse with her, she still needs halitzah, for the intercourse was an invalid act of yibbum.  Even though the get was only of a “derabbanan” status, since only halitzah can biblically exempt the woman, the subsequent act of yibbum is still invalid.  The halitzah required after this failed act of yibbum means that “there is validity to an act after intercourse” if it is not the first act performed. According to Rabbi Nehemiah, it does not matter when the act of yibbum was performed, there is never validity to any subsequent act.  Even if the yavam gave her a get before he did yibbum, the yibbum is still valid and she does not need halitzah.  Rabbi Nehemiah holds that since the get makes it forbidden only “derabbanan” to have yibbum, the yibbum is biblically valid and therefore exempts the woman from a need for yibbum. The deeper argument between Rabbi Nehemiah and the sages is over the validity of rabbinicly decreed laws.  According to the sages the rabbinic prohibition of having yibbum after having given a get, makes the yibbum invalid.  According to Rabbi Nehemiah, since the get is only derabbanan, it does not have the power to invalidate the yibbum, which is of biblical status.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that any intercourse counts as an act yibbum.
  One who has intercourse with his yevamah, whether in error or with presumption, whether under compulsion or of his own free will, even if he acted in error and she in presumption, or he in presumption and she in error, or he under compulsion and she not under compulsion, or she under compulsion and he not under compulsion, whether he only began to have intercourse or he completed having intercourse, he has acquired her as a wife. The laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse. Whether in error or with presumption:  In error means that he did not know that she was his yevamah. With presumption means that he did not intend to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum, but rather just to have intercourse with her for the sake of pleasure. Whether under compulsion or of his own free will:  Under compulsion means that someone forced him to have relations with the yevamah.  Of his own free will means that he intended to fulfill the mitzvah. Even if he acted in error and she in presumption:  He did not know that she was the yevamah, but she knew that he was the yavam but she did not intend to fulfill the mitzvah. Or he in presumption and she in error:  He did not intend to fulfill the mitzah and she did not know who he was. Or he under compulsion and she not under compulsion:  He was forced and she intended to fulfill the mitzvah. Or she under compulsion and he not under compulsion:  She was forced but he was not.  The same is true if both were forced, or both were presumptuous.  The intercourse always counts. Whether he only began to have intercourse or he completed having intercourse:  It does not matter if they complete having intercourse (assumedly referring to ejaculation). The laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse.  According to the talmud, this means that even “non-natural” intercourse (anal sex) counts as intercourse for the sake of yibbum. In all of these cases, the mere act of intercourse means that he has acquired her as a wife.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  While the previous mishnah served as a quasi-summary to the preceding chapters which all dealt with yibbum, our mishnah serves as a bridge to a new topic:  forbidden relationships, specifically women who are forbidden to priests.  We will deal with these laws for the next four chapters of Mishnah.
  Similarly, one who has intercourse with any of the forbidden relatives listed in the Torah, or with any of those who are disqualified to marry him as, for instance, a widow to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah to a common priest, a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite or the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a nathin, he has disqualifed [her from marrying a priest], and the laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse. This mishnah states the same rule that was stated in the previous mishnah:  with regard to forbidden sexual relations, any sexual intercourse counts (i.e. unintentional, under compulsion, etc.). Furthermore, the point of our mishnah is that once a woman has had forbidden sexual intercourse, she can no longer marry a priest.  This is true whether the intercourse was forbidden because it was with a priest and she was forbidden to a priest, or if the intercourse was forbidden to Israelites as well (such as a mamzer and an Israelite).  In all cases the woman is forbidden to subsequently marry a priest. [Note that a mamzeret and a netinah could not in any case marry a priest.  This clause was taught here only to teach that it is forbidden to have any type of intercourse with a mamzeret or a netinah].
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah teaches when the daughter of a priest who is married to someone forbidden to her, loses the right to eat terumah, which is reserved only for priests and their families.
  A widow to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest they do not eat terumah from the point of betrothal. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare them eligible.  There are three laws which must be explained before we can understand this mishnah.  First of all it is forbidden for a widow to marry a high priest and for a divorcee or a halutzah to marry an ordinary priest.  If they do, the women lose the right to eat terumah, both as wives of the priest and as daughters of priestly fathers.  Second of all, an unmarried daughter of a priest continues to eat terumah until she is married.  Once she is married, should she be widowed or divorced without children she returns to eating terumah.  If she was married to a non-kohen and she had children, when divorced or widowed she does not eat terumah.  Third of all, a woman who has relations with someone who is forbidden to her can no longer eat terumah. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, as soon as the woman is betrothed to someone to whom she is forbidden, she loses her right to eat terumah.  Although she is only betrothed, and has not had sexual intercourse, she already loses the right to eat terumah.  According to Rabbis Elazar and Shimon, she only loses that right when she actually marries the kohen, to whom she is forbidden.  At the point of marriage the women become what is known as halalot, or profaned women, who may not eat terumah.
  If they became widows or were divorced after full marriage they are ineligible; If after betrothal they are eligible.  If they were married and then divorced or widowed, all the sages agree that they do not return to their father’s domain to eat terumah.  Since they were married to someone to whom they are forbidden, they lose this right forever.  However, if they were divorced or widowed from betrothal, then they may return and eat terumah.  In this case even the sages who held the first opinion of section one hold that they may eat terumah.  They were forbidden to eat terumah when they were betrothed women, waiting to be married to men forbidden to them.  Now that they will surely not marry these men, they may return to their father’s home to eat terumah.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with the prohibition of a widow to a high priest.  This prohibition is mentioned in Leviticus 21:14.
  A high priest shall not marry a widow whether she became a widow after a betrothal or after a marriage.  A high priest cannot marry any widow, even one who was only betrothed and not married before she became a widow.
  He shall not marry one who has reached puberty. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon permit him to marry one who has reached puberty, but he may not marry one who lost her virginity through a stick.  Leviticus 21:13 states that the high priest must marry a betulah, commonly translated as a virgin.  The word “betulah” can also mean, young, unmarried girl.  It was probably assumed that most prepubescent, unmarried girls were also physiological virgins.  Incidentally, in Greek literature, virgin was also not used the same way that modern English uses the word virgin.  It could also denote a young, unmarried girl.  In any case, since the Torah states that he must marry a “betulah” the sages rule that he may not marry a girl who has reached puberty, which is actually six months after the first physical signs of maturation. The common age for this is 12 ½.  Before this, by legal definition a girl could not reach puberty.  Meaning, even if she did it was not considered to be statuary puberty. According to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, the high priest may marry a post-pubescent girl.  According to their definition, a betulah is defined as one who still is physiologically a virgin.  Since this girl is, the high priest may marry her.  However, he may not marry one who has lost her physical signs of virginity in any way, even not through sexual intercourse.  In the Mishnah a girl who lost her hymen in a way other than through sexual intercourse is called a “mukat etz”, literally, hit with a stick.
  [A priest who] betrothed a widow, and was subsequently appointed high priest, may bring her into marriage. It once happened with Joshua ben Gamla that he betrothed Marta the daughter of Boethus, and the king appointed him high priest, and he brought her into marriage.  If a priest betrothed a widow, who is permitted to an ordinary priest, and then subsequently was appointed high priest, he may complete the marriage, even though as high priest he cannot marry a widow.  In essence the marital bonds are secured before he became high priest and by merely completing them and bringing her into marriage, he is not transgressing the Torah’s prohibition of a widow to a high priest.  The mishnah relates the story on Joshua ben Gamala who married Marta, the widowed daughter of a very wealthy man, and then became a high priest.  Although she was a widow, he was still allowed to bring her into marriage.  Note that the function of the story in this mishnah is probably to demonstrate that not only do the sages rule that this is allowed, but the priests actually did so.  This point is crucial since often we see priests being even more strict than the law requires, at least on issues of marriage and status.
  If a shomeret yavam became liable to have yibbum with an ordinary priest and then he was appointed high priest, even though he already did ma’amar, he may not bring her into marriage. A high priest whose brother died must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum.  The laws of yibbum are problematic for a high priest, because he cannot marry a widow.  In general we can see that the positive commandment to perform yibbum does not “trump” the prohibition of marrying a widow. This section teaches that if a shomeret yavam became liable for yibbum with an ordinary priest, and then he became high priest, even if he did ma’amar, he cannot marry her.  Although in the above section we saw that if an ordinary priest had betrothed a woman and then been appointed high priest he could marry her, since ma’amar is only of rabbinic status (and not biblical as is regular betrothal), it does not create enough of a tie to allow him to marry her.  If he were to have yibbum, it would count as marrying a widow while a high priest, which is forbidden. The mishnah ends by quoting mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1, which states that if a high priest’s brother dies without children, the high priest must perform halitzah and cannot have yibbum.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Leviticus 21:7 states that an ordinary priest may not marry a “zonah”, usually translated as a “harlot”. In rabbinic literature the word “zonah” is used to refer to any woman who is categorically forbidden to a priest, even if she was not literally a harlot.  Our mishnah discusses the definition of a zonah.
  An ordinary priest shall not marry a woman incapable of procreation, unless he already has a wife or children. Rabbi Judah said: even though he has a wife and children he shall not marry a woman incapable of procreation, since she is a zonah, as mentioned in the Torah. But the Sages said: the term zonah implies only a female convert, freed slavewoman   and one who has been subjected to illicit intercourse. A woman incapable of procreation is called an “aylonit”.  The definition of “aylonit” is a woman who has never developed signs of sexual maturity.  In other words, an aylonit is not a woman who looks like a sexually mature woman but has not succeeded in becoming pregnant. Rather an aylonit is a woman, who is clearly a woman and not a man, but who never hit puberty.  An ordinary priest cannot marry her, and according to the Talmud, even a regular Israelite cannot marry her, unless he has already fulfilled the commandment of procreation.  The reason that the mishnah teaches that an ordinary priest cannot marry her and does not say that no one can marry her, is that Rabbi Judah holds that an ordinary priest cannot marry her even if he has a wife and children.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah the problem with the aylonit is that she cannot procreate.  Therefore, a person can only marry her if he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation or has another wife, with whom he may potentially fulfill the mitzvah.  According to Rabbi Judah, the aylonit is categorized as a “zonah”, who is always forbidden to a priest, even if he already has children or another wife.  She is a “zonah”, for the priest married her knowing that she could not procreate. The Sages disagree and claim that an aylonit is not a zonah.  The Sages define a zonah as a female convert, a freed slavewoman or a woman who has had illicit intercourse.  The first two are forbidden under the assumption that they had relations with Gentiles or slaves before conversion or manumission.  Although that intercourse was permitted at the time, it still renders them off-limits to the priest.  The woman who has had illicit intercourse is any woman who has had intercourse with someone with whom she is forbidden to marry.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Since the previous mishnah mentioned the aylonit, who cannot have children, our mishnah discusses the obligation of procreation.
  A man shall not abstain from procreation unless he already has children. Beth Shammai says: two males, And Beth Hillel says: male and a female, for it says, “Male and female created he them” (Genesis 5:2).  The point that this line in the mishnah is trying to make can be read in two subtly different ways.  It may be that the point of the line is to teach that there is an obligation to procreate.  In other words, without this directive people may have thought (and in ancient Judaism some sects did think) that God preferred people to be celibate and to forego children.  Judaism teaches the opposite.  Sexual relations are generally viewed in a positive light and having children is positive commandment. The other way to read the line, is that it is taken for granted that a person is obligated to procreate.  The innovation of our mishnah is that a man does not need to keep on having children as long as possible.  Once he has had two children, he may desist from procreation.  Understanding the line this way, we would have a different view of the mishnah.  Although it is still considered a commandment to procreate, a person might fulfill that mitzah with only two children and then devote his life to other things, such as the study of Torah.  We should note that in any case, the Talmud teaches that even if a man has children he should remain married for marriage is a preferred state. Beth Shammai holds that a person needs two male children to have fulfilled the requirement.  In the Talmud this is learned from a precedent set by Moses, who had two children and then separated from his wife (according to a midrash). From the story of the creation, where man and woman were created together, Beth Hillel learns that a person needs both a male and a female child to have fulfilled the mitzvah.
  If a man married a woman and lived with her for ten years and she bore no child, he may not abstain [any longer from the duty of propagation]. If he divorced her she is permitted to marry another, and the second husband may also live with her for ten years. If she miscarried [the period of ten years] is counted from the time of her miscarriage.  This section presents a halakhic ramification to the fact that Jews are commanded to procreate.  If a man is married to a woman and for ten years they do not succeed in having children, he must either marry another wife or divorce the first wife and marry another wife.  When bigamy was prohibited, only the second option remained.  Note that the mishnah is rather lenient.  Ten years is a long time to attempt to have children.  The mishnah gives the couple the benefit of the doubt.  Furthermore, the woman who could not succeed in having children with one man, is allowed to remarry.  We might have thought that there would be an assumption of infertility.  The mishnah fully realizes that the infertility might have been a problem with the man.  Finally, if she has a miscarriage, the ten years begin to be counted again.  Although the child was not even born, we have seen that the woman can get pregnant and that perhaps she will someday be able to have a viable child. I should also note, that although this halakhah is still on the books, it is not observed.  Even ultraorthodox couples do not divorce if they don’t succeed in having children.  The halakhah is simply ignored.
  A man is commanded concerning the duty of propagation but not a woman. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: Concerning both of them it is said, “And God blessed them; and said to them… “Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28).  According to the first opinion, only men are obligated to procreate.  Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka says that both men and women are obligated equally.  We should note that although the first opinion sounds very chauvinistic, and it somewhat is, not being obligated to have children does free a woman to be more in control over her own reproductive process.  Certainly the laws of birth control are more lenient if she is not obligated to have children. There is some excellent secondary literature on this issue.  Judith Hauptman has a chapter on the topic in her book, “Rereading the Rabbis”.  David Feldman’s book, “Birth Control in Jewish Law” also discusses the topic.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  If a widow [who married] a high priest, or if a divorced woman or a halutzah [who married] an ordinary priest brought in to her husband melog slaves and tzon barzel  slaves, the melog slaves may not eat terumah but the tzon barzel slaves may eat of it.The following are melog slaves: those who, if they die, are the wife’s loss and, if their value increases, are her profit. Even though it is the husband's duty to maintain them, they may not eat terumah.The following are tzon barzel slaves: if they die, they are the loss of the husband and, if their value increases, they are a profit to him. Since he is responsible for them,  they are permitted to eat terumah.The slave of a kohen is allowed to eat terumah, which can only be eaten by kohanim and those under their domain (Leviticus 22:11).  Our mishnah discusses the issue of slaves brought into a marriage by the wife as part of her dowry, in a case where the marriage was against the halakhah and therefore she herself cannot eat terumah.When we learned mishnah 4:3, we discussed the terms “tzon barzel” and “melog” or “pluckable property”. This is what I wrote there:Dowry can come in two forms.  The first form is called “pluckable property” (nikhse melog).  This is money that she brings from her father’s house that remain hers and the husband may not use.  The husband has rights to the profit earned from this money during the marriage.  He has no responsibility for the money.  For instance, if she brings in a piece of land, the land is hers but the husband may use the fruits of the land.  If the land should be taken by the Romans, he is not responsible to pay his wife the value of the land.  Money that she receives as a gift or as an inheritance is part of this category.The second form is “property of iron sheep” (nikhse tzon barzel).  This is written in the ketubah and hence the husband has responsibility for it, should the property be lost, stolen or destroyed.  The husband may use the property.  His sole responsibility is to return the value of the original property upon death or divorce.Section one:  In the case of our mishnah, a woman who is not allowed to marry a kohen, nevertheless goes ahead and marries him.  When she has intercourse with him, she becomes a halalah, a woman profaned from the priesthood, and she can no longer eat terumah, neither in her husband’s home nor in her father’s (if he was a kohen).  Since she can no longer eat terumah, her slaves can also no longer eat terumah.  The mishnah teaches that since tzon barzel slaves belong more to her husband than they do to her, they may eat terumah.  Melog slaves, who belong more to her than to him, cannot eat terumah.Section two:  This section discusses the difference between melog and tzon barzel slaves. Melog slaves belong to the woman, although while the marriage is still going they work for the husband.  The fact that they belong to the woman means that if they die it is her loss, and if they go up in value, it is her gain.  Despite the fact that the husband must maintain them with food, clothing and shelter, they still belong to the woman.  Since she cannot eat terumah due to her forbidden marriage, they too cannot eat terumah.In contrast, tzon barzel slaves belong to the husband, and his only obligation is to pay their value back to the woman upon the termination of the marriage through death or divorce.  If they die, he must still pay back the value.  If they appreciate in value, it is his profit.  Since he is responsible for their worth, meaning that if something happens to them he must pay back the woman for the loss, they may eat terumah.In summary, the mishnah defines ownership by who profits or loses when the value of the slaves rises or falls. The obligation to maintain the slaves does not cause the husband to be the owner.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss slaves that are part of a wife’s dowry and their ability to eat terumah, which depends on her status as a daughter of an Israelite or a priest, as well as the status of her husband, Israelite or priest.
  If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest, and she brought him in slaves, they are permitted to eat terumah whether they are melog slaves, or tzon barzel slaves.  When the daughter of an Israelite marries a priest she is allowed to eat terumah.  The melog slaves (see yesterday’s mishnah for a definition of melog and tzon barzel) may eat terumah because they belong to her and she eats terumah.  The tzon barzel slaves may eat terumah because they belong to her husband who is a priest, and a priest’s slaves eat terumah.
  If the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite and she brought him in slaves, they may not eat terumah whether they are melog slaves or tzon barzel slaves.  When the daughter of a kohen is married to an Israel, she forfeits her right to eat terumah.  Her melog slaves cannot continue to eat terumah because they are owned by her and she cannot eat.  The tzon barzel slaves belong to the husband, who obviously cannot eat nor give them terumah.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  When a man dies and leaves children, his wife’s status with regard to terumah goes according to the child’s status.  If the father was a priest and his child eats terumah, the wife continues to do so as well.  If the father was an Israelite, even if his wife was the daughter of a priest, if the father had a child with her, she does not go back to eating the terumah from her father’s house.  In other words a child fixes a wife into the status of her husband.
  Our mishnah discusses a situation where a priest died while his wife was pregnant.  The issue at hand is do the tzon barzel slaves, who are now in a sense owned by the fetus, eat terumah.
  If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest who died and left her pregnant, her slaves may not eat terumah because of the share of the fetus, since a fetus prevents [its mother] from eating [terumah] but does not cause her to be able to eat [terumah], the words of Rabbi Yose.  If a priest dies and leaves his wife pregnant, her tzon barzel slaves do not eat terumah, even if she has other children and she, her children and her melog slaves can eat terumah. This is because the fetus, as an inheritor of its father, has ownership over the tzon barzel slaves, and a fetus disqualifies its mother from eating terumah and does not qualify her to eat terumah.  A fetus disqualifies its mother from eating terumah in that if she is the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and he dies with no kids and she is pregnant, she does not return to her father’s home to eat terumah.  In the opposite case, if she was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest and her husband dies with no children and she is pregnant, the fetus does not allow her to eat terumah.  Rabbi Yose reasons that just as a fetus does not allow a wife to eat terumah, so too it does not allow tzon barzel slaves to eat terumah.
  They said to him: since you have testified to us concerning the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a priest, even concerning the daughter of a priest who was married to a priest, and he died and left her pregnant her slaves may not eat terumah because of the share of the fetus!  The rabbis respond to Rabbi Yose, that if his testimony about the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest is correct, then even concerning the daughter of a priest married to a priest, if her husband died leaving her pregnant, her tzon barzel slaves do not eat terumah.  After all, in either case we could explain that a fetus disqualifies tzon barzel slaves from eating terumah. The difficulty with this section is whether or not the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yose.  According to a literal reading of the mishnah they only point out a consequence of Rabbi Yose’s halakhah, without expressing their opinion on the matter.  However, it would seem that they only point this out if they disagree with Rabbi Yose.  According to the Talmud, the rabbis do disagree with Rabbi Yose.  The rabbis hold that the fetus does not actually own the slaves and therefore cannot prevent them from eating terumah.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah broadens the category of those who disqualify women from eating terumah but cannot allow them to eat terumah.
  The second two sections discuss cases of doubt.
  A fetus, a yavam, betrothal, a deaf-mute, and a boy who is nine years and one day old, disqualify [a woman] from [terumah], but do not allow her to eat terumah,  In all of the cases listed in this section, if the boy/man was an Israelite he disqualifies the woman from eating terumah, and if he was a priest, he does not allow his wife to eat terumah.  For instance, if a priest dies and leaves his wife pregnant, the fetus does not allow her to eat terumah. If he was an Israelite and she was the daughter of a priest, the fetus disqualifies her from eating terumah. When the daughter of an Israelite is betrothed to a priest she does not yet begin to eat terumah.  However, if she is the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite she already loses the right to eat terumah. A deaf-mute cannot contract marriage, according to Torah law.  This is because he is not considered to have intelligence.  [As a side note, now that sign language has been developed this concept no longer exists.]  The status of his marriage is only derabbanan (of rabbinic origin).  If he is a priest he does not allow his wife to eat terumah, but if he is an Israelite he disqualifies her from eating terumah. Intercourse with a boy less than nine years and one day of age is not considered real intercourse.  The mishnah teaches that once the boy reaches this age, if he has intercourse with a woman forbidden to him, he disqualifies her from eating terumah.  However, if he is a priest, he does not cause her to be able to eat terumah, since a boy who has not reached puberty (concretized by the appearance of two pubic hairs) cannot contract betrothal or marriage.
  If it is doubtful whether the boy is nine years and one day old or not, or whether he   has produced two hairs or not,  According to the Rambam, this section is the beginning of the second halakhah in this mishnah.  If it is doubtful whether a boy is nine years old and he does yibbum with her, or it is doubtful whether he has reached puberty or not, and he does halitzah with her, the woman still requires another halitzah, lest the first yibbum or halitzah was done by a child incapable of such an action.  However, she may not have subsequent yibbum, lest the first action was valid.
  If a house collapsed upon a man and upon his brother’s daughter, and it is not known which of them died first, her rival must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum.  This section deals with another case of doubt.  If a house falls on a husband and his wife, who is his brother’s daughter, and it is not known who died first, the rival wife must have halitzah and cannot have yibbum.  She must have halitzah, lest her rival wife died first, and she was obligated to yibbum, because at the time of her husband’s death she had no rival wife who was forbidden to the yavam.  She cannot have yibbum lest the husband died first, and therefore at the time of his death she was the rival wife of a woman forbidden to the yavam (the yavam’s sister).
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss who gives a woman the right to eat terumah and who deprives her of such a right.
  The rapist, the seducer and the insane man neither disqualify [a woman from eating terumah] nor do they allow her to eat [terumah].If they are unfit to enter into the assembly of Israel they do disqualify [a woman from eating terumah]. How is this so?  If an Israelite had intercourse with the daughter of a priest she continues to eat terumah.If she becomes pregnant she may no longer eat terumah.[Even if] she becomes pregnant she may not eat.And if his father’s mother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may not eat terumah;And if his mother’s mother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may eat terumah;  This section teaches that intercourse outside the framework of marriage does not disqualify a woman from eating terumah, nor does it give the woman the right to eat terumah.  The mishnah illustrates some of these principles.  If an Israelite has intercourse with the daughter of a priest, whether that intercourse was rape or seduction (which means she consented), she continues to eat terumah.  Only betrothal to an Israelite would disqualify her from eating terumah.  However, if she becomes pregnant she loses her right to eat terumah.  This is what we learned in the previous mishnah:  a fetus can disqualify from eating terumah.  If she should miscarry, she may resume eating terumah. If a priest has relations with the daughter of an Israelite, the intercourse does not allow her to eat terumah.  In this case only full marriage will allow her to eat terumah.  If she becomes pregnant she still does not eat terumah.  This is because a fetus does not allow a woman to eat terumah.  However, if she gives birth she can eat terumah.  In this way, the power of the son is greater than the father, because the son allows her to eat terumah whereas the father did not. There are two other notes that we need to make on this section.  An insane person cannot contract betrothal.  Therefore, if he is a priest, his betrothal does not allow the wife to eat terumah.  However, if he is an Israelite he does not disqualify the daughter of a priest from eating terumah. If any of these people were “forbidden from entering the assembly of Israel”, meaning they were mamzerim or netinim or another category of people forbidden from marrying Israelites (see Deuteronomy 22:2-4), they do disqualify the woman from eating terumah.
  If the embryo was miscarried in her womb she may eat. If a priest had intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, she may not eat terumah.If she gave birth may eat.A slave disqualifies a woman from eating terumah through intercourse but not as her offspring.If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she may eat terumah.If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she may not eat terumah.  This section explains how it is that a woman can have a descendent who is a slave but not be disqualified from eating terumah.  As a side note, the opening line states that if a woman has intercourse with a slave she is disqualified from eating terumah, since this is forbidden intercourse. If a woman has a son, and the son goes and has intercourse with a slave-woman, the child is a slave.  This is because of the matrilineal principle.  If the grandmother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, and her husband and son die, the grandson does not bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah.  This is because he is not an Israelite.  However, if the grandmother was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and her son and husband die, she goes back to her father’s house to eat terumah.  Again, the grandson who is not Jewish, does not effect her right to eat terumah.
  It is found that the power of the son is greater than that of the father. How is this so?  If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest or the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite, and she bore a son by him, and the son went and had intercourse with a slave-woman who bore a son by him, such a son is a slave;A mamzer disqualifies a woman from eating terumah and can allow her to eat terumah. How is this so?  If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest or the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite, and she bore a daughter by him, and the daughter went and married a slave or a Gentile who bore a son by him, such a son is a mamzer;  This section teaches a law that is almost opposite of the last halakhah.  If a woman has relations with a mamzer, she is disqualified from eating terumah, because this is forbidden relations.  However, if a woman has a mamzer as a grandson, he may cause her to eat terumah.  We will now explain. If a woman has a daughter and the daughter goes and is married to a slave or Gentile, the son born of such a marriage is a mamzer.  [Note, that this halakhah was not accepted by many sages in the Talmud.  Today such a child is not considered a mamzer].  If the grandmother was a daughter of an Israelite and she was married to a priest, and her husband and son die, the grandson does bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah.  This is because he is an Israelite, although he is a mamzer.  However, if the grandmother was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and her son and husband die, she does goes back to her father’s house to eat terumah.  Again, the grandson who is Jewish, does effect her right to eat terumah. In summary the final two sections of this mishnah teach that a grandson who is Jewish can bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah or cause her to lose that right.  A mamzer, the child of a Jewish woman and non-Jewish man is Jewish.  A non-Jewish grandchild, the child of a slave-woman and a Jewish man, neither gives a woman the right to eat terumah nor causes her to lose it.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah introduces the strange case where a woman can have a grandson who is a high priest and that high priest actually disqualifies her from eating terumah.
  A high priest sometimes disqualifies [his mother’s mother] from being able to eat terumah. How is this so? If a priest’s daughter was married to an Israelite and she bore a daughter by him, and the daughter went and married a priest and bore a son by him, such a son is fit to be a high priest, to stand and serve at the altar. He allows his mother to eat terumah but disqualifies his mother’s mother. And she can say, “[May there] not be like my grandson the high priest who disqualified me from eating terumah.” If the daughter of a priest marries an Israelite, she loses the right to eat terumah as long as he is alive or she has a descendent through him.  When she has a daughter and the daughter goes and marries a priest and has a son the son is a priest and is eligible to become a high priest.  If his father dies, his mother may continue to eat terumah, because she has had a son.  If his mother also dies, and his grandmother did not have any other children, she does not return to her father’s home (remember her father was a priest) to eat terumah, because she has a grandson through her marriage to the Israelite.  Although her grandson might even be a high priest, he still prevents his grandmother from eating terumah. The mishnah then brings up the strange possible complaint of a grandmother, who has a grandson who is the high priest, and yet he disqualifies her from eating terumah.  I imagine that if this was my Bubby, she would have gotten over the loss of terumah and just been proud of her grandson!
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the right of priests, their wives and their slaves to eat terumah if the priests have physical defects that might disqualify them from the priesthood.
  An uncircumcised [priest] and all impure persons may not eat terumah. Their wives and slaves may eat terumah.  An uncircumcised priest may not eat terumah.  In the Talmud this is derived through an analogy with the passover sacrifice, which also may not be eaten by anyone who is uncircumcised (Exodus 12:44-48). Impure persons may not eat terumah. This refers to someone who is ritually impure, through anything that ritually defiles, such as scale disease, gonorrhea etc.  This halakhah is stated explicitly in Leviticus 22:4-6. However, the wife and slaves of an uncircumcised priest and an impure person may eat terumah.  This means that these men are priests, but that they themselves are disqualified from eating terumah due to their lack of circumcision or purity.  This lack does not effect their household.
  [A priest] whose testes are crushed or whose member is cut off, as well as their slaves, may eat terumah, but their wives may not. If, however, he did not know her after the his testes were crushed or his member was cut off, the wives may eat [terumah].  According to Deuteronomy 23:2, a man whose testes are crushed or whose member (penis) is cut off, may not enter into the assembly of God.  This is understood to mean that they may not marry an Israelite woman.  Our mishnah discusses a priest who has one of these physical defects.  He may continue to eat terumah, as may his slaves, since he is a priest. However, his wife may not eat terumah since he was not allowed to marry her or have intercourse with her.  We have already learned that once a woman has intercourse with someone forbidden to her she loses the right to eat terumah. However, if one of these physical defects occurred to him while he was married to her, and he does not continue to know (have intercourse) her afterwards, she may continue to eat terumah.  The only reason that she loses her right to eat terumah is that she was disqualified by intercourse with someone forbidden to her.  However, without such intercourse, she remains the wife of a priest and can continue to eat terumah.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah defines the terms petzua dakkah and kerut shofkhah mentioned in Deuteronomy 23:2.  These two categories of men cannot marry full Israelite women.
  Who is considered a “petzua dakkah”? Anyone whose testes are wounded even one of them.  A “petzua dakkah” is one who has even one of his testes wounded.
  And a “kerut shofkhah”? A man whose member is cut off. If [any part] of the corona remained, even so much as a hair’s breadth, the man is regarded as fit [to serve as a priest].  A “kerut shofkha” is one whose penis has been cut off.  However, if any of the crown remains, he is still a valid priest.
  A man who testes are wounded, and one whose member is cut off, are permitted to marry a convert or a freed slave. They are only forbidden to enter into the congregation, as it is said “No one whose testes are crushed or whose member is cut off shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:2).  These two categories of men are permitted to marry converts and freed slaves, who according to this mishnah, are not considered to be part of “the congregation of the Lord”.  Only those born as fit Israelites are considered to be part of “the congregation of the Lord”.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the other categories of people who are forbidden to enter into the congregation of the Lord mentioned in Deuteronomy 23:4-9.
  An Ammonite and a Moabite are forbidden [to enter into the congregation of the Lord] and their prohibition is for ever. However, their women are permitted at once.  The prohibition of the Ammonite and Moabite (Deuteronomy 23:4) is eternal.  This means that all of their descendents are forbidden from entering into marriage with an Israelite. Note that even should they convert, which they may, they are still prohibited from marrying Israelites. However, the prohibition of Ammonites and Moabites is only for the men.  Women are permitted immediately.  As soon as they convert, they may contract marriage with other Israelites.  Indeed, Ruth was a Moabitess and one of her descendents was King David.
  An Egyptian and an Edomite are forbidden only until the third generation, whether they are males or females. Rabbi Shimon permits their women immediately. Said Rabbi Shimon:  This is a kal vehomer: if where the males are forbidden for all time the females are permitted immediately, where the males are forbidden only until the third generation how much more should the females be permitted immediately. They said to him:  If this is a halakhah, we shall accept it; but if it is only a logical reference, there is a refutation. He replied: This is not so, I am in fact saying a halakhah.  In contrast, the prohibition of Egyptian and Edomite converts is only temporary.  Three generations after the conversion, they may intermarry with other Israelites. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, female Egyptian converts and female Edomite converts are also prohibited for three generations.  This opinion probably reasons that since they will eventually be allowed to intermarry with Israelites, the temporary prohibition covers both males and females. Rabbi Shimon, on the other hand, takes a more lenient stance and allows females to marry Israelites immediately upon conversion.  He is also consistent in explaining the verse.  Since all of these verses use masculine language, they all exclude only the males and not the females. The Sages respond to Rabbi Shimon that if his halakhah is a tradition which he learned from his rabbis, they will accept it.  However, if it is just based on reasoning they have a means by which to refute it.  Their refutation is probably the logic that I presented as their reasoning above.  Since Egyptians and Edomites are permitted after three generations, the females are not permitted immediately. Despite the fact that Rabbi Shimon’s original words appeared to have been based on logic, he responds that the halakhah is actually based on a tradition.  In this mishnah we can clearly see the rabbinic preference for tradition over logic.  The rabbis will only accept Rabbi Shimon’s ruling if it was one that he received from his rabbis.  In such a case they would accept it even if they found the logic faulty.  In response Rabbi Shimon pleads with them, claiming that his words are indeed a tradition.
  Mamzerim and nethinim are forbidden, and their prohibition is forever, whether they be males or females.  Concerning the mamzer and the netin, all of the sages agree that their prohibition is for all subsequent generations and that both men and women are prohibited.  Deuteronomy 23:3 only states that mamzers are prohibited until the tenth generation.  It doesn’t say, as does verse four concerning the Ammonite and Moabite, that they are prohibited forever. However, the rabbis employ a verbal analogy (a gezerah shavah) to compare the two.  Just as it says “until the tenth generation” about the Ammonite and Moabite, and yet they are prohibited for all generations, so too the mamzer, about whom it also says, “until the tenth generation” is prohibited for all generations.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains a discussion about whether or not a eunuch is obligated to perform halitzah for his dead brother’s wife and whether or not halitzah is performed for his wife, should he die without children.  Note that this issue is tied to the eunuch’s ability or lack thereof to have children.  One who cannot have children would be less likely to be subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum whose purpose is to supply children for the dead brother.
  Rabbi Joshua said:  I have heard that a eunuch performs halitzah and that halitzah is performed by others for his wife, and also that a eunuch does not perform halitzah and that no halitzah is performed for his wife, and I am unable to explain this.  Rabbi Joshua transmits an old halakhah that he has heard, but that he doesn’t know how to explain. In these words we can see how halakhot were often transmitted in pithy, memorable phrases, such that later sages sometimes did not know how to explain them. Rabbi Joshua has heard that eunuchs are subject to the laws of halitzah and he has also heard the opposite.  He does not know if these two halakhot apply to two different types of eunuchs or whether they contradict each other.
  Rabbi Akiva said:  I will explain it: a man-made eunuch performs halitzah and halitzah is also performed for his wife, because there was a time when he was fit [to have children]. A eunuch by nature neither performs halitzah nor is halitzah performed for his wife, since there never was a time when he was fit.  Rabbi Akiva explains the puzzle brought up by Rabbi Joshua.  The eunuch who was castrated by humans performs halitzah for his dead brother’s wife.  [He cannot have yibbum, because he is forbidden to marry Israelites, as we learned above.]  If he should die without children, halitzah or yibbum is performed for his wife.  The reason that he is subject to the laws of yibbum is that he was at one time not a eunuch and he was fit to have children.  In contrast, the eunuch who was born a eunuch was never fit to have children, and therefore is not subject to the laws of halitzah.  Should he die, his wife is exempt from both halitzah and yibbum.  Should his brother die, he does not perform halitzah for his widow.
  Rabbi Eliezer said: Not so!  Rather a eunuch by nature performs halitzah and halitzah is performed for his wife, because he may be cured. A man-made eunuch neither performs halitzah nor is halitzah performed for his wife, since he cannot be cured.  Rabbi Eliezer offers the opposite reading and solution to the tradition transmitted by Rabbi Joshua.  The eunuch who is subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum is one who was born a eunuch, since he could potentially be cured, and then he could have children.  A eunuch who was castrated by others cannot be cured (even today this is not a simple procedure).  Therefore, he is not subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum.
  Rabbi Joshua ben Baterra testified concerning Ben Megusat, who was a man-made eunuch living in Jerusalem and they performed yibbum for his wife, thus confirming the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.  Rabbi Joshua ben Batera testifies about a man-made eunuch, that they performed yibbum for his wife.  This proves what Rabbi Akiva said, that man-made eunuchs are subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum.  Note that what proves that Rabbi Akiva is correct is a precedent, and not any inherent logic to his words.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the performance of yibbum or halitzah by a eunuch or by an aylonit, a woman who has not developed signs of sexual maturity, and therefore by definition cannot procreate.  Both of these categories are therefore people who cannot procreate.  Since they cannot procreate they are excluded from the laws of halitzah and yibbum, as we learned in the previous mishnah.
  The eunuch neither performs halitzah nor contracts yibbum.  We have already seen this halakhah in the previous mishnah.  Here it either refers to a man-made eunuch, who according to Rabbi Akiva does not perform halitzah.  Alternatively, it refers to all eunuchs and this mishnah contains an opinion that disagrees with both opinions in the previous mishnah.
  So too a woman who is incapable of procreation neither performs halizah nor is taken in yibbum.  A woman who is physically incapable of procreating is not subject to the laws of halitzah or yibbum.  Since the point of yibbum is procreation, those who cannot procreate are exempt.
  If a eunuch performed halitzah for his yevamah, he does not disqualify her [from subsequently marrying a priest]. If he has intercourse with her he disqualifies her, since this is an act of fornication.  Since a eunuch does not perform halitzah, there is no validity to an act of halitzah that he performs.  If he nevertheless does so, he has not thereby disqualified the woman from subsequently marrying a priest.  [A halutzah is forbidden to be married by a priest]. However, if he has intercourse with her, as an attempted act of yibbum, he has disqualified her from marrying a priest, because this was forbidden.  Since she was not liable for yibbum, she is prohibited to him by the prohibition of being his brother’s wife.  [Remember any time yibbum is not necessary, the prohibition of a brother’s wife is effective, even after the brother’s death].  Any woman who has had relations with a man forbidden to her is subsequently prohibited from marrying a priest.
  Similarly where brothers performed halitzah for a woman incapable of procreation, they do not disqualify her [from marrying a priest]. If they have intercourse with her they do disqualify her, since this is an act of fornication.  This section contains nearly the same laws with regard to the woman who cannot procreate.  If one of the brothers performs halitzah he has not disqualified her from marrying a priest.  However, if one of them tries to have yibbum with her, she is disqualified, because she was prohibited to him, as his brother’s wife.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with several categories of people who are of doubtful gender status.  A hermaphrodite is a person who has the outer sexual signs of both a male and a female.  A tumtum is a person who has no outer sexual signs.
  If a priest who was eunuch by nature married the daughter of an Israelite, he confers upon her the right to eat terumah.  A eunuch by nature is not forbidden from marrying Israelite women (he is not considered to be a “petzua daka”, one whose testes were crushed.  Therefore, if he is a priest and he marries the daughter of an Israelite, the marriage is valid and he is allowed to eat terumah.
  Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon stated: if a priest who was an hermaphrodite married the daughter of an Israelite, he confers upon her the right to eat terumah.  A priest who is a hermaphrodite is allowed to marry the daughter of an Israelite.  With regard to marriage, he is treated as if he was fully male.  Therefore, if he is a priest, his wife may eat terumah.
  Rabbi Judah stated: if a tumtum was opened up and found to be a male, he may not perform halitzah, because he has the same status as a eunuch.  A tumtum may have been born with his sexual organs covered by a thin sac of skin. Even if they open up this sac and find that he is male, he may not perform halitzah, since his status is like that of a eunuch.  Assumedly, the tumtum cannot procreate and therefore is exempt from the laws of halitzah and yibbum.
  The hermaphrodite may marry [a wife] but may not be married [by a man].  As we learned in section two, a hermaphrodite is treated like a male.  He may marry a woman but may not be married by a man.
  Rabbi Eliezer stated: concerning the hermaphrodite, [the one who has relations with him] is liable to be stoned like one [who has relations with] a male.  According to Rabbi Eliezer, if another man has relations with a hermaphrodite, he is liable to be stoned, as are all men who engage in intercourse with other men.  This is Rabbi Eliezer’s way of stating that the hermaphrodite is to be treated completely as if he is a male.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first two mishnayoth of this chapter list variations of women who are either permitted or forbidden to their husbands and to their yevamim (their husband’s brothers).
  This chapter does not really teach new laws that were unknown from other places in the Yevamoth. Rather it organizes them in a different manner.
  Some women are permitted  to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim, Others are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands, Others are permitted to both, Others are forbidden to both.[In all these cases the women] are permitted  to their husbands and forbidden  to their yevamim.  This section is an introduction to this mishnah and the next.  The different combinations will be explained as we proceed.  Note how formulaic it is and how easy it must have been to remember.
  These are the women who are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim: An ordinary priest married a widow and had a brother who was a high priest; A halal married a woman who was fit and had a brother of legitimate status; An Israelite married the daughter of an Israelite and had a brother who was a mamzer, A mamzer married a mamzeret and had a brother who was an Israelite.  The following cases are ones in which a woman is married to a man to whom she is permitted but should her husband die without children she would not be permitted to have yibbum with the yavam. An ordinary priest who married a widow and had a brother who was a high priest:  An ordinary priest is allowed to marry a widow but the high priest may not. A halal who married a woman who was fit [to marry a priest] had a brother of legitimate status:  A halal is the child of a priest and a woman who is forbidden to a priest (such as a divorcee).  A halal may marry anyone.  However, once a woman has relations with a halal, she also becomes a halalah.  A halal may have a brother who was not a halal, if, for instance, his father was a priest and his mother was a divorcee and his brother’s mother was fit to marry a priest.  In such a case the halal’s wife may not have yibbum with his brother because she is a halalah, and a priest cannot marry a halalah. An Israelite who married the daughter of an Israelite had a brother who was a mamzer:  A mamzer may not marry the daughter of an Israelite.  Therefore, the mamzer brother of an Israelite may not have yibbum with his dead brother’s wife.  An Israelite might have a brother who is a mamzer if, for instance, his father had an affair with another woman while she was married. A mamzer married a mamzeret had a brother who was an Israelite:  This is the reverse situation as that which we saw in the previous section.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  The following  are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands:A high priest who betrothed a widow and has a brother who is an ordinary priest;A fit [priest] who married a halalah and has a brother who is a halal;An Israelite who married a mamzeret and has a brother who is a mamzeret;A mamzer who married the daughter of an Israelite and has a brother who is an Israelite. [In these cases the women] are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands.The following are forbidden to both;A high priest who married a widow has a brother who is a high priest, or who is an ordinary priest;A fir [priest] who married a halalah and has a brother who was a fit [priest];An Israelite who married a mamzeret and has a brother who is Israelite;A mamzer who married the daughter of an Israelite and has a brother who is a mamzer, [In these cases the women] are forbidden to both [the husband and the yavam]. All other women are permitted to both their husbands and their yevamim.This mishnah continues to list types of women who are either forbidden to their husbands or to their yevamim.Section one:  A high priest is not allowed to marry a widow.  If he betroths a widow and then dies, his brother, the ordinary priest, may have yibbum with her.  However, if he married her, she would fall into the category of a halalah, that is a woman who has been disqualified from the priesthood.  She would then be forbidden to the yavam brother as well.Section two:  A priest may not marry a halalah.  However, if he has a brother who is a halal (for instance they have different mothers), then the brother may have yibbum with her.Section three:   An Israelite may not marry a mamzeret.  However, if he has a brother who is a mamzer (they have different mothers), then the brother may have yibbum with her.Section four:  The opposite situation of that in section three.Section five:  The mishnah now begins to list women who are forbidden both to their husbands and, should the husbands die, to the yavam as well.If a high priest marries a widow and dies and his brother is also a high priest, just as the first marriage was prohibited, so too is yibbum.  Furthermore, since the first marriage was consummated (and did not remain only a betrothal, as in section one above), the woman became a halalah and is therefore prohibited to his brother even if he is only an ordinary priest.Section six:  If a fit priest marries a halalah, who is forbidden to him, she may not have yibbum with his brother who is also a fit priest.Section seven:  Just as the mamzereth was forbidden to the first husband, who was an ordinary Israelite, so too she is forbidden to his brother, if he is an ordinary Israelite.Section eight:  Just as the Israelite woman was forbidden to her first husband, who was a mamzer, so too she is forbidden to his mamzer brother.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  In mishnah 2:4, we learned that there are secondary incest prohibitions that were instituted by the scribes.
  [Concerning] relatives of the second degree [of incest laws who are forbidden] by the words of the scribes:[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the husband but not a second degree of kinship to the yavam, is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam;  A woman could be a second degree of kinship to her husband but not to her yavam if she was the husband’s grandmother, and her husband had a brother with the same father but not the same mother.  The mishnah teaches that although the marriage was forbidden, she may still have yibbum.  This is because the prohibition of second degree kinship is only of rabbinic origin.
  [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the yavam but not a second degree of kinship to the husband is forbidden to the yavam and permitted to the husband;  The same is true in the opposite case, if she is a second degree of kinship to her yavam but not to her husband.  As we learned above in 2:3-4, in such a case she must have halitzah and not yibbum.
  [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the one and to the other is forbidden to the one as well as to the other.  If she was a second degree to both, she is forbidden to both.
  She cannot claim her ketubah or usufruct or support money, or her worn clothes. The child is fit [to marry a priest], but the husband is compelled to divorce her.  If a couple transgressed the rabbinic prohibition and the man married a woman who was a second degree of kinship, there are serious economic consequences for the woman.  The woman does not receive her ketubah (marriage payment), nor does she receive in return the usufruct, meaning the profit that the husband accrued from the use of her property while they were married.  She does not receive support (food, clothing or shelter), nor does she receive in return the reduction in the value of her things that he has used while married.  However, the status of the child is not effected, since the level of prohibition was only derabbanan.  He is forced to divorce her.  In summary, the consequences of this forbidden marriage are mostly economic and they are mostly upon the woman.
  A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorcee or halutzah who was married to an ordinary priest, a mamzer or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a natin or a mamzer is entitled to her ketubah.  The mishnah now contrasts this type of forbidden marriage, with a marriage that was forbidden according to Torah law, but that was nevertheless an effective marriage.  That is to say if a man betrothed one of these women, he has transgressed the prohibition, but she still requires a divorce.  In all of these cases the woman receives her ketubah and all of the other rights listed in the mishnah. In the comparison of these two sections, we see that the consequences of marrying a second degree of kinship which is only a rabbinic prohibition are more serious than those of marrying one who is biblically prohibited.  The reason is that a rabbinic prohibition needs the extra “strengthening” while the biblical prohibition does not.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses whether or not a woman eats terumah or tithe (which the Levites eat) in situations where she might be moving from an Israelite home to a priest’s domain, and whether she loses the right to eat terumah in situations where she might be leaving her priestly or Levite home and going to an Israelite home.
  The daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a priest, or who was pregnant from a priest, or was a shomeret yavam to a priest; And similarly, the daughter of a priest [who was in such relationship] with an Israelite, may not eat terumah.  The daughter of an Israelite may eat terumah when she is fully married to a priest. She may not eat terumah when she is merely betrothed.  If she is pregnant but not married (either he died or she became pregnant before marriage) she may not eat terumah.  Finally, if she is a shomeret yavam waiting to for yibbum with a priest, she may not eat terumah.  However, if she was the daughter of a priest and the man was an Israelite in one of these situations, she loses the right to eat terumah.  These states are in-between states, states where the woman may lose the right to eat terumah but may not gain the right.  Note that we have taught exactly this halakhah in 7:4 above:  the fetus, the yavam and betrothal disqualify her from eating terumah and cannot allow her to eat terumah.
  The daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a Levite, or who was pregnant from a Levite, or was a shomeret yavam to a Levite; And similarly, the daughter of a Levite [who was in such a relationship] with an Israelite may not eat tithe.  This section teaches the exact same laws with regard to tithes, which are eaten by Levites.  The Talmud points out that according to the halakhah, a non-Levite may eat tithe (although he is commanded to give it to the Levite).  Our mishnah goes according to Rabbi Meir who holds that only Levites can eat tithe.
  The daughter of a Levite who was betrothed to a priest, or who was pregnant from a priest, or was a shomeret yavam to a priest; And similarly, the daughter of a priest [who was in such relationship] with a levite, may eat neither terumah nor tithe.  The logic of this section is that a woman in one of these situations is not tied enough to the priest to eat terumah, nor does she remain tied enough to her Levite family to continue eating tithe.  Note that according to this section, even priests cannot eat tithe.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  As with all of the mishnayoth of this chapter, we don’t really learn any new information in this mishnah.  What we see is a tightly organized literary structure, describing a situation where one woman moves in and out of the ability to eat terumah and tithe.
  The daughter of an Israelite married to a priest may eat terumah. If he died and she has a son by him she may continue to eat terumah. If she was [subsequently] married to a Levite, she may eat tithe. If he died and she had a son by him, she may continue to eat tithe. If she was [subsequently] married to an Israelite she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. If he died and she has a son by him, she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. If her son by the Israelite died, she may again eat tithe. If her son by the Levite died she may again eat terumah. If her son by the priest died, she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. When the Israelite woman married the priest, she became able to eat terumah.  Once he dies, she can still eat terumah because she has a son from him.  When she marries a Levite she loses the ability to eat terumah, but she gains the ability to eat tithe.  When he dies, she can still eat tithe because she has a son from him.  When she then marries the Israelite, she loses her right to eat both tithe and terumah, because she has a son with him. At this point she has a son from each of her marriages.  If her son from the Israelite now dies, she reverts back to her previous status.  She can now eat tithe because of her son with the Levite.  If this son dies, she now reverts to the previous status, which means she can again eat terumah because of her son with the priest.  If he too dies, she goes back to her original Israelite family and can no longer eat tithe or terumah.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah says basically the same thing as the previous one, but in a reverse order.
  The daughter of a priest who was married to an Israelite may not eat terumah. If he died and she had a son by him she may not eat terumah. If she was [subsequently] married to a Levite she may eat tithe. If he died and she had a son by him she may eat tithe. If she was [subsequently] married to a priest she may eat terumah. If he died and she had a son by him she may eat terumah. If her son by the priest died she may not eat terumah. If her son by the levite died she may not eat tithe. If her son by the Israelite died she returns to the house of her father; And it is concerning such a woman that it is said, “And she returns to her father’s house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13). This mishnah is the exact reverse of yesterday’s mishnah.  The woman starts in a situation where she can eat terumah, but then loses that right when she marries an Israelite.  If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she still cannot eat terumah.  If she marries a Levite, she may now eat tithe.  If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she can still eat tithe.  If she now marries a priest, she can eat terumah. .  If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she can still eat terumah.  If this son dies, she goes back to eating tithe.  If this son dies, she goes back to not being able to eat either, because of her son from the Israelite.  If this son dies, she goes back to her original situation and she may eat terumah.  As the verse says, she goes back to the situation of her father’s house.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah, and several mishnayoth which follow deal with the unfortunate situation where a woman thinks her husband has died, she gets remarried, has kids, and then her husband reappears.  The mishnah lists the consequences of her now having unwittingly committed adultery.
  The usual interpretation of this mishnah is that the marriage to the second husband was not valid, since a married woman cannot marry again.  The penalties which she receives in this mishnah are because she didn’t check well enough to make sure her first husband is dead.  As we shall see, this interpretation has certain difficulties.
  A teacher of mine, Professor Shamma Friedman, suggested an alternative explanation of the mishnah, an explanation that was based on a comparison of the mishnaic law with other laws found in ancient near eastern law codes, such as the Code of Hammurabi.  He proposed that the mishnah actually means that she is married to both men at the same time.  The problem with this is that it is forbidden to be married to two men at the same time.  Since each marriage is valid but forbidden, she cannot stay married to either and doesn’t get the benefits of either marriage.  In other words, both marriages are biblically valid, but each husband makes the other husband’s marriage illegitimate.  According to this interpretation, the woman is not penalized for not having checked.  Rather the problems she encounters are the result of her being married to two men at the same time.
  A woman whose husband had gone to a country beyond the sea and they came and told her, “Your husband died”, married, and then her husband returned: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum.  This section lists all of the results of her having married another man while her first husband is still alive.  I will go through each one by one: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one:  She must be divorced from each of them, for she is forbidden to each.  She also needs a get from each of them.  According to the talmudic interpretation, the get from the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, for according to biblical law, she is not married to the second man. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one:  She does not receive any of the financial benefits that she would have accrued from her husband.  This clause was explained above in 9:3. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it:  If she had taken any of these things to which she is not entitled, she must return them.  Some times, in cases of doubt, possession is enough for a person not to have to return something.  However, in this case, her possession is considered truly illegal and she must return what she took. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer:  The child from the second husband is a mamzer because she gave birth to him while married to the first husband.  Should she return to the first husband, the subsequent child will also be a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her:  A priest is allowed to impurify himself to bury his wife.  In this case, if either husband is a priest and she dies, they may not impurify themselves for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows:  These are all rights given to a husband during marriage.  Since the marriage is now invalid, he loses all these rights.  Invalidating vows is discussed in Numbers 30. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah:  The illicit marriage to the second husband disqualifies her from all rights that might be accrued from either kohanic or levitical status.  The result is that she could no longer marry a priest nor eat tithe if her father was a Levite, nor eat terumah if her father was a priest. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah:  According to a ketubah clause which we will see in chapter four of tractate Ketuboth, a woman’s male children inherit her ketubah.  However, in this case they too are penalized and lose their inheritance. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum:  Since both marriages were invalid, the brothers cannot perform yibbum.  Note that according to the talmudic interpretation, the halitzah of the brother of the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, since according to Torah law the second marriage was not valid.
  Rabbi Yose said: her ketubah remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband.  The mishnah now brings up opinions that do not agree with the long list seen in section.  Rabbi Yose holds that she does receive her ketubah from her first husband, since she only committed adultery unintentionally.
  Rabbi Elazar said: the first husband is entitled to whatever she may find, and what she makes with her hands, and also has the right to invalidate her vows.  Rabbi Elazar adds that the first husband continues to receive the economic benefits from his wife.
  Rabbi Shimon said: intercourse or halitzah with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival, and the child from him is not a bastard.  Rabbi Shimon holds that the brother of the first husband may have yibbum with her, and that by performing yibbum or halitzah, the rival wife is exempted from yibbum or halitzah.  Assumedly he also holds that she does not need halitzah from the second husband’s brother.  Finally, should she go back to her first husband, the child from such a relationship is not a mamzer.
  If she married without an authorization, she may return to him.  This section really belongs to the following mishnah.  It teaches that if she married without the permission of the court, she is allowed to return to her first husband, because in this case the second marriage was totally accidental.  However, if she married with the permission of the court, the second marriage is valid and all of the above listed results occur.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss the situation of a woman who was told that her husband was dead and she remarried, and then her husband returned.
  If she married with the authorization of the court, she must leave, but is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. If she married without the authorization of the court, she must leave and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The authority of the court is thus more greater in that it exempts her from the sacrifice.  If she asked the court before she remarried, and they allowed her to remarry, she must leave her second husband, should her first husband return (she cannot return to her first husband either, as we saw in mishnah one).  However, she is not liable to bring a sacrifice (sin offering) since she acted with the court’s permission.  It is as if the court takes upon itself the responsibility for her accidentally having sinned. However, if she acted on her own without permission, she must bring a sin offering.    The reason that she is able to bring a sin offering to atone for her sin is that her sin was unintentional; she didn’t know her husband was alive when she married someone else.  Had she sinned intentionally, an offering would not have been effective.
  If the court ruled that she may be married and she went and disgraced herself, she   must bring a sacrifice, because the court permitted her only to marry.  If the court ruled that she could remarry and she disgraced herself by marrying someone forbidden to her, for instance if she was a widow and she married the high priest, or if she was a divorcee and she remarried a priest, etc., she is liable to bring a sacrifice.  When the court allowed her to remarry, the intention was a permitted marriage. By marrying someone not permitted to her, she is actually marrying on her own accord, and is therefore liable to bring a sacrifice as an unintentional sinner.  Note that the sacrifice is for the adultery and not the forbidden marriage.  Most forbidden marriages are not atoned for by sacrifices.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses other scenarios where a woman was told that her husband died and it turns out that the information she received was not 100 per cent correct.
  If a woman whose husband and son went to a country beyond the sea was told, “Your husband died and your son died afterwards”, and she married again, and later she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer.  When this woman hears that her husband died while her son was still alive, she thinks that she is not liable for yibbum or halitzah, since her husband died while his son was alive.  Therefore she remarried someone else, without halitzah or yibbum. When she finds out that she should have had yibbum, it turns out that she was a shomeret yavam who remarried without halitzah or yibbum.  Our mishnah’s ruling goes according to Rabbi Akiva who rules that any children from such a marriage are mamzerim.  This is true whether the child was born while her husband was alive or even if the child was born after her husband died, for she should have had halitzah or yibbum.  She must also leave this marriage.
  If she was told “Your son died and your husband died afterwards”, and she had yibbum, and afterwards she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer.  In this case she thought that she was liable for yibbum, so she went and had yibbum with her brother-in-law. Afterwards she finds out that she was exempt from yibbum, since her husband died while her son was still alive.  Since the yibbum was forbidden, any child that she has with the yavam is a mamzer, whether or not he was born while her husband was still alive.
  If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she married, and afterwards she was told, “He was alive but is now dead”, she must leave, and any child born before [the death of her first husband] is a mamzer, but one born after it is not a mamzer.  In this case, at the point when she married the second husband, she was in fact married to the first husband.  Therefore she must leave the second marriage.  The child born before the first husband died is a mamzer, for the union was adulterous.  However, the child born after the first husband died is not a mamzer.  In other words, even though she must leave the second husband in any case, not every child that she has with him is a mamzer.
  If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she was betrothed, and afterwards her husband appeared, she is permitted to return to him. Although the second one gave her a get he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying a priest. This Rabb Elazar ben Mathia expounded: “A woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7) not from a man who is not her husband.  If she is only betrothed to the second husband, and then she finds out that she is still married to the first husband, she may return to her first husband.  In the other cases in our mishnah and in the previous one, she was forbidden to do so because she had, albeit unwittingly, committed adultery by having relations with the second husband.  However, in this case, she has not had relations with the second husband, therefore she may return to the first.  The mishnah further emphasizes that the second marriage is totally invalid by stating that even if the second husband gives her a get, she may still potentially someday marry a priest. This last halakhah is supported by a midrash by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya.  Leviticus 21:7 states that a priest may not marry a woman “divorced from her husband”.  The verse could have merely stated “divorced”.  The extra words “from her husband” teach that if she is divorced from someone who is not her husband, a priest may still marry her.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the next discuss the ramifications of situations where a husband was told that his wife had died, and he married her sister.
  If a man’s wife had gone to a country beyond the sea and he was told, “Your wife is dead”, and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife came back, [the latter] is permitted to return to him. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second woman, and the second woman is permitted to marry his relatives. If the first wife died he is permitted to marry the second.  The man’s marriage to his wife’s sister was obviously forbidden, since one cannot marry one’s wife’s sister.  However, his original wife is permitted to return to him, since the second marriage was totally invalid.  By his first wife returning to him, this would not count as marrying his wife’s (his second wife’s) sister.  Furthermore, since the marriage was invalid, he may marry the second wife’s relatives (for instance her daughter).  This is true even if he has had sexual relations with her.  She too is permitted to marry his relatives. If his first wife dies, he can now remarry the second wife.  Even though he already had relations with her when she was forbidden to him, since she is now permitted to him, he may marry her.
  If he was told that his wife was dead, and he married her sister, and then he was told that she was then alive but had since died, any child born before [his first wife’s death] is a mamzer, but anyone born after [her death] is not a mamzer.  This section teaches that any child he had with his wife’s sister while his wife was still alive is a mamzer, since this is a prohibited relationship, and punishable by kareth.  However, children born after his original wife died are not mamzerim.
  Rabbi Yose says:  whoever disqualifies for others disqualifies for himself and whoever does not disqualify for others does not disqualify for himself.  The Talmud explains that Rabbi Yose refers to a situation where Reuven was married to Leah and Moshe was married to Rachel, Leah’s sister.  Leah and Moshe (Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law) go abroad and Reuven receives a report that both of them have died.  Reuven now marries Rachel, who he thinks is Moshe’s widow and his dead wife’s sister.  When both Leah and Moshe come back, since Rachel is forbidden to return to Moshe (see mishnah one), Leah is forbidden to return to Reuven.  The previous tanna would have held that while Rachel was forbidden to return to Moshe, Leah was permitted to return to Reuven. However, if there was a case where the woman whom he married was not forbidden to return to a previous husband, for instance she was not married or she married him (Reuven) without the permission of the court, since he does not make her forbidden to someone else, his own wife is not forbidden to return to him.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a quite complicated situation in which a man marries a series of sisters, thinking that each previous one was dead, and then finds out that they are all alive.  If we sort out all of the details, this braintwister shouldn’t be so bad.
  If a man was told “Your wife is dead” and he married her paternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead’, he married her maternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead”, and he married her paternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead, he married her maternal sister; and later it was found that they were all alive, he is permitted to the first, third and fifth, and they exempt their rivals; But he is forbidden to the second and the fourth, and intercourse with one of these does not exempt her rival.  A man was married to Rachel (1), and when told that she died, he married Hana (2), Rachel’s paternal sister.  When told that Hana died, he married Tova (3), Hana’s maternal sister.  Rachel (1) and Tova (3) do not share any parents.  When told that Tova has died, he marries Yael (4), Tova’s paternal sister.  Yael (4) does not share any parents with Rachel (1) or Hana (2).  When told that Yael has died, he marries Rivka (5), Yael’s maternal sister.  Rivka (5) does not share any parents with Rachel (1), Hana (2) or Tova (3). At this point, the hapless husband finds out that all of these women are still alive (you can just imagine the shock on the poor guy’s face!).  The mishnah rules that he may stay married to the first, the third and the fifth.  This means that even though the third woman is the second woman’s sister, and he is forbidden to the second woman, he may stay with the third (the same with the fifth, who is the fourth’s sister). This is because the marriage to the second and the fourth was not valid marriage, because he had already married the first and the third, and they were still alive.  Since the marriage with the second and the fourth was not valid marriage, he is permitted to marry their sisters. The mishnah also teaches that the first, third and fifth women exempt their rival wives from the need for yibbum.  This means that should this husband die without children, when one of his brothers does yibbum or halitzah with one of these women, the rest of the women are exempt. He is forbidden to stay married to the second and the fourth women, since they are the sisters of the first and third respectively.  Since both of these women are not validly married, and therefore are not liable for yibbum or halitzah, should someone perform yibbum or halitzah with them, it would not exempt their rivals.
  If he had intercourse with the second after the death of the first, he is permitted to the second and fourth, and they exempt their rivals; But he is forbidden to the third and the fifth, and intercourse with one of these does not exempt her rival.  After the death of the first wife, he is permitted to have relations with the second wife.  If he does so, then he can no longer stay with the third wife, and he can now have relations with the fourth wife (since the marriage with the third wife is now invalid).  Since he can have relations with the fourth wife, he cannot stay married to the fifth wife.  In this case, the second and fourth wife would be liable for yibbum and therefore they make their rival wives exempt.  The third and fifth wife are not liable for yibbum, therefore they would not make their rival wives exempt.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the ramifications of a boy, nine years and one day old, performing an act of yibbum, divorce, halitzah or ma’amar.  The mishnah teaches that a boy of this age is capable of having sex which is a purely physical act.  However, he does not have the requisite knowledge (da’at) to give a get, perform ma’amar or halitzah.  One other issue which we must keep in mind while learning this mishnah is that once a woman awaiting yibbum (a shomeret yavam) has had one of these acts performed with her by one of the brothers, she may no longer marry any of the other brothers of her dead husband.
  We should note that in the time of the Mishnah, not only was marriage considered possible at a very young age, but concepts of childhood were different.  Our perception of childhood as extending well into one’s teens and our assumption that children deserve protection during these years and are not to be treated as adults, are, to a large extent, more modern perceptions.  The mishnah, as we shall see, is therefore not squeamish about discussing sex and children.  Today, in our society children are (or should be) distanced from sex.
  A boy of the age of nine years and one day disqualifies [his sister-in-law for marriage] with his brothers, and his brothers disqualify her for him, but while he disqualifies her from the outset only, the brothers disqualify her from the outset and at the end.  The first section of the mishnah is a brief, memorable way of stating that which will be explained in section two and in the following mishnayoth.  I will explain the concepts as they are fleshed out in the mishnah.
  How is this so?   A boy of the age of nine years and one day who had intercourse with his sister-in-law disqualifies her [for marriage] with his brothers;  If a boy of nine years and one day has intercourse with a shomeret yavam, that is his dead brother’s wife, the other, older brothers may no longer have yibbum/intercourse with her.  This means that his act of intercourse “counts” sufficiently that she is tied to him, and no longer liable for yibbum or halitzah to the other brothers.  Since she is no longer liable for yibbum or halitzah, they are forbidden to have intercourse with her.
  The brothers disqualify her [for marriage with him] whether they had intercourse with her, did ma’amar, gave her a get or submitted to her halitzah.  In contrast to the nine year old boy, the older brothers disqualify the shomeret yavam from having relations with any of the other brothers in four different ways:  intercourse (yibbum), ma’amar (betrothal), divorce (get) and halitzah.  Even though ma’amar and a get are only of rabbinic origin for the shomeret yavam, and she still requires halitzah before she may remarry, they are sufficient to disqualify her from the other brothers. The difference between the older brothers and the nine year old brother is that for the older brothers there are legal consequences to their performance of acts that require knowledge, such as ma’amar, divorce, or halitzah, whereas for the nine year old, there are legal consequence only to physical acts such as intercourse.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah explains the status of an act of sexual intercourse done by a boy who has reached nine years and one day old, but is not yet of majority age.
  If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and then his brother who was of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with her, [the latter] disqualifies her for [the former]. Rabbi Shimon says: he does not render her unfit. As we learned yesterday, the sexual intercourse of a boy nine years and one day old has legal ramifications.  In our case of yibbum, if a boy who has reached this age has relations with his yevamah, he disqualifies her from being permitted to have yibbum with another one of the brothers.  However, this act of sexual intercourse is not sufficient to completely make her his wife.  The Talmud states that it is not a “complete acquisition”, as it would be if he was of majority age.  Therefore, when another brother, who has also reached this age, has intercourse with her, he causes her prohibited to the first brother.  Since she has now had quasi-yibbum with two brothers (akin to ma’amar with two brothers, see above 5:1), she is forbidden to both. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is doubtful whether sexual intercourse with a boy nine years and one day old can acquire a woman as a wife. In our case, if it does, then she is the wife of the first brother, and the intercourse with the second brother does not disqualify her to the first.  If such intercourse does not acquire her as a wife, then neither does the intercourse with the second brother, and she is not disqualified to the first brother.  Should she wait around as a shomeret yavam until he is of majority age, he may then have yibbum with her. To summarize, the first opinion holds that an act of intercourse by a boy nine years and one day, certainly acquires a woman as a wife, but the acquisition is not complete.  In contrast, Rabbi Shimon holds that it is uncertain whether this act of intercourse acquires.  However, if it does acquire, it acquires fully.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss the ramifications of an act of intercourse performed by a boy of the age of nine years and one day.
  If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and afterwards had intercourse with her rival wife, he has disqualified [both women for marriage] with himself. Rabbi Shimon says: he does not disqualify them.  As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, according to the rabbis an act of intercourse done by a boy nine years and one day old partially acquires a yevamah as a wife.  It is akin to ma’amar, which also partially acquires the yevamah as a wife.  Therefore, if the boy has intercourse first with one yevamah, and then with another one, who is also a yevamah, it is like giving ma’amar to two different yevamoth.  In such a case, he may not marry either one. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is doubtful whether the sexual act of a boy nine years and one day old acquires a wife.  Therefore, if it does make her his wife, then the first yevamah is his wife, and the intercourse with the second woman is inconsequential.  If such an act does not acquire her as a wife, then neither did the intercourse with the second woman, and neither are prohibited to him.  Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, when he reaches majority age he may marry either woman.
  If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and then died, she must undergo halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum.  As stated above, intercourse with a boy nine years and one day old is legally equivalent to ma’amar.  It therefore creates a tie to the yevamah, but does not totally remove the ties that she still has to her first husband.  Should this boy now die, she has ties to two yevamim (two brothers, both of whom were her husband).  As we learned in mishnah 3:9, when a woman has ties to two yevamim she must undergo halitzah, and may not have yibbum with another brother.
  If he had married [any other] woman and she subsequently died, she is exempt [from both halitzah and yibbum].  If a boy three years and one day old tries to marry a woman, and then he dies, she is not liable for yibbum or halitzah.  This is because a boy this young cannot legally contract marriage.  Throughout this chapter we have learned that there are some legal ramifications to his having sex with a woman.  This section teaches that those ramifications are limited to the realm of yibbum.  For regular marriage, there are no ramifications.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his sister-in-law, and after he had come of age he married another woman and then died, if he had not known the first woman after he had become of age, the first one must have halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum, while the second may either have halitzah or yibbum.Rabbi Shimon says: [the yavam] may perform yibbum with whichever one he wants, and he must perform halitzah for the other [woman].[The same law applies] whether he is of the age of nine years and one day, or whether he is of the age of twenty years but had not produced two pubic hairs.The final mishnah of chapter ten contains another dispute between the sages and Rabbi Shimon over the status of an act of intercourse performed by a nine year old boy.  As we have learned before, according to the sages, such an act partially acquires the yevamah as his wife.  According to Rabbi Shimon, it is doubtful whether the act acquires her as a wife, but if it does, she is fully his wife.Section one:  When the nine year old boy has relations with his yevamah, according to the sages, he partially acquires her as his wife.  If he later dies, without having intercourse with her from the time he reached majority age, she may not have yibbum, as we learned in the previous mishnah, since she is tied to two yevamim (the minor and the brother who first married her). Had he had intercourse with her after having reached majority age, he would have completely severed her ties to her first husband, and she would be able to subsequently have yibbum.Concerning the woman he married after having reached majority age, she may have either yibbum or halitzah.  The question we must ask about this clause is why we would have thought that she is not allowed to have yibbum.  The issue is connected to that which we learned in 3:9, concerning an adult who performed ma’amar with his yevamah, but before he had a chance to have yibbum with her he died.  There we learned that just as she must have halitzah and not yibbum (since she is tied to two yevamim), so too must her rival wife.  Our mishnah deals with a similar situation, where a man dies having ties equivalent to ma’amar with one wife, and full marriage with another wife.  Either our mishnah disagrees with the opinion held in 3:9, or it makes a distinction between the two situations, holding that in one case the woman may have yibbum and in the other she may not.Rabbi Shimon holds that an act of intercourse performed by a minor doubtfully acquires the yevamah as a wife.  If it does acquire her as a wife, then she is fully his wife and she may have yibbum.  If it does not acquire her as a wife, and he has not had relations with her since, then she was never the minor’s wife, and the woman may have yibbum with his brother (in this case she is still tied to the first brother).  In either case, the yavam may have yibbum with either woman.  He must have halitzah with the woman with whom he does not have yibbum or halitzah, lest the intercourse of a minor does not acquire.  If this is so, then the second wife is not the rival wife of the first wife.  If he had yibbum with the first wife, the second wife still needs to be released.   If he had yibbum with the second wife, the first wife still needs halitzah on account of her previous marriage to the first brother. Whichever wife did not already have yibbum lest the intercourse of the minor does acquire, and then the surviving brother would have had yibbum with two yevamoth, which is forbidden.Section two:  The final section of the mishnah relates to the entire second half of the chapter (mishnayoth 6-9).  A boy who reaches nine years of age is considered a minor until he reaches puberty, or until he reaches twenty years of age.  According to the talmud, this is actually true until he reaches the age of 35.  If at 35 he still has not shown signs of puberty, he is classified as a natural-born eunuch.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  A man may not marry the relatives of his wife (her mother, her daughter, her sister and some others) and he may not marry his father’s wife or his brother’s wife.  Our mishnah discusses whether a man may marry the relatives of a woman with whom he, his father or his son has had intercourse but not married.  It also deals with the question of whether or not it is prohibited to have intercourse (but not marriage) with the relatives of one’s wife.
  We should note that the mishnah refers to two categories of women: one who has been raped and one who has been seduced.  This is the common rabbinic way of referring to sex out of the bonds of marriage.  The rabbis of the mishnah did not have a single word for extra-marital sex, and therefore referred to it using these terms which were used in other contexts.
  A man is permitted to marry [the relative] of a woman [whom he has] raped or seduced.  Although it is forbidden (according to halakhah it is impossible) to marry the relatives of one’s wife, a man may marry the relatives of a woman with whom he has had intercourse.  The Torah forbids the marriage of a woman’s relatives only if he has had betrothal with that woman.
  He who rapes or seduces [a relative] of his married wife, is guilty.  In contrast, it is forbidden to have any type of sex, even extra-marital with the relatives of one’s wife.  Since the relationship was sanctified by marriage, her relatives are prohibited.
  A man may marry a woman whom his father has raped or seduced or a woman whom his son has raped or seduced. Rabbi Yehudah forbids [marriage] with a woman whom one’s father has raped or seduced.  Although it is forbidden (and impossible) to marry one’s father’s wife or one’s son’s wife, the prohibition does not include a woman who had sex out of the bonds of marriage with the father or son.  R. Yehudah prohibits sex with a woman who had sex with one’s father.  In the talmud this is learned midrashically from Deuteronomy 23:1.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah refers to a convert’s participation in halitzah and yibbum.
  The sons of a female convert who converted with her do not perform halitzah or yibbum, even if the one was not conceived in holiness but was born in holiness, and the other was both conceived and born in holiness.  When a person crosses the boundary and converts into Judaism, he legally loses his genealogical ties to his former family.  Therefore, when a woman converts with her sons, her sons lose their ties to their father and are no longer legally considered to be paternal brothers.  Since only paternal brothers perform yibbum or halitzah, these brothers do not.  Should the wife of one of them die, the other brothers do not perform halitzah and yibbum for her.  The widow is exempt as if her husband did not have any paternal brothers. This law is true even if one of the brothers was conceived before the mother converted (not in holiness, see Deuteronomy 23:1) and born after she converted (in holiness) and the other brother conceived and born after she converted.  Since at the time of the conception of the first brother the mother was not Jewish, the ties to his father do not carry over.  Only if both brothers were both conceived and born after the mother had converted are they considered paternal brothers (assuming they have the same father).
  So also [is the law] where the sons of a female slave were freed together with her.  The same exact rules apply with regard to the freeing of a female slave.  When a female slave is freed she becomes “fully Jewish”, and therefore the emancipation of slaves is somewhat like conversion.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the following two mishnayoth deal with a favorite rabbinic topic, especially in seder Nashim:  people getting mixed up and not knowing who they are.  We will see similar discussions in tractates Gittin and Kiddushin.
  In the case in our mishnah, five boys from five women got mixed up, and nobody knows for sure who belongs to which mother.  The problem is that should they die without children and they have brothers (or at least each woman has one other son who she knows is her son), they don’t know who is whose brother.  This mishnah teaches an elegant, yet intricate way of solving the problem of who gets halitzah and yibbum from whom.
  In my opinion these are rabbinic “mindbenders” that some times teach principles but do not reflect reality.
  If the children of five women were mixed up and, when these mixed up children grew up, they took wives and then died, four perform halitzah for one [of the widows] and one contracts with her yibbum. [Then] he and three [brothers] perform halitzah to [another one of the widows] and one has with her yibbum. Thus every one [of the widows] has halitzah four times and yibbum once. After the five children were mixed up, they no longer know who their mother is, nor which of the women’s other sons are their brothers.  When they grow up and take wives and then all die without children, it is unclear which brother of the dead, mixed up brothers should perform halitzah or yibbum for which widow.  The mishnah states that first four brothers should perform halitzah for one widow, and then the fifth brother may have yibbum with her.  If he was really her husband’s brother then the yibbum is done by the person who should do it.  If one of the other brothers was really her husband’s brother, then she has already had halitzah and is free to marry someone else. Then the brother who has had yibbum with one widow, joins three other brothers and repeats the process with the second wife.  She too has yibbum with the fifth brother.  So on and so on they all repeat this process until each woman has halitzah four times and yibbum once. Note that there are other potential solutions to this problem.  Four brothers could give halitzah to each woman and the fifth brother could have yibbum with each wife.  Alternatively, all five brothers could have halitzah with all five wives.  The mishnah probably chose this means of solving the problem so that all five wives would have one husband and no husband would perform yibbum more than once.  Although bigamy was permitted in the time of the mishnah, it seems that monogamy was much more common and probably preferred.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with the complex situation where a mother’s son gets mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s son.  Afterwards each woman has another son, such that it is unclear who is whose brother and who is whose father’s brother.  I will try to use names to make the situation clearer.  Sarah is the mother and Rebekah is the daughter-in-law.  They give birth each to one son, Joe and Stanley, but they don’t know whose child is whose.  They each also give birth to another son, Sarah to Moshe and Rebekah to Eli.  Joe and Stanley might be Eli’s brother or his uncle.  Joe and Stanley might be Moshe’s brother or his nephew.  Our mishnah deals with cases of potential yibbum involving these four men.
  If the child of a woman was mixed up with the child of her daughter-in-law and the mixed-up children grew up and married women and then died, the [other] sons of the daughter-in-law perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum, for it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother. The [other] sons of the older woman either perform halitzah or yibbum, since the only doubt is whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his brother’s son.  If Joe and Stanley each married a woman and then died without children, their wives become liable for yibbum or halitzah with either Moshe or Eli.  Eli, Rebekah’s son, must perform halitzah for each woman for each might be the widow of his brother.  He cannot have yibbum with either for either might be his father’s brother’s wife and it is forbidden to have relations with one’s father’s brother’s wife. After Eli has performed halitzah with both women, Moshe, Sarah’s son, may either have halitzah or yibbum with either.  He may have yibbum with either for if she is his brother’s wife, then the yibbum is valid.  If she is his wife of his brother’s son, he is still permitted to marry her for it is permitted to marry the wife of one’s brother’s son.  This mishnah is based on the fact that it is permitted to marry one’s nephew’s wife but not one’s uncle’s wife.
  If the not-mixed-up sons died then [with respect to the widows of the sons of the older woman] the mixed-up sons perform halitzah and may not have yibbum, since it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother; [With respect to the widows] of the sons of the daughter-in-law one performs halitzah and the other [may] have yibbum.  In this case, Moshe and Eli die and each woman becomes liable for halitzah to Joe and Stanley.   Both Joe and Stanley must perform halitzah for Moshe’s wife, lest she be their dead brother’s wife.  They may not have yibbum with her lest she be the wife of their father’s brother.  With Eli’s wife one must have halitzah, lest she be his brother’s widow but then the other may have yibbum.  Yibbum in this case is permitted because even if she is not his dead brother’s wife she is his brother’s son’s wife and it is permitted, as we learned above, to have relations with one’s brother’s son’s wife. In summary, if there is the possibility that the woman is his father’s brother’s wife, he may not have yibbum with her.  If there is a possibility that she is his brother’s son’s wife he may have yibbum since this is permitted.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a case where a priest’s wife’s child is mixed up with her slave’s child [this would have made a good TV movie].  Each kid doesn’t know whether he is the son of a priest or the son of a slave.
  If the child of a priest’s wife was mixed-up with the child of her female slave, behold both may eat terumah and [together] they receive one share at the threshing-floor. They may not defile themselves for the dead nor may they marry any women whether these are eligible [for marriage with a priest] or ineligible.  Since a slave owned by a priest or a priest’s wife can eat terumah, the mixed-up children can eat terumah, for both may eat terumah.  When they go to the threshing-floor, the community is responsible to give them only one portion, for only one is a priest.  Neither may defile themselves, because each one might be a priest who is prohibited from defiling himself by coming into contact with a dead body.  Neither of them can marry any woman because if he is a priest he cannot marry a slave-woman and if he is a slave he can’t marry any woman eligible to marry a priest.  Since there is no woman who can marry either a priest or a slave, these two men are stuck.
  If when they grew up, the mixed-up children freed one another they may marry women who are eligible for marriage with a priest and they may not defile themselves for the dead.  If they defiled themselves, they do not receive the penalty of forty lashes.  When they grow up, each may free the other, since one is the owner of the other.  At this point, one is a priest and one is a freed slave, but it is unclear who is who.  They may now marry any woman they want, as long as she is eligible to marry a priest, since both categories of men may marry any woman eligible to marry a priest.  Neither may marry a woman not eligible to marry a priest, for instance a convert, lest he be a priest.  Neither may defile himself for the dead, since one is surely a priest.  However, if one does defile himself, he is not lashed as is the normal punishment, for it is not certain that he was the priest.  A person can only be punished if it was certain that he committed a transgression.
  They may not eat terumah, but if they did eat they need not pay compensation either for the principal or [the additional] fifth.  They are not to receive a share at the threshing-floor, but they may sell [their own] terumah and the proceeds are theirs.  They receive no share in the holy things of the temple, and no holy things are given to them but others do not take their holy things from them.   They are exempt from [giving to any priest] the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw, while the firstling of either of them should remain in the pasture until it contracts a blemish.  They are not allowed to eat terumah, since either one might not be a priest.  However, if they do eat terumah, they do not have to repay what they ate as do regular Israelites, since each can claim that he is the priest.  They do not receive terumah at the threshing-floor, since either one might not be a priest.  However, when they separate terumah from their own produce, they may sell it, since other priests cannot prove that the terumah does not rightfully belong to either one of them.  In other words, they cannot eat terumah but they need not give it to a priest.  They do not receive parts of sacrifices, and they are not given offerings to sacrifice for each is uncertain of his priestly status.  However, if they come into possession of sacrifices, other priests may not take them away from them, for each can claim that no one can prove that he is not a priest.  When they do bring a sacrifice, other priests may not take the parts of the animal normally given to the priests, for each can claim that he is a priest and no one can prove him wrong.  If they have a first-born animal, they do not have to give it immediately to a priest, as is usual.  Rather it should graze until it becomes blemished and not valid as a sacrifice.  Then they may eat it or make other uses out of it (farming or for wool, etc.).
  The restrictions relating to priests and the restrictions relating to Israelites are both imposed upon them.  This section summarizes the entire mishnah.  Basically, the law treats each mixed-up child as stringently as it would a priest (he can’t defile himself for the dead) and as stringently as it would an Israelite (he can’t eat terumah).  However, as with regard to economic issues, other priests cannot make claims from him, since each son can always say to the other priests, “prove that I am not a priest.”  Since there is a general rule that the burden of proof is upon the claimant, he is always exempt.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  As we learned in chapter four, mishnah ten, a woman must wait three months between marriages in order to determine whether a subsequently born child is from the first or second husband.  Our mishnah deals with a case where the woman did not wait and then bore a child seven months after being married to her second husband.  In such a case it is unknown whether the child was a full-term child from the first husband or a prematurely born child from the second husband.
  If a woman did not wait three months after [separation from] her husband, and married again and gave birth [to a son], and it is unknown whether it is a nine-months child by the first husband or a seven-months child by the second, if she had other sons by the first husband and other sons by the second, these must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. So too he, with their widows performs halitzah but may not contract yibbum.  In this scenario, it is unclear whether this boy is a paternal brother of the children of the first father or of the second father.  He is a maternal brother to all of them, but only paternal brothers are obligated by the laws of yibbum.  Therefore, should he die without children, his widow must receive halitzah from one brother from the first father and from one brother from the second husband.  They may not perform yibbum lest he was not their paternal brother.  In this case since he is there maternal brother, marrying the widow would be forbidden. Similarly, if one of these brothers dies without children, the doubtful-son performs halitzah but not yibbum, lest he was not his brother.
  If he had brothers by the first and also brothers by the second,  but not by the same mother, he may either perform halitzah or contract yibbum, But as for them, one performs halitzah and the other may [then] contract yibbum.  If he had brothers from the first husband and the second husband but these brothers were not from his mother, he may have halitzah or yibbum with any of their widows.  With regard to the first husband’s son’s widow, if the first husband was his father, then he is performing yibbum correctly.  If the second husband was his father, then the widows of the children of the first husband are like strangers (non-relatives) to him, and he may marry them.  Note that this is only so if there was only one other son to the first husband.  If he had other sons, his widow must receive halitzah from one of them first, lest the doubtful son was really the son of the second husband.  With regard to the second husband’s son’s widow the same is also true.  Either she is his brother’s widow or a stranger.  In either case he may marry her.  The difference between this case and that in section one is that these brothers do not share the same mother. If he (the doubtful-son) dies, then one brother from one father must perform halitzah and then the other can have yibbum.  The second one may have yibbum because if he was his brother, then she is his brother’s widow, and yibbum is allowed.  If he was not his brother, then she was not his brother’s widow, but she is permitted since she has already received yibbum from her brother-in-law (the son of the other husband).
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, which dealt with a situation in which it was unclear whether a woman’s former husband or current husband is the father of her child.
  If one of [the two husbands] was an Israelite and the other a priest: He may only marry a woman who is eligible to marry a priest. He may not defile himself for the dead,  but if he did defile himself he does not suffer the penalty of forty stripes. He may not eat terumah, but if he did eat he need not pay compensation either for the principal or [for the additional] fifth. He does not receive a share at the threshing-floor, but he may sell [his own] terumah   and the profits are his. He receives no share in the holy things of the temple, no holy things are given to him, but he is not deprived of his own. He is exempt from [giving to any priest] the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw, while his firstling must remain in the pasture until it contracts a blemish. The restrictions relating to priests and the restrictions relating to Israelites are imposed upon him.  In this case the child is not sure if he is a priest or an Israelite.  Most of the laws here are the same as those we saw in mishnah five above, so I will not explain them again.  In essence all of the strictures that apply to a priest apply to him, but he does not receive all of the benefits of being a priest, for he might be an Israelite.
  If the two [husbands] were priests: He must be an onen mourner for them and they must be onenim mourners for him, but he may not defile himself for them, nor may they defile themselves for him. He may not inherit from them, but they may inherit from him. He is exempt if he strikes or curses the one or the other. He goes up [to serve] in the Temple watch of the one as well as of the other, but he does not receive a share [in the offerings]. If both served in the same watch, he receives a single portion.  If both the first and second husband were priests, then this child is certainly a priest and may act as a priest and receive most priestly benefits.  However there are certain complications that arise since he does not know who his father is. An “onen” is a mourner on the day that the person for whom he is mourning dies.  An onen who is a priest may not serve in the Temple service.  On the day that either of the husbands dies the son must act as an onen and cannot serve in the Temple.  Similarly, if he dies before they do, they must act as an onen for them.  Since this is a stringency it does apply. However, he may not defile himself in burying them and they may not defile themselves in burying him.  This is because it is not certain which one is his father and a priest cannot defile himself for someone who is not his relative. He may not inherit from them, for each husband’s other inheritors can say that he needs to bring proof (which he cannot) that he is this husband’s son.  The husbands split his inheritance, if he dies without sons. He is not liable for striking or cursing either one of them, since it is not certain which is his father.  Note that were it certain which is his father, this is a capital offense. The priests were divided into 24 Temple watches, called mishmarim.  Each week a different mishmar would serve.  This son is responsible for serving with both father’s mishmar since this is considered a stringency.  However, he does not receive the gifts that were divided amongst the priests of the mishmar, for each mishmar can say to him that he belongs to the other.  However, if both fathers belonged to the same mishmar he may share in their gifts.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The twelfth chapter of Yevamoth discusses how halitzah is performed.  The first mishnah discusses the necessity of the presence of judges and what type of footwear she must remove from the yavam in order for the halitzah to be valid.
  The commandment of halitzah must be performed in the presence of three judges, even though all the three are laymen.  In describing halitzah, Deuteronomy 25:7 states, “And if the man does not wish to take his brother's wife, then his brother's wife shall go up to the gate to the elders, and say: 'My husband's brother refuses to raise up for his brother a name in Israel; he will not perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me.’”  From here it is clear that halitzah must be performed in front of “elders”, interpreted by our mishnah to refer to a court.  However, there is no need for expert judges, and mere “laymen” will do.  This is probably because this is a ceremony and not a true court case.
  If the woman performed the halitzah with a shoe, her halitzah is valid, [but if] with a felt sock it is invalid. If with a sandal to which a heel is attached it is valid, but [if with one] that has no heel it is invalid. [If the sandal was tied] below the knee the halitzah is valid, but if above the knee it is invalid.  The Torah states that halitzah must be done with a shoe, which in the Torah refers to a leather shoe.  Hence any kind of shoe made of leather is fit for halitzah, but not a shoe made of felt.  In rabbinic Hebrew, a “shoe” is made of soft leather.  A “sandal” which is made of hard leather is also acceptable for halitzah, provided that it have a heel. Deuteronomy 25:9 states that she “shall pull the sandal off his foot”.  According to our mishnah, if the sandal’s straps were tied below the knee, she can fulfill the requirement to “pull the sandal off his foot”.  If the straps are above the knee, then this requirement is not fulfilled. Others explain this last clause to refer to an amputee, that if his leg was cut off above the knee, halitzah cannot be performed, but if his leg was cut off below the knee halitzah may be performed.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah relates laws concerning the shoe with which halitzah must be performed.
  If the woman performed the halitzah with a sandal that did not belong to him, or with a wooden sandal, or with the one of the left foot [which he was wearing] on his right foot, the halitzah is valid.  Deut. 25:9 says “she shall pull off his sandal”.  From here we might have concluded that if the yavam did not own the sandal, the halitzah was invalid.  Our mishnah teaches us that if the halitzah was performed with someone else’s shoe that the yavam was wearing it is still valid. Wooden sandals, although not the normal style of sandal, are nevertheless valid for halitzah, although not preferable. As long as the yavam wears the shoe on his right foot the halitzah is valid, even if it is his left shoe.
  If she performed the halizah with a sandal too large [for him], in which, however, he is able to walk, or with one too small which, however, covers the greater part of his foot, her halizah is valid.  The sandal which is used for halitzah should fit his foot.  However, if it is too large or too small the halitzah is valid, provided he can use it as a sandal.  This means that if it is too big he must be able to walk in it, and if it is too small, it must at least cover most of his foot.
  If she performed the halitzah at night, her halitzah is valid. Rabbi Elazar disqualifies [halitzah at night].  In the previous mishnah we learned that halitzah is considered a “court matter” and therefore requires three judges.  Monetary cases may be completed at night but must be begun during the day.  Halitzah is somewhat of a monetary case, because after halitzah she collects her ketubah.  The first opinion considers halitzah to be like the last stage of a trial and therefore it may take place at night, whereas according to R. Elazar it is like the last stage of a trial and therefore, must take place during the day.
  [If she performed it] with [the yavam’s] left shoe, her halitzah is invalid, Rabbi Elazar validates it.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, halitzah must be performed with the shoe from the right foot, whereas R. Elazar holds that it may be also from the left foot.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  There are three acts in the halitzah ceremony:  1)  the woman’s removal of the yavam’s shoe; 2) her spitting in front of him; 3) her recitation of the verses in Deuteronomy.  Mishnah six below will deal with the recitations stated during the process of halitzah.  Our mishnah deals with which acts are essential to a valid performance of halitzah.
  If she took off his shoe and spat, but did not recite [the formula], her halitzah is valid.  Although the recitation of the formula is required, if she does not do it, her halitzah is still valid.  This is because all tannaim agree that words are not a deed and only deeds are absolutely essential to the performance of halitzah.
  If she recited [the formula] and spat, but did not draw off the shoe, her halitzah is invalid.  Drawing off the shoe is the most essential part of halitzah, without which the halitzah cannot be valid.
  If she drew off the shoe and recited [the formula] but did not spit: R. Eliezer says her halitzah is invalid; and R. Akiva says: her halitzah is valid. R. Eliezer said to him: “‘So shall be done’ (Deut. 25:9), anything which is a deed is essential.” R. Akiva said to him: “From there is your proof!: ‘So shall be done to the man”,  only that which is to be done to the man [is essential].  This section contains a debate over whether or not spitting is essential to the halitzah.  According to R. Eliezer, since spitting is a deed, it is essential.  This is derived from the words, “so shall be done” which are understood to mean that anything that is “done” is essential to the halitzah.  R. Akiva rejects this proof by creatively reading the phrase “so shall be done to the man”.  R. Akiva interprets this to mean anything done literally to the man’s body.  Spitting is done to the man but not to his body, for according to rabbinic interpretation, she spits in front of him and not in his face as the verse implies.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Halitzah requires what is called “da’at” or awareness/intent.  That is both the woman and the man must fully understand that the halitzah permits her to marry others and causes her to become prohibited to the yavam.  According to the rabbis, minors and deaf-mutes do not legally have da’at (now that deaf-mutes can learn to communicate, they are considered as having da’at.  Our mishnah rules that deaf-mutes and minors cannot perform halitzah or have it performed to them.
  If a deaf yavam submitted to halitzah or if a deaf yevamah performed halitzah, or if a halitzah was performed on a minor, the halizah is invalid.  A deaf-mute and a minor can neither perform halitzah nor have halitzah performed upon them.  In all such cases the halitzah is invalid and the woman is not free to marry.  In the case of a deaf-mute yavam, this would mean that if there are other brothers one of them must perform halitzah.  In the case of a deaf-mute yevamah, she could only be released with yibbum (which does not require da’at).  In the case of the minor yavam, she must have halitzah with another of the brothers (if there are brothers) or wait for the minor to reach majority age.
  If a minor yevamah performed halitzah she must again perform halitzah when she becomes of age; if she does not again perform it, the halitzah is invalid.  The minor yevamah who performs halitzah must perform it again when she reaches age (12 ½).  There are other versions of this mishnah which read that in such a case the halitzah is valid.  According to this version, although the yavam cannot be a minor, the yevamah can.  The reasoning behind this is that the Deut. 25:7 says “But if the man does not want”, man implying that a minor cannot make such a choice.  There is no such word used in connection to the woman, therefore she may be a minor.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is concerned with an act of halitzah that was not done in the presence of three judges, as was required in mishnah one.
  Note the structure of this chapter:  the first mishnah dealt with judges and now the mishnah returns to this subject.  As we shall see, the next mishnah stands independent of the rest of the chapter.  That means that the mishnah was deliberately written in a chiastic structure (abba).
  If she performed halitzah in the presence of two men or in the presence of three men and one of them was discovered to be a relative or in any other way unfit [to act as judge], her halitzah is invalid. R. Shimon and R. Yohanan Ha-Sandelar declare it valid. And it once happened that a man submitted to halitzah between himself and herself in a prison, and when the case came before R. Akiva he declared the halitzah valid. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, without three valid judges, halitzah is invalid.  “Unfit” refers to those unfit to testify as listed in Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:3-4.  The list of which relatives are invalid to act as judges or witnesses is also found in the third chapter of Sanhedrin. However, according to R. Shimon, R. Yohanan Ha-Sandelar (the sandal maker ironic that a sandal maker is teaching laws of halitzah which uses a sandal), and their teacher, R. Akiva, the lack of three fit judges does not invalidate the halitzah. According to the Talmud, this case mentioned in the mishnah, was brought before R. Akiva while he was imprisoned for breaking the Roman decree not to teach Torah.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  [This is the procedure in the performance of] the commandment of halitzah:He and his deceased brother’s wife come to the court, and they offer him appropriate advice, for it is said, “Then the elders of his city shall call him and speak to him” (Deut. 25:8).She then says: “My husband’s brother refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; he will not perform the duty of a levir (” (verse 7).Then he says: “I do not wish to marry her” (verse 8).[These sayings] were spoken in the holy tongue (.“Then his brother’s widow shall go up to him in the presence of the elders, pull the sandal off his foot and spit in his face” (verse 9) spit that the judges can see.“And make this declaration: Thus shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother’s house”.Thus far they used to dictate. When Rabbi Hyrkanus was under the terebinth at Kefar Etam he dictated the reading and completed the entire section, the practice was established to complete the entire section.“And he shall go in Israel by the name of ‘the family of the unsandaled one’” (verse 10). [The recitation of this verse] is a commandment [to be performed] by the judges and not by the disciples. Rabbi Judah says: it is a commandment incumbent upon all present to cry “[the man] that had his shoe pulled off, [the man] that had his shoe pulled off, [the man] that had his shoe pulled off.”The final mishnah of our chapter outlines the procedure of halitzah.Most of this mishnah is straightforward so I will only explain the parts that require commentary.Section one:  Verse 8 says that the elders must speak to the yavam.  This is interpreted by our mishnah as giving him advice as to whether he should have yibbum or halitzah.  The advice should be appropriate, meaning that if he is very old and she is young, or they are in some other way apparently not compatible, they court tells him that he should have halitzah and not yibbum.Section four:  Since the Torah says that these verses must be recited by him and by her, they must be recited in Hebrew.  We will learn more about what things must be done in Hebrew and what can be done in other languages when we learn the seventh chapter of Sotah.Section five: Our mishnah interprets the words, “in the presence of the elders” to mean that the elders must be able to see the spit.Section seven:  The judges would dictate to the yevamah what to say up until this verse.  However, at first they would not dictate verse 10.  However, at a later time period, Rabbi Hyrkanus began to dictate the final verse and that became the established practice.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Beth Shammai says:  Only those who are betrothed may exercise the right of refusal; But Beth hillel says:  Both those who are betrothed and those who are married.Beth Shammai says: [A declaration of refusal may be made] against a husband but not against a yavam; But Beth Hillel says: Either against a husband or against a yavam.Beth Shammai says: [The declaration] must be made in his presence, But Beth Hillel says: Either in his presence or not in his presence.Beth Shammai says: [The declaration must be made] before the court, But Beth Hillel says: Either before the court or not before the court.Beth Hillel said to Beth Shammai: [A girl] may exercise the right of refusal while she is a minor even four or five times. Beth Shammai said to them: “The daughters of Israel are not ownerless property!  Rather, either she makes a declaration of refusal and then waits until she is of age, or she makes a declaration of refusal and marries again [immediately]. Section one:  According to Beth Shammai only those who are betrothed are allowed to make a declaration of refusal and thereby leave their husbands without a get.  Beth Hillel says even if she was married she may do so.  According to the Talmud, Beth Shammai allows only the betrothed woman to refuse because if the married woman also was able to refuse, men would not want to spend the money involved in marrying a minor, lest she later refuse the marriage. Section two:  If the minor girl was married off by her mother or brother and then her husband died, according to Beth Shammai she cannot make a declaration against her yavam.  Rather she must wait until she reaches majority age and then request halitzah.  However, according to Beth Hillel she may make such a declaration against the yavam as well.  However, even though she has annulled her marriage to the yavam’s brother, she cannot at a later point marry the yavam, since she was at one point his brother’s wife. Section three:  According to Beth Shammai, she must make the declaration of refusal in front of him.  According to Beth Hillel, this is not necessary. Section four: According to Beth Shammai, she must make the declaration of refusal in front of a court.  According to Beth Hillel, this is not necessary. Section five:  According to Beth Hillel, as long as she is still a minor, she may be married off as many times as her brothers and mother wish and she may later refuse as many marriages as they offer.  Beth Shammai offers a moral objection to this possibility, for through it a girl could be betrothed (but according to Beth Shammai not to several men without ever having received a get.  Rather she either waits until she is an adult or makes a declaration of refusal and then marries immediately, at which point she could no longer refuse, according to Beth Shammai.  Note that this last section is phrased differently than the previous sections.  According to some mishnaic commentators, since Beth Shammai explains their position the halakhah is according to them in this section.  In all of the other sections, the halakhah follows Beth Hillel, as it usually does.Chapter thirteen discusses the marriage of a minor, her right to refuse and thereby annul the marriage when she reaches majority age and the implications that this has on the laws of yibbum.According to the rabbinic understanding of the Torah, a father can marry off his daughter when she is a minor and cause her to be fully married (deoraita).  This marriage can only be severed by death or divorce.  If the father dies, the daughter cannot be fully married until she reaches majority age.  The rabbis, however, gave the girl’s mother and brother the ability to marry her off while still a minor.  The status of such a marriage is rabbinic (derabanan).  Since this is a lesser form of marriage, she may “refuse” the marriage and any point until she is no longer a minor.  Such a refusal is called “meun”.  If she does the marriage is annulled and she does not even require a get.Our mishnah contains five debates between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel concerning this right of refusal.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah provides three statements as to which type of minor girl can be married off by her brother or mother and before reaching majority age make a declaration of refusal.
  Which minor must make the declaration of refusal?Any whose mother or brothers have given her in marriage with her consent. If they gave her in marriage without her consent she need not make any declaration of refusal.  When the mother or brothers marry off the girl she must consent to the marriage.  If she does, she may later on make a declaration of refusal and thereby annul the marriage.  However, if she does not consent, she need not even make a declaration of refusal.
  Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says:  Any child who is unable to take care of her token of betrothal need not make any declaration of refusal.  R. Hanina adds in another criterion for which type of girl must make a declaration of refusal in order to leave her marriage.  If she was married off by her mother or brother at an age when she couldn’t even take care of her token of betrothal (either money or a document), then the marriage is totally invalid.  According to the Rambam, a girl under six by definition cannot take care of her token of betrothal and a girl over ten can.  Girls between six and ten are checked to see if they have this capability.  If they do not, then they do not need to perform meun.
  Rabbi Eliezer says:  The act of a minor has no validity at all, rather [she is to be regarded] as one seduced. The daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest may not eat terumah, and the daughter of a priest [who was married] to an Israelite may eat terumah.  According to R. Eliezer, even if her brother or mother married her off, she is not considered fully married, rather she has the status of one who has been seduced.  This is a way of stating that there is no validity to the marriage and therefore if she is the daughter of an Israelite “married” to a priest, she does not gain the right to eat terumah and if she is the daughter of a priest “married” to an Israelite she does not lose the right to eat terumah.  According to the Talmud, although she is not at all married to him, R. Eliezer still requires her to make a declaration of meun to leave the marriage.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of the previous mishnah.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says:  In the case of any hindrance that was due to the husband, she is considered to be his wife; But in the case of any hindrance that was not due to the husband she is not considered to be his wife. There are two explanations of this mishnah in the Babylonian Talmud and of what “a hindrance” is.  According to one explanation, if while married to this man another man offers to marry her and she refuses that marriage because she prefers her current husband, then she is considered to be his wife.  This is because she has expressed her opinion that she wishes to stay in the marriage, and it is unlikely that she will later make a declaration of refusal.  In such a case if she was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may eat terumah, and if she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she loses her right to eat terumah.  However, if the hindrance was caused by another factor, for instance the new man was not right for her, then she has not expressed a definite desire to stay with her husband and therefore she is not considered his wife. According to the second explanation, if her husband gave her a get before she made a declaration of refusal, she is considered to have been his wife.  The “hindrance” is the get.  The consequences is that he is subsequently forbidden to marry her relatives and she his.  However, if she makes a declaration of refusal, this is considered a hindrance from her.  She is not considered his wife and therefore may marry his relatives, as we will learn in the upcoming mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with various consequences of her refusing the marriage, especially on her subsequent marriages.  Note that the mishnah does not talk about situations that are likely to arise.  Rather by suggesting concrete cases, the mishnah teaches more abstract legal principles.
  If a minor made a declaration of refusal against a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted to [marry] his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from[marrying] a priest.  The declaration of refusal annuls the marriage, making it as if it never happened.  Therefore, neither he nor she is subsequently forbidden to marry each other’s relatives, as would be the case with divorce.  Since she is not a divorcee, she may later marry a priest.
  If he gave her a get, he is forbidden to [marry] her relatives and she is forbidden to [marry] his relatives, and he also disqualifies her from [marrying] a priest.  However, if he gave her a get, her status is that of a divorcee and the marriage was not annulled.  Neither can marry each other’s relatives and she may not marry a priest. Although the marriage was only of rabbinic status, it is strong enough to create these prohibitions.
  If he gave her a get and remarried her and then she a made a declaration of refusal against him, and then she was married to another man and became a widow or was divorced, she is permitted to return to him.  If he gives her a get, and then remarries her (this is permitted if she has not yet married someone else) and then she makes a declaration of refusal and then marries someone else, if this last person divorces her or dies, she may still return to her first husband.  Although generally a man may not remarry his divorcee if she has been married in the interim (see Deuteronomy 24:1-4), in this case the declaration of refusal, which came after the divorce, cancels the get and places her in the category of one who has refused her husband and takes her out of the category of a divorcee.
  If she made a declaration of refusal against him and then he remarried her, and then he gave her a get and then she was married to another man and became a widow or was divorced, she is forbidden to return to him.  However, in the opposite case, where she first makes a declaration of refusal, then returns to her husband and then is divorced, remarries, and is then divorced or widowed, she may not return to her first husband.  Since the divorce was after the refusal, she is in the category of a divorcee.
  This is the general rule: if divorce followed meun she is forbidden to return to him,  and if meun followed divorce she is permitted to return to him.  This general sums up what was learned in the previous two sections.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with the remarriage of a girl who has made a declaration of refusal.
  If a minor made a declaration of refusal against a man, and then she was married to another man who divorced her, and afterwards to another man against whom she made a declaration of refusal, and then to another man who divorced her: she is forbidden to return to any man from whom she was separated by a get, but is permitted to return to any man from whom she was separated by her declaration of refusal. In the scenario in this mishnah, a minor is married to a series of men, while she is still a minor.  Against the first she makes a declaration of refusal, by the second she is divorced, against the third she makes another declaration of refusal and by the fourth she is divorced.  She may now remarry the first or third since their marriage ended by declaration of refusal, and although she was remarried in the interim, since the original marriage ended with refusal it is as if it never existed.  She cannot remarry the second and fourth husbands, by whom she was divorced, because she was married in the interim.  Although the subsequent marriage was annulled and therefore should be treated as if it never happened, our mishnah teaches that it is still sufficient to prevent her from remarrying.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses whether or not a woman who has been divorced and remarried by the same man can have yibbum, should her husband die without children.
  If a man divorced his wife and remarried her, she is permitted to marry the yavam; Rabbi Elazar forbids.  When a man divorces his wife, she becomes forbidden to his brother under the category of “his brother’s divorcee”.  In the case in our mishnah, a man divorces his wife, then remarries her and then dies without children, making her liable for yibbum.  Although when she was divorced she was forbidden to her husband’s brother, since when her husband died she was married to him, she is in the category of “his dead brother’s wife” and if he had no children, she is liable for yibbum. Rabbi Elazar forbids this woman from having yibbum.
  Similarly, if a man divorced an orphan and remarried her, she is permitted to marry the yavam; Rabbi Elazar forbids.  The same rules apply with regard to a girl whose father had died (she is called an orphan even though her mother is alive) and was married off by her mother or brother, and then was divorced and remarried.  Since at the time of death she was married to the yavam’s brother, she is permitted to have yibbum with him. Again Rabbi Elazar forbids this.
  If a minor was given in marriage by her father and was divorced she is like an orphan in her father’s lifetime and then her husband remarried her, all agree that she is forbidden to marry the yavam.  This section deals with a minor married off by her father.  When she is divorced she is legally considered to be an “orphan in her father’s life”.  This is because her father no longer has the ability to marry her off.  Once she is married she never returns to her father’s domain.  When her original husband remarries her while she is a minor, this marriage is only of “rabbinic” status because a minor cannot fully contract marriage without her father.  In contrast her divorce was a regular “Toraitic” divorce because a minor can be fully divorced.  Since the divorce was biblically valid and the remarriage only rabbinically valid, she is still “biblically” considered the yavam’s brother’s divorcee and all of the sages agree that she is forbidden to the yavam.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses situations where a woman becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah to her sister’s husband.  Generally in such a case the woman is completely exempt.  However, these cases are slightly different because at least on of the marriages is only of rabbinic status.
  If two brothers were married to two sisters who were minors and orphans, and the husband of one of them died, [the widow] is free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife’s sister.  The marriage of these two brothers to these two sisters is of rabbinic status, since they were married off by their brothers or mother.  We might have thought that since this was so, the sister whose husband died needs halitzah from the yavam, even though the yavam is married to her sister (and hence yibbum is forbidden).  This is because the ties created by the necessity of halitzah are biblical whereas the marriage is only rabbinic.  The mishnah teaches that just as in a case of regular marriage where the widow is exempt from yibbum and halitzah, so too here she is exempt.
  Similarly in the case of two deaf-mute [sisters].  The marriage of a girl deaf-mute is also only of rabbinic status, since she was legally considered by the rabbis to be lacking the required intelligence to contract marriage.  This case is similar to the previous case because the marriage of both women is only of rabbinic status.
  [If the two brothers were married to two sisters one of whom was] of age and [the other] a minor, if the husband of the minor died, the minor is free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife’s sister.  In this case two brothers were married to two sisters, one of whom was of majority age and hence her marriage was of biblical status (deoraita) and one of whom was a minor, whose marriage was only of rabbinic status (derabbanan).  If the husband of the minor died, she certainly does not need yibbum or halitzah from the other husband, because he is married to her sister.  Since the marriage to the older sister is deoraita, there is no question about this case.
  If the husband of the elder sister died: Rabbi Eliezer says the minor is to be instructed to make a declaration of refusal against him. Rabban Gamaliel says:  If she made a declaration of refusal, then she did so; but if [she did] not, let her wait until she is of age and then she will be free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife's sister. Rabbi Joshua says:  Woe to him because of his wife and woe to him because of his brother’s wife! He must allow his wife to go by [giving her] a get, and [he must let go] his brother’s wife through halitzah.  The more difficult and controversial case is if the elder sister’s husband dies.  She now needs yibbum or halitzah from a deoraita marriage, but her sister is already married, at least rabbinically to the yavam.  If the yavam were to have halitzah with the older sister, the younger sister to whom he is married would become forbidden to him as his halutzah’s sister. Rabbi Eliezer says that in order to get out of this problematic situation, the court instructs the younger sister to make a declaration of refusal, thereby annulling the marriage and making it possible for the elder sister to have yibbum.  According to Rabbi Eliezer, the ties that the older sister has to the yavam (the younger sister’s husband) makes the younger sister forbidden to her husband. Therefore the only solution is for the younger sister to make a declaration of refusal. Rabban Gamaliel disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer and does not hold that the ties to the older sister make the younger sister forbidden. Therefore, the younger sister can either make a declaration of refusal immediately, or she may remain with her husband and the older sister can wait until the younger sister reaches majority age at which time she, the older sister, becomes exempt from yibbum and halitzah because her yavam is biblically married to her sister. Rabbi Joshua says that in this case the husband/yavam will lose both his wife and his yevamah.  Rabbi Joshua agrees with Rabbi Eliezer that his minor wife is now forbidden to him due to the biblical ties that he has with her sister.  However, Rabbi Joshua disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer’s strategy of teaching her to make a declaration of refusal.  This is because Rabbi Joshua holds that declarations of refusal are not desirable and that one should distance himself from them as much as possible.  The yavam cannot have yibbum with the yevamah since she is now the sister of his divorcee.  Therefore he must have halitzah with her.  In this way, he loses both women. Question for Further Thought:  What is the difference between the first case and the last case?  Why in one does she not require halitzah but in the other she might?
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Usually when two women are married to a man and he dies without children, when one of the brothers performs yibbum or halitzah with one of the widows, the other is automatically exempt.  Yibbum or halitzah are not performed for each wife.  Our mishnah discusses situations in which at least one of the marriage was only “derabbanan” either because she was a minor or a deaf-mute.  The general rule in such cases is that yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage was only derabbanan does not exempt a wife whose marriage was deoraita.  However, yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage is deoraita does exempt a wife whose marriage was derabbanan.  Furthermore, yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage was derabbanan exempts another wife whose marriage was derabbanan, as long as both marriages were of the exact same status.
  If a man who was married to two minors orphans died, intercourse or halitzah with one of them exempts her rival.  In this section both marriages were “derabbanan”; therefore intercourse (yibbum) or halitzah by the yavam with one of the widows exempts the other one.  Note that some commentators hold that the minor can perform halitzah only when she reaches majority age.  Others hold that she may even do so as a minor (see above 12:4).
  And the same is true with regard to two deaf women.  Again both marriages are derabbanan therefore yibbum with one wife exempts the other.  Note that in this case yibbum is the only option because as we learned in 12:4, a deaf-mute woman cannot perform halitzah.
  [If a man was married to] a minor and to a deaf woman [and then died], intercourse  with one of them does not exempt her rival.  In this case, both marriages were derabbanan, but one was with a deaf-mute and one was with a minor.  Since we don’t know who is “more” married, both require halitzah or yibbum.  The minor may be “more” married because her marriage will be completed upon reaching majority age. On the other hand the deaf-mute may be more married because she is more capable of having intercourse.
  If one was of sound senses and one was deaf, intercourse with the woman of sound senses exempts the deaf woman, but intercourse with the deaf woman does not exempt the woman of sound senses.  In this case, one wife was of sound senses she was not a deaf-mute or insane and the other wife was a deaf-mute.  Since the marriage with the former was of deoraita status, yibbum or halitzah with her exempts the latter.  However, since the latter’s marriage was of derabbanan status, yibbum with her does not exempt the former.
  If one was of age and the other a minor, intercourse with the one of age exempts the minor, but intercourse with the minor does not exempt the one of age.  This section teaches the same rule as in the previous section; it just uses the example of a minor and a girl of majority age.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a case where a man has intercourse with both of his brother’s widows, or he has intercourse with one and his brother has intercourse with the other.
  If a man who was married to two orphans who were minors died, and the yavam had intercourse with one, and then he also had intercourse with the other, or his [the yavam’s] brother had intercourse with the other, he has not thereby disqualified the first [for him];  In this case the man had intercourse with both minor wives, or he had intercourse with one and his brother had intercourse with the other.  In any case, the first minor widow is still permitted to the first yavam.  This is because there is a doubt whether or not yibbum is truly effective in “acquiring” a minor as a wife.  If it is effective, than the first act of yibbum makes her fully his wife, and the second act of intercourse is illicit but does not effect the first wife’s status.  If it is ineffective, then he didn’t need to have yibbum with either minor widow, because they were not biblically married to his brother.  In either case, he may remain married to the first one.  He cannot stay with the second lest intercourse is effective for acquiring a minor and he has already acquired her rival wife.
  And the same is true with regard to two deaf women.  The same rule is true where both wives were deaf-mutes.
  [If one was] a minor and the other deaf, and the yavam had intercourse with the minor and then he had intercourse with the deaf widow, or a brother of his had intercourse with the deaf widow, he has not disqualified the minor [for him].  In this case one widow was a deaf-mute and the other a minor.  If the yavam had relations first with the minor and then with the deaf-mute, or the yavam’s brother had relations with the deaf-mute, the minor may remain married to the first yavam.  This is for the same reasons that we explained above:  if yibbum is effective in acquiring the minor, then she is married to the yavam and the intercourse with the deaf-mute wife is licentious, but does not effect the first wife’s status.  If it is ineffective, then she was never liable for yibbum with him, because she was not married to his brother.
  If the yavam had intercourse with the deaf widow and then he also had intercourse with the minor, or a brother of his had intercourse with the minor, he has disqualified the deaf widow [for him].  In this case, the yavam first has relations with the deaf-mute and then he or his brother has relations with the minor widow.  In this case the deaf-mute wife becomes forbidden to him.  This is because the “acquisition” of the deaf-mute is certainly valid, but is not a complete “acquisition”.  The “acquisition” of the minor is doubtful, as we explained above, but if it does acquire it does so fully.  If the acquisition of the minor was fully valid, then it disqualifies the deaf-mute, whose acquisition was only partially valid.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.
  [If one was] of sound senses and the other deaf, and the yavam had intercourse with the woman of sound senses and then he also had intercourse with the deaf woman, or a brother of his had intercourse with the deaf woman, he does not disqualify the former [for him].  When the yavam has intercourse with the woman of sound senses, he fully acquires her as his wife.  His subsequent act of intercourse, or his brother’s subsequent act of intercourse with her rival wife is licentious but does not effect the status of the first woman.
  If the yavam had intercourse with the deaf woman, and then he also had intercourse with the woman of sound senses, or a brother of his had intercourse with the woman of sound senses, he disqualifies the deaf woman [for him].  As we learned yesterday, sexual intercourse does not effect a full acquisition of a deaf woman, but rather a partial acquisition.  Therefore, there is the possibility of acquiring the second woman, and thereby creating a situation where both rival wives are somewhat “acquired” to him.  Since it is forbidden to be with both, he must separate from both of them.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues the subject discussed in the previous two mishnayoth.
  [If one was] of age and the other a minor, and the yavam had intercourse with the one who was of age, and then he had intercourse with the minor, or a brother of his had intercourse with the minor, he does not disqualify the elder for him.  In this case one of the widows was of majority age and one was a minor.  If the yavam has intercourse (yibbum) with the one who is of age she is fully acquired to him as a wife.  If he or his brother subsequently have intercourse with the other widow the act is forbidden (for she was his brother’s wife) but does not effect the status of the one who already had yibbum.
  If the yavam had intercourse with the minor, and then he also had intercourse with the one who was of age, or a brother of his had intercourse with the one who was of age, he disqualifies the minor [for him].  If the yavam first had intercourse with the minor, there is a doubt whether or not she is acquired to him.  If he then has intercourse with the one who is of majority age, that act would be an act of yibbum if the act of intercourse with the minor did not acquire her.  Since the older widow may be his wife through yibbum (or his brother’s wife) he is forbidden to remain married to the minor widow.  He also cannot be with the older widow, lest the minor was successfully acquired through yibbum.
  Rabbi Elazar says: the minor is to be instructed to make a declaration of refusal.  Rabbi Elazar states that in such a case we should instruct the younger widow to make a declaration of refusal, thereby annulling the marriage. This would allow yibbum with the widow of majority age.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  The first half of this mishnah discusses the case of a minor yavam (up until now the mishnah has concentrated mostly on the minor yevamah).
  The second half of the mishnah discusses the situation of a woman who claims that her yavam has not had yibbum with her and she wants halitzah.
  If a yavam who was a minor had intercourse with a yevamah who was a minor, they should be brought up together.  If a minor yavam who is legally capable of having sexual intercourse (over nine years old) has intercourse with a minor yevamah, he cannot divorce her because he cannot give a get until he reaches majority age.  Therefore, they must remain together until they reach majority age, at which point they can decide whether to remain married or separate through divorce.
  If he had intercourse with a yevamah who was of age, she should bring him up until he is of age.  So too if he has intercourse with a yevamah who is of majority age; she must wait with him until he is of majority age.
  If a yevamah declared within thirty days [after yibbum], “he has not had intercourse with me”, they force him to perform halitzah;  The second part of the mishnah deals with a case where the yevamah claims that the yavam did not have intercourse with her, and she wants to have halitzah.  If she makes this claim within thirty days, she is believed, and the court forces the husband to perform halitzah.  This is because we assume that for thirty days the yavam may actually not have had yibbum with her.
  [If her declaration was made] after thirty days, they request that he perform halitzah.  If she makes this declaration after thirty days, she is no longer automatically believed, for there is an assumption that the yavam would not have waited for more than thirty days to have yibbum.  In this case, all the court can do is request that he perform halitzah for her.
  If he admits [that he did not have intercourse with her], they force him to perform halitzah.  If he admits that he did not have yibbum with her, he is forced to have halitzah, even after twelve months.  He has a responsibility to her and cannot just leave her hanging, legally bound to him and without the possibility of marrying another.
  
  Mishnah 13
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a woman who made a vow not to receive any benefit from her yavam (her brother-in-law).  Since sexual intercourse is a benefit, for it is pleasurable, she cannot have yibbum.  The question is, is the yavam forced by the courtto perform halitzah for her, or is he merely requested to do so.
  If a woman vowed to have no benefit from her yavam:If the vow was made during the husband’s lifetime they force him to perform halitzah,  If the woman made the vow while her husband was still alive, and her brother-in-law was not yet her yavam, and then her husband dies, the court forces the yavam to perform halitzah.  This is because her vow was not made with the intention of subverting yibbum. She may have made her vow just because she really didn’t like her brother-in-law or for any other reason.
  [If her vow was made] after the death of her husband, they request of him to perform halitzah.  If she made the vow after her husband died, it was obviously made in attempt to circumvent yibbum.  While the vow is still valid, and the yavam may not have yibbum with her, she is not automatically granted halitzah.  Rather the court requests of the yavam to perform halitzah, but does not force him to do so.
  If this was her intention, [even if her vow was made] during the lifetime of her husband, they request of him to perform halitzah.  Similarly, if it was clear that she made the vow only to avoid yibbum, even if she made the vow when her husband was alive, the yavam is not forced to perform halitzah.  She cannot use this vow as a means to circumvent yibbum.  Her intention would have been clear if, for instance, she said that she was doing so in order to avoid yibbum.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This chapter is concerned with divorce or yibbum involving a deaf man and/or woman.  As we have mentioned previously, according to the rabbis deaf-mutes lack “da’at”, which I translate as “awareness” and hence they cannot truly contract marriage.  The marriage which they do contract is considered “derabbanan”, that is of rabbinic origin.  I should note that although halakhically speaking deaf-mutes were considered to lack “da’at”, in reality the rabbis often recognize that deaf-mutes do not necessarily lack intelligence.  Furthermore, as I stated in other opportunities, now that complex sign-language has been invented, deaf-mutes can be halakhically regarded as fully intelligent human beings.
  If a deaf man married a woman of sound senses or a man of sound senses married a deaf woman he may, if he wishes, divorce her, and he may, if he wishes retain her; just as he marries by gestures so he divorces her by gestures.  A deaf man can divorce a woman of sound senses by making gestures that make it clear that he wants to divorce her.  Just as he can marry a woman by making gestures which make his intent clear, so too he can divorce her.  A man of sound senses can divorce a deaf woman, even though she may not understand that she is being divorced.  This is because a woman can be divorced against her will, as we shall see in section three below.
  If a man of sound senses married a woman of sound senses and she became deaf, he may, if he wishes, divorce her; and he may, if he wishes, retain her. If she became insane he may not divorce her. If he became deaf or insane, he may never divorce her.  Whereas in section one the marriage was only of rabbinic status (because one party was deaf at the time of marriage), in this section the marriage is of deoraita status because both parties were of sound senses at the time of marriage.  Hence the law is different in this case.  If she becomes deaf he may still divorce her, because she may be divorced against her will.  However, if she becomes insane, he may not divorce her.  This is a special measure of protection offered the wife so that she will still have a husband and be less subject to mistreatment by others.  If the husband becomes deaf or insane he may not divorce her.  Since the original marriage was of a higher status, he can no longer end the marriage when he lacks “da’at”.
  Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: Why may a woman who became deaf be divorced while a man who became deaf may not divorce [his wife]? They answered him: a man who divorces is not like a woman who is divorced, for while a woman may be divorced with her consent and without her consent, a man can divorce only with his consent.  In this section, through Rabbi Yochanan be Nuri’s question and the Sages answer, the discrimination between the divorce of a deaf woman and the divorce of a deaf man is explained.  Since a woman can be divorced without her consent, she can still be divorced when she is legally incapable of consenting (when deaf or insane).  Her consent is irrelevant.  In contrast, a man must express his will to divorce a woman and hence if he is legally incapable of expressing his will, he may not divorce.  I should note that this is one of the greatest examples of discrimination in Jewish law, but it was mostly corrected in the Middle Ages by Rabbenu Gershom who made a decree that a woman cannot be divorced against her will.  Until this day, this is still the law.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah contains a debate about which type of deaf woman may be divorced.
  Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; They said to him: the other also is similar to her. According to Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada a deaf minor who was married off by her father can be divorced against her will. In this case, although the marriage is deoraita (because it was arranged by the father), since a woman can be divorced against her will, she can still be divorced when she cannot express her will. The rabbis take this halakhah one step further, and state that even a woman who married herself off when of sound senses, can still be divorced should she go deaf. Note that we learned this law in the previous mishnah.  The reason that it is restated is that it is a response to Rabbi Nehunian ben Gudgada’s testimony, which was also brought in Eduyoth 7:9.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah, and the rest of the chapter, deals with various combinations of marriages between deaf people and people of sound senses, and the possibility of yibbum, halitzah and divorce.
  If two deaf brothers were married to two deaf sisters, or to two sisters who were of sound senses, or to two sisters one of whom was deaf and the other was of sound senses; And so also if two deaf sisters were married to two brothers who were of sound senses, or to two deaf brothers, or to two brothers one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses: Behold these [women] are exempt from halitzah and from yibbum.  In all of the cases in this section, there are two marriages between two brothers and two sisters, both of which are between a deaf person and another deaf person or a deaf person and a person of sound senses.  In section one both brothers are deaf and in section two both sisters are deaf.  In such a case the status of both marriages is rabbbinic (derabbanan).  When one brother dies, his wife of derabbanan status becomes liable for yibbum with the other brother, who is married to her sister.  Since she cannot marry him because he is married to her sister, she is exempt from both yibbum and halitzah.  The key to understanding this mishnah is that both marriages are of equal status.  The yavam’s obligation to have yibbum with her is only derabbanan as is his own marriage and therefore the woman is exempt.
  If  [the women] were strangers they must marry them, and if they wish to divorce them, they may do so.  If the women were not related to each other, then there is no problem with yibbum.  However, he may not perform halitzah since deaf men and deaf women cannot perform halitzah (see above 12:4).  If he wishes, he may marry her and then divorce her.  This is possible in this case because the original marriage of the yevamah to her husband was also only derabbanan.  Therefore divorce through gestures is possible.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah, the only difference being that in this case, one marriage is of deoraita status, whereas yesterday both were derabbanan.
  If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two sisters who were of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she] is exempt, because she is his wife’s sister.  In this case, when the deaf brother, who was the husband of the sister of sound senses, dies, his wife becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the husband of sound senses, who is married to her sister, who is also of sound senses.  In this case the deaf widow is not obligated for yibbum or halitzah since her sister is married to the yavam, and that marriage is of deoraita status.  As we have learned before, a woman who becomes liable for yibbum with someone prohibited to her is exempt from yibbum.
  If the brother of sound senses, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, do? He must release his wife with a get, while his brother’s wife is forbidden forever [to marry again].  This case is opposite.  Here the husband of sound senses, married to the woman of sound senses dies, thereby making her liable for yibbum or halitzah with the deaf husband, married to her deaf sister.  The deaf husband’s wife is now the sister of a woman with whom he is deoraita liable to have yibbum, but his own marriage is only of derabbanan status.  Since the connection with his yevamah is of deoraita status, it is strong enough to make his own wife forbidden to him (one cannot marry the wife of his shomeret yavam, a woman with whom is liable to have yibbum).  He must therefore divorce his deaf wife.  His yevamah can never remarry because she cannot have yibbum or halitzah.  She cannot have halitzah because he is deaf.  He cannot have yibbum with her because he was derabbanan married to her sister and a man may not marry his wife’s sister, even after divorce.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  If two brothers of sound senses were married to two sisters one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf sister, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she is] exempt because she is his wife’s sister.  In this scenario two brothers of sound senses are married to two sisters, one of whom is deaf.  This means that one of the marriages is deoraita and the other derabbanan.  If the brother married to the deaf sister dies, the deaf sister becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the other brother.  Since this is forbidden because he is deoraita married to her sister, she is totally exempt.
  If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf sister, do? He must release his wife with a get and his brother’s wife by halitzah.  In this case, the brother married to the sister of sound senses dies.  This marriage was deoraita and therefore her ties to the yavam are of a deoraita status.  The yavam is only derabbanan married to her sister, since she is deaf.  Therefore, the yevamah is not exempt from yibbum or halitzah.  Nevertheless the yavam cannot have yibbum with her because he is married to her sister.  The only solution is for him to divorce his wife, who is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman tied to him through yibbum.  Then he must have halitzah with the other sister.  He cannot have yibbum because he was married to her sister, even though the marriage was only derabbanan.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two sisters, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, died, what should the brother who was of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she is] exempt because she is his wife’s sister.  In this case the marriage between the deaf brother and the deaf sister is derabbanan and the marriage between the brother of sound senses and the sister of sound senses is deoraita.  If the deaf brother dies, the deaf sister becomes potentially liable for yibbum with the brother of sound senses.  However, she is exempt because the brother of sound senses is already married to her sister, and their marriage is deoraita.
  If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, do? He must release his wife with a get, while his brother’s wife is forever forbidden [to marry again].  In this case the brother of sound senses dies, and the sister of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum with the deaf brother.  Even though she is his wife’s sister, she is not exempt because their marriage is only derabbanan.  The deaf sister becomes forbidden to her deaf husband because she is the sister of a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum.  Furthermore, he must divorce her.  The deaf brother cannot perform halitzah for the yevamah, because he is deaf.  He cannot have yibbum with her because she is the sister of his former wife. Therefore she cannot remarry ever.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two strangers who were of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, do? He either performs halitzah or yibbum.  In this case the two brothers are married to two women who are not sisters.  Therefore there is no problem of one being married to the sister of the yevamah.  In the first section, the deaf brother dies.  In such a case there is no problem, and the yavam can have halitzah or yibbum with the deaf brother’s widow, as is the case in a normal scenario.
  If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, do? He must marry her and he may never divorce her.  In this case the brother of sound senses dies, leaving his widow liable for yibbum or halitzah with the deaf brother.  The deaf brother cannot have halitzah with her, because deaf people cannot perform halitzah. He may have yibbum with her, but he cannot afterwards ever divorce her.  This is because his ties to her are deoraita due to her having been his yevamah.  His ability to divorce is only derabbanan, and it is not strong enough to sever such a marriage.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  If two brothers of sound senses were married to two strangers, one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, and the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf woman died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, do? He must marries her and if he wishes to divorce her he may do so.  In this scenario, the brother of sound senses is married to a deaf woman and his brother, also of sound senses was married to a woman of sound senses. If the husband of the deaf woman dies, his brother must marry his widow.  He cannot perform halitzah, because she is deaf.  He can later divorce her, because he is of sound senses
  If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf woman, do? He may either perform halitzah or yibbum.  If the brother of sound senses dies, his widow who is of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the yavam.  Since he is also of sound senses he may have yibbum or halitzah with her, as is the case in all normal scenarios.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This is the final mishnah of the chapter and it concludes the rather long series of mishnayot which we have seen throughout the entire chapter.
  If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two strangers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf woman, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses do? He must marry her, but if he wishes to divorce her he may do so.  When the deaf brother, married to the deaf woman dies, she becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the brother of sound senses.  She cannot have halitzah, because she is deaf.  He must, therefore, have yibbum with her, but may afterwards divorce her, because deaf women can be divorced.
  If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf woman, do? He must marry her and he may never divorce her.  If the brother of sound senses dies, his wife of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum with the deaf brother. He cannot have halitzah because he is deaf.  He must therefore marry her.  He cannot subsequently divorce her because his ties to her are deoraita (due to the deoraita nature of her previous marriage), whereas his ability to divorce is only derabbanan.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Chapters fifteen and sixteen deal with the acceptability of testimony concerning a woman’s husband’s death in a case where the death occurred abroad.  The consequence of accepting such testimony is that she is allowed to remarry; in cases where the husband had no children she would be allowed to have yibbum with her husband’s brother.
  The first few mishnayoth of this chapter deal with the wife’s own testimony as to her husband’s death.  Generally speaking a woman’s testimony is unacceptable and a person cannot testify concerning their own matters.  Nevertheless, in this case the wife’s testimony about her own husband’s death is acceptable because the rabbis did not want the woman to be unable to remarry.   We should note that even in our days it is often difficult to ascertain whether someone died.  This was a problem during the Shoah (the Holocaust) when nearly all witnesses to a person’s death were also dead.  Recently, we witnessed this phenomenon in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.  Verifying victim’s deaths took months and to a large degree relied on the testimony of those who saw them in the building or those who knew they should have been there that day.  Imagine how much more difficult this must have been in the ancient world.
  If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea [at a time when there was] peace between him and her and [when there was also] peace in the world, and she came back and said, “My husband is dead”, she may marry again; and if she said, “My husband is dead [and he had no children]” she may contract yibbum.  If at the time the couple traveled abroad there was no discord between the two of them and there were no wars being waged in the area to which they might have traveled, then she is believed to say that he died.  The rabbis are suspicious that she might lie if there was discord, because by receiving permission to remarry when the husband was still alive, she would be causing herself to be prohibited to him when he returns.  In such a way she could force him to divorce her.  In other words, she might have a motive to lie.  The reason that the rabbis are suspicious in a case where there is war, is that he might have been taken captive and she mistakenly assumed that he was dead.  Therefore, if there was either discord between them or war in the world, she is not believed.
  If there was peace between him and her, but war in the world, [or if there was] discord between him and her, but peace in the world, and she came back and said, ‘My husband is dead”, she is not believed. Rabbi Judah says: she is never believed unless she comes weeping and her garments are rent. They said to him: she may marry in either case.  This section contains the opposites of those in section one. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion.  He holds that unless she exhibits physical signs of mourning, she is never believed, even if there was peace between her and her husband and peace in the world.  The sages respond to Rabbi Judah and state that whether or not she is crying and she shows physical signs of mourning she is believed.  Such external signs would be easy to fake in any case and are therefore not material to the verity of her words.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Bet Hillel says: we heard [such a tradition] only in respect of a woman who came from the harvest and [whose husband died] in the same country, and in a case similar to the one that happened.Bet Shammai said to them: [the law is] the same whether the woman came from the harvest or from olive picking, or from grape picking, or from one country to another--the Sages spoke of the harvest only [because the incident to which they referred] occurred then.Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai.This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.  It contains a debate between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai over when a woman is believed to say that her husband died.Section one:  Bet Hillel limits the instances in which a woman is believed to say that her husband died.  The only time she is believed is when she returned from working together with him at harvest time, and they were not returning from abroad but from the same country.  This is similar to “the case that was” mentioned at the end of this section.  The case to which the mishnah refers to is explained in the talmud as being a case where ten men went to work in a field and one was bitten by a snake and died.  When the woman returned and said that her husband was dead, the court believed her and declared that women are believed when they testify that their husband had died.  According to Bet Hillel, they are only believed in such a case because in such a case the husband’s death is so easily verifiable that it can be assumed that the woman would not lie.Section two:  Bet Shammai responds to Bet Hillel that although the law that a woman is believed to say that her husband died was connected to a certain case, it is not limited to that case or those like it.  Rather a woman is believed to say that her husband died no matter where she returns from.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  In the previous mishnah Bet Hillel agreed with Bet Shammai that a woman who states that her husband died is to be believed, at least in most cases.  In our mishnah, Bet Hillel states that her testimony allows her to remarry but not to receive her ketubah payment, the amount that a man owes a woman upon death or divorce.  Bet Shammai holds that she also receives her ketubah payment.  As in the previous mishnah, in the end Bet Hillel changes their opinion and agrees with Bet Hillel.
  Bet Shammai says:  she may marry and she receives her ketubah. Bet Hillel says: she may marry but she does not receive her ketubah.  This section delineates the dispute between the two houses, as explained in the introduction above.
  Bet Shammai said to them: you have permitted [what might be] the serious consequence of illicit intercourse, why should you not permit [the taking of her husband’s] money which is of less consequence! Bet Hillel said to them: we find that based on her testimony, the brothers may not receive their inheritance. Bet Shammai said to them: do we not learn this from her ketubah scroll wherein [her husband] writes to her “if you are married to another man, you will receive what is prescribed for you”!  Bet Shammai reasons that if she was not telling the truth about her husband dying (either by intentionally lying or by having made a mistake) the consequences of her remarrying are graver than the consequences of her illegitimately taking money from her husband.  Remarrying while still married is adultery, and if done with intention can be a capital offense.  The monetary crime of taking her ketubah while her husband is still alive is at worst fraud, and the money can always be rightfully restored.  Since the Sages allow her to remarry, despite the potential severity of the crime, they must allow her to recover her ketubah payment. Bet Hillel responds by citing a precedent.  According to the accepted halakhah, a halakhah to which Bet Shammai agrees, when a woman testifies that her husband has died, his brothers do not inherit his money.  This is because in monetary cases two witnesses are required.  [Note:  a man’s brothers inherit him if he did not have children.]  Therefore, just as the brothers do not collect their inheritance, so too the woman does not collect her ketubah. Bet Shammai responds by citing the actual ketubah wording which states that if she marries another man she may collect the payment.  Therefore, according to Bet Shammai, as soon as she is permitted to marry someone else, she may collect her ketubah.  We should note that this is an interesting source of halakhah: the wording of the ketubah.  Generally we would think that the halakhah would dictate the wording of the ketubah, but here we find the opposite.  The ketubah, a secular document, becomes the source of Jewish law.  This is not a common phenomenon in rabbinic literature but is found in several other places.
  Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai.  Bet Hillel again changed their minds and ruled as did Bet Shammai.  Therefore, even though the brothers do not receive their inheritance, the wife may collect her ketubah.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains two mishnayoth, each dealing with a different topic.  The first mishnah lists a few women who are not believed to testify that a woman’s husband has died.
  The second mishnah discusses cases of contradictory testimony regarding the husband’s death.
  All are believed to testify for her [concerning her husband’s death] except for her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law and her husband’s daughter. Why is [the bringing of] a letter of divorce different [from testifying regarding] death?The written document provides the proof.  Although women are generally not allowed to testify in a court of law, in order to make it easier for women to remarry, women are allowed to testify that men have died.  Even a woman’s own relatives can testify that her husband has died.  The only exceptions are certain relatives who are not allowed to testify for fear that they will lie in order to entrap the woman in an illegal marriage, which will cause her current marriage to be terminated.  These women might hate the wife for various reasons.  The mother-in-law might hate her daughter-in-law because she thinks that she is not good enough for her son.  The daughter of her mother-in-law might hate her because she might eventually take away her inheritance.  The rival wife might hate her because they compete for the husband’s affections.  Her sister-in-law might hate her, because if the husband dies without children, this wife could end up as her rival wife.  The husband’s daughter might hate her because she sees this wife as trying to take her own mother’s place. Although these women are not allowed to testify that a woman has died, they are allowed to bring her get to her (we will learn this halakhah in Gittin 2:7). The mishnah asks, why are they allowed to bring the get but not allowed to testify that the husband has died.  After all, both divorce and death end the marriage.  The answer is that with a get, the document itself is what proves that the marriage is ended.  The one who brings the document is not testifying as to the divorce, but is merely a messenger.  However, testifying as to his death is actually testimony, not verifiable in another way.
  If one witness stated, “he is dead”, and his wife married again, and another came and stated “he is not dead”, she need not leave [her new husband].  If one witness testifies that her husband died, and then she was remarried, and then another witness testifies that he did not die, she need not leave her new husband.  However, if she did not marry before the second witness comes, she cannot remarry because there is now contradictory testimony.
  If one witness said “he is dead” and two witnesses said “he is not dead”, even if she married again, she must leave him.  If one witness testified that her husband died, and then she remarried, and then two testified that he is still alive, she must leave the second marriage.  This is because we now have full testimony that her husband is alive and that the second marriage is illegitimate.  The testimony of the one is nullified by the testimony of the two.
  If two witnesses stated, “he is dead”, and one witness stated, “he is not dead”, even if she had not married, she may do so.  If two testify that her husband is dead, she can remarry, even if one other person testifies that he is alive.  Again, the testimony of the one is nullified by the testimony of the two.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss contradictory testimony with regard to the husband’s death.
  If one wife said “he is dead’ and the other wife said, “he is not dead” , the one who said, “he is dead” may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, while the one who said, “he is not dead”, may neither marry again nor does she receive her ketubah.  This section and the following section deal with situations in which a man is married to more than one wife.  If one wife says that he is dead and the other says he is not, the wife that says he is dead is treated like a widow, and the wife who says that he is not, is treated like she is still married to him.  The reason why the first wife is allowed to remarry and collects her ketubah is that her rival wife is not allowed to testify about her, as we learned in the previous mishnah.  The wife who says that he is alive, cannot obviously be allowed to remarry or collect her ketubah because she believes that he is alive.
  If one wife said, “he is dead” and the other stated “he was killed”: Rabbi Meir says: since they contradict one another they may not marry again. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: since both admit that he is not alive, both may marry again.  In this case, both wives agree that the husband is dead, but they disagree over whether he merely died or was killed.  Rabbi Meir holds that since they contradict each other, neither may remarry.  The Talmud teaches that Rabbi Meir also disagrees with the previous clause, where the wives also contradicted each other.  While the previous opinion held that the wife who says that he is dead may remarry, Rabbi Meir holds that she may not.  Rabbi Meir’s words are taught on this case, because here there is even a greater innovation:  even though both agree that he is dead, since they disagree over the details they may not remarry.  Rabbis Judah and Shimon hold that since they both agree that he is no longer alive, they may remarry.
  If one witness says, “he is dead”, and another witness says “he is not dead’, Or if one woman says “he is dead”, and another woman says, “he is not dead’, she may not marry again.  If two witnesses disagree over whether or not he is dead, she may not remarry. However, as we learned in the previous mishnah, if she remarried before the second witness said that he was alive, she need not leave the second marriage.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea, and she returned and stated, “my husband is dead”, she may be married again and she also receives her ketubah. However, her rival wife is forbidden to remarry.If [her rival wife] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon.Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah.This mishnah discusses a case where a man was married to more than one wife, and one wife claimed that he had died and the other wife was not able to know whether this was true.In mishnah four we learned that a rival wife may not testify that a woman’s husband is dead.  Therefore, in the situation in our mishnah, although one wife’s testimony is believed and she is allowed to remarry and collect her ketubah, the rival wife may not remarry.  Unlike the previous mishnah, where the rival wife explicitly stated that he was not dead, in our situation, since the husband and the other wife were overseas, the wife who remained behind cannot know whether or not he is still alive.Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree over whether or not the rival wife may eat terumah after the other wife has stated that the husband is dead.  This debate is only critical if she was from an Israelite family, she was married to a priest, and she had no children.  In such a case, if her husband dies she is not allowed to eat terumah.  According to Rabbi Tarfon, the halakhah is consistent:  just as she is treated as if she is still married and not allowed to remarry, so too she may eat terumah, as if her husband was still alive.Rabbi Akiva holds that allowing her to continue to eat terumah might lead her to transgress, because her husband might very well be dead.  Rather, Rabbi Akiva is strict on both counts:  she may not remarry lest her husband be alive but she may not eat terumah lest her husband is dead.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains three more debates between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva, all somewhat similar to the one we learned yesterday.
  If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah.  This section contains more or less the same debate that we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.  The only innovation is that in this case, when the woman states that her father-in-law is dead, she has already stated that her own husband is dead, and therefore she is no longer her mother-in-law’s daughter-in-law.  Therefore, we might have thought that in this case she is believed, and the mother-in-law may remarry.  In order to prevent one from making this assumption, the debate between Rabbis Tarfon and Akiva is repeated here.
  If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them,  and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah.  In this case, each woman claims to be married to one man, but the man admits to marrying only one of them.  According to Rabbi Tarfon we treat each woman as if she might be married to him and he must give a get to each.  However, since he will only admit to marrying one woman, he must pay only one ketubah sum.  The sum is left in court, until it is clarified who he married. Rabbi Akiva argues that the solution to this problem needs to punish the man for having put these women into this predicament.  In order to penalize him for his actions, he must pay a ketubah payment to each and every one.
  If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved].  In this case, a man stole from one of five other people, but does not remember from whom he stole.  Each person claims that he stole from him.  Again, Rabbi Tarfon rules that the thief pays the sum he stole and gives it to the court until it can be clarified from whom he stole.  Rabbi Akiva again wishes to punish the thief, and therefore obligates him to pay the amount stolen to each of the five. Note that in both cases Rabbi Akiva is not concerned that he is rewarding the four out of the five women or people from whom something has been stolen who are definitely lying.  Perhaps this is because it is unclear (at least to us) which is lying, whereas it is clear that this person has stolen money, or betrothed a woman without bothering to remember whom he betrothed.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with a situation where a woman goes abroad with a husband and a son and then returns claiming that both have died.  The question is:  is she liable for yibbum.
  A woman who went with her husband to a country beyond the sea, and her son was with her, and who came back and stated, “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, is believed.  If her husband died before the son died, then at the point of death she was not liable for yibbum (for her husband died at a point when he had kids).  Since she went abroad under the assumption that she is not liable for yibbum, and she now returns claiming that this is still true, she is believed.  This mishnah works according to a well-known principle whereby a person is believed if he does not change the status quo, but not necessarily believed if he does change it.
  [If she stated] “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum.  In this case, she claims that the son died first and therefore when her husband died he had no children, leaving her liable for yibbum.  Since she is changing the status quo that existed when she left, and now claiming that she is liable for yibbum, she is not entirely believed and she is not allowed to contract yibbum with her dead husband’s brother.  However, since she might be telling the truth, and really be liable for yibbum, she first must perform halitzah and only then is she allowed to remarry.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with a woman who returns from overseas and states that both her husband and son have died.  The difference between this case and that found in the previous mishnah is that here her son was born abroad.
  [If a woman states], “A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea” and she also states, “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed.  In this mishnah she leaves to travel abroad under the assumption that she is liable for yibbum should her husband die, because he has no children.  If she comes back and states that she had a son, she has changed that status quo.  However, if she says that the son died before the husband, then she reverts to the status quo of being liable for yibbum.  Since she is ultimately maintaining the status quo, she is believed.
  [If she states], “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum.  However, if she states that her husband died before her son died, she is changing the status quo because she is exempting herself from yibbum.  Therefore, she is not believed, and she is not allowed to remarry without first having halitzah.  She cannot have yibbum because she claims that her husband died before her son and therefore she is not liable for yibbum. In summary both this mishnah and yesterday’s mishnah teach that a woman is believed to retain the status quo but not to modify it.  However, even though she cannot change status quo, she must have halitzah before she can remarry.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss women who return from being abroad and come back and testify that their husbands and in this case brothers-in-law have died.
  [If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”,  and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed.  As we stated in the previous two mishnayoth, a woman is believed if she make a statement which does not change the status quo established when she left to travel abroad.  If when she left she did not have a brother-in-law, and then she returns and states that her husband had a brother, but he died (in this case it doesn’t matter whether her husband died first or his brother) she is allowed to remarry without yibbum.  After all, if she hadn’t stated that she had a brother-in-law, we would never have thought to make her wait until she had halitzah or yibbum to remarry.
  If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house.  In this case, the status quo when she left is that she had a brother-in-law.  The mishnah teaches that a woman is never believed to state that her brother-in-law died.  A woman is only believed to state that her husband died.  The reason is that we assume a woman will make sure her husband is dead before she remarries.  There is an assumption that she will not lie.  Furthermore, if she was lying and he returns, the consequences for her are serious.  However, there is no such assumption that a woman will not lie concerning her brother-in-law. She is also not believed to state that her sister died, so that she could marry her sister’s husband. Since even if her sister was alive, she would not cause serious consequences to herself by having relations with her sister’s husband, she might lie. We can see here a general pattern emerging: a person is less likely to lie if there are serious consequences awaiting him/her if he does lie.  Therefore, in these types of situations, s/he is believed.
  A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.  Finally, a man is not believed to state that his brother has died, so that he might marry his brother’s wife, for the same reason we wrote above.  Since there are no serious consequences for him if he is lying (and only serious consequences for her) he is not deemed trustworthy.  So too a man is not believed to state that his wife has died in order to marry her sister for even if he was lying there are no serious consequences for him
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction This mishnah deals with a woman whose husband died abroad and she is not sure whether or not she is obligated to have yibbum with his brother.
  A woman whose husband and rival wife went to a country beyond the sea, and to whom people came and said, “your husband is dead”, must neither marry nor contract yibbum until she has ascertained whether her rival wife is pregnant.  In this case, the husband and a rival wife went abroad, and at that time the husband had no children. Although the wife who remained behind is certain that her husband is dead, she does not know whether she is liable for yibbum, because she doesn’t know if her rival wife had children while abroad.  Therefore she cannot remarry.
  If she had a mother-in-law she need not be concerned [she had another son]. But if [the mother-in-law] departed while pregnant she must be concerned [that another son was born.Rabbi Joshua says: she need not be concerned.  If the husband traveled abroad and at that time he had no brothers, his wife need not be concerned lest her mother-in-law gave birth to a child before her husband died.  Perhaps this is because it is uncommon for a woman to give birth to another child after her older child is already married.  Furthermore, even if the mother-in-law gave birth, only a male child will make the wife liable for yibbum.  This distinguishes this case from the case in section where a child of other sex will exempt the wife from yibbum, and therefore we are concerned lest she be exempt. If, however, the mother-in-law was pregnant when she traveled, the daughter must be concerned, lest she gave birth to a male child.  The wife must wait until she is certain that her mother-in-law did not have a boy. Rabbi Judah holds that in this case as well, the wife need not be concerned and may remarry immediately.  This is because there are “two doubts”.  The mother-in-law may have miscarried (as older women often do), and even if she gave birth to a viable child, the child might be female.  In cases of “two doubts”, the halakhah is generally more lenient.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a situation in which, while it may be assumed that a husband is dead, it cannot be assumed that his brother, the yavam is dead.
  We should remind ourselves of two rules learned in the previous chapter: 1) a woman is believed when she says, “My husband is dead”; 2) a sister-in-law is not believed when she says, “Your husband is dead.”
  Two sisters-in-law, one says, “My husband is dead”, and the other also says, “My husband is dead”, this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one, and this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one.  Although in this case we believe each sister-in-law when she states that her own husband is dead, neither sister-in-law is free to remarry lest the yavam, her brother-in-law is alive.  Even though each woman’s sister-in-law says that the other’s yavam is dead, sisters-in-law are not allowed to testify for one another, because they might hate each other.  Our mishnah teaches that these women are not believed vis-a-vis the other, even though they are believed vis-a-vis themselves..
  If one had witnesses and the other had no witnesses, she who has the witnesses is forbidden, while she who has no witnesses is permitted.  If there are witnesses that one woman’s husband has died, the other woman may remarry without fear that he is alive and she is liable for yibbum.  That is to say, she is believed with regard to her own husband, and the witnesses are believed with regard to the other husband (her yavam). However, the woman who has witnesses that her own husband died but does not have witnesses that her yavam died, cannot rely on her sister-in-law’s testimony that he died, and therefore cannot remarry.
  If the one has children and the other has no children, she who has children is permitted and she who has no children is forbidden.  The woman who had children is, of course, exempt from yibbum.  The woman who did not have children is liable.
  If they contracted yibbum, and the yevamim died, they are forbidden [to marry again]. Rabbi Elazar says: since they were permitted to marry the yevamim, they are subsequently permitted to marry any man.  In this case two sisters-in-law, both of whom say, “My husband died”, have no witnesses and no children, and then have yibbum with two other brothers (not married to either of these two women).  This is permitted, as we learned in 15:1.  If afterwards, one of these brothers dies, the women may not remarry, lest the other brother-in-law still be alive, as we learned in section one.  The innovation is that even though an assumption was made that both original husbands had died, and therefore both women were permitted to have yibbum, nevertheless, we continue to fear that one of the women is lying and that the other woman’s brother-in-law is still alive. Rabbi Elazar holds that since we made the assumption that both original husbands were dead, we cannot go back to assuming that they might be alive.  Therefore the women are permitted to marry whomever they want, without fear that they are still tied to their brothers-in-law.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah provides rules of what a witness needs to see in order to testify that someone is dead.
  They are allowed to testify only about the face with the nose, even though there were also marks on the man’s body or clothing.  A person is identifiable only through his face and his nose.  Therefore, if someone sees other parts of his body or face, but not his face and nose, he cannot testify that the person is dead.
  They are allowed to testify only when his soul has departed, even though they have seen him cut up or crucified or being devoured by a wild beast.  The person must already be dead in order to establish testimony of his death.  It is not sufficient to see him being cut up, crucified or devoured by a wild beast.  Even though his imminent death in these situations is nearly certain, this is not sufficient.
  They are allowed to testify only [if they saw the body] within three days [of death].  The witness must testify within three days of the death.  Otherwise the body may begin to decompose and identity cannot be provided with certainty.
  Rabbi Judah ben Baba says: not all men, all places, or all times are alike.  According to Rabbi Judah ben Baba it is impossible to set uniform rules for identifying bodies.  Some men’s faces will change quicker than others at death, in some places decomposition will take place quicker, and much depends on the time of year as well (rain or sun).  Therefore each situation must be ruled upon based on the circumstances of that situation.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with deciding whether a person who has entered into a body of water and not reappeared can be assumed to have drowned.
  If a man fell into water, whether it had [a visible] end or not, his wife is forbidden [to marry again].  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, even though a man may have fallen into a large body of water and not reappeared, we cannot assume that he is dead.  In the Talmud, this opinion is ascribed to Rabbi Meir.  The Sages hold that if the water has an end, then his wife may remarry.  If the water has an end and we did not see him come out, then we know that he didn’t come out the other side and we can assume that he has drowned.  However, if the water has no end, he might have washed up alive on some distant shore and his wife should not remarry.
  Rabbi Meir said: it once happened that a man fell into a large cistern and came out after three days.  Rabbi Meir now offers a story that illustrates his principle, that even if the water has an end, the person might be alive.  In such a case, if people saw that he didn’t come up, they might have left the place where he allegedly drowned, assuming that he was dead.  Therefore, we cannot make such an assumption and his wife cannot remarry.
  Rabbi Yose: it once happened that a blind man descended into a cave to immerse and his guide went down after him; and after waiting long enough for their souls to depart, permission was given to their wives to marry again.  Rabbi Yose disagrees with Rabbi Meir.  He brings a story where a blind man and his guide fell into a cave that had water in it and the Sages waited a while and then left and declared that the wife could remarry.  If we extrapolate, we can conclude that if the water has an end, she may remarry.
  Another incident occurred at Asia where a man was lowered into the sea, and only his leg was brought up, and the Sages ruled: [if the recovered leg contained the part] above the knee [the man’s wife] may marry again, [but if it contained only the part] below the knee, she may not marry again.  This mishnah deals with a case where a person was cast into the sea and according to the Talmud he was bound.  Later, they drag his leg out of the water.  If when they drag the leg out of the water, it is from the knee and up, then we can assume that the person is dead.  Even if he survived the loss of part of his leg, he would not be able to swim without a full leg.  However, if only the lower part of the leg was cut off, the man might have been able to swim and he might have come out of the water somewhere else.  Therefore his wife cannot remarry. Note that this mishnah became all too relevant in determining whether widows of Sept. 11 victims could remarry.  Since the World Trade Center is like “water that has an end”, it can be assumed that someone who didn’t show up afterwards had indeed died, and his widow was allowed to remarry.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah talks about the acceptability of hearsay regarding a person’s death.  Note that such testimony is generally not acceptable in a court of law.  The Sages were lenient in these cases in order to make it somewhat easier for a woman to remarry.
  Even if he only heard from women saying, “so-and-so is dead”, this is enough.  If one hears women saying amongst themselves that a certain man has died, the one who overhears them may go to the court and testify as to his death.  This is true even though the women themselves did not intend to testify.  If they had intended to testify their testimony would certainly be acceptable, as we learned in the previous chapter.  Indeed, they themselves may come to court.
  Rabbi Judah says: even if he only heard children saying, “behold we are going to mourn for a man named so-and-so and to bury him” [it is enough].  A second category of people who cannot generally provide testimony is children.  However, in this case, in order to make it easier to establish a man’s death, overhearing children speaking about a certain person’s funeral or burial is sufficient.
  Whether [such statement was made] with the intention [of providing evidence] or was made with no such intention [it is valid]. Rabbi Judah ben Bava says: with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] only if the man had the intention [of acting as witness].  In the case of a non-Jew the evidence is invalid if his intention was [to act as witness].  According to the first opinion, hearing a person say that so-and-so is dead always allows the hearer to testify as to his death in court, whether or not the person intended to testify.  Rabbi Judah ben Bava holds that an Israelite must intend to testify for the one who hears him to be able to repeat his words in court.  A non-Jew’s words can be brought to court only if he doesn’t intend to testify. Note that there are some versions of the mishnah in which Rabbi Judah ben Bava says, “with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] even if the man had the intention [of acting as witness].”  According to this reading, Rabbi Judah ben Bava agrees with the previous opinion about the Israelite’s testimony (it is acceptable whether or not he intended to testify), but disagrees about the non-Jew’s.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss cases of hearsay or other less than perfect testimony about a person’s death.
  They may testify [even if the body was seen] in candle light or in moonlight.  Even if a witness only saw the person’s body in candle light or moonlight, he may subsequently testify that he was dead.
  And a woman may be given permission to marry again on the evidence of a mere voice. It once happened that a man was standing on the top of a hill and cried, “so-and-so son of so-and-so from such-and-such a place is dead”, but when they went [to the top of the hill] they didn’t find anyone there.  [Nevertheless], they allowed his wife to remarry.  A “mere voice” is either an echo, or a voice heard from a large distance.  In either case, if such a voice is heard saying that a certain person has died, his wife may remarry.  This is illustrated in the next case, where people only hear from a distance someone say that so-and-so is dead.  They never find the person who said it, so that they could interrogate him further.  Nevertheless, the Sages allowed his wife to remarry.
  In another instance, at Zalmon a person declared, “I am so-and-so son of so-and-so; a snake has bitten me, and I am dying”; and when they went [to examine the corpse] they did not recognize him, they [nevertheless] allowed his wife to remarry.  In this case, that happened in Zalmon (found in the lower Galilee), the person himself stated that he was about to die.  He also provided his full name.  By the time the witnesses found the body, it had been disfigured and was not identifiable.  In any case, since he had stated his name, his wife is allowed to remarry.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of Yevamoth relates some debates between rabbis over the testimony concerning a man’s death.  In our mishnah these debates are set within historical frameworks which relate interesting information as to how the Sages made decisions and about the historical period in which they lived.
  Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders.  I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”.   And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel   he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave.  This story takes place when Rabbi Akiva is going to Nehardea, which is in Babylonia, in order to intercalate the year, that is to decide whether an extra month must be added in order to adjust the lunar year to the solar year.  Normally intercalation is done only in the land of Israel.  This event must have occurred during a time of persecution, when courts could not gather in Israel to deal with calendar issues.  In any case, when Rabbi Akiva arrives at Bet D’li a man named Nehemiah asks him if it is true that among the rabbis in Israel, only Rabbi Judah ben Bava rules that a woman may marry based on the testimony of a single witness.  When Rabbi Akiva confirms this, Nehemiah apologizes that due to the marauders, he cannot reach the land of Israel to talk to the Israeli sages himself, but that he knows a tradition according to which Rabban Gamaliel the Elder allowed a woman to remarry upon the testimony of one witness.  When Rabbi Akiva returns, he relates the tradition to the current patriarch, Rabban Gamaliel (Rabban Gamaliel the Elder’s grandson).  Rabban Gamaliel rejoices, for a supporting tradition has been found for Rabbi Judah ben Bava’s tradition.  Note that Rabban Gamaliel was previously not willing to accept Rabbi Judah ben Bava’s opinion, even though he obviously approved of it. Only when he learns of a supporting tradition, does he accept that a woman may remarry based on the testimony of one witness.  After hearing Nehemiah’s words, Rabban Gamaliel himself remembers hearing of an incident where his grandfather permitted the wives of some fallen soldiers to remarry based on the testimony of one witness.  At that precedent-setting incident, several others laws were established regarding testimony over a man’s death.  Hearsay was declared acceptable, as was the testimony of women and slaves.  That is to say the normal rules of testimony were suspended.
  Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them:  When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.  This section contains a debate between Rabbis Joshua, Eliezer, Akiva and perhaps other Sages, concerning these halakhot.  Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer both disagree with the halakhah that seems to have been accepted by everyone in the mishnah, up until this point.  They hold that for a woman to remarry she needs two valid witnesses to testify that her husband died.  Rabbi Akiva, who lived a generation after Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer, and was a student of both of them, agreed partially with them, but also partially with Rabban Gamaliel.  According to Rabbi Akiva, women, slaves and relatives cannot testify.  However, one witness is sufficient. As a proof against Rabbi Akiva, the other Sages (probably not Rabbi Joshua or Rabbi Eliezer, who lived before Rabbi Akiva) bring a story where an innkeeper testified that someone staying at her inn had died, and the rabbis allowed his wife to remarry.  If a mere innkeeper’s testimony is acceptable, then a woman of higher social standing, such as a priest’s wife, can surely testify in such a case. Rabbi Akiva answers that the innkeeper did not merely state that he had died, but she brought out his belongings as well.  If the man had been alive, then he would not have left his belongings there.  In such a case, where a woman has evidence that he died, she is believed.  However, her testimony alone is not sufficient. Despite the fact that the tractate ends by stating that women may not testify about a man’s death, since all of the anonymous mishnayoth above allowed this, and allowed slaves and relatives to testify, as well as hearsay, the accepted halakhah is that all of these are permitted.  Indeed, this is a classic case where we can sense that while the earlier tannaim were generally stricter, later tannaim, including the anonymous editors of the mishnah, were more lenient. Congratulations!  We have finished Yevamoth. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Yevamoth was the longest tractate we have yet learned (but it is not the longest in the Mishnah), and parts of it were quite confusing (especially the beginning).  For those of you who have learned with us the entire tractate, a hearty Yasher Koach (congratulations).  You have accomplished a great deal and you should be proud of yourselves.  Many of the principles learned in Yevamoth will appear in other places in the Mishnah, especially in other mishnayoth in Seder Nashim.  It will be an especially helpful tractate to remember.  Tomorrow we begin to learn Ketuboth.