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text: English Explanation of Mishnah Eduyot
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה עדיות
  Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Eduyot
  
  Introduction
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Shammai says: “For all women [who begin to menstruate] it suffices [to reckon their impurity from] the time [of their discovering it].” And Hillel says: “[Their impurity is reckoned backwards] from the [last] examination to the [previous] examination, even if this covers many days.” But the Sages say:  “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one, but [they are considered impure for] the past twenty four hours  when this lessens the period from the [last] examination to the [previous] examination, and for the period from the [last] examination to the [previous] examination when this lessens the past twenty-four hours.”  This mishnah discusses a woman’s ritual impurity as a menstruant.  When a woman menstruates she makes impure certain things which she touches.  The problem is that a woman may not always know when she begins to menstruate, in order to know which things that she touched are impure.  Shammai is not concerned with this problem; he states that only things that they have touched after they discover that they are menstruating are impure.  Hillel is very considered about this problem; he states that anything touched after the last time she checked herself is impure.  In other words, since we cannot be certain when she began menstruating after the last time she checked, we are strict and anything from this time and onwards is impure.  The Sages, who probably lived after Shammai and Hillel, found a compromise position.  The things a menstruant touched before she discovered that she was menstruating are impure either within the last twenty-four hours or since she last checked, whichever was more recent.   For example if it is now Tuesday afternoon and she checked herself on Tuesday morning, anything she touched between the morning and the afternoon is assumed to be impure.  If however, it is now Tuesday afternoon and she checked herself Monday morning, anything she touched in the last twenty-four hour period is impure.
  Any woman who has a regular period, it suffices [to reckon her impurity from] her set time.  Any woman who has a regular cycle, begins to make things impure only from the moment she realizes that she is menstruating.  It can be assumed that this woman did not begin menstruating at an earlier time since she has a regular cycle.
  She who uses testing-cloths [when she has sexual relations], behold this is like an examination: it lessens either the period of the [past] twenty four hours or the period from the [last] examination to the [previous] examination.  If a woman wipes herself clean after having relations with her husband, this counts as checking herself.  If within the next twenty-four hours she should realize that she is menstruating, she has made impure only those things which she touched since she had relations and cleaned herself.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Shammai says:  “[Dough] of a kav or more is subject to the law of hallah.” And Hillel says: “Of two kavs or more.” But the Sages say: “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one, but [dough of] a kav and a half is subject to the law of hallah.”  Numbers 15:20-21 commands Jews to set aside some of their dough and give it to the priests.  This is called “hallah”.  The question is how big of a batch of dough makes a person liable to separate hallah?  According to Shammai, if one mixes one kav of dough he must separate hallah to give to the priests.  A kav is about 1 ½ liters. According to Hillel, two kavs of dough make one obligated to separate hallah.  The Sages compromise between the two positions and state that 1 ½ kavs is sufficient to obligate for hallah.
  And after they increased the measures they said:  “[Dough of] five quarters is subject. Rabbi Yose said:  “Five are exempt, five and more are liable.”  Later in the Mishnaic period, in Tsippori which is in the Galilee, the measure of weights were increased so that a kav was now larger than it used to be.  Therefore, the amount that obligates one to separate hallah became 1 1/5 kavs.  According to Rabbi Yose, exactly 1 1/5 kavs does not obligate one to separate hallah, but anything over that amount does.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why should there be a minimum amount of dough to make one liable to separate hallah?  Why shouldn’t a person have to separate hallah from even a small amount of dough?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why should there be a minimum amount of dough to make one liable to separate hallah?  Why shouldn’t a person have to separate hallah from even a small amount of dough?
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah three contains a dispute between Hillel and Shammai with regards to the laws of the mikveh (ritual bath).
  Hillel says:  “A hin full of drawn water renders the mikweh unfit.” (However, man must speak in the language of his teacher.) And Shammai says:  “Nine kavs.” But the Sages say: “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one;” But when two weavers from the dung-gate which is in Jerusalem came and testified in the name of Shemaiah and Avtalion, “Three logs of drawn water render the mikweh unfit,” the Sages confirmed their statement. A mikveh, a ritual bath used to cleanse ritual impurity, must contain water that has not been drawn by human hands.  The water must get into the mikveh by natural means, either through rain or a stream.  The question our mishnah asks is how much drawn water can fall into a mikveh before it becomes unfit to cleanse?  According to Hillel, if one hin falls in, the mikveh is unfit.  A hin is equal to three kavs (about 4 ½ liters).  The mishnah notes that Hillel used the word “hin” and not the word “kav”, even though kav is more commonly used and Hillel himself used the word in the previous mishnah.  The answer is that Hillel heard this law about the mikveh from his teacher in this language, and although Hillel himself did not regularly use this language he still taught the statement in the form that he heard it.  This is to teach that when you quote your teacher you must use the same language s/he used. Shammai gives a larger measure which would make a mikveh unfit:  nine kavs.  A smaller amount of drawn water that falls into a mikveh does not render it unfit. As we saw in the first two mishnayoth, the Sages accept neither the words of Shammai nor the words of Hillel.  Rather they accept the testimony given by two weavers who were at the Dung-Gate in Jerusalem (the gate next to the Western Wall), who said that Shemaiah and Avtalion, two early Sages, stated that three lugs, which is a quarter of a hin, are enough to render the mikveh unfit.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four discusses why the Mishnah records opinions that are not accepted as normative Jewish law (halakhah).
  And why do they record the opinions of Shammai and Hillel for naught? To teach the following generations that a man should not [always] persist in his opinion, for behold, the fathers of the world did not persist in their opinion. This mishnah, and the two mishnayoth which we will learn tomorrow ask deep questions about the nature of the Mishnah in its totality.  In the previous two mishnayoth we learned statements of Shammai and Hillel that were not accepted as normative law.  Indeed, throughout this year of learning we have read and discussed many statements that are not law in our days, nor in the days in which those statements were recited.  Why then does the Mishnah record and do we continue to learn these statements?  One answer, the answer that our mishnah provides, is to teach that just as Shammai and Hillel compromised and changed their minds when they saw they were contradicted, and they were the “fathers of the world”, the founders of Rabbinic Judaism, all the more so should lesser people change their mind when they realize that they may be wrong.  The mishnah then becomes a lesson not in argumentation, but in compromise and unity.  The mishnah records minority opinions to show that even great teachers change their mind when wrong.  We will learn other reasons tomorrow.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the question why are minority opinions recorded in the Mishnah, if there is a rule that the halakhah (the law) is according to the majority opinion.
  And why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many, when the halakhah must be according to the opinion of the many? So that if a court prefers the opinion of the single person it may depend on him. For no court may set aside the decision of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. If it was greater than it in wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, it may not set aside its decision, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. Generally speaking, when there is a dispute in the Mishnah between an individual Sage and the rest of the Sages, the halakhah is according to the Sages.  This is due to a “majority rules” principle.  Our mishnah asks why then, does the Mishnah record the minority opinion, if that is not to be the accepted halakhah?  Before we begin to discuss the answer, which is somewhat difficult to decipher, we should recognize the importance of the question.  The Mishnah is not purely a book of halakhah, Jewish law, because it contains a plurality of opinions.  In my mind this makes an important statement about Judaism and Jewish law:  the first great work of the Oral Torah, that work which continues to shape Judaism to this very day, is not a recording of what one is supposed to do.  It records a dialogue between the Sages, meant to be learned and extrapolated.  This is the process of “Talmud Torah” that continues to this day.  Furthermore, the Mishnah teaches that minority opinions are not necessarily “wrong” even though they may not be accepted. The answer the mishnah provides to its question is slightly cryptic.  I will explain it in one way, but there are others who have explained it differently.  The mishnah records the opinions of individual Sages so that future courts might rely on their opinions and decide halakhah according to them.  Although at the time of the Mishnah these opinions were not accepted by the majority, since they are not “wrong”, in the future other courts may accept them. If a future court were to disagree with the opinions of an earlier court, and there was no recorded minority opinion, they could only change the decision if they were both wiser and greater in number than the earlier court.  In other words there are two ways, according to our mishnah, that a future court can overturn an earlier decision:  1)  by relying on a minority opinion; 2) by being greater in number and wisdom.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah six contains a different answer to the same question asked in mishnah five:  why are minority opinions recorded in the mishnah.
  Rabbi Judah said:  “If so, why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many to set it aside?   So that if a man shall say, ‘Thus have I received the tradition’, it may be said to him, ‘According to the [refuted] opinion of that individual did you hear it.’” Rabbi Judah asks the same question that was asked in the previous mishnah:  why does the Mishnah record minority opinions.  His answer, however, is the exact opposite of the previous answer.  According to Rabbi Judah, minority opinions are recorded so that future Rabbis will not be able to rely on those opinions.  If a person in the future should say that he learned the tradition in a certain way, a Rabbi could point to the Mishnah and tell him that that is a minority opinion and is therefore not accepted as halakhah. Halakhah according to Rabbi Judah will continue to follow the majority. Note the irony that the Mishnah records a dispute about why it preserves minority opinions, and in this very discussion there is a recorded minority opinion.  If we were to look at this dispute in these two mishnayoth through the eyes of those who gave the first answer, they would have to say that in the future Rabbi Judah’s answer might be acceptable!  In other words those who allow for a change in the halakhah, must admit that in the future such change might not be acceptable.  If we were to look at the same dispute through Rabbi Judah’s eyes, we would have to say that this opinion is unaccepted now and forever!  Meaning, Rabbi Judah himself would have to admit that minority opinions are acceptable in the future, in which case, perhaps, even his minority opinion would someday be accepted.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What might be some of the underlying conceptual differences between Rabbi Judah’s and the Sages’ (mishnah five) reasons why minority opinions are preserved in the Mishnah?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What might be some of the underlying conceptual differences between Rabbi Judah’s and the Sages’ (mishnah five) reasons why minority opinions are preserved in the Mishnah?
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Beth Shammai says: “A quarter-kav of any bones, even from two limbs or from three.”And Beth Hillel says: “A quarter-kav of bones from a corpse, either from [the bones which form] the greater portion of the [body’s] build, or from the greater portion of the number [of the body’s bones].Shammai says:  “Even from a single bone.”This mishnah begins to list disputes between Beth Shammai (the school of Shammai) and Beth Hillel (the school of Hillel).  The rest of the chapter will contain disputes between these two schools.Numbers 19:14 teaches that if a person dies in a tent things that are in the tent, including the people, can become impure, even though they have not touched the dead body.  Our mishnah discusses how many bones must be in the tent for them to be considered a dead body which will cause ritual impurity.According to Beth Shammai, a quarter-kav of bones will transmit impurity, as long as they come from at least two or three different bones.  Beth Hillel agrees that a quarter-kav of bones is enough to cause impurity but they state that the bones must either come from the greater portion of the body (the hips, thighs, rib cage and spine) or from a majority of the number of bones in the body, considered to be 248.  If there is a quarter-kav but they come from only one limb or many limbs but not a majority of the number or from the greater portion, they do not transmit impurity.Shammai himself is even stricter than Beth Shammai, for he holds that a quarter-kav from one bone transmits impurity.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Vetches of terumah: Beth Shammai says, “They must be soaked and rubbed in purity, but can be given for food in impurity.”And Beth Hillel says: “They must be soaked in purity, but can be rubbed and given for food in impurity.”Shammai says: “They must be eaten dry.”Rabbi Akiva says: “All actions in connection with them [can be carried out] in impurity.”In order to understand this mishnah we must first explain several rules.1) Terumah (heave offering) is a portion of produce separated to give to the priests.  It is only given from human food and not from animal feed.  Vetches, a type of bean, are generally given to animals, but can be eaten by humans in time of need.2) It is forbidden to cause terumah to become impure.  A person who touches terumah must have previously ritually washed his hands.3) Food can receive impurity only once it has been made wet.  While it is dry it cannot receive impurity.Our mishnah discusses the preparation of vetches of terumah.  According to Beth Shammai they must be prepared (both soaked and rubbed) with pure hands, lest the person decide to eat them himself, in which case it would be forbidden to make them impure.  However, they may be given to animals by a person with impure hands, since animal food is not really terumah.According to Beth Hillel, they must be soaked by a person with pure hands, since getting them wet enables them to receive impurity.  However, when he rubs them or gives them to an animal it is obvious that they are not intended for humans, and therefore he can do so with impure hands.Shammai himself is again, stricter than Beth Shammai.  He holds that vetches must be eaten dry so that they will not be able to receive impurity.  Assumedly, Shammai would agree that a person might also eat them with clean hands.Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is the most lenient.  He holds that vetches are not fit for human consumption and therefore one may do anything with them while his hands are impure.  Since vetches are animal food the rules of the purity of terumah do not apply to them.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  One who changes for a sela copper coins from second tithe: Beth Shammai says: “Copper coin for the whole sela.” And Beth Hillel say:  “Silver for one shekel and copper coin for one shekel.” Rabbi Meir says: “Silver and fruits may not be substituted for silver.” But the sages allow it. Second tithe, the second ten percent of agricultural products, was to be taken to Jerusalem and consumed there.  If it was inconvenient to carry all of the second tithe produce to Jerusalem, one could redeem the produce with money and bring the money to Jerusalem.  Our mishnah discusses a person who has already redeemed some second tithe and wishes to exchange his small copper coins for a larger more valuable silver coin, a sela, which will be easier to carry to Jerusalem. According to Beth Shammai, in order to do this he must have a whole sela’s worth of copper coin.  If he has only half a sela’s worth of copper (=shekel) and he has a silver shekel (=1/2 sela) which is also of second tithe, he may not exchange the shekel and shekel’s worth of copper for a sela since it is forbidden to exchange silver second tithe for other silver second tithe. According to Beth Hillel, one is permitted to exchange a silver shekel and a shekel’s worth of copper coins for a sela.  Although it is in general forbidden to exchange silver second tithe for other silver second tithe, since part of this exchange is copper, it is permitted. Rabbi Meir limits Beth Hillel’s opinion.  Although it is permitted to exchange silver and copper for silver second tithe, it is forbidden to exchange fruit and silver for other silver.  However, the Sages allow even this.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  One who exchanges a sela from second tithe in Jerusalem: Beth Shammai says: “Copper coin for the whole sela.” And Beth Hillel says: “Silver for one shekel and copper coin for one shekel.” The disputants before the Sages say: “Silver for three denars and copper coin for one denar.” Rabbi Akiva says: “Silver for three denars and for the fourth silver, copper coin.” Rabbi Tarfon says: “Four aspers in silver.” Shammai says: “He must leave it in the shop and eat on the credit thereof.” This mishnah discusses the person who arrives in Jerusalem with his silver sela of second tithe and wishes to exchange it for copper coins so that he can buy small quantities of food. According to Beth Shammai he must exchange the entire sela for copper.  This is consistent with Beth Shammai’s opinion in the previous mishnah: one cannot exchange silver second tithe with silver, but only with copper. According to Beth Hillel, he may exchange half of the sela for a silver shekel and the other half for copper.  Again, Beth Hillel holds that since he is exchanging part of the sela for copper he may also exchange part for silver. Rabbi Akiva takes Beth Hillel’s position even further.  A person may exchange even ¼ of the sela (denar) for copper and the rest (3/4) for silver.  A sela is worth four denars. Rabbi Tarfon goes even further.  For the fourth denar he may even take four aspers of silver and one asper’s worth of copper.  An asper is 1/5 of a denar. Shammai again is strictest.  He holds that he shouldn’t exchange the sela at all.  Rather he should leave it at a store and eat on credit.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  According to Leviticus 15:4, any object on which a person who has had a discharge sits is impure.  The Rabbis taught that things that are not made to sit upon or are not fit to sit upon, do not receive impurity.  Our mishnah discusses two types of stools and whether or not they can receive impurity.
  A bride’s stool from which the covering-boards have been taken: Beth Shammai pronounces it [liable to become] unclean, And Beth Hillel pronounce it not [liable to become] unclean. Shammai says: “Even the framework of a stool [by itself is liable to become] unclean.”  An ordinary stool was made of four legs held together by four boards (the framework), on which were placed covering boards for sitting. A bride’s stool had, in addition, three upright covering boards (also called ‘covering-boards’), against which the occupant leant.  The question in our mishnah is with regards to the status of a bride’s stool that does not have its special covering boards.  According to Beth Shammai, since this stool can still be sat upon, it can receive impurity.  According to Beth Hillel, since it does not fulfill its intended function as a bride’s stool, it cannot receive impurity.   Shammai, again taking the strictest position, holds that even a simple framework with no coverings can receive impurity.  Since one could potentially sit on the framework, it is considered enough of a stool to potentially become impure.
  A stool which has been set in a baker’s trough: Beth Shammai pronounces it [liable to become] unclean, And Beth Hillel pronounces it not [liable to become] unclean. Shammai says: “Even one made therein [is liable to become unclean].”  If someone took a stool and put it into a kneading trough, in order to put flour or dough upon it, Beth Shammai would still rule that it is a stool and therefore susceptible to impurity.  Beth Hillel rules that the stool is now part of the trough, and since the trough can’t become impure, neither can the stool.  The reason that the trough can’t become impure is that it was not made for sitting.  Shammai rules that even a stool that was made from the outset as part of a trough, and therefore was never intended for sitting, can become impure.  Although it was not intended for sitting, since one could sit on it, it can become impure.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah twelve begins a series of mishnayoth in which Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai initially disagree, until Beth Hillel changes their minds and teaches according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.  Aside from the specific content of these mishnayoth, Beth Hillel’s willingness to admit that their rivals, Beth Shammai were correct, and even to subsequently teach their opinions, teaches a lesson of humility for all generations.  Beth Hillel did not allow their personal glory to supersede their search for truth; when they recognized their own mistakes, they admitted them and changed their opinions accordingly.
  Our mishnah discusses a woman who returns from overseas and claims that her husband has died.  The woman cannot bring any documentation to her husband’s death, and therefore the issue arises, is she to be believed?  If she is believed, then there are four consequences to her statement discussed by our mishnah:  1)  she may remarry, as a widow; 2)  if the husband did not have children, she must be married to the husband’s brother (levirate marriage) or have him perform halitzah, the release from levirate marriage; 3)  she may collect her kethubah, her marriage document which is paid upon death of the husband or divorce; 4)  the husband’s brothers or other inheritors would divide his estate.
  These are subjects concerning which Beth  Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai:A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died”   may be married again; “My husband died [without children]”   she must be married by her husband’s brother (the. But Beth Hillel says:  “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them:  “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai.  According to Beth Shammai she is believed and may remarry.  If the husband had no children she must either undergo levirate marriage or halitzah.  Beth Hillel responds that the precedent for this law was a case where a woman had gone harvesting with her husband and she returned claiming that he had died.  In such a case we don’t suspect that the woman would lie, for if she did her husband would return and contradict her.  Since “harvesting” is close to the city, if the husband was alive he would return. However, if she was returning from abroad, she is not believed, for the husband may still be alive and she might lie assuming that he will not turn up.  Beth Shammai responds that she is always believed, no matter where she had been.  The case of “harvesting” was how the event really happened, but the Rabbis would have allowed her to remarry under any circumstance.  In other words, from where she was returning is immaterial.  Beth Hillel accepted Beth Shammai’s opinion and taught according to them.
  Beth Shammai says:  “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.”  Beth Shammai further stated that this woman may not only remarry but may collect her marriage payment from her husband’s estate.  Beth Hillel responded to Beth Shammai that although she may remarry, we do not allow her to collect the money, lest the husband is still alive.  Beth Shammai then raised a difficulty with Beth Hillel’s opinion:  generally speaking the law is more strict with regards to issues of personal status than with issues of money.  If you are going to allow her to remarry, as we have already done, for which there are serious consequences (if it turned out that her husband had not died), all the more so should she collect the kethubah payment, for which there are not such serious consequences (at worst she will have to pay it back).  Beth Hillel responded that with regards to monetary results of the alleged death, the brothers do not share in his inheritance.  In other words, Beth Hillel brings proof from another area of law that with regards to monetary issues, this man’s death is not considered confirmed.  To this Beth Shammai responds that we can learn that she collects her kethubah payment from the language written in the kethubah itself.  The kethubah states that if she remarries, she may collect her kethubah payment.  From this wording Beth Shammai concludes that any time she is allowed to remarry, she may collect her kethubah.  Beth Hillel thereby accepted Beth Shammai’s point and taught according to them.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What does Beth Shammai hold with regards to the division of the allegedly dead husband’s estate:  do the brothers divide the inheritance?  If they do not inherit, why not?  Why would Beth Shammai on the one hand believe the woman enough to allow her to remarry, but not in order to allow the dead husband’s brothers to inherit?
   In all of these cases why do you think Beth Hillel changed their minds?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What does Beth Shammai hold with regards to the division of the allegedly dead husband’s estate:  do the brothers divide the inheritance?  If they do not inherit, why not?  Why would Beth Shammai on the one hand believe the woman enough to allow her to remarry, but not in order to allow the dead husband’s brothers to inherit?
   In all of these cases why do you think Beth Hillel changed their minds?
  
  Mishnah 13
  
  Whoever is half a slave and half a free man should work one day for his master and one day for himself, according to Beth Hillel.Beth Shammai said to them:  “You have set matters in order with regards to his master, but you have not set matters in order with regards to himself. He is not able to marry a slave-woman, nor is he able [to marry] a woman who is free.   Is he to refrain [from marrying]? [How can he] for is it not the case that the world was created in order for people to be fruitful and multiply?  For it is said, “He did not create it to be a waste; but formed it for inhabitation” (Isaiah 45:18).  But for the rightful ordering of the world his master is compelled to make him free, and he writes out a bond for half his value.”Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.This mishnah discusses the case of a slave who is half free and half a slave.  This situation could arise if a slave was owned by two masters and one of them set his half free.  Beth Hillel allows such a situation to persists and rules that one day a week he should work for his master and one day a week he works for himself.  In other words, this person can remain a half-slave.Beth Shammai remarks to Beth Hillel that this is a fine arrangement for the master, but does not solve an essential problem for the slave.  A slave is permitted to marry a female slave but a regular Jew is not allowed to marry a female slave.  The half of this person who is a slave could marry a female slave but not a free Jewish woman, and the half of this person who is a Jew (when slaves are freed they become Jewish) could marry a Jewish woman but not a slave woman.  Since this problem is irreconcilable, he could not marry anyone.  Beth Shammai points out that this is also not an acceptable situation, and contradicts the existence of the entire creation.  God created people so that they could establish families and not so that they could remain celibate.The only solution is that he must be freed by the one remaining master, who writes him a manumission document. The slave then accepts upon himself a debt to pay back his owner and the slave goes free.When Beth Hillel heard Beth Shammai’s argument they accepted it, and taught like them.We should note how truly remarkable this mishnah is.  Slavery was an accepted institution in the ancient world, and in every society slaves were amongst the lowest of the social classes.  Nevertheless, Beth Shammai is concerned that even slaves should have the opportunity to fulfill the purpose of the creation of the world:  procreation.
  
  Mishnah 14
  
  A vessel of earthenware can protect everything [in it from contracting impurity], according to Beth Hillel.But Beth Shammai says: “It protects only food and liquids and [other] vessels of earthenware.” Beth Hillel said to them: “Why?” Beth Shammai said to them:  “Because it is [itself] impure with respect to an ignoramus, and no impure vessel can screen [against impurity].” Beth Hillel said to them:  “And did you not pronounce pure the food and liquids inside it?” Beth Shammai said to them:  “When we pronounced pure the food and liquids inside it, we pronounced them pure for him [the ignoramus] only, but when you pronounced the vessel pure you pronounced it pure for yourself and for him.”Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.According to Numbers 19:15, a clay vessel that is covered with a lid prevents impurity from entering inside of it.  If this vessel is found in a room with a dead body, which would normally cause everything in the room to be impure, the clay vessel and all that is inside of it does not contract the impurity.  Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel argue about what types of things which may be inside the clay vessels are not impure.  According to Beth Hillel any object inside the vessel is pure.  Beth Shammai holds that only food, liquids and other clay vessels remain pure; non-clay vessels would be impure.Beth Shammai explains that we can assume that the clay vessel has been touched by an ignoramus (am haaretz), a person who does not strictly know or observe the laws of ritual purity.  It is assumed that the am haaretz makes the vessel impure.  Since an impure vessel does not prevent the impurity from entering, the things inside of it are impure.Beth Hillel responds to Beth Shammai by pointing out that they did indeed accept that the food and liquids inside the vessel were pure.  If the clay vessel does not prevent impurity from entering, why should anything inside of it remain pure?To this question Beth Shammai responds that when they stated that the food and liquids were pure they meant for the am haaretz himself and not for the haver (a person who scrupulously observes the laws of purity and indeed eats only pure food). Beth Shammai assumes that a haver will not borrow any of these things from an am haaretz, since they cannot be made pure (a clay vessel cannot be cleansed of its impurity).  Therefore Beth Shammai can pronounce these things clean, knowing that they will never come into the hands of a haver.  However, when Beth Hillel pronounced everything inside pure, they were in essence declaring it pure for both the am haaretz and the haver.  Beth Hillel had implied that even metal vessels, inside the clay vessel, remained pure.  A haver might borrow metal vessels from an am haaretz, with the intent of immersing them to cleanse them of their impurities.  However, this immersion will only cleanse them from light impurities and not from impurity contracted from a dead body.  Therefore, an am haaretz might borrow them thinking that he could cleanse them and in reality he could not.  Due to this problem, Beth Hillel retracted their opinion and taught like Beth Shammai.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first three mishnayoth contain four things upon which Rabbi Hanina, the chief of the priests testified.  The first mishnah discusses burning impure things.
  Rabbi Hanina, chief of the priests, testified concerning four matters:Through all their days the priests never refrained from burning meat which had been defiled by an “offspring” of impurity with meat which had been made impure by a “father” of impurity, although they were [thereby] increasing its impurity by a [higher] impurity. Rabbi Akiba added:  “Through all their days the priests never shrank from lighting oil  which had been rendered unfit by a tevul yom in a lamp made impure by one who was made impure by a corpse, although they were [thereby] increasing its impurity by a [higher] impurity.” In order to understand the first “testimony” of Rabbi Hanina we must explain some rules concerning impurity.  There are a number of things which are considered to be “fathers” of impurity, including a human corpse.  If a “father” of impurity touches something it becomes an “offspring” of impurity.  There are several levels of “offspring” of impurity.  The “first offspring”, when it touches food or liquids (but not people and things) causes them to be a “second offspring”.  “Second offspring” makes only terumah food but not normal food into “third offspring”.  “Third offspring” can make holy things such as sacrifices into “fourth offspring”. Rabbi Hanina testifies that the priests did not refrain from burning meat which had been made impure by an “offspring” with meat that had been made impure by a “father” of impurity, even though the latter meat, which is a “first offspring” increases the impurity of the former meat, which according to the Talmud had been a “third offspring”, to the status of “second offspring”.  The reason is that all of this meat was going to be burned anyway, since impure sacrifices are forbidden to eat.  Although it is generally forbidden to intentionall make sacrifices impure, that refers to already pure sacrifices.  It is not a problem to increase the impurity of already impure sacrifices. Rabbi Akiva adds another example.  The priests did not refrain from burning oil which had contracted a light form of impurity with oil that had contracted a serious form of impurity, even though this will increase the impurity of the oil.  The light form of impurity is contracted by coming into contact with a “tevul yom”, one who had already been immersed in a ritual bath and was merely waiting for the sunset to become fully pure.  The serious form of impurity is that which is contracted from a corpse.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah two discusses burning the hides of sacrificially unfit animals.
  Rabbi Hanina, chief of the priests, said: “All my days I never saw a hide taken out to the place of burning.” Rabbi Akiba said: “From his words we infer that whoever flays the hide of the firstborn beast and it is found to be trefah, the priests may enjoy the use of the hide.” But the Sages say:  “[A testimony which consists of] ‘we didn’t see’ is not a proof; rather the hide must be taken out to the place of burning. In Tractate Zevahim 12:4 the Mishnah teaches that if a sacrificial animal is found to be unfit as a sacrifice before it’s hide is flayed, the entire animal must be burnt.  If it is found to be unfit after it’s hide is flayed, the priests may keep the hide.  Rabbi Hanina testifies that he never saw a hide being burnt.  In other words, according to Rabbi Hanina if they already removed the hide, the priests may make use of it, even though the animal was deemed unfit to be a sacrifice. Rabbi Akiva learns from this that if one flays the hide of a firstborn animal, which belongs to the priests, and then discovers that it was a trefah, an animal with an internal flaw that would have caused its death, the priests may keep the hide.  Since the flaw was not known before the hide was removed, the hide becomes the property of the priests. The Sages respond to Rabbi Akiva that the type of testimony that Rabbi Hanina transmitted is not reliable enough to base upon it halakhic solutions.  Not seeing something does not mean that it did not happen.  Since they exclude Rabbi Hanina’s testimony the law is that the hide must be burnt with the rest of the animal, and the priests are forbidden to receive benefit from it.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah three contains the final two testimonies of Rabbi Hananyah, chief of priests.
  He also testified concerning a small village in the vicinity of Jerusalem in which there was an old man who used to lend to all the people of the village and write out [the bond] in his own handwriting and others signed it.  And when the fact was brought before the Sages they pronounced it legal. Hence, incidentally, you may infer that a wife may write her own bill of divorcement, and a husband may write his own receipt; for the legality of a document depends only on those who sign it.  The third thing about which Rabbi Hananyah testified is about the manner in which documents may be written.  He testified that he saw an elder in a town near Jerusalem who used to write out his own loan documents and have others sign them and the Sages pronounced it legal, even though the witnesses did not write out the entire document themselves.  Without Rabbi Hananyah’s testimony we might have thought that the lender is not allowed to write out the document himself, for fear that he would forget a document and thereby falsely claim that someone owed him money. From Rabbi Hananyah’s testimony we learn that a woman is allowed to write out her own divorce document and a man might right out his own receipt for having paid the woman’s ketubah (marriage payment).  Even though the divorce document is given by the man to the woman and the receipt is given by the woman to the man, since the legality of a document depends solely upon the witnesses, it does not matter who writes it out.  As long as these documents are witnessed properly, they are valid.
  And [he testified] concerning a needle which was found in flesh of a [sacrifice], that the knife and the hands [which had been employed on the flesh] are clean, but the flesh itself is defiled; and if it was found in the excrement, all are clean.  The final issue upon which Rabbi Hananyah testified is with regards to a needle which was found in the body of a sacrifice after it had been slaughtered.  The needle was known to have been made impure by a dead body and the question is being asked, are the knife that had been used to slaughter the animal and the person who slaughtered the animal impure from having had contact with the impure needle.  Rabbi Hananyah testifies that the knife and slaughterer are not impure but the flesh of the sacrifice is impure, for the needle surely came into contact with it.  The reason that the knife and slaughterer are still pure is that doubtful cases of impurity in the public domain are considered pure.  The flesh does not make the knife impure because food does not impart impurity to vessels. If, however, the needle was found in the feces of the animal, the knife, slaughterer and even the flesh are pure, because we cannot be sure that the animal’s flesh touched the needle.  Although we could assume that the animal swallowed the needle and therefore it touched the flesh, this is not certain and therefore, since this happened in the public domain, the rules are lenient.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four contains three testimonies of Rabbi Yishmael, which he gave in front of the other Sages in Yavneh.  As I stated in the introduction to Eduyoth, this is where the Sages gathered after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem.
  Rabbi Yishmael declared three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavneh: Concerning an egg which was beaten together, and placed on vegetables of terumah   that it acts as a connection; but if it was in the form of a helmet it does not act as a connection.  In the situation in this section a mixed egg is on top of a vegetable which is terumah (only eaten by priests).  If a tevul yom, one who was been in the mikveh (bath of ritual purity), and who is considered to carry second degree impurity (see above mishnah one) touches the mixed egg it is as if he also touched the vegetable, and he conveys third degree impurity to the vegetable.  In other words, the egg is part of the vegetable and touching the egg counts as touching the vegetable.  Since third degree impurity makes terumah impure, the vegetable is impure.  If however the egg has been cooked and rose to form a type of covering over the vegetable, it does not connect the tevul yom with the vegetable and the vegetable remains pure.  In other words the central question asked is:  does touching the egg make the vegetable impure.
  And concerning an ear of corn in the harvesting, the top of which reached the standing corn   that if it can be reaped together with the standing corn, it belongs to the owner; and if not, it belongs to the poor.  When a farmer is harvesting his wheat, if he forgets a stalk he may not go back and reap it.  Rather he must leave it for the poor (see Deuteronomy 24:19).  Rabbi Yishmael defines what is a forgotten stalk.  If a person leaves a stalk and it is close enough to another stalk at which he has not yet arrived, that if he were to bend the first stalk it could touch the other stalk, then it is not considered to have been forgotten and he may reap it.  If it is not close enough to bend it and touch the other stalk, it is considered forgotten and he must leave it for the poor.
  And concerning a small garden which was surrounded by a row of vines   that if it has space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on one side, and space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on the other side, it may be sown with seed; but if not, it may not be sown with seed.  According to Deuteronomy 22:9, it is forbidden to plant seeds in a vineyard.  Rabbi Yishmael testifies that if a small garden surrounded by one row of grape vines is big enough on each of its sides for a grape-gatherer to stand there with his basket then he may plant the garden with seeds.  In such a case the garden is large enough to be considered separate from the vineyard.  If, however, the garden is smaller, then it is merely a bald patch inside a vineyard, and it is forbidden to plant there seeds.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four, which we learned yesterday, contained three things that Rabbi Yishmael had said in front of the Sages in Yavneh.  Mishnah five contains three things which Rabbi Yishmael did not know how to explain, and Rabbi Joshua ben Matya explained them for him.
  They stated three things before Rabbi Yishmael, and he pronounced none of them either unlawful or lawful; and Rabbi Joshua ben Matya explained them.One who lances an abscess on the Sabbath: if it was to make an opening he is liable; if it was to bring out the pus, he is exempt.  The first issue about which Rabbi Yishmael did not know how to answer is one who lances an abscess on the Sabbath.  Rabbi Joshua ben Matya explained that if he did it in order to make a permanent opening in the abscess, then he is obligated for breaking the Sabbath.  This type of work is considered to be like “constructing” which is forbidden.  If, however, he intended to let out the pus, he is exempt, for his intention was not to “construct” an opening.  The fact that an opening was constructed is an unintended by-product, for which one is not generally liable on the Sabbath.
  And concerning one who hunts a snake on the Sabbath: that if he was occupied with it in order that it should not bite him, he is innocent; but if that he might use it as a remedy, he is guilty.  Hunting is forbidden on the Sabbath.  If a person should kill a snake in order to prevent it from biting him, he is exempt since the death of the snake is an unintended by-product.  His true intent was to protect himself.  If, however, he kills the snake to use it for medicine, he is liable since his intention was to kill the snake.
  And concerning Ironian stewpots: that they do not contract impurity when under the same tent as a corpse; but become impure if they are carried by a zav. Rabbi Eliezer ben Zadok says: “Even if they are carried by a zav they remain pure, because they are unfinished.”  Ironian stewpots are clay pots that were made by villagers.  They were at first made into hollow balls and then split in half to create two pots.  The issue here is what type of impurity can these pots receive.  Rabbi Joshua ben Mattiah explains, that as long as they have not been opened, they are considered to be covered clay pots which do not receive impurity by being in the same roofed structure as a corpse (see chapter one, mishnah fourteen).  If a zav, a person who has had an abnormal genital discharge, should carry one of these jars it is impure, since clay jars can receive impurity by being carried by zavim.  However, Rabbi Elazar ben Zadok, a later Sage, points out that they are not even made impure by contact with zavim.  There is a general rule that a vessel which has not been completely finished does not receive impurity. Since Ironian pots are not completed until they are split in half, it can’t receive any impurity.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah six contains three examples of one law, about which Rabbi Akiva disagreed with Rabbi Yishmael.
  Rabbi Yishmael said three things, and Rabbi Akiba disagreed with him.Garlic or unripe grapes or green ears of grain were being crushed [on the eve of the Sabbath] while it is yet day: Rabbi Yishmael says: “He may finish crushing after it grows dark.” But Rabbi Akiba says: “He may not finish.” According to Rabbi Yishmael, if a person began crushing garlic, unripe grapes or green ears of grain before the Sabbath, he may continue to do so on the Sabbath.  It would be forbidden to begin to crush these things on the Sabbath, since crushing and squeezing to get the juice out of produce is forbidden.  However, since he began crushing them before the Sabbath, and the liquid is already starting to come out, he may continue to do so.  The liquid from these things would be used for certain types of dips. Rabbi Akiva forbids this.  According to him, just as it is forbidden to begin to crush, so too it is forbidden to continue crushing.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah seven contains three things that other Sages said in front of Rabbi Akiva:  two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer and one in the name of Rabbi Joshua.
  Two things were said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer in front of Rabbi Akiva.
  They said three things before Rabbi Akiva, two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer and one in the name of Rabbi Joshua. Two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:A woman may go out [on the Sabbath adorned] with a “golden-city”;  A woman may go out of her house on the Sabbath wearing a tiara of gold, stamped with the imprint of Jerusalem.  This is called a “golden city”.  The general reason why women are not allowed to wear jewelry in the public domain on the Sabbath is that she might take off the piece to show it to others and will thereby transgress the prohibition of carrying in the public domain on the Sabbath.  However, Rabbi Eliezer holds that since a woman who has such a tiara must be wealthy, and wealthy women do not take off their jewelry to show it off, we need not be concerned that they will do so.  By the way, this phrase is reminiscent of the “Jerusalem of Gold”, the “Yerushalayim shel Zahav” given by Rabbi Akiva to his wife, and made famous by the modern song.  Evidently it was a well known piece of jewelry in ancient times.
  And they that fly pigeons are unfit to bear evidence. And one in the name of Rabbi Joshua:  Those that race pigeons are unfit to testify, since this is a form of gambling.  We learned this law in Sanhedrin 3:3.
  If there was a creeping thing in the mouth of a weasel when it walked over loaves of terumah, and it is doubtful whether it touched them or whether it did not touch them, that about which there is doubt remains pure.  There was one law stated in the name of Rabbi Joshua.  If a weasel has a dead creepy crawly thing (which is a source of impurity) in its mouth, and the weasel walks on loaves of terumah, and we are unsure whether the creepy crawly thing touched the terumah, the terumah remains pure.  This is due to a general rule that if a source of impurity is moving, and it is doubtful whether it touched anything, the thing it might have touched remains pure.  Since the weasel was moving and it is doubtful whether what was in its mouth touched the terumah, the terumah remains pure.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah eight contains three statements of Rabbi Akiva.  The Sages agreed with two of these statements and disagreed with the other.
  Rabbi Akiba declared three things; about two they agreed with him, and about one they disagreed with him.About a lime-burner’s sandal, that it is liable to contract midras impurity;  A lime-burners sandal is a special sandal that he wears over his feet in order to protect them for the burning lime.  The question being raised is are these sandals normal footwear, such that they receive midras impurity.  Midras impurity is a kind of impurity imparted by a zav (someone who had an abnormal genital discharge) to things which are normally walked upon.  For instance if a zav steps upon a carpet it is impure, for carpets are made to be walked upon.  However, if he steps upon a book it does not receive midras impurity, since people don’t normally walk on books.  Rabbi Akiva teaches that although lime-burners are not made to be walked in, since they are put on a person’s feet, they can receive midras impurity.
  And about the remains of a [broken] oven, that they must be four handbreadths high [in order to retain impurity], whereas they used to say three and [when he said four] they agreed with him. And about one they disagreed with him  If an object that has contracted impurity breaks and is therefore no longer useful, it is no longer impure.  The question is into how small pieces must an oven break for it to become pure.  According to Rabbi Akiva pieces which are smaller than 4 handbreaths (about a foot) retain impurity.  Before the Sages heard Rabbi Akiva’s opinion they had held that a piece 3 handbreadths retains impurity.  When they heard Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, they agreed with him.
  About a stool, from which two of its covering-boards had been removed, the one beside the other, which Rabbi Akiba pronounces able to contract impurity, but the Sages declare unable to contract impurity.  The disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Akiva is over a chair which had two adjoining cover-boards removed.  We discussed this issue in chapter one, mishnah eleven, when we discussed the special bridal chair.  Here we learn that according to Rabbi Akiva, once two adjoining cover-boards are removed, it is no longer useful as a chair, and therefore it is not receptive to impurity.  The Sages hold that since the chair could still be used if there was great need for it, it can still receive impurity.  In other words, it is still a chair.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  Mishnayoth nine (and ten) contain further statements of Rabbi Akiva.  These statements are not about halakhah, but rather about aggadah, or Jewish legend.
  He used to say: the father transmits to the son beauty, strength, wealth, wisdom and years.  This mishnah contains a popular saying by Rabbi Akiva, that a son inherits from his father, beauty, strength, wealth, wisdom and years, which is length of life.
  And the number of generations before Him, that shall be their appointed end:   For it is said, “calling the generations from the beginning” (Isaiah 51:4) Although it is said, “And shall serve them, and they shall afflict them four hundred years” (Genesis 15:13), it is also said, “And in the fourth generation they shall come hither again” (Genesis 15:16).  This section has been explained in many different ways and is very difficult to understand.  I will explain it the way that Albeck explains.  Rabbi Akiva is dealing with the issue of fate:  if a father controls the number of years that his son will live, how is that God has already determined how long the world will last.  The answer that Rabbi Akiva gives is that the number of generations is fixed, as the verse in Isaiah says, but the number of years in each generation is not fixed.  Although one verse from Exodus seems to say that God counts years, a few verses later generations are mentioned.  According to Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation of these verses and his theology, a person’s years are determined by his actions and by his father’s actions, and not predetermined by God.  It is only the number of generations until redemption that is known by God.  Of course, human beings do not know this number. It is important to note that when we deal with issues such as fate and the end of the world, we are dealing with issues about which many different Jewish answers have been given.  This is not an issue that human beings can fully understand.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  Mishnayoth ten contains another statement of Rabbi Akiva.
  There are five heavenly judgements which according to Rabbi Akiva were meted out for one year.
  Also he used to say that there are five things that last twelve months:The judgment of the generation of the flood [continued] twelve months;  The judgement of the generation of the flood lasted one year.  According to Genesis 7:11 the flood began on the seventeenth of the second month of the 600th year of Noah’s life.  According to 8:14, the earth was dry one year and ten days later.  The extra ten days are the adjustment for the difference between a lunar and solar calendar.
  The judgment of Job [continued] twelve months;  Job’s trial lasted a year.  This is learned from Job 7:3 which states, “So have I been allotted months of futility; nights of misery have been apportioned to me.”  According to a midrash the months of futility are the days of the summer which are long and the nights of misery which are also long.  Together, it can be concluded that Job suffered for one whole year.
  The judgment of the Egyptians [continued] twelve months;  The ten plagues lasted a year, according to Rabbi Akiva.  This is learned through a midrash on Exodus 5:12.  According to this verse the plagues began only after the Egyptians forced the Israelite slaves to search for their own straw.  Since straw is found in the month of Iyyar, May, and the Israelites left Egypt in Nissan, April, the conclusion can be drawn that the plagues lasted one year.
  The judgment of Gog and Magog in the time to come [will continue] twelve months;  Gog is a King and Magog is his country.  According to Ezekiel 38-39, at the end of time Gog will fight a battle with Israel, at which point God will bring judgement upon Gog and his people.  According to Rabbi Akiva, this judgement will last one year.  This is learned in the midrash from Isaiah 18:6, “The kites shall summer on them and all the beasts of the earth shall winter on them”.  This verse is understood as referring to the war of Gog at the end of days.  The verse states that they will be punished for a summer and a winter, meaning for an entire year.
  The judgment of the wicked in gehinom [continues] twelve months, for it is said, and “It will be from one month until its [same] month” (Isaiah 66:23). Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: “[As long as] from Passover to Shavuoth, for it is said, “And from one Sabbath until its [next] Sabbath” (ibid.).  The wicked are judged in Gehinom, which is a Jewish word for hell, for one year.  This is learned from Isaiah 66:24 which states, “They shall go out and gaze on the corpses of the men who rebelled against Me.”  The previous verse states that “Month after month and Sabbath after Sabbath all flesh shall come and worship me.”  How can all flesh come and praise God if the corpses of the rebellious are being punished.  To solve this problem, the Rabbis reverse the order of the verses, understanding that the wicked are first punished and then allowed to return to praising God.  From the words “month after month” Rabbi Akiva concludes that the wicked shall be judged from one month until the next appearance of the same month, meaning twelve months.  As an aside, this is where the Jewish custom of saying Kaddish over a parent for 11 months originates.  If one were to say Kaddish for a full twelve months, it would be assuming that the parent was wicked.  Since no one would want to make such a statement, we say Kaddish for eleven months. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri learns from the words “Sabbath after Sabbath” in the above verse that the wicked are judged for a time period equal to the time between one holiday and the next. (Sabbath can sometimes mean holiday, as opposed to its usual meaning, the seventh day of the week).   The shortest such period is the time between Passover and Shavuoth, which is seven weeks.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first six mishnayoth of this chapter contain ten disputes between Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas and the Sages.
  This is a complicated mishnah, which requires the knowledge of some rules before we begin to explain the details. 1) A corpse causes impurity in three ways: a) by contact, b) by being carried; c) by being under the same roof-space, referred to as a tent. 2) Certain parts of a dead body impart impurity even though there is not a full corpse. 3) In order for a part of a corpse to impart impurity it must have a minimum measure the size of an olive. 4) Tent impurity is contracted in three ways: i) If a corpse, or part thereof, is found under a roof structure, anything under that roof structure is impure. ii) If the corpse, or part thereof, is above a person or vessel, the corpse imparts impurity. iii) If the person or vessel is above the corpse, the person and vessel are impure. Our mishnah discusses the ability of two pieces of a corpse, that are smaller than an olive, to join together and make a piece of corpse larger than an olive and transmit impurity in different situations.
  [In the case of] all things which cause defilement in a “tent”, if they [the pieces of the corpse] were divided and brought into the house, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas pronounces [everything under the same roof-space] clean, but the Sages pronounce it unclean.  This is an introduction to the mishnah.  Here we learn that if two pieces of a dead body smaller than an olive but together the size of an olive are found under one roof, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinos declares that they do not join to impart impurity and the Sages declare that they do join.
  How so? He who touches as much as two halves of an olive [in quantity] of an animal’s carcass or carries them; or in the case of a [human] corpse, he who touches as much as half an olive and stands over as much as half an olive; or touches as much as half an olive and as much as half an olive is above him; or if he stands over as much as two halves of an olive; or if he stands over as much as half an olive and as much as half an olive is above him Rabbi Dosa b. Harkinas pronounces him clean, and the Sages pronounce him unclean. 3 But if he touches as much as half an olive [in quantity] and another thing was over him and over as much as half an olive; or if he stood over as much as half an olive and another thing was over him and over as much as half an olive, he is clean.  The mishnah now goes over all of the different examples in which the Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute. A. If one touches or carries two separate pieces of a dead animal, each the size of half an olive.  Note that there is no tent impurity caused by dead animals, and therefore this example mentions only carrying and contact. B. If one touches a piece of corpse the size of half an olive and makes a tent, over another piece the same size (rule 4iii above). C. A person forms a tent over two half-olive size pieces of a corpse. D. A person forms a tent over one half-olive size piece of corpse and one half-olive size piece of corpse forms a tent over him. In all of these case Rabbi Dosa declares that the pieces of corpse do not join together.
  Rabbi Meir said: “Also in this case Rabbi Dosa pronounces him clean and the sages pronounce him unclean. In all such cases a man is unclean unless there is an act of touching and also an act of carrying, or an act of carrying and also [the fact of] being under the same roof-space.”  In this section are listed two cases where the Sages would agree with Rabbi Dosa that he is pure. A. If one touches a half-olive size piece of corpse and something else forms a tent over him and a half-olive size piece, he is still pure. B. If one forms a tent over a half-olive size piece of corpse, and something else forms a tent over him and another half-olive size piece of corpse, he is still pure. The reason why in this case the Sages declare him pure is that the two types of impurity are of a different nature.  When something forms a tent over a person and a piece of corpse that is considered to be tent impurity, whereas when a person forms a tent over a piece of corpse or a piece of corpse forms a tent over him, that is considered contact impurity.  In the cases in section two, there were two kinds of contact impurity; hence the two half-olives joined to transmit impurity.  In the cases in section three, one piece of corpse transmitted tent impurity and the other contact impurity.  Hence the Sages agree that he is pure.
  This is the general rule: in whatever case the means of causing defilement are of one category, he is unclean; if they are of two categories, he is clean.”  Rabbi Meir holds that even in these cases the Sages would declare the person impure, and Rabbi Dosa would say he is pure.  Rabbi Meir explains that according to the Sages tent impurity and contact impurity do join.  The only type of impurity that does not join is contact impurity with carrying impurity.
  This is a general rule that summarizes the whole mishnah.  Any time there are two pieces of corpse transmitting impurity, they join only if they are transmitting a type of impurity with the same name. According to Rabbi Dosa none of the three types of impurity, tent, carrying and contact join together. According to the first version of the Sages opinion, contact and tent impurity do not join. According to Rabbi Meir, contact and tent impurity join but carrying and contact impurity and carrying and tent impurity do not join. Congratulations!  You just learned a very difficult mishnah.  If you couldn’t follow all the details do not despair.  This was probably one of the most complicated mishnayoth we have seen yet.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Food which is in separate pieces does not combine together [to receive impurity], according to Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas. But the Sages say: “It does combines together.”  For food to become impure it must be the size of an egg.  According to Rabbi Dosa food which is broken up into pieces smaller than the size of an egg does not join to receive impurity, whereas according to the Sages it does.
  One may exchange [ produce of] second tithe for uncoined metal, according to Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “One may not so exchange it.”  The second tithe may be redeemed with money and brought to Jerusalem.  According to Rabbi Dosa one may redeem this second tithe even with a coin that does not have a stamp upon it.  According to the Sages it must have a stamp.  This is learned from Deuteronomy 14:25, which says “money” in connection with second tithe.
  The hands [alone] need to be immersed for the waters of purification according to Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “If his hands have become unclean his whole body becomes unclean.”  A person whose hands have become impure by touching impure food (but not a corpse, which would cause impurity to the whole body), need only wash his hands before touching the waters of purification which are used to purify someone who has contracted corpse impurity.  This is according to Rabbi Dosa.  The Sages disagree and say that with regards to touching waters of purification, if his hands are impure his whole body is impure.  To become pure he would need to take a ritual bath (mikveh).
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  The insides of a melon and the discarded leaves of a vegetable of terumah: Rabbi Dosa permits [their] use to non-priests, and the Sages forbid it.  Terumah, one of the agricultural offerings, may be eaten only by priests.  According to Rabbi Dosa, the parts of terumah produce that are not commonly eaten are permitted to non-priests.  Since these are not considered food, and the laws of terumah are only applicable to food, these things may be eaten by non-priests.  The Sages forbid this.  Presumably, according to the Sages since people do occasionally eat these things, the laws of terumah apply to them as well.
  Five ewes, their fleeces weighing each a mina and a half, are subject to [the law of] the first of the fleece, according to Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “Five ewes [are subject] whatever [their fleeces weigh].”  According to Deuteronomy 18:4, the first shearings of a sheep must be given to the priest.  In our mishnah Rabbi Dosa and the Sages disagree about the minimum weight of the fleeces of the sheep which would cause them to be subject to these laws.  According to Rabbi Dosa a person is not liable to give these shearings to the priest unless he has five female sheep and each fleece weighs a mina and a half, about 150 grams.  Less than this is not even considered “shearings”.  The Sages disagree.  According to them as long as five female sheep are sheared, he must give the first shearings to the priest, no matter what the weight of the wool.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  All mats are [liable to become] impure by “corpse” impurity, the words of Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “[Also by] “midras” impurity.  Rabbi Dosa and the Sages disagree with regards to the susceptibility of mats to midras impurity.  Midras impurity is a type of impurity which is received by a zav sitting or lying down on an object.  Only things that are typically sat on or lied down upon can receive this type of impurity.  According to Rabbi Dosa, mats can receive corpse impurity by coming into contact with a dead body, or a part thereof.  However, since the mats under discussion are not used for sitting or for lying down, they cannot receive midras impurity.  The Sages hold that they can, since they are occasionally used for such a purpose.
  All network is unsusceptible to impurity except a [network] girdle, the words of Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “They are all liable to uncleanness, except those used by wool dealers [for carrying raw wool].”  Network, things made of nets (not computer networks, which I suppose cannot receive impurity), are not considered by Rabbi Dosa to be clothing and therefore they cannot receive impurity.  As we learned on several occasions, only things that are formed vessels or clothing can receive impurity.  Since network is not really clothing, it cannot receive impurity.  The only exception to this rule about things made of nets is a type of girdle which is a piece of clothing and therefore can be made impure.  The Sages disagree.  They hold that network is considered clothing.  The only exception is a bag used by wool dealers to hold wool.  Since this is definitely not clothing it cannot be made impure.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   We have now learned several disputes between Rabbi Dosa and the Sages.  Do you seen any consistency to their opinions?
   Mishnah four:  What modern items might be similar to the mats and network under discussion in this mishnah?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   We have now learned several disputes between Rabbi Dosa and the Sages.  Do you seen any consistency to their opinions?
   Mishnah four:  What modern items might be similar to the mats and network under discussion in this mishnah?
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  A sling whose pocket is woven is susceptible to impurity. If it is of leather, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas pronounces it susceptible to impurity, and the Sages pronounce it not susceptible to impurity. If its finger-hold is broken off, it is not susceptible to impurity; [But if the] string-handle [only] is broken off it is susceptible to impurity. This mishnah discusses when a sling is considered usable and therefore liable to receive impurity.  If the pocket is woven, all agree that it is liable to receive impurity.  However, if it is of leather, Rabbi Dosa hold that it may not receive impurity.  This is based on two rules:  1)  a strip of leather must be five handbreadths wide by five handbreadths long in order to receive impurity.  Since a sling is not this large, it does not receive impurity due to its size and significance.  2)  Rabbi Dosa does not consider the sling to be a “vessel” which inherently is receptive to impurity.  The Sages disagree.  They hold that a sling is inherently a vessel and therefore the pouch receives impurity no matter what it is made out of and no matter what size its pouch is. If the finger-hold is broken off the sling is unusable, and therefore cannot receive impurity. However, if the string-handle, which is attached to the pouch and is pulled back to throw the rock which is in the sling, is broken, the sling can still receive impurity, since it can be used.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  A female captive may eat of terumah, according to the words of Rabbi Dosa b. Harkinas. But the Sages say: “There is a female captive who may eat, and there is a female captive who may not eat. How is this so? The woman who said: ‘I was taken captive but [nonetheless] I am pure’, she may eat; because the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permit. But if there are witnesses [who declare] that she was made a captive, and she says: ‘[nonetheless] I am pure’, she may not eat.” This mishnah discusses a woman who was married to a priest or an unmarried daughter of a priest who is taken captive.  These two types of women, prior to having been taken captive, could certainly have eaten terumah.  According to the halakhah, a woman who has had sexual relations, even against her will, with someone with whom it is forbidden to do so, can no longer eat terumah.  The issue in our mishnah is, do we assume that a woman who was taken captive by a non-Jew was raped by the non-Jew and therefore can no longer eat terumah.  According to Rabbi Dosa, we do not make such an assumption, and she may continue to eat terumah unless there is evidence that she has been raped. According to the Sages, this is not always true. Her ability to eat terumah will depend on the circumstances in which the court found out that she had been taken captive.  If she came in front of the court and stated that she had been taken captive but that she was still pure, i.e. she had not been violated by the captor, she may continue to eat terumah.  This is due to a legal principle known as “the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permit”.  It means that if a person makes a statement that is to his own detriment and then makes another related statement to his benefit, he is believed in both statements.  Since he could have said nothing, and thereby not aroused any suspicion about himself, he is believed when he exculpates himself from that suspicion.  For instance, if Reuven says to Shimon, “this piece of land of mine used to be your father’s but now he sold it to me.”  Reuven is admitting that the land he owns was not always his, but he also says that he bought it. Telling Shimon that it was his father’s is “forbidding” it and stating that he bought it is “permitting” it.  In our case, if the woman says that she was taken captive, she has “forbidden” herself by creating a suspicion that she may have had relations with the captor.  When she says that she did not she is believed. However, if there are witnesses who testify that she had been taken captive, then when she denies having been violated by the captor, she is not believed.  Since she did not “forbid” but rather the witnesses did, the rule of “the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permit” is not applicable here.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Mishnayoth seven and eight both list cases in which one Sage declares something pure and the other Sages declare it impure.
  Four  cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure. In this mishnah are listed four situations in which there is a doubt whether or not the pure person was touched by the impure person, or one of them formed a tent over the other (which would cause impurity to be transmitted, even without contact) or one of them moved the other (which would also transmit impurity, even without contact).  In all of these situations Rabbi Joshua rules that the previously pure person is now impure, whereas the Sages hold that he is still pure. The cases are: i + ii)  A case where one of the people is moving and one is stationary.  In this case Rabbi Joshua pronounces the person impure due to the general rule that doubtful cases of impurity which occur in the private domain are ruled impure.  The Sages say that he is pure. Although there is a general rule that doubtful cases of impurity that occur in the private domain are ruled impure, this is true only when the pure and the impure are either both moving or both stationary.  If their status is different, then the rule is not applicable. iii + iv)  The pure and impure are in different domains, one in the public domain and one in the private domain.  According to Rabbi Joshua, since at least one of the two is in the private domain, he is impure, due to the above mentioned rule.  According to the Sages, since one is in the public domain, the rule that doubtful cases of impurity in the private domain does not apply.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah eight contains another case in which one Sage declares something pure and the other Sages declare it impure.
  Three things Rabbi Zadok pronounces [liable to receive] impurity and the Sages pronounce them not [liable to receive]: The nail of the money-changer; And the chest of grist makers; And the nail of a stone dial. Rabbi Zadok pronounces [liable to receive] impurity and the Sages pronounce them not [liable to receive]. Rabbi Zadok and the Sages disagree with regards to the liability of three items to receive impurity.  Again, in order to receive impurity something must be considered “a vessel”, which in the Mishnah can include any manmade usable object which a has a specified purpose to it.  According to Rabbi Zadok the items listed in our mishnah fit the definition of “vessel” whereas according to the Sages, they do not. The items are: 1) The nail of a money-changer.  According to Maimonides, this was the nail used to hang the scales that the money-changer would use to weigh the money. 2) The chest used by a grist-maker to store the grist.  Others explain that this is the nail of a chest used by a grist-maker, which is used to attach the chest to a wagon to bring the grist to market.  If this is the correct explanation, then our mishnah lists three different types of nails. 3) The nail used to measure time in a sundial.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Four things Rabban Gamaliel pronounces susceptible to impurity, and the Sages pronounce them not susceptible to impurity.The covering of a metal basket, if it belongs to householders;And the hanger of a strigil;And metals vessels which are still unshaped;And a plate that is divided into two [equal] parts. And the Sages agree with Rabban Gamaliel in the case of a plate that was divided into two parts, one large and one small, that the large one is susceptible to impurity and the small one is not susceptible to impurity.The next three mishnayoth contain halakhic traditions revolving around Rabban Gamaliel.  Mishnah nine continues the pattern of the previous mishnah, of a dispute over which things are susceptible to impurity.In mishnah eight we learned of three things that Rabbi Zadok declared susceptible to impurity and the Sages not susceptible.  In mishnah nine we will learn of the same type of dispute, this time between Rabban Gamaliel and the Sages.  Again, they seem to be disputing about how to define when something is a “vessel” such that it is susceptible to impurity.  They dispute over four items:1) The covering of a metal basket which belongs to a householder.  In another tractate we learn that there is a difference between this type of covering if it is owned by a doctor.  The doctors used these coverings for various uses, and therefore everyone agrees that they are susceptible to impurity.  Rabban Gamaliel holds that a covering of this type of basket is used by non-professionals as well, and is therefore susceptible to impurity even if it belongs to a non-professional (a householder).  The Sages disagree.2) The hanger of a strigil.  A strigil was a type of comb used during baths to scrape off dead skin.  All agree that the strigil itself is susceptible to impurity.  They disagree about the small chain attached to the strigil to hang it on a hook.  According to Rabban Gamaliel it too is considered a vessel and therefore receives impurity.  According to the Sages it does not.3) Generally speaking, unformed vessels cannot receive impurity.  However, when it comes to metal vessels that have not been fully finished, in other words they have not been polished, Rabban Gamaliel holds that they are susceptible to impurity, since they can be used.  The Sages insist that as long as they are not fully finished they cannot receive impurity.According to Rabban Gamaliel, a plate broken in two can still receive impurity.  The Sages hold that broken vessels cannot generally speaking receive impurity.  However, they agree with Rabban Gamaliel that if one of the pieces was large, that it still can receive impurity, since it is still useful.  The small piece cannot receive impurity.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah ten contains three cases in which Rabban Gamaliel ruled like Beth Shammai.
  This mishnah lists three cases in which Rabban Gamaliel ruled strictly, as had Beth Shammai.  Although later Sages generally ruled like Beth Hillel, there were some exceptions, and some of those are listed in our mishnah.
  In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai.One may not wrap up hot food on a festival for the Sabbath;  The Torah allows one to cook on the festival but not on the Sabbath.  This rule has a limitation:  one may cook on the festival only to eat that day, and not to prepare food for later.  It is even forbidden to prepare food on a festival for the Sabbath, since that would be considered an insult to the honor of the festival.  However, since this was necessary in cases where the Sabbath fell after the festival, the Sages developed something which is known as “eruv tavshilin”.  A person would symbolically begin to cook a meal for the Sabbath on the day before the festival.  Since he had already begun to cook for the Sabbath, he was allowed to cook other things on the festival for the Sabbath.  This is a type of legal fiction still practiced today by halakhic Jews.  According to Beth Shammai, if a person must create a separate type of “eruv tavshilin” for each type of cooking he wishes to do:  if he wants to bake he must begin baking before the festival; if he wants to boil he must begin boiling before the festival.  Rabban Gamaliel rules that it is forbidden to wrap food to make it retain its heat, since that is not part of the “eruv tavshilin” that he had made before the holiday.  Beth Hillel would have allowed such an action, since Beth Hillel holds that all one must begin to do is cook a little bit, and that is sufficient to continue to do any cooking activities on the festival.
  And one may not join together a lamp on a festival;  If a lamp made of several parts breaks on the festival, Rabban Gamaliel forbids one to fix it, since this is a type of “building” which is forbidden on the Sabbath.  Beth Hillel holds that there is no prohibition of “building” with regards to erecting vessels, and therefore this is permitted.
  And one may not bake [on festivals] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel said:  “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.”  Rabban Gamaliel holds that it is forbidden to bake large loaves on a festival, and that only thin loaves are permitted.  This is meant to prevent one from making too much bread on the festival, lest he make some for after the festival.  Beth Hillel holds that it is permitted to bake large loaves, since bread cooks better when the oven is full. The final section of the mishnah contains some interaction between Rabban Gamaliel and the other Sages, who hold like Beth Hillel. Rabban Gamaliel testifies that his father’s house indeed acted in this manner, and only baked wafer-cakes on the festival.  The other Sages accept this testimony of Rabban Gamaliel as being an accurate description of what Rabban Gamaliel’s father’s house used to do, but they understand its significance differently.  The Sages say that Rabban Gamaliel’s father’s house was strict upon themselves, but allowed the rest of Israel to cook large loaves, even charcoal roasted loaves which are very difficult to make.  The strict actions of Rabban Gamaliel’s fathers house were only meant for themselves and were not meant to set precedent for everyone else.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  In mishnah ten we learned of three cases where Rabban Gamaliel was strict like Beth Shammai.  In mishnah eleven we will learn three cases where he adopted a more lenient position than the other Sages.
  Also he declared three decisions of a lenient character:One may sweep up [on a festival] between the couches,  In the time of the Mishnah, during formal meals people would recline on couches on the ground and eat off personal tables which were more like trays.  According to Rabban Gamaliel one can sweep up between the couches after the meal on a festival.  The Sages forbid this for fear that one might fill in a hole that is in the floor, which could be considered a form of building, which is forbidden on the Sabbath.
  And put spices [on the coals] on a festival;  Cooking food is allowed on a festival (but not on the Sabbath).  Rabban Gamaliel allowed people to put spices on coals, which would make a pleasant scent.  Even though this is not cooking food, it is permitted since it is still a bodily pleasure.  The Sages forbid doing so since not all people are equally accustomed to put spices on coals after a meal.
  And roast a kid whole on the night of Passover. But the sages forbid them.  When there was a Temple in Jerusalem, people would roast kids (lambs, not the human kind) as Passover sacrifices on the day before Passover and eat them at night.  When the Temple was destroyed in 70 C.E. sacrifices could no longer be offered.  Nevertheless, Rabban Gamaliel permitted people to make roasted kids at their own seders.  The other Sages forbid this, lest someone think that they were eating sacrificial meat outside of Jerusalem.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allows three things and the Sages forbid them:His cow used to go out with the strap which she had between her horns;One may curry cattle on a festival;And one may grind pepper in its own mill.Rabbi Judah says: one may not curry cattle on a festival, because it may cause a wound, but one may comb them.But the Sages say: one may not curry them, and one may not even comb them.Mishnah twelve contains three cases where Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah was more lenient than the other Sages.Section one:  It is forbidden to carry things in the public domain on the Sabbath.  This is true even for a person’s animal, since it is forbidden to make one’s animal perform work on the Sabbath.  Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allowed his cow to go out with a strap between its horns, since this strap was only an adornment and therefore he did not consider it “work”.  In the same way a person can wear clothing in the public domain and that is not considered carrying.  However, the Sages forbid cows from carrying anything, since most cows do not do so.  Furthermore, if others were to see this they would think that it is permitted for an animal to work on the Sabbath.Section two:  Rabbi Eleazar permits a person to curry an animal on the festival, even though that might cause a wound.  Currying is a type of combing done with a sharp metal comb.  Rabbi Eleazar permits this activity since even if he causes a wound he did not intend to do so and unintentionally performed work is permitted on the Sabbath.  In section four, Rabbi Judah states that currying is forbidden since it will cause a wound, but combing with a wooden comb is permitted since it will not cause a wound.  In section five the Sages state that even combing is forbidden, lest by permitting combing one might assume that currying is also permitted.Section three:  Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah permits the grinding of peppercorns on the Sabbath, even in grinders made for grinding large quantities of peppercorns.  Although this is a large amount of work, and it is clear that most of the pepper will not be used on that day, Rabbi Eleazar nevertheless permits.  The Sages forbid this.  According to them, one may grind peppercorns only in small quantities with a mortar and pestle, since grinding more than this would be allowing one to prepare food on the festival for a week day, which is forbidden.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This entire chapter contains cases where Beth Shammai was lenient and Beth Hillel was strict.  Generally speaking the opposite is true, hence these are exceptional cases.
  Most of the examples in these mishnayoth are from the laws concerning festivals.  There is a halakhic concept in Judaism called “muktzeh”.  There are many forms of “muktzeh”;  I will explain the one form germane to these two mishnayoth.  [For more information you can look at the Steinsaltz reference guide].  Anything consumed on Shabbat or a festival has to have been available before the day begins.  This “availability” must be both physical and mental.  In other words the thing must have been physically available before the day began and the person must have known the day before that he might use the object during the Sabbath or festival.  Anything that is not available before the day began is considered “muktzeh”.  We will see some examples as we proceed.
  The following cases are [examples] of the lenient rulings of Beth Shammai and of the rigorous rulings of Beth Hillel.An egg which is laid on a festival   Beth Shammai says: it may be eaten, and Beth Hillel says: it may not be eaten.  An egg which is laid on a festival is considered by Beth Hillel to be “muktzeh” something which was not available to be consumed on the eve of the festival and therefore is forbidden on the festival itself.  Beth Shammai holds that since the chicken was available on the eve of the festival, the egg is as well, for if the person had slaughtered the chicken he could have eaten the egg inside.
  Beth Shammai says: yeast as much as an olive [in quantity], and leavened food as much as a date, and Beth Hillel says: as much as an olive [in quantity] in both cases.  On Passover it is forbidden to eat either leavened products or the leaven itself, which is yeast.  According to Beth Shammai if one eats as a much as olive’s worth of yeast or a date’s worth of leavened food, he is liable for having transgressed the laws of Passover.  Beth Hillel holds that in both cases one who eats an olive’s worth is liable.  Note that smaller amounts are not permitted either.  A smaller amount is still forbidden but one who consumes a smaller amount has not transgressed the Biblical prohibition of eating yeast or leavened food on Passover.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues the subject of yesterday’s mishnah, muktzeh.
  A beast which was born on a festival   all agree that it is permitted; and a chicken which was hatched from the egg   all agree that it is forbidden.  This section contains an elaboration of the dispute that was in the first section of the previous mishnah.  There we saw that a dispute with regards to an egg born on a festival:  Beth Shammai permitted its consumption and Beth Hillel forbid.  In this mishnah we learn that there are two other similar instances where the two houses do not disagree.  They both hold that a beast that was born on a festival is permitted.  Although the beast was not born before the festival, and therefore might have been thought to be “muktzeh”, it in reality was available since if the mother had been slaughtered, the unborn young could have been eaten as well. The two houses also agree that a chicken hatched on the festival is forbidden.  Even though Beth Shammai permits an egg that is laid, the chicken that is hatched is different because it was still in its shell the day before.  Unlike the beast which was in its mother who could have been slaughtered and eaten, the chicken was not part of another animal that could have been eaten.
  He who slaughters a wild animal or a bird on a festival   Beth Shammai says: he may dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood] , but Beth Hillel says: he may not slaughter unless he has had earth made ready. But they agree that if he did slaughter he should dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood, and] that the ashes of a stove count as being prepared for the holiday.  According to Leviticus 17:13, when one slaughters an undomesticated animal or any type of foul the blood must be poured out of the animal and covered with earth.  One who slaughters an undomesticated animal or foul on the festival has a problem.  Although it is permitted to slaughter if he doesn’t have any prepared earth to cover the blood, newly dug earth is “muktzeh” and cannot be used.  Nevertheless, Beth Shammai permits one to dig up new earth and cover the blood.  Beth Hillel says one cannot slaughter unless one has earth already prepared. However, they all agree that if he had already slaughtered the animal, even though Beth Hillel says he should not have done so without already prepared earth, he may still dig new earth to cover the blood.  This is because the principle of “muktzeh” is only rabbinically ordained and the obligation to cover the blood is Biblical.  When one has two competing commandments, one rabbinic and one Biblical, the latter takes precedence.  The two houses also agree that the ashes in the oven are considered prepared for the festival, in other words they are not “muktzeh”.  Since people used these ashes for different purposes, we can make the assumption that before the festival began he knew in his mind that he would use these ashes.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The Mishnah continues to bring disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, in which Beth Shammai took the lenient position.
  Beth Shammai says: [produce pronounced] ownerless with respect to the poor [only] is counted as ownerless. But Beth Hillel says: it is not counted as ownerless unless it is made ownerless also with respect to the rich, as in the year of release (.  This section discusses the process whereby a person announces that something he owns is legally ownerless.  One of the important consequences of such an action is that if the item is a food product he need not separate tithes before he eats it.  In other words if a person has some produce he may pronounce it ownerless and eat from it without tithing.  Of course, he runs the risk of having other people come and take it from him.  According to Beth Shammai one could partially pronounce his produce ownerless by declaring that only the poor may partake of it.  Beth Hillel disagrees and says that pronouncing something legally ownerless must be complete. Beth Hillel learns this from the precedent set by the laws of the “year of release”, or the shmittah (seventh) year.  During the seventh year all produce grown in the fields is ownerless and anyone may enter any field and eat from it, both rich and poor.  Beth Hillel says that just as seventh year produce is ownerless and available to anyone, so too all produce must be available to all.
  If all the sheaves of the field were of one kav each and one was of four kavs, and it was forgotten, Beth Shammai says: it does not count as forgotten, And Beth Hillel says: it counts as forgotten.  There are a number of agricultural rights given by the Torah to the poor. One of them is the right to collect the harvested sheaves forgotten in a field (Deuteronomy 24:19).  The dispute here is over the definition of a forgotten sheaf.  According to Beth Shammai if all of the sheaves were one kav in volume and the forgotten sheaf was four times that size, and he left the large sheaf in the field, it is not considered forgotten.  The reason is that four separate sheaves that are left together are not considered to be forgotten.  In other words, if four separate sheaves are left in a field we can assume that the owner never came to collect them, and not that he came to collect them and left them behind.  Beth Shammai says that if one sheaf is the size of four sheaves of that field we can consider it to be four separate sheaves and it is not considered forgotten.  Beth Hillel holds that since it is really only one sheaf, we can assume that he did forget it, and hence it already belongs to the poor.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The Mishnah continues to bring disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, in which Beth Shammai took the lenient position.
  A sheaf which was close to a wall or to a stack or to the herd or to [field] utensils, and was forgotten, Beth Shammai says: it does not count as forgotten, And Beth Hillel says: it counts as forgotten. This mishnah continues to discuss the definition of “forgotten”.  According to Beth Shammai, if one left a sheaf close to a specific item, we can assume that he intended to go back and get the sheaf, and that is why he left it close to that item.  In this case he may go back and collect it at a later time.  Beth Hillel does consider this sheaf to be forgotten and therefore it belongs to the poor.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   From whose perspective is Beth Shammai lenient in these mishnayoth?  Why does the editor of the Mishnah consider them lenient and Beth Hillel strict?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   From whose perspective is Beth Shammai lenient in these mishnayoth?  Why does the editor of the Mishnah consider them lenient and Beth Hillel strict?
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah contains several disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel with regards to the status of the fruit of a vineyard in its fourth year, which according to Leviticus 19:24 must be “set aside”.  The Rabbis teach that this fruit is similar to second tithe and that both may be consumed by their owners only in Jerusalem.  In our mishnah Beth Shammai says that despite some similarities to second tithe there are some key differences. Beth Hillel teaches that they are completely the same.
  A vineyard of the fourth year     Beth Shammai says: it is not subject to the law of the fifth nor to the law of removal. And Beth Hillel says: it is subject to the law of the fifth and to the law of removal.  The fruit of a vineyard in its fourth year is treated similar to second tithe.  Both must be brought to Jerusalem and consumed there.  If it is too far or too difficult to carry the actual fruit to Jerusalem one may redeem it for money and bring the money to Jerusalem and use it to buy food there.   When second tithe is redeemed for money, a person must add one-fifth the value of the produce being redeemed.  According to Beth Shammai, when one redeems the fruit of fourth year vineyard he does not need to add the fifth. According to Beth Hillel he does, just as he does with second tithe. Before Passover on the fourth and seventh years of a seven year (shmittah) cycle, one must remove all of the tithes from one’s house.  This is called the “law of removal”.  According to Beth Shammai the law does not apply to the removal of the fruit of a fourth year vineyard.  According to Beth Hillel it does.
  Beth Shammai says: it is subject to the law of fallen grapes and to the law of gleanings,   and the poor redeem them for themselves. And Beth Hillel says: all of it goes to the winepress.  According to Leviticus 19:10 one is not allowed to pick bare the fruit of a vineyard nor collect the fallen fruit.  Rather these must be left for the poor.  According to Beth Shammai these rules still apply for the fourth year vineyard. When the poor person has collected his share, he must redeem it himself and bring the money to Jerusalem and use it there to buy food.  According to Beth Hillel fourth year produce is not subject to the laws of what must be left to the poor.  Just as second tithe is not subject to the laws of what must be left for the poor, so too fourth year produce is not.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah contains two disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, the first over the impurity of olives inside a barrel and the second over the impurity of the oil dripping off a person who had entered the mikveh (ritual bath).
  A barrel of pickled olives:  Beth Shammai says: one need not perforate it, And Beth Hillel say: one must perforate it. But they agree that if it was perforated and the dregs stopped it up, it is not liable to receive impurity.  Leviticus 11:38 teaches that food cannot receive impurity unless it has come into contact with water.  The Rabbis taught that not only water but other liquids as well can cause food to become receptive to impurity.  However, if the owner of the food did not wish the liquid to touch his food the liquid does not cause the food to become receptive to impurity.  In this section of our mishnah Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagree with regards to the liquid that oozes out of olives that have been pickled in salt.  Everyone agrees that this liquid is not desired by the owner; all he wants are the edible olives.  However, according to Beth Hillel the owner must put a hole in the barrel to let the liquid seep out in order to make it clear that he does not want the liquid.  If he does not do so the olives will be made receptive to impurity by the liquid which oozes out of them.  Beth Shammai does not require one to put this hole.  According to them we can generally assume that a person does not want such liquids and therefore they do not cause food to become receptive to impurity. Both houses agree that if one put a hole in the barrel and then it was closed up by the dregs that the olives are not receptive to impurity.  Since he put a hole in the barrel he has made it clear that he does not want the liquids inside and therefore their contact with the olives do not cause the olives to receive impurity.
  One who had anointed himself with clean oil and [then] became unclean, and he went down and immersed himself, Beth Shammai says: although he still drips [oil], it is clean. And Beth Hillel says: [only while there remains] enough for anointing a small limb. And if from the beginning it was unclean oil, Beth Shammai says: [it is unclean as long as there remains] enough for anointing a small limb, And Beth Hillel says: [even if there remains as much] as a moist liquid. (4) Rabbi Judah says in the name of Beth Hillel: [provided it remains] moist [itself] and [can also] moisten [other things].  The first part of this section discusses one who anoints himself with pure oil and then becomes impure.  [Anointing with oil was part of the bathing process].  If he enters the mikveh (ritual bath) to purify himself, according to Beth Shammai, he also purifies any remaining oil on his body.  Although oil is cannot generally be made pure through a mikveh, in this case the oil becomes pure by being part of his body, which does become pure.  Beth Hillel holds that if there is only enough oil remaining on his body to anoint a small limb, it is pure.  In this case we can say that the oil is not of significance in and of itself and therefore is part of the body.  However, if there is more than that, it is impure. If the oil was impure from the outset, and then the person became impure through another source of impurity (the oil itself cannot cause the person to become impure), and went into the mikveh, then both houses are stricter with regards to the purity of the oil remaining on his body.  According to Beth Shammai if only enough remains to anoint a small limb, it is pure.  If more remains it is impure. According to Beth Hillel if enough remains to moisten the hand that touches the oil, it is impure; if less, then it is pure.  Rabbi Judah teaches a different version of Beth Hillel’s words.  According to him if enough remains to moisten the hand that touches the oil and to moisten another area as well, it is impure.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  Why are both houses stricter in the second case (where the oil was impure before he anointed himself with it) than they are in the first (where it only became impure when he became impure)?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  Why are both houses stricter in the second case (where the oil was impure before he anointed himself with it) than they are in the first (where it only became impure when he became impure)?
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues listing the leniencies of Beth Shammai.  The issues listed in our mishnah are from the realm of marital law.
  A woman is betrothed by a denar or the value of a denar, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: by a perutah or the value of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? One-eighth of an Italian issar.  There are two stages in the Jewish marital process:  kiddushin (betrothal) and nisuin (marriage).  We will learn these laws more extensively when we learn Seder Nashim.  For now I will merely mention that kiddushin creates a stronger bond than secular engagement does in our day.  In order to separate from Jewish betrothal there is a need for a full divorce. One of the ways of contracting betrothal is for the man to give something of value to a woman.  Today this is usually performed with a ring, a custom not mentioned in the Mishnah or even in the Talmud.  According to Beth Shammai, the minimum amount that a man had to give a woman was a denar.   While it is hard to know how much a denar was worth at those times, it probably was not more than a day’s wages, and maybe even less.  Beth Hillel holds that a man can give a woman an even lesser amount, even one perutah, which was worth almost nothing.
  Beth Shammai says:  one may dismiss his wife with an old bill of divorcement, But Beth Hillel forbids it. What is an old bill of divorcement? Whenever he was secluded with her after he has written it for her.  This section discusses a man who writes a get (a divorce bill) for his wife but is secluded with her before he gives it to her (the divorce is not effective until she receives the get).  If he had relations with her at this time, the get would nullified and in order to divorce her he would have to write a new get.  Beth Shammai says that even though they were secluded we don’t suspect that they had relations and therefore, he may still give her the previously written get.  Beth Hillel does suspect that they had relations, and therefore obligates the man to write a new get, if he wishes to divorce his wife.
  One who divorces his wife and she [afterwards] spends a night with him at the [same] inn: Beth Shammai says: she does not require a second bill of divorcement from him. But Beth Hillel says: she requires a second bill of divorcement from him. When [does she require a second bill of divorcement]? (4) When she was divorced after marriage. ( But if she was divorced after betrothal she does not require from him a second bill of divorcement, since he is not [yet] familiar with her.  This section discusses a similar incidence, except in this case the couple was already divorced before they were secluded.  The question is did they have relations while secluded?  If they did they may be betrothed, since sexual relations is one of the ways in which betrothal may be contracted (see Kiddushin 1:1).  According to Beth Shammai we do not suspect that they had relations, and therefore she doesn’t need a new get from her former husband (the new get would allow her to marry someone else).  Beth Hillel fears that they did have relations, and therefore she needs a new get if she wishes to marry someone else. The final clause limits this ruling of Beth Hillel to a couple that was already married.  Since they were already sexually familiar with each other, we suspect that they may have again had sexual relations while they were at the inn.  However, if the couple had been divorced before they were married, while they were still betrothed, there had not been sexual familiarity between them and therefore Beth Hillel does not suspect that they had relations while secluded.  In this case Beth Hillel would agree with Beth Shammai that they do not need a get.
  Questions for Further Thought:
  Why are these leniencies of Beth Shammai?  To whom is Beth Shammai lenient?
  Questions for Further Thought:
  Why are these leniencies of Beth Shammai?  To whom is Beth Shammai lenient?
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a dispute in the laws of levirate marriage between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.  We will learn these laws more fully when we learn tractate Yevamoth.
  Beth Shammai permits the rival wives [of a deceased brother to be married]  to the [surviving] brothers; But Beth Hillel forbids them.  This mishnah describes a complicated situation which we will first explain.  Reuven and Shimon are brothers.  Leah and Rachel are sisters.  Reuven marries Leah and Devorah (who is not related to anyone).  Shimon marries Rachel.  If Reuven should die without children one of his wives needs to either marry Shimon (levirate marriage) or have the ceremony of release (halitzah) performed.  Shimon cannot marry Leah, since he is already married to her sister, Rachel, and it is forbidden for one man to marry sisters.  According to Beth Shammai, although Leah cannot marry Shimon, Devorah, Leah’s rival wife from her marriage to Reuven, can.  According to Beth Hillel, since Leah was forbidden, Devorah is also forbidden.  If Shimon were to marry Devorah this would be considered the forbidden relationship of marrying a brother’s wife, which is only permitted when necessitated by levirate marriage. [Note:  it is forbidden to marry a brother’s wife even after the brother is dead].
  If they have performed halitzah, Beth Shammai pronounce them unfit to [marry into] the priesthood, But Beth Hillel pronounced them fit.  If Shimon should perform halitzah for Devorah, according to Beth Shammai she is now truly a halutzah, a woman had been released from levirate marriage.  Since halutzoth are forbidden to subsequently marry priests, Devorah cannot marry a priest.  According to Beth Hillel, this halitzah was not necessary, since there was no necessity for levirate marriage in this case.  Therefore Devorah is not considered a halutzah, and she may subsequently marry a priest.
  If they have married their brother-in-law, Beth Shammai pronounce them fit [to marry into the priesthood], But Beth Hillel pronounced them unfit.  If Shimon should marry Devorah and then die, according to Beth Shammai she could now marry a priest.  Shimon’s marriage to Devorah was legal and therefore she has not been rendered unfit to marry a priest by having engaged in a forbidden relationship.  Her status is that of a twice-widowed women.  [Note:  widows may marry priests.]  According to Beth Hillel, since Shimon’s marriage to Devorah was illegal, she is unfit to subsequently marry into the priesthood.  [Note:  any woman who has had an illicit sexual relationship cannot subsequently marry a priest.  This includes incestual and adulterous relationships.]
  And although these pronounce unfit and these pronounce fit, Beth Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from [the daughters of] Beth Hillel, nor did Beth Hillel refrain from marrying women from [the daughters of] Beth Shammai.  The last two sections of this mishnah are amongst the most powerful statements of pluralism in the Rabbinic tradition.  Up until now we have learned of serious and consequential disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.  The marital laws of the two houses are substantially different:  what one house accepts the other rejects.  As a consequence of these different laws, Beth Shammai will consider some children born according to the rules of Beth Hillel to be mamzerim who are forbidden for regular Israelites to marry.  The same is true for Beth Hillel with regards to the women of Beth Shammai.  Nevertheless, scholars of neither house refrained from marrying the women of the other house.  So important to them was the unity of Israel, that when it came to marriage they put aside their differences and intermarried.
  And in the case of all matters of purity and impurity in respect to which these pronounce pure and these pronounce impure, they did not refrain from preparing foods requiring a condition of purity each by means of [the vessels of] the other.  The same is true with regards to the laws of purity.  Although we have learned many disputes with regards to these laws, Beth Shammai would prepare its food with vessels used by those from Beth Hillel, and vice versa.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   In what situations would a member of Beth Hillel theoretically not be able to marry a daughter of Beth Shammai and vice versa?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   In what situations would a member of Beth Hillel theoretically not be able to marry a daughter of Beth Shammai and vice versa?
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah continues to list disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel with regards to the laws of levirate marriage.
  In order to understand this mishnah it is important to understand one issue about how levirate marriage works.  When a woman’s husband dies without children she must either marry her brother-in-law or be released from marriage by him.  According to the laws of the Torah, this marriage does not require prior betrothal.  Rather it is consummated in one step:  sexual relations.  However, the Rabbis instituted that the brother-in-law should first betroth her. This betrothal is called maamar.
  [In the case of] three brothers, of whom two were married to two sisters and one was unmarried, if one of the husbands of the sisters died and the unmarried one betrothed her (, and afterwards his other brother died, Beth Shammai says: his wife remains with him, and the other [widow] is released on the grounds of [the law forbidding] the wife’s sister. But Beth Hillel says: he should put away his wife with a get and halitzah, and the wife of his brother [he should put away] with halitzah. This is the case of which they said: woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife! If you thought the last case was complicated, it now gets even worse! In this mishnah there are three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi.  Reuven and Shimon were married to Leah and Rachel who are sisters and Levi is unmarried.  When either Reuven and Shimon dies Levi performs maamar, betrothal in the case of levirate marriage, with one of the sisters.  At this point the other brother dies.  The other sister should according to the laws of levirate marriage, also marry Levi.  This is a problem because the other brother has already betrothed, although not married this woman’s sister.  It is also somewhat of a problem for Levi to consummate the marriage with the first widowed sister since her sister is also bound to Levi by her need for levirate marriage or halitzah.  Nevertheless, Beth Shammai rules that Levi may marry the first sister.  The second widowed sister does not need either halitzah or levirate marriage, since she is forbidden to Levi who is married to her sister.  In other words, according to Beth Shammai although Levi only performed “maamar” with the first sister, the bond created is strong enough to exempt the second sister from halitzah or levirate marriage to Levi. Beth Hillel disagrees.  According to them maamar is not as strong as full marriage.  Therefore Levi must perform two ceremonies in order to release the first widow:  1)  he must divorce her to untie the bond created by the maamar; 2)  he must perform halitzah to untie the bond created by her being his dead brother’s wife.  The second widow also requires halitzah. The mishnah ends with what must have been a popular saying, although not necessarily said strictly in this circumstance.  This is truly a sorry case for both Levi, who loses both women, and for his wife (the first widow) and for his (dead) brother’s wife as well.
  Questions for Further Thought:
  In what other circumstance might the saying at the end of the mishnah been stated?
  Questions for Further Thought:
  In what other circumstance might the saying at the end of the mishnah been stated?
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains four more disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.  The first one continues to deal with marital law. The second one deals with laws of giving birth.  The final two deal with other areas of law.
  One who takes a vow not to have intercourse with his wife:  Beth Shammai says: [after] two weeks [he must divorce her and pay her kethubah], And Beth Hillel say: after one week.  According to the Rabbis, a husband is obligated to have sexual relations with his wife at regular intervals (see Ketuboth 5:6).  If he takes a vow not to have relations with his wife, Beth Shammai says that after two weeks she can sue him for divorce and she will be able to collect her kethubah (marriage payment).  Beth Hillel is stricter on the husband and gives him only one week.
  A woman  has a miscarriage on the eve of the eighty first [day]:  Beth Shammai exempt her from bringing the offering, And Beth Hillel do not exempt her.  According to Leviticus 12:5-6, a woman must bring a sacrifice 80 days after having given birth to a daughter.  In other words, she brings a sacrifice on the 81st day.  If she should become pregnant again during these 80 days, and have a miscarriage, the she need not bring another sacrifice for her miscarriage.  [Generally she would have to bring a sacrifice for a miscarriage, just as she does for a live birth].  Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagree with regards to a woman who has a miscarriage on the night preceding the 81st day, the day she should have brought a sacrifice for the first birth.  Beth Shammai rules that since she could not have brought a sacrifice at night, she is still within the 80 days, and she is exempt from bringing an additional sacrifice for the miscarriage.  Beth Hillel rules that since the 80 days have been completed, she must bring a sacrifice for the miscarriage as well as one for the previous birth.
  [With regards to the rules of] tzitzit ( on linen sheet: Beth Shammai exempts, And Beth Hillel does not exempt.  This mishnah deals with the obligation to put fringes (tzitzit) on a linen sheet.  There are two reasons why Beth Shammai exempts one from doing so:  1)  a sheet is not a piece of clothing.  Deuteronomy 22:12 specifically states that the fringes must be put on clothing.  2)  The sheet is made of linen and tzitzit are made of wool.  According to Deuteronomy 22:11 it is forbidden to mix wool and linen. Beth Hillel rules that one should put the fringes on the sheet for two reasons:  1)  The sheet may be worn as a piece of clothing; 2)  The commandment to put fringes on clothing supersedes the prohibition of mixing linen and wool.
  A basket of [fruit set aside for] the Sabbath:  Beth Shammai exempts it [from tithes]. And Beth Hillel does not exempt it.  This mishnah deals with who has put aside a basket of fruit for Shabbat but wishes to snack from the basket before Shabbat.  This snacking is not considered a fixed meal, and in general one may “snack” from produce before it has been tithed.  However, this is not true on the Sabbath.  On the Sabbath it is forbidden to eat any produce that has not been tithed.  According to Beth Shammai one may eat the fruit of this basket before the Sabbath.  Although on the Sabbath itself it will be forbidden to do so since it has not been tithed (and cannot be tithed on the Sabbath), before the Sabbath it is still permitted.  Beth Hillel forbids.  According to them, setting aside something for the Sabbath makes it forbidden to eat from it until it has been tithed.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   How did these four disputes come to be strung together?  Can you find some link between each section and the preceding one?
   Section one:  If a man is obligated to have regular sexual relations with his wife, why doesn’t he have to divorce her immediately if he takes such a vow not to perform his duty?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   How did these four disputes come to be strung together?  Can you find some link between each section and the preceding one?
   Section one:  If a man is obligated to have regular sexual relations with his wife, why doesn’t he have to divorce her immediately if he takes such a vow not to perform his duty?
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  In order to understand this mishnah we must first explain some laws concerning the nazirite.  One who takes a vow to be a nazirite (see Numbers 6) is forbidden to do three things:  1)  cut his hair; 2) drink wine or any grape products; 3) become impure.  If a nazirite should become impure during his naziriteship, he must begin to count the days of his naziriteship again.
  According to the Rabbis one who takes a vow of naziriteship without specifying the length of the naziriteship is a nazirite for thirty days.  If he specifies more than thirty days than he is a nazirite for that specified period.  If he specifies less than thirty days, he is still a nazirite for thirty days.  Thirty days is the minimum period that one can be a nazirite.
  If one took a vow of naziriteship outside the land of Israel, he will have trouble observing his vow, because the Rabbis ruled that land outside of Israel imparts impurity.  Since he is impure merely by being outside of Israel, he cannot truly keep his vow.  Nevertheless the Rabbis said that he must observe his naziriteship outside of Israel, and then later when he arrives in Israel, observe another naziriteship.  In our mishnah Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagree with regards to how long he must be a nazirite when he arrives in Israel.
  One who vowed [to keep] a longer naziriteship [than ordinary] and he completed his naziriteship and afterwards came to the [holy] land: Beth Shammai says: [he must be] a nazirite [only] thirty days, But Beth Hillel says: [he must be] a nazirite [the full time vowed as] in the beginning.  If while living outside of the land of Israel one took a vow of naziriteship, and specified a period of over thirty days, when he afterwards comes to Israel, he must, according to Beth Shammai, observe only another thirty days of naziriteship.  Since the impurity of land outside of Israel is only of Rabbinic (derabanan) ordinance and is not of the higher Toraitic status (deoraitta), Beth Shammai is lenient.  Although his original vow was of greater length, he need observe only thirty days, the minimum length of naziriteship, when he arrives in the Holy Land. Beth Hillel holds that he must observe the full length of his original naziriteship.
  One who has two groups of witnesses who testify about him, these testifying that he vowed two naziriteships and these testifying that he vowed five: Beth Shammai says: their testimony is divided, and there is no [obligation to perform] naziriteship. But Beth Hillel says: within the five, two are included, so that he must be a nazirite twice.  If there are two groups of witnesses testifying that a certain man took several vows to be a nazirite, one group claiming that he took five vows to be a nazirite and therefore should observe 150 days of naziriteship, and the other group of witnesses testifying that he took two vows, and therefore should observe 60 days of naziriteship, according to Beth Shammai the testimony has been contradicted and there is no evidence that he is a nazirite.  This person would therefore not be obligated to be a nazirite at all.  According to Beth Hillel, since all of the witnesses agree that he took at least two vows, he must observe two periods of naziriteship.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  Do you think there is significance to the mishnah’s using the numbers five and two, as opposed to three and four or any other smaller discrepancy between the two testimonies?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  Do you think there is significance to the mishnah’s using the numbers five and two, as opposed to three and four or any other smaller discrepancy between the two testimonies?
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  This is the final mishnah in the long list of mishnayoth that list the disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.
  A man who was set beneath the gap: Beth Shammai says: he does not cause the impurity to pass over. But Beth Hillel says: a man is hollow, and the upper side causes the impurity to pass over. This mishnah, which is also found in tractate Ohalot 11:3, deals with a situation explained there in mishnah two.  The situation is that there is a portico, a semi-covered courtyard, which is surrounded by pillars and on one side is a house.  The portico is covered but the walls are open in three directions.  This roof would normally cause tent impurity to be imparted to anything under the roof.  In other words, if there was a source of impurity (such as a dead body) under the roof and a live person, or vessels under the same roof, the live person and vessels would be impure.  The previous mishnah to our mishnah in Ohalot deals with a case where there is a crack in the roof.  The impurity does not pass from one side of the crack to the other.  Therefore if there is a dead body on one side and vessels on another, the vessels are not impure. The dispute between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel is about a case when a person was lying on the ground, directly under the crack.  According to Beth Shammai, this person does not bridge the crack in the roof above, and the vessels which are on the opposite side remain pure.  Beth Hillel holds that since the body of a person is considered to be hollow, the roof of his abdomen bridges the gap created by the crack and brings the impurity over to the other side.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Do you think it would make a difference if the crack did not go the whole length of the roof?
   Would this same law be true if there were cracks in a house?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Do you think it would make a difference if the crack did not go the whole length of the roof?
   Would this same law be true if there were cracks in a house?
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Chapter five continues to list disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel in which Beth Shammai were more lenient.  The difference between these lists and those in the previous chapter is that in this chapter individual Sages state the lists as opposed the lists in the previous chapter which were not ascribed to anyone in particular.  The first mishnah is Rabbi Judah’s list.  It contains six disputes.
  Rabbi Judah says:  there are six instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and stringent rulings by Beth Hillel.The blood of a carcass: Beth Shammai pronounces it clean, And Beth Hillel pronounces it unclean.  Everyone holds that the flesh of a carcass (an animal which was not properly slaughtered) is impure.  Beth Shammai holds that the blood of a carcass is not like the flesh, and it is not impure, whereas Beth Hillel holds that it is impure.
  An egg found in a [bird’s] carcass: if the like of it were sold in the market, it is permitted, and if not, it is forbidden, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. And Beth Hillel forbids it. But they agree in the case of an egg found in a trefa  [bird] that it is forbidden since it had its growth in a forbidden condition. 3+4) The blood of a non-Jewish woman and the blood of purity of a leprous woman: Beth Shammai pronounces clean; And Beth Hillel says: [it is] like her spittle and her urine.  If an egg is found in the carcass of a bird, the question arises, can one eat the egg?  The bird is forbidden, but we need to know is the egg still part of the bird, in which case it too is forbidden, or is it a separate entity, in which case it is permitted.  According to Beth Shammai, if this egg is fully-formed such that it is similar to eggs sold in the market, it is a separate entity and is permitted.  Beth Hillel states that the egg is forbidden in any case.  The mishnah notes that the two houses agree in the case of an egg found in a “trefah” that it is forbidden.  A “trefah” is an animal suffering from a wound or illness that will cause it to die within 12 months.  Since the egg grew in an animal that was definitely going to be forbidden to eat, even if it was slaughtered properly, the egg is forbidden.  The egg which was found in the carcass of the dead bird, had the potential to be a kosher egg, and therefore, according to Beth Shammai, if the egg was fully formed, it is permitted to eat.
  One may eat fruits of the seventh year with an expression of thanks and without an expression of thanks [to the owner of the field], according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: one may not eat with an expression of thanks.  Sections three and four:  This section discusses the purity of the menstrual or gonorrheal blood of a non-Jewish woman and the blood of a gonorrheal Jewish woman during the first 40 days (for a boy) or 80 days (for a girl) after giving birth.  According to Rabbinic law, fluids flowing from gentiles are impure.  However, Beth Shammai argues that this is only with regards to their spit and urine, fluids which are always present.  The decree of the Rabbis that their fluids are impure does not apply to their blood flows.  With regards to the gonorrheal Jewish woman, she is normally impure.  However, the blood flow of women is always pure during this period after childbirth.  Beth Shammai says that the blood of a gonorrheal woman is also pure.  Beth Hillel says that the blood flows of both of these women is like their urine and spit:  they are all impure.
  During the Sabbatical year all of the produce grown in the fields is considered ownerless, and may be eaten by anyone.  Beth Shammai holds that when one eats such produce one may express his thanks to the owner of the field, or one may not choose not to express thanks.  Beth Hillel holds that one may not express thanks to the owner of the field.  These fruits are ownerless; giving thanks to the owner of the field may give people the impression that he is the one giving them, whereas in truth it is the Torah’s laws which have given them to the person eating.  [I have explained the mishnah according to some versions of the text, which Albeck believes are correct.]
  As we have stated many times, a vessel cannot receive impurity unless it is functional.  Our mishnah discusses a waterskin.  According to Beth Shammai, the waterskin receives impurity only if it is tied up and standing upright, so that it will retain the water which is inside.  Beth Hillel holds that as long as it is upright, it need not be tied up to receive impurity.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah Rabbi Yose lists six cases in which Beth Shammai ruled more leniently than did Beth Hillel.
  Rabbi Yose says:  there are six instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and stringent rulings by Beth Hillel.A fowl may be put on a table [together] with cheese but may not be eaten [with it], according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: it may neither be put on [the table together with it] nor eaten [with it].  It is forbidden to place on one table both meat and cheese, lest by accident one come to eat them together.  According to Beth Shammai this prohibition is with regards to meat (cow, lamb, sheep) only.  Since eating fowl together with dairy is not forbidden according to the Torah, as is eating milk and meat, but rather fowl and dairy are forbidden only by Rabbinic law, the Rabbis were not so strict as to prevent one from putting them together on the same table.  Beth Hillel says that even chicken and cheese are forbidden to be put on one table.
  Olives may be given as terumah for oil and grapes for wine, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: they may not be given.  According to Beth Shammai, if a person has olive oil and raw olives, or wine and grapes from which he needs to separate terumah (which goes to the priest), he may give from the raw fruits (olives or grapes) and have that count as the terumah for the finished products (olive oil or wine).  Although these things are in different form, since they are of the same type, one may give terumah from one for the other.  Beth Hillel says that one may not do so.
  One who sows seed [within] four cubits of a vineyard: Beth Shammai says: he has caused one row [of vines] to be prohibited. But Beth Hillel says: he has caused two rows to be prohibited.  According to Deuteronomy 22:9 it is forbidden to plant a vineyard with other types of seed.  If one does neither may be used.  The Rabbis stated that one must leave four cubits between the vineyard and the planting of the seed.  If one plants within this four cubits, according to Beth Shammai the fruit of the first row of the vineyard, the one next to the planted seeds, is forbidden to eat.  According to Beth Hillel two rows are forbidden.
  Flour paste [flour that had been mixed with boiling water]: Beth Shammai exempts [from the law of hallah]; But Beth Hillel pronounces it liable.  According to Numbers 15:19 the first yield of bread baking must be given to the priests.  This is called “hallah”, and it is observed by separating some of the dough and giving it to the priests.  Our mishnah discusses flour that has been mixed with boiling water and thereby cooked with water instead of being baked.  According to Beth Shammai since it was not baked it is exempt from the laws of hallah.  Beth Hillel says that it is subject to these laws, and therefore one must give part of it to the priest.
  One may immerse oneself in a rain-torrent, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai; But Beth Hillel say: one may not immerse oneself [therein].  Ritual baths are usually taken in a bath of water that is at least 40 seahs large.  According to Beth Shammai, one may also bathe in a flow of rainwater, flowing down from the mountains.  Although there is not 40 seahs in the specific place where he bathes, since from the beginning of the torrent up in the mountains, until its end in the valley there are certainly 40 seahs, he may make use of it as a ritual bath (mikveh).  Beth Hillel says that he may not.
  One who became a proselyte on the eve of Passover: Beth Shammai says: he may immerse himself and eat his Passover sacrifice in the evening. But Beth Hillel says: one who separates himself from uncircumcision is as one who separates himself from the grave.  This mishnah discusses a new convert’s eating the Passover sacrifice, which cannot be eaten in a state of impurity.  If he converted on the eve of Passover, according to Beth Shammai he may immerse and eat of the Passover sacrifice that very evening.  According to Beth Shammai the convert is only impure by minor impurities, which dissipate at nightfall if the person took a ritual bath.  However, Beth Hillel says that one who has just left the uncircumcised, meaning he was just circumcised, is like one who separates from the grave and is impure like one who came into contact with a dead body. This impurity lasts seven days, and therefore, one who converted on the eve of Passover will not be able to eat his Passover sacrifice that evening.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains Rabbi Yishmael’s list of three instances in which Beth Shammai ruled more leniently than Beth Hillel.
  Rabbi Yishmael says:  there are three instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and strict rulings by Beth Hillel.The book of Ecclesiastes does not defile the hands, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai; But Beth Hillel say: it defiles the hands.  According to the Rabbis the Holy Scriptures, meaning any canonized book in the Bible, cause ones hands to be ritually defiled.  According to the Talmud the reason is that people used to put the scrolls into arks with terumah food, reasoning that both were holy.  Mice would come to eat the food and they would destroy the scrolls.  By decreeing that the scrolls would defile the terumah, people stopped this practice. There are several debates in the Mishnah about what books are included in the Biblical canon such that they defile the hands.  According to Beth Shammai, Ecclesiastes (Koheleth) does not defile the hands.  This is probably due to the deeply pessimistic, bordering on heretical, tone of the book.  At times the author of the book has at least serious doubts about whether or not the performance of good deeds brings with it rewards, a doctrine held as true by the Rabbis.  Beth Hillel includes it in the Biblical canon probably for two reasons:  1)  it was, according to tradition, written by King Solomon; 2)  the last verse of the book exhorts the reader to listen to God’s word and to do good, a message that was certainly acceptable to the Rabbis.
  Water of purification which has done its duty: Beth Shammai pronounces it pure, But Beth Hillel pronounces it impure.  “Waters of purification” refers to the water that has been mixed with the ashes of a red heifer, and was used to rid a person of corpse impurity.  According to Beth Shammai, the water remains pure even after it has been sprinkled on the impure person.  Although before it has been used it causes impurity to one who touches it unnecessarily (see Numbers 19:21), according to Beth Shammai once it has been used it is no longer impure.  Beth Hillel holds that these waters remain impure even after they have been used.
  Black cumin: Beth Shammai pronounces it not liable to become impure, But Beth Hillel pronounces it liable to become impure. So, too, with regard to tithes.  In this section Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel debate about the status of black cumin.  If black cumin is considered a food, then it should be receptive to impurity and one who wishes to eat it would have to first separate the necessary tithes and terumah.  Beth Shammai does not consider black cumin to be “food” and therefore holds that it is not receptive to impurity nor subject to the laws of tithes and terumah.  Beth Hillel holds that it is food and is therefore receptive to impurity and one who eats it must separate tithes and terumah.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the mishnah that we will learn tomorrow contain the last lists of disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel in tractate Eduyoth.
  Rabbi Eliezer says:  there are two instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and strict rulings by Beth Hillel.The blood of a woman after childbirth who has not immersed herself, Beth Shammai says: [it is] like her spittle and her urine. But Beth Hillel says: it causes impurity whether wet or dry. However, they agree in the case of the blood of a woman who gave birth when she had non-menstrual discharge, that it causes defilement whether wet or dry. According to Leviticus, chapter 12, after a woman gives birth to a male she is impure for seven days and after giving birth to a female she is impure 14 days.  After this time she is supposed to go to the mikveh (ritual bath) and she will be pure.  Any blood that flows after this time is pure (up to 33 days for a boy and 66 days for a girl). Our mishnah discusses a woman who had not gone to the mikveh after the initial seven or 14 day period. According to Beth Shammai the blood of this woman is not totally impure.  Rather it is impure only when it is wet, like her spittle and urine.  When dry the blood is pure. Beth Hillel disagrees and holds that it is impure whether wet or dry. The two Houses agree that if the woman was a “zavah”, a woman with an unnatural discharge (such as gonorrhea) at the time of childbirth, that her blood remains impure both when wet and when dry.  A “zavah” must count seven clean days (free from any blood) for her to be able to go to the mikveh and become pure. Since she has not been able to do so, her blood remains impure, both wet and dry, as blood normally is.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Now that we have learned the last list of disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, can you discern any order to their appearance in the mishnah?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Now that we have learned the last list of disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, can you discern any order to their appearance in the mishnah?
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.  It contains the second example of Rabbi Eliezer’s list of disputes between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.
  [In the case of] four brothers of whom two were married to two sisters, if those married to the sisters died, behold, these should perform halitzah and not enter into levirate marriage (with the brothers-in-. If they went ahead and married them, they must put them away (divorce. Rabbi Eliezer says in the name of Beth Shammai: they may keep them. But Beth Hillel say: they must put them away. In the case in our mishnah, Reuven, Shimon, Levi and Judah who are brothers, are each married, Reuven and Shimon being married to Rachel and Leah who are sisters and Levi and Judah being married to other women not related to Rachel and Leah.  If Reuven and Shimon die without children, Rachel and Leah need to perform halitzah or enter into levirate marriage with either Levi and Judah.  However, they cannot both be married to the same brother, since a man cannot marry two sisters.  Since each sister is “tied” to each brother (by her need to perform halitzah or be married), the best thing to do is for each to perform halitzah, the release from levirate marriage.  From here we learn that it is forbidden for a man to marry the sister of a woman who is tied to him, in a similar way that it is forbidden for a man to marry two sisters. According to Beth Shammai, if, even though it is forbidden to do so, Levi and/or Judah married Rachel or Leah, they are not forced to divorce them.  According to Beth Shammai the law that says that they must perform “halitzah” is only “lekhathilah”, meaning ab initio.  One should not do marry these sisters, but if one did the action is valid.  According to Beth Hillel, this marriage is forbidden even “bediavad”, meaning even after it was done, it remains forbidden, and they are forced to divorce them.  Beth Hillel probably reasons that if this marriage was permitted “bediavad”, “lekhathilah” people would marry in this situation.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why do clauses 1a and 1c repeat the same opinion?  What might this tell us about the structure and formation of the mishnah?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why do clauses 1a and 1c repeat the same opinion?  What might this tell us about the structure and formation of the mishnah?
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains the sad story of Akavia ben Mahalalel who was excommunicated for his disagreements with the other Sages.  Although we have seen many disagreements in the Mishnah, some over major issues of law, it has seemed that the disputing Sages lived in peace despite their differences.  This point was especially made with regards to the disputes of Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel in chapter four, mishnah eight.  However, the border of legitimate dispute seems to have been crossed by Akavia ben Mahalalel.  Although it will be difficult for us to understand what exactly it was that Akavia did that so angered the other Sages, this mishnah at least provides ample testimony to the ease in which legitimate dispute can turn into a fierce battle.
  Akavia ben Mahalalel testified concerning four things. They said to him: Akavia, retract these four things which you say, and we will make you the head of the court in Israel. He said to them: it is better for me to be called a fool all my days than that I should become [even] for one hour a wicked man before God; So they shouldn’t say: “he withdrew his opinions for the sake of power.”  In the first section of the mishnah we learn the background to the sad story of Akavia ben Mahalalel.  The Sages pleaded with him to retract the four things that he stated and in return they would appoint him to the head of the court.  Akavia responded in two ways:  1)  God would know that his retraction was false, and therefore he could not do so; 2)  he cannot change his beliefs merely in order to be appointed to a position of power.
  He used to pronounce impure the hair which has been left over [in leprosy],  The mishnah now begins to list the four statements that Akavia made and with which the Sages disagreed.  The first is with regards to a certain type of hair found in someone afflicted with a leprous like disease.  A white hair found on the leprous patch is impure.  If the disease disappears and the white hair stays and then the disease returns, Akavia considers the hair to be impure, since it is likely to be the same disease merely returning.  The Sages consider the disease to be a new affliction and therefore, since in order for the hair to be impure, the disease must precede the formation of the hair, the hair is pure.
  And green ( blood (of vaginal; But the Sages declared them clean.  If a woman has a vaginal discharge which is green (yellow), Akavia considers it to be similar to blood which everyone holds is impure and therefore the yellow discharge is also impure.  The other Sages disagree and hold that a yellow discharge is not blood and is therefore pure.
  He used to permit the wool of a first-born animal which was blemished and which had fallen out and had been put in a niche, the first-born being slaughtered afterwards; But the sages forbid it.  It is forbidden to shear a first born animal, even one that has a flaw and is therefore is not sacrificable.  (First born animals that have no flaw are sacrificed and their flesh belongs to the priests.  First born animals that have a flaw belong to the priests but are not sacrificed).  Since it is forbidden to shear this animal, the Sages decreed that it is forbidden to use any wool that comes from it, even if it falls off on its own.  If some wool falls off while it is alive and someone puts it away for safekeeping, but does not use it, and then the animal is slaughtered to be eaten (which is permitted since it has a flaw) Akavia permits this wool to be used.  Since the slaughtering permits the wool that is on the dead animal to be used (it is only forbidden to shear the live animal), it also permits the wool that fell off the animal before it died to be used.  The Sages hold that this wool is not permitted.
  He used to say: a woman proselyte and a freed slave-woman are not made to drink of the bitter waters. But the Sages say: they are made to drink. They said to him: it happened in the case of Karkemith, a freed slave-woman who was in Jerusalem, that Shemaiah and Avtalion made her drink. He said to them: they made her drink an example (and not the real.  According to Numbers 5, a woman who is suspected of adultery is to be tested by drinking the “bitter waters” (5:24).  In verse 12 of this chapter, in the introduction, it states, “speak unto the children of Israel”.  From here Akavia learned that in order to drink the “bitter waters” the woman must be born an Israelite.  According to Akavia, the chapter was taught to Israelites but not to non-Jews.  This would exclude a woman who converted or a Canaanite slave who was freed (by being freed a Canaanite slave becomes a Jew).  The Sages disagree and state that these women do drink.  Although they were not born as Israelites, since they are currently full Jews they have the same ability and liability to drink the “bitter waters” if they are accused of adultery. The Sages support their opinion that the freed slave drinks by mentioning the precedent of Karkemith, a freed slave, who was given the “bitter waters” by Shemaiah and Avtalion, two early Sages.  Akavia disagrees and states that they didn’t give her the real bitter waters, but rather a simulated version.  The reason that they didn’t give her the real bitter waters is that the in the process of making the bitter waters God’s holy name is written on a scroll and then erased into the water, something which under normal circumstances is forbidden.  To avoid unnecessarily erasing God’s name, Akaviah claims that Shemaiah and Avtalion gave the freed slave, Karkemith, some other type of waters.
  Whereupon they excommunicated him; and he died while he was under excommunication, and the court stoned his coffin.  When Akaviah made this statement they put him into excommunication.  He died while still in excommunication and to emphasize their point, the Sages stoned his coffin.
  Rabbi Judah said: God forbid [that one should say] that Akavia was excommunicated; for the courtyard is never locked for any man in Israel who was equal to Avavia ben Mahalalel in wisdom and the fear of sin. But whom did they excommunicate?  Eliezer the son of Hanoch who cast doubt against the laws concerning the purifying of the hands. And when he died the court sent and laid a stone on his coffin.  Rabbi Judah claims that Akavia was not put into excommunication.  Rabbi Judah emphatically states that the courtyard of the Temple, even when full would not contain a person of greater wisdom and fear of sin than Akavia.  Such a person could not commit a sin which would cause him to be excommunicated.  Rather Eliezer ben Hanoch was the one put into excommunication for questioning the Rabbinic concept of the impurity of the hands.  Without entering here into detail, this concept, that hands alone can become impure is a Rabbinic innovation that doesn’t appear in the Torah.  By questioning this concept, Eliezer questions the entire substance of Rabbinic authority.
  This teaches that whoever is excommunicated and dies while under excommunication, his coffin is stoned.  According to Rabbi Judah, when Eliezer ben Hanoch died in excommunication, they put a stone on his ark (this is a form of stoning, see Sanhedrin 6:4).  This action serves as a precedent for others who are excommunicated.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section four:  Why do the Sages hold that this wool is forbidden?
   Section seven:  What does this section teach us about why Rabbis are put into excommunication according to the Mishnah?  What is the reason that Eliezer ben Hanoch is put into excommunication?  How does this compare to why Akavia may have been excommunicated?
   Section eight:  What is the symbolic meaning of stoning the excommunicated person’s coffin?
   Over all, what might be the message of this mishnah?  In other words, what is the attitude of the editor of the mishnah?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section four:  Why do the Sages hold that this wool is forbidden?
   Section seven:  What does this section teach us about why Rabbis are put into excommunication according to the Mishnah?  What is the reason that Eliezer ben Hanoch is put into excommunication?  How does this compare to why Akavia may have been excommunicated?
   Section eight:  What is the symbolic meaning of stoning the excommunicated person’s coffin?
   Over all, what might be the message of this mishnah?  In other words, what is the attitude of the editor of the mishnah?
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah concludes the story of Akavia ben Mehalalel.
  At the time of his death he said to his son, “Retract the four opinions which I used to declare.” He (the said to him, “Why did not you retract them?” He said to him, “I heard them from the mouth of the many, and they heard [the contrary] from the mouth of the many.   I stood fast by the tradition which I heard, and they stood fast by the tradition which they heard. But you have heard [my tradition] from the mouth of a single individual and [their tradition] from the mouth of the many.  It is better to leave the opinion of the single individual and to hold by the opinion of the many.”  As Akavia is about to die, he offers some conciliation to the Sages, by telling his son to retract the statements to which he had previously clung.  His son is perplexed by this request of Akavia.  After all, Akavia was willing to be put into permanent excommunication, to lose his entire standing in the Rabbinic community, in order to stand up for the statements which he had made.  Why now was he all of a sudden willing to change his mind? Akavia’s answer returns us to the principle which we had learned in chapter one, mishnah five.  When there is a dispute between many Sages on one side and a singular Sage on the other, the halakhah is like the many.  Here Akavia teaches that a tradition that was learned from many Sages is stronger and more accepted as normative halakhah than a tradition that was learned from a singular Sage.  His son had learned them only from him, and therefore their weight was less than the rulings of the Sages, who in the time of Akavia were considered the many.
  He said to him, “Father commend me to your colleagues.” He said to him, “I will not commend you.” He said to him, “Have you found in me any wrong?” He said,  “No; your own deeds will cause you to be near, and your own deeds will cause you to be far.”  Akavia’s final request of his father was that he put in a good word about him with his colleagues.  Evidently, although Akavia had been put in excommunication, he retained some ties with other Sages.  Akavia’s final words teach a lesson to all children of leaders.  Although Akavia’s son was the child of a great teacher, one who was almost appointed to be the head of the court, the son will have to earn his own way into a position of leadership.  If he is worthy, he will have the opportunity to achieve high positions as a Rabbi; if he is unworthy, a good word from his father will not help him.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   According to Akavia, what gives a halakhah its authority?  In other words, why did he not retract the things which he had stated?  Did he believe that these were the necessarily “true” statements?
   As a piece of literature, what is the function of the final piece of the story?  Why does this story end with Akavia’s telling his son that his own merits are what will earn him status in the world?  Has Akavia somehow changed due to his excommunication?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   According to Akavia, what gives a halakhah its authority?  In other words, why did he not retract the things which he had stated?  Did he believe that these were the necessarily “true” statements?
   As a piece of literature, what is the function of the final piece of the story?  Why does this story end with Akavia’s telling his son that his own merits are what will earn him status in the world?  Has Akavia somehow changed due to his excommunication?
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Chapter six returns to the main style of Mishnah Eduyoth, the recording of traditions transmitted by individual Sages.  In the first mishnah Rabbi Judah ben Bava testifies with regards to five things.
  Rabbi Judah ben Bava testified concerning five things:That women who are minors are made to declare an annulment of their marriage;  Only a father has the right to marry off his daughter while she is a minor (under 12 ½) and have the marriage considered Biblically valid.  If the father is not alive, the mother or brother can marry off the daughter while she is a minor, but the marriage is only Rabbinically valid.  Being so, she has a right to refuse the marriage when she reaches majority.  If she does so the marriage is annulled and is considered as having never been.  This refusal is called “meun”.  Occasionally, if it was in the best interests of all parties, the Rabbis instructed the daughter to refuse the marriage.  Such an occasion could occur in the following instance. Two brothers, Reuven and Shimon, were married to two sisters who had no father, Leah who was of majority age and therefore arranged her own marriage (her marriage is Biblically valid) and Rachel, whose marriage was arranged by her mother or brother (her marriage is only Rabbinically valid).  If Leah’s husband, Reuven, dies she must have levirate marriage with Shimon, Rachel’s husband.  The problem is that Rachel’s marriage to Shimon is now impossible because Leah’s tie to Shimon which is Biblical, supersedes Rachel’s marriage which is only Rabbinic.  In order to allow Leah to have levirate marriage with Shimon, the Rabbis teach Rachel to refuse their marriage, thereby annulling it.
  That a woman is allowed to re-marry on the evidence of one witness;  According to the Torah, proper testimony requires at least two witnesses.  However, one exception to this rule is the case of a woman whose husband may have died. If she cannot ascertain his death, she cannot remarry, which will leave her an “agunah” a woman who cannot marry.  In order to prevent this difficult situation for the widow the Rabbis were lenient and allowed testimony based on only one witness.
  That a rooster was stoned in Jerusalem because it had killed a human being;  According to Exodus 21:28 an ox that kills a human is to be stoned.  Rabbi Judah ben Bava extends this law to include any animal that kills a human, even one as unlikely to do so as a rooster.  (See Bava Kamma 5:7).
  And about wine forty days old, that it was used as a libation on the altar;  New wine is not as good as old, aged wine.  The question that is asked is how old must wine be for it to be usable as a libation.  Rabbi Judah ben Bava states that forty days is sufficient.
  And about the morning tamid offering, that it is offered at the fourth hour.  There are two “tamid” offerings which are offered every day, one in the morning and one at twilight (See Exodus 29:39).  According to Rabbi Judah ben Bava the morning “tamid” may be offered up until the fourth hour, but not afterwards.  (The day is divided into 12 hours, the length of which is determined by the amount of sunlight during the day.  During the summer hours are longer than during the winter).  In other words, the first third of a day is considered to be “morning”.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  Why were the Rabbis willing to suspend the laws of testimony in order to allow a woman to remarry?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  Why were the Rabbis willing to suspend the laws of testimony in order to allow a woman to remarry?
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan, a man of Kefar Habavli, testified concerning a limb [separated] from a corpse that it is impure;whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man].They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal:   If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure!He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man.Another answer:  The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.This mishnah contains Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan’s testimony regarding the impurity of a limb separated from a corpse.The dispute in our mishnah concerns whether or not a limb separated from corpse transmits tent impurity (anything which is under the same roof with it becomes impure).  Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia state that it is impure.  Rabbi Eliezer states that it is pure, and that the only type of “separated limb” which is impure is one that has been separated from a living body.Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya respond with a classic type of Talmudic argumentation, called a “kal vehomer”.  Generally a corpse is considered the greatest source of impurity, whereas a living body is often not a source of impurity at all.  [It is not in and of itself impure; it only becomes impure if it contracts it somehow.]  If a limb separated from a living body is impure, even though the living body itself is pure, all the more so a limb separated from a corpse is impure, since the corpse itself is impure.Rabbi Eliezer’s response is very typical of Rabbi Eliezer.  He states that although Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya’s reasoning may be good reasoning, the tradition that he received from his teachers was only that a limb separated from a living body was impure.  Even though there may be logic in extending this principle to include limbs from corpses, Rabbi Eliezer does not believe that it is the sage’s responsibility to add on to received traditions.  Rabbi Eliezer is known as an arch-traditionalist; in another place he claims never to have stated anything that he did not hear from his teachers.  Here we see classic example of Rabbi Eliezer sticking to his received tradition, in the face of a good argument to extend that tradition.The final section of the mishnah contains a logical refutation of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya’s kal vehomer argument.  In order to refute a kal vehomer argument one must point out that one side is not always more stringent than the other side.  In other words, if the kal vehomer was based on a stable, predictable relationship between two things, the refutation points out that this relationship is not so predictable. In this case Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya had pointed out that a corpse is more impure than a living body, and therefore if something that comes from a living body is impure, all the more so the same thing that comes from a corpse will be impure.  The refutation points out that with regards to some laws, the living body is a greater source of impurity than the corpse.  A zav (a person with an unusual genital discharge) causes anything on which he sits or lies to become impure and able to transmit impurity to people or clothing.  He also causes anything above him to become impure and able to transmit impurity to food and liquids.  The corpse does not have such a strong ability to impart impurity.  Since in some ways the living body can have a stronger impurity than the corpse, one cannot make the kal vehomer argument that Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya tried to make.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  According to Exodus 13:13, the first born of a donkey must be “redeemed” with a sheep.  Since donkeys are not fit to be sacrificed, their firstborn cannot be offered on the altar as are the firstborn of “pure” animals.  Therefore they are redeemed with a sheep, which is then given to the priests (see Numbers 18:15).
  In our mishnah the Rabbis dispute the responsibility that the owner of the donkey has over the sheep which he has used to redeem the first born of his donkey. The question is, if the sheep dies after it has been used to redeem the donkey but before he gives it to the priest, must he replace it with a new sheep?
  Rabbi  Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption ( of a firstborn donkey, that if it died, the priest receives nothing,  According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok, if the sheep used to redeem the first-born donkey should die before it is given to the priest, the owner is not responsible to provide the priest with a new sheep.  According to these Sages, once he has “redeemed” the first-born donkey with the sheep he has fulfilled his religious duty.  True the sheep belongs to the priest, but the owner has no responsibility to protect the sheep on behalf of the priest.  Therefore if something happens to it, it is the priest’s loss.
  Whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: the owner must bear the responsibility as with the five selas [in the case] of a [firstborn] son.  Rabbi Eliezer disagrees.  He compares this sheep to the five selas that a father owes the priest to redeem his own first-born (pidyon ha-ben).  In that case all the Rabbis agree that if the coins are lost before the father gives them over to the priest, the father must give the priest five new selas.  Rabbi Eliezer says that just as in that case the father is responsible, so too in this case the owner of the donkey is responsible if the sheep should die before being presented to the priest.
  But the Sages say: he bears no responsibility any more than in the case of the redemption of second tithes.  The Sages, who in this case agree with Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok, compare this situation to that of lost coins of second tithe.  These coins were used to redeem second tithe produce.  The coins were then meant to be brought to Jerusalem and used there to buy food.  If the owner of the coins should lose them before he arrives in Jerusalem, he is not obligated to replace them. According to the Sages, the same is true for the sheep.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why would the Sages not agree with Rabbi Eliezer’s analogy of the sheep to the five selas given for the redemption of the human first born?
   Why would Rabbi Eliezer not agree with the Sages’ analogy to second tithe?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why would the Sages not agree with Rabbi Eliezer’s analogy of the sheep to the five selas given for the redemption of the human first born?
   Why would Rabbi Eliezer not agree with the Sages’ analogy to second tithe?
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  According to Leviticus 11:22, it is permitted to eat certain types of locusts.  However, there are some types of locusts that are forbidden to eat.  In the time of the mishnah people were able to distinguish between permitted and forbidden locusts.  Nowadays, we do not know the difference and therefore Jews do not eat locusts.  I’m sure we are all deeply disappointed.
  Our mishnah discusses the liquid that comes out of locusts when they have been preserved through salting.
  Rabbi Zadok testified concerning brine of unclean locusts that it is clean,  Rabbi Zadok teaches that the liquid that oozes out of unclean locusts when they have been salted is not considered a liquid that makes that with which it comes into contact receptive to impurities.  (See Leviticus 11:38).  The only liquids that do so are dew, water, wine, oil, blood, milk and bee’s honey (see tractate Makhshirin 6:4).  Likewise, it is permitted to drink this liquid, since it is not considered to be the blood of the locust.
  Whereas the first mishnah [said]:   unclean locusts that have been preserved together with clean locusts do not make their brine unfit.  The earlier mishnah, which existed before Rabbi Zadok taught something slightly different.  It taught that if unclean locusts were preserved, meaning pickled, with clean (edible) locusts, the it is permitted to drink the brine.  Rabbi Zadok has added that even the liquid that oozes out of just unclean locusts, and not a mixture, is permitted to drink.
  Questions for Further Thought:
  What is the relationship of Rabbi Zadok to the “first mishnah”?
  Questions for Further Thought:
  What is the relationship of Rabbi Zadok to the “first mishnah”?
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Rabbi Zadok testified concerning flowing water which exceeded in quantity dripping   water; that it was valid.There was such a case at Birath Hapilya, and when the case came before the Sages they declared it valid.This mishnah discusses water which is used for a mikveh, the bath used by Jews to achieve ritual purification.  This mishnah also appears in tractate Mikvaoth, where it is preceded by a distinction between running water and dripping water.  Water which is flowing on the ground, such as a stream, creek or river, is valid for a mikveh even if there are less than 40 seahs in one place.  However, dripping water, such as rain, must reach a minimum measure of 40 seahs in one defined place in order to be valid as a mikveh. [Note that water drawn to the mikveh is invalid in any case].Our mishnah discusses a potential mikveh that has some flowing water and some dripping water.  The question is, does this mikveh need to have 40 seahs?According to Rabbi Zadok, as long as the quantity of flowing water exceeded the quantity of dripping water, the mikveh is valid, even if there are not 40 seahs in the place where the person immerses.  If, however, there was more dripping water, then the mikveh would need to have 40 seahs of water in order to be valid.  The mishnah then brings in an actual case where such a question arose and the Sages declared the mikveh to be valid.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains additional testimony of Rabbi Zadok concerning the validity of water for use in a mikveh.  In the introduction to the previous mishnah we mentioned that flowing water such as a stream need not contain 40 seahs in any one place in order to be valid to be used as a mikveh.  However, if the flowing water is directed by vessels, then it must contain 40 seahs in one place to be used as a mikveh.
  Rabbi Zadok testified concerning flowing water which was made to run in a stream through nut-leaves, that it was valid.  In the scenario under discussion a person has used nut-leaves to direct a stream of water. The question is, are these nut-leaves to be considered like a vessel?  If they are then the stream would require 40 seahs in one place in order to be used as a mikveh.  Rabbi Zadok testifies that these nut-leaves are not to be considered like vessels, even though the person who set them up may have used them in a similar fashion.  Therefore the stream is valid as a mikveh even without 40 seahs in one place.
  There was such a case at Ahaliyya, and when the case came before [the Sages in] the Chamber of Hewn Stone they declared it valid.  This section brings additional support for Rabbi Zadok’s testimony.  A case such as this actually happened in a place called Ahaliyya, and the Sages who sat in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, which was located in the Temple in Jerusalem (Sanhedrin 11:2) ruled that the water was valid without 40 seahs. Note the similar structure between this mishnah and the previous mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The first section of mishnah five contains a testimony regarding the purity of a jar of red heifer ashes that had been placed on an impure creeping thing.
  The second section contains a testimony regarding a person who took two nazirite vows.
  Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Yakim, a man of Hadar, testified concerning a jar of ashes of a red heifer which was put over a creeping thing, that they were unclean. Whereas Rabbi Eliezer had pronounced them clean.  In the case under discussion a person has a jar which contains the ashes of a red heifer, which are used in the purification process.  The jar itself cannot receive impurity, for it is made out of stone which can never become impure.  If the jar is placed over an impure creeping thing, the ashes inside the jar are impure, even though the jar itself remains pure.  This is due to an interpretation of Numbers 19:9 which states, “A man who is clean shall gather up the ashes of the cow and deposit them outside the camp in a clean place.”  Since these ashes were not put in a “clean place”, they become impure.  This law is in contrast to that which Rabbi Eliezer stated, namely that since the jar remains pure, the ashes remain pure as well.
  Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who had vowed two naziriteships, that if he cut his hair after the first one on the thirtieth day, he could cut his hair after the second one on the sixtieth day; and if he cut his hair on the fifty-ninth day he has also fulfilled his duty, for the thirtieth day counts towards the required number.  The testimony of Rabbi Papias concerns the length of a naziriteship.  One who takes an oath to be a nazirite without specifying the length of the vow, is a nazirite for thirty days.  During this time it is forbidden for him to cut his hair.  On the thirty-first day, when the naziriteship was over he would cut his hair.  If he were to cut his hair on the thirtieth day, he has fulfilled his naziriteship, since the observance of the vow for part of the day counts as if he observed it for the full day.  If he were to take two nazirite vows, he should really cut his hair on the thirty-first day, and then begin to count that same day the second nazirite vow and then cut his hair again on the sixty-first day.  However, if he cut his hair on the thirtieth day, he should cut his hair a second time on the sixtieth day.  Furthermore, if he cut his hair for the second time on the fifty-ninth day, he has fulfilled his obligation.  This is because the thirtieth day when he cut his hair the first time, counts both as the last day of his first naziriteship and the first day of his second naziriteship.  In this manner one who takes two nazirite vows can “get away” with completing his second vow after only 59 days.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section one:  What is the basis for the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the testimony of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Yakim?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section one:  What is the basis for the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the testimony of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Yakim?
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias testified concerning the offspring of a peace-offering, that it can be brought as a peace-offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer says that the offspring of a peace-offering cannot be brought as a peace-offering.But the sages say: it can be brought.Rabbi Papias said:  “I testify that we had a cow, which was a peace-offering, and we ate it at Passover, and its offspring we ate as a peace-offering at the [next] festival.This mishnah discusses the offspring of a peace-offering.  A peace-offering (shelamim) was a sacrifice that was usually brought either as a voluntary offering, or on festivals.  The breast and the right hand leg would go to the priests and the remainder of the animal could be eaten by those who had brought it. The issue in our mishnah is the status of the offspring of an animal that had already been set aside to become a peace-offering.  In other words, after the owner declared that he was going to bring the animal to the Temple as a peace-offering, it gave birth.According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias, the offspring of a peace-offering can be brought as a peace-offering.  Rabbi Eliezer ruled that it may not be brought as an peace-offering.  The Talmud explains that according to Rabbi Eliezer the animal is put into a pen and let to die through starvation.  The reason is that if the halakhah were to allow the owner to bring it as a peace-offering he would have incentive to delay bringing the mother , who has already been declared a peace-offering, to the Temple.  The owner might wait until she gives birth, perhaps several times, in order that he would be able to bring more peace-offerings (after all he benefits as well by having more meat to eat).  This delay in bringing the animal to the Temple would violate a rule in Deuteronomy 23:22 which states that when you offer a voluntary sacrifice, do not delay in bringing it.The Sages side in this dispute with the testimony of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias.  At the end of the mishnah Rabbi Papias brings his own personal experience of having eaten a peace-offering at one festival and its offspring at the next.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains four more testimonies given by Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias.  Note that on the first two Rabbi Eliezer expresses a dissenting opinion, the same format we saw in the previous two mishnayoth.
  They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive, whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive.  The “boards of bakers” under discussion in this section are planks upon which the baker organizes his dough and puts it into the shape of loaves.  If these planks are considered “vessels” than they can receive impurity, as can all “vessels”.  If however, they are considered closer to raw material, less-shaped, then they cannot receive impurity.  According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias since these boards are specially made to have dough put on them, they can receive impurity.  Rabbi Eliezer holds that they cannot.
  They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive, whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive.  The oven under discussion is one made of bricks.  Sand has been placed between each brick and then a layer of plaster was put on the outside to seal the oven.  The sand would prevent the bricks from being stuck together and therefore make this oven easy to take apart.   According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias, since the oven was plastered from the outside, it is considered a proper oven and can receive impurity.  Rabbi Eliezer holds that since each part is separate, it is not considered an oven, but a broken oven.  Since broken vessels cannot receive impurity, this oven cannot be made impure.
  They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar,   whereas they used to say: only until Purim.  The Jewish year is based on both a lunar and solar model.  It is lunar in that the length of a month is determined by the moon.  It is solar in that the year is occasionally adjusted so that months and holidays will fall consistently in the same season.  (The concept of a year exists only in a solar calendar; the concept of a month exists only in a lunar calendar).  In today’s fixed calendar the year receives an extra month seven out of nineteen years. The extra month comes after Adar, the month in which we celebrate Purim.  This extra month is called Adar Bet (second Adar).  During the time of the Mishnah they did not have a fixed calendar.  Each year a court would have to decide whether or not to “intercalate” the year, meaning add another month.  They would do so depending on the weather outside.  According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias, the court has until the end of Adar to intercalate the year.  This means that they can do so at the last possible moment.  The older halakhah was that it could only be intercalated before Purim, which falls on the 14th of Adar.
  They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated.  The final testimony of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias is about conditionally intercalating the year.  As we can see from the example in the story, this means that a court would decide to intercalate the year in the absence of the Patriarch, in this case Rabban Gamaliel, who evidently had the ultimate decision in whether or not to intercalate.  When the Patriarch returned and agreed to the intercalation it becomes retroactively valid.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Olive-boilers and dyers would both use large metal cauldrons for boiling.  In order to prevent the water from spilling out they would put a plaster ledge around the sides of the cauldron.  The question in our mishnah is:  are these plaster ledges receptive to impurity?  In other words, are they considered “vessels” which receive impurity or raw material which does not.
  Menahem ben Signai testified concerning the ledge attached to an olive-boiler’s cauldron, that it is [liable to become] impure; and concerning that of dyers, that it is not [liable to become] impure, whereas they used to say the reverse. According to Menahem ben Signai, the ledge attached to the olive-boiler’s cauldron can become impure.  This is because it is necessary for the proper use of the cauldron; it allows the olive-boiler to fill the entire cauldron with water.  The ledge that the dyer uses cannot become impure because the dyer is careful not to fill the cauldron up to the top with water so that it might boil over.  Previously people reasoned the opposite.  Evidently they thought that the dyer’s made more use of the ledge than did the olive-boilers.  The principle, however, remains the same.  If the ledge is normally used to keep the water in, than it receives impurity.  Unfortunately, I must admit, never having boiled olives or dye, that I cannot fully understand the reason why people would change their minds about which is a “vessel” and which is not.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of chapter nine contains four testimonies given by Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada.
  Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement;  As we have learned in other places, the Rabbis considered a deaf-mute to lack intelligence, probably because in their time the deaf-mute had little way of communicating with the outside world.  Usually a person who lacks intelligence, such a deaf-mute, minor or insane person, cannot enter into legally binding contracts, because they don’t understand their ramifications.  However, as Rabbi Nehunia testifies, a deaf-mute can be divorced.  (She was married off by her father).  The reason is that divorce is not dependent upon the woman’s acquiescence; she can be divorced against her will.  Since her will is irrelevant, even one who lacks awareness can be divorced.  Although this might sound harsh, as if the Rabbis are going out of their way to allow a deaf-mute to be divorced, it may have also worked in her benefit.  If men couldn’t divorce deaf-mutes, perhaps they might refrain from marrying them.  By allowing a “way out” the Rabbis might actually be encouraging their marriage.
  And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her;  This section deals with an orphaned minor girl of a non-priestly, Israelite family, who marries a priest. Generally this type of marriage is considered to be valid only rabbinically (derabanan) and not valid through Torah law (deoraita).  Deoraita a minor can only be married off by her father.  Only when she reaches majority she can marry herself off without her father’s aid.  Despite the fact that this is really only a “derabanan” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that it is sufficient for her to be allowed to eat terumah and for her husband to inherit her, should she die.  Even though these are usually rights only given to a valid “deoraita” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that the husband does receive these rights.
  And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value;  Usually one who steals an item must return the actual stolen item, as long as the item still exists.  If one stole a beam and then used it in the foundation of a castle, legally he is bound to take down the castle and return the beam.  Obviously this will discourage people from admitting that they stole, an essential part of making atonement for their crime.  To allow people to more easily make atonement, the robber is allowed to pay back the value of the beam.
  And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many,   that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar.  If it were forbidden to use animals that might have been stolen as sacrifices, the priests would never sacrifice an animal, lest it be stolen.  Therefore, the mishnah rules that stolen animals can be used as sin-offerings, and that they do procure atonement for the one bringing them, as long as the theft is not publicly known.  This mishnah is not permission to steal an animal and bring it as a sacrifice.  Rather it is permission to use an animal without being concerned that it is stolen property.  The mishnah teaches that if it was stolen property and the person who brought it did not know that it was stolen, that it is effective in bringing atonement.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Is there any common denominator to these four testimonies of Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Is there any common denominator to these four testimonies of Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada?
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah contains two testimonies, and an additional law stated by Rabbi Akiva.
  Rabbi Joshua ben. Bathyra testified concerning the blood of carcasses that it was pure.  This law was learned above, chapter five, mishnah one. There we learned that everyone holds that the flesh of a carcass (an animal which was not properly slaughtered) is impure.  Beth Shammai held that the blood of a carcass is not like the flesh, and it is not impure, whereas Beth Hillel held that it is impure.  In our mishnah Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra testifies that the law is like Beth Hillel.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Bathyra testified concerning the ashes of purification, that if a defiled person had touched part of them he had defiled the whole of them. Rabbi Akiva added in regard to the fine flour, the incense, the frankincense, and the coals, that if a tevul yom had touched part of them he had made the whole of them unfit.  The “ashes of purification” are the ashes of the red heifer which are combined with water and then used to purify one who has contracted corpse impurity.  According to Rabbi Shimon ben Bathyra if an impure person touches some of these ashes, all of the ashes that are in the same pile have become impure.  Even though each ash is its own distinct object and they are not attached to each other, one who touches some, defiles it all. Rabbi Akiva adds several other items that are in truth each individual, separate things, yet if part of them are touched by an impure person the entire pile is impure.  This includes flour, incense, frankincense and coals, all of which are used on the altar in the Temple.  If these are touched even by a “tevul yom”, someone who as already immersed himself in a mikveh to become clean but the sun has not yet set, will make them impure.  Note that the reason that Rabbi Akiva mentions specifically the “tevul yom” is that the Saducees and other Jewish sects (including the Dead Sea sect) held that a “tevul yom” was pure.  A person did not have to wait for sundown to become pure after having entered the mikveh.  In fact, we know from the Dead Sea Scrolls, that this was one of the major disputes between the Dead Sea sect and those with whom they were arguing, probably the Pharisees.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Two more testimonies, both of which deal in some way with marital law.
  Rabbi Judah ben Baba and Rabbi Judah the priest testified concerning a minor, the daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah as soon as she entered the bridal chamber even though she had not engaged in marital intercourse.  According to the Torah when a woman from an Israelite family marries a priest she may eat terumah, food which is normally reserved for the priests.  However, the question must be asked, when is the marriage considered valid such that she may eat terumah?  Furthermore, this question must also be asked with regards to a minor girl, who was married off by her mother or brother.  As we learned in mishnah 7:9, this type of marriage is not valid deoraita (from the Torah) and is only a rabbinic institution.  Therefore, if she is not married according to the Torah, when can she eat terumah, a right normally reserved for those married deoraita?  [We learned in 7:9 that when married she can eat terumah.]  This is an important question, since the penalty for a non-priest who eats terumah is quite harsh (death by the hands of heaven).  Our mishnah teaches that she may eat terumah once she has entered the bridal chamber (huppah) even though she has not yet had relations with her husband.  She may not eat, however, while she is merely betrothed, a period that could last a year or even more.
  Rabbi Yose the priest and Rabbi Zechariah ben Hakatzav testified concerning a young girl who had been taken as collateral (by in Ashkelon, and that her family had distanced her, even though her witnesses testified that she had not secluded herself [with any Man] and that she had not been defiled. The Sages said to them: if you believe that she had been taken as collateral, believe also that she did not seclude herself [with any man] and that she was not defiled; and if you do not believe that she did not seclude herself and that she was not defiled, neither believe that she had been taken as collateral.  In the sad case under discussion in this mishnah a girl is taken by gentile debt collectors as security on a debt that a Jewish family owes them.  The family, assuming that the girl has been raped by the gentiles, distances themselves from her.  This “distancing” means that they refused to marry her (those in the family that would have been eligible to marry her, such as uncles and cousins), even though there was no law that prevented them from doing so.  This family distanced her even though she had witnesses who testified that she had not been so much as secluded with a gentile, let alone raped.  The Sages respond to this family that their position vis-a-vis the girl is illogical.  If they believed the witnesses that she had been taken as collateral, then they must believe the same witnesses who testify that she had not been raped.  If they don’t believe the witnesses that she had not been raped, then they shouldn’t believe them that she had been taken in the first place.  The Sages do not tolerate the family’s overly stringent and extremely cruel position.  While the Sages did believe that under certain circumstances, a girl who had been raped could no longer marry certain men (priests), they did not seek to compound this difficult situation by assuming that this had happened when witnesses testify explicitly that it had not.  The family’s distancing the girl is a case of a stringency run amok, and one against which the Sages rightly put down their halakhic feet.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a person who is called “issa” or “dough”, meaning that his lineage is “mixed up” like dough.  This is a man from a potentially priestly family that may have been “contaminated” by intermarrying with unfit priests, or “halalim”.  A “halal” is the child of a mother who should not have been married to a priest, such as a divorcee.  A woman who should not have been married to a priest but nevertheless does so becomes a “halalah”.  The fact that “halalim” may have married into this family casts in doubt the status of all subsequent generations.
  We should note again that lineage was an extremely important issue in Talmudic society, as it was in most of the ancient world.  Lineage was especially important to the priestly elite, who could lose their status by not preserving the “purity” of their line.
  Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra testified concerning the widow of [a man belonging to] a family of doubtful lineage (an, that she was fit to marry into the priesthood,  Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra testify that a widow of an “issa” is fit to marry into the priesthood.  Since an “issa” is only a case of doubtful lineage, and we are not sure that there really were “halalim” in the family, the ruling is not stringent.  Note that if we were sure that this widow had been married to a “halal” she would subsequently be forbidden to marry a priest.  Furthermore, if this was a divorcee, there would be no issue since no divorcee can marry a priest.  The only issue arises with the widow of an issa.
  [And that those of] a family of doubtful lineage are fit to declare who was unclean   and who clean, who was to be put away and who was to be brought near. Rabban Gamaliel said: we accept your testimony, but what can we do since Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai ordained that courts should not be commissioned for this purpose?  The priests would listen to you concerning those who might be put away, but not concerning those who might be brought near!  In their second testimony Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra testify that the people of such a family are able to declare the status of the women among them: which women are “unclean” and therefore unable to marry priests, and which are “clean” and therefore able to marry priests.  In other words, although this family itself has had a shadow cast upon its lineage, the members of the family are relied on to testify with regards to the status of the women within their family. Rabban Gamaliel responds that although this testimony is legally and logically acceptable, and he agrees that the family itself is fit to sort out its own lineage, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, the famous Sage who survived the destruction of the Second Temple, already decreed that the courts should not allow the widow of an “issa” to marry a priest.  Although Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai agreed that this was permitted by law, the priests are stringent in this matter, and would not allow the court to permit them to marry such a woman.  As we saw in the previous mishnah, many Jews were much more stringent in manners of lineage than the law required.  Here Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai teaches an important principle:  if the people are going to be so strict, the court should not make rulings that they in any case will ignore.  This would cheapen the authority of the court by putting it into blatant conflict with the people.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah Rabbi Yose ben Yoezer testifies concerning three things.  One unusual feature of this mishnah is that it is all in Aramaic, as opposed to Hebrew which is the language of nearly all of the Mishnah.
  Rabbi Yose ben Yoezer, a man of Zereda, testified concerning the ayal-locust, that it is pure;  The Torah permits eating certain types of locusts and forbids others.  However, it is very difficult to tell which locusts are permitted and which are not.  Therefore, today we don’t eat locusts (I’m sure you’re disappointed!).  Rabbi Yose ben Yoezer testifies that a certain type of locust, called the “ayal-locust” is pure, meaning one is allowed to eat it.  Bon Appetit.
  And concerning liquid in the slaughter-house (of the, that it is pure;  The liquid which would be found on the floor of the slaughter-house of the Temple, which is assumedly a mixture of blood and water, is pure and cannot become impure.  One explanation of this is that the concept of the impurity of liquids is a Rabbinic innovation (derabanan).  The Rabbis did not include in this innovation the liquids found in the Temple, so as not to increase the impurity of things found in the Temple.
  And that one who touches a corpse is impure.  This section is puzzling.  Seemingly Rabbi Yose makes the simple statement that one who touches a corpse is impure.  This law is stated clearly in Numbers 19:11, 16, and there is no need for a “testimony” to restate that which is obvious.  One explanation given is that according to the Torah one who touches a dead body is impure for seven days and one who touches this person is only impure for one day.  However, the Rabbis were stricter and ruled that also one who touches a person who has touched a dead body is impure for seven days.  Rabbi Yose disagreed with this ruling.  When he states that one who touches a dead body is impure for seven days, he excludes one who touches a person who has touched a dead body.  Another possibility is that Rabbi Yose ruled that one who definitely touched a dead body is impure, but one who may or may not have done so is not impure. An intriguing possibility that Albeck brings up is that this ruling of Rabbi Yose is against the Essenes, a Jewish sect that existed towards the end of the Second Temple period.  The Essenes, who are likely the same group that occupied the Dead Sea settlement where the Dead Sea Scrolls were found, were extremely strict in matters of purity and impurity.  They ruled that a person could be impure for seven days under certain circumstances by touching a live human being.  Rabbi Yose rules against this overly strict position; only a corpse can transmit seven day impurity.
  And they called him “Yose the permitter”.  For these rulings, Rabbi Yose ben Yoezer was called, “Rabbi Yose the permitter”.  This was probably said with a certain degree of derision; Rabbi Yose was overly permissive.  The fact that they called Rabbi Yose a “permitter” proves that section three also contained a permissive ruling.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Two more testimonies, one by Rabbi Akiva and one by Rabbi Joshua
  Rabbi Akiva testified in the name of Nehemiah, a man of Beth Deli, that a woman is allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness.  Usually Jewish law requires two witnesses in order for testimony to be effective.  Here we learn of an exception to this rule.  If one witness testifies that a woman’s husband has died, she is allowed to remarry based on one witness’s testimony.  This leniency is to prevent the sad situation where a woman cannot remarry because she doesn’t know if her first husband is dead. This same testimony appears in chapter six mishnah one, there given by Rabbi Judah ben Bava.  It is perplexing that Rabbi Akiva should repeat the same testimony.  The reason why Rabbi Akiva repeats the testimony is explained in the last mishnah of Yevamoth.  There Rabbi Akiva relates that when he traveled to Babylonia he met Rabbi Nehemiah of Beth Deli who told him that he had heard that in the Land of Israel only Rabbi Judah ben Bava allowed a woman to re-marry on the testimony of one witness; the other Sages disagree.  Rabbi Akiva confirmed that this was true.  Rabbi Nehemiah responded to him that he had heard from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder that a woman could remarry on the testimony of one witness.  The testimony in our mishnah is Rabbi Akiva’s reporting of what Rabbi Nehemiah had told him.  It is meant to teach that the testimony in chapter six, mishnah one is agreed to by more than just Rabbi Judah ben Bava.
  Rabbi Joshua testified concerning bones found in the wood-shed that the Sages said: one may gather them, bone by bone, and they are all clean.  Rabbi Joshua testifies that the bones of a human were found in the wood-shed in the Temple in Jerusalem, and that the Sages said that they could gather up the bones and bring them out of the Temple, without fearing that the bones had come into contact with other things in the Temple and impurified them.  This is because the Temple is public domain and all cases of doubtful impurity in the public domain are deemed pure.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua give testimony about the Temple and issues of its holiness.
  Rabbi Eliezer said:   I have heard that when they were building the Temple [complex] they made curtains for the Temple and curtains for the Temple-courts; but in the case of the Temple they built from the outside, and in the case of the Temple-court they built from the inside.  This section discusses the building of the walls of the Temple.  Rabbi Eliezer states that when they built the Second Temple and the surrounding courtyards they first demarcated the areas by hanging curtains.  When it came to building the Temple itself they built the walls from the outside of the curtains.  This way they did not actually see the Temple and become distracted by its splendor and not be able to build properly.  Another possible reason is to prevent unnecessary infringement upon the Temple confines.  However, when it came to the courtyard they built the walls from within the curtains.
  Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that sacrifices may be offered even though there is no Temple, and that the most holy sacrifices may be eaten even though there are no curtains, and the less holy sacrifices and second tithes even though there is no wall [around Jerusalem];  because the first sanctification sanctified both for its own time and for the time to come.  Rabbi Joshua claims that although the Second Temple in Jerusalem has been destroyed, and the walls of the Temple, its courtyards and Jerusalem have been torn down, it is still, at least theoretically possible to offer sacrifices and to eat them in the places that they would have been eaten while the Temple stood.  In other words even though there is no wall surrounding the Temple, the priests can still eat the sacrifices that had to be consumed within the Temple precents and even though there are no walls to Jerusalem, the people can still eat the sacrifices and second tithes that had to be consumed within Jerusalem.  This is because when the Temple mount was sanctified originally when the First Temple was built by Solomon the area was sanctified permanently, and the sanctity of the place continues to exist even though the Temple no longer stands. Historians have paid careful attention to this statement by Rabbi Joshua, asking the question, did the Jews continue to offer sacrifices after the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E.?  Although there is some evidence that the Jews did continue to do so, the overwhelming evidence is that they did not.  Rabbi Joshua’s claim is likely to be more theoretical/ideological than realistic.  Certainly after the Bar Kochba rebellion in 135 C.E., when hopes of restoring the Temple were crushed, the Jews simply did not have the ability to offer sacrifices on the Temple mount.  Nowadays, although Jews do have sovereignty over the Temple mount, few believe that we may return to offering sacrifices, although some fringe groups do and have attempted to do so.
  Questions for Further Thought:
  What might be the connection between these two sections?
  Questions for Further Thought:
  What might be the connection between these two sections?
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of Eduyoth discusses what Elijah, who according to the end of Malachi, will reappear at the end of time, will do.
  Rabbi Joshua said: I have received a tradition from Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher [heard it] from his teacher, as a halakhah [given] to Moses from Sinai, that Elijah will not come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near, but to put away those brought near by force and to bring near those put away by force. The family of Beth Tzriphah was on the other side of the Jordan and Ben Zion put it away by force; and yet another family was there, and Ben Zion brought it near by force. It is such as these that Elijah will come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near.  Rabbi Joshua says that Rabban Yohanan ben Zakai had a tradition that can be traced all the way back to Moses who received it at Sinai, that when Elijah the prophet reappears in Messianic time, he will not clarify which families are clean, meaning they have not intermarried with forbidden relationships, nor will he clarify the opposite.  He will neither put away the unclean families nor draw near the clean families.  All that he will do is bring near the families who were forcibly and illegitimately put away and put away the families that were forcibly and illegitimately brought near.  In other words, decisions that humans had made as to which families were clean and which were not, and were made in a legal fashion without coercion, will be accepted by Elijah, even if he knows that they were wrong.  However, actions which were enacted by force and not consented to by the law-abiding sections of society will be corrected. A note about “a law from Moses on Sinai”.  The Rambam points out that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai did not actually have a tradition that Moses said these very words.  Rather this is how the tradition understood Deuteronomy 30:3-4, which states that if you are scattered to the four corners of the earth, God will bring you back.  This is understood to mean that if a family was illegitimately not allowed to intermarry with other Jewish families, Elijah would redeem the situation. The mishnah now proceeds to mention one family that had been put away by force, meaning that this person Ben Zion, forcibly pronounced them unclean and made the rest of society abide by his will.  So too, Ben Zion, forcibly pronounced another family clean, and made society abide by his will.
  Rabbi Judah says: to bring near, but not to put away.  Rabbi Judah claims that Elijah will bring near but he will not put away.  This is probably similar to the words of the Sages at the end of the mishnah.  Elijah does not come to cause pain by putting some families away.  The only problem that he will rectify is families who should be brought near, not those who should be put away.
  Rabbi Shimon says: to conciliate disputes.  Rabbi Shimon holds that when Elijah will come he will settle all the disputes between the Rabbis.
  And the Sages say: neither to put away nor to bring near, but to make peace in the world, for it is said,  “Behold I send to you Elijah the prophet”, etc., “and he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children and the heart of the children to their fathers” (Malachi 3:23-2.  The Sages hold that when Elijah comes it will only be to bring peace to the world.  However, we should notice what peace means in this mishnah:  a state of familial harmony.  Peace doesn’t only mean the absence of warfare, rather it is more accurately interpreted as societal well-being, a reconciliation of parents with children.  The Sages’ opinion is supported by the final verses of the book of Malachi, the very verses that teach that the Messianic age will be preceded by Elijah.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   How does Rabbi Shimon’s opinion compare with the other opinions in the mishnah?  What does he hold about Godly intervention in human affairs?
  Congratulations!  We have finished Eduyoth.
  By now, for those of you who have been learning since the beginning of the Seder, you have grown accustomed to this point, where we thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives.
  However, I believe in this case we should give pause and offer an even greater hearty Yasher Koach (congratulations).  This tractate is certainly one of the more difficult tractates, one which includes an extremely wide variety of topics.  Oftentimes each mishnah or even each section of each mishnah contained a new topic. This has made the tractate difficult to follow.  For those of you who nevertheless stuck it out, Yasher Koach.  For those of you who gave up, do not despair.  The remaining three tractates of Nezikin are much simpler.  Tomorrow we begin to learn Tractate Avodah Zarah.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   How does Rabbi Shimon’s opinion compare with the other opinions in the mishnah?  What does he hold about Godly intervention in human affairs?
  Congratulations!  We have finished Eduyoth.
  By now, for those of you who have been learning since the beginning of the Seder, you have grown accustomed to this point, where we thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives.
  However, I believe in this case we should give pause and offer an even greater hearty Yasher Koach (congratulations).  This tractate is certainly one of the more difficult tractates, one which includes an extremely wide variety of topics.  Oftentimes each mishnah or even each section of each mishnah contained a new topic. This has made the tractate difficult to follow.  For those of you who nevertheless stuck it out, Yasher Koach.  For those of you who gave up, do not despair.  The remaining three tractates of Nezikin are much simpler.  Tomorrow we begin to learn Tractate Avodah Zarah.