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text: English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה חולין
  Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin
  
  Introduction
  
  Hullin means non-sanctified things. As the name of our tractate it refers to non-sacrificial meat, the topic that most of our tractate deals with. It is indeed the opposite of what Seder Kodashim is all about—holy meat. The meat in our tractate is thus called by what it is not. 
  We should note that according to many biblical scholars, before the Temple was established, all meat that was eaten would have been sacrificial. A person who wanted to eat meat would bring an animal to the local sanctuary where it would be slaughtered. Some of the meat would be given to the priests, and the remainder could be eaten by the owners. When the Temple was established, it became prohibited to offer sacrifices anywhere but the Temple in Jerusalem and therefore people who wanted to eat meat had to eat it in a non-sacrificial manner.
  Deuteronomy 12:20-24 teaches what one is to do should one want to eat non-sacrificial meat.
  20 When the LORD enlarges your territory, as He has promised you, and you say, "I shall eat some meat," for you have the urge to eat meat, you may eat meat whenever you wish.  21 If the place where the LORD has chosen to establish His name is too far from you, you may slaughter any of the cattle or sheep that the LORD gives you, as I have instructed you; and you may eat to your heart's content in your settlements.  22 Eat it, however, as the gazelle and the deer are eaten: the unclean may eat it together with the clean.  23 But make sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh.  24 You must not partake of it; you must pour it out on the ground like water:  25 you must not partake of it, in order that it may go well with you and with your descendants to come, for you will be doing what is right in the sight of the LORD.  26 But such sacred and votive donations as you may have shall be taken by you to the site that the LORD will choose.
  The Torah itself does not describe how meat is supposed to be slaughtered. However, by the very need to drain the blood (vs. 23) it is likely that the Torah presumes that the animal’s neck will be sliced. The other laws of “shechitah”—slaughtering, are oral laws, transmitted by Jewish tradition, but not found in the Torah. Our tractate will deal with these laws at length. 
  In order to make the tractate a bit easier I will explain two terms here that will come up throughout: Nevelah: An animal that died without having been properly slaughtered. See Deuteronomy 14:21. Terefah: An animal that is wounded or sick and will eminently die. Such an animal is prohibited even if it is properly slaughtered. The word “treif” which colloquially is used to mean “unkosher” comes from this word.
  There are other prohibitions concerning slaughtering and eating animals that come up throughout the tractate, but I shall introduce them as we go along.
  As we learn the tractate we should remember that despite the fact that most of us do not slaughter our own meat, and hence these laws are not really practical for us, they are still observed today, and indeed until recently, before refrigeration was invented, all slaughtering would have been local. “Buy local” wasn’t just an environmental slogan; it was a culinary necessity. Hence, butchers would have been found in every community. Indeed, when Jews moved to a new place first and foremost they needed three things: a mikveh for women to immerse in, a mohel and a shochet. Without these three institutions, no traditional Jewish community could exist. Furthermore, we should remember that usually a person would raise his own animals and then bring them to the shochet for him to slaughter. People would have seen the slaughtering occur, and while not everyone was an expert in these laws and many people never performed them, they would have at least seen them being performed. Personally, I think that the study of Tractate Hullin is a good opportunity for us to reflect on the meaning of eating meat in our society and in our personal lives.
  Enjoy the Tractate!
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction Our mishnah teaches some general rules with regard to who may slaughter and when.
  All may slaughter, and their slaughtering is valid, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, lest they mess up [the animal] through their slaughtering. And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid.  Anyone may slaughter an animal. The only exceptions are the three categories of people who are not considered to have “da’at,” intelligence. They are not allowed to slaughter and if they do slaughter, the animal is not kosher. The problem is that one cannot tell if an animal was validly slaughtered just by looking at it afterwards. Thus there is no way to check the results if one wasn’t there watching when the animal was slaughtered. Furthermore, these three people cannot be trusted to report on what they have done, because they are not considered to have intelligence. Therefore, their slaughtering is invalid. However, if an adult is watching them while they slaughter and sees that they do it correctly, the slaughtering is valid.
  That which is slaughtered by a non-Jew is a nevelah and defiles by carrying.  A non-Jew cannot ritually slaughter for a Jew. If he does, the animal is considered a nevelah (carrion) and it imparts defilement by being carried (as do all nevelot, see Leviticus 11:40). The mishnah probably notes that this meat defiles in order to teach that this animal is “deoraita” (by the Torah) considered a nevelah, and that this rule is not just a stringency initiated by the rabbis.
  If one slaughtered at night, and also a blind man that slaughtered, the slaughtering is valid.  Obviously, it would be better not to slaughter at night, and it is problematic for a blind person to slaughter. However, an animal slaughtered at night or by a blind person is still valid, as long as it was slaughtered properly.
  One who slaughtered on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for his own life, the slaughtering is valid.  Slaughtering is a prohibited labor on Shabbat and Yom Kippur and one who does so is liable for the death penalty (Shabbat) or karet (Yom Kippur). Nevertheless, the animal is still kosher. Just because the person sinned, doesn’t mean he didn’t slaughter in the correct way.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to provide general rules with regard to slaughtering including the instrument with which one slaughters. We should note that modern halakhah dictates that Jewish slaughter must be done only with an extremely sharp knife, one designed specially for such a purpose. The Mishnah still reflects a time when Jews used other instruments as well.
  If one slaughtered with [the smooth edge of] a hand sickle, with a flint or with a reed, the slaughtering is valid.  All of these instruments have smooth cutting surfaces and therefore can be used to slaughter.
  All may slaughter; at all times one may slaughter; and with any implement one may slaughter, except a scythe, a saw, teeth or a finger nail, since these strangle.  This section summarizes that which we have learned up until now. It then adds a caveat concerning instruments that can’t be used. These instruments do not sever the trachea and esophagus, as is required, but rather tear them out, thereby causing strangulation. An animal slaughtered with one of these instruments is considered a nevelah.
  One who slaughtered with a scythe, moving it forward only: Bet Shammai declare it invalid, But Bet Hillel declare it valid.  The scythe’s teeth are bent back, pointing only in a backwards direction. Therefore, if one slaughters by moving the scythe forward, the teeth won’t tear the neck and the neck will effectively be sliced. Neverthless, Bet Shammai declare it invalid lest he bring the scythe back and tear the neck. Bet Hillel declare the animal valid.
  If the teeth of the scythe were filed away it is regarded as an ordinary knife.  If the teeth are filed away, then the scythe can be treated as a normal knife and one can use it for slaughtering.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Slaughtering must be performed on the animal’s neck below the larynx, preferably below the first hard ring of the trachea and up to the place where the bronchial tubes begin to branch. Cutting outside of this area is called “hagramah” and renders the animal invalid. Our mishnah deals with a case where a person cuts right below the first hard ring of the trachea.
  If one slaughtered [by cutting] at the [top] ring [of the trachea] and left a hair's breadth of its entire circumference [towards the head], the slaughtering is valid.  As stated in the introduction, the cut should be made below the first hard ring of the animal’s trachea. If he makes the cut at this top ring, the slaughtering is valid as long as a hair’s breadth of the trachea on the side of the head remains. According to the first opinion, the hair’s breadth of the trachea must remain on the entire circumference of the highest ring.
  Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: if there was only left [towards the head] a hair's breadth of the greater part of its circumference, [the slaughtering is valid].  Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says that it is sufficient for the hair’s breadth to remain on the greater part of the circumference, and not necessarily the entire circumference.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Animals are slaughtered and sacrificed by having their throats slit. Non-sacrificial birds are also slaughtered in this manner. However, sacrificial birds are slaughtered by a process called “nipping” which is done from the back of the neck. For more information on “nipping” see Zevahim 6:4.
  Our mishnah compares the laws of nipping with the laws of slaughtering.
  If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid.  The side of neck is valid for slaughtering but not for nipping bird sacrifices. Some commentators hold that this is only ex post facto meaning one should not slaughter from the side but if one does, the slaughtering is valid. Others hold that even “lechatchila” (a priori) one can slaughter from the side. The side is considered to be part of the front.
  If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid.  Slaughtering cannot be done from the back of the neck, whereas this is the place where nipping must occur.
  If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid.  Slaughtering should be done at the front of the neck, whereas nipping done at the front is invalid.
  For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering.  This section explains the general rule any place that is valid for nipping is not valid for slaughtering and vice versa.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Yesterday’s mishnah concluded by noting that the place on the neck where slaughtering is performed is exactly where nipping cannot be performed and vice versa.
  The remainder of our chapter deals with other opposite types of situations. At first these deal with sacrificial issues, but then they move on to other issues as well.
  [The age] which qualifies turtle doves [for sacrifice] disqualifies pigeons, and [the age] which qualifies pigeons [for sacrifice] disqualifies turtle doves.  Turtle doves are valid as sacrifices when they are older and pigeons when they are younger. There is no overlapping period when both are valid.
  At the period when the neck feathers begin to turn yellow in either kind they are disqualified.  However, both are invalid when the neck feathers begin to turn yellow. When the young birds hit three months their feathers begin to fall off, first from the body and then from the neck and head. Once all of their baby feathers have fallen off, they get new adult feathers. The new feathers on the head are at first yellow in appearance. Once this yellowish color has appeared, the birds are no longer considered to be young, but they are not yet considered old. Therefore, neither turtle doves nor pigeons can be used at this in-between age.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  [The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid.  The red cow used in the purificatory process is slaughtered by shechitah, having its neck sliced, the same way all sacrificial animals are slaughtered (see Numbers 19:3). The heifer is the calf killed when a corpse is found and it is unknown who murdered the person. This heifer is killed by having its neck chopped from behind (see Deuteronomy 21:4). One cannot slaughter the red cow by chopping its neck from behind or the heifer by slicing it from the front.
  [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests.  Levites can serve in the Temple from the age of 20 to 50 (see Numbers 4:3). In contrast, priests can serve in the Temple from the time they reach majority age and they can continue as long as they want. In that sense, the age which disqualifies Levites does not disqualify priests. Priests who have certain physical blemishes cannot serve in the Temple (we will learn about this more in the seventh chapter of Bechorot). These blemishes do not disqualify Levites.
  That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels.  When something impure enters the airspace of an earthenware vessel, it is rendered impure. However, if it touches the outside of the vessel, the vessel is pure. In contrast, other vessels are rendered impure when something impure touches them, either from inside or outside, and they are not impure when something enters their airspace without touching them.
  That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things.  A vessel that does not have a receptacle is considered “simple” in mishnaic terms. A simple wooden vessel cannot become impure, whereas a simple metal vessel can. Unfinished metal vessels that can be used cannot become impure until they are completed. In contrast, an unfinished wood vessel can become impure as soon as it is usable.
  When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.  Bitter almonds are edible when they are small and inedible when they become larger. Therefore they are liable for tithes when they are small and not when they are big. Sweet almonds are opposite. When they are small they are inedible and therefore exempt from tithes. When they become larger and edible, they are liable for tithes.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of our chapter continues to describe cases where a halakhah is opposite in different situations.
  Temed: Before it has fermented it may not be bought with second tithe money and it renders a mikveh invalid; After it has fermented it may be bought with second tithe money and it does not render a mikveh invalid.  Temed is a drink made from grapes that have already been squeezed in order to make wine. Until temed has fermented the rabbis consider it to be like water. One can buy food and drink with second tithe money but not water (see Maaser Sheni 1:3, 5) and therefore not temed. Since unfermented temed is water it also has the power to render a mikveh invalid. Only drawn water can invalidate a mikveh other liquids do not. Once it has fermented it is no longer water and therefore it can be bought with second tithe money and it does not invalidate a mikveh.
  Brothers who are partners [in their inheritance]: When they are liable to pay the kalbon, they are exempt from the cattle tithe, And when they are liable to the cattle tithe, they are exempt from the kalbon.  The kalbon refers to an extra amount that people had to pay over the half shekel that every Israelite was obligated to pay to the Temple each year (see Shekalim 1:7). When sons split their fathers inheritance and then shared it in a partnership, they are treated as are all partners and they are obligated to pay the kalbon. In other words, even though at one point all of the money was jointly owned by their father, they are now regarded as regular partners. If they jointly own animals they are exempt from paying the cattle tithe, as is always the rule for partners. However, if they have not yet divided their inheritance, then we treat the inheritance as if it still belongs to their father. In such a case, they are obligated for the cattle tithe but not for the kalbon, because whenever a father pays the ½ shekel for his children, he is not liable to pay the kalbon.
  Whenever there is [the power] to sell, there is no fine, and whenever there is a fine there is no power to sell.  This section is found in Ketubbot 3:8. There are two rights discussed here: 1) the right of a father to sell his daughter as a slave and 2) his right to receive the fine paid out by one who rapes her or seduces her. The father has the right to sell her while she is still a minor (ketanah), but not when she reaches the age of a na’arah (about 12). At this age there is no fine levied on the rapist or seducer. Once she becomes a na’arah there is a fine which goes to the father. However, he no longer has the right to sell her.
  Whenever there is the right of refusal there can be no halizah, and whenever there can be halizah there is no longer the right of refusal.  The right of refusal refers to a girl’s right to annul marriage when that marriage was arranged by her mother or brother because her father had already died (see Yevamot 13:1-2). The right of refusal exists only when she is a minor. However, a minor girl cannot perform halitzah (release from levirate marriage, see Yevamot 12:4). Thus if she was married off by her father and then her husband died before she reached majority age, she cannot perform halitzah until she is of majority age.
  When the shofar is blown there is no havdalah, and when there is habdalah the shofar is not blown. [Thus], if a festival falls on the day before Shabbat the shofar is blown but there is no havdalah; If it falls on the day following Shabbat there is havdalah but the shofar is not blown. How do they recite havdalah [on a festival that follows Shabbat]? “Who distinguishes between holy and holy.” Rabbi Dosa says: “Who distinguishes between the more holy and less holy day.”  On Friday evening right before it became dark they would blow the shofar six times to let people know that Shabbat was beginning (see Sukkah 5:5). If this was a day in which they were blowing the shofar to let people know about Shabbat, then it definitely could not be time to recite the havdalah to separate a holy day from a non-holy day. However, if it was a time to recite havdalah, then there would be no shofar blasts. On a normal Saturday evening this is clear. However, it is not always so clear, as we shall see now. If the festival fell on Friday before Shabbat, then they would blow the shofar on Friday evening, as was normal. Blowing the shofar on a festival is not prohibited. However, they would not recite any havdalah at the end of the festival, since the sanctity of Shabbat is greater than that of the festival. If the festival fell immediately after Shabbat, the opposite is true. They would recite havdalah, but not blow the shofar. The final piece of the mishnah describes how the blessing was recited on Saturday night when a festival begins right after Shabbat. One could not simply recite “who distinguishes between a holy day and a profane day” because both Shabbat and the festival are holy. Therefore, according to the first opinion, one recites “who distinguishes between the holy and the holy.” Rabbi Dosa differs slightly and says that one should note that Shabbat is holier than the festival.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah returns to the subject of slaughtering. Slaughtering involves cutting the trachea and the esophagus. Our mishnah deals with a case where the slaughterer did not fully cut both organs.
  If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.  There is a difference between slaughtering birds and slaughtering cattle (cows, sheep and goats). In order for the cattle to be valid both organs must be cut, whereas it is sufficient for one of the organs to be cut for a bird to be valid.
  The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins.  If he cuts through most of the organ, the animal is valid. Rabbi Judah says that he must at least cut through the veins. The Talmud states that this applies only to the bird.
  [If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid.  Cutting through half of an organ is not sufficient. Therefore, if one cuts through half of one organ of a bird or one and a half organs of an animal, the slaughtering is not valid.
  [If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.  However, cutting through the greater part of the organ counts as cutting through the organ. Therefore, if he cuts through the greater part of one of the bird’s organs, or the greater part of both of the animal’s organs, the slaughtering is valid
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  If one slaughtered two animals simultaneously, the slaughtering is valid.  As long as the slaughtering is performed in a valid manner, if two animals are slaughtered together they are both valid.
  If two persons held the knife and slaughtered, even if one cut higher up and the other cut lower down [in the neck], the slaughtering is valid.  Similarly, if two people hold the knife, even if they hold different parts of the knife, the slaughtering is valid, as long as it was performed in a valid manner.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. Slaughtering must be done with a to and fro motion with the knife and not by chopping. Chopping the head off, which is called "derasah (pressing)," invalidates the animal.
  He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. In this case, while slaughtering, which means bringing the knife back and forth, he pressed the knife into the neck, and cut the organs. If the part of the knife that has already passed through the neck is as long as the neck, then the slaughtering is valid. The reason is that we can assume that he has already slaughtered properly with the part of the neck that was already passed through the neck.
  So too, if he slaughters two animals at the same time, and he presses down on one of them. If the length of one knife has already passed through both necks, the slaughtering is valid.
  These limitations are necessary if he had passed the knife only in one direction. But if he had already passed the knife in both directions, it doesnt matter how large the knife is, since we can assume that he slaughtered it before he chopped it.
  If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. Slaughtering must be performed by a person slicing the neck, not by a knife that somehow falls down and slices a neck without being held by a person. While this doesn't seem to be a real possibility, perhaps what it means to say is that there must be human involvement in the slaughtering process. It can't just happen on its own, even if it happens in a valid fashion.
  If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering. The mishnah lists various reasons that a person might stop in the middle of slaughtering an animal. If he stops for any of these reasons, and doesnt resume slaughtering for the amount of time it would take to slaughter an animal, then the slaughtering is invalid. In other words, the second half of the act of shechitah does not join with the first act and therefore the animal was not fully slaughtered in the correct manner. Stopping in the middle of slaughtering is called "shehiyah," delaying, and it is one of the things that renders slaughtering invalid.  
  Rabbi Shimon says that if he delays the amount of time necessary for someone to check if the slaughtering was done properly, then it is invalid. This is a longer time than it would take to actually slaughter.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  In our mishnah Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yeshevav argue about whether an animal that has been improperly slaughtered is a “nevelah” or a “terefah” two terms that I explained in the introduction to Hullin. While neither animal can be eaten, the nevelah causes impurity while the terefah doesn’t. Thus there is some practical difference between the two. Today, since neither animal can be eaten, it doesn’t really matter whether an animal is a nevelah or a terefah.
  If one first sliced the esophagus and then cut away the windpipe, or first cut away the windpipe and then sliced the esophagus; or if he sliced one of these organs and paused until the animal died; or if he thrust the knife underneath the second organ and cut it: [In all these cases] Rabbi Yeshevav says: the animal is nevelah; Rabbi Akiva says: it is terefah.  “Slicing” is how I have translated “shachat” which means to validly slaughter. “Cut away” is my translation of the verb “pasak” and it is an invalid method of slaughter. So if one properly slices one of the two organs and then improperly slices the other one, or if he slices one of the organs and then doesn’t slice the other one and the animal dies, or if instead of slicing the organ he thrusts the knife under the organ and slices up (this is called haladah, burrowing), the animal cannot be eaten. The rabbis argue as to the status of the animal. According to Rabbi Yeshevav the animal is a nevelah. As we in section two, Rabbi Yeshevav says that whenever an animal cannot be eaten because it was slaughtered improperly, the animal has the status of nevelah. Rabbi Akiva says that it is a terefah.
  Rabbi Yeshevav stated this general rule in the name of Rabbi Joshua: whenever an animal is rendered invalid by a fault in the slaughtering it is nevelah; whenever an animal has been duly slaughtered but is rendered invalid by some other defect it is terefah. And Rabbi Akiba [ultimately] agreed with him.  Rabbi Yeshevav provides a general rule for determining what is a nevelah and what is a terefah. We have already explained nevelah above. A terefah is an animal that was slaughtered correctly but couldn’t be eaten because there was some other previously existing problem with it. We shall learn what causes an animal to be a terefah in chapter three. Ultimately, Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Yeshevav. My definitions of nevelah and terefah in the introduction to Hullin reflect this mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  In order for food to become susceptible to impurity it must come into contact with one of seven liquids (see Leviticus 11:38). When an animal is slaughtered, assumedly blood will come out and render the meat susceptible to impurity. Our mishnah discusses a situation where an animal is slaughtered and blood does not come out.
  If one slaughtered cattle or a wild beast or a bird and no blood came out, they are valid and may be eaten by him whose hands have not been washed, for they have not been rendered susceptible to impurity by blood.  Although blood did not come out of the animal (be it wild or domesticated) or the bird, the animal can still be eaten. We don’t assume that the animal was already dead when it was slaughtered and therefore no blood came out. We also don’t prohibit the animal because of the blood inside the animal, because blood that is inside an animal is not prohibited. Since the meat cannot receive impurity, one who has impure hands because he has not washed them can eat the meat without fear of causing it to be impure. This would have important ramifications if the animal was sacred and was being eaten by priests. Alternatively, it would have ramifications if the person simply desired to eat his meat in a state of purity.
  Rabbi Shimon says: they have been rendered susceptible to impurity by the slaughtering.  Rabbi Shimon says that the very act of slaughtering renders the animal susceptible to impurity. Since the slaughtering causes the animal to become permitted for eating, it also causes the animal to become susceptible to impurity.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with slaughtering a dying animal. This would have been a very important issue because if the animal dies without having been slaughtered it becomes a nevelah and is inedible. Slaughtering a dying animal, therefore, would have been of utmost economic importance. However, for it to be edible it must be determined that the animal died from being slaughtered and not on its own.
  One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro.  There are basically two different opinions as to how to determine whether or not the animal died from the slaughtering or on its own. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel if the animal doesn’t jerk its foreleg and hind leg when slaughtered, it is a sign that the animal was already dead. The sages in section four add that wagging its tail is also a sign that it died from slaughtering. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon believe that the sign is the spurting of blood from the neck at the time of slaughtering. Rabbi Shimon adds that even if he slaughtered the dying animal at night, probably because he felt that he couldn’t wait until morning, and he didn’t see blood at the time of slaughtering, but the next morning he saw blood stains around the animal’s neck, the slaughtering was valid.
  This is the test both with regard to large and small animals.  This line seems to be a continuation of the sages’ opinion in the previous section. The same signs that validate large animals also validate small animals.
  If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life.  However, if a small animal that was already dying merely stretched out its foreleg when slaughtered, this is not a sign of having died from the slaughtering. It is possible that this is just a result of dying before.
  When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.  All of these signs are necessary only if the animal was known to be dying before it was slaughtered. However, if it was a healthy animal, these signs are not necessary because there is no reason to assume it died of a different cause.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  In our mishnah the sages debate whether an animal slaughtered on behalf of a non-Jew can be eaten by a Jew. The fear is that the animal was slaughtered as an idolatrous sacrifice and hence is prohibited.
  If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry.  The first opinion in the mishnah holds that an animal slaughtered for a non-Jew is valid. Rabbi Eliezer holds that even if the animal was slaughtered mostly for a Jew’s consumption and only a small part was meant for a non-Jew, the animal is still invalid because we can assume that the non-Jew intended to use it for idolatrous purposes. We see here that Rabbi Eliezer was very strict on relations between non-Jews and Jews because of the ever present fear of idolatry.
  Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!  Rabbi Yose makes a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument that this animal should be permitted. When it comes to sacrificial animals, an invalid intention can render the animal invalid, as we learned in Zevahim, chapter two. For instance, if the priest slaughters the animal in order to eat it after the time when it may be eaten or outside of the place where it may be eaten, the sacrifice is invalid. Nevertheless, when it comes to sacrifices we only take into consideration the intention of the slaughterer, and not the owner of the sacrifice. The same therefore should be true when it comes to non-sacrificial animals, whose laws are less strict. We should only care about the intention of the slaughterer, in this case a Jew, and not the non-Jew for whom he was slaughtering the animal.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with a person who slaughters an animal for idolatrous purposes.
  If one slaughtered [an animal] as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, or deserts, the slaughtering is invalid.  If a person slaughtered an animal as a sacrifice to a natural phenomenon, such as a mountain, body of water or desert, the animal is invalid, even though it was slaughtered properly. Note that worship of mountains and hills was also referred to in Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:5 and seems to be based on Deuteronomy 12:2.
  If two persons held a knife and slaughtered [an animal], one intending it as a sacrifice to one of these things and the other for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid.  We learned in mishnah two of this chapter that if two people jointly slaughter, the slaughtering is valid. Both are participating in the slaughtering. Therefore, if one of them intends to slaughter the animal as an idolatrous sacrifice, the animal is invalid.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with various prohibitions concerning where one lets the blood flow from the animal’s neck when he slaughters. The point of the mishnah is to ensure that the way that Jews slaughter their animals does not look like the way that idolaters slaughter their animals. It is interesting that with regard to this specific issue it was deemed important to distinguish between Jews and idolaters. Since slaughtering an animal is such an important moment in society, both economically and socially, it probably very frequently had religious significance. As a moment fraught with such meaning, the rabbis felt it crucial to distinguish Jewish practice from the practices of others.
  One may not slaughter [so that the blood runs] into the sea or into rivers, or into vessels,  If one slaughters and lets the blood flow into the sea or a river, it may look as if the person is using the animal’s blood to worship the sea or river. If he slaughters into a vessel it may look as if he is collecting the blood to use it in worship. Alternatively, this may look as if he is performing a Jewish sacrifice outside of the Temple. Therefore, all of these practices are prohibited.
  But one may slaughter into a pool (or of water.  The correct reading of this mishnah is probably not “pool of water” but “vessel with water.” While one cannot slaughter into a vessel, lest it look as if he is going to use the blood for a sacrifice, if there is water mixed in, it doesn’t look like he is going to use the blood, because that is not how sacrificial blood is collected.
  And when on board a ship on to vessels.  When he is on a ship, he can let the blood drain into a vessel, and even one without water. On the ship it would be clear to all witnessing the slaughter that the reason he uses a vessel is to avoid a mess. Furthermore, he wouldn’t want to use the water which has to be preserved for drinking.
  One may not slaughter at all into a hole, but one may dig a hole in his own house for the blood to run into. In the street, however, he should not do so as not to follow the ways of the heretics.  As we can see at the end of the section, it seems that the heretics, who here refer to idolaters (and not heretical Jews), used to slaughter into holes dug into the ground. Therefore, a Jew should not do so. However, in his own house he can dig a hole and slaughter so that the blood flows into the hole, but not directly into the hole. In the streets, one shouldn’t even do this.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah is, in a sense, the mirror image of mishnah eight. Whereas yesterday we learned about one who slaughtered an animal for it to be an idolatrous sacrifice, in today’s mishnah we learn about one who slaughters an animal for it to be a Jewish sacrifice, but does so outside of the Temple. While his intentions may have been good, this is still a no-no. The question is: is the slaughtering valid?
  If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid.  An olah (whole-burnt offering), a shelamim (wellbeing offering) and a todah (thanksgiving offering) can be offered as voluntary offerings. Therefore, if one slaughters an animal with the intent of it being an olah or a shelamim but does so outside of the Temple, it looks as if he is now sanctifying the animal to be a sacrifice and slaughtering it outside of the Temple. Note that the animal is not actually invalid, because he did not sanctify it before he slaughtered it, and for an animal to be a sacrifice it must first be sanctified. However, the rabbis prohibited it lest it look like he is slaughtering and eating sanctified meat outside of the Temple. Our mishnah thinks that an asham (guilt-offering) brought for a doubtful sin (meaning one is not even sure if one sinned) can also be brought voluntarily. Therefore, it too is invalid if slaughtered for this purpose outside of the Temple. With regard to the pesah, since it can be set aside at any time during the year, someone might think that by slaughtering it now outside of the Temple, he is sanctifying it. Therefore, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon holds that the slaughtering is valid because that is not the way that one offers a sacrifice. One doesn’t voluntarily offer a sacrifice in order to slaughter it outside of the Temple. Since his sanctifying the animal is obviously invalid, everyone will understand that he has not performed a sacrifice. Therefore, the slaughtering is invalid. For case in which Rabbi Shimon uses similar reasoning see Menahot 12:3.
  If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid.  As we learned in mishnah eight, when two people jointly slaughter an animal and only one of them has an intention that would render the slaughtering invalid, the one person’s intention invalidates the animal. So too here, the fact that one of them intends for the animal to be a sacrifice renders it invalid.
  If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid.  The sacrifices in this section can not be voluntarily donated to the Temple. They are only brought by those who incur an obligation to bring them. Since everyone knows that the person sacrificing them was not obligated to bring such a sacrifice, they will know that he is not really sacrificing an animal outside of the Temple. Therefore, the meat is valid. We will learn more about what exactly a “substitute sacrifice” is in tractate Temurah.
  This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid.  This section provides the general rule that is the basis for my explanation above.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  The following [defects] render cattle terefah:If the esophagus was pierced;If the windpipe severed;If the membrane of the brain was pierced;If the heart was pierced as far as its cavity thereof;If the spine was broken and the cord severed;If the liver was gone and none of it remained;If the lung was pierced,Or if part of it was missing Rabbi Shimon says: only if it was pierced as far as the main bronchi;If the stomach,If the gall-bladder was pierced,If the intestines were pierced;If the innermost stomach was pierced,If the greater part of the outer stomach was pierced. Rabbi Judah says: in a large animal [if it was torn] to the extent of a handbreadth, and in a small animal the greater part.If the omasum (the third stomach of a [was pierced];Of if the second stomach was pierced on the outside;If the animal fell from the roof;If most of its ribs were fractured;Or if it was mauled by a wolf Rabbi Judah says: small animals [are terefah] if mauled by a wolf, large cattle if mauled by a lion; small fowl if mauled by a hawk, large fowl if mauled by a falcon.This is the rule: if an animal with a similar defect could not continue to live, it is terefah.Exodus 22:30 states, “Meat in a field that is terefah you shall not eat, cast it to the dogs.” The word “terefah” literally means “torn apart by animals.” The rabbis assume that since another verse already forbade eating “nevelah,” which they interpret to mean any animal that was improperly slaughtered, the word “terefah” must refer to something else. They therefore interpret the word “terefah” to refer to an animal that have suffered an injury, or has some sort of defect, that will cause it to die imminently. Such an animal is prohibited even if it was slaughtered properly.The first five mishnayot of our chapter deal with which wounds or defects cause an animal to be a terefah. Our mishnah lists 18 different ways a cattle can become a terefah.Sections 1-18: This is the list of the 18 defects that cause cattle, cows, sheep and goats, to become a terefah. Most of these are self-explanatory, more so perhaps to those of you that are biologists or veterinarians. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Judah (in sections 8, 13 and 18) distinguish between large animals (cows) and small animals (sheep and goats). According to these two sages, the defects are not exactly the same for the two different types of animals.Section nineteen: This section provides the general rule of when an animal becomes a terefah.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  And the following [defects] do not render cattle terefah:If the windpipe was pierced, or cracked [lengthwise]. To what extent may it be deficient? Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: up to an Italian issar.If the skull was cracked but the membrane of the brain was not pierced;If the heart was pierced but not as far as its cavity;If the spine was broken but the cord was not severed;If the liver was removed but an olive's size of it remained.If the omasum or the third stomach were pierced at their juncture;If the spleen was removed, or the kidneys, or the lower jaw-bone or the womb.If [the lung] was shrunken up by an act of Heaven.If an animal was stripped of its hide: Rabbi Meir declares it valid But the rabbis declare it invalid.Today’s mishnah lists cases in which defects do not render cattle terefah. Again, most of these are self-explanatory (as before, easier to picture for the veterinarians among us)Section one: If the windpipe was severed, we learned yesterday that the animal is a terefah. If, however, it was only pierced or cracked, the animal is valid. When it is pierced, the hole can be up to the size of an Italian issar, a small coin.Section two: The animal is a terefah only if the brain membrane was pierced. A cracked skull does not render an animal a terefah.Sections 3-6: The opposite of most of these cases can be found in yesterday’s mishnah.Sections 7: The removal of any of these organs does not render the animal a terefah, because it can continue to live.Section eight: If an animal’s lung was shrunk up due to fear of some heavenly act, for instance the animal was frightened by thunder or lightning, then the animal is not a terefah. However, if it was frightened by an act perpetrated by a human being, then the animal is a terefah.Section nine: I will admit that it is hard for me to comprehend how an animal that has no hide can continue to live, but evidently, Rabbi Meir believes that it can. The other rabbis say that it is a terefah.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  The following [defects] render birds terefah:If the esophagus was pierced,If the windpipe was severed;If a weasel struck [the bird] on the head in such a place as would render it terefah.If the gizzard was piercedIf the intestines were pierced.If it fell into the fire and its innards were scorched: If they turned green, it is invalid, But if they remained red it is valid.If one trod upon it or knocked it against a wall or if an animal trampled upon it, and it still jerks its limbs, and it remained alive after this for twenty-four hours, and it was thereafter slaughtered, it is valid.Today’s mishnah lists what defects render a bird a terefah.Sections 1-2: These are the same signs that render cattle terefot.Section three: If a weasel (or any other animal) strikes the bird on a spot on its head in such a manner that we would need be concerned that the brain membrane was pierced, then it is a terefah.Section six:  If the innards turn green (gangrene?), that is a sign that the bird is going to die. If they remain red, the color that they were before the bird was burned, then the bird is not a terefah.Section seven: If after having been struck in some manner the bird begins to jerk its limbs, it must live for another twenty-four hours before we can be sure that it would not have died from the blow. If it is slaughtered before 24 hours are up, then the bird is a terefah.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah teaches what defects do not render birds into a terefah.
  And the following [defects] do not render birds terefah:If the windpipe was pierced or cracked lengthwise;  This is the same defect that does not cause a beast to be a terefah (see mishnah two).
  If a weasel struck it on the head in such a place as would not render it terefah.  The opposite of the section two in yesterday’s mishnah.
  If the crop was pierced Rabbi says: even if it was gone.  Since I don’t know exactly what a “crop” is, I looked it up in Wikipedia. There the crop is defined in the following manner: “In a bird's digestive system, the crop is an expanded, muscular pouch near the gullet or throat. It is a part of the digestive tract, essentially an enlarged part of the esophagus. As with most other organisms that have a crop, the crop is used to temporarily store food. Not all birds have a crop.”  According to the first opinion, if the crop is pierced, the animal is not a terefah, but if the crop is missing, it is a terefah. Rabbi rules even more leniently and holds that even if the crop is removed, it is not a terefah.
  If the innards protruded [from the body] but were not pierced.  As long as the innards were not pierced, the bird is not a terefah.
  If its wings were broken, or its legs; or if [the wing’s] feathers were plucked. Rabbi Judah says: if its down was gone it is invalid.  A broken limb and plucked feathers on the wings do not make the bird into a terefah. Rabbi Judah holds, that if the bird’s soft cover of down was removed, it is a terefah.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah provides a few more criteria for determining if an animal is a terefah.
  [If an animal] suffered from congestion of the blood, or was overcome by smoke or by a cold, or if it ate oleander or chicken dung, or if it drank noxious water, it is permitted.  Although an animal who suffers from one of these problems, or ate or drank one of the things listed here may be in some danger, it is not enough in order to consider the animal a terefah. While these might cause it to die, they might not. Oleander is dangerous to an animal.
  If it ate poison or was bitten by a snake, it is not forbidden as trefah but it is forbidden as a danger to life.  Commentators understand the “poison” here to be something that is poisonous to people but not animals. If it was poisonous to animals, it would certainly render the animal a terefah. The snake bite also must also be understood as a bite not strong enough to kill the animal. Since these things will not kill the animal, the animal is not a terfah. Although the animal is not a terefah, its meat is forbidden because it is a danger to human beings. The rabbis took very seriously the prohibition of causing danger to oneself. Eating meat that might cause death or other harm is not just foolish, it is religiously forbidden.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah provides the characteristics by which it can be determined whether a bird is clean (kosher) or unclean (tref, in modern terminology).
  The characteristics of cattle and of wild animals are stated in the Torah.  Leviticus 11 teaches characteristics, split hooves and cud-chewing, that distinguish clean beasts or wild animals (such as a deer) from unclean beasts, such as the pig and camel that cannot be eaten.
  The characteristics of birds are not stated, but the sages said: every bird that seizes its prey is unclean.  The Torah does not list the characteristics of birds that are permitted or forbidden. Rather, it provides a list of names of birds that are forbidden. The rabbis had to fill in the gap and provide a general characteristic: any bird that seizes its prey, be it other birds or small animals, is unclean and not kosher. Just as the animals that we eat are peaceful animals that eat only vegetation, so too the birds that we eat do not eat other birds (although they may eat worms and insects, and not just vegetation).
  Every bird that has an extra toe, or a crop and a gizzard that can be peeled, is clean.  If the bird is not one that seizes its prey, then there are a couple of signs that can be used to determine whether it is pure. These would be necessary in case new birds are discovered and one does not know whether they can be eaten. If the bird has an extra toe on the back part of its foot, it is clean and can be eaten. If its crop (explained in mishnah four) or gizzard can be peeled from the flesh by hand, then it is also clean. Commentators debate whether the bird needs to have all of these characteristics to be kosher, or whether one is sufficient.
  Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says: every bird that parts its toes is unclean.  Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok adds a sign to determine when a bird is impure. If when stood on a rope it splits its toes, two in front and two in back, then it is unclean. This is a sign that the bird is a predator.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Some types of locusts are clean and can be eaten (see Leviticus 11:20-25). Our mishnah teaches the characteristics of locusts and fish that can be eaten.
  Of locusts: all that have four legs, four wings, leaping legs, and wings covering the greater part of the body, [are clean.] Rabbi Yose says: its name must be locust.  For a locust to be clean it must have four legs and wings. It must also have two legs above its other legs with which to leap (see Leviticus 11:21). And its wings must cover the greater part of its body. Rabbi Yose adds that it must be called a locust. If it has all of the signs of being kosher but it is not called a “locust” then it is not kosher. We can see here just how important a name can be to the status of the validity of the animal.
  Of fishes: all that have fins and scales [are clean]. Rabbi Judah says: there must be [at least] two scales and one fin.  The Torah states this rule explicitly, see Leviticus 11:9. Rabbi Judah adds that there must be at least two scales.
  The scales are those which are immovable, the fins are those [wings] by which it swims.  The mishnah now defines scales and fins. Scales are those that are immovable, meaning that the fish does not have control over them.  Whereas the fins are like wings to a bird in that the fish swims by moving his fins.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with the status of the fetus within its mother’s womb, when it may be eaten by virtue of its mother having been properly slaughtered and when it may not.
  If an animal was having difficulty giving birth and the fetus put forth a limb and then put it back in, it may be eaten [when its mother is slaughtered]. If it put forth its head, even though it put it back in, it is considered as born.  Generally, when a pregnant animal is slaughtered, the fetus may be eaten by virtue of its mother having been slaughtered. However, once the fetus has been born, it too needs to be slaughtered in order to be eaten. The mishnah determines that a fetus is considered to be “offspring” once its head has emerged, even if it puts its head back into the womb. If it puts forth a different limb, it is not considered as having been born. We should note that the same criterion exists for human beings. A fetus is halakhically considered a life once its head has emerged. The main ramification is that up until this point, it is permitted to terminate (I would have used the word sacrifice, but that might have been confusing) the fetus in order to save the life of the mother. Beyond that point, and it is not.
  Whatever is cut off from the fetus within the womb [and left inside] may be eaten, but whatever is cut off from the spleen or kidneys [of the animal and left inside] may not be eaten. This is the rule: that which is from the body of the animal is forbidden, but that which is not from the body of the animal is permitted.  If someone reaches into the mother and cuts off one of the fetus’s limbs and leaves the limb in the womb, when the mother is slaughtered, that limb may be eaten. This is not considered to be eating a limb from a living animal, which is prohibited, because this is a limb of an animal that has not yet come to life. In contrast, if he reaches in and cuts off an organ from the animal itself and leaves it in inside the animal and then slaughters the animal, that limb is prohibited because it is a limb from a living animal.  Without this mishnah one might have thought that as long as the limb is inside the animal when the animal is slaughtered, it is permitted. The mishnah provides the general rule which explains this particular halakhah: if the limb is part of the animal’s body it is prohibited, but if it is not part of the animal’s body, because it is a fetus, it is permitted.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  A first born animal is holy and if it dies must be buried. In contrast, the meat of other animals can be given to dogs to eat. Our mishnah deals with an animal having trouble giving birth to her first born.
  If an animal giving birth for the first time was having difficulty, one may cut off each limb [as it comes out] and throw it to the dogs.  This halakhah accords with the general principle we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the fetus is still inside the womb, it is not considered a separate life. Rather it is considered to be one of its mother’s limbs. Therefore, it can be cut out and fed to the dogs. Note that the Mishnah uses the phrase “throw it to the dogs” because this is what the Torah states may be done with a nevelah, an animal that died without having been slaughtered.
  If the greater portion came forth it must be buried, and she is exempt from the law of the firstling.  Once the majority of the fetus has emerged from its mother’s womb, it is considered as being born. From this point forth if one has to cut it up to save its mother (which is permitted) the flesh cannot be thrown to the dogs. Rather it must be buried, as is the rule for all firstlings that die. Furthermore, once the fetus is born, the next offspring born to this mother is not considered to be a firstling. Some commentators hold that this clause “she is exempt from the law of the firstling” applies to both clauses of the mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with ramifications of the notion that a fetus within its mother’s womb is considered to be a limb of its mother and not a separate life.
  If a fetus died within the womb [of its mother] and the shepherd put in his hand and touched it, he is clean, whether it was a clean or unclean animal.  A nevelah, an animal that died without being slaughtered, is unclean. However, the fetus in its mother’s womb is not considered to be a nevelah. This is derived from a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument. If a clean animal is slaughtered and found to be pregnant, her fetus can be eaten based on the mother’s valid slaughtering. It is not a nevelah. All the more so, a fetus that dies within a live mother is not considered to be a nevelah, because its mother is alive. According to the first opinion, this is true of both clean and unclean animals.
  Rabbi Yose HaGalili says: if it was an unclean animal he is unclean, and if it was a clean animal he is clean.  Rabbi Yose HaGalili says that there is no “kal vehomer” argument when it comes to the unclean animal because when its mother is slaughtered, the fetus does not become fit for eating. Therefore, it has the status of nevelah even if it died within its mother’s womb.
  If the fetus of a woman died within the womb of its mother and the midwife put in her hand and touched it, the midwife is unclean for seven days, but the mother is clean until the fetus comes out.  If the human fetus dies within its mother’s womb, and the midwife touches it while it is still inside, the midwife is unclean for seven days, as is the rule for someone who comes into contact with a corpse. According to the Talmud this impurity is not “deoraita” from the Torah, but rather is a rabbinic decree. From the Torah, since the fetus is still in its mother it does not count as a separate life. However, the rabbis decreed that it should make her impure lest she touch it after its head has already emerged. The mother is considered clean from corpse impurity unless the head emerges and then the baby dies.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  If a fetus sticks a limb out when being born and someone cuts off that limb before slaughtering the mother, the limb causes impurity as would a nevelah, as do all limbs taken from living animals. Our mishnah teaches that in this case the fetus that remains in the mother does not have the status of nevelah and it is clean. The rabbis in our mishnah debate whether the same is true if they slaughtered the mother first and then cut the limb off of the fetus.
  If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean.  In this case, the fetus in its mother’s womb remains clean because it is considered to be a limb of its mother, while its mother is still alive. Even if the fetus dies it is still clean. Even if the unclean limb touches the fetus, the fetus is still clean because animals cannot become unclean while alive.
  If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir.  If after the fetus sticks out its limb, its mother is slaughtered, and then he cuts off the limb, we now have a case of a cut-off limb touching a dead fetus. Rabbi Meir holds that the fetus is rendered unclean by virtue of contact with the unclean limb. The limb has the status of nevelah and meat which has contact with nevelah is unclean.
  But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah,  The other sages do not accord the limb the status of nevelah but rather terefah, and as we shall see below in the mishnah, a slaughtered terefah does not cause impurity.
  For just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean.  The rabbis say that just as slaughtering renders a terefah clean (and saves it from ever becoming an unclean nevelah) even though the meat is forbidden, so too slaughtering renders the limb clean, even though it cannot be eaten.
  Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself?  Rabbi Meir rejects their argument. Slaughtering can render the terefah animal itself clean, but how can it render clean a part of the fetus, the limb, that was not attached to the fetus when its mother was slaughtered? Rather, the limb has the status of nevelah and renders the fetus unclean.
  From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean?  The mishnah now begins a prolonged argument trying to prove that a slaughtered terefah is clean, even though its meat cannot be eaten.
  [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean?  However, in a most rabbinic fashion, the rabbis do not begin with the proof but rather with a counter-proof, what one might have argued. Seemingly one might have compared the terefah with the unclean animal. Both an unclean animal and a terefah cannot be eaten. Therefore, one might have argued that just as shechitah (slaughtering) does not render an unclean animal clean, for its meat transmits impurity, so too the slaughtering of a terefah renders it unclean and able to transmit impurity.
  No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]?  That argument can be refuted. An unclean animal is not rendered clean by slaughtering because it never had the opportunity to be made permitted/clean through slaughtering. In contrast, if the terefah animal had been slaughtered before it became a terefah, it would have been rendered clean. Therefore, even if it is slaughtered after it becomes a terefah, it is clean (although not edible).
  Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb?  The mishnah, employing graphic language found in a few other midrashim but no where in the Mishnah, says that the distinction drawn between the terefah and the unclean animal must be removed. There is a terefah which would never have been permitted by shechitah the terefah that was born as such. This is similar to the unclean animal, which also never would have been permitted by shechitah. Therefore, our original question returns: How can the inedible terefah be rendered clean by slaughter?
  [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter?  The mishnah now adjusts the distinction between the terefah and the unclean animal. A terefah comes from a species of animal that is edible. Other such animals can be eaten after shechitah. Therefore, it is rendered clean by shechitah, just as other animals of its kind are. This would be true even for a terefah that was born as such. In contrast, an unclean animal is by definition from a species that can never be edible. Therefore, it is not rendered clean by shechitah.
  [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.  The rule that we posited in the previous section is that any animal whose “kind” can be permitted/edible by having been slaughtered, is also clean if it is slaughtered. An “eight months’ birth” refers to an animal born prematurely, one which is deformed and we know will die. The mishnah uses the term “eight months” because a human baby born at eight months is assumed not to be viable. An “eight months’ birth” is like a terefah it is an animal that is now alive, that we know will die shortly. Because of the general rule explained above, an animal born prematurely cannot be made clean by shechitah because none of its kind can be made permitted through shechitah. Such an animal that is slaughtered will have the status of nevelah. 
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah continues to deal with the status of a fetus found in its mother’s womb when she is slaughtered.
  If one slaughtered an animal and found in it an eight months’ fetus, either living or dead, or a dead nine months fetus, he need only tear it open and take out the blood. If he found in it a living nine months’ fetus it must be slaughtered, and he would thereby [possibly] incur the penalty for “it and its young,” the words of Rabbi Meir.  Rabbi Meir distinguishes between a live fetus found inside its mother after she has been slaughtered and a dead one. A dead fetus is considered to be part of its mother’s flesh and therefore when she is slaughtered the dead fetus is permitted. An eight months’ fetus is considered to be as if it is dead (for it could not live outside of the womb) and therefore it too is permitted when its mother is slaughtered. However, a living nine months’ fetus is an independent life. When it is found in its mother’s womb it too must be slaughtered before it can be eaten. Furthermore, one who slaughters it and its mother on the same day transgresses the biblical prohibition of slaughtering a mother and her offspring on the same day (Leviticus 22:28). We should note that the implication of this halakhah is that life begins before the fetus leaves the womb. The point at which this is so would seem to be the point at which the fetus would be viable outside of the womb.
  But the sages say: the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if it is eights years old and is plowing the field, the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted.  The other rabbis disagree. Any fetus found in its mother’s womb is permitted to be eaten without having to be slaughtered itself. All that one would need to do is drain the blood, the same rule which applies to all meat. Theoretically, as Rabbi Shimon Shezuri points out, one could even eat an eight year old animal without slaughtering it first, if it was born after its mother was slaughtered.
  If he ripped open [the mother] and found in it a living nine months fetus, it must be slaughtered, since its mother has not been slaughtered.  If he doesn’t slaughter the mother, then if the fetus is alive, it will need to be slaughtered. Since its mother was not slaughtered, there is no way to allow this animal to be eaten without proper slaughtering.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah talks about two different subjects: 1) the status as a terefah an animal whose leg has been broken off; 2) a limb hanging from an animal and whether it is considered to still be part of the animal.
  If the hind legs of an animal were cut off below the joint, it is permitted; If above the joint, it is terefah.  According to the rabbis there are three parts to an animal’s leg. The lowest part is the foot, the middle part is the calf and the upper part is the thigh. The place where the foot is attached to the calf and the place where the calf is attached to the thigh are both called “berech” which in modern Hebrew means knee. In the Talmud they debate which joint is “the joint” mentioned here. If it is the upper one, then it would mean that an animal whose leg has been severed below the knee (what we call the knee) is not a terefah. If it is the lower one, then only if it is severed below the place where the foot joins the calf is it not a terefah.
  So too if the juncture of the tendons was gone, [it is terefah].  The “juncture of the tendons” refers to the tendons that connect the thigh to the knee. If these are missing, the animal is a terefah even if the bone is still whole.
  If the bone was broken but the greater part of the flesh [around the fracture] remained, it is rendered clean by the slaughtering; Otherwise it is not rendered clean by the slaughtering.  A limb that was separated from the animal when the animal was still alive cannot be rendered clean by slaughtering the animal. A broken bone does not mean that the limb must be considered separate. As long as most of the flesh remains, the limb is part of the animal and when the animal is slaughtered, the limb is permitted and clean. But if most of the flesh does not remain, then the limb is not considered as part of the animal and the limb is unclean even after the animal is slaughtered.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with the status of the amniotic sac found in a slaughtered animal.
  If a person slaughtered an animal and found in it an amniotic sac, he who is not fastidious may eat it.  When the mother is slaughtered, her amniotic sac is permitted to be eaten by virtue of the slaughtering of the mother. However, the mishnah notes that only one who is “not fastidious” and doesn’t mind eating “yucky” parts of the animal will eat it. [I guess they didn’t have hot dogs back then.]
  It does not contract uncleanness, either food uncleanness or the uncleanness of nevelah.  Although it is edible, the amniotic sac is not considered food. Nor is it considered to be the flesh/meat of the animal. Therefore, it cannot become ritually unclean in the way that food becomes ritually unclean. Furthermore, if the animal is not slaughtered properly and therefore becomes a nevelah, it is not unclean as is a nevelah. The sac is not considered to the edible flesh of the animal, and only such flesh is unclean.
  If he intended to eat it, it can contract food uncleanness but not the uncleanness of nevelah.  If a person intends to eat it, his thoughts cause it to become “food” and it is susceptible to uncleanness. However, intention cannot cause the sac to become a “nevelah” because it is categorically not considered part of the edible flesh of the animal.
  If part of the amniotic sac emerged [before the slaughtering of the mother], it may not be eaten; For it is a sign of birth in a woman and also a sign of birth in an animal.  Once the sac begins to emerge it is considered as if the woman has begun to give birth, for the head might be inside the sac. Therefore, even if the sac goes back inside the mother’s womb, it still cannot be eaten, even if found in the mother after she was slaughtered. In this sense is treated as if it was offspring and once offspring has emerged from the womb it cannot be eaten by virtue of the mother being slaughtered. However, the main difference is that while the offspring cannot be eaten based on its mother being slaughtered, the offspring itself can be slaughtered. In contrast, when the sac cannot be eaten based on the mother being slaughtered, it can never be eaten. Once the sac begins to emerge, it is a sign of childbirth in a woman as well, again because the head might be inside the sac. From this point she has the uncleanness of a woman who gave birth (see Leviticus 12:2).
  If an animal which was pregnant for the first time miscarried an amniotic sac, it may be thrown to dogs. But in the case of a consecrated animal it must be buried. It may not be buried at cross-roads or hung on a tree, for these are amorite practices.  The amniotic sac itself does not have the halakhic status of “offspring.” Therefore, the amniotic sac of an animal’s first birth does not have the sanctity of a firstling. It can be thrown to the dogs, whereas if it was sacred it would have had to have been buried. While it is not considered offspring, the sac is still part of the animal. Therefore, if it comes from a sanctified animal, one that was dedicated to the Temple, it must be buried because it is holy. The mishnah forbids practices that are deemed idolatrous or magical. It seems that some people bestowed amniotic sacs with magical powers and either hung them in a tree or buried them at crossroads. Magical practices are deemed to be “the ways of the Amorites” and are prohibited.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Leviticus 22:28 states, “When it comes to an ox or a sheep, it and its young you shall not slaughter on the same day.” Our chapter discusses this prohibition.
  [The law of] “It and its young” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated animals.  The prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day applies in all times and all places and to both consecrated (dedicated to the Temple) and non-consecrated (hullin) animals.
  How so?  The mishnah now explains various scenarios in which a person slaughters an animal and its young, and the various liabilities that can be occurred, depending on whether the animals were consecrated and where they were slaughtered.
  If a person slaughtered an animal and its young, both animals being unconsecrated, [and they slaughtered them] outside [the sanctuary], they are both valid, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes.  In this case, both animals are hullin (unconsecrated) and both are slaughtered outside of the Temple, where they should be slaughtered. Both animals are valid and can be eaten. The fact that the second one should not have been slaughtered does not render its slaughtering to be invalid. The second person, the one who slaughters the second animal (whether or not this is the parent or offspring), is liable for the forty lashes for having transgressed a biblical commandment. The first person is not liable because when he slaughtered the animal, he did nothing wrong.
  If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, both animals are invalid, and each incurs forty lashes.  In this case both animals are consecrated and should have been slaughtered only in the Temple. The person who slaughters the first animal is liable for karet for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple. The person who slaughters the second animal is not liable for karet because that animal could not have been offered as a sacrifice on that day since its parent/child had already been slaughtered. Since it could not have been a sacrifice, the one who slaughters it outside the Temple is exempt from karet. Both animals are invalid as sacrifices because they were slaughtered outside the Temple (see Zevahim 14:2). Both slaughterers are liable for lashes but for different reasons. The first is liable for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside of the Temple and the second for slaughtering an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered.
  If both animals were unconsecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], both animals are invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes.  In this case both animals were unconsecrated, and yet both were slaughtered inside the Temple. This makes them invalid and it is forbidden to derive benefit from either animal (see Kiddushin 2:9). There is no biblical punishment for slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple, therefore the first slaughterer is not punished. The second slaughterer is liable for having slaughtered an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered.
  If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not culpable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes, and it is invalid.  In this case both were consecrated and both were slaughtered inside the Temple, as is required. The first animal is valid as a sacrifice and the one who slaughters it is exempt, for he has done nothing wrong. The second animal is invalid and the one who slaughters it is liable for having slaughtered an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.
  If [the first animal was] unconsecrated and [the second] consecrated [and they were both slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid.  The first animal was unconsecrated and the second was consecrated, and both were slaughtered outside of the Temple. The first animal is valid and the person who slaughtered it is exempt for he has done nothing wrong (way to go!). The second animal should have been slaughtered in the Temple, so the fact that it was not renders it invalid. The person who slaughtered it is lashed for having slaughtered it on the same day as the parent/offspring had already been slaughtered. He does not receive karet because the animal was not valid to be a sacrifice on that day.
  If [the first was] consecrated and [the second] unconsecrated [and they were both slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet and it is invalid, and the second [animal] is valid, and each incurs forty lashes.  In this case the order is opposite, first the consecrated animal is slaughtered and then the unconsecrated animal. The first person is liable for karet for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple. The animal is invalid. Both are liable for lashes, the first for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple, and the second for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”
  If [the first was] unconsecrated and [the second] consecrated [and they were both slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], they are both invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes.  Now we examine the scenarios if both are slaughtered inside the Temple. The first animal is unconsecrated and therefore it is invalid. The second is invalid because it could not be a sacrifice on that day. Only the second person is lashed because there are no lashes for slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple.
  If [the first was] consecrated and [the second] unconsecrated [and they were both slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first animal is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid.  Now the order is reversed. The first animal was consecrated and slaughtered inside the Temple everything good so far! The second animal is invalid because it was an unconsecrated animal slaughtered in the Temple. The person who slaughters it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”
  If both were unconsecrated and [the first was slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary] and [the second] inside, the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid.  Now both animals are hullin, but they are slaughtered in different places. If the first is slaughtered outside the Temple, then “no problem”! If the second is slaughtered in the Temple, it is invalid for being slaughtered in the Temple and the person who slaughtered it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”
  If both were consecrated and [the first was slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary] and [the second] inside, [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, each incurs forty lashes, and both animals are invalid.  Now both are consecrated, but they are again slaughtered in different places. If the first is slaughtered outside the Temple, it is invalid and the person who slaughters it is liable for karet. The second is also invalid, because it was slaughtered outside of the Temple. Both are liable for lashes, the first for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple, and the second for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”
  If both were unconsecrated and [the first was slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary] and [the second] outside, the first is invalid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is valid.  This is the same as section five, but the order of where the animals are slaughtered is reversed. The first, which is slaughtered inside the Temple, is invalid, but the person who slaughtered it is exempt, because there is no punishment for slaughtering a non-consecrated animal inside the Temple. The second is valid and may be eaten, but the person who slaughtered it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”
  If both were consecrated and [the first was slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary] and [the second] outside, the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid.  This the opposite order of section six. The first animal was consecrated and slaughtered inside the Temple good job! The second animal is invalid because it wasn’t slaughtered inside the Temple and the one who slaughters it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.” Summary of general principles that emerge from these two mishnayot: 1) The second slaughterer is always liable. However, the second animal can be eaten, if it was unconsecrated and was slaughtered outside the Temple. 2) One who slaughters a consecrated animal outside the Temple is liable for karet and lashes. 3) One who slaughters a non-consecrated animal inside the Temple is exempt. 4) An animal whose parent/offspring has already been slaughtered cannot be used as a sacrifice on that day. Therefore, if one slaughters such a consecrated animal outside the Temple he is not liable for karet. 5) No animal can be eaten if slaughtered in the wrong place.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered the red cow, or an ox which was condemned to be stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to be broken: Rabbi  Shimon exempts [him from having transgressed the law of “it and its young”]; But the sages make him liable.  In all of these cases a person slaughters a parent and its offspring on the same day, but one of the animals was an animal that could not be eaten. There are five such categories: 1) A terefah, an animal that has a flaw that will cause it to eminently die. 2) An animal slaughtered for idolatry. 3) The red cow, used for purifying people with corpse impurity. 4) An ox condemned to die for either killing a person or for engaging in bestiality. It is forbidden to derive benefit from such an ox. 5) The heifer whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder. Since these animals can not be eaten, even if they were slaughtered properly, Rabbi Shimon exempts the one who slaughters the second one from being liable for “it and its son.” Rabbi Shimon holds that slaughtering that would not make an animal fit for consumption even if done properly is not called “slaughtering.” The other rabbis disagree and say that he is liable, since he did indeed slaughter the second animal.
  If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it became nevelah under his hand, or if he stabbed it, or tore away [the organs of the throat], he does not thereby transgress the law of it and its young.  In this case, the animal was valid before it was slaughtered, but then was invalidated by an improper method of slaughtering. Such a person is not liable for transgressing “it and its son” because this prohibition only applies to one who “slaughters,” the verb used in the verse. This person did not successfully slaughter.
  If two people bought a cow and its young, he who bought first can slaughter first; but if the second preceded him, he holds his advantage.  If two people buy a cow and its young, they might end up arguing about who has the right to slaughter first. The mishnah says that the first person to buy has the right to slaughter first, and the second person should wait. But if the second person slaughters first, the other person will have to wait for the next day.
  If a person slaughtered a cow and then two of its calves, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered its two calves and then the cow, he is liable for forty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf and then the calf's offspring, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf's offspring and then the calf, he is liable for forty lashes. Symmachos says in the name of r. Meir: he is liable for eighty lashes.  This section attempts to delineate how many transgressions a person has transgressed when he slaughters multiple animals on the same day. We will take case by case. 1) Once he slaughters the mother, he will be liable for each of its offspring that he slaughters on that day. Therefore, when he slaughters two offspring, he is liable twice. 2) However, if he slaughters two offspring and then the mother, he has violated the prohibition only once, by slaughtering the mother. In other words, we don’t count his transgressions retroactively. 3) When he slaughters the mother, it is prohibited to slaughter its young. So when he slaughters the young, he is liable for forty lashes. When he slaughters the offspring of the young, he has violated the prohibition again, and is liable for another forty lashes (ouch!) 4) If after slaughtering the mother, he first slaughters the offspring of the mother’s offspring (the third generation), and then the mother’s own offspring, according to the first opinion, he has only transgressed once. Slaughtering the third generation was not prohibited at the time that he slaughtered it. And although slaughtering the second generation violated two prohibitions, for it is the mother of the third generation and the child of the first generation, one can be liable only once for each animal. Rabbi Meir holds that he is liable twice, even though he slaughtered only one prohibited animal, since that one animal was prohibited in two different ways.
  At four periods in the year he who sells a beast to another must inform him, “I sold today its mother to be slaughtered,” or “I sold today its young to be slaughtered,” and these are they:  on the eve of the last day of the feast [of Sukkot], on the eve of the first day of Pesah, on the eve of Shavuot, and on the eve of Rosh Hashanah. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, also on the eve of Yom Kippur, in the Galilee. Rabbi Judah says, this is so, only when there was no time in between the sales, but if there was time, he need not inform him. Rabbi Judah agrees that if he sold the mother to the bridegroom and the young to the bride, he must inform them of it, for it is certain that they will each slaughter on the same day.  When a merchant sells an animal and then sells its mother/offspring to different customers there might be a concern that the two people will slaughter the animals on the same day and thereby unwittingly the prohibition of “it and its son.” This will only be a concern if it is anticipated that a person who buys an animal will slaughter it on that very day. The mishnah informs us that this is a strong possibility four times a year, the four times when people ate the most meat. The four times are as follows: 1) Before the last day of Sukkot, which we call Shemini Atzeret. Interestingly, people seem to have eaten more meat on the last day of Sukkot then on the first day. This might be connected with Simchat Bet Hashoevah, the celebration described in the end of tractate Sukkah. 2) Before the first day of Pesah. People would have eaten meat for the Pesah meal (the seder) both before and after the destruction of the Temple. 3) Before Shavuot. 4) Before Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Yose the Galilean notes that in the Galilee the same rule would hold the day before Yom Kippur. In the Galilee they ate large meat meals before the onset of the fast. Rabbi Judah limits the law to a case where there was not a day separating the sale of the mother and its young. If there was a day separating the sales, then the seller need not inform him. According to Rabbi Judah, two different buyers buying on two different days are not likely to slaughter on the same day. There is a case where Rabbi Judah agrees that even if the sales occur on two different days, the seller must inform the purchasers. If a bride and bridegroom buy a mother and its young, he must inform them, because it is clear that they will be slaughtered on the same day.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of the end of yesterday’s mishnah, where we learned that there were four periods of the year when people ate more meat. This mishnah teaches us another ramification of the fact that there were four major times to eat meat during the year.
  At these four periods a butcher can be compelled to slaughter against his will. Even if the ox was worth a thousand dinars and the purchaser has only [paid] a dinar, they can force the butcher to slaughter it.  At these four times of the year (see yesterday’s mishnah for the list) a butcher can be compelled to slaughter an animal and sell the meat. This is so even if the ox to be slaughtered is worth a tremendous amount and there is only one person who wants to buy a small amount of meat. In other words, it is so important that there be meat available to celebrate these occasions, that the halakhah forces the butcher to slaughter and sell, even if he risks a loss.
  Therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the purchaser.  At these four times, the butcher had no choice but to sell and once he agreed to sell the meat, he could not change his mind. Therefore, if the animal should die before the buyer receives his meat, the buyer loses his one denar.
  At other times of the year it is not so, therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the seller.  At other times of the year, the law is exactly the opposite. First of all, the butcher is not compelled to sell. Second, he can retract the sale so long as the purchaser has not received the meat (this is the typical law with regard to sales). If he sees that there are not enough people interested in buying the meat, he can simply decide not to slaughter. The animal is fully his until it is given over. Therefore, if someone has already paid for the meat, but the animal dies before it is slaughtered, the butcher must return the money.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  The “one day” mentioned in connection with the law of “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.This was how Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma expounded (: it says “one day” (Genesis 1:5) in connection with the creation and it also says “one day” (Leviticus 22:28) in connection with “it and its young” Just as the “one day” mentioned in connection with the creation means the day and the night preceding it, so too the “one day” mentioned in connection with “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.This mishnah, which I shall explain here and not below, teaches that when we reckon the day on which an animal was slaughtered, the night goes with the day that follows it. Thus if he slaughtered one animal at night and then the following day he slaughtered its mother or offspring, he has violated the law of “it and its young.” But if he slaughters an animal during the day and then the following night he slaughters its mother or young, he has not violated the law.The basis for this law are the verses from Genesis 1 that state, “and it was evening and it was morning, the first day,” and so on for each day. These verses imply, to the rabbis, that the day begins with the preceding night. And since the words “one day” are used in the context of creation and in the context of the law concerning “it and its young,” the day is reckoned in the same way for each.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Leviticus 17:13 states, “And if any Israelite or any stranger who resides among them hunts down (or traps) an animal or a bird that may be eaten, he shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth.” From this verse we learn that when a person slaughters a wild animal such as a deer or a bird, he must pour out the blood and cover it with earth. Our chapter deals with the details concerning this mitzvah.
  [The law of] “covering up the blood” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it,  The law concerning covering up the blood applies in all times and in all places. It is not dependent upon the existence of the Temple or the land of Israel.
  It applies to unconsecrated animal, but not consecrated animals.  The law applies only to unconsecrated animals. Obviously this is true for game animals, because they can never be sacrificed. It is also true of birds which can be either a hatat or an olah. In such cases, there is no mitzvah to cover the blood with earth.
  It applies [only] to wild animals and birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not.  It applies only to wild animals and birds and not to domesticated beasts. However, it applies to these animals whether they are already trapped and at one’s disposal or not. One might have thought that since the verse says, “when one hunts/traps” that the rule applies only to wild animals and birds that were trapped.
  It applies also to a koy, for it is an animal about which there is a doubt.  The rabbis did not know whether to classify the koy as a wild animal or as a domesticated beast (see Bikkurim 2:8-11). Therefore, one has to deal with it stringently, and apply to it laws that govern both domesticated and wild animals. If one slaughters a koy, he must cover the blood, lest it is a hayah (a wild animal).
  It may [therefore] not be slaughtered on a festival; and if it was slaughtered [on a festival] one may not cover up its blood.  One cannot slaughter a koy on a festival because it is forbidden carry the dirt to cover up the blood, because the dirt is muktzeh (off-limits on Shabbat and Yom Tov). Note that if a koy was known to be a hayah, it could be slaughtered because the dirt would definitely be needed. However, since the koy might not be a hayah, it might not need to have its blood covered and therefore, carrying the dirt might be a violation of muktzeh. If it was slaughtered, the blood should not be covered on Yom Tov. Rather, he must wait until evening.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is very similar to 5:3, so see above for more references.
  If a person slaughtered [a wild animal or a bird] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered that which was unconsecrated inside the sanctuary or that which was consecrated outside, or if he slaughtered a wild animal or a bird that was condemned to be stoned: Rabbi Meir makes him liable to cover up the blood; But the sages make him exempt.  In all of these cases, the animal was slaughtered with the proper technique, but nevertheless it could not be eaten. Most of these categories were explained above in 5:3. This mishnah adds two categories: a consecrated bird slaughtered outside the Temple or an unconsecrated bird or wild animal slaughtered inside the Temple. In both cases, the animal/bird cannot be eaten. Rabbi Meir holds that since the animal was slaughtered, the blood must be covered. In other words, the mitzvah of covering the blood is not dependent upon the edibility of the animal. The other sages hold that slaughtering causes one to be liable to cover the blood only if the animal is made edible by the slaughtering. Slaughtering that is ineffective is not considered to be slaughtering (this is like Rabbi Shimon in 5:3).
  In these cases he didn’t even slaughter the animal, at least not properly. Therefore, he is not liable to cover the blood because covering the blood is a mitzvah only for an animal that was slaughtered.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  In the beginning of the tractate we learned that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile (someone who is either crazy or perhaps retarded) or a minor slaughter an animal, the slaughtering is valid, but only if someone else watches them. If no one is watching, then we can assume that they did not slaughter in a valid fashion and the animal cannot be eaten. Our mishnah deals with the issues of covering the blood and the prohibition of “it and its young” when it comes to these three categories of people.
  If a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor slaughtered while others watched them, one must cover up the blood; But if they were alone, they are exempt from covering it up.  If other people watched the deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughter a wild animal or bird, and they saw that it was done in a valid fashion, then they are liable to cover up the blood. Since their slaughtering is valid, there would be no reason for them to be exempt from this obligation. However, if they were alone, then their slaughtering is not valid and they are exempt from covering up the blood, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.
  Similarly for the matter of “it and its young”: if they slaughtered while others watched them, it is forbidden to slaughter after them [the mother/young], But if they were alone: Rabbi Meir permits to slaughter after them [the mother/young]. But the rabbis forbid it. They agree, that if a person did slaughter [after them], he has not incurred forty lashes.  As is the rule with the covering of the blood, if other people see a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughter an animal it is forbidden to slaughter the mother/offspring because the first animal was slaughtered in a valid fashion. If they were alone, then Rabbi Meir holds that the second animal (the mother/offspring) can be slaughtered because we can assume that the first one was not slaughtered properly. However, the other rabbis hold that one should not slaughter the second animal lest the first animal was properly slaughtered. According to the Talmud, the other rabbis disagree with the halakhah in section one as well they must cover the blood because the slaughtering might have been done in a proper fashion. In other words, when a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughters an animal without witnesses, we can’t eat the animal lest it not be valid. However, we have to also take into consideration that it was slaughtered correctly and therefore the blood must be covered and it is forbidden to slaughter the mother/offspring on the same day. While the rabbis say that one should not slaughter the second animal, if one does, he is not liable for the forty lashes because it is not certain that the first animal was slaughtered properly. In order for someone to incur a punishment, it must be certain that he transgressed, and in this case there is no way to ascertain whether the first animal was slaughtered properly.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  If a person slaughtered a hundred wild animals in one place, one covering suffices for all. If [he slaughtered] a hundred birds in one place, one covering suffices for all.  If one slaughters multiple animals of the same type, he is liable to cover up the blood only once. He need not cover up the blood for each animal individually.
  If [he slaughtered] a wild animal and a bird in one place, one covering suffices for both. Rabbi Judah says: if he slaughtered a wild animal he should cover up its blood and then slaughter the bird [and cover it up also].  According to the first opinion, the same applies to slaughtering wild animals and birds. All of the blood from both types can be covered together. Rabbi Judah disagrees, and says that if there are two different types that require the covering of blood, birds and wild animals, then the blood of each must be covered up separately. He would agree, though, that one can cover up all of the birds’ blood at one time and all of the animals’ blood at one time.
  If a person slaughtered and did not cover up the blood and another person saw it, the other must cover it up.  The mitzvah of covering the blood of a slaughtered bird or wild animal is incumbent upon everyone, not just the person who slaughtered the animal. Therefore, if someone sees it, he must cover it up.
  If he covered it up and it became uncovered, he need not cover it up again.  Once the mitzvah has been fulfilled, if the blood becomes uncovered, it need not be fulfilled again. In other words, the mitzvah is to cover the blood and not to make sure that the blood is covered.
  If the wind covered it up, he must cover it up again.  The Talmud explains that after the wind covers the blood it becomes uncovered. Since no one actually fulfilled the mitzvah, if it becomes uncovered again, he must cover it up.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with blood that comes out of a slaughtered bird or wild animal that then becomes mixed up with something else, either water, wine or blood.
  If the blood became mixed with water and it still has the color of blood, it must be covered up.  If the blood becomes so mixed up with water, that it no longer has reddish color, then it is no longer considered to be blood and it need not be covered up. But if it still has the color of blood, it must be covered, despite the fact that there is water mixed in.
  If it became mixed with wine, [the wine] is to be regarded as though it was water.  Wine has the same color, more or less, as blood, so we can’t say that if the mixture has the color of blood then it must be covered up. Therefore, if there is enough wine such that if it was water there would no longer be the color of blood, then he need not cover it up. This is what it means when the mishnah states that the wine is regarded as water.
  If it became mixed with the blood of a beast or with the blood of a wild animal, it is to be regarded as though it was water. Rabbi Judah says: blood does not annul other blood.  The blood of a domesticated beast (cow, sheep or goat) need not be covered. If the blood of a wild animal or bird is mixed up with the blood of a beast, then we apply the same test as we did with blood that was mixed with wine. If there is enough wild animal or bird blood such that if the beast’s blood was water the mixture would still look like blood, then he must cover it up. This section has some very puzzling words “or with the blood of a wild animal.” The blood of a wild animal must be covered and therefore this line makes no sense in this context. Albeck suggests that it is here by mistake, due to the similarity between this mishnah and Zevahim 8:6 where the words “the blood of a wild animal” do make sense. Rashi suggests that the blood of the wild animal came out not by slaughtering, while the Rambam suggests that the wild animal referred to here is not a kosher one. Neither suggestion is convincing. Rabbi Judah says that blood can never annul the presence of other blood.  While an overwhelming amount of wine or water could exempt a small amount of blood from having to be covered, the same cannot be said about blood. In general, Rabbi Judah holds that when two like things are mixed, the problematic thing (for instance nevelah meat mixed in with kosher meat) can never be annulled.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with whether all blood must be covered up or just some of it.
  The blood which spurted out and that which is upon the knife must also be covered up.  “Blood which is spurted out” refers to blood that is found at some distance from the place where the animal was slaughtered. Such blood and blood that is found on the knife must also be covered up.
  Rabbi Judah says: when is this the case? When there is no other blood but that; but when there is other blood besides this, it need not be covered up.  Rabbi Judah limits the above law to cases where this is the only blood. If this is the only blood with which to fulfill the commandment of covering the blood, then this blood must be used. But if there is other blood, at the place of slaughter, then he should use that blood and the blood on the knife or found elsewhere need not be covered. In mishnayot like this one, it is hard to tell whether there is a debate or whether Rabbi Judah is simply explaining the first clause. If there is a debate, then we might understand that there are two concepts with regard to covering the blood. According to the first opinion, all blood must be covered, regardless of where it is. The blood, the life force of the animal, cannot be left in the open. Perhaps doing so would involve some sort of danger. In contrast, Rabbi Judah says that there is a mitzvah to cover the blood, but not that all blood must be covered. The purpose of covering the blood is, perhaps, to atone for the killing of the animal, the taking of a life. In that case, someone must cover some of the blood as a symbolic act, but he need not cover all of it.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The Torah states that the blood should be covered with “earth (afar).”  The rabbis expand this to include anything in which plants grow, just as they grow in earth. The blood may not be covered with something in which plants do not grow.
  With what may one cover up [the blood] and with what may one not cover it up?One may cover it up with fine dung, with fine sand, with lime, with white clay, or a brick or an earthenware stopper [of a cask] that have been ground into powder.  All of these substances fit into the category of “earth” because plants may grow in them. Hence, they can be used to cover the blood.
  But one may not cover it up with coarse dung or coarse sand, or with a brick or an earthenware stopper [of a cask] that have not been ground into powder.  In contrast, these substances are coarser or completely solid and hence cannot be used to cover the blood. We see that the criterion for whether a substance is usable is not merely the nature of the substance itself but also the state that it is in.
  Nor may one cover it with a vessel.  Covering the blood with a vessel does not fulfill the mitzvah.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel stated a general rule: one may cover it with anything in which plants would grow; but one may not cover it with anything in which plants would not grow.  This is the general rule that governs the reasoning behind the laws above.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  At the conclusion of the story of Jacob wrestling with the angel, Genesis 32:33 states, “That is why the children of Israel to this day do not eat the thigh muscle that is on the socket of the hip, since Jacob’s hip was wrenched at the thigh muscle.” The “thigh muscle” is identified by the rabbis as the sciatic nerve. Our chapter is about this prohibition.
  [The prohibition of] the sciatic nerve is in force both within the land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated [animals]. It applies to cattle and to wild animals, to the right and left hip.  The prohibition of the sciatic nerve is applicable in all times and at all places (as was the prohibition of “it and its young” and the mitzvah of covering the blood). It applies to all types of mammals, both wild and domesticated and to both of their hips.
  But it does not apply to a bird because it does not have a socket [on its hip].  The prohibition does not apply to birds, because their hips do not have “sockets” as do those of mammals.
  It applies to a fetus. Rabbi Judah says: it does not apply to a fetus. And its [forbidden] fat is permitted.  According to the first opinion, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to a fetus found in its mother’s womb when she was slaughtered. Rabbi Judah says it does not because this fetus is edible based on its mother’s having been slaughtered. In other words, since this fetus is treated as if it were one of its mother’s limbs, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve doesn’t apply. Rabbi Judah adds that the same holds true with regard to the forbidden fat, the helev, of a fetus. It can be eaten. Rabbi Judah, as we can see, does not accord to the fetus the status of a born-animal.
  Butchers are not trustworthy with regard to the [removal of the] sciatic nerve, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: they are trustworthy with regard to it as well as with regard to the [forbidden] fat.  It is quite difficult to remove the sciatic nerve (this is why sometimes this cut of meat is not available at the kosher butcher). Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that the butcher is not believed to have removed it. The other rabbis disagree and hold that the butcher is believed to have removed both the sciatic nerve and the forbidden fat.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  One may send to a non-Jew a thigh in which the sciatic nerve has not been removed, because its place is known.  We are not concerned lest a Jew buy this thigh with its sciatic nerve, because he will be able to see by looking at the thigh that the entire sciatic nerve is still there.
  When a person removes the sciatic nerve he must remove all of it. Rabbi Judah says: only so much as is necessary to fulfill the mitzvah of removing it.  When he removes the sciatic nerve, he must remove it all, scraping away at anything that is left. Rabbi Judah holds that he need not remove the entire thing, rather just enough to fulfill the mitzvah. He need not do any “scraping away.”
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  If a person ate an olive’s bulk of the sciatic nerve, he incurs forty stripes.  As with many food prohibitions, one is not liable unless he eats an amount equivalent to an olive. While eating less is certainly prohibited, one who does so is not liable for the forty lashes, the punishment for transgression of a negative commandment.
  If he ate all of it and it was not as much as an olive's bulk, he is liable.  If one eats the entire nerve, he is liable even if it is less than an olive.
  If he ate an olive’s bulk of it from one thigh and another olive’s bulk of it from the other thigh, he incurs eighty stripes. Rabbi Judah says: he incurs only forty stripes.  According to the first opinion, the nerve of each thigh is a separate prohibition. Therefore, if one eats an olive’s bulk from each thigh, he is liable for eighty lashes (ouch!). Rabbi Judah holds that only the sciatic nerve of only one of the thighs is prohibited, because, after all, Jacob was injured on only one of his legs. Most hold, according to Rabbi Judah, that it is the right thigh that is prohibited. In any case, one who eats both thighs is obligated for only forty lashes.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  If a thigh was cooked together with the sciatic nerve and there was enough [of the nerve] as to impart a flavor [to the thigh], it is forbidden.How does one measure this? As if it were meat [cooked] with turnips.This mishnah deals with whether a thigh that is cooked before the sciatic nerve has been removed is prohibited.If one cooks a thigh without removing the sciatic nerve, this turns out to be a case of cooking something prohibited (the nerve) with something permitted (the rest of the thigh). Usually in such cases the determining factor is whether the forbidden substance imparts a taste to the permitted substance. We shall learn more about this principle in tomorrow’s mishnah.However, in this case, there is absolutely no way that someone could taste the difference between a thigh cooked with the nerve and one cooked without the nerve. Therefore, we imagine that the thigh was a dish of turnips and the sciatic nerve was meat. How much meat would impart its taste to the turnips? If this ratio exists between the sciatic nerve and the thigh, then the entire thigh is prohibited. If not, he can still remove the nerve and eat the rest of the thigh.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a sciatic nerve that is cooked with other permitted nerves. Afterwards, the mishnah continues to deal with the subject of prohibited foods that are cooked with permitted foods.
  A sciatic nerve which was cooked with other [permitted] nerves: If it can still be recognized, [then all the nerves are prohibited] if [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor.  If the person can still tell which one of the nerves is the sciatic nerve, then the other nerves are prohibited only if we can assume that the sciatic nerve imparted its taste to the other nerves. The test for this would seem to be the turnip and meat test we learned about in yesterday’s mishnah. If he can’t recognize which one is the sciatic nerve, then all of the nerves are prohibited. Note that no amount of other nerves is sufficient, in this case, to nullify the presence of one forbidden nerve. This is unlike the usual rule that holds that forbidden substances can be nullified by a high enough percentage of permitted substances. The Talmud explains that this is because the sciatic nerve is treated like a complete entity, which can never be nullified. As far as the broth goes, here the test is simply whether or not the sciatic nerve was of a sufficient amount to impart its taste. If it is not, then the broth is permitted, even if he can’t tell which one was the nerve.
  And so it is with a piece of nevelah, or a piece of an unclean fish that was cooked together with other pieces of flesh [or fish]: If it can still be recognized, [then all are prohibited] if it imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor.  The same rules hold true for other prohibited substances. Again we must explain why these pieces of meat or fish are not nullified by a high percentage of permitted meat or fish (in cases where he can’t recognize which was which). One would think that if there were, for instance, 200 pieces of permitted meat and only one piece of nevelah, that the permitted meat would nullify the tiny percentage of prohibited meat. The Talmud explains that pieces of meat or fish which are large enough to present to guests are significant enough that they can never be nullified.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  In this interesting mishnah, the sages argue whether the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to non-kosher (unclean) animals.
  It applies to clean animals but not to unclean. Rabbi Judah says, even to unclean animals.  According to the first opinion, if one eats the sciatic nerve of an unclean animal, a donkey, for instance, he is liable for eating an unclean animal, but he is not liable for having eaten the sciatic nerve. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that he has transgressed two prohibitions: 1) eating an unclean animal; 2) eating the sciatic nerve.
  Rabbi Judah said: was not the sciatic nerve prohibited from the time of the sons of Jacob, and at that time unclean animals were still permitted to them? They replied, this law was ordained at Sinai but was written in its proper place.  Rabbi Judah’s argument is based on the unique placement of the sciatic nerve prohibition in the Torah. In the Torah, the prohibition is given in Genesis, before the rest of the laws are given at Sinai. Before the laws were given, all animals were permitted to all of humanity, including the children of Israel. Thus the sciatic nerve was prohibited at a time when unclean animals were permitted. The special nature of this prohibition stays in place, according to Rabbi Judah, even after the Torah was given on Sinai. The other rabbis argue that this law was actually given on Sinai as well. From the time of Jacob until the giving of the Torah there was no prohibition of the sciatic nerve. When the law was placed in the Torah it was put into the context of the story of Jacob, for the reason for this prohibition lies there. Thus it only applies to animal that were permitted after Sinai clean animals.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Three times the Torah states, “Do not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk.” While the Torah speaks specifically about cooking a kid in its own mother’s milk, all of the rabbis agree that the prohibition is much broader. First of all, it applies to the meat and milk of all domesticated animals (sheeps, goats and cows). Second of all, all rabbis agree that it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from milk and meat that have been cooked together the prohibition is not just against cooking.
  However, beyond that, there are several issues that are not clear, and about which rabbis debate. These debates and the rules concerning milk and meat are in our chapter.
  Every kind of flesh is forbidden to be cooked in milk, except for the flesh of fish and of locusts.  There are several categories of meat: 1) Domesticated animals, sheep, goats and cows; 2) Wild animals, such as deer; 3) Fowl; 4) Fish and locusts. When it comes to the prohibition of cooking meat and milk, our mishnah draws the line before category four. Although wild animals and fowl are quite dissimilar from goats, the animal mentioned in the verse itself, it is still prohibited to cook them in milk.  Indeed, fowl and milk are prohibited even though birds don’t have milk! In my opinion, the mishnah defines “meat” as anything that needs to be slaughtered. Since fish and locusts are not slaughtered, they can be cooked and eaten with milk. This rule is recognizable today because it is the rule we follow. However, we should note that not all rabbis agreed and there were some rabbis who held that it was either not prohibited by the Torah to cook and eat fowl and meat, or that it was completely permitted. This opinion was held by a few during the talmudic period, but was not accepted in later times.
  And it is also forbidden to place it upon the table with cheese, except for the flesh of fish and of locusts.  Any meat which may not be cooked with milk, may also not be placed on the same table as a dairy product, lest someone come to eat the two of them together. We can see here that the prohibition of cooking milk and meat is clearly also a prohibition of eating them together.
  Fowl may be placed upon the table together with cheese but may not be eaten with it, the words of Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel say: it may neither be placed [upon the table together with cheese] nor eaten with it. Rabbi Yose said: this is one of the leniencies of Bet shammai and the stringencies of Bet Hillel .  Bet Shammai is more lenient than Bet Hillel when it comes to fowl. It seems likely that according to Bet Shammai the prohibition of eating fowl and milk is only derabanan, of rabbinic authority. Bet Hillel might hold that it is of toraitic origin, and therefore they rule more strictly. Alternatively, they are simply stricter than Bet Shammai, but agree that fowl and cheese is only prohibited by rabbinic authority. In any case, Rabbi Yose points out that this is one of the unusual cases where Bet Hillel rules more strictly than Bet Shammai.
  Concerning what table did they speak? Concerning the table upon which one eats; but on the table whereon the food is set out one may place the one beside the other, and not be concerned.  This section refers to the table mentioned in sections two and three. When it is prohibited to place meat and milk on the same table--that is on a table which people eat off of. Meat and milk can be placed next to each other on tables that are used to prepare foods.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  A person may wrap up meat and cheese in one cloth, provided they do not touch one another.  As long as the meat and cheese don’t touch, they may be wrapped together, without concern that someone will eat the two of them together.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: two people at an inn may eat at the same table, the one meat and the other cheese, without concern.  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that meat and cheese should not be placed on the same table. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel states that if people are eating at an inn, they may eat off the same table. The reason that this is allowed is that people at an inn do not know each other and there is no concern that one person will come to eat from the other person’s food. If the two people do know each other, the mishnah would seem to not allow them to eat off of the same table.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  If a drop of milk fell on a piece of meat and it imparted a flavor into that piece, it is forbidden.  If milk is mixed in with meat, the mixture is prohibited if the milk imparts a taste to the meat. Thus if a drop of milk falls onto a piece of meat in a pot, the meat is prohibited only if one could taste the milk.
  If he stirred up the pot, then it is forbidden only if [the drop of milk] imparted a flavor into [all that was in] the pot.  If he stirs the pot, then the small drop of milk will spread out to the entire mixture. In such a case, the meat is prohibited only if there is enough milk to impart a taste to the entire pot. But if there is not enough milk to give its taste to the entire pot, then even the piece of meat onto which the drop of milk fell is permitted, because that drop of milk has now spread out to the entire pot.
  The udder: he must cut it open and empty it of its milk; If he did not cut it open he has not transgressed the law on its account.  The udder is a problematic part of the animal because it is flesh filled with meat. If one wishes to eat the udder, he must cut it open before cooking it and empty it of all of the milk gathered in it. Then he can cook it. If he doesn’t open it, and then he cooks it with the milk, he is not liable for cooking or eating milk and meat, since the milk that is inside the flesh is not considered to be milk until it has been expelled through the animal’s udders.
  The heart: he must cut it open and empty it of its blood; If he did not cut it open he has not transgressed the law on its account.  The same problem exists when it comes to the heart it is meat (permitted) filled with blood (forbidden). He should cut it open and empty out the blood before he eats it, but if he cooks it in its blood, and eats it, he has not transgressed the biblical prohibition of eating blood.
  One who puts fowl onto a table with cheese has not transgressed a negative commandment.  Mishnah one taught that it is forbidden to put meat and milk on the same table. Our mishnah points out that while this is forbidden, one who does put them on the same table has not transgressed a negative commandment.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Strictly speaking, the Torah prohibits boiling only a kid (a baby goat) in its mother’s milk. As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, all rabbis agree that the prohibition is broader. In our mishnah there are two arguments: 1) whether or not the prohibition includes fowl and wild animals; 2) how the extensions to this prohibition are derived (the midrash).
  It is forbidden to cook the meat of a clean animal in the milk of a clean animal or to derive any benefit from it. But it is permitted to cook the meat of a clean animal in the milk of an unclean animal or the meat of an unclean animal in the milk of a clean animal and to derive benefit from it.  A kid and its mother are both clean (kosher) animals. The rabbis use the kid as a paradigm for all other clean animals. The prohibition of meat and milk applies only to the meat and milk of clean animals. But if one boils pig meat in milk or cow meat in camel milk, he has not transgressed any violation. He may also derive benefit from it (by selling it). Of course, he can’t eat it because pig and camel aren’t kosher. But as long as he doesn’t eat the mixture, he has not transgressed.
  Rabbi Akiva says: wild animals and fowls are not included in the prohibition of the Torah, for it is written three times, “You shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk;” to exclude wild animals, fowl, and unclean animals.  Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is that the prohibition does not extend to wild animals or fowl, which are in a different category from the kid. Rabbi Akiva derives this midrashically from the fact that the Torah prohibits boiling a kid in its mother’s milk three times each time the Torah excludes something that is not similar to a kid. Note that Rabbi Akiva does not state that it is permitted to boil or eat chicken and milk. He only says that doing so is not forbidden by the Torah it is forbidden by the rabbis.
  Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, it is said, “You shall not eat any nevelah” and [in the same verse] it says, “You shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21) anything that is prohibited because of nevelah it is forbidden to cook in milk. Fowl which is prohibited because of nevelah, it might also be forbidden to cook in milk, Scripture says, “In its mother’s milk;” this excludes fowl which has no mother's milk.  Rabbi Yose the Galilean disagrees with Rabbi Akiva on two counts. First of all, he holds that the wild animal is prohibited by the Torah, since it is prohibited to eat a wild animal that was not slaughtered properly, meaning one that is a nevelah. He derives this from the juxtaposition of the prohibition of nevelah with the prohibition of meat and milk. Secondly, he seems to hold that it is permissible to eat fowl and milk, whereas Rabbi Akiva seemed to think that this was prohibited by the rabbis. Indeed, in the Talmud it states that in Rabbi Yose the Galilean’s place people used to actually eat fowl and milk. However, this is not the accepted halakhah. According to the accepted halakhah, chicken and milk is prohibited “derabanan” by the rabbis, as was stated by Rabbi Akiva.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah deals with the milk that is found inside the stomach of an animal. This sour milk contains enzymes that were used to curdle milk and make cheese. Similarly, the lining of the stomach was also used in this process.
  The [milk in the] stomach [of an animal] of a Gentile or [in the stomach of] a nevelah is forbidden.  This milk is prohibited because the animal is prohibited.
  If a man curdled milk with the skin of the stomach of an animal that was validly slaughtered and it imparted its flavor [to the milk] it is forbidden.  The skin of the stomach of an animal is considered to be meat. Therefore, if a meaty taste is imparted to the cheese then the cheese is considered to be meat mixed with milk and it is forbidden. If there is no taste of the meat, then the cheese is permitted.
  The [milk in the] stomach of a validly slaughtered animal which had suckled from a terefah animal is forbidden. The [milk in the] stomach of a terefah animal which had suckled from a kosher animal is permitted, because the milk is collected inside.  The milk in the stomach of an animal is considered to have come from the mother from whom the animal suckled. Thus if milk is found in the stomach of an animal that was validly slaughtered, but it is known that the milk came from a terefah (an animal that cannot be eaten because it will die from a defect/wound) then the milk is prohibited. In contrast, if the slaughtered animal was a terefah, but the animal from which it suckled was valid, then the milk is permitted. We should note that this mishnah has many ramifications for later halakhah, specifically with regard to the issue of making cheese. There are various opinions among medieval commentators with regard to whether the milk found in the stomach of an animal, which is called rennet, can be used to make cheese if it comes from a non-kosher animal. However, this is not the place to expand upon such an issue. For more information, you might want to look on the Rabbinical Assembly’s website for a teshuvah concerning the use of rennet in making cheese.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The last mishnah in our chapter has nothing to do with the subject of milk and meat. It deals with the prohibitions of forbidden fat (helev) and blood and compares the applicability of the two.
  In certain respects the prohibition of the fat is stricter than the prohibition of the blood, and in certain respects the prohibition of the blood is stricter than the prohibition of the fat.  This section introduces the structure of the mishnah which compares the prohibition of forbidden fat with that of blood.
  The prohibition of the fat is stricter, in that the fat is subject to the law of sacrilege, and one is obligated over it for piggul, notar, and uncleanness which is not the case with the blood.  One who eats the forbidden fat of a sacrificial animal is liable for sacrilege, meaning he has made illicit use of sacred property. The fat is supposed to be burned on the altar. Thus if one eats this fat he has transgressed twice: 1) sacrilege; 2) eating forbidden fat. He is also obligated for transgressing the other prohibitions associated with sacrificial animals. When a priest, while offering a sacrifice, intends to eat it after it may no longer be eaten, he makes it into piggul. Notar is remnant sacrificial meat that has been left over after it can no longer be eaten. One who eats forbidden fat from an animal that is piggul and notar is liable for transgressing piggul and notar and for eating forbidden fat. He is also liable if he eats the fat while he is unclean or while the meat is unclean. None of these prohibitions apply to blood. If one eats blood of a piggul or notar animal, or in a state of uncleanness he has only transgressed the prohibition of eating blood. The blood is not treated as if it were the flesh of the animal.
  And the prohibition of the blood is stricter, for it applies to cattle, wild animals and fowl, whether clean or unclean; but the prohibition of the fat applies to clean cattle only.  The prohibition of forbidden fat applies only to clean (permitted) cattle: sheep, goats and cows (see Leviticus 7:23). It does not apply to wild animals or birds. In contrast, the blood prohibition applies to all living things: cattle, wild animals and birds.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The ninth chapter deals with two different forms of uncleanness: 1) food-uncleanness and 2) nevelah uncleanness. There are some differences between the two forms of uncleanness. Food that is unclean can cause other food to become unclean if there is the amount of an egg of food, whereas for nevelah uncleanness an olive’s worth is sufficient.
  Our mishnah teaches that some parts of the animal are considered to be food and therefore susceptible to food uncleanness even though they are not usually eaten.
  The hide, meat juice, sediment, dried-up meat, bones, sinews, horns and hooves join together [to make up the minimum quantity in order] to convey food-uncleanness, but not to [make up the minimum quantity in order to] convey nevelah-uncleanness.  These are all parts of the animal that are not generally or ever eaten. However, these parts, joing together with the generally edible parts of the animal to create a minimum volume the size of an egg to convey uncleanness to other foods if the animal was rendered unclean. The reason is that all although these parts are not eaten on their own, they are sometimes eaten with other parts of the meat. Alternatively, some of these things protect the meat of the animal, even if they themselves are not eaten. Therefore, they join with the meat in adding up to this minimum value. However, these things do not join together with the rest of the meat to cause nevelah-uncleanness, which requires the minimum volume of an olive.
  Similarly, if a man slaughtered an unclean animal for a Gentile and it still has convulsions, it can convey food-uncleanness, but it conveys nevelah-uncleanness only after it is dead, or its head has been chopped off.  This animal cannot be eaten by a Jew or by a Gentile. It can’t be eaten by a Jew because it is an unclean animal, for instance a camel. It can’t be eaten by a Gentile because it is still convulsing and is therefore prohibited under the Noahide prohibition of eating the limb of a living animal. Nevertheless, this animal is considered food because just as when a Jew slaughters a kosher (clean) animal he causes it to be able to receive impurity, so too when he slaughters a non-kosher animal, he causes it to be able to receive impurity. However, it is not considered a nevelah in order to convey nevelah uncleanness until it is truly dead or has its head cut off. If its head is cut off, it is considered dead even if it is still convulsing.
  [Scripture] has [thus] made more cases that convey food-uncleanness than those that convey nevelah-uncleanness.  The mishnah closes by noting there are more cases where something conveys food-uncleanness than nevelah uncleanness.
  Rabbi Judah says: if an olive’s bulk of dried-up meat was gathered in one place, one would thereby become liable [for nevelah-uncleanness].  In section one, we learned that “dried-up meat” does not join together with regular meat to create the minimum measure necessary to convey nevelah-uncleanness, should the animal be a nevelah. Because the dried-up meat is not generally eaten it does not count as meat. Rabbi Judah says that if a person gathered up an olive’s bulk of such a substance in one place, then he can be liable over it for nevelah-uncleanness (provided the substance comes from a nevelah, of course). He would be liable if he touches it, thereby becoming unclean, and then eats holy food (terumah or sacrifices) or goes into the Temple.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that the skin is not treated as part of the flesh, as far as transmitting nevelah-uncleanness. That is to say, in order for there to be an olive’s worth of flesh to convey nevelah-uncleanness, there must be meat and not skin.
  Our mishnah teaches that there are cases where the skin is considered to be impure like the flesh.
  In the following cases the skin is considered flesh: The skin of a person, The skin of the domesticated pig. Rabbi Yose says: even the skin of the wild pig. The skin of the hump of a young camel. The skin of the head of a young calf. The skin around the hooves. The skin of the pudenda. The skin of a fetus. The skin beneath the fat tail. The skin of the gecko, the monitor, the lizard and the skink. Rabbi Judah says: the lizard is like the weasel.  In all of these cases, the skin is treated just like the flesh. The skin of a dead human being transmits impurity in the same way that the flesh does. In the remainder of the examples listed here the skin is treated like flesh because it is eaten like the flesh. These are all cases where the skin is soft and therefore edible. Thus people eat the skin of the domesticated pig, but not the skin of wild pigs. Rabbi Yose says that people eat even the skin of wild pigs. In sub-section i, the mishnah lists four of the eight “reptiles” (sheratzim) mentioned in Leviticus 11:29-30. Rabbi Judah holds that the skin of a lizard is not eaten and therefore it is like the skin of the weasel, which does not count as flesh.
  If any of these skins was tanned or trampled upon as much as [was usual] for tanning, it becomes clean, excepting the skin of a man. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: the eight reptiles have [real] skins.  Generally the types of skins mentioned in section one are eaten and not tanned. That is why they convey impurity as does flesh. However, if they were tanned, or even begun to be tanned, then it is obvious that the owner does not intend to eat them. Therefore, they are pure from nevelah uncleanness. The one exception is human skin, which continues to be impure even if it is tanned (I realize that this is a disturbing image). Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri holds that the 8 reptiles listed in Leviticus 11:29-30 have real skins, ones that don’t convey nevelah-uncleanness. He disagrees with the sages above who distinguished between the different reptiles.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah discusses how long a hide that is being flayed from an animal is considered to be part of the animal. The importance of this issue is for matters of purity: if it is considered to be connected to the animal, then it conveys impurity to the remainder of the flesh and receives impurity as well. When it is disconnected it is considered a separate entity with regard to matters of purity.
  One who was flaying cattle or wild animals, clean or unclean, small or large:  The rules in this mishnah apply to all animals, whether domesticated or wild, clean (kosher) or unclean, small or large.
  In order to use the hide for a covering, if he stripped as can be taken hold of [the hide is no longer considered as connected to the flesh.]  The amount of hide necessary for it to be considered as disconnected to the flesh is going to depend on what he wants to use the hide for. If he is using it for a covering, either for a chair or table, or other such object, then once he has removed enough to grab hold of, the part that he has removed is considered to be disconnected from the flesh. If the animal is a nevelah, then the hide that has been already flayed does not make the person who touches it unclean. And if the animal was properly slaughtered but the hide became unclean, the remainder of the flesh remains clean.
  In order to make a water-skin, until the breast has been flayed.  If he was intending to use the hide as a water-skin, then the hide is considered connected until he flays the breast. When skinning an animal for this purpose, he would cut a small hole at the place of the neck and then flay the rest of the skin whole. The skin counts as being connected until he gets down to the breast, because this is the most difficult place to properly flay. Until he reaches this point, the purity status of the skin and flesh is shared.
  If he was flaying from the feet upwards, until the whole hide [has been flayed].  If he was flaying in the opposite direction, from the feet upwards, then the skin is considered connected until it is all removed.
  [All of these measures apply] for both conveying uncleanness and becoming unclean.  As I have explained above, these rules apply in both directions: both to convey uncleanness from the animal to the hide, and from the hide to the animal.
  As for the skin that is on the neck: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: it is not connected. But the sages say it is connected until the whole hide has been flayed.  The skin that surrounds the neck is easily separated from the flesh and therefore Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri considers it as disconnected from the flesh. If it becomes unclean, the flesh is not unclean and if the flesh is unclean, it remains clean. The other sages say that this hide is treated just as is the rest of the hide. One who touches it, it is as if he touched the flesh, even if part of it was removed. It is not separate until it has all been removed.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  A hide which had an olive’s bulk of [unclean] flesh clinging to it, one who touches a shred hanging from it, or a hair that was opposite to it, he becomes unclean.  This section teaches that one who touches something that is attached to a piece of flesh is considered as having touched the flesh. If there is a piece of flesh of nevelah (carrion) the size of an olive that is hanging from a hide, one who touches the hide has become unclean through nevelah uncleanness. He is also unclean if he touches the hair attached to the hide opposite the piece of flesh, for touching the hair counts as touching the hide which conveys the uncleanness from the flesh.
  If there were two pieces of flesh attached to it, each the size of half an olive, they convey uncleanness by carrying but not by contact, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: neither by contact nor by carrying.  Here, instead of there being one piece of flesh the size of an olive, the usual size necessary to convey nevelah uncleanness, there are two pieces of flesh, each the size of half of an olive. Both are attached to one piece of hide. Everyone agrees that these two pieces of flesh don’t join together to convey uncleanness by contact, since one is touching only one at a time. However, Rabbi Ishmael holds that if one carries the hide with the two olives attached to it he has become impure through carrying, because he is, after all, carrying an olive’s worth of nevelah. Rabbi Akiva says that they don’t convey impurity even when carried.
  Rabbi Akiva agrees that if there were two pieces of flesh, each the size of half of an olive, that he stuck on a twig and he waved them, he becomes unclean.  Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Ishmael that if there are two half-olive size pieces of flesh stuck on a stick, they join together to count as one full olive. Waving counts as carrying, so if he waves this stick with the two nevelah pieces on it, he is impure.
  Why then does Rabbi Akiva declare him clean in the [case where they cling to the] hide? Because the hide renders them negligible.  The mishnah now explains why Rabbi Akiva says that the two pieces of flesh attached to the hide do not join together to transmit impurity while those attached to the stick do. The two small pieces of flesh attached to the hide are negligible and nullified vis a vis the hide. However, the stick that he put them on is not considered important and therefore they are not nullified in this situation.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  With regard to a thigh-bone of a corpse or a thigh-bone of a consecrated animal, he who touches it, whether it be stopped up or pierced, becomes unclean.  When it comes to human corpses, bones convey uncleanness just as does flesh. Thus one who touches a thigh-bone (this bone can actually be referring to any large bone) is impure no matter what state the bone is in. Consecrated animals that are disqualified by becoming either piggul (the priest had the wrong intention while offering the sacrifice) or remnant, cause hand-impurity (see Pesahim 10:9). The bones of consecrated animals also cause such impurity, again, no matter what state the bone is in.
  With regard to a thighbone of a nevelah or of a [dead] sheretz, if it was stopped up, he who touches it remains clean, but if it was at all pierced it conveys uncleanness by contact.  However, when it comes to nevelah impurity or the impurity caused by a dead sheretz (one of eight types of creepy crawly animals mentioned in the Torah), it depends on whether the bone was pierced such that the marrow could escape. The bone itself doesn’t convey impurity, whereas the marrow does. Thus, if it was not at all pierced, then the person who touches it or carries it is clean. But if it was pierced, even with a very small pierce, he is unclean.
  From where do we know [the same rules apply] for carrying? Scripture says, “He that touches and he that carries” (Leviticus 11:39-40), anything that [can become unclean] by contact [can become unclean] by carrying. And anything that cannot [become unclean] by contact, cannot become [unclean] by carrying.  The same rules that apply to touching a pierced or stopped up bone of a nevelah or sheretz apply to carrying such a bone. When one carries a pierced bone, he is impure. This is not the surprising aspect of this rule. What is surprising is that if one carries a non-pierced bone, he remains clean, even though he carried the marrow which counts as flesh of the nevelah. When it comes to nevelah, the same rules that apply to touching applying to carrying if one is pure from touching a stopped up bone, then he is also pure when he carries such a bone. This is derived from the juxtaposition of the verbs in Leviticus 11.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  The egg of a sheretz in which there has formed an embryo is clean. If it was pierced, however small the hole was, it is unclean.  If the egg of the sheretz is not pierced, then one who touches it is pure, because there is no way of touching the sheretz that is inside. If it is pierced, then the one who touches it is unclean, no matter how small the hole is.
  A mouse which is half flesh and half earth, if a man touched the flesh he becomes unclean, but if he touched the earth he remains clean. Rabbi Judah says: even if he touched the earth that is over against the flesh he becomes unclean.  The rabbis know of, or at least discuss, a mouse that was not formed by normal ways of procreating, but rather rose out of the dust. When it had not been fully formed, it would be half dust and half earth. If one touches the earth part, he has not become impure by touching a mouse, which is a sheretz. If one touches the flesh, he is impure. Rabbi Judah holds that the earth counts as part of the mouse/sheretz, and one who touches it is impure. Saul Lieberman discusses this mishnah in his book, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine. On pages 183-184 he writes, “The existence of such a mouse was taken for granted by many ancient authors. Plinius cites it as a ‘fact’ which could confirm the credibility of other wonderful creatures…. ‘In one part of their body they are already alive, while the most recently formed part of their structure is still of earth.’ It is exactly the mouse described by the rabbis…The information about that kind of mouse the Rabbis probably got from Egyptian sources. When the alleged existence of the miraculous creature was brought to their attention they commented on its would-be Halakhic status.”
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Limbs or pieces of flesh which hang loose from a [living] animal are susceptible to food uncleanness while they are in their place.  In the cases in this mishnah, the flesh or limb has become severed from the animal and has no chance of becoming reattached. This limb or piece of flesh is considered pure, because it is still attached to the animal. It does, however, receive food uncleanness. Food can become impure by contact with a sheretz (and other more serious forms of impurity) and food conveys impurity to other foods.
  And [in order to become unclean] they must be first rendered susceptible to uncleanness.  In order for food to be rendered susceptible to impurity, it must come into contact with a liquid. This limb or flesh cannot become unclean until it comes into contact with one of seven liquids (water, blood, milk, dew, honey, oil or wine).
  If the animal was slaughtered, they have by the blood [of the slaughtering] become susceptible to uncleanness, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: they have not become susceptible to uncleanness.  If the animal is slaughtered properly, the limb or flesh that was hanging off is made susceptible to food uncleanness by virtue of the blood that leaves the animal when it is slaughtered. This is true even though the slaughtering of the animal does not permit the hanging limb or flesh to be eaten (see above 4:6). In other words, we must treat the limb or flesh as food, even though it cannot be eaten. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that just as it may not be eaten, it is not susceptible to impurity by virtue of contact with this blood.
  If the animal died, the hanging flesh must be rendered susceptible to uncleanness.  If the animal died without being slaughtered, the animal becomes a nevelah but the flesh which was hanging off the animal while it was still alive is not considered nevelah. There is a rule that flesh that separates from an animal while it is still alive is not considered nevelah. Although this flesh was still attached, when it dies we consider it to have fallen off the animal. It still is susceptible to food impurity (as it did in section three), but before it can become impure it must be rendered susceptible by coming into contact with a liquid.
  The limb is unclean as a limb severed from a living creature, but is not unclean as the limb of a nevelah (, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon declares it clean.  According to Rabbi Meir, the limb, attached to the dead animal, does convey uncleanness because it is considered like a limb that was detached from a living animal, which conveys impurity as does a nevelah. However, flesh that becomes separated from a limb separated from a living animal does not convey impurity. Therefore, Rabbi Meir notes that the limb is treated like a limb separated from a living animal and not like a limb from a nevelah. Should flesh become separated from this limb, it will not become impure. Rabbi Shimon says that the limb is pure it is neither like a nevelah, nor like the limb severed from a living animal. Since the limb didn’t fall off while the animal was alive, it cannot be considered at all like a limb that falls from a living animal. And since it is separated from the rest of the body, it is not considered like nevelah.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues the discussion about hanging limbs and pieces of flesh.  Whereas yesterday’s mishnah discussed an animal, today’s mishnah discusses a human being.
  A limb or a piece of flesh which hangs loose from a person are clean.  As long as the limb or piece of flesh is attached to a live human being, it is clean. It is not a limb separated from a living being, because it is still attached.
  If the man died, the flesh is clean, the limb is unclean as a limb severed from the living body but is not unclean as a limb severed from a corpse, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon declares it clean.  This debate is basically the same debate as we found in yesterday’s mishnah. When the person dies, the flesh is clean because it is considered as flesh that separated from the person while he was still alive. Such flesh is pure. The limb is considered like a limb that was severed from a living animal, which is impure. It does not count as part of the corpse because we consider it to have fallen off the body while the person was still alive. This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon considers the limb to also be clean, for the same reason that he considers the limb hanging from the dead animal’s corpse to be clean (see yesterday’s mishnah).
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Deuteronomy 18:3 states, “This then shall be the priests’ due from the people: Everyone who offers a sacrifice, whether an ox or a sheep, must give the shoulder, the cheeks and the stomach to the priest.”
  Our chapter is concerned with these gifts given to the priest.
  The [law of] the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals.  The law that a person must give the priest the shoulder, cheeks and stomach of an animal that he slaughters is in force in all places and in all times. It applies only to unconsecrated (hullin) animals and not to those that have been consecrated to the Temple.
  For it might have been argued thus: if unconsecrated animals, which are not subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, are subject to these dues, how much more are consecrated animals, with are subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, subject also to these dues!  The mishnah now explains why one might have thought that it should apply to consecrated animals. From shelamim sacrifices, whose meat goes to the owners, the priest receives the breast and the thigh. Thus one might have argued if the priest gets the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from unconsecrated animals but not the breast and thigh, all the more so he should get the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from an animal from which he does receive the breast and thigh.
  Scripture states, “And I have given them to Aaron the priest and his sons as a due for ever” (Leviticus 7:34) only what is mentioned in this passage shall be his.  To counter this argument, the Torah hints (midrashically) that from sacrifices, Aaron and his priestly descendents receive only the breast and thigh, and not the shoulder, cheeks and stomach. Along with this midrash, it seems to me that the different priestly gifts serve to distinguish between sacrifices and non-sacrifices. The fact that the priests receive different gifts from different animals might help in distinguishing whether the gifts they are receiving must be treated as holy, or can be considered hullin (non-sacred).
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  An animal that has a permanent physical blemish cannot be sacrificed. Our mishnah distinguishes between cases where the blemish preceded the consecration of the animal, versus cases where the consecration preceded the blemish.
  All consecrated animals whose permanent physical blemish preceded their consecration and were then redeemed: Are subject to the law of the firstling and to the priestly gifts, And when they become like hullin [by being redeemed] they may be shorn and may be put to work. And their young and their milk are permitted after they have been redeemed. And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is not liable. And they do not render what is substituted for them [holy]. And if they died they may be redeemed, except for the firstling and the tithe of cattle.  If the animal had a permanent blemish before it was consecrated, then the animal itself doesn’t become holy. Instead, the consecrator has in reality dedicated the value of the animal to the Temple. Thus this animal is treated like a hullin, non-sacred, animal, except that it has to be redeemed before any use can be made of it. If it gives birth to a firstling, the firstling is holy, as is the case with a hullin animal. When one slaughters it, he must give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. After it becomes hullin by being redeemed, it may be shorn and work may be performed with it. Similarly, its young and its milk are not prohibited. One who slaughters it outside the Temple is not liable for he has slaughtered a non-sacred animal. If one tries to exchange it for another animal, the other animal is not holy. If the animal dies, it will still need to be redeemed, so that its meat can be given to dogs. The only exception to all of these rules is if this animal that had a permanent blemish is itself a firstling or a tithed animal. The firstling is holy from the moment it is born even if it has a blemish. Similarly, even blemished animals must be tithed (see Leviticus 27:33). Thus these animals are holy regardless of whether they have blemishes and therefore they cannot be treated as the animals above were treated.
  All [consecrated animals] whose consecration preceded their permanent, or their impermanent blemish [preceded] their consecration and subsequently they contracted a permanent blemish, and they were redeemed: Are exempt from the law of the firstling, and from priestly gifts; And they are not like unconsecrated animals to be shorn or put to work; And [even] after they have been redeemed their young and their milk are forbidden; And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is liable; And they render what was substituted for them [holy], And if they died they must be buried.  An animal that is first consecrated and then becomes blemished is a consecrated animal, even though it cannot be sacrificed. Similarly, if an animal has a passing blemish, and then it is consecrated, it is a consecrated animal. These animals must be redeemed, and the money used to buy a new sacrifice. However, they remain consecrated even after redemption. Therefore, their offspring is exempt from the laws of tithe and firstling, as are the offspring of all consecrated animals. One who slaughters them after their redemption need not give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. Even after they are redeemed, it is forbidden to shear them or to perform any work with them. Their offspring and their milk remain prohibited, even after they have been redeemed. Indeed, it seems like the only thing that can be done with them is to eat them. Our version of the mishnah says that if one slaughters them outside of the Temple, he is liable. This is difficult, because what it he supposed to do with them he can’t offer them as sacrifices nor can he slaughter them outside of the Temple. There is a version which reads “exempt” instead of “liable.” However, the Talmud reads “liable” and explains that this mishnah is according to Rabbi Akiva who holds that if an animal with a blemish was put onto the altar, it is not to be removed (Zevahim 9:3). Thus, although this animal should not be sacrificed, if it is put on the altar, it can be sacrificed. If one exchanges this animal for another, the other animal also becomes holy. Consecrated animals cannot be exchanged one for the other, and if one tries to do so, the original animal remains holy and the new animal becomes holy. Finally, if they die before they are redeemed, they must be buried, because no one can derive benefit from their meat.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  A first-born got mixed up with a hundred other animals: If a hundred [and one] persons slaughtered them all, they are all exempt from the gifts. If one person slaughtered them all, only one animal is exempt from the gifts.  As we learned in mishnah one, one is exempt from giving the priestly gifts from consecrated animals. This includes even a first-born that has a defect that allows one to slaughter the animal and eat it. The problem presented in our mishnah is that this first born was mixed up with many other non-sacred animals. If each animal was slaughtered by a different person, meaning each animal was owned by a different person, they are all exempt from giving the priestly gifts, because each person can claim that his animal was not the first-born. However, if they all belong to one person, then he must give the priestly gifts from all but one animal, for one animal is surely exempt.
  If a man slaughtered an animal for a priest or a non-Jew, he is exempt from the gifts.  An animal owned by a priest or by a non-Jew is exempt from the priestly gifts. If one slaughters an animal owned by a priest or a non-Jew for the priest or non-Jew the animal is exempt.
  If he had a share [in the animal] with them, he must indicate this by some sign.  If a person jointly owned an animal with a non-Jew or priest, the animal is still exempt from the priestly gifts. However, in order that people should know why gifts are not being given from this animal, he must make a sign on the animal that it is jointly owned by someone who is exempt.
  If he said, “Except the gifts” he is exempt from giving the gifts.  The next few sections deal with sales of animals. If a priest sells an animal to a non-priest and he says that he is selling the animal but not the gifts, (the shoulder, cheeks and stomach), then the Israelite does not need to pay the value of these parts of the animal because they were never his.
  If he said, “Sell me the entrails of a cow” and among them were the gifts, he must give them to a priest and [the seller] does not need to reduce the price.  If a person tells a butcher to sell him the entrails of an animal, and among the entrails are gifts that must be given to the priest, the purchaser must give them to the priest and the seller need not reduce the price. This is because the purchaser knew that he was not going to get to keep all of that which he bought. In other words, it was already reckoned into the price.
  But if he bought them from him by weight, he must give them to a priest, and [the seller] must reduce the price.  However, if he buys by weight, then he is anticipating that all that he buys will be his. In this case, if the seller gives the buyer priestly gifts, he must reduce the price.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  A convert who converted and owned a cow: If he slaughtered it before he converted, he is exempt from giving the gifts. If [he slaughtered it] after he converted, he is liable. If there was a doubt about it, he is exempt, for the burden of proof lies upon the claimant.  If the convert was not yet Jewish before his cow was slaughtered, he is exempt from the gifts. If, however, he converted and then slaughtered the cow, he must give the gifts. We can see that the critical time is when the animal was slaughtered. If there is a doubt whether the conversion occurred before the animal was slaughtered, then the priest must prove that the owner was Jewish before the slaughtering in order to be able to claim his gifts. This is based on the common legal principle that the burden of the proof is on the claimant.
  What is ‘the shoulder’? From the joint up to the shoulder-socket of the forelimb, and this is the same for the nazirite.  The end of chapter ten is concerned with identifying exactly what part of the animal constitutes the shoulder and cheeks. The mishnah does not discuss the identification of the stomach, perhaps because it is clear what constitutes the stomach. The shoulder is defined as the entire front right leg, except for the foot. The joint refers to the ankle. This is the same shoulder as referred to in connection with the Nazirite in Numbers 6:19, “And the priest shall take the cooked shoulder.”
  The corresponding part of the hind leg is called the thigh. Rabbi Judah says: the thigh extends from the joint up to the fleshy part of the leg.  The same part of the hind leg is given to the priest from the shelamim offering. See above, mishnah one. Rabbi Judah says that the “thigh” referred to in the Torah is really what we would call the lower leg. It does not include from the knee and upwards.
  What counts as ‘the cheek? From the joint of the jaw to the last protrusion of the windpipe.  The “cheeks” go from the lower cheeks until the first joint of the windpipe.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Our chapter deals with the mitzvah of giving the priest the first of the wool shorn from sheep (“the first of the fleece”). Deuteronomy 18:4 states, “You shall also give him [the priest] the first fruits of your new grain and wine and oil, and the first shearing of your sheep.” This verse follows the verse that instructed Israelites to give priests the shoulder, the cheeks and the stomach. This is the reason why this chapter is found here in Hullin.
  The law of the first of the fleece is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals.  The law of the first of the fleece is applicable in all times and places, but it applies only to unconsecrated animals.  Just as consecrated animals are exempt from the shoulder, cheeks and stomach, so too they are exempt from the law of the first of the fleece.
  The law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is of stricter application than the law of the first of the fleece; for the law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach applies both to herds and flocks, whether they are many or few, whereas the law of the first of the fleece applies only to sheep, and only when there are many.  The mishnah notes that in one way the giving of the shoulder, cheeks and stomach is more broadly applied than the giving of the first of the fleece. The priest receives the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from any domesticated animal, be it cow, sheep or goat. However, the priest receives the fleece only from sheep and not from goats (cows are not fleeced, so that is not relevant). Furthermore, the priest receives the fleece only when there are many sheep, and not when there are few. This shall be explained in tomorrow’s mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah begins by explaining what the phrase “and only when there are many,” found at the end of yesterday’s mishnah. It then continues with other various aspects of this mitzvah.
  How much is “many”? Bet Shammai say: [at least] two sheep, as it is said, “A man shall rear a young cow and two sheep (” (Isaiah 7:21). Bet Hillel say: five, as it is said, “Five dressed sheep (” (I Samuel 28:18).  Deuteronomy 18:4 uses the word “tzon” which means flock. The question is: how many sheep are needed for there to be a flock? Clearly, one sheep is not enough. Bet Shammai use the verse from Isaiah to prove that even two sheep can be called “tzon.” Bet Hillel hold that the amount must be larger, and they use the verse from I Samuel to prove it.
  Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says: five sheep, which each produce [a fleece which weighs] a maneh and a half, are subject to the law of the first of the fleece. But the sages say: five sheep, whatever their fleeces weigh.  Later sages rule like Bet Hillel, but still debate whether the five sheep rule always applies. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says that there must be a minimum measure of wool that each sheep produces.  This amount is a maneh and a half, which is equivalent to about 600 grams of wool. The other rabbis disagree and hold that even if the first shearing produces only a minimal amount, he is still liable to give it to the priest.
  And how much should one give him?  The weight of five selas in Judah, which is equal to ten selas in Galilee. Bleached wool and not dirty wool, sufficient to make from it a small garment, for it is written, “Give him,” when there is enough to be considered a gift.  If there are several priests and he wishes to divide the wool up among them he must give each not less than the weight of five Judean selas which is equivalent to ten Galilean selas. When he gives the priest the wool, it must already be bleached. He is not allowed to give the unbleached, dirty wool. The mishnah derives from the word “give” that whenever he gives the wool to the priest, there must be enough wool to make a gift, defined minimally as a small garment. The Talmud explains that a small garment is a sash.
  If the owner did not manage to give [the fleece to the priest] until he dyed it, he is exempt. If he bleached it but did not dye it, he is still liable.  If he dyed it before he had a chance to give it to the priest, he need not give the priest the wool. This is because by dyeing it, he has changed it and acquired it for himself. However, he has failed to perform the mitzvah of giving the priest the first of the fleece. But if all he did to the wool was bleach it, then he is still liable, because bleaching is not enough of a change for the owner to acquire it for himself.
  If a man bought the fleeces of a flock belonging to a non-Jew, he is exempt from the law of the first of the fleece.  Only sheep owned by Israelites are liable for the first of the fleece. So if one buys wool from a non-Jew, he need not give any of it to the priest.
  If a man bought the fleeces of a flock belonging to his neighbor: If the seller kept some back, the seller is liable, But if he did not withhold anything, the buyer is liable.  If he buys from a Jew, then it depends on whether the Jew kept any of the wool for himself. If he did, then the seller must give the first of the fleece from that which he held back. However, if he did not hold any back, then the purchaser must give the first of the fleece, because the seller did not reckon the price of the first of the fleece into the amount that he collected for the wool.
  If he had two kinds of wool, grey and white, and he sold the grey but not the white, or [if he sold the wool] of the males but not of the females, each must give [the first of the fleece] for himself.  If the seller had two kinds of wool, either of two different colors or from males and females, and he kept all of one kind to himself, then each person must give the first of the fleece from his own kind. This is because when there are two different kinds, we don’t consider it as if the seller held back some for himself. Rather he sold all of the wool of a certain kind, and therefore, the buyer must give to the priest from the kind that he bought.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Deuteronomy 22:6-7 states: “If, along the road, you chance upon a bird’s nest, in any tree or on the ground, with fledglings or eggs and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs, do not take the mother together with her young. Let the mother go, and take only the young, in order that you may fare well and have a long life.”
  Our chapter, the final chapter in Hullin, deals with this mitzvah, called “letting the mother bird go from the nest (shiluah haken).”
  The law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest is in force both within the holy land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated birds but not consecrated birds.  The law of letting the mother bird go from the nest is applicable in all times and all places. However, it only applies to unconsecrated birds and not to consecrated ones.
  The law of covering up the blood is of broader application than the law of letting [the mother bird] go; for the law of covering up the blood applies to wild animals as well as to birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not, whereas the law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest applies only to birds and only to those which are not at one's disposal.  The mishnah compares the law of covering up the blood (see chapter six) with the law of letting the mother bird go because both are practiced with wild animals and not domesticated ones. However, covering up the blood is of broader application because it applies to animals and birds, whereas sending the mother bird away obviously applies only to birds. Furthermore, sending the mother bird applies only to birds that are not at one’s disposal, meaning they are not “house” birds. In contrast, the covering of the blood applies to all birds and wild animals.
  Which are they that are not at one's disposal? Such as geese and fowls that made their nests in the open field. But if they made their nests within a house or in the case of Herodian doves, one is not bound to let [the mother bird] go.  If a bird makes its nest in the open field, then it is considered to not be at one’s disposal and one needs to send it away before taking its young. If the birds nest in the house, then when one comes to take them, he need not send the mother bird away. This is probably derived from the word “along the road” in Deuteronomy 22:6. The same is true for Herodian doves, which refers to the types of doves that Herod used to raise in his palace.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  An unclean bird one is not obligated to let it go.  The obligation to let the mother bird go applies only to a clean (kosher) bird, one that can be eaten. It does not apply to birds that are not kosher.
  If an unclean bird was sitting on the eggs of a clean bird, or a clean bird on the eggs of an unclean bird, one is not obligated to let it go.  Furthermore, if either the eggs are from an unclean (not kosher) bird but the bird is clean, or vice versa, there is no obligation to let it go. The obligation applies only to a clean bird sitting on clean eggs.
  As to a male partridge: Rabbi Eliezer obligates [one to let it go]. But the sages exempt.  The Torah says “mother” because most of the time the mother bird sits on the egg. However, the male partridge does sit on the eggs, and therefore the rabbis debate whether there is an obligation to let it go. Rabbi Eliezer says that there is. Evidently, Rabbi Eliezer believes that the Torah mentioned mother, because that was the normal case. But according to his opinion, the same rule would apply to the father as well. The other rabbis are more precise in their reading of the Torah (and more hesitant about extending its logic). One must let only the mother bird go the father bird may be taken even while sitting on its young. As an aside, this reminds me of the debate concerning uncle/niece marriage. The Torah forbids a nephew from marrying his aunt, but says nothing about uncle/niece. The Jews who composed the Dead Sea Scrolls forbade both cases, thereby extending the logic of the Torah, much as Rabbi Eliezer does in this case. The rabbis, on the other hand, lauded such marriages, and read the Torah in a more narrow fashion.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  If the mother was hovering [over the nest]: If her wings touch the nest, one is obligated to let her go; If her wings do not touch the nest, one is not obligated to let her go.  The mother is considered to be sitting upon the nest only so long as at least her wings are touching the nest. If she is just hovering over the nest, and her wings are not touching, one is not obligated to send her away.
  If there was but one young bird or one egg [in the nest], one is still obligated to let the mother go, for it is written: “A nest,” [implying], any nest whatsoever.  Although Deuteronomy 22:6 uses the plural form of eggs and fledglings, the obligation is still in place even if there is only one egg or one fledgling. This is because the Torah also uses the word “nest” which implies any nest, so long as there is at least one egg or one fledgling.
  If there were there young birds able to fly or spoiled eggs, one is not obligated to let [the mother] go, for it is written, “And the mother sitting up on the young or upon the eggs:” Just as the young are living beings so the eggs must be such as [would produce] living beings; this excludes spoiled eggs. And just as the eggs need the care of the mother so the young must be such as need the care of the mother; this excludes those that are able to fly.  The prohibition applies only to fledglings that cannot fly or to viable eggs. It does not apply to a case where the young birds can already fly or to a case where the eggs are spoiled. This is derived through a midrash which compares the fledglings with the eggs. Just as the fledglings have proven themselves to be viable birds, so too the eggs must show signs of being viable. Spoiled eggs are not covered by the prohibition. And just as the eggs still require the attention of their mother, so too the fledglings must require the attention of their mother. A fledgling which can feed itself and fly, is no longer covered by the prohibition.
  If one let [the mother] go and she returned, even four of five times, he is still obligated [to let her go again], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.”  Even if the mother bird keeps returning to the nest, the person who finds her there must send her away before taking the young or the eggs. This is derived from the double appearance of the word “shalah” in the Torah, which I have translated as “surely let the mother go.” Although this is a common grammatical construct, the rabbis frequently use it as an opportunity for midrash.
  If one said, “I will take the mother and let the young go,” he is still obligated [to let her go], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.”  One cannot fulfill the obligation by letting the young go, and taking the mother. Rather, the obligation is to send the mother away and then take the young.
  If one took the young and brought them back again to the nest, and afterwards the mother returned to them, he is not obligated to let her go.  If one let the mother go and took the young, he has now acquired the young birds and eggs. If he then puts them back in the nest and the mother comes and takes them, he is exempt from sending her away again. This is because the eggs are already his.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  If one took the mother with the young: Rabbi Judah says: he has incurred [forty] lashes and he need not now let her go. But the sages say: he must let her go, and he does not incur lashes.  The Torah prohibits taking the mother bird, but then says that one should send the mother away. The question is: can one remedy the prohibition by performing the positive aspect of the commandment? Rabbi Judah says that once he has taken the mother, he has irrevocably transgressed the commandment. There are two implications: 1) he has incurred the punishment for transgressing a negative commandment (lashes); 2) he need not send the mother away, because there is no longer any commandment to do so. The other sages disagree. They hold that the transgression may be fixed by sending the mother away. Since when he transgresses there is the potential to fix the problem, one can never incur a punishment for transgressing such a type of commandment.
  This is the general rule: [For the transgression of] any negative commandment which has of a remedy by the subsequent fulfillment of a positive commandment one does not incur lashes.  This is the general rule. If there is a negative commandment that can be remedied by performing a positive commandment, then one cannot receive lashes for transgressing the negative commandment.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  One may not take the mother with the young even for the sake of purifying the metzora.  One might have thought that if one needs a bird for the purification process of the metzora (one with skin disease) that it would be permitted to take the mother with the young. This purification process requires two birds (Leviticus 14:4). The mishnah states that this is prohibited one may not transgress one commandment in order to observe another.
  If in respect of so light a commandment, which deals with that which is but worth an issar, the Torah said, “In order that you may fare well and have a long life”, how much more [must be the reward] for the observance of the more difficult commandments in the Torah!  The mitzvah of sending away the mother bird is a relatively inexpensive mitzvah a bird is on average worth only about an issar. Thus the person who shoos the mother bird away has lost only an issar, a tiny amount of money. Nevertheless, the Torah states that he will receive a reward of having a long life. The mishnah ends with a note of encouragement, that if such a great reward is received for such an easy commandment, how much greater must be the reward for observing more difficult, and costly, commandments. Congratulations!  We have finished Tractate Hullin! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Hullin was full of interesting commandments, many of which still have relevance in our lives. For those of us who eat meat (or fowl) learning Hullin is an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of taking a life in order to receive nourishment. The tractate is full of other commandments that are concerned with how we relate to killing animals in order to eat them, for instance the prohibition of killing a mother and child on the same day, or the commandment to cover the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or bird. It also dealt with the prohibition of cooking meat and milk, a practice that is to this day of great relevance in how a traditional Jew leads his/her daily life. I hope that you have enjoyed learning Hullin. In my opinion it is one of the most interesting tractates that I have learned. Tomorrow we begin learning Tractate Bechorot.