meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Modern Works/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Ketubot/English/merged.txt"}
text: English Explanation of Mishnah Ketubot
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה כתובות
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  -
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Ketubot
  
  Introduction
  
  Perhaps the most famous of all Jewish documents is the ketubah.  In modern times people buy for themselves fancy decorated ketuboth, hang them up on their walls and are (hopefully) reminded of the positive Jewish aspects of their marriage.  Ketuboth are today largely symbolic. 
  In the time of the Mishnah and Talmud, the ketubah was a real marriage contract, written in Aramaic (the language of commerce at the time) and it outlined the husband’s and wife’s financial responsibilities to one another.  Indeed the ketubah had little that was strictly “Jewish” about it, and many of the neighboring peoples used similar types of marriage documents.  Furthermore, the idea of a marriage contract is ancient and certainly predates even the Bible.  The earliest Israelite ketuboth that archaeologists have found are from Elephantine, an Israelite military colony in northern Egypt in the 5th century B.C.E.  The language of these ketuboth is remarkably similar to the language found in the ketuboth mentioned in the Mishnah and the ketubah that we still use today.  
  Besides referring to the document, the word ketubah can also refer to the minimum marriage payment that a husband (or his estate) owes his wife upon death or divorce.  For a first-time marriage (a woman assumed to be a virgin), the payment is 200 dinar/zuz and for a widow or divorcee the payment is 100 dinar/zuz.  This amount correlates to the bridal price of 50 shekels (1 shekel=4 dinar) mentioned in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 (see also Exodus 22:15-16).  The word ketubah can also occasionally refer to the dowry brought into the marriage by the wife.  Our tractate discusses dowries as well.  
  While learning this tractate it is important to remember that the understanding of marriage and the shared responsibilities of a husband and wife have changed over the past 2000 years (and especially over the last century).  In the time of the Mishnah husbands were the primary earners in the family and a woman’s place was more typically, although not exclusively, around the home.  
  In my opinion, throughout history Jewish marital law largely reflects the outside societies understanding of marriage.  For instance, in Islamic lands, where Muslims married more than one women, Jews continued to practice bigamy until modern times.  In Christian countries, where bigamy was prohibited to Christians, Jews ceased practicing bigamy around the year 1000.  Of course, there are limits to Jewish absorption of non-Jewish customs (adultery could never be tolerated), but to a large extent the financial arrangements in Jewish marriage reflect the financial arrangements customary in non-Jewish marriages.  Therefore, in our society, where men and women increasingly share equally as breadwinners and caretakers, I personally believe that Jewish law can and should reflect these arrangements.  However, that is my personal opinion, an opinion that will not be reflected in the mishnayoth themselves.
  Ketuboth is one of the most learned tractates of Talmud in traditional yeshivot for it contains many principles useful in other areas of law.  It will be a challenging tractate, but one that I am sure you will all enjoy.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Ketuboth opens by discussing on which days of the week a virgin marries, and on which days of the week a widow marries.  Note that these customs have not been observed for a very long time, probably already from the time of the Talmud.  Some of the talmudic sources mention persecution of the custom by Roman authorities.
  A virgin is married on the fourth day [of the week] and a widow on the fifth day, for twice in the week the courts sit in the towns, on the second day [of the week] and on the fifth day, so that if he [the husband] had a claim as to the virginity [of the bride] he could go early [on the morning of the fifth day of the week] to the court. According to the mishnah a virgin is married on Wednesday so that if the husband wants to make a claim against her that she was not a virgin, he can come directly to the court which sits on Mondays and Thursdays and make a claim against her.  If his virginity claim against her is accepted by the court, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah.  The chapter will continue to discuss the issue of virginity claims and how the judge is to adjudicate them.  Note that virginity claims are already mentioned in Deuteronomy 22:13-22.  The virginity of the bride was of high value in the ancient world and a man who thought that he was marrying a virgin but found that she was not had the right to claim that he had mistakenly married her. The Talmud asks why it is so important that the husband rush to the court to make his virginity claim.  After all, couldn’t he marry on Tuesday and wait two days to make his claim.  The answer in the Talmud is that the rabbis were concerned that he might forgive his wife and stay married to her.  If she had had adultery while betrothed to him, she is considered an adulteress and may not remained married to him.  To therefore encourage him to make a claim, the rabbis enacted that he should marry on Wednesday. There are several other reasons given for this custom in the Talmud, including a belief that these are “lucky days”.  Another interpretation is that a wedding on Monday allows the husband three days after Shabbat to prepare the feast (my how times have changed).  I actually wrote an article in Hebrew about this subject and it was part of my doctorate as well (also in Hebrew).  If anybody would like a copy I would be glad to send them one.  The issue is actually quite complex. The mishnah does not state why widows are married on Thursday.  According to the Talmud this is so their husbands will not go to work the next morning.  On Friday morning, after the wedding, the husband will not go to work because it is the day after the wedding, and Friday is not a full work day in any case.  Therefore, the new couple will have three days to celebrate together.  With a virgin this is not a problem since there is a mandatory seven day celebration for a virgin.  During this celebration, which is today called “the sheva berachot” after the seven blessings said at each meal, the husband is not supposed to go to work.  Note that the custom of a seven day celebration is ancient and is mentioned already in the Bible in connection to Jacob’s marriage to Leah.  He waits seven days before he marries Rachel.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah begins to discuss the size of a woman’s ketubah.  To remind ourselves, the ketubah referred to in this mishnah is the minimum payment that a husband must pay his wife upon his death or divorce.  The function of the ketubah was twofold:  to provide financial protection for a woman if she was divorced or widowed and to create a financial deterrent for divorce.  In other words the husband would not want to divorce his wife because it would cost him too much money (I believe this deterrent is often still effective today.)
  A virgin   her kethubah is two hundred [zuz], and a widow   a maneh (100.  This section provides the basic halakhah that will be discussed throughout the remainder of the chapter.  Assumedly there are two reasons why a widow (which in this context includes a divorcee) receives a smaller ketubah.  First of all, she already received a ketubah from her first marriage, and therefore has some money already saved up.  Second, and probably more importantly, there was a need to encourage men to marry widows and divorcees.  Most men probably preferred first-time marriages.  Second marriages were made cheaper, therefore, to prevent older women from remaining husband-less.  Needless to say, that people should be married was an important value to the rabbis.
  A virgin, who is a widow, [or] divorced, or a halutzah from betrothal   her kethubah  is two hundred [zuz], and there is upon her a claim of non-virginity.  The Mishnah now begins to discuss exceptional cases, ones which slightly deviate from the typical first marriage or the typical widow or divorcee.  If a woman has been betrothed, but then was divorced before marriage or her husband died before the marriage was completed is in one sense a virgin and in one sense not.  She is a virgin in that she has never had sexual relations, but she is a widow or divorcee as well. [Note that in Hebrew the word for virgin “betulah” can mean either a woman whose physical signs of virginity are intact or it can mean a young woman who has never been married.  The same ambiguity occurs in the Greek word, “parthenon”.]  According to our mishnah, such a woman receives a full ketubah, should she remarry.
  A female proselyte, a woman captive, and a woman slave, who have been redeemed, converted, or freed [when they were] less than three years and one day old   their kethubah is two hundred [zuz] there is upon them a claim of non-virginity.  In order to understand this section we must understand a few things.  First of all, all of the women mentioned in this mishnah are assumed to have already had sex.  It was assumed that female captives were raped by their captors and therefore a woman who had been taken captive was assumed to no longer be a virgin.  It was also assumed that non-Jews were extremely licentious, and that they would have sex with young girls (I realize that this is extremely bigoted, but there probably was some degree of truth to it in the world in which the rabbis lived).  Therefore a woman who converted was assumed to have already had sex.  Thirdly, it was assumed that slaves were licentious or perhaps were commonly raped by their masters.  In any case, they too were categorically not considered virgins.  Seemingly all three of these types of women should have ketuboth of one maneh [=100 zuz] and their husbands should not be able to claim that they weren’t virgins, because they were married under the assumption that they were not virgins.  However, the other assumption that the mishnah makes is that if a girl is raped before the age of three, her signs of virginity will eventually heal and return [this medical assumption was not unique to the rabbis].  Therefore if these women made the transition from slave to free Jew or proselyte to Jew or from captive to being freed before the age of three, it was assumed that their virginity would return and they could be assumed to be virgins. A note about the Mishnah’s references to sexual intercourse with young girls: The Mishnah will occasionally reference sexual relations with young girls, even under the age of three.  I expect that this will cause discomfort to people reading the mishnah, and when I think of my own three year old daughter, this makes me queasy as well.  We would do well to realize that the Mishnah’s discussion of all legal possibilities does not imply their tacit approval of them.  The Mishnah discusses many crimes without expressing horror over them, because the Mishnah is often interested in legal consequences. The rabbis certainly did not condone sexual relations with girls this young.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses three types of women who don’t fit into the normal categories of virgin/non-virgin.  This is either because they have had sexual intercourse but didn’t lose their physical signs of virginity, or because they are not physically virgins, even though they never had intercourse.
  When an adult has had sexual intercourse with a young girl, or when a small boy has had intercourse with an adult woman, or a girl who was injured by a piece of wood     [in all these cases] their kethubah is two hundred [zuz], the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: a girl who was injured by a piece of wood   her kethubah is a maneh. There are three women mentioned in this mishnah.  The first is a young girl who had intercourse with an adult man.  As we mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah, the Sages believed that if a girl has sexual intercourse before three, her hymen will regenerate when she gets older.  Therefore, when this girl gets older she will have her physical signs of virginity, even though she has had sexual intercourse. The second woman is an adult woman who had sexual intercourse with a young boy.  According to the Sages a boy less than nine years old cannot have real intercourse, such that he causes a woman to lose her virginity.  Again, this woman has her physical signs of virginity, but she has had sexual intercourse. The third woman is called a “mukath etz”, literally translated as “hit by a stick”.  This refers to a woman who lost her hymen by something other than intercourse.  In our day we might say she went horseback riding.  This woman no longer has physical signs of virginity, but she has never had sexual intercourse. According to Rabbi Meir, all three of these women receive a full ketubah.  According to Rabbi Meir in order to be considered a non-virgin a woman must have lost her physical signs of virginity through sexual intercourse. The Sages rule that the “mukath etz” does not receive a full ketubah.  The Sages seem to define “virginity” by physicality alone:  one who does not have her physical signs of virginity is not a “halakhic” virgin and does not receive a ketubah of 200 zuz.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches the opposite cases of those taught in mishnah two.
  A virgin, who was a widow, a divorcee, or a halutzah from marriage  her kethubah is a maneh, and there is no claim of non-virginity upon her.  The women in this mishnah have been previously married, and not merely betrothed as were the women in mishnah two.  Nevertheless, they are still virgins for their husbands divorced them or died after entering the huppah (the wedding room) before having had sexual intercourse.  Note that this could certainly occur if the woman was menstruating at the time of marriage.  The mishnah rules that although these women are physically virgins, they are halakhically considered to be non-virgins and are treated as such. Their ketubah payment in a subsequent marriage will therefore be only a maneh and not the full 200 zuz.  If their husband in a subsequent marriage marries them and finds them not to be a virgin, he cannot make a virginity claim against them.  One reason that they are considered to be non-virgins is that by definition a woman who was once married can no longer be a virgin, for the word for virgin in Hebrew implies unmarried.  A second reason is that although the woman claims to be a virgin, since she was married, we cannot assume that she is telling the truth.
  A female proselyte, a woman captive and a woman slave, who have been redeemed, converted, or freed [when they were] more than three years and one day old   their kethubah is a maneh, and there is no claim of non-virginity upon her.  The women in this mishnah converted, were freed from slavery or were freed from captivity after the age of three years and one day.  Since it is assumed that in their previous state they had sexual intercourse they cannot claim to be virgins when they grow up and get married.  This is because if a girl has sexual intercourse past the age of three years her physical signs of virginity will not return (see the commentary on mishnah two).
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses two exceptions to general marriage practice, one a custom in Judah and the second the custom of the priests.
  He who eats with his father-in-law in Judea without the presence of witnesses cannot raise a claim of non-virginity against his wife because he has been alone with her.  The usual custom in Mishnaic times was to wait for up to a year between the betrothal and the wedding.  During this time the couple were not supposed to have sexual relations.  Generally speaking, the young woman remained in her parental home during this period and the husband-to-be was elsewhere.  However, our mishnah refers to a practice in Judea, whereby the groom would “eat” at his father-in-law’s house.  This may refer to an extended stay.  If he should do so without witnesses that he was apart from his fiancee, he cannot later claim that she was not a virgin at the time of the wedding.  Once he has been alone with her, we are suspicious that he has had relations with her, and therefore he loses the right to make a virginity claim against her.
  It is the same whether [the woman is] an Israelite widow or a priestly widow    her kethubah is a maneh. The court of the priests collected for a virgin four hundred zuz, and the sages did not protest.  A widow receives a ketubah of one maneh (100 zuz) whether she was from an Israelite family or from a priestly family.  However, the court of priests demanded that virgins from priestly families receive double the normal ketubah payment.  We should remember that in this time period priestly families still formed a quasi-elite.  Furthermore, occasionally the mishnah refers to “court of priests”.  The priests may have had their own legal system, one which derived from the autonomy they had during Temple times.  Priests tended to live in the same area and intermarriage between priestly families was common.  While the Sages did not protest against the custom of the double ketubah, one can sense that the fact that the mishnah mentions that they didn’t protest, signifies some discomfort with the practice.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah begins a series of debates between Rabban Gamaliel, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua over the credibility of certain legal claims that a woman might make.  Our mishnah deals with virginity claims, the main topic of the chapter.
  If a man marries a woman and does not find her to be a virgin: She says, “After you betrothed me I was raped, and so your field has been washed away” And he says, “No, rather [it occurred] before I betrothed you and my acquisition was a mistaken acquisition” Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say:  she is believed. Rabbi Joshua says: We do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having had intercourse before she was betrothed and having deceived him, until she brings proof for her statement. In the scenario in our mishnah, a man comes to court after the first night with his wife and claims that she was not a virgin.  She responds by admitting that she was not a virgin, but counter-claims that she had lost her virginity by being raped and that the rape had occurred after her betrothal.  Both of these claims are essential to her defense.  The fact that the intercourse took place after betrothal means that she did not deceive him by allowing him to betroth her under the false precept that she was a virgin.  The fact that she had sexual intercourse unwillingly is essential if she wishes not to be considered an adulteress.  If she had intercourse with someone other than her husband after the betrothal she would be an adulteress and as such she would not receive her ketubah.  If the court believes both of her claims, then she would receive her ketubah.  Note that the mishnah uses a metaphor for the woman:  she is a field whose top, fertile layer has been swept away, causing a loss to the man.  The comparison of women to fields or houses, as bothersome as it might be to our modern ears, is not uncommon in rabbinic literature. The husband counterclaims that she had relations before betrothal, and that he acquired her under the mistaken assumption that she was a virgin.  It is unclear whether or not he wishes to pay her a ketubah of 100 or he wishes to be totally exempt from paying her a ketubah.  What is clear is that the dispute in this mishnah is financial:  she wishes to receive her full ketubah and he wishes to lessen his payment. Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer rule that the woman is believed and that she receives a ketubah of 200 zuz.  The talmud explains that since the woman is “certain” in her claim, whereas the man does not really know when she lost her virginity, she is believed. Rabbi Joshua says she is not believed until she can bring proof to back up her words.  The talmud explains that Rabbi Joshua reasons that since this is a monetary case, and we generally hold that in monetary cases the burden of proof is on the party which wishes to extract money from the other party, in this case the burden of proof is upon her.  In order to extract her ketubah money from him she must prove that she was a virgin at the time of betrothal.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains another debate between a man and woman over the circumstances in which she lost her physical signs of virginity.
  She says, “I was struck by a piece of wood”, And he says, “No, you, rather you have been trampled by a man” Rabban gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed, And Rabbi Joshua says: We do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having been trampled by a man, until she brings proof for her statement. In this case, when the husband comes to court claiming that his wife was not a virgin, the woman responds that she did not lose her physical signs of virginity through sexual intercourse but rather by “being struck by a piece of wood”, meaning she lost her hymen in some other way.  According to Rabbi Meir (see mishnah three) if the court believes her, she would receive a full ketubah of 200.  According to the Sages she receives a ketubah of 100.  In any case, she is claiming that she does receive some ketubah. The man responds that she lost her virginity by having engaged in sexual intercourse.  The phrase “trampled by a man” is an illustrative means of saying that she had sex with a man and not that she lost her virginity from a “stick”.  Assumedly his goal is to not pay her any ketubah. Again Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer rule in her favor.  The same reason which I offered in yesterday’s mishnah applies here:  since she is certain and he is uncertain, she is believed. Similarly, Rabbi Joshua holds that she is not believed, and that the money remains with the husband.  Again, the same reason as in yesterday’s mishnah applies:  in order for her to extract money she must provide proof.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a woman who is suspected of having had relations with a man prohibited from marrying an Israelite and she claims that while she did have relations with her, he was not the type of man prohibited from marrying an Israelite.  Again there is debate over whether or not she is believed.
  They saw her talking with someone in the marketplace, and they said to her, “What sort of a man is he?”   [And she answered, “He is] the so-and-so and he is a priest” Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed, And Rabbi Joshua says: we do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having had relations with a natin or a mamzer, until she brings proof for her statement. In the Talmud there is debate over what the woman was seen doing.  According to some, she was seen having intercourse with an unknown man, and that “talking” is a euphemism for sex.  Others say that she was merely talking with him, but there was suspicion that they had had sex.  It is important to remember that the situation is that she is a single woman and there is no issue of adultery.  However, if she had had relations with a man who was forbidden from marrying an Israelite, such as a mamzer or a natin, she would subsequently be prohibited from marrying a priest.  When asked who this man was she provides his name and says that he is a priest.  Note that it is not essential that he is a priest; it is sufficient that he is a man who is not prohibited from marrying an Israelite. Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer again rule that the woman is believed and may subsequently marry a priest.  Since she has a presumption of being fit to marry a priest, it requires solid evidence to remove her from this presumption. Rabbi Joshua holds that since she was secluded with him, she loses her presumption of being fit to marry a priest.  She must bring proof that this person was not prohibited from marrying an Israelite and until then she may not marry a priest.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah a single woman is discovered pregnant, and it is unknown to others who the father is.  If the father was from those prohibited from marrying Israelites, then the child will follow his status.  Furthermore, the woman will also be prohibited from subsequently marrying a priest (as in yesterday’s mishnah).  Again, the rabbis debate whether or not the woman is believed.
  She was pregnant and they said to her, “What is the nature of this fetus?’ [And she answered, “It is] from so-and-so and he is a priest.” Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed, And Rabbi Joshua says: we do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having had relations with a natin or a mamzer, until she brings proof for her statement. This mishnah is nearly identical to yesterday’s mishnah, the only difference being that this woman is pregnant.  The reason why the mishnah reiterates the positions outlined in the previous mishnah is to teach that Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer believe the woman even if she is pregnant.  In yesterday’s mishnah, it was unclear whether or not she had even had sex with the man in question.  When asked who he was, she could have said that she never had relations with him.  Therefore, when she admitted that she did but said that she was a priest (i.e. one who is allowed to marry an Israelite), she is believed.  However, in today’s mishnah it is certain that she had relations with someone and she could not make a better claim than to say that the man was fit to marry an Israelite.  [This type of reasoning is common in the mishnah, and it is called “migo”, which means that when a person could have made a better claim, he is believed when he makes a worse claim].  Nevertheless, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer hold that she is believed. A further innovation is that not only is the woman believed, and she is subsequently allowed to marry a priest, but her child is assumed to be fit to marry an Israelite.  In other words, even though we don’t know for sure that the child is not a mamzer or a natin, the law treats him/her as if he was not. Rabbi Joshua again states that the woman is not believed. Furthermore, her child is assumed to be the child of a natin or a mamzer and may not marry an Israelite until s/he proves otherwise.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  The previous two mishnayoth discussed the ability of a woman to marry into the priesthood.  The final mishnah of chapter one continues to discuss this subject.
  Rabbi Yose said: it happened that a young girl went down to draw water from a spring and she was raped. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: if most of the inhabitants of the town marry [their daughters] into the priesthood, this [girl] may [also] marry into the priesthood. The question in this mishnah is can this girl marry into the priesthood.  If the man who raped her was forbidden to marry an Israelite, then she is forbidden to marry a priest. This is true even though she did not willingly engage in intercourse with the man.  Although this sounds like the woman is being punished for having been raped, we would do well to keep in mind that priests were extremely cautious about the “purity” of their lineage.  The laws of who can and cannot marry a priest have nothing to do with morality, at least not as we understand it.  Rather they have to do with the prohibition of defiling the priestly line. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri rules that if most of the inhabitants of the town are men who are allowed to marry into the priesthood, meaning that their wives and daughters are allowed to marry priests, then this girl is allowed to marry a priest.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a dispute between a husband and wife over whether the woman was a virgin or a widow when he married her.  Evidently, the written ketubah from their marriage is not available as evidence (perhaps it was never written).  Therefore this is again a question of whether or not the woman is believed.
  We can further learn from this mishnah that the woman may collect her ketubah payment even if she does not have the document.  This is because the ketubah payment is a court-imposed obligation upon every husband.  The loss of the ketubah document does not mean that the woman will not be able to collect her ketubah payment.
  A woman became a widow or was divorced. She says, “I was a virgin when you married me” and he says, “Not so, rather you were a widow when I married you”, If there are witnesses that she went out with a hinuma, and with her head uncovered, her ketubah is two hundred [zuz.] Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: the distribution of roasted ears of corn is also evidence. In this the husband and wife come before the court at the time of their divorce.  The woman claims that she was a virgin when her husband married her, while he claims that she was a widow.  The mishnah rules that we check the evidence, and if there is evidence that her wedding was a virgin’s wedding, then she receives her full ketubah. In the absence of hard evidence, she can only receive a ketubah of 100 zuz. There are three pieces of evidence described in our mishnah.  The first is the “hinuma”.  It is uncertain what this word exactly means, and several explanations have been offered.  Albeck explains the word as being a “hymn” sung at virgin’s weddings.  Based on the Talmud’s explanation, Kehati explains a “hinuma” to be a special veil worn only by virgins. The second piece of evidence is that her hair hung down to her shoulders.  This is the manner in which women wore their hair during the procession that led them away from their father’s house. The third sign, mentioned by Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka is parched corn, which were distributed at virgin’s weddings. We should explain why in this mishnah the woman is not believed and therefore needs to bring evidence that she was a virgin, whereas in the mishnayoth at the end of the last chapter, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer believed the woman without any corroborating evidence.  The answer is that in this case both the man and woman can claim to be certain of the facts.  He is just as certain that he married a widow as she is certain that she was a virgin.  Therefore neither is believed more than the other.  Since the woman wishes to extract money from the man, the burden of proof is upon her, as is the rule in all monetary claims.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  At the end of the last chapter there was a series of debates in which Rabbi Joshua consistently did not believe the woman and Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer did.  Our mishnah contains a case where Rabbi Joshua does believe the claim made (this time by a man).  The reason why he believes the man in this case is that he invokes a principle called, “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”.  This halakhic principle means that if a person says something which makes something forbidden to him he is also believed when he says something to make that very same thing permitted to him.  The next few mishnayoth will illustrate this principle and limit its applicability.
  In this case Reuven approaches Shimon and tells him that the field that is currently in Reuven’s possession was purchased from Shimon’s father.  Shimon did not approach Reuven first claiming the field, nor is there any other evidence that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father.  Indeed, without Reuven having told Shimon that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father, we would have thought that the field was always Reuven’s.  In this case Reuven is the “mouth that forbade” when he said that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father.  He made a statement that was detrimental to himself.  Since he is the “mouth that forbade”, he is believed to be the “mouth that permits” and state that he purchased the field from Shimon’s father.  Reuven is believed even if he produces no evidence that he bought the field.  Had Reuven kept his mouth shut, Shimon would never have known that the field once belonged to his father.  Therefore, Reuven is believed when he says that it used to belong to Shimon’s father but he bought it from him.
  But if there are witnesses that it belonged to his father and he says, “I bought it from him”, he is not believed.  In contrast, if witnesses come and state that the field was once Shimon’s father’s field, then Reuven is not “the mouth that forbade”.  He is only the “mouth that permits”, and he is therefore not believed.  After all, had he kept his mouth shut, the field would have been taken over by Shimon.  In order to retain possession of the field he will need to bring proof that he bought it.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah contains another case illustrating the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”.
  If witnesses said, “This is our handwriting, but we were forced, [or] we were minors, [or] we were disqualified witnesses” they are believed.  In this scenario, a person comes to court with a document signed by witnesses.  When his opponent claims that the document is a forgery, the witnesses are summoned to the court to testify to their signatures.  The witnesses state that the signatures are indeed their signatures, but that nevertheless the document should not be upheld.  This is for one of three reasons:  they were forced to sign, they were minors when they signed, or they were disqualified witnesses (see Sanhedrin 3:4).  In this case they are believed, and the document is invalid. This is because of the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”.  Without the witnesses admission that they signed the document, the document would have been invalid.  When they admit that they signed, they are in fact “the mouth that forbade”.  When they say they were forced, or that they were minors or otherwise disqualified, they are the mouth that permits, and they are believed.  To state this another way, if they had wanted to lie they could have said that this was not their handwriting.
  But if there are witnesses that it is their handwriting, or their handwriting comes out from another place, they are not believed.  If their signature can be validated in another way, for instance by other witnesses testifying that they recognize the signatures, or by another document that contains their signatures, then the witnesses are not believed when they say that they were forced, or they were minors or otherwise disqualified.  This is not a situation where “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”.  Since they are not believed to say that they were invalid, their signatures are validated and the document is upheld.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The previous mishnah discussed witnesses testifying about their signatures.  This mishnah continues to discuss the subject.
  [If] one witness says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, and the other [witness] says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, they are believed. [If] one says, “This is my handwriting” and the other says, “This is my handwriting” they must join to themselves another [person], the words of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi]. But the Sages say: they need not join to themselves another [person], rather a person is believed to say, “this is my handwriting. [If] one witness says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, and the other [witness] says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, they are believed. [If] one says, “This is my handwriting” and the other says, “This is my handwriting” they must join to themselves another [person], the words of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi]. But the Sages say: they need not join to themselves another [person], rather a person is believed to say, “this is my handwriting.  Generally, two witnesses are required to create valid testimony in Jewish law.  In order to validate a signature two witnesses are needed about each signature on the document.  If each witness affirms his own signature and the other person’s signature, then both signatures on the document have been affirmed by two people, and the document has been validated. However, if each person cannot affirm the other signature on the document, they must find another person to affirm the signature.  Note that one person can affirm both signatures, so long as he recognizes them.  All of this is Rabbi Judah Hanasi’s opinion.  He holds that the witnesses are actually testifying about their signatures and therefore we need two witnesses on each signature. The Sages hold that a person is believed when he affirms his signature.  Therefore, neither needs to bring someone else to join his affirmation.  The Sages reason that the witnesses are actually testifying as to the contents of the document.  Hence the two are in and of themselves sufficient.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss cases that illustrate the principle “the mouth that forbade was the mouth that permitted”.
  If a woman says, “I was married and I am divorced”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was married, and she says, “I am divorced”, she is not believed.  If the woman herself provides the information that she was married, but then says she is now single because she was divorced, she is believed, because the same mouth that permitted, forbade.  However, if other witnesses testify that she was married, she is not believed when she says she is divorced.  In order to remarry, she will need to bring proof, either with a document or witnesses.
  If she says, “I was taken captive but I have remained clean”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive and she says, “I have remained clean” she is not believed. But if the witnesses came after she had married, she shall not go out.  If a woman is taken captive by a non-Jew, she is assumed to have been raped and is subsequently forbidden to marry a priest.  This is because she has had forbidden sexual relations, and priests cannot marry anyone who has had relations with some forbidden to them, even if the relations were against her will.  If the woman says that she was taken captive, and that information is not otherwise known, she is now “the mouth that forbade”.  Hence, when she says that she remained clean, i.e. she was not raped, she is believed and she can marry a priest.  However, if other witnesses testify that she was taken captive, she is no longer the “mouth that forbade”.  Therefore, she is not believed to permit herself to a priest. If before the witnesses come and state that she was taken captive, she marries a priest, he is not obligated to divorce her.  This is because it is not certain that she was raped.  The Talmud says that even if she received permission to remarry before the witnesses came, she may marry a priest.  According to the Talmud, what is essential is that at the point when she was “the mouth that permitted” there was not an earlier “mouth that forbade”.  Therefore, as long as she makes her statement before the witnesses come, she will be allowed to marry a priest.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss the believability of women who were taken captive and claim that they were not raped.
  Two women were taken captive: one says, “I was taken captive and I am pure”, and the other one says, “I was taken captive and I am pure”-- they are not believed.  This mishnah discusses a case in which it is certain that the women were taken captive and hence they are not automatically believed according to the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”.  The mishnah teaches that the woman herself is not believed to state that she was not raped, and therefore in this case she will not be able to marry a kohen.
  But when they testify regarding one another, they are believed.  However, if each woman testifies that the other woman was not raped, each is believed.  This is true even though generally one witness is not sufficient and generally women cannot testify.  The rabbis relaxed some of the laws of testimony in this case because there is no certainty that the woman was raped, it is only a likelihood.  Furthermore, these women are believed even though there is a fear that each might be covering up the other’s having been raped.  The rabbis were lenient in the case of captives and accepted certain types of testimony that would not have been accepted in other types of cases.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah illustrates the same principle employed in yesterday’s mishnah, but uses the example of men who claim to be priests.
  And likewise two men, [if] one says, “I am a priest”, and the other says, “I am a priest”, they are not believed.  When each man claims to be a priest, neither is believed and neither will receive terumah.  Just as in  yesterday’s mishnah, where a woman could not testify with regard to her own personal status, so too in today’s mishnah a man cannot testify with regard to his own status.
  But when they testify about one another, they are believed.  However, if both men corroborate the other’s testimony they are believed.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah three tannaim debate whether the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to confirm that an unknown person is a priest.
  Rabbi Judah says: one does not raise [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness.  Rabbi Judah disagrees with yesterday’s mishnah in which we learned that one person is believed to testify that another person is a priest.
  Rabbi Elazar says: When is this true?  When there are people who object; but when there are no people who object, one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness.  Rabbi Elazar limits Rabbi Judah’s statement to a case in which other people protest that so-and-so is not a kohen.  In that type of situation two witnesses are necessary to raise someone to the priesthood. However, in the absence of others’ protesting, one witness is believed to say that someone else is a kohen.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the assistant chief of priests:  one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness.  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel agree with the opinion in the previous mishnah according to which a person is always believed to say that a person is a priest. We should note that determining whether a person was a priest must have been an issue of importance and difficulty after the destruction of the Temple.  When the Temple stood, everyone pretty much knew who the priests were, because they were descendents of those who served regularly in the Temple.  Furthermore, when the Temple was destroyed, the records kept in the Temple were probably lost.  Hence testimony about a person’s being a priest became scarcer and hence more essential.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  As we have mentioned before, if a married woman was raped she may return to her husband but only if he is an Israelite.  If he is a priest, she is forbidden from returning to her husband.  If she willingly had sexual relations with another man, the she is forbidden to her husband, even if he is only an Israelite.
  A woman was imprisoned by non-Jews: if for the sake of money, she is permitted to her husband, and if in order to take her life, she is forbidden to her husband.Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-katzav said: “By this temple! Her hand did not move out of my hand from the time that the non-Jews entered Jerusalem until they departed.”  When a woman is imprisoned by non-Jewish authorities, there may be a fear that she had relations with one of them.  According to our mishnah, if she was taken in order to collect money, the captors assumedly did not have relations with her, because they would fear that if they rape her they will not get the money they want.  In this case, she is not prohibited to her husband, even if he is a priest. However, if they took her and intended to execute her, and then she somehow escapes or is let free, she is prohibited to her husband, even if he is an Israelite.  The concern is that in order to endear herself to her captors, she willingly had sexual relations with them. Others explain this clause to refer only to the wife of a priest. If she was taken for monetary gain, they did not rape her and she may return to her priestly husband.  However, if she was seized for execution, the captors would not hesitate to rape her and she is forbidden to her husband the priest.  According to this explanation, there is no concern that she willingly had relations with her captor(s) and therefore, if her husband was an Israelite she is in all cases permitted to him.
  A town that has been conquered by siege-troops: all the priests’ wives who are in it are prohibited [from their husbands]. If they have witnesses, even a slave, even a female slave, they are believed. However, no one is believed as to himself.They said to him: “No one may testify concerning himself.”  If a city has been captured by foreign soldiers, there is concern that the women of the city were raped.  Therefore, all of the women married to priests are forbidden to their husbands.  However, if a woman has a witness who can testify that she was not raped, even if that witness is a slave or a female slave, the witness is believed and the woman is not prohibited to her husband.  What is not allowed, is for a woman to testify about herself or for a husband to testify about his own wife.  This is illustrated by the story of Rabbi Zechariah ben Hakatzav, who swore an oath by the Temple that his wife was with him the entire time that the city was occupied by the foreign troops.  The other Sages responded to him that a person cannot testify about himself, and since this testimony effects him personally, he is not believed. The Talmud notes that if in the city there was a hiding place, all of the women are permitted to their priestly husbands, even if the hiding place could only fit one person.  This is because each woman could claim that she was in the hiding place.  Therefore, even if she says is “I wasn’t raped” she is believed because she could have said, “I hid”.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  The entire first two chapters of Ketuboth have dealt with the issue of believability in the absence of evidence or two witnesses.  Our mishnah discusses in which situations a person is believed to testify about things he saw when he was a minor.  That is to say, although minors are not allowed to testify, there are certain things that a minor can see about which he may testify upon reaching adulthood.
  The following are believed to testifying when they are grown-up about what they saw when they were minors:A person is believed to say “This is the handwriting of my father”, “This is the handwriting of my teacher”, “This is the handwriting of my brother”;  A person is believed to say that the signature on a document is similar to the handwriting of a person with whom they were close in childhood.  The assumption is that a person would remember this well.  Furthermore, this is not really “testifying” but just verifying someone else’s testimony, and therefore there is more room to be lenient in accepting such testimony.
  “I remember that that woman went out with a hinuma and an uncovered head”;  A person is believed to say that he was at a wedding and the bride wore the signs of a virgin (see mishnah one of this chapter).  The Talmud explains that he is believed because most marriages are first marriages.
  “That that man used to go out from school to immerse in order to eat terumah”;  A priest must immerse before he eats terumah.  The time of immersion is right before evening.  A person is believed to say that he saw one of his classmates leave school early to immerse in the mikveh, and that hence he is a priest.
  “That he used to take a share with us at the threshing floor”;  The priests collect their terumah at the threshing floor.  By this person testifying that so-and-so collected terumah, he is saying that he is a priest.  Note that again the mishnah is concerned with verifying the status of priests.
  “That this place was a bet ha-peras”;  A bet ha-peras is a field adjacent to a field that used to serve as a cemetery but has been plowed over.   The adjacent field may have small pieces of bones there, and therefore a priest may not enter.  A person is believed to identify such a field, even if he only saw it in his childhood.
  “That up to here we used to go on Shabbat”;  On Shabbat a person may leave his town only 2000 amot.  This is called the “tehum shabbat” or shabbat limit.  A person is believed when he reaches majority age to say that when they were children they would go this far out of the city.  The reason he is believed is that this is a matter that can be verified.
  But a man is not believed when he says: “So-and-so had a path in this place”; “That man had a place of standing up and eulogy in this place”.  The mishnah lists two things a person cannot testify that he saw as a minor.  First of all he may not testify that a certain person owned a path through someone else’s field.  Second of all, he may not testify that a person owned a place where they used to stand and give eulogies.  Such places were owned on the paths that lead from the cemeteries to the cities.  It would have been like a small, private funeral home. In both of these cases, the testimony involves the ownership of land.  For a person to prove that he owns a piece of land, he will need to bring firmer testimony than this.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Deuteronomy 22:28-29 states, “If a man comes upon a young girl, a virgin who is not engaged and he seizes her and lies with her, and they are discovered, the man who lay with her shall pay the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver and she shall be his wife.  Because he has violated her, he can never have the right to divorce her.”
  The rabbis learn from these verses that if a man rapes a virgin he must pay her father a fine of 50 shekels, which is the equivalent of 200 dinars.  Furthermore, he must marry her.  Through a careful reading of the wording of these laws the rabbis concluded that this rule applies only to a virgin (betulah) who is also young (na’arah), which means any girl who has reached the age of 12 and has shown signs of pubery.  A girl remains in this status for only six months.  After that she is considered to have reached adulthood and one who rapes her does not pay the fine.
  Before we proceed, we should remember that the fine was only one payment made by the rapist to his victim.  He also had to pay all of the damages that one pays for injuring another person.  We should also remember that society’s attitude towards rape has changed drastically in the last century.  Rape is a horrible crime and while we are discussing the technical aspects of who receives a fine and who doesn’t, we shouldn’t forget what we are talking about.
  Our mishnah teaches that a man must pay the fine to a woman even if he is not allowed to marry her.
  These are girls to whom the fine is due:If one had intercourse with a mamzeret, a netinah, a Samaritan;  The women in this section are forbidden in marriage to an Israelite.  Our mishnah teaches that although they are forbidden in marriage, he still must pay them the fine.  A mamzeret was defined in Yevamot 4:9.  A netinah is a descendent of Temple slaves.  The Samaritans were considered a splinter group by the rabbis and Jews were forbidden from marrying them.
  Or with a convert, a captive, or a slave-woman, who was redeemed, converted, or freed [when she was] under the age of  three years and one day.  It is assumed that a non-Jewish woman is not a virgin.  Captives are assumed to have been raped and slave-women are also assumed to be non-virgins.  Furthermore, as we have learned before, the rabbis thought that if a woman lost her virginity before the age of three years and one day, her physical signs would later return.  Therefore if these women made the passage into being full, free Jews or were redeemed from captivity before the age of three, they are assumed to have returned to being virgins.  Therefore, they receive the fine.
  If one had intercourse with his sister, with the sister of his father, with the sister of his mother, with the sister of his wife, with the wife of his brother, with the wife of the brother of his father, or with a woman during menstruation, he has to pay the fine,   [for] although these are punishable through kareth, there is not, with regard to them, a death [penalty inflicted] by the court.  The women listed in this section are forbidden to a man, and having relationship with them is punishable by kareth (a punishment inflicted by God and not by the court).  Since the court does not execute the man for having had intercourse with these women, he is liable to pay the fine. Note that in order for him to be liable to pay the fine, these women cannot be married nor have been married.  The only situation that he will be liable to pay the fine for having intercourse with one of these women is if they were betrothed to one of these men and then divorced or widowed before proper marriage.  Had they been married when he raped them, he would be liable for the death penalty for having committed adultery.  Had they been fully married and then divorced or widowed, they would not be considered virgins, and hence he would not be liable to pay the fine.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches those cases opposite of those mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah.
  And in the following cases there is no fine:If a man had intercourse with a female convert, a female captive or a slave-woman, who was redeemed, converted or freed after the age of three years and a day. Rabbi Judah says:  a female captive who was redeemed is considered to be in her state of holiness (a even if she is of majority age.  In these cases the women are assumed to be non-virgins, and hence do not receive the fine. Rabbi Judah rules that any captive who is redeemed is assumed not to have been raped and is therefore a virgin.
  A man who had intercourse with his daughter, his daughter's daughter, his son's daughter, his wife's daughter, her son's daughter or her daughter's daughter does not pay the fine, because he forfeits his life, for his death is in the hands of the court, and he who forfeits his life pays no monetary fine for it is said, “And yet no other damage ensues he shall be fined” (Exodus 21:2.  Having intercourse with these women is a capital crime.  Since the man is liable for the death penalty, he does not pay the fine, for there is a principle that one cannot be executed and pay a fine.  This is learned exegetically from the words in Exodus 21:22.  The case under discussion is when a man strikes a woman causing her to miscarry.  The Torah states that if there is no other “damage”, then he must pay the fine.  The interpretation is that if the woman herself doesn’t die, then the striker pays a fine for having caused her to miscarry.  Had she died, the striker would have been a murderer and would not have paid the fine.  Note that this is true even if the damages were caused accidentally.  Although one cannot be executed for an accidental murder, the rule of the Mishnah is that anytime a person commits a crime which is punishable by death had it been committed with intention, he is exempt from the fine.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  In the chapter that describes rape in Deuteronomy the Torah refers to a “young girl, a virgin who has not been betrothed”.  As we stated above, the rabbis understand that this verse means that the laws of paying the fine are limited to a “young girl” that is a girl between the ages of 12 and 12 ½ and a virgin.  Our mishnah discusses the meaning of the phrase “who has not been betrothed”.
  A girl who was betrothed and then divorced Rabbi Yose the Galilean says:  she does not receive a fine. Rabbi Akiva says: she receives the fine and the fine belongs to her. In the case in this mishnah, a girl was betrothed and then either widowed or divorced, and then she was raped.  The question is does she receive a fine?.  Note that if she was betrothed but not divorced or widowed and someone raped her, he would be liable for the death penalty for having committed adultery (she would of course not be liable since she did not willingly commit any crime).  In this case, since he is liable for the death penalty, he does not pay a fine. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean since the Torah states, “who has not been betrothed” the rapist in this case does not pay the fine. Rabbi Akiva reads the phrase “who has not been betrothed” to be a stipulation for when the father receives the fine.  If she has never been betrothed, then her father receives a fine.  If she has been betrothed, but she is still a virgin, for instance she was divorced or widowed before full marriage, the rapist is liable to pay a fine and he pays it directly to her.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The Torah discusses the “seducer” in Exodus 22:15-16:  “If a man seduces a virgin who has not been betrothed and lies with her, he must make her his wife by payment of a bride-price.  If her father refuses to give her to him, he must still weigh out silver in accordance with the bride-price for virgins.”  The rabbis learned that the bride-price referred to in these verses is the same as the 50 shekels referred to in the verses which discuss the rapist in Deuteronomy 22.  Therefore, both a seducer and a rapist must pay a fine of 50 shekels to the father, equivalent to the bride-price which the father would have received had he married her off in a typical fashion.  Our mishnah discusses the other types of payments that the rapist and the seducer must pay and other differences between the two.
  The seducer pays three forms [of compensation] and the rapist four. The seducer pays compensation for embarrassment and blemish and the fine; The rapist pays an additional [form of compensation] in that he pays for the pain.  The seducer pays three types of payment:  1)  for having shamed her; 2) for having caused her to be “blemished”; 3)  the fine.  The first two of these types of payments will be described in greater detail in mishnah seven.  The rapist must make an additional payment for the pain he has caused her.  Since the women willingly had relations with the seducer, he does not pay for the pain.
  What [is the difference] between [the penalties of] a seducer and those of a rapist? The rapist pays compensation for the pain but the seducer does not pay compensation for the pain. The rapist pays immediately but the seducer [pays only] if he dismisses her. The rapist must “drink out of his pot” but the seducer may dismiss [the girl] if he wishes.  The mishnah now relates three differences in the penalties of a seducer and those of a rapist.  The first was already mentioned above. The second is that a rapist must pay immediately, whereas the seducer pays only if he decides not to marry her.  This difference is derived from the fact that with regard to the seducer the verse states, “If her father refuses to give her to him, he must weigh out silver” (Ex. 22:16).  By inference we can conclude that if the father does not refuse, then the seducer does not pay.  In contrast, Deuteronomy 22:28 states, “The man who lay with her must pay the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver.”  In this case the ruling is stated unconditionally.  Hence he must pay whether or not the father allows the couple to remain married. The final difference is that a rapist is not allowed to initiate divorce against the woman.  This is derived from the Deut. 22:28, “Because he has violated her, he can never have the right to divorce her.”  In contrast, the seducer is allowed to divorce his wife. [I realize that the idea that the victim of a rape would somehow be rewarded by the rapist having to marry her and never being allowed to divorce her, sounds cruel to our modern sensibilities.  However, if we understand that we are talking about a society where a woman may have been “ruined” and hence unable to get married after having been raped, we will realize that the intent of the law is to protect the woman.  By forcing him to marry her, the Torah affords her the economic protection of a husband, economic protection that may have been quite necessary in ancient society.]
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The final clause of the previous mishnah stated, “The rapist must “drink out of his pot”, meaning that the rapist must marry the woman whom he raped.  Our mishnah elaborates this law.  As an aside, we should note that even though he must marry her, the woman is of course given the right of refusal, as is the father.
  What is meant by “he must drink out of his pot”?Even if she is lame, even if she is blind and even if she is afflicted with boils [he may not dismiss her].  The rapist must marry the woman whom he has raped, even if she has some physical handicap that makes him not want to marry her.  He lost his right to decide whether or not he wanted to marry her when he raped her.
  If she was found to have committed a licentious act or was unfit to marry an Israelite he may not continue to live with her, for it is said, “And she shall be for him a wife”(Deut. 22:29) a wife that is fit for him.  However, he may not marry a woman who is halakhically forbidden to him.  After all, if this were not so, a man could rape a woman and thereby allow himself to marry a woman who would have otherwise been forbidden to him.  The mishnah lists two types of such women.  The first is a woman who “has committed a licentious act”.  This refers to a woman who committed adultery after he had married her.  As is always the case, a husband may not continue to live with his wife if she had committed adultery.  If in this case, the rapist married the woman and then she committed adultery, he may not remained married to her. The second example is a woman who is not allowed to marry an Israelite, such as a mamzeret or a natinah.  If he raped such a woman, he may not marry her, and if he did marry her, he must divorce her.  Similarly, if he was a kohen and he raped a divorcee, he is not allowed to marry her.  This halakhah is derived from a midrashic reading of the words “And she shall be for him a wife”, which are read by the rabbis to mean that the woman must be halakhically “fit” to be his wife.  If she is not, he is allowed to divorce her.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that if the girl herself receives the fine, then she only receives it if she is raped.  If she consents to having relations with the man, he does not pay the fine.
  An orphan who was betrothed and then divorced Rabbi Elazar says that one who seduces her is exempt but one who rapes her is liable [to pay the fine]. In the case in this mishnah the fine surely would go to the girl, for her father is no longer alive.  In fact, the Talmud explains that the despite the fact that the mishnah refers to an orphan, this mishnah actually refers to any girl who was betrothed and then divorced or widowed, and that the mishnah is according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the previous mishnah.  A girl who was betrothed and then divorced is called “an orphan while her father is still alive” because once she is betrothed, she is out of her father’s domain.  In this case, if she was seduced then the man does not pay the fine because she consented.  If raped he must pay the fine, as Rabbi Akiva stated in yesterday’s mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with three types of payment that the seducer must pay:  embarrassment, blemish and the fine.  These were listed above in mishnah four.
  How is [the compensation that is paid for] embarrassment [reckoned]? It all depends on the status of the offender and the offended.  Embarrassment is relative to the social standing of the woman and the man.  The higher the social standing of the woman, the higher this payment will be, and the lower the social standing of the man, the higher the payment will be.  Others explain that a man of higher social standing will pay a greater payment because he embarrasses the woman more.
  How is [the compensation that is paid for] blemish [reckoned]? She is regarded as if she were a slave to be sold in the market place [and it is estimated] how much she was worth then and how much she is worth now.  The blemish of a woman raped is calculated the same way that blemishes caused by other types of injury are calculated.  An estimate is made how much she would have been worth as a slave sold on the market before she had relations (either by seduction or rape) and how much she was worth afterwards.  This is the same way that an estimate would be made for a payment for blemish if, for instance, someone cut off someone else’s hand.  What is somewhat puzzling is why a virgin slave would be worth more than a non-virgin slave.  The Talmud supposes that a master may want to purchase a female virgin slave on behalf of his trustworthy male slave, one whom he might want to “reward”.
  The fine is the same for all. And any sum that is fixed in the Torah remains the same for all.  Any fine that is given a fixed sum in the Torah, is fixed and can never be raised or lowered.  Such is the case with the bride-price.  Therefore, a seducer will pay a fine of 50 shekels whether he has relations with a poor girl or with the daughter of a king.  Other examples of fixed sums in the Torah are an ox that kills a slave (Exodus 21:32) and a husband who makes a false virginity claim against his wife (Deut. 22:19).
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  According to Exodus 21:7 a father has the right to sell his daughter into slavery.  In interpreting this verse, the rabbis limited this right to when she is a minor, meaning before she both achieves puberty and reaches the age of 12 years [that is to say, one who has reached puberty but is not yet 12 or is 12 but has not reached puberty is still considered a minor].  After this age she is considered a “young woman” (na’arah) and her father may no longer sell her.  It is at this age that if she is raped or seduced her father receives a fine.  The period in which a woman is considered a “na’arah” can be no longer than six months.  After this period, she has reached what was considered to be majority age, and there is no fine incurred by one who rapes or seduces her.
  Wherever there is the right of sale there is a fine and wherever there is a fine there is no right of sale. In the case of a minor there is the right of sale and there is no fine; In the case of a young woman there is a fine but no right of sale. In the case of a girl who has reached majority age there is no right of sale and there is no fine. When a girl is of an age where her father may sell her, according to our mishnah one who rapes or seduces her does not incur a fine.  This is learned exegetically from the fact that Deut 22:28 which discusses the fine for rape uses the word “na’arah”.  The mishnah concludes that only one who rapes or seduces a “na’arah” incurs the fine and not one who does so to a minor. We should note that according to the Talmud this mishnah is only Rabbi Akiva’s opinion.  The other sages held that one who rapes or seduces a minor is also liable to pay the fine. When the girl reaches the age of being a “na’arah”, her father can no longer sell her, because Exodus 21:7 refers only to minors.  However, at this age one who does rape or seduce incurs a fine. Finally, six months after becoming a “na’arah” a girl becomes a “bogeret”, one who has reached majority age.  At this point her father loses most of his rights vis a vis her.  He can no longer marry her off or sell her.  She is legally independent.  One who rapes or seduces her does not incur a fine.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The concept taught in this mishnah is that one who admits of his own accord that he has committed a crime, without before having evidence brought against him, is exempt from paying the fine.  He must, however, pay any penalties that are compensatory and not considered fines.
  He who declares, “I seduced the daughter of so-and-so” must pay compensation for embarrassment and blemish on his own admission but need not pay the fine.  If a person admits that he seduced someone’s daughter he does not pay the fine.  He does, however, make the other payments.
  He who declares, “I have stolen” must make restitution for the principal on his own evidence but need not repay double,  fourfold  or fivefold.  A thief is liable to pay back double the amount which he stole.  If he slaughtered or sold the animal he must pay back four or five times its value.  The double, fourfold and fivefold payments are fines, whereas the restitution for the principal is not a fine.  Therefore, if a man admits to having stolen something, he only pays the principal.
  [He who declares,] “My ox has killed so-and-so” or “the ox of so-and-so” must make restitution on his own evidence. [If he said] “My ox has killed the slave of so-and-so” he need not make restitution on his own evidence.  If a person’s ox kills someone or someone else’s ox, the ox owner must make financial restitution (see Exodus 21:30).  This is not considered a fine and therefore if a person admits that his ox killed another ox or a human being, he must make restitution.  However, if an ox kills a slave there is an automatic penalty of 30 shekels (see Exodus 21:32).  Since this is a fixed sum, a person who admits that his ox did so is not liable to pay the fine.
  This is the general rule: whoever pays more than the actual cost of the damage he has done need not pay it on his own evidence.  The mishnah now sums up what we learned above.  If a person is liable to pay a fine that is more than the actual damage, or actually a sum that is set arbitrarily and is independent of the damage, he doesn’t pay upon his own admission.  The reasoning behind this may be that fines are in order to prevent the person from committing another crime.  Therefore, if he comes forward and admits to what he has done (and it was not otherwise known) the need for a penalty does not exist.  On the other hand compensation is needed for the loss incurred by the victim and therefore compensatory penalties are paid in any case.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah deals with the issue of who receives the payments if a girl is raped or seduced.
  If a young girl was seduced [the compensation for] her embarrassment and blemish and the fine belong to her father; [and the compensation for] pain in the case of one who was raped.  This section teaches that all of the payments that are incurred by one who rapes or seduces a young girl are given to the father.
  If the girl’s case was tried before her father died [all the forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If her father died before her case was tried they are hers.  The mishnah now begins to deal with various situations in which the father died.  The question is:  does the money go to the girl herself, or does it go to her brothers who inherit her father? If the case was tried before the father died and then her father died the payments go to her brothers.  This is because once the case was tried it is as if the father had already collected, even though he may not actually have collected.  In essence the rapist or seducer owes the father money.  Since this is so, when he dies, the seducer or rapist pays the money to the brothers, the father’s inheritors. However, if the father died before the case was tried, the money belongs to her.  This is because at the point that it was determined that the rapist or seducer owes the money, she was already an orphan.
  If her case was tried before she became of majority age [all forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If she became of majority age before her case was tried they are hers.  This section deals with a situation in which the money has not been collected and she became of majority age.  At this age her father no longer receives money that she earns. If the case was tried before she became of majority, and then the father died, the money goes to her brothers, for the same reasons outlined above.  Since the debt was owed to the father, the brothers inherit this debt.  However, if the case was not tried until after she became of majority age, the payments go directly to her, even if her father is still alive.
  Rabbi Shimon says if her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her.  According to the opinion in the above sections, the point at which the debt is determined is the trial.  Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that if she didn’t collect before her father dies, even if they have already been to trial, the money goes to her.  According to Rabbi Shimon, the father does not bequeath money that is owed to him to his sons.
  Her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she had not collected [the proceeds] belong to her brothers if her father died.  While a daughter is in the status of a “na’arah” or younger all of her earnings belong to her father.  Our mishnah teaches that any work she did or things that she found, even if they have not yet been collected (such as wages) already belong to her father.  If he dies they go to her brothers as part of their father’s inheritance.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss financial rights that a father accrues from his daughter.
  If a man gave his daughter in betrothal and she was divorced, [and then] he gave her [again] in betrothal and she was widowed, her ketubah belongs to him.  In this case the daughter was only betrothed and then widowed, betrothed and then widowed again.  The mishnah teaches that since she was never fully married, both ketuboth (200 zuz for each marriage) belong to her father.  As long as she is not fully married, he never fully relinquishes control over her.
  If he gave her in marriage and she was divorced [and then] he gave her [again] in marriage and she was left a widow, her ketubah belongs to her. Rabbi Judah said: the first belongs to her father. They said to him: as soon as he gives her in marriage, her father loses all control over her.  In this case the daughter is married twice.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, both ketuboth belong to her.  According to this opinion, as soon as she is married, her father loses all control over her, and he can not make any financial gains through her.  According to Rabbi Judah, the first ketubah belongs to her father, because it was written before the marriage and hence it was a debt incurred while she still lived in her father’s home.  According to the other sages who respond to Rabbi Judah, the collection does not go according to when it was written, but rather her status at the dissolution of the marriage.  Since at this point she was independent, her father has no right to her ketubah.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Deuteronomy 22:13-21 discusses a man who makes a virginity claim against his wife.  Verse 19 states that if he was found to be lying “They shall fine him a hundred shekels of silver and give it to the girl’s father; for the man has defamed a virgin in Israel.”  Verses 20-21 state that if the claim was found to be true, then the woman is stoned.  Verses 22-23 deal with a betrothed woman who commits adultery, who is also stoned.  From the phrase “a virgin in Israel”, our mishnah derives that the punishment of stoning is meted out in both of these cases only if the woman was a born Israelite.  If she was a convert, then she is punished by strangulation, as are other adulterers.
  The mishnah lists three types of women who have committed an act of fornication, i.e. adultery.  The first is a woman who has converted with her mother, the second is one whose mother converted between conception and birth, and third is one whose mother converted before conception.  Each woman/girl has slightly different consequences to her crime.
  The daughter of a convert who converted together with her mother and then committed an act of fornication is subject to the penalty of strangulation. She is not [stoned] at the door of her father’s house nor [does her husband pay the] hundred sela’.  Since this girl is herself a convert she does not count as a “virgin of Israel”.  Therefore, if she commits adultery, she is punished by strangulation, the typical punishment for adultery.  Deuteronomy 22:21 states that if the charge of not being a virgin was true, “then the girl shall be brought out to the entrance of her father’s house, and the men of her town shall stone her to death.”  Since this girl was not a “virgin of Israel”, she is not brought out to the entrance to her father’s house.  If the husband’s claim against her was false he need not pay the 100 sela [=shekel] fine, for she was not a “virgin of Israel”.
  If she was conceived in unholiness but her birth was in holiness she is subject to the penalty of stoning. She is not [stoned] at the door of her father’s house nor [does her husband pay the] hundred sela’.  In this case the girl was conceived in unholiness, meaning her mother was not an Israelite when she was conceived.  However, the mother converted before the birth and therefore she was born “in holiness”.  In this case she is stoned if she commits adultery while a betrothed virgin.  However, she does not get taken out to the entrance of her father’s house nor is her husband fined 100 shekels if he made a false claim against her.  In other words she is in some ways treated like a full Israelite and in other ways she is not.
  If she was both conceived and born in holiness she is regarded as a daughter of Israel in all respects.  Although this girl’s mother is a convert, she herself is considered a full Israelite.
  A girl who has a father but no door of her father’s house; or a door of her father’s house but no father, is subject to the penalty of stoning [the verse did not state] “the opening of her father’s house” (Deut. 22:21) except as a precept.  This section teaches that if a girl has no father, or has a father but her father’s house doesn’t have a house with an entrance (for instance he is homeless), she is still liable to be stoned should she commit an act of fornication while betrothed.  When the Torah states that she shall be taken out to the entrance of her father’s house, the intention was not that if she didn’t have a father with a house with an entrance, that she would not receive the prescribed penalty. Rather the intention was that if she should commit such an act of fornication, she should be stoned at the entrance to her father’s house, if such a place exists.  In other words, its lack of existence does not impede upon the carrying out of the other elements to the passage in Deuteronomy.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah delineates basic rights that a father has over his daughter and that a husband has over his wife.  In addition the mishnah outlines basic responsibilities that a husband has to his wife.  We can easily see from this mishnah that the society that the Mishnah envisions/reflects is patriarchal.  The father/husband is head of the household.  Most of the earnings of the members of the household belong to him and he has the responsibility for providing for them.
  A father has authority over his daughter in her betrothal [whether it was effected] by money, document or intercourse.  When we learn the first mishnah in tractate Kiddushin we will see that there are three means by which to effect betrothal:  money, document or intercourse.  Our mishnah teaches that a father has the right to accept money or document on behalf of his daughter in order that she should be betrothed.  He also has the right to give her to a man with whom she will have intercourse and thereby become betrothed.  This right is limited to a girl who has not yet reached majority age (typically 12 ½).  After that the girl receives her own betrothal.
  He is entitled to anything she finds, to her handiwork and to annul her vows.  Any money a daughter might earn belongs to her father.  This includes things she might find and her handiwork (for instance weaving, sewing, work in the field, etc.).  In addition the father has a right to annul her vows (see Numbers 30:6).  The reason that annulling vows is listed in this clause is that it is in essence an economic right since a vow could prevent him from having her handiwork.  For instance if she took a vow that any thing she finds is forbidden to her father, she would thereby deny him of one of his economic rights.
  He receives her get but he has no usufruct [from her property] during her lifetime.  If the father betroths his daughter and then the husband decides to divorce her before fully marrying her, the father receives the get.  However, if the girl was married, the father no longer has any domain over her.  If the girl should come into money while still in her father’s house, the principal belongs to her as well as the interest (the usufruct).  However, if she dies, her father inherits both the principal and the usufruct.  The normal way that a girl would come into money that does not automatically belong to her father is by inheriting her mother’s father.  This would happen if her mother died before her grandfather died (for if her grandfather died first when her mother died her husband would inherit her) and her mother was an inheritor (i.e. her grandfather had no sons).  In such a case she would inherit her grandfather.
  When she marries, the husband surpasses him [in his rights] in that he has usufruct during her lifetime.  A husband has more rights than the father in that the husband does have right to the usufruct from his wife’s property during her lifetime.  This could happen if she received an inheritance after the marriage.  If she should die before her husband dies then he would inherit the principal as well, but if the husband would die first he would never own the principal.  The husband also has rights over whatever his wife finds and whatever money she earns.  He also can annul her vows.
  And he is obligated to feed her, to pay a ransom for her and to provide for her burial. Rabbi Judah says: even the poorest man in Israel must provide no less than two flutes and one lamenting woman.  The mishnah now begins to list the husband’s responsibilities towards his wife.  The primary responsibility is to provide food.  He also must provide her with clothing and shelter.  If she is taken captive he must pay a ransom in order to redeem her.  From the very fact that this is listed as a basic responsibility of the husband to his wife clearly demonstrates that kidnapping must have been a serious problem. The husband is also responsible to pay for his wife’s burial.  According to Rabbi Judah, even if the husband is poor he must provide two flutes and one lamenting-woman for the funeral.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the exact point in which a betrothed woman ceases to be in her father’s domain and is transferred to her husband’s domain.  We should note that different sources reflect different answers to this question.  The question is of import because as long as she is in her father’s domain, he inherits her and he benefits from her work.  Once she is in her husband’s domain, the husband gains such rights.  Furthermore, there is importance for an Israelite girl who is betrothed to a priest.  As long as she is in her father’s domain, she does not eat terumah.  She is allowed to eat terumah when she enters her husband’s domain.
  She remains in the domain of her father until she enters the domain of her husband [by going into the bridal chamber] at marriage.  In a normal situation the girl is in her father’s domain until she enters the bridal chamber (huppah) with the intent of becoming married.
  If her father delivered her to the agents of the husband she passes into the domain of her husband. If her father went with the husband’s agents or if the father’s agents went with the husband’s agents she remains in the domain of her father. If her father’s agents delivered her to the husband’s agents she passes into the domain of her husband.  The following clauses of the mishnah deal with a situation in which there is some distance to be traveled between the father’s home and the husband’s home.  If the father turns his girl over to her husband’s agents, she is already considered to be married.  If her husband is a priest, on her journey she may eat terumah.  If the father or his agents accompany her on the trip, then she is still in her father’s domain.  She enters into her husband’s domain only when she is fully turned over to him or to his agents.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Since previous mishnayoth have been dealing with the rights a father has over his daughter, our mishnah deals with his obligations to feed, clothe and shelter her.
  A father is not obligated to maintain his daughter.  According to our mishnah a father is not obligated to maintain his daughters.  The Talmud gives several important comments and reservations to this ruling.  First of all, it is also true of boys.  Second, this is only true when they are over the age of six.  When they are under the age of six, the father is obligated to feed them.  Thirdly, when it says that the father is not obligated to feed them, it means that if he has no money, he need not go out and work in order to feed his kids.  However, if he has enough assets to be able to give charity, he is not allowed to use them for himself before he gives them to his kids.  Rather just as the court can force a person to give charity, so too the court can force this person to feed and maintain his children, even above the age of six.  Finally, if he has no means by which to maintain his children, and chooses not to work in order to provide for them, while the court cannot force him to work, they embarrass him publicly, stating in public “even a cruel raven feeds its kids, look at this man who is less than an impure bird”.  In summary, the only person who can get away with not feeding his kids is one who does not want to work for himself and is willing to endure public humiliation.
  This exposition was made by Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah in front of the sages in the vineyard of Yavneh:   “The sons shall inherit [their mother’s kethubah] and the daughters shall be maintained [out of their father’s estate” just as the sons do not inherit except after the death of their father, so the daughters are not maintained except after the death of their father.  Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah supports the ruling in the first  clause of the mishnah with a midrash based on some guarantees which are included in the ketubah and which we will see in subsequent mishnayoth.  The ketubah states that sons inherit their mothers ketuboth and that daughters are maintained from their father’s estate.  Both of these guarantees are actually written into the ketubah itself.  Rabbi Elazar’s midrash is that just as the sons do not inherit their mother’s ketubah until their father dies (the father inherits it first), the daughters are not guaranteed maintenance until their father dies.  While he is alive, he is not obligated to support them, as I explained above.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The mishnah now begins to delineate a list of guarantees that a woman has that are normally written into a ketubah but that even if they are not included in her personal ketubah, she nevertheless receives.  In other words, these are rights guaranteed to any wife regardless of what is actually written in her marriage contract, or regardless of whether she even has a marriage contract.
  Our mishnah deals with the two most basic aspects of the ketubah:  1)  that a virgin receives 200 zuz and a widow 100 zuz; 2) that all of the husband’s assets are a lien for his ketubah.
  If he did not write a kethubah for her, a virgin still collects two hundred zuz and a widow one mane, because it is a condition laid down by court.  Even though the husband never wrote for his wife a ketubah, she still is able to collect the minimum amount of 200/100.
  If he assigned to her in writing a field that was worth one mane instead of the two hundred zuz and did not write for her, “All property that I possess is a lien for your ketubah”, he is liable [for the full amount] because it is a condition laid down by the court.  If the husband writes in the ketubah that a field worth a maneh (100 zuz) is the collateral for the ketubah, and he doesn’t write that all his property is a lien, all of his property is still liable to be used to pay off the ketubah.  In such a case, the husband or the husband’s inheritors cannot say to the wife, “Here is your 100 zuz field that is your ketubah”.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a husband’s responsibility to ransom his wife if she is taken captive.
  If he did not write for her, “if you are taken captive I will ransom you and take you again as my wife”, or in the case of a priest’s wife, “I will restore you to your people”, he is liable [to carry out these obligations], because it is a condition laid down by court. One of the basic rights guaranteed in the ketubah is that a husband will pay a ransom for his wife, should she be taken captive.  Even if this clause is not written into the ketubah, the husband is still liable, for it is a court-established condition. As we learned in chapter two, if a woman is captured there is an assumption that she was raped by her captors, who are assumedly not Jews.  Sexual relations with a non-Jew renders a woman forbidden to marry a priest.  Therefore if this woman was married to a priest he must still pay her ransom, but he doesn’t return her to being his wife.  If she was married to an Israelite, she may return to him in any case.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to teach that a husband is obligated to pay for the ransom of his wife.  In addition, it teaches that a husband is responsible to pay for his wife’s medical costs, should she be injured or become ill.  However, there is a difference between the responsibility to pay the ransom and the responsibility to pay for treatment.
  If she was taken captive he is obligated to ransom her; And if he said, “Here is her get and her ketubah, let her ransom herself”, he is not allowed [to act accordingly].  As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, a husband is obligated by law to pay for his wife’s ransom.  In this mishnah a husband tries to divorce his wife upon hearing that she has been taken captive (we are obviously not dealing with an ideal marriage).  He says he will give her her get and pay her the amount guaranteed in the ketubah and then she can ransom herself.  The mishnah rules that this is forbidden.  This is because as soon as she was taken captive he became liable to pay for her ransom, whether she is his wife or not.  Therefore, he must first pay for her ransom and then if he wishes to divorce her and pay the ketubah he may do as he pleases.
  If she was injured it is his duty to provide for her medical treatment; And if he said, “Here is her get and her ketubah, let her heal herself”, he is allowed [to act accordingly].  If a woman becomes sick or is injured, her husband is liable to pay for the costs of her treatment.  These costs are part of the costs of her maintenance (food, shelter and clothing).  In contrast to the previous clause, if the husband wishes to he may divorce her, pay the ketubah and not have to continue to pay for the cost of treatment.  This is because a husband does not have to pay the costs of maintaining his wife after having divorced her.  Although this may be a cruel, dastardly thing to do, a husband is allowed to divorce his sick wife.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah refers to a guarantee that a husband must give to his wife that her ketubah (in this case “ketubah” refers to money she brought into the marriage as a dowry) will be inherited by her sons.  This will be explained below.  Even if the husband does not write this guarantee in the ketubah, the sons still receive the inheritance.
  If he did not write for her, “The male children that will be born from our marriage   shall inherit the money of your ketubah over and above their shares with their brothers”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court. The “ketubah” in this mishnah refers to money that the wife brought into the marriage as a dowry.  When a wife dies her husband inherits this money and it becomes officially his property and not just his to use, as it was during the marriage.  Written into the ketubah document is a guarantee that this wife’s male children will inherit this amount over and above their inheritance from the remainder of  the father’s estate.  For instance, let us say that a woman marries a man.  She brings into the estate property in the value of 1000 zuz, has five male children and then she dies.  The husband inherits this money and then remarries, this time a wealthy woman, who brings 10,000 zuz into the marriage and then has one son and dies.  When the husband dies, he leaves an estate of 15,000 zuz.  The one son of the rich woman inherits 10,000 zuz off the top.  This is his mother’s ketubah and although it became his father’s property, he inherits that amount separately from the general inheritance (as long as it still exists).  The five sons from the first marriage split the 200 zuz from their mother’s ketubah, each son taking 200 zuz.  There are now 4,000 zuz left in the estate and each son takes an equal portion, except for the oldest son who takes a double portion. The purpose of this ketubah clause is so that a rich father-in-law will write a handsome dowry for his daughter.  A father-in-law might fear that his son-in-law will have children from another wife and these children will inherit property that he wanted to see his grandsons have.  Through this guarantee a father-in-law can be more certain that his property will stay with his blood relatives.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the clause in the ketubah which guarantees a wife that her daughters will be maintained from her husband’s estate until they are married.
  If he did not write for her, “the female children that I will have from you will dwell in my house and be maintained out of my estate until they are taken in marriage”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court. A husband is liable to support his wife’s daughters until they are taken in marriage.  As we learned above in mishnah six, this refers to after the husband’s death.  Even if he doesn’t write such a clause in the ketubah, he is liable for it is a condition laid down by the court.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the right of the wife to remain in her husband’s home after his death and to be maintained by his estate.  The woman does not have this right once she has actually collected her ketubah money.  As we shall see in our mishnah, there were different customs as to whether or not the heirs could force her to take her ketubah and leave their father’s household.
  If he did not write for her, “You shall live in my house and be maintained from my estate throughout the duration of your widowhood”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court.  When a husband dies, his wife may remain in his house and continue to receive maintenance money from his estate.  This right is guaranteed, whether or not it is written in the ketubah.  The woman only loses this right when she claims her ketubah.
  Thus did the men of Jerusalem write. The men of Galilee wrote as did the men of Jerusalem. The men of Judea used to write: “Until the heirs wish to pay you your ketubah”. Therefore if the heirs wish to, they may pay her her ketubah and dismiss her.  The men of Jerusalem and Galilee wrote as was described in section one.  However, the men of Judea “Until the heirs wish to pay you your ketubah” instead of “throughout the duration of your widowhood”.  This means that the heirs may also take the initiative. If they wish to pay her her ketubah and cease the maintenance payments, they may.  [She, of course, can also take the initiative and request her ketubah].  In contrast, according to the version written in section one, if the heirs wish to pay her the ketubah and stop maintenance payments, and she doesn’t agree, they may not do so.  Only she can make that decision.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  As we have learned on several occasions, the minimum ketubah payment is 200 zuz.  Our mishnah talks about one who wants to add on to that amount or one who wants to subtract from the amount.
  Although [the Sages] have said:  a virgin collects two hundred and a widow one maneh, if he wishes to add, even a hundred maneh, he may do so.After betrothal [but before marriage], a virgin collects two hundred zuz and a widow only one maneh, for the man wrote her [the additional amount] in order to marry her.  A husband may increase his wife’s ketubah by whatever amount he so desires.  Clearly wives from rich families would have demanded higher guarantees.  Without this mishnah one might have thought that the rabbis set an amount that was meant to be equal for all women.  This would have prevented a wife from a poor family from being embarrassed that her ketubah is less than that of a wife from a rich family.  The mishnah teaches that a husband is allowed to increase the amount and that we are not concerned lest poor folk are embarrassed.
  If she was widowed or divorced, either after betrothal or after marriage, she is entitled to collect the entire amount. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah says: [a woman widowed or divorced] after marriage receives the entire amount;  Both the first opinion in this section, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah agree that if the wife is divorced or widowed after having been betrothed but before having been married, she collects the basic payment of 200/100.  However, there is a disagreement with regard to the extra amount.  According to the first opinion, she collects that amount as well.  Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah says that the extra amount is collected only upon marriage, for the only reason that he wrote the extra amount was in order to marry her.  If, for whatever reason, the betrothal is terminated before marriage, she does not receive the extra.
  Rabbi Judah says: if he wishes he may write for a virgin a document for two hundred zuz and she writes “I have received from you a maneh”, or for a widow [he may write a document for] a maneh and she writes, “I have received from you fifty zuz”. Rabbi Meir says: Any man who gives a virgin less than two hundred zuz or a widow less than a maneh is engaging in licentious sex.  This section deals with a man who wants to write a ketubah of less than 200/100 for his wife.  Note that the wife does not object.  Evidently she (or her family) wants this man enough that she is willing to compromise on the amount of the ketubah.  Rabbi Judah says that the husband may employ a legal fiction whereby he can reduce the ketubah.  First he writes the full ketubah of 200/100, as is normally done.  Then she writes him a receipt for 100/50 zuz, even though she never received that amount.  This means that when he does pay the ketubah, he will be liable for only 100/50 more zuz.  In this way, Rabbi Judah retains a legal fiction whereby the actual ketubah does state the normal amount.  Someone looking at her ketubah will not know that he has not abided by the fixed ketubah amount of 200/100.  He also allows a husband with lesser means to marry. Rabbi Meir says that anyone who writes less than 200/100 and then engages in sexual intercourse with his wife is having licentious sex.  A financial guarantee that binds the man to the woman is distinguishes marriage from prostitution.  Without a large enough guarantee a husband could “buy” a wife for a night, and divorce her the next day.  Indeed other cultures, including Arab culture, had what was called “a wife for a night”.  There is even some reflection of this practice in the Talmud.  Rabbi Meir takes a strong stance against this practice.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the waiting period between betrothal and marriage.
  A virgin is given twelve months from the [time her intended] husband claimed her, [in which] to prepare herself for marriage. Just as [such a period] is given to the woman, so is it given to the man to prepare himself. A widow is given thirty days.  Betrothal may occur at an early age, but that doesn’t mean that marriage will necessarily occur any time close to the betrothal.  There are two steps described by our mishnah that occur before the marriage.  The first is that the husband tells the woman whom he betrothed that he wishes to marry her or the woman tells the man to whom she is betrothed that she wishes to get married. From that point on, if this is a first marriage, there can be up to a twelve month period in which the couple prepare for the wedding and the marriage.  This would include time to prepare for the wedding, and more importantly, time to prepare the new house and the things that will go into it.  She will use this time to prepare her jewelry and clothes for the wedding.  A widow is only given thirty days.  Since she has already been married she is more prepared for a second marriage.  Also, the second marriage was not as big of a celebration.
  If the time has come and they were not married they are entitled to receive maintenance from the man’s estate and [if he is a priest] they may eat terumah.  If the time to get married has come and passed, and the husband has not yet married his betrothed wife, he must begin to pay for her maintenance, meaning food, clothing and shelter.  Since he is feeding her, if he is a priest he may begin to give her terumah.
  Rabbi Tarfon says: They give her [all of her food] in terumah. Rabbi Akiva says: One half unconsecrated food and one half terumah.  There is now a debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon over how much of a woman’s food a priestly husband may supply in terumah.  It is to the husband’s advantage to give her terumah since terumah is cheaper than regular, unconsecrated food since only priests may eat terumah (smaller market = lower price).  The woman will have a problem with terumah for when she menstruates and is impure she cannot eat it. According to Rabbi Tarfon, the husband can give all of his wife’s food in terumah.  If she needs to have unconsecrated food when she is impure, she can sell her terumah and buy other food.  Rabbi Akiva demands that he give her half of her food in unconsecrated food so that when she is impure she need not go to the trouble of selling the terumah.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.  It continues to discuss when a woman may begin to eat terumah.
  A yavam [who is a priest] does not allow [his sister-in-law] to eat terumah.  If a woman is widowed while merely betrothed to her husband, her yavam does not allow her to eat terumah until he has had yibbum with her (see also Mishnah Yevamot 7:4).
  If she had spent six months waiting for her husband and six months waiting for the yavam, or even [if she spent] all of them waiting for her husband less one day waiting for the yavam, or all of them waiting for the yavam less one day waiting for her husband, she may not eat terumah.  Yesterday we learned that a betrothed woman is given one year to prepare herself from the time a husband requests her in marriage.  If he delays any longer, she may claim maintenance from his estate, and she may eat terumah.  Our mishnah teaches that if she waited part of this time for the husband and part for the yavam, she does not eat terumah, even though a full year has passed.  She may only eat terumah if she waits a full year either for the yavam or for the husband.  However, if she does wait a full year for the yavam and he does not marry her (or perform halitzah) she begins to eat from his estate and she may begin to eat terumah (provided, of course, that he is a priest).
  This [was the ruling according to] the first mishnah. The court that followed afterwards ruled: a woman may not eat terumah until she has entered the bridal chamber.  According to yesterday’s mishnah a woman might begin to eat terumah before she enters the huppah (the bridal chamber).  This would occur, if she waits for a full year and her husband does not marry her.  Our mishnah says that this was an earlier position, but that later tannaim ruled that in no case may a woman eat terumah before she is fully married, an act which occurs when she enters the huppah.  In the Talmud there is a debate as to why the later court disallowed a woman to eat terumah until she entered the huppah.  The first opinion is that if she eats while still in her father’s home she may give some terumah to her family members who are not priests.  Once she moves to her husband’s home we are not concerned with such a possibility.  The second opinion is that before she enters the huppah, her husband can annul the marriage (we need not get into here how this is performed).  If he were to do so, retroactively she would have been a non-priest who ate terumah.  However, once the marriage is finalized, he can no longer annul the marriage and there is no such concern.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a man who consecrates his wife’s handiwork to the Temple.  The question is whether or not such a consecration is valid.  The mishnah often uses this type of construct to show the degree of possession a person has over something, the idea being that a person cannot consecrate something that is not his.
  If a man consecrated his wife’s handiwork, she continues to work and to consume [that which she makes].  When a man declares that anything his wife makes should be consecrated, she may continue to consume that which she produces.  This means that she may continue to work and sell that which she makes and use the proceeds to provide for her own maintenance.  Since the husband has an obligation to provide for her, and this amount was needed for her provisions, a husband cannot consecrate what she makes.
  [Concerning the] surplus: Rabbi Meir says: it is consecrated. Rabbi Yohanan Hasandlar says: it is unconsecrated.  However, if she produces more than that which she consumes, there is a question as to whether the husband can consecrate it.  According to Rabbi Meir, since she doesn’t need this for her own maintenance, the husband can consecrate it to the Temple.  Rabbi Yochanan Hasandlar disagrees.  He holds that even the surplus cannot be consecrated by the husband.  According to the Talmud, this is because a person cannot consecrate things which have not yet been made.  A husband cannot declare that the surplus of his wife’s handiwork should be consecrated, because such surplus does not yet exist. Note that our mishnah probably presents a leniency to the husband.  One might have thought that after he consecrated his wife’s handiwork, he would have to give the handiwork to the Temple and still provide for her.  He cannot get out of his obligation to provide for her because that is mandated by the ketubah.  Our mishnah teaches that despite his consecration he can still continue to use her handiwork to provide for her maintenance.  Of course if it is not sufficient, he will need to add from his own money to provide for her, as is always the case.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  The following are the kinds of work which a woman must perform for her husband:Grinding,Baking,If she brought one slave-woman into the marriage she need not grind or bake or wash.Washing,Rabbi Eliezer says: even if she brought him a hundred slave-women he may compel her to work in wool; for idleness leads to unchastity.Cooking,Nursing her child,Preparing his bed,And working in wool. [If she brought] two slave-women, she need not cook or nurse her child. If three, she need not prepare his bed or work in wool. If four, she may lounge in an easy chair. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: if a man forbade his wife under a vow to do any work he must divorce her and give her kethubah to her for idleness leads to insanity.Yesterday’s mishnah mentioned that a husband has a right to his wife’s handiwork.  Our mishnah delineates other obligations that the wife has to her husband.  Note that although the Mishnaic portrayal of marriage was not equal, meaning men and women did not perform the same functions, there is reciprocity.  A husband must financially support the woman (among other responsibilities) and a woman must give her handiwork to her husband and perform daily chores around the house.Section one:  This section lists the basic categories of work that a wife must perform for her husband.  Note that nursing was considered “work” and not primarily an opportunity for a woman to “bond” with her child.  Our mishnah assumes that women would prefer to pay a wet-nurse to nurse their child.  The Talmud states that this list contains only the broad categories of work but that there are other things that a wife must do for her husband.Section two:  If a woman brings slaves as dowry into the marriage, she is no longer responsible for all of the work.  The more slaves she brings into the marriage, the less she is obligated to work.Section three:  Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the previous statement, that if a wife brings four slaves into a marriage she may sit around and do nothing.  A husband can always force his wife to make wool, an easy task but one that would keep her busy, for too much idle time may lead her to unchastity.  We can note that this mishnah espouses what many Americans hold as an ideal:  work and keeping busy not only provides for oneself, but also protects one from trouble.While Rabbi Eliezer says that a husband can force a wife to work, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that a husband cannot prevent a wife from performing work.  A husband cannot take a vow prohibiting his wife from working for such idleness might lead her to being insanely bored.  A rich husband might want his wife to sit around all day and do nothing, just so that everyone can see what a rich man he is and that his wife need not work.  In order to protect the woman, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that a husband does not have such a right
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that a husband has an obligation to have sexual relations with his wife.  How frequently he is obligated depends on his job.
  The idea that a husband has an obligation to periodically have relations with his wife is derived from Exodus 21:10 which states that if a man takes a second wife he cannot diminish from her three things:  food, clothing or conjugal rights.  With regard to our issue, if a man has two or more wives he must provide each one with their conjugal rights.  You can imagine that this might have been one deterrent to the practice of polygyny (the proper term for the practice of men marrying more than one woman).
  A man forbade himself by vow from having intercourse with his wife: Beth Shammai says:  two weeks; Beth Hillel says: one week.  A man cannot make a vow to forbid upon his wife anything which he is mandated to give her by law.  The man in this mishnah, perhaps in a fit of anger, forbade his wife from have sexual relations with him.  This is not permitted and if he does not have his vow annulled (a process we will discuss in tractate Nedarim), he must divorce her and pay her the ketubah.  However, he is not obligated to divorce her that very day; rather he is given a period to cool off and hopefully have his vow annulled.  According to Beth Shammai he is given two weeks and according to Beth Hillel he is given only one week.  After that length of time, he must divorce her and pay her the ketubah.
  Students may go away to study Torah, without the permission [of their wives for a period of] thirty days; workers for one week.  Since a husband must have relations with his wife, he cannot be away from her for a long period of time.  According to this section, a Torah scholar cannot leave his wife without her permission for longer than thirty days.  A worker can be out of town for only one week.  If either wish to remain away from their wives for a longer period of time, they must receive permission.
  The times for conjugal duty prescribed in the torah are: For independent men, every day; For workers, twice a week; For donkey-drivers, once a week; For camel-drivers, once in thirty days; For sailors, once in six months. These are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.  This section delineates how often in general a husband must be available to have relations with his wife.  The frequency depends on his occupation.   An independent man, meaning one who doesn’t work, must have relations with his wife every day.  Note that this does not mean that he actually has to do so, but rather that if she so desires, he is obligated.  He cannot claim that he is too busy to have sex with her.  Workers must be available twice a week.  The Talmud explains that this refers to workers who work in the city; those who work outside the city are obligated only once a week, as we learned in the previous clause.  Donkey-drivers, who travel short distances must be available once a week.  Camel-drivers who travel longer distances must be available once a month and finally, sailors who travel for long periods of time, need to return home once every six months.  This all refers to situations where the wife has not given her husband permission.  If she has given him permission, he may stay away longer.  She might give him permission if, for instance, for the sake of supporting the family, the husband had to be away for a long period of time.  However, it is her right to demand that he find work closer to home.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This first part of the mishnah deals with a wife who refuses to provide for her husband one of the things that she is obligated to him.  This could either refer to one of the labors listed in mishnah five, or it may refer to a wife who refuses to sleep with her husband.  The second half refers to a husband who does not provide his wife with one of the things that he is obligated to give to her.
  I should note that this mishnah and other related sources has been an issue of much controversy throughout Jewish history and continues to extremely controversial today.  It ties into the issue of a woman’s ability to force her husband to divorce her.  Briefly, the conclusion of the Talmud is that if after twelve months the woman continues to refuse to act as a wife to her husband, the court forces him to divorce her, but she loses her ketubah.  The Geonim, the rabbis who came after the Talmud, made a famous enactment that the husband is forced to divorce her immediately.  Some Geonim ruled that she receives part of her ketubah.  Early post-Geonic scholars ruled similar to the Geonim, until Rabbenu Tam, a 12th century French talmudic commentator, ruled that the court can never force a husband to divorce his wife.  Within a few centuries this became the unanimous opinion amongst halakhic experts.  Today we are left with the serious problem of a husband who refuses to divorce his wife.
  If a wife rebels against her husband her ketubah is reduced by seven denarii a week. Rabbi Judah says: seven tropaics.  If a husband claims that his wife is not fulfilling her duties he must bring her to court and the court will impose upon her a reduction of seven denarii per week of her rebellion.  Rabbi Judah says that it is reduced by seven tropaics, each tropaic being half of a denar.
  How long does he continue to reduce? Until the amount of her ketubah. Rabbi Yose says: he may continue to reduce, and if she receives an inheritance he may collect from it.  According to the first opinion, the reduction of her ketubah continues until it reaches the total amount of her ketubah.  At this point he must divorce her and he does not pay anything to her.  Note that he doesn’t begin to reduce from the dowry which he must return to her upon the dissolution of the marriage.  The reduction is only made in the amount that he is obligated to give her (200/100 minimum) from his own pocket.  Rabbi Yose holds that he continues to take away her property.  He would reduce from the amount of money she brought into the marriage and then continue to reduce against any potential future inheritance. In other words, according to Rabbi Yose he is never obligated to divorce his wife.
  Similarly, if a husband rebels against his wife, an addition of three denarii a week is made to her ketubah. Rabbi Judah said: three tropaics.  This section teaches that a similar process occurs with a husband.  If he rebels against her, the amount of her ketubah is increased.  However, the increase is smaller than the corresponding decrease.  According to the Talmud, the seven reduced from the ketubah corresponds to the seven labors that she is obligated to him and the three is added to his ketubah to correspond to the three things he owes her, food, clothing and conjugal rights.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Assumedly, most husbands and wives shared households.  Since the husband was obligated to feed his wife, they would eat together and she would eat whatever she so desired (usually, I would assume within reason), as long as he could afford to pay for the food.  If the husband ate well, then so did the woman and if he did not, neither did she.  However, a problem might arise if for some reason the couple does not live together, for instance he works abroad.  Alternatively, he may have two wives, each in a different house.  The question would then become, what must he provide for her.  Our mishnah and tomorrow’s mishnah lists what he must provide as a bare minimum for her food, clothing and bedding.
  If a man provides for his wife through an agent, he must give her [every week] not less than two kavs of wheat or four kavs of barley. Rabbi Yose said: only Rabbi Ishmael, who lived near Edom, granted her a supply of barley. He must also give her half a kav of pulse and half a log of oil; and a kav of dried figs or a maneh of pressed figs, and if he has no [such fruit] he must supply her with a corresponding quantity of other fruit.  Every week the husband must provide his wife with the basic grains and fruits that were the staple of most diets. There is a debate about whether or not he can give her barley in place of wheat.  Barley was a lesser grain, one which was not as good for making bread.  According to the first opinion, he may give her barley, provided he gives her twice the amount of wheat.  According to Rabbi Yose only Rabbi Yishmael who lived near Edom, on the eastern side of Israel, gave her barley, for barley was common there.  In other places a husband must give his wife the better grain, wheat. He also must give her pulse (beans), oil and fruit.  The standard, preferred fruit was figs but if he had no figs he could give her other fruit.
  He must also provide her with a bed, a mattress and a mat.  He had to provide her with bedding, including a bed frame and a mattress and a mat to sit on.  According to the Talmud, he must also provide her with a pillow.
  He must also give her a hat for her head and a girdle for her loins; shoes, from festival to festival; and clothing worth fifty zuz every year. She is not to be given new [clothes] in the summer or worn-out clothes in the winter, but must be given clothes worth fifty zuz during the winter, and she wears them when they are worn-out during the summer; and the worn-out clothes remain her property.  He must give her a hat, for women had to cover their heads, a belt and shoes.  She received new shoes at each festival, a total of three times a year.  She received fifty zuz worth of clothing a year and it was to be given to her in the rainy season. This way it would wear out at around summer time and she could then still cover herself with what shards lasted through winter.  The worn out clothing belongs to her and she could do what she wants with it.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s.  It continues to list what the husband must provide for his wife if he is maintaining her through an agent.
  He must also give her [every week] a silver ma'ah for her [other] needs and she is to eat with him every Friday eve.  Besides the requirements listed in yesterday’s mishnah, the husband must also give his wife a silver ma’ah per week for her other needs. This was not a large amount of money (=1/6 of a denar/zuz).  Furthermore, even though she is not living with him, he must eat with her once a week, on Friday nights.  In the Talmud this is interpreted in two ways:  1)  he must literally eat with her, the assumption being he must provide her with company; 2)  he must have sexual relations with her once a week.
  If he does not give her a silver ma'ah for her other needs, her handiwork belongs to her.  The mishnah now delineates the consequences of him not providing her with what is required.  If he does not give her even the smallest amount of that which is required, the ma’ah for spending money, she does not need to give him her handiwork.  In other words, he is penalized for not fully providing for her.
  And what [is the quantity of work that] she must do for him? The weight of five sela’s of warp in Judea, which amounts to ten sela's in Galilee,   or the weight of ten sela's of woof in Judea, which amounts to twenty sela's in Galilee.   If she was nursing, her handiwork is reduced and her maintenance is increased.  The mishnah now lists what she is expected to produce, in return for receiving her maintenance.  Note that the mishnah does not state that if she doesn’t produce enough, he need not pay her.  Rather the point of the mishnah is that if she produces any more, she may keep it for herself.  This is not a list of what she must minimally make for him; it is a list of the maximum of what he is allowed to take from her.  Differing amounts are given for Galilee and for Judea, for different systems of measurement were used in each region.
  All this applies to a poor person in Israel, but in the case of a more respectable [husband] all is fixed according to his dignity.  Finally, the mishnah qualifies everything that it stated in the previous two mishnayoth.  All of these amounts refer only to a poor person who cannot afford to provide his wife with any more than the bare minimum.  A rich person is obligated to maintain his wife at the same level at which he provides for himself.  Even if he is stingy with regard to his own food and clothing, if he has the means he must provide well for wife.  There obviously cannot be a situation where he is living the good life, and he sends his wife to live somewhere else and provides her with only the minimum.  Rather, all of the lists are only what a very poor husband must provide.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a wife’s right to money that she receives in various ways while she is married.
  A wife’s find and her handiwork belong to her husband.  This halakhah was already learned above in 4:4.
  And [concerning] her inheritance:  He has the usufruct during her lifetime.  If a woman receives an inheritance while she is married, the money is treated like certain portions of the dowry she brought into the wedding.  This means that the husband cannot use the principle but he can use the interest that the principle accrues.  The easiest way to calculate principle and interest is to consider a field.  The field itself is the principle.  The husband may not sell the field.  However, the produce that is picked from the field is the “usufruct”, which is more literally translated as fruits.  These belong to the husband.
  And [concerning] her inheritance:  He has the usufruct during her lifetime.  The mishnah now discusses two forms of compensation that the wife receives if injured:  indignity and blemish.  According to the first opinion, these belong to the wife, since she was the one who suffered the injury. However, Rabbi Judah ben Batera distinguishes between injuries inflicted on covered and uncovered parts of her body.  If the injury was inflicted upon a covered part of her body, then most of the suffering was hers and she receives two-thirds of the compensation.  However, if the injury was inflicted upon an uncovered part, then the husband is more embarrassed and blemished by his wife’s injury than she herself is.  Therefore he receives two-thirds.  [I realize that the conception of marriage presented by Rabbi Judah ben Batera is not a conception that many of us share.] The money that he receives due to her injury is immediately given to him.  The money that she receives belongs in principle to her, and the usufruct belongs to him.  Therefore the money is used to buy land and he can enjoy the fruit.  Buying land in Mishnaic times was equivalent to our putting money in the bank.  It was a way to ensure that the money did not lose its value for real estate was one of the only sure investments in the ancient world. The mishnah does not mention three other payments that an injured party receives:  medical fees, loss of work and compensation for pain.  The reason that these are not mentioned is that it is clear to whom they belong.  Since the husband has a right to her handiwork and must pay for her rehabilitation, the first two payments belong to him.  Since the pain is experienced solely by her, she alone receives the compensation for pain.  The only question, therefore, was about embarrassment and blemish.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a father who promises to give his wife a large dowry and then her fiancee dies, leaving her liable for yibbum with the brother. The question is, is the father obligated to give the same amount of money to the yavam.
  If a man agreed to give a fixed sum of money to his son-in-law and his son-in-law died:  the Sages say that he may say “I was willing to give to your brother but I am unwilling to give to you.” If a husband promises to give his daughter’s husband a large dowry he is legally obligated to pay that money to the son.  We should note that the rabbis encouraged fathers to give their daughters’ generous dowries so that they would find good matches. However, if the son-in-law dies while they are only engaged, the father-in-law is not liable to pay the same amount of money to the brother-in-law who might perform yibbum.  This is true even if the daughter wants to marry the yavam.  Since the father’s contract was with the other brother, he has no legal obligation to the yavam.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the sums of the dowry written in the ketubah.  Customarily the woman would bring a dowry consisting of money, objects and potentially land (our mishnah does not discuss land, because its location and not value was written in the ketubah).  The amount of dowry that the husband would write was the amount he would be obligated to return to her upon divorce or death.  If she brought a dowry of money, he would write a higher sum than she actually brought since he benefits from the use of the money. If she brought movable property into the marriage, he writes an amount one-fifth less, for it was customary to overestimate the value of the dowry to make the bride and her family sound richer than they really were.
  If a woman agreed to bring her husband one thousand denarii he must agree to give her a corresponding sum of fifteen maneh.  If a wife brings into the marriage 1000 denarii of cash, the husband writes that he has received 1500.  This is because for the duration of the marriage he benefits from the use of the money.
  As a corresponding sum for appraised goods, he agrees to give one-fifth less.  If she brings in goods whose value has been assessed, the husband need write in the ketubah only a fifth less of the value. The primary reason, according to most commentators, is that dowries tend to be overestimated (just like people planning weddings tend to be overcharged!).  The husband should not have to pay for his overestimation.  However, the mishnah notes that if he wrote 100 zuz in ketubah and she brings in goods that are actually worth 100 zuz, he cannot ask for more. The mishnah now illustrates two cases where the amount written in the ketubah is less than she actually brings into the marriage.  If he writes 100, she must bring in 125 denarii (sela=4 denar).  That is to say, he has reduced the amount by 1/5.  Similarly if he writes 400 zuz worth of goods, she must bring 500.
  [If a husband is requested to enter in his wife's ketubah] “goods assessed at one maneh”, and these are in fact worth a maneh, he only [must agree to] a maneh. [Otherwise, if he is requested to enter in the ketubah:] “goods assessed at a maneh”, his wife must give him thirty-one sela and a denar, and if “at four hundred”, she must give [him goods valued at] five hundred. Whatever a bridegroom agrees to give [his wife in her ketubah] he writes one fifth less [than the appraised value].  The husband too, when he promises to bring a certain amount of goods into the marriage (for instance clothes or perfume for his wife) writes the value at one/fifth less.  This is true because these goods are also generally overestimated.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The first part of this mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.  The second part discusses the husband’s obligation to provide his bride with money for perfume.
  If a woman agreed to bring him cash, every sela’ counts as six denarii.  As we learned yesterday, if the wife brings cash as a dowry, her husband must write into the ketubah an amount that is fifty per cent higher than that which she brought.  Since a sela is worth 4 denarii, he writes 6 denarii for every sela.
  The bridegroom must accept upon himself [to give his wife] ten denarii for her [perfume] basket for call maneh [which she brings as dowry]. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel said: in all matters the local usage shall be followed.  For every maneh (100 denarii) that she brings as dowry, her husband must provide 10 denarii of money for her perfume.  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees with the setting of an absolute amount.  Rather he holds that local custom dictates how much he must provide for her perfume.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a father who either does not specify an amount for his daughter’s dowry, or cuts a deal with the husband that the latter will accept her without a dowry.
  If a man gives his daughter in marriage without specifying any conditions, he must give her not less than fifty zuz.  If a man marries off his daughter and does not state how much dowry he is going to provide her, the husband has a right to claim from him a dowry worth 50 zuz.  As we shall see in the end of the mishnah, this is the size of a small dowry that even an orphan would receive from charity.
  If [the father] cut a deal [with the husband] that he would take her naked [i.e. without a dowry], the husband may not say “When I have taken her into my house I shall clothe her with clothes of my own”, rather he must provide her with clothing while she is still in her father’s house.  The father can cut a deal with the husband that the husband shall marry the daughter without a dowry.  The father is then not obligated to provide his daughter with anything, and all of the responsibility falls on the husband’s back.  The obligation to provide her with clothing begins already while she is in her father’s house.  The husband cannot wait for her to arrive at his home, rather he must send money or clothing to the father so that she will have what to wear for the journey.
  Similarly if an orphan is given in marriage she must be given not less than fifty zuz. If [charity] funds are available she is to be provided in accordance with the dignity of her position.  Even a poor orphan receives a dowry of 50 zuz. Furthermore, if there is extra money in the charity fund, she is entitled to more, depending on her social status.  This might refer to an orphan from a respectable, perhaps once-rich family.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the dowry given to an orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brothers.
  If an orphan was given in marriage by her mother or her brothers with her consent and they gave her a dowry of a hundred, or fifty zuz, she may, when she reaches majority age, legally claim from them the amount that was due to her. Rabbi Judah says: if the father had given his first daughter in marriage, the second must receive as much as the first. The Sages say: sometimes a man is poor and becomes rich or rich and becomes poor.   Rather the estate should evaluated and [the appropriate amount] given to her. Usually, only a father has the legal ability to give his daughter in marriage.  However, the rabbis gave mothers and brothers the ability to marry off the daughter should the father have died.  If the mother or brothers give the daughter a smaller dowry than is typical of a family of their economic status, the daughter may, upon reaching majority age, make a legal claim against her father’s estate and receive a higher dowry.  We can see that the dowry is a legal right of the daughter’s and that right cannot be abrogated by her mother or brothers, who might, after all, have a vested interest in reducing her dowry (since a large dowry cuts their inheritance. According to Rabbi Judah, if the father had an older daughter whom he married off before dying, the court can force the family to give the same amount to the second daughter.  The Sages, however, disagree, for sometimes a family can grow rich and sometimes they grow poor.  Furthermore, sometimes a rich father can be cheap and give his daughter a small dowry.  While alive, since it is his money, this is his right.  Likewise, a poor father might give his first daughter a larger dowry than he could afford.  In both cases, the first daughter’s dowry should not indicate the size of the second daughter’s.  The only way of assessing how much her dowry should be is by correlating it to the size of the estate.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a father who set aside a sum of money for his daughter for her to use for a specific purpose and then died or went away.  The question is, when the daughter gets married, can the trustee give it to her husband and allow him to use it for a different purpose.
  If a man deposited a sum of money with an agent for his daugher, and [after she was betrothed] she says, “I trust my husband”, the trustee must act in accordance with the condition of his trust, the words of Rabbi Meir.  As explained above, the father gave money to an agent to be used for his daughter for a specific purpose, for instance to buy a field.  Now that the father is no longer there and the daughter has been married, she wants the husband to receive the money, for she trusts him.  According to Rabbi Meir the agent must do whatever the father told him to do.  The Talmud explains that this is because it is a commandment to fulfill the wishes of a dead person.
  Rabbi Yose says: were [the trust] a field and she wished to sell it, it would be as if it was sold immediately!  Rabbi Yose responds that even if the agent had already bought the field which the father wanted him to buy, and the daughter now had possession of the field, she could sell it and give the money to her husband.  Therefore, there is no reason for the agent to buy the field and give it to her, rather he can give her directly the money for her to give to her husband.
  To whom does this apply?  To [a daughter] who has reached majority age, but in the case of a minor, there is no validity at all to the act of a minor.  The debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose is only with regard to a daughter who has reached majority age.  At this age she could have sold the field, and therefore Rabbi Yose holds that the money is given to her husband.  However, if she is still a minor she cannot engage in business.  Even if the agent had bought her the field, she could not have sold it.  Since Rabbi Yose’s reasoning is not applicable in this case, the agent must do what he was told to do by the father.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first six mishnayoth of chapter seven discuss vows that a husband might take to prohibit his wife from doing something.  If the husband takes such a vow and thereby deprives the woman of a right that she has, he must divorce her and pay her her ketubah.  However, he does not necessarily have to divorce her immediately.  Rather we give him a cooling off period, in the hopes that he will change his mind, and find someone to release him from his vow (we will learn about how vows are released in tractate Nedarim).
  If a man forbade his wife by vow to have any benefit from him, for thirty days, he may appoint a provider, but if for a longer period he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.  If a man takes a vow thereby forbidding anything he owns to his wife, he has broken one of the guarantees of the ketubah, namely that he must provide her with food and clothing.  Therefore he must divorce her.  The first opinion in the mishnah gives him thirty days to “cool off”.  After that time he must divorce her and give her her ketubah.  Furthermore, even during these thirty days he is not allowed to abrogate his duties to her.  Rather he must appoint someone to provide for her during this time period.   According to the Talmud, this “provider” is not a direct agent of the husband, for that would be as if he himself was providing for her, and he cannot due to his vow.  Therefore, the Talmud explains that the husband states, “Anyone who provides for my wife will not lose out”.  When someone else provides for her, the husband may pay him back and this is not consider an abrogation of the vow.
  Rabbi Judah ruled: if he was an Israelite he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for one month, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] two months. If he was a priest he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for two months, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] three.  According to Rabbi Judah, the husband is given a slightly longer period in which to “cool off” and have his vow released.  If he is an Israelite and he takes a vow that she should not benefit from his property for one month, he may provide for her with a “provider”.  However, if he takes a vow for two months, he must divorce her and give her her ketubah.  If he is a priest, if his vow is for two months he may provide for her with a provider, but if for three months he must divorce her.  The reason that Rabbi Judah gives more time to a priest is that a priest cannot remarry his own divorcee.  A regular Israelite can remarry his divorcee provided that she has not remarried someone else first.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Whereas in yesterday’s mishnah the husband tried to prevent his wife from benefiting from his property, in today’s mishnah he takes a to try to prevent her from eating any produce whatsoever.  This is obviously a much more expansive vow.
  We should note that the Talmud explains this mishnah as a case where the wife took the vow not to eat a certain fruit and the husband did not annul the vow, as is his right (see Numbers 30:11-15).  The reason why the Talmud explains the mishnah in this way is that a person can never take a vow to forbid another person to do something if it has nothing to do with his (the one who vowed) property.  In other words while Reuven can take a vow that Shimon can’t eat any of Reuven’s bread, Reuven cannot take a vow that Shimon can’t eat bread.  Therefore, our mishnah must deal with a case where the woman vowed and the man did not break the vow.
  I will explain the mishnah more according to its words than its explanation in the Talmud.  If we understand the mishnah without the Talmud’s explanation, we will need to conclude that a husband can take a vow to forbid his wife from doing anything; however, if he does so he will need to divorce her immediately.
  If a man forbade his wife by vow from tasting any kind of produce he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, if a man vows that his wife cannot eat any type of produce, he must divorce her immediately.  In this case he is not given any cooling off period, because his vow was so damaging.
  Rabbi Judah ruled: if he was an Israelite he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for one day, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] two days. If he was a priest he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for two days, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] three.  Rabbi Judah gives the man a day to cool off (and two for a priest, who cannot remarry his divorcee) but no more.  Again, since the vow was so inclusive, and she can only go for so long without eating produce, he must divorce her quite quickly.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a husband who vows that his wife should not adorn herself.  According to the mishnah, a woman has a right to adorn herself and therefore a husband who takes such a vow must divorce her.
  As in yesterday’s mishnah, the Talmud interprets the mishnah to refer to a situation where the wife vowed and the husband upheld the vow.  However, I will again explain the mishnah according to its words and not according to its Talmudic interpretation.
  If a man forbade his wife by vow that she should not adorn herself with any type of adornment he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.  If the husband vows that his wife not adorn herself with jewelry or with perfume, he must divorce her immediately.
  Rabbi Yose says: [this refers] to poor women if no time limit is given, and to rich women [if the time limit is] thirty days.  Rabbi Yose explains that there is a distinction between rich and poor wives in this matter.  If the wife was poor and he took an open-ended vow, he must divorce her immediately. However, if he set a time limit on the vow, he need not divorce her.  Because she is poor, she is accustomed to not adorning herself and a limited vow will not be so damaging.  According to the Talmud, the maximum time of the vow is 12 months.  However, were she rich, he could not take such a long vow, for she is accustomed to adorning herself frequently.  Therefore, the maximum time is thirty days; if he takes a vow of a longer duration, he must divorce her immediately.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a husband who attempts to prohibit his wife from seeing her father.
  If a man forbade his wife by vow that she may not go to her father’s house: --When the father lives with her in the same town, the husband may retain [her as his wife, if the prohibition was for] one month; but if for two months he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. --When the father lives in another town, the husband may retain [her as his wife, if the prohibition was for] one festival, but if for three festivals, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. In the scenario in this mishnah, a husband makes a vow that prohibits his wife from visiting her father.  You can imagine that this situation arose out of some tension between the two.  The mishnah rules that if the father is in the same town, he can prohibit her for only one month.  More than that, and he has to divorce her and give her the ketubah.  Since they live in the same town, more than a month without seeing each other would be too long of an absence for her or perhaps her father to bear. If the father lives in another town, the daughter assumedly sees him less frequently, and therefore the husband’s prohibition is allowed to stand slightly longer.  If he prohibits her for one festival (until the next festival), he may retain her as a wife.  According to the Talmud, in order to understand this section of the mishnah we must add into the mishnah that if he prohibits her for two festivals (until two festivals have past), he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.  If the husband was a priest, he may retain her if the prohibition was for two festivals, but must divorce her if for three.  The Talmud adds this extra clause into the mishnah, for otherwise it doesn’t deal with a prohibition of two festivals.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah five continues to discuss husbands who attempt to prevent their wives from doing certain things.
  If a man forbade his wife by vow from visiting a house of mourning or a house of feasting, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, because he has closed [peoples doors] against her.  A husband cannot prohibit his wife from paying a condolence call to a house of mourning or from celebrating at a wedding.  The mishnah reasons that he cannot do so for by preventing her from participating in others’ sorrows or joy, they will in return not visit her when she is mourning or celebrating one of her children’s weddings.  However, if he claims that his vow had a “cause”, which in the mishnah usually is a euphemism for sexual licentiousness, he may prohibit her from going.  In other words, if he fears that there will be illicit goings-on at the house of mourning, or more likely at the house of feasting, he may prohibit her from going there.
  If he claims [that his vow] was due to some other cause he is permitted [to forbid her]. If he said to her: “[There shall be no prohibition] provided you tell so-and-so what you have told me” or “what I have told you” or “that you will fill and pour out in the garbage”, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.  A husband cannot use a vow to force his wife to engage in behavior that will embarrass her.  He cannot force her to tell others secret things that he has told her or that she has told him.  The last phrase of this mishnah “fill and pour out in the garbage” is interpreted in two ways in the Talmud.  One interpretation is that it literally means that she should fill up jugs with water and then pour the water out into the garbage, an act that others will (rightfully) interpret as crazy.  Alternatively, it may be a euphemism for “spilling seed” (the man’s interrupting his intercourse with her).  A husband cannot force his wife to allow him to engage in such an act.  If he does so, she may demand a divorce and receive her ketubah.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The first five mishnayoth of this chapter referred to situations in which a husband must divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah.  In this mishnah we learn situations in which a husband has grounds for divorcing his wife and not paying her ketubah.  These situations refer to cases in which the woman has not behaved in a proper manner, either directly with her husband or with outside society.
  These leave [their marriage] without their ketubah: A wife who transgresses the law of Moses or Jewish law.  The mishnah describes two categories of women whose husbands may divorce them without paying their ketubah:  the one who transgresses the Law of Moses, which is interpreted to mean she causes her husband to transgress the Law of Moses, and the second is the one who transgresses Jewish law, which means she engages in immodest behavior.
  And what is the law of Moses? Feeding her husband with untithed food, having intercourse with him while in the period of her menstruation, not separating dough offering, or making vows and not fulfilling them.  The mishnah now lists four ways in which a wife might cause her husband to transgress.  If she does not separate the tithes or the dough-offering (hallah) her husband will eat forbidden food.  She has a responsibility to tell her husband when she is in her period of menstruation and if she does not and he has relations with her, he too is a transgressor.  The fourth category is somewhat less clear, for we would not imagine that the husband transgresses if his wife does not keep her vows.  The Talmud explains that children die as a result of broken vows and therefore she is injuring him as well.  A simpler explanation may be that since the husband has the right to annul his wife’s vows, he too is held responsible if she doesn’t keep them.
  And what is Jewish practice? Going out with her head uncovered, spinning wool in the marketplace or conversing with every man.  This section lists certain immodest actions that are grounds for divorce.  In Talmudic times women did not go out without their heads covered (for that matter, men also usually covered their heads).  Spinning in public was also considered unbecoming, perhaps because the woman would uncover her arms while spinning.  Talking with many strange men was also considered improper behavior for a married woman.  Since the woman engaged in one of these behaviors, her husband may divorce and not pay her ketubah. I might add my personal opinion that what was improper behavior must have been determined by norms in the larger society, at least to a large degree.  Since it was normal for women to cover their heads, Jewish women who did not were immodest.  I do not think that this implies that not covering one’s head is inherently immodest.  However, other Jews might disagree with me.
  Abba Shaul says: also one who curses her husband’s parents in his presence.  Abba Shaul adds that a woman’s cursing her husband’s parents in front of him is also grounds for divorce.
  Rabbi Tarfon says: also one who has a loud voice. And who is regarded as one who has a loud voice? A woman whose voice can be heard by her neighbors when she speaks inside her house.  Rabbi Tarfon adds that a woman whose voice is too loud, that is she can be heard by her neighbors from inside her home, may also be divorced without a ketubah.  The Talmud teaches that this refers to a woman who talks about sex too loudly.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss cases where a woman is divorced and does not receive her ketubah.  The cases in our mishnah are when a woman did not disclose to her husband things that he should have known before marrying her.
  We should note here that the mishnah will talk about physical defects found on both the woman and the man.  I think we should note here that these mishnayoth discuss the matters on a very legal plane.  That is to say the mishnayoth ask whether or not these defects can form the grounds for divorce.  These mishnayoth can be read as not  implying that such flaws make a person “worth less”, but merely as a recognizing that there are those in society who, unfortunately, do think so
  If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah.  It can be assumed that a husband does not want his wife to be subject to vows that will prevent her from engaging in certain activities, such as eating meat or drinking wine.  Such vows would certainly disrupt the normal functioning of a marriage.  If he betroths her on the specific condition that she is not subject to any vows, and after betrothal it is found out that she is subject to vows, she is not betrothed.  Since the betrothal was made under false pretenses it is invalid and she does not need a get to remarry, nor does she receive her ketubah.  However, if he did not make such a condition, and then later finds out that she is subject to vows, the marriage is valid. Nevertheless, since she should have told him that she had vows, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah.  In other words, the marriage was not exactly made under a false assumption and therefore she needs a get in order to remarry, but she still was dishonest with him and therefore she loses the ketubah.
  [If a woman was betrothed] on condition that she has no bodily defects, and she was found to have defects, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to have defects, she leaves without her ketubah. All defects which disqualify priests also disqualify women.  The same rule concerning a woman subject to vows is also true with regard to a woman who has physical defects.  If he specifically stipulated that she not have any physical defects (assumedly ones that he could not detect when she was clothed), and she does, the betrothal is invalid.  If he did not make a stipulation, the betrothal is valid but he may divorce her without paying the ketubah. With regard to physical defects, it is essential for us to know what physical defects are significant enough that they invalidate the betrothal or allow the husband to divorce her without paying the ketubah.  The answer is that any defect that disqualifies a priest from serving at the altar (see Lev 21:17), also disqualifies a woman.  These defects are listed in the seventh chapter of tractate Bekhorot.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah eight continues to discuss rules concerning bodily defects found on the woman that might cause her to lose her ketubah.  Again, she loses her ketubah because she had the responsibility to tell her husband about her defects before he married her.
  If she had bodily defects while she was still in her father’s house, her father must produce proof that these defects arose after she had been betrothed and that [consequently] it was the husband’s field that was flooded. If she was brought into her husband’s domain, [and the defects were discovered there] the husband must produce proof that these defects existed before she had been betrothed and [that consequently] his bargain was made in error the words of Rabbi Meir.  The question in this section is when did she develop these defects, before or after the betrothal.  If they did not exist before the betrothal, and then he discovered them at marriage, she does not lose her ketubah, because she could not have told him about the defects before the betrothal.  She loses the ketubah only if she had the defects at the time of betrothal and she withheld from him the fact that she had them.  Note that this argument, according to our mishnah, is between the father of the betrothed girl and the husband.  Clearly, the mishnah reflects a social reality whereby girls were married young, and their fathers decided whom they married and dealt with the economic aspects of the marriage. According to Rabbi Meir, if the defect was discovered while the girl was still in her father’s house, in other words after the betrothal but before she had moved to her husband’s house as the final step towards marriage, the legal assumption made is that the defects developed before she was betrothed.  Therefore, if the father wants his daughter to receive her ketubah, he must prove that the defects developed afterwards.  In contrast, if the defects are discovered when the wife comes to her husband’s home, it is assumed that they developed there.  Therefore the husband loses out and cannot divorce her without paying her the ketubah, unless he can prove that the defects existed before betrothal.  The mishnah again uses the graphic language “his field was flooded” to describe a woman who has been somehow damaged but whose husband cannot do anything about it (see above 1:6).
  The Sages say:  To what does this apply? Only to concealed defects; but with regard to defects that are exposed he cannot make any claim. And if there was a bath-house in the town he cannot make any claim even about concealed defects, because he [is assumed to have had her] examined by his female relatives.  The Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that the distinction that Rabbi Meir made between defects discovered while in her father’s home and those discovered while in her husband’s home is not valid.  Rather, the germane distinction is between concealed and revealed defects.  The husband can claim that he didn’t know about the defects only if they are concealed.  If they were revealed, and he married her in any case, he cannot later claim that had he known about them, he would not have married her.  Furthermore, if there is a bath-house in the city, it is assumed that his female relatives knew about even the concealed defects.  In such a case he can not make any claim.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  Up until now the mishnah has been discussing physical flaws found in a wife, which cause the marriage to either be annulled or her husband to be allowed to divorce her without paying the ketubah.  Just in case you thought that men were physically perfect, the last two mishnayoth of our chapter discuss physical flaws found in a man, that force him to divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah.
  A man in whom defects have arisen [after marriage] cannot be forced to divorce [his wife]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: To what does this apply: to minor defects, but with regard to major defects he can be forced to divorce her. If a woman marries a man and she finds that he has physical flaws that existed before the marriage and that he did not tell her about them, she can compel him to divorce her and pay her the ketubah. If she knew about them (or they were clearly noticeable and therefore should have known about them), and she married him in any case, she cannot later complain about them and use them as grounds for divorce.  Furthermore, if new defects arise after the marriage, she cannot force him to divorce her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the above is only true if the defect is small.  If the defect which arises after marriage is large, he must divorce her.  According to the Talmud’s explanation of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, if the defects are significant, she can force a divorce even if she knew about them before the marriage, for she can say that she thought that they wouldn’t disturb her but now they do.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah lists defects in a husband (either physical defects or ones related to his profession) that allow the woman to demand a divorce and receive her ketubah.
  These are the ones who are forced to divorce [their wives]: one who is afflicted with boils, one who has a polypus, a gatherer [of dog feces for the treatment of hides], a coppersmith or a tanner whether they were [in such a condition] before they married or whether they arose after they had married.  The wife of any husband who has one of the below-listed defects can demand a divorce, whether or not he had them before he was married. Clearly if they only developed after marriage, she can claim that she cannot remain with him and that she didn’t know he would be this way when she accepted his offer of betrothal.  The mishnah emphasizes that these defects are so physically revolting to a woman, that she has the right to be divorced even if she noticed them before he betrothal.  The defects are: 1. One who has boils. 2. One who has a polypus.  This is a Greek word for someone who has a protrusion on his nose that complicates breathing.  According to the Talmud he smells bad. 3. One who gathers dog feces, which was used in the processing of hides. 4. A coppersmith.  Assumedly, he too smells bad. 5. A tanner, who will carry an awful odor. Note that the effect of this mishnah is that a husband cannot work in such a profession without his wife’s profession.
  And concerning all these Rabbi Meir said: although the man made a condition with her [that she accept him despite these defects] she may nevertheless say, “I thought I could accept him, but now I cannot accept him.”  Rabbi Meir says that these defects are so repulsive to a woman that even if she explicitly stated that she could accept a husband in such a condition, she may retract her word and demand a divorce.
  The Sages say: she must accept [such a person] against her will, the only exception being a man afflicted with boils, because she [by her intercourse] will enervate him.  The Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir.  They hold that in most such cases, if the woman accepted upon herself to marry a man in such a condition, she cannot later say that he disgusts her and therefore demand a divorce.  The only case in which a woman can later demand a divorce is the case of a man who has boils because she “enervates” him. This means that when they have intercourse, she actually wears down his flesh and this is dangerous for him.  Since he will refuse to have relations with her, she may demand a divorce.  After all, she is guaranteed her conjugal rights.
  It once happened at Sidon that a tanner died, and he had a brother who was also a tanner. The Sages said:  she may say, “I was able to accept your brother but I cannot accept you.”  This chapter of mishnah concludes with a story that happened in Sidon, on the coast of modern Lebanon.  There a woman was married to a tanner who died, leaving her liable for yibbum with his brother, who also worked as a tanner.  She claimed that she didn’t want to have yibbum because living with a tanner is revolting and unbearable.  The brother, assumedly claimed, that if she could endure his brother the tanner, she could endure him. The Sages ruled that the woman has the right to say that she could endure her original husband but not his brother.  Perhaps she liked her original husband enough that she was willing to put up with his smell.  She will not necessarily like his brother this much. Therefore, he must perform halitzah and she receives her ketubah.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Chapter eight discusses a wife’s ability to own money independently of her husband. Possessions that come into her hands while married belong to her, but her husband has usufruct on them.  Therefore, since he too has rights, she cannot sell them.
  If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid.He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and do you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”  Money that a woman receives before she is betrothed is hers.  She may give it away or sell it, even after she has been betrothed.  However, as we will learn later, once she is married she no longer can do so.
  If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?”  If she comes into possession of property after betrothal, but before marriage, Beth Shammai maintains that she may still sell or give away the property.  However, Beth Hillel says that a priori she does not have the right to do so.  The reason is that once she is betrothed she will likely be married, and at the point of marriage her husband will have the rights to the usufruct from her property.  Therefore, already at betrothal Beth Hillel says she may not sell her property. However, both Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai agree that if she goes ahead and sells her property anyway, the sale is valid.  Rabbi Judah presents an argument against this previous line, an argument that had been presented in front of Rabban Gamaliel a generation earlier.  The Sages argued that since the husband has already, at the point of betrothal, acquired the woman as his wife, should he not also, at that point, acquire her property.  In other words, even if she had sold it, these Sages believe that the sale should be annulled.  Rabban Gamaliel says that he is distressed enough that according to the halakhah, if a woman came into possession of property after marriage and then sold it, the sale is annulled.  This halakhah does not seem reasonable to Rabban Gamaliel, but he evidently does not have the ability to change it.  However, he argues that what these Sages want to do is expand the same halakhah and apply it to the point of betrothal as well. This statement, which also appears at the end of this mishnah, provides an interesting glimpse of rabbinic authority to modify Judaism versus their acceptance of tradition.  The rabbis in the mishnah are receivers of traditions which certainly predate them.  While these traditions are in their minds authoritative, this does not mean that they blindly accept them.  As much as they do accept these traditions, they also, at least occasionally, limit their applicability and recognize the problematic aspects to the tradition.
  If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers.  If she comes into possession of property after marriage, everyone agrees that she may not sell or give the property away and that even if she does the sale is invalid.  The husband can then go to the purchaser and reclaim that which his wife sold.  You can imagine that this halakhah would make it difficult for women to sell things in their society.
  [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?”  If she came into possession of property before the marriage and then got married, she may not a priori sell the property, but according to Rabban Gamaliel, if she nevertheless does, the sale is valid. According to Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya, the argument brought in front of Rabban Gamaliel mentioned above, was actually in connection to this case, and not in connection to the case of a woman who sold property after betrothal but before marriage.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the opinion in the previous mishnah that states that under certain circumstances a woman cannot sell property, and that if she does, the sale is void.  As we shall see, Rabbi Shimon qualifies that statement.
  Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between one kind of property and another: Property that is known to the husband [the wife] may not sell, and if she has sold it or given it away her act is void; [Property] which is unknown to the husband she may not sell, but if she has sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. According to Rabbi Shimon, if the husband knew about the property that the woman had received, she may not sell the property and if she does, the sale is invalid.  The reason for this is that if this was property she had received before the marriage, and her husband knew about it, he might claim that he married her because of that money.  As much as this does not sound like a good reason to get married, it certainly was a common motivation in those days (and in ours as well) and is a valid complaint of the husband’s.  However, if the husband did not know about the property and then she sold it, while she should not have done so, the sale is still valid.  In this case, since he didn’t even know about the money, he can’t claim that he married her because of it.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah discusses what is to be done with money that a wife somehow receives, for instance through an inheritance, while she is married.  The general rule is that the money is used to buy land and then the woman receives title to the land and the husband is entitled to the usufruct, that is the money that is earned through use of the land.
  [If a married woman] came into the possession of money, land should be bought with the money and the husband is entitled to the usufruct.  Section one sets out the general rule about money a wife receives while married.  Money cannot be divided up as easily into principle and interest as can land, even though today we are accustomed to such a division. Were the husband to use the money there would be no interest.  Were he to merely hold onto the money, there would be no usufruct.  Therefore, land is bought so that there is both usufruct and principle. Today, we might say that he could put the money into the bank and use the interest, in the same way that an endowment fund works.
  [If she came into the possession of] produce that was detached from the ground,   land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct.  Produce detached from the ground is basically equivalent to money, and therefore it is sold in order to buy land.
  [If it was] produce attached to the ground Rabbi Meir says, the land is to be valued as to how much it is worth with the produce and how much without the produce, and with the difference land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct. The Sages say: produce attached to the ground belongs to the husband and produced detached from it belongs to the wife; [with the proceeds from the latter] land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct.  The mishnah now discusses a more complex case, where she inherited land with produce attached to the land.  According to Rabbi Meir, the value of this produce is part of the principle, and therefore that principle must be used to buy land, from which he receives only the usufruct.  The way that the value of the produce is evaluated is by estimating the value of the land without the produce and the value of the land with the produce.  The difference between these two amounts is used to buy land, and then he receives the usufruct.  For instance if the land was worth 1000 zuz without produce and then 1200 with produce, the land is sold in order to buy a piece of land worth 1200.  From this land the husband receives the usufruct. The Sages rule that the produce attached to the land belongs to the husband. This is considered usufruct, even though this produce was not grown while his wife owned the land.  Since it is “usufruct” its value goes straight into his pocket.  Only the already-harvested produce belongs to her and is used to buy land, from which he receives usufruct.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Rabbi Shimon teaches a general rule to help govern what belongs to the husband and what belongs to the wife.
  Rabbi Shimon says: In respect to that in which the husband is at an advantage when he marries his wife he is at a disadvantage when he divorces her and in respect to that in which he is at a disadvantage when he marries her he is at an advantage when he divorces her. Produce which is attached to the ground is the husband’s when he marries his wife and hers when he divorces her, Produce that is detached from the ground is hers when she marries but the husband’s when she is divorced. In this mishnah Rabbi Shimon teaches a simple way of remembering which produce belongs to the husband and which produce belongs to the wife during marriage and after its dissolution.  When the marriage begins, and as part of her dowry she brings a field that has on it produce attached to the ground, that produce is considered to be like produce grown after the marriage, and it belongs to him.  This is the opinion of the Sages in the previous mishnah.  When the marriage is dissolved through death or divorce the produce attached to the ground remains the property of the woman, as does the ground itself.   In an opposite direction, produce which is detached from the ground is hers when she is married.  If she brings this as part of her dowry, then it is used to buy land, as we learned above.  However, at the time of divorce, detached produce already belongs to the husband and he need not return it to his wife.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah deals with a woman who inherits slaves to old to work or trees that are too old to produce fruit.
  The second part of the mishnah deals with the expenditures that the husband puts out in taking care of his wife’s property.
  If she inherited old slaves or female slaves, they are to be sold, and land purchased with the proceeds, and the husband can enjoy the usufruct. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says:  she need not sell them, because they are the glory of her father’s house.  If a woman inherited old slaves who can no longer perform real work, the husband might want to sell them so that he will receive greater usufruct.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, he has a right to sell these slaves and to use the proceeds to buy land.  In such a manner her property will also be preserved for the slaves would have soon died in any case.  However, one doubts whether the sale would be very profitable in any case. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel rules that the woman can demand that the slaves be kept, since they are a sign of her family’s ancestral wealth.  Although they cannot now perform a significant amount of work, their connection to the family and to the family’s honor gives the woman the right to retain them.
  If she inherited old olive-trees or vines they must be sold, and land purchased with the proceeds, and the husband can enjoy the usufruct. Rabbi Judah says: she need not sell them, because they are the glory of her paternal house.  This section teaches the same rule with regard to old vines and olive trees.  Again the husband would want to sell them to increase his usufruct.
  He who spent money in connection with his wife’s property, whether he spent much and consumed little, [or spent] little and consumed much, what he has spent he has spent, and what he has consumed he has consumed. If he spent but did not consume he may take an oath as to how much he has spent and receive compensation.  If a husband has expenditures in managing his wife’s property, he cannot recoup those expenditures from the wife’s property (meaning the principle).  However, this is only if he also consumes the usufruct.  If he does not, he may receive compensation by taking an oath as to how much he spent.  The Talmud teaches that he cannot recoup more than the gain in the value of the property.  In other words, if he dug a irrigation system that cost 100 zuz, and thereby raised the value of the field by 75 zuz, he only receives 75 zuz.  If he raised the value by 125 zuz, he receives 100, the amount of his expenditures.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah appeared word for word in Yevamoth 4:3.  I have replicated my commentary here for convenience sake.  Despite the fact that this is its second appearance, it is likely that it was first taught in this context, where it matches the literary pattern of the rest of the mishnah.  Only later was it brought to Yevamoth.
  If a woman awaiting yibbum came into possession of money: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away, and that her act is legally valid.  Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that a shomereth yavam can sell new property that has come into her hands since the death of her first husband.  She does not need the permission of the yavam, because he has not married her.
  If she dies, what shall be done with her ketubah and with property that comes in and goes out with her? Beth Shammai says: the heirs of her husband are to share it with the heirs of her father; Beth Hillel says: the property is to remain with those in whose possession it is, the ketubah is to remain in the possession of the heirs of the husband and the property which comes in and goes out with her remains in the possession of the heirs of her father.  If she dies, there is a dispute between the two houses concerning her inheritance.  Usually a husband inherits his wife, but in this case she only had a yavam who had not yet performed yibbum.  He is not fully her husband. Beth Shammai holds that the heirs of her husband, meaning the yavam who inherits from his dead brother, splits the money with the heirs of her father.  The heirs of the father inherit since an unmarried woman is inherited by her father. Beth Hillel does not split the money evenly.  Rather, each part of the inheritance remains where it is presumed to be.  Since the ketubah, meaning the money paid from the husband to the wife upon death or divorce, is still with the husband’s estate, the husband’s inheritors collect this money. The dowry is in the wife’s possession, since the husband cannot sell it.  Therefore the wife’s father’s inheritors inherit this property.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah continues to teach laws regarding the potential yavam’s rights with his shomeret yavam’s (the woman whose husband has died) property.  The yavam cannot make free use of this property because the woman has a lien on it from her ketubah.
  If his brother left money, land shall be bought with it and he enjoys the usufruct.Rabbi Meir says, the land is to be valued as to how much it is worth with the produce and how much without the produce, and with the difference land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct.  The shomeret yavam has a lien on all of her dead husband’s property, meaning it is collateral for her ketubah.  Therefore, the yavam does not have a right to sell, give away or otherwise use up this property.  If this property was land, the yavam has a right to the usufruct but not to the principle.  If the property was money, the money is used to buy land and then the yavam can use the usufruct.
  [If the his brother left] produce that was detached from the ground, land shall be bought [out of the proceeds] and he enjoys the usufruct.The Sages say: produce attached to the ground belongs to the husband but that which is detached from the ground belongs to the first person who takes it:  Produce that is detached from the ground is treated like money; it too is sold and the proceeds are used to buy land, from which the yavam benefits from the usufruct.
  [If it was] produce attached to the ground: ( If he [seized it] first he acquires ownership; and if she [seized it] first land shall be bought with it and he enjoys the usufruct.  If the produce was attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir says this produce is also part of the original husband’s property which had on it a lien from her ketubah.  Therefore, it is evaluated and in essence sold to buy more land.  This is the same method that Rabbi Meir stated above in mishnah three. According to the Sages the produce which is attached to the ground belongs to the husband.  The Talmud emends this to read “to her”, meaning that since this produce grew while owned by her original husband, it to is liable for her ketubah.  There is no debate between the Sages and Rabbi Meir on this issue. The Sages dispute, however, with regard to the produce which is detached from the ground.  In their opinion, this produce does not have on it a lien from her ketubah, for ketuboth are not collectable from movable property (a category that includes most things that are not land).  Therefore, if the yavam takes this produce it is totally his.  If the woman takes the property, it now belongs to her and it is sold, the husband receiving the usufruct and the woman the principle.  According to most commentators, the Sages hold that the same is true for money; there is no lien on it from her ketubah and therefore it is “up for grabs”.
  If he married her she is his wife in every respect save that her ketubah remains a debt on her first husband’s estate.  Once he marries her, she is his full wife in all matters, except that she collects her ketubah from her first husband’s property.  The Talmud relates that if the first husband did not have any property, the yavam must give her a ketubah.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, in which we learned that the widow has a lien on the dead brother’s property.  The yavam cannot even pay off her ketubah and then use this property.
  He cannot say to her, “Behold your ketubah lies on the table’, rather all of his property has on it a lien from her kethubah.  The yavam cannot say to his yevamah that he has designated for her a specific piece of property for her ketubah and that he therefore can do what he pleases with the remainder of his brother’s property.  Rather he cannot sell any of his brother’s property.
  So too, a man may not say to his wife, behold your ketubah lies on the table, but all of his property has on it a lien from her ketubah. If he divorced her she is entitled only to her ketubah. If he remarried her she is like all other wives, and is entitled only to her ketubah.  Similarly a man may not set aside a certain piece of property and designate it for his wife’s ketubah.  When Shimon ben Shetach established the rabbinic ketubah, part or perhaps all of his legal innovation, was that all of a man’s property is subject to his wife’s ketubah.  This is not to say that a man cannot sell his own property.  However, if he does, and then when the wife comes to collect her ketubah her husband or his estate cannot pay it off, she can reclaim the previously sold property from its purchasers.
  If the yavam divorces his yevamah, he can now pay off her ketubah and then sell the rest of the brother’s property.  If he remarries her, she no longer has the status of a yevamah, but rather she is like all other wives, who cannot prevent their husband’s from selling their property.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a husband’s renunciation of the rights to his wife’s property.
  If a husband writes to his wife, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property”, he may enjoy its usufruct during her lifetime and, when she dies, he is her heir. If so, why might he have written to her, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property”?That if she sold it or gave it away her act is valid.  The reality behind the scenarios mentioned in this mishnah is probably that the woman or her family would not agree to the marriage unless the husband renounced his rights to her property.  Therefore the mishnah lists the effect that different statements will have on his rights.  The general principle is that these statements are interpreted as minimally as possible.  That is to say, we assume that the husband intended to relinquish as few rights as possible.  Therefore, if he states that he has no claim upon her property, he still can benefit from the usufruct and he still inherits her.  The only thing that he relinquishes is his right to prevent her from selling or even giving away her property.
  If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon their produce”, he may not enjoy their usufruct during her lifetime but, when she dies, he inherits her. Rabbi Judah says: he may in all cases enjoy the usufruct from the usufruct unless he wrote to her:  “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon its produce and the produce of its produce and so on without end.”  In this case, the husband specifically relinquishes his claim on the usufruct from her property.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, he can no longer benefit from the usufruct, but he does inherit her property when she dies.  Rabbi Judah interprets his statement even more minimally; while he cannot use the produce itself, he may sell the produce and that which he buys from it is his.
  If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property, its produce and the produce of its produce during your lifetime and after your death”, he may neither enjoy it produce during her lifetime nor does he inherit her when she dies. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says:  when she dies he inherits her because [by his declaration] he is making a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah and whenever a man makes a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is null and void.  In this case, the husband specifies that he has no claim on his wife’s property, and no claim on its produce or on the proceeds obtained from selling the produce, neither while she is alive nor after she dies.  With this comprehensive statement, the husband now has no rights whatsoever to his wife’s property and does not even inherit her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel points out a problem with this statement.  The Torah mandates that a husband inherits his wife.  By making such a stipulation, the husband is actually subverting Torah law.  Therefore, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, the stipulation is null and void.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This remainder of this chapter deals with the wife’s ability to collect her ketubah from the husband’s estate.
  In general, inheritors are not liable to pay their father’s debts from movable property which they inherited.  Only land is liable for these debts.  Our mishnah deals with the specific case where the inheritors have not yet collected what was owed to their father.
  A man died and left a wife, a creditor, and heirs and he also had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others: Rabbi Tarfon says:  It shall be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: We do not show mercy in a matter of law.  Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath. The husband dies while having a deposit or a loan in the possession of others. The question is:  to whom is this money repaid, to the widow, to the creditor or to the inheritors?  According to Rabbi Tarfon the weakest among the parties is the one who receives the money.  The Talmud offers two explanations for who is the weakest.  According to one interpretation, the weakest is the one whose proof that s/he is owed a debt is weakest.  According to another interpretation, the weakest refers to the woman’s ketubah, for it is not easy for a woman to chase down those who owe her the ketubah.  In any case, Rabbi Tarfon agrees that although in general movable property is not used to pay off a deceased person’s debt, in this case, since the inheritors had not yet received the money, it is used. Rabbi Akiva categorically rejects Rabbi Tarfon’s application of mercy to a matter of law.  Law must operate blindly, ignoring who is weak and who is strong.  The law must decide in favor of the one whose claim is the strongest.  According to Rabbi Akiva, in our case this is the inheritors.  Their case is strongest for they inherit their father’s estate without taking an oath, whereas debtors and widows must swear that they have not already received their due before they collect.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah.  It again deals with a case of a man who dies and leaves a widow who wishes to collect her ketubah, a creditor who wishes to collect a debt and inheritors who want their rightful inheritance.  The difference is that whereas yesterday’s mishnah dealt with money that was still in the hands of others at the time of the husband’s death, our mishnah deals with a case where the husband leaves produce already detached from the ground.  As I mentioned yesterday, such produce has the status of movable property, from which debts and ketuboth are not generally collectable.
  As an addendum, we should note that in the geonic period, the period right after the completion of the Talmud, which lasted from around 600 to 1100 C.E., the rabbis revised the Talmudic law and stated that a woman and a creditor can collect their debts from movable property. The reason for such a change was that their society was not based on the ownership of real estate, as society was to a much larger extent in the land of Israel in the 3rd century.
  If he left produce that was detached from the ground, whoever seizes it first acquires possession.  If the husband left produce detached from the ground, the first of the collectors to seize it acquires it.  This is because no one has an absolute right greater than the other and therefore their seizing of the property is effective.  We should note that although this idea sounds foreign to us, perhaps even like vigilantism, it is basically similar to the idea that the person who does not have possession has the burden of proof.  If for instance the wife takes the property, she has possession and now the others would have to prove that it is not rightfully hers.  Since they cannot prove this, she keeps the produce.  Furthermore, since it is unclear who is the rightful owner, the court would not be able to make any ruling even if the parties had asked its advice.
  If the wife took possession of more than the amount of her ketubah, or a creditor of more than the value of his debt, the balance: Rabbi Tarfon says: it should be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: we do not show mercy in a matter of law.  Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.  Despite the fact that anyone can seize the property, the widow and the creditor cannot take more than they are owed. If they do, Rabbi Tarfon rules that the remainder of the money goes to the weaker of the remaining two parties.  According to the Talmud this means that it would go to the woman if the creditor had seized the money or to the creditor if the woman seized the money. Rabbi Akiva rules, as he did in the above mishnah, that in cases of law no mercy is shown.  Therefore, the inheritors take the remainder for they collect their inheritance without an oath, whereas creditors and widows must swear an oath before they can collect their respective debts.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  We learned in Shevuoth 7:8: “And these take an oath though there is no [definite] claim:  partners, tenants, guardians, the wife who transacts the affairs in the house, and the son of the house.” In other words in these cases one person can make another person swear an oath that he has not misused any of his property.  Our mishnah further clarifies when a husband can make his wife take an oath.
  A wife’s managing her husband’s affairs would not have been uncommon in Mishnaic society, especially if many of the men were merchants.  Merchants are often away from home for long periods and while they are gone, it is typically the woman who manages the affairs of the houses.
  If a husband set up his wife as a shopkeeper or appointed her guardian he may impose upon her an oath whenever he wants.  If a husband appointed his wife to sell his produce in a store or to otherwise be a guardian over his property, he may at any time he wishes make her swear an oath that she has not acted improperly with his property.  This is not because women are inherently not trustworthy, but rather because a person in such a situation may take certain licenses with property that is not his/hers.  The fact that the husband, or in cases of partnership a partner, can make the other party take an oath, would probably have acted as a deterrent, preventing the person managing the funds from acting wrongly.  Unfortunately, the problem of people taking license with money or property which they have been appointed to guard over, is still a major problem in our society. According to the Talmud, a husband who did not appoint his wife as a shopkeeper or guardian cannot make her swear an oath over normal things that happen in the house. Allowing him to do so, and to be so tight-fisted with his property, would not help peace reign over their house.
  Rabbi Eliezer said:  even in respect of her spindle and her dough.  This last point is disputed by Rabbi Eliezer.  He holds that a husband can make his wife take an oath that she did not take for personal use any of the wool that he provided for her spindle nor from the dough that she uses for baking.  Rabbi Eliezer evidently does not think that this will lead to a disruption of the household harmony, or he does not care.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  In mishnah one we learned that a husband can renounce his right to use his wife’s property.  After learning in mishnah four that a husband has a right to make his wife swear that she did not misuse his property, our mishnah teaches that a husband may renounce this right as well.  We can easily imagine a scenario in which a woman says that she will not agree to be a storekeeper for her husband if he is so distrusting of her that he will make her take an oath. Therefore, perhaps as a precondition to her doing certain work for him, she makes him renounce this right.
  As in mishnah one, the rabbis minimally interpret each of these sayings.  In each case the court would assume that the husband renounced the minimal amount of rights that can be interpreted as being referred to in his statement.  For him to fully renounce his or his inheritors’ ability to make her swear an oath, he must be very explicit in his statement.
  If he (the wrote to her (his, “I have no claim upon you for either a vow   or an oath”, he cannot make her swear an oath. However, he may make her heirs and upon those who have done business with her swear an oath.  If he states that he will not make her take an oath, he may still make her inheritors or others who may have bought her ketubah or to whom she may have sold her ketubah take an oath or a vow.  The case of her inheritors or those who bought her ketubah can occur if he divorced his wife and then she died and these people wish to collect her ketubah.  The husband may make them swear that the woman did not give them any part of her ketubah that she had already collected, nor did she mention that she had already collected her ketubah, nor did they find among her papers documentation that she had received her ketubah.  If they can swear that all of this is true, then they may collect the woman’s ketubah.
  [If he wrote,] “I have no claim upon you for either a vow or an oath nor upon your heirs nor upon those who have done business with you”, he may not impose an oath either upon her or upon her heirs or upon those who have done business with you. However his heirs may impose an oath upon her or upon her heirs or upon those who have done business with her.  If the husband states that he will not make her swear, nor her inheritors nor those who had business with her, then he can’t make any of them swear.  However, his inheritors can make them swear.  In other words, if the husband dies, his inheritors can make the wife swear that she had not received her ketubah before she collects from them.  If the husband divorces his wife and then she dies and then the husband dies, his inheritors can make the wife’s inheritors or those who might have bought her ketubah swear the same oath we saw above.
  [If he wrote] “Neither I nor my heirs nor those who have done business with me shall have any claim upon you or upon your heirs or upon those who have done business with you for either a vow or an oath”, neither he nor his heirs nor those who have done business with him may impose an oath either upon her or upon her heirs or upon those who have done business with her.  If the husband writes that even his inheritors or others who have had business with him will not be able to make his wife, her inheritors or those who have had business with her swear an oath, then none of the latter need take an oath.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah refers to a situation where the husband exempted his wife from having to swear an oath and he also stated that his heirs may not make her take such an oath.  The mishnah asks whether or not the heirs may make her take an oath about her subsequent guardianship over her dead husband’s property.  This situation would arise because typically the widow would continue to live in her husband’s home until she either died or remarried.
  If she went from her husband’s grave to her father’s house, or returned to her father-in-law’s house but was not made a guardian, the heirs may not make her swear an oath.  If after the death of her husband, she leaves her husband’s house and returns to her father’s house, or when she returns to her husband’s house she does not act as a guardian over his estate, the inheritors cannot make her swear an oath when she collects her ketubah.  This is because her husband specifically exempted her from needing to take such an oath.  The mishnah additionally informs us that she does not take an oath over the expenses that she incurred while dealing with the burial of her husband, for if she knew that she would have to take an oath, she might not give her husband a proper burial.  (We might have thought that since these costs were incurred after his death, she would have to take an oath about her use of the money).  In order to ensure respect for the dead, the mishnah teaches that the inheritors may not make her take an oath that she did not take anything for herself while paying for her husband’s funeral.
  But if she was made a guardian the heirs may make her swear an oath in respect of [her administration] during the subsequent period but not in respect of the past.  If she was made a guardian over her husband’s property after his death, then the heirs can make her take an oath about subsequent use of the property but not about past use.  The stipulation that her husband made that she should not have to take an oath was only effective over things done in his lifetime and not her management of his affairs after his death.  If she was afraid of taking an oath, she could have declined acting as a guardian over the estate.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Most women are able to collect their ketubah without taking an oath that they did not previously collect.  However, some women must first take an oath.  This mishnah lists the category of such women and the following mishnah shall explain it more fully.  Hence I will largely refrain from commenting until tomorrow’s mishnah.
  A woman who impairs her kethubah is not paid except by an oath.  This refers to a woman who admits that she has already received part of her ketubah.
  If one witness testifies against her that [her kethubah] has been paid, she is not be paid except by an oath.  The husband needs two witnesses in order to prove that his wife has already received her ketubah.  One witness is only sufficient to make her swear an oath that she has not.
  From the property of orphans, from property with a lien on it and [from the property of] an husband who is not present she is not paid except by an oath.  These categories will be explained more fully in tomorrow’s mishnah.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah explains yesterday’s mishnah, regarding which women must take an oath in order to receive their ketubah.  We should note that the mishnah is not making any statement about distrusting women; if so they would not be allowed to take an oath!  Rather in general even when a person is trustworthy s/he must sometimes take an oath in order to collect money.
  “A woman who impairs her kethubah”: How is this so? If her ketubah was for a thousand zuz and [her husband] said to her, “You have already received your kethubah”, and she says, “I received only a maneh”, she is not paid [the balance] except by an oath.  A woman who “impairs her ketubah” is defined as one who has admitted that she has received part of her ketubah.  The reason that she must take an oath to recover the rest is that one who pays back a debt is assumed to know more accurately that s/he paid back then someone who is receiving the debt.  Therefore, we suspect that she might have forgotten that she did indeed receive the entire ketubah.  To ensure that she did not she must take an oath.
  “If one witness testifies against her that [her kethubah] has been paid”:  How is this so? If her ketubah was for a thousand zuz and [her husband] said to her, “You have already received your ketubah”, and she says, “I have not received it” and one witness testifies against her that [the ketubah] has been paid, she is not paid except by an oath.  If one witness testifies that she did receive the whole ketubah, she must take an oath that she did not. This is the same as all cases of a single witness in Jewish law, who is not sufficient to provide full and valid testimony, but is sufficient to make the opposing party swear that what the witness says is not true.
  “From property with a lien on it”:  How is this so? He had sold his property to others and she seeks to recover payment from the buyers, she is not paid except by an oath.  At the point of marriage, the wife’s ketubah creates a lien on all of her husband’s property.  If when she comes to collect her ketubah, he has no property, she can recover from anything he might have sold or given away after their marriage.  However, she must take an oath to those people who purchased the party that she has not previously collected.  This is because the purchasers cannot know whether or not the husband had already paid back the ketubah.
  “From the property of orphans”:  How is this so? He died and left his estate to his orphans and she seeks to recover payment from the orphans, she is not paid except by an oath.  For the same reason, if she collects the ketubah from her husband’s inheritors, she must take an oath.
  “An husband who is not present” How is this so? If her husband went to a country beyond the sea and she seeks to recover payment in his absence, she is not paid except by an oath.  Finally, if she collects her ketubah when her husband is abroad, for instance he sent her a get, before she collects her ketubah she must take an oath. This is because we are suspicious that since her husband is not there, she might be more brazen and lie.  To deter her from lying she must take an oath.
  Rabbi Shimon says: whenever she claims her ketubah the heirs may impose an oath upon her but whenever she does not claim her ketubah the heirs can not impose an oath upon her.  Rabbi Shimon says that if she has requested her ketubah, the heirs may make her take an oath, even if her husband had said that she would not be subject to an oath.  According to Rabbi Shimon, this stipulation does not cause the heirs to lose their right to demand that their father’s wife take an oath about her ketubah.  However, if she does not claim her ketubah, and rather prefers to continue to live on his estate (as is her right, as we shall see later in the Mishnah), the heirs cannot make her take an oath even if she was appointed guardian over his estate.  Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the halakhah found in mishnayoth four and five, that a husband has a right to make his wife swear an oath if she was appointed guardian or storekeeper.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses various issues of a woman’s collecting her ketubah.
  If she produced a get without a ketubah, she collects her kethubah.  If she comes to the court and brings evidence that she has been divorced, she can collect her ketubah.  The court would then make a sign on the get, in order to prevent her from collecting again.
  [If she produced her] ketubah without a get, and she says, “My get was lost”, and he says, “My receipt was lost”, and also a creditor who produced a debt document that was unaccompanied by a prosbul, these are not paid back.  If however, she brings a ketubah without a get, and the husband claims that he paid the ketubah but lost his receipt, the husband is believed and she cannot recover her ketubah payment.  Similarly, if a creditor comes to court with a debt document but has no prosbul, which is a document that allows debts to be collected even after the sabbatical year, and the creditor claims that he had a prosbul and lost it, he is not paid back.  The reason is that we suspect that he never wrote a prosbul in the first place.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah with out a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul.  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel discusses “the time of danger” usually understood as referring to the Bar-Kochva revolt, which was crushed by the Romans in 135 C.E.  From that time and onward it was dangerous for Jews to travel while in possession of a get or a prosbul because the Roman authorities had decreed against the observance of the Jewish religion.  Therefore during that time period a woman could collect her ketubah without a get and a creditor could collect his debt without a prosbul.
  [A woman who produced] two letters of divorce and two ketuboth collects two kethuboth.  If she produces two ketuboth and two gittin (the plural of get), all from the same husband, she collects the value of both ketuboth.  This is a case where he divorced her and remarried her (this is permitted as long as she doesn’t remarry someone else in-between) and gave her a new ketubah for the second marriage.
  Two kethuboth and one get or one kethubah and two gittin, or a kethubah, a get and [evidence of her husband’s] death, she collects one kethubah only, for a man who divorces his wife and then remarries her contracts his second marriage on the condition of the first kethubah.  However, if she has two ketuboth and one get, or two gittin and one ketubah, or one of each and proof of her husband’s death, she does not receive two ketuboth.  This is because we assume that when he married her a second time, he married her on the condition that she receives only her first ketubah, which was as of yet unpaid.  In the case of “two ketuboth” she receives only one for there is an assumption that a husband who writes two ketuboth for his wife only intends on giving her one.  Perhaps the second ketubah was to hang as art on their wall!
  A minor whose his father had given him in marriage, the ketubah of his wife is valid,  since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife.  In this case when the ketubah was written the minor was incapable of obligating himself to incur a debt.  However, the ketubah is valid when he reaches majority age for when he continues living with his wife, he is doing so with the intention of paying the ketubah.  Although when the ketubah was first written he could not legally obligate himself to pay it, his remaining with his wife after he reaches majority age is interpretable as acceptance of such an obligation.
  A convert who converted with his wife, the kethubah remains valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife.  Similarly, a gentile couple who convert, could not have taken on the legal obligation for a ketubah when they were not Jews.  However, his remaining with his wife after their conversion does effect his obligation.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Above in chapter four, mishnah ten, we learned that sons inherit their mothers ketuboth, above and beyond the inheritance they receive from their father.  This clause in the mishnah is called “ketubat benin dichrin” which is Aramaic for “the ketubah of male children”.  Our mishnah talks about situations in which a man had  two wives and either he died or both of the wives died.
  If a man was married to two wives and died, the first wife takes precedence over the second, and the heirs of the first wife take precedence over the heirs of the second.  If a man dies and leaves two wives, the first wife’s ketubah takes precedence over that of the second wife.  If after the first wife collects her ketubah not enough money remains to pay the second wife, she will not receive her full ketubah.  This is because the debt to the first wife was incurred before the debt to the second wife. If before they collect their ketubah, the wives die, the first wife’s heirs take the ketubah before the second wife’s heirs take theirs.
  If he married a first wife and she died and then he married a second wife and he died, the second wife and her heirs take precedence over the heirs of the first wife.  In this case the first wife dies while the husband is still alive, and he inherits her and her ketubah.  He then marries a second wife and he dies.  The first wife’s heirs want to now collect the ketubah (ketubat benin dichrin) from their mother, as I explained in the introduction.  The second wife, or if she subsequently dies, her heirs, want their ketubah.  The mishnah rules that the second wife or her heirs collect first because they are collecting a normal ketubah and they are like creditors who come to collect a debt.  In contrast the first wife’s inheritors are collecting an inheritance which they have received from their mother and the payment of debts always takes precedence over inheritance.  Therefore the second wife or her heirs receives their ketubah and only if enough money remains will the first wife’s heirs receive their ketubah.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  In the previous mishnah we began to learn some rules about the “ketubath benin dichrin” which is the clause in the ketubah which states that sons inherit their mother’s ketubah above and beyond their split in their father’s inheritance.  Our mishnah teaches that this is only so when there is enough for there to be an inheritance of at least one denar after all of the “ketuboth benin dichrin” have been paid out.  The reason is that “ketubath benin dichrin” is an enactment of the Sages whereas inheritance laws are mandated by the Torah.  If we allowed the ketuboth benin dichrin to be collected and no inheritance to be split, than an enactment of the Sages would displace a law from the Torah.
  If a man was married to two wives and they died, and subsequently he died, and the orphans [of one of the wives] claim their mother’s kethubah and there is only enough for the two kethuboth,[all the orphans] they divide it equally.  Let us say Reuven is married to two women, Leah and Hannah.  Leah has a ketubah of 1000 zuz and Hannah has a ketubah of 100 zuz.  After having children, both women die, and Reuven inherits both ketuboth.  When Reuven dies, Leah’s children want to collect their ketubah.  The Mishnah teaches that if there is only enough to pay back both ketuboth, i.e. there is only 1100 in Reuven’s estate, then all of the money is split evenly.  There must be an inheritance, since it is a Toraitic law.
  If there was a surplus of [at least] one dinar, these take their mother’s ketubah and these take their mothers ketubah.  If in the above case when Reuven dies he leaves an estate of more than 1100, even if the estate is only 1101, Leah’s children take their mother’s ketubah of 1000, Hannah’s children receive 100 and the last denar is split evenly.
  If the orphans [of one of the wives] says, “We are raising the estate of our father by a denar [more than the total amount of the kethuboth]”, in order that they can take their mother's kethubah, they are not listened to, rather the estate is evaluated by the court.  As we can see from the above scenario, it is definitely in Leah’s children’s best interest that there be a surplus over the value of the two ketuboth.  The mishnah now states that they may not artificially raise the value of the inheritance, by adding a denar or more, in order to take their mother’s ketubah.  If the estate was worth 1100, they may not pitch in one denar in order to make the estate worth 1101, so that they could take 1000.  If they try to do so they will be denied and the inheritance will be split evenly.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of the previous mishnah, which dealt with ketuboth benin dichrin.  As we learned yesterday, ketuboth benin dichrin may not be collected if by there collection there would remain no money for the inheritance.
  If there was property that would soon belong to the estate, it is not [regarded] as [property held] in possession.  If there was not enough in the father’s estate to cover both “ketuboth benin dichrin”, the mothers’ ketuboth that the sons wish to inherit, then the inheritance is split evenly between all of the sons.  Our mishnah teaches that the estate is not considered to include property that is not currently in its possession.  This refers to an inheritance that will soon fall to the estate, for instance from the grandfather, or money that the father had loaned to others and had not yet been collected. Although this money will too eventually be divided up between the heirs, since it is not currently available, and indeed there is always the possibility that the money will never come to the estate, it is not considered into the equation.
  Rabbi Shimon says: even if there was movable property it is not regarded unless there was real estate worth one denar more than [the total amount of] the two kethuboth.  Rabbi Shimon says that the extra denar which must exist in order for the ketuboth benin dichrin to be collected must be in land and cannot be in movable property.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a man who married three women at the same time, and gave one of them a ketubah worth one maneh (100 zuz), the second a ketubah worth 200 and the third a ketubah worth 300.  When he dies, and does not leave enough to cover all three, the question is how do they divide up his estate.
  I am explaining this mishnah according to Albeck’s explanation, who uses R. Saadiah Gaon’s explanation to the mishnah as his basis.  The Talmud offers a different, more complicated explanation.
  The general rule is that any maneh (100 zuz) that is “responsible” for all three ketuboth, they divide equally.  In our case, 100 zuz is “responsible” for all three, because all three have at least one maneh of a ketubah. Any maneh that is not responsible for all of the ketuboth is divided according to the percentage that they deserve from the total amount of ketubah money the man owes.  In our case the total amount is 600 zuz; the first woman owns 1/6, the second 1/3 and the third 1/2.  This shall be illustrated as we proceed.
  If a man who was married to three wives died, and the kethubah of one was a maneh, and of the other two hundred zuz, and of the third three hundred zuz and the estate [was worth] only one maneh they divide it equally.  If the estate was worth only one maneh, each woman has an equal right to this maneh.  This is because the maneh is “responsible” for all three ketuboth.  Therefore they divide it equally.
  If the estate [was worth] two hundred zuz [the woman whose ketubah] is a maneh receives fifty zuz [and the woman whose ketubah] was two hundred and [the woman whose ketubah] was three hundred [receive each] three gold denarii (=seventy-five.  If the estate was worth 200, the first maneh is divided equally, as above.  The second maneh is not “responsible” for all three ketuboth, hence it is not divided equally but rather by percentages.  The first woman takes 1/6 of 100, leaving her with a total of 50 zuz.  There is now 150 zuz left, all of which is subject to the ketuboth of the second and third widows.  Therefore it is divided equally, both women taking 75 zuz.
  If the estate [was worth] three hundred zuz, [the woman whose ketubah] was a maneh receives fifty zuz  and [the woman whose ketubah] was two hundred [receives] a maneh  and [the woman whose ketubah] was worth three hundred [receives] six gold denarii (=one hundred and fifty.  In this case all three divide according to their percentages.  The first woman takes 1/6 which is 50 zuz, the second woman takes 1/3 which is 100 zuz, and the third woman takes 150 zuz, which is 1/2.  In such a scenario, each woman takes one-half of her ketubah.  [Note that this division seems to work according to a different system from the previous two clauses.]
  Similarly, if three persons contributed to a joint fund and the fund lost or gained they share in the same manner.  If three or more people invest together, each investing a different percentage, when they divide up the profits or losses, they are divided in the same manner.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned of a case where a husband married several women at the same time, each having a ketubah of a different size.  In today’s mishnah we learn about the case of several women who were married to one man, but at different times.
  If a man who was married to four wives died, his first wife takes precedence over the second, the second over the third and the third over the fourth.  This section’s halakhah is basically the same as that which we learned in mishnah one.  It is brought here as an introduction to the rest of the mishnah.
  The first must take an oath to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth recovers payment without an oath. Ben Nannus says:  Should she be rewarded because she is the last? She too may not exact payment except by an oath.  Each wife must take an oath to the subsequent wife that she did not already take her ketubah.  The subsequent wives are concerned lest there not remain enough money to collect their own ketuboth and hence they have a right to make the previous wives swear.  However, the fourth wife does not need to take an oath.  Of course, if there are inheritors she needs to take an oath in any case, as we learned in 8:9. According to Ben Nannus, even the fourth wife must take an oath.  The Talmud explains that this oath would be significant if it turns out that one of the fields that one of the first wives collected for her ketubah did not really belong to the husband and therefore was taken away from the wife who had collected it.  In such a case the wife who had received that field would want to collect from the fourth wife but she can’t because the fourth wife is not obligated to give up property that she had already received.  However, the oath ensures the previous wife that at least the fourth wife did not collect illegitimately.
  If all were issued on the same day then the woman [whose kethubah] preceded that of the other, even if only by one hour, gets [her ketubah first]. And so it was the custom in Jerusalem to write the hours.  If all ketuboth were issued on the same day, then the precedence can be determined by the hour written into the ketubah.  The mishnah teaches that this indeed was the custom in Jerusalem.  Today we don’t write hours into ketuboth.  Then again, men can no longer marry two wives!
  If all kethuboth were issued at the same hour and the estate is worth no more than a maneh, they divide it equally.  If all of the ketuboth were issued during the same hour, then the halakhah is as it was in mishnah four.  If there is only one maneh, they all share it equally.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with cases where multiple parties are attempting to collect a debt.
  If a man who was married to two wives sold his field, and the first wife wrote to the buyer, “I have no claim whatsoever upon you”, the second wife may take [the field] away from the buyer, and the first wife from the second, and the buyer from the first wife; and so they go on in turn until they arrange a compromise between them. The same law applies also to a creditor and to a woman creditor. In this case a man marries two women, but not simultaneously.  At this point all of his property has a lien on it from the two ketuboth.  Later he sells a field to a buyer, who gets the first wife to promise him that should her husband die, she will not collect that field as her ketubah.  Then the husband dies and cannot repay either ketubah.  The first wife cannot claim the field from the purchaser, because she relinquished that right.  However, the second wife can collect from the purchaser (she did not relinquish any rights) and then the first wife can collect from the second wife, because her ketubah takes precedence.  Then the buyer can take back the field from the first wife, because she relinquished her claim on that field, at which point the second wife can again claim from the purchaser.  This process will continue in circles until they come up with a compromise. The same is true with the case of a creditor, a borrower and two purchasers. A borrower has two fields and sells them to two different people, and the value of the each field is equal to the value of the debt.  Then the creditor writes to the second purchaser that he will not collect from that field. If the borrower defaults he may collect from the first purchaser, and the first purchaser may collect from the second purchaser, from whom the creditor may collect.  On and on this process would go until they reach a compromise. The same would be true for a woman creditor, which means a woman whose husband owes her her ketubah.  This is the same case as above.  The husband sells two fields to two different people and the wife writes to the second one that she would not collect from his field.  She may then collect from the first field, the first purchaser may collect from the second and the second from the wife.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah and the following mishnah deal with the rights of a widow to continue to live on her husband’s estate.
  A widow is to be maintained out of the estate of [her husband's] orphans [and], her handiwork belongs to them but it is not their obligation to bury her. Her heirs, who inherit her ketubah, are obligated to bury her. In mishnah 4:12 we learned that one of the stipulations written into every woman’s ketubah is that if she becomes a widow she may continue to reside on her husband’s estate and be supported by the inheritance that he left for his children (be they her children or not).  Our mishnah adds that since these heirs are supporting her, any handiwork that she produces belongs to them.  This is the same arrangement that would have existed while her husband was alive; she received guaranteed support and in return anything she made belonged to him. However, unlike her husband who was obligated to pay for her burial, the heirs who are supporting the widow are not obligated to do so. The difference is that these heirs will not (necessarily) inherit from her, whereas her husband did inherit from her.  Her heirs (either her father or her children from another marriage) are responsible for her burial.  The underlying reasoning behind this makes some sense; the person who will benefit financially from the estate of the deceased is responsible for the burial.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  As we learned yesterday, a widow is entitled to receive maintenance from her husband’s estate.  Our mishnah discusses when a widow is allowed to sell her husband’s property in order to obtain money with which to support herself or in order to collect her ketubah.
  A widow, whether [her husband died] after betrothal or after marriage may sell [her husband's estate] without [permission from] a court.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, a widow may sell her deceased husband’s property whether she was widowed after she had been fully married, in which case she sells the property in order to pay for her maintenance or collect her ketubah, or whether she was widowed after betrothal but before marriage, in which case she sells solely to collect her ketubah.  In either case she may sell this property without the sanction of the court.
  Rabbi Shimon says: [If her husband died] after marriage she may sell without [permission from] a court, but if after betrothal, she may not sell except with [permission from] a court, since she is not entitled to maintenance, and anyone who is not entitled to maintenance may not sell except with [permission from] a court.  Rabbi Shimon makes a distinction between a widow who had been married and one who had only been betrothed.  The former may sell without the court’s permission, for she cannot wait each time to receive the court’s permission to sell in order to collect her maintenance.  However, since the betrothed woman does not receive maintenance payments from her husband, she may not sell her husband’s property without permission from the court.  Only those who are selling in order to receive money for maintenance can sell without a court.  For a widow to have to wait for the court’s permission every time she wishes to sell something in order to buy food or clothing would indeed be too troublesome.  Therefore the widow who is collecting maintenance, i.e. one who was already married, does not need the court’s permission.  In contrast, collecting the ketubah is a one time occurrence and it is not such great trouble for the widow to come to the court once to sell property from which to collect her ketubah.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah is a continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement from yesterday’s mishnah.  Rabbi Shimon limited the ability of a woman to sell her husband’s estate without permission from a court.
  The remainder of the mishnah discusses other situations where a woman might have to sell her husband’s property in order to collect her ketubah or to provide maintenance for herself.
  [A widow who] sold her ketubah or part of it; or pledged her ketubah or part of it; or gave it away to someone else or part of it, may not sell [her husband’s property] in order to receive the remainder of her ketubah except with [the permission of] a court.  Rabbi Shimon holds that if in some way a woman has used up part of her ketubah, either by selling or giving it or part of it away, or by using it as collateral for a loan, she may not sell her husband’s property in order to collect the remainder without the permission of a court.  This is because Rabbi Shimon holds that a woman who has already sold, given away or pledged even part of her ketubah, no longer receives maintenance from her husband’s estate and anyone who does not receive maintenance from her husband’s estate cannot sell except with the permission of a court.
  But the Sages say: she may sell [the land pledged for her kethubah] even in four or five installments.  And [meanwhile] she may sell [of her husband’s estate to provide] for her maintenance without [the permission of] the court, and she writes, “I sold [the land to provide] for my maintenance”.  The Sages hold that a woman can sell her husband’s property even in stages and that this does not cause her to lose her right to collect maintenance.  If after she has sold part of the estate to collect her ketubah, she wants to sell part of the estate to provide maintenance for herself, she should write in the document that she sold this to collect maintenance.  Then the proceeds of such a sale will not count as part of her ketubah.  Note that this gives her a great deal of leeway; she can sell most of the ketubah and still receive maintenance money.
  A divorced woman must not sell [her husband’s property] except with [the permission of] the court.  Although according to the Sages a widow may always sell her husband’s property in order to collect her ketubah, and she never needs the permission of a court, the divorcee always needs the permission of a court.  The reason why a widow does not have to appear before the court is that we assume that the husband would not have wanted his widow to have to do so, for it is somewhat embarrassing to have to go to court to get money to pay for basic needs.  However, a man who divorces his wife does not care if she is embarrassed to go to court.  Therefore, if she wishes to collect her ketubah, she needs the court’s permission.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a widow who when selling her field either overestimates or underestimates the value of the field.  The questions are, 1)  is she deemed to have received her ketubah; 2) is the sale valid.
  If a widow whose ketubah was two hundred zuz sold [land] worth a maneh for two hundred zuz or [land] worth two hundred zuz for one maneh, she has received her ketubah.  There are two cases mentioned in this section.  In both the widow is selling her husband’s land in order to collect her ketubah, which is worth 200 denar.  In the first case she sells a field that was worth 100 zuz (a maneh) for 200 denar.  Although her husband’s estate only lost land worth 100 zuz, since she received 200 denar, she has received her ketubah and does not receive anymore.  In the second case, she sells land worth 200 zuz for 100 zuz.  Since her husband’s estate sold off a field worth 200 zuz, it has paid off her ketubah, even though she only received 100.  In other words, the husband’s estate always gets the benefit of the doubt.
  If her kethubah was one maneh, and she sold [land] worth a maneh and a denar’ for one maneh, her sale is void. Even if she says, “I will return the denar to the heirs”, her sale is void. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: her sale is always valid unless there was so much land there as to allow her to leave a field of nine kab, and from a garden an area of half a kab, or, according to Rabbi Akiba, a quarter of a kab.  If she sells land worth more than her ketubah, the sale is invalid. This land is not hers and she only had permission to sell up to the value of her ketubah.  Even if she says that she will pay back the extra denar to her husband’s inheritors, she is not allowed to do, if the inheritors want back their land. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that the sale is only nullified if the extra amount sold would have left the inheritors with a field in which nine kab of seed can be planted, about 3750 square amot (a little over 60 x 60 amot).  If it was a garden of vegetables, the size is smaller, about 208 square amot or 104 square amot according to Rabbi Akiba.   If the size of the extra land sold is smaller than this, the sale is valid.
  If her ketubah was four hundred zuz and she sold [land] to [three] persons, to each for one maneh, and to a fourth [she sold] what was worth a maneh and a denar for one maneh, [the sale] to the last person is void but [the sale] to all the others are valid.  If her ketubah was 400 zuz, and she sold fields worth 100 to three different people and to the last person she sold a field worth 101, only the last sale is invalid.  Each sale is considered on its own merits, and it was only the last sale which went over the limit.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a case where a court erred in the evaluation of property while selling it to pay for the widow’s ketubah or for her maintenance.
  If an assessment of the judges was one sixth less, or one sixth more [than the actual value of the property] their sale is void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: their sale is valid for, otherwise, of what advantage is the power of a court?  If the assessment was either one sixth less or one sixth more than the real value of the property, the sale sanctioned by the court is nullified.  This is similar to the rule of fraud which we learned in Bava Metzia 4:3. In contrast, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel rules that there is no rule of “fraud” when a court sells.  Unlike individuals who sell, their sale may be invalidated if they over or under priced the object by more than one sixth.  This idea of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is an idea that he brings up in several places.  Basically, the respect for the court is a more important value than the fact that the court actually sold the field for the wrong price.
  But if they made a bill for inspection, their sale is valid even if they sold for two hundred zuz what was worth one maneh or for one maneh what was worth two hundred zuz.  If the court made out what is called a “bill for inspection” then even if they over or under sold by more than one sixth, the sale is valid, even according to the opinion in section one.  A bill of inspection is a document that announces that a court will be selling a certain piece of land to pay off a debt.  This will allow others to come and inspect the land and if the land is still under or over sold, the court at least has gone through the proper process.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The last mishnah of our chapter deals with cases where a marriage was prohibited or was ended by the wife’s refusal of the marriage or by her being found to be an aylonit.  To remind ourselves, a girl who is married off by her brothers or mother when she is a minor may refuse the marriage when she becomes of majority age.
  An aylonit is a woman who never reaches puberty.  Categorically she cannot have children (a woman who can have children cannot be called an aylonit).  In both of these cases the marriage is annulled.
  [A minor] who refused her husband, a secondary incest prohibition, or an aylonit is not entitled to a ketubah or to the usufruct [of her dowry] or to maintenance, or to the worn-out articles [of her dowry]. If from the outset he had married on the understanding that she is an aylonit she is entitled to a ketubah.  The rule in all of these cases is that the woman does not receive a ketubah, nor is the husband liable to pay for her maintenance, nor does she receive the usufruct from her dowry which he used while they were married, nor does she receive compensation for things that she brought into her marriage which her husband has used up.  In other words she gets no financial benefits from her husband that would accrue to her by being married to him, nor does he does have to return to her any benefits that he received during the marriage. The girl who refused the marriage loses her benefits because by refusing the marriage she is in essence annulling it. The aylonit loses her benefits because her marriage is considered to be mistaken.  That is to say, since the man didn’t know that she was an aylonit and had he known he would not have married her, the marriage is annulled.  That is why in the next section the mishnah states that had he married her knowing that she was an aylonit, he is obligated to give her a ketubah. The secondary incest prohibitions (see Yevamot 2:4) do not receive a ketubah because the Sages fine them for not having observed the laws of incest.  Below we shall see that these fines exist only for those who transgress rabbinic marital prohibitions but not Biblical ones.
  A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah who was married to a regular priest, a mamzereth or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a Natin or a mamzer is entitled to a ketubah.  The prohibitions in this mishnah are called “prohibitions of holiness” in Yevamoth 2:4.  Even though all of these marriages were prohibited, the women still receive their ketuboth, and according to the Talmud they also receive all of the other benefits listed in this mishnah. What is seemingly strange here is that although the prohibitions in this section are from the Torah and those in the previous section of the mishnah are only rabbinic prohibitions, in these latter cases the woman is not fined whereas in the former cases she was.  The answer is that the rabbis felt the need to strengthen their own prohibitions with penalties; a woman who marries a man prohibited to her only through rabbinic law does not receive benefits.  Hence she will not agree to be married in such a case.  In contrast, Biblical prohibitions are sufficiently strong to stand on their own, without additional sanctions.  Hence, these women do receive the benefits.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a case where a widow who already had a daughter married a man and cut a deal with him that he provide food and clothing for this daughter for five years.
  If a man married a woman and she cut a deal with him that he should maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years.  Since he promised to maintain her for five years, he is obligated to do so, no matter what the circumstances, as we shall see below.
  If she was [subsequently] married to another man and cut a deal with him [as well] that he should maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years. The first husband may not plead, “If she will come to me I will maintain her”, rather he must send her maintenance to her at the place where her mother [lives]. Similarly, the two husbands cannot plead, “We will maintain her jointly”, but one must maintain her and the other give her the cost of her maintenance.  If this woman is divorced from this husband and goes and gets married again, and then cuts a deal with the new husband that he should maintain the daughter for five years, the first husband is still obligated, even though the daughter will now receive maintenance from the second husband. The first husband may not say that he will maintain her only if she comes back to live with him.  Even though the first husband intended to maintain her so that he could be married to her mother, he is still obligated.  If necessary he must send her maintenance money to wherever she may be. Finally, the two husbands cannot split the costs of the daughter’s maintenance.  Rather each one must bear the full costs; one provides the actual food and clothing and another provides the monetary equivalent.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss the girl whose mother’s husband or husbands promised to support her for five years.
  If she married her husband must supply her with maintenance and they give her the cost of her maintenance.  If the daughter, who is receiving maintenance from her mother’s husbands, should marry, her husband is obligated to pay for her maintenance, as are husbands in all cases.  Nevertheless, this does not relieve her mother’s husbands from their obligations.  Rather her own husband gives her the food and clothing and other things that she requires and her mother’s husbands each pay her the equivalent value of her maintenance.
  If they die, their daughters are maintained out of their free assets only but she must be maintained even out of assigned property, because she is like a creditor.  If her mother’s husbands die, there may arise a situation where she is competing with his daughters for maintenance.  [If there are sons, daughters do not inherit but rather are maintained from their father’s estate.]  In such a situation, their own daughters receive maintenance only from free assets, property actually in possession of the estate.  This is the general rule for those maintained by an estate; they do not repossess property from those to whom the estate holder gave or sold property.  In contrast, the husbands actually have a debt to the other daughter, the one with whose mother they cut a deal.  Therefore, she may take her maintenance money even from assigned property, property which was sold or given away after the marriage or her mother.  Since she is a creditor, she collects from the estate in the same manner as do all creditors.
  Clever men used to write, “On condition that I shall maintain your daughter for five years while you are with me”.  By now we have seen that if a man cuts such a deal, he has an absolute debt to this daughter, one which is not mitigated by divorce or his wife’s death, his death or by the daughter’s marriage.  Therefore, clever husbands would limit the original stipulation, promising to feed the daughter only as long as the mother was with him.  If he wrote the stipulation in such a manner, if he died, or she died or he divorced her, he would no longer be liable.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  A widow who has not claimed her ketubah is maintained from the estate of her husband.  Our mishnah deals with the question of whether or not the widow needs to be in her husband’s house to receive her maintenance from her husband’s inheritors.
  A widow who says, “I do not want to move from my husband’s house”, the heirs cannot tell her, “Go to your father’s house and we will maintain you”, rather they must maintain her in her husband’s house and they give her a residence according to her honor.  A widow has a right to remain in her husband’s house and receive her maintenance there. The inheritors cannot ask her to leave, even if they promise to provide her with maintenance somewhere else.  Furthermore, they must provide for her at the same level that she received while her husband was alive. If her husband lived the lifestyle of the rich and famous, she may continue to do so, even if it eats into his children’s inheritance.  She must live in a proper part of her husband’s house and may not be put into lesser attractive quarters.
  If she said, “I have no desire to move from my father’s house”, the heirs can say to her, “If you stay with us you will have your maintenance, but if you do not stay with us you will receive no maintenance”.  However, the widow does not have the right to force the heirs to give her maintenance money elsewhere.  If she wishes to live in her father’s house, the inheritors can respond that she will only receive maintenance in her former husband’s house.
  If she claimed [that she didn’t want to live there] because she is young and they are young, they must maintain her while she lives in the house of her father.  The mishnah now mentions the one exception to this preceding rule.  If she is young and they are young, she may not want to live there for fear of impropriety.  It may even be that she may not be that different from them in age.  If she makes such a claim, she may receive her maintenance money in her father’s home.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The last mishnah of this chapter deals with how long a widow has to collect her ketubah.  As we shall see, this depends on whether she lives in her father’s house or remains in her husband’s house.
  As long as she lives in her father’s house she may collect her kethubah at any time. As long as she lives in her husband’s house she may recover her ketubah, only within twenty-five years, because in the course of twenty-five years she has sufficient opportunities to give favors equal [in value to the amount of] her ketubah, the words of Rabbi Meir who spoke in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel.  According to Rabbi Meir, if a widow returns to live in her father’s house she may collect her ketubah from her husband’s inheritors even after 25 years.  However, if she remains in her husband’s home, if she doesn’t collect the ketubah within twenty-five years, she forfeits it.  The reason given is that in twenty-five years it can be assumed that she gave away to friends and neighbors property equal to the ketubah.  Since this is technically not her money to give away, she loses her ketubah.  In any case we should note that twenty-five years is quite a long time.  Assumedly, a young widow who intended to remarry would have left her previous husband’s home within the twenty-five years in any case.   Furthermore, if she requests the ketubah in the twenty-fourth year, she receives the whole thing, even though she may have spent 24 years giving little things away to friends.  In the end, this mishnah strikes me as quite generous to the widow.
  The Sages say:  as long as she lives in her husband’s house she may collect her ketubah at any time. As long as she lives in her father’s house she may collect her ketubah only within twenty-five years.  The Sages posit an opposite system.  According to them, the widow loses her ketubah after twenty-five years, not because we assume that she has given it away, but rather because after twenty-five years we can assume that she has “forgiven” the ketubah to her husband’s inheritors.  Therefore, if she remains at her husband’s home she may always later decide to leave and collect her ketubah.  The reason that she didn’t ask for her ketubah earlier is that since she was living with the inheritors she may have been embarrassed to ask them.  In contrast, if she lives at her father’s home, she has no excuse for not asking for it within twenty-five years, and hence after such a long time, the ketubah is considered to have been forgiven.  Again, the important thing to realize is that which is unstated:  a widow always has 25 years in which to collect her ketubah, no matter where she lives.
  If [the widow] died, her heirs must mention her ketubah within twenty-five years.  Although the widow herself sometimes has more than 25 years in which to collect the ketubah, should she die before she collects her ketubah, her inheritors must always stake a claim within this time.  Some interpret this as 25 years within the death of the husband and some say it refers to 25 years from the death of the wife.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Chapter thirteen of Ketuboth is organized differently from the other chapters of Ketuboth, or for that matter, differently from most of the Mishnah.  Instead of being organized topically, it is organized mostly according to the sayings of two judges who lived in Jerusalem during the Second Temple period:  Admon and Hanan ben Avishalom.  The mishnah calls them “judges of fines”; they were probably civil judges.
  The first mishnah concerns a wife whose husband has gone abroad and did not leave her sufficient money to provide for her maintenance.  The wife then approaches the court, asking permission to sell the husband’s property in order to provide maintenance for herself. It is assumed by all that she must take an oath when he returns, that she used the proceeds for her maintenance, and that she has not kept anything for other use.  Alternatively, if her husband claims that he did leave her with provisions, she might taken an oath that he did not.  The question is, must she also take an oath before she sells his property, that he did not leave her with anything.
  There were two judges of fines in Jerusalem, Admon and Hanan ben Avishalom. Hanan stated two rulings and Admon stated seven.  This section introduces the rest of the chapter.  We shall see that the two things that Hanan says were both disputed by a group called “the sons of the high priest”.  Assumedly, this was a priestly court, whose center was the Temple.  Admon was disputed by “the sages” in all seven things that he said.  This gives us an opportunity to realize why these traditions and not others by Admon or Hanan were preserved. These were the issues upon which there were debates.
  If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance: Hanan says: she must take an oath at the end but not at the beginning. The sons of the high priests differed from him and ruled that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end.  According to Hanan, the woman takes an oath only when her husband returns, but not when she initially sells his property.  In contrast, the sons of the high priests say that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end.  Note, that all agree that she may sell his property, for according to the marriage contract, he owes her maintenance.  The only question is, when must she swear.
  Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well; she need take an oath only at the end.  The final section of this mishnah is attributed to later sages, ones that lived after the destruction of the Temple.   Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agrees with the sons of the high priests, but the final word is given to Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakai who agrees with Hanan.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  The format of this mishnah is identical to yesterday’s mishnah.  The subject is whether or not a person who provided out of his own pocket for a woman whose husband went overseas without leaving her with maintenance can demand his money back from the husband.
  If a man went to a country beyond the sea and someone came forward and financially supported his wife, Hanan says: he lost his money.  According to Hanan, the person who financially supported the wife cannot recover his money, since there was no promise from the husband that he would repay him, nor was there any indication from the woman that she was receiving his help as a loan.  He helped her out of the goodness of his own heart, but this does not give him the right to recover his expenses.
  The sons of the high priests differed from him and said: let him take an oath as to how much he spent and recover it.  The sons of the high priests rule that the man can take an oath when the husband returns and recover what he spent.  This is probably because the husband neglected the basic responsibility for providing for his wife.  He should not, therefore, benefit from the other man’s generosity.  Furthermore, we might assume that the man did not provide for her as a gift but rather assumed that he would recover his money.
  Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well [the man] put his money on the horn of a deer.  Again, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agrees with the sons of the high priests.  Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai uses some colorful language to express his agreement with Hanan.  The provider has “put his money on the horn of a deer”.  Just as a deer will run away and be hard to catch, so too the provider has made his money hard to recover.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The mishnah now begins to list Admon’s rulings.  You will note that instead of the “sons of the high priests” or R. Yohanan ben Zakkai, in these mishnayoth R. Gamaliel is the respondent.
  The first ruling deals with a situation in which a man dies and does not leave an estate large enough for his sons to inherit and his daughters to be maintained.  Note that we learned this mishnah already in Bava Batra 9:1.
  Admon said seven [rulings]:If a man dies and leaves sons and daughters, if the estate is large, the sons inherit it and the daughters are maintained [from it].  According to Jewish inheritance law, daughters do not inherit if there are sons.  According to a mandatory stipulation written in every ketubah (see Ketuboth 4:11), girls are provided for by the man’s inheritance until they reach a certain age, or are married.  If the estate is sufficient, then both of these rules can be fulfilled and there is no problem.
  And if the estate is small, the daughters are maintained from it, and the sons can go begging. Admon said, “Just because I’m a male I lose out!” Rabban Gamaliel said; I agree with the words of Admon.  If, however, there was not enough property, the daughters maintenance takes precedence over the sons inheritance.  In such a case the sons will have to beg at people’s doors.  In what might seem like an ironic statement to some women reading this mishnah, Admon complains that one should not lose out just because he is male.  It is not entirely clear from the mishnah itself what Admon thinks the halakhah should be.  In any case, Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Admon.  We should note that the accepted halakhah is against Admon.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the claim, he must swear. But the Sages say: the admission is not of the same kind as the claim.Rabban Gamaliel said:  I agree with the words of Admon.In chapter six of Shevuoth we learned that one who admits to part of a debt, must take an oath that he does not owe the rest.  Our mishnah deals with the case where Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him jars of oil and Shimon admitted only that he owes empty jars.  The question is, is this a case of partial admission.  The same mishnah was brought in Shevuoth 6:3.In this scenario Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him jars of oil.  Shimon admitted that he owed Reuven jars but denied that he owed the oil.  According to Admon, an early Sage, this is considered a partial admission to the claim:  Reuven claimed jars and oil and Shimon admitted only to the jars but denied the oil.  Therefore Shimon must swear that he doesn’t owe the oil.  The other Sages who disagree with Admon say that Reuven really only claimed oil.  The fact that Reuven said “jars of oil” was in order to express the amount of oil that he was claiming from Shimon.  Since the claim and the admission were of different kinds, Shimon does not swear.  Rabban Gamaliel says that he agrees with Admon.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with the case of a father-in-law who at the time of betrothal promised to give his prospective son-in-law money and then reneged on his promise, before the marriage to his daughter.  From the mishnah it is not entirely clear why he reneges, or whether he just cannot afford to pay the promised sum.  The question is, what happens to the daughter in this case if the son-in-law does not want to marry her until the father gives him the money.
  We can see here in this mishnah a reflection where marriage choice was often tied to economic matters.  Indeed, this was typically the situation in most Jewish marriages, and probably in most non-Jewish marriages as well, until modern times.  This is not to say that attraction between the couple was not a factor at all; just that it was probably not the primary factor.
  If a man promised a money to his [prospective] son-in-law and then defaulted, [his daughter] shall sit until her hair turns white.  In this situation, the father has reneged on the money, but the girl is already betrothed to the man.  She cannot marry anyone else without first receiving a get.  According to the first opinion, the son-in-law can effectively hold the girl hostage as a betrothed woman, until the father-in-law pays him the promised money.  This is certainly a grave situation for her, much worse than not being married at all.
  Admon says:  She may say, “Had I myself promised the sum I would sit until my hair turns white, but now that my father has promised it, what can I do? Either marry me or set me free.” Rabban Gamaliel said:  I agree with the words of Admon.  Admon holds that since it is not the girls fault herself, she can force the husband to either marry her or divorce her so that she may marry others.  If she herself had promised the money, the husband could force her to remain betrothed and not married or divorced.  However, since the father made the promise, why should she suffer.  Again, Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Admon.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The fourth ruling stated by Admon is not connected at all to the issue of marriage, but rather has to deal with a person who signed on another person’s deed to a piece of land but later claims that the land is actually his own.  Note that in this and the following mishnayoth, Admon disputes with the Sages and that Rabban Gamaliel is absent.  It seems that this is a second collection of Admon’s sayings, joined by the editors of the Mishnah to the first.
  If a man contests [the ownership of] a field and he has signed as a witness on [its deed of sale], Admon says:  He can say, “[Litigation with] the second is easier for me, since the first is a more difficult person than he”. But the Sages say:  He lost his right.  In this case Reuven claims that a piece of land that Shimon possesses is actually his.  Shimon proves that the land is his by showing a sale document on which Reuven is signed as a witness.  The deed says that Shimon bought the land from Levi.  Shimon says that Reuven’s signature is de facto proof that he admits that the land is Shimon’s. According to Admon, Reuven may claim that he signed on the deed because he preferred to claim the land from Shimon than claim it from Levi.  His signature on the deed is therefore not proof that he has admitted that the land belongs to Shimon.  He can still bring other proof that the land belongs to him. The Sages disagree and state that the signature is proof of such an admission and therefore even if Reuven brings proof that the land actually belongs to him, he cannot reclaim it.
  If [the protester] made it a boundary mark [when selling an adjacent piece of land to] another person he has lost his right [to protest].  In this cases, Reuven again claims that a piece of land that Shimon possesses actually belongs to him.  However, Shimon brings a deed of sale for another piece of land, in which Reuven used the piece of land under dispute as a border marker for the property being sold.  Reuven would not have used this piece of land as a border marker had he thought the land belonged to him himself.  Since in this case Reuven cannot say he did so because litigation with the second is easier, he has lost his right to make a claim.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Another dispute between the Sages and Admon.
  If a man went to a country beyond the sea and [in his absence] the path to his field was lost, Admon ruled: let him walk [to his field] by the shortest way. But the Sages say: let him purchase a path for himself even if it costs him a hundred maneh or let him fly through the air. A man owns a path that goes to his field through other fields. When the man returns from having gone abroad, the path has been overgrown (for no one was there to take care of it) and it is no longer distinguishable from the remainder of the field.  Admon says that he may walk through the shortest path available to get to his field.  The owner of the field through which he walks must allow him to use this ground.  However, he can only take the shortest path, since that is the least damaging. The Sages say that he must purchase a path from the owner of the field through which he wants to walk, even if that owner will only sell it to him for a hundred maneh (10,000 zuz, an exaggerated amount).  His only alternative is to fly through the air to get to his field.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  In the scenario in this mishnah, Reuven takes out a document that says that Shimon owes him money. Shimon claims that he paid back the debt, but that he lost his receipt.  The mishnah then discusses a possible clue that Shimon might bring to prove that he already paid Reuven back.  Again, Admon and the Sages disagree.
  If a man produced a debt document against another, and the latter produced [a deed of sale showing] that the former had sold him a field,  Admon ruled: [The other] can say, had I owed you [anything] you should have been paid pack when you sold me the field”. But the Sages say: This [seller] was clever, since he may have sold him the land in order to be able to take it from him as a pledge. In this case, Reuven takes out a document which states that Shimon owes him money.  In response, Shimon takes out a sale document which shows that Reuven sold him a field.  Shimon says the fact that Reuven sold him a field and collected money from him, proves that Reuven didn’t believe that Shimon still owed him money.  Had Reuven thought that Shimon owed him money, he should have taken out the debt document then and taken the money and not given him the field.  Admon rules that Shimon’s words are accepted and that he does not have to repay the debt. However, the Sages rule that Reuven was clever.  He may have sold Shimon the land so that later if Shimon defaulted on the debt, Reuven would be able to collect the land.  In other words, the fact that Reuven sold him the land does not mean that Reuven didn't think that Shimon owed him money.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This is the last teaching of Admon.  It concerns two people who each have a document of debt from the other.
  If two men produced debt documents against one another, Admon says; [the holder of the later document can say to the other,] “Had I owed you [any money] how is it that you borrowed from me?” But the Sages say: This one collects his debt and this one collects his debt. In this case Reuven has a document saying that Shimon borrowed from him, and Shimon has a later document that says that Reuven borrowed from him.  Shimon claims that he already paid Reuven back, but that he lost his receipt. According to Admon, Shimon says that if he really owed money to Reuven, how come Reuven did not just collect his debt, and instead borrowed money from him.  Since, according to Admon, this is not logical, it must be that Shimon did not owe Reuven money when Reuven borrowed.  Therefore, Shimon collects his debt and Reuven does not collect his. The Sages say that nevertheless, since both men have documents of debt, they can both collect.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  The final two mishnayoth of Ketuboth deal mostly with a husband (and in the next mishnah) a wife’s ability to force the other spouse to change residences.
  Our mishnah presents limitations on when a husband is allowed to force his wife to move.  Note that if both parties agree to the move, there is no problem.  The mishnah only discusses cases where one party does not want to move.
  We should also note that when the mishnah mentions “force” it does not mean that the husband can physically force his wife to move.  It means that if she disagrees, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah.  The Mishnah never sanctions physical force of a wife.  The consequences of non-compliance are always economic.
  [The following regions are regarded as] three countries in respect of marriage:   Judaea, Transjordan and Galilee.  The mishnah divides the land of Israel into three parts: Judea, the other side of the Jordan river (Transjordan) and the northern region the Galilee.  This separation is important for issues of marriage because, as we shall see, a husband can never force his wife to move from one region to another, but within the same region he can sometimes force her to move with him.
  [A husband] may not take out [his wife with him] from one town to another or from one city to an other. But within the same country he may take her out with him from one town into another town or from one city into an other city, but not from a town to a city nor from a city to a town.  The husband cannot force his wife to move from one region to another, even from one town (small) to another town, or from one city (larger than a town) to another city.  However, within the same region he may force her to move from one type to the same type; from a town to a town or from a city to a city.  He may never force her to move from a town to a city, for she may like the intimacy of living in a small town.  Similarly, he may never force her to move from a city to a town, for she may prefer the hustle and bustle of the city.  The mishnah does not believe that either a city or a town is objectively better than the other; both have pluses and minuses.
  [A man] may take out [his wife with him] from an inferior to a superior dwelling, but not from a superior to an inferior dwelling. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not even from an inferior dwelling to a superior dwelling, because the [change to a] superior dwelling tests.  According to the first opinion, no woman should prefer to live in an inferior dwelling place.  In this case, we can objectively determine which is preferable and therefore the husband can force his wife to move. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that a superior dwelling place is not necessarily in every way better than an inferior one.  The superior dwelling “tests” the body. This means that any move may be harmful to one’s physical health, even to a better place.  Therefore, if the woman does not want to move, her husband cannot force her to do so. An alternative explanation for “tests” is that in a superior dwelling a woman will constantly have to check her appearance.  She may not want the pressure of having to always keep up appearance in front of the neighbors.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of Ketuboth deals with the important and moving problem of a couple, one of whom wants to make aliyah to Israel and one of whom does not.  The second subject with which this mishnah deals are cases in which a man married his wife in one place and divorced her in another.  The question is, with which coinage must he pay her ketubah.
  Everyone may compel [their spouse]  to go up to the land of Israel, but none may compel [their spouse] to leave. Everyone may compel [their spouse]  to go up to Jerusalem, but none may compel [their spouse]  to leave. The same is true for both men and women and [slaves].  If one of the members of the household, either the husband or the wife, wishes to move from outside of the land to the land of Israel, s/he may compel the other to join.  As I stated before, “compelling” does not imply physical compulsion.  Rather what it implies is that if the other party does not agree to go, there is a financial penalty.  If the wife wants to go and the husband does not, the wife may receive her ketubah; if the husband wants to go and the wife does not, the husband may divorce his wife without paying her the ketubah.  The opposite is true with regard to staying in the land of Israel.  Anyone can financially compel the other to stay. The same is true with regard to moving from outside of Jerusalem to Jerusalem.  Either party may force the other party to move up to Jerusalem, but neither may force the other to leave Jerusalem for other parts of Israel. Some versions of the mishnah read that even a slave has this right.  However, even according to these versions, a slave only has the right to prevent a move, but does not have the right to force his master to move to Israel or to Jerusalem. One may legitimately wonder whether these mishnayoth were issues of practice.  It seems to me more likely that this is the way that the rabbis express their values.  Rather than just stating that it aliyah is a mitzvah, or that it is at least an important value to move to Israel and to stay there, the rabbis express their values in concrete halakhah.  Values are important not just as values; they must also be manifested by our actions.  I realize that I am probably touching a nerve here.  Most people reading this do not live in Israel and yet probably feel that they do value the state of Israel.  The perennially asked question is “How can one be a Zionist and not live in Israel?”  I don’t have a particularly good answer for this tension, only that it is a choice that a person might make and with which s/he will have to live.  At least we should recognize that we do have a choice as to where we live.
  If a man married a woman in the land of Israel and divorced her in the land of Israel, he must pay her [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. If he married a woman in the land of Israel and divorced her in Cappadocia he must pay her [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. If he married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in the land of Israel, he must a gain pay [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says that he must pay her [her ketubah] in the Cappadocian currency.  If a man marries and divorces in the land of Israel, he of course has to pay the ketubah using the coinage of the land of Israel.  The question arises if one of the actions occurs outside of the land.  If he marries her in the land of Israel, and divorces her in Cappadocia (the name of a land in Asia Minor), he must still pay the ketubah using the coinage of the land of Israel.  This is because the debt was incurred in the land of Israel.  If he marries her in Cappadocia and divorces her in Israel, there is a debate between Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and the anonymous opinion.  According to the anonymous opinion, he must pay the ketubah using Israeli coinage; according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel he uses Cappadocian coinage.  The Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds debate the explanation of this mishnah.  According to the Babylonian Talmud, Cappadocian coins are worth more.  Therefore, the one who holds that in this case he pays with Cappadocian coins (Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel) holds that the ketubah is of toraitic origin and therefore must be paid with the higher coinage, which is also where the debt was incurred.  The one who holds that he pays with Israeli coins (the anyonymous opinion) holds that the ketubah is of rabbinic origin, and therefore he may pay with the lesser coins.  The Palestinian Talmud explains that Israeli coins are worth more; therefore Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that the ketubah is only of rabbinic origin and the other opinion holds that it is toraitic. All of the Sages agree that if he marries and divorces in Cappadocia, he pays the ketubah with Cappadocian coinage. Congratulations!  We have finished Ketuboth. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Ketuboth is an especially important tractate since many of the principles in it are found in many other places in the Mishnah.  In fact, since the seventeenth century it has been called “Shas Katan/Talmud Katan”, the “Little Talmud” for it contains many of the most important talmudic principles.  Your having learned it is therefore even more impressive.  May you have the strength and time to keep on learning Mishnah!  Tomorrow we begin Nedarim.