meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Modern Works/Daf Shevui to Avodah Zarah/English/Daf Shevuii.txt"}
text: Daf Shevui to Avodah Zarah
  דף שבועי על עבודה זרה
  Daf Shevuii
  
  
  Daf Shevui to Avodah Zarah
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  Introduction to Avodah Zarah“Avodah Zarah” is the Hebrew word for idolatry.  It literally means “foreign worship”.  Tractate Avodah Zarah discusses the prohibition of Jews using objects that non-Jews may have used while worshipping idols.  The central idea is that once an object has been used in idol worship the object is forbidden to be used by Jews.  There are many passages in the Torah which strictly forbid Jews from worshipping idols and enjoin them to destroy any of the objects used in idol worship (see for instance Exodus 23:24, 32-33; 34:12-16; Deuteronomy 7:1-5, 25-26; 12:1-3).  The Rabbis went further in these prohibitions and created an entire system of law meant to keep Jews away from non-Jews and their idolatrous practices. Throughout Jewish history these laws aided in preserving the distinct identity of the Jewish people.  However, they also were a primary cause in anti-Semitism, with non-Jews frequently scorning Jews for their separatist practices.Rabbi Menahem Meiri, a Talmudic commentator who lived in Provence in the 14th century recognized that Christianity and Islam were not the same as the pagan religions that existed in the time of the Mishnah and the Talmud.  Christianity and Islam are both monotheistic religions with systems of law and many shared values with Judaism.  He therefore stated that most of the laws regarding non-Jews do not apply to the members of these religions. Other Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Menahem Meiri. Even the Meiri often insisted that the Jews had to continue to distance themselves from non-Jews, based on Talmudic law.Whether or not we agree with Rabbi Menahem Meiri or with his detractors, while learning this tractate I think we should keep in mind the vast differences between the circumstances in which we live and in which the rabbis lived.  The Rabbis were surrounded by a hostile culture from which they wanted to keep as great of a distance as possible.  Oftehn times they were creating a “straw” non-Jew, one whose behavior does not reflect how non-Jews actually acted. This is often a strategy adopted by a group that wishes to differentiate itself from other groups.In today’s world our surrounding culture is thankfully much more respectful of Jewish differences. We do, and should, celebrate and learn from our contacts with people from all cultures, and certainly, I believe we should be respectful of the customs, practices and beliefs that differentiate Jews from non-Jews. However, we should also keep in mind that the ultimate goal of the Rabbis was to preserve Jewish identity and religion. The problem of how we accomplish this today when most of these laws are no longer observed and contact between Jews and non-Jews is great, is probably the greatest problem that modern Jews face.
  Exodus 23:13 states, “Make no mention of the names of other gods; they shall not be heard on your lips.”  From the last part of this verse, “they shall not be heard on your lips” the Rabbis created a midrash that a Jew should avoid giving a non-Jew a reason to bring a sacrifice or libation to his foreign god.  Therefore, during the three days preceding pagan holidays, Jews should avoid any business transactions with non-Jews, lest the non-Jew thank his god for this transaction.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, this prohibition works in both directions.  It is forbidden for Jews to sell, lend or repay non-Jews and likewise it is forbidden to buy, borrow or receive repayment from them.  According to this opinion, all of these transactions may potentially cause the non-Jew to celebrate and therefore should be avoided.  Rabbi Judah dissents with regards to receiving repayment from non-Jews.  Since repaying a debt causes sorrow to a person, it is permitted to receive repayment during this time, since the non-Jew will not thank his god after having done so.  The Rabbis respond to Rabbi Judah that repaying a debt can indeed be a cause of celebration, even if the immediate parting with the money is depressing.  Therefore it too is prohibited three days preceding a holiday.We should note that although this mishnah seems to be of a restrictive nature, it does indeed allow business transactions at any time that is not three days before their festivals.  In other words, by forbidding the conduct of business on certain days the mishnah tacitly permits conducting business with non-Jews on other days.  This was of course an economic necessity; even before the modern “global economy” no people could survive without conducting business with other peoples.
  IntroductionThe tractate opens with a lexigraphical discussion of the word I have translated “festival”—איד, whether it is spelled with an aleph or an ayin. While today Ashkenazim and Sephardim do not distinguish in pronouncing these letters, originally they were pronounced differently. Jews of Yemenite descent still pronounce the ayin as a guttural letter, closer to the Arabic sound of “gh.” This is why Aza in Hebrew became Gaza or Amora (and in Sodom and Amora) became Gemorra.
  Rav and Shmuel disagree as to the exact word that appears in the Mishnah which I have rendered “festivals.”
  To support both readings in the Mishnah, the Talmud quotes verses that use both words. We should note that the words have different meanings and neither means “festivals.” Most scholars do not think that the rabbinic word is actually related to the biblical Hebrew. Rather, it comes from a different origin altogether (and is related to the word Ides, as in “the Ides of March.) The sugya presents midrash on the biblical word—it connects two words that sound the same but originally had different meanings.
  The one who related the word to Deuteronomy, where it is found with an aleph, chose that verse because there the word has the connotation of calamity. It is as if he says that the festivals of the idolaters are actually calamities.
  The reading of the word with an ayin connects it to the verse in Isaiah. There it means testimony brought before God. This reading is preferable because the testimony brought before God is what will bring about their calamity.
  The problem is that the verse from Isaiah does not refer to idolaters. The word “testimonies/witnesses” refers to Israelites.
  Huna son of R. Joshua finds another verse that uses the word “edehem” with an aleph and clearly refers to idolaters.
  IntroductionThis section begins a long aggadah in which the nations come in front of God at the end of days and God judges them for their failings. In a sense, the aggadah’s purpose is to explain why the Torah was given to Israel and not to the other nations.
  At the end of days God will invite all of the nations to come forward and justify themselves in front of Him for having observed the Torah.
  At first all of the nations come in front of God all mixed in together. But then they separate such that each comes one at a time. As we shall see, each kingdom will come in front of God, one at a time.
  
  Daf 2b
  
  The Talmud corrects a small misunderstanding in the previous text. God could not have been confused as to which nation is which. God is, after all, all-knowing. Rather, God separated them out for their own good. This would make it easier for them to understand God’s words, which as we shall see, were directed at individual nations.
  IntroductionRome is the first to enter in front of God.
  The first kingdom to enter is Rome, for they were the most powerful nation in the world, certainly at the time of the rabbis.
  This section answers why the most important party comes in for judgement first. It follows the pattern of the king standing trial before the community does. This is either due to the respect owed to the king or to allow the king to stand trial before God’s full anger is aroused.
  The Kingdom of Rome was certainly known for being great and wealthy builders in the ancient world. They come in front of God and claim to have done so all for the sake of Israel. They worked so that Israel could study Torah.
  The Holy Blessed One will say in reply: “You foolish ones in the world, all that which you have done, you have only done to satisfy your own desires. You have established marketplaces to place prostitutes in them; baths, to delight yourself in them; silver and gold, that is mine, as it is said: “Mine is the silver and Mine is the gold, says the Lord of Hosts” (Haggai 2:8).  Are there any among you who have been declaring this? As it is said, “Who among you declares this? (Isaiah 43:9). And “this” is nothing but Torah, as it is said: “And this is the Torah which Moses set before the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 4:44).  They will then depart crushed in spirit.God denies all of their claims as to having done anything for Israel. All they did, they did for themselves. The verses in Isaiah 43:9 which began the derashah continues with the phrase, “Who among you declares this?” and “this” is interpreted as referring to Torah. Thus only a nation that actually occupies itself with Torah will be justified.
  IntroductionPersia enters next.
  The Persians come in next. This is based on the verse from Daniel that says that the second nation is similar to a bear and R. Joseph identifies the verse as referring to the Persians. As an aside, after reading this, I feel that I may have a bit of bear in me.
  Like the Romans, the Persians also claim that they have been busy building the world so that Israel can be free to occupy themselves with Torah.
  The Persians claims are rejected in the same manner in which the claims of the Romans were.
  The Persians thought they stood a better chance than the Romans because they built the Temple (under the direction of Cyrus and Darius, who let the Israelites return to Israel) whereas the Romans destroyed it.
  The aggadah assumes that at this point every nation comes forth before God, and each nation’s claim fails. The other nations thought they had a chance because at least they did not impress Israel.
  The aggadah mentions Rome and Persia as the most important because their reign, according to rabbinic thought, will last until the end of days. I’m not sure history bore this out. Christianity inherited Rome, but the Vatican does not really “reign” all that much anymore. There are still Persians but not really much of an empire left. Still, these world powers had great influence on world history.
  IntroductionThe aggadah about all of the nations coming in front of God on judgment day continues. 
  The nations respond to God by saying that they were not even offered the Torah. This claim gets to the heart of a theological problem—how could the nations be judged for not keeping the Torah when it was never given to them. This in essence leads to a counter-midrash. The nations were offered the Torah but none accepted it. This is one answer to that problem. However, within our sugya, we now have two contradictory answers. Were they offered the Torah and did not observe it? Or was it never offered to them?
  The Talmud adjusts their claim against God. God forced the Israelites to accept the Torah. But he did not force the nations. Had he forced them, they would have accepted it. So how can he judge them?
  The Talmud now continues interpreting the next part of the verse from Isaiah, “Let us continue the happenings of old.” God responds to the nations that they did not keep even the commandments that they did receive, the seven Noahide laws. Having seen that collectively they did not keep them, God says that henceforth even if they do observe these commandments, they will not receive their reward for them. This is a very interesting claim. I think the idea is that if one does not regularly observe certain moral precepts, one does not receive reward for happenstance observance of them. Reward entails a commitment to a particular act, to make a habit out of it. Now I know that there are contradictory texts out there. But to me, this is what this text is hinting at. 
  
  Daf 3a
  
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded with the statement that even if the nations of the world observe the Noahide commandments, they still do not receive a reward for doing so. Today’s section begins with a critique of that view. 
  R. Meir uses the fact that the verse uses the word, “a man,” by that implying any man, to teach that non-Jews receive reward for the Torah they study and the mitzvot they perform. We should note that this sugya is a great example of the multi-vocality of the Talmud. Within a few lines of text we have two diametrically opposed positions. The Talmud will harmonize these views but this does not negate the fact that both are allowed room to exist.
  The resolution is that non-Jews who perform commandments do receive a reward, albeit not one as great as Israel who is commanded to perform the mitzvot.
  We now return to the main thread of the aggadah—the dialogue between God and the nations of the world. I think we can see this claim coming a mile away. Why are the non-Jews punished for not observing the Torah? Do they Jews do such a good job? One need not read far into the Bible to find Jews committing sins rampantly. God attempts to find witnesses to testify that Israel does observe the Torah. Stay tuned—the drama continues tomorrow!
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section, God said that the heavens and the earth would testify that Israel has observed the Torah. Today’s section begins with the response of the nations. 
  All of these sources and derashot prove that the existence of heaven and earth depend on Israel performing the commandments. This makes them partial witnesses, who are not likely to testify that Israel did not perform the commandments. The notion that the world depends on the performance of the commandments is one found throughout rabbinic literature. The mitzvoth have cosmic importance. 
  God responds that non-Jews themselves can testify that Israelites did not sin. The aggadah now lists some well-known non-Jews throughout history who interacted with various Israelites who did not sin. Most of these are probably familiar episodes. Bildad, Zophar and Eliphaz are the friends of Job who urge him to curse God. Job does not. (Elihu son of Barachel is also a friend of Job, but according to another section of the Talmud, he was Jewish). This brings us back to the verse from Isaiah 43:9 which is the backbone of the entire derashah.
  The nations now plead before God, asking God for in essence a second chance. God responds with a famous statement, that even has echoes in the Gospels. However, God does offer them an easy mitzvah to keep. Stay tuned for tomorrow where we see if the nations can keep the mitzvah of sukkah! 
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section, God offers the nations the opportunity to fulfill the mitzvah of the sukkah, even though the end of days is already here. Today’s section asks whether mitzvoth can be fulfilled at the end of days. Or is it too late then.
  How can God offer a mitzvah to the nations to perform in the world to come? According to a very common Jewish idea, the mitzvoth are to be performed in the here and now, today. The end of days is when people will be rewarded for their performance, but by that point it is too late to actually perform them. 
  God wanted to give the nations a second chance. This is God after all—He makes up the rules!
  Sukkah is an easy commandment because it does not cause any financial loss. This is different from something like peah (leaving the corners of your field for the poor) which obviously does cause a financial loss.
  The non-Jews go out and make sukkot, but God causes it to be so hot that they tear them down immediately. There is a pun being made on this verse—the last word is “עבות “which is also used in Psalms 118:27, which is connected in rabbinic thought with Sukkot.
  If God wanted to give the non-Jews a chance to keep the mitzvot, why did he make it so hot for them in the sukkah? The answer is that Jews also have end up sitting in the sukkah when it is quite hot. I can testify to this myself—it can get quite toasty in the sukkah when Sukkot falls early in the season. The next problem is that Jews do not have to sit in the sukkah if its boiling hot and makes them uncomfortable. So why blame the non-Jews for leaving the sukkah in the same situation? The answer is that while Jews need not sit in the sukkah when it’s hot, they should not kick it when they go out.
  
  Daf 3b
  
  On that day, when the nations finally fail in their claims before God, God will laugh (the word can also be translated as delight).
  IntroductionThis section relates loosely to yesterday’s section in that it too quotes the statement of R. Yitzchak.
  According to this passage, at the end of days the non-Jews will come and convert. 
  According to this counter tradition, when things are going well for the Jews, either because it is the end of days and God has made it clear that He desires the Jews, or when Jewish kings ruled, converts are not accepted. The underlying idea is that non-Jews should convert purely out of love, without any ulterior motive such as justification in the eyes of God or power/money. To be sure that this is so, non-Jews are not accepted as converts during times when it seems that they may have ulterior motives While the Jewish community will not accept these converts, they will simply begin to act as Jews, in an attempt to save themselves at the time of the Messiah. However, when they see the destruction of Gog and Magog they will take flight in fear. It is at this point that God will laugh at the non-Jews who do not trust in God’s protection. This is the only day on which God will laugh.
  While the Jewish community will not accept these converts, they will simply begin to act as Jews, in an attempt to save themselves at the time of the Messiah. However, when they see the destruction of Gog and Magog they will take flight in fear. It is at this point that God will laugh at the non-Jews who do not trust in God’s protection. This is the only day on which God will laugh.
  The notion that God laughs only at the end of days is countered by a tradition in which God laughs, playing with the leviathan, every day. 
  There is a difference, as we know, between laughing with someone, and laughing at someone. God laughs at his creatures in mockery only at the end of days. Until then, his laughter is not of scorn but of joy. 
  IntroductionThis sugya continues the discussion of laughter.
  Aha says that once the Temple was destroyed there was no more laughter, i.e. joy, for God. The Talmud will now search for a proof text for this. A verse in Isaiah in which God calls Israel to weep and wail may refer only to the day on which the Temple was destroyed. It does not mean that the weeping and wailing must continue forever.
  The well-known verse from Psalms means that God will not forget Jerusalem. But it does not mean that God will no longer experience joy or laughter.
  The Talmud finally settles on a verse which can be used to prove that from the time the Temple was destroyed there is no more laughter before God.
  Now that laughter has been removed from the world, what does God do during the fourth quarter of each day? He teaches children.
  Since God started teaching children only after the destruction of the Temple, who taught them before. There are two answers. The first is Metatron, one of God’s archangels. The other answer is that God educated the children, while he was doing other things. God should be able to multitask, I would think.
  God seems to have fun by night. Either he rides around on his chariot, visiting his 18,000 worlds. Or he listens to his singing angels.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now moves to other related discussions.
  With a small emendation, the verse can be made to read, “They who break away from the table to idle gossip, will have roots of juniper as their food.”
  Studying at night seems to be preferable to study during the day. Perhaps because there are less visual distractions at night. Or maybe people’s hearts are open at night.
  This is another version of Resh Lakish’s midrash on the verse. Studying in this world will lead to grace in the world to come.
  People are like fish and Torah is like water. We cannot live without Torah.
  Just as fish are scorched by the sun, so too are humans. This statement is then applied to either this world or to the world to come. If it applies to this world, it is understood as something out of God’s control. God does not control the heat or cold. This is an interesting acknowledgment that not all natural phenomena are in the power of God.
  In this second possibility, the sun is reserved for the world to come where it will consume the wicked and bring healing to the righteous. This is the nature of the sun—it can cause both great harm and great good.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  IntroductionThe sugya begins with another comparison between fish and human beings.
  Like fish, human beings are inclined to violence. 
  In judgment God is merciful. He does not exert his full power. But in a time of war, His full might is made known. 
  God has no fury for Jews, but does have fury on non-Jews. Of course, I realize that this is a type of statement that will make people feel uncomfortable. It is something we will see quite a bit of throughout the tractate. 
  R. Hinena b. Papa explains the first half of the verse and how it fits with the second half of the verse. Both halves refer to Israel. God says that had He not taken a vow, He would have been full of fury at Israel.
  This statement refers to something taught much earlier—God does not deal capriciously with His creatures. Before God goes to destroy the nations, he first examines their records.
  Again, God does not treat Jews as he does non-Jews. With Jews, He exacts vengeance just a little bit at a time. But when it comes to non-Jews, when exacting vengeance, he exacts it all at once, making a ruinous heap.
  This is another version of how God treats Israel differently than he does the non-Jews. This derashah hearkens back to the verse from Job from above.
  God thought that he would redeem the non-Jews by simply punishing them through monetary possessions. But this didn’t work and the non-Jews plotted against God anyways.
  This is basically the same version as the previous statement.
  Abahu tells the “minim” that R. Safra is a great man. It is hard to identify who exactly the “minim” are here, but it seems to be simply non-Jews, those with the authority to impose or exempt others from taxes. There are many scholars who interpret these people to be some type of Jewish-Christians, those who would care about biblical interpretation. So they ask him to interpret a verse, but he does not know how to explain it to them. This disappoints them tremendously.
  Many historians have taken this exchange as evidence of the difference between rabbis living in Palestine, where Christianity was strong and those from Babylonia, where Christianity was weaker. Those rabbis living among early Jewish-Christians, like R. Abahu, had to study verses so that they would know how to respond to Christological interpretations of Bible. But R. Safra, who was from Babylonia, knew tannaitic traditions, but did not know Bible nearly as well. Thus, he could not respond.
  Abahu explains the meaning of the verse through a parable. God does exact payment from Israel for its sins, but he does so in a kind way. In contrast, when exacting payment from the non-Jews, the entire payment may come at once.It should be noted that these traditions may, at least in part, be an attempt to explain the poor political state in which the Jews were in during this period (and throughout most of political history). If God loves the Jews so much, then why are the non-Jews ruling the world? The answer, at least one answer, is that God is holding back His revenge on the nations of the world. This is a common notion in both Judaism and early Christianity.
  This section interprets Abraham’s claim against God before God destroys Sodom. It opens a discussion of God’s justice, and an attempt to resolve contradictory verses.
  Those who are righteous but do not stand up against the wicked are punished as if they were themselves wicked. This is a message that still rings true through the generations.
  If God is angry every day, and no one can stand before his anger, then how can people exist? The answer is that individuals suffer the wrath of God and as such, fail to stand. But the community continues to exist.
  Only Bilaam could determine precisely that one infinitesimally small moment when God’s anger is unleashed every day. Interestingly, while Bilaam is vilified, the rabbis do acknowledge him as a prophet.
  
  Daf 4b
  
  How could Bilaam know God, but not even understand his own animal. This leads to a reconstruction of Bilaam’s discussion with his famous donkey. Each passage is based on the donkey saying a verse back to Bilaam.
  This is probably something you did not know from the Bible. Not usually taught in Hebrew school.
  This is the conclusion of the passage. Bilaam did not really know God—he only knew when exactly during the day God would get angry. This would assumedly help him in his attempt to curse Israel.
  This statement is here because it again connects with the Bilaam and with God’s wrath. Note that “Israel’s enemies” is a euphemism. The statement should read “none would have remained in Israel.” But the copyist did not even want to write such a terrible statement.
  God’s wrath is brief, as we have seen before.
  Two verses are brought to show that God’s wrath lasts only a moment.
  Abaye provides a natural phenomenon by which to determine when God’s wrath occurs.
  Again we hear of a “min” perhaps a Jewish-Christian, who is troubling a rabbi with verses. R. Joshua b. Levi thinks he can curse the min at the exact moment when God’s wrath is let loose. But it does not work—he can’t get the exact time write. So don’t try this at home. Furthermore, a righteous person should not be asking for others to be punished.
  God’s moment of wrath occurs at the hour of the morning when kings put on their crowns and bow down to the sun.
  Judgement is dished out during the first three hours of the day, when kings wake up, put on their crowns and bow down to the sun. Since God tends to be angry at this time, an individual should not pray the Musaf prayer for Rosh Hashanah lest God examine his deeds too closely and judge him accordingly.
  The congregation (minyan) can pray at that time because the collective merits of the community are sufficient.
  One can pray shacharit, the morning prayer, as an individual knowing that some congregation somewhere will be praying at that time.
  Earlier we said that God sits in judgment during the second three hours of the day, not the first. So why not pray during the first three hours, when we could assume that God’s mercy would be greater?There are two ways of solving the problem. The first is to switch the order of what God does at what time during the day.The second is to note that it would be better to pray when God is not studying Torah. Torah is “truth”—there is no hiding what one has done. It is absolute, without any mercy. But “judgment” can involve a measure of mercy. Thus it would be better to pray when God is acting as a judge, one involved in the lives of humans, then as something akin to a philosopher, who only cares about absolute truth and justice.
  This statement appeared earlier in the context of God asking the non-Jews to perform the mitzvot at the end of days.
  This midrash on Isaiah was the basis of the long eschatological drama with which the tractate opened. It is brought here again because it is another related statement by R. Joshua b. Levi.
  This is another statement by R. Joshua b. Levi about Jews and non-Jews in the world to come.
  Joshua b. Levi defends the Israelites who worshipped the golden calf. The verse proves the faith of the Israelites that stood at Sinai.
  Here R. Yohanan offers the same explanation as above, but this time including a reference to David’s sin with Bathsheva. While we might find it difficult to accept justification for sinning, this is an excellent justification for why we remember our sinning ancestors. The stories we tell are not of perfect individuals or communities. They are of deeply flawed and human characters, struggling to do the right thing, but often succumbing to temptations.
  
  Daf 5a
  
  The Talmud now explains why we needed to learn the examples of both the sinning individual and the sinning community to teach that both individuals and communities can do teshuvah.
  A difficult verse in II Samuel is interpreted as alluding to David’s role as teaching of the possibility of repentance.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with another statement by R. Shmuel b. Nahmani.
  Mitzvot and sins are personified here, leading the person towards justification in the world to come or condemnation at the Day of Judgment.
  The sins a person commits in this world are inextricably tied to them, and accompany them like a dog in the world to come. Note that while “dog” has positive connotations for most of us, it is probably not a positive image in the Talmud.
  IntroductionThis section discusses what Jewish history might have been like had Israel not sinned with the golden calf.
  The fact that our ancestors sinned at the golden calf, then people would have been like angels (god) and would not have had children. Thus we, those living now, would not have come into existence.
  The implication of the above tradition is that were it not for the sin with the golden calf, the Israelites would have been too pure to engage in procreation. But this is problematic—humanity was commanded to be fruitful from the time of Noah.The provisional answer is that this refers only to humanity up until the time of Sinai. According to this theory, once the Torah was given, Israelites would have been so holy that they would not have procreated. It is an interesting way of perceiving the revelation, even if it is not going to stand.
  The problem is that the Israelites at Sinai were explicitly told—go return to your tents. This is interpreted as meaning that they should go procreate.The Talmud resolves that they were told to have sex with their wives, but not necessarily to procreate. This is an interesting instance where the rabbis are willing to divide the two—sex does not necessarily imply procreation.
  A verse from Deuteronomy seems to imply that God planned for the Israelites to have descendants even before the sin with the golden calf. But this too can be interpreted as referring only to the children born before the revelation on Sinai.
  In this midrash God shows Adam all of the future leaders of the Jewish people, all the way through R. Akiva. Clearly God anticipated that people would procreate even before they sinned with the golden calf.
  This midrash contains the idea that there are a predestined number of souls in a place called the “guf.” Only when they have all been used up with Messiah come. Again, this implies that people were destined to procreate at the creation of the world.
  The Talmud now emends the statement with which this section began. Had they not sinned, Jews would have lived forever. While they would have procreated, those Jews who were at Sinai would eternally overshadow those Jews born later.
  The idea that had they not sinned Jews would have lived forever is problematic—the Torah contains laws which assume that people would die. The laws of levirate marriage assume that married men die and the laws of inheritance clearly assume that people die.The answer is that these laws were written conditionally. They were given under the foreknowledge that they would be relevant only if Israel did not sin.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended by saying that the verses about levirate marriage and inheritance were written “on condition,” meaning they might never come into fruition. Today’s section questions whether the Torah is written this way.
  God made the world’s existence conditional on the acceptance of Torah by the Israelites. The very foundations of the world rest on this observance. This shows that verses can indeed be written “under condition.”
  This baraita is brought as a difficulty on a statement by Resh Lakish earlier, that were it not for the sin with golden calf, Israel would have lived forever. The baraita implies that after Adam was punished for eating from the tree there was no way to abolish death from the world.
  Resh Lakish agrees with R. Yose. Had Israel accepted and observed the Torah, they could have lived forever.
  The verse, “that it may be well with them” seems to promise prosperity, not everlasting life. But R. Yose could respond that immortality is a good thing, so it too could accord with the verse.
  IntroductionThe first tanna in the baraita we learned yesterday did not read the sin of the calf as causing Israel to lose their mortality. But this seems to contradict the verse in Psalms 82:6.
  The first tanna would interpret the verse “you shall indeed die” not as referring literally to death, but as referring to other types of suffering people that are regarded as if they are dead.
  The Talmud now offers prooftexts that all of these types of people are regarded as if they are dead. Exodus 4:19 is God’s words to Moses telling him to return to Egypt for all of the people who wished him dead in Egypt are now themselves dead. But according to the midrash, those in Egypt who wished him dead were none other than Datan and Aviram, who later rebel against Moses in the wilderness. They are called here “dead” because they had already lost their property.The other prooftexts are relatively straightforward. The verse from Numbers is stated by Moses with regard to Miriam who becomes leprous when she speaks out against Moses. The verse from Genesis is stated by Rachel, when she is still childless.
  All of these verses here are part of a general program to show that God pleaded with Israel to accept the commandments.
  The Israelites in the desert were ungrateful, refusing to recognize the good that God had done for them. They were the descendants of Adam who was ungrateful to God for the woman whom he had been given.Only at the end of their time in the desert did Moses tell the Israelites that they were ungrateful.Rabbah learns from the experience of the Israelites that it takes forty years to learn the mind of one’s teacher. So students and teachers, give it some time!
  
  Daf 5b
  
  Jews who occupy themselves with Torah and righteous acts can master their inclinations. Torah and a rich life of good deeds is a spiritual practice that leads one to live a life in which our better sides win out over our more base inclinations.
  One should accept the burden of studying Torah just like an ox accepts a yoke and donkey accepts a load. There are many levels to this statement. One way I take it is that human beings were created to study Torah and wisdom. This is what God gave us our intellects for.
  IntroductionAfter three and half daf in which the Talmud barely addresses the Mishnah, we now turn our attention to the Mishnah which prohibited engaging in business with non-Jews for three days before the festival.
  The assumption here is that it is prohibited to sell an animal to a gentile before his holiday because he might slaughter it that day and use it for a sacrifice. But why do we need three days before. A mishnah from Hullin (5:3) teaches that four (or five, according to one opinion) times a year a person can assume that an animal being sold today will be slaughtered today. Therefore, if he is selling a mother he must let the buyer know if the young had been sold to be slaughtered on that day. This is in order to prevent one from accidentally transgressing the prohibition of slaughtering a mother and her young on the same day. But again, the requirement is for one day. One can sell a mother on Tuesday if its young was sold the day before, because the two animals will not end up being slaughtered on the same day.
  The mishnah in Hullin referred to selling animals for food. The assumption is that people would buy the animal and slaughter it the same day. Our mishnah refers to sacrifice. People might by the animal three days ahead of time.
  If the animal is being sold for sacrifice, then maybe the prohibition needs to be longer than three days. After all, Jews are supposed to start preparing for the Pesah sacrifice thirty days (or at least two weeks) before Pesah. The answer is that Jews need more time because there are more rules for us about what flaws disqualify animals from being sacrificed. Non-Jews have fewer rules and therefore three days is sufficient.
  The derashah here seems to be on “all flesh.” For Noah to use the animal he brings on the ark as a sacrifice, it must have all of its flesh, meaning not missing any limbs.
  The Talmud believes that this verse is needed to exclude the “trefa” an animal that will soon die. Such an animal cannot be sacrificed. But perhaps one missing a limb can be sacrificed by Noahides?The resolution is that the prohibition of sacrificing a “trefa” is derived from a different verse, “to keep seed alive.”
  If one holds that by definition a “trefa” cannot give birth, then it makes sense to exclude it from the phrase, “to keep seed alive.” But what about those who hold that a “trefa” can give birth. We would then need the earlier verse to exclude the trefa and we would have no verse to exclude the animal missing a limb.The Talmud finds a new way of excluding the trefa—from the word “with you.” The animals that Noah sacrifices must be like Noah—able to bear offspring and not trefot.
  
  Daf 6a
  
  The Talmud tries to prove that Noah was not a trefa by citing various adjectives used to describe him. But when this fails, they say simply that Noah could not have been a trefa because God would not have said “like you” if Noah himself was a trefa.
  If the Torah had just written “with you” I would not have known that Noah had to bring fertile animals on to the ark. I might have thought that they were just there for company. He could not have brought a trefa but he could have brought an old or infertile animal. Therefore, the Torah says that the animal must be able to bear children (seed).
  IntroductionThe mishnah said that a Jew should not engage in business with an idolater three days before the festival. Does this include the festival day, for a total of three days of prohibition, or is it three days before the festival even starts?
  Ishmael prohibits engaging in business for the three days before and the three days following the festival. From his phrasing it seems that the festival day is not included, for if it was, it would be included twice—with the days before and with the days following.The Talmud rejects this answer. It might be that R. Ishmael does include the festival day with the three days. It is prohibited to engage in business for three days before, including the festival. The phrase “three days following” is not precise, and does include the festival day. He only used this language to parallel the phrase “three preceding.”
  According to Shmuel, since Sunday (a reference to Christianity, manuscripts read “the Christian day” instead of Sunday) is always a holiday, it would always be prohibited to engage in business with idolaters, or at least with Christians. This must mean that the three days do not include the festival for if they did, one could engage in business with Christians on Wednesday and Thursday.
  The Talmud admits that to R. Ishmael the three days clearly does not include the festival itself. But what about to the rabbis who prohibit only the three days before?Ravina tries to use a later mishnah to answer the question. The Mishnah lists a few holidays. We will discuss what these holidays are when we get to that mishnah. R. Hanin b. Rava says that each of these holidays is eight days before or after the equinox. If the number of days includes the festival, then the first mishnah should have read ten (2 plus the 8 days of the holiday) and not 3.The answer is that all of Kalenda might be considered one day. Thus the prohibition would begin two days before Kalenda and then last for the whole festival, which is considered only one day.
  From the words “preceding the festivals,” R. Ashi concludes that the prohibition is for three days before the festival, not including the festival day itself.
  IntroductionThis section asks an important question about the Mishnah—why should Jews refrain from engaging in business with idolaters before their festivals?I should note that I have a chapter on this subject in my forthcoming volume 2 of Reconstructing the Talmud. In this chapter, my co-author and I show that the original reason for the prohibition was that participation in the economic aspect of the festival was akin to idol worship itself. In other words, the problem was not that the Jew was in some ways abetting the idol worship of a non-Jew. The problem was that the Jew was engaging in idol worship himself. However, the Talmud for the most part does not read the mishnah in this way.
  Is it prohibited to engage in business because doing so will cause the idolater to profit and then he will go thank his god on his festival? Or is it a transgression of the prohibition of causing someone else to stumble? By selling or giving an animal to be sacrificed, the Jew is causing the idolater to engage in idolatry.
  If the idolater has another animal of his own, then if the prohibition is due to profit, it is still in effect because by selling the idolater another animal, the Jew still causes him to profit. If, however, the prohibition is because of placing a stumbling block before the blind, then if the idolater has another animal to sacrifice, the Jew is not enabling him to offer a sacrifice. The idolater could have sacrificed one anyway.
  The implication above was that if the idolater has another animal to sacrifice, the Jew who sells him an animal does not transgress the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind. But this contradicts a baraita stated by R. Natan. If one makes forbidden substances available to those to whom they are prohibited, he transgresses, even if the person could have consumed the substance in any case.
  
  Daf 6b
  
  The prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind applies only if the person could not have otherwise gotten hold of the forbidden substance, such as he was on the other side of the river. Thus if the idolater has another animal to sacrifice, the Jew does not transgress placing a stumbling block before the blind.Note that the Talmud never got back to answering the original question—what is the reasoning for the prohibition of engaging in business with idolaters before their festival.
  IntroductionThe mishnah said that one should not engage in business with idolaters for three days before their festivals. Our sugya asks what happens if one did—is the profit he gained prohibited for use?
  This is the amoraic dispute on which the sugya is based.
  Yohanan cites a baraita that seems to directly oppose Resh Lakish. But Resh Lakish solves it by saying it refers only to transactions that took place on the festival itself. If a Jew engaged in a transaction before the festival, the proceeds are permitted. Note that this is a limitation on Resh Lakish’s permission to use the proceeds.
  In this version Resh Lakish tries to use the baraita as a difficulty on R. Yohanan. The baraita prohibits the proceeds only if they engaged in business on the festival itself. But R. Yohanan resolves the difficulty by saying that both before and on the festival can be called “festivals.”
  This baraita teaches two things. First of all, the prohibition extends only to unperishable items. One can engage in transactions involving perishable items. Rashi explains that if one sells a perishable item, such as a vegetable, a few days before the festival, the item will not be there on the festival such that the idolater could thank his god for it.Second, the proceeds of forbidden sales are permitted. This accords with Resh Lakish.
  According to this source, one may sell them perishable items, because they will be used before the holiday. But one may not buy perishable items because this causes them a profit.There are a various ways of understanding the relationship between this source and the previous one. According to one opinion, it is a stringency. The previous baraita seemed to say that one could engage in business with perishables. Here we learn that this is limited to selling them.
  Judah Nesi’a, a rabbinic political leader, is presented with a dilemma. He is sent a gift by an idolater (again, the word “min” is used). If he accepts the gift, the idolater will go thank his gods for having the privilege to send a gift to a prominent rabbi (I know, this seems like a stretch). If he doesn’t accept it, the idolater will be angry and the rabbi does not want to increase the enmity between him and the Roman authorities. Resh Lakish’s solution is for R. Judah Hanesia to “accidentally” throw the money down the well.This is a very “forced” story, especially the ending. The parallel in the Yerushalmi tells the story differently. I analyze the difference in my forthcoming book. So stay tuned!
  IntroductionThis section goes back to the Mishnah and tries to explain why all economic activity is prohibited. For the most part it assumes that the prohibition is meant to prevent the Jew from causing the idolater to profit and in return thank his god.
  The pattern of this section will be repeated twice below, so I will explain it only here. Giving anything to the idolater close to his holiday will cause them a profit, and thus it makes sense why it should be prohibited. But why should it be prohibited to take things from them? This only diminishes their property?Abaye says that in essence, it is not prohibited to borrow things from them. But borrowing might lead to lending and therefore it too is prohibited.Rava says that borrowing itself might lead to the idolater thanking his god. He will be so delighted that the Jew borrowed from him, that on his festival he will thank his god. [Yes, this seems to be a stretch].
  In tomorrow’s section we will learn why the mishnah needed to repeat the same rule three times.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains why the mishnah needed to forbid engaging in business, lending and borrowing articles, lending and borrowing money and paying and reclaiming a debt. Why did it need to state the same thing so many times?
  If the mishnah had taught only that business was prohibited, I might have thought that it is permitted to borrow from them. Business causes both sides to profit. But borrowing items does not give the lender a profit. Therefore, the mishnah had to teach that it too is prohibited.
  To borrow an item from someone is to acknowledge their importance. Therefore, the idolater might go thank his god. But borrowing money is just a business transaction and might cause the idolater to worry that he will not recover his money. Therefore, we might think it is permitted. The mishnah teaches that it is not.
  We might have thought that since he can get his money back when he lends, the idolater would still go and thank his god. But why would he thank his god for repaying a debt. That is simply losing money and causes pain to the one repaying the debt. Therefore, the mishnah needed to teach that even this type of economic interaction is prohibited. In essence, all economic interaction is prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with R. Judah’s ruling in the mishnah. I quote it in full here for ease of reference: Rabbi Judah says: we should receive repayment from them, as this can only depress them; But they [the Rabbis] said to him: even though it is depressing at the time, they are glad of it subsequently.
  Judah in our mishnah seems to contradict R. Judah’s opinion in another mishnah. This mishnah is about what one is allowed to do during the intermediate days of the festival (hol hamoed). The issue here is whether a woman can put a lime cream on her face (probably a whitening agent, women back then wanted to look whiter, not tanner). R. Judah allows this only if the positive results will occur during the festival. Although she will be disfigured temporarily, she will be happy during the festival. So here we see that R. Judah accepts the notion that we consider something to be joyous even if it causes temporary pain as long as the final result is joyful.
  There are two answers here. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that everything that a person is allowed to do on the festival is currently a trouble but brings about pleasant results later. For instance, slaughtering an animal is difficult, but will bring about the pleasant result of having meat to eat. Thus there is nothing unusual here.Ravina answers from a different angle altogether. R. Judah disagrees on the facts—he believes that idolaters will always be upset that they had to pay back the money. Thus this is not a case of something being troublesome now and pleasant later on.
  IntroductionThis section relates to the prohibition in the mishnah of recovering debts from idolaters during the three days prior to their festivals.
  Joshua b. Korha allows one to recover a debt made orally because such debts are generally hard to recover. We can see here that preventing the idolater from celebrating on his festival is not the primary consideration for R. Joshua b. Korha.
  Here we can see some live action in the amoraic academy. Note the precision of the seating arrangements. R. Abba sits in front of R. Huna, the master, and recites traditions in front of him. R. Joseph is also present, and from what we can see below, is also in a position of authority. R. Abba, the student, recites two pithy halakhic rulings that seem to have nothing to do with one another. The Talmud is now left to figure out the meaning of these two rulings.The ruling according to R. Joshua b. Korha is with regard to the matter at hand.
  According to R. Meir, if the dyer dyes the wool the wrong color, the wool is now his and he must pay back the value of the undyed wool to the original owner.Judah says that the owner must pay the lower of two values to the dyer: the cost of dyeing the wool (cost of dye and wood to heat the cauldron to cook the dye) or the increase in value of the wool. This way the original owner cannot lose out, but the dyer still might recover his costs. The halakhah, according to R. Abba, follows R. Judah. 
  
  Daf 7a
  
  Joseph is angry at R. Abba, not because he said something wrong, but because he said something overly obvious. It was not obvious that the halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha, because his was a minority opinion. But it should be obvious that the halakhah follows R. Judah because of a different principle. If the mishnah quotes a dispute and then later quotes one of those opinions anonymously, the halakhah follows the anonymous opinion. The idea is that when composing the Mishnah, R. Judah Hanasi hinted at his own opinion by citing the anonymous voice, with which he agreed, last. As we shall see, this is one of those cases.
  The dispute between R. Judah and R. Meir was found in Bava Kamma. In Bava Metzia a mishnah teaches that whoever changes the agreement, such as a dyer who dyes the wrong color, has the lesser right. He can claim either the costs or the increased value, whichever is less. This is the same as R. Judah’s opinion.
  Huna (who did not rebuke R. Abba) could respond that there is no order to the Mishnah. Perhaps the anonymous statement was issued first.
  Huna here clarifies his opinion. There is indeed order within a tractate, but there is no order between different tractates. Thus, if there is a dispute in Bava Kamma and an anonymous opinion in Bava Metzia, the halakhah does not necessarily follow the opinion in Bava Metzia.
  Joseph responds that this is not a case of two tractates. Nezikin (Bava Kamma, Metzia and Batra) is one tractate, that later in its development was divided into three.Alternatively, he could justify his opinion by saying that the anonymous opinion in this case has more authority because it was quoted among “legal and fixed decisions.” These are a set of rules that are taught in a pithy and apodictic manner. These mishnayot are not the typical case law—they are rules.
  IntroductionYesterday’s sugya referenced a case where the halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha. The Talmud now cites several other cases where the halakhah follows him.
  According to the first opinion, one may not ask another person on Shabbat to do some sort of work with him after Shabbat. But R. Joshua b. Korha says that this is allowed.
  Section one of the baraita says that one should not go seeking lenient views. If someone asks a rabbi a question and the rabbi gives a stringent answer, one should not go out and seek a leniency. [We should note, that this does not mean the leniency is wrong in absolute terms. This very source is an interesting statement on the fact that there are often multiple “correct” answers in halakhah, but that in the end, one must be followed].Section two says that if one asks two rabbis and one is strict and the other lenient, if one rabbi is greater than the other, then his opinion should be followed. If not, then the stricter opinion should be followed.Joshua b. Korha says that only if the matter is from the Torah must the stricter opinion be followed. If it is from the rabbis, then one may be lenient. The halakhah accords with this opinion.
  IntroductionThis section continues with another case in which the halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha.
  The context of this baraita is not exactly clear. Rashi says that it refers to robbers and ignoramuses who do teshuvah. According to R. Meir, if after doing teshuvah, they go back to their previous ways, they have lost the ability to be accepted again. In this view, backsliding is an unforgivable sin.Judah says that if they go back to their previous way of acting with regard to secret matters, then we can no longer trust them. They are in essence acting one way in the public sphere and in another way in private. Such a person has lost all semblance of trustworthiness. But if they reverted in public, then they still have the opportunity to do teshuvah.There is a second version of R. Judah’s statement. If when they did teshuvah, they observed even secret things, then they are accepted. But if when they did teshuvah, they only observed things in public, they are not accepted. Observing the laws in public and not in private is clearly hypocritical behavior.Shimon and R. Joshua b. Korha say that those who do teshuvah are always accepted. And you will probably be glad to know, the halakhah follows this opinion.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with a new mishnah.
  Rabbi Ishmael states that not only is it forbidden to make transactions with non-Jews during the three days before a pagan holiday but it is also forbidden during the three days following the holiday.  In the Palestinian Talmud two potential reasons are given for Rabbi Ishmael’s statement. The first is that non-Jews continue to celebrate for three days after their holidays are over and therefore these three days are also forbidden. The second is that if the non-Jew knows that he will not be able to conduct business with the Jew after his holiday, he will be depressed during his holiday and he will engage in less idol worship.The sages prohibit only the three days preceding the holiday and not the three days following.
  If one were to follow R. Ishmael’s ruling, it would always be forbidden to engage in business with idolaters because of Sunday. This is clearly a reference to early Christianity and indeed, in many manuscripts, the text does not say “Sunday” but “the day of the Nazarene.”
  In reality, the sages who respond to R. Ishmael are probably the same sages whose opinion was in the first mishnah. Still, the Talmud perceives this format to be repetitive—why repeat their position twice? Thus it must be that there is some halakhic difference between the two positions. The Talmud will now take various disputes that appeared above or will appear below and claim that the sages of the mishnah disagree on these points as well.
  The dispute between the two opinions is over whether the three day period includes the festival or does not.
  This is another point we discussed before and that might be a difference between the two opinions.
  Shmuel restricts the three day prohibition to the land of Israel. In the Diaspora, where idol worship does not, according to him, have such a great hold on the populace, the prohibition is only for one day. This is another possible point of dispute between the two opinions.
  This is an even more innovative way of reading the dispute. Nahum the Mede disagrees with the mishnah—the prohibition is not for three days but for only one. Clearly, the first opinion in the Mishnah cannot agree with this. But the last opinion holds that only one day before the festival is prohibited.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss Nahum the Mede’s opinion that only one day before the festival is prohibited.
  The other rabbis wish to suppress Nahum the Mede’s opinion. It seems that they consider it too lenient.
  In yesterday’s section the Talmud proposed that the other rabbis agree with Nahum the Mede. But these rabbis may be none other than Nahum the Mede himself.
  There is a prohibition of selling large animals to idolaters. The issue seems to be that the idolater will use the animal on Shabbat. We will discuss this more later in the tractate. But Nahum the Mede allows one to sell an old horse during times of war, for such a horse will not have much use and may even end up killing its owner. People won’t learn from this rare case that it is permitted to sell large animals in general.
  There seems to be another sage who holds the same opinion as Nahum the Mede. Ben Batera also allows selling a horse. But when we look deeper, we will see that they do not hold the same opinion. Ben Batera allows one to sell any horse to an idolater. This is because a horse’s work is to carry a rider, and carrying a rider is not considered work. But the other sages still prohibit selling horses, less one come to sell an ox, which pulls a plow. Nahum the Mede does not allow any horse, just old male horses. Thus he must hold like the other rabbis, and the other rabbis say that Nahum the Mede’s leniency should be hidden.
  Only the edible portions of vegetables must be tithed. According to Nahum the Mede, all three parts of the dill plant are edible and therefore, all three must be tithed.
  Eliezer seems to agree with Nahum—so why do the rabbis oppose him. The answer is that R. Eliezer refers only to the garden variety of dill. Wild dill does not require tithing for all three parts.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Nahum the Mede made several statements to which the other sages responded, “Let the matter be suppressed and left unsaid.” Our section picks up with an amoraic discussion of this response. Do we ever follow Nahum the Mede’s opinion?
  Aha b. Minyomi is not pleased that the sages from Palestine respond in each instance to Nahum the Mede, a sage from the region of Babylonia/Medea, with “let the matter be suppressed and left unsaid.” Abaye responds by saying that there is one case in which we do follow his ruling—one should make a special request for one’s needs while reciting the “who hears prayer” blessing, which is part of the daily Amidah.
  Aha b. Minyomi says that in the case of when one asks God for his needs, we are not following Nahum the Mede but actually other great rabbis (strong ropes). This introduces a baraita in which R. Eliezer and R. Joshua argue over whether one should first ask for one’s needs and then pray, or the opposite. Each rabbi supports his opinion with a verse. Note, that R. Nahum the Mede’s opinion has not yet been cited.
  Each rabbi now interprets how he would read the verse that the other rabbi cited as evidence.
  The Talmud now suggests that the dispute between R. Joshua and R. Eliezer was really connected to whether we learn from Moses’s behavior. Moses first praised God and then he asked for his needs. R. Joshua says that we too should act in the same manner. But R. Eliezer says that Moses is different. His greatness allows him to sincerely praise God first. But with any other human being, it is better to simply first ask for one’s needs.
  
  Daf 8a
  
  While one generally asks for one’s needs during “who hears prayer,” it is permitted to add on to each blessing personal requests connected to the theme of that blessing. Thus, for instance, if one had a test, one could add a request to have the wisdom to do well on the test, at the end of the blessing for wisdom. 
  Hiyya b. Ashi adds in some good opportunities to recite other supplications for common needs.
  One can also pray after prayer. This is what many people do today, since it is probably a bit easier than interrupting in the middle of the mandatory prayers.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with a mishnah which delineates which idolatrous holidays are referred to in the previous two mishnayot. I will explain these holidays independent of the talmudic commentary, which we will encounter in the next few pages.
  Kalenda, from which the English word calendar derives, refers to the first day of the month, and especially to the first day of the year.  Saturnalia was a popular Roman holiday on the 17th of December, dedicated to the god, Saturn.  Kratesis, which was on the first of August, commemorated the day that Augustus conquered Alexandria in Egypt.  Note that I have used the names of these holidays as Albeck states that they should be read.  Medieval scribes often did not know what these holidays were or what their names were and different forms of the words can be found in other versions of the mishnah.The anniversary of the accession of the king to the throne is also considered to be a day of celebration full of idolatrous practices.The final two days of idolatrous celebration are personal:  one’s birthday and the anniversary of the death of a close relative.  On these days non-Jews would make idolatrous celebrations.  Interestingly, Jews did not traditionally celebrate birthdays because it was seen to be a non-Jewish custom.
  The opinion in the previous section was that of Rabbi Meir, who held that pagans commemorate the anniversaries of all deaths.  The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that only deaths where the body and clothes were burned on a funeral pyre are celebrated by idolatrous acts.  If the body was not burned on the pyre then the day is not accompanied by idolatry and it is therefore permitted to conduct business with the non-Jew three days before.
  As was previously stated it is forbidden to conduct business with non-Jews during the three days before the personal holidays mentioned in section two.  Here the mishnah lists pagan holidays that Jews can conduct business during the three days before and are only forbidden from doing so on the holiday itself.  These include the day that the non-Jew shaves his beard and lock of hair, which refers to a lock of hair grown at the back of one’s head and is shaved once a year; the day of return from a long trip by sea; the day that one is released from prison and the day in which one marries off one’s son and makes him a celebratory feast.
  IntroductionThe Talmud begins to explain the holidays mentioned in the mishnah.
  Hanan b. Rava identifies when these two Roman holidays fall, and provides a mnemonic for remembering which is before and which is after the equinox. Note that the mnemonic makes sense only if you remember the Mishnah. The odd thing about the Mishnah is that it lists the second holiday first.
  This is an etymological story of the origins of Kalenda and Saturnalia. Some scholars also point to this story as the origin of why we light candles on Hannukah. Holidays around the winter solstice are often associated with fire, as a way of noting the beginning of the days getting longer, or to at least bring light to the darkest days of the year (in the northern hemisphere). There is also a sense here of cultural expropriation—your holidays were originally our holiday (in a sense) and you corrupted them. While there is of course a negative side to this phenomenon, the supremacist ideology it espouses, it also seems to me quite natural.
  There is a dispute in rabbinic literature over when the world was created—Tishrei or Nisan. If the world was created in Tishrei, then Adam had never seen a long day, so we can understand why he was afraid. But if it was created in Nisan, then he’d already seen short days which grew longer and then began to grow shorter. Couldn’t he have figured out what was going on?The (somewhat weak) answer is that he had not yet seen such short days.
  Poor Adam, always getting afraid of the dark! This story seems to explain a curious verse from Psalms. Why would the verse say “a bull that has horns and hooves”? Don’t most bulls have them? Is there any reason to note that the bull has these features? The midrash reads this as a bull whose horns were created before its hooves. Now there can only have been one such bull in all of history—the first bull. And who else could have sacrificed the first bull—Adam. So Adam must be saying this verse. And why would Adam offer thanksgiving—because the sun went away and the came back again. It’s actually quite a remarkable piece of exegetical thinking.
  Here is the origin of the Jewish version of the unicorn. There was once a unicorn in the world. But alas, Adam sacrificed it. This would seem to explain a difficult point with the earlier midrash. If Adam sacrificed an animal then there would be no other descendants of that animal. So what animal must that have been? The unicorn! Another great story.
  This is an amoraic disagreement as to whether one may engage in business with towns that are subject to a Roman city that is observing the Kalends festival.
  This baraita accords with R. Yohanan.
  This baraita provides more details as to the prohibition of engaging in business with idolaters around their festivals.
  Ashi cites proof from the mishnah that the three day prohibition does not precede private festivals.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is about refraining from participating in the feasts of idolaters.
  Simply living outside of Israel forces Jews to participate in idol worship, even if they have no intent of doing so. This is, I think, one of the deeper sources expressing a severely negative attitude towards living outside of Israel. Even if the Jew attempts to live a life of “purity” and not to eat the food of others, it is as if he is eating sacrifices to the dead.
  The Talmud asks a strong question—why has the Jew transgressed just because the idolater calls him to the meal? Why not say that he has transgressed only if he actually eats of the sacrifice? Rava reads this out of the verse, which says “and he will call you.” But I think that there is more than a midrash at work here. There is a deeper statement—even if the Jew does not actually transgress, the fact that he lives in an idolatrous environment, in a place where idolaters will be inviting him to participate in their celebratory meals, is already a ticket to transgression.
  This piece outlines when a Jew can accept the invitation from the idolater. When do we assume that the invite was part of the wedding celebration, in which case it is prohibited? And when can we assume that it is safe? The prohibition of participating in the meal begins from the time that the barley was thrown into the tub, in order to make beer.We should note that this same exact sugya appears in Ketubot concerning reciting the special wedding blessings (today called the sheva berachot) When do we recite the special blessings and when do we not? That was probably the original context of this material.
  
  Daf 8b
  
  The Talmud questions whether it is actually permitted to join such a feast after twelve months. R. Yitzchak heard them thanking their gods more than 12 months after the wedding and he refused to participate in the meal. But the Talmud resolves the issue by saying that he was an unusual case. An important person, a role model, should be even more stringent in avoiding such situations. But for a normal person, 12 months is long enough to wait.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the holiday of “Kratesis.” I should note that I am not an expert on the historical accuracy of these traditions concerning Roman history. This is not something I will delve into all that much in explaining this sugya. I do not think these sugyot should be treated as being particularly historical. At best, they preserve some very vague memories.
  Kratesis is the anniversary of the Roman Empire. There are two such days, according to R. Joseph. One of more recent memory and one from the distant past.
  The Talmud imagines that Rome could not prevail against Greece until Israel joined them in battle. They made an agreement to share their power should they win.
  With Israel in tow, the Romans now set out to verbally convince the Greeks to give in. Since Rome is in possession of the “Sefer Torah,” and even the Greeks agree that the Sefer Torah is the “jewel” and thus the onyx, a symbol of Greece, should serve as the setting for the Torah, the symbol of Israel and due to their alliance, Rome. The Greeks concede to this argument and Rome and the Israelites win.
  The Romans shared rule with the Israelites for 26 years, but then they turned them into their subjects. The rabbis read this into Rome’s biblical ancestor—Esau. At first Esau and Jacob walk together. But in the end, Esau walks ahead (in the biblical story, this is at the insistence of Jacob).
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to discuss how the sages determined that Rome and Israel cooperated for 26 years. Note that we will not get the answer to this question until next week’s daf. So stay tuned!
  The count begins with the beginning of Roman rule over Israel. This began roughly around 110 B.C.E. (in reality it was later), 180 years before the destruction of the Temple. Around the year 10 B.C.E. the sages made two famous decrees concerning impurity. The first is that anyone who walks anywhere outside of Israel becomes ritually impure. The second is that glass vessels are susceptible to impurity. The Torah does not list glass as a substance susceptible to impurity. The third is that around the year 30 B.C.E. the Sanhedrin, the ruling body in Israel, moved from its special chamber in the Temple to another area called “Hanut” which was also on the Temple Mount.
  But this answer itself is difficult, for we have another tradition according to which the rabbis after the Temple did adjudicate the laws of fines. The Romans decreed against ordination of rabbis and rabbis are necessary in order to adjudicate laws of fines. This was, according to legend, a devastating blow against the rabbinic movement.
  This foundational tradition is cited here to show that even after the destruction of the Temple there were rabbis who were qualified to adjudicate the laws of fines. The five elders that are listed here are some of the most important rabbis of the mid-2nd century C.E. Their names appear all the time in the Mishnah and Tosefta.
  Nahman b. Yitzchak now offers a new suggestion as to what changed with the exile of the Sanhedrin to Hanut. From this point forth, they no longer adjudicated capital crimes. But this change was not because of Roman persecution. It was because of Jewish corruption. There were so many Jewish murderers at that point that the courts could no longer properly try them. To avoid having to exile so many murderers, the court chose to go into a sort of “mini-exile.” For once their place of judgment had changed, they could no longer adjudicate capital crimes.
  IntroductionIn last week’s daf we learned that Rome began to rule over Israel 180 years before the destruction of the Temple. Our suyga asks whether this is correct. This will lead the sugya ultimately substantiate the reckoning that we learned last week—that for 26 years Rome cooperated with Israel.
  Yose b. Rabbi counts how many years each kingship ruled. The Persians ruled for 34 years after the Temple was rebuilt. Greece than ruled 180, then Hasmoneans began to rule. They ruled 103 years and then Herod’s family ruled for 103 years. If we assume, as the sugya does, that the Roman rule began at the same time that the Greeks were expelled, then the Romans ruled 206 years, not 180!
  
  Daf 9a
  
  This is how the sugya arrives at the calculation that Rome kept faith with Israel for 26 years and therefore, those years are not reckoned in the calculation of Rome’s dominance over Israel. 
  If a “Tanna” a reciter of texts, forgets exactly how many years it has been since the Destruction of the Temple, he can ask a notary and then just add twenty. This is because notaries follow the secular dating which began 380 years before the destruction, when the Greeks began to rule. So for instance, if it’s 452 according to the secular dating, then it is 72 after the destruction of the Temple.
  Vice versa holds true for the notary.What is interesting in this sugya is the existence of two separate ways of counting years—a secular one and a religious one. Such a phenomenon continues to this day, although we use two altogether different systems, a Christian one and one that counts from the creation of the world.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues with calculations related to time and history.
  The Messiah was supposed to come 2000 years after the Israelites accepted the Torah, which was given 2000 years after creation. But due to the sins of humanity (or the sins of Israel) the Messianic age has not yet arrived.Another interesting note on this source is that without Torah, the world was chaos. Perhaps this is the Talmud’s way of noting that without the ordering laws of the Torah, there would be chaos in the world.
  When do we start counting the two thousand years of Torah? If you start counting at the actual giving of the Torah on Sinai, it was not 2000 years. If you start counting at creation, there are more than 2000 years before the Torah was given. The Torah was given at year 2448 from creation, and therefore the time of the Messiah will begin before the 2000 years of Torah end, assuming the world will last only 6000 years.
  As stated above, if we count the time from the giving of the Torah, we are 448 years short for the 2000 years of Torah. Therefore, we start with the date at which Abraham and Sarah began to “make souls in Haran.” According to midrash, this refers to their converting the local population to monotheism. Abraham was 52 years old when he began doing this. If he was born exactly 500 years before the Torah was given, then from the date he began proselytizing until the intended arrival of the messianic age there are 448 years!I think there is also something meaningful in the notion that “Torah” begins not with the “Torah” but with human beings reaching out to other human beings to teach them.
  If the tanna remembers how many hundreds of years have passed into the years of the Messiah, meaning the third period of 2000 years, but does not remember the exact number of years, he can ask a scribe who counts by the secular years and add 48. So for instance if it is the year 325 in the secular years then it must be the 73rd year of the Messianic cycle, plus whatever hundred they happen to be in.
  
  Daf 9b
  
  As with above, this is simply the opposite situation.
  IntroductionThis sugya provides a way of calculating the sabbatical year.As an aside we can note that all of these calculations seem to imply that well-known calendars did not yet exist.
  Huna provides a way of remembering what year in a sabbatical cycle one is in. Let’s say it’s been 153 years since the Destruction of the Temple (in 70 C.E.) He adds one year and gets to 154. That’s two sabbatical cycles, leaving us with 54. Those divide into 7 sabbatical cycles, leaving us with 5 remaining years. He has to add two for every 100 leaving him with 7. Thus the year 153 is a sabbatical year.
  These sources suggest a messianic calculation. Why would one buy a field if he knew the messiah was coming? According to R. Hanina the Messiah will come 400 years after the destruction of the Temple. According to the baraita, the Messiah was supposed to come in the year 4231.
  The baraita is 3 years longer. So it seems that people were heavily anticipating the messiah around the year 470 C.E.
  IntroductionThis short story has to do with a document that seems to have the wrong date.
  If this document is post-dated, meaning the date of execution seems to be later than when the loan actually occurred, the power of the creditor to seize the debtor’s property is lessened. He will only be able to seize property that was in the possession of the debtor from the time written in the document.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  The dating of documents begins with the Seleucid (Greek) rule over Babylonia (312 B.C.E). However, according to R. Nahman, there are some scribes who begin this count 6 years earlier, when the Seleucids began their rule over Elam, a land close to Babylonia. Thus this document may be precise, and should not be considered a “post-dated” document.
  IntroductionLast week’s daf concluded with a story of a document that was dated close to the proper date if it followed the date of the beginning of Greek reign. In this week’s opening sugya, the question is asked whether Jews use such a system of counting altogether in their documents. Or do they date their documents by reference to the Exodus from Egypt.
  Aha b. Jacob says that perhaps he dated the document according to the date of the Exodus, which is 1000 years before the beginning of Greek rule. He just left off the thousands assuming this is clear (today we leave the “thousands” off of our Jewish dating). If so, this document indeed would be a post-dated document by six years.
  Nahman, and then a baraita, both relate that in the Diaspora Jews count only according to the years of Greek rule.
  This entire section is proof that today (meaning in Talmudic times) documents are dated from the years of the Greeks. There are two systems of reckoning the years in the Mishnah of Rosh Hashanah quoted here—one Jewish that begins in Nissan and one non-Jewish that begins in Tishrei. Today Jews all over the world count the year beginning in Tishrei. This implies that we are counting the year according to the rule of the Greeks and not the Exodus.I should note that only in the Middle Ages did Jews began to count the years from the creation of the world. Such a system was not known in the Talmudic period.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with the next part of the Mishnah, according to which the anniversary of the ascension of the foreign ruler to the throne is a holiday on which it is forbidden to engage in business with Gentiles.
  “Genosia” refers to the ascension to the throne. The pagans, according to the baraita, celebrate both the old king’s ascension as well as that of his son.
  Joseph interprets a verse in Obadiah in reference to the Romans. According to R. Joseph, they did not practice a hereditary monarchy. Nor do they have their own script or tongue.
  The Talmud tries to interpret the “day of genosia” as reference to the king’s birthyday. But this fails too.
  The Talmud now goes back to suggesting the “genosia” is a coronation day. The Romans do appoint sons as kings, but only upon request. Hereditary monarchy is possible but not automatic.
  IntroductionHaving introduced the Emperor Antoninus and Severus his son in yesterday’s section, today’s section contains a dialogue between Antoninus and Rabbi Judah Hanasi.
  Antoninus here gets some advice from Rabbi as to how to achieve both of his aims while only asking the Senate for one of them. Below, the Talmud will explain why Rabbi cannot tell Antoninus what to do directly.
  Here Rabbi gives him some advice as to how to get rid of his enemies.
  Rabbi cannot tell Antoninus directly out of fear of the Romans. Even telling him by whisper might be dangerous.
  
  Daf 10b
  
  IntroductionGet ready for some more strange Antoninus and Rabbi stories.
  In this strange story, Antoninus’s daughter commits a sin, assumedly fornication. He sends Rabbi an herb called “gargira” which is an Aramaic wordplay for “Gira fornicated.” Rabbi sends back coriander, “kusbarta,” an Aramaic hint at “kill your daughter.” Antoninus sends back leeks, an Aramaic hint at “if I do so, I too will be cut off.” Rabbi sends back lettuce an Aramaic hint at “if so leave her be.” Seems like Rabbi and Antoninus communicated quite well through some simple herbs and vegetables.
  In this story, Antoninus sends gold to Rabbi, but disguises it as dust. Antoninus seems to think of this as some sort of long term deposit. Antoninus’s descendants will eventually be paid back.
  Antoninus was so zealous about hiding his frequent visits to Rabbi’s house that he would kill the slaves who accompanied him there and back.
  This story again illustrates how much Antoninus wanted to make sure that no one would be in Rabbi’s how when he comes for a visit. Even a person with super human abilities like R. Hanina b. Hama.
  This conversation sets the notion that Antoninus, the Roman emperor, secretly acted like Rabbi’s personal servant. Rabbi recognized that such behavior was not becoming. But Antoninus seems to have thought that this was his way to get into the world to come.
  Antoninus is worried that he will not be allowed into the world to come. After all, the verse implies that anyone from the house of Esau will not be allowed into the world to come. Antoninus is Roman, and is therefore assumed to be from the house of Esau. But Rabbi relaxes him—only those who actually act like Esau themselves will have no future in the world to come. This seems to me to be an important Jewish message in general. A person’s place in the world to come is determined not by his genealogy, but by his deeds.
  Again, Antoninus cites a verse that proves that all rulers from Edom are prevented from entering the world to come. But Rabbi puts him at ease by reading the verse midrashically. The verse does not mean that no Roman king will make it to the world to come. Indeed, Antoninus is promised a place there. As is Keti’ah bar Shalom, the subject of tomorrow’s sugya.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses who Keti’ah b. Shalom was.
  Again, we find the Romans speaking cryptically. But this one is pretty easy to understand, I think. By the way, there is probably a pun here—the word for “cut away” and “keti’ah” sound very similar.
  Keti’ah b. Shalom manages to convince the king that he cannot and should not kill all of the Jews. Interestingly, this Roman general interprets a verse midrashically.The king submits to Keti’ah b. Shalom’s advice, but still sentences him to death.
  Keti’ah now performs another activity that matches his name—he circumcises himself, theoretically in order to convert. This is the “tax” that he must pay in order to get to heaven.
  Keti’ah gives away all his property to R. Akiva and his colleagues. R. Akiva finds a quite self-serving midrash to justify taking half of the property. Just as half the show-bread will go to Aaron, so too half of Keti’ah’s property will go to R. Akiva. The rest of it will be divided by everyone else.
  A heavenly voice goes out and states that Keti’ah has earned his right to heaven in a single moment. While others toil all of their lives to earn their space in heaven, Keti’ah does so with one single act.
  This is the end of the Antoninus/Rabbi cycle of stories. Antoninus “serves” Rabbi—in other words, he acts as a disciple. A Persian general by the name of Artaban served Rav, the leader of Babylonian Jewry. But these types of relationships ended with their deaths.
  
  Daf 11a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section contains the thrilling story of the conversion of a man named Onkelos and the attempts of the Roman Emperor to bring him back into the fold of paganism. While later tradition attributed to him the Aramaic targum of the Torah, there is little historical evidence as to the truth of this story.
  This is the first attempt of the Roman emperor to convert Onkelos. Onkelos recites verses to the soldiers sent to bring him back to paganism and they too convert.
  Here we see how Onkelos convinces the second cohort to convert. They are enticed by the positive comparison of God to regular, secular leaders. God leads the people himself, carrying his light before them.
  Again, Onkelos succeeds in converting the regiment sent after him. Again, he convinces the people that God is a better ruler than the flesh and blood Roman king to whom they are subservient.But this time someone learns his lesson. The Roman emperor stops sending regiments to bring Onkelos back into the fold.
  IntroductionThis short section returns briefly to the wonderful relationship between Rabbi and Antoninus.
  Rabbi and Antoninus are descendants of Jacob and Esau, the two “lords” in Rebecca’s womb. Plus they digested their food really well!
  There seems to be some dispute about the digestibility of cucumbers. But in the end, the Talmud resolves the problem by saying that large cucumbers are hard to digest, while small ones are easier. Good to know.
  IntroductionThis sugya begins to deal with the dispute in the Mishnah on daf 8a over whether a death of a foreign king is considered idolatry even if they do not burn the belongings of the king, a common practice in the ancient world and in Revenge of the Jedi. We should note that it is unclear whether this refers to burning the king’s body or just his belongings. Both customs seemed to have existed, although the latter seems to have dominated.
  The Talmud attempts to figure out the underlying reasoning behind the dispute between R. Meir and the sages. The issue seems to be whether burning the articles of a deceased ruler is an idolatrous ritual practice and therefore one cannot engage in business with pagans on that day. To R. Meir it is—therefore, only if the death is accompanied by burning of the articles is it prohibited to engage in business with them. But to the rabbis, it is not an idolatrous practice.
  According to the rabbis, Jews are allowed to burn things at a king’s funeral. It is not “the way of the Amorite” activities that are performed by idolaters and therefore are off limits to Jews. So how could the rabbis in the Mishnah hold that it is the “way of the Amorites”?
  The Talmud now reframes the dispute. The issue is whether burning the articles of the deceased king is a necessary sign of respect for the dead. Rabbi Meir says it is not—the pagans worship at the funeral whether they burn the king’s stuff or not. In contrast, the other rabbis hold that only if there is burning does worship take place.
  IntroductionThis section returns to the topic of burning the king’s things (or perhaps the king himself). However, when it comes burning Jews, they are referring to burning things, and not the dead Jew himself.
  Just as Jews were allowed to burn for kings, so too Jews were allowed to burn at the funerals of “princes.” As we shall see, this refers to the funerals of prominent Jews.
  There is contradictory testimony here as to what they burned when the king/prince died. Was it his stuff or money? The answer is that they burned his things. And when Rabban Gamaliel died, Onkelos burned 70 manehs worth of his belongings, not seventy maneh of coinage.
  We hear here of another practice done at funerals—the mutilation of the king or prince’s horse. This mutilation, according to Rashi, was cutting through the leg tendon so that the horse could no longer ride.
  When R. Papa said that they would mutilate the horse, the implication seemed to be that they could not mutilate clean animals, such as oxen. But another baraita implies that as long as the mutilation does not render the animal a “trefa” an animal that may not be eaten according to Jewish law, the mutilation is permitted.Therefore R. Papa translates the baraita as referring to a calf that pulls the royal coach. Such a calf could be mutilated, as long as it was done in such a way that did not render it trefa.
  
  Daf 11b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues explaining the mishnah. Pagans made a feast on the day that the they shaved their beards/heads. My wife was quite happy when I shaved my beard as well. She owes me a holiday.
  According to Rashi, when the pagans cut their hair they would leave a lock on the back. This lock was a sign of idolatry. Once a year they would cut the lock off. The question is—what does the mishnah refer to? The usual cutting of the hair/beard when the lock would be left? Or the once a year cutting of the hair when the lock is removed? The answer is both! Those pagans sure did love their hair-cutting parties.
  Okay, this is about as cryptic as they get. Let’s try to explain one thing at a time.The healthy man—Esau, progenitor of Rome.The lame man—Jacob, whose leg was hurt wrestling with the angel.Clothes of the first Adam—according to midrashic legend these were inherited by Esau.The scalp of R. Ishmael—a high priest killed by the Romans. He was legendarily beautiful and when they scalped him, they preserved it in oil.The reckoning of the ruler is wrong—The ruler is Jacob who said that the time for the Jews to be redeemed would come. Jacob is the brother of our lord, Esau. Jacob was the one who deceived Esau out of his blessing and birthright.They do finish the holiday with a warning—Woe to Rome, when Jacob arises.Steinsaltz explains that there was indeed a Roman holiday that was rarely celebrated and where they would declare something similar to “Let him who will see it, see it…” But the other details are, not surprisingly, not similar.
  Ashi notices that there is a way of interpreting the statement Romans’ as if they are saying that their own lord is an impostor. Good one R. Ashi!
  The Tanna of the Mishnah includes only holidays that are every year.
  The Talmud completes by listing the Persian and Babylonian holidays. I do not know what holidays these are.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss idol worship outside of Israel.
  Rav seems to be saying that only in these places is there fixed idol worship. In such places, business with the idol worshippers would always be prohibited.
  These two sages provide a few additional places with fixed idol worship.
  Hanan’s maternal grandfather explains what “fixed” means.
  The Mishnah stated that it is prohibited to engage in business with pagans for three days before their festivals. Shmuel says that this prohibition does not apply in the Diaspora.
  Interestingly, here we see Babylonian amoraim actually engaging in business with pagans on the day of their festivals. While Shmuel was lenient in the Diaspora, he was not this lenient. The Talmud resolves this by stating that this “festival of the merchants” was not a fixed festival and therefore one could engage in business even on the day itself. It seems that there is a different, even more lenient meaning of “fixed” here. “Fixed” means that it happens not all the time, as it meant above, but at the same time every year.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with a new mishnah.
  The prohibition of conducting business with non-Jews during their holidays is limited to the city that is actually celebrating the holiday.  Outside of the city it is permitted to conduct business with them.  The type of holiday referred to in this mishnah is probably a local holiday and not one that would have been observed throughout the land.
  This section begins with a question, a literary form that is not typical for mishnah.  The question is: can one go to this city on the day of the celebration?  If the answer to this question were to be categorically affirmative, stating that Jews are not allowed to even travel on the road to that city, it would create another fence to prevent Jews from aiding non-Jews in their celebrations.  However, the answer is not categorical.  Rather, a Jew may travel on the road to this city as long as the road leads to other places as well.  If it only leads to this place then it is forbidden.  After all, if the Jew was travelling to this place on the holiday and the road only travels to that city, he is obviously going to transgress the prohibition, or perhaps even worse, to actually celebrate with them.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to explain the mishnah.
  Shimon b. Lakish cites the fair in Gaza as an example of a fair that takes place outside of the city.
  In this version of the above passage, R. Shimon b. Lakish asks R. Hanina if one can engage in business with pagans at the fair in Gaza. R. Hanina responds that it is permitted, for it is similar to a case where a Jew and a non-Jew placed two pots on the same stove. The Talmud will now delve into this case—what could our concern have possibly been and how is this similar to the case of engaging in business with pagans at their fairs. We should note that Rashi extensively explains how these two issues are similar. I am going to keep my explanation short, on a slightly more superficial level.
  
  Daf 12a
  
  Abaye explains that we are not concerned lest the pagan throw some nevelah, improperly slaughtered meat, into the Jew’s pot when the Jew is not looking. After all—why would the non-Jew do that?
  Just as the sages were not concerned lest a non-Jew throw nevelah into the Jew’s pot, the rabbis were not concerned lest the money used in the fair in Gaza came from the benefit of idolatry.
  Rava said that they were not concerned lest the non-Jew cook the Jew’s food, which means at least stir his pot. As we shall see later in the tractate, a Jew is not supposed to eat food cooked by a non-Jew.
  The rabbis were not concerned lest the fair outside of Gaza was participating in the idolatrous practice occurring in Gaza.
  The rabbis were not concerned lest the food from the non-Jew’s pot splashes into the food in the Jew’s pot. Similarly, the rabbis were not concerned lest the Jew engage in business before the festival.
  IntroductionThis section proceeds with the next clause in the Mishnah.
  Meir says that it is forbidden to travel on a road that heads towards a city with idolatry going on in it because it looks like he is going to worship idols. But the sages say one can travel on a road that leads to a city with idolatry in it as long as the road does not lead only to that city.
  A person has to make sure it does not even look like he is bowing down to an idol. We will deal with the final clause later.
  When the rabbis prohibit an act because it merely looks to others as if he is transgressing (even though he is not) the act is prohibited even in private. Therefore, these acts cannot be permitted simply because no one is looking. Rather, they are permitted if it does not look like he is bowing down to an idol.
  IntroductionThis section explains why we need all of the sections found in yesterday’s baraita about not looking like one is bowing down to an idol. Couldn’t we have learned one from the other?
  If he has a thorn in his foot, he can walk away from the idol and remove it elsewhere. Therefore, it is clearly prohibited to bend down next to the idol and remove it. But if coins are found in front of the idol, he cannot bend down and pick them up somewhere else. Therefore, we might have thought that this was permitted. The baraita therefore needed to teach that it is not.
  If the baraita had taught just the case of the coins, we might have thought that this is prohibited because it is just a case of gaining some profit. But we might have thought that if he is in pain, he may bend down to take the thorn out even if it looks like he is bowing down to the idol. Therefore, the baraita had to teach us that this too is prohibited.
  If the baraita had not taught the case of the spring, we might have thought that this was permitted because it is a question of danger to his life. If he does not bend down to drink, he might die. Therefore, the baraita had to teach us that this too is prohibited.
  
  Daf 12b
  
  The only reason to teach the prohibition of putting one’s face up to the face of a statue from which water flows is to teach the last clause, which prohibits one from putting one’s mouth on water pipe. This prohibition is for another reason altogether, unrelated to idolatry. Putting one’s mouth up to the water pipe could lead to swallowing a leech (yuck!).
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the issue of healthy drinking water. While their science clearly differs from ours, access to safe drinking water remains one of the primary health issues to this day.
  Drinking straight from a source of water is dangerous due to leeches.
  Swallowing leeches is so dangerous that it is permitted to heat water to remove the leech on Shabbat. Note that if this was not dangerous, we heating water on Shabbat is prohibited.
  Well, there you have it. Be careful not to swallow a wasp. Although I did once know a woman who swallowed a fly.
  IntroductionThis section continues to deal with the issue of healthy drinking water. Trigger warning—this sugya refers to demons. If they frighten you, you’ve been warned.
  Shabriri is a demon that causes blindness in anyone who drinks from uncovered water at night. The name seems to mean something like “breaker of light.”
  If he is thirsty at night he has two options. First of all, he could wake up another person and have them come with him to get water. Evidently, Shabriri is afraid of two people. The other possibility is to use a magical incantation taught to him by his mother. This incantation involves reducing the demon’s name until the name is gone. This is symbolic means of reducing the demon himself and seems to be a common way of warding off demons.
  IntroductionToday’s daf begins with a new mishnah.
  This mishnah is addressed to the Jew who is already located in the non-Jewish city on the day of their celebration.  We might have thought that he is not to distinguish at all between non-Jews and that it is forbidden to conduct business with any of them.  In this section we learn that the prohibition is limited to those actually demonstrating that they are celebrating the holiday.  A storekeeper who does not decorate his store is evidently not celebrating, and therefore it is permitted to conduct business with him.  We should note that in this case the Rabbis are lenient even though it is not totally clear that this non-Jew will not celebrate later on.  In other words, although there is a chance that later the non-Jew will offer sacrifices to his god for the transaction with the Jew, since this is unlikely it is permitted.
  Resh Lakish offers a startling limitation of the prohibition in the mishnah. It is prohibited to enter the store only if he will directly benefit from the decorations by smelling them. But if he goes into a store where he will not smell the idolatrous decorations he may purchase items, even though the storekeepers will use the proceeds for idolatrous purposes. I should note that this is a radical reinterpretation of the mishnah, one that does not easily accord with tannaitic literature. It is a topic I will address at greater length in a forthcoming book.
  
  Daf 13a
  
  Yohanan offers a more straightforward reading of the mishnah. It is prohibited to enter any store which is participating in idolatrous activities for this would be providing benefit to idolatry. 
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Resh Lakish ruled that one is allowed to provide benefit to idolatry. Today’s section contains a difficulty on his position.
  Natan’s baraita clearly indicates that a Jew may not provide benefit to idolaters by paying the taxes. This is a direct contradiction of Resh Lakish’s ruling.
  Resh Lakish could resolve the difficulty by positing that he holds like other rabbis who disagree with R. Natan. We shall see such an opinion in tomorrow’s section. The existence of this other opinion provides legitimacy to Resh Lakish. R. Yohanan would hold that all tannaim agree with R. Natan—providing benefit to idolatry is prohibited.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended with a statement attributed to R. Yohanan according to which all rabbis agree that providing benefit to idolatry is prohibited. Today’s section begins by questioning that assumption.
  This baraita proves that there are rabbis who allow one to buy property from idolaters, even though this will cause them to profit. One can even take the document to court to have it verified to ensure one’s claim.
  The baraita now continues with cases where a person may suspend a law in order to recover property from idolaters. Generally, a priest should not leave the land of Israel because the rabbis say that the very land outside of Israel defiles. But he may do so in order to go to court to recover property from them.Similarly, a priest may be defiled by entering a burial ground in order to save property from idolaters. The Talmud is quick to correct the baraita. It does not refer to an actual burial ground—the Torah prohibits a priest from entering there. Rather it refers to a “bet haperas” a field in which a body may have been buried. Entering such a field is only a rabbinic prohibition because we are unsure if there is even a body buried there.
  The baraita continues by discussing other cases in which a priest may defile himself—to learn Torah or to marry a woman. These seem to be the two most important mitzvoth in rabbinic thinking. R. Judah and R. Yose argue over whether this is limited to a case where he cannot learn Torah without defiling himself. R. Yose says that even if he could, he is still allowed to learn Torah from his preferred teacher for not every person can learn from every teacher. The teacher-disciple relationship is very individual.
  Yohanan is cognizant of this baraita and rules according to R. Yose. Thus he too seems to be aware of the fact that the rabbis disagree and do allow one to provide benefit to idolatry. This is the end of the difficulty on R. Yohanan.
  Yohanan could resolve the two baraitot and still maintain that providing benefit to idolatry is prohibited. The baraita that seems to allow it refers only to buying from an individual from whom taxes are not collected. One is not allowed to buy from the dealer, for that will provide benefit to idolatry.
  IntroductionThis section begins by discussing the section of the baraita which says that if one buys an animal at an idolatrous festival one should disable it.
  The Talmud asks how one can be allowed to hamstring an animal—isn’t that a violation of the prohibition of causing pain to a living being? Abaye answers with a verse in the book of Joshua where God tells Joshua that in war the Israelites should hamstring their enemies’ horses. The implication seems to be that if a verse allows it, the action is permitted, despite the fact that the context of the verse was war, a time when disabling horses would seem to be an obvious step.
  This baraita is brought here because the method of “disabling” contradicts the method mentioned in the other baraita. The topic here is one who dedicates an animal or something else to the Temple in a time where the Temple still stands. This is something one should not do, but if one did do it, he should somehow destroy the object so that it will not be brought to the Temple. The animal must be left to starve to death. [Note that this seems to obviously cause pain to the animal, but the rabbis, for various reasons, are not bothered by this.]
  
  Daf 13b
  
  Abaye answers the difficulty by saying that it is prohibited to hamstring the sanctified animal because that would be considered treating sacrificial animals in a disgraceful way. One cannot slaughter the animal as a proper sacrifice because that might lead to people eating it. And one cannot cut it in half because the Torah prohibits destroying holy objects in the way that we are commanded to destroy items of idolatry.
  Rava explains that disabling the animal is prohibited because there is a prohibition of putting a blemish in a sacrificial animal. Such a blemish prevents the animal from being sacrificed. When the Temple still stood, this prohibition was considered to be biblical and disabling the animal was certainly a full blemish. But once the Temple no longer stood, the prohibition was only “like putting a blemish.”
  When the Temple still stood, it was prohibited to blemish a sacrificial animal even if it was already blemished. So why here does Rava say it is “like inflicting an animal with a blemish.” This seems to be really prohibited. The answer is that when the Temple still stood a blemished animal could be sold and the proceeds would go to the Temple. The animal was thus useful and blemishing it would damage it. But this animal is not fit for anything since there is no Temple. Therefore, blemishing it, while still prohibited, would only be “like blemishing” and not “real blemishing.”
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss buying things from idolaters at their fairs.
  Yonah asks what a Jew is to do if he bought a slave at an idolatrous fair. He knows that if one buys an animal, he should disable it, but what should he really disable a slave?Ilai quotes a source proving that it is prohibited to actively cause harm to an idolater. This is a source we shall talk about later, and it is a troubling source, but for now, it is being used here not to encourage discrimination and violence, but to discourage it.
  Zera says that the permission to buy slaves from idolaters applies only to Jewish slaves. He seems to understand the baraita as allowing Jews to buy from non-Jews only if they are “rescuing from them.” But a Jew does not need to “rescue” non-Jews from Canaanite ownership.
  Resh Lakish offers a different answer to R. Yirmiyah’s question. A Jew may purchase even a Canaanite slave for by doing so he brings him “under the wings of the Shekhinah.” A Canaanite slave is obligated in many of the mitzvot. Purchasing a Canaanite slave is thus, essentially, converting him.
  Ashi offers a different reason altogether why one is allowed to buy slaves from idolaters—it diminishes their possessions.
  We hear of two amoraim who simply bought from idolaters at the idolatrous fair, and each accuses the other of acting improperly.
  In reality, both amoraim did not break the prohibition, for both bought from private individuals from whom taxes are not collected. Since taxes are not collected, the Jew is not providing benefit to idolatry.
  Abba says that at times they take taxes even from private persons and thus buying even from a private person should be prohibited. So how then can we justify the behavior of these sages? They bought from a private individual who did not pay taxes because he did not reside there permanently. Visitors, evidently, did not pay taxes.
  IntroductionThis mishnah begins a somewhat new topic:  things which are forbidden to sell to idolaters at all times of the year and not just during their holidays, lest these things be used in idol worship.  Again, it is not only forbidden to worship idols, but it is forbidden to aid non-Jews in idolatry.
  Iztroblin are the pines of a cedar tree.  Bnot-shuah are types of figs. All of these things listed in this section are used by the idolaters for idol worship. Therefore it is forbidden to sell them to non-Jews since that would be abetting idolatry.
  Rabbi Judah presents some exceptions to the prohibition of selling a white rooster to an idolater.  A Jew may sell a white rooster to an idolater if it is sold with other regular roosters.  In this case the Jew is merely selling roosters and happens to sell one that is white. The non-Jew may also not be purchasing the rooster for idolatrous purposes since he bought a lot of other roosters.  Furthermore, when he sells the white rooster it doesn’t look to others as if he is selling something specifically for idol worship, since the other roosters he is selling will not typically be used in idol worship.  Rabbi Judah also creates a way for Jews to sell white roosters alone to idolaters.  As long as the Jew cuts off the spur the sale is permitted since the idolater will not sacrifice a blemished animal.With regards to the other forbidden items, it is forbidden to sell them to idolaters only if the sale is specifically for idol worship.  If not, it is permitted to sell the item, because it may be used for other, non-idolatrous purposes.
  Rabbi Meir adds several other things which are forbidden for a Jew to sell to idolaters.   All three of these are varieties of date-palms.
  
  Daf 14a
  
  IntroductionThis section begins to explain some of the details that were in the mishnah.
  The Talmud begins by identifying itzroblin with an Aramaic named plant called “turnita.” Rashi defines this as a type of cedar. Other rishonim argue with this definition. The problem is that a baraita lists the itzroblin as subject to the laws of the sabbatical year, despite the fact that the cedar does not have the type of root that should make it subject to the sabbatical year. [This is where Rashi’s interpretation seems to be problematic, for the cedar certainly does have a perennial root. The Ra’avad reads the baraita as referring to trees that have parts that are edible when young and then become non-edible later in the tree’s development. If the tree “has a root” it has parts that are inedible when the young shoots are edible. These young shoots are considered “fruit” and they are subject the laws of the sabbatical year. If it does not “have a root” then the entire tree consists of parts that are edible and then later become inedible. Thus there is no “tree” and “fruit.” The cedar would belong to this latter category.
  The Talmud resolves that it means “fruit of the cedar” and not the turnita (which Rashi identified as cedar wood).
  This is the next item on the list of the mishnah.
  The mishnah did not meant to teach that one cannot sell stems to idolaters. Rather, the word modifies the earlier words—these items may not be sold “with their stems.”
  It is forbidden to sell to idolaters only pure frankincense.
  A baraita explains that one may sell a large package of the goods listed in the mishnah to an idolater. The assumption is that the idolater is purchasing it for a sale and not for direct use in idolatry. As Abaye explains, a Jew may not directly abet idol worship. But a Jew is not commanded to avoid indirectly abetting it. In reality, this would be basically impossible to avoid.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses selling a white rooster to an idolater.
  If the idolater specifically requests a white rooster, it is likely that he intends to use it in an idolatrous ritual. But if he just asks for a rooster he probably wants one for food or for mating with his hens. Therefore, one can sell him even a white rooster.
  This is an extended difficulty on the ruling of R. Zevid. In the mishnah’s scenario, we do not know what the idolater asked. If he asked “who has a white rooster” then it should always be prohibited to sell him a white rooster. So he must have just asked “who has a rooster?” R. Judah allows him to sell a white one only among others, and the first tanna would be even more strict and not allow him to sell a white rooster at all. Thus neither tanna agrees with R. Zevid.
  Nahman b. Yitzchak says that the mishnah refers to a situation where he asks for both a white rooster and a regular rooster. In such a case, R. Judah allows the Jew to sell him a white one among others and the first tanna would not. But if he asks just for a rooster without specifying at all, all tannaim would allow him to sell a white one alone.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss selling a white rooster to an idolater.
  One baraita allows one to sell a white rooster to an idolater if he is putting on a banquet or if he has a sick person who might need a white rooster (evidently, they’re pretty good for you). The other baraita prohibits selling to a person throwing a banquet who asks for the white rooster, at least on that day.Yitzchak resolves the difficulty by stating that if the banquet was for an ordinary meal of friends, not a celebratory banquet, it is permitted. At an ordinary meal they do not offer up sacrifices so it is permitted to sell them a white rooster. It is only prohibited if the banquet was for a major celebration such as a wedding, where sacrifices might indeed occur.
  The Talmud returns to analyzing R. Zevid’s statement allowing a Jew to sell an idolater a white rooster if they just ask for a rooster. The mishnah ruled that with regard to normal objects if the idolater specifies what they want, one may not sell to them, but if they do not specify, then one may sell to them. If “specify” means that they intend to use it for idolatry—then obviously one may not sell it to them. And if “unspecified” means he just asks for “white wheat” then why should it be prohibited. These are, after all, not objects used in idolatry.
  
  Daf 14b
  
  “Specified” must therefore mean that he asks for a certain type of wheat. In this case, we are concerned that he wants to use it in idolatry. “Unspecified” means he just asks for wheat. In this case, the Jew can sell him wheat because wheat is not used in idolatry. But white roosters are used in idolatry, and therefore, even if he asks him for an unspecified rooster the Jew may not sell him a white rooster. This is a difficulty on R. Zevid.
  The Talmud now returns to the original interpretation of “specified”—the idolater says explicitly that he needs it for idol worship. Why would we think that it should be permitted to sell it to him? Well, maybe he stated that it was for idol worship only as a strategy to get the seller to depart with it. We might therefore have thought that this is permitted. The Mishnah therefore needs to teach that it is not.
  IntroductionThe amoraim continue to discuss selling a white rooster to the idolater.
  Mutilated animals cannot be sacrificed. So if the idolater is asking to buy a mutilated white rooster, perhaps he won’t be using it for idolatry. On the other hand, the fact that he is asking for a mutilated bird is a bit fishy—maybe he is doing this to trick the Jew into sending him a white rooster?
  Ashi here asks another question. If he asks for a white rooster, but is satisfied with a red or black one, can a white one be sold to him later on? Perhaps he was again, just tricking the Jew.Both of these questions are left unanswered.
  Introduction.Today’s section goes on to explaining the continuation of the mishnah concerning items which one may not sell to an idolater.
  Hisda quotes an interesting tradition according to which Abraham, who did grow up in an idolatrous environment, had four hundred chapters of mishnah concerning the laws of idolatry. Today, and by R. Hisda’s time, they only had five. And nevertheless, they still had trouble understanding them.
  The problem they have with the mishnah is that it contradicts another mishnah. R. Meir forbids selling certain types of trees to them. By implication a bad palm tree can be sold to them, whereas another mishnah prohibits selling anything that is attached to the ground.
  The resolution is that R. Meir prohibited the fruit of the good palm tree. The fruit of a bad palm tree may be sold to idolaters, but not the palm tree itself.
  This section is about the identity of the species of palms mentioned by R. Meir. We can see that the amoraim themselves didn’t necessarily understand the translations better than they understood the original words stated by R. Meir. R. Dimi promises Abaye that at least when he goes to Eretz Yisrael they will be able to show him what a niklas/kuryati is.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with another mishnah. This mishnah discusses the prohibition of a Jew from selling animals to non-Jews, lest the non-Jews use them for work on the Sabbath.
  The Torah teaches on several occasions that an animal must rest on the Sabbath (see for instance Exodus 20:9). Our mishnah extends this prohibition and prohibits a Jew from selling an animal to a non-Jew, lest the non-Jew use the animal for work on the Sabbath.  This is similar yet somewhat different from the issue which the mishnah discussed previously, selling potentially idolatrous objects to the non-Jew.  In both cases it is forbidden to sell something to a non-Jew.  However, in this case, Jews are not enjoined to prevent non-Jews from working on the Sabbath.  Rather Jews are prohibited from putting Sabbath observant animals into the position where they will have to break the Sabbath.  In other words this prohibition concerns the animal and not the non-Jew himself.Not all animals are used for work.  Small animals, such as sheep and goats are not used for work.  Therefore in a place where it is customary to sell them to non-Jews it is permitted to do so.  In other places it was customary not to sell even small animals to non-Jews, lest the Jew become confused and sell them large animals, which is prohibited in all places.It is forbidden in all places to sell large animals, such as oxen and horses, to non-Jews since they will be used to perform work on the Sabbath.  This prohibition includes calves and foals, even though they do not usually perform work.Rabbi Judah allows one to sell injured animals to non-Jews since they are clearly being purchased for their meat and not in order to do work.Ben Bateira allows the sale of a horse since horses are used for riding, which is not considered by the Rabbis to be work.  Pulling plows, a work performed by oxen is considered work.
  The first clause of the mishnah implies that it is not actually prohibited to sell small animals to idolaters. But there is another mishnah that would prohibit selling any animal to them whatsoever, out of fear that they would have carnal relations with it.
  Rav would say that the two prohibitions go together. If it is a place where it is forbidden to sell them an animal, then it is also forbidden to let them be alone with an animal. But in places where it is permitted to sell, it also permitted to let them alone with the animal.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  Elazar would say that it is always permitted to sell them an animal. Once they buy the animal, they will not engage in bestiality with it because this could cause the animal to become sterile. In other words, idolaters will have sex with animals, but not at cost to their own property.
  According to this tradition, Rav actually agrees with R. Elazar. Thus all tannaim agree that once that once an animal is sold to the idolater, we need not be concerned that he will have relations with it.
  IntroductionThe mishnah prohibits selling large cattle to idolaters. The question is why?
  There are several issues that may arise with selling a large animal to an idolater, but none of them seem to really make sense. We already said that idolaters do not engage in bestiality with their own animals, so that’s not a concern (phew!). Second, we might be concerned that they would make the animal work on Shabbat. But only animals owned by Jews must rest on Shabbat. Not animals owned by non-Jews. So what is the problem?
  Theoretically, the prohibition of selling them a large animal may be because this could lead to loaning or renting them an animal. In such a case the Jew owns the animal and therefore there is a problem with the animal doing work.But, halakhically speaking, when a person borrows or rents an animal he owns it (this is so he will be responsible for damages that happen to the animal). Therefore, the problem returns. Why shouldn’t a Jew sell his animal to an idolater?
  Rami son of R. Yeba explains that this entire prohibition is because the Jewish owner might actually own the animal right when Shabbat begins. During the process of selling the animal, the Jew might give the owner a few moments to “try the animal out.” And then the animal would hear the owner’s voice and while carrying a load walk a bit. This is prohibited because one is not allowed to make his animal work on Shabbat—carrying is work. Lest this scenario occur, the rabbis prohibited selling to idolaters large animals that can carry a load.
  Shisha argues that renting something to an idolater does not mean that the idolater has acquired the place. For if that were true, then it should be permitted to rent a dwelling house to an idolater. Even if he brings his idols into there, the house is his!
  The answer is that when it comes to renting your house to an idolater, the rules are stricter due to the verse quoted. The Torah does not need to prohibit bringing an abomination into one’s own home—obviously that is prohibited. What it prohibits is to even allow a pagan to bring an idol into a home rented to him by a Jew. Thus renters do “own” what they are renting. Nevertheless, it is still prohibited to rent living quarters to an idolater (in the land of Israel).
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s sugya we learned that when one rents something he technically owns it. Obviously this does not mean that he does not have to give it back. What it means is that while the object is being rented, it technically belongs to him.
  A priest may feed his animal terumah (as long as it is animal food) but an Israelite may not. If an Israelite rents a cow from the priest he may feed it terumah—renting does not constitute acquisition so the priest still owns it. Similarly, if a priest rents a cow from a priest, he may not feed it terumah. Again, renting does not constitute acquisition.
  We now have more reasons as to why it is prohibited to sell a large animal to an idolater. This might lead one to rent or lend an animal or it might to letting the idolater try out the animal on erev Shabbat. Since the Jew still owns the animal, when it works on Shabbat the Jew is violating Shabbat.
  Adda finds a way of allowing a Jew to sell an animal to an idolater. As long as he uses an agent, all of the concerns we might have are removed. Even if the agent lets the idolater try it out on erev Shabbat, the animal will not come to the unfamiliar voice of the agent. And the agent will not lend or rent the animal out because it is not his. Furthermore, he would fear that the idolater would find a fault in the animal and then not buy it.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss the issue of selling a large animal to idolaters.
  Huna ignores the prohibition and sells a cow to an idolater. When challenged, he responds that he was selling it for the purpose of slaughtering.
  
  Daf 15b
  
  Huna learns that one might assume that someone will slaughter an animal from a mishnah concerning selling a cow used for plowing on the Sabbatical Year, when plowing is prohibited. Bet Hillel permits it because it is possible that the cow will be used for food instead of for plowing.
  Rabbah points out that the cases are not the same. One is not commanded to make sure that one’s cattle rests on the Sabbatical year. It is a prohibition that falls on the person, not on the cattle. But when it comes to Shabbat, one is commanded not to let one’s cattle work on Shabbat. Therefore, Rabbah argues, a Jew cannot sell his animal to an idolater.
  Abaye points out that what Rabbah says is not true. Just because one is commanded to make sure that no forbidden work is done with one’s possession does not mean that he cannot sell it to someone who will not observe the commandment. Bet Hillel allows one to sell a field for plowing to a person who might plow it because there is a chance that they will not plow it.
  Ashi attacks Rabbah in the opposite direction. Sometimes one is not commanded concerning one’s objects and nevertheless one still cannot sell them to those who will use them to break a commandment. Such is the case with regard to selling plowing instruments during the sabbatical year.
  Ashi says that what really matters is whether we can make a reasonable assumption that the item sold will be used to transgress a commandment. It is reasonable to assume that one might decide to slaughter a cow instead of using it for work. This would not be reasonable when it comes to a donkey. It is unlikely that one will use plowing instruments for anything else. Therefore they cannot be sold to one who does not observe the laws of the sabbatical year.We should note how R. Ashi reverts to simple reason to support R. Huna’s actions. Rabbah on the other hand wanted to find an authoritative source. This may reflect a general shift from tradition as a source of authenticity to logic.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues discussing selling pack animals to idolaters.
  Rabbah defends his sale of a donkey to a Jew known to sell to idolaters by pointing out that it is not certain that the Jew will sell it to an idolater. He might sell it to a Jew.
  Abaye uses this long baraita as a (somewhat convoluted) difficulty on Rabbah. The baraita shows that Samaritans are not suspected of bestiality, nor are they suspected of a few other crimes. But nevertheless, there is a custom not to sell them small animals. And when it comes to large animals, the law is always stricter, as we saw in the Mishnah. Abaye thinks it is prohibited to sell large animals to Samaritans because they would sell it to idolaters. So how can Rabbah sell an animal to a Jew known to sell to idolaters?
  IntroductionAbaye continues to rain down difficulties on Rabbah who was lenient and sold a donkey to a Jew known to sell to non-Jews.
  Yesterday we learned that one can be alone with Samaritans. That means that they are not suspected of being murderers. Nevertheless, a Jew may not sell them weapons. The reason, according to Abaye, is that they will come to sell them to idolaters.
  You might think that a Samaritan will definitely not do teshuvah and stop selling weapons to non-Jews, but a Jew known to sell weapons (or other contraband) to non-Jews might stop doing so, and therefore it is permitted to sell weapons to non-Jews known to sell to idolaters. But there is yet another source in which R. Nahman explicitly states that any item that may not be sold to an idolater, may also not be sold to a Jew suspected of selling to an idolater. This is a clear rejection of Rabbah.
  Rabbah tries very hard to get the donkey back but he failed. Poor Rabbah, but I guess he at least got some good exercise.
  Dimi b. Abba extends the prohibition of selling weapons to Jewish robbers. The Talmud explains that this refers even to a robber not known to murder. The robber referred to here is even one who is sneaky, more of a thief than a robber. The thief may not intend to murder, but if he gets caught, he might commit murder in order to save himself. Therefore, one should not sell weapons to them.
  IntroductionThis section discusses selling shields to non-Jews. Is this allowed since shields are basically weapons of defense?
  This baraita prohibits even selling defensive shields to non-Jews (although there is a version that allows one to sell them shields).If it is prohibited to sell them weapons of defense, then it should also be prohibited to sell them food. After all, food is necessary to fend off death. And indeed, this is what Rav holds. If it would be possible to avoid selling food to them, then one should, according to Rav. I should note that this is an extreme opinion—the notion being that one should do whatever one can to avoid aiding non-Jews. It is not representative of the majority of the sages.
  
  Daf 16a
  
  Another way of understanding why one should not sell them shields is that shields are easily turned into weapons. Indeed, while I’ve never battled with swords or shields, hitting your opponent with the shield seems to occur quite frequently in television and the movies.
  Those who allow Jews to sell them shields explain that when they have no more weapons, the non-Jews will not use their weapons as shields, they will simply run away.Nahman in the end allows selling them shields. As often occurs in these issues, the Talmud adopts the more lenient view.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss selling material that can be used as a weapon to a non-Jew.
  Adda b. Ahavah adds that Jews may not even sell any raw material that would normally be turned into weapons. This refers only to a particular type of iron that would only be used for weapons. Other materials that may be used for other purposes may be sold to them.Interestingly, the sugya again notes that this prohibition is not observed. Jews were selling material to non-Jews that could be used as a weapon. R. Ashi explains that such material is sold to Persians who protect the Jews.This sugya has some interesting ramifications for the question as to whether or not it is permitted to sell weapons. One way of reading the sugya is that it is prohibited to sell weapons only to those who might use them against Jews. Jews (Israel) can sell weapons freely to others who fight each other. But the sugya might possibly be read more expansively as prohibiting selling weapons to anyone who would use them offensively.
  Judah allows Jews to sell maimed animals to non-Jews because they cannot be cured. They will not be able to use them as work animals. The non-Jew will assumedly slaughter them immediately and it is not prohibited to sell animals used for food to non-Jews. The other sages point out that these animals can give birth. Thus a non-Jew may come to hold on to them. Another Jew would then see the non-Jew in possession of the animal and come to believe that it is permitted to sell animals to non-Jews.Judah responds that maimed female animals cannot be bred. The non-Jew will see this very quickly and will not hold on to the animal for long.
  The rabbis have a notion that carrying a person is not considered forbidden labor on Shabbat because a “live person carries himself.” Since a horse is used for riding, Ben Batera says one may sell a horse to a non-Jew because the horse does not perform labor forbidden on Shabbat from the Torah.Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] forbids selling horses for two reasons. First of all, they are weapons. Second of all, they are considered large animals.
  The prohibition of selling weapons applies to a horse, for a horse can kill by trampling. Indeed, it seems quite clear that horses are used as weapons. But the prohibition of selling large cattle is more difficult to explain, for as I said above, the rabbis do not consider carrying a human to be prohibited by the Torah. R. Yohanan answers that when the animal grows old it will be made to work in a mill, which is considered work.
  Can a Jew sell a fattened ox to a non-Jew? The Talmud explains that this question can be asked of both R. Judah, who allows selling a maimed animal and of the rabbis who do not.
  This source describes the House of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] basically bribing the Roman authorities so that they would not have to give a fatted ox to be sacrificed. The second bribe they paid was to allow them to give them a dead ox, which obviously cannot be sacrificed. Now, since they already bribed the Romans that the ox should be presented the day after their festival, what does it matter whether the ox is dead or alive? The answer has to be that they were concerned lest they hold on to the fatted ox and use it for labor prohibited on Shabbat.
  The problem with the above explanation is that if the animal was dead, then why would Rabbi also have paid for it to be presented the day after the festival. The baraita simply makes no sense read that way.Rather, the series of payments was just a gradual way to ease the Romans into allowing Rabbi and his house not to have to give the fatted ox altogether.
  Ashi affirms that if a fatted ox is kept and slimmed down it can eventually perform the work of two. This is why it is problematic to sell them a fatted ox.
  IntroductionThis section opens with a mishnah that teaches that one is forbidden to assist a non-Jew in any way that may injure the public.
  A Jew is not allowed to sell bears or lions to non-Jews, lest the non-Jew not take proper care of the animal and the animal cause damage to the public.  This section may also be understood as referring to the gladiator exhibitions which often involved lions and bears.  The Rabbis were opposed to these violent exhibitions and to the culture that encouraged the enjoyment of bloodshed.  A Jew should certainly not attend such events nor sell animals to non-Jews that might be used in these events.
  A Jew may not join non-Jews in building any of the structures listed in this section.  The basilica served as a courtroom.  The scaffold was used for executions.  The platform was used for judges to make speeches.  We can see from this mishnah that the Jews had a deep distrust for the non-Jewish law system.  This law system is considered damaging to the public and therefore a Jew should not aid in building this system.
  A Jew is allowed to join non-Jews in building bathhouses, since bathhouses are for the public good.  Indeed in other Talmudic sources the Romans are praised for building bathhouses, marketplaces, roads and bridges.  From other stories in the Talmud and a famous story that will appear in our tractate, it is clear that Jews and non-Jews shared public bathhouses.[Note:  the version of the mishnah upon which my interpretation is based is “dimasaot” and not “bimasaot”, as recommended by Albeck.]A Jew may not aid in building the cupola of the bathhouse since that is the place where the idol is placed.  As we have learned already in the previous mishnayoth, a Jew may not perform any action which would aid in idolatrous practice.
  “Struggling” refers to an animal that was dying before it was slaughtered. If after it was slaughtered it “struggles” then we can assume that it was alive and the animal may be eaten. R. Hanin here is discussing the status of large wild animals. All agree that their status vis a vis struggling is the same as that of a small beast. But when it comes to selling them to non-Jews, there is a dispute. The first opinion holds that large wild animal may never be sold. In contrast, R. Hanin holds that like small beasts, it depends on the custom.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on anyone who says it is prohibited to sell them large wild beasts. Large wild beasts may not be sold only if they present a danger to the public. But if they are not dangerous, then they may be sold to them.
  Rabbah b. Ulla explains that the Mishnah prohibits selling a mutilated lion which is not fit for work, and it follows the opinion of R. Judah from the previous mishnah who forbade selling maimed animals. But an unmaimed large wild animal would be prohibited, even according to the other rabbis, even if it does not present a danger to the public.Ashi says that all lions are considered “maimed” when it comes to work. After all, a lion cannot be put to work. Thus a lion that does not present a danger could be sold. But a different wild animal that can do work cannot be sold under any circumstance.
  
  Daf 16b
  
  The baraita quoted here clearly prohibits selling them large wild animals. This rejects R. Hanan b. Rava who said that it depends on custom.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss selling wild animal to non-Jews. The material here is the same as we learned yesterday but presented in a different fashion.
  Ravina notes a direction contradiction between the mishnah and a baraita. The mishnah implies that as long as the animal is not dangerous it may be sold to non-Jews. But the baraita prohibits selling large wild animals under any circumstances.
  These are the same opinions we saw yesterday. Rabbah b. Ulla says that the mishnah refers to a maimed lion and follows R. Judah who allows selling maimed animals. R. Judah does not allow selling maimed dangerous animals. If it is not dangerous, it may be sold. But other wild animals may not be sold even if they are not dangerous.Ashi says that lions cannot perform work in any case. Therefore, they cannot be sold if they are dangerous. But animals that could possibly be put to work may be sold.
  Nahman objects to the entire difficulty. Perhaps a lion is not a large animal. Perhaps it is to be considered a small animal. As we have seen, in places where the custom is to sell small animals to non-Jews, they may be sold. Thus a lion may not be sold because it is dangerous. But other small animals may be sold.
  Ashi reads the mishnah such that it refutes R. Hanan b. Rava who allowed selling non-dangerous large wild animals to non-Jews. We should note that this is yet another organization of the same material we have seen above.
  This is probably a question you had earlier—what kind of work can a wild animal perform? The answer is that it can be tied to a mill and made to grind grain.
  IntroductionThe entire halakhic content of this sugya is the statement that a large animal has the same rule as small cattle when it comes to “struggling.” I explained this concept in section 2 of this daf, where I wrote, “‘Struggling’ refers to an animal that was dying before it was slaughtered. If after it was slaughtered it ‘struggles’ then we can assume that it was alive and the animal may be eaten.” The section we learned today is not really about the content of this halakhah but about the attribution. This sugya does open a window as to how important attributions were to Babylonian amoraim and also to how those attributions were formed.
  Zera begins his adventure by learning at the school of R. Judah. There he learns the statement, but Rav Judah does not know whether he learned it from Shmuel or from Rav, the two great amoraim of the first generation in Babylonia.At Korkunia, he hears another sage reciting the tradition in the name of Shmuel, so he believes that it originated with him.
   Sura is Rav’s home town. There R. Zera learns that Rav issued the same statement.
  When R. Zera gets to Israel (if you learned Ketubot, you might remember that at the end of the masechet he makes Aliyah) he hears the statement attributed by a different amora to Rav. He asks R. Assi if this is indeed the correct transmission.
  Assi insults R. Zera in return for his doubts about the attribution of the statement and then orders him to transmit it the way that R. Assi does.
  In the end, everyone gets their name attached to Rav’s statement. Now, was that so hard?
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to explain the next section of the mishnah, which prohibited joining idolaters in building certain structures.
  Yohanan says that there are three kinds of basilicas, and Rava elaborates that only one of these is prohibited—the basilica associated with the king. One may build with idolaters basilicas associated with bath-houses and store-houses.
  In this version of the material Rava permits all basilicas to be built with non-Jews accept for those attached to the other structures mentioned in the mishnah that one may not build with a non-Jew.As we often see, there is a tendency towards leniency in these passages.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains the famous story of the great R. Eliezer being caught by the Roman emperor for having heretical beliefs.As always, I would urge caution in viewing these stories as historically accurate. First of all, they were composed over the course of hundreds of years, and this version was probably not completed until several hundred years after R. Eliezer’s death. Second, they were not intended to be history. They may to a certain extent reflect the concerns of the authors of the story, but they are not bald descriptions of events that actually happened.
  Eliezer finds a tricky answer with which to respond to the governor. Daniel Boyarin has noted that this is a different strategy towards trials than that typically adopted and celebrated by early Christians. Rather than martyr himself, R. Eliezer finds a way of saying the right thing to the governor without actually betraying his God. We will have stories of martyrdom elsewhere in the Talmud. This story could be considered an “anti-martyr” story—when faced with accusations of heresy, choose life over death.
  Akiva, R. Eliezer’s star pupil, discerns (somehow) that R. Eliezer may have enjoyed something he heard from a heretic. As we shall see, these “heretics” are early Christians.
  
  Daf 17a
  
  Now R. Eliezer remembers that indeed he did have a conversation with a student of Jesus.A few notes about this conversation. First of all, it is interesting that the rabbis portray one of their greats as being intrigued by a Christian Jew’s teaching. Second, the teaching itself may be a sort of slur on Christianity. Jesus is associated here with a harlot and with a toilet. Third, the question is a typical type of rabbinic question, but is a farce of sorts. The story teller may be mocking both R. Eliezer and Jesus at the same time. Fourth, the midrash on Micah is also very typical of rabbinic style.The final midrash is R. Eliezer’s words, where he quotes a source that interprets the “harlot” in Proverbs 5:8 as being the embodiment of illicit Jewish sects, particularly Christianity. This may imply that the authors of this story feared that Jews found Christianity to be seductive.
  This version of the baraita reads a more literal interpretation to be included in the verse from Proverbs.
  The rabbis do not read the verse as does the Christian in the story with R. Eliezer. So how do they read the somewhat strange words of the verse? They read them in accordance with yet another verse from Ezekiel. A woman who acts as a harlot and offers her body for money will in the end pay men to have sex with her. [I am not going to discuss here rabbinic views of prostitution. Too far off the topic, and quite frankly, too complicated in light of the modern world.].
  Pedat disagrees with R. Hisda from above. R. Hisda had said that it is prohibited to come within four cubits of a prostitute. R. Pedat says that it is prohibited only to come close (in a sexual manner) only to one who is considered a forbidden relationship. Interestingly, R. Pedat seems to have little problem with coming close to a prostitute.
  This final section discusses a fascinating contradiction between Ulla’s actions and his preaching. On the one hand, in reality he would kiss his sister, either on the hand or on the breast (I assume this was considered normal social behavior in the time). This is his sister after all. On the other hand, he also preached that a man should stay away from even getting near any woman, just as we tell a nazirite to stay away from the vineyard.Interestingly, there is no resolution to this contradiction.
  IntroductionLast week’s sugya brought up the topic of apostasy. It also contained a story of potential martyrdom—R. Eliezer gets himself acquitted. This week’s daf will continue with these themes.
  In this interpretation the “leech’s two daughters” are the embodiments of apostasy and service to the Roman government, both of whom beckon from Gehenna (hell), trying to seduce Jews.
  This is a slightly different version of the previous material—here Gehenna itself beckons to the two daughters, apostasy and the ruling authority, calling them down to hell.
  The rabbis interpret Proverbs 2:19, whose simple meaning seems to refer to a prostitute or some sort of seductress, as referring to apostasy. According to this reading of the verse, when one abandon’s apostasy, one dies. It is not easy to understand why one should die when one performs teshuvah from apostasy. One answer is that separating from apostasy is so painful that it causes one to die.This will open an extended passage on apostasy. As is almost always the case, there are conflicting sources.  Below I will use the Hebrew term “minut” which is difficult to translate, instead of apostasy.
  The story brought here is of a woman whose least sin was having a child with her son. Since this is the least of her sins, she is presumed to have also acted in the ways of minut. So why didn’t she die when she repented?The answer is that she did not wholeheartedly repent. Somewhat bafflingly, partial repentance does not cause a person to die, but full repentance does.
  This is a different version of the above material. The midrash had said that one who repents of minut dies. But if one repents of another sin, one does not die? But didn’t R. Hisda say to the woman who came to repent of incest that she was going to die? And in this version she does die.The answer is that since she said this was her lightest sin, we can presume that she also performed acts of minut from which she was also repenting. The woman died because of minut, not because of incest.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains the amazing story of R. Elazar b. Dordai, the rabbi who spent his life chasing prostitutes.
  This is the amazing story of how a prostitute’s fart led to the death of the great fornicating rabbi, Rabbi Elazar b. Dordai. I think it is remarkable that the rabbis preserve such a tale and attribute it to a rabbi nonetheless.
  Elazar dies when he repents from fornication, not minut.The answer is that his addiction to fornication is like minut, it is like apostasy. I think there is a deep sense of truth in this—being addicted to something like sex is to give one’s entire being over to it. It is “minut” if we take “minut” to mean a life devoted to purposes larger than mere gratification of one’s bodily senses.
  Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] also reflects on this amazing story. First of all, Rabbi Elazar acquires eternal life in one single moment, so profound was his teshuvah. Second, even though he spent his life in sin, chasing prostitutes, he is still called “Rabbi.” Profound.
  This story is here again because of the juxtaposition of fornication and avodah zarah. Interestingly, the rabbis choose the path that offers greater temptation. The rabbis were not tempted by idol worship and indeed this tractate is not really about idol worship. It is about sharing public space with idolaters. But the sexual urges—well those have not gone away. But when they get to the brothel, the prostitutes run away. And one rabbi seems to have known that they would be protected from sin. This is based on a pun on the verb. “Mezimmah” which I have translated as “foresight” but be read as “from licentiousness.” Thus the verse could be rendered, “you will be protected from licentiousness.”
  
  Daf 17b
  
  Here Rava explains why he renders the word “mezimmah” as from or against matters of licentiousness and not Torah. The “mem” in front of the word does not make sense if “mezimmah” is simply Torah.
  This is the story of the arrest of R. Elazar b. Perata on five charges (which are not listed here) and the arrest of R. Hanina b. Tradion for only one charge, studying Torah. R. Hanina b. Tradion, despite being arrested for only one charge, will not escape punishment, whereas R. Elazar b. Perata will. This is because R. Hanina only studied Torah and did not occupy himself with “gemilut hasadim.”The Talmud adds in here a general accusation against a person who only studies Torah and does not occupy himself with “gemilut hasadim.” One who only studies Torah is akin to one who has no God. This is certainly a biting criticism of one who leads this type of imbalanced life.
  This story makes it sound as if R. Hanina b. Teradion was occupied in the supervision of charity, which seems to be an act that counts as an act of loving kindness.
  The potential resolution is that he was indeed trustworthy, but he did not actually practice acts of gemilut hasadim.
  The Talmud brings up a statement by R. Hanina concerning charity collection. Somehow he mixed up money collected for Purim, which must be given out that day so that the poor can use it to buy food for the Purim feast, with money collected for general charity. Rashi explains that to compensate for this error, he distributed his own money to the poor for Purim. In any case, it again seems clear that he was occupied with acts of gemilut hasadim.Again, the Talmud tries to resolve the difficulty. He did engage in acts of lovingkindness, but not at the level required.
  IntroductionThe story of the arrest of these two rabbis continues.
  Elazar is accused of being a robber and of being a rabbi. He points out that this is a contradiction in terms. One cannot be both. But they insist—you are called “Master.” He explains that he is not a “rabbi”—a teacher of Torah. He is only a master of weavers. As we shall see, he is not telling the truth. Again we see a rabbi try to “trick” his way out of martyrdom.
  Miraculously, R. Elazar, who is not really a weaver, is taught by some bees how to identify which is the warp and which is the woof. The warp is the passive part that sits on the loom, as a female is receptive of the male in the sexual act. I suppose one can tell male and female wasps apart?
  The House of Aveidan seems to be some place of religious disputation, more reflective of Babylonian than Palestinian reality. The authorities ask R. Elazar why he did not go there. As we have seen elsewhere, the rabbi makes an excuse and again a miracle occurs to bolster his excuse.
  According to this story, the authorities forbade slave owners from freeing their slaves. Perhaps they feared that this would lead to a revolt. R. Elazar, evidently did free his slave, but now denies it. Elijah appears to warn the man who wants to testify against R. Elazar that this will be to no avail. The man ignores Elijah, but again, a miracle occurs and R. Elazar is saved.
  IntroductionElazar has escaped. The story now continues with the trial of R. Hanina b. Tradion, who we know will not.
  Note the very different reaction that R. Hanina has to his accusers. Whereas R. Elazar consistently lied and thereby avoided martyrdom, R. Hanina willingly admits to his violation of Roman law and testifies that this is what he believes that God wants him to do. He seems to relish his opportunity to be executed. In reality, R. Hanina is not martyred because he only occupied himself with Torah and not with gemilut hasadim. He is martyred because he does not take the opportunity to avoid it.
  
  Daf 18a
  
  The Talmud tries to find sins that would explain why R. Hanina was executed. Note that this is “overexplaining”—the Talmud explained earlier that he dies because he did not engage in gemilut hasadimHanina is accused of pronouncing God’s name according to its letters. But then the Talmud explains that he only did so in order to practice or understand, but not for magical purposes. Nevertheless, he was punished for pronouncing God’s name in public.
   Hanina’s wife was punished for not stopping R. Hanina from pronouncing God’s name in public. Pretty harsh punishment.
  The Talmud searches for a sin for which R. Hanina’s daughter is punished as well. Note, the Talmud is not satisfied with saying that his wife and daughter are punished in order to punish him. This might make sense as a simple reading of the story but does not match the rabbinic understanding of God’s justice and power. Rather, they are punished for their own sins. His daughter’s sin was as minor as taking delight in the attention the Roman men paid to her.
  This is what martyrdom in the ancient world was all about. Going to one’s death and still maintaining faith in the justice of God. It was a form of “testimony” to the outside world of the greatness of the God of the martyr. Again, I should emphasize that some stories in the Talmud celebrate the martyr, but some do not.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues with another story involving R. Hanina ben Tradion, obviously before he died (which happened at the end of the previous section).
  Yose b. Kisma presents R. Hanina with a theological problem—if Jews believe that God has decreed that Rome should rule, why do we still protest against them?
  Hanina seems totally indifferent to his fate. I read in these lines some criticism of R. Hanina. R. Hanina’s answer strikes even R. Yose b. Kisma as ridiculous.
  Hanina’s willingness to pay tzedakah money out of his own pocket is what gets him a place in the world to come. Note, it is not his study of Torah or his willingness to die that allows him into the world to come. It is his good deeds. Again, I think there is some criticism here of the rabbinic movement.
  IntroductionToday’s section describes the death of R. Hanina b. Tradion.
  The beginning of this story is fascinating for the contrast it offers between R. Yose b. Kisma and R. Hanina. The former is certainly a rabbi, assumedly one who studied Torah. Yet not only did the Romans not persecute him, they attend his burial and offer eulogies for him. Again, I am not reading this tale to try to determine what happened in actual history. I read it as an ideological statement. The author/editor of this story seems to be implying that one can be a rabbi and still get along with the Romans. R. Hanina was not simply a rabbi—he was provoking a fight. While we do have some sympathies for him, he is an ambiguous character.
  The cruelty of the Romans is highlighted when they attempt to delay his death. And the bravery, dedication and martyrdom of R. Hanina is emphasized by the fact that he embraces his death. In my reading, the reason that he wishes to hold the Torah is to emphasize what he is being martyred for. If people do not know this, then his martyrdom has no value.
  Hanina experiences a mystical vision while dying. Note that his students assume that he will see something that they cannot see. This is what is expected when one acts as a martyr. He then refuses to injure himself, insisting that only God can take his soul.
  The Executioner now becomes a martyr himself, thereby acquiring eternal life through one act. Note that the act is twofold—first of all, he eases R. Hanina’s death. This seems to be sanctioned. R. Hanina is not allowed to hasten his own death, but he may allow the executioner to do so. And then he martyrs himself as well.Rabbi’s commentary here is the same as it was in the previous story.
  IntroductionThe Talmudic tale continues with the stories of Beruriah and her sister, the daughters of the martyred R. Hanina b. Teradion.
  Beruria, R. Hanina’s daughter, sends R. Meir, her husband, out to rescue her sister from the brothel. R. Meir assumes that a miracle would be wrought for R. Hanina’s daughter only if no man has violated her in the brothel. R. Meir comes across here as blaming the innocent victim. I’m not convinced the story teller has much sympathy for him.
  Disguised as a cavalryman, R. Meir determines that she has been refusing all men who come to have sex with her. This, in his eyes, justifies his coming attempt to rescue her.
  Meir bribes the reluctant jailer, who after seeing the miracles that R. Meir can work, hands Beruriah’s sister over to him.
  
  Daf 18b
  
  Meir’s saying saves the jailer, but now makes R. Meir into the most wanted man in Rome.
  Some Romans see R. Meir and in order to convince them that he is not R. Meir, he acts in a way that R. Meir would not act. He either enters a brothel, pretends to eat forbidden food, or Elijah disguised as a prostitute embraces him. This works and the Romans let him go.Nevertheless, R. Meir still runs away to Babylonia. There are two suggestions as to why he runs away. The first is due to the incident described above. The second is due to “the incident about Beruria.” This is not explained anywhere in the Talmud. Rashi adds the following legend. Beruriah made light of the Talmudic assertion that women are “light-minded.” To vindicate the Talmudic maxim, Rabbi Meir sent one of his students to seduce her. Though she initially resisted the student’s advances, she eventually acceded to them. When she realized what she had done she committed suicide out of shame.I should emphasize that this legend is not in the Talmud itself; it is found only in the commentary of Rashi. It is likely that someone (I do not imagine Rashi himself) made this up as a mirror image of Beruriah’s sister. Beruriah is known elsewhere for being learned in matters of Torah. Someone may have invented this text as a way of deterring women from studying Torah. Such study, in the eyes of the author of the legend, will lead to women taking Talmudic learning lightly, for the tradition itself deprecates women. This will eventually lead them to become sexually licentious. Whereas Beruriah’s sister, who does not seem to be learned, cannot be seduced, Beruriah, the learned one, is seduced. Whereas Beruriah’s sister escapes both shame and death, Beruriah is shamed and as a result takes her own life. Note that this is not a case of martyrdom—the martyr does not take his own life.The tale has strong misogynist tones and probably was composed by a man who wanted to offer women a cautionary tale—do not become learned like Beruriah.
  The baraita here opens a new topic—warning Jews not to visit stadiums or other places where sorcerers or various types of clowns and other entertainers perform. The meaning of the words that I have italicized is not certain. Rashi says that they are all clowns, but probably the meaning is broader than the modern word for clown.
  This baraita allows a Jew to go to both a stadium and a siege camp because he may do some good there. At the stadium he could shout and try to save the victim. At the siege camp he may be able to save the Jews under siege. The only thing he is not allowed to do there is to participate in the siege itself by consulting with the Romans.
  We can resolve the contradictions concerning the siege camps—he may go as long as he does not conspire with them. But it is difficult to resolve the contradiction with regard to the stadiums. One baraita unconditionally allows a Jew to go to the stadium while the other does not.
  There is indeed a dispute among tannaim about whether one may go to a stadium. The first opinion holds that despite the fact that he might do some good there, it remains prohibited. But R. Natan allows a Jew to go to the stadium because he might have the opportunity to save the victim and even if he cannot, he will be able to serve as a witness to allow the man’s wife to remarry.
  Meir prohibits going to a theater or circus because idolaters offer sacrifices there. We should note that the Hebrew states, “spread manure,” but clearly this is a malephemism (opposite of euphemism) for offering sacrifices. The other rabbis offer two reasons why one should not go to a circus—if sacrifices are being offered there, then they will be suspected of offering sacrifices. If they are not offering sacrifices, then it still is forbidden because it is participating in a “gathering of the scornful.”However, the Talmud notes that there is a difference between the two reasons. If sacrifices are not being offered and he engages in business there, then the proceeds of his business are not prohibited.
  This derashah on the verse from Psalms is located here because the same verse was used above.
  Since the verse had spoken of “scoffing” the Talmud brings some general moral exhortations against such behavior.
  This derashah is brought here because it is similar to the previous one, using the same verse and nearly the same message.
  IntroductionThis section contains another derashah by R. Shimon b. Pazzi, again related to the prohibition of going to pagan theaters and circuses.
  Shimon b. Pazzi applies the first verse of Psalms to the prohibition of attending pagan circuses, theaters, contests of wild beasts or engaging in evil conspiracies with idolaters. In their place, a Jew should not sleep—he should study Torah. 
  Yonatan applies each part of this verse to Abraham, using prooftexts to show how each section of the verse applies to various peoples whom Abraham did not join—the people who built the tower of Babel (they are called in rabbinic literature the “generation of the division of the world, for when the tower fell, the world was divided), the people of Sodom and the Philistines (against whom Abraham went to war).
  
  Daf 19a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a derashah on a verse that sounds similar to the verse expounded in daf 18
  Psalms 112 says “happy is the man who fears the Lord” and the Talmud quite interestingly asks why a woman who fears the Lord should not similarly be happy. As a response to this difficulty, two amoraim offer different interpretations. The first is that one is happy if he repents while his inclination to sin is still strong—while he is still a man, and not only once he is old and his inclination has weakened. The second interpretation is somewhat similar—happy is the one who conquers his evil inclination like “a man.” Clearly, these are still very gendered images.
  Elazar reads into the verse that to be happy one should serve God without the hope of any external reward. This same message is found in a mishnah from Avot.
  One can learn Torah, gain wisdom, only if one is in the place that one wants to be. I think this is one of the deepest sayings concerning Torah that I know. And it is true about most things in life—one can learn and grow only if one is happy and satisfied with where one is.
  This is a fascinating story on many levels. First of all, it provides a glimpse into how the sages studied Bible, at least on occasion. It seems that they finished one book before opening another. Moreover, they studied from physical books and not memory. Second, we can see the power relationship between Levi and Rabbi’s family. Levi seems to be forced to sit there, until he can justify leaving. Third, it is an ironic statement coming after Rabbi’s beautiful derashah. Rabbi, perhaps unwittingly, but perhaps not, has created a situation where one of the top sages in his own Bet Midrash no longer wants to learn Torah there.
  IntroductionThis section continues to expound on the end of the verse from yesterday’s section (Psalms 112:1).
  These are two slightly different takes on the meaning of this verse. Rava’s derashah is the same that we saw above where it was attributed to Rabbi Judah Hanasi. But R. Avdimi breaks up the words differently—he who studies the Torah, will have his desires granted.
  Rava reads the pronoun at the end of the verse as referring to the one who studies the Torah, not God (as it surely means according to its simple meaning). Thus, once one begins to study Torah intensely, it becomes his, and it is called by his name.
  Study here probably means something akin to “learning” or even “memorizing.” First a person should memorize or at least learn the simple readings of the verses. Once he has attained that level of learning, he should delve deeper and meditate upon its meaning.
  “Recites” in rabbinic lingo refers to rote recitation of rabbinic dicta. “Grinds” refers to understanding them, and refining them to make sure they are correct. Rava exhibits his preference for the former, at least in terms of educational priority.
  Rava refers to a seeming contradiction between Proverbs 9:3 and 9:14. Where does one who studies wisdom/Torah dwell? On the highest places or on a seat? He resolves this by detecting a progress in a student’s learning. When he begins he is in the highest places, perhaps out of excitement for beginning to learn. But when he proceeds, he moves down to a seat, a position of honor, where others will be able to learn from his Torah.
  Again, Rava notes a progression in the position of a student of Torah.
  Ulla learns another educational message from Proverbs. First drink from your cistern, where waters are gathered from elsewhere. Then, once your learning has progressed, running waters of new Torah will emerge from your well.
  IntroductionMost of the sayings in this sugya take verses from Proverbs and apply to them to the study of Torah, which was of course a major occupation of the rabbis.
  This section advocates learning a little bit of Torah/wisdom at a time—not in great big heaps all at the same time.
  Shizbi interprets a difficult word as a “notrikon”—“yach-roch” is divided into two words—“yichyeh” and “ya’arich.” One who acquires his learning deceitfully will not live long.Sheshet interprets it more in line of the simple reading. A deceptive hunter will have more success in killing his prey.Dimi goes back to interpreting it as a metaphor for learning. One who learns and then “breaks the wings” of his learning will retain his learning, like a bird whose wings are broken. But if one does not make sure that his learning stays with him, then all his learning is for naught.
  When it comes to logic, it is better to learn from multiple teachers. This would seem to ensure that one’s logical deductions are correct. However, when it comes to memorizing oral traditions, learning from multiple teachers is problematic for different teachers phrase their teaching in different languages. This could create confusion.
  
  Daf 19b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to interpret Psalms 1:3.
  A person should divide his days between the study of the different branches of Jewish learning, Scripture, Mishnah and Talmud. Interestingly, elsewhere in the Bavli they remark that in Babylonia, since their Talmud includes Scripture (which might include Midrash), Mishnah and Talmud, they fulfill this injunction by learning the Bavli alone. This was the path taken often throughout Jewish history—the Bavli has dominated the Yeshiva curriculum for a thousand years.
  One who “brings fruit” out of his learning is one who acts in accordance with that which he learns. Such a person’s learning will be sustained. But if one learns and does not “bring forth fruit,” not only does the person’s learning disappear, but so does that of the teacher.
  Generally, a student should not begin to issue legal instruction until they have reached the ripe old age of 40. Rava was an exception because there was no one older than him. In such a situation, he had no choice but to act as a master of instruction. I’ll add in here a personal note. I began to teach Talmud at the age of 27. There was no doubt that I was too young, but there was no one else willing to teach, so I took the job.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to interpret the verse from the beginning of Psalms.
  Even the ordinary talk of Torah scholars, their daily conversations, is considered to be a topic worthy of study. It will not “wither,” just like the tree from the verse in Psalms. I think when reading this statement we should remember that it, like all of the Talmud, is addressed to rabbis. This might best be read as a reminder to rabbis that people will be reading into every word they say. They should make sure they speak carefully.
  It is repeated in the Prophets, for it is written, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, but you shall meditate upon it day and night, that you observe to do according to all that is written in it; for then you will make your ways prosperous, and then you shall have good success” (Joshua 1:8).It is mentioned a third time in the Writings, for it is written, “But his delight is in the Torah of the Lord, and in His Torah he meditates day and night. And he shall be like a tree planted by streams of water, that brings forth its fruit in its season, and whose leaf does not wither; and in whatever he does he shall prosper” (Psalms 1:2-3).Joshua b. Levi emphasizes here how often we find the connection between the study of Torah and financial prosperity in the Bible.
  Alexandri works out a neat trick to get people to pay attention to him. He offers them “life” which here may not mean living long but a livelihood. Life is gained by studying Torah, as we learned in the above statement.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the next section of the Mishnah—the prohibition of participating with the idolater in building the cupola.
  The mishnah prohibits participating in building the cupola because that is where the idol is placed. This is too close to abetting idol worship.If a Jew transgressed this law and did help build the cupola, he may make use of the pay he received.
  The Talmud argues the R. Yohanan’s ruling is overly obvious. R. Ishmael and R. Akiva will argue later in the tractate over idols themselves—are they prohibited before they are actually worshipped. But they would both agree that if the item is not itself an idol, it is not prohibited until it is actually worshipped.
  Yirmiyah says that R. Yohanan was referring to a Jew who helped build the idol itself, not just the cupola. His pay is still permitted, despite the fact that he helped make an idol.
  There is a debate about whether an idol made for an idolater becomes prohibited immediately when it is made, or only when it is worshipped. If the rule is that any benefit derived from it becomes prohibited only once it is worshipped, then R. Yohanan’s statement makes sense. The Jew made this idol for the idolater, but until the idolater actually worships it, the Jew may use the wages. But if the prohibition begins immediately, then how can the wages be permitted?
  Rabbah b. Ulla explains R. Yirmiyah’s reasoning. The prohibition of the benefit derived from the idol begins only when the last stroke in making the idol is completed, for only then is it an idol. The benefit derived from that last stroke would be prohibited, but the value of this last stroke is less than a perutah—it is negligible. The amount he was paid for the work done prior to this point is considered to have already been paid before the work was completed. This means that these wages, which are essentially all of the wages, are permitted.There is a dispute in Tractate Kiddushin about how we conceive of wages paid to a person being paid not by the hour but by the project. Are all of the wages thought of as being paid at the completion of the project or piece by piece as the project is created? Rabbah b. Ulla says that R. Yirmiyah holds by the latter position.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new mishnah.
  One should not make jewelry for an idolater lest they use it to decorate their idols.  Rabbi Eliezer says that one may sell jewelry to them but not give it for free.  This opinion is perplexing because usually if we are concerned that the actions of the Jew might encourage idolatry, the fact that he profits does not make it more permissible.  There are some versions of the mishnah that do not include this line.
  The mishnah now begins to discuss selling them land and things attached to the land.  One should not sell them things attached to the land, such as trees, since this might give them a stake in the land as well.  Once the item has been cut down, it is permitted.  Rabbi Judah is more lenient and allows something to be sold while it is attached, as long as it is stipulated that it will be cut down.
  Yose b. Hanina reads the verse from Deuteronomy as prohibiting giving or even selling land to non-Jews in Israel.
  
  Daf 20a
  
   The word “tehonem” in Hebrew is written without the vav. According to the rabbis this lets it mean two things. It is pronounced “lo tehunem” to refer to the prohibition of giving them grace, but it can also mean “lo tehonem” which here is understood to mean do not give them land.
  Evidently, the word can also mean not to give them a free gift. Powerful word it is!
  This baraita encompasses all of the meanings we saw above.
  This verse refers to what a Jew may do with meat that was not properly slaughtered. According to R. Meir, it may be given or sold either to a “ger”—the stranger, which here probably refers to someone who has accepted upon himself to observe some of the commandments, or to an idolater. But R. Yehudah says it must be given to the stranger, but can only be sold to the idolater. Thus we can see that there is a tannaitic dispute over whether one can give a gift to an idolater—R. Meir permits and R. Judah does not.
  Judah says that if R. Meir was correct, the verse should have read “and” instead of “or.”
  Meir argues that the verse is phrased in that way to suggest that it is preferable to give the food to the stranger rather than sell it to a non-Jew. But R. Judah says that we do not need a verse to do this—since Jews are commanded to maintain strangers, it is obvious that it would be preferable to give the food to the stranger.
  IntroductionThis section continues to expand on the baraita we read yesterday—“do not give them grace.” Here we shall see what that means.
  According to Rav, one cannot “give them grace” by saying how beautiful a gentile woman is.
  The objection comes from the action of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel who indeed praised God for creating such a beautiful gentile woman. R. Akiva does not really offer such praise for Turnus Rufus’s wife. The story is here because he does recognize her beauty. Turnus Rufus is the evil Roman emperor who decrees that R. Akiva should be tortured to death. I am not sure if the idea that he would marry his wife appears elsewhere.
  Rav says that these rabbis were not praising these beautiful gentile women. They were praising God for creating such beings in His world. This is not only permitted, it is mandated.
  This baraita seems to say that one cannot look at anything that might be sexually enticing. This includes any woman and even at animals (and even ugly ones) when they are mating. One should guard oneself constantly against stirring up desire. This would obviously be a very hard rule to observe in the modern age. The angel of death evidently has eyes everywhere. Even if a human had this many eyes and could not help seeing everything, he still should make sure he does not look at anything improper.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  This is a side description of how the Angel of Death kills people.
  This is a resolution of the difficulty—the R. Shimon b. Gamaliel did not intentionally look at the beautiful woman. She rounded the corner and popped into view.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya analyzes the line from the baraita which prohibits looking at women’s colored clothing.
  One may not look at a woman’s colored garments, even when a woman is not wearing them. These too may be sexually arousing. However, this is limited to a case where the man knows the woman to whom they belong.
  The launderer referred to here washes clothing before the first time they are used. Obviously, he must look at the clothing first. This proves that the prohibition relates only to worn clothing. Furthermore, only worn clothing will probably be associated with a particular woman.
  The Talmud points out that when it comes to the prohibition of watching animals mate, the owner may bring animals to mate, and even watch the full intercourse to make sure that it happens.  The prohibition is waived because the owner is not interested in sexual arousal, he is interested in his work. So too in the case of the launderer, he is interested in the work. But other men may not look at new colored women’s clothing.
  Above the baraita had stated that the drop of gall from the Angel of Death’s sword kills people. But Shmuel’s father seems to say that the Angel of Death kills with his sword.The Talmud resolves this (rather weakly, in my humble opinion) by suggesting that the drop of gall may be what cuts the organs of the throat. Not the sword itself.
  To keep the drop of gall out of the body, one should turn the body on its side. Perhaps this was also a way of letting some of the liquid out so that it would deteriorate a bit slower.
  IntroductionThis is another derashah on the same verse that yesterday’s section ended with.
  This is another midrash on the verse from Deuteronomy. A person should strive for holiness, which here seems to be defined as avoiding what we might term “sexual pollution,” and may be an allusion to wet dreams.
  While R. Pinchas b. Yair viewed “righteousness” as the greatest of all characteristics, R. Joshua b. Levy sees humility as the greatest. Humility here probably means something slightly different from the way we view it. It is a characteristic whereby one does not judge the world based on social standing, but rather views all human beings as fundamentally equal, all created in God’s image.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins interpreting the Mishnah’s prohibition of selling non-Jews anything attached to the ground.
  In all three of these disputes R. Judah allows a Jew to sell a non-Jew various plants attached to the soil (in the land of Israel) as long as he stipulates that the non-Jew will cut the plant down and not take possession of the land. But R. Meir is stricter and rules that the Jew may sell only the cut down product.
  The Talmud now asks the question that we should anticipate—why do we need to know that they disagree in all three cases? Why couldn’t we have learned one case from the other?The first point they make is that if we knew only of the first dispute we might have thought that R. Meir prohibits selling the tree before it is felled, because the non-Jew would not lose out by leaving the tree in the ground. But when it comes to the grain, if the grain is ripe, it must be harvested immediately. Therefore, R. Meir might agree that the Jew can sell it unharvested. The baraita teaches us that R. Meir still disagrees.
  This is basically the opposite reasoning as above. Low growth obviously benefits by remaining the soil. So in that case, R. Judah might agree with R. Meir that he shouldn’t sell it unharvested to the non-Jew, for the non-Jew will hold on to the land for a long time. That is why the baraita tells us that R. Judah still allows one to leave it in the soil.
  If we had learned only the case of the low growth, we might have thought that R. Meir rules strictly there because it pays for the non-Jew not to cut the low growth down. Thus he will hold on to the land. But in the case of the tree or the grain, there is no definite benefit to letting it grow, therefore R. Meir might agree with R. Judah. Thus we need to know that the tannaim disagree about all three cases.
  IntroductionEarlier we learned that one cannot sell a non-Jew a large animal lest they work that animal on Shabbat. Today’s section asks whether one can sell a large animal on condition that the non-Jew slaughter it for food.
  When the Jew sells a tree, grain, or low-growth to the non-Jew while still attached to the land, the Jew still owns the land. He will have some leverage over the non-Jew to get him to cut it down. This might be why R. Judah allows one to sell the vegetation to the non-Jew. But if he sells an animal on condition that it be slaughtered, he will have little leverage. The non-Jew might hold on to it for a long period of time, and perhaps work the animal on Shabbat. In this case, perhaps R. Judah would hold that it can’t be sold. Or maybe it makes no difference, and R. Judah would permit here as well.
  Indeed, the same dispute exists when it comes to cattle.
  IntroductionToday’s section is the last mishnah of the chapter. It discusses selling houses and fields to idolaters in the land of Israel and in the surrounding areas. 
  Rabbi Meir holds that one should not even rent houses to non-Jews in the land of Israel, lest he come to sell them as well. This is true of houses and even truer with regard to fields, for with fields there is the added problem of tithes. Once a Jew sells his field to a non-Jew the field’s produce is not liable for tithing. In this way, the sale reduces the holiness of the field. In Syria, which is adjacent to Israel and was conquered by David but is not considered fully a part of Israel, we can be slightly more lenient. Houses may be rented to non-Jews, but fields still may not, because the produce grown in Syria is still subject to tithes. Outside of the land, a Jew may sell houses, but he still may not sell fields, lest by habit he come to sell fields in the land of Israel as well.
  
  
  Daf 21a
  
  In all of these cases, Rabbi Yose is slightly more lenient. Inside of Israel he allows the renting of houses, but not fields. In Syria he allows the sale of houses and the renting of fields and outside of the land, both may be sold. Note that he is still consistent in that the rules are stricter with fields than with houses. The major difference is that he does not rule more strictly in cases that should be permitted (such as selling fields outside of the land) but were forbidden by Rabbi Meir lest one come to sell something that really should not be sold.
  Although in the previous mishnah we learned that in certain places it is permitted to let a house to an idolater (in Syria according to Rabbi Meir, and in the land of Israel according to Rabbi Yose), this permission is not granted if the idolater is renting the house as a residence. Since the idolater will bring his idols into the house, this would violate the prohibition of allowing idols into one’s home. The idolater may only rent the house from the Jew to use for storage or other non-residential usage. [The Jerusalem Talmud rules that outside of the land of Israel it is permitted to sell or let houses to idolaters even for the purpose of residence. Although in this case too the idolater will bring idols into the house and seemingly thereby cause the Jew to violate the commandment in Deut. 7:26, the essential meaning of the verse is that it is forbidden for a Jew to bring idols into his own house. The halacha is more strict inside the land of Israel and in bordering areas because it is incumbent upon Jews to cleanse the land of idol worship.]
  In no place, even outside the land of Israel, may one let a bath-house to an idolater. Since the bath-house will continue to be called by the name of the Jewish owner, and the idolater will surely bring idols into the warehouse, this is forbidden. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud begins to comment on the Mishnah. 
  The Mishnah assumed that it was more obvious that one cannot sell fields to a non-Jew than it is that one cannot sell them a house. So why is it more obvious? There are two reasons not to sell them a field—1) It gives them a foothold in the land; 2) The produce becomes exempt from tithes. But there are also two reasons not to sell them a house—1) It gives them a foothold in the land; 2) The house becomes exempt from a mezuzah. So why is it more obvious with regard to a field than a house. R. Mesharsheya answers that there is no obligation for houses in Israel to have mezuzot. The obligation falls on the person, not on the house. 
  In Syria, the region outside of Israel, the rules are slightly more lenient, but it is still prohibited to sell them houses. In principle, this should be permitted because this is not the land of Israel. But it is prohibited lest someone come to sell them houses in Israel itself. But the prohibition does not extend to letting them houses, because the prohibition of renting a house in Israel is itself only a safeguard against selling them houses. There is a principle that we do not make a decree not to do something lest someone do something else that is only prohibited by a decree and not by a principle. 
  The Talmud raises a problem, that renting a field to a non-Jew is prohibited even in Syria, even though this is a decree made on a decree. The resolution is that this mishnah considers Syria to be part of Israel even though it was only conquered by an individual (David). Thus the rules concerning selling them land could apply in principle. When it comes to renting them a field, the rabbis ruled strictly because there are two problems (giving them a foothold and tithes), but renting a house, where there is only one problem (giving them a foothold), is permitted. 
  IntroductionWe continue explaining the Mishnah. 
  Once fully outside of Israel, the rules are even more lenient. One may sell them a house, because even in Israel there is only one potential problem with a house (giving them a foothold in the land). But one may only rent them a field because there are two potential problems (foothold and tithes). 
  R. Yose is more lenient. In Israel they can rent houses to non-Jews because there is only one problem (foothold). But they cannot lend them fields because there are two problems (foothold and tithes). 
  R. Yose does not consider Syria to be part of the land of Israel. Therefore, one may sell them houses there. But it is prohibited to sell them a field because in the land of Israel there are two problems with the field.
  IntroductionWe continue explaining the mishnah.
  Outside of the land of Israel, fields and houses may be sold to them. Since they are far removed from the land, there is no reason to be strict.
  The halakhah follows R. Yose—it is permitted to sell them houses and fields. However, R. Joseph adds that one should not allow them to form a community, which means three residents. There are differences of opinion among commentators as to what this refers to. According to the Rambam, it refers to the permission to rent them houses in Eretz Yisrael. According to the Tosafot, it refers to outside the land, where one can sell anything to them. R. Joseph is concerned lest they form an enemy settlement, but this would only be within Jewish community.I realize that today many of these laws sound “racist.” But we have to remember that the notion of inter-tribal harmony barely existed back then. These laws simply reflect the ethos of the time. Furthermore, while I think we do not like to admit it, there are cases where we would like the people who live in our immediate community to be similar to us. I hope that this similarity is not based on something superficial such as color of skin. But when it is a preference to live near other people of the same religion, I believe it is still understandable.
  Abaye says that the law should not be so strict as to worry that together Jews might sell three properties to non-Jews in one neighborhood, thus allowing them to form a community. One Jew should not sell to three non-Jews. That’s as far as the law needs to go.
  The final line in the Mishnah seems to support R. Meir because it hints that there are places where one is not allowed to rent a house to a non-Jew, whereas R. Yose always allows this. Nevertheless, despite this line, the halakhah follows R. Yose, as was ruled above. 
  
  Daf 21b
  
  One should not rent a bath-house to a non-Jew because this will look as if they are performing work on behalf of the Jew on Shabbat. 
  By implication, renting a bath-house to a Samaritan should be permitted. But while Samaritans observe the Sabbath and do not work on it, they do work on intermediate days of the festival. The assumption here is that Jews do not work on these days and thus people might think that he is working on behalf of the Jew.
  The answer is that Jews also are allowed to work in a bath-house on hol hamoed by heating up the water. 
  A Jew is allowed to rent, at least outside of Israel, a field to a non-Jew, even though non-Jews will certainly work there on Shabbat. Why are we not concerned lest people think that non-Jews are working for Jews on Shabbat? The answer is that people will think that he is a  tenant—someone working for a share of the crops. It is permitted to have such an arrangement.But then why not say the same thing about the bath-house—people will think that the non-Jew has a tenant relationship with the Jew, and works the bath-house for a share of the profits? The answer is that such business relationships are not typical for bath-houses.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains another baraita in which R. Shimon b. Elazar discusses renting to a Samaritan.
  A Jew should not work his fields on the intermediate days of the festival (hol hamoed). But Samaritans do not seem to observe this rule. So if one rents a field to a Samaritan and others think he is working the field on behalf of the Jew, they will say that the Jew is working his own field on hol hamoed. 
  If it is forbidden to rent a field to a Samaritan, it would seem that he would say that it is permitted to rent a field to a non-Jew. The reason is that people will assume that this a tenancy arrangement. But if this is so, why not assume the same thing about the Samaritan. Why assume that people will think he is working the field on the Jew’s behalf?
  
  Daf 22a
  
  R. Shimon b. Elazar allows one to rent the field to the non-Jew because if the Jew tells him not to work on hol hamoed, the non-Jew will listen.
  The Samaritan will not listen to a Jew who tells him not to work on hol hamoed. The Samaritan believes that he knows more than the Jew, and in their system of laws, working a field on hol hamoed is permitted.
  The Talmud notes that there is an additional reason for why it is prohibited to rent a field to a Samaritan. This will give the Samaritan an opportunity to work the field on hol hamoed. Providing a person with an opportunity to transgress is considered placing a stumbling block before the bling. Thus there are really two reasons why one should not do this.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with cases of partnerships between Jews and non-Jews where the Jew takes the profit from what is permitted to him (for instance, the work done on Sunday) and the non-Jew takes the profit from the part that the Jew is not allowed to profit from (Shabbat).
  Rava allowed the Jew and the non-Jew to share ownership of the field. The non-Jew would work the field on Shabbat, and receive the full profits from that day, and the Jew on Sunday.
  The baraita rules that if the field is already jointly owned by the Jew and the non-Jew, the Jew cannot let the non-Jew take the profits for the work done on Shabbat in return for the Jew taking the profit for work done on Sunday. They can only do this if they make the arrangement at the outset before they join into the partnership agreement. Evidently, Ravina thought that the saffron growers did not make their arrangement before Shabbat.
  At first Rava is embarrassed that he allowed them to share the profits in this way. In the end, they learned that the partners had made the condition at the outset, and therefore the arrangement was permitted.
  Rav Gavihah has a different version of the story. The partnership was not made to get around the issue of Shabbat, it was to get around the problem of orlah—the prohibition of eating the fruit of a tree during its first three years of growth. Rava allowed this deal to exist. Rashi explains that this agreement is more acceptable with regard to orlah than it is with Shabbat.
  According to this version of the story, Ravina did not raise a difficulty on Rava from the first half of the baraita, he was supporting Rava from the second half. Indeed, there is really nothing controversial about this act at all (according to Rashi). And Rava was never embarrassed.
  What if the partners did not make any arrangements, neither before nor after? Can the Jew take the profits from Sunday and the non-Jew from Saturday? In the end, the baraita cannot answer this question. The first half would lead to the ruling that without any explicit arrangements it is prohibited. And the second half would lead to the opposite.
  Congratulations, you have finished the first chapter of Avodah Zarah. It’s the longest chapter, so we’re about ¼ of the way through the Tractate. Keep up the great work!
  IntroductionThis mishnah teaches that non-Jewish idol worshippers are suspected of several heinous sins: bestiality, sexual licentiousness and murder. This mishnah adopts a very harsh attitude towards the idolaters at the time. We should remind ourselves that according to later Jewish law, non-Jews who did not engage in such practices were not subject to these laws.
  Non-Jewish idolaters are suspected of bestiality. Therefore Jews should not place animals in their inns. By doing so they would be encouraging the non-Jew to engage in bestiality, which according to Jewish ideology is also forbidden to non-Jews. It is one of the seven “Noahide” commandments which are incumbent upon non-Jews to observe.
  Jewish women should not be alone with non-Jewish idolaters for they are suspected of being rapists. Jewish men should not be alone with non-Jewish idolaters for they are suspected of being murderers.
  
  Daf 22b
  
  According to this baraita, we need not be concerned lest the animal engaged in bestiality. This directly contradicts our mishnah.
  According to this resolution, the non-Jew might engage in bestiality with animals he does not own. Thus Jews should not leave our animals with them. But they will not engage in bestiality with their own animals. Therefore, Jews can buy their animals.
  Rav’s reasoning for why non-Jews will not engage in bestiality with their own animals applies only to female animals. So R. Kahana explains that it applies to male animals as well. Having sex with human beings will weaken them. Please—do not ask me if this is actually true. And probably not a good idea to google it either. Just go on to the next section.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss baraitot about concerns that non-Jews engage in bestiality.
  We need not be concerned lest their shepherds have sex with the animals they are watching  for non-Jews because the shepherd is afraid of losing his wages. In other words, even though the animal does not belong to him, he’ll still behave himself around it.
  The problem with the above solution is that another baraita seems to imply the opposite—we are concerned lest non-Jewish shepherds engage in bestiality, and therefore Jews should not turn over animals to them.The solution is that non-Jews know a lot about bestiality and would know when one shepherd is taking his animal aside for a little more than just grooming. Therefore, they will be afraid of losing their wages. But when it comes to working with Jews, Jews are not so familiar with bestiality, so they won’t know what the shepherd is doing. The non-Jew will not be afraid lest he gets caught.Rabbah connects this to a folk saying, about how a spy (or perhaps gossip-monger/evil doer) knows what others plot.
  It is permitted to buy male animals from female non-Jews. The woman will not want the animal to form this type of bond with her.
  A widow should not take in young single men as lodgers because they may end up having sex with her and then covering it up out of modesty. However, if what we said above is true, that women won’t engage in bestiality because the animal will follow after her, then why should she not raise dogs? The answer is that she could throw them some meat and then everyone will think the dog follows after her because of the meat. [I know, this is a difficult sugya.]
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of the discussion of the issue of leaving animals with non-Jews. In a baraita on 15b it was stated that a Jew should not leave even female animals with female non-Jews. The Talmud here asks why this should be a concern. Do women engage in bestiality with female animals? (Don’t answer that).
  We don’t leave female animals alone with them lest the paramour comes knocking, doesn’t find the wife and instead finds the animal.
  I think we hear here a rabbinic ontological understanding of non-Jews, one that has echoes in many cultures trying to delineate and separate themselves from whomever they define as “the other.” Non-Jews are irreparably full of lust. This terrible pollution is their genetic heritage from the time of Eve, and was put into her by the snake [yes, I think this is a sexual allusion.] Thus all non-Jews are full of incontrollable lust. I should note that I am in the middle of reading a book by Stephen Greenblatt called “The Rise and Fall of Adam and Eve.” Christians throughout the medieval period identified the Jews with Eve, who was fallen, whereas the Christians were identified with Mary, mother of god, redeemed from original sin through Christ . Thus we see both religions using the figure of Eve in a misogynistic means of pointing out the pollution of the other—the Jews identify Eve with the non-Jews, and the Christians identify her with the Jews.
  This seems to be some sort of acknowledgment that Jews and non-Jews all come from the same essential genes—from Eve. But the Sinai revelation, accepted only by the Jews, was a redeeming moment for the Jews and ended “their pollution.” In this context R. Yohanan’s means that Jews, having accepted the Torah at Sinai, no longer have the same lustful desires (here to have sex with animals) that non-Jews do. Of course there is no way of empirically testing such a statement. But it is nevertheless an interesting conception of Torah—Torah changes the essential inner being of a person. It is not just an overlay of laws meant to keep one in line. Rather, by accepting it, Jews changed the core of their identity and no longer have the same desires as do others.
  IntroductionDo non-Jews have sex with birds?
  Evidently, at least according to these rabbis, they do. 
  
  Daf 23a
  
  IntroductionThe mishnah prohibited allowing one to let non-Jews be alone with one’s animals out of fear of bestiality. In contrast, the baraita allowed one to buy animals from non-Jews for sacrifices, and did not seem worried about bestiality. Ravina offers a different solution for this contradiction.
  Ravina solves the contradiction by distinguishing between the ab initio law and the ex post facto law. Ab initio one should not leave non-Jews alone with animals. Ex post facto if they were left alone, we are not concerned lest they engaged in bestiality with the animal. Therefore we can buy the animal and use it for a sacrifice. 
  The Talmud tries to use two seemingly contradictory mishnayot to demonstrate that there is a difference between ab initio, when we are not concerned for sexual misconduct, and ex post facto, where we are not concerned. Ab initio a woman should not be alone with non-Jews — we fear that they will rape her But ex post facto, if she was alone with them because she was imprisoned for monetary matters, then she is still permitted to her husband. We are not concerned that she willingly had sex with them (which would cause her to be prohibited to her husband, even if he is not a priest).
  The Talmud rejects the broad conclusion that ex post facto we are not concerned with sexual sin (bestiality or fornication). The reason why the imprisoned woman is permitted to her husband is not that this is an ex post facto question. Rather, she is permitted because the non-Jew will fear raping her lest this causes him to lose his money (the husband would not want to pay to have her redeemed, I know this is awful). This can be shown from the end of that mishnah, which teaches that if she was taken prisoner for a capital charge, she may not return to her husband. Thus the distinction is rejected. 
  IntroductionPedat here offers another resolution to the contradiction between the source that forbids women from being alone with non-Jews and the baraita that allowed Jews to buy animals from them and use them for sacrifice.
  Pedat solves the contradiction by attributing the sources to different tannaim. R. Eliezer holds that we are concerned about bestiality and therefore one cannot buy a red heifer from a non-Jew. He would also hold that an animal should not be left alone with them. The other sages are not concerned about bestiality.
  The Talmud points out that the issue in that mishnah may not be the concerning for bestiality. It could be a concern lest the non-Jew had used the red heifer for work, for even the smallest load placed on the red heifer disqualifies her from being used in the purificatory ritual.The “calf” referred to here is the calf used in the ceremony of breaking the neck and pouring the blood into the river to expiate for an unknown murder  (Deuteronomy 21).
  The Talmud rejects this proposal—the non-Jew who has a red heifer would know that he could sell it to the Jews for a huge amount. He would not risk this amount for the sake of carrying on it a small load.
  But the same could be said about bestiality. The non-Jew would know that if he has sex with the animal (and gets caught) he could not sell it to the Jew. Therefore, he would not risk the financial loss. The answer is that while he knows this, his inclination could overcome him and he would engage in sex with the animal. Therefore, R. Eliezer is concerned about bestiality.
  IntroductionYesterday R. Pedat suggested that the dispute between R. Eliezer and the sages over whether one can buy a red heifer from a non-Jew was based on a dispute whether we are suspicious that the non-Jew engaged in bestiality with the animal—R. Eliezer is and the sages are not. Today’s sugya suggests another interpretation of that dispute.
  Shila suggests that the reason R. Eliezer does not allow one to purchase a red heifer from a non-Jew is that the verse which begins this chapter starts off with “speak to the children of Israel.” Thus he is not concerned lest the non-Jew engage in bestiality with the heifer.
  The Talmud now rejects Shila based on the continuation of the mishnah. R. Eliezer does not allow one to buy any animals for sacrifice from non-Jews. Yet only with regard to the red heifer does the verse state explicitly that only an Israelite must bring it. Therefore, R. Eliezer’s reading cannot be based on that midrash. It must be that he is suspicious about bestiality.
  The Talmud now tries another tack. Maybe the rabbis too are concerned about bestiality. But they assume that a non-Jew will not have sex with the red heifer because that would be a great loss. But when it comes to other sacrifices, maybe they would have sex with the animal. After all, it’s not such a big financial loss if the Jew won’t buy it.
  
  Daf 23b
  
  The baraita cited here must be the opinion of the rabbis—thereby proving that the rabbis hold that we are never suspicious of bestiality.
  To refute R. Eliezer the rabbis cite a verse which implies that flocks owned by non-Jews will end up on God’s altar. This proves that they hold that we are not suspicious of bestiality.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now digresses for a bit to discuss why bestiality disqualifies the red heifer (bet you’ve been wondering about that for a while now).
  On the previous two pages we learned of a dispute about whether we are suspicious that the non-Jew had sex with the red heifer. But if he certainly did, then the conclusion would be that all agree the red heifer is disqualified from use. This implies that the red heifer has a high level of sanctity, equivalent to animals dedicated so that they may be sacrificed. For had its sanctity been lower, bestiality would not disqualify it. The problem is that we don’t generally consider the red heifer to have this degree of sanctity.
  The red heifer is not really considered an animal offered on the altar, but bestiality does nevertheless disqualify it because the Torah calls is a “sin-offering.”
  If a red heifer is akin to other sacrifices, then one born through a caesarean birth (literally, one who comes out of the wall) should be disqualified. Why then would R. Shimon rule that such a red heifer is valid, despite the fact that in general he holds that sacrifices cannot be from animals born through Caesarean.
  The red heifer is rendered unfit if someone has sex with it not because it is considered to have the holiness of a sacrifice offered on the altar, but because a physical flaw disqualifies it. Through a series of connections drawn from the word “corruption,” the Talmud derives that just as a flaw disqualifies the red heifer, so too does bestiality.
  IntroductionThis section returns to discussing an issue referred to above—can the red heifer be bought from non-Jews?
  According to Shila, R. Eliezer disqualifies a red heifer bought from a non-Jew because of the verse, “Speak to the children of Israel.” But the same language is used in connection with offerings for the Temple and non-Jews do seem to be allowed to make donations to the Temple.
  This famous story is brought here as proof that one can buy offerings for the Temple from non-Jews. After all, the sages approached Dama b. Natina asking him to sell them stones for the ephod, the high priest’s breastplate.
  
  Daf 24a
  
  At first the Talmud tries to solve this by stating that the words “onyx stones” which do not have a connective vav in front of them are separated and therefore not governed by the words, “And you shall take.” However, this fails because the words which follow do use the vav which reconnects them to the phrase “And you shall take.” So we are left with our difficulty—why is the interpretation of the verse not applied consistently.
  An even greater difficulty is that the following year Dama ben Natina sold them a red heifer. This proves that not only is Shila wrong, but even R. Eliezer himself. The Talmud answers that the red heifer was not bought directly from Dama. Dama sold it to some Jewish merchants and they sold it to the sages. Jewish middlemen—they always find a way don’t they!
  IntroductionThe Talmud returns to why R. Eliezer does not allow one to buy a red heifer from a non-Jew. To recall, earlier we said that this was because of the word “and you shall bring” and not because he is suspicious of bestiality.
  R. Eliezer’s response to the sages implies that he is concerned about bestiality. That’s why they can buy the heifer if it had been guarded by Jews from the time of its birth.
  In the end, R. Eliezer is suspicious of bestiality. But he also has another reason why—the midrash on the word “and you shall take” as taught by Shila.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues discussing the red heifer.
  Even if the new born red heifer is watched from the time its born, there is the problem that if the non-Jew had bestiality with the mother, the animal is unfit.
  Even watching the mother from the time she became pregnant is not sufficient—for R. Eliezer holds that if the mother was disqualified, then her young is too. 
  We could solve the problem by saying that the offspring are disqualified only if they had bestiality with the mother when the mother was already dedicated to the Temple. We could say that we do not have to worry about the non-Jews having bestiality with the mother because the mother was surely not yet dedicated.
  But according to R. Hinena, R. Eliezer disqualifies the offspring even if someone had sex with the mother before it was dedicated, then according to R. Eliezer we should not buy animals for sacrifice from non-Jews even if they were watched from birth.
  Not only must the young be watched, but the mother has to be watched from birth as well. 
  Earlier we said that Jews would watch the mother of the red heifer from the time the child was formed in its womb. But how would the Jews know to watch this animal? Did they watch every cow just in case it would have a red heifer? R. Kahana offers a solution—pass a red cup (of wine?) in front of her while he was mating. This would magically create a red heifer! [Maybe if you want a redheaded kid you can try this at home].
  If all you need to do is pass a red cup in front of the mating animal and out comes a red heifer, then why is the red heifer so expensive. The answer is that even two non-red hairs on the entire animal disqualify it. While it is evidently easy to produce a mostly red heifer, an exclusively red heifer is difficulty. So now comes the final and obvious difficulty—why do we need non-Jews to produce the red heifer. If all you need is the red cup trick, then we could just make our own red heifer? The answer is that the trick only works with certain breeds of cows, and evidently those breeds are possessed by the non-Jews. We should note that the Talmud painted itself into this corner with a series of difficulties. This happens from time to time—the Talmud raises difficulties, resolves them but then creates new difficulties that lead to some extremely strange types of resolutions.
  IntroductionThe discussion now goes back to R. Eliezer’s position that no sacrifices may be accepted from non-Jews.
  This is the position we saw before—R. Eliezer disqualifies all animals bought from non-Jews from being used as a sacrifice.
  The other sages responded to R. Eliezer with a verse from Isaiah. According to this verse, in the future, all the flocks of Kedar, a land inhabited by non-Jews, will be brought to the Temple to be sacrifices. This proves that non-Jews can bring sacrifices. R. Eliezer responds that in the future these nations will convert. This verse is thus not proof of non-Jews bringing sacrifices.
  R. Joseph uses the verse from Zephaniah to prove that the non-Jews will convert in the future. Abaye tries to interpret the verse as referring to simply turning away from idolatry, but not necessarily conversion. R. Joseph then uses the end of the verse to prove that it refers to conversion to Judaism, not just rejection of idolatry.
  This is all the same report as above with merely some differences in how it is presented. We can see here that some amoraim (R. Papa and R. Zevid) had the same material but had it preserved in a different formula.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss the acceptability of sacrifices brought from non-Jews.
  Moses tells Pharaoh that he must provide him with sacrifices which they will offer to God in the wilderness. This proves that animals can be received from non-Jews. The Talmud says that the law was different before the giving of the Torah. The Torah is what prohibits taking animals as sacrifices from non-Jews.
  The Talmud cites another verse where non-Jews offer sacrifices to God. However, this too occurred before the giving of the Torah, or at least this is what seems.
  Rabbis dispute whether Jethro’s visit to Moses (in Exodus 18) happened before or after the giving of the Torah (chapters 19-20). For those who hold that it happened after the giving of the Torah, we still need to resolve how Jethro could bring his own animal as an offering. The answer is that Jethro bought the animal from an Israelite.
  
  Daf 24b
  
  Saul, when he conquers the Amalekites, offers up the best of their animals as sacrifices (instead of doing what he is supposed to do and killing everyone and everything). Again, animals brought from non-Jews are acceptable. The answer is that Saul did not actually sacrifice these animals. He sold them and then used the money to buy sacrifices. But this is strange—if he’s just selling the animals, why does it matter that they are the best? He could sell any of them. The answer is that the best animals are most easily sold. 
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss the issue of offering sacrifices bought or received from non-Jews.
  Again, we have a verse that seems to prove that sacrifices can be taken from non-Jews. This is resolved by R. Nahman who posits that Araunah was a resident alien, a special category of people who are not included in the general category of non-Jews. Evidently such people can offer sacrifices.
  The Talmud digresses to figure out what the word “morigim” means in the verse from II Samuel. The conclusion is that it refers to a tool used for threshing.
  Here the Jews offer as sacrifices cattle they took from the Philistines during a war. Again, this is proof that animals can be taken from non-Jews. Here, these are obviously non-Jews and obviously this was after the giving of the Torah. They resolve the difficulty by saying that it was a temporary ruling, in which the rules were suspended for the needs of that specific moment. They prove that this was indeed a temporary ruling by noting that these are female cattle, and normally female cattle cannot be used as burned offerings. Thus this must have been a special ruling.
  The Talmud notes that it is indeed possible to offer a female burnt offering—Shmuel does so on a “high place,” a place where an altar stood before the Temple was built. This rejects the proof above from I Samuel 6. However, we are still left with the resolution that this was a temporary ruling.
  IntroductionOur sugya offers another resolution of the contradiction between the mishnah which did not allow a Jew to leave his animals alone with a non-Jew for fear of bestiality and the baraita which allowed a Jew to buy animals for sacrifices from non-Jews.
  According to R. Yohanan whether or not the animal is made infertile by having sex with a human depends on the age of the animal. If the animal is over three, it will not be made infertile, and therefore non-Jews will copulate with it. But if the animal is under three, they will refrain from copulating with it.
  All of the verses above which proved that one can bring sacrifices from the non-Jews refer to animals under the age of 3, for it is assumed that they did not copulate with the animal.
  Again, R. Yohanan could state that any animal taken from the non-Jews to be a sacrifice must be under the age of three.
  The continuation of the verse refers to the young born of these cattle. But there is a tradition that animals cannot give birth under the age of three. This is seen from a baraita that discusses a cow or donkey bought from a non-Jew. The issue is whether the next birth of the cow or donkey should be considered its first born and therefore must be given to the priest. The baraita says that if the animal is over three years old then we can assume that it might have given birth and the subsequent birth might not belong to the priest. But if the animal is three years old (or just about) then the birth must be its first. This proves that animals under three years old do not give birth, and therefore we cannot solve the verse as referring to animals under that age. This is refutation of R. Yohanan.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s sugya we encountered a verse about the cattle who were on their way to Bet Shemesh while the ark was being returned to the Israelites in the beginning of I Samuel. This section continues to discuss these verses.
  This is a midrash on the cows that sang on their way to Bet Shemesh, while accompanying the ark as the Philistines returned it to the Israelites. The word “vayisharnah” literally means went straight. But a similar root means to sing. So the rabbis take it to mean that the cows sang on their way to Bet Shemesh. [Definitely brings to mind some Sesame Street skits].
  These are five different versions of what song the cows sang as they made their way to Bet Shemesh. Psalm 98 is called the “orphaned” Psalm because the word “a Psalm (mizmor)” is not dedicated to anyone, nor is it connected to any particular event.
  R. Yitzchak Nafha’s version of the song is not Scripture, but rather a song composed by the rabbis (or someone else) themselves. The acacia is a reference to the ark, which was made of acacia wood. R Ashi teaches R. Yitzchak’s song in another context—it refers to the song that the Israelites sang when they wandered around in the wilderness with the Ark. Maybe R. Ashi did not like the idea of singing cows.
  Two amoraim here connect a Persian word with a Hebrew word. In the quote of R. Yitzchak Nafha the word “devir” is used to mean “book.” This connects with the word in Judges 1:11. R. Ashi says that the Persian word for menstruant “dashtana” is connected with the phrase in Genesis 31 where Rachel says that she is menstruating. This is what we might term a “folk etymology” connecting a word in a foreign language with a familiar word in one’s own language. 
  
  Daf 25a
  
  The book of Joshua mysteriously refers to a book known as “the book of Yashar.” According to R. Yohanan this is book is Genesis, the book about Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who were called righteous by Balaam. Balaam asks to die the death of the righteous—the good death that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob died.
  The rabbis now try to find a verse in Genesis that hints at the episode of the sun standing still. In Jacob’s blessing at the end of the work, he foresees that Ephraim’s seed will “fill the nations.” The simple reading is probably that the tribe of Ephraim will be numerous. But the midrashic meaning is taken to be that Ephraim’s fame will fill the nations when a member of the tribe performs a wondrous act.
  According to R. Joshua b. Levi the sun stood still for an extra 12 hours, such that the day which should take a total of 12 hours, actually took a total of 24 hours.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss how long the sun stood still for Joshua.
  According to R. Elazar the sun stopped for a full 24 hours, divided into two periods. This is the meaning of “a whole day”—the sun stopped for a whole day.
  R. Shmuel b. Nahmani says that its second period of stopping was a full day, but that the first time it stopped was not a full day.All of these amoraim are interpreting the verse, “And the sun stayed in the midst of the heaven and hastened not to go down for about a whole day.” The verse seems to hint at two stoppages—“stayed in the midst of the heaven” is the first stoppage and “hastened not to go down” is the second. Then the question is how long were these stoppages and what does the phrase “for about a whole day” mean? Was the whole process one day? Were the two stops one day? Or was one stop a day in and of itself?
  This is a different version of the tripartite dispute over how long the sun stood still. Here the dispute is characterized as being not over the total time, but over how long the total stoppage was—24, 36 or 48.
  IntroductionOur sugya talks about other cases in Jewish history where the sun stood still.
  That the sun stood still for Joshua is in the Bible itself. There is an unrecorded oral tradition that the sun stood still for Nakdimon b. Gorion, a wealthy member of the elite in Jerusalem around the time of the destruction of the Temple. Rashi says it refers to an instance in Taanit 19b where Nakdimon borrowed 18 springs for the pilgrims to Israel to use. When the time came to pay back the water, and the springs were empty, a miracle occurred and the heavens opened and water filled up the springs. But the king who loaned him the springs claimed that Nakdimon was late and that the day ended without him paying back his debt. Nakdimon prayed and the clouds departed and they saw that it was day.
  The amoraim here try to prove that the sun stood still for Moses. The first two amoraim learn this through an exegetical trick called a “gezerah shavah.” This is when the same word appears in two contexts and they say that information stated in one context could also apply to the other.The third amora learns it from his analysis of the verse itself. He assumes that people would have trembled in front of Moses only if he performed something truly awesome, such as getting the sun to stand still.
  The Talmud asks the obvious difficulty—it says explicitly in the book of Joshua that there was no day like that in all of history. So how can we say it happened two other times! The Talmud offers two solutions—1) the sun stood still longer for Joshua; 2) There were hailstones in the time of Joshua, but not during the time when the sun stood still for Moses or Nakdimon.This verse from Joshua is of particular appeal to me. I drive home every day past Bet Horon, on my descent to Jerusalem. And I frequently ride my bike past a junction called “Azeka” for it is near Tel Azeka. I don’t think that Bet Horon today is where ancient Bet Horon really was, but Azeka probably is. Pretty cool to live in Israel.
  IntroductionAbove in section 1 the Talmud cited a section of Joshua that refers to Sefer Hayashar. This book is referred to elsewhere in the Bible. The Talmud now explains what these references are.
  The first part of this quote is the same that we saw above—Sefer Hayashar is Genesis. Then the Talmud asks where the hint is in Genesis that the children of Judah should learn to use the bow. This they find in a creative reading of Jacob’s blessing in Genesis 49:8. Judah is told that his hands will be on the neck of your enemies. The midrash interprets this to mean not on the neck, but directed at their necks, with arrows.
  R. Elazar identifies Sefer Hayashar with Deuteronomy which uses the word “yashar.” Moses hints in his blessing that Judah will fight wars with his “hands”—and archery requires two hands.
  R. Shmuel b. Nahmani uses a similar technique to determine that Sefer Hayashar is the book of Judges.But there is one problem with this verse—we need the verse to refer to Judah because Judah is the tribe mentioned in the quote from II Samuel about the bow. Judges 3:2 does not seem to refer to Judah. They solve this by saying that the beginning of Judges refers to Judah. Rashi explains that this implies that all wars mentioned in the book of Judges are with the tribe of Judah, unless otherwise specified.
  The same three amoraim argue here over the meaning of the verse in which a cook gives a thigh of an animal that “that which was upon it” to Saul.The “waving” here has to do with a sacrifice that has to be waved, the thigh and the breast together.The “cap” seems to be the hip bone, or something in that area.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya finally moves on to the next section of the Mishnah-the prohibition of leaving a woman alone with non-Jews out of fear that they will have sex.
  The Mishnah states that a Jewish woman should not be left alone with a non-Jewish man. The question is—how does this differ from the rule with regard to being left alone with Israelites? The Mishnah in Kiddushin rules that a woman should not be isolated with a Jewish man. Therefore, the prohibition here must refer even to three idolaters. While she can be alone with three Jews, she cannot be alone with three idolaters. [Rashi explains that the Talmud says “three” and not two because a woman is always allowed to be isolated with three Jewish men. Sometimes, she may not be isolated with two. For instance, if they are on the road. If one needed to go to the bathroom, she would be isolated with one]. 
  
  Daf 25b
  
  It is prohibited for Jewish women to be isolated with loose Israelites, those who would not be ashamed to have sex with her in front of other men. This is true no matter how many there are. Thus again we are faced with the question—how does the rule for isolation with non-Jews differ from the rule concerning isolation with Jews?
  There is a leniency in the laws of seclusion—if a man’s wife is with him, another woman may be isolated with him and his wife. The idea is that the man will have some sense of  shame in front of his wife and will not come to have sex with another woman. This, according to this sugya, is true for Israelites but does not apply to non-Jews. They will have sex with another woman even in the presence of their wives.
  The Talmud asks why we fear that the idolater might have sex with her but do not seem to be concerned that he will kill her. R. Yirmiyah limits the rule in the mishnah to a woman who is important. In such a case they should not be isolated lest they have sex. But we do not need to fear that he will murder her because he would be afraid to do so. R. Idi says that women have a way of defending themselves from murder. According to Rashi, this refers to her ability to seduce him. Once he is seduced he will not want to murder her.
  This line of the Talmud is very difficult to explain and there are many opinions among rishonim as well as many different readings of the text itself. I will explain according to a dominant opinion which reads the Talmud slightly differently—“ a woman who is considered important among women but not among women.” To R. Yirmiyah, since she is not important among men, meaning she does not have strong ties to the government, she might be murdered. But to R. Idi, all women have their own protection, so we do not need to worry about murder.Rashi has an entirely different explanation, but since he is universally rejected by later commentaries, I have not explained according to him. 
  The key phrase here is “even though she is in a state of peace.” This implies that even though she will not be murdered, she still should not be alone with them for fear of fornication.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to deal with the prohibition of a man being left alone with non-Jews. The fear here is that they will murder him.
  All of these are precautions that an Israelite should take around a non-Jew so that the non-Jew will not be able to act violently against him.If the idolater has a sword, and is right-handed, then the sword will be on the non-Jew’s left, and the Jew’s right. The Israelite will thus be able to prevent the non-Jew from drawing. But if he is holding a stick, then it will simply be in the non-Jew’s hand. Better to keep him to the left, so that he could feel if the non-Jew makes his move. The Israelite should always be on the higher ground, where it is safer to defend oneself. 
  If the idolater asks the Jew where he is going, he should tell him he is going further than he actually is. This way the idolater will think he has more time to kill him, and the Jew will be able to make a quick getaway. This is what Jacob did when travelling with Jacob—he told him he was going to Seir, but he got off the road at Succoth, which was earlier.
  In this story, the students of Rabbi Akiva fulfill their teacher’s instructions and lie to the bandits who meet them on the road. 
  This story involves the thieves of Babylonia. In the story, the thieves pay a price when Rav Menashe puts them under the dreaded ban.In the end, the Bavli notes how much greater the generally violent robbers in the land of Israel are than the mere thieves in Babylonia. The robbers praised R. Akiva for his sound advice, whereas the thieves cursed R. Judah. 
  
  Daf 26a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a new mishnah dealing with issues of midwifery and nursing.
  A Jewish woman should not act as midwife for a non-Jew for this would abet idol worship. In the Talmud it is explained that this is only prohibited if the Jewish woman works for free. If she is paid for her work it is permitted. A non-Jewish woman may act as a midwife for a Jewish woman.
  A Jewish woman may not act as a wet-nurse for a non-Jewish child. This is for the same reason that she may not act as a midwife.A non-Jewish woman may be a wet-nurse to a Jewish child, provided she nurse the child on the premises of the Jewish family. The Jewish family may not give over their child to the non-Jewish woman for fear that she will kill the child.
  This baraita expands on the mishnah, explaining it, limiting its applicability and bringing in a dissenting opinion. According to R. Meir, the idolatrous woman may not serve a midwife for a Jew even if others are watching her.
  R. Meir rules that even if the idolatrous woman is being watched, it is still prohibited for her to act as a midwife because a midwife can always find the opportunity to murder the newborn, especially by pushing in his softspot (I was always freaked out by the soft spot with my own kids). The Talmud illustrates this with a story whereby a woman, seemingly a midwife, brags how many Jewish children she has killed.The rabbis read her words as an exaggeration. She’s just showing off by exclaiming how many Jewish children she has killed.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the prohibition of nursing each other’s children.
  This baraita is the same as that which we saw yesterday concerning midwifery. 
  R. Meir does not allow the non-Jew to nurse the Jewish child even if others are watching because she still may find the opportunity to kill the child.
  The Talmud now explains why we need both baraitot. If we only had the source about the prohibition of midwifery, we might have thought that the rabbis agree with R. Meir that it is prohibited for a non-Jewish woman to nurse a Jewish child, because she might be able to surreptitiously kill the child. The sages would permit midwifery because it is easier to supervise.
  The Talmud now explains why we need both baraitot. If we only had the source about the prohibition of midwifery, we might have thought that the rabbis agree with R. Meir that it is prohibited for a non-Jewish woman to nurse a Jewish child, because she might be able to surreptitiously kill the child. The sages would permit midwifery because it is easier to supervise.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues discussing the issue of acting as a midwife or nursing a non-Jew.
  The baraita cited here allows a Jew to act as a midwife for a non-Jew, as long as she is paid for her services. This seems to contradict the mishnah categorically prohibits a Jewish woman for acting as a midwife.R. Yoseph solves the difficulty by claiming that this was permitted to prevent enmity. In other words, in principle it should be prohibited, but it is permitted because such a law would create enmity between Jews and non-Jews. 
  R. Joseph here thinks that a Jew should be allowed to act as a midwife on Shabbat for a nonJew even though this would involve desecration of Shabbat. This would be to avoid enmity. Abaye remarks to him that the Jew could offer an excuse so as to avoid enmity without having to actually desecrate Shabbat. As we shall see, Abaye offers the same type of comment in each of the following cases below.
  Abaye here provides excuses for how a Jewish woman can avoid enmity and still not nurse the child of an idolater.
  The source quoted here is a pretty harsh and violent source. The baraita states that while a Jew may not actively kill non-Jews and shepherds (who are considered low life thieves), one is not obligated to save their lives either. R. Joseph thinks that as long as one is paid to do so, it should be permitted. But Abaye says that one should offer a flimsy excuse rather than save their lives. I must admit that I find it hard to believe that such an excuse would avoid enmity. “Sorry, I can’t save your life because I have to go help my son off the roof.”
  IntroductionYesterday’s sugya introduced the issue of people who are “not saved from a pit,” but are not pushed in. Our sugya discusses people who may even be thrown into a pit. A warning—the rhetoric of this sugya is quite violent, and advocates doing things that I believe are immoral. Our moral senses have changed and developed over the past two thousand years and I think that every religion, when they look at their sources will find rhetoric like this. I will not apologize for it, for it does not embarrass me to acknowledge that this is what some people believed. But neither would I live my life by it.
  There are types of people who may actively be murdered. It is hard to know exactly who these people are, especially what the difference between “heretics” and “apostates” is. There are also other versions of this list. “Informers” seems to be akin to what we call “traitors” a crime that is still considered extremely serious and for which one can be executed or jailed for an extremely long time. 
  
  Daf 26b
  
  R. Yohanan instructs that the baraita recited in front of him be emended. R. Yohanan says that one must return a lost object to an apostate. This shows that he is “your brother.” How then could we say that he must be cast down into a pit? The baraita must therefore be emended.
  The Talmud asks why we didn’t resolve the contradiction between the two sources. Why did we not say that one must return a lost object to an apostate who eats carrion (meat which had not been slaughtered properly) just because he is hungry, but not to one who eats carrion meat to provoke, because he simply enjoys transgressing?The resolution is that R. Yohanan considers one who eats carrion to provoke to be a heretic, a word already included in the baraita. “Apostate” must mean one who eats carrion because he is hungry. Therefore the word must be erased.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the meaning of the word that I have rendered “apostate.” In Hebrew the words is “meshumad.” The term I have translated as “heretic” is “min.” All sources agree that the latter is worse. 
  According to one opinion, an “apostate” is one who sins because it makes life easier (for instance, it is cheaper to eat non-kosher meat). A “heretic” is one who sins because he wants to provoke (i.e. two hamburgers are put in front of them, one kosher one not, and they eat the non-kosher one). To the other opinion, the term “apostate” includes both categories of sinners. According to this view a “heretic” is a Jew who goes so far as to worship idols.
  One probably does not eat a flea or a gnat because one is hungry. Not much nourishment there. One eats a small bug does so only to provoke—because it is forbidden. This seems to prove that even one who sins in order to provoke is still an apostate and not a heretic. The Talmud rejects this and suggests that the person may have eaten the bug neither to provoke nor to feed his hunger. He may have just been curious as to what a forbidden thing tastes like.
  The baraita seems superfluous—if you can cast these people in, then obviously you do not need to bring them up.R. Joseph b. Hama reads into the baraita a broader meaning of the lack of an obligation to bring them up. If one of these people is in the pit, one can even remove the ladder and provide some excuse as to why one is doing so. 
  These other amoraim read other things in to the baraita that one may do to make sure this person stays in the pit and to provide excuses as to why he is doing so.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses whether non-Jews may circumcise Jews. 
  In this baraita the sages and R. Meir disagree whether a non-Jew may circumcise a Jew—R. Meir prohibits because he fears murder, while the other sages say that as long as precautions are taken, it is permitted.
  In a case where the circumcision can be done only by a non-Jew or a Samaritan (a group similar to the Jews, but with a different center of worship), R. Meir says that the non-Jew should circumcise and not the Samaritan. This is probably because the Samaritan has the wrong intent, whereas the non-Jew has no intent. R. Judah allows the Samaritan but not the non-Jew, probably because the Samaritan is in some ways a Jew. In any case, this proves that R. Meir does allow a non-Jew to circumcise a Jew.
  The Talmud solves the problem by reversing the positions in the baraita—now R. Meir holds that a non-Jew cannot circumcise. This is a trick the Talmud pulls occasionally. It usually leads to subsequent problems.
  The problem is that now that we have reversed the positions in the baraita, R. Judah seems to hold that a non-Jew may circumcise. But this directly contradicts another statement of his.
  The Talmud reverses the positions back to their original arrangement. Now we have to solve the contradiction in the positions of R. Meir. The answer is that to R. Meir it depends on whether the doctor is an expert. 
  
  Daf 27a
  
  IntroductionLast week’s daf ended with R. Judah ruling that a Samaritan may circumcise a Jew. This week’s daf continues that discussion.
  R. Judah in this baraita holds that a Samaritan may not circumcise a Jew because his intention is wrong—his center of worship is Mount Gerizim, not Jerusalem. R. Yose holds that circumcision need not be performed with any intent. Thus a Samaritan may circumcise.
  The Talmud now reverses the opinions back to the first reversal. R. Judah now holds that a non-Jew may circumcise but a Samaritan may not. The R. Judah in the baraita that disallowed a non-Jew, was not the regular R. Judah [bar Ilai] but R. Judah the Prince.
  R. Hisda explains the midrashim behind the two positions. R. Judah says that circumcision must be “to the Lord”—meaning it requires the proper intent. R. Yose says that the word “circumcise” is doubled as if to say that intent is not critical.
  Each tanna now must explain how he uses the verse that the other tanna uses. R. Yose says that the words “to the Lord” refer to the words above, “he shall make a pesah sacrifice to the Lord.”R. Judah says we do not learn from repetitions of words because “the Torah speaks in human language.” Normal grammatical constructs, which this is, are not subject to midrash. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues discussing circumcision performed by non-Jews.
  The two amoraim here dispute which verse is the reason why non-Jews cannot circumcise Jews.
  The Talmud will now struggle to find a practical difference between these two amoraim. The first suggestion is a non-Jew who is circumcised. R. Yohanan would allow because such a person is circumcised. Rav would not because this person is not part of the covenant.
  A mishnah from Nedarim seems to define circumcised non-Jews as if they are uncircumcised. Therefore, one who takes a vow not to derive benefit from the uncircumcised may not derive benefit from them. This means that R. Yohanan cannot allow a circumcised non-Jew to circumcise.
  The next possibility is that they disagree about an uncircumcised Jew—Rav would allow him to because he is a member of the covenant, and R. Yohanan would not.
  The problem is that the mishnah defines uncircumcised Israelites as if they were circumcised. A Jew who was not circumcised (for medical reasons) should be allowed to circumcise.
  The final suggestion is that they disagree about whether a woman can circumcise. To Rav, she may not because she is not part of the covenant of circumcision. But to R. Yohanan she may because a woman does not need to be circumcised—it is as if she is already circumcised.
  The problem with saying that a woman cannot circumcise is that Zipporah circumcises her and Moses’s son on their way back to Egypt. The Talmud tries to read this as if she told someone else to circumcise, or only began the circumcision. Needless to say, these are not the simple readings of the text.In the Middle Ages there were occasionally women who performed circumcision, especially in remote areas with few men. Today, I do believe that in some circles it is possible to find mohalot, but the practice extremely rare and certainly not found in the Orthodox world.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins with a new mishnah that deals with going to a non-Jewish doctor or barber.
  The meaning of this mishnah is quite cryptic. The Talmud will explain it later on. 
  According to Rabbi Meir a Jew may never get his hair cut by a non-Jew, lest the non-Jew kill him with the scissors or razor. The Sages say that this is prohibited only in private. In public the non-Jew would not dare to kill the Jew.
  If the mishnah meant to say that we can let them heal us for pay but not for free, then why not say this more directly.
  We cannot say that Jews may be healed by them only in cases where the healing is not dangerous for this would contradict a statement made by Rav Judah.
  The Talmud solves the puzzle by suggesting that a Jew may go to a non-Jewish veterinarian because there is no fear to his life. But he may not go to a non-Jewish doctor for his own healing because there is always the fear that the doctor will kill him.
  One may get advice from a non-Jewish doctor as to what medicine he should take. He does not need to worry that the non-Jew will tell him to take something poisonous, because the non-Jewish doctor would fear that the Jew will go ask a second opinion and when he hears what the non-Jewish doctor recommended his reputation will be spoiled.
  
  Daf 27b
  
  R. Yohanan says that if the Jew will certainly die without the non-Jewish doctor’s medical attention, he should be allowed to heal him (or at least to try). While it is true that that the non-Jew might kill him immediately and thereby cause him the loss of the few hours/days/weeks he has left, we are not concerned with loss of such a short amount of time to live.
  In this verse in II Kings the four lepers outside the besieged city prefer to go into the city where the enemy army might be located then die of starvation outside the city. This proves that one may put a short amount of time of one’s life at risk. In other words, if I know I will die in say 2 months, I may take a risk now even though it might kill me a lot sooner than 2 months.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss whether one may receive healing from a non-Jew if he is about to die.
  This statement, which will be explicated below, holds that a Jew may never be healed by a heretic (who is assumed at first to have the same status as a non-Jew). Thus we are concerned with the short amount of time a person may live before he dies, and we do not allow non-Jews to heal Jews.
   Most scholars interpret Jacob of Kefar Sekaniah as being a student of Jesus. Jesus was often portrayed as having healing powers. Ben Dama wants to be healed, perhaps by some sort of incantation, which is often the way that Jesus heals. But R. Ishmael does not allow him to do so because of his heresy. This proves that the prohibition of being healed by a non-Jew is absolute.
  The Talmud rejects the analogy between non-Jews and heretics. Jews may not be healed by non-Jews because they are violent. But if the Jew is dying, then why not be healed? Worst  case scenario he dies a little earlier. But when it comes to heretics, the fear is that Jews will be drawn into their heresy. Therefore, Jews should have nothing to do with heretics. Note that this text, which appears in slightly different versions elsewhere in rabbinic literature, offers an interesting statement on the draw that Christianity had over Jews. The rabbis had to offer strict warnings to keep people away from Christianity. It is not that Jews wanted to become full Christians. Rather, we can see that they are attracted to some aspects of Christianity—here the healing powers of the Christians.
  IntroductionThis sugya continues to discuss the story that appeared at the end of yesterday’s daf.
  The irony of the story is that the rabbis say to him that he should be happy that he did not break a fence by being healed by a heretic, for such a person will be bit by a snake. But Ben Dama was bit by a snake! The Talmud answers by saying that the “bite of the snake” referred to in that saying is worse than the bite a real snake. The type of snake referred to in that saying is “the snake of the rabbis”—one bit by such a snake cannot be healed even in the world to come.
  Ben Dama could have responded to R. Ishmael that the Torah demands that one live through observance of the mitzvoth, not die by them.
  R. Ishmael holds that while one may worship idols in private to save one’s life, one may not do so in public for this would profane God’s name. Ben Dama’s act was in public, and therefore he did not have permission to be healed by the heretic.
  There are two versions of what types of wounds should not be healed by a non-Jew. The first is the type of wound that may be healed on Shabbat—meaning a life-threatening one. The second is an internal wound.
  
  Daf 28a
  
  Hand and foot wounds are considered serious wounds for which one may break Shabbat even though they are not internal wounds. According to the first version, one may not be healed by a non-Jew for them, but according to the second version, one may since they are not truly internal wounds.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues discussing what type of wound one may break Shabbat in order to heal.
  If you have to ask the doctor about it, then you can transgress Shabbat to heal it. 
  Earlier we learned that one may break Shabbat in order to heal an inner wound. A burning fever is an inner wound. Inner begins anywhere from the lips and inward, although the next section seems to be unclear about whether this includes the gums and teeth.
  Do pain in the gums and teeth count as internal wounds?Abaye quotes a baraita saying that one should not rinse one’s teeth with vinegar on Shabbat, for this was a form of healing and healing is prohibited on Shabbat. [This is a topic we will not get into here, but will learn when we learn Tractate Shabbat. Healing is a big issue on Shabbat, and generally the rabbis did not allow it]. But this is only if one is “troubled.” If the pain is bad, it would seem that he would be allowed to rinse with vinegar. Thus, gums and teeth are internal wounds.The Talmud rejects this—it could be that by the word “troubled” the Talmud means even a lot of pain. No matter what, one may not heal wounds in the mouth.
  In this strange vignette, R. Yohanan goes to a female non-Jewish doctor. She heals him but he wonders what he will do on Shabbat. Rashi explains that he can’t come to her on Shabbat because he will be busy teaching. In any case, the story seems to prove that one can heal gum sores on Shabbat.
  Scurvy is worse than regular sores on the gums because it can spread into one’s body. So one can cure scurvy, but we’re still not sure about regular sores.
  This section is a little sugya about the symptom, causes and cures for scurvy. Thankfully, we do not follow Talmudic medicine.
  IntroductionYesterday we learned that R. Yohanan was healed by a non-Jew. Our sugya asks how he could do this.
  Generally speaking it is prohibited for a non-Jew to heal a Jew if the wound is serious enough that we could transgress Shabbat for it (such as scurvy). The fear is that the non-Jew will surreptitiously kill him. But if the person being healed is an important man like R. Yohanan, then we are not afraid that the non-Jew will kill him.
  R. Abahu was also a distinguished man, yet the Jacob the heretic tried to poison him. Had R. Ammi and R. Assi not licked his leg R. Abahu would have lost it. This proves that heretics (or non-Jews) will try to poison Jews.The answer is that the woman who healed R. Yohanan was an expert, and thus would not risk her reputation by trying to harm an important man like R. Yohanan.
  R. Abahu’s doctor tried to kill him even though he is an expert physician because he was not just a non-Jew, he was a heretic (he may have been a Christian). The enmity of this group against the Jews is sufficient that they would be willing to die in order to cause them harm, just as Samson was willing to kill himself in order to kill the Philistines.
  IntroductionMost of this section is full of ancient cures for various skin afflictions.
  The amoraim continue to list what types of wounds are serious enough that one may desecrate Shabbat for them. The Talmud then lists how these wounds are cured.
  More medical advice, this time concerning boils that look like grapes. Ouch!
  
  
  Daf 28b
  
  Cures for hemorrhoids.
  IntroductionBasically this whole section is a description of remedies for earaches. I’m not going to comment below because I don’t really understand a thing, but it would be good for us to appreciate just how debilitating simple problems like earaches, toothaches, gum problems, headaches, etc. would have been before the advent of modern medicine.
  My assumption with the notion that kidneys are a cure for earache is that this is a result of the similarity in shape. But that’s just a guess.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with eye injuries.
  All agree that it is permitted to “restore the ear into its proper position” which means to fix a dislocated jaw. However, they disagree with regard to whether it is better to do so with medicine or with the hand. Those who prefer the hand would say that taking medicine is a rabbinic prohibition and therefore should be avoided. Those who prefer the medicine would say that resetting the jaw by hand might cause injury, and it is prohibited by the Torah to cause injury.
  An eye that got out of order seems to refer to an eye that is about to pop out of its socket. The medical treatment is to apply blue eyeshadow. The Talmud rules that this injury is so dangerous that the dyes may be ground even on Shabbat and they may be carried through the public domain. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues dealing with painting one’s eye in order to heal it on Shabbat.
  Great story! 
  Sadly, the rabbis learn how serious eye injuries can be from the maid servant who cries out in pain, but no one pays attention to her because they do not want to transgress Shabbat.
  The Talmud distinguishes between eye injuries that are threatening and therefore can be healed on Shabbat, and those that are not and cannot be healed on Shabbat.
  This is a list of food or activities that are in some situations beneficial to one’s health, but in the opposite situations are not.
  
  Daf 29a
  
  IntroductionThis sugya contains more advice as to what food is healthy and what food is not. 
  Here’s some advice on what to eat after bloodletting. And also which way to point when defecating! 
  The unkali is some cartilage on the chest that seems to have gotten out of place. It can be fixed on Shabbat. There also seems to be a medicinal cure. This same cure can be used for other problems. The Talmud gives some cute mnemonics to remember what to mix it in.
  Different versions of what to do with these drugs. 
  This list has some advice that probably is considered correct in the modern world but some which probably is not so correct.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the next section of the mishnah—the prohibition of receiving a hair cut from non-Jews out of fear that they will kill us.
  The Jew must keep his eye on the non-Jew cutting his hair, lest the non-Jew try to murder him. And a Jew may cut a non-Jew’s hair, but not his special forelock for this is associated with idolatry. The Jew should not be seen as helping groom this special part of the hair.
  The mirror shouldn’t be necessary in the public domain—everyone can see what is going on there. But in the private domain it is hard to see how a murderous barber would be stopped by a mirror. The answer tells us a bit about the history of mirrors. Only important people seem to have had them, and therefore, a Jew who has a mirror will look important enough for the non-Jew to be afraid to kill him.
  R. Hana realizes that he put his life in danger when he transgressed the words of R. Meir, who in the Mishnah had stated that a Jew should not have his hair cut by them in any place.
  The rabbis allow a Jew to have his hair cut by a non-Jew in a public place. R. Hana thought that the road to Nehardea was not a public place.
  In case you’re giving a haircut to an idol worshiper, this is what you need to know!
  There are two sages with very similar names—R. Malkio and R. Malkiah. How does a young yeshiva student avoid confusion? R. Hanina provides a list, and R. Papa a rule—all statements made in reference to a mishnah (or baraita) are R. Malkiah, whose name sounds closer to “queen.” There is one real difference between them. R. Hanina says that R. Malkio made the statement about the maid-servants, whereas R. Papa says that it was R. Malkiah. Oy, this is really making me dizzy!
  
  Daf 29b
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah lists things that belong to non-Jews that may not be used by Jews, for fear that the Jew will be using something that has previously been used in idol worship.
  A Jew may not benefit from the wine of non-Jews since it may have been used in making a libation to an idol. [This prohibition is still observed by many religious Jews today, even though we can be quite sure that the wine was not used for idol worship. We will learn a lot more material about non-Jewish wine at the end of this tractate.] Similarly, vinegar that was once intended to be wine and then went sour may not be used by a Jew, since it may have been used in idol worship when it was wine. However, if the non-Jew bought the vinegar from a Jew and then gave it back to a Jew the Jew may use it since vinegar itself is not used in idol worship.According to the Talmud Hadrianic earthenware absorbs wine and when subsequently wetted, will release the wine. If a Jew were to use such earthenware he would be using non-Jewish wine, which is prohibited.According to the mishnah, idolaters would make incisions in animals to remove animal hearts and use them in idol worship. If one sees a cut in an animal skin at the place of the heart, it is a sign that the animal was used for idol worship and it is forbidden. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel claims that only if the cut is circular is the skin forbidden. Since non-Jews do not make oblong cuts as part of their idol worship, the skin is permitted.
  Meat that is being brought into a place of idol worship is permitted to a Jew, since it has not yet been used for idol worship. It is of course not permitted to be eaten, since it probably is not kosher. However, one could use it to feed animals. Meat that is coming out of a place of idol worship is forbidden, since it was probably used for idolatry.
  It is forbidden to conduct business with non-Jews who are on their way to worship idols, since they will thank their gods for their business with the Jews. In this way the Jew will indirectly be abetting idol worship. However, it is permitted to engage them in business on their return, since they have already completed their idol worship. [Note this last section is of a different subject than the other sections. It should have been included in chapter one. It probably was included here due to its similarity to the previous clause.]
  If a Jew stores his wine in skin-bottles or ceramic flasks in which non-Jews previously stored their wine the Jewish wine becomes forbidden. Since the skin-bottles and flasks contained absorbed wine in their walls, that non-Jewish wine would mix with the Jewish wine. According to Rabbi Meir, it is forbidden to even derive any benefit from this wine. According to the Sages it is only forbidden for the Jew to drink the wine. If he wants he could sell the wine to a non-Jew and thereby derive benefit. The Sages rule that the only type of non-Jewish wine from which it is actually prohibited to derive benefit is wine that one can see. Wine that has been absorbed in a vessel is only forbidden to be drunk.
  According to Rabbi Meir, both dry and moist grape skins and seeds that belonged to non-Jews are forbidden to Jews and the prohibition extends even to deriving any benefit from them. The Sages rule that dry seeds and skins are permitted even to eat and only moist ones are prohibited.
  The concern with regards to fish brine is that there may be small amounts of wine in it. Bithynian cheese is cheese that comes from a place called Bithynia, which is in Asia Minor. According to the Talmud most of the calves raised there were used for idol worship. Since cheese uses rennet, a substance which comes from the stomach lining of a cow and solidifies the milk into cheese, we are concerned that the rennet came from a cow used in idol worship. Due to our concern with both of these foods, Rabbi Meir says it is forbidden for a Jew to derive benefit from either. According the Sages it is only forbidden to eat them; it is permitted to derive benefit from them. The fish brine is permitted since the wine was only used as an antidote for any polluting agent in the brine and not for its own taste. The cheese is permitted since most of the animals in Bithynia were not used for idol worship, only most of the calves which were a minority of the total number of animals.
  IntroductionThis mishnah contains a discussion between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Joshua concerning the prohibition of non-Jewish cheese.
  Rabbi Ishmael asks Rabbi Joshua why the Sages forbid cheese made by non-Jews. This prohibition is perplexing to Rabbi Ishmael because even the non-Jews make their cheese from kosher animals such as cows and goats. Since the milk used to make the cheese comes from kosher animals, it should be permitted.Rabbi Joshua responds that non-Jews use rennet to curdle the cheese. This rennet comes from the stomachs of animals that were not properly slaughtered and therefore the cheese is prohibited.
  Rabbi Ishmael responds that a priest who sees rennet in the stomach of a whole burnt offering may drink this rennet (I know this sounds a little gross.). Since a whole burnt offering is forbidden to be eaten, this law proves that the rennet is not considered part of the animal. If it were considered to be an integral part of the animal, it would have been prohibited. Since it is not forbidden in this case then by comparison the rennet used to make cheese should not make the cheese forbidden to Jews, even though it comes from an animal that was improperly slaughtered. At this point the mishnah offers an aside. The statement that the rennet of a whole burnt offering may be consumed by a priest was only Rabbi Ishmael’s opinion. The Rabbis did not agree with him. They stated that it is forbidden to derive benefit from this rennet and yet one who does so is not considered to have taken (trespassed) Temple property. [If he had taken from Temple property he would have to bring a sacrifice to atone for the sin, as well as pay  back the value of that which he took.] This section is not an integral part of the mishnah and was added in at a later time.
  Rabbi Joshua now provides another reason why non-Jewish cheese is forbidden. Non-Jews use rennet that comes from calves that were used in idol worship. Since any item that was used in idol worship is forbidden to a Jew, non-Jewish cheese is forbidden to a Jew.
  Rabbi Ishmael responds that if non-Jewish cheese is forbidden since it may contain rennet that comes from an animal used in idol worship, then it should not only be forbidden to eat, it should also be forbidden to derive any benefit from it. From the example in the previous mishnah concerning Bithynian cheese, we learned that the Sages said it was only forbidden for consumption and it was not forbidden to derive benefit from non-Jewish cheese.
  Rabbi Joshua does not seem to have an answer to this response of Rabbi Ishmael’s and therefore he distracts him to a different topic, this dealing with the gender of the speaker in the second verse of Song of Songs. The verse states “for your love is more delightful than wine”. “Your love” can either be masculine or feminine. The only difference in the Hebrew is the vocalization; the consonants are exactly the same. Rabbi Ishmael responds that he vocalizes it to be a masculine pronoun. In other words the speaker is feminine and she is speaking to a male. Rabbi Joshua points out that this is surely wrong for the word “your ointments” is masculine. Although this word too can be vocalized to be feminine, the fact that the end of the verse refers to maidens loving him proves that the one being spoken to is male.Scholars have attempted to connect the meaning of this section with the previous topic of cheese. The “masculine” version of the verse gives priority to the written Torah, which would prohibit cheese only if it uses non-kosher ingredients, such as nevelah. R. Joshua is arguing that if cheese is prohibited, it must be prohibited on these grounds. The feminine version of the verse prioritizes the oral Torah, that created by the rabbis. Thus R. Ishmael believes that non-Jewish cheese is prohibited by rabbinic decree, like wine, as a means to keep Jews and non-Jews apart.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya derives the source for the prohibition of deriving benefit from libated wine. We should note that this is only wine that was actually used in idolatrous ritual. Wine that belonged to non-Jews is not prohibited by the Torah, only by the rabbis.
  The Talmud learns the prohibition of libated wine from the comparison the verse makes with idolatrous sacrifices.
  The Talmud now asks the obvious question—how do we know that idolatrous sacrifices are prohibited. This is derived from Psalms which compares sacrifices to the dead. It is prohibited to derive benefit from body parts of the dead (unless one is doing so to save a life, so organ transplants are allowed).
  The chain of deriving laws continues! How do we know that one may not benefit from the dead? Because of a “gezerah shavah” (a comparison of the same word used in two different contexts) connecting it with the heifer whose neck must be broken when a body is found and the murderer is not known. It is forbidden to derive benefit from this heifer.
  How do we know that one may not derive benefit from the red heifer? Because it is an act of atonement, like a sacrifice. And just as one may not derive benefit from sacrifices (except for specifically prohibited acts like eating), so too one may not derive benefit from the heifer.
  IntroductionToday’s learning discusses the status of vinegar and cooked wine that belong to a non-Jew.
  The Talmud finds the mishnah’s prohibition of gentile wine to be obvious—just because the wine goes bad does not mean that it becomes permitted. Rav Ashi answers that there is one point of leniency with regard to vinegar. Most of the time, if a non-Jew handles Jewish wine, it must be doubly sealed. This is a halakhah we will deal with at greater length later in the tractate. But Jewish vinegar being held by a non-Jew does not need to be doubly sealed. First of all, non-Jews don’t generally libate vinegar (although they might, for the line between wine and vinegar is not so hard). Second, he won’t trouble himself to exchange this wine for his own because it does have at least one seal, making it harder to open.
  This is the same passage as above but about cooked wine. Cooked wine does not need two seals (today cooked wine can be handled by a non-Jew because we are more lenient today about wine because non-Jews do not libate. But in the Talmud they were still strict).
  
  Daf 30a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses laws pertaining to cooked wine and to alontit (explained in the sugya). One of the issues that comes up here is wine (or other liquids) that were left “uncovered.” The rabbis and other ancient peoples feared that snakes would put poison into uncovered liquids. Water left overnight uncovered was thus considered undrinkable and dangerous. They took this law quite seriously.
  Boiled wine is prohibited if it belongs to the non-Jew, although as we saw, there are some leniencies with regard to it. Alontit is wine mixed with water and some balsam. If the Jew prepared the alontit, it does not become prohibited when it enters the non-Jew’s possession.
  Snakes, according to this, will not put their poison into wine diluted with water. And non-Jews do not libate boiled wine.
  Snakes do not put their poison into boiled wine either. Those finicky snakes!
  The halakhah here is the same as above. The real life setting of the discussion is interesting. It shows rabbis learning halakhah while visiting the sick. It also shows some process of reciting a tradition and then asking another sage if it is authoritative.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss the issue of cooked wine—is it prohibited because of fear of idolatry? Is it safe to drink it when it was uncovered.
  Shmuel rebukes his friend Avlet for refusing to drink boiled wine. 
  Diluted wine is wine mixed with water. Wine was generally diluted right before it was drunk. Evidently they said that snakes do not drink diluted wine. Snakes—they take it straight up.
  According to R. Papa snakes will drink slightly diluted wine. But this is contradicted by a story in which the servant protects the wine by slightly diluting it. The Talmud resolves the issue by saying that snakes will drink slightly diluted wine, but only if they do not need to endanger their lives to do so.
  In this case the clever snake dilutes the wine himself!
  The Talmud tries to answer that the snake will drink diluted wine only if he himself diluted it. But Rav Ashi finds this a bizarre resolution to a difficulty that involves what they perceived to be real physical danger. If the snake will drink diluted wine, then we better be careful, and not just offer resolutions as if we were dealing with theoretical issues. This is a fascinating recognition that many resolutions to difficulties in the Talmud are not based on demonstrable truth. When it comes to an academic subject, this is okay. But not when it comes to subject with immediate life and death consequences.In the end, diluted wine is subject to the same laws as undiluted wine. Snakes drink it and non-Jews libate it. But boiled wine is not.
  IntroductionMore discussion of the laws of uncovered wine.
  Snakes will not drink water next to a person, even if that person is sleeping, and even if it is night. 
  According to Rav only Jewish men are particularly careful about the laws of not drinking from uncovered vessels. So he won’t drink water at a non-Jew’s house. And the only reason he drinks at a widow’s house is that he assumes she follows the customs of her husband. Shmuel acted in an opposite manner, not trusting the widow but trusting the non-Jew, assuming snakes won’t be found in his house.There is also a version where Shmuel would drink from neither house. The impression from this piece is that not drinking uncovered water was considered part of high, educated culture and that people would question who was keeping these health restrictions, and who was not. Jewish males are assumed to keep these laws. Non-Jews and females are not.
  R. Joshua b. Levi lists three types of wine that snakes won’t drink. 
  R. Hama has the same list but he understands it differently. 
  Outside of Asia, snakes won’t drink Karina. But in its place, this is just the wine that everyone drinks—snakes and humans alike. So since snakes will drink it, it does become prohibited.
  IntroductionMore discussion of uncovered wine! I told you—they took this subject seriously.
  The issue here is whether snakes will drink wine or non-Jews will libate wine that has grown old and formed a film over the top.
  
  Daf 30b
  
  The baraita continues to discuss what types of wine are subject to the laws of uncovered liquids.It also begins to discuss dishes into which wine has been placed. Will snakes drink even from them?
  Babylonian kutah is a dairy dish containing a dairy base, with additions of grain and wine.
  Snakes seem to be afraid of the sound of dripping water. 
  When a fig is picked a little hole is left where it was attached to the tree. R. Hiyya b. Ashi says that one need not suspect that the snake drank from there. But the Talmud’s comment implies that the snake may indeed have drank from there if left uncovered. Nevertheless, one may eat the fig because God protects people.
  IntroductionWe continue to discuss snake poison!
  R. Safra classifies the types of snake poison based on the age of the snake. 
  R. Safra’s classification of snake venom seems to contradict a baraita that teaches that snakes grow stronger as they age. The Talmud resolves this by saying that while they go stronger, their venom grows weaker. That is why it floats to the top. 
  The point of knowing that the venom sneaks to the bottom is that nine people can safely drink from a barrel of liquid or eat from a melon and live, and the tenth can die. 
  IntroductionThis is the last piece about uncovered wine!
  The baraita outlines what one may not use uncovered water for. The first opinion and the “others” (an anonymous group of rabbis) argue about whether one can put it on backs of hands, feet or upper part of face. There are no “openings” in these places, but the first opinion holds that one can still not do so.
  The two baraitot contradict each other—one allows giving uncovered water to animals and one does not. The answer is that the baraita that forbids one to give such water to one’s neighbor’s animal is that it refers to a cat! If one wants to give such water to one’s own cat, it is allowed because this only weakens the cat. But one should not give the water to another’s  cat because it might weaken the cat and when his neighbor wants to sell it, it will be in a weakened state.While I think the particular example is a bit strange (were people really selling cats? What does anyone need a cat for?), the principle that emerges from this source is important. One must be extra cautious when it comes to other people’s property, more cautious than one is with one’s own property.
  IntroductionToday’s mishnah turns to the subject of wine owned or possessed by non-Jews. May Jews derive benefit from such wine? May they drink it? This is a topic that will be dealt with briefly here, and then with great intensity later in the tractate.
  R. Judah b. Batera classifies three different types of wine. The first is wine that has actually been libated. Such wine is considered to be a by-product of idol worship. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from this wine. And it causes impurity. Wine that belongs to non-Jews is not considered to have been involved in idolatry. But it is still forbidden to derive benefit from it, and of course to drink it. Its defiling properties are lesser—it only defiles food and drink.If the wine belongs to a Jew, but the non-Jew was holding on to the wine, then the Jew may derive benefit from the wine, but he may not drink the wine.Note that there seem to be two issues combined here. The first is contact with items used in idolatrous ritual. This would apply either to wine that had actually been libated, or to wine that might have been libated. The second issue is preventing contact with non-Jews. Wine simply owned by a non-Jew does not need to be treated as an idolatrous product. But if the goal of this halakhah is to prevent fraternization, then prohibiting any contact would make some sense. 
  
  Daf 31a
  
  The question at hand is whether one holding on to a deposit belonging to another is considered to be the deposit’s owner (even a temporary one). The earlier baraita seemed to say no—that is why it is not prohibited to derive benefit from the wine. But this mishnah (from Sheviit) says that the produce is considered to belong to the non-Jew and therefore it is not subject to the laws of tithes or the Sabbatical year.The resolution is that in the case of the wine, he assigned it a separate corner, and thus did not touch it.
  If the non-Jew set aside a special corner for the wine, then why shouldn’t the Jew be allowed to drink it? The Talmud bolsters the question with a story about R. Yohanan coming to Parud. There he asks R. Tanhum to a halakhah in the name of his teacher, Bar Kappara. The halakhah that is quoted contradicts what was said above. As an aside, R. Yohanan is happy to hear the teaching and considers him a proper student of Bar Kappara. In any case, we now have contradictory tannaitic sources.
  R. Zera solves the difficulty by ascribing the baraita that prohibits to the rabbis and the baraita that permits to R. Eliezer. However, R. Eliezer permits only if the Jew holds the key or the seal, such that it would be difficulty for the non-Jew to break into the wine.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section began to discuss the status of Jewish wine in the possession of non-Jews. How can the Jew be certain that the non-Jew did not open the cask and drink some, in which case we would have to be concerned that he might have libated it. Our sugya discusses the topic of seals. Does a seal around the jug ensure that the wine is intact?
  According to R. Elazar, if one wants to guard, for instance, one’s food, such that it remains kosher, one seal around the package is enough (I know—on the airplane they put two seals). The exception is wine—wine must be guarded by a double seal. R. Yohanan says that one seal is always sufficient.
  This is an unusual use of the term “and they are not arguing” because in the end R. Elazar and R. Yohanan do argue. R. Elazar holds like the rabbis—a seal is not sufficient to protect wine. R. Yohanan holds like R. Eliezer—a seal does guard the wine.
  This is a more stringent version of the dispute between R. Elazar and R. Yohanan. According to this version, all agree that one seal is not sufficient to ensure that the wine is not touched. The argument is over whether two seals are needed.
  IntroductionThe Talmud defines what is considered a seal within a seal. These are pretty self-explanatory, at least once they have been translated.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses wine handled by Samaritans. The Samaritans were considered to be Jews that did not keep rabbinic Judaism. Rather, they kept their own version of the Torah. They do not libate their wine to idolatry, but how do we know that they keep non-Jews, who do libate wine, away from theirs?
  En-Kushi, Borkata and Zagdar are Samaritan cities while Birat-Sirika, Kefar-Parshai and Kefar Shalem are non-Jewish cities. Originally they prohibited the wine in the Samaritan cities due to their proximity to non-Jewish cities. But then they relaxed this law and allowed Jews to drink Samaritan wine if the cask had been closed up.
  The change happened when the rabbis realized (or simply decided) that Samaritans did generally ensure that non-Jews should not come into contact with their closed casks of wine. They just were not so strict, and thus if a cask was opened, Jews could not be sure that non-Jews had not touched it.
  This source describes a Jew who sends a substance with either a Samaritan or a non-Jew. Rashi explains that with brine the fear is that the non-Jew may switch it with his own brine that has non-kosher fish in it. Murias is also made of fish, but Rashi explains that it might have wine in it. In any case, if the Jew can tell that the wine, brine or murias has not been opened then he may drink it. But simply closing the cask is not sufficient.
  
  Daf 31b
  
  Zera solved the contraction by positing that in the town the Samaritan (or non-Jew) will not open his wine because the Jew might pop in at any moment. But on the open road, he would have time and therefore simply closing the cask is not sufficient. The Jew must be able to tell that it is has not been opened.
  Yirmiyah notes that those in the town surely got there by the road—after all they were sent on their way from one place to another by the Jew. So how can we really be lenient with wine in the town?Therefore, R. Yirmiyah offers an entirely different solution. The leniency that a simple closed cask is sufficient applies only to casks found near the wine presses. Since there are many people there, the Samaritan would be afraid to let the non-Jew touch the wine, lest the Jews see and refuse to buy from him. But elsewhere, where not that many people are around, Jews cannot drink Samaritan wine. Not because Samaritans libate, but because Samaritans do not observe the rabbinic stringencies surrounding the prohibition of non-Jews coming into contact with Jewish wine.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses beer produced by non-Jews. Beer was not libated, so it could not be prohibited for the same reason that wine was. The question then becomes—why can’t Jews drink beer produced by non-Jews? Or maybe they can?
  According to one opinion, drinking beer with non-Jews encourages fraternization with them, and that is why it is prohibited. In other words, not allowing people to drink together is a good way to prevent them from marrying each other. The other opinion holds that the problem is that non-Jews leave their beer uncovered, and it might be susceptible to snake poison. The problem with that opinion is that Jews also let their beer remain uncovered. The answer is that if the beer is left so that all the sediment falls to the bottom, then the water on top would be subject to the rules of uncovered water.
  If the problem with non-Jewish beer is that it has been left uncovered, then why should aged beer be prohibited? Rav said that snake venom prevents wine from properly maturing or going to vinegar. Thus if the wine has matured or gone to vinegar it is permitted because we can assume that there is no poison in it. The same should be true with beer.The Talmud answers that mature beer is prohibited lest one come to drink immature beer in which there may be snake poison.
  We can see here a variety of opinions on drinking non-Jewish beer. Some of the amoraim held that as long as the Jew did not drink with the non-Jew, particularly in the non-Jew’s house, he could drink the beer. But one amora was particularly cautious, and assumedly did not drink the beer at all.I should note that by the Middle Ages the laws involving beer had been much more relaxed. Today religious Jews drink beer brewed by non-Jews. Indeed, on a personal note, this particular Jew very much enjoys the excellent beer crafted by non-Jews. And that’s an understatement.
  IntroductionToday’s section mostly discusses non-Jewish beer.
  According to Rashi, Marguan is a city in which non-observant Jews reside. R. Shmuel b. Bisna would neither drink theie wine there nor their beer. Theoretically, there is no reason for him to have been so strict with the beer. But the fear seems to have been that due to their lack of observance, he should act even more strictly than necessary and not even drink the beer.
  In principle, Rav allows Jews to drink non-Jewish beer. It is not prohibited like wine. But he does not let his son drink it lest it have been left uncovered. Since his son already seems to have some sort of sickness, the little bit of venom in the beer that would not injure a healthy person, would injure his son.
  And just like that, we’re back to the topic of uncovered liquids!
  Shmuel cites a fascinating tradition he learned from Rav. It seems that non-Jews do not observe the prohibition of drinking uncovered liquids. If such liquids are truly dangerous, then we’d have to ask why? The answer is that they have a vaccine immunity to the poison. Since they eat snakes and other such creepy creatures, they are immune from their poison. Clever answer!
  Beer vinegar may be prohibited because it may contain wine yeast (the dregs would be used to re-ferment the beer). But if taken from a storehouse, we can assume it has no wine in it.
  
  Daf 32a
  
  IntroductionThe mishnah ruled that Jews may not derive benefit from “Hadrianic earthenware.” What is this earthenware?
  The first attempt to understand this term seems to be that it is simply related to the emperor  Hadrian. Rashi explains that his troops took it with them when they went on long journeys to battle. It is unclear whether this is connected with what appears below.
  R. Dimi explains that Hadrianic earthenware was an ancient way of making instant wine. Sort of like a tea bag for wine. 
  Roman instant wine was even better than Jewish first quality wine. I guess they were drinking Manischewitz back then as well.
  IntroductionToday’s section asks whether one can use these earthenware shards to support the legs of a bed?
  The Jew does not want to use the earthenware for the wine that is in it. He wants to use the shard only to even out the legs of the bed. In an abstract formulation, this is called “one who wants the object (the shard) to exist for some reason other than the prohibited substance (the wine). Two amoraim argue over whether such a usage transgresses the prohibition of using Hadrianic earthenware.
  The end of this baraita is a difficulty on the amora who said that as long as the Jew uses the object for some other purpose, besides benefiting from the wine in it, the act is permitted. In this case, the Jew wanted to use it only to cover his donkey. He did not care about the wine, and nevertheless it is prohibited.
  The Talmud responds by taking note of a contradiction between the two halves of the baraita. The first half allows one to sell earthenware flasks belonging to non-Jews even though there is wine absorbed in the flask. Assumedly this is permitted because the Jew is benefiting from the flask and not the wine absorbed in it. The second half prohibits using the leather flask for any use whatsoever, even if the Jew does not care about the wine and wishes to use only the leather.
  Rava explains that in the second half of the baraita the issue is not directly deriving benefit from the leather flask with non-Jewish wine in it. If this were the only issue, the act would be permitted. The problem is that he might use this leather to close his own flask. Should he do so, he might come to mix his own wine with the non-Jewish wine, and this is prohibited. In contrast, there does not seem to be such fear when it comes to using Hadrianic earthenware to support the bed.
  The Talmud now asks why one would allow the sale of earthenware flasks but not supporting a bed with the Hadrianic earthenware. The answer is that when it comes to the latter, they are so thoroughly saturated with wine that the prohibited substance is “there.” In contrast, the wine soaked into regular earthenware flasks is not really “there.” It is present in only trace amounts.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that Rabban Gamaliel drank Jewish wine that had been placed in non-Jewish flasks but that the other sages did not agree with this practice. Today’s sugya cites a contradictory report. 
  There are two solutions to the contradiction between these two baraitot. According to the first solution, the earlier baraita meant that the other sages disagree with Rabban Gamaliel, but Rabban Gamaliel’s own son did agree with him, and that is what is meant by the above baraita.The other solution is that there are two different rabbis who transmit this incident—each with almost the same name, but different. The first is Shimon ben Gudda with an aleph at the end and the second is Shimon ben Gudda’ with an ayin at the end. I’ll admit that this is a strained solution, but nevertheless, Jews probably did pronounce the ayin and the aleph different.
  The mishnah taught that it is prohibited to derive benefit from skins pierced at the heart. It is assumed that such skins were part of idolatrous practice. This section defines precisely what this heart-pierced skin is. The presence of the blood is necessary to determine whether the hole was made while the animal was alive. If the hole was made after its death, then there should be no blood and it is permitted. Unless the skin was salted in which case we can assume that the salt removed the blood. 
  
  Daf 32b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section briefly discusses Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s statement from the mishnah
  All of the amoraim agree that the halakhah follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel—only a round tear is prohibited.The dispute between Abaye and R. Joseph is over whether it is important to know whether or not it is important to know if there was a dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and the other sages. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss the prohibitions in the mishnah. 
  The mishnah allows a Jew to derive benefit from meat that an idolater was bringing to his temple. The Talmud notes that this does not accord with R. Eliezer for R. Eliezer thinks that in general an idolater has idolatry on his mind and thus will already have dedicated this meat to his god, even before it arrives at the Temple. By implication, the mishnah would hold that the idolater has not yet made up his mind whether this meat will be a sacrifice or not.
  The assumption of the mishnah is that any meat that came out of a place of idolatry must have been used in idolatrous worship.The mishnah says that it is prohibited to derive benefit from meat that was used in idolatry. In a roundabout way, this rule is connected with the opinion of R. Judah ben Batera. R. Judah ben Batera said that we learn the rule that products of idolatrous sacrifice defile by overhanging (this means that if they are over an object, the object underneath is ritually defiled) by the comparison with the dead body. Rashi points out that in this context there is another level to the comparison—just as it is prohibited to derive benefit from the dead body, so too it is prohibited to derive benefit from products of idolatry.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses Jews and non-Jews going to or coming back from an idolatrous festival.
  Shmuel’s explanation for the mishnah is in line with what we learned way back in chapter one. It is prohibited to do anything that causes an idolater to go and thank his gods. Thus it is forbidden to engage in business with him on his way to an idolatrous place. But on his way back, it is permitted.
  The opposite is true with an Israelite. On his way there, one can engage in business with him because we can always hope that he will change his mind and turn away from the festival. But once attracted to idolatry, he will not be able to break away from it and therefore it is forbidden to engage in business with him.
  
  Daf 33a
  
  Another baraita rules even more strictly when it comes to an Israelite. It is forbidden to engage in business with him even on his way to the idolatrous festival. R. Ashi contextualizes this baraita by saying it refers to one known to already be an apostate. Such a person is certainly going to go to the festival and will not change his mind.
  IntroductionLast week’s daf ended with a discussion of Jews and pagans going and returning from places of idolatry. Today’s sugya discusses Jews and pagans going to the fair, which as we have learned was also a place of idolatry.
   It is permitted to engage in business with a pagan on his way to and back from the idolatrous fair. The prohibition of engaging in business with them applies only to those actually there. With Jews, one can engage in business only on their way there. The Talmud will explain what the concern is.
  The Talmud now asks the question why it is forbidden to engage in business with Jews on their way back from the fair but not with pagans. If the answer is that the Jew may have sold objects for idolatry and therefore his money is the wages of idolatry, then the same should certainly be said about pagans—they too have “idolatry money” on them.
  With the pagan, we can assume that he went to the idolatrous fair in order to engage in non-idolatrous business. With the Jew, we would not make such an assumption. If he was only trying to sell a garment or wine, he would not have had to go the idolatrous fair, he could have sold them in the Jewish market. In other words, Jews go to these fairs for idolatrous purposes whereas pagans go there for all sorts of purposes.
  According to the mishnah, it is permitted to engage in business with those returning from places of idolatry. Resh Lakish limits this to cases where individuals are returning. But if there are groups returning together, the assumption is that they will return to the place of idolatry and business with them is prohibited.
  The baraita here discusses whether a Jew can use a skin bottle made by a non-Jew. Skins were lined with pitch to seal them, and as part of this process, some wine was poured in with the pitch to improve the taste. If the skin had no pitch, and was used for only a very short time, then the wine would not have been absorbed and the skin could be used. But if it was old or lined with pitch it would have absorbed the pagan’s wine and could not be used. But according to the baraita, if the pagan lined the skin with pitch and poured some wine in while the Jew watched, the skin can be used.
   The problem with the baraita is that if the pagan poured the wine in to complete the sealing of the pitch, the skin should be prohibited by the very act of the pagan pouring in the wine. Therefore R. Papa says that the pagan put in only the pitch, he did not pour the wine.
  If the Jew is pouring the wine why do we need another Jew watching? The answer is that the Jew pouring may not notice the pagan make a quickie libation by pouring some wine out.
  R. Zevid returns to the original wording of the baraita. The skin does not become prohibited when the pagan pours the first wine into it because this is like pouring water into mortar. He is making a vessel and will not at the same time libate.
  There was a practice to pour a little bit of wine into salt containers to improve the flavor. R. Papi says that from R. Zevid’s statement we can learn that if the pagan poured some wine into the salt, the salt is not prohibited. But R. Ashi disagrees. When one puts wine in with pitch, the wine is lost and therefore the skin is not prohibited. But when it comes to the salt, the wine remains and therefore the salt is prohibited.
  IntroductionThis suyga discusses “kashering” wine-skins into which non-Jewish wine had been placed.
  Tannaitic halakhah talks about kashering vessels that are of metal through heat, but wineskins cannot be torched (duh!). Thus the amoraim had to come up with a way of getting the non-kosher wine out of them, or at least the taste of the non-kosher wine. The solution was to fill them with water for three days, emptying and refilling the skin each day. 
  At first the rabbis thought that this means of kashering works only for wine-skins that were first owned by Jews. These skins would have absorbed the kosher wine of the Jew and then absorbed the non-kosher wine. So the non-kosher wine would only be, in a sense, on the surface. But a statement by Resh Lakish teaches that this works for kashering any type of wine-skin, even skins originally owned by non-Jews.
  R. Ashi rules when it comes to absorbing forbidden wine, even earthenware bottles may be koshered by the three days of water method.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses using wine vessels owned by non-Jews.
  If the earthenware bottle was new and had not been lined with pitch, the Jew can use it because it does not absorb the pagan wine. But if it had been lined with itch in it, or had been used for some time, it will have absorbed the taste and it cannot be used. There are two interpretations of what this baraita means when it says that the Jew can put water into the earthenware bottle. Rashi says that this refers to the means by which the bottle is kashered, as we learned above. Other rishonim say that the baraita means that the Jew can put water into the earthenware bottle because the water will not take out the taste of the wine. According to Rashi, the Jew can also put in fish brine or murias (another type of brine) because the taste of the wine will not be perceived in the bottle. Other interpreters perceive this to be another way of kashering the bottle—the sharp taste of the brine will get out the taste of the wine.
  The previous baraita ruled that if a Jew buys used earthenware wine bottles from an idolater, he may put brine and murias in them. Here the Talmud asks whether the baraita meant that if he put brine and murias into them, the brine is not ex post facto prohibited, but that he should not do so. Or is he completely allowed to do so. R. Zevid’s baraita states even more clearly that he is allowed to put in the brine “ab initio” or “lechatchila” in Hebrew. 
  
  Daf 33b
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses koshering wine vessels used with non-Jewish wine. We should note that while the specific subject here is non-kosher wine, the same rules do apply to kashering vessels in which other prohibited substances had been used.
  One can kasher earthenware wine vessels belonging to non-Jews by putting them back into the furnace. The heat will burn out any of the prohibited substance. R. Ashi adds that even if the pitch covering the inside of the vessel was only loosened and did not fall off, it is still permitted.
  The amoraim debate whether instead of putting the earthenware jugs into the furnace (which probably could damage them), he can put lighted chips into the jugs and heat them up from the inside.The final ruling is that this is not a valid means of kashering the jug.
  According to Rava, the beer put in these wine jugs will nullify the taste of the wine and therefore it is permitted. According to R. Nahman and R. Judah it does not. As someone who knows quite a bit about beer, I must say that R. Nahman and R. Judah are usually correct. This is why some beer is allowed to age in wine barrels. It enriches the taste.
  Ravina follows Rava and therefore he ruled that R. Hiyya could actually put beer into these vessels. R. Hiyya got confused and put wine in there. Rava was not concerned that by allowing people to use these vessels for beer, they would come to use them for wine. This case was just an accident.
  Oops—filling the vessels with water was a good idea. Leaving them out in the sun, not such a good idea. R. Abba—maybe you could have had a bit more sympathy for R. Yitzchak?
  Natron seems to be sodium carbonate. It was mined in places that also had alum. Vessels made of this material cannot be kashered for they would dissipate in water.
  Since these wine vessels were not used that much, they may be simply rinsed with water and thereby koshered.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with various types of vessels, asking whether they absorb the taste of the wine put in them.
  If a vessel is made in a way that it will not absorb the taste of the wine, then it need not be kashered. It can be rinsed out and used immediately.
  When it is first used, the cup will absorb more of the taste of the wine placed in it. That is why there is a tendency here to agree that if the first usage, or maybe even the second usage, was with forbidden wine, the it is prohibited. But if a Jew uses it the first time, or the first two times, then the cup will absorb the permitted wine. Upon further use it will no longer absorb and therefore it is permitted.
  White and black glazed vessels do not absorb the taste of the wine, but the green one’s might, so they are prohibited. And cracks will let the taste go into the vessel, so they are prohibited.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a discussion of which earthenware vessels may be kashered
  This whole section is an extended difficulty on Meremar, a late Babylonian sage. Meremar allowed all glazed vessels that had been used with non-Jewish wine. He seemed to think that such vessels do not absorb. But when it came to vessels that had been used with hametz before Pesah, he ruled much more strictly, prohibiting all of them. He saw that they “sweat,” meaning they emit liquid when heated, and therefore he assumed that they also absorb. And once an earthenware vessel has absorbed taste, there is no way to “kasher” it. 
  
  Daf 34a
  
  This is a rejected attempt to solve the contradiction. We might have thought that the rules are stricter when it comes to hametz, for hametz is prohibited by the Torah whereas idolatrous wine is prohibited only by rabbinic decree.The problem with this is that there is a principle that whenever the rabbis make a decree, it is supposed to be of the same level as Torah law. Thus if all glazed vessels used with hametz are prohibited on Pesah, so too are glazed vessels used with idolatrous wine. 
  The answer is that glazed wine vessels do not absorb taste because they are used only with cold wine. The hametz vessels referred to here are used with hot hametz (such as cooked cereal) and therefore they do absorb taste.
  IntroductionIn the fascinating story we read here, R. Akiva comes to a place and immediately is bombarded with questions, some halakhic and some aggadic. The story is here because one of these questions is about using wine bottles previously used by idolaters. 
  The first question deals with a voluntary fast that a person might accept upon himself (this seems to have been a common pietistic practice). If he began the day not thinking that he was fasting, and then decided to fast and had not yet eaten, does this count as a fast? The second question is the topic we have been discussing. The third question is whether Moses wore priestly clothing during the seven days in which the altar was being consecrated despite the fact that he is not a priest.
  These are the answers that R. Akiva received in the bet midrash. Evidently, after twelve months of not being used, the wine taste will no longer be in the bottles. Moses did not wear priestly clothing because, despite his prophetic role, he was not a priest.
  IntroductionThe mishnah ruled that grape pits and grape skins belonging to idolaters are prohibited. Our sugya discusses the issue.
  Once the grape pits and skins have dried up they are permitted. The “wine” in them has totally disappeared. But this process takes a full twelve months. That’s a long time to dry up.
  When they are moist, one may not even derive benefit from these grape skins or pit. But when they are dry, one may eat them. Not sure why one would want to, but you can, if you want.
  All of these items lose their taste of forbidden wine after twelve months and therefore may be used by Jews. 
  
  Daf 34b
  
  IntroductionThe rabbis in the Mishnah allowed one to derive benefit from “murias” made by non-Jews. This is a dish made of fish brine into which wine may have been placed. A Jew may not eat such a dish.
  Experts do not put wine into murias. Similarly, they do not mix forbidden fish into brine made of “hilik” which is a permitted fish. Thus one can even eat such murias or such brine.
  The murias of an expert is the murias produced from the first and second extracts of the fish. By the third time, there is not much fat left in the fish, and in order to make it taste good, he has to put in wine. That’s why it is prohibited.
  R. Aha puts guards around the murias that arrives by ship in Acco to prevent wine being put in there. He does not worry that wine has already been mixed into the murias before it arrives in Acco because in the region from which the wine comes, wine costs four times as much as murias, and therefore no one would mix wine in with it. And we are not worried that the murias might have come from Tyre, where wine is cheap, because shipping it from Tyre was not practical.
  IntroductionThe mishnah prohibits one from deriving benefit from Bithynian cheese. Our sugya discusses why.
  The fact that it is prohibited to derive benefit from Bithynian cheese is probably what leads R. Shimon ben Lakish to posit that most of the calves there are used as sacrifices. If the issue was simply non-kosher ingredients, then it should have been prohibited to eat the cheese but permitted to derive benefit from it.
  The problem with Resh Lakish’s statement is that even if only a minority of calves were slaughtered for sacrifice, the cheese would still be prohibited, for R. Meir does not follow the majority status. He is also concerned about the minority.The answer is that if only a minority of calves were slaughtered for idolatry, we would have “two minorities” here. The second “minority” is that the cheese may be made from animals besides calves. Thus only some of the cheese is made from calves, and only a minority of calves are slaughtered for idolatry. If this were true, R. Meir would not prohibit the cheese. Therefore, Resh Lakish had to conclude that a majority of the calves were slaughtered for idolatry.
  R. Shimon b. Elyakim points out to Resh Lakish that his statement here seems to contradict a different statement that he made. Elsewhere, R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish argue over whether an animal slaughtered with the intention of using its blood or fat for idolatry is prohibited. Resh Lakish says it is not. So how come here he says that it is.
  Resh Lakish here distinguishes between two situations. If one slaughters an animal in order to use its blood or fat for idolatry, the very act of slaughtering does not yet render the animal prohibited. Only inside the Temple would his intention to perform an ancillary act for idolatrous purposes effect the status of the animal. But if he slaughters the animal itself for idolatry, then the animal is prohibited. It was to this case that Resh Lakish referred when explaining the prohibition of Bithynian cheese.
  IntroductionToday’s section teaches that generally, non-flesh parts of animals (particularly dung and rennet) from which one may not derive benefit may be used. But if the animal has been used in idolatry, then they may not.
  Men did not betroth women with dung of any animals during the Talmudic period, any more than someone would do such a thing now. This is a great example of rabbis using the issue of the viability of betrothal to demonstrate something else. If the dung has value, then the man can perform betrothal with it. The dung of an ox that has been sentenced to be stoned (for murder) evidently has value, despite the fact that one may not derive benefit from the ox. In contrast, the dung of an animal used for idolatry does not have value. Therefore, this act of betrothal is invalid.
  The Talmud first attempts to explain this with logic. When it comes to the animals offered as idols, the owner would want them fatter—more food for the gods. Therefore, there dung is something he wanted and it has value. But when it comes to an ox sentenced to be stoned, the owner certainly does not care that they be fattened. Therefore, this dung is unwanted and has no value.
  The second proof is from verses. When it comes to idolatrous objects (things that are proscribed), the word used is “anything.” One may not benefit from anything that comes from idolatry. But when it comes to the ox, the word is “flesh.” One may not derive benefit from its flesh, but one may derive benefit from other parts of the ox.
  Rava says that he can prove both of these laws from the mishnah in which R. Joshua and R. Ishmael argue as to why cheese made by non-Jews is prohibited. R. Joshua argued that non-Jews curdle their cheese with rennet made from nevelah (an animal not properly slaughtered). To this R. Yishmael responded that the rennet of a burnt offering is permitted. This proves that non-flesh parts of animals from which one may not derive benefit (like the burnt offering) are permitted. Thus dung from an ox sentenced to be stoned is permitted and can be used for betrothal. 
  
  Daf 35a
  
  R. Ishmael clearly states that it is prohibited to derive benefit from rennet of calves offeredfor idolatry. This proves that the same is true for dung.
  The Talmud asks why R. Joshua did not respond that the reason the cheese is only prohibited in eating and not in benefit is that the rennet is no longer visible. This is like the murias (fish brine) into which wine was put. It is prohibited but only in consumption because the wine is not visible.The answer is an important distinction in halakhah—the rennet is an active agent, it is what makes the cheese curdle. Therefore, even though one cannot see it, it is not nullified.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with an exposition of the strange conversation between R. Yishmael and R. Joshua concerning cheese made by Gentiles at the end of the mishnah. We learned this mishnah on Daf 29, so go back and review it. 
  The verse from Song of Songs seems to be interpreted here in the context of written Torah versus Oral Torah. God says to Israel, your words, i.e. the oral Torah, are more precious than even the words of the written Torah. This was an important message/belief of the rabbis living during this period, for the authority of the oral Torah was an issue of great contention.
  According to this interpretation, R. Joshua hinted very subtly to R. Ishmael that he should not ask too many questions about the prohibition of Gentile cheese, for this cheese was a new prohibition of the rabbis. One does not cast doubt on new prohibitions, for this could lead to a people adopting a lackadaisical attitude towards them. One can sense here that there is a larger issue at stake in this mishnah than simply Gentile cheese. The issue is rabbinic authority and how much people respect it.
  According to R. Joshua ben Levi, the rabbis prohibited Gentile cheese because Gentiles do not make sure that snakes do not bite their cheese and thereby emit their poison. In other words, Gentile cheese may be poisonous! But we do not tell people that this is the reason for the prohibition because it’s a new prohibition and people may not treat it with all due severity. [One wonders if people would have believed this. If Gentile cheese was frequently enough poisonous, wouldn’t they stop eating it?] 
  R. Yirmiyah notes that R. Joshua ben Levi’s interpretation does not make sense. According to R. Hanina, snake poison renders it impossible for the cheese to harden or to dry out properly. Thus any cheese that was hardened or dried out properly would be permitted. But we know that all Gentile cheese is prohibited, and thus R. Joshua ben Levi’s interpretation does not make sense. 
  R. Hanina says that Gentile cheese is prohibited because it may have drops of non-kosher milk in it. Shmuel says it is prohibited because as a curdling agent they use dried skins from the stomach of nevelah animals. This dried skin will have rennet in it.
  The Talmud here quotes another sugya from Tractate Hullin. In this sugya Shmuel interprets a mishnah such that it states that any rennet (the stomach enzyme) taken from an animal that was not slaughtered properly is prohibited. So how could he here say that the problem is that the skin of the stomach is the problem.
  
  Daf 35b
  
  The Talmud solves this difficult by noting a chronological progression. The mishnah from Hullin was R. Joshua’s opinion before he changed his mind in his conversation with R. Ishmael. Originally R. Joshua thought that Gentile cheese was prohibited because they used rennet from nevelah animals. But then R. Joshua realized that rennet does not have the status of the animal from which it comes. Rennet from a sacrificial animal can be swallowed (if the priest has an iron stomach). At this stage, R. Joshua allowed cheese curdled with rennet but not cheese curdled with stomach lining (real flesh). Thus the mishnah in Hullin does not reflect R. Joshua’s final opinion, nevertheless, the mishnah did not change.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues trying to figure out why Gentile cheese is prohibited.
  These three amoraim give three more reasons why Gentile cheese is prohibited. Vinegar is prohibited because it comes from wine. Orlah is a tree in its first three years of growth, which is prohibited. It is interesting to note that everyone seems to know that it is prohibited but no one seems to know why.
  R. Joshua and R. Eliezer disagree as to whether one may use the sap from an orlah tree, R. Joshua permits and R. Eliezer prohibits. So at first, the Talmud thinks that R. Nahman b. Yitzchak follows R. Eliezer who prohibits all sap. But then the Talmud realizes that if this sap comes from the fruit of an orlah tree, even R. Joshua prohibits it. Thus R. Nahman b. Yitzchak can accord even with R. Joshua (phew!).
  It is forbidden for Jews to derive any benefit from Gentile wine or from orlah. In contrast, pig products are prohibited only in eating. If Gentile cheese was prohibited because of wine or orlah it should have been prohibited to derive benefit from it. But it is not. Thus these two reasons are refuted.
  IntroductionThis entire section contains derashot relating Song of Songs 1 to scholars of Torah.
  Torah scholars are like a flask of expensive perfume. They should teach their Torah to the outside world so that their good teachings (smell) can spread.
  This midrash (and those below) play on the word “alamot” which literally means “maidens” or “young women.” With one vowel change it turns into “the hidden things.” When a Torah scholar teaches others, the hidden meanings of the words become revealed. As a teacher, I can tell you that this is certainly true. When teaching, I understand the material far better than I do when just learning it without the intent of teaching other.
  By splitting the word “alamot” into two words and revocalizing it, we can read “over death,” an allusion to the Angel of Death. One who teaches Torah is loved even by the angel of death. While I assume that this is meant to be a good thing, I’m not really 100 per cent sure.
  Another vowel change yields “olamot”—worlds. The Torah scholar earns both worlds, for he/she impacts this world and receives merit in the world to come. I read these kind of statements as saying that a particular act is good for others and is also inherently good even if if does not impact other people. At least that’s my rationalist reading of cases where the tradition says that one receives reward in both worlds.
  IntroductionThis mishnah lists things that were made by non-Jews which Jews may not eat but fromwhich they may derive benefit.
  An earlier mishnah in this chapter began with a list of things owned by a non-Jew from which it was prohibited to derive benefit. This is a more stringent legal category than food which is merely prohibited to eat, the list which is contained in our mishnah. We will explain each item in this mishnah and why it is forbidden to eat. 1) Milk—if the non-Jew milked an animal without a Jew watching, he may have mixed into the milk, milk which comes from an non-kosher animal, such as a camel. 2) Bread and oil—this prohibition is not due to a fear of the bread or oil being truly non-kosher. Rather the Sages prohibited a Jew from eating non-Jewish bread or oil in order to prevent Jews from socializing with non-Jews. The Talmud relates that it is permitted to eat bread made by bakers (as opposed to private individuals) since that will not bring Jews and non-Jews together. The mishnah notes, in what is surely a later addition, that  Rabbi and his court permitted Jews to consume non-Jewish oil. The “Rabbi” referred to here is Rabbi Judah Nesia, the grandson of Rabbi Judah the Prince who composed the
  IntroductionThis passage asks what the problem could be with milk received from non-Jews. 
  If the milk was from an unclean animal (such as a camel or pig), it would have a different color from milk from sheep, goats or cows (clean animals). And if the milk was a mixture, such that it would look like kosher milk, then the milk could not be used to curdle cheese, because milk from unkosher animals cannot be used to curdle. So why should we be concerned about unkosher milk?
  The person here does not want to test all of the milk to see if it will curdle because he wants the milk for food, not for cheese (this was probably unusual in those days). And he can’t just test a little bit, because a little bit of milk would not curdle even if it was from a clean animal. And that milk might be from an unclean animal. 
  Even if he wants the milk for cheese, the test might be problematic because even if all of the clean milk does curdle, there might have been unclean milk in it and that milk would remain between the holes of the cheese.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the prohibition of bread made by Gentiles.
  The sugya begins with R. Yohanan noting that bread was not permitted by the “court,” which seems to be some sort of official court composed of the sages. The implication is that there were others who did permit bread made by Gentiles. And indeed, the Talmud shows that some people mistakenly thought that Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] permitted bread made by Gentiles.In reality, Rabbi only wanted to permit bread “in the field,” meaning in a non-social situation. Eating Gentile bread was prohibited because it leads to fraternization (breaking bread with someone is a sign of socializing), and in the field there is no such concern. But Rabbi did not mean to permit such bread under all circumstances.
  This is a different version of how people came to mistakenly believe that Rabbi allowed non-Jewish bread.
  Two amoraim note that even if Rabbi was looking for a Gentile baker, this does not mean that a Gentile baker could always be used. First of all, he would only allow a Gentile baker if no Jewish baker could be found. In other words, ideally one should eat Jewish bread. Only if there is no choice would one be allowed to eat Gentile bread.Two, this would only apply in non-social situations (in the field). In the city, this would always be prohibited, to prevent fraternization.
  We can see here in this story how contentious of an issue the bread of Gentiles was. Aibu was sort of hiding his eating of the bread, and still Rava severely criticized him. My impression is that this issue was delicate because the only possible reason for the prohibition is the fear of fraternization. Not eating Gentile bread was simply a means of keeping Jews away from non-Jews. It is not like wine, which is sometimes used in idolatrous ceremonies, nor is it like cheese, that might have non-kosher ingredients. It would be more like beer (yum!) which is also prohibited only because of fraternization. From the early medieval period, Ashkenazi Jews were not strict about this prohibition. In times when bread was usually made communally, and large communal ovens were needed, they did not have any choice but to eat Gentile bread. In modern times, as long as the bread is kosher, non-Haredi Jews generally eat bread baked by Gentiles, especially professionally baked bread.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins by discussing the prohibition of oil made by non-Jews. 
  According to Rav, Daniel (from the Bible) made a decree against using Gentile oil. While the Talmud does not explain here what Daniel’s reasoning was, we can assume that it was to prevent Jews from fraternizing with non-Jews. In other words, the prohibition of Gentile oil was a step to keep Jews from assimilating with non-Jews.Shmuel seems to fear that the oil actually has prohibited ingredients in it. While there is nothing wrong with the oil, if the oil was used in vessels that had been previously used with forbidden foods, then the oil is forbidden. 
  
  Daf 36a
  
  The Talmud recalls that R. Judah [assumed below to be R. Judah Hanasi, but probably referring to his grandson], the rabbis took a vote and allowed Jews to use Gentile oil. If the reason for the prohibition was that the vessels of non-Jews imparted forbidden flavor to the oil, then we can understand why it was overturned. Some rabbis thought that since this flavor does not improve the taste of the oil, the oil is permitted.
  If Rav is correct, that Daniel made a decree to prohibit oil, then how could another court overturn it. Later courts are almost never allowed to overturn decisions made by earlier courts.
  Rav discounts Shmuel’s statement because it is attributed to R. Simlai who is from Lod, and in Lod they are not respectful of rabbinic statements.Shmuel boldly offers to send for Simlai to check to see if his statement is accurate. Rav becomes embarrassed. He does not want to criticize Simlai to his face.
   Here we see the source of the notion that Jews should not eat certain foods made by non-Jews. Daniel refused to eat the king’s bread or drink his wine. The rabbis read from this that he did not drink their oil either. After all, oil is like wine and bread—it is a product refined from raw ingredients. The dispute between Rav and Shmuel is over whether this was a decree for all of Israel. Rav holds that it was, and therefore it can never be overturned. Shmuel holds that this was a private behavior, not obligatory for all of Israel, forever.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Rav said that Daniel prohibited Gentile oil. Today’s section asks whether it was Daniel or whether this was later.
  The Talmud cites a counter tradition. The food products made by Gentiles were prohibited not by Daniel, but during the period of Hillel and Shammai when they made “18 decrees.” The discussion of these decrees is found in the beginning of Tractate Shabbat.The Talmud rejects the notion that Daniel made the decrees, it was rejected, and then Hillel and Shammai remade it. If that was true, why would Rav have said that Daniel made the decree? After all, it was rejected.
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty by suggesting that the decree against oil spread. First it began with a decree against using these products in the city, where the problem of fraternization was greatest. Then a later group of rabbis, perhaps a bit more zealous than Danied, added that using these products is forbidden even outside of the city, even though there is probably little or no concern there for fraternization.
  As we learned above, R. Yehudah Hanasi (the grandson of the rabbi who edited the Mishnah) undid the decree on Gentile oil. But how could he do this? Surely, a later court cannot annul the decrees of the earlier court, and all the more so if the earlier decree was one of the 18 things that were decreed upon by Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai!
  This entire section proves the fascinating concept that since most Jews did not observe the oil prohibition, the observance can be nullified by a later court. Telling Jews they cannot use Gentile oil is a decree that people could not live with. Seeing that people were not observing the decree, Rabbi Yehduah Hanasi annulled it altogether.This is a powerful statement concerning one source of Jewish authority. Jewish authority stems not just from what rabbis tell people to do, or from what the books tell people to do, but also from what practices people accept upon themselves. Put another way, people are obligated to accept certain practices simply because other people are practicing in that way.
  
  Daf 36b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the tradition cited in yesterday’s sugya, that the prohibition of eating Gentile bread, oil and wine was one of the 18 things decreed by the disciples of Shammai and Hillel.
  This is the tradition we learned yesterday. 
  The rabbis prohibited having sexual relations with a non-Jew, declaring them to have the status of menstruants, with whom a man cannot have sex, from the time they are born. I should note that this text is addressed only to men. The prohibition of engaging in sex with a Gentile is directed at men—to them women are prohibited. I doubt the Talmud means to imply that Jewish women can have sex with non-Jewish men. It is just that the Talmud was a text composed by men, mostly for men.
  This statement treats all of these decrees as ultimately being attempts to prevent Jews from engaging in idolatry. We should emphasize that these prohibitions against assimilation are not racial. It does not seem to be some sort of “racial purity” issue that is being discussed here. Rather, it is an issue of religious belief and practice. Living with other people, eating with them, sleeping with them, marrying them and then raising families together will inevitably lead to cultural assimilation. In this case, it will lead to Jews worshiping idols. It is this the rabbis wanted to stop. Therefore, they were accepting of conversion. The end of the statement refers twice to “another matter.” The Talmud will clarify this more below.
  IntroductionThe previous sugya presented the prohibition of having relations with Gentiles as being a rabbinic decree. Our sugya asks if it’s actually from the Torah. I should emphasize that the rabbis seem to have taken it for granted that Jews were not supposed to marry or have sex with non-Jews. The question they are more interested in is where does this prohibition come from? Is it from the Torah, in which case it seems to be inherent in Judaism? Or was it decreed upon by the rabbis, in order to prevent a particular problem from occurring?
  The Torah prohibits intermarriage explicitly—but only with the seven nations that inhabited Canaan when Joshua conquered the land. The rabbis extended this prohibition to cover all non-Jews. 
  R. Shimon b. Yohai says that the Torah already prohibits a Jew from having relations with any non-Jewish women, for any such woman could end up turning the Jew away from God. So then what did Hillel and Shammai’s students do?
  The Torah prohibited marriage with a non-Jewish woman. Marriage leads to the highest level of cultural assimilation, and therefore it was prohibited. The rabbis added that even nonmarital sex is prohibited, also for fear of this leading to idol worship.
  In Genesis 38 Judah suspects that Tamar has had sex outside the framework of marriage. The simple reading of this chapter is that Judah is accusing her of quasi-adultery, but the rabbis read it as non-marital sex. The fact that he states that she is to be penalized for this, implies that sex with a non-Jew is prohibited (he assumes that she had sex with a non-Jew because there were not really that many Israelites around then). So how can we say that the students of Shammai and Hillel initiated this prohibition?
  Perhaps the Torah prohibited a Jewish woman from having sex with a non-Jewish man, for in a patriarchal society she would be drawn into his family. But Jewish men could have sex with non-Jewish women, for these women would be assimilated into Jewish society. Indeed, most Israelite men in the Bible do indeed marry foreign women. Then the later sages prohibited even Jewish men from having sex with non-Jewish women, because after all, this too can frequently lead to assimilation.
  The final resolution is that there is an ancient law from Sinai that prohibits an Israelite man from having sex with a non-Jewish woman. We can see this from the story about Zimri in Numbers 25:6-8. But that was only in public, an act of open rebellion. In private this was not prohibited, until the rabbis came along and prohibited it there as well.
  IntroductionAccording to the end of yesterday’s sugya, the Torah prohibited intercourse with a Gentile in public and the court of Shammai and Hillel prohibited it even in private. Our sugya begins by criticizing that chronology.
  The two rabbis here attribute the prohibition of sex with a non-Jewish woman to the Hasmoneans, who lived about 150 years before Shammai and Hillel. These rabbis use some strong rhetoric with regard to this prohibition, making it akin to several grave sins. The difference between the two is only with regard to the last one. R. Dimi says it is as if she is married. Ravin says it is as if she is a “zonah” which technically is a woman prohibited to a priest.
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that originally only intercourse was prohibited. Shammai and Hillel prohibited being alone with a non-Jewish woman, for they feared that this would lead to intercourse. Note that there are extensive rules preventing for the most part Jewish men and women from being alone in the same room.
  But another tradition says that in the time of David they already decreed against seclusion. This occurred in the wake of the David and Bathsheba affair.The Talmud answers that the prohibition of seclusion with a Jewish woman is indeed from David’s time. However, it was not yet prohibited for a Jewish man to be secluded with a non-Jewish woman. This was prohibited by Shammai and Hillel’s students.
  R. Yohanan finds a hint in the Torah itself that seclusion with a prohibited women is forbidden. So how can we say that the Court at the time of David prohibited this? It was already prohibited.
  This concludes our history of decrees against sex and seclusion. Might make a good title for a book—The History of Sex and Seclusion, by Joshua Kulp. 
  IntroductionEarlier on this page we read that they “decreed against their daughters on account of another matter, and against this other matter on account of still another matter.” What are these “other matters” that we could not even name?Trigger warning—the passage talks about male-male sex, in a way that makes it clear that the rabbis did not approve. It also talks about sex with very young girls, and while I do not believe that the rabbis approved of this, the text does not condemn it.
  The rabbis feared not only intercourse between Jewish men and non-Jewish women, but also between Jewish men and non-Jewish men. They therefore decreed that non-Jewish male children convey ritual impurity. They seem to have thought that this was a way to keep the boys from playing together.
  There was some debate among the rabbis whether a non-Jewish child gets this status immediately upon birth, or whether it happens later, when he is 9 years old, the age at which the rabbis believe a boy is physically capable of having sex (i.e. maintaining an erection). The decision was the latter.
  
  Daf 37a
  
  Ravina analogizes from the boy to the girl. According to the rabbis, a girl is capable of sex at the age of three [again, this does not mean they advocated such a thing. Just that it is physically possible. I know that this is not a pleasant thing to hear. But it is what the text is referring to]. The girl defiles as if she had genital discharge at the age at which she could potentially have sex.The Talmud perceives this to be obvious. Of course, the rules are the same. After all, if she can have sex, then she could be defiled by the male seminal discharge, and this is possible at the age of three.They answer with what seems a bit of a strange answer. A boy at the age of 9 is not only physically capable of having sex, he can convince a girl to have sex with him (not the boys I know). Whereas a girl at the age of three does not even know what sex is. She could not and would not persuade others to have sex. She might be able to have sex, but she certainly cannot initiate it. Therefore I might not have taught this analogy, and thus Ravina needed to assert it.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the court that permitted Jews to use non-Jewish oil. 
  This story offers us an excellent window into people’s heads. Simlai, who is not a rabbi, is thrilled that R. Judah Nesi’a allowed Jews to consume non-Jewish oil. He wants permission to eat non-Jewish bread as well. But Rabbi Judah Nesi’a, the rabbi whose court allowed their oil, fears that if he is too lenient he will tarnish his reputation. No one wants to be called a “permitting court.”
  This is a mishnah from Avodah Zarah. It proves that when rabbis permit too many things they get the reputation of being “permitters.” Not something they wanted. The Talmud will explain the particular issues below.
  Evidently, permitting is like baseball. Three strikes and you are out!
  Rabbi Judah Nesi’a also made a permissive ruling in the field of divorce law. According to the mishnah, if a husband stipulates that the divorce will be valid if he does not come back in twelve months, and then he dies, the divorce seems never had time to become valid. She will be a widow and potentially subject to levirate marriage (marriage with his brother if her husband did not have children). But R. Judah Nesi’a ruled that the divorce was valid because of the date written on it. This date proves that the husband wanted it to become retroactively valid when he failed to come back. Thus when he fails to come back it is valid from the time it is written.The other rabbis did not agree with Rabbi Judah Nesi’a. And since he had used up two of his leniencies, he did not want to risk a third.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if a man writes a get and tells his wife that it is valid if he does not come back in twelve months, and then dies during that period, R. Judah Nesi’a allowed her to remarry. He held that the date written in the get proves that the husband meant it to become valid retroactively on that day. The other rabbis held that the man meant his get to take effect only after twelve months. And since he died before the twelve months were up, her status is that of a widow and not a divorcee.
  According to R. Judah Nesi’a, who considers this get to be valid, is the woman allowed to remarry within the twelve month period?
  The same question about whether the divorce takes effect immediately could also be asked about the continuation of the mishnah. In this case, all sages agree that she the bill of divorce is valid because the husband explicitly stated, “from now onward.” They only disagreed about a case where he might have been understood as saying that the divorce would be valid only when he did not return.
  R. Elazar responds to the old man saying that he had the same question about the mishnah as he did about R. Judah Nesia’s decision to allow the woman in the other case to remarry. He asked this particular man because he evidently was one of the sages who voted with R. Judah Nesi’a. Abaye’s words below will answer this question.
  Abaye here tries to reduce the dispute between the sages and R. Judah Nesi’a. He first brings up two points where they all agree. The man here is understood as saying that his divorce would be valid when the sun rises. Since he said “when” he clearly meant that it would not take place that night. Therefore if he dies at night, she is not divorced.
  If he says “on condition that the sun rise,” he meant to say that the divorce would go into effect immediately. Thus the divorce took effect while he was alive and even if he dies at night, she is divorced.
  The rabbis and R. Judah Nesi’a disagree if the husband says, “If the sun comes out.” R. Judah Nesia’ says that in this case the date proves that his intent is for the divorce to go into effect  retroactively once the sun comes out. It is like saying, “From today if I die.” So even if he dies at night, she is divorced. The other rabbis hold that that this is like saying “when the sun comes out.” So if he dies at night, the divorce never went into effect.People may be wondering what all this hullabaloo is about—after all, she is either a widow or a divorcee. The issue is levirate marriage. If she is a widow, she might have to marry her dead husband’s brother. If she does not want to, she could be left without the ability to remarry.
  IntroductionAbove, the Talmud quoted a mishnah from Eduyot 8:4. Although this mishnah has nothing to do with Avodah Zarah, the Talmud will explain it now. It is interesting to note that there is no Talmud on Tractate Eduyot, neither Bavli or Yerushalmi. But clearly Talmudic rabbis learned this Tractate. Some tractates simply did not get commented on in the Talmud.Today’s sugya discusses which type of locust is kosher and the liquids on the floor of the slaughter-house in the Temple.
  This is the quote of the mishnah. It will now be explained.
  In this section two amoraim argue over what type of locust the tannaim in the Mishnah were arguing about—a shoshiba or a susbil. must admit, I’m not an expert on which locusts are edible. Ashkenazim stopped eating them many, many centuries ago. Ostensibly this was because they did not know which were kosher and which were not, but in reality we know why they stopped eating them. No one in Europe ate them. But people in the Middle East did eat them, and Yemenites still eat them. Some of my Ashkenazi friends have tried them. Evidently if you fry them and salt them they taste like meaty potato chips. Sounds good.
  
  Daf 37b
  
  According to Rav, the blood that was on the floor of the Temple is pure, but according to Shmuel, it does have a small degree of impurity.
  Rav thinks that the notion that liquids could become impure by contact with an impure thing is only a rabbinic decree. The rabbis made this decree outside of the Temple, but not inside it. Thus these liquids are not susceptible to impurity.
  Shmuel holds that this liquid is susceptible to impurity, but that even if impure, it does not convey impurity to anything else. This is unlike liquids in general which are highly conducive of impurity. Liquid impurity is from the Torah, but it is only the rabbis that hold that it can convey impurity to other things.
  IntroductionThis section discusses the end of the Mishnah from Eduyot which was cited above.
  There are two problems with the last section of the Mishnah. First of all, in this case R. Yose b. Yoezer is stringent. Why then is this put in with the reasons that they call him “Yosef the permitter.”Second, what he seems to be stringent about is actually in the Torah itself. This is not a rabbinic decree or law of any sorts. It is from the Torah.
  This is the first attempt to resolve the difficulty. According to the Torah only one who comes into contact with a dead body is defiled. One who comes into contact with such a person is not defiled. The rabbis added that he too is defiled, but then Yose b. Yoezer came and restored the law to the more lenient, biblical law. That is why they called him a “permitter.”
  The problem with the above resolution is that the law that a person who is defiled by contact with the dead defiles another person is also from the Torah. So how can we say the rabbis decreed this? And how could Yose b. Yoezer cancel a biblical law?
  According to this suggested reconstruction, the person who touches a corpse transmits sevenday impurity only while he is still in contact with the corpse. The rabbis added that even when he is not in contact with the corpse he still defiles the other person for seven days. Rabbi Yose b. Yoezer restored the law to its biblical form.
  The rabbis use a discrepancy in the verses to prove that there is a difference between a case where the person is still in contact with the dead body (he transmits seven-day impurity) and a case where he is no longer in contact with the dead body (he transmit one-day impurity). The verse that says he shall be impure, which means seven days, refers to a person who touches another person who is still in contact with the dead body. And the verse that says that he is only impure until evening refers to one who is no longer in contact with a dead body.
  IntroductionThis section continues to try to figure out what it is that Yose b. Yoezer permitted and why the other rabbis called him “Yose the permitter.”
  Rava completely dismisses the statement attributed to R. Nahman at the end of yesterday’s section. He has another interpretation altogether of what R. Yose b. Yoezer said that made him seem overly lenient—he stated that cases of doubtful impurity in the public domain should be ruled leniently.
  The Talmud points out that the rule for when we rule strictly in cases of impurity in the public domain is learned from the sotah, the woman suspected of adultery. We take these suspicions seriously only when she may have been defiled (had adultery) in the private domain. So too when it comes to doubtful cases of defilement, they are ruled impure only the potential contact occurred in the private domain. Thus we have here the same problem we had before. Yose b. Yoezer’s ruling is the same as the law agreed to by everyone. How then is he a “permitter?”
  R. Yohanan says that indeed the halakhah is that doubtful cases of impurity are considered pure if they occur in the public domain. But no one told other people this until R. Yose b. Yoezer came along and taught it in public.
  This baraita demonstrates that Yose b. Yo’ezer took efforts to define the public and private domains. The assumption is that this was in order to delineate when doubtful cases of impurity are treated as impure—in the public domain they are not, and in the private domain they are.
  According to Rashi people used to come in front of R. Yannai and ask him about cases of doubtful impurity in the public domain. He would tell them to go immerse in the deep waters of the river, as if to say, “what’s so hard about that?”
  IntroductionThe mishnah prohibited Jews from eating food cooked by non-Jews. As I have said before, this seems to have been part of a program to prevent assimilation. Cooked food is “civilized” and therefore sharing it is sharing “civilization.” Uncooked food is different and therefore there is no problem for a Jew to eat uncooked food given to her by a non-Jew. As we shall see, the rabbis were relatively lenient with this rule, seeming to observe it in a very technical sense. My assumption is that they were lenient because they did not really worry that eating cooked food together would be sufficient to lead to assimilation.
  During their wandering in the wilderness Moses approaches Sihon, King of Heshbon, and asks him for food and water. The rabbis compare the food and the water—just as the water the Israelites will drink has not been modified at all, so too the food that they buy from them must not be modified at all.
  If any food that non-Jews change from its original form is prohibited, then if they roast ears of wheat they should be prohibited. But they are not.
  The Talmud now refines the comparison with water. Water retains its natural form and so does wheat that has just been roasted. It still looks like wheat. The cooked food would become prohibited only if it has really been modified.
  The problem is that even flour ground by non-Jews is permitted. 
  The final conclusion is that the food must have been changed by fire for it to be prohibited. The role of fire in creating civilization is something that both evolutionary biologists and anthropologists have noted. It is likely that one of the major shifts in primate evolution occurred when human beings (homo something or other) learned to cook their meat. This allowed them to digest far more calories, which allowed their brains to grow and for them to evolve in very different directions from other primates. No other animal has the ability to manipulate fire and most animals fear fire (think of Shere Khan from Jungle Book). Thus manipulation of fire is quintessentially human. Once food has been cooked by fire it is out of the animal realm and in the civilized realm.
  We have now gone too far afield from the verse. The verse does not even hint that the food cannot be cooked. Thus the Talmud admits that the prohibition of cooked food is only rabbinic in origin.
  
  Daf 38a
  
  Introduction Today’s section deals with several amoraic statements that limit what types of foods cooked by non-Jews are prohibited to Jews. 
  If the food can be eaten while it is raw, then cooking does not make it edible for it was edible before. Thus even if it is cooked by a non-Jew, a Jew can still eat it. An example would be, for instance, a tomato. 
  This is the second version of the above statement. If the food is not “fancy” enough to be put on the table of a king to be eaten with bread then the prohibition does not apply. 
  These foods can all be eaten raw, and therefore according to the first version, the prohibition of food cooked by non-Jews does not apply. But kings do eat these foods, so according to the second version these laws do apply. Thus the two versions would disagree about these foods and others like them. 
  Since small salted fish can be eaten raw, the laws of foods cooked by Gentiles do not apply. 
  R. Joseph states two laws about these little fish. First of all, if the non-Jew cooked them, the Jew may use them for eruv tavshilin. This is the meal that one begins to cook on erev Yom Tov, as if he is making it for Shabbat, that allows him to continue to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbat.The second law is that if the non-Jew makes these fish into a fish-hash pie, the pie is prohibited because of the crust which was baked by the non-Jew.
  According to Rav, if a non-Jew sets fire to the ground and the fire roasts some locusts the locusts may not be eaten. 
  The problem with Rav’s statement is that we can assume the non-Jew burned the ground of the uncleared field not in order to roast the locusts but in order to clear the ground. In cases like this, where the intention was not to cook but to clear some unwanted thing away, the cooked food should not be prohibited. 
  The Talmud resolves that Rav prohibited because once roasted one could not tell whether the locusts were clean or not. The fact that it happened to be a non-Jew that burned the field is not material. [We should note that this is a difficult resolution. Clearly when Rav issued his statement it was material].
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins by going back to a statement made by R. Yohanan in yesterday’s sugya.
  The assumption here is that the person singed the head of the animal to remove the hair and not to cook it. Therefore, as long as the animal is kosher, the Jew can eat it even though the non-Jew performed a cooking activity with it.
  The pumpkin, put into the oven by the Jew, was cooked by the non-Jew who threw a peg into the fire and then lit the stove. Therefore the pumpkin should be prohibited. But Ravina teaches us that his intention was not to cook the peg but to harden it, therefore the pumpkin is permitted. Again, we take the person’s intention into account.
  Shmuel rules that if the non-Jew facilitates the speeding up of the cooking process, the food is not considered as having been cooked by a non-Jew.
  The Talmud notes that the statement by Shmuel seems to contradict a ruling by R. Yohanan. R. Yohanan said that if the food had already been cooked a minimal amount (sufficient for the bandit Ben Drosai to eat it—we will discuss this more later) then the prohibition of being cooked by a non-Jew does not apply. But if the food was not yet cooked, then if the non-Jew does turn it over on the coals then the food is prohibited. This contradicts what Shmuel said before.The resolution is that R. Yohanan was referring to a case where the non-Jew essentially began the cooking process by putting the pot in the oven. The Jew only put the food into the pot. But if the cooking process had already begun, then the prohibition of non-Jewish cooking does not apply. This seems to be a considerable leniency.
  This baraita teaches that if the cooking process was begun by the Jew, the non-Jew would be allowed to continue the cooking. The food is prohibited only if the non-Jew begins the cooking process.Again we can see how lenient the rabbis were with regard to this prohibition. My impression is that amoraic rabbis inherited a series of prohibitions that were created during a period in which there was a real fear of assimilation. Many of these prohibitions seem likely to have been created as early as the Second Temple period, when Hellenism was at its height. By amoraic times Jewish identity had more fully coalesced and those Jews who remained within the fold were not threatened by eating food cooked by non-Jews. Thus they could be lenient with regard to these rules.
  
  Daf 38b
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss when a non-Jew is considered to have cooked the food such that it would become prohibited.
  For the food to be prohibited the non-Jew must do all of the cooking from the beginning to the end. If the Jew participates at all in the process, the food is permitted. Again, another leniency.
  Even if all the Jew does is stoke the coals, the bread is permitted. 
  R. Yohanan considers salting to be akin to cooking. Bar Kapara allows a Jew to eat an egg roasted by a non-Jew because the food part of the egg is all internal.
  Here we can see that there was some controversy around this issue. R. Zevid tried to put his foot down and not allow the Jews in the House of the Exilarch (the political leader in Babylonia) to eat eggs roasted by non-Jews. But the story ends with R. Zevid’s death. It is probably significant that this story occurs in this particular location. The Exilarch was the political leader of the community and as such would have had the most contact with non-Jews. Perhaps that is why R. Zevid tried to stop such a relaxation with the law. And perhaps that is why the story ends with his death.
  IntroductionThis section deals with a few other foods to which the prohibition of food cooked by Gentiles does not apply.
  The foods in the first half of this baraita are not changed sufficiently when they are cooked for them to be prohibited if cooked by a non-Jew.As we learned above, oil was initially forbidden but was permitted by a later court.
  This section explains how one makes “shiata” a dish that comes from Egypt. The amazing thing with “shiata” seems to be that it grows very quickly.
  According to the first statement, the story of the fast-growing shiata is just a tale. Nothing can really grow that fast.According to the second, such incredible growth can be achieved. Through magic!
  These date-husks were probably being cooked in order to make beer. The issue with the large cauldron is that we can assume that it had been used to cook unkosher food. The taste of the forbidden food that is in the walls of the cauldron will go into the brew. Therefore the date husks are prohibited. But the assumption with a small cauldron is that it is not used with unkosher food. Therefore, the date-husk beer is permitted.
  Another baraita teaches that even if the date-husks are cooked in a large cauldron, the mixture is permitted. This is because the taste that the cauldron imparts to the brew is considered to be a worsening taste, one that does not improve the flavor of the brew. This baraita holds that in such a case the mixture is permitted. [Note that the reason that the flavor is considered to be worsening is that the cauldron has not been used for 24 hours. After 24 hours any taste imparted is legally considered to be bad taste]. The other baraita holds that even though the taste is bad, the mixture is still prohibited.
  R. Sheshet wants to prohibit oil cooked by a non-Jew, but R. Safra will have none of it. He rejects three potential reasons for why it should be prohibited. If there had been gentile wine in it, the wine would have ruined the oil.If the concern is that it was cooked by a non-Jew, oil can be eaten without being cooked and therefore should be permitted.And if the issue is that the vessels were previously used by a non-Jew, the taste would be a worsening taste, and therefore this too is not a reason to prohibit. 
  Sweet dates can be eaten raw. Therefore they are permitted even when cooked by a non-Jew. Bitter dates cannot be eaten raw and therefore they are certainly prohibited. The question was asked about dates that are moderately bitter and then improve in taste when cooked. The answer is that they are prohibited.
  Shetita is some sort of porridge that can be made with various liquids and grains/beans. If it is made with wheat or barley there is no concern that vinegar may have been added, which would be a problem because non-Jewish wine/vinegar is prohibited. If it was made with lentils and vinegar then obviously it is prohibited. The amoraim dispute when it has been made with lentils and water. Shmuel’s father and Levi are concerned lest by permitting this type of shetita people come to eat shetita with non-Jewish vinegar in it. Rav has no such concern.
  This is stricter version of the material that appeared above. 
  Barzilai sent parched grain and parched beans to David. Rav identifies this as the two kinds of shetita.The sugya about shetita concludes by noting that the people of Nehardea do not worry about shetita made by Gentiles. They completely ignore the statement of Shmuel’s father and Levi. Hard to resist that yummy shetita!
  This section deals with the next line in the mishnah, which forbade eating but allowed deriving benefit from pickled foods into which non-Jewish wine might have been placed. Hezekiah limits the leniency to a case where wine might have been put in. But if wine was certainly put in, then it is prohibited to derive benefit from the food. Murias is fish brine into which wine was placed. As we learned earlier, it is prohibited to eat murias but not to derive benefit from it, even though we know that there is wine in it. Hezekiah explains that murias is different because wine was put into it only to get rid of the bad smell. Therefore the prohibition is lesser because this wine is not really “food.” But when it comes to the pickled food, the wine was put in to sweeten the taste, therefore if we know there is wine in it, one may not even derive benefit from it.
  R. Yohanan says that even if we know that wine was put in the pickled foods, it is permitted to derive benefit from them. But R. Meir prohibited one from deriving benefit from murias. So how would he distinguish between the two?The murias mixture has the presence of the wine—therefore it is of a higher degree of prohibition. But the wine in the pickled food is there in taste but not substance. Therefore it is only prohibited to eat this food; it is not prohibited to derive benefit from it.
  
  Daf 39a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with fish—which are kosher and which are not. Fish seem to have been particularly difficult in terms of deciding which was kosher and which was not. Sometimes the scales are not so easy to see. I think we can also assume that fish was a very important part of the ancient diet. For those who live near water, fish are easier to catch than wild game. And fish (at least back then) did not have to be fed. They were thus probably one of the easiest and cheapest sources of protein. To be overly restrictive could have negative results.
  The mishnah listed certain fish that may not be eaten. The Talmud explains what the hilak fish is. Since the size of the hilak is the same as other small, non-kosher fish, the hilak may not be eaten, lest other non-kosher fish are eaten with it.
  As long as the fish will have fins and scales or once had fins and scales it is kosher. It does not have to have them when it is eaten.
  R. Abahu assumes that fish-entrails and eggs bought in Caesarea are kosher because they come from places where only kosher fish are caught. This is similar to Abaye who assumes that the small tzahanta fish from a certain river are also kosher. 
  The Talmud tries to understand why Abaye is so sure that unclean small fish do not live in the river Bab-Nahara. The answer is that the conditions simply are not conducive for their growth. The rapid water and its saltiness are not a problem, but the mud is. Ravina revokes Abaye’s leniency—since two other rivers now join the Bab-Nahara, we cannot assume that the fish is kosher.
  Here rabbis list fish and provide some mnemonics to remember which one is kosher and which one is not.
  In all of these cases the rabbis found a way of determining that the fish do indeed have scales and are thus permitted.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hannah gets lucky and hears someone call the permitted “zahanta” fish “batei.” Since “batei” is the name of a non-kosher fish, the rabbi did not eat it.
  Hiltit has a sharp taste, and so when it is cut with a knife which has been used to cut nonkosher substances, the taste of the non-kosher substances will go into the hiltit. And although such residue taste is generally considered as “imparting a worsening flavor” and permitted, in this case since the hiltit is sharp the flavor will turn out good. The implications from here are that when one cuts most foods with a non-kosher knife, the food is permitted. But not if the food has a sharp taste.
  A “haver” is a term used in rabbinic literature for one who is scrupulous about observing various halakhot, mostly tithes and purity, but here it seems to be general laws of kashrut. Since R. Levi was a haver, people can trust his slave (or servant) to not cut hiltit with unkosher knives.
  The blue wool is used to make tzitzit. The problem is that a specific type of dye must be used and it is easy to fake this dye. Someone who buys dyed wool needs to trust the seller that the dye used is the correct one. Ultimately, R. Huna learns that he can trust the wife of a haver.
  This baraita supports what was said above. The presumption that a haver behaves scrupulously extends to his wife and slaves (or servants). It also continues after his death until people begin to have specific suspicions about him.
  An am ha’aretz is a person who is by definition not a haver, meaning the person is not assumed to act with a high level of scrupulousness in certain matters such as tithing and purity.To be trusted as a haver, meaning to move from being an am ha’aretz to being a haver, one has to formally accept upon himself or herself to act in accordance with these ways. Indeed, the laws of conversion were probably patterned after these laws. So if a woman who grew up as an am ha’aretz married a haver (pretty remarkable in and of itself) she must accept upon herself these responsibilities. So too with a slave joining a haver’s household. The trust her husband has does not accrue to her immediately.But if a woman marries out—meaning she marries an am ha’aretz, R. Meir says that she maintains her reliability as haver. R. Judah says she does not. Since she grew up as a haver, she never had to accept this responsibility on herself. But now she does. R. Shimon b. Elazar cleverly illustrates how a woman can move from being married to a haver, considered an honorable, trustworthy person, can lose her level of piety by being married to a tax collector, a position considered somewhat disgraceful in rabbinic society, associated with robbery and violence.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the issue of ensuring that goods passing through gentile hands have not been tampered with such that what was assumed to be kosher is not. The question is whether one seal is sufficient, or whether two seals are needed to ensure that the non-Jew did not open the container and either use or switch the material inside.
  The fear with milk, meat and cheese seems to be that kosher ones were switched with non-kosher ones. The fear with blue wool is that the non-Jew switched the wool with wool dyed with dye not kosher for tzitzit.The hiltit may have been cut with an unkosher knife. The murias (fish hash) may have been switched with murias that has non-kosher fish in it. The wine may have been touched by the non-Jew, which would render it undrinkable. The issue with the bread is that it may have been switched with bread made by non-Jews, which is forbidden.Rav requires two seals for some of these things, but only one seal for the others
  
  Daf 39b
  
  With bread, if there is motivation for the non-Jew to switch a good loaf for a bad one, the Jew receiving it would know what had been done (the assumption is that the Jew knows what the other Jew sent him). And if they are the same, then why would the non-Jew go through the trouble of faking a seal. Thus one seal is clearly enough.
  Rav says that cheese only needs one seal but milk requires two seals. Why the difference? R. Kahana affirms that there really should be no difference between the two and therefore allows milk with only one seal. He does not allow pieces of fish with one seal less the non-Jew switch the kosher fish with non-kosher one. Two seals will make this impossible.
  Shmuel does not include milk or bread on his list. He seems to just not be worried at all that non-Jews would switch the bread, as we said above. And he removes milk, as did R. Kahana. But he does not need to add “a piece of fish” because the fish is the same as the meat.
  The baraita here refers to buying food from Jews in Syria, the area which lies to the north of Israel. This is an area that rabbis usually consider “semi-observant.” According to the baraita,  merchants there are not so careful not to sell to Jews products that were meant for non-Jews. All of these items may be forbidden to Jews. However, he may buy them from a reliable person. He may also eat with Jews there because the Jews there do not themselves eat these foods. Furthermore if a Jew sends him some food as a gift he will send from the food he himself is eating. We can assume that this food is kosher.
  The rabbis likely are making a pun here on a Greek word, connecting it with salt eaten at Roman parties. We should note that the meaning of both the original word and the word for “Roman guests” is not entirely clear.
  This baraita discusses the various reasons for why this type of salt was prohibited—the question is whether forbidden fish was mixed in with it. The other reason may be that it was smeared with pig fat.
  The mishnah says that these foods are prohibited from eating but one may derive benefit from them. The rabbis often read these types of statements as excluding something—as if to say “these items belong on this list, but others do not.” The question is—what is being excluded from the list. Earlier on daf 38b, Hezekiah held that if we know there was wine used to preserve certain foods then the food is prohibited in benefit and not just for consumption. Thus the words “behold these are prohibited” exclude such foods. But R. Yohanan said that if the wine was only used as a preservative, a Jew may derive benefit from the food. To him the words exclude murias and Bithynian cheese, both of which R. Meir prohibits in benefit.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new mishnah which lists food produced by non-Jews which a Jew is allowed to eat.
  As we explained in the previous mishnah, the concern with milk is that the non-Jew might mix milk which comes from a kosher animal with milk that comes from a non-kosher animal (such as a camel). If the Jew is watching over the non-Jew we have no such concern and the milk is therefore permitted. Mixing foreign substances with honey would spoil the honey. Therefore we can assume that the non-Jew did not put anything into the honey and it is permitted. Even though some grape juice may be dripping from the cluster of grapes, we are not concerned that the non-Jew used this juice in idol worship and it would be forbidden. The mishnah also notes that the liquid that comes out of grapes is not the type of liquid which makes a food susceptible to impurities.  As we have learned before (Eduyoth 4:6) food cannot become impure until it is made wet by seven types of liquids.  Grape juice is not one of them. Preserved foods into which it is not customary to put wine or vinegar are permitted. If one can see that the fish in the brine is actually herring, it is permitted, unlike the minced fish which was discussed above. In the previous mishnah we learned that it was forbidden to eat pieces of the asa foetida, since the same knife used to cut this plant might have been used to cut non-kosher food. In this mishnah we learn that since they don’t cut the leaves of the as foetida with this type of knife, it is permitted. Olives that have been rolled out into cakes are permitted, since no wine is used in them. According to Rabbi Yose, if the olives have become so soft that the pits fall out, wine might have been put on them to soften them.  Therefore, they are forbidden. Some types of locusts are kosher. When a seller sells them, he brings them from his storehouse and puts them in a small basket, onto which he mixes a little wine.  Due to the addition of this wine, locusts that come from this basket are forbidden.  The locusts that come from the storehouse are permitted since the wine has not yet been put upon them.The mishnah points out that the same is true with regards to terumah.  If a kohen sells locusts from the little basket, we must suspect that he has dripped wine on them, and that the wine might be terumah, which is strictly forbidden to non-priests.  If, however, the locusts come from storage, we can be sure that there is no terumah-wine mixed in with them.
  This baraita teaches something very similar to our mishnah.
  The Talmud tries to figure out what exactly the scenario is in the baraita. If there are no forbidden animals in the flock, then obviously one can drink the milk. And if there are forbidden animals, then why is the milk kosher—how do we know where the milk comes from?The answer is that there are indeed forbidden animals in the flock, but the Jew can see the non-Jew at least when he is standing. Although he cannot see him while sitting, the fact that he can see him some time, will cause the non-Jew, who knows that the Jew will not drink from milk from forbidden animals, will not take the milk from there.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to explain the mishnah which listed foods that Jews can eat even when acquired from non-Jews.
  Honey bought from a non-Jew is permitted. The Talmud lists three problems that we might have been concerned about, but are, in the end, not. The first is that there is something really not kosher in it (like pig fat). But this would be bad for the honey and cause it to go rancid. The second is that it was cooked by a non-Jew. But this prohibition does not apply to honey since honey can be eaten raw. Third is the possibility that the non-Jew cooked it in his own vessels, which had been used with forbidden food. But this is not prohibited because the taste from the non-Jew’s vessel is considered “a worsening flavor” and in such cases the substance is permitted. Thus there is no reason to be concerned about honey bought from a non-Jew.
  For a food to be susceptible to impurity it must come into contact with liquid. The liquid that comes out of grape-clusters does not render it susceptible to impurity. But this is contrasted with a mishnah in which Shammai and Hillel (!) argue over whether grapes that are harvested to be brought to the wine-press are susceptible to impurity through the liquid that oozes out of them. While originally Hillel said that they were not susceptible, he eventually agreed with Shammai that they are.
  The Talmud solves the difficulty by distinguishing between grapes harvested for food and grapes harvested for wine. If they are harvested for wine, then the person wants the liquid to come out of them. This makes the grapes susceptible to impurity.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to explain the foods that a Jew can eat if bought from a non-Jew. We should note that when it comes to fish there are many difficulties. Kosher and non-kosher fish would probably have been pickled or minced, making it hard to determine which are kosher and which are not.
  The mishnah allows a Jew to buy a tarit fish which has not been minced from a non-Jew and eat it. The Talmud explains that the fish’s head and backbone must be recognizable. This is how we can be sure that a non-kosher fish did not get in there. The mishnah allowed “brine containing fish” as long as that fish was a specific fish, called the kalbit fish. This fish is a sign that the brine is kosher. In open barrels two of these fishes are necessary, but in closed barrels, one is sufficient. 
  
  Daf 40a
  
  R. Huna and R. Nahman argue over whether both the head and backbone need to be recognizable or whether one is sufficient. But R. Ukba argues that the kashrut of fish is determined by their having fins and scales, not by their heads or backbones.  Abaye answers that while, of course, kosher fish need to have fins and scales, the fish can usually be told apart by their heads. If their heads are the same as unclean fish, then one will need to examine the fins and scales. But if we know the head belongs to a kosher fish, then the fish can be eaten. 
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s sugya we learned that for the tarit fish to be edible when bought from a non-Jew, its head and backbone must be recognizable. Today’s sugya continues discussing this subject.
  The rules regarding the brine are more lenient than the rules regarding eating the fish itself. To eat the fish itself, one needs to be able to see the head and backbone.
  R. Zera seems to hold like R. Huna, according to whom the head and backbone must be recognizable. But he used to think that the disagreement was over eating the fish itself. R. Huna would have agreed that when it comes to dipping in the brine, only one sign of its kashrut is needed. But then when he heard that they disagree over dipping in the brine, and that R. Huna said that even then both signs are needed, he stopped dipping in the brine.
  R. Papa had said that the head and spine of each and every fish must be recognizable. But the baraita seems to imply that even if only one in an entire barrel is recognizable, they are all kosher.
  R. Papa said that the case of the barrel of fish which Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel permitted was only when the pieces fit together such that we could see that they all came from one fish. But this is a bit too obvious to even need to be stated. The Talmud solves this minor problem by suggesting that we might have been concerned that this was just happenstance, that there was some unclean fish together with the clean fish. Therefore, according to R. Papa, we learn that we are not concerned about such a possibility. But if all of the pieces do not fit together, then we need to recognize the head and backbone of each and every fish.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss how we can tell if unidentifiable fish is kosher.
  A boat-load of fish called “tzahanta” comes in to town, but it is unclear whether these fish are kosher. There are no identifiable signs of kashrut on the fish themselves (probably because they are minced), but they can see scales on the sides of the boat. R. Huna b. Hinnena declares the fish to be kosher, assuming that the scales on the sides of the boat come from the fish in the boat. But Rava notes that many fish have scales. How do we know that the scales come from these fish and not from others? Each amora issues declarations prohibiting or permitting the fish. What a conflict!
  According to R. Papi, R. Huna allowed only the brine. He did not allow the eating of the fish itself. But R. Papa said that R. Huna was more lenient—even the fish could be eaten. R. Ashi is torn. On the one hand, he respects what R. Papa says, so he cannot rule strictly. Only the other hand, he has a tradition attributed to Ulla according to which the fish itself  cannot be eaten unless the head and backbone of each fish is recognizable. So R. Ashi is left paralyzed, and cannot issue a directive one way or the other.
  The kalbit fish is a sign that the brine is kosher. So if the barrels are open, one kalbit fish is sufficient for all of the barrels to be presumed kosher. But if the barrel is closed, then only that barrel can be considered kosher. The others must be suspected as coming from non-kosher fish. Interestingly, R. Hinena calls Rav, Shmuel and R. Yohanan “verses” as if to say that they are as reliable as the written word.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the kashrut of fish eggs (caviar or roe).
  “Roe,” is another word for what we usually call caviar—the fish eggs. Since we cannot tell whether they came from a kosher or non-kosher fish, one should buy them only from an expert, one who is reliable to sell kosher fish. The same is true for entrails, which we discussed earlier.
  The issue here is whether unclean fish have “roe,” meaning lay eggs. According to Rav, they do. Otherwise, roe could only come from kosher fish. But there is a baraita that says that unclean fish do not lay eggs.There are two responses to this difficulty. The first is to emend the statement of Rav and remove the word “roe.”The second is to suggest that they both lay eggs but that they lay them differently. Kosher fish lay eggs externally. Non-kosher fish have eggs but they hatch inside their bodies. The technical word for this “ovoviviparous” (cool word!). This is true of sharks and rays and a few other species of fish, all of which are not kosher.
  Why does roe have to be bought from an expert? Aren’t there signs that distinguish kosher eggs from non-kosher ones?
  If the roe is intact, it can be identified by its shape whether it is kosher or not. But if it has been pressed into a mass, the shape is lost and it should only be bought from someone who is reliable.
  R. Dostai held that non-kosher fish do not lay eggs and therefore the word should be erased from Rav’s statement. But the baraita above which notes the different shapes between kosher and non-kosher roe assumes that non-kosher fish do lay eggs.R. Dostai would answer by correcting the baraita in a different way. So if we’re going to correct it, rather than correcting it to read “fish eggs” correct it to read “fish entrails.” Now the baraita explains how to identify kosher fish entrails. But are fish entrails round and pointed? The answer is that the bladder of a kosher fish does indeed have this shape.
  
  Daf 40b
  
  According to one opinion, if there is no expert, it is sufficient if the seller says that he himself prepared the entrails and roe by salting them. But another opinion rules more strictly. The seller must show the fish from which the roe and entrails came. Otherwise, we cannot assume that they are kosher.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya explains the remainder of the mishnah.
  The stalk of the hiltit plant cannot be bought from a non-Jew because he might have used a knife with non-kosher fat on it to cut it. But we should have no such concern with the leaf— the leaf was not even cut!The answer is that we need to know that the leaf is kosher even if it has some slivers on it. We might have been concerned that the slivers come from the sliced stalk. The mishnah teaches that these slivers came onto the leaf when it was detached from the ground, and not when the stalk was cut.
  We might have thought that very soft olive cakes have wine in them, and therefore should not be bought from a non-Jew. Therefore the mishnah teaches that it is the olive oil that makes them soft, not added wine. They may be eaten even when purchased from a non-Jew.
  An olive that is very soft may have been softened with wine, and therefore R. Yose says it is prohibited.
  IntroductionThe final sugya of this chapter (!) explains the last few clauses of the mishnah.
  The issue in this baraita is whether we are concerned lest the shopkeeper mixes wine in with his wares. We learn that he does so only with wares that are ready to sell. If the products are sold from storage, they are permitted.
  Not only is the apple cider permitted, but it cures bowel disorders. Indeed, a search on google yields that there is truth to this, at least if it is apple cider vinegar.
  Priests were occasionally suspected of selling terumah as if it was non-sacred food, which carries a higher price. It is prohibited to buy produce from such a priest, but only from the basket that is in front of him. He might mix terumah into this basket. But he will not mix terumah and non-sacred produce in his warehouse lest the rabbis find out and declare that his whole warehouse is prohibited. This would be too big of a loss. Therefore one can buy food from his warehouse.
  May we return to you chapter “One may not place”
  IntroductionAccording to Deuteronomy 7:25-26 it is forbidden for a Jew to derive any benefit from idolatrous images. The first mishnah in chapter three defines which images made by non-Jews are idolatrous and therefore forbidden and which are made merely as adornments, and are therefore permitted.
  The Rabbis in this mishnah dispute which images (sculptures) made by non-Jews are prohibited, because they may be used for idolatrous purposes. According to Rabbi Meir, all images are prohibited because they are worshipped once a year. The Sages dispute with Rabbi Meir. They hold that only the images that have in their hands a staff, bird or orb are forbidden. An image that holds one of these items, which probably was a symbol of power, was certainly made for idolatry. However, although some other images may have been made for idolatrous purposes, we are not sure if they were. Therefore we are not strict with regards to them, and they are permitted. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel basically agrees with the Sages that an image about which there is a doubt if it is idolatrous, is permitted. However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel adds that any image that has something in its hand is idolatrous, and is therefore forbidden.
  In the mishnah R. Meir said that all images are prohibited because they are worshipped once a year. But if they are worshipped once a year, then they are idols, and why would the rabbis permit Jews to use them?The Talmud explains that if the idol is actually worshipped once a year, then all sages would agree that it is prohibited. The issue is whether all images, everywhere, are prohibited, because a minority of idols are worshipped once a year. R. Meir holds that we should be “concerned about a minority” and therefore even though only a minority of images are worshipped, all are prohibited. But the other sages say that we follow the majority.
  According to Shmuel the mishnah refers to royal statues made when the king dies. R. Meir holds that people worship these images, whereas the other rabbis think that they do not. R. Yohanan says that the mishnah refers to images that stand at the entrance of the city. Again, R. Meir holds that people worship these images, whereas the rabbis hold that they do not.In other words, according to both of these statements, if the images were certainly worshipped, even once a year, all would agree that they are prohibited. The question is whether they are worshipped even once a year. 
  
  Daf 41a
  
  According to Rabbah, R. Meir holds that statues that are in villages are worshipped, whereas the sages hold that they are not. But everyone agrees that statues in larger cities are only for ornamentation and are therefore permitted.
  How can the sages hold that statues in villages are there for ornamentation? Villages do not have the money to put up statues just for ornamentation. They are definitely worshipped.
  This emended version of the baraita locates the dispute in the case of cities—R. Meir says that the images there are worshipped and the sages hold that they are not. But statues in villages are definitely worshipped.
  IntroductionThe sages in the mishnah held that the image is prohibited only if it holds a staff, bird or orb. The Talmud explains that these are symbols of power.
  The staff, bird and orb are symbols of power. If the image holds one of them, it is certainly a royal idol of sorts. 
  A baraita adds three more items which if the image is found holding or wearing, is considered an idol. The Talmud then goes on to explain two things. First of all, why weren’t these items on the original list, that in the Mishnah. What were the rabbis who didn’t include them thinking? Second, what do they actually symbolize such that the rabbis prohibited idols featuring these objects?
  Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says that the image is considered an idol if it holds anything in its hand, even something small that lacks value. R. Ashi, a late amora, then pushes the question even further. What if it holds something disgusting such as excrement? Could this imply power—that everyone is worthless like filth? Or maybe it symbolizes that others held the image in contempt? Perhaps this was an image of a person vilified by all. R. Ashi’s question is not answered.
  IntroductionToday’s mishnah begins to deal with the topic of fragments of images. Can a Jew use them, assuming that either they were never worshipped and that even if they were, they were nullified by being broken?
  One who finds a fragment of an image may make use of that fragment. The mishnah teaches that we may assume that the non-Jew intentionally broke the idol and thereby annulled it from its idolatrous use.However, if one finds an entire hand of an image or a foot, it is prohibited, since there are non-Jews who use these parts in and of themselves as idols.
  Idols are definitely worshipped. Images may or may not have been worshiped. According to Shmuel, even if the fragment is from an idol, meaning from something that was definitely worshipped, the fragment is permitted.The problem is that the Mishnah says “fragment of an image” not “fragment of an idol”! Shmuel answers that the mishnah used “fragment of an image” only because of the second clause. If the first clause had read “fragment of idol” then we would have assumed that the hand or foot only if it was known to have been worshipped.
  Shmuel’s statement, that fragments of idols are permitted, seems to contradict the second clause of the mishnah, which states that a fragment that contains a hand or foot is prohibited. These fragments should always be permitted according to Shmuel.Shmuel answers by limiting the mishnah to a case where the hand or foot is on a base. If it is on a base, we can see that this is not really a fragment but a full idol. This mishnah always reminds me of the giant foot in the television series Lost. Never really understood what that was, but it made an impression. 
  
  Daf 41b
  
  IntroductionThis section contains a debate that will be discussed for the next daf and a half. We learned in the mishnah that broken pieces of images can be used by a Jew. There are two reasons to be lenient in that case. First of all, these are images, not idols. They may not even have been worshipped. Second, they are broken. Maybe the idolater annulled them when breaking them. But what about broken pieces of idols, ones that we know were not broken intentionally? These are idols, we know were worshipped, not just images. And we know that the idolater did not break them. So are they too permitted?
  R. Yohanan says that since no idolater actively annulled the idol, the fragments are still considered idolatrous and they are prohibited. R. Shimon b. Lakish tries to get into the head of the idolater. If the idolater sees that his idol broke, he will divest it of its power, thinking to himself that if the idol could not save itself from being broken, then how can it save me? Thus we can assume that it was annulled and its fragments are permitted.
  IntroductionIn today’s section, R. Yohanan, who holds that pieces of idols that broke on their own are prohibited, raises difficulties on Resh Lakish, who holds that they are permitted.
  In I Samuel 5, after the Philistines seize the ark and leave it overnight in their Temple, God takes vengeance on the Dagon idol, and knocks it over, breaking its head and hands. But the priests still refuse to enter into Dagon’s house. This proves to R. Yohanan that they still accord power to the broken pieces of the Dagon idol.But Resh Lakish responds that the priests do not enter the sanctuary not because of the broken pieces of idol, but because they believe that the divinity of the idol has gone into the threshold itself. The broken pieces of idols are not divine in the idolater’s eyes. But the “spirit” of the idol has moved elsewhere.
  The mishnah allowed Jews to use fragments of images. From here, R. Yohanan deduced that fragments of idols are prohibited. But Resh Lakish would say that you could read the mishnah in another way. Fragments of images are prohibited. But whole images are prohibited, in accordance with R. Meir of the first mishnah of the chapter. Thus the mishnah would not imply that fragments of idols are prohibited.
  This section is a difficulty on R. Yohanan. R. Meir holds that images are prohibited, but fragments therefrom are permitted. If we apply the same logic to the opinion of the rabbis we would have to say that idols are prohibited, but fragments therefrom are permitted. 
  R. Yohanan says that the analogy is not correct. Images may not have been worshipped, and when they broke, they may have been annulled. Thus there are two doubts and in cases of a double doubt, we can rule leniently. But in the case of a broken piece of an idol, it may not have been annulled. There is only one doubt, and one doubt is not sufficient to remove from the certainty that the idol was worshipped.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended with R. Yohanan stating that if there is doubt about something’s status it is not sufficient to remove it from its previous status of certainty. In today’s section, the Talmud takes a short digression from the larger topic and asks whether doubt can remove from certainty.
  A haver is someone known to tithe his food. This haver dies leaving a store room full of produce, and we do not know whether it has been tithed or not. The produce was certainly untithed at one point (this would be true of all produce). But now the “doubt” about whether it was tithed seems to be significant enough to presume that the produce is tithed. Thus a doubt sets aside a certainty.
  The Talmud rejects the proof in two ways. First of all, there is an assumption that the haver always tithes right away. So this might not be a case of “doubt” at all.Second, if one brings his produce into the store room with its chaff, animals may eat it without tithing. So the produce might not have been liable for tithing at all. This is not “doubt setting aside a certainty” but “doubt setting aside another doubt.
  Yes, I know that this source is a bit gross and quite strange as well. Why does the priest need to know if it is male or female? While it is true that there are different periods of purity and impurity for male or female births (see Leviticus 12), is this slave Jewish such that she would observe these laws? Why doesn’t the priest know that he should not look into the pit to see because that would make him impure? In any case, there seems to have definitely been a source of impurity placed into the pit. The doubt is over whether it is still there. And again, a doubt does seem to set aside a certainty.
  
  Daf 42a
  
  The Talmud solves the problem again in two ways.First of all, we could say that there was a doubt whether or not she even threw away a fetus, or whether it was a very early miscarriage, which would not defile. This is a case of a doubt setting aside another doubt.Second, we could say that the weasel or marten definitely dragged it away, since there are so many such animals in this area. This is a case of a certainty setting aside another certainty.But as R. Yohanan said, a case of doubt does not set aside a certainty.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues with the dispute between Resh Lakish and R. Yohanan over fragments of idols that broke on their own.
  According to the mishnah, an Israelite cannot annul an idol belonging to an idolater. But why should these fragments not be permitted if he breaks them? Why not consider this to be like an idol that broke on its own? This proves, to R. Yohanan, that an idol that broke on its own is not permitted.
  Abaye tries to resolve the difficulty by saying that the Israelite only defaced the idol, he did not actually smash it.The problem with his resolution is that there is a mishnah that says that defacing an idol is sufficient to annul it.The Talmud answers that if an idolater defaces it, it is annulled. But if an Israelite defaces it, it is not annulled. However, if an Israelite smashes the idol, then it is annulled, just as it would be if it broke on its own.
  According to Rava, theoretically an Israelite can annul the idol by defacing it. However, the rabbis did not allow this lest when he picks the idol up, it comes into his possession. An idol owned by a Jew can never be annulled.Rava is really only arguing with Abaye. As far as our larger argument goes, both Abaye and Rava agree that if a Jew were to smash the idol of a non-Jew, it would be annulled. So too, according to Resh Lakish, if the idol broke on its own.
  Again, we read a baraita which says that even if an Israelite breaks up a statue of Mercury (which was originally composed of stones) and uses it to pave a road, the stones and everything they were used to build is prohibited. This is a difficulty against Resh Lakish.The Talmud resolves this by again citing Rava’s statement. In principle these stones were annulled because the idol was broken. However, we don’t allow people to use them lest the Jew come to own the idol, in which case it can’t be annulled. But if an idol broke on its own, it is annulled.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the case of an idol that broke on its own.
  The baraita quoted here discusses an idol that had pieces chipped off of it. If the idolater does this, then the status of the idol depends on the idolater’s intention. If he simply wants to use pieces of the stone for some other purpose, then he is no longer treating the idol with any sanctity. The idol has been annulled and a Jew can now make use of it. But if he chips a piece off to improve the idol, then the idol has not been annulled.A Jew cannot annul idols. Therefore, it does not matter why he chipped off a piece.But again, this is a difficulty against Resh Lakish. Why shouldn’t we consider this like an idol that broke on its own?Resh Lakish can again solve this according to Rava’s statement. If a Jew chipped off a piece of the idol of a non-Jew, it should be annulled. But we consider it not to be annulled, lest the Jew come to possess the idol, and the idol of a Jew can never be annulled.
  The baraita contains a dispute over whether an idol can be destroyed by a Jew by grinding it up to powder. Rabbi Yose finds this acceptable, but the other rabbis worry that one may end up deriving benefit from the idol by doing this. Therefore, they demand that the idol be destroyed by throwing it into the sea.But again, we could ask. If, as Resh Lakish claims, even an idol that broke on its own can be used by a non-Jew, then why shouldn’t grinding it up be a valid form of annulment, in which case any benefit derived would not be a problem.Again, the solution follows Rava. He cannot annul it that way lest he come to acquire it.
  An idolater can annul an idol, but a Jew cannot. So if we do not know who cut the dragon idol’s head off, the idol is permitted. In cases of doubt, the law is lenient. But if we know a Jew cut the head off, the idol remains prohibited. This is essentially the same difficulty against Resh Lakish as we saw above. Why isn’t this considered an annulled idol, like the case of an idol that broke on its own?Again, the Talmud solves this according to Rava. Technically, the idol is annulled, but we do not permit it lest the Jew come to own the idol, in which case the idol can never be annulled.
  An Asherah is a tree that is worshipped. One may not derive any benefit from such a tree. R. Yose says that one may not plant under such a tree, because that would be taking advantage of the falling leaves as fertilizer. But again, why not consider the leaves to be like an idol that breaks on its own. After all, that is essentially what happened to the tree.In this case we cannot consider the leaves to be annulled because the tree is still standing and nothing has happened to it. Unlike an idol that breaks, no one would say that the tree has broken just because some leaves fell off.
  
  Daf 42b
  
  When it came to the Asherah tree, we said that if the main idol still exists, then the pieces are not annulled. But earlier we said that if a non-Jew chips some pieces off an idol to improve it, the chipped pieces are permitted, even though the idol still remains.The answer is that falling leaves cannot be considered a form of annulment because this is natural. Nothing was done to the leaves to annul them. But when the idolater chips pieces off the idol, he is in essence removing their sanctity. Therefore they are permitted.
  IntroductionIn today’s section, our sugya changes tack. Instead of R. Yohanan raising a difficulty on Resh Lakish, Resh Lakish raises one back (way to go Resh Lakish!). He uses a baraita to prove that pieces of an idol that broke on their own are permitted.
  The question in this baraita seems to be whether one may use the bird’s nest to make a fire (I know, not a nice thing to do, but people needed firewood back then). If the tree has been dedicated to the Temple, then we could assume that the branches may have been dedicated. One should not therefore use them. But if one does, this does not count as “trespass,” illegal use of Temple property because we cannot be sure that the nest came from that tree.But if the tree was an idol, then one can use the nest. This proves that pieces broken from an idol are permitted and refutes R. Yohanan.
  Yohanan says that the baraita refers to a bird that is assumed to have brought the twigs for the nest from another tree, not the tree in which the nest was found. This helps explain the whole baraita better. If the tree has been dedicated to the Temple, then he should not use the nest lest the twigs might have come from the tree. But it does not count as “trespass” because the twigs did not certainly come from that tree. But if the twigs did certainly come from that tree, then using them should certainly count as trespass.
  The Talmud rejects the proof that R. Yohanan brought that the twigs must have come from another tree. One could say that the twigs came from the same tree that was dedicated but that the branches grew after the tree had been dedicated. This baraita might hold that while one should not use such twigs, if one does this does not constitute “trespass.” But if the twigs come from that same tree, then they would also come from the asherah tree and this would prove that an idol that broke on its own accord may be used. In the case of the asherah tree, it would not matter when they grew. They should always be prohibited.
  Abahu explains the baraita in an entirely different way so that it is not a difficulty on R. Yohanan. When the baraita says, “[If the nest was made] on top of an Asherah, he may knock it off with a stick” it does not mean that he may use the sticks. He may not. He is knocking the next off only to get the birds, not the sticks.
  These amoraim now explain when one may or may not make use of the birds or eggs found in a dedicated tree or an asherah tree. If the birds can fly, then they do not need the tree, and therefore, they may be used. But eggs and young birds need the tree and therefore are prohibited.Note that this concludes our long sugya about idols that broke on their own. There is no resolution to the sugya. No one “wins” the argument. The halakhah ends up following R. Yohanan, but not because he wins. The halakhah follows him because according to a rule imposed on the Talmud that the halakhah basically always follows R. Yohanan when he argues with Resh Lakish except for six cases. This is not one of the six.
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses what one must do with things that he found that are likely to have been used as idols.
  If one finds a utensil that has on it a picture of the sun, moon or a dragon he must destroy it, since it was certainly used for idolatrous purposes.  According to the first opinion, the best way to totally destroy an idol is to throw it into the Dead Sea.  In such a way there is no chance that he, or any other Jew, will ever derive any benefit from it.Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel states that not all utensils that have pictures of the sun, moon or dragon are forbidden.  Only precious utensils with such pictures on them are forbidden, for they were certainly worshipped.  Cheap utensils were, in all likelihood, not worshipped, and are therefore permitted, even though they have on them pictures of the sun, moon or dragon.
  The mishnah seems to imply that people worship the sun, the moon and dragons. But the baraita quoted here implies that they worshipped many other objects as well. This is a difficulty.
  Abaye explains that there is a difference between worship and creation of images for the sake of worship. Idolaters worship a whole host of natural phenomenon. But, at least according to Abaye, they only decorate and then worship the three mentioned in the mishnah—sun, moon and dragon. Game of Thrones style!
  Sheshet here seems to be gathering material related to the Mishnah, although some translate this as gathering “difficulties” on the Mishnah. In any case, the three objects are the same as those in the Mishnah, and this baraita reads the three of them as being exclusive. Only these planets, faces and figures are forbidden. Others are permitted.
  IntroductionThis sugya is an extensive discussion of the baraita from the previous section. I replicate it here for ease of reference:[Pictures of] all the planets are permissible except that of the sun and moon;all faces are permissible except that of a human face;all figures are permissible except that of the dragon.
  If we interpret the baraita to mean that a Jew can make any image but the sun and the moon, then we have a problem for there is a baraita that explicitly prohibits making an image of any heavenly body, not just the sun and moon.Therefore, the first line must be in accord with our Mishnah, which allows one to keep utensils with all images except the sun, the moon or a dragon.
  If the first clause refers to finding images, then the second clause should also refer to finding images. One who finds an image with a face on it may use it unless it is a human face.But this clashes with the mishnah—the mishnah allows one to use a vessel with a human face on it. Only the image of a dragon is forbidden.Thus the second clause must refer to making the images, and it accords with an opinion attributed later to R. Huna son of R. Joshua who says that the verse prohibits making human figures.
  If the middle clause deals with making them, then the last clause should as well. But this is again a problem. The last clause would prohibit making the image of a dragon, but according to another baraita, making an image of god is prohibited, not the image of a dragon.Therefore, this section must refer to finding. One can keep utensils unless they have on them with image of the sun, moon or dragon.Now, in conclusion the first and third clauses of the baraita refer to finding vessels with these images on them, whereas the third clause prohibits making vessels with these images on them. This seems to be a strange structure for a baraita, and therefore this is one long extended difficulty.
  
  Daf 43a
  
  Abaye is indeed willing to interpret the baraita such that each clause deals with a different aspect.
  Rava says that the whole baraita refers to finding an object with one of these drawings on it. The baraita accords with R. Judah who does prohibit an object with the face of a human.The baraita mentions two common mythological images. The nursing woman may be the Egyptian goddess Isis, although there were other goddesses pictured as nursing. Serapis is a Greco-Egyptian god. He is always pictured with a measuring bowl on his head. Note that the baraita gives Hebrew puns on the names or presentations of these Greek gods.
  IntroductionThe mishnah that we learned last week referred to utensils which had on them the image of the dragon. Today’s sugya begins by explaining what the image of the dragon is.
  For the image of the dragon to be prohibited, it must have joints between its neck. 
  Great story! 
  From this story, three significant halakhic lessons can be learned. 
  R. Hanina quotes a baraita from Bava Metzia. According to this baraita, when people lose something in a place from which they assume that the object will not be recoverable, they despair of recovering it. The object then may be kept by the finder. R. Hanina posits that just as the person who lost the object assumes he will not recover it, he also annuls it as being an idol. So why then does R. Elazar demand that some random idolater annul it?
  Abaye says that while the owner despairs of recovering it, he is not really annulling it. He assumes that no matter who finds his idolatrous object, it will again be worshipped. Therefore, R. Elazar made sure that he found an idolater who would annul it.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses other cases in rabbinic literature where it seems that rabbis make certain use of various images. How did they do this, if it is prohibited?
  Rabban Gamaliel used to have pictures of the moon that he would show people to determine if they had seen the new moon and that he could rule that the day was Rosh Hodesh (this source is from Mishnah Berachot). But how could he do this—is it not prohibited to make pictures of the moon!
  Abaye explains that the Torah prohibits only the making of God’s attendants, things that serve God, if they can actually be reproduced in a way that is close to how they actually are. Since one cannot make a moon that is anything like the moon, drawing the moon is permitted.
  This baraita is cited as proof for Abaye’s statement. One should not make things that are exactly like the structures in the Temple, or the objects therein. But one can make objects that are close to those in the Temple, but not exactly the same, such as 5, 6 or 8 branched candelabra.The baraita cites a menorah made by the Hasmoneans when they purified the Temple. This is an interesting historical memory, which is found also in other rabbinic sources. According to R. Yose, the Hasmoneans needed to make it out of wood, because they were in haste after the Greeks either stole or defiled the gold menorah. The other rabbis believe that this menorah was made of staves, which other sources identify as the spears they used in war. They covered the menorah with tin, probably to stabilize or protect it and then eventually made it into gold.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that one is allowed to make images of God’s attendants as long as it is not possible to fashion them completely in their likeness. Thus Rabban Gamaliel was allowed to make an image of the moon. Today’s section cites a baraita that prohibits this. I should note that we see here the amoraim arguing over what images the Torah prohibits. This argument will continue in the next few sections. The issue remained a contentious one throughout Jewish history, with various Jews adopting maximal and minimal interpretations as to how to interpret the prohibition of making graven images.
  This baraita seems to prohibit making the heavenly bodies. So again, we must ask, how did Rabban Gamaliel make images of the moon? 
  Abaye explains that the only of God’s attendants that one may not make is the four-faced creatures (human, lion, eagle, ox) of the Divine chariot (see Ezekiel, chapter one). Any other image can be made, including the moon.
  
  Daf 43b
  
  Abaye says that only the four-faced angels are prohibited. But earlier we read a mishnah that prohibited the image of a human face.Judah resolves this by citing a baraita that he at his father’s public lecture. This baraita revocalizes the word “iti,” which means “with me” to read as a direct object “oti.” It is prohibited to draw the image of God, but it is not prohibited to draw any other images, including that of a human.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded by ruling that only God’s four-faced attendants are prohibited. One may draw any other image. Today’s section questions that.
  According to this baraita, one may not make images of any of the various angels, not just the four-faced super ones.
  Abaye (again) answers that the Torah prohibited only the angels that are in the highest order, including those mentioned here. But not, evidently, the moon. Again, Rabban Gamaliel is defended.
  This baraita quotes another section of the verse, and used it to prohibit making images of the sun, moon, stars and planets. This seems to refute Rabban Gamaliel.
  The Talmud resolves this by stating that this verse prohibits worshipping these heavenly and earthly images. One can make them, but not worship them.
  This baraita clearly prohibits making the heavenly images, so again, we have to ask, how could Rabban Gamaliel have made images of the moon.The Talmud responds with quite a strained answer, one that seems quite certainly to be “making it up.” Rabban Gamaliel did not make the images—someone made them for him. He can use them, because he did not make them.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded by justifying Rabban Gamaliel’s moon images by saying that he did not make them, someone made them for him, so it is okay. Today’s section questions whether it is allowed to use images that someone else made.
  People made a seal with the imprint of a face for R. Judah. Shmuel mocked R. Judah and told him to disfigure the seal. This proves that even if others make the image, it is still prohibited.
  The ring that they made for R. Judah had a protruding seal, and it is prohibited to wear such a ring. One should not wear such a ring because it looks like an idol. But one can seal with such a ring because the image is sunken in, and therefore does not look so much like an image.But if the ring’s image is sunken in, then it is permitted to wear it, but one may not sign with it, because such a sign would be protruding. In short, protruding images are prohibited, but sunken ones are not.
  The Talmud here cites the fascinating case of a synagogue in Nehardea. The synagogue is called “Shaf Veyativ” which means “destroyed and rebuilt,” and indeed, there does seem to have been a famous destruction of the Jewish community in Nehardea in 247 and then the community was rebuilt. Fascinatingly, there was a statue in this synagogue, certainly something that the rabbis would not have been comfortable with. Rabbis attended this synagogue, but it does not seem that they were leaders of it, nor were they consulted on questions of behavior there. So if Shmuel’s father and Levi attended this synagogue, they must not have been too worried that someone would think they’re worshipping idols.The Talmud resolves the issue by saying that if many people are around, then we’re not concerned that someone will worship the statue. It seems that the presence of others will act as a deterrent (there are things one might do in private that one will not do in public).
  The final problem is again with regard to Rabban Gamaliel—he was an individual, and he had these images in his upper chamber. Why wasn’t he concerned that people would suspect him of worshipping them?There are three answers:He was the head of the community, and therefore, other people were always there with him.The images were in pieces, and it is only prohibited if the image is wholeRabban Gamaliel had these images for study, and one may make images to study them. This is a very broad relaxation of the prohibition and was frequently invoked throughout history to allow for the making of images.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah, Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says, “Those figures that are upon respectable vessels are forbidden. Those that are upon disgraceful vessels are permitted.” The Talmud defines what vessels are respectable and which ones are not.
  Rav refers to eating vessels. If the images are covered by the food or liquid in the bowl, then they are “disgraceful,” because one covers the “idol” with food. But if they are above that line, then they are considered respectable, and it is prohibited to make or own them.But Shmuel thinks that all images on food vessels are “disgraceful,” which is probably an overly strong word here. “Disgraceful” here probably means something closer to “common”—not worshipped. For the image to be “respectable,” i.e. worshipped, it needs to be on some piece of jewelry, items which are accorded a far higher degree of honor.
  This baraita accords with Shmuel—to be respectable, the image must be on a piece of jewelry. Otherwise, the image is just a common decoration.
  IntroductionThis section is a direct continuation of the previous mishnah, concerning how one destroys idols from which he may not derive benefit.
  Rabbi Yose responds to the opinion that appeared earlier in the mishnah which stated that the idols must be thrown into the Dead Sea. He holds that it is sufficient to grind the idol up and then throw the dust to the wind. The other Sages respond to him that this is not sufficient. By grinding up the idol, someone might use it as fertilizer. This method of destruction would not, therefore, prevent other Jews from violating the strict prohibition of deriving benefit from idols. The Sages cite a verse from Deuteronomy to prove that it is forbidden to derive even the smallest benefit from idolatrous objects.
  R. Yose uses the case of the golden calf to prove his ruling that one may destroy idols by grinding them up. The other rabbis respond that Moses ground up the calf not in order to destroy it, but because he wanted the Israelites to drink it, the same way that the suspected adulteress has to drink the bitter waters. Idolatry is, according to many of the prophets, similar to adultery, showing lack of faithfulness to one’s god. 
  
  Daf 44a
  
  R. Yose now quotes another case in which someone grinds up an idol—Asa, the King of Israel, did this to his mother’s idol (reminiscent, certainly of the midrash about Abraham). The rabbis reject this proof as well. The problem with grinding up idols is that the dust becomes fertilizer. But the brook of Kidron is not a place where vegetation grows.
  The Talmud cites a baraita about the blood that runs off from the sacrifices in the Temple. This blood would flow into the brook of Kidron and the water/blood mixture was sold as fertilizer to farmers. This is proof that the brook of Kidron does have vegetation, which now is a proof for R. Yose, that one may nevertheless grind up an idol, just as Asa did The other rabbis would answer that the brook of Kidron has several areas. Asa would have ground the idol up in a place without vegetation, for otherwise this is prohibited.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues the dialogue between R. Yose and the sages over whether one can grind up an idol as a means to destroy it.
  R. Yose tries to bring proof from Hezekiah, who, seeing that Israel is worshipping the serpent that Moses made in Numbers to cure the people of Israel, crushes it. This is proof that crushing is a valid form of annulment.The rabbis answer that the serpent belonged to Moses. The fact that the Israelites worshipped it does not turn it into an idol, because a person cannot cause something that belongs to another person to become prohibited. If I worship your cow, it does not make your cow prohibited. So why then did Hezekiah destroy the bronze serpent? Because he saw that Israelites were worshipping it. In other words, although the bronze serpent was not prohibited, he still did not want the Jews to worship it.
  R. Yose cites another proof from an incident in II Samuel where David finds some idols of the Philistines. The literal translation is that he “took them away” but R. Yose interprets this verb in light of the same verb in Isaiah to mean that he crushed them and spread their remains to the wind.The rabbis reject this based on the parallel version in I Chronicles. There David burns the idols. Obviously since it does not say that he burned them and then scattered them, it must mean that the word “vayasi’em” does not mean scatter.
  The verse from Chronicles has David burning the idols, whereas in Samuel he takes them away. So which is it? The answer is that the verse from Chronicles refers to a period before Ittai the Gittite joined David’s court. Ittai was a gentile and therefore he could annul idols. Before he came they would have had to burn the idols, because Jews cannot annul idols belonging to non-Jews. But after he came, they were able to just carry the idols away because Ittai would annul them.
  The coming of Ittai also helps explain how David could take the crown off the king of Rabbah and have it placed on his head—Ittai annulled its idolatrous aspects first.
  A talent of gold is extremely heavy, too heavy for a crown that could be worn. The amoraim here explain how to read the verse such that David would not be putting a too heavy crown on his head.Interestingly, I listened to an interview with Queen Elizabeth this year and she did say that the crown is extremely heavy and not easy to wear. Especially, I suppose, for a 92 year old woman.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended with a discussion of King David donning a crown. Today’s section begins with a midrash that alludes to the special qualities of this crown. It then continues with more midrashim about David’s crown, and its importance to David’s descendants.
  The fact that the crown fits perfectly on his head is a reward for his having kept God’s precepts. There is room on this spot for both the crown and to wear tefillin. Thus David could wear his tefillin and crown at the same time.
  The verse quoted here refers to the coronation of Yehoash. The “testimony” that he was fit for the crown was that it fit his head. Sort of like the slipper on Cinderella.
  Adoniyah is the son of David who pronounced himself king even before David’s death. According to the midrash, since he was not fit to be king, the crown did not fit his head. 
  This section digresses a bit about Adoniyah. As part of his project of self-aggrandizement, he hires an entourage, sort of like modern celebs. I suppose if he lived today, he’d hire some Instagram followers or maybe some paparazzi to follow him around. In any case, what’s the big deal about 50 people to run in front of him? That does not sound like an impressive number. The Talmud answers that these are special runners—they had their spleens removes, and flesh from their feet removed. This seems to have been an ancient way of improving one’s speed. Doping in sports does not seem to be anything new. 
  
  Daf 44b
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah contains a famous story of a discussion between Proclos, a Greek philosopher and Rabban Gamaliel, the Jewish patriarch.
  In order to understand this mishnah we must remember that Roman and Greek society would have been full of statues. Indeed, anywhere a Jew turned his head, he probably saw a statue, often a statue of a god or goddess. If the Jews were to adopt an overly strict attitude towards these statues, and consider them idols, Jews would effectively be prohibited from taking part in most of Greco-Roman society, including such communal institutions such as the bathhouse, roads, bridges and marketplaces. In this mishnah Rabban Gamaliel shows a remarkable degree of flexibility and accommodation to this situation.The story begins with Proklos, the son of Plosphos (this may be the word for philosopher) pointing out that the Torah forbids Rabban Gamaliel’s being in Aphrodite’s bathhouse. Rabban Gamaliel responds that it is not appropriate to respond in the bathhouse. When they leave the bathhouse Rabban Gamaliel answers Proklos’s question. The bathhouse was not made for Aphrodite. Rather it was made for the public use and Aphrodite was  merely placed there as adornment. As such, Rabban Gamaliel’s presence in the bathhouse is not a form of worship to Aphrodite, as it would be in her temple. Furthermore, people do not say that the bathhouse was made to adorn Aphrodite. Rather she is ancillary to the bathhouse and it is the central structure.Rabban Gamaliel further points out that if this sculpture of Aphrodite were truly considered to be a goddess, people would not walk naked in front of her, or have seminal emissions or urinate. Such actions are signs of disrespect, which would not be appropriate in front of a goddess. When the Torah states that a Jew is commanded to destroy idols, the intent is to destroy idols that are treated as gods, and not those that are treated with disrespect.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to comment on the Rabban Gamaliel story.
  In the Mishnah itself, Rabban Gamaliel responds to Proklos that it is prohibited to respond in the bathhouse. He knows that one should not talk Torah in a place in which naked people are found, even if he does not utter the words in Hebrew. But this is not sufficient for the Talmud. They think that even saying this in the bathhouse is not permitted. Thus a tanna teaches that Rabban Gamaliel responded only when he had already left the bathhouse.
  There is an argument here over whether urinating in front of the statue is really a sign that people do not treat the statue with sanctity. According to R. Oshaia, it is not. After all, Rava pointed out that people defecate in front of the Peor statue and this seems to be a sign of honor, not disrespect. Thus Rabban Gamaliels’ answer was deceptive.
  R. Hama b. Joseph says that there is a difference between the Peor statue and Aphrodite. Peor is worshipped by defecating in front of it (at least according to the rabbis). But Aphrodite is not worshipped in this way, and therefore one who urinates in front of her has disrespected the idol and thereby annulled it.
  IntroductionThe amoraim continue to discuss whether Rabban Gamaliel’s response to Proklos was deceptive.
  Abaye offers a different alternative as to what the deception may have been. One of Rabban Gamaliel’s answers was that he did not enter Aphrodite’s domain, she entered his. But Abaye points out that it is permitted to enter the domain of an idol in order to take a bath, or a stroll in the garden. The prohibition is only to provide direct benefit to the idolatry. Thus Rabban Gamaliel did not need to say that he didn’t enter her domain.But Abaye himself points out that this answer is not actually deceptive. Rabban Gamaliel is a very important person, a real macher. His mere entrance into someone’s domain is considered providing a benefit. So if Rabban Gamaliel had entered Aphrodite’s domain, it would have been a problem. But he did not. She entered his.
  R. Shimi b. Hiyya locates a different way in which Rabban Gamaliel’s answer was deceptive. Urinating on an idol is not considered annulment, according to the mishnah. Thus the fact that people urinate it does not mean that he can derive benefit from it.But R. Shimi b. Hiyya explains that one person urinating on the idol may not be considered annulment. Later, when he calms down, he will make peace with his idol. But people urinate in front of the idol all the time. Thus it is annulled.
  Rabbah b. Ulla has yet another answer as to how Rabban Gamaliel’s response may have been deceptive. Rabban Gamaliel claims that people do not say that the bathhouse was made for Aphrodite. But, Rabbah points out, even if they did say this, it still would not cause the bathhouse too become prohibited because items cannot be dedicated to idol worship. Even if they are, they are still permitted.But Rabbah b. Ulla says that the remark was not actually deceptive. While we would not consider the bathhouse to have been dedicated to idolatry, it still would have been prohibited as an ornament for idolatry. Thus Rabban Gamaliel needed to point out that it is not prohibited because the idol adorns it; not the other way around.
  
  Daf 45a
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses hills, mountains and trees which were used in idolatrous worship. The question is asked, are these to be forbidden as were other material items used in idol worship.
  Although an idolater may worship a hill or mountain, that mountain is not prohibited to subsequent Jewish use as is a statue worshipped by a non-Jew. Anything that is either ground or attached to the ground is not considered an idolatrous “object” that would be forbidden to Jews. However, that which is upon these “worshipped” mountains and hills is forbidden. This principle is learned from Deut. 7:25 which uses the word “that is on them”. Although according to the simple sense of the verse, this refers to the gold and silver that are on idols, the midrash in our mishnah understands this to be referring to the idolatrous objects that are on a mountain or hill. They are forbidden but the land itself is not.
  Rabbi Yose Hagalili offers an alternative midrash to the one in the previous section. This verse instructs the Israelites to destroy all of the sites where the other nations worship. It says that these sites are on the mountains and hills. From here Rabbi Yose concludes that that which is on the mountains and hills is forbidden, but not the land itself.
  So far we have learned in the previous two sections that in general land and anything attached to land is not treated as an idolatrous object. The mishnah raises a glaring exception to this rule, the asherah, a tree which was worshipped, which according to Deut. 7:5 and 12:3, must  be cut down and burned. The answer is that any natural object that was planted by a human being and was gardened by a person is, if worshipped, to be treated as an idol.
  Deut. 12:2 instructs Israelites to destroy all the idolatrous sites, “whether on lofty mountains and on hills or under any luxuriant tree.” Rabbi Akiva seems to be answering the question, why does the Torah mention the mountains, hills and tree. It would have been sufficient to merely state that all idolatrous sites must be destroyed and we would know that this includes those found on mountains, hills and under luxuriant trees. Rabbi Akiva answers that the verse was giving a hint to the Jews where they could find idolatry.
  IntroductionIt seems that in the mishnah, the first opinion and R. Yose Hagalili issue the exact same ruling and just use different midrashim to prove it. The Talmud we learn today assumes that there must be a difference between them and tries to locate that difference.
  According to Rami b. Hama, the dispute is over whether some kind of coating or covering placed on a mountain is prohibited. The first opinion says that the coating is not like the mountain and therefore is prohibited if people worship it. R. Yose Hagalili holds that it is part of the mountain and therefore is permitted.
  R. Sheshet posits a different dispute. The dispute is over whether a tree that was first planted and then worshipped becomes prohibited or whether it is considered part of the mountain, and therefore cannot become prohibited. According to the first opinion, such a tree is permitted because it is part of the mountain, whereas R. Yose Hagalili holds that it is prohibited.
  
  Daf 45b
  
  The Talmud asks how we know that R. Yose Hagalili holds that a tree that was planted and then worshipped is prohibited. The Talmud says we learn this from the next clause of the mishnah, where R. Yose states that an asherah is prohibited because it was fashioned by human beings, it was not just created by nature. The repetition in the mishnah comes to include a tree which was planted and then worshipped, as opposed to a tree that was always meant to be an asherah—such a tree is more obviously prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with a tree that was first planted and only then worshipped. Is such a tree considered to be like an asherah and prohibited? Or is only a tree planted from the outset for idolatry to be prohibited?
  In this midrash R. Yose son of R. Yehudah largely reiterates the midrash the Mishnah presented, but adds in that although the verse says “under every green tree” and we might have read this to say, “and the tree cannot be their god,” we do not read the verse this way because the Torah specifically says that their asherah trees must be burned.The Talmud does not here explain how we know that this tree was first planted and only later worshipped. This will be explained in tomorrow’s section.
  The verse “under every green tree” is needed for R. Akiva’s derashah—it tells us where idolatry can be found, but it does not outline the prohibition itself.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s sugya.
  The rabbis who disagree with R. Yose son of R. Yehudah hold that if a tree is planted and only then worshipped, it is not prohibited. So they must read it is prohibiting only a tree that was planted for the express purpose of being an idolatrous tree.
  R. Yose would also read that verse as prohibiting a tree that was planted for idolatry. So he learns the additional prohibition, that a tree that was first planted and then worshipped is prohibited, from another verse. Note that this means that only the part that grew after it was worshipped is prohibited.
  The problem is that earlier R. Yose used the verse “and burn their asherim with fire” and not the verse “and hew down their asherim.” So which verse is his derashah based on?
  In essence, R. Yose does need both verses. If the Torah had stated only one, he would have said that it refers to an asherah planted for the sake of idolatry. But now that both verses have been stated, the second verse is left over as a source for the halakhah that even if the tree was not planted for idolatry, if it was subsequently worshipped, it is prohibited.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s sugya we learned that the rabbis do not use the verse “and hew down their asherim” to prohibit a tree planted and then worshipped. So, our sugya asks, what do they do with this verse?
  The rabbis understand that Deuteronomy 7:5 mandates cutting down the idolatrous trees as soon as the Israelites enter the land. They then are supposed to go conquer the land and only afterwards are they mandated to destroy the idols. This is also learned from Deuteronomy 12:3. The verse says to tear down their altars and dash in pieces their pillars. It does not mandate destroying them utterly. But we know that such destruction must be done. The answer is that at first they are torn down. Only later are they to be utterly destroyed.
  R. Yose son of R. Yehudah derives this two stage process of destruction from the repetition of the verb “destroy.”
  The rabbis used the doubling of the verb as a source for the mandate to destroy every trace of an idol. One must “really destroy it.”
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section we learned that the rabbis used Deuteronomy 12:2 as a source for the rule that in a case where one is obligated to destroy an idol, he must utterly eradicate it. So where does R. Yose son of R. Yehudah derive this law, considering he used the verse for another purpose?
  R. Yose son of R. Judah uses the very next verse in Deuteronomy to derive the rule that one must eradicate any trace of the idol.
  This baraita explains what the rabbis do with Deuteronomy 12:3. Upon destroying the idol, one must also rename it with some name that both plays on the word and degrades the place of idolatry.The idea of renaming the place of idolatry with a degrading word seems to me very emblematic of how a quite powerless people (the Jews living during the Roman period) would fantasize carrying out the words of the Torah, which imagine Israelites taking control  of their land. Rabbis did not have the power to physically do anything to Roman idols. But maybe they could have slandered them behind their backs. 
  
  Daf 46a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a baraita.
  This baraita distinguishes between mountains and vegetation. The mountains are not prohibited, but the vegetation is. In both cases, the idolaters who worship them must, at least theoretically, be executed by sword. This accords with the teaching in Sanhedrin, that Noahides are prohibited from worshipping idols, and that their punishment is death by sword. We should note that nowhere do we find the rabbis advocating that anyone actually go out and kill idolaters. These laws were clearly theoretical.
  R. Sheshet argues that the analogy the baraita draws between the mountains and the vegetation seems to imply that just as the mountain was not created to be worshipped, so too the vegetation was not created to be worshipped. Since the baraita states that the vegetation is prohibited, it must follow the opinion of R. Yose son of R. Yehudah who holds that trees that were not planted for idolatry but were then worshipped are prohibited. This view was the topic of some intense discussion in last week’s sugya.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins a long discussion concerning boulders that are separated from a mountain which had been worshipped. While we know that while attached to the mountain such boulders are not prohibited, the issue is whether they become prohibited if they become detached from the mountain.The way I see it, the rabbis interest in this issue is not a result of some realistic issue. It is probably not the case that boulders were actually worshipped. Rather the Talmud is asking, in its talmudic manner, what makes something susceptible to becoming prohibited. Does it have to have been changed from its natural form, and if so, how much?
  Later the Talmud will try to figure out which party holds which opinion. The first project is to figure out the reasoning for each side.The opinion that permits compares the boulders to the mountain. Neither is something that a human has produced through his own labor. Therefore, just as the mountain is permitted, so too are the boulders that become detached from it. For something to be an idol, a person has to have made it, or at least shaped it. [We might note that the same is true for impurity. Raw material is not susceptible to impurity. There is some but not total overlap between the rules governing idolatry and those governing impurity].
  The problem with comparing it to the mountain is that the mountain is attached to the ground, whereas boulders are not.Therefore, they Talmud tries another comparison. Let’s compare it with an animal. If an idolater worships an animal, the animal is not prohibited. So too the boulder should not be prohibited.
  Neither a mountain nor an animal are the products of human labor, and both are permitted if worshipped. So too anything that is not the product of human labor is permitted. Even boulders attached from mountains.
  The problem is that both the mountain and the animal are in their natural form, and the boulder is not. So we cannot learn about boulders from the joined precedent of the mountain and the animal.
  The Talmud now tweaks the analogy. Instead of comparing simply with a mountain and an animal, we can make the comparison with a blemished animal or a dried up tree. Neither are considered to be in their original state and yet both remain permitted even if worshipped. So too the boulder, even though it has been changed by being detached from the mountain, it still remains permitted.
  The Talmud now returns to the one who prohibits the boulders. He seems to read this out of the double command in the verse. As if it says detest it once it has been separated from its natural source.
  IntroductionYesterday we learned that there is a dispute whether boulders that have become separate from a mountain are prohibited when worshipped. Today the Talmud tries to determine who holds what opinion. To do so they compare it to a situation where someone erected an egg in order to worship it.
  Hizkiyah is one of R. Hiyya’s sons. He asks a question concerning a person who set up an egg to worship it. The question is whether the setting up of the egg in an upright position is an integral part of his action in order for it to be prohibited. At first we think it is and that for a natural object like an egg to become prohibited it must first have had some manual labor performed with it. Hizkiyah’s question was whether setting up the egg counts as manual labor. Clearly if he had not erected it, it would not be prohibited.By implication, Hizkiyah would say that boulders that became separate on their own from the mountain are permitted because no manual labor has been performed.
  The Talmud changes the assumption as to what Hizkiyah was asking. Hizkiyah would hold that if the person worshipped the egg it is forbidden even if he did not perform any labor with it. The circumstance was one in which he did not worship the egg. The question is whether the very act of setting it up makes it prohibited.
  There is a dispute over whether an idol made by an Israelite becomes prohibited immediately or only after it has been worshipped. But for either party, Hizkiyah’s question should be obvious. If it becomes prohibited immediately, then setting it up should make it prohibited. If it does not become prohibited until it is worshipped then there is no question that the egg is permitted. So, Hizkiyah, what are you asking about?
  The case that Hizkiyah asked is similar to the case of the brick that was discussed by R. Judah. A Jew set up a brick to worship it but a non-Jew worshipped it. This is sufficient for it to be prohibited. Even though the non-Jew does not own the brick, since the Jew set it up to be worshipped, the non-Jew’s worship of it causes it to be considered an idol. This is certainly true of a brick which is noticeable when set-up. The Jew demonstratively showed that he wanted the brick to be worshipped. But when it comes to the egg, setting it up is not so noticeable, so maybe it does not become prohibited when the non-Jew worships it. Hizkiyah’s question is not answered.For the record, I thought about changing this translation, but decided not to.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya (a difficult one) discusses stones that come from a mountain that was worshipped—can they be used to build the altar? As a precedent, the amoraim will cite the biblical verse prohibiting the use of the wages of a harlot as funds to buy sacrifices (or other holy use). The question may have a larger implication, one still relevant today. Can funds garnered through illicit means be put to holy use?
  Objects that have been worshipped as idols may not be offered on the altar. So there are two parts to the question of whether these rocks can be used to make the altar. 1) Does this rule apply to things attached to the ground, like rocks that are part of a mountain? 2) Does this rule apply to the things needed to offer sacrifices, like the altar, or just to sacrifices themselves? 
  
  Daf 46b
  
  Rava answers with a kal vehomer type of argument. The Torah prohibits using the wages of a harlot to offer a sacrifice and it does not matter whether the wages were paid with something attached to the ground or detached. However, the wages of a harlot, if detached from the ground may be used for secular purposes. But an idolatrous object is prohibited even for secular use when it is detached. This makes it more stringent. Therefore, we should also be  stringent when it is attached to the ground and not allow it to be used in divine worship. The rocks should be prohibited.
  R. Huna son of R. Joshua says that we could turn Rava’s argument on its head and use it to permit the wages of a harlot for use in divine worship when they are in the form of something attached to the ground. A worshipped object maybe used in the divine worship if it is attached. Attached objects are not prohibited, neither for secular nor for holy purpose. The wages of a harlot are more lenient for even when detached, they are only prohibited for holy use, not for secular use. Therefore they should also be more lenient and permitted for holy use when attached.
  One might have thought that the words “into the house of the Lord” which follows “do not bring the hire of a harlot or the wages of a dog” imply that under no circumstance should the hire of a harlot be used to buy a sacrifice, even if the wages are attached to the ground. But this reading is wrong because that verse has another use. It does not come to prohibit buying sacrifices with the hire of a harlot when those wages came in the form of attached property. Rather it either exclude the red heifer from the prohibition or includes beaten plates of gold. So R. Huna is arguing that not only can the stones be used to build the altar, the wages of a harlot could also be used in divine worship, if they are attached to the ground. The discussion will continue in tomorrow’s section.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section began a discussion between Rava and R. Huna concerning using the case of the hire of a harlot to answer a question with regard to stones that were detached from a mountain that was worshipped. Can such stones be used to build the altar? Rava used a “kal vehomer” argument as grounds for a stringency, whereas R. Huna used them as grounds for a leniency. This is where our sugya picks up.
  Rava states here a rule of thumb. When arguments can be made in both ways, one leading to a stringency and one to a leniency, the argument should be made towards stringency.
  R. Papa locates a case in Mishnah Pesachim 6:2 where R. Eliezer and R. Akiva argue and still R. Akiva uses logic to arrive at a lenient view. The issue is whether one is allowed to sprinkle the ashes of the red heifer on someone on Shabbat in order to purify him so that he may bring the pesah sacrifice. R. Eliezer is strict (in a sense) and allows the sprinkling and thereby makes him liable to bring the pesah. R. Akiva is lenient and exempts him, and offers an inference to back up his leniency. For a full interpretation of this mishnah see my commentary in Mishnah Yomit on Pesahim 6:2.
  The Talmud says that R. Akiva did not really come to this leniency by a midrashic inference. Rather, it was a tradition that R. Eliezer had taught him, but R. Eliezer forgot the teaching. His midrash was merely meant to remind R. Eliezer of his tradition. It was not formative.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains another question from Rami b. Hama concerning the use in the Temple service of something that had been worshipped as an idol. Like yesterday’s section, one can get the sense that these questions are highly theoretical. They take halakhic categories from other fields of halakhah (yesterday the issue was the difference between an object attached and detached from the ground) and see if and how they’re applicable to the laws of idolatry.
  When it comes to certain laws, if an object has been modified in some ways, it loses its original status. For instance, if a thief steals a piece of wood and then modifies it into something else, he need not return the wood. He must only return the value of the wood. The question here is whether when he harvests the grain and eventually grinds it into flour it loses its status as a worshipped thing.
  Mar Zutra tries to derive the answer from a mishnah which refers to animals that cannot be offered on the altar since they engaged in bestiality.The flour is, in a sense, the offspring of the wheat. Thus if R. Eliezer and the sages argue whether the offspring of an animal prohibited to be offered on the altar can be offered, so too would they argue about whether the flour can be used for a minhah.
  The problem with Mar Zutra is that he assumes that the dispute occurs when the animal first became pregnant and then was subject to bestiality. But R. Nahman says there is no dispute in this case, for in this case the offspring was conceived when the animal was already prohibited. So too in the case of the standing-grain it was prohibited before the flour was “born.” Thus all should agree that it is prohibited for use on the altar.
  
  Daf 47a
  
  In this version, Mar Zutra cites R. Nahman’s statement to prove that all tannaim agree that the flour is prohibited because it is like a case where the animal was first pregnant and then subject to bestiality.However, in this version, the Talmud rejects the analogy. Flour is not to be compared to animal offspring. A fetus is an animal—it is just locked up inside its mother. Birth does not really transform it. In contrast, flour is different from its “wheat” mother and therefore, all tannaim would agree that it can be used on the altar.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues the discussion about cases where something was worshipped as an idol but since it was attached to the ground, the object did not become prohibited. Can parts of that object be used in the Temple service?
  The particular issue arises if the tree was not planted for the sake of idolatry and then was worshipped. If it was planted for the sake of idolatry, it is forbidden even for secular use. Furthermore, it is only a question for those rabbis who hold that in such cases the tree is permitted for secular use. While the branches and fruit could be used for non-religious purposes can the lulav be used for the mitzvah on Sukkot?
  R. Dimi says that the question was asked with regard to an asherah, a tree that had been planted to be worshipped that was then annulled. The concept of “disqualification” is that once an object has been disqualified it cannot go back and become qualified again. If we apply this concept to the lulav, then since the lulav could not have been used when the tree was still an asherah, it cannot be used later when the tree is no longer an asherah.
  The Talmud tries to solve the question by looking at another sugya in which the concept of “disqualification” appears. The blood of a wild animal (deer) or bird that has been slaughtered must be covered. If one covered it up and then it became uncovered, since he has fulfilled the mitzvah, he need not do it over again. If the wind covered it, and then again uncovered it, he must cover it. But if the wind covered it and it remains covered, he need not perform mitzvah.The Talmud then analyzes the concept behind this last law. If the wind covered it then the mitzvah was fulfilled. So why should it matter if the wind again uncovers it. Once the mitzvah has been fulfilled, it should not need to be fulfilled again. This seems to prove that there is no concept of “disqualification” with regard to mitzvot. Even though the mitzvah was fulfilled, in a sense “disqualified” from needing to be fulfilled, it needs to be fulfilled again.
  The answer is provided by noticing the difference between cases where this concept leads to a leniency and cases where it leads to a stringency. In the case of the blood, it would lead to a leniency—if the wind covered and then uncovered the blood, the notion of “disqualification” would lead us to conclude that the blood need not be covered again. Since it would lead to a leniency R. Papa did not invoke it. But maybe he would invoke the principle in the case of the lulav, for there it would lead to a stringency—once the tree was worshipped its branches cannot be used, even if the tree was annulled as an idol. Or maybe he would never invoke the principle, no matter the results.Since we don’t know whether R. Papa did invoke the principle to lead to a stringency, the question had to be asked.  But, as often is the case, there is no answer.
  IntroductionR. Papa here asks another question about using an object for a mitzvah that had once been worshipped as an idol.
  R. Papa asks the same kind of question again, and the Talmud notices the repetition. If he is asking about using the blue thread to make clothes for priests, well that is the same as the question asked by Rami b. Hama about making a minchah out of wheat that had been worshipped. And if the question is about tzitzit, that is a personal, non-Temple mitzvah, and that is the same question asked by Resh Lakish about the using a lulav that came from an asherah tree.
  R. Papa was not asking just about the wool, he was asking about other parts of the animal to make the musical instruments used in the Temple service.
  There is a dispute in many places in the Talmud over what is the main aspect of the Temple music—is it the playing of the instruments or is it the Levites’ singing. If we hold that the  main aspect is the instruments than surely we cannot use parts of an animal that had been worshipped. But if we hold that the main aspect is the singing, then maybe we can use them, because maybe they are there just to make the singing sound better. Alas, there is again no answer to this question.
  IntroductionAnother question of the same nature.
  The Talmud tries to understand Rabbah’s question. If he was asking about what a person is actually doing when he worships a spring—is he worshipping his own reflection (literally narcissism) or is he worshipping the water (in which case it would be prohibited), then the question should have been about water in a bowl and whether it can be put to secular use. So this must not be the meaning of his question.
  The question is whether he was worshipping just the water that is in front of him. That water has already flowed away and therefore any water subsequently drawn was not actually worshipped. Or was he worshipping the flow, meaning all of the water? If so, it would be prohibited to use the water from the stream.
  Water which belongs to the public cannot become prohibited. So his question must refer to water that bubbles up from the ground on the property of a private person. While the Talmud does not say so, there is no answer to this question either.  This is the end of this series of highly theoretical and abstract questions. I thought they were quite interesting and served as a window to the thinking of late amoraim.
  IntroductionThis section opens with a mishnah that deals with two subjects: 1) a person who lives adjacent to an idolatrous shrine; 2) the ritual impurity of idolatrous objects.
  If one shared a wall with an idolatrous shrine, meaning his house was next to this shrine, he need not tear down his house and move somewhere else. Since he lived there before the shrine was built he does not need to move. However, if the house should fall down he may not rebuild the wall that will be shared with the shrine. What he may do is withdraw four cubits and build his own wall, one which will not be shared with the shrine.
  The wall that is shared by the Jewish homeowner and the idolatrous shrine is considered to be jointly owned. The half that is next to the shrine is forbidden for Jews to use and the half that is next to the Jewish house is permitted.
  
  Daf 47b
  
  According to Deut. 7:26 a Jew must abhor idolatrous objects. The word for “abhor” is <i>“sheketz”,</i> which is the same word used for an impure creeping thing in Leviticus 11:31. From here the mishnah learns that just as creeping things transmit impurity, so too do idolatrous objects. The type of impurity that a creeping thing imparts is contact impurity. It does to impart impurity to one who carries it (without touching it). Contact impurity is a lesser type of impurity than carrying impurity.Rabbi Akiva learns the impurity of idolatrous objects from Isaiah 30:22, which explicitly compares idolatrous objects to menstruating women, both being impure and imparting impurity to others. A menstruating woman imparts impurity both through contact and through carrying. So too, according to Rabbi Akiva, do idolatrous objects. In other words Rabbi Akiva holds that the impurity of idolatrous objects is more serious than that of the creeping thing.
  The mishnah states that if his wall falls down, he should rebuild it four cubits within his own property. This way he is not building a wall for the shrine. But the problem is that this extra four cubits will now, de facto, become the property of the shrine.The solution, the Talmud suggests (somewhat grotesquely) is that he use it to make a toilet. The idolatrous Temple will not get much benefit out of it. But then there is the problem of modesty. A person should not go to the bathroom where everyone can see him.The Talmud offers two solutions. 1) The toilet will be for children, who do not need to be modest when they relieve themselves. 2) Instead of using the place for a toilet, he could put up a fence of thorns and shrubs. This will stop the idolatrous place from using that area and he will still not be providing a good wall for an idolatrous shrine.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with another new mishnah.
  If the shrine was created from the beginning to be idolatrous, it is totally prohibited from Jewish usage. If the building originally existed for other, non-idolatrous, purposes, and then was somehow modified to be idolatrous, the Jew needs to remove the renovations before it is permitted to use the building. In other words, the earlier structure is permitted and only the new parts that were created for idolatry are forbidden. If the idol was only brought into the house, the house is not actually “idolatrous.” The idol may be taken out and the house is permitted.
  The Talmud analyzes the underpinnings of Rav’s statement that if a person worships a house, he turns it into an idol that is now prohibited to Jews. A house consists of pieces that were once detached from the ground and now are attached. Things attached to the ground cannot become prohibited if they are worshipped. So it seems like Rav says although the house is currently attached, since its parts were once attached, it is still prohibited.
  The problem the Talmud has is that the Mishnah says that if he built the house for idolatry it is prohibited. By implication, if he built it and then worshipped it, it is not prohibited. In such a case, since it is already attached to the ground, it does not become prohibited.The resolution is that the house becomes prohibited whether he built it for idolatry and then worshipped it or if he worshipped it but did not build it for idolatry. In either case, the house becomes prohibited.
  To Rav there really should be four clauses in the mishnah: one where he built the house for idolatry, and another where he built it for other purposes and only later worshipped it. So why are there only three?The answer is that when it comes to annulling the house as an idol, it does not matter whether it was built for idolatry or only worshipped after it was already built, the tanna of the Mishnah included both categories in one clause.
  Ami refers to the second clause in the mishnah. For it to become prohibited he must plaster or cement inside the stone itself, not merely on its outside. It seems that what he is trying to say is that for something to be considered an idol, it must be an idol “on the inside.” Almost the same way we treat human beings—our identity is formed more by our inside, than by our external features.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on R. Ami. In the mishnah, stones seem to be analogous with the house. Since when it comes to the house, the plastering was on the outside and yet it was prohibited, so too when it comes to the stones. Even though the plastering is on the outside, the stones should be prohibited.The solution is that when it comes to the house, there is plastering on the inside too, between the bricks.The problem with this solution is that the Mishnah might be dealing with a case where the house was first plastered to be a regular house, and then was again plastered for it to be an idolatrous shrine. Such a house would be prohibited even though the plastering was on the outside.
  Ami was not referring to the forming of the stone but to its annulment. What he said was that even if the person had put the plaster or tile in the stone, if he removes it the stone goes back to being permitted (it is annulled). We might have thought that since the plaster was in the stone, it was like making the stone for idolatrous purposes, so R. Ami teaches us that it is not.
  
  Daf 48a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with another mishnah that says there are “three things.” This time asherot, idolatrous trees. The mishnah is largely parallel to the previous two mishnayot, one about three types of houses and one about three types of stones. The sugya on this mishnah is also very similar to the sugya on the previous mishnah.
  In the second clause, the mishnah says that if chopped and trimmed a tree for the sake of idolatry, the new growth is permitted. The House of R. Yannai says that this is only when he in essence started a new tree by either bending a shoot into the ground or grafting a new branch onto the tree.
  In the second clause, the mishnah says that if chopped and trimmed a tree for the sake of idolatry, the new growth is permitted. The House of R. Yannai says that this is only when he in essence started a new tree by either bending a shoot into the ground or grafting a new branch onto the tree.
  The mishnah itself seems to imply that simply chopping or trimming is enough. In other words, just a negative act is enough to render the tree forbidden. He does not need to also do the positive act of starting a new tree. 
  The Talmud again shifts the reference point of the interpretation of the mishnah (the same thing happened at the end of last week’s daf). The House of R. Yannai made their statement with regard to annulment. If the tree was planted not for the sake of idolatry and then someone bent a vine into the ground or grafted on to it for the sake of idolatry, both ways of starting new trees, all he has to do to annul the idolatrous nature is remove the new growth. We might have thought that the entire tree is considered to have been planted for the sake of idolatry. The House of R. Yannai says it is not.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses a case where a person bowed down to a tree. You might remember the discussion we had a couple of dapim ago about the difference between a tree planted for idolatry and a tree planted for regular purposes that was then worshipped. That discussion will return.
  According to Shmuel, if a person bowed down to a tree, the additional growth becomes prohibited.
  R. Elazar raises a difficulty on Shmuel. Simply bowing down to the tree is not enough to make it prohibited. He must actually modify it.
  Shmuel could reply that the mishnah agrees with the rabbis who said that if a tree was planted and only then worshipped, it is not prohibited. But he agrees with R. Yose b. Judah who says that the tree is prohibited.
  R. Ashi attacks Shmuel’s resolution. He holds that all tannaim, both the sages and R. Yose b. Judah, hold that the additional growth is prohibited. The disagreement is only over whether the part that grew before it was worshipped is also prohibited. So why then say that Shmuel agrees only with R. Yose b. Judah?The essence of this section is really a discussion of the dispute between R. Yose b. Judah and the sages. Do the sages hold that even the new growth is prohibited (like Shmuel impl ies)?Does R. Yose b. Judah hold that the whole tree is prohibited?
  Above (on 45b) the verses used for each rabbi were opposite. To resolve this minor difficulty, the Talmud suggests simply reversing the verses here too. We are now still left with R. Ashi’s difficulty.
  R. Ashi’s interpretation implies that all tannaim agree with Shmuel that the additional growth is prohibited. The problem is that this does not seem match the mishnah which says that if he chopped and trimmed the tree the additional growth is prohibited. This does not match the rabbis, because (according to R. Ashi) the rabbis hold that the additional growth is prohibited even if he did not chop or trim the tree. And it does not match R. Yose b. Judah because  hewould hold that if he chopped or trimmed the tree the whole tree is prohibited.
  The Talmud now makes both parties agree with the mishnah. R. Yose b. Judah could say that in general when one worships a tree already planted the whole tree is prohibited. But if he cut down some part of the tree for idolatrous reasons, then he is in essence saying that he only wants the new growth to be worshipped. Therefore, like the mishnah, the trunk is permitted but the additional growth is prohibited.
  The rabbis could also agree with the mishnah. To recall, they would hold that by just bowing down to the tree the new growth would be prohibited. So why then does it need to state that it is prohibited if he chopped or trimmed it? To teach you that even though he actually did something to the tree itself, the trunk remains permitted. Only the additional part is prohibited. This concludes this section of the sugya. R. Ashi has been resolved and Shmuel’s original statement is not dependent on the dispute between R. Yose b. Judah and the rabbis.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with a mishnah that defines an asherah, the type of the tree that the Torah prohibits.
  This section teaches the definition of the asherah, the idolatrous tree mentioned on several occasions in the Torah. According to the first opinion in the mishnah an asherah has idols underneath it, but it itself is not worshipped. According to Rabbi Shimon the tree itself is an idolatrous object. The mishnah now tells a story that happened in Sidon, where there was a suspicion that idolaters were worshipping a certain tree. Underneath the tree was a heap of stones. Rabbi Shimon instructed the other rabbis to examine the heap of stones and when they did they found an image. From here Rabbi Shimon concluded that the tree itself was not worshipped, but rather the image underneath the tree. Therefore the tree was permitted for Jews to use.
  Today’s mishnah seems to imply that there is only one type of Asherah. But the previous mishnah said that there are three types. So the Talmud now reinterprets this mishnah so that it supplements the previous one. There are two types of trees where the tree itself has been worshiped and all agree that the tree is prohibited. The disagreement is over a case where there is an idol underneath the tree. The rabbis say that this too is an asherah and it is prohibited.
  How can one know if a tree is an Asherah? If we see someone bowing down to a tree, then there is no problem, we know its prohibited. But that is usually not the case. Rav says that if we see idolatrous priests sitting under a tree and not eating its fruits we can assume that they worship the tree. Otherwise they would eat the fruit. Shmuel says that even if they are going to use the dates to make beer, if they say that the dates are for the “House of Nitzrafei,” the tree is prohibited. This seems to have been some place of idolatry. The word is probably Persian. It appears in one other place in the Talmud (Shabbat 116a, where we learn that neither Rav nor Shmuel would go there. The halakhah in this case follows Shmuel. Even if the priests use the dates, the tree is considered to be idolatrous.
  
  Daf 48b
  
  IntroductionThis section opens with another mishnah about the asherah tree.
  One is not allowed to sit in the shade of an asherah, for by doing so he would be benefiting from an idolatrous object. However, sitting in its shade alone will not cause him to be made impure, because he did not actually sit underneath the tree. He is not allowed to pass under the asherah, and if he does he is impure. 
  Obviously one cannot sit in the shade of an asherah tree. This is clearly making use of the tree. The answer is that the mishnah teaches that he may not sit even in the “shade of its shade.” This is the shade that goes beyond the height of the tree.The Talmud has now distinguished between the “shade” and the “shade of its shade.” We would think that the rule is stricter with regard to the shade. So if it is forbidden to sit in the “shade of its shade” then one who sits in the “shade” should be impure, like one who walks under the tree according to the mishnah.The Talmud rejects that—even sitting in the shade that corresponds to the height of the tree does not defile. The Mishnah teaches that while sitting in the shade does not defile, it is still prohibited to sit in the shade of its shade.
  This is another version of Rabbah b. Bar Hannah’s statement. Obviously if one sits in the shade of the asherah tree he is pure. The mishnah did not need to teach that. After all, in the next clause we learn that he is impure only if he passes right underneath. The innovation is that this is true even if he sits in the shade of the tree’s height.But now this implies that he may sit in the shade of its shade.The answer is that it is always forbidden to sit in any form of shade. The innovation of the mishnah is that even if he sits in the shade of the height of the tree, he is still pure. To summarize the two versions, which are complementary, not alternatives: According to version 1, we needed the first clause to teach us that he may not sit in the shade of its shade. According to version 2, we needed the second clause to teach that even if he sits in the shade of its height, he is still pure.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses passing underneath an asherah tree.
  This section explains the source for the notion that walking under an asherah tree defiles. First of all, we need to assume that there are remnants of a sacrifice are under the tree. The tree itself does not defile. Second, we need a biblical source for the notion that idolatrous sacrifices defile. This is located in the juxtaposition of idol worship and “sacrifices for the dead.”We should note the notion that idolatry ritually defiles is not found in the Bible. It seems to be the invention of the rabbis.
  If the mishnah reads “passed” it means that he should not pass under the tree, but if he does, he is pure. If it reads, “passes” it means that he can pass under the tree intentionally (ab initio).The two amoraim seem to argue about the correct reading, or at least understanding of the mishnah. But the Talmud notes that they do not disagree. Both hold that if there is an alternative road one should not pass under the tree. And both hold that if there is no alternative road, he can pass under the tree even ab initio.
  R. Sheshet was blind, so he needed his attendant to help show him where to walk. He told his attendant that when he gets to the place with an asherah tree, he should help him run past so that he spends as little time as possible going under the tree.In light of what it said above, the Talmud struggles to figure out the circumstance of this instruction. If there was no other way around, then why should he hurry past? It is permissible to walk under the tree. And if there was another way around, then he should not go underneath it at all! The answer is that there was no other road. While a normal person may pass underneath without concern, a rabbi of great eminence such as R. Sheshet should do all he can to avoid it. Since there is no other road, he has no choice. But at least he can rush through.
  IntroductionToday’s section starts with yet another mishnah about the asherah tree.
  In the winter one is allowed to sow plants underneath the asherah tree, since the shade provided by the tree will not benefit the plants. In this case he is not benefiting from an idolatrous object. However, he may not plant lettuce underneath the asherah, even in the winter, since shade is always beneficial to lettuce.Rabbi Yose states that even vegetables may not be planted in winter, since the falling leaves will act as manure for the vegetables and therefore the planter would be benefiting from an idolatrous object. In other words, although he will not benefit from the shade since he will benefit in other ways, it is forbidden.
  The rabbis in the mishnah allow one to plant underneath an asherah tree even though its foliage will fall onto the plants and fertilize them. Rabbi Yose prohibits. The Talmud extracts a principle over which they dispute. In this case, the tree is fertilized by the ground and by the falling leaves. The rabbis hold that when there are two causes, one permitted and one prohibited, the product is permitted. R. Yose holds that it is not.
  The rabbis and R. Yose disagree in another mishnah, and their positions seem to be opposite of what they are here. That mishnah talks about destroying an idol by grinding it up and scattering it to the wind. R. Yose allows him to do so, even though it may fertilize the ground. According to the interpretation here, he is allowed to do so because there will be two causes in nourishing the plant—the ground up idol and the ground. The rabbis are strict in such cases. Thus both the rabbis and R. Yose contradict themselves.
  R. Yose allows one to crush up the idol because that is destroying it. The fact that it will also form manure is not significant. When it comes to our mishnah, the case of the leaves falling onto the ground, he is not destroying anything so it is not permitted.
  The first attempt to resolve the rabbis is to reverse their position with that of R. Yose. Of course that will cause R. Yose to again contradict himself.So a better way to resolve the issue is to say that the rabbis don’t contradict themselves because as the value of the foliage as manure goes up, its value as shade goes down. So there is no net gain and therefore the rabbis are not strict.This is compared with an animal which is disqualified from being a sacrificed. The animal should be sold and the profits given to the Temple. The rabbis wanted to make sure that the maximum profits go to the Temple. While skinning the animal whole would increase the value of the hide, it would decrease the value of the flesh. Therefore, it is forbidden to skin the animal whole. So too here—when the foliage falls its value as manure is offset by its loss as shade.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues the discussion of “this one and that one causes.” To recall, these are cases where one cause would lead to the product being prohibited and the other cause would lead to it being permitted. According to the paradigm of the mishnah about the leaves falling from the asherah tree, R. Yose holds the stringent view.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty from a source about orlah, fruit that grows during its first three years. One may not use such fruit. According to R. Yose, one can use the young shoot to plant a new tree, but one may not plant the nut, because the nut is fruit. However, ex post facto, R. Yose agrees that if one plants a nut, the fruit that grows eventually from the tree may be used. This is because the tree that grows is a case of “this one and that one causes.” The tree grows from the nut, but the nutrients of the ground and water also cause to the tree to grow. Thus it seems that R. Yose is lenient in such cases.
  
  Daf 49a
  
  This is an attempt at a resolution of the contradiction between the two statements of R. Yose. It could be that R. Yose is stringent in cases of idolatry. He would hold that in cases involving idolatry when there are two causes, the product is still prohibited (i.e. the case of the mishnah with the falling leaves) but lenient in other cases (the case of orlah). The problem is that the Talmud cites another case involving idolatry. These cases are also “this and that are causes.” The manure fertilizes the field, but so does the dirt that is already there. The vetch fattens the cow, but so does other food. And yet the Talmud suggests the R. Yose is the lenient baraita because even in cases of idolatry he holds that two causes are permitted.
  The Talmud rejects the identification of the baraitot and suggests that instead of a dispute between R. Yose and the rabbis, we have here a dispute between R. Eliezer and the rabbis. This means that R. Yose can be stringent in the case of idolatry (the mishnah) but lenient in other cases (orlah).The following section will attempt to identify which dispute between the rabbis and R. Eliezer is also about cases in which there are two causes.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section referred to a case where a field was fertilized with the product of idolatry or a cow fattened with the product of idolatry. It was suggested the R. Eliezer was stringent and the rabbis were lenient. Thus R. Eliezer holds that when there are two causes, the product is prohibited and the rabbis hold the product is permitted. The Talmud now searches for the source of this dispute.
  Eliezer and the rabbis disagree over a case where two pieces of leaven (starter dough) fall into a batch of dough and cause the dough to rise (neither was sufficient in and of itself). One of these pieces is terumah and can be eaten only by priests, and one is non-sacred and can be eaten by anyone. According to R. Eliezer, the status of the dough follows whatever the last piece of leaven was, because this is the leaven that causes fermentation. Abaye adds that if the forbidden leaven was left in there, then in all cases the dough is prohibited. Thus R. Eliezer seems to hold that in cases with two causes, one permitted and one prohibited, the result is prohibited. The rabbis would be lenient. This seems to locate the dispute between the two baraitot in yesterday’s section.
  The problem with the above suggestion is that it depends on Abaye’s explanation of R. Eliezer. Abaye is the one who implied that in cases of two causes R. Eliezer prohibits. Abaye’s explanation allows us to pair R. Eliezer and the sages dispute with the two baraitot concerning the field fertilized with idolatry or cow fed with idolatry. But the simple reading of R. Eliezer is that the ruling depends on which substance is put in last. If the permitted leaven was put in last, R. Eliezer may permit the dough even though the forbidden dough was still present. In other words, R. Eliezer may not hold that in all cases of two causes the result is prohibited. He may hold that the principle is that we simply follow whatever was put in last.
  Introduction
  We are still trying to identify the authors of the two baraitot concerning a field fertilized with manure from an idolatrous source or a cow fed with food used in idol worship. Earlier we said that this was R. Eliezer and the sages. The Talmud now brings another dispute between these two parties.
  Eliezer refers to a situation in which bread was baked in an oven heated up with wood from an asherah tree. This is another case of “this and that cause” for the prohibited wood and the permitted oven were used to cook the bread. Thus R. Eliezer is the strict opinion—in cases where there are two causes, one prohibited and one permitted, the rule is stringent.
  We have identified R. Eliezer as representing the view that when there are two causes, the product is prohibited. But who are the rabbis who disagree with him. It can’t be the rabbis in that very mishnah, because they rule even more strictly.
  The second possibility is that it refers to the rabbis in the mishnah about the two leavening agents, one prohibited and one permitted. They hold that no matter what order they are put into the dough, the dough is permitted. But just because they are lenient when it comes to terumah dough does not mean that they are lenient even with regard to idolatry.
  The Talmud resolves the matter by saying that R. Yose does hold that when there are two causes the product is permitted, as we saw in the case of planting a nut of orlah—it is permitted to use what grows because there were two causes, nut and ground. So why then does he say that it is problematic to plant under an asherah tree because the leaves will fertilize the plant? This, the Talmud answers, was not his own opinion. He was only responding to the rabbis—you rabbis who hold that when there are two causes the product is prohibited should hold that planting under an asherah should be prohibited even in the winter.And the rabbis would say it is permitted because while there is a gain in fertilization, there is also a loss because the shade prevents them from getting sun.
  It is forbidden to plant under an asherah tree, even in the winter.
  The produce in this garden is prohibited in accordance with R. Yose.
  
  Daf 49b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section consists of the next mishnah. What happens if someone uses pieces of the asherah tree for various purposes? What is the status of that which they were used for?
  It is forbidden to use pieces of wood that come from an asherah tree.  This mishnah teaches that the forbidden status of the tree remains in the pieces of the tree that are separated from it.If one used this wood to heat a new oven, the oven must be destroyed.  Since the first heating of an oven helps shape and finish the oven, the oven itself was built through the aid of an idolatrous object, and it itself is therefore forbidden.  However, if the oven was old, one merely needs to let the oven cool before using it again.  In such a case the heat produced by the burning of the asherah wood is forbidden but not the oven itself.
  If he baked bread in an oven heated by the wood from an asherah, the bread is forbidden.  Furthermore, if that loaf should be mixed in with other loaves, they are all forbidden, since each one may be the loaf which was made in the oven heated by the asherah wood.  We should note that in some other cases mixtures of prohibited and permissible goods can be fixed.  For instance if one pound of terumah flour should be mixed in with 100 pounds of terumah flour, one may take out one pound of terumah and give it to the kohen, even though that one pound is not the same pound that fell in.  Through this process the remainder becomes permitted to anyone to eat.  Our mishnah is especially stringent with idolatrous items.Rabbi Eliezer does make an attempt to remedy the situation without causing the loss of the bread.  If he baked a loaf using asherah wood to heat his oven, he may throw the value of the wood into the Dead Sea, thereby nullifying any benefit he received from that wood.  Afterwards the loaf may be eaten by a Jew.  The Sages disagree.  According to their opinion there is no way to redeem something that was made by using an idolatrous item.
  This section teaches the same thing that was learned in the previous section, only it uses a different example.  Here the wood was used to make a shuttle, a piece of wood used on a loom to weave cloth.  Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages have the same dispute on this section of the mishnah as they did in the previous one.
  Introduction
  Today’s section discusses why the mishnah needed to provided two examples of things made by using the wood of the asherah tree—bread made in an oven heated by the wood of an asherah tree and weaving shuttle made from wood from such a tree. What would we not have known if the mishnah had provided only one example.
  If the only case in the mishnah was that of the baking bread with the asherah wood, I might have thought that in that case R. Eliezer was lenient because by the time the loaf was cooked the wood had been burned in the oven. Since the prohibited substance is destroyed, there is room to be lenient and he can destroy the amount of value equivalent to that loaf and the other loaves are permitted. But with the shuttle that was taken from the tree, when the clothes are done the shuttle remains. So we might have thought that in that case he agrees with the rabbis, there is nothing that can be done besides destroy all of the clothes (a large loss). Therefore, the mishnah had to teach us the case of the clothing.
  This is simply the opposite of above. If the mishnah had included only the second case, I might have thought that the rabbis were strict with regard to the shuttle because it is not destroyed when making the clothes. But they would be more lenient in the case of bread. Therefore, both are necessary.
  One is allowed to destroy the equivalent value of the bread or clothes rather than destroy all of the bread or clothes.
  According to R. Adda b. Ahavah if casks of wine that are forbidden (libated wine, yayin nesekh) are mixed up with permitted casks of wine, they must all be destroyed. One cannot bring a value equivalent to the one forbidden cask to the Dead Sea. This is because the wine itself is a prohibited substance whereas the loaf is not a prohibited substance. It was made with a prohibited substance.Hisda says that the same law holds true for both.
  A case such as this actually happened and R. Hisda instructed the person to throw away the value of the libated wine. He then could use all of the wine.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya opens with a mishnah about annulling an asherah tree.
  As we will learn in the next chapter, a pagan can “annul” his idol by stopping to treat it as such.  If he does so, what was formerly an idol reverts to being a normal object and a Jew may use it.  This mishnah teaches that removing a piece of an asherah tree is a sign that it is no longer being worshipped.  Evidently the asherah was not used by the pagan for anything but idol worship.  If the pagan does make even the most minimal use of the tree, such as using its leaf, it loses its status as an asherah.  The only exception to this case is if he removes something from the tree for its own sake.  In other words, if he smoothed the tree to make it look better, it is still an asherah and it is still forbidden.  If he did so in order to get a branch, he has annulled its status as an asherah and it is permitted.
  The mishnah taught that if he smoothed off pieces from the tree because he wanted the pieces (for his own sake) then the tree is permitted, but if for the tree’s sake, the tree remains prohibited. But what about the pieces? Are they permitted since they are no longer part of the tree?While amoraim dispute the issue, the baraita says that if an idolater smoothed off the pieces, they are permitted in either case. If the Jew smooths off the tree, the pieces remain prohibited because a Jew cannot annul the idol worship of a non-Jew.
  Rav and Shmuel now begin a debate over annulling pieces that have become broken off of idols. According to Rav, the pieces that have become broken off must be annulled. According to the revised version of Shmuel, only when the idol is in its natural form, must it be annulled. When pieces break off people will not assume that they retain their sanctity.
  The Talmud tries to connect this dispute with the broader dispute over whether idolaters worship fragments of idols—Rav would hold that they do, and Shmuel would say that they do not.The Talmud then rejects this understanding. All hold that idolaters worship fragments. But these pieces are “fragments of fragments.” Over this there is a dispute.
  According to this understanding of the dispute, Rav and Shmuel generally agree that fragments of fragments are permitted. But this is a case of an idol which was made of pieces and broke apart on its own. Rav holds that since an ordinary man, a non-craftsman, can put it back together, the pieces retain their sanctity and must be annulled. But Shmuel says that the idol need only be annulled when it is its natural form. Since this idol has already been broken, it need not be annulled.
  IntroductionMishnah Sanhedrin 7:6 teaches that one who throws stones at a statue of Mercurius (the Roman god, Mercury) is guilty of worshipping the idol, for that is how Mercurius is typically worshipped.  Our mishnah deals with the status of stones found next to the merculis statue.
  According to Rabbi Ishmael, if three stones were found next to the Mercurius statue, we can assume that they were used in worshipping the statue, and they are therefore prohibited.  If there were only two, then we cannot assume that they were placed there for such a purpose and they are permitted.According to the Sages the issue is not the number of stones but rather their proximity to the statue.  Those found next to the idol are prohibited and those found further away are permitted.  Even if three are found further away, we can assume that they were not used in worship.
  According to the Talmud, the rabbis hold that idolaters worship fragments of idols. So if pieces are found on the ground and they can be seen with the Mercurius idol, then they must come from the idol.
  If R. Ishmael also holds that idolaters worship fragments then why are two permitted? And if they don’t worship fragments, then why should three be prohibited? In other words, it’s hard to understand R. Ishmael in light of the issue of whether they worship fragments.
  Yitzchak b. Joseph now offers a comprehensive interpretation of the dispute. If we know that these stones fell from the Mercurius idol, then R. Ishmael and the sages agree that they are prohibited. Even the one who holds that idolaters do not worship idols would agree in this case because Mercurius idols are made by a pile of rocks. This is not a “broken piece.” If it’s from the Mercurius, then it is simply part of it.
  The dispute can also not be where the stones are close because we would have to assume that they fell from the Mercurius.
  
  Daf 50a
  
  They differ with regard to stones found within four cubits of the Mercurius, but ones we do not know came from the larger idol.If there are three together then R. Ishmael holds that this is a “small Mercurius” which people make near a “big Mercurius” and therefore they are prohibited. Two is nothing and therefore it is permitted.
  The rabbis do not perceive this to be a “small Mercurius.” So then all that matters is whether the stones are thought to have come from the Mercurius.
  IntroductionThis sugya continues to discuss the stones found near the Mercurius idol.
  Above R. Yitzchak had said that if we know that the stones fell from the Mercurius, they are permitted. But neither the sages nor the rabbis in the mishnah say exactly that.We should note that the terminology here is unusual. Usually the word ורמינהו means that two tannaitic sources disagree. But here it seems to be a difficulty from a tanna on and amora.
  Rava here emends the first source so that it reads “found” and not “fell.”There is still something strange here, for if the word is “found” then what is the sentence really telling us.
  According to the mishnah, R. Ishmael seems to always allow two stones found next to a Mercurius. But according to a baraita, if they are within reach of the Mercurius, even two are prohibited.Rava explains that if they are within one reach they are prohibited but if they are as far apart as two reaches they are permitted. This situation is defined as a case where there is a mound between the stones and the Mercurius.
  Are stones to be considered a Mercurius if they are only right next to each other? A baraita states clearly that a Mercurius is three stones, one on top of two.Rava explains that that baraita refers to the main part of a Mercurius, which indeed is one stone on two. But once the main part is built, additional stones can be added on the side.I want to point out that the placing of stones on something is reminiscent of the Jewish practice of putting stones on a grave. Unnaturally placed stones are a way of people saying, “we were here.” Unfortunately, I was at a funeral today and so this sugya came to mind.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins with the story of the destruction of King Yannai’s palace.
  Yannai (Alexander Yannai) was a Hasmonean king who ruled between 103-76 B.C.E. According to this source, when his palace was destroyed, the Romans turned it into a palace for Mercurius. Then other idolaters came, conquered the place and did not worship Mercurius, so they used the stones to pave the ground. Thus we have stones that were once part of idols now being used to pave roads. Can a Jew walk there? Have they been annulled?  Some rabbis did, and others did not.As far as the historicity of this story goes, there may be some echo here of the fact that Israel was placed between the two great powers, the Seleucids in the north and the Ptolemies in the South. The rulers of Israel often found themselves caught between these two powers. I do not know if one of these powers worshipped Mercury while the other did not.
  Yohanan refers to a very righteous person who would walk on those stones. This R. Menahem son of R. Simai was so holy that he would never look even at the image on a coin.
  The rabbis who did not walk on these roads held that they were like idolatrous offerings that can never be annulled. Thus although they were taken down from the Temple, they still retain their idolatrous nature.
  The one who did walk on these stones held that they are not to be considered “idolatrous offerings” because stones were not offered on the altar. Only things like actual idolatrous offerings cannot be annulled. Stones can be annulled.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains two stories in which a rabbi comes to a town and he teaches a tradition that no one understands. Then, in the blink of an eye, a rabbi saves the day and offers to interpret the tradition.
  The baraita distinguishes between an idolater who uses stones from a Mercurius to pave the roads, in which case a Jew can walk on the roads, and a Jew who uses these stones, in which case it is prohibited for the Jew to walk on the roads. But Rabbah b. Yirmiyah cannot explain this distinction. “Carpenter” here seems to be a nickname for a scholar, probably due to the high level of skill a carpenter needs to shape his material.
  
  Daf 50b
  
  Sheshet explains both the difficulty and the solution. The difficulty was how can we annul a sacrificial offering. If these stones are considered offerings they, unlike idols, can never be annulled. The answer is that for an offering to be prohibited it must be like something offered on the altar, and the stones are not like the offerings we put on the altar. The stones are more like an idol and therefore when the idolater treats them with a lack of sanctity, they become permitted.
  This case is unrelated to our larger topic and is brought here because it has the same format and same rabbis as the previous story. Two time periods are being compared—the Sabbatical year when one cannot plant or work the field and “hol hamoed,” the intermediate days of the festivals of Sukkot and Pesah when certain types of work should not be performed. But again, no one can solve the statement.
  Ravina first needs to figure out what the difficulty is. If we think the difficulty is in figuring out why one can treat the tree on the Sabbatical year but not on the festival, this is not a difficulty. The Torah prohibits certain types of agricultural work but there is no prohibition of exertion. Taking care of the tree is not one of those forbidden labors. But on the festival it is prohibited to do all sorts of activities that require exertion. This would include taking care of the tree. So this should not be a difficulty at all.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the “unsolved” baraita we began to discuss yesterday. For ease of reference I am placing it back here in full:We may remove worms [from a tree] and place manure [on a cut branch] during the Sabbatical year, but we may not remove worms [from a tree] and place manure [on a cut branch] during the [intermediate days of] a festival. On both these occasions we may not prune, but we may smear oil on the place of pruning both during the festival and during the Sabbatical year.
  The Talmud now suggests that the difficulty is why placing manure is permitted while pruning is prohibited. But this too can be easily explained. It is permitted to preserve a tree during hol hamoed and the sabbatical year. One need not let the tree die and evidently placing manure on cuts in the tree is meant to prevent them from dying. But pruning strengthens the tree and is therefore prohibited.
  The next possible difficulty is that our baraita that permits placing manure on the tree during the Sabbatical year contradicts another baraita that allows this only during the time leading up to the Sabbatical year. During the Sabbatical year itself, it is forbidden.
  This difficulty also may be solved. There may be two different kinds of placing manure on the branch—one is to strengthen the tree, and this is prohibited. The other is to preserve the tree and is permitted.
  Again, the Talmud tries to claim that our baraita, which allows smearing oil on the tree, contradicts another baraita which allows smearing oil on unripe figs but only before the Sabbatical year, not on the Sabbatical year itself. But again, this is not really a difficulty. In our case the oil is being smeared on the tree to preserve it after it was pruned. Again, preserving the tree is permitted. But smearing oil on unripe figs is to fatten them up and it is prohibited.
  Finally we get an answer as to what the difficulty is. It is forbidden to place manure on the tree on the festival while it is permitted to smear oil. But both actions are for preserving the tree—so why is one permitted and the other forbidden?
  Breaking the stick in front of the idol is considered an act of idolatry and thus if an Israelite does so he is liable. But throwing the stick at or in front of the idol is not considered an act of idolatry, and thus one who does so is exempt. But why the difference? After all, both have a certain amount of similarity to an act performed in the Temple. Breaking the stick is like slaughtering an animal, and throwing the stick is like sprinkling the blood.Rava explains the difference. For an act to be like sprinkling blood it needs to be an act that is broken up into several parts. When one sprinkles blood on the altar, it is done in parts. Since the stick is thrown all at once, one is not liable.
  Trigger warning—this one is a bit gross.The idol here is worshipped by giving it feces or urine. But when it comes to the feces this seems to be like “unbroken sprinkling” for which one should not, according to Rava, be liable. Rava resolves the difficulty by saying that it refers to moist excrement, where there is “broken up sprinkling.” The feces does not all land at the same time.Don’t say I didn’t warn you. But aren’t you glad you are not part of the group that worships this idol?
  
  Daf 51a
  
  The Talmud now tries to say that tannaim would disagree over the case of breaking a stick in front of an idol. R. Judah holds that for one to be liable for an act of idolatry it needs to be like an act of slaughter. Slaughtering a locust or breaking a stick is like slaughtering an animal and therefore one is liable. But the other rabbis hold that the act must be like an act done inside the Temple. Inside the Temple locusts are not slaughtered nor are sticks broken. Therefore one who does these acts is not liable for idolatry.
  The Talmud rejects the comparison. No tannaim hold that it must be like the act of slaughter, and therefore they all agree with Rav that one is liable for breaking the stick in front of the idol. The argument about slaughtering the locust is whether this is similar enough to slaughtering an animal in the Temple. R. Judah holds that since the locust has a neck it is close enough to an animal that one who worships an idol by slaughtering a locust is liable. The other rabbis disagree.
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s daf we learned that if a Jew threw a stick at an idol he is not liable for idol worship since this is not similar to the sprinkling of the blood done in the Temple. Such sprinkling was “broken up,” not done all at once, whereas the stick is thrown all in one piece. In order to be liable for an act of idolatry, it must be similar to those acts done in the Temple. Our sugya asks how this is different from stones thrown at a Mercurius statue which become prohibited immediately.
  The Mishnah prohibits Jews from using stones that are placed by a Mercurius idol. These seem to be like a stick thrown at an idol—that is how Mercurius is worshipped, by having stones thrown at it. But if so, why are the stones prohibited? The entire stone is thrown at once, and therefore it is not like the sprinkling of blood done on the altar.The question was posed to many rabbis, and finally answered by Rav. The stone thrown at the idol becomes part of the idol. In other words, it is not an offering. It is an idol in and of itself.
  The problem with Rav’s answer is that there are some sages who hold that an idol is not prohibited for a Jew to use until a non-Jew actually worships it. This stone thrown at the Mercurius should be permitted because it has not yet been worshipped.Nahman answers that each stone is both an idol but is also an offering to the last stone. This way the stones are worshipped. Theoretically, the last stone thrown should be permitted since it has not yet been worshipped by having another . But since we do not know which stone was last, they must all be prohibited.Ashi says that each stone is an offering to itself and to the next one. Thus the stone in a sense “worships itself.” Talented stone!
  The mishnah lists objects which are prohibited if found on top of a Mercurius. The problem the Talmud has is with the wreaths of grain or grape-clusters. There are two problems here: 1) nothing like these two objects is put on the altar; 2) they are put all at one time. This is not “sprinkling that is broken up.”
  Rava explains that for these wreaths of grain or grape-clusters to be prohibited, they must have been harvested for idolatrous purposes from the outset. The very fact that they were placed on the Mercurius is not sufficient to make them prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the issue of offering sacrifices with blemishes.
  Inside the Temple one cannot sacrifice a blemished animal. Therefore, if one sacrifices a blemished animal to an idol, he is exempt. As we have seen earlier, for an act to be considered truly idolatrous, it must be similar to acts of worship performed in the Temple.
  Rava determined that the defect of which R. Abahu was speaking was a missing limb. This is because he compares the prohibition of sacrificing for idolatry with the rules governing sacrifices for the sons of Noah. The sons of Noah is a term used to refer to non-Jews who observe (at least) seven main laws, one of which is the prohibition of idolatry. The rules of sacrifice governing them are not as strict as those for Jews, and they may sacrifice animals with blemishes in their eyes. But they may not sacrifice those with missing limbs. Therefore, for the person worshiping an idol to be exempt, the blemish must be of the more serious kind, it must be missing a limb.
  Elazar used the phrase “of every living thing” to derive the law that a Noahide cannot sacrifice an animal missing a limb. We know that Noah sacrificed animals when he left the ark. Therefore we can assume that God told him to bring on the ark animals that could be sacrificed. But elsewhere those same words are used to exclude a “trefa,” a term used to refer to animal that has a wound that will cause it die in a defined period of time.The Talmud then resolves the difficulty by saying that the exclusion of a trefa from being permitted for sacrifice comes from the words “to keep seed alive.” The animals that Noah brought on the ark had to be able to procreate, and the assumption here is that trefot cannot procreate.
  Some rabbis hold that a trefa can bear offspring, and thus could not be excluded by the words “to keep seed alive.” So then we would need the verse “from every living thing” to exclude a trefa from being eligible for sacrifice, and we would not have a verse for excluding animals missing a limb.The Talmud now suggests that the source for the exclusion of trefot is the words “with you”—the animal must be like Noah, who we suppose for now was “whole” and not a “trefa.”
  So how do we know that Noah himself was not a trefa. At first the Talmud argues that we can learn that he was whole from one of the adjectives used to describe him, “without blemish” or “righteous.” The problem is that those adjectives may refer to his character qualities and not his bodily ones.The Talmud resolves the difficulty by noting that if we assume that the phrase “with you” means “animals like you” it makes no sense for God to tell Noah to take only blemished animals onto the ark. Thus the phrase “like you” must mean that Noah was physically unblemished. We now have a source to exclude trefot, and the words “of every living thing” can be used to exclude animals missing a limb.
  The word “with you” excludes the trefa. So then why does the Torah also have to use the phrase, “to keep seed alive.” This teaches that the animals must be able to procreate. They cannot be so old that they can no longer procreate nor can they be castrated. The purpose of bringing them on the ark was not so that they could keep Noah company (a cute thought, to be sure). The purpose was clearly for them to repopulate the world after the flood. Thus while the word does not mean that Noah could not bring a trefa, but it does mean that the animals he brought on board had to be fertile.
  IntroductionEarlier we learned that the Mercurius idol was worshipped by throwing stones at it. But what if someone sacrificed an animal to it? Is he liable even though this is not the normal way in which one worships a Mercurius?
  Elazar rules that although Mercurius is usually worshipped by having stones thrown at it, if one slaughters an animal to it, he is still liable. This is because there is an “extra” verse that implies that one is liable for worshipping idols even if it is not in their “usual” way. Deuteronomy 12:30 is read as teaching that one is liable for worshipping idols by doing so in the way that the nations (the goyim) serve their God. This would be the idol’s “usual” way. So then what more do we learn from Leviticus 17:7? We learn that a Jew is liable even if he worships the idol in a way that is not usual to the idol.
  The Talmud brings up the problem that Leviticus 17:7 is already used in a different midrash. To understand this midrash I think it is important to see the full verses:(3) If anyone of the house of Israel slaughters an ox or sheep or goat in the camp, or does so outside the camp,(4) And does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the LORD, before the LORD’s Tabernacle, bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man: he has shed blood; that man shall be cut off from among his people.(5) This is in order that the Israelites may bring the sacrifices which they have been making in the open field—that they may bring them before the LORD, to the priest, at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and offer them as sacrifices of well-being to the LORD.”There is some repetition here, particularly between verses four and five. To solve this, the midrash suggests that they refer to different historical settings. The first two verses deal with a period in Jewish history where private altars were prohibited, once the Tabernacle was set up. Thus verse four says that he must bring his offerings to the Tent of Meeting. The verse establishes the punishment for not doing so and a verse in Deuteronomy states the warning. These verses deal with a period in which the animal was dedicated and actually sacrificed when it was prohibited to offer outside of the central sanctuary, after the Tabernacle was erected.
  
  Daf 51b
  
  The verses that follow, from verse 5 and onwards, refer to a case where the person dedicated the animal when it was still permitted to offer animals on private altars, but then sacrificed it after the Tabernacle had already been erected, when private altars were prohibited. Although the animal was permitted as a sacrifice when it was dedicated, it was forbidden to sacrifice it. And even though he offered it on an altar, Scripture treats this as if the altar was irrelevant. It is like sacrificing in an open field.
  This is the end of the midrashic baraita. Leviticus 17:7 is the negative commandment against sacrificing on a private altar. There is a lighter penalty in the case where he dedicated before it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars—it is only a negative commandment. This is unlike dedicating and sacrificing when private altars are prohibited which is punishable by karet, as the verse explicitly states.In any case, this concludes the long difficulty. This verse is used here as the negative commandment for slaughtering on a private altar. So how can R. Elazar use it to prove that one who worships an idol in a way not usual to that idol is liable?
  Rava says that since the verse uses the word “anymore” we can read it as alluding to two prohibitions. The first is to sacrifice on private altars and the second is to worship an idol in an unusual manner.
  IntroductionThe second mishnah of this chapter continues to discuss items found in proximity to the Mercurius idol, and whether or not these items are assumed to have been used in idolatrous worship and therefore prohibited.
  The first mishnah of this chapter taught that one typical way of worshipping the Mercurius idol was to lay stones next to it.  In the second mishnah we see ways in which Mercurius was not worshipped.  It was not worshipped by having money, clothes or other vessels laid next to it.  Since this is not typical Mercurius worship, it is permitted for Jews to use these items.However, if anything that is normally sacrificed is found next to a Mercurius, these items are forbidden to Jews.  Since these items are generally used in idol worship, and evidently also in the worship of Mercurius, they are forbidden if they are found in proximity to the idol.
  Oshaia’s midrash is based on two verses which seem to contradict each other, for one mentions wood and stone and silver and gold whereas the second one mentions only silver and gold. The answer is that the verse teaches that for the items found “with them” to be prohibited they must be like the items found on them—decorative. Silver and gold are obviously decorative, but for the wood and stone to be prohibited they too must be decorative.Below the Talmud will ask how this proves the halakhah in the mishnah. After all, the list of items in the first half could also be decorative. It seems to me that R. Oshaia’s midrash here originally proved a halakhah that was different from that found in the mishnah.
  The Talmud asks why we can’t run the analogy in the opposite direction. The verse that says “with them” implies that anything that is with them is prohibited, so too anything that is “on them” should also be prohibited, even if it is not decorative. In other words, why use the analogy to create a leniency, why not use the opposite analogy to create a stringency?The answer is that if that was the case, we would not even need the verse “on them.” We could derive the full halakhah from the other verse. The mere existence of a second verse implies that one must be a limitation on the other.
   The problem with R. Oshaia’s statement is that it does not really explain the mishnah. The mishnah said that a coin, garment or vessel found near the idol are permitted. But surely these all can be decorative! The Talmud answers that these are permitted if they are not placed in a decorative fashion on or near the idol. But, by implication, if they were placed in a decorative fashion, they would be prohibited.The need to limit the mishnah shows that R. Oshaia was probably not explaining the mishnah. The mishnah prohibits items that might have been offered to the idol and permits those that are not considered offerings. In contrast, R. Oshaia prohibits decorative items and permits non-decorative ones. It seems that the Talmudic editors used a statement with one concern to explain a statement that had a different concern.
  Assi b. Hiyya refers to an idol partitioned off. The word for partitions here is probably a play on the Hebrew “קלעים” which are found in the Temple. To distinguish the holy curtains from the idolatrous partitions, the Talmud uses a different word, one that sounds like קלקל which means spoiled.
  Yose b. Hanina says that the distinction between inside and outside the partition does not apply to the Peor idol or the Mercurius. Both of these idols are, according to the rabbis, worshipped in an unusual way. Peor is worshipped by people defecating on it, and Mercurius by people throwing stones at it.The Talmud clarifies that what this means is that for these two idols there is no distinction between inside and outside the partitions. If the item is either used in the worship of the idol or is decorative it is always prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s section starts with another new mishnah.
  If an idolatrous shrine has a garden or bathhouse in its courtyard, there are certain circumstances in which the garden or bathhouse may nevertheless be used.  First of all one may always use them as long as one doesn’t give any advantage to the idolaters.  This means that one could use the garden or bathhouse as long as he does not pay the idolatrous priests for such use.  Secondly, if the garden or bathhouse was jointly owned by the shrine a private individual, one could always use them, and even pay for their use.  Even though some of the money may go to the shrine, the Jew can consider the payment as going to the individual partner.We should note that Maimonides explains that “to the advantage of” does not mean paying money as we explained above, but rather giving verbal recognition to the owners.  If the bathhouse or garden is jointly owned, one may give verbal advantage to the owners, and even to the idolatrous priests, however, according to Maimonides, one may not pay for the use.
  As soon as an idol is made by a non-Jew it is prohibited, even before it is worshipped.  The reason is that we can safely assume that the non-Jew will worship the idol, and it was certainly made for idolatrous purposes.  However, an idol made by a Jew is only forbidden for Jewish use once it has been worshipped.  The reason is that we cannot be sure that the Jew will worship the idol.  It potentially could be used for decorative, non-idolatrous purposes.
  According to Abaye, when the mishnah says that one may use the garden or bathhouse as long as it is not to the “advantage” it means to the advantage of the priests who run it. A Jew may pay other idolaters for its use.
  Some teach Abaye’s statement in reference to the second clause—one can use a garden if it is jointly owned by an idolatrous temple and by others. He can pay the other owners, but he cannot pay the priests who own it.
  If one teaches Abaye’s statement in reference to the second clause, then he could also teach it in reference to the first clause. In neither case can one make payment directly to the priests.But if one teaches the statement in reference to the first clause, then when it comes to the second clause, where the bathhouse or garden is jointly owned, he can even make payment to the priests. Since the whole bathhouse or garden does not belong to the idolatrous temple, we can say he is using the part owned by others.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the last part of the mishnah, which discusses whether an idol becomes prohibited when it is made or when it is first worshipped.The midrash cited here discusses the following verse (Deuteronomy 12:2):“You must destroy all the sites at which the nations you are to dispossess worshiped their gods, whether on lofty mountains and on hills or under any luxuriant tree.”
  The mishnah accords with the opinion of R. Akiva—an idol made by an idolater is prohibited immediately. In contrast, R. Yishmael says that such an idol is not prohibited to a Jew until it has actually been worshipped. He derives this from the words of the verse “where the nations worshipped.”
  The midrash above says that Deuteronomy 12:2 is referring to vessels—human-made objects. The problem is that the verse explicitly says “places” not “vessels.” The Talmud explains that we cannot take this word “places” at face value for we have another midrash on the same verse (one we saw above) that says that places (“mountains”) cannot be prohibited. Since it cannot mean that Jews must destroy places where idolatry took place, it must mean that Jews cannot use “vessels” that were used in idolatrous worship.
  
  Daf 52a
  
  Now the problem with the above midrash is that it interprets the verse to refer to “vessels”—things used in the worship ceremony, but then it goes on to use this as a source for a rule about idols. Vessels and idols are not the same thing. The Talmud defends this analogy with another midrash—gods (idols) are compared to vessels—neither become prohibited until they are worshipped or used in a worship service.
  Why doesn’t R. Akiva make this comparison between vessels and idols? He says that the word את interrupts the connection between vessels and idols. So while vessels may be prohibited only once they have been used, idols made by idolaters can be prohibited immediately, which is his position as we saw in the mishnah.
  IntroductionLast week’s daf ended by beginning to explain the baraita about when an idol becomes prohibited. I am copying that baraita again for ease of reference:The idol of an idolater is not prohibited until it is worshipped; but if it belonged to an Israelite it is prohibited immediately, the words of R. Yishmael;But R. Akiva says the opposite: The idol of an idolater is prohibited immediately; but if it belonged to an Israelite it is not prohibited until it is worshipped.
  Last week we saw a midrash which explained why R. Ishmael holds that the idol of an idolater is prohibited only once it is worshipped. But what about the second half of his statement—that an idol made by a Jew is prohibited immediately.The Talmud seems to think that this is just common sense. Below we will examine the other possibilities as to when this idol becomes prohibited. It’s not really common sense but rather process of elimination.
  Since we know (from elsewhere) that an idol made by a Jew must be disposed of (it requires geniza) we cannot say that it may be permitted.
  The verse referring to the making of the golden calf proves that as soon as the Jews made the calf they were considered sinners, even before they had worshipped it.
  The verse from Deuteronomy 9 about the golden calf might say only that the person is guilty of sin, not that the idol is prohibited. The Talmud then brings another verse to show that a Jew is cursed for making an idol before he even worships it. But this too does not seem to prove that the idol is prohibited immediately, only that the person who makes it is cursed.To finally solve the issue, the Talmud quotes the next word of the verse—the idol is an abomination as soon as it is made. It need not be worshipped.Akiva, who holds that an idol made by a Jew is not prohibited until it is worshipped, would hold that the idol itself is not an abomination. But making it leads to the abomination of worshipping it.
  Akiva derives the idea that idols made by idolaters become prohibited immediately from a verse that calls them “graven images.” They are prohibited as soon as they are made.
  1. Ishmael would use this verse for a different derashah. The word for graven is “pesilei” and the word for disqualify is “posel.” So R. Ishmael makes a wordplay—how do we know that a non-Jew can annul or disqualify an idol? From the wordplay on this verse.
  In its totality the verse reads, “You shall consign the images of their gods to the fire; you shall not covet the silver and gold on them and keep it for yourselves.” Clearly one is not supposed to keep the silver and gold for oneself. But Shmuel makes a midrash on the verse, reading the second half in isolation, and concluding that sometimes one can keep the silver and gold for oneself. When the idolater makes the idol it becomes prohibited and “you shall not covet it.” But when he annuls it, it is permitted and “you shall keep it for yourselves.”
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to try to figure out the sources for R. Akiva’s position that an idol made by a Jew does not become prohibited until it is worshipped.
  Rav Judah uses a verse from Deuteronomy 27 to prove that R. Akiva holds that idols made by Jews are not prohibited until they are actually worshipped.
  Yishmael would use the same verse to prove a different rule. An idol made by an Israelite can never be annulled. It must be buried or in some other way removed from sight. “He places it in secret” alludes not to the Jew’s worship of the idol (which is the original meaning of the verse), but to the mandate to remove it from sight.
  Akiva derives the rule about removing idolatry belonging to an Israelite from a different verse. The Torah seems to make a puzzling comparison between an asherah tree and the altar. R. Hisda learns from here that just as the stones of the altar (when it needs to be replaced) must be removed (they must be placed in the geniza), so too idols made by a Jew must also be removed. Interestingly we see that a geniza is word used for both the holiest of objects, the altar, and the most profane of objects, an idol. Both are things that we are supposed to not make use of, at least not in our regular lives.
  Yishmael would use this verse as did R. Shimon b. Lakish, who based his midrash on the juxtaposition of the verses in Deuteronomy 16. Appointing an unworthy judge is like planting an idolatrous tree. Appointing such a judge in a place where there are sages is like planting such a tree next to the altar itself.We can see here that some later sages seem to understand idolatry as synonymous with corruption and lawlessness. This is an understanding of what is wrong with idolatry that may have resonated more with sages who lived in a world where idolatry had lost some of its muster. It certainly appealed very strongly to post-Talmudic sages.
  A vessel used in idol worship was broken and someone (we’ll discuss who later on) welded it to repair it. Does the very act of welding it cause it to become prohibited? In other words, when does this simple vessel become something considered part of idolatrous service and therefore prohibited?
  The Talmud now analyzes whose idols these vessels were used in serving. If the idols belonged to an idolater, then there is no question that they are not prohibited until they are actually used. This is because everyone holds that accessories used in idolatrous worship are not inherently prohibited just by being made. Take for instance an incense pan. Such an accessory is not prohibited until it is actually worshipped.
  We now raise the possibility that the idol belonged to a Jew. But the question cannot be according to R. Akiva, for R. Akiva holds that even the idol is not prohibited until it is worshipped. Obviously an accessory is not prohibited until it is used.
  The Talmud finally arrives at what the question really is. R. Yishmael holds that an idol made by an Israelite is prohibited immediately. So if we derive the rule regarding this accessory from the idol itself, it too should be prohibited immediately. Alternatively, we might say that it is like accessories to idols owned by non-Jews. Just as those accessories are prohibited only once they are used, so too this accessory is prohibited only once it is used.
  Why does R. Hamnuna ask about a vessel that was repaired? Why not ask about a vessel made to be used in idol worship? The answer is that he is really referencing the idea that comes up in a mishnah (Kelim 11:1). Metal vessels are subject to impurity. If they are broken they become pure but if they are repaired they automatically resume their previous impurity. This mishnah refers to normal types of impurity, those found in the Torah (such as contact with the dead, a sheretz or a person with skin disease). But does the same apply to the rabbinic impurity accorded to idols? Does the vessel, previously used in idol worship, immediately become prohibited when it is repaired? 
  If R. Hamnuna was asking about rabbinic impurity, why did he ask about this specific form, impurity that comes from an idol? Why not ask about other forms of impurity considered to be of only rabbinic status such as the impurity conveyed to vessels by liquids?The answer is that R. Hamnuna was asking a question and a follow-up question. 1) Does rabbinic impurity return when a metal vessel is repaired, the way that biblical impurity does? 2) If we answer that it does not, is the impurity that the rabbis accord to idols the same as other rabbinic forms of impurity? Or is the rule more stringent here because of the severity with which idolatry is treated.After all that work trying to figure out what R. Hamnuna was asking, there is no answer. I bet you could have seen that one coming a mile away.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section brought up the issue of the impurity of vessels used in idol worship. Today the Talmud discusses the impurity of foods offered to idols.
  When the non-Jew annuls his idol, do the foods offered to it become pure or do they retain their impurity?
  Yohanan did not need to ask about vessels. Since they can be purified in the mikveh, they are also purified when the idol is annulled. But food cannot be purified in a mikveh. So does it become pure when the idol is annulled?
  If the food is itself worshipped, for instance idolaters bow down to a four-pack of really good beer (hmm, now why would I think of that), there is no question that when the food is annulled as an idol, it becomes pure.
  
  Daf 52b
  
  The question is only about foods offered to an idol. R. Giddel said that things offered to an idol can never be annulled. Therefore, this food will definitely always remain prohibited. And thus if it is prohibited, we might say that since it cannot be annulled, it also cannot be purified. Or we might say that since its use is prohibited by the Torah, it cannot be annulled. But its impurity is only of rabbinic status, and therefore maybe it could become pure.The question, alas, remains unanswered. I think by now you are getting the point with these questions. They are theoretical discussions about annulling idolatry, the purity and impurity of idolatry, and the difference between idols themselves and things used in their worship. They are not answered because this is theoretical halakhah, not practical rulings. The various aspects of the question are far more important than any possible answer.
  IntroductionToday’s section refers to the Temple of Onias. This was a Temple built in Leontopolis Egypt. It served the Jews of Alexandria but did not replace the Temple. The rabbis viewed it, as you might expect, as illegitimate.
  Yose b. Shaul does not consider the Temple of Onias to be a place of idolatry, but nevertheless, it is still prohibited for priests to serve there. Any priest who did so may not serve in the Temple in Jerusalem. The question R. Yose is asking is whether this applies to the vessels as well. Or were only the priests penalized because they decided to serve in this Temple?
  Alas, Rabbi knows the answer, but does not remember how to prove it.
  Both sages here refer to a verse from II Chronicles about the vessels that were defiled by the wicked King Ahaz. To both sages, this situation is parallel to the situation of vessels used in the Temple of Onias. The question is what did these people do with the vessels? According to R. Yose, they immersed them in a mikveh and then used them again. The same could be done with the vessels in the Temple of Onias. In contrast, according to Rabbi, they removed them and replaced them. Thus the vessels used in the Temple of Onias cannot be used in Jerusalem.
  Rabbi’s opinion might be supported by a tradition that the Hasmoneans (the Maccabees) stored away (put in a geniza) the stones from the altar which the Greeks had defiled through idolatry.   
  Papa finds a verse that says the Hasmoneans had no choice but to hide away the stones, for the verses from Deuteronomy would not allow them to do anything else.In contrast, there is no verse to prove that the vessels used in the Temple of Onias are prohibited.
  The Talmud asks why they could not just break the stones and then make personal use out of them. We can understand that they could not use them in the Temple service. But this does not mean that they are prohibited from personal use. The same thing occurred with coins after the Temple was destroyed. People feared that any such coin came from the gold and silver stolen from the Temple. But then they found a verse that said that once robbers (Greeks/Romans and other idolaters) enter the Temple, the objects in the Temple become “profane” and therefore permitted in personal use. So why not say the same thing about the altar?
  The Talmud now explains why the coins could be put to personal use but the altar-stones cannot. The coins belonged to the Temple and were holy. But they were not used to worship God. Therefore they can be put to personal use. But the altar-stones were used in the Temple worship. Therefore, it would not be right to use them for personal needs.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a mishnah that deals with annulling idols.
  One who is engaged in idolatry can annul an idol that belongs to him and one that belongs to others. However, a Jew cannot annul the idol of an idolater.If one annuls an idol, all of the things that go with the idol, for instances the plates used to make offerings to it, are also annulled.  Since these things are ancillary to the main idol, they are affected by its change of status.  However, if one annuls the things that pertain to the idol, without specifically annulling the idol, the idol is still forbidden.
  According to the Mishnah, which was taught by Rabbi when he was older, a non-Jew can annul the idol of another idolater, but not of a Jew. But when he was younger, Rabbi said that an idolater could annul even an idol made by a Jew.Hillel explains that an idol fully owned by a non-Jew must be set aside, as we learned earlier from this verse. However, if the idol is owned jointly by a Jew and non-Jew it can, according to Rabbi in his youth, be annulled by the non-Jew.
  When he was younger, Rabbi thought that since the idol was owned jointly by the Jew and non-Jew, the Jew was worshipping it on account of the sanctity ascribed to it by the non-Jew. When the non-Jew annulled it, the Jew would no longer accord it any sanctity and therefore it is permitted.
  When he got older, perhaps more cynical, he believed that the Jew worshipped the idol on his own account. Therefore, the idolater’s annulment would not be effective and the idol would remain prohibited.
  The Talmud now offers a different context for R. Hillel’s statement. Obviously, a Jew cannot annul the idol of a non-Jew. Why would the Mishnah need to state this? The answer is that the idol was owned jointly by both parties. The Mishnah teaches that while the Jew cannot annul the part owned by the non-Jew (this is obvious) the non-Jew can still annul his own part in the joint ownership.
  
  Daf 53a
  
  This is yet another setting for R. Hillel’s statement. R. Shimon b. Menasya holds that an idol belonging to an Israelite can never be annulled. R. Hillel adds that this is so even if he owns it jointly with a non-Jew. The Jew worships on the idol on his own account and even if the idolater annuls it, the idol is still prohibited.
  In order to annul an idol, the idolater must treat the idol with enough disrespect that we can be confident that the idol is no longer considered to be holy by the non-Jew. Note, that the issue is not a physical issue. The mishnah is not asking the question, does this still look like an idol.  Rather the issue is psychological. At what point can an outside observer assume that the owner of the idol no longer is relating to it as a god, but rather as merely a physical item devoid of religious meaning.The first way for the owner to annul the idol is to somehow physically damage it.  If he cuts off one of its appendages, this is sufficient physical damage for it to be annulled.  Furthermore, if he defaces, meaning he distorts the facial features of the idol, it is annulled, even if he has not diminished the material used to make the idol.
  Acting in a disgraceful way in front of the idol does not annul it.
  If a non-Jew sells or uses the idol as a pledge, according to Rabbi [Judah the Prince] he has annulled the idol.  Since he treated it in a profane matter, and did something that one would not do to a divine idol, he must no longer be considering it to be an idol.  The other Sages disagree with Rabbi.
  As I basically explained above, since he defaced the idol it is annulled, even though he didn’t actually break anything off of it.
  The verse here describes an idolater who curses his king and god, and then looks upward to the true God. Nevertheless, he immediately looks down to the earth, which Hezekiah reads as continuing his idolatry. Thus even though the idolater shows his anger at his idol, he has not really annulled it, even if he spits or urinates on it.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the dispute over whether selling or using an idol as a pledge is considered annulling it.
  The amoraim discuss a case where the idol was sold to a smelter. According to one opinion, the tannaim disagree if it was sold to an idolatrous smelter. One tanna hold that since the smelter is idolatrous, he might use the metal to make another idol. But if he sold it to an Israelite, the Israelite will surely melt it down for another purpose, and thus this is annulment. While the other tanna holds that even selling it to an idolater is considered annulment.The other amora thinks that the tannaim disagree when sold to an Israelite smelter.
  Above we said that according to one amora, the tannaim disagree over a case where the idol was sold to an Israelite smelter. The question is whether according to this amoraic opinion the tannaim also disagree over a case where it was sold to an idolatrous smelter. Or do they agree that when he sells it to an idolatrous smelter, it is not annulled.To answer this, the Talmud looks at a baraita. In this baraita Rabbi says that his opinion is correct if the idolater sells it to one who plans on destroying the idol, but that the sages’ opinion is correct when he sells it to one who will worship it, which here is interpreted to be an idolatrous smelter. Rabbi’s words imply that there is a dispute in both cases. In other words, although Rabbi says that his colleagues’ opinion seems correct, he still disagrees.
  We now reinterpret the baraita. Rabbi does not say that his colleagues simply agree with him about a case where it was sold to be destroyed. They never differed in the first place. The only disagreement is whether it is annulled when it was sold to another idolater.
  The baraita discusses a Jew who buys scrap metal from a non-Jew and finds an idol in there. This is a case of selling the idol to be destroyed. The baraita itself says that if he only took it into his possession, he can return the idol and simply not pay for it. But if he also paid for it, he cannot get his money back.But this baraita makes sense only if the sages in the mishanh also disagree when he sold it to a Jew to be destroyed. This baraita would follow the opinion of the rabbis. But if all agree that when he sold it to a Jew it was annulled, then why shouldn’t the Jew just keep it under all circumstances?
  If he sold the metal thinking that it was scrap metal, then he has not annulled it. He did not even know he was selling an idol, so how could he have annulled it. The rabbis and Rabbi Judah Hanasi disagree only in a case where he knew he was selling an idol to a Jewish smelter who would certainly destroy it.
  In all of these scenarios, the owner hopes to recover his idol and therefore has not annulled it in his heart.According to the rabbis, when the Canaanites fled when Joshua was conquering the land they intended to return. Therefore, they were not really abandoning their idols.
  
  Daf 53b
  
  The Talmud now explains why we needed all four of these cases.Clearly he is not annulling the idol by using it as collateral. This is not like selling the idol where he will not receive it in return. But if an avalanche fell on it, we might have thought that since he did not clear the rocks away, he has annulled it. Therefore, the baraita needs to teach that he has not.
  We might have thought that when it came to the avalanche he did not annul it because he knows where it is. All he has to do is clear the rocks and get it. But when it comes to the robbers, he does not know where it is, so we might have thought that in this case he did annul it.
  Finally, when the idol is stolen he might still assume that whoever stole it would either worship it, or sell it to someone who would. Therefore he did not annul it. But if he abandoned it, we might have thought that he annulled it.Therefore we need all of these cases to learn that in none of them do we consider him to have annulled the idol.
  IntroductionYesterday we learned that if the owners fled and had the intention of returning as was the case in Joshua’s conquest of the land, then the idol is not annulled.
  The problem is that the Canaanites whom Joshua dispossessed did not return. The Talmud explains that the baraita means that they had the intent to return. The fact that they did not return is not relevant, only their intent is. We should note that this comparison is probably made so that the rabbis can understand why the Jews had to destroy these idols. After all, if they were abandoned, then they were annulled. The answer is that the Canaanites planned on returning.
  The baraita above could have just said that if the idolaters intend to return, it is prohibited. Why mention the war waged by Joshua? The Talmud will now say that the baraita does so in order to teach something else. The issue is a case where an Israelite set up something to be worshipped, but an idolater worshipped it. Although generally a person cannot make something prohibited when it is not his, in this case he does. We will now see that this is derived from the conquest of the land. The baraita teaches us that the laws of idolatry can be learned from what occurred during this period.
  The Talmud makes a fascinating analogy. The Torah says that when the Israelites conquer the land, they must burn the asherim trees. But why should the fact that the idolaters worshipped these these trees make them prohibited? These trees belong to Israel because God promised the land to Israel, and if so, how could the idolaters have made them prohibited. And if we were to say that the verse refers to trees planted before God’s promise, then the Israelites would not have to destroy the trees—annulment would have been sufficient (an idol worshipped by a Jew must be destroyed, but one worshipped by a non-Jew may be annulled). The answer is that when the Israelites worshipped the Golden Calf they revealed their idolatrous proclivities. Therefore, when idolaters worshipped these trees, they were only fulfilling the Israelites’ will and this gives them the ability to make something that does not belong to them prohibited. The same is true with the brick. Since the Jew set it up to be worshipped, he reveals that he has idolatrous proclivities and the non-Jew can prohibit it by worshipping it.
  The Talmud points out that just because Israelites worshipped the Golden Calf it does not prove that they also wanted their trees to be worshipped as asherim.The answer is that we know from their words “these are your gods” that the Israelites were willing to accept many gods, including the trees.
  After the Golden Calf, Israel repented. Therefore, any asherim created after this point should not be prohibited. They belong to the Israelites because God gave Israel the land, and Israel no longer wants them worshipped.The problem is that there would be no way of knowing which asherim were worshipped only after the incident of the Golden Calf and which were worshipped before. Therefore they all must be burned.
  IntroductionTodays’ section opens with a mishnah that discusses whether idolaters who abandoned their idols intended to annul them.
  If an idolater abandoned his idol in time of peace the idol is permitted since we can assume that the idolater has no intention of returning to worship the idol. For instance if Maximus the idolater decides to move from Jaffa to Caesarea and he leaves his idols behind, he has shown that he doesn’t intend to worship them anymore.  However, if Maximus the idolater flees his home during a war and in distress leaves his idols behind, he may intend to return and worship them when the war is over.  Therefore they are not considered to be annulled.
  Pedestals which were set up on the sides of roads to place upon them idols when kings pass by are not forbidden to Jews, since they are only temporarily used by the kings.  During other times, when normal people pass them by, they do not worship these pedestals.
  The Temple of Nimrod, is, at least according to Rashi, the Temple built to Nimrod, led the rebellion against God before the flood. Theoretically when God dispersed them, they were leaving in a time of war and therefore the idols in this Temple should remain prohibited, as we learned in the Mishnah. But since they have had time (thousands of years) to return and reclaim the idols, and yet have not done so, it is as if they have annulled them.I’m not sure what this Temple of Nimrod actually was—did it exist in the time of the rabbis? Perhaps it was some sort of idolatrous Temple that lay in ruins that looked really old. The rabbis might have assumed that it came from the time of Nimrod.
  IntroductionThis section deals with the next part of the mishnah, about the pedastals built for kings.
  Yohanan explains why the pedestals set up for kings on the side of the roads are permitted. These are only temporary pedestals. As soon as the king takes another road, the old pedestal is abandoned, and thereby annulled.
  Ulla sits on a broken pedestal, not one set up for kings on the roads, but a normal pedestal used for idolatry. Rav Judah attacks him for doing so. Rav and Shmuel, earlier authoritative amoraim, both agreed that broken pedestals remain prohibited. Even the position that holds that broken pieces of idols are permitted would agree that broken pedestals are prohibited. So Ulla—get off that pedestal!
  Ulla graphically disagrees with R. Judah, quoting, not incidentally, a tradition ascribed to two Eretz Yisraeli sages. According to both of them, even those who hold that broken fragments of idols are prohibited, this is because they do not annul idols even when broken. But pedestals are not themselves worshipped, so when a pedestal breaks, they just throw it away and get another one.
  The baraita accords with R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish—a broken pedestal is permitted.
  An altar has more than one stone, whereas a pedestal has only one.Hezekiah cites a verse that proves that an altar has multiple stones and that in order for it to be annulled it must be completely shattered. The verse refers to how the “iniquity of Jacob” can be expiated.
  
  Daf 54a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses when animals that are worshipped become prohibited.
  If a person worships his own animal, it is prohibited. But in general a person does not have the power to prohibit another person’s property, so if he worships someone else’s animal, it remains permitted.
  The baraita is raised as a contradiction to the previous baraita. The baraita rules that any animal that was worshipped, even if it was worshipped “under compulsion,” is prohibited. At first the Talmud tries to explain that “under compulsion” refers to one who took his friend’s animal and worshipped it. This would mean it contradicts the first baraita. But Rami b. Hama explains that it simply refers to one forced to worship an animal, not an animal that was stolen and worshipped.
  Zera points out that the baraita cannot rule an animal prohibited if it was worshipped under duress. The Torah always exempts one who acts under duress, as we learn in the case of the violated girl. This should extend to the animal as well.Rava resolves it by noting a progression of verses. Theoretically, idolatry is always prohibited, even under the threat of death. On the other hand, the Torah exempts one who acts under duress. Finally, the Torah also prohibits desecrating God’s name. To resolve all of these seeming contradictions Rava says that one situation refers to something done in private and the other to a public act. In private, a person should worship idolatry rather than die. But in public, at least when it comes to idolatry, a person should be willing to die rather than transgress.We should note that there is a some blurring here in topic between the status of the animal that was worshipped and the issue of whether a person should allow himself to be killed rather than transgress. Rava seems to be talking about the latter, whereas the sugya is talking about the former. To resolve this we’d have to equate the two. If a person worships idols under duress in private, the animal is not prohibited because the person did not sin. But if the person worships idols in public under duress, just as he should not have transgressed, so too the animal is prohibited.
  IntroductionYesterday Rava stated that although an object was worshiped under duress, it becomes prohibited. Today’s section continues to deal with this subject.
  The rabbis, probably students of Rava, try to find a tannaitic teaching that supports Rava’s view. The pedestals here were worshipped at the time of persecution. This means that they were worshipped under duress. Nevertheless, they are prohibited.Rava deflects the support (he’s so modest). While most people probably worshipped the idols under duress, it is possible that someone worshipped them willingly. Therefore the baraita is not proof that worship under duress will prohibit an idol.Ashi goes a step further and says that we can be certain that a Jew willingly worshipped the idol.
  Yesterday we saw two baraitot that contradicted each other. According to one baraita, if one worships another person’s animal, the animal is not prohibited. The other baraita hinted that an item worshipped under duress is prohibited.Hizkiyah solves the contradiction in a different way. The baraita that prohibited the animal referred to a case where the animal was not worshipped but rather the idol was placed on it. Such an act renders the animal prohibited although just bowing down to it does not.
  Ada b. Ahava offers another solution to the contradiction. Although in general if one simply worships another person’s property, the property remains permitted, if he actually does something physical, the animal (or other object) can become prohibited.
  Nahman believes that R. Huna has already essentially said that while one cannot cause another person’s property to become prohibited, if he performed an idolatrous act on it, something physical, it is prohibited. The situation he describes is one where an animal is lying down before an idol. If the idolater slaughters the animal for the idol, he has rendered it prohibited.
  The Talmud asks for Scriptural support for R. Huna’s ruling. If we say that the precedent are priests who are forced to worship idolatry. Such priests may not return to serve in the Temple. The problem is that priests had a choice—they could have chosen martyrdom. But the animal had no choice.
  The second possible answer is the altar-stones. When the Greeks defiled the Temple, these stones became prohibited, even though they did not choose to be worshipped. The problem is that R. Papa already pointed out that the Greeks took technical ownership over the stones and therefore they were prohibited. This is not the case of someone prohibiting something that does not belong to them.
  
  Daf 54b
  
  The final answer is that R. Huna’s rule is derived from the Temple vessels defiled by King Ahaz. How could Ahaz have rendered them prohibited? After all, they are not his and there is a principle that a person cannot render prohibited another person’s property.The answer is that since he actually performed an act with these vessels, they became prohibited. So too with the animal slaughtered for idolatry. Since he performed an act with it, it becomes prohibited.
  Simply bowing down to the ground does not make the ground prohibited. But if one digs into it to create objects of use for idolatrous purposes, these features do become prohibited. As we learned above, “doing something” to the object is different from simply worshipping it.
  Worshipping an animal does not make it prohibited, but using the animal to purchase an idol or to sell an idol does.
  All rabbis agree that if one exchanges an idol for an animal, the animal is prohibited. The dispute is over animals exchanged for those animals. According to one opinion the prohibition continues. As we learn from the verse, anything that is derived from idolatry is accursed. The other opinion emphasizes that only “it,” the original animal is prohibited. The animal exchanged for the prohibited animal does not become prohibited.
  The one that holds that animals used in exchange for animals used to acquire an idol are prohibited uses the word “it” (“it” is prohibited and not things exchanged for it)  to exclude orlah (fruit during its first three years of growth) and mixed seeds planted in a vineyard. One may not derive benefit from either of these. But if one sells them (this is prohibited) and then uses the money to betroth a woman, the woman is betrothed. This proves that this money has value to its owner.
  The author of the other opinion now has to explain why he does not also use the word “it” to teach that only in cases of idolatry does the second exchanged object become prohibited but not in orlah and mixed seeds in a vineyard. The answer is that idolatry and Sabbatical year produce are two special cases, and only in them does the second exchanged object become prohibited. Whenever we have two verses that teach the same rule about two different cases, we don’t apply that rule elsewhere. The idea is that if the Torah wanted the rule to apply across the board it would have taught it once. By teaching it twice, the implication is that the rule applies there and nowhere else. Therefore, even without the word “it” we know that this rule does not apply to orlah and mixed seeds.
  One may not sell Sabbatical year produce. If one does, the money used to buy it now has the same restrictions that applied to the produce itself. This is the same as with idolatry—if one sells an idol and buys an animal, and then exchanges that animal for another animal, the last animal is also prohibited.
  When one redeems a holy object, for instance something dedicated to the Temple, the money becomes holy but the object redeemed is desacralized. This is not true for Sabbatical year produce. The Sabbatical year produce remains holy even after it is sold. In essence it cannot be redeemed.
  This baraita explains how exchanges with Sabbatical year produce work. The produce always remains holy as does the last item that was exchanged.Sabbatical year produce must be removed from the home when it ceases to grow in the field. This rule will also apply to whatever is exchanged for the produce.
  The other opinion uses the word “it” to exclude orlah and mixed seeds because he holds that even if there are “two texts that come as one” additional halakhot could be derived. Therefore, we might have learned that orlah and mixed seeds do make any item exchanged for them prohibited. Therefore the word “it” in the phrase, “that you should become accursed like it” is necessary to exclude them.
  IntroductionThis mishnah contains a fascinating discussion between the Sages of Rome and some idolaters. Note the different style of this mishnah.  Although most mishnayot contain brief halakhic (legal) discussions, occasionally the Mishnah does contain aggadic (philosophic) material.
  In the fascinating discussion in this mishnah some pagans in Rome pose a serious theological problem to Jewish sages: if God is all-powerful why doesn’t he destroy any of his competitors.  The basic answer given is that God doesn’t destroy things which are necessary for the existence of the world.  If He were to destroy the sun, moon and stars our universe would not be able to function.  The pagans then ask why God doesn’t destroy the things that are worshipped and that are not necessary, such as idols.  The answer is that if he were to do so, this would seemingly demonstrate the power of those things that were not destroyed.  By doing so God would actually increase the number of idolaters in the world.An interesting question with regards to this mishnah is whom are these idolaters supposed to be representing?  Are these Greek philosophers?  According to the Rambam (Maimonides) Greek philosophy does not believe in the influence that inanimate objects such as stars and planets can have on human lives.  The Rambam, who was heavily influenced by Greek philosophy, and in his book “The Guide of the Perplexed” applied philosophical principles to Torah, claims that these pagan beliefs are believed by the masses, but not by “true philosophers” who understood the unity of God.  He even claims that there are Jewish sages who believe that the stars and planets hold such a power over our lives, but that it is nevertheless forbidden by the Torah to worship them.  In this commentary the Rambam explains the astrological roots of idolatry.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya has some variant versions of the mishnah.
  This is essentially the same material found in the mishnah. The only difference is that at the end, it adds that in the future idolaters will be called into account, meaning they will be punished for their deeds.
  Stolen wheat grows—this is the way of the world.
  Adulterers conceive—fact of life.
  Human beings are occasionally considered “coins” stamped by God—for like a coin stamped with the face of the king, so too human beings were created in the likeness of God. But we put God’s coin to wicked use by committing adultery and then we force God to sign on the results when the offspring also bears God’s likeness.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with more discussions between the philosopher and Rabban Gamaliel. Again, I want to reiterate, these are not “actual” conversations. This is the way that the rabbis write their “theology,” – through dialogues. Like the mishnah, these conversations are the rabbis thoughts about why idolatry thrives so much in the world, despite the fact that God abhors it.
  The philosopher asks Rabban Gamaliel why God’s wrath is against idolaters and not against the idols. Rabban Gamaliel responds with another parable.
  The philosopher tries to prove that there is some power in the idol, and as proof he cites a case where his city burned down but the idolatrous shrine survived. Rabban Gamaliel again answers with a parable.
  This is essentially the same as the mishnah.
  The midrash here reads the verse in almost the opposite way as the simple reading. According to the “peshat” God is promising to destroy the world due to its sins. But according to the midrash, the sentence is rhetorical—God clearly is not going to destroy the world. The world is full of idolaters who worship nature and yet nature continues, as do the idolaters. So according to the midrash, God is saying that the world should not be destroyed just because of the fools (idolaters).
  
  Daf 55a
  
  IntroductionAgain, Rabban Gamaliel is asked a theological question by a prominent Roman and again he responds with a parable.
  Agrippas essentially questions the monotheistic nature of the Torah—how can God be jealous of other gods if other gods don’t exist? Moreover, God’s jealousy seems to reveal the fact that foreign gods are at least our God’s equal. Otherwise, why would God be jealous of them.Rabban Gamaliel seems to shift the meaning of jealousness to something closer to scorn. When Israel takes another god by worshipping idols, it is akin to a man taking a second and inferior wife. The first wife will be scornful of the second wife because she fails to understand why her husband took this woman, when she, the first wife, was superior. But if the second wife was superior, the first wife would not be scornful. She would understand why her husband took a second wife (I would not try this out at home). If Israel was worshipping truly powerful gods, their God would not be jealous. But they worshipped powerless stone, wood and metal. God’s jealously is the sign of their lack of power.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains another interesting theological dialogue.
  Zunin’s question is an fascinating one, and based on what we know about the placebo effect, we can understand how this happens. People who believe in non-scientific cures can be healed by merely believing in the curer and in his/her purported medicine. Idolaters go to shrines and come out healed, and yet we know that the idol is just a hunk of wood or stone. We see this quite often in both scientific medical studies and in holistic medicine.Akiva’s answer is not based on the placebo effect, probably because they did not know of this in those days.Akiva answers that this is in a sense lucky timing. God does not change his ways just because of people’s foolish behavior. If a person has a disease, there is a time set for that disease to become healed. The very fact that this foolish person went to an idolatrous healer does not mean that God should change the course of the illness. That would be a breach of God’s trustworthiness, just as it would be a breach of the banker’s trustworthiness not to pay back the foolish depositor.
  Yohanan, based on the verse from Deuteronomy, characterizes sicknesses as being faithful to their oath. The personified sickness takes an oath to leave the person it has afflicted at the appointed time.
  IntroductionToday’s section is similar to yesterday’s except in this case the efficacy of idolatry cannot be explained by the placebo effect. At best we might say that correlation is not causation.
  It seems that slaying a human being to an idol does bring rain (don’t try this one at home either).
  The whole verse that Rav cites reads as follows, “And lest you lift up your eyes to the heavens, and when you see the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the host of heavens, you are drawn away and worship them, and serve them, which the Lord your God has allotted [ḥalak] to all the nations under the whole heaven.” God has allotted the sun, moon and stars to the nations so that they may worship them. God, according to Rav, allows idolatry to be effective, at least at times, so that idolaters should believe in the efficacy of idolatry, and thereby lose their portion in the world to come.This is a fascinating argument, one that in a sense acknowledges the efficacy of idolatry, and that it is even sanctioned by God. Idolaters are punished, or to put this in another way, are mistaken in their beliefs, not because they believe in idols that do not work. They are mistaken because they do not see the deeper, underlying cause. They are misled by seeing a correlation that is not a true causation. Ultimately, it looks like the sun is a god, it looks like slaughtering a human being to an idol brings rain, but this is just what we see. It is not the true cause. Confusing the visible cause with the ultimate cause is probably something we should all be wary of.
  The Talmud brings the above statement of Rav in line with a statement by Resh Lakish. Resh Lakish says that Heaven (God, or some other power, he does not say) helps a person follow the path they have chosen. If they have chosen the dark side, the side of idolatry, then they are provided with help to continue down that path. In the case above, God created the heavenly bodies to give people the illusion that they are gods. But the converse is also true—if people choose the Force, the side of good, they too are aided on their path. So choose wisely.
  IntroductionThe remainder of tractate Avodah Zarah will deal with the prohibition of non-Jewish wine. This is a halakhah that remains in effect for observant Jews, despite the fact that commercially bought wine has probably never been touched by anyone and even if it was, there is no chance that anyone ever offered any of it as a libation. I of course realize the sensitivity of this halakhah—it seems to be treating non-Jews as inherently defiling.We should note that this is not the only food made by Gentiles that Jews may not eat—we’ve already seen bread, oil, cheese and cooked foods on this list. There are two differences though: 1) the prohibition of wine is not only to keep Jews from intermingling with non-Jews, it is also a result of the fact that wine was a major component of idolatrous ritual; 2) as a result, wine that has been touched by a non-Jew is prohibited to a higher degree than the other foods. A Jew may not even derive benefit from it.For Jews living in the middle ages these laws were exceedingly difficult to observe, and yet, for the most part, they continued to observe them. There are some excellent articles and books by Professor Haym Soloveitchik on this subject. But for the most part we will not be going beyond the Talmudic laws.The mishnah that opens this discussion defines at what point in the process of wine-pressing do the grapes and grape juice begin to be considered wine.
  A Jew may buy a winepress and all of the grapes that are being trodden in it from a non-Jew, even though the non-Jew has lifted up the trodden grapes and moved them into a different heap.  At this point in their processing the grapes are not yet considered wine, and therefore their being handled by a non-Jew does not make them “yen nesek”, which is forbidden to Jews.  In other words, while we might suspect that non-Jews offer up libations with wine, they will not do so with grapes that are not yet fully pressed, nor will they do so with grape juice.  Only when the juice has descended into the vat where it will ferment into wine is it considered yen nesek.When the wine does descend from the winepress into the vat, the wine which is in the vat is prohibited.  However, that which remains above in the winepress is still permitted, even though it has been handled by a non-Jew.
  A Jew is allowed to tread grapes in a winepress with a non-Jew, since the wine does not become yen nesekh until it goes down into the vat.  However, a Jew may not pick grapes with the non-Jew for the non-Jew causes the grapes to become impure. When the non-Jew puts the grapes in his impure winepress, the grapes will become impure. If a Jew helps him to do so, the Jew is helping to make produce grown in the land of Israel impure. The reason that treading on the grapes is permitted is that as soon as the non-Jew touches them, they are already impure.
  
  
  Daf 55b
  
  A Jew who works in a winepress while impure is committing a sin, for he is defiling the terumah and tithes and thereby rendering them inedible.  Since this is forbidden, another Jew may not even tread in the winepress with him, because that would be aiding a transgressor.  However, the other Jew may help this Jew before the process begins by bringing jugs to the winepress and he may help him remove the jugs when the pressing is over.  In other words, it is only forbidden to help him while the impure pressing is going on.  Before and after it is permitted.
  The same rules that were stated above with regards to helping a winemaker who presses his wine while impure, are also true with regards to the impure baker.  One may not help him in the baking process, for he causes impurity to the terumah and tithes.  However, one may help him after the loaves are already baked.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that the juice in the press cannot become yayin nesekh, forbidden wine. R. Huna offers an extremely significant limitation to that rule, one which in the Middle Ages became very, very difficult to implement.
  According to R. Huna, as soon as the juice from the wine press begins to flow down into the vat, it is subject to the laws of yayin nesekh. What this would mean is that if a non-Jew touched the wine in the press as it started to flow down into the vat, all of the wine in both the press and vat would become prohibited. In the Middle Ages, non-Jews were almost always needed to press the grapes due to the large amount of wine they needed to produce and the small number of Jews available to do the work. How Jews worked around this prohibition was the subject of a fascinating study by Haym Soloveitchik.
  According to the mishnah, the wine in the winepress does not become yayin nesekh, assumedly under any circumstance, even after it starts to flow. Therefore, one may purchase a winepress from a non-Jew even though he had put his hand into it.
  The only way for the wine in the winepress to avoid becoming yayin nesekh (if touched by a non-Jew) is for the press to be stopped up such that the wine does not flow to the vat below. For once the wine flows, it can become yayin nesekh.
  This is basically the same difficulty and resolution we read above.
  IntroductionAccording to R. Huna, once the grape juice from the press begins to flow into the vat, even the juice in the press can become yayin nesekh. This clearly contradicts the mishnah, as we saw in yesterday’s section. Today’s section opens with another difficulty on R. Huna, but this time he resolves it in an entirely different manner.
  Again, according to the mishnah, only the wine in the vat is yayin nesekh, not the juice in the press, even once it has begun to flow. This contradicts R. Huna.
  Here R. Huna admits that his ruling does indeed contradict the mishnah, but defends the contradiction by claiming that he follows the later halakhah. The Talmud quotes a baraita only part of which deals with treading a winepress with a non-Jew. (The baraita includes a mnemonic here and above to facilitate remembering the order of the clauses). The first topic is causing impurity to ordinary produce (non-terumah). If a non-Jew touches grapes after they have been harvested, he causes them to become impure. Note that this has nothing to do with yayin nesekh. A Jew may eat impure food. But there was originally a custom to try to avoid causing produce in the land of Israel to become impure. This seems to have been an extra measure of holiness. Therefore, one should not glean grapes with a non-Jew, nor work with produce with an impure Israelite, for this would be assisting a transgressor.
  But originally, there was no problem with treading grapes with a non-Jew in the winepress. Once the non-Jew had picked the grapes, they were already impure. By treading them, the Jew was not aiding in defiling them. Moreover, this halakhah follows the mishnah, according to which the grapes in the press cannot become yayin nesekh. This early halakhah does not follow R. Huna.
  Later, the halakhah changed to follow R. Huna. Jews may not tread grapes with non-Jews for this would cause the juice in the vat to become yayin nesekh.
  
  Daf 56a
  
  This is stricter than above. According to the earlier halakhah, it was forbidden to tread grapes with Jews who did not observe the rules of purity. According to the later halakhah, it was even forbidden to harvest grapes with them, for doing so was considered aiding a Jew in causing the defilement of the portion of terumah that would have to be separated from the grapes.
  But in this matter the law became more lenient. No longer was it forbidden to cause ordinary, non-terumah, produce to become defiled. Therefore, one could glean grapes with non-Jews.
  IntroductionThe mishnah we have been learning determined that the liquid in the press is considered “juice” and the laws of yayin nesekh do not apply to it until it descends to the vat. The Talmud cites another teaching concerning tithes that seems to contradict this definition. The assumption here is that if liquid is determined to be wine vis a vis the laws of yayin nesekh, then it should also be wine according to the laws of tithing.Once food becomes subject to the laws of tithing, one may not eat of it in a formal manner.
  The baraita about tithes teaches that even when in the press the liquid can be considered wine once the waste (skins and seeds) has been skimmed off the top. This is even before the liquid flows down to the vat, and thus disagrees with our mishnah.Rava answers that there is indeed a dispute between the mishnah and the baraita, and it reflects the dispute between the rabbis and R. Akiva. According to the rabbis, the grape juice is not subject to tithes until it descends into the vat. This accords with the mishnah from Avodah Zarah. In contrast, R. Akiva says that it is subject to tithes once it is has been skimmed, even though it is still in the press. This contradicts the mishnah from Avodah Zarah.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section, R. Akiva stated that the liquid pressed from the grapes becomes “wine” only once it has been skimmed. The question asked today is whether this is the skimming that occurs in the vat or later in the cask. As a reminder, this is relevant both to the issue of when something becomes liable for tithes and also when it becomes subject to becoming yayin nesekh.
  The baraita states that even though he has skimmed the waste off of the wine that it is in the vat, he may still drink untithed liquid that comes from the press, which is above the vat. Clearly this baraita considers the skimming that occurs in the vat to be the skimming that makes it liable for tithes and subject to yayin nesekh.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that when R. Akiva said that once the liquid has been skimmed it is considered wine, he was referring to the skimming that takes place in the vat, not later in the cask. But today we see a baraita in which R. Akiva seems to refer to skimming in the cask.
  In this version of the baraita, R. Akiva clearly states that it is not considered wine until it has been removed from the vat and put into casks.
  The Talmud now accepts this second baraita and reads the first baraita in its light. R. Akiva indeed holds that the liquid is not wine until it is put into the cask and there skimmed.
  There are now three tannaitic opinions as to when it becomes wine: 1) Mishnah—when it goes into the vat; 2) Anonymous opinion in the baraita—when it goes into the vat and is skimmed; 3) R. Akiva—when it goes into the cask and is skimmed.
  There are two resolutions to this difficulty. First of all, it may be that the entire comparison between tithes and yayin nesekh is unjustified. The rabbis were strict when it came to yayin nesekh—the liquid is subject to becoming yayin nesekh as soon as it goes down into the vat, even before it is skimmed. The dispute was only with regard to tithes.But Rava did use a baraita about tithes in his understanding of the mishnah. Therefore, he must posit that there are indeed three opinions.
  
  Daf 56b
  
  A wicker basket separates the liquid in the upper press from that in the lower vat. The basket serves to strain out the skins and seeds. According to R. Huna, when the mishnah taught that the liquid in the upper press is permitted it is referring to a case where he did not put back that wicker basket. But if he did put the wicker basket back in, all of the wine, even that in the press, becomes prohibited. This is because the wicker basket contains some prohibited wine which then mixes in with the permitted wine in the press, causing it all to become prohibited.
  The question is asked how the contents of the wicker basket became prohibited. The answer is through a concept called “nitzok” which I have translated as a “poured stream.” This means that when there is an upper vessel flowing into a lower vessel, although in reality liquid only flows downward, we consider the contents of the upper vessel to have the same status as the contents of the lower one. The contents of the lower vat flow upward to the wicker basket and make this liquid prohibited as well. Then this liquid contaminates that in the wine press, if he puts the basket back.Note that the contents are not considered as contaminating the liquid in the wine press. The commentators explain that this is because this is two stages removed, and while some might say that the status goes up one stage, to the wicker basket, all agree that it does not go up to the press.The Talmud notes that if we read R. Huna this way, then we have decided that “a poured stream serves as a connective.” This is a debated issue that appears later on in the next chapter and the Talmud does not think that R. Huna necessarily holds that it is.
  The Talmud rejects the implication R. Huna rules that poured streams always serve as a connective. Rather, this may be a case where the wine in the vat actually overflowed and physically went up into the wicker basket. This is not an issue of “nitzok.” Rather, the wicker basket has wine from the vat in it and this wine then mixes back with the liquid in the press and causes it to become prohibited.
  Fascinatingly, we hear of a six year old boy who had learned, meaning memorized, tractate Avodah Zarah, probably of the Mishnah. With this knowledge in hand, he is asked a question of law—can a Jew tread on grapes with an idolater? And the answer is clearly in our Mishnah—yes he can.
  The person who asks the boy this question asks two follow-up questions. First of all, when the idolater touches the liquid, does he not render it yayin nesekh? This very question shows a shift from the mishnaic law to the amoraic law. According to the mishnah, the liquid in the press is not considered “wine” and is therefore not subject to the laws of libated wine. Idolaters libate wine, not unfermented grape juice. There is thus no problem with their having contact with the latter.In contrast, according to the amoraim (or at least some of them) all liquid is subject to these laws. Therefore, according to the boy, we must make sure he does not libate any wine by tying up his hands. This is, of course, an absurd resolution and effectively makes it impossible to the Jew to tread with the idolater.But the idolater’s feet will still touch the wine, protests the questioner. Again, we can see here that the understanding of the status of the liquid in the press has changed. Furthermore, it seems that the questioner understands the non-Jews to be defiling the wine in a way similar to the rules of impurity, and not the rules of yayin nesekh. Defiling is done through contact and it does not matter whether this contact is by hand or foot. The boy rejects this concept and answers that wine touched by feet does not count as yayin nesekh.It is interesting that the Talmud attributes this discourse to a six year old boy. I’m not familiar with other such cases in the Talmud (there may be some, but I just do not know of them). Perhaps the idea is that Avodah Zarah is such an important tractate, that even six year olds should know it. In a world saturated with idolatry, where assimilation was such a huge threat (perhaps even more than in our day), this tractate was especially important.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a practical case that came in front of the Babylonian amora Shmuel.
  Again, according to the mishnah it would seem that Jews and idolaters can press wine together. And thus, in the Babylonian town of Nehardea they do so. But the question is put to Shmuel whether this wine it is permitted to sell or drink this wine and he delayed three festivals before answering.
  The Talmud now tries to figure out why Shmuel had to delay three festivals before answering. The first reference point is a baraita in which R. Natan and the other sages (later assumed to be R. Shimon) argue about a case where an idolater measured the amount of wine in a vat with his arm or leg. Clearly in such a case the idolater did not intend to libate the wine. Nevertheless, R. Natan says that if he touched it with his hand, it is prohibited to derive any benefit from the wine. The sages say it may be sold, but they agree that it may not be drunk.The problem is that even if Shmuel holds like R. Natan, it is prohibited only if he touched it with his hand. The people pressing the grapes touched it with their feet only. So even if he held like R. Natan, he should have allowed them to sell it.
  
  Daf 57a
  
  Shmuel was not looking for someone to support a potential stringency. He was looking for someone to support the leniency of the anonymous voice in this baraita, attributed here to R. Shimon.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with a story in which an idolater accidently touches some wine with the tip of a palm branch. Can a Jew still use this wine?
  According to Rav, this wine cannot be drunk by a Jew. But it can be sold to non-Jews. In other words Jews may derive benefit from it. This is a mid-level of prohibition. Generally, wine that has been touched by non-Jews is prohibited to Jews, even from deriving benefit. The reason that the Jew can sell it (derive benefit from it) is that the idolater touched it accidently.
  Kahana and R. Assi, good talmudists they are, compare this ruling with another ruling by Rav. In another context Rav said that if a day old child (non-Jewish) touches wine he makes it yayin nesekh, forbidden to a Jew, even though the child clearly had no control over his limbs. His touch too was by definition accidental.Rav explains that in that case as well he said that it is forbidden for the Jew to drink the wine. It is not forbidden for the Jew to derive benefit from the wine.The Talmud will continue to explore the issue of a one day old child who touches Jewish wine.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with Rav’s statement, that minor non-Jews do not render Jewish wine yayin nesekh.
  Shimi raises an objection against Rav. This baraita deals with two types of slaves—those bought from a non-Jew and those born into a Jewish house. Until these slaves are circumcised (if male) and immersed, they are considered non-Jews. Thus they convey impurity. However, others consider them to be pure. This section is not directly related to the issue at hand.
  The baraita rules that if adult slaves that have not immersed touch wine they render it yayin nesekh, forbidden to the Jew. But minors do not. This is the difficulty on Rav. We shall see his answer tomorrow.
  IntroductionYesterday R. Shimi used a baraita as a difficulty against Rav’s ruling, that wine touched by minor idolaters is considered yayin nesekh. Today Rav resolves that difficulty.
  Rav says that the baraita refers only to the children of female slaves.  Slaves owned by a Jew are considered Jewish, and therefore these children are Jewish. Their touch does not render wine yayin nesekh. But the touch of non-Jewish minors does, including slaves bought from non-Jews before the slaves were circumcised and immersed.
  The problem is that the baraita seemed to say that slaves bought from non-Jews and children of female slaves from Jewish households are treated the same.Rav answers that they are treated the same when it comes to the impurity of their spit and place of treading. But they are not treated the same when it comes to touching wine.But there is still a problem. If the spit and place of treading of slaves bought from non-Jews is impure, it makes sense to say that the same is true for the children of female slaves. But if the spit and place of treading of slaves bought from non-Jews is pure, then all the more so the spit and place of treading of children of maidservants born in a Jewish home is pure. And thus, according to the one who says that they are pure, the comparison must be that in neither case do they make yayin nesekh.
  The baraita equates slaves bought from non-Jews and slaves born from female slaves not to teach that in both cases minors do not make yayin nesekh. Rather the equation is made to teach that when slaves are bought from non-Jews, once they circumcise and immerse, they are considered Jews and do not render wine yayin nesekh, even if they still are essentially idolaters. This is the opposite of what R. Nahman said. For he said they render wine yayin nesekh until they forget the nature of idolater.There are two competing notions in this section as to what it is about the non-Jew that causes his touch to prohibit wine. According to the baraita it is his ethnicity. Once his ethnicity is changed by conversion, he no longer renders wine yayin nesekh, no matter what is actual belief or practice is. According to R. Nahman it is his belief, his religion, that matters. If he still worships idols, the fact that he has circumcised and immersed is irrelevant.
  IntroductionThe Talmud goes back to discussing the statement attributed in the last section to R. Nachman.
  When slaves are bought from idolaters they are expected to adopt Judaism. They are circumcised, immerse in the mikveh, and essentially become Jews. However, we know that this was not a “conversion” by choice. It is the only type of forced conversion that is possible in Judaism. These slaves, who had previously served in a pagan home, will still be accustomed to blessing their gods every time they drink wine. Therefore, any wine they touch is yayin nesekh unti they forget their idolatrous ways. According to R. Joshua b. Levi, this takes twelve months.
  IntroductionIn today’s section Rabbah raises a difficulty on the statement of R. Nachman from yesterday’s section, that a slave bought from a non-Jew continues to make yayin nesekh until idolatry is banished from his lips. The fact that he has been circumcised and immersed does not mean that he is no longer in some ways considered idolatrous.The long baraita quoted here is the same baraita we saw in section 2.
  The baraita implies that if the slaves had been circumcised and immersed they immediately stop rendering wine yayin nesekh. They do not need to wait until idolatry is banished from their lips, as R. Nahman stated.
  
  Daf 57b
  
  Rav Nachman says that the baraita refers only to the children of female slaves.  Slaves owned by a Jew are considered Jewish, and therefore these slaves do not make yayin nesekh. But the touch of slaves bought from non-Jews does make yayin nesekh even after they are circumcised and immersed, until they idolatry is banished from their lips.
  The problem is that the baraita seemed to say that slaves bought from non-Jews and children of female slaves from Jewish households are treated the same.Rav Nachman answers that they are treated the same when it comes to the impurity of their spit and place of treading. But they are not treated the same when it comes to touching wine.But there is still a problem. If the spit and place of treading of slaves bought from non-Jews is impure, it makes sense to say that the same is true for the children of female slaves. But if the spit and place of treading of slaves bought from non-Jews is pure, then all the more so the spit and place of treading of children of maidservants born in a Jewish home is pure. And thus, according to the one who says that they are pure, the comparison must be that in neither case do they make yayin nesekh.
  This is the mirror image of what we saw in section three. The comparison in the baraita is not meant to teach that slaves stop making yayin nesekh immediately after they are circumcised and immersed. Rather, it teaches the slaves bought from non-Jews are like slaves born into Jewish homes. In both cases, both adults and minors make yayin nesekh until they are circumcised and have immersed. This rejects Rav’s statement from earlier on this daf.You will note that this section is the mirror image of the passage above that appeared in sections 2-3.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains another story about an idolater who touches some wine.
  Rava allows the wine to be sold to Gentiles because the idolater who touched it clearly did not have the intent to drink or libate. He just wanted to see that it was wine. Note that even Rava, who is relatively lenient, does not allow Jews to drink the wine. As we have seen, once the non-Jew touches the wine, the Jew may not drink it.
  Other rabbis rule more strictly, prohibiting a Jew from even selling the wine. We have an interesting description of people going out to the street and announcing the rulings of the respective rabbis. It sounds like this issue was one of great practical significance to the Jews of Babylonia.
  
  Daf 58a
  
  IntroductionIn the story at the end of yesterday’s daf there was a dispute over a case where a non-Jew touched some wine out of anger to demonstrate to the storekeeper that it was actually wine. Rava permitted the selling of such wine whereas the two R. Hunas did not. This week’s daf continues where last week left off.
  For a reason not entirely clear, Rava does not want R. Huna b. Nahman to enter into his room. But he enters anyway. R. Huna b. Nahman asks Rava how he rules in a case where the non-Jew shook the wine but did not do so with the intention of libating. Rava, against what he said earlier, claims that it is forbidden for usage. R. Huna responds that Rava himself said that such shaking does not make the wine yayin nesekh. Rava responds that he agrees that the wine that was actually shaken is yayin nesekh. But since the storekeeper threw the wine into a barrel with unshaken wine, he need not lose the value of the entire barrel. He may sell the barrel but just reduce the value of the wine thrown in.The Tosafot have another reading of this section. They read that it is not R. Huna son of R. Nahman who comes to Mehoza but R. Nahman, Rava’s teacher. This helps explain why Rava is afraid of him—he fears that he is contradicting his teacher. Rava now asks R. Nahman for the ruling, and R. Nahman responds that it is forbidden to even use such wine. Rava then responds by claiming that R. Nahman said that such shaking does not make yayin nesekh. R. Nahman concludes by saying that the value of the wine actually shaken is prohibited.This is a much easier reading of the Talmud but it is not the text that we have in front of us, which follows Rashi’s reading.
  IntroductionRava stated that if a non-Jew put his finger in the wine to test if it is wine, it is permitted to sell the wine but not to drink it. Abaye raises difficulties on him, claiming it is even prohibited to sell such wine.
  Rava comes to Pumbedita, where Nahmani, another name for Abaye, is the head of the academy. Abaye proves to Rava that this wine is prohibited. First he cites some precedents, cases where rabbis actually ruled that it is prohibited.Shmuel prohibited it in Nehardea. R. Yohanan prohibited it in Tiberias. Thus two great rabbis already ruled strictly.Rava tries to argue that in these places they prohibited it because the people there are not “students of Torah.” Since they are not knowledgeable in the finer points of Torah, the law must be more stringent with them so that they will not come to transgress Torah law. But Abaye pushes back—if the people in Nehardea and Tiberias are not students of Torah, then all the more so the people in Mehoza, Rava’s place of residence, are not. Thus there is no justification for Rava to rule leniently.
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of the earlier sugya. Abaye continues to cite support that it is prohibited to even derive benefit from wine touched by a non-Jew even if he did not touch it to drink it.
  The market inspector was not drinking wine for his own benefit. He was testing it to see what it was, perhaps its quality. Nevertheless, the rabbis prohibited not only the wine that he actually touched, but the entire cask that he threw the wine back into. This is a proof against Rava.
  Rava tries to answer that it is prohibited only to drink the wine, but not to sell it. The problem is that the second half of this baraita uses the word “it may be sold” to rule that while it is prohibited to drink the wine, it is not prohibited to sell the wine. Thus, when the first half states “it is prohibited” the implication is that is prohibited to even sell the wine.As far as the difference between the first half of the baraita and the second half, the rule seems to be that if the non-Jew knew it was wine, we must be concerned that he libated it, even if this is very unlikely. But if he thought it was oil, then we can be sure that he did not libate it, and thus the wine can be sold. Note that the rule is still strict with regard to drinking the wine. Even though the non-Jew touched it not even knowing if its wine, it is still prohibited.
  IntroductionAnother instance where a non-Jew touches some wine and some rabbis disagree concerning its status.
  The story is fascinating—we can see that the rabbis didn’t always know who was Jewish and who was not. After having poured the wine, the rabbis debate whether Jews may drink the wine, meaning it is totally permissible, or whether they may not even sell it, meaning it is totally forbidden.
  
  Daf 58b
  
  The sugya here explains why the non-Jew did not know that it was not wine. It was night and it was new beer.
  The Talmud raises another difficulty. If the non-Jew drew the wine from the casket, then he touched the wine with the drawing cup. And even though he did not know that it was wine, he still directly acted upon it, and it should be prohibited.The resolution is that the non-Jew did not touch it directly. He only poured it. And according to this sugya, there is a principle that whenever a non-Jew pours wine without intention (meaning he does not know it is wine), the wine is permitted. Note that in this case there are two reasons to be lenient: 1) he does not know that it is wine—meaning it is unintentional; 2) he did not touch it. He only poured it.
  IntroductionIn Talmudic times people drank their wine mixed with water, both in order to lower costs and in order to prevent drunkenness. So the question is asked, ff wine is mixed by a non-Jew, can a Jew drink the wine?
  Asi asks whether wine mixed with water by an idolater is prohibited. The idolater has not touched the wine, he has only poured it in order to mix it.Yohanan responds by criticizing R. Asi for his choice of verbs. Mesakho is the biblical verb, whereas the rabbis use the word “mezago” with the zayin replacing the samekh. There are many cases in which the language the rabbis use is not identical to the biblical language. Hebrew had after all been developing for thousands of years. These two roots are actually quite close, clearly related one to the other.In any case, R. Yohanan answers that while such wine is not strictly prohibited, it is advisable that Jews avoid this situation. This is like a nazirite going into a vineyard. There is no prohibition but it is better that he avoid it lest he come to eat the grapes.
  In these two pieces we can see that rabbis prohibited Jews from drinking wine mixed by non-Jews. Although the principle “Go, go, we say to the Nazirite” is sometimes understood merely as good advice, here it is understood as creating an actual prohibition.
  Shimon b. Lakish believes that the people he sees are committing two errors—they are eating produce that should have been tithed, and they are drinking water that is prohibited.Yohanan disagrees on both counts and sends Resh Lakish back to Botzrah to let the people know that he had erred in his ruling. First of all, Botzrah is not Betzer. Betzer is mentioned in Deuteronomy 4:43 and is part of Israel. Since it’s not part of Israel, the people there do not need to tithe. Second, the water is not prohibited. The Talmud will now explain why.
  According to R. Yohanan, water belonging to the public cannot become prohibited, even if people worship it.
  
  Daf 59a
  
  By deduction, if water owned by the public cannot become prohibited, water owned by an individual can. The problem is that in general things attached to the ground cannot become prohibited. Water is considered attached to the ground and thus should not become prohibited.The Talmud answers that if a wave detached the water, and then people worshiped it, it can become prohibited.
  Earlier, on daf 46 there was a discussion about boulders that had become detached from a mountain on their own force, without human intervention. Can such boulders become prohibited if worshiped? Water that becomes detached by a wave is similar—a natural feature that becomes detached from its source on its own. So if R. Yohanan holds that it is prohibited, he must be the one who held that boulders detached from the ground are prohibited.The Talmud again refines the case—the water worshiped here was not detached simply by a wave. Rather, a non-Jew struck the water, then worshiped the detached water. Can a Jew now use such water? R. Yohanan would say yes, but this does not mean that he is the one that holds that the boulders are permitted.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a story of a rabbi arriving in a place called Gavla where Jews seem to be not strictly observing halakhah. It is very interesting to note what their practices actually are. As we shall see, they transgress certain rabbinic prohibitions, not biblical ones, prohibitions that have to do with keeping Jews from assimilating.
  The three practices that R. Hiyya sees are what I would call “marginal.” The women are not becoming pregnant from non-Jews. They are having children with non-Jews who seem to have converted, but not done so according to rabbinic law. They know that conversion entails circumcision, but they do not know about immersion.They are not drinking wine made by non-Jews. They seem to know that this is prohibited. But they do not know that it is also prohibited to drink wine poured by non-Jews.They are not eating non-kosher food. They are eating lupines, a type of bean, cooked by non-Jews.All of these are what I would call infractions of rabbinic law, practices that many Jews may simply not have known about. They are also all intended to keep Jews from fraternizing with non-Jews.
  Yohanan adopts a far more strict approach, ruling strictly in each case. The Talmud will now analyze each issue separately.
  Yohanan holds that until a convert circumcises and immerses he is considered a non-Jew. So these women were pregnant from non-Jews. And R. Yohanan also holds that if a non-Jewish man impregnates a Jewish woman, the offspring is a mamzer. So these children are mamzerim. Note that this is not the accepted halakhah.
  As we learned earlier, non-Jews should not even mix wine for Jews because it is just better to stay away from this type of situation. Here we see that R. Yohanan goes a step further and deems such wine to be yayin nesekh.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to explain R. Yohanan’s strict rulings.
  According to R. Yohanan the lupines cooked by Gentiles are prohibited only because the people of Gavla are not “students of Torah.” The implication is that they are lax in their observance and in consequence, the halakhah must be extra stringent with them. But, as we shall see, lupines should have been prohibited in any case.
  Lupines cannot be eaten raw. Therefore, the prohibition of food cooked by Gentiles should, according to a statement made by Rav, apply to them. This was an issue more fully discussed way back on 38a.
  There is another version of what types of foods are prohibited if cooked by Gentiles—foods that kings use to accompany bread. Simple lupines, a type of bean, are not eaten by kings. Therefore, Jews may eat lupines cooked by non-Jews. However, R. Yohanan prohibited the Jews of Gavla because they were not students of Torah. He thought that if they heard of this leniency they might come to transgress other laws.
  In principle, a non-Jew can carry grapes to the winepress because they are not yet wine. But R. Kahana says we should not let them do so just to stay away from any chance of them coming to touch the wine. 
  The baraita clearly allows grapes carried by non-Jews to the winepress. Even if some liquid comes out of the grapes, the grapes do not become yayin nesekh.
  
  Daf 59b
  
  IntroductionThe brief story in this section is one of the strangest of the stories in Avodah Zarah.
  R. Ashi seems to think that merely by touching the wine the gentile has not yet prohibited it. The problem will come about if he stirs the wine—meaning moves his hand about. R. Ashi seems to think that we need to be concerned lest he libate the wine. So R. Ashi instructs his students to hold the non-Jew’s hand in place. Then the Jews should pour the contents of the cask out, thereby maintaining them as permitted.
  IntroductionToday’s section is about a non-Jew who libates a Jew’s wine with the intention of making it prohibited to him. Is this wine really prohibited? Can the Jew be compensated for his loss?
  If the non-Jew knows that by libating the Jew’s wine he will render it unsaleable, the Jew may recover the cost of the wine. This is not considered “deriving benefit” but merely protecting himself from a loss. The non-Jew is looked at as a damager who must compensate the damaged party for his loss.
  R. Ashi cites his source, a ruling by R. Judah b. Bava and R. Judah b. Betera. They both hold that a non-Jew cannot just libate a Jew’s wine and thereby make it prohibited. The Tosafot say that Rav Ashi is not actually ruling like R. Judah b. Bava and R. Judah b. Batera. These rabbis allow the wine to be sold to anyone. From here R. Ashi deduces that while the other rabbis would not let the wine be sold to anyone, they would allow (or mandate) the non-Jew to compensate the Jew for his loss.There are stories in the Middle Ages of Christians actually doing this—touching Jewish wine intentionally to cause the Jews a loss. The rabbis responded by allowing Jews to even drink such wine. They did not want this to be a way for Christians to cause massive losses to Jews.
  IntroductionAnother story of a non-Jew who touches wine without any intention of libating it or even of drinking it.
  According to this version of the story, R. Papa prohibited only the wine that was on the same level as the spout. The rest of the barrel, what was above it and below it, was permitted. We don’t consider all of the wine to be connected.
  
  Daf 60a
  
  According to this version, R. Papa prohibited all of the wine above the stopper, not just the wine adjacent to it. This is because all of this wine rests on the non-Jew’s finger.
  A tevul yom is one who has gone to the mikveh to purify himself but the sun has not yet set. According to the first opinion, if the tevul yom touches the wine anywhere, the whole jug is impure. But according to the second opinion, only if he touches it on the top or bottom is the whole jug impure. On top, the bottom is all a base for what is on top and thus it is all impure. If he touches the bottom, all the wine from the top would flow through it and become impure. But if he touches it on the side it is pure. Only that which he actually touched would be impure. This is like the first version of R. Papa. The sages in this baraita do not agree at all with R. Papa. This leads Rashi to conclude that the halakhah does not follow R. Papa.
  If the non-Jew is holding a barrel of wine and pouring the wine into a cask held by the Jew, then the wine is prohibited because it is coming out from the force of the non-Jews. 
  If the Jew is pouring, the wine is permitted, because the non-Jew is just acting passively. However, if the non-Jew tilts the cask then the wine has moved due to his power and it is prohibited.
  If the non-Jew touches the wine in the skin-bottle or causes it to shift in the skin, the wine is prohibited. So if there is a Jew there watching to make sure he doesn’t touch it and the skin is full, then the wine is permitted.
  The cask being referred to here is open and therefore, the shaking of the wine does not prohibit it, because the one carrying it would not want it to spill out. Therefore if it is full, the wine is prohibited lest the non-Jew touched it accidentally. If it is not full then the non-Jew probably did not touch it, so it remains permitted.I should note that R. Papa seems to like coming up with opposite scenarios. In scenario one, a full container is permitted, whereas in scenario two it is prohibited. Rabbis seem to love these puzzles even if the logic is not always so straightforward.
  R. Ashi seems to return this law to its logical foundations. Libating is not done by shaking the wine in a skin bottle. Therefore, as long as we know he did not touch it, the wine is permitted.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with a wine press set up by a non-Jew. This was a secondary means to press extra juice out of the grapes. Does the fact that the non-Jew set it up mean that the wine is prohibited?
  According to this version, all would agree that if the non-Jew puts direct force on the grapes, the grapes are prohibited. They only disagree about a case where the non-Jew set up the press but did not put direct force on the grapes.
  According to a second version of the dispute, a more lenient one, they disagree only when there is direct force. If there is only indirect force, all agree that it is permitted.However, the story shows that amoraim continued to rule strictly even in cases of indirect force.
  IntroductionA few more stories about non-Jews coming into contact with wine containers owned by Jews.
  The non-Jew held this wine inside the jug by holding the broken jug together. The force that he applies to the walls of the jug causes the wine to be prohibited but only for consumption. A Jew may still sell it.
  
  Daf 60b
  
  If the split is lengthwise then when he held it together, the non-Jew did something that could not have been done by a heavy weight. But if it split cross-wise, and he just held the top down, then even a brick could have accomplished that. The wine remains totally permitted.
  This story is really about kashering the wine press. If the non-Jew is standing in the press then he can be assumed to have touched the wine in the press. Does this wine go into the walls of the press? If there is enough moisture there that were one to moisten one’s hands with it then touch something else the moisture would be transferred then the winepress needs to be rinsed and rubbed dry to make it usable by a Jew. As we shall see on page 74b this process is done with ash. If the winepress is not that moist, then it only needs to be dried off.
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses different types of contact that a non-Jew may have with wine that may or may not make the wine into yen nesekh, which is forbidden to Jews.
  If a non-Jew is seen standing next to a vat of wine we need to know if the non-Jew touched the wine. The mishnah teaches that if the non-Jew had loaned money to the Jew then the wine is prohibited. In such a case, the non-Jew has a lien on the Jew’s wine and might at some point say to the Jew, give me the wine and I will forgive you the loan. Since he has this financial connection to the Jew, and in some sense he has ownership over the wine, he will feel free to take some of the wine for himself. Therefore we must assume that he has come into contact with the wine. If, however, he has not loaned money to the Jew, then we do not assume that he had come into contact with the wine, and it is permitted.
  This section lists all sorts of circumstances in which a non-Jew might come into contact with wine and yet it is highly unlikely that he used it to make a libation. Since in all of these cases we can be almost one hundred per cent sure that he didn’t do so, there is room to be lenient. The Sages, in front of whom cases such as these came, said that the wine could be sold to a non-Jew. In other words, it is forbidden to drink the wine but it is not forbidden to derive benefit from it. If it had truly been considered yen nesekh, then it could not even be sold. Rabbi Shimon is even more lenient and allows a person to even drink the wine.
  If a non-Jew throws an empty cask into a vat of wine the wine in the vat is not forbidden at all. Since in this case the non-Jew certainly did not make a libation with the wine, it is permitted and a Jew may even drink the wine.
  R. Ashi quotes another mishnah that proves that the wine is prohibited only if the non-Jew could take it to collect his loan. The wine in the second clause is essentially being held by the non-Jew as collateral for a loan. If the non-Jew will not let the Jew take the wine, then he has a lien on “this wine.” But if he lets him take the wine, then we can assume his lien is on other wine (or some other collateral). In this case the wine would be permitted. We will learn this mishnah in greater depth later in the chapter.
  According to the mishnah, if a non-Jew falls into a vat of wine, the wine may be sold (R. Shimon allows it to be drunk). R. Papa says this is true only if the non-Jew dies in the vat (ewww, not sure I’d want to drink it after that). If he comes out then the wine is strictly prohibited because we can assume that he libated some of it. Surviving the fall into the wine vat is cause for him to celebrate as he would on a festival.
  R. Shimon’s methodology is quite straightforward. When he permits, he permits the wine all the way—it can even be drunk. When he prohibits, he is also clear—the wine cannot even be sold.
  A whole bunch of amoraim rule like R. Shimon—one can even drink the wine. But the anonymous voice at the end rules against him. He who rules last rules!
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the case of the non-Jew who threw a cask into a vat of wine.
  Rav Ashi tries to equate the rules governing the zav, a person with an unnatural genital discharge, with the rules governing wine touched by a non-Jew. If a zav throws something into a vat of liquid, the vat of liquid remains pure. This is a true comparison, as was noted by Rashi. The problem is that the comparison is not all that good beyond this. The main problem is that when a zav carries something, it becomes impure even if he does not touch it. But wine carried by a non-Jew is not yayin nesekh. For it to be nesekh he must touch it.
  According to the mishnah, if the non-Jew throws something in to the vat in anger, the wine remains fit. By implication, if he throws it in not in anger, it becomes nesekh. But when it comes to the zav, it does not matter what his motivation is when throwing something into the vat—it always remains pure. So the analogy does not hold up so well. 
  
  Daf 61a
  
  R. Ashi says that in the mishnah the cask was not thrown into the vat from afar. It was rolled in and the non-Jew still had contact with it when it touched the wine. This, if it were done not in anger, would make the wine nesekh, just as it would make the wine impure if done by a zav. Thus there is a similarity between the rules governing the case of yayin nesekh and the case of the zav.
  IntroductionThe mishnah discusses wine owned by a non-Jew but produced by a Jew with the intent that the non-Jew will be able to sell it to the Jews, without it having the status of yayin nesekh.
  If a Jew were to prepare wine belonging to a non-Jew and then leave it on the non-Jew’s property we need to know whether or not the non-Jew had contact with the wine and thereby made it into yen nesekh. If the house was open to the public domain and there were both Jews and non-Jews living in the city, the wine is permitted. The reason is that the non-Jew will fear that if he touches the wine a Jew passing by might see him and tell the other Jews, in which case they won’t buy the wine from him. This non-Jew from the outset wanted to sell to non-Jews therefore he won’t perform any act that might cause him to lose his ability to sell the wine. However, if there are only non-Jews in the city, the non-Jew does not fear that they will see him and report him to the Jews. Since in this case he is not afraid to touch the wine, the wine must be guarded to make sure that it doesn’t become yayin nesekh. If it is not guarded the law is strict and it is forbidden.This guardian need not sit and guard the wine 24 hours a day. It is sufficient for him to come in and out occasionally. As long as the non-Jew does not know when he will come in and out, the non-Jew will be too afraid to touch the wine for fear that he will be caught. This is similar to the way that Jewish kashruth supervisors work today. They are not present in restaurants at all times. It is enough for the restaurant owner to know that they might show up at any time for him to be afraid to break the rules of kashruth. The words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar are not easy to explain. The Talmud will try to interpret them.
  In this case the non-Jew has already written out a receipt that he has received the money for the wine. Even if he preemptively wrote the receipt before he received the money, in this case the non-Jew will assumedly not touch the wine. If the Jew really has paid the money then it simply belongs to the Jew, and the non-Jew will not touch wine that doesn’t belong to him. If the Jew has not really paid the money, the non-Jew will not touch it for if he does, the Jew will not pay him.
  However, if the non-Jew demonstrates that he doesn’t consider the wine to really belong to the Jew until he pays the money, then we cannot assume that he has not touched it. Since the non-Jew still considers himself the owner, he may allow himself to take some of the wine, even though the Jew made it in order to subsequently pay for the wine. The mishnah relates that this case actually happened in Bet Shean.
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, if the city is all non-Jews, then unless the wine left in the non-Jew’s domain is guarded it is prohibited.
  Even if the city’s residents are only non-Jews, there are still Jewish peddlers roaming around. These peddlers would inhibit the non-Jew from touching the Jew’s wine. So why is the wine not permitted without a guardian in all case.
  If the city is locked up and Jewish merchants cannot come in, then the non-Jew will be able to drink the Jew’s wine with impunity. This would mean that it is prohibited. By implication, if the city is not locked, then the Jew’s wine is permitted.
  If the wine were in the public domain, we can assume that the non-Jew would not drink it. If the house has a window, then people can see in. If there is a rubbish-heap then people could stand on it and peer into the person’s house (I know this is strange). They might also be able to see in when they climb up a date-palm.
  If the top of the date-palm is cut off then there would seem to be no reason for anyone to climb to the top. For this reason, one rabbi permits the wine. But another rabbi prohibits, thinking that the Jew might climb the tree to look for a lost animal.
  IntroductionThe baraita in today’s section discusses whether we can trust that a non-Jew has not opened and drank from a Jew’s wine in his possession.
  The question we need to ask is whether the non-Jew will enter the house and take a sip from the Jew’s wine. If there is another Jew living in the courtyard, then he will not do so, out of fear that the Jew will report him to his fellow tribesman. If the Jew has the key and seal, then he will not be able to enter without breaking the lock and seal. But if there are no other Jews in the courtyard, and the non-Jewish landlord has the key and seal, then we need to be concerned. After all, he thinks he will not be caught. 
  
  Daf 61b
  
  In this case, the wine belongs to the non-Jew and the Jew is simply producing it. Here it is even more likely that the non-Jew would touch the wine, because, after all, it is his wine. In this case, the Jew must have the key and seal even if another Jew lives in the courtyard. Since the wine belongs to the non-Jew, it would not be inappropriate for him to try some. The only reason he would not is that he does not have access.
  R. Yohanan emends the baraita. Since a Jew resides in the courtyard, the other Jew does not have to possess the key and seal for it to be permitted. If the non-Jew drinks, the Jew will see and tell the other Jew.
  The baraita continues with the case of the Jew preparing wine belonging to the non-Jew. If there are no Jews living in the courtyard, then the non-Jew is even more likely to go taste what is, after all, his own wine. R. Meir rules that the wine is kosher if the Jew holds the key. The other rabbis require at least a supervisor who goes in at regular intervals. We shall analyze this below.
  The Talmud tries to analyze what exactly the sages are referring to. If they are referring to the immediately preceding clause then all agree—the wine is prohibited unless there is a Jew present.
  If the sages are referring to the first half of the second clause, where the Jew is preparing the non-Jew’s wine, then we also have a problem. How could R. Yohanan allow such wine without a Jew even having possession of the key and seal if the sages rule that the wine is prohibited without a guard? Would R. Yohanan rule against the sages?
  The Talmud resolves that the sages refer to the first clause. The situation is that the wine belongs to the Jew. According to the first tanna, the wine is permitted if the Jew holds the key. No Jew needs to be living in the courtyard. The sages say that a guard needs either to be  there permanently or at least to be coming in at regular times. Without some sort of supervision, the fact that the Jew holds the key is not sufficient.
  A guard who enters in at regular intervals is worse—the non-Jew will know when he comes in and will be able to time his stealing a drink.The Talmud therefore emends the baraita. The guard needs to come in intermittently. This is indeed how modern kashrut supervision works.
  Introduction
  The Talmud now discusses R. Shimon b. Elazar’s opinion from the Mishnah. For ease of reference I am reproducing it here: If [a Jew] prepares a non-Jew's wine in a state of ritual purity and leaves it in [the nonJew’s] domain, in a house which is open to the public domain, should it be in a city where non-Jews and Jews reside, it is permitted. But should it be in a city where only non-Jews reside it is prohibited unless [an Jew] sits and guard.There is no need for the guard to sit and watch [the whole time]; even if he keeps going out and coming in it is permitted. Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar says: it is all one with the domain of a non-Jew.
  Is R. Shimon b. Elazar stricter or more lenient than the first opinion? Amoraim dispute the interpretation of his opinion. 
  According to R. Judah, R. Shimon b. Elazar is more lenient. According to the first opinion, the non-Jew who owns the wine might open up the jug even if it is in the domain of another non-Jew. He might say to his fellow, “If you don’t tell the Jew that I opened the wine kept in your domain, I won’t tell on you in in a similar situation.” But R. Shimon says we are not concerned about such collusion. If the wine is in the domain of another non-Jew the non-Jew who owns it will not open it.
  R. Nahman reads the mishnah in an opposite manner. R. Shimon b. Elazar rules strictly. 
  The baraita reads in accordance with R. Shimon b. Elazar. Non-Jews will deceive Jews and therefore it does not matter whether the wine is left in the domain of the non-Jew who owns it or in the domain of another non-Jew—it is always prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a story where one gentile leaves some wine made in purity by a Jew in the domain of another, the situation discussed in yesterday’s mishnah.
  The question is whether we have to be concerned that the sharecroppers drank some of the wine placed in their domain. Rava’s students argue that we need not be concerned about “collusion” because this is not a case where each placed in the domain of the other. Essentially, the sharecroppers will not open the wine placed in their domain by the powerful officer of the king. So Jews can drink it.
  Rava points out that this case is actually more problematic. Even if we are not generally concerned with collusion, if one party is powerful, the other party might cover up for him. Here, the officer might open the wine and drink some and the sharecroppers would cover up for him. Therefore it is forbidden.
  IntroductionToday’s short story completes the chapter! But not to worry—we keep discussing wine in the next chapter, so raise a glass!
  The question that needs to be asked here is whether we need to be concerned that the non-Jew drank from or even touched the wine. Rava says it depends whether people would think him a thief for standing there. If they would, then he will not have time to drink the wine, so the wine is permitted. But if people do not care if he is standing there, then the wine is forbidden.
  Congratulations—you’ve finished the fourth chapter of Avodah Zarah. Only one more to go!
  
  Daf 62a
  
  Introduction
  The opening mishnah of the fifth chapter discusses a non-Jew who hires a Jew to work with him in the transportation of yayin nesekh.
  A Jew is not allowed to assist a non-Jew in the preparation or even the transportation of yayin nesekh, wine which may eventually be used in libations. If he does so, and collects a wage for this specific type of work, the wage is prohibited, meaning that he cannot use the money. Since this person performed a forbidden act for profit, the Rabbis penalize him and forbid him to use his wages. However, if he was hired to do another type of work, for instance bring jugs of olive oil, and while working the non-Jew said to him to also bring a cask of yayin nesekh, his wages are permitted. Since the Jew was not hired to work with specifically with the forbidden wine and the wages he receives are for his other work, the wages are permitted. [If the Jew was told from the outset that part of his work involved yayin nesekh, the wages would be forbidden.]
  This section teaches a similar ruling with regard to a donkey driver. If the non-Jew hires a Jew’s donkey to bring yayin nesekh, the wages which the Jew receives are forbidden. However, if the non-Jew hires the donkey to ride on it the wages are permitted, even if the non-Jew brings his yayin nesekh on the donkey. Although in both cases the Jew’s donkey is helping carry the forbidden wine, since in the second case he is not receiving wages specifically for carrying the wine, the wages are permitted.
  IntroductionThe Talmud tries to determine why wages earned from working with yayin nesekh are prohibited.
  It is forbidden to derive any benefit from yayin nesekh. We might have thought that since this is so, wages derived from it are also prohibited. But this is not true with regard to other substances from which one cannot derive benefit, such as orlah (produce during its first three years) and seeds planted in a vineyard. While it is prohibited to derive benefit from such produce, if one did use it to betroth a woman, she is betrothed. This implies that there is value to these things even though they are prohibited.
  The second possibility for why the wages are prohibited is that the prohibited nature of yayin nesekh is transferred to the proceeds from its sale. So when the worker is paid for working with yayin nesekh, it would be as if he is selling yayin nesekh. The problem is that this is not true with regard to Sabbatical year produce. If such produce is sold, the proceeds have the same status as the produce itself. Nevertheless, if one tells a worker to go work in a field during the Sabbatical year, his wages are permitted as long as he does not specifically state “here is a dinar…” Thus the fact that the proceeds of the sale of a forbidden object become forbidden does not mean that wages earned working with that object are also prohibited.
  R. Yohanan says that there is no purely technical rationale behind the mishnah’s law. Rather it is simply a penalty the rabbis meted out for those who work in the production of yayin nesekh. R. Yohanan also mentions a penalty for donkey drivers. Tomorrow’s section will clarify what this refers to.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section R. Yohanan mentioned a penalty placed on donkey drivers.Today the Talmud explains that this refer to. As we will see, Rava mentions it at the very end.
  The penalty placed on the donkey-drivers is for doing work with Sabbatical year produce.The Talmud will now we explain what the baraita means.
  What does it mean when the baraita states that their wages are treated like Sabbatical year produce? It cannot mean that the employer pays them with Sabbatical year produce because one is not allowed to pay debts with such produce.
  The second possibility is that his wages have the holiness of Sabbatical year produce, meaning that certain restrictions apply to them. But this too does not accord with tannaitic law. One can pay a worker to gather vegetables during the Sabbatical year as long as he does not specify that he is doing so for “this dinar.”
  Abaye says that the baraita does indeed mean that the workers are paid in sabbatical year produce. As to the objection that sabbatical year produce cannot be used to pay debts, Abaye says that they find a permitted way to give it to him. He draws an analogy with second tithe, which also may not be used to pay a debt. One cannot say to his fellow that if he helps bring the second tithe to Jerusalem, where it must be consumed, he will share it with him. But he can say that when they bring it to Jerusalem, they will eat and drink together. So too with regard to Sabbatical year produce, he can give it as a gift to his worker. 
  
  Daf 62b
  
  Rava says that the baraita does indeed mean that the wages of the donkey driver carrying Sabbatical year produce are holy like the produce itself. So why is the same not true for the wages of an average workman working with Sabbatical year produce? Because his wages are low. Donkey-drivers, on the other hand, have much higher wages, and therefore the rabbis penalized them.There is one last question though—the mishnah we have been learning says that the rabbis penalized laborers who work with yayin nesekh. But we just said that since workers’ wages are low they are not penalized! The answer is that since the laws of yayin nesekh are more stringent, the rabbis penalized them as well.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya asks if there is a distinction between “yayin nesekh” and “stam yeynam” which is wine that has not been libated. This is not a distinction we read about often, but does exist in some realms of halakhah. It might be that the Talmud just brings this up to remind us that the law is just as strict with regard to ordinary wine as it is with regard to libated wine.
  Ordinary wine is as prohibited as yayin nesekh. The only difference is with regard to the laws of impurity, where wine known to be libated has a higher degree of impurity. The question is how do we deal with its status in a third category—the wages earned working with it?
  As we can see, wages earned while working with ordinary wine is just as prohibited. The Talmud asks why R. Hisday told him to burn it and bury it. This is extraordinarily strict to make sure that people don’t accidentally come to use the wheat and that he not benefit from it as manure.
  Why burn it and then bury it? Why not just bury it? This is what is done with the articles used in execution. As an aside it is interesting that the rabbis say that anything used to kill a human being can never again be used. It seems that there is some inherent disgrace, or perhaps even pollution accorded to these instruments. Not only should they not be glorified, essentially they must be destroyed.
  When it comes to the instruments buried with the executed people, everyone will know that these items are prohibited and will not come to dig them up. But with the individual burying the wheat that he gained through renting out his ship, people might think he is burying it just to hide it because he stole it. Then they will come to steal it, which seems fitting since they suspect him of being a thief. To prevent this, it must be burned.As an aside, it seems far more likely that people would come to try to steal the sword for it is more valuable. But rabbis never executed anyone so this source is not so “realistic.” Burying the sword is a symbolic act, not meant simply to prevent others from benefiting from it. On the other hand, the story of the wheat seems to be more realistic.
  IntroductionSince the Talmud spoke about the laws of Sabbatical year produce, there now appears a story about the subject.
  During the Sabbatical year the people of the house of R. Yannai would borrow produce from poor people (who can collect freely from the fields) before such produce needed to be removed from one’s home. They would pay the poor people back after the Sabbatical year, when produce can be sold. The question is—does this count as engaging in trade with Sabbatical year produce. R. Yohanan says it does not since by the time they compensated them, the original produce no longer existed. This seems to be a sort of legal fiction to circumvent the laws of the Sabbatical year, and also to benefit the poor.
  The Talmud analogizes the above case with the prohibition of using an animal paid to a prostitute as a sacrifice (see Deuteronomy 23:19). As we shall see below, if he has sex with her and then gives her the animal, the animal may be used. By giving it to her after the sex, the animal is considered a gift and not payment.
  The Talmud now analyzes the baraita. If he did not have intercourse with her, then obviously the animal is not prohibited. It was not a payment because nothing happened.
  The second half of the baraita is equally difficult. If he didn’t give her anything then there is no animal to be prohibited.
  The Talmud now seems to imply that the animal is basically always permitted, whether he gives it to her before intercourse or after. In tomorrow’s section the Talmud will analyze then how it can ever be prohibited.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to analyze the baraita about the animal used as a prostitute’s wages.
  If he gives her the animal and then has sex with her, this is payment for the sex. Why should the animal not be considered her wages and therefore prohibited? R. Elazar answers that first the man gives her the animal, then she offers it as a sacrifice and then he has sex with her. At the time when she offered it, it was permitted.
  
  Daf 63a
  
   The Talmud now analyzes the case described above. If he told the prostitute that the animal belongs to her immediately, even before having sex with her, then the animal was a gift and of course she can sacrifice it.
  If he does not tell her that the animal is hers immediately, then it is not hers and she can’t sacrifice it. A person can never sacrifice something that is not his or hers.
  The language he uses is sort of ambiguous. He is clearly not giving her a gift, on the other hand he does say that if she needs to use it, it is hers.
  IntroductionLast week’s daf dealt with an animal given as pay to a prostitute. The Torah says that such an animal may not be used as a sacrifice. But if she sacrifices it before they have sex, the sacrifice is valid. Our sugya asks what the rule is if she dedicates it before having sex. Can it be offered even after they have sex?
  As a rule of thumb when one dedicates something to the Temple, words have the same power that actually transferring possession does in ordinary cases. For instance, if I say that my animal belongs to the Temple it actually belongs to the Temple, whereas if I say it belongs to another person I have done nothing. So if the prostitute dedicates the animal before sex, perhaps it is no longer hers at the time of intercourse in which case it is not considered a payment for sex. On other hand, the animal is in existence at the time they have intercourse so perhaps it is considered a payment.
  On the previous page R. Elazar said the offering is permitted if she first offered it. By implication it is not permitted if she only dedicated it. So this should solve our question. For the animal to be permitted as a sacrifice she must first offer it, not merely dedicate it.
  The Talmud says that really the question was asked about R. Elazar’s statement itself. Was R. Elazar being specific—the animal is a valid sacrifice only if it was actually sacrificed. Or perhaps he only said “offered” because he was sure that in that case it was valid. But in the case where it was only dedicated he was not so sure. No answer to this one—sorry folks. I know you really wanted to know.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the case of the animal used to pay a prostitute. I should note that the interest in this topic is not because of the particular case at hand. Rather, the rabbis are interested in these sources because they help illustrate the laws of acquisition.
  According to the first baraita, if he has sex with her and then gives her the animal, the animal is permitted, whereas the second baraita says that it is prohibited. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak resolves them by saying it depends on how he makes his statement to her. If he specifies beforehand that this lamb will be her payment, then it is prohibited. But if he does not specify which lamb then when he had sex with her, that lamb was not designated as payment. The lamb can therefore be used as a sacrifice.
  For an object to be acquired, the person acquiring it must draw it towards themselves. A declaration is not sufficient to transfer ownership. So just because he says “for this lamb” does not mean that the lamb belongs to her, in which case it should be permitted. The answer is that this prostitute was not a Jew. Jews, according to the Talmud, acquire by taking physical possession. Gentiles can, according to this passage, acquire even through a verbal transaction.
  One can acquire objects by their being on one’s property. Therefore, if he says “this lamb” and they are on her property, it is hers and it will be forbidden.
  If the lamb is already on her property, then he gave it to her before intercourse and it should be prohibited in any case. This is not a case of giving after intercourse which is what we were discussing.The Talmud adjusts the situation. He gave it to her only as a pledge if he were not to bring payment. If he brings payment, then the lamb will never have lest his possession. But if he does not bring payment, then it will turn out that the lamb becomes hers, but only after intercourse.Tomorrow’s passage will continue to discuss this case. Again, the main interest seems to be laws of transactions, not the particular case of the prostitute.
  IntroductionToday’s section goes all the way back to the practice of the people of the House of Yannai towards the end of daf 62. The entire discussion about the prostitute’s pay was one long digression.The Talmud there states:Those of the house of R. Yannai used to borrow Sabbatical year produce from the poor and repay them in the eighth year.When this was reported to R. Yohanan, he said to them, “They are acting correctly.”R. Sheshet raises a difficulty on this practice.
  The employer here is not paying his employees; he is feeding them while they are working for him. Nevertheless, he does not need to be concerned that they will use this money to buy prohibited food or drink. Once they buy food products, the products are theirs, not his, and they are transgressing, not he.
  
  Daf 63b
  
  However, if he first tells them to eat or drink and then pays them back, he is paying for forbidden produce which is prohibited. The same should be true with regard to the House of R. Yannai—when they pay back the poor, they are paying back for forbidden produce. Stay tuned for tomorrow’s exciting resolution.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section we read a source that says that if an employer tells his worker to go eat and he will pay him back, the employer has to make sure he doesn’t eat prohibited produce. This was a difficulty on the practice of the House of Yannai to buy Sabbatical year produce from poor people and pay them back later. The Talmud will now offer a couple of solutions.
  R. Hisda explained that this baraita refers to a case where the shop-keeper (who is giving the food to the employees) usually give the employer credit. Therefore, as soon as the shopkeeper gives the food to the workers, the employer incurs a debt to the shop-keeper and it is as if he is simply buying forbidden food straight from the shop-keeper. This is not like the case of the House of Yannai for they have no set relationship with the people they are borrowing from.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on R. Hisda’s resolution. If R. Hisdah was correct then instead of the distinction taught in the baraita itself, between a case where the employer gave them the dinar first and a case where he paid them back after they had bought the food, the distinction should have been drawn with regard to the shop-keeper’s relationship with the employer. If the shop-keeper regularly extends credit to the employer it is forbidden, but if he does not, it is permitted.
  The Talmud now notes that even if the shopkeeper does not regularly extend credit, the employer owes him the money as soon as he gives the food to the workers. This is like the case discussed by Rava. Reuven tells Shimon to give Levi a maneh, and all of Reuven’s property will be subject to pay back Shimon. The minute that Shimon pays Levi, Reuven is liable to pay back Shimon. This is like the case of a guarantor who is liable to pay back a debt even though he did not receive any benefit. So too in the case at hand the employer (analogous to Reuven) must pay the debt back to the shopkeeper (analogous to Shimon).
  Rava says that it does not matter that the employer must pay the shopkeeper back. It is permitted because he did not designate which property he will use to pay him back. The House of Yannai acted in a proper manner because they did not specify which property they would use to pay back the poor people.
  The problem now is the baraita. If the employer did not designate which property he would use to pay them back, then why should it be prohibited? R. Papa answers that the employer paid the shopkeeper in advance. Thus it is as if he is directly acquiring forbidden produce. But if he did not pay him in advance, the employer would not need to be concerned.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to relate to the baraita about the employer. For ease of reference, I am replicating the relevant clause here:Go out and eat and I will pay you back, go out and drink and I will pay you back,” he must be concerned [about their eating and drinking the produce of] the Sabbatical year or tithe or yayin nesekRava had said that this clause refers to a case where the employer paid the storekeeper in advance.
  The problem with Rava’s reading of the baraita is that the employer says “and I will pay” which makes it sound like he is actually giving money to the storekeeper for the first time. So R. Kahana emends the baraita such that it reads “Go out and I will reckon with him” thereby implying that the employer already paid.
  IntroductionR. Ashi offers another solution for the last part of the baraita.
  The employer transgresses only if he actually takes the food from the shopkeeper and gives it directly to his employees. If he pays the shopkeeper back, he is not transgressing.
  As the baraita reads, it sounds like the employer is going to pay the shopkeeper back, not take the food from his hand and give it over to the workers. Therefore R. Ashi must, like R. Kahana earlier, emend the baraita to accord with his interpretation.
  IntroductionToday’s section asks whether a Jew can work together with a non-Jew to destroy yayin nesekh.
  The Jew is hired to break the jugs, which would end in the destruction of the wine inside. But until that point, he wants the jugs to continue to exist. Are his wages prohibited because he does want the caskets to continue to exist at least until he breaks them? Or are they permitted because ultimately he is causing the wine’s destruction? Nahman allows the Jew to do this work.
  The Talmud cites a baraita concerning working in a field with mixed seeds. A Jew may not work such a field with a non-Jew but he may work together to uproot them, because ultimately this is uprooting what is improper. So too, a Jew may work with a non-Jew to break casks of yayin nesekh.
  
  Daf 64a
  
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded with a baraita which forbid a Jew from working with a Gentile to hoe a field of mixed seeds, but allowed him to uproot the seeds because this was “reducing impropriety.”
  The rabbis who heard this baraita originally thought that it follows even R. Akiva. R. Akiva is more strict when it comes to the laws of mixed seeds. It is not only forbidden to plant them, or weed them, it is also forbidden to preserve them. Nevertheless, R. Akiva would allow one to uproot them for that is reducing improper things.
  The Talmud provides the midrashic support for R. Akiva’s reasoning. Rashi says that the midrash that allows R. Akiva to prohibit preserving mixed seeds is from the earlier clause which actually prohibits one from mixing different breeds of animals. In any case, the conclusion is that one may uproot the mixed seeds, even according to R. Akiva.
  The Talmud now says that the baraita is the opinion of the rabbis. This would mean that R. Akiva would rule even more strictly, prohibiting even uprooting the plants.The problem is that if the baraita is the rabbis, why would it specific that uprooting is permitted, for according to the rabbis one may even aid in preserving the mixed seeds. In other words, by saying that uprooting is prohibited, it implies that preserving them is permitted, and this is R. Akiva’s opinion.
  The Talmud resolves this by saying that in this case he was working for free, and this opinion follows R. Judah who holds that one may not aid a non-Jew for free. Therefore, uprooting would be permitted but preserving would be prohibited. But if he was getting paid, even preserving would be permitted.
  The Talmud now uses R. Judah’s opinion to learn something about R. Akiva’s. R. Judah says that one is allowed to reduce what is improper, even if this is a free gift. But then we could apply the same thinking to R. Akiva. R. Akiva allows a Jew to work for free. But all would agree that if he is being paid, he may uproot the mixed seeds or break the jugs of yayin nesekh. The baraita is now back to being a support for R. Nahman allowing the Jew to be hired to break jugs of yayin nesekh.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains another question asked of the same rabbis when they gathered together. The topic is again relevant to idolatry and yayin nesekh.
  If a Jew sells an idol the proceeds are prohibited. But what if a non-Jew sells an idol—are the proceeds still prohibited?
  Nahman says that such proceeds are permitted and proves this from a story of some non-Jews who come to convert in front of Rabbah b. Abbahu. The rabbi tells them to first sell of their possessions and then convert. Assumedly, their possessions include idols. So if they sell them first, then they can keep the proceeds. This proves that the proceeds of a sale of an idol by an idolater are permitted.
  The Talmud rejects this case as proof. These idolaters were intending to convert and therefore we can assume that they annulled their idols before selling them. But in a normal case, where the idolater is not converting, perhaps the proceeds would still be prohibited.
  This baraita proves that the proceeds of the sale of an idol by an idolater are permitted. However the baraita does prohibit them under certain circumstances. Tomorrow’s section will clarify what these circumstances are.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains a baraita from yesterday. The baraita reads: If an Israelite has a claim for a maneh against an idolater and the latter sold an idol and brought him the proceeds or yayin nesekh and brought him the proceeds, [the money] is permitted; but if [the idolater] said, “Wait until I sell an idol and I will bring you the proceeds or yayin nesekh and I will bring you the proceeds,” it is prohibited.  Today’s section clarifies why in the first case the deal is permitted and the second it is not.
  The difference between the first half and the second half of the baraita, according to R. Sheshet, is that in the second half, when the idolater says, “wait until I sell the idol/yayin nesekh and bring you the proceeds” the Jew wants the forbidden object to continue to exist until it is sold.  Therefore the proceeds are prohibited.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on R. Sheshet from the case of a convert and a non-Jew who inherit from their father who has not converted. The convert cannot take possession of the idolatrous objects or the yayin nesekh. But he can make a deal with his brother—his brother will take the idolatrous, prohibited things, and he can take the items permitted to Jews. This is so even though the Jew would seem to want the idolatrous things to continue to exist so that his brother can inherit them. Thus, even though the Jew wants the idolatrous things to be preserved, as long as he does not actually own them, there is no problem.
  This baraita refers to an idol that can be broken into pieces and still retain its value. Therefore, the Jew does not care if it is preserved. But the baraita from yesterday refers to an idol that cannot be broken up and therefore since the Jew would want it to be preserved, it is prohibited.
  How can wine be broken into pieces? If it is in jugs then the Jew wants those jugs to continue to be preserved.The answer is that the wine is preserved in hadrianic earthenware—these are potsherds soaked in wine. When people would travel they would bring them and put them in water to give the water flavor.
  Still, the Jew does in a sense care that they should be preserved—he doesn’t want them to be stolen or lost. This is another difficulty against R. Sheshet. Again, the baraita about the convert and his idolatrous brother seems to prove that just because the Jew wants the idol to be preserved does not make it prohibited.
  The difficulty is finally resolved by noting that inheritance is different. The rabbis allowed the convert to divide the inheritance in this manner because otherwise they feared that he would revert to being an idolater. After all, the loss of inheritance could be a major blow to his finances. But in a regular case of partnership, such a division is prohibited. The original baraita was not a case of a convert and therefore, since the Jew wants the idolatrous object to be preserved, it is prohibited.
  
  Daf 64b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section contains yet another question asked of these rabbis while they were sitting. Personally, I find this the most interesting of the questions.
  The ger toshav is a non-Jew who has accepted upon himself not to worship idols (he may have accepted other commandments, but clearly this is one of them). So can he annul idols? On the one hand, the act of annulment seems to only work for one who actually worships the idols. A Jew cannot “annul” an idol, only a non-Jew can. On the other hand, tribally he is “one of them” so maybe the fact that he is part of the world that does, generally, worship idols, he can annul the idol. At the heart of this question seems to be the question of what constitutes a person’s identity—his beliefs and practices, or his ethnic background?
  According to R. Nahman, the ger toshav cannot annul idols since he does not worship them.
  The baraita says that only a non-Jew can annul an idol, but that he can annul idols belonging to his fellow and it also says that he can do so whether he worships it or not. These two phrases cannot be synonymous for if they are, the baraita would seem to be repetitive. Therefore, the Talmud interprets the phrase “he does not worship it” to refer to a ger toshav, who, it seems, can annul an idol.
  The Talmud rejects this understanding and gives a simpler meaning of the baraita. The first clause refers to a case where both idolaters worship the same god, and the second refers to those who worship different gods. One who worships Peor can annul the idol of one who worships Mercurius, because both are idolaters. But a ger toshav cannot annul idols because he does not worship them.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss whether a ger toshav can annul idols. The first citation is a long baraita in which sages argue who exactly a ger toshav is. I should note that I do not believe the rabbis really knew people who considered themselves a “ger toshav.” Rather, the issue seems to be both exegetical—who is the “ger toshav” referred to in the Torah, and philosophical—what is the status of a person who does not convert but does keep some of the commandments.
  There are a lot of opinions here as to what exactly constitutes a ger toshav. I will focus on the opinion of “others.” Basically, this person keeps the Jewish laws, he just does not want to eat kosher meat. Perhaps the issue here is that fully keeping kosher, especially only eating meat slaughtered in a kosher manner, would separate himself from other people and while he believes in the commandments, he does not want to cut himself off socially from others. This might also be why we can leave him alone with wine—he does not himself make wine into yayin nesekh because he is not an idolater. But since he will have other non-Jews around him for social reasons, if we leave wine with him for a long time by depositing it, it becomes prohibited. In other words, this person believes like a Jew, mostly acts like a Jew, but wants to maintain the tribe of “non-Jew.” I think this has interesting implications as to what it means to be a Jew.
  Nahman b. Yitzchak says that the ger toshav is considered a non-Jew with regard to the issue of the eruv. An eruv is a meal shared by all members of a courtyard and allows them to carry from the house into the courtyard. But in order for this to work all members of the courtyard must participate in the eruv. A Jew who forgot to participate in the eruv may symbolically transfer or renounce his ownership, but not an apostate Jew, who does not keep Shabbat. However, if a non-Jew lives there in the courtyard, the Jews must formally rent his place. Thus the ger toshav is considered like a non-Jew with regard to the eruv. He does not “live” with the Jews. However, he may not annul idols because he does not worship them. His “religion” is like that of the Jews.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a story of a rabbi sending a gift to an idolater on the day of his pagan feast. Note that this is only one example of a rabbi acting more leniently than the law requires.
  Rav Judah proclaims personal confidence that a particular non-Jew does not worship idols and therefore the prohibition of giving him a gift on his feast day does not apply. But R. Joseph demurs—in order to get out of the status of idol worshipper one must make a formal declaration in front of three haverim, a synonym (at least here) for those who observe the laws scrupulously.
  
  Daf 65a
  
  Rav Judah limits the applicability of the ger toshav needing to make a declaration in front of three haverim. Such a declaration is necessary only in order to receive financial support from the Jewish community. But one may give any non-Jew a gift as long as one is sure that he will not go and thank his idols for the gift.
  The Talmud responds with another difficulty. According to this baraita, becoming a ger toshav is the first step on the way to full conversion. The ger toshav has twelve months in which to convert. If he does not convert within this time period, he is considered to be a heretic and one certainly should not give him a gift. We can assume that Avidarna was not circumcised.
  Judah responds that this statement refers only to a case where the non-Jew promised to be circumcised but changed his mind. In other words, once a non-Jew accepts not to worship idols and to be circumcised, changing his mind is basically impossible. Accepting these things has essentially made him a Jew and there is no going back. But one can become a ger toshav and never want to fully convert. Avidarna never accepted upon himself to circumcise and therefore he need not do so.
  IntroductionThe Talmud brings another tale of a rabbi who sends a gift to an idolater on his festival.
  In the interesting continuation of this tale, Rava finds Bar-Sheshak living the good life, at least according to Bar-Sheshak’s evaluation. But Rava points out that as long as people are afraid of the government they are essentially still living in fear. And indeed the king’s official does come and ask for Bar-Sheshak’s presence.
  Poor Bar-Sheshak.
  Papi cites a verse that shows that in the world to come royalty will serve the Jews. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that the people of Israel’s reward will be so great in the world to come that it cannot even be described.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to deal with the next section of the mishnah. This section of the mishnah reads: If he hired him to assist him in another kind of work, even if he says to him, “remove for me a jug of yayin nesekh from this place to that,” his wage is permitted.
  The Talmud cites a baraita which is similar to our mishnah but adds one caveat. In this case, the gentile hires him to work in some other form of work. And then late in the day he tacks on the task of moving a jug of yayin nesekh. In such a case his wage is permitted because he was not hired to carry yayin nesekh. But it would seem that if he had told him at the outset that part of his work was carrying yayin nesekh the wages would be prohibited. Thus the baraita seems to contradict the mishnah.
  Abaye solves the problem by just reading the baraita into the mishnah.
  Rava says that the agreement was different in the two cases. In the mishnah he removes a lump sum of jugs for a lump sum of money. Even if one of them is yayin nesekh, he was not specifically hired to carry that jug. But in the baraita, he was told to remove each jug for a perutah. Therefore, the wages he received for moving the jug of yayin nesekh are prohibited.
  This baraita supports (and is probably the source) of the distinction that Rava made between hiring him to transport a lump sum of jugs and hiring him to transport individual jugs.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the last clause of the mishnah, where he hires the donkey-driver.
  The mishnah really did not need to teach that the wages earned from carrying yayin nesekh are prohibited. We already learned that in the first clause of the Mishnah. The Mishnah only taught this clause as an introduction to the second half, that a Jew may transport a non-Jew on the back of the donkey even though the non-Jew will be resting his yayin nesekh on it.
  The Talmud turns to another aspect of this arrangement. If one hires a donkey driver to transport him somewhere, what may he bring without specifying and what can the donkey driver bring. The hirer may bring his clothes, a jar with drink and food sufficient for the whole journey. The donkey-driver can bring food for his donkey and his own food but only enough for the day. From here we can see that when one hires a donkey, it can be assumed that he is bringing his wine. Carrying the wine is part of the deal. Therefore, it would seem that the Jew is being paid for transporting wine. But the mishnah assumes that the Jew is not being paid for this. He is only being paid for carrying the non-Jew and therefore it is permitted.
  Abaye explains that the hirer is not really paying to carry the jar. He has a right to carry the jar, but if he doesn’t bring a jar of wine he will not get a discount. This is the way transportation often works still today. A person has a right to take a suitcase on a plane (sometimes) but she will not receive a discount if she does not bring one.
  If there is food available on the journey, then the donkey-driver should be able to tell the hirer that he should just buy on the way instead of loading up on his donkey.And if there is no food on the way, then is the donkey-driver allowed to bring food just for one day. Can the hirer just make the donkey-driver go hungry?
  Papa describes a situation where purchases can be made, but with some trouble. The donkey driver is accustomed to troubling himself to make these purchases. But the customer is not used to troubling himself so much and therefore he can bring enough food for the whole journey. Indeed, this seems to be the “pshat” of the baraita. The donkey driver can buy provisions at the end of each day.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains a story of R. Aha’s father who sold wine to gentiles and kept the jugs as payment.
  Aha’s father used to sell kosher wine to non-Jews in jugs. He would pour the wine into wine-skins that belonged to the non-Jews. He would then carry the wine-skins across the ford. His payment was keeping the jugs that held the wine before he sold it to the non-Jews. The question is does this count as transporting yayin nesekh? Abaye allowed this because when he was carrying the wine it had not yet become yayin nesekh.
  
  Daf 65b
  
  The Talmud raises a difficulty—doesn’t R. Aha’s father want the water-skins to be preserved. If they burst, then he will have to give them the jugs. Thus in a sense he is invested in the preservation of the wine.
  Aha’s father made a condition with the non-Jews—he would keep the jugs even if the wine-skins split and the wine was lost. In other words, he was paid up front.
  It might also be a case where the non-Jews brought barrels with him to hold the wine if the wine-skins should break.
  The Talmud raises another difficulty—once the wine is put into the non-Jew’s wineskins, the wine is prohibited. Now R. Aha’s father is being paid to ferry across yayin nesekh—this should be prohibited.
  The Talmud raises another difficulty—once the wine is put into the non-Jew’s wineskins, the wine is prohibited. Now R. Aha’s father is being paid to ferry across yayin nesekh—this should be prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new mishnah which discusses yayin nesekh that falls on other food items.  The question is whether or not this causes the food to become prohibited.
  If yayin nesekh falls upon grapes, the grapes may be washed and then they are permitted.  Since the yayin nesekh does not have any effect on the taste of the grapes, they are permitted.  If, however, the grapes were split open, then the wine could seep into them and effect their taste. In this case it is not possible to wash away the potential taste of the wine and therefore the grapes are forbidden.
  If yayin nesekh falls on other types of foods, such as dates or figs, the food becomes prohibited only if the wine improves the flavor of the food.  The mishnah mentions a story of a person who carried figs and yayin nesekh on a ship. When one of the casks of wine broke on the figs he asked the Sages if the figs were still permissible, and they permitted them.  Since the wine does not improve the flavor of the figs, the person has not derived benefit from the wine and therefore the figs are permitted.  This general rule, that the wine causes the food to be forbidden only if it imparts a good flavor, is stated specifically in the next lines of the mishnah. The mishnah concludes with an example of another situation in which the taste is not improved, when vinegar (which comes from wine) falls on split beans.
  The Talmud feels that the story of Boethus contradicts the abstract halakhah that appeared before it. To remedy this they add in that the wine gave a bad taste to the figs. I think we knew that in the first place.
  Rava allowed the Jew to sell the wheat to a non-Jew even though the wine could be tasted. Evidently, the Jew cannot eat the wheat but he can derive benefit from it. But Rabbah b. Livai raises a difficulty. It will not be that noticeable that wine fell onto this wheat and if the non-Jew sells it back to a Jew, the Jew will eat prohibited food. We learn in a baraita that Jews must be concerned about such situations. If there is a piece of cloth into which “sha’atnez” has been placed, one may not sell it to a non-Jew lest he come to sell it to a Jew. Rava accepts this difficulty and then modifies his opinion slightly. The Jew cannot sell this wheat straight to non-Jew out of fear that the non-Jew will sell it back to a Jew. He must first bake it into bread. Jews are not allowed to eat bread baked by non-Jews so there is no concern that a Jew will buy it back.
  Although the wheat is not actually split like the grapes, since wheat grains naturally have a slit in them, they are always considered as if they are split.
  
  Daf 66a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf discusses the issue of forbidden foods falling into permitted foods and the question of whether this causes the permitted food to become prohibited.
  Old wine has a taste very different from grapes. Therefore when it falls on the grapes, all agree that the grapes are prohibited only if the wine imparts taste. However, new wine will taste like grapes. Therefore there is a dispute about this issue—Abaye says that the grapes are prohibited even if there is only a very small amount of wine, whereas Rava says that for the grapes to be prohibited they must impart taste.
  Abaye says that new wine mixing with grapes is a case of “one species being mixed with the same species,” since they both have the same taste. When two of the same species are mixed, the mixture is prohibited even if there is only the smallest amount of prohibited substance. After all, if they taste the same, how can one detect the presence of the forbidden substance.
  Rava follows the name of the substance, not the taste. New wine has a different name from grapes and therefore for the wine to prohibit the grapes it would have to impart taste. Note that it would in reality be impossible to test for this because they have the same name. Therefore the only criteria would be to determine an actual amount of wine that needs to fall on the grapes. This is where the notion of 1/60th comes into play. If there is 60 times as much permitted substance, the mixture is permitted. But if less, it is prohibited.
  IntroductionAccording to Abaye if new wine falls on grapes, then even if there is the smallest amount, the grapes are prohibited. Today’s sugya contains a difficulty on Abaye from the mishnah....
  The mishnah says that if the grapes are cracked, they are prohibited. The Talmud makes two assumptions: 1) this is new wine, which has the same taste as grapes; 2) the grapes are prohibited only if the wine imparts taste. This then rejects Abaye.
  The problem with assuming that the grapes are prohibited even if a small amount of wine falls on them, is that the end of the mishnah clearly shows that the mishnah is referring to cases where the mixture is prohibited only if the prohibited substance imparts taste. Therefore, the mishnah does seem to be a difficulty on Abaye who prohibits the grapes even if a small amount of wine falls on them.But, no worries, Abaye can resolve the mishnah by saying it refers to a case of old wine that falls on grapes. Since the old wine has a different taste, the grapes are prohibited only if one can taste the wine.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues with Abaye and Rava arguing about whether a food’s status is determined by its name or its flavor.
  Wine and grain vinegar have the same name but different flavors, as do wheat and barley yeast. To Abaye these are different species because categorization is done by taste not name. Therefore the prohibition is prohibited only if the forbidden substance imparts taste.
  Rava says that since these substances have the same name they are considered the same species. Even the smallest amount of prohibited substance causes the whole mixture to be prohibited.
  IntroductionIn today’s section Abaye cites proof for his assertion that a substance is defined by its taste and not by its name.
  Abaye uses a baraita that is explained by Hezekiah to prove that a substance is defined by its taste. If three different spices with different names that are all forbidden (for instance they are all orlah—produce during its first three years) fall into a pot and each one of them is not sufficient to impart taste but together they impart taste the dish is prohibited. This is because they all taste the same. The fact that they have different names does not matter.
  Rava says that this baraita follows R. Meir. Other sages do not hold that forbidden substances with different names join together because we follow the name, not the taste.
  IntroductionAbaye and Rava continue to argue about whether certain substances combine to create a prohibited mixture.
  In this case Abaye and Rava both agree that these are two different substances—different names and different tastes. Therefore the wine is prohibited only if the vinegar imparts taste.
  The two sages debate if wine falls into vinegar. Abaye says that even if the wine does not impart taste it causes the vinegar to be prohibited. Rava says that the wine must impart taste. The Talmud shall now explain their reasoning.
  Abaye says that as soon as the wine even begins to fall into the vinegar it will begin to smell like vinegar. The smell of the vinegar will waft up into the wine. A substance is defined by its smell and not by its taste. Therefore this is a case of one species being mixed with the same species and in such cases even the smallest amount of prohibited substance causes a prohibition.
  
  Daf 66b
  
  Rava says that even though the wine smells like vinegar, it is wine and therefore this is a case of two different species being mixed together. In such cases the prohibited substance must impart a taste for the mixture to become prohibited.I should note that were it not for the Talmud I would have explained the debate in a much simpler way. The taste of vinegar is much more pronounced than wine. So when vinegar falls into wine, we can use the taste test. But when wine falls into vinegar it would require a very large amount to nullify the taste of the vinegar. Therefore the taste test won’t really work. So the amoraim debate whether it should be used in any case.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains a very important halakhic debate about whether “smell” is considered substantial in matters of halakhah.
  If an idolater smells Jewish wine through a bung hole, the wine is permitted. Such wine was not libated. But a Jew may not, according to Abaye, even smell non-Jewish wine. “Smelling” is considered deriving benefit and deriving benefit from non-Jewish wine is prohibited.
  Rava says that smell is not something substantial and proves it from a mishnah that deals with lighting an oven with terumah cumin. The bread baked in the oven has the smell of cumin but not the taste and therefore it is permitted for a non-priest to eat it.
  Abaye, who holds that smell is something substantial, responds that the case of the oven is different, for the prohibited substance is consumed by the fire. In contrast, the wine is still present and therefore a Jew may not smell it.
  Mari posits that the R. Meir and R. Yose disagree about the same issue that Abaye and Rava do. R. Meir holds that the loaf is prohibited because it absorbs the smell of the wine. Smell is substantial. This is like Abaye. R. Judah permits the loaf because he holds that smell is not substantial. This is like Rava.
  Rava would have to admit that he holds only like R. Judah. But Abaye could say that all tannaim agree with him. They only disagree in a case where the smell is not likely to go into the bread, either because the bread is cold or the wine is stoppered. Abaye could say that smelling the wine directly through the bung-hole is again a case in which all tannaim would agree that the smell is substantial enough for the act to be prohibited. I think people should note how two issues are being conflated in this sugya. Abaye and Rava are arguing whether one is allowed to smell prohibited substances. The issue is whether an action is permitted. In contrast, the sources they bring are discussing whether substances are defined by their smell or not. The issue is status of object. These are not exactly the same issue. I believe that what causes the sugya to discuss them simultaneously is the general rule—smell is substantial or not. This is a classic example of how a general rule allows different subjects to be discussed together and for one to effect the other.
  
  Daf 67a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s sugya continues with the next clause of the mishnah. These sugyot are some of the most important in the entire Talmud with regard to the laws of kashrut. The particular rule is called “noten ta’am lifgam”—“gives a bad taste.” For ease of reference I am copying the relevant clause in the mishnah here:  This is the general rule: whatever derives advantage [from yayin nesekh by its] imparting a flavor is prohibited, but whatever does not derive advantage [from yayin nesekh by its] imparting a flavor is permitted, as, for example vinegar which fell upon split beans.
  The halakhah follows the mishnah—if the prohibited substance imparts a bad taste the mixture is permitted.
  According to Shmuel, if the vinegar falls into cold beans it improves the taste. This would make it prohibited. When he heats it up the vinegar now imparts a bad flavor. But since it was good at first, the beans stay prohibited. In other words once the flavor is considered good it cannot switch to be considered bad.
  This is the same tradition as above, here attributed to rabbis from Eretz Yisrael.
  Rav Dimi restates the same statement from above. It has been abbreviated in the talmudic record because by now it is getting repetitive. He also adds that they used to make a dish of split beans and vinegar on erev Shabbat in Tzippori. Sounds pretty good if you ask me.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains what constitutes a situation where something is considered to impart a bad flavor.
  If one adds a forbidden substance to a food and the food tastes bad because it lacks salt or has too much salt or lacks or has too much spice the food is still prohibited. This is not a case of “imparts a worsening flavor” because it is not the forbidden food that made the dish taste bad. For the food to be permitted its bad taste must be because of the forbidden food.
  This is a more lenient version of Resh Lakish’s statement. If food tastes bad we do not attribute it to too much or too little salt or spice and say that if the food was properly salted or spiced the substance would not have made it taste bad and therefore it should be prohibited. Rather, we say that since the food tastes bad now, it is permitted, no matter why it tastes bad.
  IntroductionAbahu categorizes which forbidden mixtures are prohibited by the Torah, which are prohibited but not by the Torah and which are permitted.
  If one eats an amount of prohibited substance equivalent to an olive within the time it takes to eat half a loaf of bread (calculations vary between 2 to 9 minutes) one has transgressed the laws of the Torah and theoretically should be punished by lashes. For instance let’s say some ground pork falls into my stew. If I ate enough of the stew such that it would contain an olive’s worth of pork and I did so within the time it would take to eat half a loaf of bread, I am considered as one who ate pork.
  
  Daf 67b
  
  If I can taste the pork but it is only taste and not substance, then the mixture is prohibited but one who eats it has not transgressed a biblical commandment.
  If there so much prohibited substance that it gives off a bad taste then it is permitted to eat the mixture.
  Abahu uses some strange language—if he put more of the forbidden substance. Why didn’t he just say “if it imparts a detrimental flavor” it is permitted. The answer is that R. Abahu was teaching another halakhah. Even if there are other reasons why the food doesn’t taste good, if the prohibited substance does not improve the flavor and the mixture tastes bad, the mixture is permitted. This also accords with the second version of Resh Lakish’s statement. If the food tastes bad it is permitted even if it could be improved by more or less salt/spice.
  IntroductionWe continue to discuss forbidden substances that impart a bad flavor.
  Kahana thinks that all rabbis agree that if the prohibited substance imparts a detrimental flavor it is permitted. But Abaye senses in the statement made by Resh Lakish that there are those who disagree.
  The Talmud notes that there is indeed at least one tanna who holds that even if the prohibited substance imparts a bad flavor the mixture is prohibited. However, this is clearly not the dominant position....
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the baraita at the end of yesterday’s section, where R. Meir and R. Shimon disagreed over whether a substance that imparts a detrimental flavor causes the mixture to be prohibited.
  Meir derives his law from the case of vessels acquired from Gentiles. Such vessels cannot be used unless they are koshered. The assumption is that the taste of the forbidden food cooked in them will be emitted when they are used by a Jew and it will impart its flavor to the Jew’s food. But this flavor by definition will be detrimental because it has been sitting in the walls of the vessel for a long time. From here R. Meir derives the general conclusion that even though the flavor imparted to the dish makes it taste worse, the dish is forbidden.
  Shimon would hold that a vessel used by a Gentile cannot be used by a Jew only if the Gentile used it that day. By definition, the taste imparted from the walls of the vessel will be for the betterment of the dish. If the food was cooked more than a day earlier, the dish that the Jew cooks in it is not prohibited.
  Meir responds that the taste emitted by the wall of the pot will always worsen the flavor a little such that halakhically he considers this a case of “imparting a detrimental flavor.” Again, this proves that even if the forbidden substance imparts a detrimental flavor, it is prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains R. Shimon’s opinion—if the prohibited substance imparts a detrimental flavor, the mixture is permitted.
  For an animal to be called a “nevelah” and to be prohibited it must be something that people would eat. It must be something that if a Jew gave to a stranger, he would eat. If people would not eat it then it is not prohibited—it is no longer called nevelah. So too anything with a bad taste—if people would not eat it, then it is not prohibited for a Jew to eat it.
  
  Daf 68a
  
  Meir says that this verse teaches that if the animal was never fit for consumption then it is not forbidden to eat it. By extension, it would not be prohibited to eat a food that was never something people would want to eat. But if a food is edible (and prohibited) and then becomes inedible (receives a bad flavor) it remains prohibited.
  Shimon would respond that the Torah does not need to permit an animal that never was fit for consumption. That is like telling people they can eat dirt. What the Torah does not need to teach is that if the animal was fit for consumption and then becomes prohibited it is only prohibited to the Jew as long as it is fit for consumption. If a substance imparts a bad taste to it, it becomes permitted.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss the issue of “imparting a detrimental taste.” Last week we learned that R. Meir says that even if the prohibited substance imparts a bad taste, the mixture is prohibited. R. Shimon says it is permitted.
  Meir prohibits the mixture only if the taste is at first improved and then deteriorates. But if from the outset it gives a dish a bad taste, then the dish is permitted. Here he agrees with R. Shimon.
  Haga cites a baraita which seems to say explicitly that even though the wine or vinegar impairs the taste of the dish from the outset, R. Meir (the anonymous first opinion) still prohibits.
  Ulla vituperatively responds to Haga. The baraita refers to a case where the vinegar first fell into cold beans. This would improve the taste. But when he heats the dish up, the taste becomes worse and thus R. Meir prohibits. R. Shimon permits it in any case.
  Yohanan says that tannaim argue if the mixture is worsened from the outset—R. Meir prohibits and R. Shimon permits. However, it is not clear what this implies for a case where the mixture first improves and then worsens. It could be that R. Shimon would agree with R. Meir that it is prohibited. Or it could be that he is lenient here as well. In this case they would argue about both cases.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section R. Yohanan claimed that R. Meir and R. Shimon argue over a case where the prohibited substance imparts a bad flavor from the outset. In other words, even though the mixture was made to taste worse immediately, R. Meir still prohibits. Today’s section explores a potential tannaitic source for this statement.
  When the second leavening falls into the dough it makes the dough worse because the dough has already been leavened. Therefore, this second leavening, which comes from a prohibited substance, is considered as “imparting a worsening flavor.” The fact that R. Meir still prohibits the mixture proves that he rules stringently in all cases.  
  Zerasays that the case of this dough is not the normal case of imparting a bad flavor because this overly leavened dough is now capable of leavening a lot of other pieces of dough. It is not ruined or even worsened.I should note that the “simple” meaning of this baraita probably has nothing to do with the issue of “imparting a bad flavor.” The original dispute is clearly over whether the forbidden leaven causes a prohibition despite the fact that it was not necessary to leaven the dough. The issue is not “bad flavor” but rather “useless leavening agent.” Still the Talmud seems to think that these two issues are connected and therefore uses the baraita as a source for R. Yohanan.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss a potential tannaitic source for R. Yohanan’s claim that R. Meir prohibits the mixture even though the prohibited substance imparts a bad flavor from the outset.
  In the first case, both the permitted and the prohibited yeast fall in at the same time. Again, the first opinion (assumed to be R. Meir) prohibits and R. Shimon permits. If the terumah yeast falls in first, R. Shimon agrees that it is prohibited because this is not a case where the forbidden yeast worsens the mixture. But if the ordinary yeast falls in first, they disagree. Again, in this last case the second yeast only worsens the dough and yet R. Meir prohibits.
  You might argue that the case of the dough it still not conclusive. We can still argue as does R. Zera that overly leavened dough is not worsened. The problem is that this same baraita continues with a case of vinegar falling into split beans. This seems to be a case where the taste is worsened from the outset and yet R. Meir prohibits.
  
  Daf 68b
  
  We could try to say that the case of the vinegar falling into the split beans is a case where at first the vinegar improved the taste (because the beans were cold) and only then did it worsen the taste (because it was heated up). The problem is that we know that if the terumah yeast falls in first even R. Shimon agrees that it is prohibited, even though when the ordinary yeast falls in, the overly yeasted mixture will not taste good. Therefore, the only conclusion left to make is that R. Meir and R. Shimon do indeed argue even if the mixture is made worse from the outset, as R. Yohanan said. Thus this second baraita proves that he is correct, or at least that he has a source in tannaitic literature.
  IntroductionToday’s section analyzes the baraita from above concerning various prohibited substances that fall into a mixture. I am copying here the three clauses of the baraita: If terumah yeast and ordinary yeast fell into dough, each being sufficient to cause leavening, and they leavened it, it is prohibited; but R. Shimon permits it. If the terumah yeast fell in first, all agree that it is prohibited. But if the ordinary yeast fell in first and then the terumah yeast or yeast from mixed plantings in a vineyard, it is prohibited. But R. Shimon permits it. If [nesekh] wine fell into lentils or [nesekh] vinegar into split beans, it is prohibited, but R. Shimon permits it.
  The second clause teaches the principle that if the substance worsens the taste (vinegar fell into cold beans) from the outset the tannaim still disagree. R. Shimon permits and R. Meir prohibits.The second clause teaches that if the taste is first improved (by the first yeast being put in) and then worsens (when too much yeast is put in) the mixture is prohibited and even R. Shimon agrees.
  If in the final clause where the vinegar only worsens the taste the rabbis (R. Meir) prohibit, obviously they would in the first clause where the leavening agent at first improves the flavor and then worsens it. So why do we need this first clause?  
  Abaye points out that we do need the first clause in order to learn that R. Shimon permits this mixture. The rabbis say that it was the prohibited yeast they caused the dough to ferment faster. Therefore, although it went bad eventually, it was the prohibited yeast that improved the dough. R. Shimon would say that we should not look at it this way. The two doughs together helped improve at the beginning and the two doughs together made it worse at the end. The fact that the prohibited dough aided in the deterioration means that the mixture should be permitted.  
  The Talmud invokes another principle which would explain why the mixture should be prohibited. When two elements fall into a mixture, one prohibited and one permitted, in this case the terumah yeast and the ordinary yeast, and neither is sufficient to achieve the intended result (leavening) they can combine together to achieve the result and therefore the mixture is prohibited. R. Shimon, who looks at the initial leavening as if it was performed by half the ordinary yeast and half the forbidden yeast should say the two combine to create a prohibition.He does not because R. Shimon does not hold that different substances combine, even if both a prohibited. For instance if some orlah and mixed plantings fell into a mixture and neither alone was sufficient to prohibit the mixture R. Shimon would hold that the mixture is permitted.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a story where the principle of “imparts a bad flavor” has a practical implication.
  We can assume that the mouse did not improve the flavor of the beer (don’t try this at home to see how it tastes). Nevertheless he prohibited the beer. From here the rabbis assume that Rav holds that even when the prohibited substance imparts a bad flavor, the mixture is prohibited.  
  There is something innovative about the kashrut of a mouse. Mice are disgusting—people do not want to eat them. Nevertheless, the Torah prohibits them. Why, asks R. Sheshet, would the Torah need to prohibit something people would not eat? The answer is to teach that in this case, even though it imparts a bad taste, the mixture is still prohibited.  
  The rabbis raise a difficulty on R. Sheshet. If creeping things such as a mouse are disgusting and the only reason the Torah had to prohibit eating them was to teach that even if they impart a bad taste the mixture is prohibited, then why should a dead creeping thing defile only when moist. When moist the dead mouse is disgusting and obviously it should be impure. If R. Sheshet’s reasoning is correct, then it should defile even when moist. And the same goes for semen—since it is disgusting when moist, it should defile even when dry.  
  The Talmud resorts to a midrash, a close reading of the text, to teach that semen and creeping things defile only when moist. The Torah calls semen “seed from lying” which here is read as implying that the semen defiles only when it is capable of acting like seed. Similarly, creeping things defile only “in their death.”  This is read as meaning they must be similar to the way they were when they died—still moist. I know, this is a bit yucky.      
  Shimiraises a difficulty and then answers it (this is a bit odd). Evidently, mice are a delicacy, and are even eaten by kings. So how can they be called disgusting?The answer is field mice are delicacies. But the domestic mouse is not.
  IntroductionThis short piece offers halakhic rulings on the issue of “imparts a bad flavor.”
  Rava knows that when a forbidden substance imparts a bad flavor, the mixture is permitted. But he does not really know if the halakhah follows Rav, that if a mouse falls into beer, the beer is prohibited. It could be that Rav prohibited the beer because he holds that when a substance imparts a bad flavor, the mixture is prohibited. In this case, since we do not hold like Rav, the beer would be permitted (would you drink it?). Alternatively, Rav might hold that the dead mouse improves the taste of the beer. If this is true, we would have to prohibit the beer.I should conclude that as many of you know, I am a great beer lover and have dabbled in home brewing. I have indeed heard stories of rodents getting into kegs where they drown in their drunkenness. I would not want to know if the homebrewers throw away their precious brew!
  IntroductionWe continue to discuss mice falling into drinks, this time vinegar.
  Hillel seems to think that the vinegar with the mouse in it is prohibited because you can taste the mouse and even though the taste is a bad taste, it is still prohibited. Ashi responds that in that case the mouse was, or at least might have been, broken up into pieces. One who drinks the vinegar may actually eat a piece of moust. But if the mouse was whole and could be fished out (moused out?) the vinegar would be permitted because the taste is bad.
  
  Daf 69a
  
  Ravina thought that if there was 100 times more vinegar than mouse parts that the mouse would be “neutralized.” Meaning that the mixture would be permitted, as long as the volume of the mouse was removed. This is the rule with regard to terumah that falls into non-holy produce. If there is 100 times more non-holy produce, the mixture is permitted, although he does have to remove the volume of terumah that fell in.
  The mishnah about terumah being neutralized at a ratio of 100 to 1 referred to cases where one cannot taste the terumah. For instance terumah oil falls into ordinary oil. But if terumah spices fall into food and they can be tasted, the ratio does not matter. The same should be true for the case of a mouse—it should be subject to the test of taste.
  We can see here how the concept of “imparts taste” is transformed into a concept of set ratios. The early amoraim operate through a system of imparting taste. This is a sensible system but hard to follow—who wants to taste the mouse beer or vinegar. Therefore, to solve the problem, they come up with set ratios. The latest voice in the Talmud gives the same ratio to everything—60 to 1. In Hebrew this is called “batel beshishim” and is a very important concept in halakhah.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a series of mishnayot in which a Jew leaves his wine in the presence of a non-Jew. The question is whether we must suspect that the non-Jew touched or drank the Jew’s wine.
  If, while transporting the wine with the non-Jew the non-Jew assumes that the Jew was always watching the wine, the wine is permitted.  As long as the non-Jew suspects that the Jew might catch him opening up the wine and drinking from it, the non-Jew will not do so.  The Jew might even leave the wine with the non-Jew for a while, as long as the Jew does not tell him that he is doing so. If the Jew leaves the non-Jew and tells him that he is doing so, then the non-Jew knows that he has a certain period of time in which he might be able to drink the wine without being caught.  There are two opinions in the mishnah about how long this period of time must be. According to the first opinion, the non-Jew must have enough time to make a hole in the stopper of the jug (the stopper was made and sealed with clay), and then fill the hole back in, and the new seal to dry, so that the Jew will not be able to tell that it was opened when he returns.  If the Jew did not tell the non-Jew that he would be away for this period of time, the wine is permitted.  The second opinion is that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel.  He assumes that if the non-Jew merely makes a hole in the stopper and then reseals it, the Jew will see the damage.  The only way the non-Jew will avoid getting caught is if he removes the whole stopper, and then closes the jug with a new stopper and then the sealing on this new stopper dries.  If the Jew does not stay away for the period of time it takes to do all of this, the wine is permitted.
  In this situation the Jew again leaves the non-Jew with his wine, this time to make a quick excursion into the city.  Note that he uses a short cut into the city.  The fact that he is going and returning quickly will make the non-Jew fear getting caught should he open the cask.  Therefore the wine is permitted.
  In this scenario the Jew leaves the non-Jew in the store.  Although the Jew is constantly going in and out of the store, and frequently leaving the non-Jew alone with the wine, the wine is permitted.  Again, as long as he doesn’t tell him that he is leaving and when he is returning, the wine is permitted.
  When the Jew leaves the non-Jew alone at the table with an open flask of wine, it is of course assumed that the non-Jew will drink from the wine, thereby making it forbidden.  However, since it is not customary for guests to drink from the “side-table”, the wine there is not forbidden.  This side-table is evidently somewhat like the shelf behind the bar in our time.  If you leave your guest with a bottle on a table it is acceptable for him to drink from the bottle.  It is much less acceptable for him to go behind the bar and take out his own drink. If, however, the Jew told the non-Jew that he could mix some wine with water (this is how wine was always drunk during the time of the mishnah), then of course we must assume that the non-Jew will take also what is on the side-table.  Although he did not specifically tell him to take from the wine on the side-table, it is as if he had done so.  It is like someone today saying, “help yourself” to his friend sitting at his bar.  Therefore all of the wine is forbidden. If the Jew leaves the non-Jew with open casks of wine in the house, they are forbidden.  The closed casks are permitted, as long as the Jew was not absent long enough for the non-Jew to open the cask, make a new stopper and then let the stopper dry.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains the clause in the first part of yesterday’s mishnah “If a non-Jew was transporting jars of wine together with a Jew from place to place, and it was presumed that [the wine] was under guard.” What does this last phrase mean?
  To understand our mishnah, the Talmud cites a parallel from the rules of purity. The situation describes a Jew who wants to preserve the ritual purity of his food, but hires workers who are not ritually pure. If he just leaves them alone with his food, the food remains pure. But if he tells them he is going, then as soon as they are out of his site he must be concerned that they have touched the food and thereby defiled it.
  The Talmud asks why in the first case the food is assumed to be pure and the second it is assumed to be impure. R. Yitzchak explains that in the first case the Jew made sure that his workers were pure. We should not that this is clearly not the simple reading of the baraita. Clearly the difference is between telling them that he was going away and simply going away. The Talmud will get to such an explanation below.
  The Talmud struggles with R. Yitzchak’s interpretation. First of all, if the Jew had his workers’ purify themselves, then the same would seem to be true in the second clause? If we answer that the am haaretz, while himself pure, will not make sure that others, who are not pure, do not touch the pure things, then the same should be true of the first clause. When the Jew leaves, there is no way of ensuring that someone impure did not touch the pure food.
  Rava says that in the first clause the pure things remain pure because the owner could come back in some roundabout path and they would not see him coming. Since they cannot see him coming, they will be afraid to touch the food.
  
  Daf 69b
  
  This interpretation gets closer to the simple meaning of the mishnah. In the second clause, since he told them that he was going away, they will not worry that he is coming back very soon. Therefore, even if the owner could surprise them by coming back on a roundabout path, they will not be concerned.
  Introduction Today’s section explains why the mishnah had to teach all of the cases in the mishnah. Why couldn’t we have learned one from the other?
  If the mishnah had taught only the first case where they were transporting jars of wine, I might have thought that the reason it is permitted there (if it was presumed that the wine was under guard) is that the non-Jew is worried that the Jew will come back and see him drinking the wine. But if the Jew leaves the non-Jew by boat or by wagon, the non-Jew could simply travel a bit away and do what he wants. Therefore, the mishnah had to teach us that even in this case the wine is permitted (as long as the Jew did not tell the non-Jew that he was leaving).
  If the mishnah had taught only the case of the wagon or ship I might have thought that in that case the non-Jew is afraid that the Jew will sneak up on him and therefore he would not drink the wine. But if he’s left in the shop, the non-Jew could lock the door and do what he wants. Therefore, the mishnah had to teach that in both cases the wine is permitted, again, as long as the Jew does not inform the non-Jew that he is leaving.
  Introduction In the Mishnah, the tanna kamma (the author of the first opinion) and R. Shimon b. Gamaliel dispute concerning how long the Jew has to be away for the wine to become prohibited. According to the first opinion, if the Jew is away for as long as the non-Jew would need “to bore a hole [in a jar], stop it up and [the sealing clay] to become dry” the wine is prohibited. Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel is more lenient and provides a longer time: “[a length of time] sufficient for him to open a cask, put a new stopper on and [the new stopper] to become dry.” Today’s sugya discusses this topic.
  According to R. Yohanan, the rabbis are more stringent than R. Shimon b. Gamaliel in the case of a stopper of lime, where a hole could be sealed relatively easily and not detected. If, however, the stopper is of clay, where a hole could not be sealed, then all agree that the wine is prohibited only if he is absent long enough for the non-Jew to make a new stopper and let it dry.
  The Talmud quotes a baraita to refute R. Yohanan. In this baraita R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says that if he bores a hole in the stopper, the hole will be seen on both the inside and outside of the stopper. Therefore, R. Shimon b. Gamaliel is concerned only if the Jew is absent long enough for the non-Jew to make a new stopper. But this makes sense only with a clay stopper. With the lime stopper one could not detect it on the outside because the lime can be smoothed out and made to look as if it was not tampered with. Thus Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel assumes that the rabbis state their opinion in the case of the clay stopper.
  This is R. Yohanan’s answer. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel did not know what type of stopper the rabbis were referring to. If they were referring to a clay stopper, then the stopping could be seen on the inside or outside. This is what he said in the baraita. But he also said to them that if they were referring to a lime stopper, the stopping can still be seen on the inside. This will deter the non-Jew and the wine will be permitted under the assumption that the Jew did not leave the wine alone with him for long enough.
  According to R. Yohanan, the rabbis disagree only concerning the lime stopper. Since the stopping can only be seen on the inside, the Jew might not turn the stopper over to see if it had been tampered with. Knowing this, the non-Jew might bore a hole and drink some wine. Therefore, if he has long enough to do so, the wine is prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya offers a halakhic ruling in the case of the wine jar left in the hands of the non-Jew.
  The last clause of the mishnah does not contain a dispute between the rabbis and R. Shimon b. Gamaliel and yet seems to follow R. Shimon b. Gamaliel’s opinion. This indicates, according to Rava, that the halakhah follows Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel. In other words, the editor of the mishnah hinted here that the halakhah follows Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty—obviously this last passage follows R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. Why did Rava need to even state thi? The answer is that we might have thought that this last passage was actually stated by R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. If this were true it would not be a case of the mishnah following him, but just R. Shimon b. Gamaliel again stating his opinion. To teach you that this is not the case, Rava says that the halakhah follows R. Shimon b. Gamaliel because the anonymous mishnah follows him.
  The Talmud here offers a rare remark on current practice. Theoretically, the rulings have consistently followed the lenient opinions among the tannaim. We are not concerned with a hole being bored in a jar nor are we concerned that seals will be forged. And yet, Jews do not leave wine in the hands of unsupervised non-Jews. Why not? The answer is that we fear that the non-Jew will use the bunghole to extract some wine. Rashi says that this is a small hole put in the side of the jar to let some smell out. Perhaps, Jews fear, the non-Jew will slightly widen the hole and take some wine out.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with stories in which the rabbis have to determine whether we assume that a non-Jew touched Jewish wine.
  Jews may visit (or host) non-Jewish prostitutes. But, according to Rava, they will not transgress the prohibition of drinking yayin nesekh. Therefore, we can assume they will not let the non-Jewish prostitute touch their wine. As an aside, in light of human behavior, this does not seem at all shocking. It is not uncommon to see people who are cautious about ritual laws be more lax on moral ones.
  
  Daf 70a
  
  If the prostitute is Jewish and she is surrounded by non-Jewish clients, she will not be able to stop them from drinking her wine. Therefore the wine is prohibited.
  Since Jews can see the jars opposite the crack, we can assume that the non-Jew would not drink them. However, he might have opened the jars that could not be seen through the crack and therefore they are prohibited.
  Since the non-Jew does not know that the Jew is away, we can assume that he would not sneak a drink of the Jew’s wine. Note that the assumption in both this story and the previous one is that non-Jews will drink the Jewish wine unless they are sure that they will be caught. This is not necessarily a statement though about the nature of non-Jews. It may very well just be a statement about people—when they don’t think they will be caught, they will drink other people’s alcohol. I’m sure that remains true at times today.
  IntroductionMore stories in which Rava rules under what conditions wine left in the presence of non-Jews is permitted.
  If the non-Jew is startled when the Jew comes in and acts as if he was caught like a thief, then we can assume that the non-Jew was afraid of being caught and would not have drank the wine.
  If the non-Jew has a ready excuse for why he is in the house, we must suspect that he snuck in prepared to drink the wine and offer an excuse for why he is caught. But if he has no excuse, then he will be frightened when the Jew comes in and he will not come to touch the wine.
  The baraita seems to say that if the inn was locked or the Jew told him to watch, then the non-Jew would feel safe around the wine and the wine would be prohibited if the non-Jew was found among the barrels, even if he did not have an excuse. But the Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that the case was only where he did offer an excuse for why he was in the house. If he offers no excuse, the wine is permitted.
  When heading off to synagogue, Jews won’t want to leave their wine behind for long. I must say that this is another one of those lines in these passages that strike me as still true.
  The Jew leaves the ship because it is Shabbat and does not take his wine with him. Rava assumes that the non-Jew does not know that the Jew will be away all of Shabbat, so he will not touch the wine, afraid that the Jew will come back any moment. The principle here is the same we’ve seen before. If the non-Jew is afraid of getting caught, he will not touch the wine.
  The question the Talmud asks is how come the non-Jew does not know that the Jew will keep Shabbat. The answer, quite fascinatingly, is that indeed, non-Jews do not realize that Jews keep Shabbat. A convert named Issur says that before he converted, he and his fellow non-Jews assumed that Jews do not keep Shabbat, for if they did, then purses would be found in the marketplace all the time, for Jews could not carry them! What he did not know is that R. Yitzchak taught a way that a Jew could indeed pick up a purse and carry it four cubits at a time and thus save it from the marketplace. The purse referred to here is probably not just a random one, but rather a purse that the Jew was carrying when Shabbat began. If there is no alternative but to just toss it, the Jew can carry it four cubits at a time to get it home. But this is only allowed for one’s own purse/wallet.
  Since the non-Jew does not know if the Jew is there or not, the wine is permitted. I do hope that they stay away from the wine-press until the lion goes away. Or at least write a children’s book—“The Lion in the Winepress.”
  This story, if historically accurate and if it’s not just a leniency by Rava, shows how dominant the Jews were in Pumbedita, or at least among the thieves!
  Shmuel also rules that as long as we are not sure that non-Jews touched the wine, the wine is not considered yayin nesekh. The Talmud suggests that this law follows R. Eliezer and not the rabbis who would hold that he is impure even if he is not sure whether he walked in that field. In our case with the wine, it is unclear whether gentile thieves entered the house at all, for the thieves may have been Jews. This is like R. Eliezer’s rule—if we’re not sure he even entered the field, then he remains pure. The rabbis though would hold that the wine is impure.
  In the case of the casks, there are two uncertainties—one, whether the thieves were Gentiles or Jews, and even if they were Gentiles, perhaps they were looking for money and not wine. Therefore, even the rabbis who are more stringent than R. Eliezer with regard to the rules of impurity, would hold that this wine is pure.
  
  Daf 70b
  
  Rava again demonstrates his ability to explain away suspicious circumstances with regard to wine. Although it very much looks like the girl touched the wine, we are allowed to assume that she only touched the froth on the outside of the jug.
  Elazar allowed the casks of wine, but R. Dimi is not sure why. It could be that he holds that this is a case where we are not sure if he entered an area with impurity in it (below the Talmud will raise a difficulty on this) or it could be that the majority of the soldiers were Jewish (this seems unlikely to me).
  The story does not seem to be like a case where it is uncertain whether they entered a certain area. Rather it is like a case where we know they entered a certain area that had an impure thing there but we just do not know whether they touched the impure thing. After all, we know they opened many casks of wine. Thus even R. Eliezer should be stringent in such a case.The answer is that there is in essence another uncertainty in play here. Since they opened so many casks, it could be that they were looking for money and not looking for drink. Therefore, this is like a case of uncertainty about whether he even entered and R. Eliezer would indeed rule leniently.
  We do not need to assume that the Jewish woman gave her the key so that she could enter the room. She may have been given the key just to watch the key, not so that she can enter the store.
  Abaye cites a baraita to prove the above ruling. The baraita says that we can assume that the am ha’aretz was entrusted only with the key and will not go in and defile all of the pure things. All the more so we can make this assumption about yayin nesekh whose rules are assumed here to be more lenient.
  The Talmud confirms that the laws of purity are more stringent than those governing yayin nesekh. The halakhah here refers to a case where a courtyard was divided with a low partition and a haver, one who strictly maintains the laws of ritual purity, lives on one side and an am ha’aretz, who does not maintain his own purity, lives on the other. According to Rav we must assume that the am ha’aretz touched the pure things belonging to the haver and defiled them. But if a non-Jew is living on the other side, we need not assume that he touched the wine and caused it to be nesekh.
  The baraita refers to a case where there is an inner and outer courtyard, the inner one belonging to a haver and the outer one belonging to the am ha’aretz. Although the am ha’aretz could stretch out his hand and touch the haver’s belongings, we do not have to assume that he did so. The haver’s stuff remains pure. This seems to contradict Rav.Rav answers that this refers to a case where the am ha’aretz will fear getting caught—looking like a thief. Thus he will be deterred from touching the haver’s pure things. But if he has no such fear, the pure things would have to be considered defiled.
  This time the difficulty is against R. Yohanan. This baraita proves that if the am ha’aretz can reach the haver’s stuff, we must consider it impure. Yohanan could answer that in this case the am ha’aretz could have an excuse—he was only stretching his hand.
  This baraita clearly disagrees with Rav and holds that even if the am ha’aretz could reach there, the haver’s things remain pure. Rav admits that he does not agree with this baraita. He holds like R. Shimon b. Gamaliel, whose opinion we saw above. Amoraim cannot hold opinions that disagree with all tannaim, but if there is disagreement among the tannaim, they can hold like whichever opinion they want, although there is still a preference for the majority opinion.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses non-Jewish soldiers—do we have to assume that they opened casks of wine and drank from them.
  If the marauders enter the city in a time of peace, the assumption is that they may make libations from wine in open casks.  Nevertheless, wine that is found afterwards in closed casks is permitted. The mishnah is not assuming that the marauders will not open the closed casks. After all, we have seen over and over in the previous mishnayoth that we must suspect that the non-Jews will open the casks and take from the wine.  Rather the reason that the wine is permitted is that if the marauders had opened the casks they would not bother to reseal them. Unlike the non-Jews in the previous mishnah who might have attempted to be sneaky and take a drink without getting caught, the marauders have no such concern.However, if the marauders entered the city in a time of war, all of the wine is permitted, since they are too busy making war to offer libations.
  
  Daf 71a
  
  The Talmud raises a contradiction which comes from a mishnah in Ketubot. The background to this mishnah is that if a woman is raped, she may not return to her husband if he is a priest. [I know that this is a difficult law. If you’re interested, read the first parts of Mishnah Ketubot]. The mishnah assumes that marauding troops will rape women. Therefore, the women in the city are forbidden to return to their husbands if they are kohanim. So why assume that soldiers at the time of war will have time to rape women but no time to offer libations.
  The answer is indeed, soldiers have time to have intercourse (i.e. rape) but no time to offer libations. Perhaps we might add that soldiers might just be more interested in some things than others.
  Introduction Today’s section starts with a new mishnah.
  If a non-Jew who has hired a Jew to do some work for him, pays him with yen nesekh and actually gives the Jew the wine, the Jew cannot exchange the wine back for money.  Once the wine comes into his possession it is actually his, and exchanging it with the non-Jew would in essence be selling yen nesekh, which is forbidden.  If the Jew were to send back the shipment of wine before it reaches him then he may accept in its place money. Since in this case the non-Jew has never paid back his debt, it is not considered as if the Jew is selling his own yen nesekh.
  A Jew can tell a gentile to go and try to come to a tax settlement with the king or his representatives, even if the agent ends up paying the taxes with wine that might have been used in libations. We should note that the sugya assume that wine is used to pay debts, and indeed we know that throughout history, wine was often used as a trade commodity.
  According to the baraita, one may not tell a gentile to go pay a tax or a bribe (the difference was not always so apparent) out of fear that the gentile will pay the tax in prohibited wine. This is a difficulty on Rav.
  Rav said that the situation he refers to is not the same one referred to in the baraita.  When he says “Go in my place,” the gentile is acting directly in his place. If he pays the debt in forbidden wine, then it is as if the Jew is paying the debt. Rav’s situation is more similar to the end of the baraita, which allows the Jew to say, “Save me from the official.” Since this is a less direct command, it is permitted.
  Introduction Today’s sugya is about the laws of acquisition. For Jews, acquisition (according to Talmudic law) is effected generally through drawing the object towards oneself—meshikhah. In other words, if you promise to pay me ten dollars for my book, you still do not own the book. You acquire only when you take it into your possession. Furthermore, if you take it into your possession you must pay me for it, even if you don’t like the book (you will like both of my books, do not worry). Our sugya talks about whether non-Jews acquire in the same way. I should note that there are a lot of principles related to both laws of acquisition and the laws of yayin nesekh brought up in this sugya. It is not an easy passage—the give and take is quite complicated. Good luck!
  If a Jew sells his wine to a non-Jew, he must make sure that he is not receiving money for what is now yen nesekh.  If he measures out the wine to the non-Jew and then sets a price, he is actually receiving payment for selling yen nesekh, since the wine becomes yen nesekh as soon as it is in the non-Jew’s possession.  Therefore, he must set a price before he gives over the wine.  Note that once the price is set he need not receive the money, for the debt of the non-Jew is already established.
  Both Amemar and R. Ashi agree that when Persians give gifts they do not retract. The question is why not? According to Amemar it is because according to non-Jewish law, meshikhah effects acquisition. Persians do not retract because gifts cannot be taken back. But R. Ashi says that this is simply due to their refusal to go back on their word. It is not a legal principle. They could retract if they wanted to.
  Ashi attempts to prove that meshikhah does not effect acquisition for non-Jews from instructions that Rav gave to Jewish wine-sellers. Rav essentially told the Jews to first take the money from the non-Jew, or at least make the non-Jew obligated to pay back a loan, and only then to pour the wine into a container and give it to the non-Jew. Otherwise, the wine will still belong to the Jew up until the point that the non-Jew drinks it and when the non-Jew pays the money back, they will be paying the Jew for nesekh. However, if simple meshikhah acquired the wine, then as soon as he poured the wine into the container and gave it to them, it would be their wine, but it would not become yayin nesekth until they touch it. Thus meshikhah must 
  
  Daf 71b
  
  Amemar admits that R. Ashi would be correct if all he is concerned about is a case where the Jew was pouring into Jewishly owned vessels. But if the Jew is pouring into a vessel owned by the non-Jew, the wine will indeed become nesekh immediately. Thus this source really has nothing to do with acquisition through meshikhah.
  Even according to Amemar’s situation, where the wine is put into the non-Jew’s vessel, we can still say that it is acquired before it becomes nesekh, and thus Rav’s instructions are not necessary. For as soon as the wine enters the vessel, even the vessel’s airspace, it would be acquired by the non-Jew. But it would not become nesekh until it reaches the bottom. So why would this be a problem—the non-Jew would be paying for regular wine. Perhaps, the Talmud suggests, that Rav holds that liquid being poured counts as a connective. If so, then when the beginning of the flow hits the bottom, the entire stream becomes nesekh, and then the wine would become nesekh while still in the Jew’s possession. Note—the Talmud does not think that flow serves as a connective. This is why this is a difficulty.
  Amemar further resolves the difficulty by saying that in this case the non-Jew was not holding the vessel. Therefore, he does not acquire it before it becomes nesekh by having been put in the non-Jew’s vessel.
  Amemar had just said that Rav referred to a case where the non-Jew’s vessels were on the ground and therefore he did not acquire the wine until he picked it up. By this point it was already nesekh. This seems to imply that in general if a purchaser’s vessels are in the domain of the seller, the vessels do not effect acquisition for the purchaser.
  Again, we reject the previous conclusion. The purchaser does acquire the wine as soon as it is put into his jug. And still the wine becomes nesekh before it hits the bottom because there might be a little bit of wine belonging to the non-Jew left over in the vessel into which the Jew pours his wine. As soon as the Jew’s wine hits this wine, it becomes nesekh, even before it is acquired by the non-Jew.
  Rav’s instruction seemingly do not accord with Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel. Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says that when yayin nesekh (in this case, the drop in the vessel) becomes mixed up with non-nesekh wine (the Jew’s wine), the entire mixture can be sold to a non-Jew minus the value of the nesekh. So why should he not be able to receive payment for his wine when it became nesekh in the possession of a non-Jew?
  The Talmud resolves this by pointing out that Rav says that the halakhah follows R. Shimon b. Gamaliel only when casks of permitted and forbidden wine get mixed up. But if yayin nesekh becomes mixed with other wine all of the wine becomes prohibited and may not even be sold to non-Jews.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s (long) section we learned that according to Amemar a non-Jew can acquire through meshikhah. Today’s section continues to discuss this.
  The Jew buys scrap metal from a non-Jew and finds an idol in the heap. He wants to return the idol and receive regular scrap metal in its place. If he has not yet paid the coins he can return the idol, but if he already paid, he may not. This baraita seems to prove that in a transaction with a non-Jew, drawing the object acquires it—once the Jew has drawn the idol to himself, he may not return it.
  Abaye says that he may return the idol because it is a mistaken acquisition. He was supposed to be buying srap metal—broken pieces of silver, gold, etc. He did not think that he was buying idols. Thus the whole sale is annulled.
  Rava says that if the first half of the baraita is a mistaken purchase and therefore annulled, then both cases are a mistaken circumstance. So why is he not allowed to return the idol in the second case? Rava answers that both cases are mistaken purchases and therefore, in principle, he should be able to return the idol in either case. However, in the second case, since he already paid the money, it looks like the idol is already his and that he is selling it back to the non-Jew. Therefore, he may not return it. But in the first case, it does not look like he has acquired the idol so he may return it.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss whether meshikhah acquires in transactions with non-Jews.
  Ashi had said that meshikhah does not effect acquisition in transactions with non-Jews. Mar Kashisha raises our mishnah as a difficulty on him. In the mishnah, as long as the Jew sets the price before he measures it out, the sale is permitted. The non-Jew acquires the wine as soon as it enters his possession and it does not become nesekh until later. This seems to prove that meshikhah acquires.
  Ashi says that this is a case where he paid him before. Thus the money came into the hands of the Jew before the non-Jew touched the wine. It seems to be the payment that effects transition, not the meshikhah.
  The problem with R. Ashi’s resolution is that it does not accord with the end of the mishnah—if the non-Jew gave the Jew the dinar before the wine was measured out, why should it become prohibited?
  To R. Ashi, if meshikhah effects transition, then the purchase money should be permitted in both cases, for in both cases the non-Jew acquires the wine and becomes liable for the payment before he touches it and makes it nesekh.  Effectively, R. Ashi is showing that the operative principle in the mishnah is not acquisition through meshikhah.
  To R. Ashi, the determinative factor is not meshikhah, but whether or not the non-Jew is certain that the Jew will sell him the wine. If the Jew set the price then the non-Jew is assured he will get the wine and he basically acquires the wine before it becomes nesekh. But if the Jew did not set the price, then the non-Jew is not sure the sale will happen and he does not acquire the wine even if he pays for it beforehand. The wine does not become his even after he touches it. This is why it is prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss whether meshikha (drawing an object towards oneself) acquires for a non-Jew.
  Ravina uses a baraita about Noahides to prove that meshikhah acquires for non-Jews. Noahides are non-Jews, and according to the Talmud they are obligated to keep seven commandments, one of which is the commandment not to steal. As far as punishments goes, in Talmudic law the Noahide is punished by death—there are no other punishments. I should emphasize that these laws are totally theoretical, there is no evidence that they were ever applied or even meant to apply in real life.According to the baraita, a Noahide who steals from a Jew is liable for the death penalty, even if he steals less than a perutah’s worth of property. Furthermore, he does not have to give the property back. This seems to prove that it is his and therefore that he can acquire through meshikhah.
  Ashi rejects this reading of the baraita—he is not executed because he acquired the property. He is executed because he gave trouble to a Jew.
  
  Daf 72a
  
  The baraita does not mean to say that he is not obligated to make restitution. He has not really taken possession of anything such that he would not have to return it. Rather it means to say that the laws of restitution do not apply to him because he never really takes possession of the item.
  According to the continuation of the baraita, if another thief comes along and steals from the first thief, he too is killed. Now this thief did not cause any distress to a Jew. The only reason to execute him is that he has stolen property. In order to steal the property, we have to assume that meshikhah acquires for a non-Jew. This is conclusive proof against R. Ashi.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with a person who promised to sell a piece of land to one person and then went and sold it to someone else.
  According to R. Joseph, the fact that he promised the land to the first person, means that the first person has acquired it. Abaye holds that unless they had set a price the first person has not acquired the land.
  Abaye uses the Mishnah that we have been learning to prove that once the price has been set the purchaser has acquired the goods. As long as the Jew sets the price before he measures it out, the non-Jew has acquired the wine and become obligated to pay before the wine becomes nesekh.
  Joseph would argue that when it comes to yayin nesekh, the rule is more stringent. Generally speaking simply a promise to sell is sufficient for the buyer to acquire the goods. But with yayin nesekh a price must be set.
  In the first half of this baraita, the buyer brings the worker’s carrying the produce into his home. This does not count as “meshikhah” and therefore he does not acquire the produce, even if he sets a price.However, if he unloads the produce, then he has performed “meshikhah.” In this case, if they set the price then neither can retract. This accords with Abaye. Setting the price is irrelevant if the buyer has not taken possession of the goods.
  IntroductionAnother discussion about the rights to retract a sale.
  According to R. Kahana, since they set a price, the first person acquired the land and the sale to the second is not valid. R. Ya’akov looks at this case in a different way—the higher price may have “forced” the owner to sell the land. Had the second person not offered the extra twenty zuz, perhaps he would not have sold it at all. Therefore, the second sale is valid. And this is the halakhah. Until the money is transferred, the sale is not final.
  If the seller says that he will sell the article after it is “evaluated” by three, then he has set them up as a court and he must accept the decision of even two. But if he says that the three will “say” the price, then they are just three people and all three must agree for the price to be final.
  A court consists of three, not four. So in either case, the price must be set by all four.
  The buyer has a right to reject the evaluation based on the grounds that the second group is more qualified.
  Huna son of R. Joshua points out that there is no objective way of knowing if the second group would be more qualified than the first. Therefore, the evaluation of the first group stands. And the halakhah follows his opinion.
  IntroductionThe mishnah that we will learn today opens a long discussion about a concept called “flow” or “nitzok” in Hebrew. The issue is regarding liquid that flows down into a lower liquid. Does the status of the lower liquid effect the status of the upper liquid? In other words, should this be considered one body of liquid? We should note that the issue of contamination flowing upwards through a poured liquid, was an issue of major content between different groups of Jews during the time of the Second Temple. In a famous document called “The Halakhic Letter” found in Qumran (The Dead Sea Scrolls”) the author of the document complains that his opponents (probably the Pharisees) claim that the poured liquid is pure. This complaint is also mentioned as a complaint of the Sadducees against the Pharisees in Mishnah Yadayim 4:7. We see that our mishnah takes the Pharisaic point of view. Among scholars of ancient history and especially the Dead Sea Scrolls this might be one of the most important disputes in trying to determine who the authors of these scrolls were
  In the first section a Jew pours his wine into the container of a non-Jew using a funnel. The liquid that remains in the funnel when the Jew pours the wine into the non-Jew’s flask has the same status as the wine in the non-Jew’s flask itself. The fact that the wine in the flask is yen nesekh, means that the wine in the funnel is as well. This is because the funnel goes into the non-Jew’s container and may “take back” some of the yen nesekh. If even a drop of wine should remain in the funnel and the Jew should then pour more wine into the funnel and give it to a Jew, all of the wine has become contaminated as yen nesekh and it is all forbidden. In contrast, the second section teaches a different principle from the previous section. When one pours from one vessel into another, and the poured liquid never touches both vessels at the same time, there is no contamination from the lower vessel into the higher vessel. While the bottom liquid might become itself contaminated (if it is poured into a non-Jew’s flask), the top liquid remains permitted.
  This is a mishnah from Toharot 8:9. Flows, downward streams and dripping liquid do not serve to connect separate bodies of water. So if one body is impure, the other body does not become impure. But if there is a pool of standing liquid connecting the two, they are considered connected. 
  The above mishnah was referring to the laws of purity. R. Huna says that the law is more stringent when it comes to yayin nesekh. Downward flow does cause the two bodies to be connected. Note that this would have drastic consequences for Jews. If a Jew pours wine into a cup held by a gentile, the Jew’s wine becomes yayin nesekh! 
  R. Nahman asks R. Huna for the source of his ruling and notes that one cannot deduce the ruling from the mishnah in Toharot. While we could deduce R. Huna’s ruling from the first section, if the same type of deduction was applied to the second section, it would lead to an incorrect ruling (certainly a standing body of liquid would form a connecting link with yayin nesekh). Thus this mishnah cannot be R. Huna’s source.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss whether downward flow serves as a connecting link for yayin nesekh.
  The Talmud now tries to prove that it does serve as a connecting link from the first half of the mishnah. How does the wine in the funnel become yayin nesekh—through downward flow, it is suggested. The bottom wine which is yayin nesekh flows up into the funnel and contaminates it. 
  
  Daf 72b
  
  R. Hiyya says that it is not flow that causes the wine in the funnel to become nesekh. It is the fact that wine in the flask overflows and actually goes up into the funnel. The wine in the funnel is not “connected” to the yayin nesekh below. It is the same wine. As many of you know, I dabble in homebrewing. Whenever I fill up a bottle, I use a filling tube. The beer from the bottom always flows up onto the part of the tube that’s in the bottle. If you want to fill up a bottom container with a funnel, this is what will happen. 
  The Talmud points out here that while we cannot use the mishnah to prove that flow is a connecting link, the opposite is also not true—we cannot use the mishnah to prove that it is  not a connecting link. All that we can learn is that when the lower wine reaches back into the funnel, the wine in the funnel is prohibited.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss whether downward flow counts as a connecting link.
  A Jew pours wine from his vessel directly into that of a non-Jew. The wine in the upper vessel remains permitted. The Talmud (somewhat strangely) deduces from here that the wine in between the two vessels is forbidden, and thus tries to prove that flow is considered a connecting link.
  If flow contaminates the upper liquid, then the wine in the container should also be nesekh. The Talmud has to therefore say that the baraita refers to a case where he cuts off the flow from the top to the bottom before it reaches the bottom container. This would seem to be a recipe for mess.
  The second clause in the mishnah says that the wine in the bottom vessel is prohibited. We could deduce that what is in between is permitted, leading to the conclusion that flow is not a connecting link. In the end, nothing can be learned from this mishnah concerning the concept of flow. [I might add that clearly the simple reading of the mishnah is that downward flow is not a connecting link. The Talmud does not seem to want to prove this quite yet].
  This baraita seems to imply that flow is a connective. As soon as the wine flows out of the cask into the vat of yayin nesekh, the wine becomes prohibited. R. Sheshet says that the baraita refers to a case where a non-Jew is doing the pouring. Thus he invents a new category that is not found in tannaitic sources—wine poured by a non-Jew is considered nesekh.
  The Talmud here refines the prohibition of wine poured by non-Jews, which was created above by R. Sheshet. This is considered to be a rabbinic decree, an add-on if you will to the main prohibition of yayin nesekh. Since it is an add-on, the rabbis can shape it the way they want. So the rule is that if the gentile pours the wine, what comes out is prohibited but what is inside is permitted. This, by the way, is why in kosher restaurants non-Jews do not pour wine for the customers. What comes out of the bottle is prohibited, even though the non-Jew never touched it.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains some concrete rulings and stories concerning Gentiles either sharing drinking instruments with Jews or Jews selling wine to non-Jews.
  R. Hisda does not want the Jewish wine dealers to pour directly into non-Jewish containers. Evidently he thinks that flow does cause a connecting link and the fact that the bottom wine is nesekh will contaminate the wine in the Jewish container.
  Rava thinks that wine poured by a non-Jew is prohibited, even if he is only assisting a Jew. Therefore, when pouring wine, Jews should make sure that non-Jews do not help pour out the wine in any way.
  The non-Jew puts his hand at the end of the siphon, and therefore, the entire barrel of wine is resting on his hand—if he took his hand away, the wine would flow out through the siphon. Therefore, Rava prohibits the entire barrel.
  Some rabbis wonder if the wine is prohibited because of the principle of flow. The wine would pour out onto the non-Jew’s hand, and since one part of the wine is nesekh, the entire barrel is nesekh. Rava explains that his reason to prohibit the wine is not simply flow. It is that the siphon is like a hole at the bottom of the barrel, and even without pouring, the wine will flow through the siphon.
  The instrument referred to here is a multiple straw which allows many people to drink at the same time. As long as the Jew is drinking, he will not be drinking the backwash of the nonJew. But if the non-Jew stops while the Jew is still drinking, some backwash may go in, and the Jew might drink wine that is considered nesekh. I’m putting a picture in here of people in modern Uganda drinking beer through a straw. This instrument is very common in the ancient and modern world for beer drinking. It would allow many people to share the beer and for the beer to be filtered. Traditional beer would have been full of a large amount of sediment.
  Such a device was evidently used at the house of the exilarch, the Jewish governor in Babylonia. It is not surprising to hear that in such a place, Jews and Gentiles would drink together. In any case, the rabbis permitted, and maybe even used, this device. 
  
  Daf 73a
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with the halachic topic of a forbidden substance becoming mixed with a permitted substance. The question is how much of the forbidden substance must be in the mixture for the entire mixture to become forbidden.
  If even a drop of yen nesekh falls into a large container of permitted wine, the entire container of permitted wine is forbidden. 
  If forbidden wine (yen nesekh) should become mixed with permitted (as we learned in section one) or forbidden water (that was used for idolatrous purposes) should be mixed with permitted water, the entire mixture is forbidden, even if the forbidden substance was only a drop. However, if forbidden wine should become mixed with permitted water, or forbidden water with permitted wine, as long as the forbidden substance does not impart a flavor to the mixture, the entire mixture is permitted. If the forbidden substance imparts flavor, the entire mixture is forbidden.
  This section teaches a general rule from which the specific rule taught in the previous section may be extrapolated.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses yayin nesekh that falls into a vat of permitted wine. 
  According to R. Dimi, when each drop falls into the vat it is annulled because it is such a small amount. Once it is annulled, it becomes part of the undifferentiated wine in the vat and then the next drop is annulled. At a certain point the majority of wine was originally yayin nesekh and has, in a sense, been made kosher.
  The mishnah seems to say that even the smallest amount of yayin nesekh renders the wine it falls into prohibited. This is a clear contradiction to R. Dimi. The Talmud answers that the mishnah refers only to when permitted wine falls into prohibited wine. But if prohibited wine falls into permitted wine, it is nullified. [This is clearly not the simple reading of the mishnah].
  The Talmud now proceeds with the next line of the mishnah—when wine falls into water. It seems that this too is a difficulty on R. Dimi. If prohibited wine falls into water it prohibits as soon as it imparts a taste. We don’t say that each drop is nullified. The Talmud again adjusts the mishnah—the wine is permitted and it falls into prohibited water. Prohibited water is water that was worshipped. [Again, you can sense that we are straying from the simple meaning of the mishnah].
  Now we move onto the last clause. If the mishnah is dealing with prohibited water, then in the last clause, to maintain consistency, the water should again be prohibited. This is certainly a difficulty on R. Dimi. We do not say that each drop of prohibited substance is annulled.
  R. Dimi says that the whole mishnah deals with permitted substances falling into prohibited substances. That is the consistency in the mishnah. But whether the water is permitted or prohibited changes from one clause to the next. What is crucial is that to R. Dimi, when a prohibited wine falls into permitted wine, the permitted wine nullifies the prohibited wine. This is a giant leniency in the laws of forbidden mixtures.
  Introduction Today’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s concerning a person who pours a prohibited substance, yayin nesekh, into a permitted substance, kosher wine.
  This is a slightly more limited version of R. Dimi’s statement from yesterday’s section. If one pours yayin nesekh from a small vessel into a large vat, each drop is annulled. But if one pours from a large vessel, enough yayin nesekh falls in at once such that it cannot be annulled.
  Rabin’s statement is a third tradition coming from R. Yohanan. To understand this we have to remember that according to the Mishnah, if yayin nesekh falls into kosher wine, the prohibited portion causes the entire mixture to be prohibited, even if it is the smallest amount. This is a case of a species becoming mixed with its own species. But if the prohibited wine falls into water, it must give taste to the water for the mixture to become prohibited. Rabin addresses a case where water and nesekh fall into a vat of wine. In such a case, we can ignore the permitted wine, and not see this is as a case of yayin nesekh falling into permitted wine. Rather, we look at it as if the nesekh fell into the water. If there is enough water to annul the taste of the small amount of nesekh (and there probably is) then the entire vat remains permitted.
  If the wine falls into the vat first, then the entire vat becomes prohibited because both are the same species. Only if the water falls in first can we consider it as having annulled the wine.
  In this version of R. Shmuel b. Judah’s statement, he makes his statement about the mishnah, not with regard to Rabin’s statement.
  The difference between the two statements is whether the flask of water must fall in first. If it is taught about the mishnah, then R. Shmuel b. Judah just said that there must be a flask of water that falls into the vat. It can fall in there right after the yayin nesekh falls in. But if we teach it about Rabin’s statement, then R. Shmuel b. Judah must come to add that the flask of water must fall in first for the vat to remain prohibited.
  Introduction Today’s sugya continues to deal with a situation where both yayin nesekh and water fall into a vat of permitted wine. 
  According to Hizkiyah, if forbidden wine falls in first to a vat, then the entire mixture is prohibited. The fact that water falls in after will not change the fact that the entire mixture is prohibited. But if the forbidden wine and water are first mixed together, then this mixture will be permitted, assuming that the water nullifies the forbidden wine. If this entire mixture now falls into a vat of permitted wine, the entire vat remains pure. R. Yohanan says that even in the first case, the mixture is permitted.
  
  Daf 73b
  
  R. Yirmiyah tries to pair Hizkiyah and R. Yohanan. According to R. Eliezer, the status of the dough depends on which dough falls in first. If prohibited dough falls in first, the whole mixture becomes prohibited. This is similar (to a certain extent) to Hizkiyah. But according to the rabbis, since there is not enough prohibited leaven to ferment the whole dough, the whole dough remains permitted. This is like R. Yohanan.
  The problem with R. Yirmiyah’s statement is that Abaye said that R. Eliezer permits the mixture only if they first remove the prohibited leaven before the permitted leaven falls in together. But if they do not, then the prohibited leaven joins the permitted leaven to make the whole mixture prohibited. But this is not like Hizkiyah for Hizkiyah allows the mixture even if the prohibited wine is still there. Therefore, the equation of Hizkiyah and R. Eliezer falls apart.
  The Talmud resolves that the argument is over a principle called “we see.” This refers to a case where a two of the same substance (wine), one permitted and one prohibited, fall into a permitted substance of a different type. Do we pretend (“do we see”) that the permitted substance of the same type does not exist such that the permitted substance of a different type can nullify the prohibited substance, or do we not “see” the permitted substance as if it does not exist. Hizkiyah holds by this principle and R. Yohanan does not. Note that creating such an abstract principle facilitates comparing this case with other cases in the Talmud. It is one of the benchmark’s of the editors of the Talmud. They boil down one case to its essence, to allow it to be compared to other cases.
  R. Asi asks R. Yohanan a question that seems to depend on whether we invoke the principle of “we see.” If we do, then the water would annul the terumah wine and anyone can drink this mixture? If we do not, then the mixture can only be drunk by kohanim.
  Later, R. Yohanan answered R. Asi—indeed, we do invoke the principle of “we see” and the wine is permitted.
  Here the question that R. Asi asked of R. Yohanan above is presented as a declarative statement.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a foundational dispute about forbidden mixtures.
  Rav and Shmuel’s reading of the mishnah adheres closely to the simple meaning. Any time two of the same substance become mixed together, one permitted and one forbidden, for instance terumah wine with regular wine, the mixture will be prohibited no matter how small a quantity of prohibited substance. But if the substances are different, for instance lard in a pancake mixture, the mixture is prohibited only if the prohibited substance imparts a flavor. The last line of the mishnah indicates that this is true no matter what the prohibition.
  R. Yohanan and R. Shimon b. Lakish are more lenient. In most cases, even with two of the same species, the mixture is prohibited only if the forbidden substance imparts taste [note that this is actually impossible to test. If non-kosher beef is mixed up with kosher beef, how could  one tell whether the non-kosher beef imparts a taste]. The only exception is “tevel”—produce from which tithes have not been removed. And yayin nesekh. The mishnah already referred to yayin nesekh. So the only extra thing it can add by saying “this is the general rule” is tevel. Again, this is a more difficult reading of the mishnah.
  Introduction Today’s section brings support from baraitot for both Rav and Shmuel and R. Yohanan and R. Shimon b. Lakish in yesterday’s section.
  The baraitot in this section are word for word the same as the amoraic statements in yesterday’s section.
  We can understand why R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish are stringent about yayin nesekh—the laws about idolatry are stringent. But why are they stringent about tevel—produce from which tithes and terumah have not been removed? The answer is that the prohibition is the same as the permission. If a person separates one grain of wheat from a pile of wheat and declares it to be terumah, the entire pile permitted. So too one grain of wheat can make the entire pile prohibited. In other words, one grain has significance, both to make a pile of grain (or any type of terumah, such as a vat of wine) permitted, so too it has the power to make an entire pile prohibited, if one prohibited grain falls in. Finally, the Talmud cites another baraita that supports the idea that tevel prohibits a mixture in the smallest amount only when it is of the same species. This baraita accords with R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish.
  
  Daf 74a
  
  Introduction This mishnah contains a list of things that are prohibited and if even the smallest quantity of them is mixed up with a similar looking permitted item, the entire mixture is forbidden. The difference between this mishnah and the previous one is that here we are dealing with entire units, such as a cask of wine or an ox. If one of these which is forbidden, such as a cask of wine that contains <i>yen nesekh,</i> becomes mixed in with a thousand casks containing kosher wine, they are all forbidden. The baraitot in this section are word for word the same as the amoraic statements in yesterday’s section.
  1) If one cask of <i>yen nesekh</i> is mixed up with even one thousand kosher casks, they are all forbidden. 2) If one statue used for idolatrous purposes is mixed up with even one thousand statues that were not used in idolatry, they are all forbidden. 3) In chapter two we learned that idolaters would make circular holes and take out the animals heart and use it in worship. If a piece of one of these skins is mixed up with a large quantity of regular animal skins, they are all forbidden. 4) An ox that killed a man is to be sentenced to death (Ex. 21:28). If this ox becomes mixed up with other oxen, they are all forbidden. Note that in all of the cases of live animals in this mishnah, the same rule is true if the meat of the animal is mixed up with the meat of other animals. 5) This heifer is the one referred to in Deut. 21:4. It is used to expiate the blood guilty for a murder where the murderer has not been caught. If this heifer, after it has been designated to be part of the ritual and is on its way down to the wadi where its neck will be broken, should become mixed up with other heifers, they are all prohibited. 6) When a leper becomes cleansed of his disease, he must bring two birds as a sacrifice (Lev. 14:4). If they are mixed up with other birds, they are all forbidden. 7) When a nazirite ends his term of naziriteship, he must shave (Num. 6:18). Should his hair, once it is shaved off, become mixed up with other hair, it is all forbidden. In other words, no nazirite hair wigs! 8) The first born of a donkey is usually redeemed by giving a sheep to the priest in place of the donkey (Ex. 13:13). If this newborn donkey should become mixed up with other donkeys before it is redeemed, they are all forbidden. 9) If a piece of meat, cooked in milk should become mixed up with other kosher pieces of meat, they are all forbidden. 10) The scapegoat is the goat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur (Lev. 16:22). If it should become mixed up with other goats, they are all forbidden.  11) It is forbidden to slaughter non-sanctified animals in the Temple court. If the carcass of an animal slaughtered in this fashion should become mixed up with other carcasses, they are all forbidden.
  Introduction Today’s sugya clarifies what types of items are listed in the mishnah and which are not.
  R. Hiyya b. Abba clarifies that to be on the list in the mishnah, the substance needs to be something customarily sold by number, therefore it does not included hametz, which is sold by weight or volume. It also needs to be something which may not be put to any use, and therefore the list does not include meat not properly slaughtered, which may be used and just not eaten. However, the halakhah in the mishnah is true with regard to these substances, even though they are not listed.
  These nuts and pomegranates also could have been on this list, but the tanna taught them already in Mishnah Orlah 3:7. The nuts and pomegranates are listed there explicitly.
  Loaves made by a householder that are leaven are also an item that could have been in this list. But again, it is found in Orlah 3:7 where it is properly attributed to R. Akiva.
  The Talmud reads the last clause as excluding any item that is not both customarily sold by number and prohibited from all use. This is in line with the explanation above.
  IntroductionThis mishnah returns to the discussion of yayin nesekh that falls into a larger quantity of permitted wine.
  This mishnah contains a dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and the anonymous mishnah with regards to the prohibition of a mixture of <i>yen nesekh</i> and permitted wine. According to the first section in the mishnah it is forbidden to derive any benefit from even a mixture of <i>yen nesekh</i> and other wine. In essence, the wine must be thrown away. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, the Jew may remove a quantity of wine from the mixture that corresponds to the quantity of <i>yen nesekh</i> which fell in, and the rest he may sell to a non- Jew. In this way he is not deriving any financial benefit from <i>yen nesekh.</i>
  According to Rav, the halakhah follows R. Shimon b. Gamaliel’s more lenient opinion only when casks of yayin nesekh get mixed up. But if wine falls into other wine, it is all strictly prohibited. But all other amoraim (and the list is quite long) hold that the halakhah follows R. Shimon b. Gamaliel in all cases—the wine may always be sold except for the amount of yayin nesekh that fell in.
  R. Nahman distinguishes between yayin nesekh, wine which we know was libated, and ordinary wine belonging to gentiles. With the former, the halakhah follows R. Shimon b. Gamaliel only when casks are mixed up. But when it comes to ordinary wine, the rule is always lenient. The mixture may be sold minus whatever amount of yayin nesekh was part of the mixture.
  
  Daf 74b
  
  Introduction In talmudic times wine presses were sealed with pitch. A little bit of wine was put into the pitch in order to prevent the smell of the pitch from ruining the taste of the wine made in the wine press. The mishnah that begins this section discusses a Jew who buys a wine press from a non-Jew. Since the non-Jew used wine, which is yen nesekh, in the pitch in the wine press, the mishnah must teach Jews how to make the wine press “kosher”. Note that these laws are still relevant to Jews who observe kashrut and need to “make kosher” various vessels or even an entire kitchen.
  There are three types of wine presses mentioned by the mishnah: stone, wood and earthenware. Stone is the least absorbent of these materials. Furthermore, stone wine presses do not require much pitch to seal them. Therefore, all the Jew must do is scour the wine press to rid it of any traces of the previous owner’s wine. If the wine press was made of wood, Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] holds that it also may be scoured. However, the Sages hold that he must also peel off all of the pitch. Since wood is more absorbent than stone, and since wood wine presses require more pitch, he must be even more diligent in cleaning before it becomes usable. If the wine press is of earthenware, the Jew may never use it. Since earthenware is very absorbent, there is no way to rid it of the yen nesekh.
  Rava emphasizes that scouring is necessary only when the non-Jew covered the winepress with pitch. If he tread grapes without lining the winepress with pitch, the winepress does not need to be scoured. We might have thought that it is always necessary, therefore Rava had to recite his teaching.
  According to this version of Rava’s statement, Rava is teaching that scouring is sufficient only if the non-Jew did not also tread his grapes in the pitch-lined winepress. If he also tread grapes in it, the wine is more absorbed and scouring is not sufficient. This is a more stringent version of the teaching.
  This is a fascinating story for what it tells us about the role of the rabbi in the Jewish community. A man comes to R. Hiyya and wants to essentially kasher a winepress that he probably bought from a non-Jew. R. Hiyya sends out his nephew to makes sure the kashering process is done well, for otherwise people will complain about R. Hiyya in the Bet Midrash. Rav says that smooth parts of the winepress can be koshered by scouring for they absorbed less of the wine that had fermented in there earlier. But the part that had a crack must be treated more stringently. The outer layer of the press must be scraped down. This is still a principle in koshering things like pots, pans, knives, etc. If the surface is smooth, it is less likely to have absorbed taste.
  Introduction Today’s section continues to deal with kashering vessels used with wine.
  According to the rabbis, scouring a vessel in order to kasher it is not sufficient. Since we are assumedly dealing with either a winepress sealed with lime or with earthenware vessels, the kashering must be performed by peeling off the outside layer. In contrast, Rabbi agrees that generally scouring is sufficient. However, a vessel used to store wine for a longer period will absorb more and therefore in that case even Rabbi agrees.
  Wood and stone are less absorbent than earthenware and therefore all agree that they may be scoured. But a winepress covered with pitch must be kashered by peeling off the outside layerthat had absorbed the wine.
  If the winepress had been tread in by the non-Jew, then scouring is not sufficient because it has absorbed more. But if the grapes were not trodden in the press, then scouring is sufficient.
  Introduction Today’s sugya continues to discuss how vessels used with wine are kashered.
  The mishnah rules that earthenware vessels must be peeled in order to kasher them. This is the view of the rabbis. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] would say that scouring is sufficient.
  Rava says that a tank, which probably is another word for the vat into which the wine flows, must be scalded with hot water to kasher it.
  Rava was sending empty jars from his place to other Jews in Harpania. He sealed these jars up well (some sort of double-seal) for he feared that the non-Jews with whom he was sending them would use them. Rava was of the opinion that just as the rabbis decreed against wine belonging to non-Jews, so too they decreed against storage vessels used by non-Jews, even for a short period.
  How does one scour earthenware vessels? While it might seem that Rav and Rabbah b. Hanah disagree, the Talmud believes that they do not. Both say that one needs ashes (a cleansing agent) and water. If the vat is wet, first he puts some ashes and then he cleans it off with water. If the vat is dry, he first puts some water and then the ashes clean it off.
  
  Daf 75a
  
  There are two layers of disputes here as to how many processes of rinsing and washing with ash are required for a wet winepress or a dry winepress (the former requires less because it is already moist). The first dispute is between Rav and Shmuel and the second dispute is between the schools of Sura and Pumbedita as to what the parameters of Rav and Shmuel’s dispute was. The Talmud remarks that the latter version is not really a dispute because Rav does not count the final rinsing whereas Shmuel does. [I should note that there are other ways of explaining the last comment here].
  Introduction This sugya discusses kashering the various parts of a winepress.
  R. Abahu is asked how to kasher wicker net baskets used by non-Jews in wine processing. R. Abahu answers with a baraita that discusses how to kasher the various parts of the wine press. Kashering the wicker baskets depends on what they are made of. If they are made of willows and hemp he can scour them. If of bulrush or reeds, he must let them sit unused for twelve months.
  R. Shimon b. Gamaliel seems to state the same opinion at the previous one, the tanna kamma. Both require waiting from one season to the next, which seems to be 12 months. The Talmud explains that R. Shimon b. Gamaliel is more lenient—he does not always require waiting a full twelve months. The time could be less, for instance the time between one year’s pressing of late ripening grapes and the next year’s pressing of early ripening grapes. The time between one year’s pressing and another could also be longer than 12 months.
  If one wants to purify them quickly without waiting twelve months or a similar length of time there are two opinions as to what to do. One is that one can pour boiling water (or olive- water) over them. Alternatively, he can put them in a rapidly moving stream of water. The Talmud says he puts them in the water for an “onah.” In tomorrow’s section we will learn how long an “onah” is.
  The baraita deals with the laws of purity, not with the laws of yayin nesekh. So the Talmud has to emend the baraita such that it ends by saying that the same ways of purifying the winepress can be used to kasher it from yayin nesekh.
  Introduction In yesterday’s section we learned that to kasher wicker baskets one can put them under continuously running water for an “onah.” An “onah” means a period of time, but it is not clear how long that period is.
  There seems to be a dispute as to how long an onah is, one rabbi saying a full day or night and the other saying half a day or night. But R. Shmuel b. Yitzchak harmonizes the two opinions—when the days are long, only half a day is required. But when the days are short, a full day is required. This is roughly about six hours.
  Rav Judah gives instruction as to how to kasher filter-bags.
  Here we learn how to kasher wicker-baskets and strainers.
  
  Daf 75b
  
  The am ha’aretz is assumed to be impure. According to one opinion, when he touches only one cluster we only have to treat as impure only those clusters that are around it. But according to the other opinion, we must treat the entire winepress as impure.
  The Talmud raises a contradiction between the one who says that only the surrounding clusters are impure and a mishnah which assumes that if a sheretz (a reptile of sorts) falls into an oil-mill and there is flowing liquid which would convey the impurity throughout the mill the entire mill is impure. Isn’t there liquid in the winepress as well? The answer is that the clusters will stop the liquid from flowing all the way around. The liquid will only reach the close clusters. Therefore, only they are impure. Whereas the olives are not clusters and will not stop the flow of the oil.
  The rabbis rule according to the lenient viewpoint—only the cluster and all that around it is impure.
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses how a Jew can make usable cooking utensils that were purchased from a non-Jew. Since the non-Jew surely used these utensils to cook unkosher products, the utensils must be “kashered.”
  The general principle in this mishnah is quite simple: the way that a utensil was normally used is the way that it is made usable by the Jew. A utensil that was used generally with cold foods may be washed off and it is kosher. Since it was used with cold, it did not absorb the unkosher food and therefore it need only be cleaned with water. If a utensil had been used with hot boiling liquids, such as a soup pot, it absorbed more than the utensil used with cold. Therefore it must be dipped in boiling water to remove the unkosher elements that it has absorbed. Utensils that had been used directly on the fire, such as the spit and the grill, become even more absorbent. The only way to kasher them is to make them white hot. A knife is a special case: it must be polished so that the outside layer of the knife is actually removed. This is because the knife, which is pressed with force into foods, tends to become more absorbent, even though it is not used directly on the fire. Remember that the knives in those days were not made of the hard stainless steel of which our knives are made.
  The Talmud adds that in addition to “kashering” all of these vessels need to be immersed in a mikveh.
  Rava derives this requirement from the additional word “וטהר” found at the end of the verse. This word is extraneous, so Rava uses it as the source for the requirement of immersing vessels bought from non-Jews.
  Bar Kapara derives the halakhah that vessels bought from a Gentile must be immersed in the mikveh from the use of the word “the waters of lustration” which literally translates as “the waters of the menstruant (niddah). Just as a menstruant must immerse in a mikveh, so too must these vessels be immersed in the mikveh.
  The Talmud now explains why we need both Rava and Bar Kapara’s midrash. Don’t they teach the same thing? If we only had the midrash on “it shall be clean” I would not have known that the immersion needs to be in a mikveh. The cleansing could have been accomplished by pouring water over the person. Thus we need the verse that compares the method of immersion for vessels to that needed by a niddah. And if we only had the verse that mentions the mikveh (“waters of lustration”) I might have thought that the purity laws of immersing Gentile vessels are the same as those for a niddah—they are not pure until the sun sets. Therefore, the other verse is necessary to teach that the vessels are immediately pure even before the sun sets.
  Introduction Today’s section continues to discuss immersing vessels owned by non-Jews.
  R. Nahman says that even new vessels, those never used and therefore that have not absorbed the taste of any prohibited food, must be immersed. He derives this from the fact that immersion is required even if the vessels were first kashered by fire (which is mentioned in the biblical passage). Such cleansing will utterly rid the vessel of any taste and make it like new. Nevertheless, it must be immersed. From here we can conclude that all vessels bought from non-Jews must be immersed.
  If even vessels that have no residue of taste in them must be immersed, then why not say that even scissors need to be immersed? R. Nahman answered that the only types of vessels mentioned in the biblical passage are those used in connection with meals. Shearing scissors are not included.
  In the biblical passage from which these laws are derived, the Israelites had acquired title to the utensils (they took them as booty in war). Possession means that they must be immersed. But if one borrows the vessels, they need not be immersed.  We should note that there is something a bit strange in this law. If the requirement has to do with purity or with kashrut, then what should it matter if the vessel was bought or borrowed?
  R. Yohanan explains that only metal utensils were mentioned in the passage and therefore only they must be immersed. Those made of earth and dung need not.
  Glassware can be repaired, and was indeed repaired, in a world in which glassware was very expensive, and is thus like metal. Just as metal utensils must be immersed, so must glassware.
  Glazed utensils before they are glazed are basically just earthenware and earthenware vessels need not be immersed. But by the end, they are like glass and glass vessels must be immersed. So there is a dispute as to whether they need immersion like glass utensils, or not like earthenware. The rule is that they do.
  Introduction The sugya continues to discuss kashering dishes used by non-Jews.
  The Talmud asks whether Jews have to immerse a vessel if the non-Jew gave it to them as a pledge, which would ostensibly be returned to the non-Jew upon termination of the loan. Mar bar R. Ashi, one of the last amoraim, teaches that indeed his father did immerse such a vessel. However, he is not sure if this is because a vessel taken as a pledge is considered to be the property of the creditor (this is a question frequently asked in the Talmud). If this was true, then taking a pledge is just like buying. Or perhaps in this particular case R. Ashi assumed that the non-Jew was not going to take it back but in other cases, where the non-Jew might take it back, it would not be considered as belonging to the creditor and therefore the Jew would not have to immerse it.
  Introduction The sugya continues to discuss kashering dishes used by non-Jews.
  The Talmud asks whether Jews have to immerse a vessel if the non-Jew gave it to them as a pledge, which would ostensibly be returned to the non-Jew upon termination of the loan. Mar bar R. Ashi, one of the last amoraim, teaches that indeed his father did immerse such a vessel. However, he is not sure if this is because a vessel taken as a pledge is considered to be the property of the creditor (this is a question frequently asked in the Talmud). If this was true, then taking a pledge is just like buying. Or perhaps in this particular case R. Ashi assumed that the non-Jew was not going to take it back but in other cases, where the non-Jew might take it back, it would not be considered as belonging to the creditor and therefore the Jew would not have to immerse it.
  This baraita provides all the rules for how to make vessels that can be kashered (metal vessels, mostly) usable by a Jew. They all need to be immersed, and depending on how they were used, this is how they need to be kashered. Note that many of these rules will be familiar to anyone who ever kashered anything for Pesah.
  There is a dispute if the Jew uses the vessel before it was kashered. According to one opinion, the contents cooked or prepared in the vessel are prohibited. This accords with the opinion that if a forbidden element imparts a worsened flavor the food is permitted. The non-Jew’s vessel will emit the flavor embedded in the vessel but this flavor is old and will not improve the taste of the dish. Nevertheless, this opinion holds, the forbidden element causes a prohibition. According to the other opinion, the food is permitted because he holds that if the forbidden element imparts a worsened flavor, the dish is permitted.
  The Talmud asks—if one opinion holds that when it imparts a worsened flavor the food is permitted, how did the Torah ever prohibit vessels used by non-Jews. The answer is that this prohibition only applies to vessels used that very day—in this case, the taste imparted is not considered to be a worsening flavor.
  
  Daf 76a
  
  Introduction The last daf of Avodah Zarah (!) continues to deal with kashering vessels.
  R. Amram points out that there are contradictory tannaitic sources—one says that the spit and the grill must be heated up until they are white hot, while the other says that it is sufficient to boil them.
  R. Sheshet points out that vessels used by Gentiles absorbed prohibited substances and therefore require a more thorough form of kashering. But vessels used in sacrificial worship absorbed permitted substances. Tomorrow’s sugya will continue this subject.
  Introduction In yesterday’s sugya R. Sheshet explained that vessels belonging to a Gentile must be kashered by heating them up until they are white hot. But since Temple vessels had absorbed permitted substances, they need be kashered only by boiling. Today’s sugya raises a difficulty on R. Sheshet.
  While it is true that permitted substances were cooked in the Temple vessels, when they discharge taste, that taste is from a substance that is now prohibited. The taste has been in the walls of the vessels for several days and sacrifices become strictly prohibited after one or two days. Thus in both cases, the substance cooked in one of these vessels would have the taste of a prohibited substance.
  Rava explains that the word “boiling” does not mean what it seems. Rather, it means rinsing and washing, two verbs used in the context of cleaning holy utensils in Leviticus 6:21.
  Abaye rejects Rava’s resolution because rinsing and washing are done with cold water, not hot. He resolves the difficulty by saying that in both cases, both scalding and heating until white hot are required. This is a case of each mishnah providing only partial information.
  Introduction Today’s sugya continues to try to resolve the contradiction between the mishnah that required making Gentile vessels white hot in order to kasher them and the mishnah that said that vessels used with sacrifices could be kashered by boiling. Abaye said that each mishnah provides part of the information and that each method of kashering was valid in either case. In today’s sugya, Rava offers his dissent and then tries to resolve the difficulty in a different way.
  Rava says that if we thought each mishnah testifies about the other, then two forms of kashering should have appeared in one context and one in the other. This would make it clearer that both are always valid. But one form in each context gives the impression of a difference between them.
  Rava explains that with holy vessels there is actually never a case where the taste would sit in the vessel for two days and thereby become “remnant” which is prohibited. If, for instance, a sacrifice is boiled in a vessel on Sunday, it does not become prohibited till Tuesday. But if the vessel is used on Monday, then it removes the taste of Sunday’s sacrifice. And thus there is never any time in which the taste becomes prohibited.
  Rava’s resolution above works well if we’re only concerned about shelamim, which can be eaten for two days. But a sin-offering (a hatat) can only be eaten for one day. So the taste of yesterday’s sin-offering is already prohibited when the vessel is used to cook today, making it prohibited.
  The Talmud explains that it is not necessary to kasher the vessel by making it white hot in the following circumstance. He cooks hatat today and then, on the same day, he also cooks a shelamim. This will get rid of the taste of the hatat. He then can cook in it hatat tomorrow, and then the taste of that hatat and yesterday’s shelamim will become remnant at the same time, the next day. Then he again cooks in it shelamim on that same day, thereby purging it of the taste of that day’s hatat. As long as one keeps repeating this process, kashering will not be necessary.
  If kashering is not necessary, then why should even scalding be necessary. Essentially, as long as one performs this process, one could continuously cook without kashering. This difficulty stands. Tomorrow the final resolution to this thorny problem will be offered.
  Introduction The Talmud continues to try to resolve why one mishnah requires kashering by making something white hot, while the other mishnah suffices with scalding.
  R. Papa resolves that the two sources refer to different situations. If the pot is encrusted, then it must be made white hot. Scalding will not get off the encrusted taste. If the pot is not encrusted, then scalding is sufficient.
  R. Ashi offers the final resolution to the problem, which goes back to the first resolution. The pan in which sacrifices was cooked only needs scalding and not being made white hot. Although when it emits taste, that taste is also forbidden, like yayin nesekh, the taste is just taste. It is not visible. Since the taste is not visible, and when it absorbed the taste the taste was permitted, what it emits is less prohibited. Note that it still requires kashering, just a lesser form.
  Introduction Today’s sugya explains how one kashers by making white hot and how one kashers by boiling.
  The amoraim here explain how the two major forms of kashering are performed.How does one kasher a large pot, one that cannot be boiled inside a larger pot? One makes a rim of dough around its edges and then builds it up so that the water basically boils over. The rim will get hot water splashed on it. This is sufficient to kasher it, for just as the rim absorbed taste by having the forbidden substance splash on it, so it can emit taste in the same way.
  
  Daf 76b
  
  Introduction The final sugya in Avodah Zarah discusses kashering a knife.
  This passage teaches how one kashers a knife. It seems that by plunging it in untilled soil, one will remove the outer layer that has been in contact with the forbidden substance.
  The knife that has been kashered can only be used with cold food. Using it with hot food would cause it to emit the taste that it absorbed from the prohibited food.
  In this fascinating story, the Persian King Shappur cuts some etrog slices and gives it Bati b. Tobi without kashering his knife, but kashers the knife before he gives it to Mar Yehudah. Bati is not too happy that he is not being treated like a non-Jew. The king responds that he does not know if Bati b. Tobi really is observant. And in a highly humorous end to the masekhet, the king says to him, “I remember what you did last night.” Too bad we’ll never know what naught Bati did last night. And come on, can you think of a better way to end Masechet Avodah Zarah then with a non-Jewish king kashering a knife and telling another Jew he is not observant enough?
  That’s it folks. We finished another masekhet, another wild ride through the complicated, topsy-turvy, free-thinking, beautiful minds of Hazal, our rabbis of blessed memory. I’m hoping you found this Tractate as fascinating as I did. Discussions about how Jews can preserve their identity in a world full of people whose identity they do not share. When can Jews trust non-Jews, and when can they not? When can they use their things, and when can they not? What foods of theirs can they eat and what can they drink (not wine, that’s for sure)? It was a relevant tractate then and much of it is still relevant now. I hope you have time to review some of your learning and most importantly, I hope you continue with us onto our fifth masekhet—Kiddushin!