meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Modern Works/Daf Shevui to Ketubot/English/merged.txt"}
text: Daf Shevui to Ketubot
  דף שבועי על כתובות
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -Daf Shevui
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  Daf Shevui to Ketubot
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  IntroductionKetubot, Daf Bet, Part 1 Introduction Ketuboth opens by discussing on which days of the week a virgin marries, and on which days of the week a widow (or divorcee) marries. Note that these customs have not been observed for a very long time, probably already from the time of the Talmud, and may not have even been observed in the times of the Mishnah itself.
  Explanation According to the mishnah a virgin is married on Wednesday so that if the husband wants to make a claim against her that she was not a virgin, he can come directly to the court which sits on Mondays and Thursdays and make a claim against her. If his virginity claim against her is accepted by the court, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah. The chapter will continue to discuss the issue of virginity claims and how the judge is to adjudicate them. Note that virginity claims are already mentioned in Deuteronomy 22:13-22. The virginity of the bride was of high value in the ancient world and a man who thought that he was marrying a virgin but found that she was not had the right to claim that he had mistakenly married her. The mishnah does not state why widows are married on Thursday. This will be found later in the Talmud.
  Shmuel asks why the Mishnah says that a virgin is married on the fourth day. Now we should note that his very question is puzzling—the Mishnah already stated why a virgin is married on Wednesday! The Talmud will ask this question soon. For now the answer is that we need a certain day to determine when a virgin is to be married so that we can know when the husband is obligated to feed her. A mishnah in the fifth chapter teaches that if the time for marriage comes and they are not married, she eats his food and if he is a Kohen, she may eat terumah. Let’s say they set the first of Adar as the wedding date. But the first of Adar falls on a Tuesday. In such a case the husband’s obligation to sustain his wife does not begin until Wednesday, for she would only be married on Wednesday. Furthermore, if she is married to a Kohen, it is from this date and onwards that she can begin to eat terumah, the food that only a priest may eat.
  R. Joseph now raises a difficulty on the very statement that he himself transmitted in the name of Shmuel. [This is a strange phenomenon]. The difficulty seems to be that Shmuel used a source that was not taught [in the Mishnah] to explain another source that was taught [in the Mishnah]. However, even this difficulty is wrong. What Shmuel had really done is take one mishnah from the fifth chapter of Ketubot and used it to explain our mishnah from the first chapter of Ketubot. Therefore the Talmud rephrases his difficulty. Shmuel has used a mishnah that already has an explanation (our mishnah in the first chapter) and explained it with another mishnah that doesn’t have an explanation. This too is not such an easy difficulty—after all, the other mishnah is self-explanatory. Nevertheless, in tomorrow’s section we will see a rewritten version of Shmuel’s statement. If you’re wondering why this sugya seems to say so many things that do not make sense, it may be that it has been redacted or reedited so many times that the original meaning of Shmuel was lost in the shuffle. This is typical of sugyot at the beginning of tractates.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section the chapter opened explaining why virgins are married on Wednesday. Our section continues to discuss the subject.
  This reworded statement of Shmuel is basically the mishnah: A virgin is married on Wednesday so that if her husband wishes to make a virginity claim, he can go to the court the next day. However, this version adds a difficulty. If virgins are wedded on Wednesday so that their husbands could come to court on Thursday with a virginity claim, then why not let them be married on Sunday and come to court on Monday. After all the court sits twice a week—Mondays and Thursdays.
  Virgins are not married on Mondays because that would not leave enough time after Shabbat to prepare a proper wedding feast.
  This now connects up with the earlier statement made by R. Joseph, but expands on it. If the time to get married arrives on the first day of the week, he does not feed her until the fourth day of the week. Furthermore, we learn a precedent from that case. If for some reason they cannot get married (illness or menstruation) then he need not give her food. Note that this is true even if he is sick and therefore the delay in marrying her is his fault. With regard to menstruation, women who were menstruating used to postpone their marriages because they could not have sex. Nowadays, weddings are no longer delayed for this reason.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section we learned that if the husband or the wife delayed the wedding because of illness or menstruation, he must begin to provide her with food as soon as the date set for the wedding has passed. Today, the Talmud says that this is a question.
  The Mishnah (in chapter five) clearly stated that if he has to wait a few days to marry her until Wednesday, he is not obligated to feed her until Wednesday. Note that this is at most a week’s delay. The question posed here is whether this is a precedent for other types of delays. If he can’t marry her because he is sick is he exempt from feeding her because in here too he was prevented against his will from marrying her. Or are the two cases different?
  The Talmud now advances the question. If we say that if he became sick he has to provide her with food, because the delay in marriage was his fault, what if she became sick? Perhaps he could say to her that he is ready to get married, and that the delay is her fault. Therefore, he would not be obligated to provide for her. Or perhaps she could say to him in essence, tough luck. “Your field was flooded”—nothing you could do about it, but you lost out.
  The Talmud now advances the question one final step. If illness might be considered his tough luck and therefore he would have to provide her with food, what about a case where she begins to menstruate and therefore has to delay the marriage? If she menstruates at her regular time, there is no doubt she cannot say to him, “Your field has been flooded” because she could have known that she was going to begin to menstruate. This was expected and therefore cannot simply be considered his bad luck. But what if she menstruates at an irregular time—can she say to him, “Your bad luck” or might this be considered the same situation as menstruating at a regular time since not all women menstruate with regularity?
  
  Daf 2b
  
  The mishnah uses the passive voice “they were not married” and not the active, “They did not marry them.” This means that even if the delay comes from the women, they still receive food from their husbands. However, the question is what sort of delay? If the women intentionally delayed the marriage, why should they eat of his food? That would not be fair at all. Therefore, it must refer to a situation where they were forced to delay the marriage. Nevertheless, even though the delay was due to the women, the husbands must provide them with food.
  R. Ashi rejects R. Aha’s precise reading of the mishnah. He holds that only if the husband delays the marriage must he provide her with food. If the woman delays the marriage, the husband is not liable to provide for her until she is ready. The reason the mishnah used the passive, thereby referring to the woman, is to preserve the subject of the beginning of the mishnah which reads, “They give a virgin 12 months to get ready for the wedding.” Since the passive was only used to preserve the parallel with the first clause, we cannot read anything into its use.
  IntroductionIn the previous sugya we learned that if the husband was prevented by force (such as illness) from marrying his wife, he need not provide her with food. Thus we take situations of “force” (a person was prevented from doing something not of his choice) into account. The question in our sugya is whether or not force is taken into account in matters of divorce. The sugya will explain what this means.
  According to Rava when it comes to divorce we don’t take issues of “force” into account. The Talmud will now give us some situations where this issue arises.
  The Talmud now tries to find an earlier source for Rava. The first source is a mishnah that teaches that if a husband gives his wife a get and says to her that it will be valid only if he doesn’t return within twelve months, and then he dies within twelve months, the get is not valid because he did not return. The Talmud tries to derive from this mishnah what the rule would be if he didn’t come back because he got sick (“force”). The mishnah said it’s not a get if he dies—but if he doesn’t come back because he was sick, then the get would be valid. From here we could learn that “force” is not taken into account in matters of divorce. However, this derivation is not certain. It could be that the mishnah uses the example of death to teach us that death cannot occur after divorce. If this is what the mishnah teaches us then we could not deduce from it that if he is sick, the get is still valid.
  The Mishnah already taught that there can be no divorce after death in an earlier mishnah. This would free up the mishnah of “if I do not return within twelve months” to teach that only death would prevent the get from being valid. If he doesn’t return due to illness “force” then the get would be valid.
  The Talmud now posits that the mishnah about “If I don’t return within twelve months” was meant to teach against the ruling of “our rabbis” who said that the effectiveness of a document is set by its date. For instance if a man writes “thirteenth of Nisan” in his document but then says it won’t be operative until later, the document goes into effect on the thirteenth of Nisan. The mishnah rules against this position—if he says “after twelve months” then he meant to divorce her only after twelve months. Since that mishnah was needed to rule against this position of “our rabbis” it is not possible to use it prove that if he was prevented by “force” the get is valid. This leaves us with no proof of Rava’s overall position that “force” is not taken into account. The argument continues in tomorrow’s section.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues searching for a source for Rava’s rule that we don’t take “force” into account when determining the validity of a get. As we saw what this means is that if a husband says his get will be valid if he doesn’t return within a certain period and then something happens that prevents him from returning the get is valid. The fact that it wasn’t his choice not to return (he was “forced” not to return) is not taken into account.
  The mishnah says that if the husband makes such a statement and then dies before he can make it back to his wife within the twelve months the get is valid. At first the Talmud assumes that the same would be true if he grew ill. This would prove Rava’s point—we don’t take cases of “force” into consideration when determining the validity of the get.
  Again the Talmud rejects the above deduction. Perhaps she is divorced only when he dies, for we could assume in that case he did not want her to be subject to the laws of levirate marriage (marriage to her dead husband’s brother in a case where the husband had no offspring). As an aside, this is why men sometimes would have written conditional gets. If they divorce their wives before they die, then the wife would not be liable for levirate marriage. Being subject to marrying his brother may not have been so desirable.In any case, if the husband got sick and was prevented from returning within twelve months, he would have wanted to stay married to her. So therefore in this case it would not be a valid get. Again, we have failed to find a source for Rava’s ruling.
  Here the Talmud finds a story as proof that we don’t take “force” into account.  Even if it is obvious that he wanted to return, if he’s not back, it doesn’t count. Shmuel states this explicitly. This would serve as a perfect source for Rava’s general rule that we don’t take “force” into account.
  The Talmud now distinguishes between a regular case of “force” that could have been anticipated, and an unusual case. The case of the ferry not being able to cross over is a regular case. The husband should have stipulated before that if the ferry caused his delay, it would count as if he had returned. But the case of being sick is not regular. Therefore, we might take that into account. And if he is sick and cannot return for that reason, the get would be valid.Thus we still have no support for Rava’s general principle. Stay tuned for tomorrow’s exciting conclusion.
  IntroductionToday’s section concludes the search for a source for Rava’s rule if a husband cannot return due to duress the get is considered valid, even though he wanted to return and thereby annul the get.
  Having failed to find an earlier source for Rava’s rule, the Talmud now resolves to saying that he stated his own reasoning. Basically he ruled that “force” is not taken into account due to the problems that would occur if it were taken into account.The first problem would be for overly modest women. Let’s say that we were to take “force” into account, meaning if the husband was delayed by circumstances out of his control, the get would be invalid. In such a case, after twelve months the husband doesn’t return. For all we know he decided not to return of his own volition, as could happen. Maybe he found a different wife or a different job somewhere else. But the wife is afraid that maybe he didn’t return due to duress. She would wait for him like an “agunah”—a chained wife—and not remarry. This would obviously be a terrible situation. Therefore Rava rules that we don’t take into account why the husband did not return.
  
  Daf 3a
  
  The problem would also occur with what the Talmud terms “loose” women. Let’s say the husband doesn’t return and it was actually due to duress. If the halakhah was that we do take duress into account, then she is not divorced. She might disregard this possibility and go get married. When he comes back and proves that he could not return due to duress, the second marriage would be annulled and any children she had from her second husband would be mamzerim. This is obviously also a terrible result.Thus, to summarize, it is best for everyone if duress is not taken into account. If the husband does not return in time, the get is valid. Why he did not return is not taken into consequence.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that Rava does not accept claims of “force” in matters of divorce because “modest women” might wait too long to get remarried and “loose women” might not wait long enough. What this seems to mean is that if the husband does not return because of “force/duress” legally she should not be divorced but the rabbis do consider her divorced in order to avoid certain problems. The issue here is that if she is not divorced how can the rabbis just consider her divorced? Isn’t that in essence allowing a married woman to marry another man! This is the topic addressed here.
  If according to the laws of the Torah she should be married because the divorce should not have been effective (the fact that he didn’t return under duress should be taken into account), then how can the rabbis treat her as divorced?
  The answer is affirmative. Basically, when people get married, they do so according to rabbinic law. They are buying into the system, if you will. Therefore, the rabbis always retain the power to annul their betrothal. This would mean that effectively, they were never married in the first place.I should note that this statement appears six times in the Talmud. It almost certainly was not originally stated here, for here the topic is divorce, not betrothal. The rabbis are not annulling his betrothal, they are annulling his attempt to nullify his divorce. The statement was brought here to show the power of the rabbis to determine who and who is not married.
  Ravina now asks a question of R. Ashi. It makes sense to say that the rabbis annul the betrothal if he betrothed her with money. Since they seem to have created this system of betrothal, they have the power to annul it. However, do they have such power if he betrothed her through intercourse, which is one of the three ways in which a man can betroth a woman (money, document or intercourse). It seems that this sugya considers intercourse to be a more de’orayta, or perhaps more valid, form of betrothal, than money. We should note that most sugyot consider all three forms of betrothal to be equally valid.The answer is that the rabbis have the power to change the nature of his intercourse with her, or at least the legal ramifications of it. While he (and she) might have thought that they were engaging in intercourse for the sake of betrothal, the rabbis have the power to say that it is in essence an act of fornication. This would mean that her betrothal would be effectively annulled.
  IntroductionThis entire section is a mirror image of the previous sections. The sugya about divorce began with Rava saying, “And for matters of divorce, this is not so. Therefore Rava holds: There is no ‘force’ in matters of divorce.” The sugya proceeded searching for sources for Rava’s statement (and ultimately failed). In this section Rava says the exact opposite, and every source that was used to support him above, is here used as a difficulty on him here. But just as these sources failed to support him, they also fail to refute him. In the end both statements are left neither supported nor refuted.This phenomenon of mirror-image sugyot occurs occasionally in rabbinic literature. It may be the result of the oral transmission of the literature—i.e. people did not know what earlier rabbis had said. Alternatively, it may be the result of later generations intentionally emending what earlier rabbis had said.Since we have already basically learned this material, my commentary is brief below.
  From this Mishnah the rabbis try to deduce that if he was prevented from returning by any other cause besides death, the divorce would be valid. This would prove that force is not taken into account (it is not a valid excuse for not returning on time).
  The Mishnah may use the example of death not to teach that dying is different from not returning for any other reason. It may be to teach that he can’t divorce his wife once he is dead. If so, then even if he doesn’t return for another reason, she is still not divorced.
  The fact that an earlier Mishnah also seems to teach that there is no divorce after death may be just to reject the opinion of the other rabbis who hold that we follow the date written on the document, not the date on which he says it will take effect. Thus we have two mishnayot: One teaches that there is no divorce after death, and the other stresses that this is true even if the date on the document is earlier than the date of death.
  This Mishnah seems to teach that no matter why he doesn’t come back, death or illness, within twelve months, she is divorced. This would imply that there is no excuse of “force” in matters of divorce. This would be a difficulty on the second version of Rava’s statement.But this reading is again rejected—it may be that the husband wanted to stipulate that if he dies within the twelve months, the divorce is valid so that his wife could avoid being subject to levirate marriage. But if he is prevented from returning for another reason, he would not want her to be divorced.
  Again, this story seems like clear evidence that we don’t take “force” into account. Even if we know for sure that he wants to come back, and he was prevented by the lack of a ferry from crossing the river, he is still not considered as having returned on time to annul the get. “Force” is not taken into account. This is a difficulty for the second version of Rava’s statement.The Talmud resolves the difficulty on Rava by proposing that this may be a different case, for the lack of a ferry is a foreseeable reason for not returning on time (like traffic today). In such a case, the husband should have stipulated at the outset that if the ferry prevents him from crossing the river, he will still be considered as having returned to annul the get. However, if the case was not foreseeable, then “force” might still be a proper excuse.The sugya thus ends without a difficulty on Rava’s statement. Post-talmudic authorities were therefore left with two contradictory statements by Rava (there is/there is not “force” in matters of divorce).
  IntroductionToday’s section returns to the Mishnah, which had stated that virgins were married on Wednesdays so that if the husband has a virginity claim, he could get to the court the next day.
  Shmuel b. Yitzchak notes that the mishnah’s rule—that a virgin is wedded on Wednesday, depends on Ezra’s enactment that the courts should sit on Mondays and Thursdays. Before Ezra, who lived when the Jews returned from Babylonia in the fifth century C.E., the courts, at least according to this source, would sit every day of the week. During those times, it would not have mattered when a virgin was married for he could always go to the court the next day.I should note that this source should not be taken at historical face value. It is unclear how historical any of the attributions of these enactments to Ezra are, and even if they were accurate, it is doubtful that Ezra would have limited the days on which the court convened. Rather, what is more likely is that at some point the days in which a court convened became standardized, coordinated with the market days which took place on Monday and Thursday. However, even this is not historically certain.
  The Talmud notes that the way in which R. Shmuel’s statement is phrased lacks any halakhic significance. Why should we care what happened in the days before Ezra’s enactment? What does this teach us about the current situation?The answer is that there are ramifications for today. If there are courts that sit today on other days of the week, not just Mondays and Thursdays, then a woman could be married any day of the week.This answer in my opinion cuts to the original intent of R. Shmuel b. Yitzchak. By his time the system of fixed dates for courts was probably long in disuse (this can be noted in many other places in rabbinic literature, especially Tractate Megillah). What he is saying is that now that courts do not have fixed date, the rules of the Mishnah are also outdated.
  There is another problem with her being married on any day of the week. If he marries her too early in the week, how can he prepare for the wedding? Above we learned that the sages did not allow him to marry her on Sunday for this would not give him time to prepare a proper wedding feast.The Talmud almost ignores this question. As long as he did prepare diligently for the wedding, he can marry her whenever he wants. Again we can see that the system of fixed days of the week for marriage seems to have fallen apart. By this period in history, people seem to have been ignoring the tannaitic sources and getting married whenever they so desired.
  
  Daf 3b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a baraita which goes into greater detail concerning what days of the week a virgin is married. The baraita will be explained in the coming sections as well.
  This source was explained above at the beginning of the tractate. Although the court sits on Monday, theoretically allowing him to get to the court with a virginity claim should he marry her on Sunday, the rabbis did not allow this for this would not give him time to prepare a proper wedding feast. Marrying her on Wednesday allows for three days of preparation before the wedding. 
  The baraita now notes that in reality people are no longer observing these customs. After the time of “danger” they took on the custom to marry on Tuesday. “Danger” usually refers to Roman persecution of the first and second centuries C.E.. The topic will be addressed in tomorrow’s passage.And if there is duress, they get married on Mondays. Again, this will be explained (to a certain extent) tomorrow.
  According to this source, sex with a virgin is prohibited on Shabbat for it makes a wound, and making a wound (intentionally) is considered prohibited. There will be a long passage that deals with this issue later in the Talmud. For now we should note what is odd here—if he marries her on Wednesday, why are they having sex for the first time on Friday night? It is possible that this baraita already relates to the later practice of getting married on Friday. This was common in the middle ages, but it is not clear whether it is reflected here or not.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we saw a baraita which taught that in times of “danger” people began to have the custom of getting married on Tuesdays. Our sugya attempts to define this danger.
  If the danger is of death, meaning that the Romans persecute the Jews in order to force them to abolish their custom of marrying virgins on Wednesday, then why does it use such temperate language—they had a custom to marry on Tuesday? They should abolish the custom altogether.Rather, the danger is that the Romans decree that a virgin should first have relations with the governor. To avoid this, the Jews moved weddings to Tuesday.We should note how historically problematic this source is. First of all, most scholars do not believe there ever was a “decree of the right of the first night.” This is a folk myth/fear that appears in many cultures, including several places in rabbinic literature. But scholars do not believe that it is historically accurate.Second, how would moving the wedding to Tuesday have helped? The Romans would have figured things out pretty quickly, and begun raping virgins getting married on Tuesday. This question is asked below by the Talmud itself.For these and other reasons as well, it seems unlikely that this explanation is historical. Rather, in my opinion what the baraita really seems to say is that when people saw that Romans were persecuting Jews at their weddings, they abandoned their consistent wedding practices. While this might be expressed by “they had the custom to marry on Tuesday,” it may mean that they just stopped marrying on Wednesday. I should note though that there is no historical evidence that Romans persecuted Jews specifically at their weddings.
  Why call this danger when it is really a case of “duress.” Meaning that being raped is not a matter of life and death, and therefore why call it “danger” which usually means death.The answer is that there are some women who would rather be killed than be raped by the governor. Therefore this is indeed a matter of life and death. It truly is “danger.”
  A woman who is raped is not prohibited from returning to her husband, unlike an adulteress who is. Therefore, there is no reason for chaste women to prefer to die than be raped. These women should be taught that they should not choose martyrdom over rape. And then if it’s not a matter of life and death, why change the custom. [I fully realize that this is a very difficult thing to read. And I stipulate that the rabbis were often not particularly sensitive to women, including in this remark. Perhaps I could suggest one positive side to this comment. What they are saying is that when a woman has been raped, as horrible as that may be, she need not allow her life to be ruined. Or better yet, society must not look at such a woman as “ruined,” a tendency that certainly existed in the ancient world and still exists in some circles today. She can legally return to her husband and go on with her life. And her husband must take her back. I know this still makes people uncomfortable. Rape is a very difficult subject to discuss, especially for a man, which I am.]The problem is that there are women who may intentionally have relations with the Roman governor. Such women are considered adulteresses and are legally not allowed to return to their husbands.Furthermore, there is the issue of women married to kohanim (called here priestesses, or kohanot). A woman married to a priest who has been raped is not allowed to return to her husband, even though she clearly did nothing wrong. So simply allowing the Roman governor to rape these women before their marriage would prevent them from marrying their intended husbands.
  If the Roman governor is decreeing that all virgins must first have relations with him, then the enactment to marry on Wednesday should be completely abolished. Why does the baraita just say that “people had the custom?”The answer is that we don’t simply uproot a rabbinic enactment due to a persecution decreed by our oppressors. This is, I believe, a deep message. The persecutions we Jews undergo are temporary. Our traditions are what more permanent and we do not easily abandon them.
  This is the question I asked above—if they move the custom of marrying virgins on a specific day, the governor will just come and have intercourse with the bride on that day.The answer is that once the custom has been disrupted, the governor will not bother himself to seek out Jewish weddings. This might hint at what I had stated above. The baraita may testify to a general abandonment of fixed days for weddings, and not to their having been moved to another specific day. If the governor knows that virgins are married on Wednesdays, he will bring his men out to the Jewish wedding. But if he is not sure of this custom, he will not bother.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains the last part of the baraita we have been studying, according to which if there is “duress” he can marry the virgin bride even on the second day of the week. The issue our section asks is what does the baraita mean by duress?
  The problem is that the previous clause in the baraita said that due to danger people began to get married on Tuesdays. We obviously cannot explain the current clause in the same way we explained the earlier clause. So what does “duress” mean?
  Rava suggests that the “duress” is a general coming to town, who assumedly may kill the Jews for publicly celebrating their wedding. The assumption is that they know he is coming on Wednesday. So then, the Talmud asks, why not get married on Tuesday? The answer is that if the general comes on Wednesday, his vanguard will show up on Tuesday. Under such a circumstance it is permitted to get married on Monday.We should note that what this section is really trying to state, albeit in a circuitous manner, is that if there is any danger whatsoever, the wedding may be moved.I should also note that Rava said both interpretations of the baraita—that the governor is coming to rape the virgin bride and that the general is coming to town. In my opinion, it is possible that originally he stated both of these statements on the same section of the baraita, but that the Talmud’s editors wished to use them as interpretations for both sections. This may explain some of the difficulties over the last two days.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  IntroductionIn last week’s daf we learned that if there is some sort of duress the man can marry the virgin wife on a different day of the week (not Wednesday). Today’s section opens with an alternate explanation of “duress.” I should note that what the following sugya really wishes to do is explore the connection between mourning and marriage. This is not so much an explanation of the earlier baraita as it is an explanation of what is done in a case where a close relative dies right before a planned wedding. The idea of discussing marriage and mourning laws in juxtaposition will be a constant theme over the next couple of pages.
  The reason one may need to get married on a day that differs from the prescribed fourth day of the week is if his or her mother or father died right before the wedding. Before I explain the baraita itself, I should note that this is a difficult explanation of “duress.” After all, if the wedding was supposed to be on Wednesday, and “duress” supposedly allows them to get married on Monday, then why was the bread baked etc. already on Monday. These are preps done at the last minute to make sure the food is fresh. It seems almost impossible that such a circumstance would ever arise. This is why I said that this section is not so much of an explanation of “duress” as it is an explanation of what to do if someone dies right before a wedding.If all of the preparations have been made and at the last minute the father of groom or mother of the bride dies, then they put the dead body into a separate room, the couple have their first sexual relations and then they separate.
  This is the continuation of the baraita from above. After the first intercourse, they now celebrate the regular seven days of wedding feast. The mourning is postponed till later.However, this celebration is not complete. Even though they are celebrating, they still do not have sexual relations. Not only that, they have to sleep in separate rooms, being guarded seemingly by other men and women so that they do not transgress and have sex. [Below we will see that this is not normally the halakhah during mourning].Finally, the baraita adds one last piece of information. Even though they are mourning and they are not sleeping together, she still adorns herself. The rabbis were quite adamant that the two of them should not do anything so that she would not look as beautiful to her new husband during their first month of marriage.
  The Talmud reads the “father of the bridegroom and mother of the bride” as specific. These, according to the Talmud, are the main parties who prepare the wedding feast. If the mother of the bridegroom or father of the bride dies, they first mourn, postponing the wedding till later.I should note that this is probably not the simple reading of the baraita. The simple reading is that the possessive nouns are distributive. Instead of saying, “father of the bridegroom or mother of the bridegroom or father of the bride or mother of the bride” the syntax abbreviates it. This phenomenon is found elsewhere in rabbinic language.In addition, I don’t believe there is any reason to assume that it was specifically the father of the groom and mother of the bride who prepared the feast. It could have been any of the four parents.What this does show us is why the rush to get married in the first place. The parents prepared the wedding feast. If one dies but the feast is already prepared, the only thing one can really do is just participate in the feast, despite the emotional hardship this would entail.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if all of the wedding preparations had been made and then suddenly one of the parents of the bride or groom died, they have the wedding and first intercourse and then they observe the seven days of the wedding feast. They do not begin mourning until later. Today’s section continues to discuss that halakhah.
  If water had already been put on the meat, then the meat must be eaten immediately or it will be lost. As a consequence, the wedding feast must continue despite the death of one of the parents. However, if water had not yet been put on the meat, it can still be sold. In such a case they would begin mourning and postpone the wedding. Today we might say this is like the catering already getting to the hall. If the wedding cannot carry on, there will be a substantial loss.
  Both Rava and R. Papa limit R. Hisda’s rule from above. According to Rava, in a city, where it would be relatively easy to sell the meat, even if water was put on it, it still must be sold. This means they would never have the wedding before the funeral.Papa says that in a village it would be hard to sell the meat even if water was put on it. Therefore even if water was not put on it, it is still not sold. They would always have the wedding before the funeral.But the problem is that this basically negates any validity to R. Hisda’s statement. In cities they would always sell the meat no matter whether water was put on it or not. And in villages they would never sell meat. So what was R. Hisda referring to?Ashi answers that R. Hisda could be referring to a small city such as Mata Mehasya. Mata Mehasya is large enough such that the meat could be sold if water had not been put on it. But it is too small to sell the meat if water had not been put on it.
  This is the same baraita we saw earlier. The only difference is that a few words have been added so that it accords with R. Hisda. If he put water on the meat the meat is not sold. It is probably cited here at length so that the baraita can continue with another section.  And all these days he sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women.
  There are two new clauses here. The only clause that is not new is the middle clause, which we learned in yesterday’s section.The first clause states that if his wife becomes a menstruant during the first week of their marriage, they must sleep in separate rooms. We should note that this is different from the normal situation when a woman becomes a menstruant. In normal cases, while they cannot have relations, they do not have to sleep in separate rooms.The other new clause is that he may not have first time relations with her on Friday night or Saturday night. The Talmud will clarify this below. We have already seen another baraita that stated that first time relations on Friday night were prohibited because he causes a wound. Later on the Talmud will explain why this should be prohibited on Saturday night as well.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section included a baraita that taught that if the bride or groom are mourning right after their wedding, they must sleep in separate rooms. Today’s section deals with this clause.
  The baraita taught that the couple had to sleep in separate rooms during the seven days of the wedding feast (when one of the parents died right before the wedding). These seven days are like a personal festival for the couple—both a festival and the wedding celebration last seven days. So they are in a sense keeping a festival and mourning at the same time. The fact that they don’t sleep together is support for R. Yohanan who said that even though mourning may not be observed during any festival, one still observes private forms of mourning. For instance, if one’s relative died during the festival he cannot begin mourning till after the festival. Nevertheless, he does observe some mourning practices, such as the prohibition on having sex.
  Rava says that the baraita’s rule that they sleep in separate rooms is only if they did not yet have intercourse. In such a case we cannot trust them not to have sex, because this will be there first time and we can assume they are excited. If they sleep in the same room, they might have sex. But if they’ve already had sex at least one time, their passion should have been calmed a bit, and they can sleep in the same room. Note, the prohibition of sex remains.
  The Talmud asks the obvious difficulty on Rava. How can he limit sleeping in separate rooms to a case where they have not yet had intercourse? The baraita stated that they first have intercourse and then they still have to sleep in separate rooms despite the fact that it is the first week of marriage.The Talmud now adjusts what Rava was referring to. He was not referring to a case of mourning during the first week of marriage. Rather, he was referring to a case where the woman became a menstruant. If they have already had sex, then they may sleep in the same room (not the same bed). But if she became a menstruant after they were married but before they had sex for the first time, then they must sleep apart.
  
  Daf 4b
  
  The problem with the above resolution is that it sounds like the same exact rule applies to mourning as to a case where she is a menstruant—if they had sex once, they may sleep in the same room. But this is not true, for in the case of mourning even though they had sex once, they must still sleep in separate rooms in the case where they are mourners during the first week of their marriage. This was stated explicitly by the baraita.The Talmud resolves this by adding the words “and he had not yet had intercourse with her” to the baraita. When mourning during the first week of marriage, they must sleep in separate rooms, but if she is a menstruant during the first week of marriage, they sleep in separate rooms only if they have not yet had sex.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if he had slept with his new wife after their marriage, he could now sleep in the same room as her even if she becomes a menstruant. This means we assume they won’t have sex in such a situation. However, if he is a mourner during the first week of marriage, even if they have already had sex, they still have to sleep in separate rooms. This implies that it is easier for him (and her) to transgress the laws of mourning than it would be to transgress the laws of prohibited sex during menstruation. Today the Talmud questions that assumption.
  These two sources both deal with the relations between a husband and wife when they are not allowed to have sex: mourning and menstruation. When she is a “niddah” (a menstruant) she can continue to perform the normal household work, but she cannot perform any forms of work that are considered to be acts of affection: mixing for him a cup of water and wine, making his bed or washing his face, hands and feet. This means that we are concerned lest by performing these acts, they will be led to have sex.On the other hand, when mourning she may perform these actions. This implies that we are less concerned that they have sex when mourning.Taken together, this contradicts the relationship between the two times in which sex is prohibited that we saw in the earlier sugya about the first week of marriage.
  The Talmud resolves the difficult by positing that there is a difference between a case where he is in mourning and a case where she is in mourning. The earlier sources about sleeping in separate rooms were a case where he was mourning. When he is in mourning, they must sleep in separate rooms. Evidently he will still desire sex (perhaps as a comfort) and since she is not herself mourning, she will not stop him. But when she is mourning, she may perform actions of affection for him. Even if this causes him to desire her, she will rebuff him because she is in mourning.The problem with this resolution is that the earlier baraita had referred to either of them being in mourning. So how could we limit that to a case where only he is in mourning?The resolution is that the line “the father of the bridegroom or mother of the bride” refers to the other rules in the baraita concerning having the wedding before the funeral. These rules are true no matter who is in mourning. But as far as sleeping in separate rooms, this is true only if his family member died.If some of this seems counterintuitive (for instance that he would be tempted to have sex while a mourner) we will continue the discussion tomorrow. Also there are other versions of this text that reverse the version found in the printed edition (the words for his/her are only a “yod” apart in Aramaic.) There are major problems with these other versions as well, so I have stuck with explaining the version preserved here.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if the husband is in mourning during the first week of his marriage he and his wife must sleep in separate rooms. His mourning is not so serious in his own eyes, therefore we fear that he will transgress and sleep with his wife. But if she is mourning, she may perform work that shows her affections for him and we are not afraid they will have sex. This difference between her mourning and his mourning is questioned by today’s section.
  The first baraita states that there are no differences between her mourning and his mourning. In both cases they basically observe mourning together. She does not put on makeup, and they both overturn the beds, a prominent sign of mourning in the Talmudic period. So how can we say above that there is a difference between the two?
  To resolve the problem the Talmud basically adds in a line. When he is mourning, they sleep in separate rooms. But when she is in mourning they need not do so.
  The problem with distinguishing between his mourning and hers is that the baraita explicitly stated “and so too,” implying that both situations are treated the same.The resolution is that they are both the same vis a vis putting on paint and rouge. No matter who is mourning, she does not put on makeup. But if he is mourning, they must sleep in separate rooms, whereas if she is in mourning, they may sleep in the same room.
  The second problem is that the baraita explicitly stated that she is with him, seeming to imply that although he is mourning, they may sleep in the same bed.This too is resolved. “With him” means only that they sleep in the same house. This is confirmed by a halakhah stated by Rav to his son Hiyya upon the death of Hiyya’s wife’s parent. Rav told Hiyya that he must observe customs of mourning with her when in the same house. But when in a separate house, he need not mourn, for it was not his relative that died. What the word “he/she observes mourning with him” means is that they must keep mourning when in front of each other, but not when apart. It does not mean that they can necessarily sleep in the same bed.I should note that this last halakhah is no longer really observed. We only mourn for our close relatives, and when a relative of our relative dies (in-laws) we may act out of great sympathy, but people no longer observe laws of mourning, even when in the presence of their partner. This is part of a long process of reducing the circle of people over whom we mourn.
  Ashi says that the mourning practices during the first week of marriage are different from normal cases of mourning. Since the rabbis were more lenient in that case, the husband might come to sleep with his wife. But in other cases, since the laws are stricter, we have no such concern and they may sleep in the same room. 
  IntroductionAt the beginning of this amud (half-page) of Talmud there was a complex difficulty comparing the laws of the first week of marriage (if mourning, they sleep apart, if menstruating they may sleep in same room) with other times of one’s life (if mourning she may perform acts of affection, if menstruating she may not). These seem to be opposite, for in the first case we fear that he will sleep with her despite the fact that he is mourning, whereas in the second case we have no such fear. In today’s section, R. Ashi says that this comparison is not justified.
  What is the leniency to which R. Ashi refers? It cannot be that he is allowed to have relations with her before the burial. That is not a leniency since he is not yet considered by law to be a mourner. The tannaim dispute when mourning begins. R. Eliezer holds that it is when the body has been taken out of the house to be brought to the cemetery. R. Joshua holds that it is when the tomb has been sealed with the stone rolled in front of the grave. But as long as the body is still in the house, all agree that mourning has not yet begun.The leniency is therefore that they can celebrate the seven days of the wedding feast before they begin sitting “shiva,” the seven days of mourning. This really is a leniency that might lead to them having sex. They are partying and celebrating all day long, and at night we can imagine that despite the fact that they are also in mourning, they might come to have sex. But under more normal circumstances, the fact that a person is in mourning will deter them from having sex. They can therefore sleep in the same room.
  We already learned earlier why the husband is not allowed to have sex with his virginal wife on Shabbat. The wound that first time sex on Shabbat is considered (by some) to be prohibited. But why should they not have sex for the first time after Shabbat.
  
  Daf 5a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the part of the baraita from above according to which a couple should not have first time sex on the evening before or after Shabbat. As I stated above, I think that what the baraita really means is that one should not get married on erev Shabbat (Friday) or motzei Shabbat (Sunday). Indeed, the version of this baraita in the Talmud Yerushalmi says exactly that.
  Zera says that the reason that first time sex is prohibited on Saturday night is “reckoning accounts.” Rashi explains that if they get married on Saturday night the husband will have to make a big feast that night and on Shabbat he will calculate in his head how much the meal will cost. This is why getting married/first time sex is prohibited on Saturday night.The problem with this explanation is that there are a series of sources cited by Abaye that say that one may reckon accounts on Shabbat as long as they are for the sake of a mitzvah. These sources are a general collection of what is permitted on Shabbat as long as they are done for the public good or for a mitzvah. One should not calculate on Shabbat calculations that are not for a mitzvah. I shouldn’t be talking with people about how much the house costs or car costs or things like that. But if we need to make some calculations in discussing a public good or mitzvah, it is permitted. So this cannot be the reason that it is prohibited to have sex with a virgin on Saturday night.Stay tuned for tomorrow’s section for the exciting conclusion of this sugya!
  IntroductionYesterday’s section dealt with a baraita according to which sexual relations with a virgin is prohibited on Saturday night. But the amoraim failed to explain why this is so. Today’s section is a new interpretation of this prohibition.
  Zera said that if they do the wedding on Saturday night, they might come to slaughter a bird on Shabbat for the wedding feast. I should note that this is in line with the reason it is very rare to have a Jewish wedding today on Saturday night. It is simply too likely that there will be some desecration of Shabbat involved in preparing for the meal.Abaye notes that if we were concerned with slaughtering an animal for food on Shabbat, we should not allow Yom Kippur to fall on Monday (Sunday night), lest he slaughter a bird on Shabbat.Rashi says that if Yom Kippur starts on Sunday night, he will need to eat a big meal during the day on Sunday and he might start preparing on Shabbat itself. 
  There are two main differences between preparing for the wedding feast on Saturday night and preparing for Yom Kippur on Sunday night. First of all, for Yom Kippur one needs to prepare only for one’s family/oneself. It is not such a big meal that one would need to start preparing on Shabbat. Therefore it is not a problem.Second, and I think this is really the key difference, there is a lot more time to prepare for Yom Kippur on Sunday night than there is for a Saturday night wedding. This seems to me to be such an obvious difference that Abaye’s difficulty makes little sense. In my opinion Abaye understood the prohibition as getting married on Sunday, such that the feast would fall Sunday night, the same time that the meal before Yom Kippur would fall if Yom Kippur was on Sunday night. So if one can have Yom Kippur on Sunday night, Abaye notes, why can’t one have the wedding feast. In contrast, the Talmud understood the prohibition as first time sex on Saturday night, which made the difficulty more difficult to understand. 
  The Talmud concludes this section by noting that the same problem of preparing a meal on Shabbat could occur if they have first time sex on Friday night. They will need to prepare a big feast for that night, and they might come to slaughter the fowl right before it is cooked, after Shabbat has already begun.I should note that by the medieval period, it had become the norm to get married on Fridays. People were simply poor and could not take off of work during the week. So they got married on Friday, and combined the wedding feast with the one big meal of the week, Friday night. As tends to happen in these situations, they found various ways to get around the Talmud’s prohibition.
  IntroductionThe Mishnah stated that a virgin is married on Wednesday so that if her husband has a virginity claim, he can get to the court on Thursday. However, as I noted in my explanation to the Mishnah, the rabbis provide other reasons why she is married on Wednesday (and a non-virgin on Thursday). One of those reasons is found in today’s section, but here it is woven into a sub-question concerning the Mishnah—while we already know she is married on Wednesday so that her husband can get to the court on Thursday, is the sex to occur on Wednesday night or can it occur during the day on Wednesday.
  The issue the Talmud addresses is whether we are worried that he will “cool down.” What this means is that he will find his wife not to be a virgin and get upset immediately. But by the time the court sits the next day he will have already forgiven her, not make his virginity claim and stay married to her. We might very well ask why this would be so problematic? After all, wouldn’t we want him to stay with her anyways, especially if he wants to? The answer is found in the Yerushami which notes that if he finds her not to be a virgin, she might even be an adulteress. If she had sex with another man after betrothal, then she is an adulteress and according to halakhah she may not stay married her to her husband. Therefore, what we are afraid of is that he will forgive his wife for potentially having cheated on him.If we are afraid that he will forgive her, then they should have sex only on Wednesday night, as close as possible to when the court convenes on Thursday morning. But if we are not concerned with him cooling down, then they can have sex Wednesday during the day.
  As an answer to the question, the Talmud cites a baraita attributed to Bar Kapara. According to Bar Kapara, the reason for these specific days is that the “blessing” in the Torah was written on those days, on Thursday and Friday. The “blessing” is “be fruitful and multiply” which was said to the fishes on Thursday and to humans and other mammals on Friday.From here the Talmud concludes that we are not concerned that he should “cool down.” The sex is to occur at night between Wednesday and Thursday, but not for that reason. Rather, the sex occurs at night because of “blessing.”
  If a virgin has first sex on Wednesday night (beginning of Thursday) because of blessing, then the widow should also have sex on that day. So why is her day Thursday night/Friday? The answer seems obvious—the day on which people were blessed is preferable to the day when fish were blessed.We should note that the reason of “blessing” is considered only partial—it doesn’t explain why a virgin is married on Wednesday. After all, if the reason was “blessing” then she should have been married on Thursday, because the blessing for people was said on Friday. “Blessing” only explains why the sex is on Wednesday night.
  The Talmud now brings in another baraita that explains why a widow has first sex on Thursday night, not Thursday during the day. Again, I should note that originally this baraita explained why she is married on Thursday in the first place, not why the sex occurs on Thursday night. She is married on Thursday so that her husband will celebrate with her three days, Thursday, Friday and Saturday. Since second marriages are less celebratory, if he married her a different day of the week, he would go right back to work.But the Talmud again takes the baraita and uses it to explain a side question—when do they have first sex: Thursday during the day or Thursday night. We should note that it is somewhat unlikely that his going to work on Friday will be determined by whether they had sex during the day on Thursday or at night.
   Both reasons “they watched over” and “blessing” lead to the conclusion that a widow is wed on Thursday and the first intercourse takes place on Thursday night. So, the Talmud asks, as it often does, is there any practical ramification between the two? There are indeed two cases where there is a practical ramification. First of all, if the man does not work. In such a case, the reason of “blessing” dictates that he still have first intercourse with his wife on Thursday night, because the blessing to people was said on Friday. But if we use the reason of “they watched over” then we don’t have to worry about him going to work on Friday, because he never goes to work.The second difference is if there is a festival on Friday. In such a case we need not worry about him going to work. But the reason of “blessing” would still hold true.In short, the reason of “they watched over” is not absolute. It changes based on circumstance. But the reason of “blessing” is always present.
  
  Daf 5b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section is here because it begins with another derashah (loosely translated as sermonic comment) attributed to Bar Kappara, the same sage whose derashah was found in yesterday’s section. The topic has nothing to do with the issue being discussed in Ketubot.
  Bar Kappara rhetorically wishes to prove that the works of the righteous are greater, i.e. harder to create, than the creation of heaven and earth. In creating the heavens and earth, God is described as using only one hand. In contrast, in creating the Temple, God is described as using two hands (the Hebrew is in the plural). Rashi explains that the Temple is the “work of the righteous” for in reality it is people that actually build the Temple.
  Hiyya, a sage of Babylonian origin who moved to Israel, raises some difficulties on the notion that God used only one hand in creating the world. Psalms 95 says that God used His “hands” in forming the dry land—two hands. This difficulty is answered by taking note of the defective spelling of the word, “ידו” and not “ידיו.” [Note that the Masoretic text does not use the defective spelling. It is not all that uncommon for the Talmud to refer to a biblical text slightly different from the text in use today.] The defective spelling means that the verse really says only one hand.The second difficulty is from the verb form—the plural of “formed.” This again implies that God used two hands in forming the dry land.Nahman b. Yitzchak solves the plural form by stating that it refers to fingers, not hands. God created the world using one hand, but at least he used more than just one finger.
  Again, a verse is cited to show that God used two hands to create the world.As a resolution, the Talmud reinterprets the verse. “The work of his hands” does not refer to God’s creation of the world—it refers to the acts of the righteous, the righteous deeds that they perform. And who testifies as to the deeds of the righteous? The “firmament” (Rakia in Hebrew, the name of my youngest daughter!) responds to the righteous deeds of human beings by bringing rain. This reflects the Jewish notion that God blesses the world with rain in response to the good deeds done by the righteous. 
  IntroductionToday’s section contains another derashah by Bar Kappara, the same sage whose words were the focus of the previous two sections.
  The Torah mandates that people own a peg to bury their waste when they go to the bathroom in the fields. The word for “among your gear” is “azen” which sounds like “ozen” the Hebrew word for ear. Bar Kapara therefore understands this to mean that you should have a “peg” for your ear. If you are about to hear something unworthy, you should put your finger in your ear so that you do not hear it. There may also be something close to the simple meaning of the verse in this derashah. The Torah mandates that we keep our living quarters clean, free from human waste. Bar Kapara adds that if this is true with physical waste, how much more is it true with unworthy words, mental/social waste products.
  This same message is derived from R. Elazar’s question concerning why people’s fingers are shaped like pegs. First the Talmud notes that each finger has a certain halakhic purpose. The little finger is called the “zeret” and it is used to measure a part of the high priest’s breast plate. The ring finger is called “kemitzah” for the priest uses it when taking a fist of the meal (minhah) offering. The middle finger is called “amah” which means cubit, and this finger is used in constituting a cubit. The pointer is called “etzba” and it is used to apply blood to the altar. The thumb is called “gudal” (agudal in modern Hebrew) and it is the finger on which the Torah commands blood to be put for certain sacrifices.Rather, the question is—why are fingers shaped in such a way? The answer is the same as above—so that we can put them in our ears to prevent ourselves from hearing bad things.It is interesting to note that the ear is a sensory organ that is very hard to close. We can close our eyes and we can even pinch our noses shut. But even when we close our ears with our hands, sounds can make it through. This means that we must be especially cautious not to be near unworthy things when they are stated.
  The sugya concludes with two additional exhortations not to listen to unworthy things.I must share a story with you. My grandmother, of blessed memory, was in an accident when she was young, and lost hearing in one of her ears. In my house we did a short, abbreviated birkat hamazon on Shabbat. She was more Orthodox and wished to do the full birkat hamazon. So to prevent getting confused, she would fold up the bottom of her one hearing ear, and insert it in her ear, exactly like it says here.The ear is the softest of the external organs. It is “burned first” which can be taken literally, in that if a person is burned, the ears are most easily destroyed. It also can be taken figuratively. Our ears are always open, making them particularly vulnerable to the harm done by “idle things.”.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a long passage concerning whether it is permissible to have first time sex with a virgin on Shabbat. There were several baraitot (tannaitic sources) cited earlier that prohibited this. Nevertheless, the Talmud, for whatever reason, ignores those sources.The proper place for this sugya is really Tractate Shabbat for it mostly deals with issues of what constitutes forbidden labor on Shabbat. In the Yerushalmi it is found in Tractate Berakhot, for the passage cites a Mishnah from Berakhot concerning reciting the Shema during the first week of marriage. The Bavli brings the entire passage here to Ketubot for it is related to the first week of marriage, a topic discussed in this chapter.Today’s section is an elaborate question, typical of the Bavli, where every possible reason to permit and prohibit are examined. The point of this question seems to be to examine every theoretical possibility in understanding the nature and purpose of first-time sex on Shabbat and whether it should be prohibited. It is an elaborate question, and since it is so highly theoretical, some of the possibilities mentioned might seem strange.As usual, I adopt a neutral, clinical tone in discussing these matters. I realize and understand that some people are troubled by men discussing women’s bodies.
  This is in essence an anatomical question. If the blood is simply stored up in the woman’s womb and waiting to come out, then the husband is not wounding her by having sex for the first time. He is just letting out already-gathered blood, which is not a Sabbath transgression. But if he is opening a fresh wound, then it is prohibited.
  If the blood is stored up in the womb, it is allowed, but only if he just needs to let out the blood (perhaps as a sign that she was a virgin). But if he needs to create an opening to allow future intercourse, then it is forbidden, since it is forbidden to make a new opening on Shabbat.
  We had said above that if he didn’t need the opening, then it is permitted. This implies that if one performs a forbidden act on Shabbat, but did not intend to do that act, the act is permitted. In other words, he intended to let out the blood. It was not his intention to create an opening, but an opening was created. Is this permitted? There is a dispute about this issue among tannaim. R. Shimon holds that in cases such as these, the act is permitted. But R. Judah holds that it is prohibited.
  There is yet another aspect to this question: Is he considered as having damaged or improved? R. Judah holds that if one performs a forbidden labor on Shabbat, but that act was destructive, he is not liable. So if the halakhah follows R. Judah in that unintentional acts are prohibited, do we also follow R. Judah in that destructive acts are not prohibited?
  The Talmud now elaborates on the second possibility from above—first-time sex creates a wound and therefore should be prohibited. However, this is only true if his intent is actually to create a wound. But if his intent is simply to have pleasure, then the wound is a by-product. It is not his intent and therefore the act is permitted.
  If he intends just to have pleasure, then the act is permitted, but only if the halakhah follows R. Shimon. R. Shimon says that if one did not intend to perform the forbidden act, it is permitted. But if the halakhah follows R. Judah, it is prohibited.
  If the halakhah follows R. Judah and therefore it should be prohibited, we still have to ask whether it is a destructive act or constructive one. If it is considered destructive it is permitted.
  Even if we determine that first-time sex is destructive, it is only R. Judah who would permit it. R. Shimon forbids destructive acts.This concludes the complex question that opens the sugya. As we shall see, the amoraim barely relate to this question. It seems to have been a late addition to the passage, inserted by the editors of the Talmud, as a sort of introduction to all of the legal ramifications and principles related to the particular topic of first-time sex on Shabbat.
  
  Daf 6a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to cite traditions that will answer the question asked at the end of last week’s daf—is it permitted to have sex with a virgin on Shabbat?
  The amoraim Rav and Shmuel debate whether it is permitted. Curiously (or perhaps not so curiously) every school wants to say that their rabbi, be it Rav or Shmuel, is the lenient one. This is noted explicitly by R. Nahman b. Yitzchak, who says that if you can’t remember which bet midrash teaches the debate which way, you can remember that everyone is lenient on themselves. Seems that no one really wanted to deny sex with a virgin on Shabbat.
  The Talmud initially raises a difficulty on the version of the dispute which reads that Rav is the stringent amora, forbidding sex with a virgin on Shabbat. There is another tradition where Rav states that it is forbidden to squeeze back in a stopper into a brewing vat on Yom Tov, the festival. This is because by doing so he will inevitably squeeze some beer out of the cloth stopper, and squeezing liquids out of something is prohibited on Shabbat/Yom Tov. Now this is true even though his intention was not to squeeze out the liquid. His intention was to put the stopper back into the brewing vat. This implies that Rav rules like R. Judah—even though someone’s intention was to perform a permitted act, if in doing so he performs a forbidden act, it is prohibited. So if Rav rules like R. Judah how can he allow sex with a virgin on Shabbat, since this will cause a wound?The resolution is that in the case of putting the stopper into the brewing vat, even R. Shimon, the lenient sage, would prohibit because it is a case where the prohibited work, squeezing, will certainly be performed. This is called by the Talmud a case of “if he cuts off its head, will it not die.” According to Rashi this refers to a case where someone wants to give his son the head of a bird to play with as a toy (they did not have ipads back then). He does not want to kill the bird, just give its head to his son to play with as a toy. But obviously, he cannot give the head to the child without killing the bird, which is prohibited on Shabbat. So he cannot claim that cutting the head off is permitted because it was not his intention that the bird die. This rule teaches that while R. Shimon generally permits someone to perform an action if his intent was not to perform the prohibited labor, if the prohibited labor is certain to occur, even R. Shimon prohibits.In sum, Rav can logically prohibit putting back the beer vat plug on Shabbat, but still allow one to have first time sex on Shabbat. Evidently, the wound is not certain.
  In these traditions a few amoraim relate that in general Rav holds like R. Judah—even when it is not one’s intention to perform the forbidden labor, the act is still prohibited. So how can the earlier amoraim hold that Rav was lenient in the case of sex on Shabbat with a virgin? The same is true with Shmuel—he usually rules like R. Shimon, that if one’s intent is not to perform the forbidden labor, the act is permitted. So how can he rule that sex on Shabbat with a virgin is prohibited?
  Even if Rav holds like R. Judah, he still can allow sex with a virgin on Shabbat because no matter how we explain, the labor is one of damaging. It is not a constructive act, and therefore R. Judah permits it. The explanation refers to the question found in yesterday’s section. If we say that the blood is stored in the womb and he is making an opening, then this opening may still be considered damaging and not constructive. And if he holds that the blood is the result of a wound, the act can still be deemed destructive. In either case it is a wound.
  IntroductionWe continue to discuss sex with a virgin on Shabbat. I want to reiterate that I realize that these discussions are uncomfortable for some people, but that I adopt a clinical approach to their analysis. I neither condemn practices mentioned in them (I think they were often the norms of the time) nor do I suggest that they should be norms for our times.
  This source is Mishnah Niddah 10:1. The Mishnah is concerned with differentiating between menstrual blood and virginal blood. If the wife menstruates, she and her husband may no longer have sex. But virginal blood does not cause sex to be prohibited. The determination hinges on whether she is old enough to menstruate. If she is, then a longer period is given during which we assume the blood is virginal. For instance, if she is too young to menstruate, Bet Hillel says that we assume that any blood is virginal until she heals from the original would caused during sex. But Bet Shammai says we can assume that the blood is virginal for only four nights.The key to the difficulty raised by R. Hisda is the second clause. If she has reached the age of menstruation he is allowed to assume the blood is virginal for the first four nights. To R. Hisda this means that even if he had not yet had sex with her, he still may do so for all of the first four nights after they were wed on Wednesday, including Shabbat. This is proof that sex with a virgin is permitted on Shabbat.
  
  Daf 6b
  
  Rava tries to resolve the prohibition of having sex with a virgin on Shabbat by claiming that the Mishnah permits every night except for Shabbat.Against this Abaye argues that the Mishnah explicitly says “four nights.” This must include Shabbat.
  Rava now resolves the difficulty in an entirely different manner. The Mishnah rules that it is permitted to have sex on Friday night with his new wife, but only if they already had intercourse on Wednesday or Thursday night. This accords better with the Mishnah, which assumes they are married on Wednesday and therefore the sex that occurs on Friday night would not be when she is a virgin.If we were to ask why the Mishnah bothers teaching that he can have sex with her on Friday night after they have already had sex on the previous nights, the Talmud notes that we might have thought that sex (or sex with a woman who had only begun to have sex very recently) was prohibited on Shabbat, even though it is not first time sex. This is similar to a different case taught by Shmuel. Shmuel allows one to enter a narrow opening (probably some hole in a wall) even though he will cause pebbles to break loose. This is permitted because the opening already exists and it is certainly not his intention to cause the pebbles to fall. So too, we might have thought it would be prohibited to have second or third time sex on Shabbat, just as it is prohibited to have first time sex. It is not. 
  IntroductionThe discussion of sex on Shabbat with a virgin continues. Again, an amora raises a difficulty on the position that it is prohibited.
  According to the Mishnah in Berakhot, a bridegroom is exempt from reciting the Shema because he is too concerned with the task at hand (first time sex) and will not be able to focus on the Shema. The Mishnah states without any ambiguity that if he has not yet had sex with his new wife, he is exempt till Saturday night. This seems to imply that he could be having sex for the first time with his virgin wife on Friday night.
  Abaye denies that the Mishnah allows a husband to have sex for the first time on Friday night. He is exempt on Friday night from the Shema not because he could possibly have sex with his virgin wife that night. He is exempt because he is anxious that he did not have sex the first two nights of marriage. We should note that this is an entirely different type of anxiety. In the case where he was going to have sex that night, he is anxious about the act itself. He won’t be able to focus on the Shema because he has something to do (and he’s understandably nervous about it). According to Abaye, he’s just distressed and nevertheless, he is still exempt from Shema. Rava is about to pounce on this notion.
  Rava responds to Abaye that simple “anxiety” over something that already happened is not sufficient to exempt one from reciting the Shema (or observing other commandments). If this were so, then even one who was upset that his ship had already sunk would be exempt. As proof Rava cites Rav’s statement that a mourner is obligated in all commandments except tefillin. He is exempt from tefillin because they are considered an “ornament.” This is based on a midrashic reading of Ezekiel 24:17. Ezekiel is mourning the loss of his wife, but God tells him that he is not allowed to mourn. He is instructed to wear his “ornament” which the rabbis interpret as tefillin. Since Ezekiel the mourner is told to wear tefillin, it seems that other, regular mourners, may not.
  IntroductionRava now says that there is a tannaitic dispute as to whether one can have sex with a virgin on Shabbat.
  According to the first baraita, he is exempt from Shema on the third night if he has not yet had sex. If the wedding took place on Wednesday, then the third night is Friday night. This means that sex with a virgin is permitted on Friday night, and therefore he is exempt from the Shema.The second baraita says that in all cases the groom must recite the Shema on Friday night. This baraita would hold that sex with a virgin is prohibited, and hence there is no reason for him to be exempt.
  Abaye holds that all tannaim rule that sex with a virgin on Shabbat is prohibited. It is not a tannaitic dispute as Rava claimed. So how come one tanna holds that a groom is obligated to recite the Shema on Friday night? That tanna holds that his anxiety over not yet having had sex is what exempts him from the Shema and not the fact that he is going to have (or at least attempt) sex that night.
  The Talmud now brings another baraita which shows a tannaitic dispute about sex with a virgin on Shabbat. Rabbah says that the “sages” who allow this are R. Shimon, for R.Shimon holds in general that if one does not intend to perform the forbidden labor, the act is permitted. Here his intention is to have sex, and not to cause a wound. Therefore, the sex is permitted even if he does end up causing a wound.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section, Rava said that R. Shimon, who in general allows one to perform an act on Shabbat as long as his intention was not to perform a forbidden labor, would allow a man to have sex with a virgin on Shabbat. Since his intention is not to make a wound, the act is permitted.In today’s section Abaye calls this into question because while making a wound was not the husband’s intention, it seems to be a certainty that it will occur.
  Abaye argues that sex with a virgin is like the case of the bird having its head cut off so the kid could use it as a toy (I explained this in 6-1). Since the forbidden labor will certainly occur, R. Shimon agrees that the act is prohibited.Rava responds that there are those who can have sex with a virgin without causing a wound. They somehow “move to the side.” This is a skill referred to here and in several other places in the Talmud. It is unclear what exactly it is, but it sounds like some kind of gentle way of having intercourse such that the woman’s hymen would not be broken. Since the forbidden labor will not certainly occur, R. Shimon would permit.
  If the person is skilled enough to know how to have intercourse by moving aside, why should he be so anxious such that he need not read the Shema that night? In other words Abaye is saying that if you claim that the person has skill, then the entire baraita about Shema makes no sense.Rava responds that the baraita refers to one who is not skilled. He is anxious so he is exempt from Shema.But, Abaye responds yet again, if this is true, then we should have said that one who is skilled is allowed to have sex with a virgin on Shabbat, but one who is not skilled may not do so.Rava responds that since most people have such skill, it is permitted for all men to have sex with a virgin on Shabbat
  Rava (a different amora with this name) raises a different difficulty. Elsewhere in the tractate we shall see that people were concerned about the evidence that she was a virgin. To ascertain this evidence a sheet was used (this is mentioned in the Torah as well). Furthermore, groomsmen were placed in or at least near the room to make sure that he or she did not fake or lose the evidence. The sheet and the system of groomsmen make sense only if it is expected that she will bleed from the wound that he creates. If most men know how to have sex without rupturing the hymen, then why bother with the sheet or groomsmen?Abaye answers that the groomsmen are there lest the husband tamper with the evidence. They would make sure that the husband does not hide the evidence of her virginity and then claim that she was not a virgin. We should note that this type of scheming husband is already described in Deuteronomy.
  IntroductionToday’s short section cites another difficulty on the halakhah that it is forbidden to have sex with a virgin on Shabbat.
  A Mishnah from Tractate Shabbat rules that lancing an abscess is permitted on Shabbat, as long as his intention is not to make an opening, just to release the pus. With regard to sex with a virgin, R. Ammi assumes that his intention is to release the blood. Perhaps this assumption is based on the fact that the husband wishes to see the blood as a sign of her virginity. In any case, this Mishnah is used by R. Ammi to prove that sex with a virgin should be permitted on Shabbat.The Talmud responds that anatomically these are different cases. In the case of the abscess, the pus is stored up and is ready to be released. It is not in the walls of the organs. Thus this is permitted because he is not making a wound. But in the case of virginity blood, while the blood is stored up, it is not ready to be released, and therefore this could be considered a wound. Therefore, it may be forbidden, for by releasing the blood through a wound he is performing the forbidden labor he intended to perform.
  
  Daf 7a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section concludes the discussion of sex with a virgin on Shabbat. I know it’s been a long discussion. It does seem that this was a hot topic in rabbinic circles, perhaps for two reasons. First of all, it refers to sex, a topic that the rabbis do seem to spend a considerable amount of energy discussing. Second, it has significant relevance to some general principles concerning Shabbat, another topic that rabbis spend considerable time discussing.
  The Talmud now begins to relate some actual rulings that seem to have been issued by rabbis. In other words, these are not theoretical halakhot or discussions, such as those that appeared above. They are concrete rulings. R. Ammi allows sex with a virgin on Shabbat.The other rabbis raise a difficulty we have not yet seen elsewhere—what about the ketubah? Generally, it is prohibited for a man to have a wife without having given her first her ketubah. The rabbis’ difficulty on R. Ammi reflects the idea that they would wait to give the ketubah until after the marriage had been consummated. Perhaps this was done so that he could ensure that she was actually a virgin. We should note that this is not normative practice. In any case, if he has first sex on Shabbat, how could he write for her a ketubah that night, when writing is forbidden on Shabbat?The answer is that he could just give her some movable goods, at least as temporary substitute for her ketubah.
  This time we have two versions—either R. Zevid permitted others to have first intercourse on Shabbat, or he himself had first intercourse. In either case it is permitted.
  Rav Judah allowed one to have sex with a virgin on a festival. But what we do not know is if he would have extended the same permission to Shabbat. As we shall see, the laws of the festival and the laws of Shabbat are not always the same.Papi argues that Rav Judah would have permitted also on Shabbat. The only reason he permitted specifically on the festival is that he was asked about such a case.
  Papa disagrees with R. Papi, and holds that while it permitted to have sex with a virgin on the festival, it is not permitted on Shabbat.Papi then asks what grounds there might be for such a difference. The main difference between Shabbat and the festival is that one is allowed to prepare food on the festival. This includes slaughtering an animal, lighting a fire and cooking. R. Papi assumes that R. Papa makes the following argument. The reason to prohibit sex with a virgin on Shabbat is that it makes a wound. Making a wound on the festival (slaughtering an animal) in order to eat (for a necessity) is permitted. Therefore, making a wound on the festival when it is not for the sake of eating (first time sex) should also be permitted.The problem, R. Papi says, is that we don’t consistently apply such thinking. Lighting a fire on the festival is permitted for the sake of cooking. But it is not permitted for the sake of burning incense. From here we can see that just because something is permitted when done for a necessity is it permitted when performed not for a necessity.Papa responds based on a midrash on the last two words of the verse, “by every person.” The act is permitted only if all people benefit from it, meaning all classes of society engage in it. Incense was something used by the rich, and therefore it cannot be burned on the festival. But sex is something everyone does, and therefore it is permitted on the festival, even if it causes a wound.
  Aha raises a difficulty on the above conclusion that only if everyone is customary to use a certain item can the work involved be performed on the festival (if the same work is permitted when done to prepare food). Deer meat was evidently not eaten by everyone, only by the rich. So using this logic if one came across a deer (not by hunting), he could not kill it to eat it on the festival! This is obviously not true. So, the question is: how come it is permitted to slaughter a deer on the festival?To answer, R. Ashi revises the midrash—if it is something “needed” by every person, it is permitted. Deer meat might be eaten only by the rich, but it is still food, and everybody needs food. Therefore, even though it is rich person’s food, one can slaughter it on the festival. In contrast, incense is not something everybody needs. Therefore, it cannot be burned on the festival.
  This section begins with another halakhic ruling—this time prohibiting sex with a virgin on Shabbat.The Talmud seems to think that the word “instruction” implies that something should be permitted—so how is it that R. Yohanan “instructed” something that it is forbidden.In the end they find two cases where the word “instruction” is used and it does create a prohibition. The first is a Mishnah from Nazir 3:6 where Bet Hillel instructions Helena the Queen that she should be a Nazirite for another seven years after moving to Israel. See there in my comments in Mishnah Yomit for my information.The second has to do with what makes an animal a “trefa”—unfit to be eaten. If its spinal cord was severed it is a trefa. Rabbi instructs strictly that even if it was only perforated, it is a trefa.
  The sugya ends by ruling that despite some rabbinic opposition, in the end it is permitted to have sex with a virgin on Shabbat. Tomorrow we move on to a different topic.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a long discussion about the marital blessings. The first blessing discussed is the “bridegroom’s blessings” called today the “sheva berakhot.” While that term is lacking in the Talmud, the blessings are referred to and we will learn them later on.
  According to Rav, the bridegroom’s blessing is recited at the marriage of both a virgin and a widow. As we shall see, there are some traditions that deny the recitation of this blessing at woman’s second wedding.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty from another statement where R. Huna says that there is no blessing whatsoever for marrying a widow (synonymous with any woman being married for a second time).The solution is that it depends on whether it is the man’s first wedding. If a young man, marrying for the first time, marries a widow, the blessing is recited. But not, if both are marrying for the second time, then there is no blessing.
  The Talmud now cites the source for the halakhah that requires the presence of ten for the bridegroom’s blessing. The source is the episode where Boaz marries Ruth (at least this is how the rabbis understand the episode). Boaz gathers ten men to recite the blessing, despite the fact that both he and Ruth were previously married.To resolve the difficulty the Talmud revises R. Huna’s statement. If the widower is marrying a virgin, the blessing is recited for all seven days. But if he is marrying a widow, the blessing is still recited, but only for one day. Boaz and Ruth indeed had the blessing recited, but only for one day.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita that appeared earlier in this chapter. The baraita asked why a widow is married on Thursday. The answer was that this gives the husband three days to celebrate with her until he goes back to work on Sunday. The problem is that this doesn’t match either of the situations mentioned above. If he is a widower marrying a widow, then the blessing is only one day. And if he is a young man, getting married for the first time, then the blessing should be seven days, even if he is marrying a widow.The Talmud resolves this by separating the requirement for reciting a blessing from the requirement to celebrate. This baraita could therefore refer to either a widower or a young man. If it refers to a widower, then he recites the blessing for one day, but celebrates for three. If it refers to a young man, then he recites the blessing for seven days, but only celebrates for three.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if a man is marrying for the first time the bridegroom’s blessing is recited for seven days, even if his wife is marrying for the second time. Today’s section calls this into question.
  A baraita states that the blessing is said for only one day when it is a widow that is being married. This seems to be true no matter who is marrying her, a widower or a young man.The Talmud resolves the difficulty by limiting the baraita to a widower marrying a widow.
  The Talmud now basically says that if there was a distinction between a young man marrying a widow and a widower marrying a widow, the baraita should have said so. The fact that it didn’t implies that there is no such distinction. In all cases, the widow should get only one day.The resolution is that the baraita does not teach all details. If the woman is a virgin she always has seven days of a blessing. If she is a widow, then she gets at least one day. But, if she is marrying a young man, then she gets seven days of blessing.
  The Talmud now returns to the derivation of the law requiring the presence of a minyan to recite the bridegroom’s blessing. The first tradition was cited above in section two. The second derivation is that of R. Abahu who locates it in a verse from Psalms. He seems to read “from the fountain” as referring to the fountain from which human life is formed, i.e. the woman’s womb. A blessing over the “fountain” requires an “assembly” which in Jewish tradition is at least ten.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we saw two different reasons for why the presence of a minyan is required for the recitation of the bridegroom’s blessing. Today, the Talmud asks the typical question—what does each sage do with the verse used by the other sage.
  Nahman uses R. Abahu’s verse to make the same derashah made in a baraita by R. Meir. To R. Meir (and R. Nahman) the word “ממקור” which I have translated as “from the fountain” means from the womb. According to the verse, someone blessed God from the womb. To R. Meir, this refers to the fetuses in their mother’s wombs when Israel crossed the sea. The Israelites rejoicing at going free extended even to the unborn babies.
  Why doesn’t R. Abahu agree with R. Nahman/R. Meir’s derashah on the verse from Psalms?Abahu responds that if the verse meant to refer to the unborn babies it should have specifically said “from the womb.” Since it uses a different word, “from the fountain,” it must refer to something else, and that is the “matters of the fountain” which seems to refer to something broader than the fetus, perhaps sexuality in a broader sense.
  IntroductionHaving explained how R. Nahman uses the verse R. Abahu used to prove that the bridegroom’s blessing requires a minyan, the Talmud now asks the opposite question—what does R. Abahu do with R. Nahman’s blessing?
  Nahman uses R. Abahu’s verse to make the same derashah made in a baraita by R. Meir. To R. Meir (and R. Nahman) the word “ממקור” which I have translated as “from the fountain” means from the womb. According to the verse, someone blessed God from the womb. To R. Meir, this refers to the fetuses in their mother’s wombs when Israel crossed the sea. The Israelites rejoicing at going free extended even to the unborn babies.
  Why doesn’t R. Abahu agree with R. Nahman/R. Meir’s derashah on the verse from Psalms?Abahu responds that if the verse meant to refer to the unborn babies it should have specifically said “from the womb.” Since it uses a different word, “from the fountain,” it must refer to something else, and that is the “matters of the fountain” which seems to refer to something broader than the fetus, perhaps sexuality in a broader sense.
  IntroductionHaving explained how R. Nahman uses the verse R. Abahu used to prove that the bridegroom’s blessing requires a minyan, the Talmud now asks the opposite question—what does R. Abahu do with R. Nahman’s blessing?
  According to R. Nahman, Boaz assembled ten men for an entirely different purpose and not so that he could recite the blessing. Rather, Boaz wanted to teach the elders that the Torah prohibits only male Ammonites and Moabites from marrying into Israel (Deuteronomy 23:4), not a female Ammonite or Moabite. This is important because Ruth, the progenitor of King David, is a Moabitess. Boaz needed a midrash to allow him to marry her in the first place.To prove this point, R. Nahman points out that if all Boaz needed was a minyan, the people he assembled did not have to be elders. The fact that Boaz assembled elders means that they were there for more than just the blessing.
  Abahu responds to R. Nahman’s understanding of why Boaz needed ten. If the whole point was to teach the elders the midrash that the Torah prohibits male Ammonites and Moabites from marrying into Israel but not females, then why did he need a minyan. According to R. Abahu the fact that he specifically searched for ten is proof that he did so because without ten the blessing could not be recited. Ten would not have been necessary just to teach a midrash.Nahman responds that the ten were needed to publicize the halakhah that Boaz had expounded. Without ten word would not have gotten out that only male Ammonites and Moabites are prohibited. This corresponds with a statement that Shmuel makes to R. Hanna of Baghdad concerning an entirely different topic altogether. The topic is whether one can transfer ownership over something to an unborn fetus. According to Shmuel this is possible, but in the end the halakhah is that it is not. One cannot transfer ownership over a piece of property (be it an item or a field) to something that has been determined to not yet “be in the world.” We might put this another way—fetuses do not have property rights.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now turns its attention more fully to the bridegroom’s blessing, as well as the blessing recited at betrothal. We should keep in mind that while we now recite both of these sets of blessings at the huppah, meaning at the time of marriage, in the Talmudic period, there was a large gap in time between betrothal and marriage, just as there is typically a gap in time today between (secular) betrothal and marriage. Today Jews might get engaged a long time before they are married, but this engagement is not “Jewish”—it has no legal consequences. The “Jewish” betrothal takes place at the ring ceremony, minutes before marriage.
  According to the first opinion, the bridegrooms’ blessing is recited only in the bridegroom’s home, when the wife moves in. This is basically the definition of marriage—the couple begins to live together.Judah says that the blessing is also recited earlier, at the point of betrothal. This seems to be a bit strange—after all, they are not living together so how can they recite these blessings?Abaye answers this question by saying that R. Judah’s statement refers only to the region of Judah, where as we shall see later in the chapter, there was a custom for the husband and wife to be secluded before marriage. Since this seclusion might lead to sexual relations, they should already recite the blessing when she is still in her father’s home.  But in other regions, the bridegrooms’ blessing is recited only in the bridegroom’s house.
  This baraita introduces a new blessing—the blessing over betrothal. Now we can see that there are two separate blessings for two separate occasions, the betrothal and marriage. The first blessing is recited in the house in which betrothal occurs, usually her father’s house. The second blessing is recited at the bridegroom’s house, when the woman moves in.
  The Talmud now relates what we say for the betrothal blessing. God prohibited us (meaning men) from having relations with women we have already betrothed. This is a main feature of Jewish marital law. During the period of betrothal, the woman is prohibited from having relations with her husband, but if she has relations with another man, it is considered adultery.Women become permitted to their husbands at the point of marriage.The blessing uses the curious phrase “huppah and kiddushin.” This struck some commentators as strange because the kiddushin, the act of betrothal, precedes the act of marriage, the huppah. So why are they in reverse order?My doctoral advisor, Professor Shamma Friedman answered this question in an article—shorter word tends to come first in Hebrew pairs. Just sounds better!
  In Jewish liturgy, some blessings are “complex” and some are “simple.” A complex blessing has an opening, “Blessed are You…” and then a closing one as well. An example of this is the first blessing after Barkhu, or the first blessing of Birkat Hamazon, or the first blessing of the Amidah. Kiddush is also an example. Simple blessings have no conclusion. All blessings over things from which one benefits, such as food and smell, are simple blessings. Blessings over mitzvoth are also simple (tallit, tefillin, shofar and many others).So the one who holds that a simple blessing is used for betrothal, holds that it is like blessings over mitzvoth or over things from which we derive benefit. After all, marriage is a mitzvah and people derive benefit from it.In contrast, the one who holds that it is a complex blessing says that it is like Kiddush. After all, it too uses the word “sanctification” so it really is like Kiddush.Today the halakhah is that it is “complex,” like Kiddush, beginning and opening with “Blessed are You…” 
  IntroductionToday’s section provides the text for what today is called “the sheva berakhot.” There are actually only six blessings. The blessing over the wine was added in a later period. These blessings are called in the Talmud “the bridegrooms’ blessing.” I have not commented on the meanings of the blessings. Commentary and other translations can be found in siddurim.
  According to the baraita, the bridegrooms’ blessing is recited in front of ten people all week of the celebration. However, Rav Judah notes that this is true only if new guests come. If there are no new guests at a subsequent night, then the blessing is not recited.
  
  Daf 8a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with some laws concerning the sheva berachot, specifically how many blessings are recited, and for how long is the special invitation to birkat hamazon at a wedding feast recited.
  Here we have a dispute over how many blessings the “bridegrooms’ blessings” consist of. According to Rashi, whose commentary is based on the continuation of the sugya, the dispute is whether the second blessing, “Who forms man” is included. We should note that if it is included, then there seems to be a repetition in the second and third blessings. Both seem to say the same thing—acknowledging God for creating humanity.
  Levi who blesses five, would hold that God created (formed) only one human being, a two-sided figure, and then split that being in half, male and female. This is a well-known version of creation that appears not only in rabbinical literature, but in Plato as well. Since there was only one formation, only one blessing is recited.
  The Talmud now says that both R. Assi and Levi believed that human beings were created only once. So how do we understand the discrepancy in the verses, one implying that God created one human being, and then another, and the other verse implying that God created two from the outset. The answer is that God originally intended to create a separate male and female. But in the end, it turned out that God created one human being, and then later separated them.There are clearly deep theological and anthropological implications to this passage. Why wasn’t God’s original intent fulfilled? Why did God want to create the sexes separately? What does this teach us about human beings that they were created at the same time?
  Rav Ashi now outlines a procedure for signifying through blessings how long into the wedding celebration we are. We should note that the periodization here is similar to that in mourning. The most intense period is the first week, after that the next thirty days, and then as well shall see the next period is twelve months.The blessing “In whose dwelling there is joy” is today recited as part of the zimmun, the invitation to birkat hamazon. After the wedding, the sheva berachot are recited as part of birkat hamazon and not independently.The customs reflected in this passage are no longer observed. Today, we recite all the sheva berakhot for the first seven days, but only if there are new guests. After the seventh day, no one recites any of these special blessings anymore. The special zimmun for birkat hamazon is recited for seven days, but not longer.
  Ashi did not give an upper limit with regard to how long the special blessing, “In whose dwelling there is joy” can possibly recited. R. Papi limits its recitation to a year. This is also the maximum time of mourning.
  The question here is when do they begin saying this special blessing, “In whose dwelling there is joy” begin. At first Rav Papa answers that we begin saying the blessing when “they put barley in the mortar.” Rashi offers two explanations. The first is that this refers to making some sort of beer from the barley. This would be the first preparation for the wedding. I should note that Rav Papa was known to be a brewer. The second explanation is that they would plant barley in a pot as a symbol of “be fruitful and multiply.” Nice custom, although I might prefer the beer!The problem is that Rav Papa, when preparing for his own son’s wedding, would say the blessing earlier, from the time of betrothal.The answer is that Rav Papa was sure that all the preparations for the wedding were already made. Therefore, he could say the blessing earlier. In other cases, the blessing should not be recited till the preparations are made. Today, since betrothal and the wedding both take place under the huppah, no special blessing is made until then.
  Here we can see the problem with reciting the blessing too early. Ravina said the blessing at the time of betrothal, claiming that he was certain that they would not retract. In the end, they did retract and annul the betrothal. It seems that he was testing luck.
  Rav Tahlifa said six blessings, but made them all long. The difference between this practice, and that described above comes in the first two blessings. In the above version these were short blessings, opening with “Blessed are You,” but without any “Blessed are You” conclusion. In contrast, Rav Tahlifa lengthened them both, opening and ending them with “Blessed are You.” The halakhah does not follow Rav Tahlifa. The first two blessings are short blessings.We can see here that the precise text of the “bridegrooms’ blessing” was still fluid during the Talmudic period. From other evidence (the Tosefta, and some post-talmudic works), we also know that in Eretz Yisrael they recited three blessings. In general blessings and other parts of the liturgy were not yet all standardized in the Talmudic period.
   Rav Habiba recited this blessing even at the house of a circumcision. But the anonymous Talmud rejects this, saying that a circumcision is not unadulterated joy. The child experiences pain, and therefore we do not say, “In whose dwelling there is joy.” 
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses whether the bridegroom or mourner counts towards the minyan (quorum of ten) necessary to recite the bridegrooms’ blessing or the mourner’s blessing. Note that the Talmud is now transitioning to a discussion of both wedding customs and mourning customs. There are indeed many, many parallels between the two. I have a whole book at home on the topic. Clearly the rabbis shaped the two intentionally to have so many similarities. In this way, the two most critical moments in a person’s existence, marriage and death, are parallel.
  According to the early amoraic sage, Rav, while bridegrooms count towards the minyan required to recite the special blessings, the mourners do not.However, a baraita says that in both cases, they count towards the minyan.The Talmud resolves this difficulty by noting that Rav is different from all other amoraim. For the most part, the Talmud holds that amoraim may not disagree with tannaim. If they do, they must find some way to resolve the difficulty (this is what usually happens). No resolution and the amora loses (rare, but it does occur). However, Rav lived right at the beginning of what is considered the amoraic period. He is therefore considered a tanna and may disagree with other tannaim.
  This is the same statement and difficulty from above. Again, the amora says that mourners do not count in the minyan, whereas the baraita cited as a difficulty says that they do.This time, the difficulty must be resolved. The mourners count when it comes to the minyan required to recite the special birkat hamazon for mourners (we will read more about this later). But when it comes to the line after the funeral in which mourners are comforted, they do not count. This seems to make intuitive sense. In the line, the mourners are separate from the comforters. Therefore, they do not count. But at the meal, the mourners eat just as those giving comfort eat. Therefore, the mourners count.
  
  Daf 8b
  
  Above we said that R. Yohanan does not require a minyan of mourners only at the line of comforters. The problem is that here he refers to the blessing for the mourners, and this blessing is not recited in the line of comforters.Therefore, the Talmud adjusts the above resolution. R. Yohanan refers to the blessing recited in the plaza. According to Rashi, this refers to the first meal fed to the mourner after the funeral. They would do this in the town square. At this occasion, mourners do not count in the minyan.
  Finally, we have yet another statement by R. Yohanan. Here he refers to the blessing said over the mourners all seven days. Above, we said that this blessing does not require a minyan when in the plaza. The problem is that this blessing done only during the first day.The Talmud answers that there could be a blessing in the plaza for seven days if new guests come.I should note that this is clearly a resolution of the Talmud. The meal/blessings in the plaza were done only during the first day, upon returning from the funeral. This is an excellent example of the Talmud’s propensity to “make things up” even when they don’t match reality.
  IntroductionThe story in this section is mainly a eulogy offered for the child of R. Hiyya bar Abba. I warn you, the eulogy does not contain the kind words you might expect on such an occasion. This story begins a series of “derashot” offered by a person who seems to be a professional eulogizer. It seems that these eulogies are not tailored to each individual who dies, but are more like stock poetic remarks to offer at a funeral depending. At most they are slightly tailored to the circumstance. Eulogies were important in the Talmudic period, but they were conducted very differently from how they are done today, at least in the traditions I’m familiar with from the western world.
  Resh Lakish, the father of the student of R. Hiyya bar Abba does not go to comfort R. Hiyya on the first day of his mourning. It is not clear why not. The next day, Resh Lakish shows up with his “meturgaman.” Sometimes this means “translator” but here it clearly refers to a professional eulogizer. Resh Lakish tells the unnamed eulogizer to say something about the child who has just died.
  The meturgaman opens with a verse and then offers a midrash on this verse to explain why R. Hiyya bar Abba’s son died. God was angry over the sins of the generation.Obviously, the theology expressed here is troublesome to our modern minds (and to the Talmud, as we shall see below). But I’d like to focus more on the form of the eulogy. First of all, it is extremely short. It is basically just a verse, and a short interpretation. Second, clearly the meturgaman does not know the child, and maybe not even the family. This seems to be more of a formal lament, than what we would today term a eulogy. I understand that we today would not want our or our loved one’s eulogies conducted in this manner. What is interesting to me is to look at the record of how they did this in the past.
  This is a second version of the “eulogy” which seems to fit the case better if the son of R. Hiyya that died was a “young man” and not a child. The verse from Isaiah specifically mentions “young men” and blames the person himself for his own sins, and not the fathers, as was the previous “eulogy.” Again, it seems to me that this is a stock eulogy. Scholars say that in the past people tended to have less of an individual identity. People were simply part of a group. I do not know if this is always true, but these eulogies do seem to express that world view. The eulogy is not personal, it matches the person’s age and to a certain extent the circumstances of their death. But that’s it. The eulogizer says nothing about the person’s life. Today in the age of individuality, we would of course expect the eulogy to address the unique aspects of the person who passed away.
  Before discussing the eulogy itself, the Talmud interprets the phrase “His hand is still stretched out.” This implies that God’s judgment is still hanging. Even if a person’s fate has already been sealed in the books of heaven, things could still go wrong.What is it that a person could do to overturn his good judgement? According to this sugya, it is something as trivial as saying explicitly why the bride is going into the bridal chamber. Everybody knows what is to happen there, but this is a private matter. [If you don’t know what happens in the bridal chamber, I am not saying. I don’t want my decree overturned!]. The wedding in essence is a public celebration of something that should be a private matter between a husband and wife. The rabbis were concerned that the private aspects remain as such.
  The Talmud questions the content of the meturgaman’s eulogy—how could he be so crass as to say to R. Hiyya bar Abba that your son died because of your sins?The answer is that only the righteous (and their families) are punished for the sins of their generations. I’m not sure how comforting this may be to R. Hiyya bar Abba, but at least he is not saying that his own son died because of his father’s sins.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section, Resh Lakish’s professional meturgaman delivered a eulogy for the child who had died. The meturgaman, who seems to be a professional liturgist/poet, is now asked to recite other formal blessings customarily recited at the home of a mourner.I should note that there is a rich history to these blessings, either as part of a special birkat hamazon said at the home of a mourner, or as independent blessings. These blessings are no longer recited. They seem to have been lost at some point during the period of the geonim (post-Talmudic period, roughly 700-1100 C.E.).
  The first blessing after the eulogy is about God’s greatness. We should note that this is parallel to the first blessing of birkat hamazon, where we bless God for providing food. God is great for sustaining the people of this world, and for the resuscitation of the dead.
  This blessing is about the mourners, offering them comfort for their bereavement. This blessing has some affinities with the third blessing of birkat hamazon, in which we mourn the loss of Jerusalem. Indeed, there are other texts that combine these two ideas—comforting the people over their personal loss, as well as their national loss for Jerusalem.
  Abaye says that one should not “open one’s mouth to Satan” by acknowledging that death will continue to occur. Abaye wants to mourn the loss of the individual but to a certain extent deny death, by hoping that death will cease occurring.
  The final blessing in these series is for those who comfort the mourners. Again, we can see some similarities between this blessing and the fourth blessing of birkat hamazon. The fourth blessing focuses on reward, “He rewarded us, He rewards us and He will reward us.” It is not hard to imagine how these two blessings could be combined together.The blessing mentions Abraham who is considered in Jewish lore the father of acts of loving kindness. 
  IntroductionToday concludes the last of the blessings recited at the mourner’s home.
  In this last blessing we ask God to save us from all sorts of catastrophes. The liturgy is similar to the words used in other blessings, including the “birkat haderekh” the travelers’ blessing.
  Ulla cites a baraita according to which they drank ten (!) cups of wine at the home of a mourner. Six cups were functional—to ease digestion. Four more were drunk after the meal, one corresponding to each of the blessings of the birkat hamazon.
  As if ten cups of wine were not sufficient, according to the baraita, they added four more! The additional cups were in honor of various functionaries in the city, as well as Rabban Gamaliel. Alas, fourteen cups was determined to be too much, so they went back to only ten cups of wine. (Reminds me of the old joke about the rabbi who instructed the man to bring the animals into his house. Ten cups doesn’t look like so much in comparison with fourteen).
  The Talmud explains the reference to Rabban Gamaliel—what is his connection with Jewish funerals? The answer is that Rabban Gamaliel is the sage who began the wise practice to limit the costs of a funeral. Before his time, burial had become an opportunity for people to show off their wealth. The costs of the funeral became so burdensome that people began abandon their dead. Rabban Gamaliel did not just tell the people to cease this practice. He directed that his own funeral should be simple, and that he should be buried in simple shrouds. Jewish funerals were never the same.Interestingly, just last week a group that deals with Jewish burial and mourning practices all over the world came to visit the Yeshiva. The name of the group? Gamaliel.
  
  Daf 9a
  
  IntroductionAfter a long digression about the blessings recited at weddings and funerals or homes of mourners, the Talmud now returns to the main subject of the chapter: virginity and virginity claims.I wish to remind the reader that I adopt a clinical tone when discussing these passages. I try to offer an accurate description of what I believe the rabbis are talking about. The immediate topic of these passages, virginity claims, is not practical halakhah anymore, nor was it observed very much throughout Jewish history. But the abstract principles discussed over the next few pages were of great interest to Talmudic thinkers for many generations, and made this one of the most learned pieces of Talmud in the entire Bavli.
  Rabbi Elazar refers to a completely subjective type of virginity claim, according to which the husband simply says that his wife did not feel to him like she was a virgin. This is different from the virginity claim referred to in the Torah and in earlier rabbinic literature, which was a claim based on the lack of blood.We should note that Rabbi Elazar also refers to a consequence of a virginity claim that we have never heard of before—the wife is prohibited to the husband. The Mishnah spoke about her losing her ketubah payment (200 for a first marriage). In other words, the tannaim referred to a claim that was in the realm of financial matters, whereas the amoraim discuss the issue in terms of personal/religious consequences.What Rabbi Elazar seems to be saying is that if a husband does not have the evidence to successfully prove that his wife was not a virgin, i.e. he does not have any evidence to prove that she did not bleed, but he still believes that she is not a virgin due to his subjective feeling, he may not continue to live with her, for we fear that she was an adulteress. This too is a shift from the halakhah in the Mishnah and in the Torah. In the earlier texts the problem with her not being a virgin was simply that the husband thought he was marrying a virgin. To put it crudely, he imagined he was buying a virgin, and he got a non-virgin, and therefore he wants his money back. Rabbi Elazar introduces a new fear—that she had sex with a man besides her husband after she was already betrothed.
  The Talmud points out that there are two possible reasons considered by her husband not to have been a virgin at the time of marriage is still permitted to him.The first is that she may have had sex with another man before she was betrothed. This would mean that she is still permitted to her husband because she is not an adulteress. Only an adulteress is prohibited to her husband, not a woman who had premarital sex.Second, even if she had sex once betrothed, she may have been raped and is therefore not an adulteress. A woman raped is not prohibited to her husband, as long as he is an Israelite.Since there is a “double doubt” the halakhah should rule leniently and allow this man to stay with his wife, even though he believes her not to be a virgin.
  There are two possible cases where there is not a double doubt with regard to her being prohibited to him, and therefore, Rabbi Elazar’s rule would apply.The first case is if she is married to a priest (Kohen). A kohen may not stay married to his wife if she has been raped. Therefore, we are left with only one doubt—was it after or before betrothal?The second case is where she was betrothed before she was three years old. In this case, even if she had been raped before three, the rabbis believed that her physical signs of virginity would return. Therefore, if her husband senses that she is not a virgin, we can be sure that she lost her virginity after betrothal. We are now left with only one doubt—was it rape or was it willing adultery?As I stated in the introduction above, the actual halakhah here is not what interested Talmudic commentators. What interested them far more was the principle—what do we do in cases of doubt? One principle we learn here is that if there are two doubts, the law can be lenient.I should also note that throughout these passages, the woman does not explain or otherwise respond to her husband’s claim that she was not a virgin. There are some stories coming up later where she does respond. But in the abstract halakhic discussions, we do not know her response.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Rabbi Elazar stated that a man who believes that his wife was not a virgin when they first had sex, is believed to cause her to be prohibited to him.In a somewhat strange twist, after criticizing Rabbi Elazar for being wrong, the Talmud now criticizes him for being “too right.”
  The Talmud believes that the same principle taught by Rabbi Elazar can be derived from this Mishnah. In this Mishnah, a man says to a woman “I betrothed you” but she denies that the betrothal occurred. The consequence of this statement is certainly not that she is betrothed—after all, she denied that it was true. Rather, the consequences are for him alone. He may not marry any of her close relatives, for according to him, he betrothed this woman. This is the same principle as that which underlies Rabbi Elazar’s statement—a man can say something and cause a woman to be prohibited to him based on his word alone.She on the other hand is not prohibited from marrying his relatives because she says they were never betrothed.
  If Rabbi Elazar had not stated his rule, that a man is believed to say “I found an open opening,” we might have said that he is believed only when he says “I betrothed you” because we can assume that about such a matter he is certain. After all, he knows what he said. But whether she was a virgin or not is subjective; he knows what he felt, but he cannot possibly know if his assessment was correct. Therefore, we might have said he is not believed in that case. Therefore, Rabbi Elazar says that he is believed.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now questions whether Rabbi Elazar actually said that if a husband says “I found an open opening,” i.e. he believes his wife was not a virgin at marriage, she becomes prohibited to him.
  The Talmud cites another statement by Rabbi Elazar that seems to contradict the “open opening” statement. Rabbi Elazar refers to the laws of the sotah, the suspected adulteress. According to the rabbis, for a woman to become a sotah, and for her to be brought to the Temple to drink the bitter waters, the husband must perform two preliminary actions. First of all, he must warn her not to be secluded with a particular man. Second, she must be secluded with that man. This, according to Rabbi Elazar, is like “the occurrence that happened,” which is assumed later on in this section to be a reference to the episode of David and Bathsheba. This episode is so scandalous, that the rabbis don’t even want to refer to it by name.
  This is not a difficulty, for thus he means to say: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case of warning and seclusion, [and this we learn] from the occurrence that happened, where there was no warning and seclusion and therefore she was not prohibited.Before going on with the larger difficulty, the Talmud asks about this statement itself. The problem is that the story of David and Bathsheba did not have anything to do with warning and seclusion, and moreover, Batsheba did not become prohibited to David after. The sentence as it stands makes no sense.To resolve this difficulty, the Talmud emends the statement. The reason that Bathsheba did not become prohibited to David was that it was not a case of “warning and seclusion.” [This is entirely absurd—David was not married to Bathsheba, and therefore could not possibly have warned her. What would he have said? Don’t be secluded with me?].
  The Talmud now turns to the original difficulty. Here Rabbi Elazar seems to say that the only way a woman can become prohibited to her husband is through a process of warning and seclusion. We could deduce from here that if a husband says, “I found an open, opening” he would not be believed to prohibit her to him.But this exclusionary interpretation of this statement is absurd. If witnesses come and testify that a woman has committed adultery, it is obvious that she is prohibited to him. So how could we possibly think to say that she becomes prohibited only through warning and seclusion?The Talmud therefore revises the statement (yet) again. One witness as to a woman’s adultery is not sufficient for her to become prohibited to her husband. However, if he warns her and she is secluded, she is prohibited to him even if the seclusion was seen by only one witness. Finally, if he himself claims to have found “an open opening” she is prohibited as if two witnesses saw her commit adultery.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned about the “occurrence that happened” which according to commentators is the incident of David and Bathsheba. Generally speaking an adulteress is prohibited from marrying the man with whom she committed adultery. The question, and it’s not an easy one, is why was Bathsheba not prohibited to David. After all, she was an adulteress and she should not, according to rabbinic law, be allowed to become married to David.I should put this question into perspective. In the Bible while David certainly committed two grave sins (murder and adultery) he was not punished, probably because he is God’s chosen king. The rabbis, though, have to justify David with rabbinic halakhah. This is no easy feat, as we shall see.
  The first answer to this question is not an easy one to read. An adulteress is prohibited from remaining married to her husband. But a woman who is raped is not an adulteress and is not prohibited from her husband. She did nothing wrong. Here, and only here, we read of a corollary—just as a raped woman is permitted to stay married to her husband, she is permitted to marry her rapist (I understand that she would not want to, but technically this would be permitted). So if David raped Bathsheba, he could still marry her.Obviously, this is morally repulsive and also difficult to accord with the simple reading of the Bible. There is little evidence that David raped Bathsheba, beyond the general consideration that the king is powerful and it is not possible for women to refuse him. Indeed, to my knowledge there are no other places in rabbinic literature where the incident is portrayed as rape. Nevertheless, this allows the rabbis to solve the halakhic conundrum of how David was allowed to marry Bathsheba.
  
  Daf 9b
  
  This second interpretation is more normative. David was allowed to marry Bathsheba because Uriah had divorced her before going into battle. This midrash is reflective of the rabbinic halakhah that soldiers should divorce their wives before going to battle. This would prevent her from becoming an “agunah” should he die and his whereabouts not be known. Thus Bathsheba was not married when David had relations with her. Elsewhere the rabbis find ways to justify his murder of Uriah.
  IntroductionIn this section Abaye tries to bring tannaitic support for R. Elazar’s rule that one who says, “I found an open opening” is believed.
  Abaye quotes the Mishnah with its Talmudic explanation. A virgin is married on Wednesday so that a husband can get to the court before his anger at her for not being a virgin has cooled off.
  Who cares if he cools off, asks the Talmud? What negative result might happen by his anger subsiding and his not making a virginity claim against her?If the issue is financial, meaning we fear that he will not go to the court to protest paying her the ketubah, why should we care about this? Let him give her the ketubah, even if she is really undeserving of it because she was not a virgin. A person can always give his money to whomever he so wishes.Rather, the issue must be to cause her to be prohibited to him. We fear that he will cool down and stay with her even though she might be prohibited to him, because she committed adultery after marriage.
  The final element that Abaye needs to prove is that this Mishnah refers to a husband who claims “I found an open opening.” There is simply no evidence that the Mishnah refers to such a situation. Rather, it could easily refer to the more normative claim a husband might make, that he did not find blood. Therefore, in the end the Mishnah is not proof that R. Elazar’s rule is correct.
  IntroductionIn this sugya we read the Babylonian version of R. Elazar’s law. A man who says that he found “an open opening” is believed to cause his wife to lose her ketubah. We should note what a dangerous and problematic law this would be. A husband could make a purely subjective claim, based on no evidence, and use it to cause his wife to lose her ketubah, the money he guaranteed her at the wedding. This law was greatly hedged in later halakhic literature, especially in a series of stories we shall see in the next daf.
  Rav Judah and Shmuel are Babylonian amoraim. They take R. Elazar’s rule a step further. Not only is the husband believed to cause his wife to be prohibited to him, he is even believed to cause her to lose her ketubah.
  Rav Joseph cites a Mishnah that he believes states the same rule as Rav Judah, making it superfluous. The Mishnah rules that if a husband eats at his father in law’s house before the marriage, he loses the right to make a virginity claim because he was secluded with her. We will learn this Mishnah in a couple of pages. For now, he uses it to prove that while one cannot make a virginity claim in Judea, he can make it in the Galilee, which here is a code word for all other places.
  As we did in yesterday’s section, the Talmud now asks what the effectivity of this claim is. If it is just to prohibit her to him, then why can’t he make such a claim in Judea? After, all, a husband should always be able to claim that his wife is prohibited to him and then separate from her. Indeed, if he thinks she is prohibited to him, he can just separate from her and that’s it.Therefore, it must be that this Mishnah refers to a husband making a virginity claim to cause her to lose her ketubah. Such a claim is effective in the Galilee, or anywhere else besides Judea.
  For this Mishnah to teach the same rule as Rav Judah, the husband must be making a claim of “I found an open opening.” But again, there is no evidence that this is the husband’s claim in the Mishnah. Rather, it is far more likely that he is making the claim we hear about in the Mishnah all of the time, the claim of no blood. There is no evidence that Rav Judah’s rule is found in the Mishnah.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section tries to find support for why a husband should be believed when he states that he found “an open opening.”
  Rav Nahman points out that it was the rabbis who determined that a woman should receive a ketubah, 200 for a virgin, 100 for a second time marriage. Since they enacted that she should get the money in the first place, they can shape the law such that if a husband claims that he found his wife not to be a virgin, he is believed. In other words, the rabbis giveth and the rabbis taketh away.I should note that this is in essence like saying, “that’s just the way it is” to an irrational law. A husband should not simply be believed to say that his wife is not a virgin. Since he is causing her a loss of money, he should have to bring evidence, as is always the case in civil suits. After all, there is ample reason for why he would lie.
  This section offers a better explanation of why the husband is believed. It begins by questioning why the rabbis enacted the ketubah just to allow it to be taken away.In Talmudic times the husband would have paid for the wedding feast. A husband would not have spent this huge amount of money just to go and falsely libel his wife by claiming that she was not a virgin. Therefore, when he makes this claim, he is believed.We should of course note that this is an assumption. Some husbands might indeed lie about their wives, despite the fact that this will cause them to lose their expenditures on the wedding feast. Nevertheless, it does at least point to a factor in the equation. The husband has spent a large amount of resources in making this wedding happen. The assumption that he would not just throw it away does have some legal weight.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section the claim was made that the rabbis enacted the ketubah, the marriage document that guarantees a woman money at the time of her divorce or her husband’s death. Today’s section questions the source of the ketubah—is it from the Torah or is it a rabbinic enactment.
  A baraita states that since a ketubah is a fine, a sort of penalty on the husband, if he pays out this money, he may give her from the worst land on his property. This is the general rule with rabbinic fines/enactments—they may be paid out from the worst type of land. In contrast, debts would have to be paid out of higher quality land and damages would need to be paid out of the best land.The Talmud emends “fine” to “enactment.” A ketubah is not a fine, it is an enactment of the rabbis, or at least so it was claimed in yesterday’s section.In contrast, Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel holds that it is from the Torah. The Talmud will now explore this opinion.
  The verse from Exodus refers to case where a man has seduced a virgin—he slept with her without first marrying her with her father’s permission. The Torah rules that the husband must pay her the “bride-price” of the virgins, which in Deuteronomy corresponds to 50 shekels. Since the Torah’s shekel is believed to be worth four dinars in rabbinic/Roman money, this is considered the source of the amount of the ketubah, 200 dinars. The rabbis from here say that this is also support for the notion that the ketubah, the marriage document, is of “deoraita”—toraitic—status.Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the status of the ketubah is “from the scribes” elsewhere known as “derabanan.”I should note that the issue of the source of the ketubah is complex. People were getting married with marriage documents for thousands of years before the rabbinic period. The Torah certainly did not invent the notion of the ketubah. And clearly the amount of the rabbinic ketubah is derived from the Torah’s fifty shekels. The argument here seems to be an issue of legal status, not an issue of origins.In any case, this baraita contradicts the earlier baraita, in which Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said that the ketubah was from the Torah.
  To solve the difficulty the Talmud reverses the opinions in the second baraita, such that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that the ketubah is from the Torah in both baraitot.However, the Talmud asks why reverse the opinions in the second baraita—why not reverse the opinions in the first baraita such that they accord?
  The answer is that there is yet another source that implies that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that the ketubah is from the Torah. In a Mishnah found at the end of this tractate R. Shimon ben Gamaliel says that if a man marries a woman in Cappadocia (in modern Turkey) but then divorces her in Israel, he must pay Cappadocian coins, which the Talmud believes to be worth more than coins from Israel. This is because R. Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that the ketubah is from the Torah, and therefore he must pay the debt he incurred in the place where he incurred it, as is the case with all debts. If the ketubah was of derabanan status, he would have been able to pay her with the lesser currency.
  This is an alternative resolution. Instead of switching the baraita’s opinion, the Talmud emends the whole thing, such that it is all the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel. Instead of him saying that the ketubah is derabanan, he adds that the ketubah for a widow (or any second marriage) is only from the scribes—it is of derabanan status.
  IntroductionWe now begin a most fascinating series of stories of men coming in front of rabbis with virginity claims against their wives. Most interesting is that in none of these cases does the man “win” the case. He always loses, although in various ways. In my opinion this is often the function of aggadah—to balance out the halakhah. The halakhah increasingly believed men who made virginity claims. This may have functioned to deter women from losing their virginity before marriage, at least in the eyes of the rabbis. On the other hand, actually believing husbands is a dangerous thing, for a husband could lie just to get his wife to lose her ketubah. Therefore, these stories serve as precedents that a judge could use to have some flexibility with which to rule against the husband.
  As a response to the man’s claim that he found an “open opening” R. Nahman directs the man be beaten with palm branches. The only way the husband could have acquired such knowledge of sexual matters was to learn from prostitutes. Such a man deserves to be beaten.Note what a deterrent to making a virginity claim this would have been. Sure, come make your virginity claim, but run the risk of being beaten.
  The problem is that R. Nahman himself had said that a husband who makes a virginity claim is believed.There are two answers to this. The first is that he is believed, but that they also lash him. This would seem to mean that there is still a significant deterrent to making the claim.The second answer is based on R. Nahman’s assumption that he gained his sexual experience with prostitutes. This would be true only for a young man, assumedly a virgin. If he was married, then he could have gained his experience legally, in which case he is believed and he is not lashed.
  This time a man comes in front of Rabban Gamaliel, again claiming that he found an “open opening.” Using a parable Rabban Gamaliel accuses him of “moving aside.” This is an activity that was alluded to earlier in the chapter, whereby a man can have sex without causing his wife to lose her virginity. Here, Rabban Gamaliel seems to be saying maybe the man did this accidentally. In my opinion, what he is really asking the husband is, how do you know what you did? You have no clue what a “closed” or “open” door really feels like. You are a man walking in the darkness. Clearly, Rabban Gamaliel is rejecting his claim.
  This time a man comes in front of Rabban Gamaliel, again claiming that he found an “open opening.” Using a parable Rabban Gamaliel accuses him of “moving aside.” This is an activity that was alluded to earlier in the chapter, whereby a man can have sex without causing his wife to lose her virginity. Here, Rabban Gamaliel seems to be saying maybe the man did this accidentally. In my opinion, what he is really asking the husband is, how do you know what you did? You have no clue what a “closed” or “open” door really feels like. You are a man walking in the darkness. Clearly, Rabban Gamaliel is rejecting his claim.
  In this story the husband makes a different sort of virginity claim—he did not find blood. The wife responds by denying his claim. Rabban Gamaliel washes the sheet that seems to have no blood on it, and discovers, lo and behold, that there is indeed blood on the sheet. Again, the husband’s claim is denied, but this time he can go home assured that his wife was indeed a virgin.
  In an interesting tag to the story, Huna Mar, a Babylonian rabbi, wants to enact this test in Babylonia. R. Ashi rejects this possibility, basically claiming that the laundry process in Babylonia will either not reveal the blood at all or totally remove it.We should note that R. Ashi’s response now implies that virginity claims such as these could not be made at all in Babylonia. The problem is that if the wife claims that she was a virgin, there might be blood on the sheet that cannot be revealed. Thus R. Ashi has successfully denied the possibility of virginity claims in Babylonia.
  
  Daf 10b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with stories in which a husband makes a virginity claim against his wife in front of a rabbi. Again, in all three cases, his claim is rejected.
  This may be one of the stranger stories in the Talmud. Rabban Gamaliel enacts here a virginity test, assuming that there is a channel directly from the bottom of the body to the top. If the woman was a virgin, the opening would be sealed and the smell of wine would not waft through her.Importantly, in my opinion, despite the strange nature of the test, the man again loses his virginity claim. His wife is found to be a virgin and the couple are sent on their way.The Talmud then asks why Rabban Gamaliel had to go through the test with the handmaidens. If this is a “scientific” method, why not just check her right away. The answer is telling—this is not such a scientific method. Rabban Gamaliel needed to prove its effectiveness before testing it out for real.I’ve often wondered whether this whole “test” was an elaborate set-up to prove to the gullible husband that his wife is a virgin. Rabban Gamaliel would make sure that he has ready two handmaids, one whose breath smells of wine, and one whose breath does not. The husband would believe this to be science, and he would go home with his wife. In this way, Rabban Gamaliel would bring peace between a husband and his wife.
  In this case, the woman claims that she is from a family, known as “Dorkati” whose women do not bleed—neither menstrual blood nor virginal blood. Rabban Gamaliel checks with her family and finds that this is true, the women of her family do not bleed. He now sends the husband on his way, telling him how lucky he is to have married into a family with this genetic quality.
  The rabbis play here on the word “Dorkati” which sounds like “dor katua”—a cut-off generation. This implies that a woman who does not have menstrual blood will not be fertile. [Of course, this calls into question how such a quality could be genetic in the first place].
  Two amoraim here dispute what Rabban Gamaliel said to the husband. Was marrying a woman from the “Dorkati” family a “merit” or a “liability”?We can understand why it would be called a liability—R. Hanina said that such a woman is infertile.But why might Rabban Gamaliel have said, “Be happy”? What is there to be happy about? The answer is that he won’t ever have to worry that he is having relations with his wife while she is menstruating. This was a serious transgression in the eyes of the rabbis, and while I think most would choose fertility, at least it is some consolation. You might say that Rabban Gamaliel was trying to find the silver lining in the situation.
  In this case Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] sees that these people are just too starving to really be having sexual intercourse successfully. The wife knows that they have not successfully had sex and that she is still a virgin. Rabbi kindly orders them to be fed and bathed. They are then allowed to be intimate again, and the husband finds that his wife indeed was a virgin. I think this is a really important message for rabbis. Their job is to solve problems, to make peace. All of these rabbis could have ruled strictly. But each in their own way found a way out of the problem and a solution such that the couple could continue to live together in marriage. They would have made good marriage counsellors.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a new Mishnah. [Congrats, you’ve made it to the second Mishnah!]The sugya on this Mishnah is really not about the Mishnah, but about a few words in the Mishnah. My commentary on the Mishnah is taken from Mishnah Yomit.
  Section one:  This section provides the basic halakhah that will be discussed throughout the remainder of the chapter. Assumedly there are two reasons why a widow (which in this context includes a divorcee) receives a smaller ketubah.  First of all, she already received a ketubah from her first marriage, and therefore has some money already saved up.  Second, and probably more importantly, there was a need to encourage men to marry widows and divorcees.  Most men probably preferred first-time marriages.  Second marriages were made cheaper, therefore, to prevent older women from remaining husband-less.  Needless to say, that people should be married was an important value to the rabbis.Section two:  The Mishnah now begins to discuss exceptional cases, ones which slightly deviate from the typical first marriage or the typical widow or divorcee.  If a woman has been betrothed, but then was divorced before marriage or her husband died before the marriage was completed is in one sense a virgin and in one sense not.  She is a virgin in that she has never had sexual relations, but she is a widow or divorcee as well. [Note that in Hebrew the word for virgin “betulah” can mean either a woman whose physical signs of virginity are intact or it can mean a young woman who has never been married.  The same ambiguity occurs in the Greek word, “parthenon”.]  According to our mishnah, such a woman receives a full ketubah, should she remarry.A “halutzah” is a woman who has been released from levirate marriage, the obligation to marry one’s dead husband’s brother.
  Hana of Baghdad makes a pun on the word “almanah” which means “widow.” It refers to the “maneh,” the one hundred zuz, that she receives for her marriage contract.The rabbis now ask some nitpicky questions on what was just a play on words.The problem is that sometimes a widow could receive a ketubah of more than a “maneh.” As we saw in the above Mishnah, if she is widowed before betrothal, she gets two hundred zuz, under the assumption that she is still a virgin.This question is easily answered—since most widows receive a “maneh,” all widows are called “almanah.”But the next problem is a little more interesting. The Torah uses the word “almanah” and yet it was the rabbis, who lived much later, who determined that a widow should receive a ketubah of a maneh. There is an anachronism here—how can the Torah use a word based on a halakhah that does not yet exist?The answer is that the Torah called her “almanah” based on the fact that the rabbis will in the future give her such a ketubah.
  The Talmud asks whether something can be named in the Torah based on future events. And the answer is affirmative. The Torah refers to Ashur, which R. Joseph explains as referring to the area known as Seleucia, today identified with modern Syria/Lebanon. Just as “Seleucia” is alluded to in the Torah, so is the widow’s maneh.[If you think the analogy is not so great, I agree. R. Joseph is not making a pun based on future rabbinic law, as did R. Hana of Baghdad. He is simply identifying an area of the world mentioned in the Torah based on its future name, just as I identified “Seleucia” with modern Syria.]
  R. Hana of Baghdad seems to have been a professional punster. Here he makes a pun on the word “matar,” one of the words for rain in the Bible. He uses five words that begin with “mem” to describe rain. We might note that it’s not hard to find “mem” words considering that one of Hebrew’s verb constructs begins with “mem.”Evidently we need proof for the idea that rain helps the ground. Rava locates this in the verse from Psalms.
  IntroductionMore puns!
  The word for altar, “mizbeah,” begins, conveniently, with a “mem.” R. Elazar, in the spirit of R. Hana of Baghdad, finds a bunch of mem words to describe what the altar does.The Talmud again asks a somewhat nitpicky question, and answers it.
  Dates are the subject of this statement—they have all of these wonderful qualities (although hopefully you don’t need them that often) all of which begin with “mem.” And the Hebrew word for dates has “mem” as its second letter.
  Dates used to be used to make alcoholic beverages. Therefore, one should not eat them and then render a legal decision. Nevertheless, they have many healthy qualities as well.
  The second resolution is that dates are good for one, but only after a meal, when they strengthen the body like a bar strengthens a door. Before the meal they are harsh and can cause sickness.The woman Abaye refers to is usually understood to be his wetnurse. She teaches him a lot of health remedies and other such information, things that they would have probably considered “scientific” but we would consider to be “folk.”
  Here a few Babylonian rabbis offer up some puns on common Aramaic words. The pun helps illuminate the meaning of the word.The final pun is not really a pun; It is an Aramaic translation. The Mishnah calls a woman who is clearly a woman but never reaches puberty an “aylonit” (the word will be in a Mishnah later in the chapter). In Aramaic this word is “duchranit”—which is related to the Hebrew word “zachar” for male. An “aylonit” has male qualities and therefore is infertile.
  
  Daf 11a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new Mishnah. The commentary on the Mishnah is from Mishnah Yomit.
  In order to understand this mishnah we must understand a few things.  First of all, all of the women mentioned in this mishnah are assumed to have already had sex.  It was assumed that female captives were raped by their captors and therefore a woman who had been taken captive was assumed to no longer be a virgin.  It was also assumed that non-Jews were extremely licentious, and that they would have sex with young girls (I realize that this is extremely bigoted, but there probably was some degree of truth to it in the world in which the rabbis lived).  Therefore a woman who converted was assumed to have already had sex.  Thirdly, it was assumed that slaves were licentious or perhaps were commonly raped by their masters.  In any case, they too were categorically not considered virgins.  Seemingly all three of these types of women should have ketuboth of one maneh [=100 zuz] and their husbands should not be able to claim that they weren’t virgins, because they were married under the assumption that they were not virgins.  However, the other assumption that the mishnah makes is that if a girl is raped before the age of three, her signs of virginity will eventually heal and return [this medical assumption was not unique to the rabbis].  Therefore if these women made the transition from slave to free Jew or proselyte to Jew or from captive to being freed before the age of three, it was assumed that their virginity would return and they could be assumed to be virgins.A note about the Mishnah’s references to sexual intercourse with young girls:The Mishnah will occasionally reference sexual relations with young girls, even under the age of three.  I expect that this will cause discomfort to people reading the mishnah, and when I think of my own six year old daughter, this makes me queasy as well.  We would do well to realize that the Mishnah’s discussion of all legal possibilities does not imply its tacit approval of them.  The Mishnah discusses many crimes without expressing horror over them, because the Mishnah is often interested in legal consequences. The rabbis certainly did not condone sexual relations with girls this young.
  The sugya opens without any connection to the Mishnah. The topic is the conversion of minors. There is a problem with the conversion of minors—how do we know that they want to convert? For an adult this is of course not a problem, but Jewish conversion is consensual. So how can it be done for a child? R. Huna innovates that it can be done by the court taking on the child’s consent.If anyone is interested I wrote a scholarly paper on this subject. It can be found on academia.edu. The point of the paper was to prove that in earlier times conversion was not a process that required a court.
  What you might have said? A non-Jew prefers a life without restraint because it is established for us that a slave certainly prefers a life without restraint, therefore, he teaches us that this is said only in the case of an adult who has already tasted sin, but [in the case of] a minor, it is an advantage to him.The Talmud now analyzes what we would have thought had R. Huna not issued his statement. Conversion is an advantage for a person, for he joins the Jewish people. Therefore, it should be obvious that a minor can be converted in his “absence,” i.e. before he is old enough to consent. So what does R. Huna really teach us?The answer is that without R. Huna’s statement we might have thought that it is not such a pure advantage to convert. After all, many things that were permitted before are now prohibited. R. Huna lets us know that this is only true for an adult who has “tasted the forbidden fruit.” For a child who does not yet know how sweet this fruit is, conversion remains an advantage.
  The Talmud now mentions our Mishnah. The Mishnah referred to a minor convert. But again, we must ask, how can a minor convert? The answer could be through R. Huna’s law—on the consent of the court. This would mean that there is tannaitic support for R. Huna.But this support is rejected. The Mishnah may refer to a case where the child converts with his/her parents. In such a case we don’t really need the consent of the court, for we can assume that the child would want to convert with the parents.In the end, the Talmud understands R. Huna as referring to a child who converts without his parents, perhaps a foundling. In truth, it is not easy to understand how such a situation could actually arise.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues discussing the minor convert.
  Joseph adds in a giant caveat to R. Huna’s ruling about minor conversion. Minors can convert based on the consent of the court. But since they did not themselves consent to their conversion, they can reject and undo their conversion when they reach majority age (assumedly 12 or 13, although this is not stated here). This is completely sui generis in the laws of conversion. In all other cases, once one converts it cannot be undone. Once a Jew, always a Jew.
  As we have seen, the Mishnah assumes that minors can convert, The Mishnah describes the ketubah received by such a minor (although there is no reason to assume that she was married as a minor). The problem is that if she receives her ketubah, and then protests against her conversion, she will in essence get the ketubah and consume its profits as a Gentile woman. Basically, what I think Abaye is really trying to say is that tannaitic sources assume that conversion is permanent. If they thought that conversion could be undone, they would not have given such a woman a ketubah.
  The resolution to Abaye’s difficulty leads to an important limitation of R. Joseph’s rule. At first the Talmud says that she would receive her ketubah only on reaching majority age. But this does not solve the problem—she could still theoretically protest, revert to being a non-Jew and consume her ketubah while not Jewish.As a result, the Talmud limits R. Joseph’s rule. Once she is of majority age, she can no longer protest. In essence, by not protesting, she is at that point consenting to being Jewish. There is a very limited window of opportunity in which the convert could protest.
  Rava’s difficulty on R. Joseph is basically the same difficulty raised by Abaye, he just uses a different Mishnah. The Mishnah refers to the fine paid by a rapist or seducer. The fine is paid only if the girl is a virgin, but as long as she is Jewish, she receives it. The end of the list in this Mishnah (from chapter three, where it will be explained more fully) is the same as the list in our Mishnah. Again, it shows that a girl can convert while a minor. She would receive a fine because she is considered a virgin, and then she could protest on reaching majority age. Then she could consume this fine while a Gentile.
  The resolution is the exact same as above.
  Since both objections are basically the same, the Talmud now must ask why each amora chose to raise the difficulty from that particular Mishnah and not from the Mishnah used by the other amora.Abaye could argue that the case of the fine is different, because we want the rapist/seducer to pay the fine even if she rejects her conversion. We don’t want him to be rewarded by not having to pay the fine and so we might make him pay even if she could undo her conversion later in life. So this Mishnah is a special case and we cannot use it to prove that she is limited in her ability to protest her conversion.Rava would argue that the case of the ketubah is also a special case. One of the functions of the ketubah is to deter divorce. As long as she has not protested, she remains a Jew and we do not want her husband to easily divorce her. So we might say that in she receives the ketubah even though she could “undo” her Jewishness later in life. This Mishnah is not proof that her ability to protest her conversion should be limited.
  IntroductionToday’s section really contains two mishnayot. The first discusses three types of women who don’t fit into the normal categories of virgin/non-virgin.  This is either because they have had sexual intercourse but didn’t lose their physical signs of virginity, or because they are not physically virgins, even though they never had intercourse.
  There are three women mentioned in this mishnah.  The first is a young girl who had intercourse with an adult man.  As we mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah, the Sages believed that if a girl has sexual intercourse before three, her hymen will regenerate when she gets older.  Therefore, when this girl gets older she will have her physical signs of virginity, even though she has had sexual intercourse.The second woman is an adult woman who had sexual intercourse with a young boy.  According to the Sages a boy less than nine years old cannot have real intercourse, such that he causes a woman to lose her virginity.  Again, this woman has her physical signs of virginity, but she has had sexual intercourse.The third woman is called a “mukath etz”, literally translated as “hit by a stick”.  This refers to a woman who lost her hymen by something other than intercourse.  In our day we might say she went horseback riding.  This woman no longer has physical signs of virginity, but she has never had sexual intercourse.According to Rabbi Meir, all three of these women receive a full ketubah.  According to Rabbi Meir in order to be considered a non-virgin a woman must have lost her physical signs of virginity through sexual intercourse.The Sages rule that the “mukath etz” does not receive a full ketubah.  The Sages seem to define “virginity” by physicality alone:  one who does not have her physical signs of virginity is not a “halakhic” virgin and does not receive a ketubah of 200 zuz.
  This next mishnah teaches the opposite cases of those taught in mishnah two.IntroductionSection one:  The women in this mishnah have been previously married, and not merely betrothed as were the women in mishnah two.  Nevertheless, they are still virgins for their husbands divorced them or died after entering the huppah (the wedding room) before having had sexual intercourse.  Note that this could certainly occur if the woman was menstruating at the time of marriage.  The mishnah rules that although these women are physically virgins, they are halakhically considered to be non-virgins and are treated as such. Their ketubah payment in a subsequent marriage will therefore be only a maneh and not the full 200 zuz.  If their husband in a subsequent marriage marries them and finds them not to be a virgin, he cannot make a virginity claim against them.  One reason that they are considered to be non-virgins is that by definition a woman who was once married can no longer be a virgin, for the word for virgin in Hebrew implies unmarried.  A second reason is that although the woman claims to be a virgin, since she was married, we cannot assume that she is telling the truth.Section two:  The women in this mishnah converted, were freed from slavery or were freed from captivity after the age of three years and one day.  Since it is assumed that in their previous state they had sexual intercourse they cannot claim to be virgins when they grow up and get married.  This is because if a girl has sexual intercourse past the age of three years her physical signs of virginity will not return.
  
  Daf 11b
  
  IntroductionThis sugya deals with the status of an adult woman who had sex with a young man, one not fully capable of having intercourse. In what way is she still considered a virgin?
  According to Rav, an adult woman who had sex with a young boy has the status of a “mukat etz”—literally a woman injured by a stick. This usually refers to a woman who lost her  physical virginity through some way other than sex. If an adult woman who had sex with a young boy is put in this category, then R. Meir would hold that she is still a virgin and her ketubah would be 200 zuz. The other sages would say that she is not a virgin and her ketubah would be 100 zuz.Shmuel holds that the category of “mukat etz” cannot include anyone who had sex. Therefore, since sex with a young boy is not considered intercourse, then she is not even considered a mukat etz. Her ketubah would be 200 zuz, the same as any virgin.
  Oshaia raises an objection against Rav from the Mishnah. Since the sages and R. Meir dispute the status of the girl injured by a piece of wood, but not the status of an adult woman who had intercourse with a small boy, the two categories must be different. Indeed, the fact that they are listed separately means that they are different. The implication is there is no such thing as a “woman injured by a stick” who actually had sexual intercourse. This accords with Shmuel.
  Rava resolves the difficulty on Rava by rewording the Mishnah. All sages agree that if the girl is young (under three years old) she remains a virgin for her physical signs of virginity grow back (at least the rabbis believe that they do). But when a young boy has had intercourse with an adult woman there is a dispute whether he causes her to lose her virginity. She has the same status as a woman injured by a stick—R. Meir would hold that she is still a virgin and the other sages would say that she is not.
  IntroductionToday’s section relates to the Mishnah where the sages and R. Meir dispute the ketubah of a woman who lost her physical signs of virginity through some means other than sexual relations—the mukat etz. R. Meir holds that she gets a full ketubah of 200, whereas the other sages say she gets only 100.
  The dispute in the Mishnah is only in a case where the man knew that the woman he was marrying had lost her physical virginity. R. Meir says she is a like a “mature girl”—a girl over the age of 12 ½. For whatever reason (I’m really not sure) the rabbis considered any girl over this age to not be a virgin. Nevertheless, there is no doubt whatsoever that she receives a full ketubah. So too, argues R. Meir, does the mukat etz.The Sages say that she is like a woman who had intercourse because she has no physical virginity. Therefore, she receives a ketubah of 100.But, all agree that if the husband did not know beforehand that she was a mukat etz, she does not receive any ketubah at all. Rami bar Hama seems to believe that this is deception, and therefore she loses her entire ketubah.
  The Talmud now explains each of the positions in the Mishnah. R. Meir says that she is like a mature girl because she has never had intercourse. To R. Meir virginity is defined by intercourse with a man.The other sages compare her to a woman who had intercourse with a man because in both cases “something happened.” The rabbis define a virgin as someone who lost her physical virginity through an action of any sort. A mature girl lost her physical virginity without anything whatsoever happening to her. That is why she retains the ketubah of a virgin. But something happened to a mukat etz—therefore she is no longer considered a virgin.
  Nahman objects to Rami bar Hama’s statement from a Mishnah that appears later in the chapter. The Mishnah describes a situation where the husband clearly did not know that she was a mukat etz. If all sages agreed that in such a situation she receives nothing, then what is the point in her saying “I was injured by a piece of wood.” She wouldn’t get anything anyway! The wife’s claim in this Mishnah clearly expresses the notion that she is claiming at least 100 zuz.
  Rava therefore modifies our understanding of the dispute. R. Meir holds that she always gets a ketubah of 200, even if the husband did not know that she was a mukat etz. The other sages say that if the husband knew, she gets 100. If he didn’t know, she loses her ketubah entirely. Note that this means that the Mishnah in which Rabban Gamaliel, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua debate follows R. Meir. The woman is claiming a full ketubah and the husband is claiming that she had had intercourse with a man and therefore should receive a ketubah of 100.
  IntroductionThe last section of this daf continues the discussion of a man who did not know that his wife was a “mukat etz”—a woman who had lost her virginity in some way other than sexual intercourse. In yesterday’s section Rava stated that according to the sages she loses her entire ketubah. In today’s section the Talmud concludes that he retracted that opinion.
  In order to prove that Rava changed his mind the Talmud cites a sugya that begins with a baraita. The baraita discusses the case of the “motzi shem ra”—the husband who comes to the court claiming that his wife was not a virgin upon marriage. After correcting the baraita it states two possibilities. First of all, if there are witnesses that she committed adultery after betrothal, then she is an adulteress, and she is to be stoned. This is always the punishment of an adulteress (as well as the man who committed adultery with her). Second, if there are witnesses that she fornicated before she was betrothed to him, she is not an adulteress. She of course does not receive the ketubah of a virgin, but she still receives a ketubah of a maneh (100 zuz).
  Sheshet deduces from this baraita that if a man marries a woman thinking she is a virgin, assuming she told him that she was, and then it turns out that she had sexual relations before betrothal, she still receives a ketubah of a maneh. In other words, despite the fact that she deceived him by telling him she was a virgin and that she had never had sex before, she still receives the ketubah she would have received anyway.
  Nahman uses a Mishnah from later in the chapter to refute R. Sheshet. In the Mishnah the husband claims that she had relations with another man before marriage and therefore his acquisition was a mistake. [The woman’s admits that she had sex before the marriage, she just says it was a case of rape and it occurred after the betrothal. Thus she is claiming that she was a virgin at the time of betrothal, and that she lost her virginity against her will]. The simple meaning of this Mishnah is that she receives no ketubah whatsoever. Again, this is a case where he did not know that she was a virgin, but rather than receive a ketubah of a maneh, she receives nothing.
  Sheshet already answered that difficulty in front of R. Amram and the other great sages of his generation. When that Mishnah says that his acquisition was a mistake, it does not mean that she receives no ketubah whatsoever. She receives a ketubah of a maneh. This refutes R. Nahman who claimed that the Mishnah meant she receives nothing.
  Rava now turns the tables yet again and says that the words “mistaken acquisition” imply that she doesn’t receive any ketubah whatsoever. R. Nahman’s difficulty on R. Sheshet was a good difficulty. [Indeed, this does seem to be the simple meaning of the word]. But still, we now have a clash between the Mishnah and the original baraita with which the sugya opened. That baraita had stated that she receives a ketubah of 100.To resolve this difficulty Rava reworks the baraita. He seems to have been justified in doing so because the original baraita was faulty to begin with. So now, instead of two lines, the baraita contains three. First of all, if she had intercourse with another man after betrothal, she is an adulteress who is stoned. This stays the same as above. If it turns out she had sex with another man before betrothal, then she loses her ketubah completely [so now the baraita agrees with the Mishnah]. She should have told him that she had had sexual relations with a man before this marriage.But if it turns out that she was not a physical virgin because she lost her physical signs of virginity in some other way, then she still receives a ketubah of a maneh.
  Now we see why the Talmud concluded that Rava retracted his earlier opinion, where he had stated that if the husband did not know that his wife was a mukat etz, she loses her ketubah entirely, at least according to the rabbis. Here, Rava states that she still receives a ketubah of a maneh. The Talmud believes that this is the later opinion, and that Rava had retracted the earlier statement.
  IntroductionToday’s section is related to the section of the Mishnah that determined whether a woman who had been divorced or widowed from her first marriage but had not yet had sexual relations could still be considered a virgin for a subsequent marriage.
  In this situation, it is quite clear that she did not have relations with her first husband before he died or divorced her. There are witnesses who say they did not. In reality she is still a virgin and she should be considered a virgin for her second marriage. Nevertheless, she is not considered a virgin for her second marriage because she was indeed married the first time. Once her husband brings her into his house for the sake of marriage, she is no longer considered a virgin. Since she is legally not considered a virgin, he can no longer make a virginity claim against her. This is true even if he thought that she was a virgin.
  
  Daf 12a
  
  Rabbah deduces from the baraita that if a man marries a woman thinking that she is a virgin, and then it turns out that she is not, she still receives a ketubah of a maneh. In this baraita the second husband heard from witnesses that she did not have relations with her first husband. He thinks that she is a virgin. And then when he finds out that she is not a virgin, she still receives a ketubah of a maneh. Rabbah thinks that this is true in all scenarios.Ashi says that the baraita describes a special case, one which does not serve as a precedent for all cases. Since this woman had already been married, the second husband cannot expect that she is a virgin. Therefore, this is not a normal case of a woman who is married with the expectation that she is a virgin. In a normal case, she would not receive any ketubah.
  Again the woman in this baraita is married the second time with clear proof that she did not have sexual relations with her first husband. When she turns out not to be a virgin, her ketubah remains a maneh. She doesn’t lose her ketubah. The problem, the Talmud raises, is that she may have had relations with another man after betrothal to the second husband. If she had sex with another man after betrothal, then she should be prohibited to her second husband, as are all adulteresses.The Talmud resolves this problem by saying that the second husband betrothed her and then had relations with her, i.e. married her immediately. In essence this is how we conduct Jewish marriages today—the betrothal and marriage occur one right after the other. And the reason is basically the same. The betrothal period is problematic in Jewish law, for if she has relations with someone else during this period, it is considered adultery.
  This is the exact same sugya as above, but taught in reference to the Mishnah, according to which a “virgin from marriage” receives a ketubah of a maneh.
  The Talmud now asks what difference it makes whether the dispute between Rabbah and R. Ashi is taught in reference to the baraita or the Mishnah.The difference is that in the baraita there are witnesses who explicitly state that the woman did not have relations with her first husband. Thus someone could teach the amoraic dispute in reference to the Mishnah, where it really is not known for certain whether she had relations with her first husband. It is really only her word. We could say that despite the fact that the husband seems to have believed her, he really should not have. She receives a ketubah of a maneh and he cannot make a virginity claim. R. Ashi could say that this is not a precedent for other cases. But in the case of the baraita, where there are witnesses, the husband really should have been able to cause her to lose the ketubah entirely. R. Ashi could not have stated that this case is different in reference to the baraita.But the one who teaches it in reference to the baraita, where there are witnesses, would all the more so teach it in reference to the Mishnah. R. Ashi would always say that the case is different, despite the presence of witnesses.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with a new Mishnah. [There are a lot of complicated historical issues related to this Mishnah and the accompanying baraita. If you’re interested, I wrote a paper addressing them. The paper can be found on academia.edu.]
  The usual custom in Mishnaic times was to wait for up to a year between the betrothal and the wedding.  During this time the couple were not supposed to have sexual relations.  Generally speaking, the young woman remained in her parental home during this period and the husband-to-be was elsewhere.  However, our mishnah refers to a practice in Judea, whereby the groom would “eat” at his father-in-law’s house.  This may refer to an extended stay.  If he should do so without witnesses that he was apart from his fiancee, he cannot later claim that she was not a virgin at the time of the wedding.  Once he has been alone with her, we are suspicious that he has had relations with her, and therefore he loses the right to make a virginity claim against her.
  The Talmud notes that not all places in Judea have the custom for the husband to “eat” at his father-in-law’s home before the wedding. Abaye concurs. This implies that in some places in Judea a husband could still make a virginity claim. This will now be confirmed in a baraita that also implies that there are different places with different customs in Judea.
  There are three sections to this baraita, each describing a custom that they had in Judea but not in the Galilee. According to the first custom, the couple would be secluded for a short amount of time before their wedding in order for him to get to know her. “To become intimate” may mean that they could have had sex, but it is not something of which we could be sure. The point of the custom was for him to get to know her a bit before the wedding.The second custom was for two groomsmen to guard the couple when they enter the bridal chamber (the huppah). The point of this “guarding” is so that they do not deceive each other over matters of virginity. She should not deceive him by bringing in some bird’s blood to fake her virginity. And he should not deceive her by hiding the bloody sheet that would serve as proof of her virginity.We can immediately see that the first custom differs from the second and third customs. The first custom would damage a husband’s ability to make a virginity claim, because he may have jumped the gun. The second two customs were meant to protect his ability to make a successful virginity claim and to defend her against a false claim. This supports Abaye’s claim that there are different customs in Judea.
  The last clause of the baraita stated that a husband who does not observe these customs cannot make a virginity claim. But which of these customs? If it had referred to the first clause, then it should have said, “He who acted” in this way cannot make a virginity claim.And if it refers to the last clause (really the last two) then it is not really the husband who acts this way. The groomsmen are those acting. The clause would be better had it read “he who was not examined” by groomsmen to make sure that he did not falsify the evidence.
  Abaye and R. Ashi emend the Mishnah to read according to one of the two ways suggested above. Only Rava offers a different reading. Basically Rava holds that if a husband keeps the customs of the place where he lives, he can make a virginity claim. The second two customs would serve as guards against the first custom. But only in Judea. A husband who observes the customs of Judea in Galilee would lose his right to make a virginity claim.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a new Mishnah.
  A widow receives a ketubah of one maneh (100 zuz) whether she was from an Israelite family or from a priestly family.  However, the court of priests demanded that virgins from priestly families receive double the normal ketubah payment.  We should remember that in this time period priestly families still formed a quasi-elite.  Furthermore, occasionally the mishnah refers to “court of priests”.  The priests may have had their own legal system, one which derived from the autonomy they had during Temple times.  Priests tended to live in the same area and intermarriage between priestly families was common.  While the Sages did not protest against the custom of the double ketubah, one can sense that the fact that the mishnah mentions that they didn’t protest, signifies some discomfort with the practice.
  The Talmud opens with a baraita according to which the widow of a priest (who may herself be the daughter of a priest) receives a larger ketubah than an Israelite widow. This baraita directly contradicts the Mishnah.
  Ashi solves the difficulty between the Mishnah and baraita by positing development in the history of the size of the widow of a priest’s ketubah. At first a virgin received 400 and a widow only a maneh. This caused the ratio to be off of the usual 2-1 and men treated the worth of a widow lightly. As a response, the priestly court raised the ketubah of a widow to 200. The problem now was that this amount is the same as that of a virgin Israelite. Men preferred the virgin Israelite and priestly widows were having trouble getting married. Therefore, the court restored the earlier system, even though it too was not perfect.
  
  
  Daf 12b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section relates to the Mishnah according to which a higher ketubah was given to a daughter of priests.
  In the Mishnah we learned that the court of the priests would give a 400 zuz ketubah for a daughter of the priests who was a virgin. Shmuel understands the priests as simply being an example of any family with good lineage. He then extends the custom of giving a higher ketubah to anyone who comes from such a family.
  The Talmud cites a baraita as an objection. The baraita states that the higher ketubah may be given even if a priest marries an Israelite or an Israelite marries the daughter of a priest. But from here we could infer that if neither side is of priestly stock, the higher ketubah may not be given.
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty by claiming that the baraita was in the form of a “not only” baraita. What this means is that the baraita did not even need to state that in a marriage where neither side is a priest, a higher ketubah may be given. This is because neither side can claim to the other, “I am raising you up” because I am marrying lower than my “class.” Therefore, a higher ketubah can certainly be given. But I might have thought that if one side is raising up the other, that they cannot also demand a higher ketubah. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that it is allowed.I want to add a short explanatory note here. In the Second Temple period being a priest would have usually entailed a high social status. It seems that the priests wanted to express their social status by increasing the minimum level of the ketubah. After the Temple was destroyed, the status of the priests gradually but not entirely, diminished. We can sense this in this sugya—Shmuel is taking some of the customs of the priests and applying them to other families of good lineage.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a Mishnah that begins a series of debates between Rabban Gamaliel, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua over the credibility of certain legal claims that a woman might make.  The first debates deals with virginity claims, the main topic of the chapter.
  In the scenario in this mishnah, a man comes to court after the first night with his wife and claims that she was not a virgin.  She responds by admitting that she was not a virgin, but counter-claims that she had lost her virginity by being raped and that the rape had occurred after her betrothal.  Both of these claims are essential to her defense.  The fact that the intercourse took place after betrothal means that she did not deceive him by allowing him to betroth her under the false precept that she was a virgin.  The fact that she had sexual intercourse unwillingly is essential if she wishes not to be considered an adulteress.  If she had intercourse with someone other than her husband after the betrothal she would be an adulteress and as such she would not receive her ketubah.  If the court believes both of her claims, then she would receive her ketubah.  Note that the mishnah uses a metaphor for the woman:  she is a field whose top, fertile layer has been swept away, causing a loss to the man.  The comparison of women to fields or houses, as bothersome as it might be to our modern ears, is not uncommon in rabbinic literature.The husband counterclaims that she had relations before betrothal, and that he acquired her under the mistaken assumption that she was a virgin.  It is unclear whether or not he wishes to pay her a ketubah of 100 or he wishes to be totally exempt from paying her a ketubah.  What is clear is that the dispute in this mishnah is financial:  she wishes to receive her full ketubah and he wishes to lessen his payment.Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer rule that the woman is believed and that she receives a ketubah of 200 zuz.Rabbi Joshua says she is not believed until she can bring proof to back up her words.  In order to extract her ketubah money from him she must prove that she was a virgin at the time of betrothal.The Talmud will explain the underlying legal reasoning behind both of these opinions.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with an amoraic dispute not connected to the Mishnah.
  The Talmud begins with a dispute over a case where one person (Reuven) approaches another (Shimon) claiming that the latter owes him a maneh (100 zuz). Shimon responds that he doesn’t know if he owes Reuven the money.Huna and R. Judah say that since Reuven is certain that he is owed the money and Shimon is uncertain, Shimon is legally obligated to pay him the money.Nahman and R. Yohanan invoke a different principle—until the case can be determined with 100 per cent certainty, no money changes hands. Since Shimon currently possesses the money, he need not pay Reuven back.
  Abaye now tries to correlate R. Huna and R. Judah’s opinion with that of Shmuel stated in a different context. To understand Shmuel’s statement and how it correlates with R. Huna’s we need to first understand this Mishnah, which will appear later in this chapter. The Mishnah is the last in the series of disputes between R. Gamaliel and R. Joshua (the section with R. Joshua is not quoted here). A woman is found to be pregnant, but claims that the child was the offspring of a priest, a person of valid lineage. Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eliezer say that she is believed whereas R. Joshua says that she is not. R. Judah ruled that the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel.
  Another amora further says to Rav Judah that Shmuel had stated that the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel not only in the last Mishnah of his disputes with R. Joshua, it follows him “even in the first.”The Talmud now correlates the Mishnah with the amoraic dispute above. In the Mishnah, the husband said his wife had sex with another man before betrothal, and the woman says that she was raped after betrothal. The woman’s claim is “certain” for only she can possibly know what happened to her. Her husband’s claim is “perhaps”—for he doesn’t really know what happened. To Rabban Gamaliel her “certain” wins out, despite the fact that money will have to change hands—the husband will have to give her the ketubah.Thus saying that the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel in the Mishnah is equivalent to saying that Shimon is liable to pay Reuven in the case from above.
  Above, Abaye implied that R. Judah and R. Huna follow Rabban Gamaliel. The Talmud raises the corollary—R. Nahman and R. Yohanan follow R. Joshua.Nahman now claims that he can draw a distinction between the Mishnah and the issue of the disputed maneh. In the Mishnah Rabban Gamaliel believes the woman because she has a “migo”—which is the Aramaic word for “since.” Here (and in many places throughout the Talmud) it has a technical sense—“Since” the woman could have a made a claim more beneficial to herself, assumedly that she is a mukat etz, she is believed when she makes the worse claim of having been raped after betrothal (such a claim means she can no longer marry a priest). When a person could have made a better claim for herself, she is believed when she makes a worse claim. However, in the case of the disputed maneh there is no possible “migo”. Reuven already made as good of a claim as he could have made.
  There is an alternative reason why Rabban Gamaliel might say that the woman is believed but not the man who claims the maneh. The last certain status of the woman is that she was a virgin. All women are at some point virgins. Therefore, in a case where we do not know when her status changes, she is considered to be in her “presumptive state.” But in the case of the maneh, there is no earlier presumptive status.
  The Talmud now concludes by stating that it was necessary for R. Nahman to agree with Rabban Gamaliel. Otherwise we would have a halakhic conflict, for the halakhah always follows R. Nahman in civil matters (the case of the disputed maneh is a civil matter) and in this Mishnah, as we have seen, the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel. In order for these two halakhot not to conflict, R. Nahman must agree with Rabban Gamaliel.
  
  Daf 13a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with a new Mishnah, continuing the disputes between the three tannaim over whether a woman is believed when she makes certain claims.
  In this case, when the husband comes to court claiming that his wife was not a virgin, the woman responds that she did not lose her physical signs of virginity through sexual intercourse but rather by “being struck by a piece of wood”, meaning she lost her hymen in some other way.  According to Rabbi Meir (whose opinion we learned in an earlier mishnah) if the court believes her, she would receive a full ketubah of 200. According to the Sages she receives a ketubah of 100.  In any case, she is claiming that she does receive some ketubah.The man responds that she lost her virginity by having engaged in sexual intercourse.  The phrase “trampled by a man” is an illustrative means of saying that she had sex with a man and not that she lost her virginity from a “stick”.  Assumedly his goal is to not pay her any ketubah.Again Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer rule in her favor.  The same reason which applied in the previous Mishnah applies here:  since she is certain and he is uncertain, she is believed.Similarly, Rabbi Joshua holds that she is not believed, and that the money remains with the husband.  Again, the same reason as in the previous Mishnah applies:  in order for her to extract money she must provide proof.
  The question is what is each side in the Mishnah claiming? We have already seen some disputes as to what ketubah a mukat etz receives, so we need to interpret this Mishnah in light of those disputes. Clearly this Mishnah is a case where the husband did not know beforehand that she was a mukat etz. Nevertheless, she is claiming some type of ketubah.Yohanan says that she is asking for a ketubah of two hundred zuz, whereas the husband wants to pay her 100. This follows R. Meir’s opinion that a mukat etz is considered a virgin and receives a ketubah of 200, whether he knew she was a mukat etz or not.Elazar says she is asking for a ketubah of 100, whereas her husband does not want to pay her any ketubah whatsoever. This follows the rabbis who hold that she receives a ketubah of 100, whether he knew she was a mukat etz or not.
  Elazar can answer this in the following way. The first Mishnah is to exclude R. Hiyya b. Abin who held that even if the husband presumed she was a virgin and it turns out she is not, she still receives a ketubah of a maneh. That Mishnah taught explicitly that she receives no ketubah, because the husband says, “my acquisition was a mistake.” The second Mishnah excludes the opinion of Rami b. Hama who held that if the husband did not know she was a mukat etz, she receives no ketubah whatsoever. The fact that she claims she was a mukat etz in this Mishnah obviously means that she is claiming at least 100.That works for R. Elazar. But R. Yohanan agrees with R. Hiyya b. Abin. So why does he need two mishnayot?
  Yohanan would explain the need for two mishnayot based on the legal principle of “migo” which, as we have seen, means that when one makes a lesser claim despite the possibility of making a better claim, the lesser claim is believed. In the first Mishnah, the woman had a “migo”—she could have said “I am a mukat etz” instead of saying that, she says she was raped after betrothal. This is a worse claim because it disqualifies her from a marrying a priest. Nevertheless, R. Joshua does not believe her. This Mishnah shows us the strength of R. Joshua’s position; he does not believe her claim even in the presence of a “migo.”Rabban Gamaliel believes her in the second Mishnah, where she claims “I was a mukat etz” even though in this case she has no “migo.” She has made the best claim she could possibly make.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with another Mishnah, with two sections. In both sections, Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eliezer dispute whether the woman is believed. I should emphasize that these mishnayot have nothing to do with virginity claims.
  In the Talmud below there is debate over what the woman was seen doing.  According to some, she was seen having intercourse with an unknown man, and that “talking” is a euphemism for sex.  Others say that she was merely talking with him, but there was suspicion that they had had sex.  It is important to remember that the situation is that she is a single woman and there is no issue of adultery.  However, if she had had relations with a man who was forbidden from marrying an Israelite, such as a mamzer or a natin, she would subsequently be prohibited from marrying a priest.  When asked who this man was she provides his name and says that he is a priest.  Note that it is not essential that he is a priest; it is sufficient that he is a man who is not prohibited from marrying an Israelite.Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer again rule that the woman is believed and may subsequently marry a priest.  Since she has a presumption of being fit to marry a priest, it requires solid evidence to remove her from this presumption.Rabbi Joshua holds that since she was secluded with him, she loses her presumption of being fit to marry a priest.  She must bring proof that this person was not prohibited from marrying an Israelite and until then she may not marry a priest.
  This section of the mishnah is nearly identical to the section above, the only difference being that this woman is pregnant.  The reason why the mishnah reiterates the positions outlined in the previous mishnah is to teach that Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer believe the woman even if she is pregnant.  In the previous dispute, it was unclear whether or not she had even had sex with the man in question.  When asked who he was, she could have said that she never had relations with him.  Therefore, when she admitted that she did but said that she was a priest (i.e. one who is allowed to marry an Israelite), she is believed.  However, in this section it is certain that she had relations with someone and she could not make a better claim than to say that the man was fit to marry an Israelite. Nevertheless, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer hold that she is believed.A further innovation is that not only is the woman believed, and she is subsequently allowed to marry a priest, but her child is assumed to be fit to marry an Israelite.  In other words, even though we don’t know for sure that the child is not a mamzer or a natin, the law treats him/her as if he was not.Rabbi Joshua again states that the woman is not believed. Furthermore, her child is assumed to be the child of a natin or a mamzer and may not marry an Israelite until s/he proves otherwise.
  Ze’iri understands the “talking” in the Mishnah to refer to her being secluded with an unknown man. But according to R. Assi she was seen actually having intercourse. So then why does the Mishnah say that she was seen talking? The answer is that “talking” can be a euphemism for sex. The Talmud cites another euphemism, this time from the book of Proverbs. This verse refers to an adulterous woman.
  The Talmud now asks why we need two mishnayot that are so similar to each other. For Ze’iri this is not a problem, because he interprets the first Mishnah to refer to a case where she was only secluded. R. Joshua says she is disqualified from marrying a priest even in this case. And Rabban Gamaliel would declare her fit even if she is known to have had sex with another man. So both mishnayot are necessary.Assi cannot use this reason, because he interprets “talking” to refer to sex. Therefore in both mishnayot it is clear that she had sex with an unknown man. So R. Assi offers another reason for the necessity of two mishnayot. The first declares her to be fit to marry a priest (according to Rabban Gamaliel), and the second, in which she is pregnant, teaches that her child is also fit to marry a priest.
  Below we will see a dispute whether the one who declares the woman herself to be fit, also declares her offspring to be fit. R. Assi, who says that one Mishnah teaches, that she is fit and the other teaches that her offspring is fit, would have to agree with the one who holds that if she is fit, her daughter is fit as well.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Ze’iri interpreted “talking” in the Mishnah to mean “being secluded.” The woman in the Mishnah is being accused of being secluded with a strange man. R. Assi interpreted it to mean that she was seen actually having sex. Today’s section continues that discussion.
  Ze’iri’s interpretation of the Mishnah implies that R. Joshua would not allow a woman who had been secluded with an unknown man to subsequent marry a Kohen. This clashes with a statement made by the amora, Rav. Rav said that if a wife is secluded with a man who is not her husband she does receive the punishment of lashes (I know this bothers people, but it probably is just the way the rabbis say that she has transgressed. It does not mean they actually did this). Nevertheless, she is not prohibited from staying with her husband. This means that Rav does not think she actually had sex with the other man. So does Rav contradict R. Joshua, who does not believe her?The resolution is that there is a difference between marrying into the priesthood, the topic of the Mishnah, and remaining married to one’s husband, the topic of Rav’s statement. When it comes to marrying into the priesthood, the rabbis were strict. Even seclusion with a strange man would disqualify her.  But when it comes to remaining with her husband, there needs to be more evidence that she was an adulteress for her to be prohibited.
  This baraita is basically the same as the Mishnah except here instead of her being seen “talking” with someone, she is seen entering into a hidden place or into a ruin. The Talmud will now explain that this baraita is a difficulty on R. Assi who interpreted “talking” in the Mishnah to mean that she was seen having intercourse.
  
  Daf 13b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section brings a baraita to refute R. Assi who had interpreted “talking” in the Mishnah as the woman being seen having sexual intercourse.
  This is a long baraita which relates to the situation in the Mishnah—a woman is pregnant, but we do not know who the father was. The first opinion, which follows Rabban Gamaliel, says that a woman is believed when she says that the father was a fit person, meaning he had proper lineage. R. Joshua says she is not believed. He argues from the case of a woman who was captured, a topic we will return to later. The assumption is that she was raped by her captors and therefore she is forbidden from subsequently marrying a priest. R. Joshua says that the case of the woman who is pregnant is the same—she is not believed. The rabbis say that the case of the captive woman is different, for there we have witnesses that she was taken captive. R. Joshua responds that her pregnancy is clear testimony that she had sex.The other rabbis now try to draw another distinction between the two cases. The captive woman was taken captive by non-Jews, who we assume are unrestrained in sexual matters. But the woman who is pregnant was not necessarily among a group of non-Jews, and therefore it is more likely that she had relations with someone permitted to her.Finally, the baraita adds an important caveat. She is only believed with regard to herself. But with regard to her offspring, she is not believed. Therefore the offspring must be considered a “shetuki” a child whose father is not known.
  The Talmud now explains some of the dialogue in the baraita. The main thing is that the Talmud adds a shift in topic into the middle of the baraita. At first the rabbis admit to R. Joshua that he successfully responded with regard to the pregnant woman. Such a woman is indeed like a captive woman in that we can be sure she had intercourse. But what about a woman seen “talking” meaning secluded.Joshua responds that there is no “guardian in sexual matters,” which means that after they have been secluded, we can assume they had sex.
  Assi had interpreted “talking” as her being seen having intercourse. In his opinion, if she is only seen secluded with an unknown man, R. Joshua would not prohibit her from marrying a priest. But this baraita clearly teaches two different cases, one where she is seen talking and one where she is pregnant. Therefore, R. Assi’s opinion is refuted. 
  IntroductionThis section continues the discussion from in yesterday’s baraita, comparing a woman taken captive with the woman found pregnant by an unknown man.
  The rabbis did not respond to R. Joshua that when she was taken captive most of the captors would have been men who would disqualify her if they had sex with her (non-Jews).  But when it comes to the pregnant woman, most men would not disqualify her.The fact that the baraita does not mention this difference (at least not explicitly) supports R. Joshua ben Levi who says that it really does not matter whether the majority of men were fit or unfit. R. Joshua says that she is not believed and Rabban Gamaliel says that she is.
   IntroductionThe Mishnah contained a dispute between Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer whether a woman who was pregnant from a man whose identity is unknown is still fit to marry a priest. Rabban Gamaliel says she is believed to say that the man was a priest (and therefore she is fit) and Rabbi Joshua says she is not believed. Our sugya deals with the status of the offspring.
  Yohanan says that the opinions in the Mishnah concerning the woman herself also apply to her offspring. Rabban Gamaliel would say that just as she is fit, so is her offspring. And of course, Rabbi Joshua disqualifies her offspring, just as he disqualifies her (from marrying a priest).Elazar though makes a distinction, one explained by Rabbah. The mother was born fit to marry a priest. This gives her a presumption, a hazakah, of fitness. In order to remove someone from their hazakah, we need solid proof, which in this case is lacking. However, the child has no such hazakah; from its birth it was not known what its status was. Therefore, even Rabban Gamaliel would admit that the child may not marry a priest (if it is a girl).
  Elazar uses the end of the baraita found in yesterday’s section as a difficulty on R. Yohanan. The baraita seemed to explicitly state that only the woman herself was fit. The offspring is definitely unfit, a shetuki, which means one whose father is unknown.Yohanan resolves this by saying that while the child is a “shetuki,” she is still fit to marry a priest. This is an innovative reading of the word, which the Talmud will now need to explain.
  The Talmud reinterprets the meaning of “shetuki.” A child whose father is not known is not considered a priest, even if we can be sure that his father was a priest. To be a priest one would need to know exactly who one’s father is. But if this child is a girl, she is still fit to marry into the priesthood. In other words, the mother is believed to say that the father was fit. The child too is fit. But there is no way we can consider the child a priest.
  IntroductionAs often happens the abstract discussion of the halakhah is followed by some actual case law. In today’s case a betrothed woman comes in front of a rabbi with her fiancée.
  The woman who comes in front of R. Joseph with her fiancée is not yet married. Nevertheless, she’s pregnant (it happens now and it happened then). The issue is can we be certain that the child is his. R. Joseph says that since the fiancée says it is his, and since the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel who said she is believed, we can certainly believe this particular pregnant woman.
  
  Daf 14a
  
  Abaye critiques R. Joseph based on a statement by Shmuel who said that while the halakhah is according Rabban Gamaliel, we should not declare her (or her offspring) fit unless most men were fit for her. This means that most men, who if they had sex with her, would not disqualify her. A betrothed woman is forbidden from having sex with anyone, and the only one who would not disqualify her is her fiancée. So, Abaye says, in this case, we should not believe her. 
  The Talmud resolves Abaye’s difficulty by analyzing closely Shmuel’s statement. Shmuel said the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel—she should always be believed. But then Shmuel said that that this halakhah should not be acted on unless the majority are fit for her. The resolution is that ab initio, meaning at the outset, a rabbi should not rule like Rabban Gamaliel unless most men are fit for her. But if the deed already happened, meaning she is already pregnant, ex post facto we can act like Rabban Gamaliel and trust her.
  IntroductionIn the Mishnah R. Joshua said that a woman is not believed to say that the man she either had relations with or got her pregnant is fit. In today’s section, the Talmud raises a source that seems to contradict this.
  In a Mishnah from Tractate Eduyot R. Joshua says that a widow who had been married to a priest whose lineage was not certain can still subsequently marry a priest. Rashi explains that this priest’s mother may have been a divorcee or may not. If his mother was a divorcee then he is a disqualified priest (a halal). The woman he married would then not be allowed to marry a priest. But since his status is only doubtful, she is allowed to be remarried to a priest.
  Rava now explains the difference between the two situations. In the case of the widow of the man of uncertain lineage, we can assume she would have examined his lineage before marrying him. Lineage was very important in making a marriage decision and a woman would not marry without first ascertaining that the priest she thought she was marrying was really a priest. But in our Mishnah in Ketubot the woman was not marrying, she was having sex with a man not her husband. In such situations, we cannot expect that the woman would check her lineage before having licentious relations with someone. Therefore, R. Joshua would not believe her.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the seeming contradiction between the Mishnah in Ketubot and the Mishnah in Eduyot. Whereas yesterday we focused on Rabbi Joshua, today we focus on Rabban Gamaliel.As a reminder, our Mishnah deals with a woman who says that the man with whom she was secluded or had sex was fit to marry her—Rabban Gamaliel believes her, R. Joshua does not.In the Mishnah in Eduyot R. Joshua said that a widow of a priest whose mother is a doubtful divorcee can subsequently marry another priest.
  Rava points out that there is not only a seeming contradiction between R. Joshua’s statements, Rabban Gamaliel also seems to contradict himself. In Ketubot, he believes the woman. In the other Mishnah he says that while in theory he accepts R. Joshua’s testimony, that such a widow may remarry a priest, he also adds in that the halakhah cannot be this way because the priests do not listen to the rabbis to “bring near,” meaning to allow one of doubtful lineage to marry into the priesthood. They only listen to the rabbis in order to distance, to forbid someone from marrying a priest.Rava now offers a new resolution for both Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua. Rabban Gamaliel believes the woman in the case in Ketubot for she is certain that the man she slept with was fit to marry her. But in Eduyot her husband’s lineage is unknown. Therefore, he says we act stringently.Rabbi Joshua did not believe the woman in Ketubot for there is only one doubt—was the man she slept with fit to marry her or not? But in the case in Eduyot there are two doubts. It is not entirely clear what this “double doubt” exactly is. Rashi suggests that since the status of his mother was in doubt—was she a divorcee when she married the priest or not—the son’s status is considered a “double doubt.” Other commentators say the double doubt refers to a complicated situation where the mother may have been a divorcee and we’re not sure whether the child belonged to the first husband (in which case the child is a valid priest) or to the second husband. In any case, the principle is that when there is a double doubt, Rabbi Joshua rules leniently.
  IntroductionToday’s section defines exactly what a “widow of one from mixed family” is. I should note that the Hebrew word for this is “the widow of dough.” “Dough” is something that is mixed up such that its original ingredients are no longer recognizable. This is a reference to the lineage of this priest—we don’t know what family he is from.&lt;
  The entire baraita defines the “widow of one of a mixed family.” Rabbi Joshua had said that such a widow may marry a priest, and Rabban Gamaliel had basically agreed, but added that the priests don’t listen to the rabbis with regard to these types of matters.According to Rabbi Meir, as long as we know that the husband was not a mamzer, natin or descendant of slaves, then his wife is a “widow of one of a mixed family” and she may marry a priest. By implication, if there is the possibility that the husband comes from mamzerim or natinim (similar to mamzerim in that they are both defective lineage) then the widow may not marry a priest.R. Shimon b. Elazar explains what we are concerned about with the “widow of one of a mixed family.” We are concerned that her husband was a “halal,” the offspring of the union of a priest and a woman whom he is forbidden to marry. Such a “halal” would disqualify his widow from subsequently marrying a priest. People don’t always know who is a “halal” and who is not, so we have to be concerned that such a woman was married to a “halal.” Indeed, part of why people do not recognize the “halal” is that it is not forbidden for her to marry a halal. But people don’t have to be concerned that she was married to a “mamzer” or someone with a similar lineage, because people know who the mamzerim are. This is probably because an Israelite woman is not allowed to marry a mamzer.The following sections will explore what exactly the differences are between the opinions of these various tannaim.
  The Talmud clarifies here that to Rabban Gamaliel all that matters is whether her claim is certain. If it is, she is believed even if there is one doubt. And if it is not certain, she is not believed, even if there are two doubts.Rabbi Joshua holds the exact opposite. If there are two doubts, she is believed, even if she is uncertain. And if there is only one doubt, she is not believed, even if she is certain.We might summarize by saying that Rabban Gamaliel examines her claim—how certain can she be of what she is saying—whereas Rabbi Joshua examines the situation—how likely is something to be true.
  IntroductionToday’s section defines exactly what a “widow of one from mixed family” is. I should note that the Hebrew word for this is “the widow of dough.” “Dough” is something that is mixed up such that its original ingredients are no longer recognizable. This is a reference to the lineage of this priest—we don’t know what family he is from.
  The entire baraita defines the “widow of one of a mixed family.” Rabbi Joshua had said that such a widow may marry a priest, and Rabban Gamaliel had basically agreed, but added that the priests don’t listen to the rabbis with regard to these types of matters.According to Rabbi Meir, as long as we know that the husband was not a mamzer, natin or descendant of slaves, then his wife is a “widow of one of a mixed family” and she may marry a priest. By implication, if there is the possibility that the husband comes from mamzerim or natinim (similar to mamzerim in that they are both defective lineage) then the widow may not marry a priest.R. Shimon b. Elazar explains what we are concerned about with the “widow of one of a mixed family.” We are concerned that her husband was a “halal,” the offspring of the union of a priest and a woman whom he is forbidden to marry. Such a “halal” would disqualify his widow from subsequently marrying a priest. People don’t always know who is a “halal” and who is not, so we have to be concerned that such a woman was married to a “halal.” Indeed, part of why people do not recognize the “halal” is that it is not forbidden for her to marry a halal. But people don’t have to be concerned that she was married to a “mamzer” or someone with a similar lineage, because people know who the mamzerim are. This is probably because an Israelite woman is not allowed to marry a mamzer.The following sections will explore what exactly the differences are between the opinions of these various tannaim.
  
  Daf 14b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section defines exactly what a “widow of one from mixed family” is. I should note that the Hebrew word for this is “the widow of dough.” “Dough” is something that is mixed up such that its original ingredients are no longer recognizable. This is a reference to the lineage of this priest—we don’t know what family he is from.
  The entire baraita defines the “widow of one of a mixed family.” Rabbi Joshua had said that such a widow may marry a priest, and Rabban Gamaliel had basically agreed, but added that the priests don’t listen to the rabbis with regard to these types of matters.According to Rabbi Meir, as long as we know that the husband was not a mamzer, natin or descendant of slaves, then his wife is a “widow of one of a mixed family” and she may marry a priest. By implication, if there is the possibility that the husband comes from mamzerim or natinim (similar to mamzerim in that they are both defective lineage) then the widow may not marry a priest.R. Shimon b. Elazar explains what we are concerned about with the “widow of one of a mixed family.” We are concerned that her husband was a “halal,” the offspring of the union of a priest and a woman whom he is forbidden to marry. Such a “halal” would disqualify his widow from subsequently marrying a priest. People don’t always know who is a “halal” and who is not, so we have to be concerned that such a woman was married to a “halal.” Indeed, part of why people do not recognize the “halal” is that it is not forbidden for her to marry a halal. But people don’t have to be concerned that she was married to a “mamzer” or someone with a similar lineage, because people know who the mamzerim are. This is probably because an Israelite woman is not allowed to marry a mamzer.The following sections will explore what exactly the differences are between the opinions of these various tannaim.
  IntroductionToday’s section analyzes the baraita that was in yesterday’s section. It does so by asking a series of questions about the baraita.
  The Talmud begins by asking why it seems that if her husband may have come from a mamzer, she would not be fit to marry a priest, whereas if we’re concerned that her husband was a halal (a disqualified priest), then she can still marry a priest. After all, both are biblical prohibitions. I should note that they are prohibitions in the sense that if they have relations with a woman, they disqualify her from subsequently marrying a priest.
  The second question asks what the differences are between R. Meir’s opinion and the previous anonymous one? Indeed they seem to be exactly the same.
  Here the Talmud detects a self-contradiction within the baraita. R. Shimon (two of them, actually) says that Israelites do not know who the halalim are. This would imply that if a priest may have been a halal, his widow should not be allowed to marry another priest. But the beginning of the baraita had said the exact opposite—that if there may have been a halal, she may not marry into the priesthood.
  Yohanan says that the dispute between the first opinion in the baraita and R. Meir, as well as between R. Shimon and the first opinion is over a person who protests when called a mamzer but is silent when called a halal. The dispute is over how to interpret these responses.According to the first opinion, silence implies agreement with the insult. So if someone is called a halal and does not respond, we can assume that he indeed is a halal.
  Meir says that if someone is silent when called a mamzer or a natin, we can assume that he acquiesces to their silence. No one would be silent in the face of an accusation that would disqualify him from marrying any Israelite. But if someone is called a halal and is silent, he may just not have bothered responding. After all, being a halal is not so bad. He can still marry any Israelite woman. The only consequence would be that his kids would not be able to be priests.
  Shimon b. Elazar then responds to the earlier report of what R. Meir had said. According to this report, R. Meir made fit a person who when called a halal was silent. According to R. Shimon b. Elazar, this is not what R. Meir said. R. Meir actually said the opposite—a person is fit when silent after being called a mamzer, figuring that people will know he is a mamzer. That’s why he does not bother responding.But if he is called a mamzer and protests, then that is a sign that he actually is a mamzer. And if he is called a halal and he is silent, then we have to be concerned that he actually is a halal. He is silent because he thinks that if he protests they will exclude him from the congregation, assuming that he is a mamzer.Thus the real debate is over whether someone who does not protest when called a halal is considered a halal.I should note that R. Yohanan’s resolution is much more than an actual resolution of the baraita. The Talmud conjures up some difficulties that really not are such difficulties in order to facilitate taking a new point into consideration—what does this person say when confronted with the possibility that his lineage is problematic. The baraita itself addressed only the issue of the status of a widow who had been married to a man of doubtful lineage. R. Yohanan brings in an important additional element to the discussion.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains two baraitot dealing with the lineage of a person who when called a halal or a mamzer is silent.
  According to the first baraita, which correlates with the R. Shimon b. Elazar’s report of R. Meir’s opinion in yesterday’s section, if someone is called a mamzer and is silent, he is valid. He is silent because he figures the truth will come out. But if he is silent when called a halal, he is unfit. He is only silent because he figures if he opens his mouth, he could make matters worse.But the other baraita holds the opposite, in accordance with the words stated directly by R. Meir in the earlier sections. If he is silent on being called a halal, he is still fit. He is silent because the consequences are not so bad, so he figures why bother responding. But if he is called a mamzer and is silent, he is acquiescing and we can assume that he really is a mamzer.
  IntroductionToday’s section is the last Mishnah of the chapter. It relates to the topic discussed in the previous two mishnayot—if a woman had sexual relations with a man and it is unclear whether that man was permitted to her, can she subsequently marry a priest.As I have stated many times, the Mishnah has a very limited focus. It discusses this subject and not any other aspect of the crime of rape. I realize that this is a sensitive topic in the modern world, but we should keep in mind the scope of the text we are reading.
  The question in this mishnah is can this girl marry into the priesthood.  If the man who raped her was forbidden to marry an Israelite, then she is forbidden to marry a priest. This is true even though she did not willingly engage in intercourse with the man.  Although this sounds like the woman is being punished for having been raped, we would do well to keep in mind that priests were extremely cautious about the “purity” of their lineage.  The laws of who can and cannot marry a priest have nothing to do with morality, at least not as we understand it.  Rather they have to do with the prohibition of defiling the priestly line.Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri rules that if most of the inhabitants of the town are men who are allowed to marry into the priesthood, meaning that their wives and daughters are allowed to marry priests, then this girl is allowed to marry a priest.
  IntroductionToday’s section relates to the Mishnah from above. It deals with defining the majority necessary such that the girl who was raped by an unknown man remains fit to marry into the priesthood. I should note that the rabbinic determination of when we follow the majority is quite complex and does not really follow what moderns would define as normal statistical probabilities.There are two main issues that the rabbis believe relevant: 1) Were there two groups of people from whom the rapist may have come, such that there would be “two majorities”? 2) Was the group stationary or moving? I think in our minds the issue would be simpler—what was the statistical likelihood that the rapist was fit? But the rabbis look at the issue slightly differently.
   Rava wants to analyze this last Mishnah in light of the dispute between R. Joshua and Rabban Gamaliel, neither of whom discussed the issue of the status of the majority of people. R. Joshua declared her unfit, even if the majority of men in the area were fit. And Rabban Gamaliel declared her fit, even if the majority of men in the area were fit.I should note that we could easily solve this difficulty by noting the difference between the situation argued about by Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua and in this Mishnah. They argued about whether the woman should be believed—i.e. she knew the identity of the man she had sex with. R. Yohanan ben Nuri addressed a case of rape—the woman did not know who raped her. In such a situation, she cannot be asked, so we need to use a different criteria to determine whether she is fit.
  A series of amoraim say that the incident referred to in the Mishnah occurred at the time when the wagons would arrive at the marketplaces of Tzippori. As we shall see, this has to do with the issue of the definition of the majority. In this case there are two majorities here—the people of Tzippori and the visiting people.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  The Talmud now relates to the opposite case, where we know that the person came from Tzippori and not from a passing group. In such a case the offspring must be considered a “shetuki” a child whose father is unknown and who will not be allowed to marry any Israelite. This follows R. Hanina who said that we follow the majority of the city and not a majority of the people passing through.
  The Talmud believes that we should not follow a stationary majority but we could follow the majority if it is moving. Therefore, the previous statement didn’t really make sense. We should not follow the majority of the city and we should follow the majority of a passing company.The Talmud fixes this problem by emending R. Hanina’s statement. We follow the majority of the town only when the majority of the passing company is also fit to marry into the priesthood. But we do not follow a single majority in any case—either the inhabitants of the town or the members of a passing company.Theoretically, we could follow the simple majority of the passing company because when the group is moving, one majority should be necessary. But we do not follow this majority lest we come to follow the majority of the inhabitants of the town. This would be problematic because they are stationary and a stationary majority is not followed.
  Finally, the Talmud adds in that if the rapist had left the city, we would follow the majority of the city. This follows a general rule that anyone who separates from a group is considered to have come from the majority.The only time we therefore need two majorities is where she went to the city. R. Zera said that if the group is stationary, we do not follow a single majority. Rather, we look at it as if half the city was fit and half unfit, in which case we would have to rule strictly. But if there was also another majority of men who were fit, she would be considered fit.Let me try to summarize some of these rules:If the group of potential rapists is moving—we follow a majority.If the group is stationary, but the potential rapist left the group, we follow the majority.If the group is stationary, and she went to the group, we do not follow the majority.If there are two potential groups both of whom have a majority of fit men, then she is allowed to marry into the priesthood.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we said that in order for the girl who was raped by an unknown man to be fit to marry a priest, there must be two majorities of fit men—the men of the town and the men of a passing company. Today’s section questions whether we really need two majorities.
  The Mishnah compares the case of the rape in Tzippori with a case where it is not certain whether a piece of meat was kosher. If 90 per cent of the stores in town sell kosher meat (ritually slaughtered) and one store sells non-kosher meat, and a person does not remember which store he bought from, we do not follow the majority and the meat is prohibited. This is the case of a stationary majority where the person went to the majority. All of the meat was stationary and therefore we look at it as if there was no majority. But if a piece of meat was found elsewhere and we do not know what store it came from, then we do follow the majority, even though there is only one majority.
  We cannot solve the difficulty by saying there were also groups of people passing through the city such that we would have two majorities. R. Zera said that we follow a majority even when the gates of the city are closed such that there could only be one majority.
  The resolution distinguishes between the case of the girl in Tzippori and the case of the meat. The rabbis were extra stringent in matters of lineage, requiring two majorities. But with the case of the meat, one majority was sufficient.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues discussing determining the status of something based on the probability of it being similar to the majority of the group.
  Zera said that whenever we have something that is stationary, we must look at it as if it was evenly balanced between the two different groups. For instance, if I have a bag of marbles, 90 red and 10 black and I pick out one marble, according to R. Zera’s logic, we must consider it equally likely that the marble is black or red. This is true in all situations, whether this results in a leniency or a stringency.
  The Talmud now searches for a tannaitic source for R. Zera’s rule. The first source is the rule concerning meat that we saw in yesterday’s section. This source does indeed teach that if the meat is stationary, meaning it has not left the store, we must look at it as if the likelihood of it being kosher is 50/50. But this is not a source for both sides of R. Zera’s statement—this is a stringency. We must continue to search for a case where it leads to a leniency.
  Frogs are clean and the sheretz is unclean. If he touches one of these (when they’re dead) and does not know which one, he is unclean. This again is a source for the idea that stationary groups are treated as half and half. But again, it is a stringency.
  This source gives the opposite situation—nine impure sheratzim and one pure frog. If this occurs in the private domain, he is unclean. But if in the public domain he is clean. When it comes to doubtful impurity, in the private domain the doubt is treated as unclean and in the public domain it is treated as clean. So here we have our leniency.
  IntroductionZera said that if the population was static, we treat it as if it were 50/50. In yesterday’s section we found a source in rabbinic halakhah for this idea. Today’s section searches (hard) for a source in the Torah for this idea. It begins on what seems to be a tangent, but will get to the topic eventually.
  The discussion begins with a reference to a debate in Sanhedrin concerning a man who intends to kill one man and accidentally kills another. Rabbi Shimon says that he is not guilty of murder. He derives this from the words “for him” and “against him” (Deuteronomy 19:11). A person is not guilty unless he murders the person he intended to murder.
  The other rabbis say that one who intended to kill one person and killed another is guilty of murder. The verse exempts a person who throws a rock into a group of people, some of whom are Jews and some of whom are not. In such a case the person is not guilty of murder because it is uncertain if he intended to kill a Jew.
  The Talmud now considers what exactly the case was, in order to prove R. Zera’s principle that any time there is a stationary group it is considered to be 50/50.Possibility one—the majority was non-Jews. In such a case the stone-thrower is not considered a murdered because most were non-Jews and one is not liable for murdering a non-Jew (I know, this is troublesome). This would not be because of the verse.Possibility two—the group was half Jews, half non-Jews. In this case we could not convict the murderer because in capital cases, we rule leniently. When everything is even, we’d have to say that his intention may have been to kill a non-Jew.Possibility three—the majority were Jews, but there was one non-Jew. In this case, we should convict him as a murdered because in all likelihood, he intended to murder a Jew. But because of the principle that any stationary group is considered to be 50/50, he cannot be considered a murderer. This is the source for R. Zera’s law.
  According to R. Hiyya b. Ashi, R. Yose’s decision to rely on a single majority to determine the lineage of the child is halakhah for all generations. In contrast, R. Hanan b. Rava says that it was a temporary ruling. In general, two majorities are required.
  Yirmiyah raises a difficulty on R. Hiyya b. Ashi who seems to have said that according to Rav we do not require two majorities for matters of lineage. Rav said in another tradition that if a child is found and the majority of the town was Jewish the court is commanded to sustain the child. But if there is only one majority the child is not considered to have proper lineage and cannot marry an Israelite.Shmuel said that we save such a child’s life, but again he too would agree that the child is not considered to have proper Jewish lineage.
  
  Daf 15b
  
  The resolution is that R. Yirmiyah forgot that Rav had already said that the incident occurred in Tzippori, at a time when a caravan was passing such that there were two majorities. Thus Rav did not say that one could validate the child’s lineage without two majorities. 
  Hanan b. Rava said that the decision in the Mishnah was a temporary decision. But if there were two majorities, then why was it only temporary.The answer is that the one who taught one tradition, that there were two majorities, did not teach that it was only a temporary decision. This means that the conclusion of both parties is the same—if there were two majorities, then the child’s lineage is validated. If there was only one majority, then the Mishnah’s ruling was only temporary.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now goes back to analyzing the case discussed above about determining the lineage of a foundling child.As I have stated a few times, the Talmud here posits that one does not need to break Shabbat to save the life of a non-Jew. This is a problematic, discriminatory halakhah that reflects the ethos of the time, but does not, and should not in my opinion, reflect the ethos of our time. In my commentary, I simply explain these halakhot, but I think it is important to state this at the outset. Another discriminatory halakhah appears at the end of the section.
  This statement was found above in yesterday’s section. Here we will analyze Shmuel’s statement in particular. Shmuel said that the relevance is with regard to removing stones from on top of the child on Shabbat. Lifting up these stones on Shabbat would be prohibited, unless we were at least fifty per cent sure that the child was a Jew. The Talmud will now critique the fact that Shmuel said this.
  Shmuel said that when it comes to saving a life we do not follow the majority. What this means is that if there is any chance that this child is Jewish we do save its life. This contrasts with his statement above, where he seemed to say that we rescue this child only if there is at least a fifty per cent chance that the child is Jewish.
  The Talmud now changes the applicability of the statement and changes the wording as well. If the majority of the people of the town are non-Jews, then the child is considered a non-Jew. On this, Shmuel adds that when it comes to saving the child’s life on Shabbat, we do not follow this probability. We save the child even though in all likelihood the child is a non-Jew.
  The Talmud now analyzes the practical ramifications of the various sections of the statement from above.If the majority of the town is non-Jews, we can consider the child a non-Jew such that we can feed them non-kosher meat.If the majority of the town is Jewish, then we are obligated to return to him a lost object. Note that by implication, if the majority of the town is not Jewish, then we do not have to return to him a lost object.
  The ramifications of half of the residents being Jewish, and half non-Jewish, are with regard to damages. Before we analyze this, I should note a few relevant halakhot with regard to damages.If a Jew damages the property of a non-Jew, the Jew is not liable [I know, this is discriminatory]. If a non-Jew damages the property of a Jew, he is always liable for full damages, even if had a Jew done the damage, the Jew would have been liable for only half-damages.To return to our particular case: If an ox that belonged to a Jew gored an ox belonging to this foundling from a city that is half Jewish, the Jew could say to him, “Prove that you’re a Jew and then I’ll pay you.” Since the owner of the damaged party cannot prove that he is a Jew, the damager need not pay. So in this case, we cannot say he is being considered a Jew.So it must be the opposite case—an ox owned by this child gored an ox owned by a Jew. The person from the town half of whose inhabitants are Jewish and half not, must pay the Jew half the damages, as if he was a Jew. But he can say that he won’t pay the other half until the Jew proves that he is non-Jewish. Since the Jew cannot prove this, we must assume that the child (now grown-up) is Jewish and he needs to pay only half of the damages. 
  Congratulations—You finished the first chapter of Ketubot. You should know, that despite the fact that some of these topics seem obscure, this is one of the most well-learned chapters in the entire Talmud. Indeed, the chapter itself is sometimes called “Shas Katan”—the little Talmud—because it contains so many principles that are necessary and useful in understanding the rest of the Talmud.
  IntroductionThe chapter opens with a Mishnah which discusses a dispute between a husband and wife over whether the woman was a virgin or a widow when he married her.  Evidently, the written ketubah from their marriage is not available as evidence (perhaps it was never written).  Therefore this is again a question of whether or not the woman is believed.We can further learn from this mishnah that the woman may collect her ketubah payment even if she does not have the document.  This is because the ketubah payment is a court-imposed obligation upon every husband.  The loss of the ketubah document does not mean that the woman will not be able to collect her ketubah payment.
  In this mishnah the husband and wife come before the court at the time of their divorce.  The woman claims that she was a virgin when her husband married her, while he claims that she was a widow.  The mishnah rules that we check the evidence, and if there is evidence that her wedding was a virgin’s wedding, then she receives her full ketubah. In the absence of hard evidence, she can only receive a ketubah of 100 zuz.There are three pieces of evidence described in our mishnah.  The first is the “hinuma”.  It is uncertain what this word exactly means, and several explanations have been offered.  Albeck explains the word as being a “hymn” sung at virgin’s weddings.  Based on the Talmud’s explanation, Kehati explains a “hinuma” to be a special veil worn only by virgins.The second piece of evidence is that her hair hung down to her shoulders.  This is the manner in which women wore their hair during the procession that led them away from their father’s house.The third sign, mentioned by Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka is parched corn, which were distributed at virgin’s weddings.We should explain why in this mishnah the woman is not believed and therefore needs to bring evidence that she was a virgin, whereas in the mishnayoth at the end of the last chapter, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer believed the woman without any corroborating evidence.  The answer is that in this case both the man and woman can claim to be certain of the facts.  He is just as certain that he married a widow as she is certain that she was a virgin.  Therefore neither is believed more than the other.  Since the woman wishes to extract money from the man, the burden of proof is upon her, as is the rule in all monetary claims.
  At the end of the last chapter there was a series of debates in which Rabbi Joshua consistently did not believe the woman and Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer did.  Our mishnah contains a case where Rabbi Joshua does believe the claim made (this time by a man).  The reason why he believes the man in this case is that he invokes a principle called, “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”.  This halakhic principle means that if a person says something which makes something forbidden to him he is also believed when he says something to make that very same thing permitted to him.  This Mishnah, and the few that will follow it (later in the Talmud) will illustrate this principle and limit its applicability.Section one: In this case Reuven approaches Shimon and tells him that the field that is currently in Reuven’s possession was purchased from Shimon’s father.  Shimon did not approach Reuven first claiming the field, nor is there any other evidence that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father.  Indeed, without Reuven having told Shimon that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father, we would have thought that the field was always Reuven’s.  In this case Reuven is the “mouth that forbade” when he said that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father.  He made a statement that was detrimental to himself.  Since he is the “mouth that forbade”, he is believed to be the “mouth that permits” and state that he purchased the field from Shimon’s father.  Reuven is believed even if he produces no evidence that he bought the field.  Had Reuven kept his mouth shut, Shimon would never have known that the field once belonged to his father.  Therefore, Reuven is believed when he says that it used to belong to Shimon’s father but he bought it from him.Section two:  In contrast, if witnesses come and state that the field was once Shimon’s father’s field, then Reuven is not “the mouth that forbade”.  He is only the “mouth that permits”, and he is therefore not believed.  After all, had he kept his mouth shut, the field would have been taken over by Shimon.  In order to retain possession of the field he will need to bring proof that he bought it.
  
  Daf 16a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to discuss the Mishnah.
  The Mishnah says that if there are witnesses that she was married with the customs of a virgin, then she is believed and she receives a ketubah of 200. The implication is that in the absence of witnesses, the husband is believed and her ketubah would be that of a widow. This would mean that this anonymous mishnah accords with Rabbi Joshua and not Rabban Gamaliel.
  This mishnah could accord even with Rabban Gamaliel (who always believed the woman in last week’s cases), for in this case both she and her husband are certain in their claims. He is certain that she did not wear the veil worn by virgins and she is certain that she did. Therefore, in this case, the woman does not win. In contrast, in the other mishnayot, she was certain, either that she was a mukat etz, or that she was raped after betrothal. In contrast, the husband is not certain that she lost her virginity through premarital intercourse. He can only be certain that he believes that she is not a virgin. That is why she is believed.
  The Talmud now asks why we ever questioned the relationship between this mishnah and that in the previous chapters. Obviously the case in this chapter is where both parties are certain. The answer is that we might have thought that since most women are virgins at their wedding (meaning most marriages are first marriages) she is certain and he is not certain. Therefore, this mishnah teaches that she is not believed, even according to Rabban Gamaliel.
  The Talmud now proves that Rabban Gamaliel agrees that in the case in this chapter’s Mishnah the woman is not believed. The Mishnah says “and Rabbi Joshua agrees” implying that just as Rabbi Joshua agrees in the second clause of this Mishnah (concerning the person who says, “This field was your fathers, but I bought it from him,” Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Rabbi Joshua in the first clause.However, this too is rejected. Rabbi Joshua may be agreeing with a principle that Rabban Gamaliel said in the previous chapter. This principle is called “miggo.” I have explained it above, but I will do so again here. It means that if someone makes a claim that is not the best claim they could have made, they are believed. The Talmud will delve into this in depth below. So stay tuned!
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that Rabbi Joshua’s statement in the second half of the first Mishnah of this chapter refers to a disagreement he had over a “miggo” in the first chapter. Again, a miggo is a case where a person made a certain legal claim but could have made a better claim. Generally in such cases, the person is believed. The logic is that if they wanted to lie, they would have made up a better lie. Therefore, they are assumed to be telling the truth. The Talmud now tries to find out what this refers to. Where is there a “miggo” that Rabbi Joshua disagrees with?
  In the case in this Mishnah, the woman made the best possible claim she could have made—the child is the offspring of a priest. Therefore, there is no “miggo.” So this cannot be the “miggo” with which Rabbi Joshua disagrees.
  According to Zeiri’s interpretation of this Mishnah, there would be a “miggo.” The woman is accused of being “secluded” with a man and she responds by admitting that she did have intercourse with him, but that he was a “kosher” guy—meaning sex with him would not disqualify her from subsequently marrying a priest. Had she wanted to make up a better claim, she could have said that she didn’t have sex at all. Therefore, when she admits she had sex, she is believed.But R. Assi interprets the phrase in the Mishnah, “she was talking” to mean that she is accused of having sex. So she could not have made any better claim. Therefore there is no “miggo.”
  In this Mishnah the wife says that she was a “mukat etz,” meaning she lost her virginity through some way other than sex, and her husband says that she lost her virginity through sex.According to R. Eliezer she is claiming a ketubah of 100 and her husband wants to give her nothing. She could have made a better claim—she could have said that she was a virgin at betrothal and then became “injured by a stick” after betrothal. If this were true, she would get a ketubah of 200. Therefore, she has a miggo and is believed when she says that she was injured by a stick before betrothal.But according to R. Yohanan, she is claiming a ketubah of 200, the highest level of ketubah she could possibly get. So what possible miggo could there be? 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues the search for the “miggo” which R. Joshua disagrees with. To put this another way, in what case mentioned in the mishnayot of the first chapter does the woman make a claim that was not the strongest claim she could have made.
  Finally the Talmud locates a case where the woman could indeed have made a better claim. The woman in this Mishnah responds to her husband’s claim that she was not a virgin by claiming that she was raped after betrothal. She will indeed receive the whole ketubah (if believed) but by claiming that she was raped after betrothal, she disqualifies herself from subsequently marrying a priest. [A woman who had sex with a man prohibited to her is forbidden from marrying a priest, even if that sex was not of her own choice.] She could have made a better claim here—she could have said that she was injured by a piece of wood after betrothal. With such a claim she would receive the full ketubah, and be allowed to marry a priest. Since she makes a worse claim, Rabban Gamaliel believes the worse claim that she actually makes.
  Joshua now says to Rabban Gamaliel that he believes the man who says, “This field belonged to your father but I bought it from him,” because he has a miggo (to be explained below). But in the case in the previous chapter, despite the existence of a miggo, R. Joshua does not believe the woman. 
  The Talmud now asks the obvious question—since R. Joshua accepts the principle of miggo, why does he believe the man who says, “This field was your fathers, but I bought it from you” but not the woman who says, “I was raped after betrothal”?The answer is that there is some evidence that she was not a virgin in the case regarding the woman. This is the “slaughtered ox”—i.e. evidence. But in the case in this chapter’s Mishnah, there is no evidence whatsoever as to whom the field belonged. The only evidence is the man’s words. He could have said, “This field was always mine” and we would never have known any different. Therefore, R. Joshua believes him when he says he bought it from the other person’s father.
  The Mishnah had stated that only if witnesses come to testify that she was married as a virgin does she receive a full ketubah. However, we also said earlier that the fact that most women are virgins at marriage might have turned the husband’s claim into “uncertain.” The Talmud picks up on that point and says that if most women are married as virgins, shouldn’t we just assume that she was a virgin as well. Why not believe her?The answer is that had she been a virgin, people would have known about it. A first time wedding is a big deal—it has a “voice”—people will talk about it. Since there does not seem to be clear communal knowledge that this woman was a virgin at her marriage, she loses the assumption that she is part of the majority.
  
  Daf 16b
  
  The Talmud now goes in the other direction. If people generally know when a woman is getting married for the first time, and no one is saying that this woman was married for the first time, then we should assume that she was not being married for the first time. The witnesses who come and say that this was her first marriage must be lying.Ravina therefore emends his statement from above. It is not always known that a woman being married is being married for the first time. It is just a case of “most.” Most of the time people will know that a woman is being married for the first time. But some of the time they will not. And since witnesses come and testify that this was her first marriage, we can assume that she was not part of the majority. She must have been the rare case of a woman who was married as a virgin but people did not know about it.
  IntroductionThe Mishnah had stated that if there were witnesses that she had worn the virgin’s veil at her wedding or witnesses to any other sign of this having been her first marriage, she receives a ketubah of 200 zuz. In other words, she basically collects her ketubah payment without producing the written document. The Talmud asks how we can be sure that she cannot collect her ketubah twice, once on the basis of witnesses and then a second time using the document itself.
  The Talmud offers two solutions to the problem I mentioned above. First of all, they could write a receipt for the husband when he pays out his ketubah. This way he will not have to pay twice. Second, the Mishnah could refer to a place where they do not write out ketubot, probably due to a lack of scribes. In such a place, there is no fear that she will be able to collect with a written document, for there is no such document.
  The Talmud now teaches the same traditions of R. Abbahu and Rav Papa but in reference to a different baraita. First the baraita mentions the possibility that there was a ketubah, but for some reason it has been misplaced. Next the baraita provides additional signs that the wedding was that of a virgin. If there are witnesses either to the ketubah or to the performance of one of these actions, then she is considered to have been wedded as a virgin.
  The problem now is how can Rav Papa say that this baraita refers to a place where they do not write the ketubah! First of all, the baraita says that “she lost her ketubah.” This, the Talmud explains, might mean that although they don’t normally write ketubot in this place, in this particular case the husband happened to have written her a ketubah.The problem then goes back to the same issue we had in the first place—if he wrote her a ketubah, what’s stopping her from collecting twice, once with witnesses and once with the document?
  As an answer, the Talmud interprets “she lost it” to mean “she lost it in the fire.”But this too is problematic. First of all, now the baraita is repetitive. Second, we would still have the problem if she hid it—she could take it out and collect twice. Third, if the baraita meant to teach that she lost it in the fire, why say that she lost it [this difficulty seems to really just be a repetition of the first one].
  To answer all of these difficulties the Talmud rephrases the baraita. If she lost her ketubah she must prove that it was burned. Until she does so, she does not collect any ketubah, for fear that she will collect twice.
  The sugya concludes, as these types of sugyot often do, by noting that the one who taught the amoraic statements of R. Abbahu and Rav Papa in reference to the baraita, would also teach these statements in reference to the Mishnah, where it is easier to apply them (mostly Rav Papa’s statement). But those who teach them in reference to the Mishnah would not teach them in reference to the baraita due to the difficulty of Rav Papa saying that the baraita refers to a place where they do not write ketubot, when the baraita explicitly mentions the writing of a ketubah.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to interpret the mishnah from the beginning of the chapter.
  Just as in yesterday’s section we had a fear that she would collect based on witnesses and then try to collect again based on the same evidence using other witnesses. So how do we prevent this?The answer is that if there is no other way of preventing this, then they have to write out a receipt.
  The Talmud now explains the symbolic meaning of the cup of wine passed before her at the wedding. The first explanation is that it is a cup of terumah wine. Terumah can only be consumed by a priest. So by passing terumah wine in front of her, we are symbolically saying that she was fit to be married by a priest.The problem is that while a divorcee will not be able to eat terumah if she is marrying a priest, a widow could. So how can this cup be a sign of her being a virgin, when a widow can have terumah?Rav Papa therefore applies a different symbolic meaning to the cup. Terumah is called “first” and it is this woman’s first marriage. So the terumah is symbolic of her.
  In a baraita, R. Judah mentions a slightly different practice performed at the weddings of virgins—they would pass a barrel of wine in front of them. Rav Adda son of Ahava clarifies this practice. They would pass a closed barrel in front of virgins and an open one in front of women who had already had intercourse.This practice is obviously insulting to the non-virgin. Why not just pass the barrel in front of the virgin and do nothing in front of the non-virgin.The answer is that sometimes positive testimony that she was married not as a virgin is required. If she seizes 200 zuz, the ketubah amount for a virgin, then if the practice was not to pass a barrel at all in front of a non-virgin, she could claim that they just did not have access to a barrel of wine. Therefore, they instituted the practice to pass an open barrel in front of a non-virgin so that everyone would know she is not a virgin. [I think it is significant that the Talmud notes that it is insulting to pass an open barrel in front of the non-virgin].
  This is a famous debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel—should one be honest with a bride about her appearance or should every bride be praised? Bet Hillel holds that despite the untruth, one should always strive to make others feel good, praising them and the things that they have bought. There is no reason whatsoever to tell a bride that she is not beautiful.
  
  Daf 17a
  
  IntroductionThis section continues to cite traditions about songs and dances at weddings.
  What is most fascinating to me about this source is the equation it draws between a bride on her wedding day and the rabbi receiving ordination. Both are described as graceful or beautiful gazelles, despite the fact that they do not wear any makeup or beautify themselves. The image of the physical and feminine beauty of the Torah scholar is common in rabbinic literature and probably represents a rejection of the normal masculine image.
  The meaning of some of the words I have translated is not particularly clear, but the general sense of the tradition is. When these two rabbis were ordained, this is the song that they sang to them.
  The Talmud is basically collecting stories of sayings stated in front of Rabbis concerning their beauty or related attributes. This one is simply when R. Abbahu would come to the Emperor’s court.
  These are more traditions concerning dancing in front of a bride before her wedding. To this day, in traditional circles it is customary for the rabbi to dance in front of the bride.
  This last story explores what might be the problem with some of this behavior—does it border on sexual impropriety. Rav Aha would actually put the bride on his shoulders and dance around with her. He warns his students that if they want to do this too, they must make sure that she is “like a beam,” meaning there are no sexual aspects to the act, then it is okay. But if they cannot help having sexual thoughts with the beautiful bride on their back, then they should refrain.
  Again, this source alludes to the overt sexuality at a wedding. Men at the wedding may look at a bride, for by their being sexually attracted to her, her husband’s desire for her will grow. However, the halakhah does not follow this tradition. According to this opinion, while there may be some positive benefits to engendering desire for the bride, the act is simply too fraught with danger.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss various aspects of the bridal procession.
  These kind of halakhot are how the rabbis express their value system. The value of a wedding is greater than the value of a funeral procession. While I doubt that such a conflict would in reality occur all that frequently, the rabbis say that the needs of the wedding take precedence.Finally, royalty and the honor and fear due to royalty take precedence over both. However, the story of Aggripa, who was king over Israel during the Second Temple period, seems to contradict this point—Aggripa forgoes his honor and allows the bridal procession to pass by in front of him. For his willingness to forgo his honor, the sages praise him.
  The Talmud now detects a problem with Aggripa’s behavior—kings are not supposed to forgo their own honor. We might think of this as respecting the office even if the person holding that office does not feel the need to be respected. So Aggripa should not have allowed the bridal procession to go in front of him.The resolution is that they were at a crossroads, such that it would not have looked to everyone as if he was letting the procession go in front of him. But had they not been at the crossroads, it would have been forbidden for Aggripa to allow the bridal procession to pass him.
  In this baraita we again see a hierarchy of values, but a complicated one. In the rabbinic mindset, few things rank higher than the study of Torah. But there are a few exceptions. To a certain extent, the needs of a bride and the burial of the dead take precedent over Torah study. But this is only true in a collective sense—the Torah studying community must ensure that the needs of the dead are taken care of. But, if there are already enough people at the funeral procession, the Torah scholar should continue to study Torah.
  Above, we said that if there are enough people for the funeral procession, then one does not interrupt Torah study. But what is enough? The simple sense sounds to me like a normal amount of people for a funeral, whatever that might have been. But the answers given are extremely large. It sounds to me like what these rabbis are basically saying is that there is no such thing as “enough” people at a funeral procession.At the conclusion of this passage, the soul is compared with the giving of the Torah—just as the Torah was given in front of 600,000 people, so too the soul, the inner Torah, should be taken away in the presence of 600,000 people. This is a beautiful image—our neshamot, our inner spirits and life force, are our own personal Torah.
  
  Daf 17b
  
  IntroductionToday’s short section defines the unusual word “hinuma” which I translated as a veil. This “hinuma” was the sign of her being a virgin.
  There are two definitions of the hinuma. The first is that it refers to the way the huppah itself was made. The second is that it refers to the veil. Since she sometimes falls asleep behind the veil. It is called “the veil under which the bride naps.”
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to explain the Mishnah.
  In the Mishnah R. Yohanan ben Beroka said that the passing out of parched grain is the sign of the wedding of a virgin. But that is the sign of proof only in Judea. This is not a universal custom (what is?).In Babylonia, evidently they would pour oil on heads of the rabbis at the wedding of a virgin.
  The dialogue here illustrates that not everyone knew of this custom. Evidently, R. Papa was puzzled by it. Abaye rebukes him, even making a not particularly nice reference to his mother!The Talmud then illustrates this with an actual story of this as it occurred at the wedding of a rabbi’s son.
  One might have thought that there might be a positive sign at the wedding of a widow, something to let everyone know that a widow was being married. But according to R. Joseph there is not. The sign that a widow is being married is simply the absence of the sign of a virgin being married—the distribution of roasted ears of grain.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to deal with the case in which R. Joshua agrees—if a person says to his fellow, this field belonged to your father and I bought it from him, he is believed.
  Joshua in the Mishnah illustrates the “migo” [a claim made when a better claim could have been made] with the case of a person who says “I bought this field from your father.” But why use this example when he could have stated a simpler case, “I bought this field from you.”The answer has to do with the second clause. If the first clause is a case of “I bought this field from you” and he is believed, then the second clause would have had to have been “I bought this field from you” and there are witnesses that it belonged to the other person. In such a case, since there are witnesses, the claimant has no “migo”—he could not have made a better claim. Therefore, he is not believed. Below we shall see the problem with this, had this been the case illustrated in the Mishnah.
  To understand this section I must explain the concept of hazakah. Hazakah means presumption or assumption. If a person uses a field, meaning eats its produce or shows that he owns it in some other way, for three years, he is assumed to own the field, even if the other person holds the deed. The idea is if the person holding the deed wanted to protest that another was using his field, he should have done so during those three years. The fact that he did not, means that he must have sold it to the person using it.So the problem in our Mishnah is why should his claim matter—all that should matter is whether he demonstrated ownership by eating the produce of the field.
  The problem is that even if the case involves the father—“I bought it from your father”—whether he is believed or not should hinge on whether he used it for three years and established “hazakah,” a presumption of ownership. Why does the Mishnah say that the claimant’s believability depends on the presence of witnesses who say that it once belonged to the other person’s father?The case in the Mishnah could work vis a vis the father, if the claimant used the field for two years while the father was alive and then one year after his death. These three years of use do not establish “hazakah” a presumption of ownership, because, as Rav Huna teaches, there needs to be three years of acting as owner in front of one person. Think of it this way—if the person used the field for two years while the father was still alive, the father may have intended to protest during the third year, as is his right. When the father died, the son should have three full years to protest as well. Thus hazakah is not a factor in this case.If this is the case, then the Mishnah works. If the only way we know that the field belonged to the other party’s father is through the claimant’s words, then he (the claimant) is believed. This is a case of “the mouth that prohibits is the same mouth that permits.” But if there is external evidence that the field belonged to the father, then the claimant must produce evidence to be believed.
  The Talmud now raises the problem that R. Huna seems to be teaching us what is already in the Mishnah. Why should he teach us something that we could have already derived from there? There are two answers to this [somewhat insignificant] difficulty. 1) He makes explicit what was only implicit in the Mishnah. 2) He adds the case where the son had already become of age. We might have thought that in this case, it would be sufficient for the person to use the field for two years in front of the father and one year in front of the son. Therefore, R. Huna teaches that it is not.
  IntroductionThis section continues yesterday’s discussion. There we learned that in order to establish hazakah, presumption of ownership, the possessor must use the land for three years in front of one person. If the person used the field for two years while the father was alive and one year while his son was alive, this is not sufficient.
  The Talmud still tries to find a case that does not involve the father and yet there is no hazakah. Such a case could be one where the possessor used the field for two years in front of the previous owner and then the owner ran away. Since he was not present to protest for three consecutive years, there is no hazakah. However, now the Talmud will examine what the specific case was.
  If the person fled due to danger to his life, he [the claimant] is obviously not believed. The original owner could not have protested because he was running away to save his life.
  The Talmud now proves that if the original owner fled for financial reasons, he should have protested, even if he was not in close proximity. This is learned from a Mishnah. The Mishnah divides Palestine into three regions for matters of hazakah. For the possessor to establish hazakah, the original owner must be in the same region. The Talmud will now use this to prove that one can protest even if he is not in the presence of the possessor.
  The Talmud refers to a discussion that occurred elsewhere concerning this Mishnah—can the original owner protest in the absence of the possessor? If he can, then why should he not be able to do so when they are in different regions? And then when he doesn’t protest, the hazakah should be valid. In other words, the fact that he can protest makes hazakah possible. And if he cannot protest when not in front of the possessor, then why should he be able to do so when they are in the same region, but not together?
  Abba bar Mamel says that according to the Mishnah one may protest in the absence of the possessor. The Mishnah says there is no hazakah when they are in different regions because they are so far apart that the possessor might not hear the original owner’s protest. If he doesn’t hear it, then he may not bother holding on to the document that he used to purchase the land from him. Since the protest cannot work, there can be no establishment of hazakah through possession. In other words, establishing hazakah works only when the original owner could protest and does not. If he could not protest effectively, then there is no such thing as hazakah.It always dangerous to travel from Judea to the Galilee. Therefore, these two lands were mentioned, but the same would be true for any two lands between which it is dangerous to travel.
  
  Daf 18a
  
  IntroductionThis section returns to asking the same question that was asked early on the previous page. Why does R. Joshua illustrate his law by citing the case of one who says, “This field belonged to your father and I bought it from him.” Why not use a different case?
  This case would seem to be a proper illustration of a migo—the person could have kept his mouth shut and no one would have known that he had borrowed a maneh from his friend. He is the mouth that prohibited (i.e. admitted that he owed money) and he is the mouth that permitted (said that he paid him back). So why not use this case?
  The problem with the above way of teaching the Mishnah would be that the last clause would have to read that if there are witnesses that he borrowed a maneh, then he is not believed to say he paid it back. This is not true—a person is believed to say he paid back a debt, at least from Torah law.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains another suggestion as to what the Mishnah could have taught instead of the case of “This field was your father’s and I bought it from him.”
  In this case, the person admitting that he had borrowed money claims to have paid back half. This would seem to be another cogent case of a migo—had he wanted he could have said he paid the whole thing back and no one would have known the difference.
  The problem with using the example of returning half of a debt is that it brings us into the case of the one who admits to owing a partial debt. In this case, R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says that he must take an oath that he doesn’t owe the rest of the money. Our Mishnah in Ketubot does not mention an oath, and therefore this case could not have been used according to this view. The other rabbis hold that a person who admits to owing half a debt is like one who returns a lost object. He is believed not because of any migo (he could have made a greater claim) but because we do not force people who are returning lost objects to take oaths that they are returning the entire amount. Even if the claimant asked for his father’s debt to be returned, the person would be believed to say that he already returned half because he is like someone returning a lost object.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section there was an implication that according to R. Eliezer b. Yaakov, when one returns a lost object, he may have to take an oath that he has returned the entire amount. The specific case had been a person who says, “I owed your father a maneh and now I am returning half.” The Talmud now questions whether R. Eliezer b. Yaakov indeed holds such a position.
  Rav answers the difficulty by saying that the person must take an oath that he already paid back half of the debt when a minor (we’ll call him Shimon) claimed that the person (Reuven) owed his father the debt. This is not really a case of “returning a lost object” because there was a claim of debt before Reuven announced that he had paid back half to Shimon’s father. In other cases, if someone is simply returning a lost object without someone making a claim against him, he would not have to take an oath that he was returning the whole amount.
  The problem with the above interpretation is that in general one does not have to take an oath in response to a claim put against him by a deaf-mute, person lacking sound senses or a minor, because we cannot have a high level of certainty concerning the veracity of these persons’ claims. So when the son claims that another person owed his deceased father money, the person being claimed against should not have to take an oath.For this reason, the Talmud reinterprets “minor” to mean “son of….” He is not really a minor, he is just regarded as a minor vis a vis the affairs of his father.
  We’re still not out of the woods yet. The baraita in yesterday’s section said that “sometimes a person must take an oath on his own statement.” The way we are now explaining this baraita is not that the Reuven initiated the statement by saying, “I owed your father money but I paid half.” Rather, Shimon, the son of the deceased father, initiated the claim.This problem is not solved, forcing the Talmud to now offer another explanation for this baraita.
  The concept explained here is called “the one who admits to owing part of a debt.” The idea is that if Shimon claims that Reuven owes him money, and Reuven admits to owing part of the debt, the Torah imposes an oath on him to verify his admission. The psychology of this halakhah is interesting. Reuven would not be so brazen as to deny an entire debt. Telling such a big lie directly to a person from whom one has borrowed money is just too much. But if Reuven does not have the money to pay back the full debt, he may allow himself a smaller lie—I only owe you half the money. To prevent people from denying half the debt, the Torah imposes an oath on Reuven in such a case.
  
  Daf 18b
  
  The Talmud now plugs the debate about the applicability of Rabbah’s statement back into the baraita on yesterday’s page. According to R. Eliezer b. Yaakov, a person would not be so brazen as to fully deny a debt no matter who is claiming the debt—the father or his son when the father is deceased. Even if the son is a minor, the debtor would not be so brazen. Therefore, this case of “I owed a maneh to your father and I paid him back half” is like any other admission to a partial debt—the debtor must take an oath. We cannot trust him because psychologically, this is the biggest lie he is capable of.But according to the other rabbis, psychologically people might tell a bald lie to the son of the original debt holder, and deny the whole debt. It is easier to lie to a person when the debt was not directly to him. Since he does not deny the whole debt, we believe him when he says that he has paid back half of the debt. To put this another way, the person was capable of denying any debt whatsoever. When he admits that he owes some of the money, he need not take an oath because he is acting graciously. We should trust him.
  IntroductionWe now move on to the next Mishnah. It contains another case illustrating the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits,” the operative principle from the first Mishnah of the chapter.
  Section one: In this scenario, a person comes to court with a document signed by witnesses.  When his opponent claims that the document is a forgery, the witnesses are summoned to the court to testify to their signatures.  The witnesses state that the signatures are indeed their signatures, but that nevertheless the document should not be upheld.  This is for one of three reasons:  they were forced to sign, they were minors when they signed, or they were disqualified witnesses (see Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:4).  In this case they are believed, and the document is invalid. This is because of the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”.  Without the witnesses’ admission that they signed the document, the document would have been invalid.  When they admit that they signed, they are in fact “the mouth that forbade.”  When they say they were forced, or that they were minors or otherwise disqualified, they are the mouth that permits, and they are believed.  To state this another way, if they had wanted to lie they could have said that this was not their handwriting.Section two:  If their signature can be validated in another way, for instance by other witnesses testifying that they recognize the signatures, or by another document that contains their signatures, then the witnesses are not believed when they say that they were forced, or they were minors or otherwise disqualified.  This is not a situation where “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”.  Since they are not believed to say that they were invalid, their signatures are validated and the document is upheld.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the clause in the Mishnah where witnesses say that they did sign the document, but that they did so under duress.
  At this stage of the sugya, Rami b. Hama is understood as relating to the second clause in the Mishnah—the witnesses are not believed to say they signed under duress because there were other witnesses attesting to their signatures. Rami b. Hama says that this is true only if they were essentially bribed to sign on the document. If they claim they were forced by threat to life to sign on the document, then they are believed. The logic seems to be that the witnesses did not have any choice but to sign the document.
  Rava says that a witness cannot simply recant his testimony, even if he claims that he signed under threat to his life. If witnesses could do so, their testimony would essentially be meaningless. This is true whether their testimony was oral or by signing a document—once a person has testified, he cannot recant.
  Due to Rava’s difficulty, the Talmud shifts the section of the Mishnah on which Rami b. Hama was commenting (this is a common move). He was referring to the first clause, where the witnesses are believed to recant their testimony. They are believed only if they claim that they signed under physical duress. If they claim that they signed under the influence of a monetary threat (or bribe) they are not believed, because saying that one accepted a bribe is making oneself out to be wicked. This is a form of self-incrimination, which is generally unacceptable in Jewish law. Therefore, the person is not believed to recant his testimony. His signature on the document will stand.
  IntroductionIn this last section of this daf, R. Meir argues against the Mishnah, according to which witnesses are allowed to recant their testimony.
  According to the Mishnah, witnesses who signed on a document are believed to say that they signed under duress, were minors or were otherwise disqualified to testify. This would invalidate the document. Here in a baraita we see that this opinion was that of the majority of rabbis, who hold that as long as we have a case of “the mouth that prohibited [signed] is the same mouth that permits [retracts testimony]” then they are believed.Rabbi Meir, however, disagrees. In essence he is saying we don’t believe the witnesses when they try to retract their testimony. The Talmud asks what his reasoning is.
  Rabbi Meir does not believe witnesses who claim that they were “disqualified from testifying” because we can assume that the creditor assure that the witnesses were valid witnesses before having them sign the document.
  If the witnesses claim they were minors, and therefore invalid to testify, R. Meir discounts their retraction because there is an overriding presumption that all of the parties to the document, the lender, the borrower and the witnesses, were of majority age.
  
  Daf 19a
  
  Hisda explains that if the witnesses claim that they were forced to sign the document they are not believed because had they actually been faced with the choice of signing a false document or being killed, they should have chosen the latter. Therefore, even if they say that they were forced by threat to life, they are incriminating themselves and they are not believed.
  Rava raises a significant problem with R. Hisda’s explanation. We have a tradition that the saving of a life takes precedence over everything except for three prohibitions—idolatry, illicit sexual acts and murder. So he was justified in signing the document under duress, and should be believed later to recant.
  Rav here provides an entirely different reasoning for R. Meir. Once a debtor admits that he wrote up a debt document (or agreed to have one written on his behalf) the creditor need not ascertain the validity of the witnesses. Therefore, this document was already valid. We did not need witnesses to validate it. If so, then we do not have a case of “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits” because it was the debtor that really “prohibited” by admitting that he had the document written up.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss the tradition that was found at the end of last week’s daf.
  Rav had said that if a borrower admits that he had a debt document written up and signed by witnesses, the lender does not need to confirm it by bringing the witnesses to the court. In this case, the borrower will not be believed to say that he repaid the debt, so long as the document is in the hands of the creditor. Above, this opinion was identified with R. Meir who had said that if the witnesses say they signed the document, they are not believed to say that they did so under duress. R. Nahman therefore criticizes him—why make a statement as if it is anonymous, when really what you’re saying is that the halakhah follows R. Meir?
  Nahman actually disagrees with Rav. When creditors come to his court with signed documents, but without being able to confirm the witnesses, he tells them to go and get the witnesses confirmed. Only then will he allow them to collect the debts.
  IntroductionThis sugya discusses a “loan document of trust.” This is a document which states that Reuven loaned money to Shimon. However, the loan did not really occur. The document was drawn up so that Reuven could give the money to Shimon any time he wants, without having to find a scribe to write up the document.
  One of the parties to this document holds the document and says that although it says that Reuven loaned to Shimon, Reuven has not yet given the money and therefore Shimon owes him nothing. Rav says the one who makes this statement is believed. The question is—who said that it was only a loan of trust. If it was the debtor, then why should we believe him? By saying that it is only a loan of trust, he is in denying his debt. If the creditor said it, why shouldn’t we believe him. Even if he did really loan the money, he always has a right to forgive the loan.
  So now the Talmud examines the possibility that the witnesses made the statement. But this too is problematic. If we can verify the witnesses’ signatures through another document, then obviously they are not believed. We would have a case here that is not “the mouth that forbids is the same mouth that permits” for we do not need the witnesses’ testimony at all. And if their signature cannot be verified from elsewhere, then why should they not be believed. This is indeed a case of “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits,” for without their affirmation, the document would not be valid at all.
  Before the explanations begin, the Talmud records a mnemonic to help remember the order of the rabbis.According to Rava (B), it was the debtor who said that it was a deed of trust and he is indeed not believed. Once he has admitted that he had the document written up, he cannot go back and claim that it was only a deed of trust.
  Abaye (A) says that the creditor says it, and yet he is not believed, despite the fact that in most such cases he is only doing injury to himself. This specific case refers to an instance where the creditor also owes money to another party. By denying that this document is a real deed of debt, he is ultimately denying income to the person to whom he owes money. Therefore, he is not believed.
  1. Ashi (SH) says that the witnesses say that it was only a deed of trust, and that this is a case where there was no other confirmation of their signatures. The question asked above is why this is not a case of “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits” and we should believe these witnesses. The answer is that the law prohibits holding on to a deed of trust. Such a deed could lead to unrighteousness, for a person could claim that he is owed money even if he never lent it out. Therefore, we must assume that this is not just a loan of trust and that the creditor actually loaned out the money.
  
  Daf 19b
  
  This is further support for why we don’t believe witnesses who say that the deed was only a loan of trust. Since, as we saw above, loans of trust are forbidden and lead to unrighteousness, we make the assumption that the loan document was real, meaning the loan actually occurred.
  IntroductionThis section continues to deal with unrighteousness and debt documents.
  The verse used here is the same used at the end of yesterday’s section. A creditor should not hold on to a paid debt document, because such a document might be used to collect a second time. Even if he does not intend to use the document in such a way, a person should do all he can to distance himself from such a possibility.
  The “West” here refers to the land of Israel for it is west of Babylonia. Rav interprets the entire verse from Job as referring to the retention of various types of deeds. The only example we have not yet seen is the “deed of sale for accommodation.” Elsewhere, Rashi explains that this is a deed through which a person fictitiously gets rid of their property so as to prevent another person from having a claim on them. For instance, a woman might want to give her property to someone else when she gets married so that her husband would have no rights to them. The idea is that she is not really giving him the property—she’s just trying to avoid the property from coming under her husband’s control.
  There were two different opinions as to the application of the verse “And let not unrighteousness dwell in your tents.” In today’s section it refers to a paid bill of debt, but in yesterday’s section it referred to a loan deed of trust (the loan never happened). As the Talmud often does, it compares these two applications of the verse. The one who says that holding on to a paid bill of debt is morally wrong would also oppose holding on to a loan deed of trust. However, the opposite is not true. The one who opposes holding on to a loan deed of trust may allow one, under certain circumstances, to hold on to a paid bill of debt, for at times the debt is held by the scribe in order for him to collect his fees.
  IntroductionThe previous section discussed certain documents that one should not keep in one’s house. Today’s section begins with a reference to scrolls (books) of Holy Scripture that one should not have in one’s possession.
  The problem with keeping an uncorrected scroll (of the Bible) in one’s home is that it might be used and the error in the book would then be perpetuated. We must remember that in this period all books had to be copied by hand from another scroll. The fear that an uncorrected version would begin to spread is quite understandable.
  We have already explained what a deed of trust was—a deed drawn up only in case someone needs to borrow money later on. If the witnesses testify that while they did sign the document, the loan was not executed, they are not believed. By signing the document they are testifying that the loan did happen, and once they testify, they cannot retract. Furthermore, as we have learned, it is forbidden to write up such a document in the first place.The same is true if they testify that along with a sale or loan there was a declaration of duress. For instance, Reuven sold his property to Shimon, but along with the sale he told the witnesses that he was doing so only under duress. Again, witnesses are not believed to say this, because a person should not sign such a document in the first place.
  Mar bar Rav Ashi disagrees with Rava concerning the latter case. It is forbidden to write up a deed of trust, as we learned in the past two sections. But it is permitted to write up a document that is accompanied by a declaration in order to protect the seller who was being forced by the buyer to sell. Indeed, one could argue that under certain circumstances one would have to write such a document. Since the document can be written, the witnesses are believed to say that the deed was written up under duress.
  IntroductionThis section continues yesterday’s discussion concerning witnesses who attest to their signatures on a document but at the same time somehow undermine the document’s validity.
  Rava asks if witnesses are believed if they add that the sale was made on condition and that as far as they know, the condition has not been fulfilled. Are they believed? On the one hand, just as was true in the case of witnesses who testify that the deed was of trust or was accompanied by a declaration, their words would invalidate the document and therefore they should not be believed. On the other hand, maybe they are believed because they are testifying that the document was valid. Their testimony that there was a condition placed on the sale is separate testimony, and perhaps there is no reason to reject it.
  Nahman answered him that indeed the witnesses are believed. When such a document would come in front of him in court, he would tell the parties to go fulfill the conditions attested to by the witnesses, and then they should come back to the court.
  Nahman above determined that witnesses can testify to there being a condition on the document. Here the situation becomes more complex—both witnesses testify to the general validity of the document, but one says that it was accompanied by a condition, and one denies the existence of a condition.Papa says that since we have two witnesses on the document, the document itself is valid. But the condition does not have two witnesses and therefore it not valid.
  Huna son of R. Joshua brings up a problem. Even if they both say that there was a condition we should not believe them because once they have testified to the validity of the document, they cannot testify again as to its invalidity.Rather, in general we consider witnesses who say that there was a condition on the document and that it has not been fulfilled as uprooting their testimony, not adding to it. Therefore, even if one uproots his testimony, the document is left without two valid witnesses and it is invalid.
  IntroductionThis section discusses a baraita similar to the Mishnah above that illustrated the principle of “the mouth that prohibited is the same mouth that permits.”
  But if there are other witnesses that this is their handwriting or their handwriting comes out from another place, from a document which was challenged and then confirmed in a court of law, they are not believed.This baraita echoes the Mishnah, except the original witnesses died. Their testimony can be confirmed either by other witnesses who recognize the signature of the original witnesses or by their signatures being compared to another document that had been confirmed in a court.If witnesses testify that this is indeed the signature of the original witnesses, but that their testimony should be invalid for one of three reasons (the same as those found in the Mishnah), then they are believed. This is a case of “the mouth that prohibits (testifying to the validity of the document) is the same mouth that permits (testifying to the invalidity of the testimony).”However, if the dead witnesses’ signatures can be confirmed from elsewhere we don’t have a case of “the mouth that permits is the mouth that prohibits.” Therefore, is considered valid, despite the second set of witnesses who have testified to its invalidity.
  The Talmud questions why we should consider this a valid document. After all, we have two witnesses who say that the document is valid and two who say it is not. Why should one set be given priority over the other?Sheshet answers that the original witnesses need to be contradicted in their presence. This is a rule adopted from the rules of rebuttal—cases where the second set of witnesses say that the first set of witnesses were not even there to witness the event, but were with them elsewhere. Just as “rebuttal” must be in front of the original witnesses, so too must “contradiction.”
  
  Daf 20a
  
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s section R. Sheshet stated that witnesses can be contradicted only in their presence. Here, R. Nahman challenges that assumption.
  Let’s remind ourselves of the case under discussion. Two witnesses are signed on a document and then die. Their signature is attested to by two other witnesses or confirmed by another document. Then come along two witnesses who say that the original signature was signed under duress or was otherwise not valid. The baraita had ruled that these latter witnesses are not believed and that the document can be used. R. Sheshet had said that this was because the original two witnesses who signed the document were not here such that they could be contradicted. Therefore, their testimony stands. But R. Nahman notes that this is absurd—maybe if they had been here they would have agreed that their testimony was invalid. Why then should the original witnesses’ testimony still stand?
  Nahman said that what happens here is that the sets of witnesses offset each other—one set says the document is valid and one set says it is not. In such a case we are left with no testimony. So what does the court do? The money remains in the hands of the one who possesses it, which is in this case the borrower, who need not pay back the debt. When the baraita said that the latter witnesses were not believed to validate the document, it meant that the document was not torn up. If it were to be confirmed later on, it could be used to collect the debt. Also, if the opposite party (the creditor) were to seize the debt, he would now be the possessor and it would be impossible to take it back from him without proof.
  The above resolution is similar to the ruling of R. Ashi concerning a lunatic who sold property. If he sold it during a time of lucidity, the sale is valid. But if he sold it at a moment of madness, the sale is not valid. There are two sets of witnesses who dispute when he sold the property. R. Ashi says that each set cancels the other out and we are left with no testimony. Since the last known owner is the lunatic, the property remains in his hands.
  The Talmud limits R. Ashi’s rule to a case where the field was part of the lunatic’s heritage. In this case, he is the presumptive owner because it was his family’s field. However, if he himself bought the field, then is not the presumptive owner because it is possible that he acquired it in a moment of lunacy. Therefore, we do not assume that the field is his. It would belong to the person who acquired it from him.
  IntroductionTo understand the first part of this section I should better explain what “rebuttal” (הזמה) of witnesses is and how it differs from contradiction.“Rebuttal” is when a second set of witnesses come to the court and say that the first set could not possibly have known that which they testified about, because they were in another place on that day. In other words, they rebut the very possibility that the first set of witnesses could actually be witnesses. Contradiction is simpler—the second set provides different details as to the event (i.e. first group says Joe was the killer and the second group says it was Jon). Another difference is that if witnesses are “rebutted” they receive the punishment they tried to dish out on the accused. But if they are only contradicted, no such consequences are suffered.The topic of rebuttal is discussed in the first chapter of Makkot.
  According to R. Abbahu, the laws of rebuttal are more stringent than the laws of contradiction. This is probably due to the seriousness of the punishment of rebutted witnesses. Since they are punished for their false testimony, the accusations against them must be in their presence.
  The Talmud now returns to discussing a baraita from Daf Yod Tet. That baraita had said that if there was a document confirming the witnesses’ signature, then the second set of witnesses are not believed to state that the first set signed under duress, were minors or disqualified in some other way. But for the document to be used to prove the signatures, it must have been contested and then upheld in the court. Otherwise, the second document’s validity is not assured either. A contested and upheld document is known to be valid, similar to the way we require notarization today.
  The Nehardeans, a group of rabbis from the Babylonian city of Nehardea, say that in order to uphold the signatures on a document there need to be either two ketubot to confirm their signatures or sales documents of two fields. The sale of those two fields needs to itself have gone unprotested, meaning the purchasers used the fields for three years without a protest. If the sale of the field went unprotested, we can be sure that the signatures are valid.
  Shimi bar Ashi says that these other two documents used to confirm the signatures in a third document must come from a second party, and not belong to the person who wants to uphold the signatures in the third document. If the party wishing to uphold the documents owns the other two documents, we fear he may have forged the signatures. This would not have been difficult because he owned them both. If the other two documents belong to someone else, then forgery will be more difficult because he would have to look at them, memorize the signatures and then go home and forge them. This is obviously too difficult, almost an impossible task, and therefore we are not concerned with such a possibility.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses writing a document to remember something that one has seen.
  The baraita teaches that if a person witnesses something, he may write down a written record, an affidavit, of what he saw. Then he may use this document to recall the events he saw and testify about them, even after several years.
  Huna seems to question the legality of remembering the testimony by aid of a document. Therefore, in order for the person to testify, he must remember at least some of the events himself.Yohanan, on the other hand, has no such doubts. Even if he remembers nothing, as long as he wrote something down, he can rely on his written record. Rashi adds that after he looks at the document, he must recall the events himself. In other words, even according to R. Yohanan, he must remember a little. He uses the document to remind himself, but he testifies from what he remembers, not just what is written down.Rabbah takes this a step further. If two people witness an event together and later one forgets what happened, one person can remind another person. This, to Rabbah, is similar to remembering through a written document.
  IntroductionThis section continues the discussion in yesterday’s section where we learned that if two people witness an event, and one forgets some details, one witness can remind the other of what occurred.
  There is a debate here whether the litigant himself may remind the witness of what he saw. The ruling is that he may not. We fear that since the litigant has a stake in the issue, he may cause the witness to falsely remember the events. The other witness is not a party to the issue, and therefore we trust that he will not unfairly bias the second witness.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  If the witness is a Torah scholar, then he may be reminded of his testimony even by the litigant himself. This is illustrated by a story involving Rav Kahana and Rav Ashi. Rav Ashi is reminded of the events by Rav Kahana, but on being reminded, he remembers what happened himself. His testimony is accepted. This seems to be an explanation for the entire sugya—the witness is reminded of his testimony, but we (at times) trust that what he is remembering is his own testimony, and not the words of others being placed in his mouth. 
  IntroductionToday’s section relates only tangentially to the previous sugya—both are concerned with memory. The immediate issue here is the purity or impurity of mounds. The fear is that a body (or part thereof) was buried underneath the mound.The end of the sugya connects this issue to the larger issue of testimony that we have been discussing in Ketubot.
  If the mound is near the town or road, we can assume it is unclean, for when want to bury a body, they don’t want to wander too far away from the town or off the road. If they are not so near, then it depends on whether they are new or old. It is more likely that one would remember if the mound was used for burial if it is newer.Meir defines near and old in absolute terms—near is fifty cubits and old is sixty years. In contrast, R. Judah offers relative terms. Near means it is the closest mound to the road or town and old is so sold that no one remembers it.
  The Talmud now brings up a problem with the baraita. There is a principle that we don’t assume that ground is impure. So how can we just make a blanket assumption that any mound outside of the city or road is impure?Zera therefore limits the applicability of the rule in the baraita. Only the mounds near a town near a burial place are impure. And only the mounds near a road near a burial place are impure. In other cases, we don’t assume that any old mound was used as a burial place.
  The problem with R. Zera’s solution is that if the town and road are near the burial place, then why would people bury in mounds—why not just bury in the cemetery?With a road this makes some sense, because sometimes it might happen that it gets dark on the way to the cemetery and people fear going there at night. Therefore, they bury in a mound on the side of the road. But if we are talking about a town near a cemetery, why would people bury in mounds and not just go to the cemetery itself?Hanina answers that there are some special categories of people who might bury in one of these mounds, namely people who are not burying bodies, but rather either abortions (or miscarriages) or limbs. The Talmud assumes that the women bury their own miscarriages alone and therefore might fear going too far. If the burial place is close, within fifty cubits, she will go there alone. But if it is further away, she would take a man with her and go to the cemetery. If she cannot find a man, we fear that she might bury the miscarriage in a mound on the side of the road.[R. Hanina’s statement seems to actually explain why people would bury in mounds in the first place. It seems less of an answer as to why we assume that near ones are impure and distant ones are impure.]
  But this general principle is rejected by the Talmud. R. Meir refers to a specific instance—the mounds found outside a city or off a road. It’s not his responsibility to remember what was placed in these mounds, therefore he will not remember it. But if a person is appointed to witness something, he may remember it even after sixty years. A person is more likely to remember something if he is told to remember it. He won’t remember as well things that he just happens to have seen.
  IntroductionThe section is a mishnah which continues the discussion concerning witnesses who testify about their signatures.
  Section one:  Generally, two witnesses are required to create valid testimony in Jewish law.  In order to validate a signature, two witnesses are needed to validage each signature on the document.  If each witness affirms his own signature and the other person’s signature, then both signatures on the document have been affirmed by two people, and the document has been validated.Section two: However, if each person cannot affirm the other signature on the document, they must find another person to affirm the signature.  Note that one person can affirm both signatures, so long as he recognizes them both.  All of this is Rabbi Judah Hanasi’s opinion.  He holds that the witnesses are actually testifying about their signatures and therefore we need two witnesses on each signature.The Sages hold that a person is believed when he affirms his signature.  Therefore, neither needs to bring someone else to join his affirmation.  The Sages reason that the witnesses are actually testifying as to the contents of the document.  Hence the two are in and of themselves sufficient.
  
  Daf 21a
  
  IntroductionThis section begins to discuss the mishnah from the end of last week’s daf.
  In the Mishnah, Rabbi Judah Hanasi said that each witness testifies to his own signature and then a third witness must testify as to the validity of both signatures. This implies that the witnesses are testifying as to the handwriting in the document. That’s why they need a third party—each signature requires two witnesses to uphold it.But the sages say that when they affirm their signatures, they give evidence as to the contents of the document itself. Therefore they don’t need a third party to join with them, for there are two witnesses as to the validity of the document.
  The Talmud says that the above interpretation is obvious—why bother stating it. To answer this, they explain that it is certain to Rebbe that they are testifying as to their signatures and not the contents of the document. This is true whether it results in a leniency or a stringency (in the Mishnah, Rebbe was strict). For if Rebbe was uncertain, we might have said that in some cases, he would hold that they were testifying to the contents. This would have ramifications in the case where one of the witnesses died. We might have thought that Rebbe would not allow the living witness to testify to the signature of the dead witness for then ¾ of the testimony would be based on one witness (his own half and half of the other witness’s testimony). Therefore, the Mishnah teaches us that Rebbe holds that they are testifying as to their own signature, whether this results in a leniency (as in this case) or a stringency (in the case of the Mishnah). Since they are not testifying as to the contents of the document, if one died, we would not consider this as if one witness accounted for ¾ of the testimony.
  This is the case where Rebbe would be lenient and the other sages would be strict. Rebbe would say that since they are testifying to the validity of their own signatures, this is not a case of ¾ of the testimony being based on one witness. But the sages would say that since they are testifying as to the contents of the document, we would need two outsiders to uphold the dead witness’s signature. Rav holds like the sages.
  Abaye provides a remedy for a case where we cannot find two witnesses to testify to the signature of the dead witness. The living witness would sign a piece of clay and that signature would be used to uphold his own signature. This would free him to testify about the other party’s signature, without encountering the problem that ¾ of the testimony is based on one person’s signature.
  He should write his name on a piece of clay but not on a piece of scroll. It would be dangerous to write one’s name on a piece of a scroll for someone could write on the top of the scroll an IOU document. Such a document has some validity—it can be used to collect from unmortgaged property. Writing it on a small piece of clay would prevent such a forgery.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with Shmuel’s halakhic ruling in accordance with the sages of the Mishnah who said that a person is believed to testify about his own signature. Each witness could come to the court and simply say—that is my signature.
  Shmuel rules that the halakhah is in accordance with the sages. But this is obvious—the halakhah is always according to the majority (at least almost always). So why does Shmuel need to state the obvious! The answer is that we might have thought that since the halakhah follows Rebbe when he disputes a singular sage, the halakhah follows Rebbe even when he disputes the majority. Therefore Shmuel had to teach us that the halakhah follows the sages.
  The mnemonic at the beginning of this section is meant to help remember who spoke to Rav Judah. What is significant is the document that came out of Shmuel’s court. On it was stated that both witnesses whose signature was on a document testified as to the validity of their own signature and that of the other witness. This seems to follow Rebbe’s opinion in the Mishnah—the witnesses testify about the signatures and therefore two witnesses are required to testify on each signature. This contradicts Shmuel’s own ruling, where he says that the halakhah follows the sages, and that each person can testify alone as to his signature.
  The answer is that Shmuel ruled strictly in this case for the deed was related to the property of orphans. Shmuel was worried that if he ruled leniently according to the sages, a subsequent court might rule like Rebbe and thereby disqualify the document. To offer extra security that the orphans’ documentation would not be damaged, Shmuel had two people testify to the validity of each signature.
  IntroductionToday’s section starts to go deeper into some of the rules of testimony. This is a topic the Talmud will address now for a while.
  If a document has been upheld by a court it will have on it the signatures of two witnesses and three judges. According to Shmuel, if later one someone comes to protest the validity of the document, one witness can testify together with one judge to validate the document.
  While Rami b. Hama thought that the above statement by Rav Judah was excellent, Rava disagreed. The problem is that the judge testifies that the document was upheld in the court, and the witness testifies that he saw the transaction. How can different testimonies join together to become one?Rami b. Ezekiel even says that we should not listen to the rules that Rav Judah, his brother said in the name of Shmuel. According to Rami, his brother does not accurately transmit Shmuel’s statements.
  
  Daf 21b
  
  This section echoes the one above. Amemar praises the tradition that Shmuel allowed a witness and judge to be joined into one testimony. But R. Ashi disagrees, this time accusing him of familial preference. Rami bar Hama was Amemar’s maternal grandfather, so R. Ashi thinks that Amemar praised the tradition because it was from his own grandfather. But Rava already refuted it above.
  Three judges are sitting in court to uphold the validity of a document. Two judges recognize the witnesses’ signatures but one does not. Before the judges have signed their attestation to the document, they can act as witnesses, testify in front of the third judge, and then go back to acting as judges and sign the attestation to the document. But once they have signed the document, they are judges and cannot act as witnesses.
  There is still a small problem—the attestation of the document says, “We were three sitting in judgment and we were informed…” But according to the above, this was written before all three could have been judges—only two knew of the signatures. Only the signing of the attestation occurred after the testimony. Therefore, what really needs to be done is for the attestation to be written after the two have testified before the third.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if two judges recognize the signatures on a document, they may first testify in front of the third as to the validity of the signature and then the three may jointly attest to the document’s validity. Today’s section draws (or at least tries to draw) some lessons from that case.
  The Talmud now learns from this three lessons. We will now examine the latter two of these lessons.
  Ashi accepts that a witness can become a judge as a proper inference from the above case. But how do we know that in general if the judges recognize the signatures there is no need to testify in front of them. It is true that in this case only one of the judges heard the testimony (the judge who did not recognize the signature) and two judges did not (the two who recognized the signature). But this case may be different because there was some testimony in front of at least one of the judges. It may be true that if all three judges recognized the signatures, there would still be a formal need for someone to testify in front of them.
  The third lesson was that there needs to be individual testimony in front of each judge who does not recognize the signature. But this case might be exceptional too, for the testimony of the two was the only testimony given. If two judges had not recognized the signatures, it might have been sufficient to have two witnesses testify in front of them together.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the halakhah that a witness can become a judge.
  Safra used a mishnah from Rosh Hashanah concerning the sanctification of the new moon as a difficulty on the notion that a witness can become a judge. The mishnah teaches that if two of the judges see the new moon, they cannot simply testify to the third judge, and then be part of the court and sanctify the new month themselves. Rather, they find replacement judges, and then the two that saw the new moon testify in front of the other judges. If the witnesses could become judges, this would not be necessary.
  A series of amoraim also find this question difficult and eventually the question is answered by Rav. The sanctification of the new moon was considered to be a biblical commandment, and therefore a witness cannot become a judge. But the upholding of a document, meaning the confirmation of its validity, is not a biblical commandment. Therefore the rules can be slightly relaxed.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the laws of upholding the validity of a document
  Three judges sit in court in order to uphold a document, but a protest is raised against one of them (below the Talmud will explore what this protest was). The other judges can act as witnesses on his behalf, but only if they do so before they sign on the attestation. If they have already signed, in other words, if they have already acted as judges, they cannot go back and act as witnesses on the third judge’s behalf. Rashi explains that the reason is that they are self-interested parties. It does not look good for them to have signed with a disqualified judge.
  What was stated about the judge that could disqualify him? The first possibility is the accusation that he is a robber. The problem with this is that he should not be validated by the second set of witnesses, because we have two versus two—two witnesses say he is a thief and two say he is not. This would not be sufficient to validate him as a judge. But if it is a matter of a family blemish (he is a slave-slaves were not allowed to testify) then they could just check into the matter and find out the truth. Why would we even need witnesses?The resolution is that the first two testified that he is a robber, but the second two do not deny this. Rather they testify that he has repented. This shows the power of repentance. Denial that he was a thief does not validate him to serve as a judge, once proper testimony has been served against him. But he can be restored to being a judge if evidence of repentance is offered.
  
  Daf 22a
  
  Three judges are sitting to confirm the validity of a document, and before all three can sign, one dies. To avoid having to go through the process all over again, two can write in the document that they were in a session of three and one died. In essence they are testifying themselves as to the fact that they once were a court of three. But if they don’t write this in the document, then someone who sees two signatures on the attestation will think that the court had only two, and this is not sufficient to form a court.
  Nahman b. Yitzchak says that they only need to write that they were a “court of law.” Since a court has to consist of three judges, we can assume this document’s validity. The Talmud adds that to ensure that this was not a court of only two judges, which would be valid in accordance with Shmuel’s rule that two judges can act as a court (although they should not do so, because this is considered acting arrogantly), they must write in it, “The court of our Master Ashi (the great rabbi Rav Ashi) and our Master Ashi told us.” Rav Ashi evidently ruled that a court of two was not sufficient.
  IntroductionThis mishnah in today’s section to discusses cases that illustrate the principle “the mouth that forbade was the mouth that permitted.”
  ExplanationSection one:If the woman herself provides the information that she was married, but then says she is now single because she was divorced, she is believed, because the same mouth that permitted, forbade.  However, if other witnesses testify that she was married, she is not believed when she says she is divorced.  In order to remarry, she will need to bring proof, either with a document or witnesses.Section two:  If a woman is taken captive by a non-Jew, she is assumed to have been raped and is subsequently forbidden to marry a priest.  This is because she has had forbidden sexual relations, and priests cannot marry anyone who has had relations with some forbidden to them, even if the relations were against her will.  If the woman says that she was taken captive, and that information is not otherwise known, she is now “the mouth that forbade”.  Hence, when she says that she remained clean, i.e. she was not raped, she is believed and she can marry a priest.  However, if other witnesses testify that she was taken captive, she is no longer the “mouth that forbade”.  Therefore, she is not believed to permit herself to a priest.If before the witnesses come and state that she was taken captive, she marries a priest, he is not obligated to divorce her.  This is because it is not certain that she was raped.  The Talmud says that even if she received permission to remarry before the witnesses came, she may marry a priest.  According to the Talmud, what is essential is that at the point when she was “the mouth that permitted” there was not an earlier “mouth that forbade”.  Therefore, as long as she makes her statement before the witnesses come, she will be allowed to marry a priest.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the mishnaic principle, “The mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permits.”
  Assi searches for biblical support text for the mishnaic principle of “the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permits.” He locates this principle in the verse where a father says that he gave his daughter “to this man.” The phrase “to a man” is understood as if the father said, “I gave to a man but I’m not sure which one.” This would make her prohibited to all of the world because she could be married to any one of them. When he says “to this” he makes her permitted to this man.
  The Talmud rejects the use of the verse for this purpose—the idea that a person who prohibited something can then make it permitted is simple logic. No special reading of a verse is necessary.Rather, the verse from Deuteronomy teaches us the simpler principle—a father has a right to make a statement that would cause his daughter to be prohibited to the rest of the world by marrying her off to one man. [This right is limited; he may not do so after she reaches a certain age].
  If the word “this” is not needed for the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits” then what do we need it for. R. Jonah uses it in reference to its original context, concerning the man who says that his wife was not a virgin. R. Jonah says that it refers to a case where the husband himself makes the claim, and not the brother-in-law. The brother-in-law would be in position to make this claim if his brother died after betrothing but before wedding his wife. The brother-in-law cannot make a virginity claim.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses a woman who at first says she is married and then changes her statement and says she is unmarried. Is she allowed to marry someone else, under the assumption that her second statement was true.
  This baraita seems to illustrate the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits.” She says that she was married—thereby prohibiting her to any other man. She now says that she is unmarried, she is believed.
  The problem with this baraita is that she is not explaining that she once was married and now is not. She is actually contradicting her first statement. And the problem with this is that once she says she is married, she has prohibited herself to anyone else (except her husband). She is now in the status of “forbidden.” How can she simply undo this statement, make herself permitted, by saying that she is not married?
  The answer is that for her to be believed, she has to provide a plausible reason for why she at first said that she was unmarried. If she simply says, “I am married” and then contradicts herself, she is not believed to say that she is unmarried. However, if she offers a plausible explanation, then she is believed. The Talmud will now illustrate what a plausible explanation might be.
  The example of a plausible reason is that she rebuffed some other men by saying that she was already betrothed. She only said this because she did not want to marry these other men. When she found someone whom she wanted to marry, she agreed to be betrothed to him.Interestingly, this discussion is one of the few cases where we see women given some license as to choosing a partner. It was not her father, brother or any other family member who is deciding to whom she will be betrothed. It was her choice. And the strategy seems to be one still employed to this day—tell someone offering unwanted attention that you are already involved with someone else. Timeless!
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues the discussion of a woman who at first says that she is prohibited in some way but then goes back and says that she is permitted.
  According to Rav if a woman says, “I am unclean,” meaning that she is menstruating and therefore cannot have relations with her husband, but then goes back and says that she is clean, she is to be believed, and her husband could have relations with her. Shmuel learns this from Rav, repeats it forty times so that he can memorize it, but still does not believe it enough to act accordingly. It seems from here that Shmuel acted stringently.
  
  Daf 22b
  
  In this case, we have contradictory testimony as to whether a married woman is now unmarried—either by becoming a widow or a divorcee. All rabbis agree that ab initio, she should not get remarried, for fear that she still is married. However, they disagree in a situation where she was remarried without permission. According to the sages, in such a case she may stay married to the new husband, but R. Menahem ben Yose says that she must leave the second marriage by being divorced.
  Menahem b. Yose qualifies his halakhah—she must leave the second marriage only if witnesses first came and said that her husband was not dead or she was not divorced, and then she got married before contradictory testimony was offered. In this case, she ignored the halakhah and therefore should be penalized by being forced to leave her second marriage. However, if she was remarried based on the testimony of the first witnesses (who say that her husband died or divorced her) and only then witnesses came testifying to the opposite, she need not leave the second marriage.
  The problem is that the man who marries such a woman does not know for sure that she is not married to someone else. So every time he has relations with her he technically should bring a doubtful guilt offering (asham talui), the sacrifice brought by someone who may or not may not have transgressed a prohibition (adultery, in this case). Clearly, this is not a situation that one should intentionally put oneself in.The answer is that she married one of the second set of witnesses, who claims to know for sure that she was divorced or her husband died. Since he claims certainty, he does not need to bring a doubtful guilt offering.The same problem goes for her—she herself should bring a doubtful guilt offering because she cannot be certain if her husband died or if she was divorced (this latter possibility could happen if she appointed an agent to accept her get). Therefore, she can only stay married to the second husband if she claims certainty—she claims to know that she was divorced or widowed. If she herself is doubtful, then she would not be allowed to have relations with him.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues the discussion of cases where some witnesses testify that a woman’s husband has died or divorced her, and others say he has not.
  In both cases, R. Yohanan rules that ab initio, since there is contradictory testimony concerning the death or divorce, the woman should not remarry. However, there is a difference between testimony as to his death and testimony as to his having divorced her. In the case of death, if she remarried before the second set of witnesses came, she need not leave the second marriage. But in the case of divorce, she must leave the second marriage.
  The major question concerning R. Yohanan’s halakhah is why there should be a difference between case one (death) and case two (divorce). Abaye interprets case one as a situation where one witness said he died and one said he did not die. The Torah (i.e. halakhah) believes one witness to testify that a woman’s husband has died. This is a leniency to allow her to remarry. Ulla points out that if one witness is categorically believed, the strength of his testimony is equivalent to two witnesses. Therefore, the witness who testifies that her husband is not dead does not outweigh “two” witnesses (one who counts as two) who say that he has died.
  If the first witness counts as two, then why should she not be remarried ab initio? After all, there are “two witnesses” who say that her husband is dead?The answer is that a person should always distance himself from a situation that looks bad. In this situation, even though she is legally allowed to remarry, the evidence is hardly conclusive. There is a chance that her husband really is alive. Therefore, she really should not get remarried when there is such contradictory evidence as to her husband’s death.  R. Assi expresses this notion by quoting a verse from Proverbs.
  Abaye now explains the second case—why was R. Yohanan so stringent, ruling that even if she remarried, she must leave the second marriage? Again, one witness says that she was divorced and one says she was not. Two are in essence saying that she was married and only one says that she is divorced. The two outweigh the one and we must consider her married.
  IntroductionThis section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section. It deals with R. Yohanan’s statement that if two say the husband died and two say he did not, and then she was remarried, she need not leave the second marriage. But if two say she was divorced and two say she was not, she must leave the second marriage. Here Rava offers a different explanation as to the difference between the first situation and the second.
  Rava disagrees with Abaye who says that R. Yohanan referred to a case of one witness. R. Yohanan, according to Rava, agreed with R. Menachem b. Yose, who had said that if she was remarried she must leave the second marriage, in the case of death, but not in the case of divorce. In the case of divorce, if her husband comes and says “I did not divorce you” she can say refute him. Therefore, if we were to rely on the first witnesses who say she was divorced, she could remarry even knowing that she was not divorced. Should the husband come and claim that he did not divorce her, she could claim that she was divorced. But in the case of death, if he comes back, she can’t say to him, “Hey, you’re dead.” Therefore, we can assume that she will not remarry unless she feels fairly certain that he is indeed dead. So we can allow her to stay married to the second husband.To put this another way, if the risk she takes when remarrying is high, we can trust her not to take it unless she really believes that she is free to remarry. But if the risk is low, she might lie in order to remarry.
  According to R. Hamnuna a woman would not be so bold as to baldly lie directly to her husband that he divorced her. So how can we base a law on the assumption that if her husband comes and denies having divorced her, she might lie and say directly to him that he did. The answer is that when there are witnesses who support her statement, she might lie to his faceand claim that he did divorce her. R. Hamnuna was referring only to a situation where there were no such witnesses.
  Assi offers a simpler explanation of the situation in R. Yohanan’s halakah—the witnesses say that the death or divorce just occurred. Death cannot be proven (in a case where the body has disappeared) but divorce requires documentation. If the witnesses testify that she was divorced just now, she should be able to verify the truth of their claim. If she cannot, then even if she was remarried, she would have to leave the second marriage.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss situations in which two witnesses say that a woman is free to marry and two say that she is not.
  The second half of this baraita is identical to R. Yohanan’s statement from the previous daf. The new part here is the first half. Two say she has been betrothed and therefore cannot marry someone else, and two say she has not been betrothed and is therefore free to marry someone else. According to the baraita, she may not ab initio marry someone else, but if she does she need not leave this marriage.
  
  Daf 23a
  
  Abaye’s explanation here is nearly the same as that which he provided in last week’s daf. Both halves of the baraita refer to one witness. Therefore, in the case where one says that she was betrothed and one says that she was not, they both agree that she was unmarried, and only one says she was betrothed. Therefore, the two are believed and she may remain married to the other man. But in the second case, both say she was married and only one says she was divorced. Therefore, she is assumed to be married and if married to someone else, she must be divorced.
  Rav Ashi reverses the baraita in order to make sense of it, but leaves it at two witnesses. Two say they saw her get betrothed and two say they didn’t see her get betrothed. In such a case, if she marries another man she must leave that marriage, because clearly we should assume that she is betrothed.
  The problem with R. Ashi’s reversal of the baraita is that it makes it obvious. Obviously, witnesses who say they did not see a woman betrothed have not provided any evidence that she is not actually betrothed.The Talmud resolves by saying that this is not so obvious. One might have thought that when a man betroths a woman everyone will hear about it. If this were true, there would be significance to people saying, “We did not see her betrothed.” The baraita teaches us that this is not true. Sometimes, people can be betrothed without anyone knowing about it.
  Ashi reverses the second half of the baraita as well. Two say they know that she was divorced and two say that they didn’t see her divorced. Again, the second two witnesses are not real testimony and therefore, if she gets married to another man, she may stay married to him.
  This is essentially the same difficulty as was raised above—the baraita is obvious. And if you were to answer that it refers to people living in the same courtyard, then we would still learn the same lesson we learned above—that people divorce in private.The answer is that we might have thought that while people do betroth in private, divorce is something that everyone knows about. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that just as there are people who betroth in private, there are also people who divorce in private.In the end, testimony that “we did not see her get betrothed” or “we did not see her get divorced” is not full testimony and cannot override the positive testimony of the other two witnesses.
  IntroductionToday’s section refers back to the last clause of the mishnah on daf Kaf Bet, that if witnesses come after she has already been remarried, she need not leave her second marriage.For ease of reference, I am reproducing here the entire mishnah, separated into what the Talmud calls clause one and clause two.Clause one: If a woman says, “I was married and I am divorced”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was married, and she says, “I am divorced”, she is not believed.Clause two: If she says, “I was taken captive but I have remained clean,” she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive and she says, “I have remained clean,” she is not believed.
  According to R. Oshaia, the clause of the mishnah that reads, “And if witnesses come after she got married she need not go out [of the marriage]” refers to the first clause of the mishnah which refers to divorce, whereas Rabbah b. Avin says it refers to the second clause, which refers to a woman taken captive and the fear that she was raped..
  The Talmud, as it usually does, compares the two understandings of the mishnah. The amora who teaches this sage in reference to the first clause, would agree that it could also refer to the second clause. If the rabbis were lenient with regard to the situation of the divorced woman, they would have been all the more lenient with regard to the situation of the captive woman in the second clause.But the amora who teaches it in reference to the second clause, would say it refers only to the second clause and not the first.To put this another way, R. Oshaia would say that if a woman says “I was married and then I was divorced” and then remarries, and then witnesses come and say that she was married but there is still no evidence that she was divorced, she may stay married to the second husband. Rabbah b. Avin would say that she may not.
  The Talmud proposes that these two amoraim disagree with regard to the views of R. Hamnuna who said that we can assume that a woman would not be so brazen as to tell her husband that he divorced her. A woman who makes such a statement can be assumed to be telling the truth. R. Oshaia would agree and therefore would say that even if witnesses come and say she was married, we must believe her when she says that she was divorced....
  This understanding of their dispute is rejected. Both amoraim agree that a woman would not boldly state in her husband’s presence that he divorced her. But Rabbah b. Avin would say that since in the case under discussion here, her husband was not present when she said that she was divorced, she might be bold enough to lie. Therefore, she cannot be believed in the absence of witnesses who say that she was not divorced. But R. Oshaia would say that she would not boldly lie even when not in her husband’s presence. Therefore, we can assume she is telling the truth and she need not leave the second marriage.
  IntroductionThis section continues to deal with the end of the mishnah which stated that if witnesses come and testify that she was taken captive but she has already married (a Kohen) she need not leave the second marriage.As a reminder, a woman who has had sexual relations with someone prohibited to her (such as a non-Jewish captor) may not marry a priest.
  According to Avuha DeShmuel (Shmuel’s father) if witnesses come and say she was taken captive after she receives permission to marry but has not yet married, she may marry a priest. This rule is more leniently than the mishnah actually seems to be, for the mishnah implies that she was remarried. This follows the general trend to rule as leniently as possible in cases of a woman taken captive.
  The baraita rules leniently with regards to the captive woman so long as there are no witnesses that she was actually defiled (i.e. raped by her captors). If there are witnesses that she was raped, she may not stay married to her husband the priest, even if these witnesses didn’t come until she had already had several children.
  In this fascinating interchange between Shmuel and his father, Shmuel’s father reminds his son that we are dealing with real people’s lives here. As these types of stories tend to do, they bring the abstract and sometimes cruel halakhah, down to the level of reality. It is true that no one was guarding these captive women while they were with their captors, before they were brought to Nehardea. But they deserve to be treated better.
  Shmuel’s own daughters are jinxed by his behavior and they are taken captive. But being the daughters of a preeminent rabbi, they know how to act in such a situation. Before their captors are allowed to enter the bet midrash, they each state that they were taken captive but remain pure (they were not raped). This creates a situation of “the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permits.” The rabbis in the bet midrash rule accordingly and pronounce these girls allowed to marry a priest.
  The story proceeds, with the ruling rabbi, R. Hanina, recognizing that these girls knew what they were doing. We then learn that some rabbis doubted whether these women should be allowed to marry a priest. After all, it is certainly possible that they were raped. But the rule remains fast—we cannot worry about witnesses about whom we know nothing.
  The Talmud brings the discussion back to the initial halakhah at the top of this section. In the story, the woman remains permitted because there are no witnesses. However, the impression we get is that if there were witnesses, she would be prohibited, even if they come after she received permission to marry a priest. This contradicts Avuha DeShmuel’s rule that once she receives permission to marry, she doesn’t lose the permission even if witnesses come.Ashi resolves this by saying that the witnesses referred to at the end of the story testify that they know that she was defiled. With such concrete evidence, she cannot marry a priest. Avuha DeShmuel referred to a case where the witnesses say only that they know she was taken captive, but do not know if she was defiled.
  
  Daf 23b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with a mishnah that continues to discuss the believability of women who were taken captive and claim that they were not raped.Again, I want to reiterate that I realize that just discussing this issue will cause discomfort. Please do realize that these are legal texts and therefore address the issue in a clinical sense, as do I. It does not mean that I am insensitive to the pain a woman would feel at not being believed that she was raped.
  This mishnah discusses a case in which it is certain that the women were taken captive and hence they are not automatically believed according to the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits.”  The mishnah teaches that the woman herself is not believed to state that she was not raped, and therefore in this case she will not be able to marry a kohen.However, if each woman testifies that the other woman was not raped, each is believed.  This is true even though generally one witness is not sufficient and generally women cannot testify. The rabbis relaxed some of the laws of testimony in this case because there is no certainty that the woman was raped, it is only a likelihood. Furthermore, these women are believed even though there is a fear that each might be covering up the other’s having been raped. The rabbis were lenient in the case of captives and accepted certain types of testimony that would not have been accepted in other types of cases.
  This baraita goes through all of the possibilities of what one woman might say about whether she was raped and whether her friend was raped. The Talmud will now explain each of these scenarios, focusing on the question of whether there were witnesses who testify that they were taken captive.
  The Talmud is now going to first ask whether there were witnesses to the women being taken captive. If there were no witnesses, then this is a case of “the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permits.” She should be believed to say that she is pure.
  If there are witnesses, then the second clause becomes problematic. If there were witnesses that the women were taken captive, why should she not believed to say that her friend is impure (was raped)? So, now we go back and assume that there were no witnesses. She is not believed because her friend contradicts her.
  If there are no witnesses, then the last clause becomes problematic. Again, she simply claims that she is pure and we have a situation of “the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permits.”
  Abaye affirms that the different clauses refer to different situations. The first and last clause refer to cases where there are witnesses to the fact that they were taken captive. Therefore, she is not believed to say that she was not raped—there is no “mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits.” But the middle clause refers to a case where there are no witnesses. Therefore, she is not believed to say that her friend was raped (assuming that her friend would contradict her).
  IntroductionToday’s section offers a different interpretation of the baraita that was the focus of yesterday’s section. I am copying the baraita again for ease of reference:
  Papa explains the entire baraita as referring to a case where there are witnesses that the women were taken captive, and there is also one witness who always says the opposite of what the woman says. In clause one, she is believed to say that she is impure, because a person always has the power to declare themselves forbidden (or to say that someone else is forbidden to them). And the second woman is permitted based on her testimony, despite the fact that another witness says that she was impure.
  In this case, her own testimony with regard to herself is not sufficient proof that she is pure, as we learned in the Mishnah. She would need at least one witness to attest to her purity. The second person has someone testifying to her purity. Therefore, the one witness is sufficient for her to be considered pure.
  The next clause works using the same logic as above. A person is always believed to say she is impure. But her friend is pure because of the presence of the other witness who says she is pure. The Talmud asks why we even need this clause—we learned the same principles above? The answer is that we might have thought that when she says she is impure, she is just acting as a martyr, “Let me die with the Philistines.” Knowing (or at least thinking) that her friend was raped, she might claim that she was raped too, perhaps to provide some comfort to her friend. Therefore, the baraita says that she is believed to say that she is impure.
  The final clause also uses familiar principles. She is not believed to claim that she is pure, since there are witnesses that she was taken captive. However, the other woman is considered pure based on her testimony.Again, the Talmud asks why we need to learn this twice. At the very outset of the baraita, we learned that she is believed to testify that her friend is pure.The answer is that we might have thought that when she says that both she and her friend are pure, since she is not believed about herself, she is also not believed concerning her friend. Therefore, the Talmud teaches us that even though we do not believe her about herself, we do believe her about her friend.
  IntroductionThis mishnah illustrates the same principle employed in the previous mishnah, but uses the example of men who claim to be priests. It then goes on to a discussion of how many witnesses are needed to prove that someone is a priest.
  Section one: When each man claims to be a priest, neither is believed and neither will receive terumah.  Just as in the previous mishnah a woman could not testify with regard to her own personal status, so too in this mishnah a man cannot testify with regard to his own status.Section two:  However, if both men corroborate the other’s testimony they are believed.Section three:  Rabbi Judah disagrees with the idea that one person is believed to testify that another person is a priest.Section four:  Rabbi Elazar limits Rabbi Judah’s statement to a case in which other people protest that so-and-so is not a kohen.  In that type of situation two witnesses are necessary to raise someone to the priesthood. However, in the absence of others’ protesting, one witness is believed to say that someone else is a kohen.Section five:  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel agrees with the opinion in section two according to which a person is always believed to say that a person is a priest.We should note that determining whether a person was a priest must have been an issue of importance and difficulty after the destruction of the Temple.  When the Temple stood, everyone pretty much knew who the priests were, because they were descendants of those who served regularly in the Temple.  Furthermore, when the Temple was destroyed, the records kept in the Temple were probably lost.  Hence testimony about a person’s being a priest became scarcer and more essential.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins by explaining why we need so many clauses in the Mishnah, all of which seem to illustrate the same point—the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permits.Some of the details and logic in this section may be difficult to follow. However, what you should focus on is the larger picture. The Talmud is asking why the Mishnah needs to give so many concrete examples of what is really a straightforward principle. This just emphasizes the very nature of the Mishnah. It teaches case law and usually not abstract principles.
  In the first case in the Mishnah of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits” R. Joshua said that a person who says, “This was your father’s field and I bought it from him” is believed. The first half of the statement could cause him a loss of money. He wouldn’t have said that if he didn’t intend to finish his statement. Therefore he is believed in the second half of the statement, “but I bought it from him.” But witnesses who admit to having signed a document do not cause themselves any loss. Therefore, there is no extra reason to believe them when they say that they were forced (or some other disqualification). This is why the mishnah needed to add the case of witnesses.
  The Talmud now asks the same question in the other direction—once we have the case of the witnesses, why do we need the case of the person and the field? The answer is that the witnesses’ statement concerns other people, therefore we would tend to believe them. But the person who says that he bought the field is making a statement about himself, to his own benefit. We might have thought not to believe him. Therefore, the mishnah teaches us that we do.
  
  Daf 24a
  
  If the mishnah had taught only the cases of the field and the witnesses, I might have thought that the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits” is invoked only in the case of monetary matters, but not in the case of sexual prohibitions. That is why the mishnah cites the case of the woman who says, “I was married but now I am divorced.”
  The case of a woman who says, “I was taken captive but I am pure” again teaches the same principle, so why do we need it. The answer is that we need it to allow the principle found later that if witnesses come and say that she was taken captive but she has already married a priest, she need not go out of the marriage.
  Earlier we saw that some sages read the line “But if witnesses came after she got married, she shall not go out” only in reference to the married woman, but not in reference to the captive woman. So why then do we need the clause about the captive woman in the mishnah? The answer is that we would need it segue into the next clause about two women taken captive.
  We need the clause concerning two captive women each who testifies to the other’s purity to teach us that we are not concerned lest they are colluding.
  The case of two men each of whom testifies that the other is a priest is another case where we do not worry about collusion, a principle we have already learned. So why do we need it? The answer is that we need it to allow the mishnah to teach the dispute between the rabbis and R. Judah over whether one witness is sufficient to prove that someone is a priest.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a discussion on the evidence required to allow a person to be considered a priest.
  A person comes and testifies that he and his friend are both priests. Although the baraita does not say this, it seems that his friend says the same thing. Thus both testify that the other is a priest. According to the first opinion, both are allowed to eat terumah, but until there is a third witness who can testify that both are priests, neither is allowed to marry a woman with proper lineage, a woman whom would normally be married only by a priest.1. Judah says that we do not even let them eat terumah until we have two witnesses to testify for both men.
  According to the Talmud Rabbi Judah says that we need two witnesses for each priest, even to allow them to eat terumah, because he fears collusion. That is why the one priest is not believed to say that his friend is a priest. This is now contrasted with another baraita in which R. Judah seems to say the opposite.In this baraita, donkey-drivers come to town, each praising the other’s produce, either by saying it is old (which is better) or that the tithes have been removed. R. Judah says that they are believed, implying that he does not fear collusion, the opposite of his opinion in the earlier baraita.There are two solutions to the contradiction. The first is to reverse the attributions in the second baraita. The second is to differentiate between the issues. In the donkey-driver baraita we can be lenient because it is only “demai” which is produce bought from an am haaretz (a person who is not scrupulous in observance). Since most ammei haaretz do tithe R. Judah can be lenient in this case.
  We now must resolve the position of the rabbis. Why do they believe the priests and not the donkey-drivers? The answer is from R. Hama b. Ukba, who says that he brings his trade-tools with him, in this case tools used to sell his produce. If each donkey-driver praises the others, but also brings trade-tools to sell his produce, then we should be suspicious that they are colluding with each other. If they were each being honest in disparaging their own produce, they would not have their trade tools with them.
  
  Daf 24b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section the editors of the Talmud used a statement by R. Hama bar Ukba to resolve a difficulty. But the original context of his statement was not clear. Today the Talmud turns its attention to that context.
  The context in which R. Hama b. Ukba made his statement is the contradiction between a mishnah and a baraita concerning the purity of pots left by the side of the road. A potter who wished to preserve the purity of his pots, left them for a few moments unguarded. When he returns he must regard the outer ones as defiled lest an am haaretz, a Jew who does not preserve his purity, touched them with his cloaks which are considered impure. However, the inner pots are pure, according to the Mishnah.But a baraita states that all of the pots, even the inner ones, are impure.
  Hama b. Ukba resolves the difficulty by stating that all of the vessels are impure when the potter has his selling tools in hand. If everyone knows that he is selling the pots, everyone will handle them and thereby defile them.
  The Talmud now cites another baraita that says all of the vessels, the inner and the outer ones, are pure. This too contradicts the Mishnah.Hama b. Ukba answers this in the opposite fashion. When the potter does not have his trade-tools in hand, no one will touch the vessels, so they all remain pure.
  If all of the vessels are pure when the potter does not have his trade tools, and they are impure when he does have his trade-tools, when does the Mishnah’s law, that the outer ones are impure and the inner ones are pure, apply?The answer is that it applies when these vessels are left near the public road. They are impure because of the “border stones” on the public road. Rashi explains that people would put big stones in the public domain to keep travelers from encroaching onto their property or rubbing against their walls. This potter also left his wares in the same place. People walking on the public domain would be crowded and have to make their way over such obstacles. The clothes of an am haaretz defile, and so when their clothes hang over the vessels, they defile them.
  This section refers to the dispute at the beginning of section two, between R. Judah and the rabbis. The rabbis said he is allowed to eat terumah and R. Judah said he is not. The earlier explanation was that they disagreed over whether we should be concerned about collusion. Here we have a new explanation. R. Judah holds that once a person is seen eating terumah he can be assumed to be a kohen and would be allowed to marry a woman usually only married to a kohen. Therefore, we cannot allow him to eat terumah until we are sure he is a kohen. The other rabbis say that eating terumah is not sufficient evidence that he is a kohen. Therefore, we can let him eat terumah even without proper testimony.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the question of what evidence is necessary to determine that a person is a Kohen.
  The question asked is whether evidence from a document would be sufficient to prove that someone was a priest in order for him to be allowed to marry a woman who only marries a priest.We now need to delve into the particulars of this case. What evidence can there be in a document. The first possibility is that the document has the person’s signature and he signed as a Kohen. The problem is that this is not evidence that he is a Kohen—no one has testified here that he is a Kohen. Only he did.
  The document is a loan document in which a person borrowed money and the document explicitly says that he is a priest. Witnesses have signed on this document. However, it is not clear whether they are testifying only to the loan, or whether they are testifying to the veracity of everything stated in the document, including that the borrower is a priest, information not necessary for the loan to go through.
  This section ends with an amoraic dispute on the subject—one amora holds that documentary evidence is sufficient to prove that he is a kohen, and one holds that it is not.
  IntroductionHere we have another question concerning the evidence necessary to prove that someone is a Kohen
  If a person is seen in synagogue blessing the priestly benediction and raising up his hands, as remains the custom for kohanim to do to this day in many places, is this sufficient evidence that he is a Kohen?
  The question of whether lifting up of the hands is sufficient evidence that a person is a priest is asked regardless of how one rules on the question of whether eating terumah is sufficient evidence.The one who holds that eating terumah is sufficient evidence could say that since a non-priest who eats terumah has transgressed a prohibition punishable by death (meted out by heaven), no one who is not a priest would dare eat terumah. In other words, the severity of the prohibition would deter anyone who is not sure he is a priest from eating terumah. Therefore, this is evidence that he must be a priest. But one who lifts up his hands and recites the priestly blessing even if he is not a priest has transgressed a more minor commandment. Therefore he might do so even if he is not completely certain he is a priest, and lifting up of the hands would not be sufficient evidence of being a priest.Alternatively, this position could say that both acts, lifting up of the hands and eating terumah, are sufficient evidence of being a priest.
  The one who says that eating terumah is not sufficient evidence for being a priest could still be asked whether “lifting up of the hands” is. Eating terumah is a private act, and it is simply easier to transgress in private. It does not require so much chutzpah. But it would require a lot of chutzpah for a non-kohen to get up in front of the community and bless everyone as if he were a Kohen. Therefore, we can assume that anyone who does so is a Kohen.Or there is no difference, and neither act is sufficient evidence that one is a priest.
  Again, this section ends with a dispute between two amoraim.
  IntroductionThis section continues to ask the same question we saw yesterday—is the lifting up of the hands sufficient evidence to prove that someone is a priest.
  This is a continuation of the discussion among the next generation of amoraim. R. Nahman b. Yitzhak asks his teacher, Rava, what the accepted practice is.
  As the answer to the question, Rava cites a baraita that interprets a passage from Ezra. In this passage the priestly lineage of some families returning from Babylonia to Israel is called into question. The governor (Tirshata) says to them that they may not eat the most holy things, namely sacrifices, until a priest comes who can divinely determine their lineage. However, they may continue in their presumed state. In Babylonia they eat “holy things eaten outside of Jerusalem,” namely terumah. So too on their return they may continue to eat terumah. This is evidence of how significant a concept “presumption” is. A person retains their presumed status until proven otherwise.
  Rava now explains how he uses this baraita as proof that a person seen “lifting up their hands” cannot be assumed to be a priest. Assumedly, these people who came back from Babylonia and ate terumah would also spread out their hands and offer the priestly blessing. Yet clearly, the governor does not assume that they are full priests, for they still cannot eat sacrifices. Therefore, Rava concludes, in general we cannot assume that one who lifts up his hands is a priest such that he could marry a woman only married by priests.
  The Talmud rejects Rava, claiming that this situation is different. In this situation we can allow them to lift up their hands without worrying that this will cause people to think they are full priests because their presumption of being priests was damaged. Everyone will know that these particular people can lift up their hands, but we’re not certain that they are priests. For if we did not say this, then this baraita would have been a difficulty on the position that says that one can be raised from eating terumah to being a full priest. These people clearly ate terumah, and yet we know they were not fully treated as priests. Therefore we must say that this is a special category, from which we cannot derive the halakhah in more normal situations.
  
  Daf 25a
  
  The Talmud now returns to interpreting the baraita. What is so great about presumption if all it means is that they can continue to act in the way they were already acting?The first answer is that in Babylonia they were eating terumah whose status was only rabbinical. Outside the land of Israel the separation of terumah from produce is not of the higher status of from the Torah. But when these families come back to Israel they will be able to eat terumah of the higher status–“from the Torah.” This shows us how strong the legal principle “presumption” is.
  The Talmud now brings up another possibility altogether for how to interpret this baraita in light of the question of raising a person who is seen eating terumah to the status of full priest. Perhaps in the case in the baraita they ate only terumah of the lower status, rabbinic terumah, even when they returned to Israel. [According to the Torah one does not separate terumah from vegetables, but the rabbis mandated it.] And while we do raise a person seen eating terumah to the status of priest, this is only when he eats toraitic terumah (wine, grain and oil). Eating rabbinic terumah is not sufficient evidence of being a priest.The greatness of presumption is that they are allowed to eat rabbinic terumah, even though they are not allowed to eat toraitic terumah.
  The Talmud now questions whether these doubtful priests did not eat toraitic terumah. The verse seems to say that they did not eat “most holy things,” i.e. sacrifices. But they would have eaten terumah, which is not a sacrifice.
  The Talmud clarifies that these priests could not eat anything that could be called “holy thing.” This includes terumah, referred to as “holy” in Leviticus 22:10, as well as parts of regular sacrifices eaten by priests, such as the hind leg and the breast, referred to in verse 12. These were the parts of the animal given to the priests from sacrifices such as the wellbeing offering.In the end, the only terumah these people could eat was that of rabbinic status. Eating such terumah is not evidence that one is a priest. But some hold that eating toraitic terumah is evidence that one is a priest.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues with the discussion of whether “lifting up of the hands” is sufficient evidence that one is a Kohen, such that he would be allowed to marry a woman who would only marry a Kohen.
  The Talmud cites a baraita that seems to offer proof that a Kohen seen lifting up his hands in the priestly blessing is assumed to be a Kohen. This is true even in Babylonia, where the status of terumah and hallah (dough given to the priest) is from rabbinic law, and therefore it is not sufficient evidence to accord him the status of full priest.In Syria (lands bordering Israel to the north) hallah and terumah are of toraitic status (at least according to this baraita, as it is currently understood). Therefore, if a person is seen eating them, he can be assumed to be a Kohen.Finally, if he is seen in a large city eating the priestly gifts, the breast or foreleg of a sacrificial animal, he can also be assumed to be a Kohen. While these parts of the animal can be eaten by a non-priest, Rashi explains that in places where a person would easily be seen by others, we can assume that only a priest would eat these things.The Talmud subsequently rejects this understanding of the baraita. A person seen lifting up his hands is not assumed to be a priest for all matters, including marriage. He is only assumed to be a priest such that he could eat terumah.
  The Talmud now again tries to prove that the baraita implies that one seen lifting up his hands is accorded the full status of priest. Just as one who is seen eating hallah can be assumed to be a priest for all matters (and not just for eating terumah, since eating hallah is equivalent to eating terumah), so too lifting up the hands is sufficient evidence.
  The Talmud again goes back to saying that lifting up the hands is sufficient only to prove that he can eat terumah. According to this reading of the baraita, one seen eating hallah is also not accorded full status of priest—he too is only allowed to eat terumah. But this is a rise in status, for he goes from eating hallah which has the status of rabbinic authority (derabanan) to being able to eat terumah, which has the status of being of biblical origins. Thus both lifting up of the hands and eating hallah allow us to assume that he is a priest, but only in a limited way—to allow him to eat terumah. Neither is sufficient to allow him to marry a woman who would only marry a Kohen.The Talmud refers to a statement by R. Huna son of R. Joshua. This will appear later on this page.
  IntroductionWe continue the lengthy discussion concerning what constitutes proof that a person is a Kohen.
  This baraita discusses what constitutes proof that a person is a priest depending on the region in which the action is performed. In Israel either the recitation of the priestly blessing or receiving terumah grain on the threshing floor is proof. In Syria, Babylonia and other places close to Israel where messengers would arrive to declare the New Moon, lifting up of the hands is evidence but receiving terumah is not evidence. According to R. Shimon b. Gamaliel Alexandria also has the status of Syria and Babylonia because there was a permanent court there.
  The Talmud now concludes the proof from the baraita that lifting up of the hands is proof that one should have the full status of priest and be allowed to marry a woman who marries into the priesthood.As with above, they initially try to reject this. Lifting up the hands is proof that one can receive hallah (dough given to priests). But it might not be sufficient for full proof that one is a priest.
  The problem with the above is that lifting up of the hands seems to be equated with receiving terumah at the threshing floor. Terumah and hallah generally have the same status. So if receiving terumah is evidence that one is a full priest and can marry a woman who marries into the priesthood, so too should lifting up of the hands be evidence that one should be fully accorded the status of priest.
  The Talmud now reinstates the idea that lifting up of the hands might only be proof that someone may receive hallah. The baraita could hold that terumah in our days (post-Temple) is only of rabbinic status, but hallah is of biblical status. So if one is seen lifting up the hands or receiving terumah he is elevated to the status of being able to eat biblical hallah. But he is not elevated to being able to marry a woman who marries only a priest.
  The above discussion leads to the citation of a relevant discussion in which some rabbis and R. Huna son of R. Joshua debate the status of terumah and hallah in the post-Temple period. According to the rabbis found by R. Huna in the Bet Rav (the study hall), hallah is of biblical status. This is because during the fourteen years it took to conquer and settle Israel after their entrance into Canaan, they were obligated in hallah but not terumah. This, according to the rabbis, implies that hallah has higher status.
  Huna son of R. Joshua uses a baraita to prove that the status of hallah is rabbinical unless all of Israel comes to the land. Just as in the original conquest of the land the Israelites were not obligated in hallah until everyone had entered the land, so too in post first Temple times, the Jews are no longer obligated by the Torah to give hallah, since not all of the Jews returned with Ezra to build the Second Temple.In any case, the baraita at the beginning of the page could be understood in light of the opinion that hallah is of biblical status. A priest seen eating terumah (or lifting up his hands) can eat hallah which is of biblical status. But he cannot necessarily marry a woman who marries only into the priesthood.
  
  Daf 25b
  
  IntroductionYes. You guessed it. The discussion over what constitutes evidence that one is a priest continues.
  After this baraita was corrected, it seems to offer conclusive proof that if a priest is seen lifting up his hands in the priestly blessing, he can be assumed to be a priest and he can be allowed to marry a woman who marries into the priesthood. “Lifting up the hands” has the power of actual testimony.
  The Talmud again rejects the idea that “lifting up the hands” is sufficient evidence to elevate someone to the full status of priest. It is not “like testimony.” Rather, what the baraita means to say is that testimony that someone performed an action creates a presumption that is treated like presumption itself. This accords with a story in which a man testifies before R. Ammi that he saw a person get the first Aliyah and that a Levite read after him. Since a Levite can take the second Aliyah only if the first one was given to a priest, we can assume the first Aliyah went to a priest. R. Ammi raised him to the status of priesthood, but only insofar as he could eat terumah. He was still not allowed to marry a woman of high lineage.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a story very similar to that in yesterday’s section. The only difference is that the person is being raised to the status of Levite and not priest. The story is straightforward, so there is no commentary below.
  This story begins like the stories in the previous two sections. However, here Resh Lakish seems to imply that seeing someone read the first Aliyah is not sufficient evidence that someone is a priest. He wants to know if he was seen receiving terumah on the threshing floor, which would constitute a higher level of evidence.Elazar attacks Resh Lakish, noting that if we demand receiving terumah on the threshing floor, what will people do who do not live in a place where people do not have a threshing floor for whatever reason.
  The same story now occurs again but this time Resh Lakish and R. Elazar are sitting in front of R. Yohanan, their master. This time R. Yohanan says the same line that R. Elazar said above. This angers Resh Lakish for R. Elazar was basically plagiarizing. Had R. Elazar admitted that he was saying something in the name of R. Yohanan, Resh Lakish might have accepted it from him. Note that Resh Lakish refers to R. Yohanan as a smith’s son, an appellation he receives elsewhere.
  Both of these are breaches of the normal rules of testimony—a brother cannot testify concerning his brother nor can a father for his son. But for the issue of verifying whether a person is a Kohen or Levite, the rules were relaxed.
  A baraita is cited to prove that Rabbi was the one who held that a father’s testimony is sufficient to prove that the son is a priest. Rabbi explains that if a father testifies that his son is a priest we can allow the son to eat terumah, because the father is a priest himself and would have terumah to give to his son. However, the father cannot unilaterally let him marry a woman, so we don’t accept the father’s testimony that he is a priest.This proves that Rabbi is the sage who holds that we accept a father’s testimony that his son is a priest.
  Hiyya must have been the sage who raised a son to the status of Levite, but now we are left with a problem. In the above baraita, R. Hiyya did not allow a son to be raised to the priesthood based on the testimony of his father. So why the inconsistency? After all, both are relatives who cannot testify?The resolution is that the brother was not actually testifying that his brother was a Levite. He was innocently talking and said something through which we could determine that his brother was a priest.
  
  Daf 26a
  
  This is an example of a person who was talking innocently. The speaker remembers when he was a kid and they treated him as a priest, immersing him so that he could eat terumah and hallah. His friends were even making fun of him, calling him a “hallah-eater” (not sure what’s so bad about this, but I guess kids are always making fun of those different).In any case, this is proof that R. Hiyya would allow a person to be raised to the priesthood based on the innocent talk of a relative. Had the relative actually testified, he would not have been believed. The idea seems to be that since the person is not intending to testify, we do not have to fear that he is lying for the benefit of his relative.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues the discussion of what constitutes evidence for being a Kohen or Levi.
  Shimon ben Elazar puzzlingly states that one who is seen receiving first tithe at the threshing floor, can be assumed to be a priest. The Talmud will immediately clarify some puzzling aspects of this baraita.
  The Talmud identifies the position in the earlier baraita with R. Elazar ben Azariah who holds that the first tithe belongs to the priest.
  The problem is that R. Elazar ben Azariah seems to have said that the first tithe could go to the Levite or the priest. If so, eating or receiving first tithe is not proof that one is a priest—one could be a Levite or a priest.The Talmud answers that after Ezra punished the Levites for not returning to Zion, he dictated that the first tithe would go exclusively to the priest. This is a notion explained elsewhere in the Talmud. The important thing would be that by the time of the Mishnah, only priests received the tithe (note—R. Akiva would disagree).
  The problem is that even though the first tithe was, according to R. Elazar ben Azaryah, given to priests, most rabbis held that it could be eaten by non-priests and it certainly may be eaten by Levites. So how could we know that this person who received first tithe is a priest?Hisda answers that the baraita refers to a person whose father was known to be a priest. The doubt concerning him is that his mother may have been a divorcee or halutzah (woman released from Levirate marriage). A priest may not marry such a woman. The offspring of such a union is not considered a priest.In any case, we know that he is not a Levite—his father was known to be a priest.
  But what if his mother was a divorcee or halutzah? Here, we can point the question at both sides of a debate over whether non-priests can eat first tithe. According to the opinion that holds that they may not, clearly they would not have given first tithe to this person on the threshing floor. After all, there is a rumor that he is not a priest.But even according to the opinion that holds that first tithe is permitted to non-priests, this is only to eat it. No one holds that non-priests would be given first tithe at the threshing floor. Therefore, the fact that this person did receive first tithe at the threshing floor is proof that they consider him a priest. [Remember, we know that he is not a Levite].
  The Talmud now explains the second half of the baraita, which seems to be equally puzzling. How can taking a share of terumah at the court not create the presumption that one is a priest. R. Sheshet answers that the baraita refers to a person dividing up his father’s property in court. Note that it is possible for one son to be a priest and his paternal brother not to be a priest, if for instance one of the mother’s was a divorcee. Such a son could receive some of his father’s terumah, but he could not eat it. He would have to sell it.
  The final question is that the baraita seems obvious–just because someone gets terumah at a court does not mean that he is a priest. However, in the end, the Talmud resolves that the baraita’s teaching is not so obvious. We might have thought that just as some sons are going to be able to eat the terumah they receive, so too all of the sons will be able to eat the terumah they receive. Therefore the baraita teaches that this is not so. We must be concerned that the son about whom there is a rumor that his mother was a divorcee or a halutzah, is not actually a priest.
  IntroductionWhile the Talmud does begin her to explain another clause in the Mishnah, it is still dealing with the same topic—the evidence necessary to prove that a person is a priest. This is the last section dedicated to this subject.I should note that the Talmud quotes a section of the Mishnah that it does not deal with. This is a phenomenon that occurs sometimes. These quotes of the Mishnah were placed there to help the reader understand the context of the discussion. But on occasion, the quote is wrong.
  Shimon ben Gamaliel in the Mishnah had stated that one witness is sufficient in order to prove that someone is a priest. This, to the Talmud seems to be the same as R. Eliezer (the Mishnah itself reads R. Elazar) who said the following:Rabbi Elazar says: When is this true?  When there are people who object; but when there are no people who object, one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness.Both of these sages seem to agree that if there are no objections, one witness is sufficient. And as far as what constitutes a successful objection, both agree that two people are needed to object. If one only objects, then the person still may be raised to the priesthood.
  The Talmud now cooks up an extremely complicated scenario in order to determine whether or not this person was a priest. He starts off under the assumption that he is a priest, then he is demoted based on a rumor that his mother was not allowed to marry a priest. They then raised him to the priesthood (on the basis of one witness), then demoted again (on the basis of two witnesses) and then another witness comes and testified that he is a priest.
  
  Daf 26b
  
  The Talmud now explains that the real debate is over whether we are concerned that a court that first demotes a person from the priesthood and then promotes him again will be disgraced. According to the first opinion (R. Eliezer/Elazar), it will and therefore, once demoted he may not be promoted again. And according to R. Shimon ben Gamaliel we are not concerned, and therefore although once demoted, he may be promoted again.
   Ashi points out that if this is the debate, why did the scenario have to involve two witnesses testifying separately? The scenario could have been much simpler—two come to testify that he is not a priest and then two other witnesses testify that he is.
  Instead R. Ashi says that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel are disputing whether the testimonies of two witnesses who testify on separate occasions can be joined together. According to R. Eliezer they cannot (like the anonymous opinion in the baraita) and according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel they can (with R. Natan in the baraita).
  IntroductionAs I have mentioned before, if a married woman was raped she may return to her husband but only if he is an Israelite.  If he is a priest, she is forbidden from returning to her husband.  If she willingly had sexual relations with another man, the she is forbidden to her husband, even if he is only an Israelite. Today’s mishnah refers to a woman imprisoned by non-Jews, asking whether she is permitted to return to her husband.
  There is fear that that a woman imprisoned by non-Jewish authorities had sexual relations with one of them. According to the mishnah, if she was taken in order to collect money, the captors assumedly did not have relations with her, because they would fear that if they rape her they will not get the money they want.  In this case, she is not prohibited to her husband, even if he is a priest.However, if they took her and intended to execute her, and then she somehow escapes or is let free, she is prohibited to her husband, even if he is an Israelite.  The concern is that in order to endear herself to her captors, she willingly had sexual relations with them.Others explain this clause to refer only to the wife of a priest. If she was taken for monetary gain, they did not rape her and she may return to her priestly husband.  However, if she was seized for execution, the captors would not hesitate to rape her and she is forbidden to her husband the priest. According to this explanation, there is no concern that she willingly had relations with her captor(s) and therefore, if her husband was an Israelite she is in all cases permitted to him.Rashi explains in the first manner, and I will generally adhere to that explanation below.
  Rav limits the context of the Mishnah to a case where Israel is sovereign. In such a case, the non-Jews will fear raping the woman they have imprisoned for fear of a reprisal. Thus the only concern would be if she was sentenced to death.But if the non-Jews are ruling, then even if she was taken in order to pay back a debt and there is no fear of execution, she would still be prohibited to her husband. If the non-Jews rule, then the possibility of rape would be even greater.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section.
  Rava uses a mishnah from Tractate Eduyot as a difficulty against Rav who said that if the non-Jews ruled over Israel, the woman would be forbidden even if she was imprisoned for monetary matters.My explanation of this mishnah in Mishnah Yomit was as follows:In the sad case under discussion in this mishnah a girl is taken by gentile debt collectors as security on a debt that a Jewish family owes them. The family, assuming that the girl has been raped by the gentiles, distances themselves from her. This “distancing” means that they refused to marry her (those in the family that would have been eligible to marry her, such as uncles and cousins), even though there was no law that prevented them from doing so. This family distanced her even though she had witnesses who testified that she had not been so much as secluded with a gentile, let alone raped.  The Sages respond by telling the family that their position vis-a-vis the girl is illogical. If they believed the witnesses that she had been taken as collateral, then they must believe the same witnesses who testify that she had not been raped.  If they don’t believe the witnesses that she had not been raped, then they shouldn’t believe them that she had been taken in the first place. The Sages do not tolerate the family’s overly stringent and extremely cruel position. While the Sages did believe that under certain circumstances, a girl who had been raped could no longer marry certain men (priests), they did not seek to compound this difficult situation by assuming that this had happened when witnesses testify explicitly that it had not. The family’s distancing the girl is a case of a stringency run amok, and one against which the Sages rightly put down their halakhic feet.
  Rava now explains the difficulty. This woman would have been prohibited to return to her husband in the absence of witnesses, because she was taken as collateral. Since the time to repay the loan had passed, we can assume that she had been raped. But if she was merely imprisoned in order to gain a ransom, the case in the Mishnah, then she should be permitted to return to her husband, even though Ashkelon was a city where the non-Jews ruled.
  
  
  Daf 27a
  
  The resolution is that it does not matter—whether taken as collateral or imprisoned, she is forbidden to return to her husband without witnesses that she was not defiled. Since Ashkelon was ruled by non-Jews, we have to assume that she was defiled by them. This mishnah can now accord with Rav’s opinion from yesterday’s section.
  IntroductionToday’s section is basically identical to that in yesterday’s section, just reversed. The Mishnah is brought by Rava as support for Rav (in section 3) and then the support is rejected.I have offered no explanation of the mishnah itself, since it was explained at length in yesterday’s section.
  Here, Rava explains how the mishnah could support Rav’s statement. Ashkelon was a city in which non-Jews ruled. Hence, even though she was taken for money, she would have been forbidden to return to her husband, were it not for the fact that there were witnesses who testified that she had not been defiled. And it would not matter whether she was taken as a pledge, or imprisoned.
  The Talmud rejects the use of the mishnah as support for Rav. If she was taken as a pledge, she would not be permitted to return to her husband without witnesses. In such a case, we could assume that she was raped. But if she was imprisoned, she would be permitted in any case, even though the non-Jews ruled in Ashkelon.
  IntroductionThis section contains a third version of the same passage we have seen above. In this version, instead of Rava using a mishnah to support or object to Rav, the two tannaitic sources are contrasted and then resolved.
  The two tannaitic sources seem to contradict each other. The mishnah from Ketubot says that if she is taken for money, she is permitted to return to her husband. But the mishnah in Eduyot (R. Yose testified…–the source is abbreviated since we’ve already seen it twice) is a case where the woman was taken for money and had it not been for the witnesses, she would not have been permitted to return to her husband.Shmuel bar Yitzhak (the same sage who transmitted Rav’s statement in section three) resolves the difficulty. When the non-Jews rule, she is not permitted without testimony that she was not defiled. This is what happened in Ashkelon. And when the Jews rule, she is permitted, as long as she was taken only for money. This is the case in Ketubot.
  The end of this passage relates to the last clause of the Mishnah. Rav and Levi both give examples of cases where a woman would be imprisoned only to execute her. According to Rav, wives of thieves are executed. According to Levi, only wives are murderers are executed. Ben Dunai was a famous Jewish murderer referred to elsewhere in the Talmud. But according to Levi, wives of thieves would not executed.
  According to Hezekiah, the women are prohibited only if they have already been sentenced to death. In such a case, they will be raped by the imprisoners. R. Yohanan says that they may be raped even before sentencing. He may fear that the women will intentionally sleep with their imprisoners in order to avoid the death sentence.
  If a city has been captured by foreign soldiers, there is concern that the women of the city were raped.  Therefore, all of the women married to priests are forbidden to their husbands.  However, if a woman has a witness who can testify that she was not raped, even if that witness is a slave or a female slave, the witness is believed and the woman is not prohibited to her husband.
  The Talmud cites a baraita that contradicts our Mishnah. The issue in this baraita is the concern that wine might have been offered as a libation by a non-Jew. So if a Gentile troop comes into town, only the open casks are forbidden. Closed casks are permitted because it is possible to tell that they have not been opened. But in a time of war, we are more lenient. Even open casks are permitted, because the troops would not have had time to offer libations. But this contradicts the mishnah which is concerned lest the troops raped the women of the town, even, or perhaps especially, in a time of war.
  Mari basically confirms that there are different halakhot for each concern. The marauding troops will make sure they have enough time to rape the women of the city. But they won’t make enough time to offer libations. In other words, these are pillaging troops—they will give priority to what interests them most.
  This is a different resolution. If the troop comes from the same kingdom as the Jewish city, then they will not rape or offer libations, since they are in essence part of the same political entity. But if they are from another kingdom, we would need to be concerned both for rape and that the wine was offered as a libation.
  The basic question asked here is that even if the besieging troop is from the same kingdom, how do we know that all of the soldiers obeyed the policy and didn’t rape or offer libations with the wine. There are two parts to the answer. First of all, the soldiers must be guarding one another. In other words, there must be some evidence that the troop is law abiding. Second, they must set up some sort of alarm system around their own troops to make sure that if one soldier tries to run off and rape and pillage, he will be heard and stopped. Without such assurances that the troops are law abiding, we would have to be concerned about rape and about the wine.
  This is a slightly different version of the above questions and resolutions. One of these two sages is not concerned that a lone soldier would leave his troops and go rape and offer libations. Therefore, as long as the besieging troop is from the same kingdom, we need not have any concerns. The other says we must be concerned for the lone soldier. Without a system of guards, the women and wine would be prohibited.
  IntroductionThis section continues to relate to the Mishnah according to which the women in a city conquered by marauding troops are forbidden to return to their husbands (if they are priests) out of fear that they were raped.
  This halakhah offers a significant leniency—if there is one place in which these women could have hidden from the besieging troops, we can act as if all of the women were there. They would all be permitted to return to their priestly husbands under the assumption that they were hiding when the city was conquered.
  Yirmiyah asks what the halakhah is if we know that the hiding place could fit only one woman. Do we pretend that any given woman might have been the one to hide there, even if we know that not all of the women could have hidden there? Or do we not?
  The Talmud compares the situation of a hiding place in which only one woman could have hidden with a case of two paths, one clean and the other unclean (due to the burial of a dead body). If one person walks down one path and another person down the other, we know for certain that at least one of them was defiled. The tannaim disagree over whether we must assume that all of the clean food they prepared is considered defiled.
  Rava limited the dispute in the mishnah to a case where one person came to ask whether the food he had prepared was pure and at the same time he asked about the other person’s food. R. Judah would say that this is similar to a case where they ask separately, and therefore we are allowed to presume that they are both clean, even though this is not possible. And R. Yose would say that since one person is asking about both men at the same time, this must be treated like a case where both come to ask if they are pure at the same time, and they must both be treated as defiled.
  The analogy between the two cases is drawn. In the case of the besieged city, all of the women were permitted at the same time. This is like the case of two men coming to ask if they are pure at the same time. Since we assume the men are impure (even though one is not) we should also assume that the women are impure, even though we know for sure that one is not.
  The Talmud now rejects the comparison. In the case of the two paths, we know for sure that one of them has been defiled. Therefore, if they come to ask at the same time, we have no choice but to treat both as if they were defiled. But in the case of the women, we do not know that anyone was raped, we are only concerned. Therefore, since we are only dealing with suspicions, we can be lenient. If there is a hiding place for one, all women may be considered pure and allowed to return to their priestly husband.
  This woman admits that she did not hide in the hiding place which would have protected her from being raped. However, at the same time she says that she was not defiled, i.e. she was not raped. Do we say that she should be believed, for after all, why would she say such a lie, when she could have just said that she did hide? Or do we not believe her.
  
  Daf 27b
  
  The Talmud compares the above situation of the woman with a case that came before Rava. Rava believed the man who said that he went by way of Pekod, but that there was no water there, and the donkey did not die from his own negligence. If the man had wanted to lie, he could have said that they went by way of Naresh.Abaye disagrees. If there are witnesses, we do not say “why should he lie.” According to Rashi, there are witnesses in the sense that we know that there is usually water in Nehar Pekod. The man is not believed to say that which contradicts what we know to be true.
  The Talmud now points out the difference between the two situations. In the case of Nehar Pekod, we know that there is usually water there. Therefore, his statement should not be believed. But in the case of the woman, we do not know that she was raped. There is only a concern that she might have been. Therefore, we can believe her.
  IntroductionThis section refers to the section of the mishnah which stated that if there are any witnesses at all, even a slave who is not normally allowed to testify, who can state that she was not raped, they are believed.
  Even if the only person who can testify that she was not raped is her own handmaid, the handmaid is believed. This is true even though there is some concern that the handmaid would lie on behalf of her own mistress.
  A baraita is cited that contradicts the idea that even a woman’s own handmaid should be believed. This baraita refers to a particular situation in which a woman should not be secluded with a particular man. She can be secluded with him, as long as there is any other person present, with one exception—her handmaid. The concern is that if only her handmaid is present, she might sleep with the man in the handmaid’s presence and the handmaid would not tell anyone of it. Thus we see that handmaid’s may not be trusted to testify against their mistresses.
  There are two solutions. According to R. Papi, the rabbis were especially lenient in the case of the captive woman. In that case, even her own handmaid is believed. But in the case of seclusion, she should not be secluded with him in front of her own handmaid.Papa distinguishes between her handmaid, who is not believed, and her husband’s handmaid, who is believed. Her husband’s handmaid will not cover up for the woman, because she is not her mistress.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on the notion that a woman’s own handmaid is not believed. A person cannot testify on his own behalf. But a handmaid should be allowed to testify on behalf of her mistress.The answer is that a woman’s handmaid is like the woman herself. Therefore, she cannot testify on behalf of her mistress.
  Ashi says that both cases (captive woman and seclusion) refer to a woman’s own handmaid. The handmaid will tend to see things happen and keep quiet. Therefore, in the case of the captive woman if she sees something happen and does say something, she is believed. But in the case of seclusion, a woman should not be secluded in the presence of her own handmaid because the handmaid will keep silent.
  IntroductionThis sugya continues off from yesterday. There we said that a woman’s slave is believed to testify that a woman was not raped in a city that had been taken over by a marauding army. Our sugya asks why she is believed. After all, she could be lying.
  We do not assume that a maidservant would witness her mistress being raped and not only not testify as to what she saw, but actively lie about it. She might keep quiet and not testify. But she wouldn’t compound the matter by also falsely testifying.
  To prove that we don’t assume a person would doubly lie, the Talmud cites an unrelated story. In this story a brother appears out of nowhere and wants to share an inheritance. The other brother clearly does not want to share the estate with someone he doesn’t even know. R. Hisda answers that it is certainly possible that a person does not recognize his own brothers. This is known from the Joseph story.
  This is the continuation of the story between R. Hisda, the inheritor and his alleged brother. At first, R. Hisda tells the person who just showed up that he must prove that he is a brother. This seems to make sense. But then the story takes a twist. The brother who just showed up says that the inheriting brother is a powerful man, and people are afraid to say something that will anger him. In turn, R. Hisda powerfully rules against this strong man. Generally, the person who wishes to extract money, i.e. the plaintiff, bears the burden of proof. But R. Hisda says that he is going to rule against all such powerful men and make them bear the burden of proof, even if they are the defendants!
  The story concludes with the same remark we had above. Even if this powerful man brings witnesses, we should still fear that they will lie. The answer is that we don’t fear a double lie. They won’t both hide the truth (that he is a brother) and lie and actively say that he is not a brother.In close, the assumption of this passage seems to be that we generally trust people when they testify in court. This is true to this day. Even though people are not automatically trusted, they are not automatically distrusted either.
  IntroductionThis sugya continues the discussion of whether a woman’s own handmaid is believed to testify about her. R. Papi implied that in the case of the captive woman, even her own handmaid is believed. R. Papa said that only her husband’s handmaid is believed, not her own.
  There are two baraitot cited here, both about who can testify in the case of a captive woman. The first baraita explicitly states that a woman’s own handmaid may not testify. The second baraita says that the only people who may not testify are the woman herself and her husband. These are the two parties that are immediately interested in the outcome. Anyone else should be allowed to testify.
  1. Papi and R. Ashi both said that her handmaid is believed. They certainly cannot agree with both tannaim, for one baraita explicitly said that she is not believed. But R. Papa who said that her handmaid is not believed might be able to find a way to get the second baraita to agree with him.
  Papa could answer that the baraita that implied that a woman’s handmaid is believed referred to a handmaid that “talked in her simplicity,” meaning she didn’t actively testify. Since she did not intend to testify, we do not assume that she was lying.
  The Talmud cites a case where such an event really happens. Interest, the story is told by a rabbi coming from Carthage, clearly a Roman stronghold. A son comes in front of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] and just simply tells the story of what happened. He didn’t mean to testify that his mother was not raped. He just says that he was looking after her during her captivity. Rabbi, in his wisdom, allowed her to marry a priest, based on the son’s testimony. R. Papa could say that the same is true for a handmaid. If she testifies, she is not believed. But if she speaks in her simplicity, she is believed.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a new section of the earlier mishnah.
  This story illustrates the principle in the above mishnah. A person cannot testify about something that they have a personal interest in. Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-katzav has a personal interest in his wife not being assumed to have been raped. He is a priest, and if such an assumption is made, she is prohibited to him. Sadly, he is not believed. While I admit this story causes us to have great sympathy for both the rabbi and his wife, the principle does seem to be of great legal value.
  Despite the fact that they could not stay married, Rabbi Zechariah wanted her to continue to act as the head of the family. She received her own little house in his courtyard, and she seems to have continued to mother the children.
  Abaye now asks if one can treat one’s own divorcee the same way that R. Zechariah treated his wife who was forbidden to him because she was taken captive. Was that a special leniency because of the problem of captivity? Or is that always the law—can anyone live in such close proximity to one’s divorcee?The answer is brought from a baraita that rules much more strictly. No man may live in the same neighborhood as his ex-wife who has remarried. The fear is that they will engage in an illicit affair; after all, they do have some familiarity with each other. With a Kohen the rule is even stricter—she may not live in the same alley as him, even if she was not remarried. This is because a Kohen may not have relations with his divorcee, even if she has not remarried.  Therefore, they have to live even further apart.
  
  Daf 28a
  
  The obvious follow up is—who has to move? While the answer sounds sexist, it really is not. Whoever owns the property gets to stay.
  A thornier question is what to do if they jointly own the courtyard. The baraita did not address this situation directly, so they have to try to figure it out from the case where it says that she moves out. If this is a case where she owns the property, the baraita is wrong—if she owns the property, he moves out. And if he owns the property, it is overly obvious—we already know that. Therefore, it must be a case where they jointly own the property. In such a case, the prejudice rules and she must move out.The Talmud rejects this. It could refer to a case where they are renting. In such a case it would seem that they both have to move out.
  Ultimately the answer is that it is more difficult for a man to move than a woman. While it is true that this is a sexist answer, it’s not exactly saying that the man is “better” or more important than the woman. Rather, it is saying that the husband is in essence weaker than the wife. Moving would be more harmful to him. I’m not saying this isn’t sexist. I’m saying it’s just a bit different than we might have at first expected.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the possibility that a husband would come with his ex-wife to court, so that she could collect money from him.
  According to the baraita, if she needs to collect money that her former husband borrowed from her father’s estate, she may not come to court to collect from him. According to Rashi, this refers to a priest who divorced his wife. The rabbis feared that in court they might decide to reunite, and it is prohibited for a priest to be remarried with his divorcee.The amoraim offer various stringencies which the court enacts if they do come into court at the same time.
  The baraita that R. Nahman cites here is from a minor tractate called Evel Rabbati, which means “the bigger [tractate] dealing with the laws of mourning.” Today that tractate is called “Semachot”—celebrations—which is, of course, a euphemism.The baraita limits the above halakhah to a case where the couple was already married. In such a case, since they have already been familiar with each other, we fear that seeing each other in court might encourage them to get back together. But if they were only betrothed, she can collect the payments herself, because they were never familiar with each other.
  There are two versions of this story. In the first, Rava does place a go-between to separate the betrothed from his former fiancée, and the R. Adda b. Matanah says that he did not need to, and in the end, Rava justifies the need to separate the two. In the second version the actions are flipped.In any case, the interesting issue is that we see that there may have been some “familiarity” between an engaged couple, even though this “familiarity” is supposed to wait until marriage.
  IntroductionThe last Mishnah of this chapter discusses in which situations a person is believed to testify about things he saw when he was a minor. That is to say, although minors are not allowed to testify, there are certain things that a minor can see about which he may testify upon reaching adulthood.
  Section one:  A person is believed to say that the signature on a document is similar to the handwriting of a person with whom they were close in childhood.  The assumption is that a person would remember this well.  Furthermore, this is not really “testifying” but just verifying someone else’s testimony, and therefore there is more room to be lenient in accepting such testimony.Section two:  A person is believed to say that he was at a wedding and the bride wore the signs of a virgin (see mishnah one of this chapter).  The Talmud explains that he is believed because most marriages are first marriages.Section three:  A priest must immerse before he eats terumah.  The time of immersion is right before evening.  A person is believed to say that he saw one of his classmates leave school early to immerse in the mikveh, and that hence he is a priest.Section four:  The priests collect their terumah at the threshing floor.  By this person testifying that so-and-so collected terumah, he is saying that he is a priest.  Note that again the mishnah is concerned with verifying the status of priests.Section five:  A bet ha-peras is a field adjacent to a field that used to serve as a cemetery but has been plowed over.   The adjacent field may have small pieces of bones there, and therefore a priest may not enter.  A person is believed to identify such a field, even if he only saw it in his childhood.Section six:  On Shabbat a person may leave his town only 2000 amot.  This is called the “tehum shabbat” or shabbat limit.  A person is believed when he reaches majority age to say that when they were children they would go this far out of the city.  The reason he is believed is that this is a matter that can be verified.Section seven:  The mishnah lists two things a person cannot testify that he saw as a minor.  First of all he may not testify that a certain person owned a path through someone else’s field.  Second of all, he may not testify that a person owned a place where they used to stand and give eulogies.  Such places were owned on the paths that lead from the cemeteries to the cities.  It would have been like a small, private funeral home. In both of these cases, the testimony involves the ownership of land.  For a person to prove that he owns a piece of land, he will need to bring firmer testimony than this.
  The first clause in the mishnah teaches that a boy can identify the handwriting of his father, teacher or brother. R. Huna b. Joshua adds that another adult must testify with him.
  The Talmud answers the question of why the mishnah needs to teach all three examples. If it had taught just “father” I might have thought that the son can identify the testimony of his father because he is with him so frequently. So I would not have been able to derive “teacher” from “father.” And if it had just taught “teacher” I might have thought that he was believed about his teacher, because he fears his teacher. But he doesn't fear his father so much, so if the Mishnah had not taught that he is believed about his father’s signature, I would not have derived it from there.
  The brother is neither with the father all of the time (?) nor does a brother fear his brother (this strikes me as true). Therefore, brother needs to be taught explicitly—he is believed to testify to the signature of his brother.In the end the Talmud says that since the very need to uphold a document is only of rabbinic origin, the rabbis can suspend the usual laws of testimony and let people testify who normally are not allowed to do so.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now begins to go through the cases mentioned in the mishnah we learned yesterday.
  He is believed to say that a particular woman was married with signs that she was a virgin because most marriages are first marriages. So his testimony is only, in a sense, aiding in proving that which we already can assume.
  The mishnah said that he could testify that he remembers that a certain boy would leave school early to eat terumah, i.e. he is a Kohen. But maybe this boy is not a Kohen, but was only the slave of a Kohen. The fact that we are not concerned with the possibility that his classmate is a Kohen supports R. Joshua b. Levi’s statement that it is prohibited to teach a slave Torah. [I do seem to remember echoes of this in the history of American slavery. Owners feared what would happen if there slaves became educated].
  A baraita is cited as a difficulty on R. Joshua b. Levi. The baraita teaches that a slave who performs an act that seems to imply that he is free, is still not free. One of these acts is to read three verses from the Torah in the synagogue. It seems that a slave is allowed to learn Torah!
  
  Daf 28b
  
  The resolution is that the baraita refers to a case where a slave happened to learn how to read and read in the synagogue. But R. Joshua b. Levi referred to systematically teaching one’s slave to read, as if he was one’s own son. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to interpret the various sections of the Mishnah.
  The Mishnah ruled that a person can testify that when he was young he would see his friend taken out of school to eat terumah and that this would be sufficient to allow that person to eat terumah. But the Talmud limits this to rabbinical terumah, whose status is lower than that of terumah mandated by the Torah. The rules for “toraitic terumah” would be more significant.
  The Mishnah said that the person is believed to say that someone he knew when younger used to take a share of terumah at the threshing floor. The problem is that the receiver may have been a slave of a priest. A slave may eat terumah, but if he is freed, he will not be allowed to eat terumah. The resolution is that this Mishnah follows the sage who says that one does not give terumah to the slave of a priest on the threshing floor. The reason is that if the slave is seen receiving terumah, people might think he is a priest and raise him to the full status of a priest, and allow him to marry a woman who one marries a priest. This is the opinion of R. Judah. R. Yose holds that the slave may receive terumah at the threshing floor, but does have to acknowledge there that he may be a slave. R. Yose correspondingly holds that the fact that the slave received terumah at the threshing floor is not sufficient evidence that he is a priest.
  This baraita demonstrates the danger of giving testimony, even when one believes that one is telling the truth. R. Elazar testified only once in his entire life and it almost led to a serious error. As the end of the story explains, he was in the place of R. Yose where they give terumah to slaves at the threshing floor. But R. Elazar then went to R. Judah’s place where they don’t give terumah to slaves. He testified that he had seen this person receiving terumah and the court assumed that the fact that he received terumah meant that he was not a slave.This story may also be a tacit argument against halakhic diversity. Such diversity can lead to confusion.The story is interrupted by the editor ruling out the very possibility that the slave was elevated to the priesthood. In a famous story about R. Pinchas ben Yair, we learn God does not allow even the animals of the pious to stumble, all the more so God would not allow the pious themselves to stumble. Therefore, what really happened was that they wanted to elevate the slave to the priesthood. They did not actually do so.
  The mishnah rules a person may testify that a certain field is a “bet haperas.” If one plows over a grave, he makes the surrounding area into a “bet haperas,” for bones may have been strewn there. One is allowed to testify about it because its status is only “derabanan,” of rabbinic origin. We can see this in the statement of Rav. Rav rules that if a priest wants to walk in such a field, all he has to do is blow away the dust. If the status of the field was toraitic, he would not have been so easily able to remedy it.
  Rav Judah rules that if a bet haperas was trodden by many, many people or animals walking there, all the bones there were probably trampled on and are now smaller than the size of a barleycorn. Such a small piece of bone no longer transmits impurity.
  On Shabbat a person may go only 2000 amot out of one’s town. This is called the “tehum shabbat” or shabbat limit.  A person is believed when he reaches majority age to say that when they were children they would go this far out of the city.The Talmud comments that the author of this Mishnah holds that the entire prohibition is only “derabanan” and therefore the rules can be made lenient when it comes to determining where this limit actually lies.
  IntroductionThis is the last section of this chapter.
  A person is not believed to testify that a certain piece of land belonged to another person, either that he had a path there or that he had a place to give eulogies there. The reason is that such testimony is not sufficient to take money from one person and give it to another. In order for property to be transferred, the testimony would have to originate with one who saw the events as an adult.
  The baraita adds more cases where a person is believed as an adult to testify concerning things he knew as a boy.He is believed to testify that a certain family was “fit” or “unfit.” This refers to being fit to marry an Israelite—i.e. the family does not consist of mamzerim. The original term that the Talmud uses is “pure or impure” but the Talmud prefers the terms “fit or unfit.”The Talmud will explain below what a  “ketzatzah.”He is believed only if he himself saw these things as a child. He is not believed if he only knows of them through hearsay.Finally, he must have been a Jew when he found these things out. If he was a non-Jew or a slave and then was freed, he is not believed.These last two rules accord with normal Talmudic rules of testimony. A person is not believed based on hearsay, nor are non-Jews or slaves generally allowed to testify.
  Yohanan ben Beroka seems to dispute one of the previous clause in Mishnah. The Talmud will now examine his opinion carefully.
  Yohanan ben Beroka cannot disagree with the clause that refers to the path or the eulogy place. To cause a transfer of land would always require full testimony. Rather, he must disagree with the earlier clause, according to which if a person witnessed one of these things as a non-Jewish or slave child, he may not testify about them as an adult. R. Yohanan b. Beroka says that he may testify in such a situation.
  The first opinion in the Mishnah holds that since he was not a Jew when he saw the events occurred, he would not have paid careful attention. He would have known that as a non-Jew, these issues were not relevant. R. Yohanan b. Beroka assumes that he was going to convert shortly, and so he would have paid attention.
  The “ketzatzah” ceremony was basically a way of letting everyone know that a certain person had married a woman not fit for him, and that therefore people should stay away from his offspring. As we have seen, lineage was a very, very important criterion in choosing a marriage partner for Jews living in this period. Indeed, until the modern period, lineage was probably one of the two most important determining factors in marital choice (the other would have been wealth). The ceremony was clearly meant to discourage men from marrying women unfit for them. I should note that the notion that marriage is meant for personal fulfillment and that choice of partner should be based first and foremost on love is a notion that is accepted by most people today, but that would have been strange in the ancient world. It is a modern notion that arose within the last several hundred years.
  Congratulations! You have finished the second chapter of Ketubot. There were many important legal principles in this chapter, including “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits,” “Why would she have lied,” “migo,” and “the fear of collusion.” These principles have far-reaching implications, well beyond the topics discussed here.
  
  Daf 29a
  
  IntroductionDeuteronomy 22:28-29 states, “If a man comes upon a young girl, a virgin who is not engaged and he seizes her and lies with her, and they are discovered, the man who lay with her shall pay the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver and she shall be his wife.  Because he has violated her, he can never have the right to divorce her.” There are similar verses in Exodus 22:15-16.The rabbis learn from these verses that if a man rapes a virgin he must pay her father a fine of 50 shekels, which is the equivalent of 200 dinars.  Furthermore, he must marry her. Through a careful reading of the wording of these laws the rabbis concluded that this rule applies only to a virgin (betulah) who is also young (na’arah), which means any girl who has reached the age of 12 and has shown signs of pubery.  A girl remains in this status for only six months.  After that she is considered to have reached adulthood and one who rapes her does not pay the fine.Before we proceed, we should remember that the fine was only one payment made by the rapist to his victim.  He also had to pay all of the damages that one pays for injuring another person.  We should also remember that society’s attitude towards rape has changed drastically in the last century. Rape is a horrible crime and while we are discussing the technical aspects of who receives a fine and who doesn’t, we shouldn’t forget what we are talking about.The mishnah teaches that a man must pay the fine to a woman even if he is not allowed to marry her.Another note about the beginning of this chapter. This mishnah relates to a principle that appears elsewhere in the Mishnah—if a person commits a crime for which he is obligated two penalties, he only gets the worse of the two penalties. In today’s mishnah the man violates a woman who is forbidden to him but the penalty for sex with her is karet (a penalty not carried out by the courty), or is a simple prohibition with no penalty. In this case, as we shall learn, he incurs both the financial penalty and karet. Had the sexual crime been one punishable by death, he would not be liable for the financial penalty, because in that case he receives only one penalty.
  Section one:  The women in this section are forbidden in marriage to an Israelite.  Our mishnah teaches that although they are forbidden in marriage, he still must pay them the fine.  A mamzeret was defined in Yevamot 4:9.  A netinah is a descendent of Temple slaves.  The Samaritans were considered a splinter group by the rabbis and Jews were forbidden from marrying them.Section two:  It is assumed that a non-Jewish woman is not a virgin.  Captives are assumed to have been raped and slave-women are also assumed to be non-virgins.  Furthermore, as we have learned before, the rabbis thought that if a woman lost her virginity before the age of three years and one day, her physical signs would later return.  Therefore if these women made the passage into being full, free Jews or were redeemed from captivity before the age of three, they are assumed to have returned to being virgins.  Therefore, they receive the fine.Section three:  The women listed in this section are forbidden to a man, and having relationship with them is punishable by karet (a punishment inflicted by God and not by the court).  Since the court does not execute the man for having had intercourse with these women, he is liable to pay the fine.Note that in order for him to be liable to pay the fine, these women cannot be married nor have been married.  The only situation that he will be liable to pay the fine for having intercourse with one of these women is if they were betrothed to one of these men and then divorced or widowed before proper marriage.  Had they been married when he raped them, he would be liable for the death penalty for having committed adultery.  Had they been fully married and then divorced or widowed, they would not be considered virgins, and hence he would not be liable to pay the fine.
  The Talmud merely clarifies the intent of the Mishnah is to list the women who receive a fine despite the fact that they were prohibited to the man. It did not mean to say that if a man rapes or seduces a woman permitted to him, he does not pay a fine.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the question of the age of a girl that receives the fine for being raped or seduced.As an introduction, I want to make a few comments. These sections are highly, highly theoretical. The rabbis in this chapter are basically trying to interpret the Torah’s laws in a coherent manner, but they are not referring to practical halakhah observed in their day, or perhaps halakhah that was ever observed. These halakhot try to make exegetical sense of the Torah, but I do not believe they are trying to ask the question of “what is fair.” For instance, the rabbis place severe limits on the age of the girl whose rapist/seducer is liable for the fine. This does not mean that they thought it was okay to rape girls of another age. They certainly did not. They just work out the exegesis of the Torah such as to say that only a “na’arah” receives a fine. The rabbis did not live in a world in which Jewish men were allowed to sell their daughters into slavery. This is clear from other sections of the Talmud. Nevertheless, the laws of slavery are part of the Torah, and therefore are worthy of discussion. I really can’t emphasize this enough. These are theoretical laws and the arguments are theoretical.We would do well to remember the general ages of the girl:Ketanah (small girl)—from birth to puberty.Na’arah (young girl)—from the onset of puberty till maturity.Bogeret (mature girl)—having reached sexual maturity.Elsewhere, years are used instead of physical signs.
  The Mishnah says that if the girl was a “young girl” she receives a fine. “Young girl” in rabbinic literature refers to a girl from the age of 12-12 ½. The implication is that a minor girl does not receive a fine. The Talmud will now explore who holds this opinion....
  There are two laws referred to here. The first is the issue of receiving a fine for being raped or seduced. The second is the legal ability of a father to sell his daughter into slavery. According to Rabbi Meir, a father can sell only his minor daughter into slavery. Once she hits puberty, he may no longer do so. And at that point, she receives the fine. These laws do not coincide at all.According to the rabbis, a girl can receive a fine from the age of three until she becomes mature (bogeret). The disagreement is over whether a ketanah (a small girl) receives a fine. According to R. Meir she does not, but according to the other rabbis, she does.
  The rabbis agree that a small girl can be sold. They do not mean to say that she only receives the fine. All they mean to say is that the two halakhot can coincide.
  
  Daf 29b
  
  IntroductionThe Mishnah listed women who receive a fine even though they were legally forbidden to him. The Talmud is perplexed by this.
  The Torah says that if a man rapes a woman, he must marry her as a wife (providing she agrees). But if she is prohibited to him as a wife, then how can he marry her. And if she is prohibited, then this whole passage is not applicable to her. So how can the Mishnah say that he still pays a fine the fine.
  The word “na’arah” is written twice in the passage about rape (Deuteronomy 22:28-29), and on one of those occasions it has a “heh”—the word “the”—preceding it. This allows Resh Lakish to read it three times. The first time he reads it as necessary to teach the law itself—the fine relates to the na’arah, the young girl. The second time it comes to include women prohibited to him by a negative commandment. This would include the mamzeret, netinah and a few other categories of women. The third time would include women prohibited to him by “karet,” which would include certain incestual relationships, such as sister, brother’s wife, and wife’s sister. The fine applies to these women as well.
  Papa offers a very similar set-up to Resh Lakish’s midrash, but uses a different prooftext, Exodus 22:15-16.
  The Talmud now asks the typical question—why do the rabbis use different verses? The answer will be that each rabbi uses the other’s verse for another midrash.Papa uses the verse that was the base of Resh Lakish’s derashah for a derashah that is ascribed to Abaye. Abaye reads the verse as saying that if the girl dies before the seducer/rapist pays the fine, the seducer/rapist does not pay the fine. Again, I should note that this is not a midrash meant to make life easier for an actual seducer/rapist. It is tied to legal/midrashic concepts. For instance, if someone dies before the case comes to trial (in this case the girl), the trial cannot really happen. But again, to reiterate, it is highly theoretical in their world.
  Resh Lakish used the verse used by R. Papa for the midrash that teaches that the fine levied on the rapist/seducer should be the same as the general bride-price for virgins. Deuteronomy determines that this mohar is 50 shekels. The rabbis read the biblical shekel as equivalent to four Roman dinars. This is the source of the 200 dinar (or Aramaic zuz) ketubah for a woman’s first marriage.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the dispute between Resh Lakish and R. Papa that appeared in yesterday’s section.
  The problem with yesterday’s section is that it creates the picture that Resh Lakish would disagree with Abaye or that R. Papa would disagree with the gezerah shavah, which equated the fine with the general bride price for virgins. But this is not true—all agree with both of those other derashot. In fact, there really have not been any actual disputes as of now.
  The Talmud creates harmony by saying that ultimately there are enough words to go around for everyone. It in essence combines Resh Lakish’s and Rav Papa’s derashot into one system. This allows two of the words to teach the law itself, two to each Abaye and the gezerah shavah, and it still leaves two more words, one to teach that fines apply to women who are prohibited to the rapist/seducer by a negative commandment and to those punishable by karet.
  In the baraita cited here, two tannaim (with similar names) limit the applicability of the law in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 to a woman who is legally allowed to marry the man. This opposes the mishnah here in Ketubot according to which even if the marriage is not possible, he still pays the fine.
  The two R. Shimons seem to say almost the same thing, so the Talmud strives to find a difference between them. The difference is with regard to a woman prohibited by a negative commandment to a man, but who nevertheless can be married. An Israelite man can betroth a mamzeret or netinah (similar laws to the mamzeret) but they may not stay married. He would be obligated to divorce her. In contrast, a man could not betroth someone prohibited by incest, such as his sister, daughter or mother. Even if they perform a betrothal, they are not betrothed.So according to R. Shimon the Yemenite, since the man can betroth the mamzeret, i.e. she can become his wife, the fine applies in that case. But according to R. Shimon ben Menasya, since she cannot stay his wife, the laws do not apply. Note they would both agree that if the marriage was incestual, the fine would not apply. This opposes our mishnah.
  Akiva holds (unlike most sages) that there can be no betrothal even if the prohibition of the union is only a negative commandment. Therefore, a man who rapes or seduces a mamzeret would not pay the fine (according to the two tannaim from above), if they agree with R. Akiba. If so, what is the difference between them?
  According to R. Simai, and with him R. Akiba, the only negative commandment where the offspring is not a mamzer is the offspring of a widow and a high priest. In all other cases, R. Akiba would say two things: 1) The offspring is a mamzer; 2) There can be no betrothal between the man and woman. So to connect this to our issue—R. Shimon the Yemenite and R. Shimon ben Menasya would disagree only if the rapist is the high priest and the woman is a widow. In all other cases, since there could be no betrothal, there is no fine, or any of the other laws in Deuteronomy 29:28-29. This would disagree even more radically with our mishnah.
  IntroductionThis section continues the discussion from yesterday.
  According to R. Yeshebav R. Akiba goes even further in claiming that children of forbidden marriages are mamzerim—in all cases of a negative commandment, even a widow to a high priest, the marriage is forbidden and the child is a mamzer. We are left to determine the difference between R. Shimon the Yemenite and R. Shimon ben Menasya from the baraita we learned yesterday.I should also note that we can see in this statement the strong resistance some rabbis must have had to R. Akiba’s stringency. The creation of mamzerim is a tremendous halakhic problem, dooming children to restrictions when they have done nothing wrong. Why legislate halakhah such that even more are created?
  
  Daf 30a
  
  The two R. Shimons would disagree if the prohibition is one that stems from a positive commandment. There is a positively phrased commandment not to allow an Egyptian or Edomite woman to marry into Israel. So if the woman was one of these two women, the marriage would be possible, even to R. Akiba. R. Shimon the Yemenite would say the fine applies. But he would have to divorce her, so according to R. Shimon ben Menasya, the fine would not apply. 
  The Talmud now pushes the argument further. R. Yeshebav might have been responding to R. Simai who said that R. Akiba rules that the offspring is a mamzer even in the case of a widow to a high priest but not in the case of a positive commandment. But maybe R. Yeshebav was saying his own opinion, in which case he might have meant to say that R. Akiba says the child is a mamzer even if the marriage is only a transgression of a positive commandment, such as in the case of an Egyptian or Edomite woman. If this is so, then what could possibly be a case where a woman could be married to a man (the betrothal is valid) but she could not stay married to him, such that the two R. Shimons would argue?
  A high priest must marry a virgin. This is a positive commandment. But this rule does not apply to all, only to a high priest. Therefore, R. Akiba would agree that the offspring is not a mamzer.
  IntroductionThis section opens a long discussion about an issue referred to in the Mishnah that opened this chapter. If a man commits a crime which would obligate him for two penalties, he would only get the worse of the two. Thus in the Mishnah, if he rapes or seduces a woman and thereby incurs a fine, and at the same time he is obligated for the death penalty, he gets the death penalty and does not pay the fine. The Talmud will now explore the parameters of this concept and its source.
  According to R. Hisda, all tannaim found on the previous page agree that if a man rapes or seduces a woman who is a menstruant he pays the fine even though she was prohibited to him. This is because she is permitted to him as a wife and she can remain his wife. In other words, this is different than prohibitions that remain in place, such as incest, a widow to the high priest or the positive commandment prohibitions of not marrying an Edomite or Egyptian.
  The Mishnah had distinguished between sexual prohibitions punishable by death and those punishable by karet (extirpation, a punishment not meted out by the court). If the woman was prohibited by death, the rapist/seducer dies and does not pay the fine. But if she was prohibited by karet, the rapist/seducer is punished by karet and pays the fine. This is the case with many incest prohibitions such as sister or sister-in-law. In other words, the rule that he gets the worse of the two punishments only applies when one of those punishments is death. If one is karet, then one still pays the fine.Rabbi Nehuniah ben Hakaneh disagrees. He holds that if one incurs the penalty of karet and a fine at the same time, he gets karet and not the fine. This is illustrated by Yom Kippur, whose transgression is punishable by karet and not death, as is Shabbat. Rabbi Nehuniah ben Hakaneh says that Shabbat and Yom Kippur work the same—if one transgresses Yom Kippur by doing something for which he is also obligated to pay a fine, he is exempt from the fine because he is punished with karet.Note that this would also disagree with R. Hisda above. The penalty for sex with a menstruant is karet. So according to R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh if a man rapes/seduces a menstruant, he does not pay the fine because he gets karet.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now inquires as to the reasoning of R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh who said that one who performs a single action for which he is simultaneously liable for karet and a financial penalty does not pay the fine. To understand this passage we need to understand the source of the idea that if one gets the death penalty and a fine, he only gets the death penalty. This comes from Exodus 21:22. If a man strikes a pregnant woman and she does not die (no “harm” or “ason” occurs) then he pays for the fact that he caused her to miscarry. But if she does die, the implication is that he does not pay. This is the source of the idea that a person receives the worse of the two punishments.
  As I said in the introduction, the basis of the whole idea that one does not incur two penalties for one crime comes from Exodus 21:22. This verse refers to death (harm) inflicted by a human. The same word “ason” is used in Genesis 42:38, where Jacob expresses concern that if Benjamin goes down to Egypt with his brothers, “harm” will occur to him. Abaye reads this “harm” as referring to death by the hand of heaven. This leads Abaye to conclude that R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh equated death by a man (execution) with death by the hand of heaven (karet). Just as one cannot be liable for execution and a fine for one crime, so too one cannot be liable for karet and a fine for one crime.
  Abaye assumed that Jacob used the word “harm (ason)” to refer to harm by the hands of heaven. But how do we know this was what he was warning them about. Perhaps he was warning them about other forms of harm that could be the responsibility of man—such as lions or thieves. If so, then we have no proof that “harm” could refer to harm at the hands of heaven.The answer is that Jacob was warning his sons about any type of harm, both that from heaven and that from man.Below the Talmud will ask if “lions and thieves” really are “from the hands of man.”
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that God controls heat and cold and that lions and thieves are in the hands of man. Today’s section questions both of these assumptions.
  The verse in Proverbs seems to prove that a person has control over cold and heat for one who acts well will not be punished with them. I should note that this is Rashi’s understanding of the words I have translated at “cold and heat.” Biblical translations render them as “thorns and snares.”
  The Talmud also questions the proposition that “lions and thieves” are “by the hands of man.” A tradition concerning the cessation of the four forms of capital punishment is cited to point out that God sends lions to kill someone who should have been stoned, or thieves to kill someone who should have been decapitated. This proves that lions and thieves are “by the hands of God.”
  
  Daf 30b
  
  The Talmud solves the problem by simply reversing the tradition, which is by the hands of man and which is by the hands of heaven.I should note that the way that the Gemara so easily reverses this tradition might a hint that we just don’t know what is “by the hand of heaven” and what is “by the hand of man.” Sometimes what we perceive to be the apparent truth, the immediate cause, is not really the ultimate cause. And in essence, here the Talmud is saying that ultimately there is no difference. What is “by the hand of man” really means that man causes the bad thing to happen, either directly, or by deserving it through his deeds. And what is by the hand of heaven may often be directly caused by a human being.
  IntroductionToday’s section returns to a discussion of R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh who held that if one transgresses Yom Kippur and incurs a monetary penalty with one act, he receives karet for breaking Yom Kippur but is exempt from the financial penalty.
  Rava learns this principle from Leviticus 20:5. In this verse God says that if Israel does not execute those who worship Molech, God will “cut him off.” The verb for “cut off” has the same root as “karet.” This teaches us that there is some essential similarity between the two. Just as one who deserves the death penalty does not pay a fine, so too one who deserves karet is exempt from paying a fine. This is the source of R. Nehunia ben Hakaneh’s principle.
  IntroductionRava and Abaye both gave midrashic reasons for R. Nehunia ben Hakaneh. The Talmud now asks what the practical difference between their reasoning is.
  A non-priest who eats terumah is liable for “death at the hands of heaven.” This is not exactly the punishment of karet, but it is similar. To Rava in such a case he is obligated to pay even though he gets “death by the hands of heaven” because Rava derives the reasoning of R. Nehuniah from a verse that deals with karet. One is exempt only if the punishment is karet and a fine, but not death at the hands of heaven and a fine. In contrast, Abaye derives the reasoning of R. Nehuniah from a verse referring to death at the hands of heaven. Therefore, one who incurs death at the hands of heaven and a fine at the same time is exempt from the fine. This would include, so it seems, a non-priest who eats terumah.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on Abaye, by citing a teaching of R. Hisda. R. Hisda notes that if the act can be separated into two sins, the person is liable for both. This would be true of someone who steals forbidden fat and then eats it. He is liable for stealing the moment he lifts the fat up, but he is not liable for karet until he eats it.This should then be true of terumah as well. As soon as he lifts it up, he is liable for illegal appropriation of terumah, which is punishable by a monetary fine. But he only becomes liable for the death penalty once he eats it.
  The Talmud now locates a case where both sins do come simultaneously—someone else picked it up and shoved it in his mouth. In this case his misappropriation of it and his eating of it are simultaneous. Abaye would say that he is liable for karet but not for the fine.This is an excellent example of the propensity of the Talmud to offer resolutions for anything, even if the situation is extremely unlikely.
  IntroductionThis section continues the discussion began yesterday. The idea there was that if an action for which there are two transgressions can be divided into two distinct actions, each of which incurs a different punishment, he gets both punishments. We would not say in that case that he only gets the worse of the two. Yesterday the section ended with the resolution that if someone put the terumah into his mouth, then both sins would have come simultaneously—stealing and a non-priest eating terumah. Today’s section questions this.
  The Talmud pushes the idea of separating one act into two even further. Here they suggest that when he chews the terumah, he acquires it. This is the act of stealing, for which he would be liable for a financial penalty. Once he swallows it, he is liable for eating the terumah and would get “death by the hands of heaven.” So we still do not have a case in which someone is exempt for a fine when eating terumah.The answer is that someone else shoved the terumah straight into his esophagus. Yes, this barely seems possible. But it seems to momentarily satisfy the Talmud’s need to resolve everything.
  The question now is why should he be obligated at all if someone else shoved terumah down his throat. If he can give it back, he should just give it back, but if he can’t, he wouldn’t be obligated at all.The answer is that he could give it back, but with great difficulty. In such a case he is liable for benefiting from it, but not for stealing it.
  These two amoraim offer new resolutions. Rav Papa suggests that it was liquid terumah. With no chewing, he is liable only when he swallows. So stealing and benefiting from terumah are simultaneous.Ashi offers a resolution that is in a completely new direction. The person does two discreet acts at the same time, for one he is liable for death (at the hands of heaven) and for the other he is liable for a financial penalty. R. Ashi seems to be unique in saying that in such a situation he only gets the worse of the two punishments, even though the two acts have nothing whatsoever to do with each other. Above, the Talmud seemed to hold that in such a case he would be liable for both acts.
  
  Daf 31a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues discussing R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh’s principle that if one performs one action for which he is liable for karet and a fine (such as raping/seducing a virgin woman who is prohibited to him because she is related to him or a menstruant), he is punished only b karet, the worse of the two punishments. The question continues to be—what constitutes a single act such that one would only receive one punishment. And what constitutes two acts?
  This is the tradition we saw in last week’s daf. Since he is first liable for stealing and then for eating forbidden fat, he is not exempt from the fine.
  Abin refers to a case where someone transgresses Shabbat and is liable for a monetary payment at the same time. He shoots an arrow four cubits in the public domain, an infraction of the Shabbat laws. At the same time, he destroys property. But according to R. Abin, he is exempt from the payment because in order to put the arrow down, the final act that makes him liable, he had to pick it up. So too would be the case in the case where he stole the fat and then ate it. He had to pick up the food in order to eat it. Nevertheless, R. Hisda says that he is liable for the stealing. This might imply that R. Hisda and R. Abin disagree.
  The Talmud now draws some distinctions between the two situations. With the arrow, it is impossible for it to travel four cubits in the public domain without being first uprooted. Therefore it is considered one act. But one could eat the forbidden fat without first picking it up. Therefore, the picking up is not essential to the transgression and can be treated as a separate act for which he is liable.
  The other difference is that once the arrow has been shot, it cannot be taken back. This means uprooting and landing are part of the same action. But even after the fat has been picked up, it need not be eaten. Therefore they are two distinct actions.
  The Talmud now points out the practical difference between the two answers above. The case is one who carries a knife in the public domain on Shabbat and tears silk on the way. The knife could not have been put down after traveling four cubits if it had not been picked up at the beginning of four cubits. Therefore, it could be considered one act. But it is not an action that cannot be taken back. One could walk two cubits, tear the silk and then not walk the next two cubits. Therefore it could be considered from a different perspective two acts.
  IntroductionToday’s section goes back to discussing the case of the arrow shot through the public domain on Shabbat that also tears silk on its way.
  This is the statement we saw above—since he couldn’t have transgressed Shabbat without uprooting the arrow (i.e. shooting it), we consider the shooting from beginning to end to be all one action, from the throwing until the landing. And since the silk was torn during this action, he can only be made liable for one punishment, in this case death. He is exempt from the fine.
  Bibi b. Abaye raises a difficulty on R. Abin from a baraita. According to the baraita, if he picks up a purse and carries it from one domain to the other, he is liable to pay the penalty for stealing because first he became liable for stealing and then he carried it. These are two separate actions and he is liable therefore for both of them.But if he dragged the purse out into the public domain he is not liable for the fine because the Shabbat transgression and stealing happened simultaneously, as soon as he took the purse out of the private domain.But if we invoke the principle from before, then he should be exempt in the first case as well. The lifting is necessary for the carrying out. So why should he be liable. This is the difficulty on R. Abin.
  The Talmud limits the case in which he is liable for the fine. When he lifted it up he was intending to hide it in the private domain and not take it out. At that point he became obligated for stealing. Then he changed his mind and took it out of the house. At that point he is liable for carrying (this will be modified below, but for now, this is what the Talmud says). But if he had picked it up with the intent of carrying it out in the first place, he would have been exempt from the fine because we would consider this one act.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section the Talmud limited the case where one is liable for the fine and for the greater punishment to a case where he picked the purse up in order to hide it and then took it out into the public domain. In such a case he is first liable for the fine, and then he becomes liable for the Shabbat transgression of carrying. Our section asks if he is really liable for the Shabbat transgression if he picked it up without intending to carry it out.
  As an objection the Talmud cites a statement by R. Yohanan that if one intends to perform an action that would not make him liable for Shabbat and begins to do that action, and then changes his mind and performs an action that would make him liable for Shabbat, he is exempt. The person here intended to carry within the private domain, which is permitted, and then took something out to the public domain, forbidden. To be liable the entire action must be performed with the intent of transgressing Shabbat. Therefore, if he picked the purse up with the intent of not taking it out of the private domain and then he did take it out he has not even transgressed Shabbat.
  The Talmud now offers a different case where the stealing precedes the Shabbat transgression. The man picks up the purse in the private domain with the intent of stealing it and taking it out to the public domain. He is now liable for stealing. Then he starts to carry it out but stops before he puts it down in the public domain. This detaches the initial lifting up from the putting down. Therefore, these are considered two acts and he is liable for stealing and for transgressing Shabbat.
  The Talmud now explains why he stood. If he stood for a second to adjust the weight on his shoulders, then since this is the usual way of carrying, it would still be considered one action and the liability for Shabbat would come at the same time as the liability for stealing. Therefore he must have stood in order to rest.
  
  Daf 31b
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues the discussion of when someone is liable for both stealing and transgressing Shabbat by carrying into the public domain. Yesterday we learned that if he picks up the object and walks out into the public domain we can consider it two actions because walking is like standing.
  The Talmud accepts that the previous solution and now offers a new one. Why does the baraita say that he is liable for the fine and the Shabbat transgression? Because it holds like Ben Azzai who says that one who walks is like one who stands. Each step he takes is considered like a new step. Therefore, from the moment he lifts up the object he has acquired it and become liable for stealing. He is not liable for the Shabbat transgression until he steps over the boundary and goes into the public domain. This allows us to consider the action to be two actions and not one.
  The answer is that the baraita needed to teach the case of dragging the purse out to let us know that this is considered carrying something out into the public domain on Shabbat and is a transgression. We might have thought that to be liable for carrying the person would have to actually pick the object up.
  The next question is what size of a purse was he dragging out? If it was too big to be carried, then dragging it out is the normal way of carrying such a purse and it is obvious that he is liable. And if it is small, then he really shouldn’t be liable because dragging out a small purse is an abnormal action, and one is never liable for Shabbat transgressions when the action is done in an abnormal way. Rather, it must have been a medium sized purse, one that could be carried with some difficulty but would also be dragged. Picture something like a pretty heavy suitcase.
  The question now becomes where was he dragging it to? If he dragged it into the public domain, the Talmud believes that he is exempt from stealing because he has not yet even acquired the object. But if he drags it into a private domain, he has not transgressed Shabbat, at least not toraitically, because according to the rabbis the Torah prohibits only carrying from the private domain into a public domain.The answer is that he drags it into the sides of the public domain. By doing so he has acquired the object, because this area is divided off from the public domain. But it still counts as the public domain such that he is obligated for carrying/dragging something there from the private domain.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section the Talmud limited the baraita to a case where he dragged the purse out to the sides of the public domain. In this way he has transgressed Shabbat and he has also acquired the purse such that he would be liable to pay the fine. In other words, the sides of the public domain count as the public domain for the Shabbat laws but not with regard to the laws of stealing. Today’s section explores whose opinion this is.
  There is a dispute between R. Eliezer and the rabbis about the status of the sides of the public road (or domain). R. Eliezer says they count as the public road and the other rabbis say that they do not. But our baraita, as we understood it above, matches neither of those opinions, because as I stated above, the baraita considers the sides to be like the public domain for matters of Shabbat but not for stealing. So whose opinion does this baraita match?
  The baraita does indeed accord with R. Eliezer. R. Eliezer holds that with regard to the Shabbat laws, the sides of the public domain have the status of the public domain. The reason is that sometimes the public thoroughfare becomes crowded and people use the sides. Since it does at times serve the public, it counts as the public domain. But since the public is not often there, it counts as a private domain in that one can acquire something there. Therefore, the robber of the purse who drags the purse to the sides of the public domain has transgressed Shabbat and acquired the object.
  Ashi offers a different solution as to how one could be simultaneously liable for stealing and transgress Shabbat. The baraita did not refer to someone who dragged the object to the sides of the public road. Rather it refers to a case where the person lowered his hand and put the object into it in the public domain. This is true even though his hand is close to the ground and he has not therefore picked it up (if he picks it up, then he is acquiring it in a separate act). When he puts the object into his hand, he acquires it since his hand is considered a separate domain. Now the Shabbat transgression and the stealing occur simultaneously, such that he is liable only for the worse of the two punishments.
  IntroductionThe last section of this daf continues to discuss the baraita about one who stole a purse by dragging it out into the public domain on Shabbat.
  Aha is a late amoraic sage. He taught the baraita as did R. Ashi, that it refers to a person who dragged the object into his hand that was less than three handbreadths from the ground.Ravina returns to a simpler reading of the baraita. He dragged it out into the public domain. Unlike, R. Aha, Ravina holds that one can acquire things in the public domain, and therefore, he need not limit the case to one where he put the object directly into his hand when it was only three handbreadths from the ground.
  The Talmud now seeks the source for the debate between R. Aha and Ravina over whether one can acquire the object in the public domain (without picking it up). The debate is over a deduction made from a mishnah in Bava Kamma. The mishnah describes a thief stealing from a person’s private domain. If the thief is pulling it out but the animal dies before he takes it out, the thief is exempt because he has not yet acquired the animal. But if he lifts it up in the owner’s domain or if he takes it out of the domain and then it dies, he is liable in both cases because he acquired the animal before it died.
  According to Ravina the reason he is exempt is that he did not take the animal out of the owner’s domain. Had he taken it out of the owner’s domain he would have been liable, even if he took it into the public domain. Hence, one can acquire in the public domain.
  Aha derives from the second clause that in order to acquire the object and be liable for stealing he must take it into his own domain. Just as when he lifts it up it goes into his domain, so too when he takes it out, he must bring it into his domain and not the public domain. He would have to pick the animal (or object) up in order to acquire it.
  The Talmud now turns things around and raises a difficulty for both amoraim from the clause of the mishnah that supported the opposite position.Aha holds that one does not acquire in the public domain. He would say that it is still considered to be in the owner’s property until the thief brings it into his property. If he brings it into the public domain, he is still liable.Ravina would simply say that bringing out is not the same as lifting up. He is liable when he brings the object out of the owner’s domain, even if he does not yet bring it into his own domain (by lifting it up). In other words, he is liable when he brings it into the public domain.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues with the next section of the Mishnah, but the topic of discussion is similar to the previous topic. A man who has sex through force or seduction with his virgin sister (or father’s sister etc.) is liable to pay the fine for raping or seducing a virgin. Elsewhere we will learn that a man who commits this crime is lashed (this is the human punishment for people liable for karet, the punishment for sex with sister, father’s sister etc.). The problem is that we have a principle that one gets the worse of two punishments.
  The mishnah here in Ketubot says that he pays the fine for sleeping with his sister, etc. But the mishnah in Makkot says that he is lashed. And yet we have another principle according to which one does not get lashed and pay a fine for the same crime. Thus these two mishnayot seem to contradict each other.
  
  Daf 32a
  
  Ulla offers a fairly straight forward resolution. A man is liable for the fine only if she is a na’arah, a young girl. He is not liable if she is a mature girl (roughly speaking, over the age of 12.5). So the Mishnah that says he pays the fine refers to the young girl—he pays the fine but is not lashed. And the Mishnah in Makkot that says that he is lashed refers to a mature girl, for whom there is no fine.
  The payment for rape or seduction is not limited to a fine. There are also other damage payments, mostly similar to those relevant to cases of personal injury. So even if she is a mature girl, he still has to pay shame and damage. Again, how can he pay and get lashes?The answer is that the Mishnah refers only to a woman who is not of sound senses. According to the Talmud, she is not capable of embarrassment, nor does she really suffer “damage” when seduced or raped. [Damage is assessed by how much a person would get on the slave market. According to the Talmud, someone not of sound senses would not have had any value as a slave in any case. Therefore, there are no damages and she is not aware enough to suffer shame].
  There is still another payment, relevant to the mature girl—pain. So how can he be lashed if he still has to pay for the pain?The answer is that the Mishnah refers only to a girl seduced. Since she was not raped, there is no payment for pain. The payment for pain is only in the case of rape.
  Now that we limit the Mishnah in Makkot (he gets lashed) to a case where she was seduced, we can say that it refers to a broader set of cases, namely a seduced young girl without a father. Since she was willing, there is no embarrassment, shame or pain. And since she was an orphan, there is no fine, because the fine would go only to the father. So there is no payment and therefore he gets lashes.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses Ulla’s resolution of the mishnah in Ketubot (fine) with the mishnah in Makkot (lashes), questioning what seems to be its implication—when one commits a transgression for which he is liable for both lashes and a fine, he pays the fine and is not liable for lashes.
  Ulla derives his general principle from the case of personal injury. When someone injures another person, he must pay five different penalties (these are listed in Bava Kamma, chapter eight). Theoretically, he should also be lashed for the criminal act of harming another person. But he only pays the fine. This serves as a precedent for all who incur both a fine and lashes for the same crime. In all such cases, he pays the fine and is not lashed.
  The problem with using personal injury as a precedent is that the laws of personal injury are more stringent than other fines, because he has to pay for five things. This might be why in this case, he pays and does not get lashed. But in other cases, where the financial penalty is less, he might get lashes and not have to pay the fine.
  And if you try to say paying is a more lenient punishment than lashes, even if one pays five payments, and therefore we could learn that just as with personal injury one pays and is not lashed, so too with all cases one pays and is not lashed, we could still raise a difficulty. There is a way that personal injury is more lenient than other cases—the court is allowed to injure a person as a punishment. This would mean that we cannot use personal injury as a source for Ulla because it is an exceptional law.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to search for a source for Ulla’s ruling that whenever someone does one action (such as rape/seduce his virgin sister) for which he is liable for a fine and lashes, he pays the fine and does not receive the lashes.These sections are difficult, but I do hope that the reader appreciates the artistry of the rhetorical arguments being made. These arguments are based on elaborate structures of logic that try to prove an unknown from other known assumptions. In my opinion, they are better perceived as formal examples of logical/critical thinking than actually dealing with any concrete problem. Perhaps in many ways similar to mathematics.
  “Plotting witnesses,” who falsely testify to an event that they didn’t even see, are punished by receiving the punishment they tried to dish out on the defendant. If they claimed the defendant owed money, then they themselves owe that money. Theoretically, they should also be liable for lashes for having transgressed the prohibition of testifying falsely. Nevertheless, they pay money and are not lashed. This could serve as a precedent for all cases—one pays and is not lashed.
  This is the first counterargument—the case of plotting witnesses is more stringent because they do not need to be warned in order to be punished. Thus we might say that the Torah was stringent with plotting witnesses that they should pay money, which could be a more stringent penalty than lashes. But that would not mean that in other cases the Torah would be so stringent, and the person would receive lashes and not the fine.
  And if you say that money is a more lenient form of punishment, then we could say that the reason the Torah is lenient with the plotting witnesses is that they didn’t perform any physical. They just spoke lying words. But, in other cases, where a person acts, we might say he receives lashes, the more serious penalty, and not the fine.
  The Talmud now does something it often does in these types of arguments. After failing to derive a law from two independent precedents, it tries to combine the two and use them together to derive the law. So just as both plotting witnesses and those who cause personal injury pay a fine and do not receive lashes, so too in all cases, a person pays a fine and is not lashed.
  This is basically the same two counterarguments we saw above. First of all, both plotting witnesses and personal injurers have a side that is more stringent. So maybe paying the fine is the more stringent penalty, but in other cases that are not as stringent, a person would be lashed and not fined.Alternatively, we could say that both have lenient sides and therefore are punished with the more lenient punishment—money. But in other cases a person would receive the more stringent punishment—lashes. Again, we don’t really know which is the more serious punishment, and both personal injury and plotting witnesses have aspects that are stringent as well as lenient. This prevents us from using them as precedents for other cases.
  
  Daf 32b
  
  The Talmud now offers an entirely different source for Ulla’s rule—a gezerah shavah. This is a type of linguistic comparison based on the same word being used in two different contexts. It allows the transfer of laws from one context to the other. The word “tahat” is used in the context of rape in Deuteronomy 22:29. This is the case where we are trying to prove that he pays the fine and does not receive lashes for having relations with his sister (or father’s sister). The same word is used in the context of personal injury, where we already know that he pays and does not receive the fine. Therefore, just as in the case of personal injury, one pays and does not get lashes, so too in all cases (or at least in the case of one who rapes a virgin woman prohibited by karet).
  IntroductionYohanan here offers a different resolution to the contradiction between the mishnah in Ketubot (a man who rapes/seduces his sister pays a fine) and the mishnah in Makkot (he is lashed). Ulla had said that the mishnah in Makkot referred to a girl who was of majority age, and therefore does not receive a fine, whereas Ketubot referred to a girl who was a na’arah (12-12.5) and therefore does receive a fine. R. Yohanan rejects this resolution and offers a different one in its place.
  Yohanan says that both mishnayot refer to cases where the girl was a na’arah, and therefore he should, at least in principle, pay the fine. However, Makkot (he is lashed) refers to a case where he was warned before he transgressed and Ketubot refers to a case where he was not warned. Since he was not warned, he cannot be lashed, and therefore pays a fine.As a note, according to the rabbis no physical punishment (lashes or execution) can ever be carried out unless the perpetrator is first warned by witnesses that if he commits the crime, he will be punished. This is one example of the rabbis’ severe hesitancy to even theoretically punish criminals.
  The Talmud now notes the implication of R. Yohanan’s alternative solution to the contradiction between the two mishnayot. Unlike Ulla, R. Yohanan holds that when a person is to be lashed (i.e. he was warned) and to pay a fine, he is lashed and does not pay the fine.The question now is the same as it was with regard to Ulla—what is his source?
  The source for R. Yohanan is a verse in Deuteronomy which refers to lashing one who has committed a transgression. The word for “guilt” is singular, so the midrash interprets it to mean that a person receives one punishment (one “guilt”) and not two. Since the punishment is lashes, we can conclude that if he deserves two punishments, lashes and a fine, he is lashed and not fined.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss R. Yohanan’s ruling that one who deserves lashes and a fine is lashed and not fined. Basically, since R. Yohanan’s rule is the opposite of Ulla, the sources of support for Ulla become difficulties for R. Yohanan.
  As we already know, when one injures another person he pays the fine and does not receive lashes. This seems to contradict R. Yohanan.
  Yohanan had said earlier that he is lashed only if he was warned by witnesses before he committed the crime. The Talmud here refutes a potential resolution to the above difficulty. We might have thought that one who injures another person is fined only if he is not warned. But R. Yohanan himself implied the opposite. If a person strikes another person with a blow where the damages are worth less than a perutah (a very small coin), then no fine can be levied against him. Therefore, in that case, he is lashed. But the implication is clear—if the fine is worth more than a perutah, then he pays the fine and is not lashed, even if he is warned!
  The resolution is that the Torah explicitly says that plotting witnesses have to pay money and are not lashed (the Talmud will explain where below). So too when it comes to personal injury, the Talmud explicitly states that he must pay money and is not lashed.In other words, this is an exception. In other cases (such as one who rapes/seduces his virgin sister, and she is a na’arah) if he was warned, he would suffer lashes and not pay the fine.
  IntroductionUlla had said that the Torah explicitly states that plotting witnesses pay money. The Talmud now locates the context and source of his words.
  The original context of R. Ila’s statement is a debate between the sages and R. Meir concerning plotting (lying) witnesses who falsely testify that someone owes money. According to R. Meir since there are two different verses, one that says that they receive the punishment that they tried to mete out and the other that warns people not to falsely testify, they receive both lashes and the fine. The other sages say that anyone who pays does not receive lashes.
  Ila now explains how we know that plotting witnesses have to pay (and therefore, due to the principle that one gets only one punishment for each crime, are not lashed). The Torah explicitly says that plotting witnesses are punished with the punishment they tried to mete out. It then says “hand for a hand.” We know that the rabbis interpret this to mean that he pays the value of a hand, not that his hand is cut off. Therefore, we know that plotting witnesses have to pay.
  The same logic is now applied to one who injures another. We know from rabbinic exegesis that he must pay. Since he must pay, he does not receive lashesBut remember, these are two exceptions, according to R. Yohanan. In other cases, one is lashed and does not pay.
  
  Daf 33a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section inquires as to why R. Yohanan, who said that one is lashed and doesn’t pay, does not agree with Ulla who said that he pays the fine and is not lashed. I should note that there is a lot of what I would call “rhetoric” in this sugya. Meaning there many answers to the question are obviously not correct. The sugya takes time before it gets to the correct answer.
  If the person who rapes/seduces his virgin sister pays the fine and is not lashed, then there is no case where the verse that prohibits one from having sex with his sister would apply. This verse implies (according to rabbinic understanding) that one is punished for transgressing the commandment with lashed.The problem is that we could say the same thing about personal injury and plotting witnesses, two cases where even R. Yohanan agrees that the perpetrators are fined and not lashed. In both cases we could say that if the person is fined, the verse that would seem to indicate lashes for that particular transgression would not be fulfilled.
  The Talmud now finds a way that the verses that require lashes could be fulfilled and yet still in most cases the person would pay.When it comes to plotting witnesses, it is possible that they could be lashed when they testify about something for which they cannot receive the punishment they tried to mete out. For instance, if they testify that a person is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a halutzah (a woman rejected from Levirate marriage) who had been married to a priest, the son does not have the status of his father. In other words, they are testifying that someone is not a priest. It does not make sense to say as a punishment the witnesses are not priests, especially if they were not priests to begin with. Therefore, they are lashed.If witnesses falsely testify that someone injured someone but that the damages were less than a perutah, the witnesses are punished with lashes because they cannot be fined. Less than a perutah is nothing.Thus in both of these cases we could say that in principle the person would pay, but under certain circumstances, the verse requiring lashes could be fulfilled.The problem is that the same could be said about rape/seduction. We could say that if he rapes/seduces his virgin sister who is a na’arah (young girl) he pays the fine and is not lashed (against R. Yohanan). But if she was a mature girl, he would be lashed because the fine is not applicable.
  Yohanan now gives an entirely different answer as to why he did not agree with Ulla. The verse Ulla used was “Since (tahat) he had relations with her.” The word “tahat” was compared with the same word used in the case of personal injury to prove that the rapist/seducer pays the fine and is not lashed. But R. Yohanan uses the verse for a different purpose—besides the fine, the rapist pays for shame and physical damages. Since he uses the verse for one “midrash,” it is not available for another.
  And Ulla?   He derives it from a teaching of Rava, for Rava said: The verse says: “Then the man that lay with her must give to the father of the girl fifty shekel of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29); for the enjoyment of lying [with her he pays] fifty [shekel of silver], [and from here we infer], by implication, that there is also payment for shame and damages.Ulla could derive Abaye’s halakhah from a different verse that teaches the same thing. This frees the word “tahat” up so that Ulla could use it for his own midrash—the rapist pays and is not lashed.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses why plotting witnesses pay a fine (if they testified that another person was obligated to pay a fine) and are not lashed.
  Elazar explains that plotting witnesses cannot be lashed because they cannot be warned, as Rava will explain below. As we have learned elsewhere, the rabbis believe that a person can never be punished unless that person has already been warned.
  Rava thinks that it is impossible to warn plotting witnesses. If we warned them before they offer their testimony, they could just say that they forgot the warning. If we were to warn them while they are testifying, they would not testify at all, even if they had true things to say. And we cannot warn them at the end, because once their testimony has been given, it is too late to warn them.
  These two amoraim point out that it would seem to be possible to warn plotting witnesses. First of all, we could warn them immediately after they testify. This would allow them to recant immediately.Aha says we could warn them before they testify and then hint to them while they’re testifying that they were warned not to lie. We could hint gently enough to avoid discouraging them from testifying.
  Abaye now changes his mind and agrees with Rava and R. Elazar that plotting witnesses do not require a warning to be lashed. Plotting witnesses, after all, attempt to kill the accused without warning him, therefore they deserve to be killed without being warned.To return to the argument from the beginning of the page, since they cannot be warned, they are not lashed when they testify about monetary matters. However, if they falsely testify about something that would make the accused liable for a physical punishment, then they are punished with that physical punishment, in accordance with the verses, “then you shall do to him as he plotted to do to his brother.”
  Samma raises another difficulty. We know that if someone falsely testifies that another person is the son of a divorcee or a halutzah, in essence saying that he is not a priest, the verse “you shall do to him as he thought to do to his fellow” does not apply. We don’t say that the witness is not a priest. Rather, he is lashed for his false testimony. But if this is the verse that exempts him from a warning, then we should require a warning for such a false witness before he could be lashed. So why do we not?The answer comes from a verse that equates the law for everyone. Since some plotting witnesses do not require warning (for instance they falsely testified that someone was a murderer), no plotting witnesses require a warning.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with injurers, and the fact that they are fined and do not receive lashes.
  Shisha offers a multi-staged proof that the injurer pays a fine and is not lashed. The proof comes from the verses about men fighting and striking a woman, who then miscarries. R. Elazar explains that the men are fighting with the intent to kill each other. If one does kill the man with whom he is fighting or the woman, then he is a murderer and he is executed. According to rabbinic law, he must have been warned before, because if he was not warned, he cannot be executed. Now, the warning that he receives about murder, counts as a warning for the lighter punishment of lashes which he would get for striking another person if death does not occur. Nevertheless, if death does not occur, the perpetrator is fined and not lashed. Thus we learn that even if he was warned and therefore he could theoretically be punished with lashes, he is fined and not lashed.
  
  Daf 33b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if a person is warned not to commit a more serious crime (punished by death) and then he commits a less serious crime (punished by lashes) then he can receive the less serious punishment. The warning for the more serious punishment was sufficient.
  Ashi raises two difficulties. First of all, where do we even know the rule that if one is warned regarding a severe matter, the warning stands for the less severe matter? Second, how do we know that death is more severe than lashes. Rav seemed to hint that had they threatened Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah with lashes instead of throwing them into the furnace, they would have bowed down to the idol.
  Rav’s statement concerning Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah does not prove that lashing is more stringent than death. The lashing that the Babylonian king would have meted out to them would have been without any limit, and therefore would have been more stringent than the lashes dished out by a court, for which there is a limit of 39.
  There is a dispute in Sanhedrin concerning a person who means to kill one person and accidentally kills another. Is he a murderer? This is relevant to the case of the fighting men in Exodus 21. One man was intending to kill the other man and accidentally killed the woman. According to the rabbis, he is a murderer. Therefore, we have a case of a person warned for a severe matter who is considered warned for a light matter.But Rabbi holds that such a person is not considered a murderer, and therefore the word “life for a life” does not mean “life” but money. The man would pay the value of the woman he accidentally killed to her inheritors. This would allow us to say that the entire case is one where he is not warned. If he was not warned about murder, he would pay the value of the woman he killed and if she was not killed, he would pay the value of the fetuses. But if he was warned, and he caused a miscarriage I could still say that he is lashed and does not pay the fine. So we have not proved yet that he pays the fine.
  Jacob from Nehar Pekod derives the idea that personal injurers pay and are not lashed from a different set of verses. The Torah talks about a person who strikes another and the victim lives for a few days. The perpetrator is set aside to see if the one he injured will die. If he dies, he is executed, but if he does not die, he pays the cost of healing and loss of work (there are other payments too, but the rabbis derive them from other verses). Now, if there is the possibility that the criminal would be executed, it must mean that he was warned. This warning not to murder is sufficient for the more lenient matter of lashes. So theoretically, if the victim lives, the perpetrator could be lashed because he has been warned. But the Torah clearly says that he pays the loss of work and he pays for his healing; he is not lashed (one cannot receive two punishments). Thus we again have proof that one who injures another pays the fine and is not lashed, even if he was warned.
  IntroductionThe first part of this page is the exact same difficulty we saw above in section four. The end of the section is different.
  Ashi raises two difficulties. First of all, where do we even know the rule that if one is warned regarding a severe matter, the warning stands for the less severe matter? Second, how do we know that death is more severe than lashes. Rav seemed to hint that had they threatened Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah with lashes instead of throwing them into the furnace, they would have bowed down to the idol.
  Rav’s statement concerning Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah does not prove that lashing is more stringent than death. The lashing that the Babylonian king would have meted out to them would have been without any limit, and therefore would have been more stringent than the lashes dished out by a court, for which there is a limit of 39.
  Jacob of Nehar Pekod’s proof was based on the assumption that the person struck the other intentionally, and therefore must have been warned about murder before. Perhaps it was unintentional, in which case there was no warning whatsoever. If so, then warning is just not relevant to these verses. If the victim dies, the one who struck him goes into exile. If he doesn’t die, the injurer pays the fine. But there could never be any lashes, because lashes are only if he does so intentionally.
  IntroductionToday’s section goes all the way back to the contradiction between our mishnah in Ketubot (he pays the fine) and the mishnah in Makkot (he is lashed).
  Up until now we have assumed that a person who is supposed to receive lashes and a fine is only fined or only lashed. But Resh Lakish resolves the two sources in a completely different way—he is both fined and lashed.
  According to R. Meir a man who rapes/seduces his virgin sister is lashed and pays the fine, But the Mishnah that says that one who rapes/seduces his virgin daughter is not fined because he is executed and we know that this position is the opposite of R. Meir. R. Meir holds that not only can one be lashed and fined, he can even be executed and fined. This was taught with regard to various crimes of stealing and slaughtering an animal. When the thief slaughters the animal he is liable to pay the four or five fold payment. If he slaughtered it on Shabbat or for idolatrous purposes, he is liable for the death penalty. So this is a case where with one crime he is liable for two penalties—death and a fine. R. Meir says he gets both.So, to return to our question, how can we identify the mishnah in Ketubot with R. Meir?[Below we will clarify the issue of the ox that is to be stoned]
  The Talmud now rejects the idea that R. Meir holds that one can receive the death penalty and be fined. R. Meir said that he pays the fine only if another person slaughtered the animal. If the thief himself slaughtered the animal, even R. Meir would agree that he is executed and does not pay the fine.
  The Talmud asks—how can the thief be liable for the four or five fold payment if he was not the one who slaughtered the stolen animal? Rava answers by comparing selling with slaughtering. Just as selling inevitably involves another person, so too slaughtering can involve another person. This seems to make common sense. The thief is liable for having the animal slaughtered, not for necessarily slaughtering it himself.
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s daf, we learned that if a person steals a sheep/ox or other animal and then someone else slaughter it on his behalf, the thief is liable for the four or five fold payment, even though he did not slaughter it himself. This week’s daf opens with a discussion of this issue.
  These two “schools” find words in Exodus 21:37 that they read as including the agent—even if the thief does not slaughter the animal himself, he is still liable for the extra payment.
  Mar Zutra raises a paradox on the above halakhah. If the thief himself stole the animal and then slaughtered it on Shabbat, he would be exempt from the extra payment (he receives the worse punishment, death). But if the thief had someone else slaughter the animal, he would be liable for the payment. So it turns out that the thief is more liable when someone else does the deed. This seems strange.
  The reason that he does not pay is not because he is not liable. He is indeed, at least in principle, liable. He just cannot pay the penalty because he incurs the worse punishment, death.
  In the baraita at the end of last week’s daf the rabbis ruled that the thief who steals an animal and then slaughters it on Shabbat is exempt from the four or five fold payment. The Talmud had claimed that the baraita referred to a case where someone else had slaughtered the animal. This helps explain why R. Meir says that the thief is liable for the financial—the thief did not transgress Shabbat. The problem is that we now do not understand why the sages believe him to be exempt! After all, he did not transgress Shabbat, so why should he be exempt from the fine too!The answer is that this baraita follows R. Shimon according to whom a slaughtering that does not render the animal fit to be eaten does not count as slaughtering. Since this slaughtering took place on Shabbat, the assumption (for now) is that such an animal may not be eaten. Since we disregard the slaughtering, we exempt him from the death penalty and make him liable for the monetary penalty.
  
  Daf 34a
  
  The problem is that what we just said seems to be incorrect—slaughtering on Shabbat does render the animal “kosher.” This leaves us without an explanation for the rabbis who hold that if someone besides the thief slaughtered the animal on Shabbat, the thief is exempt from the four or five fold payment.
  The Talmud now finds a tanna, R. Yohanan the Sandler, who holds that if someone intentionally slaughters an animal on Shabbat, it may never be eaten by anyone, neither the slaughterer nor someone else. This is learned out from a baraita about cooking on Shabbat. According to R. Yohanan food cooked intentionally on Shabbat may never be eaten. Thus if the agent slaughters on Shabbat, the thief is not liable because the slaughtering does not count as slaughtering because the animal cannot be eaten. Note that this is completely different than the original baraita in which the argument seemed to be over whether he can incur the death penalty and a financial penalty for the same crime.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section R. Yohanan the Sandler said that an animal slaughtered intentionally on Shabbat may never be eaten. Today’s section explains the source of his opinion.
  Hiyya derives R. Yohanan’s halakhah from the verse in Exodus—just as one may not eat holy food (unless he is a priest), so too one may not eat food prepared (cooked or slaughtered) on the holy Shabbat.
  Hiyya goes on to say that food prepared on Shabbat is not exactly like holy food. One may not derive any benefit whatsoever from holy food. But one may derive benefit from food prepared on Shabbat. It is only prohibited to eat such food, not derive benefit from it.
  Yohanan the Sandler said that the food was prohibited only if he cooked it intentionally on Shabbat. If he cooked the food on Shabbat by mistake (he didn’t know that it was Shabbat, or he didn’t know that it was prohibited to cook on Shabbat) the food may be eaten, by others, after Shabbat. This is derived from the mention of the death penalty in the continuation of the verse. The death penalty is only for those who willfully violate Shabbat. So too the absolute prohibition of the food is only for those who intentionally desecrate Shabbat.
  IntroductionAbove we learned that according to R. Yohanan the Sandler food prepared intentionally on Shabbat is prohibited even after Shabbat. Today’s section continues with discussion of this issue.
  These two amoraim dispute whether food prepared on Shabbat is prohibited by the Torah or only by the rabbis. Above, in yesterday’s section, we saw the midrash of those who hold that food prepared on Shabbat is “holy” and just as “holy” food may not be eaten, so too food prepared on Shabbat may not be eaten. The other opinion, that holds that food prepared on Shabbat is prohibited only by the rabbis, reads the words “it is holy” to mean that only Shabbat (“it”) is holy, not the food prepared on Shabbat.
  We now return to the baraita about a thief who slaughters the stolen animal on Shabbat. The rabbis had said that he was exempt from paying. But if the prohibition of eating food prepared on Shabbat is only rabbinic, then why should he be exempt from paying the fine, when someone else slaughtered it. [I realize this is a complicated set of assumptions about the case in that baraita]. In other words the agent slaughtered the animal, in which case the original thief should be liable to pay the fine, because the thief did not transgress Shabbat. This is true since the slaughtering is valid, at least by Torah law.The resolution is that the rabbis exempted him in the other cases—either one who slaughtered an ox for idolatry or one who slaughtered an ox that was to be stoned. In these cases since he is liable for the death penalty he is not fined. But if the agent slaughtered the ox on Shabbat, the thief must pay the fine, even according to the rabbis.
  The Talmud now discusses the other cases in that baraita. The first is one who slaughters an animal for idol worship. Remember, this is an animal that was stolen. According to Rabbi Meir he pays the four or five fold payment, even if he slaughters it for idolatry. The problem is that as soon as he begins to slaughter it for idolatrous purposes, the animal immediately becomes prohibited, and it is not considered to belong to the owner. And then when he completes the slaughtering, it is not the original owner’s ox that he is slaughtering, so why should he be liable to pay back the four or five fold payment!Rava answers that the person says that he is worshiping only at the very completion of the slaughtering. This way the slaughtering is completed at the exact same moment in which he also transgresses the laws of idol worship.
  The Talmud now turns its attention to the other case—a person slaughters an ox condemned to die because it had killed a person. How then can he be liable to pay the owner when this is no longer technically his ox since it had been condemned to death?Rabbah explains the scenario—the original owner gave it to a guardian, and then the ox killed a person and was sentenced to death while still in possession of the guardian. The thief stole it from the guardian’s house. The Talmud will now explain why this is relevant.
  Meir holds that if the guardian returned it after it had been condemned to death, it counts as returned, even though the owner will not be able to do anything with the animal. In addition he holds that an action that causes loss or gain of money counts as money. Together what this means is that when the thief stole it from the guardian’s home he caused a loss of money to the guardian even though it was prohibited for anyone to derive benefit from the ox. Had the ox been alive, the guardian could have returned it to the original owner. Now that it is dead, the guardian will have to pay for the loss of the ox. When the thief stole it he was therefore causing the guardian a loss. Therefore, he owes the guardian money, according to R. Meir.
  
  Daf 34b
  
  IntroductionIn our section, Rabbah goes back a few steps and explains why R. Meir would say that the thief is obligated to pay for the ox even though he is also obligated for the death penalty. Instead of saying that an agent slaughtered it, as was said at the end of daf 33, Rabbah now says that the thief slaughtered it himself.
  The answer is that generally speaking R. Meir holds that one can receive lashes and be fined (for instance, in the case of raping or seducing one’s virgin sister) but generally does not receive the death penalty and a financial penalty for the same crime. However, these three cases (the thief who slaughters the stolen ox on Shabbat, or for idol worship, or an ox condemned to be stoned) are different because they are a “kenas”—or a fine. The laws of fines are considered “innovative” because they go beyond compensation. Therefore, according to Rabbah, one can get both the death penalty and a fine.
  Rabbah here is following his own reasoning, that one can pay a kenas and still be liable for the death penalty. If he steals a kid before Shabbat and then slaughters it on Shabbat, he is liable for the four fold penalty because he became liable for the theft before Shabbat, and then he became liable for the kenas (the four fold payment) on Shabbat. Rabbah holds that one can pay a kenas and be liable for the death penalty at the same time. However, if he steals the animal on Shabbat and slaughters it on Shabbat, he does not pay anything, because his liability for stealing (evidently carrying the animal), which is penalized by a compensatory payment (paying the principle of what he stole) comes at the same time as he transgresses Shabbat. This is not a kenas a fine—it is simply paying back that which he stole. Since he does not have to pay the first payment because he is liable for the death penalty, he does not pay the extra fines either because without stealing he could not be obligated for slaughtering or selling it.
  Rabbah now refers to a different situation, but one that has a similar formula as the above. When a thief is tunneling into a house, the rabbis consider him as if he is liable for the death penalty because if the owner of the house finds him, he may kill him. So if the thief steals a kid and then breaks into a house and slaughters the kid while he is in the act of breaking into the house, he must pay the fine. This is because he is first liable for stealing and only then liable for the death penalty.But if he steals and slaughters the animal all while breaking into the house, he is exempt from the fine, because one cannot be liable to pay back the principle (the original value of the kid) and be liable for the death penalty at the exact same moment.
  Rabbah has now stated two very similar laws—one concerning the thief who slaughtered on Shabbat and the other concerning a thief who slaughtered while in the act of breaking into a house. The Talmud, as it often does, discusses why we need both laws.If Rabbah had only taught the first law, I might have said that in the case of breaking in, he does pay the fine, because his liability for the death penalty is only temporary. It only exists while he is in the act of breaking in. However, in the case of Shabbat, he is liable for the death penalty forever. Therefore, Rabbah needed to teach the case of the one who slaughters while breaking in.
  In the case of breaking in, the thief may be executed even without a warning from witnesses, a general prerequisite before any criminal is executed. Therefore, I might have said that he is exempt from payment in that case, because he is executed without warning. But in the case of Shabbat, a person may not be executed without first being warned. Since we can assume he was not warned, we might have thought that he would have to pay. After all, in the end they are not going to execute him. Rabbah therefore teaches us that even though he will not be executed, since he is theoretically liable for execution, he is exempt from payment.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with cases where one slaughtered an animal on Shabbat. When is he liable to pay the fine, and when is he not?
  The first half of R. Papa’s law is similar to Rava’s rulings in the previous section. Since he is first liable for being a thief and then liable for transgressing Shabbat, he is not exempt from payment.However, if he borrowed a cow and slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt from the fine. This is because the liability for slaughtering a cow that did not belong to him came at the same moment as the liability for transgressing Shabbat.
  Aha is perplexed—why does R. Papa need to state this rule with regard to a cow? Don’t we already know both halves of this rule?Ashi answers him, that if it were not for R. Papa we might have thought that as soon as he takes possession of the cow he becomes completely responsible for it, as if it were his own. This would imply that when he later slaughters the ox, he is slaughtering an ox that already belonged to him and that the liability for the money would be at the time of possession, earlier than the liability for Shabbat. Therefore, R. Papa teaches us that the ox is not totally his from the time he borrows it. He is only liable for the accident at the moment it happens. Therefore, the liability to pay back the value of the ox comes at the same time that the liability for slaughtering the ox comes. He is liable for death and not the financial penalty.
  If orphans take possession of their father’s borrowed cow, they may use the cow and if it dies, they are not responsible because they were not the borrowers.If they thought that they owned it through their inheritance and they slaughtered it, they are only responsible for paying back the value of the meat at the lowest price. This is the minimum amount that they benefited. In other words, they really are not responsible to pay back the cow, they merely don’t get to benefit from it. Therefore they have to pay the amount that they may have paid for food in any case. Rashi adds that they also the hide back to the owners.
  Rava’s statement goes on to teach that if the father left land to repay the borrowed cow, the inheritors must pay back the full value of the cow. The question is which part of Rava’s statement does this refer to?Some say it refers to the first case, where the animal died on its own. If they have to pay back even if the animal dies, then all the more so they have to pay back if they slaughter it themselves. This means that the father assumed responsibility over anything that happens from the time he borrowed the animal. This disagrees with R. Papa who said that this liability happened only when the animal died, and in this case since they didn’t borrow it, they wouldn’t be liable.But the one who teaches it in reference to the last clause, where they slaughtered it, would hold that it does not refer to the case where the animal died on its own. This position would agree with R. Papa that they do not become liable for anything that might happen to the ox from the time they borrow it.
  IntroductionThis section refers to the two different ways to solve the contradiction between the Mishnah in Ketubot and the Mishnah in Makkot. According to R. Yohanan, Ketubot exempts the one who rapes/seduces his virgin sister from lashes because the witnesses did not warn him before he committed his crime; Makkot obligates him for lashes (and exempts him from the fine) because they did warn him. Resh Lakish said that the Mishnah in Ketubot follows R. Meir who holds that one can receive lashes and pay the fine.As is typical in the Talmud, the question is why each amora does not hold by the other amora’s solution.
  Yohanan does not agree with Resh Lakish because R. Yohanan’s explanation allows the mishnah to follow the majority opinion of the rabbis, and not the minority opinion of R. Meir. But why doesn’t Resh Lakish accept R. Yohanan’s resolution that our mishnah refers to a case where they did not warn him, and therefore he cannot be lashed?
  According to Resh Lakish, since the person would be exempt from paying the fine if he had been warned (he would be lashed), he is also exempt if he was not warned. In other words, according to Resh Lakish the ability to actually lash the perpetrator is immaterial. All that matters is the nature of the crime. If one commits a crime for which he could be penalized with lashes and a financial penalty, he is lashed and does not pay the fine, even if in the end he cannot really be lashed. That is why he has to assign the mishnah to R. Meir who holds that one can be fined and lashed for the same crime.
  This section states basically the same as above, but in a more principled manner. According to R. Yohanan if one commits a crime inadvertently that would carry with it the death penalty (or lashes or something else) had it been done intentionally, he is liable for the fine. Since they didn’t warn him, and therefore we have to assume that it was an unwitting sin, he is liable for the fine.Resh Lakish says that since the crime carries with it the death penalty (or lashes or something else) he can never pay the fine, even if they did not warn him.
  Resh Lakish raises a difficulty against R. Yohanan. The verse in the Torah that is the source of the notion that one cannot get two penalties for the same crime is from Exodus 21. The Torah says that if no harm, meaning death, comes to the woman, the husband must pay for the miscarried fetuses. To Resh Lakish this implies that if the woman does die, the husband does not pay for the fetuses, even if the husband cannot be executed because he was not warned.Yohanan rejects this and reads the verse to imply that if the law concerning “harm” meaning death to the woman is not relevant, then the husband pays the fine. The husband is liable even if he cannot be executed because he was not warned.
  
  Daf 35a
  
  This section is just a reverse of the previous section.
  IntroductionEarlier we saw an opinion that if one committed two crimes simultaneously, for one he is liable for death/lashes and for the other a fine, then he is exempt from the fine because he would receive the more serious penalty. But there was a debate if he is liable for the fine if he cannot receives lashes/death because he committed that transgression unintentionally. For instance, if he burned down a house on Shabbat but did not know that this was forbidden on Shabbat, or he did not know that it was Shabbat, some hold that he pays the fine because he cannot be punished for transgressing Shabbat, and some hold that he is not liable for the fine.
  As we will see, Rava holds that everyone agrees that if one commits a sin for which he would be liable for death if done intentionally and is also liable to pay a fine, he does not pay the fine. Paradoxically, the person who damages property and commits a religious crime at the same time pays nothing, whereas the person who just damages property would pay.
  The house of Hezekiah (his study house) bases this midrash on Exodus 24:21—“One who kills an animal must pay, and one who kills a person must die.” Hezekiah reads these as absolute. In the case of killing an animal, the one who does so must always pay, no matter if he does this intentionally or not, and no matter how he does it. The same is true if one kills. It does not matter whether he does so intentionally or not, he never pays compensation.I should note that on a simple sense, there is nothing absurd about this. It teaches that property is always an issue of financial compensation. One never executes a person for destroying property. And the opposite is also true, one never pays for the taking of a life. Life and property cannot be equated. As a value statement, this makes perfect sense. The problem is when we understand it not as a value statement, but a legal one. If one accidentally murders, say in a car accident, then it would seem to make common sense that he should pay the damages. Otherwise you arrive at the absurdity that if one accidentally runs over another car and kills another person, he is not punished at all, whereas if no one died, he would pay the fine. As I’ve said before, this is an absurdity, one example of why the Jewish penal code could not actually be used in practice.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the issue of whether one is liable to pay a fine when one has unintentionally committed a crime for which he would be liable for death or lashes.
  Ravin says that all indeed do agree that if one commits a crime inadvertently for which he would have been liable for death had he committed it willfully, he does not pay the fine. They argue if the two punishments would have been lashes and a fine—according to R. Yohanan he pays the fine, since in the end he is not lashed. The verse cited by the house of Hezekiah referred only to death and a fine—when the punishment is death, he is never fined. But there was no such comparison for lashes. Therefore, if he cannot be lashed because the sin was unintentional, he is fined.
  Resh Lakish holds that the same is true with one who commits a crime punishable by lashes—even if inadvertent and therefore he cannot be lashed, he does not pay the fine. This is because the Torah explicitly equates the two—those who are liable for lashes and those who are liable for death.
  The amoraim now search for where the Torah compares one who commits a sin punishable by death with one who commits a sin punishable by lashes. According to Abaye, the comparison is made when the Torah calls both wicked—Numbers refers to one liable for death and Deuteronomy refers to one liable for lashes. Thus the same rules apply to both.Rava derives it from “one who strikes.” Tomorrow’s section discusses which word this refers to. In other words, where does the Torah use this word in reference in reference to lashes. We know where it uses it in connection with the death penalty—Leviticus 24:21. Stay tuned!
  IntroductionToday’s section continues yesterday’s. Here we look for where the Torah might have used the word “strikes” in connection with lashes such that we could say that death and lashes have the same rule—if one inadvertently commits a crime for which he would be liable for lashes had he done it intentionally, he does not pay the fine.
  Papa is looking for a verse in which the word “strike” means to hit someone without killing them such that the perpetrator would be liable for lashes and not the death penalty. But Leviticus 24:21 refers to one who kills and therefore this is not the correct “strike.”
  The next suggestion is that the use of the word striking to mean hitting but not killing comes from Leviticus 24:18-19. Here the word “striking” is used in reference to the animal but the problem is that this word is not used in reference to striking a person. Nevertheless, the Talmud finds this sufficient because the words mean the same thing. Thus, we are led to think that just as one who inadvertently commits a crime for which he would be liable for death had he done it intentionally is exempt from paying a fine, so too is one who inadvertently commits a crime for which he is liable for lashes.
  The problem is that the verse from Leviticus refers to one who injures another person, and in reality such a person is not lashed, as we have learned. He pays the person he has injured, and is not lashed.
  There is a case in which a person would be lashed for striking another person—if the damages he causes are not worth a perutah. Less than a perutah is not considered to have any value. Therefore, since he does not owe money to the person he struck, he is lashed. So now we have a case where the word “striking” results in lashes.
  
  Daf 35b
  
  The problem is that we can still think about the person who struck another person as liable for payment. We could still say that in general a person who inadvertently commits a sin for which he is liable for lashes and money does pay money since he cannot be lashed. In other words, he is exempt from paying because he didn’t really damage the person, not because he could theoretically be lashed.The answer is that the verse could refer to a case where a person struck another person and damaged his property at the same time. If he was not warned then he cannot be lashed for striking another person. And since he is theoretically liable for lashes, he  also does not pay the fine.So to summarize—if one strikes another and causes no property damage, he pays compensation for bodily damage. If one strikes another and causes property damage but no bodily damage, he will pay nothing. If he was warned beforehand he will be lashed, and if he was not warned beforehand, nothing will happen to him. Again, we see the impracticality of Jewish law.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the statement of the House of Hezekiah from earlier on this page (section one). To aid I am quoting the English in its entirety:“He that kills a man . . . he that kills a beast:” Just as in [the case of] the killing of a beast you have made no distinction between [it being done] inadvertently and willfully, intentionally and unintentionally, by way of going down or by way of going up, so as to free exempt him [from the payment], but [to in any case] make him liable to pay, so also in [the case of] the killing of a person you shall make no distinction between [it being done] inadvertently and willfully, intentionally and unintentionally, by way of going down or by way of going up, so as to make him liable to pay money, but to free him from paying money?
  The House of Hezekiah stated that when it comes to killing the animal, the Torah made no distinction—one who does so pays, whether he has been warned or not. But R. Hiyya points out that this is not necessarily true. If one kills an animal on Shabbat he does not pay the fine because he has transgressed Shabbat. If so, we could not state categorically that one who kills an animal pays a fine, and then we could not state categorically that one who kills a person does not pay a fine.
  Rava (or the Talmud) now explains why the verse must refer to a week day and not Shabbat. The verse says that if he killed a man, he must be put to death. This means that he was warned, for if he was not warned he could not be put to death. So if he was also warned not to kill an animal on Shabbat because if he did he would be liable for death, then he would be executed and not pay the fine. Therefore, the verse which says that he does pay the fine, must refer to the week day. On the week day, he will always pay a fine for killing an animal and never pay a fine for killing a man.
  IntroductionToday’s section refers back to a statement made by Rabbah on page 34b. The following is the quote:Rabbah said: Indeed [it speaks of a case] when he slaughtered it himself and R. Meir holds the view that [though generally] one may receive the lashes and pay, one cannot receive the death penalty and pay but these [cases]  are different, because the Torah has enacted something novel with regard to a fine, and [therefore]  he has to pay, although he has to suffer the death penalty.According to Rabbah since the case of fine is a “novelty” one can, under certain circumstances, pay and suffer the death penalty. The specific case referred to here was a thief who stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat. He is liable for the death penalty slaughtering on Shabbat, and he pays the four or five fold fine. Our sugya discusses this claim.
  According to the Mishnah if one rapes his virgin daughter, he is executed and does not pay the fine, because daughter incest is punishable by death. This does not accord with R. Meir, who holds that one can suffer the death penalty and pay a fine. According to the Mishnah, if he rapes his virgin sister, he can be lashed and pay a fine. This does not accord with R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh who holds that one cannot be lashed and pay a fine for the same crime. Finally, our mishnah says that he is liable for karet for raping his sister. According to the mishnah in Makkot, the court lashes one who is liable for karet. But R. Isaac disagrees with this principle—one liable for karet is not lashed. According to R. Isaac one who rapes his sister is not lashed at all, therefore he pays the fine. But all agree that one who rapes a mamzeret is lashed. So our mishnah that holds that he pays a fine would not accord with R. Isaac.
  Rabbah could solve the problem by following R. Yohanan who says that our mishnah according to which he pays a fine even though he is liable for karet, refers to a case where he was not warned and therefore cannot be lashed. This would allow the Mishnah to work with R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh. But Resh Lakish did not hold like R. Yohanan. So if Rabbah holds like Resh Lakish, then how could Rabbah then understand the mishnah.The answer is quite simple—Rabbah holds like R. Yohanan.
  According to Resh Lakish one who deserves lashes does not pay the fine, even if he cannot actually be lashed. So then who is the tanna of our Mishnah in Ketubot that does hold that he is lashed and pays the fine? The answer is that it is either R. Meir or R. Isaac. R. Meir would simply hold that he indeed is lashed and pays a fine. R. Isaac would say that according to our Mishnah he receives karet, but he is not fined. Therefore he is lashed.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya opens with a new baraita (yes, this section for the first time in a very, very long time, is not directly connected with the previous one).The baraita refers to two topics that really the same. The first is the fine paid for rape and the second is the payment for seduction, both of a virgin. These are the payments outlined in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 (rape) and Exodus 22:15-16 (seduction). The rabbis generally equate these two laws such as that they apply equally.Furthermore, I should again emphasize that by the rabbinic period these issues were no longer practiced. As is often the case, the rabbinic discussion is more connected to theory of law than practical law.The baraita lists women who may not claim these payments.
  Below the Talmud will explain what “forbidden relations” are. Relations forbidden in the second degree are secondary incest prohibitions. This will also be explained below.An aylonit is someone who is clearly female, but never develops signs of reaching sexual maturity. By definition she cannot give birth.A “woman who has gone out on account of an evil name” seems to refer to a woman whose husband accused her of not being a virgin at the time of her marriage. This too will be discussed below.
  If “forbidden relations” refers to biblical incest prohibitions, then “relations forbidden in the second degree” would assumedly refer to those relationships prohibited by the rabbis. This would include grandmother and other such distant relations. The problem is that if the relationship is only prohibited by rabbinic law, then why shouldn’t she receive the fine, which is mandated by biblical law. This is understandable when it comes to the biblical prohibitions, but not with regard to the secondary category.
  
  Daf 36a
  
  The Talmud now interprets both phrases in the baraita as referring to relations prohibited by the Torah. The first category refers to those punishable by death (such as daughter or mother), the second to those punishable by karet (such as sister). In these cases, the perpetrator does not pay the fine because he receives the worse punishment.But if the woman was simply prohibited by a negative commandment (such as a mamzeret), she is eligible for the fine. According to Shimon the Yemenite (statement found at the beginning of this chapter) as long as the marriage is possible, he is liable for the fines. Since marriage with a woman prohibited by the punishments of death or karet is not possible, there is no fine. But marriage with a woman prohibited by a negative commandment is possible, therefore he does pay the fine.
  According to this understanding of the Mishnah, even for women prohibited only by a negative commandment (no karet, no death penalty) there is no fine. This accords with R. Shimon ben Menassia who said earlier in the chapter that if the marriage is even prohibited, there is no fine. Even if the marriage is viable. Thus a mamzeret would not get the fine.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to explain the baraita that was at the end of last week’s daf, concerning certain categories of women who do not receive the fine for being raped or seduced.There is one term that is helpful to know for this section—na’arah. A na’arah is a girl between the age of being a minor and being an adult. Sometimes this is defined by absolute age—from 12 to 12 ½, and sometimes it is defined by physical development, a na’arah being a girl who has begun to reach puberty but has not completed it.
  A woman who refuses her husband refers to the situation where a young girl was married off by her mother or brother. Such a marriage has a lesser legal status than if she were married off by her father. Therefore, when she is older she has a right to refuse the marriage. Such a woman does not receive the fine because she has, to a certain extent, already been married, even if that marriage was annulled. As a reminder, these fines are only for virgins, women who have never been married.The implication is that an ordinary minor does receive the fine. This accords with the opinion of the rabbis, as we shall see below.
  According to the second clause of last week’s baraita, the aylonit, a woman who never shows signs of puberty, also does not receive a fine. This seems to accord with R. Meir, who holds that since she goes straight from being a minor to being an adult (at the age of 20) she has no period of being a na’arah, a young girl, the category referred to in the Torah.The problem is that the first clause (the woman who refused marriage) accords with the sages, who hold that an ordinary minor does receive a fine, and the second seems to accord with R. Meir, who holds that an aylonit does not receive a fine.
  The first attempt at solving the baraita would involve positing that R. Meir would agree with R. Judah that even a na’arah, a girl from the age of puberty through the next six months, could refuse marriage. This would mean that a na’arah who refuses marriage does not receive the fine, but a regular na’arah does receive a fine, and now the Mishnah could accord with R. Meir who agrees on this point. We would not need to deduce, as we did  above, that a regular minor receives a fine.The problem is that R. Meir explicitly disagrees with R. Judah. R. Meir holds that a girl has the right to refuse marriage until she hits puberty, that is to say as long as she is a minor. R. Judah holds that she can refuse until she is well into puberty, that is to say, even while she is a na’arah.
  The next possibility would be to identify the mishnah as being that of R. Judah. He would say that a girl who refuses marriage as a na’arah does not receive the fine, but a regular na’arah does. A minor would not receive a fine. He would agree with R. Meir that an aylonit does not receive a fine because she is not a na’arah.
  Much later in this chapter, Rav will identify this mishnah with R. Meir. By saying the mishnah is Rabbi Meir he is tacitly admitting that the mishnah agrees only with R. Meir and not with R. Judah. So we cannot say that R. Judah agrees with R. Judah. Rather, R. Judah holds that a minor does receive a fine.
  The final answer is that the mishnah agrees with R. Meir that a minor does not receive a fine, only a na’arah does. This explains why the aylonit does not receive a fine—she is never a na’arah. But the mishnah disagrees with R. Meir and holds that a girl can refuse marriage even when she is a na’arah. This means that when the mishnah says that a girl who refused marriage does not receive a fine, it refers to a na’arah. We can then deduce that a regular na’arah does receive a fine, but a minor does not.
  Rafram offers a different solution. The mishnah does not refer to a girl who actually refused marriage. It actually refers to a girl who is of the age at which she could refuse marriage, that is to say a minor. The whole mishnah would now accord with R. Meir—a minor does not receive a fine.The problem is that if the mishnah wanted to teach this, it should have just said, “a minor does not receive a fine.” Why refer to the minor in such a strange way.The Talmud does not solve this problem.
  IntroductionToday’s mishnah discusses the clause in the baraita about the aylonit, the female who never reaches sexual maturity.
  According to our mishnah, an aylonit (a woman who never shows signs of sexual maturity) still receives the fine for rape or seduction. But there is a baraita that says the opposite.The baraita also talks about virginity claims, a topic you may remember from chapter one. According to this baraita, a woman who is an aylonit can make a claim to the fine for rape.
  The simple solution is that these two baraitot follow different rabbis, as we learned yesterday. R. Meir holds that only a “na’arah” has a claim to the fine, and since an aylonit is never a na’arah (she goes directly from being a minor to being of majority age), she never receives the fine. The rabbis hold that even a minor has a claim on the fine, and therefore an aylonit can also claim the fine.
  The Talmud now transitions to a better difficulty on the earlier baraita. According to that baraita a husband can make a virginity claim again a deaf-mute wife or one lacking sound senses. But according to this baraita, a virginity claim cannot be made against these women.
  R. Sheshet solves these two problems by ascribing each position to a different tanna, of the two tannaim who argued in chapter one, mishnah six. According to Rabban Gamaliel if a man claims that his wife was not a virgin she can defend herself by saying that she was raped after betrothal. (For more information see Ketubot 1:6).This would mean that a husband basically cannot make a virginity claim against his wife because she will always have such a defense readily available. This equates, according to R. Sheshet, with the baraita that does not allow a husband of a deaf-mute or a woman not of sound senses to make a virginity claim. R. Joshua says that she cannot make such a defense, so he is the author of the baraita that allows such a husband to make a virginity claim against his wife.
  The problem is that Rabban Gamaliel said that a woman was believed to make this specific claim. He did not seem to say that if a woman cannot make such a claim, we offer the claim on her behalf.But in the end, that is what the Talmud says. If the woman cannot make a claim on her own behalf because she is a deaf-mute or lacking sound senses, her husband cannot make a virginity claim against her. She is given this defense, the Rabban Gamaliel defense, automatically. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to go over line by line the baraita that appeared in yesterday’s section.
  The baraita said that a husband cannot make a virginity claim against a woman who reaches the age of maturity. What this really means is that the rabbis did not believe that a girl who reached maturity age was a virgin anymore. While I do not know why they believed this, I would venture the guess that they may have believed that since she started to menstruate, her virginity blood is gone, perhaps washed away. The other interesting thing to note is that if most girls were not married until they were of age (this we know to be true) then virginity claims would not have been applicable to most women.The difficulty is that Rav made another statement that seems to contradict this. Rav is dealing with the first night after a wedding, and with the problem of distinguishing between menstrual blood and virginal blood. It is forbidden for the couple to have sex if she is menstruating, but if the blood is virginal, they are permitted. Rav says that if the girl had reached the age of maturity, they can have sex the whole night without concern that the blood is menstrual. Clearly he believes that mature girls have virginal blood, so why, then, does the baraita say that there is no virginity claim against them.
  
  Daf 36b
  
  The answer is that a husband can claim that his wife was not a virgin because she did not bleed. As we saw from Rav, we can anticipate that mature women do have virginal blood. But he cannot make the claim that she is “an open door” a type of virginity claim referred to on pages 9-10 of this tractate.I should note that this resolution is very difficult and contradicts other passages in the Talmud where we can see that the rabbis believed that mature girls did not have virginal blood. Furthermore, there are different versions of the line in manuscripts and medieval commentaries.
  Summachus says that blind women cannot have virginity claims brought against them. The Talmud explains that blind women may have lost their virginal blood by some strenuous act (today this could be something like horse-back riding). If this occurs to a seeing girl, she will show her mother and the girl will know what happened. The problem, according to Summachus, is that the blind girl cannot see what happened to her, so she would not know that she is not a virgin.
  The baraita that we learned in last week’s daf said that a woman who goes out because of an evil name, i.e. an adulteress, receives no fine or payment for being seduced. The problem is that a woman who commits adultery is liable to be stoned for adultery. Of course she doesn’t receive the fine.Sheshet resolves the problem by claiming that the baraita refers to a woman who had an evil name go out about before she was married, while she was still young. Such a woman does not receive the fine for rape or seduction, because she is assumed not to be a virgin. Since the fine applies only to a virgin, she does not receive it.[To reiterate, the fact that only a virgin receives the fine does not mean that rabbis sanctioned rape as long as the woman was not a virgin. The “fine” is a descendant of the biblical bride price paid to the father, which was only applicable to the virgin].
  Papa derives from this that an unsound debt document cannot be used to collect a debt. The Talmud will explore the connection between this law and the law above about a girl who had a bad name go out about her.The comparison would be that in both cases a rumor goes out that something is not as it claims to be. The document claims to be valid, but there is rumor that it was forged. The woman claims to be a virgin but there is a rumor that she is not.The problem is that Rava said such rumors are ignored.
  Since rumors aren’t trusted, the Talmud reinterprets the “evil name” about the document or the woman. In both cases two people come and claim that the woman or the person asked them to do something that caused suspicions to be raised. This would seem to be sufficient evidence to call into question either her virginity or the document’s accuracy.
  The problem is that the two situations are not really comparable. With regard to the woman, we can assume that some men would have fornicated with her (this seems like a sound assumption to me). But with regard to forging a document, how can we be so sure that he eventually found someone to forge the document. Most people will not forge documents.The answer is that even if he couldn’t find someone else to do it, since we know that he was trying to forge the document, we can assume that in the end, even if he couldn’t find anyone else to do it, he would have forged it himself. This makes perfect sense—would you trust a document that you know someone was trying to have forged?One interesting side note about this section is how R. Papa tries to take an issue that was only of theoretical importance by the amoraic period (virginity claims) and analogize it to an issue that was of practical importance in his time, the forging of documents.
  IntroductionToday’s section is the second mishnah of the chapter. It teaches those cases opposite of those mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah.I should note that the opposite of many of these cases is found in the first mishnah of the chapter, which we learned way back on the beginning of Daf 29.
  Section one:  In these cases the women are assumed to be non-virgins, and hence do not receive the fine.Rabbi Judah rules that any captive who is redeemed is assumed not to have been raped and is therefore a virgin.Section two:  Having intercourse with these women is a capital crime.  Since the man is liable for the death penalty, he does not pay the fine, for there is a principle that one cannot be executed and pay a fine.  This is learned exegetically from the words in Exodus 21:22.  The case under discussion is when a man strikes a woman causing her to miscarry.  The Torah states that if there is no other “damage”, then he must pay the fine.  The interpretation is that if the woman herself doesn’t die, then the striker pays a fine for having caused her to miscarry.  Had she died, the striker would have been a murderer and would not have paid the fine.  Note that this is true even if the damages were caused accidentally.  Although one cannot be executed for an accidental murder, the rule of the Mishnah is that anytime a person commits a crime which is punishable by death had it been committed with intention, he is exempt from the fine.A note about the Mishnah and Talmud’s references to sexual intercourse with young girls:The rabbis occasionally reference sexual relations with young girls, even under the age of three.  I expect that this will cause discomfort to people reading the mishnah, and when I think of my own three year old daughter, this makes me queasy as well. We would do well to realize that the Mishnah’s discussion of all legal possibilities does not imply their tacit approval of them.  The Mishnah discusses many crimes without expressing horror over them, because the Mishnah is often interested in legal consequences. The rabbis certainly did not condone sexual relations with girls this young.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to deal with the mishnah, particularly R. Judah’s statement that we do not suspect that a captive woman has been raped.
  R. Judah in the Mishnah said that if a woman is taken captive, we can assume that she was not raped. R. Yohanan will now try to equate that opinion with that of R. Dosa found elsewhere.
  According to R. Dosa, we do not assume that female captives were raped. At worst, they may be touched by their captors. [I apologize for the graphic language. I didn’t write it, but still].
  Rava tries to now say that it might be that R. Judah and R. Dosa might not agree. This is a difficulty on R. Yohanan.Judah might have said that a female captive is assumed not to have been raped only so that she could be considered a virgin and her rapist/seducer would have to pay the fine. But vis a vis other issues (such as staying married to her priestly husband) he might agree that we need to be concerned that she was raped.
  It is also possible that R. Dosa said that we can assume she was not raped only with regard to eating terumah, which after the destruction of the Temple is only of rabbinic status. But when it comes to the rapist or seducer paying the fine, which is of Toraitic status, we would not make him liable to pay the fine unless we could be 100 per cent sure that she was a virgin. Again, R. Dosa may not have made a blanket statement with regard to the captive woman.
  Abaye critiques Rava’s proposal that R. Judah may hold that a female captive is assumed to remain a virgin only to force subsequent rapist to pay the fine (“that the sinner should gain no advantage”). The problem is that R. Judah assumes that she is a virgin with regard to the size of the ketubah she would receive when she gets married later in life. According to R. Judah, she receives a ketubah of 200 zuz, the ketubah of a virgin. The one who marries her is certainly not sinning, so why should he have to give her 200 zuz, as if we could be certain that she was a virgin? The answer seems to be that R. Judah really believes that she was not raped.
  The Talmud now rejects Abaye’s difficulty on Rava, and posits a totally separate reason why R. Judah would say that when it comes to getting married, she is presumed a virgin. If she received a ketubah of 100, we would have to fear that men would refrain from marrying her, the idea being that men back then (and I’m still sure it’s true in places now) prefer to marry virgins.To summarize: R. Judah might not make a blanket assumption that captive women were not raped. He could say that it depends on what the ramifications of such an assumption would be. When it comes to the fine, he would say that a man who rapes a woman who had been taken captive must pay the fine, so that he should not be rewarded. A woman who had been taken would still receive a ketubah of 200, to encourage men to marry her. But a woman who had been taken captive would not be allowed to stay married to her husband the priest.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah R. Judah holds that a woman who was taken captive should not be assumed to have been raped. This section questions whether that is what R. Judah really holds.
  In this baraita, the issue is whether one who is involved in redeeming a captive woman may marry her (assuming he is a priest, who may not marry her if she was raped). The Talmud will explain the baraita as we proceed, but for now it is sufficient to note that according to R. Judah, in either case he may not marry her. Clearly, however we interpret this baraita, R. Judah says that there is an assumption that she was raped.
  The Talmud explains what it believes the baraita really means. If a man redeems a woman and testifies that she has not been raped, he himself is allowed to marry her, even if he is a priest. We can assume that he redeemed her in order to marry her [I know this might be distasteful]. But if he merely testifies on her behalf, he can’t marry her, because we are concerned that he is lying in order to allow her to marry him. Generally, people who give testimony cannot benefit from that testimony.
  Papa resolves the contradiction between R. Judah in the baraita and R. Judah in the Mishnah by emending the baraita. R. Judah says that in either case he is allowed to marry her, in line with his opinion in the Mishnah that a female captive is not assumed to have been raped.
  Huna’s resolution is slightly different from R. Papa’s. He maintains the reading of the baraita, but says that R. Judah was not stating his own opinion.Rather, R. Judah was arguing against the opinion of the rabbis. He says that if you’re going to fear that someone would testify on behalf of the woman just so he could marry her, the same fear would exist even if he redeems her.
  The rabbis explain the difference between a man who redeems and testifies on behalf of the woman and one who merely testifies on her behalf. Since the former spent money to redeem her, we can assume that he really believes that she was not raped. He wouldn’t have spent money just to redeem a woman prohibited to him. But if he merely testifies that he believes she was not raped, we must fear that he is lying.[This is not a straightforward assumption. After all, we suspect a man might falsely testify, but we don’t suspect he would spend money to get a wife prohibited to him. This seems strange to me. Therefore, I would read our concerns over false testimony not that he intentionally lies. Rather, we fear he says that he knows something even if he is not absolutely certain of it.]
  
  Daf 37a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to deal with R. Judah’s statement from the mishnah, that we do not assume that a woman taken captive was raped. Is this really his position? Is it consistent with his position elsewhere? 
  We now learn another source which according to R. Papa b. Shmuel proves that R. Judah does not hold that a captive woman is assumed to be a virgin. The baraita refers to two issues concerning a convert. The first is a case where she begins to menstruate immediately after conversion. The question is whether she is treated like all Jewish women who retroactively defile things they touched before they noticed they were menstruating. According to R. Judah she does not. She only defiles that which she touches from that point onward. According to R. Yose she is like all other women. She retroactively defiles anything she touched either in the last twenty-four hours, or from the last time she examined herself.According to R. Judah, she also must wait three months before marrying, in order to distinguish a child conceived before she became Jewish and one from after she converted. R. Yose says she need not wait.The fact that R. Yose says she need not wait implies that she we do not assume she had sex before converting (assuming she has not yet been married). Therefore, R. Judah would say that we must be concerned that she was raped. And at this point, it seems that R. Judah equates all non-Jews with captors. To R. Judah, a woman who converts is assumed to have had sex within the past three months. 
  R. Joseph replies that the comparison is invalid. A convert, meaning a woman before she converts, does not know that she is eventually going to convert. Therefore, she does not protect herself from having sex (outside of marriage). Thus, R. Judah would hold that she must wait to get married, lest she became pregnant while still a non-Jew. In contrast, a captive will protect herself, knowing that she will be redeemed. Therefore, R. Judah assumes that she remains a virgin.A word about rabbinic attitudes towards non-Jews: Rabbis at times assume the worst about non-Jews, that they are murderers, fornicators, robbers, etc. Part of this might be the experience of a people occupied by foreign rulers (Romans or Babylonians), but part of this might also be a general human tendency to demonize the other. The rabbis may cast the gentiles in the worst light as a way of imagining what the worst possibilities are for human beings.By the medieval period, and certainly in the modern period, these attitudes towards non-Jews had changed, at least among modern Jews. So while I can understand the Talmudic attitude, I think we should be thankful that nowadays, things are different. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to question the notion that R. Judah holds that a woman taken captive is not assumed to have been raped. It sharpens the difficulty by noting a baraita in which R. Judah explicitly states that a woman taken captive must wait three months to get married (or continue sleeping with her Israelite husband) lest she have become pregnant while taken captive.
  According to this baraita, R. Judah holds that anyone who goes from a state of not being Jewish, not being free, or of being a captive, must wait three months before marrying, so that we can determine if the child was conceived by the captor, or before the woman converted or was freed. [The words older than three years and one day seem to be a mistake here, perhaps from the context of virginity claims. Obviously a three year old cannot be pregnant].Yose again has no such concern. This proves that R. Judah holds that we must assume that a captive woman was raped.
  Joseph does not know how to respond to this difficulty. So he asks R. Papa b. Shmuel to solve the contradiction. The latter does so by citing a teaching of R. Sheshet who says that R. Judah refers to a case where people saw her have intercourse with her captor (or in the other cases that she had intercourse with someone). Of course in such a case we must be concerned that she is pregnant. But in any other case, we need not be concerned.
  The problem is that if someone says they saw her have intercourse before conversion, redemption or manumission, then why would R. Yose assume that she was not pregnant. In other words, the resolution to the difficulty on R. Judah, causes a difficulty on R. Yose.Rabbah resolves this by stating that to R. Yose, a woman who fornicates (basically this means non-marital sex) is assumed to use contraception. Therefore we can assume that she is not pregnant.
  The Talmud analyzes whether it makes sense to assume that these women used contraception before they became free or Jewish. In most cases, the Talmud agrees that it makes sense. The woman might not want to become pregnant at that point. A convert might want to wait until conversion to have a child, so that the child would be Jewish. A captive would not want to become pregnant, for she might be redeemed. A slave might have overheard that she is about to be set free, and therefore want to wait until that point to become pregnant.
  The problem is the case of a slave woman who is freed because her master put out her tooth or eye (all slaves go free when this occurs). How can R. Yose assume that she used a contraceptive device? She could not have known beforehand that this would happen. This is similar to a (Jewish) woman who was raped or seduced—she too did not know beforehand that this would occur, and yet R. Yose says that we assume she is not pregnant, and therefore she can be betrothed and married immediately.
  Rabbah now offers a new interpretation for R. Yose—a woman does not use a contraceptive device. Rather, she simply turns over so that she won’t get pregnant. This is something that all women do when they have non-marital sex, even a woman who didn’t know that she was about to have sex. [This is how Rashi explains the sugya. Otherwise we would have to ask the same questions as above—why would these women act in order to prevent conception. How would they have known that it is in their best interest not to become pregnant?].Judah (rightly) questions the effectiveness of such a contraceptive action. Turning over is very unlikely to prevent pregnancy. Therefore we must be concerned.
  IntroductionToday’s section goes on to deal with the next line of the mishnah. According to the Mishnah the notion that one cannot get two punishments for the same crime is derived from Exodus  21:22, the passage where a man accidentally strikes a woman and causes her to miscarry. If the woman dies, he does not pay for the fetuses. This, according to the rabbis, is because he gets the death penalty for killing the mother.
  The Talmud suggests that the principle that one is obligated for only one penalty is derived from Deuteronomy 25:2, which uses the singular in reference to punishing a person for a transgression. He is punished for one wickedness (transgression) but not for two transgressions. So why does our mishnah use a different verse?
  The Talmud, as it often does, argues that both verses are needed, for they address different situations, and one could not be derived from the other.If only the first text from Exodus was used, I might have thought that one cannot be executed and fined because execution is such a stringent penalty. But perhaps we would have thought that someone could be lashed and still pay a fine, because lashing does not involve a loss of life. That is why we need to learn that one cannot receive lashes and a financial penalty.
  If we had learned only that one cannot be lashed and receive a financial penalty, I might have thought that this is because the transgression for which one is lashed is not so grave. That is why he receives only one penalty. But since the transgression punishable by death is graver, I might have thought that one gets the death penalty and is fined. Therefore, we need another verse to teach us that one who gets the death penalty is not also fined.
  Meir holds that one may be lashed and still pay a penalty. So this leaves him without an answer as to why we need two verses both teaching that one cannot receive two penalties for one crime.Meir could answer that we need the two verses to teach that one cannot receive the death penalty and pay the fine, nor can he be executed and lashed (this is not something we spoke about before, assumedly because it’s strange—why would you lash someone and then execute them?).
  
  Daf 37b
  
  Again, the Talmud argues that both texts are needed. I need one text to teach that we do not punish someone’s body (death) and his property (fine) for one crime. But I might have thought that lashing a person and then killing him is like one long death penalty, and therefore it could be done. That is why we need a verse to teach us that a person does not receive lashes and the death penalty for one crime.
  If we had only learned that one cannot be executed and receive lashes, we might have said that this is because both are against his body. But we might have thought that a person could be executed and forced to pay a fine for the same crime. Therefore, the Torah had to teach us both. According to R. Meir, one can get lashes and pay a fine, but not death and another punishment.For an in-depth discussion of Daf Shevui, you can sign up to our Facebook page group at: 
  IntroductionThe Talmud now continues to ask why we need biblical verses that seem to teach that one cannot give out two penalties for one transgression.
  At first it might seem like Numbers 35:31 teaches the same principle as we have been learning—when a person is executed, he does not also pay the fine. However, this is not what the verse is really teaching. The verse teaches that it is forbidden for a court to take a ransom to allow a murderer to avoid execution. It does not teach that one cannot get the death penalty and also pay a fine.
  The very next verse in Numbers teaches that the court cannot take a ransom to exempt an accidental murderer from having to flee to a city of refuge.
  The Talmud asks now why we need both texts, one dealing with intentional murder and the other with unintentional killing. The answer is similar to the answer found in yesterday’s section. If we had learned that the court cannot take a ransom to exempt a person from the death penalty, we might have thought that this is because the prohibition of murder is so severe. But accidental killing is not severe (it was an accident, after all) and therefore, one could pay a ransom to get out of having to flee to the exile city. Therefore, the verse teaches us that even for exile one cannot pay a ransom.
  If we had only learned that the court cannot receive a ransom to allow an accidental killer to avoid having to flee to the refuge city, we might have thought that this is because this is not such a severe punishment. His life is not taken, therefore, he is not allowed to pay a ransom. But we have thought that a person condemned to execution is allowed to avoid the punishment by paying a ransom, because we wish to avoid execution. Therefore, both texts are necessary. Under no circumstances can one atone for murder or accidental killing by paying a fine.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to present interpretations for Numbers 35, the section of the Torah about murder and accidental murder, as well as other related passages.
  The verse requires that a murderer’s blood be shed (this is probably the original reason why Jewish execution was done through decapitation, although a different, more midrashic, reason will be expressed below). The Talmud asks why we need to know this—there are other verses that seem to say the same thing. The answer is related to the passage in Deuteronomy about breaking a heifer’s neck if a murderer cannot be found. If the heifer’s neck is broken, and then the murderer is found, the murderer still must be executed. This is read out of the verse from Numbers—atonement cannot be made except by the blood of the one who shed it. Even if the heifer already effected atonement, the murderer must still be executed.
  The verse from Deuteronomy concerning the method of breaking the heifer’s neck is used as the source for the halakhah that execution for murder is done by cutting the head off at the neck. This is derived from the fact that the verse is phrased as a generality—all clean blood is expunged by something being cut at the neck, either the heifer, when the murderer is not known, or of the murderer himself.
  The heifer’s head is chopped off with an axe at the back of its head. But the murderer is killed with a sword from the front of the neck. If execution is derived from how the heifer is killed, why the discrepancy?The answer is a midrash on “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” This is understood to refer even to a case where you are executing your neighbor—choose for him a good way to die. There are several ways in which this could be understood. The first has to do with honor. Chopping someone’s head off the same way you would chop off the head of an animal is not an honorable way to die. It is not a “good death.” The second could be with the type of wound inflicted. It could be that the ax is a more gruesome method than the sword, or that the back of the neck is more brutal than the front, where the death might be quicker. In any case, I think it’s the principle that is most interesting—even in execution, we are commanded to love our neighbor.
  The Talmud now asks the meaning of another verse, which the Talmud reads as if it refers to a person who has been sentenced to death (this is not the simple meaning of the verse). The baraita refers to a person who vows to give to the Temple another person’s value. This is the topic of chapter 27 in Leviticus. But, we learn here that if a person is being led out to execution, he has no worth. However, if he has not yet been sentenced, then he still has a value, so if someone dedicates him to the Temple, they must pay his value. Note that the value of a person is fixed in the Torah—it depends on gender and age.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues where we left off yesterday. According to a baraita we read there, if a person dedicates to the Temple the value of a person being taken out to be executed, he does not owe that value, because such a person has no value. Today we learn of dissent on this issue.
  According to R. Hananiah b. Akabia, such a person can have his value dedicated to the Temple, because his value is determined by age and gender and is not related to his actual real worth value (which in this case is basically zero).So what then does he do with this verse, “None proscribed,” the verse that received a midrash in yesterday’s section.
  There is one case in the Torah in which a person may get out of the death penalty by paying a ransom. This is the case of an owner whose ox (or other animal) kills a person. The Torah says that the owner can be put to death, which the rabbis read as “death by the hand of heaven.” However, if the owner pays a ransom, i.e. the value of the person the ox killed, he does not received “death by the hand of heaven.” R. Ishmael says that we might have thought that just as one can pay a ransom to avoid death by the hand of heaven, one can also pay a ransom to avoid death by a court. Therefore, the verse teaches that none proscribed (sentenced to execution) by a man can pay a ransom. This might have been read as referring only to “severe death penalties.” Severe death penalties are cases where a person cannot receive atonement even if he does the sin unwittingly (according to Rashi this refers to kidnapping and wounding one’s parents). The word “none” teaches that the same is true even for sins which can be atoned for if committed unwittingly, such as idol worship, Sabbath laws and fornication. In short, in all cases, one who has been sentenced to death cannot avoid execution by paying a fine.
  The Talmud now asks a logical question—why do we need a special midrash to teach that one may not pay a ransom to avoid execution? There is a verse that states this explicitly! Rami b. Hama answers that both the verse and the midrash are needed lest I think that if one kills another person with a downward motion, he may pay a ransom to avoid the death penalty because had he done so accidentally he would have been able to receive atonement by going to the city of exile. The idea is that when someone kills with a downward motion it could be an accident, whereas killing with an upward motion is assumed to be on purpose. Only the former can be atoned, the latter cannot.Thus both verses are needed to emphasize the same point the Talmud has been emphasizing throughout—under no circumstances may one pay a ransom to avoid the death penalty. This is true whether the sin was done in a manner that could have allowed for atonement, had it been done accidentally, or not.
  
  Daf 38a
  
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s daf Rami b. Hama stated that the verse, “None proscribed, that may be proscribed of men” teaches that it does not matter whether one killed with an upward or downward motion, a ransom can never be taken in order to exempt the murderer from the death penalty. Today’s section continues from that point, with Rava saying that we could have learned that halakhah from a different source.
  The tanna of the House of Hezekiah source was found above on daf 35, part 1. This baraita was directly dealing with the issue of what punishment is meted out to a murderer—execution or a fine? The source teaches that there is no distinction between murdering with an upward motion and murdering with a downward motion—the murderer never pays the fine. And just as there is no case in which a murderer pays a fine, so too there can be no distinction between killing with an upward motion and killing with a downward motion with regard to paying a ransom to exempt himself from the death penalty.Since this halakhah emerges from the House of Hezekiah source, we don’t, Rava argues, need to derive the same halakha from the extra verse, “None proscribed…” This leaves us without a solution as to why we need that verse. Stay tuned for tomorrow, where we will finally answer—what does that verse really teach us?
  IntroductionRami b. Hama again answers why we need several verses that all seem to teach that one cannot take a ransom to allow a person to escape execution.
  Rami b. Hama says that that the verse “Do not take a ransom” is needed to teach the principle that a person who murders and commits another crime at the same time is executed and does not pay the fine, even though there is another verse that could teach the same law. I might have thought that if someone puts out someone’s eye and thereby kills him, he is executed and does not pay for putting out his eye. But if he blinds him and kills him in a different way, not connected to the eye, he would pay for the eye and be executed. Therefore we need another verse to teach the principle that he receives only the more severe of the two penalties.
  Rava again says that the deduction that Rami b. Hama makes from the verse can be derived from elsewhere, causing the deduction to be unnecessary. Another teaching from the House of Hezekiah states one cannot be executed and pay a fine for putting out another person’s eye. Rava seems to take this to mean that one cannot receive two punishments for the same crime. [We should note that this is not the simple meaning of the source. The simple meaning is that when one puts out another person’s eye, he cannot be killed for the crime.]
  Ashi answers that we need two verses to teach the principle that a criminal receives only one of the punishments lest we thought that since fines are an “innovation,” one could pay a fine and be executed. The concept of “innovation” is that since there is one thing illogical about the law, namely that one would pay more than the cost of compensation (for instance paying four or five fold for stealing and slaughtering an animal), the entire law might be illogical. This would allow us to think that under certain circumstances, a person could be executed and pay a fine. Therefore, we need two verses to teach us that this is not so.
  Rabbah holds that one can be executed and still pay a fine, specifically because fines are an innovation. So what does Rabbah do with the extra verse, “None proscribed”? [Note that it is complex as to why this verse is now extraneous. Basically, if the verse, “And if there is no catastrophe” (if the woman he struck does not die, and he pays the fine for her miscarriages)  teaches that a person does not pay a fine if he is executed, and the verse “Do not take a ransom” teaches that one can never pay a ransom to get out of the death penalty, the verse “None proscribed” becomes extraneous.]Rabbah could explain this verse like the Tanna (the anonymous opinion) that argues with R. Hanania b. Akavia (see page 37, sections 5-6). According to this tanna, this verse refers to a one who dedicates the value of a person who is being taken out to be executed. According to this tanna, since such a person is about to be executed, he has no value, and the one who dedicated his value is exempt from any payment.
  IntroductionIn the chapter that describes rape in Deuteronomy the Torah refers to a “young girl, a virgin who has not been betrothed”.  The rabbis understand that this verse means that the laws of paying the fine are limited to a “young girl” that is a girl between the ages of 12 and 12 ½ and a virgin.  The mishnah which now appears in the Talmud discusses the meaning of the phrase “who has not been betrothed”.
  In the case, a girl was betrothed and then either widowed or divorced, and then she was raped or seduced. The question is—does she receive a fine? Note that if she was betrothed but not divorced or widowed and someone raped her, he would be liable for the death penalty for having committed adultery (she would of course not be liable since she did not willingly commit any crime).  In this case, since he is liable for the death penalty, he does not pay a fine.According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean since the Torah states, “who has not been betrothed” the rapist in this case does not pay the fine.Rabbi Akiva reads the phrase “who has not been betrothed” to be a stipulation for when the father receives the fine. If she has never been betrothed, then her father receives a fine.  If she has been betrothed, but she is still a virgin, for instance she was divorced or widowed before full marriage, the rapist is liable to pay a fine and he pays it directly to her.We should note that R. Akiva’s reading is clearly innovative. The Torah does not seem to assume the possibility of an independent woman. She is either in her father’s house or her husband’s. R. Akiva, and other rabbis elsewhere, carve out some space for the independence of a woman. In this case, despite the origins of the fine as compensation to the father for losing the bride price, she receives the fine.
  Yose the Galilean’s reasoning in the mishnah is clear. Since she has been betrothed, she loses the right to collect a fine. To connect this to its historical roots—the father was paid the bride price by the first husband. If she is betrothed and then divorced before marriage, a man who subsequently has relations with her is not depriving the father of the bride price. Therefore, there is no fine.
  As I explained above, R. Akiva reads the verse differently. If she had never been betrothed, the father receives the fine. If she was betrothed, she receives the fine. We should note that R. Akiva seems to read the fine as a punishment for the rapist. While this may find favor in our eyes (obviously a rapist deserves severe punishment), it does not accord particularly well with the simple meaning and interpretation of the verse. Nevertheless, we might add that the very fact that the rabbis call this a “penalty (קנס)” probably implies that most rabbis view this as a penalty, and not a replacement for the lost bride price.
  These lines raise a difficulty on R. Akiva’s line of thinking. R. Akiva reads the words “who was not betrothed” to imply that if she was betrothed, she receives the fine. Extending this logic we would say that the word “a na’arah,” to mean that if the girl is between 12 and 12.5, but if she is older, her father receives the fine. Furthermore, the word “a virgin” would mean that if she was a virgin, her father would receive the fine, but if she was not a virgin, she would receive the fine. We should note that these are not illogical readings of the verse. But this is not how R. Akiva himself reads the verse. He reads the latter exclusions as complete—if she is not a na’arah, there is no fine; if she is not a virgin, there is no fine. So too he should read the other exclusion as complete. If she was betrothed, there is no fine.To put this another way, if R. Akiva reads the payment as a fine for the very act of rape, why doesn’t it apply in all cases of rape? Indeed, this is a very good question.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues from yesterday’s section where we learned that according to R. Akiva, if the girl has been betrothed and then divorced and then is raped or seduced, there is a fine, but the fine goes to her instead of to her father. The problem with R. Akiva’s statement is how does he interprets the words “who has not been betrothed” which would seem to mean that if she had been betrothed, there is no fine whatsoever.
  The baraita cited here is parallel to the Mishnah. As in the Mishnah, R. Yose the Galilean says that if a girl was once betrothed, she never subsequently receives the fine.
  Akiva in this baraita holds that if the girl was betrothed and then divorced, she is still subject to the laws of the fine. However, in this baraita, as opposed to the Mishnah, he states that logic dictates that the father receives the fine. If the father has the right to the money received for her betrothal, then he would still receive the fine, even though she had already been betrothed.[Note that later the Talmud will ask how R. Akiva in this baraita can so obviously disagree with R. Akiva from the Mishnah].
  Akiva does not interpret the words “Who has not been betrothed” to mean that the girl was never betrothed. After all, to R. Akiva in this baraita, it does not matter whether she was betrothed or not, the father still receives the fine. So then what does he do with those words? He uses them to draw a “gezerah shavah,” a linguistic analogy, between the verse in Deuteronomy, where the exact amount of the fine is stated, and the parallel in Exodus 22:15, where the amount is not stated. Just as in Deuteronomy, the fine for rape is 50 shekels, so too in Exodus, the fine for seduction is 50 shekels.
  
  
  Daf 38b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to explain the baraita that appeared above.
  Akiva uses the phrase “who has not been betrothed” to connect the verses in Deuteronomy with those in Exodus. And the word “virgin” he interprets literally—if she is not a virgin, she receives no fine. But this is not necessarily logical. He could have interpreted the phrase “who has not been betrothed” literally—if she was betrothed and then divorced she does not receive the fine. And he could have used the word “virgin” to connect Deuteronomy with Exodus (the word appears in both places).To put this another way, the essential question is, why does he sometimes understand the verse literally and at other times midrashically?
  The first attempt to answer this difficulty is to point out that even though she has been betrothed and then divorced, she is still a virgin and a na’arah. Therefore, this verse should apply to her and she should receive the fine.
  The last answer was not truly logical. I could say that the word “virgin” is only meant to be used as a reference to Exodus. A non-virgin would still receive the fine, as long as she has not yet been betrothed. Again, we do not have an answer as to why one word is taken literally (“virgin”) and one is not (“who has not been betrothed”)
  The Talmud now arrives at what is probably the real reason why R. Akiva reads one word literally and the other as a literary reference to Exodus. A woman who is no longer a virgin has had a physical change in her body. This physical change causes a real change in the law—she no longer receives the fine. But betrothal is only a change in her legal status. Therefore, as long as she is not betrothed when the rape/seduction occurs, then she is still eligible for the fine.
  Yose the Galilean now needs to explain where he derives the halakhah that the payment for rape and seduction are the same. He does so from the words “according to the bride-price of virgins.” This verse sets a standard. The bride-price of virgins is the same as the payment for seduction—fifty shekels.
  IntroductionIn the Mishnah, R. Akiva states that a girl who has been betrothed and then divorced before marriage still receives the fine, but that since she was betrothed, she herself receives the fine, not her father. In contrast, in the baraita, he says that the father receives the fine.
  The answer to the difficulty is quite simple—these are indeed two different opinions, transmitted by two different people, each a different version of what R. Akiva said.
  The Talmud now evaluates each of the versions of R. Akiva. The version in the mishnah, that she receives the fine, is closer to the simple meaning, because it retains a difference between a girl that was never betrothed (fine goes to father) and one that was betrothed and then divorced (fine goes to her). But the version in the baraita is far removed from the simple meaning for in either case the father receives the fine. Did the words “who was not betrothed” really come just to teach a gezerah shavah, a linguistic comparison, with the verse in Exodus?
  Nahman b. Yitzchak says that R. Akiva in the baraita is based on a different pronunciation of the word. Instead of “orasah” which means “has not been betrothed” he reads “who is not betrothed.” Thus as long as she is not currently betrothed, the father receives the fine.The problem is that the verse is now too obvious. If a man rapes a girl who is betrothed, he receives the death penalty, not a fine! The answer is that were it not for the verse I might have thought that he would pay the fine and be executed. The verse therefore teaches he pays the fine only if she is not betrothed.
  Rabbah holds that one can pay a fine and still be executed. So then he could not explain the verse as if it means “who is not betrothed” for according to Rabbah if one rapes or seduces a betrothed virgin, he would pay the fine and be executed.Therefore, Rabbah must hold like R. Akiva in the Mishnah. The verse is now read in its normal fashion—she has never been betrothed. In such a case the father receives the fine. But if she was betrothed and then divorced, she receives the fine.
  A baraita is cited in which two opinions dispute whether she receives the fine, or her father. R. Hisda interprets this baraita as referring to a virgin who was betrothed and then divorced and in line with the difference between R. Akiva of the Mishnah (she receives the fine) and R. Akiva of the baraita (father receives the fine).
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with a case where the girl who was raped or seduced dies before the fine is paid.As I’ve said many times, I realize that talking about these situations is disturbing. I too am disturbed when I constantly I have to describe situations in which young girls may be raped, although I am cognizant that my being disturbed does not mean that this does not occur in the real world. I do believe the rabbis were talking theoretically, envisioning scenarios and not responding to real life situations. Their discussions are clinical to a large extent, like those of a physician or mathematician. But I realize that seeing the word rape over and over is difficult. We should also note that the rabbis engage in midrash with the entire Torah, whether or not it had practical ramifications or applications in their own lives. The fine for rape or seduction was no longer a real institution that was enforced in rabbinic times.
  Abaye reads the words “the girl’s father” as implying that if the girl dies before the father succeeds in collecting the fine, the father loses the right to the fine.
  Rava asks about a case where the liability for the fine occurs (rape or seduction), then the girl dies and then before the fine is paid, she reaches the age of maturity (had she been alive). Had she been alive and then reached the age of maturity, the fine would have been hers. But do we consider her posthumously reaching the age of maturity to be the same? If we do, the fine goes to her offspring. If we do not, then the fine stays with her father.
  
  Daf 39a
  
  The Talmud goes on a small digression here about whether a girl can become pregnant while a minor. According to R. Meir she can, and therefore she should use a contraceptive device because of the danger to her health of giving birth while a minor. According to the other sages, a minor will not become pregnant because God will protect her (I wouldn’t advise relying on this advice).There are two other categories of women whom R. Meir allows to use contraception. A pregnant woman is the first. The rabbis seem to have believed that the pregnant woman could again be impregnated and that this could damage the already conceived fetus. A nursing woman could use contraception so that she doesn’t get pregnant again and have to wean her first child too early.The problem is that Rava seems to believe that a young girl can become pregnant and have a child all before reaching majority age. According to the sages in this source, that is not possible.
  The girl under discussion must have been raped/seduced as a minor such that she could have a child to inherit her and then die before reaching majority age. She could not have had sex as a na’arah, because there is only six months between na’arut (the period in between a minor and a girl of majority age) and reaching maturity, and we know she died before reaching maturity. So again we must ask, how can a minor become pregnant?
  The question is therefore adjusted. Rava asked if the father’s right to the fine is lost if his daughter dies and then hits majority age before he collects. This question, for which Rava does not have an answer, is that which Abaye did know above.
  Here is yet another version of the issue, this time formed in a direct question by Mar son of R. Ashi, a late amora.However, there is no answer to the question. It remains undecided.
  IntroductionOur section continues to ask questions about whether a girl’s father would receive the fine under certain scenarios.
  Rava asked Abaye if the girl who was raped/seduced is then betrothed before the fine is collected, does her father still receive the fine. In other words, she was not betrothed at the time of the rape/seduction, but she was betrothed before the money was collected. Does she count as a betrothed girl who does not receive the fine?
  Abaye responds that the answer to this question is obvious. The Torah says that the girl was not betrothed at the time of the rape/seduction. It does not say that she can’t be betrothed at the time that the husband gives the money to the father. Of course the father receives the money.
  Rava now responds with a baraita that seems to prove the fault in Abaye’s line of reasoning. The baraita states that if the girl is married (not just betrothed) before the fine is given to the father, she gets the fine, not her father. This is true even though the Torah does not explicitly say that the girl must not be married when the fine is given to the father. Rava in other words is saying that we cannot prove anything from the absence of such words in the verse.
  Abaye rejects Rava’s comparison. Marriage is like becoming of majority age—she is no longer under her father’s authority. Therefore, just as we have learned that if she reaches majority age before the fine is paid, she receives the fine, so too if she is married before she reaches majority age, she receives the fine. But betrothal does not remove her completely from her father’s authority, for we have learned that he may still invalidate her vows. Therefore, it may be that even if she is betrothed, it is still her father who receives the fine.
  IntroductionThis introduction is from the Mishnah Yomit commentary.The Torah discusses the “seducer” in Exodus 22:15-16:  “If a man seduces a virgin who has not been betrothed and lies with her, he must make her his wife by payment of a bride-price.  If her father refuses to give her to him, he must still weigh out silver in accordance with the bride-price for virgins.”  The rabbis learned that the bride-price referred to in these verses is the same as the 50 shekels referred to in the verses which discuss the rapist in Deuteronomy 22.  Therefore, both a seducer and a rapist must pay a fine of 50 shekels to the father, equivalent to the bride-price which the father would have received had he married her off in a typical fashion.  This mishnah discusses the other types of payments that the rapist and the seducer must pay and other differences between the two.
  Section one: The seducer pays three types of payment:  1)  for having shamed her; 2) for having caused her to be “blemished”; 3)  the fine. The first two of these types of payments will be described in greater detail in mishnah seven. The rapist must make an additional payment for the pain he has caused her. Since the women willingly had relations with the seducer, he does not pay for the pain.Section two:  The mishnah now relates three differences in the penalties of a seducer and those of a rapist.  The first was already mentioned above. The second is that a rapist must pay immediately, whereas the seducer pays only if he decides not to marry her.  This difference is derived from the fact that with regard to the seducer the verse states, “If her father refuses to give her to him, he must weigh out silver” (Ex. 22:16).  By inference we can conclude that if the father does not refuse, then the seducer does not pay.  In contrast, Deuteronomy 22:28 states, “The man who lay with her must pay the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver.”  In this case the ruling is stated unconditionally.  Hence he must pay whether or not the father allows the couple to remain married.The final difference is that a rapist is not allowed to initiate divorce against the woman.  This is derived from the Deut. 22:28, “Because he has violated her, he can never have the right to divorce her.”  In contrast, the seducer is allowed to divorce his wife.[I realize that the idea that the victim of a rape would somehow be rewarded by the rapist having to marry her and never being allowed to divorce her, sounds cruel to our modern sensibilities.  However, if we understand that we are talking about a society where a woman may have been “ruined” and hence unable to get married after having been raped, we will realize that the intent of the law is to protect the woman.  By forcing him to marry her, the Torah affords her the economic protection of a husband, economic protection that may have been quite necessary in ancient society.]Section three:  The rapist must marry the woman whom he has raped, even if she has some physical handicap that makes him not want to marry her.  He lost his right to decide whether or not he wanted to marry her when he raped her.Section four:  However, he may not marry a woman who is halakhically forbidden to him.  After all, if this were not so, a man could rape a woman and thereby allow himself to marry a woman who would have otherwise been forbidden to him.  The mishnah lists two types of such women.  The first is a woman who “has committed a licentious act”.  This refers to a woman who committed adultery after he had married her.  As is always the case, a husband may not continue to live with his wife if she had committed adultery.  If in this case, the rapist married the woman and then she committed adultery, he may not remained married to her.The second example is a woman who is not allowed to marry an Israelite, such as a mamzeret or a natinah.  If he raped such a woman, he may not marry her, and if he did marry her, he must divorce her.  Similarly, if he was a kohen and he raped a divorcee, he is not allowed to marry her.  This halakhah is derived from a midrashic reading of the words “And she shall be for him a wife”, which are read by the rabbis to mean that the woman must be halakhically “fit” to be his wife.  If she is not, he is allowed to divorce her.
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, the rapist pays compensation for the pain. The mishnah asks what the pain is.I want to warn you that this section can be particularly difficult to read. The rabbis do not consistently take into account the psychological pain of rape. For the most part, the pain they recognize is physical. This may be found disturbing because today we recognize the deep emotional pain caused by being forced to have sex.
  According to Shmuel’s father, the pain the rapist must compensate his victim for is not the rape itself, but for the pain of being thrown onto the ground.
  Zera cites a baraita to raise a difficulty on Shmuel’s father. In this baraita, R. Shimon argues that the rapist does not pay for the pain. He assumes that the pain is the pain of first intercourse. Since the woman will eventually suffer this pain when she is married, the rapist does not owe it. [I know the insensitivity of this statement is overwhelming]. The other sages answer that he must pay for the pain he causes, because one who has sex for the first time against her will is not the same as one who does so willingly. The former suffers far more physical pain, and it may be that this opinion takes into account the psychological suffering as well.In any case, we can see here that the payment is for the rape itself. That is not to say that someone who inflicts other bodily harm while raping does not have to pay for that as well. What R. Zera is saying is that even if there is no other physical pain, for instance he throws her onto soft silk, the rape itself is painful and therefore must be compensated for.
  
  Daf 39b
  
  Nahman now revises what the pain payment is for. It is for the pain of forcing her to spread her legs.
  Nahman now explains why the seducer does not pay for having her spread her legs. Since in the case of seduction the woman was willing, the seducer need not pay. It is as if she told him to tear up her silk garments but that she will not hold him liable.
  The problem with R. Nahman’s analogy is that the girl who is being seduced does not have a right to forgo this payment, for it would go to her father. This is not because he experiences the pain, but rather because all financial benefit that comes from a young girl (a na’arah) goes to her father. So how can she tell the man to “tear up my silk garments.”Nahman’s final answer is that there simply is no pain for a virgin being seduced. Even though she is losing her virginity, she experiences no pain. Perhaps this is a sign that the pain paid by the rapist is for psychological pain. Since the seduced woman experiences no psychological pain (she wanted to have sex), there is no payment for pain.It is interesting that R. Nahman attributes this statement to women themselves. As a man, how could he know whether women experience pain at first intercourse?
  Of course it does seem that in most circumstances sex is painful for a woman during her first time, even if she is having sex willingly. So how come he does not have to compensate her in the case of seduction? Three amoraim now give answers as to how much sex hurts the first time a woman has it. They have learned these answers from various women (obviously, a man could not know how much this hurts). The point seems to be that this does not hurt any more than do other things that might happen quite frequently. Pain requires compensation only if it is abnormal pain.
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, the rapist pays the fine immediately, whereas the seducer pays the fine only when/if he divorces her. Our sugya discusses this section of the mishnah.
  The mishnah assumes that the seducer has already married her. But we seem to have skipped a step—what if he does not marry her? Abaye therefore reads the mishnah differently. The seducer pays the father the fine if he does not marry her. If he marries her, then he really never does pay the fine. It just turns into the ketubah, which he will pay on divorce.
  This baraita accords with Abaye in saying that the seducer pays the fine only if he does not marry her. It then goes on to give some other information. Unlike the fine, the shame and blemish payments must be paid immediately. The reason seems to be that these are not transformed by marriage into the ketubah. They are independent, a result of his not having gone through the proper channels of marriage. Therefore, he pays them immediately, regardless of whether he ends up marrying her.Finally, the mishnah notes that in either case, either she or her father can refuse the marriage. As we will see below, this is not quite explicit in the Torah.
  The Torah only says that the father of the seduced girl may refuse the marriage. It never says anything about refusing the marriage in the case of rape (Deuteronomy) or whether she may refuse the marriage in the case of seduction. The rabbis use midrash to derive that she may refuse in either case, but they do not derive, at least not in this midrash, that the father may refuse in the case of rape?[We should note that rabbinic law is a major advancement here over Torah law. According to the rabbis a woman could never be forced to marry someone she does not want to, unless her father is marrying her off when a minor.]
  Abaye and Rava both provide reasons why the father may reject the marriage in either case. According to Abaye, the father has a right to reject the marriage so that the sinner (the rapist) may not be rewarded by being able to marry the girl he raped.Rava offers a fairly straightforward argument. If the father of the seduced girl is allowed to refuse the marriage even though the seducer acted only against the will of the father, the father of the raped girl should all the more so be allowed to reject the marriage, for the rapist acted against both of their will.
  Since both Rava and Abaye give decent reasons as to why the father has a right to refuse, the Talmud now asks why each amora did not give the other’s answer.Rava did not give Abaye’s answer because once the rapist has paid the fine, he really is not in the position of a sinner gaining a pure advantage. He has lost out by having to pay the fine.
  Abaye says that we can’t really compare the situations of the rapist and the seducer with regard to the right of the father to refuse. When it comes to the seducer, the seducer himself is not obligated to marry her. Therefore, the father does not have the right to reject the marriage. This would destroy the “kal vehomer” and we could say that in the case of the rapist, since the rapist is forced to marry her (if she agrees), so too the father cannot reject the marriage.
  The rapist must pay the fine immediately. It is not transformed into a delayed payment as it is for the seducer. However, the corollary is that when he divorces her, he does not pay the ketubah, because he already paid it. The problem with this law is that the rapist is not allowed to divorce her, unless she requests a divorce. So the Talmud emends it to read that if she requests a divorce, she does not receive a second ketubah.
  As I stated before, according to the first opinion, her fine becomes her ketubah. She received her payment up front and not as a delayed payment. If he dies, she does not receive anything more.Yose son of R. Judah says that he must give her an additional ketubah of one maneh, which is 100 zuz. This is the ketubah given for the widow or divorcee in all cases.
  The Talmud explains the dispute between the rabbis and R. Yose. The rabbis hold that the reason for a ketubah is to serve as a deterrent for divorce. Since the rapist is not allowed to initiate divorce, there is no reason for such a deterrent. Therefore, if he dies, she still does not receive a ketubah. The other rabbis hold that if there is no deterrent, the rapist who eventually married the woman would torment her to convince her to ask for a divorce. Therefore, he needs a deterrent as well. Since she gets a ketubah if he divorces her, she also receives one if he dies.
  The mishnah ruled that a rapist must marry the woman even if he does not want to. [Only she or her father may refuse the marriage]. But the seducer need not marry her. Rava asks why there is a difference, when in general the rabbis learned the laws of one case from the other. R. Ashi answers that there is a special midrash on Exodus, the passage the rabbis interpret as referring to the seducer. But this word “to be his” is not found in Deuteronomy. Therefore the rapist has no right to refuse the marriage. He must “drink from his pot.”
  
  Daf 40a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins by discussing the mishnah’s ruling that the rapist does not marry the victim if she is prohibited to him, i.e. she is a mamzeret.
  Kahana argues that the positive commandment of “he shall marry her” should outweigh the negative prohibition of not marrying a woman prohibited to him. We should note that it is not uncommon for a positive commandment to outweigh a negative one.
  Zevid clarifies that a positive commandment supersedes a negative one only if the positive commandment must be performed, and observance of the negative commandment would make the positive commandment completely impossible. Such would be the case if one the spot where circumcision must be performed there was scale disease. It is prohibited in general to cut off scale disease through surgery, but in this case, if one observed this negative commandment, there would be no way to perform the positive one. So circumcision wins out. But in the case of the rapist, she has the right to refuse the marriage. So this is not a case of a positive commandment being prevented by a negative one. It is only a potential positive commandment.
  IntroductionThe mishnah which opens today’s section teaches that if the girl herself receives the fine, then she only receives it if she is raped.  If she consents to having relations with the man, he does not pay the fine.
  In the case in this mishnah the fine surely would go to the girl, for her father is no longer alive.  In fact, as we shall see the Talmud explains that the despite the fact that the mishnah refers to an orphan, this mishnah actually refers to any girl who was betrothed and then divorced or widowed, and that the mishnah is according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the earlier mishnah who stated that a girl who was betrothed and then divorced still receives the fine, but she gets it, not her father. A girl who was betrothed and then divorced is called “an orphan while her father is still alive” because once she is betrothed, she is out of her father’s domain.  In this case, if she was seduced then the man does not pay the fine because she consented.
  According to R. Yohanan this mishnah accords with R. Akiva who said that if a girl was betrothed and then divorced, a subsequent fine for rape goes to her, not to her father.
  The Talmud now shows how R. Yohanan derives from this mishnah that R. Elazar and R. Akiva agree. This mishnah cannot be referring to a real orphan. Obviously her father would not receive her fine—she has no father. Rather, this mishnah refers to a girl who was betrothed and then divorced before reaching majority age. At times the Talmud even calls her “an orphan in the life of her father” because her father no longer has any authority over her. According to both R. Akiva and R. Elazar she still receives the fine, but it goes to her.
  The halakhah follows R. Elazar. It is interesting to note that this is one of the only halakhic rulings in this chapter. If, as I have said on many occasions, these laws were not practical halakhah, why was there a need for a halakhic ruling in this particular case? The answer probably is that there is a paradigm here. Once a girl has been betrothed, she is no longer in her father’s domain. While this may not have had practical implications with regard to the laws of fines, which were not practiced by this period, it does have practical implications in other areas of halakhah.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a mishnah that lists the three types of payment that a seducer must pay.
  Section one:  Embarrassment is relative to the social standing of the woman and the man.  The higher the social standing of the woman, the higher this payment will be, and the lower the social standing of the man, the higher the payment will be.  Others explain that a man of higher social standing will pay a greater payment because he embarrasses the woman more.Section two:  The blemish of a woman raped is calculated the same way that blemishes caused by other types of injury are calculated.  An estimate is made how much she would have been worth as a slave sold on the market before she had relations (either by seduction or rape) and how much she was worth afterwards.  This is the same way that an estimate would be made for a payment for blemish if, for instance, someone cut off someone else’s hand.  What is somewhat puzzling is why a virgin slave would be worth more than a non-virgin slave.  The Talmud supposes that a master may want to purchase a female virgin slave on behalf of his trustworthy male slave, one whom he might want to “reward”.Section three:  Any fine that is given a fixed sum in the Torah, is fixed and can never be raised or lowered.  Such is the case with the bride-price.  Therefore, a seducer will pay a fine of 50 shekels whether he has relations with a poor girl or with the daughter of a king.  Other examples of fixed sums in the Torah are an ox that kills a slave (Exodus 21:32) and a husband who makes a false virginity claim against his wife (Deut. 22:19)....
  The Torah sets the fine for rape (and by extension seduction) at 50 selas. But the rabbis read this as only one of the payments a rapist/seducer pays. He must also pay the shame and blemish (and in case of rape, pain). The question is—how do they know this? Maybe the 50 selas should cover all the various aspects of the damage he has done?Zera answers that the payment should reflect the social status of the woman seduced/raped. A fine that is the same for all women would not reflect this. While this sounds harsh to our ears (to mine too), we would do well to remember that this payment is in essence, the bride-price paid in advance. Put in those terms, we can more easily understand that not all bride-prices would have been the same. Today this might be reflected in wedding costs. Wealthy people have more expensive weddings than do the poor.
  According to the Torah, someone who accidentally kills a slave pays 30 selas. This payment is fixed. But, Abaye argues, if R. Zera’s logic was right, then the payment for the slave should vary depending on his abilities. If he is a slave able to do high level work with jewelry, the one who accidentally kills him should have to pay higher compensation to the master.
  
  Daf 40b
  
  Zera offers another reason offers another reason why the 50 is only for the fine and not for all the payments. R. Zera refers to a situation where a woman first had “unnatural intercourse” (anal). If she was then seduced and had normal intercourse, the seducer would pay 50 shekels, even though she had already had intercourse. This would be no different from a case where a man seduces a virgin who has never had any type of intercourse. R. Zera believes that the payment of “shame” should reflect that. Put quite frankly, the woman who had never had intercourse would receive a higher “shame” payment for her shame is greater.
  Abaye again retorts that the payment for accidentally killing a slave is the same no matter whether the slave is healthy or sick.The essence of Abaye’s argument highlights the difference between the slave payment and the fine for rape or seduction. The rabbis viewed this fine as only one part of the payment the man makes for injuring her. In essence, they viewed rape (and seduction) as personal injury, and therefore added in the payments for personal injury. But the payment for killing a slave they left as the only compensation.
  Abaye and Rava both find ways of reading the verses in Deuteronomy 22:29 as if they imply that the fine is only for the “laying” with her. But since he also shamed her and blemished her, he must also pay for those elements as well. These are “midrashim”—they are not the simple understanding of the verse. But when R. Zera fails to logically prove that he must pay for shame and blemish, the other amoraim are left to offer midrashic justification.
  The Talmud now asks why the father receives these payments. After all, she was the one shamed and blemished. The initial answer is derived from a verse in Numbers which is read as if it states that all benefits that she gets when a youth (till 12.5 years) go to her father.
  But what about that which R. Huna said in the name of Rav: From where do I know that a daughter’s handiwork belongs to her father? As it is said, “And if a man sell his daughter to be a slave”, just as the handiwork of a slave belongs to her master so does the handiwork of a daughter belong to her father.” Why do I need this? Let him derive it from “Being in her youth in her father’s house”? Rather that text was written in connection only with the annulment of vows?Rav derived the halakhah that all handiwork produced by a young girl goes to her father from a verse that teaches that a father may sell his daughter into slavery (this was entirely theoretical by this period). This is another case of a father receiving financial benefit from his daughter. But the question is, why didn’t Rav use the verse from Numbers to prove that a girl’s handiwork goes to her father? The answer is that that verse refers only to a father’s ability to annul his daughter’s vows. This is indeed the context of the verses.
  The Talmud now rejects deriving the law that the father receives the shame and blemish payments from two other payments/rights he does receive. We cannot argue that since he has the right to annul her vows he receives the payments, for in general we do not derive monetary laws from ritual matters. Annulling vows is considered a ritual matter. Second, we cannot derive it from the fact that he receives the fines, because we do not learn compensatory payments from fines.
  The naked truth of the matter is that the father could shame her by marrying her off to a scoundrel or one with boils. Since he has the right to “shame” her in a sense, he receives the payment.In the end, I think the real reason he receives the money is that he is in a sense shamed by her being raped or seduced. While today we think of all human beings as individuals, there are still cultures in which the “violation” of a female member of the family is considered to be a dishonor to all members of the family. This is why the father receives the payment, at least when she is young and still a member of his household. 
  IntroductionToday’s section explains the “blemish” payment. I should again reiterate that this payment comes from the laws of personal injury and is similar to the “nezek” or “damages” payment from the eighth chapter of Bava Kamma.
  The mishnah teaches that to assess the blemish payment, they would assess the woman’s previous and current slave value. This makes sense with regard to general injury. For instance, if someone cut off my hand, the blemish (i.e. damage) payment is how much I would be worth as a slave with my hand and how much without. This would depend on what my abilities were before and whether I could still perform them). However, when it comes to the woman who was raped or seduced, the payment seems a bit strange and out of place—how much more would a man pay to have a virgin female slave than a non-virgin one?
  The Talmud offers that precise objection—why should an owner prefer a virgin slave? [The notion that he wants to have relations with her is not raised, for this is forbidden. In reality, I think it is understandable, albeit immoral, why a male owner might prefer a virgin slave]. The final answer is that he might want to marry her off to his own male slave, one whom he favors and therefore wants to find a virgin wife.
  IntroductionAccording to Exodus 21:7 a father has the right to sell his daughter into slavery.  In interpreting this verse, the rabbis limited this right to when she is a minor, meaning before she both achieves puberty and reaches the age of 12 years [that is to say, one who has reached puberty but is not yet 12 or is 12 but has not reached puberty is still considered a minor].  After this age she is considered a “young woman” (na’arah) and her father may no longer sell her.  It is at this age that if she is raped or seduced her father receives a fine.  The period in which a woman is considered a “na’arah” can be no longer than six months.  After this period, she has reached what was considered to be majority age, and there is no fine incurred by one who rapes or seduces her.
  When a girl is of an age where her father may sell her, according to our mishnah one who rapes or seduces her does not incur a fine.  This is learned exegetically from the fact that Deuteronomy 22:28 which discusses the fine for rape uses the word “na’arah”.  The mishnah concludes that only one who rapes or seduces a “na’arah” incurs the fine and not one who does so to a minor.Finally, six months after becoming a “na’arah” a girl becomes a “bogeret”, one who has reached majority age.  At this point her father loses most of his rights vis a vis her.  He can no longer marry her off or sell her.  She is legally independent.  One who rapes or seduces her does not incur a fine.
  Rav Judah notes that the mishnah above accords with R. Meir only. The other sages hold that there is overlap between the laws of the sale and the applicability of the fine. Basically, until she is of majority age the fine applies. She may only be sold before she is a na’arah. So the overlap is that both sets of laws apply until she is a na’arah.
  IntroductionAccording to R. Meir, a minor girl does not receive a fine if she is raped or seduced. Today’s section discusses why he holds this why.
  Hisda explains that R. Meir bases his law on the words “she shall be for him.” This implies that the verse refers only to a girl who can arrange her own marriage. This is true only for a “na’arah” a girl between the ages of 12 and 12 ½. A minor does not receive the fine.The other rabbis say that the word “na’arah” implies that all girls receive a fine, up to and including the age of “na’arah.”
  In this section we learn of a different tradition about what Resh Lakish said. Instead of the earlier tradition, here Resh Lakish refers to a man who falsely claims that his wife was not a virgin at the time of her marriage. The Torah refers to a na’arah. From here Resh Lakish said that if the man falsely accused a minor, he is not punished by having to pay the 100 shekels. [Again, by the time of the rabbis, this law was entirely theoretical.] We have not yet concluded the idea that this is the same tradition as above.
  Adda b. Ahavah raises a difficulty on this second teaching of Resh Lakish. Resh Lakish implies that if the Torah had not called her a “na’arah” we would have applied the whole chapter to a minor. But this is impossible, because later in the chapter we learn that if the husband’s claim is true (according to rabbinic interpretation this means that she committed adultery) she is executed. But minors cannot be punished. Therefore, the chapter must refer only to a na’arah.
  The Torah used the word “na’arah” here. But it didn’t need to. We could have figured this out on our own, because it could not have referred to a minor. This implies that anywhere else the Torah uses the word “na’arah” it includes a minor as well. This now is the same statement that Resh Lakish said above about the fine. Even though the Torah used the world “na’arah” it meant even a minor.
  
  Daf 41a
  
  IntroductionThe concept taught in the mishnah found at the beginning of this daf is that one who admits of his own accord that he has committed a crime, without before having evidence brought against him, is exempt from paying the fine.  He must, however, pay any penalties that are compensatory and not considered fines.
  Section one:  If a person admits that he seduced someone’s daughter he does not pay the fine.  He does, however, make the other payments.Section two:  A thief is liable to pay back double the amount which he stole.  If he slaughtered or sold the animal he must pay back four or five times its value.  The double, fourfold and fivefold payments are fines, whereas the restitution for the principal is not a fine.  Therefore, if a man admits to having stolen something, he only pays the principal.Section three:  If a person’s ox kills someone or someone else’s ox, the ox owner must make financial restitution (see Exodus 21:30).  This is not considered a fine and therefore if a person admits that his ox killed another ox or a human being, he must make restitution.  However, if an ox kills a slave there is an automatic penalty of 30 shekels (see Exodus 21:32).  Since this is a fixed sum, a person who admits that his ox did so is not liable to pay the fine.Section four:  The mishnah now sums up what we learned above.  If a person is liable to pay a fine that is more than the actual damage, or actually a sum that is set arbitrarily and is independent of the damage, he doesn’t pay upon his own admission.  The reasoning behind this may be that fines are in order to prevent the person from committing another crime.  Therefore, if he comes forward and admits to what he has done (and it was not otherwise known) the need for a penalty does not exist.  On the other hand compensation is needed for the loss incurred by the victim and therefore compensatory penalties are paid in any case.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now begins to deal with the mishnah we learned yesterday.
  The mishnah gives the example of a man who admits that “I have seduced so-and-so’s daughter.” It does not deal with the case where he states, “I have raped.” Why not?The Talmud answers that if he says “I have raped” it is obvious that he must pay her. There is no shame to the woman’s character when he declares that he raped her—she was an innocent victim. Therefore, since he does not defame her, he must pay her compensation. But I might have thought that when he says “I seduced her” he should not be believed, because by believing him, her character is defamed as well. After all, she is being accused of having willingly slept with him. Therefore, the mishnah teaches that he is believed, despite the fact that believing him will in some way defame her character.
  Shimon says, against the Mishnah, that if a man states that he seduced so-and-so’s daughter, he is not believed, for this would defame the daughter. Basically we do not allow any person to get up in court and defame someone else without proof, even if by defaming that person, the testifier would owe money to the one he defamed.
  Papa asks what if the girl, or her father, or her family is okay with the seducer testifying that he seduced the girl. In other words, what if they prefer the man pay the compensation, even if this means that the girl will be defamed.Abaye answers that we always have to worry that someone will not want to hear her being defamed. We cannot allow him to defame her because even if she doesn’t mind, she will be tarnished in someone else’s mind. On the one hand, this approach guards a person’s reputation. On the other hand, I do find it somewhat problematic for it takes away the choice of the person. Someone might prefer to be compensated, even though their reputation is tarnished.
  IntroductionThe mishnah taught that when one confesses to having committed a crime, he pays the principal, which is compensation for what he stole or damaged, but he does not pay the fine, which is beyond the compensatory amount. This sets up a paradigm—one who confesses pays any payment considered compensation, but he does not pay anything considered a penalty.Today’s sugya begins a relatively well-known discussion over whether the payment of half damages is considered a fine or compensation. Half damages are what the owner of an animal pays if his animal damaged in an unusual or unexpected manner. For instance, if an ox that has never gored before, gores. This is discussed in the beginning of Bava Kamma.
  Papa and R. Huna son of R. Joshua disagree over the status of the payment of half damages. R. Papa holds that they are really compensation. In reality, a person who’s ox damaged something should pay the full amount, because he should have known that oxen are dangerous. They cannot really be guarded. But since this was the ox’s first (or second) time damaging, and they had not yet become an attested danger, the Torah had mercy on him and obligated him to pay only half damages. In short, he should have paid full, but he is allowed to pay half.
  Huna holds that half-damages are a type of penalty. Really, the owner should not have been liable to pay anything, because cattle are safe. But the Torah penalizes him by making him pay half damages in order to incentivize him to guard his cattle. In short, he should have paid nothing, but he is penalized into paying half.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a series of difficulties and supports for the positions of R. Papa and R. Huna from yesterday’s section—are half damages considered compensation (R. Papa) or a penalty (R. Huna)?
  The sugya opens with a mnemonic device to help remember the order of the difficulties that are to be raised.The first difficulty is a mishnah from Bava Kamma which teaches that both the plaintiff and the defendant share in the costs of the loss of the damages. This works for R. Papa, who holds that half damages are compensation. The plaintiff loses half of the money that really should be owed to him, so he too shares in the costs. But to R. Huna, who holds that half damages are a penalty, how does the plaintiff share in the costs—he really should not be receiving any payment whatsoever.
  The answer is that the plaintiff shares in the loss if the value of the carcass decreases. When one ox kills another ox, the plaintiff owes the defendant the difference in value (or half the difference) between the dead ox and what it was worth when it was alive. So if the carcass is worth 50 and the live ox 200, the defendant will owe either 150 or 75, depending on whether the goring ox was an attested or unattested danger. If subsequently the value of the live ox is reduced, this loss goes to the plaintiff. This, according to R. Huna, is how he shares in the costs.
  The problem is that we already have a baraita that teaches that the owners of the dead ox must deal with the carcass—i.e. if it goes down in value, the loss is theirs. So why would we need another mishnah to teach the same thing.The answer is that one source refers to a mu’ad (an animal that is an attested danger) and the other to a tam (an unattested danger). We need both sources, the Talmud explains, lest we think that the rule that the defendant is responsible for the carcass applies only in one of these cases. It might refer only to the tam, because we might have not penalized the goring ox’s owner by making him take care of the carcass and absorb any loss in its value, since his ox had not yet been warned. On the other hand, it might refer only to the mu’ad, since the goring ox’s owner pays full compensation. This might have led us to think that he also must cover losses to the value of the carcass. Therefore we need both sources to teach us that the plaintiff always covers the loss of value to the carcass. This is how he too can at times share in the losses, and resolves R. Huna.
  The mishnah quoted here teaches one difference between a tam and a mu’ad. For payments caused by damage by a tam, the owner pays from the value of the offending ox’s body—payments cannot go beyond what that ox is worth. But when it comes to the mu’ad who pays full damages, the defendant pays from his own estate.If R. Huna was correct, that half damages are a penalty, the mishnah should have listed another difference. If the owner of a tam admits on his own accord that his ox damaged, he doesn’t pay, because we know that one who admits to owing a fine is not liable to pay the fine. But if the owner of a mu’ad admits that his ox damaged, he would owe the money because this is compensation, not a fine.
  The answer the Talmud gives is that the teacher of the mishnah did not teach all of the differences between a tam and a mu’ad, just some. Since he left out at least one other difference, we can assume that he may have left out the difference mentioned above.To prove this, the Talmud must now find a third difference between a tam and mu’ad. This difference is with regard to killing a person and paying the ransom, the value, of the person. The mu’ad would pay the ransom and the tam would not (this is derived from a midrash in Bava Kamma).The Talmud answers that this might not really be an omission in the mishnah, because the mishnah might follow R. Yose the Galilean who holds that the tam does indeed pay half the ransom, just as the mu’ad does. So in the end, we don’t know if this mishnah is a difficulty on R. Huna. R. Huna could hold like the tanna who teaches that the tam does not pay the ransom at all, in which case this Mishnah is not an exhaustive list of differences between the tam and mu’ad.
  
  Daf 41b
  
  IntroductionIn the last section of this chapter, the Talmud continues with difficulties on R. Huna’s position, that half damages are a penalty and not compensation. To recall, the ramification of this is that if someone admits on his own accord that his tam (unattested danger) ox damaged, he does not pay, because one is not liable to pay a fine based solely on his own admission.
  This is a quote of the mishnah, which states explicitly that if a person testifies that his ox killed a person or another ox, he is obligated to pay. If this refers to a tam, whose owner would have to pay half damages, then this would be a difficulty on R. Huna. Therefore, the Talmud says that it refers only to a mu’ad, whose owner pays full damages, which are a form of compensation and not a penalty.
  If the mishnah is referring only to a mu’ad, the implication would be that if the animal is a tam, the owner does not pay based on his own admission. But if this is so, the mishnah should have said so outright, instead of drawing the distinction it does draw between a case where a ox kills a free person and a case where ox that kills a slave (the owner pays 30 shekels, a fine and not compensation).The answer is that the mishnah prefers to deal with a mu’ad, to teach us that in the case of a mu’ad that kills a slave the owner does not pay based on his own admission. Had the mishnah taught the distinction between a tam and a mu’ad, we might not have known this.
  The last clause of the mishnah provides a general rule—if the payment is more than the damages, he does not pay based on his own testimony. This clause would lead to the inference that if the payment is less than the damages, i.e. half damages, then he does pay based on his own testimony. This is against R. Huna. But the Talmud rejects that inference, instead inferring that if the payment does not correspond exactly to the damages, then he does not pay based on his own testimony. Again, R. Huna’s position that half damages are a penalty is resolved, at least temporarily.
  If the mishnah had meant to say that only the payment is equivalent to the damages he pays based on his own testimony then instead of saying “whoever pays more” does not pay based on his own testimony it should have stated, “whoever does not pay an amount corresponding to the actual cost of the damage he has done does not pay based on his own testimony.” The fact that the mishnah does not use these words is indeed a refutation of R. Huna.
  The Talmud is perplexed. How can R. Huna be refuted and yet the halakhah follow his opinion that half damages are a penalty? The answer is that R. Huna was refuted by the fact that the mishnah did not teach, “whoever does not pay an amount corresponding to the actual cost of the damage he has done does not pay based on his own testimony.” But the mishnah could not have taught this, for even R. Huna would say that there is one case where half damages are compensation—the case of damage by pebbles. This is a type of indirect damages. The defendant pays half damages not because the offending animal was an unattested danger, but because the damages were indirect.
  There is a principle that in Babylonia, or more precisely, outside of the land of Israel, fines are not collected. The idea is that the rabbis of Babylonia do not have the authority to do so. So if half damages are a fine, then they may not be collected in Babylonia. So if dogs eat lambs or cats eat big hens, both of which are unusual, payment may not be collected. But if they eat smaller animals, then the owner would be liable for full damages, and payment could be collected.
  The Talmud seems to realize that there is a problem with not allowing the plaintiff to receive compensation for the property that was damaged. Therefore they find some alternatives to force the defendant to pay. First of all, if the plaintiff simply seizes the compensation, the court does not take it away from him. Second, if the plaintiff demands that the defendant go with him to court, the court in Babylonia sets a date for them to go. If the defendant does not go, he would either have to pay up, or be put under the ban.
  Finally, one may not keep animals that are hazardous (or other hazards) to others in his house. If he does not must remove them he will be placed under the ban. This is derived from the verse that commands a person to set up a guard rail around his roof so that no one falls off. From here the rabbis learn that one must keep one’s house safe.
  Well, I’m sure this was one of the harder or perhaps hardest chapters of Talmud you’ve ever learned, both in terms of subject material and in terms of complexity. So an extra congratulations on completing it. I think it is hard to appreciate the artistry of long and complicated arguments in a format such as Daf Shevui. It reminds me of that book “Zoom.” In Daf Shevui we zoom in on the details, but if we could see the overall structure of the rhetorical arguments, how the Talmud thoroughly examines every possible angle for every possible general principle, checking where it is derived from, where it is applicable, and whether it contradicts tradition, we would get a better sense of just how systematic this chapter really is.The first half of the next chapter, which we will begin tomorrow, continues to deal with the same subject. So stay tuned!
  IntroductionThe mishnah which opens chapter four deals with the issue of who receives the payments if a girl is raped or seduced.
  Section one:  This section teaches that all of the payments that are incurred by one who rapes or seduces a young girl are given to the father.Section two:  The mishnah now begins to deal with various situations in which the father died.  The question is:  does the money go to the girl herself, or does it go to her brothers who inherit her father?If the case was tried before the father died and then her father died the payments go to her brothers.  This is because once the case was tried it is as if the father had already collected, even though he may not actually have collected.  In essence the rapist or seducer owes the father money.  Since this is so, when he dies, the seducer or rapist pays the money to the brothers, the father’s inheritors.However, if the father died before the case was tried, the money belongs to her.  This is because at the point that it was determined that the rapist or seducer owes the money, she was already an orphan.Section three: This section deals with a situation in which the money has not been collected and she became of majority age.  At this age her father no longer receives money that she earns.If the case was tried before she became of majority, and then the father died, the money goes to her brothers, for the same reasons outlined above.  Since the debt was owed to the father, the brothers inherit this debt.  However, if the case was not tried until after she became of majority age, the payments go directly to her, even if her father is still alive.Section four:  According to the opinion in the above sections, the point at which the debt is determined is the trial.  Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that if she didn’t collect before her father dies, even if they have already been to trial, the money goes to her.  According to Rabbi Shimon, the father does not bequeath money that is owed to him to his sons.Section five:  While a daughter is in the status of a “na’arah” or younger all of her earnings belong to her father.  The mishnah teaches that any work she did or things that she found, even if they have not yet been collected (such as wages) already belong to her father.  If he dies they go to her brothers as part of their father’s inheritance.
  
  Daf 42a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins analyzing the mishnah we concluded with last week.
  The Talmud claims that the mishnah we learned at the end of last week’s daf seems to teach basically the same information that we learned in a mishnah appearing on daf 39—that the seducer pays compensation for embarrassment, blemish and the fine and the rapist also pays for the pain. So the only new information we learn in this Mishnah is that the father receives the payments.
  It is even obvious that the payments go to the father. This is because we know that the seducer must make payment even though he acted with her consent. It would not make sense for him to pay her since she was a willing party. Therefore, it is obvious that the payments belong to the father. So we are still searching for a mishnahThe final answer is that the mishnah was necessary to teach us the dispute between R. Shimon and the other rabbis. The rabbis hold that if the father dies before he collects these payments, they belong to her brothers. R. Shimon holds that she receives the money.
  Introduction
  Today’s section begins with a mishnah from Shevuot. My commentary is basically taken from Mishnah Yomit Shevuot 5:4. Shevuot is about the consequences of making a false oath.This mishnah teaches that in order for one who makes a false oath to be liable to bring a sacrifice he must deny something to which if he had admitted would have caused him to be liable. Since he is not liable to pay a fine for a self-admission, he is not liable if he denies owing a fine. He is liable only if he denies owing something which is considered financial compensation.
  In the scenario in our mishnah a man approaches another man and accuses him of having raped or seduced his daughter and therefore owing him the 50 shekels, plus the other penalties we have learned about in the earlier mishnayot. The person responds that he didn’t do so, and then when the claimant adjures him (makes him take an oath), he affirms the adjuration. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, when he admits that he did in fact rape or seduce the other man’s daughter, he will be liable for a sacrifice for his false oath.  Of course he will also be obligated to pay the fine and the other financial penalties.Rabbi Shimon disagrees.  Since there is a rule in Jewish law, that one who admits to a crime does not have to pay the fine for having done so, even if this person had admitted to having raped or seduced the daughter, he would not have been obligated to pay the fine.  Therefore, there was no denial of money, and the laws of the oath of deposit do not apply.The Sages respond to Rabbi Shimon that although one who admits to a crime does not have to pay a fine, he does have to pay compensatory damages, which in this case include the payment for embarrassment and the payment for having decreased her value (blemish). Since if he had admitted he would have had to pay, he did deny money, and is therefore liable for having sworn a false oath of deposit.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the mishnah from Shevuot.
  In the mishnah from Shevuot, R. Shimon said that if the person falsely denies raping or seducing and then takes an oath and then admits that he was lying, he does not bring a sacrifice because even if he did admit to having raped or seduced he would not be liable to pay the fine. A person is not liable to pay a fine if the only evidence that he committed the crime was his admission.Abaye presents a more complicated scenario. The accusation is not just that he raped or seduced, but that he was convicted and ordered to pay money and the accused denied even having been convicted. The question really is—if a person admits to having been convicted of having to pay a fine, is he obligated to pay that fine. If so, he would have to bring the sacrifice if he denies the crime. Or is he not obligated, just as one who admits to having committed a crime that makes him liable for a fine is not obligated to pay that fine.
  Rabbah answers that since he has been tried and convicted, it is a monetary obligation and he must bring a sacrifice for his false oath. What this also means is that if a person admits to having been convicted of owing a fine, he must pay that fine. The idea is that once he was convicted, he has a debt to pay the fine. So he is really admitting to owing a debt. This is different from admitting to having committed a crime for which one owes a fine in the first place, which is really a form of self-incrimination and is therefore not accepted.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Rabbah stated that if person swore that he had not been convicted in court of a crime for which he is liable for a fine, and then he admitted that he had been convicted, he must bring the sacrifice for a false oath. This is because this is not considered admitting to a fine. It is considered admitting to being convicted of owing money for having been convicted of a crime. Today’s section continues to deal with this subject. This is a complicated section, so beware.
  This baraita lists several halakhot that are fines 1) Rape or seduction; 2) Killing a slave—the payment is 30 shekels, no matter how much the slave is worth; 3) Knocking out the tooth or putting out the eye of a slave—the slave goes free. Note that in none of these cases is there a quid pro quo evaluation of the damage done. The fine or freedom for the slave is not necessarily equivalent to the damage done. If a person swore falsely that he had not done one of these crimes and then admitted to his false oath he is not liable to bring a sacrifice. This is because these are not like the cases listed in the Torah which are all compensation. For instance if one denies that one took a deposit from someone else and then admits that he did, he owes whatever the value of that deposit is. These are called “compensation” (literally money).
  
  Daf 42b
  
  Abaye here completes his difficulty on Rabbah by assuming that the baraita refers to a case where the person who raped/seduced, killed a slave or knocked out a slave’s tooth or eye had already been tried and convicted. This would reject Rabbah who said in such a case he does bring a sacrifice for swearing falsely.But the Talmud for the moment deflects that criticism and states that the baraita refers more simply to a case where a person had not yet been tried. This was not the case Rabbah was referring to.
  The Talmud will now try to use the first clause of the baraita to prove that the entire baraita refers to a case where a person has already stood trial, but at first falsely swears that he has not been convicted and then admits that he has.The baraita refers to three cases: 1) a thief who must pay the double payment, or if he slaughtered or sold the animal, a four or five fold payment; 2) the rapist and seducer; 3) one who falsely claims that his wife was not a virgin.The baraita seems to say that if a person denies any of these debts and then admits to them, he must bring a sacrifice.
  The baraita must refer to a case of a person who had already been tried in court because no one is ever liable for the twofold (or fourfold or fivefold) payments until he is convicted in court. If someone simply admits to having stolen, he pays back the principle and no more. And therefore, if the first clause refers to a case where one has been convicted, the second clause must also refer to a similar case.
  Rabbah offers here a potential solution that he will reject. R. Shimon holds that when one denies owing a fine and then admits to it, he is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This would allow us to say that the first clause refers to one who had already been tried, but that the second clause refers to one who had not been tried. R. Shimon would then say that if one had already been tried and convicted, and then denied and then admitted, he would bring the sacrifice. In the last clause he would be exempt because he had not yet been convicted.
  However, Rabbah admits that this would not be a good resolution because Abaye could respond that if the whole baraita is the opinion of R. Shimon, then why is his name found at the beginning of the second clause (see above). Rather, it seems clear that the first clause is the rabbis and the second clause is R. Shimon. These two positions disagree but they both refer to the same case—where one has been tried and then convicted.
  Rabbah now offers his albeit complicated solution to the baraita. First of all, the whole baraita refers to a case where the person had already been tried and convicted and then denied owing the fine. However, the first half is the rabbis and the second half is R. Shimon who would hold that even though he had been tried he still does not bring a sacrifice, because R. Shimon holds that one never brings a sacrifice for denying owing a fine. This is true even if he had already been convicted and then denied being convicted and then admitted it. When Rabbah said that this was compensatory he did not mean that the one who denied and then admitted would be liable to bring a sacrifice. All he meant was that if the father of the girl died after the rapist/seducer had been convicted but before the money had been collected the money goes to the inheritors and not to her. If we had considered it a fine, it would not have been considered part of the father’s estate and when the father is no longer around, the sons would not inherit it. Rather it would go to her as if the father had died before the conviction had occurred.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded with Rabbah saying that if the father of the girl died after the rapist/seducer had been convicted but had not yet paid, the money would go to the brothers and not to her. This contradicts, as we shall see, our mishnah.
  The mishnah clearly states that if the father dies before collecting the payments from the rapist/seducer, they go to the daughter. They are not bequeathed as an inheritance to the sons. So how can Rabbah have said that they are?
  Evidently this difficulty was a thorny one and couldn’t be resolved for twenty-two years, until R. Joseph became head of the yeshiva.  R. Joseph basically said that this was a special case due to a midrash on the word “shall give (ונתן)” found in Deuteronomy 22. If the father does not collect these payments they do not belong to him and when he dies he would not bequeath them to his inheritors. Therefore, Rabbah’s statement that a person bequeaths uncollected fines to his inheritors was only in reference to other fines (such as for killing a slave).
  Joseph cited a midrash based on the word “venatan”—the father is not considered to be legal owner of the fines until he takes possession of the money. This distinguished the fine for rape/seduction from other fines. But a word from the same root is used in connection with the fine for accidentally killing a slave. So why would Rabbah say that in that case he does bequeath the uncollected fine to his inheritors and therefore it is considered compensation and not a fine, at least with regard to the obligation to bring a sacrifice for a false oath.The answer is that although the words come from the same root, they are still different roots.
  If the fine of rape and seduction is different from all other fines, instead of using the midrash on the word “and he denied” from Leviticus 5, the earlier baraita should have used the midrash on the word “and he shall give” from Deuteronomy 22. This would better allow us to distinguish this fine from all other finesRava says that we do need the midrash on “and he denied” in connection with the fine for the rapist and the seducer. According to R. Shimon, if she became adolescent (over 12 ½) before the fine was collected, the fines belong to her. If she then dies, her father will inherit these fines even though she has not yet collected them. In this way, this fine is no different from other fines which become “money (compensation)” after the court has convicted the accused. Still, if the rapist/seducer denies owing this money and then admits to it in this case, he will not be liable for a sacrifice.
  The earlier baraita had said that the payments for rape, seduction, and killing a slave are all fines. But what we have been saying now is that they are compensation in the case where the person was tried, convicted and then denied owing the money that the court said he owed. So why call them fines and not compensation?Nahman b. Yitzchak emends the baraita to read that these are basically fines, or perhaps more accurately, they are originally fines. They can become “compensation” after conviction. But earlier they are fines.
  IntroductionThis is the last section of this long sugya. As a reminder, according to Rabbah even if the rapist/seducer was convicted and then swore that he does not owe the fine and then admitted to it, he is still not obligated to bring the sacrifice for a false oath because the payment originated in a fine.
  Shimon in the mishnah in Shevuot states that if a person admits to owing a fine, he does not pay the fine. But if he had been convicted, denied it and then admitted to having been convicted, clearly R. Shimon would hold that he must pay the fine—after all this is not self-admission, he was convicted. So with this logic in mind, he should also have to bring a sacrifice if he denies owing this money and then admits to it.
  Rabbah could explain that R. Shimon is only responding to the view of the other rabbis. To Rabbah, R. Shimon would hold that he is exempt even if he denies the debt after having been convicted. But the rabbis in the mishnah (from Shevuot) should at least agree with him that he does not bring the sacrifice based on a self-admission because one is exempt from paying a fine if the only evidence is his own self-admission.
  
  Daf 43a
  
  The other rabbis say that when the father of the raped or seduced girl demands payment from the man who admitted to the crimes, he is mainly claiming the payments for blame and blemish. Since these are compensation and not fines, the person who swore falsely is liable to bring the sacrifice, even if he admitted to his crime.Note that this interpretation of the rabbis is basically the simple meaning of the mishnah.
  In the mishnah R. Shimon views the case as if the father is claiming just the fine, whereas the rabbis say he is claiming just the compensatory payments for shame and blemish. But in reality,  the father is claiming both. So why do they argue with each other?Papa explains that the father is focusing on the fine because the fine is fixed. He knows he will receive fifty shekels. In contrast, the payments for blemish and shame are not fixed, so the father does not know how much he is going to receive.The rabbis say that he is thinking more about the payments for blemish and shame because he knows the man must pay them in all cases. The fine is less certain because the rapist/seducer will not have to pay it if he makes a voluntary admission.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins a new topic—does an orphan girl who is being sustained by her brothers (her father’s inheritors) have to give over her handiwork (the proceeds of the work she does) to them, just as she would give over her handiwork to her father when he was providing for her.
  On the one hand, her brothers are maintaining her just as her father maintained her. Just as her father received her handiwork, so too her brothers should receive her handiwork. On the other hand, her father maintained her out of his own funds, but her brothers are maintaining her out of her father’s estate. If there is no estate, they do not have to use their own funds to maintain her. Therefore, they might not deserve her handiwork.
  Sheshet answers that just as a widow being maintained out of her husband’s estate must give her handiwork to the orphan inheritors, so too should a daughter being maintained from her father’s estate.
  The Talmud rejects the comparison. A man may not want his widow both to be sustained and to keep her handiwork. He doesn’t want her to be too well provided for, at the expense of her estate. But he might want his daughter to be well provided for and therefore he might want her to keep her handiwork and be provided for.
  The implication of the difficulty raised above is that a man might prefer that his daughter be provided with more sustenance than his widow. This leads to the broader conclusion that a man prefers his own flesh and blood daughter to his widow, whom he may or may not have even chosen to marry. While this makes some logical sense (and I would argue is still often true), it contradicts another baraita. This baraita talks about a case where there is a daughter and either a widow or brothers. We know that in the case of brothers, she is maintained and they must go begging. The rabbis say that the wife is like the daughter—she is guaranteed sustenance and if there is not enough for everyone, the daughter would have to go begging.This baraita seems to demonstrate a preference for the wife—she is guaranteed sustenance whereas the daughter is not.
  The resolution is that these are two different issues. When it comes to ensuring that one party does not go begging, a man prefers to make sure that his widow does not have to beg. But when it comes to receiving expansive provisions, i.e. being able to keep one’s handiwork even while being maintained, the daughter is preferred.This seems to me to be an attempt to resolve the difficulty and does not make a lot of logical sense. It is a good example of the Talmud’s desire to resolve difficulties, even if the outcome is not intuitive.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the question of whether a daughter who is being provided for by her father’s inheritors must give them her handiwork. In yesterday’s section R. Sheshet said that she did.
  Joseph’s raises an objection from the last clause of the mishnah on daf Mem Aleph.While her father is alive, her handiwork goes to him. Should he not collect her handiwork while he is alive, it is still his and if he dies, his sons inherit it, just as they do any of his uncollected property. The implication is that this is only the handiwork produced while the father was alive. Handiwork produced after his death would remain with the girl, even if she was being maintained. This is difficulty for R. Sheshet.
  The resolution is that this mishnah refers to a case where the brothers are not providing for her. In such a case, she does not have to give them her handiwork.The problem though is that this is obvious. A master can say to his Canaanite slave, “work with me and I will not maintain you.” But a master cannot say this to his Hebrew slave. The Hebrew slave is guaranteed maintenance as long as he is working. And all the more so a father could not say this to his daughter, or sons to their father’s daughter. In all of these cases, maintenance is guaranteed.
  Rabbah b. Ulla says that the mishnah refers to surplus goods she produces. If she is not being maintained by her brothers, then she may keep her handiwork and use it to feed herself. But if there is surplus, the mishnah would rule that it goes to her brothers. Rabbah would hold that if they are providing for, they receive all of her handiwork. But if they are not providing for her, they only receive the surplus.
  Rava says that R. Joseph must have known about the possibility of surplus, and yet he still raised an objection against R. Sheshet. Therefore, Rava will provide a different understanding of R. Joseph’s difficulty.
  Rava reinterprets the difficulty that R. Joseph raised on R. Sheshet. The basis of R. Joseph’s difficulty is the mention of anything the girl finds. Findings are collected immediately, whereas handiwork may not be collected immediately (for instance wages). So how can findings be collected later? The mishnah, Rava claims, intends to compare the two. Just as things she finds belong to her father while he is alive and after his death belong to her, so too her handiwork. After his death it belongs to her and not to her brothers, even if they are providing her with maintenance. This is refutation of R. Sheshet.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss the topic of who receives a young girl’s handiwork after her father dies.
  Rav reiterates that if the daughter is being maintained by her brothers, they do not receive her handiwork. R. Kahana derives this from a verse. The verse says that a father bequeaths “them” as an inheritance to his sons. “Them” refers to his land and by extension his other property. It does not refer to the rights to his daughter’s handiwork. This is not bequeathed to his sons. This disagrees with R. Sheshet from yesterday’s page, but agrees with Rava and R. Joseph.
  The verse implies that there are some financial benefits that the father receives from the daughter that her brothers will not receive after their father’s death. But how do we know that this refers to her handiwork, as Rav claimed. Perhaps it refers to other payments, specifically compensation and fine that occurred as the result of seduction, fines and personal injury. When her father is alive, he receives these payments, and when he dies, they go to her. But her handiwork would go to her brothers if they are maintaining her.
  The problem with the above interpretation is that the compensation for pain should go to the daughter herself, not to her father. Therefore, R. Yose interprets it as referring to a wound made to her face. In such a case, her father receives at least some of the money because this is an injury to him as well, for he will have more trouble selling her or marrying her off and therefore he would receive the payment for her diminished value. [I realize that this is again troubling. Please remember, selling off one’s daughter was not practiced in rabbinic times. And as far as diminishing his ability to marry her off, this would probably remain true in all societies where parents determine whom their children marry].
  
  Daf 43b
  
  This source is basically the same as above, except here Rav’s halakhah and R. Kahana’s midrashic explanation are woven into one statement.
  “Shakud” refers to someone who pays diligent attention to something According to Rashi, Shmuel is called “Shakud” because he paid diligent attention to his halakhic statements, and therefore the halakhah follows him in matters of civil law. In any case, according to Avimi b. Papi, Shmuel agrees—the handiwork goes to the daughter.
  The last stage of this discussion is a halakhic debate between some late amoraim. The Nehardeans hold that the law is like R. Sheshet—the handiwork goes to the brothers. But R. Ashi, one of the last amoraim, holds that the law follows Rav—she keeps her own handiwork.
  IntroductionThis mishnah continues to discuss financial rights that a father accrues from his daughter.
  Section one:  The daughter was only betrothed and then widowed, betrothed and then widowed again.  The mishnah teaches that since she was never fully married, both ketubot (200 zuz for each marriage) belong to her father.  As long as she is not fully married, he never fully relinquishes control over her.Section two:  In this case the daughter is married twice.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, both ketubot belong to her.  According to this opinion, as soon as she is married, her father loses all control over her, and he cannot make any financial gains through her.  According to Rabbi Judah, the first ketubah belongs to her father, because it was written before the marriage and hence it was a debt incurred while she still lived in her father’s home.  According to the other sages who respond to Rabbi Judah, the collection does not go according to when it was written, but rather her status at the dissolution of the marriage.  Since at this point she was independent, her father has no right to her ketubah.
  Curiously, the mishnah describes a situation where she is first divorced and then widowed. Why not say that she was divorced twice or widowed twice? The result would seem to be the same thing.The Talmud reads into this a rule that if a woman is widowed twice she can no longer remarry. This accords with Rabbi Judah Hanasi who says that once that something has happened twice, a “presumption” has been created. She is “presumed” to be a fatal wife, a wife who kills her husbands just by being married to them. The idea of a fatal wife was common in the ancient world, and is even found in the apocryphal work called “Tobit.” There are other passages in the Talmud that deal with this at length. I do not believe that this halakhah is generally still observed, although it was a topic of much discussion in the middle ages.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah we learned yesterday R. Judah says that if a man gives his daughter in marriage and then she is divorced and then he gives her again in marriage and she is widowed, the ketubah from the first marriage goes to the father. In today’s sugya, some amoraim try to explain why.
  Rabbah and R. Joseph explain that according to R. Judah, since the ketubah was written before before betrothal, the father receives it should she be divorced from the first marriage. He does not receive the second ketubah for once she was married to the first husband, the father lost his authority over her.
  Rava raises a strong objection against Rabbah and R. Joseph’s explanation of R. Judah. In a baraita, R. Judah agrees that if the girl was betrothed while a minor and then became a mature girl (12 ½), and then married the father would not receive the ketubah. This is true even though the ketubah was written while she was still a minor.
  The new explanation is that the father receives the ketubah because it was written while she was still in her father’s authority. The Talmud assumes that the ketubah would be written slightly before marriage, as it is today. In the case of the mishnah, she is still not yet a mature girl when she is married, therefore the ketubah is her father’s. But if she reached maturity age before the marriage and before the ketubah was written, then the ketubah would be hers.
  The Talmud asks basically when does the ketubah go into effect such that the father or wife would be able to collect from the husband’s encumbered property.Huna divides the minimal ketubah payment of 200 or 100 from any additional amount the husband wishes to give her. The minimal payment goes into effect immediately at betrothal, whether the husband writes the ketubah then or not. The additional payment is contingent upon the marriage proper. The collection date of this additional amount follows, therefore, the date of marriage.Asi says that the date of collection for the entire ketubah follows the date of marriage. While she does collect the ketubah if she is widowed or divorced after betrothal and before marriage, she can collect only from unencumbered property.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section R. Huna said that a woman collects the basic part of her ketubah, the 200 or 100 zuz, from encumbered property from the date of the betrothal. The extra money that the husband writes in the ketubah is collectable from encumbered property but only from the date of the marriage. This means that if the husband engages in any loans or sales after betrothal or before marriage, the woman will not be able to collect her 100 zuz from that property.
  The Talmud will construe a contradiction between R. Huna’s earlier ruling and the following one. If a woman has two ketubot, one larger and one smaller, she can collect the smaller one from encumbered property from the earlier of the two dates, but the larger one only from the later date. This is because we know that only one of the two ketubot is valid and that at least two hundred zuz were owed from the first date. But we cannot know if the larger ketubah was valid from the earlier date, and therefore if she wants to collect the larger ketubah, it is only from the latter date.
  If R. Huna had said that she can collect the main part of the ketubah from the date of betrothal, and the additional part from the date of marriage, then why can’t we look at the case of the large and small ketubah as if it was the same. She could get the 200 from the earlier date and the other 100 from the later date. Why should she sacrifice the extra 100 just because she wants to be able to collect the 200 from encumbered property from the earlier date?
  The Talmud asks a rhetorical question—why should she not receive the full five hundred. Why don’t we imagine that he first wrote her a ketubah of 200 and then added another ketubah of 300, such that she should collect 500?The answer is that that he did not write this in the correct language of adding on to an existing amount. Rather he implied that what he wanted was to give her two options—if she wanted to collect from the earlier time, she could collect the two hundred zuz, but if she wants to wait and collect encumbered property from the later time, she can get 300.The same would be true if he wrote her a ketubah with one amount, 300 zuz. By accepting the larger ketubah, she forgoes the lien that was created at betrothal in the amount of 200. She can collect the full amount but only from marriage.This is different from an addition to the ketubah discussed by R. Huna. There he does write “and I added on.” Therefore, she can collect the basic amount from encumbered property from the time of betrothal. The additional amount she collects from encumbered property only from the point of marriage but she does not forgo her lien on the basic amount.
  
  Daf 44a
  
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s daf, there was a source according to which a woman with two ketubot could choose which one she wants to use to collect. This week’s daf opens by questioning that possibility.
  Above, the Talmud assumed she could collect from whichever ketubah she wished. This contradicts R. Nahman who says that if two of the same document are written, one after the other, the latter cancels out the former. The assumption would seem to be that when he wrote the latter, he intended it to override the earlier document. This would have been done so that the lien was created at a later date, and the creditor would be able to seize only the property owned by the debtor at the later date.
  The resolution is that the newer document overrides the older one only if he did not add anything in. If he did add something in, then he intended to add the addition and not override the older document. The ramification of this is that if the person wants to collect with the older document, which has an older lien on it, he can do so, but not the extra palm (or whatever is extra). If he wants to collect the addition, then he can but only with a lien from a later time.Introduction
  Today’s section discusses R. Nahman’s statement from yesterday’s sugya, that if there are two of the same document, the second one overrides the first.
  This is all material from yesterday’s sugya. R. Papa says that if the person added something into the second document, then he did not intend to annul the first document. The ramification of this is that if the person wants to collect with the older document, which has an earlier lien on it, he can do so, but not the extra palm (or whatever is extra). If he wants to collect the addition, then he can but only with a lien from a later time.
  If both deeds are the same except the first is a sale and the second is a present, we can assume that what he wanted to do was avoid the law of pre-emption. According to this law, if a person sells a piece of land, another person who has a piece of land next to that land, has first rights to purchase the land. If I want to avoid this law, I can just give the land to someone else. The laws of pre-emption do not apply to gifts.
  If the first document was a gift and the second a sale, then we can also assume that he changed the document to protect the rights of the purchaser. Once he bought the land, if a creditor comes and takes the land from him, he can go back to the original seller and claim compensation.
  If both deeds are the same, then why do we assume that the second cancels out the first.Rafram said that we can assume that the one who received the deed admitted that the first was invalid.Aha says that we can assume that the person holding the deed had forgiven the lien created by the first deed. That is why we allow him to collect only from the date of the second document.
  The Talmud asks that the practical difference between the opinion of Rafram and R. Aha—after all they both agree that the second document is valid and not the first.There are three cases in which they differ:According to Rafram, the witnesses that signed on the first document are invalid for having signed on an invalid document.According to Rafram, if the receiver had eaten the fruits of the field between the time on the first document and the time on the second document, he must pay them back.According to Rafram, the seller must pay the taxes on the field that accrued between the time of the first document and that of the second.To put this another way, according to Rafram, the sale/gift is really only valid from the date of the second document. The first document is totally invalid. According to R. Aha, the sale may have been valid from the earlier time, but the lien exists only from the second date. So except for the issue of the lien, the sale is valid from the first document.
  IntroductionToday’s section returns to discuss the situation of a woman or her father coming to collect a ketubah. Do they collect based on the date of the betrothal or based on the date of the marriage? The ramification is with regard to when the lien is created on the husband’s property.
  This dispute is identical to the dispute on daf 43.Judah divides the minimal ketubah payment of 200 or 100 from any additional amount the husband wishes to give her. The minimal payment goes into effect immediately at betrothal, whether the husband writes the ketubah then or not. The additional payment is contingent upon the marriage proper. The collection date of this additional amount follows, therefore, the date of marriage.The other sages says that the date of collection for the entire ketubah follows the date of marriage. While she does collect the ketubah if she is widowed or divorced after betrothal and before marriage, she can collect only from unencumbered property.
  IntroductionDeuteronomy 22:13-21 discusses a man who makes a virginity claim against his wife.  Verse 19 states that if he was found to be lying “They shall fine him a hundred shekels of silver and give it to the girl’s father; for the man has defamed a virgin in Israel.”  Verses 20-21 state that if the claim was found to be true, then the woman is stoned.  Verses 22-23 deal with a betrothed woman who commits adultery, who is also stoned.  From the phrase “a virgin in Israel”, our mishnah derives that the punishment of stoning is meted out in both of these cases only if the woman was a born Israelite.  If she was a convert, then she is punished by strangulation, as are other adulterers.
  The mishnah lists three types of women who have committed an act of fornication, i.e. adultery.  The first is a woman who has converted with her mother, the second is one whose mother converted between conception and birth, and third is one whose mother converted before conception.  Each woman/girl has slightly different consequences to her crime.
  Section one: Since this girl is herself a convert she does not count as a “virgin of Israel”.  Therefore, if she commits adultery, she is punished by strangulation, the typical punishment for adultery.  Deuteronomy 22:21 states that if the charge of not being a virgin was true, “then the girl shall be brought out to the entrance of her father’s house, and the men of her town shall stone her to death.”  Since this girl was not a “virgin of Israel”, she is not brought out to the entrance to her father’s house.  If the husband’s claim against her was false he need not pay the 100 sela [=shekel] fine, for she was not a “virgin of Israel”.Section two: In this case the girl was conceived in unholiness, meaning her mother was not an Israelite when she was conceived. However, the mother converted before the birth and therefore she was born “in holiness”. In this case she is stoned if she commits adultery while a betrothed virgin.  However, she does not get taken out to the entrance of her father’s house nor is her husband fined 100 shekels if he made a false claim against her. In other words she is in some ways treated like a full Israelite and in other ways she is not.Section three: Although this girl’s mother is a convert, she herself is considered a full Israelite.Section four:  This section teaches that if a girl has no father, or has a father but her father’s house doesn’t have a house with an entrance (for instance he is homeless), she is still liable to be stoned should she commit an act of fornication while betrothed.  When the Torah states that she shall be taken out to the entrance of her father’s house, the intention was not that if she didn’t have a father with a house with an entrance, that she would not receive the prescribed penalty. Rather the intention was that if she should commit such an act of fornication, she should be stoned at the entrance to her father’s house, if such a place exists.  In other words, its lack of existence does not impede upon the carrying out of the other elements to the passage in Deuteronomy.
  
  Daf 44b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to explain the mishnah.
  In the mishnah we learned that if her mother converted after becoming pregnant but before giving birth the girl is executed by stoning as are all Israelite girls. But how do we know this? Resh Lakish says that it is derived from the word, “that she die”—taken from the phrase “and they will stone her that she die.” This is an extraneous word—obviously she is to die from the stoning. So we use this word for a midrash that even though she was conceived “not in holiness,” she is still executed by stoning.
  If we use this midrash to say that this girl is treated like an Israelite girl, then why does the mishnah say that her husband is not flogged and forced to pay the 100 sela fine for libeling her, as he would be if she was a regular Israelite girl.The answer is that the midrash includes only her, that she is executed the way an Israelite girl. But it does not mean that she is counted as full Israelite girl for every issue. It does not include him.
  Why do we say that the midrash includes a girl who was conceived not in holiness, but born in holiness, meaning her mother converted during pregnancy? Why not say that it includes a girl conceived and born in holiness, meaning her mother converted before birth?The answer is that such a girl counts as a full Israelite girl.I should note that we should not take any of this for granted. What we “know” to be true—that the child of a convert is a Jew—was probably still being worked out in the Talmudic period. Similarly, while we “know” that a convert is a full Jew, this too was still being partially worked out in the Talmudic period.
  Why not say that even one conceived and born in unholiness is executed by stoning? The answer is that this would leave us without any need for the word “in Israel.” Clearly the laws refer only to a Jew. So the word “in Israel” must add some new information. What it adds is that these laws apply only to one “born in holiness”—meaning born as a Jew.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the laws of a man who accuses his wife of not being a virgin at their wedding.
  Yose b. Hanina takes the wording of the Torah literally. A man who falsely claims that his orphan wife was not a virgin does not have to pay the fine, because she has no father, and the Torah prescribes giving the money to the father. No father, no fine.
  An amora raises a difficulty from a baraita which uses the doubling of the word “refuse” to conclude that the laws of fines apply even to girls without fathers, despite the fact that the Torah consistently describes these girls as having fathers. This baraita seems to rule against R. Yose b. Hanina’s halakhah.
  Yose b. Avin solves his own difficulty. If the girl had a father when the man (the seducer/rapist) had intercourse with her, then he is liable to pay the fine. But R. Yose b. Hanina was referring to a case where the girl was already an orphan by the time they consummated their marriage.
  Rava says that a man who makes a claim about an Israelite girl without a father is liable. According to the Talmud he learns this from the fact that a baraita taught by Ammi rules that if a man makes a false virginity claim against his wife who is a convert, he is exempt. A convert is considered to be like a newborn, without any parents. Therefore, Rava could argue, that since a man who makes a claim against an Israelite without a father is obligated, we needed a baraita to teach that if he makes such a claim against a convert, he is exempt. But if a man who made a complaint against an Israelite girl without a father was exempt, then it would have been obvious that had he made the claim against a convert, he is exempt. We would not then have needed this baraita. The existence of this baraita proves that if she was an Israelite he is liable, even if she does not have a father.
  According to Resh Lakish the Torah’s use of the word “young girl” is meant to be precise—the law applies only to a girl between the ages of 12 and 12.5 (or for six months from the time she begins puberty). If he makes a false claim against a younger girl, he is exempt. Like R. Yose b. Hanina, Resh Lakish reads the Torah very literally.
  Aha b. Abba points out that in the continuation of the verses in Deuteronomy, if it turns out she really was not a virgin, she is stoned. Now this cannot refer to a minor, because minors are never punished since they are below the age of legal culpability. Therefore, we would know that this entire chapter cannot refer to a minor even if the Torah had not used the word “na’arah.”So from here, R. Aha b. Abba learns that whenever the Torah uses a defective spelling of the word for young girl, writing it נער instead of נערה, as it does in this case, the intent is to refer also to minor and not just a na’arah, a young girl.To put this another way, since we know that the chapter refers only to a na’arah and not a minor, we must ask why the Torah uses the word. We learn that the defective spelling refers to both a young girl and a minor. In this case, the word itself as used in Deuteronomy 22 could mean both. But since the Torah refers to her punishment, the whole chapter must refer only to a young girl, a na’arah, and not a minor.
  IntroductionDeuteronomy 22 refers to adultery committed in various stages of a woman being betrothed or married. In some cases the woman is stoned and in other cases the Torah says she is executed but does not mention how. Also, the stoning takes place at different locations.In this section a sage named Shila claims that a “na’arah” a young girl between the ages of 12 and 12.5 could potentially be subjected to any of these forms of execution.I should again emphasize that these are theoretical discussions concerned with interpreting the Torah and not with legislating real life situations. Rabbis were not executing people for any crimes in this period, and probably not in any other as well.
  If the witnesses come after she has already been married and testify that she committed adultery when betrothed and still living in her father’s house, she is stoned at her father’s house. This is the case referred to in Deuteronomy 22:21 (the simple reading of the passage is that she was not a virgin at her wedding). The reason to stone her at her father’s house is symbolic—as if to say to him, look what you have raised in your house.
  
  Daf 45a
  
  If the witnesses come to testify against her while she is still betrothed, that she committed adultery as a betrothed girl, she is stoned at the gates of the city. This is referred to in Deuteronomy 22:24. It is not entirely clear why she should be stoned at the gates of the city if she committed adultery in her father’s house, as was the girl in the above clause. Shila could answer, I suppose, that since we probably know in this case who her paramour is, and he is being executed as well, then they both should be executed in the same place, at the gates of the city.
  Deuteronomy 22:22 refers to adultery with a married woman. The Torah does not specify how she is executed. The rabbis generally hold that whenever the Torah does not specify a mode of execution, the criminal is to be executed by strangulation. They considered this the “best” form of execution, not because it was the least painful, but because it left the least damage to the body.Shila adds that this form of execution would also be meted out to a betrothed young girl who became of majority age after she committed adultery but before she could be convicted. The Torah consistently uses the word “na’arah,” a young girl, when referring to a girl who is to be stoned. If the girl is no longer a “na’arah” she is executed in the default manner, by strangulation.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if the girl committed adultery as a na’arah (a young girl) but then reached majority age before being tried, she is executed by strangulation and not stoning, as she would have been had she been tried as a young girl. Thus when her body changes by getting older her mode of execution changes. Our section questions this assumption.
  This source refers to the laws of a husband who says his wife was not a virgin at the time of marriage (Deuteronomy 22). If she was betrothed as a young girl but then married only when she has reached majority age, the husband is not punished for libeling her by being lashed or having to pay 100 selas.If there are witnesses who testify that she fornicated after betrothal, if they are telling the truth, she is executed by stoning, and if they are not telling the truth, then they are executed by stoning.This baraita proves that even though the witnesses testify against her only after she has reached majority age, she is still executed by stoning, since she committed adultery while she was still a na’arah, a young girl.
  Rava says that one cannot use the case of a husband “bringing out an evil name” as a precedent for other situations of adultery. As a reminder, the rabbis read this chapter as a case where the woman committed adultery (and not that she had pre-marital sex). Rava points out that this case is different from other cases of adultery. In normal cases, once a woman enters the bridal chamber (the huppah, which in those days was a real room), she is legally considered to be married, even if she has not yet had intercourse. If she commits adultery after entering the bridal chamber but before having sex with her husband, she is executed by strangulation, not by stoning, as she would have been had she committed adultery while betrothed. However, in the case of a husband who brings out a bad name against a woman who has entered the bridal chamber but not yet had sex, claiming that she committed adultery, she is still stoned.Rava argues that since the laws of the husband who brings out an evil name are different, they cannot be used to prove that in other cases if her body changes, i.e. she grows older, she still receives the same punishment.
  Huna argues against Rava. It is possible that the laws of a husband bearing an evil name are anomalous only when she remained a young girl. In this case, she is still stoned, even though she already entered huppah, a difference from the laws governing a normal situation. But perhaps if she did change, meaning by the time she was tried she was of majority age, she would be punished by strangulation.If this is so, then we could return to Shila’s ruling that if she reaches majority age before being convicted, she is executed by strangulation and not stoning.
  IntroductionOur section continues to discuss whether a girl who fornicated while a na’arah (12-12.5) and therefore should be executed according to the Torah by stoning, but who was convicted only after she reaches majority age, is still executed by stoning or whether her mode of execution changes to strangulation, the execution for a girl who was of majority age when she committed adultery.
  Nahman b. Yitzchak says that there is a tannaitic dispute over whether the punishment changes when the body changes. He quotes a mishnah from Horayot (3:3). According to this mishnah, if a high priest or chieftain issued an errant ruling before they were appointed, they are not liable to bring the special sin offering obligatory upon high priests or chieftains, since at the time of the ruling they were regular individuals. In other words, their liability is dependent upon the time of the ruling. In this case, if they transgressed they are liable to bring the same sin-offering as would a regular Israelite.Rabbi Shimon holds that if they found out they had erred before their appointment they are liable to bring a sin offering as would a regular Israelite.  However, if they found out about their sin after they were appointed, they are completely exempt.  Rabbi Shimon holds that their liability is dependent both upon the timing of the errant ruling and the realization that it was errant.Nahman b. Yitzchak equates this Mishnah with the situation about the girl who fornicated. In both cases, some status changed after the sin, and this change in status changes the punishment, according to R. Shimon. According to the first opinion, it does not.
  
  Daf 45b
  
  The Talmud critiques R. Nahman b. Yitzchak’s equation. No one holds that the fact that R. Shimon does not make a person who only finds out about his error after he is appointed priest or king liable to bring the special offering implies that the sacrifice changes because of a change in the person’s status. Rather, he says they are completely exempt because the realization of the sin and the sin itself must occur both with the same status. This is different from the case of the girl who fornicated when she was a young girl and then became of majority age. In such a case, R. Shimon might say that the punishment changes.
  If it were true that R. Shimon held that the sacrifice simply changed when their status changed, then the High Priest would have to bring a bull and the chief a he-goat. But in fact, he says that they do not bring any sacrifice whatsoever. Thus the comparison between R. Shimon and Shila is refuted.
  This section changes Shila’s ruling—if she commits adultery as a young girl and then is convicted only as a girl of majority age, she is still stoned because she committed the crime as a na’arah.Ila says that when the verse calls her a na’arah, it implies that she was a na’arah at the time of the transgression, but not necessarily at the time of conviction.
  Hanania says that if the girl is still punished by being stoned, since she was a na’arah when she fornicated, then the husband should also be punished if he falsely libels her for fornicating when she was a young girl. In other words, there is a logical inconsistency with R. Ila’s (and R. Yohanan’s) ruling.Ila responds with an attack on R. Hanania, and R. Hanania responds with a counterattack. This type of argument does not really get us very far.Yitzchak b. Avin explains why there should be a difference between her and him. Basically, when she transgressed, she was a na’arah, so she should get the punishment fitting for a na’arah. But when he transgressed, she was no longer a na’arah. She had reached majority age. Therefore, he is not punished with the punishments he would get if she had been a na’arah at the time of his false accusation.In other words, R. Elai finds reads the Torah very literally. Even if the law is not particularly logical, to him this is what the Torah says.
  IntroductionAccording to Deuteronomy 22:21, a young girl who commits adultery is stoned at the “door of her father’s house.” Today’s section talks about what happens if the girl does not have a “door of her father’s house.” Where is she stoned?
  If she has no “door to her father’s house” then she is still stoned, but the stoning takes place at the door to the city gates. This is the setting of the stoning in v. 24.However, if the city is mostly non-Jews, then the site of the stoning is moved to the Jewish court. It seems that it would be destructive to the Jewish community to have her stoned in the public gates if the majority of the city was not Jewish.
  The same change of site of stoning exists with regard to one who is being punished for worshipping idols. He too is not stoned at the gates of the city if the city is mostly idolaters.
  The first part of this baraita proves that an Israelite who worships idols is stoned at the gate where he worshipped. The phrase “your gates” in Deuteronomy 17:5 is unclear and could refer either to the gates where he worshipped idols or to the gates where he was tried. But in 17:2, the phrase “your gates” clearly refers to the gates where he worshipped. Therefore, 17:5 must also refer to the gates where he worshipped idols. Note that this does not agree with the baraita above.
  The second part of the baraita uses the word “your gates” to exclude the gates of non-Jews—one does not stone a Jew at the gates of non-Jews.The Talmud says that since the word is plural, two halakhot can be deduced from it: 1) The gates where the person worshipped idols; 2) Not the gates of idolaters.
  Abbahu derives that a betrothed girl is not stoned at the gates of a city whose majority is non-Jewish from a chain of linguistic connection. The word “door” from Deuteronomy 22:21 connects with “door” from Numbers 4:26. This “door” is connected to “gate” and this “gate” connects us back to “your gates”—not the gates of a city whose majority is non-Jews.
  IntroductionOur sugya deals with the laws of a husband who libels his wife. Again, I wish to remind the reader that in the eyes of the rabbis this parsha refers to a husband who accuses his wife of having committed adultery after betrothal but before marriage.
  The Torah says that a husband who falsely accuses his wife is flogged and pays a 100 sela fine to the father of his wife. According to the first opinion, he pays and is flogged under any circumstance, even if he did not have intercourse with her. Note that this is far removed from the simple reading of the source, according to which he is accusing her of not being a virgin. Such a complaint makes sense only after he has had sex with her. But if his complaint is that she committed adultery, then it really does not matter whether they had sex or not.According to R. Judah, he is flogged under any circumstance, whether or not they had sex. But he pays the fine only if they had sex.
  On daf 46 the Talmud will cite a disagreement between the rabbis and R. Eliezer b. Jacob. The rabbis hold that the halakhot concerning a husband who brings out an evil name against his wife refers both to a case where they had intercourse, or one where they did not. This accords with the first opinion here. R. Judah is in agreement with R. Eliezer b. Jacob, who holds that the chapter refers to a case where they had intercourse. Thus he pays only if he had intercourse. But, he is flogged under any circumstance, because he violated the prohibition of slandering another person.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section the Talmud proposed that only R. Judah agrees with R. Eliezer b. Jacob who said that the chapter concerning the husband who libels his wife refers only to a case where they had sex. Therefore the husband pays the fine only if he had sex. The Talmud had said that the other rabbis, who hold that the husband pays the fine no matter what, agreed with the other rabbis who disagreed with R. Eliezer b. Jacob. Today’s section attempts to say that everyone agrees with R. Eliezer b. Jacob.
  This version of the debate in the earlier baraita completely changes the reading of the first opinion. Whereas earlier we thought that according to this opinion, the husband is flogged and pays the fine whether or not he had sex with his wife, it now reads that he is flogged and pays the fine only if he did have sex. This opinion now completely accords with R. Eliezer b Jacob. R. Judah says he is flogged in any case, even if he did not have sex, because he violated the prohibition against libeling someone. But he agrees with R. Eliezer b. Jacob that since he did not have sex, he is not libel for the 100 sela.
  We have now another baraita according to which R. Judah says that he is flogged even if they did not have sex. This disagrees with the version of the baraita taught above and in yesterday’s section.
  Two amoraim attempt to resolve the two contradictory baraitot. According to R. Nahman b. Yitzchak, in the second baraita, when R. Judah says that the husband is flogged, he does not mean that the Torah dictates that he is flogged. His lashes are for transgressing the rabbis, who clearly do not want a husband to be falsely libeling his wife. But he does not receive lashes from Torah law, for the Torah refers only to a case where they already had sex.Papa said that the word “he is flogged” does not really mean that he is flogged. It means that he pays the fine.
  
  Daf 46a
  
  The Talmud finds a precedent where the word “flogged” is understand as paying a fine. If a person dedicates half of his value to the Temple, R. Judah says that he must pay the full value and he is flogged. R. Papa explains that he is not really flogged, rather he is “flogged” by having to pay his full value. The Talmud explains that a person who dedicates half of his value really should only have to pay half of his value. But we make him pay his full value lest he state that he is dedicating the value of half of his body to the Temple. Now the value of “half of one’s body” is equivalent to the value of one’s full body—if you lose half your body, you die. Lest people think that one who dedicates half of the value of one’s body only has to pay half of the value of his body, R. Judah declared that even if he dedicates half of one’s value, he pays the full value.In any case, the essential issue here is that when they use the word “flog” they do not necessarily mean it literally. It can be understood as referring to paying a fine. 
  IntroductionThe first half of this week’s daf continues to deal with the chapter concerning a husband who brings out a bad name against his wife. The second half of the daf will move to a new topic, one that finally discusses the typical laws of marriage.
  This source explains how we know that the husband who libels his wife must pay a fine and be flogged. The fine is mentioned explicitly in the Torah, but the fact that he is flogged must be derived from a complicated linguistic connection. First the word “shall chastise” connects this chapter with the chapter about the rebellious son (Deuteronomy 21:18). This chapter uses the word “son” which connects us with Deuteronomy 25:2. Since that chapter refers to flogging, we can interpret “shall chastise” in our chapter as referring to flogging as well.
  In this section two amoraim locate where we could read into the Torah that a husband is warned not to bring out a bad name about his wife. The idea is that a person cannot be punished unless the Torah first warns him not to commit a particular transgression.
  The Talmud now asks the question it often does when amoraim dispute which verse is used to derive a particular prohibition—why did each amora not use the other verse.Elazar did not use the verse “and you shall keep yourself from every evil thing” because he uses that verse as does R. Pinchas b. Yair. They read the verse as warning a person not to think sexual thoughts at night, which would lead to a nocturnal emission. The next verse in Deuteronomy (23:11) actually discusses nocturnal emissions, which leads to this reading of the verse.I should note that the rabbis took “spilling of seed” very seriously. I am not going to comment here on whether or not this strict anti-masturbation attitude has been proven to be a viable prohibition, or a healthy one.
  Natan does not use the text used by R. Elazar because he reads the word רכיל as a pun on the word רך, which means “soft” or “lenient”. The court should not be lenient with one litigant and harsh one another. We should note that while this reading is not the “simple” meaning of the verse, it does accord with the context in which this verse is stated in Leviticus 19. The previous verse talks about perversion of justice. This leads to the interpretation that this verse should also refer to matters of justice. In fact, even modern biblical scholars have tried to come up with an interpretation of the verse that is connected with legal issues.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the scenario of a husband who libels his wife.
  If the husband falsely accuses his wife of having committed adultery after betrothal and summons witnesses to falsely testify on his behalf, then he is lashed and fined. But if the witnesses come on their own and falsely testify that she committed adultery, the husband is not punished with the lashes or the fine.If the witnesses turn out to be false witnesses, they receive the punishment that they tried to mete out on her, stoning. But if they are telling the truth, then she is executed.
  According to the baraita at the beginning of the page, the husband is liable for lashes and financial penalty as long as he tells the witnesses to falsely testify that his wife committed adultery. But R. Judah holds that he must hire the witnesses, i.e. pay them, in order to be liable. If he merely tells them to falsely testify, they and not he are liable.
  Abbahu explains that R. Judah derives the rule that the husband must hire witnesses in order for him to be liable from the use of the word “to place.” In Deuteronomy the husband “places” on his wife a false claim, and from the use of the same word in Exodus we can know that the verb “place” refers to use of money. Thus in order for the husband to be liable, he must hire false witnesses.The same midrash is then stated by a few more amoraim.
  Yirmiyah now asks some follow-up questions about the husband’s liability. We might think that since R. Judah derives the law from the context in Exodus which deals with money and not land, that if the husband hires them with land, he is exempt.A perutah is the smallest coin. So if the husband hires them for less than this amount, does this count as hiring them for money?And if we say that the hiring has to be for a perutah, does that mean a perutah for each person or is one perutah sufficient for both witnesses?The Talmud will not answer these two questions.
  Ashi asks about a husband who marries a woman whom he married, divorced and then remarried. Now, after they are married for the second time, he goes back and says that she was not a virgin the first time he married her.He also asks about a woman whose husband died while she was still betrothed. Can the yavam, the dead husband’s brother, make a claim when he marries her that she had committed adultery after betrothal?
  Only one of the questions, the final one is answered. When the father defends his daughter against the claims of the husband he says, “I gave my daughter to this man.” This implies that only “this man” the original husband, can be liable for the false claim. Should the levir, the dead husband’s brother, make a false claim, he would not be liable.
  IntroductionOn 45b the Talmud mentioned a dispute between R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov and the rabbis as to whether the husband is punished for libeling his wife even if he never had relations with her.I should reiterate the transformation that this passage has undergone from its simple meaning in the Torah to its rabbinic interpretation. According to the simple reading of the Torah, the husband has sex with his wife and then falsely claims that she was not a virgin when he married her. The parents of the bride bring a bloody sheet that proves that she was a virgin and the husband is punished as a result. If they do not prove her virginity, she is stoned.To the rabbis (or at least the dominant interpretation) the husband claims that she committed adultery after betrothal and he brings witnesses that saw her do so. If these witnesses are lying, then he is punished and they are stoned. If he is telling the truth, then she is stoned for adultery.In the simple reading of the Torah, it is obvious that the husband had sex with her. That is how he knows, or at least claims to know, that she is not a virgin. But according to the rabbinic interpretation, there does not seem to be any reason for him to have to have sex with her. The evidence relies on witnesses.Today’s section deals, in essence, with the dissonance between the simple reading of the Torah, and the rabbinic reading.
  The baraita begins by simply explaining the rabbinic understanding of the passage. The man comes to the court and claims that he did not find his wife to be a virgin. But what does this mean? It does not mean, as we would have thought, that they had sex and he simply thought she was not a virgin. Rather, it means that there were witnesses that she had relations with another man after betrothal.If it turns out she committed adultery after betrothal, she is an adulteress and she is to be stoned. If, however, witnesses testify that she had sex before betrothal, then all she has done is lie to her husband, telling him that she was a virgin when she was not. At worst, she loses the 200 shekel ketubah of a virgin and receives only the 100 shekel ketubah.
  If the husband was lying, then he is flogged and pays the fine. Now we see the dispute between the first interpretation and R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov. According to the anonymous opinion (“the rabbis”), it does not matter whether he did or not. According to R. Eliezer BY he is liable only if he had sex with her. The Talmud will now ask a series of questions as to how the anonymous opinion can accord with the verses of the Torah.
  The Torah seems to explicitly say that he had relations with her. R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov can easily interpret these words, but how do the rabbis interpret them.The rabbis read these words metaphorically.We should note that despite the fact that the words might seem to us metaphorical, these are simply euphemisms for sex, just as we use the word “sleep.” We know that to sleep with a person is not the same as to sleep with a pillow. The rabbis knew that “he came upon her” means that he had sex with her.
  The husband claims that he did not find his wife to be a virgin—again, it seems quite clear that he had sex with her. So how do the other rabbis interpret this verse?Again, they interpret it in line with their dominant interpretation—the husband says that he did not find witnesses who could testify against the witnesses who claimed that she committed adultery.
  According to the simple reading, which accords with R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov, the parents defend their daughter by showing her virginity. The rabbis must again interpret this in connection with their interpretation. They produce witnesses who testify to her virginity.
  Finally, the rabbis have trouble with the reference to the sheet. Again, this seems to clearly refer to the parents showing a sheet with blood on it, proving that the husband had sex with her.Abbahu explains that the rabbis read the word ופרשו not as “spread out” but as “explain” a word pronounced differently but spelled the same. The rabbis clarify the matter so that it is as clear, i.e. as white, as a new garment. But R. Eliezer BY insists that the words be taken literally.
  IntroductionThis is the final section dealing the chapter about the husband who libels his wife. Just a warning, this section a bit graphic.
  Natural intercourse is vaginal intercourse and unnatural intercourse is anal intercourse. Generally speaking unnatural intercourse counts as intercourse with regard to all punishments. For instance, if a man has unnatural intercourse with a married woman, the two are both adulterers. However, in the case of the man who brings out an evil report about his wife, it doesn’t matter if he had unnatural intercourse and then claims that his wife was not a virgin because she committed adultery through natural intercourse.This interpretation is in essence in line with the rabbinic interpretation of the chapter. There is no connection between what the husband does (i.e. whether and what type of intercourse he has with her) and his claim, she committed adultery. However, since, when he accuses her of adultery, he says, “I did not find her to be a virgin,” R. Yohanan interprets the accusation of being related to the usual understanding of virginity—one who has not had natural intercourse.
  
  Daf 46b
  
  The problem is that R. Yohanan’s rule does not accord perfectly with either R. Eliezer ben Ya’akov who says that the husband is punished only if he has sex with her, such that his claim that she is not a virgin is based on his experience, or with the rabbis who hold that he need not have sex with her at all.To fix this, the Talmud emends the statement such that it basically agrees completely with R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov. The husband must have natural intercourse and then claim that she committed adultery by having natural intercourse with another man.
  IntroductionThis mishnah delineates basic rights that a father has over his daughter and that a husband has over his wife.  In addition the mishnah outlines basic responsibilities that a husband has to his wife.  We can easily see from this mishnah that the society that the Mishnah envisions/reflects is patriarchal.  The father/husband is head of the household.  Most of the earnings of the members of the household belong to him and he has the responsibility for providing for them.
  Section one:  According to the first mishnah in tractate Kiddushin there are three means by which to effect betrothal:  money, document or intercourse.  Our mishnah teaches that a father has the right to accept money or document on behalf of his daughter in order that she should be betrothed.  He also has the right to give her to a man with whom she will have intercourse and thereby become betrothed.  This right is limited to a girl who has not yet reached majority age (typically 12 ½).  After that the girl receives her own betrothal.Section two:  Any money a daughter might earn belongs to her father.  This includes things she might find and her handiwork (for instance weaving, sewing, work in the field, etc.).  In addition the father has a right to annul her vows (see Numbers 30:6).  The reason that annulling vows is listed in this clause is that it is in essence an economic right since a vow could prevent him from having her handiwork.  For instance if she took a vow that any thing she finds is forbidden to her father, she would thereby deny him of one of his economic rights.Section three:  If the father betroths his daughter and then the husband decides to divorce her before fully marrying her, the father receives the get.  However, if the girl was married, the father no longer has any domain over her.  If the girl should come into money while still in her father’s house, the principal belongs to her as well as the interest (the usufruct).  However, if she dies, her father inherits both the principal and the usufruct.  The normal way that a girl would come into money that does not automatically belong to her father is by inheriting her mother’s father.  This would happen if her mother died before her grandfather died (for if her grandfather died first when her mother died her husband would inherit her) and her mother was an inheritor (i.e. her grandfather had no sons).  In such a case she would inherit her grandfather.Section four:  A husband has more rights than the father in that the husband does have right to the usufruct from his wife’s property during her lifetime.  This could happen if she received an inheritance after the marriage.  If she should die before her husband dies then he would inherit the principal as well, but if the husband would die first he would never own the principal.  The husband also has rights over whatever his wife finds and whatever money she earns.  He also can annul her vows.Section five:  The mishnah now begins to list the husband’s responsibilities towards his wife.  The primary responsibility is to provide food.  He also must provide her with clothing and shelter.  If she is taken captive he must pay a ransom in order to redeem her.  From the very fact that this is listed as a basic responsibility of the husband to his wife clearly demonstrates that kidnapping must have been a serious problem.The husband is also responsible to pay for his wife’s burial.  According to Rabbi Judah, even if the husband is poor he must provide two flutes and one lamenting-woman for the funeral.
  The Talmud now begins to ask how we know that the father receives the money through which she is betrothed. Rav Judah answers with a midrash of a verse concerning a young girl who is sold into slavery. When this girl reaches a certain age, the master or his son is to marry her. If he does not, he must send her free, without the usual money used to redeem a slave. The Torah emphasizes this—“she goes out for nothing, without money.” The repetition allows Rav Judah to offer a midrash—there is no money when a girl leaves her master’s domain in this case. But in another similar case, when a girl leaves her father’s domain by being betrothed, there is money. And who receives the money—her father....
  Judah’s midrash successfully proved that there is money when the girl leaves her father’s domain. But how do we know the father receives it? Maybe the girl who is being betrothed should receive it?The answer is that if the father has the right to betroth her, i.e. to decide to whom she is betrothed, then shouldn’t he be the one to receive the money.
  Above we said that since a father decides whom his daughter marries, he should receive the betrothal money. But a na’arah, a girl between the ages of 12 to 12.5 can decide herself to whom she is betrothed. So she should be able to receive her betrothal money, not her father.  But we know that the father does receive the money. So again the question is asked, how do we know this?
  The Talmud now answers with a verse taken from the context of the annulment of vows. The verse implies, to the Talmud, that all financial advantage that comes to her in her youth, while a na’arah, go to her father. This would include the money used for her betrothal.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded by positing that the biblical source for the idea that a father receives the betrothal money of his na’arah (between 12 and 12.5) daughter is the verse in Numbers 30 according to which all of the financial advantages accrued to a young girl go to her father. In today’s section the same law is learned from another verse, raising the question of which verse is the actual source.
  The work that a daughter produces, her earnings, belongs to her father. Rav deduces this from the fact that a man may sell his daughter to be a maidservant. But if the verse from Numbers teaches that all of the financial advantages of a daughter go to her husband, why does Rav need to prove that a daughter’s handiwork goes to her father from that verse?
  The Talmud now admits that the verse from Numbers does not have broader implications. It refers only to the annulment of vows and not to a father’s right to his daughter’s betrothal money. And should we suggest that just as a father has a right to annul his daughter’s vows, so too he has right to his daughter’s betrothal money, this must be rejected for one cannot derive laws regarding monetary matters from the laws of vows.
  The Talmud suggests that we derive the fact that the father receives the betrothal money from the fact, learned earlier in Ketubot, that he receives any fines owed to her, such as those for rape and seduction. However, the laws of fines differ from the laws of monetary payments and therefore there is a rule that the latter cannot be derived from the former.
  If a na’arah is raped/seduced the payments for the shame and blemish go to her father (we learned this earlier in Ketubot). But this cannot be a source for the father’s receiving the betrothal money because there is a difference with shame and blemish. The meaning of “since the father is involved” is not entirely clear. I believe that the words could mean that when she is shamed or blemished, the father also suffers. In any case, we still have no source for how we know that the father receives the betrothal money.
  The resolution of how we know that the father receives the money goes back to the original source—the fact that when the daughter sold into slavery goes free, the master does not receive a payment. Had there been a payment, the master would have received it. Thus, logically, in the case of betrothal, where there is a payment, the money goes to the father, who is akin to the master.
  The problem is that the comparison between the two “going outs” is not precise. When the maidservant goes free, she becomes completely free. Her master retains no control. But betrothal is only a partial transfer of authority. Her father still retains some authority over her and will continue to do so until she enters the huppah. So how can the two be compared?
  The answer is that in one respect, even though still living in her father’s house, the father has lost control over her at betrothal—he no longer has the right to unilaterally annul her vows. Once betrothed, the father and husband jointly annul her vows.
  The Talmud now goes on to ask how we know that the father has a right to marry his daughter off through a document or by giving her to the husband for intercourse. The answer is that all of the ways of becoming a wife are included in one verb in the verse. This comparison is invoked when the Talmud wishes to compare one way of becoming a wife with another. Again, for a longer discussion of how betrothal is contracted, see my commentary on the first mishnah of Kiddushin.
  
  Daf 47a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to explain the mishnah that opened the second half of the chapter. As a reminder, this mishnah listed some of the main financial advantages a father receives from his daughter.
   The mishnah stated that the husband receives any lost object that the wife finds. The Talmud explains that this is to prevent enmity. If she keeps her lost object and he is providing for her, he will be angry at her and resent her.
  A husband has rights to any of the work his daughter does—her earnings. The source for this is the comparison the verse makes between a daughter and a maidservant—just as the latter gives her work to her master, so a daughter must give her handiwork to her father. This midrash was also found at the end of daf 46b.
  The father receives his daughter’s handiwork until she reaches majority age, 12.5. But he can only sell her when she is a minor (until she is 12). So how do we know that he receives her handiwork between the ages of 12-12.5, when she is a na’arah? [To recall, in mishnaic/Talmudic times selling one’s daughter was not something that could occur. It is a passage from the Torah, but by this period in history, Jewish law found ways to prevent it.]
  The Talmud concludes that the fact that the father has the right to determine when the marriage occurs, i.e. when she goes to the huppah, indicates that he has the right to her handiwork, for if he did not, by sending her to the huppah he would be denying her a day’s wages.
  Ahai notes that the father could send his daughter to the huppah in a way in which she would not lose her wages. First of all, he could simply compensate her for lost time at work. Or he could send her to the huppah at a time when she would not be working. So the fact that he can send her to the huppah is not an ironclad proof that he has a right to her earnings. [Note: in reality marriage cannot take place on Shabbat or the festivals].
  The final answer is that we don’t even need a verse/midrash to know that a father has a right to his minor daughter’s handiwork. This is simple logic. What we do need a verse for is to know that a father has a right to his na’arah daughter’s handiwork. Since he cannot sell her, we might have thought she keeps her earnings. Therefore, the verse, through a midrash, teaches us that her father has a right to these earnings as well.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to explain the sources of the laws concerning the father’s rights to derive benefit from his daughter.
  The question here is not how do we know that a father has the right to annul his daughter’s vows. That is found explicitly in Numbers 30. The question is how do we know that he has this right when she is a na’arah? This is derived from the use of the word “in her youth” which has the same root as “na’arah.”
  The Torah say, “And she goes out and becomes [a wife] to another man.” Just as her father receives her betrothal when she goes out, so too he receives her bill of divorce, should she be divorced before reaching majority age.
  IntroductionThe father does not have rights to the usufruct of his daughter while she is alive. Usufruct refers to the use or interest accrued through the property she owns. How does a daughter have her own property, you might ask? She could inherit it through her maternal grandfather. If her maternal grandfather dies and her mother is no longer alive, and the granddaughter is the only descendent, then the granddaughter receives the inheritance (or splits it with her sisters). So if this inheritance is, for instance, a field, the father does not have rights to use the field, or to take its produce.
  The mishnah sided with the first opinion in this baraita. R. Yose the son of R. Judah holds that the father has such rights even while his daughter is still alive.
  Later in the Talmud we will see the assumption that a husband receives rights to the usufruct from his wife’s property in return for his guarantee to redeem her should she be taken captive. The assumption seems to be that if he didn’t have some rights to her property, he would not redeem her. Quid pro quo.But when it comes to the father, he would redeem his daughter anyway. Therefore, there is no reason for the rabbis to say that the father has the rights to usufruct from her property.Note that the assumption here is that a father has greater love for his daughter than a husband for his wife. I think this is probably an accurate assumption in the Talmudic period.
  Yose holds that the father might indeed refrain from redeeming his daughter if he does not receive the usufruct of her property. He’ll say to himself, “she’s got money, let her redeem herself.” But once he receives the usufruct, he will not be allowed to do this. Ultimately, while this may cost her, it will serve as an insurance policy of sorts to protect her.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to discuss the main topic of the rest of the chapter—the rights and responsibilities a husband has towards his wife.
  The baraita refers to the issue of the dowry. According to the first opinion, if the father writes in the ketubah that he will send various types of movable property with his daughter when she moves into her husband’s home, and then she dies before she brings these goods into her husband’s house, in other words she dies after betrothal but before marriage, the husband does not have rights to this property. According to R. Natan, he does.
  The Talmud now asks if we can correlate the dispute between the first opinion and R. Natan concerning the husband’s rights to his wife’s dowry with the dispute between the first opinion and R. Elazar b. Azaryah concerning the marital payment the husband promises his wife. This sources is in the first mishnah of chapter five of Ketubot. According to the first opinion (the rabbis), if a husband writes a large ketubah (marital payment) to his wife, one greater than the mandated 100/200, she is entitled to the entire amount whether the marriage is terminated after betrothal or marriage. R. Elazar b. Azaryah says that if she is divorced or the husband dies after betrothal but before marriage, she receives only the minimal amount. He wrote the additional amount beyond the 100/200 only with the intent of marrying her, so if he does not end up marrying her, he is not liable for it.The first opinion would hold that all financial obligations are activated at betrothal. This would accord with R. Natan. R. Elazar b. Azaryah would hold that the obligations are operative at marriage. This would accord with the first opinion of the baraita.
  
  Daf 47b
  
  The Talmud now rejects this correlation. The rabbis in the baraita, who said that if the wife dies after betrothal the husband does not receive the dowry, could obviously agree with R. Elazar b. Azaryah from the mishnah—if marriage does not occur, no transaction occurs. But even R. Natan from the baraita, who said that the husband does receive the dowry if she dies before marriage (but after betrothal), could agree with R. Elazar b. Azaryah. R. Elazar said that the husband need not give her the additional amount he added to the ketubah because he wrote this additional amount only to marry her. Since he did not marry her, he does not have to give it to her. But the father of the bride wrote the dowry in order to associate his daughter with the husband’s family. This association occurs already at betrothal. Thus in both cases we could say that when someone promises something (a dowry or a ketubah) with the expectation of receiving something (association or marriage), the transaction occurs when he receives that which he was expecting. Sometimes this occurs at betrothal and sometimes at marriage. 
  IntroductionToday’s section begins the discussion concerning a husband’s obligation to pay for his wife’s food.
  This baraita views the husband’s responsibilities as a quid pro quo for the financial advantages he accrues through his wife. He receives her handiwork, therefore he must provide for her. He receives her dowry (called here the ketubah) and in return he must bury her. The last sentence seems inexplicable and will be explained now.
  The Talmud now “fills in” the baraita, adding that he is responsible for redeeming her if she is taken captive in return for receiving the usufruct. The “usufruct” is the interest accrued from her dowry. Meaning if part of her dowry is a field, for instance, the title to the field belongs to her, but he receives rights to the produce.
  The Talmud asks what the meaning of the word “therefore” is. What does it teach us? The answer is that we might have thought it better for the woman for her husband not to have rights to the usufruct. If she is taken ransom, then she could use those funds to redeem her. Therefore we learn that from her perspective, it would actually be better for the husband to have rights to the usufruct and in return, be obligated to redeem her. This is like an insurance policy. He has rights to the usufruct but then he must redeem her whether the cost is more or less than the amount he has received.
  Abaye explains why certain rights were established in return for certain obligations. Maintenance and handiwork are correlated because they are common. According to Rashi, kidnapping and a woman who has a substantial diary are not common.
  IntroductionIn today’s section Rava introduces a baraita in which it is claimed that the Torah obligates a husband to provide maintenance for his wife. The main verse used is Exodus 21:10, which refers to the girl sold into slavery. It seems that when the girl was sold into slavery the intention was that she become his wife when she reaches majority age. The Torah says that if the owner takes another wife, then he must not diminish what he gives to his first wife. The Torah says that he must not reduce her “she’arah” “kesutah” or “onatah.” The Talmud interprets what these cryptic words mean.
  The baraita interprets the three words in the Torah as referring to food/maintenance, clothing and conjugal duty. The latter will be discussed at greater length later in the tractate. It refers to the notion that the husband has an obligation to have sex with his wife at regular intervals.
  Elazar agrees that the verse mandates the husband to provide his wife with food, clothing and sex. However, he disagrees as to which word implies which duty.
  
  Daf 48a
  
  Eliezer b. Ya’akov derives halakhot from the juxtaposition of each word. The clothing must be appropriate to her age and to the season. New clothing should be given in the winter, so that when it wears out, it can be worn in the summer. The assumption seems to be that a person would receive one new piece of clothing a year.
  Joseph derives another halakhah from the baraita—a woman has the right to demand that her husband have sex with her while both of them are naked. R. Huna says that if he denies her this right, she can force him to divorce her and pay her the marital settlement, the ketubah.The background to this halakhah seems to be a certain amount of revulsion from sex, or at least sexual contact with another person’s body. The person to whom this halakhah is addressed wants to stay away from his wife’s body. The Torah forbids such a demand. Sex is not merely a procreative act. It is also fulfilling God’s will by taking delight in our bodies.
  IntroductionToday’s section relates to R. Judah’s opinion in the mishnah, that even the poorest husband in Israel must provide two flautists and one wailing woman for his wife’s funeral.
  Judah says that the poorest in Israel must pay for two flautists and a wailing woman for the funeral. By implication, the previous opinion in the mishnah holds that he is not liable to pay for this musical accompaniment. The problem is now in finding a setting in which such a dispute could occur. In general there is a rule that he must maintain her at the socioeconomic level to which she is accustomed. If her family was accustomed to such music at their funerals, then the husband should be liable, but if her family did not have such a custom, then why should he have to pay?
  The dispute will occur if his family is wealthy enough to afford paid musicians at the funeral, but her family is not. Generally, in marriage, she rises to his economic level, but if his level is lower, she does not go down a level. However, the first opinion holds that this is true only when he is alive. When he dies, he need not provide for her at his level of socioeconomic status. R. Judah would hold that he does.
  IntroductionThe topics discussed in today’s section do not directly deal with the mishnah. They are here because the first of these is a statement of R. Hisda in the name of Mar Ukba, the same amora whose statement was found at the end of yesterday’s section.
  If a man goes insane, a court can seize his property and use it to provide necessities for his family. “Something else” will be defined below.
  Ravina asks why the case of a man who goes insane is different from the case of a man who goes abroad and does not leave sufficient provisions for his wife and family. When a man goes abroad, the court seizes his property to provide for his wife, whom he is legally obligated to support. However, the court does not provide for his sons and daughters, to whom he is not legally obligated (we will discuss this in a couple of pages). Nor does the court seize his property to provide “something else.” So why are these two situations treated differently?
  Ashi replies by drawing a distinction between “leaving” with intention, the man who goes abroad, and leaving without intention, the man who goes insane. The former could have issued a directive to provide for his children. This might have even been the norm. Since he did not, the court does not have a right to seize his property since he is not obligated to feed them. However, a man who goes insane did not have the opportunity to leave a directive. Therefore, we can assume that he would have wanted his children to be provided for.
  According to R. Hisda, in the first case the court would give her cosmetics, whereas in the second, they would not. R. Joseph says that the court would give her charity for her to divide to someone else, but not in the second case.The Talmud now evaluates the relationship between these two opinions.The one who said that she does not receive cosmetics (the case where he went abroad) would say that in such a case they also do not provide her with charity to give to others. But the opposite is not true—the one who said they don’t give her charity would hold that they do give her cosmetics because we can assume that the husband would want her to look nice while he is away.
  Hiyya b. Avin adds that if a man went abroad and did not leave instructions to bury his wife, the court seizes his property to provide her with a proper burial. As we saw in the Mishnah, burial is one of the main obligations a man has to his wife.
  The Talmud questions why R. Hiyya b. Avin said “befitting his status.” What if she was from a social class higher than him? Would she not receive a burial befitting her status as well? The answer is yes—he meant to say even if the husband’s social standing is higher than that of the wife, she receives the more lavish burial. We learn here that she goes up with him in status, even after his death.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the issue of burial, which was touched on at the end of yesterday’s section.
  Matana says that a man who is about to die may issue a directive that his estate should not be responsible for burying his wife. While the husband has such an obligation while alive, the obligation is not passed down to his estate.
  The problem with R. Matana’s statement is that either the estate has the obligation to pay for her burial or it does not. Why should it matter whether the father instructed his children?
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses the exact point in which a betrothed woman ceases to be in her father’s domain and is transferred to her husband’s domain.  We should note that different sources reflect different answers to this question.  The question is of import because as long as she is in her father’s domain, he inherits her and he benefits from her work.  Once she is in her husband’s domain, the husband gains such rights.  Furthermore, there is importance for an Israelite girl who is betrothed to a priest.  As long as she is in her father’s domain, she does not eat terumah.  She is allowed to eat terumah when she enters her husband’s domain.
   The Talmud now quite radically emends the statement. Any person who says that he does not want his own estate to pay for his burial is not listened to. A person has a primary responsibility to pay for his own burial, and he cannot place this responsibility on the community in order to save money for his heirs.
  
  Daf 48b
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses the exact point in which a betrothed woman ceases to be in her father’s domain and is transferred to her husband’s domain.  We should note that different sources reflect different answers to this question.  The question is of import because as long as she is in her father’s domain, he inherits her and he benefits from her work.  Once she is in her husband’s domain, the husband gains such rights.  Furthermore, there is importance for an Israelite girl who is betrothed to a priest.  As long as she is in her father’s domain, she does not eat terumah.  She is allowed to eat terumah when she enters her husband’s domain.
  Section one: In a normal situation the girl is in her father’s domain until she enters the bridal chamber (huppah) with the intent of becoming married.Section two: The following clauses of the mishnah deal with a situation in which there is some distance to be traveled between the father’s home and the husband’s home.  If the father turns his girl over to her husband’s agents, she is already considered to be married.  If her husband is a priest, on her journey she may eat terumah.  If the father or his agents accompany her on the trip, then she is still in her father’s domain.  She enters into her husband’s domain only when she is fully turned over to him or to his agents.
  The first line of the mishnah seems extraneous—we can learn that she remains in her father’s domain until huppah from the rest of the mishnah. So what does it teach us? The answer is that this mishnah opposes an “earlier mishnah” which we will learn in chapter five. According to this mishnah, if the time for marriage arrives and the husband delays marrying his fiancée, she has a right to be maintained from his property. In addition, if the husband is a priest, she eats terumah, which can only be eaten by a priest. Therefore, our mishnah teaches us that she does not eat terumah until she enters the huppah.Tomorrow’s section will continue to discuss the topic of when a woman begins to eat terumah. I should note that this question is not just of practical importance. It is one of the ways in which the rabbis define marriage. How do I know when a woman is married, and no longer betrothed? She may eat terumah (if married to a priest).
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, the betrothed woman is considered “married” from the time the father transfers her to the husband’s emissaries. Our sugya discusses whether this transfer turns her into a married woman for all matters or whether for some matters, she must wait until she actually enters his domain.
  According to Rav, after she has been transferred by her father (or his agents) to her husband’s agents, she is married in respect to all relevant laws except for one—she may not eat terumah. Rav holds that a woman married to a priest may not eat terumah until she is fully in his domain, i.e. living in his home. The laws of terumah are often quite strict because a non-priest who eats terumah is liable for “death at the hands of heaven.”Asi holds that once she has been transferred to her husband’s agents, she may even eat terumah.
  Huna uses the mishnah as an objection against R. Asi—she is not fully part of her husband’s domain until she enters the huppah. So how can R. Asi say that she eats terumah immediately after being transferred to her husband’s emissaries.
  Rav upbraids R. Huna for using an ambiguous mishnah as the source of the difficulty. R. Asi could have responded that “transfer” is equivalent to huppah. Huppah is a symbolic entry into the husband’s domain. And transfer to the husband’s emissaries has the same effect. Either, according to R. Asi, allow her to eat terumah.
  Shmuel said that once the father transfers his daughter to the husband’s emissaries, the husband inherits her dowry, should she die.Resh Lakish’s statement is cryptic—what does ketubah mean in this context? If it referred to the dowry, which the word ketubah can mean, then Shmuel said the same thing already. Therefore, Ravina explains that it refers to the fact that if the husband dies or divorces her after this moment, her ketubah from her next husband will be only 100 zuz (one maneh). In other words, she is considered married, so she would go into the next marriage as a widow/divorcee.
  A long baraita is now brought as a difficulty. The baraita basically says that once the transfer occurs, the husband inherits her dowry, even if it is still in her father’s house. But before the transfer, the father inherits her, even if for some reason, the husband already took hold of the dowry.But when it comes to terumah, she does not eat terumah until she actually enters her husband’s home.This refutes many of the above amoraim, including R. Yohanan and R. Hanina, and R. Asi.
  The Talmud posits a contradiction between the two halves of the baraita with regard to the intent with which she enters the courtyard. If she enters with the intent of simply resting, she is not married. If she enters with the intent of being married, then this counts as marriage and she is married. But what if she enters without any specified intent?Ashi answers that the essential criteria is who owns the courtyard. If the husband owns it, we can assume that she entered in order to be married. But if she owned the courtyard, then we can assume she simply entered in order to rest. Note, that we still do not know what the rule would be if the courtyard belonged to neither party. In that case, the assumption is that the intent to be married is necessary.
  IntroductionA little background is necessary in understanding this section. A married woman who commits adultery is punished (in theory) by strangulation (as is the man who committed adultery with her). But if she is betrothed, she (and he) is punished by stoning. So determining when a woman is married is significant as far as determining how she would be punished should she commit adultery.
  According to the baraita, once she has been transferred to her husband’s agents, her punishment, should she commit adultery, would be strangulation. Since she is not physically in her father’s house, she is considered a married adulteress and not a betrothed one.
  The Talmud asks why we  can’t say that a woman is considered “married” such that she would executed by strangulation for adultery, only once she has entered the huppah, even though she did not yet have sex. Rava responds that a different verse already implies that such a woman is executed by strangulation. Deuteronomy 22:23 delineates the characteristics of a woman who is punished by stoning. She must be a na’arah, a virgin and not married. But if we define marriage as one who had sex, then this repetitive. Therefore, marriage is defined by entrance to the huppah. This “frees” the other verse to teach that even before she enters huppah, from the moment she is transferred to her husband’s agents, she is punished by strangulation if she commits adultery. Lucky her (and him).
  
  Daf 49a
  
  IntroductionAccording to Rashi’s understanding, this section is independent. It asks the question of whether a woman who is divorced or widowed after having been transferred over to her father’s agents goes back to her previous status, and would therefore be executed by stoning should she commit adultery.
  Rava uses a baraita to prove that once a woman has left her father’s home even by merely being delivered to her husband’s agents she no longer goes back to the status of being in her father’s house. This is learned from a verse that states that a widow or divorcee must uphold their vows. This is obvious—why would we have ever thought otherwise? In whose authority could she be for someone else to annul them? The baraita therefore teaches that even if she is widowed or divorced after being transferred to her husband’s agents, she is permanently considered part of her husband’s house.
  Papa derives that a woman who has adultery after being transferred to her husband’s agents is already considered married and is punished therefore by strangulation, as a married woman, and not by stoning, as a betrothed woman. This is derived from the words, “in her father’s home” in the mishnah. He (the adulterer) is not executed by stoning unless she has not yet left her father’s domain. Once she has been transferred to her husband’s agents, she is out of her father’s home.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak derives the same halakhah from a different baraita. The baraita says that once a woman has entered her husband’s domain, if another man has sex with her, he (and she) is punished by strangulation. This is true as long as she enters his domain in any form—even if she is merely transferred to her husband’s agents.
  IntroductionSince previous mishnayoth have been dealing with the rights a father has over his daughter, the mishnah that is in today’s section deals with his obligations to feed, clothe and shelter her. My commentary here is taken from Mishnah Yomit.
  Section one:  According to the mishnah a father is not obligated to maintain his daughters.  The Talmud gives several important comments and reservations to this ruling.  First of all, it is also true of boys.  Second, this is only true when they are over the age of six.  When they are under the age of six, the father is obligated to feed them.  Thirdly, when it says that the father is not obligated to feed them, it means that if he has no money, he need not go out and work in order to feed his kids.  However, if he has enough assets to be able to give charity, he is not allowed to use them for himself before he gives them to his kids.  Rather just as the court can force a person to give charity, so too the court can force this person to feed and maintain his children, even above the age of six.  Finally, if he has no means by which to maintain his children, and chooses not to work in order to provide for them, while the court cannot force him to work, they embarrass him publicly, stating in public “even a cruel raven feeds its kids, look at this man who is less than an impure bird”.  In summary, the only person who can get away with not feeding his kids is one who does not want to work for himself and is willing to endure public humiliation.Section two:  Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah supports the ruling in the first clause of the mishnah with a midrash based on some guarantees which are included in the ketubah and which we will see later in the chapter.  The ketubah states that sons inherit their mothers ketuboth and that daughters are maintained from their father’s estate.  Both of these guarantees are actually written into the ketubah itself.  Rabbi Elazar’s midrash is that just as the sons do not inherit their mother’s ketubah until their father dies (the father inherits it first), the daughters are not guaranteed maintenance until their father dies.  While he is alive, he is not obligated to support them, as I explained above.
  IntroductionIn today’s section the Talmud begins to explore who is the author of the Mishnah that stated that a father is not obligated to sustain his daughter.
  The Talmud reads two logical deductions into the Mishnah. First of all, he is not obligated to sustain his daughters. But he is obligated to sustain his sons. The second is that he is not obligated to sustain his daughters. But he should, it is a moral duty, a mitzvah.
  The Talmud now compares the Mishnah with the opinions found in a baraita. There are three opinions here: Meir holds that it is a moral duty feed daughters and all the more so sons.Judah holds that it is a moral duty feed sons and all the more so daughters. Yohan b. Beroka says that when the children are alive, there is no obligation to support any of them. The father’s estate is obligated to support the daughters after his death.
  The Mishnah, which holds that there is an obligation to feed sons but only a moral duty to feed daughters, does not seem to accord with any of these opinions in the baraita. In tomorrow’s section we will see the Talmud try to make the mishnah accord, at least potentially, with all three positions.
  
  Daf 49b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section a baraita was compared with the opinion of the Mishnah, and the problem was raised that none of the opinions in the baraita accord with the Mishnah. Today’s section attempts to bring each of those opinions into accord with the Mishnah.
  The first attempt is to correlate the Mishnah with R. Meir. The mishnah says that there is no obligation to sustain one’s daughter. But this can accord with R. Meir who holds that while there is no obligation, there is a moral duty. Similarly, while the mishnah said this only with regard to the daughter, the same is true for sons—no obligation but there is a moral duty. So why then did the Mishnah mention daughters and not sons? If the mishnah had said that there was no obligation to sustain sons, one might have thought that for daughters there is not even a moral duty. After all, R. Meir says that sons have priority because they study Torah. Therefore, the Mishnah taught that for daughters there is no duty, but there is a moral obligation.
  The mishnah could accord with R. Judah as well. While there is no obligation to feed either sons or daughters, it is a mitzvah. As to why the mishnah singles out daughters, it was to teach that even though the sustenance of one’s daughters is more important than the sustenance of sons, it is still only a moral duty and not an obligation.
  The mishnah could even accord with R. Yohanan b. Beroka who holds that there is not even a moral duty to sustain one’s children while one is alive. We would then need to ask, why the mishnah says that it is not an obligation, from which we could deduce that it is a moral duty. The answer is that since the second half of the mishnah teaches that after his death, his estate is legally liable to sustain the daughters, to preserve the parallelism, the first half of the mishnah teaches that while he is alive, he is not liable. 
  IntroductionThis section begins a series of enactments, “takkanot,” that were created in second century Israel. These legislative adjustments usually corrected social or economic problems that were created by Jewish law or by economic factors. They are loosely related to “tikkun olam”—the repair of the world. The original meaning of “tikkun olam” was social justice.
  While the halakhah in the mishnah stated that a father is not obligated to sustain his children, the rabbis in Usha, a village in the Galilee, that he must do so.
  The Talmud asks whether the halakhah follows the enactment in Usha. This itself is an interesting question—why would we have thought that the halakhah does not follow this enactment?To answer this question, the Talmud cites two stories in which sages publicly embarrass fathers who do not feed their children. They are compared to animals that do not feed their children: the yarod (either a crocodile or a wild bird) or a raven.Commentators take these stories to mean that the halakhah does not follow the enactment, for if it the halakhah was that the father had to feed his kids, the rabbis could have forced them to do so. They would not have been limited to applying social pressure if they could have applied legal force.
  The Talmud has a problem with the idea that ravens do not care for their young. According to a verse from Psalms, they do. The resolution is that some types of ravens do feed their young and others do not. It is not clear which ravens are good to their young and which are not. If you are a zoologist and know the answer to this question, I’d be happy to know!
  This is another story of the social pressure placed on the father to sustain his sons.
  Finally, the Talmud notes that if the father is wealthy enough, the court can force him to give tzedakah in any case. So too they can force him to feed his children, not because he is obligated to feed his children, but because he is obligated to give tzedakah.In the end, the halakhah is that a father is not legally obligated to feed his kids. If he decides not to do so, he will be publicly shamed. But if he has enough money to feed his kids, he can be forced to give tzedakah to provide for them. So in the end, it seems that the only kids who will not have parents feeding them are the poor kids whose parents don’t mind being publicly shamed for not feeding them. These kids probably would not be taken care of in any case.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains another enactment made in Usha.
  In Jewish law, once a person dies, his estate is divided up automatically among his heirs (sons, if he had them). If he wants to avoid that division of his property, for instance he wants to cut one son out of his inheritance, he will need to give his estate out while he is alive. The problem with that once he does this, he and his wife are technically penniless, and theoretically the sons to whom he wrote his estate could deprive them of food. Therefore they enacted that the sons are obligated to feed them.
  Zera brings up a different case where the sages had ruled that a woman was provided for, and which should make it obvious that she is provided for in the earlier case as well. This other case is one where a man died and left behind a widow and daughter. The widow is maintained by the estate that the daughter inherited. This is a guarantee written in her ketubah. When the daughter marries, the husband of the daughter gains rights to her property, and when she dies, he inherits from her. Nevertheless, even though her son-in-law now owns the estate, the widow is still sustained by the estate. All the more so this would be true when the father is still alive, and these are her own sons to whom he has given the estate.
  The Talmud concludes that if we had only had the other case, of the widow, we would have thought that she is sustained because she has no one else to provide for her. But in the case of the father who wrote his property over to his sons, the father could go to work and provide for her. We might have thought that since the father could work, neither of them are sustained from the estate he wrote to his sons. Therefore, the enactment taught us that they are.
  As occurred with yesterday’s enactment, the Talmud asks if this enactment is the observed halakhah. The answer again comes from a story. In this story, R. Yonatan forces a man’s children to feed him, in a case where he had written all of his estate to his children. The fact that R. Yonatan has to force him, implies to the Talmud, that this is not the halakhah. If the halakhah had been that the sons had to feed their father, no “force” would have been necessary.The end of this passage is similar to yesterday’s—legally, the sons are not obligated to provide for the parents. But they are forced to do so anyways.
  
  Daf 50a
  
  IntroductionThe fiftieth daf of Ketubot (!) begins with another enactment made in Usha. 
  According to this enactment, a person should not spend more than a fifth of his money on tzedakah or in observance of any other mitzvah. One who overspends on observance of mitzvoth might in the end come into need of charity himself.
  R. Nahman offers a midrash to support the law that one should not spend more than a fifth of one’s money on mitzvot. Jacob vows to give God a tenth—but he doubles the word “tenth” implying that he gives twenty percent. The Talmud notes that once one has given ten percent, the next ten percent will be less than the first. The total will not be twenty percent. To resolve this, R. Ashi says Jacob implied that the second tenth will be the same as the first. 
  We have now learned three enactments made in Usha. The first enactment was transmitted by three amoraim, the second by two, the third by one. To remember their order, R. Shimi bar Ashi invents a mnemonic device. These are found occasionally in the Talmud. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with another enactment made in Usha, this time with regard to education. It is a fascinating glimpse into some of the educational practices of the third and fourth centuries C.E.
  According to this takkanah, a person should gently educate his child from the age of 1-6, but once the child has passed this age, he should do so with threats of violence. The question is—what were people doing prior to the takkanah? What problematic behavior was the takkanah coming to correct? Violent education at an early age, or gentle education for too long? There is no clear answer to this question. Indeed, we do not really know that much about the educational system of this period.
  The takkanah is contradicted by a statement of Rav made to R. Shmuel b. Shilat, who seems to have been a school teacher. Rav told the teacher not to accept students under the age of six, but that once they reach the age of six, he should “stuff them like an ox” which seems to mean to teach him copious amounts of material, perhaps even with violence, despite the fact that he has not reached the age of 12.The Talmud resolves the difficulty by noting that this does not necessarily mean with violence. From the age of 6 through 12, he should accept students and stuff them with material, probably mostly for memorization. If the child still has not learned much by the time he is 12, he can begin to threaten him.
  The second resolution is that the text that referred to teaching gently until the age of 12 referred to Mishnah, a more advanced subject. But the text that referred to learning the more basic subject of Scripture (Tanakh) was from the age of six. After six, Scripture should be taught with violence. This is supported by a statement made by Abaye. His mother (or perhaps his wet-nurse, if Abaye’s mother died at his birth) gave him some information as to when children are developmentally ready to take certain steps. A six year old boy is ready to learn Scripture. When he reaches the age of 10, he is ready to learn Mishnah. The second half of the statement refers to fasting. A boy is ready to fast at the age of 13, whereas a girl, who on average matures faster, is ready already at the age of 12. To this day, this remains normative practice.
  Abaye’s mother (or nurse) now proceeds to relate to him some folk medicinal remedies. This type of information is found throughout the Talmud. It seems that this woman has some expertise in matters of remedies and other forms of medicine.
  There are two versions of a statement made by R. Katina. According to the first one, at least as it’s understood by the Talmud, a person who brings his child to school at too early of an age will run after him to try to bring him good health, but will never succeed. According to the other version, he will be so advanced in his studies that his friends will chase him but never catch up. And both, according to the Talmud, are true. It is dangerous to teach a child at a very early age. But if it succeeds, the child will end up being a superb student.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with yet another takkanah (enactment) made in Usha.
  When a woman is married, her husband has the rights to the interest, the usufruct, that accrues from her property. If she sells the principle, the husband will still have rights to the interest. According to this takkanah, when she dies, the husband can recover all of the property. What this means is that he has “ownership” rights to the property and so when he inherits from her, he may seize it from those who bought it. This takkanah would obviously serve as a deterrent to purchasers. Basically, the only way they will ever derive benefit from the land will be if the husband dies before the wife. In such a case, they will inherit the property.
  In this little vignette we see how rabbis learned during the Talmudic period. They heard traditions, and then they repeated them multiple times until they had them memorized.
  In this section, a midrash on Psalms connects to the topic of the mishnah—feeding or sustaining one’s children. While a father is not obligated to sustain his children, it is a righteous thing to do, one that can truly be done “at all times.” R. Shmuel b. Nahmani finds another way to perform “righteousness at all times”—to raise an orphan and find them a spouse so that they can begin their own family. This should be an inspiring message to anyone who adopts a child.
  The Talmud now segues into midrashim on similar verses from Psalms. How does one’s “righteousness endure forever”—either he teaches students, or he writes out Scripture and loans them to others so that the Torah can spread.
  In this midrash, again on Psalms, the two sages try to interpret the connection between having grandchildren and peace on Israel. According to the first interpretation, grandchildren bring peace on Israel because once one’s daughter has kids with her husband, she will not require levirate marriage (yibbum) or the release therefrom. It seems that people were troubled by yibbum because it meant the woman was marrying someone she never really agreed to marry. The second sage connects it to inheritance. Once one has grandchildren, he can be assured that his inheritance will pass to his own flesh and blood. In contrast, if his daughter dies without children, there is a chance that his inheritance, that he passed on to her in the form of her dowry, will go to the husband and then to children that the husband has with a different wife.
  
  Daf 50b
  
  IntroductionIn the mishnah, R. Elazar offers a midrash on two clauses written in the ketubah. According to the first clause, a woman’s sons will receive their mother’s ketubah, even if she predeceases her husband. I explained this briefly in my discussion of the mishnah, and it will come up again later in the Talmud. According to the second clause, once the father dies, his daughters will be maintained by his estate.In today’s section, some amoraim continue to relate to these two clauses, offering another comparison between the sons’ inheritance rights and the daughters’ rights to sustenance.
  Hamnuna and R. Joseph were sitting and learning, evidently, in front of a large group of students. R. Hamnuna said that just as orphan girls are sustained only from the land that their father leaves after his death, and not from movable property (animals, objects, etc.), sons inherit only land, and not movable property. But this is absurd—everyone knows that sons inherit land and movable property. After all, where else would this movable property go?Joseph aids him by suggesting that he was referring not to regular inheritance, but to the sons’ inheritance of their mother’s ketubah. When the sons inherit their mother’s ketubah, over and beyond their share of their father’s inheritance, they receive this inheritance only from land. This is a subject to which we will return much later in the tractate. R. Hamnuna accepts R. Joseph’s correction gracefully.
  The other possibility is that Rav was providing these daughters with actual sustenance, i.e. food. The word “aliyah” could be translated as “upper chamber.” This would accord with an enactment made in some upper chamber, that orphan daughters should be provided for even from movable property.
  The Talmud now tries to prove whether movable property can be used to sustain orphan girls or just for their dowries. In this first case, it seems like Shmuel orders that R. Banai sustain some orphan girls with movable property.
  The Talmud rejects this understanding of the R. Banai story, preferring to interpret it in connection with dowry. We already know that according to Shmuel, when it comes to dowry, we assess the father’s property, including any movable property that was part of his estate.
  We can see that this issue remained contentious during the Talmudic period. There were rabbis who did order that movable property be used to support the daughters. But R. Nahman had some strong objections, and even went so far as to threaten any judge who issued such an order.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss whether daughters receive sustenance out of the movable property left in their father’s estate.I should note that the Talmud presumes an economy based on land. That is to say, that most people’s wealth was tied up in real estate. By the geonic period (800-1100) this was clearly no longer true. The geonim in Babylonia, and subsequently rabbis in Europe, who also lived in an economy that was far less based on land, for the most part changed these laws. It was actually one of the major adjustments in Jewish law made by the geonim.
  Again, we see how contentious this issue was. Two amoraim wish to sustain daughters through movable property, but they are rebuked by another rabbi who tells them that the two great rabbis of the previous generation, R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish, both held that daughters are not to be sustained from movable property.
  Elazar too wants to sustain daughters from movable property. But he is warned that even if he does so out of mercy, and not because the law dictates that he must do so, there remains the problem that people will see and establish it as a permanent halakhah. For some reason R. Shimon b. Elyakim perceives this to be a problem. Perhaps he fears that the orphan boys will be left with nothing to sustain them.
  Joseph orders that daughters be sustained from dates that have already been taken off the tree. The problem, as is pointed out by Abbaye, is that even creditors do not collect movable property such as this from an estate. So how could R. Joseph give the daughters dates that have already been harvested? In the end, R. Joseph explains that he was giving them the rights to unripe dates still on the tree. Such dates have the status of land, and therefore can be used to sustain the daughters.
  
  Daf 51a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss the issue of sustaining daughters from movable property that was left as part of the father’s estate.
  In this story an orphan brother and sister come in front of Rava. Evidently, the their father left only movable property in his estate, which in theory belongs only to the boy, under the assumption that movable property is not used to pay for a daughter’s sustenance. Rava finds a way to maintain the girl while still observing this law. He increases the allotment given to the boy so that it can also be used to support the girl. He notes that had the boy wanted to pay for a handmaiden, he would have been provided with the funds to do so. Since this girl is also his sister, and will help him out around the house, all the more so is this allotment justified.
  According to Rabbi, daughters and wives are indeed sustained from movable property.
  When it comes to landed property left in the estate, the judges can take property from the sons in order to sustain the daughters. If some daughters have taken too much, it may be taken away and given to other daughters. If some sons have taken too much, it may be taken away and given to other sons. If the estate is large and the daughters seized more than they need for their sustenance, then the property may be seized for them and given to the boys as inheritance. However, if the estate is smaller, then it goes to the daughters as sustenance. The boys will not receive much inheritance if at all.
  However, when it comes to movable property, daughters do not have rights to it if there are sons. Thus if daughters seize this property, it can be taken away from them and given to the sons.
  The halakhah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Elazar—these payments are extracted only from landed property.In the geonic period (800-1100) this law changed. Because most Jews did not own land during this period, the rabbis said that debts, including the ketubah, dowry, and sustenance could all be claimed from movable property, which would include cash and any other belonging.
  IntroductionThe mishnah now begins to delineate a list of guarantees that a woman has that are normally written into a ketubah but that even if they are not included in her personal ketubah, she nevertheless receives.  In other words, these are rights guaranteed to any wife regardless of what is actually written in her marriage contract, or regardless of whether she even has a marriage contract.The first section deals with the two most basic aspects of the ketubah:  1)  that a virgin receives 200 zuz and a widow 100 zuz; 2) that all of the husband’s assets are a lien for his ketubah.
  Section one: Even though the husband never wrote for his wife a ketubah, she still is able to collect the minimum amount of 200/100.Section two: If the husband writes in the ketubah that a field worth a maneh (100 zuz) is the collateral for the ketubah, and he doesn’t write that all his property is a lien, all of his property is still liable to be used to pay off the ketubah.  In such a case, the husband or the husband’s inheritors cannot say to the wife, “Here is your 100 zuz field that is your ketubah”.
   One of the basic rights guaranteed in the ketubah is that a husband will pay a ransom for his wife, should she be taken captive.  Even if this clause is not written into the ketubah, the husband is still liable, for it is a court-established condition.As we learned in chapter two, if a woman is captured there is an assumption that she was raped by her captors, who are assumedly not Jews.  Sexual relations with a non-Jew render a woman forbidden to marry a priest.  Therefore if this woman was married to a priest he must still pay her ransom, but he doesn’t return her to being his wife.  If she was married to an Israelite, she may return to him in any case.
  Section one: In this section a husband tries to divorce his wife upon hearing that she has been taken captive (we are obviously not dealing with an ideal marriage). He says he will give her her get and pay her the amount guaranteed in the ketubah and then she can ransom herself.  The mishnah rules that this is forbidden. This is because as soon as she was taken captive he became liable to pay for her ransom, whether she is his wife or not. Therefore, he must first pay for her ransom and then if he wishes to divorce her and pay the ketubah he may do as he pleases.Section two: If a woman becomes sick or is injured, her husband is liable to pay for the costs of her treatment. These costs are part of the costs of her maintenance (food, shelter and clothing). In contrast to the previous clause, if the husband wishes to he may divorce her, pay the ketubah and not have to continue to pay for the cost of treatment.  This is because a husband does not have to pay the costs of maintaining his wife after having divorced her.  Although this may be a cruel, dastardly thing to do, a husband is allowed to divorce his sick wife.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the first ketubah stipulation—that a husband must pay a 200 zuz ketubah (marriage payment) to his wife (if she is a virgin) and 100 if she is a widow/divorcee.
  The mishnah seems to accord with R. Meir who holds in the first mishnah of the fifth chapter that a man who tries to lower the ketubah level owed to his wife, his intercourse is deemed to be “fornication.” We will discuss this mishnah in greater depth when we study the fifth chapter. R. Judah allows for a mechanism by which the ketubah payment may be lowered, and therefore he does not seem to accord with our mishnah here in the fourth chapter.
  The second half of the ketubah clause referred to in the mishnah contains a pledge of property that creates a lien on the debtor’s assets. The debtor, in this case the husband, who is obligating himself to pay the wife, promises that all of his property will serve as a lien for her ketubah. Should he not pay, she will be able to seize his property, even if he has sold it meanwhile to a third party (encumbered property). According to the mishnah, this guarantee exists even if the husband did not write it in the ketubah. This seems to accord with R. Judah who holds that if such a clause is not written in the document, the creditor may still collect from encumbered property, because we assume that the clause was omitted due to a scribal error.So now we have a problem—the first clause of the mishnah accords with R. Meir whereas the second clause accords with R. Judah. Before this is solved, the source of the dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah over whether the omission of the guarantee is considered a scribal error. This is a mishnah from Bava Metzia 1:6. Note that in the mishnah, it is R. Meir and the sages who dispute. The Talmud assumes that the “sages” should be identified with R. Judah.
  Generally, when a debtor pays back his debt he would take the document and tear it up, so that the creditor could not collect it again.  If one found a debt document, one could therefore assume that it came from the creditor.  However, according to this mishnah in most circumstances one should not return it to the creditor for there is a concern that the debtor and creditor colluded to defraud a third party.  I will explain. If the debtor had written a lien on his property in the document the creditor could take from this property if the debtor defaulted.  For example let us say that Reuven loaned Shimon 1000 dollars and Shimon put a lien over all his property.  After the loan Shimon sold his property to Levi and then Shimon lost all of his money (stock market crash!).  Reuven can now collect his debt from the property sold to Levi.  The mishnah is concerned that Reuven might make a deal with Shimon for Shimon to pay back, let’s say 500 dollars, and then to deny that he paid back anything and then Reuven would collect Shimon’s sold property from Levi.  Lest such collusion had been committed one should not return debt documents that have written in them liens.  According to Rabbi Meir, if no lien was written in the document there is nothing to fear and one may return it to the creditor.  According to the Sages all loans done through documents imply a lien on the debtor’s property, whether or not this is written specifically in the document.  Therefore no debt documents may be returned to the creditor.
  
  Daf 51b
  
  IntroductionThis is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section, which discussed the problem of the first half of the mishnah according with R. Meir (the ketubah amount cannot be less than 200 for a virgin and 100 for a widow/divorcee) and the second half with R. Judah (if the clause creating a lien on his property is omitted, the lien is created anyway).
  The Talmud points out that we cannot resolve the problem by positing that R. Meir distinguishes between a woman’s ketubah, where the absence of the pledge would be considered a scribal error, and other documents, where the absence of such a pledge would not be considered a scribal error (and thus the creditor could collect only from free assets). This solution would have allowed the mishnah to accord with R. Meir. The problem is that there is a baraita which says that the absence of such a pledge prevents the creditor (in the case of the ketubah, the wife) from collecting from encumbered property, both for regular debt documents and the ketubah. Thus in both cases, the absence of such a clause is not considered a scribal error. Since this baraita must accord with R. Meir, we know that R. Meir does not distinguish between the two.The baraita mentions other situations in which a person can collect only from free assets. Since they are not important for understanding the larger context, I am not explaining them here.
  The Talmud now begins to resolve this difficulty, first such that it accords with R. Judah. The mishnah here in the fourth chapter refers to a case where the woman did not write to her husband “I received from you one hundred zuz”—in the absence of her explicitly forgiving him, he must pay the full amount. But it does not mean to say that she cannot forgive him the full payment. As we learn in the fifth chapter, R. Judah holds that she may do so. In sum, he is obligated to pay the full amount, but this does not mean that she cannot forgive him some of this debt.
  The Talmud now resolves the mishnah according to R. Meir. If he does not write the pledge of property into the ketubah, he indeed has not created a lien on his property. She will not be able to collect from encumbered property. However, she will be able to collect from free assets. This is what the mishnah means when it says “he is obligated.”
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, if a woman is taken captive, the husband must redeem her and restore her as his wife. The implication of this is that even if she is raped, she is still permitted to return to her husband. We will see in the Talmud that despite this mishnah, there were rabbis that believed that a raped woman would not be allowed to stay married to her husband, even if he is an Israelite.Rape is a very sensitive subject, even more so than murder. We should realize that the way we think about rape today is not the same as the way people thought about it not all that long ago. Clearly there were and still are men (and maybe women too) who think that a woman who has been raped is somehow “defiled.” Human Rights Watch reports that many women in Africa, raped by militia men, are not accepted back by their husbands. This is a real problem that still exists. There were some rabbis who probably thought this as well, but it was not the dominant position.
  According to Shmuel’s father, if a woman is raped, she is treated like a willing adulteress and may not stay married to her husband. The Talmud adds an explanation—we fear that while it began as rape, by the end of the act, it might have been willing. I realize that this is an awful way of imagining a woman being raped. I should also note that it might be that the original reason for Shmuel’s father was not connected to the concern that in the end, she was willing. It seems that early halakhah did not take into account consent. Acts were judged based on what physically happened. The editors of the Talmud may not have subscribed to this original reasoning and therefore added on the tag that we are concerned lest at the end she was willing. This would explain why these words are in Aramaic.
  Rav cites the ketubah clause of the mishnah as a refutation against Shmuel’s father. The ketubah clause proves that even if we are concerned that she might have been raped as a captive, she is allowed to stay married to her husband.Shmuel’s father cannot find any response, a sign of intellectual weakness in the Talmud. Rav even cites a verse used in reference to those who cannot respond to a difficulty raised on their reasoning.Interestingly, Shmuel’s father could have responded that the law was more lenient with a captive woman. After all, the captive woman may not have been raped, and we know from the second chapter, that there were various leniencies in this matter. This would differ from a normal case where we know a woman was raped. In my opinion, the Talmud is in fact, making Shmuel’s father look foolish to purposely discredit his view. The Talmud believes that this halakhah, that a raped woman may not return to her Israelite husband, is clearly wrong.
  The Talmud concludes its discussion of Shmuel’s father’s ruling by noting that he must admit that there is such a case where the Torah allowed an Israelite woman who had been raped to return to her husband. This is read below explicitly from a verse. Such a case can happen, according to Shmuel’s father, if witnesses hear her objecting to the rape, from the beginning to the end. Otherwise, he holds, we must be concerned that before the rape was over she consented. Again, this is clearly not something with which we would agree today, nor is it even something with which the other rabbis in the Talmud agreed.
  Rava diametrically opposes Shmuel’s father. Rava holds that even if we know with certainty, that by the end the act was no longer rape, she is still permitted to return to her husband. She would not be considered an adulteress unless she willingly engaged in sex with another man from the outset. If it began with rape but ended in desire, then we imagine that she was not by the end engaging in sex truly in accordance with her own will. Rather, it was simply her urges.Again, I realize that the idea that a woman would desire sex with a man after he began to rape her is against our beliefs. Rava though is not saying that we assume she did. Rather, he is saying even if we know that this happened, as unlikely as it might be, we still do not consider this woman an adulteress.
  The baraita is based on a midrash of Numbers 5:13, concerning the “sotah.” The Torah explicitly states that if she was “seized” she is not considered a sotah. The midrash here is on the word “and she,” which seems extraneous. “She” was not seized, and therefore she is permitted to return to her husband. But there is another category of women who is permitted to return to her husband even if she was not seized, i.e. at least part of the act was done with her consent. This is the case which began in rape and ended in consent. Such a woman is permitted to return to her husband, as Rava said.
  A Kohen may not stay married to his wife if she was raped. The rules governing the Kohen are different from those governing an Israelite. In many cases, kohanic law works according to “facts”—i.e. what actually happened, and not the intent with which something was done.
  This last midrash is a bit odd, but it tries to address a case where a woman intends to commit adultery, but really is not considered as having done so. Rav Judah teaches that if a woman’s original marriage was a mistaken one, in other words there was a problem with the act of betrothal, then even if years later she has a child, she is not considered married. She may simply refuse this marriage and go on her way. Should she have sex with another man this is not considered adultery for she was never married in the first place. She only thought she was married.
  IntroductionThe final section of this daf discusses women who were taken captive and were assumed to have been raped. Are they permitted to their husbands?
  Women who are kidnapped are assumed to have been raped by their captors. This is true even if we see them seem to be helping them by bringing them bread and weapons. However, if the captors let them women go and the women come back, they must be considered willing adulteresses and they would be prohibited to their Israelite husbands.
  There are two categories of captors here—the king and highwaymen. The question is when do we assume that the woman would have been willing to have sex with the captor? As we shall see, there are two issues here—whether he would want to marry her and whether she would want to marry him. That is why there are two opposite baraitot.
  Ahashverosh, according to this passage, was a great king. A woman taken captive by him would know that she would have no chance of being married. Therefore, when he has sex with her it is considered rape. But Ben Netzer was, according to Rashi, a bandit king. A woman taken captive by him would have hope that he would marry her. Therefore, she is prohibited.
  A woman taken captive by a highwayman like Ben Netzer would hope that he would marry her, because he was a rich and powerful man. So if she has sex with him, this is considered to be willing adultery. But no woman would want to marry an ordinary highwayman. Therefore, it is considered rape and she would be permitted to her Israelite husband.
  Ben Netzer is somewhere in between a king and a highwayman. He is not so great that he wouldn’t want to marry a woman he took captive. But he is great enough that a woman might want to marry him. Therefore, a woman taken captive by him is assumed to have been willing to have sex with him and she is prohibited to her Israelite husband.
  
  Daf 52a
  
  IntroductionA kohenet (a woman married to a Kohen) who has been taken captive may not stay married to her husband. Nevertheless, he must redeem her and restore her to her people, probably meaning her father’s home.This week’s section begins a discussion over women taken captive who were in a prohibited marriage. Is this like the case of the Kohen, who must redeem his wife even though she is prohibited to him?
  A high priest may not marry a widow (a regular priest may). If he does and she is taken captive, he must redeem her because the ketubah clause applicable to her is still relevant—she is the wife of a priest and he can redeem her and restore her to her people.A mamzeret or netinah cannot be married by an Israelite. In this case, if the Israelite does marry her he is not obligated to redeemed her because the ketubah clause written for the wife of an Israelite reads, “and take you again as my wife.” Since he cannot stay married to her, he cannot fulfill this clause and therefore it is not applicable.Abaye, in short, reads the ketubah literally, and asks if the appropriate ketubah clause is still applicable in each of these situations.
  Rava holds that a husband is obligated to redeem his wife only if the reason she cannot stay married to him is the fact that she was taken captive. This is true for a priest’s wife. But in both cases mentioned by Abaye there is another factor prohibiting her to him—the marriage was prohibited from the outset. Thus in these cases he is not obligated to redeem her.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned of a dispute between Abaye and Rava concerning the obligation of a husband to redeem his wife in cases where he cannot stay married to her. Abaye says that as long as the ketubah clause remains applicable, he must. Rava says that if he cannot stay marry to her because she was taken captive, then he must redeem her. But if the marriage was prohibited from the outset, then he does not have to redeem her.
   The Talmud tries to pair up the dispute between Abaye and Rava with a dispute between R. Eliezer and R. Joshua. In the case which they discuss, the husband takes a vow that his wife may not receive any benefit from him. This vow means that he must divorce her and give her her ketubah. But before he can do so, she is taken captive. According to R. Eliezer, he must redeem her and give her her ketubah, even though he cannot stay married to her.According to R. Joshua, he need not redeem her. He only gives her her ketubah. R. Natan clarifies that R. Joshua only refers to a case where he made the vow and then she was taken captive. For if he also referred to a case where the woman was taken captive, the husband could simply take a vow that she could not receive any benefit from him and thereby avoid redeeming her.
  The Talmud now tries to pair up the amoraim with the tannaim, by assuming that R. Joshua and R. Eliezer refer to a wife of a priest. Such a wife would not be allowed to stay married to him even without the vow. Abaye would hold like R. Eliezer—since the ketubah clause, “I will return you to your people,” is still applicable, he must redeem her. And Rava would hold like R. Joshua, since she was prohibited even before the captivity, he need not redeem her.
  The Talmud rejects the first interpretation of the baraita and suggests an entirely different context. The woman made the vow not to derive benefit from her husband and the husband did not annul the vow, despite the fact that he does have the ability to do so. R. Eliezer holds that her husband is ultimately the one to blame for not having annulled the vow. Therefore, he must redeem her, even though she will be prohibited to him. R. Joshua holds that she is to blame for disrupting the marriage, and therefore he need not redeem her.
  The Talmud now refutes the interpretation of the baraita that says that she took the vow. If she vowed not to derive any benefit from her husband and R. Joshua blames her for the consequences, why does she receive her ketubah?
  If she made the vow, then it doesn’t matter whether she vowed and then was taken captive or the opposite. In either case, we would not have to worry about him being deceitful.Thus, this interpretation of the baraita is utterly refuted. Stay tuned for tomorrow’s exciting conclusion to this sugya.
  IntroductionThis is the end of the discussion between Abaye and Rava over whether a husband must redeem his wife even if she is prohibited to him. In this section each amora tries to say that both R. Eliezer and R. Joshua could agree with him.
  Here Abaye interprets the baraita to accord with his view, that the husband’s obligation to redeem his wife depends on whether the ketubah clause is still applicable.A high priest married to a widow must redeem her, because her ketubah reads, “And I will restore you to your people.” This is still applicable.An Israelite married to a mamzeret or netinah is not obligated to redeem her because her ketubah clause is not applicable—he cannot restore her as his wife.A priest who takes a vow that his wife may not benefit from him is like a widow married to a high priest—since the ketubah clause is still applicable, he must redeem her.The tannaim only disagree about an Israelite who vows that his wife not benefit from him. Originally, when the marriage was formed, the ketubah clause was valid—had she been taken captive before the vow, he would have been obligated to redeem her. R. Eliezer says that we follow the applicability of the ketubah clause at the beginning of the marriage. R. Joshua says that since by the time she is taken captive the clause is no longer applicable, meaning he cannot stay married to her because of the vow, he need not redeem her.Thus Abaye succeeds in interpreting the baraita so that both R. Eliezer and R. Joshua could agree with his principle.
  Rava says that if the marriage was prohibited at the outset, all agree that the husband need not redeem her. The tannaim disagree if the marriage was permitted at the outset, but then became prohibited because of the vow, and then the woman was taken captive. Again, as with Abaye, R. Eliezer says we follow the original status of the marriage, and R. Joshua says that since the marriage was prohibited by the time she was taken captive, he need not redeem her.In the end, the dispute between Rava and Abaye is over the widow married to a high priest—Abaye says he must redeem her and Rava says he need not. There is also a dispute over a priest who vows that his wife may not benefit from him. Abaye says he must redeem her, whereas Rava would say the tannaim argue over this, R. Eliezer says he must redeem her and R. Joshua says he need not.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses some of the laws related to the husband’s obligation to redeem his wife from captivity.
  This baraita deals with a woman who is taken captive right around the same time that her husband dies. The baraita teaches that the heirs are obligated to redeem her only if her father knew of her captivity before he died.
  Rav tells Levi that orphans are never obligated to redeem their father’s wife, since part of the ketubah clause is that he would restore her to him as his wife. Since he’s dead, this ketubah clause is in essence void. The responsibility to redeem her will fall on her community.
  According to the first opinion, if the captors ask for more than the wife is worth (evidently there were established values for such things), the husband must pay the exorbitant amount, but only one time. Subsequently, he is not obligated to redeem her for more than her value.According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, captives may never be redeemed for more than their value. Doing so would incentivize the captor or other captors to take more captives. Even if the husband wants to redeem her, he may not.
  
  Daf 52b
  
  The opinion of Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel in this baraita seems, at least according to the Talmud, to contradict his opinion in another baraita. Here the limit is the value of her ketubah, whereas above, the limit was her value.
  The answer is that R. Shimon b. Gamaliel has two lenient rules—the husband must redeem her only if the ransom is less than her ketubah and less than her value. If it is higher, the community will have the responsibility to redeem her.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the husband’s responsibility to pay for his wife’s medical care.
  This baraita addresses the topic of a widow’s medical care. According to the first opinion, medical care is like maintenance—just as the orphan’s must maintain her by providing food, clothing and shelter, so too they must pay for all of her medical bills.Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel limits this to medical costs that have no limit, which are like food, which also has no fixed limit. Since this is akin to regular sustenance, the orphans must pay the full costs. But if the medical costs are not ongoing, they have a set amount, then the costs are reduced from her ketubah.
  Evidently, blood letting is considered ongoing regular treatment. Therefore it is not reduced from her ketubah. So let’s let some blood!
  Yohanan’s relatives come to him for advice. Their deceased father’s wife is costing them a lot of money because she needs medical treatment on an ongoing basis. R. Yohanan instructs them to manipulate the halakhah such that this is considered a fixed-cost treatment, which means that the costs are deduced from her ketubah. Thus the relatives will not have unlimited costs and the woman will basically be paying for her own medical care.In the second half of this story, R. Yohanan regrets having given his relatives advice that would allow them to save money at the cost of their father’s wife. Rabbis are not supposed to serve as “legal advisers,” those who advocate for one side in favor of the other. At first, R. Yohanan thought this was appropriate because he was doing so on behalf of his family. But then he realized that this is not appropriate for an important man to be doing. He should not be favoring one side over the other.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a Mishnah that contains some of the ketubah clauses that a husband must guarantee to his wife upon marriage. Even if he does not write these into the ketubah, he is obligated by them.
  The “ketubah” in this mishnah refers to money that the wife brought into the marriage as a dowry.  When a wife dies her husband inherits this money and it becomes officially his property and not just his to use, as it was during the marriage.  Written into the ketubah document is a guarantee that this wife’s male children will inherit this amount over and above their inheritance from the remainder of  the father’s estate.  For instance, let us say that a woman marries a man.  She brings into the estate property in the value of 1000 zuz, has five male children and then she dies.  The husband inherits this money and then remarries, this time a wealthy woman, who brings 10,000 zuz into the marriage and then has one son and dies.  When the husband dies, he leaves an estate of 15,000 zuz.  The one son of the rich woman inherits 10,000 zuz off the top.  This is his mother’s ketubah and although it became his father’s property, he inherits that amount separately from the general inheritance (as long as it still exists).  The five sons from the first marriage split the 200 zuz from their mother’s ketubah, each son taking 200 zuz.  There are now 4,000 zuz left in the estate and each son takes an equal portion, except for the oldest son who takes a double portion.The purpose of this ketubah clause is so that a rich father-in-law will write a handsome dowry for his daughter.  A father-in-law might fear that his son-in-law will have children from another wife and these children will inherit property that he wanted to see his grandsons have.  Through this guarantee a father-in-law can be more certain that his property will stay with his blood relatives.
  A husband is liable to support his wife’s daughters until they are taken in marriage.  As we learned above in mishnah six, this refers to after the husband’s death.  Even if he doesn’t write such a clause in the ketubah, he is liable for it is a condition laid down by the court.
  When a husband dies, his wife may remain in his house and continue to receive maintenance money from his estate.  This right is guaranteed, whether or not it is written in the ketubah.  The woman only loses this right when she claims her ketubah.The men of Jerusalem and Galilee wrote as was described in section one.  However, the men of Judea “Until the heirs wish to pay you your ketubah” instead of “throughout the duration of your widowhood”.  This means that the heirs may also take the initiative. If they wish to pay her her ketubah and cease the maintenance payments, they may.  [She, of course, can also take the initiative and request her ketubah].  In contrast, according to the version written in section one, if the heirs wish to pay her the ketubah and stop maintenance payments, and she doesn’t agree, they may not do so.  Only she can make that decision.
  The point of the “male children ketubah” is so that fathers will give their daughters a generous dowry, knowing that their property will pass to their grandchildren and not to the children that their son-in-law has with another woman.
  This question gets to the heart of the rabbinic anxiety concerning the “male children ketubah.” If the Torah wants the sons to inherit, then how can the rabbis create an institution that subverts this by encouraging and even mandating that men pass their inheritance through their daughter to their grandsons?
  The Talmud defends the “male sons ketubah” by reading into Jeremiah the imperative that a father provide for his daughter so that she will find suitors. Clearly in pre-modern times the dowry was an extremely important social institution, and would have been necessary for a woman to find a proper match.
  Interestingly, these two amoraim set limits for how much a person can give for his daughter’s dowry. It seems that in Babylonia there was a problem that the dowries were too large and they were causing men to go broke. Part of the problem with the dowry is that unlike inheritance, it is given when the father is still alive, or at least often is. Should the father give too much dowry, he may not be left with money to live on. We will see such a story in the beginning of next week’s daf.
  The Talmud now begins a series of questions concerning the particular details of how the “male children ketubah” works. The first question is why the sons inherit both parts of their mother’s ketubah—the dowry their mother’s father wrote to her and the marital payment their father wrote to their mother? If the goal of this institution is for fathers to write a large dowry for their daughters, then it would have been sufficient for the sons to inherit just the dowry.The answer is that having the sons inherit the marital payment given to their mother by the husband encourages the father to write a large dowry for his daughter. The father will write a larger dowry knowing that his grandchildren will also inherit money promised to his daughter by their father.
  If the father does not give the daughter any dowry (perhaps he has no property), then why should the sons inherit their mother’s ketubah? After all, the point of this inheritance was to incentivize the father to write more for his daughter. The answer is that the rabbis did not make distinctions such as these—in all cases, the sons inherit their mother’s ketubah.
  Why do only boys inherit their mother’s ketubah? Why not daughters—after all, this would further ensure that the father wrote a substantial dowry? The answer is that the rabbis made this follow the general lines of inheritance—boys inherit, girls do not. And even in a case where girls do inherit from their fathers because there are no sons, they still do not inherit their mother’s ketubah.
  The sons who inherit their mother’s ketubah do not collect from movable property left in the estate. This is because it is treated like the woman’s collection of her ketubah—she only collects from land (as we learned earlier in this chapter).However, the sons are not like their mother. When a woman collects a ketubah, she can take even from encumbered property (property with lien on it). But since the sons are inheritors, they collect only from unencumbered property, as inheritors always do.
  In order for the sons of the two (or more) wives each to receive their mother’s ketubah, there needs to be at least an extra dinar for them to all divide evenly as “biblical inheritance.” This is because the rabbis did not want the “male children ketubah” to uproot biblical inheritance, which is all equal.I realize that this was a difficult and complicated passage. I do hope that in a future book, Reconstructing the Talmud, Volume II, you will be able to read a longer analysis of this subject.
  
  Daf 53a
  
  IntroductionThe fascinating story in this section illustrates how burdensome the institution of the dowry could be on fathers. Scholars have shown that for whatever reason, the cost of dowries seems to have risen significantly in this period.
  Papa is going to his future “mehutan” (father of his son’s wife) to have a ketubah written out for his son—meaning to negotiate a dowry with Abba of Sura. He tries to enlist Judah b. Meremar, a locally known figure of authority, to come along. Judah b. Meremar does not want to go because he is afraid that his presence will cause Abba to write too large of a dowry, thereby depriving his sons of their inheritance. R. Papa tries to assure him that the rabbis wanted fathers to write large dowries, as we learned in a statement of R. Yohanan at the end of last week’s daf. This is why the instituted that sons inherit their mother’s ketubah.
  Judah b. Meremar insists that even if he just goes in to see Abba b. Sura, the latter will feel compelled to give too large of a dowry. But he loses this argument.
  Judah b. Meremar enters and sits silently. We, the listeners, know that he does not want Abba b. Sura to give too large of a dowry. But Abba b. Sura does not know this. He thinks Judah b. Meremar’s silence is due to his dissatisfaction with the level of the ketubah. In the end, Abba gives all of his possessions to his daughter. Only after he has committed himself, does he realize his error. It is too late. Abba b. Sura will live out his life in poverty and his sons will have no inheritance.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with various questions concerning a woman who sells her ketubah. What this means is that should her husband divorce or die before she does, the purchaser will receive the ketubah. But if the woman dies before the husband, the purchaser will be out of luck because the husband never owes her the ketubah. The reason that she sells her ketubah is that she wants cash now and is willing to forego the future payout. The question asked in this sugya is if she sells (or gives up) her ketubah, do the various ketubah rights still apply?
  If a woman sells her ketubah and then dies, the purchaser gets nothing. The question that R. Yemar asks is whether her sons still inherit her ketubah after her death, as they normally die when she predeceases her husband.
  Rava says to R. Yemar that instead of asking the question about a woman who sold her ketubah, he should ask it about a woman who forgave her ketubah. Meaning she simply told her husband that he does not need to pay her the ketubah.Yemar responds that he believes the question is better asked about a woman who sold her ketubah. In such a case we could claim that she was compelled due to her need for cash. Therefore, since she sold under a sort of “duress,” her sons still receive their mother’s ketubah. But with regard to a woman who forgave her ketubah, we could not make such a statement. There would be more reason to say about such a woman that her sons do not receive their mother’s ketubah.
  Rava now explains all of the possible situations with regard to whether sons inherit their mother’s ketubah after she gave up her right to it. If she sold her ketubah, Rava holds that her sons still retain their rights to her ketubah. This is because she was compelled to sell it because of her need for cash.On the other hand, if she simply forgives her ketubah, her children lose their inheritance rights.
  Rava now combines the two situations he “knows” and asks what the law is if she sells her ketubah to her husband. He resolves this by saying that this woman is like one who sells it to others. Since she does so out of her need for cash, her sons still inherit their mother’s ketubah.
  Idi b. Abin raises a difficulty by offering an analogy to another situation. He refers to a mishnah in which a man goes abroad and does not return. His wife remarries thinking that he is dead. When he returns, the children from her previous marriage and the children from her current marriage do not inherit their mother’s ketubah. The problem is that we just said that she loses her ketubah—so why say that the children do not inherit. R. Papa answers that this mishnah refers to the potential of the male children to their mother’s ketubah. In other words, not only will she not receive her ketubah, but if she dies while the husbands are still alive, the children will not inherit their mother’s ketubah from their father.Idi then adds that here too we could have “excused” the woman. She married because in the absence of her husband, she simply desired a new husband. Therefore, just as we say that a woman who sold her ketubah was “compelled” by her need for cash, so too a woman who remarries before she is sure that her husband is dead was “compelled” by her desire to get married.The resolution is that in that case the rabbis penalized her for remarrying before she was sure her husband had died. That is why her heirs do not inherit their mother’s ketubah. But if she sells her ketubah, her sons still inherit the ketubah, should she die before her husband. She was compelled by her need for money.
   According to R. Elazar, if a woman forgives her ketubah to her husband, she loses all of the rights that are included as part of her ketubah, the right to maintenance—food, clothing and shelter. R. Hisda accepts this from Rabin b. Hanina but he notes that this is an awful law. The woman did a favor for her husband—she told him that he need not pay her the ketubah. And now the law denies her the right to be supported by him. Since R. Elazar stated this, and R. Elazar is a “great man,” R. Hisda must accept it. But he does not like it. 
  IntroductionThe story in this section deals with the obligation of a man to bury his fiancée. A husband has the obligation to bury his wife—that was stated clearly in an earlier mishnah. But it is not so clear that he has the same obligation towards his fiancée.
  A man whose betrothed wife died comes in front of this group of rabbis. They order him to either pay for her burial or pay out the ketubah
  Hiyya uses a baraita to prove that if a betrothed wife dies, the husband need not bury her or provide her with her ketubah. An “onan” is the status of a mourner before the relative is buried. Basically, this baraita does not consider a betrothed wife to be a wife, at least not with regards to burial or other benefits and responsibilities. It effectively refutes the earlier ruling that the man either has to bury her or give her heirs the ketubah.
  A woman collects her ketubah only when she becomes eligible to marry another man. If she dies, therefore, she does not receive her ketubah.
  Rabin arrives in Babylonia with a tradition that a betrothed woman who dies does not receive any ketubah or ketubah benefits. Abaye tells him that while this is true, R. Hoshaia already taught the same thing in Babylonia. In other words, you people from Israel think that you are so innovative—you should know that we in Babylonia have already taught the same thing.
  
  Daf 53b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section refers back to the ketubah clause in which the husband guarantees his wife that their daughters will be sustained from his estate after his death. The mishnah says that they retain this right until marriage. But our section asks what happens if they reach maturity and are not yet married.
  According to Rav, the daughters are maintained until they are married. But Levi holds that they lose this right as soon as they reach puberty.
  In this section, the Talmud basically concludes that all amoraim agree that if the girl is married or she reaches the age of maturity, she loses her rights to maintenance. The only disagreement is over a girl who is betrothed before she reaches maturity. According to Rav, since she was betrothed, she is no longer maintained by her father. According to Levi she loses her right only if she is married.
  In the first source here, tannaim debate the same question as the amoraim did—does a daughter lose her rights to sustenance from her father at betrothal.The R. Joseph source says they lose this right “when they become wives” but the meaning of this statement is uncertain.
  According to Rashi, the question asked here is the same as above—does a betrothed orphan girl receive sustenance from her father’s estate.Judah evidently did not say anything about this issue. So R. Joseph argues that the girl does not receive sustenance from her father’s estate because we can assume that her fiancée would provide for her since he would not want to see her disgraced by having to beg for food.Hisda argues the opposite—since the fiancée is not sure he will end up marrying her, he will not provide for her. To ensure that she is still being provided for by someone, she receives sustenance from her father’s estate.
  In this version the same claims are made by the two amoraim but the positions are reversed—R. Joseph holds that she is maintained by her father, R. Hisda holds that she is not.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to ask whether certain categories of women are sustained by their husbands or not.
  This is a mnemonic device to remember the names of the rabbis who were asked these questions and the topics they were asked about.
  A minor girl who is married off by her brother or mother may refuse the marriage when she reaches majority age (if she is married off by her father, she may not refuse the marriage). Such refusal annuls the marriage. R. Sheshet is asked whether she is sustained from her father’s estate once she has refused the marriage and has returned to her father’s home.
  The baraita refers to three women who are betrothed but are still in their father’s house when the marriage is terminated either by death or divorce, or she is waiting for the yavam, her deceased husband’s brother, to marry her. In all of these cases, the first opinion (the tanna kamma) holds that she is still maintained by her father’s estate. R. Judah seems to hold the same thing—as long as she is in her father’s home, she receives maintenance from his estate. So what is the halakhic difference between them?Sheshet answers that the difference is with regard to the minor who refuses marriage. The first opinion holds that she is sustained by her father’s estate. R. Judah holds that since she left her father’s house in marriage, she loses her rights to maintenance even should she return to his house after refusing marriage.
  When a woman’s husband dies and he had no children, she is liable for yibbum—levirate marriage—with her husband’s brother. Resh Lakish asks what the law is if she marries the brother-in-law and has a daughter with him and then the father (the yavam) dies. Is the new husband’s estate liable for her maintenance? On the one hand, only the first husband’s estate is liable to pay the wife’s ketubah. Since the daughter’s rights to maintenance are a responsibility of the first husband, the estate of the yavam (brother-in-law) should be exempt. On the other hand, if the first husband did not leave sufficient funds to pay for her ketubah, the yavam’s estate is liable to pay for it. Thus perhaps the daughter should be maintained from his estate, because her mother might receive her ketubah from there.The question remains unanswered.
  
  Daf 54a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to ask whether certain categories of women are sustained from their father’s property.
  In Tractate Yevamot there is a list of women who are prohibited as second degree incest prohibitions. This includes, for instance, one’s grandmother. Betrothal with such women is possible but is prohibited. R. Elazar asks if the daughter of such a union receives sustenance from her father’s estate. On the one hand, we would think that she does not, since her mother does not receive a ketubah. On the other hand, her mother might have been penalized for her transgression of marrying a man prohibited to her. But that does not mean the daughter should be punished—after all, she did not do anything wrong.The question remains unanswered.
  Men and women are not supposed to have sex before marriage, even if they are already betrothed. But, things happen, and therefore Rava asks whether the daughter of a betrothed woman would be maintained by her father’s estate, should he die. On the one hand, the mother has a right to a ketubah even though she is only betrothed. Thus, the daughter should be maintained. On the other hand, the actual ketubah is usually written out only at marriage. Using this logic, the daughter should not be maintained.The question is not answered.
  Papa asks about a daughter born from a woman not married to her husband. The Talmud refers to a daughter born out of rape, but in my opinion, the original question was really with regard to a simple case where the parents were not married. Nevertheless, the Talmud reads this literally as referring to a case of rape.A man who rapes a woman must pay a fine of 200 dinar (=50 selas). According to R. Yose b. R. Judah, in addition, when he marries her (as he must), he owes a ketubah of 100. Since she has a ketubah, there is no doubt that her daughter must be maintained. But the other rabbis hold that this fine basically is the ketubah payment. He marries her but does not owe her a ketubah. The question is—does her daughter receive the right that is owed to her based on the ketubah. On the one hand, since the mother does not have a ketubah, the daughter has no rights. On the other hand, her mother does not really need a ketubah. The point of a ketubah is to deter divorce. A husband who was forced to marry a woman because he raped her does not have the right to divorce her husband. Therefore, her daughter would be maintained from his estate.Again, no answer to this question.I want to reiterate here that the laws of rape are highly theoretical. The rabbis were aware that such a woman would probably not want to marry her rapist. These laws are a relic of a system that was no longer in effect in rabbinic times. I understand that they are disturbing to many people, but this is the nature of ancient law.
  IntroductionA widow may dwell in her deceased husband’s house for as long as she remains a widow. Today’s section and tomorrow’s puts some limits on this right.
  The mishnah gives the right to the wife to remain in her husband’s house. Rav says that if they live in a tiny little hovel, the heirs can ask her to leave, but they must continue to provide her with her needs. Mar son of R. Ashi says that since she is not living with them, they are not even responsible for her maintenance, but the halakhah does not agree with him. Seems to me like the halakhah strikes a balance here. If it is too crowded, she does not get to live there, but they still must support her.
  According to the mishnah, the wife loses her rights to maintenance only when she actually gets remarried. The amoraim move this up to the point where she demonstrates that she is ready to get married. Clearly, according to these rabbis, if she accepts a marriage proposal she loses her rights. But even if she turns one down because it was an inappropriate match, she still loses her rights. Since she implies that she is ready to get married, she loses her rights to stay in her husband’s home. But if she turns down a match because she is still pining away after her husband, she has shown she is not yet ready to get married and she does not lose her rights to sustenance.
  IntroductionThe amoraim continue to discuss under what conditions a woman loses her right to be maintained from her husband’s property.
  According to R. Hisda, if she fornicated, meaning had sex with someone while a widow, she loses her rights to maintenance from her husband’s estate, because this is demonstrating that she no longer wishes to remain a widow. According to R. Joseph, if she put on makeup or colored her hair, she is showing that she is ready to get married and she loses her rights to maintenance.The Talmud now compares these two opinions. R. Hisda would hold that all the more so she loses maintenance if she puts on makeup or dyes her hair. These are even clearer indicators that she is ready to remarry than is fornication.However, R. Joseph would hold that if she fornicates, she still is entitled to maintenance. She desired to have sex with someone and therefore, in some senses, was not in control of her actions. This is not an exhibition of a desire to remarry—it is simply an exhibition of sexual desire which cannot be helped.
  The Talmud now rejects the above statements. The only woman who loses her ketubah is one who demands her ketubah in court. Clearly once she has received her ketubah payment from her husband’s estate, she loses her rights to maintenance. This is explicit in the mishnah. But, according to Shmuel, even if she merely claims her ketubah, she already loses maintenance.
  There are other acts that can also cause a woman to lose her maintenance—these are basically selling or pledging away her ketubah. So why say she loses maintenance only if she claims her ketubah in court? The answer is that the other acts cause her to lose her ketubah whether done in court or not. But claiming her ketubah must be done in court—if she claims it outside of court she does not lose her right to maintenance, since claiming the ketubah outside of court will not have any effect. In other words, simply desiring to move on and receive her ketubah is not sufficient for her to lose her rights to maintenance. She must make an effective step towards recovering her ketubah payment.
  Introduction
  This section refers back to the Mishnah which lists different customs as to what is written in the ketubah. I am copying the Mishnah here for reference:If he did not write for her, “You shall live in my house and be maintained from my estate throughout the duration of your widowhood”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court.Thus did the men of Jerusalem write.The men of Galilee wrote as did the men of Jerusalem.The men of Judea used to write: “Until the heirs wish to pay you your ketubah”. Therefore if the heirs wish to, they may pay her her ketubah and dismiss her.
  We can see from this section that practices differed as to how to write the ketubah—some followed the practice in Judea, which Rav ruled was the halakhah. Others followed the practice in the Galilee, which Shmuel ruled was the halakhah.
  Rav Nahman deals with a situation where a woman from Mehoza, which is close to Babylon, marries a man of Nehardea. The practice follows his custom, which in this case is better for her.The Talmud concludes by noting that the region that follows Nehardean custom follows the regions that use the Nehardean kav, a unit of volume that seems to have differed from that used elsewhere.
  IntroductionThis section discusses whether the clothes that a widow wears when she collects her ketubah count as part of her marital payment. In other words, are the clothes hers or are they her husband’s, since he was the one who bought them for her.
  According to Rav, when a widow collects her ketubah, the clothes she wears need to be assessed because they are reckoned as part of her ketubah payment. According to Shmuel they are not.
  Hiyya b. Avin says that the positions of the two amoraim are reversed in the case of a hired worker who receives his clothing from his employer. R. Kahana says that the same positions hold. He then adds a mnemonic to remember what Rav, who seems to be his teacher, said—strip both a widow and an orphan (the hired worker). Both of them must either return their clothes to their husband/employer or count them as part of their payment.
  Nahman cites a mishnah that supports Shmuel’s ruling—a wife’s clothing belongs to her and therefore is not assessed as part of her ketubah. In this mishnah, a man dedicates his belongings to the Temple. His belongings do not include his wife’s clothing, thereby proving that they does not belong to him.Despite the fact that the mishnah supports Shmuel, the halakhah follows Rav.
  Nahman explains that while the mishnah seems to follow Shmuel, it really can also agree with Rav. Rav would say that while she does own the clothes while she is married to him, when she leaves his household to remarry (when she collects her ketubah), the clothes no longer belong to her. He gave them to her for her to use while married, not for her to depart with them. It’s sort of like a buffet—no doggie bags.
  In this story some orphans trick their father’s wife (not necessarily their mother) into wearing all of her clothing when collecting her ketubah. When she gets to court, Ravina rules that they must be assessed as part of her ketubah. Had she not worn them, she could have collected her ketubah payment from elsewhere, not just her clothes. Tricky orphans!
  IntroductionThe fourth chapter ends with a few stories.
  A father designates a certain object to be his daughter’s dowry. For instance, he says that she will receive ten ounces of gold. By the time the daughter gets married, the price of gold has gone down. The daughter now wants more gold to equal the value of the gold her father designated for her, but the inheritors, the father’s sons, want to give her only ten ounces. R. Idi b. Avin rules that she only receives the ten ounces.
  
  Daf 54b
  
  In this case, the value of the object set aside for dowry rises. The daughter wants to receive the same amount of wine even though it is now worth more. R. Joseph says that she receives the lower amount of wine, still worth 400 zuz. The profit, meaning the extra wine she does not receive, goes to the orphans.
  The wife in this story is consuming a great amount of food (or costing too much maintenance). The sons are worried that she will consume their inheritance. R. Yohanan says that if the father designates for her a plot of land, she will only be sustained from there. Sort of like a trust fund.
  Resh Lakish disagrees vehemently with R. Yohanan. If the husband designates a plot of land for his wife, he has simply given her more maintenance. R. Yohanan in the end seems to acquiesce.
  According to R. Abbahu it depends on whether the husband says “towards maintenance” or “for maintenance.” If he says the latter, he has limited her maintenance towards the field that he designates for her.
  Congratulations on finishing another challenging chapter of Talmud. There were some difficult portions in this long chapter, but the end took a welcome (in my opinion) turn towards the practical. While the text is still a document written thousands of years ago, I believe that its discussion of the responsibilities that a husband has towards his wife still have meaning in our lives today, even if we perceive them to be mutual. What responsibilities do partners have to maintain the other partner’s lifestyle choices? What responsibilities do they have in times of need or danger? At what cost? These are still issues that are relevant today.Tomorrow we begin chapter five which contains some of the most famous and interesting material in the entire Talmud! Stay tuned.
  IntroductionAs we have learned on several occasions, the minimum ketubah payment is 200 zuz.  The mishnah that opens chapter five discusses a man who wants to add on to that amount or one who wants to subtract from the amount.
  A husband may increase his wife’s ketubah by whatever amount he so desires.  Clearly wives from rich families would have demanded higher guarantees.  Without this mishnah one might have thought that the rabbis set an amount that was meant to be equal for all women.  This would have prevented a wife from a poor family from being embarrassed that her ketubah is less than that of a wife from a rich family.  The mishnah teaches that a husband is allowed to increase the amount and that we are not concerned lest poor folk are embarrassed.Both the first opinion and Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah agree that if the wife is divorced or widowed after having been betrothed but before having been married, she collects the basic payment of 200/100.  However, there is a disagreement with regard to the extra amount.  According to the first opinion, she collects that amount as well.  Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah says that the extra amount is collected only upon marriage, for the only reason that he wrote the extra amount was in order to marry her.  If, for whatever reason, the betrothal is terminated before marriage, she does not receive the extra.
  This section deals with a man who wants to write a ketubah of less than 200/100 for his wife.  Note that the wife does not object.  Evidently she (or her family) wants this man enough that she is willing to compromise on the amount of the ketubah.  Rabbi Judah says that the husband may employ a legal fiction whereby he can reduce the ketubah.  First he writes the full ketubah of 200/100, as is normally done.  Then she writes him a receipt for 100/50 zuz, even though she never received that amount.  This means that when he does pay the ketubah, he will be liable for only 100/50 more zuz.  In this way, Rabbi Judah retains a legal fiction whereby the actual ketubah does state the normal amount.  Someone looking at her ketubah will not know that he has not abided by the fixed ketubah amount of 200/100.  He also allows a husband with lesser means to marry.Rabbi Meir says that anyone who writes less than 200/100 and then engages in sexual intercourse with his wife is having licentious sex.  A financial guarantee that binds the man to the woman is distinguishes marriage from prostitution.  Without a large enough guarantee a husband could “buy” a wife for a night, and divorce her the next day.  Indeed other cultures, including Arab culture, had what was called “a wife for a night”.  There is even some reflection of this practice in the Talmud.  Rabbi Meir takes a strong stance against this practice.
  It seems obvious that a husband could give his wife a larger ketubah. So why would the mishnah need to state this? The answer is that we might have thought that the ketubah is a set amount, sort of like the half-shekel donation to the Temple. This way it would not embarrass a man who couldn’t afford a larger one. The mishnah teaches us that it is not. A person can give as much as he wants.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to interpret the mishnah from the beginning of the chapter.
  The Talmud reads the mishnah as supporting a statement by R. Yannai. According to this statement, any of the additions to the ketubah, meaning any amount over the basic amount, has the same regulations as the ketubah itself. The Talmud will now list these regulations. Most of these laws are explained in depth elsewhere in the tractate, so the explanations here are of necessity, quite brief.
  
  Daf 55a
  
  There are twelve rules/issues which are the same for both the base part of the ketubah and the addition:If a woman sells her ketubah to another person or forgives her ketubah, she has sold or forgave the entire amount, not just the base 200/100.If she rebels, she loses her entire ketubah. We shall learn what “rebels” means later in this chapter.Damaging the ketubah means that she stated that some of it was paid back to her. She can collect the rest only with an oath. This is true even if she “damages” only the additional part of the ketubah.If she claims her ketubah, she loses the right to be sustained by her husband. This is true even if she only claims the additional amount.If she transgresses “the law” (a category we will learn about in chapter seven) she loses her entire ketubah, base and additional funds.The “improvement” here refers to improvements made by orphans after the death of the father. Let’s say he designated a field for her ketubah and then died. If the orphans improve the field, she does not receive this improvement. This is also true of the additional amount.There are times when a woman needs to swear an oath to recover her ketubah. These laws are the same whether she is recovering the additional amount or the base.The sabbatical year does not annul a ketubah debt, neither the base nor the additional amount.If one assigned all of his property to his sons and wrote a small amount to his wife, and she signed off on this, she has lost the rest of her ketubah, base and addition.A ketubah is collected from real estate, but the lowest type of real estate. The same rule applies to both the base and the addition.A woman living in her dead husband’s home can collect the ketubah for as long as she wants, but once she moves out, she has only twenty-five years in which to collect. This is true for the base and the additional amount.Sons inherit their mother’s ketubah over and beyond their share of their father’s inheritance. This is obviously true of all parts of the ketubah, the base and the extra.
  IntroductionThis section begins a series of disputes concerning marital law between the rabbis of Pumbedita and the rabbis of Mata Mehasya, both important centers of rabbinic learning in Babylonia.
  This dispute is about the preferential inheritance sons receive of their mother’s ketubah, a rule we learned in chapter four. As a reminder, if a man has two wives and they die before he dies, and then he dies, the sons of each mother collect her ketubah, and then the rest is divided evenly. This way the sons of the mother with the larger ketubah receive a larger inheritance. The issue at hand is whether they take this inheritance even from property their father had sold or mortgaged to others. If they are like creditors, taking their mother’s ketubah as she would have taken it had her husband died first, then they may seize the ketubah from mortgaged or sold property. Basically, in this conception of the rule, they stand in the place of their mothers. But if they are like inheritors, then just as inheritors take only what is actually left in the estate, so too they collect only what is left in the estate.The rule is that they collect only what is left in the estate. This is in accordance with our reading of the mishnah—“they shall inherit their mother’s ketubah.” In Mata Mehasya they had a different reading of the mishnah—“they shall collect.” According to this reading, they are creditors and would collect even from sold or mortgaged property.
  If a man designates movable property for his wife to take as her ketubah, and when he dies, that property is available, she may collect that property without taking an oath that she has not already received her ketubah. It is obvious that her husband did not pay her the ketubah, because he said that he would pay her with these items and these items are still in front of us.However, if that movable property is not available, then there is a debate. According to those from Pumbedita, she still collects without an oath. Since he designated certain property for her, we can be sure she did not collect her ketubah from elsewhere. But those from Mata Mehasya say that since she is collecting other property, she does need to take an oath that she did not receive the property from elsewhere. The law again follows those from Pumbedita—she need not take an oath.
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of the disputes between the scholars of Pumbedita and those of Mata Mehasya.
  If a husband set aside a piece of land for her ketubah, and he designated all four borders, then we can be sure that he did not give her other property as part of her ketubah. But if he designates the piece of land only by one of its borders, then it is possible that this was not a serious designation. He might have already given her the ketubah some other time. Therefore the rabbis of Mata Mehasya say that she would collect her ketubah only with an oath, that she has not already received it. But those of Pumbedita say that she need not take an oath, and this is the accepted halakhah.
  If a man gives instructions to witnesses to write up a deed, assumedly in which he obligates himself to another person, sign it and then give it to another person, and then he performs a symbolic act giving them the authority to do this, there is no doubt that they have the authority to execute the document. But if he does not perform the symbolic act called kinyan, then the scholars of Mata Mehasya say they must consult him before they execute the document and give it to the addressee. Those of Pumbedita say he need not do so, but the halakhah is that he is obligated.
  IntroductionThe mishnah contains a dispute between R. Elazar b. Azaryah and the sages concerning a woman who is widowed after betrothal but before marriage proper. According to the former, she would only receive the basic ketubah of 200/100. She would not receive the extra amount he assigned for her unless she was actually married. According to the sages, she receives the entire amount, no matter when he dies.
  In this sugya, there is a debate over whether the halakhah follows R. Elazar b. Azariah or not, but we do not know which amora holds what. The Talmud concludes that R. Natan is the amora who said that the halakhah is like R. Elazar b. Azariah because elsewhere he seems to follow what can be categorized as “an assumption.” In our mishnah, R. Elazar b. Azariah “assumes” that the husband wrote the additional amount in the ketubah only to marry her. If he does not marry her, she does not receive the additional amount. Elsewhere R. Natan also follows the “assumption” when he rules in accordance with R. Shimon Shezuri. R. Shimon Shezuri issues two rulings.
  If a man is setting out to sea or for a long journey and he says “write a get for my wife” they may write the get and give it to her, even though he didn’t say “give it to her.” Normally a person must say “give it to her” but because this person was about to travel, we can assume that he forgot to say the full formula. R. Shimon Shezuri says the same is true for a man who is about to die—we can assume he meant to say “give it to her” for he would not have a get simply written just as he is about to die.
  The second case refers to Mishnah Demai 4:1, which reads: Terumat maaser of demai which had become mixed up again [with the produce] from which it had been taken: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even on a week day he may ask the seller and eat based on his word.The following is my commentary from Mishnah Yomit:Terumat maaser is the terumah taken from the tithe and given to the priest. One must separate terumat maaser from demai.  Usually the laws of terumat maaser are quite strict because terumah can only be eaten by a priest and non-priest who eats it is punished by “death at the hands of heaven”.  If terumah is mixed up with regular produce all of the produce can be eaten only by priests.  However, in the case in this section the law can be lenient. R. Shimon Shezuri says that if one separated terumat maaser from demai produce and then the terumat maaser fell back into the demai he may ask the seller if he had tithed the produce. [The fact that it is a weekday is here due to a contrast with an earlier clause in the mishnah, not relevant to this sugya].  If the seller says that he had tithed it, the buyer may eat the produce under the assumption that it wasn’t necessary to take out the terumat maaser in the first place.
  
  Daf 55b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we concluded that R. Natan was the amora who ruled like R. Elazar b. Azaryah of the mishnah, for both “follow the rule of the assumption.” But according to that conclusion, Rav does not follow the rule of the assumption and therefore he holds like the sages. In today’s section, evidence is cited that Rav does indeed follow the rule of the assumption.
  The dispute in this section has to do with a dying man who wants to give a gift to someone. Generally, a dying man can gift property without a symbolic act of acquisition—kinyan. He doesn’t even need a deed—words are sufficient. But this person does write out a deed and perform kinyan. The question is—should this be treated like the gift of a dying man, or like the gift of a healthy man, each of which have their own special rules.According to Rav, the gift is doubly-strong, as if it is riding on two horses. On the one hand, it has the strength of a gift given by a healthy man, such that if he recovers his health, he cannot change his mind. The gift is immediately permanent. On the other hand, it like the gift of a dying man, in that he can transfer debt in this manner—he can say that a loan owed to him should be given to a certain other person. Normally, a healthy person cannot transfer debt in this manner. Here we can see Rav “following the rule of assumption”—he assumes that this person intentionally wished to give his document the strength of a deed bequeathed by a healthy man and the strength of a gift by a dying man.Shmuel says that the document is entirely invalid because it contradicts itself. A document written by a dying man transfers property only after death, but when he wrote the kinyan in the document, he also gave the impression that the document is what affects the transfer, not his words. Since documents cannot begin their effectiveness after a person’s death, this document contradicts itself and is invalid.
  
  Daf 56a
  
  IntroductionThis is the exciting conclusion to the “who follows the rule of assumption” discussion.
  The amora who rules like R. Elazar b. Azaryah clearly “follows the rule of assumption”—the husband wrote the additional amount in order to marry her, and since he did not end up marrying her, he does not owe her this additional amount.But the other position could also be following an assumption, just a different assumption. The other position might be saying that the husband wrote the additional amount in order to draw her and her family near to him through the betrothal. Since this aim was achieved at the point of betrothal, he does owe her the additional amount.In the end, the dispute in the Mishnah and between the amoraim is not over whether or not we follow in general the rule of the assumption. Rather it is over what we assume the husband wanted when he wrote the additional amount in the ketubah.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the mishnah—does the halakhah follow R. Elazar b. Azaryah who says that if he writes her an additional amount in her ketubah and then dies before marriage, she does not collect the additional amount.
  Hanina sits in front of his master and he states that the halakhah should follow R. Elezar b. Azaryah. For this, R. Yannai basically kicks him out and tells him that the halakhah does not follow R. Elazar b. Azaryah.
  In this section there more amoraic opinions concerning whether the halakhah follows R. Elazar b. Azariah or not. In the end, the decision is that the halakhah is in accordance with him.I should note that in the post-talmudic period, this halakhah becomes irrelevant because the kiddushin and nisuin (betrothal and marriage) ceremonies are both performed under the huppah. However, the issue of what happens when two parties plan to marry and then one party backs out remained, and I would say still remains, a contentious and thorny issue.
  IntroductionMarriage occurs when a woman enters the “huppah.” Today the huppah is a symbolic room, but in the times of the Talmud, the huppah was a real room, in which intercourse should have usually occurred. In other words, marriage is defined, usually, by the first act of intercourse. But this does not always work out—sometimes the couple does not have intercourse. The question is—is she considered married?
  Joseph says that it is the “desire of the first night” that acquires her as a wife. There may be sex on subsequent nights, not just the first. But the bridal chamber, the huppah, is only on the first night. Therefore this text proves that it is his desire of entering the huppah that makes her his wife.
  Above, we resolved that huppah acquires her as wife, regardless of whether there was intercourse. The problem is that R. Joseph said that it is “the first night” that acquires, and huppah can be during the day. But sex can also occur during the day, if it is in a dark room. Therefore, the Talmud resolves that R. Joseph was just teaching us the normal course of events. Normally sex takes place at night. And since huppah is normally a prelude to sex, it too normally takes place at night.
  Ashi pushes the question a step further. If she enters the huppah and then becomes niddah (menstruant), is she married or just betrothed. Even if the huppah generally transforms her into a wife, this might be the case only if intercourse was possible. It might be that since intercourse is not allowed, she is not yet a wife. Or it might be that huppah always causes her to be a wife.The question is not answered.
  IntroductionIn the Mishnah, R. Judah says that the husband may write a complete ketubah for his wife, and then she could immediately write him a receipt for half, even though she had not actually received half of her ketubah. Today’s section deals with this portion of the mishnah, specifically with the issue of whether a receipt is written when one pays back part of a debt.
  Judah mishnah implies that when a person repays part of his debt, the creditor writes a receipt to the debtor. And yet in a different mishnah, R. Judah rules that instead of a receipt, a whole new document must be written up, in order to protect the debtor from having to pay the full amount twice, should he lose the receipt. So why does he here allow for the writing of a receipt, whereas there he demands a whole new document be written.
  R. Yirmiyah says that in the mishnah in Ketubot, the receipt the wife gives the husband is written within the ketubah itself. This way the husband (who is the debtor in this case) does not have to worry about losing the receipt. But when someone repays part of a debt, R. Judah holds that a new document must be written up so that the debtor does not have to preserve his receipt.
  Abaye says that the two situations are completely different. In the case of a regular debt document, the debtor paid back part of the loan. If the creditor writes out a receipt, the debtor might lose the receipt and then the creditor could collect twice. So R. Judah says that he must be protected by having a new document written up. But in the case of our mishnah in Ketubot, the husband did not really give her anything. She was just letting him off of the hook. Therefore we need not protect him by making him write out a whole new document.
  The Talmud asks why R. Yirmiyah didn’t agree with Abaye—after all, R. Yirmiyah’s explanation forces us to add words into the mishnah—that the receipt was written in the ketubah. The answer is that R. Yirmiyah holds that since R. Judah prohibits writing a receipt elsewhere, lest the debtor lose the receipt and the creditor collect twice, he also prohibits writing a receipt in this case, even though the man did not really pay the woman anything of her ketubah.
  IntroductionJudah in the Mishnah stated that a wife may write to her husband that she already received 100/50 of her ketubah, and then he will only owe her the remaining 100/50. The implication is that she must write out a receipt in order to forgive him from paying the entire ketubah. Today’s section explores why not.
  The mishnah here in Ketubot implies that if the woman simply forgives the husband from having to pay the entire ketubah, her words would be invalid. That is why she has to write out a (fictitious) receipt. However, elsewhere we learn that R. Judah allows one to make a verbal stipulation to get out of fulfilling financial responsibilities, even those prescribed by the Torah. A man may betroth a woman on condition that she have no claim for the three rights given to her by the Torah—food, clothing and sex. So why can’t the couple simply lower the ketubah amount through an oral agreement.
  The resolution is that the ketubah is, according to R. Judah, of rabbinic origin, whereas a wife’s rights to food, clothing and shelter are from the Torah. Normally, we would think that something that is derived from the Torah is treated more stringently. But this is not so—the rabbis strengthened their own enactments more than they did for laws derived from the Torah. Thus, since the ketubah is of rabbinic origin (according to R. Judah), she cannot forego her rights except through a written agreement.
  The Talmud now raises a difficulty from another source. A man has some rights to his wife’s property, particularly the “usufruct” basically the benefit derived from them (interest). But he can renounce those rights. R. Judah says he must specifically renounce that he is not even deriving the rights from the compound interest. In any case, what is important for our purpose is that R. Judah holds that he may renounce those rights even through an oral statement. These rights are rabbinic in origin, and yet the rabbis did not strengthen their words and demand that his renunciation be made in writing.
  
  Daf 56b
  
  Abaye resolves the difficulty by differentiating between the ketubah and the husband’s rights to produce. All women by law receive a ketubah. Since this is common (actually universal), the rabbis strengthened this law. She can forgive the ketubah only in writing. But not all women have property such that their husband’s would receive the usufruct from it. Therefore the rabbis did not strengthen this particular halakhah—he may forgive his rights through an oral agreement.
  In this scenario, two donkey-drivers enter a town with wine to sell, each disparaging their own wine and praising that of the other. According to R. Judah, they are believed. This is an issue that is of rabbinic origin, and according to the Talmud it is common (!) and nevertheless, at least according to R. Judah, the rabbis did not strengthen their words and say that the donkey-drivers are not believed.
  Abaye resolves the contradiction by claiming that the rabbis were not strict with regard to the donkey-drivers because there is only a concern that they are lying—it is not certain. The rabbis were strict only on matters that were certain, such as the ketubah.Rava says that they were not strict because they were always lenient when it comes to demai, which is doubtfully tithed produce.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah, R. Meir says that anyone who gives a virgin less than 200 zuz for her ketubah or 100 for a widow is considered to be a fornicator. Today’s section discusses this halakhah.
  According to the Talmud, R. Meir holds that one who tries to reduce his wife’s ketubah, even through a stipulation such as, “Behold you are betrothed to me on condition that your ketubah is only 100,” his stipulation is null and void and she would be married and receive a ketubah of 200. In other words, the stipulation just does not work. But if so, then we would need to ask, why his intercourse with her is considered “fornication”—which here means that it is “cheap,” almost like prostitution. After all, she will receive her full ketubah in the end.The answer is that since he said to her that she will receive only a maneh (100 zuz, half the amount), she will be worried that in the end, if he dies or divorces her, she will not receive the full amount. That is why R. Meir labels his intercourse “fornication.” In other words, the problem here is not that he is cheating his wife out of her full ketubah. It is that he is causing her to worry that she may not be properly taken care of upon death or divorce.
  We know from elsewhere that R. Meir allows a person to make a stipulation against a rabbinic law, just not against Torah law. So if the ketubah is of rabbinic origin, why can’t the husband make a stipulation to reduce the amount?The answer is that R. Meir considers the ketubah to be of biblical origin.
  This baraita is word for word the mishnah except there is a third opinion—that of R. Yose. According to the baraita, R. Yose allows a husband to write out a ketubah for less than the obligatory amount. Unlike R. Judah who forces the husband to write a full ketubah, and then the woman can write a receipt, R. Yose seems to imply that as long as both parties agree, he can write whatever amount he wants in the ketubah.
  IntroductionThis section discusses R. Yose’s opinion, that a husband may write for his wife a ketubah of any amount he/she agree on.
  The notion that R. Yose holds that there is no determined amount for a ketubah contradicts his opinion in a different baraita. In this baraita, the first opinion holds that a man may not set aside movable property to pay his wife’s ketubah. This is a “repairing of the world”—or in Hebrew, Tikkun Olam. Movable property may get lost or deteriorate in value, and this would cause her to be concerned that she would lose out on her ketubah.Yose argues that one could not make a ketubah out of movable property because their price is not set. It’s not “tikkun olam”—it’s simply illegal. The Talmud will now first explain this dispute and then explain how it relates to R. Yose’s opinion in the earlier baraita.
  The problem with the baraita is that it is difficult to determine what the dispute is—both positions hold that the husband cannot set aside movable property for the ketubah.To solve the problem, the Talmud adds in a clause. According to the first opinion may set aside movable property for his wife’s ketubah if the husband takes responsibility for them, meaning if they are lost or stolen he will replace them. R. Yose says that even if he takes responsibility for them, he still can’t use them because they will deteriorate in value. If he sets aside, for instance, three goats for her ketubah, the value of those goats will change over their lifetime.
  The Talmud now returns to the main topic. In this baraita, R. Yose is concerned lest the value of the movable property deteriorate. So how can it be that in the other baraita he seems to have no problem whatsoever with a husband who gives his wife a smaller amount in the ketubah.
  The difference between the two situations is actually quite clear. In the case of the movable property, the woman does not know whether the value will or will not deteriorate. She is not foregoing her rights to a full ketubah. But in the case of the other baraita, where R. Yose says that the husband may lessen the ketubah amount, the woman has agreed to this. If she does not agree, then she should not have married him.In other words, R. Yose holds that if the husband promises her a full ketubah, we must ensure that she receives it. But this does not mean that she cannot forgive him the obligation to pay the full ketubah.
  
  Daf 57a
  
  According to Shmuel, only R. Meir holds that the man cannot dwell with his wife without her having a ketubah, but the other sages say that this is not a problem. We should note that according to Rashi, with or without the document, she will still receive her ketubah. The issue is her anxiety. Without the document the woman will be concerned lest she does not receive the ketubah later should the situation arise. R. Meir says that this position is intolerable, but the other sages are not concerned about it.
  Abaye raises a difficulty on R. Nahman—didn’t the latter say in the name of Shmuel that the halakhah follows R. Meir whenever he makes such a decree? R. Nahman seems to agree, and therefore he tells the husband to go write a new ketubah.
  IntroductionIn this section the amoraim debate the scope of the dispute between R. Yose and the sages, concerning whether or not the husband can reduce his wife’s ketubah. The main ideas here are pretty clear, but the structure and details admittedly become somewhat complicated.
  According to R. Joshua b. Levi, R. Yose allows the wife to forgive her ketubah only before the marriage. But after the marriage has already been contracted, she may not forgive her ketubah, unless she writes out a receipt. In other words, in that case he agrees with the sages. R. Yohanan says that the same dispute remains in both cases.
  Yohanan here tries to claim that he and R. Joshua b. Levi do not dispute. To do this he reinterprets the reference points of beginning and end. R. Joshua b. Levi said that they disagree only about the moment when they enter the bridal chamber. R. Yohanan meant that the argument remains until the end of the “huppah” moment, which is really right before intercourse begins. Once intercourse has begun, R. Yose would agree that she needs to write a receipt in order to forgive the ketubah.
  As often happens, Rabin points out a different dispute between the earlier amoraim as to the dispute between R. Yose and the sages. All of the amoraim agree that in the beginning she may forgive her ketubah, but at the end, R. Joshua b. Levi holds that the sages hold that she may not do so unless she writes out a receipt and R. Yose holds that she may do so orally. R. Yohanan says that there is still a dispute.
  Yohanan again tries to say that there is no dispute between him and R. Joshua b. Levi. This version is slightly different such that it would accord with Rabin’s different version of the dispute. When R. Joshua b. Levi said that they all agree that she may not forgive “at the end” he meant at the end of the meeting in the huppah. This is when they are leaving the huppah after intercourse. All agree that this is too late for her to forgive the ketubah. But when R. Yohanan said that they still dispute at the end, he meant at the end of intercourse. As long as they have not left the huppah, R. Yose would still agree that she may forgive the ketubah.
  Papa notes that R. Abahu (quoting R. Yohanan) tries to erase the dispute between R. Yohanan and R. Joshua b. Levi, but had he not done so, he (R. Papa) could have erased the dispute between Rabin and R. Dimi by again redefining the definition of beginning and end.
  This is actually a very interesting tag to the end of the sugya. R. Papa says that he could have found a way to reconcile the reports of Rabin and R. Dimi. But this would have meant that R. Yohanan and R. Joshua b. Levi still disagree. So who cares? The answer is that it is fine for amoraim to disagree. Rabbis disagree all of the time and no one finds this to be a problem at all. But it is more problematic that later rabbis disagree over what earlier rabbis said. This calls into question the accuracy of the transmission of statements from one generation to the next and that is a problem.
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses the waiting period between betrothal and marriage.
  Betrothal may occur at an early age, but that doesn’t mean that marriage will necessarily occur any time close to the betrothal.  There are two steps described in this mishnah that occur before the marriage.  The first is that the husband tells the woman whom he betrothed that he wishes to marry her or the woman tells the man to whom she is betrothed that she wishes to get married. From that point on, if this is a first marriage, there can be up to a twelve month period in which the couple prepare for the wedding and the marriage.  This would include time to prepare for the wedding, and more importantly, time to prepare the new house and the things that will go into it.  She will use this time to prepare her jewelry and clothes for the wedding.  A widow is only given thirty days.  Since she has already been married she is more prepared for a second marriage.  Also, the second marriage was not as big of a celebration.
  If the time to get married has come and passed, and the husband has not yet married his betrothed wife, he must begin to pay for her maintenance, meaning food, clothing and shelter.  Since he is feeding her, if he is a priest he may begin to give her terumah.There is now a debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon over how much of a woman’s food a priestly husband may supply in terumah.  It is to the husband’s advantage to give her terumah since terumah is cheaper than regular, unconsecrated food since only priests may eat terumah (smaller market = lower price).  The woman will have a problem with terumah for when she menstruates and is impure she cannot eat it.According to Rabbi Tarfon, the husband can give all of his wife’s food in terumah.  If she needs to have unconsecrated food when she is impure, she can sell her terumah and buy other food.  Rabbi Akiva demands that he give her half of her food in unconsecrated food so that when she is impure she need not go to the trouble of selling the terumah. 
  If a woman is widowed while merely betrothed to her husband, her yavam (her dead husband’s brother) does not allow her to eat terumah until he has had yibbum (the consummation of levirate marriage) with her (see also Mishnah Yevamot 7:4).Above we learned that a betrothed woman is given one year to prepare herself from the time a husband requests her in marriage.  If he delays any longer, she may claim maintenance from his estate, and she may eat terumah. If she waited part of this time for the husband and part for the yavam, she does not eat terumah, even though a full year has passed.  She may only eat terumah if she waits a full year either for the yavam or for the husband.  However, if she does wait a full year for the yavam and he does not marry her (or perform halitzah) she begins to eat from his estate and she may begin to eat terumah (provided, of course, that he is a priest).According to the beginning of this mishnah, a woman might begin to eat terumah before she enters the huppah (the bridal chamber).  This would occur, if she waits for a full year and her husband does not marry her.  This final clause says that this was an earlier position, but that later tannaim ruled that in no case may a woman eat terumah before she is fully married, an act which occurs when she enters the huppah.  The Talmud will explain why the later court changed its decision.
  
  
  Daf 57b
  
  IntroductionThe mishnah ruled that a woman is given a year to prepare herself to be married. Today’s section anchors this law in the story of Rebekah from Genesis.
  When Abraham’s slave asks for Rebekah to return with him to Canaan so that she can marry Isaac, Rebekah’s brother and mother respond by asking that she remain with them for “days” or “ten.” Now what does “days” mean? If “days” means two days, the minimum of a plural, then this is a strange way of requesting something—first they asked that she stay for two days, Abraham’s servant refused and then they asked she stay with them for “ten days”? This is an impossible interpretation. Therefore, the Talmud interprets it to mean a year, which accords with the use of the same word in Leviticus. Thus we have biblical support for a girl remaining with her family for a year to prepare for her marriage.
  The word “days” is used elsewhere to mean a month. So how do we know that the girl receives a year to prepare for her wedding and not just a month? The answer is that the word “days” is compared to other cases where it is used without a modifier. We would not compare the use of the word without a modifier to a case where there is a modifier.
  IntroductionThis section discusses the how long of a delay there is for young brides before they are married. It opens with a discussion of who may demand the delay.
  The Talmud explains why the father has a right to delay the marriage until his betrothed daughter is of majority age. The young girl may be enthusiastic about getting married and not realize the burdens that come with marriage. If she is married too young, she might decide later that she wants out and then return home after a broken marriage. This is obviously not something the father would want. Therefore, he too has the right to delay the marriage.
  Minors may be betrothed, but they are not supposed to be married until they are at least 12 ½, the age of adolescence. They are too young before then. However, arrangements for their marriage may be made while they are still young. We are not concerned lest this causes the young girl to fear her impending marriage and get sick.The question of what age young girls were married in rabbinic society is interesting. Many scholars think that in Israel during the mishnaic time, girls were not married until between the age of 18-25. In Babylonia, they were married off earlier, perhaps immediately after reaching puberty. But pre-pubescent girls were not married off in either locale. In either case, we should realize that the proper age for marriage is very culturally determined.
  According to R. Huna, if a girl becomes of majority age (12 ½) and then is betrothed, even the very next day, she receives only 30 days to prepare for her marriage, like a widow. It seems that to R. Huna this was “late” for being betrothed. A girl should have been betrothed as a minor, and then married when she became an adolescent.
  According to the baraita, once a girl hits majority age, it is as if she is automatically “claimed” by her husband. This means that he does not have to formally request that she marry him (meaning move into his house). The clock starts ticking immediately. It seems like this means that she gets a year to prepare herself, which would refute R. Huna who says she gets only one month.But the Talmud resolves this by saying that the baraita means that she gets the amount of time a widow who is claimed would receive—one month.
  According to this baraita, R. Eliezer allows a husband to annul his betrothed wife’s vows once she is an adolescent and has waited twelve months and has not yet been married. The implication is that an adolescent gets twelve months to prepare for her wedding. Again, this is a difficulty against R. Huna.The baraita is therefore emended to refer to two categories. Either a younger girl who waited twelve months after her husband requested that she marry him, or a girl who reached adolescence. Such a girl will receive only thirty days, as R. Huna said.
  This baraita explicitly states that a virgin who reaches adolescence is given an automatic twelve months to prepare for her marriage. This refutes R. Huna who said that she was given only thirty days.
  Papa interprets the last clause of the above baraita, and his interpretation has some affinity with what R. Huna originally said. If she reaches adolescence and she is already betrothed, she is given 12 months to prepare for the wedding. But if she is not yet betrothed, and then 12 months pass and then she is betrothed, she is given only 30 more days to prepare. The idea seems to be that once a girl hits adolescence, she should be prepared to be married within a year. If a year goes by and she is still not married, henceforth she will be given only thirty days.
  IntroductionThis sugya discusses why the rabbis prohibited a woman from eating terumah until she reaches huppah.
  According to Ulla, from the point of betrothal, a woman is considered a priest’s wife such that she could eat terumah. However, the rabbis prohibited this lest by giving her terumah in her father’s house, where she is living while still betrothed, she come to give some terumah wine to her family who are not priests.
  The mishnah said that when the time to be married arrives, the husband may give her terumah even though she is still in her father’s home. But why are we not concerned lest she gives the terumah to her non-kohanic family? The answer is that when the time to marry comes, the husband will designate a place for her to live. [Note, I doubt that this reflects historical reality].
  If we are concerned that a person would give terumah to others around him who are not allowed to eat terumah, then why are we not concerned that a Kohen working with non-kohanim would give them terumah? The answer is that when a Kohen goes and works in an Israelite farm, the Israelite will feed him. Therefore we need not worry that the Kohen will give his terumah to the Israelites.
  Shmuel b. R. Yehudah gives another reason why an Israelite girl betrothed to a priest cannot eat terumah. The word he uses is “simpon.” “Simpon” refers to an annulment of an agreement. In this passage, originally it referred to a way of annulling betrothal. If the betrothed wife eats terumah and then the betrothal is annulled, it would turn out that she was an Israelite eating terumah which is strictly forbidden. The Talmud assumes that “simpon” means physical flaws. If the husband finds some sort of disgusting physical blemish on her (for instance a giant festering perpetual sore), he can annul the marriage (she can do the same if she finds a horrible blemish on him).The problem is that the betrothal could be annulled even after she enters the huppah, so long as they have not had sex, at which point they would see each other’s physical flaws. So why is she allowed to eat terumah as soon as she enters the huppah, even before they have had sex?The answer is that he examines her before the huppah. [Again, I do not believe that this is an accurate reflection of reality].
  The Talmud now asks why a slave bought by a priest bought from an Israelite should not be allowed to eat terumah lest the sale be annulled due to “simpon.” The answer is that there is no way that the sale of a slave could be annulled by “simpon.” If the flaw is internal or hidden, then the owner should not care about it, because the slave is bought only for work. If the flaw is visible outside of the clothes, then the purchaser accepted the flaw when he bought the slave. If the slave turns out to be a thief or gambler, the sale cannot be annulled. And if the slave turns out to be an armed robber or condemned to die, the sale cannot be invalidated because the purchaser should have known about this before he bought the slave.
  
  Daf 58a
  
  The Talmud asks the question it often does—what is the practical difference between the two reasons why a woman does not eat terumah until she enters the huppah? There are two such differences. First of all, if the husband accepts all of his wife’s defects, then R. Shmuel b. Yehudah would say that she can eat terumah immediately. But Ulla would say she cannot lest she give the terumah to her family members. The other difference is a case where the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s agents or even if the father’s agents have gone with the husband’s agents. In both of these cases the marriage could still be annulled, so R. Shmuel would not allow her to eat terumah. But she is no longer with her family, so there is no fear that she will give to her family.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah R. Akiva and R. Tarfon disputed what percentage of her sustenance a priest could give to his wife in terumah—R. Tarfon said he may give her all of the produce in terumah, and R. Akiva said only half of it may be terumah.  We should note the issues at hand here. On the one hand, terumah is cheaper than non-sacred produce because it has less of a market—only priests and their family can eat it. On the other hand, the woman would not want terumah because she cannot eat it when she is impure, for instance when she is menstruating.
  According to Abaye, R. Tarfon said that he may give her all of her sustenance in terumah only if she was from a priestly family and she was marrying into a priestly family. Such a girl is accustomed to eating terumah. Also, when impure, her family will know how to sell it for her. However, if she was an Israelite, R. Tarfon would agree with R. Akiva that he must give her half non-sacred food, so that she would be able to eat such food when impure.
  Similarly, Abaye claims that R. Tarfon would allow the husband to provide her with solely with terumah only when she is betrothed, for the same reasons as above—her family could sell it for her. But when she is married and living in her husband’s home, she will need one half of her sustenance to be non-sacred food because she will not have her family to sell it for her.
  This baraita reiterates that which Abaye stated.
  This is the continuation of the baraita. It provides more tannaitic opinions as to what percentage of her food is terumah.Judah’s opinion seems to be the same as R. Tarfon in the mishnah—both agree that the husband may give her all of her food in terumah. So what is the difference between them?The answer is that according to R. Judah, she must bother selling her own terumah. According to R. Tarfon the husband can give her the terumah, but then he must lug it to the market where he can sell it to buy non-sacred food for her when she is impure and cannot eat terumah.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to interpret pieces of the mishnah.
  If a priest dies before he has conferred upon his wife the right to eat terumah, meaning before the time for marriage has arrived, the yavam, the husband’s brother, does not confer upon her the right to eat terumah until he marries her (or delays for a year). This is because the yavam did not acquire her through the money of kiddushin—his brother acquired her.
  The mishnah is phrased slightly strangely—if we already know that she does not eat terumah if she waits for marriage with the husband 12 months less a day, then why do we need to know that she does not eat if she waits six months with the husband and six with the yavam? The answer is that this is simply the style of the mishna06h, at least at times.
  According to the mishnah, later in the development of halakhah, the rabbis prohibited a woman from eating terumah until she entered the huppah. Here one of the two amoraim that appeared in last week’s daf offers the same answer from above as to why they made this switch—because of simpon, which again means bodily defect. In other words, they prohibited her from eating terumah lest the marriage be cancelled due to some bodily defect.
  If the above statement was issued by Ulla, then we can work out a comprehensive interpretation of the mishnah and its stages in the development of halakhah. According to the Torah, a woman could eat terumah as soon as she is betrothed to a priest, but the rabbis prohibited this until the time for marriage arrived (and he designates for her a special place) lest others in her father’s household come to eat terumah. The later rabbis prohibited her from eating terumah until she entered the huppah lest the marriage be annulled due to a bodily defect.But if this opinion belongs to R. Shmuel b. Judah, it is trickier to trace a comprehensive history because both prohibitions were due to a bodily defect. The Talmud answers that originally the rabbis thought that it was sufficient for her to be examined by others, and therefore they allowed her to eat terumah when the time for marriage arrived, assuming (for some odd reason) that others would examine her at this point. Later rabbis determined that such an examination does not negate the possibility of the husband annulling the marriage. Therefore, they made her wait to eat terumah until she enters the huppah.
  
  Daf 58b
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses a man who consecrates his wife’s handiwork to the Temple.  The question is whether or not such a consecration is valid.  The mishnah often uses this type of construct to show the degree of possession a person has over something, the idea being that a person cannot consecrate something that is not his.
  When a man declares that anything his wife makes should be consecrated, she may continue to consume that which she produces.  This means that she may continue to work and sell that which she makes and use the proceeds to provide for her own maintenance.  Since the husband has an obligation to provide for her, and this amount was needed for her provisions, a husband cannot consecrate what she makes.
  However, if she produces more than that which she consumes, there is a question as to whether the husband can consecrate it.  According to Rabbi Meir, since she doesn’t need this for her own maintenance, the husband can consecrate it to the Temple.  Rabbi Yochanan Hasandlar disagrees.  He holds that even the surplus cannot be consecrated by the husband.  The Talmud will explain these opinions.Note that our mishnah probably presents a leniency to the husband.  One might have thought that after he consecrated his wife’s handiwork, he would have to give the handiwork to the Temple and still provide for her.  He cannot get out of his obligation to provide for her because that is mandated by the ketubah.  The mishnah teaches that despite his consecration he can still continue to use her handiwork to provide for her maintenance.  Of course if it is not sufficient, he will need to add from his own money to provide for her, as is always the case.
  IntroductionThis section is not directly related to the mishnah. It refers to the issue of whether a wife may say that she does not want to work for her husband, and in return is willing to forgo her rights to sustenance.
  Generally speaking there is a quid quo pro relationship between what the wife gives to her husband and what she receives. Any proceeds she makes through work go to him and he in turn supports her. According to R. Huna, she may sever this relationship. The Talmud explains that this is because R. Huna believes that her right to receive sustenance is foundational—it is her absolute right. His right to her handiwork is only to prevent enmity—he would be angry if he must provide for her, and yet she gets to keep her handiwork for herself. Therefore, she may forgo her fundamental right and in return, he would not receive his rights.
  An objection is raised from a baraita according to which his right to her handiwork is foundational and she receives sustenance only because she is giving him her handiwork. This would imply that he can sever the relationship by saying that he does not want to receive her handiwork, but she could not. This is a difficulty on R. Huna.The problem is solved by emending the baraita. Isn’t it fun when you can just change sources if they do not accord with your halakhah!
  The Mishnah rules that if a husband consecrates his wife’s handiwork, her handiwork is not sanctified and she may continue to work and eat the proceeds of her earnings. The Talmud suggests that is true even in a case where her husband can maintain her—meaning she said to him that she does not want to be sustained and she will keep her handiwork. This would support R. Huna—a wife has a right to keep her own handiwork, if she is willing to forego being sustained.The Talmud rejects this support, suggesting that the mishnah refers to a case where the husband simply cannot sustain her. Only in such a case can she keep her handiwork. But if he can sustain and wants to do so in return for her handiwork, she would not have the right to refuse this relationship.
  The problem with the above resolution is that it is obvious that a husband cannot say to his wife that she must give him her handiwork in a case where he cannot provide for her. He cannot even make such a statement to a Hebrew slave, all the more so, he could not say so to his wife. Thus we cannot assume that the mishnah would teach us something so obvious.
  The answer is that the first part of the mishnah is obvious—if he is not providing for her, obviously she can keep her handiwork. The only reason this clause is in the mishnah is to serve as an introduction to the second clause, which discusses the surplus.We should note that at the end of this section R. Huna’s rule has not been rejected. The Talmud has stated that there is no support for it from the Mishnah, but this is not the same as implying that it is wrong.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section, R. Huna stated that a woman could tell her husband that she does not want to be sustained and therefore was going to keep her handiwork for herself. According to the Talmud, Resh Lakish disagrees with this position. This disagreement emerges from his interpretation of the Mishnah.
  Resh Lakish is really asking how R. Meir, who says at the end of the mishnah that the surplus is consecrated, can say that something that has not yet come into existence can be consecrated? Resh Lakish rejects the reasoning that R. Meir simply holds that a person can consecrate something not yet into existence. Rather, Resh Lakish explains that since a husband can force his wife to give him her handiwork, it is as if her husband consecrated her hands. From this statement, the editor of the Talmud draws the conclusion that Resh Lakish disagrees with R. Huna. Whereas the latter held that a wife could refuse to give her handiwork to her husband, Resh Lakish holds that she may not.
  Although the husband did not actually consecrate his wife’s hands, and rather he clearly consecrated her handiwork (which is not effective, at least so we assume now), we treat his statement as if he said that her hands were consecrated. This is due to R. Meir’s principle that a person would not utter words to no purpose.
  From another baraita we see R. Meir holds that a man can betroth a woman in the future whom he cannot currently betroth. Since the word for “betroth” and the word for “consecrate” are nearly the same, we see here that R. Meir holds that one can consecrated something that currently cannot be consecrated.The Talmud ends up admitting that this indeed is R. Meir’s position, but that it cannot be derived from this mishnah in Ketubot, because one can explain the Ketubot mishnah in another way.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah R. Meir says that if a man consecrates his wife’s handiwork, the surplus is consecrated. Today’s section asks whether it is consecrated while she is still alive, or whether it is only consecrated after she has died.
  According to Rav and Shmuel, we won’t really know what the “surplus” is until the woman dies. During her lifetime she can consume any of the proceeds she earns. Only when she dies will we know what she did not consume and that will become consecrated.Adda b. Ahava says that the surplus can become consecrated while she is still alive.
  Papa tries here to figure out in what case the above amoraim argue. If the husband is providing her with all of that which he is required to provide her with, including an extra silver ma’ah for her other unspecified needs (spending money), then the surplus belongs to him and it should be consecrated immediately. But if he is not providing her with all that he must give her, then why would anyone hold that her handiwork is consecrated while she is still alive. What if she needs it?
  Papa now explains the situation in which the amoraim dispute, and the underlying reason for their dispute.According to Rav and Shmuel, the rabbis decreed that a husband must sustain his wife in return for receiving her handiwork. In addition, he gives her a little extra and in return, the surplus handiwork (the amount she does not need to provide for herself) is his. So if he is not giving her this extra silver coin, the surplus is not his and it will only become consecrated after her death.Adda b. Ahava switches what was enacted for what. Therefore, as long as he is providing her with the silver coin, the surplus is his.Rav and Shmuel say that the usual (sustenance) was given in return for the usual (handiwork). R. Adda b. Ahava says that the fixed sum (one silver coin) was given in return for a fixed quantity (the amount of handiwork she must produce).We should note that R. Papa’s way of thinking is exceedingly academic/intellectual. In a real home (in mishnaic times), the husband provides his wife with whatever she needs and she does whatever work she is able to do.  Also, R. Adda b. Ahava’s version of the quid pro quo is exceedingly odd—he gives her all of her needs for the surplus but only a small silver coin in return for all of her handiwork. Clearly, R. Papa is struggling to make sense of R. Adda b. Ahava’s position.
  
  Daf 59a
  
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s session, R. Adda b. Ahava said that the rabbis established that the husband receives the surplus of his wife’s handiwork in return for sustaining her. Today’s section raises a difficulty on this concept.
  A baraita is cited which specifically states that her husband sustains her in return for her handiwork. The Talmud resolves this by simply emending the baraita to read in accordance with R. Adda b. Ahava.
  This source (a piece of mishnah) is actually a difficulty on Rav and Shmuel who said that he gives her the silver coin in return for the surplus of her handiwork. The baraita seems to imply that he gives her the silver coin in return for the handiwork itself, not just the surplus.Again, the difficulty is resolved by emending the source.
  The mishnah quantifies how much work a wife must do for her husband. But this seems to imply that in return for giving her the silver coin, she gives him her handiwork.The Talmud explains that in order to determine “surplus” we must first determine how much work she must do for him.We should note that the simple meaning of that mishnah is that when he is away and is providing for her through an agent, she must continue to perform a basic amount of work for him. The mishnah does not mean that there is some sort of standard that all wives must produce for their husbands. This is the same as the list for what he gives her—it refers to a situation where he is away. When he is home, she eats what she needs and she produces what she can.
  IntroductionIn this sugya, Shmuel rules in accordance with R. Yohanan Hasandlar from the mishnah—when a husband consecrates his wife’s handiwork, none of it is consecrated. This section of the Talmud understands that this is because a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.
  Shmuel rules in our passage in accordance with R. Yohanan Hasandlar, who said that even the surplus is not sacred.This seems to contradict his ruling on another mishnah. This mishnah deals with a wife who takes a vow to prohibit her husband from benefitting from anything she does. The word “konam” is a nickname for a sacrifice, so it is as if she says, “Anything I do shall be prohibited to you like a sacrifice.” [More information about this can be found in my introduction to Nedarim for Mishnah Yomit]. The first opinion holds that such a vow is completely invalid. R. Akiva says he should annul the vow lest she produce more than she owes him. Such produce would be hers and therefore, if the husband wants this surplus, he must annul her vow. R. Yohanan ben Nuri says he must annul the vow lest he divorce her and then the vow would be valid and he would not be able to remarry her.Shmuel rules like R. Yohanah b. Nuri. This seems to imply that her vow may eventually become valid, therefore he must annul it. This contradicts Shmuel’s ruling in accordance with R. Yohanan Hasandlar who seems to hold that one cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.
  The resolution is that Shmuel said that the halakhah follows R. Yohanan b. Nuri but only in respect to the surplus. The wife has the ability to consecrate the surplus and when he divorces her, he will not be able to consume the surplus. But with regard to the handiwork itself, she cannot dedicate it because it has not yet come into existence. [This is difficult for a number of reasons, mainly because Shmuel still holds that one can dedicate something that has not yet come into existence.]The Talmud raises the difficulty that if this is what Shmuel meant to say, he should not have said that the halakhah is like R. Yohanan b. Nuri.
  Joseph says that the situation in this mishnah is different because by using the language of “konamot” a person has the power to consecrate something that has not yet come into existence. This is different from the mishnah in Ketubot, where the husband uses the language of “consecration.” Using such language one cannot “consecrate” something that has not yet come into existence.
  Abaye raises a logical difficulty on R. Joseph. A person can forbid himself to eat his fellow’s fruit, or forbid his fellow from eating his own (the swearer’s) fruit. But what a person cannot do is tell his friend that he can’t eat his own (his friend’s) fruit—that would be absurd. So then how can we rule that a person can forbid something that has not yet come into existence?
  Huna son of R. Joshua offers a completely different explanation of the mishnah about “konamot.” The woman does not consecrate/prohibit her handiwork. She cannot do this because her handiwork is not yet in existence. But what she can do is consecrate her hands, for they already exist. But she must also add that she is consecrating them only after her divorce. While married her consecration does not take effect because she is obligated to give the proceeds of her labor to her husband.
  IntroductionToday’s section asks the question whether one can consecrate something now that will become holy only in the future. This is what we saw can happen according to yesterday’s section when a woman says that anything she produces is forbidden to her husband. It is not consecrated now, but it will become consecrated in the future when/if he divorces her.
  Ilai offers an analogy to prove that one can consecrate something now that will not become consecrated till some future time. A person can sell a field to his friend and say that when (if) he repurchases the field it will be consecrated. So too, a woman should be able to prohibit/consecrate her handiwork but the effect not take place until he divorces her.
  Yirmiyah notes that R. Ilai’s analogy is not quite precise. In the case above, the person consecrating the field currently owns the field so if he wanted to he could have just consecrated it now. However, in the case of the woman who prohibits her handiwork to her husband, it is the husband who determines when she is divorced, not her. Therefore, since she cannot do something now that would make the consecration valid, the consecration might never be valid.Therefore, R. Yirmiyah adjusts the analogy to a case where the field has already been sold. The original owner can consecrate the field now, even though it is not in his ability to force the current owner to sell it back to him.
  Papa points out that the analogy is again not perfect. In the case of the field, the buyer owns both the field and the produce. But in the case of the woman, she is not owned by anybody. She owns herself and it is only her handiwork (like the produce) to which the husband has rights.Therefore, R. Papa adjusts the analogy yet again, this time to a case where a person mortagaged a field to someone else. Basically, this means he gave the other person the field until he paid back the loan. In such a case, the buyer owns the produce, but the original owner still owns title to the field.
  
  Daf 59b
  
  Again the cases are not analogous. The person who mortgaged the field can redeem it whenever he wants. In contrast, the woman cannot divorce herself.To correct this, R. Shisha adds in that the field was mortgaged for ten years. The borrower will not be able to redeem it for ten years.
  The cases are still not analogous, because while the borrower can redeem his field after ten years, the woman will never have the power to divorce herself.
  Ashi now cuts the Gordian knot and resolves the issue. While generally a consecration that is not currently effective will not take effect in the future, the votary formula of konamot can take effect in the future because is particularly powerful. Konamot is not just a promise to do something, it actually effects the body of the object itself.
  This statement by Rava supports what R. Ashi had said. Konamot (here called “consecration”) cancels a mortgage. What this means is that if I have used, for instance, an animal as security for a loan, and then I dedicate that animal to the Temple, the animal is dedicated and cannot be used to collect the loan. The debtor still owes the money, but the creditor will have to collect from other assets. The same is true in two other cases. If I use my chametz for collateral and then Pesach comes, the chametz is no longer mine and does not count as collateral. Finally, if I use a slave as collateral and then set him free, he no longer can be used as collateral.
  If konamot consecrations are so strong, then her handiwork should become consecrated immediately. Why does the consecration not take effect until he divorces her? The answer is that the rabbis strengthened the husband’s rights to her handiwork such that even if she prohibits them by using the “konamot” formula, her handiwork will not be prohibited to him until he divorces her.
  IntroductionThis mishnah delineates general household obligations that the wife has to her husband.  Note that although the Mishnaic portrayal of marriage was not equal, meaning men and women did not perform the same functions, there is reciprocity. A husband must financially support the woman (among other responsibilities) and a woman must give her handiwork to her husband and perform daily chores around the house.
  This section lists the basic categories of work that a wife must perform for her husband.  Note that nursing was considered “work” and not primarily an opportunity for a woman to “bond” with her child.  Our mishnah assumes that women would prefer to pay a wet-nurse to nurse their child. The Talmud states that this list contains only the broad categories of work but that there are other things that a wife must do for her husband.
  If a woman brings slaves as dowry into the marriage, she is no longer responsible for all of the work.  The more slaves she brings into the marriage, the less she is obligated to work.
  Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the previous statement, that if a wife brings four slaves into a marriage she may sit around and do nothing.  A husband can always force his wife to make wool, an easy task but one that would keep her busy, for too much idle time may lead her to unchastity.  We can note that this mishnah espouses what many Americans hold as an ideal:  work and keeping busy not only provides for oneself, but also protects one from trouble.While Rabbi Eliezer says that a husband can force a wife to work, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that a husband cannot prevent a wife from performing work. A husband cannot take a vow prohibiting his wife from working for such idleness might lead her to being insanely bored. A rich husband might want his wife to sit around all day and do nothing, just so that everyone can see what a rich man he is and that his wife need not work. In order to protect the woman, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that a husband does not have such a right.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to discuss the mishnah.
  The Talmud cannot imagine that a woman would have to grind grain. This is very heavy work, usually done with animal or water power. Therefore, the mishnah must either mean that she supervises getting this work done or that she grinds with a hand mill.
  The Talmud cites a few statements by R. Hiyya that seem to disagree with the mishnah that could be read as emerging from the mishnah. The mishnah portrays marriage as a mutual relationship in which the husband sustains his wife and the wife does household work. It is a family economy. R. Hiyya pictures marriage as fulfilling other girls, emphasizing a wife’s beauty and her childbearing abilities.I think that by noting different aspects of marriage, the Talmud is in essence saying that human beings engage in marriage for a wide variety of reasons, and in truth one.
  IntroductionToday’s passage begins to discuss a wife’s obligation to nurse her child. I should make a few notes about nursing in this period. First of all, it seems quite clear that rich women would at least have preferred not to have to nurse. Clearly most women would not have been able to avail of the services of a wet nurse, but it does seem that those who could, would. Second, the rabbis perceive of nursing as an obligation that a woman has to her husband. She is responsible for nursing his child, because he is responsible for the child’s food. I am not saying that this is the way people would have perceived nursing. This is the legal way that the rabbis relate to it.
  The Talmud cites a baraita in which Bet Shammai’s opinion seems to disagree with the mishnah. According to the mishnah, a woman must nurse her child. But according to Bet Shammai, a woman may take a vow not to nurse her child. Were she obligated to nurse the child, she would not be able to take a vow to get out of her responsibility.In the baraita, Bet Hillel holds that the woman may not take such a vow. Clearly, they hold that he is obligated to nurse the child.If she was divorced all agree that she is no longer obligated to nurse her child. But if the child will not nurse from anyone else, then she must nurse the child to save its life. However, the husband would have to pay the wages of a wet nurse to the mother. Again, this shows that the husband is responsible for feeding his child. If his wife is no longer married to him, she has no responsibility.
   The Talmud tries to shift our understanding of the dispute in this baraita such that Bet Shammai could agree with the mishnah. The baraita could refer to a situation where the woman took the vow and the husband confirmed the vow—he did not annul it. According to Bet Shammai, since he did not annul the vow (as is his right), he is at fault and she need not nurse the child. Bet Hillel holds that the woman is at fault, since she is the one who vowed. Therefore, she needs to nurse her child.But all would agree that in principle a woman is obligated to nurse her child, as it says in the mishnah. The dispute is over who is to blame in a case where she vowed and he upheld the vow.
  The Talmud rejects this understanding. If the two houses were arguing over who is to blame in a situation where she vows and he upholds the vow then the argument should be over a broader case. The woman simply vows not to provide any benefit for her husband. The fact that the dispute is about the specific case where she vows not to nurse her child means that the dispute is about the obligation of a wife to nurse her child.Furthermore, there is a baraita that explicitly says that according to Bet Shammai, a woman is not obligated to nurse her child.
  
  Daf 60a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf (60!) continues to discuss nursing. Last week we learned that a woman who has been divorced must continue to nurse her child if the child recognizes her. Today’s section asks how old a child must be for him to recognize his mother and refuse to nurse from another.
  Here we have three different opinions as to how old a child usually is such that he recognizes his mother’s breast milk and will not nurse from another.
  Shimi b. Abaye rules that it takes the child fifty days to recognize his mother.But then the Talmud asks whether a child could really recognize his mother within 30 days, as Shmuel says. Is such a precocious child even possible?Basically the Talmud thinks this is not possible. Therefore Shmuel’s original statement is replaced with an alternative statement. There is no set time at which we can assume a child recognizes his mother—as soon as he recognizes her, his mother is legally obligated to nurse the child.
  The woman in this story has been divorced and does not want to nurse her child, but the father evidently wants her to. The child is examined and the child recognizes his mother. The mother tries to hide, but she is not successful. While she will get paid for doing so, she is in the end obligated to nurse her child.A blind child could recognize his mother based on taste or smell.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the interesting topic of how long a child is allowed to continue nursing.
  According to R. Eliezer, the limit for nursing is 24 months. Beyond that and it is considered forbidden to nurse, as if one is eating a “sheketz” which could be loosely translated as a repulsive thing.  
  The Talmud raises a long baraita that seems to contradict R. Eliezer who holds that human milk is prohibited. According to this baraita, it would have been logical for human milk to be strictly prohibited because human beings have a far greater potential to be impure through contact than do beasts. Since the milk of beasts that one cannot eat (pig, camel, etc.) is forbidden, thus human milk should also be forbidden. Therefore, the rabbis locate a midrash that explicitly permits human milk.Human blood is also not prohibited. We might have argued that the blood of all animals is prohibited and therefore human blood should also be prohibited. Again, a midrash is located which states that human blood is not prohibited.Sheshet even adds that it is totally permitted to drink human milk.
  The resolution is that R. Eliezer prohibits the child from nursing directly from the mother after twenty-four months. But if the child receives the milk from a cup, it is not prohibited by the Torah.
  When it comes to blood, if it is found on a loaf of bread, he must scrape the blood off before he eats it. But if one’s teeth or gums bleed, he need not spit the blood out.
  In a different baraita R. Joshua states that the child can nurse until he is old enough to carry his bundle on his own shoulders. [My daughter in first grade has a huge backpack].The Talmud says that this is the same age—about four or five.The halakhah is in agreement with R. Joshua—a child can nurse until he is four or five years old.
  IntroductionThis beginning of this section is tangentially related to the previous part. It discusses milking an animal on Shabbat.
  Milking an animal is prohibited on Shabbat. However, milking an animal is usually done by hand. A sick person whose pain would be alleviated by having some milk may suck milk directly from the animal on Shabbat for this is an unusual way of obtaining the milk. Generally, when an act forbidden on Shabbat is performed in an unusual way, it becomes prohibited by “rabbinic decree;” it is no longer prohibited “by the Torah.” Since he is in pain, the rabbis did not prohibit him from obtaining the milk in this manner.
  Clearing debris from a gutter is forbidden on Shabbat, for it is an act of repairing. However, stepping on the debris in order to clear it is an unusual way of clearing the debris. Furthermore, if he does not clear the debris the roof may become flooded, which may lead to a serious loss of property. Since there is a loss, the rabbis did not prevent him from clearing the gutter in this unusual manner.Note that this section is here only due to the formal similarities between it and the previous section.
  According to the mishnah, once the child stops nursing, he may not resume. “Stopping” means not nursing for three days.
  IntroductionThe rabbis did not want a nursing woman to remarry for fear that she would become pregnant from her new husband and that this would cause her milk to dry up. This is the topic of today’s passage.
  There are two sets of disputes in this baraita. R. Meir and Bet Shammai hold that she must wait 24 months to remarry, for that is the time that a child is supposed to nurse. R. Judah and Bet Hillel are slightly more lenient and allow her to remarry after eighteen months.Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel provides an additional leniency for both positions. All allow a woman to actually marry three months earlier then they stated for it takes three months from conception for the milk to go bad.We should note that this halakhah was actually a great hardship on women who needed to be remarried for the sake of economic stability. It continued to be observed through the middle ages and was the source of many discussions as to its applicability.
  
  Daf 60b
  
  We see here that some amoraim adopted the most lenient positions from above.
  Abaye’s field worker asks Abaye if he can betroth a nursing woman fifteen months after her child was born. Abaye knows all of the sources from above and proves to him that indeed he can betroth her after this short waiting period.
  Abaye goes in front of R. Joseph and the latter tells the former that Rav and Shmuel insisted that she wait 24 full months. Abaye, realizing he has ruled in error, runs after the field worker but cannot find him. Assumedly the latter has already gone and married the nursing woman.
  Abaye regrets issuing a halakhah when in such close proximity to his master, R. Joseph. This error is what he believes caused him to forget the teaching of Rav and Shmuel which he did indeed know.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with how long a woman must wait to remarry if she is nursing.
  If a woman was nursing but no longer is, then the baraita allows her to remarry immediately. However, R. Nahman prohibited this. The reason would seem to be clear—if she really wants to remarry, she might try to wean her child early, which could endanger the child’s life. She might not even know that she is doing so, rationalizing subconsciously to herself that the child is ready to be weaned, when in reality, she is not.Another problem is that a wet nurse might retract her agreement to nurse the child, and if the mother had already stopped nursing, the child’s life would be in danger.This can be seen from the fact that R. Nahman allowed the women in the Exilarch’s family to remarry in less than 24 months from when their child was born, if they gave their child to a wet nurse. The Exilarch was the political leader of the Jews in Babylonia and he had some political power. Women who had agreed to nurse a child from that family would not renege on their deal. But if the deal was made with ordinary women, there was a fear that they would renege.
  Papi says that from another halakhah we could have learned that R. Nahman does not allow a nursing woman to remarry for 24 months. The baraita he cites refers to a woman whose husband has died. Generally such a woman must wait three months before she marries in order to determine if the child is from the first or second husband. However, if it is clear that she was not pregnant from the first marriage, R. Yosi allows her to remarry immediately. But R. Meir does not. R. Nahman, the later amora, rules in accordance with R. Meir, saying that the halakhah allows follows R. Meir when he is restrictive. Thus R. Papa and R. Huna could have known that the halakhah is that a woman must wait until her child is 24 months old in order to remarry, even if she is not nursing him. Evidently, they simply did not know this baraita.
  The halakhah is that if the child died, the mother may remarry immediately. Despite the story of a woman who strangled her child in order to remarry, crazy acts such as this are not sufficient to create law. We are not worried that a woman would kill her child in order to remarry for only a crazy woman would do such a thing. But we are worried that she might wean him early in order to remarry. Therefore the prohibition remains even after she has weaned him.
  IntroductionThis sugya begins with more laws connected to nursing, but then moves on to nutritional advice.
  A woman who has agreed to serve as a wet nurse may not take on other children to nurse at the same time, not even her own child. Nursing two children at the same time could be dangerous for both.She also must eat sufficient amount of food and must avoid foods that are bad for her milk.
  Once the baraita stated that a wet nurse cannot nurse her own child, isn’t it obvious she can’t nurse an additional child, not her own? The answer is that this is not so obvious. She might not be allowed to nurse her own child because she would give more to that child than to her client’s child. But this conflict would not exist for two children neither of which are hers Maybe she took on this responsibility simply because she has enough milk for two. Thus the baraita had to teach that she is not allowed to nurse even a child who is not her own, even though she would not naturally favor the one over the other.
  If she agreed to a small allowance for food, she still has a legal obligation to eat sufficient food for the child she is nursing. She must provide this food from her own funds.
  The amoraim here list foods that were considered bad for the milk, either by causing the flow to stop, or by causing it to be “turbid,” which probably would cause the child to stop nursing.
  This is a list of practices that can affect one’s children, or foods that one should eat while pregnant. Of course this is not a scientific list of what is healthy and what is not. More of a list of folk wisdom. Still seems that there is some good advice buried in there.The belief that how the parents engage in sex can affect the child seems to have been common in the ancient world and is referred to elsewhere in the Talmud.
  
  Daf 61a
  
  IntroductionThis is the last section that discusses nursing.
  In this case, the woman wants to nurse but the husband does not want her to. Perhaps he does not want her to disfigure her body in such a manner. Or perhaps he thinks it is below his social station. In any case, the answer here is clear. Since she will suffer by not nursing, she has a right to do so, even if this does not please her husband.
  If she comes from a family that does not nurse, then it is obvious, she is not obligated to nurse the child. He married her knowing that she would probably not nurse their child, so there is no reason that she should have to. But what if the women in his family do not customarily nurse, but those in her family do? Is she obligated because she comes from a family that does nurse?The answer is no. When there is a difference in their social status, she always takes on/stays with the higher status.
  The two amoraim here provide proof texts that the woman rises with her husband’s status, but does not go down, if his is lower. The first proof is based on a word play that is difficult to see in the translation. The second is the notion that things that a woman should not have to suffer based on her marriage.I might note that if the husband is marrying a woman from a higher social class, he knows ahead of time what he is getting into. Thus, he really does not have much of a leg to stand on in complaining that she does not want to nurse.
  IntroductionFor each slave that a woman brings into the marriage, a few of her responsibilities are reduced. The problem with this is that if a woman on her own could be expected to perform all of the household chores, why can’t one slave do the same? Why does she need four slaves before she is exempt from all chores?I should note from the outset what I think the real answer to this question is, even if the Talmud does not say the exact same thing. Housework is never ending. Whatever gets done, gets done and that’s it. Having a housekeeper helps, but clearly, the members of the household still have work to do.
  If she brings in one slave woman, she does not need to grind, bake or launder the clothes. But she still has to do the rest. What the sugya sounds like its saying is that since there is another person in the house, there will be more work to do. Therefore the wife still needs to work.
  If she brings two slaves, she does not have to cook or nurse. But she still needs to perform other duties. The Talmud seems to think that with two slaves, there will be a lot of guests visiting and there might be even more work. So the wife is not completely off the hook.
  If she brings in three slaves, she still needs to work because there will be more houseguests. But if she brings in four she need not do any work at all, because the slaves will help one another and thus will get all of the work done even if there are houseguests.
  The woman does not have to bring actually slaves to her husband to get out of performing her household duties. She only needs to bring sufficient funds into the marriage such that if he wanted, he could buy slaves. Today I would say this is similar to a well-off partner not wanting to clean the house, but rather wanting to hire someone else to do it. If someone brings in sufficient funds to do this, they have the right to make this request.Alternatively, she can simply save up her money so that the household could acquire slaves.
  There are household chores, and it is these that a woman need not do if she brings enough servants into the household. However, she still must perform the small, more intimate acts that a woman would customarily have done for her husband in those times.I realize that the Talmud presents these in a sexist manner—the woman is obligated to wash her husband. But if we detach this issue from its hierarchical nature, it makes sense. There is something different about hiring a cleaning person from hiring someone to, for instance, read to your children at night. There are things that others can do, but there are some, more intimate acts, that we must perform ourselves.
  Filling his cup, making his bed, etc. are all intimate acts between a husband and wife. Therefore a woman should not perform them for her husband when the couple may not have sex. But the other labors, grinding, baking, etc. are not intimate and therefore she continues to perform them even while a menstruant.
  The wives of these amoraim all find a way to pass the cup to their husband’s without doing so in the normal manner. Somehow this prevents the act from becoming one of intimacy.
  People may eat in front of a waiter and not give him any of their food to eat, unless they are eating meat or drinking wine. If the waiter sees them eating meat or wine and he is not allowed to partake as well, he will suffer excessively. R. Hisda and Rava limit this to good meat and good wine, only in the summer season when the wine is best.
  Both of these stories illustrate how important it was to be concerned about the hungry waiter before one eats.
  
  Daf 61b
  
  This story is mainly here to illustrate how dangerous it can be to see food and not be able to eat it. R. Ashi risks his life by putting his finger into the king’s dish so that Mar Zutra can eat the food, which is not kosher to begin with. 
  Again, the story here illustrates how dangerous it can be to see food that one desires and not be able to eat it.I do wonder how well this marriage worked out.
  A husband can demand that his wife work with wool, but not with flax because flax is very difficult to work with.According to this baraita, the husband may not force her to give straw to his beast, but he may force her to give straw to the cattle. Rashi reads “beast” to refer to “a horse or donkey” whereas “cattle” refers to cows. Horses and donkeys have strong sexual appetites and may try to “come upon her.” [I’m trying to put this gently]. Cattle will not do so. I know this is odd, but think of it this way—at least they’re trying to protect her.The Tosafot have a different reading of the text—the husband cannot force his wife to put straw in front of any of his animals. While this makes some sense, I doubt that it is the original reading.
  IntroductionThis section closes out the discussion on work that a woman must perform for her husband. Next section we move on to discuss sex—you know you’ve been waiting for this one!
  The section opens with a halakhic statement in the name of R. Malkio—even if she brings in a hundred slaves, she still must work in wool.The name of this sage, R. Malkio, is very similar to that of another sage, R. Malkia. So R. Ika and R. Papa argue over which of the two said which of six statements. I will explain each of these issues very briefly:“A spit”: Carrying a spit that was used to roast meat on the festival (Betzah 28b)“Bondwomen”: The statement above.“Follicles”: Whether hair follicles without hair count as a sign of a child reaching majority age (Niddah 52a).“A forelock”: How a Jewish barber should handle the forelock of an idolater, which was grown for idolatrous purposes (Avodah Zarah 29a).“Wood-ash”: Putting wood-ash on one’s wound, which may cause one to have a tattoo (Makkot 21a).“Cheese”: The prohibition of eating gentile cheese (Avodah Zarah 29b).The only difference between R. Papa and R. Idi is as to who said the statement about the bondwomen—according to R. Papa it was R. Malkia and according to R. Idi it was Malkio.
  Shimon b. Gamaliel also says that even a woman with many slaves must perform some sort of work. So how is his opinion different from R. Eliezer? The Talmud explains that the difference is if she is busy with more frivolous, non-productive occupations, such as playing with puppies or checkers. If she has some frivolous occupation, she will not become mad with boredom. But she may still engage in licentiousness, due to the fact that the only things she is doing are those without particular meaning.
  IntroductionThis mishnah teaches that a husband has an obligation to have sexual relations with his wife.  How frequently he is obligated depends on his job.The idea that a husband has an obligation to periodically have relations with his wife is derived from Exodus 21:10 which states that if a man takes a second wife he cannot diminish from her three things:  food, clothing or conjugal rights.  With regard to our issue, if a man has two or more wives he must provide each one with their conjugal rights.  You can imagine that this might have been one deterrent to the practice of polygyny (the proper term for the practice of men marrying more than one woman).
  A man cannot make a vow to forbid upon his wife anything which he is mandated to give her by law.  The man in this mishnah, perhaps in a fit of anger, forbade his wife from have sexual relations with him.  This is not permitted and if he does not have his vow annulled (a process discussed in tractate Nedarim), he must divorce her and pay her the ketubah.  However, he is not obligated to divorce her that very day; rather he is given a period to cool off and hopefully have his vow annulled. According to Beth Shammai he is given two weeks and according to Beth Hillel he is given only one week.  After that length of time, he must divorce her and pay her the ketubah.
  Since a husband must have relations with his wife, he cannot be away from her for a long period of time.  According to this section, a Torah scholar cannot leave his wife without her permission for longer than thirty days.  A worker can be out of town for only one week.  If either wish to remain away from their wives for a longer period of time, they must receive permission.
  This section delineates how often in general a husband must be available to have relations with his wife.  The frequency depends on his occupation.   An independent man, meaning one who doesn’t work, must have relations with his wife every day.  Note that this does not mean that he actually has to do so, but rather that if she so desires, he is obligated.  He cannot claim that he is too busy to have sex with her.  Workers must be available twice a week.  The Talmud explains that this refers to workers who work in the city; those who work outside the city are obligated only once a week, as we learned in the previous clause.  Donkey-drivers, who travel short distances must be available once a week.  Camel-drivers who travel longer distances must be available once a month and finally, sailors who travel for long periods of time, need to return home once every six months.  This all refers to situations where the wife has not given her husband permission.  If she has given him permission, he may stay away longer.  She might give him permission if, for instance, for the sake of supporting the family, the husband had to be away for a long period of time.  However, it is her right to demand that he find work closer to home.
  The Talmud enquires as to why Bet Shammai allows the ban to stand for two weeks, whereas Bet Hillel allows it for only one. They find the answer in various biblical precedents for abstinence. After giving birth to a girl, a woman must wait two weeks before resuming sex. Bet Shammai justifies this comparison because both in the case of pregnancy and in the case of a vow, the husband caused the abstinence. Bet Hillel derives the law from the precedent of the menstruant, who may not have sex for a week. According to Bet Hillel just as menstruation is frequent, so too is the case of a husband taking a vow that his wife may not sleep with him. I guess there were a lot of fights in the Bet Hillel household.
  According to Rav, Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai disagree only if the husband specifies the length of the vow. But if he just vows that she may not sleep with him, and does not say how long the vow would last, he would have to divorce her immediately. This is because during that period of time she would not know when the absence would end, or if it would ever end. The psychological suffering of an open-ended vow would be too great, and therefore, he must divorce her immediately.Shmuel says that in either case we wait some time before forcing him to divorce. The point of this waiting period is for him to calm down and find a way of getting out of the vow. Thus it is always reasonable to allow a week or two for this to occur.
  Rav and Shmuel disagreed over the same issue in another context. So, the question is asked, why did the Talmud have to repeat their dispute? Couldn’t we ourselves have taken it from one context to another?
  We need to know that Rav and Shmuel maintain their opinions in both cases. For if we only had the case of the vow about sex, we might have thought that in that case Rav said that he must divorce her immediately if the vow is open-ended, since he obviously cannot appoint an agent to provide her with sex (that would be interesting). But in the case of deriving benefit, Rav would allow the vow to stand for a month, since he can provide for her anyway.And if we had learned this only in the second case, about deriving benefit, we might have thought that only in this case does Shmuel hold that he may allow the vow to stand for one month, but that in the case of the vow about sex, he would agree that if the vow was open-ended, he must divorce her immediately.Therefore, to teach us that they both always disagree, the Talmud had to preserve the dispute in both contexts.
  
  Daf 62a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to deal with a husband’s obligation to have sex with his wife on a regular basis.
  The Mishnah says that a husband who is a Torah student may absent himself from his wife for 30 days without her permission. This seems to imply that with her permission he may absent himself from the home for a longer period. How long? The Talmud says as long as he wants. There will be stories later on this page that discuss this phenomenon—students leaving their wives for extremely extended periods of time. They do not all have happy endings, so beware.The Talmud says that a normal period of time is either one month at home and one month away studying, or two months at home and one month away studying. R. Yohanan proves this by citing a verse connected to the building of the Temple, while Rav proves this by citing a verse connected with serving King David.Rav did not use R. Yohanan’s prooftext because Torah study is different from building the Temple. Torah study must be done by the individual himself—others cannot study for me. So he should spend one out of every two months studying. But building the Temple can be done by anyone—there is no need for the Torah scholar to be there. Therefore he should spend two months at home.Yohanan did not use Rav’s prooftext because serving the king is different from Torah study. When one serves the king, one receives a better salary, more food. Therefore, we can assume that the wife would allow him to be absent for a longer period of time, one out of every two months.. But when it comes to Torah study, there is no material benefit. Therefore, the wife would want him home two out of every three months.
  This section is here because there is a similar set up as the previous section. Again, Rav and R. Yohanan dispute, this time over whether a sigh breaks half a man’s body or all of his body.
  The Jews are so familiar with their sufferings and destructions, that even when they sigh over them, their bodies remain whole. I guess this is both bad and good. On the one hand, it is disheartening to think about how many calamities the Jews have been through. On the other had, at least in this story we seem to be running faster than the goyim!
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to analyze the mishnah about how often husbands must have sex with their wives.
  The mishnah uses an unusual term in reference to the type of men who must have sex every day. It calls them “tayyalim.” According to Rava, this refers to students who study at the “pirka,” which seems to have been a local event of study, one which would not require the scholars to travel to faraway places. However, Abaye disagrees. Despite the fact that these scholars may live close to home, they still stay out very late at night, leaving their wives at home to worry about them. Therefore, it cannot be that they are obligated to have sex every day.
  Rather, Abaye finds a concrete example of a “man of leisure.” This is like R. Shmuel b. Shilat who does not seem to have to worry about earning a living or about being conscripted into the king’s army. Absence of such worries, he has sufficient energy to be with his wife every day.
  According to Rabin, the “men of leisure” are the pampered men of the west, i.e. the land of Israel, who live an invigorating life style, and seem to have great physical strength. The Talmud illustrates this with the stories of these virile men.We should note that all of the attempts to define the “men of leisure” define the term in reference to various types of rabbis. The rabbis seems to have inhabited a fairly closed social circle, and were mainly concerned with issuing rulings relevant for themselves and the few others who shared this circle with them.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to interpret sections of the mishnah.
  Laborers who work in the same town in which they live, must have sex with their wives twice a week. If they work out of town, then they are required to do so only once a week. Commuting was and still is a killer.
  Rabbah bar R. Hanan notes a problem with the mishnah. In the first clause, Bet Hillel rules that a man who takes a vow not to sleep with his wife must divorce her within one week or two. But this is relevant only to a man of leisure or a worker doing work in his own city, who must sleep with his wife twice a week. A worker working outside of the city would only have to sleep with her once a week anyway. And the other occupations in the mishnah—a donkey driver, a camel driver and a sailor, only have to sleep with their wives at greater intervals. So that first clause in the mishnah does not refer to them. It seems strange to Rabbah that the first clause of the mishnah should refer only to these two categories.Abaye answers that the first clause concerning the vow does indeed refer to everyone. A woman whose husband has sworn not to sleep with her is not the same as a woman whose husband is simply away. The anger expressed in the vow, the fact that he could sleep with her but refuses to do so, is the grounds for her to sue for divorce. It is not the mere absence of sex. Therefore, if for instance, a sailor vows not to sleep with his wife, he will be obligated to divorce her after a week, even though he is not liable to have sex with her more than once every six months.
  
  Daf 62b
  
  Rabbah b. R. Hanan asks what the law is if a donkey driver, who must sleep with his wife once a week, becomes a camel driver, who is obligated only once every month. Can she sue for divorce on the grounds that he has taken a job that requires him to be away more often?Abaye says that she can. A woman, in general, would prefer her husband to be around so that she could engage in “frivolity” (i.e. sex) even if this means that the family brings in less money.  While this statement has been taken throughout history that women would rather have any lousy husband to no husband, what it really means here is that she simply prefers the companionship of marriage more than she wants material goods.
  IntroductionThis section begins a fascinating and famous discussion concerning Torah scholars who absent themselves from their homes for extended periods of time. As we shall see, not all of these stories have happy endings.
  The mishnah which lists the periods in which a husband may absent themselves from their wives is attributed to R. Eliezer. But there are no other opinions in the mishnah. R. Beruna rules in accordance with this mishnah. Torah scholars may absent themselves without the permission of their wives for only thirty days. But R. Adda b. Ahava says that the mishnah was the opinion only of R. Eliezer. The other sages, whose opinion was not expressed in the mishnah, hold that a husband can stay away for even two or three years.However, Rava issues an ominous warning. There were indeed rabbis who acted according to this opinion of R. Adda b. Ahava. But they did so at risk to their lives. We shall see this illustrated in the next two stories.
  There are many ironic elements of this tragic story. First of all, his name is Rehumi, which is the Aramaic word for “lover.” But whom does he love—the Torah or his wife? R. Rehumi “regularly” comes home once a year. The day he comes home is Yom Kippur—perhaps in acknowledgement that by staying away he is committing a sin. Maybe he comes home to ask her forgiveness. In the end, her tears kill him. R. Rehumi did not have the ability to truly understand his wife’s pain, and for that he was punished severely.
  After a few sources that said that husbands could theoretically absent themselves from their homes for extended periods of time, the Talmud goes back to a more reasonable period of abstinence—one week. Ideally, a scholar should return home every Shabbat to be with his wife.I should note that there is also the hint here that Shabbat is the proper time for sexual relations. There were in fact some ancient Jewish groups (the Dead Sea Sect) who tried to ban having sexual relations on Shabbat. The rabbis took a strong stance against this position. Sex is not “impure” and therefore the antithesis of the “sanctity” of Shabbat. By urging Jews to have sex on Shabbat, the rabbis are clearly stating that sex too is holy, and therefore should be engaged in on the holiest day of the year.
  Again, we see in this story a rabbi who is overly attracted by his studies and the story ends with tragic results. These pair of stories seem intended to warn off a student who feels that by regularly returning home, he can have the best of both worlds. Inevitably, the Torah will become so attractive to him that he will not be able to return to pay proper attention to his family life. We might find this strange—how could someone become so attracted to the study of Torah that he neglects his family life? Is Torah study that engaging? The answer is that it can be, as can be any deep engagement with the life of the mind. Even to this day there are people who become so addicted to their own study, writing or research, that they neglect all other aspects of their lives. The life of the mind can be thrilling, far more exciting than the mundaneness of the everyday world. The rabbis warn us against this—becoming overly attracted to Torah can lead to death.Note—overturning the bed is a sign of mourning.
  IntroductionAnother story of a Torah scholar.
  Rabbi’s first attempt to arrange for the marriage of his son ends in disaster. Rabbi’s son is a direct descendent of David, whereas R. Hiyya’s daughter descends from David’s brother, a lesser lineage. This small discrepancy in their lineage causes the poor girl to die. This story exemplifies just how important lineage was in arranging marriages in Babylonia and how concerned they were for even the minutest of details.
  This is a beautiful story showing how the passions of a young man can clash with the norms of his society. It also shows an understanding father, who celebrates his sons desires, and anchors them in holiness. In the end, the son is first married and only then sets off for his years of study. However, this makes the following story even more poignant.
  Here we almost see another disaster. Rabbi’s son leaves after marriage and by the time he returns, his wife is barren. In the normal way of the world, there would only be two options, given the fact that the son must fulfill the mitzvah of procreating. He could either divorce her or marry another wife. Either leads to an awful result for this poor woman who waited twelve years for her husband.Disaster is averted by Rabbi’s prayers, but still, I think the reader is left with the clear warning that such a way of acting could lead to terrible tragedy.
  IntroductionThis section contains two more stories about rabbis who leave their wives for extended periods of time.
  Hanania b. Hakinai is so excited to get to the Bet Midrash and study that he cannot wait for R. Shimon b. Yohai to finish celebrating his wedding. He abandons his wife and goes there for twelve years, far and away longer than any amount of time we have ever heard of before. Note that R. Hanania is portrayed as someone without the proper respect for a marriage—he cannot even wait for seven days to be over before he rushes off to the study hall.
  Hananiah comes home after twelve years but has spent so long away from his home and family that he does not recognize the streets, nor does he recognize his daughter. He only knows her because other people are calling her “daughter of Hakinai.” We should also note that they are calling her by her grandfather’s name, not her father’s.Note also that he uses an academic term “learn from this” to discover his own daughter’s identity.
  Hananiah’s wife is so startled by her husband’s appearance after twelve years away that she dies. While her husband does succeed in bringing her back to life, again the message is clear. Such a way of acting can bring death. Even Hananiah recognizes his wife’s misery, calling her “poor one.”
  Hama b. Bisa also goes away for 12 years, but he is wise enough not to return home suddenly, as did the rabbi in the previous story. At least this rabbi has some consideration for his wife.
  Hama also does not recognize his family. In a classic “sit-com” moment, he enters the study hall and begins to learn with a younger man. This younger man impresses him so much, R. Hama wishes that he had stayed in town so that he could have educated his son as well.There is much irony in these lines. First of all, somehow R. Oshaia has gained his learning without having to leave home for 12 years. Second, R. Hama recognizes that by going away to study he was abandoning his family and not educating his own son, one of the primary principles in the Torah.
  The father doesn’t recognize his son until his wife points out his identity. The woman knows her family, but her husband does not. Rami b. Hama (R. Oshaia’s brother?) seems to see here a happy ending, noting that there are three generations of sages in this family. But again, I think we are left with the feeling that this is just not the way things have to or should be. After all, it is not because of R. Hama that R. Oshaia succeeded in becoming a sage.
  IntroductionToday’s section is the famous story of R. Akiva’s origins and his relationship with his wife. I have put the story in parallel columns to make it easier to see the correspondence between the Hebrew and the English. The story is self-explanatory, but I offer a few brief remarks at the end. 
  Some notes on the story:Kalba Savua means “satisfied dog.”R. Akiba’s wife is never named. Elsewhere she is called Rachel.While his wife gave him permission to go away and study, she did not initially give consent for him to be away for 12 years. R. Akiva discovers her approval only after being away for 12 years.His wife calls herself a “beast.”His students want to push away a simple woman. What kind of students are these?Why does the storyteller insist that in the end, R. Akiva and his wife were wealthy as well? What values does this imply?
  
  Daf 63a
  
  IntroductionThese stories conclude the remarkable cycle of stories about husbands who leave their wives to go study Torah in the academy.
  Akiva and his wife have a daughter who acts the same way—selflessly allowing her husband to absent himself from the home for an extremely long period of time. We should note that somehow, even though he was absent for 24 years, R. Akiva still seems to have had a child.
  This harsh story ends the cycle. R. Joseph is sent away for six years, but clearly he is homesick. He wants to return to see his wife, which is probably the meaning of “my family.” Interestingly, he wants to visit them on Yom Kippur, the one day of the year he could not have sex.The father comes up, armed, ready to send him home and utters a horrible line—“You have remembered your whore.” This line is so troubling that even the Talmud itself seems to want to soften it into “your dove” which in Hebrew is only one letter difference. Why is Rava so angry with his son? It sounds like he is accusing him of not respecting his learning, of being so desirous of his wife that he is willing to abandon the academy.Neither party is able to eat the meal before Yom Kippur, which is considered by the Talmud to be an important feast, equivalent to fasting on Yom Kippur itself. It’s almost like saying that neither side was able to observe Yom Kippur and to receive the proper atonement for their transgressions.What do we think at the end of these stories? With whom do our sympathies lie? This is not an easy question and the Talmud does not provide any real answer. It is one of the things I love about Talmud stories—they do not provide easy answers. Like life, they are messy.
  IntroductionThis first part of the mishnah deals with a wife who refuses to provide for her husband one of the things that she is obligated to him.  This could either refer to one of the labors listed in mishnah five, or it may refer to a wife who refuses to sleep with her husband.  The second half refers to a husband who does not provide his wife with one of the things that he is obligated to give to her.I should note that this mishnah and other related sources has been an issue of much controversy throughout Jewish history and continues to extremely controversial today. The main issue is a woman’s ability to force her husband to divorce her.  Briefly, the conclusion of the Talmud is that if after twelve months the woman continues to refuse to act as a wife to her husband, the court forces him to divorce her, but she loses her ketubah.  The Geonim, the rabbis who came after the Talmud, made a famous enactment that the husband is forced to divorce her immediately.  Some Geonim ruled that she receives part of her ketubah.  Early post-Geonic scholars ruled similar to the Geonim, until Rabbenu Tam, a 12th century French talmudic commentator, ruled that the court can never force a husband to divorce his wife.  Within a few centuries this became the unanimous opinion amongst halakhic experts.  Today we are left with the serious problem of a husband who refuses to divorce his wife.
  If a husband claims that his wife is not fulfilling her duties he must bring her to court and the court will impose upon her a reduction of seven denarii per week of her rebellion.  Rabbi Judah says that it is reduced by seven tropaics, each tropaic being half of a denar.
  According to the first opinion, the reduction of her ketubah continues until it reaches the total amount of her ketubah.  At this point he must divorce her and he does not pay anything to her.  Note that he doesn’t begin to reduce from the dowry which he must return to her upon the dissolution of the marriage.  The reduction is only made in the amount that he is obligated to give her (200/100 minimum) from his own pocket.  Rabbi Yose holds that he continues to take away her property.  He would reduce from the amount of money she brought into the marriage and then continue to reduce against any potential future inheritance. In other words, according to Rabbi Yose he is never obligated to divorce his wife.
  This section teaches that a similar process occurs with a husband.  If he rebels against her, the amount of her ketubah is increased.  However, the increase is smaller than the corresponding decrease.  According to the Talmud, the seven reduced from the ketubah corresponds to the seven labors that she is obligated to him and the three is added to his ketubah to correspond to the three things he owes her, food, clothing and conjugal rights.
  IntroductionThe Talmud begins to discuss what the woman refuses to do such that she is considered a “rebellious wife.”
  The mishnah says only that the wife is “rebelling”—meaning she is refusing to perform some marital duty. The rabbis debate what it is she is not doing—refusing to have sex or refusing to work.
  The mishnah presented rebellion as being possible in either direction—the woman rebels against her husband or the husband rebels against his wife. If the rebellion is a refusal to have sex, then the rebellion could be either way—either party refuses to sleep with the other. But if the rebellion is from work, the husband does not really have to “work” for his wife.The Talmud responds that while he does not do “household work” for his wife, he is obligated to sustain her. His refusal to do so is considered rebellion.
  The problem is that according to Rav, if a husband refuses to support his wife, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. The Mishnah says that we increase the ketubah he will eventually give her; it does not say that he must divorce her immediately.The answer is that we first consult him about whether he really wants to issue a statement that will lead to him having to divorce his wife. During this time while he is deciding whether to divorce her, the amount of the ketubah will go up.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty. The first understanding of this is that the difficulty is against R. Huna. The baraita says that she is considered a rebellious wife even if she is a menstruant. But a menstruant cannot have sex anyway, so why should she considered rebellious?The answer is that there is a difference between not being able to have sex because she is legally forbidden during menstruation and not being able to have sex when she refuses. Neither party can “eat” but the first has bread in his basket, meaning he knows he will eventually be able to eat.
  This is a different version of the difficulty. Here the difficulty is raised against R. Yose b. R. Hanina who said she rebels from work. A sick woman might be able to have sex, but she cannot work.
  
  Daf 63b
  
  In the end, the Talmud resolves that both R. Huna and R. Yose b. R. Hanina agree that if she refuses to have sex she is considered a rebellious wife. R. Yose b. R. Hanina would add that if she rebels from work, she is also considered a rebellious wife. R. Huna, on the other hand, would say that if a woman does not wish to perform the labors prescribed in the mishnah, she is not obligated to do so. This accords with a statement he has made elsewhere, that a woman is allowed to say, “I will not work and I do not ask for sustenance.”
  IntroductionThis section begins to talk about the practical halakhah concerning a rebellious wife.
  The beginning of this baraita is the same as the mishnah. However, in the second half we see that already in the tannaitic period, the law concerning the rebellious woman had changed. Evidently, reducing her ketubah every week did not solve the problem. Perhaps it was just too long of a period. Thus later rabbis decreed that instead of steadily reducing her ketubah, the woman would be given four weeks of warning, and after that period she would lose her entire ketubah.Part of this process would be announcing her rebellion at the synagogue every Sabbath (this will be explicated more below). This would clearly embarrass the woman, but might also embarrass the man. It might prevent him from going to the court in the first place to sue for her to lose her ketubah. In other words, it may be that the fear of having their “dirty laundry” aired in public, may have provided them with an incentive to repair their marriage.The end of the baraita states that rebellion applies to all women.
  This is a repeat of the idea we saw in yesterday’s section. Although the menstruant cannot have sex with her husband, her refusal to have sex still counts as a rebellion. Her husband is like one who does not have bread in his basket. Knowing that she would not have sex with him even if she were allowed to makes it worse.
  The fact that the announcement is made on Sabbaths leads to the conclusion that it was performed in a place where people would gather for public prayer—the synagogue or the study house.
  The court attempts twice a week to get her to end her rebellion—both before and after the announcement.
  There is a dispute in this passage whether the halakhah follows the rabbis of the baraita, according to whom the court announces her rebellion for four weeks and then she loses the entire thing, and the other, earlier, opinion in the mishnah, according to which she loses 7 denar a week from her ketubah. During this period, they would consult her to see whether she wants to continue with her rebellion.I should note that this is Rashi’s interpretation of “they consult her.” Others explain that all hold that the court announces her rebellion for four weeks and then she loses the entire amount. The dispute is whether they send to her twice each week asking whether she wishes to continue with her rebellion. This is the “consulting” referred to at the end.
  IntroductionThis passage is probably the most important passage in the Talmud about the rebellious wife. It discusses her motivation in rebelling against her husband, her rights vis a vis some of her property, and some late Babylonian halakhic rulings as to what is done in this situation.
  Here we see a serious limitation on the entire rule of the rebellious wife. All of the laws we read about before do not refer to a wife who wants to be divorced. They refer to a wife who wants to make her husband miserable. A wife who simply wants a divorce is another matter altogether. According to Amemar, they do not force her to remain with him. What this means is that she could get a divorce immediately, although she would probably lose her ketubah and maybe her some or even all of her dowry as well.Mar Zutra says that they do force her. This does not mean physical force. Rather, it means that she cannot get an immediate divorce.
  The Talmud relates a story of Mar Zutra forcing a woman to reconcile with her husband with what seems to be a positive result—a rabbi was born of the union. But the Talmud immediately rejects this—that was just luck, and not a result of the fact that Mar Zutra forced them to remain together. The Talmud clearly rejects Mar Zutra’s opinion. A woman who despises her husband is not forced to stay with him.
  The issue in this section is whether a woman retains possession of her clothing when she rebels against her husband and the court is forcing him to divorce her. Amemar and his friends cite a tradition whereby she loses even her worn-out clothing. But R. Gamda accuses them of saying this just to benefit R. Zevid, whose daughter-in-law had rebelled. In R. Gamda’s view, there is no conclusive answer as to whether she keeps her worn out clothing.
  
  Daf 64a
  
  This is the opposite version of the previous one. Here Amemar and his comrades rule that she keeps her worn out clothing. R. Gamda accuses them of intentionally ruling against R. Zevid because he was a great man. In other words, they went out of their way to show that they are not biased in his favor.
  Since there is no answer as to who owns the worn-out clothing, possession/seizure becomes critical. If she is in possession of the clothing, then she may keep it. But she may not seize it from her husband, at least not legally.Finally, the Talmud issues what seems to have been the practice towards the end of the Talmudic period. There would be a 12 month waiting period during which she would not receive support from her husband. After that period she could successfully force her husband to divorce her.The post-Talmudic history of this law is very complicated. One big change was that European rabbis grew increasingly hesitant about forcing a divorce. It was mostly this change that caused the modern problem of husband’s being able to refuse to divorce their wives.
  IntroductionToday and tomorrow’s section deal with a woman who rebels against her husband either when she is only betrothed to him, when sex between them is not permitted in any case, or a woman who rebels against her husband while she awaits levirate marriage (her husband has died but his brother has not yet married her or released her). In this case as well, she is not allowed to sleep with him.
  The certificate of rebellion seems to be a document that attests to the fact that the woman is rebelling against her husband. It would allow him to be able to eventually divorce her without paying the ketubah. According to Shmuel, if a betrothed woman rebels, i.e. she states that even if she were married, she would not sleep with her husband, they do write a certificate of rebellion. But they do not write one if she is awaiting levirate marriage. The difference between the two will be discussed in tomorrow’s section.
  This baraita clearly says that they do write a certificate of rebellion for a woman awaiting levirate marriage.
  The solution is that Shmuel was referring to a case where the woman claimed that she wanted to marry the levir and he refuses. In such a case, we do not write a certificate of rebellion because he is not obligated to marry her. But if he wants to marry his dead brother’s wife and she refuses, then she is considered a rebellious wife.
  If we say that Shmuel was referring to a case where the husband refuses to marry his dead brother’s wife, then the first clause in Shmuel’s statement should be a case where the husband refuses to marry his betrothed wife. But if so, the statement should read “on behalf of a betrothed woman” [whose husband refuses to marry her] and not “against a betrothed woman” [who refuses to marry her husband.] To solve this problem, the Talmud simply emends the baraita. To wit, Shmuel’s statement now refers to a case where he, not she, rebels. If he rebels against his betrothed wife, he is a rebelling husband. But not if he rebels against the woman awaiting levirate marriage.
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of yesterday’s section concerning a rebellious wife/husband in a case where she is either betrothed or awaiting levirate marriage.
  Why, the Talmud asks, is a husband considered a rebellious husband if he refuses to marry his betrothed wife, but not if he refuses to marry the woman awaiting levirate marriage. If you say that it is because women are not commanded to procreate, well that would be true in both cases.
  If the woman wants to get married and have children not in order to fulfill the mitzvah of procreation but so that she will have a child to support her in old age, then that too will be the same for all women, both the woman awaiting levirate marriage and the betrothed woman.This successfully refutes the resolution of Shmuel with the baraita, that Shmuel was referring to a case where the husband rebels. We now return to the difficulty—Shmuel says that if the woman awaiting levirate marriage rebels she is not considered rebellious, whereas the baraita says that she is.
  Both Shmuel and the baraita refer to a case where the woman awaiting levirate marriage rebels, but Shmuel refers to a case where the husband demands levirate marriage. In this case, he is not heeded and she is not considered rebellious. But if he demands halitzah, the release from levirate marriage, she must perform it for him no matter what. If she refuses to do so, (perhaps she wants to be married) she is considered a rebellious wife.
  Why do we force her to perform halitzah but not levirate marriage? In both cases the husband could claim that he cannot marry another woman while one is already bound to him.[We should note that this does not mean that polygyny was not allowed. It just means that women did not want to marry a man who already had a wife].
  This is the final resolution of Shmuel with the baraita. When the baraita stated that a woman awaiting levirate marriage is considered a rebellious wife, it was a case where the levir wanted to marry her. The baraita refers to an earlier stage of Jewish law when levirate marriage was considered preferable over halitzah. This was because men were marrying their brother’s wife in performance of the commandment, not simply because they desired them. Since levirate marriage was preferable, if she refused she could be considered a rebellious wife. But Shmuel refers to a later point in history, when the rabbis preferred halitzah for men were engaging in levirate marriage for the wrong reason. In such times, if the husband wants to marry her, and the woman does not want to be married, she is not considered rebellious.
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, a rebellious wife’s ketubah is reduced by seven denars a week and if the husband rebels, her ketubah goes up three denars a week. R. Judah says that the increase and decrease are in a coin known as a tropaic, worth less than a denar. Today’s section deals with this halakhah.
  A tropaic is half a zuz (denar). Three tropaics is equivalent to nine ma’ahs. If the husband rebels against his wife, she receives an extra 1.5 ma’ah per day, six days a week.
  If the wife rebels, her ketubah is reduced by seven tropaics (according to R. Judah) one for every day of the week. But if the ketubah is increased, it goes up only 3 tropaics a week which is 1.5 ma’ahs for every week day. The ketubah does not increase on Shabbat. Why not?The difference is that reducing a debt does not look like receiving a wage on Shabbat, but increasing a debt does. To avoid the appearance of a person earning a wage for Shabbat, her ketubah is not increased on Shabbat.
  
  Daf 64b
  
  There are two reasons given why the decrease of the ketubah is greater when she rebels than the increase when he rebels. First of all, it is an observable fact that men pay for sex with women, and the opposite is rarely true (this remains true to this day). This implies that his desire for sex is greater than hers, and therefore, his loss of sex is greater. [I realize people may disagree with this, or find it offensive. But it is clearly what people thought for most of human history, and most people still think today. Whether it is biologically or culturally determined, is certainly a complicated and controversial question.] Furthermore, a man’s desire for sex is shown externally, whereas a woman’s is internal. His lack of sex is therefore perceived to be more shameful, for everyone would see it.I think it would do well to remember that the rabbis were staunchly opposed to masturbation. A man who was denied sex and had no other sexual outlet, would find himself with the choice of transgressing the prohibition of masturbation or suffering significantly. The rabbis acknowledge throughout this chapter that women have a right to frequent sex and suffer without it. But they do perceive men and women as being constructed differently.
  IntroductionAssumedly, most husbands and wives shared households.  Since the husband was obligated to feed his wife, they would eat together and she would eat whatever she so desired (usually, I would assume within reason), as long as he could afford to pay for the food.  If the husband ate well, then so did the woman and if he did not, neither did she.  However, a problem might arise if for some reason the couple does not live together, for instance he works abroad.  Alternatively, he may have two wives, each in a different house.  The question would then become, what must he provide for her?
  Every week the husband must provide his wife with the basic grains and fruits that were the staple of most diets. There is a debate about whether or not he can give her barley in place of wheat.  Barley was a lesser grain, one which was not as good for making bread.  According to the first opinion, he may give her barley, provided he gives her twice the amount of wheat.  According to Rabbi Yose only Rabbi Yishmael who lived near Edom, on the eastern side of Israel, gave her barley, for barley was common there.  In other places a husband must give his wife the better grain, wheat.He also must give her pulse (beans), oil and fruit.  The standard, preferred fruit was figs but if he had no figs he could give her other fruit.
  He must give her a hat, for women had to cover their heads, a belt and shoes.  She received new shoes at each festival, a total of three times a year.  She received fifty zuz worth of clothing a year and it was to be given to her in the rainy season. This way it would wear out at around summer time and she could then still cover herself with what shards lasted through winter.  The worn out clothing belongs to her and she could do what she wants with it.
  Besides the requirements listed in yesterday’s mishnah, the husband must also give his wife a silver ma’ah per week for her other needs. This was not a large amount of money (=1/6 of a denar/zuz).  Furthermore, even though she is not living with him, he must eat with her once a week, on Friday nights.
  The mishnah now delineates the consequences of him not providing her with what is required.  If he does not give her even the smallest amount of that which is required, the ma’ah for spending money, she does not need to give him her handiwork.  In other words, he is penalized for not fully providing for her.
  The mishnah now lists what she is expected to produce, in return for receiving her maintenance.  Note that the mishnah does not state that if she doesn’t produce enough, he need not pay her.  Rather the point of the mishnah is that if she produces any more, she may keep it for herself.  This is not a list of what she must minimally make for him; it is a list of the maximum of what he is allowed to take from her.  Differing amounts are given for Galilee and for Judea, for different systems of measurement were used in each region.
  Finally, the mishnah qualifies everything that it stated above.  All of these amounts refer only to a poor person who cannot afford to provide his wife with any more than the bare minimum.  A rich person is obligated to maintain his wife at the same level at which he provides for himself.  Even if he is stingy with regard to his own food and clothing, if he has the means he must provide well for wife.  There obviously cannot be a situation where he is living the good life, and he sends his wife to live somewhere else and provides her with only the minimum.  Rather, all of the lists are only what a poor husband must provide.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the amount of grain a woman receives a week, either two kavs of wheat or four kavs of barley. These amounts are analyzed vis a vis other sources about the amount of grain a person would consume per week. Get ready for some math.
   This mishnah discusses how much food is needed to make an eruv. While we usually think of the eruv as the string that borders a community, in the mishnah, the eruv is the meal symbolically shared by the whole community [for more information see the Mishnah Yomit introduction to Eruvin]. This mishnah discusses how big the meal must be. What is crucial is the amount of grain that R. Yohanan b. Beroka and R. Shimon prescribe (for an explanation of the whole mishnah, see the Mishnah Yomit commentary on Eruvin 8:2).Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka states a minimum amount of bread that must be used for the meal that is the eruv. This amount of bread is what is sufficient for two meals, since the eruv must consist of two meals.  It is the size of a loaf that can be bought for one pundion (a coin) when 4 se’ah (24 kav, a measure of volume) of wheat are sold for a sela (a coin worth 48 pundion).   If we do the math, we can see that a kav of wheat is bought for two pundionim, meaning that one pundion will buy half a kav of wheat, which according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka is sufficient for two meals. Each meal is a ¼ of a kav.According to Rabbi Shimon, two meals are equivalent to two-thirds of a loaf when three loaves are made from a kav of wheat.  A loaf is therefore 1/3 of a kav and 2/3 of a loaf is two meals. Each meal is 1/9 of a kav. This is a smaller amount than that set by Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka.
  The mishnah says the woman receives 2 kavs of wheat. R. YbB says that half a kav of wheat is enough for 2 meals, so this would be sufficient for only eight meals, not enough for a week, in which a person eats 14 meals. For R. Shimon, 2 kavs is enough for 18 meals—more than a person eats a week. So with whom does our mishnah accord?
  The first attempt to solve the problem is to add a third for the profit of the shopkeeper, who will bake the loaves. R. Yohanan b. Beroka said that she needs to buy the loaves from the shopkeeper. The shopkeeper has a profit margin of 1/3 (talk about markup!) so that means that the shopkeeper needs more grain to produce enough for a meal. Still, 2 kav is enough only for 12 meals, not 14. The answer is that she eats with him on Shabbat.
  There are two problems. First of all, later we will see that some sages explain that she really eats with him on Friday night. But others say that this is a euphemism for sex. So they would be two meals short. Furthermore, even if she eats with him on Friday night this still gets us to only 13 meals.
  The Talmud now resolves that this follows R. Hisda who said that the shopkeeper makes 50 per cent profit. So 2 kav will be enough for 16 meals.
  Before we go on with resolving whom our mishnah follows, there is a problem with R. Hisda’s two statements—in one case he says that the shopkeeper profits 1/3 and elsewhere he says ½. The resolution is that it depends on whether the seller supplies the wood. If he does, then his profit margin is 50 per cent. If not, then it is only 33.3 per cent.
  The problem now is that there would be enough grain for sixteen meals, more than a person needs for a week. This is resolved by attributing the mishnah to R. Hidka who elsewhere stated that a person must eat four meals on Shabbat, two more than normal! The Talmud does not seem to want to accept this because it is strange that our Mishnah should agree with a minority opinion in Tractate Shabbat.
  The resolution is that the mishnah could agree with the other rabbis who hold that a person eats three meals on Shabbat. The extra meal’s worth of grain is for visitors.
  The resolution is that the mishnah could agree with the other rabbis who hold that a person eats three meals on Shabbat. The extra meal’s worth of grain is for visitors.
  IntroductionToday’s short section deals with the line in the Mishnah, where R. Yose says that only R. Yishmael, who lived hear Edom, granted the wife a supply of barley.
  The Talmud wants to make sure we don’t think that only in Edom do they eat barley. Rather, what R. Yose means to say, is that the ratio given in the Mishnah of 2:1 for barley vs. wheat is true only in Edom, where the barley is inferior. In other places, this ratio would not hold. The Talmud does not say what the exact ratio would be elsewhere.
  
  Daf 65a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the issue of whether a husband should provide wine for his wife. Whether or not women should drink wine was an issue of contention in the ancient world. There were strong voices opposing women drinking wine, especially in the absence of her husband, out of the fear that it would lead to sexual licentiousness. This was an issue I discussed in one of the chapters of my book, Reconstructing the Talmud.
  In the mishnah’s list of foods that a husband must provide for his wife, wine is absent. This supports a statement made by R. Elazar according to which a court apportioning provisions to a woman whose husband has left town does not provide her with wine. A verse from Hosea does seem to imply that women drink wine. The word “shikuyay” seems to mean alcoholic drink. But the Talmud reads a pun into this word—the word does not mean “drink,” it means things which a woman desires, namely jewelry.
  Judah derives a halakhah from the change of syntax between the word for eating and the word for drinking, which both seem to refer to Hannah. According to his reading, Hannah ate but she did not drink, proving that women do not drink wine, at least when they are away from their husband’s, as was Hannah at the time.
  The Talmud cites a baraita according to which a woman accustomed to drink is provided with wine in her husband’s absence. There is a difference between a woman accustomed to drink and one unaccustomed. If she is accustomed to drink when her husband is with her, then she is given slightly less when he is not around. But if she only drinks one cup of wine or less in her husband’s absence, then when he is not around, she does not get any wine at all.
  According to this explanation of the baraita, even a woman accustomed to drink wine when her husband is in town would not be provided with drinking wine in his absence. The only wine she would receive is cooking wine. This is illustrated by a story of the daughter-in-law of a famously rich man, who was provided with a rather large amount of wine for her cooking, and still seems to have complained about it.
  IntroductionThis sugya continues to deal with the issue of women and wine.
  The baraita graphically describes the concern of a woman getting drunk.Rava limits this concern to a case where a woman is not with her husband. But if she is with her husband, we are not concerned by how much she may drink.
  Hannah was not allowed to drink wine, even though her husband was with her. However, this is not because of the prohibition of wine. It is because of the prohibition of guests having sex while at an inn. It would seem to me that there simply was not enough privacy for people to be having sex while in a hotel. How times have changed.
  In this ironic story it is not the woman who becomes overly amorous due to wine—it is the man, Rava, who becomes overly amorous at seeing Homa, the femme fatale’s exposed arm. I believe that this story is intentionally critiquing male control over women. It is as if the story is noting that it is not women that are problematic, it is men.
  This is a classic example of a story that seems to intentionally contradict the halakhah. The halakhah was extremely reticent to allow women to drink wine in the absence of their husbands. But if it is known that the people in that particular area drink wine, then there is no problem.
  Joseph’s wife received not only wine but silk as well. As she says, she needed to keep up appearances in front of those rabbis!
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with a husband’s obligation to provide his wife with.
  There were (at least) two types of bed in mishnaic times—those with leather stretched out over the frame, and those with ropes. If she was using a rope bed, her husband would have to provide her with a mat and a mattress to protect her from the ropes. But if the bed used leather, then he need not provide her with a mat.
  In the baraita there is a dispute over whether a husband must provide his wife with a cushion and bolster (a long thick pillow). But it is difficult to contextualize this dispute—if it refers to a case where she was accustomed to sleeping with pillows, then he should by law provide her with one while he is away. And if she is not accustomed to sleeping with pillows, then why should he give her one?The answer is that the case in which they dispute is one where he usually sleeps with pillows, and while he is in town, she too shares his pillows. According to the first opinion, he takes the pillows with him on the road and need not provide her with any while away, since she is not accustomed to them in the first place. According to R. Natan, he must provide her with pillows lest he return at twilight on the Sabbath, when he cannot carry them back with him, and he would take something from her to compensate for his lack of pillow. Rashi explains that he would take a pillow that she had bought, or maybe take her mattress.I guess we can learn from here that stealing the blankets and pillows is not a new phenomenon.
  
  Daf 65b
  
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss the various things a husband must provide his wife with while he is away.
  According to the mishnah she receives shoes from “time to time,” which here is interpreted to be at each major festival—Pesah, Shavuot and Sukkot (note that this is not the “peshat” of the mishnah). But she receives clothes only once a year. Surely clothes are more important than shoes!The answer is that the tanna of this mishnah was referring to a mountainous, rocky region, where a person would need three pairs of shoes a year. In terms of wear and tear, it is not so important that he give them to her specifically at the three holidays. But if he is going to give her three pairs of shoes a year, it’s nice to receive them as a present on the festivals. New shoes would help her perform the mitzvah of being happy on the festival.
  The mishnah teaches that he must give her fifty zuz of clothing a year. The Bavli knows of two types of “zuz/denar”—the ordinary kind and the “real” kind, which they trace back to the Torah. The real zuz is worth eight ordinary zuz. Fifty real zuz would be a fantastical sum. Since the mishnah refers to a poor person, it must refer to fifty ordinary zuz, a far lesser amount.
  The discussion here is over the worn out clothing. The mishnah and the baraita say that they belong to her. Rehava explains that she can wear this clothing while menstruating. It would seem that clothing she wears while menstruating may become stained with blood. Should she wear this clothing at other times, she would become repulsive to her husband. [Alternatively, he may be repulsed even if it is not stained. The sugya may refer to some beliefs that men had that the clothing their wives wore while menstruating was polluted]. In any case, she keeps the worn out clothing. However, if she is a widow being provided for by her husband’s heirs, they get to keep the worn out clothing. We do not really care if she becomes repulsive to them by wearing the same clothes she wears while menstruating. We are only concerned that she not become repulsive to her husband. [I know, this is not a particularly generous sugya].
  IntroductionThe mishnah says that a husband should eat with his wife every Friday night, even if he is providing for her through an agent. The Talmud here debates what “eating” really means.
  Here two amoraim debate whether he actually eats with her, or whether “eating” refers to sex.
  The Talmud locates a precedent for the word “eating” to refer to sex. The quote in Proverbs refers to the adulterous woman. Clearly “eating” is a reference to sex. So too would R. Ashi interpret the mishnah.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel adds that he must “eat” with her on Shabbat during the day as well, not just on Friday night. Now if “eating” means just “eating” then there is no problem. But if it refers to sex, there is a problem—Jews are not supposed to have sex during the day, for it is immodest.However, Rava said that if the room is dark it is okay to have sex even during the day.
  IntroductionEarlier in chapter four of Ketubot we learned that a man is not obligated to provide food for his kids. Today’s sugya qualifies that statement.
   Ulla says that a man must provide for his children when they are very young—until the age of six. We should note that while this sounds like a very young age, the notion of an extended childhood is a modern innovation. Children in poor countries even today are often forced to go out to work at the age of six (or even younger). We are fortunate enough to live in a part of the world and in a time in history in which a person can delay joining the work force until very late in life (maybe too late, but that’s another question). Most people throughout history did not have that luxury. Many people today still do not.The age of six is found in another halakhah, one concerning the eruv. This refers to the eruv that extends where a person can travel on Shabbat [for details see the intro to Mishnah Yomit Eruvin]. If the father set an eruv to extend his travel to the north of the city and the mother to the south of the city, the child can travel with the mother to the south of the city. This proves that a child is dependent on his mother until the age of six.
  The source for Ulla’s halakhah that a father must provide sustenance for his young children is his obligation to provide extra food for his wife while she is nursing. Indirectly, this shows that he is obligated to feed his child, at least while he is nursing. The assumption seems to be that he must continue to feed the child until the age of six.
  The Talmud raises another possibility as to why the father must increase his nursing wife’s food—she is considered sick. In other words, he is obligated to take care of her, not his son.The Talmud does not ultimately reject this understanding of the mishnah. If we accept this understanding, then there is no proof from the mishnah that he must feed his young children. However, the lack of proof from the mishnah does not mean that Ulla is rejected. He is not.
  Interestingly, the chapter ends by returning again to the topic of wine. She receives an allowance of wine because wine helps a woman lactate. Today I know they say this about beer. [Indeed, it did seem to help my wife nurse our children while I drank beer.]
  Congratulations on finishing this fascinating chapter of Talmud. This is indeed one of my favorite chapters to learn and teach. It contains the stories of the rabbis who left their wives for extremely long periods of time to study Torah. These are some of the most well-known and studied stories in the Talmud. It also contains the laws of the rebellious wife, which form some of the most contentious halakhot in Jewish history.
  IntroductionThe mishnah that opens the sixth chapter discusses a wife’s right to money that she receives in various ways while she is married.
  This halakhah was already learned above in chapter four. Basically, since he provides for her, the money she earns goes to him.
  If a woman receives an inheritance while she is married, the money is treated like certain portions of the dowry she brought into the wedding.  This means that the husband cannot use the principle but he can use the interest that the principle accrues.  The easiest way to calculate principle and interest is to consider a field.  The field itself is the principle.  The husband may not sell the field.  However, the produce that is picked from the field is the “usufruct”, which is more literally translated as fruits. These belong to the husband.
  The mishnah now discusses two forms of compensation that the wife receives if injured:  indignity and blemish.  According to the first opinion, these belong to the wife, since she was the one who suffered the injury.However, Rabbi Judah ben Batera distinguishes between injuries inflicted on covered and uncovered parts of her body.  If the injury was inflicted upon a covered part of her body, then most of the suffering was hers and she receives two-thirds of the compensation.  However, if the injury was inflicted upon an uncovered part, then the husband is more embarrassed and blemished by his wife’s injury than she herself is. Therefore he receives two-thirds.  [I realize that the conception of marriage presented by Rabbi Judah ben Batera is not a conception that many of us share.]The money that he receives due to her injury is immediately given to him.  The money that she receives belongs in principle to her, and the usufruct belongs to him.  Therefore the money is used to buy land and he can enjoy the fruit.  Buying land in Mishnaic times was equivalent to our putting money in the bank.  It was a way to ensure that the money did not lose its value for real estate was one of the only sure investments in the ancient world.The mishnah does not mention three other payments that an injured party receives:  medical fees, loss of work and compensation for pain.  The reason that these are not mentioned is that it is clear to whom they belong.  Since the husband has a right to her handiwork and must pay for her rehabilitation, the first two payments belong to him.  Since the pain is experienced solely by her, she alone receives the compensation for pain.  The only question, therefore, was about embarrassment and blemish.
  As I said above, part of this mishnah was taught above in chapter four. The Talmud asks why we need to say the same thing over again.
  The only reason that the mishnah repeats itself is as an introduction to the dispute between R. Judah ben Batera and the rabbis concerning who receives the payments for blemish and embarrassment. This dispute is not found elsewhere in the Mishnah.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with lost objects that a woman finds and whether she has to turn them over to her husband.
  Here we see a dispute—according to the first opinion, which goes against the mishnah, a wife may keep the objects she finds.
  
  Daf 66a
  
  Rava argues that R. Akiva must say that the things she finds belong to her. This is because elsewhere he rules that if a woman vows that her husband will not derive benefit from anything that she does, the husband must annul the vow even though she is obligated to give him her handiwork. This is because she may do “extra” and that extra would belong to her. From here we can see that if a wife does “extra” handiwork it is hers. If so, all the more so would R. Akiva consider the things she finds, which she didn’t even work to earn, as belonging to her.To solve the problem the Talmud simply reverses the positions in the baraita. Now R. Akiva says that she gets to keep the things she finds.
  Finding something seems to be similar to surplus work done without a lot of exertion or extra effort. According to Rabin, all agree that if she produces extra handiwork without working overly hard to do so, then it belongs to her husband. She only gets to keep the extra handiwork, according to R. Akiva, if she works extra hard to earn it. So then how come R. Akiva holds that she keeps her findings.
  Papa disagrees with the above assumption: A find is not like extra work produced without exertion, concerning which there is no dispute that it belongs to the husband. Rather, a find is like work done through exertion. There is a dispute about both topics.
  Is there a dispute if she does two jobs at the same time? Three or four? Clearly R. Akiva would hold that she keeps the extra earnings. But would the other rabbis agree with himThere is no answer to this question.
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, if an assailant embarrasses or blemishes a wife, she receives the compensation. R. Judah b. Batera says that the husband receives some of this compensation.
  While this is a crude comparison, what Rava is really asking is how R. Judah b. Batera could hold that the husband is compensated when it is his wife that is embarrassed. While Rava does compare her with a horse, the idea is that while she may give her earnings to her husband, she is independent and therefore she, not her husband, should be compensated for being embarrassed.
  The problem with Rava’s analogy is that a horse may not be embarrassed. Therefore, the Talmud likens it to a person who spits on another person’s coat. A person is liable an enormous sum for embarrassing someone by spitting on them. But not, according to R. Papa, if they spit only on an another person’s coat. So too, why should a husband receive embarrassment payment if someone embarrasses his wife. His wife is not him.
  The answer is that when a man’s wife suffers indignity, he too is shamed. But this is simply not true if his garment is spat on. In such a case, it is just a piece of clothing and he suffers no shame.Ashi raises a difficulty by drawing an analogy between this situation and when a poor person from a good family is shamed. Since this person is poor and vulnerable, his family is obligated to protect him. So if he is shamed, why aren’t they paid money, just as a man receives compensation when his wife is shamed?The answer is that the relationship between a husband and wife is far closer than that between one member of the family and the others. A wife is like a husband’s own flesh—when she suffers an indignity, he does as well. Therefore, according to R. Judah b. Batera, he too receives compensation.
  IntroductionThe mishnah which opens this sugya deals with a father who promises to give his wife a large dowry and then her fiancee dies, leaving her liable for yibbum (levirate marriage) with the brother. The question is, is the father obligated to give the same amount of money to the yavam (the levir).
  If a husband promises to give his daughter’s husband a large dowry he is legally obligated to pay that money to the son.  We should note that the rabbis encouraged fathers to give their daughters’ generous dowries so that they would find good matches.However, if the son-in-law dies while they are only engaged, the father-in-law is not liable to pay the same amount of money to the brother-in-law who might perform yibbum.  This is true even if the daughter wants to marry the yavam.  Since the father’s contract was with the other brother, he has no legal obligation to the yavam.
  The following section of the mishnah discusses the sums of the dowry written in the ketubah.  Customarily the woman would bring a dowry consisting of money, objects and potentially land (our mishnah does not discuss land, because its location and not value was written in the ketubah).  The amount of dowry that the husband would write was the amount he would be obligated to return to her upon divorce or death.  If she brought a dowry of money, he would write a higher sum than she actually brought since he benefits from the use of the money. If she brought movable property into the marriage, he writes an amount one-fifth less, for it was customary to overestimate the value of the dowry to make the bride and her family sound richer than they really were.
  If a wife brings into the marriage 1000 denarii of cash, the husband writes that he has received 1500.  This is because for the duration of the marriage he benefits from the use of the money.If she brings in goods whose value has been assessed, the husband need write in the ketubah only a fifth less of the value. The primary reason, according to most commentators, is that dowries tend to be overestimated (just like people planning weddings tend to be overcharged!).  The husband should not have to pay for his overestimation.  However, the mishnah notes that if he wrote 100 zuz in ketubah and she brings in goods that are actually worth 100 zuz, he cannot ask for more.
  
  Daf 66b
  
  The mishnah now illustrates two cases where the amount written in the ketubah is less than she actually brings into the marriage.  If he writes 100, she must bring in 125 denarii (sela=4 denar).  That is to say, he has reduced the amount by 1/5.  Similarly if he writes 400 zuz worth of goods, she must bring 500.The husband too, when he promises to bring a certain amount of goods into the marriage (for instance clothes or perfume for his wife) writes the value at one/fifth less.  This is true because these goods are also generally overestimated.
  Obviously if the first son is a scholar and the second son an am ha’aretz (ignoramus), the father can say to the second son that he is unwilling to give him the money he promised the first son. But even if the second son is a scholar, and rationally speaking the father should be even happier with the match, the father still retains the right not to give the promised money to the second son.
  There is some repetition in the mishnah. The first clause teaches, “Whatever a bridegroom agrees to give [his wife in her ketubah] he writes one fifth less [than the appraised value].” Later the mishnah teaches, “[Otherwise, if he is requested to enter in the ketubah:] “goods assessed at a maneh”, his wife must give him thirty-one sela and a denar.” Both of these lines teach the same exact principle—the amount that is written in the ketubah is 1/5 higher than the actual amount given.The Talmud answers that the repetition is there for two reasons: 1) to teach that the same principle holds whether there is a large amount of dowry (first clause) or a small amount; 2) to teach that the same principle applies to the money he brings to the marriage (first clause) as she brings to the marriage (second clause).
  IntroductionThe first part of the mishnah that opens today’s section is a continuation of the mishnah we learned yesterday.The second part discusses the husband’s obligation to provide his bride with money for perfume.
  As we learned yesterday, if the wife brings cash as a dowry, her husband must write into the ketubah an amount that is fifty per cent higher than that which she brought.  Since a sela is worth 4 denarii, he writes 6 denarii for every sela.
  For every maneh (100 denarii) that she brings as dowry, her husband must provide 10 denarii of money for her perfume.  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees with the setting of an absolute amount.  Rather he holds that local custom dictates how much he must provide for her perfume.
  Again, the mishnah is repetitive, teaching twice that if she brings in cash, he writes an extra fifty per cent. Why does the mishnah need to teach the same principle twice?The answer again is that the mishnah had to teach that the same principle applies to both a large transaction and a small transaction. If it had taught only the law with regard to the large transaction, we might have thought that since a profit can be gained with such a large sum of money, the husband must write a larger amount to pay her back later. And if the mishnah had taught only about a smaller amount, we might have assumed that if she gave him a larger amount, since it requires a greater degree of responsibility not to lose such a sum, when he pays her back, he gives her only the principle. Therefore, both clauses of the mishnah were necessary.
  IntroductionThis sugya discusses the perfume that a husband must promise to give to his wife.
  Ashi interprets the mishnah to refer to a basket of perfumes (might also include makeup). Furthermore, the mishnah refers only to the golden period of Jerusalem, when people were rich enough to adorn themselves with ample perfume.
  The mishnah said that the husband must provide ten denarii of perfumes for every maneh. But it did not say whether this accords with the maneh written in the ketubah or the maneh that she actually gives him. It also did not say whether this is a daily or one time allowance? Or is it monthly or yearly? All of these questions are left unanswered.
  Four hundred gold denarii of perfume for one day is a crazy amount of perfume. It is not clear whether she is complaining when she responds, “May you grant such allowances for your own daughters.” As we shall see now, she is being set up as a rich and spoiled woman, who in the end, receives her upcommance.
  In this tale, we learn that in the end, the daughter or Nakdimon b. Gorion became destitute, swept up in the tragedy of the destruction of Jerusalem.
  Nakdimon b. Gorion did indeed give to the poor. However, there are two problems with the way in which he did so. First of all, he gave tzedakah for his own glorification. While this too is ultimately helpful to the poor, it seems that the Talmud is saying that since he did it only for personal gain, it did not offer him or his family any protection in times of danger. Second, and in my mind, more important, he did not give enough. While the amount he gave is greater than that of an ordinary person, Nakdimon b. Gorion was the Warren Buffet or Bill Gates of his time—he was fabulously wealthy. He should have given more.
  The sugya ends with R. Elazar b. Zadok seeing the poor girl picking barley grains out from among the hooves of horses. He applies to her a verse. According to Rashi the verse means that if Israel does not dedicate itself to the Torah, in the end they will lose their very bodies.
  
  Daf 67a
  
  The sugya ends with R. Elazar b. Zadok seeing the poor girl picking barley grains out from among the hooves of horses. He applies to her a verse. According to Rashi the verse means that if Israel does not dedicate itself to the Torah, in the end they will lose their very bodies.
  IntroductionTo recall, last week’s daf discussed money brought by the wife into the marriage as dowry. The general idea is that if she brings cash, the amount written in the ketubah is fifty per cent more than the cash. If she brings goods, the amount written is 1/5 less. Today’s sugya and tomorrow’s discuss a woman who brings gold as part of her dowry—is this treated like cash or goods?
  Gold is not to be overvalued or undervalued in the ketubah. Rather its real value is to be entered into the ketubah.
  The baraita seems to say that pieces of gold are treated like vessels of silver. This means that since they wear out, their value diminishes over time. Thus in the ketubah a lower value for the gold should be written.The Talmud resolves this by saying that gold is like gold vessels—the value does not diminish over time.
  The Talmud now rejects this understanding of the baraita. First of all, if it meant to say that pieces of gold are like gold vessels, then it should have said “like vessels made from it” and not “like vessels,” which implies like gold vessels.
  The Talmud now cites a longer baraita as a difficulty against R. Shemen. The first opinion holds that that gold is treated like silver vessels. Just as silver vessels are devaluated in the ketubah, so too is gold. Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel would say that they are like gold denarii in a place where such coins cannot be exchanged for smaller coins. The problem is that R. Shemen seems to hold like Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel. Stay tuned for the continuation of the sugya tomorrow.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is a continuation of yesterday’s sugya concerning what is written in the ketubah when the woman brings in pieces of gold or gold denarii.
  The Talmud now reinterprets the baraita. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel might be disagreeing about the second half of the baraita, in reference to gold denarii. The dispute is over a case where the gold denarii can be used, but only with some difficulty (like an obscure credit card). The first opinion would hold that since they can be used, they are like cash, and their value is increased in the ketubah. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel would hold that since it is difficult to use them, their actual value is written in the ketubah.
  The Talmud now interprets the baraita so that it is all Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s opinion. This does not really change much of the sugya. We would still hold that pieces of gold are treated like silver vessels and devalued, which is a difficulty on R. Shemen b. Abba, who said that their actual value is written into the ketubah.
  There are two resolutions to the difficulty, both somewhat similar. According to the first resolution, the baraita was referring to small broken pieces of gold. Such small pieces of gold are worth less than the larger pieces to which R. Shemen was referring when he said that their actual value is written in the ketubah. R. Ashi says we are referring to powdered gold, which might have been used in painting, like gold leaf. Again such gold loses its value and therefore a lower value is written into the ketubah.
  Evidently, one could trade in these spices, so their value in the ketubah is written like cash.
  According to most Talmudic commentators, these objects are like land and therefore a woman may seize her ketubah from them. Generally she can collect land for her ketubah, not regular movable property, unless nothing else is available.
  Rava first thought that the value of these purses was like land. But then he realized only land is “real estate” and therefore it, and not these purses, serve as the real collateral for her ketubah.
  IntroductionThe mishnah which opens this section deals with a father who either does not specify an amount for his daughter’s dowry, or cuts a deal with the husband that the latter will accept her without a dowry.
  If a man marries off his daughter and does not state how much dowry he is going to provide her, the husband has a right to claim from him a dowry worth 50 zuz.  As we shall see in the end of the mishnah, this is the size of a small dowry that even an orphan would receive from charity.
  The father can cut a deal with the husband that the husband shall marry the daughter without a dowry.  The father is then not obligated to provide his daughter with anything, and all of the responsibility falls on the husband’s back.  The obligation to provide her with clothing begins already while she is in her father’s house.  The husband cannot wait for her to arrive at his home, rather he must send money or clothing to the father so that she will have what to wear for the journey.
  Even a poor orphan receives a dowry of 50 zuz. Furthermore, if there is extra money in the charity fund, she is entitled to more, depending on her social status.  This might refer to an orphan from a respectable, perhaps once-rich family.
  As we have learned before, there are two kinds of zuz—the simple one and the real one. A simple zuz is worth 1/8 of the value of the real one. Abaye infers that the mishnah refers to fifty simple zuz because fifty real zuz would be an enormous sum to give from charity funds. The mishnah implies that if there were funds available, she could receive even more than fifty zuz, but Abaye cannot imagine that the charity could ever give more than that. Therefore, the whole mishnah must refer to simple zuz.
  The Talmud now begins a long discussion on charity. Here the issue is who’s needs are more pressing—those of the boy or girl? In both of these cases the girl orphan takes priority. If someone has to go begging, better it should be the boy than the girl. If both need to be married, the girl again takes priority, for it is more shameful for a girl to remain unmarried than it is for a boy.
  
  Daf 67b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the issue of charity.
  If an orphan comes for assistance in marriage, he is first provided with all of the needs to prepare a house fit for beginning a family. Only then is he assisted in finding a wife. Helping a poor person does not mean simply giving him money. It means examining what he needs at that point in his life and providing him with the means to obtain those needs.We should also note that “finding a wife” was not something someone usually did alone. As we can see here, it requires assistance.
  This remarkable baraita gets to the heart of the ideal of the mitzvah of tzedakah—you are commanded to provide the poor person with that which the poor person lacks. Tzedakah is not about just providing a person with their basic human needs. It is about restoring their dignity to where the poor person himself feels it should be. Thus if the poor person is froma  family of wealth, we are commanded to restore him to his former wealth, for this is “that which he lacks.” Hillel the Elder is famous for himself being a poor person. Nevertheless, he does not hesitate in ensuring that the poor person from the rich family has a horse and a slave to restore his honor.
  The story here is told of a poor person who was given from charity a pound of meat (or a pound of coins to buy meat) every day, again illustrating the principle from above—he must provided with everything he lacks.
  The story is illustrative of the two sides of charity—the giver and the receiver. On the one hand, R. Nehemiah is thought, at least for a moment, to have killed the poor person by making him eat lentils. This was not the poor person’s diet and indeed, it may have been dangerous for him to eat such food. On the other hand, the poor person should not have requested fat meat and wine. This is the food of the wealthy, and being poor, he should have learned to subsist on less.
  IntroductionMore complex tales and halakhot concerning tzedakah.
  This is another fascinating and complex tale of tzedakah. On the one hand, the poor person is correct, at least theologically speaking. Jews are supposed to believe that God provides for all of their needs. On the other hand, we know that in reality people have to work hard to provide food for the community. While a miracle does occur, and it is as if God sends the fat chicken and wine in answer to the poor person, I don’t believe that the point of the story is that one should rely on such a miracle occurring.
  Here we see two strategies as to how to handle a person who does not want to take money but needs it. The first strategy is to offer him a loan and then forgive it. In this way, he won’t feel like he’s getting a gift. The second strategy is to try to give it as a gift, but if this doesn’t work, to at least give him the money as a loan.
  Interestingly, according to the opinion in this baraita, even if a person has enough money to sustain himself, he is provided for from charity, at least while he is alive. However, after his death, those who gave him the charity may collect the money they gave him from his estate.
  According to R. Shimon, the community is not responsible to maintain a person who has his own funds. Finally, the baraita returns to the topic of a person who does not want to accept charity. Here the strategy is to offer him a loan and tell him to bring a pledge to secure the loan. This way he feels that he is not taking charity.
  This baraita goes over the same issues that we examined above, but connects them to the verse.The sages do not derive any special halakhah from the repetition of the words “surely you shall lend to him” in the verse. Rather they say that the Torah speaks in the language of ordinary people. This means that extra halakhot are not to be derived from grammatical nuances such as the repetition of words.
  IntroductionMore tales of tzedakah.
  In this fascinating story, Mar Ukba gives tzedakah secretly—while he knows to whom he is giving, the poor person does not know who is giving to him. This is an ideal way to give tzedakah, for it protects the poor person from the shame of his poverty. But one day it happens that the poor person notices who is giving him the money, and tries to run him down, perhaps to thank him, or perhaps to be sure who it really was. Mar Ukba and his wife run away and jump into a furnace (I know this is puzzling. See below). Mar Ukba feels the heat of the furnace, but his wife does not. It seems that not being burned is a sign of righteousness, in the same way that Daniel and his colleagues were not burned. This distresses Mar Ukba—after all, he has been giving tzedakah to this poor person every day. Why is he not righteous enough to merit protection? Mar Ukba’s wife explains to him that since she is at home, she can immediately aid the poor every day. This is different from Mar Ukba who is not always around to give the poor some food to eat.
  The Talmud explains why Mar Ukba and his wife jumped into the fire. It seems to be the live enactment of a moral lesson—a person should throw himself into the fire rather than publicly embarrass someone else. This lesson is learned from Tamar, Judah’s daughter-in-law. Tamar, as we recall, became pregnant with Judah’s child after dressing up as a prostitute and sleeping with him. Judah comes to town and, not recognizing her, accuses her of adultery. In her defense, Tamar does not simply retort that the child is Judah’s. She takes out Judah’s staff and ring, the pledges he left her. She gave him the opportunity to deny his actions and thereby avoid the shame, even though had he done so she would have been burned in punishment. In other words, she was willing to risk the horrible death of burning rather than embarrass Judah.
  In this story, Mar Ukba sends a very large amount of tzedakah to a poor person every Yom Kippur. He then discovers that the poor person actually has a lot of money. He uses old wine to sprinkle the floor, which was done in Talmudic times to keep the dust of the floor down. Usually this would have been done with water. We would expect him to cut the tzedakah. Indeed his son says to him that he no longer needs to send the poor person so much money. He doesn’t need it. But Mar Ukba unexpectedly doubles the amount that he sends. If this poor person needs to sprinkle wine on the floor, then Mar Ukba will help him do so. Certainly this is idealistic, but that is part of what these stories are about. They are not about the practicalities of tzedakah. They are about the ideals.
  The final tale about Mar Ukba occurs at his death. Mar Ukba sees that he has only dedicated 7000 gold denarii to tzedakah, a tremendous amount but evidently not commensurate with his wealth. He thereupon dedicates half of his wealth. The Talmud clarifies that while alive a person should not give away more than twenty per cent of his wealth, lest he grow poor and need tzedakah himself. But once he is about to die, he can give away as much as he wants.
  
  Daf 68a
  
  IntroductionThis is the final section of the long sugya about tzedakah.
  In the first story, R. Abba finds a way to give tzedakah without knowing who takes it. However, in this case, the receiver would know from whom he is receiving the money.The second story again illustrates the case of a person who takes tzedakah but does not need it. R. Hanina’s response is that we should be grateful for such deceivers, for they prevent us from sinning. Knowing that people are deceptive gives others the excuse to not give them tzedakah, and in this case, it is a legitimate excuse. But it is just an excuse. People would probably not give tzedakah even if those who received it were honest. And doing so would be sinful, as we learn from the verse. Now that there are deceivers, the excuse becomes legitimate.
  Joshua b. Korha uses the fact that the same word “base” is found in these two verses to equate not giving charity to idol worship. It would be worth asking what makes these two crimes similar.
  Pretending as if one is in need is not only deceptive, but will in the end lead to actually needing help.
  A person who has more than 200 zuz may not take the agricultural offerings such as forgotten sheaves and corners of fields. The issue at hand here is whether a person must sell his possessions to prevent him from going below the poverty level. The first baraita says that he need not, whereas the second baraita says that if he was used to using gold, he must now use copper.Zevid resolves the two contradictory sources by stating that one does not need to sell his cups and dishes. But he does need to sell his bed and table.
  The problem with R. Zevid’s resolution is that it is hard to understand why a person could be forced to sell his expensive bed and table but not his expensive cups and dishes. Therefore two other resolutions are offered. The first is that the person need sell only toys or other such unnecessary but valuable objects. The second explanation is difficult and there are many interpretations. I will suggest one. There is a difference between taking the agricultural offerings and taking tzedakah funds. We don’t require a person to sell his possessions in order to collect agricultural offerings. However, we do require him to do so in order to collect tzedakah.
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses the dowry given to an orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brothers.
  Usually, only a father has the legal ability to give his daughter in marriage.  However, the rabbis gave mothers and brothers the ability to marry off the daughter should the father have died.  If the mother or brothers give the daughter a smaller dowry than is typical of a family of their economic status, the daughter may, upon reaching majority age, make a legal claim against her father’s estate and receive a higher dowry.  We can see that the dowry is a legal right of the daughter’s and that right cannot be abrogated by her mother or brothers, who might, after all, have a vested interest in reducing her dowry (since a large dowry cuts their inheritance.According to Rabbi Judah, if the father had an older daughter whom he married off before dying, the court can force the family to give the same amount to the second daughter.  The Sages, however, disagree, for sometimes a family can grow rich and sometimes they grow poor.  Furthermore, sometimes a rich father can be cheap and give his daughter a small dowry.  While alive, since it is his money, this is his right.  Likewise, a poor father might give his first daughter a larger dowry than he could afford.  In both cases, the first daughter’s dowry should not indicate the size of the second daughter’s.  The only way of assessing how much her dowry should be is by correlating it to the size of the estate.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is about assessing the dowry a girl would receive in a case where her father had died before he married her off.
  Shmuel says that if a father is no longer alive when his daughter is being married, we assess how much he would have given to his daughter as a dowry and that is what she receives.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on Shmuel, under the initial assumption that the source refers to the dowry. The baraita says that the estate is evaluated, not what the father would have wanted to be given. These two methods of evaluating what the father would have given could yield a different dowry amount. For instance, let’s say the family is very wealthy, but the father is known to give small dowries. If we assess the estate, she would receive a low dowry. But if we assess the husband’s wishes, she would receive a high dowry. The opposite could also be true.
  Nahman b. Yitzchak says that the baraita does not refer to the dowry—it only refers to the maintenance of the girl before she is married. The Talmud interprets the two clauses “are to be maintained and provided for” as referring to both food and drink and to clothing and bedding. In all such cases she is provided for according to her father’s wealth and not what he would have wished to have done. But when it comes to dowry, we could still say that we estimate how much the father would have given were he alive.
  The Talmud now uses the mishnah to raise an objection against Shmuel. According to the sages in the mishnah, if the father is dead the estate is evaluated and whatever she deserves she is given. Thus, Shmuel is refuted because he does not agree with the sages.
  Shmuel can hold like R. Judah, according to whom we estimate how much the father would give the second daughter by seeing how much he gave to the first daughter.
  The Talmud now explains that Shmuel had to say “that the assessment is based on the father” and not just that “the halakhah follows R. Judah” to let us know that even if the father had not married off a first daughter, we still estimate how much he would have given and give that amount to the daughter who is married after his death.The mishnah mentions that he married off his first daughter only to let us know that even in that case the sages who disagree with R. Judah hold that we do not assess the father’s wishes. According to the sages, the estate is assessed, not how much the father would have given.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss the dowry an orphaned girl can claim from her father’s estate.
  Rava says that according to R. Hisda, the halakhah follows R. Judah from the Mishnah, according to whom we assess how much the father gave the first daughter in order to determine how much the second daughter receives. R. Hisda is pleased with this report.
  Above Rava says that we estimate how much the father gave the first daughter and that is the amount the second daughter receives. Here Rava seems to say the opposite—she receives ten per cent of the estate. In other words, what she receives is based on the size of the father’s estate, not his estimated generosity.The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that the first statement of Rava refers to a case where we were able to estimate how much the father would have given. If we cannot estimate what the father would have given, then the size of the dowry is based on the size of the estate.
  The Talmud supports this resolution by noting that if we didn’t differentiate between cases where we could estimate how much the father could give and cases where we could not, then Rabbi’s statements would contradiction one another. Earlier he said she receives 10 per cent of the assets, whereas here Rabbi says she receives 1/12. To resolve these contradictory halakhot, the Talmud rules that one is a case where she received an amount based on the size of the estate (ten per cent), the other is a case where she received an amount based on the estimate of the father’s generosity (1/12, in that particular case).
  This baraita expands what Rabbi really meant when he said that a girl receives ten per cent of her father’s estate. The second girl (and so on) receives ten per cent of what is left after the first girl is married off. She will receive less. The end of the baraita is not clear and will be clarified below.
  
  Daf 68b
  
  The Talmud clarifies the end of the baraita. If all ten come to marry at the same time, they all receive equal shares.
  Matana also holds that if all ten girls are married at the same time (oy), they would each receive a tenth of their father’s property. [I hope that at least they share caterers!] Assumedly, this would leave nothing for any boys that the father might have had.
  IntroductionThis sugya discusses when a girl loses her rights to claim her dowry.
  According to Rabbi, when a girl reaches majority age and has not yet been married, she loses her rights to be maintained from her father’s estate. However, she does not lose her rights to her dowry. Rabbi Shimon b. Elazar says that she even loses her rights to her dowry. The only way she could recover her dowry would be to hire someone to marry her, and then use that husband to get them their dowries. Not a particularly effective system.Nahman rules at the end that the halakhah follows Rabbi—she does not lose her right to her dowry.
  Rava uses the mishnah as a difficulty on R. Nahman, who ruled according to Rabbi. The mishnah could be read as implying that she receives a dowry only if she is married as a minor. If she is not married until she becomes an adult, she loses her rights to claim her dowry from her father’s estate.
  The difficulty is resolved by saying that she must stake a claim in receiving her dowry. If she does protest, she can recover it her dowry when she is married. If she does not protest then she loses it.
  The Talmud notes that it is reasonable to say that there is a difference between a case where the girl protested and a case where she did not. Otherwise the earlier statement of Rabbi (she does receive her dowry if she is married after becoming an adult) would contradict a different statement. Only a daughter being maintained by her brothers, i.e. a minor, receives her dowry. An older girl does not. To resolve these two statements, we say that it depends on whether she protested.
  According to Ravina, she needs to protest only if she both becomes of majority age and is married. If she was married while a minor or just reached majority age, she need not protest in order to later on receive her dowry.
  Earlier Rava raised an objection against R. Nahman, and the resolution was that there is a difference between a case where the girl protested and one where she did not. The conclusion was that if she reached majority age and didn’t protest she loses her dowry. This implies, according to Rashi, that if she was married as a na’arah (no longer a minor) and didn’t protest, even though she is not of majority age, she still loses her dowry.So how can Rava say here that as long as she is not of majority age when married, she receives her dowry?The answer is that it depends if she is being sustained by her brothers. If she is, then she need not protest, for we can assume that she would not want to ask for her dowry when she is already being sustained by them. But if she is not being sustained by them, then she needs to ask for her dowry if she is married as a na’arah.
  IntroductionThis sugya compares a girl’s rights to her dowry with her rights to receive maintenance from her father’s estate after his death.
  Huna in the name of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] contrasts the rules governing the right of a girl to collect her dowry from her father with the rights that a woman has to receive her ketubah conditions from her husband. These ketubah conditions are found in chapter four. They include her rights to be maintained by her husband’s estate.The Talmud must now understand how they differ. If we were to say that they differ in that dowry may be collected from encumbered property whereas maintenance may not, this would be too obvious. It is an everyday occurrence that the court would seize encumbered property in order to secure a girl’s right to a dowry but they would not do so in order to maintain the girl.
  If we were to suggest that they differ in that funds for the dowry can be seized from movable property whereas funds for maintenance may be collected only from real estate, the problem would be that Rabbi explicitly says that funds for maintenance may be collected from movable property.If we were to suggest that they differ in that funds for the dowry can be seized from movable property whereas funds for maintenance may be collected only from real estate, the problem would be that Rabbi explicitly says that funds for maintenance may be collected from movable property.
  The conclusion is that a father has a right to leave a will denying his daughter a dowry, but he does not have a right to leave a will denying her maintenance from his estate. This right is ensconced in the ketubah, while the right to a dowry is not.
  
  Daf 69a
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the daughters’ rights to recover their dowries from their deceased father’s estate.
  Rav send a question as part of a longer letter to Rabbi. He inserts the question in between the lines of the longer letter. The question basically is whether a daughter can recover her dowry from property the brothers have encumbered—meaning they have either outright sold it or used it to secure a loan.Hiyya is with Rabbi when the question reaches him. R. Hiyya asks whether Rabbi thought the question referred to a case where the brothers sold the property or used it to secure a loan. Rabbi thinks R. Hiyya’s question is somewhat out of place, for it matters not how the property was encumbered. Encumbered property can be used to recover the dowry, but not to pay for ongoing maintenance.
  Why didn’t Rav phrase his enquiry in a clearer fashion, specifying whether he was asking about a case where the brothers sold the property or a case where they pledged it?
  In reality, Rav wanted to ask about both cases, but went through the following thought process. If he were to ask about a case where they sold the estate, and the answer was that she may seize the property, he would know that she may seize the property if it was only pledged, for the brothers would still possess the property. But if they wrote back that she may not seize the property, he would still not know what the rule would be if the brothers had only pledged it.
  If he asked specifically about a case where the brothers only pledged the property, then he would be able to figure out the rule in the case of where they sold it only if the answer was that the daughters may not seize the property.But he would not know the rule in the case where they sold if the ruling in the case of pledging was that they may seize.Since if he had asked about one, he would not have been able to figure out the other, Rav asked in more general terms, hoping to hear the answer for both cases. 
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with a statement by R. Yohanan that contradicts what we had read earlier. According to R. Yohanan, daughters cannot extract anything from encumbered property, not even their dowries.
  Rabbi had said the daughters may seize encumbered property but only in order to collect for their dowries. They may not collect for maintenance. R. Yohanan clearly disagrees, holding that they cannot collect for either. The question is whether he heard Rabbi’s statement and disagreed. Or did he simply not know what Rabbi had said.
  The Talmud will now try to figure out from other sources whether R. Yohanan knew of Rabbi’s statement. In this situation the second daughter does not take her dowry until the son dies and leaves the full inheritance to be shared by the two daughters. The second daughter loses out, according to R. Yohanan, because the first daughter received her dowry on top of the share of the inheritance. Note that this accords with his general rule—girls may not extract their dowries from encumbered property.
  Hanina responds that the second daughter may certainly take her dowry and then divide up the estate, for even if the sons had encumbered the estate, she would have been able to take her share. All the more so can she collect it in this case, where the property has not even been encumbered.
  The Talmud now returns to the issue at hand—did R. Yohanan know of Rabbi’s statement, quoted here by R. Hanina? If R. Yohanan had never heard that halakhah, he should have retorted to R. Hanina—who said that? Thus it seems that he had heard Rabbi’s statement, but simply did not agree with it.
  In fact, the case here is different from a normal case, for the second daughter has just inherited half of the remaining estate. R. Yohanan could agree in general with Rabbi that girls may seize encumbered property for their dowry, but not allow them to do so in this case because the second girl has funds on which to be married. To put this another way—R. Yohanan’s ruling in this case might not disagree with Rabbi.
  Yemar notes that if the second daughter loses out on taking her dowry on top of the inheritance because she fell into some money, the implication would be that any daughter who falls into money would lose her right to claim her dowry. But this is absurd—we know that girls can always claim ten per cent of their father’s estate for their dowry.Ashi answers that they only lose out on their dowries if they inherit because there are no male heirs. If they fall into funds through some other means, they do not lose out on their rights to claim their dowries from their father’s estate.
  IntroductionThis section opens with Amemar’s statement that when it comes to her rights to collect her dowry, a girl is treated like an inheritor. Note that this would agree with R. Yohanan from yesterday’s section—she cannot collect from encumbered property.
  According to Amemar, a girl is an inheritor of her dowry. This would mean she could derive her share from any of the lands of the inheritance, equally according to the percentage owed her. The other inheritors could not pay her off or give her one portion of land. Thus if she takes ten per cent, she has a ten per cent claim over every piece of land left in the estate.
  According to R. Ashi, the daughter is treated like a creditor. This would mean that the brothers could give her money or whatever they want to pay for her dowry, as long as it added up to the required amount.
  In this story, Amemar seems to agree with R. Ashi that the daughter is like a creditor. The implication is that if the sons wish to give her her share in cash instead of land, they have the right to do so.
  If she is a creditor from her father, who has already died, then she can only collect only from the worst land available and she would have to take an oath that she has not yet received her dowry. But if she is considered the creditor of her brothers, she can collect from medium land and she need not take an oath. So it matters whether we consider her to be collecting from her father or her brothers.
  In this story R. Ashi has died. The fact that his daughter collects her dowry from her brother, Mar bar R. Ashi, from medium land without an oath proves that she is a creditor of her brother. But when collecting from the son of R. Sama, R. Ashi’s other son, she can only collect this part from the worst land and she needs to take an oath because she is owed the land by R. Sama who is dead.
  In these two cases we see some relaxing of the laws of collecting the tenth only from land. In the first she collects from the place where handmills are attached to the ground, for this too is considered like land. In the second case, she collects from money derived from rent.We should note that in the post-talmudic period, for the most part, any debts that in the Talmudic period were collectable only from land, became collectable from cash or other property. By that period the economy had shifted from land-based to commodity-based and therefore many of the Talmudic laws no longer made sense.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to address the issue of the dowry.
  In this story, R. Anan sends a letter to R. Huna asking him to give a certain orphan girl ten per cent of her father’s property as her dowry. R. Huna sends back R. Sheshet his student with two follow-up questions, only the first has to do with our issue: Should the dowry be taken from both land and movable property? The second question has to do with the social conventions at a mourning meal—who sits in the most important position. It is unclear why he asks this unrelated question.
  Sheshet comes to R. Anan and conveys R. Huna’s questions. The problem is that R. Huna addressed R. Anan in a condescending manner, calling him “Anan, Anan.” R. Sheshet is embarrassed to speak this way to R. Anan, but has no choice.
  Anan goes and complains (whines) to Mar Ukba that R. Huna has not addressed him with the correct appellation. Mar Ukba responds that if R. Anan does not know what a marziha is, he should not presume to call R. Huna his colleague. R. Huna was set off by the fact that R. Anan called him “our colleague, Huna.”
  
  Daf 69b
  
  The Talmud now defines what “marziha” means and how we learn from Scripture that at the meal eaten at the mourning house the mourner sits at the head. We should note that “the head” does not mean the “head of the table” as we conceive of it today. In Talmudic times they probably still ate either reclining on couches or sitting on the floor.
  The long passage about dowry concludes with Rava’s ruling that in all cases where a woman needs to collect funds from her father’s estate, she may do so only from real estate. She may not collect from movable property. As I have stated on other occasions, this changed in the post-talmudic period when Jews for the most part stopped being land owners.
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses a father who set aside a sum of money for his daughter for her to use for a specific purpose and then died or went away.  The question is, when the daughter gets married, can the trustee give it to her husband and allow him to use it for a different purpose?
  As explained above, the father gave money to an agent to be used for his daughter for a specific purpose, for instance to buy a field.  Now that the father is no longer there and the daughter has been married, she wants the husband to receive the money, for she trusts him.  According to Rabbi Meir the agent must do whatever the father told him to do.  The Talmud explains that this is because it is a commandment to fulfill the wishes of a dead person.
  Rabbi Yose responds that even if the agent had already bought the field which the father wanted him to buy, and the daughter now had possession of the field, she could sell it and give the money to her husband.  Therefore, there is no reason for the agent to buy the field and give it to her, rather he can give her directly the money for her to give to her husband.
  The debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose is only with regard to a daughter who has reached majority age.  At this age she could have sold the field, and therefore Rabbi Yose holds that the money is given to her husband.  However, if she is still a minor she cannot engage in business.  Even if the agent had bought her the field, she could not have sold it.  Since Rabbi Yose’s reasoning is not applicable in this case, the agent must do what he was told to do by the father.
  IntroductionThis sugya discusses the mishnah’s law that if a father-in-law gives his son-in-law money, the daughter must do what the father directed.
  In this baraita R. Meir and R. Yose dispute when the daughter has a right to do with the money as she wishes (give it to her husband) and when the father’s agent must do as he was told. According to R. Meir, it depends on whether the girl was married. If she was married, then she may do as she wishes. But if only betrothed, the trustee must do as he was told. According to R. Yose it depends on whether the daughter has reached majority age. If she has, she may do as she wishes. But if she is still a minor, then the trustee must do as he was told.
  The Talmud now tries to figure out what exactly the dispute is between R. Meir and R. Yose in light of the baraita and in light of the mishnah. The first practical difference may be with regard to a minor who has been married. According to R. Meir since she has been married she may do as she wishes, whereas R. Yose holds that since she is still a minor, she may not do as she wishes.
  The Talmud notes that the last clause of the mishnah cannot be R. Yose. The last clause states that R. Meir and R. Yose debate only with regard to a minor. But R. Yose has already implied in the second section of the mishnah that a minor cannot do as she wishes, since minors do not in general have a right to sell anything. So if the author of the last clause is R. Yose, then the mishnah is repetitive.
  If the last clause is not R. Yose, then it must be R. Meir. But this means that R. Meir agrees that if she is a minor, even if she has been married, she may still not do as she wishes. R. Yose obviously agrees with this, and therefore there is no disagreement in this case.
  The conclusion is that R. Meir and R. Yose disagree about a girl who is of majority age but has not yet been married. R. Yose would say that since she is of majority age she may do as she wishes. R. Meir would say that since she has not yet been married, the trustee must still do as he was told.
  The amoraim dispute whom the halakhah follows.
  IntroductionThis is the last sugya of the chapter! It continues to deal loosely with the mishnah that we learned last week.
  In this colorful story, Ilfa, a rabbi (assumedly) issues a challenge to the other rabbis. If I can’t find a source in the mishnah for every baraita recited by R. Hiyya or R. Oshaya I will drown myself (oy Ilfa!).The challenge is from a baraita that discusses when one must follow precisely the directive of a dying father. In the first case the dying man says to provide his kids with a shekel a week, but we can assume that what he means is “provide them with their needs.” If they end up needing more than a shekel, they need a sela, then they may be given more than a shekel. However, if he specifically says, “give them no more than a shekel” then they may not be given anything more than a shekel.Finally, if the father adds that if these these kids die, his other children should inherit their allowance, then he is exhibiting his concern that there should be money left for the other children. Therefore, under no circumstances may they be given more than a shekel.
  
  Daf 70a
  
  Ilfa identifies this halakhah with R. Meir in the Mishnah who had said that the agent of the father should do as the father instructed. This implies that it is a mitzvah to carry out the instructions of a dying man. In our case, even though the shekel will not be sufficient for them, they are given only a shekel from his estate.
  Hisda rules that the halakhah is that in all cases, no matter what the father says, the children are provided with their needs. The assumption is the father would have wanted this.The Talmud raises a difficulty—don’t we hold like R. Meir that there is a mitzvah to follow the instructions of a dying man?The answer is that usually we do rule that it is a mitzvah to follow the instructions of a dying man. But in this case, we can assume that the only reason the father said to give them a shekel, an amount that was too low for them live off of, was to encourage his children to work to earn money themselves. But if we can assume that the father would not have really wanted them to not have enough to live on.
  The Talmud now cites a mishnah from elsewhere. According to the mishnah, minors can sell and buy things (but not land). Rafram (an amora) limits this to a case where they have no guardian. If they have a guardian, then the guardian is the one who sells and buys on their behalf.
  The Talmud finds a source for Rafram—our mishnah from above. There is no legal validity to the act of a minor. If the minor has no guardian, no one to take care of him/her, then of necessity we need to let him/her sell and buy things. But if there is a guardian then the minor cannot sell or buy anything without the guardian’s okay.
  The Talmud notes that the case of the mishnah might be different—there was no validity to the act of the minor because in that case there was a trustee who was appointed to do what the father instructed him to do. But perhaps in other cases there would be no validity to the act of a minor.
  The precise reading of the mishnah leads to the interpretation that there is never any validity to the act of a minor—not just in the case of a trustee. The only case where there would be validity to a minor’s act is if there is no guardian to help take care of him.
  Congratulations on finishing another chapter of Talmud. We are now almost halfway through the chapters of Ketubot (there are thirteen). And we’ve finished more than half of the material. I have been tremendously enjoying teaching you this material—so thanks for the opportunity!
  IntroductionThe first six mishnayoth of chapter seven discuss vows that a husband might take to prohibit his wife from doing something. If the husband takes such a vow and thereby deprives the woman of a right that she has, he must divorce her and pay her her ketubah. However, he does not necessarily have to divorce her immediately. Rather we give him a cooling off period, in the hopes that he will change his mind, and find someone to release him from his vow (for more information on how a person is released from vows, see tractate Nedarim).
  If a man takes a vow thereby forbidding anything he owns to his wife, he has broken one of the guarantees of the ketubah, namely that he must provide her with food and clothing. Therefore he must divorce her. The first opinion in the mishnah gives him thirty days to “cool off”. After that time he must divorce her and give her her ketubah. Furthermore, even during these thirty days he is not allowed to abrogate his duties to her. Rather he must appoint someone to provide for her during this time period. 
  According to Rabbi Judah, the husband is given a slightly longer period in which to “cool off” and have his vow released. If he is an Israelite and he takes a vow that she should not benefit from his property for one month, he may provide for her with a “provider”. However, if he takes a vow for two months, he must divorce her and give her her ketubah. If he is a priest, if his vow is for two months he may provide for her with a provider, but if for three months he must divorce her. The reason that Rabbi Judah gives more time to a priest is that a priest cannot remarry his own divorcee. A regular Israelite can remarry his divorcee provided that she has not remarried someone else first.  
  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, if a man vows that his wife cannot eat any type of produce, he must divorce her immediately. In this case he is not given any cooling off period, because his vow was so damaging.
  Rabbi Judah gives the man a day to cool off (and two for a priest, who cannot remarry his divorcee) but no more. Again, since the vow was so inclusive, and she can only go for so long without eating produce, he must divorce her quite quickly.
  If the husband vows that his wife not adorn herself with jewelry or with perfume, he must divorce her immediately.
  Rabbi Yose explains that there is a distinction between rich and poor wives in this matter. If the wife was poor and he took an open-ended vow, he must divorce her immediately. However, if he set a time limit on the vow, he need not divorce her. Because she is poor, she is accustomed to not adorning herself and a limited vow will not be so damaging. According to the Talmud, the maximum time of the vow is 12 months. However, were she rich, he could not take such a long vow, for she is accustomed to adorning herself frequently. Therefore, the maximum time is thirty days; if he takes a vow of a longer duration, he must divorce her immediately.  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the first part of the mishnah we learned yesterday—where a husband takes a vow that his wife should not derive any benefit from his stuff. The problem is that he is obligated to provide for her. So how can he take such a vow?
  The Talmud cites another mishnah in which a wife takes a vow that anything she produces will be prohibited to her husband (this is the meaning of “Konam”). The husband does not need to annul this vow because it has no validity since the wife is obligated to give the things she produces to her husband. So too, since the husband is obligated to provide for his wife, he cannot take a vow to cancel his obligation. So how can the mishnah lend any validity to this vow?
  A husband has a right to say to his wife that she should keep her handiwork and use it to provide for herself. Therefore, the Talmud suggests, that when he says that she may not derive benefit from him, it is as if he said that she may keep her handiwork. In other words, one right flows from the other.
  
  Daf 70b
  
  Huna says that a wife may tell her husband that she does not wish to be maintained and in return she will retain her handiwork. In other words, she has the right to end the mutuality of the relationship. If this is so, then we could say that the husband would need to annul her vow, for when she says, “Konam…” it is as if she says, “I will not be maintained…” Thus, we can see that just because a person has the right to end the quid pro quo relationship, does not mean that they have the right to make a vow ending their obligation to the other person. Now we are back to the mishnah—what gives the husband a right to vow that his wife will not receive any benefit from him?
  The Talmud now suggests that the husband actually said, “Deduct your handiwork for your maintenance.” He did not take a real vow. What this means is that she will live off the money she produces.But if she makes enough money to live off of, what need does she have of a steward, someone appointed by her husband to provide for her?The first answer is that the steward provides her with those things she does not earn enough money to buy.The problem with this is that if she needs these things to live off of, then we are right back to our original difficulty. What gives the husband the right to make such a vow in the first place? In other words, if she does not earn enough to pay for her keep, then the husband is obligated to provide for her and cannot take a vow to get himself out of this obligation.
  IntroductionThis section continues directly from yesterday’s. If the mishnah refers to a situation where the husband said that his wife should use her handiwork to maintain herself and that handiwork is indeed sufficient, then what need is there for a steward to provide for her?
  Ashi says that the mishnah refers to a situation where the woman earns enough to provide for her major needs and therefore, the husband has a right make such a statement. But they are not sufficient for her minor needs, and therefore the husband must appoint a steward to provide her with these minor needs.
  The problem now is the definition of “major” and “minor” requirements. If she is accustomed to having these things, then the husband must provide them himself, even if her income does not cover the costs. And if she is not accustomed to having these things, then why should the husband have to provide them through a steward. To put this another way, why should his have any effect—he should just be obligated to continue business as usual.
  The answer is that these are things that she was accustomed to in her father’s house. Therefore, she has in principle a right to demand them from her husband. But she did not do actually demand them from her husband. Rather she forgave her husband from having to provide her with them when they were married. But now that her husband took this vow, she is going to demand her full rights. The mishnah teaches us that she has a right to do so. Paradoxically, after her husband’s vow it will now cost him more to provide for her.
  If the steward provides for her, why does the husband have to divorce her after thirty days? After all, she is receiving everything she needs. The answer is that this is an embarrassing situation for her—her husband is not eating with her or giving her anything directly. She should not be forced to tolerate such a situation for more than thirty days.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to deal with the question of how the husband can take a vow to prohibit his wife from deriving benefit from him
  The Talmud suggests another case in which the husband’s vow may be valid—he took his oath before marriage, while she was just betrothed. 
  A husband generally does not have to provide his betrothed wife with maintenance. But if the time for marriage has arrived and he has not yet married her, then he is obligated. So if he takes the vow at this point, he will have to provide for her with an agent. 
  The question now is why can this arrangement be kept up for only thirty days? After all, unlike the case where she was married when he took this vow, where it was embarrassing for her to be provided for through an agent, in this case it is not embarrassing. The answer is that the agent simply cannot be trusted to continue providing for her for longer than thirty days. [We should note that this is a strained answer. Furthermore, most husbands who must provide for their betrothed wife do so through an agent. So why is this case any different from a normal case?] 
  The next solution is that her husband took the vow while she was betrothed and then married her. In such a situation he must provide for her, and therefore the vow is possible, but he must provide for her with an agent. 
  The problem with this last resolution is that if she was married after the husband took the vow, by agreeing to be married she accepted that he would not provide for her. So how can she now sue for divorce? The answer is that she pleads that she thought she could accept that he would not provide for her, but now it turns out that she cannot. 
  Elsewhere in Ketubot we will learn that if a woman is married to a man with bodily defects she may later claim that she cannot bear him and sue for divorce. But this is not the case with maintenance—if she accepted that he would not pay for her maintenance, she cannot later sue him for divorce for not maintaining her. Therefore, ultimately his resolution is rejected. It must be where he took.
  IntroductionThis section discusses the issue of the steward who maintains the wife of a husband who took a vow not to provide for her. 
  The mishnah says that for the thirty days in which this vow is allowed to stand the husband must appoint a steward to provide for his wife. The problem with this is that generally an agent acting on behalf of a person is considered simply to be in that person’s place. So if the husband may not provide for his wife because of his vow, how can he simply just let another person do so for him?R. Huna answers that the husband does not actually appoint a steward. Rather he states that anyone who provides for his wife will not lose out. This seems to be a hint sufficient for all to understand that the husband needs someone to provide for his wife. 
  The Talmud tries to use another case to prove that saying “whoever does X” counts as appointing an agent. If a man has fallen into a pit and fears dying, and wishes to divorce his wife before he dies (so that she does not become liable for levirate marriage), he may do so by saying “whoever hears my voice should write a get for my wife.” This counts as the necessary agency needed to appoint a person to write a get. So why in our case does R. Huna claim that saying “whoever provides for my wife will not suffer a loss” is not considered appointing an agent?
  The answer is that the wording was different—in that case the man was more direct and therefore created agency.
  The Talmud refers to another case of a person who makes a “whoever does X” type of statement. This is the case of a fire breaking out on Shabbat. A Jew is really not supposed to put out this fire, unless a life is directly in danger. A Jew cannot even say to a non-Jew — please put out a fire. But he can hint to the non-Jew that he wants him to put out the fire and if he does, he will repay him for his costs.The Talmud at first assumes that the source implies that such statements may be made only in the case of a fire and not in any other. Thus the husband in our mishnah would not be allowed to say, “whoever maintains my wife will not lose out.” This is a difficulty on R. Huna. The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that the source excludes acting in such a manner for other cases of Shabbat violations. One cannot say, “whoever performs this forbidden act for me on Shabbat (for instance cooking) will not lose out.” Only in the case of fire due to the potential loss of property may one make such a statement. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the question of whether one who says “anyone who does X will not lose out” has appointed that person to be his agent. 
  Rabbah uses a different source to prove that if one says “whoever will provide for [so and so] will not suffer a loss” is appointing that person to act as his agent. The source refers to case where A has taken a vow that B will not derive any benefit from him. A sees that B is starving and wishes to feed him, but cannot do so because of his vow. A can relate the situation to a shopkeeper, as long as he does not directly tell the shopkeeper to provide for B. The shopkeeper may now feed B and A can pay the shopkeeper back. But, according to Rabbah, A cannot simply state, “Whoever provides food for B will not lose out” because this is considered appointing an agent. 
  Rabbah tried to read the mishnah about the vow as if only this statement was permitted. The Talmud suggests that it can be read in the opposite way—even this statement is permitted. We might have thought that the general undirected statement, “whoever will provide” is permitted but not direct speech to the shopkeeper. Therefore, this mishnah teaches us that one may even hint directly to the shopkeeper that he is to provide food for so-and-so. 
  The Talmud now turns to the text from above. This portion is a mishnah from Nedarim 4:7. The continuation is a baraita.
  This is a similar halakhah to the first section, but applied to a different situation. 
  Since he gave the food to a third person and did not tell him to give it to the one who had no food, this is permitted. The first opinion allows the one who took the vow to put the food on a rock and the other party may take it. R. Yose says that this is prohibited. Rava says that this is because of what happened in Bet Horon. This is a reference to Mishnah Nedarim 5:6. I am replicating that source here:It happened to one in Beth Horon that his father was forbidden to benefit from him. Now he [the son] was giving his son in marriage and he said to his neighbor, “The courtyard and the banquet are give to you as a gift, but they are yours only that my father may come and feast with us at the banquet.”He said to him, “If they are mine, let them be dedicated to heaven!”[The son] responded, “But I did not give you my property to dedicate it to heaven.”[The other] responded, “You gave me yours so that you and your father might eat and drink together and become reconciled to one another, while the sin [of a broken vow] should devolve upon his (i.e. my) head.”When the matter came before the Sages, they ruled: every gift which is not [so given]that if he [the recipient] dedicates it, it is dedicated, is no gift [at all].The father could not enter his son’s courtyard or eat of his food, because he was forbidden by oath to benefit from his son. It is unclear how this situation arose, whether the father or the son initiated the vow. In any case, there was clearly strife in their past. Now that his own son is marrying, the son wants his father to be able to attend the wedding and join in the feast. To solve the problem he gives the courtyard and the food to a third party. However, the third party declares that it is all dedicated to the Temple, which would make it impossible to use for a feast. The Sages rule that since the son does not want the dedication to be valid, he did not really give it to the third party. Therefore it is still his, and his father may not come to the wedding.Rava seems to explain R. Yose as referring to the first situation where A gave his property to B so that B could give it to C. R. Yose was afraid if he allowed this to occur, the situation that happened in Horon could reoccur. The other rabbis were not concerned.  
  
  Daf 71a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses R. Judah’s opinion in the mishnah. For ease of reference, I am replicating the mishnah here:If a man forbade his wife by vow to have any benefit from him, for thirty days, he  may appoint a provider, but if for a longer period he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.Rabbi Judah ruled: if he was an Israelite he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for one month, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] two months.If he was a priest he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for two months, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] three. 
  R. Judah’s rule in the mishnah with regard to the wife of an Israelite is the same as that of the first sage—for one month he may stay married to her, after one month he must divorce her. So what is the dispute?According to Abaye, there is no dispute about the wife of an Israelite. The only difference between the first opinion and that of R. Judah is with regard to the wife of a priest. This seems to the be simple reading of the mishnah.Rava digs a bit deeper, striving to find a difference with regard to the wife of an Israelite. He claims that there is a difference with regard to a full month (30 days). The first opinion says that the husband can let the vow stand for a full 30 days—in other words, even a full month. R. Judah lets the vow stand for only a month—29 days.  
  According to Rav, the husband is allowed to let the marriage last for thirty days only if he specifically states that the vow should last thirty days. But if he just vows that she may not derive any benefit from him, and does not say how long the vow would last, he would have to divorce her immediately. This is because during that period of time she would not know when the vow would end, or if it would ever end. The psychological suffering of an openended vow would be too great, and therefore, he must divorce her immediately.Shmuel says that in either case we wait some time before forcing him to divorce. The point of this waiting period is for him to calm down and find a way of getting out of the vow. Thus it is always reasonable to allow a week or two for this to occur. 
  Rav and Shmuel disagreed over the same issue in another context (found on Ketubot 61b). So, the question is asked, why did the Talmud have to repeat their dispute? Couldn’t we ourselves have taken it from one context to another? 
  We need to know that Rav and Shmuel maintain their opinions in both cases. For if we only had the case of the vow about sex, we might have thought that in that case Rav said that he must divorce her immediately if the vow is open-ended, since he obviously cannot appoint an agent to provide her with sex (that would be interesting). But in the case of deriving benefit, Rav would allow the vow to stand for a month, since he can provide for her anyway.And if we had learned this only in the second case, about deriving benefit, we might have thought that only in this case does Shmuel hold that he may allow the vow to stand for one month, but that in the case of the vow about sex, he would agree that if the vow was openended, he must divorce her immediately.Therefore, to teach us that they both always disagree, the Talmud had to preserve the dispute in both contexts.
  IntroductionThis section deals mainly with the question of who is to blame when a woman takes a vow and her husband upholds it—the wife for taking the vow in the first place, or the husband for upholding it. 
  The Talmud now raises a difficulty on Shmuel. The next mishnah in this chapter does not give any time period for which the vow can stand. This seems to contradict our mishnah in which the vow is allowed to stand for thirty days. Rav could solve the apparent contradiction by saying that the other mishnah refers to a case where the man did not specify the length of the vow. Therefore she may sue for divorce immediately. The earlier mishnah referred to a case where the vow was made for thirty days, therefore it was allowed to stand. But how would Shmuel, who holds that in all cases the husband should be given thirty days, rec oncilethese two mishnayot? 
  The Talmud resolves the contradiction by stating that the latter mishnah refers to a case where she made the vow and he upheld it. Since he upheld the vow, and we say he is the one to blame (“he put his finger between her teeth”), he must divorce her immediately. But if he took the vow, which is assumed to be the case in the first mishnah, we allow it to stand for thirty days, lest he find someone to release his vow. Note that at this point the Talmud assumes that this mishnah accords with R. Meir. His name is not mentioned in the mishnah but the Talmud commonly assumes that anonymous mishnayot agree with R. Meir. 
  In the baraita quoted here the sages essentially disagree over who is to blame when a wife takes a restrictive vow, such as a nazirite vow,that might be disruptive to the marriage—the husband for not annulling it, or the wife for taking it in the first place. In other words, who put their finger in between her teeth—the husband or the wife? If it is the wife, then the husband may divorce her without paying the ketubah. If it is the husband, then he must pay the ketubah should he choose to divorce her. R. Meir holds that she is to blame. This contradicts with the second mishnah here in Ketubot, where the husband must divorce hiswife immediately and pay her the ketubah even if she took the vow. 
  To solve the problem, the Talmud simply reverses the opinions in the baraita. R. Meir now consistently holds that the husband is to blame.
  The problem is that by reversing the opinions we now have to explain that R. Yose blames the wife. If so, then whenever she takes the vow (which the Talmud has said is the case in this mishnah) the husband may divorce her without paying the ketubah. So why then does R. Yose agree in the first mishnah that if the woman is poor and no time limit is given, then he must divorce her and pay the ketubah? To fix this the Talmud again emends the baraita.
  Again, we encounter the same problem—R. Judah seems to blame the husband when the woman takes the vow (assuming that this is what the mishnah refers to). And again, the Talmud emends the baraita—this time three tannaim say that it is the husband’s fault, and only R. Elazar says that it is the wife’s fault. 
  The Talmud now offers another resolution to the original difficulty, one that retains the pattern of two tannaim holding each position. This time R. Meir says that the wife is to blame for her vow, but we do not assume that the mishnah, which says the husband is to blame, follows R. Meir. Usually anonymous mishnayot follow R. Meir, but evidently this one does not. 
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the limitation of a husband to annul his wife’s vows. While the Torah does not specify which vows a husband may annul, the rabbis offer some significant limitations on this power. 
  In yesterday’s section, which quoted the mishnah, we learned that according to R. Yose if a wife takes a vow not adorn herself her husband must divorce her within a specific period of time—depending on whether or not she was poor. The Talmud cites a source from Nedarim that seems to say something different. Numbers 30:14 says that a husband may annul a vow that was done for “self-affliction (נפש לענות).” According to R. Yose, taking a vow not to adorn oneself is not a vow of self-affliction which a husband could annul. So why then in our mishnah in Ketubot does he imply, at least according to the talmudic reading of this mishnah, that a husband could annul such a vow. 
  
  Daf 71b
  
  The Talmud answers that our mishnah refers to a special category of cases where the woman takes a vow that will interfere with her personal life with her husband. As we shall see, there are some amoraim who hold that the husband may annul such a vow even if it is not a vow of self-denial. 
  There is an amoraic dispute over whether a husband may annul a vow that interferes with the private life a husband and wife. The statement, “that we do not find that a fox should die in the dust of his den” is translated according to Rashi and a common understanding of this sentence. However, Saul Lieberman explained this statement based on a different reading, one related to a similar passage in the Yerushalmi. Lieberman explains that it refers to a bat (like a flying fox) that lies upside down limp during the day, but arises at night. The idea is that even if the husband is limp during the day he will arise at night, even if his wife has taken a vow not to adorn herself or to bathe. 
  The Talmud now offers a new interpretation of our mishnah. The woman does not simply say that adorning herself will be prohibited. Rather, she says that if she has sex with her husband it will be forbidden for her to have intercourse with him. A husband may annul such a vow because he will not be allowed to have intercourse with her, which accords with a statement by R. Kahana. However, R. Kahana adds that if the woman says that having sex with her is forbidden to her husband, the husband does not even need to annul such a vow, because she cannot make something prohibited to him—she can only make something prohibited to her. Note that this does not mean the husband can physically force her to have sex. What it means is that if she refuses to have sex, the husband may divorce her and not pay her ketubah. In any case, we have now “solved” the mishnah. R. Yose says that a husband cannot break the vow of a woman who simply vows that she does not want to adorn herself. However, he may break the vow of a woman who says that if she adorns herself it will be forbidden for her to have sex with him. If he does not break such a vow, then she is still at fault for the vow and he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah. 
  Why should he have to annul the vow, or divorce her? She could simply not adorn herself. The answer is that this is not an option because a woman who did not adorn herself would be called ugly, a result she clearly would not have desired. 
  The problem now is why he would have to divorce her immediately for taking a vow that will make sex prohibited. Let her adorn herself and even if sex is prohibited we learned earlier in the tractate that Bet Shammai allows the vow to stand for two weeks and Bet Hillel for one week.The answer is that Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel allow the vow to stand for a week or two only when the husband took the vow. In such a situation the woman will assume that once the husband has calmed down he will ask a sage to release him from the vow. But if she took the vow (which is how we understand the mishnah) and he did not annul it, she will be certain that he hates her. The fact that she believes he hates her means that he must divorce her immediately. Thus paradoxically if he took the vow, he could stay with her for a week or two, but if she took the vow and merely upheld it, the law is stringent and he must divorce her immediately.  
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with R. Yose’s statement from the mishnah. For ease of reference I am putting that mishnah here again, with the explanation:Rabbi Yose explains that there is a distinction between rich and poor wives in this matter. If the wife was poor and he took an open-ended vow, he must divorce her immediately. However, if he set a time limit on the vow, he need not divorce her. Because she is poor, she is accustomed to not adorning herself and a limited vow will not be so damaging. According to the Talmud, the maximum time of the vow is 12 months. However, were she rich, he could not take such a long vow, for she is accustomed to adorning herself frequently. Therefore, the maximum time is thirty days; if he takes a vow of a longer duration, he must divorce her immediately.
  The Talmud cites three views as to what the time limit is that R. Yose gives for the vow to last. Both Shmuel and R. Yohanan give very long periods of time, seemingly under the assumption that poor women basically never adorn themselves. Therefore, the vow can be made for a very long period of time. Abimi gives a much shorter time—until the next festival, assuming that Jewish women adorn themselves on festivals. 
  Why should the vow last for thirty days for rich women? The answer is that rich women used fragrances that would last for thirty days. That’s some serious perfume!
  IntroductionToday’s section consists of the next mishnah. 
  In the scenario in this mishnah, a husband makes a vow that prohibits his wife from visiting her father. You can imagine that this situation arose out of some tension between the two. The mishnah rules that if the father is in the same town, he can prohibit her for only one month. More than that, and he has to divorce her and give her the ketubah. Since they live in the same town, more than a month without seeing each other would be too long of an absence for her or perhaps her father to bear.If the father lives in another town, the daughter assumedly sees him less frequently, and therefore the husband’s prohibition is allowed to stand slightly longer. If he prohibits her for one festival (until the next festival), he may retain her as a wife.
  A husband cannot prohibit his wife from paying a condolence call to a house of mourning or from celebrating at a wedding. The mishnah reasons that he cannot do so for by preventing her from participating in others’ sorrows or joy, they will in return not visit her when she is mourning or celebrating one of her children’s weddings. However, if he claims that his vow had a “cause”, which in the mishnah usually is a euphemism for sexual licentiousness, he may prohibit her from going. In other words, if he fears that there will be illicit goings-on at the house of mourning, or more likely at the house of feasting, he may prohibit her from going there.
  A husband cannot use a vow to force his wife to engage in behavior that will embarrass her. He cannot force her to tell others secret things that he has told her or that she has told him. The last phrase of this mishnah “fill and pour out in the garbage” is interpreted will be interpreted by the Talmud in two ways.
  IntroductionToday there are two short pieces, the first dealing with the mishnah and the second loosely connected to our topic. 
  The Talmud reads the mishnah as if it contradicts itself—if we make a deduction from the first clause it seems that if the husband makes the vow for two festivals, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. But when we make a deduction from the second clause, it seems that if he makes the vow for two festivals he need not divorce her and pay her the ketubah. 
  Abaye resolves the difficulty by saying that the second clause refers only to a priest’s wife, to whom R. Judah gives a longer period before husband must divorce her. The implication is that if she is not married to a priest, the vow can be for only one festival. More than that and he must divorce her. 
  Rabbah b. Ulla provides another resolution—it depends on whether the woman was anxious to go to her father’s house. If she is not, then she is given three festivals before he must divorce her. But if she is anxious, she is given only one. 
  R. Yohanan reads this verse as if the word “peace/shalom” is “shalem/whole.” Metaphorically, the Torah has been accepted by Israel and wishes to run off and tell her father of her success. 
  Once a bride is in her father-in-law’s home, she is comfortable with her husband, no longer shy around him. So too will Israel someday be comfortable in God’s house. 
  
  Daf 72a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with a reference to the mishnah we learned last week. For ease of reference I am reproducing it here:If a man forbade his wife by vow from visiting a house of mourning or a house of feasting, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, because he has closed [peoples doors] against her. 
  The idea that the husband has no right to tell his wife not to go to a place of feasting, probably a reference to a place where a marriage is being celebrated, makes sense. If she does not go to other people’s weddings, they will be insulted and close their doors to her. But what’s the problem with not going to the house of mourning? The people’s whose doors he has closed are dead! The answer is similar to the reason he may not prohibit her from going to the house of feasting—if she does not mourn others, others will not mourn her; they may not even bury her. 
  R. Meir explains why the author of Ecclesiastes claims that it is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting, for one who takes care of the dead will in turn have others take care of him when he dies. 
  The mishnah said that if the husband claims that there is a cause for his vow that she may not go to a house of feasting or a house of mourning he is permitted. Rav Judah explains that the  cause is the presence of disreputable people who are found there. Assumedly, this means that the husband fears sexual licentiousness. R. Ashi adds that the husband cannot make such a claim out of the blue. For his claim to be effective, it must be already a place known to be of dispute. 
  The mishnah ruled that he may not force her to say things in public that either she said to him or he said to her. Rav Judah interprets these things as referring to “disgraceful” words that one would not say in public. Again, this probably refers to sexual matters, what we might call pillow talk. 
  IntroductionToday’s section refers to the cryptic vow the husband takes in the mishnah, “That you shall fill and pour out on the rubbish heap.” What does this mean? 
  There are two interpretations of what the husband is trying to force his wife to do. The first is some sort of birth control (probably ineffective anyways). A husband cannot force his wife to act in a way that would might her from becoming pregnant. The second act is that she should simply fill up water jars and then pour them out. 
  It is understandable that a husband who takes a vow to force his wife to prevent herself from becoming pregnant must divorce her and pay her the ketubah. Refusal to procreate is grounds for divorce. But what’s the big deal about pouring water into the rubbish heap? The answer is that it makes her look crazy. A husband may not force his wife to do anything that would destroy her reputation. 
  IntroductionThe first part of this chapter referred to situations in which a husband must divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah. In the mishnah that opens the second half of the chapter we learn situations in which a husband has grounds for divorcing his wife and not paying her ketubah. These situations refer to cases in which the woman has not behaved in a proper manner, either directly with her husband or with outside society. 
  The mishnah describes two categories of women whose husbands may divorce them without paying their ketubah: the one who transgresses the Law of Moses, which is interpreted to mean she causes her husband to transgress the Law of Moses, and the second is the one who transgresses Jewish law, which means she engages in immodest behavior.
  The mishnah now lists four ways in which a wife might cause her husband to transgress. If she does not separate the tithes or the dough-offering (hallah) her husband will eat forbidden food. She has a responsibility to tell her husband when she is in her period of menstruation and if she does not and he has relations with her, he too is a transgressor. The fourth category is somewhat less clear, for we would not imagine that the husband transgresses if his wife does not keep her vows. The Talmud explains that children die as a result of broken vows and therefore she is injuring him as well. A simpler explanation may be that since the husband has the right to annul his wife’s vows, he too is held responsible if she doesn’t keep them.
  This section lists certain immodest actions that are grounds for divorce. In Talmudic times women did not go out without their heads covered (for that matter, men also usually covered  their heads). Spinning in public was also considered unbecoming, perhaps because the woman would uncover her arms while spinning. Talking with many strange men was also considered improper behavior for a married woman. Since the woman engaged in one of these behaviors, her husband may divorce and not pay her ketubah. I might add my personal opinion that what was improper behavior must have been determined by norms in the larger society, at least to a large degree. Since it was normal for women to cover their heads, Jewish women who did not were immodest. I do not think that this implies that not covering one’s head is inherently immodest. However, other Jews might disagree with me.
  Abba Shaul adds that a woman’s cursing her husband’s parents in front of him is also grounds for divorce.
  Rabbi Tarfon adds that a woman whose voice is too loud, that is she can be heard by her neighbors from inside her home, may also be divorced without a ketubah. 
  If the husband knows the food is untithed, then he should simply tithe it. Why blame his wife? And if he doesn’t know that it is untithed, then how is it that he is divorcing her for feeding him untithed food? The answer is that she told him that a priest tithed the food for her and when the husband asked the priest, it turns out that his wife lied to him.
  Again, the Talmud asks the same question as above—if he knows that she is menstruating, then he should not have sex with her. And if he did not know and she said that she was not menstruating, then he is supposed to rely on her. How could it be in such a situation that he comes to divorce her?There are two answers. The first is basically the same as above—she told him that she had her blood examined by a sage and the sage told her that it was not menstrual blood and therefore he could have sex with her. Alternatively, he found out that she was menstruating from neighbors. This last interpretation accords with Rav Judah’s statement—if the neighborhood knows that a woman is menstruating, then the husband must follow what everyone knows. Should he have sex with her he would be punished for having sex with a menstruant. 
  This is basically the same interpretation of the mishnah found above. 
  IntroductionThe first part of today’s section discusses a woman who does not keep her vows.
  According to rabbinic thought, parents who sin in matters related to vows might cause their children to die. Thus a woman who vows but does not keep her vow will cause her children to die. This is why the husband may divorce her for such a sin.  
  According to R. Meir, if a man knows that his wife makes vows and does not fulfill them he should find a way to annul the vow by provoking her into making the vow in her presence, in which case he may annul the vow. He does not have the right to divorce her without paying her ketubah, as was stated in the mishnah. But the other rabbis disagree. Even if he could find a way to annul this vow, he might not be able to annul other vows she takes on other occasions and does not observe. He should not be forced to “live in the same basket with a serpent”—meaning live with his life when she is a danger to his children’s lives. 
  R. Joshua says the same basic law with regard to separating hallah, and again the other sages disagree. A man should not be forced to live with a woman who might feed him forbidden food.The Talmud now compares the statements of R. Judah and R. Meir. The one who teaches that the husband can fix the situation of a wife who does not separate dough would all the more agree that the husband must fix the situation of a wife who does not keep her vows. But the opposite is not true—the one who teaches that a husband must fix the situation of a wife who does not keep her vows would not agree that he needs to remedy the situation of a wife who does not separate hallah. Not separating hallah is particularly pernicious for it could happen at any time that he would eat bread from which hallah had not been separated.
  According to the mishnah a woman who goes out with her head uncovered has transgressed “Jewish practice.” This is understood to be a rabbinic transgression. But a verse from Numbers leads R. Ishmael’s school to conclude that the Torah itself mandates women to cover their hair. 
  
  Daf 72b
  
  The Talmud now distinguishes between two levels of head covering. According to the laws of the Torah it is sufficient for her head to be covered by some sort of work basket. Assumedly, this would allow some of her hair to be seen. But Jewish practice demands that she cover her hair to a greater extent. Should she not do so, her husband may divorce her.
  R. Yohanan said that a woman who goes about with the basket on her head is not considered to have her hair uncovered. But where exactly this is true is puzzling. In the marketplace, this is not sufficient to serve as a head covering. And in a courtyard, women evidently went around all the time without their hair covered at all. If you allowed a husband to divorce his wife for not covering her head with a basket while in the courtyard, all Jewish women could be divorced.Therefore, the only place where this applies is to one who walks from one courtyard to another through an alley. This is a semi-private area, where one must dress with some modesty, but not with the full modesty expected in the market. Today this might be equivalent to walking around in an apartment building. One might walk around there in one’s pajamas, but probably not naked (I hope).
  A woman can be divorced for spinning in public, either because this exposes her arms in public, or because it causes attention to be paid to her “face,” which Rashi explains as a reference to her private parts.
  Introduction Today’s section discusses the section of the mishnah concerning a woman who “converses with every man.”
  Simply talking with men is not grounds for divorce. But “playing with young men” is. This assumedly refers to flirtatious, sexual behavior. 
  In this story an “Arab woman,” probably a merchant, spins and talks to the rabbis in the marketplace. One rabbi says that she is an example of a woman who “spins in the marketplace” whereas the other rabbi said she was an example of one conversing with every man. 
  Cursing one’s in-laws in front of either one’s husband or husband’s children is also grounds for divorce. The “mnemonic” device here is a bit unusual. Usually such devices are used to remember the names of amoraim and orders of statements. Here it is used to remember that grandchildren are like children. 
  IntroductionToday’s section concludes the discussion of the previous mishnah. We will then move on with another mishnah.
  There are two explanations as to what one “with a loud voice” refers to. The first is that she talks to loudly about sexual matters. The other explanation is she screams extremely loudly during intercourse, according to Rashi because it is painful for her. The problem with the second explanation is that this is a “defect” and should be listed in the next mishnah. Therefore this explanation is rejected.  
  Introduction to the next mishnahThis mishnah continues to discuss cases where a woman is divorced and does not receive her ketubah. The cases in our mishnah are when a woman did not disclose to her husband things that he should have known before marrying her.We should note here that the mishnah will talk about physical defects found on both the woman and the man. I think we should note here that these mishnayoth discuss the matters on a very legal plane. That is to say the mishnayoth ask whether or not these defects can form the grounds for divorce. These mishnayoth can be read as not implying that such flaws make a person “worth less,” but merely as a recognizing that there are those in society who, unfortunately, do think so
  It can be assumed that a husband does not want his wife to be subject to vows that will prevent her from engaging in certain activities, such as eating meat or drinking wine. Such vows would certainly disrupt the normal functioning of a marriage. If he betroths her on the specific condition that she is not subject to any vows, and after betrothal it is found out that she is subject to vows, she is not betrothed. Since the betrothal was made under false pretenses it is invalid and she does not need a get to remarry, nor does she receive her ketubah. However, if he did not make such a condition, and then later finds out that she is subject to vows, the marriage is valid. Nevertheless, since she should have told him that she had vows, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah. In other words, the marriage was not exactly made under a false assumption and therefore she needs a get in order to remarry, but she still was dishonest with him and therefore she loses the ketubah.
  The same rule concerning a woman subject to vows is also true with regard to a woman who has physical defects. If he specifically stipulated that she not have any physical defects (assumedly ones that he could not detect when she was clothed), and she does, the betrothal is invalid. If he did not make a stipulation, the betrothal is valid but he may divorce her without paying the ketubah.With regard to physical defects, it is essential for us to know what physical defects are significant enough that they invalidate the betrothal or allow the husband to divorce her without paying the ketubah. The answer is that any defect that disqualifies a priest from serving at the altar (see Lev 21:17), also disqualifies a woman. These defects are listed in the seventh chapter of tractate Bekhorot.  
  IntroductionThe same mishnah we learned at the end of last week’s daf is found word for word in Tractate Kiddushin. The Talmud begins by asking why the editors of the Mishnah felt it necessary to include it in both places. To aid in memory, I have copied the mishnah here: If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah.
  The first half of each section of the mishnah deals with betrothal—is the betrothal valid. The second half of each section deals with the laws of the ketubah—may he divorce her without paying her the ketubah. In Ketubot, they needed to teach the section about the ketubah, but the other section was just dragged along. Same thing happened in Kiddushin. 
  The mishnah at the end of Daf Ayin Bet refers only to these particular vows, ones that are of self-denial. Only in such a case is the marriage annulled or can he divorce her without giving her the ketubah payment. 
  According to R. Papa, R. Yohanan’s statement and the baraita must refer to the second clause of the mishnah, where he married her without a specific stipulation beforehand. Had he stipulated that he was betrothing her under condition that she “have no vows” on her, then any vow would have been grounds to dissolve the marriage. After all, he could say that he specifically stated that she is betrothed only if she has no vows upon her. 
  R. Ashi said that R. Yohanan’s limitation may refer even to the first clause. If a man stipulates before marriage that he is marrying a woman on condition that she not have taken any vows, he is assumed to be referring to the types of vow to which people usually take exception—vows that involve self-denial. If she has taken other types of vows, the marriage is not annulled.  
  IntroductionToday we begin a long passage about a husband who betroths his wife on condition that she does not have any vows on her. But then when he marries her, he does not reiterate the condition. The question is whether the marriage is annulled without the need for a formal divorce with a get, or must the husband divorce her by giving her a get.  
  According to Rav, since he married her without reiterating his condition, he must issue her a get before the marriage is dissolved. To put this another way—she is married, but he may divorce without a ketubah. Abaye offers two reasons to explain Rav, the first of which he rejects. First of all, we might say that by not reiterating his original condition, he has taken the condition back and married her unconditionally. This would mean the situation is the same as that in the end of the mishnah. The second explanation, the one that Abaye accepts, is that no man would willingly make his intercourse an act of fornication. Here “fornication” refers to sex with a single woman. If the marriage is annulled because she was under a vow, then when they had sex at the point of marriage, she would have been single. Rav, according to Abaye, assumes that no man would want this to happen, so he must have betrothed her again when they had intercourse. 
  
  Daf 73a
  
  Rav and Shmuel had the same dispute with regard to a different case. Here a young girl without a father was married off while still young. In such a case she has a legal right to refuse the marriage when she becomes of majority age. Her husband has relations with her after she reaches majority age and then she refuses the marriage and marries another man. According to Rav, by having relations with the first husband she has cemented that marriage, and thus does not need a divorce from the second husband. According to Shmuel, the first marriage was never fully sealed and therefore she does need a divorce from the second husband. The similarity is that in both cases, Rav believes that the intercourse sealed the marriage, whereas Shmuel does not. 
  The Talmud explains why the same dispute had to be transmitted in both situations. If it had only been stated with regard to the case of the minor, then we might have assumed that in the  case of the condition, Rav would agree with Shmuel that he need not divorce her. Since there was an explicit condition made by the husband himself, we can assume that he did not want to marry her if she had vows on her. And if the rule had been stated only with regard to the case where the husband had made a condition, then we might have assumed that Shmuel would say that in the case of the minor, the first husband did cement the marriage when he had relations with her. Therefore, she will need a divorce from the second husband. 
  IntroductionYesterday we learned the dispute between Rav and Shmuel. According to Rav, if a man betroths a woman and makes the condition that she be under no vow and then marries her without any such condition, she needs a get. According to Shmuel the marriage is invalid and she does not require a get. Today’s section contains a difficulty on Shmuel from the Mishnah. 
  The Talmud quotes the second clause of the Mishnah, which explicitly states that he married her without any condition. In such a case she loses her ketubah (if she had taken a vow) but she still requires a get. If we assume that this is a case where he stipulated at the betrothal that she not have any vows on her, then this is a difficulty on Shmuel.
  
  Daf 73b
  
  The difficulty on Shmuel is resolved—the second clause of the mishnah refers only to a case where he both betrothed her and married her without any condition. In such a case even Shmuel would agree that she does require a get.
  The implication of the above reading of the mishnah is that if he betrothed her under condition and then married her with a condition she would not require a get (according to Shmuel). If so, instead of reading as it does, the mishnah should have stated this explicitly— if he married her without a condition, she does not require a get. From that we could have derived that all the more so, if he betrothed her with a condition, and then married her without a condition, she does not require a get.   
  The Talmud now rereads the entire mishnah such that it accords with Shmuel. If he betroths her with a condition and then marries her without a condition, she does not require a get. But if he never mentions the condition, then she does require a get, but still does not receive her ketubah.
  The Talmud now asks why the husband is obligated to divorce her with a get, but not obligated to pay her ketubah. The same grounds that release him from the ketubah would also seem to imply that the marriage was under false pretenses and she should not require a get. 
  According to both of these amoraim, she does not really require a divorce. From biblical law, the marriage was never valid. But just so it does not look like a woman is leaving a marriage without a divorce, she does require a get.
  According to Rava, the tanna of the baraita was ambivalent as to whether the marriage was valid. Therefore, when it came to monetary matters he was lenient. Until the wife could prove that the marriage was valid, she cannot claim the ketubah. But when it came to issues of prohibition, allowing this woman to remarry, the tanna was strict. She cannot do so until she receives a get. This is a common line of thought—when it comes to monetary matters, the law is lenient. But when it comes to prohibitions, the law must be strict. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the dispute between Rav and Shmuel over whether a man who betroths a woman under condition that she not have any vows and then marries her without reiterating this condition and then finds out that she has vows on her has to give her a get.
  According to Rabbah, Rav said that the woman does not require a get only if the husband betrothed two women. Rashi explains that he betrothed Leah on condition she have no vows, and then married another woman without stating such a condition. In this case, Rav would hold that the second woman would require a get. Since he did not stipulate the condition with her, he might in essence be saying that he does not care if she has vows, and the marriage would be valid in all cases. But if he betrothed only one woman with a condition and then married her, she would not require a get.
  Clearly the Mishnah refers to a case where the error involved only one woman. Nevertheless, in yesterday’s section we used the mishnah as a difficulty on Shmuel. The implication is that Rav would hold that the woman requires a get even if the error involved only one woman. This is a refutation of Rabbah.
  To resolve the difficulty, Rabbah’s statement is slightly tweaked. The disagreement is about a case where he betrothed a woman on condition that she has no vows. Then he divorced her while still betrothed, then betrothed her again and then married her without any condition. By marrying her this time without any condition, he may be in essence saying that he wants to be married to her even if she has vows. Therefore, if we wishes to terminate the marriage she needs a get. But if he just married a woman without any condition, then she does not need a get because we can assume that he does not want to marry a woman who has taken a vow.
  Abaye cites a baraita which describes a case where there was a problem with the original betrothal. Presents sent after this initial betrothal do not count as a new act of betrothal, and therefore, the betrothal is not valid. But if the couple has sex after a problematic betrothal, then according to one opinion, they are married, and according to the other, they are not. If the error here is that he made a condition that she has no vows, then this is the same situation we have been discussing all along. He betrothed her under condition that she not have any vows, but then they were “married,” i.e. they consummated the marriage, without a condition. And in the baraita, the tannaim dispute this. So how can Rabbah say that if the error involved only one woman, all agree that the betrothal is not valid?
  The Talmud explains the baraita such that it does not refer to a man who made a condition at the time of betrothal. The error that was made was more technical—the man did not give the woman a coin the value of a perutah. In such a case, there is indeed a dispute between tannaim if the marriage would be valid if they later had intercourse. But if the husband stated explicitly that he was betrothing her under condition that she have no vows and then married her, she would not require a get. All would agree with this.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains the dispute in the baraita we read yesterday. The man betrothed his wife with less than a perutah. This is not a valid act of betrothal. But then they have intercourse. According to one opinion, this intercourse counts as marriage. According to the other opinion, it does not.
  According to one opinion, the man would know that his betrothal was invalid and therefore when he has sex with the woman, this would constitute an act of betrothal (which can be done through sex). According to the other opinion, the man would assume that his first act of betrothal was valid, and therefore would not have intercourse thinking that it was a new act of betrothal.
  Again, Abaye raises an objection against Rabbah from a baraita. Here the man makes a condition and it turns out the condition is not met (the father does not actively consent to the marriage). Nevertheless, one opinion holds that the marriage is valid. This opinion seems to accord with Rav, proving that Rav and Shmuel disagree even if the error involved only one woman.
  The Talmud now offers an alternative explanation of the dispute, one that hinges on the meaning of the condition, “On condition that my father consents.” According to one opinion, for the condition to be fulfilled, the father need only remain silent. Since the father evidently did remain silent, the betrothal is valid. The other opinion reads the condition as requiring active consent of the father. Since the father did not say yes, the betrothal is not valid.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with the dispute between Abaye and Rabbah over whether Rav said that when a man betroths a woman under a condition and then marries her without reiterating that condition she needs a get. According to Abaye, Rav did say she needs a get (Shmuel disagrees), whereas Rabbah said that in such a case, Rav agrees with Shmuel—she does not need a get.
   In this situation a minor girl was married off by her father. Such a marriage is considered of biblical authority. Then her husband divorces her while she is still a minor. Her father cannot marry her off again because once she has been married, she has left his authority. But she cannot marry off herself because she is too young to legally. If the same husband nevertheless marries her while she is still a minor, his marriage to her is of rabbinic status. If the husband dies, while she is still a minor, the brother must perform halitzah but he cannot marry her as through levirate marriage because the original husband had divorced her and when he remarried her, it was not legally biblical marriage. In other words, she was once biblically married to her original husband, but the second marriage to him was not of biblical status. She is biblically prohibited to the brother because she was his brother’s wife. Such a marriage is permitted only if levirate marriage is obligatory.
  The baraita now limits the above rule to a case where he divorced her, remarried and then died all while she was a minor. In this case, there is no doubt that the marriage is not of biblical status. However, if he remarried her when she was a minor and then she became of age while still married to him, the first opinion in the baraita holds that she is now fully married to him and therefore may perform halitzah or levirate marriage with his brother. Again, this is a case where the original betrothal was not fully effective (because she was a minor and her father could not marry her off) but the fact that they were living together (i.e. having sex) means that the marriage becomes fully legal. This is similar, so Abaye claims, to the case of a husband who betrothed his wife on condition that she have no vows, and then marries her without a condition. Abaye holds that the very act of sex is a new betrothal and therefore Rav would hold that she does need a get. R. Eliezer would that she may not perform levirate marriage—the second marriage is not fully legal. This is similar to Shmuel who holds that she does not need a get.
  
  Daf 74a
  
  The Talmud reinterprets the baraita such that the dispute is not on the same dispute as that concerning the vows, and therefore is not a difficulty on Rabbah. Rabbah would say that according to the first opinion, the husband would know that his betrothal of the minor girl is not valid. Therefore when he has intercourse with her, he would have it in mind that he was betrothing her. According to R. Eliezer the husband would not know that his original act was invalid, and that when he has relations with her, it would be under the presumption that they are married. But the case of the vows is different because in that case all would agree that he is having intercourse with his original act of betrothal in mind and therefore, she does not need a get.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the topic of a husband who betroths his wife with a condition and then has relations with her—is she married?
  According to R. Yohanan, if the condition is not fulfilled, there can be no marriage. Therefore, even if they have relations, this is not a new act of betrothal. It is based on the prior act of betrothal which is not valid.
  R. Aha son of R. Ika begins here a difficulty on R. Yohanan. This difficulty is a bit long so I will explain in stages. R. Aha quotes a baraita according to which halitzah, performed under mistaken pretences, is still valid.
  According to Resh Lakish, “halitzah under false pretenses” is a case where the person simply does not understand what he is doing by the act of halitzah. He thinks he is marrying her. R. Yohanan disagrees because according to him halitzah must be performed with intent—both parties must understand what they are doing. Therefore, he interprets “halitzah under false pretenses” to refer to a case where halitzah was performed under the condition that he receive 200 zuz. According to R. Yohanan, the implication is that even if she does not give him the 200 zuz, the halitzah is valid.
  This is the conclusion of the difficulty. Once the man has performed the act, in this case halitzah, he has forgiven his condition. The act is valid whether the condition is fulfilled. So too the same should be true with regard to betrothal on condition. Once he has had intercourse, he has fulfilled his condition and she should require a get in order to leave him.Stay tuned for the next section, where this difficulty will be answered.
  IntroductionThis is the continuation of yesterday’s sugya—how can it be that if a man betroths with a condition and then has sexual relations with the woman, she does not need a get? 
  R. Yohanan responds that the difficulty raised by R. Aha is wrong. The laws governing  “conditions” are derived from the conditions that Moses places on Reuven and Gad concerning their inheritance of the land on the other side of the Jordan (Numbers 32). Those conditions can be fulfilled by the agent—in this case Joshua, who will apportion the land. But halitzah cannot be performed by an agent. The husband himself must perform the act.Therefore, his condition is invalid. But betrothal can be performed on condition. Therefore, if the condition is not fulfilled, she is not married.To put this briefly—conditions cannot be placed on halitzah, but they may be placed on betrothal.
  The obvious problem is that betrothal through intercourse also cannot be performed through an agent. Meaning a man cannot say to another man, “Go and betroth that woman for me through intercourse.” Nevertheless, a man may place a condition on his own act of betrothal through intercourse. This is a difficulty on the above resolution.The answer is that all forms of betrothal were compared to one another. A man can use an agent to betroth a woman through money (“Go and betroth that woman for money by giving her this money”). Since he can perform one form of betrothal through an agent, and therefore he can make a condition on this act of betrothal, he can make a condition on any act of betrothal. If the condition is not fulfilled, she is not married. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses cases where the betrothal was invalid but the man had relations with his wife afterwards. Does she require a get? Did the intercourse count as betrothal?
  In all of these cases the betrothal was for some reason invalid. According to R. Elazar, by having intercourse he has formed a new act of betrothal and therefore she would require a get from him in order to be divorced. The idea is that the man knows that his betrothal is invalid. Therefore, when he has intercourse with her, he knows that he is doing so for the sake of betrothal.Betrothal by loan is when he forgives her from paying back a debt she owes him. This is not valid because he must give her something.
  R. Ammi agrees that a man would know that betrothal done with less than a perutah is invalid. Therefore, when he has intercourse it would be for the sake of betrothal. But in the other two cases, where he betrothed her by forgiving a loan or betrothed her through a condition that was not fulfilled, he would not know that his betrothal was invalid. Then when he has relations with her, he would not be renewing his act of betrothal. Therefore, she would not need a get from him. 
  Ulla addresses one of the situations from above—he betrothed her on a condition, the condition was not fulfilled and then he had sex with her. She needs a get. The other sages wanted her to able to leave her marriage without a get, but they were not able to actually do this. Interestingly, this last line shows that at times, the legal ability of the sages was limited. 
  According to this last source, if the betrothal was done in any mistaken way, the marriage is never valid, even if she has a child riding on her shoulder (obviously she had sex with him). This law is derived from a midrash on Numbers 5, the passage about the sota (suspected adulteress). If she was not “seized” by another man, not her husband, then she is prohibited to her husband as an adulteress. However, there is another woman who is permitted even if she was not seized, meaning she engaged in consensual sex. This refers, according to Shmuel, to a woman whose betrothal was made under mistaken circumstances. 
  
  Daf 74b
  
  IntroductionIn the mishnah, we learned that if she had vows on her, the betrothal is not valid. Similarly, if she had physical defects, the betrothal is not valid. 
  If after betrothal she goes to a sage and is released from the vow, the betrothal becomes valid. When a sage releases the vow, the vow is annulled. It is as if she never took it. But if she goes to a doctor and is cured from her illness, the betrothal is still invalid, because when she was betrothed, she had the physical defect. 
  The Talmud now cites a contradictory baraita—even if she is released from her vow, the betrothal is still invalid. 
  Rava resolves the contradictory baraitot by attributing them to different tannaim. The former, according to which the betrothal is valid, is attributed to R. Meir. R. Meir says that the husband does not mind that his wife goes to the court to have her vow released. Therefore, the betrothal is valid. In contrast R. Elazar says that he would not want his wife to go in front of a court to have her vow released. Therefore, he did not betroth her thinking that she would do such a thing and the betrothal is invalid.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the source of the notion that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah disagree over whether a husband would want his wife to have to go in front of a court. I should note that this section is not easy. It takes us into a lot of side discussions about divorce. To clarify one issue—this sugya believes that if a husband divorces his wife and then later discovers that he did not for some reason divorce her, the divorce could be annulled. This would obviously lead to serious problems later if she is subsequently remarried. 
  The issue in this baraita is whether a husband may remarry his wife after divorcing her on account of either a vow or a bad name (accusation of adultery). According to the first opinion, if he divorces her for either of these two reasons he may not remarry her. There are two reasons given for this in Tractate Gittin. The first is that if she goes and remarries after being divorced and then she is released from the vow or it turns out the bad name was false, the husband might say that he mistakenly divorced her. The divorce would be annulled and the subsequent marriage and any kids born through it would be problematic. Therefore he is told that if he divorces his wife, there is no remarrying her. This will mean that he cannot later make such a claim. The other interpretation is that this is a preventative measure to deter women from taking vows or committing adultery.According to R. Judah, if the vow was made in front of many people there may be no release from this vow. In such a case he may not remarry her. But he may remarry her if the vow was made in front of only a few people. R. Judah’s reasoning is that the rabbis prohibited remarriage to discourage vows, but since vowing in front of only a few people is not so serious, they did not make a prohibition in this case.According to R. Meir, if the vow can only be released by a sage, meaning the husband cannot annul it, then the husband may not remarry her, lest he regret divorcing her later and annul  the divorce. But if the husband himself could have annulled it, then he should have done so. He may not later on claim that had he known that he could annul the vow, he would not have divorced her. Therefore, since he cannot regret the divorce and thereby annul it, he may remarry her.R. Elazar says that in principle they should have allowed him to remarry her after a vow which requires a sage to release it. A husband cannot regret the divorce in such a case because we make the assumption that no husband would ever want his wife to have to go to a court to annul her vow. The only reason remarriage in this case was prohibited is because of the problem in a case where the husband could have annulled the vow. We do fear that later the husband will claim that had he known that he could have annulled the vow, he would not have divorced her. Therefore, they prohibited marriage in this case.
  
  Daf 75a
  
  This section is a side note explaining R. Judah, who holds that a vow taken in front of many people cannot be annulled by the husband. The source is Joshua 9:18, where the children of Israel keep their vow not to kill the Gibeonites because the vow was taken in front of the many.The amoraim then debate what the word “many” means. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak is from a baraita on Leviticus 15:25, which says “many days.” “Days” might only be two, but “many” means more than two—three. R. Yitzchak derives this from the word “congregation” found in the verse from Joshua. This word is often interpreted to mean ten.
  According to R. Meir, a husband would not mind if his wife has to go in front of a court/sage to have his vow released. Therefore, if he divorces his wife because of a vow that requires a  sage to release her from it, there is a fear that the husband might later regret having divorced her and say “had I known that I could have had that vow released I would not have divorced her.” To prevent this, he is told that he may not remarry her.R. Elazar holds that a husband could not later say, “had I known that I could have had that vow released I would not have divorced her” because no husband would ever want his wife to have to go in front of a court. Therefore, in principle, after divorce due to such a vow, he could remarry her. But they prohibited remarriage in this situation due to the problem of divorce on account of a vow that the husband could have annulled.
  IntroductionEarlier there was a contradiction between two baraitot concerning a husband who betrothed a woman on condition that she have no vows and then the woman had her vows released. According to the first baraita she is betrothed and according to the second she is not. Rava now offers a new resolution between these two baraitot. 
  Rava says that the second baraita, according to which she is not betrothed, refers to a woman from a prominent family. If the husband’s betrothal is valid and he needs to divorce her, he will never be able to marry anyone from her family. Therefore, if she is from a prominent family, he may not want the marriage to be “on the books.” He would prefer it annulled. 
  The final clause of the baraita states that if the man betrothed her on condition that he had no vows on him or no physical flaws and then had the vow released or the flaws healed, she is betrothed. But the second clause should have said that she is not betrothed, because if he is from a prominent family, she may not want to be prohibited from marrying another member of his family. 
  The Talmud answers that the woman would want to be betrothed because women prefer to be married to any man rather than to dwell alone. The Talmud now cites some folk sayings that illustrate this principle.I realize that these statements do not match our modern ethos and that they are sayings by men attributing their thoughts to women. It was probably relatively true in their society that a woman needed to be married, or was at least on much safer grounds if she was. Finally, the Talmud ends with a misogynistic note—these women get married, but then they will commit adultery and say that the baby is their husband’s. 
  IntroductionThis week’s daf discusses the notion that a husband can annul the marriage if he finds that his wife had physical blemishes he did not know about beforehand (I discussed this when we learned the mishnah on ayin gimmel). The mishnah had said that any physical blemish that disqualified a priest from working in the Temple, would also be grounds to annul the marriage. 
  These defects are not listed as disqualifying a priest, but they nevertheless, are grounds to annul a marriage.
  The Talmud cites a mishnah which lists three blemishes that disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple. They include “the polluted” which right now the Talmud assumes refers to a person who perspires too much. Thus there is a difficulty—does perspiration disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple.R. Yose b. Hanina answers that it depends on the frequency of the perspiration. If the perspiration is severe but passing, it is grounds to annul the marriage but not to disqualify the priest, but if the perspiration is constant, it disqualifies the priest as well.
  R. Ashi says that the difficulty is incorrect from the outset. “Polluted” refers to someone with bad body odor or breath. That can be removed either by wine (ancient deodorant) or by pepper (ancient mouthwash). But these problems can only be removed temporarily. A man may not want a wife (or a wife a man) who has bad body odor or bad breath. 
  The Talmud now tries to explain what kind of mole would be grounds for divorce in the case of marriage but would not be a physical defect in the case of a priest. If it has hair—it is always a defect. If it is large—it is always a defect. If it is small and hairless, then it is never a defect.
  R. Yose b. R. Hanina explains that the mole is on a prominent place on her forehead. While it is small and hairless, it still is grounds for divorce because of its placing.The problem is that if the husband saw the mole before marriage, he accepted it and therefore should not have grounds for divorce. Therefore, R. Papa explains that it is found on a part of her forehead that is sometimes showing and sometimes not. We cannot assume that the husband saw it and therefore accepted it, but he may still complain that since he has to see it at times, it is grounds for divorce.Personally, I think that this mole needs a PR agent to start calling it a “beauty mark.” From what I recall, that worked pretty well for Cindy Crawford. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss what counts as physical defects such that the marriage could be annulled. Be warned that some of these discussions will bother many modern readers. I might add that while we like to think that we do not judge people by their appearance, making blemishes on the body disappear is a multi-billion dollar industry today. So I’m not sure how different our society really is. 
  The verse is here to prove that a woman’s voice is part of her beauty. Therefore if is flawed, it counts as a physical defect. 
  More than three fingers between a woman’s breasts is considered a physical defect. And no, I do not know who is supposed to do the measuring.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with physical defects.
  Asymmetrically sized breasts are considered a physical defect. 
  Evidence is cited that it is possible for a woman to have breasts of such disparate size. 
  This derashah is here because it was stated by the same amoraim as the above halakhah. R. Maysha interprets a verse in Psalms as referring not only to those who live in “Zion” but to those who look forward to seeing its restoration.Abaye and Rava have a dialogue relevant to the issue of Babylonia vs. the land of Israel. Abaye notes that the sages of the land of Israel are worth two of those who live in Babylonia, but Rava immediately tempers his remark. This is true only for those sages who are still in exile in Babylonia. But once they get to Israel, somehow being there (the good air?) increases their wisdom such that they refer to their former colleagues as “those stupid Babylonians.” This small snippet of conversation is part of a broad discussion concerning the relative merits of Babylonian versus Israel that appears frequently in the two Talmuds. It is a topic that I hope to address in a chapter of the second volume of “Reconstructing the Talmud” which will hopefully appear some time within the next two years. 
  IntroductionThe mishnah we will learn today continues to discuss rules concerning bodily defects found on the woman that might cause her to lose her ketubah. Again, she loses her ketubah because she had the responsibility to tell her husband about her defects before he married her. 
  The question in this section is when did she develop these defects, before or after the betrothal. If they did not exist before the betrothal, and then he discovered them at marriage, she does not lose her ketubah, because she could not have told him about the defects before the betrothal. She loses the ketubah only if she had the defects at the time of betrothal and she withheld from him the fact that she had them. Note that this argument, according to the mishnah, is between the father of the betrothed girl and the husband. Clearly, the mishnah reflects a social reality whereby girls were married young, and their fathers decided whom they married and dealt with the economic aspects of the marriage.According to Rabbi Meir, if the defect was discovered while the girl was still in her father’s house, in other words after the betrothal but before she had moved to her husband’s house as the final step towards marriage, the legal assumption made is that the defects developed before she was betrothed. Therefore, if the father wants his daughter to receive her ketubah, he must prove that the defects developed afterwards. In contrast, if the defects are discovered when the wife comes to her husband’s home, it is assumed that they developed there. Therefore the husband loses out and cannot divorce her without paying her the ketubah, unless he can prove that the defects existed before betrothal. The mishnah again uses the graphic language “his field was flooded” to describe a woman who has been somehow damaged but whose husband cannot do anything about it (see also Mishnah Ketubot 1:6). 
  The Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that the distinction that Rabbi Meir made between defects discovered while in her father’s home and those discovered while in her husband’s home is not germane. Rather, the critical distinction is between concealed and revealed defects. The husband can claim that he didn’t know about the defects only if they are concealed. If they were revealed, and he married her in any case, he cannot later claim that had he known about them, he would not have married her. Furthermore, if there is a bath-house in the city, it is assumed that his female relatives knew about even the concealed defects. In such a case he cannot make any claim. 
  
  Daf 75b
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to analyze the mishnah. The sugya connects this mishnah with a mishnah from the first chapter, which I will reproduce here.If a man marries a woman and does not find her to be a virgin: She says, “After you betrothed me I was raped, and so your field has been washed away” And he says, “No, rather [it occurred] before I betrothed you and my acquisition was a mistaken acquisition” — Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed. Rabbi Joshua says: We do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having had intercourse before she was betrothed and having deceived him, until she brings proof for her statement.
  In our mishnah in the seventh chapter, in the absence of proof, the husband is believed. This seems to accord with R. Joshua’s opinion from chapter one—in the absence of proof, the husband is believed. The underlying notion of R. Joshua is that we do not follow the last known state of the person (in both of these cases the woman). The last known state of the woman is virgin and non-blemished, because that is how she was born. While the topics are different, the underlying issue of who is believed in the absence of evidence and for what reason, is the same.
  In the second clause in the mishnah, in the absence of proof, the father is believed. This seems to accord with Rabban Gamaliel who would hold that we rule according to the last known state of the woman. Until proven otherwise she is assumed to have been a virgin and unblemished. Thus the two clauses of the mishnah are construed as contradicting each other.
  R. Elazar in essence accepts the difficulty. The two halves of the mishnah do actually contradict each other and hence each stems from different sages.We should note that literarily, this is clearly not true. The mishnah’s literary structure is an integral whole, clearly created by one author. What R. Elazar and the Talmud are in essence saying is that when you dig deeper, the two halves of the mishnah do contradict each other. 
  IntroductionThis section is a direct continuation of the previous one. Yesterday we learned that R. Joshua does not follow the “presumption of the body.” According to this presumption, in the absence of evidence we look for the last known status of that which is in question. Since the girl was born a virgin, we would assume she was a virgin until the husband could prove she was not. R. Joshua does not hold by this principle, and thus does not believe the woman who says that she was a virgin at the time of betrothal or the woman and her father in our mishnah who say the blemishes occurred after betrothal.
  Rava explains that R. Joshua does not always ignore the principle of following the presumption of the body. In the first chapter of Ketubot, he does not follow that principle because there is a competing principle—the principle of possession. The woman may not receive her ketubah from the husband because the husband currently has possession of the money. To exact payment, she needs to prove she was a virgin at the time of betrothal. But in other cases, where there is no competing principle, he would follow the principle of “the presumption of the body.”
  This source proves that R. Joshua does follow the presumption of the body in cases where there is no money at stake, i.e. there is no principle of possession. In this case, if we do not know whether the skin disease is pure or impure, meaning which came first the bright spot or the white hair, R. Joshua considers it pure. This is because its last known status, before any spot or hair emerged, was pure. Thus R. Joshua does follow the principle of “the presumption of the body.”
  IntroductionThis week’s sugya continues to interpret the mishnah from the previous daf, and the purported contradiction between its two halves. Rava begins by offering a fairly straightforward interpretation as to why the burden of proof is on the father of the bride if the physical defects are found while his daugther is still in his house whereas the burden of proof is on the husband if they are discovered after she has moved in with her husband. I should note that while the particular subject matter may cause some to be disturbed, the real issue here is how do we make legal decisions in the absence of evidence. 
  In the first half of the mishnah, the defects are found in her father’s home. Therefore, we can assume that they happened while there, and therefore the father must bring proof that they happened after the betrothal. If the defects are discovered in the husband’s home, we can assume that they happened there. Therefore, the husband must bring proof that she had these physical defects before betrothal.
  Abaye raises a difficulty on Rava. If the woman moves to her husband’s house and then the defects are discovered, he must prove that they existed before the betrothal. It is not sufficient for him to prove that they existed after betrothal, before she moved to her husband’s home. But why not—if we know that she had these defects in her father’s home, why not say, “here they were found, and here they appeared [before betrothal].
  Rava now provides what is essentially a different answer to why the burden of proof is on the husband once she has moved to his house. We can assume that the husband would have examined her before he betrothed her. Thus even if she has defects, he must have betrothed her anyways.Tomorrow’s section will continue with what I think is an obvious difficulty. If this is true, then why is the burden of proof on the father if the defects are discovered after betrothal but before she moves into her husband’s home. 
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded with Rava’s statement that we can assume that a husband would examine his wife before betrothing her. Therefore we can assume that he saw any defects and accepted her with them.
  If we assume that he would have checked her out, then even if he can prove that she had the defects before betrothal, we could still make the assumption—he saw the defect and accepted them.
  The Talmud tries to resolve this by saying that we can assume that a man would not accept a wife with bodily defects. But then, we return to our earlier difficulty. If we discover the defects after betrothal, why can’t he avoid paying the ketubah? Can’t we just say that we assume that he would not have accepted her with them, and therefore the burden of proof should not be on him.
  Rava now attempts an overall explanation of the mishnah. If the physical defects are discovered in her father’s home but after betrothal then there are two reasons why the burden of proof should be on her husband. First of all, there is a general assumption that we go back to the last determined status of the woman’s body. Since she was born without these flaws, it would mean the burden of proof is on the husband. Second, we can assume that he examined  her first. If you counter claim, that there is an assumption that men do not reconcile themselves to defects, that is only one assumption, and it does not outweigh the other two.
  
  Daf 76a
  
  If the defects are discovered before betrothal, then the first presumption is clearly not a factor because we know she had these defects at the point of betrothal. Now all we have are two contradictory presumptions that nullify each other. Since there is no way to presume one over the other, all we can say is that in such a case, the money remains in possession of the holder, in this case the husband. 
  IntroductionR. Ashi gives another explanation as to why the two halves of the mishnah do not contradict each other. 
  R. Ashi explains that in the first clause of the mishnah, where the physical defects are found while she’s in her father’s home, her father is claiming that the husband owes him the ketubah, because she is still living in his home. Since this is not her personal claim, the burden of proof is on her/her father. But in the second clause, once she has been married, she is making her own claim for her ketubah. Therefore, the burden of proof is on her husband.
  R. Aha raises a difficulty on R. Ashi from a baraita. In this baraita we see that if the physical defects were the type that would have been there when she was still in her father’s house, then the burden of proof is again on the father, despite the fact that this is a case where she, the wife, is actually claiming the maneh. 
  Clearly, she did not grow an extra limb (finger?) after betrothal. Therefore, in this case it is obvious that he does not owe her the ketubah. The only evidence the father could bring is that the husband saw it and accepted it. 
  IntroductionThis sugya begins with an unrelated subject, but then compares it back to our subject. The comparison underlies what I have been saying for a while. The issue in these passages in the Talmud is how to deal with legal issues when there is no proof. The rabbis are interested in this not because of the particular issue being discussed, but because of the approach to law. 
  According to Talmudic law, animals are acquired by drawing them near to oneself—by leading them with a cord of some sorts, or in some way getting them to move physically into one’s possession. Payment does not acquire them. In other words, if I give you money for your animal, it is not really mine until I physically take it from you. In this case, the two men exchange a cow for a donkey. The owner of the donkey draws the cow to him but by the time the owner of the cow can draw the donkey, it is dead. The owner of the donkey must prove that the donkey was still alive when he drew the cow. Otherwise, his acquisition of the cow is invalid.Shmuel finishes by asserting that his ruling is supported by the tanna of our mishnah. The Talmud will now explore in depth the connection between this ruling and the mishnah.
  In the first half of the mishnah, if the father produces the proof he gets to take the ketubah from the husband. But in the case of the cow/donkey, the owner of the donkey produces proof that is donkey was alive when he drew the cow and he keeps the cow. Therefore, the two cases are not similar.
  
  Daf 76b
  
  R. Abba says that the ruling is similar to the second half of the mishnah, where the husband must bring proof that the defects occurred before betrothal. But the two cases are still not similar. In the mishnah, the “presumption”—that she did not have physical blemishes—lies with the father. The husband’s proof is strong enough to override the opposing party’s presumption. But in the case of the donkey/cow, the presumption is that the donkey is alive—for that is its last known status. Thus the proof is necessary just to uphold the presumption.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that the first half our mishnah would indeed support Shmuel. The mishnah places the burden of proof on the father, even though the presumption of her body would imply that the burden of proof should be on the husband. Above we raised a difficulty that the cases are different because the donkey owner must prove that the donkey was alive in order to retain the cow, but the father must produce evidence to take the ketubah. The answer is that here too, in the case of the daughter, there is something that the father must produce evidence to retain—the tokens of betrothal (today that would be the ring). If the father produces evidence that the physical defect occurred before betrothal, he may keep the tokens of betrothal. Thus the two cases are found to be similar.
  IntroductionToday’s section raises a difficulty on Shmuel’s ruling from yesterday. 
  If the needle found in this animal pierced its stomach, then the animal is terefah, forbidden for consumption, but only if the piercing happened before the animal was slaughtered. If the butcher bought the animal and the wound is already crusted over, then we know that it was a terefah (forbidden) before he bought it. He may demand his money back. But if the top of the wound is not crusted over, then the burden of proof is on the claimant, the butcher, to prove that he bought a terefah. 
  But this is a difficulty on Shmuel. According to Shmuel, the person possessing the animal (the cow) must produce proof in order to keep the animal already in his possession. In contrast, in the above source, the person who paid already must produce proof to get his money back.
  The resolution is that this is a case where the butcher had not yet paid the money. In such a case, the one who sold the animal must prove that the animal he sold was not a terefah. But if  the butcher had already paid the money, he need not produce the proof to get the money back. Thus in any case, the person who sold the animal would have to prove that it was not a terefah when he sold it.
  The problem with this resolution is that the baraita is worded weird. If the original owner has the burden of proof, then why say, “the burden of proof is on the claimant.” Can we be so sure that the original owner will always be the claimant? Thus this resolution is rejected. Tomorrow’s section will offer a new resolution
  IntroductionThis section introduces a different version of Shmuel’s statement about the person who exchanges a donkey for a cow. 
  Rami b. Yehezkel changes Shmuel’s statement. Shmuel now is read as saying that the burden of proof lies with the person in whose domain the doubt arose. Since the donkey owner never gave the donkey over, he must prove that it was alive when he took possession of the cow. This is the same principle as in our mishnah about the bride. The burden of proof lies with the person in whose domain the physical defects were discovered. 
  The same objection is again raised. Again, in a case of doubt, the principle was that the burden of proof is on the claimant. If the butcher had not yet paid the price, the owner of the animal would have to prove that the animal became a terefah after it was slaughtered. This contradicts the principle we learned above---the burden of proof is in on the person in whose possession the doubt was created. Here, since the doubt was created while the animal was already in the domain of the butcher, he should have to bring the proof.The answer is that the butcher already paid for the animal. Therefore, it is the butcher who must bring proof that the animal was a terefah before he bought it.Again, how can we be so sure that this is the case (same question as asked above). In this case the answer is simple—generally people do not give animals to others without receiving payment. Therefore, we can assume that the butcher already paid for the animal and that since the doubt was born while in his domain, the burden of proof is upon him.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues with the next section of the mishnah—still about bodily defects. 
  According to the sages, the husband may make a claim against his wife either to annul the marriage or to not have to pay the ketubah if the bodily defect is concealed. If the defect is visible, then the assumption is that he saw it and married her nonetheless.R. Nahman says that epilepsy is considered a concealed bodily defect. However, this is true only if the attacks occur regularly such that they could be hidden from the husband. If they occur at irregular periods (which I think would usually be the case), then the husband should have seen such an attack, or at least heard from someone else that his wife was subject to such attacks. The fact that he married her anyways means that he cannot later make a claim against her.The following is an introduction to the next mishnah.Up until now we have been discussing physical flaws found in a wife, which cause the marriage to either be annulled or her husband to be allowed to divorce her without paying the ketubah. Just in case you thought that men were physically perfect, the last two mishnayot of chapter seven discuss physical flaws found in a man, that force him to divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah.
  
  Daf 77a
  
  If a woman marries a man and she finds that he has physical flaws that existed before the marriage and that he did not tell her about them, she can compel him to divorce her and pay her the ketubah. If she knew about them (or they were clearly noticeable and therefore should have known about them), and she married him in any case, she cannot later complain about them and use them as grounds for divorce. Furthermore, if new defects arise after the marriage, she cannot force him to divorce her.Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the above is only true if the defect is small. If the defect which arises after marriage is large, he must divorce her. 
  There are two readings of the mishnah—“A man in whom defects have arisen [after marriage] cannot be forced to divorce [his wife]” and “A man in whom defects were [present before marriage] cannot be forced to divorce [his wife].”Rav Judah, who says that the mishnah reads “have arisen,” would all the more so agree that if the man entered marriage with defects, he is not liable to divorce his wife. After all, she saw the defects and still agreed to marry him. But if we read “were” then she loses the right to demand divorce only if he already had the defects at marriage. If they “arose” during marriage, she can sue for divorce. 
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on the reading “were.” If we plug “have arisen” into Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel’s statement, it makes sense. If major defects arise, she may sue for divorce. But if the defects were there beforehand, what difference does it make whether they were major or minor? In either case, she saw the defects and accepted them. 
  The answer is that if the husband has major defects she may sue for divorce even if he had those defects before marriage. She could claim that she thought she would be able to accept them, but in the end, it turns out that she cannot.
  Above, R. Yohanan ruled that the halakhah follows R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. But elsewhere, someone said that according to R. Yohanan the halakhah does not follow R. Shimon b. Gamaliel in the case of “Zidon”—a reference to this halakhah based on a story we will learn tomorrow. The Talmud resolves this by saying that there was a disagreement among R. Yohanan’s students as to what he actually said.
  IntroductionMost of this section is the last mishnah of the chapter. It discusses cases in which the woman could demand a divorce from her husband. 
  The wife of any husband who has one of the below-listed defects can demand a divorce, whether or not he had them before he was married. Clearly if they only developed after marriage, she can claim that she cannot remain with him and that she didn’t know he would be this way when she accepted his offer of betrothal. The mishnah emphasizes that these defects are so physically revolting to a woman, that she has the right to be divorced even if she noticed them before he betrothal. The defects are: 1. One who has boils.2. One who has a polypus. This is a Greek word for someone who has a protrusion on his nose that complicates breathing. According to the Talmud he smells bad.3. One who gathers dog feces, which was used in the processing of hides.4. A coppersmith. Assumedly, he too smells bad.5. A tanner, who will carry an awful odor.Note that the effect of this mishnah is that a husband cannot work in such a profession without his wife’s profession.
  Rabbi Meir says that these defects are so repulsive to a woman that even if she explicitly stated that she could accept a husband in such a condition, she may retract her word and demand a divorce.
  The Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir. They hold that in most such cases, if the woman accepted upon herself to marry a man in such a condition, she cannot later say that he disgusts her and therefore demand a divorce. The only case in which a woman can later demand a divorce is the case of a man who has boils because she “enervates” him. This means that when they have intercourse, she actually wears down his flesh and this is dangerous for him. Since he will refuse to have relations with her, she may demand a divorce. After all, she is guaranteed her conjugal rights.
  This chapter of mishnah concludes with a story that happened in Sidon, on the coast of modern Lebanon. There a woman was married to a tanner who died, leaving her liable for yibbum with his brother, who also worked as a tanner. She claimed that she didn’t want to have yibbum because living with a tanner is revolting and unbearable. The brother, assumedly claimed, that if she could endure his brother the tanner, she could endure him. The Sages ruled that the woman has the right to say that she could endure her original husband but not his brother. Perhaps she liked her original husband enough that she was willing to put up with his smell. She will not necessarily like his brother this much. Therefore, he must perform halitzah and she receives her ketubah. 
  The Talmud identifies the “polypus.” As I wrote above, this is not exactly what this Greek word originally meant, but it is pretty close.R. Assi uses a mnemonic to remember who offered which definition. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues interpreting sections of the mishnah.
  Rav Judah defines “one who gathers” as one who gathers dog excrement. I’m assuming that this is either for burning or for fertilizing. In any case, if the husband becomes a doggy doo collector, she can sue for divorce.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty from a baraita which defines “one who gathers” as a tanner. But even this interpretation is difficult because the Mishnah lists “one who gathers” and a “tanner” as separate professions. 
  We can solve the Mishnah by saying it refers to two different kinds of tanners—a great tanner and a small tanner (evidently there is substantial difference between the two). But there is still a difficulty for Rav Judah, who defines “one who gathers” as a collector of dog excrement. 
  It turns out that the tannaim already argued about what “one who gathers” means. The fact that a tanna agrees with him gives legitimacy to R. Judah’s opinion. 
  There are two opinions as to what a “coppersmith” actually refers to. 
  According to Rav if a husband states that he wishes to cease supporting his wife, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. The woman has an absolute right to her maintenance, and refusing to give it to her is a breach of his marriage obligation. 
  According to Shmuel, instead of forcing the husband to divorce, they should force the husband to provide for his wife. This would achieve the goal without causing the marriage to be dissolved.
  Rav says that the court forces him to divorce her because she should not be forced to live with a husband who tried to get out of providing for her. He is in essence a “serpent.” She would never know when he would try to deny her what are her legal rights. 
  R. Zera goes to Israel where he finds R. Benjamin b. Yafet reciting Rav’s statement. He warns them—be careful. They made Elazar eat barley in Babylonia for saying the same thing.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses when the court forces the husband to divorce his wife.
  R. Judah says that the court forces divorce only if the marriage was to a disqualified partner. He then lists cases where the man married a woman forbidden to him by Torah law.
  There is an amoraic dispute about whether a man must be compelled to divorce his barren wife. I should note that there is a mishnah in Yevamot that says that if she did not bear children after ten years the husband must divorce her. The issue here is whether the court would compel a husband to do so. According to R. Judah the court does not intervene in such a case, but according to R. Tahlifa it does. 
  The mishnah is not a difficulty for R. Assi, for he could say it lists cases where the rabbis said she had a right to divorce, but that he was referring cases where the husband married a woman prohibited to him by Torah law. But R. Tahlifa b. Abimi has a problem with the mishnah—why wasn’t the case of the barren woman listed?
  R. Nahman tries to resolve the difficulty by claiming that in one case they force him with words whereas in the other they force him with physical compulsion. The problem is that “forcing” implies more than words, as can be seen by the verse in Proverbs.
  R. Abba offers a different explanation for the different lists. In the case of the mishnah, if she wishes she may remain married to him. These are not cases where the marriage was forbidden such that the court should intervene unprompted. But in the case of a forbidden marriage, the court intervenes and forces the husband to divorce her.
  
  Daf 77b
  
  The problem is that there is a mishnah in which they do force the man to divorce, even if the woman did not ask to be divorced—the case of the man with boils. 
  The Talmud now refines the difference between the two cases. In the case of the man with boils, she may stay with him if we can guarantee that they do not have sex by having witnesses keep them apart. However, if she is barren, R. Tahlifa says that they must divorce. In other words, we have to ask why the court would force divorce and whether this can be remedied in another way. If he has boils, then sex is the problem (according to the mishnah). So witnesses can make sure they do not have sex and they can stay married. But if she is barren, then their lack of procreation is the problem. The only way to fix this is for them to divorce and hopefully they can have children with another partner. 
  IntroductionThis section gets into some folk medicine related to boils. Warning—some strange stuff ahead.
  The rabbis believed that blood letting followed by intercourse could lead to the dreaded “ra’atan” disease.
  This is the medical cure for ra’atan. Please, please do not try this at home. My guess is that the ra’atan disease must have been pretty bad for them to have allowed their heads to be cut open to cure it.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss the ra’atan disease. Most of the section is a fascinating, multi-faceted aggadah about R. Joshua b. Levi and R. Hanina b. Papa. The Angel of Death even appears so read on!
  R. Joshua b. Levi wishes to spare death from all of humanity, in essence to reverse the curse of Adam. But God corrects him—death is necessary for humanity. While R. Joshua b. Levi is allowed into heaven alive, this ending is not possible or even beneficial for any other human being. 
  This section is somewhat cryptic—why would the rainbow be a sign that he is not R. Joshua b. Levi. I think the most straightforward reading is that the rainbow is a sign of God’s covenant with humanity. As long as R. Joshua b. Levi is alive, such a sign is not needed. R. Joshua b. Levi’s humility is so extreme that even upon meeting R. Shimon b. Yohai in heaven he refuses to take any credit for himself. 
  R. Hanina b. Papa seems to be contrasted with R. Joshua b. Levi. He wishes to remain alive so that he can continue learning, not so that he could serve the sick as did his colleague. He could have had any wish and instead of wishing for something for others, he wishes for something for himself, perhaps believing that learning Torah will earn him merit in Heaven. This will become clearer in the next line.
  The condemnation of those who study Torah and do not help the suffering is now made clear.
  The story seems to want to clarify here that Torah study is an incredibly meritorious act, even though it does not rise to the level of being with the afflicted. 
  The pillar of fire kept people away from R. Hanina b. Papa who needed to be buried. It departs only when asked to do so for the honor of R. Hanina b. Papa, so that he can be buried.
  Drinking beer—I can agree with that one!Congratulations—you finished the seventh chapter. This is one of my favorite chapters of Ketubot and perhaps one of my favorite chapters in the entire Talmud. It contains some foundational halakhot delineating a husband’s obligations towards his wife. It is at times a brutally realistic portrayal of marriage. It portrays couples having problems with handling their anger at each other, their dislike of in-laws and their repulsion at each other’s physical defects. It deals with these sensitive issues in a legalistic and clinical manner, one that at times may have made some of us squeamish. But at some level we know that this is what marriage is—making those decisions about whether to overcome the problems that almost always arise in life long relationship. Or whether to dissolve the marriage, as so often happens.In the next few chapters the Talmud will focus to a large degree on financial matters. It is not easy material, but needless to say, the financial aspects of a marriage were extremely important back then, and they remain so today. 
  
  
  Daf 78a
  
  IntroductionChapter eight discusses a wife’s ability to own money independently of her husband. Possessions that come into her hands while married belong to her, but her husband has usufruct on them. Therefore, since he too has rights, she cannot sell them. 
  Money that a woman receives before she is betrothed is hers. She may give it away or sell it, even after she has been betrothed. However, as we will learn later, once she is married she no longer can do so.
  If she comes into possession of property after betrothal, but before marriage, Beth Shammai maintains that she may still sell or give away the property. However, Beth Hillel says that a priori she does not have the right to do so. The reason is that once she is betrothed she will likely be married, and at the point of marriage her husband will have the rights to the usufruct from her property. Therefore, already at betrothal Beth Hillel says she may not sell her property. 
  However, both Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai agree that if she goes ahead and sells her property anyway, the sale is valid. 
  Rabbi Judah presents an argument against this previous line, an argument that had been presented in front of Rabban Gamaliel a generation earlier. The Sages argued that since the husband has already, at the point of betrothal, acquired the woman as his wife, should he not also, at that point, acquire her property. In other words, even if she had sold it, these Sages believe that the sale should be annulled. Rabban Gamaliel says that he is distressed enough that according to the halakhah, if a woman came into possession of property after marriage and then sold it, the sale is annulled. This halakhah does not seem reasonable to Rabban Gamaliel, but he evidently does not have the ability to change it. However, he argues that what these Sages want to do is expand the same halakhah and apply it to the point of betrothal as well.This statement, which also appears at the end of this mishnah, provides an interesting glimpse of rabbinic authority to modify Judaism versus their acceptance of tradition. The rabbis in the mishnah are receivers of traditions which certainly predate them. While these traditions are in their minds authoritative, this does not mean that they blindly accept them. As much as they do accept these traditions, they also, at least occasionally, limit their applicability and recognize the problematic aspects to the tradition.
  If she comes into possession of property after marriage, everyone agrees that she may not sell or give the property away and that even if she does the sale is invalid. The husband can then go to the purchaser and reclaim that which his wife sold. You can imagine that this halakhah would make it difficult for women to sell things in their society. 
  If she came into possession of property before the marriage and then got married, she may not a priori sell the property, but according to Rabban Gamaliel, if she nevertheless does, the sale is valid.
  According to Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya, the argument brought in front of Rabban Gamaliel mentioned above, was actually in connection to this case, and not in connection to the case of a woman who sold property after betrothal but before marriage.
  According to Rabbi Shimon, if the husband knew about the property that the woman had received, she may not sell the property and if she does, the sale is invalid. The reason for this is that if this was property she had received before the marriage, and her husband knew about it, he might claim that he married her because of that money. As much as this does not sound like a good reason to get married, it certainly was a common motivation in those days (and in ours as well) and is a valid complaint of the husband’s. However, if the husband did not know about the property and then she sold it, while she should not have done so, the sale is still valid. In this case, since he didn’t even know about the money, he can’t claim that he married her because of it.
  IntroductionOur section begins to explain the mishnah. In the first clause, the two houses do not disagree—if the woman owned the property before she was betrothed, she may sell it or give it away. But in the subsequent clause, they do disagree. Why are the two situations different?
  R. Yannai’s school gives a relatively simple explanation—if she comes into possession of the property before betrothal, then the property came into her possession. But after the betrothal, the property comes into the husband’s possession. 
  The problem is that both Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that if she sold or gave away property that she received after betrothal, the gift or sale is valid. But if it came into the husband’s possession, her gift or sale should not be valid.
  The Talmud slightly tweaks the resolution from above. Before betrothal, any property that comes into her possession is certainly hers. But after betrothal, it might be hers or it might be his. During the period between betrothal and marriage her status is unclear. Therefore, ab initio, she should not sell it (lest it is his property). Ex post facto, if she sold it, the sale is valid. 
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with R. Judah’s words from the mishnah. The section of the mishnah refers to a case where the woman came into her property after betrothal. According to Bet Shammai such a woman may sell this property, while Bet Hillel says that while the woman should not sell this property, if she does, the sale is valid. Concerning this R. Judah says: Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”
  The question is to what does the argument that R. Judah brings up refer? If the sages’ argument is in reference to Bet Shammai, then the questioners agree with Bet Hillel that if she sells the property, the sale is valid. But if the questioners have a more radical position, they may be arguing against Bet Hillel—even if she sells the property, the sale is not valid. 
  
  
  Daf 78b
  
  This is a slight different version of R. Judah’s words. The sages argue that since a married woman is his wife, and everyone agrees that even if she sells her property, the sale is not valid, so too the sale of a betrothed woman, who is also his wife, is invalid. Thus these sages are arguing against Bet Hillel, not only against Bet Shammai.
  IntroductionThis section continues with a different version of Rabban Gamaliel’s argument against the sages. As a reminder, the sages argued that since a betrothed woman is the husband’s “wife” as is a “married” woman, just as the married woman’s sale is invalid, so too is the betrothed woman’s. 
  R. Hanina b. Akavia adjusts how Rabban Gamaliel responds to the sages. Rather than simply say that we are “embarrassed” by the earlier rule with regard to a married woman, he notes a salient difference between a married woman and a betrothed woman. A husband has certain rights vis a vis his married wife that he simply does not have with his fiancée. Since he does not have these financial rights over his betrothed wife, the implication is that she has more rights over her own property—she can sell such property.
  The sages push their argument with Rabban Gamaliel further. Below we shall see that this argument contradicts the mishnah. The sages argue that the distinction makes sense if the woman sells the property before marriage. But does the argument make sense if she sells it after marriage. Rabban Gamaliel insists that even if she sells the property after marriage, the sale is still valid. 
  The sages argue that since he has gained possession of a wife, he should also gain possession of her property, making it impossible for her to sell it. Rabban Gamaliel answers that we are embarrassed enough that she cannot sell property that came into possession after marriage, but the sages want to make this worse by saying that she cannot sell property that came into her possession after betrothal but before marriage.
  In the baraita above, Rabban Gamaliel holds that a woman may sell property she came into possession of after betrothal but before marriage. This is an ab initio right. But in the mishnah, it seems that her rights are only ex post facto—she should not sell the property but if she does, the sale is valid. Thus the mishnah and baraita contradict each other. 
  R. Zevid solves this problem by emending the mishnah—Rabban Gamaliel indeed does say that she has the ab initio right to sell property which came into her possession after betrothal but before marriage.R. Papa says that there are two different perspectives. The mishnah follows R. Judah’s version of Rabban Gamaliel—she only has an ex post facto right to sell this property, whereas the baraita follows R. Hanina b. Akavia, she has an ab initio right. 
  R. Hanina b. Akavia seems to hold like Bet Shammai, for according to Bet Hillel even when she was betrothed she should not have sold property that came into her possession after betrothal. Clearly after marriage she could not sell such property. The Talmud assumes that R. Hanina could not possibly hold like Bet Shammai.The answer is that R. Hanina offers a completely different version of the dispute between the two houses. According to him, both houses hold that if she came into possession of the  property after betrothal she may sell the property before marriage. The argument is over whether she can sell the property even after marriage.
  IntroductionThis section opens with an amoraic statement that seems to disagree with all opinions in the mishnah. 
  Rav and Shmuel both rule that if even if the woman came into possession of her property after betrothal and before marriage, her husband may take the sale away from the buyers. This does not agree with any opinion we have seen so far. R. Judah had said that while she may not sell such property, if she came into possession of it before marriage, her sale is valid.
  The Talmud finds another opinion that agrees with Rav and Shmuel. This opinion was based on a vote. It limits the ability of a woman to sell her property, ruling that a husband may revoke such a sale, even if she sold the property after betrothal and before marriage. 
  According to the Mishnah, both houses agree that if she sold pluckable property (dowry to which the husband has rights of usage while married but that he may not sell) the sale is not valid even after her death. This seems to be the same as the Mishnah, so the Talmud is puzzled why the Mishnah would teach in different words the same law as that enacted in Usha. 
  The Talmud explains that there is a difference between the two rules. The Mishnah teaches that if the woman sells property, the husband may seize that property while his wife is still alive. However, he cannot take the principle away from the buyer. He may only claim the usufruct. This is because while the woman is married to her husband, he has a right to the usufruct from the property. Note that if husband dies before the wife, the purchaser will be able to keep the property in perpetuity.The enactment of Usha ruled that if the woman sold the property the husband may seize the land itself (not just the usufruct) after her death.These two laws do not contradict one another. But neither are they the same.  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses R. Shimon’s opinion from the mishnah: Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between one kind of property and another: Property that is known to the husband [the wife] may not sell, and if she has sold it or given it away her act is void; [Property] which is unknown to the husband she may not sell, but if she has sold it or given it away her act is legally valid.
  According to R. Yose b. Hanina, the definition of “known” property is simply land and “unknown” property is movable property. He seems to assume that the husband would know about land owned by his wife but not about movable property that she owns.
  R. Yohanan and the baraita offer a simpler, more literal interpretation of “unknown”—it refers to property that came into her possession abroad. 
  
  Daf 79a
  
  IntroductionThis section contains a discussion as to how a woman can prevent her husband from taking possession of her property at marriage.
  The woman in this story wants to keep her property away from her husband. So before marriage she gives the property in writing to her daughter (seems that the woman was previously married). When she is divorced, she wants her property back from her daughter. In other words, she is claiming that she did not really give the property to her daughter as a present. She only gave it to her sot that the husband would not get a hold of the property. Interestingly, the daughter does not want to give it back! R. Nahman accepts the wife’s claim and tears the document up.
  Anan goes to Mar Ukba, the exilarch, hoping to overturn R. Nahman’s ruling. However, Mar Ukba agrees with R. Nahman—such a document was not written in order for it to be a real gift. It was only meant to evade giving the property to the husband, and therefore, the daughter has no claim to it.
  Rava objects—while it is true that a person would not give such a gift to a stranger, this is the woman’s own daughter. Maybe her gift was sincere?Nahman answers that even when it comes to a daughter, a person prefers to keep the property for herself. Therefore, her gift was not really a gift. It was only intended to keep the property from the husband.
  The Talmud cites a baraita as an objection to R. Nahman. In order for a woman to keep her property away from her husband, she must write “you shall acquire it as long as I consent.” So if she did not write this formula out, the receiver may keep possession of it.
  Zera says that there is a difference between assigning all of your property and only a part thereof. If she writes all of her property, the person has not acquired it, for people do not normally give all of their property away. Therefore, it is clear she is doing this only to keep it away from her husband. But if she writes only part of it, the gift may be serious. Therefore, she would have to add that it will remain in the possession of the receiver only as long as she (the wife) consents.
  This final difficulty relates back to the mishnah. While we can understand why the daughter does not receive this property (the gift was not sincere), why is it the wife’s? After all, if the gift was not sincere, then sale was not valid and when the woman married the husband, he acquired her property?The answer is that this property is treated as if it was property unknown to the husband, which according to R. Shimon in the mishnah is not acquired by the husband. Thus this seems to be a way that a woman could keep her property from her husband. She would write it to someone else before marriage and then reclaim it after marriage. Note, that she would not be able to use it during marriage, and this would probably upset her husband. In other words, there would be negative consequences to such an action. But it would at least give her an option as to how to make sure that her husband would not have hold of her property.
  IntroductionThis section’s mishnah discusses what is to be done with money that a wife somehow receives, for instance through an inheritance, while she is married.  The general rule is that the money is used to buy land and then the woman receives title to the land and the husband is entitled to the usufruct, that is the money that is earned through use of the land.
  This section of the mishnah sets out the general rule about money a wife receives while married.  Money cannot be divided up as easily into principle and interest as can land, even though today we are accustomed to such a division. Were the husband to use the money there would be no interest.  Were he to merely hold onto the money, there would be no usufruct.  Therefore, land is bought so that there is both usufruct and principle. Today, we might say that he could put the money into the bank and use the interest, in the same way that an endowment fund works.
  Produce detached from the ground is basically equivalent to money, and therefore it is sold in order to buy land.
  The mishnah now discusses a more complex case, where she inherited land with produce attached to the land.  According to Rabbi Meir, the value of this produce is part of the principle, and therefore that principle must be used to buy land, from which he receives only the usufruct.  The way that the value of the produce is evaluated is by estimating the value of the land without the produce and the value of the land with the produce.  The difference between these two amounts is used to buy land, and then he receives the usufruct.  For instance if the land was worth 1000 zuz without produce and then 1200 with produce, the land is sold in order to buy a piece of land worth 1200.  From this land the husband receives the usufruct.The Sages rule that the produce attached to the land belongs to the husband. This is considered usufruct, even though this produce was not grown while his wife owned the land.  Since it is “usufruct” its value goes straight into his pocket.  Only the already-harvested produce belongs to her and is used to buy land, from which he receives usufruct.
  Rabbi Shimon teaches a simple way of remembering which produce belongs to the husband and which produce belongs to the wife during marriage and after its dissolution.  When the marriage begins, and as part of her dowry she brings a field that has on it produce attached to the ground, that produce is considered to be like produce grown after the marriage, and it belongs to him.  This is the opinion of the Sages from above.  When the marriage is dissolved through death or divorce the produce attached to the ground remains the property of the woman, as does the ground itself.   In an opposite direction, produce which is detached from the ground is hers when she is married.  If she brings this as part of her dowry, then it is used to buy land, as we learned above.  However, at the time of divorce, detached produce already belongs to the husband and he need not return it to his wife.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that if her property is considered principal, he may use the usufruct. But if the property itself is considered “usufruct” then it must be sold, land purchased from the proceeds and he can use the usufruct. The question is—what is considered “land” such that it may be purchased and the husband could use the usufruct?
  If the husband wants to buy a house with the proceeds of the sale of the fruit, and she wants to buy land, land is bought. But houses are more like real estate than date-trees, so houses are bought. This seems to be because they last longer and produce more revenue. Similarly, date trees are preferred over other fruit trees, but other fruit trees are preferred over vines.
  There is an argument over whether a thicket of sorb trees, which produce lumber but not fruit, and fish ponds are considered capital or produce. If the branches that are used for lumber or the fish are considered fruit, then the land itself can be considered the capital. She would keep the land and he could sell the fruit. However, if the fish and branches are considered capital, then they must be sold so that land could be bought with the proceeds.
  My interpretation here follows R. Hananel’s reading of the text, which I have placed in parentheses. This rule demonstrates whether something is regarded as part of the capital or produce. If the item continues to shoot new growth, such as a fruit-bearing tree, then it is considered capital. Such an item is not sold—the husband receives the fruit and the wife keeps the capital. But if the object does not produce new growth, and rather it is just used up, then it is considered produce. It must be sold so that the capital is not completely used up.
  The woman owns an animal that is part of her dowry—she keeps the animal and the husband receives the interest. Such a type of dowry is called “melog.” The thief who stole the offspring of such an animal must pay back the double payment to the wife. Below we shall evaluate the implications of this statement.
  
  Daf 79b
  
  Zera implies that the offspring of a melog animal belongs to the wife. But this does not seem to accord with any of the opinions in a baraita. According to the rabbis, if a melog beast has offspring, it belongs to the husband, while the child of the melog slave woman belongs to the wife. While Hananiah disagrees about the child of a slave woman, he agrees that the offspring of the animal belongs to the husband. Thus R. Zera does not seem to accord with either opinion.
  The rabbis and Hananiah said that the offspring of the melog animal go to the husband. But the double payment from the thief is the “produce of the produce”—it is earnings accrued through the produce. The rabbis never said that the husband has rights to this.
  The Talmud now asks about the inconsistency in the rabbi’s position. Hananiah’s position makes sense—he is not concerned lest the animal or woman die and the woman loses her principal. But why do the rabbis say that the offspring of the animal belongs to the husband, but the offspring of the slave woman belongs to the wife? Why the inconsistency?
  The rabbis answer that they are concerned about the death of the principal. But even when an animal dies, there is still some value to it—its skin can be used. Therefore, the woman would not lose everything. But if the slave woman dies, there is no value left. Therefore, the offspring belongs to the woman.
  IntroductionIn today’s section, Shmuel rules that the halakhah follows Hananiah—the offspring of slaves and animals that are part of a woman’s dowry belong to the husband.
  While the halakhah follows Hananiah, and technically the offspring of the slave woman belong to the husband, if divorced the woman may buy these slave children back from the husband. In those times, slaves were considered “the pride of her paternal house” and she would not want to lose control of the legacy she inherited. Of course, today we do not condone slavery. But slavery was a normal part of the ancient world, and I do not believe that there were many voices (if any) opposing the institution altogether back then.
  There are two main explanations of this section. According to Rashi, while the items listed here produce fruit, there will be something of value even when they stop producing. Therefore, the husband gets the fruit and the wife the capital. But others explain that since the producing animal or tree is not noticeably used up each time it produces, the husband takes the fruit even if at the end there is nothing of value left.
  A husband can use the things his wife brings into the marriage, even if eventually they are used up. This would seem to accord best with the second explanation above.
  If she inherits a mine of salt or sand, the salt and sand are produce—she keeps the land and he gets the produce. But if she inherits a mine of sulfur or aluminum, R. Meir holds that the sulfur and aluminum themselves are capital. Since they are used up, they must be sold and land bought. The rabbis hold that the sulfur and aluminum are produce, and therefore, she keeps the land and he gets the produce. R. Nahman’s statement accords with this.
  This is a new line from the mishnah, related to R. Shimon’s statement. According to a simple reading of the mishnah, R. Shimon basically explains a handy rule to remember when the produce belongs to the wife and when it belongs to the husband. He does not disagree with the first opinion. But the Talmud wishes to see some halakhic difference between the two—otherwise R. Shimon’s teaching is unnecessary. So Rava said that the difference is produce attached to the ground when the husband divorces his wife. The first opinion holds that since this produce grew while they were married, it belongs to the husband. R. Shimon explicitly states that this produce is hers, since the husband gained possession of such produce when they were married.
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with a woman who inherits slaves too old to work or trees that are too old to produce fruit.
  If a woman inherited old slaves who can no longer perform real work, the husband might want to sell them so that he will receive greater usufruct.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, he has a right to sell these slaves and to use the proceeds to buy land.  In such a manner her property will also be preserved for the slaves would have soon died in any case.  However, one doubts whether the sale would be very profitable in any case.Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel rules that the woman can demand that the slaves be kept, since they are a sign of her family’s ancestral wealth.  Although they cannot now perform a significant amount of work, their connection to the family and to the family’s honor gives the woman the right to retain them.
  This section teaches the same rule with regard to old vines and olive trees.  Again the husband would want to sell them to increase his usufruct.
  IntroductionToday’s section limits the dispute in the mishnah concerning old olive trees that she inherited.
  The first opinion and R. Judah disagree about a case where she inherited old olive trees only if they were part of her field. In this case, there is the honor of her father’s house that she may wish to preserve, according to R. Judah. But if she inherited them in someone else’s field, then there is no issue of the honor of her father’s house, and all agree that she must sell them because the capital is finished up.
  The same rule applies to slaves—the woman can hold on to them according to Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel because they are an honor to her father’s house. But these slaves are like trees in a field that do not belong to her. They exist on their own, with no context. Nevertheless, there is still a dispute.
  The Talmud now changes the statement. There is a dispute only if the trees are in a field that does not belong to her. In such a case, R. Judah would hold that she still may retain them. Despite the fact that they are not in her own field, they are still the glory of her father’s house. If the trees are in a field that belongs to her, then even the sages would agree that she need not sell them, for in such a case, they are clearly part of the glory of her paternal inheritance.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with a mishnah concerning a husband who spent money improving his wife’s property.
  If a husband has expenditures in managing his wife’s property, he cannot recoup those expenditures from the wife’s property (meaning the principle).  However, this is only if he also consumes the usufruct.  If he does not, he may receive compensation by taking an oath as to how much he spent.
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, if the husband spends a lot to improve his wife’s property but only consumes a little, he cannot recoup his costs. Today’s section deals with how little this consumption can be such that he could not recoup the costs.
  Even if he eats only the smallest amount, he still may not recoup the costs. However, he must eat the food in a dignified manner. There are several interpretations of this statement. It likely means that he ate them sitting at home, as part of a meal, and not out in the field.
  
  Daf 80a
  
  Abba lowers the threshold of what is considered “consuming a little.”
  This refers to the refuse after the dates have been made into an alcoholic drink.
  If he did not eat the food in a dignified manner, then it must be of a minimum value for him to be considered as having consumed his wife’s property. Some say it must be worth an issar and some a dinar.
  These vine-shoots were used by the husband as animal feed. Nevertheless, Rav Judah considered this a case where the husband had consumed his wife’s property.
  This statement refers to the concept of “hazakah”—one who possesses a piece of property for three consecutive years is considered to own the property. This was discussed at length in Bava Batra. One sign of “possession” is to consume the food grown on that property. Rav Judah says that even if he eats forbidden food such as orlah (first three years of a tree’s produce), Sabbatical year produce or kilayim (mixed seeds), he has established presumption of ownership over the property. The Rambam interprets the connection between this statement and the earlier statement as follows. This latter statement proves that any benefit counts as benefit, no matter what. Therefore, even if only his animal benefitted from the food from his wife’s property, it counts as if he benefitted. Rashi and others interpret that in these cases he didn’t really eat the food—after all it is forbidden. Rather, he used the vines. Such usage counts as consumption in both cases.
  IntroductionWe have learned on several occasions that if a young girl has no father, her brother or mother can marry her off. Such a marriage is considered to be only of rabbinic status. The Talmud discusses a husband who improves his minor wife’s property. Can he claim costs (if he does not consume any of it) as he would for an adult wife?
  Hisda rules that a husband may recoup the expenses he laid out improving his minor wife’s property. In reality, this is advantageous to the young girl. If the husband could not recover his expenses, he would let her property deteriorate.
  Because this man used just one dinar of his wife’s money, he may not recoup the 600 he spent to retrieve them from Be Hoze. Not a very smart guy, you might say.
  The other rabbis argue that the mishnah refers only to a case where the husband consumed the produce from his wife’s property. In this case, he consumed the capital, which really is like his expenditures. R. Ammi agrees and says that he may receive compensation for what he spent. In tomorrow’s section we will see that he may not receive more than the original value of what his wife inherited.
  IntroductionAccording to the mishnah, if the husband does not consume any of his wife’s property, he may take an oath and recover the amount he spent improving it. This halakhah is the topic of today’s section.
  Assi limits the mishnah to a case where the appreciation in the value of the wife’s property is equivalent to the expenditure. What exactly this means will be explored below.
  The amoraim now debate the practical manifestation of R. Assi’s words. As we shall see there are two possible implications. According to Abaye, if the appreciation is greater than the expenditure, then the husband can recover his costs without an oath. He only need take an oath if the expenditure and appreciation are equivalent. We should note that this would encourage the husband to improve his wife’s property. People did not like taking oaths, even if they were telling the truth. Requiring him to take an oath might have dissuaded him from working on her property, which would ultimately be to her detriment.
  Rava fears that not requiring a husband whose expenditures were lower than the appreciation to take an oath might lead him to lie. He would say that the expenditures were slightly lower than the appreciation when in reality they were far lower. Therefore, Rava says that the implication of R. Assi’s rule is different. If the expenditures are higher than the appreciation, then he may recover only the amount of his expenditures. And even in this case, he must take an oath.
  The question here is about a husband who gave his wife’s land to sharecroppers to work. The husband used some of the produce from the land, and then divorced his wife. At this point he must give the land back to his wife and the husband cannot recover the costs he incurred in working the land. Do the sharecroppers lose their share of the land, because they were in the husband’s place? Or can the sharecroppers remain on the land, for it does not matter to whom it belongs, their agreement stands in its place?
  In general, if a person improves someone else’s land, he may ask for compensation. He will receive the lower of two amounts—his expenditures or the improvement to the land. But at least he will always receive something. So why would the sharecroppers not receive their pay, at least as if they were just regular people who had worked someone else’s land?
  The Talmud explains the difference between the two cases. In the case of a person who simply improves someone’s else’s land, there was no one else working on it. Therefore, he has a right to claim his costs or the appreciation. But in this case, the sharecroppers are working the land on behalf of the husband. If the husband loses his rights, they might lose theirs as well.
  Huna issues a final ruling on this issue. If the husband is a sharecropper himself, meaning he is capable of working the field himself, then the sharecroppers are in his place. If he loses his right, they lose their rights as well. But if the husband is not a sharecropper, then they are treated like anyone else working someone’s land, and they have not lost their share.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses a husband’s rights to sell his wife’s property for the usufruct. In other words, this is a sale in which the buyer has rights to the produce from the land, but not title to the land itself. Is such a sale legal?
  The question is asked—can a husband sell his rights to usufruct from his wife’s property.
  
  Daf 80b
  
  Two amoraim disagree over whether this sale is valid.
  Papa says that Judah Mar b. Meremar never really said the statement attributed to him. Rather, it was attributed to him based on a misunderstanding of a case. The case involved a woman who brought two slave women into her marriage. Her husband subsequently married a second wife, and gave this second wife one of the first wife’s slaves. This of course angered the first wife, who came in front of Rava. But Rava paid no heed to her complaint.
  The one who saw this thought that Rava held that the husband has a right to sell his wife’s property. But this is not so, according to Rav Papa. The husband must use his wife’s property for the comfort of the home, and in this case, he has done so. But he could not have sold it to a third party, someone living outside of his house.
  Both Abaye and Rava give different reasons as to why a husband may not sell fields that belong to his wife. According to Abaye we fear that the person buying them will not take care of them, since he only receives the produce and does not own the field. The buyer would have no interest in the long term health of the field. According to Rava, we simply wish the field to remain part of the husband and wife’s home, so that they will be comfortable.
  There are three cases in which Abaye and Rava would differ as to whether the husband can sell the field.The field is close to the town. Since he can make sure it is being properly taken care of, Abaye would allow him to sell the field for its usufruct. Rava would not.The husband takes care of the field himself, even though he sold it to someone else. Again, we can be sure that the husband will take care of it, so Abaye would let him sell it and Rava would not.The husband uses the proceeds of the sale to engage in business. This will help provide for the comfort of the house, so Rava would allow it. Abaye would not.
  IntroductionThe mishnah in this section discusses a woman awaiting levirate marriage (a shomeret yavam) who received an inheritance. What are her rights as to selling it, and what happens to her property if she dies?
  Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that a shomeret yavam can sell new property that has come into her hands since the death of her first husband.  She does not need the permission of the yavam (the levir), because he has not married her.
  If she dies, there is a dispute between the two houses concerning her inheritance.  Usually a husband inherits his wife, but in this case she only had a yavam who had not yet performed yibbum.  He is not fully her husband.Beth Shammai holds that the heirs of her husband, meaning the yavam who inherits from his dead brother, splits the money with the heirs of her father.  The heirs of the father inherit since an unmarried woman is inherited by her father.Beth Hillel does not split the money evenly.  Rather, each part of the inheritance remains where it is presumed to be.  Since the ketubah, meaning the money paid from the husband to the wife upon death or divorce, is still with the husband’s estate, the husband’s inheritors collect this money. The dowry is in the wife’s possession, since the husband cannot sell it.  Therefore the wife’s father’s inheritors inherit this property.
  The shomeret yavam has a lien on all of her dead husband’s property, meaning it is collateral for her ketubah.  Therefore, the yavam does not have a right to sell, give away or otherwise use up this property.  If this property was land, the yavam has a right to the usufruct but not to the principle.  If the property was money, the money is used to buy land and then the yavam can use the usufruct.
  Produce that is detached from the ground is treated like money; it too is sold and the proceeds are used to buy land, from which the yavam benefits from the usufruct.
  If the produce was attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir says this produce is also part of the original husband’s property which had on it a lien from her ketubah.  Therefore, it is evaluated and in essence sold to buy more land.  This is the same method that Rabbi Meir stated above in mishnah three.According to the Sages the produce which is attached to the ground belongs to the husband.  The Talmud emends this to read “to her”, meaning that since this produce grew while owned by her original husband, it too is liable for her ketubah.  There is no debate between the Sages and Rabbi Meir on this issue.The Sages dispute, however, with regard to the produce which is detached from the ground.  In their opinion, this produce does not have on it a lien from her ketubah, for ketuboth are not collectable from movable property (a category that includes most things that are not land).  Therefore, if the yavam takes this produce it is totally his.  If the woman takes the property, it now belongs to her and it is sold, the husband receiving the usufruct and the woman the principle.  According to most commentators, the Sages hold that the same is true for money; there is no lien on it from her ketubah and therefore it is “up for grabs”.
  Once he marries her, she is his full wife in all matters, except that she collects her ketubah from her first husband’s property.
  The yavam cannot say to his yevamah that he has designated for her a specific piece of property for her ketubah and that he therefore can do what he pleases with the remainder of his brother’s property.  Rather he cannot sell any of his brother’s property.
  Similarly a man may not set aside a certain piece of property and designate it for his wife’s ketubah.  When Shimon ben Shetach established the rabbinic ketubah, part or perhaps all of his legal innovation, was that all of a man’s property is subject to his wife’s ketubah.  This is not to say that a man cannot sell his own property.  However, if he does, and then when the wife comes to collect her ketubah her husband or his estate cannot pay it off, she can reclaim the previously sold property from its purchasers.
  If the yavam divorces his yevamah, he can now pay off her ketubah and then sell the rest of the brother’s property.  If he remarries her, she no longer has the status of a yevamah, but rather she is like all other wives, who cannot prevent their husband’s from selling their property.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses who is responsible for burying a woman who dies while awaiting levirate marriage.
  On the one hand it would seem that the husband’s heirs should bury her, because they inherit the money that the original husband was going to pay this woman. On the other hand, the woman’s father’s heirs receive her dowry, so maybe they should inherit her property.
  Amram answers the question with a baraita—it is the responsibility of her husband’s heirs to bury her, since they inherited her ketubah.
  
  Daf 81a
  
  Abaye cites a mishnah to prove the same thing. The mishnah refers to a widow who has two sets of heirs. This can only be a shomeret yavam who has heirs from her family’s side and heirs from her husband’s side. Thus the mishnah clearly states that her husband’s family, meaning the levir, is obligated to bury her.
  Rava disagrees with Abaye—the levir is inheriting his brother. Why should he be responsible for burying his brother’s wife.Abaye responds that either way we look at it, he would have to bury her. If we think of him as his brother’s heir, then he takes over his brother’s responsibilities, including burying his brother’s wife. If he is not considered his brother’s heir, then he should not receive the ketubah his brother owes his wife. This ketubah would then be paid out to the wife’s inheritors, and they could use the funds to bury her.
  Rava responds that expecting the levir to bury his brother’s wife because he is inheriting the ketubah does not make sense. The ketubah is not collected while the husband is alive. And since the brother is in place of the original husband, he need not pay out the ketubah while he is still alive.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended with Rava stating that a ketubah may not be collected during a husband’s lifetime. This, according to the Talmud, is derived from a midrash on the text of the ketubah itself. Our section explores this issue, and how it is relevant to the law of who is responsible for burying the woman awaiting levirate marriage.
  Elsewhere we learn that Bet Shammai holds that one may derive laws by making a midrash on the ketubah. The ketubah says that she will collect the payment, “when she marries someone else.” But she cannot marry someone else while her husband is still alive. From here Bet Shammai derives the rule that the ketubah may not be collected while the husband is alive. But elsewhere Bet Shammai also holds that a document due to be paid is treated as if it was already paid. If this is so, the levir could not say that he is inheriting his brother, for the document is treated as if it is already paid, even though in reality it was not.
  To prove that Bet Shammai holds that a document which is due for payment is regarded as repaid, the Talmud cites a dispute connected to the sotah, the suspected adulteress. If the woman’s husband dies before she has a chance to drink the waters, Bet Shammai holds that the woman receives her ketubah and does not drink. Bet Hillel says that since she cannot drink the waters, because her husband is no longer alive, she loses her ketubah.
  The Talmud explains how Bet Shammai could possibly hold that she receives her ketubah. After all, the woman’s claim on her ketubah is doubtful for she might have committed adultery. How can her doubtful claim be sufficient to take the ketubah payment from her husband’s heirs whose claim to their inheritance is certain? To answer, we must posit that according to Bet Shammai it is as if the woman has already received her ketubah. This would place the burden of proof on the heirs to prove that she had committed adultery. Since they cannot prove this, she receives her ketubah.
  The Talmud again asks how the ketubah could be collected while the yavam is still alive—after all, she cannot marry another man at this point because she has not yet had halitzah. And the ketubah can be collected only after she becomes eligible for marriage.Ashi says that the fact that she is eligible for marriage with the yavam is sufficient for the ketubah’s conditions to have been carried out. Thus she could receive her ketubah immediately upon her husband’s death. When she dies, the yavam will either bury her, or pay the ketubah to her heirs.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the principle that a ketubah could be collected while the levir is still alive (if he chooses to pay the ketubah instead of burying her).
  Rava again tries to prove that the woman may not collect the ketubah while the levir is still alive. He refers to a situation in which the woman’s husband died and she married the levir. The levir cannot sell the property because it is all owed to pay the widow’s ketubah. If he is an Israelite, he can divorce her and now he only owes her the ketubah. He can sell the rest of the property. Then he can remarry her. If he is a priest, he will have to get her permission in order to sell the property. He cannot divorce her and remarry her because a priest cannot marry a divorcee.
  
  
  Daf 81b
  
  If we could consider the ketubah as if it had been paid off while the levir was still alive, then why not just set aside the amount of money necessary to pay off the ketubah, and then the levir could sell the rest of the property, as if he had already paid off the ketubah.
  Abaye argues back that setting aside the amount of the ketubah would not be sufficient to remove a lien on the remainder of the property. Such an argument would clash with a clear mishnah. A levir may not set aside property for his yevamah’s ketubah and remove the lien from the rest. So too in the mishnah quoted by Rava, the levir cannot set aside the ketubah and sell his brother’s property, even if we allowed a ketubah to be collected during the levir’s lifetime.
  Rava responds that the mishnah was just teaching good advice, but not a legal principle. It is not advisable for a husband or a levir to set aside property for the wife/yevamah’s ketubah, for this would cause them to have less cash/property far earlier than is necessary. But of course, if they want to set aside money, they may do so.
  The problem is that we now do not understand why the yavam may not simply sell his wife’s property. Why does he have to divorce her and then remarry her?The answer is that setting aside property to pay her in case of divorce would cause enmity between the couple. Rather, that he should divorce her, sell some property and then remarry her. In such a case she knows that his only motivation is to sell property, and not to divorce her in the future.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses a levir’s right to sell his brother’s widow’s property.
  Rachel is married to Levi, who dies without offspring. She should do yibbum (levirate marriage) with Reuven, but Shimon wants to prevent this by giving her a get (a divorce document). This would make it forbidden for her to have yibbum with him. So Reuven tries to cut a deal with Shimon.
  Rav Joseph says that the rabbis do not allow a levir to sell his brother’s widow’s estate. Since all of his property has a lien on it for her ketubah, he may not sell any of her property. And if he does sell it, the sale is invalid. Similarly, any such deal that he makes with the brother is invalid. This discussion continues in tomorrow’s section.
  IntroductionYesterday Rav Joseph said that since a levir is not supposed to sell his yevamah’s property, if he does sell it, the sale is invalid. Abaye argues that just because someone should not sell something does not mean that if he/she does sell it, the sale is invalid.
  Abaye cites the mishnah we have been discussing to prove that just because someone holds that one should not sell something does not mean that if she does, the sale is invalid. Bet Hillel holds that the woman should not sell her property (when she inherited the property after betrothal) but that if she does sell it, the sale is valid. This refutes R. Joseph’s proof.
  The same case is sent in front of another sage, who gives the same answer as R. Joseph. But Abaye criticizes him because he did not “hang jewels” on it—meaning give reasons for his ruling.
  After another sage rules according to Abaye (that the agreement is valid) R. Joseph goes and finds another source to support his opinion. In this case found in this baraita a man had a debt with his brother and then he died without children, leaving his wife waiting levirate marriage with the very person who owed a debt to her husband. The levir cannot say that since he acquired the debt by marrying the woman (i.e. he would owe himself the debt), he need not pay it back at all. Rather what he must do is take the money and put it into the wife’s estate. Then land would be bought with the money and he would get the usufruct. To Rav Joseph this is proof that the husband cannot sell his wife’s estate. Just because he will have rights to it does not mean that it is his now.
  Abaye tries to deflect the proof from this baraita. Perhaps it does not mean that he must sell the property. Perhaps they were just giving him good advice. Buying land would ensure that his capital is not lost.Joseph responds that the language of the baraita proves that this is mandatory—he must sell the land. It is not simply “good advice.” This sugya continues with tomorrow’s section.
  IntroductionThe saga of the deal made by the levir continues.
  The question is again sent to R. Minyomi, this time with the baraita R. Joseph used to support his ruling. This time, R. Minyomi, whom we already know sided with Abaye, says that the baraita R. Joseph cited is not a valid teaching such that it could be used as proof.
  The Talmud now explores why this baraita is not a valid teaching. The borrower borrowed money and owes back money to the dead brother’s estate. According to one opinion, money and other movable things are not pledged to a woman’s ketubah. Her lien is only over real estate owned by her husband. If so, the original husband would not have to set this money aside to pay for her ketubah and neither should the levir. The problem is that R. Meir does hold that movables are pledged to a ketubah. The baraita might follow R. Meir.
  
  Daf 82a
  
  The Talmud suggests another reason why R. Minyomi invalidated the baraita. Perhaps the levir could say, “I don’t owe you [the wife] a debt. I owe a debt to your husband.” The problem is that the baraita could follow R. Natan who holds that if X owes Y a debt, and Y owes Z, Z can be made to pay X. So if the levir owes his brother, and his brother owes his wife, the levir could be made to pay the wife.
  The final answer is that no tanna holds like both R. Meir and R. Natan. Therefore, R. Minyomi rejects this baraita.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues with a discussion of another case where a woman becomes liable for yibbum and there are two brothers with whom this can happen. One brother wants to give her a get, which would disqualify her from having yibbum with the other brother.
  One brother (we’ll call him Shimon) seems to not want his sister-in-law to do yibbum with the other brother (Reuven) because he doesn’t want him to inherit the dead brother’s estate. So Shimon tries to give her a get, which would make her ineligible for yibbum with any of the brothers. In such a case the inheritance would be shared equally by all of the brothers. Reuven offers to share the estate with Shimon, so long as Shimon does not stand in the way of them having yibbum.
  Shimon replies that even if he agrees to split the inheritance, he is afraid that once Reuven takes the inheritance, he will go back on the deal like the story from Pumbedita we read last week. So Reuven says that he will split the inheritance now, even before he has yibbum.The Talmud will continue to discuss whether this agreement works. So stay tuned!Lovers of game theory will note that there is a classic prisoner’s game here. If Reuven and Shimon cooperate, they share the inheritance to the exclusion of the other brothers. If Shimon does not cooperate, they will have to share it will all of the other brothers. But Reuven could win if Shimon cooperates and then he defaults. So you game theorists, what do you think Shimon should do?
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s story, the yavam (Reuven), who wanted to have levirate marriage with his brother’s widow, promised Shimon that if the latter would refrain from preventing him from having yibbum, Reuven would split the inheritance with him. In today’s section, amoraim debate whether such a promise can be enforced.
  Mar bar R. Ashi believes that Reuven’s promise to Shimon to share the inheritance cannot be enforced. Even though a person can make a promise to transfer ownership over a cow to someone at a future date, he can only do so if he can currently transfer ownership. Since Reuven currently does not have possession over the inheritance, because he has not yet performed yibbum, he cannot legally transfer possession in the future.
  Rabin’s version of R. Yohanan’s statement concerning future transfer of the cow contradicts R. Dimi’s version of the statement.
  If the seller states, “acquire from now” then the acquisition will work, but only after thirty days. In other words, the acquisition will be guaranteed now, but only go into effect after thirty days. If he does not add in “from now” then even after thirty days, the acquisition will not go into effect.
  If Reuven has levirate marriage with the wife, and then the court divides the dead brother’s property among the brothers, the division of property is meaningless, because once the brother has married the yebamah, all of the dead brother’s property belongs to him.So too, Ulla rules, if first the property is divided up and then they have levirate marriage. Again, all of the property goes to Reuven, who performed levirate marriage.
  Sheshet has trouble understanding why the second question was asked after the first. We might have thought that in the first case, since Reuven already acquired the property, it could be divided up. If such a division is not valid in this case, all the more so it is not valid in the second case, where it is divided before Reuven even performs yibbum. The Talmud answers that these questions were asked in two separate incidents, and the person who asked the second question had not heard the first.
  This final section repeats what was stated above—in either case, the division of the property is invalid.
  IntroductionThis section refers back to the mishnah on the bottom of 80, to a case where the brother died while owning produce attached to the ground. According to the sages, such produce belongs to the husband, i.e. the yavam. The Talmud questions why this is so.
  The problem with the mishnah is that the property should seem to belong to the wife—after all, all of her [first] husband’s property is a pledge to her ketubah. This produce grew while owned by her husband, so it should belong to her and not to the yavam.
  The mishnah rules that after he has yibbum (marriage) with her, she is completely his wife. The Talmud asks what law the mishnah is teaching us here. R. Yose answers that here we learn that later if he wishes to divorce her, he must do so with a get and that if he wants to remarry her, he may (as long as she has not been married in between).
  The Talmud explains that we need to learn that he divorces her with a get and only with a get lest we would think she also needs halitzah, the release from levirate marriage. Once she is married she is no longer considered a yevamah.
  
  Daf 82b
  
  It also seems obvious that he may remarry her. Why should this have been taught? The answer is that without the mishnah we might have thought that since he performed the mitzvah of yibbum which overrides the prohibition of marrying one’s brother’s wife, she again would become prohibited to him to remarry. In other words, remarriage is no longer yibbum, so she is prohibited to him. That is why the mishnah must teach that she is permitted to remarry him.
  The Talmud now questions why indeed she is not prohibited to remarry him due to her being his brother’s wife. The answer is derived from a midrash—once he has “taken her,” meaning had yibbum with her, she is treated as if she was his wife with regard to all matters. If he divorces her, he may remarry her. The prohibition of her having been his brother’s wife is off the table.
  IntroductionThis section discusses a few more sections from the mishnah.
  Since the yavam, the brother who performs levirate marriage, did not choose this woman to be his wife, rather his brother died and then she became liable for yibbum with him, the yavam’s assets are not pledged to pay her ketubah. However, if there is not enough money in her husband’s estate to pay her ketubah, the yavam must pay the remainder. This is the same reason that a woman always receives a ketubah—so that it will not be easy for him to divorce her.
  The mishnah stated that neither a yavam nor a regular husband can state to his wife that her ketubah is on the table—she may take it any time she wants. Rather, all of their assets are pledged to her ketubah. The Talmud asks why the mishnah needed to say the same thing about a regular wife as it states about a case of yibbum.The answer is that in a regular ketubah, the husband writes that he pledges to his wife all that he has already required and all that he will require. We might thus have thought that he would not be prohibited from saying to his wife, “here’s your ketubah.” Therefore the mishnah needed to teach us that even though he writes this, he still may not say to her, here is your ketubah.
  If the husband wishes to sell the property that he inherited from his brother, he must divorce his wife. This is in accordance with a statement by R. Abba on 81a, that if an Israelite husband wants to sell the property he inherited from the brother, the only way he may do so is by divorcing the woman.
  IntroductionThe sugya interprets the last clause of the mishnah, according to which if he remarries her she receives a ketubah like all other wives.
  The Talmud asks why the situation of a yavam who divorces his wife and then remarries her is any different from any man who divorces his wife and then remarries her. In such a case the ketubah from the first time they were married is still in effect. So how is this any different?
  The case of the yevamah is different because the husband did not write the ketubah—his brother did. Therefore, when he divorces her and remarries her we might have thought that he needs to write an entirely new ketubah. Hence the mishnah had to teach us that if he remarries her, she still only gets the first ketubah.
  Introduction
  The last section of this chapter discusses the historical development of the ketubah. These sources posit that at some point in Jewish history the laws of the ketubah were changed. In my opinion, these sources should not be viewed as historical records but rather ideological statements. They address why the ketubah works the way it does—why does the husband pay this amount at the dissolution of marriage and not at the outset. In truth there are records of ketubot from a very ancient period, both in Israelite documents (from the fifth century C.E.) and thousands of years earlier in other cultures. The notion that the husband must pay at the time of divorce seems to be very ancient. So I will look in these sources for ideology and less for history.
  According to what seems to me the most likely interpretation of this source, at first they used to make the husband set aside the money for his wife’s ketubah—200 for a first time marriage and 100 if this was her second marriage. This is a large amount of money, and seems to have been an even larger amount in Babylonia, where Rav Judah lived. Men could not afford so much money and therefore they simply did not marry. This situation remained until Shimon b. Shetach made a takkanah, an adjustment to the law. Henceforth, the husband did not have to pay the ketubah or even set the money aside before marriage. Rather, the amount became a lien on his property. This way he did not actually have the cash in order to get married. The ideology here is that even poor men and women should be allowed to get married.
  This source is a baraita that provides more stages in the development of this halakhah. It begins the same as R. Judah’s statement from above. However, the first adjustment in the law is that instead of just giving her the money, he would put it in her father’s house. It is very unclear how this enactment would remedy the problem. In all likelihood we have here a composite source—an editor combined R. Judah’s version of the development with another version. The issue over here seems to be a different problem than that addressed by R. Judah. Here the problem is not that it is hard for the husband to come up with such a large amount of cash and therefore he will not get married. Rather, the problem is that once he has paid the amount, there would be no deterrent for divorce. So instead of paying it, he would put the money in her father’s house.
  Once he has given over the money for the ketubah, it is still easy to divorce her. It is not clear why this would change if the women would use the coins to make baskets or tubs. Perhaps if the husband could see these nice things, he might be a bit more disinclined to divorce her.
  As I said above, as long as he has to pay the ketubah at the outset, he will still be able to divorce her without losing any liquid cash. Therefore, Shimon b. Shetach ordained that he should not give her the money. He may continue to use it and thus he would be deterred from divorce.
  
  Daf 83a
  
  IntroductionThe mishnah that opens this chapter discusses a husband’s renunciation of the rights to his wife’s property.
  The reality behind the scenarios mentioned in this mishnah is probably that the woman or her family would not agree to the marriage unless the husband renounced his rights to her property. Therefore the mishnah lists the effect that different statements will have on his rights. The general principle is that these statements are interpreted as minimally as possible. That is to say, we assume that the husband intended to relinquish as few rights as possible. Therefore, if he states that he has no claim upon her property, he still can benefit from the usufruct and he still inherits her. The only thing that he relinquishes is his right to prevent her from selling or even giving away her property.
  In this case, the husband specifically relinquishes his claim on the usufruct from her property. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, he can no longer benefit from the usufruct, but he does inherit her property when she dies. Rabbi Judah interprets his statement even more minimally; while he cannot use the produce itself, he may sell the produce and that which he buys from it is his.
  In this case, the husband specifies that he has no claim on his wife’s property, and no claim on its produce or on the proceeds obtained from selling the produce, neither while she is alive nor after she dies. With this comprehensive statement, the husband now has no rights whatsoever to his wife’s property and does not even inherit her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel points out a problem with this statement. The Torah mandates that a husband inherits his wife. By making such a stipulation, the husband is actually subverting Torah law. Therefore, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, the stipulation is null and void. 
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to interpret the mishnah. 
  According to R. Hiyya, the husband need not write down that he is renouncing his rights to his wife’s property. It is sufficient for him to state so verbally. 
  The baraita that is brought here seems to contradict the mishnah altogether. If a field is jointly owned by two people and one states to the other that he is renouncing his ownership over it, his statement has no effect. In other words, a person cannot renounce his rights to property over which he does have a legal right. So how can the husband renounce his rights over his wife’s property?
  The school of R. Yannai answers the question by saying she was only betrothed when he renounced his rights to her property. Since he did not yet actually have any rights to her property, he may renounce them before they come into fruition.
  The idea that a man can renounce his rights to his wife’s property accords with this statement by R. Kahana according to which a man can wave his rights to an inheritance that he has not yet inherited.
  Furthermore, a person has the right to denounce the advantages he might receive from a takkanah, an ordinance, made by the rabbis. A husband’s right to his wife’s property is considered a right granted to him by the rabbis. Should the husband not want to avail himself of this right, the choice is his. 
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that a person can renounce their rights to a rabbinic ordinance “such as this.” Our sugya asks what “such as this” refers to. 
  This refers to a statement made earlier in the tractate. A woman may renounce her rights to be maintained by her husband, and as such keep her earnings. 
  If Rava is correct that a person can renounce his rights to a takkanah enacted by the sages, then why can’t he renounce his rights to his wife’s property? Why may he do so only when she is just betrothed?Abaye and Rava say that once he is married his rights over the property are as great or even greater than hers. Since the property is in a sense already his, he cannot renounce his rights over it.  The Talmud concludes by asking what the difference between Abaye and Rava’s answers are. According to Abaye he could renounce his rights over her property, but according to Rava he cannot, because his rights over his wife’s property are so strong that he cannot renounce them unless they have not yet been married. 
  IntroductionEarlier we learned that if a person writes/says that he does not want any rights to a piece of property his statement is not valid. Today’s sugya asks whether an act of “kinyan” would make such a statement valid. “Kinyan” is a symbolic act that is considered to bolster the validity of a transaction. Today people are familiar with it from the signing of the ketubah or the selling of chametz. Usually it is performed by symbolically lifting up a pen/handkerchief or other such small item. 
  According to R. Joseph the act of kinyan does not aid in the validity of his renunciation if the renunciation was not valid in the first place. In other words, kinyan bolsters an act that is valid.R. Nahman says that the act of kinyan is related to his wish to renounce his rights to the land, and therefore it does work.
  
  Daf 83b
  
  If the partner who denounces the property and does so with a kinyan immediately withdraws his renouncement, then R. Joseph’s statement makes sense. Since he immediately said he does not wish to renounce his rights, we can assume that the kinyan was not meant to be serious. But if he delays his wish to renounce his renouncement (I know this is confusing), then we must take the kinyan seriously.
  Amemar seems to rule in accordance with R. Nahman. R. Ashi asks if he always rules like R. Nahman or only in the case in which he delayed his protest? In other words, does Amemar accept the statement of R. Joseph when he protests immediately? The answer is that he does not accept it. Amemar holds that the halakhah always follows R. Nahman. Thus if the person renounces his rights and performs kinyan, his renouncement is valid. 
  According to the mishnah, if he writes “I have nothing to do with your property” he has only renounced his ability to sell or give away the property. But the Talmud asks why—why should this not be considered a renouncement of all claims? Abaye explains that whenever someone has a deed we interpret it in a minimal fashion—he is at a disadvantage. So too here, we interpret the husband’s words as minimally as possible. What is the smallest advantage he might be renouncing his right over—the right to prevent her from selling or giving the property away.
  So why not say he renounced his rights to the usufruct, the produce that grows on the land? The answer is that rights to usufruct are greater than rights to prevent sale of the field. Abaye cites a folk saying the same as our saying—a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. A young pumpkin in hand is better than a big one in the field.
  Why not say he renounced his rights to inherit her property after her death? Abaye says because death is common—she will often die before he does. But selling property (at least land) was not so common in those days. Therefore, he did renounce his rights to prevent a sale.
  R. Ashi reads what Abaye said into the precise wording of the husband’s renouncement. The husband renounced his rights to his wife’s current property—not to usufruct which comes only in the future, nor to the property after her death, when it is no longer really her property. 
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses what is considered usufruct and what is considered the usufruct accrued from the usufruct. This is relevant for R. Judah’s statement: Rabbi Judah says: he may in all cases enjoy the usufruct from  the usufruct unless he wrote to her: “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon its produce and the produce of its produce and so on without end.”
  This seems pretty straightforward. Usufruct is the produce that grows on the land brought in by the woman to the marriage. If that produce is sold, and more land bought, the produce that grows from that land is considered usufruct of usufruct.
  R. Judah said two phrases that seem superfluous: “the usufruct of the usufruct” and “without end.” Does the husband need to write both phrases or is one or the other sufficient?
  If we say that “the usufruct of the usufruct” is essential, then he did not really need to write “without end.” The phrase is only there in the mishnah to teach that “usufruct of the usufruct” means without end.
  If “without end” is the essential statement, then the words “usufruct of the usufruct” are not really necessary. The mishnah included them to teach us that they are not sufficient.
  If both phrases are necessary, then we must ask why they are not redundant. The Talmud answers that without the word “without end” we might have thought that he could benefit from the “usufruct of the usufruct of the usufruct.”And without the phrase, “usufruct of the usufruct” we might have thought that “without end” renounces his claim only to the usufruct.Therefore, he needs to write both.The Talmud ends without any real answer as to which phrase is essential. Either it was just not that important, or in the end, what’s the harm in writing both phrases.
  Introduction
  The Talmud asks about a husband who renounces his claim over the “usufruct of the usufruct” but not the first degree produce itself. So can he eat this but just not the second degree produce?
  The Talmud first interprets that this phrase must be a renouncement of all claims. After all, if he eats the usufruct, there will be no “usufruct of usufruct.”
  The Talmud counters that if we ask the above question, we could ask the same question about R. Judah’s statement in the mishnah. R. Judah says that he may eat “usufruct of the usufruct” until he writes “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon its produce and the produce of its produce and so on without end.” If he eats the usufruct (when he has not renounced ownership), how will there ever be any usufruct of usufruct etc.Rather, we must say that there could be “usufruct of usufruct” even when he can eat the usufruct, simply in a case where there was some left over.[I should note that there are some difficulties in this section. Namely, R. Judah’s statement is taken here to refer to a case to which he was not referring. R. Judah referred to a case where he did not eat the usufruct. But the Talmud understands him as referring to a case where he did eat the usufruct. This difficulty is not easily resolvable.]
  IntroductionIn the mishnah Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel states that even though the husband completely and fully renounced his rights to his wife’s property, he still inherits her because his right to inheritance is biblical and a person cannot make a stipulation that goes against the Torah.
  Puzzlingly, Rav rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel, but adds that he does not agree with his reasoning. The Talmud now tries to figure out what this means. It could be that Rav agrees that the husband does inherit his wife, but disagrees with the reasoning because Rav thinks that a husband’s right to inherit from his wife is a rabbinic enactment (i.e. it is not from the Torah) but that the rabbis strengthened their words more than the words of Torah. In other words, you can’t make a stipulation to subvert rabbinic law but, by implication, you can make a stipulation against the laws of the Torah.
  
  Daf 84a
  
  The problem is that elsewhere Rav does say that one may not make a condition that goes against the Torah. The Torah prohibits someone from overcharging. If a seller sells something and makes a condition that the buyer cannot claim later that he was overcharged, Rav holds that the buyer still has a right to claim overcharging. So why would Rav say that he does not agree with Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel’s reasoning?
  Here the Talmud interprets Rav in a way that obviously does not make sense. Rav must agree with Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel’s halakhah and not his reasoning.
  If Rav agrees with Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel’s halakhah, but holds that one cannot make a stipulation even against rabbinic law, then Rav would not really be disagreeing with Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel. He would be adding to it.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to try to explain the meaning of Rav’s statement, “the halakhah is in agreement with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel but not because of the reason he gave”?”
  Rav could agree with Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel’s halakhah but hold that a husband’s right to inheritance is only rabbinic, and that a person cannot stipulate against rabbinic law or Torah law, whereas Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel holds that one cannot make a stipulation only against Torah law.
  The Talmud now tries to prove that Rav holds that a husband’s rights to inheritance are from the Torah. R. Yohanan b. Beroka says that if a husband inherits his wife’s ancestral land, he must return it to her family at the Jubilee. When he gives it back to them, he may sell it to them, but may do so at a reduced rate. The Talmud will now explore what this means.
  The problem is that we do not know why he would have to return it to the family, but still be allowed to recover some of the cost. If his inheritance rights are from the Torah, he should not have to return it at all, because the laws of the Jubilee year do not relate to inherited property. And if his inheritance is only of rabbinic origin, then he should have to return it for free.
  Rav explains that the rights of a husband to his wife’s inheritance are from the Torah. But the husband must sell the land back to her family because he inherited an ancestral graveyard and it would be a slight to the family for them to lose their graveyard. He may exact a full price expect for the price of burying his wife because he would have to pay this amount anyways.This is the end of the difficulty—from here it seems that Rav holds that a husband’s right to inherit his wife’s property is from the Torah.
  The resolution is that here Rav was only explaining the view of R. Yohanan b. Beroka. He was not himself issuing a ruling on halakhah
  IntroductionThis remainder of this chapter deals with the wife’s ability to collect her ketubah from the husband’s estate.In general, inheritors are not liable to pay their father’s debts from movable property which they inherited.  Only land is liable for these debts.  This mishnah deals with the specific case where the inheritors have not yet collected what was owed to their father.
  The husband dies while having a deposit or a loan in the possession of others. The question is:  to whom is this money repaid, to the widow, to the creditor or to the inheritors?
  According to Rabbi Tarfon the weakest among the parties is the one who receives the money.  The Talmud offers two explanations for who is the weakest.  According to one interpretation, the weakest is the one whose proof that s/he is owed a debt is weakest.  According to another interpretation, the weakest refers to the woman’s ketubah, for it is not easy for a woman to chase down those who owe her the ketubah.  In any case, Rabbi Tarfon agrees that although in general movable property is not used to pay off a deceased person’s debt, in this case, since the inheritors had not yet received the money, it is used.
  Rabbi Akiva categorically rejects Rabbi Tarfon’s application of mercy to a matter of law.  Law must operate blindly, ignoring who is weak and who is strong. The law must decide in favor of the one whose claim is the strongest.  According to Rabbi Akiva, in our case this is the inheritors.  Their case is strongest for they inherit their father’s estate without taking an oath, whereas debtors and widows must swear that they have not already received their due before they collect.
  If the husband left produce detached from the ground, the first of the collectors to seize it acquires it.  This is because no one has an absolute right greater than the other and therefore their seizing of the property is effective.  We should note that although this idea sounds foreign to us, perhaps even like vigilantism, it is basically similar to the idea that the person who does not have possession has the burden of proof.  If for instance the wife takes the property, she has possession and now the others would have to prove that it is not rightfully hers.  Since they cannot prove this, she keeps the produce.  Furthermore, since it is unclear who is the rightful owner, the court would not be able to make any ruling even if the parties had asked its advice.
  Despite the fact that anyone can seize the property, the widow and the creditor cannot take more than they are owed. If they do, Rabbi Tarfon rules that the remainder of the money goes to the weaker of the remaining two parties. According to the Talmud this means that it would go to the woman if the creditor had seized the money or to the creditor if the woman seized the money.Rabbi Akiva rules, as he did in the above mishnah, that in cases of law no mercy is shown.  Therefore, the inheritors take the remainder for they collect their inheritance without an oath, whereas creditors and widows must swear an oath before they can collect their respective debts.As an addendum, we should note that in the geonic period, the period right after the completion of the Talmud, which lasted from around 600 to 1100 C.E., the rabbis revised the Talmudic law and stated that a woman and a creditor can collect their debts from movable property. The reason for such a change was that their society was not based on the ownership of real estate, as society was to a much larger extent in the land of Israel in the 3rd century.
  IntroductionThe mishnah had stated that the husband died with either a deposit or a loan in his possession. Why teach both of these things? Aren’t they essentially the same things—someone else’s money?
  When it comes to a loan, the money was probably already used, and all there is left is a debt that someone owed the husband. There’s nothing physical there. Therefore, it is not really in the possession of the orphan’s and therefore it might be that R. Tarfon said it should be given to the weakest of those wishing to collect. But when it comes to a deposit, where the money is still there, we might think that R. Tarfon would think of it as being in the possession of the orphans and no one would be able to collect it. Therefore, we need to know that even in this case, R. Tarfon holds it goes to the weakest of the collectors.And had the mishnah taught only the case of the deposit, we might have thought that in that case R. Akiva said it stays with the orphans, but that in a case of a loan, it goes to one of the collectors, because the orphans never had possession. Therefore, so that we know that the dispute occurs in both cases, the mishnah needed to teach both.
  According to one opinion, the money would go to the one whose proof is at the biggest disadvantage, namely the one whose document is latest. Such a person would not be able to collect from the earlier debtors and earlier debtors would be able to collect from him.The other opinion is that the money goes to the woman’s ketubah, because the rabbis instituted the ketubah so as a favor for the woman, so that they would want to be married. Since the rabbis instituted the ketubah for her benefit, she takes priority in collection.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah there is a dispute between R. Akiva and R. Tarfon. I am copying it here:If the wife took possession of more than the amount of her ketubah, or a creditor of more than the value of his debt.The balance:Rabbi Tarfon says: it should be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage.Rabbi Akiva says: we do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
  To R. Akiva the entire estate belongs to the heirs, not just the balance of what the wife/creditor took beyond that which they were owed. The only reason he mentioned that the balance belongs to the creditor is to oppose R. Tarfon who says that the balance goes to the person under the greatest disadvantage.
  
  Daf 84b
  
  Rava clarifies R. Akiva’s position on a creditor who seizes property owed to them. Once the husband has died, R. Akiva holds that such seizure is not effective, because movable goods have no lien on them. Debts cannot be collected from them. But if the creditor seized them before the debtor’s (the husband’s) death, the seizure is valid.
  Tarfon holds that if the creditor seizes the property, his seizure is valid. But the amoraim disagree as to where this produce is such that the seizure is effective. According to Rav and Shmuel, the produce must be in the public doman for seizure to be effective. If it is in an alleyway, then we consider the heirs to have acquired it already, and seizure is not effective. In other words, to Rav and Shmuel if the produce is already in a semi-private domain, it belongs to the heirs. R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish say that as long as it has not come into the possession of the heirs, seizure is still effective.
  Some judges act in accordance with R. Tarfon and allowed the creditor to keep the money he had seized. Resh Lakish objects and forcefully removes the money from the creditor and gives it to the heirs. This cause R. Yohanan, a contemporary of Resh Lakish, to accuse him of going overboard, and treating R. Akiva’s ruling as if it was from the Torah. The Talmud will now explain what the dispute between Resh Lakish and R. Yohanan really is.
  It could be that both Resh Lakish and R. Yohanan agree that the judges erred, and should have ruled according to R. Akiva, but they disagree over whether this error should be corrected. According to Resh Lakish, since this was an error related to a mishnaic position, that of R. Akiva, the decision must be reversed. According to R. Yohanan, even though the error was related to a basic mishnaic position, it need not be reversed.
  The disagreement might be more fundamental—whether or not the halakhah follows R. Akiva or R. Tarfon. Resh Lakish would hold that the halakhah always follows R. Akiva, even if he disagrees with one of his teachers (supposedly R. Tarfon, but see below), whereas R. Yohanan holds that the halakhah is like R. Akiva only if he disagrees with one of his colleagues.
  This is another possibility for understanding the amoraic dispute. Resh Lakish holds that the halakhah follows R. Akiva because R. Tarfon was his colleague and not his teacher. R. Yohanan holds the halakhah follows R. Tarfon because he was R. Akiva’s teacher.
  Finally, the two amoraim might disagree over what the tradition was. Resh Lakish would say that the halakhah is in accordance with R. Akiva, whereas R. Yohanan would say that this was not a hard and fast rule. It is better to rule like R. Akiva, but not mandatory.
  IntroductionToday we learn a few stories in which creditors seize debts from property belonging to orphans.
  Yohanan holds that the seizure is effective, because he rules in accordance with R. Tarfon. But Resh Lakish holds like R. Akiva—seizure after the death of the father is not valid.
  Nahman rules according to a principle called “migo.” According to this principle, when a defendant (in this case, since the creditor now has the ox, he is the defendant) makes a claim and could have made a better claim, he is believed, in the absence of witnesses. Since the herdsman has no witnesses as to when the creditor seized the animal, he is believed.
  Resh Lakish had said that there is no law of presumptive possession over animals. In other words, because animals tend to wander around, someone who possesses them is not assumed to own them. So how could the creditor have said, “I bought it.” He would not have been believed.The answer is that an ox is different from sheep and goats, because an ox does not wander around. It is constantly watched over by a herdsman.
  Abba accuses the rabbis sitting with them of ruling in favor of the patriarch’s house only because they are politically strong.
  Papa and R. Huna tell the agent that his seizure of the boat was invalid because the debtor owed other people as well. As we shall see now, the debtor owed money to R. Papa and R. Huna themselves!
  
  Daf 85a
  
  Papa and R. Huna now attempt to acquire the boat for themselves!
  Pinchas b. Ammi now tries to invalidate their seizure by saying that the boat was acquired in the private domain, and once it is in the private domain, it belongs to the inheritors. The rabbis successfully defend themselves.
  Finally, R. Papa and R. Huna come in front of Rava and he invalidates their seizure altogether. For the seizure to have been valid, they would have had to have seized it while the debtor was still alive. Once the debtor dies, the property belongs to the inheritors, and they need not pay back their father’s debts with movable property they inherited.I should note that in this sugya we see some rabbis blatantly acting in their own self-interest, or out of fear of powerful people in the community. I think that what is important to remember is that power can corrupt anyone—rabbis too. This is one of the lessons I learn from this sugya, and especially from Rava and R. Abba who do not let them get away with it.
  IntroductionThis week’s sugya begins with another story where a legal claim of “migo” is staked. As a reminder, “migo” is a situation in which a person is believed to make one claim because he could have made a better claim.
  After the men of Be Hoze refuse to give Hama the money they owe Abimi, Hama goes in front of R. Abbahu wanting him to force them to do so (or give back the debt bond so that the debt will be repaid). Abaye says that since Hama has no evidence that they even paid the money, the men of Be Hoze can claim that they were paying the money back in settlement of another debt, not the one over which they have the document. Had Hama wanted to make the payment over that particular debt, he should have stated so from the outset.
  The agent has not successfully repaid the debt that the sender sent him to repay. So does the agent have to repay the money to the sender for not having fulfilled his agency? According to R. Ashi it depends on the particular language used to instruct the agent—if he was told to take the debt document back and only then repay the money, then he is liable because he did not fulfill his instructions. But if he was first told to repay the debt and then to take the bond, he did as he was told and he is not liable.
  The Talmud disagrees with R. Ashi. The sender may in either case ask the agent to repay him for the former may claim that he did not send the agent to make things worse for him. In other words, the agent better be careful that he accomplish his job.
  The woman here holds a bunch of bonds that were owed to a particular man. When the man dies his inheritors come to collect the bonds from her. She refuses to give them to the inheritors, claiming that the man owed her money and that she was going to hold on to the bonds in repayment of the debt owed her. She claims that as long as she seized the documents during the creditor’s lifetime, they now belong to her. Had she claimed them only after he was dead, then they would not be hers because a creditor (she is the creditor of the man who died) is not repaid from encumbered property. R. Nahman says that she must prove that she “seized” them while the man was still alive—meaning she must prove that someone claimed them from her and she refused to give them over. After all, in this case, mere possession is not a sign that she “seized” them because they were given to her as a deposit in the first place. Since she cannot prove this (because it did not happen—she was really claiming that she “seized” them when they were given to her as a deposit), she must give the bonds back to the inheritors.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues with legal stories related to debt recovery. The first of these stories refers to an oath. Generally, if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him money, but he has only one witness to prove it, Shimon can take an oath that he does not owe Reuven anything and thereby avoid paying. However, there are exceptions to this rule.
  The woman under discussion here was obligated to take an oath that she was not liable to pay money to a certain person. But R. Hisda’s daughter who is married to Rava said that this woman is known to lie under oath. Rava accepts his wife’s words and thereby allows the claimant to take the oath that the woman does owe money and thereby recover his loan.
  In this case, Rava does not accept R. Papa’s testimony that the document was already paid off. Jewish law requires two witnesses; one is not sufficient.
  Adda b. Matana is surprised that Rava relies on the testimony of one woman but will not rely on R. Papa because he requires two. Why the inconsistency? Rava pointedly replies that he knows how honest his own wife is and therefore can rely on her. But he cannot rely on R. Papa.We should note here that this is a classic exception as to how “real life” does not always accord with the law. According to the law, two witnesses are required, but Rava relies on one, because he evaluates the situation and determines that his wife is reliable.
  Papa now derives a halakhah from the fact that Rava accepted a single witness (his own wife) because he was “certain about her.” R. Papa says that if his own son were to tell him that a certain document had been paid back he would tear the document up. The Talmud thinks that this is extreme—tearing up the document would prevent it from every being collectible. Therefore, they slightly emend his statement. He would not tear up the document. He would merely “impair” it—meaning that it would be impossible to collect based solely on the document. But should other witnesses come and testify that it was indeed not paid, it could potentially be used as evidence.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues with another legal story of a woman obligated to take a vow in court that she does not owe money.
  The litigant wants the woman who purportedly owes him money to take the oath in a more public forum. He hopes that the shame she would feel at lying in the city would force her to tell the truth.
  Before she is willing to take the oath in the city, she wants a verdict written in her favor, that when she takes the oath, he will have to give her the money.
  Papi first utters a general slur against R. Bibi b. Abaye, and then he explains why such a document should not be issued—it looks like a lie to have a document written up before the action it confirms takes place.
  The Talmud disagrees with R. Papi. A document can be written up without the event actually even being planned. R. Nahman says that according to R. Meir, there is no need for the get to be written for a particular couple. A husband can find a get anywhere, even in the garbage, and use it to divorce his wife (as long as the names are the same). So too here, the court can write up a document even though the verdict has not yet been reached.
  The Talmud adds that even the rabbis who disagree with R. Meir require only that a divorce document not be written without a specific case in mind. In other cases they agree that documents can be drawn up even if the event has not yet occurred. The only concern we have is that if a debt has been repaid, and then the same document was reused, it would create a lien from the date of the first loan, when it really should create a lien from the date of the second loan. This would be unfair to anyone who had purchased from the second borrower after the date of the first loan. But in other cases, a document could be written up before the event takes place and we are not concerned that “this looks like a lie.”
  
  Daf 85b
  
  IntroductionMore legal stories!
  Ammi responds that this case should not be such a problem. Clearly the pearls did not belong to R. Miasha, as his inheritors would like to claim, for he was not rich. Second, the man who deposited the pearls could give a sign proving that he was the owner. As long as he can do so, the pearls are his.
  The fact that the depositor can describe the signs of the deposit is only useful if he could not have found out this information by frequently visiting there. If he does visit there often, then he might have just seen them and is lying when he claims that they are his.
  This is the same story but with different characters.
  The same story a third time!Note that it is unusual for the Talmud to contain virtually the same story with the same rulings three times in a row. I do not know why it does so here. Even if the event occurred more than one time, why preserve all three traditions?
  IntroductionAnother legal story, but different from those that we have been reading so far.
  The issue that will be raised in this story is to whom did the man who died intend to give his estate. After all, there may be many men named Tobiah. Today this would be like declaring that you’re leaving your estate to David Cohen. How many David Cohens are there?
  Tobiah may not claim the estate because the person left it to Tobiah, not R. Tobiah. This is true unless the man who died was on familiar terms with R. Tobiah, in which case we can understand why he would have called him Tobiah and not R. Tobiah.
  The scholar is always given precedence because we assume that person would want to leave his money to a Torah scholar. My guess is that there is no small amount of wishful thinking going on here.
  A neighbor is given precedence over a relative (unless the relative is also a neighbor. But if both Tobiahs are of the same status, the judges are given the discretion to evaluate to whom the estate was given.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya returns to the topic of the control that a husband has over his wife’s property.
  In the situation described here, Reuven owes Shimon money, and then Shimon sells this debt to Levi. Shimon or his heir can then forgive Reuven the debt and Levi will not be able to collect the money. Obviously, this is a devious thing to do but it is legal. Shmuel however agrees that if a wife brings in a debt document (a document stating that money is owed to her) as part of her dowry, she cannot forgive the loan, because her husband has equal control over her property.
  The wife sells her ketubah with the understanding that if her husband dies or divorces her the recipient will collect in her place. The woman is divorced and then dies. At the moment she is divorced the ketubah is owed to those who bought it from her. But they have not yet collected. Then she dies and her daughter inherits the ketubah debt. R. Nahman provides her with a legal maneuver that would allow her to inherit this ketubah, at least when her father dies (without sons). As the inheritor of credit, she can forgive her father the debt that he owed her mother. Then her father will not have to pay the money to those who bought the ketubah from her mother. When her father dies, she will inherit this money.
  
  Daf 86a
  
  Nahman now laments that he gave advice to his own relative that would allow her to basically cheat the purchasers out of their rightful acquisition. At first he believed that it was nepotism was preferable. But afterwards he realized that this was not proper behavior for a person of stature.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf goes back to Shmuel’s statement found at the end of last week’s daf. If you don’t remember, don’t worry—I’ll explain it again below.
  In the situation described here, Reuven owes Shimon money, and then Shimon sells this debt to Levi. Shimon or his heir can then forgive Reuven the debt and Levi will not be able to collect the money. Obviously, this is a devious thing to do but it is legal.
  The one who purchases the debt (Levi) can avoid this problem by having the debtor (Reuven) write over his debt to him. This way the original creditor (Shmuel) cannot cause him a loss of ability to recover the debt.
  There is a dispute about whether a court can force someone to pay when he has caused indirect damage to another. In this case, the original creditor causes indirect damage to the purchaser by forgiving the debt. So, Amemar notes, those who do force payment for indirect damages would make him pay back the full value of the document. But those who do not enforce cases of indirect damages would just make him pay back the value of the paper on which the loan was written, because the purchaser will never get this paper.
  Rafram forced R. Ashi to pay full damages in such a case. These are described as like beams used to support idols, for these beams are designed with precision. Today we might say that Rafram forced R. Ashi to pay every last dime.
  IntroductionThis section has two passages about returning debts.
  If the man has enough to pay back both the creditor and his wife’s ketubah, then he gives the cash to the creditor, since he borrowed cash from him and he gives the land to the woman, since her ketubah creates a lien on his land.But if he only has land, and it is only sufficient for the creditor, the creditor comes before the wife. The justification for this is that the woman really wanted to be married, even if she might not be able to get her ketubah. Although this sounds sexist, there is a key difference between the woman and the creditor. The woman was married not just to receive a ketubah—she was married for other reasons. The creditor loaned money fully expecting to get it back. Therefore, he takes precedence.
  Papa asks R. Hama if he issued the following rule in the name of Rava. If a debtor has land and tells the creditor to go collect the land, the court can order the debtor to sell the land himself and give the proceeds to the creditor. It is not the job of the creditor to sell the land himself.
  Hama says that he did not issue such a ruling. Rather, this happened in a particular case. The debtor had money but claimed that it belonged to the non-Jew and therefore he could not use it to pay back the Jew. Since this was a lie, they did force him to sell the land and use the proceeds to pay back the debtor. But normally, a debtor can simply give the creditor land.
  If returning a debt is a mitzvah, as R. Papa says, then seemingly a person should be able to simply decide that he does not want to perform a mitzvah. Obviously, this is problematic—how could debtors simply decide not to return the debt.Kahana answers that according to halakhah, the court can force a person to comply with a positive commandment, and they can apply as much pressure as they like. Now while I do not believe courts actually were in the business of enforcing religious commandments, in the case under discussion here, the returning of a loan, the court can enforce a debtor to do so.
  
  Daf 86b
  
  IntroductionThis sugya refers to a statement of Rav and Shmuel that we read on 84a, that in order for a person to seize something that they claim belongs to them it must be found in the public domain.
  The get will become valid only after thirty days. If she put it on her property the divorce would be valid then. But if she puts it on the sides of the public domain, she has made it ownerless, and when the divorce would become valid, she no longer owns it. Therefore, she is not divorced. According to this section, the sides of the public domain are like the public domain.
  The Talmud tries to prove the opposite—that she is divorced. This could be learned from a statement of R. Nahman, that if a person is sold a cow and he pulls it to him to acquire it (equivalent to the woman being given the get), but he is told that the sale would become valid only after thirty days, the sale is valid even if the animal is standing in the meadow.
  The Talmud rejects this comparison. concluding that the meadow has a different status from the sides of the public domain. The latter is considered the public domain, while the former is not.
  This is a different version of the above sugya, but it simply reverses everything from the first version. At first we think that she is divorced because this is the same as the case of the meadow. Then the Talmud criticizes this comparison because of the ruling of Rav and Shmuel. Then it resolves that the meadow and sides of the public domain are different. The former is not the public domain, but the latter is.The difference between the two versions is that according to the first, she is not divorced and according to the second she is.
  IntroductionWe learned in Mishnah Shevuot 7:8: “And these take an oath though there is no [definite] claim:  partners, tenants, guardians, the wife who transacts the affairs in the house, and the son of the house.” In other words in these cases one person can make another person swear an oath that he has not misused any of his property.  The mishnah in today’s section further clarifies when a husband can make his wife take an oath.A wife’s managing her husband’s affairs would not have been uncommon in Mishnaic society, especially if many of the men were merchants.  Merchants are often away from home for long periods and while they are gone, it is typically the woman who manages the affairs of the houses.
  If a husband appointed his wife to sell his produce in a store or to otherwise be a guardian over his property, he may at any time he wishes make her swear an oath that she has not acted improperly with his property.  This is not because women are inherently not trustworthy, but rather because a person in such a situation may take certain licenses with property that is not his/hers. The fact that the husband, or in cases of partnership a partner, can make the other party take an oath, would probably have acted as a deterrent, preventing the person managing the funds from acting wrongly. Unfortunately, the problem of people taking license with money or property which they have been appointed to guard over, is still a major problem in our society.
  Rabbi Eliezer adds taht a husband can even make his wife take an oath that she did not take for personal use any of the wool that he provided for her spindle nor from the dough that she uses for baking.The Talmud will clarify what the dispute is about.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s mishnah R. Eliezer said that a husband can make a woman take an oath even with regard to her “spindle and dough.” In that he extended the oath that the first opinion said that a husband can impose on his wife. Our section discusses this issue.
  Does R. Eliezer mean to say that if a husband is making his wife take an oath because he appointed her a shopkeeper or guardian he can also make her take an oath about her spindle or dough (rolling one oath into another), or does he mean to say that he can make her take such an oath at any occasion, even if he is not making her take an oath for other things?
  The Talmud quotes the continuance of the conversation started in the mishnah. The sages say to R. Eliezer that if he can make her take an oath any time he wants, then no woman could live with her husband. He would be like a serpent.
  The Talmud resolves that even if he “rolls” the oath on to her, she could still complain that she cannot live with him when he is so exacting with her.
  The Talmud now quotes the full version of the baraita. Here we can see quite clearly that even if he cannot impose an oath on her because he appointed her shopkeeper or guardian he may still make her take an oath on everyday items that she makes us of.
  IntroductionIn the first mishnah of this chapter we learned that a husband can renounce his right to use his wife’s property. In the mishnah that precedes today’s mishnah, we learned that a husband has a right to make his wife swear that she did not misuse his property. Today’s mishnah teaches that a husband may renounce this right as well.  We can easily imagine a scenario in which a woman says that she will not agree to be a storekeeper for her husband if he is so distrusting of her that he will make her take an oath. Therefore, perhaps as a precondition to her doing certain work for him, she makes him renounce this right.As in the first mishnah of the chapter, the rabbis minimally interpret each of these sayings.  In each case the court would assume that the husband renounced the minimal amount of rights that can be interpreted as being referred to in his statement.  For him to fully renounce his or his inheritors’ ability to make her swear an oath, he must be very explicit in his statement.
  If he states that he will not make her take an oath, he may still make her inheritors or others who may have bought her ketubah or to whom she may have sold her ketubah take an oath or a vow.  The case of her inheritors or those who bought her ketubah can occur if he divorced his wife and then she died and these people wish to collect her ketubah.  The husband may make them swear that the woman did not give them any part of her ketubah that she had already collected, nor did she mention that she had already collected her ketubah, nor did they find among her papers documentation that she had received her ketubah.  If they can swear that all of this is true, then they may collect the woman’s ketubah.
  If the husband states that he will not make her swear, nor her inheritors nor those who had business with her, then he can’t make any of them swear.  However, his inheritors can make them swear.  In other words, if the husband dies, his inheritors can make the wife swear that she had not received her ketubah before she collects from them.  If the husband divorces his wife and then she dies and then the husband dies, his inheritors can make the wife’s inheritors or those who might have bought her ketubah swear the same oath we saw above.
  If the husband writes that even his inheritors or others who have had business with him will not be able to make his wife, her inheritors or those who have had business with her swear an oath, then none of the latter need take an oath.The next section of the mishnah refers to a situation where the husband exempted his wife from having to swear an oath and he also stated that his heirs may not make her take such an oath.  The mishnah asks whether or not the heirs may make her take an oath about her subsequent guardianship over her dead husband’s property.  This situation would arise because typically the widow would continue to live in her husband’s home until she either died or remarried.
  If after the death of her husband, she leaves her husband’s house and returns to her father’s house, or when she returns to her husband’s house she does not act as a guardian over his estate, the inheritors cannot make her swear an oath when she collects her ketubah.  This is because her husband specifically exempted her from needing to take such an oath.  The mishnah additionally informs us that she does not take an oath over the expenses that she incurred while dealing with the burial of her husband, for if she knew that she would have to take an oath, she might not give her husband a proper burial.  (We might have thought that since these costs were incurred after his death, she would have to take an oath about her use of the money).  In order to ensure respect for the dead, the mishnah teaches that the inheritors may not make her take an oath that she did not take anything for herself while paying for her husband’s funeral.
  If she was made a guardian over her husband’s property after his death, then the heirs can make her take an oath about subsequent use of the property but not about past use.  The stipulation that her husband made that she should not have to take an oath was only effective over things done in his lifetime and not her management of his affairs after his death.  If she was afraid of taking an oath, she could have declined acting as a guardian over the estate.
  
  Daf 87a
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud begins explaining the mishnah we learned at the end of last week. That mishnah referred to an oath which a husband waives his right to impose on his wife, but it did not clarify the type of oath which he was waiving his right to impose. Today’s sugya explains.
  Rav Judah interprets the oath in light of the previous mishnah. The oath is for a woman who was made guardian over her husband’s affairs. He makes her take an oath that she did not make illicit use of his property.Nahman interprets the oath in light of the next mishnah, which refers to a woman who somehow impairs her ketubah by selling some of it, or giving some away. He may make her take an oath that she did not receive the other part of her ketubah.
  We can imagine a woman telling her husband ahead of time, maybe before her marriage, that if she ever wants to sell her ketubah, her husband should not be able to impose an oath on her when she comes to collect the rest. This is something that a woman could anticipate occurring ahead of time. But she would not anticipate ahead of time that someday he would appoint her guardian.
  Rav Ashi answers R. Mordecai that he teaches Rav Judah’s statement in connection with a different section of the mishnah altogether. The mishnah says that if she was made guardian over her husband’s house, the inheritors cannot make her take an oath about the past. Rav Judah explains what this means.
  Rav Judah says that the inheritors may not impose an oath on her for any guardianship she undertook while her husband was alive. After all, he declared that he would not make her take an oath over this period. But they may make her take an oath over the period between her husband’s death and his burial. While this is admittedly a short period, it would be enough for her to seize property that does not rightfully belong to her. She could say that she used it for the funeral expenses, but then she would have to take an oath to that.
  Matana says that even over this period they may not impose an oath on her, because there is a rule that for three things they would sell a person’s property without a public announcement: 1) To pay taxes to the ruling authorities; 2) To maintain his family in his absence; 3) For his funeral. Since paying for his funeral is an urgent matter, we also do not make her take an oath that she did not misappropriate funds.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the precise language which the husband would use to exempt his wife from being liable to take an oath that she had not misappropriated his things.
  The first formula, “Neither vow nor oath” implies only that he will not impose an oath on her. It does not mean that his heirs will not be able to do so. But if he says, “free from vow, free from oath” he has exempted her altogether.
  Joseph agrees with the first half of Rabbah’s statement, but disagrees with the second half. “Free from vow, free from oath” does not mean that she will be free from having to take an oath. “Free” can also mean “clear” or “cleanse.” What the husband is saying is that she should “clear” herself by taking an oath.
  According to R. Zakkai it does not matter whether he uses the language “neither” or “free.” All that matters is whether he says “in respect of my property” or “in respect of this property.”
  In principle, R. Nahman holds that no matter what language the husband uses to declare that he will not impose an oath on her, she is exempt from taking the oath. However, there is a different rule that forces her to take an oath. If she is coming to collect her ketubah from the orphans, she will have to take an oath because all creditors who collect from orphans must take an oath. The only way she would not have to take an oath is if she is collecting her ketubah from her husband, meaning he divorced her.
  In this version a baraita (a tannaitic source) is taught and R. Nahman affirms that the halakhah follows that baraita. In the previous version R. Nahman was the source of the halakhah itself.You might be interested in the name of this sage—Abba Shaul son of Imma Miriam. Unfortunately, we know nothing about him or his mother. There were sages and even Syriac speaking church fathers who used the title, “Abba,” similar to the way “father” was used in Christianity. “Imma” also appears from time to time in rabbinic literature in reference to a woman. But we do not know anything about this particular man or woman.
  IntroductionMost women are able to collect their ketubah without taking an oath that they did not previously collect.  However, some women must first take an oath.  The first part of the mishnah lists these women and then the mishnah explains each categoryWe should note that the mishnah is not making any statement about distrusting women; if so they would not be allowed to take an oath!  Rather in general even when a person is trustworthy s/he must sometimes take an oath in order to collect money.
  This is just the list. The mishnah is explained below.
  A woman who “impairs her ketubah” is defined as one who has admitted that she has received part of her ketubah.  The reason that she must take an oath to recover the rest is that one who pays back a debt is assumed to know more accurately that s/he paid back then someone who is receiving the debt.  Therefore, we suspect that she might have forgotten that she did indeed receive the entire ketubah.  To ensure that she did not she must take an oath.
  If one witness testifies that she did receive the whole ketubah, she must take an oath that she did not. This is the same as all cases of a single witness in Jewish law, who is not sufficient to provide full and valid testimony, but is sufficient to make the opposing party swear that what the witness says is not true.
  At the point of marriage, the wife’s ketubah creates a lien on all of her husband’s property.  If when she comes to collect her ketubah, he has no property, she can recover from anything he might have sold or given away after their marriage.  However, she must take an oath to those people who purchased the party that she has not previously collected.  This is because the purchasers cannot know whether or not the husband had already paid back the ketubah.
  For the same reason, if she collects the ketubah from her husband’s inheritors, she must take an oath.
  Finally, if she collects her ketubah when her husband is abroad, for instance he sent her a get, before she collects her ketubah she must take an oath. This is because we are suspicious that since her husband is not there, she might be more brazen and lie.  To deter her from lying she must take an oath.
  
  Daf 87b
  
  Rabbi Shimon says that if she has requested her ketubah, the heirs may make her take an oath, even if her husband had said that she would not be subject to an oath.  According to Rabbi Shimon, this stipulation does not cause the heirs to lose their right to demand that their father’s wife take an oath about her ketubah.  However, if she does not claim her ketubah, and rather prefers to continue to live on his estate (as is her right), the heirs cannot make her take an oath even if she was appointed guardian over his estate.  Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the halakhah found earlier in this chapter, that a husband has a right to make his wife swear an oath if she was appointed guardian or storekeeper.
  IntroductionOur sugya deals with the status of the oath taken by a woman who “impairs” her ketubah by stating that she had received part of it.
  There is a general principle that if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him 200 and Shimon admits to owing 100, Shimon must take an oath that he does not owe the other half and then he will not have to pay. This is called in halakhah “the one who admits to part of a claim.” Rami b. Hama thinks that the woman who impairs her ketubah fits into this category.
  Rava rejects Rami b. Hama for two reasons. First of all, all “biblical oaths,” meaning oaths whose authority is from the Bible, are cases where a person takes an oath and does not pay. In this case, the woman is taking an oath and collecting the remainder of her ketubah from her father.Second, oaths in the Torah are always about movable property. This oath is about a document secured by a lien on her husband’s land. Thus it would have the status of an oath on land, and such oaths are not of biblical authority.
  Rava explains that the oath is not of biblical status. Rather, the rabbis made her take an oath because they realized that people who pay money are careful to remember how much they paid. The husband will be careful to remember how much of the ketubah he already paid. But people who receive money are less careful. She might not remember so well how much she received, therefore they made her take an oath so that she would not mistakenly claim that she had not received her ketubah.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya asks what the rule is if she admitted in front of witness that she received part of her ketubah.
  In this case, we know that the woman received part of her ketubah because there are witnesses who said he did so. The husband claims he paid back the rest and woman claims that he did not (this is always the case in the Mishnah, for if both parties agreed there would be no need for an oath). Do we assume that since he paid part in front of witnesses, he would have paid the rest in front of witnesses and since there are no witnesses, we can assume he did not pay her back? If we make this assumption, then she would not need to take an oath. Or is it merely coincidental that there were witnesses that he paid back part?
  According to this mishnah, if the first installment of the debt was paid back not in front of witnesses, the claimant must take an oath in order to receive the rest of the payment. By implication, if the debtor (the husband) paid the first installment in front of witnesses, the creditor would not need to take an oath to receive the second half. The absence of witnesses would indicate that he had not received the payment.
  To solve the problem, the Talmud reads the mishnah in an entirely different way. Obviously, if there are witnesses that she received the first half, she will need to take an oath on the second half. The only reason she admits that she received the first half is because there are witnesses. But to be trusted on the second half, she needs to take an oath. The mishnah adds that even if there are no witnesses that she received the first half, she still needs an oath on the second half. We might have thought she is like a person returning a lost object who does not need to take an oath that he is returning the whole thing. She could be like a person returning a lost object because she admits to having received part of the ketubah even though there is no evidence that she did. Thus without this mishnah we would have thought that she does not need an oath when there are no witnesses.
  IntroductionSimilar to yesterday’s section, today the Talmud asks several questions about various scenarios where the wife admits that she received part of her ketubah.
  If the woman admits to receiving parts of her ketubah, but does so in a very detailed manner, saying that at such and such a time she received this small amount, and on another occasion she received another small amount, do we assume that these details imply that she is telling the truth? Or might she be elaborately faking it, and in reality, she had received all of her ketubah? In other words, does she need to take an oath?The Talmud leaves this unanswered.
  What if the woman does not admit that she received part of her ketubah, but claims that the original ketubah promised her was actually less than that written in the ketubah? In other words, the husband says he already paid her, and she says that he did not pay her, but the original ketubah was lower than is written in there. Is this a case of a woman impairing her ketubah, and just as a person who admits to owing part of the claim must take an oath that he does not owe the rest, she must take an oath that she is still owed the rest? Or is this case different because she did not admit to having received anything? She just said that she was owed less from the start.
  This baraita states explicitly that the woman can receive payment for the ketubah that she claims, even though she claims less than the ketubah states.
  Finally, there is a problem—how can she collect based on this document when she admits that the amount is false! The answer is that she claims there was a side arrangement between the two of them. For instance, the ketubah was written for a large amount to make the husband look rich, but in reality, she agreed to receive far less, because he was not really rich. Since she is not claiming that the document is forged or somehow faulty, but merely claiming that it does not represent reality, she is believed.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the second clause of the Mishnah–if one witness testifies that the ketubah has already been paid, the woman must take an oath in order to collect her ketubah. Again, the main question at hand is whether this oath is of biblical origin or just rabbinic.Note that this sugya is nearly identical to one we learned in last week’s daf.
  Rami b. Hama posits that the oath she must take is of biblical status. The Torah says that one witness has no effect but this is only with regard to testifying that the person sinned or transgressed or criminal matters. When it comes to monetary matters, the Torah does not categorically rule that one witness has no effect. Rather, as another rabbi stated, one witness is sufficient to impose an oath on another person. The status of this oath is biblical.
  Again, Rava says that the oath is only of rabbinic status. For an oath to be considered biblical, it must be a case where the one swearing takes an oath and is thereby exempt from paying. Here, the woman swears and collects her ketubah. Second, since he owes her land, this cannot be a biblical oath, for biblical oaths are always over movable property.
  Rava posits that this oath is of rabbinic origin. The rabbis enacted it in order to satisfy the husband. After all, one witness does testify that the ketubah was paid. When she swears that it was not, the husband will be more assured that he is not paying twice.
  
  Daf 88a
  
  Papa finds a way for the husband to impose a biblical oath on her. First he pays her the amount of her ketubah in front of one witness. Now he has two witnesses that she received her ketubah. Then he claims that this payment was a loan. Now, he can make her take a biblical oath that she has not yet received her ketubah. Note that while this might seem unfair because the first witness saw her get a loan, not her ketubah, the woman is not losing her ketubah. She is simply having to take a higher status oath in order to receive it because after all, one witness says she did already receive her ketubah.
  Shisha offers a slight tweak in R. Papa’s procedure. In order to combine the two witnesses into one testimony, he must give her the ketubah while the two are together.
  Ashi points out a different difficulty. The woman could claim that this second payment was for a different ketubah. She could keep this money and say that he did not pay the first ketubah. In this way, she will be able to get two ketubot.Rather what R. Ashi says he does is that he informs the witnesses that when he gives her the money this time, he is doing so for the sake of her ketubah. Now there are two witnesses that she has her ketubah. Now he can sue her for the first amount of money that one witness says she received. She would have to take a biblical oath that she had not received this money. The assumption is that the husband would not do this unless he was sure that she had indeed received the money.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is not really about our mishnah. It is based on a mishnah in Shevuot about orphans exacting payment.
  A mishnah from Tractate Shevuot states that orphans may not receive payment unless they first take an oath. The question is—from whom are they exacting payment. If they are collecting a debt owed to their father from a regular borrower, then just as the father did not need to take an oath to collect his debt (the document was sufficient) so too they would not need to take an oath to collect this same debt.Therefore the Talmud resolves that these orphans were collecting from other orphans. Whenever one collects a debt from orphans, he must take an oath. We might have thought that this rule is suspended when orphans are collecting from other orphans. The mishnah teaches that the same rule still applies.
  Zerika claims that orphans of a creditor coming to collect their debt from the orphans of the borrower can impose an oath only if the orphans of the borrower claim that their father told them that he did borrow, but that he repaid. [If they didn’t think he had repaid, then they would simply pay back the debt]. But if the orphans claim that their father said he never borrowed, the orphans of the creditor cannot collect even if they do take an oath.We should note that this is a very difficult statement—why should the orphans of the debtor be believed when there is evidence, a document, that their father did borrow money.
  Rava says that the orphans of the purported debtor cannot simply get away without paying the debt because their father said that he did not borrow. When a debtor denies having borrowed money and there is a document that says that he did, he is treated the same as if he admitted to not having paid. In the face of a debt document, such claims are simply not believed.
  The Talmud now offers a modified version of R. Zerika’s statement. The first half stays the same—if the orphans of the debtor say that their father told them that he borrowed but that he paid back the debt, the orphans of the creditor must take an oath to exact payment. But if they say that their father told them he never borrowed, they are treated as if he said that he never paid back the debt. After all, there is a document that states that he did borrow.
  IntroductionA woman collecting her ketubah in her husband’s absence, for instance if he was abroad, must take an oath
  Aha, a rabbi known by the title “governor of the castle” (we do not know why he is called that) relates a story whereby R. Aha limits the rule of the mishnah to a wife collecting her ketubah. In order to increase the favor her husband has for her, they ruled that if she collects when he is not around, she must take an oath that she has not received her ketubah. But if this is a case of a regular creditor coming to receive his repayment, he need not take an oath, even if the debtor is not present. He can collect from those managing the debtor’s assets without any oath.[Note that the idea of “favor” seems to imply that the rabbis were lenient on occasion on the husband’s obligation to pay the ketubah. For if this was too burdensome, he would not want to marry her].
  Rava says that any time a creditor collects not in the debtor’s presence, he must take an oath. For if this were not true, people would borrow money and then move abroad and their creditor would not be able to collect without an oath (which we might assume he does not want to take). Ultimately, if it is difficult for creditors to collect their debts, they will not lend money and it will become difficult for borrowers to secure loans. This is a theme we see frequently in halakhah—the law must make it relatively straightforward for creditors to receive their debts for otherwise, they will n
  IntroductionToday’s section is about R. Shimon’s opinion in the mishnah. To help us recall, I am copying this section here:Rabbi Shimon says: whenever she claims her ketubah the heirs may impose an oath upon her but whenever she does not claim her ketubah the heirs cannot impose an oath upon her.It is not clear with whom R. Shimon is disagreeing, or even what exactly he is saying. Our sugya tries to clarify this issue.ot extend loans.
  The question the Talmud asks is what part of the mishnah does R. Shimon disagree with. R. Jeremiah answers that he wishes to limit the rule that a woman who comes to make a claim on the orphans must take an oath. According to the first opinion, it does not matter what the woman wants to claim from the orphans—whether it is maintenance money (expenses she needs while she is still living in her deceased husband’s home) or her ketubah money, she must take an oath before collecting. R. Shimon says that she need take an oath only if she is collecting her ketubah. If she is collecting money for maintenance she need not take an oath.
  
  Daf 88b
  
  The Talmud ties the dispute between R. Shimon and the first opinion in our mishnah, into a dispute from Mishnah Ketubot 13:1. This mishnah concerns a wife whose husband has gone abroad and did not leave her sufficient money to provide for her maintenance.  The wife then approaches the court, asking permission to sell the husband’s property in order to provide maintenance for herself. It is assumed by all that she must take an oath when he returns, that she used the proceeds for her maintenance, and that she has not kept anything for other use.  Alternatively, if her husband claims that he did leave her with provisions, she might take an oath that he did not.  The dispute is over whether she must also take an oath before any of her husband’s property is sold. According to Hanan, the woman takes an oath only when her husband returns, but not when she initially sells his property.  In contrast, the sons of the high priests say that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end.  R. Shimon in our mishnah agrees with Hanan, she must take an oath only when her husband returns, but she need not take an oath when selling his property. In contrast the sages in our mishnah agree with the sons of the high priests—she takes an oath before selling the property.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues where we left off yesterday. According to R. Yirmiyah, R. Shimon in the mishnah was referring to a case where the woman was collecting her ketubah not in her husband’s presence.
  The problem with R. Yirmiyah’s reading of R. Shimon is that R. Shimon says that the orphans may impose an oath on her. But if she is collecting her ketubah not in her husband’s presence, meaning he is abroad, then the court is administering the oath. Her husband is still alive!
  Sheshet reads R. Shimon as referring to an earlier mishnah in the chapter. After her husband’s death if she is claiming her ketubah, the heirs may impose an oath on her. But if she is claiming maintenance from them, they may not impose an oath on her.
  The dispute between R. Shimon and the rabbis in Ketubot is the same as the dispute between Abba Shaul and the rabbis in Gittin 5:4. The mishnah in Gittin states as follows. When orphans grow up, according to the law they can make the guardian swear that he did not misappropriate any of their money (see Mishnah Shevuoth 7:8). According to the first opinion in Mishnah Gittin, the orphans have such power only when the guardian was appointed by the father.  If the court appointed the guardian, he is not liable for such an oath.  This is because the court forced him to be a guardian, and he didn’t necessarily receive any satisfaction.  If the halakhah were to force him to take an oath, people would refuse to become guardians.  However, if the father appointed him, the guardian has the satisfaction of helping out the father who was assumedly his friend. Since he has that satisfaction, he will accept becoming a guardian even though he might eventually have to take an oath.Abba Shaul reasons that the exact opposite is true.  If the father appoints him he need not swear since he was only doing a favor for the father.  According to Abba Shaul, if guardians appointed by the father were forced to swear they would not want to become guardians.  However, when the court appoints someone to be a guardian he gets the added benefit of the community knowing that the court believes that he is a trustworthy man.  Since he receives this added benefit, he will not refuse becoming a guardian even if it might cause him to take an oath.Shimon in Ketubot agrees with Abba Shaul. The woman is like the guardian appointed by the father, therefore she need not take an oath over the guardianship she was appointed by her husband. She only takes an oath when collecting her ketubah. The rabbis in Ketubot agree with the rabbis in Gittin, that even though she was appointed by the father of the orphans, she still must take an oath.
  IntroductionThe sugya from yesterday continues—yet another attempt to understand what R. Shimon was referring to.
  If R. Sheshet was correct, then instead of saying “whenever she claims her ketubah” implying that eventually she will claim her ketubah and at that point the heirs may impose an oath on her, it should have stated, “if she claims” because in the scenario to which he referred, the wife might claim maintenance instead of her ketubah.
  Abaye reads R. Shimon as disagreeing with the clause of the mishnah where the rabbis say that a husband may exempt his wife from taking a vow or oath even if she is repaid by his heirs. R. Shimon holds that the husband does not have such a right over his heirs. If she is collecting her ketubah from them, she must take an oath.
  Shimon would hold like Abba Shaul from daf 87—if she is collecting her ketubah from her heirs, she must take an oath. The rabbis hold like the other rabbis who disagree with Abba Shaul—the husband may exempt her from having to take an oath even to the heirs.
  The problem with Abaye’s interpretation is that the woman is in both cases “claiming her ketubah.” She is just claiming them from a different party. So how can the second half of R. Shimon’s statement read, “but where she does not claim her ketubah.”Therefore R. Papa says that R. Shimon is disagreeing with both R. Eliezer and the sages who argued with him on daf 86. All of those sages said that a husband could make his wife take an oath after appointing her a guardian. R. Shimon disagrees completely—he can make her take an oath when she comes to claim her ketubah. But not for other reasons, such as when she was appointed guardian.
  
  Daf 89a
  
  IntroductionThe mishnah which opens this week’s daf discusses various issues of a woman’s collecting her ketubah.
  If she comes to the court and brings evidence that she has been divorced, she can collect her ketubah.  The Talmud will discuss how to prevent this woman from subsequently presenting her ketubah and requesting to be paid again.
  If however, she brings a ketubah without a get, and the husband claims that he paid the ketubah but lost his receipt, the husband is believed and she cannot recover her ketubah payment.  Similarly, if a creditor comes to court with a debt document but has no prosbul, which is a document that allows debts to be collected even after the sabbatical year, and the creditor claims that he had a prosbul and lost it, he is not paid back.  The reason is that we suspect that he never wrote a prosbul in the first place.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel discusses “the time of danger” usually understood as referring to the Bar-Kochva revolt, which was crushed by the Romans in 135 C.E.  From that time and onward it was dangerous for Jews to travel while in possession of a get or a prosbul because the Roman authorities had decreed against the observance of the Jewish religion.  Therefore during that time period a woman could collect her ketubah without a get and a creditor could collect his debt without a prosbul.
  IntroductionToday’s mishnah explains how we prevent the woman from collecting twice, the first time without a ketubah, the second time with.
  According to the mishnah, the woman may collect her ketubah by producing a get. The problem is that she could bring her ketubah out after her husband’s death and then collect the ketubah a second time. The fact that we are not concerned about this means we must write a receipt that could be preserved by the heirs.
  Rav answers that receipts are not generally written. A woman can collect with a get only if this is a place where ketubot are not generally written.
  Shmuel says that she may collect the ketubah by producing the get even in a place where a ketubah is generally written. Nevertheless, he too agrees that we do not write a receipt. So how do we prevent her from claiming the ketubah twice? When she collects with the get she will have to prove that he did not write for her a ketubah, if it is in a place where they generally write a ketubah. If she comes to collect her payment without a ketubah and there is no custom to write one, then she can collect without the ketubah unless her husband proves that he did write one for her.
  Rav also says that our mishnah applies even to a place where they do write ketubot. With the get she can collect the base amount of 200/100 owed to every woman. To collect the additional amount she would need to produce the ketubah itself. If after collecting the base amount with a get, she later on produces her ketubah, she will only receive the additional amount.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on Rav from the mishnah. This mishnah makes sense according to Shmuel. The woman comes with a ketubah but no get. The husband claims he paid back the ketubah earlier when he divorced her. The woman claims he did not. Why is the husband believed? Shmuel would say that this is in a place where a ketubah was not written and the husband claims that he did write her a ketubah, and that he paid it back when he divorced her. He lost this receipt. The important point here is that since this is a place where the ketubah was not written, we can understand why he would have had a receipt that he could have lost.However, according to Rav she would be able to collect the extra because at the time of divorce she could only collect the base.
  Joseph explains that the husband is believed because he has a type of legal claim called a “migo.” This means that he is believed because he could have made a better claim. He is believed to say that he paid the ketubah, because he could claim that he never divorced her in the first place.
  
  Daf 89b
  
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on R. Joseph. We must be dealing with a case where there are witnesses to the divorce for R. Shimon ben Gamaliel says that she can collect her ketubah without a get. So obviously there must be evidence that she was divorced, otherwise we could not let her collect her ketubah without any evidence whatsoever that she was divorced!
  The Talmud now basically emends the entire end of the mishnah to read like Rav.If there are no witnesses to the divorce, she cannot collect anything, because she cannot prove that she was divorced. If there are witnesses, she can collect the additional amount, but not the base amount because we fear that she collected earlier based on a get. If she produces the get at a later date, she will be able to collect the base amount as well. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says that she can collect the entire amount at the first collection with only the ketubah, but she still has to have witnesses that she was divorced. To Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel, if she later comes up with the get, she will not collect anything.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya refers to yesterday’s sugya where we learned that if a woman presents a get but does not have her ketubah she may collect her base payment of 200/100 but not the additional amount that he might have written in there. The question is how does a widow who does not have her ketubah collect her get?
  If a woman with a get can collect her base ketubah payment, how would a widow who does not have her ketubah collect her payment?The obvious answer is that she has witnesses to testify that her husband has died.
  The Talmud now begins to ask questions concerning how we would ensure that a widow does not find a way of collecting twice. She could collect first through witnesses that testify that her husband died. Then, if she was divorced (obviously before he died), she could take out her get and collect again with it.The answer is that she can collect only if it is known that she was still living with her husband. This way we can be sure that he did not divorce her.
  If he divorced her right before his death, she could potentially collect twice. The answer is that if he divorces her and then dies, and she ends up collecting twice, then it is his loss.
  The problem with the above assertion that for a widow to collect her ketubah she needs to have been dwelling with her husband is that a betrothed woman does not yet live with her husband. So again, we would need to be concerned that she was first divorced and then her husband died and now she could collect twice.
  In the end, sometimes to make sure that she does not collect twice, we need to write out a receipt.I should note that we might ask what’s so bad about writing out a receipt? Why does the Talmud seem so hesitant to make her write a receipt? My assumption is that this was not always practical and furthermore, that it would force the husband to protect a receipt. If he does not have the receipt, he would always have to pay her again. This burden would turn the tables as to whom the burden of proof is usually on (the collector, in this case her).
  IntroductionYesterday’s sugya mentioned the ketubah of a widow whose husband died after betrothal but before marriage. Today’s sugya asks how we even know that such a woman receives a ketubah.
  There is a mishnah that explicitly mentions that a widow from betrothal receives her ketubah. But this is not evidence that all widows from betrothal receive a ketubah. That mishnah might refer only to a case where he wrote her a ketubah. What if he planned on writing the ketubah after marriage but he died before marriage? How do we know she receives a ketubah even under such circumstances?
  If the mishnah refers only to a case where he wrote her a ketubah, we might object that it is so obvious that we do not even need a mishnah to teach us this. Using such logic, we might conclude that the mishnah refers to a case where he did not write her a ketubah, and nevertheless, she does receive one.But this is rejected—the mishnah is there to teach us R. Elazar b. Azaryah’s dispute with it. R. Elazar holds that if she is widowed before marriage she only receives the base amount.Furthermore, simple logic dictates that he wrote for her a ketubah before betrothal because otherwise how could she get the additional amount. The amount that the husband wants to give in addition is not even known until he writes her a ketubah.Therefore, this mishnah proves only that she receives a ketubah after betrothal if he wrote one. We still do not know if she receives one even when he did not write one.
   The Talmud brings another source which mentions that if he died while she was still betrothed, i.e. before marriage, she collects her ketubah. There are other laws here too—if she dies and he is a Kohen, he does not defile himself to bury her, nor does she defile herself to bury him.But again, we could object—maybe that refers only to a case where he wrote her a ketubah. There is no evidence from there that she receives her ketubah even if he did not write for her.
  Again, we could ask why we need a source to teach us that if he wrote her a ketubah she can collect the ketubah. Isn’t this obvious? The answer is that we needed this mishnah in order to teach the opposite situation—if she dies, he does not inherit her because they were not yet wed.Note, the question ends unanswered. There is no source for the law that a woman whose husband dies before she is married receives her ketubah.
  The Talmud now returns to the issue of how we prevent a woman from collecting her ketubah twice. If, as Rav says, she can collect with a get, then she could take her get to one court, collect with it, and then collect with the same get at another court. And we cannot tear up the get because she needs it to remarry.The solution is to put a small tear in the get and then for the court to write on the back of the get that they have torn it up in order to prevent her from collecting twice. They did not tear it because it was an invalid get.
  IntroductionToday’s section is just a short mishnah. We’ve had some long dapim, so you deserve a short one.
  If she produces two ketubot and two gittin (the plural of get), all from the same husband, she collects the value of both ketubot.  This is a case where he divorced her and remarried her (this is permitted as long as she doesn’t remarry someone else in-between) and gave her a new ketubah for the second marriage.
  However, if she has two ketubot and one get, or two gittin and one ketubah, or one of each and proof of her husband’s death, she does not receive two ketubot.  This is because we assume that when he married her a second time, he married her on the condition that she receives only her first ketubah, which was as of yet unpaid.  In the case of “two ketubot” she receives only one for there is an assumption that a husband who writes two ketubot for his wife only intends on giving her one.  Perhaps the second ketubah was to hang as art on their wall!
  IntroductionThe Talmud begins by commenting on the woman who produces two ketubot and one get. According to the mishnah she receives only one ketubah. But which ketubah is the real one? We should note that the issue here is the lien—when was the lien on his property created—from the date of the first ketubah or the second? She would obviously prefer the first because that would give her a greater ability to collect.
  It seems that the women could have collected from either document. But this seems to contradict a statement made by R. Nahman, that if there are two documents written about the same event, the second annuls the first. Thus she should be able to collect only with the second ketubah.
  Concerning the statement by R. Nahman, R. Papa, a later sage, stated that if the second document contains something additional over the second document, we can assume that the whoever wrote the document not in order to annul the first one, but to add to it. Thus the lien would be created from the time of the first document, at least for the creditor to collect everything but the additions made in the second document. Thus we can say here that if there is something additional in the second ketubah, the wife can collect with a lien from the time of the first ketubah.
  
  Daf 90a
  
  This time she has evidence of divorce and death, but only one ketubah. The question is whether she can collect two ketubot. If we can ascertain that he divorced her, and then wrote her a new ketubah when he remarried her and then died, we can assume that he intended to give her a second ketubah upon remarriage. But if the ketubah is dated to before the get, then we can assume that when he remarried her, he did so on the basis of the old ketubah and she receives only one.
  IntroductionAbove in chapter four, mishnah ten, we learned that sons inherit their mothers ketuboth, above and beyond the inheritance they receive from their father.  This clause in the mishnah is called “ketubat benin dichrin” which is Aramaic for “the ketubah of male children”.  Our mishnah talks about situations in which a man had  two wives and either he died or both of the wives died.
  If a man dies and leaves two wives, the first wife’s ketubah takes precedence over that of the second wife.  If after the first wife collects her ketubah not enough money remains to pay the second wife, she will not receive her full ketubah.  This is because the debt to the first wife was incurred before the debt to the second wife.If before they collect their ketubah, the wives die, the first wife’s heirs take the ketubah before the second wife’s heirs take theirs.
  In this case the first wife dies while the husband is still alive, and he inherits her and her ketubah.  He then marries a second wife and he dies.  The first wife’s heirs want to now collect the ketubah (ketubat benin dichrin) from their mother, as I explained in the introduction.  The second wife, or if she subsequently dies, her heirs, want their ketubah.  The mishnah rules that the second wife or her heirs collect first because they are collecting a normal ketubah and they are like creditors who come to collect a debt.  In contrast the first wife’s inheritors are collecting an inheritance which they have received from their mother and the payment of debts always takes precedence over inheritance.  Therefore the second wife or her heirs receives their ketubah and only if enough money remains will the first wife’s heirs receive their ketubah.
  IntroductionThis sugya examines the first section of the mishnah, which says that the first wife takes precedence over the second.
  The mishnah had stated that the first wife takes precedence over the second. Meaning she “should” take her ketubah before the second does, and if nothing is left for the second wife, then too bad.But the Talmud reads into the mishnah that if the second wife does take her ketubah, she gets to keep it. This implies that if a creditor who extended the loan later than an earlier creditor comes and collects, his collection is valid.
  The Talmud corrects the above assumption. If the second wife seizes the property before the first wife recovers her ketubah, then the seizure is invalid. “Takes precedence” means that the second wife cannot even seize the ketubah before the first wife has received hers. This is similar to the son’s rights of inheritance, which take absolute precedence over the daughter’s. If she seizes her inheritance, he may take it from her. Thus the word “takes precedence” now means absolute.
  The Talmud now tries to learn the conclusion from above from the fact that the mishnah does not say that if the second wife collects her ketubah first they do not take it away from her.This would imply that whenever a creditor of a later date seizes property before the earlier creditor, his seizure is invalid.
  The Talmud now says that even though the Mishnah did not say that if the second wife seizes the ketubah her seizure is valid, that may still be true. So why then did the Mishnah say “takes precedence,” implying that if the second wife seizes, it is invalid. This was to preserve the parallel with the second part of the mishnah. This was the case where the first wife died while the husband was still alive and the second after. The second wife (and her inheritors) collect the ketubah as a regular debt which is considered to be “of biblical origin.” But the first wife’s inheritors collect only through the rabbinic enactment of “the ketubah of male sons.” Such a right is considered only of “rabbinic origin” and therefore if they seize the ketubah, it is invalid.Let’s just summarize the two versions of the Talmud:Version one—we assume that the mishnah implies that if the second wife seizes before the first wife collects, her seizure is valid.We reject this assumption. Her seizure is invalid.Version two—we assume that the mishnah implies that if the second wife seizes, her seizure is invalid.We reject this assumption. Her seizure is valid.This is a classically structured small piece of Talmud, one that works out all logical possibilities.
  
  Daf 90b
  
  IntroductionToday begins a long sugya about “ketubat benin dikhrin,” which literally means “the ketubah of male children.” Let’s remind ourselves what this is. If Jacob marries two wives, Leah and Rachel, and gives Rachel a large ketubah and Leah a small one, and then Leah and Rachel die, and then Joseph dies, Rachel’s sons will collect her ketubah and then Leah’s sons will collect hers and then they will split the rest of the inheritance. This is the case if both Leah and Rachel die while Joseph is still alive. But what about a case where one of the wives died before he died (we’ll call her Leah) and one after his death (Rachel). In such a case Leah’s sons inherit a “benin dikhrin” ketubah—one of biblical origin. But Rachel’s sons inherit their ketubah (when she dies) from biblical law, because they are inheriting it straight from their mother. This is of particular interest to the rabbis—what to do when one set of sons inherit from biblical law and one set from rabbinic law.
  The Talmud will derive three rules from our mishnah. First of all, if one wife dies before the husband and one wife after, the sons of the wife who died before the husband will get their benin dikhrin ketubah. We are not concerned that the sons of the wife who died after her husband will complain that the other sons are receiving their “benin dikhrin” ketubah, and that their “biblical” right should take precedence.
  The mishnah clearly implies that the sons of the first wife take their mother’s ketubah (benin dikhrin) if there is enough funds to cover it. The second sons take precedence—but if there is enough for both, then the first sons collect.
  In order to understand this line we need a bit of background. In order for the benin dikhrin laws to be enacted, there also needs to be a surplus of inheritance of at least a denar that will be divided equally between the sons. This is because the equal inheritance is of biblical status, and the rabbis do not want the benin dikhrin inheritance which is of rabbinic status to completely uproot the biblical laws of inheritance. But in this case, where one wife died before the husband and one after, there does not need to be an extra denar to be divided equally. This is because the second wife’s ketubah counts as that surplus denar since her sons collect “biblical” inheritance (remember, their mother died after their father, so they are collecting their mother’s ketubah directly from her, and not from their father). We can learn this because the mishnah does not say that for the first son’s to collect their benin dikhrin there needs to be an extra denar.
  Finally we learn that sons collecting their benin dikhrin ketubah do not collect from property that has been mortgaged (has a lien on it). For if they did, then they should be able to take their benin dikhrin ketubah from the sons of the second wife since their mother’s ketubah was written before the second wife’s ketubah. In other words, the husband’s debt to the second wife was later than his debt to the first wife, but nevertheless, the inheritors of the second wife take her ketubah only from unencumbered property.
  Ashi now critiques the first two conclusions from above. It might be that in this case, the first sons do not receive any of their mother’s ketubah. They would only split the inheritance with the second sons. So then what does “take precedence” mean? It means that the second sons take their inheritance of their mother’s ketubah first (which is of biblical status) and then they divide the rest of the father’s inheritance equally.
  One might have asked that if the sons of the first wife are not inheriting their mother’s ketubah, and all they are inheriting is their father’s property, then why call them “inheritors of the first wife”? The answer is to preserve the parallel. Since we have to refer to the inheritors of the second wife as her inheritors, for they do inherit their mother’s ketubah, we also refer to the first sons as the inheritors of the first wife, even though they are not.
  Ashi turns to the second conclusion from above and rejects it as well. It might be that this mishnah, despite not saying so, refers only to a case where there is an extra denar to be divided as biblical inheritance. But if there is no real extra denar, then all the sons divide their father’s inheritance equally.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues the sugya we began to learn yesterday concerning a case where a man was married to two women, one of whom died before he did, and one after. The question is whether the sons of the first woman to die (I will just call them the sons of the first woman)  receive their mother’s ketubah as a result of the “benin dikhrin” clause, which guarantees sons receive their mother’s ketubah. Or does this guarantee only apply to cases where both women die while the husband is still alive.To again, remind the reader, in order for any benin dikhrin ketubah to be collected, there must be some division of inheritance according to the biblical laws. The mishnah calls this the “surplus”—the amount left in the inheritance beyond the two ketubot.
  The Talmud now cites a tannaitic dispute which it will read as being over the issue we have been discussing—do the sons of the first wife receive their “benin dikhrin” ketubah. The Talmud interprets Ben Nannas as saying that they do. The children of the first wife can tell the second sons to take their mother’s ketubah as inheritor’s of the debt that their father owed their mother. Then the first sons will recover their mother’s ketubah, which seems to be the rest of their father’s inheritance.Rabbi Akiva says that the first set of sons is out of luck. The fact that their mother died while their father was still alive but the second wife outlived the husband means that the second set of sons inherit the ketubah from biblical law (directly from their mother). The first set of sons will divide the remainder of the estate equally among all of the sons—they will lose out, especially if their mother’s ketubah was large.
  Rabbah and the other rabbis in the academy begin to discuss a different framing for the debate between R. Akiva and Ben Nanas. According to the other rabbis (not Rabbah), the debate is over whether the second wife’s ketubah counts as the necessary surplus so that the first sons can receive their benin dikhrin ketubah. To recall, in order for the benin dikhrin clause to be effective, there must be some inheritance divided up according to the biblical laws of inheritance. These rabbis hold that both R. Akiva and Ben Nanas agree that if there is extra money left over after the two ketubot are divvied up, then the first sons collect their benin dikhrin ketubah. The second sons would get their mother’s ketubah and then the surplus would be divided equally. But Ben Nanas goes a step further and says that even if there is no money left over, when the estate pays the ketubah to the second wife, that counts as biblical inheritance. The sons of the first wife can then take their mother’s ketubah through their benin dikhrin right. R. Akiva would say that if no money is left beyond the two ketubot, then the first sons do not receive the benin dikhrin ketubah. The second sons would take their mother’s ketubah, and then the rest of the inheritance would be divided equally.These rabbis say the same dispute holds if both women die while the husband is still alive, and there is no real extra dinar, but there is a debt owed by the estate. Ben Nanas would say that when the estate pays off the debt, that counts as biblical inheritance, and each set of sons would take their mother’s ketubah. R. Akiva would say that in this situation, the second sons take their mother’s ketubah and the rest is divided equally.
  According to Rabbah, Ben Nanas and R. Akiva agree that if there is an external debt, that this counts as the surplus. They only disagree about whether the ketubah of the second wife counts as the necessary surplus.
  IntroductionThe saga of the benin dikhrin sugya continues. In the section we learned yesterday all rabbis agreed that according to Rabbi Akiva, as long as there is an extra dinar to be divided equally among all of the sons, the first sons receive their benin dikhrin ketubah from their mother. R. Joseph disagrees with that assumption.
  Akiva’s actual wording does not lend itself to Rabbah’s interpretation. Therefore it is rejected by R. Joseph.
  Joseph reinterprets the Ben Nanas and R. Akiva baraita to be over whether the sons of the first wife receive their mother’s ketubah in all cases, even if there is a real surplus. And then R. Joseph (or perhaps the Talmud) pairs these two tannaim up with two tannaim from another baraita, which it again reads as being over whether the first sons receive their benin dikhrin ketubah when one wife dies while the husband is alive and one dies after his death.Stay tuned for the exciting continuation of this sugya![As an aside, this is a sugya which will be analyzed in greater depth in a future volume II of Reconstructing the Talmud. The issue of inheriting the mother’s dowry was of great practical importance and has a long standing tradition in ancient near eastern law.]
  IntroductionToday the sugya about the benin dikhrin ketubah continues. Last week we ended by assuming that the tannaim disagreed over whether the sons of the first wife receive their benin dikhrin ketubah when their mother dies while their father is still alive and the mother of the second wife dies after his death.
  The Talmud begins by suggesting that the first opinion and R. Shimon both agree that in principle the first sons can collect their mother’s benin dikhrin ketubah. They only disagree over whether the surplus that is divided up equally among all sons must be from real estate. The first opinion would hold that it must be from real estate, and R. Shimon would hold that it can also come from movable property.
  
  Daf 91a
  
  The above proposal that the tannaim disagree over whether the surplus needs to be in real estate does not make sense in light of a baraita in which R. Shimon explicitly says it must be in real estate.
  The next suggestion is that they disagree over whether the surplus must be free and unmortaged—the sages would say it must be, and R. Shimon would say that even mortgaged property counts as surplus.
  If R. Shimon was saying that even if the surplus is mortgaged it still counts as surplus, then he should have said “since there is a surplus” and not “if there is a surplus.”  After all, all sages refer to a situation in which there is a surplus, they just argue over whether it counts.
  One Master holds that a dinar constitutes a surplus but not a sum less than a dinar, and the other Master holds that even less than a dinar [constitutes a surplus].The next suggestion is over whether the surplus must be at least the value of a dinar—the first opinion holds that it must be and R. Shimon holds that it need not.
  The problem is that R. Shimon in the next mishnah (later on this page) explicitly says that there must be an extra dinar. And even if we reversed the attributions in that mishnah, the first opinion also holds that there must be an extra dinar.
  To solve the problems, first we reverse the opinions in the baraita. Now R. Shimon is more stringent. And then we can follow one of the two suggestions from above—either they disagree over whether the surplus must come from real estate (R. Shimon says yes, other sages say not) or they disagree whether it can come from mortgaged property (R. Shimon says no, other sages say yes).This concludes the analytic portion of this section. One thing we might note is that whereas tannaim seem to disagree over whether the benin dikhrin ketubah clause is valid when one wife dies while the husband is alive and one after his death, the amoraim and the anonymous voice of the Talmud all agree that it does.
  If he taught us only this, I might have said that it [applies to a case,] where a man had married three wives two of whom died during his lifetime and one after his death, and the one who died after his death had given birth to a daughter who is not entitled to inheritance, but [it does not apply to a case where] one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death and the latter had given birth to a son, [since in this case] we would have to be concerned about quarreling. Therefore, he teaches us [that even if one dies during her husband’s lifetime and one after his death, the sons of the first receive their ketubah].
  IntroductionToday’s section is the exciting conclusion of the “benin dikhrin” sugya!
  Mar Zutra rules that the first sons do receive their mother’s ketubah, even if there is no real surplus.
  In Mar Zutra’s statement there are two sections. The main section is the ruling that the first sons do receive the ketubah, and then the second statement, is a sub-section, according to which the ketubah of the wife he dies after the husband counts as the surplus. Mar Zutra could have just taught the sub-section and we would have known the main halakhah. So why did he have to state both?
  Had Mar Zutra not taught us the main halakhah, I would have thought that the idea of the extra ketubah counting as surplus only applies to a case where the husband had three wives. Two of these wives die while he is still alive, and the third wife has only female offspring. She does not have sons who could have thought about receiving a “benin dikhrin” ketubah, because this enactment was only for boys. Thus this daughter would not be upset that the first sons were receiving their benin dikhrin ketubah and she was not. She would not quarrel. But we might have thought that if the wife who died after her husband had male children, then we would not give the first sons their mother’s ketubah because they would quarrel. So that is why we need to know the first law as well.
  IntroductionThe mishnah we learn here is again related to the “ketubat benin dichrin,” the clause in the ketubah which states that sons inherit their mother’s ketubah above and beyond their split in their father’s inheritance. To a certain extent we have learned most of this mishnah before through the preceding sugya.  The mishnah teaches that the ketubah benin dikhrin is only so effective there is enough in the husband’s estate for there to be an inheritance of at least one dinar after all of the “ketubot benin dichrin” have been paid out.  The reason is that “ketubat benin dichrin” is an enactment of the Sages whereas inheritance laws are mandated by the Torah.  If we allowed the ketubot benin dichrin to be collected and no inheritance to be split, than an enactment of the Sages would displace a law from the Torah.
  Let us say Reuven is married to two women, Leah and Hannah.  Leah has a ketubah of 1000 zuz and Hannah has a ketubah of 100 zuz.  After having children, both women die, and Reuven inherits both ketubot.  When Reuven dies, Leah’s children want to collect their ketubah.  The Mishnah teaches that if there is only enough to pay back both ketubot, i.e. there is only 1100 in Reuven’s estate, then all of the money is split evenly.  There must be an inheritance, since it is a Toraitic law.
  If in the above case when Reuven dies he leaves an estate of more than 1100, even if the estate is only 1101, Leah’s children take their mother’s ketubah of 1000, Hannah’s children receive 100 and the last denar is split evenly.
  As we can see from the above scenario, it is definitely in Leah’s son’s best interest that there be a surplus over the value of the two ketubot.  The mishnah now states that they may not artificially raise the value of the inheritance, by adding a denar or more, in order to take their mother’s ketubah.  If the estate was worth 1100, they may not pitch in one denar in order to make the estate worth 1101, so that they could take 1000.  If they try to do so they will be denied and the inheritance will be split evenly.
  If there was not enough in the father’s estate to cover both “ketubot benin dichrin,” the mothers’ ketubot that the sons wish to inherit, then the inheritance is split evenly between all of the sons.  Our mishnah teaches that the estate is not considered to include property that is not currently in its possession.  This refers to an inheritance that will soon fall to the estate, for instance from the grandfather, or money that the father had loaned to others and had not yet been collected. Although this money will too eventually be divided up between the heirs, since it is not currently available, and indeed there is always the possibility that the money will never come to the estate, it is not considered into the equation.
  Rabbi Shimon says that the extra denar which must exist in order for the ketuboth benin dichrin to be collected must be in land and cannot be in movable property.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with some of the laws regarding the benin dikhrin ketubah.
  This baraita is a fairly straightforward illustration of the mishnah—the sons receive their mother’s ketubah only if there is a surplus of a denar. The Talmud will now examine some of the rules with regard to that surplus.
  If the estate is worth the value of both ketubot plus one denar when the husband dies and then it depreciates before it can be divided, the sons take their mother’s ketubot even though there is no longer any surplus. This is because as soon as the husband dies the money is automatically considered to have been inherited by the proper inheritors.However, we do not have a clear ruling in the opposite case—what if there is no surplus when the husband dies, but then the estate grows after his death such that there is a surplus before it could be divided?
  In this case, there are two sets of sons—one set with a mother with a large ketubah and one with a small ketubah. When the father dies, the estate does not have sufficient funds for there to be any surplus, but by the time it is going to be divided, there is enough for a surplus. The sons of the wife with the larger ketubah come in front of R. Amram wanting the entire ketubah, and not just their equal share of the father’s estate. R. Amram tells them that they have to come to some sort of agreement with the other sons. He will not enforce their right to their mother’s ketubah. He then has to threaten them with a “thorn that causes no blood to flow,” which Rashi interprets as excommunication.When the sons come in front of R. Nachman, he gives a reason for R. Amram’s ruling—whatever the condition of the estate is at the time of death determines whether the sons will receive their mother’s ketubah. Since in this case, it was not large enough at the time of the father’s death, they all divide the inheritance equally.
  
  Daf 91b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section (and tomorrow’s) contains cases in which the rabbi tries to use our mishnah as a source for his ruling.
  This is a mnemonic to remember the order of the cases and halakhot that are coming up. These all have some sort of loose connection to the Mishnah.
  In this case, Reuven owes Shimon 1000 zuz. Before Shimon collects his debt, Reuven sells two mansions, each for five hundred zuz. When Shimon comes to collect, Reuven has no money, so Shimon goes to collect them (distrain them) from the purchasers. This is his legal right since his loan preceded the sale. He takes the first mansion and then goes to the other purchaser, to take the other one. This purchaser thinks that the mansion he has is worth 1000 zuz (or more). So he gives Shimon the choice—either take the 1000, or leave me alone because the mansion you took is also worth a 1000. Shimon does not want the cash—he wants to take the second mansion, for they are now worth more than 500.
  Rami b. Hama wants to compare this case with that of the mishnah. There we learned that if the sons of the wife with the larger ketubah want to add another denar to the estate so that there is a surplus, they cannot. In other words, the estate’s value is fixed. So too here, Rami b. Hama supposes that the purchaser of the second mansion cannot raise its value to 1000 zuz.
  Rava, as he always seems to do, corrects Rami b. Hama. The two cases are not the same. In the mishnah, if the sons of one wife are allowed to raise the estate by a denar, they will cause a loss to the other sons, who want an equal share of the estate. However, here the creditor gave 1000 zuz and he will get 1000 zuz back, if he chooses to take the cash. Any way we look at it, he is not experiencing a loss.
  The person who purchased the land from Reuven can now go back and claim the amount he lost from Reuven. But how much did the second purchaser lose? A thousand zuz, the amount that he pays to Shimon. Or five hundred zuz, the amount of the original purchase. Two amoraim disagree over this and the ruling is that he can recover only 500 zuz. He should take this into account when he offers Shimon 1000 zuz.
  This is the exact same case as above. The only differences are that the amount is smaller and different rabbis issue the rulings.
  IntroductionMore halakhic cases.
  This story is clear—tricky creditor. The question is can he distrain the same property twice.
  Abaye divides the two payments into two categories—with the first payment the orphans were fulfilling the mitzvah of paying back their father’s debts. With the second, the creditor was legally seizing property that belonged to him. Thus the creditor’s actions are confirmed.
  The Talmud finds a work-around for the orphans. If they say to the creditor that the fifty zuz they are giving him are for the land, then they have successfully removed his right to the land.
  When the man sold his mother’s ketubah, he was basically selling his right to inherit his mother’s ketubah. But he told the purchaser that if his mother protested and thereby annulled the sale, the son would not compensate the purchaser. Buyer beware!The mother dies without objecting to the sale, but the son himself now objects.
  Rami b. Hama thinks that the son has the right to object, for he has inherited the ketubah from his mother when she died. While this is on a certain level absurd, it makes some technical sense. Since the ketubah is now his, he can object to his own sale!Rava disagrees—the son stated that he would not accept responsibility for his mother’s actions. But he cannot deny taking responsibility for his own actions.
  IntroductionThis section deals with some of the laws concerning distraining property—when a creditor seizes property from a third party in order to recover debt, and what happens when he does.
  Reuven sold the field to Shimon without guaranteeing that if a creditor seized the land to recover a debt from Reuven, Reuven would compensate Shimon. Shimon then sold the same land back to Reuven but did write such a guarantee. Reuven’s creditor then comes and seizes the land from him to pay back a debt. Since the last sale was from Shimon to Reuven, and Shimon guaranteed the sale, Rami b. Hama rules that Shimon must compensate Reuven for the loss of the land.
  
  Daf 92a
  
  Rava disagrees. Shimon accepted responsibility that he would pay back Reuven if someone made a claim against Shimon and based on that claim, distrained the property from Reuven. But Shimon did not mean to accept responsibility if someone wanted to claim a debt from Reuven himself! After all, Reuven should not benefit from the guarantee that Shimon gave him—it is merely a protection so that he does not lose out. Therefore, Shimon need not pay back Reuven.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s. There we learned that according to Rava, if Shimon sold land to Reuven with a guarantee (after having bought the land earlier without a guarantee) and a creditor seizes the land from Reuven to recover a debt that Reuven himself owed, Shimon need not compensate Reuven. Shimon guaranteed to compensate Reuven, but not if Reuven had to give over the land to pay for his own debt.
  In this case, the creditor was owed a debt from Jacob, from whom Reuven inherits, and not from Reuven himself. In such a case, Rava agrees that Shimon must compensate Reuven
  IntroductionThis section contains yet another ruling by Rami b. Hama that Rava reacts to. This time instead of disagreeing, he adds a suggestion.
  Reuven sells a field to Shimon with a guarantee that should one of Reuven’s creditors seize the field, Reuven would compensate Shimon. Shimon does not actually pay Reuven, but rather the amount he owns becomes a loan. Then Reuven dies. Then a creditor comes to seize the property to recover his debt. Shimon, rather than giving him the land, pays him money. But now Shimon does not want to pay back Reuven’s inheritors. After all, he paid for the land he owns when he paid the creditor. Nevertheless, Rami b. Hama says that he must either pay them back because their father left “coins” or “movables” with Shimon, and movable property is not subject to seizure from orphans. Note, had Shimon just let the creditor seize the land, he would not have had such a problem. He would have lost the land, but he never paid for it.
  Rava finds a solution to this problem. Shimon would give some land to the orphans to settle the amount that he owes them. But then he could just collect this land back again, because if orphans receive land, a creditor may come and collect it from them.We should note that Shimon does not end up “ahead” in this, neither do the inheritors really lose out. Shimon bought land and he has paid Reuven’s creditor for it. Reuven’s inheritors really should have to pay his debts—after all, these are loans that Reuven took. It was a glitch in the law that really let them off. Rava has fixed that glitch.
  IntroductionThis section contains another case ruling related to the seizure of fields.
  Reuven’s creditor may collect from either Shimon or Levi. He need not take from Shimon who was the first to buy all of Reuven’s fields. But as we shall see, this is true only in a very limited number of cases.
  The above is true only if Levi bought a piece of medium quality land. This is generally speaking the type of land that a creditor is supposed to seize when recovering debt. But if Levi buys either high or low quality land, he can tell the creditor to go seize the land from Shimon. He intentionally did not buy medium quality land from Shimon in case a creditor came to collect a debt.
  If there are several pieces of medium quality land, and Shimon sells one of them to Levi, Levi can tell the creditor to go take the other piece of medium quality land from Shimon and not from him.Basically, we can see here that according to the Talmud the only case in which the creditor can take from Levi is when Levi has the only piece of land that he should take. If Shimon still has the type of land that the creditor should take, then he must collect from Shimon, because Shimon was the first to buy Reuven’s property.
  
  Daf 92b
  
  IntroductionThe sugya continues with discussions of the laws of creditors seizing fields.
  Reuven’s creditor wants to seize the field from Shimon and does not want Reuven to simply pay back the debt in cash. But Reuven can force his creditor to accept compensation directly from him for he can point out that anything that the creditor takes from Shimon, Shimon will have a right to collect in return from Reuven.
  Some push the above law one step further and say that even if Reuven did not guarantee to compensate Shimon should the field be distrained, Reuven can still force the creditor to accept compensation from him. Reuven can simply say that he does not want Shimon to have any grievances with him.
  
  Daf 93a
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses a man who married three women at the same time, and gave one of them a ketubah worth one maneh (100 zuz), the second a ketubah worth 200 and the third a ketubah worth 300.  When he dies, and does not leave enough to cover all three, the question is how do they divide up his estate.I am explaining this mishnah according to Albeck’s explanation, who uses R. Saadiah Gaon’s explanation to the mishnah as his basis.  As we shall see, the Talmud offers a different, more complicated explanation.The general rule is that any maneh (100 zuz) that is “responsible” for all three ketubot, they divide equally.  In our case, 100 zuz is “responsible” for all three, because all three have at least one maneh of a ketubah. Any maneh that is not responsible for all of the ketuboth is divided according to the percentage that they deserve from the total amount of ketubah money the man owes.  In our case the total amount is 600 zuz; the first woman owns 1/6, the second 1/3 and the third 1/2.  This shall be illustrated as we proceed.
  If the estate was worth only one maneh, each woman has an equal right to this maneh.  This is because the maneh is “responsible” for all three ketubot.  Therefore they divide it equally.
  If the estate was worth 200, the first maneh is divided equally, as above.  The second maneh is not “responsible” for all three ketuboth, hence it is not divided equally but rather by percentages.  The first woman takes 1/6 of 100, leaving her with a total of 50 zuz.  There is now 150 zuz left, all of which is subject to the ketuboth of the second and third widows.  Therefore it is divided equally, both women taking 75 zuz.
  In this case all three divide according to their percentages.  The first woman takes 1/6 which is 50 zuz, the second woman takes 1/3 which is 100 zuz, and the third woman takes 150 zuz, which is 1/2.  In such a scenario, each woman takes one-half of her ketubah.  [Note that this division seems to work according to a different system from the previous two clauses.]
  If three or more people invest together, each investing a different percentage, when they divide up the profits or losses, they are divided in the same manner.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now begins to explain the mishnah. As I stated above, the Talmudic explanation differs from the one I used, which was based on Albeck, who took it from R. Saadyah Gaon.
  The Talmud refers to the case where there was two hundred zuz to pay off the ketubot and asks why the woman whose ketubah is for a maneh, should receive fifty zuz. If her entire claim was only on the first maneh, and all three women have equal rights to this maneh, then she should receive only 33 1/3.Shmuel offers a contextualization to solve the problem. The woman with the 200 zuz ketubah denounced her rights to the first maneh. Therefore, the other two women split it evenly.
  If the woman who has a 200 zuz ketubah renounced her claim on the first maneh, she leaves 50 for the woman with the 100 zuz ketubah. The woman with the third ketubah would also then take 50 from the first maneh. There are now 100 zuz left, to be split evenly between the woman with the 200 and the 300 ketubot. This should leave the woman with the 200 ketubah with only 50. So why does she receive 75?She can answer that she did not renounce any claim to the first maneh. She only renounced her claim vis a vis the woman with the 100 ketubah. She can still claim her portion of this maneh from the woman with the 300 ketubah. So the woman with the 100 ketubah gets her 50. But the other 150 must be split evenly between the other two women. Each woman gets 75 dinars.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to explain the division of the ketubot among these three women. A warning—gets more complicated.
  Shmuel explained in yesterday’s section that the woman who has a two hundred zuz ketubah renounced her argument over the first hundred zuz with the woman who has a ketubah of 100 zuz. The 100 woman took 50 zuz. The 200 woman now really has a case only over 150 zuz, because she has no claim on the third maneh, since her ketubah was only for 200. Therefore, she should receive 75, not 100.Shmuel rules that the last clause of the mishnah refers to a case where the woman who has a 300 zuz ketubah renounced her claim over the first maneh. The 200 and 100 women will divide this maneh evenly. Then the second maneh will be divided evenly by the 300 and 200 women, leaving the 200 woman with 100 zuz.
  Ravina gives an entirely different explanation of the mishnah, one that disagrees with Shmuel and with the explanation I gave in my interpretation of the mishnah (the simple reading).Ravina’s trick is to state that the property came into their hands on separate occasions and each time the women seized the property.In the first clause, where there were 200 zuz to be divided up, first 75 zuz became available and then 125 zuz. When the first 75 became available, they all had equal rights to it, so they all took 25. When the next 125 became available the 100 woman had a right to only 75 of that money, so she takes 25 (1/3 of 75) as do each of the other women. There are now 50 zuz left, split evenly between the two remaining women. In the end, they receive 75 each.
  In the final clause there are a total of 300 zuz available but they become available at different times. The first time 75 becomes available, so they all split evenly. The second time 225 become available. The 100 woman has a claim only on 75, so she gets her third, bringing her to 50. The 200 woman has a claim on only 175 of the remaining 225. The first 75 of this was divided evenly among all three, and the remaining 50 is divided evenly among the 200 and 300 woman. This brings the 200 woman to 100. The remaining fifty goes to the 300 woman, leaving her with 150. Clever system!
  Rabbi does not agree with the mishnah’s system of dividing the money. Rather they simply divide the money equally. Note that while this is simple, it is not really fair. If there are 300 dinars there, and each takes 100, one woman has received her entire ketubah, while another has received only a third.
  
  Daf 93b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the next clause from the mishnah, which refers to people who form a partnership and then need to divide the profits. Do they divide equally or according to their level of investment?
  Despite the fact that each partner put in a different amount, the profit is divided equally. Of course you anticipate that the Talmud will not pass this by without questioning it. This would seem to disagree with the mishnah which stated that they divide as do the women dividing different size ketubot.
  According to Rabbah, if the partners bought an ox for ploughing and used it for ploughing then each divides the profit equally. In such a case, if the ox cost 300, then the person with 200 could not have bought an ox without the 100. Therefore, they were each necessary contributions and they divide the profits equally. But if the ox was slaughtered, even if they bought it to be used in ploughing, they divide according to their investment, since we can divide the ox itself up into parts. One could buy 2/3 of an ox’s meat.
  Hamnuna says in all cases the profit is divided equally, even if the ox is slaughtered.
  The Talmud cites a baraita (one that looks like the mishnah but is not) that says that even if they invest different amounts, the profits are divided equally. If this refers to an ox used for slaughter, then it would reject Rabbah.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is the continuation of yesterday’s, which ended with a difficulty on Rabbah who said that if the ox was bought for slaughtering then the profits are divided equally.
  The Talmud resolves the baraita—the profits are split only if the animal was bought and used for ploughing.
  The Talmud cites a difficulty on the notion that the baraita refers only to a case where the ox was used for ploughing. The second half of the baraita makes a distinction with the first half. If the partners bought multiple animals, meaning each bought at least one oxen, and the animals were mixed up such that we do not know who bought which one, then when they divide the animals they each take according to their investment. If there was a distinction between oxen bought for ploughing and oxen bought for slaughter then why didn’t the baraita make this distinction, which is a more fundamental one?
  The Talmud emends the baraita so that it accords with Rabbah. If the ox was bought for ploughing and then used for slaughter it is like the case of multiple oxen that were bought by partners and then were mixed up. The idea is that the original purchase was not going to be “shared” but rather “divided.” In such a case, the profit is divided according to the investment. But when one ox is bought for ploughing, its works is shared—half an ox cannot plough. Therefore, the profits are divided equally.
  The mishnah seems to reject Shmuel who said earlier that partners share the profits no matter their investment. The mishnah says that they divide according to the amount they invested. R. Nahman resolves the difficulty by saying that the “profit” and “loss” in the mishnah does not refer to profit or loss from the transaction itself. Rather it refers to the increase in value of the coins, or decrease. If during trade they receive coins whose value goes up, this value is divided according to their investment level. The same is true if the value of the coins goes down—they suffer the loss according to their investment. But if they enjoy real profit through their business or real loss, they divide them equally.
  IntroductionIn a previous mishnah in this chapter we learned of a case where a husband married several women at the same time, each having a ketubah of a different size.  In the mishnah in today’s section we learn about the case of several women who were married to one man, but at different times.
   This section’s halakhah is basically the same as that which we learned in the beginning of the chapter.  It is brought here as an introduction to the rest of the mishnah.
  Each wife must take an oath to the subsequent wife that she did not already take her ketubah.  The subsequent wives are concerned lest there not remain enough money to collect their own ketuboth and hence they have a right to make the previous wives swear.  However, the fourth wife does not need to take an oath.  Of course, if there are inheritors she needs to take an oath in any case, as we learned in chapter eight.According to Ben Nannus, even the fourth wife must take an oath.  The Talmud explains that this oath would be significant if it turns out that one of the fields that one of the first wives collected for her ketubah did not really belong to the husband and therefore was taken away from the wife who had collected it.  In such a case the wife who had received that field would want to collect from the fourth wife but she can’t because the fourth wife is not obligated to give up property that she had already received.  However, the oath ensures the previous wife that at least the fourth wife did not collect illegitimately.
  If all ketuboth were issued on the same day, then the precedence can be determined by the hour written into the ketubah.  The mishnah teaches that this indeed was the custom in Jerusalem.  Today we don’t write hours into ketuboth.  Then again, men can no longer marry two wives!
  If all kethuboth were issued at the same hour and the estate is worth no more than a maneh, they divide it equally.If all of the ketuboth were issued during the same hour, then the halakhah is as it was in the previous mishnah.  If there is only one maneh, they all share it equally.
  
  Daf 94a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the reason underlying the dispute between Ben Nanas and the sages in the mishnah. To recall, the sages hold that the fourth wife need not take an oath when she collects her ketubah, because there are no other wives collecting after her. Ben Nanas says that just because she is the last wife to collect does not mean that she gets away without taking an oath. She too must swear an oath.
  Shmuel tries to find a broader legal principle about which Ben Nanas and the sages disagree. The case is one where one of the fields that one of the first three wives collected turns out not to have belonged to her husband. This wife will now have to return the field to its rightful owner, and then turn to the fourth wife who already collected her ketubah and try to get the field from her. The principle behind their debate is what happens when a later creditor jumps his turn in line and collects the debtor’s property. In this case, since the field that one of the first three wives took was not the husband’s it turns out that the fourth wife collected her ketubah debt from a field that should have gone to one of the first three wives. According to the first opinion, the fourth wife will have to give the field back to one of the first wives. Therefore, she does not need to take an oath when collecting her ketubah—the first wives’ could take the field from her if need be. They do not have any interest in whether her collection of the field was legitimate in the first place. According to Ben Nanas, the fourth wife would get to keep the field. Therefore, she needs to take an oath that she was indeed owed her ketubah. This way the earlier wives can at least be certain that she was indeed owed her ketubah.
  According to R. Nahman all tannaim hold that the fourth woman would have to give the field to one of the first women if it turns out that the field they collected for their ketubah was not the husband’s. The disagreement is over whether we are concerned lest the fourth woman lets the field deteriorate, thinking that one of the earlier women might come and take it away from her anyways. Ben Nanas is concerned that she would do so, and therefore says that she should take an oath. Taking the oath like the other women would impress on her the impression that she has a firm hold on the field (even if she does not). The other sages are not concerned about this.
  Abaye provides a third explanation of the dispute. The two tannaim disagree over something that Abaye the elder (a different sage) said. The Mishnah taught that when the widow comes to collect the ketubah from the orphans, she must take a vow. Abaye the elder says it does not matter whether the orphans are adults or minors.The first tanna does not agree with Abaye the elder and therefore holds that the woman would not need to take an oath if the inheritors are adults. Ben Nanas would hold like Abaye the Elder—women always have to take oaths when collecting their ketubot.
  Reuven and Shimon are partners or brothers and they have a court case against Levi. If either Reuven or Shimon go to court and lose their case, the other cannot say to Levi that they did not lose the case—only their partner lost his share in the case. Rather, we assume that the brother/partner who went to court was acting on behalf of the other brother/partner.
  Nahman was asked by the sages in Sura whether he agrees with R. Huna’s ruling. R. Nahman agrees with R. Huna and backs it up with our mishnah. In our mishnah the first wife takes an oath to the second wife, but the first wife does not take an oath to the third. But why not? After all the third wife also wants to ensure that the first wife’s collection of her ketubah was legitimate. The answer is that the second wife is assumed to be acting on behalf of the third wife in accepting the oath from the first wife. Thus we see that when a person has a court case with two people, one can be viewed as acting on the other’s behalf.
  The Talmud rejects R. Nahman’s comparison of the mishnah with the case of the partners/brothers. In the case of the mishnah, it does not really matter to whom the first wife takes an oath—her oath is the same in any case. But in the case of one brother/partner going to court, the partner who did not go to court could complain that had he been there he would have made a better claim. Therefore, he too has a right to sue for his half in court.
  The brother/partner who did not come to the court can make a claim only if he was out of town when his partner took the other litigant to court. If he was in town he should have come to court.
  IntroductionToday’s section relates to the issue of documents that were written on the same day. Can we determine which document takes priority?
  The case relates to two documents written on the same day—for instance someone wrote a sale document over the same property to two different people on the same day and did not write the hours in the document. Rav said that the two claimants should divide the property. Shmuel said that the judges have discretion to determine which document takes priority
  The Talmud now attempts to tie the dispute between Rav and Shmuel into a broad dispute between R. Meir and R. Elazar concerning the essential element of the get (or any document)—is it the signing of the get, or the delivery? Rav would hold like R. Meir— it is the signing that makes the document effective. Since the seller/giver told both to sign this document without writing a precise time of day, it means that he really meant to give the property to both of them at the same time. Shmuel would hold like R. Elazar—witnesses to the delivery of the get make it effective. Since we can assume that the seller gave one person his document before the other, we can assume that he meant to sell or give the property to the first person and not the second.
  
  Daf 94b
  
  The Talmud rejects the idea that Rav agrees with R. Meir that witnesses make the document effective. Rather, the two amoraim agree that it is the delivery that makes it effective. Here they simply disagree over what to do in a case where we are not sure to whom the gift or sale was really made. Rav prefers to divide the property and Shmuel prefers to let the judges evaluate each individual circumstance.
  The problem is that Rav thinks that the halakhah follows R. Elazar but only in the case of divorce documents. When it comes to other documents, the witnesses make the document effective.
  Thus the conclusion must be as was stated at the outset.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a continuation of yesterday’s discussion of what to do if two documents were issued on the same day.
  Shmuel had said that if both documents have the same date, the judges have discretion as to whom to give the property to. But the baraita says that the property is divided. This would seem to reject Shmuel.Shmuel answers that he holds like R. Elazar—the witnesses who see the transmission of the document make it effective. The date on which the document was written does not determine when it becomes effective. But the baraita holds like R. Meir—the document is effective when it is signed. Therefore, the date does determine its effectiveness and since we cannot tell to whom the property was given or sold by the date, it must be divided.
  According to the second clause of the baraita, if both documents were written on the same date, but one was delivered to the recipient and one was not, then the one that was delivered to him is effective. This obviously does not accord with R. Meir who said that the witnesses who sign the document make it effective.
  The Talmud concludes that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel actually echoes a tannaitic dispute. The Talmud quotes a baraita that refers to the following situation. A person tells an agent to bring money to a certain person. The agent goes to find the person and that person has died. At the same time, the sender also dies. The tannaim disagree with regard to what is to be done with the money. The sages say that the money should be divided between the inheritors of the sender and the inheritors of the recipient. But other sages “here” say that the agent should do what he sees fit. This is similar to Shmuel’s ruling that the court has discretion. While the situation in this baraita is not exactly the same, the principles are. According to Rav and the Sages, when it is not clear to whom property should go, it is divided. According to Shmuel and the second opinion in the baraita, judges have some discretion as to what to do in such situations.
  IntroductionThis section contains a legal story in which the principle of giving the judges the discretion to decide a case is invoked. We could call this story the dysfunctional Hama family saga.
  Since Rami b. Hama received the gift first, R. Sheshet awarded it to him. Note the gifts were given on the same day.
  Uh oh—the plot is growing thicker! Rabbis, families, everyone’s arguing over pour Mrs. Hama’s property.
  Nahman rejects R. Sheshet’s reasoning that Rami should get the property first because his deed was first. Only in Jerusalem do they write hours in deeds. Outside of Jerusalem, all deeds written on the same day have the same status.
  The problem is that both judges can claim that they acted on their own discretion.
  Nahman defeats R. Sheshet for two reasons. First of all, R. Nahman is a sanctioned “judge” authorized to adjudicate legal cases. R. Sheshet is a rabbi, but not a judge. Second, R. Sheshet in the beginning said that he gave Rami the property because his deed was first. This is faulty reasoning. He cannot later on say that he gave Rami the property because he simply thought that was the proper thing to do.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains another legal case concerning conflict between two documents.
  Joseph seems to reason as follows. We know that the document dates on the fifth of Nisan was valid from that day. We do not know when the other document went into effect. So therefore, the fully dated document takes precedence.
  The problem with the document without the date in it is that it might have been written at the end of month.
  Here is where the real problem comes in. The person whose document lacks a date now wants R. Joseph to write him a document allowing him to seize any property that was sold after the last day of Nisan. But those people who bought property after Nisan may claim that the other person’s document was from the beginning of Nisan, in which case he should take the property from the person whose document said the fifth of Nisan.
  
  Daf 95a
  
  The way to fix this situation is for the person whose document says the fifth of Nisan to write a document allowing the person whose document just says Nisan to collect in his name. This way he is either collecting on behalf of his friend, or on behalf of himself. In either case, his document would predate that of those who bought property after Nisan.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains the final mishnah in the tenth chapter. The mishnah discusses cases where multiple people have claims over a piece of property.
  In this case a man marries two women, but not simultaneously.  At this point all of his property has a lien on it from the two ketuboth.  Later he sells a field to a buyer, who gets the first wife to promise him that should her husband die, she will not collect that field as her ketubah.  Then the husband dies and cannot repay either ketubah.  The first wife cannot claim the field from the purchaser, because she relinquished that right.  However, the second wife can collect from the purchaser (she did not relinquish any rights) and then the first wife can collect from the second wife, because her ketubah takes precedence.  Then the buyer can take back the field from the first wife, because she relinquished her claim on that field, at which point the second wife can again claim from the purchaser.  This process will continue in circles until they come up with a compromise.The same is true with the case of a creditor, a borrower and two purchasers. A borrower has two fields and sells them to two different people, and the value of the each field is equal to the value of the debt.  Then the creditor writes to the second purchaser that he will not collect from that field. If the borrower defaults he may collect from the first purchaser, and the first purchaser may collect from the second purchaser, from whom the creditor may collect.  On and on this process would go until they reach a compromise.The same would be true for a woman creditor, which means a woman whose husband owes her her ketubah.  This is the same case as above.  The husband sells two fields to two different people and the wife writes to the second one that she would not collect from his field.  She may then collect from the first field, the first purchaser may collect from the second and the second from the wife.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah we learned yesterday, the wife can relinquish her rights to property by writing to the purchaser, “I have no claim whatsoever upon you.” Today’s section questions whether such language is sufficient to relinquish a claim on a field.
  The Talmud contrasts the mishnah with a baraita, a different tannaitic source, according to which a person cannot relinquish his rights to a field by making such a statement.
  The Talmud first tries to solve the problem by saying that our mishnah here deals with a case where they formalized the acquisition by performing an act called “kinyan.”  This is a way of legally binding the person engaging in the transaction. The problem is that even if they enact kinyan, the woman could still say that the only reason she agreed to make such a statement was that she wanted to please her husband. Her husband needed her permission to sell the property. Perhaps he wanted the cash. But later she can say that she did not really mean to give away her rights to collect the property if need be.
  Zera solves the difficulty by ascribing the baraita to R. Judah and the mishnah to R. Meir. This accords with a dispute found in yet another mishnah that deals with the following situation. The husband has two fields he wants to sell. When he tries to sell the first one, the wife refuses to agree to the sale. In other words, she refuses to release the field from being subject to her ketubah. The buyer wanted to buy the field without a lien. The husband then brings a buyer for the second field, and she agrees to this sale. Since she has shown that she is willing to refuse her husband, she cannot later on change her mind and say that she signed only to please her husband. If when he dies he has no assets, she will not be able to seize either field. She will not be able to seize the first field because the purchaser could say that he left the husband with enough assets, the second field, to cover her ketubah. She will not be able to claim the second field, because she signed away her rights to this field. This accords with our mishnah—she has the ability to sign away her rights to a field. R. Judah says that she still retains the right to say that she signed only to please her husband. This accords with the other mishnah.
  The problem with R. Zera’s solution is that it forces us to imagine that Rabbi [Judah Hanasi], the editor of the Mishnah, taught an anonymous opinion in one place in accordance with R. Meir and in another place in accordance with R. Judah. If we imagine that Rabbi teaches mishanayot anonymously in order to imply that he agrees with that opinion, then Rabbi has disagreed with himself.
  Papa says that our mishnah refers to a case where a divorced woman wrote the document allowing a husband to sell his property. There is no reason to assume that she has done so to please her husband because he is not her husband anymore. Therefore, she has the ability to sign away her rights.
  Ashi says that the baraita and the mishnah brought here can both accord with R. Meir. In the mishnah, R. Meir refers to a case where a woman did not agree to the sale with the first buyer. If she was only trying to please her husband and did not intend to sign away her rights to the second field, she should have said the same thing with regard to the first sale. But if there is only one buyer, and the woman signs on to the sale, she can later say that she signed on only to please her husband.As to our mishnah—it must refer to a case where there were two buyers. She did not agree to let the field be sold to the first buyer, but she did agree to let it be sold to the second buyer. Therefore, she cannot later claim that she did not mean to allow the husband to sell the field, and that she was trying to appease her husband. In other words, the case in our mishnah is the same as that in the baraita.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with a mishnah from Gittin.
  If a creditor comes to collect a debt, he must first collect free assets, not mortgaged property. This is true even if the mortgaged property is of greater quality, land which the creditor should have a principled right to collect.But the question must be asked—what if the free assets were ruined? The word “ruined” seems to refer to land that was washed away. Such land is not just “poorest quality.” It really is not worth anything. Must the creditor still be stuck collecting such property?
  The Talmud proves that if she cannot collect from the free assets—in this case, the field bought by the second buyer—she cannot collect from the mortgaged property—the field of the first buyer. Thus the answer seems to be that so too if the free assets are ruined, she cannot collect from mortgaged property.
  Nahman b. Yitzchak says that R. Meir did not really say that she loses her rights to recover the field from the first buyer. She only loses her rights from the second buyer. Thus, in general if the free assets are either ruined or cannot be collected, she (or any creditor) can collect from mortgaged property.
  IntroductionThis is a direct continuation of yesterday’s sugya. There, R. Nahman said that the woman who signed away her rights to the second field, can go back and collect the first field.
  There are two problems with R. Nahman’s interpretation of the baraita. First of all, when it says “she loses” it means that she loses her ketubah completely, and not just her right to collect from the second purchaser.Second, the first purchaser left the wife property from which to collect her ketubah—the second piece of land. She should never have the right to collect from him. This is derived from a baraita in which Reuven borrowed from Shimon. Reuven then sold his property, first to Levi and then to Judah. If Shimon tells Judah he will not collect his property, then Shimon cannot collect even from Levi, because Levi can say that when he bought the property, he left Reuven with land with which to pay off his debt. This returns us to our previous supposition—that just as the woman cannot collect from the first purchaser, so too all creditors cannot collect from mortgaged property if any sort of free property is available.
  The Talmud now draws what is the obvious difference between the two cases. In the case of the woman (or creditor) who writes away her (or his) rights to the second field, she has damaged her own rights. But in the case of the field that was destroyed, the creditor did not do anything.
  
  Daf 95b
  
  Yemar says courts regularly take away mortgaged property when free assets have been ruined. This is illustrated by a case where a man gave another a vineyard for ten years. The person taking possession of the land would eat the fruit of the vineyard for ten years as payment for the loan. The problem then could occur that the vineyard would grow old after five years, and the lender could not recover his debt. In other words, the “free assets” were ruined. The rabbis gave the creditor a “tirpa”—a document allowing him to seize the debtor’s mortgaged property.
  Again, the Talmud solves the problem by saying that the people who bought property from the debtor after he had pledged his vineyard should have known that they were at risk, for vineyards do grow old. The person who took the vineyard might be able to seize some of his other property. So this situation is not similar to the normal situation of free assets that are simply destroyed.
  This is the final answer. The creditor may collect from mortgaged property if the free property was ruined in some completely unexpected way.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with cases where a man gives money to a woman but directs who shall inherit it after her death.
  A man says to an unmarried woman—when I die, my estate will be yours, but after you die, the estate will go to a different person. The woman then marries someone (not the man who gave her the property). Her husband has the status of someone who “purchases” her property, and therefore, when she dies, the other person does not inherit it. In other words, the property was fully hers when she was alive, and she “sold” it to her husband, which she had a right to do. The other person cannot take such property away from him.
  Abaye’s statement agrees with Rabbi Shimon b. Gamaliel.
  How could Abaye rule like Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel? He believes that a person who advises another to sell the property to avoid it being inherited by the subsequent inheritor has acted wickedly! The resolution is that Abaye did not advise acting like R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. He ruled that if the woman is married, since the husband is a “purchaser” of the field, the subsequent inheritor will not receive the field, in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. This is a ruling, not advice.
  In this case, the woman first sells the estate to someone. Then she dies. The husband may seize the estate from the buyer, as is always his right because he inherits his wife’s property. The successor may then take the field from the husband (this shall be questioned below). The purchaser may not take the field back from the successor because he is a purchaser, whose power is greater than an inheritor. This is how the situation ends.
  The Talmud asks why in this case the purchaser ends up with the property and we do not force the three parties to come to a compromise as we do in the case found in the mishnah. The difference is that in the case of the mishnah, the parties were two wives and a creditor. Each of these parties suffers a loss if they do not get the property. In contrast, in this case the husband and successors were inheritors. They are not “owed” money. They just inherit it. Therefore, the purchaser’s rights are prioritized.
  Rafram notes that the two statements of Abaye disagree with one another. In the first statement, he said that the husband has the status of a purchaser. So why in the second statement does the successor have a right to take the field away from him?The answer is that in the first case she was single when he made the statement to her. When he named a successor he was not trying to avert the husband. But in the second statement, she was already married. So when he said that the estate will go the successor, his point was to avert the husband.
  The baraita here explains the last line of the mishnah. In this situation, the creditor writes to the second purchaser that he will not take the property from him. Should the debtor default, creditor may take the property from the first purchaser. The first purchaser may take the property from the second purchaser, the second purchaser from the creditor and so on until they come to a compromise.The same will also be true if the creditor is a woman coming to collect her ketubah and there are two buyers. Just exchange creditor for woman.
  Congrats on finishing another chapter of Ketubot. Ten down, three to go!
  IntroductionThis mishnah is the beginning of chapter eleven. It deals with a widow’s right to be maintained from her husband’s estate.
  In mishnah 4:12 we learned that one of the stipulations written into every woman’s ketubah is that if she becomes a widow she may continue to reside on her husband’s estate and be supported by the inheritance that he left for his children (be they her children or not).  This mishnah adds that since these heirs are supporting her, any handiwork that she produces belongs to them.  This is the same arrangement that would have existed while her husband was alive; she received guaranteed support and in return anything she made belonged to him.However, unlike her husband who was obligated to pay for her burial, the heirs who are supporting the widow are not obligated to do so. The difference is that these heirs will not (necessarily) inherit from her, whereas her husband did inherit from her.  Her heirs (either her father or her children from another marriage) are responsible for her burial.  The underlying reasoning behind this makes some sense; the person who will benefit financially from the estate of the deceased is responsible for the burial.
  There are two possible readings of the mishnah, each of which accords with a different custom as to what to write in the ketubah (Mishnah Ketubot 4:12). The men of Galilee would write in their ketubot that the widow could stay in her husband’s home as long as she wishes and be provided for by the orphans. Thus a “widow is maintained”—they have no choice in the matter. But the men of Judea would give the orphans the right to give her the ketubah payment and send her on the way. Therefore, our mishnah would read “a widow who is maintained.” Note that I Hebrew there is only one letter difference between these two readings.
  
  Daf 96a
  
  Shmuel says that a widow can keep what she finds. This makes sense only if the orphans are not maintaining her, implying that they are not obligated to maintain her. For if they are maintaining her, then just as a wife’s findings go to her husband, since he is maintaining her, so too a widow’s findings should go to the heirs who are maintaining her.
  The Talmud resolves that even if the orphans must maintain her, she could still keep her findings. The reason that the rabbis said that a wife’s findings go to her husband is to prevent him from resenting her. Imagine that I (a husband) am working hard to support my wife—literally toiling in the field. She finds a diamond. Should she keep the diamond and force me to continue to have to toil in the field would naturally cause me to resent her. And in marriage we want harmony between the two. But we do not care if the orphans resent the widow they are maintaining. They have to pay her maintenance out of the money they inherited, not out of their earnings. So there is no reason to legislate that she must give her findings to them.
  In Mishnah Ketubot 5:5 we learned that a wife must perform the following household work: grinding, baking, washing, cooking, nursing her child, preparing his bed, and working in wool. In addition, she must pour his drinks and help him wash. A widow must perform the more “work-like” aspects of this list, but not the labors that are considered to be signs of affection between the couple. She need not pour their drinks, make their bed or wash their hands or feet because we do not want that kind of relationship between her and the orphans. The relationship is that they provide for her basic needs—food, clothing and shelter. And she does the household work.
  Joshua b. Levi says that a student must serve his master in the same way that a slave does. However, the one piece of service the student may not perform is taking off his shoe, because this is lowly work, unbecoming of a student.Rava, however, says that this is true only when people do not know that he is a student and not a slave. Seeing him taking off someone else’s shoe would lead them to think that he is a slave. If everyone knows that he is a student, he may even remove his master’s shoe.
  Slaves do not wear tefillin because it is a positive time bound commandment and slaves are exempt from such commandments. So if the student is wearing tefillin, no one will mistake him for a slave.
  A teacher must allow his student to serve him, even if this might make the teacher feel somewhat uncomfortable. A student who serves his master is given the opportunity to perform an act of kindness. And serving his teaching inculcates in him a sense of the fear of God. Sometimes it is hard for a person to allow another to perform acts of kindness for him. But being willing to accept help can often be a great service to the performer as well.
  A teacher must allow his student to serve him, even if this might make the teacher feel somewhat uncomfortable. A student who serves his master is given the opportunity to perform an act of kindness. And serving his teaching inculcates in him a sense of the fear of God. Sometimes it is hard for a person to allow another to perform acts of kindness for him. But being willing to accept help can often be a great service to the performer as well.
  A widow is supposed to collect her provisions, food, clothing and shelter, only from real estate left behind by her husband. According to the law, she is not allowed to seize movable property, for this is not liable to pay for her provisions. Nevertheless, if she does seize movable property from her husband’s estate in order to provide provisions for herself, she is allowed to keep the property that she has seized.
  Ravina limits Rav Dimi’s rule to property the widow seizes for her maintenance. But if she seizes movable property for her ketubah the court would take it away from her and give it to the heirs.
  Mar bar R. Ashi objects to Ravina’s limitation of R. Dimi’s statement. The rules governing a widow who collects for her ketubah are the same as those governing those collecting for maintenance. In both cases the law dictates that they collect from real estate and not movable property. And in both cases, if she seizes movable property, the court does not take it away from her.
  Yitzchak b. Naphtali reports that others transmit a statement in the name of Rav that accords with Ravina and not with Mar bar R. Ashi. 
  IntroductionOur sugya continues to discuss a widow’s rights to collect provisions.
  If the widow does not claim maintenance from her husband’s estate for two or three years, she loses her rights to it. As often happens in life, if one does not claim one’s rights for a certain period of time, one loses the right to claim afterwards.
  Yohanan probably said “two or three” because that is the way that people talk. But the Talmud wants to read precision into the phrase “two or three.” Therefore it distinguishes different types of woman. A poor woman would need maintenance more immediately. Therefore, if she foregoes it for two years, she has lost her rights to claim it. But a rich woman could live longer without support, and therefore does not give up her right to do so unless she waits three years. Similarly, a bold woman who does not demand maintenance is more quickly assumed to have given up her rights than a modest, more timid woman.
  Rava offers a significant limitation of R. Yohanan’s rule. When she does not claim maintenance, she only loses her rights to claim that which she has already used or consumed. But she can continue to claim rights for maintenance in the future.
  IntroductionThis sugya continues to discuss the woman’s ability to collect her maintenance from the orphans.
  There is a rule in halakhah that the burden of proof is upon the person who wishes to take something that is in another’s possession.  But in this case the issue is not so clear—in whose possession is the money that the woman needs for maintenance: In the possession of the orphans or in that of the widow?
  
  Daf 96b
  
  The answer is that it depends on whether she has remarried. If she remains unmarried, the burden of proof is on them. If they pay her maintenance, they should make sure that they get a receipt. But once she is remarried, and she wishes to claim maintenance for the period in which she was not married, she must bring proof.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss the issue of the burden of proof in cases involving the widow’s maintenance—does she have to prove that she received it, or do they have to prove that they paid it?
  Shimi b. Ashi suggests that this issue is disputed by R. Judah and R. Yose. R. Judah says that when a widow sells her deceased husband’s property she must write out a document of sale what the purpose of the sale is. Are the proceeds going for maintenance or for her ketubah? This is because the orphans are believed to say that they gave her maintenance. If later, she comes and sues them for the parts of the estate that she says are still owed to her, they will say, “You sold that property for your ketubah.” And then when she says, “Okay, then give me my maintenance,” they will be believed to say that they already gave her provisions. Thus she should write that she is selling for maintenance, and then she would be able to collect for her ketubah. According to R. Yose, it does not matter what she writes because she will be believed later to say that she sold to collect her ketubah. If she wants, later she could also say that she sold earlier for maintenance. This would allow her to now distrain property from her deceased husband’s creditors.
  It may be that R. Judah is not saying that she must write this in the sale document, but that she should. He is giving her good advice. She will be able to claim money for provisions later without proving that the earlier sale was for her ketubah. But by writing that the first sale is for her ketubah, people who later see her asking for more provisions will not think she is being gluttonous.
  The Mishnah itself says that she must write in the sales document what she is selling for. If we read this as mandatory, we could have solved R. Yohanan’s question (from the beginning of the previous section) right off the bat. The fact that we did not implies that the Mishnah is only good advice. So too R. Judah’s statement is only good advice.
  Alternatively, R. Yose may say that the property is in the presumption of belonging to the orphans. Nevertheless, R. Yose says that she is better off not specifying what she is selling for, since this will increase her ability later to distrain property that her husband sold after the marriage. If she writes that she is selling for her ketubah, she will not be able to collect later for maintenance from mortgaged property. But if she writes without specifying, later she can say that she collected earlier for her provisions, and that she is now collecting for her ketubah. This is like the case of a dying man who gives a present to his creditor. The creditor may accept this as payment for his debt which would allow him to collect the money from third parties (i.e. mortgaged property).
  
  Daf 97a
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses how a widow would sell her husband’s property in order to buy food for maintenance.
  Once or twice a year the widow can sell of a piece of her husband’s estate. The person purchasing it will then provide her with money for provisions once a month. This way she does not have responsibility to make sure the money is safe throughout the entire year. Furthermore, selling more often than that might result in lower revenue because the estate would have to be broken into two small pieces.
  These baraitot reflect the disagreement between R. Huna and R. Judah.
  Amemar, a late amora, rules in accordance with R. Huna.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues the discussion of a widow who sells her deceased husband’s property in order to maintain herself. 
  R. Sheshet is asked an interesting question. A widow sells her husband’s estate in order to provide herself with maintenance. Then, at some point, she wants to collect her ketubah money. Can she go and collect the property that she sold so for her own provisions? After all, this property was subject to the lien of her ketubah before it was sold to provide her with maintenance.
  The Talmud explains the basis of the question. When a widow (or the court on her behalf) sells property to pay for her provisions, the orphans bear the responsibility if that land is seized by a third party. So let’s say Reuven buys the land to pay for her provisions. And then Shimon, to whom the husband owed money from a debt incurred before he died, comes and seizes the land. The orphans now have to pay back Reuven. The question asked to R. Sheshet was what if instead of Shimon seizing the land, the woman herself wants to seize the land in order to collect her ketubah. Do the orphans still have to pay back Reuven? If they do not, then the woman could not seize this land. 
  R. Sheshet replies by saying that we can learn the answer to this question from the mishnah. The mishnah says that she can sell the husband’s property as long enough remains to collect her ketubah. Thus she cannot seize the property she has sold in order to collect her ketubah. There must be enough property left in the estate to collect the ketubah. 
  The Talmud attempts to suggest that it was only good advice that she should leave enough property to collect her ketubah. Good advice so that she won’t look like she is collecting twice. But she does have a legal right to seize property that she herself has sold for her own maintenance.The Talmud rejects this by reading the words “this is a support for her” with great precision. She will have the support of a ketubah only if she leaves property from which to collect. If she sells all of the property for her own maintenance, she will not be able to have the support of collecting her own ketubah. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya asks a question about revoking a sale. If a person sold an item or a piece of land because he needed the cash, and then it turns out he does not need the cash, can he revoke the sale.Today we would not consider allowing a person to revoke a sale under such circumstances. For one thing, revoking sales can wreak havoc on the flow of the economy. Second, for the most part people sell real estate for a profit or because they want to move. And if it turns out they don’t need the money, they can usually purchase a different piece of real estate for a similar value. But in the Talmud real estate seems to have been worth more than its value, and thus people would only reluctantly part with it. 
  The fact that R. Papa allowed the seller to revoke the sale of his land is not proof that this is the law for R. Papa may have gone beyond the strict letter of the law. 
  R. Nahman said that since the people sold their homes (mansions!) because they thought wheat was not going to arrive, when the wheat arrives and it turns out that they did not need to sell their homes, they can buy their homes back for the same price. This would seem to prove that sales may be revoked if the person does not need the cash. The Talmud rejects this is proof. Those who sold their mansions did not know that the wheat was already in the harbor. This was not a mistake about the future—what would happen. It is a mistake about what already happened. 
  The discourse between R. Nahman and Rami b. Shmuel proves that R. Nahman did not intend to rule that all sales may be revoked. He allowed only sales in Nehardea that were mistakenly due to famine to be revoked. Rami b. Shmuel argues that allowing such sales will cause problems in the future—people will be reluctant to buy. But both seem to agree that not all sales can be revoked—only those based on mistaken interpretation of events that have already occurred. 
  Nevertheless, the law is that if one sells land and then later it turns out that he does not need the money, the sale may be revoked. 
  IntroductionAs we have stated, a widow is entitled to receive maintenance from her husband’s estate. The mishnah in today’s section discusses when a widow is allowed to sell her husband’s property in order to obtain money with which to support herself or in order to collect her ketubah.
  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, a widow may sell her deceased husband’s property whether she was widowed after she had been fully married, in which case she sells the property in order to pay for her maintenance or collect her ketubah, or whether she was widowed after betrothal but before marriage, in which case she sells solely to collect her ketubah. In either case she may sell this property without the sanction of the court. 
  Rabbi Shimon makes a distinction between a widow who had been married and one who had only been betrothed. The former may sell without the court’s permission, for she cannot wait each time to receive the court’s permission to sell in order to collect her maintenance. However, since the betrothed woman does not receive maintenance payments from her husband, she may not sell her husband’s property without permission from the court. Only those who are selling in order to receive money for maintenance can sell without a court. For a widow to have to wait for the court’s permission every time she wishes to sell something in order to buy food or clothing would indeed be too troublesome. Therefore the widow who is collecting maintenance, i.e. one who was already married, does not need the court’s permission. In contrast, collecting the ketubah is a one-time occurrence and it is not such great trouble for the widow to come to the court once to sell property from which to collect  her ketubah. 
  
  Daf 97b
  
  IntroductionThis sugya begins to explain the mishnah. 
  A woman who is widowed after marriage will immediately need provisions from her husband’s estate. There is no one else who is obligated to provide for her. Thus she cannot wait for the court to approve of her selling her deceased husband’s estate. But if she is widowed after betrothal, her father can provide for her. So why should she sell without the court’s approval?Ulla says that permission to do so was granted her to make marriage more attractive. This seems to mean that this is a type of leniency on her to avoid difficult situations. R. Yohanan says that men don’t want their wives to have to go to court to ask permission to sell property in order to be sustained. It is not dignified for women to have to go to court. 
  The practical difference between Ulla and R. Yohanan is a divorced woman who must sell her husband’s property for her ketubah. Ulla would say that since women were granted this privilege to make marriage more attractive, she still may sell without going to the court. But R. Yohanan would say that a man does not care if his divorced wife must suffer the indignity of going to court. 
  Later on the mishnah states explicitly that a divorced woman would need to go to court before selling her deceased husband’s estate. According to what we just said, this accords with R. Yohanan but not Ulla. 
  The Talmud solves the problem by ascribing this clause to R. Shimon and not the sages. The sages would hold that even a divorced woman can sell without the court, and this would accord with Ulla.The problem is that R. Shimon already stated that anyone selling the property only for the ketubah and not for provisions must first go to the court. Since a divorced woman does not receive provisions, obviously R. Shimon would hold that she must go to the court. So why repeat it later in the Mishnah. We already know this!
  The Talmud again tries to assert that we would already know that R. Shimon forces a divorced woman to go to court to collect her maintenance. This is hinted at by the second half of his statement in the Mishnah, “anyone who is not entitled to maintenance may not sell  except with the permission of the court.”The Talmud resolves this by saying that this clause refers to a woman who is doubtfully divorced—meaning the status of her divorce is uncertain. Her husband is obligated to provide for her, and therefore she may sell her husband’s estate for provisions without first going to the court.
  If the wife dies, her heirs may sell the deceased husband’s property to collect her ketubah, and they need not go to the court to do so. This works for R. Yohanan who said that a husband does not want his wife to have to go to court—he would also not want his wife’s heirs to have to go to court. But why should his wife’s heirs need to have marriage made more attractive. These heirs are likely her sons, and the idea was to make marriage more attractive for women. 
  Ulla resolves this difficulty by saying that the case is where the woman’s female relatives inherit her. The notion of making marriage more attractive would apply to them. The idea is that if they see that they have to go to court to sell their mother or sister’s property to collect her ketubah, they will lose a certain amount of motivation to get married. Admittedly, this is a bit strained, but such is the nature of Talmudic resolutions. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with the continuation of the mishnah. 
  This opinion is a continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion from the previous mishnah.
  Rabbi Shimon holds that if in some way a woman has used up part of her ketubah, either by selling or giving it or part of it away, or by using it as collateral for a loan, she may not sell her husband’s property in order to collect the remainder without the permission of a court. This is because Rabbi Shimon holds that a woman who has already sold, given away or pledged even part of her ketubah, no longer receives maintenance from her husband’s estate and anyone who does not receive maintenance from her husband’s estate cannot sell except with the permission of a court.
  The Sages hold that a woman can sell her husband’s property even in stages and that this does not cause her to lose her right to collect maintenance. If after she has sold part of the estate to collect her ketubah, she wants to sell part of the estate to provide maintenance for herself, she should write in the document that she sold this to collect maintenance. Then the proceeds of such a sale will not count as part of her ketubah. Note that this gives her a great deal of leeway; she can sell most of the ketubah and still receive maintenance money
  Although according to the Sages a widow may always sell her husband’s property in order to collect her ketubah, and she never needs the permission of a court, the divorcee always needs the permission of a court. The reason why a widow does not have to appear before the court is that we assume that the husband would not have wanted his widow to have to do so, for it  is somewhat embarrassing to have to go to court to get money to pay for basic needs. However, a man who divorces his wife does not care if she is embarrassed to go to court. Therefore, if she wishes to collect her ketubah, she needs the court’s permission. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with the continuation of the mishnah. 
  This opinion is a continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion from the previous mishnah. Rabbi Shimon holds that if in some way a woman has used up part of her ketubah, either by selling or giving it or part of it away, or by using it as collateral for a loan, she may not sell her husband’s property in order to collect the remainder without the permission of a court. This is because Rabbi Shimon holds that a woman who has already sold, given away or pledged even part of her ketubah, no longer receives maintenance from her husband’s estate and anyone who does not receive maintenance from her husband’s estate cannot sell except with the permission of a court.
  The Sages hold that a woman can sell her husband’s property even in stages and that this does not cause her to lose her right to collect maintenance. If after she has sold part of the estate to collect her ketubah, she wants to sell part of the estate to provide maintenance for herself, she should write in the document that she sold this to collect maintenance. Then the proceeds of such a sale will not count as part of her ketubah. Note that this gives her a great deal of leeway; she can sell most of the ketubah and still receive maintenance money. 
  Although according to the Sages a widow may always sell her husband’s property in order to collect her ketubah, and she never needs the permission of a court, the divorcee always needs the permission of a court. The reason why a widow does not have to appear before the court is that we assume that the husband would not have wanted his widow to have to do so, for it  is somewhat embarrassing to have to go to court to get money to pay for basic needs. However, a man who divorces his wife does not care if she is embarrassed to go to court. Therefore, if she wishes to collect her ketubah, she needs the court’s permission. 
  As I stated above, since she loses her right to be provided for when she sells even part of her ketubah, she also loses the right to sell off her husband’s property without his permission.
  Rabbi Shimon says that since she has lost her claim to part of her ketubah, it is as if she has lost her claim to the entire ketubah, and therefore she loses her rights to provisions. Part of the amount is equivalent to all of the amount. In contrast, the other rabbis (assumed to be the voice of Rabbi Meir) say that though she lost her claim to part of the ketubah, this is not the same as losing the claim to all of the ketubah. Part of the amount is not equivalent to all of the amount. 
  The issue here is whether a high priest can marry a girl who has reached the age of 12 ½. The rabbis believed that when a girl reaches this age she is no longer fully a virgin. Since a high priest must marry a virgin, Rabbi Meir holds that he may not marry such a girl. Loss of part of her virginity is equivalent to loss of all of her virginity. Rabbi Shimon holds that loss of  part of her virginity is not the same as the loss of all of her virginity. Thus the positions are reversed. 
  The answer is that when it comes to the issue of the high priest marrying the rabbis are arguing about midrash, not principles. I’m not going to interpret each of the midrashic techniques here. Not really relevant for this sugya. But it is worth pointing out that there is a difference between midrash and logical principles. Midrash does not need to be logical. At times it is anti-logical, working on how one applies hermeneutical techniques to the verses. There is no need for it to follow one’s general legal principles. Thus R. Meir and R. Shimon can have one opinion when it comes to the ketubah and a different when it comes to defining a virgin.
  
  Daf 98a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a story of a widow who seized property to collect her ketubah.
  The widow here seized a silver cup as part of her collection of her ketubah. According to R. Shimon, since she has received part of her ketubah, it is as if she has received all of her ketubah and she no longer has a right to maintenance. But Rava does not rule in accordance with R. Shimon.
  Rabbah son of Rava asks whether a widow who sells her husband’s property without the court needs to later take an oath that she did not collect more than she really deserved.
  Joseph says that Rabbah should have asked whether a public announcement needs to be made when a widow sells her deceased husband’s estate. This is a public notice that the person’s property is going to be sold. It is a means by which the value of the property can be assessed. Rabbah answers that by analyzing a statement made by R. Nahman, he can learn that even without a public announcement her sale is valid. R. Nahman had said that if the widow herself assesses the property the sale is invalid. But this can only be if there was no public announcement, since if there was an announcement, no assessment needs to be made anyways. Thus we can conclude that if someone else assesses the property, no announcement will need to be made.
  The Talmud rejects Rabbah’s answer that proof can be brought from R. Nahman’s halakhah. It could be that even if a public announcement was made, she still cannot assess the value of the property on her own because no one authorized her to make the assessment. This is bolstered by a story of a person who was holding on to some coral that belonged to orphans. He assessed its value at 400 and then bought the coral for himself. But when the price went up, R. Ammi said he was not authorized to assess the value of the coral for himself.
  In the end, the question about the oath was never really answered. The Talmud rules that she does take an oath to ensure that she does not collect more than she was owed. But there need not be a public announcement before the deceased husband’s property is sold.
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with a widow who when selling her field either overestimates or underestimates the value of the field. The questions are, 1) is she deemed to have received her ketubah; 2) is the sale valid.
  There are two cases mentioned in this section. In both the widow is selling her husband’s land in order to collect her ketubah, which is worth 200 denar. In the first case she sells a field that was worth 100 zuz (a maneh) for 200 denar. Although her husband’s estate only lost land worth 100 zuz, since she received 200 denar, she has received her ketubah and does not receive anymore. In the second case, she sells land worth 200 zuz for 100 zuz. Since her husband’s estate sold off a field worth 200 zuz, it has paid off her ketubah, even though she only received 100. In other words, the husband’s estate always gets the benefit of the doubt.
  If she sells land worth more than her ketubah, the sale is invalid. This land is not hers and she only had permission to sell up to the value of her ketubah. Even if she says that she will pay back the extra denar to her husband’s inheritors, she is not allowed to do, if the inheritors want back their land.Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that the sale is only nullified if the extra amount sold would have left the inheritors with a field in which nine kav of seed can be planted, about 3750 square amot (a little over 60 x 60 amot). If it was a garden of vegetables, the size is smaller, about 208 square amot or 104 square amot according to Rabbi Akiba. If the size of the extra land sold is smaller than this, the sale is valid.
  If her ketubah was 400 zuz, and she sold fields worth 100 to three different people and to the last person she sold a field worth 101, only the last sale is invalid. Each sale is considered on its own merits, and it was only the last sale which went over the limit.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya explains the first clause of the mishnah. 
  The Talmud asks why the woman loses out in both cases in the mishnah—if she sells a field for more than it is worth, she has received that which it is worth. If she sells for less than it is worth, she is considered as if she collected that which it was worth and not the actual proceeds. This seems inconsistent—either she takes blame and gets credit or she does not receive either? 
  
  
  Daf 98b
  
  R. Nahman affirms that since the woman is acting as an agent in selling her husband’s property, she takes the risk but does not receive the profit. This is where Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] expressed his opinion concerning this issue. Rabbi’s opinion in this mishnah in Ketubot is similar to R. Yose’s opinion with regard to the purchase of something that has an indeterminate value. According to R. Judah, the profit always belongs to the agent. R. Yose’s opinion is that if the item has a fixed value, then when the seller gives him something extra, the extra something is considered like a gift. Since we do not know to whom he intended to give the gift, they divide the profits. But if there is no set value for the item being sold, then we cannot really tell what the extra is, and therefore the profit goes to the sender. So too in this case, it is hard to tell how much the field was “really” worth and therefore, profit goes to the husband (or his estate). 
  R. Papa rules in accordance with the resolution that Rami b. Hama gives above concerning the two different opinions of R. Yose. The Talmud asks why we even need such a resolution—after all, we already know this. The answer is that it simply confirms that which we already know.
  IntroductionIn this section a halakhic question is asked concerning sales.
  Reuven tells Shimon that he wants to buy a letekh, which is half of a kor, of a certain item. But instead of selling him the letekh, Shimon sells him a kor. Is the sale invalid or has at least a letekh been sold?
  R. Ya’akov finds the answer to the question by comparing it with a baraita dealing with the issue of “trespass” which means illicit use of holy property. The case is as follows: Reuven tells Shimon to give the guests meat that turns out to be holy. Use of holy property is considered “trespass” and one who does so must restore the value to the Temple and pay an extra amount. Reuven tells the agent to give one piece, Shimon gives two, and the guests take three. They have all trespassed. Reuven intended to give one, so when Shimon gives the first piece, Reuven is held responsible. The second piece was Shimon’s fault, and the third piece is the guests’ fault. This proves that the agent has fulfilled the sender’s agency and in the question asked above, the letekh was sold. 
  The Talmud rejects this case as proof. In this case, the agent explicitly said that one piece of meat was coming from the householder. Therefore, the householder has trespassed by giving out that piece of meat, and the agent himself transgresses when he gives out the second piece of meat. But if the agent had simply given the wrong amount, then only he would trespass, not the owner.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to try to answer the question that began yesterday’s section—if the agent sold more than he was told to sell is the sale valid?
  In the case in the mishnah, the woman is like the agent and the heirs are like the sender. They send her to sell a hundred zuz worth of land, and she sells 101 zuz worth of land, and actually receives 101 zuz. Even if she promises to give back the extra denar to the heirs, the sale is invalid. This would seem to prove that if the agent does not follow the sender’s precise instructions, the sale is invalid.
  R. Huna says that this is not a case where she sells more land than she was supposed to. Rather, she sold the 101 denars worth of land but only received 100 in return. This is not a case where she simply sold too much. The problem is that she sold for the wrong price and that is why the sale is annulled.
  
  Daf 99a
  
  IntroductionThe sugya about the agent who sells more than he is supposed to continues. 
  The last clause of the mishnah deals with a case where she sold for less than the value. To prevent the mishnah from being repetitive, the assumption should be that the first clause is where she sold more than she was supposed to.
  Both clauses refer to a case where she sold for too low a price and not where she sold too much property. But the second clause does teach us something new—that if a person sells their own property for too low a price, the sale is valid. Her sale was invalid in the mishnah because she was selling someone else’s property.
  The problem is that we already learned that principle in the first clause. There, the woman sold her own ketubah for less than it was worth and the sale is deemed valid.The Talmud now resolves how both sections can be about a case where she sold the land for less than it is worth without being repetitive. The first clause refers to a case where she sells all of the property at once. But in the final clause she sells the property in pieces. We might have thought that the sale of the first piece is invalid because the sale of the last piece is invalid. We need this clause to teach us that it is not. To clarify we have not yet answered the original question. All we have done is rejected proof from these sources.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss the case of a person who sends an agent to do one thing, and the agent does another.
  The Talmud now adjusts the question. If the person sold more than he was told to sell, clearly the sale for the part that he was supposed to sell is valid. But what if he sold less than he was supposed to sell? Is the sale for that part valid? 
  There are two possible ways of imagining the reaction to a case where the agent sells too little. First of all, the agent could say to the owner that he has done him a favor. For if the owner sells too much and then decides he did not want to sell so much goods, he would not be able to retract his sale. Alternatively, the owner could say that he does not want to sell his goods in halves. He does not want so many sale documents to be accredited to his name.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya addresses the question asked in yesterday’s sugya—if the agent sells less than he was supposed to sell, is the sale valid.
  In this case the sender gave him a denar, which is worth six sela’im and he told him to buy him a shirt. The agent found him a shirt for three sela’im and bought a cloak for the other three sela’im. If we say that the agent has fulfilled his mission and just added on to it, then both have “trespassed” (if the denar turns out to be holy). But if we say that the agent has transgressed his instructions, then why should we say that the sender has trespassed.
  The Talmud rejects this and says that agent actually fulfilled his duty because he got a good deal on the shirt. The shirt was worth six and he bought it for three. Therefore, he has fulfilled the agency he was sent to perform and the sender has trespassed. But why then is the agent also guilty of trespass? Because he also bought the cloak.
  The problem with this interpretation is that it makes R. Judah’s words difficult to interpret. R. Judah says that the owner is not guilty of trespass because the agent did not fulfill his words. But if the agent bought a six sela shirt for three selas, why would the owner complain? This is not a “bad” shirt.
  “Bad” does not mean that the shirt was of poor quality. It means that the owner can complain that he should have bought a bigger shirt that was worth more. This interpretation is also borne out by a precise reading in the baraita. R. Judah agrees that if the owner sent him to buy a certain amount of pulse and he bought less, that both of them have committed trespass. Pulse is sold for the same rate no matter how much is bought so when he buys less he is not transgressing the directive of the sender. But if the item is not of this nature, then the owner can complain that the agent did not buy a greater amount.The Talmud considers this to be a conclusive argument, but now it explains what this case of pulse actually was.To note—the conclusion here is that we have not yet answered the question concerning the case of an agent who buys a lesser quantity. The case of the shirt was not one in which he bought less than he was supposed to. He bought “six sela’im” of shirt, but just paid only three for them. There is still another source we will learn tomorrow that will go back to determining the halakhah in the situation where he buys less. 
  
  
  Daf 99b
  
  In a place where pulse is sold by estimate, were he to buy a bigger quantity, he would have gotten a greater discount. Therefore, when he bought a lesser amount, the agent has harmed the sender. Therefore, the baraita must refer to a place where they sell strictly by measure, and the quantity does not matter.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to try to determine whether an agent who sold part of what he was sent to sold has effectively sold that part.
  This proof is brought from the mishnah. At the outset the woman was supposed to sell property worth four hundred zuz so that she could collect her ketubah. But she sold first 100 zuz of land to this one, and so forth. The fact that those sales are valid seems to imply that an agent who sells less than he was sent to sell has made a valid sale.
  The Talmud rejects this as proof. The mishnah refers to a case where the husband’s estate consisted of small plots of land. Thus she did not have any choice but to sell them 100 zuz at a time. But this does not provide any answer as to what the rule would be if she sold ¼ of a large plot of land. 
  IntroductionThis sugya continues to discuss cases where the agent does not fulfill the precise instructions of the sender. Is the sale valid?
  If the sender told him to sell the land to one person and not to sell to two, and the agent sold to two, the sale is invalid, because he was specifically told not to sell to two. This is obvious.
  If the sender did not specify that he wanted the property sold to one person and not to two, and the agent goes ahead and sells to two, what is the rule? R. Huna says that when he said “To one,” he meant “and not to two.” But R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna say that unless he specifically stated “and not to two” the sale is valid. “To one” does not mean “not to two.”
  R. Nachman pops in to Sura and the sages ask him the question from above. He confirms for them that he shares their opinion.
  The two amoraim continue to ask R. Nachman. What if the agent made an error? Meaning he not only sold it to the wrong number of people, but he also sold it for too low an amount. He answers that if the agent made an error, the sale is invalid. R. Nahman holds that there is no rule of “over/undercharging” when it comes to land. The rule of “over/undercharging” means that if the property is sold or bought for too high or low of an amount, the sale is invalid. So if this rule does not apply to land, then why should the agent’s sale be invalid? The answer is that the rule of overcharging does not apply when the owner sold the land himself. In such a case, the fact that he sold the land means that he cannot go back later and complain that the price was too low. But if he told an agent to sell for one price, and the agent sold for a lower price, he can invalidate the sale. 
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s sugya we learned that if the agent sells the land for too low a price, the owner can invalidate the sale. This is despite the fact that if the owner himself sells it for too low a price, the sale cannot be invalidated. Today’s section inquires into the difference between the two situations.
  According to this mishnah (Terumot 4:4), the agent should give 1/50th of the produce as terumah (unless he knows how much the owner wanted him to give). But if he gives 1/60th or 1/40th, the terumah is valid. If he gives more than that or less, the terumah is not valid. Thus an agent has some margin of error, but not a large one.
  In contrast, the owner’s margin of error is much higher. Even if he gives 1/20th as terumah, his terumah is valid. This is the basis of the distinction between the owner making an error and the agent.
  This is another source brought to prove that when an agent was supposed to sell to one, but sold to many, the sale is still valid. This is our mishnah from above—the sales to the first three were all valid.R. Shisha son of R. Idi rejects this source as support, because the source refers to a case where she had no choice but to sell small plots, for that is what the husband’s estate consisted of. We cannot use this mishnah to prove what the rule would be if she broke up a large plot to sell in pieces. 
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with a case where a court erred in the evaluation of property while selling it to pay for the widow’s ketubah or for her maintenance.
  If the assessment was either one sixth less or one sixth more than the real value of the property, the sale sanctioned by the court is nullified. This is similar to the rule of fraud fund in Mishnah Bava Metzia 4:3.In contrast, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel rules that there is no rule of “fraud” when a court sells. Unlike individuals who sell, their sale may be invalidated if they over or under priced the object by more than one sixth. This idea of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is an idea that he brings up in several places. Basically, the respect for the court is a more important value than the fact that the court actually sold the field for the wrong price.
  If the court made out what is called a “bill for inspection” then even if they over or under sold by more than one sixth, the sale is valid, even according to the opinion in section one. A bill of inspection is a document that announces that a court will be selling a certain piece of land to pay off a debt. This will allow others to come and inspect the land and if the land is still under or oversold, the court at least has gone through the proper process.
  
  Daf 100a
  
  Introduction[Congrats on making it to page 100! Since we started at page 2, it’s not really the 100th page, but I’ll let it slip. Give yourself a pat on the back]. The mishnah we learned last week said that if a court erred in selling property the sale is valid as long as the error was less than a sixth. In contrast, we learned earlier, that if the widow erred in selling the property, no matter how small the error, the sale is invalid. Today’s section asks about a regular agent—is he like the court or like the widow?
  In some ways the agent is similar to a court—both are third parties, selling property on behalf of another person. Thus, the agent should be allowed a margin of error, as is the court. But in other ways, the agent is like the widow—both are singular individuals, who might not be granted a margin of error. The law is decided that when an agent sells, he is not allowed a margin of error, like a widow.
  In this mishnah which we learned last week, even if the agent errs in the amount of terumah he gives, his terumah is valid. So why did we say above that if the agent errs, his sale is invalid?
  The difference is that in the case of terumah, there is leeway as to how much terumah a person may give. The average is 1/50 but a person can give more or less. So the agent might have simply made a mistake as far as the nature of the person who sent him to give terumah on his behalf. This is not an “absolute” mistake. But selling something for the wrong value is considered an error, and therefore the owner can force a retraction of the sale.
  IntroductionTo aid in reference, I will replicate here the mishnah that this sugya is based on: If an assessment of the judges was one sixth less, or one sixth more [than the actual value of the property] their sale is void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: their sale is valid for, otherwise, of what advantage is the power of a court?
  The halakhah is in accordance with the sages—if the court erred by a sixth or more, their sale is void.
  R. Nahman in this case does invoke the principle of “what advantage would the power of a court be.” When the orphans become of majority age, they may not protest, for otherwise what is the power of the court. This contradicts his view in the case in our mishnah.
  The Talmud resolves the problem by saying that if there was a mistake, the court’s sale is invalid. If there was no mistake, the orphans cannot protest.But, the Talmud asks the obvious question—if there is no mistake what could they possibly have protested such that R. Nachman states that they may not. The answer is that they could have protested that the field they received is not located where they want it to be. Meaning it is not adjacent to their other fields. R. Nahman rules that they may not protest. But if the guardian did not receive the correct amount of land on their behalf, he would agree that they may protest.
  In this story, Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] initially rules like the sages. But then he changes his mind and rules in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel.
  In this version of the story, Rabbi is about to act in accordance with the ruling of the sages, but then is corrected before he acts.
  At first, the Talmud supposes that there is a principled difference between the two versions of the story. The first story holds that if a sage errs in a decision and the principle on which he erred is found in a mishnah, his ruling should be reversed. Rabbi ruled in accordance with the sages, but when he learned that R. Perata (and his whole family) holds like Rabban Shimon b.  Gamaliel, he reversed his ruling. In the second version of the story, Rabbi reverses his ruling before he issues it. Had he already issued his ruling, he would not have been able to reverse it.In the end though, the Talmud concludes that there is no principled disagreement between these two versions. They disagree only over how the events actually unfolded. 
  If a widow or a court sells the deceased husband’s property in order to collect either her ketubah or money for provisions and then it turns out that there was a prior lien on the property and a third party seizes it from the purchaser, the purchaser can sue the orphans, the husband’s inheritors to get their money back.
  The Talmud complains that this law is obvious. Since the estate owed her this money, the responsibility for the sale lies on the estate. But this is not as obvious when it comes to the court. I might have thought that whenever a court sells property, the court first makes a public announcement and that therefore anyone who wished to protest the sale because they had a prior lien would have already come. We might have thought therefore that the purchaser would have forgone his right to collect should the property be seized from him. Therefore, this source informs us that he does have a right to collect from the orphans. 
  
  
  Daf 100b
  
  IntroductionIn the mishnah, Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says that if the judges err in their assessment of the value of the property, their estimate is still valid. This sugya opens by asking if there is no limit to such an error.
  The upper limit is one half of the value. Actually, when they underestimate the value of the property it is 100 per cent, but I think you get the picture.
  If a court sells an estate belonging to orphans, the court must first make a public announcement to assess the value of the estate. If they do not, it is as if they have erred in a law that comes from the Mishnah, and their sale can be invalidated.But, the Talmud asks—this is not “as if they erred in a mishnaic law”—this law is found explicit in the Mishnah.The answer is that were it not for Amemar’s statement, we would have applied the Mishnah only to the case of an agent who sells the land. If the court sells the land, we might have thought that they do not need to make a public announcement. Therefore, Amemar teaches us that even a court needs to make a public announcement.
  But if it corresponded to the actual worth of the land their sale is valid. Does not this [refer to a case] where no public announcement was made? R. Ashi at first assumes that the mishnah we learned last week refers to a case where no announcement was made. Thus if the sale is for the right amount, the sale is valid even without an announcement. 
  The Talmud tries to resolve the problem by saying that the mishnah refers to a case where an announcement was made. The problem is that the second clause of the mishnah says explicitly that if an announcement was made, their sale is valid no matter how large the error. Thus the easiest way to interpret the mishnah is that in the first clause no announcement was made and yet the sale is still valid. In the second clause an announcement was made.
  The Talmud admits that there was no announcement made in the first clause and yet the sale is valid if it is for the correct amount. But this is still not a difficulty on Amemar for the mishnah refers to particular items which can be sold without a public announcement—slaves, movables and deeds. The Talmud will now explain why unlike land, these can be sold without an announcement.
  No announcement is made about the sale of slaves lest they hear the announcement and run away. [Yes, slavery is cruel]. No announcement is made about the sale of goods and deeds, lest someone hear that they are being sold and steals them.
  The second solution to the difficulty between Amemar and the mishnah is that Amemar refers to a time when public announcements are made. These are “normal” times. The mishnah refers to times when property needs to be sold quickly to raise funds for an urgent need, such as to pay the poll-tax, to provide provisions for a wife or widow, or to pay for funeral expenses. Since the need is so urgent, no announcement need be made.
  The final resolution is that Amemar refers to a place where the custom is for the court to make an announcement. But the mishnah refers to a place such as Nehardea where such announcements are not made.The Talmud now tries to explain why public sales announcements were not made in Nehardea. The initial thought seems to be that such announcements were not necessary because the judges would not err in their assessments. But in reality the reason is that making  such announcements would give the purchaser a bad name. People would say that he is taking advantage of other people’s losses. And while this is true—one who buys at a public auction is taking advantage of the fact that others were forced to sell their property—it is also true that sometimes people need to sell their property in order to raise funds. To ensure that they would be able to do so, they stopped making public sales announcements in Nehardea. 
  The issue at hand is selling movable property belonging to orphans in order to preserve the value of their inheritance. The money would be used to buy something of more permanent value, namely real estate.At first it seems that the amoraim disagree over whether these movables must be brought to markets and sold there where they would fetch a higher price. The problem with having to bring them to a market is that this would take long and the value might begin to deteriorate. But in the end, the Talmud says that the amoraim do not disagree—if the market is close, then the property must be sold in the market, but if not, it may be sold without the market. 
  The story illustrates how R. Kahana was ultimately looking out for the best interests of the orphans, and not just following some absolute rule.
  R. Ashi tells Ravina that he can bring Little Ravina’s wine to Sikara. If this is where Ravina is selling his own wine, then we can assume that it is a good place and time to sell wine. Therefore, he can sell Little Ravina’s wine there as well.
  Before, I explain this mishnah, a few definitions:A girl who is married off by her brothers or mother when she is a minor may refuse the marriage when she becomes of majority age.A secondary incest prohibition is one degree away from the prohibitions mentioned in the Bible. For instance, a wife’s grandmother or granddaughter.An aylonit is a woman who never reaches puberty. Categorically she cannot have children (a woman who can have children cannot be called an aylonit). In both of these cases the marriage is annulled.The rule in all of these cases is that the woman does not receive a ketubah, nor is the husband liable to pay for her maintenance, nor does she receive the usufruct from her dowry which he used while they were married, nor does she receive compensation for things that she brought into her marriage which her husband has used up. In other words she gets no financial benefits from her husband that would accrue to her by being married to him, nor does he does have to return to her any benefits that he received during the marriage.The girl who refused the marriage loses her benefits because by refusing the marriage she is in essence annulling it.The aylonit loses her benefits because her marriage is considered to be mistaken. That is to say, since the man didn’t know that she was an aylonit and had he known he would not have married her, the marriage is annulled. That is why in the next section the mishnah states that had he married her knowing that she was an aylonit, he is obligated to give her a ketubah. The secondary incest prohibitions (see Mishnah Yevamot 2:4) do not receive a ketubah because the Sages fine them for not having observed the laws of incest. Below we shall see that these fines exist only for those who transgress rabbinic marital prohibitions but not Biblical ones.
  The prohibitions in this mishnah are called “prohibitions of holiness” in Mishnah Yevamoth 2:4. Even though all of these marriages were prohibited, the women still receive their ketuboth, and according to the Talmud they also receive all of the other benefits listed in this mishnah.What is seemingly strange here is that although the prohibitions in this section are from the Torah and those in the previous section of the mishnah are only rabbinic prohibitions, in these latter cases the woman is not fined whereas in the former cases she was. The answer is that the rabbis felt the need to strengthen their own prohibitions with penalties; a woman who marries a man prohibited to her only through rabbinic law does not receive benefits. Hence she will not agree to be married in such a case. In contrast, Biblical prohibitions are sufficiently strong to stand on their own, without additional sanctions. Hence, these women do receive the benefits. 
  IntroductionThe sugya refers to a minor whose father died and was married off by her mother or father. Such a marriage is considered to be only of “rabbinic” status. The girl has a right to refuse the marriage when she becomes of majority age. In our sugya the amoraim debate whether or not she receives her ketubah if she is divorced.
  According to Rav, since the marriage was never of biblical status, the minor girl who was married does not receive her ketubah as long as the marriage is severed before she becomes of majority age. It does not matter whether the marriage is severed by divorce or annulment (refusal).But Shmuel holds that if the marriage is severed by a get, she receives her ketubah in the same way as would any other divorcee. Only if the marriage is annulled does she not receive her ketubah.
  Shmuel issues here a series of rulings that demonstrate that, in his opinion, a minor who is divorced was married, but one who refuses the marriage has annulled it and therefore is considered to never have been married. This is expressed in three halakhot:If she was divorced, she receives her ketubah, but not if she refuses the marriage.If she was divorced she can no longer marry the husband’s brothers or a priest. This is true of all divorcees. But if she refuses the marriage, then it is as if the marriage never existed and she may marry his brothers or a priest.If she is divorced she must wait three months to remarry, as is the rule with all women who are divorced. This is true even though minors cannot become pregnant (by definition). But if she refuses the marriage, she need not wait three months.
  
  Daf 101a
  
  Most of the laws that Shmuel teaches are found in a baraita. Only the third one is his innovation.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s sugya Rav and Shmuel disputed whether a minor girl who is divorced receives her ketubah. Rav in essence says that since the marriage was valid only according to rabbinic law, if she is divorced she is not considered to have been married. Shmuel considers her to have been validly married. Today, the Talmud connects this amoraic dispute with a tannaitic dispute.
  According to R. Eliezer, if a minor girl is married off by her brother or mother, her marriage has no legal validity, and all of the laws that govern a regular marriage do not apply here. The only “validity” her marriage has is that if she does not want to remain married, she must formally issue a declaration of refusal. This would seem to match Rav who said that if she is divorced, she is not considered a divorcee since her marriage was never really a marriage in the first place.Joshua holds the opposite—her marriage is valid in every way and all of the regular rules for a marriage still apply. The only exception is that she is allowed to make a declaration of refusal. This is like Shmuel who holds that if she is divorced, she is considered a divorcee with all of the attendant consequences.
  There is no doubt that Rav could agree with R. Eliezer that the marriage is invalid and Shmuel cannot agree with this view. And there is no doubt that Shmuel could easily accord with R. Joshua—the marriage is valid. But Rav could argue that R. Joshua could even agree with him. R. Joshua said that all of the marital benefits that go from wife to husband are valid for a minor. But he did not say that any benefits that go from the husband to the wife are valid. Thus R. Joshua could hold that she is considered divorced.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues explaining the mishnah. A girl who has refused her marriage, an aylonit or a woman who is a secondary incest relationship does not receive a ketubah when divorced, nor does she get to keep her worn out belongings.
  There are two types of dowry. One is called “pluckable property.” Her husband has a right to use this property during the marriage, but he must restore it to his wife upon dissolution of the marriage, and pay the value back at the value of the day of marriage. She basically holds title, and her husband gets usage. This property was not written into her ketubah. According to this statement of Shmuel, if the worn out articles were “pluckable” she does not receive them in return. But if they were of the “iron sheep” type, which were written in the ketubah, she does receive them in return.
  Papa now begins to explore to which category of woman listed in the mishnah Shmuel refers to. He cannot be referring to the minor girl who refuses her marriage. Since her marriage is annulled it is as if it never occurred. Any worn out belongings that are still in existence she keeps, but her husband need not restore their original value. Anything that has been completely worn out such that it no longer exists, she does not receive in return.
  If Shmuel was referring to an aylonit, then there is a different problem. If the articles are still in existence, she just keeps them. If they are no longer in existence, then the opposite rule should apply. If they were pluckable property, then she always retains title over them. But if they are “iron sheep” property, then the husband had title over them, and since the marriage turns out to be in error (he did not know that she was an aylonit), he need not return them to her.
  The conclusion is that Shmuel refers to a woman who is a forbidden relative of the second degree. Neither party should have entered into such a marriage. Thus she loses her pluckable property, but he loses his title to the iron sheep property.
  The issue over here is the status of a piece of clothing that a woman brings into her marriage, after she is already married. R. Shimi b. Ashi considers it to be “capital” and therefore the husband cannot use it until it is worn out. In other words, we do not say that she gets to keep the cloak but he gets to use it, as is normally the procedure with capital—she keeps the principle, he gets the use. R. Shimi learns this from R. Kahana who said that only the woman prohibited due to second degree forbidden relations loses her worn out pluckable property. A regular wife does not.But R. Nahman says that use of cloak is considered produce, which does belong to the husband. Thus she keeps the cloak, but he gets to use it.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues with the next part of the mishnah, which taught that the aylonit, the second incest prohibition and the girl who refuses marriage do not receive their ketubah.
  Legally, these women are not entitled to their ketubah. But that refers only to the amount that the husband is legally obligated to give her—the 100 or 200 depending on whether this was her first or subsequent marriage. It does not, according to Shmuel, apply to the additional amount that the husband wrote for her in the ketubah. This is considered a gift and she receives it even though the marriage was prohibited or annulled.
  The baraita distinguishes between women whose marriage was prohibited (or annulled), and women whose behavior allowed the husband to divorce without paying the ketubah. The women in the first category do not receive their statutory ketubah, as we learned above. But they do receive any additional amount. These women are not penalized. They merely cannot receive the mandatory amount because their marriage was not licit or was annulled. But the women in the second category (see Ketubot 72a) are penalized and therefore lose both amounts.In addition, a woman about whom there is a charge of adultery (a rumor) would take nothing out of her marriage except the property that still remains. In other words, she also loses her dowry. I should emphasize that the “rumor” here is not a rumor as we use the word—something totally unsubstantiated. It is something which is basically certain, but without sufficient testimony to convict her of adultery in court. Today this would be something like seeing a man and a woman (she is married to someone else) holding hands at a romantic dinner in a way that makes it clear that this is not just a friendly relationship. In other words, this is not a woman who just “misbehaved” by engaging in inappropriate behavior. This is basically an adulteress.
  The last line of the baraita supports R. Huna, who had said that if she committed adultery, she does not lose any of her possessions that are still in existence. Meaning she can’t sue the estate for articles she brought into the marriage and which are no longer in existence. But she keeps anything that is still in existence.
  
  Daf 101b
  
  There is some discussion here about the wife who fornicated and whether she loses her right to retain possession of the worn out articles still in existence. In the end, she retains her rights to them.
  IntroductionThe mishnah taught: “If from the outset he had married on the understanding that she is an aylonit she is entitled to a ketubah.” Our sugya is about the aylonit, a woman who by definition cannot procreate and the widow married to a high priest. To recall, an aylonit is not just infertile, she is a woman who never develops signs of being female.
  With an aylonit, her right to a ketubah depends on whether the husband knew beforehand that she was an aylonit. But when it comes to a widow being married to a high priest, it does not matter. She receives her ketubah in either case.
  To R. Judah the two women are treated the same. If the husband did not know that she was a widow or an aylonit, then the marriage was in error and she does not have a ketubah. But if he did know about it and married her anyway, she does receive a ketubah.
  This baraita presents a difficulty to R. Huna who held that the widow married to a high priest always receives her ketubah. According to this baraita, if he knew she was a widow, she receives her ketubah. By implication, if he did not know, she does not.
  The Talmud rejects the deduction from the baraita. Instead of deducing to a situation where the high priest does not know her status one way or another, deduce that if he actively presumes that she is not a widow and then it turns out that she is a widow, she loses her ketubah. Here he clearly did not intend to marry a widow and therefore she does not receive her ketubah.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on R. Huna’s resolution. If the baraita had meant to imply that if he marries her without any presumption then she receives her ketubah, it should have said so directly and we could have figured out that this is all the more so true if he marries her thinking that she is a widow.
  The baraita cited here clearly refutes R. Huna.
  The Talmud now explains what caused R. Huna to err. The mishnah states only with regard to the aylonit that if he knew she was an aylonit, she receives her ketubah. It says nothing about the widow married to the high priest. This caused R. Huna to err and think that there was no such distinction with regard to the widow—she always receives her ketubah. But this is an incorrect (although possible) inference. The mishnah’s second clause, concerning the widow, was taught in juxtaposition to the first clause so that the reader would apply the same rules to the case of the widow as were applied explicitly to the case of the aylonit.
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with a case where a widow who already had a daughter married a man and cut a deal with him that he provide food and clothing for this daughter for five years.
  Since he promised to maintain her for five years, he is obligated to do so, no matter what the circumstances, as we shall see below.
  If this woman is divorced from this husband and goes and gets married again, and then cuts a deal with the new husband that he should maintain the daughter for five years, the first husband is still obligated, even though the daughter will now receive maintenance from the second husband.The first husband may not say that he will maintain her only if she comes back to live with him.  Even though the first husband intended to maintain her so that he could be married to her mother, he is still obligated.  If necessary he must send her maintenance money to wherever she may be.Finally, the two husbands cannot split the costs of the daughter’s maintenance.  Rather each one must bear the full costs; one provides the actual food and clothing and another provides the monetary equivalent.
  If the daughter, who is receiving maintenance from her mother’s husbands, should marry, her husband is obligated to pay for her maintenance, as are husbands in all cases.  Nevertheless, this does not relieve her mother’s husbands from their obligations.  Rather her own husband gives her the food and clothing and other things that she requires and her mother’s husbands each pay her the equivalent value of her maintenance.
  If her mother’s husbands die, there may arise a situation where she is competing with his daughters for maintenance.  [If there are sons, daughters do not inherit but rather are maintained from their father’s estate.]  In such a situation, their own daughters receive maintenance only from free assets, property actually in possession of the estate.  This is the general rule for those maintained by an estate; they do not repossess property from those to whom the estate holder gave or sold property.  In contrast, the husbands actually have a debt to the other daughter, the one with whose mother they cut a deal.  Therefore, she may take her maintenance money even from assigned property, property which was sold or given away after the marriage or her mother.  Since she is a creditor, she collects from the estate in the same manner as do all creditors.
  By now we have seen that if a man cuts such a deal, he has an absolute debt to this daughter, one which is not mitigated by divorce or his wife’s death, his death or by the daughter’s marriage.  Therefore, clever husbands would limit the original stipulation, promising to feed the daughter only as long as the mother was with him.  If he wrote the stipulation in such a manner, if he died, or she died or he divorced her, he would no longer be liable.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is about a person who states verbally admits that he/she is obligated to pay someone else an amount of money. Are they really liable?
  R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish dispute whether a person who spontaneously says to his fellow that he owes him a maneh (100 zuz) is liable. The Talmud tries to figure out whether he appointed witnesses to his statement. If he did not appoint witnesses, it is difficult to figure out why R. Yohanan would say he is liable. But if he did appoint witnesses, it is hard to understand why he Resh Lakish would say he is exempt. So what is the case, and how can we make sense of the dispute in that particular circumstance?
  According to R. Yohanan if he wrote “I owe you a maneh” in a document and handed it to another person, he is liable. The fact that he wrote these words in a document gives them legal force. Resh Lakish says that it does not matter. Without appointing witnesses there is no legal force to his statement.
  The Mishnah refers to a case where a man states that he will provide for his wife’s daughter for five years. It seems that he obligates himself simply by making this statement, as long as he writes it down in a document. This would be support for R. Yohanan.
  
  Daf 102a
  
  The Talmud rejects this understanding of the mishnah. This agreement to provide for the wife’s daughter was entered into at the time of the betrothal, kiddushin. They are like the agreements made by the fathers of the bride and groom to support the couple. Because of the seriousness of the event of the betrothal, no formal “kinyan” acquisition need be performed. It is sufficient for the person to verbally commit himself and he is obligated. The writing in the document is for documentation and not as a means by which he effects acquisition.
  First born sons must be redeemed for five selas (=shekalim). This person instead of just giving the priest five selas, writes in a document that he is obligated to give him five selas. According to the baraita, he owes him five selas, but still his son has not been redeemed. This baraita would seem to prove that if a person admits that he owes someone else money, he is liable to pay him that money. This case is different. It is not someone who just says out of the blue that he owes someone money. He is obligated by the Torah to pay that money. Only in such case would a simple statement be sufficient to obligate himself to pay.
  This case is different. It is not someone who just says out of the blue that he owes someone money. He is obligated by the Torah to pay that money. Only in such case would a simple statement be sufficient to obligate himself to pay. 
  If he was already obligated from Torah law to pay the priest five shekels, then why would he write this out in a document? The answer is that he wanted to specify to which priest he was going to give the money.
  Why then is the son not redeemed through the document that says that he is obligated to give five selas over to the priest? The answer is that this baraita accords with Ulla. Ulla (an amoraic sage) holds that according to the Torah, when the man gives the money that he obligated himself to give, the son is indeed redeemed. But if we allowed this, people might think that he was redeemed by the writing of the document itself, and the rule is that the son is only redeemed when he gives the money. To prevent misunderstanding, the rabbis ruled that if a person writes out a document saying he is obligated to pay a certain priest five selas, he will have to pay that priest five selas and then still pay another (to any priest) to redeem his son. This will prevent the misunderstanding that redemption of the first born can be done with document.
  IntroductionWe have been discussing whether a person who simply says that he is obligated to pay another, or one who writes this in a document, is indeed liable. This continues to be the subject of this sugya. 
  Rava says that there are tannaim who dispute the same issue as did R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish. The case here is where a guarantor to a loan signed below the signatures of the witnesses. Since he signed afterwards, there are no witnesses to his statement that he is obligated to pay if the debtor defaults. According to R. Ishmael, this signature is sufficient such that the creditor could collect from unencumbered property, meaning property free of debt that belongs to the guarantor. This would be like R. Yohanan. But Ben Nannas holds that such a signature is not worth anything. This is like Resh Lakish—without witnesses, his statement has no legal force. 
  Ben Nannas argues that the guarantor that signs after the witnesses is like a friend who stops an assault by saying that he will pay the assaulter to stop. He clearly does not mean to obligate himself. So too in this case, the creditor loaned without the guarantee of the guarantor. Therefore, if the borrower defaults, the guarantor need not pay.
  
  
  Daf 102b
  
  There is no doubt that Resh Lakish would hold like Ben Nannas—the guarantor is not obligated, nor is any person who verbally obligates himself to another. R. Yohanan could not agree with this opinion. But the amoraim can argue with regard to R. Ishmael. R. Yohanan would clearly agree with R. Ishmael—he is obligated. But Resh Lakish could say that R. Ishmael holds that the guarantor is liable for in general a guarantor is liable from the Torah to pay off debts in case of default. But if a person just writes to another that he is liable to pay him a certain amount of money, he might not be liable for there is no general liability from the Torah for that person.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya goes back to explain R. Gidel’s statement about statements of allotment made by the fathers at the betrothal of their children.
  Rav asks how it is that we can enforce these verbal statements without a formal act of acquisition. His answer is that there is an exchange going on here. The father receives some tangible benefit when his daughter is betrothed and in exchange he transfers to the husband the money that he promises. But this is true only when he betroths his daughter as a na’arah (a girl between the ages of 12 and 12 ½) or younger. In such a case the father receives the betrothal money. If she is already a bogeret, past that age, then she receives the betrothal money. Thus the transaction is not effected when she is a bogeret, or at least so it seems.
  Rava now states that what he said above is wrong. Even if the father does not receive any tangible benefit (i.e. his daughter was a bogeret), he still receives the intangible benefit of having in-laws (yes, I too wonder about this). By receiving this non-monetary benefit, he effects the transition of the money he promised to the opposite side. The proof that this is sufficient is that the father of the son also engages in the transaction despite the fact that he receives no tangible benefit—betrothal money goes to the girl or her family, not the boy.
  IntroductionAbove we learned about agreements made at the betrothal to provide for the couple and about a commitment a husband makes at betrothal to support his wife’s daughter. Today’s sugya ask whether such agreements may be written down. The issue with writing them down is that this would give the collector the ability to extract the guarantees from encumbered property. In other words it would create a lien on their property. Do we want these promises to have such power?
  According to R. Ashi, these agreements may not be written down.
  Ravina cites the mishnah from the previous page which refers to a husband writing to his wife at the point of betrothal that he will provide for her daughter. However, R. Ashi responds that “writing” means “saying.” He backs this up with another mishnah in which R. Hiyya interprets “writing” as “saying.”
  Ravina cites another baraita which talks about the writing of “documents of betrothal and marriage.” If these refer to the financial agreements made at the time of betrothal then the baraita is proof that such documents may be written.
  Ashi rejects the above understanding of the baraita. In reality, it refers to documents of betrothal. These are documents in which the husband writes “Behold, you are betrothed to me” and then gives it to the woman. If he writes it with the particular woman in mind, but does not ask her first if she wants him to write such a document, she is not betrothed according to R. Papa and R. Sheravya. This is what the baraita is teaching. It has nothing to do with the topic at hand here.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss whether promises made at betrothal may be written down into documents.
  This is the continuation of the mishnah from above. It proves that the daughter has the power to collect from her mother’s husband’s encumbered property after his death. This seems to imply that the document was written down.
  Ashi explains that they did not write the arrangement down in a document. Rather they made an act of kinyan. This act is what gives the wife’s daughter from a previous marriage the right to collect from encumbered property.His own daughters should also be able to collect their provisions from encumbered property (in a case where their father died). But they no act of kinyan was done on their behalf, and therefore they collect only from property that has no lien on it.
  The wife’s daughter from a previous marriage existed at the time of betrothal. Therefore his act of kinyan works in order to enable her to collect from encumbered property. But the daughters he has with this woman in the future were not yet born at this moment. Therefore, kinyan does not work for them.
  It is possible for him to be betrothing a wife who already has a daughter through him—if he divorced her and remarried her. So how do we know that his daughters were not in existence at the time of kinyan.
  His daughters are provided for based on the court stipulation that mandates a father to provide for his daughters after his death. Therefore, even if he makes a kinyan, it does not change the nature of their rights. The wife’s daughter is not his daughter so she is not coved by these court stipulations. Therefore, when he makes a kinyan on his promise to provide for them, the kinyan is effective.
  It seems strange that daughters provided for by the mandate of a court should have a lesser ability to collect than does the girl who is not his own daughter.Therefore the Talmud explains that with his own daughters we are concerned that he already gave them money. If they could collect from encumbered property, the father might have a way to cheat those who loaned him money or bought from him. He would give his free unencumbered property to his daughters before his death, and then they would collect from his creditors or purchasers. To avoid this, they may not collect from encumbered property. We have no such concern with regard to daughters who are not his own.
  IntroductionThis sugya references the mishnah on daf 101 that had stated: The first husband may not plead, “If she will come to me I will maintain her”, rather he must send her maintenance to her at the place where her mother [lives].
  The mishnah seems to imply that the mother receives the custody over the daughter. I should note that the norm in those times seems to have been for the father to receive custody. This is for several reasons: 1) Financially, he would be more able to support the child; 2) The children “belonged” to him; 3) It might have been more difficult for women to remarry if they already have a child to support. We can sense that in this mishnah—she needs to cut a deal with her new husband for him to support her daughter.
  The Talmud points out that it might be that the mishnah refers to a minor child whose father had died. A minor child should be left with the mother for fear that the other children who are competitors for the inheritance might kill this child. The Talmud cites a story of this actually happened. Some older sons killed their younger brother (of a different mother) on the eve of Pesah. It is unclear if there is any significance to the fact that this occurred on erev Pesah. In the medieval period some Christians (assumedly apostate Jews) claimed that this was a reference to the killing of children on erev Pesah for their blood to be used in matzot. This absurd and anti-Semitic claim may have led to a revision from “erev Pesah” to “erev Rosh Hashanah.”
  
  Daf 103a
  
  The Talmud rejects the above assertion that only a minor daughter remains with her mother. All daughters remain in their mother’s custody.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains a legal story that is related to the mishnah about the case where two husbands end up simultaneously supporting a daughter.
  Reuven leases his mill to Shimon. In return Shimon will grind Reuven’s grain. Reuven then grows richer and buys another grain and donkey to do his own grinding. He now wants rent from Shimon. Shimon replies that he never agreed to pay rent.
  Ravina thinks that he can adjudicate the case of the mills by comparing it to the mishnah. In that case while the husband promised to give food to his wife’s daughter, in the end he has to give money because the other husband is giving the provisions. So too here while Shimon originally promised to grind the grain instead of paying cash for rent, he can be obligated to give money.
  Avira says the two cases are not similar. In the case of the mishnah, the girl simply cannot eat two times the amount of food she would need. Furthermore, it does not really make a difference for the husband to pay her directly in cash instead of buying food. In contrast, Shimon could tell Reuven that he could grind in his mill and sell the ground grain, and then eat the grain ground in Shimon’s mill. Furthermore, Shimon may simply not have the cash to pay Reuven. Thus Shimon has the right to maintain the arrangement.
  If Shimon can find other people who will want to grind their grain in the mill he is renting from Reuven, then he really should not have a problem paying Reuven rent. This would not cause him any loss—he could grind other people’s grain and give the proceeds to Reuven. So if it is possible for Shimon to act in a way that behooves Reuven without incurring a loss, we force him to do so. His refusal to pay rent even when this would not cause him a loss is acting in the “way of Sodom.” The people of Sodom would not act generously to others even if this did not cause them a loss. According to the Talmud, the court can legally prevent people from acting in this way.
  IntroductionA widow who has not claimed her ketubah is maintained from the estate of her husband.  The mishnah in this sectiondeals with the question of whether or not the widow needs to be in her husband’s house to receive her maintenance from her husband’s inheritors.
  A widow has a right to remain in her husband’s house and receive her maintenance there. The inheritors cannot ask her to leave, even if they promise to provide her with maintenance somewhere else.  Furthermore, they must provide for her at the same level that she received while her husband was alive. If her husband lived the lifestyle of the rich and famous, she may continue to do so, even if it eats into his children’s inheritance.  She must live in a proper part of her husband’s house and may not be put into lesser attractive quarters.
  However, the widow does not have the right to force the heirs to give her maintenance money elsewhere.  If she wishes to live in her father’s house, the inheritors can respond that she will only receive maintenance in her former husband’s house.
  The mishnah now mentions the one exception to this preceding rule.  If she is young and they are young, she may not want to live there for fear of impropriety.  It may even be that she may not be that different from them in age.  If she makes such a claim, she may receive her maintenance money in her father’s home.
  IntroductionThis sugya is based on the mishnah we learned yesterday. After this, we’re on to aggadah.
  The widow may continue living in her husband’s home at the same level of comfort she lived in while he was alive. The heirs may not in any way reduce the level of comfort to which she was accustomed. This is guaranteed in her ketubah clause (the clause was quoted in the fourth chapter).
  Joseph makes a “midrash” on the ketubah clause. If he has a decent house, she may remain there. But if his house is very small, the inheritors may force her out.
  The orphans may not sell the widow’s home. If they do, the sale is invalid.
  When a father dies, the sons inherit and the daughters are provided four out of the estate. If there is not enough money for them to inherit and the daughters to be provided for, the sons may not sell the assets. But if they do, the sale is valid. So why is this sale valid when the sale of the widow’s home is not?The difference is that from the time a husband marries a woman, his estate is liable to provide for her. This is not an obligation that kicks in only when he dies. In contrast, he is not liable to provide for his daughters until he dies. Therefore, while the sons should not sell the property, if they do so their sale is valid.
  The widow is legally permitted to live in the same house she was living in while the husband was alive. But if it falls apart, it is no longer the same dwelling place. In such a case, not only are the heirs not liable to fix it, they can prevent her from rebuilding it. This seems to be a way to force her to leave her house. It is unclear if she is even allowed to repair it.
  The widow cannot force the heirs to provide her with food in her father’s house. This is because it is cheaper to feed her while she is living with them if she does not want to live with them. It is obviously cheaper to provide for her when she eats at their table then it is to bring her food separately in another home.However, if she asks to be provided according to the amount it would have cost to feed her while in the heirs home, then they must. Again, as long as it does not cost them anything, they must act generously.
  Huna now locates sources of good advice in halakhic statements made by the sages. The first is the mishnah we are learning. This mishnah hints that it is cheaper to feed people when they are all together in one house.
  A person legally acquires an object when he pulls it towards himself. He does not acquire it at the point when the seller measures it out. But if a buyer wants to acquire something without having to actually draw it towards him (for instance he is not present for the acquisition) he may rent the place in which the produce is found. In this way his property acquires the produce for him. This is how the sages teach the business acumen in order to be wealthy.
  This mishnah indirectly teaches us that chewing wheat and putting it on one’s wounds can heal. Again, by reading rabbinic halakhic statements we can indirectly learn wisdom.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins a long and famous aggadic passage about R. Judah Hanasi. I am not going to comment on every aspect of these aggadot. The stories are understandable, although sometimes strange. And this is not the framework for a long discussion of the meaning of these stories. I would though encourage you to think about them and perhaps bring up some of the issues related to them on our FB page.
  We can see why this story is here in Ketubot. Rabbi on his deathbed instructs his heirs to show respect for his widow and to provide her with the same amenities she was used to during her life. Thus the story is placed in the context of obligations towards widows.
  The Talmud asks why Rabbi had to tell his sons to honor their mother—this is written directly in the Torah. And even if she is their stepmother, that too is in the Torah, at least midrashically.The answer is that the Torah mandates honoring stepparents only while the parent is still alive. Once the parent has died, there is no such mandate from the Torah. Thus Rabbi had to instruct his sons to continue honoring his wife after his death.
  Even after his death, Rabbi used to come home to visit his wife every Friday evening. That is why he needed the house set as it was in his lifetime. While the text does not say this, it would seem likely that it is hinting that he would come home to have relations with his wife. Rabbi stopped coming when he feared that people would know that he came back even after his death, and they would say that only Rabbi was great enough to merit returning after his death. Throughout these stories, Rabbi is often a model of modesty.
  It seems like Rabbi was saying that Joseph and Shimon would take care of his burial. But these two men die before him. They were to tend to him in the world to come. So why then did Rabbi make that statement? It was to let people know the merit of Joseph and Shimon so that people should not think that they were deserving of death and were kept alive only due to the protection of Rabbi.
  This is Rabbi’s next set of instructions.
  
  Daf 103b
  
  Again, people misunderstood the intent of Rabbi’s instructions. They thought he was telling people not to eulogize in the smaller towns to save them trouble. But then they saw that in the end, everyone gathered together to eulogize, thus augmenting Rabbi’s honor.
  Rabbi tells the sages to go back to learning after thirty day. Again, this was due to his modesty, so that people would not think him greater than Moses. Nevertheless, the people did continue to mourn Rabbi for a whole year whenever they were not learning.
  This is admittedly a strange story. It is meant to show the salvific power of Rabbi’s death, but also the poignant ironies of life.
  Rabbi says that Shimon is “wise.” This is interpreted as meaning that although Shimon is wiser than Gamaliel, Gamaliel is to be the Nasi, the political leader, because he is the first born. This is true even though Gamaliel, unlike the biblical king Yehoram, was not worthy of filling the shoes of his ancestors, at least in terms of his wisdom. Ultimately, Gamaliel did fear sin, and therefore, despite his inferiority to Shimon in terms of wisdom, he was appointed the political successor of Rabbi.
  IntroductionWe continue with stories involving Rabbi Judah Hanasi’s death.
  This story is mostly a description of the succession of Rabbi as head of the academy. When Levi has no one else to keep him company outside the bet midrash, he goes off to learn and teach Torah in Babylonia.
  By the mere fact announcement that Levi is coming to Babylonia, Rav discerns exactly the circumstances that led to his coming.The Talmud asks how he was so sure that R. Afes died. Maybe R. Hanina, who was keeping him company outside the Bet Midrash, died and that’s why Levi came to Babylonia. There are two reasons why this is impossible. 1) Levi could have sat as a student in front of R. Afes. It was only R. Hanina that could not sit in the academy with R. Afes. Levi stayed outside to keep him company. Had R. Hanina died, Levi would have gone in. 2) Since Rabbi predicted that Hanina would be the head of the academy, it was certain to happen.
  Why didn’t Rabbi appoint R. Hiyya to be his successor? The Talmud tries to answer that R. Hiyya died before Rabbi. But this contradicts a tradition in which R. Hiyya says that he cried over R. Hiyya’s grave. The Talmud resolves this by reversing the names—Rabbi cried over R. Hiyya’s grave.In another tradition, R. Hiyya talks about Rabbi’s death. Again, the Talmud suggests reversing the names. You can get a sense of where this is going.
  Again, we have a tradition according to which Rabbi died before R. Hiyya. The tradition is about omens concerning a person’s death. It is better to die before Shabbat because one will immediately be at rest in the world to come. But it is better to die after Yom Kippur because he will have been forgiven on Yom Kippur.
  Again, the Talmud suggests reversing the names.But then, after all of these texts in which Rabbi dies before R. Hiyya, they finally offer a different reading of why Rabbi didn’t appoint R. Hiyya, even if R. Hiyya was still alive. R. Hiyya was too busy “performing mitzvot” to occupy himself with political office. This reminds me of something that remains an issue to this day. A person may be, for instance, the best teacher in the school, the best engineer in the company, and then they are moved up to administrative positions.
  Here we can see that while R. Hanina was known for his sharp acumen, R. Hiyya was known for his care in education. He would make sure that there were Torah scrolls from which children could learn the Torah, he would teach them the oral Torah and on top of that, he fed orphans. The performance of these mitzvot was what prevented Rabbi from appointing R. Hiyya as the head of the academy.
  Rabbi continues with his instructions to his sons. He tells Rabban Gamaliel, who will be the patriarch after him, to conduct his Patriarchate with a high degree of hierarchy.
  The question asked here is whether Rabban Gamaliel should act with such authority vis a vis scholars. Another source portrays Yehoshaphat, King of Judah, as humbling himself in front of scholars. So which is the proper attitude for a political leader to adopt? The answer is that it depends on the setting. In public, the political leader must guard his authority. But in private, he may show his subservience to the scholar/spiritual leader.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues with stories about Rabbi Judah Hanasi’s death.
  Rabbi lived in Bet She’arim, but when he took ill he was brought to Tzippori. Eventually he was buried in Bet She’arim.
  
  Daf 104a
  
  One can see in this tradition how reluctant the rabbis were to even have it said that Rabbi had died.
  In this sad story we see how at times one must reluctantly let go of loved ones.
  Only the handmaiden is sensitive enough to understand that it is better for Rabbi to die than for him to go on living in this state. She disrupts the sages’ prayers, and thereby Rabbi is allowed to die.
  Bar Kappara does not want to even say that Rabbi has died so he hints at it poetically and gets the other sages to say that he has died.
  IntroductionThe beginning of this story returns to Rabbi’s last hours.
  Rabbi prays for peace in his eternal resting place, and a heavenly voice goes out announcing that he will indeed, rest in in peace. However, it uses some strange syntax.
  Since Rabbi is a singular individual, they should say to him “on your bed” and not “on their beds.” The plural is taken as alluding to a conversation between God and the angels when a righteous person dies. Here too they mix between singular and plural.
  The sugya ends with how the rabbis imagine the righteous and the wicked being greeted in the world to come.
  IntroductionThe mishnah we learn here discusses how long a widow has to claim her ketubah.
  According to Rabbi Meir, if a widow returns to live in her father’s house she may collect her ketubah from her husband’s inheritors even after 25 years.  However, if she remains in her husband’s home, if she doesn’t collect the ketubah within twenty-five years, she forfeits it.  The reason given is that in twenty-five years it can be assumed that she gave away to friends and neighbors property equal to the ketubah.  Since this is technically not her money to give away, she loses her ketubah.  In any case we should note that twenty-five years is quite a long time.  Assumedly, a young widow who intended to remarry would have left her previous husband’s home within the twenty-five years in any case.   Furthermore, if she requests the ketubah in the twenty-fourth year, she receives the whole thing, even though she may have spent 24 years giving little things away to friends.  In the end, this mishnah strikes me as quite generous to the widow.
  The Sages posit an opposite system.  According to them, the widow loses her ketubah after twenty-five years, not because we assume that she has given it away, but rather because after twenty-five years we can assume that she has “forgiven” the ketubah to her husband’s inheritors.  Therefore, if she remains at her husband’s home she may always later decide to leave and collect her ketubah.  The reason that she didn’t ask for her ketubah earlier is that since she was living with the inheritors she may have been embarrassed to ask them.  In contrast, if she lives at her father’s home, she has no excuse for not asking for it within twenty-five years, and hence after such a long time, the ketubah is considered to have been forgiven.  Again, the important thing to realize is that which is unstated:  a widow always has 25 years in which to collect her ketubah, no matter where she lives.
  Although the widow herself sometimes has more than 25 years in which to collect the ketubah, should she die before she collects her ketubah, her inheritors must always stake a claim within this time.  Some interpret this as 25 years within the death of the husband and some say it refers to 25 years from the death of the wife.
  IntroductionThe mishnah had stated that a widow can collect her ketubah for only 25 years because “in the course of twenty-five years she has sufficient opportunities to give favors equal [in value to the amount of] her ketubah.” The Talmud discusses this clause and the subsequent clauses of the mishnah.
  It would seem that a rich woman, such as the legendary Martha daughter of Boethus, would take far longer to give away her massive ketubah than a poor woman would. But R. Joseph disagrees—as the saying goes, according to the camel is the burden. Rich people give large gifts, poor people give small gifts.
  Meir says that after 25 years of widowhood, she loses her ketubah. But do we prorate this by year—i.e. after 12.5 years she would lose half of her ketubah? The Talmud does not answer this question.
  The sages said that if she waits 25 years we can assume she forgave her right to collect her ketubah. The implication is 25 years exactly. Taken to its extreme, this becomes absurd—a few extra hours and we assume that she forgave her ketubah. But that is just the way it is with measures. If the mikveh has forty se’ahs it is valid. Just a little bit less, and it is not.
  According to R. Yose, if the widow still has her ketubah document, there is no 25 year limit on recovering the ketubah. But according to R. Elazar there is always a 25 year limit.
  Sheshet raises a difficulty from a baraita according to which a creditor can collect his debt without having to remind the debtor that he owes it. The assumption is that creditors do not forgive debts. By implication, we could assume that widows do forgive a debt, even if they are still holding on to the ketubah. This is a difficulty on R. Yose.
  Sheshet solves his own difficulty. This baraita refers to a case where there is no document, but the debtor admits that he owes the money. If there is a document, then there is no limit on claims, either for a creditor or a widow.
  The Talmud raises an almost identical difficulty. We assume that a divorcee does not forgive a ketubah debt. She is like a creditor, who does not generally forgive debts. But a widow might be assumed to have forgiven a debt.The resolution is the same as above. This source refers to a woman who does not have her ketubah, but whose husband admits that he owes her the ketubah. But if the woman has her ketubah, both a divorcee and a creditor then there is no limit.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to deal with the issue of how long a widow has to claim her ketubah.
  If she claims her ketubah, the 25 year period is reset. This is because we can assume that up until that point she had not forgiven the ketubah. Similarly, as we learned in yesterday’s section, if she has her ketubah document, she may claim the ketubah payment at any time.
  
  Daf 104b
  
  The dispute between R. Meir and the sages in the mishnah is only when she does not have her ketubah document. If she has the document, all sages agree that she may collect her ketubah whenever she wants, even after twenty-five years. Furthermore, if she does not have her document, she loses the ketubah after twenty-five years only if she lives in her father’s house. This is in accordance with the sages.
  According to Bar Kappara, even if the widow loses the mandatory ketubah amount, the 200 zuz for the first time marriage and 100 zuz for subsequent marriages, she still receives any extra amount that the husband writes for her. But R. Yohanan disagrees. All ketubah conditions are subject to the same rules as the base amount. Since she loses the base amount after 25 years, she also loses the additional amount.
  Huna agrees with Bar Kappara from above. She loses only the base amount and not the additional amount that he wrote for her. R. Abba asks if Rav really said this, which we eventually understand is his way of saying that Rav did not really say this.The words “silence” and “give me a drink” sound very similar. So R. Huna is making a pun, asking R. Abba what his intent is.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a story about a widow related to a rabbi.
  Hiyya Arikha’s wife’s mother was married to his brother (i.e. the two brothers married a mother and her daughter—this is permitted). His brother died and she returned to her father’s home and lived there for 25 years, where he provided her with food and other provisions. After 25 years, R. Hiyya b. Arikha cut her off from her maintenance and also refused to pay her ketubah.
  Hiyya Arikha is summoned in front of a judge, where he tells him that he provided for her for 25 years.
  Rabbah b. Shila orders R. Hiyya Arikha to pay her the ketubah. The rabbis set a 25 year limit for collecting the ketubah because they assumed that the widow was embarrassed to ask for her ketubah while living and being supported in her husband’s home. But this widow also may have been embarrassed to ask for her ketubah while R. Hiyya Arikha was paying for her maintenance. We should not assume that she forwent her rights to the ketubah payment. Therefore Rabbah b. Shila orders him to pay her the ketubah.
  Hiyya refuses to pay, so Rabbah b. Shila orders a document written up that would allow the widow to seize his property. Rava affirms the ruling.
  Now that the ruling in favor of the widow was confirmed, she wants to recover any produce that R. Hiyya consumed from the property between the time of her claim of the ketubah and now. Rava however notices that there is a clause missing in the document—it does not say that the court determined that the property belonged to the deceased.
  Unfortunately for the woman, without a properly written writ of seizure, she cannot collect any of the produce that he has consumed.
  The woman, who seems to be well-steeped in the law, now responds to Rabbah saying that documents in which commonly written clauses are missing should be regarded as scribal errors and not intentional ommissions. Thus, even without this clause the document should be valid for we can assume that the judge intended the clause to be included but the scribe simply forgot. But again Rava denies her claim. In this case, even Rabbah b. Shila did indeed make a mistake. He originally did write the writ of seizure with any particular piece of property in mind, thinking it did not matter from which she piece of property she would collect. But this is improper procedure. For if no particular property was designated, the widow might go improve one piece of land and then the orphans would eventually give her the other piece. This would cause her to lose out and would be a disgrace for the court. Therefore, Rava insists that improperly written writs of seizure are not valid. The irony is that by insisting on protecting widows, this particular widow is losing out on her ability to collect. I would assume that Rava deems proper procedure and precedent to be more important than this particular case.
  Congratulations—you finished chapter twelve. One more to go and then it is siyyum time!
  IntroductionThis week we begin the final chapter of Ketubot. Mishnah Ketubot chapter thirteen is organized differently from the other chapters of Ketuboth, or for that matter, differently from most of the Mishnah.  Instead of being organized topically, it is organized mostly according to the sayings of two judges who lived in Jerusalem during the Second Temple period:  Admon and Hanan ben Avishalom.  The mishnah calls them “judges of fines”; they were probably civil judges.The first mishnah concerns a wife whose husband has gone abroad and did not leave her sufficient money to provide for her maintenance.  The wife then approaches the court, asking permission to sell the husband’s property in order to provide maintenance for herself. It is assumed by all that she must take an oath when he returns, that she used the proceeds for her maintenance, and that she has not kept anything for other use.  Alternatively, if her husband claims that he did leave her with provisions, she might take an oath that he did not. The question is, must she also take an oath before she sells his property, that he did not leave her with anything.
   This section introduces the rest of the chapter.  We shall see that the two things that Hanan says were both disputed by a group called “the sons of the high priest”.  Assumedly, this was a priestly court, whose center was the Temple.  Admon was disputed by “the sages” in all seven things that he said.  This gives us an opportunity to realize why these traditions and not others by Admon or Hanan were preserved. These were the issues upon which there were debates.
  
  Daf 105a
  
  There are two differences between the baraita and the Mishnah—the number of judges in Jerusalem and what they judged. The first difference may be just a result of the fact that the author of the Mishnah did not consider Hanan the Egyptian significant enough to list. But there is still a contradiction between what they adjudicated—fines or robberies. We should note that in Hebrew there is only a one letter difference between the two words, and these two letters can be easily confused in spoken language “resh” and “lamed.”
  Nahman b. Yitzchak resolved the issue by saying that these judges would decree fines for acts of robbery. The particular case cited is one in which an animal damages a new plant. The older the plant, the higher the fine.
  Nathan includes another name on the list—the famous Nahum the Mede. But other sages do not include his name on the list and hence he does not appear in the Mishnah.
  There were indeed many other judges, institutes of law and educational institutes in Jerusalem. The mishnah lists only those who had enough authority to decree fines.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains several exhortations against bribe taking.
   This is R. Abahu’s derashah on the Torah’s verse that taking bribes blinds the one who takes it. If one has a problem with one’s eyes, one can pay to try to be healed. But one who takes a bribe is in essence, being paid to go blind.
  The rabbis interpret the verse to mean that even if one is a great sage, if he takes a bribe he will lose his wisdom. And even if one is completely righteous, if he takes a bribe he will lose the clarity of his mind.
  
  Daf 105b
  
  The image of the king is one who does not need to take anything. He is already wealthy. But the image of the priest is one who chases after the terumah given at the threshing floor. While such terumah does legitimately belong to the priest, he should not go from threshing floor to threshing floor searching for it. Thus a judge who seeks to make money off his work as a judge, overthrows, i.e. destroys the land.
  A judge who always borrows and does not lend may not adjudicate cases. In such a case we would fear that what he is doing is actually taking bribes. But if he both lends and borrows then he is allowed to act as a judge.
  Rava borrowed from the house of Bar Merion and did not lend them anything in return. This would seem to disqualify him as a judge. But the Talmud resolves that Rava did not borrow from them because he needed something. He borrowed from them in order to make them look good. When a great rabbi borrows something, the social standing of the lender is elevated.  Therefore, this is permitted.
  By giving a gift to someone, the receiver sees himself as the giver. And since a person cannot render judgment for himself, the receiver can no longer judge for the giver. The Talmud ends with a word play—“shohad” the word for bribe/gift is divided into two—“she-hu had,”—they are one. The giver and the receiver have become one.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses rules related to the impartiality of judges.
  The fact that the people of the town love a particular scholar is not evidence of his greatness. Rather, it is evidence that he is lax in rebuking them with regard to their behavior. This is not a positive attribute in Abaye’s eyes. A scholar should rebuke people when appropriate, even if this results in his falling into disfavor.
  Rava realizes that the love that the people of Mehoza have for him is not dependent on how he acts as a judge. The people realize that sometimes one wins and sometimes one loses. Their love and hate for him will depend on other factors, such as his righteousness and dedication.
  Obviously it is forbidden to take a financial bribe. But there are other types of bribes that are also forbidden. The Talmud will now cite a few examples of how seriously the sages took the prohibition of receiving a bribe.
  Even though all this person did was offer Shmuel a hand while crossing the river on some sort of rickety bridge, Shmuel could no longer act as his judge.
  In all of these stories even the slightest help provided for the judge renders him disqualified for adjudicating cases in which the person who helped him is involved.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues with stories of rabbis avoiding taking bribes.
  This story illustrates the slippery slope of taking even the smallest bribe. R. Yishmael refused to take even what rightfully belonged to him and did not act as the sharecropper’s judge. Nevertheless, he was still trying to find claims on behalf of the sharecropper. All the more so would someone who actually took a bribe.
  This is a similar story. The person brings the first fleece sheerings which belong to the priest to R. Yishmael b. Elisha who is a priest.
  Interestingly, after all we have said about not taking gifts, we have here a baraita that teaches that bringing a gift to a sage is equivalent to bringing first fruits to the Temple. The man can give the gift to R. Anan as long as R. Anan does not judge his case thereafter. Nevertheless, we shall see below that the sugya is deeply ambivalent about people bringing gifts to rabbis.
  Nahman adjudicates the man’s case and even stops, at least in the meantime, busying himself with the orphans’ estate. Although both helping orphans and issuing rulings of law are positive commandment, the latter takes precedence. When the man sees R. Nahman’s actions, he is so honored that he is silenced.
  
  Daf 106a
  
   This story contains two elements. First it shows that although R. Anan acted in accordance with the law, he still did not act in the most respectable manner, and therefore Elijah ceased visiting him and learning with him. This is often a sign of disapproval in rabbinic literature. R. Anan had to pray for Elijah’s return. When Elijah did return, his appearance scared R. Anan. Henceforth, R. Anan placed a box between him and Elijah, symbolizing a certain distance in their relationship.The second part of the story is an etiology—a story of origins. There are two books known as Seder Eliyahu. The “greater” one is that which was taught to R. Anan earlier, whereas the lesser one is the one taught to him after he placed the box in between him and Eliyahu.
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s sugya a reference was made to Elisha, the prophet. Today’s sugya continues with another story that refers to Elisha.
  Joseph refuses to pray to God to bring an end to the famine because even Elisha did not pray for an end to famine. To ask God to end a famine requires someone who is worthy of making such a request.Elisha is cited as an example due to the large number of rabbis who would gather around him and would be provided for by him. Of course, this is anachronistic—there were no “rabbis” at the time of Elisha. But this is typical of rabbinic literature—they imagine that they were active throughout the biblical period.
  In the story in II Kings 4, a man comes to Elisha with twenty loaves of bread. Elisha instructs it to be given to the men, but his servant complains that this is not sufficient food for 100 men. God then causes a miracle and there is enough for all. The problem is that twenty loaves should be enough for 100 men, at least in a year of drought. Thus the rabbis interpret that each loaf was put before 100 men. Thus 2000 men were with Elisha, not just 100.
  These stories describe how many rabbis would attend the discourses of several famous amoraim, as well as how many rabbis would remain behind to study with them permanently. The numbers are clearly exaggerated, as tends to be the case in ancient literature. More interesting is the perception that the numbers were going down as the period wore on. While it is possible that this is an accurate assessment of the situation, it is also possible that this is an idealistic portrayal of the past.  In the “good old days” there were 1200 rabbis who resided permanently with Rav. Now the number has dwindled to 200.The “amplifiers” in the story of R. Huna refer to men who would basically scream out R. Huna’s discourses so that people far from R. Huna could hear.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya returns to the subject brought up last daf—what funds were used to pay various Jewish functionaries?
  Before an animal can be offered on the altar, it must be examined for blemishes. There were inspectors who examined these animals. Their wages were paid from Temple funds.
  This is probably anachronistic, a case of rabbis portraying themselves as being in charge of the rituals performed in Jerusalem. In any case, since this is a need of the Temple, these rabbis can take their fees from the Temple funds as well.
  Kemitzah refers to taking some of the flour and placing it on the altar. It had to be performed in a particular fashion and thus the priests had to learn how to do it from scholars.
  “Book editors” refers to those who read Holy Scriptures to make sure that they were copied correctly. This is hard work, but essential to ensure that errors do not creep into the transmission of the Tanakh.
  IntroductionThis sugya continues to discuss where certain Temple functionaries draw their salaries from.
  According to Rav, the curtains in the Temple are a need of the sacrificial service. Therefore the women who wove them would receive their wages from the same funds used for the sacrificial service. But R. Nahman says that weaving the curtains is part of the building process and therefore they would receive their salaries from funds collected for general upkeep.
  According to this baraita, the women who wove the curtain received their wages from the Temple funds. This is a difficulty on R. Nahman.
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that these were the curtains used as sort of doors, and not those curtains used inside the Temple to separate and define areas of holiness.
  Children who would serve in the ritual of burning the red heifer so that its ashes could be used in purification rituals would have to raise their children from birth to be pure. According to the first opinion, the food and other needs of these families were taken care of by the Temple funds, since this is again, a need of the sacrificial service. But Abba Shaul says that rich women in Jerusalem voluntarily paid for their upkeep.
  IntroductionAbove the Talmud had discussed financing wages for those performing various services for the Temple. Today the topic shifts slightly to the funds used for purchasing the vessels used in the Temple.
  According to Rav, the vessels used in the Temple are to be financed from the same funds used to purchase sacrifices. They do not come from the funds used to repair the Temple.
  
  Daf 106b
  
  The verse in Chronicles refers to repairing the Temple. Once the Temple had been repaired, the rest of the money was used to make vessels. This is a difficulty against Rav.
  Rav points out that according a verse from Kings, the money collected for repairing the Temple was not used for making the ministering vessels.
  The Talmud resolves the contradiction between the verses. In the verse from Chronicles, they collected money for Temple repair, and then money was left over. Such money could be used for financing the ministering vessels. The verse from Kings does not state that it is forbidden to use such funds to pay for the ministering vessels. It just says that they didn’t do so in that case. According to the Talmud, the reason was simply that there was no money left over.
  The problem with the resolution of the verses, is that there remains a difficulty against Rav. Rav said that funds for Temple repair cannot be used to finance the making of the ministering vessels. Yet according to the Talmud, if there was money left over, such funds could be used.Abahu resolves the difficulty by saying that when these funds are initially collected, the court stipulates that any money left over should go for the ministering vessels. This way it turns out that money dedicated for Temple repair does not go to making the ministering vessels.As an aside, there is probably some relevance to this issue today. For instance, if funds are collected for a specific charitable purpose, let’s say, building a Yeshiva’s library, and money is left over after the library has been built, can they be used, for instance, to pay for the Rosh Yeshiva’s vacation fund?  If you’d like to donate to the Conservative Yeshiva’s library fund, please be in touch.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss the financing of the ministering vessels.
  A baraita from the school of R. Ishmael uses the same verse from Chronicles that was earlier used to prove that the ministering vessels are bought from funds used for Temple repair, to prove that they come from the regular Temple funds used for sacrifices. The reason is the phrase “the remainder.” The word I have been translating as Temple funds is more literally translated “collection of the chamber.” This money was brought into a chamber in the Temple and whatever was necessary for sacrifices was used. The rest was put to other use—according to R. Yishmael, it was used to pay for making ministering vessels.
  Why not say, asks the Talmud, that the remainder itself can be used for the ministering vessels, but not the original donations themselves? These must be used for sacrifices.The answer is based on a midrash that Rava states elsewhere. The Torah refers to “the burnt offering.” This refers according to Rava to the first burnt offering. So too “the money” refers to the first money donated to the collection chamber. Such money can be used to purchase and make ministering vessels.
  This baraita discusses which funds were used for all the various aspects of the Temple. Clearly according to the baraita the ministering vessels do not come from funds dedicated for Temple repair or from the general funds collected for sacrifices. They come from the remainders of funds set aside for libations (wine poured on the altar).The frankincense referred to here was used to accompany the show bread.
  IntroductionThis is the conclusion of the sugya concerning which funds were used to make the ministering vessels.
  We now see that this is a tannaitic dispute. This mishnah (Shekalim 4:4) deals with money left over from the previous year’s appropriation of funds to be used for the sacrificial service. I am not going to explain every detail of this mishnah (the altar’s “dessert” refers to sacrifices put on the altar to keep it occupied when no other sacrifices needed to be offered). But we can easily see three opinions as to what funds are used to pay for the ministering vessels. Rabbi Ishmael says they come the surplus of the money dedicated for the sacrifices themselves. Rabbi Akiva says that they would use money left over from libations (see Shekalim 4:3). Whereas R. Hananiah says that the extra from the appropriation itself is used for the ministering vessels.Both  R. Hananiah and R. Akiva agree that it is not allowed to make a profit from the sale of the produce, as was R. Ishmael’s opinion. The Talmud will return to this issue below.
  This section explains what the “produce” in section one of that mishnah refers to. However, according to this baraita, these profits were used to keep the altar busy when there were no other sacrifices to offer. This accords with R. Ishmael’s opinion from above.
  Rabbi Akiva does not agree with Rabbi Ishmael that a profit can be made from the purchase and then sale of produce bought with Temple funds. This text is Shekalim 4:3, the mishnah that immediately precedes the one we quoted above.
  This section explains R. Akiva’s opinion. One cannot make a profit with Temple funds, because selling produce and making a small profit is not appropriate for the wealth of the Temple. There should be no “poverty”—i.e. acts that a poor person would do—in the place of wealth—the Temple. Doing so would cheapen the Temple.One cannot make a profit with money given to the poor lest the poor come anThis is still a relevant question today. Charities regularly invest funds they have been given, for in this way they can better perform the missions to which they were entrusted.  The problem is that investments are risky, and in the end, when the money is needed, if it was not invested properly, it might not be there.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya returns to the topic discussed in the mishnah—the maintenance money for a woman whose husband has gone abroad.
  Rav states that if a married woman comes to the court, claiming that her husband went abroad and left her with no money, the court allocates for her money from her husband’s estate to maintain her until he returns. But Shmuel holds that the court does not. Shmuel’s reasoning will be explained below.
  
  Daf 107a
  
  Shmuel often refers to Rav as “Abba” for that was Rav’s real name. According to Shmuel, Rav agrees that during the first three months of his absence, she does not receive any allowance because we can assume that he did not leave his house completely lacking in any provisions. She does not need any extra provisions.
  If the court knows that the husband died, then both rabbis agree that she does receive maintenance because she is a widow. But they disagree if there has been no report of his death. Rav says that they do allot money to pay for her maintenance, because he is obligated to do so.  We shall explain Shmuel below.
  According to R. Zevid, Shmuel holds that she does not receive maintenance money because we are concerned that her husband already gave her money (or things to sell) to cover her maintenance.Papa is concerned lest the husband made a deal before he left that she would use her earnings to cover her expenses. The Talmud will delve into this subject in greater detail below.
  There are two practical halakhic differences between R. Zevid and R. Papa. With an adult wife, he may have given her money. If her earnings are not enough to cover her expenses, R. Zevid would say she does not receive maintenance because we are concerned he gave her money, whereas R. Papa would say that she does receive maintenance because she does not earn enough to cover her expenses. If she is a minor, he cannot legally give her money. Therefore, even if she earns enough to cover her expenses, R. Zevid would say she receives maintenance. But R. Papa would say she does not because the husband may have told her to use her earnings to cover her expenses, and she does earn enough to do so.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues the discussion of whether a court will allot maintenance money to a woman whose husband has gone abroad. According to Rav they do, and according to Shmuel they do not.
  The Mishnah is raised as a difficulty against Shmuel. Both disputing parties in the Mishnah agree that the wife receives maintenance. The only question was regard to the oaths that she must take.Shmuel resolves the difficulty by saying that this was a case where they had heard that the husband had died. In such a case he agrees that she receives maintenance, as I explained in yesterday’s section.
  This is in essence the same difficulty as above. The baraita adds that if a husband states that he left her with provisions and he takes an oath to such, he is believed and she will have to return all the money she used to buy provisions.
  The resolution is the same as above. The court will order her husband’s property sold and the proceeds used for her provisions only if they have heard that he died. The Talmud interprets the end of the baraita to mean that if he comes back after he was reported (falsely) as having died, he is believed.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues the discussion of whether the court will sell a man’s property to provide for his wife if he went abroad. Do we assume that he left provisions for her?
  This baraita discusses a situation where a woman was left without provisions, but before she could sell her husband’s property, he came back and said that she should use her earnings to provide for herself. If her earnings were sufficient to provide for her, then the husband may make this statement.But if the court already stipulated that his property should be sold, then what she has sold is sold. Again, this is a difficulty against Shmuel who holds that the court does not sell his property to provide for her.Again, the Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that this is a situation where there was a report that he died.
  Again, this source is a difficulty on Shmuel.
  Sheshet resolves the difficulty by saying that in this case, the husband was already providing for his wife through an agent. If the agent runs out of money by which to sustain the wife, then the court may sell the property to provide for her. But without such an arrangement, they may not.
  If the husband appointed an agent, then why doesn’t the court sell the property to provide for the children? Why just the wife? The simple answer seemed to be that without any instructions the court provides for his wife because he is obligated to do so. But he is not obligated to provide for his children as we learned earlier in the tractate. But if he appointed an agent, then why not sell property to provide for all of them?The answer is that he specifically told the agent to provide for his wife but not for his children.
  The problem with the above solution is that it is random and uncertain. How do we know that the baraita refers only to a situation where he appointed an agent to provide for his wife but not his children?Papa therefore provides a more logical answer. There is one witness that the husband has died. Now with one witness, the wife is allowed to remarry. Therefore, to her, he is dead. The court may now go sell his property to provide for her. But with only one witness, the children do not inherit. Therefore, they do not receive provisions for to him, he is not dead.
  According to R. Hisda, in the first case the court would give her cosmetics, whereas in the second, they would not. R. Joseph says that the court would give her charity for her to divide to someone else, but not in the second case.The Talmud now evaluates the relationship between these two opinions.The one who said that she does not receive cosmetics (the case where he went abroad) would say that in such a case they also do not provide her with charity to give to others. But the opposite is not true—the one who said they don’t give her charity would hold that they do give her cosmetics because we can assume that the husband would want her to look nice while he is away.
  
  Daf 107b
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the issue of a woman whose husband has gone abroad.
  The baraita here discusses a woman awaiting levirate marriage (yevamah). During the first three months after the death of her husband, she is still maintained from her husband’s estate. During this period she may not remarry, therefore she receives from her husband and not the levir. After that period, she is not legally entitled to maintenance from either her husband or the levir (the husband’s brother). We should note that usually a widow does receive maintenance from her husband’s estate because there is an assumption that she does not want to remarry because she wants to honor her husband. But here she has no choice—she requires yibbum or halitzah (levirate marriage or release therefrom). Once she is released from levirate marriage, she would be maintained from her husband’s estate.If the levir is instructed by the court to either marry her or release her and he runs away, then she does receive maintenance from the levir’s property.This last line seems to be a difficulty against Shmuel. The yavam ran away and nevertheless, she may sue for maintenance from his estate.
  Shmuel could respond that this case is different from the case of a husband who went abroad. Since the levir has not yet married her, there is no reason to be concerned that he gave her some of his possessions to sell from which she could draw provisions. And we are also not concerned that he told her that she can keep her earnings, because a yevamah, a woman awaiting levirate marriage, does not need to give her earnings to the yavam. Even if he provides for her, she keeps her earnings until they are married. Thus this particular case is not indicative of the rule in other cases.
  We can see in the second half of this baraita, that if the woman’s husband is abroad, and she claims that he divorced her, she may collect her maintenance. Again, this is a difficulty against Shmuel.
  Again, the Talmud resolves the difficulty by positing that she is maintained only in a case where there is a report that he died.If so, the Talmud asks, then why is the maintenance limited to the amount of her ketubah?The answer is that she has caused the loss to herself  by claiming that she is a divorcee Divorcees are not entitled to maintenance. Therefore, she cannot collect more than her ketubah. Should the husband return and affirm her statement, then she has received her ketubah. Should he say that he did not divorce her, then she is married and took her provisions legitimately.
  This baraita refers to a girl who was married off by her mother or brother as a minor. When she hits majority age she may annul the marriage by “refusal.” There is a saying quoted according to which a girl who refuses marriage does not receive maintenance. Obviously this cannot refer to a girl who has actually refused marriage—she’s not married so she clearly does not receive provisions from her husband. It also cannot refer to a girl still married to her husband, because he certainly owes her maintenance. Therefore, the baraita concludes, it can refer only to a girl whose husband has gone abroad. If she borrowed money for provisions, spent it and then refused the marriage, he need not pay her back. However, the clear implication is that if she did not refuse the marriage, he is obligated to pay her maintenance. Again, the baraita is a difficulty against Shmuel.
  Again Shmuel could respond that this case is different from a normal case of a husband who went abroad. He assumedly did not give her bundles (i.e. valuables which she could sell) because people do not give bundles to minors, especially not valuable ones. Also, he cannot say to her to use her handiwork to provide for her maintenance because minors do not earn enough to provide for themselves. To reiterate, a wife is guaranteed provisions even if she does not earn enough to cover the costs. Therefore, again this is a special case not indicative of the rule governing a regular wife whose husband goes abroad.
  IntroductionAfter an extended, but abstract, discussion of the case of a woman whose husband has gone abroad and has purportedly not left her with provisions, the Talmud tries to determine what the actual halakhah is in this situation.
  We can see here that Rabbi Judah Hanasi said that she does receive maintenance, whereas R. Yishmael said that she does not.
  Yohanan raises a difficulty on R. Yishmael—in the mishnah all parties agree that she receives maintenance! They only argue over the oath that she must take that she did not take more than she was supposed to receive.
  Shemen gives the same resolution we have seen over and over that was originally issued by Shmuel. She receives maintenance only if the court has heard that the husband died. R. Yohanan seems to remain skeptical of this answer.
  This is a slightly different version of the same material we saw before. The only real difference is that the positions of Rabbi and R. Yishmael have been reversed.
  IntroductionThis is the conclusion of our sugya about whether a court provides an allowance for a wife whose husband has gone abroad. In other words, does the court sell his property without his permission in order to provide for his wife.
  The court does rule in her favor.
  This is another related issue that came up during this long sugya. A wife may say to her husband that she wants to provide for herself. She does not want to give her earnings to him, and is okay with not being provided for by him.
  It is entirely unclear why this statement is here. The issue is whether glazen vessels will absorb the material cooked or eaten on them. According to R. Zevid, if they are glazed white or black, they do not absorb taste and therefore as long as they are clean, they may be used even though they were earlier used with non-kosher food (or with meat/dairy and now one wants to use the opposite). Vessels glazed green do absorb and therefore are forbidden. However, in all cases, if the vessel is at all cracked, the taste will be absorbed and the vessel is forbidden.
  IntroductionThe format of this mishnah is identical to the mishnah that opened the chapter. The subject is whether or not a person who provided out of his own pocket for a woman whose husband went overseas without leaving her with provisions can demand his money back from the husband.
  According to Hanan, the person who financially supported the wife cannot recover his money, since there was no promise from the husband that he would repay him, nor was there any indication from the woman that she was receiving his help as a loan.  He helped her out of the goodness of his own heart, but this does not give him the right to recover his expenses.
  The sons of the high priests rule that the man can take an oath when the husband returns and recover what he spent.  This is probably because the husband neglected the basic responsibility for providing for his wife.  He should not, therefore, benefit from the other man’s generosity.  Furthermore, we might assume that the man did not provide for her as a gift but rather assumed that he would recover his money.
  Again, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agrees with the sons of the high priests.  Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai uses some colorful language to express his agreement with Hanan.  The provider has “put his money on the horn of a deer”.  Just as a deer will run away and be hard to catch, so too the provider has made his money hard to recover.
  IntroductionYesterday’s mishnah discussed paying off other people’s debt. Today’s sugya refers to a mishnah from Nedarim that discusses a related topic. As background, Shimon can take an oath that Reuven will not receive any benefit from him. The question this mishnah asks is—what counts as a benefit.
  When the Temple still stood every Jew had to send a half shekel every year for the upkeep of the Temple.  Even if Reuven cannot receive benefit from Shimon, Shimon may pay his half shekel.  Similarly, Shimon may pay off Reuven’s debts.Shimon may also return a lost object to Reuven because he is only returning to Reuven what is already his.  Furthermore, all Shimon is doing is fulfilling the mitzvah of returning lost objects.If people customarily offer financial rewards to someone who returns a lost object, Shimon may not turn down Reuven’s offer of a reward, because by doing so he would be giving financial benefit to Reuven.  If Shimon does not want to just take the money, he may donate it to the Temple by making it sacred property.
  
  Daf 108a
  
  The Talmud proves that when one pays the shekel on another’s behalf, he is not providing him with a direct benefit. This is proven from a mishnah which states that when the Temple treasurers remove funds from the Temple treasury to buy sacrifices, they do so also on behalf of those whose shekel was lost, was collected and had not yet arrived or those whose shekels had not yet been collected, even if they will not be collected. Thus, in essence, even if one does not give his shekel to the Temple, he is still considered as having participated in the Temple service.
  Again, we can understand that one who restores a lost object is performing a mitzvah, and not providing benefit for the person who lost the object. But repaying someone’s debt, how can that not count as providing benefit directly to him?
  Oshaya solves the problem by saying that the mishnah from Nedarim refers to a similar situation in our mishnah in Ketubot, where the person obligated, the husband, does not have to pay off the debt at all. If Shimon pays off a debt of Reuven’s that Reuven could have gotten away without paying, then the one who benefits is not Reuven (parallel to the husband). It is the creditor (parallel to the wife).
  Rava offers another solution. This mishnah is dealing with a case where the borrower borrowed money on condition that he must repay only when he wants to do so. Thus by repaying the debt the third party is providing a service for the creditor, but not for the borrower.
  Rava did not resolve the difficulty as did R. Oshaia because Rava prefers that the mishnah accord with the rabbis and not just Hanan.Oshaia did not answer like Rava because he holds that by paying back the debt, the third party confers a benefit on the debtor even if the debtor made an agreement not to pay back the debt. Debtors feel embarrassed at owing money, so he is saving him from this embarrassment. This is a tangible benefit and one who may not provide benefit to another person may not save them from embarrassment either.
  
  Daf 108b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with the next mishnah of the chapter. The mishnah now begins to list Admon’s rulings.  You will note that instead of the “sons of the high priests” or R. Yohanan ben Zakkai, in these mishnayoth R. Gamaliel is the respondent.The first ruling deals with a situation in which a man dies and does not leave an estate large enough for his sons to inherit and his daughters to be maintained. This same teaching is also found in Mishnah Bava Batra 9:1.
  According to Jewish inheritance law, daughters do not inherit if there are sons.  According to a mandatory stipulation written in every ketubah (this was learned in Mishnah Ketubot 4:11), girls are provided for by the man’s inheritance until they reach a certain age, or are married.  If the estate is sufficient, then both of these rules can be fulfilled and there is no problem.
  If, however, there was not enough property, the daughters’ maintenance takes precedence over the sons inheritance.  In such a case the sons will have to beg at people’s doors.  In what might seem like an ironic statement to some women reading this mishnah, Admon complains that one should not lose out just because he is male.  It is not entirely clear from the mishnah itself what Admon thinks the halakhah should be.  In any case, Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Admon.  We should note that the accepted halakhah is against Admon.
  Abaye tries to explain why Admon thinks that since he is male, he should not lose out. Abaye answers that the male privilege is a result of the fact that men study Torah (and are commanded to study according to rabbinic law), whereas women are not. Thus Admon thinks that males (including himself) should receive priority in inheritance, because only they are engaging in what is probably the supreme value of the rabbis—the study of Torah.
  Rava disagrees with Abaye. The rights of the sons are in essence equal to the rights of the daughters in the case of a small estate. Just because sons inherit if the estate is large, does not mean that in the opposite scenario, they lose out. Each case, at least according to Admon, should be judged on its own.
  IntroductionChapter six of Mishnah Shevuot teaches that one who admits to part of a debt, must take an oath that he does not owe the rest.  Today’s section contains a mishnah which deals with the case where Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him jars of oil and Shimon admitted only that he owes empty jars.  The question is, is this a case of partial admission.  The same mishnah was brought in Mishnah Shevuoth 6:3.
  In this scenario Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him jars of oil.  Shimon admitted that he owed Reuven jars but denied that he owed the oil.  According to Admon, an early Sage, this is considered a partial admission to the claim:  Reuven claimed jars and oil and Shimon admitted only to the jars but denied the oil.  Therefore Shimon must swear that he doesn’t owe the oil.  The other sages who disagree with Admon say that Reuven really only claimed oil.  The fact that Reuven said “jars of oil” was in order to express the amount of oil that he was claiming from Shimon.  Since the claim and the admission were of different kinds, Shimon does not swear.  Rabban Gamaliel says that he agrees with Admon.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to examine the reasons underlying the mishnah we learned yesterday.
  In the mishnah, Reuven says that Shimon owes him jugs of oil, and Shimon admits to owing the jugs but not the oil. The rabbis hold that he is exempt from the oath because this is not a partial admission. This is compared here to a case where Reuven claims that Shimon owes him wheat and barley and Shimon admitted only to the barley (or the wheat). If he too is exempt, then this is a refutation of R. Nahman’s statement in the name of Shmuel.
  Rav Judah says the mishnah refers to a case where Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him a certain amount of oil. He didn’t mean “jugs of oil”—he meant the amount of oil contained in a certain number of jugs. Thus when Shimon says that he owes him jugs, this is not a partial admission. In contrast, when Shimon admits to owing barley, it is a partial admission.
  The problem with Rav Judah’s answer is that while it makes sense of the sages, it does not make sense of Admon. If Reuven is claiming an amount of oil, and Shimon admits to owing jugs, then Admon should not categorize this as a partial admission.Therefore, Rava reinterprets the argument in the mishnah. The argument is over the meaning of language. Does “you owe me ten jars of oil” refer to an amount of oil (the sages think so) or to jugs and oil (Admon thinks so). Thus Admon says that when Shimon admits to owing jugs, he has admitted to part of the claim, whereas to the rabbis, he has not.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues the discussion of the mishnah. Yesterday, Rava interpreted the dispute between the sages and Admon to be over a case where Reuven said to Shimon, “You have ten jugs of oil of mine” and Shimon admitted to owing empty jugs. According to Admon this is a partial admission. According to the rabbis it is not.
  If we held that “you owe me jugs of oil” means both jugs and oil, then admitting that he owes “jugs” would be considered a partial admission. The sages would agree. But this would then be a refutation of R. Hiyya b. Abba who holds that when Reuven claims wheat and barley and Shimon admits to owing one of them, Shimon has not admitted to part of the claim and need not take an oath.
  Shimi b. Ashi said that the mishnah is not a case of claiming two things—jugs and oil. It is a case of claiming one thing, just as is claiming a pomegranate with its peel. This way the mishnah is not a difficulty against R. Hiyya.
  Ravina thinks that this interpretation of the mishnah does not make sense.
  Ravina reinterprets the mishnah such that it makes sense but is not the same as the case of one who claims wheat and barley and the other admits to one of them.In the mishnah, Reuven says that Shimon owes ten jugs of oil. Shimon admits to owing five jugs. The rabbis say that Reuven did not claim any jugs. Therefore, Shimon does not take an oath. But Admon says that Reuven claimed jugs and oil. However, if Shimon admitted to owing jugs, this would not be a partial admission. What makes it a partial admission is that he admits to owing only five jugs. Therefore, Shimon must take an oath that he does not owe him the other five jugs. And while he’s at it, he must also take an oath that he does not owe him the oil.
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with the case of a father-in-law who at the time of betrothal promised to give his prospective son-in-law money and then reneged on his promise, before the marriage to his daughter.  From the mishnah it is not entirely clear why he reneges, or whether he just cannot afford to pay the promised sum.  The question is, what happens to the daughter in this case if the son-in-law does not want to marry her until the father gives him the money.We can see here in this mishnah a reflection where marriage choice was often tied to economic matters.  Indeed, this was typically the situation in most Jewish marriages, and probably in most non-Jewish marriages as well, until modern times.  This is not to say that attraction between the couple was not a factor at all; just that it was probably not the primary factor.
  In this situation, the father has reneged on the money, but the girl is already betrothed to the man.  She cannot marry anyone else without first receiving a get.  According to the first opinion, the son-in-law can effectively hold the girl hostage as a betrothed woman, until the father-in-law pays him the promised money.  This is certainly a grave situation for her, much worse than not being married at all.
  
  Daf 109a
  
  Admon holds that since it is not the girl’s fault that her father reneged, she can force the husband to either marry her or divorce her so that she may marry others.  If she herself had promised the money, the husband could force her to remain betrothed and not married or divorced.  However, since the father made the promise, why should she suffer. Again, Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Admon.
  IntroductionToday’s section brings up a different version of the dispute found in the mishnah we learned yesterday.
  In this version of the dispute, all tannaim agree that if the father promised the money and then defaulted, the girl can force her prospective husband to either divorce her or marry her without the money. Since the father promised the money, even the sages agree that she cannot be held accountable. They disagree about a case where the daughter herself promised the money. The sages say that the husband can leave her hanging. But Admon says that even in this case, she can force the husband to either divorce her or marry her without the money.
  A baraita makes a distinction between a girl of majority age and a minor. The above baraita applies only to a girl of majority age. When it comes to a minor, force is used.But the baraita is unclear—who is forced to do what? If the father is forced to pay, then the opposite should have been true. A girl who is of majority age can make a valid promise. So her father should have been forced to pay, and not the minor. Therefore, Rava interprets in the opposite way. If the girl is a minor, all agree that they force the husband to give a get, because the girl’s promise is not valid at all.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the halakhic ruling that emerges from the Mishnah.
  In all cases, even in those found in baraitot (non-mishnaic, tannaitic sources) in which Rabban Gamaliel says that he agrees with Admon, the halakhah follows Admon.
  Zera seems to say that the halakhah always follows Hanan and never follows Admon.
  The problem with this interpretation of R. Zera is that if he rules that the halakhah is never like Admon, then his statement disagrees with the statement made by R. Yitzchak b. Elazar. The assumption seems to be that the two statements should agree.
  The meaning of R. Zera’s statement is reinterpreted. It does not mean that halakhah does not accord with Admon himself. Rather it means that the halakhah does not agree with halakhot that are similar to Admon’s halakhot.
  There is still a problem. R. Zera still implies that the halakhah always follows Admon. But R. Yitzchak b. Elezar says that the halakhah follows Admon only if Rabban Gamaliel agrees with him. The halakhah does not always follow Admon.
  The Talmud fixes the statement one more time. The halakhah does not always agree with Admon, only sometimes. But the halakhah always follows those who rule similarly to him.
  IntroductionThe fourth ruling stated by Admon is not connected at all to the issue of marriage, but rather has to deal with a person who signed on another person’s deed to a piece of land but later claims that the land is actually his own.  Note that in this and the following mishnayoth, Admon disputes with the Sages and that Rabban Gamaliel is absent.  It seems that this is a second collection of Admon’s sayings, joined by the editors of the Mishnah to the first.
  In this case Reuven claims that a piece of land that Shimon possesses is actually his.  Shimon proves that the land is his by showing a sale document on which Reuven is signed as a witness.  The deed says that Shimon bought the land from Levi.  Shimon says that Reuven’s signature is de facto proof that he admits that the land is Shimon’s.According to Admon, Reuven may claim that he signed on the deed because he preferred to claim the land from Shimon than claim it from Levi.  His signature on the deed is therefore not proof that he has admitted that the land belongs to Shimon.  He can still bring other proof that the land belongs to him.The Sages disagree and state that the signature is proof of such an admission and therefore even if Reuven brings proof that the land actually belongs to him, he cannot reclaim it.
  In this case, Reuven again claims that a piece of land that Shimon possesses actually belongs to him.  However, Shimon brings a deed of sale for another piece of land, in which Reuven used the piece of land under dispute as a border marker for the property being sold.  Reuven would not have used this piece of land as a border marker had he thought the land belonged to him himself.  Since in this case Reuven cannot say he did so because litigation with the second is easier, he has lost his right to make a claim.
  According to Abaye, only if a witness is signed on the document does he lose the right to claim it for himself. But since judges may sign a document even though they have not read it, their signature on the document is not an admission that the field is not theirs. Judges do not affirm that the document is correct. They are affirming that the witnesses who signed on it are who they say they are.
  
  Daf 109b
  
  IntroductionWe learned yesterday that “If [the protester] made [a piece of land] a boundary mark [when selling an adjacent piece of land to] another person he has lost his right [to protest].” Today, Abaye limits this halakhah. There follows a story where this incident actually occurs.
  Abaye limits the ruling in the mishnah to a case where the person uses the field as a sign for a sale to another person. This is an admission that the field belongs to the other person. But if he uses it as a sign for a sale of the adjacent field to himself he can claim that this is not an admission that the field belonged to the other person. He could say that he signed it only so that he could get the field that he is currently buying. If the other person should say that the signee should have declared that he was only signing because he wanted to buy the other field, the signee could retort that had he made such a declaration, the other person would have eventually heard that he had made such a declaration.
  Reuven cites a field as belonging to Shimon as a boundary marker when selling a field to another person. He then claimed that the field he cited as belonging to Shimon actually belongs to him. Then Reuven dies and a guardian was appointed to pursue the claim on his heirs’ behalf. The guardian came in front of Abaye who quoted the mishnah to him. Reuven tacitly admitted that the field belonged to Shimon and therefore cannot claim it belongs to him.
  The guardian says that while Reuven admitted that part of the field belonged to Shimon, he did not necessarily admit that it all belonged to Shimon. At a minimum he was admitting that only one furrow, the one that lays on the border, belonged to Shimon. Abaye cites a statement by R. Yohanah that basically says as much. Still Reuven’s heirs must at least one furrow of this field to Shimon.
  The guardian now goes even further and claims that although Reuven once signed on a document tacitly admitting that the field (or at least a furrow) belonged to Shimon, he (or his heirs) could claim that while Reuven did once sell the furrow to Shimon, he bought it back. Again, Abaye accepts this claim and says that even this furrow belongs to Reuven’s heirs.Finally Abaye notes, quite correctly, what an astute guardian this was. For by knowing the statements made by R. Yohanan, this guardian was able to collect the field on behalf of the heirs.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with another dispute between Admon and the sages.
  A man owns a path that goes to his field through other fields. When the man returns from having gone abroad, the path has been overgrown (for no one was there to take care of it) and it is no longer distinguishable from the remainder of the field.  Admon says that he may walk through the shortest path available to get to his field.The owner of the field through which he walks must allow him to use this ground.  However, he can only take the shortest path, since that is the least damaging.The Sages say that he must purchase a path from the owner of the field through which he wants to walk, even if that owner will only sell it to him for a hundred maneh (10,000 zuz, an exaggerated amount).  His only alternative is to fly through the air to get to his field.
  Rav tries to explain why the sages force the man to purchase a path. It would seem obvious that he once had a path through his fellow’s field, and thus he should have to give it to him. Rav answers that the purported path is surrounded by four fields owned by different people. Each one claims that the path was originally in the field of the other person. Therefore, while it is obvious that the claimant once owned a path, there is no way of knowing in whose field it was.
  If all four fields are owned by different owners, then why would Admon say that he can force one of them to give him a shortcut through his field? Rava answers that if all four fields are owned by four different owners, and have always been, then indeed, Admon would agree that the claimant does not receive a shortcut. The same is true if all four fields were bought from one person. Admon and the sages disagree only if one person currently owns all four fields, but they were bought from four different original owners. Admon would hold that since the path was originally in one field, and currently all four are owned by one person, he can force the current owner to give him a short cut. After all the path must be in one of his fields.  But the sages hold that the current owner can say to him that if he will keep quiet, they might come to an agreement. But if he insists, he could return the fields to their owners and thereby avoid having to give up a path altogether.
  Joseph thinks that this is like the Mishnah because one of the male orphans owes the daughter a palm tree, but each argues that the other daughter owes it.
  Abaye argues that the two cases are different. A path can exist in only one field, and therefore the owner of each field could argue that the path is in the other’s field. But here, the palm tree is in their joint possession. Each brother owns a part of the palm tree that they owe her. They can fix the situation easily—give her a palm tree and redivide the property equally.
  Rav Ashi is not sure whether he would be fulfilling the dying man’s words by giving the two halves of the palm trees to the daughter. [The man shared two palm trees in partnership with another].
  Mordecai answers in the affirmative—he should give both halves of the palm tree, meaning the partnership in the palm tree, to the daughter.
  
  Daf 110a
  
  IntroductionIn the scenario in this mishnah, Reuven takes out a document that says that Shimon owes him money. Shimon claims that he paid back the debt, but that he lost his receipt.  The mishnah then discusses a possible clue that Shimon might bring to prove that he already paid Reuven back. Again, Admon and the Sages disagree.
  Reuven takes out a document which states that Shimon owes him money.  In response, Shimon takes out a sale document which shows that Reuven sold him a field.  Shimon says the fact that Reuven sold him a field and collected money from him, proves that Reuven didn’t believe that Shimon still owed him money.  Had Reuven thought that Shimon owed him money, he should have taken out the debt document then and taken the money and not given him the field.  Admon rules that Shimon’s words are accepted and that he does not have to repay the debt.However, the Sages rule that Reuven was clever.  He may have sold Shimon the land so that later if Shimon defaulted on the debt, Reuven would be able to collect the land.  In other words, the fact that Reuven sold him the land does not mean that Reuven didn’t think that Shimon owed him money.
  If the practice is to first pay and then write out the deed, then Reuven should have immediately recovered the debt when he received the money. The fact that after he received the money he wrote out a deed for the land indicates that Shimon did not owe him the money.
  If the practice is to first write out the deed, then it is theoretically possible that Reuven is giving Shimon land so that he can collect his debt from that land. But Admon would say that if this was his motive, he should have made a declaration to others that this is the only reason he is selling land. The sages say, as they did earlier in the Talmud, that making a secret declaration is not feasible because the rumor would go around. Since he could not make a declaration, we believe him when he says that the only reason he was selling the land was so that he could later recover his original debt.
  IntroductionThis sugya is based on another mishnah with another debate between Admon and the sages. It is a rather long and somewhat complicated passage.
  In this case Reuven has a document saying that Shimon borrowed from him, and Shimon has a later document that says that Reuven borrowed from him.  Shimon claims that he already paid Reuven back, but that he lost his receipt.According to Admon, Shimon says that if he really owed money to Reuven, how come Reuven did not just collect his debt, and instead borrowed money from him.  Since, according to Admon, this is not logical, it must be that Shimon did not owe Reuven money when Reuven borrowed.  Therefore, Shimon collects his debt and Reuven does not collect his.The Sages say that nevertheless, since both men have documents of debt, they can both collect.
  If the amounts here are the same, R. Sheshet says that there is no point in simply exchanging bags of money. R. Nahman says that each one still pays the other.
  If both litigants possess equivalent quality land from which the other would collect, then R. Nahman would agree that there is no point in exchanging similar pieces of land.
  If one has medium quality and the other worst quality land, then according to R. Nahman they do exchange the pieces of land. When land quality is assessed, it is assessed based on the quality of land in the possession of the borrower—what is his worst property, what is his medium level and what is his best. Debtors are supposed to pay back medium quality land. So the owner of the worst quality land would come and collect the medium quality from the other. This would now be his best land. Then when the other person collects, he could only take the worst quality land from him, because the medium quality land is now his best property. The loser in this deal is the one who started with medium quality land.
  Sheshet holds that the determination of the quality land is based on a general assessment of land all over, not on the quality of land owned by a particular person. Thus when the owner of the medium land gives his land to the owner of the low quality land, he will just take it back in return. It would be a pointless exchange.
  The problem with R. Nahman’s ruling is that it depends the owner of the worst quality land collecting first. If the owner of the medium quality collects the worst land first, then the other will come and just take back his own land.  So what’s the point?The Talmud answers that R. Nahman was indeed referring only to a case where the owner of the worst land collected first. If they collect at the same time, there indeed is no point.
  Even if one makes a claim before the other, when they come to collect it will be at the same time, in which case how can you ever determine who takes first. Therefore, a new answer is provided. One person has best and medium land and the other only worst land. According to R. Nahman, assessment is based on the land owned by the debtor. If the owner of the worst land collects first, he will take medium land and then give back his worst land, which is now medium level. Whereas according to R. Sheshet, he will collect medium land and return medium land, so again no point.
  The mishnah seems to rule like R. Nahman and against R. Sheshet. R. Nahman resolves the difficulty on R. Sheshet by saying that the mishnah refers to a case where the debts were for different periods of time. The Talmud will now explain this, and how it can fit into the debate between Admon and the sages.
  If the document with the earlier date was for ten years and the second document was for five, then Admon’s claim would not make any sense. The second did not owe the first money when the first loaned to him because the date to pay back the debt had not yet arrived. So by borrowing money from the second, the first was not admitting that the second did not already owe him money.
  Rather, the first document was a loan for five years and the second was a loan for ten years. But still, we have to figure out if the first loan had already come due. If it did, then why would the rabbis disagree with Admon. Indeed, it would be strange for Reuven to borrow from Shimon when Shimon already owed him money. And if the time of the debt had not come due, then what sense is there to Admon’s statement. Why shouldn’t Reuven borrow from Shimon—Shimon does not yet owe him the earlier debt?
  The Talmud limits the mishnah to a case where Reuven comes to loan money to Shimon on the day his loan to Shimon is due. The sages hold that it is not unusual for a person to borrow money for one day (he would have been paid back the next day). Therefore, borrowing from Shimon is not a sign that Shimon does not owe him the money. Admon would say that this is unusual. The fact that Reuven borrows from Shimon is a sign that Shimon does not owe him money.
  Rami b. Hama says that one of the debtors/creditors is an orphan (or more than one). Orphans can collect debts of their father, but debts cannot be recovered from the movable property they inherited. Rami b. Hama now has to change the language of the mishnah such that it accords with his words.
  Nahman offers two refutations of Rama b. Hama. First of all, his resolution does not accord with the wording of the Mishnah. Second, Reuven could pay the orphans back with land and then re-collect it, as R. Nahman noted elsewhere, that in general orphans pay back debts with land they have recently collected.
  The Talmud finds another way to make sense of the mishnah. When creditors collect from orphans, they collect only worst quality land. So Reuven will give the orphans his medium quality land and then only be able to collect the orphan’s worst quality land. This is why the rabbis could say that they switch plots, without such a switch being meaningless.
  This ruling about collecting only worst land from orphans is true only when the creditor had not yet seized the property. But if he has seized medium level land, he need not return it. Since Reuven originally owned the medium quality land, it is as if it was already seized. And therefore, there would be no meaning to their exchange. This refutes Rami b. Hama.
  IntroductionThe final two mishnayoth of Ketuboth deal mostly with a husband (and in the next mishnah) a wife’s ability to force the other spouse to change residences.The mishnah in today’s section presents limitations on when a husband is allowed to force his wife to move.  Note that if both parties agree to the move, there is no problem.  The mishnah only discusses cases where one party does not want to move.We should also note that when the mishnah mentions “force” it does not mean that the husband can physically force his wife to move.  It means that if she disagrees, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah.  The Mishnah never sanctions physical force of a wife.  The consequences of non-compliance are economic.
  The mishnah divides the land of Israel into three parts: Judea, the other side of the Jordan river (Transjordan) and the northern region the Galilee.  This separation is important for issues of marriage because, as we shall see, a husband can never force his wife to move from one region to another, but within the same region he can sometimes force her to move with him.
  The husband cannot force his wife to move from one region to another, even from one town (small) to another town, or from one city (larger than a town) to another city.  However, within the same region he may force her to move from one type to the same type; from a town to a town or from a city to a city.  He may never force her to move from a town to a city, for she may like the intimacy of living in a small town.  Similarly, he may never force her to move from a city to a town, for she may prefer the hustle and bustle of the city.  The mishnah does not believe that either a city or a town is objectively better than the other; both have pluses and minuses.
  
  Daf 110b
  
  According to the first opinion, no woman should prefer to live in an inferior dwelling place.  In this case, we can objectively determine which is preferable and therefore the husband can force his wife to move.Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that a superior dwelling place is not necessarily in every way better than an inferior one.  The superior dwelling “tests” the body. This means that any move may be harmful to one’s physical health, even to a better place.  Therefore, if the woman does not want to move, her husband cannot force her to do so.An alternative explanation for “tests” is that in a superior dwelling a woman will constantly have to check her appearance.  She may not want the pressure of having to always keep up appearance in front of the neighbors.
  As I said above, while most people in talmudic times would have preferred living in a city, due to the easy availability of goods, some people seem to have preferred smaller towns. This is proven by R. Yose from a verse which implies that it was hard to get volunteers to move to Jerusalem. Those willing to move to Jerusalem were blessed by all.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says that “a superior dwelling tests.” What does this mean?
  “Tests” refers to a change of diet, which can lead to GI distress. Just ask anyone who visits a foreign country and tries some new food.
  The Talmud quotes Proverbs but attributes this quote and the following one to the book of Ben Sira. Ben Sira is the only non-canonical book named and quoted as Scripture in the Talmud. It is a book much like Proverbs, and hence the confusion between it and Proverbs. It was probably not included in the canon because it was attributed to Ben Sira, a Second Temple priest, and not Solomon, as was the case with Proverbs. Once not included in the canon, Hebrew copies became scarce. It was preserved by the Church and is included in the Apocrypha, where it is often called Ecclesiasticus. But some Hebrew manuscripts were found in the Cairo Geniza. Today the originally has been mostly reconstructed based on these manuscripts and on the Greek translation.The first quote is brought here because it too is interpreted in light of Shmuel’s statement.The second quote is brought here because of the first. It too refers to the life of a poor person. His roof is low and his vineyard is high. Water runs into his home and earth runs off of his vineyard.
  IntroductionThe final mishnah of Ketubot deals with the important and moving problem of a couple, one of whom wants to make aliyah to Israel and one of whom does not.  The second subject with which this mishnah deals are cases in which a man married his wife in one place and divorced her in another.  The question is, with which coinage must he pay her ketubah?
  If one of the members of the household, either the husband or the wife, wishes to move from outside of the land to the land of Israel, s/he may compel the other to join.  As I stated before, “compelling” does not imply physical compulsion.  Rather what it implies is that if the other party does not agree to go, there is a financial penalty.  If the wife wants to go and the husband does not, the wife may receive her ketubah; if the husband wants to go and the wife does not, the husband may divorce his wife without paying her the ketubah.  The opposite is true with regard to staying in the land of Israel.  Anyone can financially compel the other to stay.The same is true with regard to moving from outside of Jerusalem to Jerusalem.  Either party may force the other party to move up to Jerusalem, but neither may force the other to leave Jerusalem for other parts of Israel.Some versions of the mishnah read that even a slave has this right.  However, even according to these versions, a slave only has the right to prevent a move, but does not have the right to force his master to move to Israel or to Jerusalem.One may legitimately wonder whether these mishnayoth were issues of practice.  It seems to me more likely that this is the way that the rabbis express their values.  Rather than just stating that it aliyah is a mitzvah, or that it is at least an important value to move to Israel and to stay there, the rabbis express their values in concrete halakhah.  Values are important not just as values; they must also be manifested by our actions.  I realize that I am probably touching a nerve here.  Most people reading this do not live in Israel and yet probably feel that they do value the state of Israel.  The perennially asked question is “How can one be a Zionist and not live in Israel?”  I don’t have a particularly good answer for this tension, only that it is a choice that a person might make and with which s/he will have to live.  At least we should recognize that we do have a choice as to where we live.
  If a man marries and divorces in the land of Israel, he of course has to pay the ketubah using the coinage of the land of Israel.  The question arises if one of the actions occurs outside of the land.  If he marries her in the land of Israel, and divorces her in Cappadocia (the name of a land in Asia Minor), he must still pay the ketubah using the coinage of the land of Israel.  This is because the debt was incurred in the land of Israel.  If he marries her in Cappadocia and divorces her in Israel, there is a debate between Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and the anonymous opinion.  According to the anonymous opinion, he must pay the ketubah using Israeli coinage; according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel he uses Cappadocian coinage.All of the Sages agree that if he marries and divorces in Cappadocia, he pays the ketubah with Cappadocian coinage.
  The mishnah says “all may force” and then lists men and women. This is repetitive—why say “men and women” when it includes all? The answer is that it includes slaves—slaves may force their masters to move to Israel, or at least let them move to Israel. For those rabbis who include slaves in the mishnah already, the words “all” come to include forcing one to move from a superior dwelling place to a bad one. In other words even if one’s home is nicer in the Diaspora, one can force the other to move to Israel.The sugya will now continue to try to figure out what the word “all” comes to include in the rest of the mishnah.
  A slave who flees from outside of Israel into Israel cannot be forced to go back to his original master. If his original master wants to, he can sell him in the land of Israel. Now I realize that selling slaves is not something we condone today. But this is still a remarkable value statement. The settling of the land of Israel is more important than the fact that someone is losing rights over his property.
  A husband/wife can force their partner to move to Jerusalem, even if it is from better to worse housing.
  One cannot compel his/her spouse to leave Jerusalem even if it is to a better dwelling place.The final clause of the mishnah does not include anything we do not already know. It was taught in order to preserve the parallel between the different halves of the mishnah.
  This baraita teaches what I explained above. The consequences of not consenting are not physical. Rather, if the woman does not consent she may be divorced without receiving the ketubah. And if the man refuses, he must divorce his wife.
  IntroductionThis section begins to discuss the second part of the mishnah, concerning which currency must be used to pay the ketubah payment. I should note that there is a big difference between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi concerning this mishnah. The Bavli believes that Cappodocian coins are worth more, whereas the Yerushalmi thinks Israeli coins are worth more. Furthermore, both Talmudim get into a discussion of whether a ketubah is “from the Torah” or “from the rabbis.” I would read this as a legal argument more than an historical one. If the ketubah is from the Torah, then it must be paid out in the higher currency. As far as its actual historical origins, it seems clear that the notion of a marriage payment exists in the Torah. On the other hand, the mechanics of how a ketubah worked may have changed over the centuries, such that in some ways, how it works is “rabbinic.”
  What is the operative principle in the Mishnah? Does he pay her with coins from the place in which they were married or the place in which they divorced? The mishnah seems to contradict itself.Rabbah answers that this is one of the leniencies with regard to the ketubah. Israeli coins are of lesser value, therefore if he marries her abroad and divorces her in Israel, or vice versa, he always pays her with the lesser coinage. This reflects the Babylonian perception that coins from Israel are of lesser value.
  Again, the assumption is that Cappadocian currency is more valuable. Since R. Shimon b. Gamaliel holds that he pays her with the higher value coins, he must hold that the ketubah is from the Torah. The rule is not lenient.
  When it comes to debt collection, the basic rule is that if the place of the debt is written in the document, then the coinage follows the place of the debt. If no place is written in it, then it follows the place of collection. If it does not specify the type of coinage, then the borrower may pay whatever type of coinage he wishes. Rashi interprets this to mean that the document says “100 coins.” The debtor can pay back the lowest value of silver coins.Finally the rule is different when it comes to the ketubah. The Talmud now clarifies what rule is different..
  The last clause is read as disagreeing with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. If the ketubah was written in Babylonian but collected in Israel, R. Shimon b. Gamaliel would hold that the woman collects with Babylonian coins, which are of higher value. This baraita holds that she collects with Israeli coins.
  If the document says “silver” we would not necessarily assume that it refers to a silver coin. It might mean a piece of silver. Only if it says “coin” do we assume that it is a coin.But how do we know it is not a really small coin, in which case the debtor could potentially pay next to nothing. The answer is that really small coins were made of copper, not silver.
  This text begins a series of debated between two viewpoints. The first viewpoint, represented well here, sees living in the Land of Israel as an end to itself. Even if the city in Israel is full of idolaters, the Land of Israel is God’s home and one who lives outside the Land, it is as if he is worshipping idols. We shall see other viewpoints as this long aggadic sugya continues on the next daf.
  IntroductionThis daf continues the dialogue over the value of moving to the land of Israel. We shall see a vigorous debate concerning this issue, with some sages prioritizing land over Torah (or at least Torah scholars and their learning) and others prioritizing the Torah and its scholars.
  Zera wants to go to the land of Israel, but R. Judah will not allow him to do so. R. Judah is the voice in the Talmud that represents the prioritization of the Torah-rich land of Babylonia over the historical and theological significance of Israel. By this period in history, the late third, early fourth century, there were probably more Torah scholars in Babylonia than there were in Palestine. R. Judah reads a verse from Jeremiah as saying that the holy vessels (in his reading, Torah scholars) must remain in Babylonia until the time that God brings them back to Israel. Obviously, R. Zera does not share this sentiment.
  
  Daf 111a
  
  Zera responds that the verse in Jeremiah refers to the vessels from the Temple. The Temple, by extension, will not be rebuilt until the coming of the messiah, when God will bring them back to Jerusalem. But individuals Jews may move from Babylonia to the land of Israel before the end of days.Judah now counters with another verse—a famous oath from Song of Songs. R. Judah reads this verse as alluding to an oath that God makes Israel swear that they will not “stir up the love,” meaning attempt to bring about the messianic age by returning to the land of Israel until the Messiah actually comes. I should note that this verse, and the continuation of the sugya, has historically been the justification for many Jews (mostly what we call the ultraorthodox) for not coming to the land of Israel.
  A dialogue now begins over how each sage interprets the verse the other sage used. R. Zera says that the verse from Song of Songs does not imply that individual Jews may not move to Israel. It means only that Jews should not go up as a “wall.” While the meaning of this term is not entirely clear, it is usually understood to mean that Jews should not move to Israel en masse. This midrash was often the source of modern religious anti-Zionist rhetoric. The Zionist movement broke with tradition by moving up to Israel “as a wall.”Judah responds that the rule that Jews cannot move to Israel “as a wall” comes from the second appearance of this verse in Song of Songs (the same verse appears again in 3:5).Zera notes that the verse actually appears three times (2:7, 3:5 and 8:4). Why repeat the same verse three times? Once for each of three oaths. The first is the prohibition of going up as a wall. The second is God’s making Israel swear that they will not rebel against the nations of the world. They will accept their subjugation among them. The third oath is that the nations may not oppress Israel “too much.” The Zionist counterclaim was that in the Holocaust the non-Jews broke their oath, and therefore the Jews were released from their oaths. This was offered as the religious justification of their participation in the Zionist movement, i.e. the breaking of one of the oaths.
  Judah seems to want to derive even more from the verse. Each verse has a doubling phrase in it, which is sufficient to prohibit individual Jews from moving to Israel.Zera pulls the same trick he did before. The doubling of the verbs in each verse alludes to six oaths (!), none of which prevents individuals from moving to Israel. The first three are those above. The next three have to do with not revealing the end of days, not delaying the end of days and not revealing the secret mysteries of God to the non-Jews. I would tell you what these secrets are, but I was put under oath by God not to do so. Come visit and maybe I’ll tell you in person J.My co-author and I will have a chapter on this sugya and especially on these oaths in our forthcoming volume II of Reconstructing the Talmud. So stay tuned.
  Elazar explains the imagery of deer and gazelles used in the verse.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues with the dialogue concerning the primacy of the value of living in the land of Israel.
  To R. Elazar, the very act of living in the land of Israel cleanses one of sin. Notably, though, the Babylonian amoraim read this verse very differently. Illness cleanses one of sin, not living in the land of Israel.
  Whereas R. Elazar lauded living in Israel, and perhaps we could understand that as the opportunity to fulfill the mitzvoth that can only be fulfilled in Israel, R. Anan believes that burial in Israel atones for sin, like the altar does. The implication might be that R. Elazar’s statement should be read that way too. Living in Israel is preferable not for a practical reason, but for a mystical reason—Israel is holy land.
  To R. Elazar living in the land of Israel is what is crucial. While he may not deny all value to being buried in the land, it is not the same. Interestingly, we see here a practice begun with Jacob and Joseph in the Bible. Leaders who die outside the land, are brought to Israel for burial.
  Not only does R. Hanina refuse to allow the man to leave Israel to marry his dead brother’s wife, he goes so far as to bless God for causing the brother to die. He even calls the man’s wife a “Cuthean” which usually means a Samaritan. It is as if to say that the mere fact that she lived outside the land implies that she is not a Jew.
  These Babylonian amoraim again shift the conversation away from the ontological superiority of the land of Israel to the Torah superiority of Babylonia, and within Babylonia, the superiority of Pumbedita over other places.
  Rabbah and R. Joseph make a statement that seems to prioritize Israel over Babylonia and Babylonia over all other places. But they do not clarify what these people are “fit” for. The normal meaning of “fit” in statements like this is genealogical. Those whose genealogy is pure in Babylonia could marry Jews from Israel, and those from outside of Babylonia could marry Jews in Babylonia. The problem is that elsewhere we learn that Babylonia is genealogically superior to other lands, even Israel. Israel is “dough” compared to Babylonia, meaning its genealogical lines are all mixed up. Thus the statement is reinterpreted to refer to burial. The fit in Babylonia are of a high enough level to be successfully buried in Israel. Evidently, the unfit are not.
  Again, Rav Judah voices the opinion that Babylonia is at least equivalent to the land of Israel.Abaye adds that Babylonia will be spared the suffering that will come with the advent of the Messianic age. This particular statement was interpreted as referring to a place known as Hutzal in Benjamin, a city in Babylonia. This place was called the “Horn of Salvation” for it will only experience salvation and not suffering.
  IntroductionThis sugya discusses resurrection outside of the land of Israel.
  According to R. Elazar, only those buried in the land of Israel will be resurrected. For those who believe (and still believe) in the resurrection of the dead, one can imagine what a strong statement this is, how much fear it could induce.
  Abba b. Memel uses a midrashic technique to prove that even Jews outside of the land will be resurrected. The verse that says that someone will not be resurrected is interpreted as referring to Nebuchadnezzar. Tzvi, the word that above means “desire” here means a deer, and is used in reference to Nebuchadnezzar. The verse has nothing to do with resurrection.
  Elazar now uses another prooftext to show that only the dead buried in Israel are “given life,” that is to say resurrected.
  What then does R. Elazar do with the verse that implies that dead bodies will arise elsewhere?  That verse refers to the resurrection of miscarriages. As long as they are buried in Israel, even a miscarriage will arise.
  Abba b. Memel has to find an interpretation for the verse that R. Elazar uses to prove that resurrection is reserved for those in Israel. R. Abba b. Memel says that it refers to a very limited case–Canaanite (non-Jewish) slave women who die in the land of Israel will inherit the world to come. By using a midrashic play on the word עם which can be read to mean either people or “with,” R. Ababu states that even those who are similar to donkeys, i.e. Canaanite slave women, will be resurrected.
  This is a midrash on the continuation of the verse from above from Isaiah. Here it is understood to mean that anyone who spends any time in the land of Israel is assured of the world to come. Again, we have a land-centric view being presented.I should also note that “resurrection” and “world to come” are not necessarily synonymous. The sugya sort of transitions from one to the other without really noting any distinction.
  Both Jacob and Joseph instruct their descendants to eventually carry their bones back to the land of Israel. But this is a problem in light of what we just learned—the righteous outside of the land of Israel will roll to Israel and be resurrected there. So why bother carrying their bones there? It’s a good question and probably is recognition that rabbinic eschatology does not add up to that in the Torah.In any case, the sugya answers that Jacob and Joseph might have been worried that they were not righteous enough to merit underground rolling.
  IntroductionThis sugya is a letter that Rabbah’s brothers sends to Rabbah. The letter opens with the tradition we learned at the end of yesterday’s sugya concerning Jacob. But then it continues with a series of other matters, unrelated to the issue at hand altogether.
  The first part of this letter that Rabbah’s brothers sent to him is the same as the tradition we ended yesterday’s sugya with. Jacob made his descendants carry his bones back to Canaan lest he not be worthy of rolling back underground.Ilfa (a sage) adds another tradition related to the importance of living in Israel. It relates to a certain man who wants to leave Israel to get married. But when he heard the statements about the importance of Israel, he refused to leave and suffered all of his life without getting married. I don’t know if this story is here to support the notion that Rabbah should return, or to give an explanation for why he might want to stay in Babylonia.
  Rabbah’s brothers urge him to leave Babylonia and come back to Israel where he can learn with the great teacher R. Yohanan.
  Since Rabbah does not seem likely to move to Israel, his brothers give him some health advice. The advice reminds me of my watch which tells me not to sit too much. I suppose standing too much could be bad for you as well, but I’m not sure that the advice not to walk too much is really borne out by science.
  
  Daf 111b
  
  Finally his brothers let him know the halakhic ruling regarding mating mules. It is forbidden to mate an animal with a different species. But what species are mules? According to R. Yehudah, they may mate only with other mules. I know, they’re generally sterile. But if the mule wants to give it a go, why not let him try?I must admit that this is just a puzzling letter. It contains some traditions about the value of living in Israel, some advice about standing, sitting and walking and a halakhah about mating mules. If anyone can come up with a good explanation what these three issues are doing together, I’d be happy to buy them a beer.
  IntroductionThis text contains a fascinating debate between R. Elazar and R. Yohanan over the resurrection of the am ha’aretz, a Jew who does not study Torah. I would suggest that rather than read this as an historical debate, we should read it as the rabbis themselves debating how to deal with Jews who so sharply do not share their values. On the one hand, rabbis believed very strongly that engaging in the study of Torah was the supreme act a person could do with their life (or at least in the top two, procreating being the other). On the other, many, if not most Jews, did not (and do not) study Torah with that kind of intensity. How to relate to these Jews is an extremely thorny issue for the rabbis.
  Elazar cleverly uses a verse that seems to imply that there is no such thing as resurrection to teach that only “amei haaretz,” which here means those who do not engage in the study of Torah, will not be resurrected. Note how this statement again shifts the values from the earlier statements. What guarantees resurrection—the study of Torah or living in the land of Israel? Earlier rabbis were saying that the supreme value, the one that led automatically to resurrection, was living in the land. Here it is the study of Torah.
  Yohanan scolds R. Elazar for speaking in such a manner of God’s creation. Amei Haaretz are human beings, created in the image of God.Elazar responds by somewhat obtusely quoting another verse that again proves that amei ha’aretz will not be resurrected. While he may be learned in text, one wonders how good of a listener R. Elazar is.
  Elazar perceives that finding another support for his notion that amei ha’aretz are not resurrected. So he offers them a solution, which boils down to providing material support for Torah scholars as a way to cling to God.My initial reaction to R. Elazar is admittedly not particularly positive. I live in a world in which the ultraorthodox have taken advantage of this sugya (and others like it) and basically turned the rest of Israel into their personal servants (although they would not dream of marrying my daughter). On the other hand, it is true that not all people are capable of engaging in high level Torah study. Some do not have the intellectual interest or ability in doing so and many do not have the time. How could God create a world in which Torah study is the means by which people are resurrected, meaning it is the supreme value, and yet at the same time create so many people who just cannot learn Torah (remember back then it was all memorized). R. Elazar seems to be searching for an answer to this question.Another analogy might be made with social work. We all admire social work, but not all people can be social workers. Supporting good deeds through tzedakah is an essential act—without it, like Torah, good deeds do not generally get accomplished.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to present various messianic visions of the future. The second half of the passage switches to the present, talking about the rich agriculture of the land of Israel in the here and now.
  Here we have a graphic description of the resurrection of the dead—they will burst forth out of the soil like grass. Will make a great movie!
  The dead will rise up in their own clothes.
  The same verse leads R. Hiyya b. Joseph to envision a world in which bread and clothes grown on trees. The midrashic technique here is a bit obscure but it seems to use the word “pissat” to mean clothing and “bar” to mean bread.
  The same verse from above is again interpreted as envisioning a messianic future in which grain is abundant and very easy to harvest.
  This section begins with a vision of fat and gigantic kernels of wheat that will arise in the future. But then it notes that such giant vegetation exists already in this day.
  In the future wine will flow in great abundance.
  Dimi offers an exposition on the wonders of the wine of Israel. Note that this is not messianic. R. Dimi is saying that here and now the wine of Israel is superior. Israel is a region blessed with good wine, although I still prefer to wash my clothes in water.
  According to R. Dimi the simple meaning of the verse is that the people of Israel are asking God to show them His love with eyes that are sweeter than wine and to smile at them with teeth that are whiter than milk. This seems to be the “simple” meaning of the verse in the sense that it is read as an allegory between God and the people of Israel.
  The verse also alludes to an interpretation by R. Yohanan—smiling at a person is better than giving him milk to drink. J
  This story illustrates not only the juiciness of the grapes in the land of Israel but also the value in being diligent in teaching Torah.
  More traditions about the richness of the land of Israel.
  
  Daf 112a
  
  IntroductionYou’re almost there! Welcome to the last daf of the Masechet. I promise you, no monster at the end of Ketubot. Just the good eats of Eretz Yisrael.
  Now I know where Roald Dahl got his idea for James and the Giant Peach.
  A year later, alas, the peaches were no longer quite as big.
  Joshua b. Levi sees grapes of amazing size and mistakes them for calves. But when he learns that they are grapes he rebukes the vines for producing such fruit for the foreigners who have conquered the land. Now this is not particularly gracious behavior for those who just brought out grapes for their guests. Thus when the same thing happens a year later for R. Hiyya they tell him to go away.
  IntroductionThis sugya talks about the fertility of the land of Israel.
  The baraita compares the fertility of the land of Israel with the fertility of other lands. When the land of Israel is blessed, meaning a good year, a field planted with a seah of seed would yield 70,000 kor of grain, whereas a normal number would be 70 kor. This is evidenced by Bet Shean which here is considered not to be part of the land of Israel.
  The most fertile spot in all of the lands is Tzoan in Egypt, whereas Hebron has the rockiest ground. Nevertheless, Hebron is seven times as built up as Tzoan. In this context, “built” means fertile.
  The verse that says that Hebron was built seven years before Tzoan cannot be taken literally for God would not build a home for his younger son, Canaan, before he builds one for his older son, Mitzrayim (Egypt). Thus the verse must mean that Hebron is seven times as fertile as Tzoah. But this brings us only to 49 kor per bet seah. Hebron is stony ground. In ground in Israel without stones a bet seah would yield 500 kor. And when Israel is blessed, as it was in the time of Isaac, the reward would be a hundredfold, yielding 50,000 kor for a bet seah of seed. Those must have been some good years!
   IntroductionThis sugya continues discussing the fecundity of the land of Israel.
  In Judea the wheat was so good that when ground it would yield five seahs of product. “Kiburya” is course flour from which coarse bread can be made.
  Even a “Sadducee,” which may refer here to someone who is not somehow part of the rabbinic class, praises the fertility of the land of Israel. The wheat is so great in Israel that one bet seah can be used to pay for all a person’s needs.
  Besides again emphasizing the fecundity of the vegetation of the land of Israel, this story may also emphasize that the land is not dependent on the people harvesting it. The Amorite used to enjoy as great of a harvest as the Jew.This concludes the section dealing with the fertility of Eretz Yisrael. The sugya reminds me, to a certain extent, of the way people still brag about the vegetables, fruit, meat, wine or beer or other such produce of their region. My in-laws are from Connecticut and they think Connecticut corn is unsurpassed. My parents think the same thing about their Jersey corn (the corn in Israel is terrible). Who’s right? I don’t know, but I do certainly enjoy them both.
  This statement of R. Hisda explains why the verse in Jeremiah compares the land of Israel to a deer. A deer’s skin shrinks once it has been removed from the body of the deer. It would not be large enough to cover all of the flesh. So too the land of Israel is simply not large enough to contain all of its fruit. Furthermore, the fruit ripens with the swiftness of a deer. But not to worry. The produce is fat and rich, not lean like the meat of a deer. What more could you want!
  By moving to the land of Israel, by receiving rabbinic ordination and by participating in the council to intercalate the years, R. Elazar sees himself as avoiding the three penalties or punishments referred to by Jeremiah.
  R. Zera is the character with whom this long sugya really began. He wanted to move to the land of Israel and had to hide from R. Yehudah to do so. He we see that he finally made it, but at the very end, had to risk his life to cross the river to get in. A Sadducee (again) sneers at him, alluding to the statement of the Jews at Sinai, “we will do and we will hear.” Jews are hasty, lacking any patience. R. Zera admits that he is hasty. But what can he do—even Moses and Aaron did not merit coming into the land. R. Zera was not going to lose this opportunity.
  
  Daf 112b
  
  IntroductionThis is it, the last sugya of Masechet Ketubot. It’s a nice one too.
  When I was younger people would occasionally kiss the ground when they got off the plane at Ben Gurion airport (nowadays you never really set foot on the tarmac so you’d have to wait a while to kiss any ground). R. Abba did this thousands of years ago—he would kiss the cliffs of Akko when arriving Israel (probably by boat). R. Hanina would perform constructive work and repair stumbling blocks in the road. Great idea! R. Ammi and R. Assi would make sure that they are always comfortable by being either in the shade or sun, depending on what they wanted at that moment. Nowadays, we turn on the air conditioner. And R. Hiyya b. Gamda would roll in the dirt. He was probably a kibbutznik.
  The masechet ends with a few cryptic notes about the messianic age. In the generation in which the son of David, the Messiah, comes, there will be great hatred and persecution against Torah scholars. Perhaps it means that the people of the world will hate them because they are not being judged as are the rest of the world. Shmuel implies that there will be some sort of purge, and the “false” scholars will be removed so that the true scholars will receive their reward. R. Joseph foresees a plundering of the land of Israel. 
  The masechet ends (!) on a positive note. In the future, even barren trees will yield fruit. This is read out from the verse in Joel. 
  Traditionally this is the point when Jews do a siyyum, a ritual signifying the completion of a large section of learning. Below I have copied the Hebrew. If you have a minyan (a quorum of 10) then you can recite the Kaddish with a minyan. If not, just recite the stuff before the Kaddish. In either case, you should definitely celebrate, let people know about what you’ve learned, and be happy that you had the privilege to spend over two years studying Talmud together with thousands of other people. Ketubot is one of the most well learned tractates of the Talmud. It contains many of the arch-principles with regard to financial obligations such as contracts, loans and debt repayments. It is the best tractate through which to learn what marriage was like from the 2nd through 6th centuries C.E. and it contains some of the most fascinating aggadah in the entire Talmud. I hope you have enjoyed learning it as much as I have enjoyed translating and commenting on it for you. I hope you will continue studying together with Daf Shevui for many years to come, in good health and in good cheer. Sunday we begin Tractate Avodah Zarah!