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text: English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה גיטין
  Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin
  
  Introduction
  
  The laws of divorce are taught in only four verses in Deuteronomy 24:1-4, verses which directly deal with the prohibition of remarriage.  Interestingly, the Torah addresses the issue of divorce almost as an aside, something which everyone would know without a description.  
  The first two verses read, “When a man takes a wife and has relations with her, and if she does not find favor in his eyes because he finds something obnoxious about her, and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house; and she leaves his household and becomes the wife of another man…”  From here the rabbis learn that divorce must be performed with a document, called a “get” which is Aramaic for document (and not connected to the English word, as in “get out of my house!).  Divorce without a properly written document is invalid.  Most of the laws of this tractate deal with how this document must be written and given.  The rules can be quite strict, and to this day, gittin (the plural of get) are written by professional scribes.  
  In Jewish law, the man must give the divorce document to his wife; she may not write a “get” and give it to him.  However, under certain circumstances, many of which were discussed in Ketuboth, the court may force the husband to give his wife a get.  
  The grounds for divorce, while a very important issue in divorce law, are not discussed until the last mishnah of the tractate.  
  We should note that the issue of divorce was an issue of controversy among different groups of Jews in this period.  As is well-known, Jesus, according to one of the gospels, took a strong stance against divorce.  Less well-known is the fact that the Dead Sea sect also, in all likelihood, opposed divorce.  The rabbis were in general quite lenient on divorce.  How easy divorce should be, is something about which we can argue.  Some may say too-easy divorce will lead to instability in marriage, while others may claim that easily attainable divorce is desirable, since a bad marriage is worse than a broken marriage.  I should point out something that is not usually mentioned in these arguments.  In the time of the Mishnah (and indeed until recently) marriages were typically arranged by the parents of the couple, while divorce was a decision taken by those married (or at least by the man).  Those who allow for divorce provide more autonomy for the feelings of the couple than do those who forbid or put severe restrictions on divorce.  Allowing divorce is in a sense saying that staying married is a decision based on the feelings of the couple themselves, be they feelings of love or security.  Forbidding divorce causes the parents’ decision to become permanent, allowing no or little expression for the couple themselves. 
  Finally, we should note two an important change in divorce law that was legislated around the year 1000 C.E.  Rabbenu Gershom, a leading German rabbi, made a decree that men could not divorce their wives against their consent.  This was an important balance to his other famous decree that prohibited bigamy.  However, during the mishnaic and talmudic periods bigamy was permitted and men could divorce their wives against their will.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that messengers who deliver divorce documents from abroad must declare that the document was written and signed in their presence.  In the Talmud there are two explanations for this requirement.  The first is that if the husband comes to protest the get, saying that he did not send it, the people who heard the messenger testify that he saw it written and signed will be able to disregard a  husband’s potential appeal. This is especially important if his wife had already remarried and had children.  If her get is invalidated, her subsequent children would become mamzerim.  The reason why the testimony of the messenger is only necessary if he comes from abroad is that in such a case it would be more difficult to find the original witnesses.  Furthermore, in the ancient world travel was often dangerous, and the original witnesses could not always travel to testify concerning the validity of the get.  The testimony of the messenger makes it easier to uphold the validity of the get, in essence a service for the woman.  The other opinion in the Talmud, which is really an additional opinion, is that outside of the Land of Israel they were not knowledgeable in writing gittin. Therefore, someone who came from abroad had to testify that it was written properly.  Those which were written in the Land of Israel did not need such testimony.
  One who brings a get from abroad [to the Land of Israel] must declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”  This section was explained in the introduction.
  Rabban Gamaliel says: even one who brings it from Rekem or from Heger. Rabbi Eleazar says: even one who brings it from Kefar Ludim to Lud. The sages, however, say: declaration “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is required only from one who brings a get from abroad or who takes it there.  The tannaim in this section, Rabban Gamaliel, Rabbi Elazar and the other sages disagree with regard to the applicability of the halakhah in section one.  According to Rabban Gamaliel, even if a messenger brings a get from towns such as Rekem or Heger which lie on the border, he must recite the formula. This is either because it is hard to bring the witnesses from these towns to testify, or because people who live on the border do not know how to properly write gittin.  Rabbi Elazar adds that even if the two cities lie adjacent but one is in the land of Israel and one is not, such as Kefar Ludim, which is outside and Lud which is inside, one must still recite the formula.  However, the sages disagree and hold that the formula must be recited only by one who brings a get from abroad, or one who brings one back from there.  The reason that someone bringing a get from Israel to a different land must recite the formula is lest the original witnesses cannot be found in order to uphold the get.
  One who brings [a get] from one province to another province in foreign lands is also required to declare, “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even from one hegemony to another hegemony.  Just as the messenger must make the declaration that the get was written and signed in his presence when bringing the get to and from Israel, so too must he make the declaration when bringing the get to and from provinces outside of the land.  The reason is that the original witnesses may be difficult to find if there is a need to uphold the get.  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel adds that even within one province, if he is switching hegemonies, places ruled by different governors, all within the Roman empire, he must make the declaration.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah the tannaim continue to debate the definitions of what is inside the land of Israel and what is considered “abroad”, such that a messenger who brings a get from there must state, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”  Whereas in the previous mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer debated the borders, in this mishnah Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir, who lived two generations later, debate.
  We should note that the Hebrew word for “abroad” is literally translated, “the province of the sea.”  This may mean a place accessible by sea travel but it may also mean coastal towns contiguous with the land of Israel.  Often people would travel to coastal towns by sea, so there would be difficulty in bringing witnesses from there to the hinterland.  Furthermore, these towns were usually more populated by Greek speakers, who settled on the coasts to control the trade.  Jews, or at least Aramaic speaking, less Hellenistic Jews, tended to live inlands. Hence, the rabbis feared that those who live on the coast, “abroad”, do not know how to properly write a divorce document.
  Rabbi Judah says: From Rekem eastwards, Rekem being like the east; from Ashkelon southwards, Ashkelon being like the south; and from Acco northwards, Acco being like the north. Rabbi Meir says: Acco counts as the land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. Rabbi Judah defines cities that he considers outside of the land of Israel, at least for issues of divorce.  Rabbi Meir disagrees with him concerning Acco.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with which messengers must recite the formula “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”
  One who brings a get within the land of Israel need not declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” If there are those who protest [its validity] it must be established through the signatures.  A messenger who brings a get from one place within the land of Israel to another place need not say the formula “In my presence” etc.  The formula is only mandatory for cases where it will be difficult to locate witnesses to validate the get. Within the borders of the land of Israel this will not be difficult. Furthermore, it was only people outside of the land who did not know how to write and sign gittin, and therefore the messenger had to testify to its validity.  Within the land there was no such concern. If someone should come and protest the get, saying that it is false, the court could summons the witnesses.
  If one who brings a get from abroad is not able to declare “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, if there are witnesses on it, its validity can be established through its signatures.  This section discusses a messenger who did not see the get written and signed, and therefore cannot state, “In my presence…” In such a case, the default procedure is to validate the get through the witnesses who have signed on it.  In this case the woman receiving the get cannot remarry until its validity has been proven.  In contrast, in the above case, if the get is brought within Israel, she may remarry without validating the get. She only needs to validate if others protest its validity.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah begins to compare the laws concerning bills of divorce with those concerning writs of emancipation for slaves.  These comparisons will continue until the end of the chapter.
  In Aramaic the word “get” means document and not necessarily just a divorce document.   The word can refer to either divorce or emancipation documents, as well as other documents.  Furthermore, there is some similarity to the two situations (marriage in the ancient world and slavery) and between the ways that the two documents (divorce and emancipation) are written.  However, we should not think that the comparison between divorce and emancipation is complete.  The major difference is that a man may sell his slave but he may of course not sell his wife.
  Both bills of divorce and writs of emancipation are similar [concerning a messenger] who takes them [abroad from the land of Israel too brings them [from abroad to the land of Israel].  The rules which we learned above concerning the declaration that a messenger must make upon presenting a get also apply to a messenger delivering a writ of emancipation.  Whether he brings the get from Israel to a foreign land or brings it to Israel, the messenger bringing either document must say “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”
  This is one of the ways in which bills of divorce are similar to writs of emancipation.  This section introduces the similarities between the two documents which will be discussed in the following mishnayoth.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah deals with documents whose signators are Samaritans.  The Samaritans were a Jewish splinter group whose history is somewhat blurry.  For more information on the Samaritans, see the introduction to Nedarim 3:10.
  The second section of the mishnah deals with documents pertaining to Jews which were validated in non-Jewish courts.  This was certainly a common phenomenon in the mishnaic periods.  The Greco-Roman court system was well-developed, as were their laws.  As subjects, if not always citizens, of the Roman Empire, Jews would have had some legal recourse to Roman courts and justice.  Therefore, the rabbis had to discuss the validity of documents which were upheld in these courts.
  Any document which has upon it the signature of a Samaritan is invalid, except for bills of divorce or a writ of emancipation. It happened that a bill of divorce was once brought before Rabban Gamaliel at Kefar Otnai and its witnesses were Samaritan, and he declared it valid.  The mishnah teaches that all documents which have upon them signatures of people known to be Samaritans are invalid, except for bills of divorce or writs of emancipation.  According to Albeck, Samaritans were suspected by the rabbis of lying with regard to issues of money, and therefore they could not serve as witnesses for matters such as loans and acquisitions.  However, they were evidently not suspected of lying in matters of divorce or emancipation and hence they could serve as witnesses in these matters.  Furthermore, they were assumed to be knowledgeable enough in matters of divorce and emancipation. Indeed, according to the mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel once allowed even two Samaritans to serve as witnesses on a get.  This occurred at Kefar Otnai, in the southern Galilee.
  All documents which are accepted in the courts of non-Jew, even if those who signed on the documents are non-Jews, are valid except bills of divorce and of writs of emancipation. Rabbi Shimon says: these also are valid; they were only pronounced [to be invalid] when done by ordinary persons.  This section of the mishnah deals with documents that were upheld by non-Jewish courts or even signed by non-Jews.  In this case, these documents are generally valid with the exception of divorce and emancipation documents.  Monetary documents are valid, because non-Jews are trustworthy to adjudicate monetary matters.  However, since they do not know the laws of Jewish divorce and emancipation, bills of divorce and writs of emancipation could not be upheld in non-Jewish courts, nor could those who signed them be non-Jewish. Rabbi Shimon partially disagrees with the opinion in the previous clause.  According to him, the earlier opinion that said that divorce and emancipation documents done in non-Jewish courts are invalid, referred only to those done by courts which lack knowledge of the laws.  However, if the court was an expert court, they may even draw up divorce and emancipation documents, even though they are not Jewish.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The topic of this mishnah is a man who instructs a messenger to give a get to his wife, or a writ of emancipation to his slave, and then changes his mind or dies before the document is delivered.
  If a man says: “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, if he wants he may change his mind on either document, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: he may change his mind in the case of the get but not in the case of the writ of emancipation, since a benefit may be conferred on a person not in his presence but a disability may be imposed on him only in his presence; for if he does not want to maintain his slave he is permitted, but if he does not want to maintain his wife he is not permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: behold, he disqualifies his slave from eating terumah [by emancipating him] in the same way that he disqualifies his wife [by divorcing her]? They said to him: [the slave is disqualified] because he is the priest’s property.  According to Rabbi Meir, the husband may change his mind after instructing an agent to give a get to his wife or a writ of emancipation to his slave.  The Sages disagree and say that he may change his mind only with regard to the get.  He may not change his mind with regard to the freeing of the slave.  The reason is that there is a principle that one may confer benefit on another person not in that person’s presence, but one may not confer a disability on a person not in that person’s presence. In our situation, the woman/slave is not in the husband/master’s presence at the moment and that is why the husband is instructing a messenger.  For the woman, divorce is a considerable disability for she loses her guaranteed source of income.  Should the husband not want to provide maintenance for his wife (food, clothing etc.) he does not have the right to do so.  He may not say to her, take whatever income you make and use it for your own maintenance.  In contrast, the slave has no such guarantee.  A master may say to his slave that he must provide his own maintenance.  Note that a master may not tell his slave to work for the master and the master will not provide maintenance. The master may only stop providing maintenance, if he allows the slave to work for his own maintenance. Nevertheless, the slave’s income is not guaranteed as is that of the wife, therefore it is a total disability for him not to be freed.  Since this is so, the master may not retract freeing his slave once he has told a messenger to do so. Rabbi Meir responds that in some ways freeing a slave is a disability and therefore, just as he can retract in giving the slave his manumission, so too he can retract from divorcing his wife.  The disability for the slave is that if he was owned by a priest, he could eat terumah. Upon emancipation, he loses such a right. The sages respond that the slave’s eating terumah is not a “benefit”; rather it is something he is allowed to do because the master owns him.  Indeed, the priest could sell his slave to an Israelite and thereby disqualify him from eating terumah without freeing him.  Therefore, loss of terumah is not truly a disability to the slave.
  If a man says, “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, and dies [before they are given], they do not give [the documents] after his death. [If he said], “Give a maneh to so-and-so” and died, the money should be given after his death.  In this case, the husband/master dies before the document is given.  The mishnah teaches that in cases of divorce and emancipation, the messenger should not give the document after the husband/master’s death.  A get and a writ of manumission do not go into effect until they are given.  Since a dead man cannot divorce his wife or free his slave, the documents cannot be given after his death.  In contrast, when a dying person gives a present, his mere statement transfers ownership. Therefore, the present should be given even after the giver’s death.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah returns to discussing  one who delivers a get from abroad and is obligated to say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”  Today’s mishnah deals with one who can only recite part of the formula.
  I should note that the Talmud provides a very complicated explanation for this mishnah.  I have tried to explain according to the words of the mishnah without the Talmudic explanation.
  If one brings a get from abroad and declares: “It was written in my presence” but not, “It was signed in my presence”; “It was signed in my presence” but not “It was written in my presence”; “All of it was written in my presence and in my presence but only one of the witnesses signed in my presence”; “Half was written in my presence but both witnesses signed in my presence”;   [in all these cases] the get is invalid.  In all of these cases one person brings the get, and he cannot recite the full formula.  Even if he can recite nearly the whole formula but cannot honestly say that the entire get was written and fully signed by two witnesses in his presence, the get is invalid.  As we learned above in 1:3, that this get is invalid means that in order for the woman to use this get to remarry, the witnesses themselves must verify their signatures or two witnesses must testify that they recognize both signatures.  The testimony of the one who brought the get is not sufficient in and of itself.
  If one says “It was written in my presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, the get is invalid.  In this case, one messenger testifies that the get was written in his presence but cannot say that it was signed in his presence, and the other person with him says that the get was signed in his presence but cannot say that the get was also written in his presence.  Since there is no complete declaration made by any one messenger, the get is not valid.  Again, this means that it remains invalid until its signatures are validated.
  If two say, “It was written in our presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, it is invalid. Rabbi Judah declares it valid.  In this case two people bring the get and both can testify that the get was written in their presence, but neither can say that it was signed in their presence.  A third person says that it was signed in his presence. The first opinion states that the get is still invalid, and still needs to be upheld by validating the signatures.  Rabbi Judah holds that the get is already valid since there is full testimony by two witnesses on the writing.  To Rabbi Judah, the writing is the essential part of the making of the get and if two testify that the writing was done properly, the get is valid.  This is not through their being deliverers of the get, but rather through their being witnesses. However, one person saying that the writing was done properly is not valid, because one person is not full testimony in Jewish law.
  If one says, “It was written in my presence” and two say, “It was signed in our presence”, it is valid.  In this case two testify that they saw the get signed.  This is essentially upholding the signatures on the get and it always makes the get valid.  Again, these two function as witnesses.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  It is necessary to write the date inside a get.  Our mishnah deals with a cases where the get was written on one day but signed on the night that follows, which is considered the following day according to the Jewish way of reckoning days and nights.  In this case, the get’s date will not match the date upon which it is finalized.
  If [a get was] written by day and signed on the [same] day, written by night and signed on the [same] night, written by night and signed on the day [following], it is valid.  In all of these cases the get is valid since it was written and signed on the same day.  Since the day follows the night in Jewish counting of days, if it was written at night and signed the following day, this still counts as being written and signed on the same day.
  If it was written by day and signed on the night [following], it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon validates it, for Rabbi Shimon used to say that all documents written by day and signed on the [following] night are invalid except bills of divorce.  However, if it was written by day and then later signed that night, the date written in the get does not match the actual date on which it was signed.  The reason why documents must be written and signed on the same day is that documents can be used to collect collateral.  A debt document creates a lien on another person’s property.  For instance, if Reuven borrows 1,000 dollars from Shimon on the first of the month of Av, Shimon now has a lien on all the property that Reuven owned on that date.  If Reuven subsequently gives or sells property to a third party and then defaults on his loan, Shimon may collect from the third party.  However, Shimon’s lien takes priority only over other debts created after Shimon loaned the money. For this reason, documents whose dates precede their finalization, done in their signing, are invalid, lest someone try to defraud a third party.  Since all other documents whose dates precede their finalization are invalid, divorce documents are as well. According to Rabbi Shimon, money is never collected based on the date written in the get.  A woman collects her ketubah based on the date written in the ketubah.  Therefore, the get which was written during the day but only signed at night is valid.  Even though other documents whose date precedes their signing are invalid, gittin are valid.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah discusses what can be used to write a get.  The second section deals with what gittin may be written on.
  They write [a get] with any material, with ink, with arsenic, with red chalk, with gum or with sulfate of copper or with anything which is lasting. It may not be written with liquids or with fruit juice or with anything that is not lasting.  The writing materials in the first part of this section are lasting and those in the second part are not lasting.  The get should not be written with something that can easily be erased.  We should note that since parchment and paper were scarce and expensive in the ancient world, people often reused paper, scratching off the previous layer and starting afresh.
  They write [a get] on anything: on an olive leaf, on the horn of an ox and he must give her the ox, or on the hand of a slave--and he must give her the slave. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: they do not write [a get] on anything living or on food.  The get need not be written only on a scroll, as seems to be prescribed in the Deuteronomy 24:1. Rather it can be written on nearly any material.  The one condition is that there must be no step between the writing of the get and its being given to the woman.  This is the reason that if the get is written on the horn of an ox, he must give her the ox, or if on the hand of the slave, he must give her the slave.  He cannot cut the ox’s horn off and give it to her, for that would be an added step. This halakhah is derived from the verse “And he writes her a bill of divorcement and puts it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1).  The writing must lead directly to the giving. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says it may not be written on anything that is still alive (like the horn of an ox or the hand of a slave) or is food.  The Torah says it should be written on a scroll.  While Rabbi Yose the Galilean does not require it to be written on a scroll, he says that it must be somewhat similar to a scroll, which is neither alive nor serves as food.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with what a get may be written on.
  They do not write [a get] on something still attached to the ground.  As we explained in yesterday’s mishnah, there can be no steps done to the get in between it’s having been completed and its being given to the woman.  In yesterday’s mishnah that meant that if written on the horn of a cow, the husband has to give her the cow.  Cutting off the cow’s horn and giving her the horn would not be valid.  Today we learn that the get cannot be written on something still attached to the ground, for then the husband would have to cut it down in order to give it to his wife.  He cannot give her the land to which the get is attached, because land cannot be transferred from hand to hand.
  If he wrote it on something still attached, and then detached and signed and given to the wife, it is valid. Rabbi Judah invalidates it until it is both written and signed on something detached from the ground.  In this case, he wrote the get on something that was still attached to the ground, but then he detached it before he gave it to her.  According to the first opinion, the signing of the get is the essential part, and therefore, as long as it was done on something detached from the ground, the get is valid.  Rabbi Judah, however, holds that it is invalid unless it is written and signed on something which is already detached from the ground.
  Rabbi Judah ben Batera says:  they do not write [a get] on a sheet from which writing has been erased nor on semi-finished parchment, for it can be faked. But the sages validate [such a get].  As I stated in yesterday’s mishnah, in the ancient world paper/parchment was scarce and expensive. Therefore they would reuse paper.  There were types of materials which were rough and meant for reuse.  Rabbi Judah ben Batera invalidates such writing materials for gittin, since they can be forged.  Someone might erase one person’s name and write in another’s and the forgery would not be recognizable.  However, the Sages say that we are not concerned about forgeries in the writing of the get.  The Talmud explains that it is the witnesses who see the get being given to the woman who are critical. They will read the get when it is given to the woman and if afterwards someone tries to forge the get, these witnesses will be able to testify as to what was really written on it.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah deals with who may write a get, and the second section with who may deliver a get.
  All are qualified to write a get, even a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor. A woman may write her own get and a man his own receipt [for the ketubah], since the document is upheld only by its signatures.  Anyone can write a get including people who were categorically considered not to have “awareness”.  These people can write a get even though they would not even understand what they are doing (remember that in the ancient world deaf people were wrongly considered to lack intelligence), because as we see below, the critical issue with the get is that it is signed by valid witnesses.   Similarly, a woman may write her own get (this would make for an interesting scenario), and a man may write his own receipt for having paid the ketubah to his wife.  Since the get is upheld not by checking who wrote it but who signed it, it matters not who does the writing.  Although the woman has written her own get, the witnesses will not sign it unless they are sure that it was written upon the husband’s directive.  Similarly, witnesses will not sign a receipt for payment unless they know that the husband paid the money to the wife.
  All are qualified to bring a get except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person and a non-Jew.  Almost anybody can deliver a get from a husband to his wife.  The exceptions are again those people who categorically do not have awareness.  In all areas of halakhah, someone who does not have “awareness” cannot act as someone else’s agent.  A blind person can also not deliver a get, even though blind people were not considered to lack “awareness”. The Talmud explains this to mean that he cannot deliver a get from abroad to Israel because he cannot say “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”  Note that blind people were considered to have “awareness”, unlike deaf-mutes who could not really communicate. Non-Jews cannot marry or divorce Jews and therefore cannot serve as agents for delivering a get.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of the end of yesterday’s mishnah which discussed those categories of people who are disqualified from delivering a get.
  If the minor had received the get [in order to deliver it] and then became of age; or the deaf-mute [received the get and then] his speech was restored; or the blind person [received the get and then] his sight was restored; or the imbecile [received the get and then] his reason returned; or the Gentile [received the get and then] converted, [the get] is invalid.  In this case a person received the get while disqualified to deliver it (see yesterday’s mishnah) and then his/her status changed to one who is qualified to deliver the get before he/she delivered it.  Since the person was disqualified when receiving the get in order to deliver it, the delivery is invalid, even though by the time the get was actually delivered the person was in a valid category.
  But if a person of sound senses [received the get] and then became a deaf-mute and then recovered his speech; or one with sight [received the get and then] became blind and then recovered his sight; or one who was sane [received the get and then] went insane and then recovered his reason, [the get] is valid. The general principle is that anyone who begins and finishes [his mission] in full possession of his mental faculties is qualified.  In this case the person was qualified to deliver the get when it was received and when it was delivered but while in the process he/she briefly entered a status of one who is disqualified.  As explained at the end of the mishnah, since the person was qualified at the two critical moments, the reception of the get from the husband and the delivery to the wife, the delivery is valid.  The fact that the person was temporarily invalid in-between is immaterial.  Note that this section cannot include a person who was Jewish and then apostatized to another religion and then returned to Judaism for in the eyes of Jewish law, a Jew cannot legally convert to another religion.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah makes reference to Yevamoth 15:4. That mishnah teaches that some women may not testify that another woman’s husband has died.  The fear is that these women will intentionally lie in order to trick the woman into remarrying while her husband is still alive, thereby causing an irreparable rupture in their marriage.  In our mishnah we learn that although these women are not trusted to testify regarding the death of the husband, they are trusted to deliver a get.
  Even the women who are not trusted to say “Her husband died,” are trusted to bring her get:  her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law (husband’s brother’s and the daughter of her husband.  These five women may dislike or even hate a wife and therefore cannot testify that her husband died (see Yevamoth 15:4).  As stated in the introduction, these women may nevertheless deliver a get to a wife, thereby showing to her that she is divorced and allowed to remarry.
  What is the difference between the get and death? The writing [on the get] proves [that she is divorced.]  In this section the mishnah questions why these women can deliver a get but not testify regarding a husband’s death.  The answer is that the get’s validity is ultimately proved by those who wrote and signed the get, and not by the person who delivered it.  Although an agent delivering a get is under certain circumstances required to declare “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered”, this is not truly testimony, but rather a means of allowing the get to be accepted without checking its validity.  This is why those who are not allowed to testify can still deliver a get and make the above declaration.  In contrast, testifying that a husband has died is truly testimony.  Therefore, since we fear that these women may lie, they are not trusted.  [Note that women in general are allowed to testify regarding a husband’s death in order to lessen the problem of wives not knowing if their husbands have died.]
  A woman may bring her own get but she must say, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered.”  Theoretically speaking a woman could even bring her own get and this would not be considered testifying about herself, since the writing on the get proves its validity.  However, she is still required to state, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered”, the statement that is always required when a get is brought from abroad to the land of Israel.  This situation could happen if the husband gave her the get outside of Israel but told her that he didn’t want the divorce to be enacted until she reached Israel.  A truly Zionist husband!
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches that a get must be written with the express intention to divorce the specific woman to whom it will eventually be given.  This rule is derived from a midrash on Deuteronomy 24:1, “And he writes for her”.  The words “for her” are interpreted to mean that the get must be written specifically for her.  Our mishnah will illustrate this principle.
  Any get which is not written [expressly] for the woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid. How is this so?  This mishnah introduces the halakhah mentioned in the introduction, according to which a get must be expressly written for the woman who will be divorced with it.  The rest of this mishnah will illustrate this principle.
  If a man was passing through the street and heard the voice of a scribe dictating “So-and-so divorces so-and-so from such and such a place” and he says “that is my name and that is the name of my wife”, it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife.  In this scenario, a scribe was teaching his students to practice writing divorce documents.  These documents were probably always written by scribes, as they require great skill and precision.  A man walking by heard the scribe and noticed that the names being used matched those of his and his wife.  It dawned on him, wow, I could use this to divorce my wife (I believe that this is intentionally humorous, so you are permitted to chuckle.)  The document was only for practice and was not written to be used at all, and therefore certainly cannot be considered as having been written for a specific woman.
  Moreover: if he wrote [a get] with which to divorce his wife and changed his mind and a person found him and said to him, “My name is the same as yours and my wife’s name the same as your wife's”, it is not a valid [document with which the second] may divorce his wife.  In this case, the document was written to be used to divorce, but not to be used by this husband to divorce this wife, but rather for different people who happen to have the same name.  Since it was not written for this man’s wife, he may not use it, even though the names are appropriate.
  Moreover: if he had two wives with the same name and wrote a get with which to divorce the elder, he may not use it to divorce the younger.  In this case, the correct husband wrote the get, but he wrote it with the intention to divorce one of his wives and now he wants to divorce the other.  Since the get was not written to be given to the younger wife, he may not use it to divorce her.  As an aside, you can imagine how interesting family life must have been for the family in which a husband married to two women with the same name!  If you think Jacob had problems with Leah and Rachel, think of this family.  (Again, I think this is supposed to make you crack a smile, so feel free).
  Moreover: if he said to the scribe, “Write [a get] and I will divorce whichever I choose,” it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife.  Finally, a husband cannot tell a scribe to write out a get, leave the name of the woman blank, and then the husband will later decide which wife he wishes to divorce.  In this case, the “correct” husband wrote the get, and he did not actively intend to give it to a different wife.  Nevertheless, the positive intention to give it to a specific wife is lacking and hence the get is invalid.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  There are two parts of any document, called in Hebrew the “tofes” and the “toref”.  The “tofes” is the general formula which is used in all of these types of documents.    The “toref” is the place where the names of the parties involved, the amount of money involved and the time and place where the matter referred to in the document was performed.
  In the previous mishnah we learned that a divorce document must be written expressly for the woman to whom it will be given.  Our mishnah deals with the validity of divorce documents whose “tofes” was written without this specific intention.
  [A scribe] who writes out formulas of bills of divorce must leave blank spaces for the name of the man and the name of the woman and the date. [A scribe who writes] loan documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the lender, the name of the borrower, the amount of money and the date. [A scribe who writes] sale documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the seller, the name of the purchaser, the amount of money, the property and the date; [These spaces must be left blank] because of the “takkanah” (.  According to the first opinion in this mishnah, a scribe may write out document formulas before he knows who or under what circumstances the documents will be used, but he must leave the “toref”, the details, blank.  The mishnah lists three types of documents:  divorce, loan and sale.  The reason that these spaces must be left blank in a divorce document is that if they are not, the get will not have been written expressly for the woman to whom it will be given.  This is according to the halakhah which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.  The loan and sales documents do not have such a requirement.  Nevertheless, according to this opinion they too cannot be fully filled out beforehand because if the rabbis allow this, scribes will do the same with divorce documents.  This is called a “fence around the Torah”, a stringency meant to prevent people from doing that which is truly problematic.  The rabbis forbade filling out all documents lest divorce documents were also fully written out. The mishnah cryptically explains that these must be left blank “because of the takkanah”, or “enactment”, without explain what the “takkanah” is.  There are several explanations for this, each of which is not without its problems.  One explanation is that the “takkanah” was that scribes may write the formulas ahead of time so that when people request a certain document that document would be readily available.  The problem with this explanation is that the mishnah seems to state that the “takkanah” was that the spaces should be left blank and not that scribes might write the formulas.  A second explanation is that the “takkanah” was that they shouldn’t write out the entire document, so that people would not be rash in selling their property or borrowing money.  This is a decent explanation for the sales and lending documents, but does not explain well the issue of the divorce documents, which are invalid if fully written out even without a special “takkanah.”
  Rabbi Judah disqualifies all of them.  Rabbi Judah disqualifies all of these documents.  According to the Talmud, he forbids writing the formula (“tofes”) of the get, lest the scribe come to also write the specifics, which according to the midrash must be written for the specific woman. He also disqualifies loan and sales documents whose formulas were pre-written lest a scribe pre-write a divorce document.  We can see that he is doubly strict, creating many “fences” around what is actually prohibited (pre-writing the details of the get).
  Rabbi Elazar validates all of them valid except divorce documents, as it says, “He writes for her” (Deut 24:1), expressly for her.  Rabbi Elazar partially agrees with Rabbi Judah.  He agrees that pre-writing the divorce formula is forbidden, and this he derives from the midrash.  According to his interpretation, the entire get must be written with a specific woman in mind, and not just the “tofes”. However, he agrees with the opinion in section one that the formulas of other documents may be written ahead of time.  He is not concerned that if the halakhah allows the scribe to pre-write these documents, the scribe might pre-write divorce documents as well.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first half of this mishnah deals with a get that was temporarily lost on its way from the husband to the wife.
  The second half deals with a sick or old husband who sent a get to his wife.  The question is whether or not the one bringing it can assume that the husband is still alive when he (the one bringing the get) arrives at the wife?
  One who brings a get and loses it on the way: If he finds it immediately it is valid, and if not it is not valid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a folder if he recognizes it, it is valid.  If a messenger loses a get, we fear that the get that he finds is not the same get that he lost, and therefore the get will not have been written for that specific woman.  Note that the names written on the found get have to be the same as those on the lost get, otherwise it will be clear that it is not the same get.  However, as we learned in previous mishnayoth, similar names may not have been so uncommon.  If the get is immediately found, it is still valid.  But if time elapses we are concerned that the one bringing the get found a different get, even though the names are the same.  Furthermore, if he recognizes the bag or folder which he was using to carry the get, and the get is still inside, the get is valid even if it was found after time had elapsed.  The likelihood that a get with the same names as the lost get would get into a bag that looks exactly the same as the lost bag is too remote for concern.
  If one brings a get and left [the husband] when [the husband] was an old man or sick, he should deliver it to her on the presumption that he is still alive.  A woman may not be divorced from her husband after he died. The importance of this halakhah is in the realm of levirate marriage.  A woman whose husband died before he had offspring is liable for yibbum (levirate marriage), whereas a woman who was divorced is not.  Since a get goes into effect the moment that the woman receives it, and not when given to the messenger to deliver, it is important to know if the husband was alive when the get was delivered to the woman.  Nevertheless, the mishnah states that the person delivering the get should not be concerned lest the husband died after he (the one delivering the get) received it.  He may deliver it to the wife even if the husband was an old or sick man and presume that the husband is still alive.
  If the daughter of an ordinary Israelite is married to a priest and her husband goes abroad, she continues eating terumah on the presumption that he is still alive.  The mishnah now brings two halakhot which employ a similar principle, that is we assume that a person is still alive until it is known that he has died.  A woman who eats terumah because she is married to a priest can continue to do so even if her husband went on a long trip and she no longer knows if he is alive.
  If a man sends a sin-offering from abroad they sacrifice it on the presumption that he is still alive.  Similarly, the priests at the Temple may offer up a sin-offering which was sent from abroad under the assumption that its owner who sent it is still alive.  Had they known that the owner had died, the animal would not be able to be sacrificed.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who delivers a get from a husband to his wife may assume that the husband is alive, even if the husband was old or sick. The mishnah followed with two other cases where we can act as if a certain person is still alive.  Our mishnah deals with three statements made by Rabbi Elazar ben Parta which deal with assuming that a person is still alive.
  Three statements were made by Rabbi Elazar ben Parta before the Sages, and they upheld his words.  Rabbi Elazar ben Parta spoke about three different situations, each of which can be divided into two different possibilities.   The other Sages in front of whom he spoke accepted his reasoning.
  About [people in] a besieged town; And about [people on] a ship listing at sea; And a person who has been brought to court [in a capital case] that they are presumed to be alive.  We may presume that a person in a besieged town, or a person on a ship listing at sea and threatening to sink, or a person who is being tried in a capital case is still alive.  This presumption may be made even if we don’t know for sure that the person is still alive.  Therefore, if the man is a priest, his Israelite wife may continue to eat terumah under the assumption that he is still alive.  If the man is an Israelite and his wife is the daughter of a priest, she may not eat terumah because we assume that her husband is still alive.
  [However, concerning people] in a besieged town which has been captured; Or [people in] a ship which has been lost at sea; Or a person who has been led out to execution we put upon them all of the stringencies of their being alive and all of the stringencies of their being dead. The daughter of an Israelite who has married a priest or the daughter of a priest who has married an Israelite may not eat of the terumah.  In these cases we cannot assume that the person is still alive, but neither can we be sure that he/she is dead.  Rabbi Elazar ben Parta says that it is likely enough that the person is dead that we cannot continue to act as if he/she is alive.  Therefore, we have to rule strictly in either case.  If a husband in one of these situations was a priest and he had a wife who was the daughter of an Israelite she can no longer eat terumah because her husband may be dead.  If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she still cannot eat terumah because her husband may still be alive.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a person who becomes sick while delivering a get inside the land of Israel.  In tomorrow’s mishnah we shall deal with a person who becomes sick while bringing a get from abroad.
  If one bringing a get in the land of Israel becomes sick, he can send it with another.  As we learned in chapter one, a person who delivers a get within the land of Israel need not state, “In my presence it was written and signed.”  Therefore, there is no problem with giving the get to another person, should the original person not be able to complete the delivery due to sickness.
  But if [the husband] said to him, “Take for me from her such-and-such an object”, he may not send it [the get] with another, since the husband may not want his deposit in the hand of another.  In this case, the husband told his agent to do two things:  1) bring the get; 2) retrieve something from his wife.  While we can assume that the husband will not mind someone else delivering the get, he may not trust a different person to recover his belonging.  Therefore, the agent cannot even send the get with another person, since that other person cannot retrieve the object.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah discusses a person who is delivering a get from abroad and cannot complete his delivery.
  If one bringing a get from abroad becomes sick, he may arrange a court of law and send him [on with the get,] declaring before them, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”  Generally, the person who was charged to bring the get should bring it himself.  If he cannot because he becomes sick on the way, he cannot merely give it to another messenger because the husband did not give him permission to do so.  In order to deliver the get to the wife, he will need to set up a court of law consisting of three judges and make his declaration in front of them.  The court may then, on the husband’s behalf, appoint an agent to deliver the get.
  And the last agent is not required to say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, rather he declares, “I am the messenger of a court.”  The agent sent from the court obviously cannot say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, which the person delivering the get usually needs to say, because that would not be true. Upon delivering the get, what he can say is “I am the messenger of the court.”  We can trust that the court would not have sent him had the get not been executed properly. As an aside, by calling him “the last agent” the mishnah alludes to the fact that this may not be the original agent sent by the court.  The passing of the get from one agent to the other may happen many times.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to deal with situations in which we assume that a person is still alive even though we cannot be sure that he is.
  If a man lends money to a priest or a levite or a poor man on condition that he can may separate [terumah or tithes] from their portion, he may do so, in the presumption that they are still alive, and he need be concerned that the priest or the levite may have died or the poor man may have become rich.  In this scenario a person loans money to a priest, Levite or poor person with the agreement that the debt will be worked off by the person withholding terumah (given to the priest), first tithe (to the Levite) or poor tithe (the poor person) which he would have given to them.  In such a case, the person will harvest his produce and separate terumah and tithes as he normally does. The terumah he must sell to another priest but he may keep the money for himself as payment for his debt.   Note that he may not eat the terumah since terumah is strictly forbidden to non-priests.  The tithes he may eat himself, since non-Levites and people who are not poor may eat tithes. The person paying off his debt need not be concerned that the priest or Levite died or that the poor person is no longer poor.  As we learned in the previous mishnayoth, we can assume that a person is still alive until we have strong reason to believe otherwise.
  If they died, he must obtain the permission of the heirs. If he made the loan in the presence of the court, he need not obtain permission from the heirs.  If the lender knows that the priest, Levite or poor person died, he may not continue the arrangement without obtaining permission from the heirs.  Since the heirs may prefer to pay back the debt, the lender must let them know what about the arrangement.  Assumedly they will find the arrangement acceptable.  Furthermore, if the arrangement was made in the presence of the court, he need not obtain their permission.  The court has the power to finalize the debt such that the debtor may not preemptively pay it back.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  The previous several mishnayoth taught that a person need not be concerned lest someone might have died.  Our mishnah teaches that a person need not be concerned lest some produce that he set aside has spoiled.
  If a man sets aside produce in order to count it as terumah and tithe, or money in order to count it as second tithe, he may continue to count it as such in the presumption that they still exist.  The person here set aside some produce in another place for it to count as tithe so that he could eat other produce without tithing it. Or he set aside some money to count it as the redemption money for second tithe. This redemption money will eventually be brought to Jerusalem and consumed there. He may continue to eat his produce, assuming that the things he set aside still exist.
  If they are lost, he must be concerned from time period to time period, the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua. Rabbi Judah says: at three seasons they check the wine: when the east wind begins to blow at the end of Sukkot, when the buds first appear [on the vine], and when the juice begins to form in the grapes.  According to R. Elazar b. Shammua, if he comes back and discovers that the produce is lost, meaning it has gone bad, he must assume that it was lost within the last 24 hours. This means that he had unwittingly eaten untithed produce for the last 24 hours, and will have to repay that amount to the priests. R. Judah says that they check the wine at only three seasons to ensure that it has not gone bad. Thus he would have to assume that any wine he had left over in order for it to count as tithes and terumah had spoiled some time between the last check and the current period.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The fourth chapter of Gittin begins by discussing a husband who sends a get to his wife and then attempts to annul the get.  The general rule is that as long as the get has not yet gotten to her hand, he may annul the get.
  If man sends a get to his wife and then catches up with the messenger, or sends a messenger after the original messenger, and says to him, “The get which I gave you is annulled”, then it is annulled.  In this case after sending the get to his wife with a messenger, the husband either catches up with the original messenger or sends a second messenger to catch up with the first and one of them tells the original messenger that the get is cancelled. The mishnah rules that the get is cancelled.  Since the woman is not divorced until she receives the get, the husband may cancel it any time until this point.
  If the husband arrives at his wife before [the messenger] or sends a messenger to her and says, “The get which I sent to you is annulled”, then it is annulled.  In this case, the husband or his agent does not chase after the original messenger but rather the husband or his agent arrives at the wife before the messenger does.  Again, since she has not yet received the get, the get is annulled. In both of these cases, even if the messenger should subsequently give her the get she is not divorced.
  Once the get has reached her hand, he cannot annul it.  However, once she has received the get she is no longer his wife and there isn’t anything he can do about it.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  The first section of our mishnah continues to discuss a husband who attempts to cancel his get after he has already sent it to his wife.  In this section, a “takkanah” of Rabban Gamaliel is mentioned.  “Takkanah” literally means “a fixing”, and it refers to a rabbinic decree which remedies a problematic situation.  The remainder of this chapter and the next chapter contain lists of “takkanot”, made because of “tikkun olam” fixing the world or other related reasons.  Today this concept has come to mean good deeds such as charity done in order to make the world a better place.  In the Mishnah its meaning was more specific and it usually refers to correct either problems created because of  marital laws or economic injustices.
  Throughout the Mishnah I will leave the term “tikkun olam” untranslated, as there is no word that precisely captures its meaning.  I also think that the best way to understand the mishnaic meaning of “tikkun olam” is through the examples used by the Mishnah itself.
  Originally, a husband would bring together a court wherever he was and annul the get. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that this should not be done, because of “tikkun olam”.  In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a husband catches up with someone delivering a get to his wife or arrives at his wife before the messenger gets there and delivers the get, he may annul the get.  Today we learn that in older times the husband could gather together a court and in front of them annul the get i without getting to his messenger or his wife.  This would be extremely problematic for the wife because she might not know that her husband had annulled the get.  If she were to assume that the get was valid and that she was divorced, she might remarry and have children.  In such a scenario, her second marriage would be illegitimate and her children with her new husband would be mamzerim, because she is still married.  Another problem would be that women receiving gittin by messenger would not know if the get was valid, because their husbands may have annulled it.  To avoid problems they wouldn’t remarry.  To prevent these complications Rabban Gamaliel the Elder who lived during the time of the Second Temple established that people should not do this.
  Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so or any name that he has,”;  “the woman so-and-so or any name that she has,” because of “tikkun olam.”  In mishnaic times people evidently would have several different names, names which may have been used in different regions or perhaps by speakers of different languages (i.e. a Greek name and a Hebrew name).  The problem arose in identifying the get  who was the husband or who was the wife.  This is what the mishnah means “change his name” etc.  The husband would write only one of his names, or his wife’s names or his town’s name and then he would claim that the get was not his and thereby annul it.  Rabban Gamaliel established that the husband should write “The man so-and-so or any name that he has” so that annulling the get after the wife has received it would be impossible.  Some commentators interpret this to mean that this formula itself should be written in the get, whereas other commentators hold this to mean that inside the get the husband must list all of the names that he goes by.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Today’s mishnah contains three different “takkanot”, decrees meant to remedy situations.  The first was made by Rabban Gamaliel the Elder, as were those in yesterday’s mishnah.  The second is anonymous and the third was made by Hillel.
  A widow is paid back [her kethubah] from the property of orphans only by taking an oath.   [When the court] refrained from imposing an oath on her, Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that she could take any vow which the orphans wanted and collect her kethubah.  We learned this law in Ketuboth 9:7-8.  If a widow wants to collect her ketubah money from her husband’s orphans, she must take an oath that she has not already collected.  In our mishnah we learn that at some point courts began to refrain from imposing an oath upon her, for fear that she would swear falsely.  It is not that she would lie but that she would think that the money she had collected from her husband’s estate was not really her ketubah but payment for helping take care of her husband’s children.  If the court would not impose an oath upon her then she could not collect the ketubah and she would be left without any money.  In order to fix this problem the rabbis said that the widow could circumvent the court by taking any vow that the orphans so choose. The vow would be something like, “Let such and such an object become forbidden to me if I have already collected my ketubah.”  This change in the law also kept the court from being involved in potentially false oaths.
  Witnesses sign their names on a get because of tikkun olam.  According to the letter of the law (contrasted with “takkanot”), a get is valid even if the witnesses had not signed on it.  As long as they saw that it was written by the directive of the husband and given to the wife, the get is valid.  However, without witnesses written on the get it will be more difficult to validate.  Therefore the rabbis established that the get should be signed.  We can see that the “tikkun olam” here was done in order to make it easier to validate a get, something that would have been in the best interests of the woman.
  Hillel instituted the prosbul because of tikkun olam.  The third takkanah of our mishnah is the famous takkanah of the prozbul.  I shall explain this takkanah briefly.  According to the Torah all debts are remitted in the seventh year.  While this may be thought of as a benefit for the borrower (and in a perfect society perhaps it would be), in reality it could work against him.  If lenders see that their loans will be erased in the seventh year they might not lend money, thereby making it difficult for those in need to take out loans.  In order to remedy this problem Hillel established that a creditor could write out a document through which he transmits all debts to the court.  According to the rabbis’ interpretation of the Torah, debts to the court are not remitted in the seventh year.  In this way the creditor’s loans are not erased and the interests of those who need to borrow money (i.e. farmers) are also served.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  These two mishnayoth discuss the emancipation of slaves.
  A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery, If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says:  in either case he goes back to slavery.  If a non-Jewish slave is taken captive and held for ransom and then his ransom is paid, according to the first opinion in the mishnah his return to slavery depends upon the intent of the one who paid his ransom.  Since the original master didn’t offer up the ransom himself, he loses the ability to decide whether the slave remains a slave.  According to another source, if the person who paid the ransom decides that he should remain a slave to his former master, the master must pay back the ransom money.   Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that in any case the slave returns to his previous owner.  The Yerushalmi explains that this is in order to prevent the slave from running away.  Another explanation is that the first opinion in the mishnah holds that there is no commandment to redeem slaves.  Therefore, by paying his ransom the redeemer has in essence purchased the slave and may do with him as he wishes.  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that there is a commandment to redeem slaves owned by Jews.  Since the redeemer fulfilled a commandment he did not acquire the slave and the slave returns to his owner. We should note that there are several other explanations of this mishnah.
  If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him.  In this case Reuven loans Shimon money, and as a pledge (like pawning) for his loan, Reuven takes Shimon’s slave.  Shimon still owns the slave and therefore can free the slave despite the loan.  In such a case, according to the letter of the law the slave is totally free and need not do anything.  However, to protect the slave from an angry Reuven, the court forces Reuven to write out an emancipation document, as if he too has freed the slave.  The slave then writes out a document stating how much he is worth, and with this document Reuven can try to recover his loan from Shimon.  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the original owner (Shimon) writes out the document for he is the one who damaged the lender’s lien on his assets by freeing the pledged slave.  If the debtor writes the document, the creditor is more likely to recoup his loss.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a person who is half a slave and half free. This could happen if he was owned jointly by two masters and one of his masters freed him but not the other.
  One who is half a slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of Beth Hillel.  Beth Hillel seems to make a reasonable suggestion for what to do in this situation.  The half-slave splits his time between working for his master and working for himself.
  Beth Shammai said to them: you have set things right for the master but you have not set things right for the slave. He cannot marry a female slave because he is already half free, and he cannot marry a free woman because he is half a slave.  Shall he then decease [from having children]? But wasn’t the world only made to be populated, as it says, “He did not create it as a waste, he formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18)?  Rather because of tikkun olam we compel his master to emancipate him and he writes a document for half his purchase price.  Beth Shammai responds in what is in my opinion one of the more remarkable statements in the Mishnah.  Beth Hillel’s solution for the half slave is beneficial to his master but leaves the half slave in an untenable position.  Slaves and free people cannot marry. Since this person is a half slave, he can marry neither a slave nor a free woman.  However, the commandment of having children “be fruitful and multiply” applies to everyone, even slaves and half slaves.  The halakhah cannot allow a situation where a person has no one to marry.  The world, after all, was formed by God for it to be inhabited, and not for it to lay desolate of human beings.  Therefore, because of tikkun olam, his master is forced to free him, thereby allowing him to marry a free woman.  The slave merely writes a document for half of his value and owes that amount to the owner.
  Beth Hillel retracted [their opinion and] ruled like Beth Shammai.  Indeed, Beth Shammai’s argument was so compelling that Beth Hillel changed their opinion and ruled like Beth Shammai.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  There are four sections to our mishnah. The first deals with selling slaves to Gentiles or to an owner who lives outside the land of Israel.  The last three clauses deal with redeeming captives or sacred objects taken captive.
  Unfortunately, I should note that as I write these lines (many months before you read them) the issue of captives and the price we pay to redeem them is terribly relevant, both in Israel and in the entire world.  Muslim extremists are regularly taking captives (often innocent bystanders and not soldiers) and threatening them with beheading in order to force the political hands of countries with whom they are at war.  In Israel a hotly debated topic is whether to exchange live prisoners for the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed in battle or even for knowledge of the whereabouts of their bodies.   While the mishnah seems to have simple answers for the question of how to deal with these situations, we should note that real life situations are complex, involve people’s families and political forces that differ from situation to situation.  One thing which I think all can agree upon is to pray that our leaders have the wisdom to deal with these situations as best as possible, to when possible redeem captured soldiers, journalists and others, to prevent others from being taken captive in the future, and to put a stop to the terrible people who commit these crimes.
  If a man sells his slave to a Gentile or [to someone living] outside the land [of Israel] the slave goes free.  According to halakhah, a slave owned by a Jew is obligated to observe most of the commandments.  If a slave-owner sells a slave to a non-Jew he has put a person obligated in the commandments into a position where he will not be able to observe the commandments. Therefore, the halakhah demands that such a slave go free.  Whether or not the non-Jew will observe the halakhah is a different question.  The mishnah seems to be presuming a situation of Jewish political sovereignty.  Secondly, we learned in Ketuboth 13:11 that a husband cannot force his wife to leave the land of Israel (neither can a wife force her husband).  Here we see that a master cannot force even his slave to be sold to someone living outside of the land.
  Captives should not be redeemed for more than their value, because of tikkun olam.  Redeeming captives for more than their price will obviously encourage captors to continue to take and ransom innocent people and to charge exorbitant prices for their return.  Therefore this practice is forbidden.  Note that the rabbis do not forbid redeeming captives and paying ransoms, but those ransoms must not be exorbitant.  It seems to me that the rabbis are searching for the middle road, somewhere between respect for the life of the person taken captive and fear that paying a ransom will encourage further capturing.
  Captives should not be helped to escape, because of tikkun olam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says [that the reason is] to prevent the ill-treatment of fellow captives.  According to the first opinion, rescuing captives, while effective in the present, may encourage future captors to take more drastic measures to keep their captives under lock.  Saving one person now may cause many others in the future to be treated in a very harsh manner.  Therefore, they should not be rescued.  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says we are not concerned about future captives but rather about those currently being held.  If we rescue some captives, those that remain in captivity will be ill-treated, and perhaps even killed.  However, if there are no other captives and we can successfully rescue all those that are currently under captivity, we should make such an attempt.  Again, we should note exactly what the rabbis were trying to accomplish the safe return of current captives while at the same time the prevention of harm to future captives.  While their means may not be directly applicable today, their goals seem to me to be the same as ours should be.
  Torah scrolls of the law, tefillin and mezuzoth are not bought from Gentiles at more than their value, because of tikkun olam.  Evidently, Gentiles knew well what was valuable to Jews.  From the mishnah it seems that they would capture religious items and ransom them back. Again, the mishnah forbids paying more than they are worth.  At least with things it is easier to establish a value than with human beings.  After all, how much is a human being worth.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a man who divorces his wife either because a rumor went out that she had committed adultery or because of a vow that she took.
  If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her.  If a man divorces his wife because he believes that she committed adultery he may not remarry her.  The fear is that after he divorces her he may find out that the rumor was false.   When he discovers that the rumor was false he may regret divorcing her and say, “Had I known that the rumor was false, I would never have divorced her.”  Since the divorce was based on a false assumption, the get is invalidated and any children which she had from a subsequent marriage are considered mamzerim.  To prevent this problematic situation (in other words for tikkun olam), when the husband divorces they say to him that he must know that his divorce is final and irrevocable, even if the rumor for which he divorces her proves to be false.  In this way, he will in his mind divorce her completely and he cannot later claim that the divorce was mistaken.
  If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her.  The same holds true for a husband who divorces his wife because she took a vow that disrupted their marriage in some way.  In such a case he may later discover that he could have had the vow released and then regret divorcing her, thereby annulling the get.  To prevent this he is told that if he divorces her because of a vow, he can never remarry her.
  Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her.  The following sages argue over which types of vows the previous section was referring to.  According to Rabbi Judah, if the vow was public he cannot remarry her, but if the vow was not public he may remarry her.  The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah believes that the rule husbands may not remarry their wives if they divorced them because of a rumor of adultery or because of a vow is a punishment for the wife.  Therefore, if she vows privately such that others don’t know that she took a vow, then she is not punished and her husband may remarry her.
  Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says:  they only forbid that one because of that one .  Rabbi Meir makes a different distinction. According to Rabbi Meir he cannot remarry her if the vow required the investigation of a sage in order to release the vow.  If it did not require even the investigation of the sage for the vow to be released then it must have been a mistaken vow.  Such a vow can obviously be released and everyone should know this.  Therefore, he cannot later claim, “Had I known that the vow could be released I would not have divorced her.”  Since he cannot make this claim, we do not need to prevent him from remarrying her.  Rabbi Elazar reasons completely opposite.  The reason that they made it forbidden for him to remarry her for a vow that does require the investigation of a sage is because he may regret divorcing her for making a vow that does not require the investigation of a sage.
  Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her  because of tikkun olam.  The final section deals with a case where a husband vowed to divorce his wife.  In this case, we might have thought that in order to encourage men not to hastily vow to divorce their wives the law would have been that if he does so he cannot remarry her.  However, the Sages ruled that he can nevertheless remarry her.  The only reason that in other cases they prohibited him from remarrying her was lest he state “Had I known that the vow could be broken I would not have divorced her.”  This prohibition was made because of tikkun olam protecting the wife from a husband who makes such a statement.  However, if the husband vows there is no reason to prevent him from remarrying her.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a husband who divorces his wife because she turns out to be an “aylonit.”  An aylonit is a female who does not develop physical signs of sexual maturity, but is clearly a female.  By definition, she cannot have children.  If later on she has children then it turns out that she is not an aylonit.
  A man divorces his wife because she is an aylonit: Rabbi Judah says he may not remarry her, But the sages say that he may remarry her.  The reason that Rabbi Judah says that he may not remarry a wife that he divorced because she was an “aylonit” is similar to the reasons we learned in yesterday’s mishnah why men who divorce for certain reasons may not remarry their wives.  If he divorces her because she is an “aylonit” and then she remarries and has children from her next husband the first husband might say, “Had I known that she was not an aylonit, I would not have divorced her.”  This statement would annul the divorce and her children would become mamzerim.  To prevent this, Rabbi Judah rules that we tell him when he divorces her that he will never be able to remarry her, and in that way he will divorce her with complete conviction. However, in this case the Sages do not agree, for they are not concerned lest such a scenario arise.  Perhaps they thought it unlikely for a woman who was assumed to be an aylonit to later have children.
  She marries someone else and has children from him and then demands her ketubah settlement [from her first husband]: Rabbi Judah said, they say to her, “Your silence is better than your speaking.”  When a woman is divorced because she is an aylonit, her husband does not have to pay her ketubah (see Ketuboth 11:6). When this woman who was divorced because she was thought to be an aylonit has children in her subsequent marriage, it turns out that she wasn’t really an aylonit.  Hence she could make a valid claim that her first husband owes her a ketubah.  However, Rabbi Judah says that she would do better not to make such a claim, for if she does her husband might attempt to annul the divorce and thereby make her children mamzerim and forbid her to her new husband because she is an adulteress (albeit an unintentional one.)
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The two sections of this mishnah deal with a person who sold either himself, his children or his fields to a Gentile.
  If a man sells himself and his children to a Gentile, he is not to be redeemed but his children are to be redeemed after the death of their father.  If the Jewish community were to redeem a man who sold himself to a Gentile, others in the future would be encouraged to do so in order to raise money, and eventually it would become a serious financial burden.  Therefore, the community is not allowed to redeem such a person.  However, his children were sold through no fault of their own.  In order to prevent them from being lost to the Jewish community they are redeemed after their father’s death.  However, while he is still alive even they are not redeemed so that the father will not be encouraged to sell them again.
  If a man sells his field to a Gentile, and an Israelite bought it back, he has to bring, the purchaser must bring first fruits from it, because of tikkun olam.  There are two versions to this section, the one that I translated above, and another version which Rashi used.  I will explain both. When a Gentile acquires land in Israel, the land still retains its holiness and therefore the first fruits (bikkurim) which grow from this land must be brought to Jerusalem, as is the rule with all first fruits.  However, the person who buys the land from the Gentile might think that since the fruits grew while owned by the Gentile, he need not bring first fruits.  To prevent this situation, the rabbis stated that the one who bought the land from the Gentile must bring first fruits.  Note that according to this interpretation something done because of tikkun olam is also a “toraitic” law (deoraita).  This is unusual and hence makes this interpretation tentative.  The Talmud adds further complicated wrinkles to this mishnah to solve this problem. Rashi’s version reads, “If one sells his land to a Gentile, he must buy the first fruits and bring them.”  This is easier to understand.  The Gentile will obviously not do so himself and therefore if the Jew doesn’t go back and buy the first fruits, they will not be brought.  Furthermore, this is a penalty on the person for selling his land to a Gentile.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches what type of land must be used in order to repay debts.  Its connection to “tikkun olam” is that the sages shaped some of these laws using “tikkun olam” type criteria.  That is to say they tried to take into social needs when making these rules.
  Damages are paid out of [property of] the best quality;  The rule that damage payments are made out of the best of one’s land is seemingly stated in Exodus 22:4, “When a man lets his livestock loose to graze in another’s land, and so allows a field or vineyard to be grazed bare, he must repay the best of his field and the best of his vineyard.”  However, there is a debate over this issue.   Rabbi Akiva interpreted this to mean that the damager must pay back from the best of his (the damager’s) land and Rabbi Ishmael interpreted it to mean that the damager must pay back with land equivalent to the best of the other person’s land.  If this mishnah goes according to Rabbi Ishmael than the “tikkun olam” is that although the Torah does not demand that the damager pay back from the best of his own land, the rabbis demanded that he do so in order to deter people from being negligent and causing damage.  If the mishnah goes according to Rabbi Akiva, then the Torah itself ruled because of tikkun olam.  Although tikkun olam usually implies a rabbinic enactment, this is not always the case.
  A creditor pays out of land of medium quality,  According to the Talmud, Torah law dictates that when a debtor collects land in payment of his debt, he collects from the debtor’s worst property.  Seemingly this would be good for debtors, certainly a noble goal.  The problem with this is that it might end up deterring lenders and thereby make it difficult for people to get the loans they need (especially if they are farmers.)  People will be hesitant to lend money if they know that if the debtor defaults they will collect from lousy land.  In order to encourage people to lend money (remember it was without interest, so lending was a form of charity), the rabbis enacted that if a debtor defaults the creditor collects from property of medium quality.
  And a ketubah is paid out of land of the poorest quality. Rabbi Meir says that a ketubah is also paid out of medium quality land.  There is a debate over what type of land a woman receives upon collecting her ketubah.  Collecting a ketubah is like collecting any debt the husband (or his estate) is a debtor to the woman.  Therefore Rabbi Meir holds that just as usual debts are collected from middle quality land, so too is the ketubah debt.  However, the first opinion in this mishnah holds that normal debts are not totally analogous to ketubot.  With regard to a normal debt, the rabbis ruled that it is collected from middle quality land in order to encourage people to loan money.  No such encouragement is needed with regard to ketubot, for women will marry whether they will collect their ketubah from middle or poor quality land.  Since there is no special reason that the woman should collect her ketubah from middle quality land, she collects from poor quality land, as is the Torah’s rule for all debts.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues the topic which was begun in yesterday’s mishnah which type of land is used to pay off debts.
  Payment cannot be recovered from mortgaged property where there free property is available, even if it is only of the lowest quality. Payment can be recovered from orphans only from land of the lowest quality.  As we learned yesterday, generally debts are repaid with middle quality land.  When a person takes out a loan, all of his currently owned land automatically becomes collateral for the loan.  If the creditor should come to collect, and the debtor only has poor quality land, but at the time of the loan he had middle quality land and subsequent to the loan he sold or gave it away, the creditor collects from the poor quality land.  This is a case of conflicting values.  We want the creditor to be able to collect from better property in order to encourage people to lend.  However, the collection of debts from third parties is terribly disruptive to the economic system.  Therefore, in order to prevent losses to the third party in other words for tikkun olam the creditor can only collect from the poor quality land in the debtor’s actual possession.
  If a creditor is collecting from the orphan of the debtor, he can only collect from the poor quality land.  Again this is because of tikkun olam and to make things easier for the orphans.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah continues the topic of collecting debts from mortgaged properties.  The second section deals with returning lost objects.
  [Creditors] do not collect from mortgaged property for produce consumed, for the improvement of property, [and payment] for the maintenance of a widow and daughters, because of tikkun olam.  There are three types of repayments mentioned in this section.  In each of these cases when a creditor collects his debt he can only collect from unmortgaged property, meaning property that is actually in the hands of the debtor. The first category is “produce consumed.”  This refers to a situation where someone illegally obtained land, for instance he stole it.  He then eats the produce on the land and sells the land to another person. When the original owner comes to claim the land he extracts the land from the person who purchased it from the thief and he can extract the value of the produce from the thief himself.  However, he can only exact this payment from the thief from unmortgaged property and not from property which the thief sold or gave away to others. In this same situation, the one who purchased the property from the thief and then had to restore it to its original owner collects from the thief the original purchase price.  He also may collect from the thief any money he spent to improve the property, but this amount he may collect only from unmortgaged property.  This is what the mishnah means by “improvement of property.” When a man dies one of the ketubah stipulations is that his widow and daughters are to be provided for from his estate until they are married.  However, they are only provided for from the dead husband’s unmortgaged property. The “tikkun olam” here is that these amounts are not fixed.  Therefore, one who buys from a person who might be in this situation will never know how much debt that person is really in and he won’t be able to be cautious lest he buy property that has a lien on it.  To protect these purchasers, these amounts cannot be collected from them.
  The finder of a lost article is not required to take an oath, because of tikkun olam.  If a person returns a lost object to another person, and the person receiving the lost object suspects that the one returning it has kept part of the object for himself he cannot make the one returning the object take an oath that he has returned it all.  If such an oath could be enforced, people might be hesitant to return lost objects, because people did not want to take oaths even if they were true.  In order to encourage people to fulfill the mitzvah of returning lost objects, in other words for tikkun olam, such oaths were not enforced.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The first two sections of this mishnah deal with certain responsibilities that guardians have in taking care of orphans.  The final section deals with damages that are done to food or sacrifices that cannot be seen.
  If orphans relied on a householder or if their father appointed a guardian for them, he must tithe their produce.  A guardian has the responsibility to tithe the produce of orphans who are relying on him to manage their lives.  This clause is here to introduce the next sections of the mishnah.
  A guardian who was appointed by the father of the orphans is required to take an oath.  [A guardian who was] appointed by the court does not need to take an oath. Abba Shaul says that the rule is the reverse.  When the orphans grow up, according to the law they can make the guardian swear that he did not misappropriate any of their money (see Shevuoth 7:8).  According to the first opinion in this section, the orphans have such power only when they were appointed by the father.  If the court appointed the guardian, he is not liable for such an oath.  This is because the court forced him to be a guardian, and he didn’t necessarily receive any satisfaction.  If the halakhah were to force him to take an oath, people would refuse to become guardians.  However, if the father appointed him, the guardian has the satisfaction of helping out the father who was assumedly his friend. Since he has that satisfaction, he will accept becoming a guardian even though he might eventually have to take an oath.  We can see here that the “tikkun olam” is to exempt guardians from taking oaths if the oath would deter them from accepting such appointments in the first place. Abba Shaul reasons that the exact opposite is true.  If the father appoints him he need not swear since he was only doing a favor for the father.  According to Abba Shaul, if guardians appointed by the father were forced to swear they would not want to become guardians.  However, when the court appoints someone to be a guardian he gets the added benefit of the community knowing that the court believes that he is a trustworthy man.  Since he receives this added benefit, he will not refuse becoming a guardian even if it might cause him to take an oath.
  One who renders impure [someone else’s pure food] or mixes terumah [with someone else’s non-terumah produce] or makes a libation [with someone else’s wine], if he does so inadvertently, he is exempt, but if intentionally he is liable. Priests who intentionally made someone else’s sacrifice piggul in the Temple are liable.  There are three types of invisible damage mentioned in this first clause.  If one causes someone else’s terumah to become impure, it has to be thrown away.  If someone mixes in terumah with another person’s normal produce it must be sold to priests at the price of terumah which is lower than the price of normal produce.  Finally, if someone makes an idolatrous libation with someone else’s wine, the wine must be thrown away.  Similarly, if one mixes already libated wine with non-libated wine it must all be thrown away.  In all of these cases the damage is done but the object has not physically changed at all.  The bottom line halakhah holds that damage that cannot be seen is not considered damage.  Therefore, if any of these things were done intentionally, the damager need not make restitution.  However, had he done so intentionally he must pay because of “tikkun olam” to prevent people from intentionally damaging other’s property. “Piggul” is a sacrifice offered by a priest who has intends to eat it at a time when that sacrifice may no longer be eaten.  “Piggul” cannot be put onto the altar and it does not bring about the intended result of a sacrifice (for instance atonement).  This is again a case of invisible damage, and as above, if a priest intentionally causes such damage he is liable.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This same exact mishnah appears in Eduyoth 7:9.  It is brought here because it contains two “takkanot” (in sections three and four).
  Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement;  As we have learned in other places, the Rabbis considered a deaf-mute to lack intelligence, because in their time the deaf-mute had little way of communicating with the outside world.  Usually a person who lacks intelligence, such a deaf-mute, minor or insane person, cannot enter into legally binding contracts, because they don’t understand their ramifications.  However, as Rabbi Nehunia testifies, a deaf-mute can be divorced.  (She was married off by her father).  The reason is that divorce is not dependent upon the woman’s acquiescence; she can be divorced against her will.  Since her will is irrelevant, even one who lacks awareness can be divorced.  Although this might sound harsh, as if the Rabbis are going out of their way to allow a deaf-mute to be divorced, it may have also worked in her benefit.  If men couldn’t divorce deaf-mutes, perhaps they might refrain from marrying them.  By allowing a “way out” the Rabbis might actually be encouraging their marriage.
  And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her;  This section deals with an orphaned minor girl of a non-priestly, Israelite family, who marries a priest. Generally this type of marriage is considered to be valid only rabbinically (derabanan) and not valid through Torah law (deoraita).  Deoraita a minor can only be married off by her father.  Only when she reaches majority she can marry herself off without her father’s aid.  Despite the fact that this is really only a “derabanan” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that it is sufficient for her to be allowed to eat terumah and for her husband to inherit her, should she die.  Even though these are usually rights only given to a valid “deoraita” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that the husband does receive these rights.
  And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value, because of the enactment to encourage repentance.  Usually one who steals an item must return the actual stolen item, as long as the item still exists.  If one stole a beam and then used it in the foundation of a castle, legally he is bound to take down the castle and return the beam.  Obviously this will discourage people from admitting that they stole.  This admission is an essential part of making atonement for their crime.  To allow people to more easily make atonement, the robber is allowed to pay back the value of the beam.
  And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many,   that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar.  If it were forbidden to use animals that might have been stolen as sacrifices, the priests would never sacrifice an animal, lest it be stolen.  Therefore, the mishnah rules that stolen animals can be used as sin-offerings, and that they do procure atonement for the one bringing them, as long as the theft is not publicly known.  This mishnah is not permission to steal an animal and bring it as a sacrifice.  Rather it is permission to use an animal without being concerned that it is stolen property.  The mishnah teaches that if it was stolen property and the person who brought it did not know that it was stolen, that it is effective in bringing atonement.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with “sicaricon”, which refers to the illegal, governmental expropriation of land from its rightful owners.  Specifically we are talking about land taken from Jews by Romans during the Second Temple and mishnaic periods.  The word “sicaricon” can refer to either the Roman who expropriated the property (in this case I shall capitalize the word); the rule governing land taken in such a faction; a person who came into land by buying it from a sicaricon.
  There was no sicaricon in Judea for those killed in war.  During the Great Revolt from 67-70 C.E. which culminated in the destruction of the Temple, the rule of sicaricon was not applied.  Practically what this meant was that land expropriated by the Romans was considered to legally belong to the Romans.  Therefore, a Jew who subsequently bought the land did not need to return anything to the original owner.  This was to encourage people to buy back the land in order that it should not remain Roman in perpetuity.
  After the war’s slaughter ended there is sicaricon there. How so? If a man buys a field from the Sicaricon and then buys it again from the original owner, his purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the original owner and then from the sicaricon it is valid.  After the war the rule of sicaricon was enforced.  What this meant was that a Jew who bought the land from the Roman and then went and asked to buy the land from the Sicaricon had not legally acquired the land.  This is because we can assume that the original owner only agreed to sell the land out of fear were he not to sell the land the Romans who had already sold it might lose their sale.  However, if the purchaser acquired it first from the original owner and then from the Sicaricon the sale is valid.
  If a man buys [a piece of a married woman’s property] from the husband and then buys it from the wife, the purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the wife and then from the husband it is valid.  This section does not have to do with the rules of sicaricon and is brought here because of its similarity to the previous section.  When a man marries a woman the woman retains ownership over her property but her husband has the right to use the property.   Neither of them may sell the property without the other’s permission.  If someone buys the property first from the husband and then from the woman (who agrees), the sale is not valid.  The problem is that the woman may have sold under duress, being pressured by her husband.  However, if he buys from the woman first, we can assume that the woman sold of her own free will.  If the husband also agrees to the sale, the sale is valid.
  This was [the ruling] of the first mishnah. The court that came after them said if a man buys property from the Sicaricon he had to give the original owner a quarter [of the value]. When is this so? When the original owners cannot buy it themselves, but if they can they have preemption over everyone else.  The problem with this system may have been that people would have been afraid to buy land from the Sicaricon.  This might have left large pieces of Jewish land in Roman control.  Therefore, a later court made a new rule.  If a person buys from a Sicaricon, he must give one quarter of the sale price to the original owners.  This way people would buy the land and the original owners would get at least some of their money back. However, if the original owners have the money to buy back their land, they still have the first shot at doing so.
  Rabbi assembled a court and they decided by vote that if the property had been in the hands of the Sicaricon twelve months, whoever purchased it first acquired the title, but he had to give a quarter [of the price] to the original owner.  Rabbi Judah Hanasi and his court enacted a further change in this law.  If the land remained with the Sicaricon 12 months, and it didn’t look like anyone was going to buy it, the first person to purchase it has legally acquired it.  In other words, a purchaser need not worry that the original owners would preempt him.  However, the purchaser must still pay compensation to the original owners.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah has to do with transactions done by two categories of people considered to legally lack “da’at”, intelligence minors and deaf-mutes.  As we see from this mishnah, the rabbis seem well aware that well deaf-mutes had great difficulties communicating, they nevertheless could make their wishes known.
  A deaf-mute can gesture and be gestured at [and thereby conduct transactions]. Ben Betera says that he may make lip-motions, if the transaction is of movable property.  If a deaf-mute wishes to sell or purchase an object he may do so by gesturing or by being gestured at.  People who can speak must verbalize their commands.  Since this is impossible for a deaf-mute, gestures are sufficient. Ben Betera is more lenient and even allows even lip-motions, as long as the transaction is only with movable property, i.e. not land.  To buy or sell land he would need to make a full gesture.
  The purchase or sale done by young children in movable property is valid.  Young children can sell or purchase movable property.  The Talmud explains that this is a form of “tikkun olam”.  If children could not sell or buy things they would not be able to earn their keep, and until modern times children had to work to help support their families (in good situations) or support themselves (in much worse situations).
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah teaches rules that were made in order to keep peace between people.  These “ways of peace” are a subcategory of “tikkun olam”.  Whereas many of the other enactments made because of “tikkun olam” had a strong economic element, these rules are more concerned with interpersonal relations.
  These were the rules they laid down because of the ways of peace:A priest is called up first to read the Torah and after him a Levite and then an Israelite, because of the ways of peace.  The custom of the Kohen receiving the first aliyah to the Torah and the Levite the second and only then the rest of the congregation was enacted because of the ways of peace.  [Quite frankly, it seems that this hasn’t worked all that well and synagogue-goers will just find something else to argue about but that’s another story.]
  An “eruv” is placed in the room where it has always been placed, because of the ways of peace.  An “eruv” is made by enclosing an area (done today with twine or something similar) and by putting a symbolically communal meal in one house in the area.  This is a legal fiction to turn a large community into a “home” so that people can carry on Shabbat within this area.  The mishnah teaches that this meal is put in the same house every week.  If it were to move around from week to week people might argue where it should be put.  Alternatively, people might not trust that the eruv was set properly because they didn’t know where it is.  Therefore, it is left in the same house week after week.
  The cistern which is nearest to the channel is filled first, because of the ways of peace.  To irrigate cisterns channels were made from the river.  The mishnah teaches that the first cistern on the channel is allowed to fill up first and the other cistern owners cannot tell the owner of the closest cistern that he should periodically close his up so that they can fill up first.  Rather the cisterns are always filled up in the same order to avoid fights.
  [Taking of] beasts, birds and fishes from traps [set by others] is robbery, because of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery.  The mishnah now begins with a list of three things the taking of which is not considered to be true robbery.  Rather, taking these things is prohibited only because of the “ways of peace”.  In each of these cases, Rabbi Yose holds that it is prohibited not because of the “ways of peace” but because taking them is truly robbery as defined by the Torah. The first case is taking animals from traps.  Since these animals have not yet come into the physical possession of the trap-setters, taking from them is not technically robbery.  However, it is still prohibited because of the “ways of peace.”  Rabbi Yose holds that although they have not yet come into the physical possession of the trap-setters, the trap-setters have acquired them and therefore taking them is full “robbery.”
  [Taking away] anything found by a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor is robbery, because of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery.  According to the first opinion, a deaf-mute, imbecile or child do not legally acquire things that they find.  Therefore, technically speaking when one takes something that they found away from them, he is not robbing them.  However, for many obvious reasons, this is prohibited because of “the ways of peace.”  Again, Rabbi Yose considers this to be full robbery.
  If a poor man strikes [down olives] on top of an olive tree, [taking the fruit] that is beneath him is robbery. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery.  There are three things that a poor person can take 1) the corners of the field; 2) things which the harvester forgot to take; 3) grain that fell out of the harvesters’ hands.  In our mishnah a poor person is on top of an olive tree, beating the tree so that the olives fall below so that he can collect them.  Technically, the olives which fall below are not his until he gathers them into his possession.  Therefore, if someone else takes them before he gathers them he has not technically stolen them.  However, because of “the ways of peace” it is forbidden.  Again, Rabbi Yose holds that this is “full robbery.”
  Poor Gentiles are not prevented from gathering gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field, because of the ways of peace.  The agricultural products left in the field are meant to be for poor Jews.  However, in the interest of peace Jews are supposed to allow non-Jews to take them as well.  I should note that this obviously is an important issue for modern Jews, both in the Diaspora and in Israel.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of chapter five completes the examples of enactments made because “of the ways of peace.”
  This mishnah demonstrates that in the Second Temple period Jews of different levels religiosity lived in the same communities and shared their things with one another.  While people who were more observant of certain ritual requirements had to be careful in certain areas, they did not cease living together.
  A woman may lend to another woman who is suspected of not observing the sabbatical year a fan or a sieve or a handmill or a stove, but she should not sift or grind with her.  It is forbidden to keep sabbatical year produce in one’s house after it no longer exists in the field.  The woman suspected of not observing the sabbatical year may have such produce in her house.  Nevertheless, another woman may still lend various vessels, even though those vessels will used to commit transgressions.  However, the woman should not physically help her neighbor commit a transgression.
  The wife of a “haver” may lend to the wife of an “am ha-aretz” a fan or a sieve and may winnow and grind and sift with her, but once she has poured water over the flour she should not touch anything with her, because we do not assist those who commit a transgression.  A “haver”, literally friend, or perhaps better translated as “member”, is one who is careful about purity laws and about tithing.  An “am ha-aretz” an ignoramus is not careful about such laws.  The wife of the “haver” may work with grain with the “am ha-aretz” even though the latter is impure.  However, once the flour has become wet, it is now susceptible to impurity.  At this point since we are discussing flour that belongs to an am haaretz, terumah and tithes have assumedly not been taken out of the flour.  Therefore the am-ha-aretz will be rendering the terumah impure and this is forbidden.  Since this is forbidden, the wife of the haver may not help her.
  All these rules were only said because of the ways of peace.  The permissions granted in the first two sections were because of “the ways of peace.”  Communities of people with varying degrees of religiosity need to learn to be able to live together.
  Gentiles may be wished luck in the Sabbatical year but not Israelites and greeting may be given to them, because of the ways of peace.  It is forbidden to work fields during the Sabbatical year.  If Gentiles own a field in the land of Israel one may wish them luck in their endeavors, even though the field should not be worked.  However, one shouldn’t wish luck to Jews who are engaging in a prohibited activity.  One may also greet a Gentile in order to increase peace between Jews and Gentiles.  It seems that there is an underlying fear in this section. If Jews do not wish Gentiles luck, or greet them properly, they may cause danger to the Jewish community.  Alternatively, one could see a more positive message here.  It is important for Jews and Gentiles to get along and therefore, to increase peace, Jews should wish them well.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  After a two chapter digression, the Mishnah returns to the main topic of the tractate divorce law.  Most of this chapter deals with men and women appointing agents to deliver or to receive the get.  As we shall see, a husband can tell the agent to bring the get and a woman may make an agent to receive or bring a get.  The difference between the two has to do with when the woman is considered to be divorced and up until what point the husband may change his mind.
  If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so.  A man can appoint an agent to bring a get to his wife, but he cannot appoint an agent to accept the get on behalf of his wife.  A agent who is empowered to legally accept the get can only be appointed by the wife, since she is the one who has to receive the get in order for it to be valid.  Therefore, it does not matter what language the husband uses, when he sends an agent with a get she is not divorced until she receives the get.  Even if he says to the agent, “Receive this get…”, the get is not valid until the agent hands it over to the woman.  Therefore, the husband may change his mind and annul the get until she actually receives it.
  If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so.  In contrast, a woman has the right to appoint an agent to receive a get on her behalf.  Once this agent has received the get, the woman is fully divorced.  If after giving it to an agent empowered to receive the get the husband wishes to retract, he may not do so.
  Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so.  This section teaches that the husband may change the appointment of the agent from one of “receiving” to one of “carrying.”  The husband authorizes the agent to bring the get to the woman but not to receive it on her behalf.  The woman is divorced only when she receives the get and therefore the husband may retract until that moment.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract.  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel deals with a woman who says, “Take for me…” instead of “Carry to me…” or “Receive for me…”  He rules that “Take for me” is equivalent to “Receive for me” and therefore the woman is divorced as soon as the agent receives the get; after that point the husband may no longer retract.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  The first part of this mishnah continues to discuss a woman’s appointing an agent to receive her get.  The second part deals with the divorce of a betrothed girl who has not yet reached majority age.
  A woman who said [to an agent], “Receive my get for me” requires two sets of witnesses, two to say, “In our presence she told him”, and two to say, “In our presence he received [the get] and tore it”. Even if the first set are the same [witnesses] as the latter set or if there was one in the first set and one in the second, and one joined with them [for both testimonies].  If a woman appointed an agent to receive her get she will need two sets of witnesses to execute her divorce, one to witness her appointment of the agent and the second to witness the agent receive the get.  However, there can be full or partial overlap between the two sets.
  If a young girl is betrothed, both she and her father may receive her get. Rabbi Judah said that two [different] hands cannot take possession as one.  Rather her father alone may receive her get.  A young girl (defined as being between the ages of 12 and 12 1/2) who is betrothed is in an “in-between” situation.  On the one hand, she is neither fully married nor mature and hence her father retains some control over her.  However, she is no longer a minor and therefore has some of her own legal rights.  Were she being divorced after being married or having reached maturity, she alone would have the legal right to receive her get.   However, in this “in-between” situation, the first opinion in the mishnah rules that either she or her father can receive her get. Rabbi Judah disagrees.  It would be legally too ambiguous for both to be able to receive the get.  Therefore, only her father may receive the get.
  One who is not able to keep her get is not capable of being divorced.  This section refers to a minor who is not yet capable of receiving her get.  At such a young age she cannot be divorced, even if her father were to receive the get.  Since she is too young to even know the meaning of being divorced, the husband must wait until she is of majority age to divorce her.  [I should note that the husband is not a particularly salutary fellow (to say the least).  We should remember that we are dealing with legal rights not with what seems to be ethically acceptable.]
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first part of this mishnah deals with a minor girl’s legal ability to receive a get and to be divorced.  The second section deals with instructions that a wife or husband might give to an agent who is to bring or receive the get and the implications that those instructions can have on the validity of the get.
  If a young girl says, “Receive my get for me”, it is not a get until the get reaches her hand. Therefore, if [the husband] wishes to retract, he may retract, since a minor cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to him, “Go and receive a get for my daughter”, the husband may not retract.  A minor may be divorced since divorce does not require her consent, consent which she would statutorily lack.  However, she cannot appoint an agent since minors do not have such legal authority.  Hence, even if she says “Receive my get for me”, the agent is not authorized to receive it on her behalf.  She is not divorced until the get reaches her hand.  In such a case the husband is able to retract until she receives the get. In contrast, the father has the ability to appoint an agent to act on his daughter’s behalf, as long as she is still a minor and was never fully married.  This mishnah refers to a case where she was only betrothed (see yesterday’s mishnah).  If the father appoints an agent to receive the get on behalf of his daughter, she is divorced from the moment the agent receives the get.  If she had been fully married, the father may no longer receive her get or appoint an agent to do so.
  If a man says, “Give this get to my wife in such-and-such a place” and he gives it to her in another place, [the get is] invalid. [If he says,] “She is in such-and-such a place”, and he gives it to her in another place, [it is] valid.  In the following two sections, a husband or a wife appoints an agent and gives the agent instructions as to where to deliver/receive the get.  If the husband tells the agent to give his wife the get in a certain place, she is not divorced if the agent gives the get to her in another place.  In such a case we can assume that the husband wanted the get delivered specifically in that place.  However, if the husband merely tells the agent where to find his wife, the husband does not necessarily care if she is really somewhere else.  He was only helping the agent locate her. Therefore the get is valid no matter where the gives it to her.
  If a woman says, “Receive my get in such-and-such a place” and he receives it for her in another place, [it is] invalid. Rabbi Elazar says it valid. [If she says,] “Bring me my get from such-and-such a place” and he brings it from somewhere else, [it is] valid.  The same is true if the woman tells her agent to receive the get in a certain place.  The get is not valid unless he receives it in that place.  However, in this case Rabbi Elazar disagrees.  He holds that since the woman can be divorced without her consent, even when she said, “Receive it for me in such-and-such a place” she only meant to tell the agent where her husband was. If she appoints an agent to bring her a get and not to receive it on her behalf, she doesn’t care where he gets the document.  Even if she tells him to bring it from a certain place and he brings it from somewhere else, she is divorced.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a woman married to a priest.  As long as she is married she may eat terumah.  However, once she is divorced she loses this right.  The mishnah deals with such a woman who appoints an agent to receive or bring her get.
  [If a woman says to an agent], “Bring me my get”, she may eat terumah until the get reaches her hand.  Since she appointed the agent to bring her the get, she is not divorced until she actually receives the get.  She may continue to eat terumah until this point.
  [If she says,] “Receive for me my get”, she is forbidden to eat terumah immediately.   [If she says,] “Receive for me my get in such-and-such a place”, she can eat terumah until the get reaches that place.  However, if she appoints an agent to receive the get, she must cease eating terumah immediately.  Since the agent might receive the get on her behalf at any moment, we must be concerned lest she is divorced immediately and hence she immediately loses her right to eat terumah.
  Rabbi Elazar says that she is forbidden immediately.  If she tells the agent to receive the get in a certain place, then according to the first opinion she is not divorced unless the agent receives the get at that place.  Hence she may estimate how long it will take the agent to arrive at that place and she may continue to eat terumah until that point. However, Rabbi Elazar disagrees. Since, as we learned yesterday, he holds that the agent can validly receive the get anywhere, she can be divorced immediately.  Hence he holds that also in this situation she must cease eating terumah immediately.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with the specific words that a husband must state to a scribe or other agents in order for them to be empowered to write a get and give it to his wife.
  As a general rule, the husband must use language that clearly implies that he intends to divorce his wife, and not just write a get which he may or may not want to use.  He must instruct his agent to write the get and to give it to her.  However, there are extenuating circumstances where instructions to write the get are sufficient to empower the agent to also deliver the get.
  If a man says, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, [or] “Divorce her”, [or] “Write a letter and give it to her”, then they should write it and give it to her.  The language which the husband employs in this section is sufficiently clear and precise that the agents are empowered to write out a get on the husband’s behalf and to give it to the woman.
  If he said, “Release her”, [or] “Provide for her”, [or] “Do for her as the law dictates”, [or] “Do the proper thing for her”, he has not said anything.  The language in this section is too ambiguous and although it may imply that he wishes to divorce his wife, it is not certain that that is his intention.  Hence, an agent who hears the husband make one of these statements is not empowered to write a get and deliver it to his wife.
  Originally they said that if a man was being led out to execution and said, “Write a get for my wife”, they may write a get and give [it to her]. Later they said, even if he were leaving for a sea voyage or for a caravan journey. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if he were dangerously ill.  Usually a husband must state that he wishes the get to be written and give to the woman.  However, in extenuating circumstances where the husband seems to have been facing immanent death, it is highly unlikely that when he instructed someone to write a get, he wanted the get to be written but not given to his wife.  After all, why else would he want a get at this point?  Therefore, one who hears the husband says “Write a get for my wife” may write it and also give it to her.  At first the category of people facing immanent death included only a person being led out to execution. Later, they expanded the category to include one leaving for a sea voyage or a caravan journey.  These men would have wanted to write out a get that would go into effect should they not return, not an unlikely scenario.  This would prevent their wives from being left as “agunot” a woman who doesn’t know if her husband is alive or dead and therefore cannot remarry. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri added that an agent who hears such a statement from a dangerously ill person may also write and give the get.  This man may want to divorce his wife in order to exempt her from levirate marriage (if he was to do childless and with a brother she would have to undergo yibbum or halitzah).  Again, it is very unlikely that a dying man would want to write a get but not give it to his wife, and therefore we are not concerned with such a possibility. 
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah continues to discuss cases in which a man instructed someone to write a get for his wife, but did not specify that he was also to give it to her.
  If a man had been thrown into a pit and cried out, “Whoever hears his voice should write a get for his wife”, those who hear should write a get and give it to her.  The man in this case clearly fears that he will die in the pit leaving his wife subject to levirate marriage.  As in the cases in yesterday’s mishnah, there is again no reason that he would want to write a get but not have it given to his wife. Therefore, someone who hears him scream out his name and his wife’s name may write out the get and give it to his wife.  Note that the person screaming is referring to himself in the third person.  This way people hear him state his name.
  If a healthy man says, “Write a get for my wife”, his intention is merely to play with her.  However, one who hears a healthy man say to write a get but not say to give the get is not allowed to write out the get.  The fear is that the husband wants to use the get only to “play with his wife”, which I take to mean mentally cause her pain.  He wants to use the get as a threat (alternatively if she wants to be divorced, perhaps it is a tease).  Therefore, not only should those who hear these instructions not give her the get, they shouldn’t even write one out.  Note that what the mishnah probably wishes to avoid is gittin that are written out but not intended to be given.
  It once happened that a man in good health said, “Write a get for my wife”, and then went up on to a roof and fell and died, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said that the Sages said:  if he had thrown himself down this is a get, but if the wind had blown him over it was not a get.  In this case a seemingly healthy person told someone to write out a get.  Although the person should not have written the get and given it to his wife, he did so anyway.  If afterwards, the husband intentionally commits suicide, this proves that he was sick at the time he instructed someone to write the get.  Since he was about to die, he definitely intended to divorce his wife and not “to play with her.”  However, if the wind pushed him off the roof it is not suicide, he was not sick and therefore the get is invalid.  In such a case this woman is a widow and not a divorcee, and may be subject to levirate marriage.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of chapter six teaches that if the husband made his agents into a court (consisting of three), they may appoint a scribe to write the get.  However, if he did not constitute a court to take care of the get, then his agents must write the get themselves.  Assumedly this would have been difficult, if not nearly impossible since writing divorce documents is complicated and is usually the work of a professional.
  The final section teaches that sometimes all those who hear the instructions to write a get must sign the get, and sometimes only some must sign the get.  It depends on the precise words of the husband.
  If a man said to two people, “Give a get to my wife”, or to three people, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, they must write it and give it.  In the first case, the husband’s agents themselves must write the get and give it to his wife, since two people cannot constitute a court.  [Note that since he said “Give” and not just “Write” they are at least empowered to write and give the get themselves.]  If he instructed three people to write a get and give it to his wife, they must write the get themselves.  Even though three people are sufficient to constitute a court, since he specified that they should write the get, they are not empowered to tell someone else to do so.
  If he said to three persons, “Give a get to my wife”, they may tell others to write the get because he has made them into a court, the words of Rabbi Meir. And this is the halakhah which Rabbi Hanina a man of Ono brought from prison:  “I have received a tradition that if a man says to three persons, ‘Give a get to my wife’, they may tell others to write it, because he has made them into a court. Rabbi Yose said: We said to the messenger, we also have a tradition that even were he to say to the great court in Jerusalem, ‘Give a get to my wife’, they must learn [to write] and write the get and give it.  If he told three people to give his wife a get but did not tell them to write the get, he has made them into a court and empowered them to tell a scribe to write the get. This is Rabbi Meir’s opinion.  This halakhah of Rabbi Meir is supported by a tradition which Rabbi Hanina a man of Ono (a place) brought from prison.  The commentators explain that he received the tradition from Rabbi Akiva who had been imprisoned during the Bar Kokhba revolt. Rabbi Yose disagrees with the tradition brought from the prison and with Rabbi Meir.  He says that he too has a tradition that even if one instructs the greatest court that exists, the court that in Jerusalem, to give a get to his wife, the court must write the get themselves.  Even if they must learn to write, they may not appoint others in their place.  They are empowered to appoint a scribe only if he specifically tells them that they may do so.
  If a man says to ten persons, “Write a get”, one writes, and two sign as witnesses. [If he said,] “All of you write”, one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them dies, the get is invalid.  If a husband tells a group of ten people to write a get (and give it to his wife), it is sufficient for one of them to write the get and two of them to sign.  They need not all sign the get.  However, if he says to them “All of you write”, they must all participate in the writing of the get, one writing and nine signing.  Should one of them die before he signs the get, the group will not be able to execute the get since they will not be able to fulfill the husband’s command.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is about a husband who is gripped by some sort of mental illness and hence may not be in his right mind when he decides to divorce his wife.
  The second section is about a mute husband’s ability to divorce his wife.
  If a man is gripped by the kordiakos illness and says, “Write a get for my wife”, he has not said anything. If he says, “Write a get for my wife”, and is then gripped by kordiakos and then says, “Do not write it”, his latter words are of no effect.  “Kordiakos” is evidently some sort of mental illness.  If a husband is gripped by this illness, his instructions to others to divorce his wife do not have any legal validity.  Similarly, if a healthy person instructs others to divorce his wife, and then is gripped by “kordiakos” and then wishes to retract, his retraction is meaningless.  In short, the instructions of a mentally sick person do not have legal validity.
  If he becomes mute, and they say to him, “Should we write a get for your wife”, and he nods his head, he is tested three times. If he answers ‘no’ and ‘yes’ properly each time, then they should write the get.  A mute person is not considered someone who lacks “da’at” awareness or intelligence.  Hence he can legally divorce his wife.  However, since he cannot speak, it is a slightly more difficult to ascertain whether he wants to divorce.  The mishnah rules that he may answer questions with head gestures.  Those asking the questions must be certain what these gestures mean and therefore they test him with other questions.  For instance, if his name is Reuven, they can say, “Is your name Reuven?”  If he nods, that means that nodding signifies an affirmative answer.  They would repeat this test three times.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah returns to the subject taught in 6:7, that if a husband instructs people to write a get, they themselves must write the get.  They may have a scribe write the get only if he tells them that they may do so.
  They said to him, “Shall we write a get for your wife”, and he said to them, “Write!”, and they then told a scribe and he wrote and witnesses and they signed even if they wrote it and signed it and gave it back to him and he gave it to her, the get is void until he himself says to the scribe “Write” and to the witnesses, “Sign”. In this mishnah’s scenario the husband told others to write a get for his wife.  The people whom he told then went and had a scribe write the get and other witnesses signed.  This invalidates the get since the husband did not tell them that others could write the get. Even if after the scribe writes it they give the get back to the husband and the husband gives it to the wife, thereby tacitly agreeing to what they had done, the get is still invalid.  Since he did not tell them beforehand that they could have a scribe write the get, his consent ex post facto cannot revalidate the get.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  On several occasions we have noted that husbands may have divorced their wives right before their death (the husband’s, that is) in order to prevent their wives from having to undergo levirate marriage or halitzah (release from levirate marriage).  An obvious problem is that a person does not know when they will die.  Our mishnah deals with a husband who tries to remedy this problem by making the divorce conditional upon his death.
  [If a husband says], “This is your get if I die”, [or] “This is your get if I die from this illness”, [or] “This is your get after my death”, he has not said anything.  The stipulations that the husband makes in this section cause it to be impossible for the get to be valid, because by the time the get would become valid the husband is already dead.  A dead husband cannot divorce, and therefore when this husband dies his wife’s legal status is that of a widow and not a divorcee.
  [If he says, “This is your get] from today if I die”, [or “This is your get] from now if I die”, the get is valid.  In this case, the stipulation is effective. When the husband dies, the get will become retroactively effective to the day that he actually gave her the get.  This language may have been effective for a husband going off to war, or a husband who has gotten sick and looks like he will die soon.  If he returns from war or recovers from illness he can retract the get. However, it would be problematic for a husband who is home and healthy because the minute he says this, he is potentially ending his marriage.  This problem shall be dealt with in tomorrow’s mishnah.
  [If he says, “This is your get] from today and after [my] death”, it is both a get and not a get. If he dies [without offspring] she must perform halizah but she cannot marry the husband’s brother.  In this case the husband used ambiguous language.  We don’t know whether he intended the get to be valid after his death or beforehand.  Therefore, the status of the get is doubtful and the halakhah must rule stringently.  Should he die without children, she cannot remarry without halitzah, lest the get was not valid and she has a connection to the brother-in-law.  However, she cannot have yibbum (levirate marriage) lest she is a divorcee, in which case yibbum is strictly forbidden.
  [If he said], “This is your get from today if I die from this illness”, and he then got up and went about and fell sick and died, we estimate [the probable cause of his death]; if he died from the first illness, the get is valid, but otherwise not.  In this case, the husband made his divorce conditional upon his dying from his current illness.  If he seems to recover and then gets sick and dies, doctors or other qualified people would need to estimate whether he died of the original illness or of another cause.  If he died of the original illness she is divorced; if not, she is a widow.  If it is doubtful then she is a doubtful widow/divorcee.  Again, she would be required to do halitzah and forbidden from contracting yibbum, as we learned in the previous section.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The previous mishnah discussed a person who conditioned his wife’s divorce upon his subsequently dying.  For this to work, he must state that the divorce would retroactively be effective from the time he gave her the get.  However, until he dies she is not divorced because the get is conditional upon his death. Our mishnah discusses her status between the time he gives her the get and the time that he dies, thereby finalizing her divorce.
  She should not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, even a slave or a handmaid  [any witness is sufficient] except for her own female slave, since she can take liberties in front of her own handmaid.  Once the husband gives her the conditional get, she will retroactively be divorced from that moment onward.  Therefore, he is not allowed to have sexual relations with her.  Furthermore, as we shall learn in a later mishnah (8:4), sexual relations with her at this point, renders the get invalid.  In order to avoid the possibility that they would engage in sexual relations, they are not even allowed to be secluded together.  Seclusion is defined as being totally alone. The presence of anyone else in the room means that they are not secluded.  The one exception is her handmaid.  Since she would not be embarrassed at having sexual relations in front of her own handmaid, the handmaid’s presence is not sufficient to prevent seclusion.
  What is her status during those days? Rabbi Judah says that she is regarded as a married woman in every respect. Rabbi Yose says that she is both divorced and not divorced.  The mishnah now asks what her status is in-between the time that the divorce was given and the husband dies. According to Rabbi Judah, she is fully married.  Rabbi Judah seemingly disagrees with the previous clause and holds that when the husband dies the get is retroactively effective to a point a moment before he died.  It is not retroactively effective to the time when he gave her the get.  Therefore, she can continue to live with him as a married woman.  Rabbi Yose disagrees and holds that the get is retroactively effective to the point at which he gave it to her.  Therefore, she is both married and not married. This means that she could not have relations with him and not eat terumah if he was a priest.  However, she could not marry anyone else and if she did have relations with someone else, it might have the status of adultery.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The remainder of chapter seven discusses conditional divorces.  Today’s mishnah discusses someone who divorces his wife on the condition that she pay him a large sum of money.
  [If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz”, she is divorced and she has to give [him the money].  In this case, the divorce is effective immediately and she must give him the two hundred zuz.  If she elects not to give him the two hundred zuz, then the get is invalid.
  [If he says], “On condition that you give [the money to] within thirty days from now, if she gives him within thirty days she is divorced, but if not she is not divorced.  In this case, the husband wisely set a time limit for her to pay the divorce money.  If she wishes to be divorced, she must give him the money immediately.  If she does not do so, the get is invalid. I should note that the amount of 200 zuz is probably not accidental.  This is the amount of money that the husband would have to pay her for her ketubah if he divorces her.  What we may have here is a husband who wants to divorce his wife, and perhaps a wife who wants to be divorced, but he cannot afford to pay her the ketubah.  He is in essence saying that he wants to divorce her without paying her marriage settlement.  She has a right to forego her ketubah, should she wish to be divorced.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “It happened in Sidon that a man said to his wife, “This is your get on condition that you give me my robe”, and his robe was lost, and the Sages said that she should give him its value in money.  In the case that happened in Sidon (on the coast of modern Lebanon), a husband wanted to retrieve his robe from his wife.  However, the robe was lost and therefore the question arose whether the wife could fulfill the get’s condition by returning to him the value of the robe.  The Sages answered that she could.  In essence, the husband was not asking for the robe back but for the value of the robe.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah, instead of conditioning the get upon her paying him money, the husband stipulates that to be divorced she must continue to look after his father.  We can easily see the social situation reflected in this stipulation.  The husband no longer wishes to remain married, but the wife has performed an important function in the family.  The mishnah discusses when we consider the stipulation fulfilled.
  I should make an important note when discussing these situations.  The Mishnah does not generally provide an opinion whether a husband, or really any person, has done something “virtuous”.  The Mishnah is often interested in the technical, legal details and implications of things that can potentially occur.  These mishnayoth are not providing approval of a husband’s essentially blackmailing his wife.  Rather, they admit that such action is legally possible and hence its implications must be discussed.
  [If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child” How long must she nurse? Two years. Rabbi Judah says, eighteen months.  In this scenario, the husband made the get conditional upon his wife’s continuing to look after his father or to nurse his child.  The time limit for looking after the father is the remainder of the father’s life.  However, the wife need only nurse the child for two years, the standard length of time in which an average child nursed in mishnaic times.  Rabbi Judah says she need nurse only for eighteen months, which was probably the minimum amount of time that children nursed in this time period.
  If the child dies or the father dies, the get is valid.  When the husband said that she must continue to take care of his father or child, his intention was that she should do so as long as the father or child was alive.  Should they die, she has fulfilled the stipulation on the get and it is valid.
  [If he says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father for two years”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child for two years”, if the child dies or if the father says, “I don't want you to look after me”, even though she has not caused him to complain, the get is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says:  something like this is a get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said a general rule: wherever the obstacle does not arise from her side, the get is valid.  In this the husband stipulates a limit of two years to her having to take care of his father or child.  The mishnah takes this to mean that she must take care of the father or nurse the child for a full two years no matter what happens.  Therefore, in this case if the father or child dies, she has not fulfilled the stipulation.  Furthermore, if the father decides he no longer wants her to wait on him, she still hasn’t fulfilled the stipulation.  This is certainly true if she gave him reason to “fire” her, but according to the first mishnah, even if she was not at all at fault, she still has not fulfilled the condition.  However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees with this.  He holds that if she was not the obstacle which prevented the fulfillment of the stipulation, then the get is valid.  Therefore, if the father gets angry at her and she was not at fault, she is divorced.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  IntroductionIn this mishnah a man conditions the validity of his get upon his arrival at a certain place or lack of return within thirty days.   The idea would be that if he arrived at his destination and did not return, he either was never intending on returning or something else had occurred to him, preventing his return and thereby validating the get.
   [If a husband says,] "This is your get if I do not return within thirty days", and he was going from Judea to Galilee, if he got as far as Antipatras and then returned, his condition is broken.    [If he says,] "This is your get if I do not return within thirty days", and he was going from Galilee to Judea, if he got as far as Kefar Otnai and then returned, the condition is broken. [If he said,] "This is your get if I do not return within thirty days", and he was going into foreign parts, if he got as far as Acco and then returned his condition is broken. All three of these sections have identical structures, so we will explain them together.  According to the Talmud explains that in each case the husband made two conditions: 1) if he were to arrive at his destination the get would become effective immediately; 2) if he did not return within thirty days the get would come into effect.  [I should note that there are other explanations of this mishnah, and its language is actually quite difficult and open to various interpretations.] In all three scenarios, he does not arrive at his destination and he returns within thirty days.  Antipatras is on the border between Judea and the Galilee, but it is still in Judea.  Kefar Otnai is still in the Galilee. Acco, while almost being considered outside the land of Israel (however, compare Gittin 1:2). 
  [If he said,] "This is your get as long as I shall keep away from you for thirty days", even though he came and went and came and went, since he was not secluded with her, the get is valid. In this case, the husband conditions the validity of the get upon his staying away from his wifes presence for thirty days.  The mishnah teaches that his intention was that he should not be secluded with his wife for thirty days.  Therefore, even if he comes and goes but they are not secluded together, she is divorced.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  [If a husband says,] “This is your get if I do not return within twelve months”, and he dies within twelve months, it is not a get.[If he says,] “This is your get from now if I do not return within twelve months”, and he dies within twelve months, it is a get.In today’s mishnah, a husband conditions his get upon is return home within twelve months.  The mishnah discusses the validity of the get should he die within that time.As we learned in mishnah three, there can be no divorce after death.  In the first section, the wife is a widow because the get could not become valid until after twelve months.  At the point when the get could become valid, the husband was already dead.  In contrast, in the second section the husband says “From now…”, meaning that the get will become retroactively valid to the point at which it was given.  When he fails to return after twelve months, she is considered a divorcee and not a widow. An interesting question asked, but not solved, in the Talmud, is whether or not she may remarry after he dies but before the twelve months are up.  On the one hand, in the future she will be considered a divorcee at the point of the giving of the get.  On the other hand, she has still not reached that point. [This is sort of a mishnaic time warp, and I love time warp scenarios].
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  In the last mishnah of the chapter, the mishnah discusses a husband who conditioned his get upon his return within twelve months, but unlike yesterday’s mishnah, he told agents to write and deliver the get rather than giving it directly to his wife.
  [If a husband says,] “If I do not come back within twelve months, write a get and give it to my wife”, and they wrote a get before twelve months had passed and gave it to her after, it is not a get.  In this scenario, the husband stipulated that his agents should not even write the get until twelve months had passed.  Even though we could have interpreted his words to mean only that they should give the get after twelve months, the rabbis were quite strict in the interpretation of the language of gittin and in instructions given to deliver a get.  Therefore, the get is invalid.
  [If he said,] “Write a get and give it to my wife if I do not come back within twelve months”, and they wrote it before the twelve months had passed and gave it after, it is no get. Rabbi Yose says:  like this is a get.  In this case, the husband was not as clear as to when he wanted the get written.  He said “Write a get…” before he said “If I do not come back within twelve months.” Hence, there is room to debate the validity of the get. The first opinion is that the get is invalid, for his intention may have been the same as it was in the previous section.  However, here R. Yose disputes and says that in this case, the get is valid.
  If they wrote it after twelve months and delivered it after twelve months and he died, if the delivery of the get preceded his death the get is valid, but if his death preceded the delivery of the get it is not valid. If it is not known which was first, this is the woman about whom they said, “[She is] divorced and not divorced.”  If the husband’s agents faithfully fulfilled his instructions and wrote and delivered the get, then the only question left is whether or not the husband died before or after twelve months. If it is doubtful, then this woman is doubtfully divorced.  In other words, she might be a widow but she also might be a divorcee.  Therefore, should she be in a situation which would require yibbum (her husband left no children and had a brother) she could only do halitzah (yibbum would be prohibited lest she is a divorcee, and her brother-in-law be prohibited to her as her husband’s brother).  On the other hand, without halitzah she could not remarry, lest she is a widow and obligated for yibbum.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first three mishnayoth of this chapter discuss a husband who throws his get to his wife.  While a woman need not consent to being divorced, the husband must deliver the get into her possession and make her aware of the fact that she is being divorced.  These mishnayoth define what it takes to fulfill these two requirements.
  If a husband throws a get to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard, she is divorced.  The Torah states that the husband “puts the get in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1).  The rabbis expand this requirement and allow the husband to put the get into any place which is in her possession.
  If he throws it to her in his house or in his courtyard, even though it is with her on the same bed, she is not divorced.  In this case, she is on his property and hence he cannot just throw the get at her.  This is true even if the husband puts the get into her bed, if the bed belongs to the husband, she is not divorced.
  If he throws it into her lap or into her basket, she is divorced.  If he puts the get into her lap or into her basket she is divorced.  This is true even if she is standing on his property.  Since her lap and basket belong to her, it is sufficient if he delivers the get to one of these places.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah deals with a husband who tries to sneak a get to his wife by telling her it is a different type of document or by giving it to her while she is asleep.  Perhaps he wishes to avoid a face to face confrontation.  The mishnah will teach us that he must state to her “Here is your get” in order for her to be divorced.
  The second section returns to the subject of a husband who throws a get to his wife.
  If he said to her, “Take in this debt document”, or if she found it behind him and read it and it turned out to be her get, it is not a get, until he says to her, “Here is your get.”  In this case the husband tries to sneak the get to his wife either by telling her it was a debt document, or by hiding what it was until she picked it up.  In either case the get is invalid unless he affirmatively states to her “Here is your get.”
  If he put it into her hand while she was asleep and when she woke up she read it and found it was her get, it is not a get until he says to her, “Here is your get.”  Similarly, he may not place the get in her hand while she is sleeping and then just let her wake up and read it.  Although he can divorce her against her will, he must at least tell her that she is being divorced.
  If she was standing in the public domain and he threw it to her, if it lands near her she is divorced, but if it lands near him she is not divorced. If it lands midway, she is divorced and not divorced.  In this case she is standing on neutral ground, in the public domain which is neither his nor her property.  According to the mishnah if the get lands close to her, it counts as if he actually gave it to her and she is divorced.  The Talmud explains that in order for the get to be considered “close to her”, it must be within four amot (cubits).   If it is in-between the two of them, let’s say two amot from her and two amot from him, then she is doubtfully divorced.  In such a case, she would need another get in order to remarry.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first section of the mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.  It teaches that the laws concerning a husband throwing a get to his wife are the same as the laws of a man throwing betrothal money or a betrothal document to a woman or a borrower repaying his debt by throwing money at the creditor.
  The second half of the mishnah deals with a husband who is on a roof and throws a get down to his wife or is below and she is on the roof and he throws the get up to her.
  Similarly with betrothals and similarly with a debt. If a man’s creditor said to him, “Throw me my debt”, and he threw it to him, if it lands nearer to the creditor, the borrower is credited [with paying back his debt]; if it lands nearer to the borrower, the borrower is still obligated [to repay the money]; if it lands midway, they divide.  The laws concerning throwing a get are the same when it comes to throwing betrothal money or documents or repaying monetary debts.  The remainder of the mishnah illustrates the principle with regard to repaying debts.  Note that the one difference between debts and divorce/betrothal is that in the latter case, if the document lands halfway, the woman is doubtfully divorced or doubtfully betrothed.  There is no possibility of a woman being half divorced or betrothed.  In contrast, when it comes to debts, people can split money.  Therefore, if the money lands halfway between the two parties they split it and the borrower owes half the debt.
  If she was standing on a roof and he threw it up to her, as soon as it reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above and she below and he threw it to her, once it has left the space of the roof, [even were it to be immediately] erased or burnt, she is divorced.  When the husband is standing below and she is standing on the roof, the get must reach the level of the roof for she to be divorced.  In other words, her domain only begins at roof-level. Similarly, if he is standing on the roof, her domain begins at the level of the roof.  If he drops the get, she is divorced as soon as the get enters her domain, which is below the level of the roof.  Even if it briefly enters her domain and then is somehow erased (severe case of bird droppings?) or burnt (by a lightning bolt) she was divorced as soon as the get entered her domain.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  In this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel disagree over whether or not a get is valid if after its being written but before its being given the husband was secluded with his wife.
  Bet Shammai says:  a man may divorce his wife with an old get, But Bet Hillel forbids this. What is meant by an old get? One where he was secluded with her after he wrote it. Bet Hillel forbids a man to use an “old get” to divorce his wife.  Bet Hillel is concerned lest while secluded the couple has sexual relations, she becomes pregnant and people think that the child was conceived after she was divorced, assuming that the divorce occurred only on the date written on the get.  For instance, let’s say he had the get written in November, continued to live with her and she became pregnant in February, and he gave her the document in March before they knew that she was pregnant.  People will think that he divorced her in November, the date written on the get, and that the kid was conceived after she was divorced.  Therefore, Bet Hillel prohibits the use of an “old get.” Bet Shammai does not assume that just because they were secluded, they had sex.  Therefore, he allows the husband to use the get so long as they were only secluded but did not actually have sex.  We shall see at the end of the tractate, that Bet Shammai rules that a husband may divorce his wife only on the grounds of adultery. Since divorce is possible only under such circumstances, it is unlikely, and indeed forbidden, for the couple to have relations after he writes out a get.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  If the get was not written precisely the way that the rabbis prescribed it to be written, it is invalid.  Our mishnah mentions mistakes in writing the get which cause it to be invalid. If she were to remarry with such a get, she is considered an adulteress, because she was never divorced from her first husband.  This is analogous to a situation where she thought her husband was dead, she remarried and then it turned out that he was still alive.  Hence, all of the consequences that were described in Yevamoth 10:1 are again listed here.
  If the get was dated by an unfit kingship, by the empire of Medea, by the empire of Greece, by the building of the Temple or by the destruction of the Temple, Or if being in the east he wrote “in the west”, or being in the west he wrote “in the east”, She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum.  There are two potential problems with the writing of the get in this section.  The first is that he dated the get to the wrong kingship.  Documents used to be dated to the ruling empire, so in the Roman period, it would be invalid to date a get with dates from the Medean (Persian) or Greek empires.  Furthermore, the rabbis ruled that even dating a document to the building or the destruction of the Temple is forbidden and invalidates the get.   The second problem is that he wrote the wrong place.  Although this would seemingly be a trivial point in writing the get, the rabbis were adamant that any deviation from the precise truth invalidates the get.  As stated above, if this woman now remarries, she is an accidental adulteress and all of the following consequences apply.   For further information, you can look back at Yevamoth 10:1. She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one:  She must be divorced from each of them, for she is forbidden to each.  She also needs a get from each of them.  According to the talmudic interpretation, the get from the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, for according to biblical law, she is not married to the second man. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one:  She does not receive any of the financial benefits that she would have accrued from her husband. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it:  If she had taken any of these things to which she is not entitled, she must return them.  Some times, in cases of doubt, possession is enough for a person not to have to return something.  However, in this case, her possession is considered truly illegal and she must return what she took. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer:  The child from the second husband is a mamzer because she gave birth to him while married to the first husband.  Should she return to the first husband, the subsequent child will also be a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her:  A priest is allowed to impurify himself to bury his wife.  In this case, if either husband is a priest and she dies, they may not impurify themselves for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows:  These are all rights given to a husband during marriage.  Since the marriage is now invalid, he loses all these rights.  Invalidating vows is discussed in Numbers 30. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah:  The illicit marriage to the second husband disqualifies her from all rights that might be accrued from either kohanic or levitical status.  The result is that she could no longer marry a priest nor eat tithe if her father was a Levite, nor eat terumah if her father was a priest. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah:  According to a ketubah clause which we will see in chapter four of tractate Ketuboth, a woman’s male children inherit her ketubah.  However, in this case they too are penalized and lose their inheritance. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum:  Since both marriages were invalid, the brothers cannot perform yibbum.  Note that according to the talmudic interpretation, the halitzah of the brother of the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, since according to Torah law the second marriage was not valid.
  If his name or her name or the name of his town or the name of her town was wrongly given, she must leave both husbands and all the above consequences apply to her.  If he made a mistake in writing his name, her name, his or her place of residence the get is invalid and all of the consequences mentioned in the previous section apply to her.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  To understand this mishnah we must remind ourselves of the first chapter of Yevamoth, and especially mishnah four.  There we learned that if a man was married to two women, and he died childless, and one of those women was forbidden to his brother, for instance the brother was married to that woman’s sister, not only is the prohibited woman herself exempt (a man may not marry two sisters) from yibbum/halitzah (Levirate marriage and release thereof) but her rival wives are also exempt.
  With regard to all of the near relatives concerning whom they said “their rivals are permitted to marry [without halitzah]”:  If the rival wives went and married and it was then found that this one (the near relative) was an aylonit, [the rival wife who married] must leave both husbands and all these consequences apply to her. In our mishnah, a man was married to a woman who is prohibited to the yavam (brother-in-law) and he is also married to other women.  When he dies, since one wife is prohibited to the yavam, all of her rival wives are exempt from yibbum and halitzah.  The rival wives therefore remarry without halitzah.  If it turns out that widow who was prohibited to the yavam was an aylonit, a woman who never reaches physical maturity, then her marriage to her first husband was invalid and her rival wives should have had halitzah with the brother-in-law before remarrying.  Therefore, the remarried rival wives may not remain with their current husbands nor may they marry the yavam either.  All of the above consequences also apply to them. This mishnah regards the child of a woman who did not undergo halitzah as a mamzer.  However, the halakhah is not according to this mishnah and the child is not considered a mamzer.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is quite similar to yesterday’s mishnah.  Mishnah Seven
  If a man marries his sister-in-law and her rival wife goes and marries another man and it was found that the first is an aylonit, the other must leave both husbands and all these consequences apply to her. In today’s mishnah Reuven was married to two women, Rachel and Leah.  When Reuven dies, Rachel marries Shimon, Reuven’s brother, thereby fulfilling the mitzvah of yibbum.  Leah is free to marry an outsider, so she marries David.  When it turns out that Rachel is an aylonit, her yibbum marriage to Shimon is invalidated.  Leah has therefore married an outsider without halitzah, which according to our mishnah (but not the accepted halakhah), renders her marriage invalid and her child with her new husband a mamzer.  She may not remain married to her husband, nor have yibbum with Shimon, and all of the consequences listed in mishnah five apply to her.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  The first half of the mishnah deals with a situation where a scribe wrote a get for a husband to give to his wife and a receipt for payment of the ketubah for the wife to give to her husband.  He accidentally switched the documents, giving the get to the wife and the receipt to the husband, whereupon the husband divorced his wife using a ketubah receipt.  The problem is that this wife never received her get.
  The second half of the mishnah contains a debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over a husband who writes out a get to give to his wife but does not give it to her.
  If a scribe wrote a get for the husband and a receipt for the wife and by mistake gave the get to the wife and the receipt to the husband and the two exchanged them and after some time the get came out of the hands of the man and the receipt out of the hands of the woman, she must leave both husbands and all these things apply to her. Rabbi Elazar says:  if [it comes out of her hands] immediately, it is not a get, but if [it comes out of her hands] after some time, it is a get; it is not in the power of the first to render void the right of the second.  According to the first opinion in this section, since the wife never received her get she was never divorced.  Hence her second marriage is invalid, and all of the consequences that applied in the previous mishnayot apply to her as well. Rabbi Elazar says that the get is invalid only in a case where she immediately noticed that she had received a ketubah receipt and not a get.  If she only discovered that she had never received the get at a later time, she is considered divorced.  The reason that she is considered divorced is that we fear that the husband and the wife may have made a deal in order to disrupt the second marriage.  By her giving him back the get and his giving her back the receipt, they can make it look like she was never divorced.  The first husband does not have the authority to ruin the second husband’s marriage.
  If a man wrote a get with which to divorce his wife and then changed his mind, Bet Shammai says that he has disqualified her from marrying a priest. Bet Hillel says that even if he gave it to her with a certain stipulation, if the condition was not fulfilled, he has not disqualified her for marrying a priest.  A priest cannot marry a divorced woman.  According to Bet Shammai, even if a woman’s husband writes a get but does not give it to her, he has already disqualified her from subsequently marrying a priest.  In contrast, Bet Hillel holds that even if he gives her the get with a condition (for instance, “here is your get if I don’t return within 12 months) and the condition is not fulfilled and the get is invalid, she is still not disqualified from marry a priest. The Yerushalmi (Palestinian Talmud) connects this Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate with their debate that appears in the last mishnah of the tractate.  Since Bet Shammai says that a husband can divorce only on grounds of adultery, the very fact that the husband suspected her of adultery and therefore wrote out a get, disqualifies her from marrying a priest.  In contrast, Bet Hillel allows divorce on nearly all grounds, and therefore does not see a disqualified get as disqualifying a woman from the priesthood.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The first section of the mishnah deals with a man who is suspected of having sexual relations with his divorcee.  The second section deals with a “bald get”, one that does not have the proper number of signatures.
  A man divorces his wife and then stays with her over night in an inn: Bet Shammai says:  she does not require from him a second get, But Beth Hillel say she does require a second get from him. When is this so?  When she was divorced after marriage. And [Beth Hillel] agrees that if she is divorced after betrothal, she does not require a second get from him, because he would not [yet] take liberties with her.  If a divorced woman is secluded with her ex-husband, Bet Hillel suspects that they may have had sexual relations and through the sexual act he betrothed her again (we shall learn about how betrothal is performed in the beginning of Kiddushin).  Since they may have remarried, she requires another get from him.  Bet Shammai is not suspicious that they had sexual relations and therefore does not require another get.  Again, this debate may be connected with their debate over the grounds for divorce.  Since Bet Shammai holds that divorce can only be a result of adultery (or at least suspected adultery), it is less likely that the couple will again engage in sexual relations.  Bet Hillel holds that a man may divorce his wife for almost no reason and therefore there is a greater chance at reconciliation. However, Bet Hillel suspects that the divorced couple may have sex only if they were already married and assumedly had already had sexual relations while married.  In this case, their prior intimacy increases the likelihood that when secluded they will again become intimate.  If the divorce occurred after their betrothal but before they were ever married, since they had never been intimate before, it is less likely that they will now engage in sex.  Therefore, in such a situation she does not require a second get.
  If a man marries a [divorced] woman through a “bald” get, she must leave both husbands and all the above-mentioned consequences apply to her.  A “bald get” is a “sewn document”, as described in Bava Batra 10:1-2.  There we learned that to protect forgeries people would sew several folds into their documents, having people sign on each fold.  A “bald get” is one where there are more folds than signatures.  It is “bald” because it is missing signatures and is therefore invalid. Since it is invalid, she was not properly divorced from her first husband when she married her second husband and all of the consequences which were discussed in mishnah five (and mentioned in 6-8) apply to her as well.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  At the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a woman who was divorced with a “bald get” is not divorced.  Our mishnah explains what a “bald get” is and how it can be fixed.
  A “bald” get anyone can complete its signatures, the words of Ben Nannas. But Rabbi Akiva says that it may be completed only by relatives who are qualified to testify elsewhere. What is a “bald” get? One which has more folds than signatures. It would be helpful to explain this mishnah backwards.  The end of the mishnah clarifies that a “bald get” is one which has more folds than signatures.  As I explained yesterday, some documents were folded and sewn on the folds to prevent forgeries.  One person would sign on each fold, and there could be many folds.  If there are any folds without signatures, then the document/get is invalid. However, in order to validate this get, it need not have perfectly acceptable witnesses sign. According to Ben Nannas, if at least two valid witnesses have already signed all that is needed is an additional signature for each fold and, that signature may be from a person who normally disqualified from testifying.  This would include relatives and gamblers.  Rabbi Akiva restricts the leniency to relatives who would otherwise be allowed to testify, but would not normally be allowed to in this case. Gamblers and others who are always invalid could not complete the “bald get.”
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with a man who tried to divorce his wife but at the same time restrict her from subsequently marrying a certain man.  Generally speaking divorce frees a woman to marry almost anyone who she wishes to marry (except priests and anyone related to her previous husband).  The background to this case is probably that the husband is divorcing his wife because he suspects that she has committed adultery with a certain man.  By divorcing her, he does not want to allow her to go marry the very man whom he suspects.
  If a man divorces his wife and said to her, “You are free to marry any man but so-and-so”, Rabbi Eliezer permits her [to marry on the strength of this get], but the rabbis forbid her.  Rabbi Eliezer allows the woman to remarry on the strength of this get.  She can marry anyone save the person whom her husband stated she was not allowed to marry.  The remainder of the sages declared this get to be invalid.  In the Talmud, there is recorded a story of four sages who gathered together to refute Rabbi Eliezer after his death.  Indeed the opposition to this opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is among the most vehement in the Talmud.   Evidently, the rabbis believed that for divorce to work it must totally sever the legal relationship between the man and woman.  Any retention of his control over her undermines the entire validity of divorce.
  What should he do? He should take it back from her and give it to her again saying, “You are free to marry any man.” If he wrote [the restriction] in the get, even though he went back and erased it, it is invalid.  In this section we learn how the husband can fix the situation so that his wife is legally divorced.  If he has not written the words “but so-and-so” in the get, he need merely take the get back from her and restate the divorce formula correctly. However, if he has written the invalidating words in the get, the document itself is irreparably invalid.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.  Again, while divorcing his wife, the husband attempts to restrict her from subsequently marrying a certain man.  Yesterday we learned that the sages consider such a get to be invalid.  Today, the mishnah discusses what would happen if the man to whom the husband tried to restrict his wife was in any case prohibited to her.
  [If he said,] “You are permitted to any man but my father, your father, my brother, your brother, a slave, a Gentile, or anyone to whom she is incapable of being betrothed,” the get is valid.  In this section the husband tells his wife that she may not subsequently marry someone whom she couldn’t subsequently marry in any case.  All of the men in this list cannot possibly contract marriage with her.  In other words his restrictions on the divorce were in essence meaningless, because she couldn’t marry any of them in any case.  Hence, the get is valid.
  [If he said,] “You are permitted to anyone but (supposing she was a a high priest, or, (supposing she was a divorcee or a an ordinary priest, or, (supposing she was a mamzeret or a a regular Israelite, or (supposing she was an a mamzer or a natin, or anyone who is capable of betrothing her even in transgression, the get is invalid.  In this section, the husband restricts his wife from marrying someone who would be prohibited to her, but to whom she could possibly be betrothed. The marriages listed in this section are possible even though they carry with them a transgression.   For instance, his wife was a mamzeret and he says “You are permitted to any but to so-and-so the Israelite”.   In such cases, the get is invalid because his restriction was not meaningless. We should note that the list in this section is a stock list, since not all of these categories are relevant in this situation.   The woman whom he is divorcing will in any case be prohibited to a priest, as are all divorcees.  However, this is a stock list and hence it appears in all places as an entirety.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  The body of the get is: “Behold you are permitted to any man.” Rabbi Judah says: [he must add] “And this shall be to you from me a writ of divorce and a letter of release and a bill of dismissal, with which you may go and marry any man that you wish.”The body of a writ of emancipation is: “Behold you are a free woman”, “Behold you belong to yourself.”This mishnah provides the wording for the standard parts of divorce documents and documents which free slaves.The mishnah is straightforward and doesn’t require any explanation.  One thing to note is that Rabbi Judah’s addition to the get is in Aramaic.  Documents in this period were in Aramaic (or Greek), the lingua franca(s) of Palestine during the mishnaic and talmudic periods.  Rabbi Judah may have insisted that the get be in Aramaic so that everyone would understand it.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  There are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit:If the husband wrote it with his own hand but there are no witnesses on it.If there are witnesses on it but no date.If it has a date but only one witness. These are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit. Rabbi Elazar says even though there are no witnesses on it, as long as he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses it is valid, [and on the strength of it] she may collect her ketubah [even] from mortgaged property, since the witnesses only sign on the get because of tikkun olam.This mishnah teaches that there are three gittin which are invalid, but nevertheless if a woman were to remarry on the strength of one of them, a child from the subsequent marriage is not a mamzer, as he would be were the get to be completely invalid.  In other words, “lechatchilah” ab initio the woman should not remarry based on one of these gittin.  However, “bediavad” ex post facto if she has married using one of these gittin, her subsequent marriage is not considered adulterous.  Another way of putting this is that the get is kosher “deoraitta” according to Torah law, but the rabbis declared it invalid “derabanan” from rabbinic authority.Get #1:  If the husband wrote the get in his own hand, it will be easy to verify that he wrote the get through comparison of his handwriting.  Therefore, the get is valid, at least bediavad/deoraita.  However, witnesses are always preferable and considered to be more conclusive.  Therefore, the rabbis said that the get was invalid and that “lechatchilah” a woman should not remarry using it.Get #2:  The rabbis declared that a get without a date is invalid.  We learned above in mishnah 2:2, that without a date we fear that the woman may improperly collect her ketubah from mortgaged property.  However, the get is not completely invalid and if she uses it to remarry, her subsequent child is not a mamzer.Get #3:   In this case, there is only one witness, and not the two that are normally required.  Again, the get is invalid, at least derabbanan, but nevertheless if she does use it to remarry the subsequently born child is not a mamzer.Rabbi Elazar goes even further than does the previous opinion and claims that even if there are no witnesses on the get, the get is completely valid and may even be used to collect the ketubah from the husband’s mortgaged property.  Certainly she can remarry, according to Rabbi Elazar, on the strength of this get.  Rabbi Elazar holds that the witnesses who are essential in the divorce process are not those who sign on the get, but rather those who witness the husband transfer the get to the wife.  The only reason that witnesses sign on the get is for “tikkun olam” the improvement of the world.  It will be easier for the woman to certify the validity of her get using the signatures on the get, and hence they sign for her benefit.  If she decides to remarry without such benefit, it is her right.  That witnesses sign because of tikkun olam was also learned above in mishnah 4:3.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  The first section of this mishnah is about two men with the same name who both send a get to their wives, who also share the the same name, and the one delivering the gittin mixes the two of them up.  (You can imagine what kind of mail problems they must have had!)
  The final two sections are about five men who try to combine their gittin into one document, perhaps in an attempt to save the costs of the parchment and the scribe.
  Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void.  Since we don’t know which get belongs to which woman, both gittin must be given to each woman.  If one of the two mixed-up gittin is lost, then neither woman can be divorced because we don’t know if she is receiving the get from her husband.  This requirement is related to the halakhah which we learned in chapter three that a get must be written specifically for the wife being divorced.  Although both gittin are exactly the same, they both have to be given to the right woman.
  If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women].  The mishnah teaches that multiple men can divorce their wives with the same document.  In order for the get to be valid for all of the wives, they must write the names of the divorcing men and their wives before the formula.  This way it is clear that the formula refers to all five husbands and that the witnesses are signing on all five gittin.  In addition, the get must be given to each woman, since a woman is not divorced until she receives the get in her hand.
  If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.  In this case, the scribe writes out what is essentially a separate get for each man, complete with a divorce formula for each one.  Therefore, it may look as if the witnesses who signed on the bottom of the get are only attesting to the last get.  This is “the one with which the signatures are read.”  Hence, only this get is valid.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the validity of two gittin written side by side on one sheet of paper, with one set of witnesses testifying (or appearing to testify) to the validity of both of them.
  If two gittin are written [on the same sheet] side by side and the signatures of two witnesses in Hebrew [stretch] from under one to under the other and then signatures of two witnesses in Greek [stretch] from under one get to under the other, the one with which the two first signatures are read is valid.  The question in this mishnah is, are the witnesses testifying to the validity of both or only of the gittin, or perhaps can we not consider them as testifying to either.  Hebrew is written from right to left.  Hence, if the first two witnesses signed in Hebrew, their own names will be under the get on the right side, and their father’s names under the get on the left side, since people signed “so-and-so son of so-and-so.”  Since the get on the right side has the witnesses actual name it is valid.  However, we cannot be sure that the Greek witnesses are testifying to either get, since there is a break between their signatures and the get itself. Hence, only the get on the right side is valid.  Had the Greek witnesses signed first, the left get would have been valid, since Greek is written from left to right.
  If there is one signature in Hebrew and one in Greek and then another signature in Hebrew and a signature in Greek [stretching] from under one [get] to under the other, both are invalid.  In this case, the signatures alternate between Hebrew and Greek. This is problematic, because the Hebrew signatures can only work for the get on the right side and the Greek signatures can only work for the get on the left side. If the first signature is in Hebrew, it counts for the right get. The next signature in Greek counts for the left get. The third signature, which is in Hebrew, is for the right get but it cannot be counted together with the first signature because the second signature interferes.  Similarly, the fourth signature, which is in Greek, cannot count with the second signature, for the third interferes.  Hence, neither the left nor right get is valid.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses scenarios where due to the way in which the writing of the get is found on the paper, it is somewhat doubtful whether the witnesses are testifying to the get.
  If he left over some of the get [from the first sheet] and he wrote the rest of the get on the next column and the witnesses [sign] below, [the get is] valid.  A scribe folds a piece of parchment in half and begins to write the get on the right hand column.  He doesn’t have room to complete the get, so he continues on the top of the left hand column.  If the witnesses signed below the left hand column, the get is valid.  We can assume that they were testifying also to what is written in the right column.
  If the witnesses have signed at the top of the sheet or at the side or on the back of a simple get, it is invalid.  A simple get is one that is not folded.  It is simply written and usually signed below.  Signing on the back of such a get is not valid.  Signing on top or on the side is never valid because the signatures are not read with the text.   It could be that the signatures were originally on something else on that piece of paper, and then the person cut it off, thereby creating a forgery.  The signatures must always be directly below the text of the get.
  If he connected the top of one get to the top of another and the witnesses’ signatures are between the two, both of them are invalid.  In the following three sections, two gittin were written on one page, in one column, each containing a separate divorce formula.  If the two tops meet in the middle and the signatures are in the middle as well, then neither get is valid because the signatures do not read with either get.  In other words, the signatures are above each get and hence they are both invalid.
  If the end of one is connected to the end of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are between, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid.  Here the scribe placed the gittin with the two bottoms connected to each other and the witnesses signed in between.  The get which is read in the same direction as the witnesses is valid and the other is not.
  If the top of one is connected to the bottom of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are in the middle, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid.  Here he simply wrote two gittin in a row and the witnesses signed in the middle.  The top one has signatures which read with it, and therefore is valid.  The bottom one has signatures above it and hence is invalid.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  The first section of the mishnah discusses gittin written in languages different from the language in which the witnesses signed.
  The second section deals with how witnesses sign a get.
  The third section deals with the way in which the husband and wife’s names may be written.
  The fourth and final section deals with husbands whom the court forces to divorce their wives.  This last issue is obviously a crucial one, and I will discuss it at somewhat greater length below.
  A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid.  In all of these cases we might have feared that since the person signed a language different from that in which the get was written, the signer did not actually understand the document.  The mishnah nevertheless rules that these gittin are valid, relying on people’s good faith not to sign documents unless they know what is written in them.  This section also teaches that the scribe himself may sign the get.  His role as scribe and his role as witness are independent, and therefore he can act as both.
  [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid.  Normally, people would sign, “So-and-so, son of so-and-so, witness.”  The mishnah teaches that while this is the normal custom, it is not necessary for the signature to be effective.  A signature can be valid without one’s personal name, or without one’s family name or without the word “witness.”   I should note that printed editions contain the line “And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do” at this point, and not as it appears in manuscripts, as part of the next section.  According to this, the scrupulous in Jerusalem did not write the word “witness.”   The manuscript version is clearly correct, as the line makes little sense here.
  If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do.  Usually the scribe would write the husband and wife’s personal names.  However, if he wrote their family names, which were not surnames as we now use but rather some sort of personal nicknames, the get is valid.  Indeed, since these names are sometimes more precise, the practice of writing nicknames was common among the “scrupulous people of Jerusalem.”
  A get given imposed by court:  in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is.  Perhaps the most controversial issue in Jewish law today is the problem of the “agunah”, a woman who cannot obtain a divorce.  Often (although not always) this is the result of the husband’s refusal to divorce his wife.   The mishnah states quite clearly that if an Israelite court forces him to divorce his wife and he divorces her under duress, the divorce is nevertheless valid.  Only if the coercion is done by a Gentile court, not acting according to Jewish law, is the get invalid.  Even if Gentiles beat the recalcitrant husband, telling him to do what the Israelite court has told him to do (divorce his wife) the get is valid so long as the Gentiles are enforcing Jewish law.  Gentile coercion invalidates the get only if it comes without the request of an Israelite court. After reading this mishnah, one might wonder why, if the Mishnah states that husbands may be compelled to divorce their wives, do women today find it often difficult to get a court to actually do so. I cannot answer this question fully in this forum but we should make three notes. First of all, it is not clear that this mishnah would apply in all cases.  The question still needs to be asked; upon what grounds a court might force a husband to divorce his wife.  The most important issue of all:  what if the wife merely no longer wants to remain married to her husband, without any formal, specific grounds?  Secondly, from the 12th century and onwards, rabbis became increasingly hesitant about compelling men to divorce.  Hence, our modern problem is not so new. Thirdly, it seems to me that the modern problem is not one of halakhah, but rather of rabbis being overly hesitant in using halakhic authority.  It is more of a sociological issue than a halakhic one.  Rabbis could solve the problem, and many have made various suggestions of how to do so.  They are often unwilling to solve the problem for sociological reasons.  However, the subject is too important and complex to be dealt with fully here.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses a case where a rumor went around that a certain woman was either betrothed, and hence forbidden to marry anyone else, or divorced and permitted to remarry.  Without full testimony regarding either status, her status would seem to be uncertain.  Nevertheless, the mishnah generally relies on the rumors.  We should remember that in mishnaic times they didn’t have the systems of verification and documentation that are available today and hence people would inevitably have to at least occasionally rely on rumors.
  If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced.  The mishnah regards either rumor as being true.  The Talmud explains that a rumor alone would not be enough to create a legal assumption that a woman is married. Rather, physical signs of a marriage must have been observed.  For instance, women seemed to be celebrating with her, saying “she’s married.” With regard to the rumor of divorce, the Talmud explains that this clause refers to the woman who was regarded as married based on a rumor.  Since the assumption of her being married was not based on evidence but on a rumor, a rumor of divorce is sufficient to allow her to remarry.  In contrast, a woman who was known to be married cannot be assumed to be divorced based on a rumor. Rather, she must bring evidence, either witnesses who saw her divorced or the document itself.
  [This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him”   this is a qualification.  If there is a “qualification” to the report, then it is not regarded as true.  The “qualification” is something that would cause us to disbelieve the rumor.  For instance, her husband attempted to divorce her, but the divorce came with a stipulation that was not fulfilled.  Or he attempted to betroth her by throwing the betrothal money at her, but we’re not sure if it landed closer to her (in which case she is married) or closer to him (in which case she is not).  In both of these cases, since there was a qualification to the rumor, the rumor is not accepted.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of the tractate is perhaps the most important and basic mishnah in the entire tractate.  In it Bet Shammai, Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva dispute the grounds which justify divorce.  Part of the basis for this dispute is exegetical how do we understand Deuteronomy 24:1, whose language is admittedly difficult and part of the debate is certainly based on ideology.
  We should remember that divorce was a hotly debated by Jews in the first century.  Jesus and Paul were quite stringent in their opposition to divorce and the Dead Sea sect also probably prohibited divorce, or at least disallowed remarriage after divorce.  The rabbis, with Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva at the fore, were more open to allowing people to divorce.  This is not the proper forum for debating this issue but I will offer a couple of potential explanations for why rabbis were more open to divorce than were other sects of Jews.  First of all, most rabbis took a much more positive attitude toward sexuality and procreation than did early Christians.  Divorce allows a dysfunctional couple to fulfill their procreative and sexual desires elsewhere.  Although divorce can be damaging and abused, it can also be beneficial, at least in rabbinic perspective.  Secondly, the rabbis rarely used the Adam and Eve story as a source of halakhah.  This story contains a strong monogamous ideal and was used by both Jesus and the Dead Sea sect as grounds for prohibiting divorce.  Finally, divorce is clearly permitted by the Torah.  Hence, rabbinic openness to divorce may be seen as at least partially stemming from a simple understanding that God allows divorce.  However, this last reason is less convincing for whereas the Torah certainly allows divorce, it is unclear whether it is allowed in all occasions.  The Torah leaves room for multiple interpretations as we shall see in our mishnah.
  While reading this mishnah and understanding this debate, I think we would do well to keep in mind that divorce can be a painful trauma.  While the rabbis may advocate allowing divorce, they recognized well the human pain involved for both the man and the woman. Furthermore, we are dealing here with general principles.  These principles and ideals would apply differently in individual people’s lives and marriages, each with their own nuances.  By talking about the grounds for a husband to divorce his wife, we should not be callous to the real pain that real people feel in such situations.
  Bet Shammai says: a man should not divorce his wife unless he has found her guilty of some unseemly conduct, as it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Bet Hillel says [that he may divorce her] even if she has merely burnt his dish, since it says,  “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Rabbi Akiva says, [he may divorce her] even if he finds another woman more beautiful than she is, as it says, “it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes. The three positions in this mishnah are all based on differing interpretations of Deuteronomy 24:1 which states, “If a man takes a wife and possesses her, and she fails to please him because he finds something unseemly in her…”  Bet Shammai interprets the verse to mean that he may only divorce her if he finds something “unseemly” in her.  The word “unseemly” in Hebrew can also mean a forbidden sexual act.  Therefore, Bet Shammai interprets the verse to mean that divorce is prohibited only if the husband suspects his wife of adultery. Bet Hillel focuses not on the word “unseemly” but on the word “thing.”  The husband may divorce his wife if he finds any “thing” wrong with her, even something seemingly as trivial as burning his dish. Rabbi Akiva focuses upon the earlier part of the verse “she fails to please him” as separate grounds for divorce.  Even if she has done nothing wrong, he may divorce her if he desires another woman more.  We should note that Rabbi Akiva assumes that he won’t want to or be able to marry another woman while still married to his first wife.  It could be that while polygamy was permitted, it wasn’t always so practical, for economic and social reasons.  There are other versions which imply that Rabbi Akiva thinks that a husband may not stay married to one woman while he desires another.  Rabbi Akiva’s ideal of marriage is one of love and such love cannot thrive when the husband desires another woman. Congratulations!  We have finished Gittin. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. One of the most memorable parts of Gittin was the two middle chapters which discussed the concept of “tikkun olam” repairing the world.  As we saw, “tikkun olam” means remedying economic, social and legal injustices in an attempt to make the world a more livable place.  “Tikkun Olam” is always about going beyond the letter of the law.  This is something we would do well to remember in general while learning rabbinic literature.  Often what we are learning are the basic laws obligations and penalties.  Clearly for the Jews and the rest of the world to have a just society, individuals must do more than just keep the law (although that would be a good start).  They must look at each individual and individual situation and attempt to figure out what actions would aid in improving people’s lives and in avoiding conflict and pain, both now and in the future. Congratulations on making it through another tractate.  May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah!  Tomorrow we begin the final tractate of Seder Nashim, tractate Kiddushin.