meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Modern Works/Daf Shevui to Kiddushin/English/merged.txt"}
text: Daf Shevui to Kiddushin
  דף שבועי על קידושין
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -Daf Shevui
  -
  
  Daf Shevui to Kiddushin
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  IntroductionCongratulations on starting a new Masechet!The first mishnah of Kiddushin teaches how a woman is “acquired” in marriage and how she “acquires” herself, that is to say, how she becomes free to marry another man.  The mishnah also teaches how a “yevamah” is “acquired.”  A “yevamah” is a woman whose husband has died without any children.  According to the Torah she must either marry her husband’s brother or perform halitzah, the release from the obligation to her brother-in-law. 
  A man can betroth his wife in any one of three ways.  The first is by giving her a small amount of money and saying to her “Behold you are betrothed to me with this money.”  Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate how much money is needed to effect betrothal.  What is crucial is that both a denar and a perutah are small amounts of money; a perutah is almost valueless.  These are not representative of a woman’s true value, which is clearly much greater.  Rather they are symbolic, especially in Bet Hillel’s opinion.  To this day, nearly all betrothals are effected through money.  Since the Middle Ages and perhaps earlier, Jews have used rings to effect betrothal.  This custom was originally a Christian custom.  In the Talmud rings are never used.The second way is for the husband to write her a document in which it is stated, “Behold you are betrothed to me.”  This document is not to be confused with a ketubah, although some scholars posit that they are both derived from common origins and that originally they were written together.  The thirds means of betrothal is sexual relations.  This act must be done with the intent of betrothal.  No one holds that casual intercourse can effect betrothal. The thornier problem is whether or not sexual relations between a couple “living together” can effect betrothal.  Most modern halakhists rule that it does not, although there are some who hold that couples who live together with the intent to form a familial type of unit do require a get in order to separate.
  A woman becomes halakhically separated from her husband either by divorce or by death.  Without one of the two, any relations that she has with another man will be considered adultery.
  The dead husband’s brother-in-law “acquires” his brother’s widow through sexual intercourse.  The yevamah is not acquired by money, as a woman would be in cases of normal betrothal.The yevamah is free to marry another man if she performs halitzah with the yavam.  Alternatively, if the yavam dies (in a situation where there is only one yavam) she also may marry anyone she so chooses.  Note that once she is married she is considered a normal wife, and she “acquires” herself through the death of her husband or through divorce.
  IntroductionThe first couple of pages of Kiddushin are intensely interested in the particulars of the language of the Mishnah, and not in its content. Since the Geonic period (the period that immediately followed the Talmudic period), rabbis have known that these few pages were late additions to the Talmud, from a period they labeled “the savoraic period.” There is little historical information about this period. 
  The Talmud asks why our mishnah uses the language of “acquisition” whereas other mishnayot use the language of “betrothal (mekadesh)” In other words, why not teach here “a woman is betrothed?”
  The word “acquisition” is used because the law that betrothal can be effected with money is derived from the use of the word “taking” in two contexts—betrothal and the transfer of money when Abraham buys the field from Ephron. Since buying something is called an “acquisition” (two prooftexts are cited), taking a woman in betrothal is called, at least by this mishnah, “acquisition.”
  
  Daf 2b
  
  Now that the Talmud explained why our mishnah uses the language of “acquisition” it must explain why the rest of the tractate uses the language of “betroth” with in Hebrew is “lekadesh,” from the word for holy.The answer is that the Mishnah opens with biblical language—acquisition. But then it moves on to rabbinic language, “mekadesh” (kiddushin). The meaning of this peculiar rabbinic term is that when a woman is betrothed, she becomes prohibited to all other man, just as “hekdesh,” holy property, is prohibited to all.It is worth noting that the rabbis were cognizant that their Hebrew vocabulary, and indeed, much of the basics of their language, differed radically from that found in the Torah.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss why the Mishnah states “a woman is acquired.” 
  The second chapter opens with “a man betroths.” So why not open the first chapter with “a man acquires” instead of the passive, “a woman is acquired”?The answer is to preserve the parallel with the end of the mishnah—“a woman acquires herself.” 
  The first clause still could have read “a man acquires” and thn the latter clause could have read “and transfers ownership.” In other words, both could have been in the active, with the man as the subject, and not the passive with the woman.The answer is that when it comes to the husband dying, the husband is not causing her to acquire herself. The husband’s death is “from Heaven.” Therefore, the second half could not have taught, “and transfers ownership.”
  The use of the woman as the subject, albeit a passive one, indicates that a woman cannot be married against her will. Unlike any other “acquisition” where the consent of the acquired is not necessary, when it comes to marriage, the acquired party, the woman, must consent.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now begins to examine why the Mishnah uses the feminine form of the word for three (shalosh), and not the masculine form (sheloshah). 
  The mishnah uses the feminine form of “shalosh (three)” because it uses the word “derekh (way)” which is also feminine, as we can see from Exodus 18:20.
  A different mishnah, concerning a “zav,” a man with unnatural genital discharge, uses the masculine form of the number seven, because the word “derekh” is masculine. I think you can anticipate the difficulty on its way!
  The Talmud first explains why some verses use “derekh” in a feminine form and why some use it in a masculine form. The word for Torah is feminine, as proven from a verse in Psalms. Therefore, the word for derekh is feminine. The word was used in masculine form in the context of war because men wage war, women do not.I should note that this is not the type of explanation that would be acceptable to linguists. Just because the name for a document is in one gender, does not mean that the gender of words in that document should shift to that gender. Nor should context affect gender.
  The Talmud offers a similar resolution with regard to the mishnah’s use of both feminine and masculine forms.  When the context is women, the feminine is used. When the context is men, the masculine is used.
  IntroductionNow the Talmud asks why the mishnah uses the word “ways” instead of “things.” 
  The Talmud asks why the mishnah uses the word “derekh” which means “way” and not “devar” which would mean thing. The answer is that intercourse is a “way” not a thing.
  “Intercourse” is a “way” not a thing. But the other two means to affect betrothal—money and document are things. And it would not make sense for the mishnah to use the word “way” that is appropriate for only one out of the three means listed in the mishnah.The resolution is that money and deed are really given to the woman as a prelude to intercourse. Therefore, they are in a sense subservient to intercourse and the word “ways” is used, not “things.”
  IntroductionA parable by R. Shimon as to why the Torah says a man takes a woman and not a woman is taken by a man. 
  The Talmud here quotes a statement by R. Shimon in order to explain something about the mishnah. To Rashi, the quote explains why the language of the mishnah uses the word “ways” and not “things.” But we should note that R. Shimon himself is explaining a verse in the Torah and not the mishnah. This is a case where a statement made in one context is being used to explain something else. To me it is not so clear that the Talmud uses R. Shimon’s statement to explain why “ways” is used and not “things.”
  The allusion here is to the story of the Garden of Eden. Men seek out women because the first woman was taken from a man.I realize that this is a gendered way of viewing the world. But it certainly seems true of R. Shimon’s time, and probably is still relatively true in our world. The percentage of marriage proposals in which the man asks the woman is still probably very high. Would be interesting to think of what R. Shimon would say about changing gender roles in our society. Is this midrash essentially his way of saying men are genetically disposed to be the pursuers? Or would he say that gender roles can change? 
  IntroductionThe Talmud now asks why other mishnayot use the word “ways” instead of “things” just as it asked and answered above concerning the first mishnah of this masekhet. 
  The mishnah about zavim (people with unnatural genital discharge) use the word “ways” instead of “things.” The Talmud explains that this is because it is an excessive “way” that leads one to have these types of problems.
  The mishnah uses the word “ways” in comparing an etrog to trees or vegetables because the “way” of an etrog is to grow like a vegetable. Just as vegetables grow on “all waters”, so too do etrogs. This means that in addition to rainwater, they also need irrigation. Their tithing year follows their point of harvesting. For other types of fruits the tithing year follows when they first appear on the branch of the tree.  
  
  Daf 3a
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to ask why the word “way” is used and not the word “thing.” 
  A “koy” is some sort of animal (we do not know what type) that is somewhat similar to a wild beast and somewhat similar to a domesticated animal, each of which have different rules (for instance with regard to eating certain parts or with regard to covering the blood). Why does the Mishnah use the word “ways” and not “things”?
  This is another mishnah that uses the word “ways” instead of “things.” But the Talmud has sort of run out of particular answers for each of them and now will search for a broader explanation. 
  The Talmud now offers a different resolution for why “ways” and not “things” is used. If two issues are different, the word “ways” is used. But if they are the same then “things” is used. This is proven by R. Eliezer who uses the word “things” when saying that the etrog is the same as trees for all matters.
  IntroductionThis section is substantially different from what we learned before. Here the Talmud is interested in why the mishnah has to use the word “three.” Why not just say, “a woman is acquired through money, a document and intercourse.” This is a frequent trope of the anonymous voice in the Talmud. The author of these sections tries to derive extra meaning from unnecessary words in the Mishnah just as earlier rabbis tried to derive meaning from words they perceived to be extra in the Torah. 
  The number in the first clause, concerning how a woman is acquired comes to exclude the huppah. A woman who enters the huppah but has not been acquired through money, documents or intercourse, is not married to her husband.I should note that “huppah” in the Talmud is not what huppah is today. It is not entirely clear what this word means, but it seems closer to an actual room that the husband brings the woman into. Perhaps this originally was the room in which they would live. Today our “huppot” are symbolic. 
  R. Huna says that betrothal can be done through huppah. We will return to this statement later so I am not going to dig deeper now. If so, then what does the number in the mishnah exclude?The Talmud answers that it excludes betrothal through “a symbolic exchange.” Today we do this with a handkerchief or some other small object. The idea is that one person has an object and he symbolically transfers it to the other person and in exchange the person who symbolically receiving the hanky transfers something to the other person. This is also called “kinyan.” It is a convenient way to exchange either abstract goods or goods that are not present at the time of exchange.We might have thought that since some of the laws of betrothal are derived from the verses in which Abraham buys a field from Ephron, and a field can be acquired through a symbolic exchange, so too betrothal can be enacted through a symbolic exchange. The mishnah, by using the word “three” teaches that it cannot. 
  Symbolic exchange can be done with anything, even something not worth a perutah. But betrothal, as we learn in the Mishnah, can only be done with at least the value of a perutah. That is why betrothal cannot be done through symbolic exchange. 
  
  Daf 3b
  
  IntroductionThe mishnah also uses a number in the second clause, “and she acquires herself in two ways.” What does this number come to exclude?
  The number in the second clause teaches that a married woman does not leave her marriage through “halitzah.” “Halitzah” is the release from levirate marriage, the obligation of a woman whose husband died without children to marry her husband’s brother. This woman, called the “yevamah,” is released through halitzah. We could have made a “kal vehomer” (all the more so) argument. If halitzah works to release a yevamah (a woman awaiting levirate marriage) but a divorce document, a get, does not work, then halitzah should all the more so work to release a married woman. The mishnah teaches that it does not. Halitzah is only for a woman awaiting levirate marriage.  
  The Torah requires a document for divorce. Halitzah, which is a ritual performed through the removal of the husband’s shoe, is not valid.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to interpret the mishnah—from where is it derived that a woman is betrothed through money. However, this passage is not really from Kiddushin. It was originally composed in connection with a  mishnah from Ketubot 46b according to which when a father betroths his daughter, he receives the money. 
  There are two questions that will be answered. 1) How do we know that betrothal can be effected through money? 2) How do we know that it goes to the father. Note that it goes to the father only if she is a minor or a young girl. Once she has hit majority age, the money is hers. The Talmud defines majority age as 12 ½.
  The Talmud now begins to ask how we know that the father receives the money through which she is betrothed. Rav Judah answers with a midrash of a verse concerning a young girl who is sold into slavery. When this girl reaches a certain age, the master or his son is to marry her. If he does not, he must send her free, without the usual money used to redeem a slave. The Torah emphasizes this—“she goes out for nothing, without money.” The repetition allows Rav Judah to offer a midrash—there is no money when a girl leaves her master’s domain in this case. But in another similar case, when a girl leaves her father’s domain by being betrothed, there is money. And who receives the money—her father. 
  R. Judah’s midrash successfully proved that there is money when the girl leaves her father’s domain. But how do we know the father receives it? Maybe the girl who is being betrothed should receive it?The answer is that if the father has the right to betroth her, i.e. to decide to whom she is betrothed, then shouldn’t he be the one to receive the money. 
  Above we said that since a father decides whom his daughter marries, he should receive the betrothal money. But a na’arah, a girl between the ages of 12 to 12.5 can decide herself to whom she is betrothed. So she should be able to receive her betrothal money, not her father.  But we know that the father does receive the money. So again the question is asked, how do we know this?
  The Talmud now answers with a verse taken from the context of the annulment of vows. The verse implies, to the Talmud, that all financial advantage that comes to her in her youth, while a na’arah, go to her father. This would include the money used for her betrothal. 
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded by positing that the biblical source for the idea that a father receives the betrothal money of his na’arah (between 12 and 12.5) daughter is the verse in Numbers 30 according to which all of the financial advantages accrued to a young girl go to her father. In today’s section the same law is learned from another verse, raising the question of which verse is the actual source. 
  The work that a daughter produces, her earnings, belongs to her father. Rav deduces this from the fact that a man may sell his daughter to be a maidservant. But if the verse from Numbers teaches that all of the financial advantages of a daughter go to her husband, why does Rav need to prove that a daughter’s handiwork goes to her father from that verse?    
  The Talmud now admits that the verse from Numbers does not have broader implications. It refers only to the annulment of vows and not to a father’s right to his daughter’s betrothal money. And should we suggest that just as a father has a right to annul his daughter’s vows, so too he has right to his daughter’s betrothal money, this must be rejected for one cannot derive laws regarding monetary matters from the laws of vows. 
  The Talmud suggests that we derive the fact that the father receives the betrothal money from the fact, learned earlier in Ketubot, that he receives any fines owed to her, such as those for rape and seduction. However, the laws of fines differ from the laws of monetary payments and therefore there is a rule that the latter cannot be derived from the former. 
  If a na’arah is raped/seduced the payments for the shame and blemish go to her father (we learned this earlier in Ketubot). But this cannot be a source for the father’s receiving the betrothal money because there is a difference with shame and blemish. The meaning of “since the father is involved” is not entirely clear. I believe that the words could mean that when she is shamed or blemished, the father also suffers. In any case, we still have no source for how we know that the father receives the betrothal money.
  The resolution of how we know that the father receives the money goes back to the original source—the fact that when the daughter sold into slavery goes free, the master does not receive a payment. Had there been a payment, the master would have received it. Thus, logically, in the case of betrothal, where there is a payment, the money goes to the father, who is akin to the master.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  The problem is that the comparison between the two “going outs” is not precise. When the maidservant goes free, she becomes completely free. Her master retains no control. But betrothal is only a partial transfer of authority. Her father still retains some authority over her and will continue to do so until she enters the huppah. So how can the two be compared?
  The answer is that in one respect, even though still living in her father’s house, the father has lost control over her at betrothal—he no longer has the right to unilaterally annul her vows. Once betrothed, the father and husband jointly annul her vows.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section, Exodus 21:11 was used as the basis for kiddushin being performed with money. Today’s section notes that this verse was used for another purpose. This is a consistent question asked by the “stam hatalmud” the anonymous voice of the Talmud. While tannaim did not seem to have any problem learning two laws or more from one verse, the late Babylonian rabbis who composed the Talmud did. 
  This other midrash is more directly related to the verses of the Torah. The Torah specifies that a girl bought as a slave at a young age “goes out” if the master does not do certain things on her behalf (like marry her, or marry her off to his son). But there would seem to be the need for a time-limit. The rabbis invent such a time limit, and apply it here and elsewhere. A “ketanah” is a girl under 12. A girl between 12 and 12 ½ is called a “na’arah” and after that she becomes a “bogeret.” This midrash teaches that if the master has not done these things before she hits 12, she goes out free and need not pay any money for her manumission.
  Ravina reads meaning into the letter “yod” found in the word “eyn.” The appearance of the letter “yod” allows two halakhot to be learned from this verse. This is of course an unusual derashah to say the least. Tannaim do not derive meaning from verses in this way. Even among late amoraim, which Ravina is, this is a strange derashah, which the Talmud will immediately notice. 
  The midrash here teaches that if a daughter of a priest who is married to a non-priest and then the non-priest died had any offspring, even grandchildren or illegitimate offspring (such as mamzerim) she no longer may eat priestly food such as terumah. The midrash uses the letter “yod” in “eyn” as if the word was written “ayen” which means to “search.” Her lineage must be examined to see if she has any offspring. The reason this midrash is cited is to prove that derashot (rabbinic exegesis) may be based on the letter yod. 
  This very derashah undermines what the Talmud perceives to be a rule of exegesis—no word may be interpreted twice. The word “eyn” was used to derive that both grandchildren and illegitimate offspring disqualify her from eating terumah. To resolve the difficulty, the Talmud says that the first derashah, concerning grandchildren, was not needed. Grandchildren are treated like children (usually treated much better than children, I might add). The derashah was needed to teach that illegitimate children also prevent her from eating terumah.
  The Talmud now shows that sometimes the Torah writes words that have an “ey” sound without the letter you. The word “me’eyn” does not have a yod, but “eyn” does. This, to the tanna, legitimates making exegetical conclusions from what it perceives to be an extraneous letter.I should note that such derashot are never made in tannaitic literature. Tannaitic exegesis is based on units that have independent meaning, words, phrases, etc. Not on single letters such as this. This type of “hyper-exegesis” is found in the later stages of the Talmud. This is an issue that I will address in a forthcoming third volume of Reconstructing the Talmud.
  IntroductionThe Talmud has now brought in derashot showing that a na’arah’s betrothal money and her handiwork all go to her father. The Talmud asks why we could not have learned one of these laws from the other. Again, the underlying notion is that the Torah should never be at all superfluous. 
  If the Torah had written only that her kiddushin money goes to her father, I might have thought that her income from work goes to her since she earned it. It does not—it goes to her father. 
  I might have thought that her earnings go to her father because in return for her giving him her earnings she is provided for. But her kiddushin money is a different story—she would not be giving it to her father in return for something. Therefore, I might have thought that it is hers. It is not. As we learned, all financial gain that comes from the young daughter goes to her father.
  IntroductionEarlier we read a derashah that discusses when a young girl sold into slavery goes free. This sugya discusses that derashah. 
  The derashah states that a girl sold into slavery goes free at na’arut (age 12) and at bagrut (12.5). This is obviously superfluous—all the Torah needed to say is that she goes free at na’arut, and then she’ll already be free by bagrut.
  Rabbah explains that if we only had one word, we would assume she goes free at bagrut. We need both words to teach that she goes free at na’arut.
  The same phenomenon occurs with Leviticus 22:10 which teaches that a “toshav and sakhir” who are part of a priest’s household may not eat terumah. What do these words mean, the rabbis ask? Toshav refers to a Hebrew slave acquired for perpetuity (meaning he was acquired for six years and then did not want to go free. He remains a slave until the Jubilee). And a sakhir is one acquired only for six years. Here too we can ask that if the one acquired for a longer time does not eat terumah, obviously one who is acquired for a lesser period does not eat. After all, he is less owned by the non-Jew. But if only one word had been stated, we would have said that it refers to one acquired for the shorter period—he does not eat terumah. But one acquired for perpetuity does eat terumah. Therefore, I need both words.
  Abaye says that the two cases are not similar. When it comes to the toshav and sakhir, these are two different people, and sometimes the Torah writes out a law that could be learned from a “kal vehomer” argument—an “all the more so” type of argument. Therefore, they are not really superfluous.
  But here, Abaye continues, there is no reason for the Torah to write both, because if she goes free at na’arut, she’s not even there at bagrut. She’s one person so the verse is truly superfluous.  
  Abaye points out that not all girls who reach majority age will actually go through “na’arut.” “Na’arut” is more than just hitting 12. It is hitting 12 and developing signs of puberty. A girl can become a bogeret at the age of 20 without ever hitting puberty. Such a girl is called an “aylonit” (we learned the term in Ketubot—it is sometimes translated as barren, but women can hit puberty and be barren. Still an aylonit is by definition barren). If only one word had been taught I might have thought that only a bogeret who had hit puberty would go free. Therefore, the second word teaches that a na’arah goes free, and a bogeret who never becomes a na’arah also goes free (although only at a later age).
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the midrash about when a girl sold into slavery goes free. We had said before that this midrash teaches that she goes free at the age of bagrut even without having reached puberty, an ayloni (this is considered to be 20 by Rashi). She also goes free at na’arut, which means she reached puberty and is at least 12 years old. 
  Mar bar Rav Ashi points out that we could have learned that a girl who is a bogeret goes out from her master’s authority by a kal vehomer argument. A girl who becomes 12 and has hit puberty goes free from her master but, if she is living in her father’s domain, is not free from his authority. But a bogeret, one who reaches majority age, goes free even from her father’s domain. All the more so she would go free from the domain of her master. So why do we need a midrash to teach us what we would already know. Obviously any type of bogeret, whether she is an aylonit (a woman who does not hit puberty) or not, goes free.
  The argument here is getting more complex. We might have thought that a girl who will never reach na’arut, meaning she will never hit puberty could not be sold. After all, if she goes free at na’arut then maybe if she will never be a na’arah, meaning she is an aylonit who will never hit puberty, then she could not have been sold in the first place. Therefore, we have a verse that says (midrashically) that an aylonit goes out of slavery at bagrut (age 20). This teaches us that she can be sold in the first place.
  Above, Mar bar R. Ashi argued that the verse cannot be interpreted to say something that we could have learned through logic, through a kal vehomer argument (“all the more so”). But we earlier said that the Torah does write laws (ones usually drawn out by midrash) that could be learned through a kal vehomer. So why is this a difficulty?The answer is that we would always prefer to read a verse such that its law could not be learned logically. But we do admit that at times the Torah does write a law that could be learned logically.
  
  Daf 4b
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya brings in another source in the Torah for the halakhah that a woman can be betrothed through money. Note again that there is a certain amount of wordplay in these proofs.Throughout,this passage “acquired” is frequently used in the sense as “acquired as a wife” i.e. betrothed, or perhaps occasionally, married. 
   This tanna proves that betrothal can be performed through money by the verb in Deuteronomy 24—“takes.” This verb implies the transfer of money, as we see the same verb used in Genesis 23.
  The Talmud now discusses whether we could derive betrothal with money from a logical argument. If we can, then we do not need to learn this from a verse.The first argument is to prove the case from the Hebrew maidservant. A master may acquire a Hebrew maidservant with money by buying her from her father. But intercourse is not a means of acquisition. Therefore, since intercourse is a means of betrothal (acquisition) of a wife, all the more so money should be as well. 
  The case of the yevamah (the woman awaiting levirate marriage) proves that just because one can be acquired through intercourse does not mean that she can be acquired through money. A woman awaiting levirate marriage is married to her brother-in-law when she has intercourse with him. He does not give her money.
  The Talmud now rejects the difficulty raised through the case of the yevamah. A yevamah may not be acquired through money because she also cannot be acquired through a document. But a wife, who can be acquired through a document, should, so it is argued also be able to be acquired through money.The Talmud now cites the proof from Deuteronomy again.The problem is that according to the flow of the logic we should not need a verse—we have a logical argument drawn from the Hebrew maidservant from which we can deduce that a woman can be acquired as a wife through money.    
  R. Ashi says that the deduction from the Hebrew maidservant is refutable. A Hebrew maidservant goes out of slavery with money—she buys her freedom. Therefore, she can be acquired with money. In essence, she is property. But a wife cannot buy her way out of marriage—giving money to the husband is not a means through which divorce is enacted. Therefore, we might think that just as she does not leave the marriage through money, so too she does not enter the marriage through money. Therefore, we need a verse to teach that she is acquired through money.
  The Talmud now asks why we need two verses to teach that kiddushin can be performed through money. Shouldn’t one have been enough?We need the verse from Exodus, “and she goes out for nothing” because that verse served as a source for the notion that her father receives the money, at least when she is betrothed as a minor or a na’arah. 
  The verse from Deuteronomy teaches that for betrothal to occur, the man must give the woman money, not the other way around.I do realize that this is one of the points that the Talmud emphasizes the patriarchal nature of the system. There is no denying that the system of marriage in the time of the Talmud was not egalitarian. However, it is still interesting to note that the Talmud does not seem to think it is inherently wrong for the woman to acquire the man, that men are not “acquirable” or any such broader message. We could read this section as saying that betrothal by the man is simply following the literal reading of the verse. I don’t know if this offers much solace for those bothered by the patriarchy, but I still think it is interesting to think about.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya brings a prooftext for the halakhah that betrothal can be performed through intercourse. The sugya is very similar to yesterday’s, so I would advise looking there for reference.I should note that this is a strange halakhah. According to its literal application, a man would have intercourse with a woman, she would now be betrothed to him and they would not be allowed to again have intercourse until marriage proper, which could be a long time away. There does not seem to be any evidence that betrothal was actually ever performed through in this manner and it is indeed counterintuitive. In my opinion, it is a remnant of an earlier understanding of these “three means by which a woman is acquired” according to which all three are customary—betrothal through money, a marriage document and then physical consummation. But rabbinic tradition reads the mishnah differently—each means alone serves to enact betrothal.
  The same verse that proves that a woman can be acquired through money is also invoked to prove that she can be acquired through intercourse.But again, we could prove that a woman is acquired through intercourse by analogy with the yevamah (the woman awaiting levirate marriage). She is not acquired through money and yet she is acquired through intercourse (levirate marriage is effected by intercourse with the yavam). Thus a wife who is acquired through money should also be acquired through intercourse. 
  Again, the Hebrew maidservant serves as a difficulty for she can be acquired through money but not through intercourse. The same could be true of a wife. 
  The Talmud refutes the difficulty. A Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired through intercourse because she is being acquired as a servant, not as a wife. But a wife could be acquired through intercourse because she is being acquired as a wife.The Talmud then requotes the verse to prove that she can be acquired through intercourse. But again, we have a difficulty—why do I need a verse to prove something that I can deduce from logic? 
  As he did in yesterday’s sugya, R. Ashi explains why the logical argument is not sufficient. The argument that a wife can be betrothed through intercourse had been made by analogy with a yevamah who can also be acquired through intercourse. But the yevamah is already connected to her yavam, the brother-in-law, by virtue of her marriage to her (now dead) husband. She does not really need “betrothal”—all she needs is “marriage.” But a regular woman getting married is not at all connected to her husband. Therefore, we might have thought that intercourse would not be an effective means to betroth her. Thus we do need a Scriptural verse to prove it. 
  
  Daf 5a
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses how we know that a woman can be betrothed through a document. 
  The law that betrothal can be done through deed is derived from a kal vehomer from divorce. If a document works to divorce but money does not, then since money works for betrothal, all the more so a document should as well.
  The Talmud now refutes the argument. Money can be used for betrothal because it can also be used to redeem sacred property and second tithe (the money becomes holy and the things become not-holy). But documents cannot be used to redeem sacred things and therefore there is no reason to assume that documents may be used to betroth a woman.
  Having rejected logic as a source, the Talmud now brings in a verse to prove that she can be betrothed through a document. The verse compares being married with being divorced—just as she is divorced through a document, so too she is betrothed through a document.
  If we’re going to compare means of divorce with means of betrothal, then why not say that just as she can be betrothed through money, so too she can be divorced through money. Abaye responds that were this to be so, then the “defender”—money used for betrothal—would become the “prosecutor”—money used for divorce. 
  The next difficulty is obvious—if the defender cannot become the prosecutor then how can the prosecutor (document) also become the defender—a document used for betrothal.The resolution is that the documents are different, whereas all coins are the same. So the fact that a document can be used for both betrothal and divorce is not a problem of the prosecutor becoming the defender. But money is all the same, so it would be a problem.
  Rava cites a midrash to prove that she cannot be divorced through money—the Torah says that the husband writes her a divorce. He does not give her money.
  Why not read the verse another way—as if it says that she is divorced through money but not betrothed.The resolution is the same comparison—just as she can be divorced through a document, so too she can be betrothed. 
  We could have read the verses in another way. The verse that juxtaposes divorce and marriage would teach that just as she can be betrothed through money so too she can be divorced. Then the verse about divorce would teach that she cannot be betrothed by document.The Talmud resolves this by saying that a verse that is talking about divorce must be excluding a means of divorce, not a means of marriage. So that verse must mean that she can be divorced by document and not by money. And then the comparison verse must teach that just as she can be divorced through money so too she can be betrothed through money.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s sugya we encountered a midrash that reads the verse “Then he shall write for her a bill of divorce” as meaning that she can be divorced by a document but not by another means such as money. But R. Yose Hagalili uses the verse for another midrash. So from where does he derive the halakhah that a woman cannot be divorced by money. 
  R. Yose Hagalili uses the next few words of the verse as the basis for the fact that she is divorced through writing but not through any other means. 
  The rabbis use the word “divorce” which can also be translated as “severing” as teaching that the husband cannot try to maintain control over her by offering a conditional divorce which limits her future behavior. Note, even if she agrees to the condition, this is not divorce. However, if there is a time limit, then the divorce is effective. She can disagree with the condition and simply not be divorced. But it is a possible means of divorce.
  The Talmud now asks, as it usually does, how does R. Yose Hagalili derive this last halakhah—that divorce must sever the relationship. After all, he has already used that word to teach that she must be divorced with a document.He can get two laws out of this verse because it is in the plural “keritut” instead of “karet.” The rabbis, however, do not make anything out of the use of the plural. This is also how the discussion can be completed.
  IntroductionHaving failed to derive betrothal in one of the three ways from one of the other ways, the Talmud now asks if betrothal in one way can be derived from the other two ways. Note that the Talmud is consistently bothered by superfluity—we need to prove that every verse, every midrash was needed, and that no laws could be learned through the existence of the others. 
  The first suggestion as to which means of betrothal could be derived from the others is that betrothal through a document could be derived from money and intercourse. For this to work, we would need there to be nothing common to money and intercourse that is not common to the document. But there is—there is pleasure in receiving money and engaging in intercourse. But there is no pleasure in receiving a document. Thus betrothal through a document could not be derived from betrothal through money and intercourse.
  We could not have derived betrothal through intercourse from betrothal through money and document because money and documents are normal ways of acquiring. Intercourse works as a means of acquisition only in marriage.
  Money cannot be derived from the other two because money never works in marriage against the woman’s will, whereas intercourse does in the case of a yevamah and a document divorces a woman against her will.
  If one were to push back and say that money does work, for a Jewish girl can be sold into slavery against her will, the answer is that money does not work against her will in the case of marriage.
  IntroductionToday’s long sugya discusses whether “huppah”—the entrance of the bride into the domain of the husband, can effect betrothal. Usually “huppah” is performed as marriage, not as betrothal.We should note that huppah was more literal in Talmudic times than it is today. Today huppah is a symbolic entrance into the husband’s domain (or in more egalitarian terms—their beginning to live together). But back then it probably literally meant moving into his home. 
  R. Huna argues that if money can acquire a wife in betrothal but still does not allow her to eat terumah (if she is betrothed to a priest) then all the more so huppah, which does allow her to eat terumah (when marrying a priest) should also acquire her in betrothal.
  Ulla stated that according to the Torah, a woman betrothed to a priest should be able to eat terumah immediately after betrothal through money. She is fully connected to him and is part of the priest’s family. Halakhah does not allow this lest she come to give terumah to the members of her childhood family who are not priests. 
  The Talmud tweaks the argument. Money cannot be used for “marriage” and yet it acquires in betrothal. Therefore huppah which is the way that marriage is completed should also acquire in betrothal.
  
  Daf 5b
  
  The Talmud will now raise a series of difficulties against this kal vehomer argument. Money works in betrothal because it can be used to redeem sacred things and second tithe. But huppah cannot, therefore, huppah cannot be used for betrothal.
  But intercourse does not work to redeem sacred things and second tithe and nevertheless it does work in betrothal. So too should huppah.The problem is that intercourse does work to acquire a yevamah and thus is a valid means of betrothal. But huppah does not work to acquire a yevamah and therefore cannot be used for betrothal.
  The Talmud now tries to take money and intercourse together and use them both as a kal vehomer to prove that huppah can acquire in betrothal. Money and intercourse are both means to acquire “elsewhere” (in purchases or in the case of the yevamah) and in betrothal. Huppah acquires “elsewhere” (in marriage) and therefore should also acquire here, as a means of betrothal.
  The Talmud refutes the comparison—sex and money are pleasurable and therefore acquire in betrothal. Huppah is not.
  A document works for betrothal and nevertheless there is not pleasure in it. So too should huppah.But the problem is that a document has the power to release a woman in divorce. Therefore it acquires in betrothal. Huppah is not a means of divorce and therefore we have no reason to think it would acquire in betrothal.  
  Money and intercourse are also not means of divorce and therefore they should prove that huppah can acquire. But this again could be refuted because there is pleasure with money and intercourse. As it did above, the argument goes around in circles. But what all three have in common is that they all acquire (money and documents acquire things, intercourse acquires a yevamah) and acquire in betrothal, so too huppah acquires elsewhere (in marriage) and should also acquire here.
  The Talmud now refutes the commonality—money, document and intercourse can all be performed against her will whereas huppah cannot (money buys the handmaiden, document frees a divorcee against her will, and intercourse acquires the yevamah).But R. Huna could respond that money does not work against her will to betroth her in marriage. Therefore, there is no “commonality” and the three together can be used to demonstrate that huppah is a means of betrothal.So after all of this the Talmud has finally provided some support for R. Huna. 
   Rava raises two difficulties on R. Huna. First of all, the mishnah teaches there are three ways of betrothal, not four. Second, huppah acquires in marriage only when preceded by betrothal. But without prior betrothal, why should we think there is any efficacy to huppah whatsoever. 
  Abaye answers Rava’s two difficulties on R. Huna. The mishnah only taught means of betrothal that could be learned through midrash. And R. Huna’s argument was based on the awareness that huppah acquires in marriage only after betrothal through money. He simply noted that money never acquires in marriage, even after betrothal. But huppah does aquire after betrothal. Therefore it is as strong as money and should acquire in betrothal as well.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses how kiddushin with money is performed. 
  This baraita teaches two things: 1) he must say to her certain words, words that can clearly be construed as words of betrothal. There are a variety of different phrases he may use to betroth her. 2) He must give the money to her. She cannot say the words and give the money to him. Yes, this is most definitely not egalitarian.
  R. Papa notes that since there are two factors—giving the money and making the declaration, it is difficult to tell which is determinative. Particularly he wants to know if the kiddushin is valid if the husband gave the money and the wife made the declaration. It is interesting that R. Papa does not even consider what the rule would be if the woman gave the money.
  The first resolution is to say that the husband must both give and say.
  According to this interpretation, the second clause seems to clarify an unclear point in the first clause. In any case, the result is the same—he must give the money and make the statement.
  Here we see the slimmest of more egalitarian possibilities. If she makes the declaration, maybe the kiddushin are valid as long as he gives the money. The kiddushin would be valid and to be divorced she would need a get. We will also see that in rabbinic thinking the statement is less significant than the giving of the money.
  IntroductionIn today’s sugya Shmuel continues to discuss the language of kiddushin. 
  The main thing that Shmuel says is that the husband must actively betroth her to him. He cannot betroth himself to her.
  The same holds true for divorce. He has to send her forth, divorce her. He cannot divorce himself from her.
  R. Papa notes that in Shmuel’s formulation the man does not say “to me.” He just says “you are betrothed.” How then do we know that he is not acting as an agent to betroth her to someone else? This is what is called “ambiguous abbreviations.” It seems, R. Papa notes, that here Shmuel holds that ambiguous abbreviations are valid.But elsewhere Shmuel seems to hold the opposite. If a person says “I will be” he has taken a nazirite vow only if a nazirite is walking by. If not, then although this does seem to be some sort of nazirite vow formula, he is not a nazirite.     
  The answer is that he does say “Behold you are betrothed to me.” Without the words “to me” the statement is too ambiguous and she is not betrothed.
  If the man says “Behold you are betrothed to me” she is obviously betrothed. Shmuel seems to be teaching us nothing. The Talmud answers that the second half of each of Shmuel’s statement is what he is teaching us. As stated above, the man must betroth the woman or send her away in divorce. He cannot use language that makes it seem like he is betrothing himself to her or sending himself away from her.
  
  Daf 6a
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss what words can be used by the man to betroth the woman. 
  These are all valid betrothal formulas.The Talmud notes that the baraita has two lists even though both lists have the same halakhah. This is unusual. Usually if there are two clauses in a baraita, they have opposite halakhot. But this is simply the way the baraita is. The tanna heard two different sets of halakhot and collated them into two lists. 
  The Talmud asks whether certain other formulae are also valid. Many of these words are taken from the stories of Adam and Eve or from elsewhere in the Bible. I will list the references here:מיוחדת—Genesis 2:24מיועדת—Exodus 21:8-9עזרתי, נגדתי—Genesis 2:18עצורתי—Unclear, some say this is from I Samuel 21:6, but Rashi disagrees.צלעתי, סגורתי—Genesis 2:21תפושתי—Deuteronomy 22:28The only of these that we know is valid is “taken by me” because the verse explicitly uses the language “takes a wife.”
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is based on a word from Leviticus 19:20, “If a man has carnal relations with a woman who is a slave and has been designated for another man.” The word for designate is נחרפת. Can this root be used for betrothal?
  In the beginning, the Talmud thinks this word can be used anywhere as a betrothal formula because it works in Judea and because it is used in Scripture. But in the end, the Talmud rules that this formula works only in Judea because in Judea the word “harufah” simply means betrothed and seems to be used frequently.
  The Talmud here is asking about all of the unclear betrothal formulae we have seen over the past few sections. What was the context in which he gave the money to her and said these things. If they were talking about getting married, then even if he says nothing and gives her the money, she is married, at least according to R. Yose, whom the halakhah follows.And if they were not talking about getting married, how is she supposed to know what he is saying. The formulas listed above do not sound completely like betrothal formulas. 
  The Talmud answers that if he said nothing, and they were talking about betrothal, then they would be married. But since he used one of these confusing formulas, she might not have understood what she was saying yes to—maybe she was agreeing to work for him. Therefore, they are considered of doubtful validity. In such a case the couple would either need to redo to betrothal or get divorced.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya goes back to discussing betrothal or divorce without an explicit statement. 
  Several amoraim comment on R. Yose’s opinion in the baraita according to which the husband need not make any declaration. They clarify that he must at least be talking about “that topic” meaning her betrothal or divorce.
  There is a tannaitic dispute as to whether they actually have to be talking about betrothal or divorce for the act to be valid without an explicit statement. But R. Elazar holds that they don’t even need to be talking about the betrothal or divorce. But this seems perplexing—how does she know what he’s doing? Abaye explains that the betrothal or divorce is valid only if they were at least talking somewhat about the matter.
  R. Huna rules that the halakhah follows R. Yose—he need not make an explicit declaration about divorce or betrothal for the act to be valid.R. Ashi then tells R. Yemar, his student, that Shmuel’s warning not to have any official dealings with a judge who does not know how to adjudicate the matters of betrothal and divorce applies even to this case. The consequences of a misjudgment in divorce or betrothal could be that a woman has a child who is a mamzer (offspring of a forbidden union). Therefore, a judge who wishes to take on responsibility in these areas must know all of the relevant halakhot, even that the halakhah follows R. Yose in this issue.
  IntroductionThere are some similarities between divorce and slave manumission (even if, as I have insisted many times, and as this passage says twice, wives are not owned by their husbands). In both cases a man gives a person who lives in his household a document called a “get” and that person now is no longer a member of the household. Our sugya discusses whether there is any overlap in the formulae used to divorce or free a slave. 
  To slaves one says “behold you are free.” But this formula does not work for divorce because she was already free. Wives are not slaves and divorce is not manumission.To a wife, one might say, “behold you are permitted to all men” because after divorce she may marry any other man she wants. But this does not work for slaves because she was not prohibited before manumission.    
  
  Daf 6b
  
  Is “you are for yourself” a valid divorce formula? On the one hand, it could mean that she can keep her handiwork, which she generally has to give to her husband. Thus this would not be a divorce formula. Alternatively, it might actually be a valid divorce formula.
  Ravina derives that this is a valid divorce formula—if it works to free a slave, whose body belongs to the master, then all the more so it works for a wife whose body does not belong to her husband.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss valid formulas for manumitting a slave. 
  If the master says “I have no dealing with you” to his slave does he mean that he wants to free his slave completely, or that he simply does not want to benefit from the slave’s work?
  R. Nahman brings proof from a statement of R. Sheshet that “I have no dealing with you” is full emancipation. R. Sheshet interpreted a word in a statement by Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel to mean that if an owner sells a slave to a non-Jew, and writes a document that says “If you run away from your new owner, I do not have any dealings with you” then the owner need not write out any other deed of manumission. Thus “I do not have any dealings with you is itself a deed of manumission.
  IntroductionAbaye discusses here betrothing through a loan. What this means is forgiving her from repaying a loan he previously gave her.After this the Talmud continues to discuss variations of giving the woman money. 
  For the woman to be betrothed the man must currently give her something. He cannot simply forgive her from repaying a debt that she already owes him.But technically he can betroth her with “the benefit of a loan” a term which will be explained shortly. However, this is prohibited because it constitutes an evasion of interest.   
  If “benefit of a loan” means forgiving her the interest he had already charged her, then this was A) prohibited to do in the first place; B) essentially the same thing as betrothing by forgiving a loan.Therefore, “benefit of a loan” is interpreted to mean that he extended the terms of repayment. This is a tangible “new” benefit and therefore it is effective as a means of betrothal. But it is also considered interest—she is repaying him by agreeing to be betrothed and by paying back the debt. The betrothal is the interest. Therefore such an act is prohibited.  
  Rava says that in general if one says “here is some money on condition that you return it to me” the act does not count as an act of giving. It does not work to acquire a purchase, betroth a woman or redeem a first-born. However, it does work in the act of giving terumah to a priest. [Terumah is part of one’s produce that must be given to a priest]. However, it is prohibited to do so because doing so makes it look as if the priest is “assisting on the threshing floor.” The rabbis did not want priests to have to work to get their terumah. So too here we can imagine a scenario where a priest would agree to give back a high percentage of the terumah in return for the terumah being given to him and not to a different priest.
  Rava seems to be inconsistent in his thinking.
  Rava clearly holds that if someone gives someone something on condition that they return it, the object is theirs while they hold it even though they must return it. We can see this from the case of the etrog. Each person needs to own his own etrog, but what to do if etrogim are hard to find, as is often the case. Basically one passes it around, each time giving it as a gift on condition that it be given back. This is enough for us to consider the person as owning his own etrog.
  Rav Ashi says that gifts on condition that they be returned always count except for the case of betrothal. The problem is that this seems to be a case of symbolic exchange, a mechanism that allows for property to be exchanged in cases in which property is not present. But such a mechanism is not valid for betrothal.
  Here we see a very late amora tell R. Ashi that they teach R. Ashi’s statement in the name of Rava. Here we can see a process that probably lies behind a lot of cases of amoraic transmission of oral material. An amora makes a statement, others raise difficulties on the statement, and then the statement is emended but still taught in the name of the original amora.
  IntroductionIn today’s section Rava asks some very theoretical questions exploring how betrothal might possibly work. I want to emphasize that these are theoretical explanations. It is very unlikely that these are practical questions. 
  Rava says that a woman can be betrothed without deriving any actual benefit. She can say, “give the money to someone else” and once the husband gives the money to that other person, she is betrothed. This is derived from the laws concerning a loan guarantor. A guarantor obligates to repay the loan even though he does not derive any benefit. So too this works for a woman.
  
  Daf 7a
  
  The man can give the woman a maneh and tell her she is betrothed to someone else, not the person who is giving the money. [Of course, both parties have to agree]. In other words, a man can acquire a woman without giving anything. This is like a Canaanite slave (a non-Jewish slave) who can be freed without giving any money (someone else pays for his freedom). The slave “acquires” his freedom without paying any money. So too a man can betroth without paying any money.
  Rava now combines the two above possibilities to prove that a woman can tell a man to give money to another person and she will become betrothed to a different man. Note how weird this is: Leah says to Reuven, give a perutah to Shimon and I will be betrothed to Levi. Leah gets nothing, Levi loses nothing and yet, through the comparison with the guarantor and the Canaanite slave, Leah is betrothed to Levi. From the guarantor we learn that a person can give a guarantee without acquiring anything. And from the slave we learn that a person can acquire without giving anything. Thus a woman can be betrothed without receiving anything and a man can betroth without giving anything.You should note what an incredible jurist Rava must have been. From two totally different cases, the guarantor and the slave, he derives two highly abstract principles, and then applies them to the case of betrothal.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with Rava’s discussions of pushing the limits of betrothal law. 
  R. Papa rules that the woman may give the money to the man and say that she will become betrothed to him. Note that some commentators say that the man must also say back “Behold you are betrothed to me.” But this is not necessarily the meaning of the text.It might be argued that this is a glimpse of a more egalitarian version of betrothal. The woman gives the money and makes the declaration. I am not sure if this is what motivates these amoraim, but it certainly might be possible.
  According to a mishnah we will learn later in the tractate, one can acquire money along with a transaction of real estate. So if I buy a piece of land, I can acquire things with it, without a special act. But the opposite is not true—I cannot acquire land by acquiring movables. The case brought above, to R. Ashi, is a case of the woman transferring money to the man, and through this money, transferring herself, and she counts as real estate. Thus it would be a breach of mishnaic halakhah.Hazakah is the rule of possession. We will learn about this more later in the masechet.      
  Mar Zutra points out that the woman was not saying “you will acquire me [in betrothal] along with this money.” This would indeed not work. The mechanism of betrothal is that she is deriving benefit. If he is an important man, she might derive benefit from the very fact that he receives a present from him. Thus this is a quid pro quo—she receives benefit and she gives herself in betrothal. Note that Mar Zutra is willing to abstract the notion of “benefit” in order to allow this form of betrothal to work.
  This refers back to what Rava taught in yesterday’s section. All of the strange ways that Rava said betrothal can work, can also work for selling a field.
  The Talmud now asks why we need to know that these roundabout means of acquisition work for both betrothal and sales.If we had said that they work for betrothal, it might have been because the Talmud assumes that women would prefer to be married to unmarried. Thus we might have said that a woman allows herself to be betrothed even though she receives no benefit. But when it comes to selling a field, I would have said that this is not true. The seller must receive benefit for the sale to be valid. Therefore, Rava says that the same is true with regard to selling.Resh Lakish’s statement appears several times in the Talmud and has, on occasion, been used to assume that a woman would prefer a bad marriage over no marriage. However, this is not necessarily the original meaning. It might just mean that she prefers to be married in general, but not if the marriage is bad. 
  A person can just give away his property—I can waive my rights to my property. Therefore, it seems obvious that a person could transfer his property without receiving any benefit. But kiddushin does require a transfer of money, otherwise it cannot happen. Therefore, Rava had to tell us that a woman can actually, in a roundabout way, be betrothed without receiving any money.
  IntroductionMore theoretical musings by Rava on kiddushin. 
  Rava introduces this paradoxical statement, whereby a formula of “be betrothed to half of me” is effective, but “half you be betrothed to me” is not. The rest of the sugya will explore why one works but the other does not.
  Abaye points out that if we are reading “halves” into the verse then neither formula should work. The Torah refers to whole men and women.
  Rava responds that while half a man cannot marry a woman, a man can marry two women. Saying, “you are married to half of me” is akin to the man pointing out that he might want to marry another woman. Since this is possible (although not the most romantic way to pop the question) it is effective as a betrothal formula. But a woman cannot be married to two men, so he cannot say to her “half you be betrothed to me.” 
   Mar Zutra points out that when it comes to dedicating an animal, if one dedicates a limb, at least a limb that the life depends on (such as the head), the whole animal is considered dedicated. So too this should work with a woman—if he says “half of you is betrothed to me” the kiddushin should spread to the whole woman and she would be fully betrothed to him.
  The difference between the two is that with the animal, it is property. If the man wants he can dedicate his entire animal and no one can stop him. But with the woman, we need her consent to be betrothed and she consented only to be half-betrothed. So we cannot compare the case of betrothal to dedicating an animal.
  The better comparison is when someone else owns half the animal. In such a case, one partner cannot dedicate the animal because it is not all his. So too a man cannot betroth half a woman.The Talmud talks out some of the halakhic rules relevant to the case of the animal. If he then goes back and purchases the second half of the animal, and dedicates the second half, then it is all dedicated. However, since it was not fit for sacrifice when half dedicated, it cannot actually be sacrificed. If someone tries to substitute another animal for it, that animal becomes holy, and the original animal remains holy. In other words, this is a fully dedicated animal that cannot be sacrificed.
  The Talmud learns three halakhot relevant to sacrifices and things dedicated to the Temple. The concept discussed here is called “defferal” or “dichui.” Once something has become invalid as a sacrifice, it can never return to becoming valid. This applies to live animals—so we learn from the half-dedicated animal. 2) It can be “deferred” even from the outset, as soon as it is fit. Others say (elsewhere) that in order for a sacrifice to be permanently deferred, it must first be fit for a sacrifice. This animal which was only half-dedicated, never was fit to be offered. 3)  Deferral applies even if only the value of the animal was dedicated, like this one half of whose value was dedicated.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  IntroductionMore theoretical questions about half-kiddushin from Rava
  Essentially the question is, is this like saying “all of you with a whole perutah” and he is just counting halves or did he make two separate invalid kiddushin statements.
  In the first case he said “half a perutah.” Since half a perutah does not work, we might assume that he was just counting half perutot. But what if he says a full perutah—perhaps he is making distinct betrothal statements, in which case this does not work. Or perhaps as long as all of this occurs on the same day, it still works.
  Here, Rava (or the Talmud in his place) pushes the envelope and asks if this could work even if he divides the kiddushin into a two-day affair.
  Finally, the Talmud proposes a way of saying this that would most seem to be a valid statement—“your two halves for one perutah.” This is clearly all at one time, so it would seem to work. Or is it again an invalid attempt to marry a woman one half at a time.But this too does not have a clear answer. None of these questions do. They all remain unanswered. But it was certainly fun thinking this all out!
  IntroductionMore theoretical questions. I want to emphasize again—these questions are not representative of the way people actually acted. They are theoretical musings as to how we can understand language, what assumptions we can make about what people may mean when they say certain things. Men are not buying cows and betrothing in one short pithy statement. 
  If one person does the betrothing and one person does the accepting (on behalf of their children) can they get away with a “two for the price of one” deal? No answer to this one either.
  Here he tries to finagle a cow out of the deal too. Can we imagine that he is betrothing with the perutah and just acquiring the cow by drawing it to him (he’ll pay back later)? Again, no answer.
  Land can be acquired by “hazakah” which means possession. Other than that, this is essentially the same question as asked by R. Papa above.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains a story and a dispute among rabbis concerning the issue of betrothing with items of indeterminate worth. 
  The issue is whether the woman must know exactly how much the silk is worth. Assumedly there is no question that it is worth at least a perutah, which is a very small amount.   
  The Talmud narrows down the scope of Rabbah and R. Joseph’s disagreement. If she explicitly agrees to be betrothed for whatever it is worth, then she is betrothed. She has a right to agree to this arrangement.If he lies to her, obviously she is not betrothed. That would be a false acquisitionThe issue is if he tells her what it is worth and his assessment turns out to be correct. According to Rabbah, the woman does not need to know beforehand that his assessment is verified. As long as what he says turns out to be true, she is betrothed.But to R. Joseph, at the moment of betrothal she is uncertain. She is agreeing to something whose value she can’t know. Therefore, her agreement to be betrothed is not really a full agreement. The silk would need to be evaluated beforehand. Here we can see an important concept in the rules of kiddushin—the woman needs to have acquiesced to the proposal and we need to be sure that she knew what she was agreeing to.   
  According to this version, R. Joseph would rule strictly also in the case of a husband who says, “Be betrothed to me for whatever it is worth.” Just as a woman will know how much the money is worth, so too the woman has to know how much the goods are worth. 
  
  Daf 8a
  
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s daf R. Joseph said that when a woman is betrothed with the equivalent of money, i.e. goods, the goods must have a clearly defined value. In our sugya, R. Joseph offers a source for this ruling. The source is then rejected by Rabbah. 
  R. Joseph takes a source about a Hebrew slave who buys his freedom. The verse implies he was acquired with money, which the rabbis understand as excluding produce or utensils.
  The baraita cannot possibly mean that a slave cannot be acquired by “produce or utensils” for we have an explicit source that says that he can. When he pays back his purchase price, he can pay back the equivalent of money. Thus he must have been acquired through goods as well.
  The produce and utensils would not be valid to acquire the slave if they were less than a perutah, but this is true also of money. So why specify produce and utensils.
  This is the conclusion of R. Joseph’s proof. The problem with acquiring a slave with produce or utensils is that they do not have definite value. Thus the same, according to R. Joseph, applies to kiddushin—the goods used for kiddushin must have a definite value.
  Rabbah argued earlier that the goods being used for kiddushin do not need to be of definite value. So how does he read this baraita, such that it does not prove R. Joseph’s rule? He reads it as excluding “exchange” as a means to acquire a slave (or to betroth). “Exchange” is the symbolic act whereby one person symbolically acquires something of insignificant value and thereby gives the other person something of significant value. This was often done with a handkerchief. Sometimes today it is done with a pen. The two most common occasions on which one would see this is with the signing of the ketubah and with selling chametz.
  There is a debate in Bava Metzia whether produce can be used in “exchanges.” R. Nahman says it cannot and thus there is no need to exclude produce.
  The Talmud now retracts and says that “produce and utensils” are invalid only if they are not worth a perutah. Above, we rejected this interpretation because the same is true of money—it too must be worth a perutah. So why specify “produce and utensils”? The answer is that we might actually have thought that goods worth less than a perutah can be used for kiddushin because they can be used immediately. For instance, if you need an eraser, it might be worth more to you than a perutah, even if you would not pay a perutah for an eraser at the store. Therefore, the baraita needs to teach us that a slave cannot be bought for less than a perutah. But according to Rabbah, the goods need not have a definite value.
  IntroductionIn today’s sugya R. Joseph again tries to bring proof that goods used for betrothal need to have definite value. If he uses silk, for instance, it must be evaluated prior to the act of betrothal. But again, the Talmud will reject this proof. 
  The baraita here is about redemption of the first born son which must be done with five selas. A father can use the equivalent of money, but he must state that it is worth five selas.Now, R. Joseph asks, what’s the purpose of stating the amount? If the object is not worth five selas, then saying it is worth that much does not change reality. Rather, it must actually be worth that amount. The point of saying “five selas” is that the price needs to be determined. So too, R. Joseph would argue, does the money used for betrothal.
  The Talmud rejects R. Joseph’s proof. It could be that the animal was not actually worth five selas. As long as it is worth five selas to the Kohen accepting the animal, the redemption is valid.
  R. Ashi says that the story about R. Kahana accepting a scarf worth less than five shekels for the redemption of a son works only for a great man like R. Kahana. Evidently, in R. Ashi’s times, great men would pay large amounts to cover their heads. But most people would not, and therefore the object used for redemption must actually be worth five shekels.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses cases where the man tells the woman he is betrothing her with a large sum but then gives her only part thereof. Is the kiddushin valid and he just owes her the money? Or is the kiddushin not valid until he gives her all of the money. 
  The man here says that he is betrothing her with a maneh (100 dinars) but then only gives her one dinar. The question is—is the betrothal valid, and he simply must give her the rest later? Or is the betrothal invalid until he actually gives her 100 dinars?The answer is that since he says “on condition” the betrothal takes place immediately. She is betrothed to him and he must pay the rest. The ramification of this is that should she wish try to be betrothed to someone else, the betrothal would not be valid.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty. A man says to a woman “be betrothed to me with a maneh” and begins to count out the money. The betrothal is not final until he gives her the entire maneh. This opposes R. Elazar who says the betrothal is final after the first dinar and that he simply owes her the rest.The resolution is that in this case he said, “with this maneh.” Since he said the formula in this way, he must have meant that he needs to give her this maneh right now. 
  The Talmud points out that in the second clause the man says, “this maneh.” The assumption then is that in the first clause he said “a maneh” and not “this maneh.” This would then be again a difficulty against R. Elazar.
  The Talmud resolves it by saying that in both cases he said “this maneh.” The second half of the baraita clarifies that the first half referred to a case where he said “this maneh.” Had he said “a maneh” she would be betrothed immediately and he would be obligated to give her the rest of the maneh.This reading of the baraita is also logical, so the Talmud argues. For if the first case was “a maneh” and still she is not betrothed until he gives her the complete maneh, then obviously if he says “this maneh” she is not betrothed until he gives her the complete maneh.
  The last piece of logic from above does not prove that the first clause must deal with “this maneh.” For it could be that the first clause refers to “a maneh” and yet the second clause still teaches “this maneh” to make sure that you interpret the first clause in the opposite way. In other words, do not say that the second clause is obvious. Say that the second clause teaches you how to interpret the first clause.The conclusion here is that the resolution of the difficulty on R. Elazar stands but is not proven through logic. R. Elazar can interpret the baraita so that it does not contradict him, but the baraita does not need to be interpreted in that way.  
  R. Ashi offers a different resolution of the difficulty. If the man is counting, then clearly he intends to give her the whole sum right now and she is not betrothed until he does so. But if he just says “a maneh” and gives her a dinar, his intention is to owe her the rest and she is betrothed immediately.
  The baraita had ruled that the copper dinar is invalid. But if she saw it and accepted it, why should this be a problem? A woman has the right to accept what she wants for her betrothal as long as it is worth a perutah.The answer is that he gave it to her without knowing, for instance at night, or buried among the other dinarim. But if she willingly accepted the lesser coin, she is betrothed. 
  If the “bad dinar” referred to in the baraita is also not usable, then how is it different from the “copper dinar.” Why teach essentially the same thing twice? The answer is that it is usable, but with difficulty. Again, we can assume that if she accepted it, then the betrothal is valid. It is invalid only if she does not know what she is accepting.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is about betrothing with a pledge, an item given to be reclaimed when money is paid. 
  The man betroths a woman and promises to give a maneh. But instead of giving her the money itself, he gives her a pledge, an object for her to keep until he gives her the maneh.R. Nahman rules that the betrothal is not valid. She has not received the maneh and the pledge is not hers. So in essence he has not given her anything.
  
  Daf 8b
  
  The baraita clearly rules that a pledge can be used for betrothal.
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that this pledge referred to here is a pledge that the betrother took from another person. Through a midrash the rabbis learn that a creditor has legal title to the pledge he takes. The Torah considers it righteous for a creditor to return a pledge to a poor person. If the pledge did not belong to the creditor, then how is this righteous? Thus the creditor is considered as the owner of the pledge. This does not mean that he need not return it to the debtor when the debt is paid back. It just means that while it is in his possession it belongs to him. If he wants, he could even use it to betroth a woman. But a man cannot betroth a woman by giving her a pledge on a debt that he himself owes her. In other words he can give it to her as a creditor possessing a pledge, but not as a debtor promising to give her money.We should note that this is difficult. After all, if a creditor owns a pledge, then why is she not betrothed when he gives her his own pledge? The Tosafot explain that while the pledge might be hers, it is not considered “money” and a woman can be betrothed only with money or goods.     
  R. Ami rules here that the silver ingot given as a pledge does not acquire the slave. Thus we can see that a pledge cannot enact a transaction, only the giving of the money can. So too when it comes to kiddushin, the giving of a pledge is not considered akin to the giving of money and she is not betrothed.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with cases where she receives the kiddushin money and then either throws it away or instructs the husband to give it to someone else. Is she still betrothed?
  The baraita reads her act as a rejection of his kiddushin offer. We should note that she is obligated to compensate him for throwing his stuff away. The issue here is that she is not betrothed.
  The baraita stated that if she throws the kiddushin away, she is not betrothed. By implication we might say that if she simply throws it to the ground in front of him, she is betrothed. But why should this be? Is this not a rejection of the proposal?
  The resolution is that it is obvious that she is not betrothed if she throws the money down in front of him. But we might have thought that she is betrothed if she throws it into a place that causes it to be lost. Since she is liable to pay the money back, maybe she was agreeing to the proposal and only threw it away to see if he would get mad. Therefore, the baraita says that she is not betrothed. Good thing, because this just does not seem to be a promising match.
  The woman can direct the kiddushin money to one of their fathers but she must state this in a way that makes it clear that she is accepting the proposal and not just telling him to give it away.The Talmud then interrupts the baraita to state that it does not matter whether it is her father or your father. Even if she says “Give them to my father” she is not betrothed. And even if she says “On condition that your father accept them” she is betrothed. 
  This is the same clause as the previous one, just with “So-and-so” except for her father and his father. 
  The Talmud now needs to explain why both clauses are necessary. If it had only taught the clause about the fathers I might have thought that she relies on the fathers to give her the money. Therefore it is kiddushin. But if she says, “On condition that So-and-so” accept for me, she does not rely on this person and therefore she is not betrothed. Therefore the baraita teaches that in either case she is betrothed. She can choose whom she relies on.
  If the baraita had only taught the case of “So-and-so” I might have thought that when she says “Give it to him” the kiddushin is not valid because we would not assume she is giving a gift to them. But she might give a gift to her father or his father in which case she would be betrothed. Therefore, the baraita needed to teach us that when she says “give it to him” she is not betrothed in any of these cases. 
  IntroductionMore instances where she says to give the kiddushin object to someone else or put it somewhere else besides directly in her hands. Again, I want to emphasize that these are not realistic situations. This is the Talmud’s way of exploring what it means to give something to someone or to give benefit to them. 
  She needs the kiddushin to be placed on her property for her to be betrothed. Just putting them on a rock does not count as giving the money to her. If the rock belonged to both of them, there is no answer whether this counts as kiddushin. 
  Telling the man to just give it to a dog is like telling him to throw the kiddushin away. But if the dog is hers, then she is feeding her dog. I’m sure she loves her dog.
  The woman is running down the street being chased by a dog. The man says to her “Be betrothed to me” and she says “Give it to the dog.” Does this count as betrothal? On the one hand, she is getting some benefit—protection from the hungry dog? On the other hand, he is obligated to save her, so this is not really benefit. It’s what she deserves anyways.There is no answer to this question. Let’s hope this situation does not arise too often. 
  In this case, she is not betrothed because by giving the loaf to the poor person the man is observing his own commandment to give tzedakah. He is not giving benefit to her, even if this is a poor person who is reliant upon her for his sustenance.The implication of all this is that if I am performing a mitzvah that benefits someone else, I am not directly giving benefit to this other person because I am obligated to do so in any case. I could not, for instance, ask for recompense for saving someone else’s life, at least not beyond my expenses (the loaf of bread).
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is about a woman who wants something and the man tries to cajole her into agreeing to be betrothed to him if he gives it to her.
  The woman here did not consent to kiddushin. She just expressed that she wants the beads. Therefore she is not betrothed. 
  
  Daf 9a
  
  My heart truly goes out to this woman. She just wants a drink of wine (I’m sure she’d prefer beer). And the heartless man wants to betroth her for it. Luckily, R. Hama again rules that she is not betrothed.
  Different story, same ruling.
  What if she only says the phrase once, not twice, as she said in the cases above? Amoraim differ on this question but the halakhah is that she is still not betrothed. We need a more solid affirmation that she is consenting to betrothal.
  The passage ends with three halakhic rulings concerning sugyot that we have learned over the last daf.1)	If a man gives a woman an object such as silk as kiddushin, it need not be evaluated before he gives it to her.2)	The law follows R. Elazar who said that if the man said he was betrothing her with a maneh and gave her a dinar she is betrothed and he owes her the rest.3)	The law follows R. Nachman—if he promised her money but only gave collateral she is not betrothed.
  IntroductionToday’s daf begins to discuss how kiddushin is done by document. Up until now we have only been discussing kiddushin with money or goods. 
  Interestingly, when it comes to marriage by document, the cases are all where the husband gives the document to the father of the girl being married, and he marries his daughter off. This can only occur while she is a minor. I am not sure if this is reflective of reality. In any case, these three phrases count as the language of kiddushin. The baraita also notes that the physical apparatus on which the formula is written need not be worth anything. If it is worth a perutah, this could be kiddushin by money.
  R. Zera b. Mammel notes an anomaly. Generally when a person sells something, the seller writes out a document. Here, the one acquiring, the husband, writes out a document. Why doesn’t she write the document saying that she is betrothed to So-and-so? Or her father should write the document?
  Rava resolves the difficulty by noting that in the case of selling possessions, the Torah describes the seller as selling his field. Whereas when it comes to marriage, the husband takes a wife. I might note that this is essentially noting that marriage is not really a “sale.” It is an acquisition but no one is really selling anything.
  The Talmud notes that elsewhere the Tanakh describes a sale from the vantage point of the acquirer. So why then does the seller write the document.At first the resolution is to revocalize the text so that it reads “they shall transfer,” referring to the seller. The problem is that there is no compelling reason to read the text this way. And if we’re going to revocalize texts, we can do so with the text about marriage too, reading it as if it says, “If [a father] causes (yakiah) a woman to be taken by a man.” Furthermore, there is a verse that describes marriage from the viewpoint of the man whose daughter is getting married. Why, then, doesn’t he, or if she is old enough, she, write the document? 
  Rava ends up concluding that the rule that the husband writes the document is a tradition supported by a verse, but not one that originates in the verse. In other words, this is just how things are done.Alternatively, there is another verse that ascribes the writing of sales documents to the seller. This would tip the scales in favor of this document being written by the seller.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss betrothal by document. 
  If she has not yet reached majority age, then her father must consent to her betrothal.
  If she is of age, then she must be the one that consents to the betrothal. Note that what matters is not who physically accepts the deed. What is determinative is who consented to the betrothal.
  R. Shimon b. Lakish asks whether the document used for betrothal must be written expressly for this woman. Meaning if he finds a piece of paper on which it is written, “Your daughter be betrothed to me” can he just pick it up and use it to betroth whatever girl he wants.A get must be written with the particular divorcee in mind. So does the same law apply to the deed of betrothal? Or might we say that just as the money does not need to be “for her sake,” neither does the deed of betrothal? 
  
  Daf 9b
  
  Due to the verse that is read as comparing marriage to divorce, betrothal documents must also be written with the particular woman in mind.
  IntroductionThe Talmud discusses whether a betrothal document needs to be written with the woman’s consent.
  The deed was written with her in mind, but he wrote it before he told her (or her father) he was writing it. Maybe he was trying to be romantic?In any case, there is a dispute over whether this document is valid. 
  R. Papa first explains the reasoning of his disputants. A get must be written for the woman’s sake, with that particular woman in mind. But it need not be written with her consent. After all, she can be divorced against her will. So too when it comes to marriage, the document must be written for her sake, but not necessarily with her consent.
  R. Papa also compares the divorce document with the betrothal document. When it comes to divorce, the one giving something must consent—the man is giving her herself, so too when it comes to betrothal, the giver, this time the woman giving herself in marriage, must consent to the writing of the document.
  This baraita seems to state explicitly that both the man and woman must consent to the writing of the documents of marriage and betrothal.
  The Talmud reinterprets the baraita such that it refers to “deeds of stipulation.” These are deeds written at the time of betrothal in which the fathers of the groom and bride promise to endow their children with gifts. Once the betrothal occurs, the fathers owe this money even if a more formal act of acquisition (kinyan) has not occurred. However, a document is not written out without their consent. It might be that they prefer to keep this a verbal obligation. We should note that there is a bit of a paradox here—the Talmud calls them “deeds of stipulation” but then says that they need not be written down.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to discuss kiddushin through sexual intercourse. A warning—today’s Talmud contains adult themes of a sexual nature. If your young children are reading this, you might want to read it first yourself. 
  The verse from Deuteronomy describes a married woman as one “who had intercourse with her husband.” To R. Yohanan this proves that intercourse is a means of betrothal.
  The question is asked why R. Yohanan needed a new midrash when Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi] had provided what seems to be a perfectly good one using a different verse.
  If we only had the verse from Deuteronomy 24 we might have thought that two stages were necessary. First betrothal, assumedly by money, and then intercourse. After all, the verse uses two verbs—“take” and “has intercourse.” R. Yohanan’s midrash teaches more effectively that intercourse alone is sufficient to create a bond of betrothal.
  R. Abba b. Mammel raises a difficulty on the notion that we might think that for betrothal to occur, there needs to acquisition by money and intercourse. According to the Torah, a betrothed virgin who commits adultery is sentenced to death by stoning. But if both betrothal by money and intercourse were necessary for betrothal, then there would be no such thing as a betrothed virgin. She would either be betrothed and not a virgin, or not betrothed at all. 
  The rabbis try to answer the objection. It is possible that the betrothal was done through “unnatural (anal) intercourse.” This, with money, would be enough to betroth her. But then she would still be a virgin such that if she committed adultery, she would be sentenced to death by stoning. In other words, unnatural intercourse counts as intercourse, but leaves her as a virgin (yes, this beginning to sound Clintonesque). While this scenario is completely unlikely, it is not, according to these rabbis, impossible.
  Abaye says that unnatural intercourse with her husband (or fiancée) does cause her to be considered a non-virgin. Therefore, if she has unnatural intercourse as a means of betrothal, she is not considered a virgin. The only dispute was over whether unnatural intercourse with other men renders her a non-virgin.The dispute in the baraita occurs with regard to a betrothed girl. If ten men have sex with her, all unnaturally, they are all considered to be having adultery with a betrothed virgin and all are executed by stoning. Rabbi disagrees. The first had sex with a virgin, so he is stoned. But the remainder had sex with a non-virgin, so they are strangled, the punishment for adultery with a betrothed non-virgin.[A reminder—these types of discussion are highly theoretical. I would say that what is at stake here is not at all who is executed and how. What is at stake is who is considered a virgin. The rabbis just use this case to define virginity. And even that discussion probably has little ramifications on real life].
  Abaye says that unnatural intercourse with her husband (or fiancée) does cause her to be considered a non-virgin. Therefore, if she has unnatural intercourse as a means of betrothal, she is not considered a virgin. The only dispute was over whether unnatural intercourse with other men renders her a non-virgin.The dispute in the baraita occurs with regard to a betrothed girl. If ten men have sex with her, all unnaturally, they are all considered to be having adultery with a betrothed virgin and all are executed by stoning. Rabbi disagrees. The first had sex with a virgin, so he is stoned. But the remainder had sex with a non-virgin, so they are strangled, the punishment for adultery with a betrothed non-virgin.[A reminder—these types of discussion are highly theoretical. I would say that what is at stake here is not at all who is executed and how. What is at stake is who is considered a virgin. The rabbis just use this case to define virginity. And even that discussion probably has little ramifications on real life].      
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak finds a better solution. The case in the Torah could occur if he betrothed her by deed. Such an act does not need to be accompanied by intercourse for it to be an effective means of betrothal.Just to track where we are in the argument: we have now successfully explained why R. Yohanan needed another verse to prove that betrothal can be done through intercourse. Without that verse we might have thought that betrothal through intercourse can only be done when first preceded by betrothal through money. Now we know that each means of betrothal can be done independently.   
  R. Yohanan did not use the verse used by Rabbi to prove that intercourse is a means of betrothal. So what does he do with that verse? He uses it to learn that a wife may be betrothed (acquired) through intercourse. But intercourse is not a means to acquire a female slave. The Talmud will now explain why we might have thought that it is.  
  A yevamah, a woman awaiting levirate marriage, is “acquired” through intercourse when the yavam has relations with her. But she is not acquired through money, as a wife is in regular marriage. So if the yevamah, can be acquired through intercourse, I might have thought that the same is true of the Hebrew slave woman, for she can be acquired even through money.
  The Talmud pushes back against this argument. I might have thought that a yevamah could be acquired through intercourse because she is already connected to the yavam through her marriage to his now deceased brother. But I would not have thought such a thing about a slave woman who does not have a prior connection to the owner.
  The Talmud now invents another reason we would have thought that a female Hebrew slave could be acquired by intercourse. In the verses about such a slave the owner is described as taking another wife. We might have thought that just as this wife is acquired by intercourse, so is the slave. That is why we learn that she is not.As an aside, while it is clear that this slave is not acquired by intercourse, we should note that in the verses the distinction between the slave and a wife is not so clear. It seems that he acquires her so that she might someday become his or his son’s wife. Such an institution did not exist in rabbinic times. And as I’ve said, these discussions are extremely theoretical.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s. Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi] now needs to explain from where he derives the halakhah that a Hebrew female slave cannot be acquired through intercourse. From this point on, we’ll continue with a lot more midrashim. 
  Rabbi uses the extra word “her” which the verse could have skipped to derive both laws—a woman is betrothed through intercourse but a Hebrew female slave is not.
  Rava uses this same verse for yet another halakhah. For kiddushin to be valid, they must be able to be followed by legal intercourse. This is a case which we will learn later in the tractate in which a man married one of two sisters but does not know which one. He cannot have sex with either of them because either of them might be his sister’s wife. Therefore, the kiddushin are not valid.But now we return to our midrashic question—how can Rava learn all three things from one verse.  
  Rava learns another halakhah from the fact that the verse states “and” and not “or.” The betrothal (“when a man takes a woman”) must be inextricably connected with the legality of having intercourse.
  Now we have to ask the other question---how does Rabbi use the verse that R. Yohanan used to prove that betrothal can be done through intercourse?He uses it to prove that if the husband has unnatural intercourse with her, she is now considered a non-virgin. But if another man has unnatural intercourse with her, she is still considered a virgin.
  But Rabbi earlier said that he does posit that unnatural intercourse renders her a non-virgin. This baraita was explained in yesterday’s section.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  Rabbi distinguishes between the fine, paid by a man who rapes a virgin, and the death penalty given to a man who sex with a betrothed virgin.When it comes to defining a virgin vis a vis the fine, she is a virgin even if she already had unnatural intercourse. However, when it comes to the death penalty, if she had unnatural intercourse, she is not considered a virgin. A man who has sex with her will be executed by strangulation. Lucky him. Rabbi derives this from the word “alone” which seems to be unnecessary.
  Rabbi distinguishes between the fine, paid by a man who rapes a virgin, and the death penalty given to a man who sex with a betrothed virgin.When it comes to defining a virgin vis a vis the fine, she is a virgin even if she already had unnatural intercourse. However, when it comes to the death penalty, if she had unnatural intercourse, she is not considered a virgin. A man who has sex with her will be executed by strangulation. Lucky him. Rabbi derives this from the word “alone” which seems to be unnecessary.  
  The last piece of the sugya is that we need a verse from which R. Yohanan can hold that a husband renders his wife a non-virgin through unnatural intercourse whereas another man does not. He derives that from the use of the word “husband” in the verse, as opposed to “man.” Intercourse with the husband has a different effect on her from intercourse with another man.I do realize that it’s been difficulty to follow this long midrashic chain. I’m not sure every detail here is so crucial (I know, this is heresy). The overall picture is that every sage must give a midrash for every unusual phrase or word. And no one can use the same verse twice. That’s an ideology held to by the anonymous voice of the Talmud consistently throughout the entire work. But it’s not an ideology shared by the named sages themselves.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains two halakhic questions concerning kiddushin performed through intercourse. 
  If betrothal is done through intercourse, then is the betrothal completed as soon as intercourse begins, or when it is completed (by the man)?The Talmud drums up two ramifications to this question, both seem to be quite unusual. First of all, what happens if while they’re having intercourse, she accepts kiddushin from another man? Dramatic, for sure! Second, can a high priest, who must marry a virgin, betroth her through intercourse? If the beginning of intercourse acquires her, then no problem. But if the end of intercourse acquires her, then no go. She would already be a non-virgin by the time he acquires her.  
  Amemar answers that when men have intercourse (yes, he’s referring to men, not truly “all”), they are intending to “finish” intercourse. Starting intercourse is not really what they want. Therefore, the “acquisition” is not complete until he is finished.I’m sure you’re noticing how male-focused the Talmud is. It was written by men, after all, over 1500 years ago. I’m not sure men knew very much about female sexual pleasure, and besides that, in this case, to them it would not be relevant, for betrothal is the acquisition of a wife, not a wife’s acquisition of a husband.
  In normal cases of marriage, a man betroths a woman with money or goods, they wait a while, then when she moves into his home, they have intercourse. Intercourse is what defines marriage. But the Talmud relates to it as a means of betrothal as well. So then, does intercourse effect only betrothal, in which case they would have to have intercourse again in order for marriage to be effected? Or does intercourse effect marriage?There are three ramifications to this question, three important distinctions between a betrothed woman and a married woman. 1) A man inherits from his married wife, but not his fiancée; 2) If he is a priest, he is allowed to defile himself for her, but only if they are married; 3) If they are married, he alone annuls her vows. But if they are betrothed, either she or her father can annul her vows.The rest of this daf will deal with this question. So stay tuned!
  IntroductionIn today’s section Abaye tries to answer the question of whether intercourse causes betrothal or marriage. 
  Abaye brings proof from a mishnah in the fourth chapter of Ketubot that even if kiddushin is done through intercourse, there are still two stages of marriage. First she is betrothed, and then the husband has certain rights (and responsibilities). Then she is married and he gains more rights and responsibilities. This intercourse creates betrothal, not marriage. 
  The Talmud rejects the proof. There are two stages if she is betrothed by either money or deed. But if she is betrothed through intercourse then she might be immediately considered a married woman.
  IntroductionHere Rava tries to bring proof that intercourse effects betrothal, not marriage.The baraita that he cites refers to sex with very young girls. I will reiterate what I have said before. Talking about things that are possible is not the same as condoning such activities. While the rabbis (and all ancient people) had different notions of childhood, they did not condone sex with young girls. Rabbis talk about things that are possible, actions have legal significance, without stating their moral opinion about such subjects. This is simply the nature of this literature. I, as I usually do when it comes to such passages, will talk about them in a clinical manner, in the same way I might talk about murder without condemning murder, assuming the reader knows that I, and the text I’m interpreting are not supportive of murder. I hope that my reader knows enough to realize that I do not condone sex with girls close to the age of three.
  The baraita basically teaches that intercourse with a girl over three years old “counts.” What this means is that it renders her a non-virgin (as we learned in Ketubot). The baraita now enumerates a number of ramifications. First of all, she can (not should, but can) be betrothed by intercourse. If she has already been married before this age, and her husband dies, the yavam can acquire her through intercourse. If betrothed, adultery with her is punishable by death (to the man, not her). If she menstruates she defiles as does a menstruant. If she is married to a priest, she may eat terumah. Incest with her is also punishable by death (again, for the male not her).. And if she has intercourse with someone prohibited to her, she may no longer marry a priest.The issue at stake here is that first the baraita says that she is betrothed, and then its states that she is married. Like Abaye did yesterday, Rava reads this as two stages, even if betrothal is done through intercourse. Thus intercourse creates betrothal, not marriage. 
  
  
  Daf 10b
  
  The Talmud rejects Rava’s proof. We do not need to read “if  she married” as a second stage, but rather we can read it as connected to what immediately follows—“if she married a priest.” 
  IntroductionToday’s daf continues to discuss whether betrothal through intercourse creates betrothal or full marriage. The source cited is a critical argument between two sages over whether a woman betrothed to a Kohen can eat terumah. This is a source I analyze in depth in a forthcoming book (Reconstructing the Talmud: Volume 2). I believe that the issue at hand is how strong Jewish, rabbinic-style betrothal is. If betrothal is “strong” then a woman betrothed to a priest may eat terumah, which is strictly reserved for members of the kohen’s family. A weaker form of betrothal might prohibit this and not allow her to eat terumah until she enters her home. For comparison’s sake, in our society betrothal is relatively weak. A couple who gets engage does not need a divorce to split up. They are not, as far as I know, considered a unit in the eyes of the law. 
  Evidently Yohanan b. Bag Bag wrote a letter from somewhere in Israel to R. Judah b. Batera who was residing in Netzivin (currently in Syria) complaining that  the latter was allowing girls betrothed to priests to eat terumah. If we can read into this, we can see that R. Judah seems to espouse a strong form of betrothal, whereas Yohanan b. Bag Bag, an obscure sage, vehemently disagrees with such a notion. While rabbinic literature is full of disputes, it is quite rare for one sage to write a letter to another sage at such a great distance, with what clearly can be read as an attack.
  R. Judah b. Batera argues that if a Caananite slave woman can eat terumah after being purchased by a Kohen, even though if the priest has intercourse with her it would not allow her to eat terumah, all the more so an Israelite girl betrothed to a priest through money should also be allowed to eat terumah. After all, intercourse with her would also allow her to eat terumah. The simple meaning of this is that it refers to intercourse as part of marriage. However, the Talmud will try to read this as proof that betrothal through intercourse is sufficient to cause marriage.     
  The Talmud clarifies that in order for Ben Batera’s argument to make sense both the intercourse and the giving of the money must have been the only act performed, not accompanied by huppah. After all, after entering the huppah all agree that she eats terumah.
  The Talmud argues that according to Ben Batera intercourse as a means of betrothal creates a bond of marriage. That is why it is obvious to him that a woman eats terumah after intercourse with a Kohen. But if he held that intercourse only creates betrothal, then how could he be so sure that after betrothal through intercourse she eats terumah, but not after betrothal through money.The argument based on this baraita will continue with tomorrow’s section....
  IntroductionWe continue to discuss the baraita about whether a woman betrothed to a priest can eat terumah.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak tweaks Ben Batera’s argument such that when he refers to intercourse, he refers to intercourse that follows huppah (in other words marriage) whereas when he refers to betrothal through money, he refers to kiddushin and not huppah. This allows him to hold that intercourse creates a bond of betrothal and not marriage. [Note that this is probably the simple reading of the source—when Ben Batera referred to intercourse, he was referring to the intercourse that typically follows huppah].
  This is an explanation of the end of the baraita. If Ben Batera holds that a woman can eat terumah even before she enters the huppah, so then why don’t the sages allow her to do so? This was explained by Ulla earlier in Kiddushin—lest she come to feed terumah to her non-priestly family.
  Now the Talmud explains why Ben Bag Bag would reject Ben Batera’s argument. A Canaanite slave acquired through money eats terumah as soon as she is acquired because there are no steps left to fully acquiring her. But a woman betrothed with money does not eat terumah because there is still a stage left to her full acquisition—she must enter his domain. Therefore, the kal vehomer argument does not hold.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss the dispute between Ben Bag Bag, who believed that a woman betrothed to a priest should not eat terumah and Ben Batera who held that she can. In today’s sugya, Ravina transforms the argument from one over whether the Torah prohibits the betrothed girl from eating terumah to whether the rabbis prohibit it.  
  According to Ravina, all sages agree that from the Torah, an Israelite woman betrothed to a Kohen may eat terumah immediately. She need not wait for huppah. The issue is whether the rabbis prohibited it. Ben Bag Bag accuses Ben Batera of not being concerned about a “simpon” which is a way of annulling a sale or contract. If the husband can annul the betrothal then it would turn out that she was never betrothed to the Kohen. If she eats terumah before huppah and then the betrothal is annulled it, retroactively it would turn out that she ate terumah as an Israelite.
  This is Ravina’s rewrite of Ben Batera’s argument. When a kohen acquires a Canaanite slave, the slave eats terumah immediately and we are not concerned that the sale will be annulled. So why shouldn’t the same be true about a girl betrothed to a Kohen? Ben Batera then admits that the sages do not allow a betrothed girl to eat terumah because of Ulla’s concern that she will feed terumah to her relatives. 
  
  Daf 11a
  
  Ben Bag Bag must now explain why a slave can eat terumah immediately and we’re not concerned about nullification of the sale, whereas a betrothed girl cannot. The answer is that there is no way that the sale of a slave could be annulled by “simpon.” If the flaw is internal or hidden, then the owner should not care about it, because the slave is bought only for work. If the flaw is visible outside of the clothes, then the purchaser accepted the flaw when he bought the slave. If the slave turns out to be a thief or gambler, the sale cannot be annulled. And if the slave turns out to be an armed robber or condemned to die, the sale cannot be invalidated because the purchaser should have known about this before he bought the slave.   
  Both Ben Bag Bag and Ben Batera agree that a woman does not eat terumah until she enters the huppah, so what is it that they’re arguing about? In other words, what is the practical difference between the two reasons why a woman does not eat terumah until she enters the huppah—for fear that she will give the terumah to her family (Ben Batera), or fear that the betrothal will be annulled (Ben Bag Bag)? There are two such differences. First of all, if the husband accepts all of his wife’s defects, then Ben Bag Bag would say that she can eat terumah immediately. But Ben Batera would say she cannot lest she give the terumah to her family members. The other difference is a case where the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s agents or even if the father’s agents have gone with the husband’s agents. In both of these cases the marriage could still be annulled, so Ben Bag Bag would not allow her to eat terumah. But she is no longer with her family, so there is no fear that she will give to her family.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins to address the dispute between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel in the Mishnah. According to Bet Shammai a woman cannot be betrothed for less than a dinar. Bet Hillel says a perutah, a lesser sum.
  According to R. Zera, Bet Shammai requires a dinar for betrothal because they assume that a woman would not allow herself to be betrothed for a lesser amount.
  Abaye objects. If the issue is that we assume that a woman will not agree to be betrothed for less than a dinar, then what about rich women, such as the daughters of R. Yannai. We might assume that they would not agree to be betrothed for less than a heap (a tarkav is a measure of weight) of dinars. And then, if such a woman did accept a dinar as kiddushin, we would have to say that she is not betrothed due to our assumption. But this seems a strange, and incorrect thing to say. Would Bet Shammai really say such a thing? 
  R. Zera responds that in his opinion, Bet Shammai requires a dinar only if the woman does not knowingly accept the betrothal. For instance, he betroths her at night and she does not see the coin he gives her. Or he betroths her through an agent. However, if she wants to accept less than a dinar, she does have a right to do so.Note that while this lowers the amount of kiddushin, it gives the woman greater agency. She can get betrothed, even according to Bet Shammai, for whatever amount she wants, as long as we are sure she agrees to it. 
  R. Joseph gives a different reason for Bet Shammai. A dinar is a silver coin of Tyrian coinage (from Tyre, no relation to Tyrion, the diminutive Game of Thrones hero). Such coinage was considered to be the standard coinage in the Roman Empire, at least according to rabbinic thinking. [Reality was a bit more complicated, but there is some truth to there being a standard coinage and local coins]. Since the money for betrothal is mentioned in the Torah, it must be in Tyrian coinage. Local coinage can be used for obligations not found in the Torah. The Talmud will continue to explore this statement below.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the statement we learned yesterday about whether the coins referred to are Tyrian coins or the lower value provincial coins.
  This is the same statement we saw at the end of yesterday’s passage.
  The Talmud now examines whether R. Asi’s rule is always true. There is a concept called “partial admission.” Let me illustrate this. Reuven claims that Shimon owes him something and Shimon admits that he owes him some of what Reuven claims but not the whole amount. Shimon now must take an oath that he does not owe him the rest. For this to happen, Reuven’s claim must be for at least two ma’ahs and Shimon must deny at least a perutah. But why two ma’ahs? Why not one? After all, a dinar would seem to be the minimum amount for any money mentioned in the Torah and as the Talmud shows, the source of this oath is from a verse (it is derived midrashically from there).
  
  Daf 11b
  
  The reason why the claim must be for two pieces of silver and not just one is a midrash comparing money and utensils, which appears in the plural. Just as the claim must be for “utensils,” i.e. a minimum of two, so too must the claim of money be for at least two coins. These coins must have value, like utensils. So it cannot be for two perutot, which have minimal value.Thus this source does not disprove the rule that any money mentioned in the Torah must be Tyrian coins.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to search for exceptions to the rule that any money mentioned in the Torah must be a minimum of a silver dinar. 
  Second tithe is produce which is then redeemed for money and the money is brought to Jerusalem where it is used to buy food. The fact that second tithe is mentioned in the Torah implies that the minimum amount should be a dinar. And nevertheless, there is a mishnah that refers to a sela of copper coins, which is a lesser amount.The Talmud resolves that this is a special case—the Torah states “the money” and not just “money” to teach that even a lesser amount would be valid as second tithe. 
  When one dedicates something to the Temple he may redeem it with money and according to Shmuel, even a copper perutah. But again, we have a verse which means that the minimum amount should be a silver dinar. Yet the halakhah allows less than a silver dinar.The Talmud resolves that this is compared with tithes due to the use of the word “the money.” Just as “the money” with regard to tithes meant that the amount could be less than a dinar, so too with dedicated property.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya  contains yet another difficulty raised against R. Assi’s rule that any money mentioned in the Torah is in Tyrian coins, which implies a minimum of a silver dinar. 
  The idea of kiddushin with money is derived from a verse in the Torah. Nevertheless, Bet Hillel says that kiddushin can be performed with less than a silver dinar. Is it possible that R. Assi would rule according to Bet Shammai who mandates a dinar? This seems to the Talmud to be an impossible supposition.
  To solve the difficulty, the Talmud makes a small tweak in the statement attributed to R. Assi. R. Assi was only referring to numbers whose penalty or amount is fixed in the Torah. These include the penalty for accidentally killing a slave, the penalty for rape, seduction and defamation of a virgin, and the redemption of a first born. These amounts must be paid in the higher Tyrian coinage. But just because something is derived from the Torah does not mean that the payment must be in Tyrian coinage. Finally, other amounts mandated by rabbinic law can be paid in the lesser coinage.
  IntroductionToday’s daf asks why R. Assi needed to even tell us that any amount fixed by the Torah is reckoned in Tyrian currency. 
  There is a baraita that basically teaches exactly what R. Assi had stated. So why the repetition?   
  R. Assi needed to teach us the second half of his statement, that if the amount is not set by the Torah, it is reckoned in provincial currency, which in rabbinic literature means is considered 1/8 the value of Tyrian currency.We might have not known this because of a baraita with regard to personal injury. The baraita refers to the payment for embarrassing another person. One who boxes another person’s ears must pay a sela. Now normally a sela is worth four zuz (dinar). This would be according to a Tyrian standard and would seem to indicate that the Tyrian standard was used even if the amount is not set in the Torah. However, in light of R. Assi we can interpret this as a lower value, only half a zuz, 1/8 the value of a Tyrian sela. To back this up, the Talmud claims that people do call half a zuz an “istira” an Aramaic word which here seems to be equivalent to the Hebrew word “sela.”
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to try to understand why Bet Shammai rules that a woman cannot be betrothed for less than a dinar. 
  R. Shimon b. Lakish says that Bet Shammai derives the rule that a woman is betrothed for a minimum of a dinar from a rule that Hizkiyah stated with regard to the redemption of a slave girl. The Torah says that the girl (or someone else on her behalf) can continue to reduce from the money through which she was purchased. If she was acquired for a dinar, then this could be reduced to a perutah, essentially buying her back. But if she was acquired through a perutah, there is no more money that could be reduced.
  Perhaps the notion of deducting is not mandated. He could buy her for whatever amount her father would agree to. She only deducts if there is enough to deduct from.
  
  Daf 12a
  
  The Talmud rejects the above notion, positing that like designation, deducting from the sale money must be possible for the sale to be invalid. “Designation” refers to the idea that the owner would marry the girl off to his son. If this is not possible, for instance the son is prohibited to her, then the sale is not valid.I should reemphasize—by rabbinic times such institutions such as selling daughters into slavery did not exist. They are there in the Torah, and therefore rabbis interpret them, but they did not practice them in their real lives. 
  As stated above, Beth Shammai derives the laws of betrothal from the laws of the female slave. This is the conclusion of Resh Lakish’s statement.
  Although a perutah cannot be used, why does the amount have to go all the way up to a dinar. Why not some amount in-between? The answer is that once a perutah was excluded, they went to the next highest coin.
  This is the conclusion of the sugya about why Bet Shammai demands a dinar. Less than a dinar is simply too cheap. It’s treating Jewish women as if they were “hefker,” ownerless property that no one cares about.While this is a more pleasant saying than comparing betrothal to slave acquisition, we should acknowledge that a dinar is still a very low amount of money.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to discuss Bet Hillel’s opinion, that kiddushin can be performed with a perutah
  R. Yosef thought that the perutah that Bet Hillel said was any small coin, no matter how small. But Abaye reminds him that the mishnah actually gives a minimum amount—according to the mishnah, the perutah must weigh an eighth of an Italian issar.
  We might have thought that the absolute value of the issar is an antiquated number. According to this line of thought, a perutah is whatever people call it in their time the smallest coin. It would be of indeterminate size. Countering this, Abaye cites a dispute between several amoraim as to the weight of a perutah. Some say it is an eighth of an Italian issar, others say it is a sixth. But all hold that it must have some determined weight.
  R. Yosef cites a source in response to Abaye. According to this source, there are more than 2000 perutot in a sela. Now a sela is 4 dinars, and each dinar is 24 issarim. So a dinar equals 192 perutot, and a sela is 768 and two selas is 1536 perutot.Thus a perutah cannot weigh 1/6 or 1/8 of an issar.
  An old man corrects the baraita so that there are close to two thousand perutot in two selas, not more. While 1536 is not exactly close to 2000, it has gone past 1500 so we can call it close to 2000. Thus R. Yosef is refuted and a perutah does have an official amount. Below we will explain the dispute over whether it is 1/6 or 1/8 of an issar.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with how much a perutah is worth. 
  Abaye tries to locate the dispute between R. Dimi and Ravin, two amoraim, in an earlier dispute between the first opinion in a baraita and the R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. The first opinion, as one can easily see, holds that a perutah is 1/8 of an Italian issar.R. Shimon b. Gamliel mentions some different coins. The only ones he mentions in common with the first opinion are the perutah and the ma’ah. So the math is a bit trickier. I will put it in terms that might make this easier to see.Perutah=1/2 shamin=1/4 hanetz=1/8 hadris=1/24 ma’ah=1/12 pundion=1/6 issar.
  R. Dimi replies that they both agree with regard to the value of the perutah vis a vis the dinar—it is always 1/192. They were actually not arguing at all about the value of the perutah, only referring to different evaluations with regard to the copper issar. When the copper issar was worth more, there would be 24 to the zuz (dinar). In such a case, the perutah referred to need be worth only 1/8 of an issar. But if the issar has been devalued such that it stood at 32 to a dinar, then the perutah must be worth 1/6 of an issar.  But the value of a perutah vis a vis the dinar stays the same—1/192.
  According to Shmuel, if a man betroths a woman with an object that we know to be worth less than a perutah she is still betrothed. For we are concerned that maybe the item is worth a perutah elsewhere. Essentially what Shmuel is saying is that objects do not have absolute worth. A date might be worth very little in a place where dates are abundant (a kor, a large measure of volume, of dates sells for a dinar). But take one date it to a place where they are not abundant, and its value will go way up.
  Shmuel’s ruling seems to contradict the mishnah which says that the object must be worth a perutah.
  If the object is worth a perutah in the place where she is betrothed, then she is certainly betrothed. If it is not, then she is doubtfully betrothed.
  This story essentially says the same ruling as above. If the item is worth a perutah, she is certainly betrothed. If it is not, she is doubtfully betrothed. The ramifications of this are that she would need a get in order to marry someone else.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues with another story of a man who betroths a woman with an object that might not be worth a perutah. 
  This is essentially the same story we read in yesterday’s section. But stay tuned—there’s a twist coming.
  R. Hisda says that for the betrothal to be valid, the object must be worth a perutah in the place where she is betrothed.
  The mother of the man who betrothed argues that the stone was worth a perutah when he betrothed her, and thus the woman should not be allowed to betrothed to another man.But R. Hisda refuses to be concerned about this and here we can see what R. Hisda is really trying to do. Evidently, this woman has tried to become betrothed to another man, assuming that the first marriage was not executed properly because the item was not of value. If R. Hisda starts to be concerned that the item might have been worth a perutah, then the second marriage will turn out to be illegitimate. So R. Hisda tells his mother that she cannot just make an assumption that would invalidate the second marriage, the one the woman seems to want to maintain, is invalid.
  
  Daf 12b
  
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section, R. Hisda tells his mother that she cannot just make an assumption that would lead to the invalidation of a woman’s betrothal. In today’s sugya R. Hisda cites another story with the same line as proof.  
  Poor Judith, wife of R. Hisda. Her birth pains are so bad that she claims that she was betrothed to someone else and therefore her marriage to R. Hiyya is invalid. Essentially, she is in such pain that she wants to end her marriage. Like R. Hisda, R. Hiyya says that people cannot just make up things to invalidate marriages. Such power could threaten to destabilize marriage altogether.
  The other rabbis respond to R. Hisda—how can you invalidate the betrothal? There are witnesses elsewhere who will vouch for the fact that the stone was worth a perutah.
  R. Hisda responds that the court does not take into account witnesses who are not present. This also came up in a case that came before R. Hanina. The case is found in Ketubot. Shmuel’s daughters appear at court and say that they were taken captive but that they were not raped. [If they were raped, they would be prohibited from marrying a Kohen. Any woman who has had sex with someone prohibited to her cannot marry a Kohen, even if the sex was not willing]. Since they testify that they were taken captive, they are also believed to say that they were not raped (the principle of “the mouth that prohibits is the same mouth that permits”). This is so even though there are witnesses sitting right outside that say that she was taken captive. The principle is clear—the words of witnesses are taken into account only if they actually testify. We are not “concerned” that there might be witnesses elsewhere.
  Abaye and Rava disagree with R. Hisda’s analogy between the case of a captive woman and the married woman. The rabbis were lenient in the case of the captive woman because they assume she will try to prevent herself from being raped. She, they argue, is not at all an adulteress.But there is no reason to be lenient about the married woman. Furthermore, the prohibition here is much more serious than a woman marrying a priest. Here, if the first marriage is valid, the second marriage is adulterous. Therefore, we should be concerned about witnesses who might know that the object is worth a perutah.   
  Abaye and Rava disagree with R. Hisda’s analogy between the case of a captive woman and the married woman. The rabbis were lenient in the case of the captive woman because they assume she will try to prevent herself from being raped. She, they argue, is not at all an adulteress. But there is no reason to be lenient about the married woman. Furthermore, the prohibition here is much more serious than a woman marrying a priest. Here, if the first marriage is valid, the second marriage is adulterous. Therefore, we should be concerned about witnesses who might know that the object is worth a perutah.
  IntroductionAnother story of a man who uses an object to betroth a woman.
  R. Joseph sends back two laws. We will start with the second—the marriage is valid and therefore she requires a divorce, should she want to marry someone else. This is true even though the myrtle branch is probably not worth a perutah, because, as Shmuel taught, we are concerned lest the object is worth a perutah somewhere else.However, he is also to be lashed for Rav said that it is immodest to betroth a woman in the marketplace. This begins a list of actions that are technically legal but should not be done. Betrothal can, according to the mishnah, be performed through intercourse. But Rav does not allow it and punishes one who does so. Shiddukhin are akin to modern betrothal—a non-legal commitment to marry made by the two families. While a man can betroth a woman without arranging it with her parents, Rav would punish one who does so. Annulling a divorce before the get arrives in the woman’s hand is possible. But since it creates so many potential problems, namely the woman might think she is divorced when she is not, Rav punishes one who does so.The next two have to do with respect for rabbinic authority. Harassing a messenger of the rabbis shows lack of respect for the rabbis.The rabbis have the power to put someone under the ban (to excommunicate him) in order to force him to act in accordance with the law, for instance to pay a debt. Someone who allows this ban to remain for over thirty days is punished additionally by lashes.The final case is also different. A son-in-law should not live with his mother-in-law for fear of sexual impropriety.     
  Rav would lash a son-in-law only for living with his mother-in-law, but not for simply passing by her house. R. Sheshet, though, once lashed a son-in-law for merely passing by his mother-in-law’s house. But that was because there was already suspicion about them.We should note that it might not have been uncommon for a mother-in-law to be a similar age to her son-in-law. If men got married about ten years later than women, the mother-in-law might have been closer to him in age than his wife.
  The Nehardeans, a group of rabbis who lived in the city of Nehardea, taught a much shorter list of things Rav (an earlier amora) would beat men for. According the Nehardeans, Rav would lash only those who betrothed through intercourse, according to one version without shiddukhin, and according to the other even with shiddukhin. Betrothing by intercourse is, while a valid form of kiddushin, is considered licentious behavior.
  IntroductionRava issues a ruling in a case of kiddushin that came in front of him. 
  The issue here is what was the man was betrothing her with—the mat of myrtle twigs or the money in it? She thought it was a worthless mat of twigs before she received it, and only saw the money after. The fact that she is silent after receiving it and does not protest is not, according to Rava, sufficient for her to be betrothed.
  Rava uses this baraita to prove that silence after accepting the money is not akin to consent. There are two situations in the baraita: 1) He says he is giving her the money as a deposit and then changes his mind and say it is kiddushin money. If she accepts the money, she is betrothed, even if she does not say yes. This is because she knows it is kiddushin before she accepts it.2) He gives her the money as a deposit and then says it is kiddushin. If she accepts the proposal, she is betrothed. But if all she does is remain silent, she is not betrothed. Since she did not know what it was before she accepted it, she needs to have an active affirmation of her acceptance.This is how Rava learns that silence after accepting the money is not legally significant. On the other hand, silence before receiving the money is legally significant. The very act of taking the money from the husband counts as kiddushin. 
  
  Daf 13a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation from yesterday. In that case a man gave a woman a worthless object as a means of betrothal. When she opened it up, there were coins in it and she did not say anything. In other words, she did not throw the coins back at him but neither did she actively consent. Rava ruled that she is not betrothed because silence after accepting the money is not legally significant. As a source, Rava cited a baraita in which a man gave a woman a deposit and then, after she accepted the money as a deposit, he said “Be betrothed to me.” If she is silent, she is not betrothed. In today’s section, some amoraim say that the two situations are not analogous. 
  R. Huna raises a pretty strong difficulty on Rava. In the case of the baraita, he told her it was a deposit. She could not just throw it back at him for by doing so, she could incur a loss. Therefore, her silence could mean that she simply wants to accept it as a deposit. But in the case Rava adjudicated, the man gave her the mat as kiddushin. Had she not wanted it, she should have thrown it back at him. Silence, therefore, should be akin to acceptance and she is betrothed.
  R. Ahai points out that this woman might not have known the law that she has a right to throw it back at him. Therefore, her silence also might not be a sign of acceptance.
  Here we can see some later amoraim who debate whether the ruling accords with R. Huna, who says she is betrothed, and Rava who says she is not.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses a story in which a man snatches an object from a woman and tries to betroth her with it. 
  R. Nahman ruled that she is not betrothed.
  The baraita clearly states that if he steals something from her and then uses it for betrothal, she is betrothed. This is a direct contradiction with R. Nachman.R. Nachman answers that in that case he had already made a shiddukh—arranged the marriage. This bolsters the assumption that she was accepting the betrothal.   
  R. Nahman here is using a baraita that we have seen before to prove that there is a difference between a case where he did shiddukhin before the betrothal and one where he did not.The Talmud asks what the meaning of the words “she consented” and “she did not consent” are in the first part of the baraita.If we take these words literally, then by implication if she is silent, she would be betrothed. But if this is so, why not simply state “she is betrothed.” After all, this is simply a normal case—if she says no, she is not betrothed, and if she says nothing, she is betrothed.    
  Rather, the baraita must mean that if she is silent, then she is not betrothed because she is only taking back what is hers. Note that this now agrees with R. Nahman’s ruling from the case above. Essentially, R. Nahman has a baraita that supports his ruling.
  The problem now is that the two baraitot contradict each other. Therefore, R. Nahman resolves them by saying that one baraita refers to a case where he made a shiddukh first (arranged the marriage) and one where he did not. If he made a shidukh, he can betroth her even with something stolen because we can assume that she is agreeing to her marriage.We should note that these questions comes up only when she is silent. If she says yes—we know she is betrothed. If she says no, we know she is not. The only question is in a case where she stays silent.  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya offers a rare opportunity to see the setting in which rabbinic statements were related. The rabbis gather together at R. Assi’s death and collect his sayings. Indeed, we see this occasionally in rabbinic literature—statements collected according to attribution and not according to topic. Both of these sayings are relevant to the topic of kiddushin and so they are brought here. 
  R. Assi compares the rules of kiddushin with the rules of buying land. Just as a woman cannot be acquired for less than a perutah so too land cannot.
  R. Jacob responds that land can be acquired through something less than a perutah if that is done through symbolic exchange. This is when someone gives something of symbolic value to another and thereby acquires something else in exchange. This is also called “acquisition through a kerchief” for often the kerchief was what was used to accomplish this. Today one encounters this usually when the husband transfers the ketubah to the woman. It is also done when selling hametz. With symbolic exchange one does not really acquire the valuable item with the valueless item. Rather, one symbolically uses the valueless item to acquire the valuable one.
  The rabbis now bring up another of R. Assi’s statements. This statement was made in reference to Rav’s statement that if a judge does not know how to enact a divorce or a betrothal, other judges should stay far away from him. R. Assi adds that judges who adjudicate marital matters without knowing how to do so are more harmful to the world than even the generation of the flood, a generation so wicked they were utterly destroyed. The prooftext he brings is from a verse in Hosea, which refers to adultery.R. Joseph interprets this in reference to those who bring forth illegitimate children through adultery. Improper adjudication of matters of divorce and betrothal can also cause illegitimate children to be born. This “adds sins to sins” for not only was the original intercourse sinful, these children will be mamzerim and when they marry into Israel, this too will be in sin (according to rabbinic understanding).R. Assi posits that this sin is worse than the sin of the generation of the flood for in the verse in Hosea even the fish die, whereas in the flood they did not. 
  The verse from Hosea refers to more than just adultery. It also refers to other sins. So perhaps the world is not destroyed unless people commit all of these sins. How does R. Assi know that improper adjudication of marital law which causes unintentional adultery is alone sufficient to cause the destruction of the world?A verse from Jeremiah implies that the world is destroyed from false oaths alone. This was the first sin mentioned in the verse. So if the world is destroyed for this sin alone, then the sins in the rest of the verse, including causing adultery, are also sufficient for the world to be destroyed.     
  Had the conjunctive “and” been used, then we would have read the verse that all of the sins need to be committed for the world to be destroyed. But since there is no conjunctive, the rabbis can read the verse as if one sin alone is sufficient.  
  
  Daf 13b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with another of the sayings of R. Assi. 
  If a woman gives birth she must she must bring a sin-offering. If she dies, her heirs must bring it on her behalf. According to Rav Judah this is so only if she already set the sacrifice aside. If she did not, her heirs do not need to bring it.From here we can see that the mere fact that she is obligated to bring the offering is not enough to make her heirs obligated. Debt obligation, thus, is not from the Torah such that it should pass from one generation to the other.
  R. Assi holds that even if she did not already set aside the sacrifice before she died, the heirs must bring it.
  The same dispute between Shmuel and R. Yohanan exists elsewhere. The case here is where one’s father (or someone else from whom one inherits) incurs a debt without a written contract. According to Rav and Shmuel, the heirs cannot collect. They hold, therefore, that debt is not “from the Torah” such that it can be bequeathed to an inheritor. In contrast, Resh Lakish and R. Yohanan hold that the heirs can collect the debt. Thus debt must be from the Torah.The question the Talmud asks is why we need two cases to illustrate the same principle. Once we know the principle that debt is or is not from the Torah shouldn’t we be able to figure out the particulars?
  If we had only known the case of the debt incurred without a written contract, I might have thought that in that case only Shmuel holds that the heirs cannot collect, because such a debt is not mandated by the Torah. But in the case of the woman and the sacrifice that she owes, I might say that Shmuel would hold that her heirs must bring the sacrifice because such a debt is mandated by the Torah. Therefore, we need to learn that they do not. Debt is never bequeathed.  
  This is basically the opposite of above. Had only the case of the sacrifice been taught, I might have thought that in a case of a debt not written in the Torah, R. Yohanan would agree that the debt is not bequeathed to the inheritors. Therefore we need both cases.
  R. Papa mediates between Shmuel and R. Yohanan. On the one hand, if an heir inherits a debt incurred by a verbal contract, he must pay it off. Debt obligation is from the Torah. On the other hand, if a purchaser buys land from someone not knowing that the seller had some debt because the debt was incurred by a verbal contract, he need not pay off the debt. Since the debt was oral, he would have no way of doing due diligence and therefore he need not pay back the creditor.
  IntroductionToday’s section searches for a proof text for how we know that a widow is allowed to marry anyone she wants. Note, the Talmud knows that widows are allowed to remarry. It is obvious, and the Torah really didn’t need to state this. However, the rabbis are still curious as to how we know this. 
  The idea that a woman is released from marriage by divorce is written in the Torah. The idea that she is released by death is logical.
  The problem with the logic is that a woman is not totally free to marry whomever she wants just because her husband dies. When they get married, she becomes prohibited to certain of his relatives. She still cannot marry his relatives (his father, brother, and son).The Talmud now does locate a source. A woman whose husband dies without children is not free to marry anyone until she either undergoes yibbum (levirate marriage) or halitzah (release therefrom). By implication, if he died with kids, she is free to marry whomever she wants.
  The Torah only states that if she has no children she is forbidden to any other man and permitted to the husband. A possible implication is that if she has children, she is prohibited to marry anyone. Note that while this is an unlikely way of reading the Torah, it is a possible one and therefore we do not have a textual source for a woman going free at the death of her husband.
  The Torah prohibits a widow from being married to a high priest. By implication she is permitted to marry a regular priest, and indeed anyone else.
  Again, the Talmud pushes back. Perhaps there is a negative commandment not to marry a high priest, but there is a positive commandment that would prohibit her to marry anyone else. Thus there would be a positive commandment saying she must stay unmarried.
  How can we have a positive commandment that would make her be prohibited by a positive commandment to marry anyone else? If her husband’s death is effective, she should be allowed to marry anyone else. If it is not effective, there should remain a stricter prohibition of marrying anyone else.
  The Talmud argues that there is precedent for a change of status lessening a prohibition such that a married woman would be penalized by death for adultery whereas a widow would be penalized for transgressing a positive commandment.The precedent for such a phenomenon would be animals dedicated to the Temple that are unfit to sacrifice due to some sort of blemish. Before they are redeemed, one may not use them and if one does one has transgressed the sin of “trespass” and must bring a sacrifice. After the animals are redeemed they may be used but one still may not shear them or work them.    
  When going to war, a man who recently married is exempt lest he die in battle and another man marry his new wife. Clearly a widow can remarry.
  Perhaps she is only permitted to marry the brother-in-law and not any man she wants? Still, there is no proof that a widow can remarry whomever she wants.
  R. Ashi finally puts forth an acceptable argument as to how we know that a widow may remarry. 1) When the Torah says she may marry another man, it does not mean the yavam. The yavam is not called “another man.”  2) The Torah compares divorce with death. Both free a woman to marry almost any man she wants (there are some restrictions, such as a widow cannot marry the high priest).
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to deal with how a yevamah is acquired by the yavam. Quick review: If a man dies without offspring his wife must either marry his brother (yibbum) or be released from this obligation through halitzah. The yavam is the brother and the yevamah is the widow. 
  A yevamah is acquired, meaning she becomes the wife of the yavam, through intercourse. The rabbis do not believe that money or a document can acquire a yevamah, as they do for betrothal with a regular woman. Part of the reason for this is that money or a document is done for betrothal and the yevamah is already tied to her brother-in-law by virtue of her marriage to her now deceased husband. All she needs to really do is complete a tie that was already forged.
  
  Daf 14a
  
  The rabbis use the additional word “and perform levirate marriage with her” to prove that only sexual relations is effective to acquire the yevamah. Money or a document is not.
  The rabbis here tease out a bit more meaning from the extra heh at the end of the word “vayevamah”. The word itself teaches that if he has intercourse with her against her will, she is married to him. [Yes, this is very problematic. I might add that this does not at all mean that this should be done. Just that legally, consent is not necessary for levirate marriage because she consented to marry the brother]. The extra heh allows us to also learn that only sex completes the acquisition. Money and document do not.
  IntroductionHow do we know that a woman who undergoes halitzah is free to marry whomever she wants? Again, this is something the rabbis know and is not really under debate. The rabbis just want to know how we know this. 
  The rabbis use the word “in Israel” to prove that once halitzah is performed by her removal of his shoe, she is permitted to marry whomever she wants.
  The word “Israel” is already used up by another midrash—to teach that halitzah must be performed in a court of Jews and not in front of a court of non-Jews.
  The word “in Israel” is written twice thus justifying its use in two midrashim.
  The Talmud argues that both times that the word “Israel” appears are needed for other midrashim. The first is, as we saw above, that the court must consist of Jews. The second is that after the shoe is removed the Jews present must respond with a declaration. So again, if both instances of the word are used up, the word “in Israel” is not “free” to derive from it that a woman who has undergone halitzah is free to remarry whomever she wants.The Talmud answers that the obligation to answer with a declaration comes from a different part of the verse. This frees up one instance of the word “Israel.”
  IntroductionHere we need to prove that a yevamah whose yavam died may marry anyone whom she wants. 
  The penalty for regular adultery is execution by strangulation (for both the man and woman). But a woman waiting for yibbum who has sex with another man has transgressed a negative commandment, but it is not penalized with the death penalty. Therefore, the rabbis argue, if the former can remarry at the death of her husband, all the more so can the latter.
  The Talmud argues that a married woman is different from a yevamah because the former goes out through divorce whereas the latter does not.
  The Talmud responds that the yevamah also has another means of being released from marraige—halitzah.
  A married woman goes out at the death of her husband because he is the one who married her. But the yavam is not the one who married her. So how can his death free her?
  R. Ashi points out that the yavam does in a sense bind her—had there not been any yavam, she would have gone free at the death of her husband. So the comparison is valid—just as a regular wife goes free at the death of her husband, so too the yevamah goes free at the death of her yavam.
  IntroductionToday’s section asks why a married woman cannot be released through halitzah, as is a yevamah and why a yevamah cannot be released through a get, as is a married woman. Again, these questions are theoretical. The rabbis know that halitzah works only for a yevamah. But they are asking why it does not work for a married woman or how we know it does not work. 
  While we might construe a logical argument for claiming that a married woman could have her marriage terminated through halitzah, the verse proves that only a document will sever the marriage.
  The word “thus” in the passage about levirate marriage means that a yevamah goes out of the obligation for levirate marriage only through halitzah, and not through a get as does a regular wife.
  This is a complicated argument embedded within another argument. Above, we learned not to make a kal vehomer in a case where a word implies that a certain act is “indispensable.” But the Talmud cites another case where an indispensable word exists and yet there is still a kal vehomer. The case refers to the goat on Yom Kippur upon whose head falls the lot to be a sin-offering. The midrash teaches that this goat becomes holy not by verbal designation but by the placing of the lot. It rejects a kal vehomer argument that would argue that designation also works to make it holy. But were it not for this midrash, the kal vehomer argument would be valid even though the word “statute” implies indispensableness. Thus indispensableness itself does not rule out making a kal vehomer argument to the contrary.
  The Talmud now comes up with a new midrash to prove that a yevamah does not leave the marriage by divorce—the word “her” in the verse about divorce.
  The problem with the word “her” is that even though it is written twice, it is needed for two other midrashim. One to teach that the get must be written with a specific woman in mind and the other to teach that two women cannot be divorced with one get. This means we still need a midrash to prove that a yevamah is not released with a get.
  The Talmud now comes up with another midrash—the word “shoe” proves that the removal of his shoe (essentially what halitzah is) severs the tie with the yavam and nothing else, including a get.   
  The problem is again familiar—the word “shoe” is used for other midrashim. So how can we use it to teach that a yevamah is not released through a get?
  
  Daf 14b
  
  The extra “heh” allows the word “shoe” to be used for both purposes—to teach laws about what type of shoe may be used and to teach that a yevamah is not released through a get.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a new mishnah, one concerned with the acquisition and release of slaves. There are different rules for Hebrew slaves than there are for “Canaanite” slaves—non-Jewish slaves.  One of the major differences is that all of the biblical verses which discuss a slave’s going free after a certain period of time are considered by the rabbis as referring to Hebrew slaves.  This includes Exodus 21:1-11; Leviticus 25:39-44, 47-55; Deuteronomy 15:12-18.  Leviticus 25:44-46 refers to Canaanite slaves.  Non-Jewish slaves are called “Canaanite” after Genesis 9:25, “Cursed be Canaan; the lowest of slaves shall he be to his brothers.”  The major difference between the two is that a Hebrew slave goes free automatically after a certain number of years of servitude, whereas a Canaanite slaves works in perpetuity.  We should note that the practice of owning Hebrew slaves was probably non-existent, or at least almost non-existent, in the mishnaic/talmudic periods.  However, Jews did own non-Jewish slaves.  Slavery was a common feature of the Greco-Roman world.  The halakhah in general mandates relatively liberal treatment of the slave, but it did not forbid slavery.  
  Section one: There are two possibilities for how an Israelite can legally be sold as a slave. First of all, he may sell himself into slavery in order to pay off his debts.  In such a case he may be sold to a Jew or to a Gentile.  The second possibility is that the court may sell him in order to make compensation for something he sold.  The mishnah teaches that in these cases the sale must be done either through money or through a sale document.Section two:  The slave goes free after six years of servitude, as is taught in the beginning of chapter 21 of Exodus.  If the Jubilee year, which occurs once every fifty year, happens before he serves out his six years, then he goes free earlier (see Leviticus 25:40).  If the slave somehow earns enough money to pay back the original sale price, he has the right to do so at any time.  For instance if he was sold for 600 denar, and he would have worked for six years, each year is worth 100 denar, and depending upon when he wants to buy himself back, he pays back 100 denar per year left of work.  The master cannot refuse to allow the slave to buy himself back.  In this way, the Hebrew slave is more like an indentured servant than truly a slave.Section three:  The sale of female Hebrew slaves is even more restricted.  According to halakhah there is no such thing as a female adult Hebrew slave.  She can only be sold as a minor and when she shows physical signs of reaching maturity (pubic hair) she becomes free automatically, without having to pay back her sale price.  In addition, she can also become free in any of the ways that a male Hebrew slave becomes free.  It seems that the institute of minor female slaves was probably a way for the father to marry off his daughter without paying a dowry.  While this practice seems cruel to us, it may have been a better option for the daughter than some alternatives.Section four:  In Exodus 21:5-6 we learn that a slave who does not wish to regain his freedom must have his ear pierced and then he may work indefinitely for his master.  The piercing causes him to be acquired to his master for a period beyond the normal period of servitude.  However, he does not work forever and his master’s inheritors do not inherit him.  Rather he goes free either at his master’s death or at the Jubilee year, whichever comes first.  At this point, even if he wishes to remain a slave he has no such choice.  
  Leviticus refers to the money the slave was purchased for. Thus it is clear that a slave is purchased through money.
  The verse in Leviticus refers to a Jew sold to a non-Jew. A non-Jew according to halakhah always acquires objects through money, and not through any other means. But a Jew can acquire through other means (such as taking possession or a document). So how do we know that a Jew acquires slaves through money?This is learned from a verse referring to the female slave. If a female slave acquires money she deducts the value of the time served from her purchase money and buys back her own freedom. Thus she was clearly acquired for money.     
  The verse from Exodus referred only to a female Hebrew slave. But we can extend the same law to a male Hebrew slave through the comparison made in Deuteronomy. Both can be acquired through money.
  The verse in Deuteronomy referred to a Jewish slave sold by the court to pay back a debt incurred by stealing. Since the money needs to be recovered it is obvious that he is acquired through money. But what about a Jew who sells himself into slavery? This is learned from the repetition of the word “sakhir” This word, which means “hired laborer,” is used in both Leviticus (one who sells himself) and Deuteronomy (one who is sold by the court). Therefore, the same rules apply to both.
  The vav in the phrase “and if …” allows for a law written below to apply to what appeared above. Below is the case of a Jew sold to a non-Jew—he can be acquired through money. And because the two passages are attached by the vav, we can learn that a Jew sold to another Jew can also be acquired for money.
  IntroductionYesterday we heard of a dispute about whether one can derive laws from comparing one use of the word “sakhir” with the other—some do and some don’t. Today’s sugya discusses who does not derive laws from the repetition of the word. 
  The baraita here contains a dispute about the laws governing a Hebrew slave. There are two possibilities as to how a Jew could be sold into slavery—he could sell himself into slavery to recover a debt or the court. The rabbis read Leviticus 25:40 as referring to a Jew who sells himself and Deuteronomy 15:18 as a case where the court sells him. Deuteronomy limits the term of servitude to six years, it provides an opportunity to extend the servitude by having a hole bored in his ear and it mandates the owner provide him with a gift upon release. Exodus 21, parallel to Deuteronomy, also allows the master to give him a Canaanite slave-woman as a wife. Leviticus does not contain any of these provisions. To the tanna kamma (the first opinion) this means that the rules governing these two situations are different. To R. Elazar the same rules govern both. 
  Abaye claims that both parties are willing to derive halakhah by comparing the word “sakhir.” This will mean that for other matters, ones not discussed in this baraita, all rabbis will use this midrashic technique. However, for these particular matters the tanna kamma reads the verse in Deuteronomy as excluding one who sold himself into slavery. He, the one who is sold by the court, receives all of these benefits, but not the one who sold himself into slavery. In other words, the reason for the dispute is not that the rabbis refuse in principle to apply the laws  Deuteronomy to the situation referred to in Leviticus. Rather, the dispute is over how to read the verse in Deuteronomy.
  This is the typical midrashic chain found at ends of midrashic disputes—how does each tanna derive the halakhah and still make one use of each word. R. Elazar reads the word as excluding an heir from an inheriting a Hebrew slave. The tanna kamma derives that from a second appearance of the word “serve you.” But R. Elazar uses that second appearance of the word for a different purpose.The discussion of this baraita will continue next week.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss the baraita about the difference between a Hebrew slave who sells himself into slavery (Leviticus 25) and the one who is sold into slavery (Deuteronomy 15 and Exodus 21). 
  The first tanna of the baraita says that only one sold by the court has his ear bored through with an awl should he wish to remain a slave. One who sells himself does not. The tanna kamma reads this out of the verse in Exodus. 
  
  Daf 15a
  
  R. Elazar uses this verse to draw a gezerah shavah from one appearance of the word ear to another--both cases refer to the right ear. 
  The tanna kamma claims that the use of “his ear” and not just “ear” means that both derashot can be made.R. Elazar counters that “his ear” does not exclude one who sells himself. It excludes a woman. A female slave does not have an option to get her ear bored and thereby extend her servitude.  
  The tanna kamma deduces that female slaves do not have their ears bored from the male form of slave.R. Elazar counters that he uses this word to teach that the slave must make this declaration while still a slave.    
  The tanna kamma uses the extra “heh” in front of the word “slave” as the basis for the slave having to make the declaration while still a slave.R. Elazar does not make anything out of the extra “heh.” And at a certain point, these conversations always have to end.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the baraita that distinguished between the laws applicable to a Jew who sells himself into slavery and those applicable to one who is sold into slavery. 
  Deuteronomy 15 refers to a Jew sold into slavery by the court. The tanna kamma reads the word “him” as an exclusion. “He” receives a gift when he goes free. But one who sells himself into slavery does not.
  R. Elazar, who says that one who sells himself into slavery also receives a gift when going free reads the word “him” as excluding his heirs. If the slave dies, his heirs do not receive this gift.
  The Talmud rejects this reading of what the word “him” excludes. The heirs should receive the gift that was supposed to go to the slave himself.
  The Talmud now offers a different reading of what the word “him” excludes. It excludes giving the gift to the slave’s creditor. In general if Reuven owes Shimon money, and Shimon owes Levi, the court can force Reuven to give to Levi. To counter this general teaching the word “him” comes to teach that this is not so with regard to the gift. The slave receives it and not his creditor.
  The first opinion does not need the word “him” to exclude the creditor because the author of opinion does not agree with R. Natan’s general rule. Thus it is obvious that the creditor does not get the gift.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to explicate the baraita about the differences between the slave who was sold into slavery by the court and the slave who sold himself into slavery.
  This section is basically the same as the opening of yesterday’s section. The Torah says “him” in Exodus, a verse regarding one whom the court sold into slavery. He may be given a Canaanite slave as a wife, but not one who sells himself into slavery.
  R. Elazar uses the word “him” to teach that the master can force his Hebrew slave to marry a Canaanite slave woman. The other rabbis learn this halakhah from the verse that teaches that a Hebrew slave works twice as hard as a hired servant. The hired servant works only by day, but the Hebrew slave works at night by having sex with the Canaanite slave woman given to him by his master. [Again, this is a theoretical halakhah, one that probably explains why the Hebrew slave’s offspring belong to his master. They follow the status of the mother. But such a halakhah was probably never enforced].
  R. Elazar says that we need the word “him” to prove that this can be done against the Hebrew slave’s will. The other verse would only prove that he can take a Canaanite slave as a wife.
  IntroductionToday’s section explicates a line from yesterday’s section which said that the Torah had already taught that a slave whose ear was bored, meaning a slave who chose to remain a slave after seven years, goes free at the Jubilee. This essentially teaches that the laws of Leviticus 25 supersede the laws of Exodus 21/Deuteronomy 15. But where was this taught?
  Leviticus 25:10 is a verse about the Yom Kippur of the Jubilee. It describes a return of every person to his possession and his family. But, the rabbis argue, this cannot refer to either a slave sold into slavery by the court or one who sells himself into slavery, because both of these types of slaves are already referred to (according to rabbinic interpretation) in the passage later in Leviticus 25 that refers directly to slaves. Therefore, this passage must refer to a slave whose ear has been bored, meaning he served his six year period and then chose to remain. He too goes free at the Jubilee.
  Rava b. Shila explains that the word “man” indicates that Leviticus 25:10 refers to the slave who had his ear bored. According to rabbinic law, only male slaves have an option to extend their term of servitude. Women can serve no longer than six years.
  Why does the Torah need to teach us that both one sold by the court and one whose ear was bored go free at the Jubilee?If we had learned only that the one sold by the court goes free, I might have thought that this was because he did not choose to have his term of servitude lengthened. But the one who chose to remain a slave might not go free at the Jubilee, as a sort of punishment for choosing to remain a slave. 
  The Torah had to teach that one who was sold by the court goes free at the Jubilee despite the fact that he had not yet even served six years.
  Exodus states that after having his ear bored, the slave serves forever, whereas Leviticus states that he returns to his family at the Jubilee. The Talmud now explains why both are needed. Had we only Exodus we would think that once his ear is bored, he literally serves forever. Thus it is clear why we need the Torah to teach that he goes free at the Jubilee. The harder question is why does the Torah state that he serves forever? What wrong supposition would I have without this word? The answer is that we might have thought that after having his ear bored, the slave serves another six years, but no more. Just as he served six years before, so he serves six years after. That is why the Torah teaches “forever” which in light of Leviticus means that he serves only until the Jubilee.
  IntroductionYou might not have noticed but we still have not identified the tanna that does not learn from the repetition of the word “sakhir” in Leviticus and Deuteronomy in the context of the Hebrew slave. The search goes on!
  Leviticus 25:54 refers to an Israelite sold to a Gentile. The Torah says that he may be redeemed by his relative. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] rules that he does not go free after six years. Rabbi points out that we might have made a kal vehomer from a Hebrew slave sold to a Jew. He cannot be redeemed by his relatives and yet he does go free at six years. This proves that Rabbi does not learn from the repetition of the word “sakhir” for the word “sakhir” is used in both the context of a Jew sold to Gentiles and a Jew sold to other Jews. If Rabbi learned from “sakhir” then both types of slaves could be redeemed by their relatives.   
  
  Daf 15b
  
  As occurred earlier, the Talmud rejects the notion that Rabbi does not learn from the repetition of the word “sakhir.” In general he does, but in this case he does not because he reads the verse as specifically limiting the one able to be redeemed by relatives to the Hebrew sold to a Gentile. Thus according to Rabbi we could say that the laws of Exodus apply to the slave described in Leviticus. But we could also distinguish between a slave sold to a Gentile and one sold to a Jew.
  Rabbi reads the words “by these” as teaching that a slave purchased by a Gentile does not go free after six years. In contrast, two other tannaim read the phrase as teaching something different. R. Yose the Galilean reads them as teaching that if a relative redeems the slave, he goes free. But if he is redeemed by a non-relative, then he becomes a slave to that redeemer. R. Akiva reads this opposite—if he is redeemed by the relative, then he remains a slave. If by any other man, then he goes free.
  The Talmud shows how each of these two rabbis reads the verse. R. Yose inserts the difference between a relative and a stranger straight into the verse.R. Akiva reads the verse slightly differently. If he is not redeemed by any but these, then he goes free. But if he is redeemed by these, i.e. the relatives, he does not go free until the Jubilee year.R. Yose counters that R. Akiva’s reading is not actually written in the verse and requires the insertion of several words.  
  The Talmud now offers a different reason for their dispute, which is anchored in the words of the verse. There are three forms of redemption alluded to in the verse—by relatives, by oneself, by strangers. Rabbi Yose Hagalili says that redemption by oneself teaches something about what appears before—redemption by relatives. Just as self-redemption is (obviously) for freedom, so is redemption by relatives. R. Akiva says that the verse teaches about that which follows. Just as redemption by oneself leads to freedom, so does redemption by others.
  The phrase “by these” is used to offer some limitation. The words indicate that some sort of redemption leads to freedom and some sort does not.
  Rather, the Talmud suggests that their dispute is due to differing assessments of psychology. R. Yose Hagalili argues that by allowing the slave to remain in servitude, we are encouraging Jews to redeem him from non-Jews. In contrast, R. Akiva argues that if he were to go free when redeemed by relatives, he would just sell himself into slavery over and over again, knowing that a relative would redeem him and he would go free.
  According to Rabbi, no matter who redeems the slave, the slave goes free. “By these” implies, as we learned above, that a slave sold to a Gentile does not go free after six years.
  According to Rabbi, the verse in Leviticus refers to a Gentile who lives under Israelite rule. He owns the Hebrew slave and must send him free at the Jubilee. It cannot refer to the Gentile not living under Israelite rule because such a Gentile would not listen to the Jew in the first place. 
  
  Daf 16a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins by discussing a source for the rule that a Jewish female slave is acquired by a document. 
  Ulla derives the law that a maidservant is acquired by a document from the fact that the two are mentioned in the same verse. Just as a wife is acquired in marriage by a document, so too is a female slave.
  When a woman is married, the husband, the one making the acquisition, writes the document. If the master writes the document to acquire the female slave, then the analogy makes sense. But according to R. Hisda, the father who is selling his daughter into slavery writes the document. This means that they are not analogous—in marriage the acquirer writes, and in slavery the seller writes.
  R. Aha b. Ya’akov derives this halakhah from a precise reading of the verse. A female slave goes free in a unique way, but she is acquired the same way all slaves are—by document.
  A non-Jewish slave can be acquired through hazakah. Hazakah, which means presumption of ownership, is achieved when a slave performs a labor for a master that would be typical only of a slave. So why not say that just as slaves are acquired by hazakah, so too are Jewish female slaves?The answer is that the rabbis read Leviticus 25:46 as limiting acquisition by hazakah to non-Jewish slaves. 
  The Talmud continues to push back—why not say that Leviticus 25 implies that only non-Jewish slaves are acquired by document, not Jewish female slaves?But then we’d still need to account for the verse that distinguishes how female Jewish slaves go free and how non-Jewish slaves go free. This verse implied that they can all be acquired in the same way. So we have one verse that draws a distinction between them and one that compares them (in terms of acquisition).So why say that the distinction is made in acquisition through hazakah and that they are both acquired by a document? Why not the opposite?The answer is that a document has greater power since it is used for divorce.But still, we could argue, that hazakah has greater power because it can be used to acquire the property of a convert who dies without heirs.Still, we do not find a case where hazakah (possession) acquires in a case of marriage. And since acquisition of a female slave is somewhat similar to marriage, we can conclude that it does not work in this case. We could also prove that the comparison is only made with regard to rules connected to marriage because the very next verse in Exodus to marriage.[I realize, this is complicated. Kol Hakavod if you made it through!]
  Since R. Huna holds that the master writes the document, he can derive that a female slave is acquired by a document without using verse “she shall not go out as male slaves do.” Therefore, he can use this verse to teach that she does not go free if her master causes her to lose a limb. Only non-Jewish slaves go free under these circumstances.
  R. Hisda can learn both rules—that she is acquired as are non-Jewish slaves and that she does not go free at loss of limb as do male slaves—from this one verse since the verse has an extra word--“go out.”
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses how a Hebrew slave goes free. 
  The Mishnah teaches that which is stated explicitly in the Torah.
  A slave may also go free by essentially buying himself back. This is done by dividing the purchase money into the number of years of acquisition. Then the amount the person has worked is reduced, the slave pays back the rest and goes free.
  A baraita teaches that a slave goes free either by money, money’s equivalent or a document. The first two are easy to understand and are anchored in the verse. But what about the document? What kind of a document is this? If it is just an IOU, then it is equivalent to money. And seemingly it should not be a document of manumission, because we would think that a slave does not really need a document of manumission. It should be enough that the master simply tells him to go free.This leads Rava to say that the slave actually belongs bodily to his master and cannot go free without a document of manumission. An oral declaration is not enough.
  IntroductionToday’s daf begins to discuss the female Jewish slave. The laws for this type of slave are found in Exodus 21:7-11.
  A female Jewish slave goes free when she hits puberty. But a girl does not automatically leave her father’s authority at puberty—she must also be at least 12 years old. So Resh Lakish argues that it is easier to leave the master’s authority than to leave her father’s authority. And if she leaves her father’s authority upon her father’s death (meaning she can now keep her own handiwork), so too she must leave her master’s authority upon her father’s death, even though she is no longer living with her father.
  If the female slave goes out at her father’s death, then the mishnah should have listed it.
  The Talmud resolves R. Hoshaya’s difficulty by saying that the mishnah simply omitted one way a female slave goes free. The problem is that according to talmudic thinking, the mishnah would not just omit one detail—it must omit at least two.The first suggestion as to the other detail it omits is the death of the master. But the problem with this suggestion is that a male slave also goes out at the death of his master. So this is not a way in which a female slave goes out that a male slave does not.
  So now we are back to the difficulty—why doesn’t the mishnah teach that a female slave goes free at her father’s death.The answer is that her father’s death can happen at any time, and the mishnah only teaches things that have a fixed time, such as the end of the six years or the Jubilee, or a fixed amount, her purchase price.
  “Signs” of puberty are also not fixed and yet the mishnah taught that the female slave does go free at that point.The answer is that while there is no latest date at which a sign can appear, there is an earliest date. If signs of puberty appear too early, they are not considered halakhically speaking to be signs of puberty.There is a dispute about when a sign of puberty is considered to be a “sign” or just a “mole.” But all agree that after thirteen, any sign that appears on a boy is a sign of puberty.   
  
  Daf 16b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Resh Lakish ruled that a Hebrew maidservant goes free at the death of her father. Today R. Sheshet raises more difficulties on this halakhah that is not found in tannaitic literature. 
  Upon going free a slave receives a gift from his master. There are a total of four different ways of going free (to be listed below), three for a man and three for a woman. “Signs” of puberty free a woman but not a man and the death of the master of a slave who had his ear bored frees a man but not a woman (she cannot have her ear bored). But according to Resh Lakish there would be another way for a woman to go free—the death of her father.  
  The fact that R. Shimon specifies four means that there are no other ways for her to go free. He did not leave anything out.
  We can’t say that he only teaches things that are fixed in time or amount because “signs” of puberty are not fixed.
  We might have thought to say that R. Shimon taught “signs” because they have a lower amount, as we learned yesterday from R. Safra. But the problem is that the death of the master is assumed to be one of these “four ways” and yet it too does not have a fixed time.The Talmud responds by saying the death of the master is also not taught.
  The four does not include the death of the master. This can be shown by the end of the mishnah—for if the mishnah had meant to include this, there would be four ways for a female slave to go free.Thus the mishnah omitted two ways of going free—death of the father and death of the master, and we have, for the time being, resolved the difficulty raised by R. Sheshet on Resh Lakish.  
  Resh Lakish, who said that a female slave goes out with the death of her father, is finally defeated. The fact that the baraita specifically taught the death of the master, means that this baraita did not leave anything out of the list.
  Resh Lakish’s argument is based on a kal vehomer argument and thus if Resh Laskish is defeated, then what about his kal vehomer argument. The Talmud refutes it by pointing out a difference between “signs” of puberty and her father’s death. The former entails a physical change, and therefore she goes free. The latter does not, and therefore she remains a slave.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the gift granted a slave upon freedom. Who receives this gift? The slave or the father (in the case of a female slave)?
  Who gets the gift granted a female slave when she goes free? According to the first baraita, she receives it herself. Whereas according to the second baraita, her father receives it. Indeed, the second baraita teaches that her father also has claim to anything she finds during her term of servitude, including things she finds. All the master would get is the loss of the amount of time it takes her to carry these findings to her father’s house. Note, that we are referring to a minor girl, and objects found by minors always belong to their parents.
  The Talmud tries to resolve the two baraitot and at the same time revive Resh Lakish’s rule that she goes free at her father’s death. The first baraita, according to which she receives the gift, refers to a case where she went free by her father’s death. Her father cannot receive it because he is no longer alive. The second baraita, where her father receives the gift, refers to a case where she went free by “signs.” This explanation would accord with Resh Lakish.
  There is another way to harmonize the baraitot—if she has a father, he receives the gift. If her father has died, and then she goes free by “signs,” then she receives the gift. But her father’s death does not cause her to go free.
  The baraita teaches that the father’s rights in his daughter are not bequeathed to his sons. Thus a father’s right claim on his daughter’s gift on going free go to her if the father dies. They do not go to his sons.
  The problem with the baraita is that it is obvious that the gift goes to the male slave. This slave is an adult (there is no way according to halakhah for a male child to become a slave). So who else would get it?R. Joseph admits, this is a difficulty. It is like the letter yod, which is really small, that is made into a town. In other words, the tanna could have abbreviated his teaching. He made it longer for no reason.Abaye says that R. Sheshet explained that the baraita follow a tanna named Totai. Totai ruled that the gift cannot be given to one of the slave’s creditors. This is why the tanna had to teach that the gift goes to the slave himself. It is not so obvious.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya clarifies more which type of slave receives a gift upon going free. 
  Some of this material we saw above. The new material is basically the issue of the runaway and the one who buys back his own freedom. All tannaim agree that the runaway does not receive the gift. But they disagree about the one who buys back his freedom.
  The Torah directly states that one who goes free at the end of six years receives the gift. Through the repetition of the verse, the baraita adds the three other circumstances that according to the first opinion entail a gift from the master—Jubilee, master’s death and “signs” for a female slave.This baraita excludes the runaway and one who buys his freedom. They are not “sent away”—they leave on their own.
  To R. Meir, a runaway is not sent away and therefore does not receive a gift. But one who buys his own freedom is sent away, even though he can force this to occur. Therefore, he too receives a gift.
  Why would we even think that a runaway receives a gift? On the contrary, he needs to complete his term of servitude. A slave must be present to work for six years. If he is sick, he still goes out in the seventh year. But not if he runs away.  
  
  Daf 17a
  
  We might have thought that in the case where a slave runs away and then the Jubilee arrives he does get a gift, since the Jubilee would have set him free under all circumstances, and indeed, means that he does not need to complete his term of servitude. Therefore, the baraita comes to teach us that he does not receive a gift since he ran away and was not sent away by the Jubilee. 
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the Hebrew slave who cannot serve his whole six year term of servitude due to illness. Does he have to complete it when he becomes healthy?
  According to the baraita we learned yesterday, it would seem that if the slave is sick and misses time during which he could work, he still goes out free at the seventh year. But according to the second baraita, this is true only if he works part of the time. If he is sick all six years, he does not go free.
  If he is able to do some minimal work while he is ill then he need not make up missed time. But if he cannot do anything, then he must make up the missed time.
  The baraita is somewhat unclear—does he have to serve at least three years (first clause) or not (second clause)? The Talmud resolves by saying essentially that he must serve three years. If he is sick for four years, it is as if he was sick for all six and he must make up the missed years.
  IntroductionAccording to Deuteronomy 15, when a slave goes free his master must provide him with a gift. In our sugya tannaim debate how much that gift must be. 
  Deuteronomy 15:14 states that the slave must be granted from your flock, your threshing floor and your winepress. R. Meir says he must get five selas worth of each, for a total of fifteen selas worth of a gift.R. Yehudah derives his number from the law concerning an ox that kills a slave—the owner pays 30 shekels (selas).R. Shimon derives his law from the laws concerning a person who dedicates his own value to the Temple. An adult male is worth fifty shekels. 
  R. Meir did not need to say “which is fifteen sela’s in all.” We could have done that math ourselves! He added that number in order to teach that the total must be fifteen selas. But if the master gives 8 of one, 4 of the other and 3 of the other (for instance), he has fulfilled his duty.
  The five selas is derived from the redemption of the first born in Exodus 34:20. Since the word “empty” is used in both this context and in the context of freeing the slave, Rabbi Meir applies the laws of one to the other.
  But why five sela’s from each? Why not five sela’s in all? After all, this is the total for redemption of the first born.The answer is that “empty” is written before the three categories. Therefore it applies individually to each of them.
  The answer is that the Torah hints that this must be a substantial gift when it says that the gift must come from all that God has blessed you with.
  IntroductionAccording to R. Judah, the master must grant the slave thirty shekels 
  R. Judah derives the amount of thirty shekels from the fact that both this law in Deuteronomy 15 and the law of the ox that kills a slave in Exodus 21:32 use the word “give.”
  The word “giving” is also used in the context of evaluations of a person’s worth (Leviticus 27). But there are two reasons R. Judah prefers to learn from the context of killing a slave. First of all, there is a general principle according to which when there are two options, go with the smaller one. Essentially what this means in this context is that we know the master is liable for at least thirty, but we cannot be sure that he is liable for fifty. Thirty is a safe bet, fifty is not.The second reason is obvious—better to learn from a similar context. 
  As stated above, Rabbi Shimon derives the amount the master must give the slave from the use of the word “giving” in both this context and in the context of dedicating the value of something to the Temple. The highest value is 50 shekels.But why not learn from the lowest value—which is 5 shekels?Again, the Talmud answers with the verse “as the Lord God blesses you.” This is read as mandating a higher amount.    
  The two claims that helped explain why R. Judah learned thirty from the context of the slave are both difficulties on R. Shimon.
  R. Shimon does not learn from the repetition of the word “giving.” Rather he learns from the repetition of the word “poverty,” which appears in Leviticus 27:8 (evaluations) and Leviticus 25:3 (slavery). Note that the problem with this is that the law that the master must grant the slave a gift does not appear in Leviticus, so to accomplish this we have to do a double jump, from Leviticus 27 to Leviticus 25 to Deuteronomy 15.
  R. Meir derives from these three words that fifteen shekels, three times five, must be given. But what do R. Judah and R. Shimon do with them?
  The Talmud now weaves in a baraita in which tannaim debate what types of things a master may not grant the slave. The grant must come from things that are considered a blessing. R. Shimon excludes from here money. Money is easily lost, devaluated etc. And therefore, it is problematic. [One might thing that today we value money over many things, but we really do not. That’s why we put most of our money in a bank where it is transformed into an investment. Furthermore, our money is totally symbolic. In fact, most of the money in the world, probably well over 99 per cent is just a number in a computer. In the ancient world money was actual silver. But this is a larger topic]. R. Eliezer ben Jacob excludes mules. The rabbis had two problems with mules. 1) They were considered violent. 2) They do not reproduce. [I discuss this in volume 1 of Reconstructing the Talmud.]
  R. Shimon says that despite the fact that mules cannot procreate, their own bodies grow and can be used to perform other tasks.And R. Eliezer b. Jacob points out that there is some usefulness to cash—it is the easiest way to engage in business.    
  The Talmud explains why all three examples were necessary. Flocks and threshing floor teach that animals and produce are acceptable. Wine-press excludes either money or mules.  
  
  Daf 17b
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to explicate the verses about setting a slave free. To facilitate understanding, I am copying the verses here (Deuteronomy 15:12-14):If a fellow Hebrew, man or woman, is sold to you, he shall serve you six years, and in the seventh year you shall set him free.When you set him free, do not let him go empty-handed:Furnish him out of the flock, threshing floor, and vat, with which the LORD your God has blessed you.
  According to the first opinion, even if the master’s house has not prospered while the slave was serving, the master must still grant him a gift. If the house was blessed, the master should (but not must) give him more. If the house was not blessed, there is still a minimal amount.R. Elazar b. Azariah says the master must give him only if the house was blessed. R. Elazar ben Azariah does not read anything into the word “you shall grant him.” This is simply the only way the Torah could express the idea that if the house was blessed on his behalf, the master should grant him a gift.   
  This baraita discusses whether a Hebrew slave continue to serve after their master’s death. The source for these halakhot will be explained below.
  The baraita reads Deuteronomy 15:12 as teaching that the slave works for the one who bought him, but not his heir. In this context, the heir referred to must be someone besides the son, such as a brother or daughter. Exodus 21:2, where the word “you” is not found, is read as teaching that he does work for the son should the master die.
  Why should the slave be bequeathed to the son but not to the brother or any other heir? The first answer is that there is a tie between the father and so that does not exist for other heirs. A father can designate a female Hebrew slave to marry his son. And if a son redeems a consecrated ancestral field owned by his father, then the field returns to his possession at the Jubilee.
  The Talmud argues that the brother also has a special relationship with the father—should a  man die without children, his brother performs yibum with his wife.This argument is refuted—yibum happens only if there is no son (or offspring). But if there is a son, then there is no yibum. Thus we see that son’s relationship is primary.  
  We don’t even need to point out that if there is a son, there is no yibum. Even without this counterargument, the son is preferable because he has two points in his favor while the brother has only one.
  The author of the baraita also learns the halakhah that the son takes his father’s place in redeeming the ancestral field from the argument against yibum—is there yibum when there is a son? Thus we can see that we need that argument to refute the counterargument that a brother, or another heir, can inherit the slave. Only a son inherits the slave....
  IntroductionThis section continues to explicate the baraita about inheriting a slave.
  Deuteronomy 15:17 compares a slave who had his ear bored (meaning he wanted to continue to serve his master) with a female slave. Just as the former does not work for the son or daughter (we will learn this below) so too a female slave does not. 
  The verse in Deuteronomy teaches that a male and female slave are treated the same, whereas the verse in Exodus is read as distinguishing between the two. So in what way are they the same and how are they different?Both types of slaves are granted a gift when going free. But only a male slave can extend his servitude by having his ear bored. A female slave has no such option.The problem the Talmud has is that this verse, “Do the same with your female slave” is used twice, once to teach that she receives a gift and once to teach that she does not serve the master’s son. 
  The word “do” is extra, thus allowing us to read both halakhot into the verse.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the baraita that listed which types of slaves are bequeathed as an inheritance and which are not. 
  The Torah says that the slave who has his ear bored shall serve the master forever—he serves the master but if the master dies he goes free. He does not serve the master’s children.
  Leviticus 25:50 refers to a Jew sold to a non-Jew. When being redeemed the Torah refers to a negotiation with the Jew’s purchaser. From here we can conclude that only the purchaser can own the slave, and not one of his children. The slave goes free if his/her master dies.
  The above baraita implies that a non-Jew inherits from his father. That is why the baraita had to say that the son/daughter does not inherit the slave. They do inherit, just not this slave. [We should note that we do at times find rabbis legislating laws for non-Jews even though it is quite clear that non-Jews do not obey rabbinic law].  
  When a non-Jew converts to Judaism, he no longer inherits from his parents from biblical law. But he does inherit from them from rabbinic law. Below is proof.
  A Jew cannot derive benefit from idols or non-Jewish wine. Therefore, once the convert actually takes possession of his father’s inheritance, it would be prohibited to exchange them for other parts of the inheritance. This would be considered deriving benefit. But he can exchange them before he takes possession because he does not yet own them. This proves that the convert does not inherit from his non-Jewish father from biblical law, because if he did, then as soon as his father died the son would be considered as if he owned the idols or wine and he would not be able to exchange them. 
  The rabbis decreed that the convert should inherit from his non-Jewish father. They feared that if he did not do so, he might return to being a non-Jew just so he could claim his inheritance.
  By contrasting inheritance with partnership the baraita implies that inheritance is not considered possession, and therefore the convert can exchange the idols or wine for permitted property.
  A non-Jew does not inherit from his father, should his father have converted. Similarly, a convert does not inherit from his father if both of them have converted. The issue here is that the rabbis think of conversion as a rebirth of sorts—one loses all ties with one’s previous family. Therefore, if the laws of inheritance applied, it would be as if conversion is not actually a rebirth.This is illustrated by a mishnah in Sheviit. Normally, if one’s creditor dies, one must repay his inheritors. But not if they are all converts. Indeed, the rabbis were not happy with one who did so. 
  A different baraita states that the sages were pleased with one who repays the converts converted children. [Note that the simple reading of these two sources is that there was some dispute over the matter. Some rabbis thought that it is always good to pay one’s debts. Other rabbis feared that by repaying the converted children, there would not be recognition that conversion is like rebirth. In other words, which is more important, money or ideology?]The Talmud, as it usually does, harmonizes the two sources. If the child was conceived and born before the father and the children converted, then the sages did not want the borrower to repay the debt. But if the child was conceived, and then the parents converted, while the child still does not inherit from his parents, the rabbis were pleased with one who repaid the debt. 
  
  
  Daf 18a
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss inheritance laws among non-Jews. 
  The fact that God uses the word inheritance in the context of Esau’s descendants implies to R. Hiyya b. Abin, that non-Jews inherit from their father’s from biblical law.
  The problem with Esau is that it is unclear whether he is considered a Gentile or an apostate Israelite. After all, his father was Jacob. Lot, on the other hand, is clearly not from Abraham’s line and therefore the fact that his descendants receive an inheritance proves that Gentiles inherit from their fathers.
  Rava proved that a Gentile inherits from his father from the verse in Leviticus—and he shall reckon with his purchasers, and not his inheritors, proving that a Gentile has inheritors. R. Hiyya b. Abin did not use this verse because the words “and not with his inheritors” are not in the Torah.
  IntroductionToday’s section compares the laws for a male and female Hebrew slave. 
  These are the basic differences between the laws governing a female and male slave. The Talmud will now deal with them below.
  The baraita above implies that a male slave goes out upon his master’s death but a female slave does not. But this clearly contradicts the mishnah which teaches that any way that he goes out, she does too. The only difference is that she also goes out with “signs” meaning she has hit puberty.Rav Sheshet solves the contradiction by positing that the baraita refers to a case where the master designated, i.e. married off, the slave girl to his son. This seems to have been the point of the sale in the first place. However, as we shall see, this is not an easy solution. 
  Obviously, if the son married her she does not go out as a slave—she is a married woman who would require divorce!The Talmud responds that this is not so obvious. We might have thought that the same laws remain—therefore the baraita teaches us that they do not. 
  The problem is that if the baraita refers to a case where she was designated, then how can she go out by signs? The Torah explicitly states that if she is designated she does not go out by signs!The Talmud now has to emend the baraita to make it make sense. She only goes out by signs if he did not designate her. Clearly, this is not the original meaning of the baraita. Indeed, it does seem that the baraita and the mishnah do indeed disagree.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses whether a slave can be sold, freed and resold. A female slave cannot. Once she goes free, there is essentially no longer anyone with the power to sell her, and women are not sold due to thievery or for debt recollection.
  A Jew may be sold to recover the value of an item he stole. But if he cannot afford to pay the double payment owed by a thief, he is not sold for the double payment. If a Jew falsely testifies that another person stole, then the false witness must pay back the amount he accused the other of stealing. But if he cannot afford this payment, he is not sold to recover it. And if he was sold once, and then went free, he cannot be sold again.
  Rava resolved the difficulty by claiming that although he may not be sold twice for two different thefts, he may be sold twice to recover one debt. Let’s say he stole a large amount of money. By selling him once, the theft might not be recovered. In such a case, he may be sold twice.
  Abaye offers another resolution. If a person stole from one man, he may only be sold once. If this is not enough to recover the debt, then so be it. This is true even if he stole multiple times from the same man. But if he stole from two men, he may be sold twice.
  This baraita has variant opinions about whether a thief can be sold at all, and whether he can be sold twice. Amazingly, R. Eliezer almost legislates this entire law out of existence. If the slave is not worth exactly what he stole, then he is not sold at all.
  Rava points out that R. Eliezer is more consistent than the rabbis. According to the rabbis if his theft was worth five hundred and he is worth one thousand he is not sold because we cannot sell half of him. But so too we could read the other word in the the verse with precision—that he cannot be sold to recover half of his theft, not even once. Thus, according to R. Eliezer, unless the theft and purchase price are exactly the same, the slave cannot be sold.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to explain ways in which a female slave is different from a male slave. The female slave may be redeemed “against his will” while a male slave may not. The question is “whose will?” 
  Rava assumes that when the mishnah teaches that he may redeem her against “his will”—“his” means the master. Abbaye reads this to mean that if she does not have the money to redeem herself, we can write an IOU document for her value and give it to her owner and force her to be freed. But why should we have this right? The master  currently now owns a “pearl”—the slave. Why should we be able to force him to take a worthless shard (the document)?
  Abaye therefore says we can redeem her against her father’s will to protect the family from being disgraced by the fact that her father sold her off into slavery.
  The question is—why is this a difference between male and female slaves? Why not also force male slaves to be redeemed due to family disgrace? The answer is that the male slave can go sell himself again, whereas a female slave cannot be sold twice. So once we (the community) redeem her against her will, she can no longer be sold into slavery.We should note that this opinion of Abaye and indeed of the other sages shows just how deeply discomforted they were by the very notion of a father selling his daughter into slavery. 
  According to the first opinion, once a man marries off his daughter, if she is divorced or widowed while still young, he can marry her off again. If he sold her to be a slave and she was freed while still young, he can sell her off again. And if he sold her to be a slave, and she was freed while still young, he can still marry her off. But if he sold her to be a wife, he cannot sell her later to be a slave. R. Shimon is more restrictive and rules that once sold into servitude, she cannot be sold again.
  The Torah states that if he did not designate her to his son as a wife or marry her himself, he must set her free. He cannot sell her to non-Jews. The phrase used for “deal deceitfully” is “bevigdo bah.” Beged (bg”d) is the root for “dealing deceitfully” but it is also the root for the word “clothing.” R. Akiva reads the word as if it means “clothing”—once the master has “spread his clothing over her,” i.e. he has married her, can no longer sell her. Once she was married, the father can no longer sell her. R. Eliezer reads the word differently—since the father dealt deceitfully with her by selling her the first time, he can no longer sell her.
  
  Daf 18b
  
  R. Eliezer holds that the text as it is written is authoritative. Thus we can read it without the vocalization, as if it says “bevagdo.” This refers to his betrayal of her. R. Eliezer would hold that once the father has sold her, he can never sell her again. R. Akiva says that the way that the text is read is authoritative. It is read as “bevigdo”—which he reads as “his clothing was upon her.” Once she has been married, she cannot be resold.R. Shimon says both ways of reading the text are authoritative. Thus she cannot be sold neither after she was married once, nor after she was sold once.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses an institution referred to in Exodus 21:8-9, “If she proves to be displeasing to her master, who designated her for himself, he must let her be redeemed; he shall not have the right to sell her to outsiders, since he broke faith with her.And if he designated her for his son, he shall deal with her as is the practice with free maidens.” The rabbis read “designate” as a formal arrangement and in this sugya ask whether designation creates marriage or betrothal? 
  The sugya lists three different ramifications between being betrothed and being married: A husband inherits his married wife, not his betrothed one. If he is a priest, he must defile himself to bury his married wife, but not his betrothed wife. And he alone may annul the vows of his married wife, but not his betrothed one.
  The rabbis read the words “bevigdo bah” as referring to the master designating her for himself. Once the master has married her, her father may not sell her to anyone else. But he may, by inference, designate her for another man if the master dies or divorces her. In other words, he can marry her off again. However, in general a father cannot give her daughter away in marriage once she has already been married. Therefore, this must mean that when the master designated her to become a wife for himself, he caused her to be betrothed, not married.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak interprets the verse such that it does not refer to the father selling her daughter, but rather regular betrothal. Once a father betroths his daughter, he may no longer sell her. This leaves us without any answer as to whether designation effects betrothal or marriage.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss whether designation creates betrothal or marriage.
  The baraita discusses whether a father can sell his daughter to someone she may not marry. According to the first opinion, if the marriage would be a high level prohibition, punishable by karet or death, then he may not sell her to this man. But if it is a lower level prohibition, such as a divorcee to a Kohen, then he may. R. Eliezer says he always may sell her to a man whom she may not marry.
  The Talmud now tries to figure out what this case of the widow is. She could not have betrothed herself because she is a minor (otherwise the father could not be selling her).
  It also cannot be a case where the father betrothed her, because once he betroths her, he cannot sell her.
  R. Amram explains that this girl became a widow through designation. I.e. she was sold and then designated to be the wife, and then the master or his son died. The Talmud adds that the original money, the sale, was not given as kiddushin, and therefore, new kiddushin money would have to be given when he designates her. Thus the sale was not “kiddushin” and therefore the father can betroth her again should she be widowed.[The Talmud will return to discussing the issue of whether the original money counts as kiddushin later on daf 19]    
  It cannot be that the designation effects marriage, because once a girl is married her father can no longer sell her off.
  The problem is that if designation counts as kiddushin, then we still need to ask how could her father again sell her. Once a girl has been betrothed, she may no longer be sold.
  We could try to get out of the problem by saying that while her father cannot sell her after he accepts her betrothal, he can sell her after she accepts her own betrothal from her master (designation). But then we could say the same thing if designation effected marriage—he can’t resell her after he marries her off, but he can after she marries herself off. So this again leaves us with no answer to our question.
  The different forms of betrothal can be different from one another—in one case the father betroths her to someone else, and in another the master betroths her without the father’s participation. But why should there be different forms of marriage? Marriage is simply the coming together of the couple (intercourse).
  
  Daf 19a
  
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that R. Yose b. R. Yehudah holds that the original sale money counts as kiddushin money. Should the master designate her, he need not give more kiddushin money. But then we have a problem—the father essentially betrothed her when he sold her? How can he sell her again?The answer is that this baraita agrees with R. Eliezer who had said that a father may sell his daughter for servitude after marriage. 
  IntroductionCan a master designate a female slave for his minor son, one too young to marry her himself? 
  The Talmud states the parameters of the question. Lurking behind this question is a bigger question—can a minor son ever be married?
  The baraita seems to teach that a minor boy can never be married. But if a master can designate the slave woman to his son, then a minor could be married. Should a man commit adultery with this woman, why does it not count as adultery?
  But we could actually read the baraita in an opposite way. If a minor can never marry, why exclude the minor’s wife from the punishment of adultery—there would be no such thing as a minor’s wife? Thus there must be a case where a minor can marry, and we can assume it is designation.
  Rav Ashi provides an entirely different context to the baraita. The minor here is a minor yavam (brother-in-law) who is nine years old. This is the age from which the rabbis believe that a minor could have intercourse (younger than that is considered just “playing doctor”). In normal cases a minor cannot marry a woman because he cannot betroth her—betrothal requires “awareness” which he is considered to lack. But this yavam need not “acquire” his wife—she is connected to him by Torah law because the Torah mandates she be married to the brother-in-law. When he has intercourse with her, he now becomes a “minor” husband. We might have thought that his wife is subject to the laws of adultery, therefore the baraita needs to teach us that she is not. But we now do not need to posit that a master can designate a slave woman to his minor son.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss whether a master can designate a slave girl to his minor son
  R. Yannai rules quite clearly that the son must be of age in order for his father to designate the slave girl to him for marriage. The son must consent to the marriage.
  Abaye son of R. Abbahu teaches that she too must consent to the designation.
  Abaye also explains this baraita. If the original sale money was not given as kiddushin, then there still needs to be an act of kiddushin. This kiddushin happens when the master designates her to himself or her son. Like all regular acts of betrothal, this needs to be done with her consent. 
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that even if the original sales money counts as kiddushin, we can still say that designation requires her consent. The Torah uses the word “ye’adah” in order to let us know that her consent is required. [Below we will see that R. Nahman b. Yitzchak himself holds that the original sales money does not count as kiddushin].
  The Talmud has mentioned R. Yose son of R. Yehudah’s opinion several times. It now explains what that opinion is. The Torah says that if the master does not designate her, then she can be redeemed. Redeeming means paying back the value of the time she has not yet served. By implication, he cannot designate her unless there is time left in her service for her to work the value of a perutah. R. Yose son of R. Yehudah reads the Torah as if it says that the master betroths (designates) her with the value of the work she has left to perform. Forgiving her from having to do the work is the kiddushin money. Hence, he must in general posit that when the master buys the slave, this does not count as kiddushin money.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that R. Yose son of R. Yehudah could even hold that the original sales money counts as kiddushin money, but still in order for her to be designated there must be time in the day for her to work. This is simply what the verse teaches.Just to go over the structure here. R. Yose son of R. Yehudah did not saying anything about whether the original sales money counts as kiddushin money. He only ruled that there must be time left in the last day of her service for her to work in order for the master to designate her. The “stam,” the anonymous voice in the Talmud and R. Nahman b. Yitzchak argued over whether this implies that he holds that the sale money counts as kiddushin money. The “stam” holds that it does not, and R. Nahman b. Yitzchak holds that it does. This is why earlier we saw two opinions attributed to R. Yose son of R. Yehudah. 
  IntroductionIn today’s sugya Rava uses the laws of female slave designation to derive two halakhot concerning regular kiddushin. We can see here an excellent example of Rava’s halakhic creativity—he boils down the essence of one halakhah, and then draws an analogy to another halakhah, one that in this case, has far greater practical importance.   
  A father has the legal right to betroth his minor daughter, but a minor does not have the legal ability to act as an agent for an adult. So how can a father send off his own minor daughter to accept her own kiddushin? To accomplish this Rava draws an analogy to the girl sold as a slave who then becomes designated as a wife to either the master or his son. R. Yose bar R. Yehudah said that the original sale was not the money for kiddushin. When the master designates her, he must give her kiddushin money or forgive her a perutah’s worth of work. Thus the father has essentially appointed the daughter to be the agent to accept her own kiddushin. So too this can happen in a non-slave case.
  Rava derives another halakhah from the ruling of R. Yose son of R. Yehudah. When the father sells her to the master, it is like a loan. The master gives money and the daughter owes the master a certain amount of work. She herself is the collateral, held by the master until she completes the work. And then when he betroths her, he forgives her at least a perutah’s worth of work. So he is essentially forgiving a loan and returning the collateral. So too a man can betroth a woman through a loan she owes him and by returning to her the collateral that he holds.   
  
  Daf 19b
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya brings a foundational dispute as to how slave designation is performed. 
  According to the first opinion in this baraita, the master can designate her right up until sunset during the last day of her servitude. The idea seems to be that when the master bought her, he already paid the kiddushin money. Thus he need not forgive her any work or give her any money.R. Yose son of R. Yehudah says that there must be time for her to work for him the value of a perutah. This is the kiddushin money, because as we have seen R. Yose son of R. Yehudah does not hold that the sale counts as kiddushin.    
  The baraita continues with a parable. The parable talks about a person who uses an unclear betrothal formula (we will talk about this a lot later in the tractate). He says that she will be betrothed now and also after thirty days. Then, before the thirty days elapse, someone else comes and betroths her. She is betrothed to the first, for the baraita considers his betrothal as having begun “now.” The question is—what does this have to do with the slave designation? And with whose opinion does this accord?
  The parable does not seem to work with R. Yose son of R. Yehudah. He holds that the sale is not a form of betrothal. She must have enough time left to work the value of a perutah. This is not like the case of betrothal that begins at two different times.Rather, the parable is similar to the ruling of the rabbis. The betrothal begins with the sale but is only completed when he designates her. So too this man’s betrothal begins when he gives her the kiddushin and is only completed at the end of thirty days. If another man tries to betroth her in-between, she is not betrothed. 
  We might have thought that since the master, when buying the slave, did not say that his betrothal was beginning at this point, this is not analogous to the case of “from now and after thirty days,” therefore the baraita needed to teach us that it is.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains another baraita with a dispute between R. Yose son of R. Yehudah and the other sages over marriage by designation. This baraita is very similar to the one we learned yesterday. 
  According to R. Yose son of R. Yehudah, the initial sale is not an act of betrothal, even if the master believes that it will lead to it eventually. Therefore, if the father betroths her to someone else, she is betrothed. While this is a betrayal of the master, it is effective. The sages say that the master can designate her, even if the father tried to betroth her to someone else. They hold that the sale essentially was an act of betrothal.The baraita draws a parable to a man who betroths a woman after thirty days. If she accepts kiddushin from someone else within those thirty days, she is betrothed to this second person.   
  In the parable, the master is analogous to the first man and the man to whom the father betrothed her is analogous to the second one. The parable does not work for the opinion of the sages, for they say that the master can designate her even though the father betrothed her to someone else. Thus the betrothal of the second person does not work.Thus the parable accords with the opinion of R. Yose son of R. Yehudah. He holds that the sale is not akin to betrothal and therefore the father can betroth her to someone else. So too, a man who says “behold you are betrothed  to me after thirty days” has not betrothed her until the thirty days are over.The parable teaches us that even though when buying the girl the master did not state that his kiddushin would not begin until he designates her, this is still like a case of a man who states “behold you are betrothed  to me after thirty days.” She is not betrothed until the master actually designates her and if someone else betroths her in the meanwhile, she is betrothed.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with a father who wants to sell his daughter but not allow her to be designated. Can he make such a deal? And what about a case where he sells her to a master to whom she is prohibited in marriage? 
  The Torah gives the master the right to designate the slave either to him or to his son. According to R. Meir, the father can prevent this from happening by making a stipulation at the time of the sale. According to the other sages, one cannot make a stipulation to avoid the Torah’s laws.
  The Talmud raises what seems to be a contradiction in the opinions of R. Meir. Above he implies that one can make a stipulation against that which is written in the Torah. But in the case of a husband who tries to stipulate with a woman that he will betroth her but not take on the responsibilities mandated by the Torah he rules that the stipulation is invalid. This seems clearly to be a contradiction.
  Hizkiyah explains that the case of the slave is different because the Torah explicitly says that the father can sell her just to be a slave. In general, though, R. Meir would agree that one cannot make a stipulation that contradicts the Torah.
  The rabbis do not need a special midrash on the word “to be a slave” because they already hold that one cannot make a stipulation to contravene Torah law. So what do they do with this word? They use it to teach that he can sell her to those unfit to marry her, but with whom betrothal is valid. This category would primarily include a mamzer.The baraita argues that we should not need this word, that it is logical that he should be able to sell her to those unfit to her. After all, a father can betroth his daughter to those unfit to her (he should not do so, but he has the legal ability). And if something is logical, then we do not need a verse to teach it.To counter this, the baraita argues that a father has rights with regards to betrothing his daughter that he does not have with regard to selling her. He can betroth her when she is a na’arah, a young girl, but he can only sell her when she is a minor. Thus we might have thought that he can betroth her to a mamzer, but not sell her to one. Hence we need the verse to teach that he can.    
  R. Eliezer reads another verse as allowing her to be sold to those unfit for her. So then what does he do with the word “to be a slave”? He claims that it teaches that he can sell her to relatives, even though these relatives cannot marry her because that would be incest.Again, the baraita claims that this is obvious—if he can sell her to those unfit for her, clearly he can sell her to relatives. But this argument is easily debunked. He can sell her to those unfit for her, because even though designation would be prohibited, it would still be possible. But we might have thought that he cannot sell her to relatives because these relatives could not designate her. Therefore, the verse teaches us that he can even sell her to a relative, one who could not designate her because marriage with this relative is prohibited.
  
  Daf 20a
  
  Having used the word “for a slave” to teach that a father may not stipulate that his daughter not be designated, R. Meir needs a source for allowing the father to designate her to those unfit for her. This is a halakhah agreed to by all. To do this, R. Meir can use the verse that R. Eliezer used, “if she is found not pleasing to her master [so that he has not designated her].” And when it comes to relatives, he can agree with the sages that the father may not sell her to relatives.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss whether a father can sell his daughter to his relatives.
  The baraitot both agree that a father may not sell his daughter to his son (I can just imagine how this would play out in my family!). But one baraita says he may sell her to his father.
  At the end of last week’s daf we saw a dispute between the rabbis and R. Eliezer—the former hold that he may not sell her to his relative, while the latter holds that he may. So the second baraita agrees with the rabbis, but with whom does the first baraita, the one that distinguishes between the father and the son, agree?
  The baraita that allows a man to sell her to his father can even agree with the rabbis who do not allow her to be sold to relatives. If a man sells his daughter to his father, the father can designate her to his other son, who is her uncle. Uncle-niece marriage is allowed according to Jewish law. Thus he may sell her to his father because designation is possible. This would not be true when it comes to selling her to his son, because she is not allowed to marry her nephew.
  IntroductionThe Torah states, “If he came in ‘begapo”, he shall leave ‘begapo’; if he had a wife, his wife shall leave with him.”What does the word “begapo” mean? 
  There are two positions here as to the meaning of “be-gapo.” But even these interpretations are difficult to understand. The Talmud will explain them as we proceed.
  The first opinion in the baraita read “begapo” is if it said “begufo” (the Hebrew letters are the same. But what does this mean?Rava interprets it to mean that if his master strikes him and he loses a limb, he does not go free as does a non-Jewish slave. 
  Abaye finds another place to derive the law that a Jewish slave does not go out with loss of major limb. The Torah explicitly states that a female Jewish slave does not go out “as slaves do” and this can be interpreted to refer to the law that a non-Jewish slaves go out at loss of major limb.
  If the Torah had only stated that he does not go out as do Canaanite slaves, I might have thought that when it comes to Jewish slaves, if the master causes a loss of limb the master must pay for the loss and then he goes free. This would be different from a Canaanite slave who simply goes free without compensation.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak interprets R. Eliezer’s opinion to mean as follows: If he came in without a wife, the master cannot force him to take a wife (“if he came in single, he goes out single”). But if he came in with a wife, the master can force him to take another wife.I should note that the “pshat” of the verse is almost certainly that if the slave came in unmarried, he goes out unmarried, and if he came in married, his wife and children go out with him. But this is a hard verse for the rabbis to countenance for it is too obvious. If he came in single, why would he go out anything but single? He has no wife! And if he came in married with his kids, of course his kids and wife go out with him! They were not bought as slaves. Therefore, the rabbis have to find alternative meanings for this verse.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the slave buying his own freedom (or someone else redeeming him). The idea is simple—if he is sold for 240 dollars, that’s 40 dollars a year. So if he is redeemed after two, he needs to pay back 160 dollars. But what if his value changes? If it goes up, does he pay more? If it goes down, does he pay less? 
  If his value goes up, when he redeems himself he need only take into account his purchase price.
  If his value goes down, he can redeem himself at the lower value. Note that the rabbis are clearly rigging the game in favor of the slaves. 
  Leviticus 25:51-52 refers to a Jew sold to a non-Jew. Such a Jew may be redeemed by his relatives. But how do we know that the same is true of a Jew being sold to another Jew who comes to redeem himself? The answer is our old favorite word comparison (I’m hoping you still remember this one). The Torah uses the word “sakhir” in this context, and in Leviticus 25:40, in the context of a Jew being sold to another Jew. This allows for the transference of halakhot from one context to the other.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s sugya we saw that a midrash was lenient with regard to redeeming a Jewish slave—if his value goes up, he is redeemed at the original lower value. If his value goes down, he is redeemed at the new, lower value. But we could have read the verses in the exact opposite way, to the master’s advantage. So why read them so tendentiously? 
  Abaye is walking down the streets feeling like a great scholar, in the grand old city of Tiberias, when some rabbis come up to him with the question I presented above.Abaye responds that the Torah is lenient with the Hebrew slave. And if the Torah is lenient when it comes to the slave’s comforts, it clearly wishes us to be lenient when it comes to his redemption. Therefore he is always redeemed for the lower amount.  
  The other rabbis push back, and note that we could use another baraita to prove that we should rule stringently against one who sells himself into slavery. This baraita describes a long chain of events set into motion by a person who “sells sabbatical produce.” This is relatively small transgression, but nevertheless, it can lead to financial ruin. The baraita is based on the juxtaposition of verses. First the laws of the sabbatical year, and then laws describing a person selling his property. Later we will get to the context of selling oneself into slavery.    
  This is a small digression in the baraita. The Talmud picks up on the different language in describing his repeated sin. They explain it as referring to a concept that once a person becomes accustomed to sin, he will continue to do so as if the act was permitted. Now that he has begun down the path of selling sabbatical year produce, he will continue to do so.
  This next stage, having to sell one’s daughter, is from elsewhere in the Torah. So what is it doing here? The Talmud says that it is here to teach that it is better to sell one’s daughter than borrow with interest. In our minds, this probably sounds quite exaggerated, but borrowing money at very high interest rates, which was certainly the case in the pre-modern world, could easily lead to financial ruin. Selling one’s daughter can always be fixed by buying her back. Once one is in debt to a loan shark, the interest compounds and there is nothing one will be able to do to get out of debt.
  The next thing he will have to do is borrow with interest, which is a dangerous endeavor.
  Ultimately, he will come to sell himself off to idolatry itself. The midrash here expounds on some of the superfluity in Leviticus 25:47 reading into it three categories—a convert, a righteous non-Jew, a non-Jew, and then adding in even to be a slave for a Temple.This is the end of the midrash. The question therefore has been asked—why is the law lenient when it comes to the redemption price when we can see that someone who sells himself into slavery must have, at one point, committed the serious sin of violating the Sabbatical year. 
  
  Daf 20b
  
  Abaye responds that the verse itself says that after this person has reached the depths of depravation and sold himself to be a slave for idolatry, he still must be redeemed. Thus, even though he was a sinner, the law should still treat him leniently when it comes to redemption.
  Again, the other rabbi pushes back against Abaye. Yes, he must be redeemed, but this does not mean he should be redeemed at the lower value. 
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak finds another way of deriving the law that he is always redeemed for the lesser amount of money. Instead of the years being “increased” or “decreased” years? Rather, the increase or decrease refers to his value. 
  The final difficulty is why not read the verses according to their simple meaning—the amount he pays to redeem himself accords with how many years he works. This is clearly the original meaning of the verses.The rabbis tease out the extra midrashic reading from the prefix “ב.” The prefix seems to them to be extraneous and thus allows them to find extra meaning in the verse, one which accords with the midrash that we learned yesterday.   
  R. Joseph thinks R. Nahman’s interpretation is so great, it’s as if the verses were given at Sinai. High praise indeed!
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses whether a Jew sold to a non-Jew can be half-redeemed. 
  The question is can a Hebrew slave buy back part of his freedom, and thereby reduce the remaining time of servitude.
  When it comes to redeeming one’s ancestral field (Leviticus 25:26), the field must be redeemed in its entirety. So the question is whether the same laws apply to redeeming the slave sold to a non-Jew.R. Sheshet answers by using another comparison. A Jew can be sold only in his entirety. He cannot be half sold. So too, he cannot be half redeemed.  
  Abaye now explores the ramifications of holding that a slave may be half redeemed in a case where his value changes and shows how this creates both a stringency and a leniency. If he can be half redeemed, and his value goes up, the law will be relatively lenient.
  The problem with Abaye’s above scenario is that we said earlier that his redemption must be from the amount of money he was bought for. If he goes up in value, he is redeemed for what the original value was and not the higher amount at the end.The Talmud solves this by suggesting a case where he fluctuates in value. He is sold for 200, then his value decreases to 100. He now redeems half of the value. Then his value goes up again to 200, and he now redeems the other half for 100 and it turns out he pays only 150, less than his original and current value. 
  Abaye now explains how being able to be half redeemed could lead to a stringency. If he is worth 200 he will need to pay 100 to redeem half of his value. If his value then decreases to 100, he will pay another 50 and go free, for a grand total of 150.But if we said he cannot be half-redeemed, even if he paid 100 when his value stood at 200, this payment is considered only a deposit. In the end, when he is worth 100, he can go out free without paying any more.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya asks again about half redeeming, but this time in the case of house in a walled city. The Torah (Leviticus 25:29-30) states the following with regard to this issue:If a man sells a dwelling house in a walled city, it may be redeemed until a year has elapsed since its sale; the redemption period shall be a year.If it is not redeemed before a full year has elapsed, the house in the walled city shall pass to the purchaser beyond reclaim throughout the ages; it shall not be released in the jubilee.
  The word “his redemption” is used both in the case of the walled city and in the case of redeeming an ancestral field. When it came to the ancestral field, there was a midrash that taught that in order to be redeemed, the whole field must be redeemed. It cannot be half-redeemed. So do we apply this law to the walled city as well? Or do we say that the Torah specified in the case of the ancestral field that it cannot be half-redeemed, but it did not specify this in the case of the walled city, therefore it can be half-redeemed.
  The answer will come from a midrash stated by R. Shimon below. The verse quoted here refers to one who consecrates his ancestral field. Such a person can borrow money in order to redeem it, and he can redeem half of it. This differs from one who sells his ancestral field, who can neither borrow to redeem it, nor redeem half.
  R. Shimon explains why one who sells his field cannot borrow and redeem or redeem half. Since he will get the field back anyway at the Jubilee year, if he wants to redeem it, he must redeem it fully and without borrowing.
  One who dedicates a field to the Temple, loses the field permanently at the Jubilee if he does not redeem it before then. Therefore, since he has more to lose, he may borrow and redeem, or redeem just a half.
  One who sells his house in a walled city may also lose it permanently, even before the Jubilee. If he does not redeem it within a year, the house permanently goes to the purchaser. Therefore, like the one who dedicates a field to the Temple, he can redeem it in halves.
  This baraita is brought as an objection against R. Sheshet. The baraita learns from a midrash that one may redeem half of a field that he has dedicated to the Temple (this is the same as above). But then it argues that from a logical perspective, just as one who sells his field cannot redeem half of it, so too one who dedicates his field cannot redeem half of it. This is the opposite of R. Shimon’s midrash from above.
  The baraita now continues and argues that deriving the law about one who consecrates his field from one who sells his field is not possible, because the latter cannot redeem his field immediately, whereas the former can. To prove therefore that it would have been logical to claim that one who consecrates his field cannot redeem half, the baraita turns to the one who sells a house in a walled city. He too can redeem immediately, and yet he can still redeem half. This final line is where the difficulty on R. Sheshet lies—it proves that one who sells a house in a walled city cannot redeem half. 
  Indeed, the two baraitot do disagree, but that is because they represent two tannaitic opinions. The rabbis hold that he may not redeem half and R. Shimon holds that he may.
  
  Daf 21a
  
  These two baraitot express precisely the disagreement between the sages and R. Shimon over whether one may borrow and redeem or redeem half of a house in a walled city.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues with the same subject that we dealt with last week—borrowing and redeeming or redeeming half of a field consecrated to the Temple. 
  R. Aha son of Rava argues that one cannot derive the laws regarding redeeming a consecrated field from the laws governing redeeming half of a house in a walled city. The latter may not be redeemed in halves because he has less power in general—it must be redeemed within a year. But one who consecrates a field can redeem it until the Jubilee. So maybe he should be able to redeem it in halves. This is the opposite of what the baraita at the end of last week’s daf stated.
  Consecrating an ancestral field is both similar and different to the case of selling an ancestral field and selling a house in a walled city. Since there is something different from both, we cannot use either one to prove that one cannot borrow and redeem or redeem half of a consecrated ancestral field. But together, the commonality can be used to prove that just as in the other two cases one cannot borrow and redeem or redeem half, so too one cannot borrow and redeem or redeem half of a consecrated ancestral field.We should note that this is a common midrashic technique—it is easier to learn one unknown from two knowns then from one known. 
  To refute the above argument, we would need to find a feature common to the two known cases (selling an ancestral field, selling a house in walled city) that is not shared by the unknown (consecrating an ancestral field). And this is exactly what Mar Zutra does. The first two have an impaired power, in that they cannot be redeemed in the second year—the one who sells an ancestral field cannot redeem it during the first two years, whereas the one who sells a walled house cannot redeem it after the first year. But one who consecrates an ancestral field can redeem it during the second year. So maybe he can also borrow and redeem or redeem it in halves.
  Ravina brings in yet another case to compare, one that is further removed from the issue of selling/consecrating ancestral lands. A Hebrew slave sold to a non-Jew may be redeemed in the second year, and yet he cannot borrow and redeem or redeem half. This is a law we learned earlier on the last daf. So too we could say about the one who consecrates an ancestral field. Just because he can redeem in the second year, does not mean that he redeem half or borrow and redeem.
  IntroductionOur sugya is about whether a house sold in a walled city can be redeemed by relatives.Again, I am quoting here the relevant verses from Leviticus 25:29-30:If a man sells a dwelling house in a walled city, it may be redeemed until a year has elapsed since its sale; the redemption period shall be a year.If it is not redeemed before a full year has elapsed, the house in the walled city shall pass to the purchaser beyond reclaim throughout the ages; it shall not be released in the jubilee.
  In last week’s daf we learned that a like an ancestral field, a house in a walled city cannot be half redeemed. Leviticus 25:25 explicitly says that the ancestral field can be redeemed by relatives. So the question is does the comparison of the two carry over for that issue as well. Or does it only teach that neither can be redeemed in halves.
  The midrash reads Leviticus 25:24 as teaching that relatives may redeem houses and Hebrew slaves. The assumption is that this refers to a house in a walled city.The Talmud then rejects this and posits that it refers to a house sold in a village that does not have a wall. 
  The Torah seems to explicitly say that houses in open villages are not classed as houses in walled cities, and thus can be redeemed by relatives. So why would need a midrash to teach this.
  The Talmud responds that the similarity between houses in a walled city and open fields is that relatives have an obligation to redeem both of them (as long as they have the ability to do so). This accords with R. Eliezer, who holds that whenever relatives can redeem land or houses sold by their family, they must do so. R. Joshua holds that it is an option, not an obligation. This allows us to restore R. Sheshet’s answer—relatives may not redeem houses in walled cities.     
  Leviticus 25:24 uses the word “in all.” This inclusive phrase should mean that even houses in walled cities and not just even house in villages can be redeemed by relatives. But to R. Sheshet, who held that they can’t, what does “in all” come to include? After all, we already know that houses in villages can be redeemed by relatives. 
  Abaye raises another difficulty against R. Sheshet who held that houses in walled cities cannot be redeemed by relatives.A midrash reads the repetition of the word “he shall redeem him” as indicating that all cases of redemption have the same “order of redemption” that appears in connection with a Hebrew slave sold to a Gentile—first the brother should redeem him, next the uncle or some other relative and if not, then anyone else. So too, Abaye argues, when it comes to houses in walled cities or Hebrew slaves sold to Jews. 
  The Talmud resolves Abaye’s difficulty by saying that the midrash refers only to houses in villages and ancestral fields.But again, there is a problem, same as above. We have a verse that explicitly teaches that houses in villages have the same rule as ancestral fields. So why would we need a midrash to teach that. 
  The Talmud solves this by referring to a statement made in another context—that the nearest relative has the first obligation to redeem the house in the village. That is what this midrash teaches. But neither midrash need be read as teaching that houses in walled cities can be redeemed by relatives. 
  IntroductionYesterday’s section concluded with the statement of R. Nahman b. Yitzchak, that the closer a relative is, the more he takes precedence in the obligation to redeem a field, a slave or a house. Today’s section examines where he made this statement.Note that the structure and content of this section is very similar to yesterday’s. So my comments here will be a bit briefer.  
  The Talmud shifts to the question of whether a Hebrew slave sold to an Israelite, and not a Gentile, can be redeemed. Rabbi clearly holds that he cannot, but what about the rabbis. The rabbis could employ either of two midrashic techniques. They could expound on the use of the word “sakhir” and say that the laws referring to being sold to a non-Jew apply to the case of a slave sold to a Jew. Or they could read the word “may redeem him” exclusively—relatives may redeem “him,” the one sold to a non-Jew. But they may not redeem the one sold to a Jew. 
  Again, the Talmud invokes a term read as inclusive—“in all.” This is read as teaching that Hebrew slaves can be redeemed by relatives. The initial assumption is that this refers even to Hebrew slaves sold to other Jews. But then the Talmud rejects this and says it refers only to slaves sold to non-Jews. 
  The Torah explicitly states that a Hebrew slave may be redeemed by a relative. So why would we need a special midrash to teach this elsewhere? The answer is that the verse “in all” comes to add that redeeming a Hebrew slave sold to a non-Jew is obligatory, even according to R. Joshua who holds that redeeming land is optional. We have now rejected the first answer to the question as to whether Hebrew slaves sold to Jews may be redeemed. We need another source to find an answer.
  
  Daf 21b
  
  This section is nearly identical to that found in the end of yesterday’s section.The repetition of “he shall redeem him” is read as teaching that all redemptions are the same, and by this the Talmud tries to extend it to the ability of relatives to redeem Hebrew slaves sold to Israelites. The Talmud then rejects that and claims that the verse refers only to the redemption of houses in villages and ancestral fields. But then, again, the difficulty is raised that it is explicitly stated that these may be redeemed by relatives. So what then does the midrash “in all” come to include.R. Nahman b. Yitzchak reads this midrash as teaching that the nearest relative comes first. So again, we arrive at the conclusion that according to the rabbis while Hebrew slaves sold to non-Jews, fields and houses in villages may be redeemed by relatives, Jews sold to other Jews may not. They will need to either redeem themselves or complete their six year term.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the slave who wishes to remain with his owner whose ear is bored. 
  Once his ear is bored, the slave remains with his master until the Jubilee.
  A Hebrew slave who had his ear bored goes free at his master’s death—he serves the master and not the master’s children. And while the Torah would seem to say that he serves as a slave forever, according to the rabbis he goes free at the Jubilee.
  The first part of this baraita contains a few opinions as to what the awl used to bore the ear must be made out of—must it be from metal or can it be from other materials.In the second part of the baraita, the rabbis argue over where on the ear a slave is bored. Evidently, a hole in the earlobe was considered a blemish while a hole in the upper part of the ear, on the cartilage was not. The reason to avoid “blemishing” the slave was that if he was a priest, he would not be able to return to serving as a priest with a permanent blemish. Thus the rabbis say that when boring, we must take into consideration his status after the Jubilee when he is no longer a priest. 
  The Talmud now discusses the midrashic techniques that led to the dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Yose b. R. Yehudah. Rabbi uses a midrashic technique that focuses on sequences of generalizations and specifications. This leads to the interpretation that the specification limits the generalization—the awl must be of metal.
  R. Yose uses a different midrashic technique. This technique leads to the inclusion of any physical instrument, but to the exclusion of using a chemical to bore a hole in the ear—ouch!
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to interpret the baraita about boring the hole in the ear of the slave who wishes to remain with his master. 
  The baraita had read “the awl” as including even a large awl. But what is the midrashic technique used to derive that from the verse? The Talmud compares this midrash with a midrash that Rava offers on the prohibition of eating part of the thigh. From the definitive article “the” Rava derives that the prohibition applies only to the most important part of the thigh. So too here we can derive that the article implies only the most important of awls—the great awl. 
  The sages had said that the priest slave cannot have the lobe of his ear bored because that would create a blemish. But what’s so bad about having his ear blemished, the Talmud asks?The answer is that when set free, he must return to the same familial status he had before, and a priest with certain types of blemishes is no longer considered to have that status. 
  The sages had said that the priest slave cannot have the lobe of his ear bored because that would create a blemish. But what’s so bad about having his ear blemished, the Talmud asks?The answer is that when set free, he must return to the same familial status he had before, and a priest with certain types of blemishes is no longer considered to have that status. 
  R. Nahman ridicules R. Anan for not being able to prove that a master can give the priest slave a female slave as a wife. The rabbis say that all of the laws of the Hebrew slave, including where he has his ear bored, must apply to the priest. But if he could not take a non-Jewish slave as a wife, how could he say, “I love my…wife.” This statement proves that all Hebrew slaves, even priests, may marry non-Jewish slaves.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss whether certain laws of the Torah apply even to priests.The issue here is the beautiful woman taken captive during a war (Deuteronomy 21:10-14). Generally a kohen cannot marry a convert, but perhaps this is an exception.The law of the captive woman is not a law that has been observed, maybe ever, but certainly not in rabbinic times or since. It is clearly a problematic law for it allows a man to essentially take a woman against her will. But such was probably the norms of war in the ancient world (and still in many parts of the modern world) and as such, the intent of the law seems to have been to create some sort of brake on what could have been an even worse situation.The Talmud will continue to discuss the “beautiful captive woman” below. 
  The whole law of the “beautiful woman taken captive” is an unusual law because it allows a Jew to have sex with a non-Jewish woman (one time). So maybe the same rule applies to priests. Alternatively, since priests have extra restrictions, maybe they are prohibited to do what other Israelites are allowed to do.As we saw in yesterday’s section, Rav allows and Shmuel prohibits. 
  The Torah allows the soldier to have sex with the woman the first time before she converts because the Torah knows that men (soldiers in particular?) have an evil inclination and when they see this beautiful woman they will either sleep with her in a permitted way or do something far worse. Therefore, since priests also have this inclination, they too are allowed to have relations with the captive woman. But the second time, after she converts, is disputed. Rav says that since the first act was permitted, she stays permitted to him. Shmuel says that she is a convert and since priests cannot marry converts, a priest cannot marry this woman.
  According to this version of the dispute, the two sages both agree that marrying her, the “second intercourse” is prohibited because priests may not marry converts. They disagree over whether the Torah’s concession to the evil inclination applies to even to the priest. Rav says that it does, since priests, like everyone else, have evil inclinations.Shmuel holds that since he cannot “bring her into his house” as a wife, he also cannot have intercourse with her the first time.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a baraita about the beautiful captive woman.  
  This baraita goes through every word or phrase of the passage about the “beautiful captive woman” and explains what it teaches. I will go through these rules one at a time:1)	This rule applies only when in war. This is not something that can be done in peace time.2)	The rule applies even if she is already married to a non-Jewish man.3)	The reason that the Torah calls her beautiful is that it realizes the evil inclination of men. The Torah preferred to the lesser evil of basically forced marriage to what would basically be rape. This is a concession, not an ideal4)	While the Torah calls her beautiful, the law applies to any woman the man desires.5)	The soldier can only take one such wife, not two.6)	He must marry her (after the first intercourse).7)	He cannot take two women, one for him and one for a family member.8)	He cannot have sex with her there on the battlefield. He must bring her home.Note that while there is still much that is disturbing in these laws (what about her consent?) the rabbis do seem to be modifying the Torah’s rulings such that the situation is slightly better for her.
  
  Daf 22a
  
  The baraita teaches that the slave must twice make the declaration that he wants to remain a slave—at the beginning of his term of servitude and at the end. We will see below how later rabbis interpret this. It seems somewhat absurd that the slave should have to make this statement at the beginning of his term of servitude.
  The verse “I will not go out free” is not the only indication that the slave must make his statement at the end of his servitude. We could also derive this from the verse, “I love my …wife and children” which he could not say at the very beginning of his servitude.
  Rava interprets beginning and end to be referring to a very small window. He must make his statement some time before he begins to do his last perutah’s worth of work. At this time he already could have a wife and kids. He must also reiterate the statement later on, while he is doing his last perutah’s worth of work.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a baraita that severely limits the ability of the slave to have his ear bored and thereby remain a slave for a longer period of time. We can sense that the rabbis wanted to write this law out of existence. They assumedly did not want Jews remaining slaves for such a long period of time. Indeed, they probably did not want Jews becoming slaves at all. 
  For the slave to be bored, he must fulfill all of the conditions in his statement. These include that the master has a “house”—meaning a wife and kids. And that he (the slave himself) have a wife and kids.
  The master must love the slave for him to be bored. This is one way in which the rabbis interpret the words “because it goes well for him with you.”Of course, the slave must also love the master. That is simply the simple reading of the verses. 
  For the slave to be bored, both he and his master must be healthy. This is another restrictive interpretation that they put on “because he is well with you.”
  The Torah says “because he is well with you.” If we focus on the “with you” section, then all that matters is that both are either well or unwell. But if we focus on “he is well” than if both are unwell, he cannot be bored. There is no answer to this question.
  IntroductionSeveral more baraitot about how much support the master must offer his Hebrew slave.
  A master must share the material benefits he enjoys with his Hebrew slave. Clearly, owning a Hebrew slave would be burdensome.
  The Torah says that when the slave goes free, his children go free with him. This can refer only to children born to the Jew before he became a slave, for we already know from Exodus that those born to him in servitude (children of the Canaanite slave given to him) do not go free. But the problem is that the children were not sold. Only the father was. So why state that they go free? To solve this problem R. Shimon rules that the master is responsible for the upkeep of the children while the father is a slave. Once the slave goes free, the master is no longer responsible for them. This would be yet another way the rabbis write this law out of existence—why would anyone take on the responsibility of maintaining not only the slave but also his children? It would be far cheaper to hire a servant.
  The same rule applies to his wife. Again, this can only refer to a wife he married before he was a servant. The Canaanite wife given to the Hebrew slave does not go free with him.
  The Torah needed to teach us that the master must support the children, because the children cannot work to earn a living. It needed to teach us that he must support the wife because it would not be seemly for a woman to go begging.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the door on which the slave’s ear is bored. Again, we can see just how opposed the rabbis were to the entire institution of Hebrew slavery, and especially permanent Hebrew slavery. 
  The Talmud clarifies how the boring is to be done. The master is not to put a hole in the ear and then another one through the door. Rather, he puts the slave’s ear up to the door and then he puts a hole in the ear until it gets to the door. Seems like a smart way of doing this!
  
  Daf 22b
  
  The door must be standing, attached to the ground.
  The ear is singled out for punishment because God does not want people to remain slaves in perpetuity.
  The door and the doorpost are singled out as witnesses to the choice of this man to have his ear bored because they were also witnesses to the key moment in the Exodus.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins the discussion of “Canaanite” slaves which is the term the rabbis used for non-Jewish slaves. 
  Money and deed acquire Canaanite slaves, just as they acquire Hebrew slaves.  In addition, Canaanite slaves can be acquired through “possession”, which could also alternatively be translated as “presumption of ownership.”  We learned the rules of possession in the third chapter of Bava Batra.  Practically this would mean that a slave, who treated a certain person as if that person were his owner, would become the property of that person.
  Both Rabbi Meir and the Sages agree that a slave acquires his freedom either through a manumission document or through his freedom being purchased with money.  However, they disagree over whether or not the slave may purchase himself back.  According to Rabbi Meir a Canaanite slave can never own property.  Any property which he would acquire would automatically become the property of his owner, since the owner owns the slave.  Therefore, only other people may purchase the slave’s freedom.  When it comes to a document, the document must be received by the slave himself.The Sages disagree on both counts.  They hold that a slave may, under certain circumstances, own his own property.  This is possible if other people give the slave money with the condition that the owner not take possession of that money.  According to the Sages either he or others may purchase his freedom.  Similarly, they disagree about the document.  The master can write out a manumission document, give it to another person beside the slave and thereby free the slave.  Note that the Sages could have stated that “a slave is acquired by documents or money through his own agency or the agency of others.”  This would have been a clearer and slightly briefer statement of the sages’ intent.  Instead, the mishnah phrases their statement as the opposite of Rabbi Meir’s statement in order to retain the parallelism.    
  The Torah uses the same word “ahuzah” which means “possession” in the context of the ancestral field as it does in the context of non-Jewish slaves. Therefore, they can both be acquired in the same ways. To recall, hazakah is an act that presumes ownership. We shall get more into this later on. 
  Unlike the field of inheritance, the non-Jewish slave does not revert to his original owner at the Jubilee. They remain slaves forever.
  A baraita adds in “halifin” which is a symbolic transfer usually performed with an object of small value fictitiously exchanged for an object of large value. Slaves may be acquired through halifin.The tanna of our mishnah does not disagree with this law. He just does not include it because halifin can also be used to acquire movable property. The mishnah lists ways of acquisition that cannot be used to acquire movables. 
  Meshikhah is a form of acquisition whereby the acquirer basically pulls the acquired object to himself. According to Shmuel, this form of acquisition works for acquiring slaves. But it must be done physically by taking hold of the slave. Simply calling him is not sufficient.
  The tanna of the mishnah omitted meshikhah as a means of acquisition because he only taught methods that apply only to land. But the other tanna taught “halifin”—which does apply to goods. So why not also teach meshikhah?The answer is that the outside tanna only taught methods of acquisition that apply both to land and movable property. This is only halifin. But meshikhah applies only to movable property and not land, and therefore he did not include it.
  According to the baraita, one does not acquire a slave by calling him and having him come to him. However, according to another baraita, one that discusses acquiring animals, one can acquire an animal by calling it to him. This baraita describes two ways to acquire an animal—mesirah, which is physically taking control of the animal, and meshikhah, which is causing it to go in a certain direction. Thus there is a contradiction between the baraita concerning animals and the one concerning slaves.
  An animal can be acquired by calling it because an animal moves when its owner wills it. It has far less of an independent will than a human. A slave on the other hand is a human being and moves on his own will. Therefore, the slave cannot be acquired by a purchaser simply calling it.
  A minor slave will move according to his master’s will. Therefore, he can be acquired by the purchaser calling him to him.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses acquisition through hazakah. 
  Hazakah is an act that creates the presumption of ownership. To acquire a slave through hazakah, the slave must act in a manner subservient to the one acquiring him. The baraita therefore describes common things that a slave would do for an owner. Note that most of these are acts of personal servitude. It seems that most slaves served as personal servants and not workers in the field.
  At the end of the baraita R. Shimon makes a cryptic statement regarding hazakah.R. Ashi explains that according to the tanna kamma (the first opinion) if the slave lifts the master, the master acquires the slave, for this is an act of hazakah. The slave shows that he is a slave by lifting the master. But if the master lifts the slave, there is no acquisition.R. Shimon disagrees. In general when one lifts something up he acquires it. Thus hazakah should not be greater than lifting means that whenever someone lifts something, he acquires it. Even if the master lifts the slave.  
  If a slave can be acquired by lifting his master, then a female slave should be acquired through intercourse. After all, if she is on the bottom, she lifts him.The Talmud responds that when a slave lifts his master, the master derives pleasure, the slave does not. During intercourse, both parties derive pleasure. Therefore, this does not imply that the female slave is serving the male partner. 
  The initial assumption is that women do not enjoy unnatural (anal) intercourse. Therefore, he could acquire her through such a form of intercourse, because she would be doing this just as an act of servitude (again, this is not sanctioned—the Talmud is asking how come this does not work).There are two answers: 1) Some women do enjoy anal intercourse. 2) The Torah uses the plural in reference to forms of intercourse, thereby implying that they are all treated the same. Just as a female slave cannot be acquired through natural intercourse, she also cannot be acquired through unnatural intercourse.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a story related to the issue of acquiring a slave through hazakah, an act which creates the presumption of ownership. 
  According to halakhah, a convert who does not have offspring, has no heirs because when he converts, he cuts off ties with his former family. Thus, the issue at stake here is when R. Judah dies, who inherits his slave. Has Mar Zutra has acquired the slave by having the slave take the shoes to his house?According to the first opinion, he has. The slave has acted as a slave for Mar Zutra, and therefore, when R. Judah dies, Mar Zutra becomes the slave’s owner.
  
  Daf 23a
  
  Others interpret the story to refer to a minor slave. If a convert dies, his adult slaves go free according to all opinions. According to Abba Shaul, minors do not become free. Thus Mar Zutra did not have to send the slave to do an errand for him. He would have remained a slave in any case, and Mar Zutra could have just taken him as a slave after R. Judah’s death.
  IntroductionAccording to R. Meir, other people can buy a slave’s freedom, but the slave himself cannot. Our section explores this opinion. 
  According to R. Meir, others may buy the slave’s freedom—they may pay to set him free. So the question is what are the circumstances? The first possibility is that the slave has not consented to be set free. But this should not work for R. Meir holds that it is not to the slave’s advantage to go free. And we also know that a person cannot cause disadvantage to another without his consent. Therefore this cannot refer to a case where the slave has not consented to be set free. 
  Rather, R. Meir must refer to a case where the slave consented to being set free. And nevertheless, he cannot free himself. Others must buy his freedom. Here we learn that a slave cannot acquire any property. As soon as he does, it becomes the property of his master.
  R. Meir goes on to say that if he is going free by document, he must accept the document himself. Others cannot accept it on his behalf. But if he is consenting to going free, then why can’t others accet a document to set him free?
  The Talmud now introduces a solution that it immediately rejects. We might have thought that a slave can acquire himself through a deed even through his own agency, and not exclusively through his own agency. The innovation here would be that his freedom and his ability to acquire arrive at the same moment, such that at the same moment he is set free, he is also able to acquire the document. The problem is that there is a baraita in which R. Meir explicitly states that a slave acquires himself by document only through his own agency, not if the document is accepted by others.Thus we now no longer have an acceptable situation for the Mishnah. If the slave did not consent, then why can others set him free by paying for his freedom? And if he did consent, then why can’t others accept a document of manumission on his behalf?
  Abaye said that the mishnah refers to a case where the slave does not consent. Since a slave can be bought against his will, he can also be sold against his will.
  If a slave can be freed against his will through money, then why not also through a document accepted by others? Just as he is bought against his will with a document, so he can also be set free against his will with a document.The answer is that these are different documents. And if you argue that the money used to acquire him is also different from the money used to purchase his freedom, we can answer that money is money. It is all stamped the same way. 
  Rava offers a different reason for why R. Meir holds that a slave can be set free by money given by others but not by a document accepted by others. The slave goes free when his master receives the money. It is not that others are causing him disadvantage. But if the slave goes free by document he goes free when the others accept the document. Therefore, they are causing him detriment, and one may not cause detriment to another without his consent.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with who accepts the money and document when a Canaanite slave goes free. 
  According to the rabbis, a Canaanite slave can buy his own freedom but others cannot buy his freedom. But why not? After all, even if this is done without his knowledge, the rabbis still hold that it is to the slave’s advantage to go free, and one can cause an advantage to a person without his knowledge. So why can’t they accept the money to set him free?
  We might have thought, as we tried to propose in yesterday’s section, that when it says that he may free himself it means “even through his own agency,” and then say that what this teaches us is that his right to acquire money and his freedom come simultaneously. Thus he can acquire the money to use to buy himself free. But the problem is that the end of this clause in the mishnah teaches that when it comes to the document, the slave can become free by a document accepted by others, but not by one that he himself accepts. The problem is that we hold that his freedom and his ability to accept a document also come simultaneously. This means that he should be able to accept his own deed of emancipation.
  If we try to solve this last problem by positing that the slave can be redeemed even when others accept the document on his behalf, and also when he accepts the document, and that this mishnah teaches that it is to the slave’s advantage to go free (and thus others can receive his document), then we encounter the problem that both clauses say the same thing. So why teach them as independent clauses?
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">
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that R. Shimon be Elazar holds that if the slave goes free by a document of emancipation, it must be accepted by others. The slave cannot accept it himself. Here Rabbah explains why. 
  R. Shimon b. Elazar derives his law by connecting the word “lah” (to her) found in Leviticus 19:20 in the context of a female slave going free with the word “lah” in the context of divorce in Deuteronomy 24:3. When it comes to divorce, the woman must take the get into a domain that is hers (this would include her hand). The husband can also put in onto property that belongs to her. But it must leave his property. So too, when it comes to a slave going free, the slave must take the domain into property that does not belong to the master. This would preclude accepting the deed of emancipation himself.
  IntroductionRabbah continues to discuss the opinion of R. Shimon b. Elazar who holds that a Caananite slave cannot receive his own deed of emancipation.
  In yesterday’s section we saw that R. Shimon b. Elazar derives the laws of a slave going free from the case of a woman being divorced. So now we have to ask whether a slave, like a woman being a divorced, can appoint an agent to receive his deed of emancipation.Rabbah asks the question, and then answers it himself. Like a woman, he can.
  
  Daf 23b
  
  Elsewhere R. Huna son of R. Joshua says that priests serving in the Temple are agents of God and not agents of the people whose sacrifices they are offering. They cannot be our agents because an agent should not be able to do something that the person sending him cannot do himself. But now we do have a case of an agent being able to do something that the person himself cannot do. A slave’s agent can accept the slave’s deed of manumission, whereas the slave himself cannot.Thus we have a difficulty on R. Huna.
  The Talmud rejects the difficulty on R. Huna. An Israelite can never offer sacrifices himself. The laws of sacrificing in the Temple simply do not apply to him. However, a slave can accept a deed of manumission, just not his own. Thus these laws do apply to him, and therefore, he can appoint an agent to receive his own deed of manumission.
  IntroductionAccording to the sages, a slave can redeem himself by means of money that he himself gives the master, but the money must come from others. R. Meir says that the others must give the money. 
  The Talmud presents a possible explanation of the dispute in the mishnah. R. Meir would hold that a slave cannot acquire property independent of his master (nor a wife independent of her husband). The second the money goes into his hand, it belongs to his master. Therefore, the slave cannot give the money to free himself. The other rabbis say that a slave can acquire money separate from his master. So if others give him money to redeem himself, he can take the money and redeem himself.
  According to Rabbah, in general everyone holds that anything a slave acquires, his master automatically acquires as well. The dispute in the mishnah is only in a case where someone gives the slave money on condition that the master not have any rights to it. R. Meir says that this condition does not work, whereas the rabbis hold that it does. Therefore, R. Meir holds that there is no way for the slave to buy his own freedom, whereas the rabbis would hold that as long as others gave him the money and said, “on condition that your master has no right to it,” the slave may use that money to free himself.
  R. Elazar says that the third party cannot really say “on condition that your master has no right to it.” All would agree that such a condition does not prevent the master from gaining rights to the money acquired by the slave. R. Meir and the rabbis rather disagree about a case where the third party says “on condition that with it you go free.” To R. Meir this still does not work and the master acquires it immediately. The other rabbis hold that this works because the third party did not transfer ownership of the maneh to the slave—he only gave it to the slave for the slave to free himself. Since the slave has not come into possession of the maneh, he is able to use it become emancipated.
  IntroductionToday’s section contrasts the opinions of R. Meir and the sages with what appear to be contradictory opinions found elsewhere. At the end of last week we read of the following dispute:What are we dealing with here? For instance a stranger gave him a maneh, saying: “On condition that with it you go free.”R. Meir holds: When he says to him, “Acquire [it,]” the slave acquires it and so does his master; and when he says to him, “on condition [etc.],” he says nothing.Whereas the Rabbis hold: He did not give transfer ownership of it [even] to him [the slave], since he said to him, “On condition that with it you go free
  Second tithe produce is usually redeemed, the money is brought to Jerusalem and used there to buy food products. The issue here is a woman redeeming her husband’s second tithe. When one redeems one’s own second tithe, one is liable to pay an added fifth. But when redeems someone else’s second tithe, one need not add the fifth.According to the first opinion, that of the sages, the woman essentially is like her husband, and therefore she must add the fifth. According to R. Meir she need not add the extra fifth.  
  
  
  Daf 24a
  
  If the money and the tithe are her husband’s then all would agree that she is her husband’s agent and must add the fifth. And if it is her money (inherited), then all should agree that she is exempt from the tithe.Therefore, the Talmud suggests that it must be a case where someone gives her money on condition that she use it to redeem the tithe. The rabbis hold that this money is automatically her husband’s and therefore, she is his agent and must add the fifth. R. Meir says it is not automatically her husband’s and therefore she need not add the fifth.These opinions are opposite of those we saw above, and thus both seem to be contradictory. 
  Abaye says that we should reverse the opinions.But, as usually happens, Rava finds a way not to reverse the opinions. The case is one of tithe which she inherits from her father’s estate. According to R. Meir, second tithe is holy, and therefore her husband does not acquire it. When she redeems the produce, she is redeeming her own tithe.The other rabbis hold that second tithe is not holy. Her husband does acquire it (or at least certain rights) and therefore when she redeems it, she is fulfilling her husband’s agency. She must add the extra fifth.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the following verses from Exodus 21:26-27:When a man strikes the eye of his slave, male or female, and destroys it, he shall let him go free on account of his eye.If he knocks out the tooth of his slave, male or female, he shall let him go free on account of his tooth.
  The Torah explicitly states that a slave goes free at the loss of an eye or tooth. The rabbis add that the same is true for any projecting limb (such as a leg or hand or finger. There are 24 of these and they will be listed later on daf Kaf Heh). The blemish must also be exposed, as are teeth and eyes. A slave who loses such a limb will be noticeably deformed.
  When the Torah uses one example to illustrate a law it can be seen as a paradigm for other potentially similar things. But when it uses two examples, it could be said that these examples are all that fit into the category. Thus it might be that the slave goes free only if the master puts out his tooth or eye.
  The Talmud now demonstrates that both are necessary. The case of the eye teaches that he does not go free at loss of a milk tooth, which will be replaced by an adult tooth. And it taught tooth to demonstrate that he need not be born with the “limb” in order to go free at its loss.   
  
  Daf 24b
  
  The Talmud now proposes reading the verse as a case of a general statement followed by a specific one. In such a case, the rule applies only to the specific examples—only the tooth and eye.
  The Talmud now reads the verses as a sequence of general, followed by particular, followed by another general statement. In such a case, the law applies to things like the specific example. In this case, the slave goes free when he loses limbs that are like eyes and teeth—noticeable and they do not return.
  Eyes and teeth when put out cease to function. So why then does slave go free if the master dislocates his jaw. This is not a total loss of function. It is not like the eye or tooth.
  The verse “he shall let him go free” is read as including another way of the slave going free—in this case for the dislocated jaw. But now that we read this as an inclusion, we have to ask why temporary wounds, such as temporarily causing the hand to wither, do not also cause the slave to go free.The answer is that including all such injuries would render the examples of “eye and tooth” meaningless. Thus we need to negotiate between the limitations of “eye and tooth” and inclusion of something else. For a dislocated jaw, the slave goes free, but not for a temporarily hurt hand.   
  IntroductionThe Talmud discusses whether a slave going free because his master put out one of his limbs requires a deed of emancipation
  This baraita contains a dispute over whether the slave being emancipated because his master put out his eye, tooth or other major limb, needs a deed of emancipation. The number of sages who participate is somewhat unusual. In the end, a compromise seems to have been reached. Since tooth and eye are mentioned explicitly in the Torah, the slave does not need a deed of emancipation. But for the other limbs, which are only derived through a midrash, he does.
  The Talmud explains the midrashic origins of the dispute. The word “sending” is used both in the context of the slave and in the context of a woman being divorced. According to R. Shimon, just as a woman being divorced needs a document, so too a slave going free always needs a document.R. Meir uses the order of the words in the verse to posit that he does not. The phrase begins with “to freedom” and therefore R. Meir holds that the slave is free right away, even without a deed.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to deal with setting a slave free because his master struck him and caused loss of limb. 
  For the slave to go free, the blow must be on the eye or ear. If the master strikes something and doing so makes a loud noise which causes the slave to become so afraid he goes blind or deaf, the slave does not go free. (I do not know how it is possible to cause blindness by making a loud noise. This is how Rashi interprets the statement, probably because Rashi cannot imagine that if a master actually strike’s the slave’s body, and the slave goes blind or deaf, the slave would not go free. Furthermore, this is how the Talmud seems to interpret below. However, a source referred to below refers only to deafness, which makes more sense). 
  The above tradition does not seem to consider making a noise that causes damage equivalent to physically doing the damage onto the damaged object. But R. Shemen quotes two amoraic statements that refer to animals that cause damage by making noise and in both of them, makes the person liable. Thus making a loud noise does cause liability. This seems to be a contradiction.
  R. Ashi explains that the case of a noise damaging an object is different from the case of a person being damaged. A person is intelligent, and to a certain extent, brings this damage on himself by being frightened. This is proven by a case of a person who makes a loud noise and thereby deafens another. He is not liable unless he physically seizes the other person.
  IntroductionMore baraitot about when a slave goes free if his master puts out his eye or tooth. 
  Both of these baraitot essentially say the same thing. If the eye or tooth does not work, it counts as having been put out. If it was previously not working and the master puts it fully out, then this does not count as being put out. The test is whether the eye or tooth works.
  If I only had the first baraita, I might say that if the master severely weakens his eyesight or tooth, so much so that he cannot use them, he goes free. But if the eye is already weak and he puts it out, he does not go free because it was already weak. Therefore we need the second baraita.
  If we only had the second baraita, I would think that the slave never goes free unless he is completely blinded. Therefore, we need the first baraita to teach that as long as the slave cannot use his eye or tooth, he goes free, even if he is not completely blind.
  To the rabbis, if the master puts out the slave’s eye or tooth he goes free, even if the master did not intend to do so. But R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says he must intend to put it out. 
  The rabbis use the phrase “and he destroys it” to exempt a master who accidentally blinds a fetus while trying to help his maidservant deliver her baby. In this case, he did not intend to do anything to an eye at all. However, if he intended to perform an operation on the eye and he accidentally put it out, the slave does go free, because he intended to do something to the eye.
  R. Elazar derives this other halakhah from the word “it” at the end of the verb. This “extra” word allows him to derive both halakhot.The other rabbis do not derive any meaning from this extra word. This allows this midrashic discussion to end.
  IntroductionSome amoraic laws concerning putting out the slave’s eye. 
  According to R. Sheshet, even if the eye is already blind, if the master removes it, the slave goes free.
  A baraita supports R. Sheshet. According to this baraita, while bird sacrifices need not be fully unblemished (as do animals) they cannot have their eyes plucked out. This supports the idea that if the slave’s eye is plucked out, it is a serious enough offense that he goes free, even if he could not see before.    
  If the master cuts off the slave’s extra finger, the slave still goes free, as long as it is on his hand. If it is protruding from elsewhere, it does not count as a finger. 
  
  Daf 25a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses whether a slave goes free if his master castrates him. The discussion is cased in quite a humorous story, and who knows, maybe the humor is a response to the subject? 
  Evidently not going to R. Hisda’s study session is a real no-no. But the elders of Nezunia have an answer, and we’ll see how it plays out.
  R. Hamnuna cannot answer the question of whether a master who castrated his slave must set him free. Does this count as an open blemish, one that others will notice, and therefore the slave goes free. The elders of Nazunia laugh at Hamnuna and changed his name to Karnuna. Evidently Hamnuna is read as meaning a “hot” (ham) fish “nuna.” But Karnuna is a cold fish. Good one elders!
  R. Hisda tells R. Hamnuna that he could have answered the question from a mishnah. The mishnah refers to a person who has a skin affliction. If there is a healthy, unaffected spot within the affliction, then he is rendered impure. The mishnah lists parts of the body which if unaffected do not count as a healthy spot and do not render him impure. On this mishnah a baraita is taught according to which a slave goes free if his master cuts off these parts (ouch). Since Rabbi includes castration we have the answer to our question. A slave castrated by his master goes free.
  This clarifies that castration refers to cutting off the testicles and not the penis. I will add here that there is a great reference to this passage in an episode of Game of Thrones. For more information, contact me.
  IntroductionToday’s passage discusses whether cutting off the tongue causes the slave to go free. If yesterday’s discussion reminded me of Game of Thrones, today’s discussion reminds me of the Handmaid’s Tale, a book that made a deep impact on me, but a television show I did not enjoy all that much. 
  Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi] says that the slave goes free if he is castrated, but he does not seem to agree with Ben Azzai that he goes free if his tongue is cut off. But there is a baraita that seems to contradict this. This baraita is about sprinkling a person with the red heifer waters in order to purify him. According to Rabbi, if he is sprinkled in his mouth, which we at first interpret as on his tongue, then the sprinkling is considered valid. This implies that the tongue is an exposed organ and that a slave would go free if the master cut it off.
  The Talmud solves the difficulty by saying that the water fell on his lips, not on his tongue. But if it falls on his lips, then it should be obvious that he is pure—after all the lips are an external part of the body. The answer is that sometimes when his lips are tightly closed, the lips are not exposed to the outside. Therefore Rabbi needed to say that if the water falls on the lips, he is pure.
  The problem with the above resolution is that there is an explicit baraita in which Rabbi teaches that if the water falls on his tongue he is pure. And there is another baraita about blemishes that disqualify a priest from serving on the altar in which Rabbi agrees that even if only part of his tongue was removed, he cannot serve. Clearly, Rabbi considers the tongue an external part of the body.
  The Talmud now offers a different reading of the debate. Both tannaim hold that loss of tongue causes the slave to go free. They just disagree about castration.
  If Ben Azzai does not agree with Rabbi then why does he say “the tongue too.” He should have just said “the tongue.”The Talmud answers that Ben Azzai is adding on to the list that appears before Rabbi, and not to Rabbi. But then why didn’t the baraita put his words first. The Talmud answers that the author of the baraita listed the opinions in the order in which he heard them. But he did not change the wording of Ben Azzai’s statement, even though it could lead to some confusion.
  IntroductionThe Talmud explores the dispute over whether the tongue is considered an external organ. 
  A sheretz, a creepy-crawly thing conveys impurity. All sages agree that if it touches one’s tongue, the person is impure [EWWW]. In this case, the tongue is considered to be an exposed organ. 
  When it comes to immersing in the mikveh, all sages agree that the tongue need not come into contact with the mikveh (that would again, be EWWW).
  The dispute between Rabbi and the sages is only about a person who is sprinkled on his tongue. According to Rabbi sprinkling on the tongue purifies, just as being touched on the tongue by a sheretz defiles. Rabbi reads the verse as connecting sprinkling with the source of impurity—if the water lands on a part of the body that can be defiled, the person is pure.The other sages say that sprinkling on the tongue is compared with immersing. Just as a tongue need not be immersed for it is not considered an external organ, so too if the person is sprinkled on the tongue, he is not pure.     
  The sages prefer to learn a rule related to purification from another rule related to purification.Rabbi compares it to impurity and not immersion because there are a few words that separate “and purify him” with “and bathe himself in water.” This interruption prevents us from connecting the purification method with the immersion.
  IntroductionThe Talmud discusses Rabbi’s opinion that with regard to immersion, the tongue is considered an external organ and need not be immersed.
  In this story, Rabbi seems to require that the waters of the mikveh enter one’s mouth. So how can we say that he considers the tongue to be concealed such that it need not be immersed?      
  The Talmud answers that we do not require that the water actually enter the mouth and hit all the teeth and the tongue. But there cannot be anything preventing it from doing so, had the person opened his mouth.This is compared with the case of mixing flour and oil for a grain offering. If the flour is fit to be mixed, then the mixture if valid even if it was not actually mixed. But if the flour is not fit to be mixed, then mixing becomes indispensable. In other words, you don’t actually have to mix the flour. You just have to be able to mix the flour. So too the tongue need not be immersed, it just needs to be able to be immersed. 
  
  Daf 25b
  
  Earlier we saw a dispute over whether a slave whose master cuts off his testicles goes free. This dispute matches the dispute here over whether an animal whose testicles have been removed can be offered as a sacrifice.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a mishnah which teaches how large animals such as cows and oxen, and small animals such as sheep and goats are acquired.  We should note that money does not acquire animals, nor does it acquire any other movable property.  According to mishnaic law a person must actually come into contact with the animal in order to acquire it.  We should note that while this may have worked for the small agricultural communities of Palestine in antiquity, it became very difficult by and perhaps long before the Middle Ages.  By that time Jews were heavily involved in international trade and could not possibly physically handle every commodity that they acquired. Hence alternative legal means were worked out whereby money could be used to acquire legal rights to movable commodities.  
  According to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar large animals are acquired by being “handed over” from their owner to the purchaser. This would entail the purchaser taking hole of the reins, saddle or even hair of the animal.  Small animals, however, may be lifted and therefore they are acquired only through lifting.  They are not acquired by being handed over or by being led. The sages disagree with regard to the acquisition of small animals.  Despite the fact that they can be lifted, it is still difficult to do so. Therefore they are acquired by being led.  Since goats and sheep do not have reins they are led by being pushed or directed by voice commands.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses acquisition of large animals—cows, oxen and elephants! 
  Meshikhah is pulling the animal towards oneself, or causing it to come to oneself by calling it. Rav seems to state that large cattle are acquired by meshikhah. However, other statements, including one by Rav himself, say that large cattle are acquired by mesirah, which involves taking the reins of the animal.I should note that the relationship between meshikhah and mesirah is disputed. Rashi holds that mesirah is a more effective method of acquisition, and therefore one who holds that the animal is acquired through mesirah would hold that it is not acquired through meshikhah, the less effective manner. But the Tosafot hold the opposite—meshikhah is more effective. 
  Rav rules according to a different position. Both large and small cattle (goats and sheep) are acquired by meshikhah. According to Rashi this would mean even by meshikhah, all the more so by mesirah. R. Shimon holds that both are acquired by lifting.
  R. Joseph notes that if large animals need to be acquired by lifting, then how can one ever acquire an elephant? (I’m not sure why he needs to ask about an elephant. Isn’t a cow hard enough to lift? Maybe he just likes elephants.)Abaye provides two other ways of acquiring objects. One is through “halifin” symbolic exchange. I give you something of little value, a pen, and you exchange it for the thing of value of mine that you are buying. Alternatively, I can transfer ownership to you by putting my stuff on your place. So if you rent the place where my elephant is, I can transfer ownership of it to you.Note that these are two ways the amoraim developed to ease transfer of large objects.    
  R. Zera suggests putting vessels underneath each of the elephant’s feet. In this way, the purchaser’s vessels contain the elephant and will acquire it. I would not suggest using your fine china.
  R. Zera’s statement seems to take one side in a dispute from Bava Batra over whether a person’s vessels can acquire when they are on the seller’s property.In order to avoid taking a stance on this dispute, the Talmud suggests that this transaction (of an elephant) takes place in an alley!Alternatively, the elephant can be acquired by having it step on bundles of sticks hire than three handbreadths from the ground. This is considered “lifting.”I might add that I don’t suggest buying an elephant. They eat 200-600 pounds of food a day.
  
  
  Daf 26a
  
  IntroductionToday’s mishnah discusses the acquisition of land and movable property.  Land in the Mishnah is called property which “has security.”  This means that creditors can collect from this property for outstanding debts, even if the land is already owned by a third party (not the debtor).  “Movable property”—cannot be used for debt collection from third parties.
  Land is acquired through money, deed or possession.  That is to say if Reuven wants to acquire land from Shimon he can do one of three things.  Either he can pay money to Shimon, write out a document, or demonstrate possession over the land with Shimon’s consent.
  Just as animals are not acquired by money, so too “things” are not acquired through money.  Rather the purchaser must physically take the object he wishes to acquire into his possession.  Until he does so, the item still belongs to the seller.
   Just as animals are not acquired by money, so too “things” are not acquired through money.  Rather the purchaser must physically take the object he wishes to acquire into his possession.  Until he does so, the item still belongs to the seller.
   In Mishnah Shevuoth 6:5 we learned that people do not take oaths over land.  For instance, if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him land, and Shimon admits to part of the claim, he need not swear that he does not owe him the rest, as he would were Reuven to claim that Shimon owes him money or animals.  However, if Shimon needs to take an oath over movable property and land, since he must take an oath over the movable property he must also take an oath over the land.  This could happen if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him a piece of land and a 100 sheep.  If Shimon admits that half of the land is Reuven’s and half of the sheep, he must take an oath over both the land and the sheep which he claims not to owe.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the mishnah’s ruling that land can be acquired through money. 
  This verse from Jeremiah is the source for the ruling that fields are acquired with money.
  The verse does mention writing the sale down in a document. But since it first uses the word acquire, we can learn that money alone acquires land, even if no deed is written up.
  Rav limits the mishnah’s rule to a place where deeds are not normally written. But if deeds are normally written, then a deed must be written to acquire land.
  The Talmud, based on a practice of R. Idi b. Abin, allows the purchaser to make a statement that allows him to retract but not the seller. Of course, the seller has to agree to this arrangement, but if he dies, the purchaser has a legal right to make it.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya explains how we know that land can be purchased through a deed. 
  We can’t use this verse from Jeremiah because we said earlier that money acquires land and that the deed referred to in this verse is just proof. It is not what effects the transaction.
  The Talmud uses a different verse from Jeremiah to prove that documents can acquire.
  Shmuel places a strong limit on the Mishnah’s rule that a document can acquire without money changing hands. This is true only if someone is giving land away. But if someone is selling land, the document does not acquire until the person also pays the money.
  R. Hamnuna cites a baraita which explains the mishnah. This baraita equates between selling and given—in both cases the transaction is valid even before money was given.
  R. Hamnuna distinguishes between one who sells something because it is poor quality and one who sells something because he needs the cash. If he is selling it because it is poor quality, then he really wants to get rid of it, and the sale is valid as soon as the deed is signed. However, if he is selling for other reasons, he may retract until he receives the cash.
  R. Ashi says that the entire baraita refers to someone who is giving the land as a gift. The only reason that he wrote the sales document was to make sure that everyone would know that the recipient is the owner. If he was really selling it, then the transaction would not be valid until money had changed hands.
  The Talmud cites two sources which note that land is acquired by dwelling on it. These verses refer to land seized in war, and thus the land is considered unowned. Israelites take possession of the land (meaning individual possession) by living there.I want to emphasize that acquisition by “hazakah” does not mean I can take your land just by squatting on it. Elsewhere we learn that to possess land by hazakah one must also claim that he bought it but lost the documentation. Hazakah creates a presumption of ownership. If you live on land for three years and I do not protest, I cannot come later and say that the land is mine. And if I sell you land, and you go and dwell on it, its yours even if you have not yet paid for it. But no one thinks that you can buy land by simply dwelling on it. 
  The Talmud now provides a source for the rule that objects are only acquired by physical transfer from seller to buyer.
  R. Yohanan holds that according to the Torah, even money can acquire objects. He interprets the mishnah as a rabbinic enactment, which offers protection to the purchaser. He will not officially acquire title and responsibility until the object comes into his hand.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the law which allows one to buy movables together with land. In other words, one does not need to actually pick up the movables. Once one buys the land, the movables are his as well. 
  The fact that the gifts are given with the walled cities implies that one can transfer movables with land.
  The Talmud asks a critical question—must the movables be on the property that is being acquired. In other words, how does this transaction work? Is it that since I’m buying land, I can more easily also buy what’s on the land? Or is it some sort of bundled acquisition—acquiring the land allows me to more easily acquire other things.The fact that R. Akiva says that movables can be acquired even with a small piece of land seems to imply that the movables need not be on the land. Otherwise, why mention that the land need not be of a minimum size.[A prosbul allows debts to not be remitted during the sabbatical year. For this document to be written, the debtor must own some land, even an amount far smaller than his actual debt. Peah is the corners of land left for the poor. First fruits are brought to the Temple.]   
  
  Daf 26b
  
  R. Shmuel b. Bisna locates a case where movables could be on a very tiny piece of land—the person stuck a needle into the ground. Buying this ground would allow one to buy the needle with it. But it would not allow one to buy movables not on the land.R. Joseph responds that this is absurd—would a baraita teach such a halakhah—one can buy a tiny needle, when he buys a tiny piece of land? Surely the baraita was referring to a more consequential case, one in which a person was trying to buy a very tiny, almost non-existent piece land so that with it he could buy valuable movables that are not on this land.R. Ashi defends R. Shmuel b. Bisna—perhaps he put a pearl on the end of the needle!
  In this story a man wants to give away movables but the movables are not with him. So he buys a small plot of land, which here we seem to think cost a sela (very small amount of money for land). Clearly, a hundred sheep and a hundred barrels cannot fit on this piece of land. Nevertheless, by giving away the tiny piece of land land, he is also able to give away the sheep. This proves that the movables need not be on the land.
  The Talmud reinterprets “bet sela” from a very small piece of land, to a large piece of land that was hard as a rock (a sela). We now assume that the sheep and barrels fit on the land. This discussion will continue tomorrow.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss whether movables must be on the land when they are acquired together with it. 
  This story seems to prove that one can transfer movables by transferring land without the movables being on the land. Certainly, a hundred sheep and barrels cannot fit on a piece of land that is only one handbreadth square.There are two versions of the story, and these are dependent on whether a dying person can transfer property by a declaration alone. According to the sages, he may and therefore this person who transferred his property by a more formal act, must have been healthy. Had he been sick they would not have told him he needed to transfer property by use of land. According to R. Eliezer, even a person who is dying cannot transfer ownership without a formal acquisition, therefore this person could have even been a sick person. Sick or healthy, they would have told him he needed to use land to transfer the movables. 
  The Talmud rejects the idea that the sheep and barrels were literally being transferred. Rather, it was the monetary equivalent of 100 sheep and barrels. Evidence for this is the fact that had he wanted to give away real objects, he could have done so by symbolic exchange.
  The problem with it being money is that the recipient could have just taken the money and acquired it through meshikhah. And if we say that the recipient is absent, then how could symbolic exchange have been done. This is why his only option was through land.
  Theoretically, he could have transferred his money to another by use of a third party. But this would entail the risk that a third party would steal the money. Due to this risk, his only option was to transfer the money through land.In the end, we still have no proof that the property being transferred with the land does not need to be on the land. This discussion will continue next week.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss whether when transferring movables through the transfer of land, the movables must be heaped on the land. 
  In this story, Rabban Gamaliel wants to eat his produce but tithe it by setting aside produce not on the ship. This way he can eat all the food on the ship. He declares that the first tithe will go to R. Joshua (who is a Levite) and the poor tithe will go to Akiva b. Joseph, who is poor. To transfer them the produce, he rents the space to them so that they can acquire it. This seems to prove that to transfer movables, the movables must be on the land being transferred.The Talmud rejects the proof. He might have rented them this property just so they could leave the tithes there for a while.The discussion will continue tomorrow. 
  
  Daf 27a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section concludes the long discussion over whether the movables must be heaped onto the land through which they are acquired. 
  Rav explains that if the person only says “and write the deed” he can retract from his instruction to write the deed. But he cannot retract from the granting of the field itself. The transfer of the land has already occurred and cannot be taken back. However, if he stipulates “on condition” then the land is not transferred until the deed is written. Therefore, he can retract from both elements.
  R. Hiyya b. Abin adds in another type of document—one which the seller writes before the sale even occurs. In this case, once he transfers the land, the deed belongs to the buyer no matter where it is. This seems to prove that the movables (in this case the deed) need not be on the land, for the seller has transferred ownership of the field and through it he has transferred the document as well.The Talmud rejects this as proof—the deed is like the land. It is not a different type of movable, like sheep or barrels. The deed is not transferred by being connected to the land—it simply is part of the transaction of the land.
  The Talmud notes that the mishnah which taught that movables could be acquired with land was itself used as a source to connect to the acquisition of the deed with the land. This implies that this deed is considered like other movables. It is acquired through acquisition of the land. And that folks ends our discussion of this issue. Movables may be acquired together with land even if the movables are not on that piece of land.I should note that in the middle ages a technique developed whereby a person could transfer movables based on the idea that every Jew owns “four cubits of land in Israel.” I would give you (temporarily) my four cubits of land and with that I could also give you my movables, even if the movables were far way. This facilitated the transfer of movables without one actually having to own land, let alone put the movables on the land.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with transferring movables together with land. 
  Does the seller have to say that he is transferring ownership of the movables “by means of” the land? Or can he just say “and with it”?The Talmud answers by noting that we had a number of cases where someone was transferring movables with land and in none of them did he say “by means of.” He only said “and with it.” Seems like he does not need to say “by means of.”
  The problem with making a deduction from words not found in the baraita is that there are other words absent from it. According to the Talmud the seller must say, “let him acquire it” and nevertheless “let him acquire it” is not found in the baraita. So too “by means of” must be stated even though these words are not found in the baraita.
  This is the end of a long passage so a halakhic statement is in order. The law is, as we saw earlier, that the movables need not be heaped on the land. But the seller must say “acquire it” and “by means of.” So the proper phrasing would be “acquire these sheep by means of the land I am also selling/giving to you.” Sounds like a game of Settlers of Catan!
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to ask halakhic questions related to purchasing movables together with land.
  Can one sell the field and give the movables with it? The answer is brought from Rabban Gamaliel’s giving the tithe to R. Joshua. He rents him the land (which is like selling) and gives him the tithe. Thus one can sell land and give away movables through the sale.
  Can one split the land from the movables—giving the land to one person and the movables to another?The Talmud tries to prove this from the continuation of R. Gamaliel’s giving away of tithes. He gives the tithes to the poor, through Akiva, but he rents the place to Akiva. This seems to prove that one can give the land to one person and the movables to another.
  The Talmud offers two rejections of using this source as as proof. First of all, maybe the land was not rented to R. Akiva. It might have been rented only for the tithe, in which case it was, in a sense, rented to the poor, those who also received the tithes.Alternatively, R. Akiva may be considered like the poor because he is the charity collector. Thus R. Gamaliel was giving to R. Akiva, and not to the poor. Again, the one receiving the land was also receiving the movables.
  IntroductionIn today’s section Rava puts an important limitation on the halakhah that one can acquire movables by acquiring land.
  If the buyer pays the whole price, for both the land and the movables, then he has acquired both the land and the movables. But if he pays only part of the money, he acquires only what he pays for.
  The Talmud cites a baraita that supports Rava’s rule. This first part of the baraita is not relevant though to the rule. It simply compares the things that can be done with money and things that can be done with a deed. Money can be used to redeem holy things, including second tithe. The deed can be used to divorce but money cannot.
  The baraita now compares money and deed with hazakah, the idea that one can acquire something by acting as its owner. A Hebrew slave can be acquired through money and deed but not by acting as a slave to someone. But hazakah is stronger because when acquiring multiple pieces of land from one person, a person can take possession of one and thereby acquire them all. When it comes to buying the land with money or deed, the money or deed must cover all of the pieces.
  
  Daf 27b
  
  Hazakah acquires all ten fields only if he paid for all of them. But if not, it only acquires that which he paid for. This is the line that is similar to Rava’s line.
  The baraita is word for word the same as Shmuel’s statement.  
  According to R. Aha son of R. Ika the proof from the baraita’s rule is that one obviously can acquire ten cows tied together by one cord. So too one can acquire ten pieces of land by buying one of them.  
  Someone unknown responded to R. Aha telling him his comparison is not justified. In the case of the cows, he has one tie connected to all of them. In the case of the land, there is nothing connecting him to the other pieces of land.
  In this version, R. Aha son of R. Ika critiques the baraita by comparing it with another halakhah. In this version of the cows, he acquires only one cow. Therefore, R. Aha compares, he should acquire only one piece of land.The Talmud then rejects this as well. Acquiring one cow cannot allow one to acquire another cow because each cow is separate. But the land is all one piece. Acquiring one piece can allow one to acquire other pieces as well.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the last clause of the mishnah. To ease understanding this, I’m going to copy my explanation from there again here. The clause reads:And it obligates the property which provides security, to take an oath concerning them.In Mishnah Shevuoth 6:5 we learned that people do not take oaths over land.  For instance, if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him land, and Shimon admits to part of the claim, he need not swear that he does not owe him the rest, as he would were Reuven to claim that Shimon owes him money or animals.  However, if Shimon needs to take an oath over movable property and land, since he must take an oath over the movable property he must also take an oath over the land.  This could happen if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him a piece of land and a 100 sheep.  If Shimon admits that half of the land is Reuven’s and half of the sheep, he must take an oath over both the land and the sheep which he claims not to owe.  
  At the basis of the mishnah in Kiddushin is the idea of “the extension of the oath,” gilgul shevuah in Hebrew. The idea is that if you are liable for an oath for one thing but not for another, since you must take the oath on one item, I can also impose on you an oath for the other thing as well.Ulla claims that this idea comes from the repetition of the word “amen” when the sotah woman, suspected of adultery, responds to the oath administered to her. The second “amen” is an oath that she did not commit adultery with any other man. The Talmud will explore this and eventually show that one of these oaths is what we would call an “extension of an oath.”    
  The woman who says Amen cannot be a betrothed woman because betrothed women do not drink the water.
  If the husband warns her when she is a betrothed woman and then she was secluded with him, he should not marry her. He must divorce her. If he does marry her then he too has sinned. If he has sinned, she does not drink the water. So a betrothed woman can never take this oath.
  The husband cannot make his betrothed wife take an oath. But if he is making his married wife take an oath, he can at the same time make her take an oath that she did not have relations with another man while betrothed. This is the biblical proof of the technique of “extension of an oath.”
  IntroductionLast week we concluded by learning about “oath extensions” (Hebrew, גלגול שבועה). The idea is that if a person can legally make someone take an oath about X, he can also make him take an oath about Y, even though he cannot alone make him take an oath on Y. This was learned from the case of the Sotah.Sotah is what is called a “prohibition” which loosely refers to laws that are really between God and humanity (Shabbat, kashrut, purity etc). The question is can oaths be extended in the realm of monetary law as well. 
  To make the woman drink the Sotah waters and take the oath, two witnesses are needed. But a claimant needs only one witness to make someone take an oath that they do not owe money. So if an oath extension works in the case where it is harder in general to impose an oath, all the more so it works in the case where it is easier to impose an oath. 
  
  Daf 28a
  
  How do we know that a person can make another take an oath by extension even if he is not certain about that he owes him money? The answer is by comparison with the sotah oaths. The sotah oath is by its very nature a case of uncertainty. We do not know if the woman committed adultery or not. Nevertheless, she can be forced to take an oath and an oath by extension. So too in cases that occur outside the Temple—one can force another to take an oath by extension even in cases of uncertainty.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss loan extensions, asking their limits. If person A can make person B take an oath about a financial matter, can he make him take an oath about anything else? 
  The institution of oath extension goes as far as one wants to take it. He can even make him take an oath that he owns him—swear that you are not my slave.
  The problem is that one who gratuitously calls another person a name such as “slave” or “mamzer” is punished (by being excommunicated, by being lashed, or by losing his livelihood). How then could we let someone call another person that in a court of law?     
  Rava adjusts the resolution slightly—he must swear that he was not sold as a Hebrew slave. Being a Hebrew slave is not so ignominious because it does not affect one’s language. 
  The problem with this is that saying that someone else is your Hebrew slave is essentially saying that he owes you money. A Hebrew slave is like an indentured servant. This is not a good example, therefore, of an oath being overextended. It is a simple extension of an oath from one issue of money to another.
  The Talmud resolves by saying that to Rava this is not simply a monetary claim. To Rava, the master owns the Hebrew slave and therefore this is a further extension of the oath.
  If the slave is owned by the master, then this is the same as land and we have already learned that if one can impose an oath on another over movable property, he can extend it to land. So what new halakhah are we learning here?The answer is that were it not for this statement, I would have thought that oath extensions work for land, because people sell land secretly. The purpose of the oath is to uncover the truth, truth that would not have been otherwise unknown. So one might need to make the other take an oath over land. But if a person sells himself into slavery, everyone would know that he had done so. Therefore, we would not need to make him take an oath over such a matter. This is why the Talmud says oath extensions can even go this far. Even though it seems very unlikely that B is actually A’s Hebrew slave (had this been true we would know of it), A can still make him take an oath that he is not.
  IntroductionThis mishnah discusses acquiring things through barter.  
  The general rule of acquiring things through exchange is illustrated simply in the example of the cow and ox. If Reuven and Shimon exchange an ox for a cow, when Reuven takes physical possession of Shimon’s cow, Shimon becomes owner of the ox, even if Shimon doesn’t take physical possession.  The implication would be that if the ox dies or is stolen, Shimon is out of luck for it is his ox that died or was stolen.  Alternatively, if the oxen market rises dramatically Shimon wins out.  For better or for worse, in an exchange once one party takes possession of one of the objects being exchanged, the other party automatically owns the other object.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses exchanges by barter. What types of exchanges are considered irreversible? Particularly, can coins and produce be used as barter?  
  The Talmud asks what this item is that is being exchanged for another item. If that item is money, then barter can be performed with money. This would mean that if I give you money for your cow, then I have acquired your cow and neither of us can renege. The problem with this is that we have learned that money cannot be used to acquire objects.
  Rav Judah explains the mishnah—for an item to be used as barter it must be something that does not have a value that can be expressed in its own terms. For instance, I could say a Hershey Bar is worth four Hershey kisses or two Goldenberg’s chews (I really loved those). But I cannot say how much a Hershey bar is worth in terms of Hershey bars. But a coin’s value is expressed on its own terms—a dollar is worth a dollar. Therefore, coins cannot be used in barter.
  
  Daf 28b
  
  The Talmud now goes back and asks how we would interpret the mishnah if we thought that coin could become an object of barter. To do this the Talmud basically rewrites the mishnah. The first part of the mishnah refers to coin, which can be used as barter, and the second half refers to produce (or what we could call edible products) which can also be used for barter. Note that prior to this we would not have thought that produce can be used for barter. If I want to trade you my Hershey bars for you Reeses cups, you would not take possession of the Hershey bars until you took them into your possession. But if it can be used as barter, then you would possess them as soon as I took the peanut butter cups.
  The Talmud now alludes to a dispute about whether produce (and animals) can be used to effect barter. R. Sheshet says it can, but R. Nahman says it may not. We should note that this is a new problem, not related to the previous one. How can R. Nahman even understand the mishnah which does seem to say that produce and animals and not just vessels can be used for barter.
  This is an entire reinterpretation of the mishnah such that the mishnah does not teach that produce or animals can effect barter. My explanation follows Rashi. The beginning of the mishnah states that money can sometimes be used to acquire through barter, even though the money was given as such and not as a form of barter. If Reuven sold Shimon an ox for a man, and Shimon drew the animal to him, he is now liable to give the maneh to Reuven. Reuven now says “Give me the cow instead of the money.” Shimon says yes. If Shimon says, “I am giving you this cow in place of the money” Reuven acquires the cow without having to pull it towards himself. We have now avoided the problem of produce effecting barter.  
  Generally speaking money cannot acquire—so why did this mishnah allow money to acquire (in this limited circumstance)? The answer is that from the Torah, money can acquire. The rabbis decreed that money does not acquire goods lest someone sell some wheat, take the money and then tell the other person that his wheat was burned. In other words, the law that money does not acquire was created for the protection of the buyer. 
  The rabbis decreed that money does not acquire things in unusual circumstances. But there was no reason to make such a decree for the rare case described above, since it is such a rare case. 
  Resh Lakish disagrees with R. Yohanan about what acquires. He holds that money does not acquire, and that even from the Torah only meshikhah acquires. The problem is that if he holds like R. Nahman that produce cannot effect barter, how can he understand the mishnah? So in the end, you have to say that he holds like R. Sheshet, who holds that produce can effect barter. So he can interpret the mishnah in the following manner quoted from above: “And produce too can effect a barter. How so? If one barters the meat of ox for a cow, or the meat of donkey for an ox, as soon as one party takes possession, the other assumes liability for what is given in exchange.”
  IntroductionToday’s section compares giving objects to another person with transferring them to the Temple.
  Ordinary people cannot acquire movable property by using money (as we have learned already), but the Temple can use money to acquire movable property.  So if the Temple’s treasurer wants to buy a cow, once he gives the cow’s owner money the cow is sanctified and belongs to the Temple.Ordinary people can acquire through hazakah, which here seems to be used in the sense of taking physical possession.
  A verbal declaration is not sufficient to transfer ownership.  In other words, if I just pick up an object and say “This belongs to Reuven”, the object does not yet belong to Reuven.  However, when it comes to dedicating something to the Temple, a verbal declaration is sufficient.  If I state, “This cow belongs to the Temple,” the cow belongs to the Temple and is considered sacred.  We can see through both of these sections that the Temple more easily acquires property than does an ordinary human being.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains the mishnah.
  As I explained in my commentary on the Mishnah, the Temple can acquire by paying for things whereas an ordinary person needs to perform meshikhah (drawing it to him).
  This illustrates the second half of the mishnah. The Temple acquires things when someone simply says they belong to the Temple. Ordinary people transfer objects by physically transferring them.
  
  Daf 29a
  
  The ordinary person described here is acquiring something from the Temple. He pulls it to himself, but has not yet given the money. Then the price goes up. He must pay the higher value. This would not be true if he were acquiring something from another person. In that case, once he pulled the item to himself, it would be his.
  This is the same case except the object falls in value. Now the Talmud rules that he must pay the higher value, which is the same as would be if he purchased it from another ordinary individual. This is to make sure that the law would not be stronger for an ordinary person (protecting the ordinary seller) than it is for the Temple (when it sells).
  The first section here is the same as above, but uses the example of redeeming holy property instead of buying it.But the second section is different. If he redeems it for a maneh and the value goes up to 200, he need not pay the extra 100. The Talmud is perplexed by this—why should the rights of an ordinary person, who would be able to claim the full 200, be greater than the Temple?The answer is that an ordinary person (the seller) who demands the higher value would be subject to the curse of “He Who exacted payment from the generation of the flood (and the generation of the dispersion will punish one who does not keep his word.” In other words, if I offer to sell you something for 100, and you give me 100 and before you take possession the price goes up. I can demand the higher value. But I will be cursed by God if I do so. Thus an ordinary’s persons rights are not really greater than that of the Temple.
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with the distinction between commandments obligatory for men and those obligatory for women.  The mishnah can be divided into two subjects:  1) mutual obligations between parents and children; 2) general commandments both negative and positive.  It is not entirely clear why this mishnah is in this chapter.  Inside my commentary, I have not delved into the ramifications of these rules in our day, when many women wish to be more involved in Jewish ritual life. 
  This refers to obligations that the father has in raising his son.  They include circumcising him, redeeming him from a priest if the son is a first-born, teaching him Torah, teaching him a profession and finding him a wife.  The father and not the mother is responsible to fulfill these commandments.
  When it comes to obligations that a child has to his/her parent both men and women are obligated, and they are obligated equally to both their mother and father.  This includes fear and respect.  According to the rabbis respect means providing financially for the parent in his/her old age.
  Only men are obligated in positive time-bound commandments.  This includes the reading of the Shema, blowing the shofar, sitting in the Sukkah and several other commandments.  Note that the mishnah does not state that women are forbidden from fulfilling these commandments—it says only that they are not obligated to do so.
  Positive commandments which are not time-bound are obligatory upon both men and women.  This would include mitzvoth such as mezuzah, charity and returning lost objects.
  Nearly all negative commandments are equally obligatory upon men and women.  The mishnah notes a few exceptions.  The prohibitions of rounding the corners of the head and marring the beard (Leviticus 19:27) are obligatory only upon men. Since most women don’t have beards the beard prohibition would not apply to them—the prohibition of rounding the corners of the head is an accompanying prohibition appearing in the same verse and hence women are exempt from it as well.  In addition, women do not act as priests and therefore the prohibition of a priest from coming into contact with a dead body applies only to male priests and not to daughters of priests.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains the meaning of “obligations of the son on father” which according to our reading of the Mishnah (there are other ones) are incumbent upon the father but not the mother.
  Daughters are obligated to honor their parents just as sons are. Therefore, when the mishnah says that “all obligations of the son upon the father” are incumbent on the man and not the woman, it cannot be referring to mitzvoth that children must perform for their parents.
  Any mitzvah that a parent must do for a child, the father is liable, not the mother.
  This baraita lists the obligations that a father must perform for his son (and not daughter). The Talmud will explain these as we go along.
  IntroductionThe Talmud explains the obligation to circumcise, which is primarily incumbent upon the father.
  To the Talmud, this verse lays out the basic obligation for a father to circumcise his son. 
  If the father is negligent in his duty, then the court must circumcise him. If the court does not do so, then he has an obligation to get himself circumcised. Would really not be easy to become an adult and then find out your Dad and the court did not circumcise you.
  God commanded Abraham to circumcise Yitzchak. He did not command Sarah.
  The idea that circumcision was a commandment not just for Abraham, but for all subsequent generations is derived from the use of the word “command.” We should note that Leviticus does state that newborn males must be circumcised on the eighth day. It is unclear why that source is not used here.
  IntroductionThis sugya discusses redeeming the first born son. 
  All firstborn sons must be redeemed. It is primarily the father’s responsibility but if the father does not do so, the son must redeem himself.     
  Daughters need not be redeemed. Since others do not need to redeem them, they do not need to redeem others, nor do daughters need to redeem themselves. They are simply excluded from the obligations of redemption, just as they are excluded from the obligations of circumcision.
  According to the rabbis, if there is not enough money to redeem both him and his son, his primary responsibility is to redeem himself. This is like putting the oxygen mask on yourself first on an airplane. But R. Judah says that the mitzvah to redeem lies primarily on the father. So first he must redeem his son, and only then, when he has the money, he must redeem himself.
  R. Yirmiyah limits the dispute in the baraita. If the father really has only five selas, then he redeems himself and not his son. There is only a dispute if the father has five selas that are free and five selas that have a lien over them, meaning he used them to secure a loan or he sold them. According to R. Judah, the “lien” of the Kohen on the five selas owed for the redemption of the father is like a debt written in a document, and therefore it can be collected even from property encumbered with a lien. So the priests would seize five selas worth of land and with this the father would be redeemed. The father can then use the free five selas to redeem himself. But the other rabbis hold that the debt of the five selas cannot be taken from encumbered property. Therefore, he really only has five selas with which he is to redeem himself. 
  
  Daf 29b
  
  The rabbis now engage in a “which mitzvah takes priority” discussion. Here we have a dispute over which takes priority—redeeming one’s son, or spending the money to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem during one of the festivals.
  R. Judah explains why the mitzvah of the pilgrimage takes precedence. But the rabbis do not explain their opinion. Therefore, the Talmud explains that it simply follows the order of the verse—first the verse says redeem your son, and then it instructs people to go on the pilgrimage.
  When it comes to redeeming the first born, the first born is determined by the mother. So if a man has five sons from five different wives, he must redeem them all. But when it comes to inheritance, it follows the father. Only his own first born son inherits a double portion.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses learning Torah. I should reiterate that I am not discussing how these halakhot play out in our modern world. But I should just note that today many Jews from all streams consider it not just a good thing but an actual obligation to teach daughters Torah. 
  The Talmud provides a source obligating a father to teach his son Torah. And as with the other mitzvot, if the father does not teach the son, the son must learn himself.
  Since the rabbis read the word “your children” as if it is written “your sons” they derive that fathers are not obligated to teach their daughters. And since they are not obligated to teach their daughters, the daughters (eventually mothers) are not obligated to teach their sons. 
  Again, we have a dispute over which takes precedence—father or son. I think that is question is really interesting for parents who constantly have to make choices as to where to allocate their resources. Does one save every penny for the enrichment of one’s children, or does one also spend money on their own activities? It’s a question I would guess most parents face quite frequently. 
  This wonderful story is here because R. Ya’akov decides that it is better for him to learn than his dull son. But the story itself has a life of its own. I’ll make a few remarks. First of all, the story exhibits an ambiguous attitude towards the father, who prefers to leave his son at home. On the one hand, he kills the demon. But on the other, people seem willing to let him risk his life in order to try to kill the demon. R. Ya’akov is saved in the end, but it takes a miracle, and tomorrow that miracle might not happen. Were the townsmen justified in what they did? Did R. Ya’akov do the right thing? As is often true with Talmudic aggadot, there are no easy answers to these questions.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the issue of marrying and studying Torah. Studying Torah for rabbis was a very intense, committed occupation. Very hard to do and yet maintain a family life. On the other hand, rabbis were young men with sexual desires. If marriage is the only sexual outlet, well how can rabbis stay unmarried for so many years. There is no easy solution to this dilemma, but this is the topic our sugya addresses. For those interested, the topic has been addressed by several scholars, including Jeffrey Rubenstein and Daniel Boyarin. It is a fascinating topic, but my commentary will pretty much adhere to the text itself. 
  In Eretz Yisrael they seem to have preferred learning Torah for some time and then getting married later (hard to know when). This allows the student/rabbi to learn full time without a “millstone” around his neck. [Let’s face it, marriage is a responsibility for both partners, and it is hard to be completely dedicated to a project while one is also responsible for a family]. In Babylonia, they marry and then head off to the Yeshiva to learn.
  R. Huna does not even want to look at a man who is unmarried and is older than 20. This is in line with the Babylonian point of view, that men should marry at a relatively young age.
  A word of warning about sources like this and the ones that come before and after. The rabbis clearly want men to marry by the age of twenty. This does not mean that men did so. Indeed, I could argue that this source implies that men were not marrying before twenty—otherwise why exhort them to do so.    
  Here we can get a sense of why the rabbis urge men (boys) to marry so early—to ward off “Satan.” This is probably a way of expressing the sexual urge. Unmarried boys over the age of puberty will almost certainly either masturbate or engage in illicit sex, both activities the rabbis did not condone. To prevent this, it would be best to marry as young as 14. But again, this does not mean that people actually did so. 
  
  Daf 30a
  
  This source debates whether men should marry between the ages of 16-22 or 18-24. Note that these ages are slightly older than those above.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf discusses the obligation a father has to teach his son Torah. 
  The question asked is how much Torah a father is obligated to teach his son---every field in the Torah, or just the basics?The answer is brought from the case of someone named Zevulun son of Dan, who Rashi said was a contemporary of Shmuel’s. Zevulun learned from his grandfather basically all of the fields of Torah.   
  The Talmud raises a difficulty—a baraita rules that the father needs only to teach his son Mikra (Torah), not all of the rest of the fields.The resolution is that the example of Zevulun b. Dan was come to show that even a grandfather is obligated to teach his grandson Torah. But fathers (and grandfathers) are obligated to teach only Mikra, not all the fields. 
  The Talmud notes that there is actually a tannaitic debate about whether grandfathers must teach their grandsons Torah. Some read the verse “and your sons’ sons” as requiring a grandfather to teach his grandsons, but some read it metaphorically.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss a father’s obligation to teach his son Torah. 
  Teaching your grandson Torah is akin to standing at Sinai (Horeb). I never had the merit of studying with either of my grandfathers, but I do hope that I someday have the merit to teach my grandchildren (boys and girls alike).
  R. Joshua b. Levi is in such a rush to go bring his child to the synagogue to learn that he does not even dress properly. Other rabbis do not eat meat until they read with their children, and add on to the previous lesson or bring them to the bet midrash.
  R. Safra offers a sort of pun on the word “veshinantem” which in its simple meaning means to teach. Rather than teaching, one should divide one’s learning into three. The first third should be devoted to the study of Mikra, what we call Bible. The second third to Mishnah. This probably refers to more than just what we call the “Mishnah.” It would refer to any text that simply states the halakhah without discussing. Talmud would not refer to what we call the Talmud—such a book did not yet exist. It would refer to either midrashim—support for halakhah from the Torah, or explanations of the underlying reasons for the halakhah.
  IntroductionThis sugya is independent of the previous one. It talks about a group of sages called “soferim.” In the Mishnah and elsewhere, this simply refers to a group like the rabbis or the Pharisees. Indeed, the New Testament refers to “scribes” and seems to use the term synonymously with “Pharisees.” 
  While historians usually understand “soferim” as scribes, taking the word to refer to the meaning of the verb as “counting” this passage, this passage associates it with the meaning of “counting.” These sages loved counting the words of the Torah and Psalms, the two most learned books in rabbinic times. They worked out which letters and words appeared right in the middle of these books. Interpreters have often tried to find deeper meaning out of the search for the middles of these books. But in my opinion, this is just something people love to do. Some people (including myself) simply love statistics.
  Interestingly, the students of R. Joseph wants to answer his question by really checking things out, to see where the middle of the Torah is. They act like empirical scientists not simply trusting tradition. He even cites another case where they actually counted the letters of the Torah (we do not know the context of this case). But alas, R. Joseph seems to acknowledge that we do not know if our Torahs are written according to this count of letters. In Hebrew the vowels for “oo” and “oh” can either be written with the letter vav (full spelling) or without (defective). There are other words that can be written in either defective or full spellings. So we do not really know where the middle of the Torah is in terms of letters.  
  The truth is that we do not even know the exact number of verses in the Torah. There may be variants on this as well. Therefore, we can’t bring a Sefer Torah to see if the word vehitgalah is part of the first half or the second half.
  This source posits that the Torah, Psalms and Chronicles are almost the same length. However, we should note that this is not true according to our Bibles. The Tosafot already note that it’s not even close. There are over 5000 verses in the Torah and 2461 in Psalms. Not sure how many there are in Chronicles, but since there are only 65 chapters, the number of verses will be less than Psalms by a lot. Indeed, this source is so far off from the number of verses actually there, that it is somewhat of a mystery. The only thing I can say is that these are the three largest books in the Bible. 
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with a baraita that offers another interpretation of the word “veshinantem” which was earlier interpreted as an allusion to dividing one’s time into three, as if it read “veshilashtem.”
  This long baraita reads “veshinantem” as related to the word for “sharp” used elsewhere in reference to arrows. Rabbis should be able to answer questions without any hesitation. They should be as known to someone as his own sister. Bound on their hearts. They should be sharp and ready to draw in an instant like arrows.
  
  Daf 30b
  
  When people begin to learn Torah together, they argue, neither seeing what the other is trying to say. But by the time they are done, they will come to love each other, to appreciate what the other is saying. This is read midrashically into a verse. The verse begins with “the wars of the Lord.” But the end of the verse quotes some difficult words “vahav besufah.” “Vahav” the rabbis read as related to “ahavah,” “love.” “Besufah” they change to “besofah” which means “at the end. So there is war in the beginning but love at the end.
  This baraita plays on another word in the Shema, reading it as if it says that God gave Israel a perfect drug (or as Huey Lewis would say, a new drug). The baraita reflects on the strange fact that although we Judaism considers humanity as created in the image of God, we also have evil desires. God created us with these desires, but also with their antidote, Torah. Through Torah study, one can conquer the evil urge.I do not believe that this source is saying that those who study Torah will have no sexual urges—rabbis do not seem to believe this at all. Rather, study of Torah, of how one is to act in the world, reflecting on what it means to be human, all of this should, indeed must, lead to an inner transformation that allows us to have control over our lives. The baraita reads the famous verse from Genesis, stated to Adam after he ate the fruit of the tree (and the subject of one of my favorite books, East of Eden). Sin crouches at the door, but with proper reflection on Torah, humans can learn to act in a decent, moral way.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss the evil inclination. 
  These three statements talk about how difficult the Evil Inclination is and that the only remedy is the help of God. The Talmud will continue to the video.     
  Torah is like fire and water, overcoming the hard rock or iron of the Evil Inclination.
  The Talmud now goes on to discuss the next responsibility a father has for his children—to marry them off. As we shall see, this plays out a little differently for sons than it does for daughters. Still, it seems that in this case, the rabbis think that a father has equal responsibility vis a vis both male and female children.
  A father can find a wife for his son, and, the Talmud seems to assume, force his son to marry the woman. But a father cannot really force another man to marry his daughter. But what he can do is provide her with a good-sized dowry, clothes and help make her attractive so that men will want to marry her. In the ancient world, where decisions on marriage were made by parents for practical reasons, there is no doubt that this was a primary consideration in choosing a spouse.This notion of how parents marry off their children may be somewhat antiquated, but I still think that this is what parents essentially do. They try to provide their children with education and other opportunities so that they will be able to go out into the world, choose for themselves a spouse and start their own families. As someone who has two children who (hopefully) in the next ten years will be in the marriage market, I can testify that I do think about this a lot. What can I do to help my children be most prepared for starting their lives in the real world, including finding partners with whom to build their lives.    
  Kohelet compares a wife with a livelihood. Whether wife is meant to be taken literally or figuratively, the verse can be read as mandating that a father teach his child a means through which to earn a living.
  Teach your children to swim—their life may depend on it.
  According to R. Judah, a father must teach his son a real craft—i.e. how to make things. According to the other opinion in the mishnah, as long as he teaches him a way to make money, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  IntroductionThe mishnah rules that “obligations of the father on the son” are incumbent on both the father and mother. The question is—what is the meaning of this phrase? 
  Any mitzvah that a child must do for a parent is incumbent upon both the daughter and the son. 
  There is a grammatical tension in Leviticus 19:3. The verse opens with “a man” which implies that only men are obligated to fear their parents. But the plural verb implies that both men and women are. The rabbis resolve this by saying that all children are obligated to fear their parents (below the Talmud will explain what this entails).  But women, who in talmudic times moved to their husband’s house) are not mentioned in the outset of the verse because they do not always have the ability to fulfill this mitzvah. However, when/if they are divorced or widowed, they revert to a full obligation to honor their parents. 
  The Torah three times uses the same language to refer to parents as it does to God, because as we shall see parents and God are partners in creating the child.There is one law that refers to parents that cannot refer to God—striking. It is impossible to strike God physically. 
  Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi] picks up on the different order between mother and father in the verse about fear and the verse about honor. He explains that in each case the Torah speaks against a person’s inclination. Children are inclined to honor their mothers and fear their fathers (I know, it’s definitely sexist, but I wonder if this is still often true. It is in our family). Therefore the Torah teaches them to honor their fathers and fear their mothers. Both parents are due an equal portion of fear and honor.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to deal with honoring one’s parents. 
  This one hits home hard. Definitely written by a parent well-versed in eliciting guilt.   
  
  Daf 31a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to deal with honoring one’s parents. 
  This one hits home hard. Definitely written by a parent well-versed in eliciting guilt.
  Since the previous source imagined God dwelling among human beings, these sources continue to discuss the ramifications of God actually living on earth. The first ramification is that God is everywhere—one cannot hide from God. Sinning in secret is akin to making the theological statement that God is not in a certain place. I should note that there are sources that contradict this and seem to say that sinning in secret is preferable to sinning in public.The second two statements deal with the proper posture and clothing to acknowledge that God is only slightly above one’s head. This last statement is one of the sources used to prove that Jews must keep their heads covered.
  My wife (and mother, and pretty much every other woman I know) would not be too pleased with the rule from this source.But in the end, R. Joshua does rule that if the woman is divorced then the son owes them equal honor. If they’re both hollering for water, then all one can do is put the water on the floor screech at them as one does to chickens! 
  The fact that God demands that children honor their parents is proof that God is not interested only in God’s own honor.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains the famous stories of Dama ben Natina, the non-Jew who honored his parents better than anyone in history. 
  Interestingly, the greatest example of honoring one’s parents is brought from a non-Jew, the famous Dama ben Netinah (rhymes with an old favorite, Funky Cold Medina). Dama did not wake up his Dad, even though this would have profited him 600,000 gold dinars. I have told me children that if someone comes by to our house and offers a deal that will make me the equivalent of millions of dollars, I’m okay with being woken up.
  This is a slightly different version of the story. Here the sages need a precious stone for the High Priest’s breastplate. And at the end Dama ben Natinah receives his reward—a red heifer is born into his herd. But being such a generous guy, he only (!) asks for the 600,000 dinars he lost when not waking up his father.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned about Dama ben Natinah and the remarkable way he honored his sleeping father. Dama ben Natinah was a gentile, and therefore not obligated by the Torah to observe this commandment. This brings the Talmud to discuss people who perform the commandments despite not being obligated to do so. 
  According to R. Hanina, a person who fulfills a commandment even out of obligation is greater than one who fulfills it not out of obligation. This, I think, is somewhat counterintuitive. Most of us think that when we do something because we want to, we are in some way better than those who fulfill it because they have to. That is, I think, R. Hanina’s point. Fulfilling commandments out of a sense of obligation shows a commitment not just to the particular deed, but to its source.
  R. Joseph is blind. There is a tannaitic dispute over whether blind people are obligated in commandments. R. Judah holds they are exempt and the other sages hold that they are not. So at first, R. Joseph wishes the halakhah would follow R. Judah so that he could be fulfilling the commandments even though he’s not obligated. But then when he hears R. Hanina’s statement, he wants the halakhah to follow the sages who make blind people obligated.I do love the image of the R. Joseph making a holiday for the rabbis. I can picture a big spread on the table with lots of food.
  This is the first description of how someone honors one’s mother. Interestingly, while fathers are always described as sleeping, mothers are usually portrayed as somewhat disturbed. Honoring one’s father means not waking him up, honoring one’s mother means tolerating her embarrassing behavior.
  This tradition is found more elaborated in the Yerushalmi, and it is basically impossible to understand the Bavli without the Yerushalmi. There we read:There is one who feeds his father fatted birds and inherits Gehenom and one who ties his father to a mill and inherits heaven.How is it that one can feed his father fatted birds and inherit Gehenom? There once was a man who fed his father fatted birds. Once, his father said to him, “Son, where did you get this?” He said back, “Old man, eat and shut up like a dog.” It turns out that while he feeds his father fatted birds, he still inherits Gehenom.How is it that one can tie his father to a mill and still inherit heaven? There once was a man who was a wheat-grinder. A command came from the king to the grinder. The son said to his father, “Father, grind in my place so that if they come to disgrace or beat (one of us) better they should disgrace or beat me and not you.” [The king would first take those who were not working]. It turns out that he ties his father to the mill, and still inherits heaven.We should note that it in all of these sources the parallel in the Yerushalmi is usually easier to understand. It seems that the Bavli inherited its sources in some sort of truncated form. 
  
  
  Daf 31b
  
  Abimi, R. Abahu’s son, was particularly scrupulous in performing the mitzvah of honoring his father. Interestingly, his father is again asleep.Rashi asks what is so special about Psalm 79? He explains that this Psalm really should be a lament to Asaf, for in it the Temple is defiled and destroyed. The darshan, however, explains the positive side—while the Temple is destroyed, the people were not all killed. God took God’s full wrath out on stones, and thereby a remnant of the people was saved.  
  R. Ya’akov b. Abahu’s parents honor him by pouring him wine even before he comes home. But can he accept such an honor? Abaye says that he may accept it from his mother, but not his father, for his father is also a Torah scholar. We can sense here the tension between the honor due a person because he is a scholar, and the honor due a person as a parent. R. Ya’akov is a scholar, and thus his parents honor him. But they are his parents, and he should honor them. The solution is that he may indeed accept this honor from them, but only if it does not at the same time dishonor his father as a scholar.
  R. Tarfon helps his mother get in and out of bed (yup, he’s the Jewish Oedipus) and doing so leads him to think he’s really the greatest at honoring his parents. He thinks he’s so great at it, that he goes and brags in the Bet Midrash. There the other rabbis put him in his place—really honoring your mother means not shaming her when she acts crazy in public, even when she causes you a financial loss.  
  R. Joseph literally thinks his mother is like God. One of my sons was like this when he was little—wanted nothing to do with me. It’s gotten better since then, but he’s still not crying out “I will arise before the Shekhinah” when I come into the room. I’m lucky if he looks up from his screen.
  This is really one of the saddest portions of the Talmud I know. Honoring one’s mother and father is so difficult that it is better not to have known them.I should say that while honoring one’s mother and father is difficult (and has been difficult for me, more than I usually admit), I certainly am happy to have shared so many years with mine, and I hope that my children someday feel the same way about me.Abaye here claims that he never knew his mother. But elsewhere he frequently quotes his mother. The claim is that she is not his mother, but his foster-mother, the one woman who raised him.
  What a great  and tragic story—R. Assi is being pursued by his overbearing mother, who wants to marry a man who looks just like her son (kind of sad). So he runs away to Eretz Yisrael, but she chases after him. He then wants to go greet her, maybe save her some of the difficulty of the travel. But now we have an opportunity to hear of the relative value of honoring one’s parents vis a vis remaining in the land of Israel. He gets permission to leave, but before he gets to her, his mother has died. And now he has lost out on both counts—he did not get to fulfill the mitzvah of honoring his mother, and he left the land of Israel.The relationship between parents and children is surely the most difficult relationship of many people’s lives.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya helps bring greater precision to what exactly it means to honor and fear on’es parents. 
  This baraita talks about how one honors one’s parents. Honoring means attributing credit to them in their lifetime and remembering them for a blessing in their death.
  When quoting a tradition in the name of his father or teacher, a sage should not say his name. This is considered disrespectful. But when the meturgeman, sort of a loudspeaker who would say the sage’s words in a very loud voice, quotes the tradition he can say the sage’s father’s or teacher’s name.
  This baraita outlines the difference between fearing and honoring one’s parents. I think that what the baraita defines as “fear” we would call “honor.” Tipping the scales refers to expressing an opinion that differs with one’s father. [I should note that there are plenty of cases in the Talmud where a rabbi does disagree with his father].Honoring is essentially helping a parent materially—making sure they have food, drink, clothing and someone to help them when its hard for them to walk.
  InstructionAt the end of last week’s daf, we learned that honoring one’s parents means providing them with food and other forms of sustenance. The question now asked is-who pays for this—the child or the parent? If it is the parent, then honoring them means using their money to go and buy them the things they need. But if it is from the child, then the child must use his/her own resources. 
  The rabbis dispute who must pay, but ultimately the majority holds that the parent must use his own funds to provide for himself. I should note that this section assumes that both parties have resources. 
  
  Daf 32a
  
  A baraita that we saw earlier seems to say that a person must honor his parents at personal cost. But what personal cost can there be if the parent pays for his own upkeep? The answer is personal loss of work time. If one needs to help one’s parents and by doing so he will lose time at work, he must nevertheless do so.
  Every third and sixth year of the sabbatical cycle a Jew must give 10 per cent of his produce to the poor. But a son can give it to his poor father. The problem is that one should not be filling debts with the poor person’s tithe. So this would imply that feeding one’s father is not the responsibility of the son. This therefore is a difficulty on Rav Judah from above.The resolution is that the son is giving him extra food from the poor tithe, not the basic amount he is obligated to give him by law.  
  R. Judah commented on this baraita, saying essentially that it is disgraceful to feed one’s father poor tithe. It looks like one really does not want to honor one’s father by taking care of him. But if the son is only giving the father extra food, then why should he be cursed for using poor tithe.The answer is that even if its extra food, it is still disgraceful to use poor tithe to feed one’s father. People do not like to be treated as if they were poor and if the son has the means to feed his father without using his poor tithe, he should do so.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues the discuss of who pays for providing for the parent—the parent or the child. 
  As we have seen before, the height of honoring one’s parents means watching the parent throw away a purse of money into the sea and not shaming the parent. But if the parent has to pay for his own upkeep, then it really does not matter, because the financial loss is the parent’s loss. So its not such a great show of honor to not get angyr.The answer is that it does matter—if the child will inherit the parent. In essence, the parent’s current loss is the future loss to the child.This section does acknowledge an inherit tension between parents and children, one that still exists to this day. Currently, the parent’s assets belong to the parent and the parent can dispose of them at his/her will. However, this money will eventually go to the inheritor, usually the child, and if the child is taking care of the parent, and in some ways has authority over the parent’s money, the child may be hesitant to spend it, especially if he perceives the spending to be frivolous.   
  R. Huna tests his son to see if his son will be angry when R. Huna tears up his own property. R. Huna seems to want to see if his son cares for him, or only cares for his father’s property. 
  If Rabbah gets angry then R. Huna will have caused him to sin by dishonoring his parents, and it is against the Torah to try to incite another person to sin.The answer is that R. Huna forgave his honor. I’m not really sure how this would work—if he tells Rabbah he is forgiving his honor, then the whole test won’t really work. And if he doesn’t tell him, then how is he forgiving his honor? 
  Again, the Talmud wonders how R. Huna could do this—isn’t it forbidden to needlessly destroy propertyThe answer is that he tore the garment at the seam, so it could be resewn.But if he tore it at the seam, then it might not have been a good test. Maybe he didn’t get angry because he saw that no harm was done.The answer is that Rabbah was already angry about something else. Once angry, he would not notice that the tear was at the seam.I think we can see here that the Talmud is not comfortable with R. Huna’s test of his son.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains a halakhic discussion between R. Yehezkel and his sons, Rami and R. Judah. The issue is a passage from Sanhedrin about executed criminals who are mixed up with one another and the court does not know which execution to give them. [This is clearly a theoretical discussion, whose main point is moral—you can never give out a death penalty worse than the person deserves]. 
  According to R. Shimon, burning is a more severe penalty than stoning. And since the court cannot give a condemned criminal a worse death penalty, they must all be executed by stoning.
  R. Judah points out that if the majority are condemned to be stoned, then there would be two reasons to stone them and not burn them—1) It is a less severe penalty; 2) It is what the majority are to receive. Rather, he should change the order of the words—it is a few who are to be stoned who are mixed up with the majority that are to be burned. This helps isolate R. Shimon’s principle. Despite the fact that the majority should have been burned, they all must be stoned because it is prohibited to give a criminal a more severe penalty than he deserves. 
  R. Yehezkel responds—if you switch around the words such that the majority should have been burned, then the sages’ position has the same problem that R. Shimon’s statement had according to the original version. The sages think that stoning is the worse punishment and therefore they are all to be burned. But if the majority is those that should have been burned, then again, there are two reasons they all are burned.
  R. Judah responds that in this line the rabbis are just responding to R. Shimon, disagreeing with him as to which punishment is more severe.This is the end of the section about stoning and burning. The Talmud will now discuss how R. Yehezkel’s son interacted with him.
  Shmuel rebukes R. Judah, whom he calls “toothy one” for speaking so directly to his father. One is allowed to tell one’s father that he has done something wrong—but he must say so in a very indirect manner, one that will not cause the father grief.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya talks about situations in which one might not be obligated to honor one’s parent. 
  The issue here is a conflict between honoring one’s parent and performing a mitzvah. According to the first opinion, since all Jews are obligated to perform mitzvoth, the son should first perform the mitzvah and then honor is father. But the second opinion looks at the issue more pragmatically—can both mitzvoth be accomplished. If the other mitzvah, for instance, such as burying the dead, can be performed by others, then he should let others do that mitzvah and he should help his father. Note there is still a hierarchy here, but if it is possible to avoid the conflict, the conflict should be avoided.
  All rabbis agree that a parent can forgo his rights to his honor. But they argue about whether a rabbi can. R. Yitzchak argues that he cannot. A sage’s honor is due him because of the Torah he has learned—this Torah is not his and therefore he cannot forgo his honor.R. Joseph argues through an analogy with God that a sage can forgo his honor. If God humbled God’s self by leading the people through the wilderness, then a sage too should be allowed to forgo his honor.But Rava pushes back—God can forgo God’s honor because the world belongs to God. But the Torah does not belong to the sage. The sage cannot forgo the honor due him because the honor is not really due him—it is due to his Torah learning, which is not really his.
  
  Daf 32b
  
  Rava later changed his mind—the Torah does belong to the sage, and therefore should he decide to forgive his honor, the honor due him is forgiven.
  In this story Rava gets angry with R. Mari and R. Pinchas who do not stand up before him. This seems to mean that even though he forgave his honor by serving them drinks, they still must honor him.
  Again, a rabbi gets angry when others do not show him respect.The resolution is that when a rabbi forgives his honor, others are not technically obligated to honor him. Still, they should show him some respect.Seems like the Talmud is walking a thin line, but such is the nature of people forgiving other’s the honor due them. Sort of reminds me of people who say they don’t want a big fuss made over their birthday. Often, this means that they really do want a big fuss over their birthday, but feel a bit uncomfortable about it. [I, however, really do not want a fuss over my birthday. But it’s July 16, if you are curious).
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss who is allowed to forgive their honor and who is not. 
  The “Nasi” was the political leader of the Jews in Eretz Yisrael and in Babylonia during the Talmudic period. The role of this leader is hard to pin down, but he seems to have held some real power over the Jews. According to R. Ashi, the Nasi cannot choose to forgive his honor. His honor comes from his office and there is general utility to it—it is important for people to respect their political leaders. I’m sure that this is true in many countries. One cannot call the President by his first name, one cannot touch the queen (I think they forgot to tell that to Trump). There are rules and these rules were not created by the people who currently inhabit the office.
  R. Eliezer does not want Rabban Gamaliel, the Nasi, to give him drink even at his own son’s wedding. But R. Joshua says that it is okay—after all Abraham served drinks to his guests. Thus we see that according to R. Joshua, a Nasi can forgive his own honor.
  R. Zadok one-ups R. Joshua—even God, in a sense, serves people. So why shouldn’t we allow R. Gamaliel to pour us drinks?
  The Talmud now emends R. Ashi’s statement. There are those who allow the Nasi to forgive his honor, but no one allows the king to forgive his honor.
  IntroductionSince we have been discussing honor, the Talmud moves on to a discussion of the Torah’s commandment that one stand before an elder. The full verse from Leviticus 19:32 reads, “Before a hoary head you shall stand, and you should show deference to an elder; you shall fear your God: I am the LORD.”
  Two tannaim use two different prooftexts to prove that the obligation to stand in front of an elder refers to a sage, and not just any old person.
  The baraita teaches four things:1)	One does not need to rise in front of a sage who is far away since this does not really honor him.2)	One does not need to honor the sage by giving him money (although I’m sure he’d be delighted to receive it).3)	 One does not rise in a place like a bathroom or bathhouse. These are not places of reverence. 4)	It is not okay to pretend one did not see the elder and thereby avoid rising. This is why the Torah states, “and you shall fear your God.” God will know whether you’re telling the truth or not.   
  R. Shimon b. Elazar adds that the elder should not put himself into a position whereby he forces others to rise.Issi b. Judah disagrees with the definition of an “elder” from the beginning of the baraita. He holds that one must rise before any old person, even if he is not an elder.  
  R. Yose the Galilean and the first opinion in the baraita seem to hold the same opinion but merely derive it from a different source. Both hold that the word “elder” means “sage” and not just an old person.The Talmud posits that they disagree about a young sage. According to the first opinion, for the mitzvah to apply the sage must also be an elder. In other words, they read two things into the word “elder”—sage and old.R. Yose the Galilean holds that one must stand even in front of a young sage. 
  R. Yose the Galilean bases his opinion on the fact that the Torah uses two phrases—the first referring to the hoary head, and the second to the elder. This implies that they are different, and that the commandment to honor includes even a young sage.
  The first Tanna responds to R. Yose the Galilean—the reason that the Torah split them up was to make sure that the word “you shall fear” is near the elder. This teaches us that the elder (sage) should not make things difficult for others.
  The rabbis claim that had the verse referred to two different people it should have applied both verbs to both types of people—the young and old sage. The fact that one verb applies to each implies that they are identical.We should note that the Talmud spends a lot of time discussing honoring the young sage. It seems to ignore the opinion that the verse refers to any old person, even one who is not a sage.
  
  Daf 33a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss the obligation to stand up before a sage. The baraita had taught that one does not need to rise if it will cause a financial loss. 
  The Talmud clarifies a line in the baraita. We might have thought that while a person does not need to spend money to honor a sage, he should stand before a sage even if this involves a loss of money through cessation of work. The Talmud clarifies that it does not. A person should not stop working to stand before a sage.The last line provides a context for this—an artisan. An artisan is working for someone else, but not on an hourly basis. For instance, a cobbler making a pair of shoes. We might have thought that he could stop working because he’ll just continue working later, and he is not cheating his employer of his paid time. The Talmud says that even this is not allowed because it takes up time in which he could be completing the project. I think there is an important message in this piece, one that is very hard to observe these days, with all of the distractions in our lives. When we are working, we are working for others and we owe them the best that we can do. It is a value and we need to take it seriously (I am not lecturing you, my readers, I am mostly confessing to my own sins). 
  The Talmud cites a source that refers to the farmers bringing their first fruits to Jerusalem. As they enter the city, artisans stand before them and greet them. This implies that artisans are allowed to stop working to stand up in honor of other people coming through.The resolution is that artisans can stop working to greet the farmers going to the Temple, but they may not do so to greet sages.  
  R. Yose b. Abin draws a lesson from the fact that artisans can stand before the farmers but not before the scholars—a mitzvah being performed in its proper time is a higher value, even then the respect due to scholars.But the Talmud notes that this may not be the proper explanation of why artisans are allowed to stand before the farmers. It might be that if they are not greeted properly, they will not return the following year. In other words, it is not the value of what they are currently doing, it is the fact that they need encouragement, and maybe scholars do not need as much encouragement.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with two more lines from the baraita about standing before a sage.
  The baraita states teaches that one does not need to rise before a sage in a bath-house or bathroom (toilet). Nevertheless, R. Shimon son of Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi] is offended when R. Hiyya does not stand in front of him even though he is in a bath-house. He even goes and complains about it to his father.
  Again, another sage does not stand up in front of R. Shimon b. Rabbi and the latter gets upset. Rabbi provides an excuse for why the sage might not have stood in front of his son, but the principle remains—the sage should have stood up.
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty—in the inner rooms, one need not rise in front of a sage. But in the outer rooms, he must.The idea that Bar Kapara was in an outer room is also logical, for if he were in the inner room, he would not have been allowed to even think about Torah.However, this last support for the resolution is not certain. It is possible that Bar Kapara was in the inner chamber and was thinking about Torah, even though he should not have been doing so. After all, one does not always have control of one’s thoughts.
  The baraita does not really need to tell people not to close their eyes to ignore a sage once the sage comes into view. The baraita is not addressing people who would willfully break the law. Rather the baraita is addressing one who might close his eyes before the sage is even close enough such that the obligation to rise kicks in. Technically this would be allowed. Therefore the Torah states “you shall fear.” A person should not intentionally put himself in a position to avoid fulfilling a commandment.
  How close to one’s teacher must one be for one to be obligated to rise? The baraita rules four amot, but Abaye restricts this to a regular teacher. If the teacher is his primary teacher, he must rise if he is anywhere within his sight.The story here seems to illustrate that while some rabbis took this mitzvah seriously, not all did. 
  The baraita had taught that the sage should not trouble the people to rise in front of him. Abaye adds that a sage will live longer by not making other people rise. It seems that there is some sort of “measure for measure” reward in this idea. Making people stand in order to honor oneself means using their energy, in a sense shortening their lives. Avoiding using other people for one’s own ends brings one longer life.
  Evidently being in the presence of a rabbi requires one to cover one’s head. R. Yirmiyah of Difti calls a man chutzpadik for not covering his head in his presence. But, it turns out that if you are from a place full of rabbis, then maybe you have an excuse. 
  The halakhah follows Issi who said that one must stand before any old person, not just a sage. 
  Some rabbis even rose up in front of non-Jewish elders. After all, the non-Jewish elder has undergone just as many life experiences as has the Jew. Rava found a compromise and would show them respect but not rise up.
  These other rabbis found other ways to help the elders. Abaye would give them a hand so that they could lean on him. R. Nahman does not want to help them himself and instead finds agents to do so. He reasons that his Torah learning is irreplaceable and therefore it is better for him to perform the mitzvah through others.
  Jews recite the Shema in praise of God twice a day. A Torah scholar should not rise before his teacher more than twice a day so that the teacher’s honor not supersede that of God. I think we can sense here that rabbis were accorded a high level of honor, and that there was a fear that this honor would exceed proper boundaries and perhaps the students would revere their teacher’s more than God. It is this mentality that R. Yannai is trying to curb.  
  
  Daf 33b
  
  Jews recite the Shema in praise of God twice a day. A Torah scholar should not rise before his teacher more than twice a day so that the teacher’s honor not supersede that of God. I think we can sense here that rabbis were accorded a high level of honor, and that there was a fear that this honor would exceed proper boundaries and perhaps the students would revere their teacher’s more than God. It is this mentality that R. Yannai is trying to curb.
  R. Elazar reads a verse in Kohelet in light of the verse about standing before a sage in Leviticus. Both contain the phrase “fear God” and while other verses talk about fearing God in the context of other mitzvoth (not having false weights, and not lending to other Jews with interest) only these two verses use the word “pene.” The verse about rising reads “מפני שיבה” and the verse in Kohelet says, “מלפני אלוהים.”R. Elazar derives that he will forget his Talmud from the phrase “Good (tov) will not be”—“good” is a code word for Torah, as in the phrase, “For I have given you a good teaching.”
  IntroductionToday’s section asks a series of questions about the liability to rise. 
  If the son is the father’s teacher, does the son still have to rise before his father? In other words, if one relationship has been turned on its head, the norm being that the older person is the teacher, is the other relationship, father-son, overturned as well?
  This story seems to prove that a son should always stand before his father, for Shmuel instructs R. Judah to stand in front of his father, even though his father was his son’s student.The Talmud rejects this argument—R. Judah was not told to stand in front of his father because of his father’s scholarly characteristics. It was his father’ good deeds that caused Shmuel to rebuke R. Judah for not standing, and even other sages stood in front of him.What Shmuel was telling him was not just to honor his father. He was telling him to honor his father even at Shmuel’s expense. 
  Above we said that the son who is a scholar need not stand in front of his father. But should the father stand in front of him.R. Joshua ben Levi says that the only reason he stands before his son is that his son is part of the Nasi’s (the political leader’s) household. But, the Talmud reasons out, that the reason the father says he should not stand in front of his son is that the father is the teacher. But if the son were the teacher, the father would stand in front of him.  
  The Talmud adjusts the meaning of what R. Joshua ben Levi said. R. Joshua b. Levi thinks it is always inappropriate for a father to stand in front of his son, even if the son is the teacher.
  The question is whether one must stand in front of one’s teacher if the teacher is riding by on a horse. Is he considered to be sitting, in which case one must rise, or do we consider him walking, in which case one need not rise?Abaye derives the answer from a mishnah about purity. The issue is how impurity is conveyed in a “tent”—the branches of the tree overshadow both the impure person and the pure person.If the impure person is sitting, he conveys impurity.If the impure person is standing, he does not convey impurity.If a person is carrying an impure stone, and he sits down, the stone conveys impurity. But if he is standing, the stone does not convey impurity.From this line, R. Nahman b. Cohen proves that riding is the same as walking. The impure stone is riding on the person, but is considered to be walking, and therefore does not convey impurity.
  This is the source of the practice of standing up in the presence of the Torah.
  R. Shimon b. Abba describes himself as only a “haver.” In this context it seems to mean that he is less than a sage. This is the first reason that they should not rise in front of him. The second reason is that since they are actively engaged in studying Torah, they are Torah itself. He, on the other hand, is just a student of Torah.It is admittedly a strange story. Perhaps it shows some discomfort that sages felt with having other sages stand in front of him.   
  R. Elazar held that students who are studying Torah cannot rise before their teacher. The act of study takes priority over the respect due to the teacher. But Abaye believed that this was disrespectful to the teacher and therefore he cursed anyone who acted in this way. [Seems a bit harsh to curse them, but I guess he felt pretty strongly about it]. 
  The Talmud cites a dispute between two amoraim concerning the verse that describes the people looking at Moses until he enters the tent. Those who interpret it derogatorily refer to a midrash not even cited by the Talmud. Rashi explains that the people were making fun of Moses’ appearance—his fat thighs and oily neck. [I’m serious—this is what Rashi says!]
  The Talmud cites a dispute between two amoraim concerning the verse that describes the people looking at Moses until he enters the tent. Those who interpret it derogatorily refer to a midrash not even cited by the Talmud. Rashi explains that the people were making fun of Moses’ appearance—his fat thighs and oily neck. [I’m serious—this is what Rashi says!]
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins by listing some positive commandments that are time-bound and thus women are exempt, and some that are not time-bound and thus women are obligated. 
  Sukkah and lulav can be performed only on Sukkot, and the shofar only on Rosh Hashanah.Tzitzit is not worn at night, and tefillin are not worn on Shabbat or holidays. Thus these too have a set time.
  
  Daf 34a
  
  Most of these are self-explanatory. The guard rail refers to the commandment to put a railing around one’s roof so that no one falls off.
  IntroductionThe Talmud notes that the rules in the mishnah concerning when women are obligated and when they are exempt have many exceptions. 
  There are many positive time-bound commandments in which women are obligated and there are positive non-time bound commandments that they are exempt from. So how can the Mishnah propose a general rule?
  R. Yohanan says that we simply do not learn from general rules, even if the rule cites a particular exception. He proves this from the case of food used to make an eruv (a common meal that transforms a courtyard into the domain of one person) or a shittuf (the same thing but with an alleyway). The mishnah states that any food product can be used except water or salt because these are not really foods. However, there is another exception—mushrooms, which also are not considered a food, assumedly because they don’t really have any true substance to them.So what then is the point of a general rule? It seems like these are rules of thumb. They are there because they are generally true, and they help one remember the rule. But they are not strong enough to derive from them any halakhah. Knowing that women are exempt from positive time bound commandments helps one remember what they are obligated in and what they are not. But one cannot derive from here any halakhah.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains how we derive that women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments and it also discusses a few exceptions. 
  To find out why women are exempt from time-bound commandments, the Talmud seeks a paradigm and finds it in tefillin. Women are exempt from tefillin, because tefillin is compared to the study of Torah in Deuteronomy 6:7-8 (the first paragraph of Shema). And from Deuteronomy 11:19 we derive that women are exempt from Talmud Torah.
  The Shema also mentions the mezuzah, and women are obligated in mezuzah. So why not say that tefillin are compared to mezuzah and that women should be obligated to wear them.The answer is that tefillin is immediately juxtaposed to the study of Torah in both the first and second paragraphs of the Shema, but it is juxtaposed to mezuzah only in the first. Therefore tefillin is more like Talmud Torah than mezuzah.   
  If the second chapter of Shema compares mezuzah to Talmud Torah, then maybe women should not be obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah. So why are they obligated?The answer is that immediately after the mitzvah of mezuzah, the Torah says “that your days be multiplied”—that you live a long life. Since women want and need life as much as men, they too are obligated in mezuzah.
  Sukkah is a positive time-bound commandment. Women are exempt but not because of a general rule. Rather, there is a special midrash on the word “ha’ezrah”—often translated as the citizen—that exempts them. Were this word not written there, it would seem that, contrary to the rule, they would be obligated.  
  Abaye explains why we need a separate teaching to exempt women from dwelling in the sukkah. There is a midrash on the words “You shall dwell” which are generally interpreted to mean that you shall dwell in the sukkah as you dwell in your house. Since husbands and wives live together in their house, perhaps they should also live together in the sukkah. Therefore, the word “ha-ezrah” comes to teach that women are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah.
  Rava points out another reason we might have thought women were liable for the sukkah—it falls on the fifteenth of the month, as does Pesah. Since women are obligated to eat matzah on Pesah which falls on the fifteenth of the month, so too they would be liable for sukkah which falls on the fifteenth of the month. This is why we need the midrash to teach that they are exempt.
  
  Daf 34b
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to deal with other cases of positive time-bound commandments. 
  The mitzvah to appear at the Temple during a festival is a positive time-bound commandment—it should not apply to women. So why then do we need a verse to exclude women? 
  Women are obligated to gather at the Temple at the end of the Sabbatical cycle (Deuteronomy 31:11). I might have thought that since they are obligated for this mitzvah, they are also obligated for the pilgrimage, despite its being a positive time-bound commandment. Therefore, the Torah specifically exempts women from the pilgrimage.
  IntroductionWe continue to discuss the derivation of the rule that women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments. 
  The fact that women are exempt from tefillin led the rabbis to derive the general rule that they are always exempt from positive time-bound commandments. But instead of deriving the general rule from tefillin, why not derive it from the mitzvah to rejoice on the festival, a positive time-bound commandment which women are obligated in, as we learn explicitly in Deuteronomy 16:14-15.Abaye essentially exempts women from an independent commandment to rejoice on the festival. The husband is obligated to make her happy, but she herself is not obligated to rejoice. If she is a widow, then those men who are accompanying her (chaperones?) are obligated to make her happy.As a side note, we can see here the development of a rule. The rule that women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments was originally descriptive and prescriptive. It, for the most part, was an accurate description of what mitzvoth women are obligated in. But by Abaye’s time it becomes prescriptive, for after all, rules are not really rules if they have exceptions. Abaye uses the rule to exempt women from a mitzvah they were previously obligated in.    
  Women are obligated to “assemble” in Jerusalem at the end of the seventh year. So why not learn from this commandment that they are obligated in all positive time-bound commandments?The answer is that we now have two positive time-bound commandments for which women are obligated—matzah and “gathering.” And there is a rule that if we have two mitzvoth that fit a rule, then that rule applies only to those two and not to other mitzvoth. The logic is that had the Torah wanted this to be a consistent rule, it would have stated the rule with regard to one mitzvah and from there we could have applied it everywhere. So when it made the statement with regard to two mitzvoth, the idea was that it should apply there and nowhere else.    
  The Talmud has now boxed itself into a discursive corner—if we don’t learn from two verses that “come as one” why not say that tefillin and pilgrimage are also two verses that come as one, for they are both positive time-bound commandments which explicitly exclude women?
  The Talmud now explains that we actually needed the Torah to exempt women in both the case of tefillin and pilgrimage. Had the Torah stated the rule with regard to one, I would not have been able to derive the other.Had we not learned that women are exempt from pilgrimage (at all three festivals) I would have thought that just as they are obligated in “assembling” (at the end of seven years) so too they are obligated in pilgrimage.And had I not learned that they were exempt from tefillin, I would have compared them to mezuzah, for they are right next to the mitzvah of mezuzah in the Shema.Since we need both verses, this is not considered a case of “two verses that come as one.”
  IntroductionToday’s section continues where we left off yesterday—if two verses state the same rule, but both are necessary, then we can say that they teach a general rule. Such a case is not considered “two verses that come as one.” 
  Women are obligated in both assembling and in eating matzah. So why not say that they both are necessary and that we could use these two to create a general rule (as we did for tefillin and pilgrimage).Now stating that women are obligated in matzah is actually necessary, for if the Torah did not, I would have thought that just as they are exempt from sitting in the Sukkah which falls on the fifteenth, so too they are exempt from matzah, which also falls on the fifteenth.But we do not really need the Torah to teach us that women are obligated to assemble. If children are obligated to assemble, as the Torah explicitly states, then obviously adult women are. Therefore, this verse is really not necessary.And since it is not necessary, these two verses truly are “two verses that come as one.” The Torah could have stated the rule with regard to matzah and said nothing about assembling, and we would have known that women are obligated. And two verses that come as one do not aid in forming a general rule.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues where we left off last week, discussing the derivation of women’s exemption from positive time-bound commandments. The rule we learned was that “two verses that come as one do not teach” about a third issue. Meaning that the rule applies only to these issues and cannot be extended further. 
  The Talmud asks two difficulties—first of all, there are some sages who hold that we can learn from two verses that teach the same thing. If so, just as women are obligated in matzah and gathering, so too they are obligated in all positive time-bound commandments. The Talmud will return to this difficulty below.The other question is the source for the opposite rule—that they are obligated in positive non-time bound commandments.
  Women are obligated to fear their parents, as we learned above. Just as they are obligated in this commandment, so too they are obligated in all positive non-time bound commandments (below I will write PNTB).
  Women are exempt from Talmud Torah, despite its being a PNTB commandment. So why shouldn’t they be exempt from all such commandments?The answer--because they are exempt from two PNTB commandments—Torah study and procreation.
  
  Daf 35a
  
  R. Yohanan b. Beroka holds that women are obligated in the mitzvah of procreation. This leaves them exempt only from Talmud Torah—so why not use that as a paradigm and make them exempt from PNTB commandments?The answer—there is another PNTB commandment for which they are exempt—redeeming the first born. Only the father is obligated to redeem his first born.
  R. Yohanan b. Beroka holds that women are obligated to procreate and to fear their parents—so we now have a situation of two verses that come as one, and therefore we should not have a rule that women are obligated in PNTB commandments.
  The Talmud now will explain why both verses are necessary and therefore are not really a case of “two verses that come as one.” The Torah had to explicitly obligate a woman in procreation (according to R. Yohanan b. Beroka) for otherwise I would have thought that she is exempt because the Torah instructs humankind to “conquer” and women’s nature is not to conquer (this can be certainly be disputed, but there are people who might agree that men have a greater tendency towards war).
  If the Torah had not taught that women are obligated to fear their parents I might have thought that they are exempt because women often do not have the opportunity to fear their parents because they are with their husband (we learned this above). Therefore, the Torah had to teach that they are obligated.Since both verses are necessary this is not a case of two verses that come as one.
  IntroductionWe continue with the discussion of the source for the exemption of women from positive time-bound commandments. There are some rabbis who hold that two verses that come as one can teach about a third case. So if this is so, then why don’t we use two matzah and gathering on the seventh year to obligate women in all positive time-bound commandments, just as they are obligated in those two?  
  The Papunians, those from a place called Papuna, have another source for the exemption of women from all positive time-bound commandments. The verse in Exodus compares the Torah to tefillin. And since we know that women are exempt from tefillin (because tefillin is compared to Torah study), women are exempt from all such mitzvoth. And if they are exempt from time-bound commandments, they must be obligated in non-time bound ones.
  R. Meir holds that tefillin are not time-bound. R. Meir holds that they must be worn all the time. So what is his source for women being obligated in positive non-time bound commandments? The answer is that he holds that two verses that come as one do not teach. Therefore, matzah and gathering cannot serve as a paradigm to obligate women in positive time-bound commandments. 
  R. Judah has a bigger problem—he too holds that tefillin are not a time-bound commandment. Plus he holds that two verses that come as one can teach about others. So why then do we not hold that matzah and gathering teach that they are obligated?The answer is that we have a third verse, the obligation to rejoice on festivals. R. Judah holds that they are obligated for this mitzvah as well. And since everyone holds that when three verses come as one do not teach, we now have no source to obligate women for positive time-bound commandments.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now looks for a source for the obligation of women in all negative commandments.
  One source for the rule that women are obligated in negative commandments is Numbers 5:6 which explicitly mentions both males and females.
  The first verse in parshat Mishpatim uses the plural—“before them.” Thus women are obligated in all civil laws.  
  This verse equates men and women in the case of an animal that kills a human being. In such a case the master must pay a ransom in order to avoid the death penalty. 
  There are three derivations of the general rule—the first from a verse about atonement for accidental sins, the second about civil law, and the third about paying a ransom when an animal murders a human being. Why do we need all three?The first would not be sufficient to teach that women are subject to all civil law because women did not engage in commerce as did men.The second, about civil law, would not be sufficient to teach that if an animal kills a woman the owner must pay a ransom because women are not obligated in all commandments, as are men. (I know, this is a bit of an ugly one. But I do think it is a faithful representation of what happens when you exempt people from commandments. You might start to think that there life is less worthy than those fully commanded. This seems to be what might have happened to at least one strand of rabbinic thought).If all we had was the third rule we might have thought that in that case, men and women were equated because it is a matter of life. But in cases of atonement or civil laws, they are not equal. Therefore we need all three derivations to teach that they are equal in all negative commandments.   
  
  Daf 35b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to deal with the few negative commandments that do not apply to women. This was dealt with in the mishnah, but since it’s been a while, I am reproducing it here:And all negative commandments, whether time-bound or not time-bound, both men and women are obligated, except for the prohibition against rounding [the corners of the head], and the prohibition against marring [the corner of the beard], and the prohibition [for a priest] to become impure through contact with the dead.
  The Torah refers to the sons of Aaron when transmitting the prohibition of defiling oneself to take care of the dead. Therefore, this mitzvah applies only to males, not to females.
  The Talmud now turns to the prohibitions of marring and rounding—both of which refer to parts of the head. This source teaches that since they are not subject to the prohibition of marring, they are not subject to the prohibition of rounding. Below, we will address how we know they are not subject to the prohibition of marring.
  There are two ways to exempt women from the prohibition of marring the corner of their beards. First, women do not normally have beards. Second, the verse uses the singular in reference to the beard. This changing of the person teaches that men are prohibited but not women.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita that says that the beard that grows on a woman’s face or on a eunuch’s face counts as a beard in all matters. This seems to contradict the mishnah which says women are not obligated in matters related to the beard.
  Abaye says that you cannot read the baraita as being in respect to marring one’s beard because the word “corner” appears here and in the mitzvoth given to priests (Leviticus 21:5). Since there it refers only to men, so too here in the commandment not to mar one’s beard issued to all Israelites it refers only to men.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty. Leviticus 21 is directed at sons of Aaron, and therefore we would assume that the prohibition against marring one’s beard applies only to the males. And from here we could use kal vehomer argument to derive that the same is true for Israelites, because priests have more commandments in general than Israelites. So then why do we need the gezerah shavah comparing the word “corner” in both contexts? 
  The gezerah shavah is necessary to exempt women from the prohibition of marring one’s beard, for without it I would have thought that the opening words “sons of Aaron” applies only to the first few halakhot which deal with impurity, and not all of the mitzvoth in the chapter.
  The Talmud now asks why not say that indeed “sons of Aaron” refers only to the first commandments in Leviticus 21 and that the comparison of the verses (the gezerah shavah) is there to teach what instruments are included in the prohibition to shave—only a razor and not scissors, pincers or some sort of remover.This returns us to our original question—how do we know that women are exempt from this prohibition?
  The Talmud concludes that the Torah uses the word “corner” when it does not really need to do so in order to teach two comparisons: 1) both prohibitions refer to the same shaving implements; 2) women are excluded from the prohibition.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss women with beards. 
  If women are exempt from the prohibition of marring their beards, then what does the baraita mean when it says that their beards are like a man’s beard in all respects?Mar Zutra answers that it refers to the impurity of scale disease. Scale disease on a woman or eunuch’s beard is treated differently than it would be if it was on another part of the skin.
  The Torah explicitly refers to a man or a woman when discussing an affliction upon the head or beard. So why do I need this baraita to tell me something learned directly in the Torah?The answer is that I might have thought that “beard” refers only to the man. The baraita comes to teach us that with regard to scale disease, women too can have beards.
  IntroductionDeuteronomy 14:1-2 contains a prohibition of gashing oneself or of making a bald spot on one’s head. In our sugya, a sage says that women are liable for this mitzvah too.
  Issi interprets the word “sons” as excluding women from the prohibition of making a bald spot on their heads.
  According to Issi, the prohibition against cutting refers to all of the holy people, men and women. The prohibition against making a bald spot refers only to men.
  Why does the baraita include women in the prohibition of cutting but not baldness? The prohibition against cutting is broader—it applies both to places that have hair and that don’t. Therefore, it applies to both men and women.
  Why not say that women are also exempt from cutting. We could then interpret “for you are a holy people” to refer to the gashing mentioned in Leviticus 21:5 (because it would be analogized to the prohibitions in Deuteronomy).Issi holds that gashing and cutting are the same prohibition. Therefore the “you are a holy people” phrase must refer to cutting, for otherwise it would have no referent.
  
  Daf 36a
  
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s daf Issi posited that women are exempted from the prohibition of making a bald spot between their eyes (Deuteronomy 14:1) just as men are. While one explanation of his opinion has already been proffered, today’s section offers another one. 
  Abaye explains that Issi exempts women from the prohibition of making a bald spot by comparing the prohibition in Deuteronomy with that in Leviticus. Since Leviticus refers only to men (“sons of Aaron”) and not daughters of Aaron.The Talmud then asks why we need this gezerah shavah from Leviticus. We could say that the Leviticus 21:1 “Speak to the sons of Aaron” refers to the whole passage, including the prohibition of making a bald spot. Then we could derive from a “kal vehomer” that all women, not just priestly women, are exempt from the mitzvah. 
  The gezerah shavah is needed so that we can derive that the address in the beginning of Leviticus, “Speak to the sons of Aaron” refers to the whole passage, including that about making a bald spot. If we did not have the gezerah shavah we might have thought that women priests (daughters of priests) are prohibited from making a bald spot and that the exclusion of women refers only to the first few mitzvoth in the passage.   
  The Talmud pushes the argument further. We could say that “Speak to the sons of Aaron” refers only to the first few verses and not to the prohibition of making a bald spot. And the gezerah shavah is needed for another baraita that teaches the rules governing this prohibition. [The gezerah shavah appears in the continuation]. The baraita teaches two rules. 1) One is liable for each bald spot. 2) The prohibition refers to the whole head, not just between the eyes, as is stated in Deuteronomy. 
  This is the continuation of the baraita. It contains the gezerah shavah which connects Leviticus with Deuteronomy so that the rules in the former which were stated with regard to priests also apply to the latter, a verse stated with regard to all of Israel. 
  The Talmud says that the word is written in an unusual fashion, which allows us to “double darshan” the gezerah shavah. The gezerah shavah teaches us that the verse about baldness refers only to men and it also teaches us that the rules in Leviticus apply to the priests, just as the do to Israelites.
  IntroductionRava offers yet another reason why Issi exempts women from the prohibition of making a bald spot on their heads.
  The words “between your eyes” appear in connection with the bald spot prohibition and tefillin—just as women are exempt from tefillin, so too they are exempt from the bald spot prohibition. 
  At the end of yesterday’s section, Abaye had to posit a different between the word “kerah” and “korhah.” Rava thinks that’s a stretch.
  Abaye says we cannot derive one of the rules for the bald spot from tefillin because elsewhere we learn in the opposite direction, deriving the rules for tefillin from the bald spot prohibition. Tefillin must be worn above the hair line, where one can make a bald spot. They are not worn literally between the eyes.
  This baraita contains a dispute between R. Judah and R. Meir over whether Israel remains “sons of God” (or children of God) even after they sin. According to R. Judah the verse from Deuteronomy 14 indicates that if they do not behave, Israel can lose their status as sons. R. Meir cites a plethora of verses that refer to Israel as sons even after they sin.   
  The Talmud explains why R. Meir needs so many verses to prove his point. Ultimately, even idol worshipping Israelites are still called “sons of the living God.” This is a deep, but in some ways problematic message. On the one hand, it provides hope to all Israelites. No matter how much a Jew is distanced from God and Judaism, in the eyes of Judaism, he/she remains a Jew. On the other hand, one could read here a genealogical understanding of Judaism that prioritizes genes over everything else, even morality.
  IntroductionThis mishnah lists a number of ritual procedures performed upon bringing a sacrifice which are performed by men and not by women. The Talmud will explain how we know that 
  The [rites of] laying hands:  Most animal sacrifices require the person offering the sacrifice lay his hands upon the animal before the animal is slaughtered (see for instance Lev. 1:4).  Only men lay their hands upon the sacrifice. When women bring the sacrifice, no one lays their hands.Waving:  After the animal is slaughtered parts of it are waved jointly by the priest and by the male owner of the sacrifice (see Lev. 7:30).  If a woman brought the sacrifice the priest waves it by himself.Presenting [the meal-offering]:  When a person brings a meal-offering (a minhah), they present it to the priest. The priest then takes it and presents it to the altar (Lev. 6:7).  Only male priests present the minhah—daughters of priests do not.Taking the handful:  With a minhah offering, the priest takes a handful of the offering (Lev. 2:2).  Again, only male priests perform this rite.Burning [the fat]:  See Lev 3:5.Pinching off [the neck of bird sacrifices]:  See Lev 1:15.Sprinkling and receiving [the blood]:  See Lev 5:9.Except the meal-offering of a Sotah and a female nazirite, where they [themselves] wave the offering:  The Sotah waves a minhah offering and the nazirite waves the leg of the animal she/he brings, a bread-offering and a wafer (see Sotah 3:1 and Nazir 6:9).   In each case the woman and the priest would jointly wave the offering. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to provide sources for the exemption of women from the rituals mentioned in the mishnah. These are all self-explanatory. 
  In this case we do not have a verse that specifies that states “sons of Aaron.” But pinching off the head off the bird is compared to burning, so the analogy can be drawn.
  The rabbis interpret “shall offer” as drawing the blood near to the altar. 
  
  Daf 36b
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya tries to explain what “sprinkling” of the blood is referred to in the mishnah. There are several occasions on which a priest sprinkles blood. Which occasion is one in which we need to know that women cannot do so?
  The sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer can be performed only by the deputy high priest, as it was by Elazar in the wilderness. The sprinkling inside the Holy of Holies must be performed by the high priest. If even other priests cannot do this sprinkling, all the more so women cannot. Thus the mishnah should not even need to state this.
  The sprinkling referred to is the sprinkling of the blood of a bird offering on the altar. That it must be offered by a male priest is derived from an inference from animal offerings. Even an Israelite may slaughter an animal offering, but only a priest can sprinkle its blood. So if only a priest can slaughter a bird offering, obviously only a priest can sprinkle its blood.
  IntroductionThe mishnah had stated that women who are a sotah (a woman suspected of adultery) and a nezirah, a woman who took a nazirite vow, can wave their own meal offerings. These are exceptions to the general rule that women do not perform Temple rituals. 
  The question which emerges from this section is how we know that the meal offering of a sotah is waved by its owners and not by the priests.
  The word “hand” is used in the context of the sotah offering and the peace-offering. This allows the rabbis to combine the two procedures—in the context of the sotah-offering it seems like the priest is supposed to wave the offering, whereas in the context of the peace-offering it seems like the owner brings it. So the resolution is that they both do so together.
  The word “kaf” is used in both the context of the sotah (Numbers 6:19) and the nezirah (Numbers 5:18). This allows the process used in the sotah to be applied to the nezirah. She too waves her offering with the priest’s hand underneath.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with a mishnah that discusses which commandments are obligatory only inside the land of Israel and which are incumbent on Jews no matter where they live. 
  In general, all commandments which are connected to the land are practiced only in the land of Israel.  There are some commandments such as tefillin concerning which the Torah uses language such as “When God brings you into the land…” (Exodus 13:5).  One might have thought that these commandments would be obligatory only for a Jew living in the land of Israel. The mishnah, however, says that the distinction between commandments observed in and outside of Israel is not the language used in the Torah but rather whether or not the observance of the commandment itself is tied to land.The only exceptions to this rule are “orlah” and “kilayim.”  “Orlah” is the prohibition of using the fruit of a tree for its first three years.   “Kilayim” refers to the prohibition of planting wheat in a vineyard.Rabbi Elazar adds to the list of exceptions the prohibition of new produce.  This refers to the prohibition from eating from the new grain harvest until the omer sacrifice is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:14).  
  
  
  Daf 37a
  
  The Torah occasionally says “when you come into the Land you shall do something.” We might have thought that mitzvoth that are dependent on the Land means mitzvoth about which the Torah uses such a phrase. The problem is that the Torah uses this phrase in relation to two mitzvoth that appear together—tefillin and the redemption of the first born donkey (Exodus 13:11-16), two mitzvoth that are obligatory outside the Land.Therefore, R. Judah interprets the phrase to mean literally you need land to perform the mitzvah. Thus for instance the rules of tithing need land—they refer to produce that grow on the land. Therefore, they are obligatory only in the land. Other mitzvoth such as tefillin that are not connected to the land are obligatory everywhere.  
  IntroductionThe Talmud now asks how we know the rule that mitzvoth dependent on land (soil) are obligatory in the land of Israel and those not dependent on land are obligatory everywhere. The section expounds on Deuteronomy 12:1 which reads in full:אֵ֠לֶּה הַֽחֻקִּ֣ים וְהַמִּשְׁפָּטִים֮ אֲשֶׁ֣ר תִּשְׁמְר֣וּן לַעֲשׂוֹת֒ בָּאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר֩ נָתַ֨ן יְהוָ֜ה אֱלֹהֵ֧י אֲבֹתֶ֛יךָ לְךָ֖ לְרִשְׁתָּ֑הּ כָּל־הַיָּמִ֔ים אֲשֶׁר־אַתֶּ֥ם חַיִּ֖ים עַל־הָאֲדָמָֽה׃These are the laws and rules that you must carefully observe in the land that the LORD, God of your fathers, is giving you to possess, as long as you live on earth.
  The baraita interprets each phrase in the verse as referring to a different aspect of rabbinic Judaism—study and practice. The key section for the issue at hand is the end. The phrase “in the land” makes it seem that all mitzvoth are obligatory only in the land. On the other hand, the phrase “on the earth” refers to those living anywhere. So which is it? 
  Now that we have the phrase “in the land” and “on the earth” we have to figure out which commandments are obligatory everywhere and which only in the Land. The baraita determines this from the first mitzvah mentioned immediately thereafter—the mitzvah to uproot idolatry. This is considered a personal obligation—a mitzvah that one does with one’s body, not with the Land. Therefore it is a paradigm for all mitzvoth—any mitzvah that is a personal duty is obligatory no matter where one lives.I might add that this sugya prevents a limiting of Judaism to those living in the Land, a notion that might have been catastrophic for the history of Judaism. Had rabbis decided that mitzvoth need only be observed inside Israel, one might wonder if Judaism would still exist.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to discuss the relationship between R. Elazar and the first opinion in the mishnah—is R. Elazar more stringent or more lenient? For convenience sake I reproduce here the mishnah.Every commandment which is dependent on the land is practiced only in the land [of Israel]; and every commandment which is not dependent on the land is practiced both in and outside the land, except orlah and kilayim. Rabbi Elazar says:  also [the prohibition of] new produce.The section discusses the meaning of the last word in Leviticus 23:14, which prohibits eating new grain before the omer sacrifice is brought after Pesah. The verse reads:Until that very day, until you have brought the offering of your God, you shall eat no bread or parched grain or fresh ears; it is a law for all time throughout the ages in all your settlements.
  The first possibility is that R. Elazar is stricter than the first opinion. The first opinion says that the prohibition of eating new grain is prohibited only in Israel. The word “settlements” implies that Israel has taken possession and settled the land. Thus the prohibition is only applicable in a place that Israel takes possession of and settles—the Land of Israel. It is unlike orlah and kilayim which are obligatory everywhere.
  R. Elazar says that the prohibition of eating new produce applies everywhere, even outside the Land. The word “settlement” implies all settlements, wherever Jews may be living. 
  According to this reading, the first opinion holds that the prohibition of “hadash” applies everywhere, like orlah and kilayim. R. Elazar would say that hadash is obligatory only inside the land. The word “also” in the phrase, “also new produce” refers back to the beginning of the first tanna’s opinion---like most soil related prohibitions, new produce too is prohibited only in the Land. The word does not relate to its immediate antecedent, “except orlah and kilayim” for according to R. Elazar hadash differs from orlah and kilayim.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section, the Talmud debated the relationship between R. Elazar and the tanna kamma—was R. Elazar more lenient or stringent vis a vis the prohibition of new produce outside the land of Israel. Today’s section determines an answer to the question. 
  To prove that R. Elazar is more stringent than the first opinion, and holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere, the Talmud cites a statement made by Abaye. Abaye said that R. Yishmael disagrees with R. Elazar. R. Yishmael holds that wherever “settlement” is stated it means that the mitzvah is obligatory in the land, after Israel has conquered it and settled it. R. Yishmael is therefore lenient—he would rule that the prohibition of new produce is practiced only in the land. If R. Elazar disagrees, that means that he holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere.Within the baraita, R. Akiva argues that “settlement” is not a sign that the mitzvah is observed only in the land. After all, in Leviticus 23:3, the word is used in reference to Shabbat, and Shabbat is observed everywhere. R. Yishmael seems to think that Shabbat is an exception to the rule because it can be derived through a kal vehomer.In any case, this proves that R. Elazar holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere. The first opinion holds that it is observed only in the land. 
  In the baraita, R. Yishmael was referring to the libations brought with offerings (Numbers 15:2). But in this verse two words are used to indicate that the obligation occurs only in the land—תבואו, which means “enter” and “מושבותיכם” your settlements. For the rule to apply both of these words need to be used. If only “settlements” is used, then the mitzvah might apply outside the land.
  
  Daf 37b
  
  If R. Yishmael requires both the words entering and settlement, why didn’t he respond to R. Akiva that Shabbat is obligatory everywhere because only the word “settlements” is used and not the word “enter.”  
  Indeed, R. Yishmael could have made two responses against R. Akiva.
  The direct subject of the dispute between R. Akiva and R. Yishmael is whether they offered libations with the sacrifices offered in the Mishkan while still in the wilderness. R. Akiva holds that they did not, R. Yishmael holds that they did.
  IntroductionThis section deals with R. Yishmael’s understanding of the phrases used in the Torah for entering and settling the land. Do they always mean that the mitzvah is obligatory only in the land? For ease of reference, here again is R. Yishmael’s statement:R. Ishmael. For it was taught: This is to teach you that wherever “settlement” is stated, it means only after taking possession and settling down, the words of R. Yishmael.According to the Talmud, R. Yishmael requires both the words “entrance” and “settlement” must be used.
  According to the earlier baraita from the School of R. Yishmael, when it says “entrance” and “settling down” the mitzvah takes effect only when the land has been settled. If both words are not used, then the mitzvah takes effect before Israel settles down (and outside the Land). But according to this baraita, also attributed to the School of R. Yishmael, whenever the Torah uses the word “entrance (ביאה)” we apply the rule that the mitzvah takes effect only after possession and settling down. The verse that uses both verbs is Deuteronomy 17:14, in reference to appointing a king, “When you come to the land…and you inherit it and settle it.”   
  The other baraita holds that the appointment of a king is not a paradigm because there is another verse that also uses both verbs—Deuteronomy 26:1 about first fruits. Since there are two verses that use these verbs, it is a case of “two verses that come as one” and in any such case they do not serve as paradigms for other cases.  
  To counter the “two verses that come as one” argument, the opposing view must argue that both verses are necessary. If the Torah had only used these verbs in connection with the king, I would have thought that the obligation to bring first fruits is immediate, since they would have benefited from first fruits immediately. And if the Torah had not used these verses in connection with the king, I would have thought that the law to appoint a king is immediately effective since a king is needed to conquer the Land. 
  The other voice argues that both are not really necessary. The Torah could have written the verbs only in connection with the king and we could have said that if the mitzvah to appoint a king does not go in effect until possession and settling down, all the more so the mitzvah to bring first fruits does not. 
  The other voice argues that the Torah had to state this explicitly with regard to first-fruits, for if not we would have analogized it with hallah, which is obligatory even outside the Land. Therefore, we needed the verse to teach that both with regard to the appointment of the king and first fruits, the mitzvah does not take effect until the land is settled. But only for these two mitzvoth and not for others.
  IntroductionEarlier we concluded that the words “settlement” and “entrance” imply that the mitzvah is obligatory only in Israel. But there are mitzvoth, such as Shabbat, that use these words and yet are still obligatory everywhere. Why then are these words used in those contexts? 
  Leviticus 23:3 states that Shabbat should be observed in “all of your settlements.” The verse emphasizes that Shabbat is obligatory everywhere lest we think that it requires “sanctification” as do the Festivals. This refers to the sanctification of the new moon by the court, a practice done only in Judea. Shabbat is not dependent on the new moon, and therefore it is observed in “all your settlements.”
  Leviticus 3:17 states, “A perpetual statute throughout your generations in all your settlements, that you shall eat neither forbidden fat nor blood.” The word “settlements” emphasizes that the prohibition of forbidden fat and blood is obligatory even when sacrifices are no longer practiced. After the destruction of the Temple, these parts of an animal remain prohibited.
  Exodus 12:20 states, “In all your dwellings you shall eat matzah” in order to emphasize that one must eat matzah and marror even after the Passover sacrifice is no longer eaten—i.e. after the destruction of the Temple.
  Exodus 13:11, which deals with tefillin and redeeming the first born of a donkey uses the word “entrance.” Why do we need this word—after all, both mitzvoth are obligatory everywhere, and not just in the Land? These mitzvoth were performed in the wilderness and through them Israel entered the Land. They are not mitzvoth “dependent” on the Land. They are mitzvoth on which entrance into the Land is dependent.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss the implications of the dispute over whether the word “settlement” implies that the mitzvah is obligatory in any place where Israel dwells, or only in the land of Israel, after the land was conquered and settled. 
  The word “settlement” is written with regard to the prohibition of eating new produce. To recall, there are two opinions as to what this word implies—1) that the mitzvah applies everywhere; 2) that the mitzvah applies only once the Israelites conquered and settled Canaan. This verse shows that they ate the new produce as soon as they entered the land, even before conquering and settling it. This proves the first interpretation. 
  
  Daf 38a
  
  According to the second view, they could have eaten the new produce even before offering the omer sacrifice, since the mitzvah does not apply until after they conquered and settled the land.
  The Israelites in the desert began to eat new produce on the sixteenth of Nisan in their first year in the land of Canaan, not because it was prohibited until this point. According to this view, the prohibition did not apply until the land was conquered and settled. They ate until this point because that’s when the manna ran out. Before that date, they simply had enough manna left over.The section here is an internal solution to a perceived contradiction between the two halves of Exodus 16:35—did they eat until they came to the borders of Canaan, or until they came to an inhabited land. The resolution is that the manna stopped descending as soon as Moses died (just as the well stopped when Miriam died). But they had enough manna stored up to last about a month and a half.
  IntroductionOur sugya delves deeper into the issue of how long Israel ate the manna and when Moses died and was born, issues brought up in yesterday’s sugya. 
  The manna did not begin to fall until the sixteenth of Iyyar in the first year of the Exodus, but they stopped eating the manna on the sixteenth of Nissan, on the fortieth year after leaving Egypt. So why does the verse say they ate it for a full forty years? Because the cakes they brought out of Egypt already tasted like manna. I don’t think that this was a good thing.
  Israel mourned Moses’ death for thirty days. It took them three days to make preparations to cross the Jordan. They crossed the Jordan on the tenth of the first month (Nissan). If we subtract 33 days, we can conclude that Moses died on the seventh of the twelfth month—Adar.
  The midrash derives that Moses was born on seventh of Adar from the word “this day.” The righteous live a full life—they are not cheated out of a single day. Moses’ life was set at 120 years, and he lived till exactly that amount. To this day, it is considered a good sign when a person dies on his birthday.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss which mitzvoth apply both inside and outside the Land of Israel. The dispute here is really over how to we determine which mitzvoth are obligatory outside the Land of Israel—can a commandment connected to the ground, such as mixed kinds of seeds or fruit during its first three years of growth, be obligatory outside of Israel? 
  R. Shimon b. Yohai uses the prohibition of new produce, which applies both inside and outside the land, as a precedent to prove that kilayim (mixed kinds) and orlah (fruit during the first three years of a tree’s growth) are observed even outside of Israel. The prohibition of new produce is lenient in three ways: 1) It applies only to grain that grew before the omer was offered; 2) it is prohibited only to eat it. Other forms of benefit, such as selling it, are permitted; 3) once the omer sacrifice is offered on the 16th of Nissan, it becomes permitted. Nevertheless, this mitzvah is observed even outside the Land. Kilayim has none of these leniencies, and therefore it too should be observed even outside the Land. Orlah has one of these leniencies—it applies only to fruit that grows during the first three years. But it does not have either of the other leniencies, and so it too should apply outside the Land.
  R. Elazar son of R. Shimon says that if the Israelites were commanded to observe the mitzvah before they entered the Land, meaning that the obligation is not connected to the Land, then the mitzvah is observed both inside and outside the Land. But if the mitzvah is connected to the Land, then it is observed only within the Land. The two exceptions are release of monetary debts and the obligation to free slaves at the Jubilee year. While the latter is definitely connected to the Land, the Talmud below will question whether release of monetary debts is connected to the Land. 
  
  Daf 38b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section R. Elazar b. R. Shimon stated that all mitzvoth that are connected to the land are observed only in the Land with two exceptions. One of those exceptions is the commandment to release debts at the sabbatical year. But this is a personal obligation, not connected to the Land. So why state that it is an exception? It would seem to simply follow the rule.   
  The reason that the R. Elazar had to state that the release from debt is observed outside of the Land is that there is some connection between this mitzvah and the land, since Rabbi connected it to the release of the land (the prohibition of working the land during the sabbatical year). Rabbi says that as long as the mitzvah of letting the land rest is observed, the mitzvah of release from debt is observed in all places. In other words, release of debt is observed outside the Land even though it is tied to the Land.
  The Talmud now asks indeed why we don’t read the verse another way—not with regard to time, but with regard to place. This would mean that the mitzvah to release debt applies only inside the Land.The Talmud reads the verse as implying that the mitzvah does apply in all places.Thus in the end, the release of debts is practiced in all places, but only if the mitzvah to release the land (not work the land) is practiced in the land. Today both of these mitzvoth are still observed, but their status is considered derabanan, of rabbinic origin.
  IntroductionR. Elazar b. R. Shimon said that the mitzvah to release slaves at the Jubilee year is observed outside of Israel even though it is connected to the Land. But the release of slaves is a personal obligation, so why list it as an exception. 
  While freeing of slaves is a personal obligation, it still needs to be listed as an exception to the rule that mitzvoth tied to the Land are practiced only in the Land. First of all, the verse states “throughout the Land,” which might give the impression that it is observed only in the Land. Second, its observance outside the Land is dependent on its observance inside the Land. For both of these reasons, R. Elazar b. R. Shimon listed it as an exception to the general rule.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the status of various “soil-based mitzvoth” outside the Land of Israel. 
  This mishnah (Orlah 3:9) outlines the obligation of three soil-based mitzvoth outside the land of Israel: 1) the prohibition of eating new grain (hadash) before the Omer sacrifice on the sixteenth of Nissan; 2) the prohibition of fruit from a tree during the first three years of its growth (orlah); 3) the prohibition of mixed seeds (kilayim).
  Amoraim disagree over the implication of the word “halakhah,” the status of the prohibition of orlah outside of the Land. To Shmuel the prohibition is a law of the country. Rashi explains that this means that the observance of this prohibition was dictated by the sages who lived outside the Land. R. Yohanan gives it a higher status—it is an oral tradition that goes all the way back to Moses at Sinai.
  Ulla argued that outside the Land, orlah is a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai, a relatively high status, whereas kilayim is only a simple rabbinic prohibition. This helps us make sense of why the rules governing orlah are stricter than those governing kilayim. Outside of Israel, a Jew may buy orlah and kilayim from a Gentile, but with regard to the former, he cannot see him gather the fruit, whereas with the latter, the only prohibition is for the Jew to gather the kilayim vegetables himself.  He can see the Gentile gather them.
  But, Ulla continues, according to Shmuel’s view, there should be no difference in the rules governing buying orlah and kilayim from a Gentile outside the Land. Both have the same status—prohibited by the rabbis.
  
  Daf 39a
  
  Shmuel did indeed emend one of the mishnayot such that both read the same. Thus he accepted Ulla’s criticism.
  Mar son of Rabbana, a late amora, was lenient in both cases—as long as the Jew does not gather the orlah or kilayim, the produce is not prohibited.
  IntroductionThe Talmud picks up from where we left off last week, with the topic of the status of orlah (fruit from the first three years of growth of a tree) outside the land. 
  In the first two cases rabbis will eat orlah outside of Israel, but they will not pick it themselves. It seems that in this way, they can pretend that they’re not sure that this is orlah, and doubtful orlah is not prohibited outside of Israel.The rabbis of Pumbedita go a step further and say that the prohibition of orlah does not apply at all outside the land of Israel. 
  R. Yohanan vehemently disagrees with the scholars of Pumbedita. He instructs R. Yehudah, the founder of the school of Pumbedita, to hide the law that doubtful orlah is permitted outside of Israel, he tells him to destroy certain orlah and that doubtful orlah must be hidden. He concludes with a strong exhortation, condemning those who say that there is no prohibition of orlah outside of Israel. The line from the book of Michah about casting a “line by lot” refers to receiving an inheritance. Those who say that there is no law of orlah outside of Israel will not take part in any future inheritance of the land.
  The opinion held by the scholars of Pumbedita has a strong pedigree too.
  In the mishnah R. Elazar said that “also new produce” is observed outside the Land. This seems to mean that he agrees that kilayim and orlah are also observed outside the Land. That’s why he said “also.” Assuming that R. Elazar is the same sage as “R. Elazar the Great,” then how can he say above that there is no prohibition of orlah outside the Land?To resolve the problem the Talmud now erases the word “also.” To R. Elazar only the prohibition of “new produce” is observed outside the land—not kilayim and orlah.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the status of orlah (fruit during the first three years of the tree’s growth) outside of Israel. 
  R. Yohanan rules that the prohibition of orlah outside the Land is a halakhah to Moses at Sinai. This is a status almost akin to the status of prohibited by the Torah. But R. Zera raises a difficulty on this position. Doubtful orlah is permitted outside the Land. This would seem to mean the prohibition of certain orlah is lower than that of a “halakhah of Moses from Sinai.” R. Assi responds by including the distinction between doubtful and certain orlah into the halakhah of Moses from Sinai. In other words, when the halakhah was given to Moses, it reflected the same halakhah found in the baraita.  
  In this second statement by R. Assi in the name of R. Yohanan, the sage claims that kilayim is prohibited by the Torah outside of Israel. He expresses this by referring to the punishment for the transgression—a normal way for the rabbis to express the level of a prohibition. If the prohibition is considered to be from the Torah, then it is theoretically punished by lashes.This again contradicts the baraita we saw earlier, which stated that kilayim outside of Israel is only a rabbinic prohibition.The answer is that there are several different types of kilayim. One is the prohibition of planting seeds in a vineyard (Deuteronomy 22:9). This prohibition is only “derabanan”
  IntroductionThis is the last passage about the obligation of kilayim outside of the Land.
  This story takes place outside of Israel. When the two rabbis see someone planting diverse seeds, one rabbi wants to put the planter under a ban, a very serious punishment. The other rabbi refuses, telling his fellow that this halakhah is not clear to him.
  This time they see another Jew sowing seeds in a vineyard, and again one rabbi wants to ban the man. But again, the other rabbi refuses, this time explaining that his fellow does not know that one is not liable for sowing seeds in a vineyard unless he throws down the different seeds in the same act. We should maybe detect here a note of one rabbi rebuking another for trying to punish someone without being 100 percent sure that he is deserving of the punishment.
  The rules of mixed seeds in a vineyard are stringent inside the Land—one may not derive any benefit from them. Therefore, outside the Land the rule is also stringent. But the rules regarding planting mixed seeds are lenient inside the Land—one may not eat the plants that grow, but one may derive benefit from them. Therefore, this rule is not observed outside the Land.
  R. Joseph now retracts his statement that outside of the Land one may plant mixed seeds. The basis for this retraction is the actions of Rav, a Babylonian amora, who seems to plant the garden of the rabbinic academy in rows in order to prevent the mixture of the seeds. 
  Abaye rejects R. Joseph’s reading of why Rav planted the garden in rows. If he had planted it in the way that gardens were to be planted in order to avoid the mixing of the seeds (four sides of a square, each with a different species and one row of another species in the middle), then we could be sure that he was doing so in order to avoid the problem of kilayim. But since this is not what Rav did, we can offer other assessments of his motivation. He might have done so either because this makes the garden look nicer or to save the attendant, the one harvesting the vegetables, the trouble of having to search for what he was looking for.
  
  Daf 39b
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah presents a very straightforward version of rewards and punishments.  Those who perform commandments are rewarded and those who do not are not rewarded.  Obviously, this mishnah is expressing an ideal which often does not match reality.  The problem of good people not being rewarded, or the problem of an omnipotent God in control of a random and often cruel world is called “theodicy” and was recognized well by the rabbis.  There are many other answers in rabbinic literature to the problem of theodicy, including an extreme statement such as “there is no reward in this world.”   Our mishnah persists with what I perceive to be a very optimistic outlook.  Despite all of the evidence to the contrary the world in which we live is ordered and good.  It is a reward in which the righteous receive reward and the wicked are punished.Another issue worth pointing out, is that the language used here of “merits” is a metaphor. This is the language the rabbis use when they want to talk about how critical it is to perform mitzvoth, and in particular certain mitzvoth. It does not mean that the rabbis had a literal view of this being how the world worked.  
  The peculiar language of the mishnah “he who does not perform one commandment” is a euphemism for “he who commits one transgression.”“Days are prolonged” is understood to refer to a long life in this world and “inherit the land” is typically understood to refer to a reward in the world to come.
  This well-known baraita states that one receives a reward in this world only for particular mitzvoth, not for every mitzvah, as our mishnah seems to teach.
  R. Judah interprets our mishnah so that it teaches not that one mitzvah earns one a long life, but that if one has more merits than sins he earns a long life and the world to come. In other words, any one mitzvah can “put one over the top” in the overall reckoning. Since one does not know how many mitzvoth and transgressions one has performed, the wise course would be to continue to try to perform mitzvoth.
  The mitzvoth listed in the baraita must have some sort of special power, for if not, what does this baraita teach us? But, the Talmud asks, is one rewarded with a long life just for performing one of these mitzvoth!Since that seems absurd, the Talmud interprets the baraita to say that if one’s merits and faults are even and one of these mitzvoth is part of one’s merits, it tips the scales. But alone, these mitzvoth are not that powerful.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a fascinating and important dispute about the view of the mishnah, that when a person does good deeds (mitzvoth) he is rewarded. Is there really a reward, at least in this world, for the performance of mitzvoth?
  The baraita quoted here seems absolutely absurd at face value—if one has more merits than sins he is punished severely, and if one has more sins than merits he is rewarded. How can we even begin to make sense out of this utterly strange baraita, especially in light of the Mishnah which offers a much more positive view of the world?
  According to Abaye, the Mishnah does not mean that life will always be good for one who does more good things than bad. It means that some days will be good and some days will not. The bad days serve as punishments to cleanse him of his sins.
  Rava brings in the view of R. Ya’akov—rewards are reserved for the world to come. In this world, people who perform good deeds can die, as is illustrated by the tragic story of the boy who performs the very two mitzvoth that promises a long life and yet nevertheless dies.
  The Talmud tries to find some justice in the world, but is ultimately unsuccessful.Perhaps such things do not really happen. Nope, this really happened.Perhaps the person had bad thoughts, and was being punished for them. Nope—God does not punish for bad thoughts.Perhaps he was thinking about idolatry, and there is a verse in which God seems to say that he will trap (meaning punish) Israel even for thinking about idolatry.
  If there was a reward for observing mitzvoth in this world, than at a minimum they should have protected him from thinking about idolatry. So even if this man was thinking about idolatry, his death is still proof that there is no reward in this world.
  In general, those going to perform a mitzvah are not injured. However, if there is human negligence involved, meaning the ladder was rickety, then one cannot rely on divine intervention. Note that this resolution still resolves the notion that the world makes sense—while we cannot rely on a miracle, we might be able to rely on our own abilities to make sure that our ladders are safe. Theoretically, if the ladder had been checked, this damage could have been prevented.
  “Aher” which means “the other one” refers to Elisha ben Abuya, the famous rabbi who left rabbinic Judaism to lead a life of sin. According to our sugya, what lead him to sin was the problem of theodicy. He saw good people’s lives ended in tragic death. He did not realize, as R. Ya’akov would have told him, that the reward for leading a good life was waiting for the world to come.
  According to the mishnah, one needs to perform a mitzvah to receive a reward, but according to the baraita, all one has to do is not transgress in order to be rewarded. 
  Simply sitting and not transgressing will not bring one a reward. But if the temptation to transgress arises and one does not transgress, then he will be rewarded. 
  The rabbi tries to resist sexual temptation by making himself disgusting, but this does not work for the woman magically heals him. He then escapes and spends the night in a bath-house haunted by demons where a miracle is performed for him and he is healed. In the end we learn that it was his resistance of temptation that protected him.We should note here the interplay of human initiative and divine intervention. The rabbi is protected because he himself resists temptation. But his ability to resist causes him to be strong enough to be immune to the demons lurking in the bath-house.
  
  Daf 40a
  
  IntroductionThe last daf of this (very long) chapter continues where we left off last week, with rabbis who resist sexual temptation.
  In this fascinating tale, R. Zadok manages to avoid temptation. A few thoughts on the story:1)	The rabbis here are expressing what I think is a prevalent fantasy for them—that they will be pursued by an attractive, non-Jewish woman, and that at the last minute they will resist temptation. This would amplify their own sense of manliness and at the same time their fealty to the Torah.2)	The connection between food and sex is explicitly made in this story—“one who does this eats this.” Maintaining strict separation in terms of sex is aided, in the end, by maintaining strict separation in terms of food.3)	Rabbis are often running to sit in the oven as a form of self-affliction. Not sure why, but it seems to be a common trope in their culture.    
  In this story, it seems to be R. Kahana’s occupation with baskets that leads him to the dangerous contact with the non-Jewish woman. He is so tempted to have relations with her, that in order to avoid doing so, he attempts to commit suicide. Miraculously, he is saved by Elijah who is none too happy to have to go to the trouble (Elijah seems to fly). But all ends well when R. Kahana is miraculously rescued from poverty. 
  This is the well-known baraita about mitzvoth that one receives a reward for in this world and in the world to come.
  The Talmud now begins to provide biblical sources for each of the mitzvoth listed in the baraita—how do we know that one receives a reward in this world and in the world to come for their performance?     
  R. Abahu derives the reward for peacemaking from the connection (gezerah shavah) created by the word “pursuing” between Psalms 34:15 and Proverbs 21:21 (above). The study of Torah also has a verse that alludes to these rewards.
  This is the conclusion of Rava’s difficulty: Why doesn’t the baraita include the mitzvah of shooing away the mother bird?
  The Talmud tries to suggest that the baraita simply is not exhaustive. But this solution fails due to the language of the baraita—“these are the things”—implying that there are no others.
  R. Idi’s statement explains that to be truly righteous one needs to be good to other people and not just listen to God’s commands. Sending away the mother bird is an act between God and people—it is not an act that can make one “good.” To be good (or at least not evil), one needs to be kind to other human beings.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss rewards and punishments. 
  For performing a mitzvah, one receives additional reward beyond the scope of the mitzvah itself. However, there is no punishment for sins beyond the principal punishment itself. This is a classic Jewish statement of the mercy of God. God rewards good deeds more than God punishes transgressive acts.    
  There is, however, a verse that seems to say that transgressions do bear fruit. This is interpreted to refer to a transgression that bears fruit—meaning its consequences are somehow amplified beyond the transgression itself. Rashi suggests that others learn from his sin because it was performed in public.   
  When rewarding people for good deeds, God provides them with extra reward for their good thoughts.   
  God is generous with humanity—if one even thinks about performing a mitzvah but cannot do so, she is credited as if she performed it.
  Again, God is more generous with the sinner—God does not join evil thought with deed.
  But if the intention bears fruit—i.e. it leads to an action, God does join it with the evil deeds to punish for them both.
  One is punished extra for bad thoughts only if they are about idolatry, which is the most heinous of sins.
  Ulla offers a different explanation for when God joins bad thoughts to bad actions—when one repeatedly sins. Rashi explains that even if one does not actually repeat the evil deed, when he thinks about doing it but is prevent from doing so because of circumstances, he is treated as if he performed the evil deed. By thinking of doing it, he has shown that his repentance is not sincere. He’s just waiting for the right opportunity to come along. 
  IntroductionThe beginning of this section discusses sinning in private versus sinning in public. 
  According to this source, better that a person sin in private than profane God’s name in public.
  According to R. Ilai, if one cannot help it, better to sin in private than in public. 
  R. Joseph’s statement contradicts the previous source—sinning in private is reprehensible for it is as if one is saying that God does not see one’s private actions.The resolution is that if one cannot conquer his evil desires, then it is better to sin in private. But if one can conquer his evil desires, but decides that a sin in private “does not count,” for it is not seen by God, it is better that he not come into the world. Such a person has no respect for God.The Talmud cites the statement of Rabbah—that one who gazes at the rainbow is careless with his Master’s honor. The rainbow according to Ezekiel 1:28 is like the presence of God. One who stares at it, it is as if he is staring at God. I should admit that I probably have transgressed this one on many occasions. I’m not sure what the rule is about one who sends out lots of rainbow pics from a rainy day in the Golan.
  Profaning God’s name is considered to be worse than other sins, and one receives no “credit” in this case. One interpretation of “credit is not granted” is that God does not act like a shopkeeper and delay demand for payment. Rather, he immediately extracts punishment for profaning the Name.Another interpretation is that if one has committed this sin, it tips the scales if one’s merits and sins are equally balanced.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss rewards and punishments for sins and good deeds.
  Sound advice on how to approach one’s life.   
  
  Daf 40b
  
  Wow—R. Elazar son of R. Shimon is really laying it on thick here. And you think your parents put a guilt trip on you! 
  The message here is both comforting and scary. It is comforting, for there is always the chance to repent. It is frightening, for one wrong deed can destroy one’s entire life. Unfortunately, I think I’ve seen too many cases that fall into the latter. 
  Resh Lakish mollifies a bit the harshness of R. Shimon b. Yohai’s statement. Simply performing one bad act does not destroy all the good things one has done. The baraita refers to one who regrets the good things he has done in the past. As such, he in a sense erases them, and is left only with his last, evil deed.
  IntroductionToday’s section concludes our long chapter—perhaps the longest in the Talmud. It opens with a new mishnah.
  To be a part of civilized Jewish society one must be both learned and take part in worldly activities, namely work.  Occupation with the study of both written and oral Torah, accompanied by a livelihood provides a person with a culture which will prevent him from sinning.  One who is not engaged in all three is not considered to be civilized.  In another words, in the eyes of the rabbis, such a person is a barbarian.
  Suffering is brought upon the righteous in this world so that they will inherit their full portion in the world to come. Their trunk, which I would say is their essence, stands already in the world to come. Only their branches overhang into this world, the world of impurity.
  The opposite is true of the wicked.  
  Study is greater than practice, but not inherently. It is only greater than practice because it leads to practice. It would seem that study that does not lead to practice is not greater.
  The Torah was given when Israel left Sinai. Hallah, the mitzvah to give a part of the dough to the priest, only began when Israel entered the land, forty years later. The obligation to separate tithes and terumah began when Israel conquered and settled the land another 14 years later. The first sabbatical year came only seven years later, 61 years after the giving of the Torah And only then did they begin to count the Jubilee years, so according to R. Yose’s method, this mitzvah was observed only 103 years later. Thus Torah study preceded the full observance of many mitzvoth by many years.
  When one is judged in the world to come, he is first judged on how much Torah study he engaged in. The verse from Proverbs refers to water, which is often a code word for Torah study.One is also first rewarded for his Torah study. The verse from Psalms refers first to God’s statute, which was understood earlier as a reference to Torah study.
  R. Yohanan gives some teeth to the Mishnah—to serve as a witness one must be fully cultivated through learning and deed.    
  The rabbis perceive one who eats in the shuk as acting in a barbaric, animalistic manner. While today it is common for Western people to eat in public, we should note that in some ancient cultures, eating was a more intimate private act. One who performs intimate acts in public is not fit to testify because he lacks culture.
  Nothing beneficial comes from anger. 
  
  Daf 41a
  
  One should have no part with a person who is not learned of both Torah and the ways of the land. Such a person is not worthy of association.
  Wow. Just wow! Congratulations on completing what I’m pretty sure is the longest chapter in the Talmud. We began this chapter way back in November. It surely contains some fascinating and difficult material, both intellectually and emotionally. I hope you have enjoyed learning it, that you feel that you have grown Jewishly, that your understanding of Jewish law and text has grown, and that you’re ready to move on next week to chapter two!
  IntroductionThe second chapter opens with a discussion concerning the ability to appoint an agent to perform an act on one’s behalf.
  A man can betroth a woman through an agent. This would mean that the man gives money to an agent to use in betrothing a certain woman.  This probably would have been a common means of doing betrothal if the couple lived far apart from one another and was matched by others, as was nearly always the case.  Similarly, a woman may appoint an agent to receive her betrothal money.
  A father has the right to marry off his daughter while she is still a young girl (na’arah). This is defined as a girl between the ages of 12 and 12 1/2 who has already reached puberty.  He may also marry her off at a younger age, but not when she is past that age.  When marrying her off, he may use an agent to accept her betrothal money.  Basically, the father takes her place in matters of betrothal.I should note that while a father had the legal right to marry off his daughter and not his son, and this right extends only until she reaches 12 1/2, in practice the father played a very large role in arranging matches for both sons and daughters no matter what age they were when they married.  The idea that a 12 1/2 year old girl became totally independent of her father was probably as strange of an idea in the mishnaic period as it would be today.   
  While one may use an agent to betroth a woman, it is a greater mitzvah to betroth on one’s own, without an intermediary. This is illustrated by two sages who would prepare their own food on Shabbat, even though it could have been done by others.    
  Others say that it is actually prohibited to betroth a woman through an agent. While one who betroths a woman in that matter is betrothed (i.e. the betrothal is legally effective), the act is still prohibited. The problem with the act is that a man must see his wife before he marries her, otherwise he might see her and decide he does not want to be married to her. Seems like a reasonable request to me.   
  According to this version, R. Joseph’s statement was made in reference to the woman, not the man. It is preferable for her to see her husband before she is betrothed. However, it is not forbidden for her to be betrothed through her agent. The (highly gendered) assumption is that a woman would prefer to be married to anyone rather than remain unmarried. Therefore there is less of a risk that she will see something unseeming in him and not want to be married. 
  The mishnah states that a man may marry off his daughter when she is a na’arah (has reached the age of puberty, but is not yet an adult). From here the Talmud concludes that he may not marry her off when she is minor, until she is old enough to say that she wants a certain man. While we have a tough time imagining a 12 year old girl making such a statement, it seems that in their society this was not so outlandish. 
  IntroductionThis section begins a longer discussion on where the rabbis derive the notion that a person can appoint an agent who can perform acts of legal consequence on his/her behalf.
  The rabbis use the verb “send her” in the verse concerning divorce to prove that one may appoint an agent. The “simple” meaning of this verse is that the man sends his wife out of his house. The first level of midrash is based on the choice of verb—“veshilah.” Since this is the same word used for an agent, the midrash takes it as a hint that a man may appoint an agent. The second level of the midrash is based on the “heh” at the end of the verb. In its literal meaning, the heh means “her” as in “he sends her.” But read another way, it could mean “she sends” which alludes to her ability to appoint an agent. Finally, the word is also used to derive the idea that an agent can appoint another agent. This final halakhah would allow for agents to pass their agency along, rather than travel long distances. 
  The Talmud now wants to know how we know that agency works not only in divorce, but also in betrothal. This cannot be derived directly from divorce because divorce differs in that a woman can be divorced against her will. She cannot, however, be married against her will. 
  The sequence of verbs in the verse about divorce is read as implying that the same means of contracting divorce can be used to contract marriage. Thus just as an agent may be used for divorce, one may be used for marriage.Note that since the verse implies that marriage and divorce are to be treated the same, this is not considered deriving the rule from divorce, which we stated above cannot be done. Rather, it is a case of simply reading the dictates of the verse. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud now begins to examine other cases in which the Mishnah refers to appointing an agent. How do we know that agency works in these cases as well? The first case cited is from Mishnah Terumot 4:4. 
  The mishnah allows one to appoint an agent to give terumah on his behalf. How do we know that such an act is valid and that such produce is actually considered terumah?  
  
  Daf 41b
  
  We cannot derive agency for terumah from agency from divorce because terumah is considered holy, whereas divorce is not an issue of holiness. Since these are different fields, we cannot derive one from the other.
  The word “also” is read as including an agent in separating tithes and terumah.
  Why can’t we derive agency in divorce and marriage from agency with regard to terumah? Because terumah can be given without an act, just by thinking “this produce will be terumah.” Marriage and divorce require acts, and therefore even if we knew that agency was valid with regard to terumah, we would not know it is valid with regard to marriage and divorce.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the issue of agency—how do we know that one may appoint an agent to act on his behalf?
  This source is from Mishnah Pesahim 9:9. The issue is related to the halakhah that one cannot eat from a pesah offering for which he is not registered. However, it is cited here only because the company appoints an agent to go slaughter a pesah on their behalf. How do we know that one may appoint an agent for such a matter.
  Earlier we learned that one may appoint an agent to separate terumah on his behalf. But from this halakhah we cannot derive that one may also appoint an agent to separate a pesah offering, because pesah offerings are holier than terumah. Perhaps one cannot appoint an agent to perform such a sacred act?...
  The Torah states that the whole assembly of Israel slaughters the pesah sacrifice, although it is obvious that only one person performs the act. From here we can derive that a person’s agent is as himself—it is as if all of Israel slaughtered the pesah.
  IntroductionAbove the Talmud derived that one can appoint an agent to separate and eventually slaughter the pesah sacrifice. Today’s section asks the question that usually follows—if we know that one can appoint an agent for sacrifices, then why can’t we derive the other cases, marriage, divorce and terumah, from this case?
  Sacrifices cannot serve as a paradigm for the ability to appoint an agent in other matters because most sacrificial actions are performed through an agent, usually a priest. 
  We have discussed four issues—marriage, divorce, terumah and sacrifices, and stated that the right to appoint an agent cannot be derived from one of them and therefore the Torah had to teach agency in all of them. But maybe we can derive from two of them that agency works in the others? If so, why would the Torah have to teach the efficacy of agency in the others? The Talmud will now test this out.We could not derive agency in sacrifices from the other cases, because sacrifices are holy whereas the other matters are either not holy at all, or less so. Therefore, the Torah had to teach the efficacy of agency with regard to sacrifices.
  We could not derive agency in divorce from agency sacrifices and terumah because sacrifices and terumah can be designated by thought only. This is not true of divorce—the man must give the woman a get. It is not sufficient for him to merely think that he wishes to divorce her.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss whether the Torah could have skipped teaching that agency was effective in one of the cases (marriage, divorce, terumah and sacrifice) and we could have derived that case from the others.
  The Talmud now admits—the Torah need not have written agency in connection with terumah and we could have derived it from marriage and sacrifices together. But now we have a new issue—what do we do with the superfluous words “also you”?These words are used by R. Yannai to teach that just as “you” are members of the covenant, i.e. Jews, so too your agent must be a Jew.
  Why would I need a verse to teach that an agent must be Jewish? This law can be derived from logic and by extension from the laws of receiving a divorce document. A slave cannot receive the document because he is not subject to the laws of marriage and divorce.
  Indeed, we do need the verse to teach us that a non-Jew cannot serve as an agent for terumah. We might have thought that since a non-Jew can separate terumah from his own produce (i.e. the terumah is considered terumah, even though he was not obligated to do so) he can also serve as an agent for a Jew. Therefore the verse teaches us that he cannot.  The non-Jew is different from a slave vis a vis marriage, since a slave cannot marry a Jew at all.
  R. Shimon rules that if a non-Jew separates terumah, it does not count as terumah. His opinion is found in a mishnah about forbidden mixtures. If a non-Jew cannot separate terumah, then why do we need a verse to teach us that he cannot serve as an agent? The non-Jew would be the same as the slave—anyone who cannot perform the action himself cannot be an agent for others. 
  We need the words “also you” to teach that an agent can separate terumah if appointed by the owner of the crops for otherwise I might have read the word “you” as also excluding an agent, just as it excludes many other categories from separating terumah (a sharecropper, a partner, a guardian, or anyone separating terumah from produce not his own).Thus in the end we have solved why we need the midrash on the words “also you” even though we might think that we could have derived this law from other fields of halakhah. 
  IntroductionOn the previous daf, R. Yehoshua b. Korha stated that we can derive the rule of agency from Exodus 12:6 that states that all of Israel shall slaughter the pesah sacrifice. Since it is obviously impossible for every Israelite to slaughter the pesah, the verse must be referring to an agent who performs the sacrifice on behalf of others. But other rabbis use this verse for other purposes. So for these rabbis, how do they derive agency? 
  R. Yonatan uses the verse to teach that theoretically one pesah sacrifice would be sufficient for all of Israel to fulfill their obligation. Since he uses the verse for another derashah, how does he derive the notion of agency? From that same verse—if there is only one sacrifice, then obviously only one person is slaughtering on behalf of everyone.The Talmud, however, notes that this is problematic. In this case, the slaughterer is also fulfilling his mitzvah to offer the sacrifice. But how do we know that one can appoint an agent to offer a sacrifice on one’s behalf when the agent is not obligated to offer that same sacrifice? 
  
  
  Daf 42a
  
  Exodus 12:3 again clearly implies that one person performs an action on behalf of others—this time it refers to setting aside the pesach sacrifice. But again, this might not be sufficient to prove agency in cases where the agent is not part of the mitzvah.The Talmud now resolves the problem by pointing out that we have two verses that teach the same thing. Since we don’t need to learn this twice, we can apply this teaching to a case where it does not belong, meaning an agent who does not have a partnership in the sacrifice.
  The Talmud argues that that verse is needed for another purpose—for R. Yitzchak’s derashah that an adult can acquire, in this case the sheep, on behalf of others but that a minor does not have such legal ability. If the verse is needed for that derashah, it is not available to teach agency.The Talmud locates another use of the word “man” in the same context. This frees up the earlier verse.     
  The word “man” in this last verse (Exodus 12:4) is needed for another derashah—that the pesah may be slaughtered even if only one person is going to eat it.This is resolved by reference to a dispute—Rabbi Yonatan, who learns agency from the second verse, would hold that the pesah may not be slaughtered for an individual. This frees up the earlier verse to derive agency even when the agent is not participating in the mitzvah.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the source for a person’s legal ability to appoint an agent. 
  Rav derives the institution of agency from another verse—the verse where each prince is designated to allocate the land to the members of the tribe. But why doesn’t he derive agency from the verse about slaughtering the pesah, or any of the other verses used above (such as the verse about designating terumah).
  The Talmud questions whether agency can explain how the princes allocated the land. After all, they had to allocate portions to minors and minors cannot appoint agents. Thus this source does not seem to be a valid source of agency. The right of the princes to allocate the land must be understood in another way.
  The Talmud now offers another version of Rav’s statement, which derives a different principle from the allocation of the land—one can confer benefit on another person even in his absence.
  The problem with deriving this principle is that in order to confer a benefit on someone without their presence what is being conferred needs to be a complete benefit without any disadvantage. It cannot have some aspects that are beneficial and some that are not. While every person does benefit from inheriting the land, people have different preferences as to which land one inherits. Thus the princes were in some sense disadvantaging those who inherited land.
  Finally we learn a different principle from the verse about the allocation of the land. When a court allocates a father’s estate for his minor children inheriting from him, the court can appoint a guardian on their behalf, even if there is a temporary disadvantage that will eventually lead to an advantage. This is essentially what Moses does in appointing the prines to allocate the land.This brings this part of the discussion to the conclusion. We cannot use this verse to derive agency, but we have properly understood what principle is derived from this verse.
  IntroductionHaving mentioned the topic of orphans that divide their father’s property, the  Talmud now dives deeper into the subject.
  All rabbis agree that the guardian can choose which part of the inheritance the orphan receives. The argument is over whether the orphan can protest against the choice once the child reaches majority age. Shmuel says that he may, while R. Nahman says that he may not.
  In another source, R. Nahman does not seem to worry about the authority of the court in making evaluations. This source deals with a court that evaluates property to be sold. According to R. Shimon b. Gamaliel, even if the court’s assessment deviates by 1/6, which is the standard level of accepted deviation, the sale is valid. In other words, the court’s authority is greater than that of an individual. However, R. Nahman rules with the sages, who say the court has the same authority as an individual. This seems to contradict his view in our case.
  In the case of the orphans, the judges did not err. Therefore, the guardian’s allotment of the property cannot be undone. But in the case  of the court, the court made a mistake.
  
  Daf 42b
  
  If there was no error in the case of the guardians, then what are the orphans protesting against, such that their protest is not accepted. The answer is they received the right amount of property but just do not like the location.Thus R. Nahman says that when the court makes a real error in assessment, their decision can be undone. But if there is no error, and the person simply does not like their decision, the decision cannot be undone.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to deal with sayings by R. Nahman concerning division of property
  R. Nahman says that the rules concerning over and undercharging that apply to purchasers also apply to brothers dividing up their father’s property.  
  Rava now places several limitations of R. Nahman’s ruling. If the error was less than one-sixth, but was made by an agent appointed by one of the brothers, the brother can nullify the sale because the agent has not done his job.   
  If the brother’s explicitly stipulate that they will divide the property according to the court’s evaluation, then the rule follows Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel who said that the court’s evaluation stands even if it errs by more than a sixth. 
  The law of overcharging does not apply to real estate, only to movable property. 
  If the error with land was not an error of evaluation but of measure, the division of the land can be returned. When we said that there is no rule of “overcharging” with land, that was when the issue was over or undervalued land, not land that was improperly measured.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now returns to discussing the issue of agency.
  If a person sends out a fire with another person and the fire causes damage, the sender is not liable. If he sends it with a person not considered legally responsible, then no one is liable in a human court, although since the sender acted carelessly, he is liable in the heavenly court. But if he sends it with a person considered legally responsible, then the one who carries the fire is liable. But why should this be—don’t we hold that a person’s agent is as himself. Thus the sender should be liable.
  There is no agency when one commits a wrongdoing. It may be wrong or careless for me to send someone else out with a dangerous substance which might cause damage, but I am not legally liable if he does so. He should have listened to the words of the master, i.e. God, who would prohibit engaging in damaging activities.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the principle of “there is no agent for wrongdoing.” 
  The issue here is “trespass”—illicit use of Temple funds. If one sends out an agent to perform an act of trespass, as long as the agent actually does what he is sent to do, the sender has committed trespass and is liable for it, not the agent. But why, since trespass is a sin, shouldn’t we invoke the principle “there is no agent for wrongdoing” and hold the agent liable. 
  The laws of trespass are derived from the laws of terumah due to the use of the word “sin” in both contexts. Therefore, just as one can appoint an agent when it comes to terumah, so too one can appoint an agent when it comes to trespass, despite the rule of “there is no agent for wrongdoing.”    
  Why not use trespass as a paradigm to derive the principle that there is an agent for wrongdoing? The answer is that there are two cases in which one can appoint an agent for wrongdoing, trespass and misappropriation. And as we learned earlier, if the Torah teaches a principle twice, the principle is not a paradigm. It is restricted to those three cases.We will now learn what “misappropriation” refers to. 
  “Trespass” referred to in Exodus 22:8 is a case where a person who was guarding someone else’s goods claims that the goods were stolen. He takes an oath that he did not misappropriate the goods for himself. According to Bet Shammai, he is liable even if he thought about taking the goods. Bet Hillel says he is liable only if actually takes the goods. But Bet Hillel hold that he is liable if he sends his agent to misappropriate the goods. Thus, to Bet Hillel, there are two cases where one is liable for sending an agent to do an act of wrongdoing—trespass of Temple property and misappropriation of guarded goods. Two cases cannot serve as a paradigm. In all other cases, one is not liable for sending an agent to commit a wrong act.
  IntroductionThis week’s section continues where we left off—why isn’t the case of “trespass” used as a paradigm to prove that there is agency for wrongdoing. According to Bet Hillel, there is also agency for misappropriation, and thus trespass and misappropriation are two words/concepts that teach the same thing, which do not serve as paradigms. But Bet Shammai did not say that there is agency for misappropriation, so our question returns. Why not use “trespass” as a paradigm?
  According to Bet Shammai we do not have two verses, and thus we should be able to use trespass as a paradigm to prove that there is agency in wrongdoing. If one sends an agent to commit a crime, the sender should be liable.
  
  Daf 43a
  
  The Talmud now locates yet another case where there is agency for wrongdoing, thereby restoring the case that there are two verses that teach the same thing and hence cannot serve as paradigms. “Slaughtering and selling” will be explained now.
  “Slaughtering and selling” refers to a thief who steals an animal and then either sells it or slaughters it. In such a case he is liable to make four or five fold restitution (had he simply sold it, he would be liable for twofold restitution). The baraita teaches that even if an agent slaughters it, the thief is liable for the restitution. Thus we now again have two cases where there is an agent for wrongdoing, and these cases cannot serve as a paradigm.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss why we do not have a paradigm for the law that there can be agency for wrongdoing. In other words, how are we so sure that if one appoints an agent to do something wrong, the agent is liable not the sender.
  There is an opinion that holds that one can learn from two verses that come as one. This means that we should have a paradigm that there can be agency for wrongdoing.
  The Talmud now cites a source from which we can actually derive the rule that there is no agency for wrongdoing. The issue is slaughtering a sacrifice outside the Temple. The Torah emphasizes “unto that man”—he is liable if he slaughters, but if he appoints an agent to slaughter the animal, he is not liable. The agent is. There is no agency for wrongdoing.
  The Talmud suggests that sacrifices slaughtered outside the Temple should be a paradigm for all other cases. In all other cases (except for the exceptions we’ve discussed so far) there is no agency for wrongdoing.
  The case of sacrifices slaughtered outside can be used as a paradigm and not the other cases where there is agency for wrongdoing (such as trespass or misappropriation) because there is yet another extraneous verse that states that the slaughterer is liable only if he slaughters the animal himself. If he sends an agent, the agent is liable.
  If one holds that two verses do not teach, then there is no reason we need the midrash on “that man” to teach that there is no agency for wrongdoing because we now have no paradigms to indicate that there should be. So then what does this position do with “that man.”The word appears twice so it can be interpreted twice. The first is to exempt a case where there are two men holding the knife. While they should not slaughter a sacrifice outside the Temple, neither is liable. The second appearance limits liability to those who did so knowingly and willingly. One who is forced, or one who does so without knowing what he is doing or that it is prohibited is not liable.
  We now enter the typical midrashic chain. How does the position that holds that two verses that come as one do not teach (and thus uses the word “hahu” to teach that there generally is no agency in wrongdoing) derive the law exempting those who slaughter without full knowledge or will? He derives it from the extra “ha.” The Torah could have written “hu” instead of “hahu.” [Actually the prefix is necessary, but midrashic logic is willing to expand the notion of proper syntax].The other position does not need to make any midrash on the extra “heh” because he simply thinks that doing so is ridiculous. Those are my words, not Rashi’s.If you had a little trouble following this last section, I would not worry about it too much. It’s pretty complex.
  IntroductionWe continue discussing whether there is such a thing as agency for wrongdoing.
  The first opinion holds that if a person sends another to commit murder, the murderer (the agent) is liable, not the sender. But Shammai holds that the sender is liable. His paradigm is David, who was held responsible by the prophet Natan for sending Uriah out to be killed in battle. So if we have a principle “there is no agency for wrongdoing” where does Shammai get the idea that the sender is liable?  
  The Talmud finds some technical/exegetical means of rescuing Shammai. Shammai holds that two verses that come as one do teach, so we do have a paradigm from “trespass” and “slaughtering or selling” that there is agency for wrongdoing. And they don’t use the word “hahu” to teach that there is not. So they are left with the conclusion that there is agency for wrongdoing. 
  The Talmud now suggests that Shammai holds him liable, but only to the laws of Heaven. In other words, he did something heinously wrong, but he cannot be held accountable by a human court. The problem with this is that it implies that according to the first tanna, he would be exempt even in the heavenly court. That seems absurd—why shouldn’t God hold him accountable?The next suggestion is that they differ as to the level of punishment. The first opinion would hold that the sender is responsible but to a lesser degree. The second opinion would hold that he is fully responsible. 
  Alternatively, Shammai makes a special exception because the Torah (actually Natan) lays responsibility directly on David’s shoulders.The first tanna (creatively) reads the verse as exculpating David, not implicating him.
  Why is David not liable for having Uriah killed? Because Uriah rebelled against the king by disobeying his direct order to go home, eat, drink and lie with his wife. [Yes, these are clearly David apologetics. Sometimes the rabbis are willing to condemn him, but sometimes they do end up defending him. Complicated character that David]. 
  Even if Shammai holds that there is agency in wrongdoing, and that the sender is liable, this is only in a case where the agent does not enjoy himself while doing the wrongdoing. If the wrongdoing involves sex or food, where he does enjoy himself, then the sender is exempt and the agent is liable. There are no cases, according to Rava, where one person enjoys something forbidden and another is liable.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is about whether an agent can become a witness concerning the issue which he was an agent for, such as betrothing a woman. 
  Whether an agent can become a witness is an amoraic dispute. 
  The Talmud first offers a reason that does not explain why R. Shila holds that an agent cannot be a witness. The betrother did not say to him, “be a witness for me.”The problem with this explanation is that the man betrothing a woman does not have to say to his witnesses, “you are my witnesses.”
  Rav holds that the agent can be a witness. If we trust him as an agent all the more since he is the one carrying out the matter. In other words, since we trust him to be the agent and betroth the woman to the man, we must also trust him to testify that she agreed.R. Shila’s school holds that since we consider the agent to be like the sender himself, he cannot testify about matters related to himself.
  In this dispute both Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel disagree only about a case where one tells three to be his agent for betrothal. But they would both agree that if the betrother tells two to be his agents, neither can serve as a witness. The difficulty is that Rav seems to agree with neither house.    
  Rav can find support in the following baraita. According to Bet Shammai, when an agent betroths a woman he may also serve as a witness. Bet Hillel says two separate witnesses are required. The agent cannot be a witness.The problem with this is that it means that Rav rules like Bet Shammai. As we know, you’re not supposed to rule like Bet Shammai. You’re supposed to rule like Bet Hillel. The solution is to reverse the opinions in the baraita. Yes, the Talmud does do this from time to time. 
  R. Aha son of Rava reversed the amoraic opinions and not the tannaitic opinions. Now Rav would hold like Bet Hillel, who says that an agent cannot be a witness.In the end, the halakhic rule is that an agent can be a witness.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss whether agents can also serve as witnesses.
  Just as agents can be witnesses for marriage, so too they can for divorce or monetary cases. 
  
  Daf 43b
  
  The Talmud now explains why R. Nahman needed to teach that agents can also be witnesses in all three fields of law.If the law had been stated about betrothal, I might have thought that he is believed because betrothal makes her prohibited to him. But divorce would make her permitted to him. So maybe we wouldn’t believe him to say that he had been sent to divorce her. 
  If R. Nahman had taught us about divorce, we might have thought that the agents are believed to be witneseses because both witnesses cannot marry the woman. There is less fear of collusion. But they could both lie about a monetary matter and share the illicit proceeds.
  There is a dispute among amoraim whether or not when one takes a loan in front of witnesses he must also repay in front of witnesses. If he does, then these agents are interested witnesses. They would want to say “we did repay him” because otherwise the sender will claim the money back, since there are no witnesses to say that they (the agents) gave him the money back. In other words, these agents have an incentive to lie.
  Rava holds that one need not pay back a creditor in front of witnesses. These agents would be believed to say that they had returned the money to the sender. Therefore, since they have no incentive to lie, they are believed to say that they did indeed give it to the creditor.
  The rabbis instituted that when one completely denies a monetary claim the one denying must take an oath that he does not owe money. If the agents claim that they returned the money to the sender, they would have to take an oath. Therefore, they have an incentive to say that they gave the money to the creditor, and such their testimony is not believed. To be believed they must take an oath that they indeed gave the money to the creditor (the person to whom they were sent to give the money). If the creditor then takes an oath that he has not received the money, the sender will have to repay him the money. In short, do not send out agents if you do not trust them.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses who has a right to betroth a young girl and who has a right to accept her divorce if she is already married. 
  The Talmud quotes a mishnah from Gittin. According to the first opinion, a betrothed girl who is between 12 and 12.5 years of age, a na’arah, can either receive her own get or her father can. R. Yehudah holds that only her father can receive the get. And if she is so young (or mentally incapacitated) that she cannot hold on to her get, then she cannot be divorced.    
  According to Resh Lakish, the same dispute that occurs with regard to divorce all occurs in betrothal. The first opinion would hold that a na’arah can betroth herself or her father can betroth her, while R. Yehudah would hold that only the father can. 
  Why does R. Yohanan say that when it comes to divorce, either she or her father can accept the get, whereas when it comes to betrothal, since it removes her from her father’s domain, only he can accept it, not her? The issue hinges on whether the act brings her into her father’s domain (either can accept) or takes her out of her father’s domain (only the girl can accept). 
  Above we said that for a na’arah, only her father can betroth her since kiddushin takes her out of his domain. But this mishnah says that when it comes to “ma’amar” betrothal for a girl awaiting levirate marriage, either she or her father can accept it, despite the fact that this also takes her out of her father’s domain. This is a difficulty on R. Yohanan. 
  
  Daf 44a
  
  The Talmud now rewrites R. Yose son of R. Hanina’s explanation of R. Yohanan. Since betrothal requires a woman’s consent, and she is too young to give it, only her father can accept it. But when it comes to divorce, which does not require her consent, it does not really matter who accepts the document. Even she can accept it.
  This is the same difficulty as above. A na’arah (12-12.5 year old girl) can accept ma’amar (levirate betrothal), even though it requires her consent. Thus, a na’arah can accept something even if she is not legally able to consent.The Talmud resolves that this opinion accords with Rabbi who said that unlike betrothal, ma’amar can be performed against a girl’s consent. [The main effect of ma’amar is that she will not be able to have yibbum, levirate marriage, with any of the other brothers]. However, the other sages hold that like kiddushin, ma’amar requires consent.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss whether or not ma’amar, betrothal in the case of levirate marriage, can be done without the woman’s consent. Normally, betrothal cannot be done without the consent of both parties. But ma’amar is different. 
  If a yavam has sex with his yevamah against her will, the act of yibbum is considered to be performed (I want to emphasize that this is not saying that he is allowed to rape her, just that if he does, the act has legal validity). According to Rabbi, the same is true when it comes to ma’amar—it is valid even if it is done against her will. 
  The other rabbis, who hold that ma’amar cannot be performed against a woman’s will, compare it with regular kiddushin, which also cannot be performed against a woman’s will. 
  Rabbi and the other rabbis disagree about what to compare ma’amar with—other laws related to the yevamah or other laws related to kiddushin.
  R. Yohanan holds that when it comes to betrothal of a na’arah, only her father can accept the betrothal. This is directly supported by the second clause of the baraita we learned last week—when it comes to divorce, both the daughter and her father can accept the get. But when it comes to betrothal, only her father can.Moreover, this baraita now seems to be a difficulty on Resh Lakish who said that a na’arah can also accept her own betrothal.    
  Resh Lakish tries to ascribe that baraita to R. Judah, who holds that we can never have a case of two people having the right to accept the same document or legally binding object.     
  R. Judah was referring to divorce, not kiddushin. So why does the baraita say “which is not so in the case of kiddushin”!  
  The Talmud admits that the baraita really should have stated “which is not so in the case of divorce” but since the topic was ma’amar, kiddushin for a woman awaiting levirate marriage, the baraita taught “which is not so in the case of kiddushin.”Thus the Talmud has defended Resh Lakish, who holds that according to the rabbis both the na’arah and her father can accept her kiddushin.
  R. Judah holds that the rules governing ma’amar are different from divorce--she can accept the former but not the latter. This is because she is already tied to the yavam as soon as her husband dies.The Talmud now notes that this logic can also be used to explain why R. Yohanan holds that either she or her father can accept ma’amar but in ordinary betrothal only the father can. In the former case she is already tied to the yavam, and therefore the acceptance is less consequential.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with a difficulty on Resh Lakish who holds that a na’arah (girl age 12-12.5) can accept her own kiddushin.
  The mishnah implies that when the girl is a na’arah her father or his agent can marry her off, but she cannot accept her own kiddushin. Thus it contradicts Resh Lakish. 
  Again, Resh Lakish can deflect difficulties by ascribing them to R. Judah, who holds that only one person, the father, can accept her divorce and by extension, her kiddushin.   
  The problem with ascribing the first clause of our mishnah to R. Judah is that the second clause is ascribed to R. Shimon. In this clause, a man says to a woman “be betrothed to me with this date and be betrothed to me with this date.” She is betrothed only if one of the dates is worth a perutah, the minimum measure for kiddushin. Had he said “be betrothed” only once, we could have added up the value of all the dates. Rabbah identifies this position with R. Shimon who holds that when one takes a false oath to multiple people he is liable for each false oath only if he reiterates the word “oath.”     
  Perhaps R. Judah agrees with R. Shimon about the issue of detailed enumeration—whether one must enumerate each issue for it to have legal significance. However, R. Judah does not require him to say “oath” to each person. We can see easily that R. Judah actually disagrees with R. Shimon on this very issue. So our whole mishnah cannot be R. Judah, and if the second half is not R. Judah, the first half cannot be his opinion. 
  The whole mishnah could, however, be R. Shimon. R. Judah would not agree with the second clause, but R. Shimon could agree with the first clause—only the father may accept the kiddushin. But other rabbis (except R. Shimon) could hold like Resh Lakish, that both she and the father can accept kiddushin.Now that’s how you solve a difficulty folks!
  IntroductionThis section continues to refer to the dispute between R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish. To recall, all hold that both the father and the betrothed na’arah can receive the girl’s divorce, but they disagree over betrothal. Resh Lakish holds that the rule is the same, whereas R. Yohanan holds that only the father may receive it. 
  I always love it when we get a description of rabbis playing hooky from the Bet Midrash and having FOMO over what they missed. In this case, they missed Resh Lakish crying out with a prooftext when everyone agreed with R. Yohanan. The prooftext is often brought out to prove that the same rules apply for both divorce and marriage. 
  R. Assi wonders if R. Abin is reliable—should we believe him that everyone agreed with R. Yohanan. Yup, responds R. Zera. His word is as fresh as a fish pulled straight from the sea and plopped into the frying pan. This is definitely a saying I’m going to try to use more. 
  R. Assi wonders if R. Abin is reliable—should we believe him that everyone agreed with R. Yohanan. Yup, responds R. Zera. His word is as fresh as a fish pulled straight from the sea and plopped into the frying pan. This is definitely a saying I’m going to try to use more. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya asks whether a na’arah can appoint an agent to receive her get. We know that at least according to the rabbis she can receive a get. But is she like her father and able to appoint an agent?
  The Talmud fleshes out the two possibilities as to whether the na’arah can appoint an agent. We know she can receive her get, but is this because she is like her father’s hand, meaning that she has the exact same powers that he has? Or is this because she is like her father’s courtyard, part of her father’s property? Just as a husband can place the get in her father’s courtyard and thereby divorce her, so too he can give her the get. But a courtyard cannot appoint an agent. 
  
  Daf 44b
  
  The Talmud now tries to show that Rava does not have any doubt about this question, by citing his opinion in a different law about divorce. The husband places the get in the hand of his wife’s slave. If the slave is sleeping and she is watching over him, then he is fully controlled by her and she is divorced. But if he is awake, then the divorce is not valid, because he is like a courtyard that she is not watching.Now if we consider the na’arah to be like her father’s courtyard, then even if the husband gives her the get, she should not be divorced, because like the slave, she is a courtyard that is guarded without his awareness.Thus Rava must hold that the na’arah is like her father—just as he can appoint an agent, so can she.
  The question is far simpler—even if she is like her father’s hand, can she appoint an agent? The answer is she cannot. We would do well to remember—this is referring to a 12 year old girl. The rabbis simply did not believe that she had this great legal power.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss whether a na’arah can appoint an agent to accept her get. 
  A mishnah from Gittin teaches that a minor girl cannot appoint an agent to receive her get. By deduction, a na’arah, a girl slightly older than a minor, can appoint an agent.
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty—we are dealing here with a girl who has no father. Since she is of age and has no father with authority over her, she can appoint an agent. But a na’arah with a father cannot.
  The second clause refers to the girl’s father. If he appoints an agent, then the divorce is valid as soon as the agent receives the get, since he clearly has the right to appoint an agent. Therefore, it seems that the first clause also refers to a ketanah (minor) that has a father.
  The Talmud now adds words into the mishnah such that it accords with Rava. A minor can never appoint an agent to receive her get. A na’arah can, but only if she has no father. When Rava said that she cannot, he was referring to a minor whose father was still alive.
  IntroductionTheoretically a minor girl cannot accept her own betrothal, only her father can makes such an arrangement. Today’s sugya begins a discussion about what happens if she does accept her own betrothal without his knowledge. To leave this marriage does she require a full divorce?  
  Shmuel says that this girl requires a get, a regular divorce document. She also must perform “mi’un” which means refusal and is the way of annulling a marriage whose validity is only rabbinic and not biblical. Mi’un usually refers to a case where a girl without a father was married off by her mother or brother. From the Torah only the father has the right to marry her off. The rabbis gave the mother or brother such a power, but added that when the girl becomes of majority age, she can refuse the marriage.Karna (not the Great Karnak, but close) points out that Shmuel contradicts himself. If the marriage was valid, than she should need a get, not mi’un. And if the marriage is valid only rabbinically, then why should she need a get.The rabbis for some reason reverse the opinions and send the discussion to Rav. Rav rules like Shmuel did originally, and then notes that he could not believe that Shmuel would say like Karna. Rav too thinks she need a get and mi’un. 
  R. Abba son of R. Ika explains why she needs both. If the father consented to the marriage, then it would be valid and to leave the marriage she would need a divorce.If the father does not consent, then really the marriage is not valid. But since she received a get, we would think that she is a divorcee and therefore this man cannot marry her sister (a man may not marry his divorcees sister). To signify that the marriage was not necessarily valid, and therefore if he tries to marry her sister the kiddushin are valid, we also force them to perform mi’un. If he betroths the sister and then wishes to terminate the marriage, he would have to divorce her as well.  
  Shmuel’s rule is valid only if they already arranged the match (a shidukh). In such a case, we can assume that the father would have wanted the marriage. But if there was no such arrangement we do not need to assume that he would have been okay with the marriage.
  Ulla totally disagrees with Shmuel—such a girl does not even need mi’un. All the more so, she does not require a get.But, the Talmud notes, this is true only if there were no prior arrangements. If there were, then she would need a get and mi’un.  
  According to this version, even if there were arrangements, she still does not require mi’un. 
  R. Kahana cites a mishnah from Yevamot. A man is married to two women and dies and both become liable for yibbum (levirate marriage) with the yavam. If the yavam is prohibited from marrying one of them (for instance she is his daughter), then the rival wife is also exempt (this is the subject of the first chapter of Yevamot). However, if the marriage with the forbidden wife was terminated, then the rival wife can perform yibbum.One of the ways of terminating this marriage is mi’un, refusal. Who, the Talmud asks, gets to leave a marriage with refusal—it must be a minor who was married without the consent of her father.   
  R. Kahana resolves the difficulty by saying it refers only to a case where the girl was treated like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. He married her off as a minor and then she was divorced or widowed. Her father no longer has any authority over her. If she now, while still a minor, accepts marriage without her father’s consent, she can leave that marriage without a get and with only mi’un. But if she was married without his consent for her first marriage, the marriage, according to Ulla, has no validity.
  IntroductionWe continue with last week’s discussion about the case where a minor betrothed herself without her father’s awareness. Ulla had said that there is no validity to this marriage whatsoever. R. Hamnuna will raise a difficulty on him. 
  The baraita refers to the rights of a father to sell his daughter (Exodus 21). The issue is that the Torah refers to this girl as eventually marrying her master or her master’s son. The first opinion holds that he may not sell her to an owner that cannot fulfill this aspect of the verse. R. Elazar holds that he can.But both agree that if the prohibition is not first degree relative, but just one of the priestly prohibitions, he can sell her. A widow may not marry a high priest, but if she does, the marriage is valid. The same is true for a divorcee or a halutzah to an ordinary priest.
  
  Daf 45a
  
  A father can sell his daughter off only when she is a minor. So how can a father sell a widowed daughter? If he had married her off and then she was widowed, he no longer has the right to sell her. Rather, it must mean that she married herself off. Nevertheless, she is still called a widow, proving that there is some validity to such a marriage.
  R. Amram resolves the difficulty. She was widowed from a betrothal that was done in the form of designation—meaning she was sold as a slave, and then the master designated her as his wife (like betrothal) and then died. But this betrothal was not done with the consent of the father. The kiddushin does not go into effect with the original sale to which the father did consent, so we have here a case of a girl who is a widow but her father is allowed to sell her again because he never consented to betroth her in the first place. But in a regular case of betrothal, a father could not sell his daughter after she had already been married.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses what the law is when the girl who was married without her father’s consent is widowed and becomes liable for yibbum. 
  The young girl who was betrothed without her father’s knowledge now becomes a yevamah, a woman awaiting levirate marriage. The question asked is—what do we do in this complicated situation.Rav says essentially that the levirate connection, in Hebrew, zikah, is not relevant here. What is relevant here is the fact that the yavam, her husband’s brother, performed ma’amar with her, and ma’amar is like betrothal.If he performed ma’mar with her, then to get out of this connection to the yavam, she will need three things—a get, halitzah (release from levirate marriage) and mi’un, refusal.
  If the father did not consent to the marriage to the first man, but did consent to the marriage to the second, then the act of betrothal with the second is valid, and she will need a get to be released from this marriage. This marriage was not yibbum, it was just regular marriage. 
  If the father consented to the first marriage, then this is a regular case of yibbum and she needs halitzah to be released. 
  If the father did not consent to either of the marriages, then she is not married to the second man at all. If this man performs kiddushin with her sister, the kiddushin will be valid. However, people might not know this, thinking that she was married to the second husband, in which he cannot subsequently marry her sister. To let people know that there was no validity to either marriage, she should perform mi’un, which would annul the marriage had it existed.   
  If the brother did not perform ma’amar, she certainly does not need a get. If the father consented to the first marriage then halitzah would be enough.We might have thought that she needs mi’un for the same reasons as above—maybe people will think that if the brother marries her sister, the marriage is not valid. But everyone knows that marriage with the sister of one’s halutzah is prohibited only by the rabbis and therefore is valid according to biblical law. If he marries her, she will need a divorce in order to be married to someone else.Resh Lakish notes that the Torah prohibits one from marrying the sister of one’s divorcee. The rabbis add that the same is true of the sister of one’s halutzah—she is prohibited but only derabanan.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains a story about two men who betroth their kids to each other.
  This scene strikes me as reflective of actually society. Two men are drinking and they decide to marry off their kids to one another. What parent hasn’t tried (or at least thought) to marry their kid to one of their friend’s kids. 
  Ravina says that these kiddushin are not valid at all. If a girl is married without her father’s consent, we might think that the father may have consented. But a father cannot marry off his son and no one holds that perhaps the son consented. A man cannot marry unless he gives explicit consent.   
  
  Daf 45b
  
  Had the son appointed the father as an agent, the marriage would have been valid. But this is insolent behavior, and we do not assume that the son was so brazen as to do so.
  Ravina does not agree with Rav and Shmuel who said that we are concerned lest the father consented to the betrothal of his daughter who was betrothed without his knowledge. Ravina holds that we are never concerned that someone might have consented. Without the father’s consent for his daughter to be betrothed or the son’s consent to betroth, there is no validity to the betrothal.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues with another story of betrothal. While it is hard to tell if these stories are accurate descriptions of kiddushin, they certainly are interesting tales. 
  In this case we can assume that the father would not have consented to the kiddushin because it was done in such a disgraceful manner.
  Both aspects of this betrothal are disgraceful. The fact that it was done with vegetables and the fact that it was done in the shuk.
  IntroductionNow today’s story strikes me as being very realistic. They could make a movie out of this one!
  Oy, the drama!
  Both Abaye and Rava rule that the girl is not married to the father’s relative, for the father in the end told his wife she would be married to her relative. Abaye says that Jewish people should not be assumed as doing such a treacherous thing—throwing a party to marry the girl off to one man, but at the same time allowing her to marry another. Rava says that if the man wanted to marry her off to his relative, why would he have made the party? 
  If the father did not bother making a festive meal, Rava might assume that he did consent to the betrothal, whereas Abaye would still say that we do not assume the Jews will act this way.    
  In this case we do not know if the father wanted her to go overhead with the marriage because he was overseas. Eating terumah is the sine qua non sign that one is married, because eating terumah for someone not from a priestly family is strictly prohibited.Rav says she may eat terumah, and if her father returns and protests, then she will have to stop.R. Assi is concerned lest her father protest, and therefore he says she may not eat terumah.
  Such a case actually occurred and despite his ruling, he was concerned about R. Assi’s opinion and did not allow her to eat terumah.Finally, when it comes to inheritance, Rav says we follow a different principle—give the money to the last person we know owned it. In this case, that would be her father, for had she died before marriage, her father would have inherited her.
  IntroductionThe first part of today’s sugya deals with a case where we do not know if the father consented to the marriage or not. He did consent to the betrothal. 
  The betrothal was done correctly, with the father’s knowledge. But the marriage was not done with his consent. Since a woman does not eat terumah (if married to a priest) until she enters the huppah, the question we need to ask is whether or not her entrance to the huppah, i.e. marriage, is legally acceptable in order to allow her to eat terumah. 
  Earlier Rav had said that if the father is overseas she may eat terumah. Rav said that she can eat terumah, because we can assume that since her father consented to the betrothal, he would also consent to the marriage. R. Huna says that in this case Rav would agree that she may eat not eat terumah. The father’s silence should be interpreted as anger.
  R. Assi had said that if the father was overseas she does not eat terumah lest the father return and protest against the marriage. But R. Yirmiyah b. Abba argues that in this case, the father was here. The fact that he did not protest can be interpreted as a sign that he consents to the marriage.  
  In this case she was both betrothed and married without her father’s knowledge, but he was there and did not protest. R. Huna argues, in a very puzzling manner, that we assume that her father’s silence is a sign of consent. R. Yirmiyah b. Abba shifts his opinion and argues that since the father did not concede to the betrothal or the marriage, she may not eat terumah. 
  Ulla points out that R. Huna’s opinion seems absurd. If she does not eat terumah when the father consented to the betrothal, why should she eat terumah when her father did not consent? Hence, in this case we rule like R. Yirmiyah b. Abba who is a mere student in comparison with R. Huna, one of the great Babylonian amoraim.
  
  Daf 46a
  
  Rava explains why R. Huna allows her to eat terumah. Since her father allowed her to be betrothed and married without saying a word, means that he was treating her like an orphan, by not paying attention to what she was doing. Thus he is in a sense, no longer her father. Her marriage is valid if she consents to it herself. This is an excellent example of how Rava and other late amoraim will defend all opinions, even those that seem to make little sense to them.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses a girl who is betrothed without her father’s consent. All agree that if her father wants to prevent the marriage he can. Since she is a minor, he needs to consent to her actions. The question is whether she can prevent the marriage. In other words, if her father is okay with the match, can she change her mind?
  Rav argues that either her father or she can prevent the marriage. Essentially, since her father did not agree, the betrothal is simply not valid. But R. Assi would argue that only her father can undo the marriage, not she. 
  The verse from Exodus refers to a case where a man had sex with a young virgin without her father’s permission (the rabbis call this a case of seduction). The Torah says that the father can refuse the marriage. The rabbis add that the girl can as well. This is analogous to a case where a girl was betrothed without her father’s consent. Even if she originally consented, she may revoke it at a later period.  
  Rav resolves the difficulty raised on R. Assi. The baraita could refer to a case where the man seduced her not for the sake of marriage, but just for sex. In this case, there never was a betrothal, so of course she can refuse the marriage. 
  Obviously, if he seduced her without the intent of marriage, then she is not married. The rabbis do not believe that premarital sex causes a marital bond. So then why would we even need this verse?  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak argues that the verse is necessary to teach that he pays the fine, even though she refused to subsequently get married and her father consented to the marriage. Without this verse we might have thought that he pays the fine only if the father refuses the marriage, not she.   
  If the previous baraita referred to a case where he seduced her without the intent to marry her, then we learn the same thing in another baraita. This baraita requires that the seducer betroth her before marrying her. But if he seduced her with the intent to betroth her, then why does she need another betrothal. She is already betrothed! Thus the Torah refers to a situation where he did not seduce her for the sake of marriage. 
  Abaye argues with R. Joseph. Even if the man seduced her with the intent of betrothal, she still needs kiddushin with her father’s knowledge. Thus this latter baraita could refer to a case where the seducer had the intent of betrothal and would not be a support for Rav’s interpretation of the first baraita.
  In this case a man gives a woman several dates (palm dates) in an attempt to use the dates as betrothal money.  Here he says the words “Be betrothed to me” as he gives each date.  The fact that he repeats the formula each time means that each act is a separate act of betrothal.  Since they were separate acts, in order for the betrothal to be effective at least one of the dates must be worth a perutah.  If each individual date is worth less than a perutah, we do not add the dates up so that together they make a perutah.    
  In this case, since he made one betrothal statement, we can add up the dates.  If together they are worth a perutah then she is betrothed.  
  This section continues the scenario of the previous section.  In this case, while he is giving her the dates she starts to eat them one at a time (dates are quite delicious, and I guess she just couldn’t resist!)  Unless one of them is worth a perutah she cannot be betrothed by the combined value of them all because they are never all in her hand at the same time.  
  R. Shimon is the tanna who holds that separate phrases make the act separate acts. If one uses the word “oath” to each person to whom he owes an oath, and it turns out each was false, then he is liable for each oath. But if he makes one collective oath, he is only liable once.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues with interpreting the next line of the mishnah. 
  The last clause of the mishnah describes her eating the dates one at a time. She is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a perutah. To what does this clause refer? It cannot refer to the first clause where he said, “Be betrothed to me with this one, be betrothed to me with this one,” because she is not eating the dates. She could even put them down and as long as one of the dates is worth a perutah, she is betrothed. 
  Where he said “with this one and with this one and with this one.” If she is eating them one at a time, one of them alone must be worth a perutah. 
  If the first date is worth a perutah, and he keeps giving her dates, the betrothal is not complete until he gives her the last date. The rabbis view the first dates as a loan, because were he to retract his offer, she would have to give the date back. By the time she is betrothed, this date is gone and he is saying to her—if you become betrothed to me, you do not need to give me the loan back. But then this is betrothal through forgiving a loan, and this is not a valid form of kiddushin. R. Yohanan is indeed puzzled by the conundrum and offers a colorful statement to express it. 
  Rav and Shmuel return to saying that the last clause refers to the first clause of the mishnah, where he says “Be betrothed to me with this one, be betrothed to me with this one.” If she puts the dates down it is obvious that she is not betrothed unless one is worth a perutah because she has not yet derived any benefit from them. But if she is eating them, and deriving immediate benefit, I might have thought that even if no date is worth a perutah, she has agreed to be taken in marriage. Therefore, the mishnah teaches that this is not so. A woman never agrees to be betrothed for less than a perutah. 
  R. Ammi says that it can refer to the last clause of the mishnah as long as we read it as saying that the last date he gives her has to be worth a perutah. This last date is not a loan, it is the date on which she must agree to be betrothed. This date, and not the earlier dates, must be worth a perutah. 
  Rava derives three halakhic lessons from R. Ammi’s statement. First of all, kiddushin cannot be performed by forgiving a debt, as was stated above. Second, if one forgives a debt and at the same time gives the woman a perutah, she is thinking about the perutah and is betrothed. This is what happened in this situation. The first dates were a loan which he is now forgiving. And the last date is worth a perutah. Third, if she in the end does not want to be betrothed, she must return the money, which here refers to the first dates.    
  
  Daf 46b
  
  IntroductionOne cannot betroth one’s sister. But what happens to the money if one tries to do so. Does the money go back to the one who gave it? This is related to the issue that came up at the very end of yesterday’s sugya. 
  Rav says that the money returns to the giver and that we assume that he gave it to his sister to hold on to as a deposit. She must give it back to him. He did not tell her he was giving it to her as a deposit because he was concerned she would not accept it. 
  Shmuel agrees that the man knew that the kiddushin would not be valid, but he assumes that the man gave his sister the money as a gift. He did not tell her it was a gift because he thought she would be embarrassed to receive a gift from him (evidently she was not embarrassed that he asked her to marry him!).  
  Hallah, a portion of one’s dough given to a priest, is supposed to be separated from the dough and not from flour. If one separates it as flour, it is not hallah and if he gives it to the priest, the priest must return it. We do not assume that the man knew that he should not separate dough from flour and that he gave it as a gift to the priest.  This is a difficulty on Shmuel who said that we do make such an assumption when it comes to kiddushin.
  Shmuel resolves the difficulty by noting that this situation could lead to a problem. The priest might have some flour of his own that he wants to knead and bake. If this flour alone is less than five quarters of a kav, it is not liable for hallah. When he adds this flour in, he will think he need not separate hallah because this extra flour already had the mandatory hallah removed. Now when he eats the bread, he will be eating tevel, produce that has not had the appropriate gifts removed.
  How could the priest make such a mistake—he should know that one does not separate hallah from flour? The answer is that people know that one should not separate hallah from flour, but they might err in the reasoning. They might think that its because giving the priest dough is easier for the priest. And if the priest is okay with receiving it as flour, then the hallah separation is valid. But this is not true—this separation is not valid at all.So the difficulty on Shmuel is resolved—if the priest keeps this flour, a problem might occur. But no problem will occur if the woman keeps the kiddushin money.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section we learned that if someone separates hallah from flour and gives it to the priest, the priest must return it to the original owner. Our sugya asks why. 
  Why not say that the hallah separated from flour belongs to the priest, but the dough still has to have terumah removed from it before the dough can be eaten. This would be the like the case of one who separates terumah from a perforated pot for produce in an unperforated pot. The produce in the unperforated pot must still be tithed, but that which was set aside is terumah and belongs to the priest.    
  The first answer is that when there are two pots or other type of container, the person will understand that the unperforated pot still needs terumah to be separated. The other pot cannot be used. But if we say that the priest gets to keep the hallah separated from flour, people will not think that more hallah needs to be separated from the dough before it can be eaten. This is a case of one container. 
  The second solution is that the hallah must be returned to the owner not because the priest will make a mistake but because the owner will. The priest will know that that which he receives is not hallah. But the owner will not know that he still has to take out hallah. Therefore, we say it is not hallah.    
  This is the same resolution that we saw yesterday. The man will think that since the priest accepted it, it is a valid separation of hallah and he will not separate more hallah from his dough.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to ask why the priest cannot keep the hallah given to him. Even though it’s not a valid separation of hallah, why must he give it back? As we will again see, in other cases, even though the separation is not valid, the priest may keep the terumah given to him. 
  This is essentially the same difficulty raised yesterday. The Talmud resolves it again—with two pots, the Israelite will understand that he must separate terumah again, even if we let the priest keep what he was given. But with one pot (i.e. the case of the hallah) the Israelite will think that he has separated hallah and he will eat the dough without separating again, which is considered eating tevel, untithed produce. To let him know that his dough may not be eaten until hallah is removed, the priest must return the hallah he was given.   
  The Talmud cites a source that refers to “one pot” and still the priest can keep the terumah even though the Israelite must separate terumah again. This contradicts what we said before about the Israelite not listening and again separating terumah if it is a case of one pot. In such cases, we should say that what he separated is not terumah otherwise he will come to think that he need not separate again.   
  In the case of separating terumah from bad produce to exempt good produce, this separation is valid terumah. The other produce can be eaten without separating more terumah, and the terumah he separated is real terumah. However, to prevent people from doing this, the rabbis made him separate terumah again. Thus in one container, even if the person does not separate terumah again, he will not be eating tevel (untithed produce). We can allow the terumah to remain with the priest without concern that a biblical violation will occur.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with the next section of the mishnah which reads:[If he says,] “[Be betrothed to me] with this one and with this one and with this one” if together they are worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.
  If he said “with these” then he is betrothing her with all of the dates he is going to give her. Even if she eats one at a time she is already betrothed and is eating her own dates. 
  
  Daf 47a
  
  This baraita is brought as a support for Rava. If in his betrothal statement he includes all of the produce he is giving her, then she is betrothed if the sum value is a perutah. But if he specifies each piece of produce and before he gives her all of them she eats them one at a time, she is not betrothed unless each is worth a perutah.The Talmud will demonstrate precisely how this baraita supports Rava. 
  The Talmud tries to figure out the precise situation referred to in the first clause of the baraita. If he meant to say “or with an acorn” etc. then they must each individually be worth a perutah, yet the baraita said that we add the value up together.If he meant “and with an acorn, and with a pomegranate” etc., then this is the same lesson as the last clause. This would make the baraita repetitive.
  The baraita refers to a case where he said “with these” and he had an acorn, pomegranate and nut.
  The problem is that the second clause of the baraita says “with these” which implies that the first clause must refer to a different statement, otherwise it would be repetitive. To solve the problem the Talmud suggests that the second clause simply explains the first clause. 
  The Talmud now proves that there is a distinction between saying “with this one and with this one” and “with these” as Rava said. In the case of “with this one…”, if she eats one at a time she will not be betrothed until on individual piece is worth a perutah. To be betrothed she must put them down until they add up to a perutah. But if he says “with these” she is betrothed if they all add up to a perutah even if she eats one at a time, because as soon as he gives them to her, they are hers.
  IntroductionToday’s section raises a difficulty from this baraita on Rav and Shmuel whose disagreement with R. Ammi appeared earlier. I am replicating here the mishnah for ease of reference:1.	He who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with this date, be betrothed to me with this one” if any one of them is worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.2.	[If he says,] “[Be betrothed to me] with this one and with this one and with this one” if together they are worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.3.	If she eats them one by one, she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a perutah.The dispute between R. Ammi and Rav and Shmuel was over whether the last clause refers to the first clause (Rav and Shmuel) or the second clause (R. Ammi).
  R. Ammi could be consistent in his interpretation of the baraita and mishnah—in both cases the last clause refers to the second clause, and she is not betrothed unless the last one is worth a perutah. This avoids the problem of this being a case of betrothal by forgiving a loan.
  Rav and Shmuel say that the mishnah’s last clause refers to the first clause. Rav said despite the fact that she gets immediate benefit by eating the dates immediately, a single date must be worth a perutah for her to be betrothed. The problem for them is the baraita, which lists a general statement “be betrothed to me with these.” So why would any one item need to be worth a perutah?  
  Rabbi here is addressing the laws of piggul, sacrifices offered with improper intent. If the priest making the sacrifice thinks to himself that he will eat “the size of an olive outside of its proper time, the size of an olive outside of its proper place” or he thinks the word “and” in between the two statements, in both cases, he has committed two acts of piggul. He did not intend to combine the statements. So too in the case of kiddushin, since he said “with this, with this” he has made separate statements, even though he said “be betrothed to me” only once.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with betrothing with a loan, a topic the rabbis seem to talk about a lot, and which can mean various different things. 
  According to Rav, one cannot betroth a woman by forgiving a debt. Once the loan is given, the loan may be used and therefore he is not giving her anything at the time of betrothal. 
  The Talmud suggests that tannaim disagree over Rav’s reasoning and halakhic ruling.   
  In the second half of the baraita all tannaim agree that one can acquire an object by forgiving a loan. But if one tanna holds that a loan is given to be expended, how can forgiving a loan acquire an object. What is given in order to acquire the object? 
  R. Huna changes the topic of the baraita such that it is not the same issue addressed by Rav (forgiving an already existent loan). The baraita deals with a case where he says to her, “be betrothed with a maneh (100 dinars).” This is way more than a perutah. The problem is that the money was short a dinar. So now he owes her a dinar. One tanna thinks that she will be embarrassed to claim the extra dinar, and therefore she is not betrothed. This is “kiddushin with a loan” for he still owes her more money. 
  R. Elazar seems to have made a statement that agrees with one opinion in the tannaitic dispute. To avoid this, the Talmud suggests that there is a difference between being one dinar short and 99 dinars short. In the first case, she might be embarrassed to ask for one extra dinar. She’ll look cheap. Therefore, one tanna holds she is not betrothed. But 99 dinars short is essentially not paying and she will not be embarrassed to claim the remainder of the money. Therefore, all tannaim would agree that she is betrothed and he owes her the rest.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with betrothal by forgiving a loan.
  This baraita is raised as an objection against Rav. The Talmud will now clarify the difficulty. 
  
  Daf 47b
  
  The tannaim disagree only with regard to the issue of whether the woman must still have in her possession a perutah of the money given to her as a loan. The first tanna holds that it need not be in her possession whereas R. Meir holds that it must be. But all tannaim would seem to hold that if she has a perutah of the loan in her possession and the husband forgives the loan, she is betrothed. This is a difficulty against Rav. 
  Rava says this baraita is corrupt and should not be used as a difficulty against Rav. The baraita does not explain what the case of the deposit is. If she guaranteed the deposit, then it is essentially the same as a loan. She must pay it back if it was stolen or lost, the same as is true for a loan. But if she did not guarantee the deposit, then instead of making a distinction in the second clause between a deposit and a loan, the baraita should have distinguished between a guaranteed deposit and a non-guaranteed deposit. This would have presented a more precise teaching. Therefore, this baraita is corrupt and should not be used as a difficulty. Note that this is a common strategy to resolve difficulties against amoraim. 
  Having stated that the baraita is corrupt, Rava now can emend the first clause. Rather than saying “even if a perutah’s worth of it is not left, she is betrothed” it should read “even if a perutah's worth is left, she is not betrothed.” According to this understanding of this tannaitic opinion, betrothal cannot be done with a loan, just as Rav said. R. Meir would hold that it can be performed with a loan, but this is not a problem for Rav for he has a tanna with which to agree.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s baraita, R. Meir and the tanna kamma disagreed over whether a woman can be betrothed with a loan that a man had given her and that was still in her hands. The tanna kamma ruled that she may not and R. Meir ruled that as long as she still has some of the loan in her hands, she may be betrothed with it.  
  The rabbis at the academy say that the debate is over whether a loan that has not yet begun to be spent belongs to the creditor or the debtor. There are two ramifications to this: 1) whether the creditor can retract the loan; 2) If an unpreventable accident happens, who is responsible. According to the first opinion, the loan belongs to the debtor, and therefore, the man who loaned the money to the woman cannot use it for betrothal. It is already hers, so he would not be giving her anything. According to R. Meir, the loan still belongs to the creditor and therefore he can use it for betrothal.
  Rabbah makes a small adjustment in what the other rabbis say. Everyone agrees that once the money is taken, the borrower is responsible for all accidents, even unpreventable ones. They argue only about whether the creditor can retract.Note that this is still a viable interpretation of the dispute between the tanna kamma (one cannot betroth with a loan) and R. Meir (if the money is still in her possession, one can). 
  R. Huna seems to say that a borrower does not acquire the loaned object until he uses it. This seems to be R. Meir’s opinion. 
  The Talmud now distinguishes between lending money and lending objects. When it comes to lending money, the tannaim disagree whether it remains in the possession of the owner until the debtor has used it. But when it comes to objects, all agree that until the borrower uses it, it is still in the possession of the lender. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss Rav’s statement that a loan may not be used for betrothal.
  There are two cases in the baraita: 1) a man tries to betroth a woman by giving her a debt document; 2) he betroths her by transferring a loan that others owe him to her. The debt document must be money she owes him, otherwise the two cases are the same. Thus we have a tannaitic dispute over whether a man can betroth a woman by forgiving her debt. 
  The Talmud resolves that neither case refers to a debt the woman owes him. Rather, case 1 is a loan contracted by document, and case 2 is a loan contracted verbally.  
  There are now two topics in the baraita—written and verbal debts. The Talmud will first explore the issue of written debts. Why would the sages hold that she is not betrothed when he gives her a debt document, concerning a debt others owe him? The Talmud explains that these sages agree with the rabbis who dispute Rabbi in a baraita about transferring a debt document. Rabbi says that all one must do is simply transfer the debt document. R. Meir would thus agree that one can betroth a woman by simply transferring a debt document to her. The other sages do not agree with Rabbi—and therefore simply giving her a debt document is not sufficient.  
  Perhaps no one agrees with Rabbi that one may transfer a debt document simply by handing it over. The question is what does he have to write in order to transfer it? The tanna kamma of the baraita agrees with R. Papa that he must write “acquire it together with all of its obligations” whereas R. Meir would hold that he need not write this formula.
  Shmuel rules that the original creditor can forgive the loan, even after he has transferred the debt. [This rule would seem to make debt transfer impossible, or at least highly risky, and therefore it seems unlikely that any economy could actually abide by this rule.] According to Shmuel’s rule, the one receiving the debt document does not really possess it, because it could always be forgiven. Therefore, the tanna kamma holds, that one may not betroth in this way. R. Meir disagrees with Shmuel and therefore allows one to betroth through transfer of debt.
  
  Daf 48a
  
  Perhaps all tannaim agree that the original creditor can forgive the debt even after he has transferred it. The question is—is the woman concerned that the husband will do so. If she is not worried that he will do so, then she has agreed to betrothal by accepting the document. This would accord with R. Meir. The tanna kamma would hold that she is not confident that he will not do so, and therefore, she has not willingly transferred herself by accepting this form of kiddushin.Note that the act of accepting betrothal has shifted some here. The question is not—did the woman receive something of absolute value. The question is, does she feel that she has received something of value such that her acceptance of it shows that she is accepting kiddushin. We have shifted from an issue of value, to an issue of, “what was the woman thinking.” This is a shift that I believe we can find in other passages in the Talmud. 
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss betrothal through a loan. Earlier we learned that the tannaim disagree whether one can betroth with a loan contracted verbally. Today’s sugya opens by explaining both positions. 
  Rav allows one to transfer debt verbally when all three parties are present—the creditor, the debtor and the person to whom the debt is being transferred. So if the debtor is present, the husband could transfer the debt to the woman he is betrothing. R. Meir would hold that this is true of loans, but the tanna kamma would hold that it is true only of deposits, not of loans.
  The Talmud again suggests that Rav’s statement, that one may not betroth with a loan, is part of a tannaitic dispute. In this baraita, the tannaim argue over whether one may betroth with a debt document. If this debt document was a document stating that others owed money to him, then R. Meir cannot say that he cannot use this for betrothal, because earlier he said that one can use a debt document for betrothal. Rather, it must mean a document stating that she owes him money. Rav would then hold like R. Meir but unlike the other tannaim. 
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that the topic of this baraita is not betrothal by loan but rather the validity of a document without witnesses signed on to it. To interpret this way, R. Nahman refers to a dispute concerning divorce documents. R. Meir says that signees are essential and thus a document without them is invalid. R. Elazar says that the essential act is transfer of the document to the woman, and that signees are necessary only as a backup. Since this document is valid, it may be used for kiddushin. The other rabbis are not sure as to whom the halakhah follows and therefore demand that the paper be worth a perutah. In such case, she is betrothed through the paper and not the debt. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud now suggests another way of interpreting the dispute in the baraita over whether a woman can be betrothed with a document. 
  The next suggestion is that the document here is a document of betrothal, but one that was not written with her in mind. All agree that a divorce document must be written for the woman who is being divorced. The question is whether the same is true for a document of betrothal. After asking this question, Resh Lakish affirms that a deed of betrothal must be written with her in mind. R. Meir would agree with him and R. Elazar would not.   
  Perhaps all tannaim agree that a betrothal document must be written for her sake, but they disagree, as do amoraim, whether it can be written without her knowledge. R. Meir would say that it cannot, but R. Elazar would say that it can.
  IntroductionYet again, the Talmud attempts to tie Rav’s statement, that one cannot betroth with a loan, into a tannaitic dispute. I think by this point we can sense where this is going. It seems to be more of an exploration of many different possibilities for how betrothal can be done, than a belief that Rav’s opinion is connected to a tannaitic dispute.  
  The topic of the tannaitic dispute is a woman who commissions a man to betroth her by making some jewelry for her. Instead of paying him, she will be betrothed to him by him not charging her for making the jewelry. According to R. Meir this works and she is betrothed as soon as the jewelry is finished. The sages say he must give her money, which the Talmud here interprets to be other money, and not the jewelry itself. Therefore, this would be a dispute over one who betroths with a loan. R. Meir says that this is possible—she owes him money and he forgives the debt. The other sages say that this does not work. 
  The Talmud further clarifies another assumption we must make. When A hires B to do a job, the debt accrues as the work is done and is not incurred only at the end, upon completion of work. As the man works to make the jewelry, the woman gradually owes him money. She owes him a debt, and then he forgives the debt at the point of betrothal. R. Meir says that this works, whereas the other sages say that it does not. 
  The Talmud now rejects the idea that this debate is over betrothal with a loan. The issue here is whether we consider wages to incur incrementally while the work is performed or only at the end. The sages would say that they incur incrementally, from beginning to end. At the end of his work, she owes him money and he forgives the debt. This is not a valid form of kiddushin. R. Meir would say that the debt is incurred only at the end, when he actually performs the betrothal. There is no loan here, only him converting the money she now owes him into betrothal. Since there was never a loan, this is not betrothal by loan.
  
  Daf 48b
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues trying to explain the dispute between R. Meir and the sages in yesterday’s baraita. For the purpose of clarification I am copying that baraita again here:[If a woman says to a man,] “Make me a necklace, earrings and [finger] rings, and I will be betrothed to you,” as soon as he makes them, she is betrothed, the words of R. Meir. But the Sages say: She is not betrothed until the money reaches her hand.
  The Talmud now suggests that R. Meir and the sages argue over whether the artisan making the vessel with material given to him acquires title to the vessel while working on it. If he does, acquire it, then he is selling it back when he gives it back to her. Instead of her paying him, she is betrothed through it. This is how R. Meir would hold. The other sages would say that the vessel is not his so he cannot be betrothing her by giving it to her.   
  According to this last interpretation of the dispute, the issue is whether a man can betroth a woman by forgiving her a debt and at the same time giving her a perutah. According to R. Meir, if the jeweler adds something of his own to that which she gave him, she is agreeing to betrothal by accepting the material that belonged to him, which must be worth a perutah. Therefore, this betrothal works. According to the sages, her mind is on the forgiving of the loan, and therefore, she is not betrothed by him giving her this perutah.  
  The Talmud now cites another dispute about whether one can betroth with owed wages or with wages that will be owed.   
  All tannaim hold that one cannot betroth by simply forgiving a debt. That is why all agree that with regard to back wages, one cannot use them for betrothal. But the first tanna holds that one may betroth with future wages. This tanna would hold that as soon he finishes the work, he becomes entitled to the wages and by forgiving them he betroths her. There is no debt incurred. R. Natan would hold that the wages are incurred incrementally and therefore this is betrothal with a debt. 
  R. Natan would hold that even if he adds something of his own and gives it to her, when a man betroths by forgiving a debt and with a perutah, her mind is on the debt. Therefore, adding something of his own does not help make this a valid form of kiddushin.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with a new mishnah. 
  In each case in this mishnah, the husband makes an incorrect statement as part of the betrothal formula.  For instance, he states that he is betrothing her with a cup of a certain liquid and it turns out to be a different liquid.  Alternatively, he says that he is betrothing her with a certain type of coin and it turns out to be a different coin.  Finally, he tells her that he is of a certain economic status and he is not.  According to the first opinion, since the facts as he stated them are incorrect, the betrothal is ineffective. This is true even if he deceived her to her own advantage. For instance, he said that he was giving her a cup of wine and it turned out to be a cup of honey, which is more valuable than wine.  According to the first opinion, we don’t reason that a woman who would agree to be betrothed to a certain man with a cup of wine would also agree to such a betrothal if done with a cup of honey, since she could always sell the honey to buy wine.  Rather, the betrothal statement must be accurate.Rabbi Shimon disagrees.  He holds that if the deception is clearly to her advantage, the betrothal is valid.  Therefore, if he says that the cup was honey and it turned out to be wine (cheaper) she is not betrothed.  But if he told her that the cup was wine and it turned out to be honey, she is betrothed. 
  The statement “be betrothed to me with this cup” could be read in three different ways—with both the cup and its contents, with just the cup, or with the contents. The Talmud resolves the three baraitot by saying they refer to different contents. If there is water in the cup, he means to betroth her with the cup and not its contents. If there is wine, he is betrothing her with the contents and not the cup, because she could drink the wine and give the cup back. If there is brine in the cup, then she needs the cup, so he is betrothing her with both. [Another interpretation of this last word is oil].
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to deal with R. Shimon’s opinion, that if he deceived her and ended up giving her something of greater value, she is betrothed. 
  Why not say that even if he deceives her by giving her gold when he said he was giving her silver, she is not betrothed, because maybe she would have preferred silver. After all, evidently some people prefer vinegar over wine (like when you’re making a salad, or you’re a recovering alcoholic, although I don’t think they had salads or alcoholics back then).   
  Abaye completely changes the situation. The husband wanted to give her a silver denar, but his agent gave her a gold denar. The first tanna in the mishnah holds that the husband did not want to betroth her with a gold denar, so she is not betrothed. R. Shimon says that the husband did not really care what coin was used for betrothal, so she is betrothed.
  The Talmud points out that the language of the mishnah simply does not accord with Abaye’s interpretation.  
  Rava and R. Hiyya b. Avin interpret the case to be one where the woman sent an agent, not the man. She told her agent that the man was going to betroth her with a silver denar, and he gave her a gold denar. The first tanna holds that the woman specified silver denar because that is what she was expecting. R. Shimon holds that the woman was only stating a coin and does not really care what he does betrothal with. As far as the language “it was found,” the Talmud explains that initially the coin was wrapped up in a cloth when given to her.  
  IntroductionAt the end of last week’s daf we learned of a notion called “merely indicating the place.” What this means is that when a person gives a detail to an agent of sorts, he does not really care about the performance of the detail, he is just giving an example or some extraneous information. In today’s sugya, Abaye notes that there are several tannaitic statements that could be interpreted using this rubric. 
  The first tanna who holds that one was merely indicating a place was R. Shimon from yesterday’s source about kiddushin. The second source is about divorce documents, and it deals with the difference between plain gets, whose witnesses sign inside the document, and tied gets, whose witnesses sign on the outside of the document, after it has been tied. The tannaim dispute whether a get can be valid if signed in the wrong way. The Talmud will now discuss the various opinions in this source.  
  
  Daf 49a
  
  R. Ashi explains the disagreement between the first tanna and R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. The first opinion holds that if both types of documents are customary in that particular place and the husband asked to make a particular one and the scribe makes the other kind, the get is invalid. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says that he does not really care, he was merely “indicating a place.”
  R. Ashi explains the disagreement between the first tanna and R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. The first opinion holds that if both types of documents are customary in that particular place and the husband asked to make a particular one and the scribe makes the other kind, the get is invalid. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says that he does not really care, he was merely “indicating a place.”
  IntroductionToday’s sugya goes back to explaining the dispute in the mishnah. To recall, according to the tanna kamma, if the husband says that he is betrothing her with one thing and then it turns out he betrothed her with another, the betrothal is invalid. R. Shimon holds that if the thing used was better than what he stated, than she is betrothed. 
  R. Shimon would agree that if he deceives her by presenting himself as being of lower lineage than he actually is, she is not betrothed. While R. Shimon believes that all women would agree to betrothal for a higher betrothal payment, not all women want to be married to a man of higher lineage. Some women might actually prefer the lower lineage, perhaps because they will not have to live up to such high expectations.
  In the next mishnah, we learn of cases where a husband lies about his lineage. Even if he says that he was a Levite and it turns out he is a priest, a more prestigious lineage, she is not betrothed. R. Shimon does not disagree in this case. From here we can conclude that he only disagrees if the deception was with money. If the deception was with lineage, i.e. he has better lineage than he stated, she is not betrothed. A “natin” is a category similar to a mamzer, both of whom have very limited marital prospects.
  Mar bar R. Ashi points out that in the next mishnah, there is a case of a man who claims to not have an adult daughter who and it turns out that he does. Having such a daughter seems to be some sort of a monetary advantage. According to Ulla and R. Ashi, R. Shimon should disagree—if he deceives her and in reality has a monetary advantage, she is betrothed. But he does not disagree. This indicates that just because R. Shimon does not express his disagreement, does not mean that he does not disagree. R. Shimon, according to Mar bar R. Ashi, would hold that if he deceives her to her advantage, she is betrothed, even in the case of  a deception involving lineage. 
  The Talmud rejects Mar bar R. Ashi. In the case of financial advantage, since the mishnah taught that R. Shimon disagrees with regard to the first clause, it assumes that the same dispute can be applied to the second clause. However, when the issue is one of lineage, if he disagrees then it should have taught his disagreement. The fact that it does not implies that R. Shimon agrees that if the deception was with regard to lineage, she is not betrothed.   
  The Talmud now interprets the word “megudelet” to mean something different from what we originally thought. It does not mean an adult daughter (like the word “gedolah”) but rather a daughter that an braid hair. A woman might not want a hairdresser for a daughter for such a hairdresser might gossip about her to her neighbors.
  For a man to be a “Torah reader” all he has to do is read three verses in the synagogue, the minimum number for an aliyah. R. Judah says he must also be able to translate into Aramaic. 
  The Talmud clarifies that to translate does not mean to make up one’s own translation. It means to recite the official translation sanctioned by the sages. 
  “Kara” implies an expert in reading Scripture. Beyond that which is implied by the term “karyana.”     
  The word “shoneh” (or mishnah) which I have translated as “recite” always refers to reciting Oral Torah and not reading Written Torah. Therefore, when R. Yohanan says “Torah” he must mean midrash, which is exegesis of Torah. Thus we have here the two main forms of Oral Torah—Midrash, which are laws connected to verses, and halakhot, laws taught independent of verses. The latter form is found today in midrashic collections that follow the order of four of the five books of the Torah (there is none on Genesis). The former is found in the Mishnah and Tosefta.
  
  Daf 49b
  
  Again, the Talmud clarifies two levels of qualifications. “Taneina” implies a low level of familiarity with oral Torah. “Tanna” implies a much higher level.   
  Modern talmudic historians interpret “kallah” here as referring to a gathering of sages that took place for two months out of the year in Babylonia. During this gathering they would learn one tractate. Thus this tractate was the freshest one on people’s minds. But knowing something even from that particular tractate would qualify one to be a “talmid.”    
  In all of these cases, we take the most minimal possible meaning of the word. We should note that this does not necessarily mean that one who, for instance, is able to answer one matter of wisdom is truly considered wise. Rather, the issue is that with betrothal, we need to err on the side of caution. If we consider her betrothed and she is not, the consequences are minimal. But if we consider her not betrothed and she is, and then she marries someone else, her kids are mamzerim.
  IntroductionThe aggadic discussion that follows seems to be here due to its reference to some of the same attributes as we learned about yesterday. Other than, your guess is as good as mine as to what it’s doing here. It has nothing to do with kiddushin. 
  In one of my favorite personifications, we learn that arrogance descended to Babylonia, and from there made its way to Elam. [I can just picture a green little demon making its way across the desert]. The intent was to build a house, but the house was not built there in Babylonia, rather it was built in Elam, a neighboring region.
  Arrogance accompanies poverty, but not poverty of material. Rather, it accompanies spiritual poverty, the lack of Torah. Elam which has material wealth lacks Torah and thus it, not Babylonia where Torah is abundant, is characterized by arrogance.
  IntroductionThe aggadah of the ten kavs continues. Trigger warning—you might not like all of these so much.  
  And to think, I always thought the ten kav of lice descended to the Israeli school system.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a mishnah very similar to the previous one. In  all of these cases the man makes a false statement when betrothing the woman.  What is different in this mishnah is that in these cases it is not clear which is “better.”  For instance, in the previous mishnah it was clear that having a gold denar was better than a silver one. However, here it is not clear whether the woman would rather be married to, for example a townsman, more than she would want to be married to a villager.  Even living near the bathhouse is not clearly an advantage, as the foot traffic there will be greater.  Since we cannot affirm which is necessarily better, we can assume that in these cases Rabbi Shimon would agree that she is not betrothed.
  In the context of the mishnah, we have to understand that marrying a priest is not necessarily advantage.  Even though the priest receives terumah which would have been a substantial economic benefit, the woman may potentially prefer to be married to a Levite who receives tithes.
  As we learned previously, the word I have translated as “braids hair” might also be translated as “grown up.”  While this would change the meaning of the mishnah, in either case we have to interpret that it is not a clear advantage to either have or not have a daughter or maidservant that braids hair or is grown up.  Whether it is a benefit would depend if the woman prefers having some extra help over her privacy.
  Having or not having sons may be connected to issues of inheritance or yibbum (levirate marriage).  She may want him to have sons (or children in general), so that if he dies she won’t have to undergo yibbum. She may not want him to have sons since those sons will share with her own sons in his inheritance.  Again, since we cannot affirm which is preferable, Rabbi Shimon would agree that she is not betrothed.  
  There is a general rule in laws of betrothal and other areas of halakhah—thoughts that a person keeps to himself or herself are not legally consequential.  Therefore, even if she thinks to herself that she would have agreed to be betrothed to him in any case, she is not betrothed.  Had she wanted to be betrothed in any case, she should have responded at the time of betrothal, “I agree to be betrothed to you whether you are a priest or a Levite” etc. 
  All of the above rules also apply if she deceives him.  For instance, if she says “I am a priest’s daughter” and she is a Levite’s daughter, she is not betrothed.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the issue of “matters in one’s heart,” which refers to cases where a person has a particular intent but does not state that intent out loud. Is there legal significance to such cases?
  The man sold his land only because he wished to move to Israel, but did not say so. For some unknown reason, this did not work out (does tend to happen). Nevertheless, since he did not state that this is why he was selling the land, he cannot retract, for matters that remain in one’s heart have no legal significance. 
  A mishnah teaches that if a person is obligated to bring a sacrifice but does not want to bring it, the court can physically force him to bring it. Nevertheless, he must also do so with his own free will. The court therefore forces him to say “I am willing” even though we know he is not. This seems to follow the rule the matters of the heart have no legal significance. 
  
  Daf 50a
  
  The Talmud rejects this as proof for Rava. In that case, although it looks like he does not want to bring a sacrifice, we can say that in truth, he would want to bring the sacrifice. So this is not a case where matters of the heart are ignored.
  The Talmud now tries to derive the principle from the second half of the same mishnah which states that the court can force a husband to divorce his wife or free his slave in cases where the court compels him to do so. But again, this is rejected. Although he says he does not want to divorce his wife, it is a mitzvah to listen to the court. 
  R. Joseph tries to derive Rava’s principle from the mishnah we just learned. The man explicitly says that he thought the woman he was betrothing was something else than she turned out to be. This seems like a strong proof that “matters of the heart are not significant.” 
  The problem with this mishnah is that it is a stringency. It might be that the mishnah rules that she is betrothed simply as a stringency. To really prove that “matters of the heart are not significant” we will need to find a case that involves a leniency.   
  Abaye cites the first half of the mishnah, which rules that when he deceives her by stipulating that he is something that he is not. She is not betrothed, even if she says that she wanted to be betrothed in any case. This again seems to prove that matters of the heart are not significant. But again, this proof is rejected. She cannot just obviate his stipulation. He said, for instance, “You are betrothed to me on condition that I am a priest.” If he is not a priest, she is not betrothed under any circumstance. 
  In this case, the master sends his agent to get a purse left somewhere. The agent brings him something that actually belonged to the Temple. Even if the master says “I didn’t intend for you to bring that purse” the master is liable for trespassing Temple property. Again, this proves that matters of heart are not significant.   
  Again, it might be that in this case we don’t trust him, because all he is trying to do is get himself out of a sacrifice. In other cases, matters of the heart might be considered significant. 
  The Talmud now tries to find other responses the master (the one who sends the agent) could have said to exempt himself from a sacrifice. The fact that he did not state these excuses means that he is telling the truth when he says “I was thinking.” And if we nevertheless don’t believe him, it can only because “matters of the heart are not significant.”A person who intentionally commits trespass is not liable for a sacrifice. So while theoretically he could have said “I intentionally sent him to take sacred property” people do not want to say that they would intentionally commit a sin.However, he could have said “I remembered” that the property was holy after I sent him to get it. Since he could have said this and thereby exempted himself for a sacrifice, but did not say this, he did not need to say “I was thinking [that it was not holy].” Nevertheless, we still do not believe him. This proves Rava’s rule that matters of the heart are not significant.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains two more stories of people who sell their property in order to move to Israel, but in the end do not succeed in doing so. Interesting that the same phenomenon that occurred 1500 years ago still occurs. Its not easy moving to a foreign land for ideological reasons. 
  In this case, the man stated explicitly that his intention was to move to the land of Israel. The question is—what counts as moving to Israel? Just going there, or settling there permanently? According to the first ruling, his intention was to settle there. No one declares that they are moving to Israel without the intention of settling there. Therefore, when he comes back to Babylonia, he can renege on his sale because his intention was not fulfilled.According to the other version, his intention was just to move there. Since he did, the sale is final even though he move back and he cannot ask to renege.
  In this case, the man does not go to Israel, and the question again arises, whether he can renege on his sale. According to the first version, he could have gone and since he did not, the sale cannot be annulled. According the second version, where R. Ashi responds in the form of a question, if some unforeseen circumstance, something that could not be helped, prevents him from moving to Israel, then he can renege on the sale. 
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new mishnah. 
  In both sections, a husband appoints an agent to betroth his wife and gives the agent instructions as to where to betroth the woman.  If the husband tells the agent to betroth the woman in a certain place, she is not betrothed if the agent betroths her in another place.  In such a case we can assume that the husband wanted the betrothal to be performed in that specific place.However, if the husband merely tells the agent where to find the woman, the husband does not necessarily care if she is really somewhere else.  He was only helping the agent locate her. Therefore the betrothal is valid no matter where the agent eventually finds her.
  Virtually the same mishnah is taught in Gittin with regard to an agent who gives a get. 
  The Talmud now explains why we need both mishnayot. Had we only the mishnah about kiddushin, I might have thought that a man cares about where he betroths a woman because in some places people like him and in others people do not. He does not want the agent to betroth her in a place where people might say bad things about him.But when it comes to divorce, he would not care if people like him or not, therefore he might not care where the agent delivers the get. Thus we needed a mishnah to teach us that even with regard to gittin, if he says “give my wife a divorce in such and such a place” the get must be given in that particular place.    
  On the other hand, divorce is somewhat disgraceful (perhaps too strong a word, but that does seem to be the correct translation). Therefore, he might not want to divorce her in certain places. But betrothal is not disgraceful and therefore he might not care.Thus we need both mishnayot to teach us that the same rule applies in both cases.
  It can be assumed that a husband does not want his wife to be subject to vows that will prevent her from engaging in certain activities, such as eating meat or drinking wine.  Such vows would certainly disrupt the normal functioning of a marriage.  If he betroths her on the specific condition that she is not subject to any vows, and after betrothal it is found out that she is subject to vows, she is not betrothed.  Since the betrothal was made under false pretenses it is invalid and she does not need a get to remarry, nor does she receive her ketubah.  However, if he did not make such a condition, and then later finds out that she is subject to vows, the marriage is valid. Nevertheless, since she should have told him that she had vows, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah.  In other words, the marriage was not exactly made under a false assumption and therefore she needs a get in order to remarry, but she still was dishonest with him and therefore she loses the ketubah.  
  The same rule concerning a woman subject to vows is also true with regard to a woman who has physical defects.  If he specifically stipulated that she not have any physical defects (assumedly ones that he could not detect when she was clothed), and she does, the betrothal is invalid.  If he did not make a stipulation, the betrothal is valid but he may divorce her without paying the ketubah.With regard to physical defects, it is essential for us to know what physical defects are significant enough that they invalidate the betrothal or allow the husband to divorce her without paying the ketubah.  The answer is that any defect that disqualifies a priest from serving at the altar (see Lev 21:17), also disqualifies a woman.  These defects are listed in the seventh chapter of tractate Bekhorot.  
  The same mishnah was also taught in ketubot. The first clause of the mishnah is about kiddushin, which is why the mishnah is found here, and the second clause is about ketubot, which is why the mishnah is found there. But the entire mishnah was taught in both places.  
  In both of these cases the first act does not cause the woman, or women to be betrothed because there was not a perutah’s worth given to each woman.  When the man later sends gifts which are worth more than a perutah, we might have thought that these gifts can now act as the betrothal money.  After all, he clearly intended to betroth her and she clearly agreed.  However, the mishnah rules that since these gifts were not sent with the intent of effecting betrothal, they do not act as such.  We also do not assume that the man realized that his first act of betrothal was invalid and that he is now sending betrothal money.  
  A minor cannot betroth a woman.  Betrothal requires “awareness”, and minors legally lack the required “awareness.”  Therefore, if he tries to betroth a certain woman, she is not betrothed.  Even if he later on sends presents to the woman whom he tried to betroth, the presents do not effect kiddushin, for they were not sent as such but rather on account of the first act of betrothal, which was invalid.
  
  Daf 50b
  
  The first clause of the mishnah contains two clauses. If the mishnah had taught only the case where he gave one perutah to two women, I might have thought that in that case, he thought that since he gave a perutah, the kiddushin was valid. Therefore, when he sent gifts later, he did not think of them as kiddushin. But in the case where he gave less than a perutah, we might have argued that everyone knows that one cannot perform kiddushin with less than a perutah. Therefore, when he sent presents, they were kiddushin. Thus the mishnah needed to teach us that even in this case, the presents are not considered kiddushin money.  
  In the cases in the first clause, I might have thought that the gifts were not kiddushin because the man might not have known that he had given less than a perutah for each woman he was betrothing. After all, it is hard to distinguish between a perutah and less than a perutah. He might have thought that he performed kiddushin, and that the gifts were just gifts.But when it comes to the minor who betroths, we might have thought that everyone knows that minors cannot betroth. Therefore, when he sends gifts as an adult, this is kiddushin. Therefore, the mishnah had to teach us that also in this case the gifts do not count as kiddushin.  
  IntroductionOur sugya is about gifts sent from the groom to the bride. Might these be considered betrothal money?
  According to both of these amoraim, if a woman agreed to be betrothed and then the husband sent gifts, the gifts may be considered betrothal money. 
  The mishnah says that gifts are not considered betrothal money, which seems to contradict R. Huna and Rabbah. But Abaye explains this is only if there was an invalid act of betrothal that preceded the gifts. If there was no prior formal betrothal act, the gifts may actually be betrothal money, even though they were sent as gifts.    
  In this version, Rabbah uses the mishnah as a proof that gifts may be considered kiddushin. Only when they are sent because of a mistaken act are they not. This is similar to Abaye’s statement in the first version. 
  In this version, Abaye now rejects Rabbah. When the man has not performed any act of kiddushin, it is obvious that the gifts he sends are not kiddushin. But when he first betroths her I might have thought that the gifts are for the sake of kiddushin. That is why the mishnah needs to tells us that they are not.So now we have a dispute between Abaye and Rabbah over whether gifts sent not following kiddushin can be concerned kiddushin.  
  R. Papa mediates between the two opinions. If the custom is to first betroth and then send gifts, the gifts might be a sign that betrothal occurred. But if the opposite, then the gifts are just gifts. 
  Even if a minority first send gifts and then betroth, we still need to be concerned lest the gifts are a sign that betrothal occurred.   
  This last section is about a case where a ketubah was seen by the people in the shuk—do we assume that this woman was married. Or perhaps the ketubah was written before betrothal?R. Ashi explains that it depends on the custom. If they usually first betroth and then write a ketubah, then the ketubah might indeed be a sign of betrothal. But if they first write the ketubah and only later betroth, then it is not a sign that she was married.
  IntroductionThe main point of the mishnah we learn here is that a man who tries to simultaneously betroth two women whom cannot be simultaneously betrothed to him has betrothed neither woman.  
  A man cannot simultaneously marry a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister.  If he was already married to a certain woman and he attempted to betroth her daughter or sister, the betrothal would not be effective.  The mishnah deals with a case where a man tried to betroth two such women simultaneously.  Since they cannot both be effective neither is.
  This is a classic rabbinic story, utterly packed with information.  The main thing which we learn is that if one tries to simultaneously betroth two sisters, neither sister is betrothed.  However, we also learn the following halakhot.1)	A man can betroth a group of women with one act of betrothal, and even if the betrothal is ineffective with some of the women (the sisters) it is effective with the others.2)	During the seventh year (the sabbatical year) a man can betroth using the agricultural produce of the women he is betrothing.  This is because such produce is considered ownerless during the sabbatical year and when the man picks it up he owns it.3)	One woman can simultaneously accept kiddushin for herself and for other women. By packing all of these details into one brief story, the story becomes an excellent didactic opportunity, far exceeding that which it is brought to explicitly demonstrate— that if one tries to simultaneously betroth two sisters, neither sister is betrothed
  Rami b. Hama uses the verse that prohibits marrying two sisters to teach that if he marries them (or tries to) simultaneously, neither of them is considered married. 
  Rava points out that the verse prescribes karet (cutting off) for anyone who marries two sisters. But if the verse is talking about someone who tries to marry two sisters simultaneously and the betrothal is not valid, then why should he (or they) receive any punishment? He (and they) did not do anything.Therefore, he explains that the mishnah follows Rabbah who said that when an act, such as marrying two sisters, cannot be performed consecutively, it can also not be performed simultaneously. If he tries to marry two sisters at the same time, neither are married.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya goes back to Rabbah’s general principle that we encountered yesterday, “Anything which cannot be [done] consecutively cannot be [done] simultaneously.”
  If one gives 2/10 of one’s produce as tithe, the produce is considered tithed and may be eaten. But the tithes themselves are ruined since we do not know which part is the tithe and which part is not. But why, Abaye asks, is the second tenth considered even potentially a tithe? If I can’t first separate 1/10 and then another 1/10 both as tithes (indeed, one cannot), then when both are separated at the same time, neither of them should be tithes? This seems to refute Rabbah. 
  
  Daf 51a
  
  One can dedicate not just whole grains, but even half grains. One can say “let half of each grain be the tithe.” So this is how we understand what happened in the case of the person who made double the amount tithe. He didn’t make 2/10 of the produce tithe—rather he made ½ of each grain of 2/10 of the produce tithe. The remainder of the produce is tithed, but the tithe itself is ruined because we can’t tell which half of each piece of grain is tithe.   
  Abaye now cites the example of cattle tithes. The cattle tithe is performed by letting animals out of a pen, counting them, and every tenth becoming the tithe. If two come out at the same time and the owner calls both “tenth” then one is the tithe and one is not but we do not know which is which. But animals cannot be partially tithed. Yet nevertheless, although one cannot call both the tenth and the eleventh animal tithe consecutively, when one calls them both tenth at the same time, the statement takes effect. 
  Cattle tithe is different because an animal can be considered tithe even if one makes a mistake in counting. Just as in the mishnah cited here, animals that are not the tenth can be considered tithe, so too in Rava’s example of the tenth and eleventh coming out of the pen together, both can be considered tithes. But kiddushin cannot be done accidentally, and therefore, if the kiddushin cannot be done one after the other, they also cannot be done simultaneously. 
  Forty loaves of bread are supposed to be offered with the thanksgiving offering. If one tries to offer eighty loaves with them, Hizkiyah says that all eighty are sanctified. It looks like Hizkiyah is saying that although they can’t be sanctified consecutively, they can be sanctified simultaneously. R. Yohanan would invoke Rabbah’s principle.    
  Hizkiyah and R. Yohanan were not arguing about Rabbah’s principle. They were arguing about how we interpret the person’s words when they were stated unclearly. If he clearly states that he only intends for forty to be sanctified, then they are sanctified, although we would not know which are sacred and which are not. If it sounds like he is trying to make all eighty sacred, then the statement definitely does not work because whatever cannot be done consecutively cannot be done simultaneously. The only issue is whether when he simply states that all 80 are being sacrificed we assume that he was taking responsibility that if some loaves were ruined, others would be sacred in its place, or whether he intended to actually dedicate eighty loaves. 
  Rava explained that since one cannot marry a woman and then her sister, if one marries two sisters at the same time, neither are married. This follows Rabbah’s principle. But Rava could have invoked a different principle, one that he uses elsewhere. Kiddushin which create a situation in which the couple may not have sex do not count as kiddushin. This is the situation here. If the man was married to both sisters, he could not have sex with either because each is his wife’s sister.The Talmud explains that Rava was explaining it according to the verse used by Rami b. Hama to explain the mishnah (see end of daf Nun). Rava said that the verse Rami b. Hama used cannot explain the mishnah because it refers to a man who marries a woman and then her sister, whereas the mishnah refers to a man who marries both at the same time. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins a discussion of whether kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse count as kiddushin. This is a situation in which a man betroths a woman but cannot have sex with her because she is prohibited to him. Is she betrothed such that she would need a get? 
  This is the core dispute. Rava backs up his opinion with a verse, whereas Abaye does not. 
  The mishnah is used as a difficulty against Rava. A man cannot betroth both a woman and her sister, daughter or mother. But if he says to a woman and her mother/sister/daughter, “One of the two of you is betrothed to me” by deduction it would seem that they all could be doubtfully betrothed even though sex with any of them would be prohibited. This seems to be a refutation of Rava. 
  Rava responds that the end of the mishnah could be read as supporting him. A man says to a bunch of women, “Behold you are all betrothed to me.” The sisters are not betrothed, but the non-sisters are.So what exactly did he say? If he said “all of you” then this would be like a case of a person who says to another person and a donkey (or any animal), “You and the donkey should acquire this.” Since the donkey cannot acquire, the other person does not either. So too here, since the sisters do not acquire the betrothal money, neither would the non-sisters.Rather, he must have said, “one of you [is betrothed to me].” The sisters are not betrothed because this is “kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse” since he could not have sex with either one of them.This discussion continues tomorrow. 
  
  Daf 51b
  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss the topic disputed in yesterday’s sugya—whether kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are valid kiddushin.To recall—Abaye holds that these kiddushin are valid, whereas Rava holds that they are not. 
  Abaye here solves the entire mishnah such that according to both clauses, kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are valid kiddushin.Clause 1: If he betroths two women simultaneously that cannot be betrothed consecutively, neither are betrothed. This follows Rabbah’s rule.Deduction, part 1: If he betroths only one of these women, both are doubtfully betrothed. The kiddushin are essentially valid even though they cannot be followed by intercourse.Deduction, part 2:  If he explicitly says that he is betrothing only the one who is allowed to have sex with him, neither is betrothed. Since he does not know which one he is betrothing, neither of them can have sex with him.Clause 2: This is exactly what the husband said. The sisters are not married not because “kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are not valid” but because he explicitly stated that he was betrothing only those eligible for intercourse. Thus Abaye has resolved this clause with his opinion.  
  Rava resolves it so the mishnah would not imply that kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are kiddushin.Clause 1: A man says to two women “one of you is betrothed to me.” Note that this is not the precise language in the mishnah, but it is like the case directly mentioned in the mishnah. Rava has now resolved the mishnah with his opinion. Kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse, like marrying one of two sisters without knowing which he married, are not valid kiddushin. Neither woman needs a get.Clause 2: This clause essentially describes the same scenario is the first clause. He said “one of the two sisters.” Since he cannot tell which sister he married, neither are betrothed.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss betrothal that cannot be followed by intercourse. 
  If one betroths one of his daughters but does not remember which one (wife is not going to be happy about this situation!), we are not concerned that he betrothed one of the adult daughers, because he cannot marry off his adult daughters. But we are concerned about the minors. Any one of them might be the one betrothed. However, this is a case of kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse. The man cannot have intercourse with any of the minor sisters lest she is his wife’s sister (meaning he actually married the other one).  
  Rava says the mishnah refers to a case where there is only one of each kind of daughter. In this case, the man who betrothed the minor daughter could have intercourse with her (once they get married).
  The Talmud raises a difficulty—how can we say there was only one adult daughter when the mishnah uses the plural?The answer is that the mishnah refers to laws concerning adult daughters in general, not this specific case. The plural is a category not a detail of the case.But now the mishnah is overly simple—clearly the father meant to betroth the younger daughter, the only daughter he has the power to betroth?To resolve this, the Talmud says that the actual case is where the adult daughter appointed the father to betroth her. In this case, the father does have the power to betroth her. Nevertheless, we assume he betrothed the minor daughter because he has the benefit there of receiving the kiddushin money.    
  Even if the adult daughter told the father he could keep the kiddushin money, we still assume he married off the younger daughter because he has a mitzvah to marry her off. There is no mitzvah to marry off the older daughter.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to raise difficulties against Rava who said that “kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse” are not kiddushin. 
  Again, we encounter a case where a man does not remember which of his daughters he betrothed. R. Meir says we must consider three of the four girls doubtfully betrothed. Only the youngest girl of the younger set is not betrothed.  But the husband cannot have intercourse with any of the doubtfully betrothed girls since any one of them may be the sister of his betrothed wife. This seems again to indicate that kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are kiddushin. 
  In the mishnah, the father at one point knew which daughter he was betrothing. At the point of betrothal, the kiddushin could have been followed by intercourse. Later, he and the husband became mixed up, and this is why three of the girls are prohibited. In other words, the kiddushin were done properly, but the identity of the betrothed girl was subsequently lost. 
  R. Meir’s opinion counters the opinion of R. Yosi who says that when the father makes this statement, he is referring only to his oldest daughter, and thus she is the only one betrothed. R. Meir teaches us that if the father and husband cannot remember which girl was betrothed, three of them, anyone who could be called “older” must be considered doubtfully betrothed. 
  This is essentially the same difficulty and resolution raised above. The mishnah quoted here is Yevamot 2:6. 
  The reason this mishnah is taught is for the last clause. Since this is a bit complicated, I am quoting my full commentary from Mishnah Yomit:If he dies, both sisters become liable for yibbum or halitzah to his brothers. If he has one brother, that brother cannot have yibbum with either because it is forbidden to have relations with the sister of a woman with whom you are liable to have yibbum (z’kukah).  In other words, if he were to have yibbum with one of them, it could be that the other was the one who was really betrothed.  Therefore, he must perform halitzah for both.If there are two brothers, the first brother performs halitzah for one of the women and then the second brother can have yibbum with the other sister.  The first brother should do halitzah because if he were to have yibbum he might be having relations with the sister who was not betrothed, and therefore he is having relations with the sister of his z’kukah (as in the above situation).  However, after the first brother has halitzah with one of the sisters, there can be no problem for the second brother to have yibbum with the second sister.  If she is the one who was betrothed to the dead brother, then he has yibbum with her, which is perfectly okay.  If the other woman was the one betrothed, she has already had halitzah, and her ties to the brother are severed.  Therefore, this woman is not the sister of his z’kukah.If both brothers have yibbum with the two sisters, the court does not force them to separate, even though the first brother should have performed halitzah.  Although the brother who first performed yibbum may have originally had yibbum with the sister of his z’kukah, since her sister has now had yibbum, her ties to the other brother have been severed and neither brother is currently married to the sister of his z’kukah.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss betrothal that cannot be followed by intercourse. 
  Each husband cannot have relations with either woman because she might be the sister of the one he betrothed. So if kiddushin that cannot be followed by betrothal is not kiddushin, then why is either woman betrothed? This is a difficulty against Rava.
  Again, the Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that at the point of kiddushin each man and each woman knew who was betrothing whom. The kiddushin were valid at that point. Then they were mixed up. 
  As with yesterday’s section, the Talmud asks why we need this mishnah. The answer is that it is there to teach the continuation of the same mishnah (Yevamot 2:7). The following is my commentary from Mishnah Yomit:If Reuven and George (non-brothers) die, and each has only one brother (Shimon and Bill), Shimon must perform halitzah with both women and Bill must perform halitzah with both women.  Neither can have yibbum with either woman because each woman might be the sister of the woman with whom he is truly liable to have yibbum, the z’kukah (because we don’t know who betrothed whom).If Reuven has two brothers, Shimon and Levi and George still only has Bill as a brother, Bill must have halitzah with both Rachel and Leah.  With regard to Shimon and Levi, one brother must have halitzah with both women but the other brother can have yibbum.  This rule was explained in the above mishnah quoted in the previous section.  The second brother can have yibbum with either women because if she was truly the woman who Reuven betrothed, then yibbum is proper.  If Reuven betrothed the other sister, then the sister with whom this brother now has yibbum is no longer the sister of his z’kukah, because this other sister has already received halitzah from his other brother.If both brothers preemptivelymarry both sisters, they are not forced to have a divorce.  Certainly the second marriage is okay, and even the first marriage was only problematic in the beginning, before the second sister had yibbum.  Even though the woman whom he married may have once been the sister of his z’kukah, after she has had yibbum the other sister is no longer a z’kukah. With regard to the last example, the Talmud emphasizes that one brother must first performe halitzah and then the other can perform yibbum. But if one brother performs yibbum first he may be marrying someone else’s yevamah, and until someone performs halitzah with her, she may not be remarried.
  
  Daf 52a
  
  The Tavyumi source clearly holds that kiddushin that cannot be followed by betrothal are kiddushin. Rava’s statement is refuted and the halakhah follows Abaye. The Talmud ends by noting that the halakhah follows Abaye in six cases which can be remembered by the acronym, Y’Al KGM. The K stands for kiddushin that cannot be followed by betrothal.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with Rav deriving halakhah from the strange story that appears at the end of the mishnah:And it once happened that five women, among whom were two sisters, that a man gathered a basket of figs, which was theirs, and which was of the seventh year, and he said, “Behold, you are betrothed to me with this basket,” and one accepted it on behalf of them all and the sages said: the sisters are not betrothed.
  One is not allowed to use seventh year produce as merchandise. From our story we learn that one can use it for betrothal.  
  Rav also learns from the story that one cannot betroth with stolen goods. In the story, the man uses something he took from the women and it was sabbatical produce. The kiddushin are valid only because the produce he stole was sabbatical produce which is considered ownerless. During the sabbatical year, anyone can take the produce from the field. Had it not been the sabbatical year, they would not have been betrothed because one cannot use stolen goods to betroth.     
  In this story one woman accepts the betrothal on behalf of them all. This is allowed, even though the woman she accepts kiddushin for becomes her rival wife.
  This story was used by Abaye to prove that kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are kiddushin. Abaye said that in the story the sisters are not betrothed because he married both at the same time. Had he married one then become mixed up as to which one he married, they both would have both been doubtfully betrothed even though he could not have intercourse with her.Rava said that the mishnah refers to a case where he married only one but did not say which one. This proves that kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are kiddushin.Rav did not want to learn anything about this topic from the mishnah because he was not sure whether to read it like Abaye or Rava.I should note that this is obviously not a chronological way of understanding Rav. Rav could not have known about the debate between Rava and Abaye, for they lived three generations after he did. Indeed, the reason that Rav does not learn anything about kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse from the mishnah is that this topic had not yet been brought up. It is also worth noting that this is a highly abstract concept, whereas the halakhot Rav did learn are far more practical. This is emblematic of the differences between early amoraim like Rav and later amoraim like Abaye and Rava. Rav is interested in real halakhic rules, whereas Abaye and Rava are interested in abstract halakhic conceptsץ
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses one of the halakhot Rav derived from the mishnah—betrothal by stolen goods. 
  R. Yohanan is surprised that Rav would have said that one cannot betroth with a stolen object.  
  R. Yohanan also holds that stolen property is not the possession of the thief, as long as the owner does not despair of recovery. The thief cannot consecrate it, and therefore he cannot use it for betrothal. So why would R. Yohanan have been surprised by Rav’s ruling?The answer is that he was not surprised by the ruling, he just didn’t realize that Rav ruled in the same way he did.
  A baraita states explicitly that a woman can be betrothed with stolen goods.The Talmud resolves this by saying it refers to goods stolen from her. When she accepts the goods she forgives him for having stolen them.
  The baraita is read so that the entire baraita refers to goods stolen from her. Only in this case is she betrothed.
  
  Daf 52b
  
  The problem is that the story in the mishnah was a case where he stole an object from her and tried to use it to betroth her. Nevertheless she is not betrothed. This was the source Rav used to prove his halakhah. So how can we say that she is betrothed if the stolen item was hers.The resolution is that the mishnah refers to a case where the marriage had not been arranged. In such a case, we don’t know if by accepting the article she is agreeing to marriage. She might just want her object back and this is the best way to do so. But if the marriage was already arranged, then we can assume that she wanted to get married. Only in such a case can we assume that by accepting it as kiddushin, she was forgiving him from having to pay her back.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains a couple of stories about men who try to betroth with stolen goods.
  We’ve already learned that one cannot betroth with a stolen object as long as the owner’s have not despaired of recovery. Such despair would mean that the thief now owns the object. But Rava rules that unless we know that the owner despaired of recovery, we do not assume that he despaired. Title to the object is still his and therefore, the thief cannot use it for betrothal. Only R. Shimon would disagree but no one holds according to him.
  The onions do not belong to the sharecropper—they are jointly owned by him and the owner of the field until they split them up. Therefore, the sharecropper cannot betroth a woman with a handful of onions.However, if the sharecropper takes a standard amount, what is called here a bundle (maybe akin to a bushel today), then we can say that these onions are fully his. The owner will take a bundle in its place. In other words, the problem is not that the sharecropper took onions. The issue is taking onions but then not dividing the rest evenly. This would be considered robbery. It is interesting to note how far we’ve come—they used to betroth with onions, now with diamond rings. Gotta admit, onions taste far better than diamonds!
  IntroductionA story about a brewer using beer to betroth a woman—a man after my own heart. Hope things go well for him. 
  The brewer used beer that does not belong to him to betroth the woman. When the owner saw what he had done, he asked why he used the weak beer and not the better, stronger, beer. The question is whether this is considered acquiescence to his use of the beer such that the woman is betrothed.Rava essentially rules that the betrothal is not valid. The actions of the brewer remind him of the case of terumah. The baraita refers to a case where a person separates terumah on another person’s behalf. The separation of terumah is valid if we can ascertain that the owner was satisfied with the separation. If he says to the one who separated—why didn’t you separate from better produce, and there is better produce, then the separation is valid. But if there is no better produce, then he is being sarcastic and the separation is not valid.If the owner adds more produce to that already separated, then again, the initial separation is valid. 
  This is the end of Rava’s ruling. In this case, the owner of the beer did not really want the brewer to use his beer to betroth a woman. He was simply embarrassed that poor quality beer was used. But the beer did not belong to the brewer and therefore he cannot betroth with it.
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with attempts to betroth using various different types of sanctified property.  The real question is, does the property belong to the one using it such that his betrothal is effective?
  Portions of many sacrifices go to the priests who eat them.  However, a priest cannot use them as his betrothal money because these portions are not considered to be his possessions.  Rather, the priest’s right to them is limited to his or other priests eating.  Since for kiddushin to be effective the man must own that which he gives to the woman, the priest’s portion in sacrifices may not be used.
  Second tithe must be taken to Jerusalem and there it may be eaten by its owner.  According to Rabbi Meir, second tithe does not belong to its owners.  It is sanctified property—“kadosh” and just as portions of sacrifices cannot be used for kiddushin, so too second tithe cannot be used.  Rabbi Judah says that second tithe does belong to its owner.Therefore if he deliberately did kiddushin with it, she is betrothed.  However, if he unwittingly uses the second tithe for kiddushin then she is not betrothed for this was a mistaken act of kiddushin.
  Sanctified property can become non-sanctified property if it is redeemed.  However, if it is not redeemed then it remains sanctified and cannot be used for betrothal.  According to Rabbi Meir, if the man intentionally uses sanctified property as his betrothal money, he is in essence redeeming it.  The betrothal is valid and the man will owe to the Temple the value of that which he gave to the woman.  However, if he does so unwittingly, then the sanctified property is not redeemed and therefore the betrothal is invalid.Rabbi Judah disagrees on both counts.  He holds that one who intentionally uses the sanctified property for betrothal does not thereby redeem it, therefore the betrothal is invalid. However, if he unwittingly uses the sanctified property this is considered “me’ilah”—improper use of sacred property.  In such cases the object which was misappropriated loses its sacred status and the person who misappropriated the property owes the Temple the value of the object plus one-fifth and must bring a guilt offering.  The key for our purposes is that the object is no longer sacred, and therefore the betrothal is valid.
  According to our mishnah, sacrifices of lower holiness do not belong to their owners. This does not agree with R. Yose Hagalili who says that lower holiness sacrifices belong to the person who brought them. A person who makes improper use of them has trespassed even though the animal belongs to him.
  The Talmud resolves the mishnah even with R. Yose Hagalili. When he said that the animal belongs to the person who brings it, he was referring to a live animal, before it was slaughtered. Once slaughtered, portions of the animal go to the priest. But these portions are not the property of the priest, they belong to God. When the  mishnah said that priests cannot betroth with their portions, it was referring to the portions allotted to the priest, and these portions refer to parts of slaughtered animals.
  IntroductionToday’s section provides a fascinating story of the tension between R. Yehudah and R. Meir’s students after the latter’s death.
  R. Yehudah does not seem particularly fond of R. Meir, or at least not of his students, and wants to keep them out of his Bet Midrash after their master’s death. R. Yehudah’s complaint is that they posit halakhot that really cannot happen. They are halakhic nudniks if you will. R. Meir states that a priest cannot betroth a woman with his sacrificial portion. But how can this ever happen—this meat cannot leave the Temple Courtyard, and a woman cannot enter the Temple Courtyard! So why rule against an impossible situation?  
  R. Yossi finds a case where it would be possible for a woman to be betrothed with the priest’s portion—either by a man accepting betrothal for his daughter, or in a case where a woman appoints a man to accept her kiddushin in the Temple Court on her behalf. Finally, she could force herself in. Even though she should not do this, if she does, she is betrothed.  
  R. Yehudah and R. Yossi disagree whether a priest can betroth with his portion of sacrificial meat. The Torah says that this portion belongs to the priest. R. Yehudah argues that therefore he can do what he wants with it—even betroth a woman. R. Yossi holds that when the Torah compares this offering to “offerings by fire” it means to say that just as the portion burned on the fire is consumed, so too the portion eaten must be consumed. The priest cannot use it to betroth a woman.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss a priest who betroths with his portion. 
  So now we have a dispute about whether there is a dispute. Those rabbis sure love their disputes!  
  
  Daf 53a
  
  Abaye is now going to quote a long baraita that in its totality supports R. Yohanan. The details of this baraita are not relevant for our sugya, but I will still, of course, explain them briefly. The main message of the baraita is that the priests may not exchange one sacrificial gift (meat, fowl or meal-offering) for another.Priests who receive meal-offerings as part of their portions may not demand to exchange them for sacrificial meat.
  Meal-offerings can take the place of bird offerings for the poor—if the poor cannot afford a bird offering, they can bring a meal-offering. Therefore, I might have thought that they are exchangeable. They are not.  
  Animal sacrifices may also not be exchanged for bird sacrifices even though both are types of blood. 
  Fowl offerings are killed by pinching off their necks, whereas animal sacrifices are slaughtered with a knife. Thus one may not exchange one for the other. But meal offerings are all made with utensils. So maybe priests could exchange one meal-offering for another. They may not. 
  Even the same type of meal-offering may not be apportioned one in exchange for the other.
  The same rules apply for all types of sacrifices—higher and lower ones. The thanksgiving offering is a sacrifice of lower sanctity. 
  The baraita now concludes by saying that priests with blemishes receives sacrificial portions, but not minors.The entire prohibition of exchanging one portion for another implies that a priest cannot use his portion for anything, even to betroth a woman. The Sifra is the midrash on Leviticus, and the Talmud assumes its author is R. Judah. Thus, R. Judah does not believe that a priest can use his portion, whereas earlier he said that he can. We can assume that he retracted his opinion and that no one holds that a priest may use his portion to betroth a woman. This accords with R. Yohanan and opposes Ravץ
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Abaye brought a baraita according to which even R. Yehudah agrees that a priest may not betroth with sacrifices given to him as his portion. This supported R. Yohanan who said that there was no longer a dispute over the issue. Today Rava defends Rav’s position, according to which the dispute remains.   
  Rava cites a baraita that supports Rav. The baraita refers to priests dividing up the weekly showbread. The modest ones did not even want to eat it. Perhaps they felt it was too holy. In their place, the gluttonous ones take all of the shares. This seems to imply that they can exchange their portions—the modest ones do not take and in their place others do. 
  The Talmud rejects this meaning of “shared.” The gluttonous did not share their portions, they snatched, i.e. stole, them from one another. Those greedy priests!
  The amoraim provide biblical verses to explain the meaning of Ben Hamtzan—son of the snatcher. You really don’t want to be called “son of the snatcher!”
  IntroductionToday’s section goes on explaining the continuation of the mishnah. 
  R. Aha provides a verse to support R. Meir’s view that one cannot use second tithe to betroth a woman. Second tithe is holy to God; it cannot be used for betrothal. 
  One can use terumah for betrothal because the Torah does not say “to the Lord.” It says “of the Lord.” Yup, this is a bit of a nitpicky one.
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss what types of agricultural gifts can be used for betrothal. 
  Even though hallah, dough given to the priest, is described as “to the Lord” one can use it for betrothal because it is not called “holy” by the Torah. [Hallah is sometimes called terumah, because both are given to the priest]. 
  One can use sabbatical year produce to betroth a woman because the Torah does not describe it as “to the Lord.”
  When Jeremiah uses the words “to the Lord” and “holy” he is referring to Israel, not to terumah.The Talmud then asks if Israel is holy to the Lord then why shouldn’t terumah also be holy to the Lord, and not usable as betrothal money. After all, the two are compared.Rabin now pulls out another element of the verse about tithe—tithes are “for the Lord” and must remain in their natural form. They cannot be used for betrothal.
  
  Daf 53b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses betrothal with property belonging to the Temple, the next subject of the mishnah. To make things easier I am replicating my commentary on the mishnah.
  Sanctified property can become non-sanctified property if it is redeemed.  However, if it is not redeemed then it remains sanctified and cannot be used for betrothal.  According to Rabbi Meir, if the man intentionally uses sanctified property as his betrothal money, he is in essence redeeming it. The betrothal is valid and the man will owe to the Temple the value of that which he gave to the woman. However, if he does so unwittingly, then the sanctified property is not redeemed and therefore the betrothal is invalid.Rabbi Judah disagrees on both counts.  He holds that one who intentionally uses the sanctified property for betrothal does not thereby redeem it, therefore the betrothal is invalid. However, if he unwittingly uses the sanctified property this is considered “me’ilah”—improper use of sacred property. In such cases the object which was misappropriated loses its sacred status and the person who misappropriated the property owes the Temple the value of the object plus one-fifth and must bring a guilt offering.  The key for our purposes is that the object is no longer sacred, and therefore the betrothal is valid.
  R. Judah had said that if a man unwittingly uses hekdesh for betrothal, she is not betrothed. R. Meir said that if a man unwittingly uses second tithe money, she is not betrothed.R. Yohanan gives two reasons for why not, but R. Jacob does not remember which goes with which halakhah. Yes, this is a confusing one.
  R. Yirmiyah tries to solve the puzzle. The woman does not want to be betrothed through tithes because she’d have to bring them to Jerusalem to use them there. However, there is no reason why the husband won’t want to betroth his wife through tithes. He gets a wife without having to use other money.When it comes to hekdesh, neither want to accidently transform hekdesh into non-sacred property. People are not supposed to do this unless they are specifically redeeming the hekdesh.   
  R. Ya’akov argues the opposite (of course he does—this is just that kind of sugya). Neither want to use tithes for betrothal. She does not want to because of the trouble of the journey. He does not want to lest she loses the second tithes on her journey to Jerusalem and she derives no benefit from them. This will cause her distress, that she received no benefit from her betrothal money.When it comes to hekdesh, he might be okay that she is betrothed with hekdesh. After all, he gets a wife without spending any extra money.Thus the sugya ends without us really knowing why each tanna said what he said.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the status of the sacred money used for betrothal. 
  Since the act of betrothal is not valid, the money retains its sacredness. 
  If a person tries to use sacred money to buy something, the acquisition is not successful. 
  R. Hiyya b. Avin raises an objection against R. Hisda. The discussion in this baraita is of a person who deposits some money with someone and does not tell him that the money is sacred. If he deposits money in a bundle with a money-changer, the money-changer may not use the money. If he does use it, and it is sacred, then he has committed trespass, because he should not have been using the money. But if not bundled up, the money-changer may use the money, and therefore, he has not committed trespass. Rather the depositor has. If one deposited it with a homeowner, the homeowner may never use the money, whether it is bundled up or not. The tannaim disagree about the status of a storekeeper—is he treated like a homeowner (R. Meir) or like a money-changer (R. Yehudah). But all agree that if the storekeeper used the money, he has trespassed. This implies that the transaction takes effect, meaning that if hekdesh is used to buy goods, the transaction is successful.
  The Talmud reads R. Meir as only arguing against R. Yehudah, not expressing his own opinion. According to R. Meir’s own opinion, no matter what, the storekeeper has not committed trespass. The money remains holy and the goods are not acquired. In the dispute, he is speaking to R. Yehudah—to you, the shopkeeper should be like a private individual. He should never be allowed to use the money. R. Yehudah responds that he is like a money-changer. If the money was not bundled up, then he may use it and he would not be liable for trespass.
  IntroductionIn today’s section Rav makes a broad statement about R. Meir’s view concerning when hekdesh, sacred property, becomes desacralized. 
  According to Rav, R. Meir usually holds that if one uses hekdesh unwittingly, the hekdesh does not remain sacred. And if he uses it intentionally then it does not become non-sacred.However, this is exactly opposite of what R. Meir says about using hekdesh for betrothal in our mishnah. In the mishnah he said that if one used it unwittingly the betrothal is invalid and the hekdesh remains sacred. If used intentionally, the betrothal is valid and the hekdesh becomes non-sacred. Since Rav believes this mishnah to be different from R. Meir’s usual opinion, he interprets it as referring to a priest who betroths with his priestly clothing. If he does so unwittingly (I know this is hard to imagine) then she is not betrothed and the clothes remain sacred. This is because the priests may benefit from their clothing even when not performing the worship service. It would simply be too hard to tell the priests that they cannot even wear this clothing when not serving in the Temple and the Torah was not given to angels.If he intentionally uses them for betrothal, they become non-sacred and she is betrothed.  
  
  Daf 54a
  
  The Talmud not tries to prove that one who unwittingly uses priestly clothing for a non-sacred purpose does commit trespass, against what Rav has just said. The baraita says that once they have worn out, they are susceptible to trespass. But this is only if they have worn out. Before they are worn out, the priest does not trespass even if he wears them when not performing the service.
  The issue here is trespass with shekels donated to the Temple. The first opinion holds that one does commit trespass if he uses the new shekels, those donated this year, which will be used to buy sacrifices. But one cannot commit trespass with old shekels, for they are used for Temple maintenance. In contrast, R. Meir holds that one can even commit trespass with money set aside for Temple maintenance, such as the surplus of the Chamber, the money left over after the sacrifices were purchased.But this is surprising for R. Meir holds “the Torah was not given to angels.” These shekels will be used pay for the city wall and its towers. People will obviously use these things for secular use. So here we see that one can commit trespass even it is obvious that people will make non-sacred use of them.  
  Change the name of the author of this opinion and presto—no more difficulty. It is not R. Meir who holds that one can commit trespass with old shekels. It is R. Judah. Yes, the Talmud does pull this trick from time to time.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss whether R. Meir holds that one can trespass with an object even though we know that people will make non-sacred use of the object. The paradigm was priestly clothing. R. Meir holds that since the Torah was not given to angels, and we know that priests will use them when not serving at the altar, trespass cannot be committed with them.
  The stones of the walls and towers of Jerusalem are holy but of course we can expect that people will make use of them. Nevertheless, R. Meir holds that one does commit trespass with them. Thus even in a case where we might invoke the principle that “the Torah was not given to angels” people can still commit trespass.Again, the Talmud changes the attribution to R. Judah.
  The problem is that R. Judah does not believe that the things used to build Jerusalem are sacred. If one takes a vow and says that a certain object should be “as Jerusalem” he has not dedicated it. So how can we say that people commit trespass with the stones of Jerusalem?
  
  Daf 54b
  
  According to the resolution, people disagree as to what R. Judah held. Some held that he believed that the stones of Jerusalem were sacred. Some held that he thought they were not.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss R. Meir’s views on what happens to hekdesh (sacred property) if it is used in a non-sacred way. Does it become desacralized?
  If one intentionally uses hekdesh, then the hekdesh is considered to be desacralized. Essentially, it is considered as if redeemed it. But if unwittingly it remains hekdesh. However, if he does use it unwittingly, he still must bring a sacrifice.
  If the hekdesh remains sacred, then why is he liable for a sacrifice. Essentially, he has not done anything.Therefore, Rabin adjusts Bar Pada’s statement. If he ate the entire hekdesh (meaning used it up, consumed it), then if done unwittingly, then he must bring a sacrifice. However, if he did not use it up, then essentially nothing has happened. The hekdesh remains sacred and he is not liable to bring an offering.By the way, the name Bar Pada somehow conjures up Star Wars in my mind.
  IntroductionIn today’s sugya R. Nahman explains how we rule on the halakhic disputes between R. Meir and R. Yehudah. 
  R. Nahman rules in accordance with tannaim that agree with anonymous views in tannaitic literature. Thus, like R. Meir, second tithe is considered sacred and betrothal with it is not valid.But the halakhah follows R. Judah in respect to hekdesh. If unwittingly, he has betrothed her. If intentionally, he has not. 
  This mishnah is from Peah 7:6. The following is my explanation from Mishnah Yomit:For the first three years’ of a vine’s growth, its grapes are “orlah” and cannot be eaten.  In the fourth year of its growth, they are like second tithe and must either be eaten in Jerusalem or redeemed and brought to Jerusalem where the proceeds are to be used to buy food.  Our mishnah deals with these laws and in the second half of the mishnah it deals with the impact that these laws have on some of the agricultural gifts.Section one:  According to Bet Shammai when one redeems the grapes of a fourth year vineyard, that is one takes money and transfers the holiness of the grapes onto the money and brings the money to Jerusalem, one does not need to add a fifth of the value, as one does for second tithe.  With regard to second tithe Leviticus 27:31 states, “If anyone wishes to redeem any of his tithes, he must add one-fifth to them.”  This, according to Bet Shammai, was stated only with regard to tithes and not with regard to the fourth-year vineyard.  Bet Shammai also holds that another rule concerning tithes does not apply.  Deuteronomy 14:28 states, “At the end of three years you shall bring out the full tithe of your yield of that year.” This means that at the end of three years one must get rid of all of the tithes within one’s household and give them to whomever they rightfully belong.  According to Bet Shammai one does not have to get rid of the wine made of fourth year grapes.  In short, Bet Shammai says that while there is some similarity between fourth year grapes and second tithe, they are not similar in all aspects.Bet Hillel says that all of the laws of second tithe apply to fourth year grapes.  Therefore, when one redeems them he must add a fifth and they must be removed at the end of three years.Section two:  The laws of peret (fallen grapes) and defective clusters (olelot) do not apply to tithes.  Since Bet Shammai does not hold that the laws of tithes apply to the fourth year grapes, they therefore hold that the laws of peret and defective clusters do apply.  The poor people would take their peret and olelot, redeem them, and bring the money to Jerusalem, just as the owner does with his own grapes/wine.Bet Hillel, on the other hand, holds that the poor do not receive the peret and the olelot because the agricultural gifts of the poor do not apply to tithes. Rather the owners take all of the grapes and bring them to the winepress, make wine and then either bring the wine to Jerusalem or redeem the wine and bring the money to Jerusalem.  
  The fact that Bet Hillel does not obligate one to separate gifts for the poor from fourth year wine means that they do not hold that it is holy. Therefore, they must agree with R. Meir. Fourth year wine and second tithe are both holy. 
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s sugya we heard of an anonymous mishnah that rules like R. Yehudah when it comes to hekdesh. To recall, he had said that if a man uses hekdesh for betrothal, if unwittingly, he has betrothed her. If intentionally, he has not.
  This is Mishnah Meilah 6:2. An employer sends an agent of sound senses (not deaf or a minor) and remembers that the money he gave to his agent is holy, but he remembers too late. The employee is already on his way. At this point the sender cannot be liable for trespass, or at least not to bring a trespass to atone for trespass, because a sacrifice is not brought by one who intentionally commits trespass. Although he sent it without knowing it was holy, since he knows before it is used, he is considered as one who intentionally commits trespass.This accords with R. Judah who holds that when one intentionally uses hekdesh, the hekdesh remains holy. It will be descralized only when the shopkeeper uses it. 
  The Talmud goes back to ask whether we are so sure that the anonymous mishnah about second tithe accords with R. Meir. There is a mishnah that refers to second tithe being given from one person to another. But if second tithe is holy, it cannot be given as a gift.   
  The gift given to the one separating tithes was not second tithe itself, but untithed produce. The agricultural gifts are still within the produce (mixed up in it) and are not considered as if they have been separated. Therefore, one can give, in a sense, second tithe, to another person. When he separates the tithe, it will be his own tithe he is separating.
  IntroductionThe discussion of whether there are anonymous mishnayot that agree with R. Yehudah, who holds that second tithe is not holy and can be used for betrothal, continues. 
  Fourth year plantings have the same status as second tithe. So if one can give fourth year plantings as a gift, then they, and by extension, second tithe, are not considered holy. This mishnah would thus seem to agree with R. Yehudah.
  The Talmud resolves that the plantlings were given to him while they were still budding, before they became obligated in agricultural gifts. This disagrees with R. Yosi who holds that plants while still budding are liable for agricultural gifts.   
  A person is buying second tithe produce. He draws it into his possession but before he can redeem it the produce is worth two selas. He pays the seller only a sela since he acquired it before it went up in price. The full second tithe produce is now his and he has gained a sela. The problem is that if second tithe is holy, as R. Meir says, then one acquires it only after paying the money, not by drawing it into his possession, like non-sacred items. This seems to be another anonymous mishnah that follows R. Yehudah. 
  The Talmud admits that this mishnah accords with R. Yehudah. Still, the mishnah that accords with R. Meir appears twice, once in Maaser Sheni and once in Eduyot and the mishnah that agrees with R. Yehudah appears only in Maaser Sheni. Two seems to be better than one.R. Nahman b. Yitzchak explains that the preference for R. Meir is not that his mishnah was taught twice, but that his mishnah was taught in Tractate Eduyot, called “Behirta” or “choice”. Tractate Eduyot is viewed, occasionally, as a more authoritative tractate.   
  
  Daf 55a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a mishnah from Tractate Shekalim that seems to accord with R. Meir. The issue is how to treat domesticated animals found in close proximity to Jerusalem which may be escaped sacrifices (reality TV show?).
  The mishnah says that males must be considered burnt offerings and females peace-offerings. The problem is that males can also be peace-offerings.R. Oshaia interprets the mishnah to refer to a case of one who finds the animal and wants to bring its value as an offering. What the mishnah says is that if he does so, he must bring the value of a burnt offering and a peace offering because a male animal may be either. Once he commits to this, the animal’s value is desacralized. This accords with R. Meir who holds that one may intentionally redeem hekdesh.
  IntroductionYesterday’s sugya taught of a person who finds a sacrificable animal near Jerusalem and redeems it for money. The money is holy and the animal has been desacralized. The question our sugya asks is whether one can actually desacralize an animal dedicated to be a sacrifice. 
  This mishnah from Tractate Me’ilah teaches that misusing an animal dedicated to the Temple or a vessel from the Temple does not desacralize them. Thus no matter how many people use these items in a non-holy way, each person commits trespass. This shows that things that have intrinsic holiness, such as animals donated to be sacrifices, cannot be desacralized. This differs from things whose value was donated to the Temple. These do not have intrinsic holiness and can be redeemed.In any case, this seems to prove that things with intrinsic holiness cannot be redeemed (i.e. desacralized), whereas in yesterday’s mishnah, about animals found near Jerusalem, we said they could be redeemed. 
  The Talmud resolves by saying that according to R. Meir animals with intrinsic holiness can be redeemed. This is the mishnah from Shekalim. But this mishnah, from Tractate Me’ilah, follows R. Yehudah who holds that they may not.
  R. Yehudah holds that if one unwittingly uses hekdesh it is desacralized (our mishnah in Kiddushin). But one cannot desacralize things that have intrinsic sanctity (this mishnah in Meilah). R. Meir’s opinion should be parallel. He holds that if one uses hekdesh intentionally it is descralized. But he should also hold, like R. Yehudah, that things with intrinsic sanctity cannot be desacralized.    
  The answer is that R. Yehudah refers to a case where someone unwittingly uses hekdesh. He does not intend to desacralize it, and thus if it has intrinsic sanctity, it is not desacralized. But R. Meir refers to one who intentionally uses hekdesh. Since he is acting intentionally, he can desacralize even something with intrinsic holiness. But stay tuned—tomorrow’s section continues this holy discussion!
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues to discuss whether R. Meir holds that things that have intrinsic sanctity can be desacralized. 
  This difficulty is raised against R. Oshaya who said that according to R. Meir if one finds an animal near Jerusalem he can redeem it and use the money to buy a peace-offering. A peace-offering is a sacrifice of lower sanctity. But we only know that R. Meir said this about something that is of the highest sanctity. Do we know that he said this about sacrifices of lower sanctity.
  The argument here is pretty straightforward. If R. Meir holds that items of higher sanctity can be desacralized, all the more so items of lower sanctity.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss R. Meir’s opinion about desacralizing hekdesh. 
  This is a summary of what was stated in the previous few sections. 
  
  Daf 55b
  
  R. Yohanan is surprised by R. Oshaya’s explanation of the mishnah about the lost animal (see section one). Do we say to a person “Sin” by intentionally redeeming an animal intended to be offered as a sacrifice. An animal designated to be sacrificed cannot be redeemed unless it has become flawed and cannot be sacrificed. Even though he will have the merit of donating two sacrifices in its place, and thereby remedy the situation, we do not generally tell people to sin even if the sin will eventually result in merit.Therefore, R. Yohanan has another suggestion. We wait until the animal is blemished. Then it is redeemed and we make a stipulation. If the animal was a burnt offering, then the first offering will be a burnt offering in its place and the second a voluntary peace offering. If the animal was a peace offering, the second animal is a peace offering in its place and the first offering is a voluntary burnt offering. After doing this, the animal he found is successfully desacralized. He may now eat it. Bon Appetit! 
  IntroductionThe Talmud returns to the mishnah about the lost sacrificial animal. The assumption was that male animals are either burnt offerings or peace offerings. But is that all they can be? 
  The Talmud adds another possibility—the animal might be a thanksgiving offering, so he has to bring one of those too. And the loaves that go with it. The altar is really making out here!
  It can’t be a guilt offering because a one year old animal was found, not a two year old (no idea how they know this). It is not assumed to be a guilt-offering of a leper or a nazir which are yearlings because these are not common sacrifices. 
  We are not concerned with the animal being a Pesach because people don’t lose those sacrifices so close to Pesah. And when it is not close to Pesah, the animal has the status of a peace offering.     
  If it is a firstling or tithe, then this is not a problem. We wait for a blemish and then eat it when blemished, which is always the rule for firstlings and tithes.
  IntroductionThe assumption was that female sacrifices are peace-offerings. But they too could be other types of offerings.
  The Talmud adds another possibility—the animal might be a thanksgiving offering, so he has to bring one of those too. And the loaves that go with it. The altar is really making out here!
  If a two year old is found it is not a sin offering and we do not assume it is a sin offering whose time passed. 
  If a female yearling is found then we have to treat it as if it is a sin-offering. There is nothing that can be done to redeem this sin-offering. It can’t be sacrificed because it might not have been a sin-offering. And one cannot redeem it and use the money to bring another sin-offering because one cannot bring a voluntary sin-offering. The only thing that can be done is simply put it in a pen and starve it until it dies. I know, this is not a nice halakhah.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss using second tithe money and desacralizing it. 
  Second tithe money should not be used to buy food outside of Jerusalem. According to the first opinion, if one uses second tithe money to buy an animal outside of Jerusalem, if unwittingly, the sale is void. The money returns to its “place” meaning it stays second tithe. But if he does so deliberately, the sale is valid and the animal must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there.R. Yehudah explains the first opinion—the person was buying an animal to be used as a peace-offering, which seems to have been a normal thing to be done with second tithe money. If he does so intentionally, then the acquisition is valid. But if he was trying to buy a non-sacred animal, meaning his intent was to turn the second tithe into non-sacred money, then the exchange is invalid whether done unwittingly or deliberately. 
  
  Daf 56a
  
  In the mishnah R. Yehudah said that if one intentionally uses second tithe money to betroth a woman, the betrothal is valid. This contradicts what we just said—if he uses the money deliberately, the sale is not valid. 
  R. Elazar explains that in the mishnah a woman knows that the second tithe money stays holy and that she must take it to Jerusalem. Therefore, there is no reason for the kiddushin not to be valid. In contrast, when one tries to desacralize second tithe money, the act is invalid and the money remains second tithe.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues the discussion of using second tithe money for acquisitions. Yesterday we said that if a man intentionally uses it for betrothal, the betrothal is valid because the woman knows that the second tithe remains holy and she will take it to Jerusalem and use it there. Today, the Talmud raises a difficulty on this notion. 
  People should know, according to R. Yirmiyah, that if one buys items that cannot be eaten the money is not desacralized. Second tithe money should be used to buy food to be eaten in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, if one does use second tithe money to buy these things, the sale is valid. He then takes other coins and states that they become second tithe in place of the coins that are in the hand of the seller. Then he brings these coins to Jerusalem and consumes them there (essentially he is penalized by having to spend twice as much). So why is this not the rule with kiddushin? Why don’t we make the man who betrothed the woman redeem the coins and bring them to Jerusalem? Why make the woman bring them?  
  The woman in the mishnah knows that second tithe remains holy and therefore she will bring the coins the man gave her to Jerusalem. But in a regular case, of a woman who does not know that second tithe must be brought to Jerusalem, the man who betrothed her must himself redeem the coins he gave her and bring them to Jerusalem.   
  The mishnah we just saw says that if one buys things that cannot be eaten, he redeems those coins, brings the equivalent value in their place, and uses those coins to buy food in Jerusalem.But R. Yehudah said that if one intentionally tries to desacralize second tithe coins, the coins remain holy. They “return to their place” and the sale is nullified.Shmuel says that the mishnah here refers to a case where the seller fled and therefore the coins cannot be returned to him. They cannot “return to their place.” In such a case, he may redeem them and use the new coins to buy food in Jerusalem.
  
  Daf 56b
  
  If the seller leaves town, then the purchaser redeems the coins. But if the seller is still around, then he is penalized because he has to return the money and the sale is nullified. 
  Why not penalize the purchaser by making him take an equivalent amount of money and bring it up to Jerusalem? Why penalize the seller? After all, what did he do wrong?The first answer is that a mouse cannot steal an item unless he has a hole to put it in.  The seller is at fault, for had he not accepted the money, the purchaser would not have been able to use it.But, the Talmud continues, come on—the mouse is the one who stole it? How can you let him off the hook (I’m definitely picturing Jerry as I’m learning this)?The final answer is that the seller is penalized because he is the one that has the money. Note that the penalty is only the nullification of the sale. He is not really out of any money.
  IntroductionThis mishnah lists things from which it is prohibited to derive benefit.  Therefore, a man who tries to betroth a woman with one of these items has not betrothed her.  In my explanation I will explain what each of these items is.
  “Orlah”:  Fruit from a tree during its first three years (Leviticus 19:27). “Kilayim of the vineyard”:   Wheat which has been planted in a vineyard (Deuteronomy 22:19). “An ox which is to be stoned”: An ox that has killed a person must be stoned to death (Exodus 21:28). “The heifer whose neck is to be broken”: This refers to the ceremony performed when a body is found and its murderer is unknown (Deuteronomy 21:4).“A leper’s bird-offerings”: At the end of his leprosy (tzaraat) the leper brings two birds as sacrifices (Leviticus 14:4).“A nazirite’s hair”: The nazirite cuts his hair at the end of his naziriteship and burns it (Numbers 6:18).  “The first-born of a donkey”:  The first-born of a donkey must be redeemed by donating a sheep.  Until that point it is prohibited to derive benefit from it (Exodus 13:13).  “Meat [boiled] in milk”:  Exodus 23:19 and parallels.“Non-sacred meat slaughtered in the Temple court”:  It is forbidden to slaughter non-sacrificial meat in the Temple court.Section two:  It is forbidden to derive benefit from all of the above items.  They also may not be sold.  However, if he does sell them, the money does not retain the prohibited status of the original item.  Therefore, the money is effective for betrothal.  Note that the mishnah does not state that it is permitted to use the money for betrothal.  The act may be prohibited but nevertheless effective.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now begins to explain how we know that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the various items listed in the mishnah. 
  The Torah explicitly prohibits one from eating orlah. But there are some extraneous words at the beginning of the verse. These are read as adding on that even deriving benefit is prohibited. 
  The verse uses the strange phrase “pen tikdash” to describe the status of diverse seeds sown in a vineyard. Hizkiyah employs a pun on these words to read them as if they say “lest it be burned” which indicates that if such seeds do grow into plants, the plants must be burned.R. Ashi reads the word as related to “kadesh” which means sanctified. The plants are prohibited for people to use like sanctified things. 
  The problem with R. Ashi’s interpretation is that when one sells sanctified things the money becomes holy and the original item loses its holiness. Essentially, one can redeem them in this way. But kilayim, mixed seeds that grow in a vineyard cannot be redeemed.The Talmud therefore rejects R. Ashi’s derivation. 
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the ox condemned to be stoned for having killed a person. The mishnah taught that one cannot use such an ox to betroth a woman. [I really would love to imagine someone trying to actually do this]. 
  The verse states that the flesh of the stoned ox may not be eaten. But this is obvious—an animal stoned to death has not been properly slaughtered and therefore it clearly cannot be eaten. So what do we learn from the words “its flesh shall not be eaten”? That even if it was slaughtered properly after its trial was over, the flesh may not be eaten. 
  The earlier verse only stated that the flesh may not be eaten. How do we know that one may not derive benefit from the flesh by selling it to non-Jews or feeding it to dogs, actions generally permitted when it comes to nevelah?The Talmud reads this from the word “naki” which I have translated here as “clear.” The simple meaning of this word is that the owner of the ox is not guilty. But this, to the rabbis, is obvious. How could we possibly consider the owner to be guilty of murder when it was his ox that did the deed? Therefore, the rabbis read the word as “clear” from his property. He does not even retain the value of the ox carcass.   
  The Talmud suggests that we need not interpret the verses in this way. We could say that the verses prohibit deriving benefit from the ox only when it is stoned and that the extra “it shall not be eaten” comes to teach that it is prohibited even to derive benefit from the ox’s flesh. The verse that says that it is stoned would not be enough to know that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. The ox’s flesh would then be permitted if it was ritually slaughtered after its trial was concluded.   
  The Talmud explains that if the words “it shall not be eaten” were the only clue we had that it should be prohibited to eat something, we would indeed say that they teach that it is prohibited to derive benefit. But in this case we know we can’t eat the stoned ox because it is nevelah (improperly slaughtered meat). Furthermore, this case is different from others because the verse says “its flesh shall not be eaten.” The extra word “flesh” intimates that its flesh is prohibited even if the animal was properly slaughtered and not stoned. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the prohibition of using the carcass of the stoned ox. 
  Mar Zutra suggests that maybe the Torah prohibits eating the ox only if it is stoned or slaughtered with a sharp stone. This would be almost like the animal was stoned, which is the reference point of the verse. But if the ox is slaughtered with a knife, maybe it should be permitted to eat its flesh. 
  Mar Zutra is rejected. The Torah does not mandate that slaughtering be done with a knife. It can be done with any sharp instrument. Therefore when the baraita says that the flesh is prohibited even if it was slaughtered in a kosher manner would hold true even if slaughtered with a stone.We should note that in reality, the Torah says nothing about how slaughtering of non-sacrificial animals is supposed to be done. This is an interesting topic, but this is not the place to go into it. 
  The phrase “and the owner shall be clean” comes to teach that even parts of the ox that are not its “flesh,” i.e. its hide, are prohibited to derive benefit from. 
  Some tannaim use the verse “and the owner of the ox shall be clear” to teach that the owner of the ox does not pay even half damages. And if the ox kills a pregnant woman, the owner does not pay for the miscarriages. Since they use this verse for another purpose, how do they derive the law that the hide is prohibited?They use the extra word “et.” This word comes to include the hide.
  The Talmud now segues into a famous source about doing a midrash on the word “et.” A sage we never hear about elsewhere is said to have interpreted all of the times this word “et” appears, until he came to one whose interpretation would seem to be heretical. From that point forward, he stopped making derashot on the word et. R. Akiva, who seems to be his student, or at least his successor, succeeds in coming up with a derashah even for this verse.We should note that we never find the word “et” being interpreted in actual tannaitic sources. Tannaim, the sages who operated in the tannaitic period, did not interpret grammatical features of verses such as full spelling and individual letters. It is only in later tradition that rabbis begin to ascribe to the tannaim such interpretive methods. This is a topic I will return to in a forthcoming third volume of Reconstructing the Talmud. So stay tuned. 
  
  Daf 57a
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to explain how we know that it is forbidden to derive benefit from the items listed in the mishnah. 
  The word “atonement” is used in connection with the heifer whose neck is broken (Deuteronomy 21:8). This connects this ritual with sacrifices and since one cannot derive non-sacred benefit from sacrificial animals, so too one cannot derive benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken.    
  When it comes to the leper’s mitzvoth, inside the Temple there is a mitzvah that enables—his guilt-offering, which allows him to eat sacrifices. Other sacrifices offered in the Temple atone. Outside the Temple, the leper’s bird offerings enable him to enter the camp. And there are other mitzvoth that atone that are performed outside the Temple, namely the breaking of the heifer’s neck. Just as in the first case, the mitzvah that enables is like the mitzvoth that atones, so too with mitzvoth outside the Temple, those that enable are equivalent to those that atone. Just as one may not derive benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken, so too one may not derive benefit from the leper’s bird offerings. 
  R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagree over when the leper’s bird sacrifices become prohibited—as soon as they are set aside to be the leper’s bird sacrifices or only once the one that is slaughtered has been slaughtered.    
  R. Yannai does not know when the heifer becomes prohibited, although from what we have seen, it must be before it is killed. Some other rabbis (colleagues) say that as soon as they begin to take the animal down into the wadi to break its neck it is prohibited. 
  The problem is that if the heifer is forbidden from the time it is taken down to the wadi, and not immediately when it is set aside, why are the birds prohibited immediately when they are taken? The answer is that there is no other determining point for the birds. They are set aside and then one is sacrificed and the other released. With the heifer there is another point from which the animal could be prohibited. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss when the leper’s birds become prohibited. To recall, R. Yohanan said from the time the bird is slaughtered, whereas Resh Lakish said they are prohibited already when they are set aside. 
  The baraita teaches that the bird that is slaughtered cannot be eaten but that the bird that is set free can be eaten. But if the birds becomes prohibited when they are taken, why would this baraita need to teach that it is prohibited after it was slaughtered?
  We needed this baraita to teach us that even after slaughtered, one may not eat the bird. Otherwise we might have thought that this bird is like a sacrifice and permitted after it was slaughtered. But Resh Lakish can still hold that it is forbidden to derive benefit from the birds from the time they are taken.   
  The bird slaughtered is found to be a trefa, an animal with a fatal flaw, and therefore a new bird must be brought. The baraita teaches that another bird must be found to be sacrificed and be a partner for the remaining bird. But one may derive benefit from the bird found to be a trefa. This seems to prove that this bird was not prohibited already from the time it was set aside. Otherwise it would stay prohibited.    
  Resh Lakish explains that the baraita refers to a case where the bird was found to be flawed inside. This means that the bird was never holy and therefore it can be used after.  
  With the bird sacrifice, one must bring hyssop, cedar wood and scarlet thread. If one slaughtered the bird without these things, the rabbis disagree with regard to whether the slaughtering is considered slaughtering such that one may not derive benefit from the bird. But what is clear is that both R. Ya’akov and R. Shimon agree that the bird is not prohibited until it is slaughtered.  
  Resh Lakish admits that the baraita R. Yohanan used against him does not accord with him. But he cites another baraita that does. This baraita again makes “enabling” and “atoning” equivalent both in and out of the Temple. Inside the Temple, the leper’s guilt offering is like all guilt offerings. So too outside the Temple, the leper’s bird offering is like heifer whose neck is broken—both become prohibited while still alive.    
  IntroductionToday’s sugya returns to discuss the prohibition of the leper’s sacrificed bird and the permission to eat the leper’s sent away bird. 
  The midrash teaches that the bird that is set free may be eaten but the slaughtered animal may not be. But why not teach the opposite—the bird that is set free would be prohibited and the slaughtered one permitted.R. Yohanan posits a general rule—live animals cannot be permanently prohibited.
  
  Daf 57b
  
  Animals set aside to be idols or actually worshipped as idols are only prohibited for sacrificial use. Therefore, they follow R. Yohanan’s general principle.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the permission to eat the bird set free.
  The School of R. Ishmael derives that the bird is prohibited from the word “field” used in the verse.  
  The Talmud argues that the word field teaches that he must cast the bird out of a city towards an open field—not into the sea or wilderness. It does not teach that if one finds the bird one may eat it. 
  The School of R. Yishmael can learn two things from one word because of the word “the.” 
  Rava offers a practical resolution to the problem—if this bird was prohibited how would we know which bird it is. Someone might come and eat it! The Torah did not give this instruction so that people would accidentally sin. Therefore, we know it must be permitted.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to explain how we know that it is prohibited to derive benefit from various items mentioned in the mishnah.
  The Nazirite’s hair is called “kadosh.” This means one cannot derive benefit from it. But it is not like other holy objects, which if one buys or redeems become desacralized and the money becomes holy. The Nazirite’s hair stays holy forever.    
  According to Exodus 13:13, the firstborn of a donkey must be redeemed with a sheep. If the firstborn is not redeemed, its neck must be broken.The mishnah rules that one may not betroth with the firstborn of a donkey. This seems to agree with R. Yehudah but not R. Shimon. R. Nahman responds that the mishnah refers to a firstborn after its neck has been broken. In such a case, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.  
  According to R. Yishmael the Torah prohibits cooking a kid in its mother’s milk three times to teach that there are three prohibitions—eating, deriving benefit and cooking.   
  The mishnah does not agree with R. Shimon b. Judah who holds that just as one may derive benefit from meat that was not properly slaughtered (one can use it to feed one’s animals), so too one may derive benefit from meat cooked in milk. I should note that this is not the accepted opinion—according to halakhah, one may not derive any benefit from meat cooked in milk.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses non-sacred animals (hullin) that we slaughtered in the Temple. It is prohibited to derive benefit from them. 
  The Torah clearly prohibits sacrifices offered outside the Temple. The rabbis compare this with the opposite prohibition, slaughtering non-sacred animals inside the Temple. It is forbidden to derive benefit from either. However, the punishment of karet is given only for one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple. It is forbidden to slaughter non-sacred meat inside the Temple, but the punishment for doing so is not karet. 
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on the analogy between hullin sacrificed in the Temple and sacrifices slaughtered outside. The latter is punished by karet, and that is why it may be prohibited to derive benefit from it. But the former is not punished by karet and therefore it might not be prohibited to derive benefit. So we need more proof.
  Abaye derives the rule that one cannot derive benefit from non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple from the repetition of the same word, “it” in three verses. What do we learn from the repetition of this word? The answer will become clearer as we proceed.The baraita begins with the verse which allows one to slaughter non-sacrificial animals when far away from the Temple. But one is not allowed to slaughter non-sacrificial animals inside the Temple. 
  One is liable even for slaughtering a blemished animal inside the Temple, because while this particular animal cannot be sacrificed, it is of a species that can be sacrificed.    
  The baraita asks how we know that one is liable for killing non-sacred wild beasts or birds inside the Temple. The former is analogized to domestic animals because both require ritual slaughter. Birds are included from the repetition of the word “it.” Note that this is not yet what Abaye is trying to prove—he is trying to prove that these words teach that one may not even derive benefit from any type of non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple.    
  The Talmud now proceeds to go through the same verses and logic to prove that not only may one not slaughter hullin in the Temple, if one does, the meat is prohibited. 
  Here the baraita adds one last point—one may derive benefit from animals not properly slaughtered. But one may not derive benefit from hullin slaughtered in the Temple.  
  
  Daf 58a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss hullin, non-sacred animals, slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard. Last week we learned that it is forbidden to derive benefit from such animals. 
  R. Shimon holds that if a man betroths a woman with hullin killed in the Temple Courtyard she is betrothed. This implies that he holds that this is not a biblical prohibition.   
  In this baraita, R. Shimon mandates the utter destruction of hullin killed in the Temple Courtyard. This implies that the prohibition is biblical.
  R. Joseph and R. Shmuel do not know how to answer Mar Judah’s question, so they bring it to Rabbah. After denigrating Mar Judah for his contentious personality, Rabbah solves the problem. R. Shimon holds that hullin animals killed in the Temple are biblically prohibited. But the baraita was referring to a case where the animal was found to be a terefa, an animal with a physical flaw that would have caused it to die. Such an animal could not be a sacrifice. Since its slaughter would in any case not have permitted it to be eaten, R. Shimon does not consider this to be under the prohibition of hullin killed in the Temple. 
  IntroductionThe mishnah rules that if the man sells any of the items mentioned in the mishnah and then betroths with them, the woman is betrothed. The Talmud asks how we know this rule. 
  The rabbis read the Torah as ruling that idols or things used in idolatrous worship are prohibited and if they are used to produce something else, then whatever is used for the purchase is prohibited as well. But since the Torah specifies this about idolatrous objects, by implication other prohibited items are different. In other cases, if the item is sold, the proceeds can be used.
  The Talmud asks why idolatry shouldn’t be a paradigm for everything else. The answer is that there are two objects that have the same rule (the proceeds of their sale are prohibited). Idolatry and seventh year produce. And in any such case, neither serves as a paradigm for other things. 
  If seventh year produce is sold, the money used to buy it becomes holy but the seventh year produce is not desacralized. 
  This baraita illustrates how the seventh year produce retains its status and yet passes on its status to whatever is purchased through it.
  Other rabbis hold that one can learn from two verses that teach the same thing. So how do they know that only idolatry and seventh year produce cause the money used to purchase them to become prohibited? They learn it from the word “it” that appears in both verses. “It” has this rule, but nothing else....
  IntroductionToday we begin with a new mishnah—things you can do kiddushin with!
  Terumot:  Terumah can only be eaten by a priest.  A priest can use terumah for betrothal and then the woman may sell it. However, even an Israelite can potentially own terumah.  For instance, if someone’s maternal grandfather is a priest, he is not a priest because the priesthood is not inherited through his mother.  In such a case he will inherit from his grandfather, if his mother inherits from her father and then dies.  The non-priest cannot eat the terumah which he inherits, but he can sell it.  He could also use it for betrothal and then the woman can sell it.  He would have to tell her that it is terumah, because terumah is less valuable than regular food.Tithes:  These are given to the Levite, who may use them for betrothal.  An Israelite can use them for betrothal in the same way described above.Priestly gifts:  This refers to parts of non-sacred animals given to priests (see Deuteronomy 18:3).  The priest can use them as betrothal money and if they come into the hands of an Israelite, he too can use them.The water and ash of purification:  To purify someone who came into contact with a dead body, they would burn the red heifer and put its ash into water.I should note that I have explained that an Israelite cannot betroth with terumot or tithes that he separates from his own produce.  Such gifts must be given for free directly to a priest or Levite.  However, it is possible to explain that the mishnah is referring to the tithes or terumot that an Israelite himself separates from his produce.  The Israelite has the benefit of being able to give such gifts to whichever priest or Levite he so desires.  This benefit is worth money—for it will make the priest or Levite look favorably upon him.  It is with this benefit that he is betrothing the woman.  She now has the benefit of giving the terumot or tithes to anyone she wishes.  While this may be a small benefit, remember, it only takes a perutah. However, as we shall see, the Talmud does not like this interpretation. 
  Ulla says that the ability to give terumah or tithes to whomever one wants is not considered of monetary value. If a man gives a woman terumah so that she can decide what priest to give it to her he has not given her “money” such that she would be betrothed.
  The mishnah seems to be a direct refutation of Ulla. One can betroth with terumah and tithes. The benefit of discretion does seem to count as money.     
  The mishnah does not refer to an Israelite who gives terumah that he had to separate to a woman. Rather, it refers to an Israelite who inherited tevel, untithed produce, from his mother’s father. There is terumah inside this tevel, and this tanna considers the terumah to be a separate entity. The Israelite owns the terumah and can do with it what he wants, although he may not eat it. The woman will now be able to sell it. That is why he can perform kiddushin with it.  
  This is basically the same material we just saw placed in a bet midrash dialogue.
  
  Daf 58b
  
  R. Huna calls R. Hiyya b. Abin “hutza’ah” and the latter thinks this is an insult. But then R. Huna reassures him it is not. He only meant to say that someone from Huzal agreed with him.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to talk about whether benefit of discretion counts as money. 
  Tevel is untithed produce. If one steals tevel from another, he clearly must pay back the value of the hullin, non-sacred portions. But does he have to pay back the terumah, which would have had to have gone to the priests anyways? Rabbi says he must pay back the terumah value. This could be because he holds that the one from whom the terumah was stolen has now lost the rights to give it to whom he wants. And this benefit counts as money. 
  The tevel stolen here was not from the produce of the person from whom it was stolen, meaning it was not grown on his land. Rather, he inherited it from his maternal grandfather who was a priest. The terumah is part of the inheritance, but the person who inherited can sell it. The question is do we consider this terumah as being stolen? If we consider the terumah to have already been separated, then the grandson inherited the terumah and the thief must pay it back. If we consider the terumah not to have been separated, then the grandson must separate the terumah and give it to a priest. So the thief only stole from him the benefit of discretion which does not count as money.      
  The Talmud now goes back to interpreting the dispute to be about regular tevel, not inherited tevel. They disagree about Shmuel’s rule that giving one grain of wheat as terumah makes the rest of the stack permitted. Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi says that it does, therefore, the thief has to pay back the entire value of what he stole because he could have given only one grain as terumah. R. Yose b. R. Yehudah holds that the person must give the real amount of terumah. Therefore, the thief pays back hullin. The right to give the terumah to whomever he wants is not considered money. 
  The next explanation is that Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi simply penalizes the priest by making him have to pay back the full value of what he stole. Why should he luck out just because what he stole was tevel? 
  Alternatively we can explain that the rabbis do not make the thief pay back the value of the terumah because they are penalizing the owner for holding on to tevel and not separating the terumah before it was stolen. One should always strive to separate terumah as soon as possible so that people do not accidentally eat untithed produce.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya, the last in this chapter, deals with the continuation of the mishnah, which allows a man to use the water of purification and the ashes of purification to betroth a woman. 
  The Talmud contrasts between the mishnah and a baraita. According to the mishnah, one can use the waters of purification and the ashes from burning the red heifer to betroth a woman. But according to a baraita, one may not derive monetary value from these things.    
  Abaye resolves that one may receive payment for bringing the water and drawing the water. One can perform this act for a woman and betroth her in this way because it saves her from having to do so herself (should she need some red heifer water sprinkling). But the baraita refers to the mixing of the ashes with the water and the sprinkling. The priest must do this himself and may not receive payment for it.As an aside, while this sugya does not deal with paying clergy, it is interesting to relate it to that context. The priest can get paid but only for things someone else can do, like bringing the water and drawing it. But he cannot get paid for things that only he can do. Judges and witnesses also may not be paid. This is certainly a fascinating topic, but keep in mind, this passage is not the main source for the issue.  
  Congratulations, you’ve now finished two chapters of Kiddushin. The last part of this chapter was indeed quite difficult. A lot of material about laws that are not really observed much anymore or are observed only in Israel. And very theoretical, to say the least. So kol hakavod for making it through this material. We’re more than half way through the tractate, and I hope you’re all still enjoying the practice of learning one daf of Talmud a week.
  IntroductionThe chapter, as all chapters do, begins with a mishnah. My commentary is from Mishnah Yomit. The first section deals with a person who sends an agent out to betroth a woman on his behalf and then the agent betroths the woman to himself.The second section deals with a man who betroths a woman but sets the betrothal date to occur in thirty days.  The question is, if someone else betroths her within those thirty days, is she betrothed to the first man or to the second?
  Reuven sends Shimon out to betroth Rachel on his behalf.  Upon seeing Rachel, Shimon decides that he himself wants to betroth her, and when he proposes betrothal, Rachel agrees. She is now betrothed to Shimon and the fact that Shimon was supposed to act as Reuven’s agent is irrelevant.  Of course, we can be sure that Reuven will not be happy with Shimon and Shimon has acted shamefully with his friend (sounds like a movie plot).  Nevertheless, this fact is not of legal significance. 
  The connection between this section and the previous one is that in both the woman under discussion is betrothed to the second man.  In this case, Reuven betroths the woman but sets the betrothal to begin in thirty days. When Shimon betroths her within thirty days, she is betrothed to Shimon, because Reuven’s betrothal has not yet begun. When the thirty days are up, Reuven’s betrothal does not “kick-in”, because she is already fully betrothed to Shimon.  The mishnah expresses the fact that she is fully betrothed to Shimon by stating that if she is an Israelite’s daughter and therefore prohibited to eat terumah, she is now fully betrothed to Shimon and if he is a priest she may eat terumah.  Were she not fully betrothed, the mishnah would not say that she can eat terumah.
  In this case, Reuven makes an ambiguous statement, “Be betrothed to me from now and after thirty days.”  It is unclear whether his betrothal begins now, or after thirty days.  Alternatively, she may begin to be betrothed now but not fully betrothed until thirty days.  In any case, if Shimon comes along and betroths her within the thirty days, his kiddushin are also doubtfully valid.  If Reuven’s betrothal has begun, then she is betrothed to Reuven and Shimon’s act is irrelevant; but if Reuven’s betrothal has not begun, then she would be betrothed to Shimon.  Alternatively, if Reuven’s betrothal has begun but not been completed, she may be betrothed to both of them at the same time.  In such a situation she would be forbidden to both and require a get from both (see Gittin 7:3).  If she was the daughter of a priest and one of them was an Israelite, she would no longer eat terumah lest her marriage to that man was valid.  Similarly, if she is the daughter of an Israelite and one of the men was a priest she would not eat terumah lest her marriage to that man was not valid. In other words, we act stringently and she doesn’t get to eat terumah no matter what the case. Again, this is the mishnah’s way of saying that she is doubtfully married to both men and not fully married to either. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud begins to react to the first clause of the mishnah in which an agent betroths to himself the woman he is sent to betroth on behalf of another. 
  The agent’s act is valid and the woman is betrothed to him, but he has not done the honorable thing. Indeed he has been deceptive. One might say that from this mishnah one learns a lesson—when something is really important to you, try to get it done yourself.
  The Talmud asks why our chapter calls the one sent to betroth, “his neighbor” while the other chapter calls him “his agent.” It suggests that in both cases the mishnah uses a word that is “new” meaning it teaches us something that we would not have otherwise thought.Here it teaches “neighbor” to let us know that even though one does not generally rely on neighbors for such types of favors, even so, the neighbor who betroths the woman to himself is still considered deceptive.  
  
  Daf 59a
  
  IntroductionThis section contains a few stories about people who either betroth a woman or buy land that someone else was seeking to betroth/ buy. 
  Rabin is ironically called “pious” even though his actions don’t seem all that pious. He is supposed to betroth a woman for his son, but then decides he’s going to betroth her for himself. The Talmud asks how Rabin could do such a thing. His excuse is that the men giving the woman away in betrothal (the brother, the father?) did not want to give her to the son, they wanted the father. And he was afraid that if he went back to his son and told him about what was happening, the girl would meanwhile be given to another.Sounds like a good story to me.
  This is the same exact story except the agent is sent to buy land, not betroth a woman. 
  This story again discusses one who ends up buying something that someone else wanted. When my grandmother of blessed memory would play Monopoly with me, she would not buy a third property if I already had two. She was a very kind woman, and an amazing grandmother. But she always lost Monopoly.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the next clause in the mishnah. 
  According to the mishnah, if the first man says to her “be betrothed to me after thirty days” and another comes and betroths her in the meanwhile, she is betrothed to the second. But what if no one else comes and betroths her during these thirty days?Rav and Shmuel both say she is betrothed even though the money has been used up. This is slightly surprising because at the time the kiddushin go into effect, she is not getting any money. She received it already.
  Had the money been given to her as a deposit or a loan she would not be betrothed. But that is not the case. The money he gave her is not a deposit. It’s her money and when she uses it she is not using the original owner’s money. It’s also not a loan because a loan would be given for her to use and therefore there would be no money around at the time of betrothal. Here, the money was for betrothal.  
  This is the beginning of a classic dispute between R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish. Can the woman change her mind within this thirty day period? After all, she is not betrothed until after thirty days. R. Yohanan says that she can change her mind—her subsequent words can nullify her earlier words. Resh Lakish says that they cannot.  
  The case here is one who sends an agent to separate terumah but then annuls the agency. If he does so before the agent separates the terumah, the separation is not valid. But here is a case of speech annulling speech. This seems to support R. Yohanan. 
  Here Resh Lakish retreats from his position a bit. Speech can annul speech. But the case of kiddushin was more than just speech. The woman received money. Since she accepted it for the sake of kiddushin, she cannot retract because this is like an action. 
  If a man sends an agent to deliver a get, a divorce document, to his wife, he can cancel the agency by telling the agent not to deliver the get. But this seems to be a case of a speech cancelling an action (giving the get to the agent). Therefore, it is a difficulty against Resh Lakish.Resh Lakish resolves the difficulty by pointing out that until the get reaches the woman’s hand, this is a case of speech nullifying speech. The giving of the get to the agent is really not relevant. And Resh Lakish agrees that speech can nullify another act that consisted purely of speech. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues the discussion of speech annulling speech. Here Resh Lakish begins to counterattack.
  The mishnah quoted here is about purity laws. A vessel becomes susceptible to impurity when one thinks that one has finished it. For instance, if I’m making a dish and I intend to glaze it, it is not susceptible to impurity until I do so. But if I think to use it unglazed, it is susceptible to impurity before it is glazed. In order for it to become not susceptible to impurity, one would have to do something to it, like break it.The mishnah then summarizes the power of acts and intention. An act is powerful enough to annul an intention or another act, but intention is not powerful enough to annul either speech or action.This is a difficulty against R. Yohanan who holds that speech should be able to cancel other speech.
  
  Daf 59b
  
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty by stating that the rules with regard to purity are different for in this realm thoughts can count as action. This is borne out by R. Papa’s statement concerning liquids that make food susceptible to impurity. Food is not susceptible to impurity until it comes into contact with a liquid. The person does not have to put this liquid on the food because the verse is read “if it be put.” However, the verse is written as if it says, “If one put.” So the susceptibility to purity depends on whether the person would want the liquid on the food. If he would, then it is susceptible to impurity. Here we can see that in the realm of impurity, thoughts count like action.
  R. Zevid teaches R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish’s dispute in a slightly different context. Instead of teaching it about a case where the woman changed her mind with regard to kiddushin that will not take effect for thirty days, he teaches it with regard to the case of a woman who authorized her agent to betroth her and then changed her mind before the agent did so. R. Yohanan says that she can retract—her words authorizing the agent to betroth her can be annulled by other words retracting his agency. Resh Lakish says she may not.  
  The case here is one who sends an agent to separate terumah but then annuls the agency. If he does so before the agent separates the terumah, the separation is not valid. But here is a case of speech annulling speech. This seems to support R. Yohanan.
  Rava solves the difficulty on R. Yohanan by positing that the case in the baraita is one in which the owner didn’t really annul the agency, but gave terumah on his own, before the agent did. By doing so, he is effectively nullifying the agent’s agency. 
  This is the same difficulty we saw above. 
  This is the same resolution we saw above.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya is the exciting conclusion of the “speech nullifying speech” discussion. 
  A husband sends a get to his wife and then finds him and annuls his agency. This is a case of speech nullifying speech. This refutes Resh Lakish. 
  The halakhah follows R. Yohanan in all cases. Even though he gave the woman money (and said, “Be betrothed to me in 30 days”) and we might have thought that this is like an action, her speech can still annul her acceptance of the kiddushin.   
  R. Nahman holds that even after the husband nullifies the agency, the husband can still use the get. This seems to mean that speech does not nullify speech for the get is still valid. So how can we hold like R. Nahman and like R. Yohanan. 
  The resolution is that the husband was nullifying the agency, not nullifying the get. He can still use the get should he later on decide he wants to divorce his wife.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins addressing the next section of the mishnah which reads:Similarly, if he says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second.
  Rav says that once betrothed to the second, she is permanently betrothed to him. Shmuel says that the betrothal is only effective till the thirty days are over. At that point the first man’s kiddushin begin to take effect and she is now betrothed to him. The betrothal to the second ends. Yes, this is really weird!
  R. Hisda does not understand how the betrothal of the second could just simply be removed. Poof! After all, the first person’s betrothal does not begin until after thirty days. The second person’s betrothal should be permanent. To solve the problem, R. Joseph offers another context for Rav and Shmuel’s dispute. He also slightly modifies the words. The dispute between Rav and Shmuel is on the second clause of the mishnah, where the first man says, “From now and after thirty days” and then a second man betroths her during that thirty day period. The Talmud will now explain how their dispute maps out onto this clause. 
  Rav does not know whether the first betrother intended his statement as a stipulation, “If I do not change my mind within thirty days, you will be betrothed to me from now” or a retraction, i.e. “No you are not betrothed to me until after thirty days.” If it was a stipulation, then she would be married to the first man. If a retraction, then she is married to the second because the first kiddushin was never valid. Therefore, she is doubtfully betrothed to both men and will require a get from both.Shmuel holds that the statement was a stipulation. She is doubtfully betrothed for the first thirty days but after that the second person’s betrothal is removed because the first person’s takes effect.
  Rav and Shmuel have the same argument as Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] and the sages. The context here is divorce. Divorce cannot occur after death. The sages hold that when he says “from today and after my death” it might be a stipulation (in which case it is valid) and it might be a retraction (in which case it is not). Rabbi holds that it is a stipulation, and the get is valid, although it takes effect only after death. Rav holds like the sages and Shmuel holds like Rabbi.    
  If Rav agrees with the Sages who referred to the case of divorce, why not just say “the halakhah agrees with the Sages.” The Talmud explains that Rav needs to teach his statement in relation to betrothal for had he not we might have thought that when it comes to betrothal, the Sages would agree with Shmuel that it is a stipulation. Since betrothal is to draw her near, we might assume that he is not retracting his statement.  
  If Shmuel had said “the halakhah agrees with Rabbi” I might have thought that only in that case do we interpret his statement as a stipulation because he cannot be saying “Be divorced after my death.” People know that one cannot divorce after death. But when it comes to kiddushin, they can take place after thirty days. So maybe in that case the man was retracting his earlier statement.
  IntroductionAccording to Rav, if the man says “Be betrothed to me now and after thirty days” we do not know if he made a stipulation or a retraction. If another person comes and betroths her within the thirty days, then if it we consider it a stipulation she is married to the first man, but we consider it a retraction she is married to the second. This leaves her doubtfully married to both and requiring a get from both. 
  Abaye explains that if there are multiple betrothers, Rav would hold that she can only be betrothed to either the first (if the statement is taken as a stipulation) or the last (if it was a retraction). She could not be betrothed to any of the middle ones.
  
  Daf 60a
  
  Were it not for Abaye we might have thought that “now and after thirty days” could imply both a stipulation and a retraction. This would mean that she would be doubtfully betrothed to each man and require a get from all of them. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that to Rav the language means either stipulation or retraction. Not both.
  R. Yohanan holds that each act of betrothal was partial, leaving room for the next. Therefore, they all must give her a get. This seems to differ from the approaches we saw above. The idea would be that the betrothal begins immediately but does not fully take effect for another thirty days. Therefore, she is betrothed to them all.  
  This baraita seems to imply that when one says “Behold this is your divorce from today and after” it is doubtful whether it is a stipulation “from today if I die” in which case she is divorced or a retraction (and means she is divorced only after his death) in which case she is not divorced. To remedy the situation she must have halitzah (in case she is not divorced) but can’t do yibbum (in case she was divorced). This accords well with Rav. And Shmuel could say that this baraita holds like the Rabbis whereas he holds like Rabbi according to whom the divorce is valid for he holds that it is a stipulation.But according to R. Yohanan who holds that these statements imply “partial” application, this statement should not work at all for there can be no “partial” divorce. There is a rule that the divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife. If so, she should be able to have yibbum for she is a widow not a divorcee.
  Rava explains that to R. Yohanan in this case the divorce is partial but death completes the severing of the ties. Therefore, even R. Yohanan can explain why she must have halitzah (she’s not fully a divorcee) but not yibbum (she is partially a divorcee). 
  Abaye notes that we cannot so easily combine the effects of divorce with the effects of death. Divorce causes her to be exempt from yibbum whereas death makes her liable for yibbum. Thus we need another way for R. Yohanan to read the baraita according to which she must undergo halitzah and not yibbum. 
  Abaye says that in principle R. Yohanan would hold that if he says “From today and when I die” this would not be a valid get and she could have yibbum (because she would be a widow). But he does not allow her to undergo yibbum lest people think that the same would be true if he says, “From today if I die” which is definitely a valid get, since this is certainly a stipulation. 
  The Talmud notes that the logic should work in the other direction as well. If we say that she cannot have yibbum in one case then we should say the same about the other case. In other words, they are both similar, so we should not let he have yibbum in one lest she come to perform yibbum in the other. 
  In the end, the Talmud admits that while it is preferable for her to have halitzah in a case where he says “from today and after my death” if she does have yibbum it is not a problem. Again, in this case there is no real doubt to R. Yohanan that this is not a valid divorce. It is only a rabbinic prohibition that she should have halitzah and not yibbum lest people allow the woman divorced by a man who said “from today if I die” who most certainly may not have yibbum.
  In such a case the woman is immediately betrothed and the man must thereafter give her two hundred zuz.  If he does not give her two hundred zuz, the betrothal becomes invalid.  The problem is that since he didn’t set a time limit he has an unlimited time to give her the two hundred zuz.  Potentially, the only way for the betrothal to become invalid would be for him to die before he gives her the money. In such a case she would not be considered his widow and she would not be liable for yibbum. Therefore, this is not a particularly good way of performing betrothal, especially for the woman. 
  In such a case the woman is immediately betrothed and the man must thereafter give her two hundred zuz.  If he does not give her two hundred zuz, the betrothal becomes invalid.  The problem is that since he didn’t set a time limit he has an unlimited time to give her the two hundred zuz.  Potentially, the only way for the betrothal to become invalid would be for him to die before he gives her the money. In such a case she would not be considered his widow and she would not be liable for yibbum. Therefore, this is not a particularly good way of performing betrothal, especially for the woman. 
  In this case, all the man has to do is demonstrate that he owns two hundred zuz.  Again, she is betrothed immediately and he must prove that he has two hundred zuz.  However, we should note that in order to be certain that the betrothal is invalid she would have to prove that he doesn’t own two hundred zuz.  This will not be easy and again the woman is in a disadvantageous situation.  
  Here he must not only own two hundred zuz, but show her the cash (or its equivalent).  He may not show her two hundred zuz lying on a table unless he actually owns them.  Just as in section two, this too seems to be better for the woman.  Here she can actually see that he owns the two hundred zuz and need not worry about proving (or disproving) it.  
  The mishnah only stated that “he must give the two hundred zuz.”  The amoraim disagree over whether this means that she is betrothed immediately and he owes her 200 zuz, or whether the betrothal takes effect only after he gives her the two hundred zuz.
  The practical difference between these two opinions would arise in a case where before receiving the two hundred zuz she accepted kiddushin from another man. If the original act of kiddushin was a condition then the second act of kiddushin is not valid. But if we say that the first act is not valid until he gives the money, then the second act would be valid.   
  As we have already seen a few times, the same exact debate occurs with regard to divorce—is the divorce valid and then she must give the money. Or is the divorce valid only when she gives the money.
  
  Daf 60b
  
  The Talmud asks the question we could certainly anticipate—why teach the same dispute twice? The answer begins by explaining what would have happened if it taught the dispute only about kiddushin. We might have thought that only in this case does R. Huna say that the kiddushin takes effect immediately. Since the husband is drawing her near, he would want to draw her near as soon as possible. However, in the case of divorce we might have thought that he would agree with R. Judah. She is divorced only once she gives the money.   
  If we had taught the dispute only in relation to divorce, I might have said that in that case she is divorced immediately according to R. Huna because we can be sure that the husband will ask the money from her. Since they are divorced, he will not be ashamed. But we might have thought that in the case of kiddushin he agrees with R. Judah that she is betrothed only when he gives her the money since the woman might be ashamed to ask the money. In that case, R. Huna might agree that since we’re not sure she’ll get the money, she is not betrothed until she gets it. To correct both these errors, we need to teach the dispute in both the context of divorce and betrothal.
  IntroductionR. Yehudah holds that if the man says that he will divorce her on condition that she give him 200 zuz she is not divorced until she gives the money. Our sugya begins with a difficulty on this position.
  According to the baraita, the divorce occurs immediately upon the giving of the get, even before she gives the money. Thus if the get is torn or lost before she gives the money she is still divorced. This is a direct contradiction against R. Yehudah. 
  In this baraita, the man again makes the divorce dependent on her giving him 200 zuz. He then dies. If she gave the money she is a divorcee and not liable for yibbum. But if she did not give the money, she is a widow. According to the first opinion, she cannot give it to his heirs. According to R. Shimon b. Gamaliel she can give it to his heirs. Tje only dispute is about whether she can give the money to the heirs. All would hold that she is divorced immediately as long as at some point she gives the money (according to the first opinion, she simply will never have such an opportunity). Thus this is again a difficulty against R. Yehudah. 
  R. Yehudah could answer you that this baraita accords only with Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi] according to whom when one says “On condition” the statement takes effect immediately. But R. Yehudah (the amora) holds like the other rabbis, according to whom “On condition” is a stipulation and the statement won’t take effect until the condition is fulfilled. This is a common way of solving difficulties—ascribe the tannaitic source to a minority position and then claim that the majority disagreeץ
  IntroductionThe Talmud now turns its attention to Rabbi’s statement that anyone who says “on condition” it is as if he says “from now.” Meaning his statement takes effect immediately, even before the condition is fulfilled. 
  R. Zera, upon reaching Israel, learns that everyone agrees with Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi—saying “on condition” is like saying “from now.” What they disagree about is whether when one says “from today and after death” he is making a condition, in which case the divorce is valid, or a retraction, in which case it is not.   
  According to the sages, we don’t know what “from today and after death” means—is it a condition or a retraction. Therefore, she is doubtfully divorced. According to Rabbi this statement is a condition—“From today if I die” and therefore when he dies, she is considered to be divorced from the time the get was given.  
  R. Yehudah, as we learned earlier, holds that there is also a tannaitic dispute over the meaning of “on condition [that I die].” Only Rabbi holds that this is equivalent to “from now.” The other sages would say that this is also ambivalent and thus she is only doubtfully divorced. So then, the Talmud asks, why don’t we have a baraita in which the tannaim disagree over this subject, and from that dispute we could learn that all the more so they disagree over “from today and after death.”  
  The dispute is placed in case of “from today and after death” to let you know that even in this case Rabbi considers it a condition and therefore she is divorced. Had we taught the dispute in the case of “on condition” we might have thought that only in that case does Rabbi hold that she is divorced, but not in a case of “from today and after death.” 
  The Talmud asks why not teach the dispute in the case of “on condition” and from here we could learn that even in this case the rabbis are not sure what he means and therefore she is only doubtfully divorced. All the more so we would know that in their opinion she is doubtfully divorced if he says “from today and after death.”The answer is that it is better to frame the dispute in a way that we can see just how lenient Rabbi is—in both cases we hold that she is divorced. It is better to teach a leniency because it takes greater halakhic boldness to teach leniencies than stringencies.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to deal with the mishnah.
  The Mishnah seems to teach something too obvious—if he says “on condition that I give it to you from now until thirty days” she is betrothed if he gives it to her within thirty days. Why would we ever have thought otherwise?I might have thought that he is only saying that as a way to hurry himself up and that he does not really mean to make his betrothal conditional. Therefore, the mishnah needed to teach us that this is indeed a condition. The betrothal is not effective unless he gives her the monety within thirty days. 
  The Mishnah rules that if he says “on condition that I possess two hundred zuz” she is betrothed only if he does possess it. But how can we ever be sure that someone does not own two hundred zuz? Maybe he does and we, or even he, does not know about it.The answer is that if we do not know that he has 200 zuz, she is only doubtfully betrothed. If we know that he has 200 zuz, she is certainly betrothed.    
   He must show her his won money for she did not agree to simply see money belonging to someone else. 
  The mishnah again seems to teach something obvious—if he just shows her money on the table she is not betrothed. The Talmud resolves this by saying that even if this is money someone gave him to invest, she is not betrothed. The money needs to be his, not just given to him to use as an investment.  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya continues with the next mishnah, one very similar to the previous mishnah. 
  A “bet kor” is the amount of land it takes to grow a kor of produce.  In modern terms it is about 17,000 sq. meters, a rather large piece of land.  This clause is nearly the same as the end of the previous mishnah.
  Land value differs from place to place.  It seems here that the woman wants to know that he owns good land, and not a worthless piece of land.
  This is nearly the same as the final section of the previous mishnah.  Showing it to her in “the plain” means that he shows her land that is not his. This is not what she thought he meant by his “showing her a bet kor.”
   This is word for word the same comments we read on the previous mishnah concerning money. Here the topic is land. 
  The mishnah and baraita needed to teach the same clause about land and money because if it had taught only the clause about money I would have thought that only in that case would we be uncertain if she is betrothed or not. If he does not show her 200 zuz, she is doubtfully betrothed. But in the case of land, if he has it, we would know and therefore if he does not show it to her, she is not even doubtfully betrothed. Therefore it teaches that even in the case of land, she is still doubtfully betrothed if he does not show her the land.  
  Were it not for the mishnah, I might have thought that it is not important that he possess land in that specific place. After all, if she wants the produce, he can bring it to her from wherever his land is. Therefore, we need the mishnah to teach us that he does need to possess the land in that specific place. Otherwise she is not betrothed.
  Again, when he says “I will show you” he must show her something belonging to him.  
  If she shows her a field that he is working as a sharecropper she is still not betrothed. He must actually own the field.
  IntroductionSince the mishnah dealt with sizes of fields, the Talmud brings in other material relevant to the subject. 
  The topic of this mishnah is one who dedicates his field to the Temple. What counts as his field such that he would have to pay 50 silver shekels for each area?   
  
  Daf 61a
  
  Elsewhere the Gemara asked a difficulty about this mishnah. While we can understand why the ravines and rocks do not count as part of the field, we should still consider them to have been separately dedicated to the Temple. Why does he not have to redeem them as well?
  The baraita cited here teaches that even the smallest sized field must be redeemed. So why doesn’t he have to redeem the ravines and rocks that are higher or lower than ten handbreadths within the larger field he dedicated? 
  Mar Ukba explains that while small fields must be redeemed, one need not redeem places that he could not sow. These ravines are full of water and therefore, he does not need to redeem them. 
  If the parts of the field that cannot be sown don’t count in measuring the field, then why just ten handbreadths high or low? Even higher ravines or lower rocks can’t be sown.The answer is that when these features are less than ten handbreadths, they count as part of the field because it is normal for fields to have small rises and inclines. Only if they are ten handbreadths high do they not count.
  IntroductionToday’s section cites another mishnah relevant to how land is measured. 
  As with the previous mishnah, ravines and rocks ten handbreadths deep or high are not counted as part of the field. 
  In this case, the ravines do not count as part of the field even if they are not full of water. This is different from dedicating the value of a field to the Temple where the ravines were considered part of the field if they were not full of water.  
  The question is—when it comes to kiddushin, and he said “on condition that I have a field the size of a bet kor,” do we count the ravines not filled with water as we would with hekdesh (consecrated property) or do we not count them, as we do not for sales?The answer is that we do count them. The husband could say that although it is more trouble, he will plant crops in these fields and so she will benefit from the profit.
  IntroductionThis mishnah contains a general principle of Rabbi Meir:  any stipulation must be a double stipulation.  This means that if I make a stipulation I must state both the consequences of the condition being fulfilled and the consequences of its not being fulfilled.  For instance, if I want to say that I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake (and I would), I must say, “I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake, and I will not come to your house if you don’t give me chocolate cake.”  Otherwise the stipulation is not legally binding, and even if you give me chocolate cake, I am not legally bound to come to your house (but I would never do such a thing).Rabbi Meir derives this principle from Moses’s words to the children of Gad and Reuben, as we shall explain below.
  The children of Gad and Reuven did not want to inherit on the west side of the Jordan river; they wished to remain on the east side, in a place good for their cattle.  Moses responded to them that if they cross to help fight in the conquering of Canaan, then they may inherit on the east side of the Jordan.  He also added that if they did not cross and fight with the rest of Israel, then they would only be able to inherit in Canaan.  From the fact that Moses “doubled” his stipulation, Rabbi Meir derives that all stipulations must be doubled.  Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel responds that Moses had to state the second half of his statement.  Had he not done so, he might have implied that if they didn’t fight for Canaan they wouldn’t even get an inheritance in Canaan.  Since the second half is a necessary statement, we cannot learn that stipulations that don’t need a “negative” side do not need to be doubled.The mishnah ends with Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel’s response to Rabbi Meir.  Had Rabbi Meir responded he might have said that it is obvious that the children of Gad and Reuven would inherit in the land of Canaan, since all of the tribes inherited there irregardless of their participation in the conquest.  Since the second half of his stipulation was unnecessary, we can learn that the only reason Moses added it in was because all stipulations must be thusly doubled.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to explain the mishnah. 
  According to R. Meir, had the doubling of the stipulation not come to teach that all stipulations need to be doubled, the verse could have simply stated “they shall have possession among you.” The extra words “in the land of Canaan” come to teach that all stipulations need to be doubled.
  
  Daf 61b
  
  To R. Haninan b. Gamaliel the words “in the land of Canaan” are necessary to teach that if the tribes of Reuben, Gad and half of Menashe don’t cross over they will still have possession in the land of Canaan. This is essentialy what R. Hanina b. Gamaliel said in the mishnah.
  R. Meir responds that we would not have thought that for the words “among you” imply anywhere you live. This leaves the words “in the land of Canaan” extraneous and therefore available for a midrash.   
  R. Hanina b. Gamaliel uses a parable to explain his reasoning. Sometimes the extra stipulation is necessary to let the person know what happens if he does not fulfill the conditions. 
  The Talmud critiques the comparison. In the mishnah, the doubling is necessary to teach that if they don’t fulfill the condition, they will not receive any inheritance, neither in Canaan or in Gilad. Here, in the parable, the doubling is effective only in respect of the rest of the estate. He would have received that portion of the field in any case, whether he fulfilled the condition or not. This implies that without the doubling the tribes would have inherited in the Gilad even without the double formulation.
  The Talmud resolves that the mishnah and baraita are two stages of the dialogue. In the mishnah R. Hanina b. Gamaliel holds that if the double formulation was not used, the two and ½ tribes would not have received any inheritance, even in the land of Gilad. But after the response of R. Meir, R. Hanina b. Gamaliel admits that without the double formulation they would have received a portion in Gilad. The double formulation comes to teach that if they don’t fulfill the condition, they would have received a portion in Gilad, as in the parable.
  IntroductionThe discussion of R. Meir’s requirement for a double stipulation continues. 
  God when speaking to Cain uses a double formulation. This accords well with R. Meir. R. Hanina b. Gamaliel would say that without the double formulation we might have thought that if Cain does not act well he would be neither rewarded nor punished. The double formulation teaches us that if he sins, he will be punished (sin crouches at the door, always reminds me of my dog wanting to go for a walk). 
  When Abraham instructs his servant to bring a wife for his son, he uses a double formulation: “Thus shall you be freed from my adjuration: if, when you come to my kindred, they refuse you—only then shall you be freed from my adjuration.” This makes sense for R. Meir, but again, why, according to R. Hanina b. Gamaliel is a double formulation needed?The answer is that if Abraham had only instructed the servant to take a wife for his son (v. 38) we might have thought that if she was willing to go but her family did not want to send her, he should bring her against her family’s will. Hence, Abraham had to stress that she was not to come against her family’s will. 
  Genesis 24:8 emphasizes that Rebekah must also be willing to come back to Canaan, not just her family. 
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to seek verses that seem to use a double formulation. 
  This is similar to the interpretation of the verses from Genesis about Cain. The double formulation is necessary to teach that if the Israelites do not follow God’s laws, they will be punished.  
  The same structure as above. 
  The verse I have translated “you shall eat the sword” is clearly meant to teach that “you shall be devoured by the sword” and that is how most translators render it. But literally translated it could be read as if you will eat the sword? What!!! Rava explains that the sword here is harsh food. Coarse bread, coarse salt and onions. We should note that this is not far off from what most people probably ate most of the time. One would hope for soft bread, but people ate a lot of bread back then. 
  
  Daf 62a
  
  IntroductionThis is the last sugya about R. Meir’s requirement to use a double formulation when making a stipulation. Again, the Talmud searches for verses that either do or do not use such a double formula.
  The oath administered to the sotah, the woman accused of adultery, does not use a double formulation. This accords with R. Hanina b. Gamaliel but not with R. Meir. 
  R. Tanhum resolves R. Meir by rereading the Hebrew word for “be free.” The word is hinnaki which could also be read “ḣinnaki” with a chet, which means “strangled.” Thus R. Meir can indeed read a double formulation into the verse.But now we have the opposite difficulty—if the verse is a double formulation, then it is a difficulty against R. Hanina. Again, the Talmud resolves by noting that the verse needed to teach that she is totally free if she did not sleep with another man. Otherwise, we might have thought that she is guilty of a violation since, according to rabbinic interpretation, to become a sotah she had to have been isolated with another man. 
  The verse with regard to sprinkling the purificatory red heifer waters is expressed through a double formulation. This accords with R. Meir but seems to be a difficulty on R. Hanina b. Gamaliel. R. Hanina could respond that were it not for the continuation of the verse I might have thought that it would be sufficient to sprinkle on one of the days.   
  The Torah repeats the same instructions later in the chapter to let us know that the sprinkling must be performed on the third and seventh, not the third and eighth days.   
  Again, the Talmud enquires concerning what seems to be an extraneous verse—why do we need this verse. The answer is that this verse is needed to teach that both sprinklings are necessary in order for him to be pure enough to eat even terumah.  
  IntroductionThe first section of this mishnah teaches that if a man was mistaken about some part of a woman’s identity before he betrothed her but she wasn’t the one who mislead him into making that mistake, the betrothal is still valid.The second two sections of the mishnah deal with a man who tries to betroth a woman who could not currently be betrothed to him. The question is whether the betrothal can become valid at a later point without its being performed again. 
  In this case the man made a mistake with regard to the woman’s identity, but she didn’t cause the mistake.  The betrothal is therefore valid.  After all, were these grounds to annul a betrothal a man could always annul his betrothal. He could always say that he thought something was true and it turned out to be untrue and there would be no way of falsifying his claim.  
  The general principle in this section and in the next is that if the betrothal is invalid now, it cannot become valid later on through an act performed now.  There are five things that prevent the betrothal from being possible at this point.1)	Either the man or woman is not Jewish.2)	Either the man or woman is a slave.3)	The woman is married.4)	The man is married to the woman’s sister.5)	The woman is awaiting halitzah (release from levirate marriage).In all of these cases, the betrothal cannot currently occur. Therefore, even if he says that the betrothal should only become valid when their statuses change such that betrothal would become possible, the current act of betrothal is invalid.
  In this section too the man is attempting to betroth someone in the future to whom he could not be currently betrothed. Here he couldn’t betroth her now because she doesn’t even exist.  She hasn’t even yet been conceived. This guy is really trying to get his bid in early!    Again, the mishnah rules that his kiddushin are invalid.The last section of the mishnah is an addition to the mishnah (meaning it is missing in mishnaic manuscripts).  It is clause from the Talmud that somehow crept in and it changes the meaning of the mishnah, for here we have an example where kiddushin that could not currently occur can be currently contracted.  According to this clause, as long as it is already recognized that the woman is pregnant, the betrothal is valid and if a girl is born she is betrothed to that man.  In order to make this clause match the remainder of the mishnah, the Rambam explains that he must betroth her again when she is born.
  The Talmud discusses a mishnah from elsewhere because our mishnah will be brought up as part of the discussion. Terumah cannot be separated from detached produce in order to exempt produce still attached to the ground. R. Assi then asks what if someone takes some detached produce and declares that the terumah he is separating will count as terumah for the attached produce when the attached produce becomes detached from the ground. R. Yohanan says that this works. Since he can detach the produce from the ground, we treat it as if it was already detached.
  In most of these cases the kiddushin is not effective because it is not in his power to free her himself or to cause her husband or sister to die or to cause the yavam to perform halitzah for her. However, right now the Talmud assumes that he has the power to convert. Therefore, he should, according to R. Yohanan, be able to say “behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert.” 
  The Talmud answers that conversion also cannot be done by the man himself, for he needs a court to convert and it is not clear that he will find three to serve for him in such a capacity.Conversion is a legal matter (see Leviticus 24:22).I should note that in earlier rabbinic literature it seems that conversion was a self-administered process. A person just decides to become Jewish, goes through the proper ritual and thereby becomes Jewish. Only later in the Talmudic period do we hear of the necessity for a court. I wrote an article about this—you can find it on academia.com if you are interested. And let me know what you think!
  
  Daf 62b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to raise difficulties on R. Yohanan’s position, “whatever lies in his power to do, is not as though that act were lacking.”
  If R. Yohanan is correct, that if a person can do something, it is not as if that act is lacking even if he had not yet performed the act, then a man should be able to marry his slave woman, saying to her that she’ll be betrothed after he frees her. After all, he has the power to do so.The Talmud rejects this (you probably won’t like the answer). Slaves are not considered to have the ability to consent. They are like animals. But after she is freed she is considered to have an independent mind. She would need to consent as a free woman in order to be betrothed.
  It would seem that R. Yohanan should disagree with R. Oshaia. However, the Talmud resolves that R. Yohanan agrees because while a man can divorce his wife against her will (according to Talmudic law), he cannot marry her against her will. Therefore, this is not something that he can do.    
  If R. Yohanan agrees with R. Oshaia in the earlier case, then maybe we would have our answer to this other case, where a man tries to betroth a woman now and again after he divorces her, all within one act of betrothal. R. Oshaia did not know the answer to this, but it would seem that since he can’t marry her against her will after he divorces her, even if she consents now, the second kiddushin would not be valid.The Talmud answers that maybe in this case her consent could carry over to the second kiddushin. Thus this question still remains.
  IntroductionToday’s section brings tannaitic support for R. Yohanan’s statement, “whatever is in his power to do, it is not as if it has not been done.”
  One cannot separate terumah from attached produce for detached produce or vice versa. But if one adds in “when it is cut off” then the statement is valid, because he does have the power to cut the produce off.   
  R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov goes a step further and says that someone can do this even though the produce had not yet even grown to a third, which is when it becomes liable for terumah.     
  Fodder refers to the young plant that has grown less to one-third ripeness but is still useful for animal feed. While not liable for terumah, it still is usable. The soft plants have not even reached this state and therefore, Rabbah holds that one may not dedicate them to be terumah. R. Yosef disagrees.
  R. Elazar explains the biblical etymology of the word “agam”—how do we know it refers to a soft plant. We should note that this word does not seem to be the same as the word “agam” which means lake.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section, Rabbah and R. Yosef argued about a case where a person separates terumah from produce still attached to the ground. According to Rabbah, the produce has to be at least in a state where it is not completely soft. R. Yosef said he could separate it even in the earlier state. Our sugya correlates these two positions with a mishnah about a man who tries to betroth a fetus. Yes, you read that correctly. 
  Rabbah would say that a man can betroth the fetus only if the woman is visibly pregnant. R. Yosef would say that while she must be pregnant, the pregnancy need not even be discernible. 
  This is another version of Rabbah and R. Yosef’s dispute. Rabbah holds that to be separated as terumah, the fodder must be in a naturally watered field. Such fodder will definitely ripen because it receives its water naturally. But fodder in an artificially irrigated field might not ripen if no one waters it. Therefore, it cannot be separated. R. Yosef says it does not matter. In either case, the terumah may be separated even before the produce has ripened. 
  The mishnah about betrothing a fetus can only refer to a visibly pregnant woman, but now it is not connected to the dispute between Rabbah and R. Yosef. 
  IntroductionR. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said that one can separate terumah from produce that has not yet been harvested. The idea is that one can transfer ownership over something not yet in existence. Abaye lists other tannaim who hold this same position. 
  The rabbis don’t like the simple reading of the verse, which seems to prohibit one from returning runaway slaves. While our sympathies will of course lie with the simple reading of the verse, rabbis did not oppose slavery (I’m not sure if anyone in the ancient world did). As such, it did not make sense to them that a slave could simply run away and thereby become free. Therefore, Rabbi limits the law to a particular type of slave. One that was bought under the condition that he be set free. But how does this happen? R. Nahman b. Yitzchak explains that the master wrote that when he buys the slave, the slave will be freed from this moment and on. Thus the slave can acquire himself even before the buyer buys him. This is considered a case of a person acquiring something not yet in the world. 
  
  Daf 63a
  
  In this case, a man makes a betrothal statement to a woman at a point at which the statement cannot be fulfilled—one of them is not Jewish, one of them is not free, she is married, he is married to her sister, or she is subject to yibbum. In all of these cases, R. Meir says she will be betrothed when the event occurs. This is like a case of transferring title for something not yet in the world, because at this point she is not permitted to him.R. Judah Hanasi theoretically allows such a statement to be effective, but says that the rabbis did not allow it because this would create enmity. Imagine how this would play out in family dynamics if he’s married to her sister and he says “Behold you are betrothed to me after your sister dies.” Might make a good TV show. 
  Rabbi was already counted due to the previous source. Since Rabbi and R. Judah Hanasi are the same person, Abaye did not need to count him twice. 
  In this mishnah from Ketubot, a woman takes a vow that anything she produces, meaning the profit of her work, should be forbidden to her husband. Such a statement is against the marriage contract, in which she is obliged to turn over her handiwork to him. Thus, the first opinion rules that the husband need not annul the vow. The vow has no validity to begin with. But R. Akiva allows the vow to stand, lest she produce for him more than she is obligated to do. This is a case of a person dedicating (“konam” is a dedication statement) something that does not yet exist—her handiwork has not yet been made. So why didn’t Abaye include R. Akiva on the list.   
  R. Huna said on this mishnah that the woman did not dedicate her future earnings. A person cannot, in his opinion, dedicate something not yet in the world. Rather, she dedicated her hands, which are in the world. Anything they make will be forbidden to her husband (should this vow stand). Thus R. Akiva is not on Abaye’s list.
  IntroductionThis mishnah teaches that a man may stipulate that his betrothal to a woman is contingent upon his performing for her a certain favor.
  The question which the Talmud will ask is whether he must also give her money for the betrothal to be effective. Or is the favor he does for her sufficient to count as the money for kiddushin. [Speaking to the government on her behalf sounds a bit like something out of the Trump or Netanyahu regime].  
  According to Resh Lakish, the man must also give her kiddushin money. The fact that he will perform a favor for her is not sufficient.     
  The two baraitot cited here prove that a man can betroth a woman by performing work or some sort of favor for her as long as that work has not yet been done and it is worth the value of a perutah. So this is a refutation of Resh Lakish. 
  Resh Lakish could resolve those baraitot by connecting them to a tannaitic dispute as to how to reckon wages. When one performs work for another, does that person become liable to pay the worker all at one time or incrementally? If incrementally, then at no point is he giving her the value of a perutah, because we could divide the moments up into units worth less than a perutah. This is the opinion of our mishnah—wages cannot be used for betrothal because there is no point at which they are worth a perutah. The other baraitot hold that the obligation is incurred only at the end of the labor, when they are worth a perutah.   
  Rava explains why Resh Lakish had to explain that our mishnah holds that wages are incurred from beginning to end and that therefore he also gave her an additional perutah. In the baraita, the man stated “in payment for.” Clearly the work was the betrothal money. Our mishnah teaches “on condition.” This teaches that “on condition” is an external stipulation; it is not the mechanism through which betrothal is contracted. Therefore, he must also give her an additional perutah.
  The first part of this mishnah is straightforward.  Slightly more complicated is the second part.  If the father dies, he cannot consent to the betrothal.  Nevertheless, the mishnah rules that she is betrothed.  The assumption is that when the man said “on condition that my father consents” he really meant to say, “on condition that my father does not disapprove.”  Since after his death the father cannot disapprove, the betrothal is valid.  If the son dies, the mishnah finds a convenient way for the woman to avoid the need for yibbum (levirate marriage to her husband’s brother).  The court would instruct the father to state that he did not approve of the marriage and he would thereby annul the betrothal.  If the betrothal was annulled, the woman would not be liable for yibbum. 
  This is the problem with the mishnah—what does it mean when he says “on condition that my father consents.” The first clause seems to mean that the father says yes. If he is silent, she is not betrothed.The second clause implies that “consent” means the father did not protest. Silence is acquiescence. The last clause implies that to undo the kiddushin, the father must actively protest. His earlier silence is not sufficient. Thus the three clauses of the mishnah do not all seem to agree one with the other.
  
  Daf 63b
  
  R. Yannai indeed agrees, the mishnah refers to two different contexts. In the first clause, the meaning of the statement is that the father must say yes, whereas in the last two clauses, the meaning of the statement is that my father not object. To Resh Lakish, it is preferable to say the mishnah refers to two different circumstances, i.e. the betrother said two different things, rather than attribute the mishnah to two different tannaim. 
  R. Joseph b. Ammi finds one reasoning for the whole mishnah. If the father does not protest within thirty days, she is betrothed. If the father dies before protesting, she is betrothed because he will not protest. It is not his silence that causes the betrothal to be effective, it is his lack of protest. If the son dies within thirty days, the father must protest to undo the betrothal. Thus we can successfully provide one explanation for the whole mishnah.
  IntroductionA father has a right to betroth his daughter before she reaches majority age, defined by halakhah as being 12 1/2.  Our mishnah deals with a father who says that he has betrothed his daughter but does not remember to whom.  
  The father does not remember to whom he betrothed his daughter.  At this point she is in a terrible situation; she could be married to anybody therefore she is forbidden to everybody, lest she be married to someone else.  Comes along a man and says that he was the one who betrothed her.  He is believed, since there is no contradictory testimony.
  In this case two men come along and claim that they are the ones who betrothed her.  Neither can marry her lest she is betrothed to the other.  They must both give her a get.  However, if they come to an agreement, one may give a get and then the other may marry her.
  IntroductionThis section deals with the mishnah we learned yesterday. A father says he does not remember to whom he betrothed his daughter. A man comes along and says it was him. The mishnah says he is believed. The amoraim ask what it means when it says he is believed. 
  Rav says that the man who claims to have married her is allowed to give her a divorce. We can assume that he didn’t lie for without a purpose. He must believe that he is married to her. He would not lie just to get her out of her pickle.On the other hand, maybe he is lying, and he simply desires her. She’s a “damsel in distress” of sorts.Since there is contradictory logic here, we tell him he must divorce her. He is not allowed to marry her lest he is lying and is married to someone else. 
  R. Assi says that if the father claims he married her off, the man who says it was to him can even marry her.However, if the woman herself accepted the kiddushin, but does not remember from whom, the man is not believed to marry her. The Talmud will explain this below.  
  The mishnah said that if two men come and claim to have married her, one can divorce her and the other marry her. This seems to dispute Rav for Rav seems to say that one may not marry her.Rav could solve the problem by saying that it is different if there are two men. The man who marries her will be afraid to lie in front of another person [this reasoning is very difficult—after all, one of the men is certainly lying].  
  This baraita accords with R. Assi—the first man who comes and claims he married her is allowed to marry her.If another man comes and now claims it was him, he cannot disrupt the previous marriage. We do not trust him to undo what is already done.However, if the woman herself forgot to whom she was betrothed, a man is not believed lest he is lying and she is colluding with him to get herself out of this problematic situation.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the woman whose father said he betrothed her but does not remember to whom. 
  The mishnah ruled that she is prohibited to all men. But do we really treat her as if she is married? If she has intercourse with a man, are she and he stoned as adulterers? Rav says no—the father is believed to prohibit her to any person, but he is not believed to the extent that a court could execute based on his word only.R. Assi says that the Torah completely believes the father. 
  R. Assi agrees that if it was the woman herself who said “I was betrothed,” we do not stone her if she sleeps with someone else. The Talmud will below explain why R. Assi agrees with Rav in this case.   
  R. Assi notes that his own rulings are inconsistent. Earlier he had said that if the father says “I betrothed her” she is allowed to marry one who comes to marry her. This implies that we don’t take the father’s words so seriously that we would not allow her to marry this person. Nevertheless, if she has intercourse with someone, she (and he are stoned). All the more so, we should stone in a case where we do not allow her to marry someone else because we take her original words, “I was betrothed but I do not know to whom” even more seriously and don’t allow her to marry anyone.   
  The Talmud rejects R. Assi’s own difficulty on himself. The woman is simply not believed enough to cause her or the one she sleeps with to be stoned based on her words. There is different reasoning for this issue than there is for the issue of allowing her to marry someone who says she was betrothed to him. It is not that we believe her more than we believe the father. The issue is that we fear she is colluding, as we learned in yesterday’s section.  
  R. Hisda says that no matter who says the girl was betrothed, she or her father, we do not stone anyone if someone sleeps with her. R. Hisda, the Talmud notes, follows his own opinion that fathers can be believed in some matters, but not in others. In order to be liable for a forbidden sexual act a boy must be nine years and a day and the girl three years. [I should emphasize, the boy or girl in this case is not the one liable—the one who sleeps with them is. Thus if an adult married woman has sex with a nine year old boy, she is an adulteress. If an adult male has sex with a three year old betrothed girl, he is an adulterer. The adult is punished, not the child.] The father is believed if the issue is unwitting adultery. This would cause the adult to be liable for a sacrifice. The father is not believed to have the adult punished physically. Here we can see that in certain cases there is some inconsistency. A person can be believed to have certain consequences, but not others.  
  The baraita accords with R. Hisda, in that a father is believed in some matters but not in others. If the father says that the child is old enough to take a vow, or to dedicate or sanctify something to the Temple, or to say that the value of something will go to the Temple, the father is believed. The age required for a person to be able to legally dedicate something is thirteen for a boy, twelve for a girl. But a father is not believed to say that a child is this age, if the consequence will be the punishment of the child.In all of these cases we can see the rabbis’ famous leniency when it comes to punishments. A witness (the father) might be believed, but the credence the court lends him only extends to non-punishment types of consequences, mostly economic consequences. There needs to be greater evidence before someone can be punished. 
  
  Daf 64a
  
  IntroductionThe main topic discussed in this mishnah is when a man is believed with regard to statements he makes that impact his children’s personal status.  The general rule is that a man is believed to say that he has done something which he currently has the legal ability to do.  We shall see examples of this in the mishnah. 
  As we have learned already, a man has the legal right to betroth his daughter before she reaches majority age.  He also has the legal right to accept a get on behalf of his married daughter as long as she has not reached majority age.  If the daughter about whom this father is testifying is now a minor, he is believed to say that he betrothed her, or that he betrothed her and then accepted her get, since he currently has the power to perform either activity.  The ramification of his being believed to state that he accepted her get, is that she will be disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest.
  If she is now an adult (past 12 1/2 years old), he is no longer believed if he makes these statements, since he no longer has the legal right to either accept betrothal or a get on her behalf.  We should note that this limits the power of the father over his daughter.  Once she is past a relatively young age, he has no legal right to make decisions regarding her kiddushin, nor can he make any statement which would severely impact her status.
  A woman who was taken captive is forbidden from subsequently marrying a priest (see Ketubot 2:5).  This is because it is assumed that her non-Jewish captors had sexual relations with her and a woman who has had intercourse with a non-Jew is forbidden from marrying a priest.  The father is not believed if he states that his daughter was taken captive, no matter how old she is when he offers such testimony.  A father does not have the legal right to give his daughter in marriage to a non-Jew and therefore he doesn’t have any special right to testify about this having happened in order to thereby prohibit her to a kohen.  Note that when she is a minor the father does have another means by which to prohibit his daughter to the priesthood; he can testify that he betrothed her and then accepted her divorce. Nevertheless, he does not have the right to testify that she was taken captive.
  The Talmud explains, as I explained above, that the father is believed when he has the power to marry her off, but not when he does not, when she is of majority age. Similarly, he is not believed in the last clause because he does not himself have the power to disqualify her to the priesthood, neither when she is a minor or an adult. 
  The Talmud argues—a father does have the power to disqualify his minor daughter by marrying her off to a halal. A halal is the son of a priest who married a woman prohibited to him. According to many rabbis, a woman who has relations with a halal can no longer marry a Kohen. In other words, a father does have the power to disqualify his daughter to the priesthood.The answer is that our mishnah holds like R. Dostai, an Israelite woman “purifies” the lineage of a halal. Her child will be fit to marry a priest (although the boys are not priests themselves). She herself is also still eligible to marry a priest, should her current husband die. Thus a father does not have the power to disqualify his daughter to the priesthood. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to ask how we can be so sure that a father does not have the possibility of marrying his daughter off to someone who would disqualify her from subsequently marrying a priest. To recall, this was the explanation for why the father is not believed to say that she was taken captive, but was believed to say that he married his daughter off and then accepted her divorce.  
  An Israelite woman who has sex with a mamzer is disqualified from marrying a priest. So the father could give her in marriage to a mamzer and thereby disqualify her from the priesthood.The Talmud answers that the mishnah accords with R. Akiva who holds that marriage cannot be contracted between two people prohibited by a negative commandment such as that which prohibits a mamzer from marrying an Israelite woman. Most other tannaim hold that while it is prohibited for a mamzer to marry an Israelite, should the marriage occur, it is valid.     
  Another difficulty—perhaps the father could marry off his widowed daughter to a high priest, and according to R. Simai, R. Akiva would say that in this case the marriage is valid but that she, and her child, are disqualified from marrying priests. 
  The Talmud resolves that our mishnah accords with R. Yeshvav, according to whom R. Akiva says that all forbidden marriages, even that of a widow to a high priest create mamzerim. Thus the father cannot marry her off to anyone prohibited to her, because such marriages are not valid.    
  It is unclear whether R. Yeshvav means to say that even if a man marries a woman who is prohibited by a positive commandment, (such as the prohibition of marrying an Egyptian or Edomite for the first three generation) the child is a mamzer, then our problem is solved. But if all he meant to say is that a widow married to a high priest is a mamzer, then it is still possible for the father to disqualify his daughter by marrying her to someone prohibited by a positive commandment. Such a marriage would be valid and yet she would be disqualified from the priesthood. 
  R. Ashi now raises a difficulty against the whole interpretation of the mishnah—that a father is believed when he says something happened that he has the power to make happen. A father generally does have the power to betroth his daughter while a minor, but not to divorce her. Furthermore, while he has the power to betroth her, he might not have the power to betroth to a specific man. The other man can always say no, after all. Thus we need another reason why the father is believed or not believed.    
  R. Ashi uses a verse to prove that a father has the right to prohibit a daughter by making a statement concerning her marriage. The words “I gave my daughter to a man” would prohibit her to everyone. After all, we would not know who married her. The word “this” frees her to be with that man (and after his death or divorce, with any other). This is all accomplished by a mere statement.However, the father does not have any power to forbid his daughter to the priesthood by declaring that she was taken captive. Therefore, he is not believed.
  This mishnah discusses a man who offers testimony which will impact his wife’s subjectivity to the laws of yibbum.  By stating that he has sons he is exempting her from yibbum.  He is believed because if all he wanted to do was exempt her from yibbum he could divorce her.  However, he is not believed to state that he has brothers, thereby obligating her for yibbum.  Unless we know that he has brothers, he (or others) would have to bring evidence to make his wife subject to yibbum.  
  The mishnah seems to accord with Rabbi. A husband is believed to make a statement that would permit his wife to remarry without having to undergo yibbum or halitzah (either I have sons or I have no brothers). But he is not permitted to prohibit her, such that she would require yibbum or halitzah (I have no sons, or I have brothers). R. Nathan says he is believed in either case.  
  Rava said that R. Natan believes him in the baraita because he is retracting a statement at the time of his death. However, in other cases, such as that in the mishnah, where he simply makes a statement, R. Natan would not believe him.  
  Abaye points out that Rava’s statement does not make sense. If he is believed in the case of the baraita where he contradicts his previous words, all the more so he should be believed in the case of the mishnah, where is not contradicting any previous statement.  
  Abaye tries to harmonize the mishnah with the baraita by contextualizing both. The mishnah refers to a case where the husband is not presumed to have brothers or sons. He can make a statement such as “I have sons” because that will not make her liable for yibbum. But he cannot change the presumption to make her liable for yibbum by saying “I have brothers.” 
  The baraita refers to a situation where we thought he had brothers but not sons (making her liable for yibbum). If he is lying in order to exempt her from yibbum, we could ask why he would tell such a lie. He could, after all, just divorce her right before his death and thereby exempt her. Therefore, he is believed to exempt her from yibbum. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] would hold that when he said he has no brothers at the time of his kiddushin, he is totally believed, because why would he lie. This overrides the presumption that he had no sons, and now exempts her from yibbum. He will then not be believed later to contradict his words by saying that he does have brothers. Rabbi Natan says that “why would I lie” is considered like a presumption and one presumption cannot cancel out another. So he was not believed to say he had no brothers at the time of his kiddushin. At the time of kiddushin we maintain that he has brothers and no sons and he cannot later contradict himself at the time of his death by saying either that he has no brothers or that he has sons. 
  
  Daf 64b
  
  This section connects back to the previous mishnah as well as to the next section.  If a father states that he betrothed one of his daughters, but does not remember which one he betrothed, all of his minor daughters are in a state of possible betrothal, since he has the legal right to betroth any of them.  None of them can marry until the matter is clarified.  However, the girls who are of majority age are not doubtfully betrothed since the father has no legal right to betroth them.
  The father says he has given in betrothal his “eldest daughter” to a man, and he has forgotten who that man is, and the question is who his “eldest daughter” is?  Once we figure out whom the eldest daughter is that daughter will be forbidden to marry any other man, and his other daughters will be permitted.  Again, the man has two sets of daughters; one set is a group of “seniors” in that they are all older than the other set which are “juniors.”  According to Rabbi Meir, any daughter who has a younger sister may be called the “eldest daughter” since she is older than another daughter.  The only daughter who cannot possibly be called the “eldest daughter” is the youngest daughter of the youngest set.Rabbi Yose rules that only the eldest daughter of the seniors is called the “eldest daughter” and therefore only she is prohibited.
  This section is basically the same as the previous section, except that in this section the father claims that he gave his “youngest daughter” in betrothal.  The opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose are consistent with those above.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to explain the mishnah. 
  When a man says “I betrothed my daughter” without specifying which, he cannot be referring to his daughter who is a bogeret, but he can be referring to his minor daughter. But this implies that all of his minor daughters are impacted by his statement, even though, if he has more than one, this is a case of “kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse” because any one girl could be his wife’s sister. Thus we could learn that in such cases the kiddushin is at least doubtfully valid—each minor daughter is doubtfully betrothed. To recall, this was a major topic discussed earlier in the tractate and thus we do not want this mishnah to answer the question.The Talmud answers that there was only one minor. Thus there is no doubt that she is the one who is betrothed. 
  The mishnah did not mean that there was more than one bogeret, such that by implication there would also be more than one minor daughter. It only meant “bogrot” in general, meaning any daughter who fits into that category. 
  A father cannot marry off his daughter once she is a bogeret, a girl of majority age. So this mishnah is too obvious—obviously the bogeret cannot be the girl who is betrothed.To make the mishnah less obvious (and therefore not extraneous) the Talmud suggests that this was a case where the bogeret appointed her father to accept her kiddushin on her behalf. The mishnah rules that if the father does not remember which girl he betrothed, we can assume that he did not betroth the bogeret. The assumption is that since if he marries off his younger daughters, he would receive the betrothal money, he must have married off one of them and not the older daughter who appointed him as an agent. 
  Even if the bogeret says that the father can keep the kiddushin money, we still assume he married off the younger daughter because marrying her off is his responsibility, whereas marrying off the bogeret is not his responsibility.
  IntroductionOur sugya asks about what seems to be some repetitiveness in the mishnah. The second clause seems to be a repetition of the second clause. For ease of reference, I am copying here the entire mishnah:1)	If one has two groups of daughters by two wives, and he declares, “I have given in betrothal my eldest daughter, but I do not know whether the eldest of the seniors or the eldest of the juniors, or the youngest of the seniors who is older than the eldest of the juniors,” all are forbidden [to marry other men], except the youngest of the juniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. a)	Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the eldest of the seniors. 2)	“I have betrothed my youngest daughter, but I do not know whether the youngest of the juniors or the youngest of the seniors, or the eldest of the juniors who is younger than the youngest of the seniors,” they are all forbidden, except the eldest of the seniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. a)	Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the youngest of the juniors.
  According to this logic, a father prefers to call his daughters “elder.” So if we had learned only the first clause, we might have thought that R. Meir disagrees with R. Yose only in this case and says that eldest could refer to any except the youngest. But if he says “youngest” we might have thought that he agrees with R. Yose and that this term can only refer to the youngest. Therefore, we need the second clause.    
  If we did not have the first clause I might have thought that R. Yose disagrees only in this case. Youngest can only refer to the youngest daughter of all. But in the first case, I might have thought that he agrees with R. Meir, that “eldest” could refer to any except the very youngest.Therefore, we need both disputes to let you know that they dispute in both cases. 
  In our mishnah R. Meir seems to say that people will make statements that cause doubts to arise. Such is the man who says “I have given in betrothal my eldest daughter, but I do not know whether the eldest of the seniors or the eldest of the juniors, or the youngest of the seniors who is older than the eldest of the juniors.” R. Yose says that there is no doubt that this statement refers to the oldest daughter. A person does not make a statement that cause a doubt to arise. Therefore we interpret his statement in accordance.But in another mishnah from Nedarim the two tannaim disagree over the meaning of “Until pene’ Pesah.” R. Meir seems to be certain of this statement’s meaning—it means before Pesah begins. But R. Yose seems to think it is doubtful—maybe it means until Pesah is over in which case his vow is effective until Pesah is over.   
  R. Hanina b. Avdimi solves the problem by reversing the positions in the baraita about the vows. Now R. Meir is the one who holds that a person does enter themselves into doubt. “Untile before” could mean “until it ends.” R. Yose says that a person does not enter themselves into doubt.  
  Abaye limits the dispute to the case referred to in the mishnah—two groups of daughters from two wives. But if a man has only one wife (poor guy or lucky guy, guess that depends on your perspective) then “elder” and “younger” are taken literally. A middle daughter would not be called “elder” or “younger” but “middle.”
  If the middle one is not called “elder” or “younger” then the middle one of the second group could not be called elder. So why shouldn’t she be permitted to marry?   
  
  Daf 65a
  
  The Talmud solves the problem by saying that the younger group of daughters consists of only two. There is no middle daughter, for had there been one, we would have had no doubt about her being called “eldest.” And this is evident by the fact that a middle daughter is not mentioned in the mishnah.  
  The problem is that if there is a middle daughter in the first group, the older daughters, she too is part of the doubtful group, for she is older than the second group of daughters. But the mishnah does not teach her? So maybe the fact that a daughter does not appear in the mishnah does not matter, and there might be a middle daughter in the second group.  
  The Talmud rejects the difficulty. In the first half of the statement, the youngest daughter of the first group is mentioned. Any girl older than her is part of the doubt, for all of these girls are older than those in the second set. However, when it comes to the second group, the mishnah mentions only the oldest. Had there been a doubt about any daughter younger than her, then the mishnah should have mentioned her. 
  R. Huna points out that Pesah is not a case of two entities and yet R. Meir and R. Yose still dispute over the meaning of the father’s statement.Rava responds that these are two separate disputes. This is not a general dispute (as we thought above) over whether a person enters himself into doubt. Rather it is a dispute over the particular meanings of words—does “until pene Pesah” mean until Pesah arrives or until Pesah is over. The dispute over the meaning of eldest/youngest is a separate dispute.
  IntroductionThis mishnah deals with cases where a man says that he betrothed a certain woman and she contradicts him or where she claims that he betrothed her and he denies it.The general principle upon which this mishnah stands is that a person can make a statement which impacts himself/herself but does not impact others. Stated otherwise, a person is believed with regard to personal consequences but not with regard to consequences to others. To have consequences one needs witnesses.    
  The man claims he has betrothed the woman, and therefore he is believed with regard to himself.  The consequence is that all of the woman’s relatives (daughter, mother, sister etc.—for a full list see Yevamot 4:7) are prohibited to him, because according to him, he is betrothed to their relative.  However, the woman denies that this man betrothed her.  Hence she is not prohibited to his relatives.
  This is the opposite case.  Since she claims to be betrothed to him, she is prohibited from marrying his relatives.  Since he denies being betrothed to her, he is permitted to her relatives.
  The mishnah adds a wrinkle to the previous cases.  Here the husband claims that he betrothed a woman and she responds that he didn’t betroth her but rather he betrothed her daughter (again, one can imagine a Hollywood scenario lurking behind this mishnah!).  As above, he is prohibited to her relatives because he claims that he betrothed her.  The mother (the senior woman) is not prohibited to his relatives, because she claims that she is not betrothed to that man.  The man is not prohibited to the daughter’s relatives because he denies having betrothed her.  The daughter is also permitted to his relatives, since she didn’t claim that she was betrothed to him, but rather the mother did.  A mother does not have the legal ability to give her daughter in betrothal and hence, unlike a father who does have such a legal ability, she is not believed to say that she has done so.  
  This section provides the opposite scenario to that which we saw above.  The man claims that he betrothed the woman’s daughter, and is therefore forbidden to the daughter’s relatives.  However, the daughter is still permitted to his relatives, since neither she nor her mother claimed that she was betrothed to him. The mother’s relatives are permitted to him, because he doesn’t claim to have betrothed her.  However, she is forbidden to his relatives because she claims to have been betrothed to him.
  IntroductionThe Talmud begins to explain the mishnah. 
  Why did the mishnah need to teach the same rule with regard to him and with regard to her?The answer is that if the mishnah had taught it only with regard to the man, we might have thought that the man does not care about happening to say that he is betrothed to a woman when he is not. He can always betroth another one. So we would not believe him and therefore she is permitted to marry his relatives. But the consequences for a woman to say “I was betrothed to a certain man” are greater, for now she cannot marry anyone. Therefore, we might have believed her and said that he is prohibited to her relatives. We would assume based on her word that they indeed are betrothed. Therefore, we need to say that she too is not believed vis a vis other people.  
  Why does the mishnah need another example of the same principle? Why does it need to teach us that if the mother says the daughter was betrothed to this man, the mother is not believed vis a vis the daughter?The answer is that the rabbis did give the mother the power to betroth the daughter when the father is no longer alive. So we might have thought that the mother is believed and creates a prohibition for her daughter. Therefore, the mishnah teaches that she is not.
  This section of the mishnah is indeed repetitive—we did not need another example. But it is taught anyways, just for a sense of completion.
  IntroductionThe mishnah describes cases where the man claims he married a woman or she claims he married her but the other party denies it. The amoraim discuss whether the court forces the man to divorce the woman in such cases. 
  It does not make any sense to say that their dispute refers to the case where the husband said “I betrothed this woman” and she denies it. She is free to marry his relatives—his words have no impact on her. So why force or even ask him to divorce her?And if it refers to the case where she said, “You betrothed me” and he denied it, it makes sense to ask him to divorce her. This would allow her to marry someone else. But how can we force him to divorce her when this will cause him to be prohibited from marrying her relatives. After all, he denies that he ever betrothed her!
  The Talmud now explains that there was no dispute. Rather, these halakhot go in tandem. First of all, the court asks him to divorce her, but they cannot compel him. But if he divorces her of his own accord, without being asked, then we can assume that he did betroth her and therefore the court forces him to pay the ketubah.     
  This statement, at least how it is read after it is emended, supports the Talmud’s earlier explanation of the relationship between the statements of Rav and Shmuel.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya contains a dispute over whether two witnesses are needed for betrothal. 
  According to R. Judah, without two witnesses, the kiddushin are totally invalid.   
  R. Yehudah was uncertain whether or not they are betrothed if both agree.     
  R. Nahman rules that two witnesses are necessary for kiddushin to be valid. But this seems to contradict our mishnah. If there were witnesses in the case in our mishnah, then his relatives should not be permitted to her—indeed, they are married. But if there are no witnesses, why would anyone think that her relatives are prohibited to him. According to the Talmud no one holds that kiddushin can be valid without any witnesses.Rather, Rava posits that the case refers to one witness. This is a difficulty against R. Nahman who posited that with one witness no one thinks that the kiddushin have any validity.    
  R. Nahman says the mishnah refers to a case where the husband claims he performed the betrothal in front of witnesses but that those witnesses are gone overseas and cannot be examined. Since he is claiming that he performed the kiddushin in a valid manner he is prohibited from marrying her relatives. 
  The issue at hand in this mishnah is whether we think the husband betrothed his ex-wife when he stayed with her at an inn (the betrothal might have been done through sex). But again, were there witnesses? If there were, then why would Bet Shammai not require him to give her a get? And if there were no witnesses, why would Bet Hillel say she does require a get. Without witnesses, kiddushin are invalid.Therefore, Rava again assumes there was one witness. And since Bet Hillel requires a get, this is a difficulty against R. Nahman.    
  According to the baraita, Bet Hillel would agree that if they were divorced after betrothal but before marriage, then we would not assume that he had relations with her and thereby betrothed her, because he was not previously intimate with her.
  The Talmud now assumes that in this mishnah there were witnesses, but only witnesses that they were secluded, not that they had intercourse, which would constitute betrothal. Bet Shammai says that this is not sufficient to create an assumption of sex and betrothal and therefore she does not require a divorce. Bet Hillel says it is sufficient.However, they both agree that if the couple had not previously had intercourse because they were never married, then she does not require a get. In such a circumstance, we cannot assume that they had sex at the inn.
  
  Daf 65b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to address the topic of one who betroths without the presence of two witnesses. 
  Without two witnesses, there is no betrothal.
  Whoever this great court is, they do not believe that kiddushin performed in front of one witness is valid.
  A twisted scenario indeed. Both men have to give her a get, which means we must have some degree of certainty that they are married to her. But if either has two witnesses, then how could she claim, “These are my slaves.” Thus it must be that there is one witness. This is sufficient to create the suspicion of kiddushin. And thus this is a difficulty against those who say that with one witness, we disregard her kiddushin. 
  One witness might have, at certain times, some level of believability. But not when this witness is contradicted by the woman herself.Rather, the men do not give her a divorce in order to free her to marry someone else. She is free to marry someone else even without a divorce from either of them. They give her a divorce in order for her to collect the ketubah, which according to R. Meir, can be collected from movable property.    
  R. Kahana and R. Papa argue over whether we are concerned for kiddushin done in front of one witness in a case where the man and woman agree that there was kiddushin. R. Kahana says that such kiddushin are not valid. But R. Ashi argues with him. Perhaps R. Kahana is thinking that just as the word “davar” stated in reference to monetary matters (Deuteronomy 19:15) means that we require two witnesses, so too the word stated in reference to sexual matters (Deuteronomy 24:1) implies that we need two witnesses. The problem with this analogy is that in monetary matters, a person who admits he is liable is liable. But R. Kahana is arguing that even if the couple says they were betrothed, without two witnesses, the betrothal is invalid.R. Kahana responds by noting the difference between the two situations. In the case of monetary matters, if a person admits he owes money, he is not causing others to be obligated. But here, the couple’s admission impacts each other’s relatives, who will not be able to marry them. Therefore, it is invalid.  
  IntroductionThis sugya is about cases where two witnesses are not necessary. 
  Mar Zutra and R. Ada want their division of property to be finalized without the need for witnesses. So they ask R. Ashi whether witnesses are there just to prevent people from changing their mind and therefore, if they waive the need for witnesses, the contract can exist without witnesses. He agrees that it can.   
  One witness is believed to make the other person liable for bringing a sacrifice for accidentally eating forbidden fat, as long as the other person does not disagree. But if the other person protests, one witness would not be sufficient.
  This is the same tradition but about purity instead of being about eating forbidden food. 
  Again, this is the same law. One witness is sufficient to lend a certain amount of credibility to the idea that bestiality had been committed with the ox. The result of this is that the ox will not be able to be sacrificed. Had there been two witnesses, the ox would be stoned.
  
  Daf 66a
  
  Having stated essentially the same law three times, the Talmud now asks why Abaye needs to be so repetitive.When it comes to the “you ate forbidden fat” statement, we can say that his silence means he agrees, for if he did not eat forbidden fat, and then brought a sacrifice after being told he did, he would be sacrificing a non-sacred, hullin, animal in the Temple. This is another sin and we don’t think he wants to sin. Therefore, he must agree that he ate forbidden fat. But when someone says his “pure food has been defiled” he might not care so much because he can eat this food when he is defiled. Thus, his silence might not mean anything. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that even in this case, the witness is believed. 
  If we had learned about the case of defiled food, we might have thought that in the case of the ox with which bestiality was committed the silence is not acquiescence, the owner might have been quiet because he does not really care if the ox cannot be sacrificed. Therefore, Abaye (and the baraita) had to teach this case as well. 
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues the discussion of whether one witness is believed if the person whom the testimony effects is silent. 
  The consequence of this one witness being believed is that she would be prohibited to him as an adulteress. She could not, however, be punished without two witnesses. As we saw above, punishments cannot be meted out with less than two witnesses. However, there might be consequences to one witness (I can just hear my parents say—“This is not a punishment, it’s a consequence).&lt;bר&gt;According to Abaye the witness is believed and the woman is now prohibited to her husband. Rava holds that since this is a sexual matter, we require two witnesses. 
  Abaye cites Mar Shmuel’s ruling from this story to prove that one witness is believed in order to prohibit a wife to her husband. To Abaye “if you believe him” means that if the blind person believes that the messenger is trustworthy, then he must divorce her.[Very interesting to read of a blind person organizing his mishnayot. There were blind sages, which might have even been advantageous for them. The Torah that they learned was all oral].   
  Rava says that “if you believe him” does not just mean that the messenger is trustworthy. It means that he must be as trustworthy as two people. Thus this is not proof that one person is believed in sexual matters. 
  IntroductionWe now discuss the second part of the baraita from above—how do we know that if a priest is discovered to have a blemish, all of his previous service at the altar is rendered unfit?
  This is a rare case in which the amoraim make a midrash on the way a letter is written. The letter vav in the world “shalom” is broken in half (look in a tikkun and you will see). This allows us to read it as if the word says “shalem” and not “shalom.” The verse can now be read as if it says that the descendants of Aaron are given the covenant only if they are “whole” meaning not blemished. If they are blemished, all of their earlier sacrifices are rendered invalid.    
  IntroductionThis section contains Abaye’s proof that one witness is believed in sexual matters.The story that Abaye cites is a famous aggadah about the origins of the antagonism between the Pharisees and a Jewish king, here King Yannai. There is even a parallel to the story in Josephus (Antiquities 13.288-300) although many of the details are different. This, along with other passages, serves scholars as proof that although the rabbis did not read Josephus’s works (which were all written in Greek) there are stories that were transmitted orally and adopted by both Josephus and the rabbis. Many scholars have discussed this passage, and there is even an entire book on Josephus and the Rabbis (in Hebrew). 
  Alexander Yannai (or Yannaeus) was the second Hasmonean king and ruled from 103-76 B.C.E. The story begins with him returning to Jerusalem to celebrate a military victory, and acting with proper fashion in front of the sages. 
  The evil man, Elazar, wants to bring a conflict between Yannai and the Pharisees, who are imagined by this story to be the leaders of the Jewish people. He wants Yannai to do something with the “tzitz” the frontlet that the high priests would wear. 
  Elazar’s instigation has its proper effect. The sages do not think that Yannai should be high priest. There seem to be two reasons for this. First of all, one should not be priest and king. This is too much power in the hands of one individual. Second of all, if Yannai’s mother was taken captive, then she is not fit to marry a priest, nor are her children priests. While this charge could not be substantiated, the sages still depart in anger.    
  Elazar now urges Yannai to crush the sages/Pharisees. Yannai is hesitant. Without the sages, what would happen to the Torah? Elazar cynically responds that we do not need the sages. The Torah is there, anyone who wants can come and learn it. 
  A much later amora interpolates into the story that Yannai’s response is heretical for it assumes that the Torah is limited to the Written Torah. The Oral Torah requires the sages, and if Yannai destroys them, it will be lost.   
  The story’s end seems to be, at least partially, an explanation as to why we know of so few sages from an early period. After all, if the Oral Torah was given on Sinai, then we should have rabbis from a much earlier period. One explanation, the one given in our story, is that there was a break in the transmission of Oral Torah, and that all of the sages were massacred. Shimon b. Shetach restored the Torah to where it was, and thus our Torah is legitimate. But still, there was a break.  
  Abaye now explains how this story is proof that one witness is believed. This seems to be puzzling—after all, according to the story there was no evidence that Yannai’s mother was taken captive.Evidently all agree, there were two witnesses that said Yannai’s mother was not taken captive. So how many witnesses said that she was taken captive? If there were two, then why were the latter believed to say she was not taken captive, maybe the former should have been believed. This would at least be enough to cast a doubt on his lineage. Therefore, there must have been one witness who said she was taken captive. The one witness was not believed because two contradicted him. But if two did not contradict him, then the one would have been believed. Thus one witness is believed in sexual matters (this is a sexual matter, because the issue is the possibility that she was raped). 
  Rava says that this is not simply a case of contradicting witnesses. The second witnesses refute the very possibility of the first witnesses knowing that Yannai’s mother was taken captive. For instance they say that the first witnesses were elsewhere when they say they saw the event. This is called “hazamah” which is a special category in which the second witnesses are believed. Thus we do not need to say that there was only one witness.    
  R. Yitzchak says that when the Jews saw that Yannai’s mother was going to be taken captive, they sent a female slave to take her place (reminds me of the movie Dave). Thus Yannai’s mother was not really taken captive and therefore Yannai can remain the high priest.
  IntroductionIn today’s sugya Rava provides tannaitic support for his position that when it comes to sexual matters, two witnesses are always necessary. 
  Rava will quote a long baraita that will eventually prove his point. The baraita refers to a reservoir (a small one it seems) that had been used as a mikveh but then turned out not to have enough water in it. Can we assume that when people or things which had been immersed in it were immersed, the mikveh was already lacking? R. Tarfon rules leniently—that which was immersed in it is assumed to be pure. R. Akiva rules stringently—everything is impure.   
  
  Daf 66b
  
  R. Tarfon notes that the assumption is that the mikveh is full. It remains under the presumption of being full until it can be proved lacking. In contrast, R. Akiva looks at the person—the person is assumed impure until it can be proven that he is pure.
  R. Tarfon and R. Akiva now muster other comparisons—the case of a priest who was serving in the Temple and discovered to be unfit either because his mother was not fit to marry a priest or because he has a blemish. If it was discovered that his mother was not fit because she was a divorcee or a halutzah, then his earlier service is not disqualified. But if it is discovered that he has a blemish, his earlier service is unfit.
  R. Akiva now argues that the case of the mikveh is more similar to the case of a priest who is discovered to have a blemish. In both cases, the disqualification can be attested to by one witness, whereas a divorce or halitzah must be attested to by two witnesses. Furthermore, the disqualification of a mikveh or that of a priest with a blemish is inherent in the mikveh or the priest. There is something physically different between a mikveh with enough water and one without enough water.But when it comes to the disqualification of a priest whose mother is a divorcee is due to the mother, not the priest.R. Tarfon admits the superiority of R. Akiva’s argument. What a modest guy! And that R. Akiva sure is smart!
  Rava now shows how he can prove that in sexual matters, two witnesses are always necessary. It is not sufficient to have one witness plus the silence of the accused. In the case of the blemish, where one witness is sufficient, it must be that the priest himself does not protest. Otherwise, one witness would not be believed. By analogy, in the case of the woman being a divorcee, there must be two witnesses, even if the priest is silent. The priest would not be disqualified if there was one witness and he was silent. This is proof for Rava.
  Abaye argues back that both cases deal with a situation in which the priest argues that he is not blemished. So why is the witness believed? Because the witness could tell the priest to take off his clothing and prove his point. And indeed, this is how Abaye would interpret the last clause. The unfitness of a blemished priest is provable by his own body. Now when it comes to two witnesses who testify that the mother is a divorcee or halutzah, they are necessary because the priest contradicts them. But if one came, he would be believed, so long as the priest does not contradict him. Thus Abaye can maintain his opinion that one witness is believed in cases of sexual matters as long as the accused does not contradict. 
  IntroductionToday’s section contains prooftexts as to how we know that if a priest is discovered to be the son of a divorcee, all the sacrifices he offered before that point are retroactively considered still valid. 
  The baraita had stated that if it is discovered that the mother of a priest is a divorced woman (meaning she was divorced before she married the priest’s father) or a halutzah, the priest’s service is not retroactively disqualified. How do we know this? Why is the different from the case of a priest who is discovered to have a blemish?R. Yehudah derives this from the verse that says that the seed of a priest is valid forever, even if he was discovered to be disqualified. However, the priest will not be able to continue serving at the Temple. Henceforth, he is disqualified.   
  The father of Shmuel cites the blessing given to Levi by Moses and makes a pun on the word “heilo.” Even the work of non-sacred descendants of Levi, i.e. those who were made into “halalim” priests whose line has been desacralized, can be accepted, at least ex post facto. 
  R. Yannai cites another verse. Clearly one cannot go to a priest who is not there in “those days.” Therefore, it must refer to a priest who is no longer a priest because his line has been discovered to be non-sacred—his mother was discovered to be a divorcee. All the sacrifices he offered before this discovery are still considered valid.
  IntroductionWe now discuss the second part of the baraita from above—how do we know that if a priest is discovered to have a blemish, all of his previous service at the altar is rendered unfit?
  This is a rare case in which the amoraim make a midrash on the way a letter is written. The letter vav in the world “shalom” is broken in half (look in a tikkun and you will see). This allows us to read it as if the word says “shalem” and not “shalom.” The verse can now be read as if it says that the descendants of Aaron are given the covenant only if they are “whole” meaning not blemished. If they are blemished, all of their earlier sacrifices are rendered invalid.
  IntroductionThis mishnah begins discussing a subject which will be covered throughout the remainder of Kiddushin:  lineage.  We have already encountered throughout Seder Nashim many different genealogical statuses:  priests, Levites, Israelites, converts, mamzerim, natinim and more.  Our mishnah discusses how these lineages are transmitted from generation to generation, namely the issue of whom the child’s lineage follows, that of the father or that of the mother.  We should note that lineage was probably the most important factor in choosing a spouse in the ancient Jewish world and probably was a key factor in the entire ancient world.  Indeed until the modern period many matches between young men and women were made based on lineage.  Lineage largely determined a person’s social standing.  It is sometimes hard to relate to this value for those of us living in 20-21st century America, a country where societal standing is perhaps less based on lineage than almost any nation throughout history.The final clause of our mishnah contains the famous principle of “matrilineal descent”—the “Jewishness” of the child follows the mother and not the father.  This principle is surprising since ancient Jewish society was clearly patriarchal.  Men were almost always the heads of their households, the woman would typically leave her family to enter the man’s house, men had custody and overall responsibility for their children etc.  Furthermore, it seems quite clear that the Bible operates on the principle of “patrilineal descent.”  Throughout the Tanakh men marry women of foreign descent and the women assimilate into their husband’s culture and homes (or notoriously fail to assimilate).  The same is true of Second Temple literature such as the later books of the Bible, Josephus and Philo.  How the matrilineal principle came to dominate rabbinic halakhah and literature is a mystery.  There are a few places in rabbinic literature with a hint of a patrilineal principle, but there are few of them and they are usually rejected.  A good discussion of these issues can be found in Shaye Cohen’s excellent book, The Beginnings of Jewishness.
  In these marriages the status of the child follows that of the father: the child of a priest is a priest, of a Levite is a Levite and of an Israelite is an Israelite.
  If the marriage is valid, meaning that the woman requires a get to separate from the man, but the marriage involves a transgression, the child receives the lower status. Therefore, the child of a mamzer or a mamzeret is a mamzer(et).  Furthermore, if the marriage is prohibited but neither parent is “flawed” (such as a mamzer or a natin), a female child from such a marriage is disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest.  For instance the daughter of a priest and divorcee cannot marry a priest.
  If the marriage is invalid, but the woman could be betrothed to other men, the child is a mamzer.  The example given is incest.
  This section is where we see the famed “matrilineal principle.”  We should note that it is incomplete.  The mishnah states that the child of non-Jewish woman or slave is not Jewish or is a slave, but it does not specifically address the status of the child of a Jewish mother and male father.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins to explain the mishnah about lineage. 
  R. Shimon [ben Lakish] thinks that the mishnah’s general principle has exceptions. If a convert marries a mamzeret, which is allowed, the child is a mamzer. Note that the child of a mamzer/et is always a mamzer. 
  
  Daf 67a
  
  R. Yohanan responds that the mishnah agrees with R. Yehudah who holds that a convert may not marry a mamzeret. Therefore, this is a case of there being kiddushin (meaning they would need a divorce to separate) but with a transgression and in such cases the offspring follows the inferior, flawed, genealogical status. This is the second clause of the mishnah, not the first.This is alluded to in the mishnah with the words “in any case.” 
  The mishnah could read like R. Yose—a convert can marry a mamzeret. However, the words “this is the case” would exclude this case from following the rule. Although a convert can marry a mamzeret, the offspring still follows the flawed status.    
  If “this is the case” means that the case in the mishnah is the only case (Israelites, Levites and priests who marry daughters of Israelites, Levites and priests) then what about a halal, a disqualified priest, who marries an Israelite woman. Here there is no transgression and the offspring is a halal.The answer is that our mishnah follows. R. Dostai who holds that in this case the offspring is kosher, not a halal.   
  If a halalah (a woman disqualified from marrying a priest, for instance a divorcee who had relations with a priest) marries an Israelite, the child follows a male. This is another example that would fit into the first clause of the mishnah and yet it is not taught.The answer is that the words “in any case” in the first clause are there to include this case.This case is not included in the mishnah because it would not easily fit in. While a halalah can marry an Israelite or Levite, she cannot marry a priest.
  IntroductionThe Talmud looks for another case of betrothal without a transgression where the status follows the father. 
  The Torah prohibits marrying an Egyptian until the third generation (this no longer applies, as the original “Egyptians” have been lost). The status of generations follows the father—so if the father is second degree and the mother is first degree, the child follows the father and is third degree. 
  R. Yohanan could read this law into the mishnah’s words “in any case.” And R. Dimi who disagrees and holds that the offspring is a second degree Egyptian, following the mother, he would read the words “this is the case” as excluding the case of the Egyptians. In other cases where there is kiddushin and no transgression the offspring follows the father. But not in this case. 
  Ravin discusses how to figure out what generation Egyptian or Edomite (both prohibited for the first three generations) is. If non-Jews marry, say a first generation Egyptian marries a non-Egyptian, we follow the male. But when they convert, the more inferior status is followed, not the male. This does not follow the rule of the mishnah where the status follows the male. [A convert may marry an Egyptian convert].The Talmud now reads “this is the case” as excluding two non-Jews who convert.
  If you say that the mishnah accords with R. Yehudah who said that a convert may not marry a mamzeret, then the mishnah works well. The words “in any case” come to include an Israelite who marries a halalah (the child follows the father and is not a halal) and the case of the second generation Egyptian who marries a first generation Egyptian. The words “this is the case” exclude the cases of Ravin and R. Dimi from above.
  
  Daf 67b
  
  R. Yose says a convert may marry a mamzer. So what does he “include” in the second clause of the mishnah?
  This is a bit confusing, I admit. But the short of it is—sometimes you cannot read something into a word like “in any case” or “this is the case.” Sometimes the former does not come to include anything and sometimes the latter does not exclude anything. They’re just there because that’s the style of the mishnah.I should note that the Talmud never derives new halakhot from words like “in any case” or “this is the case.” The Talmud uses these little words as an opportunity to add known halakhot to the Mishnah. This type of “midrash” on the mishnah is not “generative,” meaning generating new halakhot. It simply supports existing ones. 
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses Ravin’s statement from yesterday. 
  The Talmud now will more fully explain Ravin’s statement, that in the case of other nations, we follow the male. The main issue is what ramifications genealogical status of non-Jews might have on Jews. In other words, when would it be relevant for Jews to know the genealogical status of non-Jews?  
  The Torah prohibits Canaanites from residing in the land of Israel (there are no Canaanites anymore). According to this baraita, the child of a non-Canaanite man and a Canaanite woman is considered a non-Canaanite. The verse proves that there are people in your land you can buy—i.e. not everyone in your land is considered a Canaanite. 
  The second half of the verse proves that you can buy slaves from those just born in your land, meaning not from your land. This would refer to the child of a slave (one who belongs to a Jew) who has a child with a non-Jewish (and non-Canaanite) woman. Such a child is considered a slave. But you cannot buy slaves from those who dwell in your land, i.e. those whose fathers are Canaanite. 
  If the two non-Jews convert, we follow the inferior status. The statuses compared here are Egyptian—one can marry an Israelite after the third generation, and Ammonite, one can never marry into Israel (again, these statuses no longer exist). But the prohibition of Ammonite is only against Ammonite men, not women. Therefore, it must refer to an Ammonite man who marries an Egyptian woman and not an Egyptian man who marries an Ammonite woman. If the child is male, then he is considered an Ammonite who may never marry an Israelite. If the child is female, the Ammonite prohibition would be meaningless. Therefore the child is considered a second generation Egyptian. This girl’s child will be able to able to marry an Israelite.  
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to deal with the next part of the mishnah, referring to a woman who cannot marry this man but can marry others—the child of such a union is a mamzer. This refers to incest or adultery.
  The rabbis read the second half of Deuteronomy 24:2 as proving that a woman can marry “another man” meaning one who is not her relative. Otherwise, the verse could have just said “man.” The word “another” is the source of the rule that betrothal is ineffective with someone prohibited because of incest.
  Why not say that “another man” excludes marrying her husband’s son—with him betrothal would be ineffective, but not with other prohibited relations.The answer is that there is a specific verse that states that a man cannot marry his father’s wife. Thus we would not need the word “another” to teach this. The word “another” can teach that other incest relations also cannot betroth her. 
  The Talmud continues to try to say that the word “another” refers only to the husband’s son. Perhaps one verse teaches that she shouldn’t be betrothed to him ab initio and the other that if he tries to betroth her, the betrothal is invalid, ex post facto.But this is rejected because we know the ab initio prohibition by comparing it with the prohibition of marrying one’s wife’s sister. We know this because it specifically states “do not take” which is interpreted to mean that marriage does not work. If this is prohibited even though the penalty is only karet, all the more so it is prohibited (and impossible) to marry one’s father’s wife, for which the penalty is death. Therefore the verse is free to learn that kiddushin is invalid with any incestual prohibition. 
  The Talmud now concedes that both verses could be referring only to a wife’s sister. Thus we would know that it is both prohibited ab initio and ex post facto to marry one’s wife’s sister. This will now need to serve as a paradigm for other prohibited sexual relationships. How do we know that in those cases as well, the kiddushin are invalid. Stay tuned!
  IntroductionYesterday’s sugya ended by saying that kiddushin are both ab initio prohibited and ex post facto ineffective with one’s wife’s sister. The Talmud now tries to expand this to all incestual relations. In other words, we know that one cannot have sex with someone prohibited because of incest. But how do we know that if a man tries to betroth such a woman, the betrothal is ineffective. 
  This is a simple comparison. One who has sex intentionally with his wife’s sister is punished with karet (being cut off). If unwittingly (either he did not know that this is prohibited or he did not know she was his wife’s sister) they must both bring a sin-offering. In this case, kiddushin is not possible. So too with other incest prohibitions kiddushin is impossible.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty concerning the analogy of a wife’s sister to the case of a brother’s wife. If the brother dies without children, then there is a mitzvah to marry her. So maybe in this, the kiddushin would be valid (even not in a case of yibbum) for she is not like a wife’s sister, who is never permitted. There is never a mitzvah to marry one’s wife’s sister. 
  The analogy between a married woman and a wife’s sister is also difficult. The wife’s sister is prohibited as long as the wife is alive. It does not change at divorce. But a married woman is prohibited only while married. Once she is divorced, she is permitted. So maybe kiddushin is possible with a married woman but not with a wife’s sister. I know, this sounds absurd (that a man could betroth an already married woman), but sometimes arguments are made out of the necessities of logic and not because they make real sense.In tomorrow’s exciting conclusion to this week’s daf we will finally learn how we know that betrothal with incestuous relations is not possible.
  IntroductionThis sugya finally resolves how we know that kiddushin are invalid with all incestuous relationships, just as they are with one’s wife’s sister. 
  The verse “any of these abominations” means that the same rules apply to all of the incestuous relationships referred to in Leviticus 18. Just as kiddushin are ineffective with one’s wife’s sister, so too they are ineffective with all incestuous relationships.
  The list in Leviticus 18 includes the prohibition of having sex with a woman while she is menstruating (18:19). So if she is compared to all the other prohibitions, why would Abaye say that all tannaim agree that kiddushin with her (and with a woman suspected of adultery) is valid?To solve this problem, Hezekiah cites a verse that uses the Hebrew word “will be” which is the same word used at times to signify kiddushin. While this is certainly not the simple meaning of the word, he reads it as teaching that kiddushin with a niddah (a menstruant) is valid. 
  
  
  Daf 68a
  
  IntroductionThe Torah explicitly states one may not marry one’s wife’s sister. The rabbis say that this is true of all incestuous relationships punishable by karet—kiddushin is ineffective with them. But kiddushin is effective with a menstruating woman, even though sex with her is prohibited by karet. So why are all other incestuous relationships compared with a wife’s sister (kiddushin is ineffective) and not with a niddah (kiddushin is effective). 
  Other incestuous relationships are compared with a wife’s sister, with whom kiddushin is not possible, and not with a niddah, with whom kiddushin is possible, because in cases where an unknown can be compared with two knowns, we compare to the more stringent case, in this case a wife’s sister. 
  R. Aha b. Ya’akov derives the rule that betrothal is ineffective with incest prohibitions from the rule with regard to a yevamah. A yevamah is prohibited to all men except the yavam by a negative commandment, a transgression considered lesser than that prohibited by penalty of death or karet. So if kiddushin is ineffective with her (note that this is not the post-talmudic halakhah) then kiddushin should also be ineffective with those more prohibited, namely incestuous relationships.
  The problem with R. Aha b. Ya’akov’s proof is that we could use the yevamah to prove that kiddushin are ineffective with marriages prohibited by a negative commandment such as a divorcee to a priest. Such marriages are effective. But we could say that just as a yevamah is prohibited by a negative commandment and kiddushin are not effective with her, so too all women prohibited by a negative commandment, kiddushin are ineffective with her.R. Papa cites a midrash that interprets “beloved” and “hated” not to mean the woman is actually beloved or hated—God does not play favorites (although human beings clearly do). Rather, the word “beloved” means that her marriage is permitted. “Hated” means it is forbidden. Thus there must be a category of women with whom marriage is prohibited but with whom kiddushis is nevertheless effective. This category is women prohibited by a negative commandment (widow to high priest, divorcee to priest).
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended with a midrash explaining the words “beloved” and “hated” to refer to women prohibited in marriage by a negative commandment. Marriage is effective with such women and their children are not considered mamzerim. But R. Akiva holds that they are, and he holds that kiddushin are ineffective with such women. So how does he read the verse? 
  According to R. Simai, there is one marriage prohibited by a negative commandment that R. Akiva does not declare a mamzer—a widow married to a high priest.
  R. Yeshvav laments R. Akiva’s overly strict position. However, it is unclear what R. Yeshvav thinks R. Akiva’s position actually is. If he thinks it is the same as R. Simai does, then we understand how R. Akiva interprets the words “beloved” and “hated.” But if he thinks R. Akiva rules even more strictly, that the offspring of all women prohibited by negative commandments and even those prohibited by positive commandments are mamzerim, then how would R. Akiva understand the verse?The answer is that R. Akiva could read the verse as referring to a non-virgin who may not marry a High Priest. This is considered a positive commandment for the Torah says that the High Priest must marry a virgin—the rule is phrased in the positive and not the negative. It is different from other positive commandments in that it applies only to a High Priest and not to other Jews, even other priests. Only in this case would the offspring not be a mamzer according to a very expansive reading of R. Akiva.Note that according to this R. Akiva reads the verse, “If a man has two wives, one beloved and one hated” as referring only to the Kohen Hagadol who has two wives, one he married as a virgin and one as a non-virgin. Yes, this is weird. But you’ve been reading Talmud for a while now—lots of stuff gets weird. As I’ve said, as long as it’s possible, an interpretation can be offered, even if it seems remarkably unlikely.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss the explanation of “beloved” and “hated” in the verse about a man married to two wives. The rabbis who disagree with R. Akiva and hold that kiddushin are effective with women prohibited by a negative commandment explain this verse as referring to such women. But why—why not explain the verse as referring to women prohibited by positive commandments? In other words, why do they hold like they do and not like R. Akiva? 
  The rabbis don’t interpret the two wives as being prohibited by positive commandments because this would not fit the verse. If both are Egyptian (a positive commandment prohibition) then both are hated. If one is Egyptian and one a Jew, then both need to be from the same nation. And if the verse refers to the prohibition of a non-virgin to a High Priest, well the verse says “man” not “priest.”
  R. Akiva, who reads the verse as referring either to a non-virgin married to a high priest or an Egyptian married to a Jew is forced to just read the verse in a difficult manner. Sometimes there is nothing else you can do, even if you’re R. Akiva. 
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins to explain the next section of the mishnah:And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status.And what case is this?  The child of a female slave or a gentile woman.
  When leaving to sacrifice Isaac, Abraham tells his servants “stay here with the donkey.” There really is no reason for Abraham to add in “with the donkey.” These are extraneous words so the rabbis see this as an opportunity for midrash. They play on the word “עם” and read it as “am.” Essentially, Abraham says, “Stay here, you people like a donkey.” Just as a Jew cannot marry a donkey (although some have married an ass [couldn’t help it]), so a Jew cannot marry a slave woman. The kiddushin would be invalid.Yes, this is not the piece of Talmud you want to be shouting about in the streets. But it does represent the way people in the ancient world most likely thought—slaves do not have marriage or genealogical lineage in the same way that free people do.
  Exodus 21 says that if a master gives a slave woman to his Hebrew slave the offspring belong to the master. This shows that the offspring of a Jew and a slave woman follow the status of the slave.    
  
  Daf 68b
  
  The Talmud now explains how we know that kiddushin is invalid with a non-Jewish woman and that her offspring is not Jewish. First of all, the Torah says “Do not marry them.”As to the second question, the verse warns that if a non-Jewish man marries a Jewish woman, the son will be turned away from God. Thus the child of a Jewish woman is called “your son” meaning an Israelite. By deduction, we can conclude that the child of a Gentile woman is not your son.Note that all of these explanations are clearly “derashot”—interpretations of the verse meant to accord with known halakhah. As I said in my intro to the mishnah, in the Torah there is little doubt that genealogy goes through the father. None of these verses actually means that it goes through the mother. This is the rabbis reading their own halakhah into these verses. Indeed, later in this passage, the Talmud will basically admit that.   
  Since the Jewish woman cannot have kiddushin with this man, because he is not Jewish, but she can have it with other men, if they are Jewish, this case should fit into the category of the mishnah that says the child of such a union is a mamzer. This would mean that the child of a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman is a mamzer, and would not be allowed to marry an Israelite.The Talmud rejects this—this child is not “fit” which means she cannot marry a Kohen. This is because there was a transgression in the union. But she/he is not considered a mamzer. She/he is Jewish and can marry an Israelite.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section the Talmud used the verse “Do not marry them” as a proof for the rule that a Jew cannot have kiddushin with a non-Jew. But today’s section asks whether that is a sufficient prooftext.
  Canaan (listed in verse 7:1). Kiddushin are invalid with members of those seven nations. But what about members of other nations? The answer is found in the next verse—kiddushin are invalid with any non-Jew because they may turn your son away. [The assumption here seems to be that the problem with intermarriage is not purely genealogical. It is social/educational/religious. Intermarriage will lead to foreign worship.]  
  There is a debate in the Talmud over whether one searches for the reason behind mitzvoth. According to R. Shimon, one does. The prohibition of intermarriage is lest the non-Jewish partner turn the offspring to idol worship. Thus it applies to any non-Jew, not just the seven nations.But the other rabbis do not interpret the reasons of Scripture. And therefore the verse “Do not marry them” applies only to the seven nations. They, instead, find another verse to derive the rule that kiddushin with non-Jews is invalid. According to rabbinic interpretation, the Torah allows one to marry a captive woman only after she has converted. From here they derive that kiddushin with her before she converts is invalid. 
  IntroductionThe verse about the captive woman was sufficient to teach that kiddushin are invalid with a non-Jewish woman. But we still need a source that her children have her status—they are not Jews. 
  According to the reading of this verse, if the marriage is valid then the children follow his status—the woman bears the children to him. But if the kiddushin are not valid, the children do not follow his status, they follow hers.
  If we have a verse that teaches that in all cases where the woman cannot be betrothed to an Israelite, the children follow the mother, then what do we need the verse from Exodus for? Why have a specific midrash when we have a general one?The answer is that the verse from Exodus can be used for another midrash. A master tries to free a female slave but tells her that her future children will be his. According to R. Yose the Galilean, this does not work. Once she goes free, her kids are hers. However, the sages say the offspring belong to the master even after the mother is freed.The verse quoted seems like it should explain the position of the rabbis. And in some ways perhaps it does—the children belong to the master even if the wife does not. But Rava does not read it that way. He reads it as referring back to R. Yose the Galilean. The children belong to the mater only if the mother does as well. If the mother does not, then her children born to her when free are also free. Yeah!
  
  Daf 69a
  
  IntroductionThis mishnah is a continuation of the last one about lineage. 
  Rabbi Tarfon uses the rules in the previous mishnah to find a means by which a mamzer can have a child that is not a mamzer.  A mamzer is allowed to marry a slave woman, even though a non-mamzer cannot. If the mamzer owns the slave woman, then he owns the child.  If he frees the child the child loses his mamzer status and becomes a regular Israelite. Rabbi Eliezer, however, holds that such a “trick” does not work. The status of the child is “slave mamzer.” When his father/master frees him, he is no longer a slave but he is still a mamzer.   
  The question about R. Tarfon is—is his rule something that one can do, meaning he was giving advice, or was it a case of if a mamzer married a slave, then the mamzer can be purified? Is one allowed ab initio to have a child with a slave woman in order to purify one’s line? Or is this only a case of ex post facto—he had a child with a slave woman against the rules but now his lineage is rid of the stigma?In the baraita the sages say to R. Tarfon that he has found a way to purify male mamzerim but not female mamzerim. This seems to reflect that R. Tarfon’s rule was only ex post facto, for if it were ab initio permitted to do so, he would have said that a mamzeret can also marry a male slave and when the child is freed, the child’s lineage would be non-mamzer.The problem is that male slaves have no lineage. Meaning that according to halakhah, their children are not even considered theirs. Thus there is no solution for a mamzeret.    
  R. Simlai seems to have advice he could give his host on how to purify the lineage of his children. This implies that R. Tarfon was giving an ab initio rule—a way for mamzerim to purify their lines intentionally. Not just a way to purify them if they did something unintentionally and against the rules.  
  Even if the rule was only ex post facto, R. Simlai could have found a way to purify his host’s line. First the host would have to steal something and then be sold in order to recover the debt. Then he could marry a Canaanite slave and if his master frees the children, they would no longer be mamzerim. Yes, you do have a case here where the Talmud imagines a rabbi advising someone to steal. 
  The problem is that by R. Simlai’s time, there was no such thing as a Hebrew slave. That practice was not observed already by mishnaic times. So the only advice R. Simlai could have given him was to have a child with a slave woman (this is prohibited) and then free the slave. This means that R. Tarfon’s rule is ab initio. He would allow one to have a child with a slave woman in order to get rid of the stigma on his lineage.And indeed the halakhah follows R. Tarfon. Thus there is actually a way for mamzerim to remove the stigma from their lineage. However, it is a drastic one, one that could not be observed in a time in which slavery has been outlawed. 
  IntroductionR. Eliezer rules that the child of a slave and a mamzer is a slave mamzer. When freed, the child remains a mamzer. Our sugya explains his reasoning. 
  R. Elazar explains that R. Eliezer reads the word “of his” as implying that we follow the mamzer’s lineage forever. There is no way to get rid of that genealogical flaw.     
  The rabbis read the word “of his” as referring to a case where an Israelite marries a mamzeret. We might have thought that in such a case the lineage follows the father’s house and the child is not a mamzer. They read the word “of his” as excluding such a person from entering the community of Israelites. He does not follow his father’s lineage.    
  R. Eliezer responds that once we’ve made one exception and said that although we usually follow the father, if the mother is a mamzeret the child is also a mamzeret, so too we can make an exception about the verse concerning who is a slave. Although the child of a female slave is a slave, this does not mean that he is not also a mamzer.    
  The other rabbis do not think that non-Jewish slaves can be traced after their father, just like it is impossible to determine the father of an animal. So the child of a female slave is a slave, with no genealogical connection to the father. The child is not a mamzer slave and when freed, will not be a mamzer. 
  That’s it folks—the end of the third chapter of Kiddushin. Get ready for chapter four. It’s a bit of a wild one! 
  IntroductionThis mishnah introduces a concept that was very important in marital law in the mishnaic/talmudic times and continued to be a prominent factor in the choice of spouse throughout Jewish history:  genealogical class.  In Hebrew this is called:  yichus. There are some genealogical “classes” who may not marry each other (Israelites and mamzerim, priests and converts).  As I have stated before, in our modern society it is hard to grasp the importance of such categories in the ancient world.  Until recently it was believed that a person is qualitatively reflected in their class; belonging to a social/religious class is an integral part of one’s identity.  However, we should realize that in rabbinic halakhah class structure is only legally relevant to choice of marriage, and occasionally to positions of leadership.  When it comes to other elements of society, Jews seem to have mingled relatively freely.  The rabbis recognized well that a person’s integrity, wisdom and virtue did not depend upon his social class.  Nevertheless, it was an important criterion in choosing a spouse.
  The mishnah attributes the separation of the Israelites into ten genealogical classes to the return to Zion from the Babylonian exile in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah.  It is clear from the book of Ezra that genealogical lineage was an important issue to the authors of the book and to the leaders of that time period.  Ezra demands that the men send away their foreign born wives.  In the lists of returning exiles lineages are listed and there are verses which show that priests who couldn’t demonstrate their lineage were denied their priestly rights.  In other words, although this mishnah may contain what is basically a legend, in may be based on some historical recollections.According to the mishnah, which is probably legend, lineage was so important to Ezra that when he gathered up the exiles and brought them back to the land of Israel, he separated them into classes.  When they returned to Israel, each person would therefore know their proper status.Most of the classes mentioned in this mishnah should be familiar by now.  Natinim are descendants of Temple slaves, and are actually mentioned in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah (see for instance Ezra 8:20 and Nehemiah 7:62).  Halalim are the children of disqualified priests.  Hushlings and foundlings will be explained in tomorrow’s mishnah.
  Here the mishnah lists who may marry whom.  Subsequent mishnayot will clarify some of these statements.  For now we should note that converts can marry Israelites and can marry mamzerim.  Other sages hold that converts may not marry mamzerim. There is also some debate over whether certain types of converts may even marry priests.    
  A shtuki or a hushling is a kid who knows who his mother is, but doesn’t know who his father is.  The word “shtuki” comes from the word for silence.  When you ask the kid who his father is he is quiet because he doesn’t know.An asufi or a foundling is a kid found in the streets who doesn’t know who his parents are.  The word “asufi” comes from the word to be gathered, because he is gathered in from the streets.Abba Shaul would call the shtuki a b’duki (a checked one).  The different name reflects a different halakhic position. According to Abba Shaul the child’s mother is believed to testify that the father is so-and-so. This is according to Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer in Ketubot 1:8-9.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to explicate the mishnah. 
  The mishnah uses the word “went up” to teach that Eretz Yisrael is higher than all other countries and that the Temple is the highest point in Israel.Of course, we know today that this is not literally true. But as someone who rides his bike quite a bit around the hills of Jerusalem, I can tell you it’s not flat either. And Jerusalem is pretty high up there, although in reality Hebron is even higher. 
  Deuteronomy 17:8 uses the phrase “go up” to describe going to the Temple. This demonstrates that the Temple is the highest point in Eretz Yisrael.Jeremiah uses the phrase brought up to describe people coming to Eretz Yisrael from other countries. From here we can see that Eretz Yisrael is higher than other countries.
  
  Daf 69b
  
  The mishnah uses the word Babylon to allude to what Ezra, the leader of the Jewish people in exile, did before he moved to Israel. He made the Jewish community like “sifted flour.” This is taken to mean that he sifted out the best lineages in Israel and left them to run the Babylonian Jewish community. The poorer lineages moved with him to Eretz Yisrael. According to Rashi, he had to do this because he was not leaving behind any sages in Babylonia who could help in the future determine people’s lineage. While there may be some historical truth in this, at least insofar as the leaders of the Jewish community in Babylonia probably stayed behind, the idea that Babylonian lineage is better than that in Eretz Yisrael is a Babylonian claim that would bolster their leadership during a time of competition with the center in Eretz Yisrael. We shall see this theme quite frequently in this chapter. It is also one I dealt with in my newest book, Reconstructing the Talmud, volume 2.  
  Abaye and Rava argue over whether the return to Eretz Yisrael after the exile was voluntary. They also seem to argue over how exactly the mishnah is worded.Abaye holds that the immigration was voluntary and thus he agrees with R. Elazar’s statement about Ezra making Babylonia like sifted flour.Rava holds that they were forced to go, and since they were forced, everyone knew who was of what lineage without him having to sort it out for them.  
  Alternatively, both Abaye and Rava could agree that Ezra made Babylonia into sifted flour. Abaye holds that he separated them into lineages and then they voluntarily went to Israel, knowing who could marry whom. Rava says that even though they knew each other’s lineage, he still had to force them to go.
  IntroductionTo recall, Abaye reads the mishnah as saying “they went up” to Eretz Yisrael, which, according to the Talmudic reading, means that Ezra did not first sort them into proper lineages. Rava reads the mishnah as saying, “he forced them to go” which means that he did sort them into proper lineage before they went. The Talmud continues this discussion. 
  Rav Yehudah said that the lineage of most countries is dough in comparison with Israel, meaning it is all muddled. But Israel’s lineage is more muddled than Babylonia. This works well with Abaye who said that they went up to Israel voluntarily and that Ezra did not sort their lineages out before they went up. There was no oversight as to who could marry whom. But to Rava who said that Ezra forced them to go, Ezra sorted their lineage out. So why is Israel like dough in comparison to Babylonia?The answer is that while that generation knew its lineage, subsequent ones did not. 
  According to Abaye, after leaving for Eretz Yisrael, Moshe still had to clarify people’s lineages, as we see in the verse. But according to Rava, he should have sorted them all out from the beginning.The answer is that Ezra was careful to sort out those unfit to marry into Israel. He knew who the mamzerim and netinim were. But he did not know who were priests, Levites and Israelites. He was less cautious with these groups because they can all marry each other. Therefore, he had to figure this out at a later stage. 
  The Talmud now cites support for the fact that priests, Levites and Israelites came back to Eretz Yisrael.
  The verse and accompanying baraita quoted here proves that halalim, disqualified priests (“they were deemed polluted”), came with Ezra. The Tirshata, understood to be Nehemiah, allowed these disqualified priests to continue to eat the same food they ate while in the Diaspora. This is “sacred food eaten outside of Jerusalem,” namely terumah but not sacrifices. This proves that one is not removed from one’s presumed status without proof. Thus “presumptive status (hazakah)” is great.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section discussed disqualified priests who could eat terumah but whose lineage was still not that of full priests. Today’s section discusses the problem that would ensue from such an arrangement. It also discusses what type of terumah they were allowed to eat. 
  The priests referred to in Ezra were allowed to eat terumah. But this could cause a problem if their eating terumah was evidence that they are proper priests and therefore can marry into priestly lineage and their children would be priests. So how could Ezra allow them to eat terumah?The answer is that in this case, since their presumptive status was weakened and they could not eat sacrifices, everyone would know that the lineage of these priests is flawed. Thus they could eat terumah and their problematic lineage still be known.[As an aside, this and many other passages, assumed that priests would marry daughters of other priests. The “lineage” referred to here would fit into that situation. However, according to halakhah, priests, Levites and Israelites can intermarry.]  
  If the priests cannot ascend to the lineage of fully valid priests, then how does this source show us that “presumptive status is great”? On the contrary, it would seem that presumptive status is not so great. The answer is that in Babylonia they ate terumah whose status is derabanan. Now back in Israel, they are eating terumah whose status is biblical. This is to show you how strong presumptive status is.   
  Alternatively, we could correct the rule about promoting from terumah to lineage. These priests were eating only rabbinic terumah, even in the land of Israel [this would be terumah from produce not biblically liable for terumah]. And we do not promote from this type of terumah to lineage. 
  According to this second reading of what these priests did, the greatness of presumptive status is expressed in the fact that now back in Eretz Yisrael, where biblical terumah does exist, the rabbis still let them eat rabbinic terumah. They were not strict lest by eating rabbinic terumah they come to eat biblical terumah. In contrast, in Babylonia, there was no biblical terumah, so there would have been no reason to be strict. 
  The verse says that these priests could not eat “most holy things”—sacrifices. By implication, they could eat terumah, even biblical terumah.   
  The Talmud now offers a new explanation of the Tarshita’s words. He did not prohibit only sacrifices. He prohibited anything that is called “holy.” And in Leviticus 22:10 terumah is called holy. Thus, these priests could not eat biblical terumah, but they could eat rabbinic terumah. 
  
  Daf 70a
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to explain the mishnah. 
  The verse shows that there were Jews who came to Eretz Yisrael who had separated themselves from the nations. This could have been done either through conversion or being freed.  
  How do we know that mamzerim came with Ezra to Eretz Yisrael? Tobiah comes up to Eretz Yisrael. Tobiah is an Ammonite. He marries Shechaniah’s daughter who is an Israelite. According to our mishnah, the child of a non-Jewish father and a Jewish mother is a mamzer.  
  There are three reasons why this verse is not sufficient to prove that mamzerim went with Ezra to Israel. First of all, some tannaim hold that the child of a non-Jewish man and Jewish woman is not a mamzer. Thus Tobiah’s children would not have been mamzerim. Second, perhaps Tobiah did not have children. Third, even if he did, he might have had them in Israel in which case they did not go up with Ezra.  
  The rabbis offer creative interpretations of who these people were. The first category were people whose deeds were like those of Sodom who acted licentiously. These people are assumed to be mamzerim. The other categories are people who do not know their lineages. These two are listed in the mishnah about who came up with Ezra. 
  This midrash plays on the word “Immer” which reminds the rabbis of the leopard. The leopard was not viewed favorably by the rabbis because they thought the leopardess would lie with other leopards she was not supposed to be mating with. I’m not sure why the rabbis expected monogamy from animals, but they seem to have pointed the figure at the leopard in particular. 
  IntroductionThis section begins with a midrash on the same verse we ended with yesterday. 
  Rabbah b. Bar Hannah explains the verse in connection with a man who marries a wife whose lineage is not fit for him. It is as if he ploughs all of the land (harsha) but sows it with salt (melah). The derashah also relies on the end of the verse that speaks of these people as not being able to determine their lineage. 
  Rabbah son of R. Adda adds that if one takes a wife whose lineage is not fit for him just for the sake of money he will have unworthy children. The moral sin of the father will affect his children. He interprets the verse in Hosea as referring to a man who marries a woman with improper lineage.The children will not only be unworthy, but he will end up losing the dowry he aimed to profit. She, the woman he married, will also lose her own personal money. And they will lose it all within a month.
  You are strongly advised not to take a wife not fit for you. I mean lashes from the Kadosh Barukh Hu—OUCH!
  This is an important caveat to what we’ve just read. On the one hand, one should not disqualify one’s own lineage by marrying one of flawed lineage. But do not go around telling other people their lineage is flawed. That only testifies as to the flaws of the one pointing the finger.  
  IntroductionThis story illustrates the saying at the end of yesterday’s section— “He who declares [others] to be disqualified, disqualifies them with his own flaw.” 
  Scene one: The man is not happy to have to wait for his meat until R. Judah b. Yehezkel gets his. I probably wouldn’t be happy in his place either. I think it’s actually kind of humorous the way he bastardizes his name. I could see myself doing that.   
  Scene two: The tension mounts as R. Judah declares that this man is a slave. This does not mean that he has to serve anyone in particular. What it does mean is that he won’t be able to marry a Jewish woman and his offspring will have flawed lineage. 
  Scene three: The man summons him to court in front of R. Nahman, who is the Exilarch (Nasi)’s son-in-law. 
  Scene 4a: R. Judah now gets to Nehardea and finds R. Nahman building a railing. R. Judah does not think that such work is appropriate for a leader of the community. When defending himself, R. Nahman uses a strange word for railing, one probably from Persian. Why not use the biblical word or the rabbinic word? 
  R. Nahman uses some strange words, and R. Judah does not like it.The story will continue tomorrow. Meanwhile, might be worth the time to think about how the narrator put this story together. The main theme seems to be about use of language.
  IntroductionThe story picks up where yesterday’s left off. The issue of language has been dropped and now the story picks up with a discussion of the proper role of women within the household. 
  R. Nahman wants his daughter Donag to come and serve R. Yehudah some drink. No go, even though she is a child.R.  Nahman then suggests R. Yehudah send greetings to his wife, Yalta. R. Yehudah, remarkably, believes it is improper to even hear a woman’s voice. Finally, R. Yehudah believes it is improper to even ask after a woman’s welfare.This source goes way beyond other sources regarding interaction between men and women. There are other sources that consider it improper to hear a woman sing. But this source considers it improper to even hear a woman speak. We should remember that R. Nahman does not seem to have even heard of these prohibitions.
  
  Daf 70b
  
  Finally, Yalta sends R. Nahman a message—finish up with this monkey business and let’s get this guy out of here!R. Nahman does not even remember sending the summons, but R. Yehudah whips it out, so R. Nahman reluctantly agrees to get on with the show. 
  R. Yehudah explains that he excommunicated him, a punishment worse than lashes, for abusing R. Yehudah’s agent when the agent was buying meat.    
  R. Nahman thinks R. Yehudah went overboard by proclaiming him a slave. Shmuel might have said that we suspect the person of calling others by his own disqualification, but he did not say we proclaim the offendant as such. To use contemporary terms, there are opinions one might legitimately have, but declaring them in the public space is not legitimate. 
  R. Yehudah always seems to have a quote ready from Shmuel. Overly praising your own lineage is a sign that in reality, the braggart is a descendant of slaves.  
  R. Nahman points out a problem—R. Yehudah should not be allowed to issue a ruling in his own favor after a case comes in front of him. It’s like making a prediction after you know the outcome.R. Yehudah responds that R. Matanah agrees with him. Stay tuned—tomorrow we will meet R. Matanah.
  IntroductionThe fascinating conclusion to the epic story of R. Yehudah and the namecaller. 
  R. Matanah conveniently comes to Nehardea that very day for the first time in thirteen years. Shmuel jogs his memory and R. Matanah remembers Shmuel indeed ruling that whoever claims that he is from the Hasmonean house is a slave. The last remaining Hasmonean committed suicide. In this story, Herod kills all of the members of the Hasmonean household and claims their throne. Herod, according to that rabbinic tradition, is descended from a slave. So even if one can trace his/her lineage to Herod, his rule is not the authentic Hasmonean rule. He is a usurper.  
  This is a fascinating end to the story. R. Yehudah wins, but ruling that a prominent man is a slave can be very dangerous. Evidently, he had many family members, and many people discovered that their marriages were annulled. The people are understandably furious with R. Yehudah for essentially ruining their lives. His response is to threaten them even more—if you don’t back off I’ll let you know even more information as to who is valid and who is not. The people back off, but their stones cause a stoppage in the river. Definitely symbolic—all of this name calling causes an end to the flow that sustains life.This whole story is a fascinating discussion of the power of language and lineage. Knowing too much about a person can be dangerous. Neither R. Yehudah nor his disputant is a sympathetic character, which makes the story even more fascinating. 
  R. Yehudah, now perhaps drunk with his own power, begins to proclaim who is fit or unfit in Nehardea. I believe that this portrayal of R. Yehudah is at least partially critical of his behavior. 
  The Bavli continues to portray rabbis casting aspersions on entire families of Jews. Again, it is hard to know what the editor thinks of these actions. On the one hand, there is no doubt that all rabbis believed in the importance of lineage. On the other, maybe rabbis should not go around announcing information that will cause such terrible disruptions in society. Do we always want to know the truth?
  R. Yehudah casts aspersions on all impudent priests. Pashchur b. Immer was a priest in the time of Jeremiah. He is found in Jeremiah 20. He is described as having deep conflict with Jeremiah and is not a positive character at all. Here he seems to be the emblematic priest—priests that come after him are descended from his slaves. Abaye adds another slam on the people of Nehardea. Those who sit in the “row of honor” are all descendants of slaves. Abaye, as you can imagine, was not from Nehardea.Abaye and R. Yehudah’s negative views of lineage of cantankerous priests are not shared by R. Elazar. Priests are just cranky, quarrelsome people. This does not mean that they have flawed lineage. One wonders how the priests would have responded to this.
  God, in a sense, cuts off men who marry wives not fit for them (meaning their lineage is not appropriate). The people of Israel are a testimony to God only when their proper lineage is preserved.
  God’s Divine Presence will rest only on families with unflawed lineage.   
  The comparison of the two verses allows Rabbah bar R. Huna to conclude that those born as Jews are automatically the people of God. Whereas converts must first pledge their hearts to God, and then they too shall be God’s people.This source is, in my opinion, an accurate reflection of a dominant trend in Judaism. Jews, by virtue of being born Jewish, have a special relationship with God. As problematic as this sounds to our ears, the rabbis believed that Jews are God’s chosen people and as such have special responsibilities as to how they act in the world. But they also believed that the path to God is not closed to the rest of the world. It is open and it is each individual’s choice to choose that path.       
  R. Helbo plays on the similarity in the Hebrew between the word “and they shall cleave” and the word for “scab” in the context of skin diseases. Converts, are difficult to Israel, like scabs and sores are difficult to a person.There are several different interpretations of this fairly well-known statement. In my opinion, the simple reading is that R. Helbo has a very negative, blood-related (perhaps racist, if you want), view of conversion. Converts, whose lineage is not Jewish, defile, in a sense the pure blood of Jews, and while Judaism is open to conversion, this is not something that should be celebrated.However, we should note that throughout history there have been more positive takes on this statement, and some more ambivalent ones. A positive take is that converts, by their dedication to Judaism, and their choice to join, make Jews look bad, for Jews are often lax in their observance. Rashi reads the difficulty of converts in that they are not scrupulous in the performance of the commandments.The history of Judaism’s attitude to converts and conversion is, like most things in Judaism, long, complicated and dynamic.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss lineage. We’ll be talking about this for a long time, just so you know. 
  God is portrayed here as sorting out the proper lineage of Israel—who married women fit for them and who did not. When God does this, the first tribe to be sorted out will be the Levites.
  
  Daf 71a
  
  R. Yehoshua b. Levi uses the same verse to prove what seems to be an eternal truth—money buys prestige. Mamzerim can buy their way into families of proper lineage and in the future, God will not sort them out as mamzerim. Rashi explains that R. Yehoshua reads the verb “purifier” differently than did Rami b. Hama. R. Yehoshua reads this as God allowing those mamzerim who had intermarried with Israel to remain there. This is a good representation on the two views of mamzerim we will see throughout these sugyot. Is it desirable that improper marriages, poor lineages, etc. should be weeded out? Or does God (and we in return) celebrate the fact mamzerim (and others of flawed lineage) have managed to hide their identity and in a sense “purify” their lines.
  This interpretation maintains the second line I explained before. God does not reveal a family the flawed lineage that has become mixed up in a family.  
  According to this source, the lineage of Eretz Yisrael is dough, meaning mixed up, in comparison to Babylonia. Babylonia has preserved their lineage better than Eretz Yisrael. The practical ramification of this is that a family from a place of better lineage would have to investigate the lineage of someone they want to marry from a place of poorer lineage.There was an attempt, according to this source, to change this around. But it failed. Even those in Eretz Yisrael realize that the lineage of those in Babylonia is superior.We should realize that this is a source in the Bavli portraying those in Eretz Yisrael as admitting that those in Babylonia have superior lineage. From a source like this, it is not possible to know what those in Eretz Yisrael thought about their lineage.
  In this fascinating story a rabbi realizes that his statement is not going to be popular, so he tells his slaves that as soon as he issues the statement, they should help him flee. Evidently, the slaves can run faster carrying him than he can run on his own (R. Pinchas really needs to get in shape).To catch the students in the bet midrash off guard, he first issues a puzzling statement. The Torah does not mandate the ritual slaughtering of fowl. One who eats fowl not properly slaughtered has not transgressed a biblical commandment. Note that while there is someone who holds this in the Talmud, this is not the accepted halakhic opinion. In any case, while the other rabbis are looking into this puzzling law, R. Pinchas slips in that the lineage of Jews from Eretz Yisrael is dough in comparison to Babylonian Jews. The students end up confirming his statement once they look into his opinion.  
  R. Yohanan swears by the Temple that the rabbis can reveal who has poor lineage. The problem is that some of the greatest men of their time are already mixed up with them and do not want to have their genealogical flaws revealed. R. Yohanan agrees with R. Yitzchak that once a family has their lineage mixed up, there is nothing anyone should do about it. 
  Abaye cites a tannaitic source that describes a strong man named Ben Zion who decided which family had improper lineage and which did not. In the future, Elijah will come and clarify the status of these families. But he will not look into the status of families who have been mixed up, whose lineage is not known.As I’ve said before, statements like these express an ambivalence towards the “reality” of lineage. Is a genealogical flaw something “real” that manifests itself in the family in some way—perhaps moral, perhaps personal, social or religious? This might be similar to our asking today is “race” real? [I know, this is a very controversial question]. Or is it more “nominal,” meaning that it is a social construct that is at times best left unknown? I think the rabbis waver on this issue and are able to see it in both ways. At least we are presented with both opinions in the Bavli. 
  While the sages have information about which families have flawed lineage, they should preserve it but not reveal it. At most, they reveal it twice every seven years. Even one who takes a nazirite vow if he does not reveal which families are impure, should rather be a nazirite than reveal these impurities. This shows that the less such information is revealed, the betterAgain, rabbis realize the danger of people going around and revealing which families have poor lineage. Social harmony seems more important than being adamant at revealing the truth about who people are.
  IntroductionToday’s section is connected to yesterday’s statement about genealogical information because it too talks about traditions that sages transmit once or twice every seven years. 
  God’s name, the “Tetragrammaton” has a certain pronunciation that is known only to the very few. The sages know how it is pronounced, but they transmit it only once or twice every seven years. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak connects this with a midrash on the way the world “le’olam” is spelled, without the vav. Pronounced a different way, the meaning could be “to conceal.” God’s name is meant to be concealed.    
  What! Rava wanted to reveal it to everyone and some old man said two words to him and stopped him. Who was this old man? Why? Why? And Rava, pretty bold move, although he was certainly discouraged very easily. 
  R. Avina contrasts the two parts of Exodus 3:15 as the source for why God’s name is written one way and spelled another. This indeed can be very confusing. Especially those times when it is written with yod he, but pronounced “Elohim.” Those cases always throw me for a loop.  
  IntroductionThis sugya continues to discuss God’s name. 
  Interestingly, according to this view of history, at one point everyone knew God’s twelve letter name. But people began to use it for their own gain, and at that point it needed to be hidden. They continued to transmit it to priests who would guard it properly. These priests softly uttered it during the chanting of the priestly blessing. Rashi explains that most priests would use God’s four letter name, as we do today (although we do not pronounce it the way it is written). When they would extend their singing, the priests who knew the twelve-letter name would utter it so that most people couldn’t hear it. Rashi even translates chanting into French as “trope”—as in Torah trope!
  The most guarded of God’s name is the 42 letter name. The qualities that one has to be able to be entrusted with this name seem to me the exact type of qualities we would want in a powerful politician. I love it how the person is supposed to be middle-aged. That’s at least one characteristic that I fulfill!
  We now return to the issue of genealogical fitness. In Babylonia, people are presumed to be genealogically fit. In other lands they are assumed to be unfit. In Eretz Yisrael, whatever a person is presumed to be is his status. As we have seen before, Eretz Yisrael’s lineage is superior to most lands, but not to Babylonia.
  The last part of Shmuel’s statement seems to be self-contradictory as far as the status of one with no presumption—is that person assumed to be fit or unfitThe solution is that in order to marry a fit woman, the man needs to be presumed to be fit. But in order to be forced to divorce a fit woman, one needs to be presumed to be unfit. In other words, there is a higher bar ab initio than there is ex post facto.
  
  Daf 71b
  
  Evidently, at some point in Babylonia there was a special way of talking that showed that a person was of good lineage. From what I understand, there is such a thing in England (I’m not so good at identifying English accents). But alas, people can fake their accents, so we cannot use this anymore. I can totally imagine this kind of statement being made in reference to England.   
  This source presents the tension between Torah learning and lineage. The Torah learning in Eretz Yisrael is good enough such that Ze’iri moved there from Babylonia. But the lineage is not good enough, even for him to marry R. Yohanan’s daughter. R. Yohanan points out to him that there remain in Babylonia both fit Jews (priests, Levites and Israelites) and there remain there unfit classes (mamzerim and netinim). So marrying only those of Babylonian descent will not help.But R. Yohanan forgot that which R. Elazar taught. Ezra sorted out the genealogical lines before he left Babylonia. Therefore, Ze’iri did not fear marrying one from Eretz Yisrael. Sort of ironic that R. Yohanan forgets that which another Eretz Yisraeli sage teaches.
  IntroductionMore stories about lineage.
  R. Yehudah does not seem to want to marry off his son because he cannot determine the lineage of the women around him. Ulla begins to point out that we too do not know our lineage. Perhaps we are descended from the Babylonians who raped Israelite women during the time when the First Temple was destroyed. R. Yehuda could respond that he holds that the offspring of a non-Jew and a Jewish woman is fit. Therefore, maybe we are pure.
  In this colorful exchange, R. Abbahu ends up interpreting the verse about those taken captive as referring to people who act licentiously, committing adultery. Perhaps, Ulla says, we are descended from such people whose children are mamzerim.In short, Ulla questions how R. Yehudah can be so sure about his lineage.    
  Ulla gives him a simple test—those who are less quarrelsome, they are of superior lineage. 
  Genealogical exams are done by people’s silence, their agreeableness. This is how Rav examined the people of Shafei Halah (Rashi explains that they are vinegar strainers). If they do not argue a lot, then they have good lineage. 
  If people or families quarrel then one must be unfit and God will providentially prevent them from marrying one another.One might read these sources as teaching that when people get along it is a sign that they are fit to get married. At the end of the day, this is not bad advice.
  IntroductionThis section begins to outline the genealogical purity of the Babylonia—which regions are pure and which are not. 
  The metaphor here is related to lineage. Babylonia has healthy lineage. The other areas around it—not so much. Mishon is dead, Medea is sick and Elam is dying and almost certainly will die. 
  The amoraim here delineate the boundaries of Babylonia when it comes to genealogy. Inside Babylonia people are presumed to be genealogically fit. Babylonia lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates. The amoraim discuss how far north and how far south the presumption of genealogical purity extends.We can see at the end of this description how important genealogical purity was to these people. People who won’t marry into each other’s families did not end up even lending fire to one another, and fire is not something that costs anything to lend.
  Rav, Shmuel and R. Yohanan discuss how far Babylonia extends on the upper reaches of the Euphrates.Abaye curses either Rav or both Rav and Shmuel for extending the border to far north. Note that Abaye wants to limit the extension of genealogical purity so far north. He is more stringent than the other rabbis.
  
  Daf 72a
  
  Abaye is again, hot to trot, to cut people out of assumptions of genealogical purity. He seems to want to disqualify Biram. But R. Yosef responds that families with the best lineage in Pumbedita married women from Biram. So relax Abaye.
  R. Papa says that the borders of Babylonia with regard to lineage are the same as those with regard to divorce. When it comes to divorce, a messenger delivering a divorce from abroad to Eretz Yisrael must be able to say “it was written and signed in front of me.” This is to ensure it was produced properly. However, if he is bringing it from Babylonia, we can trust that it was written and signed properly. R. Yosef says that the borders differ when it comes to divorce. 
  If you’re from one of these places, then you’ve won the lineage lottery. Like the Upper East Side of Babylonia!
  R. Papa tries to rag on the lineage of these places by saying Samaritans have become mixed up there. Luckily the Talmud defends their honor—the Samaritans wanted a wife from one of these places, but they were refused. 
  A man declares he is from Shot-Mishot. Lucky for him, this is located between the rivers and he is assumed to have good lineage.
  R. Ika b. Avin issues a statement saying that the families of two certain cities are valid in terms of their lineage. But Abaye claims that he is saying this only so he can marry a certain yevamah from there. Those are some pretty strong words Abaye!
  R. Ika b. Avin holds that Hilazon and Nihavnad are fit. R. Yohanan holds that they are not.  
  R. Yohanan interprets a cryptic verse from Daniel in line with the identification of locations in Babylonia we saw above. 
  The Persians were evidently bear-like. If you watched or read Game of Thrones, think House Mormont. I do not think that the rabbis considered this a compliment. They didn’t have “teddy bears” back then.   
  Talk about racial stereotypes! The Habarim are, according to Rashi, a region neighboring Persia, and they are much worse than the Persians, who according to this tradition, come out pretty well. “Demons in the outhouse” sounds pretty bad.
  On his death bed, R. Yehudah Hanasi has some prophetic visions through which he identifies which parts of Babylonia are not kosher (and where they engage in some pretty salacious hanky-panky). He also identifies which places have apostate themselves. He can also see who had his bris (is sitting in Avraham’s lap) and who was born. 
  
  Daf 72b
  
  When one great leader passes away, another is born. God does not leave this world without proper leadership.  
  The verse in Eichah says that even in Exile, the Jewish people are surrounded by enemies. R. Judah interprets this in relation to Humania, which is full of Ammonites, and yet is right next to Pum-Nehara.  
  Rav and Shmuel disagree about the meaning of Ezekiel’s words when Pelatiah dies—one amora interprets that his words reflect a good reaction to what Pelatiah had done and the other reads it as a bad reaction.The good interpretation begins with the governor of Meshan sending a message to his father-in-law, Nebuchadnezzar. The governor complains that he has not received any captives to serve as slaves.  
  Nebuchadnezzar wants to send an Israelite to serve his son-in-law, but Pelatiah convinces him to send the slaves. While I’m not sure I read this so positively, the Talmud does. Pelatiah saved the Jews from having to be slaves. This is why Ezekiel cries out—why did Pelatiah die so young. 
  According to this read of the situation, Pelatiah and his followers not only turned their backs towards the Temple, they defecated in that direction. Now that’s pretty bad. That’s why Ezekiel cried out—why should such an evil man die such a peaceful death?