meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Modern Works/Daf Shevui to Sukkah/English/merged.txt"}
text: Daf Shevui to Sukkah
  דף שבועי על סוכה
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -Daf Shevui
  -
  
  Daf Shevui to Sukkah
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  MISHNAHThe first opinion in the Mishnah sets twenty cubits as the maximum height of a sukkah. This is about 10 meters, quite high. Anything over that height is invalid. Rabbi Judah does not believe that there is any height limit to a sukkah. The Talmud will extensively discuss why there should be any limit to a sukkah's height.The second section of the mishnah adds three more restrictions. 1) A sukkah must be at least ten handbreadths high. Since there are 5 handbreadths to a cubit, this is about half of a meter. The sukkah must have three walls. And the skhakh, the roof of the sukkah, must make it so there is more shade in the sukkah then sun. 
  GEMARA.The Talmud begins by referring to a similar mishnah from Eruvin 1:1. In order to carry within an alley on Shabbat, one must put a beam on top of the entrance to the alley (see my Mishnah Yomit commentary for more info). The first opinion in this mishnah holds that if this beam is higher than twenty cubits it must be lowered.The Talmud in Sukkah asks why the mishnah from Sukkah simply declares that a sukkah over 20 cubits high is invalid whereas the mishnah in Eruvin says that one may lower the beam. Why couldn't Mishnah Sukkah say to lower the skhakh? 
  The first answer the Talmud provides is that the Sukkah is a toraitic commandment. Therefore, a Sukkah over 20 cubits high is invalid. The Torah does not, according to the first opinion, count sitting in such a sukkah as fulfilling the mitzvah. Carrying in an alleyway without a cross beam on Shabbat is only "derabanan"—prohibited by rabbinical law. Therefore, the mishnah in Eruvin provided a means to remedy the problem by lowering the cross-beam. 
  The second explanation as to the difference between the two mishnayot is that when it comes to the sukkah, there are several rules in the mishnah. In order to lump them all together and use the same phrase for each, the mishnah simply taught "it is invalid." But when it comes to the cross-beam over the alley, since there is only one rule, that it must not be more than 20 cubits high, the mishnah could be more specific and teach the remedy of lowering the beam. 
  IntroductionIn today’s piece of Talmud we will see three different amoraim providing biblical sources for the 20 cubit height limit to the sukkah.
  Rabbah emphasizes the word "know" from the verse. A person must dwell in a sukkah in such a way that he "knows" that he is in a sukkah. Since sukkah is synonymous most of the time with "skhakh" the person must notice the skhakh. If the skhakh is higher than 20 cubits one will not notice it.
  Rabbi Zera emphasizes the word "shade" from the verse in Isaiah. The sukkah, i.e. the skhakh, must provide shade, not the walls. If the skhakh is higher than 20 cubits then the walls will provide the shade.Abaye raises a difficulty on Rabbi Zera. Ashteroth Karnayim seem to be two large mountains. If a person made his sukkah in between these two mountains, then the mountains would provide the shade, not the skhakh. Nevertheless, everyone agrees that such a sukkah is valid.Rabbi Zera responds by noting that in the case of Ashterot Karnayim the skhakh would provide shade, if the mountains were not there. But in the case of the 20 cubit sukkah, even if you took away the walls, the skhakh would not provide shade, at least not in the area in which he is sitting. Therefore, a 20 cubit sukkah is invalid whereas a sukkah built in the shade of mountains (or tall buildings for that matter) is. 
  Rava focuses on the seven day aspect of the sukkah. For the sukkah to be valid it must be built as an impermanent dwelling place. If one builds the sukkah too high, over twenty cubits, then the sukkah is invalid because it is considered a permanent dwelling place.Abaye again raises a difficulty. There is no halakhah preventing one from making his sukkah out of walls of iron. Such a sukkah would clearly be valid even though it is permanent. So why should a twenty cubit sukkah be invalid?Rava responds by saying that a twenty cubit sukkah must be permanent. One could not build a temporary structure that is so high. But up to twenty cubits one could build a temporary structure. Therefore, even if he uses "permanent" material, the sukkah is still valid. 
  
  Daf 2b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we saw three different amoraic opinions as to why a 20 cubit sukkah is invalid. All three amoraim cited biblical verses to support their opinion. Today’s section asks why each amora didn’t simply accept the verse cited by the other amoraim. In other words, why do we need three different opinions supporting the exact same halakhah?
  Rabbah had stated that the reason a 20 cubit sukkah is invalid is from the verse, “In order that they shall know.” The “knowing” according to Rabbah, refers to a person sitting in a sukkah today (or in his time). The other amoraim did not accept this text as a prooftext because the verse refers to the “knowing” of subsequent generations. In other words, subsequent generations should know that God caused Israel to dwell in Sukkot, but the one sitting in a sukkah does not need to “know” that there is skhakh above his head.
  R. Zera had used the verse from Isaiah which implied that a sukkah should be for shade. From here R. Zera concluded that all sukkot, even the ones we sit in today, must provide shade. Above 20 cubits and the sukkah (=skhakh) does not provide shade, the walls do. The other rabbis don’t agree with R. Zera because they read that verse as referring to a messianic sukkah, and not the everyday sukkah in which we sit in today.The Talmud also ascribes a response to R. Zera. R. Zera says that the fact that the verse uses the word “sukkah” as opposed to “huppah” which means covering, implies that it is meant to teach two things. One of those is that the sukkah that we sit in today must be for shade.
  Rava said that since a 20 cubit sukkah must be permanent, it cannot be used during sukkot when one’s dwelling place must be temporary. Abaye objected that one can indeed build a permanent sukkah with iron walls. No one invalidates such a sukkah. Although Rava responded to Abaye’s objection, according to the Talmud the other sages sided with Abaye and hence they did not use this verse as proof.
  IntroductionAt the core of today’s section are three amoraic opinions that limit the mishnah’s invalidation of the 20 cubit sukkah. These amoraim mostly claim that only a narrow 20 cubit sukkah is invalid. A broader sukhah is valid no matter how high it is.The Talmud then takes each of these three amoraic opinions and pairs it up with one of the opinions from the previous parts of the sugya, where the three amoraim debated why a 20 cubit sukkah is invalid.
  R. Yoshaya says that a 20 cubit sukkah is invalid only if the walls don’t go all the way up the skhkakh. As long as the walls of the sukkah are ten handbreadths high, the skhkakh can be much higher. But if the walls go all the way up to the skhakh, the sukkah is valid even if the sukkah is more than 20 cubits high.The gemara explains that this follows Rabbah who held that a 20 cubit sukkah is invalid because he won’t notice the skhakh. If the walls go all the way up to the skhakh the eye will be drawn upward and one will notice the skhakh no matter how high it is.
  R. Huna says that if the sukkah is larger than four cubits by four cubits about 2 meters by 2 meters) it is valid even if it is more than 20 cubits high. The mishnah invalidates only a 20 cubit high sukkah that is narrower than this measure.This, according to the gemara, accords with R. Zera who holds that the skhakh must provide the shade. As long as the sukkah is at least 4 x 4 cubits, the skhakh will provide the shade, even if the sukkah is more than 20 cubits high.
  R. Hanan bar Rabbah says that as long as the sukkah is broad enough to fit a person’s head, most of his body and his table, the sukkah can be higher than 20 cubits. We should note that on daf gimmel (3) we shall see that according to the halakhah, this is the minimum breadth of a sukkah. Thus R. Hanan bar Rabbah holds that as long as the sukkah is even slightly broader than is minimally required, the sukkah can be as high as one wants.R. Hanan bar Rabbah’s opinion does not match any of the opinions on the previous page. If the sukkah is this narrow, one will not notice the skhakh and the shade will come from the walls not the skhakh. Furthermore, R. Hanan bar Rabbah implies that the more permanent a sukkah is, meaning the broader it is, the more likely it is to be valid. This is opposite from Rava who held that the sukkah should be more temporary, i.e. narrower not broader.
  IntroductionToday's section compares the three amoraic opinions we learned yesterday, each of which limited the mishnah's scope in a slightly different way. 
  We can understand why R. Yoshayah disagreed with R. Huna and R. Hanan bar Rabbah for he limited the mishnah by saying that as long as the walls reached the skhakh the sukkah was valid even if it is more than 20 cubits high. They, on the other hand, limited the mishnah by saying it applied only to sukkot that were narrow. 
  The gemara now suggests that what R. Huna and R. Hanan b. Rabbah are really arguing about is the minimum size of a sukkah. R. Hunah holds it needs to be at least 4 cubits square and R. Hanan b. Rabbah says that it is valid as long as it can hold his head, most of his body and the table.
  The gemara rejects the previous explanation of the disagreement between R. Huna and R. Hanan b. Rabbah and offers a new one.According to R. Huna the sages and Rabbi Judah disagree if the sukkah is exactly large enough to fit his head, most of his body and table. At this exactly minimum size the first opinion in the mishnah will disqualify a 20 cubit high sukkah and Rabbi Judah will validate it. But if it is any bigger than the minimal breadth, the sukkah is valid according to all opinions in the Mishnah.R. Hanan b. Rabbah says that there is a dispute concerning any sukkah that is smaller than four by four cubits. In such cases the rabbis of the Mishnah disqualify a 20 cubit high sukkah and R. Judah validates. But if the sukkah is more than four by four cubits in breadth, even the rabbis agree that it is valid.
  A baraita (a tannaitic source not found in the Mishnah) is brought as a difficulty on one of the amoraic opinions from above. Below we will clarify whom the baraita is a difficulty upon. The baraita relates the story of Queen Helena, a legendary queen from the Second Temple period who converted to Judaism. The story is told of her sitting in her sukkah that was twenty cubits high. Rabbi Judah relates this story to prove his opinion—a sukkah can be more than twenty cubits high.The other sages respond that she could sit in such a high sukkah because she is a woman and women are exempt from the mitzvah of the sukkah (it is a time-bound positive commandment). Thus even if the sukkah was invalid it wouldn’t matter because Helena does not need to sit in any sukkah.Rabbi Judah has the final word in the baraita. While Helena was not obligated to observe the mitzvah of the sukkah, her sons were. Furthermore, even if she wasn’t obligated to keep the mitzvah, she still always observed the rules of the sages. Thus the height of the sukkah is conclusive proof that a 20 cubit sukkah is valid.
  The gemara now reconstructs R. Judah’s response to the sages. Minors who still rely on their mothers (defined as minors who wake up in the middle of the night and scream ‘mommy’) are not liable to sit in the sukkah. So the sages might have responded that her sons were minors and therefore they too could sit in an invalid sukkah. To this R. Judah responds that she had seven sons and there is no way for a woman to have seven sons without one of them having reached the age of no longer needing his mother (he hadn’t heard of the ‘octomom’).Still, a child under bar mitzvah is only obligated out of rabbinic law (derabanan). It is possible that Helena sat with seven minor sons in her sukkah and the oldest had not yet reached bar mitzvah. To this R. Judah responds that Helena was observant even of rabbinic law. If even one of her sons was liable to sit in the sukkah, even from the rabbis and not from the Torah, she would not have sat in an invalid sukkah.
  The gemara now clarifies the difficulty. According to R. Yoshaya, the sages and R. Judah argued about a case where the walls don’t reach the skhakh. It is possible that Queen Helena sat in such a sukkah, for a queen might sit in a sukkah built in such a way for ventilation.However, the other two amoraim said that the tannaitic dispute was about a small sukkah (either four cubits, or large enough for his head, most of his body and his table). It seems unlikely that a queen would sit in such a small sukkah.
  
  Daf 3a
  
  The first resolution is offered by Rabbah b. Adda. He says that the sukkah was built of many recesses. Thus it was a 20 cubit sukkah, and the recess in which she sat was small, but a queen might sit in such a sukkah.
  The gemara still doesn’t buy it. Would a queen sit in a small sukkah with many recesses.
  R. Ashi refines Rabbah bar Addah’s resolution. She was sitting in one of the recesses in the sukkah, evidently a sukkah fitting for a queen.The rabbis who argued with R. Judah held that her sons were sitting in a larger section, while she was in the smaller invalid section. Therefore it was okay for her sukkah to be more than 20 cubits high—she didn’t need to be in any sukkah. The sons’ sukkah was broader in which case even a 20 cubit high sukkah is valid. That’s why the sages in the story did not say anything to her. R. Judah holds that her sons were with her, in the small section of the sukkah and nevertheless, the sages in the story said nothing to her. Thus there is conclusive proof that a sukkah may be more than 20 cubits high, even if it is narrow.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with an amora issuing a halakhic ruling with regard to the minimum breadth and width of a sukkah.
  R. Shmuel b. Isaac, an amora (person who lived in the Talmudic period) rules that for a sukkah to be valid it must be able to hold his head, the greater part of his body and his table. We should remember that back then tables were like our trays. They were small and used by one or two people. His legs could be out of the sukkah, and he doesn’t need to be able to stand in the sukkah. He should be able to sit in it and eat and then lay down.R. Abba is perplexed by this ruling for it accords with Bet Shammai, as we will see later on in this page. Usually sages do not rule according to Bet Shammai; they rule according to Bet Hillel.There are basically two versions of R. Shmuel bar Isaac’s response. In the first he rhetorically says, “According to whom else?” In others words, obviously I am ruling according to Bet Shammai.In the second version R. Shmuel bar Isaac himself says that the source is Bet Shammai but that one shouldn’t “budge from this position.” In other words, in this case we do rule that the halakhah is like Bet Shammai.Today a sukkah must be at least 7 handbreadths by 7 handbreadths. Since 10 handbreadths are basically a meter, it needs to be about 70 cm broad and wide. I doubt many of us have ever been in a sukkah this small!
  IntroductionYesterday we learned that according to R. Shmuel b. Yitzchak, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel disagree about the minimum size of a sukkah. R. Shmuel rules like Bet Shammai, that the sukkah must be at least large enough to hold his head, most of his body and his table. Today, an amora challenges R. Shmuel bar Yitzchak’s statement.
  According to R. Nahman b. Yitzchak (perhaps R. Shmuel’s own brother) Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel both might agree that a sukkah must be at least large enough to hold his head, most of his body and his table. The disagreement is only concerning whether he can sit on the edge of his sukkah with his table outside of the sukkah. Bet Shammai worries that if one sits with his table outside of the sukkah he will be drawn to eat outside of the sukkah. Bet Hillel is not worried about this.
  This is a continuation of the above. By reading a mishnah with precision, R. Nahman proves that Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel disagree about where a person sits and not about the minimum size of the sukkah. The mishnah says, “If his…table was within the house…” The description is dealing with how a person sits. If the mishnah wanted to discuss the size of the sukkah, the wording should have been, “if the sukkah can contain” or “if the sukkah cannot contain.” Thus R. Nahman has proven that the debate is over position within the sukkah, not size of sukkah.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a response to R. Nahman b. Yitzchak from yesterday. R. Nahman claimed that Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel argue about where one sits in the sukkah, not the minimum size of a sukkah. Here, the Talmud argues that the two houses do indeed disagree about the minimum size of a sukkah.
  To prove that the two houses disagree concerning the minimum size of a sukkah, the Talmud cites two baraitot (tannaitic sources not found in the Mishnah). In both baraitot the sages disagree with Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] concerning the minimum size of a sukkah. Rabbi’s position is the same in both: the sukkah needs to be four cubits square (about 2 x 2 meters). But the sages position is different. In the first baraita they hold that it must contain his head, the greater part of his body and his table. The second baraita does not mention table.To prevent a discrepancy between the two baraitot the Talmud infers that the first follows Bet Shammai and the second follows Bet Hillel. Thus we have proven that the two houses do indeed disagree about the minimum size of a sukkah.
  Mar Zutra supports the notion that the two houses argue over minimum size of sukkah and not position within the sukkah. The mishnah uses the language “declare it invalid” and “declare it valid.” These words refer to the sukkah itself: a sukkah that cannot contain his head, most of his body and table is invalid according to Bet Shammai and valid according to Bet Hillel. If the mishnah had been discussing his position within the sukkah it should have used the words, “he has fulfilled/not fulfilled his obligation.”
  Finally, the Talmud concludes that the wording of the mishnah demonstrates that Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel actually disagree about both issues. They disagree about a “large sukkah”—meaning a sukkah large enough to hold his head, body and table but where he sits with his table in the house, and not in the sukkah. Bet Shammai says that in such a case he has not fulfilled his obligation whereas Bet Hillel holds that he has. They also disagree with regard to the minimum size of a sukkah: Bet Shammai says it must be able to hold his head, body and table, whereas Bet Hillel holds that it need not hold his table.In any case, the halakhah is according to Bet Shammai, as we saw on the beginning of this page.
  IntroductionIn the previous section we saw a dispute concerning the minimum size of a sukkah. Rabbi Judah Hanasi held that it must be at least four cubits by four cubits. Today’s section explores other halakhot where we also see that the minimum measure must be four cubits square.
  his baraita lists halakhot that are not applicable to houses that are smaller than four by four cubits. In essence, the baraita is saying that a house smaller than this size does not count as a house, at least not for matters which the Torah applies only to a house.1: Mezuzah—I’m assuming you know what this one is.2: Parapet—The Torah requires a person to place a parapet, a fence, around his flat roof so that people don’t fall off the roof (Deuteronomy 22:8).3: Houses are susceptible to some form of scale disease. This is discussed in Leviticus 14:33-53 and in tractate Negaim.4: According to biblical law if one sells a house in a walled city in the land of Israel he has only one year to redeem the house from the purchaser (Leviticus 25:29-34). Our baraita teaches that if the house is smaller than 4 cubits square, this special law does not apply. It may be redeemed any time. If it is not redeemed before the Jubilee if reverts to its original owner.5: According to Deuteronomy 20:5, when preparing for war, anyone who has begun to build a house but has not yet lived there is exempt from war. Our baraita teaches that to be exempt from war the house must be at least 4 cubits square.6: An eruv is a shared meal that allows people who share a courtyard to carry from their homes into the courtyard. A “shittuf” accomplishes the same thing for an alleyway. All people who own a home adjacent to the courtyard or alley jointly buy a meal and then can carry from one place to the other. If the house is smaller than 4 x 4 cubits then they don’t need to share in the costs of the eruv, nor can the eruv be placed in that house.7: A person can’t go out on Shabbat more than 2000 cubits from his city. Two cities that are more than 141 1/3 cubits from each other are considered two separate cities. But if there is a house that is in between them and is less than 70 2/3 cubits from each city, it joins the two together such that the entire area is considered one city. In this case a person could go 2000 cubits on Shabbat even beyond the other city. But the house must be 4 x 4 cubits.The same rule would apply if there was a house within 70 2/3 cubits of a city. Such a house would extend the city limits such that one could go on Shabbat 2000 cubits outside of the house.8: Finally, if brothers inherit a house one brother can force the other to divide it. However, if the house is smaller than 4 x 4 cubits, they cannot do so.
  
  Daf 3b
  
  The Talmud proposes that the above baraita would accord only with Rabbi Judah Hanasi who held that a sukkah must be 4 x 4 cubits. The other rabbis would say that even if the house can only hold his head, most of his body and his table, it would count as a house.The Talmud then rejects this. A sukkah, according to the rabbis, can be very small, because it is only a temporary abode. But for a structure to be considered a real house, they agree that it must be at least 4 x 4 cubits. We should note that this is still pretty small—about 4 square meters, about 36 square feet. Not exactly Versailles!
  IntroductionToday’s Talmud analyzes the reasons for the baraita which exempted a house smaller than four cubits squared from a series of halakhot. We learned this baraita yesterday.
  The Talmud explains that for something to be called a “house” it must be 4 cubits by four cubits. Since the Torah uses the word “house” in reference to all of these matters, anything that is not a “house” is exempt.
  If there is a house smaller than four by four that is attached to a courtyard or alley, the dweller therein need not participate in the eruv or shituf (see yesterday for explanation) nor can the eruv (the joint meal) be placed therein. The reason is that such a small house is not fit for dwelling in, certainly not for longer than the holiday of Sukkot.
  The baraita had stated that the eruv for a courtyard could not be placed in such a small house. The Talmud deduces from here that a “shittuf” the shared meal that allows one to carry from the courtyard to the alleyway may be placed in this small house. The reason is that this is no worse than placing a shittuf in a courtyard (and not in a house), as we can learn from the following mishnah.
  The mishnah (Eruvin 8:4) teaches that the eruv (shared meal) is placed in the courtyard and the shittuf (shared meal) is placed in an alleyway. However, it is clear that the eruv is not placed in the open air part of the courtyard. The eruv must be placed inside a house. It cannot even be placed in a courtyard, or portico or a porch. These places don’t count as part of the courtyard, and if one who lives there does not participate in the cost of the shared meal he does not cause it to be prohibited for others to carry in the courtyard (if this were a regular house, he would).
  The Talmud resolves that normally an eruv is placed in a house that is part of the courtyard, and a shittuf is placed in the courtyard that is off the alleyway. The shittuf need not be in a proper house—just as it can be in the courtyard itself, so too it can be in a house smaller than 4 x 4 cubits. That is why the baraita said only that one cannot place an eruv in a small house; it did not say that one cannot place a shittuf in such a house.
  IntroductionToday’s section concludes the analysis of the baraita which listed halakhot that don’t apply to a house smaller than 4 x 4 cubits.
  A house smaller than 4 x 4 cubits isn’t usable even as an outpost, a little shack where a person would sit to guard over the orchards. It’s too small to even sleep in it.
  The last part of the baraita teaches that if the house is smaller than 4 x 4 brothers who jointly inherit it cannot force a division. The implication is that as long as it is larger than four cubits square they can force a division of property. The Talmud now questions whether this is so in light of a mishnah that says that in order to force a division there needs to be four cubits square for each brother.
  The Talmud offers a different explanation of the baraita. It is not, as we said above, that the brothers can’t force one another to divide it. That would be true even if the house were larger than 4 x 4. Rather, if such a small house is attached to a courtyard the resident of such a house does not have rights to divide the courtyard.The Talmud cites a dispute between two amoraim concerning the division of a courtyard. According to R. Huna it is divided according to the number of doors leading into it. According to R. Hisda, every person gets four cubits in the courtyard for each door they have leading to the courtyard. Beyond that, they divide the courtyard equally.In any case, what concerns us here is that this rule of dividing the courtyard according to the number of doors leading into it applies only if the house with the door is at least 4 x 4. A smaller house is not meant to stand—it is doomed to be demolished because it is too small to be used. Therefore, such a house doesn’t receive any share in the courtyard.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  IntroductionToday’s daf begins by discussing ways in which one could or could not reduce the height a sukkah that is already more than 20 cubits high by adding material to the base of the sukkah. The general principle here is that such a reduction in height is effective if we are sure that he has abandoned the material he used to reduce the height, and he won’t remove the material to use it during the week. If he has not abandoned it, the sukkah remains invalid lest he remove the substance he used to reduce the height and the sukkah would again be over 20 cubits high
  He puts pillows and cushions on the ground so that the sukkah (the skhakh) is now no longer 20 cubits high. Such a reduction is not valid because we assume that when he sees people walking on the pillows or cushions, he will want to remove them. If he does so, the sukkah will again be more than 20 cubits high. Even if he specifically declares that he is going to “abandon” the pillows and cushions there, since most people wouldn’t do so, his intention is irrelevant.
  Straw and earth can be used to reduce the height of the sukkah, as long as he declares that he has no intention to come back later during the week and use them for some other purpose.
  Now the Talmud deals with two categories of situations in which earth or straw were used to reduce the height of the sukkah. 1) Straw which he did not intend to remove, but neither did he explicitly declare that he intended to leave it there; 2) Earth which he put there but we don’t know if he intended to leave it there or not. This is related, according to the Talmud, to a dispute between R. Yose and the other rabbis.The mishnah they is from Ohalot 15:7. The mishnah teaches that if he filled the house with straw or gravel and then abandoned it there, the empty space of the house has been reduced. The issue in Ohalot is whether the impurity of a dead body in the house is trapped in the house or whether it goes up and down beyond the house. However, this is not relevant to us. What is relevant is that according to this opinion, he must expressly abandon the straw there. If not, it is not deemed to be part of the house.However, R. Yose holds that he does not need to expressly abandon the straw there. As long as he has no express intention of removing it, it is considered to be part of the house.This same debate would hold true with regard to the sukkah: according to the sages he would have to expressly abandon the straw or earth, whereas R. Yose would hold that it is sufficient to simply not intend to remove it.
  But if he intends to remove the earth from the sukkah, it is like regular straw which he did not specifically intend to remove. Such straw or such the earth cannot be used to reduce the height of the sukkah because he may remove it later.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with reducing the height of a 20 cubit high sukkah.
  If palm leaves were coming down from the roof of the sukkah, and they reduced its height to less than 20 cubits, the sukkah is valid as long those palm leaves provide more shade than the sun they let in. In other words, we’d have to estimate what would occur if we removed the upper skhakh. If the palm-leaves that are within 20 cubits would themselves constitute valid skhakh by providing more shade than sun, the sukkah is kosher.
  The Talmud now examines whether these palm-branches coming down off the roof would serve to invalidate a sukkah that was 10 handbreadths high by making it too small.Abbaye tried to apply the same principle from above. If the lowered-down palm branches don’t provide shade, meaning they let in more sun than shade, then they don’t count and the sukkah is valid.Rava counters that such a sukkah is a “lousy dwelling place.” One couldn’t even sit in such a sukkah because the branches would bother him. Therefore it is invalid.
  In this case he builds a ledge in the middle of the 20 cubit high sukkah. If he builds it out from the middle wall of three walls and the ledge goes out at least for the minimum breadth of a sukkah, then the sukkah is valid. Note that the entire sukkah is valid, not just the part over the ledge. Since the ledge comes out of the middle wall, it joins all three walls.
  If he built the ledge from a side wall, the sukkah is kosher only if it’s within four cubits of the opposite wall. If it is further than that, the entire sukkah is invalid.
  The Talmud now asks a typical question—couldn’t we have known that which we just taught from elsewhere. We just learned that if there are less than four cubits from the valid part of the sukkah, where the ledge is, to the invalid part (higher than 20 cubits), then the sukkah is valid. This principle is called a “curved wall.” What it means is that one can fictitiously imagine a wall that is not directly adjacent to the skhakh as if it was curved in to meet the skhakh.The same is taught in Mishnah Sukkah 1:10—if one opens a hole in the ceiling of his house and puts skhakh on the hole, under the skhakh is a valid sukkah as long as there are less than four cubits between the valid skhakh and the walls of the house.
  The Talmud now explains why we needed this baraita about the ledge. In the case of the house, all of the walls were proper walls. But here with the 20 cubit high sukkah, one wall is 20 cubits high because it has not been reduced by the ledge. We might have thought that such a wall could not be used. Therefore, we needed this baraita to teach us that even if the wall itself is invalid because it is too high, we can invoke the principle of the “curved wall.”
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with the case of a person building a platform inside a sukkah to reduce the size of the sukkah that is over 20 cubits high.
   This is very similar to the previous case, but here he builds the platform right smack in the middle of the sukkah, not attached to any wall. Again, as we learned yesterday, if the platform/ledge is less than four cubits from the walls, the walls are considered its walls and we now have a sukkah that is less than 20 cubits high.
  The Talmud now asks a logical difficulty. If the principle we learn here is again “the curved wall”—one can treat a wall removed by up to 4 cubits as if it were part of the sukkah—then we learned that in the previous section. Why do we need to learn it again.
  The answer is that this section teaches us that the principle of the “curved wall” can be applied even if you have to “curve” all of the walls. In the previous case the platform or ledge was adjacent to one of the walls. In this case it is not adjacent to any wall. Therefore, this source had to teach that we can pretend that all of the walls go with this platform and the reduced height of the sukkah is valid.
  
  Daf 4b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss possible remedies to sukkot that are either too high or too low.
  The sukkah is less than ten handbreadths high, which means it is not valid, as we learned in the Mishnah. If he digs a hole in the ground in the middle of the sukkah so that the skhakh is ten handbreadths from the bottom of the hole, and the edges of the hole are less than three handbreadths from the wall, the sukkah is kosher. If they are more than three handbreadths from the walls, it is invalid.
  The Talmud asks the obvious question. In the previous parts of this daf, we said that if the kosher part of the sukkah (under 20 cubits high) was four cubits from the walls, the walls could go with it. Now we say that the kosher part of the sukkah (over 10 handbreadths high) must be within 3 handbreadths of the wall. Why the inconsistency?
  The answer is that in the case of the too high sukkah there already is a wall. A wall must be ten handbreadths high, and those walls were already plenty high. Therefore, they only need to be within four cubits of the platform that reduced the height of the skhakh.In this case, the walls are not actually walls for without digging in the ground, the walls are not even 10 handbreadths high. For the hole in the ground to make them a wall, they must be within 10 handbreadths.
  In this case he builds a pillar, or a sort of platform, in the middle of the sukkah and the pillar is broad enough so that it itself could constitute a sukkah. It seems like the pillar is more than four cubits from the walls, otherwise we could count them with the pillar as we have already learned.Abaye wants to employ a legal fiction whereby something that rises from the ground is accorded fictitious partitions that are drawn upward. That is to say, we imagine that the edges of the pillar are drawn up to the skhakh such that there are now valid walls. This principle is called “גוד אסיק” and we will encounter it throughout the Tractate.Rava disagrees. The problem is that the walls of the sukkah must be recognizable, and not just legal fictions. We shall see that there are cases in which this principle is effective, just not this case.Introduction
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with a person who puts up four poles and then skhakh on top. He puts up no walls. Can we pretend that there are walls?
  As we shall see later, this person seems to be building his sukkah on a roof. He drives four poles into the roof and somehow manages to get valid skhakh to stay up top. Rabbi Jacob declares that the sukkah is valid. But the other sages say it is not valid because there are no walls.
  R. Huna, a Babylonian amora, limits the dispute between the two positions in the tannaitic baraita. R. Jacob says that such a sukkah is valid only if the sukkah was erected on the edges of a flat roof. In such a case we can imagine that the walls below were drawn up above such that they can serve as walls for the sukkah. This is the principle of “גוד אסיק” that we mentioned in yesterday’s section.The other rabbis do not invoke this principle. The sukkah is invalid.
  This is the continuation of R. Huna’s statement. If he puts the poles in the middle of the roof and not the sides of the roof, even R. Jacob agrees that the sukkah is invalid. There are no walls to fictitiously draw upwards.
  R. Nahman, another Babylonian amora, disagrees with R. Huna. He holds that the sages and R. Jacob disagree even if the poles are placed in the middle of the sukkah.
  The Talmud now asks exactly what R. Nahman meant. Did he mean that there is a dispute only if the sukkah is built in the middle of the roof? If the sukkah was built on the sides, the rabbis would agree that one can invoke the principle of “draw the partition upward.”The other possibility is that R. Nahman meant that even if he makes it in the middle of the roof there is a dispute. The sages would always invalidate such a sukkah, and R. Jacob would always validates it.The Talmud does not have a resolution to this question. This is called a “teko” which in modern Hebrew means “tie” but in Aramaic means—let it stand.In this case, what this means is that the Talmud does not know if R. Nahman thinks that the sages allow such a sukkah built on the sides of a roof. Since the halakhah assumedly will follow the sages and R. Nahman, this means that the Talmud does not answer a practical halakhic question. Don’t worry, this is a frequent occurrence!
  IntroductionThis is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section which dealt with erecting four poles and putting skhakh on top of them without building walls.
  The Talmud now brings an objection against R. Huna who held that if he built such a sukkah (with poles and without walls) in the middle of the roof even R. Jacob would agree that it is invalid.This baraita is nearly the same as the baraita above in section five, except that here they explicitly disagree about a sukkah built on the ground. R. Jacob still validates it, even though he cannot invoke the principle of “draw the partition upward.”
  The Talmud now explains the difficulty it has raised against R. Huna. Building a sukkah on the ground is like building it in the middle of the roof. Nevertheless, R. Jacob validates it. This proves that R. Huna is wrong—R. Jacob would validate even such a sukkah built in the middle of the roof.
  R. Huna said that the sages and R. Jacob disagree about a sukkah built on the sides of the roof. R. Jacob validates and the sages do not. However, the fact that in this baraita they disagree about a sukkah built on the ground (=middle of roof) might imply that they don’t disagree if he built the sukkah on the sides of a roof. All would validate such a sukkah.
  R. Huna could defend himself on this point. He seems to retreat a bit here from his position above, and now holds that the sages and R. Jacob disagree in all situations, whether the sukkah is built in the middle or the sides of the roof. The reason why the baraita specifies that they disagree if the sukkah was built on the ground or in the middle of the roof is to let you know that even in such a case, where one cannot invoke the principle of “draw the partitions upward” R. Jacob still validates it.
  In this baraita the sages and R. Jacob again disagree about using poles to build a sukkah. In this case, R. Jacob wants to pretend that if the poles are wide enough we could count them as a wall going in each direction. The pole would have to be wide enough such that if you hollowed it out, you could have a handbreadth going one way and a handbreadth going another way. This is called a דיומד in Hebrew which is a combination of the word “two” and “pillar.” For such a pillar to count as two walls, it has to be at least a handbreadth in both directions.The sages disagree. Two walls have to be proper walls and only the third wall can be fictitious.As an aside this is the halakhah to this day. Your sukkah has to have two proper adjacent walls, but the third wall is valid even if it is only a handbreadth.
  
  Daf 5a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins by explaining the derivation for the minimum height of a sukkah—ten handbreadths.
  The underlying assumption of this section, one which is unstated, is that the place in which we sit in the sukkah is the realm of humanity. We sit on “earth” and God doesn’t descend all the way to earth. The midrash claims that the meeting point for God (the Shekhinah—God’s immanent presence) was immediately above the ark of the covenant and its cover. The ark was 9 handbreadths high and the cover (the kaporet) was another handbreadth high, meaning that God spoke to Moses from right at the level of 10 handbreaths. This means that the skhakh must be at least ten handbreadths high, thereby in a sense reenacting the meeting point between God and Moses in the Tabernacle.The midrash is based on the verse in Psalms that claims that God has given the earth to humanity. There is a realm into which God does not enter, however we might understand that concept.There is an interesting ramification in this piece for our experience of sitting in the sukkah. The skhakh separates us from God, but it is right at the point of the skhakh in which we encounter the divine. The skhakh which symbolizes protection is also a meeting place between the human realm and the realm of God.
  The Talmud now critiques the notion that God never came down to earth. There are indeed verses that, at least according to their simple meaning, show that God did indeed come down to earth.For both of these and in the following section the Talmud offers strained solutions, a phenomenon not at all atypical in rabbinic literature. God did not really come all the way down to earth, according to this passage. God stopped right at the ten handbreadths limit. Thus even when the Bible seems to say that God did descend to earth, the rabbis interpret it to mean that God still didn’t really enter the human realm.
  After having shown that God doesn’t descend to earth the Talmud now tries to prove that people don’t go up to heavens, despite the fact that the Bible seems to occasionally describe humans ascending to heaven. In each of these cases the rabbis say that the person, specifically Elijah or Moses, didn’t really go to the heavens. They always remained ten handbreadths away from heaven.Some of you may be a bit bothered by these passages—if the Bible says that God came down to earth or that man went up to the heavens, who are the rabbis to deny it.I think this is a classic demonstration of how the rabbis impose their own thoughts upon biblical readings. While in the biblical view, the realms of God and humanity are not totally separate, in the rabbinic view they are. This is not really the place to discuss why this is so. What I wish to demonstrate is that when we read these types of passages we should appreciate that we are seeing the dynamic changes that occurred between the world view of the Bible and that of the rabbis.
  The Talmud now uses another midrash, this time from a difficult verse in Job, to show that man can ascend to heaven. The verse implies that man went up into the heavens so that God could spread some of his cloud upon him.The resolution only solves the second half of the verse. God lowered his radiant cloud to a level lower than ten handbreadths. But what about the throne? That too according to the Talmudic resolution was lowered into the human realm where man can grasp it.Thus, if we were to summarize, God and the Divine meet, but only right at the threshold. God never comes into the human realm and humans never enter the divine realm. At best, God lowers some of his accoutrements, his cloud and his throne, into the human realm. But true meeting on an equal level within the same realm, does not seem to occur.
  IntroductionIn the previous section the Talmud stated that the ark was nine handbreadths high and that the ark covering was one handbreadth high, bringing the total to 10, the minimum height of the sukkah. In today’s section the Talmud tries to show how we know this.
  The Torah specifically says that the height of the ark was 1.5 cubits. Since 1 cubit is 6 handbreadths, the ark was 9 handbreadths high.
  The Torah does not say how high the ark-cover (the kaporet) was. Therefore, the rabbis need to derive it somehow midrashically. The first attempt is to compare it to the smallest of vessels which is the border of the table. Although we might consider this border to be part of the table, the rabbis and maybe the Torah itself seem to consider it to be at least an accessory to a vessel.
  The Talmud now asks why we shouldn’t derive the height of the ark-cover from a real vessel and not just the border, which is really just an accessory to a vessel. This would mean that the ark-cover would have to be at least the height of one of the real vessels.The answer is a principle somewhat similar to “don’t bite off more than you can chew” in English. When one derives something from elsewhere the derivation should be minimalistic. So if the smallest possible measure is one handbreadth because there is an accessory to a vessel that is this height, then that should be the determined height of the ark-cover. By the way, this idiom is still used in modern Hebrew.
   The Talmud now asks why we can’t derive the height of the ark-cover from the height of the “tzitz,” the golden headplate that the high priest wore on his forehead.There is a debate exactly what was written on the tzitz. Interestingly, according to this story, R. Eliezer b. R. Yose saw the tzitz in Rome. Assumedly it got there when it was carried off by the Romans when they destroyed the Temple in 70 C.E.
  Deriving the height of the ark-cover from the tzitz is not possible because the tzitz is not a vessel, as is the ark-cover. It is an ornament, otherwise translatable as a piece of jewelry.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to attempt to learn the size of the ark-cover from other vessels that existed in the Temple.
  The “zer” or “crown” refers to various crowns that were on the Ark, Table and Incense altar (Exodus 25:11, 24, 30:3). These “crowns” needed to be only the smallest possible measure. Meaning they had no minimum height. Why then can we not derive that there is no minimum height to the ark-cover?
  We don’t derive the height of the ark-cover from the crowns because the ark-cover is a vessel and the crowns are only accessories to vessels.
  f we can’t derive the measurement of a vessel from something that is an accessory to a vessel, then how can we derive the height of the ark-cover from the border of the table which is also an accessory (see yesterday’s section)?The answer is that the border was below the table and not above. Since the table was placed on the border, the border is considered more than a mere accessory. It too is a vessel.
  The Talmud now notes that there is a dispute as to whether the border was above or below the table. The one who holds that it was below the table can derive the measure of the ark-cover from it because both are vessels. But the one who holds that it was above the table cannot derive from there the height of the ark-cover because the border would be an accessory and the ark-cover is an actual vessel.
  The Talmud now explains why we can’t learn the height of the ark-cover from the height of the crowns or the headplate. The Torah gave some of the measures for the ark-cover and it gave measures for the border of the table, but since there are no measures for the headplate or the crown, we can’t use them as a basis to derive the height of the ark-cover.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to find various places in the Bible from which we can derive the height of the ark-cover.
  R. Huna provides a new source for the height of the ark-cover. The Torah uses the word “face” in reference to the ark-cover. Therefore the ark-cover must at least be the minimal size of a face. The minimum size of a normal human face is one handbreadth.
  
  Daf 5b
  
  Bar-Yokani is a legendarily large bird. The yoke of the egg was enough to drown sixty cities (Bechorot 57b). Its face must have been enormous. So if we are deriving the size of the ark-cover from the size of a face, maybe the face would have be as large as this bird’s face.The Talmud rejects this with the same principle we saw earlier—whenever possible we should be minimalist in deriving measures. We should derive the “face” of the ark-cover from the smallest face, and not from the largest one.
  he Talmud now turns to the opposite extreme. The smallest face belongs to that of a small bird (called the tziparta). So why not learn the size of ark-cover from that small face.The answer comes from an amora, R. Huna. R. Huna compares the use of the word “face” in Leviticus with the same word that appears in Genesis, where it refers to Isaac. Thus we should learn the size of the ark-cover from a human face, not a small bird’s face. 
  There is yet another “face” mentioned in the Torah—the “face” of God. Such a face is huge. So why not derive the height of the ark-cover from the face of God.Again, the Talmud rejects this by referring to the minimalist principle. We shouldn’t learn from God’s face because that’s the largest face there could possibly be.
  Finally, there is another verse that uses the word “face” in reference to the cherubim, the two angelic figures that were on top of the ark-cover. Why not derive the height of the ark-cover from there?R. Aha answers that indeed we could have learned the height of the ark from the size of the cherubim for they too were at least one handbreadth high. Indeed, according to R. Aha, R. Huna did derive the height of the ark-cover from the height of the cherubs.Finally, we get a folk-derivation of the word “cherub.” R. Abahu says that it comes from two words “like” (כ) and “a child” (רביא). Thus the word from the Bible is connected to Aramaic.summary, there are many faces, big birds, little birds, God and cherubim. But if we want to learn we should learn from a human face.
  IntroductionYesterday we concluded by learning that the face of the cherub is like that of the face of a person. Today’s passage begins by questioning that assumption.
  The verse from Ezekiel seems to imply that the face of the cherub looks different than that of a man. But this contradicts what was said in the previous lines.The answer is that the cherub has a little face, albeit human, whereas the face of a man in Ezekiel’s vision implies the face of an adult.
  The Talmud now goes back to questioning the very issue of learning the height of the sukkah from the height of the ark and cover. How do we know that the sukkah’s empty space must be 10 handbreadths high? Perhaps the skhakh can be inside the 10 handbreadths minimum height requirement as long as the some of the skhakh is above 10 handbreadths?
   The Talmud will now learn, in quite an indirect fashion, that the skhakh must be above ten handbreadths. The ten handbreadth minimum measure does not include the skhakh.The first Temple, built by Solomon, was 30 cubits high. The height of top of the cherubs was 10 cubits. So the cherub reached to a height of 1/3 of the Temple.There is a tradition that the same proportion of height of cherub to height of Temple existed in the Tabernacle, the wandering “temple” in the desert.
  The height of the Tabernacle was ten cubits, which is 60 handbreadths. So the top of the cherubs would have reached a height of 20 handbreadths.
  The ark was ten handbreadths high, including the ark-cover. The Torah uses the word “skhakh,” translated here as “covering” to refer to the cherubs who must be above 10 handbreadths. Hence, using this calculation we can conclude that the skhakh must be above 10 handbreadths.On a more “midrashic” note we might find it interesting that the skhakh is described as above us like the cherubs who seem to be the seat of God’s throne on earth. By extension, we could say that the skhakh is our version of building God’s throne.
  The Talmud still persists on asking. The cherubs sat 10 handbreadths high. How do we know that their wings were above that? Maybe there wings were exactly at 10 handbreadths which would mean that the skhakh could be included in the 10 handbreadths.
  R. Aha b. Jacob says that we learn this from the word “above.” The wings were above their head. And this doesn’t mean that the wings were very high, for if that was the intended meaning it would have repeated the word high. Thus we can learn that while the cherubs sat exactly at 10 handbreadths, their wings were above the 10 handbreadth mark, just as our skhakh must be.
  IntroductionEarlier on this page we learned that the ark was nine handbreadths high, based on the fact that the Torah said it was to be 1 and 1/2 cubits. This works under the assumption that a cubit is 6 handbreadths. But there was some dispute in the rabbinic world about the size of the cubits referred to in the Torah.
  The whole system above was based on R. Meir’s assumption that all of the cubits mentioned in connection with the Sanctuary were 6 handbreadths. But R. Judah holds that the measurements of the vessels are based on smaller cubits—only five handbreadths.
  According to R. Judah the ark was 7.5 handbreadths (=1.5 cubits) and the cover was one handbreadth. If the tops of the cherubim reached a height of 20 handbreadths, then there remains a space of 11.5 handbreadths underneath their wings. That would imply that a sukkah would have to be at least 11.5 handbreadths high, according to R. Judah. Obviously, this can’t be because we have never heard that R. Judah makes such a requirement.
  The Talmud answers that according to some rabbis there is no way of deriving the laws of minimum measures from the Torah. These laws are called “halakhah from Moses at Sinai.” This, in my opinion, is often just the rabbis’ ways of saying that there is no way of deriving the halakhah. It just is. The sukkah is a minimum of 10 handbreadths high but this is just an accepted halakhah.There are two other matters that are considered “halakhah from Moses at Sinai.” The first is “interpositions” which refers to what things block an immersion in a mikveh from being successful. For instance if someone immerses in a mikveh and is wearing their clothes, they are not pure.The other issue is the height of various partitions, which is usually 10 handbreadths.The next daf will continue to address these three topics.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s daf we learned that the minimum measures found in the Torah are “halakhah to Moses from Sinai.” Today’s Talmud brings a contradictory tradition.
  The seven species mentioned in the famous verse in Deuteronomy are all related by R. Hanin to various minimum measures used in a wide array of halakhot. This implies, as we shall see, that the minimum measures were given by the Torah.
  Wheat is in reference to a house that has some type of scale affliction (see Leviticus 14). The Talmud quotes Mishnah Negaim 13:9. This mishnah teaches that with regard to the time for clothes brought into an afflicted house to become defiled there is a distinction between clothes carried into a house afflicted with scale disease and clothes worn into such a house.In the first case, since he wasn’t wearing the clothes, shoes or jewelry, they are considered to be vessels which are brought into a house. They become impure immediately upon entrance to the house.However, if he is wearing his clothes, shoes or jewelry, they must be in the house for as long as it would take to eat half a loaf of wheat bread with some sort of condiment/dip, and while reclining (concerning this amount see Eruvin 8:2). This is derived from Leviticus 14:47 which states: “Whoever sleeps in the house must wash his clothes, and whoever eats in the house must wash his clothes.” For his clothes to be impure he need not actually eat or sleep in the house. Rather he must be there long enough so that he could eat a minimum measure of a meal, which is considered to be half a loaf of wheat bread.
  
  Daf 6a
  
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of the list of the seven species and the allusions each makes to a minimum measure in halakhah.
  The measure of a barleycorn is used with regard to the defilement caused by a dead body. A small piece of human bone the size of a barleycorn defiles by contact and carrying (even if there is no contact) but it doesn’t defile in a “tent”—by being overshadowed by something else.
  Carrying from one domain to another or in the public domain is prohibited on Shabbat. To be liable for transgressing this biblical commandment by carrying food, the food must be at least the size of a fig.
  A vessel is susceptible to impurity as long as it is still usable. According to this mishnah (Kelim 17:1) householders (non-professionals) will use vessels that have holes in them unless the hole is as large as a pomegranate. At that point they will throw the vessel out.
  When it comes to most issues, the minimum of what is considered biblically prohibited is an olive’s worth. For example, if one eats an olive’s worth of forbidden food he has transgressed. The same is true for performing a mitzvah. In order to fulfill one’s obligation to eat matzah on Pesah, one must eat an olive’s worth of matzah.
  When it comes to most issues, the minimum of what is considered biblically prohibited is an olive’s worth. For example, if one eats an olive’s worth of forbidden food he has transgressed. The same is true for performing a mitzvah. In order to fulfill one’s obligation to eat matzah on Pesah, one must eat an olive’s worth of matzah.
  The Talmud offers a minor correction to the above statement. Not all of the measures of the Torah are an olive. Some are figs, pomegranates etc. But most of them are indeed olives.
  On Yom Kippur one who eats a piece of food the size of a date has transgressed.
  This concludes the difficulty raised above. The fact that the Torah is read to refer to all of the typical minimal measures seems to bequeath to them the status of “from the Torah.” So how can we say, as we did above, that these minimum measures are halakhic traditions (which is different from being “from the Torah”)?The answer is that while the Torah alluded to these measures, they weren’t actually written in the Torah. Rather these minimum measures are traditions which were later attached to the Torah. We can probably sense this as we read the passage above. For instance, when the Torah says, “A land of olive oil” it does not mean “a land where the minimum measure of transgressions and prohibitions is based on the olive.” Rather, this is clearly a secondary midrash attaching an already known halakhah to a verse.
  IntroductionThis section analyzes the statement that the laws of “interpositions” are not from the Torah.
  The Talmud now turns to the second matter that was claimed to be a “halakhah from Moses at Sinai” was “interpositions.” This refers to the notion that if there is something blocking one’s body from direct contact with the waters of the mikveh, the purification is not effective. The Talmud notes that this is implied by a midrash on Leviticus 14:9—one must wash one’s body directly in the water. Nothing may interpose.
  The resolution is that the general law of interpositions is indeed from the Torah. But one details of the law is only “derabanan”—of rabbinic origin. This is the law concerning how many knotted hairs constitute an interposition. One knotted hair can be tied really tightly, so it does interpose. Three knotted hairs will not be knotted so tightly, so they don’t interpose. Rabbah b. Bar Hana does not know if two knotted hairs interpose or not.
  Through a midrash on the same verse from Leviticus cited above, we now see that the idea that hair interposes is also from the Torah. So we return to our earlier question—what part of this law is a “halakhah from Moses at Sinai.”
  
  Daf 6b
  
  The Talmud resolves that there are two levels of the law concerning hair interposing in the mikveh. There is a level of interposition that according to Toraitic law disqualifies the immersion. Upon this level the rabbis decreed that other types of interposition disqualify the immersion.From the Torah two criteria need to be fulfilled for the immersion to be blocked: 1) a majority of his hair must be blocked. 2) He (or she) must “mind” the thing that interposes. What this means is that the thing that is in his hair is something a person would generally not want this to be in his hair. For instance, gum. Other foreign substances (tar, blood etc.) would also not be wanted in one’s hair. Similarly one wouldn’t want one’s hair knotted up.If only one of these conditions is fulfilled, then the rabbis decreed that it interposes.If neither of the conditions is fulfilled—it doesn’t block the majority of his hair and he doesn’t mind its presence—then there is no interposition.
  The Talmud now asks why we don’t go even a step further. Why not decree that even if he doesn’t mind its presence and it is not on a majority of his hair that it does interpose? In other words, why not just say that anything that interposes blocks the immersion?The answer is that since only a case where it blocks a majority of the hair and he minds its presence interposes from Torah law, we don’t need to issue a decree lest someone transgress another decree. This is a common principle in rabbinic decrees. They are one degree stricter than Torah law—they do not need to be two degrees stricter.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the laws of partitions.
  The idea that for a partition to be valid it cannot be less than ten handbreadths is a “halakhah to Moses from Sinai” for R. Judah (see the end of daf heh). But R. Meir holds that we learn those laws from the Torah. So then we must ask: what aspect of the laws of partitions are “halakhah?”The Talmud provides three legal fictions that we shall encounter throughout the tractate. The first is “extension.” This means that we can fictionally imagine a straight edge as going up into the air such that it creates a partition. It also could mean that the edge of a wall that doesn’t reach the ground can be looked at as if it reaches the ground.The law of “lavud” means that a space less than three handbreadths does not count. For instance if there is a gap of less than three handbreadths in the skhakh then the skhakh is valid.
  IntroductionToday’s section returns to the original mishnah and the topic of how many walls are necessary to build a proper sukkah.
  The rabbis (the majority opinion) hold that the sukkah must have three walls. Two walls must be at least of the minimum size (which we learned on daf gimmel—enough to hold his head, most of his body and table) and the third can be even a handbreadth.Rabbi Shimon says the sukkah requires three proper walls. The fourth wall may be as small as a handbreadth.
  The Talmud now tries to figure out the source of this debate—what is the underlying reasoning behind their dispute?This debate is connected to a debate about whether to understand the Torah as it is pronounced or how it is spelled. This is an issue because the Torah does not have vocalization in it. In other words, there are no vowels.There 3 cases in which the phrase “the Festival of Sukkot” is mentioned. Two of them are written like this: חג הסכת and one is written like this חג הסכות. The first way is with the vav which makes the world plural and the second without it. But all three cases are pronounced the same—in the plural. [Note that the way we write the Torah is not exactly like this].The rabbis give authority to the way the Torah is written. Therefor there are a total of four “sukkot” in the Torah for the cases in which it is written without a vav count as only one. One mention of sukkot is necessary just to teach you that you need to build a sukkah. That leaves three extraneous “sukkot” for three walls. Tradition teaches that the third wall need not be real. That leaves us with two real walls and one that need only be a handbreadth.R. Shimon holds that the way we pronounce the Torah is authoritative. So there are a total of six “sukkot” in the Torah. One mention is needed to teach the law itself. That leaves four “sukkot”—four walls. Tradition says that one wall can be as small as a handbreadth, which leaves us with 3 full walls and one fictional one.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now continues with some other ways of explaining the dispute between the sages and R. Shimon as to whether the sukkah requires 3 or 4 walls.
  It is possible that both the sages and R. Shimon agree that the way we pronounce the Torah is authoritative. This leaves us with 6 sukkot—3 mentions and each is worth 2 because they are all plural. All agree that one mention is needed to teach the law itself. That leaves 4. The sages hold that one more mention is needed to teach that the sukkah needs skhakh. That leaves 3. R. Shimon holds that the skhakh does not need its own mention.
  The next possibility is that all agree that the way we write the Torah is authoritative. This leaves 4 mentions. One is required to introduce the law of sukkah itself. This leaves 3 mentions. Rabbi Shimon holds that the tradition comes to say that there needs to be another wall that is at least a handbreadth long. The tradition adds. The other sages say that the tradition reduces the size of the third wall to a handbreadth.
  It is also possible that all agree that the way the text is written is authoritative (4 mentions) and that the tradition comes to reduce and not to add. But they disagree whether one can expound midrashically upon the first reference. The rabbis hold that one cannot. This leaves us with three references—two full walls and one handbreadth wall. Rabbi Shimon says that you can use even the first mention of sukkah as a midrash. So that leaves four mentions—3 full walls and one handbreadth wall.
  R. Matanah offers a completely different understanding of why R. Shimon requires 4 walls. According to the verse in Isaiah, the sukkah is to be for shelter from the elements. Only a four walled sukkah can truly offer shelter. Therefore, the sukkah must have four walls.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the one handbreadth wall that both the sages and R. Shimon allow to complete the mandated 3 or 4 walls of the sukkah.
  Rav says that the one handbreadth wall should be placed directly opposite one of the “departing walls.” Basically this means that if one wall runs east-west and the other south-north, he should attach it to either one of the walls. The handbreadth wall would be directly opposite the other wall.Two other sages ask why he should not place it in another way. The Hebrew and English are a bit hard to understand here and there are various interpretations. One interpretation is that he should place this wall diagonally so that it curves in a bit, creating the impression that the Sukkah is actually enclosed. Another possibility is that it is placed opposite both existing walls. The full walls are on one side and the handbreadth wall is opposite them, creating the illusion that there are actually four walls.Rav didn’t answer their question.
  
  Daf 7a
  
  The Talmud brings two other opinions that concur with Rav from above.
  There is now a third opinion about where to put the third wall. The third wall should be a “loose” handbreadth which is like a handbreadth with expanded fingers. He then places that handbreadth within three handbreadths of one of the existing walls. Less than three handbreadths is considered to be halakhically insignificant. This way he now has a four handbreadth wall. Four handbreadths is a majority of the minimum size for a wall—seven handbreadths. So in this way he has a wall that is more than half of what it needs to be.
  There is another opinion concerning the sukkah built like an alleyway. According to this opinion he must make a wall that is at least a little bit more than four handbreadths. He places this strip within three handbreadths of one of the walls, which means that it counts as being joined to the wall. That allows there to be a 7 handbreadth wall, fulfilling the minimum requirement.
  One can make a sukkah with two parallel walls. The third wall can be placed in the middle between the two, wherever he so wishes.
  The Talmud now notes that R. Simon (or R. Joshua ben Levi) seems to contradict himself. Above he said that it was sufficient to have one loose handbreadth, but here he said that the strip must actually be four handbreadths.
  In the other case there are already two walls forming a right angle. These are basically 2/3 of a valid sukkah. Since they are already valid, we only need one more handbreadth wall to create a proper sukkah. But in this case where the two walls are not connected, we need a four handbreadth wall to create a proper sukkah.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with a statement by Rava that for the sukkah to be valid it needs to have “the form of a doorway.”
  Rava rules that for the sukkah with this third wall that is only a handbreadth to be valid it must also have the “form of a doorway.” Rashi explains that this is accomplished by dividing a handbreath into halves—each half is placed on opposite sides and a pole is put across them to create the form of a doorway.
  Above in the previous section R. Simon had said that the handbreadth wall must be a “loose handbreadth” placed within three handbreadths of the other wall. In this way he could fictionally create a full seven handbreadth wall. According to this version of Rava’s statement if there is the form of a doorway on the third wall, he doesn’t need the handbreadth wall to be within three handbreadths of the other wall. Note that according to this version, Rava offers a leniency.
  According to this version Rava supplements R. Simon’s requirement that this type of sukkah, one whose third wall is a handbreadth. Rava says that even after he puts the handbreadth wall up and places it within three handbreadths of the other wall, he still needs to make the form of a doorway. According to this version, Rava is a stringency upon R. Simon’s ruling.
  We now have a story related to the above discussion. R. Ashi, a late Babylonian amora sees R. Kahana his teacher, building a sukkah where he made the third wall a loose handbreadth, as R. Simon said in yesterday’s section. R. Kahana was also making the form of a doorway. This seems to accord with the third of Rava’s statements, that this sukkah also requires a doorway.
  R. Ashi now asks R. Kahana why R. Kahana doesn’t hold like the more lenient of Rava’s opinion, according to which if he has the form of a doorway, he doesn’t need the “loose handbreadth.”
  R. Kahana answers that he follows the other statement of Rava, the more stringent one. This type of sukkah requires both the loose handbreadth placed within three handbreadths of the other wall and the form of a doorway.Thus we can see that there was a debate among these late amoraim as to whether Rava ruled stringently (R. Kahana) or leniently (R. Ashi).
  IntroductionThis section is based on another statement by Rava concerning the status of a one handbreadth wall on Shabbat.
  Rava said: And similarly with regard to the Shabbat.   Since [the handbreadth] is regarded as a valid wall of the Sukkah it is also regarded as a valid wall in respect of the Sabbath.Rava says that since the one handbreadth wall is effective in making the sukkah valid, so too it is effective in allowing one to carry within the walls on Shabbat.
  Does this not mean that the law relating to the Shabbat of Sukkot is more [stringent] than that relating to the Sukkah itself, and that we do not apply the rule of ‘since’?Rava above implied that any time a wall is kosher for use in the sukkah it is also kosher for allowing one to carry on Shabbat. Abbaye however brings a baraita that shows that sometimes the law differs. Both walls cannot have gaps of greater than three handbreadths. But the laws of Shabbat are more stringent in that there must be more wall than empty space.This means that if we have a sukkah standing on Sukkot whose gaps are greater than the standing portion the sukkah is valid as a sukkah but one could not carry within it. This proves that we don’t say, “since it is valid as a sukkah it is valid to allow carrying on Shabbat.”
  Rava now responds, or at least the Talmud responds on his behalf. During Sukkot, if a wall is valid for the purpose of the sukkah, it is valid to allow carrying within the sukkah on the Shabbat of the festival. But during the rest of the year, one would not be able to rely upon such a wall to carry. Strangely, there can be a sukkah in which one could carry on Sukkot, but not during the remainder of the year.
  Abbaye now responds against Rava. As a background we need to understand a statement made elsewhere by Rava that if one puts skhakh up on an alleyway that has a post on its end, the sukkah is valid. This post is part of the eruv system and it allows one to carry from the courtyard to the alleyway. So if Rava is correct that a wall that allows one to carry on Shabbat should also be valid as a Sukkah wall, then the sukkah shouldn’t require a third wall that is a full handbreadth. Even the “post” which is less than a handbreadth should be sufficient.
  Rava responds that the baraita did not even need to state that. If the lenient case of the sukkah (it’s a positive commandment which are considered more lenient than negative ones) can dictate to the stringent case of Shabbat (whose penalty is the death penalty) that a wall is valid to allow carrying, then all the more so a wall that we allow carrying on Shabbat should be able to dictate what counts as a wall for the issue of Sukkot.
  
  Daf 7b
  
   IntroductionSection four deals with three statements/leniencies issued by Rava in connection with the sukkah
  This statement appeared in yesterday’s section. There we explained that if one puts skhakh up on an alleyway that has a post on its end, the sukkah is valid. This post is part of the eruv system and it allows one to carry from the courtyard to the alleyway.
  This is Rava’s third statement (the first was in the beginning of section 3). The situation revolves around boards set up at four corners around a well. These boards are used to allow one to draw from the well on Shabbat without transgressing the prohibition of taking something out from one domain to another. According to the Talmud, this is a specific leniency intended to make life easier for people who are traveling to the Temple on a pilgrimage. The boards are at four corners around the well. Each board is a handbreadth in each direction. Rava rules that if one puts skhakh up over these boards, a proper sukkah can be formed. This is another leniency because in this case there aren’t any real walls.  
  The Talmud now does what it often does when it has multiple statements from a single source. It asks why we need all three statements. Couldn’t we have sufficed with just one or two of them and derived the others from the first or second? The Talmud will now give an extended answer to this question. If Rava had just mentioned the case of the alleyway, we would have assumed that this sukkah is valid because it has at least two real walls, the walls of the alleyway. But the case of the wells the sukkah doesn’t have any real walls, just four one handbreadth walls at the corners. Therefore, Rava teaches us that even this is a valid sukkah.
  If Rava had said only that he could put the skhakh over the boards around the alleyway, we might have thought that this sukkah was valid because there are four, albeit fictional walls. But an alleyway has only two walls. Therefore, Rava has to issue both of these statements.
  If Rava had made those first two rules, we would have thought that both of those sukkot are valid because they involve a case of allowing one to make a sukkah in a place where carrying on Shabbat has already been allowed (the well and the alleyway). Thus if for the more stringent matter it counts as a sukkah, all the more so it counts for the less stringent matter, fulfilling the mitzvah of sukkah.  But we wouldn’t have thought that he would allow one to carry in a structure on Shabbat only because it has been made into a valid sukkah by the addition of a third one handbreadth wall. That’s why he had to issue that statement as well.
  IntroductionToday’s section goes on to discuss the next section of the Mishnah, which teaches that a sukkah that lets in more sun than shade is not valid.
  According to the first opinion in this baraita, the mishnah refers only to the skhakh. The skhakh must be able to provide the sukkah with more than 50 per cent shade. But if sun enters the sukkah from the sides due to gaps in the walls and covers more than 50 per cent of it, the sukkah is still valid. In other words, this halakhah is really about the amount of skhakh and not so much about the amount of sun actually in the sukkah.R. Yoshayah says that the walls must also provide shade for the sukkah. If they allow more than 50 per cent sunshine to enter the sukkah, the sukkah is not valid.
  Abaye offers a biblical prooftext for R. Yoshayah’s opinion. The Torah uses the verb “and you shall cover,” the same word for skhakh, in reference to the veil placed over the ark. This veil, according to Abaye, served as a partition, just as the walls of the sukkah do. And since the veil was completely closed, i.e. there were no gaps in it, the walls of a sukkah must also be completely closed.
  The rabbis respond (or the gemara responds on their behalf) that this veil didn’t fully cover the ark. It was not a true partition; it just went over the sides a little bit. Therefore, we can’t use the veil to learn anything about the walls of the sukkah.
  IntroductionIn today’s section Abaye identifies a series of tannaim (sages from the time of the Mishnah) who all require that a sukkah be a permanent structure. This contrasts with our general understanding of the sukkah as a temporary structure.
  Abaye cites 8 different opinions and attributes to each of them consistent reasoning—the sukkah must be constructed as a permanent abode. As we shall see, this is a relative opinion. By that I mean that in each of these cases the opinion referred to by Abaye holds that the sukkah must be built more permanently than the opposing opinion.The first opinion is that of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi]. As we have seen, Rabbi Judah Hanasi holds that the sukkah must be 4 cubits squared. This is a more permanent structure than those who hold that the sukkah need only be wide enough to hold his head, most of his body and his table.
  R. Yoshayah stated in the previous section that the walls of the sukkah must also provide shade. This would make it a more permanent structure than those who allow gaps in the wall that allow in the sun.
  R. Judah allows a sukkah to be more than 20 cubits high. This would make it a more permanent structure than those who don’t allow it to be so high.
  R. Shimon requires three full walls and one fictional wall. This is more permanent than those who require only two full walls and one fictional one.
  Rabban Gamaliel does not allow one to build a sukkah on a wagon or a ship, or probably on any moving vehicle. This is interpreted by Abaye to mean that R. Gamaliel requires a more permanent structure for the sukkah.
  This is the dispute we saw earlier in the tractate. According to Abaye, Bet Shammai requires a larger sukkah because he requires it be more of a permanent abode. We should note that according to Abaye both Bet Shammai, who requires the sukkah to be large enough only to hold his head, most of his body and table, and R. Judah who says it must be four square cubits (a larger size) agree that the sukkah must be a permanent abode. As I stated above, “permanence” is a relative concept in these sources. Abaye attributes the idea that the sukkah must be a permanent abode to the opinion which requires the sukkah be more permanent than that of the opposing opinion.
  This is a mishnah that will appear later in the tractate. R. Eliezer requires the sukkah to have a flat roof. This, according to Abaye, makes it into a more permanent structure.
  A dovecote is round. The “others,” an anonymous opinion, invalidate such a sukkah because it has no corners. According to Abaye, a structure built without corners will be less permanent. Thus the “others” require a more permanent structure for the sukkah.
  IntroductionToday’s section is about the validity of a round sukkah. Just a warning—there is a lot of math in this section and in the subsequent sections as well. Good luck!
  R. Yohanan describes a round sukkah shaped like a furnace. As long as twenty-four men can sit around the circumference of the sukkah it is valid. The Talmud will now discuss how big this actually is.
  Earlier in the Talmud we saw three opinions as to how big a sukkah must be: 4 cubits square, large enough for head, most of body and table, or just large enough for head and most of body.The Talmud assumes that this opinion must match that of Rabbi Judah Hanasi, who says that the sukkah must be four cubits square. This is the largest of the three measures. Obviously, a sukkah that only needs to be large enough to fit his head, most of his body and his table (which would have been small) is far smaller than is necessary to sit 24 people around.However, as we shall see, the math doesn’t work out that all that well for this.
  For the rabbis π was 3 and not 3 1/7…. as we now know it is. To remind ourselves—the circumference of a circle is diameter multiplied by π (or 2πr). In this case we know the diameter is 4 cubits for it is within a square where each side is 4 cubits. Since the diameter is 4 the circumference is 12, enough space for 12 people to sit around. So why does the sukkah need to be so big that 24 people can sit around the side?
  
  Daf 8a
  
  Temporarily, the Talmud answers that the previous formula was true only for a circle. However, the perimeter of a square is more than three times its width. The round sukkah must have a circumference that would equal a square that is four cubits wide. So the circumference would indeed have to be more than 12 cubits.As we shall see in tomorrow’s section, the math is still problematic.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the size of the round sukkah. Yesterday we concluded that the perimeter of the square needed to be greater than a circle. But today we see that it still won’t get us from a circumference of 12 to a circumference of 24, the number required by R. Yohanan for the round sukkah to be kosher.
  A square is only 25 percent larger than an inscribed circle. Thus if the circle has a diameter of 4, its circumference is 12 (assuming that pi is 3). A square placed around this circle will have sides that are 4 cubits (= to the diameter), leading to a circumference of 16 (4 x 4). So why then does the circle need to be 24 cubits?
  The above was assuming that the square was around the circle. But if R. Yohanan was talking about a round sukkah that could fit inside a sukkah of four squared cubits in it, the sukkah must be bigger because of the projection in the corners (the places where the circle doesn’t fill the square.
  The problem is that this still doesn’t add up to 24. According to rabbinic calculation, a hypotenuse is 1.4 times the side of a square (in reality it is the square root of 2, but 1.4 is close). So the diameter of the circle (which is equal to the hypotenuse of the inscribed square) is 4 x 1.4—5.6. That would mean that the circumference of the circle is 16.8 (3 x 5.6). We still have not gotten too close to 24.
  The Talmud answers that R. Yohanan wasn’t precise in his figure. Admittedly, not a particularly satisfying answer.
  IntroductionMore math! We continue to try to figure out how R. Yohanan came up with the number 24 for the required circumference of the round sukkah. Yesterday’s section ended with the conclusion that the sukkah really only needed to have a circumference of 16.8 cubits but that R. Yohanan was simply approximating when he said it needed to be 24 cubits.
  If R. Yohanan gave a number that was close to 16.8, we could say that he was issuing an approximation. But 24 cubits is just too far off of 16.8. It’s hard to imagine that he was simply approximating. Thus we are back to square one-why does the circular sukkah have to be so large.
  Mar Kashisha now adjusts one of the key figures in the original calculation. We thought that each person takes up 1 cubit, but in reality three men can fit into 2 cubits. So for 24 men to be able to sit around this sukkah, they only need 16 cubits. This is still not exactly what R. Yohanan said, but it’s close. R. Yohanan’s figure is 16 and the size of the sukkah that fits around a 4 cubits square sukkah is 16.8.
  The problem is that R. Yohanan’s approximation leads to a leniency. R. Yohanan says it only needs to be 16 cubits around so that 24 people could sit around it. But in reality it should be slightly bigger.
  R. Assi now changes the assumption we have been making all along that the people were sitting outside of the sukkah. If each person takes up a cubit’s space, this leads to the diameter being 8 cubits (1/3 of the circumference). But if they sit inside the sukkah, then we can reduce a cubit in each direction, bringing the diameter down to 6 cubits. This leads to a circumference of 18. So if he really needed to require 16.8, the circumference that would allow an inner circle of 16, R. Yohanan was slightly stringent. And it is okay to be offer an approximation if it leads to a stringency.
  
  Daf 8b
  
  The rabbis of Caesarea provide a formula for measuring a circle within a square and a square that is inside a circle.The circle inside a square has a circumference that is 1/4 less than the square. This matches what we said before. So if the perimeter of the square is 16, than the diameter of the inscribed circle is 4. Multiply that by 3 and you get 12, which is 1/4 less than 16.A square that is inside a circle has a circumference that is half that of the circle.
  The Talmud rejects the rabbis of Caesarea’s last formulation. If the square is 4 square cubits, then its 5.6 cubits, which is also the diameter of the inscribing circle. The circumference of the circle is 3 times this amount, meaning 16.8. Indeed it is difficult to imagine that the rabbis of Caesarea (or R. Yohanan) made such a gross error in calculationThe Gaon of Vilna explained that in actuality this was not an error at all. What these rabbis meant to say was that if you put another square around this circle, that square would have a circumference that is 50 percent larger than the inner square. This outside square would have sides that are 5.6. Its circumference would be 24 (5.6 x 4). This square is now 50 per cent larger than the inner square, whose circumference is 16. This, according to the GRA is what these rabbis really intended to say.This matches R. Yohanan’s number above. R. Yohanan meant to say that this circular sukkah must be large enough so that when you put a kosher sukkah inside (16 square cubits), the square formed outside of the sukkah would be 24 cubits.Interestingly, we see that R. Yohanan’s math was actually correct. It was later rabbis that seemed to have misunderstood his words. Perhaps, we might surmise that in Eretz Yisrael, where R. Yohanan and the rabbis of Caesarea lived they understood math better than they did at a later period in Babylonia. This makes sense considering the fact that the Greeks were well known to have been excellent mathematicians.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a new discussion about various forms of sukkot.
  R. Levi discusses a two-part structure that houses a potter and probably serves as his shop as well. There is an outer hut and an inner hut. The inner hut is not valid as a sukkah because this is the potter’s regular home. Even if this hut fulfills all of the requirements of a sukkah it is not valid because he lives there all year round. A person can’t just live in his sukkah all year round without doing something to make it valid for Sukkot. However, it is obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah because it is his regular domicile (big word!).The outer sukkah is valid as a sukkah (provided it is made of proper dimensions and material) but is exempt from the mitzvah of mezuzah because he doesn’t live there.
  The Talmud now criticizes this—why should the outer hut be exempt from mezuzah? After all, even a gate-house is obligated to have a mezuzah. Why can’t we say that the outer hut is like a gate-house to the inner hut and therefore should have a mezuzah?The answer is that neither huts are permanent. A gate-house is obligated to have a mezuzah because it protects a permanent hut. But this outer hut serves an inner hut which itself is not a permanent structure. Therefore the outer hut is exempt from the mitzvah of mezuzah, even though the inner one is.
  This baraita begins with a mnemonic device. It teaches that it doesn’t matter who built the sukkah, even a gentile or a Samaritan, or whether it was primarily built for cattle, it is valid. As long as it was “covered according to the rule.”
  R. Hisda answered: Provided that [the covering] was made [with the intention of providing] the shade for the sukkah.R. Hisda explains that “according to the rule” means that it was made with the intention of providing shade. Note that this doesn’t mean that it had to be built with the intention of using it as a sukkah for the festival of Sukkot. The rule is that the skhakh has to have been put up with the intention of it being used for shade. If it was made for some other reason, such as privacy, it is not a valid sukkah.
  IntroductionThe baraita cited above ended with the words, “any sukkah whatsoever”—is valid. Obviously this doesn’t mean any sukkah is valid. There are some types of sukkot that are invalid. So the Talmud asks—what other types of sukkot are valid that weren’t mentioned in the other baraitot.
  It includes the sukkot [whose mnemonic is] rakbash, as our rabbis taught: The sukkah of shepherds, the sukkah of fig-watchers, the sukkah of city guards, and the sukkah of orchard-watcher, and any sukkah whatsoever  is valid, provided that it is covered according to the rule.The Talmud connects the previous baraita to another baraita based on a mnemonic device. This baraita states that sukkot built for people who are basically guarding property is valid. These sukkot were obviously not made for Sukkot. Nevertheless, they are valid, as long as they were covered “according to the rule.”
  This is the same explanation of “according to the rule” found in the previous section. See there for an explanation.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss the previous two baraitot that basically allowed any sukkah to be used as long as it was constructed for shade.
  The second baraita the one that included “rakbash” added “any booth whatsoever” to include ganbak. Of course, this means that the first baraita (ganbak) included “rakbash” and the second baraita “rakbash” included “ganbak.” This will lead to the question why does each baraita begin with a different list and then add the other list at the end.
  The author of the first baraita thought that the “ganbak” sukkot (those built by Gentiles, Samaritans or for cattle) were of greater validity, therefore he listed them and then included the rakbash sukkot with “any sukkah whatsoever” because rakbash sukkot (made for people temporarily filling jobs) are impermanent.
  
  Daf 9a
  
  The author of the second baraita, the “rakbash” baraita thought that those sukkot were of greater validity because they were built by Jews who are obligated to dwell in sukkot on the festival. He then included the other sukkot which were built by people (or for animals) not obligated for the mitzvah of sukkah (gentiles, Samaritans and cattle).
  IntroductionFinally—a new mishnah!
  Bet Hillel allows a person to use an old sukkah. For Bet Hillel the intention that went in to building the sukkah is not critical.  In contrast, for Bet Shammai an old sukkah, one that was not made with the intent to use it on the festival, is invalid, even if it matches all of the other halakhic criteria.  However, Beth Shammai agrees that any sukkah that was made thirty days before the festival is valid, since we can assume that he made it knowing that he might use it on Sukkot.  The only debate is over a sukkah that was made more than thirty days before Sukkot without the intention of using it on Sukkot.
  Bet Shammai derive the halakhah that a sukkah must be made specifically for the sake of the festival from the words “unto the Lord” in Leviticus.
  Bet Hillel does not hold that the sukkah must be made expressly for the festival. They don’t use the verse in the same was as does Bet Shammai. In a typical move, the Talmud now finds a use for the verse. Bet Hillel uses the verse, as does R. Sheshet, to forbid the use of the wood used to build a Sukkah during the seven days of the festival. For instance, if at some point during the festival I decided I wanted to take some wood from anywhere used in building the sukkah and use it to make a fire, I could not do so. The wood is “muktzeh”—set aside for use in the sukkah.
  The Talmud cites an additional baraita to show that the sukkah is “set aside to the Lord” at least during the festival itself. Just as one is not allowed to take an animal dedicated to be a sacrifice and make other use of it, so too one is not allowed to take a part of the sukkah and make other use of it.
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of yesterday’s section.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on Bet Shammai. They agree that one cannot use the wood of the sukkah for all seven days. So don’t they too need to derive this law from the verse, “a festival of sukkot for seven days to the Lord.” If so, they don’t have a verse left to support their disqualification of the old sukkah.
  The Talmud answers that indeed Bet Shammai does use the verse from Leviticus in the same way that Bet Hillel used it. Bet Shammai derives the notion that one must make a sukkah specifically for the festival from another verse, this time from Deuteronomy.
  Bet Hillel uses the verse from Deuteronomy to teach that one may make a sukkah during any of the seven days, even during one of the intermediate days of the festival.
  This section ends finally with another dispute between the two houses. Bet Shammai holds that one may not make a sukkah during the intermediate days of the festival. This is an opinion that we shall explore later in the Talmud where it is attributed to R. Eliezer. It seems that this opinion reads the verse as if it says—either build a sukkah that will be used for seven days, or don’t build one at all.
  IntroductionToday’s section raises a difficulty against Bet Hillel who seems to hold that in general ritual objects don’t need to be made with the specific purpose of their ritual use in mind.
  Above, we learned that according to Bet Hillel a sukkah doesn’t need to be built with the specific intention of being used for the festival. The Talmud extrapolates from this that Bet Hillel would hold that in general religious objects need not be made with the specific ritual use in mind. Thus a sukkah could be built as a hut for some other purpose and then used as a sukkah when the time came along.This contradicts with what Rav Judah said in the name of Rav and Shmuel confirmed—tzitzit cannot be made with string spun for other purposes. The examples here are threads that were made for various other purposes. So if tzitzit must be made for the purpose of being used for tzitzit, why doesn’t the sukkah have to be made for its use as a sukkah?
  The Talmud initially answers that there is a specific verse that is midrashically interpreted to mean that tzitzit need to be made for the sake of use as tzitzit.
  The problem with the previous explanation is that the same language is used in reference to Sukkot.  So if the words “for yourself” imply that tzitzit must be made for the sake of your obligation to wear tzitzit, then the same should apply to sukkot.
  The answer is that that verse doesn’t teach that one has to build the sukkah for the sake of Sukkot, but that one cannot use a stolen sukkah (this is a topic we will discuss at greater length later in the tractate).
  The follow up question is obvious. If we use the word “for yourself” to teach that one cannot use a stolen sukkah, then why not use the same word to teach that halakhah with regard to tzitzit—one cannot use stolen tzitzit. This would mean that one could use tzitzit not made for the festival, as long as they were not stolen.
  Tzitzit are referred to in another verse that uses a similar word—for themselves. That verse is used to teach that one cannot use stolen tzitzit. This frees up the verse from Deuteronomy to teach that one cannot use tzitzit that were not made for use as tzitzit. But when it comes to the sukkah, there is only one verse and this verse is used to teach that one cannot use a stolen sukkah.
  
  Daf 9b
  
  IntroductionThis section starts the analysis of a new mishnah.
  A tree while still attached to the ground cannot be used for skhakh, the roofing of the sukkah. Skhakh must come from a natural source, but it must be detached from the ground.  Therefore, if one puts his sukkah underneath a tree it is invalid, just as it would be invalid if one built a sukkah inside a house with the ceiling as his roof.If a person builds one sukkah on top of another, it turns out that the skhakh of the bottom sukkah is the floor of the top sukkah.  Even if the skhakh meets all other halakhic requirements it is still invalid because the fact that someone is living above makes it again similar to a person who builds his sukkah inside a house.Rabbi Judah holds that if there is no one who is living in the upper one, than the bottom one is valid. The upper sukkah is not considered to be living quarters unless someone is actually living there.
  The mishnah taught that a sukkah that is underneath a tree is invalid. Rava says that this is only so if the tree provides more shade than the sun shining through. But if it allows more sun to shine through, then the sukkah underneath is valid because the tree isn’t like kosher skhakh.
  The Talmud says that Rava derives this halakhah from the precise wording of the mishnah. The mishnah says that a sukkah built under a tree is “as if he made it within a house.” The mishnah could have stated simply that such a sukkah is invalid. Usually the mishnah is as concise as possible. According to Rava the reason that the mishnah adds in that such a sukkah is as if it was built in a house is that it wishes to limit the invalidity of such a sukkah to a case that is just like a house. Just as a house would provide more shade than sun, so too in order for the tree to invalidate the sukkah underneath it needs to provide more shade than the sun it lets in.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Rava said that if the tree lets in more sun than the shade it provides, the skhakh underneath is valid. Today’s section questions this.
  The Talmud raises the problem that even if the tree lets in more sun, still the tree’s leaves and branches are invalid as skhakh. Therefore, he is joining invalid skhakh to valid skhakh, which should invalidate the sukkah.
  R. Papa answers that for the sukkah to be valid, he must weave the invalid live branches with the valid skhakh (cut off from the ground). This would serve to make it look as if it was all valid because one wouldn’t notice the difference between the valid and invalid branches. And as long as at least 50 per cent of the skhakh is indeed valid, the sukkah is indeed kosher.
  The Talmud now raises a typical difficulty: this is obvious! If he wove the valid skhakh in with the invalid live branches, it is obviously valid. So why would we even need to teach this?
  The Mishnah has to teach that if he interweaves the valid and invalid skhakh. If it had not explicitly taught that it is valid we might have thought that we would decree that such a sukkah is invalid lest he validate even a case where he didn’t interweave the valid and invalid skhakh. In other words, we might have thought that we would be stringent and not allow this type of sukkah (the interwoven) to be valid, so the mishnah taught that it is valid.
  The Talmud now raises another difficulty—haven’t we already taught that if a person weaves together valid and invalid skhakh it is valid. The mishnah teaches that if one takes vegetation still attached to the ground and puts it on the sukkah, the sukkah is still valid as long as there is more valid (unattached) skhakh than invalid skhakh.We then have to ask whether this mishnah describes a case where he wove them together or didn’t. If he didn’t weave them together, then we have the same problem we discussed above—he joins invalid skhakh with valid skhakh.Therefore, the mishnah must refer to a case where he did interweave the valid and invalid skhakh. So if this mishnah teaches that we don’t decree that such a sukkah is invalid, why would we need our mishnah to teach the same thing.
  There is a subtle difference between the two mishnayot. The mishnah about the vine teaches that ex post facto, if this situation arises, the sukkah is valid. Our mishnah teaches that ab initio one is allowed to intentionally build a sukkah in this way. Thus both mishnayot are necessary.
  IntroductionOur section continues to explain another section of the mishnah, where we learned that if one placed one sukkah above another, the bottom sukkah is invalid.
  As stated in the introduction, a sukkah built underneath another sukkah is invalid. The Talmud cites a baraita which uses a verse to derive that the skhakh must be directly under the sky. It can’t be underneath another sukkah, underneath a tree or underneath the roof of a house.
  The Torah literally says, “You shall dwell in sukkot”—using the plural form. It would seem therefore that one could indeed dwell in two sukkot, where one was built underneath another.
  In Hebrew, the word “In sukkot” is written without the vav. While we pronounce the word as a plural, we could read it in the singular. This would give the impression that it is singular. One cannot dwell in a sukkah which is underneath another sukkah.
  Rabbi Jeremiah will now begin an extended explanation of four different scenarios where one sukkah is on top of another. There are four possibilities as to their validity, and he will explain how each works out.
  If the lower sukkah’s skhakh lets in more sun than shade, then this skhakh is not valid in any case. It does not count as a sukkah. So if the upper skhakh is valid and is within 20 cubits of the ground, then only that skhakh counts as the covering of the sukkah and the bottom sukkah is valid.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of yesterday’s section 6 where we learned that when one sukkah is placed on top of another, there are different variations as to which is valid.
  In this case, since the upper sukkah lets in more sun than shade it doesn’t count as a sukkah. Furthermore, this sukkah is within twenty cubits of the ground, so it is valid to join with the skhakh of the bottom sukkah. Altogether, this allows the bottom sukkah to be valid. The top sukkah is invalid because it doesn’t have sufficient skhakh.
  If both of them create more shade than the sun they allow in, and both are within 20 cubits of the ground, then the bottom one is prevented from being valid because it is a sukkah underneath another valid sukkah. The top sukkah is valid, because it within 20 cubits of the ground.
  The Talmud asks—isn’t this obvious! Rashi explains that it would be obvious that if the skhakh allows more sun in than shade that it doesn’t count as a sukkah, so we wouldn’t have a case of one sukkah underneath another one.The answer is that if R. Jeremiah had not made this statement we might have disqualified even the lower sukkah even when the top one was within 20 cubits from the ground, lest one think that one could join the top skhakh with the bottom one even when it is above 20 cubits from the ground. R. Jeremiah issued his ruling to teach that we don’t rule stringently. As long as the top one is within 20 cubits of the ground, the bottom one is valid (when the top one lets in more sun than shade).
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the mishnah concerning one sukkah above another sukkah.
  The Talmud asks how much space there needs to be between the upper skhakh and the lower skhakh for the lower sukkah to be invalidated. We shall see several answers to this question.The first answer is provided by R. Huna, who derives his answer from the laws of impurity. R. Huna says that if there is even a handbreadth of space between the two sukkot, the lower one is invalid. This is because a one handbreadth space is significant when it comes to the laws of overshadowing (ohel). If there is an empty space of one cubed handbreadth then impurity is conveyed by overshadowing. What this means is that if there is an impure thing in the space, such as a human bone, it will defile the clean things that are also in the space. It will also block the impurity from spreading above. But if the space is less than one handbreadth it neither conveys the impurity nor blocks it.
  R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna say that there must be a space of four handbreadths between the two sukkot for the bottom one to be invalid, because four handbreadths is generally considered an important space. For instance, if one carries something for a distance of four handbreadths on Shabbat, he is considered as having transgressed.
  Shmuel says that the bottom sukkah is invalid only if there is a gap of ten handbreadths between the top one and the bottom one. This is the same measure of a valid sukkah—it must be ten handbreadths high. It’s as if Shmuel is saying that for the top sukkah to invalidate the bottom one, the top one must be a real sukkah.
  The Talmud now raises a difficulty on Shmuel by using our very mishnah. R. Judah says that if there are no occupants in the top mishnah, then the bottom one is valid. But this can’t be taken literally—why should it matter if there are actual occupants. Therefore, the interpretation must be that R. Judah says that if the top sukkah is too small to live in because it is not ten handbreadths high, the bottom one is valid.The first opinion in the mishnah was more stringent than R. Judah’s opinion. So that opinion must hold that even if the top sukkah is unsuitable for living, the bottom one is still invalid. This contradicts Shmuel who held that if the top sukkah is less than ten handbreadths high, the bottom sukkah is valid. [It can be assumed that Shmuel does not rule like R. Judah, who is a minority opinion.]
  We now get another opinion as to the interpretation of the Mishnah. R. Dimi cites a tradition from the “west” (the land of Israel, which is to the west of Bablyonia) that if the roof of the bottom one is strong enough to hold bolsters and cushions that would be used on the floor of the upper one, the bottom sukkah is valid. In other words, if the skhakh is not strong enough to be used as a floor, then it doesn’t count and we don’t have one sukkah on top of another.
  Again we need to understand the first opinion in the mishnah in light of our interpretation of R. Judah. The first opinion would have to be slightly stricter and rule that even if the floor couldn’t hold bolsters and cushions, the bottom sukkah would still be invalid. But why should this be so? If this skhakh is unusable as a floor for the top sukkah then we don’t really have one sukkah on top of another. We just have one sukkah!The Talmud therefore resolves that R. Judah says that if this skhakh can bear the weight of bolsters and cushions with great difficulty the bottom sukkah remains valid. The first opinion would invalidate such as sukkah because the skhakh can hold the bolsters and cushions. But all of the rabbis agree that if the bottom one can hold bolsters and cushions without great difficulty, it is invalid. And all would agree that if it can’t hold them at all, the bottom sukkah is valid.
  IntroductionWe begin a new section of the mishnah.
  If he spread a sheet on top of the sukkah to keep out the sun, or a sheet underneath the skhakh to keep out the falling leaves, the sheet invalidates the sukkah.  This is because a sheet cannot be used for skhakh, so in essence he is using invalid skhakh to form his sukkah.Similarly, if he spreads a sheet over a four-post bed, the sheet invalidates his skhakh, because the sheet forms a roof.  However, the sheet does not invalidate the skhakh if it was spread over a two-post bed.  This is because the sheet forms a tent-like structure, one that slopes to the sides and is not considered a roof.  Since there is no roof made of a sheet, the only roof is the skhakh and the sukkah is valid.
  R. Hisda limits the applicability of the mishnah. The sheet put under the skhakh invalidates the skhakh only if it was put there to stop the leaves from falling into the sukkah. But if it was put there just as decoration then the sukkah remains valid.
  The Talmud raises the difficulty that R. Hisda’s statement is obvious. After all, the mishnah itself states that if one puts the sheet there because of “falling leaves” the sukkah is invalid. This implies that if one puts it there for another reason, the sukkah remains valid. So why would R. Hisda have needed to state what was already obvious?The answer is that without R. Hisda’s statement we might have thought that the words “because of falling leaves” were taught in the mishnah because that is common reason to put a sheet under the skhakh. It is not there to teach that if one puts the skhakh under the sukkah for other reasons it is valid. To combat this interpretation R. Hisda says that the sukkah is invalid only if the sheet is put there to stop falling leaves, but if it is to beautify the sukkah, it is valid.
  The Talmud now tries to bring support for R. Hisda from a baraita (a tannaitic source). The source teaches that one can hang various fruits and food items from one’s sukkah and the sukkah remains valid. These were clearly here for decoration, which means that this baraita supports R. Hisda.
  
  Daf 10b
  
  The Talmud rejects this support for R. Hisda. The baraita might refer to decorations placed on the side of the sukkah, and not placed right under the skhakh. This means that there is no tannaitic support for R. Hisda who holds that anything can be put under the skhakh as long as it is only there for decoration. Note that it doesn’t mean that R. Hisda has been proven wrong.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the decorations of a sukkah.
  If one hangs decorations from the sukkah it doesn’t diminish the height of the sukkah. Thus if the sukkah was 10 handbreadths high, the minimum height, but then he hung some decorations that brought the height lower than 10 handbreadths, the sukkah is still kosher.
  R. Ashi limits this rule to decorations hung from the middle of the sukkah. But if one puts decorations at the side of the sukkah and thereby reduces the dimensions of the sukkah from the minimal 7 handbreadths, the sukkah is invalid. The difference between the top and the side is that these decorations are not valid as skhakh, so we can’t consider them too-low skhakh. But these decorations can count as walls, so they would reduce the minimum size of the walls.
  In this story Minyamin has his shirt soaked in water and wants to spread it on top of the sukkah to dry it out. A shirt is susceptible to impurity. To prevent the impression that one could use such material as skhakh, R. Ashi, a prominent amora, tells him to take it down.
  Minyamin (or the Talmud on his behalf) responds that people will see that it’s wet and they’ll know that he wasn’t using it as skhakh. So why should he have to take it down?R. Ashi answers that he doesn’t have to take it down right now. He only has to take it down once it dries. If he leaves it up there people will think that he is using things that are susceptible to impurity for his skhakh.
  This debate is about a decorated sheet that was put underneath the skhakh to serve as decoration, but it was four handbreadths away from the skhakh. According to R. Nahman, the sukkah is valid because we will know that it was put there for decoration and not to serve as skhakh.R. Hisdah and Rabbah son of R. Huna say that they are invalid because they form a barrier with the real skhakh.
  This story is told about the very two rabbis who rule that a sukkah whose decorations were separated from the skhakh by four handbreadths is invalid. When they get to the exilarch’s house (the political leader of the Babylonian community) he has them sleep in such a sukkah. They sleep there for the night and don’t say anything to him about it.This leads the exilarch to think that they have changed their mind about the validity of the sukkah.They respond to him that they are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah because they are on their way to perform a mitzvah. Later in the tractate we will learn that if people are on the way to perform a mitzvah, they are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses a person who sleeps in a sukkah but in a bed with some sort of netting on top. The question is: does this netting form a barrier between him and the skhakh such that he hasn’t fulfilled his obligation.
  Rav Judah allows one to sleep in a bed with a canopy that has a flat roof. We might have thought that this flat roof would count as invalid skhakh and would therefore invalidate the sukkah. The one caveat is that the canopy must be less than ten handbreadths from the bed. If it is more than ten handbreadths then it would form a barrier to the skhakh and one who sleeps there would not have fulfilled his obligation.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita that directly contradicts Rav Judah. This baraita clearly states that if one sleeps in a sukkah with a canopied bed he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  The Talmud resolves that this baraita was disqualifying a case where the canopy was more than ten handbreadths from the bed.
  The Talmud has a new objection, again from a tannaitic source, this time a mishnah. The mishnah rules that one who sleeps under a bed inside the sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation. The same should be so for one who sleeps under the canopy in a sukkah—the canopy blocks the skhakh and he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  The resolution to this difficulty is brought from a different statement of Shmuel. The person sleeping under the bed has not fulfilled his obligation only if the bed is more than ten handbreadths high. Such a bed forms a barrier to the valid skhakh. But if the bed is less than ten handbreadths high, one can sleep under it. The same is true with the canopied bed.
  A third difficulty is raised. If one spreads a canopy over a four-post bed, the sukkah is invalidated.
  The same resolution is brought yet again. The mishnah rules that this is invalid only if it is higher than ten handbreadths. In all cases, if the barrier is lower than ten handbreadths one can sleep there.
  The Talmud now rejects the previous resolution. There are two types of canopied beds—one’s with two posts, one at each end, and one’s with four posts, one on each corner. If one spreads a canopy over a two-posted bed, the sukkah remains valid because this doesn’t form a roof. But this is true only if the naklitin are less than ten handbreadths high. If they are higher, the sukkah is in any case invalid. The baraita also states that one cannot sleep under a four-post canopy. There is no caveat about 10 handbreadths. The implication is that one can never sleep in a four-posted canopied bed, even if it is less than ten handbreadths high. This contradicts R. Judah.
  Kinofot are permanently fixed into the bed. Therefore, even if they are lower than ten handbreadths, one cannot sleep under them in a sukkah.However, if the canopy is not fixed into the bed, one can sleep under it, as long as it is not ten handbreadths high. In other words, only permanent structures are always invalid.
  This is a case we had above on daf tet. If one sukkah is above another sukkah the bottom one is invalid, but only if the top sukkah is ten handbreadths high, according to Shmuel. This proves that Shmuel says that even for a permanent structure (at least as permanent as a sukkah might be) the bottom one is valid if the top one is not ten handbreadths high.
  The Talmud now resolves the difficulty. In the case of the sukkah on top of the sukkah, we had one sukkah invalidating another sukkah. So for that to happen, the top one had to be ten handbreadths high. But in the case of the four post canopy bed, the canopy doesn’t make a sukkah because it is invalid as skhakh. The canopy just forms a tent that would act as a barrier. So even if it is less than ten handbreadths high, the sukkah is invalidated.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a side discussion connected to someone who is sleeping in a canopied bed.
  One is not allowed to read the Shema while naked. So if one is sleeping naked in a canopied bed he can stick his head out of the canopy and read the Shema. The canopy counts as his clothing.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty from a baraita that states the exact opposite. One is not allowed to simply put his head out of the canopy and say the Shema.
  Similar to yesterday’s section, here too the Talmud resolves the difficulty by stating that the baraita refers to a case where the canopy is ten handbreadths high. Such a canopy counts as a structure and not as something similar to clothing. This is also proven by the comparison the end of the baraita makes to a house. One couldn’t count the house as his clothes. So too if the canopy is large enough, it doesn’t count as clothes.
  
  Daf 11a
  
  IntroductionThe previous daf ended with a comparison between a house and a canopied bed. Today’s section continues with this comparison.
  A house is also not like a bed because a house is permanent. Therefore, even if the house is less than ten handbreadths high, it counts as a tent. A person could not poke his head out of a window while naked and say the Shema (I like the idea of someone being in a house that is less than ten handbreadths high, and being naked and then poking his head out the window to say the Shema. Pretty crazy!). This is the same rule that would apply to a four-post bed, as we learned in yesterday’s baraita. Even though it is not ten handbreadths high, since it has a flat roof, it counts as a permanent structure.
  This is an alternative version of Rav Judah’s statement. Here he allows one to sleep in a bridal-bed inside a sukkah, even if it is ten handbreadths high. The reason that this is allowed is that the bridal-bed has two posts. Since the roof is slanted, it doesn’t count as a roof and there is nothing imposing between him and the skhakh above.
  This is an alternative version of Rav Judah’s statement. Here he allows one to sleep in a bridal-bed inside a sukkah, even if it is ten handbreadths high. The reason that this is allowed is that the bridal-bed has two posts. Since the roof is slanted, it doesn’t count as a roof and there is nothing imposing between him and the skhakh above.
  This is an alternative version of Rav Judah’s statement. Here he allows one to sleep in a bridal-bed inside a sukkah, even if it is ten handbreadths high. The reason that this is allowed is that the bridal-bed has two posts. Since the roof is slanted, it doesn’t count as a roof and there is nothing imposing between him and the skhakh above.
  This is an alternative version of Rav Judah’s statement. Here he allows one to sleep in a bridal-bed inside a sukkah, even if it is ten handbreadths high. The reason that this is allowed is that the bridal-bed has two posts. Since the roof is slanted, it doesn’t count as a roof and there is nothing imposing between him and the skhakh above.
  This is an alternative version of Rav Judah’s statement. Here he allows one to sleep in a bridal-bed inside a sukkah, even if it is ten handbreadths high. The reason that this is allowed is that the bridal-bed has two posts. Since the roof is slanted, it doesn’t count as a roof and there is nothing imposing between him and the skhakh above.
  The Talmud asks another question. If naklitin, the two-post bed, are permanent, then why don’t they have the same status as kinofot, the four-post bed. The baraita said that one can sleep in a two-post bed as long as it’s not ten handbreadths high but not in a four-post bed, even one that is less than ten handbreadths. But if both are permanent why should they have different statuses.The answer is that permanency exists on a scale. A four-post bed is more permanent than a two-post bed. Therefore one can never sleep in a sukkah in a four post bed. But a two post bed is more permanent that a bridal-bed. Therefore, if the two-post bed is ten handbreadths high, one cannot sleep in it in a sukkah. But one can always sleep in a bridal bed.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss sleeping in a canopied bed in a sukkah.
  Rabbah bar R. Huna allows one to sleep in a canopied bed inside a sukkah under all conditions. Even if it has a roof, meaning the bed has four posts. And even if the canopy is ten handbreadths over the bed such that it would count as a “tent.”
  The Talmud explains that Rabbah bar R. Huna’s opinion matches that of R. Judah from a mishnah that will appear later in the tractate. R. Judah states that they used to sleep under a bed in the sukkah and the sages were okay with that. This, the Talmud explains, is because a temporary tent (that formed under the bed) cannot nullify the permanent tent that is the sukkah. [Note that the Talmud here considers a sukkah to be a permanent tent. Probably because during that week one dwells in it permanently].
  f Rabbah bar R. Huna rules according to R. Judah, why doesn’t he just say “the halakhah is according to R. Judah”? Why does he state an independent halakhah?The Talmud answers that had he stated that the halakhah is according to R. Judah we would have thought that it’s okay to sleep under a bed, because a bed wasn’t meant to sleep under it. It was made for sleeping on top of it. Therefore, the space underneath the bed might not count as a “tent.” But a canopy was meant for sleeping under it. Therefore, it would nullify the sukkah above. Hence Rabbah bar R. Huna teaches us that in all situations a temporary structure (the canopied bed) does not nullify the existence of the permanent structure (the sukkah).
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new mishnah. This is a long section, but don’t blame me—I’m just explaining, I didn’t write the stuff!
  In this mishnah we learn several important rules governing skhakh.  The first is that the skhakh must be detached from the ground.  If one takes living vines and trains them on top of his sukkah, the sukkah is invalid.  This is true even if he put some valid skhakh on top of the vines that were still attached to the ground. The sukkah becomes valid only if he puts more valid skhakh than the invalid attached vines, or if he cuts down the vines.  This is an important point. The only thing that makes the vines invalid is that they are still attached to the ground.The second part of the mishnah presents two general rules. The first is that the skhakh has to be something that cannot receive ritual impurity. This means that clothing, chairs, tables, dishes, sheets, etc. cannot be used as skhakh.  Basically, this includes most things that have been “made” or “fashioned” by human hands.  Branches of trees cannot become impure and hence can be used for skhakh.  Secondly, it has to be something that originally grew from the ground.  This rules out metal, stone, clay, plastic etc.Interestingly, these two rules, and that in the previous section, are in a sense foils for one another. The skhakh must be dead, but it must be something that was once alive.  Something has to have been done to it by human hands—it has to be cut from the ground, but not too much can be done with it—humans can’t turn it into useful instruments.  The skkakh is then “liminal”—it mediates between the natural world and the humanly created world.  So too it is above us, mediating between God and humanity.
  In this scene, R. Joseph is reciting the mishnah before R. Huna while the two of them are studying, perhaps in front of others as well. R. Joseph adds to the mishnah a statement made by Rav, an earlier amora: “he must shake them.” This refers to the line in the mishnah that said if “or if he cut them down, it is valid.” According to Rav it is not sufficient just to cut down the branches or vines that were attached to the ground. He must pick them up and shake them, thereby performing a positive act to show that he means to use them as skhakh. In other words he must put them there as valid skhakh—he must make the sukkah/skhakh—and not have the skhakh already there when it was invalid and then just have it turned into valid skhakh.R. Huna rebukes R. Joseph by questioning the attribution of the statement—it was stated by Shmuel, no Rav.R. Joseph responds by being annoyed with R. Huna. R. Joseph claims that when he said that Rav issued the statement, he didn’t mean that Rav said it and not Shmuel. They both said the same thing (this sounds fishy to me).
  R. Huna responds that according to Shmuel the skhakh needs to be shaken, as we explained above. Rav, on the other hand, hold that it does not need to be shaken.R. Huna derives Rav’s opinion from a ruling issued by Rav concerning tzitzit. R. Amram attached fringes to the aprons of women in his house (according to R. Amram women are obligated to wear tzitzit). The way he did this was to first place one string on the apron, double it and then double it over again, such that there would be four double strings. Once already in place, he would cut them, thereby creating the necessary 8 strings. The question of what to do came before Rav and Rav said that if he cut them after they had already been put into place, the tzitzit would be valid.This, according to R. Huna, is similar to the case of the skhakh. You have something that is already in place and then is just cut. Just as the tzitzit is valid without any other step, so too the skhakh is valid without having to shake it. This is how R. Huna knows that Rav did not say, “And he must shake it.”
  The Talmud questions whether Shmuel disagrees with Rav on this issue. Shmuel too seems to hold that one can first put tzitzit onto a garment, have them fully knotted and then cut double ends. This is because Shmuel also seems to hold that “their cutting is their making.”
  The Talmud resolves this by saying that Shmuel was referring to a situation where he put the threads onto two corners of the garment before he knotted them, then he cut them, and only then he knotted them.That this is valid would seem is obvious. Obviously one could put the threads on the corners without knots, then cut them, then knot them. The knotting while on the corners would certainly count as making them. Why would Shmuel even need to issue such a ruling?The answer is that we might have thought that each tzitzit thread must be inserted into each corner after it has already been separated from the other threads. Therefore Shmuel had to state that as long as he knots them after having put them on the corners and after having been cut, they are valid. But Shmuel does not hold that their cutting is their making.
  
  Daf 11b
  
  The Talmud cites a baraita as a difficulty upon Rav. The baraita seems to imply that if he doesn’t cut the tzitzit before he hangs them on the garment they are forever invalid. This would refute Rav who says that they may be cut after they have already been put on the garment.
  The Talmud responds on Rav’s behalf by reinterpreting the baraita. The tzitzit are invalid only until they are cut. But they may indeed be cut even after they have been placed on the garment.
  These amoraim, among them Shmuel, hold that if he puts the threads on the garment before they are cut, they are forever invalid. Cutting them doesn’t count as “making tzitzit.”
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss the case of a person putting tzitzit onto the corners of his garment and only then cutting them so that there are 8 single strings and not 4 doubled strings.
  This is a restatement of the end of yesterday’s section. To refresh our memories, if someone ties tzitzit to a garment but does not yet cut the ends, Shmuel holds that they are invalid even if he cuts them afterwards.
  The Talmud now brings two sources as difficulties upon Rav, who holds that cutting the tzitzit or cutting the vines/branches from the ground does count as their making.The first is from a baraita that directly teaches that if he first inserts the tzitzit into the garment and then cuts the threads, the tzitzit are invalid.The second difficulty is from the mishnah concerning sukkah. The halakhah in this mishnah is based on a midrash on the words, “You shall make.” One must “make” a sukkah and not turn something already made into a sukkah. This notion is then connected to the mishnah which disqualifies a case where one trained a vine, gourd or ivy over a sukkah and covered it also with valid skhakh. If the vine was still attached to the ground it is invalid because it is attached to the ground, not because of a midrash on “you shall make.” Therefore, the Talmud concludes, such a sukkah is invalid even if he first trained the vine over the sukkah and then cut the vine from the ground. This is invalid because cutting something from the ground is not a sufficient act to be considered “making” a sukkah.This is a refutation of Rav’s opinion.
  Rav could answer this difficulty by saying that in this case he didn’t really cut the vines from the tree, he just pulled them out of the tree. This is enough to make the skhakh technically valid because it is detached but it will look like it’s still attached to the tree and therefore it is invalid.But if he had really cut them from the tree, the skhakh, according to Rav would be valid for “their cutting is their making.”
  Unfortunately for Rav, the above solves only the second difficulty against him. The first difficulty, from the baraita concerning the tzitzit, remains a difficulty for it explicitly states that if he put the tzitzit on the garment first and then cut the ends, it is invalid. Rav does not offer a resolution to this difficulty.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the topic of whether “their cutting is their making.” Here it is connected to the hadas, the myrtle, one of the four species used in the lulav.
  The Talmud attempts to draw a correlation between Rav and Shmuel’s dispute over whether “their cutting is their making” with regard to the skhakh and a dispute found in a tannaitic source concerning the hadas. This hadas branch had berries on it. These berries invalidate the hadas. According to R. Shimon b. Yehozadak, if he plucked the berries off the hadas is still invalid. The other sages say that it is valid.
  Do they [then] not dispute this principle? That the one who declared it valid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we say that ‘their cutting is their making’, and [therefore] with regard to lulav we also say that their plucking is their making; while the one who declares it invalid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that ‘their cutting is their making, and [therefore] with regard to lulav also we do not say that their plucking is their making?The Talmud now tries to correlate the two disputes. At first we suppose that all sages hold that the lulav must be tied together. This is the “making” of a lulav. Plucking off the hadas berries after it is bound would then be turning an invalid, already made lulav into a valid one.When it comes to the sukkah we have a midrash that states that one cannot make the sukkah from that which is already made. We learned this midrash in the above section. However, not all sages agree. Some sages say that cutting the skhakh is considered making the skhakh and the same would be true for plucking the berries from the already bound lulav. This would be the opinion of the sages. While other sages hold that cutting the skhakh is not sufficient to be considered making the sukkah, and so too plucking the berries is not making the lulav. This would be R. Shimon b. Yehozadak.
  The Talmud now rejects the above explanation of the baraita and offers an alternative. Both R. Shimon b. Yehozadak and the sages agree that when it comes to the sukkah cutting the skhakh is not considered to be making a sukkah. Therefore one could not simply cut attached skhakh that has already been placed on the sukkah. The question is whether one applies the principles of sukkah to lulav. According to R. Shimon b. Yehozadak one does and therefore plucking is not making a lulav. According to the other sages, we do not derive the laws of lulav from the sukkah and therefore there is no requirement to make the lulav. One can pick the berries off after it has already been tied.
  The final interpretation of the dispute between R. Shimon b. Yehozadak and the sages connects their dispute with the question of whether one must bundle the lulav together. R. Judah says that just as the bundle of hyssop used in the ritual in which the Israelites put blood on their doorposts had to be bundled together, so too the lulav which also uses the word “take” must be bundled together. R. Shimon b. Yehozadak agrees—a lulav must be bundled together. If he takes the berries off after it has been bundled, this is a violation of the principle that one must make a lulav and not have one already made (i.e. bundled) then become valid.The other rabbis say that the lulav does not need to be bundled. Therefore, there is no concept of “making a lulav.” One can remove the berries at any time.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita that doesn’t accord with either R. Judah or the sages. The baraita says that it is a mitzvah to bind the lulav’s components together but if one does not, it is still valid. This does not accord with either R. Judah who would seem to hold that if one doesn’t bind the lulav together it is not valid or with the sages who hold that the lulav need not be bound together.The answer is that the baraita follows the rabbis who hold that even if it is not bound it is valid. Nevertheless, one should bind the lulav’s components for that makes them look nicer. The principle that one should make mitzvoth look more aesthetically pleasing is derived from the verse, “This is my God and I will adorn Him.”
  
  Daf 12a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section, which attempted to offer a midrash as to why skhakh must grow from the ground and not be susceptible to impurity. The last midrash we encountered compared the skhakh to animal sacrifices offered on the holiday—just as the animal grows from the ground and (while alive) is not susceptible to impurity, so too skhkakh must grow from the ground and not be susceptible to impurity.
  The problem with deriving the laws of skhakh from the laws of the festival offering is that this leads to the conclusion that skhakh too must be an animal. Obviously this is absurd so this midrash is rejected.
  The Torah says that one should celebrate the festival of Sukkot during the time of year when one harvests one’s grain and grapes to make wine. Ravin reads this verse midrashically as if it says to build sukkot out of the left over products of one’s grain and grape harvest. This would mean that skhakh should grow from the ground and not be susceptible to impurity, since only the food part of the harvest is susceptible to impurity
  The Talmud asks why we don’t read the verse as mandating the use of the actual product from the threshing floor and wine press. Why do we think it is just the waste product, which is not susceptible to impurity?R. Zera answers that it would obviously be impossible to use actual wine as skhakh. Therefore we must interpret the verse to mean the waste from the winepress and threshing floor, which is not susceptible to impurity.
  R. Yirmiyah objects that we could still interpret the verse as referring to food products. We could interpret “winepress” as referring to solidified wine coming from the region of Senir, which is similar to fig-cakes. Such material is susceptible to impurity and could be used as skhakh (although I wouldn’t want to sit in a sukkah with congealed wine as my cover!).
  R. Zera laments that he thought they had an answer to the source of the halakhah that skhakh must be from the ground and not susceptible to impurity, but after R. Yirmiyah’s difficulty, we have no answer.Not to worry, R. Ashi comes to the rescue! The Torah uses the word “from” before threshing floor and winepress. This implies that the skhakh must come from them but not be their main product—the actual wine or grain.
  In the book of Nehemiah, after returning to Israel and renewing the covenant, Ezra reads in the Torah and tells the people to go out to the mountain and use these species to build a sukkah.[1] These branches grow from the ground and are not susceptible to impurity.
  The problem the rabbis have with the verse is that it mentions myrtle twice, since the rabbis consider the “thick tree” to also be a myrtle tree (see Leviticus 23:40).R. Hisda therefore interprets the verse to refer to both mitzvot—the sukkah and the lulav. One type of myrtle, the wild myrtle, was to be used for the sukkah since all branches can be used as skhakh. The other type of myrtle, the one referred to in the Torah, was to be used for the lulav.[1] It seems that this is how Ezra understands what one is meant to do with what we call the “four species.” Normative, rabbinic tradition, considers this a separate mitzvah, not connected to the building of a sukkah.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new mishnah.
  The Talmud will offer various explanations as to why these things cannot be used for skhakh. Once any of them is untied, they are valid for skhakh because they all grow from the ground and are not susceptible to impurity.The final section teaches that everything that is invalid for the skhakh is valid for the walls. When it comes to the walls all we are concerned about is that there are walls—we are not at all concerned with the material of the walls.
  R. Yaakov heard R. Yohanan his teacher explain two mishnayot but he’s not sure which explanation goes with which mishnah. The first mishnah is the one above. The other mishnah is one we will encounter later in this chapter. It teaches that if one hollows out an empty space in a haystack one cannot use the empty space as a sukkah.There are two reasons given for these mishnayot. The first is that one shouldn’t make his store house into a sukkah. The second is that one must actively make his sukkah. The sukkah shouldn’t be made on its own.
  Now since this is a decree lest one use his store-house [as a Sukkah] the other must have been forbidden on the ground of ‘you shall make’ [which implies], but not from that which is made.R. Yirmiyah now tries to sort out which explanation goes with which mishnah. R. Yirmiyah is familiar with another tradition stated by R. Yohanan which explains that one cannot use these bundles as skhakh lest one store his bundles up there and then later on decide to use it as his sukkah. It looks as if this is actually the other reason, “you shall make, but not from that which is made.” Rashi explains that there are actually two levels of prohibitions here. From the Torah it would be prohibited to put bundles on the sukkah and then change one’s mind and untie them to use them as skhkakh. This would indeed be a violation of the principle, “You shall make, but not from that which is made.” Since this is a toraitic prohibition, the rabbis decreed that one can never use these bundles as skhakh, even if one put them up there to use as skhakh from the outset. This is understood as “lest one make one’s storehouse into a sukkah.”Since this mishnah is explained by the principle of “lest one make one’s storehouse into a sukkah” the other mishnah, about digging in a haystack, must be explained by the reason “you shall make, but not from that which is made.” If one digs in a haystack and then uses the empty space as his sukkah, he didn’t actually make a sukkah. Meaning he didn’t put skhakh on top of his sukkah. Rather, he created negative space and it just turned out that he had skhakh above his head. This is not considered making a sukkah.
  The Talmud explains that R. Yaakov hadn’t heard this statement of R. Hiyya b. Abba. That’s why he didn’t know which explanation went with which mishnah.
  IntroductionThis section continues to deal with the explanation of the two mishnayot: 1) the prohibition of using bundles of wood for the skhakh; 2) the prohibition of making a sukkah by hollowing out a haystack.
  R. Ashi disagrees with R. Yirmiyah’s analysis. He holds that both reasons apply to both mishnayot. Using bundles of straw is prohibited because it looks like a storehouse and because one might first put it up there and then change one’s mind and untie it, thereby violating the principle, “You shall make, but not from that which is already made.” Hollowing out a haystack also looks like a storehouse and it also violates the “you shall make” principle.
  The Talmud responds on behalf of R. Yohanan why he explained the two mishnayot he did. R. Yohanan picked up on small cues from the language of the two mishnayot. When our mishnah said, “one may not use them as skhakh” it meant from the outset (lehathilah) one shouldn’t use them. But if one did, the sukkah is still valid. This type of halakhah is a “decree (gezerah)”—one shouldn’t do something, but if he did, his act is still valid. The other mishnah uses the language “it is not a sukkah.” This means that even according to toraitic law it is not a sukkah. This type of halakhah is one that would come from a midrash on the Torah such as “You shall make, and not from that which is already made.”
  
  Daf 12b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with using arrow shafts as skhakh.
  The Talmud raises the difficulty that it is obvious that male arrow shafts can be used, since they are not receptive to impurity. Why then would Rav Judah need to state an obvious halakhah? The answer is that we might have thought that it would be prohibited to use any arrow shaft, lest one come to use a female one. Therefore, he needed to state that it is permitted.
  The same difficulty is raised with regard to female shafts—isn’t it obvious that they cannot be used as skhakh? The Talmud answers that we might have thought that since the receptacle of the female arrow shaft is meant to be permanently filled by the arrowhead, we might have thought that it doesn’t count as a receptacle and this type of arrow shaft would not be susceptible to impurity. Therefore, Rav Judah teaches us that they are susceptible to impurity and cannot be used for skhakh.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with using flax stalks as skhakh. As a reminder, when things have been processed to make them usable for humans, they are more likely to be susceptible to impurity. Unprocessed plant products are not susceptible to impurity.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hana states in the name of R. Yohanan that he knows that if the flax stalks have been processed by being soaked and then baked, they can’t be used for skhakh because they are susceptible to at least some forms of impurity. And when they are in their natural state they can certainly be used. What he doesn’t know is whether they can be used in an in-between state, when they have begun to be prepared for use but are not fully prepared.
  Rabbi Yohanan says that he doesn’t know what exactly constitutes the intermediate stage. There seem to be three stages in processing the flax: soaking, pounding and combing. It might be that if it has been pounded but not yet combed it is still in the intermediate stage, but soaked and not yet pounded is still in its natural state. Or even if it has only been soaked it is already in an intermediate stage, and shouldn’t be used as skhakh, lest it is susceptible to impurity.Note that R. Yohanan doesn’t know the halakhah concerning whether one can use flax in the intermediate stage, and he doesn’t even know what constitutes this intermediate stage. You can see—even great rabbis don’t know some things!There is no answer to this question in the Talmud. Usually in such circumstances the halakhah rules strictly.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with various plant products that can or cannot be used as skhakh.
  Rav Judah says that there is no problem using either fern or wormwood as skhakh. Since these are not plants eaten by people, they are not receptive to impurity.Abaye says that wormwood cannot be used because it smells. We wouldn’t want to put anything up as skhakh that would cause people to want to leave the sukkah.
  
  Daf 13a
  
  IntroductionDaf Yod Gimmel continues where we left off, discussing types of vegetation that can or cannot be used as skhakh.
  R. Hanan b. Rava allows one to use both of these types of prickly bushes as skhakh. Abbaye, similar to his statement in yesterday’s section, says that if the skhakh might do something to cause the person to leave the sukkah, it can’t be use. Evidently the leaves of the hegeh would fall off and assumedly land in a person’s food. Therefore, this type of shrub cannot be used.
  Earlier in this chapter the mishnah stated that one could not use bundles of twigs or straw as skhakh. Here, R. Gidal allows one to use the branch of a palm tree whose branches look like they are bundled together for two reasons. First of all, something that is naturally bundled does not halakhically count as bundled. Second, even if one ties the ends by hand, bundling is only when two different things have been bundled together. If one ties together the end of one branch, this is not halakhically speaking considered “bundling.”
  This teaching is basically the same as above, just related to a different species of plant.The Talmud then cites a baraita that also allows reeds and forked reeds to be used as skhakh. The difficulty is then raised: isn’t it obvious that one can use forked reeds? The Talmud answers this by slightly emending the baraita. Instead of saying “reeds and forked reeds” it just says “forked reeds.”
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section R. Hisda made a statement about the sukkah in the name of Ravina bar Shila. As happens often in the Talmud, a different unrelated statement by the same sage is now brought.
  There are various plants one can use on Pesah to fulfill one’s obligation to eat bitter herbs. One of them is actually a plant called “marror.” R. Hisda says that one can use the type of marror known as “marror of the marsh” as his marror for Pesah.
  The Talmud raises an objection. There are certain rituals that require the use of hyssop. For instance the waters of purification ritual (red heifer ashes mixed with water) requires hyssop. The hyssop used for this ritual must be plain hyssop. If the hyssop is known by any accompanying name, it cannot be used. By extension, the same would be true of marror. Only plain “marror” could be used. Not any marror known also by an accompanying name.
  Abbaye answers that when it comes to anything that had several names before the giving of the Torah such as hyssop, when the Torah specifies plain hyssop, only plain hyssop may be used. I don’t really know how Abbaye knows that hyssop had several different names before the Torah was given. In any case, according to Abbaye marror was only known as marror before the Torah was given. Therefore, when the Torah said “marror” it didn’t necessarily mean to exclude various types of marror that have an accompanying name.
  Rava offers a different answer to the difficulty. “Marror of the marsh” is really just plain old “marror” and that’s its “full” name. It is not called “marror of the marsh” because it is a different species. It is called as such simply because it is found in the marshes.
  IntroductionOur sugya discusses bundling the hyssop used to apply the blood to the lintel and doorpost when the Israelites left Egypt (Exodus 12) or the hyssop used in the red heifer ritual (Numbers 19). While these are no longer practical issues the ramifications are still practical—what counts as bundling something up and what does not? In our tractate the practical ramification to this dispute is what counts as “bundles” such that the material cannot be used for skhakh.
  R. Hisda states that if one bundles one thing to itself it doesn’t count as “bundling.” But if one bundles three things together, they do count as having been bundled together. There is a debate over whether bundling two things together counts as bundling. To show that there is a dispute about this R. Hisda cites a dispute from Mishnah Parah 11:9 concerning the hyssop used in either the Exodus from Egypt or in the red heifer ritual. We shall see presently show how R. Hisda understands this mishnah such that the rabbis and R. Yose disagree over whether two bundled things count as a “bundle.”
  R. Yose says that if one of the stalks falls away from the original bundle of three, the remnants are still valid even if only two remain. This means that he only requires three for a “mitzvah”—meaning it is the preferred way of observing the commandment. It is not mandatory. Now if R. Yose allows a bundle to have two than the rabbis who disagree with him would require three. According to this opinion, without three the mitzvah cannot be performed. R. Hisda explains that according to the rabbis the reason that two do not count is that two stalks of hyssop tied together don’t count as a bundle.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita that proves that even R. Yose holds that at the outset one must have a bunch of three stalks of hyssop. It seems according to this baraita that R. Yose distinguishes between requirements at the outset of the performance of a mitzvah (three are required) and the remnants (two are sufficient). But this would be a difficulty to R. Hisda who said that R. Yose held that two were sufficient.
  Based on this baraita the Talmud reverses the interpretation of the Mishnah from Parah cited above. R. Yose holds that three are required (and two are valid only if there were originally three). The other sages hold that two are sufficient even at the outset, although it would be more proper to fulfill the mitzvah with three.
  Yet another baraita is brought to support the notion that the rabbis allow a bundle of two stalks of hyssop at the outset. If the bundle started with two it is valid, even if only one remained. It is only invalid if it began with only one stalk, for one stalk cannot count as a bundle.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty that the above baraita seems to contradict itself. At the end the baraita says that if only one remains it is invalid. But at the very beginning of the same baraita it says that if one remains it is valid.The resolution is to emend the end of the baraita. It is invalid if the number at the outset matches the legal number of remnants—one.In sum, from this mishnah and baraita we have proven that R. Yose requires a bundle of three for the hyssop. Anything less than three is not a “bundle.” The other rabbis say that a bundle of two also counts as a bundle. This same debate concerning the hyssop would apply to the skhakh. If two things are bundled together the rabbis would disqualify them for use as skhakh, but R. Yose would not. This is an excellent example of the Talmud using one topic of halakhah (the bundle of hyssop used either in Egypt or in the red heifer ritual) and applying it to another topic of halakhah (the skhakh).
  
  Daf 13b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss what counts as “bundles” such that they could not be used as skhakh.
  Meremar (a late Babylonian amora) says that the bundles of twigs sold in the marketplace in Sura, an important Jewish center in Babylonia, can be used for skhakh because the bundle is meant just for counting. The bundles are not made for storing them in this manner or for transporting them. Thus we learn that if someone bundles something together just to count it, the bundle could be used as skkakh.
  R. Abba cites another case of a bundle that can be used as skhakh, as long as the top knot is untied.
  R. Papa modifies R. Abba’s statement slightly. If the bottom knot is still fully tied, then the bundle cannot be used. But if the top knot was fully undone and the bottom knot was merely loosened, they may be used even though they are still tied together.
  R. Huna son of R. Joshua says he doesn’t even need to loosen the bottom knot of the willow bundle. Since such a bundle would fall apart if carried, it doesn’t count as a bundle.
  Shmuel says that any of the five species that can be used as marror on Pesah (see Mishnah Pesahim 2:6) also have the following three halakhic characteristics.1)     They convey impurity. This means that they can act as a “tent.” If a dead body or part thereof is found underneath one part of the vegetable and a vessel underneath the other part, the herb acts as a tent to convey the impurity from the dead body to the vessel.2)     They do not block impurity. If a dead body is underneath the herb, the herb does not block impurity from defiling a vessel found above the herb.3)     If used as skhakh they invalidate the sukkah as if it was an open gap of air space, and not as if they were invalid skhakh. The Talmud will now explain why.Clearly the reason this law is here is to teach the third principle—what the rule is if these herbs are used as skhakh.
  Why do these herbs count as open air space and not merely invalid skhakh? The reason is that they will dry up, crumble and disappear. Thus even before they crumble away, we look at the space they occupy as if nothing is there. If there are three handbreadths of open space, the sukkah is invalid. If they had been treated as invalid skhakh, there would have to be four handbreadths to invalidate the sukkah.
  The Talmud now cites another statement by R. Abba. This statement is probably brought here because the statement which follows it is related to the laws of skhakh. When one harvests grapes to press them, the stems do not become susceptible to impurity because one doesn’t need to use the stems to make wine, nor does he need to use them to hold the grapes. Things are susceptible to impurity only if one intends to use them as food or as handles to hold on to the food part of the plant.Similarly, when one harvests grain to use the stalks as skhakh the stalks themselves are not susceptible to impurity. This is because the person doesn’t want to use the kernels of the grain, since they can’t be used for skhakh anyway. Since the stalks aren’t necessary as “handles” for the kernels, they are not susceptible to impurity.
  The Talmud now explains why one amora made his statement with regard to grapes harvested for wine while the other amora made his statement with regard to ears of grain harvested to use for skhakh.The one who made the statement with regard to the grain, R. Menashye, would agree with R. Abba’s statement regarding the grapes because clearly one doesn’t want the stalks of the grapes to be harvested with the grapes. These grapes would suck up the wine and cause a loss. Since they are undesirable, they are not susceptible to impurity.However, R. Abba, who made his statement with regard to the grapes, might hold that someone actually wants to keep the grain attached to the stalks to that the grain doesn’t get lost until it is time to use it. Since he might like the grain still attached to the stalks, the stalks are considered handles to the food and they are susceptible to impurity.
  To remind ourselves, R. Menashye said that one who harvests grain to use as skhakh does not render the stalks susceptible to uncleanness, because he doesn’t want the grain to stay with the stalks. The stalks don’t count as “handles.” The Talmud now suggests that this issue is actually a tannaitic dispute found in a baraita. According to the first opinion in the baraita one can use branches that have food products on them for skhakh as long as the inedible part is greater than the edible part. The “others” say that the inedible part, the straw, must be greater than both the edible part and the stalks, the handles by which the food can be hold. The “handles” are also susceptible to impurity.According to this second opinion, when one harvests these handles with the food part and wants to use it all for skhakh he would render the handles susceptible to impurity. According to the first opinion, he does not. Therefore, using the branch with the food is just a matter of making sure that the inedible part is greater than the edible part.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section concerning one who cuts down grain to use it for skhakh. Do the stalks, the parts of the grain that holds the kernels to the rest of the plant become susceptible to impurity? Yesterday, we saw a baraita which had a tannaitic dispute on this issue.  The Talmud said that R. Abba, who said that they are not susceptible to impurity, agreed with one side of this tannaitic dispute.
  R. Abba had said that one who harvests grapes for wine does not render the stalks susceptible to impurity, but that one who harvests grain for skhakh does render them susceptible. R. Abba must admit that he follows one side in the tannaitic dispute found at the end of yesterday’s section, namely the opinion of “others” who said that produce used as skhakh does have the rule of handles—meaning the handles used to hold the produce have the status of produce. Harvesting grapes does not render the handles susceptible because he actively does not want them there.The question is can we interpret R. Menashye, who said that the handles are not susceptible to impurity when harvested for skhakh, such that he can agree with both sides of the tannaitic dispute.
  R. Menashye could answer that both tannaim, the first opinion and the “others,” agree that when one harvests produce to use for skhakh he does not render the handles susceptible to impurity. The baraita, where the “others” seem to hold that he does render the handles susceptible, refers to a case where a person originally harvested the grain for food and then changed his mind and wanted to use them for skhakh. Once he harvested them for food he rendered the “handles” susceptible to impurity. The “others” hold that they remain susceptible even afterwards when he decides to use them for skhakh.
  The Talmud now asks why the rabbis (the first opinion in the baraita) would hold that if he harvested them originally for food the handles are not susceptible to impurity, even after he changed his mind to use them for skhakh. As we shall see in the mishnah that follows once something is susceptible to impurity, simply changing one’s mind about it cannot stop it being susceptible to impurity.
  
  Daf 14a
  
  Mishnah Kelim 25:9 teaches that once a thought or action has rendered a vessel susceptible to impurity, it remains susceptible until an action is taken to annul its susceptibility (for an interpretation see there). What this means in our case is that if one harvested the grain to use it for food the handles are susceptible to impurity and remain that way even if he changes his mind and decides to use it as skhakh.
  And if you will say that this refers only to vessels which are of importance but that ‘handles’ which are needed only as aids for the eating of the food,  are made [susceptible to uncleanness] by intention and are also unmade by intention [it may be objected].You might have thought that the rule from that mishnah applies only to vessels which are of importance. But maybe, you might think, it would not apply to handles of food that are not so important. Since they are of less importance and making something a handle is only a matter of intent (your intent to use it to hold food) they can become unsusceptible to impurity merely by thought.
  The Talmud now continues the difficulty. It cites a mishnah that seems to say that once one has threshed grain on the threshing floor the handles are no longer susceptible to impurity because he has shown that he is not interested in having the grain attached to the handles.
  There are two interpretations to this mishnah. According to the first “threshing” means that he loosened the sheaves. Thus once one loosens the sheaves they are no longer susceptible to impurity. This would help us explain the rabbis in the original baraita who (according to the Talmudic interpretation) hold that if one first harvested the grain for food and then decided to use the grain for skhakh the handles are no longer susceptible to impurity. These rabbis would say that loosening the sheaves is not a real action, it is just an intent—he intends to thresh the grain. The “handles” would lose their impurity when he intends to use them for skhakh. Thus deciding to use the grain for skhakh would also cause it to lose its susceptibility.But what would we say if “threshing” meant that they actually had to be threshed. This would imply that the handles maintain their susceptibility until something is really done to them—they are threshed. Similarly, simply intending to use the grain for skhakh would not be enough to prevent the handles from being susceptible to impurity.
  The Talmud now offers another interpretation for that earlier baraita. The rabbis say that the handles are not susceptible to impurity only if he first threshed them, and then intended to use the straw and handles as skhkakh.
  Now that we’ve made the rabbis’ opinion reasonable, we have the same problem with the “others” who held that the handles are susceptible to impurity. If he threshed them why should they be susceptible to impurity?
  The “others” hold that threshing is not sufficient of an action to cause the handles to be susceptible to impurity. They remain susceptible in any case.This sugya will continue on the next page, so stay tuned!
  IntroductionAt the end of the last daf we saw a dispute between the sages and R. Yose concerning one who threshes grain—according to the rabbis the handles are no longer susceptible to impurity because he no longer needs them. The Talmud had compared the situation in that mishnah—threshing grain at the threshing floor, with the other baraita, harvesting grain to use it for skhakh. This page begins by questioning this comparison.
  The Talmud uses an explanation from R. Shimon ben Lakish found later in this sugya to explain R. Yose’s opinion from that Mishnah. R. Yose holds that even after the grain has been threshed the handles are susceptible to impurity because a person might want the handles to remain attached to the grain to make it easier to turn it over with a pitchfork.
  But, the Talmud asks, if he wants cuts down the grain to use it for skhakh what use to the “handles” have once the grain has been crushed. Why should these handles remain susceptible to impurity?
  The handles (stalks) still have use so that he can hold onto the grain when he takes the sukkah apart. Since the handles still have some use, the “others” in the original baraita say that the handles are susceptible to impurity.
  The Talmud now returns to discuss the mishnah in which the rabbis and R. Yose debate whether the handles of foodstuffs are susceptible to impurity after they have been threshed.Above we saw that R. Yohanan says that “threshing” is to be taken literally, whereas R. Elazar interprets it to mean that the bundles of sheaves were untied.
  It’s easy to understand why R. Elazar interprets “threshing” to mean that he untied the bundles. This allows us to better understand why R. Yose holds that the handles remain susceptible to impurity. R. Elazar would say that if he really threshed the grain, the handles would no longer be susceptible to impurity because he no longer needs to use them to hold the food part.But for R. Yohanan who interprets the word used for “threshing” to mean actual threshing, how can R. Yose say the handles remain susceptible to impurity?We saw the answer already at the top of this daf—he still might want the handles to be attached so that it would be easier to turn them over with a pitchfork.
  Since we just had a statement about a pitchfork, the Talmud cites a completely unrelated statement concerning the pitchfork. In Genesis 25:21 Isaac “entreats” the Lord on behalf of his barren wife. The word for entreat is ויעתר which has the same root as the word for pitchfork, עתר. R. Elazar says that prayer is compared to a pitchfork because prayer has the ability to overturn God’s harsh judgments.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to explain the next mishnah.
  Rabbi Judah holds that one can use wooden planks as skhakh whereas Rabbi Meir holds that wooden planks cannot be used.The second part of the mishnah goes according to Rabbi Meir who forbids using wooden planks.  Rabbi Meir admits that one wooden plank, even if it were wide, would not invalidate the entire sukkah, just the area that it actually covers.  Therefore, he shouldn’t sleep (or eat) underneath this plank, but he may utilize other areas of the sukkah.
  Rav says that R. Meir and R. Judah disagree only with regard to planks that are four handbreadths wide or broader. R. Meir prohibits these broad planks from being used lest one think that one can sit under an ordinary roof, which is certainly invalid.R. Judah allows such planks. But all of the tannaim, even R. Meir, agree that planks that are thinner than four handbreadths wide can be used as skhkakh. No one would think that since three handbreadth planks can be used, an ordinary roof would also be okay.
  Shmuel, an amora who was a contemporary of Rav, disagrees with Rav (this is common). He holds that if the planks are less than four handbreadths wide there is a dispute in the mishnah—R. Judah allows and R. Meir disallows. But if they are broader than four handbreadths, even R. Judah disallows their use.In sum, there is a dispute in the Mishnah and there is a dispute in the Talmud concerning the parameters of the mishnaic dispute.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty on Shmuel’s position. When he said there is a dispute if the planks are less than four handbreadths wide, did that mean that even if they are less than three handbreadths wide? Less than three handbreadths is just a stick, so why shouldn’t one use it as skhakh according to R. Meir?R. Papa explains Shmuel more thoroughly. If they are greater than four, then everyone holds that the sukkah is invalid. If they are less than three, then everyone agrees that the planks may be used. The dispute is when they are between 3 and 4 handbreadths wide. R. Judah holds that they are valid because anything less than four handbreadths is not a “place.” “Place” refers to the rules of a domain—for something to be considered a “domain” it must be at least four handbreadths in each direction. R. Meir says that as long as it is broader than three handbreadths, it invalidates the sukkah because three handbreadths is the minimum size to be out of the category called “lavud.” “Lavud” means that something is so small it is as if it doesn’t exist. Since the planks are not so small that we consider them “lavud”—they disqualify the sukkah.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues yesterday’s section in which Rav and Shmuel argued over the parameters of the dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah in the Mishnah.
  The Talmud raises the second half of the mishnah as a difficulty against Rav. Shmuel can interpret the end of the mishnah, which clearly disqualifies a sukkah with a four handbreadth plank, as representing both R. Judah and R. Meir. Both disqualify a plank that is four handbreadths or wider.However, according to Rav, R. Judah allows planks even if they are wider than four handbreadths. So how could R. Judah not allow one to sleep under such a plank?
  The Talmud basically accepts this difficulty. The second half of the mishnah accords only with R. Meir, at least according to Rav’s explanation of the mishnah.
  
  Daf 14b
  
  The Talmud now brings another baraita as a difficulty on Rav. According to the baraita two sheets whose breadth is minimal can combine together to invalidate a sukkah. But two boards placed next to each other are considered individually. As long as each is not of the measure that disqualifies a sukkah, they are both valid. R. Meir disagrees and says that boards also combine. The Talmud here is concerned with R. Meir’s opinion.Shmuel can easily interpret R. Meir’s opinion in this baraita. He would say that two boards can combine together to add up to a four handbreadth board, which all tannaim disallow.Rav, on the other hand, cannot easily interpret the baraita. Rav holds that all tannaim allow boards that are less than four handbreadths. If the boards are each more than four handbreadths, then they are already invalid (according to R. Meir) and wouldn’t need to combine. But if they are less than four handbreadths, then clearly they are valid. They are considered nothing more than mere sticks.
  The Talmud reinterprets the whole baraita. The planks are indeed four handbreadths and if in the middle of the sukkah, they would invalidate the whole sukkah according to R. Meir. The “combining” refers to a situation where they are at the side of the sukkah. Invalid skhakh at the sukkah’s side invalidates the entire sukkah only if they are four cubits wide (there are 6 handbreadths per cubit). So if there are several four handbreadth planks at the side of the sukkah, these planks would combine to invalidate the whole sukkah if there are four cubits worth of them.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains another difficulty from the Mishnah on Rav’s opinion that R. Meir and R. Judah dispute boards that are four handbreadths.
  Shmuel can explain the baraita that said that two sheets or boards combine together to invalidate a sukkah as combining together on the side to invalidate a sukkah because there would be more than four cubits between the walls and the valid skhakh. This is the same explanation that Rav gave to this baraita above in yesterday’s section.
  However, the baraita is a difficulty upon Rav who said that there is a dispute only about four handbreadth wood planks, less than that and the planks are valid. He can explain the baraita according to R. Meir who invalidates four handbreadth planks. R. Meir would say that the baraita refers to planks on the side (see above). They combine when they are on the side, but when they are in the middle, they invalidate.But to R. Judah who allows any planks (according to Rav), why would the baraita say that they do not “combine?” After all, to R. Judah, planks are nothing more than mere sticks and can be used for skhakh. Obviously they don’t combine.
  The answer is that the language in the first half of the baraita “two boards do not combine” is only there to disagree with R. Meir who says they “do combine.” To R. Judah they obviously don’t combine. Boards are always usable for skhakh (according to Rav’s interpretation of him). But R. Meir needed to say that they do combine so the baraita taught that according to R. Judah they do not. The attempt to preserve parallelism within a tannaitic source is very common.
  Introduction
  Today’s section contains a baraita that agrees with Rav and one that agrees with Shmuel.To remind ourselves: Rav holds that if the boards are four handbreadths, then R. Meir disallows and R. Judah allows. But both agree that smaller than four is valid.Shmuel holds that they dispute about boards which are smaller than four handbreadths, but that if the boards are four or more, then all agree that they are invalid.
  This baraita clearly agrees with Rav. The debate between R. Meir and R. Judah is specifically over planks/boards that are four handbreadths in width. We can deduce that they would both agree that smaller planks are valid.You might ask what this time of danger is. There are several sources that mention the “time of danger.” Most scholars assume that if these sources are historically reliable (some believe that they are not) they refer to the Bar Kochva revolt. The problem with our source is that R. Judah lived well after this time period.
  This version of the baraita agrees with Shmuel. The debate is only over planks that have a width of less than four handbreadths. If the plank is larger, everyone agrees that it is invalid.There are two additional clauses to this baraita. R. Meir says that one may not cover his entire sukkah with planks. But he agrees that one can put planks up on top of the sukkah and leave space in between each plank for valid skhakh (called here by-product because it is the unusable portions of vegetation).R. Judah’s clause is slightly harder to explain. In the first part of the baraita R. Judah says that one can’t use a plank that is four handbreadths wide. R. Meir also holds this position. So how can he say that the sukkah is valid? Rashi explains that he agrees that while one can place a four handbreadth wide plank on the side of a sukkah, where we can fictitiously consider it part of the wall, he agrees that one may not sleep under this plank.
  IntroductionToday’s section is about a person who tries to use planks for his skhakh but turns them on their side, such that the way they are placed is not by their width.
  R. Huna says that planks that are four handbreadths wide are invalid as skhakh even if they have been placed on their side where they are thinner than four. R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna say that they are valid.
  The Talmud now brings an interesting story related to the previous halakhah. R. Nahman, a sage from Nehardea, comes to Sura, where R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna are. They ask him his opinion on this issue, hoping that he will agree with them, that if he places the planks on their sides, the sukkah is valid. R. Nahman disagrees and says that they are invalid because they are like metal spits, which are always invalid for a sukkah.R. Huna, who also holds that they are invalid, now rebukes them for not agreeing with his opinion. They shouldn’t have bothered asking R. Nahman, for R. Huna already told them that such a sukkah is invalid.R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna respond that since R. Nahman explained his reasoning to them, they accepted his opinion. To this, R. Huna responds that had they asked him for his reasoning, he would have given it to them as well.I think we can see from here that it is better to explain one’s reasoning than to simply state the halakhah. Had he explained his reasoning to R. Hisda and his son from the outset, maybe they would have accepted it.
  The Talmud now tries to use a baraita to support R. Huna and R. Nahman who say that even if the planks are put on their sides, the sukkah is invalid. The baraita lists several sukkot that are invalid:1)     A sukkah that is not large enough to hold his head, most of his body and table.2)     A sukkah with a hole in the wall large enough for a goat to jump through.3)     Or if a four handbreadth plank has been put on it, even if he puts in only three handbreadths.It seems that the third clause refers to a four handbreadth plank that has been placed on its side, which is only three handbreadths. This would mean that the baraita agrees with R. Huna and R. Nahman. A four handbreadth plank is always invalid, even if laid on its three handbreadths’ side.
  The Talmud reinterprets the last clause from the baraita such that it no longer deals with the case of laying the planks down on their side. The baraita refers to a four handbreadth plank that was placed on the side of the sukkah (not on the plank’s side, on the sukkah’s side), with one handbreadth beyond the wall. The fact that one handbreadth was beyond the wall doesn’t mean that we consider it to be a three handbreadth plank for there is a principle that any skhakh protruding from the sukkah is judged as if it were part of the sukkah. This is a case of four handbreadths of plank being in the sukkah and therefore it is invalid.
  
  
  Daf 15a
  
  IntroductionThis daf begins with a new mishnah.
  Rabbi Judah relates here the opinions of Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel.  Bet Shammai holds that in order to make this roof valid he must do two things.  First of all, he must pick up every plank, loosen it and only then put it back down in its place. This seems to be a demonstrative act to show that this is a sukkah and not a house.  He must also remove every other plank so that it also looks like a sukkah and not a house.  Bet Hillel is more lenient and allows one to do one or the other—he either loosens the planks by picking them up or he removes one from between each two.  He need not do both acts.Rabbi Meir rules differently.  According to Rabbi Meir, the symbolic act of loosening the planks is not necessary nor does it help.  Rather, he must remove one out of every two planks so that the sukkah does not look like a house. This is in line and somewhat modifies what Rabbi Meir said in the previous mishnah—wooden planks may not be used.  Here we see that they can be used, but they must not be placed right next to each other.  Rather there must be gaps equal to their thickness.  Assumedly, he will fill in these gaps with other types of skhakh that clearly can be used.
  The Talmud now tries to examine the reasoning of Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel’s opinion is understandable.  They hold that one must actively make a sukkah. If the sukkah is already covered by a wood ceiling there would be two ways by which to “make” a sukkah—either to pick up each plank and then put it down again. Or one could remove one out of every other plank.But Bet Shammai’s opinion is more puzzling. If they too hold that one must “make” a sukkah, then either act (picking up or removing) should be sufficient. And if they hold that one can’t use a wooden roof because it looks too much like an ordinary roof, one that has plaster on it, then he shouldn’t have to do both acts. It should be enough to remove one out of every two.
  The Talmud answer the question by emending Bet Shammai’s statement. Instead of saying that one needs to perform both loosening and removing, one really needs to remove one out of every two. They disallow a wooden roof lest one come to allow an ordinary roof in a sukkah, one that has plaster.
  If one reads that according to the first clause of the mishnah Bet Shammai holds that one must remove one of every two, and that loosening is not sufficient, then what is the difference between Bet Shammai and R. Meir from the end of the mishnah.
  The Talmud now re-explains the end of the mishnah. R. Meir doesn’t offer a different opinion. He just says that Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai don’t actually disagree about this matter. Both say that one must remove one out of every two in order to make the wooden roof valid.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section. It relates back to the mishnah, where R. Judah said that Bet Hillel allowed one to either loosen or remove one plank out of every two from a wooden roof and thereby make a valid sukkah. R. Meir said one had to remove one out of every two. Loosening wasn’t sufficient.
  In essence, this mishnah relates that R. Judah does not worry lest one’s skhakh looks like an ordinary roof. That is why he allows one to simply loosen and put back every plank. R. Meir is concerned lest the skhakh look like an ordinary roof and therefore makes him remove one out of every two. But this is the same debate that we had in the previous mishnah. R. Judah allows one to use planks and R. Meir does not. So why would we need another mishnah to teach the exact same thing.
  R. Hiyya b. Abba says that only our mishnah actually talks about the use of regular planks. The previous mishnah had nothing to do with regular planks that might look like a ceiling. Rather, the planks being referred to there have already been planed. These may not be used because they look too much like vessels, which are susceptible to impurity and therefore may never be used.
  The Talmud now says that R. Hiyya’s statement could be used as a difficulty on R. Judah’s statement from a few pages ago. R. Judah said one can use plain arrowshafts as skhakh because these shafts are not susceptible to impurity. He doesn’t disallow plain shafts lest one come to use bored shafts that have a receptacle, which are susceptible to impurity. Anything susceptible to impurity is never valid as skhakh.So if R. Hiyya says that one may not use something that even looks like a vessel lest someone use something that is a vessel, why would R. Judah allow one to do so.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended with a difficulty—if we interpret the previous mishnah to be dealing with planed planks and Rabbi Meir doesn’t allows them lest one come to use a regular ceiling, then why doesn’t he forbid one from using regular arrow shafts lest one come to use bored arrow shafts.This returns us to our original difficulty—does the mishnah about a non-plastered ceiling teach the same thing as the previous mishnah about the planks?
  Both mishnayot, the previous mishnah in which Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir argued over whether one can use planks as skhakh and this mishnah, where Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah argue over whether Bet Hillel allows one to merely loosen the planks of an already existent sukkah, are over the same issue: do we disallow planks lest one come to use regular roofing including plaster? If this same dispute occurs in both mishnayot, then why did it need to be taught twice?
  The answer is that the second mishnah is in a sense a continuation of the conversation between the two that began in the first. Rabbi Judah who allows these planks tells Rabbi Meir that his opinion matches that of Bet Shammai. Since we know that the halakhah is like Bet Hillel (or so the Talmud assumes) Rabbi Meir must be wrong.Rabbi Meir then responds that the two houses do not disagree upon this matter. Both agree that if the ceiling already exists, what he must do is remove one out of every two planks. That is not Bet Shammai’s opinion—that is everyone’s opinion.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss the dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah in this mishnah about a wooden roof that has no plastering. Why does R. Meir make one remove one out of every two planks while R. Judah says it is sufficient to merely loosen the boards?
  Rav says that R. Meir and R. Judah disagree concerning planks that are four handbreadths wide. He can interpret both mishnayot as being about whether we prohibit using planks lest one come to use ordinary roofing, as we did at the end of yesterday’s section.
  But Shmuel holds that the dispute is about smaller planks, and such planks are not generally used to make a ceiling. If so, what then is the dispute in the second mishnah?
  The sugya ends with a different interpretation of the second mishnah, about the roof with no plaster. Rashi explains that Shmuel could hold that if one was coming to make new skhakh even R. Judah would agree that he couldn’t use planks that are four handbreadths wide, because he decrees lest one sit under ordinary roofing. But the second mishnah deals with a roof that’s already built, and the question is how does one annul it from becoming a roof. According to R. Judah, if one loosens the planks, it shows that he knows that he is using them for his sukkah and that is sufficient to make the sukkah valid, at least according to Bet Hillel. Such a person knows that he can’t sit under ordinary roofing, so there is no reason to be strict. R. Meir disagrees and holds that even if he demonstrates that he is using them for a sukkah, it is still not valid until he removes one out of every two.
  IntroductionOur sugya begins with a new mishnah.
  ExplanationNeither iron spits nor bedposts can be used as skhakh because they are both made of metal.  However, they can be put on top of the sukkah as long as there is valid skhakh between the posts or spits and the valid skakhah is of at least equal quantity to the metal.In the second clause of the mishnah a person does not make a sukkah but rather the sukkah is made by his hollowing out a hole in a haystack. The Talmud will discuss why such a sukkah is invalid.
  The Talmud tries to use our mishnah as a difficulty upon R. Huna son of R. Joshua. R. Huna implies that if the breach, the non-covered part, of the skhakh is equal to the part that is existent, the sukkah is invalid. The mishnah says that if there is valid skhakh in between the invalid metal poles equal to the metal poles, then the sukkah is valid. Thus as long as the valid skhakh is equal to the invalid part (poles or nothing) the sukkah is valid.We should note that R. Huna and R. Papa were really arguing about walls that determine a domain for Shabbat. The Gemara is applying their dispute to a different case, that of skhakh.
  R. Huna could answer that when the mishnah says “equals” it doesn’t mean that the space of the valid skhakh is exactly equivalent to the poles. What it really means is that the valid skhakh of an equivalent size to the invalid poles can easily pass through the spaces left in between the poles. This would mean that there was more space for valid skhakh then for the invalid stuff.
  
  Daf 15b
  
  The Talmud continues to raise a difficulty. If they are so close in size, then it is still possible for him to measure them exactly. And if so, there again is a difficulty on R. Huna. If when the valid part is exactly the same as the invalid part the sukkah is valid, then the same would be true for a case where the open part was the same as the closed part. It too would be valid.R. Ammi says that the mishnah refers to a case where the valid skhakh is actually greater than the invalid poles. If they are the same, the sukkah is indeed invalid.Rava offers a different explanation. Such a sukkah could be valid if the valid and invalid skhakh were equal but placed in different directions.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to explain the next line of the mishnah—why one can’t use the long boards of a bed as skhakh.
  The Talmud begins by suggesting that our mishnah supports a statement made by R. Ammi b. Tavyomi that one cannot use discarded vessels as skhakh. Later we shall see that these are worn out pieces of clothing (which are called vessels in rabbinic Hebrew). Once these pieces of cloth are smaller than three handbreadths squared, they are no longer susceptible to impurity. Nevertheless, R. Ammi holds that they may not be used as skhakh. So too, our mishnah might refer to bed boards which have worn out and are no longer susceptible to impurity. Despite the fact that they are not susceptible to impurity, they may not be used as skhkakh.   
  The Talmud now rejects the support of R. Ammi from our mishnah.Elsewhere (we shall see the context below) R. Hanan explained in the name of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] that a mishnah referred to the long or short board with two short legs attached. The long and short board are the sides of a bed—either the long side of the bed with one leg from the head and one leg from the foot or the short side of the bed with two legs from the head or two legs from the foot. Such a long (or short) board is still susceptible to impurity (to be explained below). So too in the context of skhakh we are talking about the long board with two legs attached which is still susceptible to impurity and therefore cannot be used as skhakh. The implication is that if the long board did not have the legs attached it would not susceptible to impurity, and it could be used as skhakh. This would mean that the mishnah does not support R. Ammi b. Tovyami—worn out vessels that are no longer usable can be used for skhakh.
  
  Daf 16a
  
  The Talmud now searches for the original context of R. Hanan’s statement. It was made in the context of Mishnah Kelim 18:9. According to R. Eliezer a bed can become impure when it is assembled and if unassembled it cannot be purified again in a mikveh until it is reassembled.The sages say it can be made unclean when unassembled and purified when unassembled.
  R. Hanan explains the sages’ opinion from the mishnah. The bed can become impure and be purified when the parts into which it has become disassembled are still usable. This, according to R. Hanan is the long board with two legs or the short board with two legs. Both of these are usable by propping up one side on the wall and then forming a bed by weaving ropes between the long or short board and the wall. Note that I have explained this Talmud without the words “and sitting upon it.” The Talmud describes one way of using these boards with their legs, not two.
  IntroductionOur daf begins by discussing a statement cited on the previous daf concerning the use of worn out vessels (clothing) as skkakh.
  R. Ammi doesn’t allow one to use worn out discarded vessels as skhakh. We should note that this is true even if they follow the other rules governing skhakh. The cloth is from a plant so this is something that grew from the ground and is no longer attached to the ground. Second, discarded vessels are no longer susceptible to impurity. Nevertheless, they can’t be used as skhakh.Abaye explains that these discarded vessels are small pieces of cloth, so small that even poor people wouldn’t use them. Anything larger than that cannot be used for skhakh because it is susceptible to impurity.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita that agrees with R. Ammi b. Tavyomi. However, the agreement is subtle. The baraita says that matting made of reed or rushes can never be used for skhakh. Since this matting was once a vessel, it can never be used for skhakh even if it is now smaller than the minimum measure.However, a large mat of reeds was never made to be a vessel. We can assume that such a mat was made for skhakh from the outset.  A small mat of reeds may have been made for sitting or lying upon. Since it is a vessel it cannot be used for skhakh.R. Eliezer says that a large mat made of reeds may also have been made for sitting or lying upon and therefore it too may not be used as skhakh.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with the next clause in the mishnah, concerning one who hollows out a haystack to make a sukkah. Is such a sukkah always disqualified?
  R. Huna says that the sukkah is invalid only if there is not an empty space of at least one handbreadth high by seven handbreadths wide. But if the empty space is of this minimum size, the sukkah is valid because it is wide enough.The Talmud finds support for R. Huna’s position in the contradiction between a baraita that says that such a sukkah is valid and the mishnah says that it is not a valid sukkah. The resolution is that the baraita refers to a case where the empty space is one handbreadth by seven handbreadths whereas the mishnah refers to a case without such an empty space.
  This section is the same as the previous one just structured differently. This section begins by noting the contradiction between the baraita and the mishnah. R. Huna’s statement resolves this difficulty. This is different from the previous version where R. Huna’s statement was independently corroborated by the baraita and the mishnah.
  IntroductionToday’s section starts with another new mishnah.
  The walls of the sukkah must be ten handbreadths high.  However, there is a special rule according to which a gap of less than three handbreadths is not considered sufficient to render a sukkah invalid. Therefore, if he suspends the walls on a pole above the ground and the walls do not fully reach the ground but they are less than three handbreadths from the ground, the sukkah is valid.  In other words, we look at those three handbreadths as if they don’t exist.  Of course, the total height of the walls must be ten handbreadths, as we learn in the next section. But if the gap is larger than three handbreadths, then we can’t count the walls as having reached the ground.If he raises the walls from the ground upwards, the walls do not have to go all the way up to reach the skhakh.  It is sufficient for the walls to be ten handbreadths high, when measured from the ground. Ten handbreadths is about one meter high. This is the standard minimum height for matters which require a wall.Rabbi Yose disagrees with the opinion in section one.  He says that the same rule concerning raising the walls from the floor to the skhakh applies if he suspends the walls from the skhakh.  As long as the walls are ten handbreadths they are valid, even if they don’t reach within three handbreadths of the ground.  To reiterate:  the debate between Rabbi Yose and the other sages is with regard to a ten handbreadth wall hanging down from the skhakh (assumedly from a pole upon which the skhakh rests) which does not reach to within three handbreadths of the ground.  Rabbi Yose says this is valid whereas the other sages say it is not.  According to the sages it must reach within three handbreadths of the ground.
  The first opinion in the mishnah holds that a hanging partition, one that doesn’t reach within three handbreadths of the ground, does not render the sukkah valid. R. Yose holds that it does. This is the Talmud’s way of basically creating an abstract principle from the concrete debate in the mishnah. It is also the way of segueing to the next section, where we will see tannaim who dispute the same issue.
  The Talmud now cites Mishnah Eruvin 8:6. My interpretation here is taken from my mishnah commentary.Without a partition, it is forbidden for residents of either courtyard to draw from the cistern on Shabbat, since it belongs partly to other people, since half of the cistern is in other people’s domains.  The only way that both sides can use the cistern on Shabat is if they make a special partition, more than just the wall that separates the two courtyards.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, it doesn’t matter whether or not the partition is above or below the water, it is effective.  In the Talmud, Rav Judah explains that “below the water” means that most of the partition is below the water, whereas “above the water” means that most of the partition is above the water, but there is at least some partition, at least one handbreadth, in the water.According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, this question was debated by Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai.  Bet Shammai holds that the partition must be below the water, a more stringent position.  The partition must actually divide the water between the two courtyards so that the residents of different courtyards are not really sharing any of the water.  In contrast, Bet Hillel is lenient and allows the partition to be above or below the water.  The anonymous opinion in section one was according to Bet Hillel.According to Rabbi Judah, the wall that separates the two courtyards is sufficient in and of itself to allow the residents of both courtyards to draw from the cistern.  The wall which is above the cistern is fictionally drawn down through the cistern and is considered as if it divides the cistern in half, even if in reality it does not.
  
  Daf 16b
  
  Rabbah b. Bar Hana matches the opinion of R. Judah from this mishnah in Eruvin with R. Yose in our mishnah from Sukkah. Both hold the abstract concept that a hanging partition validates. R. Judah spoke about a hanging partition above the cistern, which allowed both courtyards to draw water on Shabbat. R. Yose spoke about the wall of the sukkah suspended from above. It validated the sukkah. 
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section Rabbah b. Rav Hannah said that R. Judah’s opinion from Mishnah Eruvin accorded completely with R. Yose’s opinion from Mishnah Sukkah. The Talmud now says that neither tanna (mishnaic sage) agrees with the other.
  R. Judah disagrees with R. Yose who allows the hanging partition in the sukkah because a sukkah is a toraitic commandment. Therefore, we need to be strict. In contrast, the use of an eruv for a courtyard is only of rabbinic origin, therefore R. Judah can rule leniently and allow a hanging partition.
  R. Yose allows one to hang a partition in a sukkah because a sukkah is “only” a positive commandment. In contrast, transgressing Shabbat is punishable by stoning, which the rabbis consider to be the most severe form of the death penalty. Therefore, R. Yose disagrees with R. Judah and doesn’t allow using a hanging partition to divide the cistern shared by the two courtyards.This section shows a typical rabbinic hierarchy of commandments. Positive commandments (sukkah, lulav, mezuzah, etc) are considered to be lighter than negative commandments (Shabbat, adultery, idol worship, etc.). Therefore, rules that apply to the sukkah will not necessarily apply to Shabbat.
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of yesterday’s section concerning the validity of hanging partitions.
  The Talmud now refers to an incident that occurred in Tzippori. R. Yose was no longer alive when the incident occurred so, the Talmud wonders, whom did they ask. The answer is R. Yose’s own son, R. Yishmael son of R. Yose.
  R. Dimi comes to Babylonia and tells the story of forgetting to bring a Torah scroll to a certain synagogue on Shabbat. It seems that the Torah scroll was in an adjacent courtyard and they needed to carry it from one courtyard to the other, but they hadn’t set up an appropriate eruv (actually, in this case it’s called a “shituf” which allows one to carry from one courtyard to another in the same alleyway) before Shabbat (an eruv/shituf is a shared meal that allows one to carry from one courtyard to another). To remedy the problem they took sheets that were already spread over pillars and hung them down. Despite the fact that these sheets didn’t reach all the way to the ground, they counted as partitions for R. Yose and his son hold that hanging partitions are valid.
  IntroductionSince using matting as skhakh was mentioned earlier on this daf, the Talmud now discusses using matting as a wall for a Sukkah. Note that the question here is not about the material—any material is valid as a wall. The question is about size and position.
  One can use a four handbreadth wide mat as a wall by suspending it in the middle of a ten handbreadth space, the minimum size of a sukkah wall. This allows us to invoke the principle of “lavud” which states that a space less than three handbreadths is nullified. The mat is considered next to the ground and next to the top by being three handbreadths away from each.
  The Talmud explains the innovation is R. Hisda’s statement. You might have thought that one can invoke the principle of “lavud” only once, either at the bottom or at the top. R. Hisda lets us know that you can invoke it both times, to fictionally consider the wall as reaching the bottom and fictionally reaching the top as well.
  According to this baraita, the matting must be seven handbreadths, which implies that you could invoke the principle of “lavud” only once. A four handbreadth mat would not be sufficient.
  The Talmud resolves that this baraita does not refer to a wall used for a minimum size sukkah. Rather it refers to a wall used for a larger sukkah. The seven handbreadth mat is hung within three handbreadths of the top of the sukkah, thereby creating a fictitious ten handbreadths wall. It need not go all the way to the bottom of the sukkah, because this baraita follows the opinion of R. Yose who allows hanging partitions.
  R. Ammi allows one to use a four handbreadth board as a wall as long as he puts it three handbreadths away from the adjacent wall. This allows us to invoke the principle of “lavud” to achieve the requisite seven handbreadth wall.The Talmud asks what new thing R. Ammi teaches us. In the Talmud’s opinion we have already learned the principle of “lavud” on several occasions. We don’t need another example from R. Ammi. The answer is that R. Ammi teaches us that the minimum size of a sukkah is seven handbreadths.
  
  Daf 17a
  
  IntroductionToday’s daf begins with a new mishnah.
  The walls of a sukkah must be no less than three handbreadths horizontally removed from the skhakh.  Otherwise there is a three handbreadth gap in the roof of the sukkah, which would mean that that wall could not count as one of the walls of the sukkah.In the second case described in the mishnah a person opened a hole in the roof of his house and covered the hole with valid skhakh.  This is a valid sukkah as long as the hole which has been filled with skhakh is less than four cubits from the walls. [Three handbreadths is the maximum empty space, four cubits the maximum filled space].  This space between the walls and skhakh is not open, but rather has a regular roof (plaster and wood).  The roof is considered as if it is part of the walls, at least for a distance of four cubits.  As an aside, there are people who actually do this.  They have a retractable roof, less than four cubits from the walls and they open it up on Sukkot and have a sukkah in their house!The mishnah then notes another possible circumstance in which this halakhah is applicable. A courtyard is surrounded by a section of columns and covered with a roof. This covered roof is made of invalid skhakh.  In such a case, the open space is slightly removed from the walls.  If he covers the open space with valid skhakh and the walls are no more than four cubits from the skhakh, then the sukkah is valid.The final case is pretty much the same halakhic situation as that in the first two.  Again, a person has a sukkah in which there is some distance from the skhakh in the middle to the walls on the side.  If he fills in this gap with material that is invalid for a sukkah (perhaps he does not have enough kosher material which he can use) than the sukkah is valid.  Obviously, in all three cases in the mishnah, when he goes to sit or dwell in the sukkah, he must sit underneath the valid skhakh for it is only there that we can consider him to have a sukkah.
   The mishnah seems to repeat itself several times. The three cases in the mishnah (the house with the opening, the courtyard or the sukkah distanced from the walls) all teach the same principle. In order for the walls to be considered part of the sukkah they must be no more than four horizontal handbreadths from the skhakh. So why teach this same principle three times?
  The Talmud will now explain why we need all three cases. If we had only learned the case of the house we might have said that those walls can count towards the sukkah because those walls were made to enclose that which is in within them. However, the courtyard’s walls were not made for the area with the columns. They were made for the house inside. Therefore, you might have thought that we can’t count with the sukkah put on top of the columns. The mishnah teaches us that we can.
  If the mishnah had included just the first two examples, then we might have thought that if he puts up invalid skhakh around the outsides of his large sukkah, the sukkah would be invalid. Invalid skhakh would be problematic because someone who sees it would think that one can sit in a sukkah with this material as skhakh. Therefore the mishnah teaches us that this case is also valid. As long as this gap is filled and the walls are no more than four cubits from the valid skhakh, the sukkah is valid.
  IntroductionToday’s section has an extended discussion between Rabbah and the other rabbis concerning the mishnah with which we began the daf.
  Rabbah finds the rabbis in the house of Rav, which is probably a house of study of some sort, and they say the following halakhah. If there is an open gap of three handbreadths in the skhakh, it is invalid. If there is a strip of invalid skhakh that is four handbreadths in size, it disqualifies the sukkah.
  Rabbah responds by assuming that they derive this halakhah from our mishnah. The mishnah states that if he distances the skhakh from the walls by three handbreadths, the sukkah is not valid. From here you could learn that open air space invalidates if it is three handbreadths.The problem is that the very same mishnah teaches that invalid skhakh only invalidates if it is four cubits, not four handbreadths. A cubit is equivalent to five handbreadths. So it is much larger.
  The rabbis respond by citing Rav and Shmuel’s explanation of that mishnah. The mishnah allows four cubits of invalid skhakh because this was the skhakh adjacent to the wall. This skhakh is considered to be part of the wall—as it is a “curved wall” extending up and over. If the invalid skhakh is found in the middle of the sukkah, then four handbreadths of it invalidates the whole sukkah.
  Rabbah challenges them by presenting them with the following scenario. There is invalid skhakh that is less than four handbreadths next to an open space that is less than three handbreadths. This sukkah is valid. If he fills in the empty space with metal spits (invalid skhakh) then the sukkah is invalid. Thus air space is treated more leniently than invalid skhakh even though generally the rules regarding open spaces in the sukkah are more stringent.
  The other rabbis point out that the same problem occurs with Rabbah’s halakhah (invalid skhakh invalidates the sukkah only if there is 4 cubits of it). If there is invalid skhakh less than four cubits next to open air less than three handbreadths, the sukkah is valid. Just as above, if he fills it in with invalid skhakh, the total invalid skhakh is now over four cubits and the sukkah is invalid. But again, why should the rules regarding invalid skhakh be more stringent than those regarding open air.
  
  Daf 17b
  
  Rabbah responds by differentiating between the reasoning lying behind his halakhah and the reasoning behind the halakhah of the other rabbis. Rabbah explains that four cubits is the “standard size”—it is the accepted measure of invalid skhakh that invalidates a sukkah. Rabbah knows that this is the measure of invalid skhakh because it is found in the mishnah. If there isn’t this measure, and there is less than four cubits of invalid skhakh next to less than three handbreadths of open air, the sukkah is still valid.But the other rabbis who say four handbreadths of invalid skhakh invalidates the sukkah hold that the reasoning is that four handbreadths is sufficient to divide the sukkah. Four handbreadths is the minimum measure for something to count as a place unto itself. Therefore, if there is a “place” large enough to divide the sukkah, then the skhakh cannot all be counted as part of one sukkah. If this is so, then why should three handbreadths of invalid skhakh next to two handbreadths of open air, which is valid, be different from four handbreadths of invalid skhakh, which is invalid.
  IntroductionAccording to Rabbah in yesterday’s section invalid skhakh and open air do not join together to invalidate a sukkah. Abaye, Rabbah’s student, points out that sometimes they do.
  In a small sukkah that is seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths, the measure of either invalid skhakh or open air that would disqualify the sukkah would be 3 handbreadths. And in such a case, clearly the open air and invalid skhkakh would join together to invalidate the sukkah. Since they can join together in a small sukkah, Abaye argues against Rabbah that they should indeed join together to invalidate even in a large sukkah.
  Rabbah responds that the reason in a small sukkah three handbreadths disqualifies for both open air and invalid skhakh is not because the measures are equal. They just happen to be equal in such a small sukkah. Rather, the reason that they join together in that case is that since three is greater than the measure of “lavud”—the minimum measure to count as significant— it turns out that the remaining valid skhakh, less than four handbreadths, would not sufficient to have a valid sukkah, which needs to be seven handbreadths.
  The Talmud continues to object to Rabbah who stated that whenever there are different measures the different items don’t join together to be susceptible to impurity.This mishnah (Kelim 27:2) teaches that there is a different measure for susceptibility to impurity depending on the material. Cloth (a garment) is the most expensive material and therefore it is susceptible even if it is only three handbreadths squared. Sacking, leather, and matting each have slightly higher minimum measures.A baraita related to this mishnah teaches that two of these materials can join together. Thus if one has 2 handbreadths of garment sewn together with three handbreadths of leather, the piece is susceptible to impurity, despite the fact that they have separate measures.
  The Talmud now explains that the case of the minimum size for a garment is different because in certain situations all of these materials have the same minimum measure. If anyone cuts and evens out a piece of one handbreadth square from any of them, it is susceptible to the impurity conveyed by a zav (a person with unusual genital discharge) who sits on it. In other words, while generally they each have their own distinct minimum measure to be susceptible, in at least one case they are the same. That is why they can join together even in other cases to become large enough to be susceptible.As an addendum the Talmud asks what one could possibly do with such a small piece of material. The answer is that one could patch up the saddle of a donkey. Thus, if cut properly, even a very small piece of cloth, leather, etc. can have use and be susceptible to impurity.
  The above discussion (from section 2 of this daf) was the way that the rabbis in Sura, a center of learning in Babylonia, taught this material. They taught it as a long dialogue between Rabbah and the other rabbis.In Nehardea, a different center of learning, they taught the same debate but it in a different manner, ascribed to different sages. Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel that there is a difference between invalid skhakh on the sides and invalid skhakh in the middle. On the sides, it invalidates only if there are four cubits. But if in the middle, it invalidates if there are four handbreadths. This accords with the opinion of the rabbis in the previous discussion.In contrast, Rav holds that the same measure of four cubits applies in both places. This accords with Rabbah’s opinion above.
  The Talmud uses the mishnah to raise a difficulty on Shmuel. The mishnah holds that one plank of four handbreadths does not invalidate the sukkah. This accords with Rav who holds that in the middle of a sukkah, four handbreadths of invalid skhakh does not invalidate the entire sukkah. But Shmuel holds that in the middle of the sukkah four handbreadths does invalidate. Thus the mishnah presents Shmuel with a difficulty.
  The difficulty is resolved by saying that the plank was on the side of the sukkah. When placed at the side Shmuel agrees that four handbreadths does not disqualify.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now cites another baraita which presents a difficulty to the earlier version of Rav’s opinion (the “Sura” version, the position held by the rabbis of the house of Rav). Rav held that four handbreadths of invalid skhakh invalidates the sukkah if placed in the middle of the sukkah.
  We have seen this baraita before (daf 14a). It teaches that according to R. Meir, if one places side by side two boards that are each not the minimum measure to disqualify the sukkah, they join together to disqualify the sukkah.If Rav holds that four cubits of invalid skhkakh disqualifies the sukkah, then we can make sense of the baraita. The two planks combine together to add up to the four cubits.
  But if Rav holds that four handbreadths invalidates in the middle as well (the opinion of the rabbis of the “house of Rav” in the Sura version), then we have trouble understanding this baraita. If each board is four handbreadths itself then it need not combine with another board. Even one such board invalidates the sukkah.And if the board is less than four handbreadths, then it is not invalid skhakh (Rav holds that all tannaim allow boards less than four handbreadths, see 14a).  So how can we understand this baraita.
  The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that the baraita refers to boards which are each four handbreadths placed on the side of the sukkah. There they do not invalidate the entire sukkah unless together they combine to be four cubits.
  
  
  Daf 18a
  
  IntroductionToday brings us to the exciting conclusion of the debate concerning how much invalid skhakh disqualifies a sukkah when placed in the middle of the sukkah.
  In this baraita R. Meir and R. Judah disagree about whether one can use planks that are four handbreadths wide. While both agree that one couldn’t use such planks as skhakh for the whole sukkah, R. Meir (and all the more so R. Judah) allows one to use some planks as skhakh, as long as one puts valid skhakh equal to the size of the invalid skhakh in between each plank.Clearly, this baraita follows the opinion of the amoraim who hold that in the middle of the sukkah invalid skhakh needs to be four cubits to invalidate the whole sukkah. For if one plank of four handbreadths would invalidate the skhkah, how would putting valid skhakh between it and the next four handbreadth plank help matters?
  R. Huna finds a scenario where four handbreadths of invalid skhakh do invalidate the sukkah, but there is still a valid sukkah created. The sukkah is exactly eight cubits in width. And he puts a plank on both sides and then works inward, alternating valid skhakh with invalid planks. In the middle there will be two sections of valid skhakh, each four handbreadths in width. This is sufficient to form a valid sukkah. The walls count because the invalid skhakh is only on the side. If the sukkah were any larger, then you wouldn’t have a valid patch in the middle and it would be invalid.Although I don’t usually get in to halakhic matters in these pages, since you spent so long invested in learning this material, I will tell you that the halakhah follows the opinion that four handbreadths invalidates even in the middle of the sukkah. So be careful when you make your sukkah.
  IntroductionWe continue to discuss how large a gap of air invalidates a sukkah.
   Abaye holds that if one wants to diminish a gap in a sukkah there is a difference between a large and a small sukkah. A three handbreadth gap in a large sukkah can be diminished even with invalid skhakh because once he diminishes the gap, there will no longer be a three handbreadth gap of air.However, if the sukkah is small he can diminish it with sticks, which are valid as skhakh. Since a less than three handbreadth gap is negligible (lavud), the sukkah is valid. However, if he does so with spits, which are not valid skhakh, the sukkah is not valid, even though there isn’t a minimum measure of air space or a minimum measure of invalid skhakh. Since of the seven handbreadths of the sukkah (the minimum measure of a sukkah) more than three aren’t valid (either air or spits) there isn’t sufficient skhakh to validate the sukkah.
  The Talmud limits Abaye’s statement to a case of a gap on the side of the skhakh. If there is an air gap of less than three handbreadths on the side of the sukkah, the sukkah remains valid for we can invoke the rule of “lavud.” However, when it comes to such a gap in the middle of the sukkah, there is a dispute between two amoraim. One holds that the rule applies in the middle as well. The other holds that it does not.
  The amora (we don’t know which one) who holds that the rule of lavud applies in the middle derives this from a baraita. The baraita is not discussing a sukkah but rather the beams laid across an entrance to an alleyway on Shabbat. These beams are part of the eruv system and allow one to carry from one courtyard to another on Shabbat. One thing that needs to be done is to lay a beam across the alleyway entrance. The baraita teaches that as long as there is not a gap of three handbreadths between the beam and the wall or between one beam and the other, the system works. This is even true if the gap is in the middle, one beam coming from one side and the other beam coming from the other side. Thus the rule of “lavud” can be applied even in the middle.
  The amora who holds that the rule of lavud is not invoked in the middle rejects the proof from the baraita because all of the rules of eruvin, including the beam that allows one to carry from one alleyway to another, are only “derabanan”—of rabbinic origin.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we saw one amora who holds that we don’t invoke the principle of lavud when the gap is in the middle of the sukkah. The Talmud now attempts to find a source for this position.
  The Talmud cites Ohalot 10:1 as proof that we don’t invoke the principle of lavud when the gap is in the middle. The mishnah discusses the formation of an “ohel” a tent. If there is a dead body or piece thereof in the tent the impurity spreads throughout the tent. Without getting into the details of this mishnah (see my commentary on that mishnah in Mishnah Yomit), clearly a one handbreadth hole is sufficient enough to let the impurity out, if the unclean object is directly underneath. Thus one handbreadth is not lavud when in the middle of the house.
  The other position, which holds that there is “lavud” in the middle, responds by claiming that the laws of uncleanness are different because they have been learned in a special tradition. But this tradition is specific to the laws of uncleanness. And wouldn’t extend to the laws of sukkah.
  R. Judah b. Ilai expounds a halakhah which he subsequently explains to match that in the mishnah. If one opens a hole in the roof of his house, he can put skhakh there and have a valid sukkah as long as it is not more than four cubits between the skhakh and the walls of the house.
  This section is here only because the same rabbi is “expounding” and the same rabbi asks him to explain his words. Here he allows one to eat a small fish called the “abruma.”  The problem with buying the abruma is that it is sold in bunches and sometimes one can’t tell if there are forbidden foods (perhaps crustaceans) mixed in with them. R. Judah b. Ilai explains that it depends on where it comes from. Some places sell the abruma mixed in with all sorts of forbidden foods and from those places it is forbidden. Tomorrow’s section will continue discussing this fish.
  IntroductionToday’s section connects with the end of yesterday’s section where R. Judah b. Ilai allowed one to eat the abruma fish under certain circumstances.
  Abaye allows one to eat a certain fish called the tzahanta, another small fish, from a place in Babylonia called the “Bab Nahara” (which literally means the Gate River). The Talmud asks why it’s permitted.The first possibility is that this river is so fast unclean fish that don’t have spinal cords (eels?) can’t live there. But this simply isn’t true. Eels and other spineless unkosher fish can live in fast rivers. So we need a new reason.
  Again, just because this is a salty river (or maybe its near the sea?) doesn’t mean that unclean fish that don’t have scales can’t live there.
  The Talmud finally answers that this river is muddy and evidently the Talmud doesn’t think that unclean fishes live in muddy waters. Since I’m not an ichthyologist I won’t comment.
  Before you go run off to order a tzahanta in a restaurant, Ravina also said that nowadays, we can’t eat those little fishes anymore because the two rivers that flow into it have unclean fish. And since you can’t be sure that there are no unclean fishes mixed in, you can’t eat the tzahanta anymore. Go have some sardines instead.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with a place in front of a Roman style building called the “exedra” (there is an entry for this on Wikipedia, you can look it up). Rashi explains that in courtyards that were surrounded by the houses, there was a covered open area called the exedra. Our sugya refers to a sukkah built in the open space not covered by the roof of the exedra. The skhakh is resting on the exedra roof. This was also referred to in the mishnah that began daf yod zayin.
  Rashi explains that the sukkah built on top of the exedra is too far from the walls of the house for those walls to count. As we learned in the mishnah, if the walls are more than four cubits from the skhakh, the walls cannot count as part of the sukkah. However, if there are pillars that hold up the roof of the exedra and there are less than three handbreadths between each pillar, the sukkah is valid. In this case, the pillars can count as the wall and the sukkah is valid.However, there is a debate between Abaye and Rava if there are no pillars. Abaye says it is still valid, whereas Rava declares it invalid. Each amora will now explain their position.
  
  
  Daf 18b
  
  Abaye uses a legal fiction to pretend that there are walls for this sukkah. The roof of the exedra, upon which the skhakh rests, is looked at if its edges goes down to the ground and fill up the space needed for a wall.Rava does not invoke this legal fiction.
  Rava raises a rhetorical difficulty on Abaye. If there is a regular sukkah with three walls and the middle wall falls down, we could look at the edges of the existent two walls as if they fictiously go down to the ground and create a third wall. This would be absurd for it would in essence validate all two walled sukkot.
  Abaye agrees that this sukkah is invalid because with two parallel walls it is like an alley-way. There is no way to consider the third wall as fictitiously existing.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the “exedra” an open but covered area usually found inside a courtyard, outside of the house. In yesterday’s section we learned that Abaye holds that the edge of the roof of the exedra can fictitiously be extended below such that the sukkah found in the courtyard can be considered as if it has walls. Rava disagreed.
  The Talmud attempts to correlate between Abaye and Rava’s dispute concerning the sukkah in the exedra with a similar dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerning carrying on Shabbat in an exedra found in a field. Rav and Shmuel’s dispute concerns an “exedra” in the field. Clearly this cannot be at all similar to the structure found in Roman-style courtyards. Rather, it seems that these amoraim have used this word to refer to a covered structure without walls standing in a field. The cover was probably made for shade. Rav holds that one can carry throughout the entire exedra on Shabbat because we can consider this to be a closed area. Shmuel says we do not consider the roof to be extended to the ground. Therefore, this is an open area and on Shabbat one can carry only up to four cubits.
  
  Daf 19a
  
  Both Rava and Abaye agree that Shmuel holds that one cannot fictitiously extend the roof to the ground. Therefore, Abaye would be forced to admit that only Rav would agree with him. However, Rava could argue that not only Shmuel but even Rav would agree with him in the case of the sukkah. Rav allowed one to fictitiously extend the roof of the exedra found in the field because the beams that form the edges of the roof were made for the exedra. However, in the case of the exedra in the courtyard the beams that are over the exedra were not made for the sukkah which was placed in the area in between the sides of the exedra. Since these beams were not made for the sukkah, they cannot be fictitiously extended to count as the sukkah’s walls.
  IntroductionToday’s daf continues to deal with the issue of whether we consider the edge of a roof to fictionally descend to the ground so that it forms a wall, which could validate the sukkah.
  The Mishnah on 17a allowed one to build a sukkah in the middle of a courtyard which is surrounded by an “exedra,” a portico covered by a roof, but only as long as the walls of the house are not four cubits removed from the skhakh. But if we invoke the principle of assuming that the edge of the roof descends to the ground, we could consider the edge of roof of the exedra, upon which the skhakh rests, to go to the ground and act as a wall. Then this sukkah would be valid even if the skhakh was more than four cubits from the real walls. The mishnah is therefore a difficulty on Abaye who holds that we can consider the edge of the roof of the exedra to extend to the ground.
  Rava answers the difficult on Abaye by saying that the mishnah is a case where the beams used for skhakh were placed on a level equal to the roof of the exedra. Thus the roof of the exedra cannot be seen in the sukkah and in such a case there would be no way to bring the roof down to the ground to fictitiously create a wall.
  The above tradition of the debate between Abaye and Rava was the Suran version of the debate. This version (part 5 of the previous daf) read: “If one placed skhakh over an exedra which has pillars, it is valid; If it has no pillars: Abaye declares it valid and Rava declares it invalid.” Thus everyone agrees that if the exedra has pillars it is valid and they dispute a case where it doesn’t have pillars.In Pumbedita they teach a more stringent version of the dispute. In this case, if there are no pillars everyone agrees that it is invalid. This implies that no one says that we can fictitiously extend the roof of the exedra to the ground. They disagree if they have pillars, each of which is less than three handbreadths from the next. Abaye says we invoke the rule of “lavud”—less than a three handbreadth gap is considered as if it doesn’t even exist. Rava says we do not apply this rule.Finally, the sugya ends saying that we follow the first version of the dispute. Post-talmudic halakhic authorities also rule according to Rava. Therefore if there are pillars, the sukkah is valid because of the principle “lavud.” But if there are no pillars, the sukkah is invalid because we don’t invoke the principle of drawing down the roof to create a wall.
  This story ends the discussion concerning the sukkah built in the exedra (it is common for such stories to come at the end of long halakhic discussions). Rav Ashi finds his teacher, Rav Kahana building his sukkah in an exedra that has no pillars. He asks him how he can do such a thing. After all, the accepted halakhah is according to Rava who holds that without pillars, such a sukkah is invalid. Rav Kahana responds by showing him that there actually was one pillar there that could count as the third wall (evidently two walls were real, and a sukkah’s third wall can be as small as one handbreadth.) This sukkah is valid whether this pillar could be seen from within the sukkah, meaning it is within the other two walls, or even if it is outside the sukkah. Such a pillar, even if it can’t be seen within the sukkah, counts as a third wall!The proof text for this concerns the side-post, the structure needed to create an eruv in the courtyard. This is a post placed next to the gate exiting the courtyard. The side-post need not be visible from within the courtyard to count as a side-post. R. Kahana claims that the same is true for the pillar to count as a third wall in the sukkah. It need not be seen inside the sukkah.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a new topic.
  Our sugya contains four different explanations of the opening baraita (a tannaitic source not found in the mishnah). The first explanation is by the amora Ulla. He takes the baraita to mean that if there are sticks projecting out the back of the skhakh of a sukkah, the area under the sukkah is considered to be part of the sukkah. As we shall see in a moment, this halakhah is quite puzzling for it is overly obvious.
  The Talmud proceeds to ask a series of difficulties that can be summed up in one question—how can this area underneath the skhkakh projecting out from behind a sukkah count as a sukkah if it doesn’t have the other requirements of a sukkah? The answer to all of these questions is that it does fulfill these other requirements. There are three walls back there, the sukkah is wide enough and there is enough skhakh to provide more shade than sun.But if this area is simply another sukkah, why does the baraita need to exist? Obviously this space counts as a sukkah.The answer is that we might have thought that this skhakh couldn’t count for the back sukkah because the skhakh was put there with the intent that it be used for the front sukkah. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that it does count.
  Rabbah and R. Joseph say that the baraita refers to a case where the sticks (kosher skhakh) go out in front of the sukkah, on the open side of a three-walled sukkah and there is one wall that goes out with them. We might have thought that the continuation of this sukkah is its own sukkah and it is not valid because it has only one wall. Therefore, the baraita teaches that it is valid. We look at it as part of the sukkah which is covered by the rest of the sticks.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hana provides an entirely different interpretation of the above baraita. He would translate it as if it read: “skhakh that goes out of its validity counts as part of the sukkah.” What this means is that if there is a sukkah and throughout most of the sukkah there is more shade than sun, but in one small part there is more sun than shade, the sukkah is still valid. The small portion that has more sun does not invalidate the large portion that has more shade.
  R. Oshaia says that the baraita refers to a small sukkah whose dimensions are only 7 x 7 handbreadths. There is a strip of invalid skhakh that is less than three handbreadths. This strip does not invalidate the sukkah. He would translate the words “going out” in the baraita as a strip of skhakh that “goes out” from being valid skhakh for use in a sukkah.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section, R. Oshiah interpreted a baraita to mean that a sukkah remains valid even if it has a section of invalid skhakh that is less than three handbreadths. Our section begins with a difficulty on this position.
  R. Hoshiah raises a difficulty on R. Oshaia (I know, this is confusing). Why would a baraita need to teach that a small sukkah that has less than three handbreadths of invalid skhakh is still valid? Even a gap of less than three handbreadths is not enough to invalidate the sukkah!
  R. Abba said that if there is invalid skhakh one can still sleep under it, for it combines with the valid skhakh to create a sukkah. But when it comes to a gap of air, while the space can count towards the sukkah, one cannot sleep under it.
  The Talmud asks how the gap in the skhakh can add up to equal the necessary minimum measure for the sukkah but in and of itself is not valid such that one couldn’t sleep under it. Is there another example of such a phenomenon?R. Yitzchak ben Elyashiv answers in the affirmative! The case is that of a mikveh. If there is fluid clay (mud?) in the mikveh it adds up with the water to create the requisite 40 seahs needed for a valid mikveh. But if one dips in fluid clay alone, without water, it doesn’t count as a mikveh and it doesn’t purify.
  
  Daf 19b
  
  IntroductionOur sugya starts with a new mishnah.
  In this case a person made a sukkah in a cone-shape, somewhat like a teepee.  It seems that the upper sections of the walls must have been made of valid skhakh. Alternatively, he leaned a wall made of skhakh against another wall not made of skhakh, somewhat like a lean-to. Rabbi Eliezer rules that this is invalid since a sukkah needs to have a roof. The sages rule that it is valid.
  R. Eliezer agrees that the sukkah is valid if he either raises the wall a handbreadth off the ground or distances the leaning wall a handbreadth from the other wall. In both cases a “roof” is formed.  In the first case one of the walls is the roof, and in the second he would have to add a little skhakh into the space created in between.
  The rabbis of the mishnah allow such a tent-like structure is valid for a sukkah because the incline of a tent, meaning the sides, are treated as if they were the roof of the tent. The sukkah is valid because what looks like the wall can be considered its roof.
  In this story Abaye finds R. Joseph sleeping in a bridal bed, one with two posts such that the canopy slopes down on both sides. Evidently, R. Joseph doesn’t think that the sheets that serve as the canopy form a barrier to the sukkah. This is because a tent can’t be a valid sukkah. But, Abaye asks him, this is R. Eliezer’s opinion. Does R. Joseph really hold like R. Eliezer?R. Joseph defends himself by saying he holds like a baraita in which the opinions from the Mishnah have been reversed. R. Eliezer declares it valid and the sages declare it invalid. So he holds like the sages.Abaye continues to challenge R. Joseph. How can he rule like a baraita and forsake the Mishnah, usually the more authoritative source?R. Joseph answers with another baraita. This baraita says the same thing as the Mishnah with one key difference—it is attributed to R. Natan. This allows R. Joseph to deduce that the version of the dispute found in the Mishnah (R. Eliezer invalidates and the sages validate) is only R. Natan’s opinion. Others disagree and R. Joseph rules like them.We might add in here that it is not uncommon to find sages arguing that what looks like an anonymous opinion is actually disputed, even if we have no explicit source that proves this. It seems that it was important for them to rule like the majority opinion among the tannaim, but that they were willing to be somewhat creative in finding such a source.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new mishnah.
  This section of the mishnah requires a few words of introduction concerning the susceptibility of objects to impurity.  Objects are susceptible to impurity if they are considered “vessels.”  This halakhic category includes most objects that have been fashioned to be of use for people, but not things that are used for building.  For instance a cup is susceptible to impurity but a brick is not.  In the case under discussion here, a reed mat made to be sat upon is susceptible to impurities whereas a reed mat made to be used as skhakh is not.According to the sages, all small mats may have been made to be sat upon and hence they are all susceptible to impurity.  We learned above in mishnah four that anything that is receptive to impurity cannot be used as skhakh. Hence, small reed mats cannot be used for skhakh.  A large reed mat may have been made either to sit upon or to use as skhakh.  Hence, its susceptibility to impurity and its validity as skhakh depend upon the intent in which it was made. If it was made to be used for sitting, it cannot be used as skhakh. But if it was made to be used as skhakh then it is valid.Rabbi Eliezer says that the size of the skhakh does not matter.  All that matters is whether the mat was made for sitting or for skhakh.  As long as it was made for skhakh it can be used as such, no matter its size.
  The Talmud begins by trying to draw out a contradiction within the mishnah. The mishnah says that if he makes it intentionally to recline upon it, then it is subject to impurity and cannot be used as skhakh. However, if he had no specific intention as to its use when he made it, then it is usable as skhakh.However, the second half says that it usable for skhakh only if he made it with the purpose of using it as covering. If he made it without any express purpose, it would be assumed that he made it for reclining and he wouldn’t be able to use it.Thus the mishnah contradicts itself in terms of what the law is when a mat is made without it having an express purpose. The first half would say it is valid for skhakh whereas the second half would say it is not.
  The Talmud resolves this difficulty by saying that the first half of the mishnah refers to a large mat. Such a mat is valid as use for skhakh even if it was made without any intention as to its use. Since it is large, we can assume that the intent was to use it for a covering.However, if it is a small mat and it was made without any specific intent, it is invalid, because we can assume it was made to be used for reclining.In other words, if something is made without any intent in mind, its size will determine its function and susceptibility to impurity.We should also note how the Talmud “teases” more information out of a mishnah. The mishnah teaches only the simple situations—where he made the mat for an express purpose. It doesn’t really state what the rule is if he had no use in mind when he made the mat. The Talmud gleans this info out of the mishnah by trying to create a contradiction between the first half and the second half. This is a common talmudic technique.
  IntroductionThis section continues the analysis of the mishnah from yesterday’s section, again addressing the question of whether the mat can be used as skhakh if it was made without any intention as to how to use it.
  The Talmud now applies the same logic it did in yesterday’s section to R. Eliezer’s opinion. In the first half of his words R. Eliezer says that if one made the mat to recline upon is susceptible to impurity. But without any designated purpose, it is not susceptible to impurity.But in the second half he says the opposite. If he made it specifically for covering, it can be used as skhakh. But if he had no purpose in mind when he made it, then we can assume he was going to use it for reclining and it is invalid as skhakh.
  Rava resolves this difficulty and explains the entire mishnah. When it comes to a large mat, which is usually used for covering, both opinions agree that if he makes it with no intent, it can be used as skhakh. No intent implies that it will be used in its normal fashion. They disagree concerning a small mat. The first opinion in the mishnah holds that a small mat is usually made for reclining. Therefore, if he has no intent when he makes it, he cannot use it for skhakh. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that a small mat is usually made for a covering as well. Therefore it too can be used as skhakh unless it was specifically made to be used for reclining.
  [1] Note that I have translated this section according to the emendation put into the printed edition. Usually, brackets mean that one should read those words and parentheses means one should ignore those words.
  
  Daf 20a
  
  IntroductionThe last daf we finished ended with Rava’s interpretation of the mishnah concerning using mats as skhakh. Rava said that the basic disagreement was over a small mat made without specific intention. The first opinion held that a small mat was usually made for reclining and therefore could not be used as skhakh. R. Eliezer held that a small mat was generally used for covering and therefore could be used as skhakh. Our daf opens with a difficulty that Abaye had on that position.
  Abaye raises two difficulties. The first is the order of the way R. Eliezer lists “small or large.” R. Eliezer is in essence saying that a small mat has the same rules as a large one. So, Abaye argues, it should read “large or small” which emphasizes that the small mat has the same rules as the large. [We should note that it is not at all clear which should in reality come first, and Rashi seems to be aware of several different versions of this line in the mishnah and gemara.]The second difficulty is more substantive. Abaye uses a baraita to prove that R. Eliezer holds that even a large mat can be susceptible to impurity if made without any specific intended use in mind. The first opinion in this baraita holds that a large mat can be used as skhakh. R. Eliezer says that this is so only if it is not susceptible to impurity, meaning if he made it for a covering. But, R. Eliezer would hold, if he made it with no specific intent, then it is susceptible to impurity and cannot be used as skhakh. Thus R. Eliezer and the other sages disagree about a large mat.
  R. Papa, who lived a generation after Abaye now offers another reinterpretation of the mishnah. The first tanna and R. Eliezer agree that a small mat is usually made for reclining and cannot be used for skhakh (unless specifically made for covering). The first opinion holds that usually a large mat is made for covering and therefore can be used for skhakh if made without any specific intent. R. Eliezer holds that a large mat is also made for reclining. When he says, “if it was made for reclining” then it can’t be used as skhakh what he really meant to say is that a large mat is normally is made for reclining and can’t be used for skhakh. It could only be used for skhakh if it was made specifically with the intent of using it for a covering, the same rule that applies to a small mat.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a baraita about using various kinds of mats for skhakh.
  The first section of the baraita deals with a mat of wicker or straw. As we saw in the discussion of the mishnah, the usability of this type of mat depends on its size. If it was large, it was probably meant for a covering and can be used for skhakh. If small, it was probably meant for reclining and cannot be used for skhakh.One made of reeds or helat, a type of reed, can be used if it is was plaited. Plaiting seems to have been a cruder, rougher way of making the reeds into a mat. Due to its roughness it would not have been made for reclining and it can be used for skhakh. But if it was woven more tightly, it could be used for reclining and cannot be used for skhakh.The sages in the last section all hold that all mats made of reeds can be used for skhakh because they are always made for covering, even if they are woven.
  IntroductionToday’s section cites a different mishnah that also has to deal with the purity of mats (I know this is your favorite topic).
  Rabbi Dosa and the Sages disagree with regards to the susceptibility of mats to midras impurity.  Midras impurity is a type of impurity which is received by a zav (one who has an unnatural genital discharge, not semen or menstruation) sitting or lying down on an object even if he/she doesn’t touch it.  Only things that are typically sat on or lied down upon can receive this type of impurity.  According to Rabbi Dosa, mats can receive corpse impurity by coming into contact with a dead body, or a part thereof.  However, since the mats under discussion are not used for sitting or for lying down, they cannot receive midras impurity.  The Sages hold that they can, since they are occasionally used for such a purpose.
  The Talmud begins by offering a slight emendation to the sages’ words. These mats are susceptible, according to the sages, even to midras impurity. They are obviously also susceptible to the more conveyable type of impurity, corpse impurity.
  The word used in the mishnah for “mats” is unusual. Here it is explained first with a strange word “marzbulei,” but that word is also not so clear. Ultimately it is interpreted as “bags filled with foliage.” Evidently, these were used as mats. Sounds somewhat comfy and very eco-friendly!
  R. Shimon ben Lakish, otherwise known as Resh Lakish, says that the hotzlot of this mishnah are real mats, not bags of foliage. This matches what he says in another statement. In this statement R. Hiyya (who was Babylonian and restored proper Torah learning to the land of Israel) explains the mishnah. R. Dosa and the sages agree that reed-mats from Usha (a place in the Galilee) are susceptible because they are made for sitting upon. Reed-mats from Tiberias are not made for sitting upon, so they are not susceptible. They only dispute reed-mats from other places. R. Dosa holds that since they are not usually used for sitting upon, they are not susceptible, like those of Tiberias. The other sages hold that since they sometimes are used for sitting upon they are susceptible. Note that this matches our discussion on previous pages. The issue is how to deal with mats made without any specific purpose in mind.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  The Talmud now notes that what R. Dosa says here contradicts what he said above, in the previous section. There R. Dosa agreed with R. Yose that one could use such mats for skhakh. This implies that they are not susceptible to impurity. But here he says that the mats are susceptible to corpse impurity.The resolution is that mats that have a rim are susceptible to impurity, whereas mats that don’t have a rim are not. Again, the more formed something is, the more susceptible it is to impurity.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section dealt with the types of mats that are susceptible to impurity. Today we continue with this subject (don’t worry, it’s almost done).
  The Talmud now cites a baraita that seems to be a slightly different version of the baraita about the “hotzlot” that we saw in yesterday’s section. As we shall see, the Talmud will try to match this baraita with the other one.
  The Talmud now explains that this baraita accords with the person who held that “hozlot” were bags filled with foliage. The question is what use can be made out of these mats besides sitting on them, so that they would possibly be susceptible to corpse impurity and not midras impurity (which is only applicable to things that are sat or lied upon). He can explain that the sacks made of bamboo reed grass, sackcloth and goat’s hair can also be used for basketlike purpose. But the one who defined “hozlot” as real mats has trouble understanding this baraita. Sackcloth and goat’s hair can be used as curtains or sieves, but what use can one make out of a bamboo or reed-grass mat besides sitting on them?The Talmud finds an answer: they can be used to cover brewing vats. [I actually used to brew beer, but alas, I never tried a bamboo or reed-grass mat as a brewing cover. God willing, in the future].
  This section is simply a mirror version of the previous section.
  IntroductionToday’s section is the last section in chapter one. It continues to deal with using mats as skhakh.Don’t worry—the other chapters are shorter. And congratulations—we’ve now finished the first chapter of Daf Shevui!
  The long sugya ends with a tradition that one can use a reed mat as skhakh, as long as it doesn’t have a rim. If it has a rim it is susceptible to impurity and cannot be used.
  This tradition is about the specific mats found in Mahoza, a city in Babylonia. Basically, it teaches the same thing as we learned in the previous section.
  This is how every chapter of Talmud concludes, with a wish that we should go back and learn it again, to commit it to memory. So please do continue with the next section, which begins the second chapter. But when you have some extra time, keep learning the first chapter. As I’ve always told my students, the best way to improve your ability to learn Talmud is to review the material you’ve already learned.
  Introduction
  The first mishnah of chapter 2 teaches that a person who sleeps underneath a bed inside the sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation to dwell in the sukkah. This is because the bed, which is not valid skhakh acts as a barrier between him and the valid skhakh above.We should note that in mishnaic and talmudic times it was clearly customary and obligatory to sleep inside the sukkah.  The practice of not sleeping in the sukkah has its origins in cold medieval Europe where a person would truly suffer by sleeping in the sukkah.
  The problem with sleeping under a bed inside a sukkah is that there is a covering which creates a barrier over the person so that the skhakh is not what is covering him.Rabbi Judah holds that the bed does not serve as a barrier between him and the sukkah and hence one who sleeps under a bed has fulfilled his obligation.  Interestingly, Rabbi Judah notes that this was actually their custom.  It might be that students visiting their rabbis on Sukkot, which seems to have been a norm on festivals, found the sukkot quite crowded.  Hence, some people would sleep under the beds, causing the question to arise: is this legitimate behavior?Section three:  Rabbi Shimon agrees with the sages in section one and he brings a story to illustrate his point.  Rabban Gamaliel owned a famous slave named Tabi.  In tractate Berakhot 2:7 that Rabban Gamaliel respected his slave, and that when Tabi died he even mourned for him.  In this mishnah, Tabi exemplifies his knowledge of halakhah by sleeping under the bed in the sukkah.  He knew that he was exempt from the sukkah, as are all slaves, so he did a demonstrative act to let others know that one who sleeps under the bed has not fulfilled his sukkah obligation.
  The mishnah seems to say that sleeping under any sized bed means that one has not fulfilled the mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah. But this is a problem—if the bed is less than ten handbreadths high then it is not large enough to be a sukkah. How then could it form a barrier to the skhakh of the sukkah.Shmuel answers that this bed is indeed ten handbreadths high. If it was any lower, one could sleep under it in the sukkah without it forming a barrier.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a mishnah from Ohalot 3:7 that deals with the definition of a tent with regard to the issue of “overshadowing.” Overshadowing means that if a dead body or piece thereof is found in the same covered area as is an object susceptible to impurity, the object is defiled. There are also other ramifications within the realm of purity laws to something being considered a “tent.”
  Any structure, no matter how it is made, can act as an ohel, a tent. Earlier in this mishnah from Ohalot it was taught that if there are spaces that are one handbreadth wide, long and tall between the different parts, then the part on top is treated separately from the part below.Rabbi Judah says that only human-made structures can serve as an ohel.
  
  Daf 21a
  
  The Talmud says that Rabbi Judah derives his halakhah, that only human made tents count as “tents,” from the fact that the same word is used in Numbers concerning purity as is used in Exodus concerning the “tent” that was used in making the Tabernacle. Just as that was a real tent so too the tent in Numbers 19 which conveys impurity must be a real “tent,” meaning it must at least have been made by human hands. A tent made by animals or water does not count as a tent.The Talmud then asks the typical question—how can the rabbis hold otherwise? How do they deal with the fact that “tent” should imply that it is made by human hands. The answer is that the Torah uses the word “tent” several times in Numbers 19:14. The repetitions of the word are interpreted to mean that any structure that has the dimensions of a “tent” can act as a tent, even if it was not made by human hands.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we encountered a mishnah in which R. Judah says that any “tent” not made by a person doesn’t count as a tent. Today’s section asks whether this is really R. Judah’s opinion.
  This mishnah discusses how in the Second Temple period would preserve the purity of the children of priests so that they could perform the red cow ritual (needed to purify others from corpse impurity) without ever having become impure. This was an extra stringency due to the high degree of gravity with which they took the red cow ceremony.They would not build the courtyards in which these children were raised directly over the ground just in case there was a grave deep in the ground, and the dead body’s impurity would rise and defile the priests above. The hollow between the rock and the building platform would serve to capture the impurity and prevent it from rising. This was a concept we learned much about in Mishnah Ohalot—a space the size of one handbreadth by one handbreadth prevents impurity from rising up above the space.They would bring pregnant women there to give birth and raise their children there so that the children would never become impure. Again, this is not strictly necessary but it demonstrates the extra degree of severity with which they treated this purity ritual.The end of the mishnah describes how they would draw water from the Shiloah spring without possibly coming into contact with a source of impurity. The children would ride oxen down to the spring. The doors on the oxen’s backs would prevent the children from overshadowing (making an ohel over) any source of impurity. They used stone cups because stone cannot become impure.They filled their cups from the Shiloah spring which is on the southern side of Jerusalem (also called the Silwan). Rabbi Yose says that they didn’t even get off the backs of their oxen to do so. Again, this was an extra stringency to make sure they did not become impure.The Talmud then cites a baraita in which Rabbi Judah says doors aren’t necessary because the oxen themselves would form a tent to stop the feared impurity from rising from the depths and defiling these kids. This contradicts his earlier opinion from the mishnah in Ohalot where he says that for something to function halakhically as a tent it must have been made by a person.
  R. Dimi responds that R. Judah agrees that if the “tent” is as large as a fistful, meaning larger than a cubed handbreadth, it can count as a tent even if it was not made by a human being. There is also a baraita in which R. Judah agrees that an empty space like a crag or cleft in a rock, formations clearly not made by human beings, can still count as “tents.”
  The problem with R. Dimi’s interpretation is that R. Judah seems to say the opposite. R. Judah seems to imply that they didn’t use doors because the oxen were sufficient. And yet the doors would have had many fistfuls of distance from the ground to the door.
  Abaye answers that what R. Judah meant was that the doors on the backs of the oxen were unnecessary. But the doors would have been sufficient to act as a tent.Rava gives a slightly different answer. They didn’t bring the doors because the kids sitting on the doors might get curious and peak their heads over the door. This would cause them to be defiled because of the fear of the dread “grave in the depths.”Thus both Abaye and Rava uphold R. Dimi’s explanation. R. Judah does not disallow a tent not made by human hands, as long as that “tent” is at least a fistful in size.
  
  
  Daf 21b
  
  This baraita accords with what Rava said. It also provides a little bit of extra detail about the oxen they would bring.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that R. Judah seems to hold that as long as the tent was made by a human it functions as a tent. We now return to our mishnah in Sukkah in which R. Judah allows one to sleep under a bed, even though the bed was clearly made by a human being.
  The Talmud now brings our mishnah in Sukkah as a difficulty on R. Judah. A bed clearly is more than a few fistfuls high and yet to R. Judah it doesn’t seem to count as a tent. They resolve that difficulty by saying that the bed doesn’t function as a tent because it was made for what goes on top. It is not a “tent” because a “tent” is made for what goes underneath.
  The problem with the previous resolution is that oxen are also used for what goes above and not for what goes below. Therefore they too shouldn’t be considered tents.Rabin provides the answer that oxen sometimes are used for what goes below as well. In the summer the shepherd sits underneath to protect himself from the sun and in the winter from the rain (but watch out shepherd, cause you might still get wet under there!).
  But again, the Talmud retorts, the bed also could be considered to be used for what goes below—shoes and sandals! [I like it that they put their shoes and sandals under their beds even two thousand years ago]. So if an ox is considered a tent because sometimes the space underneath it is used, so too a bed should be considered a tent, despite the fact that one usually uses the space above.
  The answer is that the oxen’s torso is a tent because it is meant to shelter the oxen’s innards. This is not just some temporary use, but truly the main function of an oxen’s torso, whereas the main function of a bed is for sleeping on top. So a bed does not count as a tent whereas the oxen’s torso does.
  IntroductionToday’s section offers a different reason for why R. Judah allows one to sleep under a bed in the sukkah.
  The Talmud now tries to explain that R. Judah in this mishnah follows his reasoning found elsewhere throughout the tractate. R. Judah says that for something to count as a sukkah it must be a “permanent abode” meaning that it has the dimensions of a building in which a person could live permanently. In the case at hand, the sukkah is more permanent than the bed, which is not at all a “permanent abode/tent.” Therefore, the temporary abode of the bed would not annul the fact that he is indeed sleeping in the sukkah, the more permanent abode.
  The problem is that R. Shimon also demands that a sukkah be a permanent above (as we saw on 7b he requires that it have four walls) and yet he doesn’t allow one to sleep under a bed in a sukkah, as we saw in our mishnah (bottom of 20b).
  The Talmud resolves this by stating that R. Judah and R. Shimon agree that the sukkah needs to be a permanent abode. However, they disagree about whether the temporary tent (the bed) can annul the permanent tent (the sukkah). R. Shimon would say that it does and therefore, one who sleeps under a bed in a sukkah has not fulfilled his duty. R. Judah says that the temporary tent does not annul the fact that he is sleeping in a sukkah and therefore he has fulfilled his obligation.
  IntroductionThis section relates to R. Shimon’s statement in the mishnah back at the end of Daf Kaf.
  This is a more expanded version of R. Shimon’s statement from the mishnah. In the mishnah R. Shimon relates the story of R. Gamaliel who tells the other sages to look at Tabi his slave who is sleeping under the bed, knowing that slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah but that others who sleep under the bed have not fulfilled their obligation. The baraita teaches pretty much the same thing.
  The Talmud inquires why R. Gamaliel said “from the casual conversation of R. Gamaliel” why not just say “from his words?” The answer is that R. Shimon teaches us that even the casual conversation of sages is worthy of study. This is derived from the verse in Psalms 1 which refers to a Torah scholar (see verse 2). Even his leaf, the lightest part of a tree, will not wither, for it too is worthy of study.There’s a bit of irony here in that when R. Shimon says “casual conversation” he himself is teaching something “casually.” So R. Shimon teaches casually that we should pay attention to “casual” conversation. 
  IntroductionThis section begins to deal with a new mishnah.
  The person uses his bedposts to support the sukkah. The sages and R. Judah dispute whether this sukkah is valid if it cannot stand without the support from the bedposts.
  The Talmud tries to explain why R. Judah disqualifies such a sukkah. There are two amoraic opinions, but as sometimes happens, the Talmud doesn’t know which statement goes with which amora. In any case, one amora holds that R. Judah disqualifies the sukkah because it is not permanent enough. As we have seen a few times, the amoraim say that R. Judah requires that the sukkah have a relatively high degree of permanence. The other opinion holds that the problem is that the sukkah is propped up on something that is susceptible to impurity, namely the bed.The Talmud will now explore the ramifications of the differences between these two opinions.
  These two opinions would differ if someone made a sukkah by sticking four iron stakes in the ground and using them to hold up the skhakh. The sukkah would be directly supported by something that receives impurity, and therefore the amora who explains that R. Judah disqualifies a sukkah propped up by something susceptible to impurity would also hold that R. Judah would disqualify this sukkah. However, this sukkah is permanent, or at least more permanent than one supported by a bed. So the other amora would say that R. Judah allows this sukkah.
  Abaye limits R. Judah’s disqualification to a case where he supported the skhakh with the bedposts. If he, props up the skhakh in another way (such as putting iron posts into the ground), but the beds serve as walls of the sukkah the sukkah is valid. This sukkah is permanent because it is not attached to the bed nor is it propped up by the bed.
  
  Daf 22a
  
  IntroductionThis daf begins with a new mishnah.
  The Talmud will explore what a “disarranged” (meduvlelet in Hebrew) sukkah is and how this relates to the second clause “whose shade is more than its sun.”The second clause is sometimes surprising to people who think that one must be able to see the stars through the skhakh. While this is desirable, a sukkah is valid even if one cannot see the stars.
  Rav says that “disarranged” or in Hebrew מדובללת means that the skhakh is thin or poor. Despite this, it is still valid.Shmuel says that its reeds are all disheveled, some are on one level while some are on another.
  The Talmud now explains how each of these amoraim reads the mishnah’s two clauses. Rav reads the mishnah as if the second clause explains the first. “Meduvlelet,” which is a strange and unusual word, is read by Rav as if it says “meduldelet” which comes from the word “dal” meaning poor. Such a sukkah has “poor” or thin skhakh but it is still kosher as long as there is more shade than sun, a rule we saw in the beginning of the tractate. We should also note that this accords with the end of the mishnah—the first clause says that the sukkah is kosher even if the skhakh is really thin and the second clause says that the sukkah is kosher even if the skhakh is really thick.Shmuel teaches the mishnah as two separate clauses. The first clause teaches that a sukkah whose reeds are disheveled is valid. The second clause is totally separate. It teaches that if the shade is greater than the sun, it is valid.
  IntroductionIn today’s section Abaye and Rava debate the applicability of Shmuel’s interpretation of the mishnah—a disarranged sukkah, whose reeds are at different heights is still valid.
  Abaye says that Shmuel allows a disheveled sukkah only if the reeds are not separated by more than three handbreadths. But if some are above and some are below and there are three handbreadths separating them, the sukkah is not valid.
  Rava says that if the upper reed is one handbreadth wide we can invoke a legal fiction called, “beat and throw it down” and thereby imagine it joining the lower reeds, even if they are separated by more than three handbreadths. The upcoming sections will explore where this principle comes from and how it is used. Basically it allows us to imagine that things that are up above, are actually below.However, if the upper reed is thinner than a handbreadth, we cannot invoke this principle because, as Rashi explains, less than handbreadth cannot be a “tent” in rabbinic literature.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section Rava said that if the upper reeds of the skhakh are at least a handbreadth they can be fictitiously considered to be lower and join with the lower reeds to form valid skhakh. Today Rava brings a tannaitic source for this opinion.
  To prove his point, that if the upper reed is a handbreadth we can invoke the principle of “beat and throw it down” and if it less than a handbreadth than we cannot, Rava quotes a mishnah from Ohalot 12:5. Below is my interpretation of that mishnah from Mishnah Yomit. Tractate Ohalot is all about “overshadowing”—the concept that if something overshadows a dead body and piece thereof, the impurity of the corpse spreads to the other objects that are also overshadowed.Section one: In the first scenario, the upper roof beams are precisely above the lower ones. If there is uncleanness beneath one of the beams of the house, anything below it is impure because it forms an ohel (a tent). However, the beam also prevents the impurity from spreading to the area above it. And the impurity doesn’t spread to anywhere else in the house because there is nothing overshadowing the spaces in between the beams.If the impurity is on top of the lower beam and below the upper beam, it remains in this area.If it is above one of the upper beam then the impurity only travels upwards.Section two: In this case the upper and lower roof beams are not lined up. Rather the upper beams are spaced right in between the lower beams.If there is impurity underneath one of them, then it spreads to the area underneath all of them, as if there was only one roof. In other words, we look at the upper beams as if they had been lowered to a level equal to the bottom beams.If the impurity is found above any of the beams, it is not in any ohel, and therefore it only defiles that which is found directly above it.
  The first part of this quote is a baraita taught on the mishnah from Ohalot. In section two the mishnah said that we can look at the upper beams as if they had been lowered to a level equal to the bottom beams. The baraita says that this is true only if the beams are each a handbreadth wide and there is a gap of at least one handbreadth between the upper and lower ones. Rava attributes this is to the principle “beat and throw it down.” Thus the principle is evoked only if the beams are at least one handbreadth wide, the same rule that he applies to the disarranged sukkah.
  IntroductionThis section continues to deal with the concept of “beat it and throw it down” which allows us to consider the upper reeds of the skhakh as if they were next to the lower ones.
  Rav Kahana, a sage who lived a generation after Rava, is sitting and reciting the statement of Rava. Rav Ashi, his student, hears him and tries to prove that Rava’s rule is incorrect—we can apply the principle of “beat and throw down” even if the object is not a handbreadth wide. He now cites a long baraita dealing with the beams used to make an eruv. As a reminder, to allow one to carry within a courtyard, part of what one had to do was lay a beam across the entryway to the courtyard. The baraita that Rav Ashi cites deals with this beam. To make it easier I will divide the baraita into sections and refer to it in the translation and explanation using these sections.
  
  Daf 22b
  
  Section one: This deals with a case where the beam doesn’t fully reach the other side of the entrance, or with a case of two beams, one coming out of each side, that don’t reach other. If there is less than a three handbreadth gap between the beam and the other side or between one beam and the other, the eruv is valid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the gap may be up to four handbreadths.Section two: This case deals with two thin parallel beams. The beam should be thick enough to hold a half-brick, whose thickness is 1.5 handbreadths. So if the two beams are close enough that they can hold a 1.5 handbreadth wide half brick, they are valid.Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is again more lenient. As long as the two beams can hold the half-brick by its length, which is three handbreadths, they are valid.Section three: This is the section relevant to our topic. The beams here go all the way across but they are less than one handbreadth wide. If one beam is up top and the other beam is below, the two beams can join together to form the requisite one handbreadth  as long as one isn’t above 20 cubits from the ground and the other below ten handbreadths, because these beams must always be below 20 cubits and above ten handbreadths (just like the sukkah).
  Rav Ashi now points out the essential issue from this baraita. In section 3 we see that even if the beams are less than one handbreadth wide they can join together, as long as they are all within twenty cubits from the ground. So why then does Rava hold that they must be one handbreadth wide?
  Rav Kahana now resolves the baraita. The first thing he does is separate it into three situations. In the first situation both beams are up high, but within twenty cubits from the ground. The lower beam is within three handbreadths of the upper beam, so we can invoke the principle of “lavud”—a gap of less than three handbreadths is considered as if it didn’t exist.The second situation is almost the same—but both beams are just above ten handbreadths from the ground.Finally, if the two beams are more than three handbreadths apart, they cannot join by the principle of “beat and throw down” because they are not one handbreadth in width. This resolves the difficulty on Rava.
  IntroductionThis section deals with the next clause of the mishnah, which states that if the shade is more than the sun inside the sukkah, the sukkah is valid.
  This type of nitpicky question is frequently asked in the Talmud. In my opinion it provides the Talmud with a chance to add a caveat to the Mishnah. In other words, I think the Talmud realizes that the Mishnah doesn’t actually contradict itself. They just posit the contradiction in order to offer a comment about the mishnah.The mishnah in the second chapter stated that if the shade is greater than the sun the sukkah is valid, implying that if they are equal, the sukkah is invalid. The opposite implication can be drawn from the first chapter. If the sun is greater than the shade, the sukkah is invalid, implying that if they are equal the sukkah is valid. So what is the law if they are equal?
  The answer is that it depends on where we measure the shade/sun. If they are equal from above, the sukkah is invalid for down below the sun will appear to dominate the shade (this is according to Rashi). If they are equal below, then above there is more skhakh than empty spaces so the sukkah is valid.Rav Papa notes a folk-saying that reflects this idea. If there is a hole the size of a zuz, a larger coin above, it becomes smaller below, the size of an issar.
  IntroductionThe first part of today’s section contains a baraita related to the last part of the Mishnah. The second part is another mishnah, which will be commented upon and explained on subsequent pages.
  Both houses agree that one need not be able to see the stars through the skhakh. While this may surprise some people, the idea that you have to see the stars is not true.If you can’t even see the sun through the skhakh then it must be really thick. Bet Shammai says that it is invalid. But Bet Hillel doesn’t even invalidate this.
  As background to this mishnah we should note that on a festival or Shabbat it is forbidden to climb a tree, lest one break off a branch, which is prohibited on Shabbat and a festival.  It is also forbidden to ride on an animal on a festival or Shabbat.The mishnah uses the language “go up into” the sukkah because sukkot were often built on the flat roofs of their homes.  Nevertheless, not all of these mishnayot describe actually going up into a sukkah.Section one:  One can build a sukkah on a wagon or on a ship and one can enter into it on Shabbat.  The Talmud explains that the sukkah has to be strong enough to stand up to a wind of common strength.  One who builds such a sukkah can enter into on the festival because there is no prohibition of getting onto a ship or a wagon on the festival.  Indeed, there is a well-known story in the Talmud of rabbis traveling on Sukkot and making a sukkah on the ship.Assumedly, Rabbi Judah who in yesterday’s mishnah stated that a sukkah made using a bed’s bedposts is invalid, would also invalidate a sukkah made on a wagon or ship.Section two: A sukkah made on top of a tree or on the back of a camel is also a valid sukkah (I have actually seen such a thing in Neot Kedumim, near where we live in Israel).  However, since it is forbidden to climb a tree or ride on an animal on Shabbat or a festival, these sukkot could only be used during Hol Hamoed, the non-festival days of Sukkot.Section three: In this and the next section the person doesn’t make his sukkah in a tree but rather he uses a tree to support the roof of his sukkah.  A tree can be used to support the sukkah’s wall even though the leaves may not count as skhakh when they are attached to the tree. A sukkah must have at least three walls, so if he uses a tree to support even one these three walls he cannot enter the sukkah on the festival because that would be considered using the tree.Section four:  If, however, he has four walls and only one supported by the tree then the sukkah would be valid and would be able to stand even without the tree.  Hence, he may enter this sukkah on the festival because by doing so he is not actually using the tree. The tree-wall is superfluous.The last clause provides the general rule that sums up what we learned above.
  
  Daf 23a
  
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to deal with the mishnah found at the end of yesterday’s daf which allowed one to build a sukkah on a ship or on a wagon.
  The mishnah allowed one to build a sukkah on a ship. The Talmud notes that this opinion accords with R. Akiva. In the continuation of the baraita R. Akiva actually goes ahead and builds a sukkah on a ship. The sukkah is blown away by the wind which is stronger out on the water. R. Gamaliel cynically responds to him with what is one of my favorite lines in the entire Talmud—”Hey Akiva, where’d your sukkah go?” Poor R. Akiva.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the dispute between R. Gamaliel and R. Akiva about whether one can build a sukkah on a ship. Abaye limits this dispute to a situation in which the wind is of a certain nature.
  Abaye begins his statement by positing that both R. Gamaliel and R. Akiva agree on two points. If the sukkah cannot stand in a normal breeze on land, where the wind is less, than the sukkah is invalid. A sukkah must be strong enough to withstand a normal wind. And if it is super-strong, and can withstand an unusually strong land breeze (we used to get these in Atlantic City where I grew up—hurricane season) then even R. Gamaliel would agree that it is valid.Note that Abaye seems to be saying that this is true no matter where the sukkah is built—even on land. Thus he has taken a dispute concerning a sukkah built on a ship and shifted it to something even more relevant—how sturdy must the sukkah be when built on land.
  The dispute occurs with a sukkah that can withstand a normal land breeze but not an abnormally strong one. R. Gamaliel disqualifies this sukkah because it is not a “permanent abode.” Just as a home should be able to withstand a strong wind so too a sukkah should be able to withstand such a wind.R. Akiva holds that the sukkah is valid because it should be a temporary structure. A temporary structure need only withstand a normal wind.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins a relatively long and complex discussion about building a sukkah on the back of an animal.
  The Talmud begins by citing a baraita which demonstrates that the mishnah, which allows one to make a sukkah on the back of a camel, accords with R. Meir. R. Judah declares that such a sukkah is invalid.
  The Torah says that one should dwell in a sukkah for seven days. To R. Judah this means that the sukkah one uses must be able to be used for seven days. Since on Yom Tov or Shabbat one cannot get on a sukkah that was built on an animal (this was stated in the mishnah at the end of Daf 22), this sukkah cannot be used for seven days.
  R. Meir validates this sukkah because according to Torah law it is okay to get onto an animal on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Thus according to Torah law this sukkah is valid for all seven days. The rabbis prohibited using it on Yom Tov or Shabbat because it is on the back of an animal, but this does not detract from its general validity.
  In this baraita the person doesn’t make a sukkah on an animal. Rather, he uses the animal as a wall for a sukkah. R. Meir, who allowed one to make a sukkah on an animal, does not allow one to use the animal as a wall. R. Judah does allow one to use the animal as a wall.The baraita precedes by listing other cases in which R. Meir doesn’t allow one to use something that has “the breath of life.” There are four such cases. 1) The wall of a sukkah. 2) A side-post for an alley. This is the post that is requited as part of the eruv system. It allows one to carry from one courtyard to another courtyard within a common alley. 3) Boards around wells. These are four “corner-boards” placed around a well to allow one to draw water from the well on Shabbat. They fictitiously create a private domain even though there are not four real walls around the well. According to the Talmud, this was a leniency for people who were making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.4) The covering of a grave. This covering prevents the impurity from the grave from escaping. The covering itself, however, is impure and defiles one who touches it.R. Yose the Galilean adds that one can also not use something that is alive to write a get, a divorce document. The Talmud shall deal with this at greater length on the next daf.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section R. Meir stated that something that has “the breath of life” in it cannot be used for certain halakhic uses (see yesterday’s section) including as a wall for a sukkah. In today’s section we begin to explore R. Meir’s reasoning.Today’s section contains one of my favorite passages in the entire tractate. So enjoy!
  Two amoraim debate why R. Meir doesn’t allow one to use an animal for any of these purposes, including as a wall for a sukkah. Abaye said that we are concerned lest it die. R. Zera says we are concerned that it will run away.
  The Talmud, as it often does, tries to find the practical ramifications between different amoraic opinions. In this case, for some reason the Talmud tries to determine when the two amoraim debate if one uses an elephant as a wall for a sukkah. It seems that the Talmud uses this example because it’s the biggest animal they can imagine. I doubt anyone ever really used an elephant as a wall for a sukkah.In any case, if the elephant is securely tied in place (don’t try this at home) then there is no problem. The elephant won’t be able to run away and if it dies its carcass will still be large enough to serve as a wall.
  The two amoraim disagree if the elephant used as the wall of the sukkah is tied up. According to Abaye who says we fear lest it die, we are not concerned in this case, because the elephant’s carcass can still serve as a wall. But for R. Zera who says that we are concerned lest if escape, we should be concerned since it is not tied up.
  The problem with the above explanation is that Abaye who says we are concerned lest the animal die should also be concerned lest it escape.Therefore, if the elephant is not tied up, all amoraim say that R. Meir’s is concerned lest it escape. They differ only if it is a smaller, ordinary animal that is tied up. Abaye says that R. Meir is concerned lest it die and its carcass wouldn’t be large enough to constitute a wall. R. Zera says that since it is tied up, R. Meir is not concerned lest it escape.However, even this doesn’t make full sense. Why shouldn’t R. Zera be concerned lest it escape? The answer is that death is not a frequent occurrence. It is obviously far more likely for an animal used as a wall to a sukkah to run away than it is for it to escape. Since death at this particular moment is unlikely to occur, R. Zera says that R. Meir would not be concerned.
  The Talmud now raises some general problems with using an animal as a wall for a sukkah. What about the space between its legs? The answer is that he fills that space in.And why aren’t we concerned lest the animal lie down? The answer is that he ties it up from above.
  This section concludes with another difficulty. If we said that in order for the animal to be used as a wall it must be tied up to the top of the wall, why should be concerned lest it die? Even if it dies, it seems that the carcass will stay standing up and can serve as a wall.The answer is that he might have tied the animal up just within three handbreadths of the skhakh. If the animal dies it will sag a bit and be more than three handbreadths from the skhakh. This will invalidate the sukkah but he won’t notice. Therefore, even if it is tied up the one who is concerned lest it die still needs to be concerned.We should note that these types of answers are admittedly far-fetched. They demonstrate how far the Talmud is willing to go to resolve all potential difficulties. In this case, it does make for some good images—an animal tied up to the roof of the sukkah with palm fronds between its legs! Especially if it’s dead! Those rabbis.
  
  Daf 23b
  
  IntroductionIn the previous parts of this daf we learned that R. Meir forbids one from using something that is alive as the wall of a sukkah (and from other uses as well). Abaye said that R. Meir is concerned lest the animal die, whereas R. Judah who allows an animal to be used as a wall for a sukkah is not concerned that death will happen so soon.In today’s section the Talmud cites another passage where Abaye seems to say the opposite—R. Meir is not concerned about death occurring, whereas R. Judah is.
  The Talmud will now cite a few tannaitic sources and a statement by Abaye in which he explains their contradiction. The first mishnah brought describes an Israelite woman who is not allowed to eat terumah unless she was married to a priest (Kohen). If she is married to him she can eat terumah as long as he is alive. If he goes abroad she can continue to eat terumah assuming that he is still alive. Thus this mishnah is not concerned about death.
  In this mishnah a husband gives his wife a conditional get. The get will go into effect one hour before he dies. The reason that one would want to do such a thing is that if he divorces her before he dies she will not be liable for levirate marriage (marriage to his brother). If the husband is a kohen, she immediately cannot eat terumah because we must be concerned that he might die at any moment. Thus in this mishnah we are concerned with death.
  Abaye solves the contradiction between these two mishnayot by saying that the first mishnah follows R. Meir who is not concerned with death and the second mishnah follows R. Judah who is concerned with death. Here we can see the contradiction with the previous passage—Abaye here contradicts what he said above.
  Abaye’s prooftext that R. Meir is not concerned with death and R. Judah is concerned with death comes from a baraita dealing with a completely separate matter. If a person buys wine from a Samaritan who does not tithe he will need to separate tithes and terumah before he drinks the wine. In this case he is traveling with the wine and Shabbat comes, which means he can’t drink without separating first tithes and terumah (one can eat produce without tithing under certain circumstances, but once Shabbat comes it must be tithed). He also doesn’t have a pure jug in which to put the terumah. So what he does is declare that in the future he will separate terumah and the appropriate tithes. This separationis valid according to R. Meir and he may now drink the wine. Rabbi Judah and R. Shimon do not allow this, lest the wineskin split and he wouldn’t be able to tithe later on and it turns out that he drank untithed wine.In conclusion, we can see from this baraita that R. Meir is the worrywart whereas R. Judah is not. This is indeed opposite from Abaye’s explanation of the sukkah mishnah, where R. Meir was concerned lest the animal died and R. Judah was not.
  
  Daf 24a
  
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended with a difficulty. Earlier in the daf Abaye had said that R. Meir was concerned lest the animal died. But in solving two mishnayot he said that R. Meir was not concerned lest the person die. Today’s section resolves the difficulty by changing Abaye’s statement.
  To resolve the difficulty the Talmud reverses Abaye’s statement. The mishnah which was not concerned lest the husband die is now attributed to R. Judah, whereas the mishnah that is concerned lest he die is attributed to R. Meir. This is supported by a baraita which returns to our subject.
  The resolution is that R. Meir is concerned with death because death is a frequent occurrence (at least it is a certain occurrence), whereas the splitting of the wineskin in which he was holding the wine he bought from the Samaritan is not a frequent occurrence. Thus R. Meir is a worrywart when it comes to things that happen frequently such as death. But he doesn’t worry about things that happen infrequently or may not ever happen at all.
  IntroductionToday’s daf continues with the sugya from the previous daf. R. Judah had said that one could use an animal as the wall of a sukkah because he is not concerned lest the animal die. But R. Judah doesn’t allow one to separate tithes retroactively because he is worried lest the wineskin splits. So, our Talmud asks, why worry about one and not about the other?
  R. Judah doesn’t allow to declare ahead of time that that which he tithes later will count as tithes retroactively because he rejects a principle called “bererah.” This principle allows us to take something whose status is determined later on and let us consider the status as having been determined at an earlier period. In our case, we could say that when he later on separates terumah and tithes the wine that he drank earlier was considered to have already been tithed.
  In the continuation of the baraita about tithing retroactively, R. Judah (or others speaking on his behalf) explicitly asks R. Meir about the splitting of the wineskin. Thus it seems quite clear that R. Judah doesn’t allow one to do this because he is concerned about this possibility, and not because he doesn’t hold by the principle of “bererah.” This would return us to our original difficulty—why is R. Judah concerned about the splitting of the wineskin, but not about death.
  The Talmud now reinterprets the baraita such that R. Judah does not let one drink the wine before tithing because he doesn’t believe in the legal concept called bererah. When he said to R. Meir “aren’t you concerned about the wineskin splitting” he wasn’t expressing his own opinion, he was rebutting R. Meir on R. Meir’s own terms. R. Meir allows for “bererah” but still he should be concerned lest the wineskin splits and it will turn out he drank untithed wine. R. Judah wouldn’t allow one to do so for other reasons—namely he doesn’t allow for “bererah.”
  The sugya ends with another source in which it seems that R. Judah is concerned about the possibility of death. Mishnah Yoma 1:1 talks about preparing the High Priest for the Yom Kippur ritual. The Torah says that he has to make atonement for him and his house—meaning his family, including his wife. Assuming he is already married to one woman, R. Judah says that the rabbis assign him a second wife just in case his first wife dies right before Yom Kippur and he can’t make atonement for him and his wife. Here we see that R. Judah is concerned about death.The Talmud resolves this by saying that generally R. Judah is not concerned about death but that there is a higher standard regarding the Yom Kippur ceremony. Since this was such a crucial ceremony, R. Judah would say we have to take even remote possibilities into account. But in other matters, R. Judah is not concerned about remote possibilities.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with the issue of using an animal to form the wall of a sukkah.
  On the previous page we saw that R. Zera and Abaye dispute why R. Meir doesn’t allow one to use an animal as a partition. While they provide different reasons, both say that it is “lest” something else occur. This implies that while the animal could actually act as a partition according to Torah law, the rabbis rule strictly and don’t allow it. Usually this results in a stringency—the animal cannot be used as a partition. However, in one case it results in a leniency. If one uses it as a covering for a grave, R. Meir says that it isn’t susceptible to impurity, as a covering for a grave usually is. Thus from this halakhah we can see that R. Meir holds that an animal simply doesn’t count as a partition, even from Torah law. The reasoning is not “lest” it die or run away.
  We now have a whole new explanation for R. Meir. R. Aha b. Jacob says that R. Meir doesn’t count as a partition anything that stands through “wind” or “spirit.” Since an animal stands through its own spirit, it can’t count as a partition.
  This is a slightly different version of R. Aha b. Jacob’s explanation of R. Meir.
  Both statements of R. Aha b. Jacob would mean that an animal can’t be used as the wall of a sukkah, or for any other partition. So in what case would these two reasons differ.They would differ if one used an inflated wine skin (one blown up by one’s mouth) as a partition. If R. Meir holds that partitions that stand by wind are not valid partitions, then this one is invalid. But it is made by human hands, so if he disqualifies an animal because it is not made by human hands, then this inflated skin is valid for use as the wall of a sukkah. I’m sure you’re glad to know!
  
  Daf 24b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with R. Yose the Galilean’s opinion that one cannot write a valid divorce document, a get, on something that is alive.
  This baraita contains the midrash whereby R. Yose the Galilean explains why one cannot use something that has the “breath of life” in it as a get. The Torah calls a get “a sefer” or “scroll.” A scroll in rabbinic times was always made of parchment—animal skin. But the rabbis allow one to write on other materials as well, including paper (as we do today), earthenware and a variety of other materials. The midrash says that these materials are included from the word “and he wrote to her” which are read to imply that he can write on anything. However, if this is true, why would the Torah call the divorce document a “scroll”? The answer is that a get must be written on something that has some similarities to a scroll. It cannot be alive, nor can it be written on something that eats. This is how R. Yose the Galilean derives his exclusion of animals from being material upon which a get may be written.
  The other rabbis allow one to write a get on an animal. So how then do they interpret the word “sefer” from the Torah? The answer is that had the Torah written “And he wrote for her in a scroll” then R. Yose the Galilean would have been correct. But the Torah just says, “a scroll” which they creatively read as if it says “sippur” which means “story.” He doesn’t write “in a scroll” rather he “writes a story.”
  IntroductionThis section continues to deal with the issue of the get. To recall—the rabbis don’t read the word “sefer” as being restricted to a book. The person can write the get on any material he so choose, even an animal. While R. Yose the Galilean had an interpretation of the word “and he wrote,” the rabbis who disagree with him do not. That is where our section picks up.
  The rabbis use the word “and he writes” to teach that divorce is only done through writing and not through any other means. We might have thought that since the Torah compares marriage with divorce (see Deuteronomy 24:2) just as she can be betrothed through money, so too she can be divorced through money. Therefore, the word “and he writes” is read as emphasizing that she is divorced by a written document and not by money.
  The previous comment now begins a sort of “midrashic chain” whereby each position must derive each halakhah from some place in the Torah and each position must use each word of the Torah available. R. Yose the Galilean agrees that a woman can be divorced only through writing and not through money. But the word “And he writes” was already used up by another midrash. So where does he derive this halakhah from? From the words “a scroll of divorce.” The word used for divorce can also mean “cutting off.” Thus to R. Yose the Galilean a scroll severs the bonds of marriage but nothing else does.
  The rabbis now need a halakhah to be attached to the word “sefer keritut” which we have translated as “a scroll of divorce.” The word “keritut” can also mean to “sever.” The rabbis read this word to mean that divorce must completely sever the ties between the husband and wife. He cannot make the divorce contingent upon her refraining from doing something such as drinking wine or going to her father’s house. Note that these might be things that caused him to want to divorce her in the first place. She drank wine and he was bothered by that. He didn’t like her father, or her going to visit her father’s house. The rabbis rule that the husband cannot control her in divorce in any way—even in the ways that led him to want to divorce her.However, he may make the get contingent upon a temporary condition—that she not do such an act for thirty days. Since this condition will disappear, the divorce is valid.
  How does R. Yose the Galilean derive the halakhah that divorce must sever the ties when he has already used up the word “keritut” for a different halakhah? The answer is that he derives it from the plural form. The Torah calls the get a “sefer keritut” which is the plural (or some sort of expanded form) of the word for “karet”—to sever. This allows him to use the word twice.
  Of course, this chain has to end at some point (I would hope). So the Talmud ends by stating that the other rabbis do not derive any meaning from the double form. Otherwise they would have to find a new halakhah and the argument would continue.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a new mishnah.
  Whereas the previous mishnayot discussed one who supports his skhakh on trees, this mishnah teaches that one can use trees as walls for a sukkah.
  R. Aha b. Jacob says that in order for a partition to count (for any halakhic matter requiring a partition) the partition needs to be able to withstand a normal wind. We shall now explore how this relates to our mishnah.
  The Talmud uses the above mishnah to raise a difficulty on R. Aha b. Jacob. The mishnah allows one to use a tree as a wall. But trees sway with the wind—they are not able to withstand a normal wind.
  The Talmud now offers a series of contextualizations to reconcile the mishnah with R. Aha b. Jacob’s statement. First of all, the trees we are talking about are solid trees, not bushes, which are also called “trees” by the rabbis.But even solid trees have swaying branches that don’t stand up to a normal wind.The Talmud answers this by supposing that he plaited the branches so that they wouldn’t move with the wind.But now that we’ve come this far in understanding the mishnah—that it refers to solid trees whose branches have also been made solid by being plaited—why do we even need the mishnah? Obviously these trees can be used as walls!The answer is that without this mishnah we might have thought that since at least on Shabbat or Yom Tov one cannot use a tree, that we wouldn’t let him use it as a wall. Therefore, the mishnah must teach us that he can use it as a wall, even on Shabbat or Yom Tov.
  The Talmud now uses another baraita as a difficulty on R. Aha b. Jacob. This baraita says that one can use a tree or other types of partitions as a “corner-piece.” This corner-piece when placed in the four corners around a well, would allow people to draw from the well on Shabbat. These four fictitious walls create a private domain in which one is allowed to carry. So here to we see that one can use a tree as a partition.The answer here is the same as that above—in order for the tree to count as a valid partition he must solidify the branches. If the branches sway the tree cannot be used.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the issue of whether a partition that sways to and fro counts as a partition.
  The Talmud raises yet another difficulty from a baraita that seems to allow one to consider a tree to be a partition. In this case, the issue is carrying under the tree during Shabbat. As long as the tree’s branches are within three handbreadths of the ground, one may carry underneath it.Again, as it we saw in yesterday’s section, the resolution is that he made the tree’s partition more solid by plaiting it with shrubs and trees. Without having done so, the Talmud rules that he would not be able to consider the branches to be a partition.
  
  Daf 25a
  
  If underneath the trees is considered a private domain for its partitions are real partitions, then why did R. Huna son of R. Joshua limit carrying there to an area of “two bet se’ah” which according to a book I have is about 1500 square yards.The answer is that the people who wish to dwell under these trees don’t really want to be there just to spend their Shabbat under the tree. This is not a real “abode.” Rather, they are there on Shabbat because they are doing something outside, assumedly guarding fields. Whenever an abode is set up for something outside of it, such as a guard hut, one can carry within only if it is smaller than 1500 square yards.
  This baraita says that an area that is raised ten handbreadths above the normal height of a field, or is ten handbreadths below ground level, or is surrounded by stalks that are ten handbreadths, one can count it as an enclosed area. One can walk through this entire area as if it were all four cubits in length and width. His “Shabbat border”—the distance he is allowed to leave his town on Shabbat—is reckoned from the end of the area. Had we not considered this his Shabbat area, he would be limited to 2000 cubits from the exact point at which he begins Shabbat.Again, the point of bringing this baraita here is that we have another case where vegetation that sways to and fro can count as a partition—the stalks of grain.And again, the Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that he had plaited the stalks with shrubs and bay-trees to make a more solid partition.This concludes our sugya about using considering swaying partitions to be halakhically valid. We should note that the tannaitic texts, the baraitot that the Talmud cites over and over, quite simply allow one to use such partitions even though they sway. The Talmud, the commentary and reaction to the Mishnah, rule more strictly. Formally speaking, however, the amoraim are not allowed to disagree with the Mishnah. But we can see here an excellent example of how the Talmud reacts when they do disagree with the Mishnah. They explain the Mishnah such that it accords with their opinion. Thus we might say that while formally, the authority lies with the earlier traditions, in reality, the later interpreters can do with these earlier traditions as they see fit.
  IntroductionThis  new daf begins with a new mishnah.
  People who are busy performing a mitzvah and find it difficult to eat or sleep in a sukkah are exempt from the sukkah.  This is due to the general rule that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah.People who are sick enough so that being in the sukkah would be a discomfort for them, are not obligated for the laws of the sukkah.  Being in the sukkah is not supposed to be painful and therefore, one who would be pained by being in the sukkah is exempt.  Note, that the mishnah is not addressed to those who might “fake” being sick in order to get out of sleeping or eating in the sukkah.   It is addressed to those who are so zealous about keeping the commandments that they would risk injury or at least illness to do so.  The rabbis tell such a person to get out of the sukkah—the sukkah is not supposed to cause one pain.Meals must be eaten in the sukkah.  However, snacking may be done outside of the sukkah.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita which provides scriptural support for why an agent on his way to perform a mitzvah is exempt from sitting in a sukkah. There is a general principle that whenever one is occupied with one mitzvah, he is exempt from performing another mitzvah. This is derived from the words from the Shema: “You shall speak about the words of Torah when you sit in your house and when you are going on the path.” “Sitting in the house” implies that you don’t have to study Torah when you are engaged in another mitzvah. “Going on the path” implies that a bridegroom is exempt from the Shema. How this midrash functions will be discussed below. After the midrash, the baraita appends a halakhah that states that when a man marries a virgin he is exempt from the recitation of the Shema, but when he marries a widow (or divorcee) he is liable. Below, the Talmud will discuss why there exists such a difference.
  The Talmud asks how we can use the words “when you are going on the path” to exclude one who is going to perform a mitzvah from being obligated to read the Shema. R. Huna answers that going on a path, meaning a trip, is not a mitzvah—it is an optional act. From here we can deduce that one is obligated to recite the Shema only when one is performing an optional act, but when one is occupied with a mitzvah, he need not recite the Shema.
  The Talmud presses the question. How do we know that the person referred to in the Shema as “walking on the path” was going to perform an optional act? Maybe he too was going to perform a mitzvah? The answer is that R. Huna derives this from the fact that the Torah says, “When you sit” or “when you walk.” The word you (expressed by the suffix kaf) implies that only when you are sitting or walking and occupied in something that is “for you” are you obligated to recite the Shema. If you are going on a religious errand, or occupied with a mitzvah, you are exempt.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that anyone going to perform a mitzvah, is exempt from other mitzvot occurring at the same time. But the baraita quoted said that a man is exempt from the Shema only if he is marrying a virgin. If he is marrying a widow/divorcee he is obligated. Our section questions that distinction.
  The answer is that one who marries a virgin has his mind quite preoccupied. I think the assumption is that usually this is also his first marriage. One can understand just how nervous he is, and in light of that, he can’t think about reciting the Shema. One who is marrying a woman with some experience will be less worried or preoccupied. Therefore, he is liable to recite the Shema.
  The problem with the above solution is that it implies that anyone preoccupied with anything is exempt from the Shema. If this were really true, then even one standing on the shore watching his ship sink would be exempt from the Shema. But we know this is not true because a mourner is obligated for the Shema. He is only exempt from wearing tefillin because Ezekiel calls them “beautiful” (this is based on a midrash) and a mourner is not supposed to make himself look beautiful. But despite the fact that his thoughts are also occupied with other matters, he is liable to recite the Shema. So too in general anyone who is preoccupied with something is still obligated.
  The answer is that there is an important distinction between being preoccupied with performing a mitzvah and being simply upset. If someone is preoccupied with performing a mitzvah such as marriage, he is exempt from the Shema. But if he is preoccupied with an optional activity, such as worrying about his ship, he is liable.Note that it is a mitzvah to marry either a virgin or a widow. But if he marries a widow he is not preoccupied. Therefore, despite the fact that he is going to perform a mitzvah, he is liable for Shema.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the concept that while one is performing a mitzvah he is exempt from performing another mitzvah.
  The Talmud brings a baraita that can be used to teach that one who is occupied with a mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah. Number 9:6 tells of some men who were impure and therefore couldn’t offer the Pesah sacrifice in its proper time. The rabbis, as they frequently do, wanted to identify these men. Who were they and why had they had contact with a dead body? Was this some special circumstance?The first answer is that these are the men who were carrying Joseph’s coffin up from Egypt. The second answer is that these were Mishael and Eltzaphan who buried Nadav and Avihu (Leviticus 10:4). These answers are not related to the use of this baraita in this context. However, they are part of a general tendency among the rabbis to identify unnamed characters in the Bible with named characters from elsewhere.R. Yitzchak says that if the impure men had been any of these characters they could have arranged it so that they would have become pure before Pesah. The people in this story obviously could not have become pure. Therefore, this person must have been person who had been occupied with what is known in rabbinic literature as a “met mitzvah.” This is the idea that if a person encounters a dead body that has no one to take care of its burial, one is obligated to provide the body with a proper burial. This is a mitzvah. R. Yitzchak implies that these people would have known that if they occupied themselves with the body, they would not have been able to offer the Pesah sacrifice, for their seventh day of purification would fall on the eve of Pesah, the day on which the Pesah is slaughtered. Nevertheless, they did not avoid one mitzvah (burying the dead body) in favor of another mitzvah (the pesah).Our Talmud asks why we can’t use this source as proof for the general concept that one who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah.We shall see the answer in tomorrow’s section.
  
  Daf 25b
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud now resolves that we need both sources, the verse “when you walk on the path” and the story about the men who were occupied with a dead body (a met mitzvah) and therefore couldn’t offer the pesah, in order to fully derive that one who is occupied with a commandment is exempt from performing another commandment. If we didn’t have both sources, one would not have known the extent of this principle.
  If I only had the source about the men who buried the body, I would have said that one should not refrain from performing a mitzvah now just because it will prevent him from performing a mitzvah later. This is exactly what the men did when they buried the body. They buried the body even though that meant that they couldn’t offer the pesah on time. However, if I am currently occupied with one mitzvah and another one comes at the same time, I might have thought that I should fulfill both of them. Therefore, I need the verse in the Shema to tell me that if I am currently doing one mitzvah, I need not perform simultaneously another one.
  If the only verse I had was the case of the Shema, I would have said that if one is performing a mitzvah he need not perform another one at the same time, as long as the mitzvah he doesn’t perform is not punishable by “karet,” a serious punishment, which is the consequence of not offering the Pesah. Therefore, we need the case of the impure men to teach us that even though they risk not being able to fulfill a mitzvah punishable by the serious punishment of karet, they still invoke the principle that one who is occupied with a mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah.
  IntroductionThe Talmud now goes back to discussing the source concerning the mourner being exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah.
  In Ezekiel 24:15-17 God tells Ezekiel that he is about to take his wife away from him but that he is not allowed to mourn over her. God specifies certain ways in which Ezekiel is to behave. The rabbis use these verses to derive some of the laws of mourning. Among His instructions, God tells him, “Put on your turban.” The word for “turban” can also be translated as “your beauty” and the rabbis interpret this to mean tefillin. Ezekiel was told specifically to put on his tefillin—their presence upon him was a sign that he wasn’t mourning. But all other mourners are not allowed to wear their tefillin while mourning.However, this only applies to the first day of mourning. After the first day, even a mourner must put on his tefillin.
  The Talmud now quotes another statement by R. Abba b. Zavda. He holds that a mourner is obligated to sit in the sukkah.But, the Talmud asks, isn’t this obvious! We just said above that a mourner is obligated for all of the mitzvot in the Torah. Why issue a separate statement saying that he is obligated to sit in the sukkah?The answer comes in light of another statement by R. Abba b. Zavda. In this other statement he says that one who is experiencing discomfort by sitting in the sukkah need not stay there (we shall examine this later in the chapter). We might have thought that the mourner is also experiencing discomfort and should be exempt from the sukkah. Therefore, R. Abba bar Zavda teaches us that the discomfort that exempts one from sitting in the sukkah is only discomfort that is a result of sitting in the sukkah. It is externally caused (too hot, too cold, bugs) and therefore cannot be controlled. In contrast, the discomfort to the mourner is caused by his own emotions. He must settle his thoughts such that he can be in the sukkah, even after a relative has died.We should note that during the festival one does not mourn. So the person is not really a “mourner” but rather someone who has just experienced the death of a relative over whom he would have had to mourn. Finally, I should also note that today a mourner puts on tefillin after the burial, but not before the burial.
  IntroductionToday’s section teaches that people who are involved with celebrating a wedding are exempt from sitting in the sukkah.
  R. Abba bar Zavda says that all of the wedding celebrants are exempt from sitting in the sukkah, for all seven days of the wedding celebration. Note that in talmudic times proper weddings seem to have been seven days of celebration. This is already reflected in the Torah where Jacob marries Leah and then must wait another seven days to marry Rachel.Note that this halakhah seems to be a derivative of his other halakhah—one who is occupied with a mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah. People who are occupied in celebrating the marriage are not liable to perform the mitzvah of sukkah.
  The Talmud now tries to find some way to allow the wedding celebrators to still fulfill the commandment of the sukkah. The first option would be to have the wedding feast in the sukkah. The problem with that is that in Talmudic times they seem to have celebrated in the actual huppah. You can’t have the wedding feast anywhere else. We should note that it is not all that clear what the “huppah” was in the times of the Talmud. It was certainly not the symbolic huppah we use today. In this sugya we can see that it seems to have been some sort of room.The next idea would be to eat in the sukkah, but celebrate in the huppah. The problem with that is that you can’t really celebrate somewhere besides where the food is [still remains 100 per cent true today!].
  The next possibility would be just to do the huppah inside the sukkah. I take this to mean, why not just move the entire wedding and celebration into the sukkah.Rashi explains Abaye as saying that the problem is that they used to put their sukkot on their roofs. The sukkah was not particularly accessible to people. If the husband had to go down to the bathroom it might happen that he would leave another man alone in the sukkah with his wife. This was strictly forbidden because of what is known as “yihhud” or “seclusion.”Rava says that having the huppah in the sukkah would be a discomfort to the groom. Rashi notes that since it was so small he would have trouble “playing” there with his wife. It seems that the couple was supposed to consummate their marriage in the huppah, which was originally an actual room. Doing so in a sukkah, while possible, just isn’t the same.
  As the Talmud often does, it asks what the practical difference is between Abaye’s reason for why one can’t have the huppah in the sukkah, and Rava’s.The two amoraim will differ in a case where people are going in and out of the sukkah. Since there will not be a problem of seclusion in such a case, Abaye would say that it is okay. Rava would say that the problem of the discomfort still exists so it is not allowed.
  Despite the fact that the sugya says one is not obligated to eat in the sukkah during the seven days of feasting following a marriage, R. Zera says that he did indeed do both—he ate in the sukkah and celebrated in the huppah. This caused him even greater rejoicing in that he could fulfill both commandments. We should note that this is a slightly different “rejoicing” then was referred to before. Rejoicing at a wedding is not because it is a commandment, but because one is genuinely happy, or at least supposed to be, about what has actually happened. In contrast, R. Zera’s rejoicing is at the opportunity to perform a commandment. It is a religious type of rejoicing. I don’t think these contradict each other (most of the time), but I do believe that they are slightly different.
  
  Daf 26a
  
  IntroductionDaf Kaf Vav continues to discuss those who are exempt from performing one mitzvah because they are occupied with another mitzvah.
  This baraita deals with the ritual prayer obligations of those involved in the wedding party. These people are exempt from prayer (the Amidah) because prayer requires a lot of intention—kavanah, and it is difficult for people celebrating to have the proper intention for prayer. They are exempt from tefillin because people may be getting drunk and one should not wear tefillin when drunk. We should note that in talmudic times people probably wore tefillin all day long. It was only in a later period when the norm began to be to wear them only during prayer. But they are obligated to recite the Shema, because the Shema is shorter and requires less kavanah (intention). Also, the Shema is a biblical passage that is probably easier to remember than the Amidah which had not yet been written down and whose precise wording had not yet been fully determined.R. Shila says that the bridegroom is exempt from the Shema because he is worried about his wedding. But the other members of the wedding party are obligated because they are not so worried.We should note that this baraita disagrees with the principle we learned above, that anyone occupied with the performance of a commandment is exempt from performing another commandment.
  This baraita is even more expansive in who is exempt from performing any mitzvah because they are occupied in the performance of another mitzvah. Even people who are preparing objects to be used in the performance of a mitzvah, scribes and sellers of religious objects, are exempt from performing another mitzvah at the same time.In my opinion these statements should be understood more as value statements than as halakhic prescriptions. What I mean is that when one is doing something important, performing one mitzvah, s/he shouldn’t turn away from that mitzvah in order to do something better. One should stay involved in the mitzvah that one is already performing. In reality, scribes and sellers can do both, and throughout history, to this day, that is what people do. I have been to many evening weddings in which we stop to daven maariv. But still, the principle remains true, and personally I think that there are some important life lessons here. One shouldn’t always be chasing after the “better” thing to do. One should be satisfied with the importance of the here and now.
  This baraita deals with the difficulty travelers have in performing the mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah. Those who are traveling are exempt from the mitzvah, but only while they are actually traveling. When they are resting, they are obligated to sleep and eat in a sukkah. However, one who is on his way to perform a mitzvah is exempt even when he is not traveling. Again, I read this as a value statement. Traveling for work or pleasure is important and one is allowed to do so during hol hamoed, but it only takes priority when one is actually traveling. Traveling in order to perform a mitzvah is of greater significance and therefore one is exempt even during the time of day he is not traveling.
  R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna go to visit the exilarch (the political leader in talmudic Babylonia) on the Shabbat of Sukkot. While they probably could have just as easily slept in the sukkah of the exilarch, they do not do so, choosing to camp out on the banks of the river. They do so to teach that one who is in the process of performing a mitzvah is exempt from simultaneously performing another mitzvah. In this case, the mitzvah that they are performing is to greet their rabbi on the festival, something we see many rabbis doing in the Talmud.
  IntroductionThis sugya deals with watchmen and whether they are exempt from the mitzvah of the sukkah.
  People who are guarding the city generally can go home when they are not working. Therefore, when they are out at the gates or walls watching the city, they are exempt. But when they are home, they must sleep and eat in the sukkah. In contrast, people watching gardens and orchards are outside of the city and don’t come home every day. Therefore, they are exempt all of the time, day and night. In essence, they are always on the job.
  The Talmud asks why the orchard or garden watchmen can’t just make a sukkah out in a field and dwell there. Abaye explains that there is a midrash on the word “dwell” in the context of Sukkot. The word “dwell” implies that your “dwelling” in the Sukkah should be like your “dwelling” in a house. In talmudic times used to take out their furniture from the house, the bed, the mattress, and put it in the sukkah and make it like their homes. Since the watchman can’t do this when he is out in the field, he is exempt from the sukkah altogether.Rava offers a different reason for why the watchman is exempt from the sukkah—it will impede his job performance. If he goes into a sukkah, a place with walls, the thief will see that he is not guarding the orchard and will take the opportunity to steal the produce.As often happens, the Talmud asks why give two reasons for one halakhah? What is the practical difference between the reason offered by Abaye and that offered by Rava? The difference is expressed in a case where the watchman is out in the field but his only duty is to watch a pile of produce. In such a case he can build the sukkah and still guard the produce, so Rava would say that he is liable to dwell in the sukkah. Abaye would say that since he still can’t bring his stuff out there to the fields, he can’t “dwell” as he normally does, so he is exempt.
  IntroductionThis section goes on to discuss the next clause of the Mishnah, which exempted sick people from dwelling in the sukkah.
  This baraita teaches that one who is sick and would be discomforted by sleeping in the sukkah is exempt from the mitzvah. Even if this pain is minor, he is exempt.We should note that the psychology here is not of people looking for excuses to “get out” of being in the sukkah, but rather the rabbis instructing people not to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah if it causes them discomfort. The rabbis seem to be worried that people will do so even if it is painful for them; they do not seem to be concerned that people will use these halakhot as an excuse to get out of sleeping in the sukkah.
  The Talmud now cites two stories in which rabbis gave permission to other rabbis to not fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah because of the discomfort there. R. Aha Bardela sleeps under a canopied bed which is not allowed (if it has four posts—it forms a barrier to the skhakh) in the sukkah. Rav allows him to do so because the canopy protects him from the gnats whose presence makes the sukkah intolerable. R. Aha b. Ada’s sukkah is smelly, so Rava allows him to sleep outside the sukkah altogether.
  Rava’s permission to sleep outside the sukkah because of the stench is a result of his broader belief—anyone who is in discomfort by being in the sukkah need not remain there!
  However, the Talmud now thinks that Rava has gone a bit too far. The Mishnah exempted those who are sick, not anyone with any discomfort.The resolution is that there is a difference between the sick and those merely in discomfort. If someone is truly sick, then he might need attendants with him. In such a case the attendants are also exempt from being in the sukkah. But if someone merely feels discomfort, he is exempt if the sukkah increases his discomfort. But even if he has attendants, they are not exempt. As long as they do not feel discomfort in the sukkah, they are obligated to dwell there.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses what types of eating are allowed outside of the sukkah and what types of eating can be done only in the sukkah.
  The Talmud defines “casual” eating as a certain volume and not as a manner (i.e. eating while standing up is casual, but sitting or reclining is formal). This leads to the question of how much food can still be considered “casual eating.”R. Joseph says that the volume of 2-3 eggs is considered casual eating. This would seem to me the equivalent of a handful of pretzels, a piece of fruit, or something like that.Abaye seems to have a smaller appetite. Two-three eggs might be enough for an entire meal (not a super-sized meal, that’s for sure). So how can it be considered casual eating?Therefore Abaye rules that casual eating is as much as a young student eats before he goes into the learning session. This is evidently less than 2-3 eggs. In my opinion, Abaye may be referring not just to the amount, but to the manner in which the food is eaten. Eating a small amount while running into class is “casual.”
  The main acts a person is supposed to perform in the sukkah are eating and sleeping. But while casual eating is allowed outside the sukkah, casual sleeping is not. Why not? R. Ashi explains that if one is allowed to “casually sleep”—i.e. nap—he might fall fast asleep. In other words, we can protect ourselves against allowing “casual” eating to turn into “set” eating (at least we think we can stop ourselves from eating), but with sleep, we cannot because we are asleep.
  One is not allowed to sleep a deep sleep in one’s tefillin. This is because tefillin require a “clean body” and one cannot keep one’s body clean while sleeping (one is not supposed to flatulate while wearing tefillin). Nevertheless, one is allowed to casually sleep while wearing tefillin. So, Abaye asks, if we allow casual sleeping with tefillin and we are not concerned that he fall deeply asleep, why not say the same with regard to sleeping outside of the sukkah.R. Joseph b. Ilai says that this baraita refers to one who tells someone to wake him up if he falls to fast asleep. In that way he can be assured that he won’t fall too deeply asleep. If he sets up an “alarm clock” he can sleep in his tefillin.
  R. Mesharshaya says that even one person watching over you to make sure you don’t fall fast asleep is not enough. What if that person falls asleep as well!Therefore R. Yohanan offers another interpretation to casual sleep. Casual sleep is not an amount of time, it is a position. If one just puts one’s head between one’s knees, sort of like putting one’s head down on a table, the sleep is casual. People don’t generally fall really fast asleep in such a position. So one can sleep that way with his tefillin on (and maybe outside of the sukkah as well).Rava has an entirely different answer. He holds we are never concerned about someone falling fast asleep. One can sleep casually in one’s tefillin without concern that he will fall into a deep sleep. But when it comes to the sukkah, sleep is sleep. There is no “set” amount for sleep—any sleep might be sufficient for a person. Therefore, one isn’t even allowed to nap outside of the sukkah.
  IntroductionSince yesterday’s section discussed sleeping with one’s tefillin on, today’s section continues to deal with this topic. We should remember that in talmudic times rabbis probably wore their tefillin all day. This explains why the sugya has to deal with certain actions that may be undertaken while wearing tefillin. Today, when most people do not wear tefillin all day long, these problems should not arise.
  There are three baraitot in this section discussing whether one can sleep in tefillin. One says yes, one says no, and one says only casual sleep, a nap.
  The baraita that forbids one from sleeping while wearing tefillin refers to a case where he is holding them in his hands. He is not allowed to sleep lest he drop them on the floor. The baraita that allows only napping refers to a regular case where he simply has them on his head. He is not allowed to sleep deeply lest he pass gas with them on. Finally, the baraita that disallows sleeping with tefillin refers to a case where he wrapped them up in a cloth and put them next to his head.
  Here we learn that “casual sleep” is a really short time. As long as it takes to walk only 100 cubits, about 50 meters. Personally I wouldn’t even consider this a nap. Seems like they’re saying that while theoretically, you can sleep in your tefillin, you really cannot.
  
  Daf 26b
  
  This baraita supports the definition of casual sleep offered above. It also provides another reason why the rabbis didn’t want one to sleep with tefillin on—lest he have a seminal emission. The baraita seems to hold that one who has had a seminal emission is not allowed to even touch his tefillin due to the rules of impurity. As we shall see below, the Talmud rejects this interpretation. In any case, R. Yaakov says that the solution to this problem is just to hold the straps and remove the tefillin in that way. The straps do not contain the scrolls and therefore purity is not an issue. The other sages say he shouldn’t sleep more than a few seconds in his tefillin. Longer sleep might be risky.
  The Talmud now moves into the general subject of sleeping during the day. Rav said one shouldn’t really nap during the day, no more than the time it takes for a horse to nap. This seems to be no more than a few moments. The reason is not due to tefillin but because the rabbis perceived sleep as a waste of time that could be better spent learning Torah. Abaye notes a chain of great Jewish leaders (from his teacher Rabbah all the way back to King David) who barely slept during the day. However, ironically, Abaye himself was a deep sleeper. He would sleep for a long time, even during the day. R. Joseph called him a sluggard. Nevertheless, I would argue that Abaye’s long naps don’t seem to have cost him very much as far as his Torah learning goes.
  R. Natan holds that one can sleep during the day with tefillin on. But R. Yose is even more strict—young men should never sleep with their tefillin on. Assumedly this is because young men more frequently have seminal emissions while sleeping. However, the Talmud rejects this interpretation—it is not forbidden to wear tefillin after having a seminal emission. Therefore, Abaye interprets R. Yose in a different way– the prohibition is related to young men who frequently have intercourse with their wives. If they are allowed to sleep with their tefillin, they might grow accustomed to wearing their tefillin in bed and then might grow accustomed to having sex while wearing tefillin. This is not respectful. It is not a transgression of the laws of impurity. It is simply not proper.The final baraita addresses what to do if one forgets to remove tefillin before having sex. The baraita says that one should first wash one’s hands and only then remove the tefillin. This is because the hands might have touched places after which one should wash one’s hands. Again, this is not an issue of impurity. It is an issue of cleanliness.While it sounds sort of unlikely to us that a person would forget to remove his tefillin before having sex, we would do well to remember that people used to wear their tefillin all the time. Tefillin were probably quite small, and it seems that a person might simply get used to having them on and forget to take them off.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with a new mishnah. It discusses whether one can eat anything outside of the sukkah.
  The mishnah tells a story of two rabbis who refused to eat anything outside of the sukkah, even a couple of dates, water or the taste of a dish.  It seems that these rabbis were acting “beyond the letter of the law.” Although they could have eaten outside of the sukkah as we learned in the previous mishnah, they chose to be strict and ordered their servants to bring the food up to the sukkah.Rabbi Zadok on the other hand does not tell his servant to bring the small amount of food, less than an egg’s worth, up to the sukkah.  He eats it outside the sukkah.  He also performs a few more acts from which we can learn halakhah.  First of all, he takes the food in a napkin and does not wash his hands, as was customary during this period.  Secondly, he does not say a blessing afterwards.  Rabbi Zadok holds that one recites a blessing after eating only an egg’s worth of food.
  The previous mishnah (found on Daf Kaf Heh) said that one is allowed to eat casually outside the Sukkah. So, the Talmud, asks, why did R. Yohanan b. Zakkai and Rabban Gamaliel not eat these small amounts of food outside the sukkah. The answer is that they were being strict upon themselves. They could have eaten the food outside the sukkah, but they wanted to eat the food in the sukkah. Without these stories we might have thought that since one is not obligated to eat the food in the sukkah, it is presumptuous, or arrogant to do so. One should not try to “show off” by performing mitzvoth that one is not obligated to do. The mishnah teaches us that in this particular case, eating small amounts of food in the sukkah is not presumptuous.
  
  Daf 27a
  
  R. Zadok seems to hold that anything more than the bulk of an egg must be eaten only in a sukkah. But above on this very daf of Talmud, R. Joseph said one can eat 2-3 eggs outside the sukkah. Abaye said that one can eat as much as a young student eats before going into the Talmud lesson. Both of these measures are greater than an egg. So perhaps these amoraic opinions are refuted by the opinion of the tanna, R. Zadok.The resolution is that the measure of an egg was mentioned not because it is the precise measure of food that obligates one to go into the sukkah. If one eats an egg, one must first wash one’s hands and one must say blessing after eating the food. But if the volume is less than an egg one can eat the food without washing hands and there is no requirement to say a concluding berakhah. When it comes to the laws of sukkah, one can eat even more than an egg’s worth of food outside the sukkah.
  IntroductionNew daf, new mishnah.
  The Talmud will discuss both of these sections, so I will leave explanation for there.
  R. Eliezer says that your dwelling in the sukkah should be like your normal dwelling, when you dwell in your house. In talmudic times it was normal to eat two meals a day, one midday meal and one night meal (breakfast was not a real meal), so too you must have two meals in the sukkah per day.
  The rabbis agree that your dwelling in the sukkah should be like your dwelling in an abode. However, this does not mean that one has to eat two meals a day. Just as in normal situations, one eats only if one wants to eat, so too in the sukkah.I think we can see that R. Eliezer imposes a rule on the sukkah—you have to dwell there, and that entails eating two meals a day. The other rabbis understand the mitzvah differently. When you dwell, i.e. eat, it must be there. But if you don’t want to dwell/eat, there is no mitzvah to do so.
  The other rabbis agree that on the first night of Sukkot there is an obligation to eat in the Sukkah. The rule is not that if one eats, one must do so in the sukkah; the rule is that one has to eat and do so in the Sukkah. Where do the rabbis derive this obligation from?The answer is that Sukkot is compared with Pesah. Just as on the first night of Pesah it is mandated to eat matzah, and on the rest of the nights one can eat matzah but doesn’t have to (but of course, no chametz!) so too on Sukkot which falls on the same day of the month. On the first night one must eat in the Sukkah; on subsequent nights one can eat in the sukkah. If one doesn’t want to eat, one need not do so (but no eating a meal outside of the sukkah).The obligation to eat matzah on the first night is learned directly from Exodus.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with the second half of the mishnah.
  In the first part of the mishnah, R. Eliezer says that one must eat fourteen meals in a sukkah. But in the second half he says that if he misses eating the first night, he can make it up on the last night. The problem is that R. Eliezer seems to disagree with himself. If one is obligated for fourteen meals, then he would have to make up any missed meal. [There are other interpretations of how R. Eliezer contradicts himself.]
  Bira agrees with the above assessment—the two statements of R. Eliezer do indeed contradict each other. His answer is that R. Eliezer changed his mind. Originally he did hold that one had to eat fourteen meals in the sukkah. Later, he recanted and agreed with the sages—only the first night is obligatory and so this is the only night that need be made up.
  If one has to make up the meal, the question is how to do so? After all, if he eats an extra meal involving bread how would one know that this meal is to make up the missed first meal? What he’s really doing is just eating the meal that he has to anyway on that night.The resolution is that he adds desserts to the meal he eats on the last night. He finishes his regular meal and then clears the plates, and then eats foods that he would not have eaten had he not missed the meal on the first night. This way he makes it clear that he is eating extra.The Talmud supports this with a story about King Agrippa, a legendary Jewish king whom the rabbis portray as a good king. The king’s assistant asks what he should do, since he eats only one meal a day. For him it is regular to eat one meal, not two meals. R. Eliezer answers that since he always adds a variety of appetizers to his meal, he should do so on Sukkot and that can be considered his second meal. From here we can see that this meal need not consist of bread.Note that this last baraita does not reflect the notion that R. Eliezer changed his mind about the requirement to eat fourteen meals in the sukkah. This is a complicated question and there are many, many commentaries on this sugya, but I have tried to keep my commentary simple.
  IntroductionThis section continues the baraita from the previous section, which discussed how one makes up a missed meal in the sukkah.
  The baraita proceeds with another question asked of R. Eliezer—can a man who has two wives use two sukkot in two different places? R. Eliezer answers in the negative. As we shall see below, R. Eliezer holds that it is a mitzvah to sit all seven days in one sukkah. This also matches what he said in the Mishnah—one must eat 14 meals in a sukkah. R. Eliezer seems to conceive of the seven days as one complete mitzvah, that must be completed with integrity, i.e. in one sukkah.
  
  Daf 27b
  
  This is the dispute alluded to above. R. Eliezer holds that one must sit in the same sukkah for all seven days. The mitzvah is to dwell for seven days in a sukkah. The rabbis hold that the mitzvah is to dwell in a sukkah whenever one is “dwelling” on Sukkot. It doesn’t matter what sukkah one dwells in, or whether one dwells in the same sukkah for all seven day.
  This is a midrash which provides Scriptural basis for R. Eliezer. The Torah says to keep Sukkot for seven days. The word “keep” can be read “make.” R. Eliezer says you have to make a sukkah that you will sit in for seven days. If you make one during the intermediate days (Hol Hamoed) of Sukkot then the sukkah was not for seven days. And if you leave your sukkah during the Festival, then it also turns out that your sukkah was not made for seven days.
  The other rabbis don’t read the verse this way. They read it to mean that you make must a sukkah to use during the seven days of Sukkot, but one does not have to make a sukkah that he will live in for all seven days.
  The Talmud comments that the last section of the baraita is obvious. Obviously if the sukkah falls down, R. Eliezer would allow one to rebuild it! What other option is there? The answer is that we might have thought that a rebuilt sukkah is considered to be like a different sukkah and therefore R. Eliezer would not allow one to dwell there. Therefore, R. Eliezer lets us know that it is considered to be the same sukkah as before, and he can fulfill his obligation by dwelling there.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss R. Eliezer’s various positions regarding the laws of sukkot.
  The background to this dispute is that all sages agree that one must own one’s own lulav, at least on the first day of the festival. This is derived by the sages from the words “for yourselves” that appears in Leviticus 23:40. Even a borrowed lulav cannot be used on the first day of the Festival. We shall discuss this more in the next chapter. The same word “for yourself/yourselves” also appears in connection with the sukkah in Deuteronomy. Thus R. Eliezer holds that one can fulfill his obligation only with his own sukkah. Note that this also accords with what he held in the previous sections—one must build a sukkah and sit in the same sukkah for seven days. No visiting friends for R. Eliezer.The other sages use Leviticus 23:42 to derive that people can share sukkot. They read the verse creatively, as if it says that every “homeborn” (in the Torah this term is used to exclude the resident alien) can sit in one sukkah. A beautiful image but I’m not sure I’d really want to be in that sukkah.
  As often happens in these sugyot, the Talmud now discusses what each side does with the verse used to support the other side. The rabbis use the words “for yourself” to exclude a “stolen sukkah.” One can use a borrowed sukkah, but a stolen sukkah is off limits. We will return to the topic of the stolen sukkah in the next chapter.
  R. Eliezer uses the phrase “All that are homeborn” to teach that if one became liable for mitzvoth during the Festival, one has to build a sukkah. There are two such categories of people: a convert who converts during Sukkot and a minor who reaches majority age during Sukkot. Both of these people begin Sukkot exempt from mitzvoth, including the mitzvah to dwell in a sukkah, but as soon as they convert or reach majority age, they must build a sukkah, even in the middle of the festival. Rabbi Eliezer needs this verse because for him, this is an exception to the rule. A person who didn’t build a sukkah at the beginning of the Festival cannot build one later on during Hol Hamoed.The other rabbis don’t even need a verse to teach this. Since they hold that anyone can build a sukkah during Hol Hamoed, obviously so too can one who wasn’t obligated at the beginning of the Festival.
  IntroductionAnother baraita about R. Eliezer on the festival.
  In this section of the baraita R. Eliezer is asked whether one can put up a sheet in the Sukkah to block out the sun. As we shall see, R. Eliezer does not want this done because he thinks it a violation of the rules of Shabbat and the Festival. However, as the end of the baraita notes, R. Eliezer never said anything that he didn’t hear directly from his master. He is the arch-conservative. He didn’t have a tradition he heard about the matter. Rather than say nothing, he keeps trying to shift the conversation to a discussion of what tribes judges and prophets came from. This doesn’t seem at all connected to the question he is being asked—can I put up a sheet?
  In this section of the baraita R. Eliezer is asked whether one can put up a sheet in the Sukkah to block out the sun. As we shall see, R. Eliezer does not want this done because he thinks it a violation of the rules of Shabbat and the Festival. However, as the end of the baraita notes, R. Eliezer never said anything that he didn’t hear directly from his master. He is the arch-conservative. He didn’t have a tradition he heard about the matter. Rather than say nothing, he keeps trying to shift the conversation to a discussion of what tribes judges and prophets came from. This doesn’t seem at all connected to the question he is being asked—can I put up a sheet?
  The Talmud now notes that R. Eliezer’s behavior in this story does not accord with his rulings in the baraitot above. First of all, R. Eliezer said that one should not go from one sukkah to another, one should stay in one’s own Sukkah for all of Shabbat.The Talmud resolves this difficulty by saying that the story didn’t actually happen on Sukkot. While they were sitting in a sukkah, they were not doing so because of any halakhic obligation, they were doing so simply because it was too hot to be outside.The next problem is that R. Eliezer thinks that people should stay home on the Festival. So how could R. Eliezer travel to see R. Yohanan b. Ilai.The final answer is that this story took place on Shabbat—it didn’t even happen on a festival. R. Eliezer allows one to travel to greet a fellow rabbi on Shabbat.
  Rabbi Eliezer did not wish to answer R. Yohanan b. Ilai’s question because he never said anything that he didn’t hear from his master. The reason that R. Eliezer didn’t want the sheet spread over him is that he seems to consider it a transgression of the prohibition of building on Shabbat. It sounds like he himself doesn’t have any traditions about whether one can erect a temporary tent on Shabbat. However, there is a mishnah in which R. Eliezer says it is forbidden to put a shutter back in a window on Shabbat because he considers this building. So why didn’t he just quote his own teaching.The Talmud answers that the situations are different. In the case of the window shutter, when he puts the shutter back in its place it becomes part of the building. R. Eliezer considers this to be building. However, the sheet spread over him does not become part of the sukkah. Therefore, one can’t use the mishnah from Shabbat to prove that putting the sheet under the sukkah is prohibited. And since he didn’t want to say anything not already stated by his rabbi, he tried to change the subject.
  
  Daf 28a
  
  IntroductionAt the end of the previous daf we learned that R. Eliezer never said anything he hadn’t learned from his master. Daf Kaf Het (28) continues with another baraita about R. Eliezer, including his statement that he never said anything he hadn’t heard from his master.
  The baraita begins with the story of the sages asking R. Eliezer halakhic questions while he was in the Upper Galilee. R. Eliezer answers only those questions for which he already knows a tradition. If he doesn’t know a tradition, he doesn’t state his own opinion. This is an extreme version of one notion what it means to be a tannaitic rabbi. All rabbis transmit traditions that they learned from their teachers. This is the “Oral Torah” passed down by word of mouth from generation to generation. However, most rabbis also use their own intellect to figure out the answers to situations for which they don’t have a tradition. They operate using both their memory and their acumen. R. Eliezer, in contrast, refuses to add his own contribution to the tradition. He sees himself as merely a conduit in the passing of the tradition from one generation to the other. The other sages ask him questions, trying to get him to answer a question for which he doesn’t have a tradition. He refuses to do so, recognizing their questions for what they are.
  This is a continuation of the baraita about R. Eliezer. We can see R. Eliezer’s extreme devotion to the life of Torah study. He never discussed anything besides Torah (not even sports!). He was a pure conduit for the transmission of traditions, filling his head with what he had learned and transmitting it to the next generation.We should note that R. Eliezer is accredited with amazing, even wondrous abilities, but he is not the model that the Talmud seems to prefer. As important as memory was, most of the time the Talmud lauds intellectual sharpness, the ability to be creative and derive new halakhot. Most importantly, overall the Talmud values dialectics, the ability to see the faults in an argument and to offer a solution. As important as memory was, the rabbis valued other intellectual abilities to an even greater degree.
  The next part of the baraita is about R. Yohanan b. Zakkai the legendary rabbi who spearheaded the preservation of Judaism after the destruction of the Temple. Many of the patterns of behavior attributed to R. Eliezer above were learned from his teacher, as would seem to be appropriate for such a conservative rabbi. We also learn of R. Yohanan ben Zakkai’s great humility—he never let anyone else open the door for his disciples.In the middle of the baraita we saw that R. Yohanan b. Zakkai was also strict about the rules of cleanliness. He wouldn’t even think in his heart about Torah while he was in a filthy alleyway (they did not have proper sewage back then). This is beyong the letter of the law which only prohibits talking about Torah in such places. Indeed, we can imagine that this was no easy task. For a person who learns Torah all day long, every day, stopping oneself from even thinking about Torah could not have been easy.Towards the end of the baraita we learn that there were only two days a year in which he left “work” early. The eve of Pesah so that he could make seder with his family. And the eve of Yom Kippur so that he could make sure that his family ate a proper meal before the fast. The rest of the year—Mrs. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakai—you’re on your own. Leave a light on, but don’t wait up!
  IntroductionThis section continues with more legends about some significant figures in the tannaitic period.
  The baraita tells of the great quantity of students that Hillel the Elder (founder of Bet Hillel) had. Interestingly, some of these students were average. Good thing it doesn’t list their names.
  R. Yohanan ben Zakkai was a true polymath, occupying himself with all of the branches of Jewish learning. Rashi defines most of these terms. Below follows his explanations:Mishnah: The teachings of the tannaim divided into the six orders.Talmud (or Gemara): The explanations that later tannaim offered to the words of earlier tannaim. Note that R. Yohanan ben Zakkai is a tanna (from the mishnaic period). Therefore, Talmud cannot refer to what we call Talmud. Other scholars have noted that “talmud” can also mean “midrash”—interpretations of verses.Aggadot: stories and legends.Minutiae of Torah: Deriving laws from extra letters found in the Torah (we shall see an example of this on the bottom of the page).Minutiae of the Scribes: This refers to the rabbis, called “scribes” who made exacting laws to keep a person from sinning. Elsewhere laws such as these are called “fences around the Torah.”Kal vehomers and analogies: These are two common techniques used to derive halakhah from the Torah.Calendrical computations: Such as when to add a month to a year.Gematriot: Special letter codes, including but not limited to the numerical evaluation of letters.The speech of the ministering angels, demons and palm trees: Rashi says he doesn’t know what these things are. With regard to demons, this may refer to the “magic bowls” that Jews used to write in order to control demons, or to prevent them from causing damage. This is similar to amulet writing. “The speech of palm trees” may refer to King Solomon’s ability to speak with the trees (see I Kings 5:13).Parables: Used by the ancients to communicate their messages.The works of the chariot: Maaseh Merkavah, a word used to refer to speculative mysticism. The “chariot” is God’s chariot described in the first chapter of Ezekiel.The discussions of Abaye and Rava: Abaye and Rava lived in the middle of the talmudic period. Clearly R. Yohanan ben Zakkai could not have known these discussions. What the baraita seems to say is that all of the intricate discussions that these two amazing amoraim had were already known to R. Yohanan ben Zakkai.
  Yonatan b. Uzziel’s fire for Torah was so great that if he studied Torah and a bird flew overhead, the bird would be burned up. Rashi says that this was because the ministering angels would gather over head to learn his Torah. These angels were fiery seraphim.I had a friend who once told me a joke about this he learned in his Yeshiva. He said as student once asked, if Yonatan ben Uzziel was so great that a bird flying overhead would burn up when he studied Torah, what would happen when Hillel himself studied Torah? The Rosh Yeshiva scratched his head, thought for a moment and then turned to the student and said, “Hillel’s Torah study was so great, that when he would learn, a bird would fly overhead and not be burned.” Not everyone likes this joke, but it’s one of my all time favorites.
  IntroductionToday’s section consists of just mishnah, specifically two mishnayot which are numbered 2:7-8 in the Mishnah itself. Since I have already explained them as part of the Mishnah Yomit project, the below explanation is taken from there.I should note that Mishnah Seven, concerning the size of the sukkah, or the position in which a person must sit while eating in a sukkah, was already dealt with in chapter one, on pages 2-3. So the Talmud doesn’t explain this mishnah here. The passage that we will begin to learn tomorrow is on mishnah eight.
  Section one: If someone has a small sukkah, one that is not capable of fitting his entire body, but only his head and most of his body, Bet Shammai declare the sukkah invalid and Bet Hillel say it is valid.  Similarly, if one has a large sukkah, a sukkah sufficient to fit his entire body, but he sat with only his head and most of his body in the sukkah, while the rest of his body was out of the sukkah, he would not have fulfilled his obligation according to Bet Hillel.We should note that the terminology of this mishnah is ambiguous.  At first it sounds like the mishnah is discussing where the person sits, regardless of the size of the sukkah.  However, the words “valid” and “invalid” at the end of section one describe the validity of the sukkah based on its size.  Hence, in my explanation I have tried to incorporate both elements.  According to Bet Shammai the sukkah must be large enough to encompass his entire body and he must sit with his whole body in the sukkah. Bet Hillel say that the sukkah need only hold his head and most of his body and when sitting in the sukkah, only his head and most of his body need be inside. The table may be outside of the sukkah.Section two:This story illustrates the argument between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai.  As an aside, we can note from this story and the discussion in 2:1 that space in sukkot might have been tight. This might reflect the reality in the Second Temple period in Jerusalem when many people came to make their pilgrimage. Alternatively, it may reflect the cramped housing and living spaces of 2nd century towns in the land of Israel.
  Section one:  Dwelling in the sukkah is a positive time-bound commandment, similar to hearing the shofar.  As such, women and slaves are exempt.Section two: Children are exempt, as long as they rely on their mothers and need to be with them most of the time.  According to the Talmud, a child who wakes up in the middle of the night and still cries for his mother is not obligated to dwell in the sukkah.  Such a child sleeps where his mother sleeps—outside of the sukkah.  But if he wakes up and doesn’t need his mother, then he is obligated to sleep in the sukkah.Section two:  In this fascinating story, Shammai the elder opens up a hole in the roof of his house so that his newborn grandson can sleep in the sukkah.  Shammai obviously disagrees with the halakhah in the previous section.  Shammai the elder is also known to have made his son fast on Yom Kippur, far before he would have understood the meaning of fasting.  It seems that Shammai’s concept of commandment is not that one must perform an act with intent in order to affect one’s inner life (what we call “kavvanah”), rather the act must be performed regardless of whether one understands what one is doing. Children must perform mitzvot despite the fact the fact that they clearly don’t understand what they are doing.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the traditional exemption of women from the obligation of sukkah.
  This midrash derives from an “extra” letter in the Torah the exclusion of women and minors from being obligated to observe the mitzvah of sukkah. We should note that in these situations we should not expect the midrash to be a “simple” reading of the Torah. The midrashim are creative, deriving meaning from the Torah in places that a regular reader would not find it.The exclusion of women is derived from the letter “heh” , the word “the,” that precedes the word “homeborn” in Leviticus 23:42. Had the word just been “homeborn” women would have been included (so the sugya says), but the extra heh comes to exclude them. The word “every” includes minors in the obligation to sit in a sukkah. Below, the Talmud will ponder this—after all the Mishnah says that minors are not obligated to sit in the sukkah.
  The problem with “the homeborn” excluding women from being obligated for the sukkah is that the same word is used in the context of Yom Kippur in Leviticus 16:29, and the rabbis use the word to include women in the Yom Kippur obligation. So which is it—does “the homeborn” include women (as in the case of Yom Kippur) or does it exclude women (as in the case of Sukkah)?Rabbah answers that one of these sets of midrashim is only there to bolster the traditions. In other words, the rabbis did not derive these laws from the midrash. Rather, they had a tradition and in order to support it, they created a midrash. Only one of the two cases is actually a midrash that generated a halakhah.
  The main problem alluded to here is that we don’t really need a verse to exempt women from the sukkah or to obligate them for Yom Kippur. There is a rabbinic rule that women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments. Sukkah is a positive commandment (you have to do something, namely sit in a sukkah) and it is time-bound (you can fulfill the mitzvah during Sukkot only). So why would we need a verse to know that which we already know.Second, Rav Judah already said that when it comes to negative commandments which are punishable, they all apply to men and women equally. Yom Kippur is a negative commandment (you are prohibited from doing things) and therefore women are just as liable for it as men.So to return to our main question—if we already knew from general principles that women were liable for Yom Kippur and exempt from sukkah, what are these midrashim doing?
  
  Daf 28b
  
  Abaye says that without the midrash we might have thought that despite sukkah being a positive time-bound commandment, women are still liable. One is supposed to dwell in the sukkah as one does at home. Since at home, husband and wife live in the same building, so too in the sukkah we might think that both a husband and wife should be there together. To combat this notion the midrash tells us that women are exempt.
  Rava offers another reason why we might have thought that women are liable for the mitzvah of sukkah, despite it being a positive time-bound commandment. Women are liable for the mitzvot of Pesah, including the mitzvah to eat matzah. This is true even though this is a positive time-bound commandment. Sukkot and Pesah both begin on the fifteenth day of the month. So we might have thought that just as women are liable for the commandments applicable to Pesah, so too they are liable for the commandments applicable to Sukkot. Therefore the baraita had to teach that women are exempt from sukkah.
  Above we saw that we don’t really need the midrash to teach us that women are excluded from sukkah. So, the Talmud now asks, why do we need the extra “heh” in front of the word “homeborn.” What does the “heh” teach? The answer is that it includes converts. Note that this is closer to the original context of the verse. The word “homeborn” probably originally was intended to exclude the resident alien (ger toshav). Only an Israelite, according to the verse, is liable for the mitzvah of sukkah. The rabbis, however, use the extra “heh” to say that the convert is liable, even though he wasn’t born into Judaism.
  The word “homeborn” was used in the midrash alluded to above to teach that women are liable to “afflict themselves” (fast) on Yom Kippur. However, we don’t need a special midrash for that. It could have been derived from Rav Judah’s statement that women are liable for all negative commandments.The answer is that without the midrash I might have thought that they are not obligated for the extra affliction, the hour or so we add on to the fast on Yom Kippur. This extra fasting is not punishable (although it is mandated). Since it is not punishable I might have thought that women are not liable for it—they are, after all, liable only for things that are punishable. The midrash comes to teach that they are liable even for this extra amount of fasting.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the obligation of a minor to sleep in the sukkah.
  Above we saw a baraita (a tannaitic source not from the Mishnah) which used the word “every” as in “every homeborn” to teach that even minors are obligated to dwell in the sukkah. This is a direct contradiction to the mishnah which exempts minors from dwelling in the sukkah.The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that the first baraita refers to a minor who is old enough to be educated. Such a minor must dwell in the Sukkah. Below we shall see the definition of this age.A minor who is too young to be educated is not obligated at all to sit in the sukkah.
  Above, the baraita used the word “every” to include a minor in the obligation for sukkah. This implies that the Torah mandates minors to dwell in the sukkah. But there is a principle that until the age of bar mitzvah, children are never obligated to observe the commandments. The Talmud resolves that the verse is just a support—the source of the ruling is rabbinic.
  There are two definitions for a child who does not need his mother any more, two definitions that I think are still applicable today. The first is that the child can relieve himself without help. As a father of four, I can safely say that passing this hurdle remains one of the signposts of having reached maturity.The second is that when the child wakes up, he doesn’t call “Mommy, mommy” until she rescues him from his bed. A child that wakes up and calls “Mommy” once is already somewhat independent.We should note also that both of these are related to the sukkah. Women were exempt from the sukkah, so a child sleeping in the sukkah would be without his mother. He would also have to be responsible for taking care of his own needs. A child who still needs to be wiped and can’t make it through the night without his mother would be better off sleeping in the house.
  In the mishnah it looks like Shammai just disagrees with the other sages. He holds that even new-born infants are liable to sleep in the sukkah, so when his daughter-in-law gives birth, he opens up a sukkah over her bed.However, the Talmud at times wants to harmonize variant opinions. It is bothered by the fact there is a story that disagrees with the opinion preceding it. The Talmud resolves this by saying that Shammai doesn’t disagree on principle—he agrees that a new-born need not sleep in the sukkah. He just rules strictly.
  IntroductionToday’s section starts with a new mishnah. The Talmud deals  first with the opening clause, which teaches that one must make the sukkah into a permanent dwelling place. The second clause is the topic of next week’s daf.
  This baraita illustrates how one makes the sukkah his “permanent dwelling” during Sukkot. A person’s permanent dwelling place is defined in several ways. First of all, we keep our nice stuff there, not just our temporary stuff our “good” stuff. I realize that this is pretty difficult now, and I doubt you find many people today who bring their couches out into the sukkah. It’s just not practical in a time when our houses are generally large and contain many possessions. But at the least it would seem we could follow this halakhah by bringing out nice dishes, tablecloths, chairs, and other such items. These give the sukkah a more permanent feel.Second, one spends most of one’s time in the sukkah. Where we live is defined by where we eat and where we relax, as well as where we sleep. I realize again that this is not easy. Our homes are very comfortable and I love lying down on my couch as much as the next person. Still, we should make an effort to turn the sukkah into the place we dwell, not just the place we eat a few meals and then go back into the house.
  Most of this section is a repeat of the previous baraita. There are two additions. First of all, the Biblical source of the halakhah is provided. The midrash on the word “you shall dwell” is again cited. Dwelling in the sukkah should be like dwelling in your home—bring in your real stuff.Most of the rest of the baraita is simply a repeat of the above. The only addition is the last line. The baraita claims that one should study in the sukkah. The remainder of the passage will explore this topic.
  The above baraita stated that one should “recite” in the sukkah. This is a synonym for learning oral Torah, which was recited and not read. The Talmud now brings a contradictory source according to which Rava would recite outside the sukkah. The three part division that Rava makes is noteworthy. Scripture is the easiest thing to learn because it is written. The “Mishnah” probably refers to short halakhot which were easy to memorize. However, there is a type of learning that Rava would do outside the sukkah. I have translated this as “reciting” although the Mishnah was also studied through reciting.In any case, the Talmud resolves that easier forms of “reciting” can be done in the sukkah. Rashi explains this to be reviewing material that one has already learned. More difficult form of study, analyzing material, learning new material, and other such endeavors, should be done outside the sukkah. This seems to be because the sukkah would be hot and perhaps a bit distracting. It’s just harder to learn there, so one should go inside.
  
  Daf 29a
  
  This is an example of how the amoraim (the sages of the talmudic period) would learn. First of all, we should note that they don’t sit, they stand. The teacher or rosh yeshiva, R. Hisda, is the one who is sitting. His students stand. Second, they open their learning by “running” through it. This seems to refer to simple recitation—they would just say which tanna of the mishnah or baraita said what. After having gone over the tradition, they would investigate its meaning—why each opinion holds the way it does.I should mention that this seems to be an excellent compromise between the two essential elements of learning—memorization and comprehension. The educational process begins with memorizing content. But it doesn’t end there—it continues with comprehensive analysis. This latter, more difficult stage can be done outside the sukkah.
  The final part of the sugya discusses what vessels may be kept in the sukkah and which must be brought in when they are done being used.Drinking vessels can be left in the sukkah because they don’t get so dirty. But eating vessels (plates, maybe large knives, they didn’t have forks) should be brought in because they get really dirty.Large vessels used for drawing water should be kept outside of the sukkah. This doesn’t seem to be so much because they are dirty. Rather, there is simply little need to keep these vessels in the sukkah. To save space they should be kept outside of the sukkah.Finally, a lamp can be kept in a large sukkah where the danger of starting a fire is low. But it should not be kept in a small sukkah where the smoke might bother people’s eyes and it may cause a fire.To be honest, I think that the rule of thumb is to use common sense. If the vessel will be troublesome in the sukkah, take it out. But if it’s not a problem, feel free to leave it in.
  IntroductionThe final daf of this chapter deals with the end of the last mishnah which stated that one may leave the sukkah if the rain is strong enough to ruin one’s porridge.
  A baraita related to the mishnah teaches that the porridge referred to in the mishnah was made of beans. According to Rashi such a dish spoils quickly in the rain, quicker than a grain porridge.This is followed by a story of Abaye hanging out in the sukkah with his teacher, R. Yosef. The wind begins to howl and blows some twigs into the food. Thereupon R. Yosef orders his servants to clear his stuff from the sukkah—he’s going inside. Abaye asks him how he can justify this—after all the mishnah says that one can only go in once the soup has been ruined, and evidently it hasn’t gotten that bad yet.Interestingly R. Yosef answers that he is particularly delicate and he can’t stand being in the sukkah when the wind is blowing this hard. This seems to imply that there is some personal standards in being able to tolerate being in the sukkah during bad weather. While there are general standards at which point anyone is allowed to leave the sukkah, it really depends on what the individual can tolerate.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with rain coming down while one is eating or sleeping in the sukkah.
  Basically the principle is simple—if you’re engaging in one of the main sukkah activities, eating or sleeping, and you have to leave the sukkah due to rain, you don’t have to come right back to the sukkah as soon as it stops raining. Rather, you can finish your meal inside, or finish the night’s sleep inside. Only then must you go back into the sukkah, if it’s not raining of course.We should note that as usual the Talmud refers to leaving a sukkah as “going down.” This is because their sukkot were usually on roofs.
  The end of the baraita above said that he need not go back to the sukkah until שיאור. This word if written with an “aleph” means until it gets light outside. But if this word written with an “ayin,” שיעור, then it means until he wakes up. The words sound almost the same, even though their roots are different. So the Talmud asks which is it—if he wakes up and it’s still dark, does he have to go back to the sukkah? Alternatively, if it gets light and he’s still sleeping should someone wake him up and send him back to the sukkah?The answer comes, paradoxically, from a baraita that seems to say שיאור, until it gets light outside. It would seem to mean that as soon as it’s light outside, he must go back to the sukkah. However, this baraita also says “until it is dawn.” The baraita shouldn’t need to say both—they are superfluous. Therefore, the Talmud reads the baraita as שיעור with an ayin. He only has to go back to the sukkah once he wakes up and it is light outside.
  IntroductionToday’s section interprets the parable found in the mishnah: “They made a parable. To what can this be compared?  To a slave who comes to fill the cup for his master, and he poured a pitcher over his face.”
  The first section begins with a question about the parable in the mishnah—who spills on whom? Does God spill the rain on the people dwelling in the sukkah? This seems to be the obvious meaning of the parallel, and indeed this seems to be the interpretation that the Talmud will provide. The alternative meaning is that the servant, Israel, spills on God by acting in an improper manner. The advantage to this meaning is that there is now a quid pro quo. Israel behaves improperly, and as a response, God causes it to rain in the sukkah. In the next passage we will see that there is this sense throughout the Talmud. On the one hand, rain is a good sign, absolutely essential for the land and for welfare. But there is also the problem of raining in the sukkah which could be interpreted as God saying to Israel—I don’t want your service.
  This second baraita strengthens the same idea found in the first baraita, but applies it to another heavenly sign. The eclipse of the sun must have been exceedingly frightening in the ancient world. The baraita understands it as God saying to the world, “I provided you with this light. If I get angry, I can take it away whenever I want.” The message would seem to be—act well, for if you don’t, it won’t always be here.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss heavenly signs as omens for the future.
  This is a sad baraita. Israel (the “enemies of Israel is a euphemism for Israel) is presented as the abused school child, fearful of every bad sign for he is used to being beaten. Rabbi Meir points out that it is only natural for Israel to assume that a heavenly sign is a bad omen for them and not for the rest of the world, for Israel is the suffering child of God.We should also perhaps note that this baraita is particularistic—heavenly signs are directed at Israel and not at the whole world. Nature acts on behalf of Israel, albeit as a sign of punishment. Throughout this sugya we would do well to keep track of when heavenly signs are directed against particular nations and when they are directed against all of humanity.
  This baraita notes that Israel is a “moon” people—we reckon our calendar based on the moon. The rest of the world reckons by the sun. So when the moon is eclipsed it’s a bad sign for Israel, but when the sun is eclipsed, it’s a bad sign for idolaters.
  This section is pretty self-explanatory. Here the signs are universal, not directed against a particular nation.
  The first half of the baraita interprets the color of the sun as an omen to the world. Red signifies the blood shed by a sword and the grey of sack-cloth signifies the ashen face of someone undergoing starvation.The second half imparts significance to the time of day of the eclipse, but there are two versions of the interpretation. The first version is that if the eclipse is at sunset, then it was delayed. This implies that calamity will be delayed. If the eclipse appears first thing in the morning, calamity will hasten on its way.The second version interprets in the opposite manner. If it is eclipsed in the evening, then just as the sun is hurrying to set, so too calamity will appear quickly. However, if the eclipse is in the morning, then just as the sun has a long time before it sets, so too calamity will tarry in coming.
  IntroductionThis is a continuation of the source that began in yesterday’s section, concerning the interpretation of eclipses.
  There are two sections here. In the first, the baraita says that the calamity that strikes the world is also meted out to the gods that each people worships. This is directly related to the verse in Exodus where our God says that in meting out punishment to the Egyptians, He will also execute judgment against the Egyptians gods. This line is probably familiar to many of you from the Dayyenu.The second half is a message of comfort and theology to Israel—heavenly omens portend calamities but only when Israel is not performing the will of God. When Israel performs the will of God, the heavenly bodies have no effect on them. To put this another way, the heavenly bodies are only signs of God’s anger at Israel. They are not the cause of Israeli’s suffering.
  IntroductionThe last section of this daf and this chapter continues with baraitot explaining why the various luminaries are in eclipse.
  An Av Bet Din is the head of the court. He should be eulogized properly. The second crime is the rape of a betrothed girl, referring to Deuteronomy 22:27. We should note that that Torah says that the rapist is punished with death. However, the Torah’s verse refers to a case where the rape occurred in the field, where no one could protect Torah. The baraita here refers to a case where she was raped in the city, where there should have been people to protect her. In such a case, clearly the rapist is still liable for the death penalty. But the community also bears some responsibility for not being there to save her.“Sodomy” refers to male on male sex.
  We now move on to a phenomenon that is not just a portent of bad things to come (eclipses) but is actually itself a type of calamity. Throughout talmudic literature we hear of the fear that the Roman government will take possession of Jewish property. This seems to have been a significant fear of the time period.Again, the baraita seems to propose a measure for measure basis for why bad things happened to Jews. When Jews do not act justly in economic matters, there property is taken away from there. One who holds on to a paid bill may use it to collect the same debt twice (or someone else might use the bill to collect the debt a second time). Lending money with interest to a fellow Jew is prohibited by the Torah. If Jews have the power to prevent wrongdoings to others and they don’t, then they will be punished by others committing wrongdoings against them.
  
  Daf 29b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section consists only of the opening mishnah of the third chapter. Most of the commentary below is from my Mishnah Yomit commentary.The third chapter of Sukkah deals with the four species, which are together called the “Lulav.”  These four species are described in Leviticus 23:40, “On the first day you shall take the product of ‘hadar’ trees, branches of palm trees, boughs of leafy trees and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.”  The four species are identified by the rabbis as 1) the etrog or citron; 2) the lulav or palm-branch; 3) the hadas or myrtle; 4) the arava or willow.  I will refer to them by their Hebrew names.The Torah does not say exactly what one is to do with these four species and this led to different interpretations among ancient groups of Jews. In Nehemiah 8:14-18 we see Israelites using them, or more precisely, something similar to them, to build their sukkot.  Other groups of ancient Jews used them strictly in the Temple to walk around the altar.  For the rabbis the mitvah of the lulav was incumbent upon every Jew, whether at the Temple or outside of it.  The rabbis explain that each Jew must simply pick these four species up once a day on Sukkot and wave them in each direction.  This remains our custom to this day.The first seven mishnayot deal with the physical attributes of the four species.  To this day, observant Jews are extremely cautious to make sure that the four species look like they are supposed to look, or in Hebrew are “mehudar”, adorned.You can find many interesting pictures and information about the four species by googling them and looking at the images.
  Section one:  There are two potential reasons why a stolen lulav is invalid.  First of all, the Torah states, “And you shall take for yourselves (lachem) on the first day…”  The extra word “lachem (for yourselves)” is understood to mean that a person’s lulav must be their own and not one that was stolen or even borrowed.  Secondly, performing a mitzvah with a stolen item is considered a “commandment that derives from a transgression” and such an act is invalid. A dried up lulav is invalid because it is not “adorned”, meaning it does not look good.Section two:  An asherah is a tree used for idol worship.  Since it is forbidden to use anything from this kind of tree, its palm-branch cannot be used to fulfill the mitvah of lulav. A “condemned city” refers to an idolatrous city which must be utterly destroyed, according to Deuteronomy 13:13-18.  Everything in the idolatrous city must be burned.  Hence it is impossible to use a lulav that comes from such a city. Section three:  The lulav must not be broken off at its top and its leaves must still be attached to the spine, the middle leaf that goes through all lulavim. Section four:  If the leaves are still attached but they are spread apart, the lulav is still valid. Rabbi Judah says that if the leaves are still attached one should tie the lulav (just the palm-branch) together at the top.  We shall learn more about tying all four species together later in the chapter.Section five:  The “iron mountains” are identified in Josephus, Wars of the Jews 4, 8, 2 as being mountains north of Moab, on the other side of the Jordan river.  From our mishnah we see that the palm trees that grew there seem to have been a slightly different type of palm.  Their leaves are shorter and do not grow on the whole length of the spine. Nevertheless, they are valid for the mitzvah of lulav.Section six:  The lulav must be three handbreadths, long enough so that one can wave it.  The Talmud explains that the lulav must actually be three handbreadths long, like the hadas and aravah, and then an additional handbreadth so that it can be waved.  We will learn more about waving the lulav and other four species later in the chapter.
  IntroductionThe Talmud begins by trying to explain why a stolen or dried up lulav cannot be used on Sukkot.
  The mishnah does not distinguish between the first day of the festival and subsequent days (second day and onwards)—one cannot use a dried up or stolen lulav on any day. This makes sense with regard to a withered up lulav. Leviticus 23:40 uses the word “goodly (הדר)” in the context of the etrog, but the rabbis apply it to all four species. All must be goodly and not withered or dried up. This rule applies every day of the festival.With regard to a stolen lulav, there is a midrash which disqualifies the use of a lulav on the first day of the festival. The same verse from above says, “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day.” From the words “for yourselves” the rabbis derive the halakhah that on the first day of the festival one may use only one’s own lulav, as if the verse said, “from your own stuff.” A stolen lulav or even a borrowed lulav is not allowed. But the verse applies only to the first day of the festival.But why is a stolen lulav not to be used on the second day (meaning any day but the first day)? The midrash that one must own one’s lulav refers only to the first day. So why not use a stolen lulav on the second day. This is the question that occupies the rest of this talmudic passage.
  The answer comes from a statement made by R. Yohanan in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai. Using a stolen lulav to fulfill a mitzvah would be performing a transgression (stealing) in order to fulfill a mitzvah. Not only is this prohibited, but one cannot even use such a lulav to fulfill one’s commandment. R. Yohanan’s midrash compares a stolen animal to a lame animal—even after one takes legal possession of the stolen animal (we shall see how below) the animal cannot be used as a sacrifice. Just as a lame animal cannot be fixed, so too an animal that has been stolen can never be used as a sacrifice.
  
  Daf 30a
  
  The answer comes from a statement made by R. Yohanan in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai. Using a stolen lulav to fulfill a mitzvah would be performing a transgression (stealing) in order to fulfill a mitzvah. Not only is this prohibited, but one cannot even use such a lulav to fulfill one’s commandment. R. Yohanan’s midrash compares a stolen animal to a lame animal—even after one takes legal possession of the stolen animal (we shall see how below) the animal cannot be used as a sacrifice. Just as a lame animal cannot be fixed, so too an animal that has been stolen can never be used as a sacrifice.
  In Jewish law there is a concept called “despair (יאוש).” When a person loses something or something is stolen from him and he despairs of hope of recovery, the object becomes the property of the robber or the finder. Note that this doesn’t mean that the robber doesn’t need to return the object. It just means that legally while he holds on to it, it belongs to him. So too with the lulav or sacrifice, after the robber has taken legal possession of it because the owner gave up hope of recovery, it belongs to him. So he should be able to use it for the mitzvah (sacrifice or lulav). It is clear that he can’t use it before the owner had despair for it doesn’t belong to him. But why not after?The answer is that such a lulav/sacrifice is not viable for the performance of a mitzvah because it is a “commandment fulfilled through a transgression.” One cannot steal something in order to please God with it. We shall see another midrash explaining this concept in tomorrow’s section.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the concept of “a commandment performed through a transgression.”
  In Isaiah 61 God says that he hates stolen sacrifices. But why, the darshan seems to ask. If everything in the whole world belongs to God then it doesn’t seem to matter whether this particular animal belongs to me or to someone else. Why shouldn’t God desire it as a sacrifice and why should this matter to God? The answer is that God shuns stolen sacrifices not because it matters to God but because there is a moral lesson to be learned. God is like the King who pays the tax collector. The tax is going to go right back into his pocket anyway. So why pay? The answer is that paying the taxes teaches the traveler to act morally and not to evade taxes, i.e. not to steal.We should note that the issue of paying the Temple tax (half shekel per year) was contentious in ancient Judaism. Jesus, who was after all a Jew, seems to have been adamantly opposed to this tax. His position is articulated in Matthew 17:24-26:After Jesus and his disciples arrived in Capernaum, the collectors of the two-drachma tax came to Peter and asked, “Doesn’t your teacher pay the temple tax?” “Yes, he does,” he replied. When Peter came into the house, Jesus was the first to speak. “What do you think, Simon?” he asked. “From whom do the kings of the earth collect duty and taxes–from their own sons or from others?” “From others,” Peter answered. “Then the sons are exempt,” Jesus said to him. “But so that we may not offend them, go to the lake and throw out your line. Take the first fish you catch; open its mouth and you will find a four-drachma coin. Take it and give it to them for my tax and yours.”Jesus believes that Jews shouldn’t have to pay this particular tax. In contrast, the rabbis were adamant that paying taxes was a good thing, one which brought the Jew close to God. In this sugya in Sukkah the message is that one should not bring a stolen sacrifice, but the broader picture is that bringing things to God, taxes and sacrifices, is not something that alienates us from God. It brings us closer.
  R. Ammi, an amora, agrees with the opinions we saw in the previous sections. He explains that a dried up lulav is invalid for use because it is not “goodly”—הדר. A stolen lulav cannot be used because that constitutes a commandment fulfilled by means of a transgression.
  For the first time we hear a rabbi who limits the mishnah to the first day. Only on the first day of the festival is a stolen lulav disqualified. On subsequent days, since one can use a borrowed lulav (everyone agrees with this) one can also use a stolen lulav. To R. Yitzchak and Shmuel the problem with a stolen lulav is that it doesn’t belong to the one using it. But once that requirement is waived (pun intended), meaning from the second day and onwards, even a stolen lulav can be used. They do not believe in the concept of a “commandment performed through a transgression.”
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we saw that Shmuel held that a stolen lulav is disqualified only on the first day of the festival. Today, another amora challenges this halakhah.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak analyzes the mishnah that teaches that a stolen lulav is disqualified. First he notes that the mishnah disqualifies only a stolen lulav. This implies that a borrowed lulav is valid. Otherwise the mishnah would have stated that a borrowed lulav is invalid.Now when is a borrowed lulav valid? It can’t be on the first day of the festival because the Torah says, “And you shall take from yours on the first day…” which to the rabbis means that on the first day one must own one’s lulav. Therefore, the mishnah must refer to the second day and onward. From the second day and onward a borrowed lulav is valid but a stolen one is invalid. This is a difficulty for Shmuel who said that on the second day a stolen lulav is valid.
  Rava defends Shmuel, again claiming that the mishnah refers only to the first day. On subsequent days a stolen lulav is valid. The question now becomes why the mishnah mentions a stolen lulav and not a borrowed one. This was the difficulty raised on Shmuel and it must be answered. Rava answers that it is obvious that a borrowed lulav doesn’t belong to the owner. People don’t give up hope of getting back objects they loaned out (at least not immediately) and therefore, clearly the borrowed lulav can’t be used. The mishnah didn’t even need to teach this. However, we might have thought that a stolen lulav belongs to the one who steals it because the owner will immediately have despair of ever getting it back. Therefore, the mishnah has to teach us that this is not true. One cannot use a stolen lulav on the first day of the holiday because its owner does not automatically despair of recovered. However, on the second day and onwards, one can use the stolen lulav because one doesn’t need to own the lulav after the first day.
  IntroductionToday’s section consists of a story related to the prohibition of using a stolen hadas (myrtle) as part of the four species.
  R. Huna is offering halakhic instructions to Jewish merchants who are buying myrtles from non-Jews to sell to Jews for Sukkot. He wants to avoid the possibility that these myrtles would halakhically be considered stolen. The problem is that we can assume that the non-Jew has stolen the land, perhaps by government repossession which seems to have been a common Jewish fear during the period. Land cannot be acquired when it is stolen. This means that technically it still belongs to the owners. So, R. Huna instructs the merchants to tell the non-Jews to cut the myrtles down themselves. This will effect immediate assumption of abandonment on the part of the owners. But this is not enough to effect a transaction. However, change of domain aids in allowing the technical transfer of ownership. So the change of domain will occur when the merchant acquires it. When the Jew then uses it, it will be his own. It will no longer be a stolen lulav.
  
  Daf 30b
  
  The Talmud now asks a series of somewhat technical difficulties concerning R. Huna’s instruction. Most of these difficulties deal with the technicality of how ownership is legally transferred when a person acquires a stolen or legal object. There needs to be both abandonment of hope of recovery by the owner and then some other change. Above, the change was the sale itself. Here the Talmud asks why the traders (who are Jewish) shouldn’t just cut down the myrtles themselves? When they cut the myrtles down the owners could be assumed to abandon hope of recovery. Then when they sell the myrtles to other Jews, we would have change of domain and the purchasers would be able to use the myrtle for a mitzvah.The answer is that this would indeed solve the problem for the purchaser, but it would not solve the problem for the traders. If the Jewish traders wanted to use such a myrtle and they cut it down themselves we would only have abandonment of hope. There would be no subsequent change of domain. Therefore, the non-Jews should cut the myrtles down.
  However, this still doesn’t answer all of the difficulties. The Talmud asks why the trader couldn’t acquire the myrtle when he changes it by binding it together with the other two species, lulav and willow (aravah). The issue of whether one must bind three of the species together is taken up later in the chapter.The answer is that R. Huna holds that one need not bind them together. Therefore, there would be no subsequent acquisition after the owners were assumed to abandon hope of recovery.
  The Talmud now hedges a bit and says that even if R. Huna holds that the lulav must be bound, this is not a sufficient change in the myrtle for it to be considered the property of the trader. Binding the myrtle to the other two species can be undone, and only permanent changes are sufficient to enact a transfer of ownership. So the trader still wouldn’t be able to use it to fulfill his mitzvah.
  Finally, there is another change that can effect a transfer—change of name. Before it was used as part of the lulav, the Aramaic world for myrtle was asa. Now that it is part of the lulav it is called hoshanna—another Aramaic/Hebrew word that means, “God save us.” So again, if the trader cuts it down and then calls it by a new name, it should belong to him and he should be able to use it on Sukkot.The answer is that a myrtle is always called a hoshanna, even before it is used in the lulav. Since this is not a totally new name, there is no change of name and no transfer of property.
  
  Daf 31a
  
  IntroductionThe previous daf dealt with a stolen lulav. This week’s daf begins with a discussion about a stolen sukkah.
  The sugya opens with a baraita in which R. Eliezer and the sages dispute the validity of a stolen sukkah and one built in the public domain, R. Eliezer invalidating it and the sages validating it.
  The amora R. Nahman now begins to explain the underpinnings of the dispute between R. Nahman and the sages. In order to understand this we need to understand that there is a dispute concerning whether when one “robs” someone of his land, does legal title change hands. If title does change hands, then when Shimon robs Reuben of his land, the land now belongs to Shimon. Of course he must restore the land to Reuben, but until he does so, it is his land. If something happens to the land (such as a river flooding it) he must restore the original value of the land to the one from whom he stole it.R. Nahman interprets R. Eliezer’s opinion so that we don’t need to know whether R. Eliezer holds that land can or cannot be stolen. R. Eliezer holds that one must own his own sukkah. So if land can be stolen, then the sukkah is a stolen one and cannot be used because it doesn’t belong to him. If land cannot be stolen then it is still a borrowed sukkah and one can’t use a borrowed sukkah either.
   The rabbis hold that one can use another person’s sukkah in order to fulfill his obligation. They also hold that land cannot be stolen, so this is considered a borrowed sukkah, which one can use to fulfill one’s obligation.
  R. Nahman limited the dispute between the rabbis and R. Eliezer to a case where he stole the land itself—meaning he built the entire sukkah on land that is not his. The reason that R. Nahman interpreted the mishnah this way is that the “stolen sukkah” is compared in the baraita to one who builds a sukkah in the public thoroughfare. In both cases one is using land that doesn’t belong to him.The sages and R. Eliezer do not dispute if one steals wood and uses it to build a sukkah. In such a case all agree that the sukkah can be used for the festival. The thief just owes the wood back to the one from whom he stole it. But in the meanwhile, the sukkah is his and he can use it to fulfill his obligation.
  IntroductionToday’s section contains a story about a woman who came before R. Nahman complaining that someone had stolen wood from her to use in building his sukkah.
  This is somewhat of a sad story, at least in my opinion. An old woman comes in front of a bunch of rabbis, complaining that they stole her wood. The rabbis of the exilarch’s house, the head of the community in Babylonia, ignore her. She continues to complain, making a reference to Abraham who had 318 servants—she is Abraham’s descendent, just as much as they are. R. Nahman continues to ignore her, dismissing her as a noisy woman. He concludes by stating that they do owe her the value of the wood. But the wood itself belongs to the rabbis who assumedly stole it, or perhaps bought it from someone who stole it.
  IntroductionOur sugya continues to deal with various parts of a sukkah that was built with stolen parts.
  There is a rabbinic “enactment” called “the enactment of the beam.” What this means is that if someone steals a piece of wood and then uses it to build a house he doesn’t need to return the actual wood, as one normally does with stolen property. Returning the actual beam would require tearing down the whole house. Rather, he can return just the value of the wood, whatever it was worth when it was stolen.
  The Talmud is puzzled why Ravina even needed to state this. Why would we have ever thought otherwise?The answer is that we might have thought that a joist is not treated the same as unfinished wood. Unfinished wood is easily found and easy to replace. Therefore, the robber need only return the value. The owner can just buy new wood. In contrast, a joist is harder to find. Therefore, the robber would have to return the joist itself. That is why Ravina needs to teach that even the joist need not be returned—only its value.
   The section concludes with two caveats on Ravina’s ruling. First of all, after Sukkot is over he must return the joist itself. Since he doesn’t need the sukkah for a religious purpose, there is no reason not to force him to return the joist as it is to the owner.However, if he has attached the joist to the sukkah he doesn’t have to return it even after Sukkah. Attaching it makes it like any beam of any building, which need not be returned once it has been made part of the structure.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to discuss the second reason that a lulav is invalid—it is dry and withered up
  In this baraita there is a dispute between the sages and R. Judah concerning whether some part of the lulav is invalidated if it is dried up. However, it is not entirely clear whether the baraita refers to all four species or just to the etrog. The reason we might think that it refers just to the etrog is that the Torah specifically calls the etrog “the fruit of a goodly tree.” So it seems clear that a etrog that is withered cannot be used.Rava says that the debate is over whether the lulav (the palm-branch) is compared with the etrog. The rabbis say that it is—just as the etrog must be goodly (not withered) so too must the lulav. R. Judah says that we do not make such a comparison.   
  The first difficulty the Talmud raises is whether R. Judah really holds that the lulav (the palm-branch) need not be goodly. To prove that he does require that the lulav be aesthetically pleasing the Talmud cites a baraita where R. Judah says that he must bind the lulav, the palm-branch, from above. For now, we assume that this is because he requires that it be aesthetically pleasing.  
  The Torah calls the lulav “branches of palm-trees.” The word which I have translated as “branches” is כפות which also means in Hebrew – bind up (this is not the real meaning in the Bible). Thus R. Judah makes a midrash using this word to teach that the top of the lulav must be bound. But this has nothing to do with the lulav being “goodly.” R. Judah does not require this.
  The Talmud presses its case by citing a mishnah in which R. Judah says that the lulav must be bound with something that is its own species, a piece of the palm tree itself. The initial assumption is that by using something that matches the lulav itself, the binding will be more aesthetically pleasing.
  The Talmud now provides a different reason why R. Judah holds that the lulav must be bound with something that is part of the palm tree itself. Rava stated that one could use even a sinew or a piece of the root, parts of the palm that are clearly not so pretty to look at. Thus the reason that R. Judah says that whatever is used for binding must be part of the palm is that if one uses a different species he will transgress the prohibition of adding on to the commandments. The Torah said to use four species, not five. If binding the lulav is mandatory then it too must be from one of the four species. But R. Judah doesn’t hold that the lulav must be “goodly.”To summarize where we are up till now—R. Judah holds that withered lulav is valid, while the sages say it is invalid. But when it comes to the etrog, all sages hold that it must be goodly, i.e. not withered.    
  
  Daf 31b
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss R. Judah’s position on the issue of which if any of the four species need to be “goodly.”  Earlier, Rava had stated that R. Judah agrees that the etrog must be “goodly.” Here the Talmud questions whether this is really so.
  The Talmud cites a baraita from which it seems that R. Judah holds that a dried up etrog is still valid. The baraita teaches that one must use only four species—one cannot put another species in there. Secondly, one cannot bring a substitute for the etrog, even if etrogim are hard to find, as I’m sure they were. Then the baraita gets into the subjected of dried up species, assumedly dried up etrogim. If they are only partly dried up, withered, they are valid. But if they’re fully dried up, they are invalid. R. Judah, on the other hand, says that they are always valid, even if they are dried up. He even cites a story of city dwellers who probably did not have access to etrogim and would therefore pass down their etrogim from generation to generation. Interestingly, the other rabbis respond by saying that this was an emergency situation and therefore cannot demonstrate the general rule. However, we do see from here that even the rabbis tolerated an old dried up etrog in an emergency situation, when no other etrog could be procured.
  The Talmud now completes the difficulty and then resolves it. While it might seem that R. Judah was referring to the etrog, in reality he too agrees that the etrog must be “goodly” and not dried up. The rest of the lulav, though, can be dried up.
  The Talmud asks why the baraita even needed to say that one is not allowed to bring an extra species. Isn’t that obvious—one is never allowed to add on to the mitzvoth! The answer is that we might have thought that if he binds the four species together (actually three, the etrog is not bound with the others) and then holds a fifth species separately, he hasn’t transgressed the prohibition of adding on to the commandments. To counter this notion, the baraita needed to teach that one may not bring an additional species.
  Again, the Talmud asks, isn’t it obvious that one can’t bring another species in place of the etrog. The Torah says “etrog” (at least that’s the way the rabbis interpret the Torah). Why then does the baraita need to state the obvious?The answer is that without this baraita I might have thought that he should bring another species so that he doesn’t forget that he’s supposed to bring a fourth species. In other words, the quince for instance, would remind him that he should have brought an etrog but that he just didn’t have one. To prevent one from bringing an etrog substitute so that he will remember the law of the etrog, the baraita forbids doing so. The Talmud explains that if we allowed him to bring a different species he (or someone watching him) might think that that species is the one he’s supposed to bring. And in subsequent years, when he does have access to an etrog, he would bring the quince instead, remembering how he acted last year when he didn’t have an etrog. Therefore, if one doesn’t have an etrog, he shouldn’t bring a substitute.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss whether R. Judah requires that the etrog be “goodly.
  The fact that R. Judah allows one to use an old etrog, assumedly dried up, means that he does not require that it be “goodly.” This is a refutation of Rava above who held that all sages agree that the etrog must be goodly.
  Despite the fact that we seem to have resolved the question above, the Talmud presses on—does R. Judah really not require that the etrog be “goodly.” In another baraita R. Judah invalidates a green etrog. This seems to prove that he does require that it look good. Yellow etrogs are better looking than green etrogs.The Talmud rejects this understanding of the baraita. R. Judah invalidates a green etrog not because it doesn’t look good but because it is not yet ripe.
  Again, the Talmud uses a baraita to try to prove that R. Judah requires a “goodly” etrog. Here, R. Judah says that it cannot be smaller than an egg, which is larger than the minimum size prescribed by R. Meir, a nut. His preference for a larger sized etrog seems to be due to aesthetics—a large etrog looks better than a small one.Again, the Talmud rejects this, saying that the minimum size prescribed by R. Judah is because a smaller etrog is not yet ripe.
  This time the Talmud tries to use the maximum size as proof that R. Judah holds that the etrog needs to be “goodly.” R. Judah says that the etrog must be small enough to be held in one hand. R. Yose allows a much bigger etrog. The initial assumption is that R. Judah requires a smaller etrog because too big of an etrog doesn’t look good.Again, the Talmud rejects this. R. Judah requires that the etrog can be held in one hand lest one drop a larger etrog if he at first put it in the wrong hand.
  Finally, the Talmud asks how R. Judah can allow the etrog to not be “goodly” when it says so specifically in the Torah. Indeed, the etrog is called “the fruit of the goodly tree.”The Talmud answers that R. Judah reads the word differently. The Hebrew word for “goodly” is “hadar” which can also mean “to reside” (the heh is a prefix and the dalet and resh are the root for “reside.”) R. Judah says that this fruit must be one that “resides” in the tree from year to year, as an etrog does. But it need not be “goodly.”    
  IntroductionThis new week’s daf begins to discuss the second line of the mishnah that opened the chapter. This line stated that a lulav taken from an asherah, a tree that was part of idolatrous worship (Deuteronomy 16:21) or taken from a tree found in a city condemned to death due to mass idolatry (Deuteronomy 13:13-19), cannot be used to fulfill the mitzvah.
  The mishnah invalidates a lulav taken from an asherah tree, assumedly because it was used in idol worship. In contrast, Rava, a Babylonian amora, says that one can use fulfill his obligation with a lulav that had been involved in idol worship. This seems to be a blatant contradiction.The Talmud resolves this by positing that the mishnah prohibits only an asherah that was used in the time of Moses. The Israelites were commanded to destroy all idolatrous objects when they conquered the land of Israel. Since there was a mitzvah to destroy all such trees they have no “minimum measure,” meaning it is as if they no longer have any quantity whatsoever. Since the lulav does have a minimum measure (we shall learn about this later), these trees cannot be used in the performance of a mitzvah. But there is no mitzvah to destroy trees used in idolatry during rabbinic times, when Rava lives. Therefore, these trees have a “minimum measure.” So while one still should not use such a lulav, if one does so, he has fulfilled his obligation.The section concludes by “proving” that the mishnah refers to an asherah from the time of Moses. The mishnah groups the asherah with a lulav from a “condemned city.” The rabbis stated that the laws concerning a condemned city were no longer practiced in their times. So too the asherah also refers to the type of asherah no longer in existence.We should note that it is interesting that Rava says that one can use a lulav from an Asherah tree. It is possible (although not certain) that Rava was concerned that many trees in his region in Babylonia were from idolatrous roots. To disqualify all such lulavim might have been simply impossible.
  The mishnah says that if the top of the lulav was broken off, it is invalid. From here R. Huna deduces that if the top was only split, which is less of an injury to the lulav, then it remains valid.
  R. Huna said that a lulav whose top has been split is valid. However, this contradicts a baraita that explicitly says that a lulav whose top is split is invalid.R. Papa resolves the contradiction by saying the baraita refers to a lulav with top like a prong—in other words split really badly. If the split is less pronounced, it is valid.
  
  Daf 32a
  
  The mishnah says that a curved lulav is invalid. Rava says that only if the lulav is curved to its front is it invalid. But if it is curved back it is valid, because that is the natural way for it to grow.There are different traditions concerning what R. Nahman said about a lulav that grows to the sides. Some say he thinks it is like a lulav that grows to the front, and it is invalid. Others say it is valid like a lulav that grows towards its back and it is valid.
  If all of the lulav’s leaves go to one side the lulav is invalid. 
  IntroductionIn today’s section we continue to interpret the mishnah about various problems that invalidate the lulav.
  R. Papa interprets the mishnah. “Detached” doesn’t mean that they were fully detached. Such a lulav is obviously invalid. What it means is that the leaves were separated from the spine like a broom. Such a lulav is invalid, with its leaves wide apart, is invalid. If the leaves were merely spread apart the lulav remains valid.
  R. Papa asks now about the central middle leaf of the lulav. This is the middle leaf that you might have seen people looking at with a magnifying glass to see if it is split (especially if you’ve been to the shuk in Jerusalem). R. Yohanan says that if the central leaf is removed, the lulav is invalid. But, the Talmud notes, this is a different question from if it is split.Note that the Talmud does not really answer R. Papa’s question.
  This is an alternative version of R. Yohanan’s statement. Here he clearly says that if the central leaf is split it is invalid.
  IntroductionIn the mishnah, R. Judah said he should tie the leaves of the lulav together at the top. Our sugya discusses the source for this ruling.
  The Torah calls what we identify as the lulav “kapot temarim,” usually translated as branches of palm-trees. The word “kapot” can mean to bind. So from this word R. Judah learns that if the leaves had separated, as they tend to do, one should bind them together, as he said in the Mishnah.
  Ravina and other amoraim now asks how we know that the Torah mandates taking the part of the palm tree that we call the “lulav”? The Hebrew words are not at all clear, so how can we be so sure that what we use is the correct part.I should note that by Ravina’s time there was a centuries’ old tradition to use this branch as part of the four species. This is probably a tradition whose origins are lost—we don’t really know why they originally used this part of the palm. Our sugya asks how we know that this is the right part—but no matter how we answer this question, the tradition to use this part of the palm on Sukkot will certainly remain.The first suggestion is to use the hardened part of the palm closer to the trunk. The problem with using this part is that the spread apart leaves are already so hardened that they can’t be bound up. Since the Torah uses the word “kapot,” which we have interpreted as “bound up” the leaves must be such that they can be bound.The second suggestion is to use the large central branch or stalk of the palm tree. The problem with using this part is that its leaves can never become separate. The lulav needs to have leaves that can be separated such that it can be bound.The third suggestion is to use the spiky part of the palm (I have a palm tree in my front entrance and I’ve encountered this part too many times). Abaye rejects the use of this part because it would be exceedingly unpleasant to use it. The Torah is supposed to be pleasant and carrying a spiky lulav is not.Finally, Rabbah Tosfa’ah asks why we can’t use the bunches of dates themselves. I should note that this might indeed be the simple meaning of the verse. The first answer is that the Torah writes the word “kapot” without a vav, meaning that it is singular. Rabbah Tosfa’ah responds that if so, we could just use one bunch of dates. To this Ravina responds that one bunch of dates is called “kaf” and not “kapot.” Thus by paying attention to Hebrew grammar and spelling Ravina rejects using bunches of dates. As I noted above, it seems quite clear that this was not how the decision to use the lulav branch was made. Rather this is what we call a “supporting midrash.” The ancient halakhah is clearly a tradition, one whose origins have been lost.
  IntroductionToday’s section interprets the section of the mishnah that allows one to use lulavim that grow on the “Iron Mountain” (which is also identified in our sugya). Evidently these lulavim have poor leaves and therefore there is a question as to their usability.
  The mishnah allows one to use the thorny palms from the Iron Mountain for a lulav. Abaye restricts this ruling to a case where the top of one palm leaf reaches the junction of the next leaf. But if there are so few leaves that the top of one doesn’t reach the next leaf, the palm branch cannot be used as a lulav.Abaye’s ruling also aids in solving a contradiction between a baraita which forbids using these palm branches and the mishnah which permits using. Abaye clarifies that when the leaves don’t reach the next, they cannot be used (baraita), but when they do reach the next leaf they can be used (mishnah).
  
  Daf 32b
  
  This section is merely a different way of ordering the previous one. As far as content goes, they are identical.
  R. Marion (or some other sage) identifies the “thorn palms of the Iron Mountain.” In Jerusalem, on the western side of Mt. Zion is the Hinnom Valley, in Hebrew “Gehinnom.” This is the valley that is today between the Cinemateque theater and Mt. Zion. In the Bible we find that child sacrifice occurred here (II Chronicles 28:3, 33:6), and therefore it was considered to be a cursed place. It appears already in the Mishnah as the bad place where the wicked receive their punishment (see Kiddushin 4:14, Avot 1:5, 5:19-20). In a later period, Gehenna came to be synonymous with hell.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with how long the lulav, hadas and aravah must be. This sugya does contain a little bit of math, but I think you will be fine, so no worries.
  Here we can see that all amoraim agree that the hadas and aravah must be three handbreadths. They also all agree that despite the fact that the mishnah says that the lulav needs to be three handbreadths, it actually needs to be four. They disagree whether the whole lulav needs to be four, or that the spine, which ends before the top of the lulav, needs to be four. This would make the whole lulav longer.
  The mishnah says that the lulav needs to be only three handbreadths, sufficient to wave with it. This is a difficulty on all of the amoraim who said that it needs to be four handbreadths.To resolve the difficulty the Talmud adds a “vav” to the mishnah. Instead of saying “three handbreadths, long enough to wave” it reads, “three handbreadth and long enough to wave.” The “and” implies that the “long enough to wave” is in addition to the three handbreadths. Now each of the amoraim from above can debate how much longer this is—one handbreadth beyond three, or one handbreadth of the spine beyond the three. But both can resolve the mishnah.
  This baraita is assumed to be a difficulty on R. Yohanan who holds that the spine of the lulav must be four handbreadths. At first we assume that the four handbreadths referred to in the baraita includes the leaves, meaning the part of the leaves that goes beyond the spine. However, the Talmud quickly resolves that we can understand the baraita to refer to just the spine. The four handbreadths does not include the part where the leaves go beyond the spine.
  R. Tarfon seems to say that the hadas and aravah need to be a full cubit consisting of five handbreadths. Rava, a Babylonian amora, complains bitterly about this. In his day people seem to have had trouble finding even a smaller hadas, one of four cubits, so how can R. Tarfon require an even larger one.
  R. Dimi reinterprets R. Tarfon’s statement such that his stringency is reduced. R. Tarfon doesn’t say that they must be five handbreadths. Rather he says that the handbreadths used here are not handbreadths in which there are six in a cubit, but rather five in a cubit. This means that each handbreadth is 1 1/5 of the handbreadths in a six handbreadth cubit. The result is larger handbreadths (if you’re having trouble understanding, think of what would happen if there were 10 inches in a foot—each inch would be bigger than it is now).So if we reckon this in 6 handbreadth to a cubit handbreadths, the hadas needs to be only 3 3/5 (3 x 1 1/5). The lulav will be 4 4/5. This is not such a huge stringency.
  The amora Shmuel seems to contradict himself. On the one hand he rules that the hadas and aravah need only be three normal handbreadths. On the other hand, he holds that R. Tarfon says that the hadas and aravah need to be 3 3/5 handbreadths.The Talmud tries to answer by saying that Shmuel’s statement wasn’t precise. He said three, but what he meant was really 3 3/5. However, this is not a satisfying answer. It is one thing not to be precise in order to create a stringency (to say that it must be 3 3/5 when it only needs to be 3), but an amora should not create a leniency through lack of precision.
  Rabin, a different amora, offers an alternative explanation of R. Tarfon’s words. R. Tarfon said to take a cubit measured with five handbreadths and then turn it into six. Each handbreadth when measured against the old handbreadth will now be 5/6 of the length. Three of these are used for the hadas, making it 2.5 handbreadths (3 x 5/6). The extra fourth handbreadth goes for a lulav.Now when Shmuel said that the hadas needs to be 3 handbreadths his imprecision lead to a stringency. In reality, the hadas needs to be only 2.5 handbreadths (halakhah is according to R. Tarfon), so when he said that it needs to be 3 handbreadths, it was a small stringency.
  IntroductionToday’s section moves on to the next mishnah, one concerning the hadas.
  The first two lines are the same as the previous mishnah concerning a lulav. The remainder of the mishnah is specific to the physical qualities of the hadas. The Talmud will discuss these as we proceed over the next few pages.
  As the Talmud did with regard to the various parts of the lulav, it asks how we know that the Torah refers to the myrtle. After all Leviticus 23:40 only states “the branches of a thick tree.” How do we know that the tree is a myrtle?The word for “thick” can also mean “interwoven.” So an olive branch is ruled out because its leaves are not “wreathed” or “interwoven.”The plane tree is ruled out because the branches must cover the trunk in order to be a “thick” tree.The oleander is ruled out because its branches are thorny. This is the same reason that the spiky parts of the palm cannot be used. The Torah’s mitzvoth are pleasant and peaceful. Using a thorny branch to perform a mitzvah would not be pleasant.
  The first section of this baraita is an interpretation of the word “avot” from Leviticus 23:40. “Avot” means plaited and like a chain—these are the leaves of the myrtle (hadas).R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says that the leaf (anaf) and the wood (etz) must taste the same and this, in his opinion, is true of the hadas.
  A baraita says that the hadas must be “avot” the word used to describe the hadas in the Torah.R. Judah says that “avot” means that three leaves must all grow from the same spot. Today, the best hadasim have this quality. But R. Kahana says that a hadas where two leaves grow together and then one is separate is either also okay, or perhaps even better. R. Aha, a later amora, seeks out such a hadas because he holds R. Kahana in such esteem.The section ends though, with Mar b. Amemar telling R. Ashi that a hadas that doesn’t have three leaves coming out of one spot is a wayward hadas. It seems that such a hadas would not be valid.
  The baraita seems to contradict itself. How can a hadas have most of its leaves fall off and still be plaited? Usually there are three leaves per “nest” (spot on stem). So if 2/3 fall off, the plaited look will certainly be gone!Abaye solves the problem by saying that the baraita refers to an Egyptian hadas which begins with seven leaves per nest! Even if four fall off, the hadas is still plaited by the three leaves in one spot.
  
  Daf 33a
  
  Since the above baraita must refer to the Egyptian hadas, Abaye deduces that this type of hadas is valid for use in the “hoshanna,” an Aramaic word for the hadas, usually in reference to the hadas used on Sukkot. But this seems obvious—on what grounds would we have disqualified this hadas? The answer is that under certain circumstances if something has an accompanying name, it doesn’t count as part of the category (see for instance Mishnah Parah 11:7). But in this case, since the Torah doesn’t specifically use the word hadas, rather calling it the “thick tree”—any “thick tree” will do.
  If most of the leaves have withered but only three bunches of green leaves remained, the hadas is still valid, as long as they are at the top of each twig, according to R. Hisda.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya deals with a concept calls “something set aside” in connection with commandments. What this means is that if something has become unfit for ritual use at the time it is meant to be used, it cannot subsequently be remedied for use. This is an abstract halakhic concept that appears several times in the Talmud, but this is one of the main passages in which it appears. Here the topic at hand is a hadas that had its top removed, rendering it unfit, but subsequently had a berry replace the top, rendering it fit again.
  If the top of the hadas breaks off it is invalid. However, if a berry grows in its place the hadas is valid again because it no longer has a broken top.
  The hadas was invalid when Sukkot began. Then it became valid again on the festival because a berry grew on its top. The question is whether once it was “set aside” from being valid at the beginning of the Festival it can again be valid on the festival.
  The sugya that is brought to our discussion here is about covering the blood of a slaughtered bird or wild animal after the animal was slaughtered, as is mandated in Leviticus 17:13. If one fulfilled this mitzvah and then wind uncovered the blood, one need not cover the blood again. But if the wind covered it, he still need to cover it. This is the teaching found in Mishnah Hullin 6:4. The idea seems to be that it is a mitzvah to cover the blood, not to have the blood covered. Thus the slaughterer must cover the blood and not the wind. But if the blood is covered he need not make sure it remains covered.Rabbah b. Bar Hana, an amora, changes this slightly, seeming to say that as long as the blood is covered, he need not cover it again. Thus if the wind covered the blood and it remained covered, he need not cover it again.The Talmud asks—if the mitzvah was fulfilled by the wind covering it, why would he ever need to cover it again? Once the mitzvah has been fulfilled, it should be permanently fulfilled.R. Papa answer that this is not so. The law of “set aside” doesn’t apply to mitzvoth. There are cases where a mitzvah might be fulfilled and then become “unfulfilled.”Returning to our sugya, the Talmud asks why R. Yirmiyah had to ask a question when R. Papa already answered it. R. Papa said that the law of “set aside” doesn’t apply to mitzvoth, so the answer should be that just because the hadas is not fit for use at the beginning of the festival does not mean that it can’t become fit for use on the festival.We should note that this is anachronistic question—R. Yirmiyah lived before R. Papa.
  The idea that “the laws of ‘set aside’ does not apply to commandments was applied by R. Papa to the case of covering the blood in order to create a stringency—although the wind already covered the blood he must cover it again should it become uncovered. R. Yirmiyah knew that R. Papa had stated this rule in such a situation—but that was in order to be stringent (he must cover the blood again). But R. Yirmiyah wasn’t sure whether the rule could also lead to a leniency—if the berry grew on the top of the hadas on Yom Tov (the festival) it would be restored to validity. That is why he asked the question.Sorry to say, but the Talmud doesn’t resolve the question. Nevertheless, tomorrow’s section continues to deal with the concept of “set aside.”
  IntroductionThis section continues discussing the concept of “set aside” with regard to the commandment of the lulav. As a reminder, this concept means that once a certain mitzvah has either been fulfilled or something has been rendered invalid, it can no longer become unfulfilled or valid.
  The passage opens with a dispute about the validity of a hadas on which where there are berries on the hadas at the outset of the festival but one removes them on the festival. The Talmud will now to try to analyze the dispute over whether such a hadas is valid. We should note that in these style of sugyot, there are often multiple possibilities as to how to frame the dispute. But the preference is to isolate each factor. You’ll see what I mean as we go through this sugya.The discussion begins by alluding to two other possibilities as to how to understand the dispute; these will become clearer later in the sugya. The first has to do with whether one must bind the three species, lulav, hadas and aravah, together. The second has to do with whether one must “make” the lulav, just as one has to “make” the sukkah. We shall clarify how these two issues relate to the hadas with berries below.For now, we should note that this is a hadas that begins Yom Tov invalid due to the berries. It is now considered “set aside”—invalid for the performance of the mitzvah.  According to R. Elazar b. Zadok, since it is invalid when Sukkot begins, it remains “set aside” and cannot be remedied. Thus he is the one who holds that the concept of “set aside” does apply to the commandments. The sages, who validate this hadas, would hold that the concept does not apply to mitzvoth. Just because something is “set aside” does not mean that it can’t again become valid.
  The Talmud now tries to find other ways to interpret the dispute between R. Elazar b. Zadok and the sages. The first possibility is that all tannaim hold that there is no concept of “set aside” with regard to mitzvoth. Furthermore, all tannaim hold that the lulav must be bound, which is considered to be an act of “making a lulav.”The only dispute left is whether one has to actively make a lulav, or is a lulav “made on its own” valid. When it came to the Sukkah, all tannaim agreed that one must “make the sukkah” and that one that is “made on its own” is not valid. R. Elazar b. Zadok extends this to the lulav as well—if he removes the berries from a lulav that was bound before Yom Tov then he hasn’t made a lulav, rather it was “made on its own” (when he bound it it wasn’t valid, so he never made the lulav by binding three valid species together).  The sages do not compare the lulav with the sukkah, and thus although he “made it on its own” it is still valid.[I know, this is complicated.].
  Finally, the Talmud suggests that the dispute concerning the berries may be tied to the dispute concerning binding. If you hold that the three species do not need to be bound, then there is no problem of picking the berries on Yom Tov. Even if you hold that the sukkah cannot be “made on its own” and you would compare the lulav with the sukkah, if the lulav need not be bound then there is no “making” of the lulav. So he can remove the berries on Yom Tov and the hadas will be valid.The one who holds that lulav requires binding would hold that this would count as a lulav “made on its own” because it was made (bound) while invalid. So removing the berries on Yom Tov would not validate the hadas.[Again, I realize that this is complicated].
  Rabbi Judah derives that the lulav must be bundled from the fact that the word “take” is used in the context of the lulav and in the context of the bundle of hyssop used to apply the blood to the doorposts in Exodus 12. Just as the hyssop must be bound into a bundle so too must the lulav. The other rabbis do not deduce the laws of the lulav from the similarity in words.
  The sugya concludes with a baraita which is a bit confusing. On the one hand the baraita says that it is a “mitzvah” to bind the lulav together. This seems to be R. Judah’s opinion. On the other hand it also says that if he doesn’t bind it together it is still valid. This seems to be the other rabbis’ opinion. So which is it?The answer is that the mitzvah he fulfills here is the general mitzvah of glorifying God by “beautifying the commandments.” The lulav looks better when the lulav, hadas and aravah are neatly bound together. However, as far as the actual mitzvah of lulav goes, one need not bind it together in order for it to be valid. This is generally true of the concept called “hiddur mitzvah”—the beautification of a mitzvah. One should try to make the lulav, the etrog and other such physical mitzvoth look beautiful, but their validity is not dependent on this.
  IntroductionThe mishnah rules that if the berries on the hadas were more numerous than the leaves, it is invalid. This is the topic of today’s sugya.
  R. Hisda transmits a statement by his rabbi (identified by Rashi as Rav) limiting the mishnah’s ruling to a case where the berries were all in one place and there were more in that one place than on the entire hadas branch. But if the berries were spread out in several places the hadas is valid even if there were more berries than leaves.
  
  Daf 33b
  
  Rava rejects Rav’s statement because a hadas with berries in several places would look striped and would not look good at all. Below the Talmud will rephrase Rav’s statement.
  In this version of R. Hisda/Rav’s statement, he limits the mishnah to a case of black berries. Such black berries disqualify the hadas, if they are more numerous than the leaves. However, if the berries are green than that is just a normal hadas and it is valid. We should also note that such a hadas won’t look “striped”—thereby averting the difficulty raised by Rava.
  R. Hanina said that with regard to identifying menstrual blood, black counts as red. The same, according to R. Papa, is true for the berries on the hadas. Red berries disqualify the hadas the same way that black berries do.
  IntroductionThe mishnah stated that if he reduced the numbers of the berries, the hadas is valid. The question is—when did he reduce them? Before or on the festival? This sugya, as well as the following one, again discusses the issue of “set aside.”
  The question is—when did he reduce the number of berries on the hadas? If he did so before he bound the hadas together with the lulav and the aravah then it is obviously not disqualified. Why should it be?Therefore, it must be a case where he first bound the disqualified hadas with the other two species and then reduced the number of berries. Such a lulav (the three species together) was “set aside” at the outset but then became valid. So why not use this mishnah as proof for the general principle—that just because something is “set aside” at the outset it doesn’t mean it is permanently “set aside”?The answer is that binding the three species together is not of significance. It’s just a designation. The lulav doesn’t really come into fruition at that point such that it could even be considered “set aside.” Therefore, we can’t derive any general principles with regard to “set aside” from this mishnah.
  IntroductionThe mishnah states that one is not allowed to reduce the invalid berries on Yom Tov (the festival). The sugya continues to discuss the issue of “set aside” in light of this mishnah.
  The mishnah teaches that one shouldn’t reduce the number of berries on Yom Tov. The reason why will be explained below. However, the mishnah doesn’t say that if he reduces the number of berries on Yom Tov it is invalid. The implication is that this is something one shouldn’t do, but that if one does it, it is validSo now the question becomes—when did the berries turn black (only black berries are invalid)? If they turned black before the festival began then this is a case of “set aside from the outset.” The hadas was invalid when the festival began. So why then didn’t we use this mishnah to derive the question about this that we asked earlier?But if it became black on the festival outside, then we have a slightly different case. The hadas was fit when Yom Tov began, then it became unfit when the berries turned black, and then it became fit again when he removed the berries. Based on this assumption we could deduce that in all such cases, when something is fit and then set aside, it can become fit again. But evidently the Talmud does not want to make such an assumption.
  The Talmud returns to option one from above. The hadas’s berries were black before Yom Tov began. It was “set aside” from the outset but then became valid when he picked them off. From here we can deduce that indeed, in general, if something is “set aside” from the outset it can still become valid at a later point. But we still don’t know what the rule is if something is at first fit and then become set aside (the berries were green and then became black). Can it become fit again? This question is not answered in our sugya. Sometimes the Talmud just prefers to leave matters unanswered.
  In this baraita we see a dispute over whether one can reduce the berries on the hadas on Yom Tov. The majority opinion holds that one cannot, for this is considered “fixing an object” which is forbidden on Shabbat and on a festival. However, R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon does allow one to do so.The Talmud is perplexed by R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon’s opinion—it seems to be a blatant violation of Shabbat.R. Ashi answers that R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon allows ond to pick the berries off of the hadas only if he does so to eat them. In such a case his intent was not to “fix the object” but to get food, which one is allowed to do on Yom Tov. Therefore, this tanna holds like his father, R. Shimon, that if one intends to do something that is permitted and he at the same time does something forbidden, the action is allowed.
  However, a problem remains—Abaye and Rava both hold that if you intend to do X action which is permitted but Y will certainly happen, then the action is still prohibited, even though performing Y wasn’t his intention. The case they refer to is where one wants to cut the head off a bird so his kid can play with it (thank God for Legos!). One can argue that his intention is not to kill the bird, an action that is forbidden on Shabbat, but to get a toy for his kid, which is not inherently prohibited. However, since we know the bird will die when he takes off its head to be a toy the action is still prohibited. So too, picking the berries for food is prohibited because he knows that by doing so will validate the hadas.The Talmud answers that this is the case where he has another “hoshanna”—the Aramaic word for hadas. It is clear that he is picking the berries for food because he doesn’t need this hadas to perform his mitzvah. Therefore, the hadas is valid if he or someone else should subsequently decide to use it.
  IntroductionThis sugya contains a short baraita and discussion about what to do if the lulav’s binding falls off on Yom Tov.
  The baraita teaches that if the binding that ties the three species together comes undone on Yom Tov he may bind it up together, but only loosely as one does with a bundle of vegetables.The Talmud then asks why not make a proper loop. After all, while tying a knot is prohibited on Shabbat, making a loop is not. So why does the baraita allow him to make only a loose knot.The answer is that the baraita follows the opinion of R. Judah who holds that making a loop on Yom Tov (or Shabbat) is forbidden, just as it is forbidden to make a knot.
  The problem is that once we have identified R. Judah as the author of the baraita, then a loose loop such as one makes around vegetables would not to be sufficient for the lulav. After all, R. Judah is the very tanna who holds that the lulav must be bound.The Talmud answers that this baraita agrees with R. Judah on one matter—making a proper loop on Yom Tov is prohibited. However, it disagrees with him on another matter—the lulav need not have a proper binding. Evidently this tanna holds that the lulav must be bound as part of “hiddur mitzvah,” the beautification of mitzvoth. However, the mitzvah of lulav can be fulfilled without a proper binding.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a new mishnah, one very similar to the previous ones but this time about the aravah (willow). Parts of this mishnah that were explained in earlier mishnayot will not be dealt with again here.
  The first three clauses of the mishnah are the same or nearly the same as those with regard to the lulav and hadas. The Talmud will later explain what a tzaftzefah is.The Torah calls the willow “willows of the brook.” The mishnah teaches that one that grows in rain watered soil is also valid.
  This baraita gives several interpretations of the phrase “willows of the brook” from Leviticus 23:40. The first interpretation is pretty straightforward—one should use willows that grow on a brook.The second interpretation understands “brook” to be a description of the leaves of the willow—they should be shaped like a brook.The third interpretation focuses on the plural form “willows,” interpreting the form as allowing any willow to be used, not just one that grows by a brook.Finally, Abba Shaul offers a different interpretation for the plural. The verse alludes to two uses of the willow. One as part of the lulav and the other was used in the Temple. We will learn more about this Temple ritual in chapter four.
  
  Daf 34a
  
  The rabbis in the above baraita used the plural form in the verse to prove that one could use any aravah, not just one that grows by the brook. But this left them without a source for the Temple aravah ritual. So, the Talmud asks, from where do they derive that halakhah?R. Yohanan answers that this ritual is a “halakhah from Moses from Sinai.” Throughout rabbinic literature this term means that the tradition is very old and is assumed to have come from Sinai. It always means that there is no source for it from the Torah. Thus they don’t need the midrash on the plural form “willows.”R. Yohanan mentions three halakhot. The first is “the laws of ten plants.” This refers to Mishnah Sheviit 6:1 concerning a field that has ten plants in it. I refer you to the Mishnah Yomit commentary to understand this mishnah.The other two halakhot are connected with Sukkot. The first is the aravah ritual in the Temple. And the second is the water libation, which is discussed later in chapter four.
  IntroductionThe mishnah that opened this week’s daf ruled that a willow called a “tzaftzefah” cannot be used as part of the lulav. Our sugya deals with how we know that this type of aravah cannot be used.
  The Torah calls the aravah a “willow of the brook.” Since the “tzaftzefah” willow grows in the mountain, it cannot be used.R. Zera explains the source of this halakhah. He reads the verse in Ezekiel as having two halves. The great eagle (this is the actor in the verse, which is speech God makes to Ezekiel) plants some seed “beside the waters” and then in the second half of the verse he “sets it as a tzaftzefah.” The structure of the verse implies, to R. Zera, that a “tzaftzefah” is not beside the waters.
  Abaye critiques R. Zera’s reading of the verse. How do we know that the first half and second half are two different “placings.” Couldn’t it be that the second half is just an interpretation of the first half? This would mean that a “tzaftzefah” is a willow that grows on water. And if so, why can’t one use it for his lulav?The Talmud rejects Abaye by saying that the verb in the second half of the clause “he set it” implies that the two halves refer to different “settings.” Thus the first half refers to a willow placed on water and the second half to the “tzaftzefah” which is not found by the water.
  R. Abbahu offers an independent theological reading of the verse, an interpretation not connected to the discussion above. God says: I gave Israel a position next to the waters, which are symbolic for Torah. But they went away from my waters to the mountain, like the tzaftzefah, a willow that grows in the mountains.
  There is no substantive difference between this version and the above version. The only difference is that in the first version R. Zera cites the verse and Abaye raises the difficulty. Here, the verse is part of a baraita and R. Zera raises the difficulty. Other than that there is no difference. We should note that this is not that uncommon. The Talmud preserves two different organizations of a chunk of material, without any substantive difference between the two. This probably shows us that the organization of the words of the rabbis is very important to the editors. To use Marshall McLuhan’s famous maxim—”the medium is the message.”
  This baraita provides identifying marks to distinguish between a valid aravah and the invalid tzaftzefah.
  The first baraita in this section describes a tzaftzefah as having a serrated edge like a sickle. Thus a willow like a sickle would seem to be invalid. But a different baraita says that a willow that is like a sickle is valid. These two baraitot seem to contradict each other.Abaye answers that the second baraita was taught in reference to a “rounded aravah” and not a tzaftzefah. If a rounded aravah has an edge like a sickle it is valid.Abaye goes on to deduce from here that the rounded aravah is valid for use with the lulav on Sukkot, as a “hoshanna.”This seems to be obvious—why would we think that such an aravah is invalid? The answer is that it is an “accompanying name.” As we have seen elsewhere, sometimes if something has an “accompanying name” it cannot count as part of the category, in this case the category of “aravah.” That’s why Abaye had to.Finally, the Talmud asks why such an aravah is valid. They answer with a midrash. The Torah uses the plural form of “willow” to include other willows besides the normal type. Thus a rounded willow is valid.
  This long section is a list of things whose name has changed since the destruction of the Temple. I will try to explain them one at a time.1: Halafta—aravah. This is the topic of our sugya and is the reason why this sugya is here.2. Shifora—hatzotzratah. The shifora is bent or twisted and is valid for use on Rosh Hashanah. The hatzotzratah is straight, does not come from a ram and should not be used on Rosh Hashanah.3. Patorta—patora. A big table or a small table. The reason why it is important to know the difference is in a case where one is selling or buying a table.4. Huvlila—be kase. Parts of the stomach. Identifying the parts of the stomach is significant for if a needle is found in a certain part the animal is a “trefe” and cannot be eaten.5. Borsif—Babylon. The names of various regions in Babylonia. This is important to know because when one brings a get from Babylon to Israel he need not testify “It was written and signed in front of me.” We can assume that a get written in Babylon was executed properly because it is an area rich in Torah. Borsif was not known for its Torah learning, so gittin originating in Borsfi were distrusted. But now that the names have switched, the halakhah is switched. A person delivering a get from Babylon must say, “It was written and signed in front of me.”  But from Borsif he need not make such a declaration.
  
  Daf 34b
  
  IntroductionThis section begins a new mishnah.
  The Talmud will explain below how the various rabbis derived their halakhot.
  In this baraita the three tannaim from the mishnah expand, a little bit, upon their opinions.R. Ishmael explains how he derives the idea that one must hold one etrog, one lulav, three hadasim and two aravot. One etrog might come from the singular word “fruit.” One lulav might come from the defective spelling of “branches” which is written כפת and not כפות, the more expansive spelling of the word. Three hadasim probably comes from the three words used to describe this tree. Two aravot comes from the plural form “aravot.” Of course, there is not great consistency in these derashot. This just goes to show that R. Ishmael probably had a tradition as to how many of each species one was to take. He then used the verses to support the traditions that he already knew.R. Tarfon basically reiterates his opinion from the mishnah, showing that he agrees with R. Ishmael that three are necessary, but holds that all three can have their tips cut off.R. Akiva’s words are the same as those in the Mishnah.
  This is the continuation of the baraita from above. In the first clause R. Eliezer uses the lack of the word “and” between the “fruit of a goodly tree” (etrog) and “branches of palm-trees” (lulav) to derive the halakhah that the etrog need not be bound up with the other three species mentioned after.The second clause teaches that if one doesn’t have one of the four species, one cannot partially fulfill the mitzvah with the others. When it comes to the lulav, it’s all or nothing.
  R. Ishmael said in the mishnah that two of the hadasim can have their tips broken off but one has to be whole. The Talmud believes this to be inconsistent. Either they all have to be whole or none have to be whole. Bira’ah an amora basically agrees with this difficulty and claims that R. Ishmael changed his mind. He actually holds as he does at the end of his statement. Only one hadas is required, but it must be whole.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the halakhic ruling stemming from the mishnah concerning how many of each species one must take.
  R. Judah rules in the name of Shmuel according to R. Tarfon in the Mishnah, who held that one has to take three hadasim, but that they can all have their tops broken off.This, the Talmud points out, is consistent with a story in which Shmuel tries to keep the price of hadasim down by threatening to tell the merchants that if they don’t, he will let everyone know that they can use hadasim whose tips have been broken off, which are cheaper.This story proves that Shmuel really holds like R. Tarfon for if he was just trying to be lenient, he could have ruled like R. Akiva who requires only one.The Talmud rejects the proof, noting that Shmuel is indeed threatening to rule in the most lenient manner, for it is easier to find three hadasim with broken tips than one complete one.In any case, this section seems to rule like R. Tarfon. One has to use three hadasim, but their tips can be broken. I should note that many rishonim do not rule according to this sugya, so please do not assume from here that you can use a hadas whose tip has been broken off. You’ve been tipped!
  IntroductionToday’s section is a mishnah which deals with the etrog. There are several reasons why the mishnayot concerning the etrog are much longer and more detailed than those about the other four species. First of all, of the four species, only the etrog is a food and hence only an etrog is subject to the normal agricultural laws—tithes, terumah, and orlah (fruit prohibited in its first 3-4 years).  The mishnah therefore focuses on these subjects. Second, the Torah calls the etrog the “fruit of the goodly tree.” Therefore, there are more details about how it looks.My commentary from below is taken from the Mishnah Yomit archives (Mishnah Sukkah 3:5-7).
  Sections one and two:  Explained earlier.Section three: Orlah is fruit grown from a tree less than three years old.  It is forbidden to eat such fruit or derive any benefit from it.  Hence an etrog that is from an orlah tree cannot be used.  Similarly, it is forbidden to eat or derive any benefit from unclean (impure) terumah.  Therefore it too cannot be used in the performance of the mitzvah.Section four:  A pure terumah etrog should not be used to perform the mitzvah, although if it is used it is valid.  In the Talmud they debate why it should not be used.  The core of the reasoning seems to be that by using it he may ruin it from being a food and terumah is supposed to be eaten.  Alternatively, by using a terumah etrog with the lulav he may cause the etrog to get wet and thereby susceptible to impurity [produce is susceptible to impurity only after it has been in contact with liquid].Section five:  Demai is doubtfully-tithed produce, produce that was purchased from someone who is suspected of not separating tithes.  There is a frequent debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over the use of demai produce in the performance of a mitzvah. The talmudic explanation is that demai can be eaten by the poor.  Since anyone can renounce ownership over all his possessions and thereby become poor, Bet Hillel holds that anyone can use demai to perform a mitzvah. In other words, every person is potentially a poor person. Bet Shammai holds that since it cannot be eaten by anyone but the poor it cannot be used as part of the lulav.Section six: Second tithe must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. Nevertheless, the mishnah says that even in Jerusalem he should not use a second tithe etrog as part of his mitzvah.  The reasoning is the same as that in section four concerning pure terumah.  However, if he did use it he has performed the mitzvah, again the same rule as with terumah.Section seven:  If there is a rash, which might refer to some discoloration, or things like warts (not just bumps, which are considered desirable in an etrog) on a majority of the etrog, than it is invalid.  The pitom is the funny looking mushroom which sticks out of the ends of some etrogim (Google pitom and etrog and you can find some nice pictures). I should note that not all etrogim have a pitom.  An etrog without a pitom is valid, indeed in some ways it is preferable because it is less likely to become invalid.  The etrog is invalid only if the pitom was there and was then removed. However, if its stem, the part of it which attached it to the tree is removed, it is still valid.  The stem is basically not part of the etrog.Section eight: Likewise it is invalid if it is peeled, split or any part of it is missing.Section nine:  A black etrog is invalid.Section ten:  There is a debate over the green etrog, Rabbi Meir declaring it valid and Rabbi Judah invalidating it.  In Israel one sees many green etrogim, which never fails to surprise my family (as does the pitom-less etrog).Section eleven:  Rabbi Meir sets the minimum size of an etrog at that of a nut, assumedly something about the size of a walnut.  I have never seen an actual etrog this size, but I suppose that if they are picked early from the tree one can find them this size.  Rabbi Judah sets the minimum size at that of an egg.Section twelve:  In this section they argue about the maximum size of the etrog.  According to Rabbi Judah (who is the stricter sage in both parts of the mishnah), it must be small enough so that one could hold two with one hand. The reason is that sometimes a person might need to hold the lulav and the etrog in one hand. If the etrog is too big he might drop the etrog which might ruin it by disfiguration.  Rabbi Yose disagrees and says that the etrog can be so big that one needs both hands to hold it.  In the Talmud, Rabbi Yose tells a story of Rabbi Akiva who came to the synagogue with an etrog so large that he had to carry it on his shoulder!  In Israel, I have seen very large etrogim, ones that look like they would be difficult to carry with one hand.
  
  Daf 35a
  
  IntroductionThe Torah calls the etrog the “fruit of the goodly tree.” Our sugya deals with how we know that this is the etrog.
  The Torah uses the word “tree/wood” and “fruit” in describing the etrog. According to the midrash, this means that the Torah refers to a fruit whose taste is like the wood of the tree on which it grows. The Talmud seems to think that the wood of the etrog tree tastes just like the etrog itself (never tried this). That’s how we know that the Torah refers to the etrog.
  If we are looking for a fruit that tastes like the wood of the tree, then why not use the pepper (what we call black pepper)? The Talmud cites another baraita in which R. Meir midrashically demonstrates that the Torah refers to the pepper tree when phrasing the laws of orlah (the prohibition of eating fruit in its first three years of growth). Here the Torah uses “food” and “tree” in juxtaposition to teach that if the fruit tastes like the tree, it is liable for orlah.
  The reason we don’t use peppers as one of the four species is that this is just impossible. One peppercorn would not even be noticed. And since the Torah refers to one fruit, a handful of peppercorns is not allowed.
  The Torah calls the etrog the “fruit of the hadar tree.” Rabbi plays on the word “hadar,” reading it as “ha-dir.” A “dir” is an animal pen. Just as an animal pen contains various sizes of animals, as well as blemished and unblemished ones, so too the etrog is part of a tree with various sizes and qualities of etrogs still on it.But, the Talmud asks, couldn’t we say the same thing of any tree—don’t most trees have large and small fruits, blemished and unblemished.To answer, the Talmud offers a small emendation—on an etrog tree the old, large fruits remain even once the new ones have begun to bud.
  The baraita concludes with two more puns on the word “hadar.” The first is to split the word into a prefix “heh”—the—and the word “dar” which means to live. The etrog lives on the tree from year to year.The second pun is based on Greek. As you know, in Greek water is “hydra.” Ben Azzai says that the Hebrew “hadar” refers to the Greek “hydra” and thus means the etrog, a tree that grows on any type of water (stream, rain or irrigated). I think it’s interesting to see the rabbis reading Greek into the Torah. Creative!
  IntroductionMost of today’s section discusses why one cannot use an etrog that is “orlah”—fruit during is first three years of growth.
  This is the same comment we saw above with regard to the lulav. Anything from a city condemned for idol worship is already considered as if it doesn’t exist. Therefore, an etrog from such a city has no minimum measure.Just a reminder, the condemned city was a theoretical category, one certainly no longer in existence by the rabbinic period.
  The mishnah doesn’t allow one to use an etrog that is orlah, produce during its first three years, from which one cannot derive any tangible benefit. We should note that just because one can’t “benefit” from orlah doesn’t inherently mean it can’t be used in the performance of a mitzvah. When one performs a mitzvah one is not considered to be “benefiting” at least not in any way that would violate a prohibition from benefiting from something. So the Talmud must look for other reasons why one can’t use an orlah etrog.There are two different reasons given as to why one can’t use such an etrog. First of all, it can’t be eaten. Second, it has no monetary value.The Talmud notes that right now, until further notice, you should think that these positions are exclusive. Each sage holds one reason why an orlah etrog is disqualified and disagrees with the other. This assumption will change later on in this very passage.
  The Talmud uses a different section of the mishnah as a difficulty against whichever amora holds that the reason an orlah etrog can’t be used is that it has no monetary value. The mishnah disqualifies an etrog that is taken from unclean terumah (produce given to priest, but has been ritually defiled). It is forbidden to eat unclean terumah, so this mishnah accords with the opinion that holds that orlah can’t be used because it can’t be eaten. But one may derive benefit from unclean terumah—not by eating it but by burning it and using the fire. Therefore we see that produce that cannot be eaten but has monetary value (such as unclean terumah) can still not be used for Sukkot.
  The Talmud slightly adjusts our previous understanding of the dispute. Both amoraim hold that for the produce to be used in the performance of a mitzvah on Sukkah one must be permitted to eat it. Therefore, unclean terumah is invalid. They disagree whether it must also have monetary value. One holds that it must, and therefore orlah is invalid for two reasons—it has no monetary value and one can’t eat it. The other holds that an orlah etrog cannot be used for the same reason that an etrog of unclean terumah cannot be used—neither can be eaten.
  The Talmud now asks why should we really care why an orlah etrog can’t be used—what practical ramifications are there to this dispute? After all, everyone agrees that it cannot be used.The answer is that there are ramifications for another type of problematic etrog—one that is second tithe. Second tithe must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. So there is permission to eat second tithe. But according to R. Meir it is considered holy property, belonging to God, so it has no monetary value. Now we can see the ramifications that the dispute about orlah has on second tithe. According to the one who holds that orlah can’t be used because it can’t be eaten, since second tithe can be eaten, a second tithe etrog could be used. But to the one who holds that orlah can’t be used because it has no monetary value, a second tithe etrog can also not be used because it too has no monetary value.
  The Talmud now concludes that it is R. Assi who said that an orlah etrog cannot be used because it has no monetary value. We can see this because R. Assi says that whether one can use a second tithe etrog depends on whether one holds like R. Meir or the sages. R. Meir says that second tithe has no monetary value because it belongs to God, whereas the sages say that it belongs to its owner and therefore has monetary value. R. Meir would not allow one to use a second tithe etrog, but the other sages would. Thus it can be concluded that R. Assi holds that orlah can’t be used because it has no monetary value. By deduction R. Hiyya b. Avin is the one that holds that it can’t be used because it can’t be eaten.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with using produce from second tithe in the performance of a mitzvah.
  R. Assi refers to three separate subjects—etrog, matzah and hallah (the small piece of dough separated from the larger batch of dough and given to the priest). In all three cases R. Meir says that if it is of second tithe it is not subject to the mitzvah and the sages disagree. We could, at least for now, understand this to mean that R. Meir holds that this is not regular food—it can be eaten but it belongs to God. The other sages hold that it is regular food, just that it has restrictions such as it must be eaten in Jerusalem. Still, it counts as one’s property.
  R. Papa raises a difficulty on R. Assi. R. Assi implies that one must own one’s dough, matzah and etrog in order for it to be part of the mitzvah. Since R. Meir holds that one doesn’t own second tithe, R. Meir would hold that one cannot use second tithe in the performance of these mitzvoth. Now there is a verse that calls it “your dough” implying that if you don’t own the dough it is not liable for hallah. There is also a verse saying “take from yours” when it comes to the four species. As we have seen, this verse is used to teach that one must own one’s lulav (and hadas, aravah and etrog). But there is no verse or halakhah saying that one must own one’s matzah. So why should R. Meir disqualify second tithe matzah.
  The answer is that the law that matzah cannot be of second tithe is derived from the use of the same word “bread” in the passage concerning matzah and concerning dough. Since both passages use the same word, halakhot that apply to one can be applied to the other. This technique is called a “gezerah shavah” and it is a little like a wormhole of rabbinic midrash, transferring material from one context to another.
  
  Daf 35b
  
  Usually when the Talmud states “Can we say that the following supports [this view]” it takes a baraita and tries to use it as a support for an amoraic statement. The problem is that in this case, the baraita that they cite is exactly the same as the statement of R. Assi above.Therefore, the Talmud adjusts the question. The question is whether the fact that R. Meir and the sages disagree over whether second tithe dough is liable for hallah implies that they also disagree over whether one can use second tithe matzah or an etrog. It might be that the three issues are all the same, as R. Assi stated, or it might be that the dough of second tithe is different because the Torah twice states, “your dough.” Since this is stated twice by the Torah, clearly R. Meir would say that second tithe dough is exempt from hallah. But it is not certain that he would say that one cannot use second tithe matzah or a second tithe etrog. 
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with using a terumah etrog, either unclean or clean terumah. Unclean terumah may not be eaten while clean terumah can be eaten but only by a priest.
  As we learned earlier, one cannot use an etrog that is unclean terumah (produce that must be given to the priest) because it cannot be eaten. While the etrog is not meant to be eaten during Sukkot, it must not be of a substance that can never be eaten.
  The mishnah says that one shouldn’t use a terumah etrog, even though it has not been defiled. Two amoraim debate why it can’t be used. One says that by doing so he will get it wet which will cause it to become susceptible to impurity (see Tractate Makhshirin in the Mishnah Yomit commentary). Since one doesn’t want terumah to become impure, one shouldn’t use the etrog as part of the lulav.The other amora holds that with so much use the outer layer of the etrog will be ruined and one should not cause terumah to be diminished.
  As happened in yesterday’s section, the Talmud now asks what practical difference there is between their two explanations. After all, both amoraim hold that one shouldn’t use a terumah etrog, so why should it matter why one cannot do so.The Talmud has to dream up a weird case to answer the question. If one says that all of the etrog is terumah except for the outside peel, then we still have to worry about it becoming susceptible to impurity, but we wouldn’t have to worry about it being diminished, because the part being diminished, the outside, is not terumah.We should note how theoretical this case is. After all, how could one give the inside of the etrog to the Kohen and keep the outside for himself?
  While one should not use a terumah etrog, if he did use it, it is valid. This is true for all amoraic explanations as to why certain things cannot be used for the lulav (see yesterday’s section). Terumah can be eaten, at least by a priest, and terumah has monetary value (people can sell it). Therefore, if one uses a terumah etrog, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  IntroductionDemai is doubtfully tithed produce, meaning it was purchased from someone who was assumed to not have tithed it (an am haaretz). In the mishnah Bet Shammai does not allow one to use a demai etrog and Bet Hillel does. Our mishnah explains the reason that lies behind this debate.
  According to the Talmud a poor person can eat demai without separating tithes. This is because the rule that one has to take tithes out of demai is just a stringency. For a poor person, the rabbis were willing to be lenient, at least according to Bet Hillel. For an etrog to be usable in the lulav, it must be one that a person is allowed to eat. Since a person could always become poor by giving away all of his stuff, in a sense anybody could eat demai. It is his, fulfilling the midrash that states that one must own his lulav. Therefore, Bet Hillel allows the use of a demai etrog.
  In these sources we see that Bet Shammai holds that no one can eat demai, not even poor people or troops that one is forced to quarter. Bet Hillel is more lenient in both cases. Poor people need not tithe demai, and Jews being forced to quarter soldiers may feed them demai. Bet Hillel holds that since the obligation to tithe demai is only a stringency, it may be waived.
  IntroductionThis section continues explaining new parts of the mishnah.
  The mishnah says that one should not use a second tithe etrog in Jerusalem, even though one may eat second tithe. This is in some ways like terumah—although these products can be eaten, they still should not be used for the etrog.The same explanations that applied to terumah apply here. The one who says he shouldn’t use it because by making it wet it becomes susceptible to impurity, the same problem exists with second tithe. It too should not be defiled. And according to the one who says that a terumah etrog shouldn’t be used because one diminishes it by making the outside layer dirty, the same thing is true of second tithe. It too should not be diminished.
  If one used a second tithe etrog in Jerusalem, even though he was not supposed to do so, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Talmud now correlates this with the opinions as to why someone hasn’t fulfilled his obligation with an orlah etrog. Second tithe can be eaten in Jerusalem, so the one who explains that orlah can’t be used because it can’t be eaten, can that since second tithe can be eaten, if one uses it on Sukkot, he has fulfilled his obligation.But the one who holds that orlah can’t be used because it has no monetary value would have to explain this section according to the rabbis who rule that second tithe has value. Rabbi Meir holds that second tithe has no value, so he would hold that one who uses a second tithe etrog has not fulfilled his obligation.
  The mishnah said that if the larger part of the etrog is covered with a rash, it is invalid. R. Hisda says this is true only if the rash was in one spot. But if the rash was in two or three spots, the etrog is valid.We should note that R. Hisda said nearly the same words on the bottom of 33a in connection with berries that appear on the hadas. It is possible that R. Hisda himself made this statement on only one occasion and the editors of the Talmud moved it to the other place. Rava’s response below is also nearly the same as that found earlier.Rava responds that if there is a rash in several spots the etrog will look striped, which would invalidate it. Therefore, R. Hisda’s statement must be rejected.
  Due to his above difficulty, Rava emends R. Hisda’s statement. Now, R. Hisda refers to the latter clause of the mishnah, which stated that a rash on a small part of the etrog doesn’t disqualify it for use. R. Hisda, according to this version, limits this to a case where the rash is only on one spot. But if there is a rash in several spots the etrog is considered striped and is invalid.Rava adds that if the rash appears on the nose, which Rashi defines as the upper edge of the etrog leading up to the part where the pitom is, this etrog is invalid, even if the rash is very minor. This halakhah is why you will find people carefully examining this part of their etrog.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with several small sugyot concerning various physical defects that would disqualify the etrog.
  R. Yitzhak b. Elazar explains that the “pitom” is the upper stem of the etrog. If it has been removed, the etrog is invalid. Note, that some etrogim do not have a pitom. These etrogim are valid because there pitom was not removed—they just never had one.
  The mishnah rules that an etrog that has been peeled is invalid. In contrast, Rava seems to rule that an etrog that has been peeled is valid.The Talmud resolves this difficulty by saying that the mishnah invalidates an etrog that was totally peeled, whereas Rava validates an etrog that was only partially peeled.
  
  Daf 36a
  
  The mishnah teaches that if it was pierced it is invalid. Ulla b. Hanina clarifies that there is a difference between a piercing that goes all the way through to the other side. Such an etrog is invalid no matter the size of the piercing. But if the pierced point does not go all the way through, it is only invalid if it is the size of an issar, a coin.
  Rava asks a question about an etrog that has symptoms that make it look like an animal that is a terefah. A “terefah” is an animal that has some sort of disease or physical defect that will cause the animal to die.At first, the Talmud doesn’t even understand the question. After all, the mishnah has already discussed the cases of an etrog that is pierced, peeled or split. What defect could Rava be addressing that is not found already in the Mishnah?The answer is that he is referring to an etrog whose innards seem to be pouring out, like an animal whose lungs are pouring out. Such an animal is not considered a terefah as long as the arteries are still whole.So Rava’s question is whether an etrog is treated like the animal. The animal might not have died from the lung probelm because it’s all still inside the animal. But the etrog’s innards are spilling out, they are not inside the etrog. So the question is—does this make a difference?
  This baraita lists various physical problems that render an etrog invalid. Below we will see how this baraita functions as an answer to Rava’s question.
  The baraita taught that a swollen or decayed etrog is invalid. At first we understand this to mean that swollen refers to the outside of the etrog and decayed is from the inside. This would mean that the answer to Rava’s question is negative—an etrog that is a terefah would be invalid.But the Talmud rejects this understanding of the baraita. Both swollen and decayed are on the outside of the etrog, and an etrog is disqualified even if it is only swollen or only decayed. It need not have both defects.
  IntroductionToday’s brief section deals with the line from the baraita that disqualified an Ethiopia etrog.
  The first baraita disqualifies an Ethiopian etrog. In contrast, the second baraita says that an Ethiopian etrog is valid; only one that is like an Ethiopian etrog is invalid. Rashi explains that an Ethiopian etrog is one that grows in Ethiopia. But an etrog that is like an Ethiopian is one that grows in Israel, but is like the Ethiopian ones. An Ethiopian etrog is valid, because that’s just the way they look there in Ethiopia. But if such an etrog grows elsewhere, it is not natural and it is invalid.Abaye answers the difficulty by simply stating that the mishnah also refers to a case where the etrog is like an Ethiopian one. True Ethiopian etrogs are always valid.Rava answers that the mishnah refers to a true Ethiopian etrog, which the mishnah indeed invalidates. However, it invalidates it for people living in Israel who are far from Ethiopia. But Babylonia is closer (according to Rashi) to Ethiopia, and therefore Ethiopian etrogim are valid there. But an etrog similar to an Ethiopian one is unnatural and therefore invalid.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the baraita that was quoted above in section one of this week’s daf.
  In the baraita that was found in the beginning of the daf, R. Akiva said that a half-ripe etrog is not valid on Sukkot. Rabbah lumps R. Akiva’s ruling together with R. Shimon’s ruling made elsewhere, that when an etrog is still small, it need not be tithed, because it is not yet considered a fruit. Thus both tannaim seem to say the same thing—an etrog is not considered halakhically to be a fruit until it is ripe.
  Abaye rejects Rabbah’s attempt to equate the positions of R. Akiva and R. Shimon. First of all R. Akiva might have disqualified an unripe etrog for Sukkot because it is not goodly, but when it comes to the obligation to tithe it, he would still hold that it is liable for tithes.Second, R. Shimon might have stated that a half-ripe etrog need not be tithed because until it is ripe, its seed cannot be used. But when it comes to using it for Sukkot, he might agree with the sages that an unripe etrog can be used.In short, both tannaim might have special requirements due to their interpretation of the verse at hand, either about Sukkot or about tithing. But this doesn’t mean that they always rule that an unripe etrog is not yet considered a fruit.Abaye finishes his statement by saying that no more argument can be done. I’m not sure what gives him the right to say such a thing, but that’s just the way it is. There is nothing more to say about it!
  
  Daf 36b
  
  The baraita invalidated an etrog that was grown in a cast such that its shape would look like another species. Rava emphasizes that this etrog is invalid only if it is made to look like another species. If it still looks like an etrog, it is valid. After all, it is an etrog.The Talmud asks what Rava teaches us beyond that which is already taught in the baraita itself.The answer is that if he grows it in the shape of “planks joined together” it is still valid, if it still looks like an etrog. Rashi explains that “planks” means that there are deep grooves in it, making it look like it is a series of joined planks. As long as the etrog still looks like an etrog, it is valid.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with an etrog that was partly eaten by mice.
  The section opens with Rav’s statement that one cannot use an etrog that has been gnawed at by mice because it is no longer “goodly.”However, this seems to be contradicted by the actions of R. Hanina, who ate a little bit of his etrog and then still used it to perform a mitzvah.At this point, the Talmud seems to equate the two—an etrog that has been partially eaten is either valid or invalid, it matters not who ate it, a human or mice.
  The Mishnah stated that if the etrog is missing any part of it, it is no longer valid. This seems to be a difficulty against R. Hanina who took a bite out of his and then used it on Sukkot. But this difficulty can be resolved by saying that the Mishnah refers to the first day of the Festival when the mitzvah to take an etrog is considered to be “deorayta” from the Torah “And you shall take on the first day…”. On subsequent days, the mitzvah is only derabanan, of rabbinic origin, and therefore, R. Hanina could use an etrog from which he had already taken a bite.But the problem with Rav still remains—if R. Hanina could take a bite out of his, why then can’t an etrog gnawed at by mice be used on subsequent days?
  The answer is that an etrog gnawed at by mice is disgusting, and therefore is not goodly. Think of it this way—if I offered you a bite of my sandwich and you were hungry, you might take a bite. If I offered you a bite of a sandwich from which mice had gnawed, you’d probably have to be pretty hungry to eat it.
  In this version of the sugya, Rav rules just like R. Hanina—an etrog that has a bite taken out of it can be used, but not on the first day.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the minimum and maximum size of an etrog.
  In the Mishnah R. Meir said that the minimum size of an etrog is the size of a nut, whereas R. Judah said it must be the size of an egg.Rafram b. Papa, an amora, noted that the same sizes are attributed to the same tannaim in connection with an entirely different dispute. On Shabbat it is forbidden to carry more than four cubits in the public domain. Within four cubits it is also forbidden to carry, but the prohibition is lighter—only derabanan. However, for the sake of cleanliness, a person can carry three stones with which to wipe himself if he needs to go to the bathroom on Shabbat (aren’t you thankful for toilet paper). Again, this is only within four cubits. It is always prohibited to carry more than four cubits.R. Meir says that the stones can only be the size of a nut. R. Judah says that they can be up to the size of an egg. I’m sure we could all make some humorous remarks right now. But I’ll hold them in.
  In the Mishnah R. Yose allowed an etrog so large that one needed two hands to hold it. R. Judah said that one had to be able to hold two in one hand.R. Yose tries to bring proof from the fact that R. Akiva came to shul one day with an etrog so large that he had to carry it on his shoulder. But R. Judah, as we might have expected him to do, does not accept that as proof. According to R. Judah, the other sages told R. Akiva that the etrog he was schlepping on his shoulder didn’t look so good.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with a new mishnah.
  According to some sages, three of the species (all except the etrog) must be bound together. In the mishnah there is a debate whether the cord used to bind the three together must be from the same species as one of the three species. As we shall see in the Talmud, the problem with it being from another type of tree is that when he picks up the lulav, he will be carrying five species—the four mandated ones and the one from which he made his cord. This might be a violation of the prohibition of adding on to the Torah’s commandments. The Torah says four species—it would be prohibited to add a fifth.
  Rava says that any part of the palm tree can be used to bind the three species together, even the sinew or parts of the base of the tree. The reason that R. Judah demands one use parts of the palm is not so that the lulav looks good, but because if he uses a different species, he would be taking five species, as I explained above.
  Rava explains that the fact one uses sinews and roots of palm-trees to make a sukkah, and that R. Judah demands that the sukkah be made from any of the four species, proves that these parts of the date-palm count are considered part of the species. We shall return to this point below. For now, we will first explain the baraita itself.The main dispute in this baraita is quite interesting. R. Meir says that one can use any material to make a sukkah, as long as it follows the normal rules of making a sukkah. In other words, while the skhakh must have grown from the ground, it need not be of the four species.R. Judah says that it must be one of the four species.The background of this dispute is Nehemiah 8:15, which is quoted below. In this verse Nehemiah and Ezra and the people who have returned to Israel after the first exile seem to interpret Leviticus 23:40 as if it mandates building the sukkah from the four species. However, their identification of the species slightly differs from the normative rabbinic interpretation and from the precise wording of Leviticus. Biblical scholars nevertheless interpret this verse as referring to building the sukkah from the four species. The rabbinic way of dealing with this verse is found below.
  
  Daf 37a
  
  The rabbis respond to R. Judah that his stringency (the sukkah must be built of the four species) will actually lead to a leniency, for if he doesn’t find enough of the four species to build a sukkah, he won’t be able to dwell in the sukkah.Here the rabbis note that in Nehemiah the Jews don’t use just the four species as identified in Leviticus to build their sukkot, they seem to use other species as well. Indeed, five are mentioned, and the etrog seems to be absent. In other words, since the species mentioned here are not exactly the same as those in Leviticus, the rabbis assume that these are different and that the Jews referred to here also took the four species in Leviticus and used them for what we call a lulav. Again, this is not how biblical scholars read the verse. The rabbis read this verse in this manner so it doesn’t contradict their reading of Leviticus.Paradoxically, while the verse might have originally been the source of R. Judah’s ruling that the sukkah must be built of the four species, here it becomes a difficulty against him. The Jews here use more than just the four species from Leviticus to build their sukkah.
  This section accomplishes two things. First of all, R. Judah offers his interpretation of the verse. The species mentioned in the book of Nehemiah that are not part of the four in Leviticus were used for the walls, and R. Judah agrees that the walls need not be made of the four species. Only the skhakh, according to R. Judah, must be made of the four species.Now we return to Rava’s statement above that sinews and roots are considered date-palms. R. Judah allows one to use planks to make the skhakh. Since he holds that one must use one of the four species to make the skhakh, it must be that these planks were made of the base of the date-palm. Thus we can see that planks, and probably sinews as well, are halakhically considered part of the date-palm.
  IntroductionThe first half of this section is a continuation of yesterday’s section, where R. Judah said that the skhakh had to be made of the four species. The second half continues with a discussion of the material used to bind the lulav.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita in which it seems quite clear that R. Judah does not demand that the skhakh be made of one of the four species. The particular details of the baraita are not our concern here. What is our concern is that it contradicts that which we taught above.
  Conveniently, the Talmud is able to use a biblical verse in order to interpret “cedar” as “myrtle.” Thus, R. Judah doesn’t allow one to use cedar planks, just myrtle planks. Now, how one can make a plank out of myrtle, a plank that is four handbreadths wide, that’s another story.
  R. Meir in the mishnah allowed one to use a cord made of any type of material to bind the lulav. Here he cites a story where the nobility of Jerusalem used gold strands to bind their lulav.However, as usually happens, the proof from the story is rejected. The other sages say that the nobility used gold on top of binding material made of the same material as the lulav. Thus it was bound with its own species, and the gold was merely decorative.
  According to Rabbah, when one holds the lulav, his hand must touch the lulav itself. If something else is there, it interposes. Here, the binding put around the hoshanna (the Aramaic word for the lulav) would interpose and prevent him from performing the mitzvah. Therefore, according to Rabbah, he should leave space for his hand so that his hand isn’t blocked.Rava says that since the binding is only there to make the lulav look good, it doesn’t interpose. Rava, as we can see here, holds that the lulav need not be bound.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the issue of holding the hoshanna (Aramaic for lulav) with some sort of holder.
  This statement of Rabbah’s is related to his statement at the end of yesterday’s section, that when binding the lulav, one should leave room at the end so that the binding doesn’t block him from holding it. Here too he notes that if one shouldn’t hold the lulav with a scarf because that is not a “whole taking.”As was the case in yesterday’s section, Rava disagrees. Holding something by means of something else still counts as “holding.” One’s skin need not touch the thing that he is holding.
  Rava uses Mishnah Parah 12:1 to prove that holding something by something else still counts as holding. When dipping the hyssop into the purification waters (those that have the ashes of the red heifer) in order to sprinkle them on the impure person, he may lengthen the hyssop with thread or a reed. This is allowed even though the Torah says that he must take the hyssop and then dip it. From here we can see that “taking” does not preclude holding the object by something else.
  That mishnah is rejected as general proof because the reed or thread is actually attached to the hyssop. Thus it is not sufficient proof that one can hold the lulav in a scarf.
  
  Daf 37b
  
  Now Rava uses Mishnah Parah 6:1 to prove that “taking” by means of something else still counts as taking. According to Numbers 19:17 one is to “take” of the ashes and put them in the water. But Rava deduces from the Mishnah that if he casts them into the water directly from the tube in which they were previously put, the “taking” is still valid.This successfully proves Rava’s point. “Taking” by means of holding the object with something else, still counts as “taking.”
  According to Rabbah when putting his lulav into the bound hoshanna, with the hadas and aravah, one should be careful not to cause leaves to fall off, because they will interpose between his hands and the lulav.Surprise—Rava disagrees. Since the leaves are of the same species as that being held, they categorically cannot interpose.
  This is basically the same dispute as above, just a slightly different situation.
  IntroductionToday’s section opens with another statement by the amora, Rabbah, concerning various laws governing the four species. The specific topic today is smelling the hadas or etrog, the two species that have a fragrant smell.
  Rabbah prohibits smelling a hadas because the main purpose of a hadas during the year is for fragrance. Indeed, I’m not sure there is any other use for the hadas. So when one designates it for use during Sukkot to fulfill his mitzvah, he cannot use it during this same period for its regular use. However, one can smell an etrog because the main use of an etrog is for food, like a lemon. Since its main purpose is food and not fragrance, he can smell it during Sukkot.
  Rabbah seems to enjoy the paradox that the laws are reversed when the etrog and hadas are still attached to the ground. In such a case, one can smell the hadas. There would be no need to detach it in order to smell it. On the other hand, if he smells the etrog he might be tempted to cut it down and eat it. This will not be helfpul if we want to use it for a mitzvah. Therefore, it is prohibited to cut it down.
  IntroductionToday’s section focuses on another statement by Rabbah, this time concerning the manner in which one is to hold the four species.
  One should hold the lulav bundle in his right hand because it has three mitzvot in it—lulav, hadas and aravah. Since the right hand is usually the stronger one, that’s where you put the greater number of mitzvot (sorry lefties). The etrog goes in the weaker left hand.
  This section is related to the previous one, for both talk about why the lulav is more prominent than the others. Here, R. Zerika explains that the blessing is “to take the lulav (על נטילת לולב) and not “to take the etrog” because the lulav is taller than the others. This is true both in the way that we hold the lulav but also in the way that they naturally grow. Palm trees are higher than the trees on which the other species grow.
  IntroductionToday’s section starts with a new mishnah, concerning what one actually does with the lulav.
  The mitzvah of taking the lulav involves waving it in six directions—to the directions of the four winds and up and down. The custom was and still is to waive the lulav the first time one takes it up, and then to waive it again in the synagogue at various points during the recitation of Hallel at the morning service. This is the background to our mishnah. Here we see that there is a debate about one of these wavings. According to all of the sages, one waves at the beginning of Psalm 118 and at the end, a Psalm that begins and ends with “Give thanks to the Lord.” Everyone agrees that there is also a waving in the middle of this Psalm, but they disagree as to the extent of the waving. Bet Hillel says that one waves during the first half of verse 25, “O Lord, deliver us”, but not during the second half, “O Lord, let us prosper.” Bet Shammai says that one also waves during the second half of the verse. Rabbi Akiva, who lived long after Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai were no longer really in existence, testifies that he saw all of the people waving at “O Lord, let us prosper” as Bet Shammai stated, while Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua, two of Rabbi Akiva’s elders, waived only at “O Lord, deliver us,” as Bet Hillel posited. The halakhah is according to Bet Hillel. As an aside, while it is typical for the rabbis to follow Bet Hillel, it is interesting to note that in this case most of the people acted like Bet Shammai.
  The Gemara is puzzled by the Mishnah seeming to discuss how one waves the lulav without first stating that one does wave the lulav. Our mishnah, in other words, seems to come out of nowhere.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with a different mishnah that discusses other rituals that involve waving.
  This section quotes from Mishnah Menahot 5:6, which discusses the two loaves of bread and the two lambs used on Shavuot (see Leviticus 23:20) which must be waved in the Temple. In describing how an offering is waved, the Torah states that it was “waved and lifted up” which seems to be repetitive. The rabbis interpret “waving” as moving it forward and backward and “lifting up” to mean moving it upward and downward.
  There will now be various symbolic meanings attributed to the waving back and forth of the lambs and the loaves. By extension, since the same motions are used for the lulav, this is also symbolically what we’re doing when we wave the lulav (this is made explicit below).R. Yohanan explains that we wave these items in all directions to acknowledge that God owns everything.
  In Eretz Yisrael they have a different understanding of the symbolic waving of the ritual items—this waving stops bad winds and dews. It is a preventative (apotropaic) ritual. It’s interesting to note the small debate that seems to be occurring here. The first tradition understands this ritual as a type of prayer, acknowledging God’s power. The second tradition understands it in a manner akin to magic. It has the power to prevent bad things from happening.R. Yose b. Abin adds that this text proves that even the ancillary parts of commandments, such as waving, protect people from harm. Obviously, the mitzvot themselves also have this capacity.
  
  Daf 38a
  
  Rava says that the same motions used to waive the lambs and the loaves are used on Shavuot to are also used with the lulav.R. Aha b. Yaakov seems understand the lulav as a weapon against Satan, as if by waving the lulav, one is putting it into Satan’s eyes.But the Talmud isn’t so comfortable with such a blatant provocation of Satan. Provoking Satan might lead Satan to tempt the person in a way that the person would not be able to resist. This is a complex topic, but it seems that the rabbis preferred one to just try to avoid Satan somewhat surreptitiously. Outward hostility towards this tempting force was risky
  It is preferable to take up the lulav first thing in the morning before one eats. This is usually done today during the morning prayer service, right before Hallel. However, one can fulfill the mitzvah any time during the day. If one is returning from a trip and he didn’t have a lulav with him, he should take one as soon as he gets into his house. Even if he is in the middle of a meal and then remembers that he hasn’t performed the mitzvah of taking the lulav, he should put aside his meal and take the lulav. One can perform the mitzvah all the way through dusk.
  The mishnah says that when he comes home from his trip he should immediately take up his lulav, even if this means interrupting a meal. However, this contradicts a different baraita which states that if one starts a meal before he has prayed the minhah prayer, he need not interrupt his meal. He can finish eating and then complete minhah. The difficulty is that one source says that if one is in the middle of the meal and realizes he has not yet performed a mitzvah, he must stop and perform the mitzvah, whereas the other source says that one need not stop. He can perform the mitzvah after.R. Safra offers the first resolution to the contradiction. If there will be time during the day to take up his lulav or say minhah after he is done his meal, then he need not interrupt his meal. But if the day will be done before he finishes his meal, he better take up his lulav or say minhah before the day is over, otherwise he will have missed the opportunity to perform a mitzvah.Rava rejects this, saying it’s really not a difficulty at all. The obligation to take the lulav is from the Torah, deorayta. Therefore, one would have to interrupt his meal to take up the lulav. But the obligation to recite minhah is considered derabanan, from the rabbis. Therefore, if one begins his meal before reciting minhah, he need not interrupt in order to recite it.
  Rava maintains R. Safra’s resolution but says that it was stated over an internal contradiction in the mishnah. The first clause states that he should interrupt his meal to take his lulav, whereas the second is read by Rava as implying that he need not interrupt his meal. Since these are both the same mitzvah, taking the lulav, we cannot resolve the difficulty the way we did above. Therefore R. Safra answers that it depends on whether he will have time after his meal to take up the lulav.
  R. Zera says that the mishnah also does not contradict itself. The first clause of the mishnah states that it is preferable to take the lulav before one starts his meal. The second clause says that if one does not, he has not missed the opportunity to take the lulav, because the whole day is kosher for taking the lulav.
  R. Zera restores the original difficulty between the mishnah about the lulav and the source concerning minhah. Rava had said this was not a good difficulty because lulav is from the Torah and reciting the minhah prayer is only from the rabbis. To this R. Zera responds that the mishnah refers to the subsequent days of Sukkot, not the first day, when taking the lulav is only derabanan.He also proves that the mishnah refers to the subsequent days by noting that it refers to a person who comes back from a trip. Since one would not be allowed to travel on Yom Tov, the first day of Sukkot, this mishnah cannot refer to the first day of Sukkot.
  IntroductionIn the time of the Mishnah not every person in the synagogue would recite the Hallel on his own, as we normally do today. Rather, the leader would recite part, or perhaps most of the verse and the rest of the congregation would respond with the second half of the verse, or with “Halleluyah.” In this way, the leader would aid the congregation in fulfilling their obligation to recite Hallel.In this mishnah we learn that slaves, women and minors cannot aid a free adult male in his recitation of the Hallel because they themselves are not obligated to recite Hallel. This fits in with two general rules: 1) women and slaves are exempt from positive time-bound commandments; 2) a person who is not obligated for something cannot fulfill that obligation on behalf of someone who is.The second part of the mishnah is concerned with the repetition of verses during Hallel. This mishnah will be explained later in the Talmud.
  The mishnah describes an adult man who doesn’t know how to recite Hallel and therefore needs someone else to recite it for him. Usually, this would be done by another free adult male, but for some reason, this person cannot find another free adult male who knows how to recite the Hallel. He therefore turns to a slave, a woman or a minor who does know how to recite Hallel. This is allowed, except unlike a normal case where the person would only answer “Halleluyah” (as is the case in section two), in this case he must repeat the entire verse after the slave, woman or minor. In this way, he fulfills the obligation himself and they do not fulfill it on his behalf.It is interesting to note that it sounds like the rabbis had to confront the possibility that a slave, woman or minor would be more educated, at least religiously, than a free man. It is hard to know how realistic this situation was or how often it might arise. Nevertheless, it is at least a theoretical possibility. The mishnah is clearly disturbed by the man’s lack of knowledge and hence it says that a man who allows this situation to happen should be cursed.This is the normal way in which Hallel was recited during the time of the Mishnah and Talmud.
  This is a related baraita that basically teaches the same thing that was taught in the mishnah about the Hallel and relates it to Birkat Hamazon. Women, slaves and minors can recite birkat hamazon for the “man of the house” but it is considered disgraceful for a man to have a woman, slave or child recite birkat hamazon on his behalf.
  
  Daf 38b
  
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we mentioned the notion of a son, woman or slave reciting Hallel and the man repeating every word they say. In today’s section Rava uses the general customs of how Hallel was recited to derive some general halakhot with regard to the recitation of Hallel.We should note that Rava alludes to an older custom whereby people would recite Hallel responsively, or semi-responsively with the leader of the service. The idea seems to have been that most people did not know Hallel, so they would need to rely on the leader’s knowledge of Hallel. It is always important to remember that people did not have siddurim back then. They didn’t even exist. The first siddurim were written in the post-talmudic period. It is likely that until the invention of the printing press, most people did not have siddurim.
  In today’s section Rava learns three halakhot from the way that people recite Hallel in his time. We shall look at these one at a time.1) The recitation of Hallel begins with the leader reciting Halleluyah, the first word in Psalms 113. The respondents then reply by saying Halleluyah as well. From here he learns that this is a mitzvah—something that people should do. Rashi says that in earlier days they used to answer “Halleluyah” to everything that the leader said. People didn’t know how to recite the full Hallel, so they would just say “Halleluyah.” Rava limits this to their time. Nowadays, meaning in Rava’s time, one doesn’t answer “Halleluyah” to every line of Hallel, just the first word (and the first line as we will see below). The fact that they answer “Halleluyah” and they don’t just start reading right away shows that the old custom is no longer around.2) Rava goes on to say that the fact that they say “Halleluyah” after the first half line, teaches another halakhah. If today there is a person that doesn’t know how to say the whole Hallel, then it is sufficient to recite Halleluyah for every line that the reader recites. In other words, we don’t do like they used to do, when people didn’t know how to say the Hallel. But a person could still recite the Hallel in that way.3) Finally, there is a mitzvah to respond with the full verse of the beginnings of chapters. This, Rashi explains, was the old custom. They would recite the beginning of the chapter and then Halleluyah for the remainder of the chapter. But we, Rashi explains, who know how to recite the whole Hallel, don’t even do this.
  IntroductionThis section is a continuation of yesterday’s section concerning what halakhot we can learn from the way in which we recite Hallel.
  In this case, the responders say exactly what the leader says. This is a hint at the halakhah that if the Hallel leader is a child who is not obligated to recite the Hallel then the responders must say exactly what the child says. This is because there is a rule that if one is not liable in a certain mitzvah, he cannot discharge the duty on behalf of others. So in this case, those obligated must say the whole Hallel.
  Here again, we have the practice of repeating the exact words stated by the prayer leader. We don’t need to learn the same halakhah from above, so Rava (whose statement began in yesterday’s section) learns something different. If a person wants to repeat extra elements, he is allowed to do so. This is still the practice today—the above two verses are repeated when singing the Hallel.
  This is an important principle in halakhah. Generally if one person recites a berakhah and the other answers amen, the one who answers amen has fulfilled his obligation to recite a berakhah. This is what we do for berakhot over food, birkat hamazon can be done this way, as well as other berakhot. But at times one can fulfill an obligation just by listening without any response whatsoever. Rashi brings up an interesting example of this. If someone is in the middle of reciting the Amidah and the shaliah tzibbur gets up to the kedushah, the one reciting the Amidah should not participate in the kedushah, because that would interrupt his own Amidah. But neither should s/he just go on with the Amidah, because the community is reciting the kedushah, the holiest part of the Amidah. Rather, s/he should just stop and listen and by listening s/he is fulfilling the duty to answer those sections of the kedushah that require a response.The final section is interesting for the way that R. Hiyya b. Abba cites all sorts of groups as authorities on this matter. I don’t know of anywhere else in the Talmud where we see this type of description. Most interesting to me is the notion that it was not only rabbis who were giving the “derashah” (expounders) but there seem to have been others, perhaps professionals, who gave derashot in front of the community.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues discussing the concept that someone who hears is like someone who answers a blessing.
  Bar Kappara notes a discrepancy between two verses in II Kings 22. According to the latter verse, it was the King of Judah, Josiah, who actually read the scroll. But earlier in the chapter Shaphan, the scribe, is described as reading the scroll in front of the king. From here Bar Kappara learns that Josiah, who really only listened to the scroll being read by Shaphan, is given credit for having read it himself. The one who listens is credited as if he had responded.
  R. Aha b. Yaakov goes on to prove that Josiah did not read the scroll himself, he only heard it. This is accomplished by pointing to verse 19 where it specifically says that he heard the scroll—he didn’t read it.
  IntroductionThe final section of this week’s daf contains a few more instructions that Rava gives concerning prayer.
  Rava says one shouldn’t split up the verse “Blessed by he that comes in the name of the Lord” which is part of Hallel. Rashi explains that disconnecting “in the name of the Lord” makes it unclear what it refers to.R. Safra replies that this really isn’t so clear and therefore there is no problem splitting the verse up.
  
  Daf 39a
  
  Rava says the same thing about the phrase that is today recited in the middle of the kaddish (the kaddish as we know it did not exist during the talmudic period).Again, R. Safra says that it is not a problem because it is clear that the second half is just the conclusion of the first.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins by relating to the issue of repeating lines in the Hallel. Today we do this towards the end of the Hallel, at the end of Psalm 118.
  According to the baraita that explains the mishnah, Rabbi used to repeat certain phrases. Rashi explains that Rabbi would repeat only from verse 25, “Ana Hashem Hoshia Na” and onward. Rabbi Elazar b. Perata would add more repeated verses, from verse 21 and onward, “Odecha ki anitani.” This is the custom that we follow today.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the blessings recited before and after Hallel. The mishnah seems to say that this is just a custom—in a place where they have a custom to bless they would bless, and if there was no custom to bless, they would simply not bless. This is modified in the Talmud.
  The mishnah said that blessing over the Hallel was dependent on custom. However, Abaye says that this is only with regard to the concluding blessing. Some people recite this blessing and some do not (today we do recite it). But either custom is valid. However, the blessing before the Hallel must be recited. It is not dependent on custom. This is because Rav Judah stated that one blesses prior to the performance of all mitzvoth.We should note that there is a slight expansion of the rule in this passage. When Rav Judah said one blesses before performing commandments, he probably meant commandments that are “performed” such as circumcision, candle lighting, lulav, shofar, etc. Hallel is not “performed” for it is a prayer/recitation not an act. Abaye takes Rav Judah’s rule and expands it to include recitations as well.
  Rav Judah used the word “over” to mean “before,” in his statement about blessing before a mitzvah. Evidently, the rabbis sense that this is an unusual use of the word. Therefore, they try to look for biblical precedent for the word used in this manner, to mean “before.” They find three verses in which the word or the root עבר is used to mean to go before. We should note that this isn’t exactly the way that Rav Judah uses the word. He uses the word as a preposition—before their performance. In the verses, the word is used as a verb. Nevertheless, it does mean to go before.
  IntroductionToday’s short section consists of a mishnah. My commentary is from the Mishnah Yomit. The Talmud will explain this later, so consider these explanations a preview.
  On the sabbatical year all produce must be removed from one’s house and destroyed once it no longer grows in the field. A person can harvest the etrog and use it, but once etrogim are no longer found in the trees he must get rid of the etrogim in his house. When a person sells an etrog (or any other produced) which grew on the sabbatical year, the money retains the status of the etrog (or other produce) itself. That is to say, when there are no more etrogim in the field he must get rid of the money as well. The person in our mishnah is purchasing the four species from someone he fears does business in produce grown in the sabbatical year. He shouldn’t buy from him the etrog lest the seller not get rid of the money when he is supposed to. A person shouldn’t aid another in transgressing the commandment of observing the sabbatical year. To avoid this problem and still obtain a lulav, he should pay for the lulav (the palm) which is not subject to the laws of the sabbatical year (because it sprouted in the previous year) and have the price of the etrog included in the price of the lulav. He receives the etrog as a present when he buys the lulav. In this way the money used to buy the etrog need not be removed from the seller’s house when etrogim are no longer found on trees.
  IntroductionToday’s section comments on the mishnah, which said that on the sabbatical year one shouldn’t purchase the etrog—he should get it as a gift along with the lulav.As an aside, we can sense from this sugya that there were many people who didn’t observe the sabbatical year laws. This halakhah is an interesting case of how the rabbis had to navigate living in a world where Jews did not keep the halakhot the way the rabbis would have liked them to. The rabbis had to find a way to do business with Jews who weren’t perfect in their observance of mitzvoth. It is, in my opinion, an interesting test case.
  If the seller doesn’t want to give the etrog directly as a gift, he can include the price of the etrog in the price of the lulav. In this way, he can get the same amount of money that he wanted but the money doesn’t take on the sanctity of the etrog (see the explanation of yesterday’s mishnah).
  The Talmud now explains why one shouldn’t pay directly for the etrog. There is a general principle that one shouldn’t give money to an am haaretz for sabbatical year produce. An am haaretz, sometimes translated as an ignoramus, was in mishnaic times a person not scrupulous about tithing, as well as the observance of other agricultural laws and the laws of purity. One shouldn’t give something to an am haaretz if he will not treat it with the proper sanctity. As I explained in yesterday’s section, on the Sabbatical year, once produce has stopped growing in the field, one can no longer eat the same type of produce that one has stored in the house. If one sells this produce, the money can be used only as long as the produce that the money purchased still grows in the field. Since the am haaretz will not observe this law, he will circulate money that should no longer be used. Therefore, one should only buy produce from him for an amount of money greater than needed to buy three meals. Assumedly, if the am haaretz gets a small amount of money he will use it up before it becomes prohibited.If one still wants to buy a larger amount of produce from the am haaretz, he should declare that regular produce he has at home will take on the sanctity of the money he is giving to the am haaretz. In this way the am haaretz can use the money as long as he wants, and the purchaser will just have to treat that produce that he has in his house as if it was sabbatical year produce itself.
  
  Daf 39b
  
  During the sabbatical year one is obligated to treat all of his fields as if they were ownerless. In other words, I can sell the produce in my field with certain restrictions. But I can’t lock up and guard my field. One who does so is suspected of being a sabbatical year transgressor. So the person who buys three meals worth of food from the am haaretz can do so only if he sees that the am haaretz is treating his field as if it were ownerless. But if the am haaretz has guarded his field, then we know that he is transgressing the sabbatical year laws. Under such circumstances, one cannot buy any produce from him whatsoever. 
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section a baraita ruled that when one buys sabbatical produce from an am haaretz, he may only buy enough for three meals. If he gives him more than that, the am haaretz is not trusted to treat the money with the proper sanctity. And even this is allowed only if we can see that the am haaretz has declared his field ownerless.In our section, R. Sheshet cites a different baraita that seems to contradict this.
  In the baraita that R. Sheshet cites there is a list of types of produce that are not subject to the laws of tithes because people don’t store these types of produce. They are always just left to grow ownerless. Also, a person can buy them from an am haaretz during the Sabbatical year and there is no limit to how much he is allowed to buy. This proves that if something is not guarded, meaning it is left out in the field to grow and anyone can come and pick it, then one is allowed to buy as much of that produce as he wants from anyone. The earlier baraita had limited this to three meals.
  R. Sheshet solves the problem by limiting the permission to buy from an am haaretz to an amount sufficient for daily food, which is never more than three meals (three meals on Shabbat, two are sufficient for the week). Thus this baraita is brought into harmony with the earlier baraita that said one can buy only enough for three meals when purchasing sabbatical year produce from an am haaretz.As it did earlier on this daf, the Talmud again asks how we know that the word “man” from the phrase “mano” means food. The prooftext is a verse from Daniel where the king appoints food and the verb used is “vayaman.”
  The original mishnah which started this discussion implied that one can buy a lulav from an am haaretz during the sabbatical year. The lulav wasn’t the problem—the etrog was. But if it’s true that one can’t buy sabbatical year produce from an am haaretz, why is one allowed to buy a lulav? Later on the next page, the Talmud will explain why the lulav is subject to the laws of sabbatical year produce when the lulav is not edible.The answer is that this lulav grew during the sixth year, so it’s not a sabbatical year lulav. Even though it was picked during the seventh year, the status of most trees vis a vis the sabbatical year is determined by the year that they started to demonstrate real growth.But this leads to yet another problem—why not say the same thing about the etrog? After all, this etrog that was picked right before Sukkot surely did not just start growing during the sabbatical year?The answer is that the etrog’s sabbatical status is determined by the day it is picked, not when it begins to demonstrate growth. Thus the lulav is a sixth year lulav, while the etrog picked at the same time, is a seventh year etrog. I know—confusing. Be comforted that the Talmud itself seems to find this a bit difficult! 
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section the Talmud determined that the status of an etrog vis a vis the sabbatical year follows the time it is picked. Our Talmud brings some other opinions concerning this question.
  The Talmud now cites Mishnah Bikkurim 2:6 to demonstrate that with regard to the sabbatical year status—all sages agree that an etrog is treated like a tree. Just as a tree’s status is determined by when it blossoms, so is the status of an etrog. There is a dispute in this mishnah, but it is about the tithe, and not about determining the etrog’s sabbatical year status. So how can we say, as we did at the end of yesterday’s section, that its status follows the time when it is picked?I have not explained the details of this mishnah. For more information, you can look on line at my Mishnah Yomit commentary.
  
  Daf 40a
  
  The Talmud now finds support for the notion that the sabbatical year status of the etrog follows the time when it is picked. There are two slightly different versions of this baraita. The proof comes from the corrected version, the second one.The first opinion belongs to Avtulmos who testifies that when it comes to tithing, the etrog follows the time it is picked. For the sabbatical year, its status follows the time that it blossoms. Our mishnah in Sukkah does not hold like this tanna.However, our mishnah does agree with the rabbis who voted in Usha (a settlement in the Galilee where rabbis lived and thrived after the destruction of the Temple). These rabbis held that the status of an etrog is always determined by the time it is picked, both for tithing and for the sabbatical year. Therefore, an etrog picked just in time for Sukkot of the sabbatical year, is considered a sabbatical year etrog. In contrast, the lulav follows the time of its blossoming and it is not a sabbatical year lulav.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues the discussion about sabbatical year produce. Last week we learned that if one wants to buy a lulav from an am haaretz on the sabbatical year, he can buy the lulav because the lulav of the sabbatical year blossomed in the sixth year. The implication is that if the lulav had blossomed during the seventh year, the sanctity of the sabbatical year would apply to it. Our daf begins by questioning this implication.
  The Talmud cites a baraita according to which leaves that were gathered for firewood are not subject to the laws of the sabbatical year. Only produce that is eaten, even by animals, is liable to these halakhot. So then, why would a lulav ever possess the sanctity of the sabbatical year, even if it blossomed on the seventh year itself?
  The Talmud cites a midrash on the verse concerning what type of produce is subject to the laws of sabbatical year sanctity—anything whose benefit and consumption come at the same time. This is true of food—when one eats food, one simultaneously benefits and consumes the product. But when it comes to something used for kindling, first it is consumed, the heat is produced and only then one benefits from it by cooking or heating up the house. Therefore, if he sets aside the leaves to burn them, they are not subject to the laws of sabbatical year produce.Rashi explains that the normal use of a lulav is to sweep out the house—it was the ancient broom. The benefit one derives from it comes at the same time it is used. Thus it gets ruined simultaneous to its use. Therefore the laws of sabbatical year produce do apply.
  The wood of the “oily tree” was used to light torches, not for cooking or heating. In this case it is consumed at the same time that one derives benefit from it. So why don’t the rules of the sabbatical year apply?Rava answers that since wood is generally used for heating, all wood falls into this category. The sabbatical year rules never apply to wood, even if it is used for making torches.
  IntroductionThe Talmud continues to discuss whether wood set aside for heating/kindling is subject to the sabbatical year laws. This section uses a baraita that only indirectly relates to the subject.
  The Talmud cites a baraita, which it will now explain and then later connect to the issue about wood during the sabbatical year. In this baraita we see a dispute between the sages whether one can use produce gathered during the sabbatical year for steeping or washing. Rashi explains that this produce is wine—they would steep flax or launder clothes in wine. R. Yose says that the wine can be used for such a purpose, while the first opinion says it may not. Below we shall see why.
  The Torah (Leviticus 25:6) says that one can use sabbatical year produce for food. The first opinion in the baraita learns from here that one cannot use this produce for other purposes—such as steeping or washing.
  Rabbi Yose emphasizes a different word from the verse—”for you.” One can use the sabbatical year produce for any purpose, even to steep or launder.
  The Talmud now asks what the first tanna who said that sabbatical year produce can only be used for food, does with the verse “for you.” The answer is that he compares it with “for food.” This is a similar notion to the one we saw in yesterday’s section—once can use sabbatical year produce only if it is consumed and benefit is derived from it at the same time. When one steeps or launders with wine, the product is first consumed (by being rendered undrinkable), and then the benefit is derived. Therefore, one cannot use it for such a purpose.This opinion would therefore hold that wood is not subject to the sabbatical year restrictions because its benefit by definition comes after it has been consumed. Thus from this baraita the Talmud can conclude that there is a debate about wood, not just about using wine for steeping or laundering.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section. R. Yose used the word “for you” to deduce that one could use sabbatical year produce even for steeping or for laundering. So, the question is, how does he understand the word “for food” which seems to limit the use of sabbatical year produce to food.
  He needs that phrase to deduce, “for food”, but not for a salve, as it has been taught, “for food”, but not for a salve. You say “for food” but not for a salve; why not say, “[for food”] but not for washing? When it says, “for you” washing is included. So how then do I understand, “for food”? “For food”, but not for a salve.R. Yose uses the word “for food” to teach that one may not use sabbatical year produce as a salve. The baraita cited here debates whether the word “for food” excludes using sabbatical produce for washing or for a salve, ultimately deciding that it excludes the latter.
  I include washing since it is a requirement common to all men and exclude a salve since it is not common to all men.The baraita now asks the obvious question—why allow one to use sabbatical year produce for washing but not for a salve.The answer is that the Torah wished to allow one to use sabbatical year produce for things that everyone always needs. Washing is a need common to all people, assumedly at all times. A salve is probably used more often by those who can afford it and it is certainly not something that someone needs all of the time.
  
  Daf 40b
  
  Who does this agree with? With R. Yose, for if it were the Rabbis, they also exclude steeping and washing.The end of this section cites another baraita that also deals with what one can do with sabbatical year produce. There are three things one may not do—use it for a salve, for perfume or for an emetic (something that makes you throw up). All of these are not foods. The baraita accords with R. Yose and not the other rabbis, for they are even more stringent and wouldn’t allow one to use it for steeping and washing.
  IntroductionWhen one sells sabbatical year produce, the money takes on the sanctity of the produce. Note that the produce remains sacred (this is something we will learn in part six of this daf). Our sugya discusses whether there are other ways to redeem sabbatical year produce.
  R. Elazar says that the only way to redeem sabbatical year produce is to sell it. R. Yohanan adds that one can intentionally exchange it–i.e. he takes some money and declares that it is in place of the produce.
  R. Elazar derives his law from the juxtaposition of Leviticus 25:13 which mentions the Jubilee, a year that is similar to the normal sabbatical year, with the following verse which mentions selling. From this juxtaposition he derives the halakhah that sabbatical year produce is redeemed only by selling it.
  Rabbi Yohanan notes that the Torah calls the sabbatical year “holy.” Just as holy things such as items dedicated to the Temple can generally be redeemed by exchanging them for money, so too sabbatical year produce can simply be exchanged for money.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section, R. Elazar used the verse “And if you sell something to your fellow” to derive the halakhah that one can redeem sabbatical year produce only by selling it. R. Yohanan did not read the verse that way, for he allowed one to redeem the produce also by exchanging it. Our passage asks how R. Yohanan reads that verse.
  R. Yohanan does not derive a halakhah from the juxtaposition of the verses. Rather, he reads it as a story. First comes the Jubilee year, representative of any sabbatical year. During the sabbatical year one should not do regular trade in produce. The idea is that one can eat the fruit of the land, and if there is extra one can sell the extra, but one shouldn’t make a business out of it. This is called “the dust of the sabbatical year” for the main prohibition of the sabbatical year is not to plant or work the field in any way.In any case, if one does engage in business with sabbatical year produce, then the next verse will apply to him—he will grow poor as a punishment and end up selling his possessions. Note that this is a type of “measure for measure” punishment. One didn’t leave sabbatical year produce out in the fields so that anyone could take it, even the poor. In the end, that person himself will grow poor.
  Rabbi Elazar uses the verse that calls the Jubilee year “holy” to teach a general halakhah about sabbatical year produce. When one sells something that is holy, such as something that has been dedicated to the Temple, the money now takes on the holiness of the sold object. That money would have to be given to the Temple just as the holy object would have had to have been given to the Temple. The same is true for sabbatical year produce—when one sells it, the money takes on the sanctity of the produce. In tomorrow’s section we will note that redeeming sabbatical year produce is different from redeeming holy things.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with the dispute between R. Elazar and R. Yohanan. As a reminder, R. Elazar says that sabbatical year produce becomes desacralized only by selling it. R. Yohanan says that it also may be redeemed, meaning a person can just take his own money and exchange it for his own sabbatical year produce. We shall also note that the two baraitot we see here establish the halakhah that redeeming or selling sabbatical year produce does not desacralize it. Sabbatical year produce can never be desacralized, unlike objects dedicated to the Temple that can.
  After a brief introduction, the Talmud opens with a baraita that accords with R. Elazar. I have broken this baraita up into several pieces due to its length.The first section teaches the same halakhah that we learned in yesterday’s section. When one redeems sabbatical year produce, the money used to redeem the produce assumes the same sanctity as the produce itself. The baraita will now continue and explain this.
  The baraita explains that there is a difference between redeeming holy objects and redeeming sabbatical year produce. When one redeems holy objects, the objects are desacralized. The sanctity that used to reside in the object is now found only in the money itself. But when one redeems sabbatical year produce—the produce retains its sanctity, even though the money or object for which it is exchanged is now sacred as well.
  The baraita now explains how the purchased item retains the sanctity of the original sabbatical year produce. One has sabbatical year wheat, for instance, and exchanges it for meat. The meat and the produce are now both holy and must be removed from one’s home when the time during the year comes at which one can no longer have sabbatical year produce in one’s home. If one now sells the meat for something else, the meat loses its sanctity and that which is purchased with the meat takes on that sanctity. This process basically continues ad infinitum. The last object acquired always takes on the sanctity and the original produce never loses its sanctity. This makes it different from normal holy things dedicated to the Temple. When such objects are redeemed they lose their sanctity and only the money (or that which is used for an exchange) becomes holy. Sabbatical year produce, in contrast, can never really be desacralized.The Talmud now notes that since the baraita continually uses the word “purchase” it implies that one can never redeem sabbatical year produce for money. One has to sell it. This accords with R. Elazar’s opinion.
  This baraita (which shall be discussed more thoroughly in next week’s daf) uses the word “redeemed” in relation to sabbatical year produce. This accords with R. Yohanan who allows one to “redeem” or “exchange” sabbatical year produce, without selling it.Within the baraita there is a dispute over whether one can exchange sabbatical year produce for live animals or birds. The sages forbid this because the animal or bird used to redeem the produce will now be holy. The problem is that any of its offspring will be holy as well. The sages are concerned that one might raise entire flocks of holy animals. This will be confusing, people will forget that the animals are holy (and had to have been eaten by a certain time) and they will end up transgressing. Therefore, the sages rule one can exchange sabbatical year produce only for meat that has already been slaughtered.
  
  Daf 41a
  
  IntroductionSince this sugya comes at the beginning of a new daf and a new week, I am going to quote the baraita that appeared at the end of daf mem which serves as the basis for a lot of today’s section.Both the produce of the Sabbatical Year and of Second Tithe may be redeemed with cattle, beast or fowl, whether live or slaughtered, the words of R. Meir.But the sages say: With slaughtered [animals and birds] they may be redeemed, but not with live ones, lest one rear flocks from them.For a commentary on the baraita, see 40, part 6. We now turn to this week’s daf. Again, I realize this is difficult material. Good luck!
  According to Rava the dispute between the sages and R. Meir is only about male animals. In such a case R. Meir allows one to use males to redeem second tithe and sabbatical year produce because one doesn’t use male animals to raise flocks. Only one male is needed to impregnate large numbers of females. But when it comes to female animals even R. Meir agrees that one cannot use them to redeem second tithe and sabbatical year produce.
  Rav Ashi refers to the dispute on the previous daf between R. Elazar, who allowed one to redeem sabbatical year produce only by selling it and R. Yohanan who was more lenient, allowing for redemption by sale and by exchange. R. Ashi says that this dispute is only over the actual sabbatical year produce itself. Such produce may be redeemed only through a sale, according to R. Elazar. But “secondary produce,” which refers to the money used to buy sabbatical year produce and now has the sanctity that the produce had, can be redeemed through exchange or sale.On the previous page R. Elazar was supported by a baraita which used the word “sale” or “sold” to refer to redeeming sabbatical year produce. R. Ashi explains that the baraita repeatedly uses the word sale because of the sale of the original produce—this can only be redeemed by selling it (see the baraita there). The baraita could have used the word “exchange” after the first clause, but it didn’t because once it began to use the word “sale” it just continued to do so.
  In this section Ravina uses a baraita to raise a difficulty on R. Ashi. The baraita describes a person who has a sela, a coin that he used to buy sabbatical year produce. The coin now has the sanctity of sabbatical year produce and cannot be used to buy a shirt. But the clever rabbis find a way for him to nevertheless purchase the shirt with the sela. He goes to a shopkeeper he knows and who knows what to do. He uses the sela to buy some produce. Now the sela is no longer sacred. Then he takes the produce and gives it back to the seller and the seller gives him back the sela coin. The sela now can be used to buy the shirt. [The produce will have the sanctity of the sabbatical year].The problem for R. Ashi with this baraita is that the original sela is “secondary produce.” So why did he have to sell it to the shopkeeper? He could have just taken his own produce and exchanged it for the sela, making his own produce have the sanctity of sabbatical year produce. Why bother with the shopkeeper? This proves that even secondary produce can be redeemed only by way of sale and not by way of exchange.
  Due to Ravina’s difficulty, R. Ashi modifies his original statement. Now he claims that R. Elazar holds that even secondary produce must be redeemed by way of sale and not by an exchange. R. Yohanan disagrees with regard to secondary produce, but when it comes to the original produce picked from the ground, it may be redeemed only by way of sale, not by exchange.
  The problem that R. Ashi now faces is the baraita that was taught on daf 40 as a proof for R. Yohanan. This baraita (cited above in the intro) teaches that “Both the produce of the Sabbatical Year and of Second Tithe may be redeemed by exchange.” R. Ashi interprets “produce of the Sabbatical Year” to mean money used to buy produce of the Sabbatical Year. His proof for this interpretation is that the baraita also refers to “tithe.” If you interpreted this to mean second tithe produce, then the baraita would seem to say that you could exchange second tithe produce for animals. But the Torah says that second tithe produce can be exchanged only for money. Therefore, “tithe” must refer to “second tithe money.” So too, the words “Sabbatical Year produce” do not refer to the original produce itself but to money used to buy such produce.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins with a mishnah. My commentary on the mishnah itself is from Mishnah Yomit.Leviticus 23:40 reads, “On the first day you shall take…and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.” The beginning of the verse states “on the first day” and the end of the verse says, “seven days.” From here the rabbis derived that the mitzvah of taking the lulav is for a different amount of time in different places. They read the second half of the verse as applying to the Temple, “before the Lord your God.” Hence, the lulav should be taken up for seven days in the Temple. Outside of the Temple, or according to other commentaries, outside of Jerusalem, the lulav need be taken for only one day.
  When the Temple still stood the lulav was taken in the Temple (or in Jerusalem) for seven days and outside of the Temple for only one day, as explained in the introduction.However, when the Temple was destroyed, there was a problem. If people only observed the commandment for one day, they would soon forget that originally the commandment was observed for seven days, at least in some places. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, one of the leading rabbinic figures after the destruction of the Temple, decreed therefore that the lulav should be taken up for seven days in all places, in memory of the Temple.Section three: Having related one of the decrees that Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai made after the destruction of the Temple, the mishnah now relates another, similar decree. We need to note a little bit of background to understand this. On the second day of Pesah, when the Temple still stood, the Omer offering of barley was harvested and brought to the Temple and waved by a priest. After this day, it was permitted to eat from the new grain harvest (see Leviticus 23:9-14). Since people outside of Jerusalem would not know precisely when the Omer had been offered, they would wait at least half of the day before they would eat from the new harvest. When the Temple was destroyed and they could no longer offer the Omer, the rabbis derived from the Torah that the new produce could be eaten as soon as the second day of Pesah began. In other words, without an Omer sacrifice the day itself allowed the new harvest. Again, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai perceived a problem. If people would eat from the new harvest immediately on the 16th of Nissan, when the Temple is rebuilt they would forget that they need to wait until the Omer is offered. Therefore he decreed that the new produce could not be eaten for the entire day.It is interesting to note that the rabbis who lived close to the destruction of the Temple believed that it would speedily be rebuilt. Just as they began working on the rebuilding of the First Temple only 70 years after its destruction, rabbis who lived in the first and early second century probably assumed that their Temple would also be rebuilt in a short time. However, after the Bar Kokhba revolt was crushed (135 C.E.), it probably began to dawn on many that the realistic chances of the Temple being speedily rebuilt were not good. The hopes of course never died, but this type of legislative activity—making decrees lest the Temple be rebuilt quickly, were more characteristic of the pre Bar Kokhba period.
  R. Yohanan (the amora, not the tanna of the Mishnah) seeks a source for the notion that we should act religiously in such a way that we remember the Temple. He locates it in a verse from Jeremiah where the prophet laments that there are none who “seek Zion.” The fact that Jeremiah laments this situation implies that there is a need to “seek Zion” which R. Yohanan ben Zakai accomplished by enacting ceremonies to remember how things were done in the Temple.
  Introduction
  This section deals with the second of R. Yohanan b. Zakkai’s “takkanot,” enactments. I explained this in yesterday’s section, but for convenience I am bringing it again here.On the second day of Pesah, when the Temple still stood, the Omer offering of barley was harvested and brought to the Temple and waved by a priest. After this day, it was permitted to eat from the new grain harvest (see Leviticus 23:9-14). Since people outside of Jerusalem would not know precisely when the Omer had been offered, they would wait at least half of the day before they would eat from the new harvest. When the Temple was destroyed and they could no longer offer the Omer, the rabbis derived from the Torah that the new produce could be eaten as soon as the second day of Pesah began. In other words, without an Omer sacrifice the day itself allowed the new harvest. Again, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai perceived a problem. If people would eat from the new harvest immediately on the 16th of Nissan, when the Temple is rebuilt they would forget that they need to wait until the Omer is offered. Therefore he decreed that the new produce could not be eaten for the entire day.
  This takkanah of R. Yohanan was not intended to help people remember the Temple. Rather, it was meant to prevent halakhic mistakes from occurring should the Temple be rebuilt. The explanation here is as I explained in the intro and in yesterday’s section.
  The question the Talmud asks is when might the Temple have been rebuilt such that people would mistakenly eat the new grain as soon as dawn broke. If it wasn’t rebuilt until the sixteenth of Nisan (or any time after), then when that day began it was permitted to eat from dawn in any case. Thus there would be no need to declare the entire day permitted.And if it was rebuilt on the fifteenth, then only half of the day should be forbidden, because even when the Temple stood only half the day was ever forbidden. Those living far away from the Temple could always assume that the court would offer the first Omer sacrifice no later than the middle of the day. So at most R. Yohanan ben Zakkai should have said that the first half of the day was prohibited.
  
  Daf 41b
  
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that according to R. Yohanan b. Zakai, when the Temple is not standing and the omer sacrifice cannot be offered, it is prohibited to eat the new grain on the whole day of the sixteenth, for the Torah says “until this very day.” R. Yohanan b. Zakkai reads this as including the entire day. Therefore, in the absence of the Temple it is prohibited from the Torah to eat on the entire sixteenth of Nisan.
  The problem with the above explanation is that R. Yohanan b. Zakai and R. Judah explicitly disagree in a baraita. R. Judah responds to R. Yohanan b. Zakkai’s takkanah (that found in the mishnah) by saying that such an enactment wasn’t even necessary—the Torah itself prohibits eating new grain until the sixteenth of Nisan is over. So how could R. Nahman say that they agree?
  The difficulty is resolved by claiming that R. Judah didn’t understand R. Yohanan b. Zakkai’s intent. Rabbi Judah thought he meant that the prohibition of eating grain for the whole day was a rabbinic decree lest the Temple be rebuilt. But in reality R. Yohanan meant that it was prohibited from the Torah to eat for the entire day when the Temple no longer stood. Although the baraita says “he instituted” it really means that he first expounded (darash) the Torah where he found a verse that he read as saying said that it was forbidden to eat new grain for the whole day. Then he instituted the law based on this interpretation of the verse.We should note that this is not the simple meaning of the tannaitic sources—the mishnah and the baraita. In both sources R. Yohanan b. Zakai legislates a rabbinic law, not one from the Torah.
  IntroductionToday’s section is from the Mishnah.Today we don’t take the lulav on Shabbat. However, in the time of the Mishnah if the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, they would take the lulav, because as we learned in mishnah twelve, the taking of the lulav on the first day of Sukkot is mandatory even outside of the Temple. The mishnah teaches how they avoided the problem of carrying the lulav to the synagogue on Shabbat, which is clearly a transgression.
  Section one: In order to avoid the problem of carrying on Shabbat, the people would bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Friday and leave them there for the next day.Section two: The only problem with this is that a person needs to use his own lulav on the first day of the festival, because the Torah says “and you shall take for yourselves on the first day”—understood to mean that the lulav must belong to the person taking it. If all of the lulavim were heaped together in the synagogue a person might not know which lulav is his own. Therefore the mishnah says that everyone must be able to recognize his own lulav.Section three: The verse which implies that the lulav must belong to the person taking it refers only to the first day of the festival. After this day a person may fulfill his obligation with someone else’s lulav. The result is that if Shabbat falls on another day of the festival, not on the first day, they need not recognize which lulav belongs to them. They therefore would bring their lulav to the synagogue on Friday but they wouldn’t have to worry about recognizing their own lulav.Section four: According to Rabbi Yose, since a person is supposed to take the lulav on Shabbat if it is also the first day of the festival, he is not obligated if he mistakenly carries it out into the public domain. In other words, since he was allowed to take it in the first place, he is excused for making the mistake of carrying it outside. However, if he did this on another day of the festival, meaning if another day of the festival fell on Shabbat, he would be liable since he should not have taken it at all.Finally, we should note that if he carries it outside into the public domain on Shabbat intentionally he is always liable, whether on the first day or on any other day.
  IntroductionToday’s section provides scriptural support for the halakhah mandating that one must own one’s lulav.
  The words, “And you shall take for yourselves” from Leviticus 23:40 are interpreted by the rabbis to mean that every Jew must take the lulav in his hand and that each must own his own lulav. The lulav cannot be borrowed or stolen, as we learned in the beginning of this chapter. However, one can give the lulav to his friend as a gift. This will be illustrated in the following story.
  Here we can see that R. Gamaliel’s very expensive lulav was passed from one sage to the other as a gift so that each could use it to fulfill his obligation.At the end of the story of the sages, R. Akiva returns the lulav to Rabban Gamaliel. But why does the baraita even need to mention this? What additional halakhic information do we learn from this line? After all, Rabban Gamaliel already fulfilled his duty to take the lulav.The answer is that this line hints at an important principle. If someone gives a present to someone on condition that it be returned, while the receiver holds the gift it is legally his. This means that I can give my friend an etrog (or any other part of the lulav) and specifically state that it is his on condition that he returns it. If he doesn’t return it, he has broken the condition and he has not fulfilled his obligation because retroactively it was never his.
  There is one more extraneous detail to the baraita—that R. Gamaliel spent 1000 zuz to buy his lulav. This just teaches us how precious the commandments were to them.As an aside, the notion of a one thousand zuz lulav is clearly exaggerated. But if you want to see a great movie that picks up on this piece of folklore, watch Ushpizin.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the practice of holding the lulav in one’s hands all day long. It seems that these people read the verse “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day” as if it meant that one should just hold the lulav all day long! Today the practice is generally to take the lulav once during the day at synagogue, to hold it during parts of the service, but then to put it aside for the rest of the day.
  Mar bar Amemar, a late Babylonian amora, says his father used to pray while holding his lulav. The Talmud objects by citing a baraita that states that one shouldn’t hold objects in one’s hand while praying, even a pair of tefillin or a Torah scroll. Shmuel adds that the same is true for more mundane items. Basically, holding an item is considered distracting and therefore one should not do so while praying.The answer is that there is a difference between holding something used to fulfill a mitzvah and something that is not a mitzvah. When holding an object that he need not be holding he is worried over it falling and he won’t concentrate on his prayers. But when he is holding his lulav, he will be so happy to be performing a mitzvah that he won’t feel as if he is worried and he will be able to concentrate on his prayers.As an aside, this line contains the interesting and in my opinion true notion that when we are excited about something, it is less difficult to perform a task.
  In this baraita we learn that the people of Jerusalem basically carried their lulavim with them everywhere they went during Sukkot. There were only a few occasions when a person would put it down. When reading Torah or reciting the priestly benediction a person would need both hands, so he would have to put it down on the ground (I’m assuming they just didn’t have anywhere else to put it). And when studying in the Bet Midrash, the person would be so intensely occupied with his learning that he would forget he had a lulav in his hand. To avoid the problems that this could cause, he would send his lulav away with someone else who wasn’t going to be studying in the Bet Midrash.
  
  Daf 42a
  
  IntroductionDaf Mem Bet begins with a passage about R. Yose’s ruling from the mishnah, that if one accidentally carried a lulav out into the public domain on Shabbat he is not liable for even having committed an accidental transgression. Normally speaking if one accidentally transgresses the laws of Shabbat he must bring a sin offering.
  Abaye limits R. Yose’s ruling. He is exempt from a sin offering only if he didn’t yet fulfill his obligation to take the lulav. But if he had already fulfilled his obligation before he left the house with the lulav, then he has no excuse for doing so and he is liable to bring a sin offering.
  The problem with Abaye’s statement is that as soon as one picks up the lulav he has fulfilled his obligation. So how could someone ever have a case where he takes the lulav out of the house before he fulfills his obligation?Abaye himself answers that if he held it upside down he has not yet fulfilled his obligation. By holding it upside down it would be possible that for him to take it out of the house before fulfilling his obligation. Only then would R. Yose would rule that he is exempt. Rava says that there is another way for him to get it out of the house without first fulfilling his obligation—he carries it out in a vessel, and in this way, he does not fulfill his obligation.
  The Talmud now raises a difficulty. In this suyga Rava seems to say that when one takes something by holding it with something else he has not fulfilled his obligation. That is how he can get the lulav out of the house without first fulfilling his obligation. The problem is that elsewhere Rava himself said that if one holds the lulav with something else (like a holder) then he has fulfilled his obligation. So Rava contradicts himself!The answer is that if he holds it with something that is respectful like a proper lulav holder then he has fulfilled his obligation. In our sugya, he takes the lulav out in something like a dish, which is not respectful and therefore he has not fulfilled his obligation. Elsewhere, when Rava said that holding a lulav with something else is a valid “taking” he meant with something respectful such as a kerchief.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the notion found in R. Yose’s halakhah that if one accidentally sins while trying to perform a mitzvah he is exempt from bringing a sin offering for his transgression.
  R. Huna, an amora, quotes another saying by R. Yose. A priest found a bird that really should have been a burnt offering, meaning it should have been completely burned on the altar, but he ate it thinking it was a sin offering, which a priest is allowed to eat. R. Yose rules that he is exempt and need not bring a sin offering to atone for his sin.
  The Talmud explains why R. Yose needed to make this statement above, even after he had already made his statement in the mishnah. We might have thought that he was exempt for carrying the lulav out into the public domain because although he was transgressing the laws of Shabbat, he was also fulfilling the mitzvah of lulav. But here, in the case of the bird sacrifice, he is not fulfilling a mitzvah. There is no mitzvah for him to eat this sacrifice. Therefore, we might have thought that he should be liable for his transgression. That is why R. Yose had to teach us that even in this case he is exempt because he thought he was performing a mitzvah.
  The Talmud now brings an objection to this broad interpretation of R. Yose’s principle. The person in this baraita wanted to slaughter a daily offering (tamid) on Shabbat, an act which is allowed. But he slaughtered one whose validity had not been examined, which means the animal cannot be used as a tamid. This is a transgression of the laws of Shabbat for which R. Yose says he must bring a sin offering. Thus we see that R. Yose doesn’t hold that if someone errs while performing a mitzvah he is always exempt from bringing a sin-offering.
  The Talmud now explains why that case is different and not demonstrative of R. Yose’s general rule. In this case they brought the animal from the wrong chamber. This was closer to negligence than a simple mistake, and therefore he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his transgression. But in cases like the lulav where he simply made a mistake, he is not liable for a sin-offering.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a mishnah, so my commentary is from Mishnah Yomit.As anybody who has ever fulfilled the commandment of lulav knows, or for that matter, as anybody who has ever dealt with cut flowers knows, they tend to dry up over time. This is especially true for the aravah and the hadas—they simply won’t last when they are taken out of water. Our mishnah deals with putting the lulav back into water on Shabbat and on the festival.
  Section one: This section really teaches two things. The first is that putting a lulav back in water on Shabbat is permitted. This is not similar to watering plants which is prohibited because the plants are still attached to the ground. Secondly, the mishnah teaches that a woman may handle a lulav on Shabbat even though she is not liable to take the lulav. We might have thought that since she is exempt from the laws of lulav, that the lulav is muktzeh to her (forbidden for her to handle). The mishnah teaches that since a man is obligated to take the lulav on Shabbat (if it is the first day of the festival), then the woman may handle it as well.Section two: Rabbi Judah expands on the previous opinion. He agrees that on Shabbat one may put the lulav back into the water. However, he is not allowed to add new water. On a festival he can even add new water, but he may not completely switch the water. That he may do only on the intermediate days of the festival (hol hamoed).Section three: Once a child has reached an age where he is big enough to hold the lulav (all four species) and shake them properly, he is obligated to do so. The Talmud Bavli and subsequent commentators interpret this to mean that at this age his father has an obligation to teach him how to shake the lulav. His real obligation does not begin until his bar mitzvah, at age 13.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals mostly with the last part of the mishnah—at what age do children become obligated or able to perform various mitzvoth?
  The Talmud asks why the mishnah even needs to say that a woman can take the lulav and put it in the water—why not just say that the man puts it back in the water himself? The answer is that since women are not obligated in the mitzvah of lulav, I might have thought that they cannot carry it on Yom Tov or Shabbat. For them it would be a type of “muktzeh.” Therefore, the mishnah had to each that they can.
  The mishnah says that a child must take the lulav once he is old enough to know what to do with it.The baraita expands the mishnah and lists minimum ages for a few other mitzvoth. I should note that in the mishnaic period there was no concept of a “bar mitzvah.” That is to say, the idea that a child becomes obligated for all of the commandments at one particular age did not yet exist. Rather, it seems that a child was obligated for particular commandments when she/he was able to either physically or mentally perform that commandment. We can see this in this baraita. As soon as he knows how to put on a tallit, he must do so. As soon as he knows how to take care of his tefillin he must do so. This age is certainly younger than thirteen. The notion that 12/13 is the age of obligation is a talmudic innovation.
  The Talmud offers a minimal interpretation for “Torah” and “Shema”—after all, this is a child who just learned how to read. All the father has to do is teach him one verse from the Torah and the first verse of Shema.
  These three rules refer to the laws of ritual purity. Basically, if the child is old enough to stay away from things that are ritually impure, such as a dead sheretz (creepy crawly thing) then we can eat pure things that he touched.And if he knows how to answer a question about purity—i.e. did you touch something impure—then if there is a doubtful case of impurity, it is treated the same way that doubtful impurity is always treated. If it occurred in the private domain, we rule stringently and it is impure. If in the public domain, the rule is lenient.
  The son of a kohen may be given terumah, the food that only kohanim may eat, once he is old enough to know how to spread his hands to give the priestly benediction. What this probably means is that he can be given this special food as soon as he is aware that he is a priest and that he is different from other boys.This last one sounds crazy, but if a minor knows how to slaughter an animal, meaning he has learned which parts of the throat must be severed, then we can eat an animal he slaughtered. R. Huna says that this is true only if an adult was standing over him and watching him. In other words, a minor might be able to slaughter, but we can’t trust him to know if he did it properly.
  
  Daf 42b
  
  IntroductionThis section continues discussing the development of a child and the ramifications for how he is treated by Jewish law.
  It is forbidden to pray or recite the Shema within four cubits of excrement or urine. But a child’s waste is not considered waste until he/she can eat bread. Before that time, the waste is not sufficiently malodorous to mandate distancing. To eat bread is defined by the ability to eat an olive’s worth within the amount of time it takes an adult to eat half a loaf of bread (this is a standard time used in many contexts). I think that this is something any parent who has watched their child weaned from breast milk knows-changing diapers was more pleasant before the kid started eating regular food.When it comes to an adult, it doesn’t matter whether he can eat this amount of bread in this amount of time. One can never recite the Shema or pray within four cubits of his excrement. The verse states that the more you know the more your stuff smells. Some truth to that.
  Exodus 12:4 says that when slaughtering the pesach sacrifice, they count how many people will be able to eat it, and they slaughter the number of goats/sheep to provide for that number of people. A minor is taken into account only when he is old enough to eat roasted meat, which would probably be a bit tougher to eat than boiled meat.Rabbi Judah offers another way of determining when a child is old enough to be taken into account for slaughtering the pesah—he puts food in his mouth, but not other things. I’m not sure how old this is, but I imagine it is older than the previous opinion.
  Congratulations—You finished the third chapter of Sukkah. Tomorrow we start chapter four. Way to go!
  IntroductionToday’s section includes only the mishnah that opens chapter four. My commentary is taken from Mishnah Yomit.The mishnah opens with an introduction to the remainder of the tractate Sukkot. On Sukkot there are some mitzvot that are observed for the full eight days (seven days of Sukkot and one day of Shmini Atzeret) and there are other mitzvot that are observed for a lesser number of days, either because they are not observed on Shabbat or because they do not apply to Shmini Atzeret.
  Section one: The lulav and the special mitzvah of the aravah are observed for either six days or seven days. We will learn why below. The mitzvah of the aravah refers to circling the altar with the aravah, a mitzvah described in detail later in the chapter.Section two: The full Hallel is recited for all eight days of Sukkot and Shmini Atzeret. Similarly, there is a mitzvah to rejoice on all eight days of the festival. Both of these are referred to later in the chapter.Section three: The mitvah to sit in a sukkah is for only seven days. On Shemini Atzeret one does not sit in the sukkah. The water libation was a special libation of water poured onto the altar only on Sukkot. It is described in detail later in the chapter. Here we learn that they would perform this special water libation for all seven days of the festival, even on Shabbat.Section four: The flute is played at a special celebration that occurred in the Temple called “Simchat Bet Hashoeva.” This celebration does not take place on Shabbat, the first day of the festival (Yom Tov) or on Shmini Atzeret. Hence the flute is played for only five or six days, depending on whether the first day of the festival is on Shabbat. Simchat Bet Hashoeva is described at length in chapter five.Section five: As we have learned before, outside of Jerusalem it is a mitzvah from the Torah to take the lulav only on the first day of the festival. Hence, if the first day of the festival falls on Shabbat, one still performs the mitzvah of the lulav. We saw this described in chapter three. In such a case the lulav will be taken for seven days—one day in which the mitzvah is “deoraita”—from the Torah, and the rest of the days it is “derabbanan”—from the rabbis.However, if Shabbat falls on another day besides the first day of the festival, then since the mitzvah is only of rabbinic origin, it is not observed. In other words, the derabanan mitzvah of the lulav does not override the Shabbat. In such a case the mitzvah is observed for only six days.Since the time of the Babylonian Talmud it has become customary not to take the lulav on Shabbat, even if it falls on the first day of the festival. However, this is not the custom reflected in the mishnah.Section six: The only difference between this section and the previous section concerning the lulav is that the lulav is taken on Shabbat if Shabbat is the first day of the festival, whereas the aravah (the willow) is taken on Shabbat if Shabbat falls on the seventh day of the festival. If Shabbat falls on one of the other days, the aravah ritual is not performed on that day and it will turn out that the aravah ritual happens on only six days. Later in the chapter we will learn more about the aravah ritual as it was performed in the Temple. The reason that only the seventh day supersedes Shabbat is that the seventh day is the climax of the ritual.Section seven: The question is not really how the mitzvah of lulav was in general performed, but rather how the mitzvah was performed so as to avoid the problem while avoiding certain halakhic problems that would arise on Shabbat.Section eight: The problem of taking the lulav in the Temple on Shabbat is twofold. First of all it is forbidden to carry a lulav through the public domain on Shabbat, so they would have to bring their lulavim to the Temple Mount on Friday. Secondly, one has to be able to recognize his own lulavim because one can fulfill one’s obligation only with one’s own lulav. In chapter three we saw that in the synagogue everyone recognized their lulav. In the Temple there were just too many lulavim to hope that everyone would recognize which was theirs. Therefore the leaders in the Temple trained everyone to say that if someone else took their lulav, then that lulav should belong to them. In this way everyone would own the lulav that they actually ended up with.Section nine: While this solution resolved the halakhic problem, it created a social problem—people were still jostling each other over who gets which lulav. It might have been that everyone was trying to get their own lulav, despite what they had said the previous day. Equally likely in my opinion, is that everyone wanted to take the nicest looking lulav they could find, even if the one that they had brought was not the best. In any case, the mad scramble for lulavim led to brawls. This seems to be another case of people allowing their religious zeal to go overboard causing them to neglect the welfare of their fellow human being.Section ten: The court was quick to put an end to this situation and ruled that it is better for people just to stay at home then to potentially harm each other over the taking of the lulav. I think it is essential to notice how far the court was willing to go to ensure the safety of the people and to prevent religious zealotry from becoming a dominant force. Better that the opportunity to join together in fulfilling the mitzvah of the lulav should be lost than that it should bring violent results.
  IntroductionThe chapter begins with a discussion of why one doesn’t take the lulav on Shabbat.
  According to the mishnah, the lulav does not override Shabbat except for the first day of Sukkot. What this means is that if Shabbat falls on any day of Sukkot besides the first, one does not take the lulav on that day.But it is not clear why taking the lulav on Shabbat should be problematic. We are not talking about carrying it out in the public domain—that is certainly prohibited on any day. But why shouldn’t one leave it in the synagogue or in one’s home and take it on Shabbat? There doesn’t seem to be any prohibition for this.Rabbah answers that the sages prohibited taking the lulav on Shabbat lest one not know how to wave it correctly (or not know something else about how to perform the mitzvah) and one carry it through the public domain to bring it to an expert who can show him how.This is also the reason why we don’t blow the shofar on Shabbat or hear the megillah if Purim falls on Shabbat. In all three cases there is no real Torah prohibition. We are only concerned lest he carry it through the public domain to find an expert who knows how to blow the shofar correctly or read the megillah.
  
  Daf 43a
  
  The problem with Rabbah’s explanation above is that it doesn’t explain why one still takes the lulav if the first day falls on Shabbat.At first, this is easily answered. The end of the mishnah itself says that the rabbis decreed that if the first day falls on Shabbat, one should take the lulav in one’s own home. Not in the synagogue.The Talmud now has an additional problem—what about before they made this decree. As we recall, the mishnah describes people bringing their lulavim to synagogue before Shabbat so they wouldn’t have to carry them. But why allow this at all—why didn’t we fear that they would forget to bring them the day before and then they would end up carrying on Shabbat.The answer is that since taking the lulav on the first day of Sukkot is a mitzvah from the Torah, the rabbis did not decree that one should not do so. The mitzvah from the Torah overrides the fear that one will carry on Shabbat.
  The question that the Talmud asks is very illustrative, for it shows that in Babylonia Jews did not take the lulav on the first day of Sukkot even when it fell on Shabbat. In other words, even though the mitzvah is from the Torah on the first day, they still do not take the lulav.The answer is that in Babylonia they did not know exactly when Sukkot fell because they didn’t know when the New Moon (first of the month, Rosh Hodesh) was determined. I’m not going to get into this too deeply, but in Israel every month they would determine when Rosh Hodesh fell; whether the previous month had 29 days or 30 days. There was no set calendar as we have today (and from the fourth century). This would have consequences for the date of Sukkot and Pesah (and the other holidays as well). But in Babylonia or elsewhere outside of Israel, they wouldn’t find out when Rosh Hodesh was until much later. That is how the custom to keep two days of Yom Tov in the Diaspora was formed. Since they weren’t really sure if the day was the first day of Sukkot or not, they did not take the lulav.The Talmud asks somewhat rhetorically—why doesn’t the lulav override Shabbat in Israel where they do know when the New Moon is declared? The answer is that it does. This is proven by comparing two mishnayot. In one mishnah the people are described as bringing their lulavim to the Temple and in another mishnah they bring their lulavim to the synagogue. The first mishnah refers to a time when the Temple still stood and the second mishnah to the period following its destruction, proving that Jews in Israel continue to take the lulav even in the absence of the Temple.I should note that currently in Israel, the same rules as the Diaspora apply. No one takes the lulav on Shabbat, even if it falls on the first day.
  IntroductionThis section opens with a discussion of how we know that one has to take the lulav on the first day of Sukkot even in the “provinces.” This term refers either to land outside of Jerusalem, or to any place outside of the Temple, including the rest of Jerusalem.
  The baraita cited here deals with the first four words of Leviticus 23:40 which refers to the lulav. Taken all together this baraita teaches that everyone must take a lulav, it must belong to them, they should do so on Shabbat, anywhere, even in the Provinces, but only on the first day of Sukkot. On other days, at least in the Provinces, one does not take a lulav on Shabbat.
  The Talmud now raises the difficulty that we shouldn’t even need a verse to allow taking the lulav on Shabbat. What could possibly be problematic with just lifting up the lulav?Rava answers that the verse allows one to do things on Shabbat that would enable one to take the lulav. This would include even cutting the lulav down from the tree which would normally be a Shabbat prohibition. But this is only according to R. Eliezer. The other sages would not agree, as we shall see below.
  R. Eliezer reads the verse as if it emphasizes that one can do anything necessary to get a lulav even on Shabbat.
  The Talmud now asks, as it often does, what does the other side in a debate do with the words that the rival used as a basis for his halakhah. R. Eliezer used the word “on the day” to prove that one can do anything necessary to get a lulav on Shabbat. The rabbis disagree. So what do they do with that word?They use it to rule that the lulav must be taken during the day and not at night.
  The Talmud continues in its usual manner. R. Eliezer has used the word “on the day” to teach that one can do anything to prepare a lulav on Shabbat. So how does he learn that one takes the lulav during the day and not at night.He learns it from the word “days” at the end of the verse.
  The rabbis don’t learn from the verse used by R. Eliezer because we might have thought that the word “days” refers to days and nights, as it does for the Sukkah. Jews are obligated to dwell in the Sukkah not just during the day, but also at night. But this is not true for the lulav, which is taken only during the day. To avoid this faulty learning, the rabbis derive the rule for the lulav from the word “on the day.”
  IntroductionThis section contains a long baraita that teaches that one dwells in the Sukkah during both days and nights.
  The Torah states that one must dwell in the Sukkah for seven days. The question is how we know that “days” means nights as well? After all, when it came to the lulav, we interpreted the word “days” to mean just during the daytime. One does not take the lulav at night. So, if we were to compare the rule of the sukkah to the rule of the lulav, we would not have to dwell in the sukkah at night.But there is another context in which someone is told to do something for seven days. In Leviticus chapter eight, Moses and Aaron prepare for the initial consecration of the priesthood and the Tabernacle. At the end of the chapter, Moses is told to dwell at the opening of the Tent of Meeting for seven days. This “seven days” means days and nights. So too when it comes to Sukkot, the word “days” can mean days and nights.
  Since the mitzvah of Sukkah could be like lulav and observed only during the day or like the preparations for the consecration of the Tabernacle and observed day and night, we must decide to which it is more similar. But this is also problematic. On the one hand it is similar to the “preparations” for inherently it is a mitzvah meant to be performed for an extended period of time. The lulav, in contrast, is a mitzvah that can be fulfilled in a single moment. So it would seem that it would be most proper to compare the sukkah with the “preparations,” in which case “days” means nights as well.But lulav is a mitzvah meant for future generations—it is not just a onetime event like the “preparations.” Since the sukkah is also obviously a mitzvah for the generations, it would seem that we should compare it with the lulav and not the “preparations.”Thus this analysis in the end fails. We can’t use this type of comparison to understand why we believe that “days” with regard to the sukkah means days and nights.
  
  Daf 43b
  
  Since the comparison fails, the baraita resorts to what is called a “gezerah shavah.” This is a midrashic technique whereby two verses that both use the same word can have details from one applied to the other. The word “you shall dwell (תשבו)” is used in the context of the sukkah and the context of the seven days of preparation. So just as the latter refers to days and nights, so too does the former. 
  IntroductionThe mishnah referred to a special mitzvah performed with the aravah, the willow-branch. This is a Temple ritual whereby they would circle the altar with the aravah in hand. We will learn more about the ritual later in this chapter.For now we discuss the mishnah which teaches that this ritual overrides Shabbat, but only if the seventh day falls on Shabbat. If the seventh day falls on another day, then the ritual does not override Shabbat.
  R. Yohanan explains that the reason that the aravah ritual overrides Shabbat is to let people know that it is a mitzvah “from the Torah.” Indeed, there were Jews who opposed this ritual. This ritual seems to be Pharisaic/rabbinic and opposed by their rivals, the Sadducees. One way of letting people know that a ritual was from the Torah, in other words that it wasn’t just a custom, it was the real deal, was to perform that ritual on Shabbat. This is something that occurs in other areas of halakhah as well (for instance, the reaping of the Omer barley). Performing a mitzvah on Shabbat promotes its status.
  The Talmud now asks a series of difficulties on the mishnah’s rule that the aravah ritual overrides Shabbat on the seventh day.First of all, if we want to publicize that it is from the Torah, why shouldn’t the lulav also be taken on Shabbat on the first day.The answer is taken from the earlier passage where we read about Rabbah’s restrictive enactment—we don’t take the lulav on Shabbat lest one carry it through the public domain.
  If we are worried about people carrying the lulav through the public domain on Shabbat, then we should be worried about the same problem with regard to the aravah.There is, however, a difference between the two mitzvot. Lulav is an individual mitzvah performed by every male Jew. The mitzvah of the aravah is a Temple ritual, carried out by the agents of the court. We are not concerned that these agents will forget about the rules of Shabbat.
  If we are not concerned that the agents of the court forget the rules of Shabbat, so then why shouldn’t the aravah ritual override the rules of Shabbat no matter what day of Sukkot it is? Why just the seventh day?The answer is that if the aravah overrode Shabbat every day, but the lulav only on the first day (inside Jerusalem), then people would think that the aravah is a greater mitzvah than the lulav.
  Why then, does the aravah override Shabbat on a different day? Why not let it override Shabbat on the first day, as does the lulav?The answer is that people would not realize that it is the special aravah ritual that is overriding Shabbat. They might think that because the aravah is part of the lulav (the four species) it overrides the Shabbat. But people would not realize that the mitzvah has importance in and of itself.
  So why then specifically the seventh day? The answer is that it should be on a special day—the first or the last. But having it override the fourth day, for instance, would not really make any sense.
  This was a question asked earlier on this daf—why doesn’t the mitzvah of the aravah override Shabbat during our day (post-Temple times) as well.The answer is that we don’t really know when the seventh day is because we (the rabbis of Babylonia), who live outside of Israel, are not experts in determining the calendar.I should note that today the calendar is set such that the seventh day of Sukkot never falls on Shabbat. This day is called “Hoshanah Rabbah” and at the end of a long series of circling the synagogue, Jews customarily beat their aravot on the ground. This is a relic of the Temple ritual. Because we couldn’t do this on Shabbat and because there is only one day on which the mitzvah could be performed, the calendar has been set up so that Hoshanah Rabbah can never fall on Shabbat. This is the reason that the first day of Rosh Hashanah is never on Sunday (it is never on Wednesday or Friday either).
  In Israel they know (at least they used to know) when the New Moon is determined. So why doesn’t the aravah ritual override Shabbat in Israel. Note that the lulav does override Shabbat if it falls on the first day. So why doesn’t the aravah do the same if it falls on the seventh day?At first, a sage comes from Israel and says that this just never ever happened. The seventh day of Sukkot never fell on Shabbat (as it does not today).But Ravin came and said that there were times when it fell on Shabbat. So why don’t the Jews in Israel let the ritual override Shabbat as the mishnah seems to dictate?
  Since the seventh day can fall on Shabbat, our question returns—why doesn’t it override Shabbat in the land of Israel.The answer is that the real mitzvah of the lulav was not “taking it” by hand and circling the altar. The mitzvah was performed by standing it up next to the altar. Since we no longer have an altar, we can no longer really perform this mitzvah. That is why it doesn’t override Shabbat.Thus we can see the essential difference between the two commandments—the lulav is not strictly a Temple ritual, whereas the aravah ritual is.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section R. Joseph stated that the mitzvah of the aravah is not to take it, as it is with the lulav. Rather, the mitzvah is to stand it up next to the altar. This supposition is debated in today’s section.
  Abaye points out that the mishnah seems to compare the lulav with the aravah. Just as the mitzvah of the lulav is performed by it being taken so too the mitzvah of the aravah should be performed by its being taken, and not by standing it up next to the altar, as it was claimed.
  Abaye’s argument from the mishnah is rejected—just because the lulav and the aravah are in the same mishnah does not mean that they have the same rules. Each one is performed in its own way, the lulav by being taken, the aravah by being stood up next to the altar.
  This time Abaye raises a difficulty with a mishnah that will appear later on in the chapter. To Abaye this mishnah rules that they would circle the altar seven times on the seventh day with the aravah. This implies that the mitzvah is to take it, not to stand it up next to the altar.But this is rejected—the “it” mentioned in the mishnah is the entire lulav, not the aravah.We should note that this mishnah really is ambiguous. It does seem to make sense that the six days are the entire lulav, but that the seventh day may be the just the aravah.
  This section contains a series of amoraic statements where we hear different opinions as to what they had in their hands when they circled the altar—the lulav or the aravah. As we can see, this was a big argument among the amoraim. We shall return to this subject when we discuss that mishnah later in this chapter.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section R. Joseph stated that the mitzvah of the aravah is not to take it, as it is with the lulav. Rather, the mitzvah is to stand it up next to the altar. This supposition is debated in today’s section.
  Abaye points out that the mishnah seems to compare the lulav with the aravah. Just as the mitzvah of the lulav is performed by it being taken so too the mitzvah of the aravah should be performed by its being taken, and not by standing it up next to the altar, as it was claimed.
  Abaye’s argument from the mishnah is rejected—just because the lulav and the aravah are in the same mishnah does not mean that they have the same rules. Each one is performed in its own way, the lulav by being taken, the aravah by being stood up next to the altar.
  This time Abaye raises a difficulty with a mishnah that will appear later on in the chapter. To Abaye this mishnah rules that they would circle the altar seven times on the seventh day with the aravah. This implies that the mitzvah is to take it, not to stand it up next to the altar.But this is rejected—the “it” mentioned in the mishnah is the entire lulav, not the aravah.We should note that this mishnah really is ambiguous. It does seem to make sense that the six days are the entire lulav, but that the seventh day may be the just the aravah.
  Abaye continues to argue. R. Nahman, an earlier amora, stated explicitly that the mishnah which says that they would circle the altar with “it” referred to the aravah, not the lulav.R. Joseph responds that he does not have to agree with R. Nahman—after all both are amoraim and of equal authority. R. Joseph interprets the mishnah to mean the lulav, not the aravah.
  This section contains a series of amoraic statements where we hear different opinions as to what they had in their hands when they circled the altar—the lulav or the aravah. As we can see, this was a big argument among the amoraim. We shall return to this subject when we discuss that mishnah later in this chapter.
  IntroductionThis section continues the discussion from the previous sections—is the mitzvah of the aravah fulfilled.
  This fascinating baraita relates a story of a clash in the Temple between the “Boethusians” and the priests in charge of the Temple. The exact identity of the Boethusians remains unknown, but they seem to have been an ancient Jewish sect either identified with the Essenes or with the Sadducees. They are always portrayed in opposition to the Pharisees. In any case, it once happened that the seventh day of Sukkot did fall on Shabbat. To avoid having to carry on Shabbat, they brought the aravot to the Temple before Shabbat began. The Boethusians seized this opportunity and hid the aravot under some stones. But their nefarious plan was foiled by the simple folk, the “ammei haaretz.” These people knew that the sages wouldn’t lift the stones on Shabbat for they are “muktzeh”—set aside on Shabbat. So they lifted the stones themselves and removed the aravot. [As an aside, this is an interesting case where someone’s ignorance of the details of halakhah proves advantageous to the greater good].The Talmud proves from here that the mitzvah of the aravah is in “taking.” The Talmud reads the baraita as if the phrase “the priests brought them in” means that they waved the aravot, circled the altar with them and then stood them up on the sides of the altar, once the performance of the mitzvah had been completed. I realize that this is not an intuitive means of reading the baraita, but it does seem to be the way that the Talmud reads it. In any case, Abaye has rejected R. Joseph.
  The Talmud now returns to the question of why the mitzvah of the aravah doesn’t override Shabbat in the land of Israel after the Temple was destroyed. Above, we had said that it does not override Shabbat because the mitzvah was to stand the aravah up next to the altar. Since the mitzvah cannot be performed in the absence of the Temple, it does not override Shabbat. But now that we have determined that the mitzvah is just to “take” the aravah, and that the way we do it in the synagogue seems to be the same as the way it is done in the Temple, the question returns. Why not do so on Shabbat?The initial answer is that since the mitzvah of the aravah does not override Shabbat for those in the Diaspora (us), it also doesn’t override it for the Jews of Israel.
  The problem is that earlier we had established that in the land of Israel, when the first day of Sukkot falls on Shabbat, the mitzvah of the lulav does override Shabbat, even though it does not in the Diaspora. So we see that there can be a difference between the Diaspora and Israel with regard to taking the lulav on Shabbat. Why not allow such a difference for the aravah?To answer this difficulty, the Talmud retracts what it had said earlier. Even in the land of Israel the mitzvah of the lulav does not override Shabbat.
  
  Daf 44a
  
  Earlier the Talmud had used a discrepancy between two mishnayot to prove that in the land of Israel one does take the lulav on Shabbat if it falls on the first day of Sukkot. One mishnah said that the people take their lulavim to the Temple, while one said that they take them to the synagogue. The Talmud had solved this difference by saying that the first mishnah referred to a time when the Temple stood and the second to the post-destruction period. Hence, in the land of Israel they do take the lulav on Shabbat, even after the destruction of the Temple.
  The Talmud now retracts that resolution. Once the Temple was destroyed, the lulav was not taken on Shabbat, even in the land of Israel. Both of these mishnayot refer to Temple times. The reason that one describes people bringing their lulavim to the synagogue and not the Temple is that the mishnah refers to the “provinces,” areas outside of the Temple.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to discuss the aravah ritual. In the Temple they would circle the altar once every day with the aravah for the first six days of Sukkot. On the last day they would circle it seven times. But after the Temple was destroyed this custom was no longer observed. The Talmud now asks why.
  Outside of the Temple the mitzvah of the lulav is still observed for seven days, as a remembrance of the Temple, where it was taken for seven days. Abaye asks Rabbah why we don’t also perform the ritual of the aravah for seven days, as it too was done in the Temple for seven days.Rabbah answers him that we can fulfill the mitzvah of the aravah with the aravah that is part of the lulav. We don’t need to have a separate aravah ritual, as they did when the Temple still stood.
  Abaye does not accept Rabbah’s answer, because taking the aravah as part of the lulav is not the same as taking the aravah alone, as the ritual was performed in the Temple. And if you were to attempt to say that we could lift it up again separately for seven days in memory of the Temple, we all know that we just don’t do that.R. Zevid offers another interpretation as to why we don’t still do perform the aravah ritual for seven days. The lulav ritual is a toraitic commandment, for seven days in the Temple and for one day outside of the Temple. Because it was a toraitic commandment we still observe it for seven days. But the aravah ritual was never a Torah commandment, even when the Temple still stood. Therefore, without a Temple, the ritual is no longer observed for a full seven days.
  R. Zevid’s statement that the ritual of the aravah is of rabbinic origin is not so simple. There is a dispute among the sages concerning the status of the aravah ritual. According to Abba Shaul (cited above on 34a), it is indeed from the Torah. He picks up on the plural word “willows” from Leviticus 23:40. One aravah is for the lulav ritual and the other for use in the Temple ritual. So Abba Shaul holds that it is from the Torah.
  According to the other rabbis, the laws of the aravah are a “halakhah from Moses on Sinai.” This means it is an ancient law, believed to have been given orally to Moses on Sinai. The status of such a halakhah is disputed by post-talmudic rabbis, some holding that this also means that it is from the Torah while some hold that it is not. But such an ancient tradition is not considered to be from the “rabbis” as R. Zevid had said.R. Yohanan mentions two other halakhot that are “halakhah from Moses on Sinai.” One of these is “ten plants.” This refers to Mishnah Sheviit 6:1 concerning a field that has ten plants in it. I refer you to the Mishnah Yomit commentary to understand this mishnah. The other is the water libation made on Sukkot. This will be the topic of the fifth chapter of Sukkot.
  This is what is called “tweaking” your original statement. R. Zevid now notes that the observance of the lulav in the provinces is from the Torah, at least for one day. Therefore, in the absence of the Temple there is greater impetus to keep observing it for seven days, as it was in the Temple. But the aravah ritual never had any toraitic basis outside of the Temple. While it may be “from the Torah” that only refers to its observance in the Temple itself. Therefore, in the absence of the Temple it is not observed for seven days.
  IntroductionOur mishnah discusses the issue of how priests with certain physical blemishes, who normally are not allowed to go between the altar and the Sanctuary, can perform the aravah ritual, which involves circling the altar with the aravah in hand.
  Resh Lakish claims that the normal prohibition for blemished kohanim to go between the Sanctuary and the altar is suspended so that they may fulfill the mitzvah of the aravah. There is a dispute as to why. The Tosafot say that this prohibition is only derabanan—of rabbinic origin. Therefore, it is waved so that the positive commandment of the aravah may be fulfilled. The Rambam says that the prohibition is from the Torah. The reason it is suspended is that a positive commandment overrules a negative commandment, as long as the negative commandment is not punishable by karet or death.
  Rabbi Yohanan does not seem to agree with Resh Lakish. So he turns to him and says, “Who said so?” In other words—what gives you the right to make this stuff up?The problem with R. Yohanan’s statement is that he himself said that the laws of the aravah ritual were given to Moses on Sinai. So why should he be so upset with Resh Lakish.
  The Talmud now fixes R. Yohanan’s statement. R. Yohanan agrees that it is a commandment from the Torah. But maybe they could fulfill the commandment by standing the aravot up next to the altar, and not by circling it. And who said that it has to be performed by blemished priests? R. Yohanan agrees that there is such a mitzvah, but he does not agree that blemished priests are allowed to perform it.
  IntroductionIn this section the amoraim dispute the status of the aravah ritual.
  According to both of these amoraim, the aravah ritual is attributed to the prophets. However, they dispute the exact nature of how it originated. According to one amora it seems to have been a formal institution enacted by the prophets, whereas according to the other amora, it was a custom, not a formal institution. Rashi explains that the ramification for this dispute is whether one says a blessing over the aravah ritual. If it’s a formal institution, then one does say a blessing. But if it’s just a custom, then one does not.In any case, as occasionally occurs, we are not sure who said what.
  The first statement here seems to be conclusive evidence that R. Yohanan was the one who said that it is a “institution of the prophets.” But R. Zera argues with R. Abbahu that from another statement we can see that R. Yohanan holds that the ritual was related to Moses on Sinai, long before the prophets. So which is it?
  R. Abahu takes some time to answer this one. He then finds a way to maintain both statements of R. Yohanan. The aravah ritual was indeed given to Moses on Sinai. However, the Jews then forgot the commandment, assumedly when exiled to Babylonia. The prophets reinstituted the ritual when the Second Temple was built.
  The Talmud cites another statement issued by R. Yohanan. This statement is complicated and has an interesting story so I will translate Rashi’s interpretation.R. Kahana was a student of Rav, and he was very sharp. He fled to the land of Israel, to R. Yohanan, due to persecutions [in Babylonia], for he had killed a man, as it is stated in the last chapter of Bava Kamma (117a). R. Yohanan depended on R. Kahana to answer some questions. [Because of this] R. Yohanan would say to the people of the land of Israel: I thought that the Torah was yours, for you had not been exiled from your land and you had not suffered the troubles of exile. But now I see that it belongs to the people of Babylonia, for even though they were exiled, they were supported by the wise of the exile of Yehanyah (end of seventh century B.C.E.)….Thus we can see that the Torah was never lost during the Babylonian exile.So R. Yohanan does not believe that the Jews forgot their Torah during the Babylonian exile.The Talmud now resolves the difficulty in a different way. In the Temple the aravah ritual is a halakhah given to Moses on Sinai. When God instructed Moses to teach this ritual, its observance was restricted to the Temple. But the prophets expanded its observance to the provinces as well. This follows what we have seen earlier, that when the Temple still stood the aravah ritual was observed in the Provinces as well.
  
  Daf 44b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with various halakhot concerning the aravah.
  R. Ami states three rules with regard to the aravah. It must be of a minimum size, it must be taken alone, not with the lulav, and one cannot fulfill his obligation with the same aravah that is in the lulav.
  The problem with R. Ami’s statement is that the second two rules seem to be superfluous. If the aravah must be taken by itself, then obviously you can’t use the one in the lulav.The answer is that the two statements emphasize that even if one would pick up the lulav once, then put it down and then pick it up again, thereby proving that he is doing so only for the sake of the aravah, this still does not fulfill the mitzvah. The aravah must be picked up alone.
  R. Hisda disagrees—one can fulfill his obligation with the same aravah used in the lulav. [The words in the parentheses, “on the first day of the festival,” seem to be a mistake, for the aravah is a special mitzvah on the last day of the festival, not the first. I have not translated them.].
  The Talmud now turns its attention to the minimum measure of the aravah. R. Nahman says it must include three twigs, each twig having at least one leaf.R. Sheshet, after a bit of clarification, holds that even one twig with only one leaf on it is sufficient.
  In these two stories we see that the amoraim did not bless over the aravah because they hold that it is a custom of the prophets, not an institution of the prophets.We should note that I have translated the word “חביט” as shake. This accords with Rashi. However, the Rambam understands the word to mean “beat.” Today Jews follow this custom and beat their aravot at the end of the Hoshana Rabbah service.
  IntroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section an amora named Aibu participated in a few stories connected with the aravah. Today’s section continues with stories about Aibu, but without any connection to the aravah, our larger topic.
  The question here is whether the man can allow the people of the city to eat the Sabbatical year olives. The problem is that one is not supposed to use these olives to pay wages. He should make the available to everyone. The question is—is this informal arrangement improper?
  R. Elazar is impressed with the man’s piety. He could have, after all, continued to do as he had done before without asking R. Elazar what to do.The man even goes so far as to come back and ask R. Elazar what the proper thing to do would be. R. Elazar answers that he should declare the olives ownerless and pay the people to hoe the vineyards. Note how much more money this would cost him—he would lose the value of the olives and he would have to spend money on the hoeing. But the man seems to be quite righteous, willing to do what the Torah demands, even if this costs him.
  The Talmud raises a difficulty—how can R. Elazar allow any hoeing at all on the Sabbatical year? The rabbis read Exodus 23:11 as explicitly prohibiting hoeing.R. Ukba b. Hama resolves the difficulty—there are two types of hoeing. Closing the fissures is allowed because these fissures expose the roots and their exposure might cause the tree to die. One is allowed to prevent a tree from dying during the Sabbatical year. On the other hand, one is not allowed to aerate the soil because that is done to improve the tree. Thus as a general rule one can take an action to preserve the life of the tree, but one cannot take an action to improve the tree. The type of hoeing that R. Elazar allowed was only to preserve the life of the tree.
  IntroductionThe final section contains another statement by Aibu.
  Aibu says that on Friday a person should not walk more than three parasangs. The exact length of a parasang is unknown, but a good estimate may be four kilometers. Thus this is about 12 km (7-8 miles). The problem with going so far on erev Shabbat is that he might not make it home. Rather, he should stop and prepare food for Shabbat wherever he is.R. Kahana says that this is so only if he is going home. They won’t know that he is coming and they won’t prepare food for him. This will make him angry. But if he is going to an inn, he won’t expect them to make food for him, so he’ll be okay with eating whatever food he might have with him.
  There is another version of what R. Kahana said. In this version he says that Aibu’s statement refers even to one traveling to his own home. We might have thought that at home, they would give him whatever food they have. But Aibu says nevertheless a person shouldn’t surprise his family by popping in unexpectedly on Friday night. All the more so, one should not go to an inn, where he won’t find any food whatsoever.The sugya closes with a story in which R. Kahana himself arrives at an inn on Friday night and there’s no food for him. Not even a small dish of fried fish.
  
  Daf 45a
  
  IntroductionThis section refers to the line in the mishnah concerning how they would set up the lulavim on Shabbat in the Temple so that they would not have to carry them to get them there.
  According to the tanna’s (the professional reciter’s) version of the mishnah the lulavim were set up on the roof of the “portico.” This was the covering for the outer portion of the Temple, a sort of patio that was open but that had benches. This was called the “portico.”R. Nahman finds this set up problematic for it would dry the lulavim out.Therefore, he reads in the Mishnah “on top of the portico.” In Hebrew, there is only one letter difference גב vs. גג. The portico was covered by an overhanging. This would prevent the lulavim from drying out.The last statement in this section describes how the collonades were set up in the Temple. There was an inner and an outer colonnade. This statement has no bearing on the previous issue about the lulavim.
  IntroductionThis section consists of a mishnah. My explanation is taken from Mishnah Yomit. We have already discussed a lot of these issues, but a little review is probably not a bad thing.
  IntroductionThis mishnah teaches how the special mitzvah of the aravah (the willow) was performed in the Temple. This ritual is not mentioned at all in the Torah and according to the majority opinion in the Talmud it is either an ancient halakhah, a prophetic enactment or a custom. However, others derive the mitzvah of the aravah from the Torah by using a midrash.It seems likely that the Sadducees, a group that rivaled the Pharisees while the Temple stood, did not believe that this was indeed a mitzvah. There is a story in the Talmud that one time the Baytusim (the name of a sect possibly synonymous with the Sadducees) covered the aravot with a heap of rocks to prevent the mitzvah from being performed. The fact that other sects of Jews opposed this mitzvah explains why it was performed with so many verbal demonstrative acts (recitations and shofar blasts). This was a way to demonstrate that this mitzvah should be performed and a way to convince others to do so.After the destruction of the Temple, the custom developed to circle around the synagogue one time each day of the week while holding the lulav and seven times on Hoshanah Rabbah, the last day of Sukkot.
  Section one: Most of this ritual is self-explanatory. The aravot would need to be about 11 cubits high (more than five meters) so that their tops would go over the altar which was ten meters high. The shofar blasts were meant to give the ritual great publicity and great authority. They were also a sign of rejoicing.Section two: While circling the altar the people would recite Psalms 118:25, which is a plea to God to save us and bring us prosperity. Since Sukkot is the holiday on which we pray for the beginning of the rainy season, it is likely that the prosperity which they were praying for was rain.Section three: According to Albeck, Rabbi Judah pronounced the beginning of this verse differently. Whereas we pronounce it “ana adonay”, he would pronounce it “ani vaho.” However, the meaning of “ani vaho” is not clear. Others read “ani vehu” which would mean “I and God”, meant to express the idea that God also participates in the sorrows and sufferings of His people Israel.Section four: On the seventh day they would circle the altar seven times. This is the origins of “Hoshanah Rabbah”, the last day of Sukkot on which we circle the Torah, which is placed in the middle of the synagogue, seven times.Section five: The end of this seven day ritual was also accompanied by recitations, again meant to emphasize the importance of the aravah ritual and our sadness that the joyous occasion is completed. The people are actually paying homage, in a sense, to the altar. Through the altar the people of Israel receive atonement and hence it is desirable for us to praise it. We should note that we often think of Judaism as an anti-iconic religion—God is transcendent, has no body or image, and we therefore deemphasize religious artifacts and emphasize intentions, emotions and our intellect. While this is not the space to enter into a thorough examination of these issues, it does seem to me that this is largely a Maimonidean concept of Judaism. In our mishnah we see that most rabbis had no problem directly speaking to the altar itself.Section six: Rabbi Eliezer adds that the praise should not go only to the altar, but to God as well.
  1) As was its performance on a weekday, so was its performance on Shabbat, except that they would gather them on the eve of Shabbat and place them in golden basins so that they would not become wilted.2) Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: they used to bring palm branches and they would beat them on the ground at the sides of the altar, and that day was called “[the day of] the beating of the palm branches.”3) Immediately after beating the willows (or palm branches) the children undo their lulavs and eat their etrogim.Section one: The mishnah emphasizes that when this ritual was done on Shabbat (if it fell on the seventh day) it was done in the exact same way that it was done during the week. This seems to be an emphasis of the rabbis in several places—certain holiday rituals are indeed carried out on Shabbat. This is another area of halakhah in which the rabbis/Pharisees deeply disagreed with the Sadducees and the sect from the Dead Sea. Indeed, according to the solar calendar used by the Dead Sea Sect, the holidays mostly began on Wednesdays. They thought that holiday ritual never superseded Shabbat and they shaped their calendar accordingly. In contrast the Pharisees/rabbis said that on certain occasions, it did.Section two: In this section we learn that Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka disagrees with all of the previous mishnayot. He holds that the entire ritual was done with palm branches and not with aravot.At the end of the rituals they would beat whatever had been carried around the altar for seven days (the palm branches according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, and aravot according to the other sages). That day was called “the day of the beating of the palm branches/aravot.” To this day beating the aravot on Hoshanah Rabbah is still customary.Other commentators explain that Rabbi Yohanan’s debate with the other sages is only concerning the seventh day. On that day one takes palm branches and aravot. On the other days he agrees that he takes only aravot.Section three: Once the ritual of the aravah was completed, children would immediately undo the ties binding their lulavim together and would immediately eat the etrogim. This seems to encompass two concrete ways of demonstrating that the mitzvah was utterly completed. Once the lulav is untied it is no longer really a lulav—it is now just a palm branch, a willow and a myrtle branch. Once the etrog has a bite taken out of it, it can no longer be used on Sukkot.
  IntroductionThis section begins to explain the Mishnah.
  The Mishnah had stated that the place from which they picked the aravot was called Moza. But the Talmud has a baraita in which it is called “Kolonia.” The Talmud accepts this name and provides a “midrashic” reason for why it should be called “Moza”—the people there were exempt from the king’s taxes. “Moza” in Hebrew can mean “to take out” here interpreted as something like “taken out from the tax of the king.” Assumedly, the name “Kolonia” is actually the Greek name, whereas Moza is the Hebrew.
  The mishnah taught that at the end of the daily aravah ritual, they would lean the aravot against the sides of the altar. The aravot were long enough that they would bend over the tops of the altar. Must have been a really beautiful sight, the altar hidden in the willows (would make a nice title for a book).
  Maremar does the math and sees that if the aravot were only (!) eleven cubits high, they could not have been placed on the ground, because the altar did not go straight up. There are two spots where it goes in a cubit. This would mean it would need to be placed on the foundation in order for it to lean over the altar.
  R. Abbahu takes a verse that mentions “boughs” which he interprets as the aravot, as being brought up to the horns of the altar.
  In this statement, R. Abbahu offers a different interpretation of “boughs.” The word for “boughs” is similar to the word used for the hadas in Leviticus 23 (עבתים/עבות). So he interprets the verse as referring to the hadas. The word “bind” he interprets as the lulav, which is bound together. Taken altogether, the verse teaches that taking the lulav and the hadas is equivalent to offering a sacrifice.
  
  Daf 45b
  
  R. Yirmiyah interprets the word “אסרו” to mean “make an addition.” This is the source for the custom still observed in Israel today known as “Isru Hag.” It is an additional day attached to the end of the Festival that is not observed as a true festival, but is observed as a day off of work by some, an extra celebration. From personal experience I can tell you what this means in Israel—adults work and kids have off of school. Great for kids, not as good for working adults. In the Diaspora it has fewer ramifications because there are two days of Yom Tov anyway. 
  IntroductionThe organizing principle in this section is that the statements are transmitted by Hizkiyah in the name of R. Yirmiyah in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai. Only the first statement is connected with the topic of the lulav.
  Whenever one is using something that grew from the ground for a mitzvah he must use it in the way that it grew, meaning that the part that was below is below and the part that is up top, is towards the top. Rashi gives two examples—the boards used in making the Tabernacle, and the lulav. The proof text is the odd phrase in Exodus 26:15, “acacia wood standing up.” Why does the Torah need to say “standing up”? Of course, if the planks are used to build the Tabernacle they will be “standing up.” R. Shimon b. Yohai interprets this to mean that the part that grew below should be below. The same is true for the lulav. When we take the lulav we take the part that grew out of the trunk in our hands, and the lulav goes up, as it did on the palm tree. Holding the lulav or any of the other species upside down would prevent one from fulfilling his obligation.
  The Talmud cites a supporting baraita containing several more interpretations of “standing up.” The first interpretation is the same as that from before.The second interpretation is connected to the gold covering made for the boards. The word “standing up” means that the gold covering should be nailed into the boards, according to Rashi’s interpretation. It shouldn’t just be a complete overlaying that could stand on its own.The final interpretation is more aggadic. Despite the fact that these boards are wood, these boards will last forever, not just their gold covering.
  R. Shimon b. Yohai now talks about his own merit, and that of his sons. This line is related to a famous aggadah about R. Shimon b. Yohai and his son (Shabbat 33b) and their time in the cave. Their suffering there was sufficient to protect the whole world from its sins. Also their Torah learning was great enough to save the whole world from the consequences of their lack of dedication to the Torah.Here R. Shimon b. Yohai adds in Yotam son of Uzziah, whose merit is even greater than his or his son’s. The one mention of Yotam in the Tanakh is in II Kings 15:6, that while his father the leper “lived in isolated quarters, while Yotam, the king’s son, was in charge of the palace and governed the people of the land.” The rabbis understand this to be a sign of Yotam’s respect for his father—instead of just becoming king, he ruled in the king’s name. There may also be a sense in this legend that Yotam was a decent person at a time when all of the kings were doing “what was displeasing to the Lord.” The Tanakh doesn’t say that Yotam was good, but neither does it say that he was bad. That may be sufficient in times of such great evil.
  IntroductionThis mystical section opens with R. Shimon b. Yohai’s statement as to how many people there are in heaven who have merited the right to greet the Shekhinah, God’s divine presence.
  This continues the theme from the end of yesterday’s section. R. Shimon b. Yohai says that there are few human beings who are righteous enough to merit seeing God in heaven, but that if there are only two, they are he and his son.There is a debate among commentators whether R. Shimon b. Yohai refers to all of history or just his own generation. R. Hananel says that he refers to his own generation for R. Shimon b. Yohai observed the behavior of the people in his time and based on that observation he claimed that there are few who truly merit seeing the Shekhinah.
  The Talmud cites a contradiction with R. Shimon b. Yohai’s statement that there may be as few as two who see God’s presence. Rava, a Babylonian amora, claims that there are 18,000 righteous sitting before God. According to Ezekiel this is the size of the perimeter of the city of Jerusalem—18,000 cubits. The name of the city is “The Lord Is There.” Since we know from elsewhere that a person takes up one cubit’s worth of space, we can conclude that there are 18,000 people sitting around the city of the Lord, “The Lord Is There.”The answer is that there are only few people who see the Shekhinah clearly, through a bright speculum (some interpret this word to mean a partition). But there are many who can see God but more dimly, without this bright speculum (or through a thick partition). We should note that this “seeing of God” and how it relates to prophecy, and what prevents people from being prophets, who were/are true prophets is a complicated and rich topic. But this is not the space to delve deeply into the topic. I will say that for the Rambam what bars a person from being a prophet are that person’s own bad qualities, stubbornness, anger, haughtiness, stupidity, jealousy, etc. The prophet is therefore one who perfects his qualities to such an extent that he can see God clearly. This is indeed a rare quality, as our sugya teaches us.
  Again the Talmud raises a difficulty. Are there only a few, perhaps as few as two people who see God through a bright speculum? Abaye says that in every generation there are 36 righteous people who see the Shekhinah every day. This is the source for the famous legend that there are thirty-six righteous people who sustain the world.The Talmud resolves this by saying that there are indeed only a very few who can, so to say, go see God without permission. This, in my opinion, also alludes to Moses of whom it is said that he is “Faithful in all my house” (Numbers 12:7). “In all my house” sounds as if God is saying that He allows Moses to come and go freely in his house, the Tabernacle/Temple. Others may see God, but they must do so at prescribed times, it is more formal, less intimate relationship. In our sugya this means that they need special permission to see God’s Divine Presence, the Shekhinah.
  The Talmud refers to R. Eliezer’s statement that when leaving the altar at the end of the aravah ritual they people would say, “To the Lord and to you, O altar, to the Lord and to you, O altar.” This seems to be a transgression of the prohibition of “associating the name of God with something else.” The resolution is that the people thank God and “praise” the altar. They understand that ultimately it is God that is worthy of thanks, for God is the source of goodness and atonement. But the altar is still the vehicle through which atonement is achieved. Therefore, it is worthy of praise.
  In the mishnah R. Yohanan b. Beroka says that on the seventh day they would bring palm branches, lulavim, and “they would beat them on the ground at the sides of the altar, and that day was called “[the day of] the beating of the palm branches.” This, according to the Talmud, is a dispute between the sages and R. Yohanan ben Beroka. The former hold that this ceremony is done with the aravot, whereas the latter holds that it is done with the lulav.The Talmud brings up midrashic support for each position. R. Yohanan b. Beroka derives his halakhah from the plural form of “branches” whereas the rabbis do not derive anything from the plural form because its written defectively, without the vav.R. Levi finds midrashic meaning in the fact that there is only one lulav. There is only one lulav, because the palm tree has only one heart, just as Israel has one collective heart, directed at God in heaven.
  This section is a dispute about saying the blessing over the sukkah and the lulav. At the heart of the issue is whether sitting in the sukkah or taking the lulav for seven days is seven independent performances of the mitzvah or one long performance of the mitzvah.Rav Judah says that since one should be dwelling in the sukkah night and day, it is one long performance. You say one blessing. But the lulav cannot be taken at night, therefore it is seven independent performances, and one blesses every day.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hana holds that one blesses over the Sukkah every day for it is a toraitic commandment for seven days. But outside the Temple the lulav is only toraitic for one day, therefore one blesses for only one day.Rabin holds that one recites both blessings for seven days. This is the accepted halakhic ruling. We bless on the lulav once a day, when the mitzvah is fulfilled. But we bless on the sukkah every time we eat a meal in there, as long as we left in between mealsDespite this, R. Yosef holds that we prefer Rabbah b. Bar Hana because all of the other amoraim hold as he does.
  
  Daf 46a
  
  IntroductionLast week’s daf ended with an amoraic dispute concerning how many days one recites the blessing over the lulav and sukkah. The sugya ended with the ruling that one blesses over the sukkah all seven days but for only one day over the lulav. This week’s daf begins with a difficulty on this ruling.
  Before we understand how this baraita is a difficulty on the amoraic position from the previous daf, we should understand it on its own. It begins by determining when one recites blessings over the lulav and which blessing is recited. When one “makes a lulav” for oneself, he recites the blessing known usually by its Hebrew, “shehehiyanu.” This would occur assumedly before the festival. But when one uses it to perform the mitzvah, he recites “asher kidshanu…to take the lulav” the blessing formula always used for the performance of mitzvoth. Finally, one blesses over the lulav for seven days.The blessings over the sukkah are basically the same. The only difference is that the blessing over the sukkah is recited once, on the first day.
  Rabbah bar bar Hannah had ruled that one recites the blessing over the sukkah for seven days and over the lulav for one day. This contradicts the baraita on both counts.The contradiction about the lulav is reconcilable by saying that when the Temple stood, one blessed all seven days, for at that time the mitzvah of the lulav was from the Torah for all seven days, at least in the Temple. But now, after the destruction, the mitzvah is only for the first day, and we therefore say the blessing for only one day.But the contradiction concerning the sukkah remains unresolved.
  The Talmud now notes that both sides of the dispute over the sukkah have parallels in a tannaitic dispute over tefillin. We should again note that it was customary in talmudic times to wear tefillin all day. According to Rabbi, every time one takes off his tefillin and then puts them back on again, he recites the blessing again. This is similar to the opinion that one should bless over the sukkah every day. Every time the mitzvah is performed, it is a new mitzvah. The other sages say that he blesses only in the morning. Should he take them off and put them back on later, he would not recite a new blessing. This correlates with the opinion that one recites the blessing over the sukkah only once.
  Abaye says that the halakhah is in accordance with Rabbi—one blesses over the tefillin every time he puts them on. Rava disagrees and holds like the sages. However, R. Mari notes that Rava didn’t behave according to his own ruling. Every time he would go to the toilet he would take off his tefillin and when he put them back on again, he would say a blessing again.Finally, the sugya ends with more statements supporting the halakhah that one recites the blessing every time he puts on his tefillin. Some sages would even recite a blessing every time they touched their tefillin to make sure that they were still there. Since people used to wear their tefillin all day long, there was a fear that they would forget that the tefillin was even on their head. Therefore, they were supposed to touch their tefillin frequently. Today people do not say a blessing for merely touching their tefillin.
  IntroductionThis section continues to deal with the issue of whether one blesses over the lulav all seven days, or only on the first.
  According to Rashi the argument in this section is over whether one recites a blessing over the lulav for all seven days of Sukkot. Rav Judah in the name of Shmuel says that there is a mitzvah all seven days and therefore one blesses for all seven days, even though only the first day is a mitzvah from the Torah. R. Joshua ben Levi says that since only the first day is from the Torah, one blesses only on that day. On subsequent days the mitzvah is from the “elders” and therefore one doesn’t bless. While at first it seems that R. Yitzchak holds that one would not recite a blessing even on the first day, the Talmud cannot countenance such a position. Therefore it emends R. Yitzchak’s statement such that he agrees with R. Joshua b. Levi.
  This section begins by using a different statement made by Rav to deduce that he too holds that one recites the blessing over the lulav for all seven days, even though there is no mitzvah from the Torah after the first day. This ruling is derived from another ruling where Rav says that one who lights the Hannukah lamp must recite a blessing, even though this is surely not a mitzvah. In other words, Rav holds that one recites blessings over “derabanan” rabbinic commandments.The Talmud now turns to discuss the laws of lighting the Hannukah lamp.R. Yirmiyah says that one who sees the Hannukah lamp must also recite a blessing, similar to one who hears the sound of the shofar.R. Judah works both of these opinions into one statement. The person who lights recites three blessings (on the first night) and two on subsequent nights. The person who only sees the lamp recites two on the first day and one on subsequent days.The one who lights recites “who has commanded us to light the Hannukah lamp.” The one who sees would not say this blessing. He would say “who has wrought miracles for our ancestors (sheasa nisim)” They would both recite shehiyanu on the first night but not on subsequent nights.
  The Talmud now asks where we were commanded to light the Hannukah lamp—after all, its certainly not in the Torah! The rabbis use two generic verses that both imply that one should listen to what the sages tell you to do. These two verses are frequently cited to bolster the authority of the rabbis, as if to say that even a commandment issued by the sages (or elders) has toraitic authority.Next the Talmud asks why one omits only the blessing on the time (shehiyanu). Why not omit the blessing over the miracle? The answer is that each day that this small amount of oil remained lit was a miracle.The sugya concludes with a statement in which Rav explicitly rules that one blesses over the lulav. Earlier we had derived this opinion from a statement concerning Hannukah. Here it is transmitted explicitly.
  IntroductionThis section goes back to discussing the recitation of blessings over the sukkah.
  According to the baraita, when one builds a sukkah he says shehiyanu. And then when one dwells in it on the first night of Sukkot, he says the blessing, “Who has commanded us to dwell in the sukkah.”If the sukkah was built already, he would bless beforehand only if he modifies it or renovates it in some way. But if not, he would wait and recite both blessings when he dwells in it.R. Ashi is the source for the way we behave today—we recite all of these blessings when we say Kiddush on the first night of Sukkot. Combining all of these blessings and reciting them at one time seems to be a way to bolster all of their sanctity. Furthermore, joining a mitzvah with a cup of wine is also a common means by which to give the mitzvah more sanctity.
  IntroductionThis sugya discusses a person who has many mitzvoth to fulfill all at the same time.
  Rashi gives an example of someone who has a lot of mitzvot to fulfill at the same time. For instance, it is sukkot, and he has to take the lulav, dwell in the sukkah, put on tefillin and tzitit. All at the same time! According to the first opinion, he can combine all of these blessings into one formula and simply recite “who has commanded us concerning the commandments.”R. Judah says he must recite a blessing specific to each commandment.
  There are two statements here issued by R. Zera (or R. Hanina b. Papa), both relating to R. Judah’s statement from the above baraita. First R. Zera rules that the halakhah is in accordance with R. Judah—one recites a separate blessing for each commandment. Second, R. Zera explains R. Judah’s statement. The verse seems to say that we should bless God every day. But Jews should bless God not just during the day—we should bless God at night as well! Therefore, R. Zera understands the verse as teaching that one should recite blessings appropriate to the day—a blessing for Shabbat, for festivals etc. So too one should recite separate blessings appropriate for each mitzvah.
  This section is here because it is ascribed to the same amoraim whose statements are found above.It is a common trope in rabbinic literature to compare the normal ways of the world with the ways of God, or in this case with the ways in which a human being operates in the holy realm. In the normal ways of the world, an empty vessel can hold things, but one that is already full cannot. But this is not the way that observance or “listening” to the Torah works. When one begins to listen to the Torah, or to observe its commandments, she is led down the path to increased observance. But if a person refuses to “listen” as her life goes on, it becomes increasingly difficult to do so. I should note that this is true for many aspects of life. For instance, as one learns a language, the better one gets at that language, the more pleasurable it becomes and the easier it becomes to learn more. When one begins to exercise it is difficult. But as one continues to do so, it becomes easier. So too with Torah observance and study—at first it is difficult but as one continues to “listen,” the habit is formed and the “full vessel” has room for more.The section ends with another interpretation of the verse, one quite similar to the first. If one listened when one was young, it will be easier to continue listening when one grows old. But if one didn’t listen during one’s youth, it is just harder to begin doing so as one grows older.
  
  Daf 46b
  
  IntroductionToday’s section is based on the line in the mishnah that says that on the seventh day after the aravah ritual was completed the children would eat their etrogim. The issue is when does it become permitted to eat the etrog?
  According to R. Yohanan one must wait until the end of the seventh day to eat the etrog. This is because he holds that it was “set aside” (a form of muktzeh) for the whole day. One is not allowed to make other use (such askindling) of the material used to build the sukkah until the eighth day is over. This should seem a bit perplexing for the moment because one does not dwell in the sukkah on the eighth day (Shemini Atzeret). Below, the Talmud will explain why it is nevertheless forbidden on the eighth day.Resh Lakish holds that once the mitzvah has been performed on the morning of the seventh day, the etrog is no longer muktzeh, set aside. Now one may eat it.
  Resh Lakish uses the mishnah as a difficulty on R. Yohanan. In the mishnah we learn that as soon as the aravah ritual is over, the children would eat their etrogim. Resh Lakish assumes that while it states that children ate them, adults would be allowed to do so as well. This implies that the etrog is permitted already on the seventh day..The Talmud rejects this difficulty by saying it was specifically the children who ate them—adults who are obligated to observe the commandments did not do so.
  This section is basically a mirror image of above. Here the mishnah is a difficulty on Resh Lakish because it implies that only children can eat the etrog, adults cannot.Resh Lakish responds that adults too could eat their etrogim. The reason that the mishnah mentions children is that this is simply what happened. I should note that this is clearly the simpler reading of the mishnah. Children are the ones that ate the etrogim because it was a fun way of celebrating the completion of the ritual. They did not do it because adults were forbidden from doing so.
  R. Papa asks Abaye why there is a difference between the sukkah and the etrog—after all neither are used on the eighth day. The answer is that one might come to sit in the sukkah for a meal at the very end of the seventh day, at twilight. This is the time that the status of an object is determined for the following day. This means that since the sukkah was set aside for its ritual purpose at twilight, it is also set aside for the entire following day.But the etrog cannot be taken at twilight at the end of the seventh day. By this point, since twilight might be the beginning of the eighth day, it would be too late to fulfill the mitzvah of the lulav and etrog. Therefore, it is not set aside for its ritual purpose at twilight and it can be used as soon as the seventh day is over.
  The amoraim in this section argue over whether an etrog is forbidden on the eighth day. According to Levi even on the eighth day it is still forbidden. Shmuel’s father at first disagrees, but then when he hears Levi’s opinion, he adopts Levi’s view.But the passage ends with R. Zera’s opinion that after the seventh day one may eat the etrog. R. Zera also states that even though the etrog was invalid and couldn’t be ritually used, one still can’t make use of it during the seven days of Sukkot. Once it was set aside for use at the beginning of the holiday, it is forbidden for the whole holiday, even if it was invalidated during the holiday.
  IntroductionThis section continues to discuss the laws of the lulav and etrog.
  R. Zera says one shouldn’t transfer the hoshana (the Aramaic word for lulav) to a child during Sukkot. The problem is that the child will take ownership over the lulav but then he won’t be able to transfer it back to the original owner. Generally children are legally able to acquire but not to transfer to other. When he gets the lulav back it will turn out that the lulav didn’t belong to him when he uses it to fulfill his obligation. As we have learned, one must use one’s own lulav at least on the first day of the festival.
  I think this one is pretty self-explanatory. If you’ve ever tried to do this to your children, then you know what a rotten thing it is to do. I should confess that I once tried this with my daughter when she refused to take a bath (I was truly desparate). I told her that I would give her ice cream afterwards, and then I didn’t. I hope she forgives me when she gets older. And I never did that again.
  The Talmud now correlates the following dispute with the earlier dispute concerning whether one may eat the etrog on the seventh day. A person sets aside seven etrogim, one for each day. Rav said that once he has fulfilled the mitzvah, he can eat the etrog immediately. This is like Resh Lakish who said that one can eat the etrog on the seventh day because it was set aside only for its mitzvah. R. Assi rules that he must wait till the next day. This correlates with R. Yohanan who said that in general one must not eat the etrog until the eighth day. It was set aside for the whole day.
  This section deals with the Diaspora where there is an extra day of the festival (Second Day of Yom Tov). The eighth day may be the seventh day or it may be the eighth day; they didn’t know because there was no set calendar. But this day is observed as Shemini Atzeret. Abaye says one may still not use the etrog on this day, for it may be the seventh day. But on the ninth day, which may be the eighth day, one can definitely eat the etrog.Meremar is more lenient and allows one to eat the etrog even on the eighth day. This is probably because Jews didn’t actually take the lulav on this day.The halakhah though is in accordance with Abaye who prohibits one from eating the etrog on the eighth day in the Diaspora.
  IntroductionThis sugya talks about the status of the eighth day of Sukkot, known as Shemini Atzeret, in the Diaspora, where this day may indeed be the seventh day of Sukkot.
  According to Rav, in the Diaspora one must sit in the sukkah on the eighth day of Sukkot, because it might actually be the seventh day, on which one is certainly obligated to sit in the sukkah. However, as far as the blessing goes, meaning does one say “Shemini Atzeret” or “Sukkot” during Kiddush, the Amidah and Birkat Hamazon, it is treated as the eighth day and one says Shemini Atzeret.R. Yohanan says that it is treated as the eighth day for both the sukkah and the blessing.The Talmud now explains that both amoraim hold that one sits in the sukkah on the eighth day—the debate is whether one also recites the blessing over sitting in the sukkah. According to R. Yohanan one does not, while Rav says that one does.
  
  
  Daf 47a
  
  R. Yoseph offers testimony that on the eighth day of Sukkot in the Diaspora one sits in the sukkah but does not recite the blessing.However, the Talmud points out that the fact that he saw these rabbis sit in the sukkah and not recite a blessing is not proof that they hold that one doesn’t bless on the eighth day of Sukkot. It could be that they hold that once one has recited a blessing on the first day, one doesn’t recite the blessing on any of the subsequent days.This possibility is negated when we learn that there is a tradition that they had just come from the fields, meaning they had not yet sat in a sukkah for the whole festival! Since it was their first time in the sukkah, they certainly should have blessed. The fact that they did not do so was evidence that they hold that one never recites a blessing over the sukkah on the eighth day.
  This section opens with a reversal of the interpretation of the debate from the previous section. Here we see that all amoraim agree that one does not bless over the sukkah on the eighth day in the Diaspora. They disagree over whether one even sits there. Rav holds that one does, and R. Yohanan holds that one does not.R. Yoseph rules according to R. Yohanan, citing evidence that even R. Judah son of R. Shmuel b. Shilat, the sage who transmitted Rav’s statement, did not sit in the sukkah on the eighth day.Nevertheless, the sugya concludes by ruling that one does sit in the sukkah on the eighth day in the Diaspora, but no blessing is recited. I should note that the last time I spent Sukkot outside of Israel was 1993 (it’s now 2014). I barely remember what we did way back then, but I guess we sat in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.
  IntroductionOur sugya continues to deal with Shemini Atzeret and its status as an independent holiday.
  R. Yohanan notes that the eighth day of Sukkot, Shemini Atzeret, is enough of a separate holiday that one recites the blessing over time, what we call shehiyanu. This occurs at candle lighting and kiddush. This distinguishes it from the seventh day of Pesah, which is not an independent holiday at all.R. Levi b. Hama notes that there are two or three ways in which the eighth day of Sukkot differs from the other days. One does not sit in the sukkah or take the lulav on Shemini Atzeret and in the Temple they did not perform the water libation (a topic to which we will return later). R. Judah holds that the water libation was performed on Shemini Atzeret. So to him there are two differences. In any case, this is enough to distinguish it from Sukkot.
  The Talmud notes that the seventh day is in some ways different from the preceding days of Pesah. One is obligated to eat matzah on the first night, but not on any of the subsequent nights.But this argument really isn’t so strong. The seventh day of Pesah is different from the first night, but not from the first day, because one is obligated to eat matzah only at night. But Shemini Atzeret is different from the previous day as well.
  These four amoraim now continue to explain why Shemini Atzeret is different from Sukkot, but the seventh day of Pesah is not different from the rest of Pesah.Ravina points out that the seventh day of Pesah is different from the first day, but it is the same as the sixth day. Shemini Atzeret, the eighth day, is different from the seventh day of Sukkot.R. Papa points out that there is a difference in the number of bullocks sacrificed. For most of Sukkot each day has many bullocks sacrificed, starting from 13 and going down to 7. On Shemini Atzeret there is only one.R. Nahman b. Yitzchak notes that on all other days it is written, “And on the X day.” For Shemini Atzeret the word “and” is missing. This signifies that it is a distinct day.Finally R. Ashi notes that when it comes to Shemini Atzeret the Torah uses “their ordinance” whereas for the preceding days the singular form was used.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section R. Yohanan ruled that on Shemini Atzeret one recites a blessing over the season—shehiyanu. Today’s section continues to deal with that subject.
  This long baraita is brought as a support for R. Yohanan, but first we need to explain it. The baraita deals with a case where some of the sacrifices are offered, but for some reason they cannot offer them all. According to the first opinion, if any of the sacrifices are not offered, then they cannot fulfill the mitzvah of the sacrifices that have been offered. But R. Judah says that if they don’t have enough bulls then they can sacrifice a lesser number and at least partially fulfill the mitzvah. This is because the number of bulls required is diminished every day of the festival (from 13-7). Therefore, we can see that it is not essential to have the correct number.The other sages point out that the same is true for the lambs and rams—there are fewer on Shemini Atzeret than there were on the previous days. R. Judah defends his position by stating that Shemini Atzeret is a separate festival. It has its own number of sacrifices, the Psalm (song) is different from the other days, the blessing is different, and it too has a requirement to stay in Jerusalem overnight after the festival is completed (this is true of other festivals as well). Therefore, since it is a separate festival we don’t say that the number of lambs and rams is diminished from day seven to day eight.In any case, what is crucial to us is that R. Judah says that Shemini Atzeret has its own blessing. At first, we assume that this means that one recites shehiyanu on Shemini Atzeret.
  
  Daf 47b
  
  The Talmud now rejects that interpretation of the “blessing” in the baraita. The blessing does not refer to shehiyanu, it refers to saying “Shemini Atzeret” in birkat hamazon and the tefillah (the amidah) and not Sukkot.This is also a more reasonable explanation of the baraita for R. Judah said that the seven days all have their own “blessing.” This cannot be “shehiyanu” for this blessing is recited only on the first night.
  At first the Talmud says that the previous line is not a difficulty because the blessing over the season could be recited on any of the seven days, if he forgot to recite it on the first day. This means that just as the first seven days could have a shehiyanu recited on them, the eighth day does have a shehiyanu.
  But the idea that one could recite shehiyanu after the first night is also difficult because it requires a cup of wine, as we do for Kiddush. Since there is no Kiddush after the first night, it does seem that the baraita refers to the blessing that is part of the Amidah or Birkat Hamazon.However, there does seem to be an amora who holds that the blessing over the season can be recited even without wine, in the marketplace.Since we can assume that people don’t always have wine, it must mean that shehiyanu can be recited without wine.This too is rejected for it may be that R. Nahman refers to a case where he did happen to have wine.Thus in the end, we see that one must recite the shehiyanu over a cup of wine, but that this still could occur any day of the festival.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section there was a baraita that stated that one must sleep over in Jerusalem the night after the festival. Our section picks up on this topic.
  In this baraita R. Judah teaches that if one has to offer the pesah sacrifice on Pesah Sheni, the second chance to observe Pesah a month after the first Pesah, he doesn’t have to spend the night in Jerusalem, as he would for first Pesah. Only the first Pesah, which is six (actually seven) days does one have to stay overnight after offering the pesah sacrifice. Pesah Sheni is only one day, so there is no requirement to stay overnight.This seems to imply that Shemini Atzeret which is also only a one day holiday does not have a requirement to stay overnight, contradicting what R. Judah himself taught in the earlier baraita.
  The Talmud corrects the previous understanding—Shemini Atzeret does require staying overnight; only Pesah Sheni does not. The derashah excluded Pesah Sheni which is similar to the first Pesah. It did not exclude Shavuot or Shemini Atzeret which are both one day holidays.The Talmud now proves that R. Judah does hold that only Pesah Sheni does not require staying overnight. Every other holiday, including one day holidays, does. They prove this by first citing a baraita which states that when one brings his first fruit, the bikkurim, to the Temple, he must also stay overnight. This opinion must belong to R. Judah for he is the sage who holds that one must wave the first fruits. This is shown in a baraita which uses a midrashic technique focusing on the repetition of the phrase “and he put it down” which appears twice in Deuteronomy. One time refers to literally putting the basket of first fruits down, but the other time is interpreted as waving. Since R. Judah is the one that holds that the bikkurim must be waved, he must also hold that one is required to sleep overnight in Jerusalem when bringing the bikkurim, for both were mentioned in the same baraita.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that the baraita which required one to waive the bikkurim and to sleep in Jerusalem overnight was the opinion of R. Judah. But today the Talmud offers another possibility as to the author of this baraita.
  In this baraita we learn that R. Eliezer ben Yaakov also holds that bikkurim must be waved. He derives this from the fact that the same word “hand” is used in Deuteronomy 26:4 which discusses the bikkurim as is used in Leviticus 7:3, which discusses the waving of shelamim offerings. R. Eliezer b. Yaakov rules that for both offerings the priest and the owner together wave the offering before God.
  In this final section of the sugya two amoraim argue directly whether we say shehiyanu on Shemini Atzeret. The ruling is that we do.
  This baraita agrees with R. Nahman that Shemini Atzeret is a separate festival. It lists six ways in which this halakhah is manifested. Some of these we have seen before, so I’ll explain only the two that are new.Drawing (piyyus): This means they had a separate lottery among the priests as to who gets to offer which sacrifice. Shemini Atzeret is not part of the lottery that occurred for Sukkot.The nature of the festival: According to Rashi this means that we do not sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.The other issues have all been explained before.
  
  Daf 48a
  
  This baraita agrees with R. Nahman that Shemini Atzeret is a separate festival. It lists six ways in which this halakhah is manifested. Some of these we have seen before, so I’ll explain only the two that are new.Drawing (piyyus): This means they had a separate lottery among the priests as to who gets to offer which sacrifice. Shemini Atzeret is not part of the lottery that occurred for Sukkot.The nature of the festival: According to Rashi this means that we do not sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.The other issues have all been explained before.
  IntroductionThis week’s daf opens with a new mishnah.
  On all eight days of Sukkot and Shmini Atzeret the full Hallel is recited. This is different from Pesah on which a full Hallel is recited on the first day only. “Rejoicing” has a general meaning in that one is supposed to be happy on the festival, as it says in Leviticus 23:40, “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.” Despite the fact that the Torah specifies “seven days” the rabbis expanded this to include Shmini Atzeret. “Rejoicing” also has a more specific ritual sense—during the festival one should bring sacrifices and eat them because eating meat, a much rarer luxury in mishnaic times than it is now, was considered one of the consummate signs of rejoicing.
  The question the Talmud asks is how we know we have to celebrate on the eve of Shemini Atzeret and then the rest of the day for Shemini Atzeret. After all the verse says that we must rejoice on Sukkot and as we have seen Shemini Atzeret is not Sukkot. According to Rashi, this midrash is based on the fact that the Torah twice says that we should rejoice on Sukkot, once in Vayikra and once in Devarim. Why the second time? The extra mention includes the night of Shemini Atzeret, and since we must rejoice at night, the whole next day is included as well. Thus we must rejoice on Shemini Atzeret.The second stage of the baraita shows why we rejoice at night on Shemini Atzeret. As we learned in the mishnah, this “rejoicing” is expressed in the Temple by sacrificing extra well-being offerings. So they would sacrifice them on the seventh day of Sukkot in order to eat them that night, which was the beginning of the festival. This is preferable to sacrificing the day before Sukkot and then eating on the first night of Sukkot, because then the sacrifice would be offered on a day that is not even holy, the day before Sukkot.Thus, this baraita proves that we slaughter well-being sacrifices on the last day of Sukkot in order to rejoice on Shemini Atzeret. The rejoicing is eight days, as the Mishnah.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya begins with a new mishnah concerning eating in the sukkah on the last day of Sukkot.
  The mishnah teaches that one should eat his last meal in the sukkah for lunch on the seventh day of Sukkot and then start to bring his nice things, his dishes, his bed, his couch etc., into the house as a sign of respect for Shmini Atzeret. However, he should not undo his sukkah because he might still need to eat in there if he wants to eat again before the day is over. Taking the sukkah down before Sukkot is completely over might also be perceived as a sign of disrespect for Sukkot. It might make it look like he couldn’t wait to take down his sukkah.
  The Talmud asks what he should do if he has no place to put the vessels that he was using in the Sukkah. In essence the Talmud is asking what he should do to signify that he has finished his observance of the ritual of the sukkah if he is not for some reason able to remove the vessels that he was using in the sukkah.R. Hiyya b. Ashi says that he should open a hole in the roof of the sukkah four handbreadths wide. A hole of this size would disqualify the sukkah. This would signify that he is finished sitting in the sukkah. R. Ashi says that he should light a lamp in there, for such a lamp is not appropriate for a small sukkah.The Talmud then notes that these two positions do not contradict each other. In Eretz Yisrael, where R. Hiyya b. Ashi lives, they could completely disqualify the sukkah because they didn’t sit there on the night between the seventh and eighth. Sukkot was over by then. In contrast, in Babylonia where they didn’t know if the eighth day was really the eighth or was actually the seventh, they would dwell in the sukkah that night. Therefore, they could not disqualify it. The lamp was sufficient to signify that at least the certain part of Sukkot had been completed. It does not disqualify the sukkah.
  Bringing in a lamp to signify that the sukkah will no longer be used is appropriate only for a small sukkah. It does not mean anything for a large sukkah, because one is allowed to bring a lamp into a large sukkah. So what should one do to signify that he is no longer using a large sukkah?The answer is to bring in eating utensils. We have learned elsewhere that one does not bring these into the sukkah because they are dirty. So if he brings them in, he will be signifying that his dwelling in the sukkah is basically over.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a mishnah. My commentary is taken from Mishnah Yomit.Another one of the unique ceremonies performed at the Temple on Sukkot was the water libation. During the year libations, that is pouring liquid onto the altar, were always performed with wine. The water libation is unique and was vehemently opposed by the Sadducees, as we shall see at the end of the Mishnah.The water libation functioned as a supplication to God to bring rain in the upcoming season. As I have emphasized in other places, the rainy season in Israel is from Sukkot to Pesah. If enough rain does not fall in this period people’s lives would have been in serious danger. In the Temple they would pour water onto the altar to ask God to bring rain from the heavens to fill the cisterns and underground aquifers below.
  The water libation ritual would begin with a procession from the Shiloah, the stream that empties out at the base of the Temple Mount. As we shall see when we learn the fifth chapter, this procession would begin in the morning after Simchat Bet Hashoevah (to be explained below). The people would make their way up to the Temple and enter through a designated gate called “the water gate.” [Made much more famous about 2,000 years later!] Just as we saw with the aravah ritual, here too they blew three shofar blasts. Again, this seems to have been a way of highlighting the event and emphasizing its importance in light of the fact that others disagreed with its fulfillment. They would then pour the water into a special bowl that had a hole in it. The water would go down to a cistern underneath the altar called “shitin”, where according to legend it would cause the waters of the deep to rise and nourish the earth. The wine libation was done simultaneously.Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion in the mishnah concerning two matters: 1) the libation was done with a log and not with three logs. Secondly, he holds that the water libation was for all eight days and not just on the seven days of Sukkot.In the final story a priest, identified in the Talmud as a Sadducee, pours the water onto the floor of the Temple rather than pouring it onto the altar. In response, the people pelt him with their etrogs. There are several fascinating aspects to this story. First of all, although the Sadducean priest disagreed with the water libation, he was still working in the Temple and he ended up with the water flask in his hand. If the Sadducees controlled the Temple why did he have the water flask such that he had to cast it down? Why would they have bothered bringing the water up from the Shiloah in the first place? And if the Pharisees controlled the Temple, why would they have let a Sadducean priest perform a ritual that they surely knew he disagreed with? Another interesting point is that the people’s sentiments clearly lie with the rabbis/Pharisees.I should not that there is a very similar story in Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book 13, Chapter 13:“As to Alexander, his own people were seditious against him; for at a festival which was then celebrated, when he stood upon the altar, and was going to sacrifice, the nation rose upon him, and pelted him with citrons [which they then had in their hands, because] the law of the Jews required that at the feast of tabernacles every one should have branches of the palm tree and citron tree; which thing we have elsewhere related.”This event occurred during the Hasmonean reign, meaning sometime in the early 1st century B.C.E. Alexander Yannai was king and high priest and was known to have had Sadducean leanings. However, there is nothing in Josephus about a water libation. The people pelt him with etrogs (citrons) because they oppose him as king and high priest. It is hard to know if the story in the Mishnah is related to this story from Josephus, either historically or literarily, but one thing we can know for sure—if you’re a Sadducee in the Temple on Sukkot, you’d better watch your head!After the description of how the water libation was performed, the mishnah emphasizes that it was performed on Shabbat just as it was performed during the week. I believe that this is frequently one of the ways in which the rabbis emphasized the importance of controversial rituals. It is as if to say that the water libation is so crucial that it is even done on Shabbat.However, they had to make sure that the water was not carried through the public domain on Shabbat. In order to do this they would bring the water up on Friday before Shabbat and leave it in the chamber until the next morning. However, this posed another problem. Water or any other liquid left overnight in a sanctified vessel becomes unfit for use in the Temple. Therefore they would use a golden barrel that had not been consecrated.If the water was poured away (perhaps by the Sadducean priest we met yesterday) then it obviously can’t be used. Similarly, if it was left uncovered it also can’t be used. Liquids left uncovered overnight are forbidden for anyone to drink for fear that a snake put venom in them. Since exposed liquids can’t be drunk by people, it is also forbidden to use them on the altar. If the water that they had brought up the day before could not be used, then they would just use water from the laver that was in the Temple.
  
  Daf 48b
  
  According to Rashi, R. Ena explains how we know that the drawing of water from the Shiloah is accompanied with a celebration. The prooftext cited from Isaiah also serves as a starting point for the following strange story.
  According to some modern scholars, this seemingly silly story is an anti-Christian parody, related to John 7:35-37. In these verses, Jesus speaks to the crowd on the last day of the Festival of Sukkot saying that all who are thirsty should come and drink from him. According to the author of the Gospel, he was referring to a spiritual drinking, not a literal one. The story centers around two “minim,” the Hebrew word for heretic. The rabbis portray Jesus as if he is “Sason” (elsewhere understood as the Messiah, based on Psalms 45:8) and the angel/messenger named “Simcha” tells him that he is going to literally become a water skin. The first part of the story, where each claims to be greater than the other, is a further parody on Christian literature.
  In this section the parody is further developed, this time in the (imagined) conversation between a min (heretic) and R. Abahu, a sage frequently portrayed as having contact with heretics. The “min” tries to claim that it is R. Abahu that will draw the water in the world to come. But his grammar mistake is corrected. The min (probably representative of Jesus) will be the simple water-skin through which the water is drawn.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains two more pieces of the mishnah.
  This baraita notes that in most cases when the priests ascended the altar they would turn right after their ascent, make their way around, and descend on the left. The only exceptions were the water and wine libations and the bird offerings when the altar was full. The right side of the altar is where most of the sacrifices were offered and there would have been a lot of smoke. This would not have been good for the water or wine. Most bird-offerings were performed on the right side of the altar, but if there was not enough room they would offer the birds on the left side.
  According to the mishnah, the bowls into which the water and wine were poured were made of plaster but they looked silver because of the wine that had been poured into them. The Talmud notes that this makes sense with regard to the bowl into which wine would have been poured. But the other bowl only had water—how would it have turned silver? The answer is that sometimes the priest would accidentally pour the wine into the one meant for water. This libation was still valid. That is how the bowl meant for water turned silver—it was an accident.
  IntroductionThis section continues to interpret portions of the mishnah.
  The mishnah says that the hole into which they poured the water was narrow, whereas the hole into which they poured the wine was wide. This, at first, seems to agree with R. Judah who holds that the water libation was only one log (a measure) of water, whereas the wine libation was three. Since the amounts were different, they made one narrow so that they would complete at the same time. But the rabbis who hold that both wine and water were three logs would seem to require snouts of the same size for them to both drain out simultaneously.
  The Talmud says that the Mishnah can even follow the opinion of the rabbis who hold that both libations were of three logs. Wine is more viscous and therefore takes longer to go down. So they would put the wine in the bowl with the wide snout and the water in the bowl with the narrow snout so that they would drain out at the same time.The Talmud goes on to cite a baraita in which R. Judah uses terms that are different from those in the Mishnah. Whereas the Mishnah uses “wide and narrow” R. Judah’s baraita uses “broad and short.” The different terms prove that the Mishnah does not follow R. Judah.
  The Sadducees opposed the water libation for it was not found in the Torah. This was explained already in section three of this week’s daf.In this baraita we also learn that on that same day that they pelted the Sadducees with etrogs, the altar was damaged, rendering it invalid for sacrifice. This seems representative of just how terrible a day it was. The priests temporarily fixed it up with a block of salt, but this was just for appearances sake. It did not actually render the altar valid. There are four or five parts of the altar that if missing, render the entire altar invalid. The ascent is the ramp on which the priests would go up. The horns were raised a cubit on each corner. The base was a cubit around the entire altar. The altar must have a square shape. The circuit is the walkway around the altar.
  
  
  Daf 49a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins with a discussion about the pits underneath the altar into which the libations would drain, both of water and wine. According to rabbinic mythology, reflective of their worldview, the Temple is the “navel of the world”—it is where the dark forces suppressed underneath the ground, the abyss, connect to the world.
  The rabbis usually understood Song of Songs metaphorically, not as a love song between a woman and a man, but as a love song between God and the people of Israel. Here the verse alludes to the legendary antiquity of the pits that lie underneath the altar in the Temple. Each of these sections is based on a wordplay from the verse. The word for thighs חמוקים is taken to mean hidden parts—just as thighs are hidden, so too are the pits hidden under the altar. They are carved out and go all the way down to the abyss, where the foundation of the world lies. And they are the work of God—i.e. they were not created when the Temple was built, but when the world was created.
  This midrash is based on a word play on the first word in the Torah. The first word in the Torah, bereshit, is not read according to its simple meaning, “In the beginning” but according to a midrash which separates the word into two “He created (bara) the pit (shit).”
  In this midrash, R. Yose finds an allusion to the building of the Temple in the book of Isaiah. In the verse, Israel sings out a praise to its lover, God, for building the Temple, the altar and the pits underneath the altar.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section we learned that the wine and water libations would drain out into the “pits” which lead down to the deep abyss that lies at the center of the world. Today’s section provides a different imagination of the where the wine libations would drain out.
  According to R. Elazar b. Zadok there was a space between the ascent to the altar and the altar platform itself. The wine libations would drain out into this space. Young priests would clean out this congealed wine once every seventy years and then burn it in a holy place. Truly a once in a lifetime opportunity, for the lucky young priest! That they would burn it in a holy place is proven by a midrash, but the midrash is a bit puzzling and shall be explained below.
  As I stated above, the midrash doesn’t seem to make sense. It is not clear how R. Elazar b. Zadok uses the verse to derive the notion that the congealed wine must be burned in a state of holiness. Ravina explains that it is based on an analogy of the word “holy (קדוש)” in Numbers and in Exodus. In Exodus the Torah says that something that cannot be eaten because it is holy, must be burned. This is applied to the congealed wine, which is also holy.
  
  Daf 49b
  
  We have now seen two opinions as to where the wine libations drain off—into the abyss or into the pits. The Talmud analyzes a mishnah in light of this dispute. The mishnah says that if one makes use of drink-offerings before they have been poured out on the altar he has committed sacrilege—illicit use of a holy item. But once it has been poured out, sacrilege is not committed by use of the wine. The Talmud suggests at first that this must accord with R. Elazar b. Zadok because the rabbis hold that the wine drains off into the abyss. There would be no reason to say that one who uses it commits sacrilege if there was simply no access to it.The Talmud resolves that the mishnah could follow the rabbis (the wine drains into the abyss) if a person put a vessel there to collect the wine before it drains into the abyss.I should note that this mishnah shows that in normative/halakhic texts the rabbis picture the wine draining off into a place from which it may be collected. It is in aggadic texts that they consider the wine as going down the abyss. We shall see more about this concept later.
  The Talmud now notes that in a different sense the mishnah may accord better with the rabbis who hold that the wine drains off into the abyss. For according to R. Elazar b. Zadok we might think that if one were to derive benefit from the wine after it drains off into the space between the altar and the ascent he has still committed sacrilege. After all, this congealed wine must be burned. So how can the mishnah accord with R. Elazar b. Zadok.The answer is that even R. Elazar agrees that once the mitzvah to pour the wine out onto the altar has been fulfilled, one who uses the wine has not committed sacrilege. 
  IntroductionToday’s section continues the discussion of the libations that would drain out into the pits underneath the altar.
  Resh Lakish reads the verse concerning the wine libation as if it requires stopping up the pits while the wine is actually being poured on the altar. As occurred in yesterday’s section, it is not entirely clear how this verse proves what Resh Lakish claims it does. This will be clarified now.
  R. Papa explains that Resh Lakish’s halakhah comes from the word “shekhar” which I have translated as “strong drink.” The word, according to R. Papa also means satiation. When the wine is poured out onto the altar and stays there while the pits are stopped up, the altar looks satiated.From this, R. Papa also learns the proper way to drink wine. According to Rashi, R. Papa suggests that one will feel more satiated if he fills his mouth with a large quantity and then swallows it all at once. Taking small sips will leave him feeling less full. Interesting to note that in our day, since we have plenty of wine (and most of our other needs) we usually aim for the opposite—to eat and drink in a manner so that we won’t feel bloated.
  The section concludes with Rava’s advice to rabbis who don’t have enough money to afford lots of wine. They should gulp their wine down. Rava even did so with the “cup of blessing” the cup used with birkat hamazon. This was a way to show how much he wanted to fulfill the mitzvah. Funny, Rava also claims to have drunk wine all day on erev Pesah. Seems to have been quite a character.
  IntroductionThis section continues with derashot (sermons) on Song of Songs.
  Rava expounds upon the verse in Song of Songs, as usual interpreting it to refer to the children of Israel and God. The Talmud also expresses surprise that only Abraham is mentioned, and not Isaac and Jacob. The answer is that Abraham was the first convert. The word for “prince” is to dedicate. Rashi explains that Abraham “dedicated” his heart to be the first person devoted to God.
  The School of R. Anan compares Torah to the thigh. Just as the thigh is usually hidden by one’s clothing, so too the study of Torah should not be done publicly in a manner intended to draw attention to one self. One should not sit on the top of a hill and study Torah so that all the people of the town could see. Rather, one should act humbly and study Torah in a more modest setting.The same lesson is drawn from R. Elazar’s statement. Micah uses the phrase “walk humbly” to describe mitzvoth that are done in public because they involve helping others. If, R. Elazar says, we are to walk humbly in the performance of such public mitzvoth, all the more so we should be humble when engaging in a more private act, the study of Torah.
  This statement expresses a common rabbinic idea, probably related to the fact that the Temple no longer stood. Charity is greater than sacrifice. We should note that this does not imply, as it is sometimes taken to, that sacrifice is worthless. The idea is that both have value, but that charity is the greater of the two.
  R. Elazar now ranks acts of loving kindness, gemilut hasadim, a category which includes all sorts of ways in which one person can help another person, above charity, which is more limited to simply donating money to another person. This is derived from the fact the when it comes to charity the verb is “to sow” whereas when it comes to gemilut hasadim, the verb is “to reap.” Reaping guarantees food to eat, sowing does not.
  In this statement R. Elazar combines the two, charity and acts of loving kindness. The reward one gets for charity depends on the level of kindness with which one performs it. Charity performed with love may not be better for the receiver than charity performed without love, but it is certainly better for the giver.
  Again, gemilut hasadim is preferred over charity. Charity, giving of money, is performed only with one’s bank account, it can only be given to the poor (one can give money to the rich, but they don’t need it). And charity can only be given to the living, whereas one can perform an act of loving kindness by helping bury the dead.
  A few more statements by R. Elazar concerning charity and acts of loving kindness. R. Elazar admits that it’s not easy, it is precious, difficult. Nevertheless, for someone who fears the Lord, it is not so difficult. It seems that God makes things easier for those who fear him.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues with more exhortations concerning acts of loving kindness.
  R. Hama b. Papa expounds upon the same verse found at the end of yesterday’s section. One who has the grace of God must be one who fears God.
  In describing the “woman of valor (eshet hayil)” Proverbs 31 uses the phrase the “Torah of loving kindness.” This, to the Talmud, doesn’t make sense for there is no such thing as a Torah which is not of “loving kindness.” To solve the problem the Talmud asserts that when Torah is studied for its own sake, it is a Torah of loving kindness. But when Torah is studied for an ulterior motive, such as in order to use it to gain power to rule over others, it is not a Torah of loving kindness.Alternatively, when Torah is studied in order to teach others, it is a Torah of loving kindness, meant to be shared with others. But when it is not studied in order to teach, it is not a Torah of loving kindness.
  IntroductionThe fiftieth (!) daf of Sukkah deals with the mishnah from daf mem het which said that when they drew the water from the Shiloah to be used on Shabbat, they would leave it overnight in the Temple in a non-sanctified vessel.
  The mishnah had stated that when they bring the water for the water libation to the Temple on Friday to be used on Shabbat, they bring it in a non-sanctified vessel. The Talmud asks about this curious detail—why the necessity to bring it in a non-sanctified vessel.The answer according to Zeiri is that as soon as the water is put in the ministering vessel (a vessel used in the Temple) it all becomes holy, even if the intent was not for it to become holy immediately. There is no fixed amount of water needed for the water libation, and therefore it would all become holy. Holy things that are meant to be sacrificed cannot be left over in the Temple overnight. This would mean it would be invalidated because it spent overnight in the Temple.
  
  Daf 50a
  
  According to Hezekiah, if one puts something in a ministering vessel without intending to use it for a sanctified purpose (or at least not immediately) it does not become holy. Thus the water was not actually sanctified. So why then did they still bring it in a non-sanctified vessel? Lest someone see them bring the water in the vessel and assume that there was intention to use it (immediately) for holy purposes. Then the person would think that something that had been left overnight in the Temple could be used for sacrificial purposes.
  R. Yannai said that even if the water was not actually sanctified by being put in a sanctified vessel, people might mistakenly think that the water was set aside for use in washing the feet and hands of the High Priest. Such water is put into a sanctified vessel before it is poured over the feet and hands. Then when it spends the night in the Temple, people will mistakenly think that such water is not disqualified.
  IntroductionThe mishnah ruled that if the water left over in the Temple was uncovered, it cannot be used the next day in the Temple. The reason is that we are concerned that a snake might have put its poison into it. In general it is forbidden to ever drink water that was left uncovered and unwatched. Our section discusses this subject.
  The Talmud questions why we couldn’t just filter the water to remove the snake’s venom (I know this sounds unlikely). The Talmud cites a baraita which describes a liquid that has passed through a strainer. According to the first opinion, the strainer does not remove the poison, and therefore the water in the lower vessel remains forbidden. R. Nehemiah says that this is true only if the water in the lower receptacle was uncovered. If the lower receptacle was covered, the water in it is permitted because the strainer would remove the poison. The poison of a snake is like a fungus that remains floating on the surface of the water.The fact that the mishnah does not advocate using a strainer implies that a strainer would not remove the poison, like the first opinion in this baraita.
  The Talmud says that the mishnah might even follow R. Nehemiah. R. Nehemiah allows one to strain water for regular ordinary drinking. But not for holy purposes. For as the prophet Malakhi states, when it comes giving something to God, one must be extra cautious, and give only the best items. Not just the minimum things that a person himself would normally eat.And that my friends, is the end of this chapter. Congrats! One more to go and we’ll have finished Daf Shevui’s first tractate.
  IntroductionThe fifth chapter of Sukkah is all about the Temple celebration known as the Simhat Bet Hashoevah.
  The mishnah refers to a flute that was played during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. This celebration would only take place on five or six days because it did not override Shabbat or the festival day. So if the first day of Sukkot and Shabbat coincided, then it would happen for six days; if not for only five. Interestingly, in the descriptions of the Bet Hashoevah that follow, the flute is no longer present.
  
  Daf 50b
  
  There are two readings of the mishnah—Shoeavah and Hashuvah. According to Mar Zutra both readings make sense. “Shoevah” refers to the root which means to draw water and is found in Isaiah 12. “Hashuvah” means “important” and it refers to the description of the pits that we read about earlier in the previous chapter. These pits were created during the seven days of creation and the water during the water libation ceremony is poured out into them.We should note that originally when these two versions of the mishnah were created, they both probably referred to the same thing—the drawing of the water. The difference was simply in pronunciation. Some people swallowed the heh and pronounced it “shoeavah.” Whereas others pronounced the word “hashuvah.” But there was no difference in meaning. The difference in meaning was imparted to it by Mar Zutra, a later amora. 
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to discuss whether one is allowed to play the flute on Shabbat or on Yom Tov (the first day of Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret) in the Temple. As we shall see, there is some debate over which flute is referred to in the baraita.
  According to R. Yose bar Judah one is allowed to play the flute in the Temple on Shabbat and certainly on Yom Tov. But the sages rule much more strictly—not only can the flute not be played on Shabbat, but even on Yom Tov it cannot be played.
  According to R. Yoseph, the tannaim in the above baraita debate the playing of the flute that accompanies regular sacrifices. R. Yose bar Judah who allows this, holds that the main form of music in the Temple was that performed by musical instrument. Therefore, playing the flute overrides the Shabbat.But the sages hold that the main aspect of music in the Temple was singing by voice. The flute is just for accompaniment. Therefore, it does not override the rules of Shabbat.
  But according to R. Yoseph, all tannaim agree that the flute that is used during the Simhat Bet Hashoevah does not override Shabbat, for it is not really a “mitzvah” or even an aspect of a mitzvah. It is simply an aspect of rejoicing and therefore is not done on Shabbat or Yom Tov.
  IntroductionIn yesterday’s section R. Yose b. R. Yehudah and the sages disagreed as to whether the playing of the flute in the Temple overrides the Shabbat prohibitions. R. Yoseph limited this dispute to the flute that accompanies the sacrifices. But all sages agree that the flute played during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah (the topic of this chapter) does not override the rules of Shabbat.
  Now do they not differ on this: the one who declares them valid is of the opinion that the essential feature of the [Temple] music is with an instrument and [its validity may, therefore,] be deduced from that of the reed-flute of Moses.While he who holds them to be invalid is of the opinion that the essential feature of the Temple music is the vocal singing and its validity, therefore, cannot be deduced from that of the reed-flute of Moses?R. Yoseph had said in the previous section that the dispute concerning playing the Temple flute on Shabbat was connected to a larger dispute over whether the main feature of the Temple music was with an instrument. Here he cites another baraita over a different subject—whether a vessel made of wood is valid—that features the same disputants. R. Yose b. Judah declares such a vessel valid because he holds that the essential feature of Temple music was with vessels. This allows the wood reed-flute used by Moses that had been in the Temple (referred to in Mishnah Arakhin 2:3, which states that they used this flute on Sukkot) to be a precedent for all vessels, which also can be made of wood.The other sages disagree and say that the essential feature of Temple music is singing with one’s voice. Therefore the reed-flute is not a precedent for other vessels.
  The Talmud now provides another interpretation for this baraita. The dispute is not about whether the essential feature of Temple music is with an instrument. It is over whether we derive that which is impossible to make from that which is possible to make. Moses’s reed flute had to be made of wood, for according to a story elsewhere in the Talmud, when they covered it with metal and it didn’t sound as good. On the other hand, the other musical instruments can be made of metal. Therefore, according to the sages, they must be made of metal, for they are compared to the menorah, which was made of gold. R. Yose b. Judah, on the other hand, holds that the reed-flute which had to be made of wood can serve as a precedent for the other vessels which also may be made of wood. But this dispute has nothing to do with the dispute over whether the flute may be played on Shabbat.
  IntroductionThis section continues the previous section. Here we see a different explanation for the underlying dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Yose b. Judah.
  The Talmud now posits that all agree that the essential element of the Temple music is singing, thus denying any essentiality for the use of the flute on Shabbat. They also agree that we do not derive that which is possible to make of wood (the other vessels) from that which is impossible. This means that Moses’s flute is not a precedent for making other vessels out of wood. Rather, they argue about how which hermeneutical principle should be used to understand what material the menorah and other vessels may be made out of. This is unrelated to the issue of playing the flute on Shabbat. It is just a separate dispute about whether the Temple’s vessels can be made of wood.
  Rabbi reads these verses using the principle called “general and particular” which has to do with the order of general instructions and particular details as they appear in the Torah. If there is a general rule followed by a particular instruction then followed by another general rule, the general rule includes only things that are like the particular detail. In this case, this leads to the conclusion that all vessels must be made of metal, like the menorah.
  R. Yose b. Judah uses a different principle for interpreting the Torah, one that is similar but yields different results. As a result of this different principle he would hold that only earthenware cannot be used for the Temple vessels. But wood is not excluded.
  
  Daf 51a
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud returns to discussing whether the main aspect of Temple music was the vocal singing or the musical instruments.
  R. Papa says that the dispute concerning whether the essential element of the Temple music was with an instrument or by voice is related to a dispute over whether the flute players in the Temple were slaves owned by priests or whether they were Levites. This dispute is found in Mishnah Arakhin 2:4. R. Meir says they were slaves because he holds that the main aspect of the Temple music was the singing. Therefore, the flutes could be played by the slaves, those of lower status.In contrast, R. Hanina b. Antigonus holds that they were Levites. Since the main feature of the Temple music was the musical instrument, the flutes had to be played by Levites, those of higher status.
  The problem with R. Papa’s explanation of this mishnah is that it does not take into account R. Yose’s opinion from the mishnah– men from respectable families, but not Levites would play the flute. The problem is that this opinion does not accord with the scheme that R. Papa set up. If the main feature of Temple music was by voice, then why not let slaves play the flute? And if it was through an instrument, then he should demand that Levites play the flute.
  Having rejected R. Papa’s explanation, the Talmud says that the tannaim merely differed as to their historical recollections of who actually played the flute. Some say it was Levites, some say it was men of important families, and some say that the flutes were played by slaves. But they all agree that the essential element of the music in the Temple was by voice.
  To just say that the sages disagree about how things were done is not a satisfactory explanation of the mishnah, for it does not explain why the tannaim (or the editors of the Mishnah) would bother remembering such details. There must be some reason why this mishnah was remembered.The answer is that it is connected to the question of what we can assume about a person who played the flute on the platform in the Temple—was he from a good Israelite family, was he a Levite, or might he have been a slave?According to the one who holds that they were slaves, having sung on the platform is not evidence of being from a good family. Such a person would not even be allowed to marry an Israelite woman.According to the one who holds that they were Israelites from good families, he would be allowed to marry a woman from a good family, but he would not be allowed to receive tithes because he was not a Levite.Finally, the one who holds that these men were Levites would hold that any man known to have played the flute on the platform would be allowed to marry into a good Israelite family and he would be allowed to receive tithes. Such a man would be assumed to be a Levite.
  IntroductionThis section goes all the way back to the interpretation of the baraita that contained a dispute about the flute overriding Shabbat. R. Joseph had interpreted the baraita to mean that there was a dispute over the flute that accompanied the sacrifices. Here we see a different context for the baraita.
  R. Yirmiyah b. Abba now offers a different interpretation altogether about the dispute concerning the flute overriding the Shabbat. That flute was not the flute that accompanied the sacrifices. All agree that his flute overrides Shabbat, for all agree that the instruments are an integral part of the worship service. The dispute was with regard to the special flute played only during the Simchat bet Hashoevah service, the Sukkot ritual described in the Mishnah. R. Yose b. Judah holds that even though this ritual is not essential to Sukkot and it is just extra rejoicing, the flute still overrides the Shabbat. But the other sages hold that since it is only added rejoicing it does not override the Shabbat.
  R. Joseph had said earlier that the dispute was about the flute that accompanies the sacrifice. But, according to his opinion, all sages agree that the flute that accompanies the Simchat Bet Hashoevah does not override the laws of Shabbat. This baraita conclusively proves that there is a dispute about the Simchat Bet Hashoevah flute. Thus at least one part of R. Joseph’s statement has been refuted.
  There were two parts of R. Joseph’s statement. R. Joseph claimed that there is a dispute about the song that accompanies the sacrifices and second that there is no dispute about the song that accompanies the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. The second part of his statement was refuted. But what about the first part—if the sages don’t disagree about this flute, then both parts of his statement have been rejected.
  R. Joseph could reply that the sages actually disagree about the flute that accompanied the sacrifices as well. They disagree about all flutes. The reason that we find the dispute specifically about Simchat Bet Hashoevah is to let you know just how radical R. Yose b. Judah’s opinion is—even the flute of Simchat Bet Hashoevah, which is only “extra rejoicing” overrides the rules of Shabbat. All the more so, everyone would agree that the flute accompanying the sacrifices overrides Shabbat.
  The Talmud now uses the mishnah itself to refute R. Joseph. The mishnah clearly rules that the flute of the Simchat Bet Hashoevah is not played on Shabbat. From the mishnah, we can deduce that flute that accompanies the sacrifices does override the Shabbat. The mishnah emphasizes—this is the flute that doesn’t override Shabbat. Now this mishnah is clearly the rabbis’ opinion, for we know that R. Yose b. Judah allows the flute to be played on Simchat Bet Hashoevah. Thus we can see that the rabbis do allow the flute to accompany the other sacrifices, thereby contradicting the opinion of R. Joseph.
  This section returns to the earlier subject of whether the essential element of the Temple music was with an instrument or by voice. The one who holds this position offers proof from a verse in II Chronicles that the song was done with trumpets.
  This verse serves as proof for the opposite position, that the essential element of the Temple music was by voice, for in this verse voice is emphasized.
  This is the response to the one who says that instruments were essential, by the person who holds the position that the voice was essential. He interprets this specific verse to mean that the song began by voice, and the instruments were just to make the voices sound better.
  The position that holds that instruments were essential interprets the verse used by the opposite position as if it compares singers with trumpeters. Even the singers held instruments.We should note that this ending is very typical of the Babylonian Talmud. Each position has a midrashic proof of its correctness and a refutation of the other’s proof.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a long mishnah. My commentary is taken from Mishnah Yomit.The first four mishnayot of the final chapter of Sukkah are about a Sukkot ritual called “Simchat Bet Hashoevah”, which is usually translated as the “Celebration of the Water-Drawing.” The water-drawing refers to the drawing of the water from the Shiloah in order to perform the water-libation, described above in chapter four. At the end of the all-night Simchat Bet Hashoevah ceremony, early in the morning, they would leave the Temple, go down to the Shiloah and draw the water.It seems that the function of the ceremony was twofold. First of all it highlighted the importance of the water-libation, which as we saw before, was controversial. Secondly, it allowed non-priests a chance to participate in the Sukkot ritual in the Temple. This seems to be one of the major differences between the Pharisees and Sadducees—the former encouraged the participation of non-priests in Temple ritual as much as was possible, whereas the Sadducees seemed to have abhorred it.
  ExplanationThe Simchat Bet Hashoevah was supposed to have been the most joyous, celebratory occasion in the Jewish calendar. Indeed, to this day in our tefillot we call Sukkot “the time of our rejoicing (z’man simchatenu)”.
  ExplanationSection one: As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, they did not celebrate the Simchat Bet Hashoevah on either Shabbat or on the festival. They would not begin until after the first festival day was completed. The celebration would start with the people going into the “Women’s Court.” This was a section in the Temple into which both men and women could enter, but it was as far as women could go in the Temple. Hence it was called the “Women’s Court.” The mishnah says that they would make their a “great enactment” but does not explain what this was. The Talmud explains that they separated the men and women, putting the men below and the women up into the balcony so that they wouldn’t mix. The fear was that in the midst of such a raucous occasion the mixture of men and women together could lead to transgression. Hence they separated between the sexes. However, on normal occasions men and women seem to have been together in the Women’s Court.Section two: The first thing they would do was light an enormous menorah. On each candlestick there were four golden bowls—according to tomorrow’s mishnah, there was enough light to light up all of Jerusalem! Children would climb ladders to light the menorah and they would use 120 logs of oil, which is the equivalent of fifteen liters of oil. This works out to about half a liter of oil for each bowl.
  ExplanationSection one: The wicks that they used to light the candles were not made from any old ordinary material. They used the worn-out pants and belts the priests, which they wore in their Temple service. This teaches us that once something has been used for one mitzvah it is fitting that it should be used in another mitzvah as well.Section two: The light from the menorah was so great that according to the mishnah it lit up all of Jerusalem.
  
  Daf 51b
  
  ExplanationSection one: After having lit the menorah, the party kicks off with dancing, singing and the playing of musical instruments. The first participants mentioned are the “Hasidim” or the men of piety and men whom are known for their good deeds. This group’s participation is unusual and noteworthy for these were men chosen based on their deeds and not on their lineage. In my opinion this was indeed one of the functions of the Simchat Bet Hashoevah, to give a greater role to those who are not of the priestly or Levitical clans. It is these people whose dancing, songs and praise would probably have stood out the most. This dancing and singing took place in the Court of the Women.Section two: The second group is the Levites who would arrange themselves on the fifteen steps leading up from the Court of the Women to the Court of the Israelites. The mishnah notes that these fifteen steps correlate with the fifteen Psalms which begin “A Song of Ascents (Shir Hamaalot)” (Psalms 120-134). One can only imagine how beautiful, indeed sublime, their music must have been.Section three: The third group involved is the priests. The priests begin the ceremony standing above everyone else, up in the Court of the Israelites. When the cock crows at the crack of dawn they begin a process of descending and blowing shofar blasts at set stages. Eventually this leads them down through the women’s court and out to the eastern gate.Section four: When they get to the eastern gate they are facing the sun. They turn around so that their backs are to the sun and use this opportunity to profess their faith in God and their denial of the worship of the sun. They quote from Ezekiel 8:16 in order to highlight that the sin of sun-worship is not just something that “others” or Greeks were engaged in, but something that Israelites themselves were accused of by Ezekiel. It seems to me likely that there is also a polemic here against other contemporary Jewish groups who had a solar calendar. A calendar based on the sun and actual worship of the sun could probably have been associated. Certainly it would make sense that the Pharisees/rabbis would claim that their rivals, the Essenes and perhaps the Sadducees, were not just basing their calendar on the sun but were worshipping the sun as well. We have already seen on a number of occasions that Sukkot was a holiday full of strife between the various sects of ancient Judaism.The mishnah ends its procession at this point, but it is quite clear that it was not actually over at this moment but that from the eastern gate they would make their way down to the Shiloah spring in order to draw water for the water-libation.
  IntroductionThe mishnah had stated that whoever hadn’t seen the Simchat Bet Hashoevah had never seen rejoicing in his life. Today’s section of Talmud discusses what a spectacle the Temple in general was.
  This section notes the beauty and splendor of Jerusalem and the Temple as well.
  This section contains a brief description of Herod’s Temple, which according to traditional rabbis and academic scholars alike, was the most beautiful of all of the various versions of the Temple that stood in Jerusalem. Herod built the Temple of marble, with stones layered so that the plaster could be laid down layer by layer. While he wanted to cover it with gold (at least according to this legend), the blue, yellow and white marble gave it the look of the sea, which was even more beautiful. It must have truly been quite a sight, especially on a hot day in Jerusalem.
  IntroductionToday’s section discusses the glorious double colonnade that served as a synagogue for the Jews of Alexandria, Egypt.
  Alexandria served as a major settlement of Jews during the Second Temple period. In this section we learn of the beauty and glory of a double colonnade where the leaders of the Jewish people would sit and which also served, as we shall see, as a synagogue. While it seems quite obvious that some of these numbers are exaggerations, clearly the Talmud describes a large number of people.
  What is most interesting about this section is the description of separate seating in the synagogue. This was a way of separating people by class as seating was in European synagogues and still is in some places today. It was a way for people looking for jobs to meet people of their own profession. In other words, there was a strong socio-economic component to it as well.
  In this section, Abaye claims that all of these myriads of people in Alexandria were slain by Alexander of Macedonia. I wouldn’t grant a significant amount of historical accuracy to this statement, but it does seem that Abaye senses that Alexandria’s Jewish community was destroyed at some point. However, there is some interesting theology in this section. As is typical, the rabbis portray the non-Jewish political leader as if he subjects himself to the Jewish God, reads verses and makes decisions based upon them. Second, the people are punished for their sins. In this case, the very decision to return to Egypt was against the Torah. This is actually quite a complex subject, for despite the prohibition of living in Egypt, Jews have lived there periodically over the past 2000 years and for a time it was an important Diaspora community. There also seems to have been some antagonism between the Jews of Babylonia and those of Egypt. This may be partially the background to these statements of Abaye, a prominent Babylonian sage.
  IntroductionThis section begins a long discussion of the separation of the sexes that supposedly occurred during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah.
  The mishnah stated that at the end of the first day of Sukkot they made a “great enactment.” While the original meaning of this “great enactment” may have been simply a reference to the preparations for the Simchat Bet Hashoevah itself, the Talmud takes this in a different direction, interpreting that this “enactment” was the separation of the sexes during the celebrations. This is the source for the idea of a mehitzah (a separation) between the sexes in religious areas such as the synagogue. According to the Talmud, they actually built the balcony around the Women’s Section (Ezrat Nashim) for this very reason. I should note that other readings of this passage portray the actual separation as the “enactment.” The balcony was built for other reasons.
  This baraita presents various manifestations of where the men and women would sit either in or outside the Ezrat Nashim, the Women’s Court, in the Temple. I should note that this baraita seems to be more ideology than actual history. The point seems to be that according to the rabbis the best place to prevent the mingling of the sexes is for the women to be in the balcony.
  The Talmud questions what gave them the right to add on to the Temple’s physical structure. There is a verse in Chronicles according to which all of the Temple’s architecture was given to Solomon by his father David, and that it shouldn’t be changed. So how could they add the balcony?Rav finds a verse according to which in the time to come (the end of times) when they come to mourn the great destruction, men and women will sit separately. If during this time, when people are mourning and when the evil inclination has been destroyed (we will read more about this in the coming passages), they still need to sit separately, all the more so during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah when they are celebrating.
  
  Daf 52a
  
  IntroductionAt the end of the last daf we read a verse from Zechariah 12 talking about a great mourning that will come in the future, eschatological time. This next daf begins by discussing what they were mourning.
  Here we see the core dispute about what they were mourning over—the death of the Messiah son of Joseph or the evil inclination. This “messiah” is a figure that appears in Second Temple literature and seems to have been a forerunner to the great redeemer, the Messiah of David, who will usher in the final redemption. We should note that we are dealing with eschatological beliefs, ones that do not have the certainty of the more normative halakhic beliefs. As such, there are often less “definitive” answers in sections of this nature. In any case, we will learn more about these figures as we proceed.
  It makes sense that the Jews would mourn over the death of the Messiah ben Joseph, and it even may be midrashically alluded to in the verse. But why would they mourn over the end of the evil inclination. After all, shouldn’t the end of evil desires be an opportunity for rejoicing.
  In this fascinating midrash, everyone weeps over the slaying of the evil inclination. The righteous weep over how hard they worked to conquer this great mountain. The wicked also weep, for the evil inclination was no more than a hair thread, and yet they couldn’t conquer it. This midrash seems to me to be expressive of how we perceive the difficulty of life. We don’t know how hard something is until we look at it in retrospect. Sometimes tasks that we thought were easy, were actually quite difficult, and we are amazed at the strength we had to surmount those problems (I still don’t know how I finished my doctorate). And sometimes the opposite is true. We fail in our mission, what we are meant to do in life, even though our problems were really miniscule. I think that the wisdom of this saying is that there is no objective reality to our problems, there is really only our apprehension of them.
  The point of this saying is that temptation is at first very flimsy, easy to break apart, like the thread of a spider. But as we give in to it more and more, it becomes thicker, the cords become like those used to draw a cart. Once we have adopted bad habits, they become more and more difficult to break.
  This midrash presents a dialogue between God and the Messiah, son of David, the Messiah that will usher in the end of days after the slaying of the Messiah son of Joseph. God tells this descendant of David that he can ask anything of him. But the Messiah wisely asks only for his life, which he is granted by God. There may be some Christian overtones/polemics to this midrash, for according to this passage the real Messiah will not be slain.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the yetzer hara, the evil inclination.
  This section lists seven verses that the rabbis read as referring to the yetzer hara, the evil inclination, each calling it by a different name.
  IntroductionMore discussion about the yetzer hara.
  In this extended baraita, the rabbis interpret most of the elements of the verse from Joel 2:20 as if it refers to the yetzer hara. Some of these midrashim are based on puns. For instance the verse refers to the “northern one” (although this very word may be a corrupted form of another word). The word for “north” is “tzafon” which can also mean “hidden.” Therefore it refers to the yetzer hara, hidden in the hearts of man.The yetzer hara will be driven away by God to a place where it can no longer cause any damage to human beings.The word for “eastern sea” is “kadmoni” which can also mean “ancient” or something like that. Here it is taken as referring to the First Temple.The western sea is called the “latter sea” which is taken as a pun for the last Temple. 
  The verse actually refers in Joel to God, but Abaye understands it as referring to the evil inclination, which attacks scholars more than anyone else. In this famous story, Abaye sadly realizes just how strong his yetzer hara is. He suspects the other person of having an evil inclination when he sees him sneak off with others. But he is projecting his own frailty onto others. The old man at the end of the story teaches him his lesson. The greater the man, the worse the yetzer hara.
  
  Daf 52b
  
  IntroductionThe sugya continues to discuss the yetzer hara.
  These two statements talk about the great power of the Evil Inclination, which according to R. Shimon b. Lakish, a person could not withstand were it not for the help of God.
  This section uses some midrashic references to show that the antidote to the Evil Inclination is the study of Torah. This is something the rabbis believed in quite fervently. Indeed, in other places we learn that the Torah was specifically created to be the antidote for the Evil Inclination.
  The perniciousness of the Evil Inclination is twofold: it entices a man to sin in this world and then it testifies against him in the world to come. This is related to a midrash on Proverbs 29:21 in which the “servant” is interpreted as the Evil Inclination. The Evil Inclination is given over to a person’s control, like a servant. But if he doesn’t take control, the evil inclination will testify against him in the world to come. This is derived from an “Atbah” which is a letter code system whereby each Hebrew letter corresponds with another letter. Using this particular “atbah” system, the word “manon” corresponds to “witness.”
  These two midrashim point out the progressive influence and eventual dominance that the yetzer hara exerts over a person. At first it is an external force, residing outside of the person. Eventually, it takes him over and utterly dominates his life. I think the same could be said about many evil influences in our life—at first they are visitors to our daily lives, causing us to err, but not radically changing our personality. Eventually, however, they become a part of our identity, making it all the more difficult to be free.
  While the immediate reference for this statement seems to be the (male) sexual organ, it could also refer to the yetzer hara in general. The more one succumbs to one’s evil inclination, the larger that inclination grows. In contrast, when we resist the urges that push us to do the wrong thing, we often are able to grow stronger, more resistant to temptation.
  In this midrash, God regrets having created four things: the exile of the people of Israel, the Chaldeans (a people renowned for their sorcery), the Ishmaelites (known as robbers) and the Evil Inclination. I should emphasize that all of these verses are being read midrashically and not according to their peshat (simple) meaning.
  These three (four) verses bring comfort to Israel (the enemies of Israel is a euphemism for Israel) for they offer a promise that the evil inclination will not continue to rule over us forever. Ultimately, God is in control of humanity and will remove that stone that He has given us as a heart.
  IntroductionToday’s section returns to the topic of the Messiah son of Joseph and various other Messiahs or figures thought to be redeemers of Israel.
  The prophet Zechariah refers to four craftsmen shown to him by God. R. Hana b. Bizna interprets these as referring to four messianic figures. According to Rashi all of these various “messiahs” worked as various types of craftsmen. Elijah built an altar. The messiahs will be involved in the rebuilding of the Temple. Rashi offers two interpretations of the “Righteous Priest.” He is either Shem, son of Noah or Malchizedek who blessed Abraham.
  R. Hana b. Bizna demonstrates that the four craftsmen are not those referred to in the beginning of the verse. The “horns” also mentioned in the verse are the nations of the world that scattered Israel, whereas the craftsmen are those that redeem Israel.R. Sheshet gives up the argument, noting that R. Hana is the expert in matters of aggadah.
  The continuation of R. Hana’s midrash interprets the four shepherds and the eight princes referred to by Micah. Even Rashi admits that it is not all that clear why these specific characters are referred to.
  IntroductionToday’s section returns to interpreting the mishnah about the Simchat Bet Hashoevah.
  The baraita cited here shows that there were thirty log in each jar, not one hundred and twenty in each.
  The baraita claims that these four youth were stronger than the legendary son of Martha bat Baytos, a priest. Marta’s son could carry two sides of a huge ox up the altar while walking slowly, heel to toe, because one shouldn’t run up the altar. Nevertheless, the sages wouldn’t allow him to do so because they held it would be better for more priests to participate in the sacrificial ceremony. Indeed, they ruled that twenty four people would be involved in bringing the meat of the ox up to the altar.
  The Talmud questions what makes the young priests superior to Marta’s son. After all, clearly the meat was much heavier than the oil.The answer is that the ladders were basically perpendicular, making the ascent much more difficult. In contrast, the ramp up the altar was a gentle slope.
  
  Daf 53a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues with the description of the Simchat Bet Hashoevah.
  The light of the Bet Hashoevah was so great that a woman sitting in Jerusalem could sift her wheat with the light. Now that’s a lot of light!
  This baraita describes two groups. The men of piety and good deeds, who were righteous even when they were younger. And the penitents (Baalei Teshuvah) who had repented from their youthful sins. The baraita seems to place both on equal footing.
  This section contains three sayings of Hillel the Elder, the famous Hillel. Two of them seem to be connected to the Simchat Bet Hashoevah, and the third is from Mishnah Avot. The first two statements espouse a startling view of human beings as the literal image of God, a view which grants to human beings tremendous cosmic significance. If I am here, I, Hillel, created in the image of God, it is as if everyone, all of humanity and God, is here.My feet, he says, are literally drawn to the Temple, which is “my house”—not just God’s house, for I too am a God. This view of human significance in the world is drawn from the ambiguous parallel of the two halves of the verse in Exodus 20: In any place, I (the human being or God) mention my name (human or God), I (human or God) will come to you and bless you (human or God).The third statement is from Avot 2:6. These were my comments on that mishnah:This mishnah expresses Hillel’s deep faith in the ultimate justice of the world. In the end everyone receives not only a punishment for their crimes, but the exact punishment that fits their crimes. The person who drowned others is not only punished by being killed as a murderer, but he receives the same type of death that he meted out to others.Although this may seem to be a statement purely of faith, one not empirically observable, Maimonides points out that it is borne out by experience all of the time and in all places. People who do evil and introduce violence and corruption into society, fall eventually as victims to the very violence that they perpetuated.
  This fatalistic story is brought to illustrate R. Yohanan/Solomon’s saying, that a person ends up wherever they are supposed to be. I think the story is quite understandable—there is no running away from death. Whether or not this quite proves that a person always ends up where they are supposed to be, I will leave up to you.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to discuss the spectacle of the Simchat Bet Hashoevah.
  R. Shimon ben Gamaliel, besides being a great rabbi, also had amazing circus like abilities. He could juggle eight torches (and I doubt that they were the balanced types we have today) and he could hold himself up by his thumbs. My friends, do not try either of these tricks at home.
  Levi, an amoraic rabbi, did a Kidah type of bow in front of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] and as a result grew lame. However, the Talmud questions whether this was the cause of his lameness. R. Elazar had stated that the cause was Levi’s theological complaint against God. In Taanit Levi accuses God of withdrawing to the heavens and no longer taking a role in the lives of human beings.The (somewhat simplistic) resolution is that both were a cause of Levi’s loss of physical abilities. Levi physically overdid it by trying to perform a Kidah. And he theologically overdid it, by accusing God of abandoning humanity.
  This section contains a few more stories of rabbis and their amazing juggling abilities. It is interesting that Shmuel juggles in front of Shapur, the king of Babylonia. While I wouldn’t take this as historical fact, it is nevertheless interesting that the Talmud portrays a rabbinic sage juggling in front of a non-Jewish king.
  This baraita shows how busy those attending the Temple would have been during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. Indeed, it sounds like they didn’t sleep for seven days.
  It is impossible for a person to go six days without sleeping. R. Yohanan stated this indirectly when he taught that if one takes a vow not to sleep for even three days, the vow is invalid because he vowed to do something impossible. In such a case, the person is lashed for taking God’s name in vain but then he may go to sleep immediately. In any case, how could R. Joshua claim that they didn’t sleep for the entire Simchat Bet Hashoevah.The resolution is that they didn’t sleep well for all seven days, because they only dozed on each other’s shoulders. But they did sleep.
  IntroductionThe mishnah had taught that there were fifteen steps leading up to the Temple, to correspond to the fifteen Songs of Ascent (Shir Hamaalot) in the Book of Psalms. This section explains what these songs cause to ascend.
  In this section, R. Yohanan explains what prompted King David, who according to tradition authored the Book of Psalms, to write these fifteen psalms. The answer is related to some of the material taught in this chapter and in the previous one. When David dug the Pits under the altar, he accidentally hit the point at which the “Deep” called the “tehom” in Hebrew, was connected to the earth. These deep, primordial, waters threated to surface and flood the world, as they did in the days of Noah. David composed these fifteen songs, and they somehow caused the waters to subside. The world was preserved.Note that this myth is part of the constellation of stories related to the notion that the altar in the Temple is the navel of the world. It is at this point that the waters of the world threaten to come out and destroy the world.
  R. Hisda critiques R. Yohanan’s aggadah. If these songs caused the waters of the Deep to subside, then they should be dubbed “Songs of Descent” not “Ascent.”Therefore, he offers a different aggadic story. David dug the Pits, but then saw that he had opened up a conduit whereby the waters of the Deep might destroy the world. Somehow he knew that writing God’s name on a sherd and throwing it into the Pits would cause the water to subside. What he didn’t know was whether this is permitted. Ahitophel, Saul’s son’s adviser after Saul’s death, a figure portrayed as a wise man in both the Bible and in rabbinic tradition, notes that in the Sotah ritual God’s name is written on a scroll and then the writing is rubbed off into water. This ritual is meant to bring peace between a man and woman by eliminating his suspicion that she was an adulteress. If for such a purpose, God’s name may be erased, all the more so it may be erased to save the world.David then wrote God’s name on the sherd, and the waters subsided. The problem was that they subsided too much. While people don’t want waters coming up from the ground and submerging them, they also don’t want the waters to go too deep. So to get the waters to come back up, he composed fifteen Songs of Ascent. Now the primordial water was about 1000 cubits from the surface. Still, pretty deep, about 500 meters. This will be noted below.
  Ulla learns some science from this aggadic legend. The crust of the earth is one thousand cubits thick. The problem with this theory is that one can easily see that one need not dig one thousand cubits to reach water. Water lies far closer to the surface. R. Mesharshya answers that the water we find close to the surface is not the primordial waters of the deep. It is the water that is due to the local river, the Euphrates. The waters of the Deep lie far down below the Earth’s surface.
  
  Daf 53b
  
  IntroductionThe Talmud now goes on to explain more sections of the mishnah that outlined the end of the Simchat Bet Hashoevah ritual.
  On their way down the steps to proceed out of the Temple, the priests would stop on the tenth step and blow the shofar. R. Yirmiyah tends to ask questions that are a bit nudnicky. Here he asks whether this was the tenth step from the top or the bottom. There is no answer to the question.
  When Ezekiel describes the idolatrous priests in the Temple, he is a bit redundant. They face the east, so obviously there backs were to the Temple. The Talmud uses this redundancy to make the priests out to be even worse than Ezekiel actually stated. The priests turned toward the sun, exposed themselves and actually defecated towards the Temple.
  According to the mishnah, the priests leaving the Temple after the Simchat Bet Hashoeavh would say “We are the Lord’s and our eyes are turned to the Lord.” The problem with this statement is that it comes close to sounding like a belief in two powers, which seems to be the arch-heresy according to the rabbis. Someone who says the word “Shema” or “Modim” (part of the Amidah prayer) is to be silenced because it looks like he is praying to two Gods.Therefore, the Talmud offers a slight adjustment of this statement. By adding the word “our eyes” into the second half of the statement, they avoided creating the impression of worshipping two Gods.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a mishnah. The commentary is from Mishnah Yomit.Since the previous mishnah mentioned the extra shofar blasts that were sounded during Sukkot, today’s mishnah discusses how many shofar blasts were sounded on other occasions in the Temple. As we shall see, more shofar blasts were blown on the eve of Shabbat during Sukkot than at any other time during the year.
  Section one: This is an introduction to the rest of the mishnah. We should remember that each tekiah (unbroken sound) and each teruah (staccato sound) counts as one blast. The blasts always come in sets of three, first a tekiah, then a teruah and then another tekiah. Sometimes this order is repeated and sometimes it is performed three times.Section two: On normal days there were twenty-one blasts. There were three blasts in the morning to announce the opening of the Temple gates, and then nine blasts at each of the two daily sacrifices, the morning tamid and the afternoon tamid.Section three: On the festivals and on Shabbat there were an extra nine blasts for the musaf offerings. The Talmud explains that no matter how many musaf offerings were offered on that day, nine and only nine blasts were sounded. Thus even on Shabbat during the festival, when there were musaf offerings for Shabbat and for the festival, there were still only nine.Section four: On the eve of Shabbat there were six other blasts, whose function was not connected to sacrifices or to Temple procedures but rather to Shabbat. There were three blasts that let people know that Shabbat was approaching and that they needed to stop working. And then there were another three blasts to let people know that Shabbat had begun. Interestingly, there was a stone from the ruins of the Temple found in Jerusalem that had written on it “bet hatekiah lehav…” which means “the house of blasting to distinguish.” Probably, the reference is to the practice in this very mishnah. This stone was once part of the section in the Temple where they blew shofar blasts to distinguish between kodesh (Shabbat) and hol (non-Shabbat). To this day in Jerusalem and in a few other cities in Israel as well they sound a warning to let people know that Shabbat has begun.It turns out therefore, that on the eve of Shabbat during Pesah or on Shavuot, there would be thirty-six blasts—21 for the normal occasions, 9 for musaf, and 6 for the eve of Shabbat.
  IntroductionToday’s section begins to explain the mishnah about how many shofar blasts there were in the Temple.
  The mishnah sets the minimum and maximum number of shofar blasts at 21 and 48, whereas R. Judah sets it at seven and sixteen. The explanation for this discrepancy is actually quite simple. According to R. Judah each set of tekiah, teruah, tekia counts as one note, whereas the other rabbis count each set as three.
  R. Judah derives that these two notes are all part of one because the Torah uses the root for tekiah as the verb meaning “to blast a teruah.” Therefore, a tekiah and a teruah are all part of the same note, and together they count as one.
  The rabbis who hold that the tekiah and the teruah count as different notes derive this from Numbers 10:7, which says that the people should sound a tekiah but not a teruah. Clearly this means that they count as two different notes, for if they were each half of the same note, the Torah would be telling the people to perform half of a mitzvah.
  R. Judah responds to the rabbis that their verse cannot serve as proof for the shofar blasting in Numbers 10 was not a mitzvah, it was just a signal to the people to march. Therefore, he can maintain that a teruah and a tekiah are part of the same note.The rabbis agree that Numbers 10:7 refers to a signal. However, despite this, God treated it like a mitzvah, therefore teaching that they are two different notes.
  The Talmud analyzes R. Kahana’s statement in light of the mishnah. R. Kahana stated that there may not be any time interval between the tekiah and the teruah. This seems to go according to R. Judah, who holds that these two notes count as one note. Since they are one note, one can’t pause in between.The problem is that this is obvious. Why would we even need to ask such a simple question?
  
  Daf 54a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf begins by analyzing whether they blew the shofar on the tenth step at the end of the Simchat Bet Hashoevah, when departing the Temple to go down to the spring and draw water.
  This mishnah does not count three shofar blasts sounded on the tenth step, whereas the previous mishnah did mention these three blasts. Thus the two mishnayot contradict each other.The Talmud concludes that this mishnah agrees with R. Eliezer ben Jacob who says that they blew three blasts on the altar. The author of the previous mishnah held that three blasts were made on the tenth step, but not on the altar. This way the maximum number of blasts, 48, remains, the only dispute being where these three blasts were made.
  Rabbi Eliezer b. Jacob says that it is preferable to blow the shofar on the altar for after having blown at the opening of the gates to leave the Temple, why blow again in the middle of leaving, at a place also considered a gate.The other rabbis reason that since they will blow the shofar upon drawing the water, why blow it again when pouring it onto the altar.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with how many trumpet blasts were sounded on days with additional offerings, musafim.
  R. Aha b. Hanina’s baraita exploits the redundancy in the word, “you shall blow” which appears in both Numbers 10:8 and 10:10. From the redundancy the baraita learns that the trumpet blasts should be in accordance with the musafim, the additional offerings, that are sacrificed on the festivals. Below the Talmud will explain this in greater detail.
  R. Aha explained that the baraita means that there is a trumpet blasting for each musaf offering. On days where there are more musaf offerings, the trumpet would be sounded more frequently.
  The Talmud raises the difficulty that if there were three trumpet blasts for every musaf, then on Shabbat during the festival, there should have been more than forty-eight. There would have been fifty-one, including the extra three for the extra musaf.R. Zera answers that on Shabbat they didn’t sound the trumpets when opening the gates, because this was not a mitzvah, such that it would override Shabbat.
  IntroductionYesterday’s section ended with the resolution that there were not fifty-one blasts on Shabbat Hol Hamoed Sukkot because they didn’t sound the trumpet for the opening of the gates. In our section Rava raises some difficulties on this resolution and then offers an alternative.
  Rava begins with an insult—whoever made the previous resolution doesn’t care about “the flour” he grinds, meaning the quality of the resolution he offers.The first difficulty Rava raises is that the mishnah says that there were at least twenty-one blasts every day, and included in the list of twenty-one are those for the opening of the gates. Clearly, they sounded the blasts at the opening of the gates every day.Second, if on the Shabbat of the festival there were forty-eight, but not fifty-one, the mishnah should have stated this directly. From this we could have learned that the halakhah is like R. Eliezer b. Jacob who said that they don’t blow the shofar on the tenth step (see above) and we could have learned like R. Aha b. Hanina who held that we blow two sets for the two different musaf offerings, but we don’t blow for the opening of the gates on Shabbat. Instead the mishnah taught that there were forty-eight on erev Shabbat during the festival, from which we can only learn R. Eliezer b. Jacob’s ruling.
  Rava offers an alternative reason why the mishnah didn’t refer to Shabbat during Sukkot—on Shabbat they don’t blow the shofar for the water-drawing. This was because they drew the water before Shabbat. This would have reduced the number greatly, making it far lower than erev Shabbat during Sukkot.
  There is yet another case where there would have been 48 shofar blasts—on Rosh Hashanah that fell on Shabbat. On this day the usual 21 would have been blown, plus another 27 for the three additional offerings. This would accord with R. Aha b. Hanina who holds that there are separate sets of blasts for each musaf offering. The fact that the mishnah didn’t cite this example is a difficulty for R. Aha.
  The reason that the mishnah cited the example of erev Shabbat during Sukkot was to teach that the halakhah is in accord with R. Eliezer b. Jacob who said that they don’t blow the shofar on the tenth step. Had the mishnah used the example of Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, we would not have known this.
  The problem still remains—why didn’t the mishnah teach both cases where there could be forty-eight blasts?The answer is that the mishnah cited one case, but there are other instances where forty-eight blasts were sounded. The idea behind this common resolution is that if there are two cases that belong to a certain category, the Mishnah should have taught both of them. But if there are more than two, then it is possible the mishnah cited one and simply left out the others.Now the Talmud will have to find a third instance where 48 blasts are sounded in one day.
  The first possibility is that he omitted erev Pesah. On that day there would be an additional 27 blasts. This is because the pesah sacrifice was offered in three groups. Each group ended up singing Hallel three times, since it took a while to offer up all the sacrifices. The shofar was sounded at the beginning of each round of Hallel. This adds up to an additional 27 blasts, bringing the total to 48.
  
  Daf 54b
  
  The problem is that this case might not really be an omission. It is possible that the mishnah holds like R. Judah who said that the third group was always a smaller group and they would offer all of their sacrifices even before the first reading of Hallel was complete. So according to R. Judah, there never were 48 blasts on erev Pesah.
  The problem is that earlier we had stated that this mishnah does not agree with R. Judah, who holds that a set of tekiah, teruah, tekiah counts as only one blast. So how could the mishnah disagree with R. Judah about that point, and count the three notes as three, but agree with him that on erev Pesah the third group never read Hallel three times.This question is easily answerable—the mishnah indeed agrees with R. Judah about one issue but disagrees with him on the other.This now means that the case of erev Pesah was not an omission for the mishnah might hold like R. Judah that the third group never read Hallel three times. So we still need to find another case of 48 blasts that the mishnah did omit.
  The other omission was erev Pesah that fell on erev Shabbat. The mishnah could agree with R. Judah who holds that the third group only read Hallel once. This would cause us to lose six blasts. But then we could add in six more for erev Shabbat, the six blasts that would cause the people to stop working and then distinguish between the week day and Shabbat. This would leave the total at 48.
  IntroductionToday’s section deals with the assertion of the mishnah that there were a maximum of 48 blasts in the Temple. There were indeed cases in which there were more.
  The mishnah stated that there were never more than 48 blasts. But on erev Pesah which falls on Shabbat there would have been 51 according to R. Judah (21 regular, 9 for musaf, 21 for the Hallel of the three groups offering their pesah sacrifices) or 57 according to the rabbis (27 for the Hallel of the three groups—all three groups recited Hallel three times). So why would the mishnah state that there were only 48?
  The answer is that the mishnah only teaches occasions that occur every year. Erev Pesah which falls on Shabbat is a rare occurrence so it was not taught in the mishnah.
  The problem with the above resolution is that erev Shabbat does not fall during Hol Hamoed Sukkot every year either. If the Festival of Sukkot begins on Friday, then there will be no erev Shabbat during Hol Hamoed Sukkot. The next Friday will be Shemini Atzeret, no longer Hol Hamoed Sukkot.
  The Talmud resolves this by stating that the rabbis who shape the calendar never let the first day of Sukkot fall on erev Shabbat. This is because if the 15th of the month of Elul (Sukkot) falls on Friday, then the tenth of the month, which is Yom Kippur, falls on Sunday. Yom Kippur can never fall on Sunday because the sages didn’t want erev Yom Kippur to be on Shabbat, for this would mean two days in a row of a biblical holiday. There are two problems with this scenario. One, on erev Shabbat people would have to gather their vegetables for the break fast meal two days later. During times when they didn’t have refrigeration, this would have presented a problem. The second problem is that there would be two days in a row in which a person couldn’t be buried. Again, without refrigeration, this would cause a problem.They would postpone Yom Kippur by a day by making sure that they made Elul a full month, meaning a month of thirty days.
  ItroductionAt the end of yesterday’s section we learned that the rabbis intercalate (add a day) to Elul to make sure that Yom Kippur never falls on Sunday. Our section questions this assertion.
  The Talmud now cites several pieces of evidence that Yom Kippur could fall on Sunday (or Friday, where it also no longer can fall). First of all, there is a mishnah that states that if they don’t have enough time to burn all of the forbidden fats on the altar on Shabbat, they can do so the next day, even if the next day is Yom Kippur. Clearly, Yom Kippur could fall on Sunday. Second of all, R. Zera relates a baraita that discusses various issues related to a case where Yom Kippur fell either immediately before or after Shabbat. R. Zera thought that all agree with that baraita, but R. Judah corrected him and related it only to R. Akiba. In any case, all seem to agree that Yom Kippur can fall on Friday or Sunday.
  There is a dispute between tannaim over whether the rabbis can add a day to a month (intercalate it) for some ulterior motive, such as making sure that Yom Kippur never falls on Friday or Sunday. The rabbis of our mishnah in Sukkah do allow for this to be done (that’s why the first day of Sukkot is never on erev Shabbat). However, there are “others” who say that there are always four days between the day on which a holiday occurs in one year, and the day in which it occurs in the next. For instance, if Rosh Hashanah begins on Sunday this year, next year it will be Thursday. This is because there are always 354 days in the year, 50 weeks plus four days. The months always alternate between 30 and 29 days, 59 days in two months. So there are always four extra days. During a leap year, another month is added, and this month has 29 days. So that would push next year’s holiday back another day of the week (4 weeks plus one day). The important issue is that according to these “others” the rabbis never manipulate the calendar in order to cause a holiday to fall on a specific day. The year cannot have 355 days.I should note that today’s calendar is fixed and has been since the fourth century. It was arranged so that Yom Kippur would never fall on Friday or Sunday.
  IntroductionEarlier on this daf, R. Aha had stated that on days of multiple holidays they would have blasts for each musaf offering. The Talmud raises a difficulty on this position.
  A baraita teaches that if Rosh Hodesh falls on Shabbat, the Levites sing the psalm of Rosh Hodesh and not the psalm for Shabbat. But if we sound shofar blasts for each musaf sacrifice, as R. Aha holds, why not sing a separate psalm for each as well.
  R. Safra interprets the baraita to mean that the psalm for Rosh Hodesh doesn’t set aside the psalm for Shabbat. It simply comes first. But both are recited.
  Normally in halakhah, if something is performed frequently, it is done before something that is performed less frequently. Since Shabbat is more frequent than Rosh Hodesh, it is a bit puzzling why the psalm for Rosh Hodesh is recited first.R. Yohanan answers by stating that the psalm takes precedence to let people know that the court established Rosh Hodesh at the proper time. Since most people do not actually witness the new moon, it is important for them to be assured that this day is actually Rosh Hodesh.
  The problem is that there is another distinguishing sign to let people know about the new month—the fats were placed in a spot on the way up to the altar different from the other additional offerings. This refers to where they the fats were put before the priests would bring them up to be burned on the altar. In any case, what is important is that there was another distinguishing sign done in the Temple to let people know that it was Rosh Hodesh.The Talmud answers that there were two distinguishing signs—some people noticed one and some noticed another. In any case, both psalms were recited on Shabbat Rosh Hodesh, just as both musaf offerings had their own set of trumpet blasts.
  
  Daf 55a
  
  IntroductionThis week’s daf continues to raise difficulties on R. Aha who had stated that they sound a separate set of blasts for each musaf offering.
  This baraita clearly states that while there are blasts for Rosh Hodesh and Shabbat (when they fall on their own), there are not separate blasts for multiple musaf offerings when holidays, Shabbat or Rosh Hodesh fall on the same day. Meaning that if Shabbat coincides with a festival, there are only one set of blasts for the two offerings. This is a successful refutation of R. Aha’s statement.
  While R. Aha was refuted, it is unclear exactly how the verse is being used. Abaye explains that the plural form “New Moons” implies that the number of blasts sounded on all New Moons should be the same. This would mean that just as there are one set of blasts on most months, so too there are one set of blasts on Rosh Hashanah, even though there are two musaf offerings—Rosh Hashanah and Rosh Hodesh. This serves as a paradigm for all other occasions with more than one musaf offering.
  R. Ashi has a different reading of the midrash on the verse. The plural “On the beginnings” coupled with the singular “your month” seems, to R. Ashi, to refer to a month that has two beginnings. This can only be Rosh Hashanah which is the beginning of the new year and the new month. Nevertheless, the Torah still refers to it as one beginning, meaning one set of blasts. Thus, again we have the precedent that even though there are two musaf offerings, there are only one set of blasts.
  IntroductionToday’s section continues to deal with R. Aha b. Hanina who had stated that separate blasts were sounded for each musaf offering.
  This long baraita describes what Psalms were recited in the Temple while offering the musaf sacrifice. The end of the section contains a few mnemonics which some sages used to remember the order of the Psalms. This is followed by yet another mnemonic to remember what sage gave what mnemonic!The important issue is that R. Aha has again been refuted because the Psalm for Shabbat supersedes the Psalm for Sukkot. Just as two Psalms would not be recited on one day, so too we would not have two sets of trumpet blasts.
  The problem with the refutation of R. Aha (b. Hanina) is that there was a baraita that stated that they blast the trumpet according to the musafim (additional offerings). This seems to support R. Aha who said that they sound separate blasts for each offering.Ravina reinterprets the baraita—they don’t sound separate blasts for each musaf. Rather, when there are multiple musafim, they just sound longer blasts.R. Aha (a different R. Aha) explains that they had more trumpeters, although there were still only one set of blasts for all of the musafim.
  The sugya ends with a question concerning the practice outside of Israel where the first day of Yom Tov is doubled. On the second day, we can’t say the regular second day of Sukkot Psalm, because that Psalm is for a day that is not as holy (Hol Hamoed). On the other hand, if we said the second day Psalm on the third day, then on the seventh day we would say the sixth day’s Psalm. But then what happens to the seventh day’s Psalm?According to Abaye, we just skip the second day’s Psalm. According to Rava, we just skip the seventh day’s.Amemar rules that each and every day we would say two days’ Psalms. For instance on the first day of Hol Hamoed we would say the second and third day’s Psalm and so forth. The next day we would say both the third and fourth day’s Psalms. In this way, each day would be covered. This would also express the underlying doubt that they had in the Diaspora as to what day of the month it was—i.e. is today the second day of Sukkot or the third?
  
  Daf 55b
  
  IntroductionThis section is a mishnah. My commentary here is taken from Mishnah Yomit.The priests were divided into twenty-four watches, each watch serving for a week at the Temple. During a watch’s week the priests of that watch kept all of the sacrificial meat and any other part of the sacrifice that they were allowed to use. However, during pilgrimage festivals all twenty-four watches equally divided the sacrifices that were offered on account of the festival. Our mishnah teaches how the numerous Sukkot offerings were divvied up.
  ExplanationSection one: On the first day of Sukkot there were thirty animals sacrificed: thirteen bulls, two rams, one goat (for a sin-offering) and fourteen lambs (Numbers 29:13-16). This means that 16 priestly watches could take one animal each, leaving fourteen animals for the other eight watches. On the first day of the festival, six watches would sacrifice two lambs and the other two watches would get one lamb each.Section two: On the second day there was one less bull, so the total number of animals was only 29. Fifteen watches would take the fifteen non-lamb animals, leaving nine watches to split 14 lambs. Five would take two lambs, leaving four to each take one.Section three: On the third day there were 11 bulls, for a total of 28 animals. Fourteen watches would take the fourteen non-lamb animals, leaving ten watches to split 14 lambs. Four would take two lambs, leaving six to each take one.Section four: On the fourth day there were only 10 bulls, for a total of 27 animals. Thirteen watches would take the thirteen non-lamb animals, leaving 11 watches to split 14 lambs. Three would take two lambs, leaving eight to each take one.Section five: On the fifth day there were only 9 bulls, for a total of 26 animals. Twelve watches would take the twelve non-lamb animals, leaving 12 watches to split 14 lambs. Two would take two lambs, leaving ten to each take one.Section six: On the sixth day there were only 8 bulls, for a total of 25 animals. Eleven watches would take the eleven non-lamb animals, leaving 13 watches to split 14 lambs. One would take two lambs, leaving 12 to each take one.Section seven: On the seventh day there were 24 animals for 24 watches—each watch got one.Section eight: On Shmini Atzeret there were only 10 animals sacrificed, one bull, one ram, one goat and seven lambs (Numbers 29:35-38). The watches would then cast lot to see who received what (see Yoma 2:1).
  IntroductionThis section deals with the issue of which watch (mishmar) offers the bull sacrifices on Shemini Atzeret, an issue addressed by the mishnah from yesterday.
  The mishnah had stated that on the eighth day they returned to casting lots, as was done on the first day. The Talmud now quotes a baraita which gives the impression that the opinion in the mishnah accords with Rabbi [Judah Hanasi]. The other sages hold that the watches that didn’t get to offer three bulls during Sukkot had the chance offer this bull.
  The mishnah might even accord with the rabbis. The mishnah only says that they cast lots on the eighth day to decide who would offer the bull. Even if only two watches were eligible to offer this bull, they would still need to cast lots to decide which of them does so. Thus Rabbi would hold that all watches cast lots, whereas the other rabbis would hold that only those lots that had not yet offered two bulls could cast lots.
  The Talmud now cites a baraita that states that all of the watches went through two full cycles of sacrifices except for the last two. This again seems to follow Rabbi who said that on Shemini Atzeret, they go back to a regular system of casting lots.
  The Talmud resolves that even the other rabbis can agree with this baraita. The last two watches do get a chance to participate in all three casting of lots. The only thing they don’t get is a certainty about receiving a third bull.
  What then does this baraita teach us? After all, we could do the count ourselves without the baraita specifically telling us that one of the last two watches does not get a third bull?The answer is that the baraita teaches that the watch that receives the meat of the bull this day, will not receive the meat of a bull tomorrow.
  During Sukkot 70 bulls are offered in total. These correspond to the 70 nations that there are in Jewish lore. Each bull sacrificed offers atonement for one nation.The final bull offered on Shemini Atzeret corresponds with Israel. Israel is that favored friend in the parable, who God asks to stay on just one more day, so that God can enjoy our company.R. Yohanan offers an expression of lament for the non-Jews who lost their mechanism for atonement when the Temple was destroyed. It is as if he is saying, “Look, our Temple was not only for the atonement or protection of the people of Israel. It was for the whole world, at least on this most universalistic of holidays, Sukkot. You destroyed. This was your loss as well as ours.”
  IntroductionToday’s section is a mishnah. My commentary is from Mishnah Yomit.
  Section one: This is a reference to the previous mishnah. On all three festivals all of the watches shared equally in all of the sacrifices that came on account of the festival. This would include the musafim mentioned yesterday, but also the “hagigah” and other special sacrifices that individuals would bring on account of the festival. They also divided the showbread equally, despite the fact that the showbread is not really a sacrifice that comes on account of the festival.Section two: On Shavuot there were both the matzot of the showbread and leavened bread (chametz) from the two special loaves on Shavuot. Therefore they could amusingly say to the priest coming to take his share: here’s your matzah, here’s your chametz.Section three: The watch whose week fell on the week upon which there was a festival would get the offerings that were brought not on account of the festival. They would get the tamid, the daily offerings. They also received the individual voluntary offerings—vow offerings and free-will offerings. They also received other public offerings not listed in the previous mishnah. This would include the Shabbat musaf offerings. Finally, they would get any offering that was brought for some reason other than the festival. This would include first-born animals and tithes. We should note that despite the fact that the festival offerings were divided up equally among the different watches, it surely would have been a bonus to have one’s watch fall on the festival for the simple reason that more people came to the Temple at these times. It was at these times of the year that people would have brought their voluntary offerings, their first-born animals, their animal tithes and other offerings. Hence, it was probably quite lucrative to have your watch fall during the festival.
  IntroductionToday’s section explains various portions of the mishnah that deal with what parts of sacrifices each of the watches receive.
  The mishnah had taught that the “emurim” were shared by all the watches. The usual meaning of “emurim” are the parts that are completely burned on the altar. So how could this belong to the watches of priests? It belongs to God!R. Hisda therefore reinterprets the word to be pronounced “said”—the mishnah refers to the special sacrifices offered on the festivals.
  This baraita offers a midrash supporting the idea that during the festivals all watches share the sacrifices equally. The Torah refers to a priest who comes to Jerusalem when he so desires and serves in the Temple there. The beginning of the verse describes the priest as coming from “one of your gates.” The midrash interprets these words to mean that the priest comes when all of Israel is gathered at “one of your gates” meaning in one city. This is, at least idealistically, during one of the festivals. Thus they share the sacrifices only when all of Israel is gathered together in Jerusalem.
  
  Daf 56a
  
  This baraita proves that the watches share the showbread on the festivals.The Torah states that the priests shall receive equal portion of their dues, meaning of the sacrificial food. This means that since they offer the sacrifices equally, they share the proceeds. The question is—to what does this refer? We already know from Leviticus that when a priest offers a sacrifice, it is his right to eat it. So what more could we learn from the verse in Deuteronomy. The answer is that it refers to the showbread.Now the showbread is a weekly offering. It is not connected to the festival at all. We might have thought that just as all priests share the showbread during the festival, so too they share all offerings that are offered on the festivals, even those that are not connected to the festivals. This would include voluntary offerings that people happen to bring during that week. The answer is midrashically derived from the next verse. The Torah says that all of the priests share only to that which has been sold according to their fathers’ houses. What they sold to the other is basically the system of watches, whereby one watch serves this week, receives all of the sacrifices, and in return, allows the other watches to serve in other weeks and receive all of the sacrifices then. This means that any sacrifice except for the showbread that does not come because of the festival, is taken by that week’s watch.
  IntroductionToday’s sugya discusses the order of the blessings recited when we first enter the sukkah.
  This amoraic debate is over which blessing is said first—”who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to dwell in the Sukkah” or “who has kept us alive and brought us to this day” (shehehiyanu). According to Rav we first recite the blessing over the sukkah because that is the obligation of the day, and the obligation of the day always takes precedence. According to Rabbah b. Bar Hannah we first recite the blessing over the season because it is recited more frequently than the blessing over the sukkah and there is general halakhic principle that whatever is performed more frequently is performed first.
  The Talmud now tries to establish a parallel between the dispute concerning the two blessings recited upon entering the Sukkah and the dispute between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel concerning the two blessings that constitute Kiddush. Bet Shammai holds that one first recites the blessing over the day (mekadesh hashabbat/hazemanim) and then the blessing over the wine (bore peri hagafen) because the important occasion of the holy day is what causes the wine to be drunk. This is similar to Rav who holds that the blessing over the sukkah comes first due to its importance.Bet Hillel holds that we first recite the blessing over the wine because it is more frequent. This is similar to Rabbah b. Bar Hannah who said the exact same thing with regard to the blessings of the sukkah. First the shehehiyanu, which is more frequently recited, then the blessing over the sukkah.Tomorrow’s section will reject this parallel. We should note that whenever the Talmud says, “shall we say X” it is always rejected. So stay tuned!
  IntroductionToday’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s comparison of the debate between Rav and Rabbah b. Bar Hannah over the order of blessings made in the sukkah with Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel’s dispute over the order of blessings of Kiddush.
  Rav said that we recite the blessing over the festival first and then the blessing over the season, whereas Bet Hillel said that when it comes to Kiddush, the blessing over the wine is first and then the sanctification of the day. These positions seem to differ. However, Rav claims that Bet Hillel made his statement only with regard to Kiddush, where the wine is the mechanism through which Kiddush (the sanctification of the day) is recited. No wine, no Kiddush. In contrast, the blessing over the sukkah is independent from the blessing over the season. It is recited even on subsequent days, when no blessing over the season. Therefore, it comes first.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hannah says that the blessing over the season comes first and then the blessing over the day. He could claim that Bet Shammai who says that the blessing over the day comes first could agree with him in the case of the sukkah that the blessing of the season is first. Bet Shammai says that the blessing over the day comes first because it is the reason that we drink the wine. No festival/Shabbat, no wine. In contrast, even if one didn’t have a sukkah, he’d still have to recite the blessing over the season. Therefore, the two are independent, and even Bet Shammai could agree that first the blessing over the season is recited and then the blessing over the day.
  The Talmud now raises a difficulty on Rav. On Shavuot there are both the regular showbread which comes in the form of matzah and the leavened bread of the two special loaves for Shavuot. The leavened bread is the essential main sacrifice of the festival, yet the matzah of the regular showbread is mentioned first when both breads are divvied out to the priests. This is a difficulty for Rav who holds that the blessing over the day comes first because that is the main feature of the day.
  Rav resolves the difficulty upon him by referring to a baraita in which there is a tannaitic debate over which comes first—the matzah or the unleavened bread. Rav would hold like Abba Shaul who says that they first mentioned the leavened bread, the special sacrifice for Shavuot.
  Here there is a dispute among later amoraim as to the order of the berakhot. The sugya concludes with a ruling that first we recite the blessing over the Sukkah (leshev basukkah) and then the blessing over the season (shehehiyanu). That is the way the practice remains to this day.
  IntroductionThis short section deals with the sacrifices divvied up the watch of priests whose set time fell during the festival.
  The mishnah had stated: “A watch whose period of service was fixed [for that festival week] offered the tamid, vow-offerings and freewill-offerings and all other public offerings; and it offered them all.”The Talmud asks what else the words “all other public offerings” includes. After all most public offerings had already been listed. It answers with two types of sacrifices not already mentioned—a bull brought when the entire congregation erred and sinned. And the male goats brought as atonement for unintentional acts of idolatry committed by the public.The second half of the mishnah also contains some additional words “and it offered them all.” What do these words come to include? The Talmud answers they include animals offered on the altar when it was not otherwise being used. The altar was not supposed to be left without any other sacrifice on it. Rashi explains that there were special funds for this. Occasionally an animal set aside for a sacrifice cannot be offered. It is then left to pasture until it develops a blemish. The animal is then “redeemed” meaning its value goes to the Temple and animal becomes non-sacred. These funds go for this purpose.
  IntroductionToday’s section is a mishnah. My commentary is taken from Mishnah Yomit.The final mishnah of Sukkah is a continuation of the previous mishnah which dealt with the division of the showbread.
  Section one: If Shabbat fell either on the day before the festival or the day after, all of the watches would receive an equal portion of the showbread. If it fell before the festival, they would have to get to Jerusalem before Shabbat, a day earlier than if the festival had fallen during the week. If it fell after the festival, they would have to stay a day later. Since they had to be there anyway, they received a portion of the showbread even though Shabbat was not on the festival.Section two: If there was one day in between Shabbat and Yom Tov, the watch whose week it was would get most of the showbread but not all. Since some of the watches might not be able to begin their way back home because they lived too far away to make it in one day, or might need to get to Jerusalem before Shabbat, they were compensated by getting at least a little bit of the showbread.Section three: At all other times of the year the incoming and outgoing watches would split the showbread evenly. The watches would actually switch their service on Shabbat. The new watch would arrange the new showbread and the two would split the showbread from the previous week.Rabbi Judah says that this division was not completely equal.Section four: In order that the watches should not get confused, the incoming watch would divide the showbread in the northern section of the Temple and the outgoing watch would divide in the south.Section five: Bilgah is the name of one of the watches (see I Chronicles 24:14). According to the Talmud they divided their sacrificial meat as punishment. We shall learn why in the final two sections of the tractate.In the Temple there were twenty-four rings, one for each watch. When skinning a sacrifice they could put the animal’s neck through the ring and have it held up while they skinned it. Bilgah’s ring was closed up so that they couldn’t use it. In addition, every watch had its own alcove in which they could store their knives. Bilgah’s was closed up, again as a punishment for their misdeeds.
  IntroductionThe mishnah had stated: “A festival which fell next to Shabbat, either before or after it, all the watches shared equally in the distribution of the showbread.” Our sugya discusses the precise meaning of this mishnah and then discusses other parts of the mishnah.
  If “before” means that the first day of the festival fell before Shabbat and “after” means that the last day of the festival fell after Shabbat, then the Shabbat is Shabbat Hol Hamoed. We already know from earlier in the mishnah that on this Shabbat the watches divide the showbread equally.Therefore, it must mean that the last day of the festival fell right before Shabbat or the first day of the festival fell right after Shabbat.
  If the last day of the festival comes right before Shabbat, then the watch that serves after the festival will have to arrive early and the watch that is leaving will have to stay an extra day. So too if the first day of the festival fell right after Shabbat. Since in either case both watches had to stay in Jerusalem an extra day, thereby overlapping with the other watch, the rabbis made an enactment such that they would eat together.
  
  Daf 56b
  
  In the mishnah R. Judah had stated that the watch that is incoming gets seven loaves whereas the watch that is outgoing takes only five. Why the extra two loaves?R. Yitzchak says that this is a reward for closing the doors, which were opened by the watch that was leaving in the morning. I guess this was a lot of work.The problem is that this system doesn’t really make sense. Why not just make it even every week? After all, the entering watch is going to receive less next week.Abaye answers with a maxim that is equivalent to our “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” The incoming watch would prefer to receive an extra two loaves now, even if that means they will receive less next week.
  IntroductionThis is it—the siyyum (conclusion) of Sukkah. This last section deals with the priestly watch known as Bilgah, and why they were set apart from the other watches.
  The watches generally divided their shares in separate sections of the Temple so that everyone could see that there were two watches, one whose week of service was beginning and one whose week was concluding. Furthermore, people seem to have entered in the north, such that it would make more sense that the incoming watch would divide in the north.
  According to this baraita, the watch of Bilgah was punished either for its apostasy or for its lack of diligence in Temple service. Modern historians note that this connects with the fact that the two Helenizing high priests in the Maccabean period, Simon and Menelaus, were both from the watch of Bilgah (this is preserved in II Maccabees 4:23). Furthermore, they were not late one time in their Temple service. Rather the watch wished to avoid their sacrificial duties altogether.Thus the baraita is partly reflective of second century B.C.E. reality. However, there is no hint in earlier sources as to the sins of one particular individual, Miriam the daughter of Bilgah. This is found only in rabbinic literature.The word “lokos” is Greek for wolf. Miriam accuses the altar of being a wolf, consuming Israel’s sacrifices without offering any benefit in return. Interestingly, this is probably a case of the rabbis using a marginalized figure to express their own doubt. They may have had their own doubts as to the efficacy of their sacrifices. Rather than express them themselves, they commonly attribute them to others, especially apostates and non-Jews.Yeshbav was the name of the watch that followed Bilgah. They were rewarded by always dividing in the north.
  The Talmud raises the difficulty that it does not seem fair to punish the entire watch on account of the actions of one individual.
  Abaye provides a two-part answer as to why the whole watch was penalized for one girl’s actions. First of all, a child’s words, thoughts and actions are reflective of her parents. Clearly, Miriam must have heard such talk from her mother and father.Second, while there is no evidence that the rest of the watch sinned, people who live in proximity to the wicked suffer the consequences. The whole watch of Bilgah is thus penalized for the evil behavior of the few.
  Congratulations! You finished the entire Tractate. This was an amazing accomplishment, especially if you stuck with it for all 55 daf (remember, we started on page 2). Learning a whole masekhet of Talmud justifies a siyyum—a celebratory mitzvah meal. Below is the Hebrew text recited at this occasion. You can recite the first part of this without a minyan, but the Kaddish which appears at the end requires a minyan. So bring it to your synagogue and celebrate.