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text: English Explanation of Mishnah Shevuot
  ביאור אנגלי על משנה שבועות
  Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp
  
  
  English Explanation of Mishnah Shevuot
  
  Introduction
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah one is an introductory mishnah to the entire tractate.  Besides mentioning oaths it mentions knowledge of impurity, a topic to be discussed throughout the remainder of the chapter.
  Oaths are of two kinds, subdivided into four;  There are two kinds of oaths of “expression” (category one above, in introduction) which are explicit in the Torah:  1)  A person swears to do something such as eating;  2)  A person swears to refrain from doing something.  If a person takes such an oath and then breaks it, he will be obligated to bring a sacrifice to atone for his sin (see Leviticus 5:4-13).  The types of oaths specifically referred to in the Torah are oaths regarding the future, that a person will or will not do something.  The Sages added two more types of oaths:  those taken with regards to the past:  1)  A person swears that he did do something; 2)  A person swears that he did not do something.  This is what the mishnah means when it says that there are two types of oaths which are four.
  The laws concerning the discovery of having contracted uncleanness are of two kinds, subdivided into four;  There are two types of sins mentioned in the Torah with regards to one who becomes impure without realizing it.  The first is one who is impure and then eats holy food, such as sacrifices or terumah (heave offering).  The second is one who is impure and then enters the Temple.  One who had intentionally committed one of these acts would be obligated for kareth (excommunication).  Our mishnah teaches that one who unintentionally does one of these acts, and later realizes what he has done, is obligated to bring a sacrifice.  The Sages added two other types of sins of this nature.  1)  A person knew that he was impure but did not know that what he was eating was holy food; 2)  A person knew that he was impure but entered the Temple without realizing that he was doing so.  In both of these cases the person is again obligated for a sacrifice.
  The laws concerning carrying on the Sabbath are of two kinds, subdivided into four.  On the Sabbath it is forbidden to carry an object from the private domain to the public domain.  The two primary categories of this prohibition are:  1)  A person stands in the public domain and puts his hand into the private domain and brings something out; 2)  A person stands in the private domain and puts something out into the public domain.  The Sages taught that there are another two categories of forbidden carrying:  1)  A person stands in the private domain and puts his hand out into the public domain and brings something in; 2)  A person stands in the public domain and puts something from there into the private domain.  These laws are discussed at greater length in Tractate Shabbath.  They are only mentioned here due to the similarity in language with the first two sections.
  The symptoms of negas are of two kinds, subdivided into four.  A nega is a skin disorder, discussed at length in Leviticus 13.  It is often referred to as leprosy but in truth we do not know precisely what disease is referred to in the Torah.  Our mishnah teaches that there are two types of negas mentioned specifically in the Torah:  1)  A swelling; 2)  A discoloration.  The Sages added two more types of negas, both of which are learned from the word “rash” mentioned in the verse.  These laws are discussed at greater length in Tractate Negaim.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah two begins to define when a person is obligated to bring a sacrifice in a situation where he did not know that he had been impure.
  Our mishnah begins to discuss the laws concerning the discovery of the contracting of uncleanness mentioned in section two of the previous mishnah.
  Where there is knowledge at the beginning and at the end but forgetfulness between,  a “sliding scales” sacrifice is brought.  In order for one to become obligated to bring a sacrifice for this type of sin, one must have known that he had become impure, and then forgot, and then ate of a holy thing or entered the Temple, and then afterwards remembered that he was impure.  In other words there must be knowledge of the impurity in the beginning of the process and knowledge at the end, as well as forgetfulness in between at the time when he either at holy food or entered the Temple.
  Where there is knowledge at the beginning but not at the end, the goat which is [sacrificed and its blood sprinkled] within [the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement]  together with the Day of Atonement itself hold the sin in suspense until it become known to the sinner, and he brings the “sliding scale” sacrifice.  If after having eaten the holy food or entered the Temple one never afterwards rembembered that one was impure at the time, obviously one will not even realize the need to bring a sacrifice to atone for the sin.  Therefore our mishnah teaches that the sin is suspended, meaning punishment for the sin is suspended, through the sacrifice of the goat on Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) and through Yom Kippur itself. Once he does remember what he has done, although Yom Kippur and the sacrificial goat have meanwhile suspended the punishment for the sin, he must bring a sacrifice in order to achieve full atonement.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah three continues to define when a person is obligated to bring a sacrifice in a situation where he did not know that he had been impure.
  Where there is no knowledge at the beginning but there is knowledge at the end, the goat sacrificed on the outer altar together with the day of atonement bring atonement, for it says: “[one he-goat for a sin-offering] beside the sin-offering of atonement” (Numbers 29:1:  for that which this goat [prepared inside the Holy of Holies] atones this goat [prepared outside] atones: just as the ‘inner’ goat atones only for a sin   where there was knowledge [at the beginning], so the “outer” goat atones only for a sin   where there was knowledge [at the end]. Our mishnah deals with the situation where a person did not know that they had become impure and then ate of holy food or entered the Temple and then realized that they were impure.  Since there is not knowledge in the beginning and in the end, this person cannot achieve atonement by personally bringing a “sliding scale” sacrifice.  Rather our mishnah teaches that the goat sacrificed on Yom Kippur at the outer altar as a sin-offering brings atonement from this person.  This teaching is learned by a comparison with the goat offered inside the Holy of Holies.  Just as the goat offered inside brings atonement in a case where there was knowledge of the contraction of uncleanness, in this case prior to the eating of the holy food or the entering into the Temple (see mishnah two) so too the goat offered outside brings atonement in a case where there was knowledge of the contraction of uncleanness, in this case after the eating of the holy food or the entering into the Temple.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah discusses which goat offerings atone for which sins.  There are three goat offerings discussed in this mishnah, all of which are sin-offerings (hatat):  1)  Those offered on festivals; 2)  Those offered on the first of the new month; 3)  The goat offered on the outer altar on Yom Kippur.  The Sages all agree in general that these sin-offerings atone for one who imparts impurity either to holy food or to the Temple. However, they disagree as to which goat atones for which specific sin.
  Where there is no knowledge [of the impurity] either at the beginning or at the end, the goats offered as sin-offerings on festivals and new months bring atonement, the words of Rabbi Judah.  According to Rabbi Judah, the goats offered on the holidays and on the new months atone for sins of impure people who entered the Temple or ate holy food, in cases where their impurity never became known to them.  In the previous two mishnayoth we learned the procedures of atonement in cases where their impurity did become known to them, either in the beginning in the end.
  Rabbi Shimon says:  “The festival goats atone [for such sins] and not the new moon goats.   And for what do the new month goats bring atonement?  For a pure man who ate impure holy food.”  According to Rabbi Shimon, the goats offered on the festival atone for sins of pure people eating holy food or entering the Temple.  The goats offered on the new month atone for sins whereby a pure person unintentionally ate impure holy food.
  Rabbi Meir says:  “All the goats have equal powers of atonement  for imparting impurity to the Temple and holy food.  According to Rabbi Meir all three of the goats mentioned here atone for all three of the crimes mentioned in this mishnah and in the previous one:  1)  An impure person who entered the Temple or ate holy food and only realized that he had been impure after the fact; 2)  An impure person who entered the Temple or ate holy food and never realized that he had been impure; 3)  A pure person who unintentionally ate impure holy food.
  Rabbi Shimon used to say:  “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure man who ate impure holy food; and the festival goats atone for transgression of the laws of impurity where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; and the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement atones for transgression of these laws where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end.  This section reviews Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regards to the three goats and the three sins.  According to his opinion each goat atones for its own sin.  1)  The goat offered on new months atones for a pure person who unintentionally ate impure holy food.  2)  The goat offered on festivals atones for an impure person who entered the Temple or ate holy food and never realized that he had been impure.  3)  The goat offered on the outer altar on Yom Kippur atones for an impure person who entered the Temple or ate holy food and only realized that he had been impure after the fact.
  They  said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said to them: “Let it be offered.” They said to him: “Since they are not equal in the atonement they bring how can they take each other's place?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”  The Rabbis ask Rabbi Shimon what happens in a situation where one of the goats set aside to be offered on one of these occasions is lost and then found on a different occasion.  Since all three of the goats are all sin-offerings can the goat set aside for one occasion be offered on another?  Rabbi Shimon answers that it can.  The other Rabbis then raise a difficulty on Rabbi Shimon’s response.  Since according to Rabbi Shimon each goat atones for its own sin, it would seem that each goat is different from the other goats.  Therefore, how could a goat intended for example for a new month be offered on a festival?  Rabbi Shimon responds that they all have a common denominator in that they atone for sins of imparting impurity to the Temple and to holy food.  Since they are all means of atonement for similar types of sins, each can replace the other.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section five: Why is this question asked of Rabbi Shimon and not of Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Judah?  What might these other Sages have responded to this question?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section five: Why is this question asked of Rabbi Shimon and not of Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Judah?  What might these other Sages have responded to this question?
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah five is a continuation of the discussion in the previous mishnah.  There we learned three different opinions with regards to the topic of which sin-offering goats bring atonement for which sin.  The final opinion was that of Rabbi Shimon, whose full name is Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai.  According to his opinion each goat atones for its own sin.  1)  The goat offered on new months atones for a pure person who unintentionally ate impure holy food.  2)  The goat offered on festivals atones for an impure person who entered the Temple or ate holy food and never realized that he had been impure.  3)  The goat offered on the outer altar on Yom Kippur atones for an impure person who entered the Temple or ate holy food and only realized that he had been impure after the fact.  Our mishnah contains a different version of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai’s opinion, taught by Rabbi Shimon ben Judah, one of his students.  It seems that the students of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, who lived in the middle of the second century C.E., disputed what their teacher’s opinion really was.  The previous mishnah contained one student’s opinion and our mishnah contains another’s.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Judah said in his name [of Rabbi Shimon (bar]:  “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food; the festival goats, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food, atone also for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food and for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end, atones also for a case where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end.  According to Rabbi Shimon ben Judah the goats offered on the festival atone for a pure person who ate impure holy food, the goats offered on the new months atone for this sin as well as a case where an impure person entered the Temple or ate holy food and never realized that he had been impure, and the goat offered on the outer altar on Yom Kippur atones for both of these previous sins as well as a case where an impure person entered the Temple or ate holy food and only realized that he had been impure after the fact.  In other words festival goats atone for one sin, new month goats for two sins and Yom Kippur goats for all three of the sins under discussion.
  They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said, “Yes.” They [further] said to him: “Granted that the Day of Atonement goat may be offered up on the new month, but how can the new month goat be offered up on the Day of Atonement to bring atonement for a sin that is not within its scope?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”  Similar to the previous mishnah, our mishnah now continues with a discussion of a case where one of the goats set aside to be offered on one of these occasions is lost and then found on a different occasion.  The question is asked: since they are all sin-offerings, can one be offered in another’s place?  Rabbi Shimon ben Judah answers that they can, just as his teacher Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai answered in the previous mishnah.  The Rabbis then raise a difficulty with this answer.  It is possible to understand how a Yom Kippur goat could be offered on the new month, since all of the sins for which the new month goat atones, the Yom Kippur goat also atones.  However, how can a new month goat be offered on Yom Kippur since the new month goat does not atone for all of the sins for which a Yom Kippur goat atones? Rabbi Shimon ben Judah’s answer is the same answer as that of his teacher. All of the goats have a common denominator in that they atone for sins of imparting impurity to the Temple and to holy food.  Since they are all means of atonement for similar types of sins, each can replace the other.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What is the difference between the end of this mishnah and the end of the previous mishnah?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What is the difference between the end of this mishnah and the end of the previous mishnah?
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah six continues to discuss which sacrificial goat brought as a sin-offering brings atonement for which transgression.
  For intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food, the goat offered inside [the Holy of Holies] on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself bring atonement.  The previous several mishnayoth discussed for which sins the goats offered on new months, festivals and at the outer altar in the Temple on Yom Kippur bring atonement.  Our mishnah discusses yet a fourth goat, the goat sacrificed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur and whose blood is sprinkled inside the Holy of Holies.  This goat along with Yom Kippur itself atones for intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.  The previous mishnayoth discussed only unintentional sins.
  For other transgressions of the Torah, light and grave, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive and negative, those punishable by kareth and those punishable by death imposed by the court   for all these the scapegoat [sent out on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement.  All of the other possible transgressions of the Torah’s laws, no matter how they are punished and no matter how serious they may be, whether done intentionally or unintentionally, are atoned for by the scapegoat, sent out to the wilderness, on Yom Kippur.  This teaching is learned from Leviticus 16:21-22:  “And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat and confess over it all the iniquities and transgressions of the Israelites, whatever their sins, putting them on the head of the goat; and it shall be sent off to the wilderness through a designated man.  Thus the goat shall carry on it all their iniquities to an inaccessible region.” Our mishnah does not mention this, but there is one exception to this rule:  transgressions between one human being and another, for instance shaming another person in public.  The last mishnah in Tractate Yoma, which deals with Yom Kippur, states explicitly:  “For sins between a man and God Yom Kippur atones; for sins between a man and his fellow, Yom Kippur does not atone.”
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah seven discusses differences between the atonement of Israelites and the atonement of priests.
  [The scapegoat] brings atonement to Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest alike. What [then] is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest? [None], save that the bullock [offered on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement to the priests for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.  The scapegoat mentioned in the previous mishnah atones for the transgression of all of the members of Israel, including the priests.  The one difference between priests and regular Israelites is that priests are atoned for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food by the sacrificial bullock, brought on Yom Kippur.  This is learned from Leviticus 16:11, “Aaron shall then offer his bull of sin offering, to make expiation for himself and his household.”  “His household” refers to all of the priesthood.  However, except for this difference, there is not difference in the atonement process for priests and Israelites.
  Rabbi Shimon says:  “Just as the blood of the goat that is offered within [the Holy of Holies] brings atonement for Israelites, so the blood of the bullock [offered on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement for priests; and just as the confession of sins pronounced over the scapegoat brings atonement for Israelites, so the confession pronounced over the bullock brings atonement for priests.  Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the opinion in the previous mishnah.  H learns this by means of an analogy.  Israelites receive atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food by the sprinkling of the blood of the inner goat, without the confessional recited on the scapegoat.  So too do priests receive atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food by the means of the blood of the sacrificial bullock without the confessional mentioned Leviticus 16:11.  Therefore, we must ask, for what sin does the confessional bring atonement?    According to Rabbi Shimon the confessional over the bullock acts for priests the same way that the confessional over the scapegoat acts for Israelites.  Just as the confessional over the scapegoat brings atonement for all sins for Israelites, so too the confessional over the bullock brings atonement for all sins for priests.  This is the disagreement between Rabbi Shimon and the opinion in section one:  according to Rabbi Shimon priests receive atonement for most of their sins by the confession over the bullock, while according to the other Sages they receive atonement the same way other Israelites do, by the confession over the scapegoat.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah one discusses the second clause of the first mishnah of chapter one, which dealt with the case where a person either entered the Temple or ate holy food without knowing that he was impure.
  The first line of the mishnah is a quote of the second clause of the first mishnah in chapter one.  After a long digression in chapter one in which the mishnah discussed which goats offered as sin-offerings atone for which types of crimes, our chapter returns to discuss the main topic at hand:  the case where a person unknowingly became impure and entered the Temple or ate holy food.  To refresh our memories, according to chapter one in order to enter into this category one must first have awareness then forgetfulness and then awareness.  Our mishnah explains the four different possibilities for such a scenario.
  The laws concerning the discovery of having contracted uncleanness are of two kinds, subdivided into four;[If] he became impure and was aware of it, then he forgot that he had been impure, though he remembered that the food was holy; [If the fact that it was] holy food was unknown to him, though he remembered that he was impure; [If] both were unknown to him; And he ate holy food, and was not aware, and after he had eaten, he became aware:   in these cases he brings a sliding scale sacrifice.  In all of the cases mentioned in this section the transgression is the eating of holy food while impure.  There are actually three different possibilities mentioned in the mishnah, although the mishnah considers them to be two:  1)  He knew that had contracted impurity, and then forgot but he knew that the food that he was eating was holy; 2)  He forgot that the food that he was eating was holy but he knew that he was impure; 3)  He forgot that the food was holy and that he was impure.  In all of these cases if he were to eat of the holy food while being unaware either that he was impure or that the food was holy (or both) and afterwards realized that the food was holy or that he was impure, he is obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice.  A sliding scale sacrifice is a sacrifice brought based on the economic means of the sinner.  If he has financial means he must bring either a sheep or goat.  If he cannot afford a sheep or a goat he brings two turtledoves.  If he can’t even afford these, he may bring a grain offering.  This sacrifice is described in Leviticus 5:6-13.
  [[If] he became impure and was aware of it, then he forgot that he had been impure, though he remembered that [he was entering] the Temple; [If the fact that he was entering] the Temple was unknown to him, though he remembered that he was impure; [If] both were hidden from him; And he entered the Temple and was not aware, and after he had gone out, became aware:   in these cases he brings a sliding scale sacrifice.  This section teaches the exact same law as in section one, except the sin discussed here is entrance into the Temple while impure.  In this case either forgetting that he is entering  the Temple or forgetting that he is impure or both will obligate him to bring a sliding scale sacrifice.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah consider the three possibilities in each section to be only two?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah consider the three possibilities in each section to be only two?
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah two discusses which areas of the Temple are included in these laws.
  It is the same whether one [while impure] enters the Temple court or the addition to the Temple court, for additions are not made to the city [of Jerusalem], or to the Temple courts except by the king, prophet, Urim and Thummim, the Sanhedrin of seventy one, and with two [loaves] of thanksgiving, and with song. And the court walks in a procession, the two [loaves] of thanksgiving [being carried] after them, and all Israel [following] behind them. The inner one is eaten, and the outer one is burnt. And as to any addition that was made without all these   he who enters it [while impure] is not liable. A person who is impure and enters the Temple is obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice even if he only entered an addition that had been made to the Temple court.  In other words, the holiness inherent to the Temple is also to be found in any additions made to the Temple.  The reason is that the additions made to the Temple are made with the consent of all of the ruling institutions in Israel, as well being performed in a religious ceremony.  Additions to the Temple or to the city of Jerusalem, which is also considered to be holy, can only be made with the consent of the following parties:  1)  the king; 2)  the Urim and Thummim, the two stones that sat in the high priest’s breastplate which were used to receive oracles (see Numbers 27:21);  3)  the Sanhedrin of 71 elders.  The additions to the Temple would be made in a great procession with two loaves of thanksgiving.  Any addition to the Temple that was not made using all of these elements was considered to be of a lower status.  Therefore, one who entered there while impure would not have to bring a sliding scale sacrifice. This mishnah has some interesting historical implications.  In the Second Temple period, which began in the 5th century B.C.E. and continued until the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E. there were no Urim and Thummim.  Therefore, any additions to the Temple would not have been of the same holiness.  On the other hand, the mishnah does not completely delegitimize these additions to the Temple.  The last clause in the mishnah indeed admits that additions to the Temple can be made without the approval of the all of these parties.  The only consequence is that one who entered there impure would not be obligated to bring a sacrifice.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why do you think that in order to add on to the Temple they need the approval of the king, the priestly oracles and the Sanhedrin?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why do you think that in order to add on to the Temple they need the approval of the king, the priestly oracles and the Sanhedrin?
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah three discusses one who entered the Temple while impure.
  If he became impure while in the Temple court [and was aware of it], and then forgot that he was impure, though he remembered that he was in the Temple; [Or] he forgot that he was in the Temple, though he remembered that he was impure; [Or,] he forgot both; And he prostrated himself, or waited [in the Temple] the time it takes to prostrate; Or went out the long way, he is liable; [If he went out] the shorter way, he is not liable;  This section is similar to the teaching in mishnah one, except it presents a new problem:  he is actually in the Temple while he becomes impure. Since it is forbidden to be in the Temple while impure he therefore must leave immediately, and in the shortest possible manner.  To remind ourselves, in order for him to be liable for a sliding scale sacrifice for having been in the Temple while impure he must have awareness, forgetting and then afterwards awareness.  Our mishnah teaches that the forgetting can either be of the fact he was impure or that he was in the Temple or both.  As long as he knew what had happened or where he was and forgot one of those two things or both, and then he worshipped in the Temple by prostrating himself, or even stayed in the Temple long enough to prostrate, or even did not take the quickest way out, he is obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice.  In other words, should he delay himself at all within the Temple after having become impure he will be obligated for a sliding scale sacrifice.  Only if he goes out immediately will he be exempt.
  This is the positive precept concerning the temple for which they [the court] are not liable.  Usually, if the court gives a mistaken ruling with regards to a mitzvah that is punishable if done intentionally by kareth and obligates one for a sacrifice if done unintentionally, the court must bring a bullock as a sacrifice (see Leviticus 4:12).  However, in this case, if the court told the person who had become impure while in the Temple that it was okay to leave through a longer path, the court is not obligated to bring the sacrifice.  We will learn this law again in Tractate Horayoth 2:4, the last tractate in Seder Nezikin.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four contains a short digression which discusses the obligation of a court to bring a sacrificial bullock if they give a wrong teaching.  This subject is learned more fully in Tractate Horayoth.  This digression is found here because one of the wrongful teachings for which the court is not obligated is given as an example in mishnah three.
  And which is the positive precept concerning a menstruant for which they are liable? [This:] if one cohabited with a [ritually] pure woman, and she said to him:  “I have become impure”, and he withdrew immediately, he is liable, because his withdrawal is as pleasant to him as his entry. This mishnah continues the subject taught in section two of the previous mishnah, namely cases where the court is or is not obligated to bring a sacrifice if they gave a mistaken ruling.  In Tractate Horayoth 2:4 we will learn that if the court made a mistake with regards to the laws of menstrual purity, in either a positive or negative commandment, they must bring the sacrifice.  Our mishnah asks what is the positive commandment to which that mishnah refers. The answer is a case where a man was having sexual relations with a pure woman, i.e. a woman who was not menstruating.  If, while having sex she told him that she had just begun to menstruate, he has a problem, since the Torah forbids sexual relations with a menstruant (Leviticus 20:18).  Our mishnah teaches that if the court instructed him to withdraw immediately, the court has taught mistakenly and must bring a sacrifice.  This is because his withdrawal while erect is actually pleasurable for him.  Rather he is forbidden to withdraw until his erection disappears.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Rabbi Eliezer said:  “[Scripture says: ‘If any one touch… the carcass of] an impure creeping thing, and it be unknown to him’ (Leviticus 5:2), when the impure creeping thing is unknown to him, he is liable; but he is not liable, when the [fact that he is in the] Temple is unknown to him.”Rabbi Akiba said:  “[Scripture says:] ‘and it be hidden from him that he is impure’:   when his impurity is unknown to him, he is liable; but he is not liable, when the [fact that he is in the] Temple is unknown to him.”Rabbi Ishmael said:  “[Scripture] twice [says:] ‘and it be hidden from him’, in order to make him liable both for the forgetfulness of the impurity and the forgetfulness of the Temple.”Mishnah five conclude the discussion of a person who enters the Temple while not realizing that he is impure.  It contains a midrashic discussion which took place between Rabbis Eliezer, Akiba, and Ishmael.As we have explained throughout this chapter, in order to be obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice one must have known something and then forgotten it and then remembered it later on.  In both mishnah one and mishnah three of this chapter we assumed that what was known and forgotten was either the fact that he was impure or the fact that he was in the Temple or both.  This is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael in section three.  His opinion is the dominant opinion in this chapter of mishnah.Rabbi Eliezer holds that what was known and then forgotten was specifically the source of the impurity, be it an impure creeping thing or other source of impurity mentioned in Leviticus 5:2 (carcasses of pure animals).  If he forgot that he was in the Temple he is not obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice.  Likewise if never knew that he had been made impure by an impure creepy thing, but merely knew that he was impure, he is not obligated.Rabbi Akiva holds that what was forgotten was the fact of impurity but not the fact that he was in the Temple.  Unlike Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Akiva does not limit the knowledge and subsequent forgetfulness to the source of the impurity.  Even if he never knew what the source of the impurity was, but knew only that he was impure and then forgot, he will be obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice.  Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael in that the latter holds that being aware and then forgetting that one was in the Temple also makes him obligated for bringing a sliding scale sacrifice, whereas Rabbi Akiva (and Rabbi Eliezer) believe that it does not.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah begins to discuss oaths, the main topic of the tractate.  The oaths discussed in the beginning of this chapter are oaths of utterance, whereby one swears that he has or has not done something, or that he will or will not do something.  One who breaks such an oath is liable for a sliding scale sacrifice, described in chapters one and two and in Leviticus 5:6-13.
  Oaths are two, subdivided into four. “I swear I shall eat”, and “[I swear] I shall not eat”; “[I swear] I  have eaten”, and “[I swear] I have not eaten”.  The first line of this mishnah is a quote of the first mishnah of the tractate.  After two chapters of digression, we return to the main topic at hand, oaths.  Our mishnah lists all four types of oaths of utterance, two with regards to the past and two with regards to the future, two negative and two positive.  Eating is just an example of a common oath.  An oath can involve most types of actions.
  “I swear I shall not eat”, and he ate [even] a minute quantity, he is liable, the words of Rabbi Akiva. They [the Sages] said to Rabbi Akiva:  “Where do we find that he who eats a minute quantity is liable, that this one should be liable?” Rabbi Akiba said to them:  “But where do we find that he who [merely] speaks brings a sacrifice, that this one should bring a sacrifice?”  According to Rabbi Akiva, one who swore not to eat and then ate is liable to bring a sacrifice even if he ate the most minute amount of food.  The Sages raise a difficulty on this Rabbi Akiva’s position.  Generally, a person is not obligated for having eaten a forbidden food unless he ate a minimum measure of the food, usually the size of an olive.  Rabbi Akiva responds that we cannot compare the laws of oaths of utterance to any other laws, for an oath of utterance can obligate a person to bring a sacrifice of atonement just by his having said something.  In all other realms of law in order to be liable to bring a sacrifice of atonement one has to actually perform a sin.  Only with regards to oaths of utterance can a person merely retract on his words, and thereby be obligated for a sacrifice. Since the laws of oaths of utterance are already different, there is no room, according to Rabbi Akiva, to compare them to other laws.
  [If a man says,] “I swear I shall not eat” and he ate and drank, he is liable only once. “I swear I shall not eat and I shall not drink,” and he ate and drank, he is liable twice.  This section deals with the question is drinking subsumed under the category of drinking.  According to the mishnah, generally drinking is considered a form of eating and therefore, if after having sworn not to eat, he eats and drinks, he is liable for only one sacrifice.  Drinking is considered a separate violation from eating only if he specifically swore not to eat or drink.  In this case if he ate and drank he would be obligated to bring two sacrifices.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What might be other reasons behind Rabbi Akiva’s opinion?
   What would be the ruling if someone swore not to eat and then drank but did not eat?  Would he be liable to bring a sacrifice for having violated his oath?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What might be other reasons behind Rabbi Akiva’s opinion?
   What would be the ruling if someone swore not to eat and then drank but did not eat?  Would he be liable to bring a sacrifice for having violated his oath?
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  “I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once.“I swear I shall not eat wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread,” and he ate [all three], he is liable for each one.Mishnah two discusses a person who swears not to eat different types of bread.  The question again is, how many different oaths did he make.Similar to the end of the first mishnah, we learn here that if a person made one oath not to eat and did not specify what foods were covered, he will be obligated to bring only one sacrifice if he were to break the oath.  If, however, he specifically swore not to eat three different types of bread and he ate all three, he is obligated to bring three sacrifices.  In this case he has actually sworn three oaths and subsequently broken three oaths, thereby making him obligated for three sacrifices.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  “I swear I shall not drink,” and he drank many liquids, he is liable only once.“I swear I shall not drink wine, oil, and honey,” and he drank [all three], he is liable for each one.Mishnah three discusses a person who swears not to drink.  The question again is, how many different oaths did he make.This mishnah teaches the same law as the previous mishnah, except it discusses drinking.  Again we learn that if he specifies what he will not drink, he has sworn (and then broken) three separate oaths and he will be obligated for three separate sacrifices.  If he makes one general oath, he will be obligated to bring only one separate sacrifice.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four continues to discuss how many oaths one is liable for when he takes an oath not to eat.  This mishnah talks about one who violates the oath by eating things that are either not fit to be eaten or forbidden.
  “I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate foods which are not fit to be eaten, and drank liquids which are not fit to be drunk, he is exempt.  Again this mishnah discusses a person who swears not to eat.  In this case after having sworn not to eat he eats food which are not fit to be eaten, for example rotten fruit, or drinks liquids not fit to drink.  The mishnah teaches that in such a case he is exempt from having to bring a sacrifice.  The assumption is that when a person swears not to eat his intention is not to eat food that is fit for consumption.  Therefore, by eating food not fit for consumption he has not in actuality broken his oath.
  “I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate carrion, trefot, and reptiles and creepy things, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him.  In this case the person who swore not to eat, ate foods which are forbidden to a Jew.  Carrion are animals that died either a natural death or died as a result of an improperly carried out act of ritual slaughter.  Trefot are animals that were either torn by beasts of prey or afflicted with severe diseases or defects that would have caused them to die within 12 months.  They are both forbidden to eat, as are reptiles and creepy things.  If one swears not to eat them and does eat them, according to the first opinion he is liable to bring a sacrifice.  Even though he is forbidden to eat them, they are still considered edible food, which other people eat, and therefore he has broken his oath. Rabbi Shimon disagrees.  According to his opinion, at Mount Sinai the Jewish people took an oath not to break the commandments. This oath was binding for all future generations as well.  Therefore, one cannot add another oath to that which he has already sworn not to do.  One who does so has not done anything legally significant, and is therefore not obligated to bring a sacrifice.
  He said, “I vow that my wife shall not benefit from me, if I have eaten today,” and he had eaten carrion, trefot, forbidden animals, or reptiles, his wife is prohibited to him.  This section discusses vows (nedarim) which are halachically different from oaths (shevuoth).  If a man took a vow that if he had already eaten today his wife would be forbidden to benefit from him or his property, and he had in fact eaten a forbidden thing, she is forbidden to benefit from him.  This law is agreed upon by all of the Sages, even Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon in essence does consider eating forbidden food to be considered eating.  The reason that he exempted the one who swore not to eat and then ate forbidden food was that there was a prior existing oath upon him not to eat.  In the case in our section, this logic is not applicable.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section three:  How do you know that Rabbi Shimon would agree to the ruling stated in section three?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section three:  How do you know that Rabbi Shimon would agree to the ruling stated in section three?
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Our mishnah teaches that a person can swear with regards to things that concern himself or others.  He also may swear about things whether or not they have substance.
  The second half of the mishnah contains an important debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael with regards to the validity of oaths taken about the past.
  It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”,  or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.]  An oath of utterance is valid, according to the mishnah, whether or not it was taken with respect to himself or with respect to his involvement with others.  It is also valid even if the oath is made on a non-substantive thing.  The mishnah now gives example of all of these categories.
  It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”,  or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.]  One who takes an oath with regards to giving things to others has taken a valid oath, whether it was to give, not to give, that he had given or that he had not given.  This is an example of an oath with regards to others. If he breaks any of these oaths, or any of them turn out to be false, he will be obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice.
  It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”,  or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.]  Oaths regarding sleeping are also valid even though sleep is not a substantive thing.
  It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”,  or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.]  Throwing a pebble into the sea is a useless action that has no value to a human being.  For this reason the mishnah considers it a type of action that has no substance.  Nevertheless, if one takes an oath regarding throwing a pebble into the sea, the oath is valid.
  Rabbi Ishmael says:  “He is liable only for [an oath with regards to] the future, for it says,  “To do bad or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Rabbi Akiva said to him:  “If so, we would know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; but how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable? He said to him:  “From the amplification of the verse.” He said to him: “If the verse amplifies for that, it amplifies for this also.”  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regards to the validity of oaths taken about the past, such as “I swear that I did eat” or “I swear that I did not eat”.  Up until now, we have assumed that such oaths were valid (see mishnah one, and the first half of this mishnah).  Rabbi Yishmael disagrees.  According to Rabbi Yishmael oaths taken with regards to the future, i.e. “I swear that I will eat”, or “I swear that I will not eat” are valid.  Oaths taken with regards to the past are not valid.  Rabbi Yishmael learns this from Leviticus 5:4, which states “to do bad or to do good”.  The simple meaning of this verse is that the person is swearing to do or not do something in the future.  Rabbi Akiva responds to Rabbi Yishmael by pointing out that we cannot take the verse literally.  If we were to do so, we would rule that oaths are only valid if they are about doing something good or something evil.  However, we know that oaths can involve neutral activities as well, such as eating or drinking, which are neither “good” nor “evil”.   Rabbi Yishmael responds that the second half of the aforementioned verse in Leviticus which states, “whatever a man may utter in an oath” expands the category of oaths, thereby making neutral oaths also valid.  Rabbi Akiva argues that if the second half of the verse expands the validity of oaths to include neutral oaths, it also expands the category of oaths to include oaths with regards to past actions.  To summarize:  for Rabbi Yishmael the first half of the verse refers to oaths for the future involving “good or bad” while the second half of the verse expands the category of oaths to include all oaths about the future.  To Rabbi Akiva, the second half of the verse expands the category of oaths to include even oaths about the past.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  Whose opinion seems to be closer to the literal reading of the verse in Leviticus, Rabbi Yishmael’s or Rabbi Akiva’s?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  Whose opinion seems to be closer to the literal reading of the verse in Leviticus, Rabbi Yishmael’s or Rabbi Akiva’s?
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah six discusses swearing to either break or fulfill a commandment.
  The subject of this mishnah is swearing with regards to positive and negative commandments, a subject that the Mishnah dealt with briefly in mishnah four.
  If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra.  If a person swears not to fulfill a positive commandment, for instance he swears not to eat matzah on Passover, and he does eat it, he is not obligated for having broken his oath.  The positive commandment of matzah takes precedence over his oath.  Similarly, if a person swears to break a negative commandment, such as eating forbidden foods, and he then does observe the commandment by not eating the food, he is also exempt.  These cases are agreed upon by all of the Sages. The dispute in our mishnah is about a person who swears to observe a commandment and then does not.  For instance he swears to eat matzah on the first night of Passover and then he does not.  According to the Sages in section one, he is not obligated for having broken his oath.  Since he was already obligated to eat matzah on Passover, his oath did not add upon him any new obligation.  It is as if it had no effect and therefore if he breaks the oath by not eating matzah he will not be liable for having broken the oath.  Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra disagrees with this ruling, as we will learn in section two.
  [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him:  “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability];  But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!  Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra analogizes swearing on a commandment to swearing on an optional, non-commandment activity.  His argument is that just as a person is liable if he makes an oath about an optional activity and then breaks the oath, even though he had no prior obligation to perform this activity, all the more so he should be obligated if he makes and then breaks an oath with regards to a commandment, which he had a prior obligation to observe.  This type of argument is called a “kal vechomer” argument.  It takes a “light” law (the kal) and says that if the law is such in this case all the more so must it be in the “serious” law (the chomer).  Swearing on an optional activity is “light” and swearing on a commandment is “heavy”.  If one is obligated for the “light” all the more so is he obligated for the “heavy”. The Sages respond that the two cases are too dissimilar to be comparable.  In the case of swearing about optional activities, the oath is valid whether he swore in the positive (“I swear to eat”) or in the negative (“I swear not to eat”).   However, in the case of swearing about a commandment there is a difference between positive and negative swearing.  As we learned in section one, all of the Sages agree that if one swears not to perform a commandment he is exempt.  Since the two cases are already dissimilar, the Sages conclude that even if he swears positively with regards to a commandment he is exempt.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah seven concludes the mishnah’s discussion of “oaths of utterance.”
  “I swear I shall not eat this loaf”; “I swear I shall not eat it”; “I swear I shall not eat it”; and he ate it, he is liable only once.  If one repeats the same oath several times and then breaks the oath(s) he is only liable for having broken one oath.  Since after he made the first oath the loaf was already forbidden to him, he cannot make the same loaf any more forbidden to him.  The repeated oaths do not create any new forbidden things, and therefore they do not count.
  This is the oath of utterance, for which one is liable, for its willful transgression, flogging; and for its unwitting transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice. For a vain oath one is liable for willful transgression, flogging, and for unwitting transgression one is exempt.  This is the concluding section of mishnah which began at the beginning of the chapter and which has discussed “oaths of utterance.”  For intentionally breaking an oath of utterance one is flogged and for unintentionally breaking an oath of utterance one must bring a sacrifice.  The mishnah now mentions “vain oaths” a topic which will be discussed throughout the remainder of the chapter.  For intentionally swearing a vain oath one is flogged.  There is no punishment for unintentionally swearing a vain oath.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  At the end of the previous mishnah we were introduced to the concept of a vain oath, which is forbidden in Exodus 20:7, one of the verses of the Ten Commandments.  The punishment for intentionally swearing in vain is lashes and for unintentional swearing in vain there is no punishment.  Our mishnah lists four different types of vain oaths.
  What is a vain oath?If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to people, saying of a pillar of stone that it is of gold; or of a man that he is a woman; or of a woman that she is a man.  If one swears about something that is obviously false, for instance if he looks at a pillar of stone and swears that it is gold, then he has taken God’s name in vain by swearing in vain.
  If he swore concerning a thing which is impossible, [for instance if he said,] “If I have not seen a camel flying in the air”,  or “If I have not seen a serpent as thick as the beam of the olive press”.  Similarly, if he swears by something that cannot happen, for instance he swears that he saw a camel fly in the air, he has also sworn in vain.
  If he said to witnesses, “Come and bear testimony for me”, [and they replied,] “We swear that we will not bear testimony for you”.  According to Leviticus 5:1, if a person has been witness to an event he is obligated to testify.  If a person asks another person to testify and he has testimony to give, and he swears that the he will not testify, then he has sworn in vain.  This example actually can fit into the example in the next section, one who swears not to observe one of the commandments.  Since testifying is a positive commandment one who swears not to do so has sworn in vain.
  If he swore to annul a commandment, [for example] not to make a sukkah,  or not to take a lulav,  or not to put on tefillin. These are vain oaths, for which one is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression one is exempt.  One who swears not to observe one of the commandments has sworn in vain.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah consider all of these oaths to be in vain?
   What is the difference between a false oath and a vain oath?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah consider all of these oaths to be in vain?
   What is the difference between a false oath and a vain oath?
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah nine discusses one who takes two oaths, the second oath being the exact opposite of the first oath.
  [If one said:] “I swear I shall eat this loaf”; [and then he said,] “I swear I shall not eat it,” the first is an oath of utterance,  and the second is a vain oath. If he ate it, he transgressed the vain oath; if he did not eat it, he transgressed the oath of utterance. In the case in our mishnah a person swears two oaths, the second oath contradicting the first.  The first oath is considered to be a normal oath of utterance, which he must observe or be liable for breaking his oath.  The second oath is considered a vain oath, since it is forbidden to observe the oath.  In other words, similar to one who swears not to observe a commandment, this person has sworn to do that which is forbidden for him to do. If he eats the loaf, as he swore to do in the first oath, he is liable for having broken the second oath.  If he does not eat it, he is liable for having broken his oath of utterance.  In the Talmud it is explained that if he does not eat the loaf he has transgressed not only his oath of utterance but he has also made a vain oath, despite the fact that he kept the oath.  Since at the time that he made the oath it was forbidden to keep, he is liable for having made a vain oath even if he does keep it.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  Introduction
  The mishnah that we will learn today contains a list of when the oath of utterance is applicable.  A similar list will appear in tomorrow’s mishnah with regard to vain oaths.  The similarities between these two types of oaths will be contrasted with the rules of the testimonial oath, to be learned in the first mishnah of chapter four.  Some of the points in these mishnayoth may seem obvious.  They are included here only to be contrasted with what we learn in chapter four mishnah one.
  The oath of utterance applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man’s own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice. An oath of utterance equally applies to men and women.  Similarly it does not matter if the person swears concerning a relative or non-relative, one who is fit to testify or not fit to testify.  It can be uttered before or not before a court.  Again, these laws may seem obvious, but we will see in chapter four that they are different with regards to testimonial oaths. The oath of utterance must be uttered by the one swearing.  We will learn at the end of mishnah eleven that he may also swear by being adjured by someone else and answering amen. The end of the mishnah reiterates the punishments for breaking an oath of utterance. The punishments for oaths of utterance and vain oaths were already taught in mishnah seven.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is similar to the previous mishnah except that it discusses the vain oath.  The end of the mishnah discusses a similarity between the two oaths: in both cases one person can adjure another person.
  A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man's own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, stripes, and for unintentional transgression he is exempt.  This section is the same as the previous mishnah.  It is here only to contrast it with the rules of the testimonial oath taught in the next chapter.
  [In the case of] both this and that [oath], if he was adjured by the mouth of others, he is liable. How so? If he said, “I have not eaten today,” or, “I have not put on tefillin today” [and the another person said,] “I adjure thee,” and he said, “Amen!”, he is liable [if his oath was false].  A person need not utter the entire oath on his own in order for it to be valid.  If he makes a statement without using the language of an oath, and then another person adjures him with regards to the truth of his words, and he answers “amen”, he has sworn an oath.  In this case his answer “amen” to another person using the language of an oath makes it as if he himself swore.  If his oath is false he will be liable.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Leviticus 5:1 states, “If a person incurs guilt, when he has heard a public imprecation and although able to testify as one who has seen or learned of the matter he does not give information, so that he is subject to punishment.”  In simple English this verse refers to one who has sworn that he does not know information regarding another person’s case in court.  The Mishnah refers to this as an oath of testimony.  Our entire chapter discusses the rules and regulations of this type of oath.  The mishnah which we learn today and the one we will learn tomorrow serve as a contrast to the last two mishnayoth of chapter three, which discussed oaths of utterance and vain oaths.
  The oath of testimony applies to men and not to women, to non-relatives and not to relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and not to those unqualified.  And it applies only to those eligible to bear witness.  The oath of testimony only applies to those who are allowed to testify.  In other words, if a person adjures another person to testify on his behalf, and they know testimony, and they are qualified to testify, and they swear that they do not know any information, then these witnesses have made a false oath of testimony.  If they were not qualified to testify then they have not made a false oath of testimony, even if they knew information.  Therefore the rules of oaths of testimony do not apply to women, to relatives or to otherwise unqualified individuals (see Sanhedrin 3:3-4). In the last clause of this mishnah it is not entirely clear to whom the mishnah refers when it states that the oath of testimony applies only to those qualified to testify.  The Talmud interprets this clause to mean the King, who according to Sanhedrin 2:2 does not testify.
  Whether [uttered] in front of the court or not in front of the court, if [uttered] with his own mouth; [but if adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say:  “Whether [uttered] with his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court.”  According to Rabbi Meir, when an oath of testimony is sworn by the witness himself it can be done either before or not before a court  However, if the litigant adjures the witness to take an oath, then the witness is not obligated for making a false oath of testimony unless he denies knowing information while in front of the court.  The Sages say that in both the case of a witness swearing on his own and the case of the litigant adjuring the witness, the witness is not liable until he denies knowing information in front of a court.  One who swears a false testimony while not in front of the court is not liable.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does Rabbi Meir require denial in front of the court in a case where the litigant adjured the witness but not in a case where the witness himself swore?  Why do the Sages always require denial in front of a court?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does Rabbi Meir require denial in front of the court in a case where the litigant adjured the witness but not in a case where the witness himself swore?  Why do the Sages always require denial in front of a court?
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  And they are liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of knowledge of] testimony, but they are not liable for unintentional transgression.And what are they liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A sliding scale sacrifice.This mishnah continues the lists we have seen in the previous three mishnayoth.There are two elements to the false oath of testimony:  1)  knowing information and intentionally withholding it; 2)  intentionally swearing falsely that one does not know the information.  The mishnah teaches that if the witnesses intentionally deny knowledge of the testimony, even if they don’t realize that swearing falsely is forbidden, they are liable for intentionally swearing falsely.  However, if they don’t realize that they know information then they are not liable, since this was a totally unintentional transgression.  In other words, there punishment hinges upon their intentional denial of knowledge of information.  If they intentionally withheld information and swore to it, then they are liable to bring a sliding scale sacrifice, as described in Leviticus 5:5-13.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  The first half of mishnah three explains how an oath of testimony is done.  The second half of the mishnah discusses a witness who falsely swears five times that he had no knowledge of testimony.
  The oath of testimony:  How is it done? If he said to two [persons]:  “Come and bear testimony for me”; [and they replied:]  “We swear we know no testimony for you”; Or they said to him:  “We know no testimony for you”, [and he said:]  “I adjure you” and they said,  “Amen! “, they are liable.  An oath of testimony can be done in one of two ways.  The first way is for the litigant to ask the witnesses to come and testify on his behalf and for them to swear that they have no knowledge of testimony.  Alternatively the witnesses can state that they know no testimony and the litigant can adjure them that they know no testimony.  If they answer amen, they have sworn an oath of testimony.  If they have sworn falsely they are liable.
  If he adjured them five times outside the court, and the they came to the court and admitted [knowledge of testimony], they are exempt. If they denied, they are liable for each [oath]. If he adjured them five times before the court, and they denied [knowledge of testimony], they are liable only once. Said Rabbi Shimon: “What is the reason?   Because they cannot afterwards admit [knowledge].  This section discusses a case where a litigant adjured the witnesses five times.  The mishnah asks the question, in what case will they be liable for having sworn falsely five times, in what case they will be liable for having sworn falsely once and in what case will they be exempt. If, he adjured them outside of the court, and then when they came to court they admitted that they knew testimony, they are not liable.  As we learned in mishnah one, the denial of knowledge must occur in front of the court. If, after having adjured them five times they come to court and continue to deny knowledge, then they are liable for having sworn five false oaths of testimony.  The denial at court makes each oath outside of court a potentially effective oath, and therefore if it was false, it causes them to be liable. If he adjured them five times in front of the court and they denied knowledge each time, they will be liable for having sworn only one false oath.  Rabbi Shimon explains that since after the first denial in front of the court they will not be able to change their minds, the subsequent oaths were meaningless.  Once a person has in court denied knowing testimony he cannot change his mind and testify.  Since, except for the first oath, the other oaths were meaningless, he can only be liable for one false oath.
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four discusses how many of the witnesses deny knowledge such that they become liable for swearing a false oath of testimony.
  In order to understand this mishnah it is important to remember that in Jewish law two witnesses are needed to prove a case.  A single witness’s testimony is not acceptable in court.
  If both [persons] denied [knowledge] together, they are both liable.  If both witnesses deny knowledge at the same time then they are both liable for false oaths.  Since they both equally have caused the litigant to lose his case, they are both liable.
  If one after another, the first is liable, and the second exempt.  If one denies knowing testimony and then the second witness also denies, the first witness is liable and the second is not.  Since, when the second witness was asked to testify, the only other witness had already sworn that he had no knowledge, the second person’s testimony would not have been accepted in any case.  In other words, by denying knowledge he did not cause any loss to the litigant, and he is therefore not liable.
  If one denied, and the other admitted, the one who denied is liable.  If one person denies knowledge and the other person admits to knowing testimony, the first person is liable since he caused the litigant to lose his case.  If he had admitted, there would have been the sufficient two to prove the case.
  If there were two sets of witnesses, and the first denied, and then the second denied, they are both liable, because the testimony could be upheld by [either of] the two.  If two sets of two witnesses deny knowledge, one after the other, both sets, meaning all four witnesses, are liable.  Since the testimony could have been established by either set of witnesses, they have all caused a loss to the litigant by denying knowledge, and they are therefore, all liable.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What is the difference between the scenario in section two and the scenario in section four?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What is the difference between the scenario in section two and the scenario in section four?
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah five discusses combining several oaths into one oath or separating one oath into several oaths.
  “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that there are of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”; [And they respond]:  “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know not that there are of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”, they are liable for each one.  In the scenario in this section a person adjures witnesses to testify that another person has in his possession a deposit, a loan, a stolen object and a lost object that belong to him (the first person).  If the witnesses swear falsely that they know no testimony, they are only obligated for having sworn one false oath of testimony.  Since they made only one oath they can be obligated only once. If however, they swear four different oaths, by separately mentioning the deposit, loan, stolen object and lost object, then they are obligated for four false oaths.  Since they separated their response into four details they have sworn four oaths and they are obligated for each one.
  “I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that there is of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”; [And they respond]:  “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that there is of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”, they are liable for each one.  The scenario in this section is similar to the scenario in the previous section.  The only difference is that here at issue are three different kinds of grain.  Again, if the witnesses combine their denial into one oath, then they are obligated only once.  If they separate the oath into three different details they will be obligated for each detail.
  Questions for Further Thought:
  Why does the mishnah need to teach section two after having already taught section one?  Would you have been able to learn the ruling with regards to section two from having known only section one?
  Questions for Further Thought:
  Why does the mishnah need to teach section two after having already taught section one?  Would you have been able to learn the ruling with regards to section two from having known only section one?
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah six defines a false oath of testimony as denying testimony that would have aided the litigant in a monetary suit.
  All of the cases mentioned in our mishnah are cases where a person is adjuring witnesses to testify for him in a monetary suit.  In mishnah seven we will learn examples of testimony in non-monetary suits.  Together these two mishnayoth teach that if a person swears a false oath of testimony in a monetary suit he is liable, but if he swears a false oath of testimony in a non-monetary suit he is not liable.
  “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so owes me full damages, or half damages, or double payment, or four or five payment;  Half-damages are paid in cases where an animal damages in an unusual fashion, and it has not previously done so three times.  Full damages are paid in all other cases.  Double payment refers to a thief’s obligation to pay back double the theft.  Four and five times payment is what a thief must restore if he sold or slaughtered the stolen animal.
  Or that so-and-so raped my daughter, or seduced my daughter;  One of the penalties for rape and seduction of a virgin is a fine to the father of the girl.
  Or that my son struck me;  Striking one’s parent and not causing a wound is punishable by a financial penalty, as are all cases of personal injury.  In mishnah seven this will be contrasted with striking one’s parent and causing a wound, which is punishable by death.
  Or that my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Day of Atonement”; [And they deny knowledge of testimony] they are liable.  Injuring another person and causing a wound or burning their haystack on the Day of Atonement is punishable by kareth (excommunication) and a financial penalty.  In mishnah seven we will learn that doing either of these two things on the Sabbath is punishable by death.  As we shall learn there, there is a general rule in Jewish law that if a person does one action for which he is liable to pay money and to be executed he is executed and does not owe money (see Bava Kamma 8:5).  However, if by one action he is liable for kareth and to pay money, he gets kareth and still has to pay the money (see Bava Kamma 8:3).
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction Mishnah seven lists cases where although the person falsely testifies, since the case did not concern money, he is not guilty of a false oath of testimony.
  This mishnah is a contrast to mishnah six.  In it a person adjures witnesses to testify in non-monetary cases, or at least in cases in which the one adjuring does not stand to gain money by the testimony.
  "I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that I am a priest, or, that I am a levite, or, that I am not the son of a divorced woman, or, that I am not the son of a halutzah; That so-and-so is a priest, or, that so-and-so is a levite, or, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, or, that he is not the son of a halutzah; In all of these cases the testimony is about the status of either the person who adjures the witnesses or about a third party.  There is no monetary suit.  The son of  priest and divorcee or a priest and a halutzah (one rejected by the levir) are considered disqualified priests and they do not retain their priestly status.
  That so-and-so violated his daughter, or seduced his daughter; A person who rapes or seduces his own daughter is liable for the death penalty and not for a fine, as is one who rapes or seduces another person's daughter.
  That my son injured me; A child who strikes his parent and inflicts a wound is liable for the death penalty.  Since he will be executed he is exempt from paying a financial penalty, and therefore this case is not a monetary suit.
  That my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Sabbath" [And they deny knowledge of testimony] they are exempt. One who injures another person on the Sabbath or burns a haystack is liable for the death penalty.  Although these cases also involve financial damage, since a person cannot be obligated for death and payment for the same act, the criminal would be liable for death and not payment.   This is not, therefore, a monetary suit.
  Questions for Further Thought: Why might you have thought that these cases were monetary suits?
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses one who gives falsely swears about money that one person promised to give to another.
  [If a man said,]  “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so promised to give me two hundred zuz, and did not give me”, they are exempt, for they are liable only for a money claim as [in the case of] deposit. The oath of testimony is discussed in Leviticus 5:1.  Leviticus 5:21 discusses an oath a person makes to deny having received a deposit, a loan, found a lost object or a stolen an object.  The similarity in the language between these two verses led the Rabbis to conclude that although not mentioned specifically in verse 5:1 it is similar to 5:21 as it also concerns things similar to deposit.  Therefore, in order for the witnesses to be liable for a false oath of testimony they must deny knowledge of a case that is similar to the case of a deposit, where one person claims he deposited money with another.  If the case is one of a monetary promise, such as our mishnah, the false oath does not make the witnesses liable.
  
  Mishnah 9
  
  Introduction
  The mishnah continues to discuss cases that are not technically considered false oaths of testimony.
  “I adjure you that, when you know any testimony for me, you should come and bear testimony for me,” they are exempt, because the oath preceded the testimony. This mishnah teaches that the testimony must precede the oath.  A person may not in advance adjure witnesses that if they, in the future know any testimony for him, that they must come and testify.  The order of the verbs in Leviticus 5:1 also points to the fact that the testimony must precede the oath.
  
  Mishnah 10
  
  [If] he stood in the synagogue and said,  “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”, they are exempt unless he directs himself to them. If the litigant stood in a public place and adjured a large, unspecified crowd of people that they should testify for him, and they all swore that they knew no testimony, the ones who did in fact know testimony are nevertheless exempt.  The mishnah teaches that the litigant must specify exactly who he is adjuring. When learning this mishnah we must remember that people who witness an event have a religious duty to testify, regardless of whether the litigant adjures them or not.  Our mishnah merely teaches that they have not sworn a false oath unless specifically adjured.
  
  Mishnah 11
  
  If he said to two [persons]: “I adjure you, so-and-so and so-and-so, that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”: [And they replied,]  “We swear we know no testimony for you”, and they did know testimony for him, [but it was evidence of] one witness from the mouth of another witness; or if one of them was a relative or [otherwise] ineligible [as a witness], they are exempt. This mishnah teaches that if the witnesses who swore that they do not know testimony did know testimony but that the testimony would not have been accepted in the court, they are exempt for having sworn falsely.  The reasons that their testimony might not have been accepted are:  1)  the testimony was hearsay (see Sanhedrin 4:5); 2)  they were related to one of the litigants (see mishnah one of this chapter); 3)  they were otherwise unfit to testify (ibid.).  Since their testimony would not have been sufficient to render a verdict in any case, they are not liable for having sworn falsely.
  
  Mishnah 12
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah twelve teaches that the claimant must be the one who recites the adjuration.
  If he sent by the hand of his servant, or if the defendant said to them: “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for him you should come and bear testimony for him”, they are exempt, until they hear [the adjuration] direct from the claimant. If the claimant (the plaintiff) sends a servant to adjure potential witnesses to testify on his or if defendant the adjures the witnesses to testify in his defense, and the witnesses swear falsely they are not liable.  The claimant must be the one who adjures them directly.
  
  Mishnah 13
  
  Introduction Mishnah thirteen discusses different possibilities for the language of the adjuration.
     [If he said]: "I adjure you"; "I command you";  "I bind you"; they are liable. "By heaven and earth!", they are exempt. "By Alef Daleth"; "By Yod He";  "By God Almighty"; "By The Lord of Hosts; "By the Merciful and Gracious one"; "By the Long Suffering One";  "By the One Abounding in Kindness"; or by any of the substitutes [for the name], they are liable. The first section of our mishnah establishes which words are valid as words of adjuration.  If we look at Leviticus 5:1, the Biblical verse that discusses the oath of testimony, we will notice that the word shevuah, oath, is not used.  Rather the Torah uses the word allah which can mean a curse but can also mean an oath.  The Rabbis did not limit adjuration to the use of the word allah but extended it to included either a shevuah, or something similar.  We will learn what an allah is in section five.  This section discusses words that are similar to shevuah and therefore may be used in adjuration.
  Sections 1a and 1b contain invalid and valid substitutes for Gods name.  Heaven and Earth are not substitutes for Gods name and therefore may not be used in adjuration.  Heaven and earth were created by God but they are not potential substitutes for His name.  However, the letters of his name, and various substitutes used frequently in the Torah are valid.  "Aleph Dalet" are the first two letters of Adonay, which means "My Lord" and is a name frequently used for God.  "Yod He" are the first two letters of God's unpronounceable four letter name, YHWH.  The rest are names for God used in the Torah or attributes of God.
  He who blasphemes by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses his father or mother by any of them is liable according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses himself or his neighbor by any of them transgresses a negative precept. There are three different types of blasphemies mentioned in this section:  blaspheming God, blaspheming one's parents and blaspheming oneself or another person.  Blaspheming God or one's parents is punishable by death.  We learned in Sanhedrin 7:5 that one is not liable for having blasphemed unless he uses God's name.  According to Rabbi Meir, one who blasphemes using one of the aforementioned substitutes for God's name is liable for the death penalty.  According to the Sages he must use God's specific name, meaning the full four letter name.
  As an aside the mishnah mentions that blaspheming others and even blaspheming oneself violates a negative commandment.  The commandment referred to is in Leviticus 19:14, "Do not curse a deaf person".  The Rabbis reason that if it is forbidden to curse a deaf person it is also forbidden to curse any other person.  The Torah means to say, "Don't curse even a deaf person, who cannot hear."
   [If he said,]  "May God smite you"; or  "Yea, may God smite you";  this is the curse written in the Torah. "May [God] not smite you"; or "May he bless you"; Or  "May he do good unto you [if you bear testimony for me]": Rabbi Meir makes [them] liable, and the Sages exempt [them]. The mishnah now explains that the "alla", the curse mentioned in Leviticus 5:1 is saying "May God smite you [if you know testimony for me and do not testify]".  According to Rabbi Meir the "allah" may be phrased in the positive.  Instead of saying "May God smite you", the claimant may say something like, "May God be good to you if you testify for me".  According to Rabbi Meir from the positive statement you can conclude that the claimant means to say that if you do not testify may God not be good to you.  According to the other Sages the "allah" must be stated in the negative, as a curse.  Stating the adjuration in the positive does not allow one to conclude the negative.
  Questions for Further Thought: Why dont the Sages hold that one could phrase the "allah" in the positive?
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  Chapter five discusses the oath of deposit.  The scenario in which this type of oath would be taken is one where Reuven requests of Shimon to return to him something he (Reuven) left in his (Shimon’s) guard.  If Shimon denies having accepted the item as a deposit and takes an oath that he did not do so, and then admits that the oath was false, he is liable.  This oath is referred to in Leviticus 5:21-26.  An oath of deposit need not only be on a deposit but may be on any item that one person claims from the other.
  The first mishnah is similar to those that we have learned previously. It categorizes when and to whom this type of oath is applicable.
  The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear testimony] and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, [if uttered] from his own mouth. And [if adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, whether [uttered] from his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others   since he denied it, he is liable.  This section is similar to the mishnayoth learned at the end of chapter three and the first mishnah of chapter four, which discussed the same regulations with regards to other types of oaths.  The oath of deposit applies to anyone (as did the oath of utterance and the vain oath, but not the oath of testimony).  Again, there is a dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir with regards to whether or not the person must state the oath in front of the court in order to make it valid.  According to Rabbi Meir if the person utters the oath himself, he need not do it in front of a court.  If, however, he is adjured, meaning the claimant asks him “Do you swear?” and he answers “Amen”, then it must be done in front of the court.  According to the Sages, whether the person utters the oath on his own, or is adjured by others, he need not do so in front of a court.
  And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of having received the] deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver.  A person is liable whether he intentionally swears a false oath or even unintentionally swears a false oath, meaning he didn’t know that one who swears falsely is liable to bring a sacrifice, but did know that he had the object being claimed.  If he didn’t know that he had the object and then swore falsely, he is not liable.  If he has intentionally violated either of these (the oath or the knowledge of the deposit) he must bring a guilt offering which is worth at least two shekels.  This is the amount mentioned in Leviticus 5:15.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Compare this mishnah with the first two mishnayoth of chapter four.  What are the differences and why are they different?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Compare this mishnah with the first two mishnayoth of chapter four.  What are the differences and why are they different?
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah explains how an oath of deposit works.
  This mishnah is almost exactly the same as the chapter four, mishnah three.  It may help to look back there as well.
  The oath of deposit   how? If he said to him: “Give me my deposit which I have in your possession” [and the other replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession”; or he replied to him; “You have nothing in my possession,” [and the depositor said:] “I adjure you”, and he responded, “Amen!”, he is liable.  An oath of deposit may either be done by the claimant asking the other person to return the object and the other person swearing that it is not in his possession, or by the claimant adjuring the other person and the other person answering “Amen”.  In either case, if the other person falsely denied having the object he will be liable.
  If he adjured him five times, whether before the court or not before the court, and he denied, he is liable for each one. Rabbi Shimon said:  “What is the reason? Because he can retract and admit.”  If the claimant adjured the other person five times and he falsely denied it five times, he will be obligated for five sacrifices.  Rabbi Shimon explains that since he could legally change his mind and admit at any point that the object was in his possession, each subsequent oath is in fact effective and is treated as a new oath.  This differs from an oath of testimony mentioned in 4:3, where if the witnesses denied knowledge in front of the court five times, they will be obligated only once, since they cannot change their mind after having already testified.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Does the last section of this mishnah go according to Rabbi Meir or the Sages (see mishnah one)?  How so?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Does the last section of this mishnah go according to Rabbi Meir or the Sages (see mishnah one)?  How so?
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah distinguishes between cases where a person has taken one oath of deposit and cases where a person has taken more than one oath of deposit.  Similar mishnayoth were taught in 4:5, and 3:2-3 with regards to the other types of oaths.
  If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” [and he replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. [If he said:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says:  “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.”  In this scenario five people at the same time claim from one person an object that they say is in his possession.  If he takes one oath denying that he has the object, he will be liable for one sacrifice, if the oath was false. There are three different opinions as to how he can make his statement into five different oaths and thereby be liable for each one.  According to the first opinion each time he repeats “you” he is swearing a new oath, and will therefore be liable for another sacrifice.  According to Rabbi Eliezer, in order to make all of the subsequent “you”s into new oaths, he must repeat the word “oath” at the end of the statement.  If he does not it still counts as one oath.  According to Rabbi Shimon he must repeat the word, “I swear” to each individual who makes a claim against him.  If he does not it will count as one oath.
  “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one.  In this scenario a person claims four different categories of things from another person.  These four are patterned after the language of the Leviticus 5:21.  If the person responds with one oath of denial without specifying what he is denying, he will be liable for only one sacrifice.  If he mentions all four things which he is denying, he will be obligated for four sacrifices.
  “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession”, [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said:  “Even if he said, ‘... A grain of wheat, barley and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.  This same rule applies if the claimant claims different types of the same item.  Again, if he mentions each type individually, he is liable for multiple sacrifices. If he groups them together in one general statement, then he is liable for only one sacrifice.  Rabbi Meir adds that even if he slightly changes the language of the claim, from plural to singular, he is still liable.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah need to teach section three after having taught section two?  In other words, why would you have thought that the case of wheat, barley and spelt was different from the case of deposit, loan, theft and lost object?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah need to teach section three after having taught section two?  In other words, why would you have thought that the case of wheat, barley and spelt was different from the case of deposit, loan, theft and lost object?
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  The final two mishnayoth of chapter five teach that in order for one who makes a false oath of deposit to be liable to bring a sacrifice he must deny something to which if he had admitted he would have been liable.  Since he is not liable to pay a fine for a self-admission, he is not liable if he denies owing a fine.  He is liable only if he denies owing something which is considered financial compensation.  Mishnah four deals with a case of rape or seduction.
  “You raped or seduced my daughter” and the other says, “I did not rape, nor seduce,”   “I adjure you,”   and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission. They said to him:  “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish [to the girl], based on his own admission. According to the Exodus 22:15-16 and Deuteronomy 22:28-29, if a man rapes or seduces a virgin, he must pay her father a fine of 50 shekels.  The Rabbis added that besides the fine, he also has to pay other which penalties incumbent upon anyone who injures another person (see Bava Kamma, chapter eight).  He must pay for having embarrassed her, and he must pay for having injured her, thereby decreasing her value.  (We will learn the details of these laws in the third chapter of tractate Kethuboth.) In the scenario in our mishnah a man approaches another man and accuses him of having raped or seduced his daughter and therefore owing him the 50 shekels, plus the other penalties.  The person responds that he didn’t do so, and then when the claimant adjures him, he affirms the adjuration.  According to the first opinion in the mishnah, when he admits that he did in fact rape or seduce the other man’s daughter, he will be liable for a sacrifice for his false oath.  Of course he will also be obligated to pay the fine and the other financial penalties. Rabbi Shimon disagrees.  Since there is a rule in Jewish law, that one who admits to a crime does not have to pay the fine for having done so, even if this person had admitted to having raped or seduced the daughter, he would not have been obligated to pay the fine.  Therefore, there was no denial of money, and the laws of the oath of deposit do not apply. The Sages respond to Rabbi Shimon that although one who admits to a crime does not have to pay a fine, he does have to pay compensatory damages, which in this case include the payment for embarrassment and the payment for having decreased her value.  Since if he had admitted he would have had to pay, he did deny money, and is therefore liable for having sworn a false oath of deposit.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah five deals with a principle similar to that which we learned yesterday, namely that a person is only liable for an oath of testimony if had he admitted to doing what he swore he did not do he would have been liable to pay money.
  The examples in the first six sections of this mishnah illustrate the rule that is stated at the end.  If a person denies a claim, to which if they had admitted they would have had to pay money to the claimant, they have caused the claimant to lose money and are liable to bring a sacrifice.  If the person denies a claim, to which even if they had admitted they would not have been liable to pay money to the claimant, they have not caused the claimant to lose money, and they are therefore not liable for a sacrifice.  The other relevant rule for our mishnah is the one mentioned in the previous mishnah, that one is not obligated to pay a fine based on his own admission, but he is obligated to make financial compensation based on his own admission.  The general difference between a fine and financial compensation is that a fine is a fixed amount whereas financial compensation is based on the actual damages.
  “You stole my ox,” and he says, “I have not stolen it”   “I adjure You,”   and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable.  In this case a person denies having stolen the object.  If he had admitted to stealing he would have had to pay the value of the object to the owner, plus an additional one times the value of the object.  Paying back the value of the stolen object itself is considered financial compensation.  Since he would have been obligated to pay if he had admitted, he is liable for a sacrifice for having lied.
  “I have stolen it, but I have not killed it or sold it”,   “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt.  If the thief slaughters or sells the stolen animal he is liable to pay four (for a sheep) or five (for an ox) times the value of the stolen animal.  In this case the person admitted to stealing the animal but denied having sold or slaughtered it.  This extra payment, beyond the value of the animal, is considered a fine.  Since he would not have been obligated to pay even if he had admitted, he is not liable for a sacrifice for having lied.
  “Your ox killed my ox,” and he says, “It did not kill [your ox]”,    “I adjure you,”   and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable.  When one’s ox kills another’s ox, the owner of the ox that killed must financially compensate the owner of the dead ox. Since he would have been obligated to pay if he had admitted, he is liable for a sacrifice for having lied.
  “Your ox killed my slave,” and he says, “It did not kill [your slave]”,   “I adjure you,”   and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt.  When one person’s ox kills another person’s slave, the owner of the ox must pay the owner of the slave 30 shekels.  This is a fixed amount and is therefore considered a fine. Since he would not have been obligated to pay even if he had admitted, he is not liable for a sacrifice for having lied.
  He said to him, “You injured me, or bruised me,” and the other says, “I have not injured you or bruised you,”   “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable.  When one injures another person he is liable to make different types of financial compensation. Since he would have been obligated to pay if he had admitted, he is liable for a sacrifice for having lied.
  His slave said to him, “You knocked out my tooth, or blinded my eye,” and he said, “I did not knock out [your tooth], or blind [your eye],’   “I adjure you,”   and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt.  If a slave owner knocks out the tooth or puts out the eye of his slave he must set the slave free.  This is not a monetary claim but rather is considered to be a fine.  Since he would not have been obligated to set the slave free had he admitted to putting out his tooth or eye, he is not liable for a sacrifice for having lied.
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  In the previous three chapters the mishnah discussed oaths which a person takes on his own.  Our chapter begins to discuss oaths which are imposed by a court.  There are several different types of oaths that may be imposed by a court.  The first type of oath, the one described in our chapter, is sworn in a case where a person admits to owing part of a claim but denies the other part of the claim.  We will learn the particulars of this oath as we proceed.  For the sake of clarity, when explaining these mishnayoth we will use the name Reuven as the claimant, and Shimon as the defendant.
  The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so?  This section introduces two general rules for the “oath of judges” described in our mishnah.  The case is where Reuven tells Shimon that he owes him money and Shimon denies owing the full amount.  Our mishnah teaches that if Shimon denies owing Reuven at least 2 ma’ah (a small, silver coin) and admits to owing at least a perutah (a small, not valuable, copper coin) he will be obligated to swear an oath that he does not owe the rest.  Furthermore, he only has to swear an oath if that which he admits owing is the same kind as that which he denies. For instance if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him 50 barrels of oil and Shimon responds that he owes 50 barrels of wine, Shimon need not swear.  The mishnah will explicate this ruling in mishnah three.
  “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,”  he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable.  The remainder of the mishnah explains the first rule, that the denial must be of two ma’ahs and the admission one perutah.  If Reuven claims two ma’ahs and Shimon admits to one perutah, Shimon is not obligated for he denied only two ma’ahs less a perutah, which is less than the minimum two ma’ahs required.  He will be obligated to swear if Reuven claims two ma’ahs and a perutah and Shimon admits to owing a perutah, for in this case Shimon did deny a full two ma’ahs.
  “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies],  “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable.  If Shimon completely denies owing Reuven money he is exempt from taking an oath.  If, however, he admits to part of the claim, he must take an oath.  This law requires some explanation for it may seem counterintuitive.  The reasoning is thus:  people are generally not so brazen as to completely deny something that is true.  If Reuven claims money from Shimon and Shimon really does owe money he will not be so brash as to deny the debt completely.  Therefore if he does deny the debt, he is believed without having to take an oath.  People are however brazen enough to deny parts of debts.  Shimon may reason to himself that he will deny owing Reuven part of the debt now and then when he gets the chance he will repay the whole debt.   Since we assume that people might lie in such occasions, he must take an oath so that we can more safely assume that he is telling the truth.
  “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.  If Reuven claims that Shimon’s father owes him money and Shimon admits to part of the claim, he need not take an oath on the rest.  Since this was not a claim against Shimon but against Shimon’s father, Shimon could have been brazen enough to deny the entire claim.  Since he admitted to part of it, we trust him without making him take an oath.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why is this compared to returning a lost object?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why is this compared to returning a lost object?
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  “You have of mine a hundred denarii”, he said to him, “Yes.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me”, [and he replied,] “I have given them to you,” he is exempt. [If he says,] “Nothing of yours is in my possession,” he is liable.  In the first scenario, Shimon admits one day to owing Reuven a hundred denarii (a coin).  When the next day Reuven claims them, Shimon counterclaims that he has already paid him back.  In such a case Shimon is exempt since Reuven cannot prove that Shimon did not pay him back.  If, however, Shimon changes his claim from the previous day, and now denies owing Reuven money, he is liable to pay.  After having admitted to owing money on one day, he may not change his mind the next.
  “You have of mine a hundred denarii”, he said to him, “Yes”. [And then he said], “Do not give them to me except before witnesses.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me;” [and he replied,] “I have given them to you,” he is liable, because he should have given them to him before witnesses.  If, when Shimon admits to owing money, Reuven tells him that he wants the money returned only in front of witnesses, and then the next day Shimon claims that he paid back the money, Shimon is not believed.  Since Reuven specified that he wanted the money returned in front of witnesses, the burden is now on Shimon to prove that he did pay him back. Without witnesses he will not be able to do so.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Mishnah one, section four:  Why is this compared to returning a lost object?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Mishnah one, section four:  Why is this compared to returning a lost object?
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah explains the second rule mentioned in mishnah one:  the denial and the claim must be of the same “kind”.  Our mishnah discusses what does “kind” mean, so that we will know when the person who admits to part of the claim must take an oath.
  “You have of mine a litra of gold”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a litra of silver,” he is exempt. “You have of mine a golden denar”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a silver denar, or a tresis, or a pundion, or a perutah”, he is liable, for all are one kind of coinage.  A litra is a measure of volume (liter in English).  If Reuven claims from Shimon a litra of gold and Shimon admits to owing a litra of silver he need not swear since gold and silver are two different kinds.  However, if Reuven claims gold money, and Shimon admits to owing silver money of any coinage, he is liable to swear since all money is of the same kind.
  “You have of mine a kor of grain”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans”, he is exempt. “You have of mine a kor of produce”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans,” he is liable, for beans are included in produce.  If Reuven claims from Shimon a kor (a unit of weight) of grain and Shimon admits to owing a kor of beans, he need not swear that he does not owe the difference (grain is worth more than beans) since grain and beans are two different “kinds”.  If Reuven claims a kor of produce and Shimon admits to beans, then he is liable to swear that he does not owe the difference, because beans are a form of produce.
  If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted barley, he is exempt. But Rabban Gamaliel makes him liable.  If Reuven claims wheat and Shimon admits to barley the first opinion in our mishnah considers these different kinds and therefore Shimon need not swear that he doesn’t owe the difference.  Rabban Gamaliel does think that Shimon needs to swear.
  If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the same kind as the claim, he must swear. But the sages say, the admission is not of the same kind as the claim. Rabban Gamaliel said, “I approve the words of admon.  In this scenario Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him jars of oil.  Shimon admitted that he owed Reuven jars but denied that he owed the oil.  According to Admon, an early Sage, this is considered a partial admission to the claim:  Reuven claimed jars and oil and Shimon admitted only to the jars but denied the oil.  Therefore Shimon must swear that he doesn’t owe the oil.  The other Sages who disagree with Admon say that Reuven really only claimed oil.  The fact that Reuven said “jars of oil” was in order to express the amount of oil that he was claiming from Shimon.  Since the claim and the admission were of different kinds, Shimon does not swear.  Rabban Gamaliel says that he agrees with Admon.
  If he claims from him vessels and lands, and he admits the vessels, but denies the lands; or admits the lands, but denies the vessels, he is exempt. If he admits a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable because properties for which there is no security bind properties for which there is security to take an oath for them.  If Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him land and vessels and Shimon admitted to owing the land and not the vessels or the vessels and not the land, Shimon is exempt from swearing.  This mishnah teaches that oaths are not taken on land (we will learn this again in mishnah five).  Therefore, even if he admits that he owes land, he need not swear with regards to the vessels which he denies. If Shimon admitted owing part of the land, he is still not liable to swear, for the same reason mentioned above.  If, however, he admitted to owing some of the vessels, then he must swear with regards to both the other vessels that he denies owing as well as the land that he denies.  He must swear with regards to the vessels because he admitted to owing part and he denied owing part.  He must also swear with regards to the land because property for which there is no security (meaning property that cannot be used as a lien, namely movable property) can force one to swear on property for which there is security (land and slaves).  This means that once someone is liable to swear to another person with regards to movable property the other person can force him to swear about land as well, even though in general one doesn’t swear about land.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  How do you know that this mishnah assumes that grain is more valuable than beans?
   Section four:  Upon what basis might Rabban Gamaliel disagree with the first opinion?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  How do you know that this mishnah assumes that grain is more valuable than beans?
   Section four:  Upon what basis might Rabban Gamaliel disagree with the first opinion?
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  In mishnah four we will learn cases where an oath is not taken because of the status of the claimant or defendant.
  No oath is imposed in a claim by a deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor.  If a deaf-mute, an insane person or a minor make a claim against another person, that person does not have to swear an oath.  Since the mishnah considers these people to be lacking intelligence, their claims are not trustworthy enough to impose an oath upon others.  [When we learned Bava Kamma 4:4 I discussed the mishnah’s attitude towards deaf-mutes, and how Jewish law has changed now that sign language has been developed.]
  And no oath is imposed on a minor.  A minor is never asked to take an oath, since he cannot understand the consequences of falsely swearing.
  But an oath is imposed when a claim is lodged against a minor, or against the Temple’s property.  One who comes to collect a debt that a minor’s deceased father owed him, may take an oath that he is owed the money.  This is not considered a case of the minor being a defendant, but in reality the deceased’s estate is the defendant. If Reuven owes Shimon money and then Reuven dedicates all his property to the Temple, Reuven may take an oath and collect from the property that had been dedicated to the Temple.
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah five discusses cases where no oath is imposed because of the nature of the object in dispute.
  And these are the things for which no oath is imposed: slaves, bonds, lands, and dedicated objects. [The law of] paying double, or four or five times the value, does not apply to them. An unpaid guardian does not take an oath, and a paid guardian does not pay. Rabbi Shimon says:  “For dedicated objects for which he is responsible an oath is imposed and for [dedicated objects] for which he is not responsible an oath is not imposed. A person does not have to take an oath over any of the objects that are listed in this section.  This means that if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him slaves, bonds or land, and Shimon admits to part of the claim, he need not swear over the rest.  The laws of paying double, or four of five times the value also do not apply to these things.  These are the penalties for one who steals, or one who steals and then sells or slaughters that which he stole.  If Reuven steals a bond from Shimon and then sells it, Reuven is only obligated to restore the value of the slave, but not the double payment.  If Reuven steals a sheep that had been dedicated to the Temple, and then sells the sheep, he is not liable to pay back to the Temple four times the value of the sheep.  The laws of guardianship also do not apply to these things.  If an unpaid guardian is watching a slave, and the slave runs away, the unpaid guardian need not swear that he was not negligent.  A paid guardian does not have to pay if, while watching one of these objects, it is stolen or lost. Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between dedicated objects for which a person is responsible and those for which he is not responsible.  If a person says, “I dedicate this sheep to the Temple” and the sheep dies, he is not responsible to replace the sheep.  Since this sheep is already considered Temple property, it is not subject to the laws of oaths and guardianship.  If a person says, “I dedicate a sheep to the Temple” and he sets aside a sheep to bring to the Temple, and the sheep dies, he must replace the sheep with another sheep.  Since the first sheep is still under his responsibility, and is therefore still his sheep, it is subject to the laws of oaths and guardianship.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah six continues to discuss land, which as we learned in the previous section, is not subject to the laws of oaths.  Finally, in the last section of the mishnah, after several mishnayoth in which we learned when oaths are not taken, the mishnah states when oaths are taken.
  Rabbi Meir says: “There are things which are [attached] to land, but are not like land.” But the sages do not agree with him. How so? [If one says,] “Ten vines laden with fruit I delivered to you”   and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; But the Sages say:  “All that is attached to land is like land.”  After we stated in the previous mishnah that oaths are not imposed on claims of land, our mishnah discusses the status of things attached to the land, such as grapevines.  According to Rabbi Meir grapevines are like land, and if a person admits to owing part of a claim of grapevines, he is exempt from swearing.  The Sages say that grapevines are independent of land, and therefore one swears on them.
  An oath is imposed only for a thing [defined] by size, weight, or number. How so? [If one says,] “A store room full [of produce] I delivered to you,” or “A purse full [of money] I delivered to you” – and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “[I gave you produce reaching] up to the moulding [above the window],”   and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.  In order for an oath to be imposed in defense of a claim, what was claimed and what was admitted must be measurable, by size, weight or number.  In the first scenario in our mishnah, Shimon responds to Reuven that he doesn’t know how much Reuven gave him, but that Reuven can take whatever is left.  Shimon’s admission was not phrased as a measurable amount.  Therefore he does not have to take an oath regarding that which he denied.  The second scenario is a case where the claim and admission were measurable amounts.  Reuven claims that the house full of produce that he left for Shimon was full up to the top moulding over the window. Shimon admits that the store room was full only up to the window.  Although it may seem that this is not a claim nor an admission of a measurable amount, the mishnah rules that it is, and Shimon must swear to Reuven.
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  The final mishnah of chapter six discusses a dispute between two people over the value of a pledge taken to secure a loan.  We will learn that if the defendant admits to owing part of the claim then he must swear that he does not owe the rest.
  In the scenario in both sections of our mishnah Reuven lent Shimon money and took from Shimon a pledge, which would generally be returned upon payment of the loan.  Reuven subsequently loses the pledge.  Shimon now owes Reuven the amount of the loan and Reuven owes Shimon the value of the pledge.  Our mishnah will teach that if one side denies part of the claim must an oath be taken.  If the entire claim is denied there will be no oath. There are three coins mentioned in our mishnah.  There relative values are:  1 sela = two shekels = 4 denar.
  If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a  sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable.  Reuven tells Shimon that the loan was a sela and the pledge was worth a shekel.  He is in essence claiming from Shimon a shekel.  Shimon responds that the pledge was worth a full sela, and he therefore does not owe Reuven anything.  Since he denies the entire claim, there is no oath. If Shimon were to say that the pledge was worth three denarii (¾ of a sela), then he has admitted to owing Reuven one denar and denied owing him another denar.  In such a case an oath must be taken.  [At the end of the mishnah we will learn who swears.]
  “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable.  Shimon tells Reuven that the pledge was worth two selas and the loan was only one sela.  Reuven responds that the pledge was worth only one sela.  Since he has denied the entire claim, he need not take an oath.  If Reuven were to respond that the pledge was worth five denarii, he has admitted that he owes Shimon one denar.  Since he has admitted part of the claim, he must swear that he doesn’t owe the rest.
  And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.  This section asks who takes the oath.  We would have expected that in the first section Shimon would swear, since he is the one who admitted part of the claim that Reuven made against him, and that in section two Reuven would swear, since he was the one who admitted part of the claim that Shimon made against him.  However, the mishnah teaches that the one who had the deposit, in our case Reuven, is always the one who has to swear.  The simple reading of this mishnah is that Reuven will swear and then take from Shimon the money that he claims.  This is an exception to the general rule that people swear to exempt themselves from paying, but not to allow themselves to take money from others. The reason that this case is exceptional and that the one who holds the pledge must swear is that we are concerned lest Shimon, who does not have the pledge, would swear and then Reuven would take out the pledge.  If Shimon’s claim to the value of the pledge would turn out to be wrong, his oath will have been a false oath.  The Rabbis tried to prevent situations where people might swear falsely, and therefore, in this case, they allowed the claimant, as opposed to the defendant, swear. We should note that the Talmud explains the mishnah differently, and there are some difficulties in understanding this last clause.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why aren’t the Rabbis as concerned in a normal case of a monetary dispute, lest the defendant swear falsely? What makes this case different from the others?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why aren’t the Rabbis as concerned in a normal case of a monetary dispute, lest the defendant swear falsely? What makes this case different from the others?
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first six mishnayoth of our chapter discuss the exceptional cases in which a person takes an oath and thereby collects money from another person.  All of the cases that we have seen in the mishnah until now have been examples of people who take oaths and are thereby exempt from paying.
  All whom the Torah obligates to take an oath, take an oath, and do not pay. But these take an oath, and receive [payment]: the hired laborer, he who has been robbed, he who has been wounded, and he whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath, and the shopkeeper with his account book.  Under most circumstances the one who takes an oath is the defendant or the one who would potentially owe money.  Usually he swears and is thereby believed and does not have to pay the claimant.  However, there are five cases in which a claimant takes an oath and thereby collects.  This section briefly lists these five cases.  The mishnah through mishnah six will explain these cases one at a time.
  “The hired laborer”   How so? [If] he says to him [his employer], “Give me my wages which you owe me,” and he replies, “I have given,” and the other says, “I have not received it,” he [the laborer] takes an oath and collects his wages. Rabbi Judah says:  “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission:   How so? If he says to him, “Give me my wages, fifty denarii, which you owe me,” and the other says, “You have received a gold denar (25 silver.”  The first person who takes an oath and is thereby able to collect a debt is a hired laborer.  If a hired laborer claims his wages and his employer claims to have already paid him, the laborer may take an oath and collect his wages.  The Talmud explains that since employers have many employees, they may tend to forget whom they have paid and whom they have not.  It is not unlikely that they have indeed forgotten to pay their employees.  Therefore, the hired laborer is allowed to swear that he has not been paid, and thereby collect his wages. According to Rabbi Judah, the hired laborer is allowed to collect by swearing only if the employer admitted to owing him part of his wages.  In the scenario that he presents, the employer admitted to owing him 25 denarii but denied owing him an additional 25 denarii.  The laborer may swear that the employer owes him 25 and collect.  If the employer had denied the entire debt the employee would not be able to take an oath and collect.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does Rabbi Judah believe there needs to be a partial admission in order for the claimant to swear and then collect?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does Rabbi Judah believe there needs to be a partial admission in order for the claimant to swear and then collect?
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  “He who has been robbed”   How so?If they testified of a man that he entered into another’s house to take a pledge without permission, and the other says, “You have taken my vessels, and he says, “I have not taken them,” he takes an oath, and takes back his vessels.Rabbi Judah says:  “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission:   How so? He said to him, “You have taken two vessels,” and the other says, “I have taken only one.”This mishnah discusses the oath taken by one who has been robbed.  Through this oath the one who was robbed can recover his money from the robber.The second type of person who is allowed to swear and collect is one who has been robbed.  In the scenario presented in the mishnah Reuven enters Shimon’s home to take Shimon’s property as a pledge against Shimon’s debt to Reuven, but Reuven did not have permission, neither from Shimon nor from the court, to do so.  Shimon claims that Reuven took his vessels when intruding into the house.  If Reuven denies having done so, Shimon may swear and take from Reuven the value of the vessels that he has claimed.  The reason that Shimon is allowed to swear and thereby collect is that Reuven is punished for having illegally entered Shimon’s house.  Since he already broke the law, we do not trust him to deny having further broken the law.According to Rabbi Judah, he is allowed to swear and collect only if Reuven denies part of the claim and admits to the other part.  If Reuven denies the entire claim, Shimon cannot swear and thereby collect.
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses the oath taken by one who has been wounded.  Through this oath he can collect money from the one who wounded him.
  “He who has been wounded,”   How so? If they testified about a person that another went onto his property whole, and came out wounded, and he said to him, “You have wounded me,” and the other said, “I have not wounded you,” he takes an oath, and receives [damages]. R. Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission:   How so?  He said to him, you have inflicted on me two wounds,” and the other said, “I inflicted on you only one wound.” This mishnah discusses the third example of one who swears and thereby collects:  a person who has been wounded.  In this scenario witnesses testify that Shimon entered Reuven’s property without having been previously injured and that he came out wounded.  Shimon claims that Reuven injured him and Reuven denies having done so.  Since it is highly likely that Shimon is telling the truth and that Reuven did indeed injure Shimon, Shimon may take an oath and collect damages. Rabbi Judah states that Shimon may collect only if Reuven admits to part of the claim.  For instance if Shimon claims that Reuven injured him twice and Reuven admits to having done so only once, then Shimon may swear and collect.  This opinion of Rabbi Judah is consistent with his opinion in the two previous mishnayoth.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What would be the law if there were no witnesses who testified that Shimon went onto Reuven’s property?  Would Shimon still be able to collect?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   What would be the law if there were no witnesses who testified that Shimon went onto Reuven’s property?  Would Shimon still be able to collect?
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah discusses an oath taken by one person in order to collect from another person who is not allowed to take an oath because he is suspected of taking false oaths.
  “He whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath,”   How so? Whether it be the oath of testimony, or the oath of deposit, or even a vain oath.  The fourth category of person who swears and thereby collects is one whose opponent is suspected of taking false oaths.  The mishnah explains that this is true no matter what type of false oath he took, even a vain oath.
  If one [of the litigants] was a dice-player, or usurer, or pigeon-flyer, or dealer in the produce of the seventh year, his opponent takes the oath and collects [his claim].  The mishnah now expands the list of those who are suspected of taking false oaths.  This category includes all those who are forbidden from testifying (see Sanhedrin 3:3).  Since these people are gamblers or otherwise do not respect the normal societal rules for money, they are not trusted when another claims a debt from them.
  If both are suspect, the oath returns to its place, these are the words of Rabbi Yose. Rabbi Meir says:  “They divide [the claim].”  If both sides are not trustworthy, Rabbi Yose says that the normal rules return to their place.  This means that the defendant, the one who had a claim made against him, takes an oath and is thereby exempt from paying money.  Rabbi Meir disagrees.  If both are suspected of taking false oaths, the court cannot allow either of them to swear.  This would be in essence encouraging people to take false oaths. Rather they split the claim, meaning that the defendant will have to pay half the claim.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah say “even a vain oath”?  Why might you have thought that if he took a vain oath he would still be trustworthy with regards to other oaths?  Why is he not trustworthy with other oaths after having taken a vain oath?
   Why doesn’t Rabbi Judah disagree on this mishnah, as he has on the three previous mishnayoth in our chapter?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah say “even a vain oath”?  Why might you have thought that if he took a vain oath he would still be trustworthy with regards to other oaths?  Why is he not trustworthy with other oaths after having taken a vain oath?
   Why doesn’t Rabbi Judah disagree on this mishnah, as he has on the three previous mishnayoth in our chapter?
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  “And the shopkeeper with his account book,”   How so? Not that he [the shopkeeper] says to him [the customer], “It is written in my account book that you owe me two hundred zuz”. Rather he [the customer] says to him [the shopkeeper], “Give my son two seahs of wheat,” or, “Give my laborer small change to the value of a sela” and then he says, “I have given,” and they say, “We have not received”; he [the shopkeeper] takes an oath, and receives [his due from the customer]. And they take an oath, and receive [their due].Ben Nanas said:  “How can both be permitted to come to a vain oath?  Rather he   takes without an oath, and they take without an oath.”The mishnah which we will learn today discusses the fifth type of person who swears and collects:  the shopkeeper with his account book.This mishnah explains the fifth category of person who swears and thereby collects:  the shopkeeper with his account book.  The mishnah first explains that this is not a case where a shopkeeper claims that it is written in his book that so-and-so owes him money.  In such a case the shopkeeper would not be able to swear and thereby collect from his customer.  In that case the customer would be able to deny the debt without even having to take an oath.Rather the mishnah describes a case where a customer requested that a shopkeeper give his son 2 seah of wheat or his worker coins the value of two sela.  The customer promises to pay the shopkeeper back later on.  We can see from here that in the time of the Mishnah shopkeepers, who usually had cash and produce on hand, functioned somewhat like a bank.  Later on, the shopkeeper claims that he has paid the son or the workers.  The son or the workers respond that they have not been paid.  In other words, both sides are claiming that the customer/employer owes them money.  According to the first opinion in our mishnah the shopkeeper can swear and collect from the customer.  He is allowed to do so because he did not have any direct dealings with the son or the workers, direct dealings which would have implied that he trusts them to take an oath that they had not collected.  There is no true business relationship between the son or workers and the shopkeeper.  Rather there is a relationship only between the customer and the shopkeeper, and the customer and his son or workers.The workers also may swear and thereby collect their wages from their employer.  Since they have no business relationship with the shopkeeper, they need not trust him to swear that he did pay them.  They may then swear and collect from their employer as all wage earners do (see mishnah one).Ben Nanas points out a problem in this situation:  if the shopkeeper swears that he did give the wheat or money and the son or employees swear that they didn’t receive, one of them is definitely swearing falsely.  By the court mandating that both sides swear, the court is actually encouraging God’s name to be disgraced by a false oath.  Rather, Ben Nanas rules that both sides collect without taking an oath.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah six continues to discuss the oath of the shopkeeper.
  If he said to a shopkeeper, “Give me fruit for a denar,” and he gave him, and then the shopkeeper said to him, “Give me the denar”, and he replied to him, “I gave it to you, and you placed it in the till”, the customer takes an oath. If he gave him the denar, and said to him, “Give me the fruit,” and the shopkeeper says to him, “I have given it to you, and you took it to your house,” the shopkeeper takes an oath. Rabbi Judah says: “He who has the fruit in his possession, has the advantage.”  Reuven asks Shimon the shopkeeper to sell him a denar’s worth of fruit, and Shimon gives him the fruit.  When Shimon claims the denar from Reuven, Reuven responds that he has already paid him, and that Shimon put it in into the till.  The mishnah rules that Reuven may swear that he gave Shimon the denar and be exempt from paying.  Since Shimon cannot prove that he did not receive the denar, he cannot recover the alleged debt. In the second scenario in this section, Reuven gives the denar before getting the fruit.  When Reuven claims the fruit, Shimon responds that he has already paid him and that Reuven put the fruit into his house.  In this case Shimon is allowed to swear that he has already paid, for the same reason that Reuven was allowed to swear in the first case. Rabbi Judah says that whoever holds the fruit has the advantage.  According to Rashi, Rabbi Judah disagrees with the ruling in section one.  Since the customer already has possession of the fruit he is believed when he says that he gave the denar without taking an oath.  Even though it is not unusual for shopkeepers to give their produce on credit, Rabbi Judah still believes the customer who claims to have paid since he has possession of the goods.
  If he said to a money-changer, “Give me change for a denar,” and he gave him; and said to him, “Give me the denar,” and the other said, “I have given it to you, and you placed it in the till,” the customer takes an oath. If he gave him the denar, and said to him, “Give me the small change,” and the other said to him, “I have given it to you, and you threw it in your purse,” the money -changer takes an oath. Rabbi Judah says:  “It is not usual for a money-changer to give [even] an issar until he receives the denar.”  This section is basically the same as the previous one, accept that it discusses a money-changer and not a shopkeeper.  Rabbi Judah’s opinion differs slightly, at least in the way he phrases it.  Rabbi Judah again disagrees with the first part of the section (according to Rashi).  When the customer has already received the change and the money-changer claims that he has not received the denar, the customer is believed to have given the denar even without taking an oath.  Since money-changers generally do not give coins without having received other coins, we can assume that the other person did indeed give the coin.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   How are the two scenarios in the two halves of this mishnah different?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   How are the two scenarios in the two halves of this mishnah different?
  
  Mishnah 7
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah seven teaches two more categories of people who swear and thereby collect.
  So too they have said that she who impairs her kethubah [by admitting that it had already been partially paid] cannot receive [the remainder of the] payment except on oath; And that if one witness testifies against her that it [the kethubah] has been paid [in full], she cannot receive payment except on oath; And that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment [for her kethubah] except on oath; And that if she claims [her kethubah] not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath.  The previous six mishnayoth listed five cases where a person could swear and collect from others.  Our mishnah lists two other such cases.  There is however a difference between the cases listed here and those listed above.  In those above, the innovation of the mishnah was that the person might take an oath and thereby collect.  Without the mishnah we would have thought that the person could not have collected at all, since they could not prove their claim.  In the cases in our mishnah, the mishnah is teaching that they must swear before they collect.  Without the mishnah we would have thought that they could have collected without an oath, for as we shall see, these people can indeed prove their claims. The first section discusses women collecting their “kethubah” or marriage document, which has written in it an amount of money paid to the woman upon death or divorce.  In normal circumstances the woman could collect without taking an oath, since she holds the actual document.  However, there are several circumstances where in order to collect, she must take an oath:  1)  a woman who has already received part of the kethubah money; 2)  if one person testifies that she has already received her kethubah (two witnesses are needed for the husband to prove that she has already collected); 3)  if she collects from property that the husband had already given to others (the kethubah creates a lien on all of the husband’s property) or from the husband’s children; 4) if she collects while not in front of him.  In all of these cases, the woman must swear that she has not received her kethubah before she can collect from the husband or from his estate.
  So, too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath [namely]: “We swear that our father did not enjoin in his will, neither did our father say unto us, nor did we find [written] among the documents of our father that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says:  “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said:  “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives [his claim] without an oath.”  Similarly, if orphans find amongst their fathers documents a bill that says that others owe him money they must swear that their father did not tell them, either verbally, in a will or in a separate document, that the bill had already collected.  If they take this oath they may then collect the debt. According to Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, even if the son was born after the father’s death, and therefore cannot swear that his father did not tell him that the bill had already been paid, he may still swear that he did not find amongst his father’s other documents a note stating that the debt had already been paid.  After taking this oath the son may collect the debt. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel if there are witnesses who say that at the time of death the father said to them that the bill was not paid, the father’s heirs may collect the debt without taking an oath.
  
  Mishnah 8
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah eight teaches five types of defendants who must take oaths even though the claimant’s claim is not certain.
  And these take an oath though there is no [definite] claim:  partners, tenants, guardians, the wife who transacts the affairs in the house, and the son of the house.  Generally, a person has to swear that he doesn’t owe the claimant, only if the claimant had professed to be certain that he was owed money.  If the claimant is not himself certain, the defendant need not swear.  Our mishnah lists several exceptions to this rule. 1.  If one partner suspects another partner of not equally sharing the business costs or profits, he may impose upon him an oath. 2. If a landowner suspects that a sharecropper did not honestly report the amount of crops harvested, he may impose upon him an oath. 3. If a person suspects that someone who had been appointed as a guardian over his property, had withheld some of the property for himself, he may impose upon him an oath. 4. If a husband leaves his household and finances in the care of his wife, he may make her take an oath that she did not take any of his property. 5. Similarly, if one brother administers an inheritance, the other brothers impose upon him an oath that he did not take any of the property for himself.
  [If] he said to him, “What do you claim of me?”, [and the other replied,] “I want you to swear to me”, he must take an oath.  In all of these circumstances the claimant may request that the defendant swear that he didn’t take any of the property, without the claimant having to express a definite claim.
  If the partners or tenants had divided, he cannot impose an oath upon them.  Once partners have already split up their partnership, one partner may not force another partner to swear that he didn’t take a part that didn’t belong to him while the partnership still existed.
  If an oath was imposed upon him in another case, they impose upon him the whole.  If a person already must take an oath to another person that he does not owe him something, the claimant may make him swear another oath, that under normal circumstances he would not have the power to impose.
  And the seventh year cancels the oath.  The Sabbatical year cancels all debts.  If Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him money, and Shimon admitted to owing part of the money and denied owing the rest, and then the Sabbatical year arrived, Shimon does not need to swear that he doesn’t owe the rest.  Since the Sabbatical year cancels the debt, it also erases the need to swear with regards to the debt.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah rule that in these circumstances a person make another person take an oath without having a definite claim?  Why under normal circumstances must there be a definite claim for an oath to be imposed?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah rule that in these circumstances a person make another person take an oath without having a definite claim?  Why under normal circumstances must there be a definite claim for an oath to be imposed?
  
  
  
  
  
  Mishnah 1
  
  Introduction
  The first mishnah in this chapter was taught in its entirety in Bava Metziah 7:8.  It is repeated here as an opening to the rest of the chapter which discusses when a guardian is liable to bring a sacrifice for having sworn a false oath.  There are certain types of guardians who under circumstances if not able to return the object under their guard may take an oath and thereby exempt themselves from having to pay back the owner.  Our chapter will teach that they are liable to bring a sacrifice only if they take an oath that exempted them from paying back the owner.  The type of oath described here is an “oath of deposit”, discussed above in chapter five.  The punishment for intentionally swearing a false oath of deposit is a guilt offering.
  There are four kinds of guardians:  an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen. This mishnah lists the four types of guardians in Jewish law.  The general principle is that the more benefit a guardian receives and the less benefit he gives to the owner of the object, the more liable he will be if the object is not returnable.  Therefore a borrower, who does not pay and gets full use of the object pays in any case that the object is not returnable.  On the other hand, an unpaid guardian only gives benefit to the owner and receives no benefit in return.  Therefore in all cases in which something occurs to the object that he is guarding he may take an oath that he was not neglectful and be exempt from liability.  Paid guardians and hirers are in-between cases.  The hirer gets use of the object but he pays for such use.  The paid guardian is not allowed to use the object but he gets paid for watching it.  Therefore both of these guardians are sometimes allowed to take an oath and thereby be exempt from liability and sometimes they are liable to pay the owner. If the animal was lost or stolen and is no longer in front of us, they must pay the owner the value of the animal.  If, however, it died a natural death, was taken captive or injured then they may take an oath and exempt themselves from liability.
  
  Mishnah 2
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah deals with the oath taken by the unpaid guardian, who as we learned in the previous mishnah, can always take an oath to exculpate himself from liability.
  If he [the owner] said to the unpaid guardian, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied], “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “amen”, he is exempt [from having to bring a sacrifice for a false oath]. As we learned in the previous mishnah, an unpaid guardian can always take an oath and exempt himself from repaying the owner if he cannot return the object under guard.  It doesn’t matter whether the animal died, was injured, taken captive, stolen or lost; in all of these cases the unpaid guardian may swear that he was not negligent and be exempt from having to pay back the owner. In the five different scenarios in our mishnah the unpaid guardian lies with regards to what happened to the animal.  However, even if he had told the truth, he would not have been liable to pay back the owner.  For instance, if he says that the animal died, but in truth it had been lost, he has lied, but he could have told the truth without having to pay back the owner.  In all of these cases, even if the unpaid guardian swears to his lie, he is not liable to bring a sacrifice.  Since his false oath was unnecessary it does not obligate him for the same consequences as an oath that did actually exempt him from paying back the value of the animal under his watch.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah have to list all of these possibilities?  What might a reader have thought had some of the possibilities not been listed?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Why does the mishnah have to list all of these possibilities?  What might a reader have thought had some of the possibilities not been listed?
  
  Mishnah 3
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah three continues to discuss unpaid guardians who swear falsely with regards to the object under their watch.
  [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen”, he is exempt.  When the unpaid guardian is asked by the owner of the ox where is his ox, the he denies ever having received it.  When adjured, the he swears that he never received the ox.  If the ox in reality had died, been injured captured or lost, the unpaid guardian is exempt from bringing a sacrifice or from paying back the owner.  As we learned in the previous mishnah, since he could have told the truth and been exempt, when he lies he is still exempt.
  [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was lost”; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you”, and he said, “Amen”, and witnesses testify against him that he had consumed it, he pays the principal; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, a fifth, and brings a guilt-offering.  In this case the unpaid guardian swears falsely that the animal had been lost.  In reality he had consumed the animal himself.  If he had told the truth he would have had to pay back to the owner the value of the animal.  If witnesses testify against him that he had consumed the animal himself, he must repay the value of the animal to the owner.  If he himself admits that he consumed the animal, without witnesses testifying against him, he must not only restore the value of the animal, but pay an additional fifth and bring a guilt offering.  This is the punishment prescribed in Leviticus 5:21-25.  Our mishnah teaches that a person makes this type of expiation for a false oath, only if he admits to having sworn falsely.  If witnesses prove him to have sworn falsely he does not bring a sacrifice or an additional fifth.
  [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was stolen;” [and the owner said,] “I adjure you, and he said, “Amen”, and witnesses testify against him that he himself stole it, he pays double; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal,   fifth, and brings a guilt-offering.  If the unpaid guardian claims that the ox was stolen but in reality he stole it, he is considered a thief.  If witnesses testify that he stole it he is obligated to pay back double the value of the ox, as are all thieves required to pay back double.  If he himself admits to having stolen the ox, he must pay back the value of the ox, and an additional fifth and bring a sacrifice, for having sworn a false oath.  He does not bring the double payment, due to the general rule that one who admits to having done a crime does not pay a fine.  Double payment is considered a fine.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  What is the paradox in this section, a law that seems to be counterintuitive?
   Why is one who admits to a crime exempt from paying the fine?  What does this say about the penal system at the time of the Mishnah?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   Section two:  What is the paradox in this section, a law that seems to be counterintuitive?
   Why is one who admits to a crime exempt from paying the fine?  What does this say about the penal system at the time of the Mishnah?
  
  Mishnah 4
  
  Introduction
  Mishnah four is a digression in the Mishnah, which deals with some laws of stealing.
  If a man said to one in the market, “Where is my ox which you have stolen?” and he replied, “I did not steal it,” and witnesses testified against him that he did steal it, he pays double. If he killed it or sold it, he pays four or five times its value. If he saw witnesses coming nearer and nearer, and he said, “I did steal it, but I did not kill or sell it,” he pays only the principal. This mishnah does not discuss false swearing but rather some laws of stealing. As we learned in Bava Kamma, one who steals and is caught must pay back a double payment. If he killed or sold a stolen animal he must pay back four (for a sheep or goat) or five (for an ox or cow) times the value.  We have also learned on several occasions, that one who admits to having stolen the object, without witnesses first testifying against him, only pays back the principal. The scenario in our mishnah, in which a person accuses someone (not a guardian, rather any person in the marketplace) of having stolen his ox teaches two new rulings.  First of all, if the accused admits to having stolen the object only because witnesses are about to testify against him, he is nevertheless obligated to pay back the principal but exempt from the double payment.  In other words, even though witnesses were about to testify against him, this still counts as an admission.  Second, if he admits to stealing the object, but does not admit to killing or selling it, he is exempt from paying back four or five times the value.  Although witnesses testify that he did indeed sell or slaughter the ox, since he admitted to stealing it, it is considered an admission and he must pay back only the principal.  There is no case in Jewish law where a person makes the four or five times payment, but is exempt for the double payment.  This is because the Torah states that he will pay back four or five times.  If he didn’t pay the double payment he would end up paying three or four times, an amount not specified anywhere in the Torah.
  Questions for Further Thought:
   How would the ruling in this mishnah differ, if the accused was the unpaid guardian of the ox?
  Questions for Further Thought:
   How would the ruling in this mishnah differ, if the accused was the unpaid guardian of the ox?
  
  Mishnah 5
  
  Introduction
  This mishnah is similar to mishnah two, except it discusses a borrower as opposed to an unpaid guardian.  The principle taught as that learned above:  if the false claim does not effect his liability to pay back the owner he is not liable for having taken a false oath.
  If he [the owner] said to the borrower, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This mishnah contains the exact same structure as mishnah two, and can be seen as the flip side to that mishnah.  Mishnah two discussed an unpaid guardian, who is always exempt from having to pay back the owner, should something happen to the animal under his guard (of course, if he stole or ate the animal he is liable).  Therefore, if he lies about what did happen, his lie has no effect on his liability to pay back the owner, for he would have been exempt in any case. Mishnah five discusses a borrower who is always liable to pay back the value of the animal should something happen to it.  It does not matter whether the animal died, was injured, taken captive, stolen or lost; in any case in which he cannot restore the animal as it was, he must compensate the owner.  Therefore, if he lies with regards to what happened to the animal, his lie has no effect. If for instance he says that the animal died, he still must pay back the value of the animal.  The fact that the animal in reality was stolen does not change his degree of liability.  Since the false oath did not change his liability he does not need to bring a sacrifice for swearing falsely.
  
  Mishnah 6
  
  Introduction
  The first section of our mishnah contains one more law concerning the borrower.  Sections 2-4 discuss the paid guardian and the hirer.  Sections five and six contain general rules which summarize most of the laws learned in this chapter.
  [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable.  This section continues to discuss a borrower.  If the borrower denies having received the ox in the first place, he is attempting to exempt himself from paying back the owner. This is in reality the only way that the borrower can exempt himself from having to pay back the owner.  If his oath was false he is liable to pay back the owner the value of the animal, as well as bring an additional fifth and a sacrifice for having sworn a false oath.
  If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.  Sections two-four discuss the paid guardian and the hirer, who have the same liabilities to pay back the owner of the animal.  If the animal was injured, taken captive or died they may take an oath that they were not negligent and thereby exempt themselves from having to pay back the owner.  If the animal was stolen or lost they cannot take an oath; rather they must pay back the owner.  Our mishnah again illustrates the principle that if the false oath would have exempted the guardian in a case where if he had told the truth he would have been obligated, he must bring a sacrifice for having sworn falsely.  If the oath does not reduce his liability he is not liable, even though he swore falsely.  For instance, if he swears that it was injured, but in reality it was taken captive, he has sworn falsely, but his false oath did not reduce his liability.  He is exempt in either case.  Similarly, if he says that the animal was lost and it was really stolen, the false oath did not effect his liability.  He would have been liable in any case.  Since his false oath does not reduce his liability, it also does not make him liable to bring a sacrifice.
  [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable.  By swearing that the animal died, was injured or taken captive, the hirer or paid guardian is attempting to exempt himself from having to pay back the guardian.  If, in reality, the animal was stolen or lost, the guardian has taken a false oath which would have exempted him from having to pay back the owner.  Since the oath reduced the liability, the false oath makes him liable to bring an additional fifth, and a sacrifice.
  [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.  By swearing that the animal was lost or stolen the hirer or paid guardian is making a claim that will make him liable to pay back the value of the animal to the owner.  If, in reality, the animal was lost in a manner that would not have made him liable, it turns out that the false oath did not reduce his liability.  On the contrary, in this case the false oath actually made him more liable.  Even though the oath effected his liability, since it did not reduce his liability, he is still not obligated to bring an additional fifth or a sacrifice.  He is, however, liable to pay back the value of the animal.
  This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt;  From liability to exemption, is liable.  This section contains a general rule that summarizes must of the laws learned in this entire chapter. It is interesting to note, that although one could have learned all of the laws from this rule, the mishnah nevertheless states all of the laws using concrete examples, rather than abbreviating to just the general rule.
  This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.  This section contains another general rule meant to explain the laws of the chapter.  Some versions of the Mishnah do not contain this line.  It seems that this is an alternative version of the rule in section five. Congratulations!  We have finished Shevuoth. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. For those of you who have learned with us the entire tractate, a hearty Yasher Koach (congratulations).  You have accomplished a great deal and you should be proud of yourselves.  Indeed we have now finished together six tractates of Mishnah, and are three quarters of the way through the entire order of Nezikin.  Of course, we have much more to learn.  We will begin Shevuoth tomorrow!